    [Senate Hearing 113-376]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 113-376

    ENHANCING OUR RAIL SAFETY: CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR PASSENGER AND FREIGHT
                                      RAIL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION

                      AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,

                              SAFETY, AND SECURITY

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 6, 2014

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    89-623                    WASHINGTON : 2014
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
    BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             DEAN HELLER, Nevada
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  DAN COATS, Indiana
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    CORY BOOKER, New Jersey              RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    JOHN WALSH, Montana
                        Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
                       James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
                         John Williams, General Counsel
                  David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
                  Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
       Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
                                     ------

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
                      INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY

    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut,     ROY BLUNT, Missouri, Ranking
        Chairman                             Member
    BARBARA BOXER, California            ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           DEAN HELLER, Nevada
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             DAN COATS, Indiana
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    CORY BOOKER, New Jersey              RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on March 6, 2014....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................     1
    Statement of Senator Blunt.......................................     3
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    66
    Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    71
    Statement of Senator Thune.......................................    73
        Prepared statement...........................................    75

                                   Witnesses

    Hon. Mark Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia.....................     5
    Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal Railroad
      Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation..............     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
      Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
      Transportation.................................................    18
        Prepared statement...........................................    20
    Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, National Transportation
      Safety Board...................................................    28
        Prepared statement...........................................    29
    Geoffrey C. Blackwell, Chief, Office of Native Affairs and
      Policy, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal
      Communications Commission......................................    37
        Prepared statement...........................................    39
    Prentiss Searles, Marketing and Rail Issues Manager, American
      Petroleum Institute............................................    43
        Prepared statement of Bob Greco, Group Director, Downstream
          Operations, American Petroleum Institute...................    45
    Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer,
      Association of American Railroads..............................    46
        Prepared statement...........................................    48
    Hon. Heidi Heitkamp, U.S. Senator from North Dakota..............    67
        Prepared statement...........................................    84
    Hon. John Hoeven, U.S. Senator from North Dakota.................    69

                                    Appendix

    City of Fargo, prepared statement................................    89
    Bruce Bennett, President, Stage 8 Locking Fasteners, prepared
      statement......................................................    90
    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
      by:
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................    92
        Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   102
        Hon. Heidi Heitkamp..........................................   104
        Hon. John Thune..............................................   105
        Hon. Roger F. Wicker.........................................   108
        Hon. Roy Blunt...............................................   109
        Hon. Kelly Ayotte............................................   110
        Hon. John Hoeven.............................................   111
    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Cynthia L.
      Quarterman by:
        Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV..................................   112
        Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   114
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   116
        Hon. Heidi Heitkamp..........................................   116
        Hon. John Thune..............................................   119
        Hon. Roger F. Wicker.........................................   119
        Hon. Roy Blunt...............................................   120
    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Christopher A.
      Hart by:
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................   120
        Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   124
        Hon. Heidi Heitkamp..........................................   125
    Response to written questions submitted to Geoffrey C. Blackwell
      by:
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................   125
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................   127
        Hon. Heidi Heitkamp..........................................   127
    Response to written questions submitted to Prentiss Searles by:
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................   128
        Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   130
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   130
        Hon. Heidi Heitkamp..........................................   131
        Hon. John Thune..............................................   132
        Hon. Roger F. Wicker.........................................   133
    Response to written questions submitted to Edward R. Hamberger
      by:
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................   133
        Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   135
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   137
        Hon. Heidi Heitkamp..........................................   140

                           ENHANCING OUR RAIL SAFETY:

                        CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR PASSENGER

                                AND FREIGHT RAIL

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
             Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
               Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:04 a.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard
    Blumenthal, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

        Senator Blumenthal. Let me call this subcommittee meeting
    to order and begin by thanking Chairman Rockefeller, who may
    not be with us this morning, for the honor of taking over this
    assignment. It's a recent one for me and I want to thank
    Senator Warner for his excellent stewardship and leadership of
    this subcommittee. I hope to fill his shoes, in part, and thank
    my colleagues for joining me this morning: Senator Cantwell,
    Senator Heitkamp, Senator Hoeven, and of course, the Ranking
    Member, Senator Blunt, whose leadership on this issue is
    longstanding. And he and I look forward to an era of very close
    bipartisan work together as is characteristic of this committee
    and particularly this subcommittee in general.
        Welcome to our witnesses. By way of warning, we have votes
    at 11:20. I'm told that there will be a single vote and then
    two voice votes. I'm hoping that we can take a brief break,
    ten, fifteen minutes, and then come back and resume the session
    this morning.
        We are here this morning because of safety and reliability
    issues that deeply concern, in fact alarm, much of the American
    traveling public and much of the business community that relies
    on freight. The transportation of products and people is
    absolutely essential to our economy. It's the lifeblood of job
    creation and economic growth.
        So we are at a critical period in the Nation's long and
    storied railroad history and we plan to have a series of
    hearings, this one being simply the first of a number and it
    was scheduled before I became Chairman, but I'm very glad that
    all of our witnesses could come back after the snowstorm
    required its postponement.
        Obviously, there are severe consequences to failures in
    safety and reliability. We've seen them in Metro-North, the
    busiest railroad in the country, and the series of incidents
    have caused not only delays in convenience, economic harm, but
    also injuries and fatalities. Injuries at the Bridgeport
    derailment and crash back in May, and then more recently, on
    December 1, at Spuyten Duyvil in the Bronx of New York where
    four people were killed and there were several injuries.
        But the American public also may not realize, looking
    forward, the severe environmental consequences and economic
    costs that could result from repetitions of these failures in
    safety and reliability. And recently, in The New York Times, I
    saw a map. I'm going to ask that it be shown momentarily, as
    soon as it arrives, but clearly these failures can cause
    pollution problems, as well as other kinds of damages, to
    health and to safety in the general public.
        We're going to focus on the responsibilities of railroads
    to make investments and improve policies and practices; change
    their cultures; and install new leadership, because this record
    has to be improved. We need to invest in the future of our
    railroads and these hearings and the work of this committee
    will explore what can be done, what must be done, to improve
    safety and reliability. But we're also going to focus on the
    responsibilities of our Federal agencies to oversee and
    scrutinize those practices and policies, and the leadership and
    management that has to come from our railroads.
        And I must say right at the beginning that I have been
    disappointed and disturbed by some of the delays and failures
    in rulemaking and oversight and scrutiny that has been imposed
    on these railroads. With seven rules left to finalize from a
    law passed in 2008, the Railroad Safety Act of 2008 still has
    not been implemented years later. And some of those rules are
    pass their deadline in the time that's been given to implement
    them. Rules delayed means safety denied and that is
    unacceptable and intolerable.
        And so, part of what we're going to do here is make sure
    that we impose accountability on Federal agencies. I understand
    that there have been steps in the right direction. The recent
    voluntary operating practices announced by the Department of
    Transportation, that relate to rail safety regarding freight,
    particularly on speed, rerouting, certain kinds of inspections
    of content of those freight cars, are very welcome, but they
    are voluntary. And again, legal standards have to be imposed
    and followed so that they truly protect the public.
        I understand that recently, Operation Classification and
    unannounced inspection indicated that 11 of 18 samples were not
    assigned correctly. Eleven of 18 samples of crude oil, to be
    transported through the United States, simply on a random
    inspection, done voluntarily under Operation Classification by
    PHMSA, showed that there are significant lapses.
        So I think that we need to make sure that the regulatory
    agencies are not victims of regulatory capture as happened, for
    example, in the financial industry in 2008. We saw the
    consequences; they affected not only Wall Street but Main
    Street. The focus affected by that regulatory laxity were
    severely harmed financially and their lives changed forever; so
    too, in Canada, in North Dakota, in New York, and Connecticut.
    The costs can be in lives as well as dollars.
        We have a responsibility to do better. This hearing will
    also look at ways, and future hearings as well, that we can
    prioritize Federal dollars for infrastructure. Members of this
    subcommittee have indicated, and I have as well, very directly
    and pointedly that we need more investment in infrastructure
    and the ways to do it, whether it's an infrastructure bank, a
    railroad trust fund, are going to be part of an effort that we
    will have ongoing and part of legislation that, I hope, will be
    introduced within the next months.
        And again, we're going to work in a very bipartisan way to
    reach conclusions that can actually also achieve passage
    because we need bipartisan work on rail transportation. There's
    nothing Republican or Democratic about it. And the effort to
    prevent laxity, lethargy in enforcement begins here, but so
    does the effort to achieve greater investment. And in that
    bipartisan spirit, I'm going to turn to our Ranking Member,
    Senator Blunt.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator Blunt. Well, thank you Chairman Blumenthal. And
    after a week as Chairman, you're already having a major hearing
    and off to quite a start and I look forward to our opportunity
    to work together on this committee.
        I also want to thank Senator Warner for his leadership and
    his continued interest in these areas and for taking time to be
    here today on what he and I thought was an important topic when
    we originally decided we needed to have a hearing on this. And
    again, thanks to you for following through on that and I look
    forward to our opportunity to work together.
        I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today. We
    have six people: four government witnesses, two private sector
    witnesses. Obviously, this is a topic that has significant
    implications and involves both the government and the private
    sector finding ways to work together. I know I join you in
    being pleased that our colleagues from North Dakota, Senator
    Hoeven and Senator Heitkamp, have--while not on the Committee--
    have joined us today and will be functioning as if they were
    acting members of this committee. And certainly, they may
    understand these issues better than anybody else on the
    Committee; certainly as well as anybody else understands.
        There's certainly no doubt that the recent rail accidents
    involving trains transporting crude oil have brought new
    questions of rail safety and transporting this product to the
    forefront. The central issues we are grappling with here is how
    our infrastructure can keep up with the national and global
    needs that we have, specifically the infrastructure we're
    talking about today; rail infrastructure and the twenty-first
    century demand. We're talking about, the new demand we're
    talking about on that infrastructure is energy.
        There's no doubt that infrastructure is a critical
    component of our economy. Again to mention Senator Warner, he
    and I were and are co-sponsoring two pieces of legislation that
    would add just tools to the toolbox. I think all of us have
    talked about this many times; the infrastructure challenge is
    so big, it's hard to imagine putting more things in that
    toolbox than we can use because there are so many different
    ways to do, as you just suggested, Mr. Chairman, what needs to
    be done.
        Quality transportation is, of course, vital to connect
    people and connect products with each other. The Energy
    Information Agency projects that world energy consumption will
    grow by 56 percent between now and 2040. They also project that
    crude oil production will be at 8.5 million barrels a day in
    the United States by the end of this year; 8.5 million barrels
    is 3.5 million barrels higher than we were producing in 2008.
    And so, obviously this is a part of our energy economy that has
    grown dramatically and we expect it to continue to grow. We
    need to look today--one of the things we'll be looking at is
    clearly what impact that has had on rail.
        In 2012, Class I railroads moved more crude oil than ever;
    over 230,000 carloads. Now, that's up from 9,500 carloads just
    4 years ago. And those are numbers that, the kind of numbers I
    have a hard time repeating later because I'll think surely I
    didn't, even though I'm the one reading this information,
    surely I didn't read that right. In four years, we've gone from
    9,500 carloads of crude oil on rail to 230,000 carloads of
    crude oil on rail. And obviously, a dramatic change both in our
    energy profile, but also in how we're moving that energy
    around.
        Now one of the things that obviously benefits from that is
    the ability to send those carloads to a different place than a
    fixed pipeline might send them. But I think, again back to
    infrastructure, whether it's increasing pipeline capacity, rail
    capacity, how we deal with that, that's just going to be an
    important part of the foreseeable future for us unless we walk
    away from the energy opportunity we have.
        This examination of where we are needs to be balanced. It
    needs to understand everything from tank car design, to rail
    infrastructure, to rail safety. And I think, when you look at
    the panel here today, we clearly are prepared to talk about all
    of those things and to look at how we classify hazardous
    materials. And back to the Chairman's comments; how that
    classification is working and how it needs to work better.
        It's also important that we have somebody here from the
    Federal Communications Commission to talk about positive train
    control. Positive train control can only happen if you can have
    the information you need to have and that can only happen if
    you have the towers sited that need to be sited. And this is a
    topic I brought up with Chairman Wheeler in this room when he
    was testifying in his nomination hearing. I think I also
    brought it up with two other members of the Commission that
    have recently been added when they were testifying.
        And now, how are we going to solve this tower siting
    problem and is it possible to do that in a way that meets the
    deadline of the law? And, my personal belief is that if the
    answer is no, it's not possible. So what are we going to do
    about that?
        The private sector companies have invested substantially in
    time and resources and rail safety. Rail safety is at a higher
    level than it has ever been, but what do we want to talk about
    today is what do we still want to do? I know Mr. Szabo,
    particularly with a lifetime of time spent in this industry,
    could probably tell us better than anybody else. I may ask him
    to later. What's happened in the 30 years you've been doing
    this? And if you look at the derailment numbers and all the
    other numbers, there is dramatic improvement. And what do we
    still need to do to make that even better?
        But I think it's important we understand how far we've
    moved in just the last few years. And Chairman, again, thank
    you for holding this hearing and I look forward to working with
    you as the Chairman of this subcommittee.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Blunt.
        I'd like to ask Senator Warner, since by all rights you
    should have been here if the hearing had taken place when it
    was supposed to, whether you'd like to make any opening
    statement.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

        Senator Warner. I will be very, very brief in mine. And I
    really appreciate your courtesy for having me back, and Senator
    Blunt as well, we had a great working relationship during my
    tenure. I want to thank all the witnesses. I would have gotten
    this in right under the wire as I moved off the Committee but
    for the snowstorm.
        And, you know, I think there's enough, particularly on the
    tanker car safety, enough economic opportunity, enough money
    being made that we've got to be able to figure out a solution
    set here. And I want to give special kudos to Senator Heitkamp
    who basically gave me tanker car safety 101 and 102 for about
    an hour and a half one day and taught me a lot about this, both
    the challenges that we face and the fact that, you know,
    there's got to be a collaborative way. And particularly
    appreciate the focus from industry.
        I know there has been great progress since we started this.
    I also just want to echo, again, since I will get this done in
    under a minute or I'll never be invited back, echoing what
    Senator Blunt said. There's got to be a way. There's enormous
    asset value created by these thousands and thousands of towers.
    I've said, in my previous life, I would take that obligation
    off of all the railroads if I could have the revenue stream but
    we've got to find a way that the FCC can license this in an
    efficient and effective and expeditious manner or we're not
    going to get the rail safety that I know the Chairman and the
    Ranking Member want.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
        Let me begin the questioning before we have to leave for
    votes. And I'm delighted that we have a great turnout this
    morning. So we're going to begin with 5 minutes apiece to each
    of the Senators.
        Mr. Szabo, what can you tell us about so far of the results
    of the Operation Deep Dive look into Metro-North?

       STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
       RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

        Mr. Szabo. So you want a Q&A before opening statements, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to have any statements that any
    of the witnesses may have.
        Mr. Szabo. OK, opening statements.
        Mr. Chairman, and to Ranking Member Blunt, members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify.
        Over the past decade, train accidents/derailments have
    declined by 47 percent; highway grade crossing accidents are
    down 35 percent; and employee fatalities have dropped by 59
    percent. Meanwhile, intermodal freight traffic has surged
    toward a new record. Amtrak ridership has reached all-time
    highs. While rail became the fastest growing mode of public
    transportation, new records in safety have been achieved four
    out of the past 5 years, and preliminary data indicates all-
    time best for Fiscal Year 2013. Better than Fiscal Year 2012,
    previously our safest year on record.
        But we owe it to the public to always do better. That's
    what we expect out of ourselves at FRA, and it's what we expect
    out of the industry that we regulate. So let me share with you
    my vision for driving the next generation of rail safety. And
    it consists of three pillars.
        First is continuing strong oversight and enforcement that
    is data driven. Second is advancing more proactive safety-based
    programs that identify and mitigate risk well in advance of an
    accident. And third is ensuring predictable and reliable
    funding for rail in order to improve infrastructure through
    capital investments and develop new safety technologies through
    robust research and development.
        Our enforcement program is based on the strategic use of
    data. By using statistical modeling, we allocate our resources
    and execute our national inspection plan. It's a disciplined
    approach that has been the foundation of the dramatic drop in
    accidents over the past decade. We also learn from every
    accident and identify root causation to further eliminate risk
    and identify the need for additional regulation.
        In December, we initiated Operation Deep Dive; a
    comprehensive look at Metro-North's entire operation. And we'll
    share with you our report in a couple of weeks after we've
    analyzed all the data. We've got a target date of March 17.
        FRA is also part of a comprehensive strategy for ensuring
    the safe transportation of Bakken crude. In partnership with
    our sister agency PHMSA, we're examining the entire system for
    crude delivery for making sure it's properly classified and
    packaged, to supporting PHMSA's tank car rulemaking, to taking
    steps to further eliminate risk through railroad operations.
    And I would like to recognize AAR for committing to a series of
    immediate voluntary steps that will significantly enhance
    safety.
        The Rail Safety Advisory Committee is currently engaged in
    three tasks regarding the safe movement of hazardous materials,
    train securement, and appropriate crew size. And they have a
    firm April 1 deadline to complete their work. Last month, we
    revised our track safety standards to require railroads to
    adopt a more performance-based approach of rail inspections to
    maintain higher levels of safety. And as we work with the
    industry to advance positive train control, we continue to make
    strides addressing human factors by taking steps to ensure the
    competency of locomotive engineers and conductors.
        But the next level of safety will come from advancing
    proactive safety-based programs, like system safety for
    passenger railroads and risk reduction for freight railroads,
    including programs like Confidential Close Call Reporting.
    While our data-based oversight and enforcement program has
    produced tremendous results, this data comes from accidents
    that have already occurred. Through Close Call Reporting it
    allows us to gather this data before, before an accident
    happens, and develop risk mitigation strategies well in
    advance.
        New regulations will require railroads to do thorough risk
    analysis, to identify hazards, and put in place customized
    plans, including a fatigue mitigation plan to reduce risk. This
    push, over and above our traditional oversight and enforcement,
    will help us drive continuous safety improvement. But the
    sooner we put rail on par with other transportation, with the
    source of dedicated and predictable funding, the sooner we will
    achieve the next generation of safety.
        Capital improvements in advancing next generation
    technology must be a part of the mix. And funding the National
    Cooperative Rail Research Program, work force development
    efforts will ensure a pool of talent with the necessary skills
    and technical capacity.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to thank you, personally, for
    the work you did in helping FRA secure additional resources,
    additional employees, for Fiscal Year 2014. That's a great
    first step for us. It's going to help us better in our
    enforcement program.
        And I look forward to any questions that you have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Szabo follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal
           Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of
    Secretary Foxx, to discuss the safety of our Nation's railroads. Rail
    is a particularly safe mode of transportation, and one that American
    passengers and shippers are choosing more than ever before. Today, I
    will first give an overview of the railroad industry's safety record
    and the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) safety program,
    including our implementation of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of
    2008. Then, I will discuss the U.S. Department of Transportation's
    (DOT) actions in response to recent accidents and present FRA's vision
    to drive the next generation of rail safety.
        FRA's mission is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient
    movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the
    future. We are a data-driven agency. Every regulation, safety advisory
    and emergency order we issue is based on facts and sound research using
    advanced statistical methods and modeling. We closely monitor data and
    trends to identify, reduce, and eliminate risks.
        Two straight years of record-breaking safety performance, along
    with significant reductions in all types of accidents since 2008, are
    strong evidence that FRA's approach to oversight and enforcement is
    effective.
    The Railroad Industry's Safety Record and FRA's Safety Program
        FRA's top priority is safety, and Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 was the
    safest year on record, with preliminary data from FY 2013 indicating it
    will be even better than FY 2012's record.
        Since FY 2004:

       Total train accidents have declined by 47 percent.

       Total derailments have declined by 47 percent.

       Total highway-rail grade crossing accidents have declined by
            35 percent.

        These safety improvements resulted in 13-percent fewer fatalities
    overall (895 fatalities to 779 fatalities--95 percent of which are
    trespassing or grade crossing related), 59-percent fewer employee
    fatalities, and 9-percent fewer injuries (9,367 injuries to 8,534
    injuries) over 10 years. These improvements are impressive in their own
    right, but especially if you consider the regulatory workload that FRA
    received from the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) and
    passenger and freight rail's growth during this same time.

       Amtrak set new ridership records in 10 of the last 11 years,

       Rail was the fastest-growing mode of public transportation,
            and

       Intermodal freight traffic surged toward a new record.

        RSIA mandated that FRA, as the Secretary's designee, complete an
    unprecedented 42 tasks, including final rules, guidance documents,
    model State laws, studies, and reports as well three types of annual
    reports and hundreds of periodic accident reporting audits.
        Thirty of the 42 tasks are complete, and the rest are in the
    pipeline progressing towards completion. Appendix 1 lists the
    rulemakings, non-periodic reports and studies, guidance, and model
    State laws that FRA has completed as of February 26, 2014.
        The chart and table below illustrate a decade of safety
    improvement.

                               Ten-year Railroad Safety Trends by Accident/Incident Cause
       *Accident/Incident, Train Accident, and Highway-Rail Incident Numbers Normalized by Million Train-Miles for
          Fiscal Year, Non-Accident Hazmat Releases Normalized by 200 Million Hazmat Ton-Miles for Fiscal Year
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            FY 2004  FY 2005  FY 2006  FY 2007  FY 2008  FY 2009  FY 2010  FY 2011  FY 2012  FY 2013
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Accidents/         19.039   18.093   17.525   17.298   16.907   16.873   16.696   16.063   15.167   14.852
    Incidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Human-Factor-             1.721    1.648    1.380    1.297    1.230    1.041    0.948    0.995    0.919    0.888
    Caused Train
    Accidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Track-Caused              1.314    1.398    1.318    1.258    1.094    1.036    0.972    0.954    0.843    0.727
    Train Accidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Equipment-                0.548    0.499    0.433    0.418    0.435    0.366    0.370    0.342    0.286    0.271
    Caused Train
    Accidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Signal/             0.692    0.707    0.641    0.506    0.497    0.484    0.494    0.469    0.438    0.430
    Misc.-Caused
    Train Accidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Highway-Rail              4.024    3.800    3.797    3.523    3.240    2.986    2.900    2.881    2.773    2.685
    Incidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Non-Accident              1.387    1.398    1.147    1.221    1.227    1.149    1.063    1.079    0.933    0.932
    Hazmat Releases
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Response to Accidents
        As we use data and research to drive continuous safety improvement,
    we learn from every accident. FRA investigators focus on identifying an
    accident's root causes so we can further eliminate risk and take
    appropriate enforcement action. This is one more facet of our
    comprehensive approach to rail safety.
        The Department, including FRA, has responded aggressively to recent
    accidents that have received widespread attention.
    Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ A description of Metro-North Railroad is in Appendix 2 to this
    testimony.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a result of several accidents on Metro-North Commuter Railroad
    Company (Metro-North), FRA issued Emergency Order 29 and Safety
    Advisory 2013-08 on December 11, 2013.

       Emergency Order 29 required Metro-North to take immediate
            action to prevent excessive train speeds by identifying and
            prioritizing high-risk areas, modifying its existing signal
            system to ensure speed limits are obeyed, and ensuring a higher
            level of engagement and communication among operating
            crewmembers in higher risk locations. To date, FRA has not
            identified any instances of noncompliance with Emergency Order
            29.

       Safety Advisory 2013-08 helps ensure that all railroads
            adhere to Federal regulations regarding maximum authorized
            train speed limits through training, operational testing, and
            train crewmember communication.

        On December 16, 15 days after a fatal accident in New York, FRA
    commenced Operation Deep Dive, a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary
    safety assessment of Metro-North where technical and human factors
    experts are reviewing safety-critical procedures and processes,
    including operations, mechanical and engineering. The Federal Transit
    Administration is participating with FRA to ensure investments in
    Metro-North are properly prioritized to improve safety.
        The rail safety team is assessing the following:

       Track, signal and rolling stock maintenance, inspection and
            repair practices;

       Protection for employees working on rail infrastructure,
            locomotives and rail cars;

       Communication between mechanical and transportation
            departments at maintenance facilities;

       Operation control center procedures and rail traffic
            controller training;

       Compliance with Federal hours of service regulations,
            including fatigue management programs;

       Evaluating results of operational data to measure efficiency
            of employees' execution and comprehension of all applicable
            Federal rail safety regulations;

       Locomotive engineer oversight;

       Engineer and conductor certification; and

       Operating crew medical requirements.

        Operation Deep Dive ended February 14, 2014 and FRA will present a
    report of its findings within 30 days afterwards. FRA will meet with
    Metro-North to discuss the findings and appropriate remedial actions.
    Additionally, FRA will discuss best practices and lessons learned from
    Operation Deep Dive with other commuter rail chief executive officers
    (CEOs) through the American Public Transportation Association.
    Rail Accidents involving Crude Oil
        Crude oil transportation by rail rose quickly because of increasing
    production in the Bakken region of North Dakota. FRA is paying close
    attention to that region, and accident rates in North Dakota have
    fallen over the past three years, even with increased traffic.
        In response to recent train accidents in the United States and
    Canada involving tank cars carrying crude oil, DOT, including FRA and
    the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), has
    taken action on multiple fronts to mitigate risks and ensure the safe
    transportation of crude oil, ethanol, and other hazardous materials by
    rail. FRA and PHMSA have related but distinct responsibilities in
    managing the risk from the transportation of hazardous materials. PHMSA
    produces regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous
    materials by rail, which are primarily enforced by FRA's safety staff,
    while FRA's staff also acts to enforce comprehensive safety regulations
    for rail transportation.
        On January 16, oil industry representatives and rail industry CEOs
    met with the Secretary and heads of PHMSA, the Federal Motor Carrier
    Safety Administration, and FRA in a ``Call to Action.'' The CEOs were
    asked to develop specific plans to immediately improve the safety of
    crude oil shipments, and recommendations on how to improve safety over
    the long term. After analyzing their plans and suggestions, on February
    20, 2014, Secretary Foxx sent a letter to the Association of American
    Railroads (AAR) with a list of actions to be voluntarily taken
    immediately by industry to dramatically improve the safety of railroads
    transporting crude oil and the communities they move through. AAR
    President and CEO Edward Hamberger signed the agreement that same day,
    and individual railroads are signing on subsequently. The letter from
    Secretary Foxx listed eight commitments:

      1.  By July 1, subscribers will apply HAZMAT routing analysis to
            trains with 20 or more tank cars loaded with petroleum crude
            oil (Key Crude Oil Trains). The routing analysis utilizes a
            computer model to analyze 27 risk factors to determine the
            safest and most secure route for the product to travel.

      2.  By July 1, subscribers will adhere to a speed restriction of 50
            mph for all Key Crude Oil Trains, and 40 mph in high-threat
            urban areas if they are using a DOT 111 tank car.

      3.  By April 1, subscribers will equip all Key Crude Oil Trains on
            main track with distributive power locomotives or an operative
            two-way telemetry end of train device to achieve benefits in
            braking speed and substantially reducing the kinetic energy in
            trains to prevent pile ups.

      4.  Effective March 25, subscribers will perform at least one
            internal rail inspection and two track geometry inspections
            more than is required by current regulations every calendar
            year on Key Crude Oil Train routes.

      5.  By July 1, subscribers will begin installing wayside defective
            bearing detectors every 40 miles on Key Crude Oil Train routes
            to prevent equipment-caused accidents.

      6.  Subscribers will develop an inventory of emergency response
            resources along Key Crude Oil Train routes. This information
            will be provided to DOT and emergency responders upon request.

      7.  Subscribers will provide $5 million to develop and provide
            training on hazardous material transportation and fund training
            for emergency responders through the end of 2014. Comprehensive
            training will occur at the Transportation Technology Center,
            Inc. facility in Colorado with a training program fully
            developed by July 1.

      8.  Subscribers will continue to work with communities on Key Crude
            Oil Train routes to address location-specific concerns.

        A copy of the full agreement is included with this testimony. This
    agreement is an important step in improving the safety of crude oil
    transportation by rail. FRA will continue to use its regulatory
    authority to address this issue and act accordingly to maintain public
    safety and confidence.
        Here is a summary of other DOT actions in response to accidents
    involving crude oil and other hazardous materials.
    Order and Advisories
        FRA issued Emergency Order 28, and both FRA and PHMSA issued safety
    advisories, held public hearings, and notified shippers and carriers of
    the critical importance of public safety when transporting hazardous
    materials.

       FRA's emergency order addresses unattended trains, train
            securement, the use of locks, communication between train crews
            and dispatchers, and daily safety briefings for railroad
            employees and was published August 7, 2013.

       A joint FRA-PHMSA safety advisory on related issues was also
            published August 7, 2013.

       A joint FRA-PHMSA follow-up safety advisory was published
            November 20, 2013.
    Rulemakings
        In addition to the emergency order and safety advisories, FRA is
    updating applicable rail safety regulations, and as PHMSA will describe
    in more detail, FRA is collaborating with PHMSA on a rulemaking that
    addresses DOT Specification 111 tank cars. All rulemakings are subject
    to extensive study and analysis.
        But tank cars are only one part of the chain of delivery, and we
    must identify and evaluate all of the risks associated with bulk
    movements of hazardous material, such as ethanol and crude oil, and
    then work to eliminate those risks.

       On August 28, 2013, FRA and PHMSA held a public meeting with
            industry stakeholders to solicit input for a comprehensive
            review of the Hazardous Materials Regulations applicable to
            rail. PHMSA and FRA are collaborating to address comments
            received at the public meeting.

       On August 29, 2013, FRA convened an emergency session of the
            RSAC. During the emergency RSAC meeting, participants
            established three collaborative working groups to formulate new
            rulemaking recommendations regarding (1) transportation of
            hazardous materials by rail, (2) appropriate train crew sizes,
            and (3) train securement procedures. These working groups are
            meeting on a regular basis and we expect formal recommendations
            for consideration by April 1, 2014.
    Operation Classification (the ``Bakken Blitz'')
        In August 2013, PHMSA, supported by FRA, launched Operation
    Classification, which involves joint activities at all transportation
    phases to investigate how shippers and carriers are classifying crude
    oil and what actions they are taking to understand the characteristics
    of the material. The operations have primarily targeted shipments from
    the Bakken region and consisted of unannounced spot inspections, data
    collection, and sampling as well as verifying compliance with Federal
    safety regulations. Operation Classification is nearing completion.
        As I have described, rail safety is at an all-time best. Yet, these
    accidents illustrate why we can never be complacent.
    Our Vision for the Next Generation of Rail Safety
        Continuous safety improvement requires a comprehensive strategy
    designed to eliminate risk. Here is FRA's strategy, founded on three
    pillars:

      1.  Continuing a rigorous regulatory and inspection program based on
            strategic use of data;

      2.  Advancing proactive approaches for early identification and
            reduction of risk; and

      3.  Capital investments, and robust research and development.
    Pillar I. Continuing a rigorous regulatory and inspection program
        As stated previously, FRA's approach to rail safety has led to
    unprecedented safety improvements. We will continue this framework for
    safety oversight and enforcement and improve it. Data driven analysis
    will continue to guide workforce planning and inspection activities.
        FRA's regulatory program improves safety by developing rules based
    on facts, incident and accident causation analysis, comparison of
    alternative mitigation measures, and cost-beneficial solutions. FRA
    rulemaking considers current and future industry capabilities,
    compliance burden and cost, and other economic and social realities.
    Within this context, FRA will continue to attempt to meet statutory
    milestones with its available resources.
        State rail inspectors are a force multiplier for FRA's compliance
    and enforcement efforts. The State Rail Safety Participation Program
    consists of states employing safety inspectors in the five rail safety
    inspection disciplines. State programs conduct planned, routine
    compliance inspections; and may undertake additional investigative and
    surveillance activities consistent with overall program needs and
    individual State capabilities. FRA provides on-the-job training to
    State inspectors. We invite additional state participation in this
    important program and view it as an opportunity to improve oversight in
    key states and regions.
    Focus Areas
        Safety overall has improved; however, accidents related to human
    error and track defects account for more than two-thirds of all train
    accidents, and trespassing and highway-rail grade crossing incidents
    account for approximately 95 percent of all rail-related fatalities. We
    will allocate resources and work with partners, such as Operation
    Lifesaver, to make improvements in these challenging areas. The
    following rulemakings, reports, guidance documents, and other actions
    are important milestones that will guide our work in these areas:
    Human Factors

       Final rule to advance nationwide implementation of positive
            train control (PTC) systems (which prevent overspeed
            derailments, train-to-train collisions, and other types of
            accidents often caused by human error) by defining statutory
            terms and the essential functionalities of PTC systems. FRA
            also issued two other rules designed to reduce some of the
            costs of PTC implementation,. PTC systems are a technology that
            promotes safety improvement through the reduction of certain
            human-factor-related incidents and will complement FRA's other
            safety efforts, such as implementation of safety Risk Reduction
            Programs (RRP) and crash energy management.

       Final rule requiring a railroad to have a formal program for
            certifying train conductors. This will raise the bar of
            professionalism and ensure that only those persons who meet
            minimum Federal safety standards serve as conductors.

       Proposed rule that would enhance safety by mandating that
            certain railroads (each Class I railroad, intercity passenger
            railroad, and commuter railroad) have a Critical Incident
            Stress Plan that may help mitigate the long-term negative
            effects of critical incidents upon railroad employees and the
            impact of performing safety-sensitive duties in the days
            following such incidents when the associated stress may hinder
            their ability to perform such duties safely.

       Final rule on the hours of service of passenger train
            employees. This rule draws on detailed research into the causes
            of train operator fatigue and analysis of thousands of operator
            work patterns. FRA also published in the Federal Register three
            lengthy, detailed statements of agency policy and
            interpretation to clarify the hours of service laws as amended
            by RSIA.

       An FRA-led industry-wide initiative to combat the dangers of
            electronic device distraction in the railroad workplace as well
            as an emergency order and then a final rule prohibiting
            distracted operation of trains.

       A proposed rule that would establish minimum training
            standards for each class or craft of safety-related employee
            and contractor. The rule would require the qualification and
            documentation of the proficiency of such employees on their
            knowledge and ability to comply with Federal railroad safety
            laws and regulations and the employing railroad company's rules
            and procedures implementing those laws and regulations. A final
            rule on minimum training standards and plans is under
            development.
    Track Safety

       Final rule to Improve Rail Inspections. Requires the use of
            performance-based rail inspection methods that focus on
            maintaining low rail failure rates per mile of track and
            generally results in more frequent testing; provides a four-
            hour period to verify that certain less serious suspected
            defects exist in a rail section once track owners learn that
            the rail contains an indication of those defects; requires that
            rail inspectors are properly qualified to operate rail flaw
            detection equipment and interpret test results; and establishes
            an annual maximum allowable rate of rail defects and rail
            failures between inspections for each designated inspection
            segment of track. These changes are intended to reduce the risk
            of derailments caused by rail failures by improving the
            accuracy of rail inspections and shortening the time that
            latent, undetected rail flaws remain in track.

       Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards. The final rule
            was based on research into vehicle/track interaction, and it
            promotes the safe interaction of rail vehicles with the track
            over which they operate under a variety of conditions at speeds
            up to 220 mph. The rule also adds flexibility for safely
            permitting high cant deficiency train operations \2\ through
            curves at more conventional speeds so that both freight and
            passenger trains may better sustain maximum allowable speeds
            through curved track.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Cant deficiency involves traveling through a curve faster than
    the balance speed and produces a net lateral force to the outside of
    the curve. http://www.highspeed-rail.org/Documents/
    PRIIA%20305%20DocSpec%20and%20other%20NGEC%20Documents/
    305%20PRIIA%20Tilt%20
    presentation.pdf

       New Technology to Improve Track Safety. Through our research
            and development program we are about to bring to market new
            technology for avoiding track buckles (sun-kinks). The device
            measures the neutral temperature of rail and warns the railroad
            when track maintenance is required to avoid track buckling. We
            are also developing technology to predict rail temperature
            variations. This provides railroads information needed to
            decide the extent and duration of slow orders to reduce safety
            risk on hot days.
    Grade Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention

       Standards requiring railroads to establish and maintain
            toll-free ``1-800'' emergency notification systems by which the
            public can telephone the proper railroad about a stalled
            vehicle or other safety problem at a specifically identified
            grade crossing.

       Regulations requiring 10 states to issue State-specific
            action plans to improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings.

       Model State laws on highway users' sight distance at
            passively signed crossings and on highway motorists' violations
            of grade crossing warning devices.

       A proposed rule specifying the types of information that
            railroads would have to report to the Department's National
            Crossing Inventory.

       A five-year strategy to improve highway-rail grade crossing
            safety, including an audit every two years of Class I
            railroads' highway-rail grade crossing accident reports to
            ensure that these railroads are accurately reporting these
            incidents. Resources permitting, FRA will conduct such audits
            every five years on other railroads.

       Guidance addressing pedestrian safety at or near passenger
            rail stations,

       An FRA-released smartphone application with grade crossing
            information.
    Pillar II. Advancing proactive approaches to reduce risk
        Continuous safety improvement requires a multi-faceted approach.
    The next level of safety will come from advancing proactive safety-
    based programs that analyze risks, identify hazards, and put in place
    customized plans to eliminate those risks.

       Risk Reduction Programs (RRP) and System Safety Programs
            (SSP) that help identify accident precursors so that corrective
            action can be taken in advance. We will issue a final rule
            before the end of 2014 to require passenger railroads to
            develop and implement SSPs. A notice of proposed rulemaking
            that would require freight railroads to establish RRPs is
            currently under development. Both are designed to require
            railroads to develop and implement systematic risk-based
            approaches to ensuring continuous safety improvement.

       Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C\3\RS), a
            voluntary and non-punitive program for railroads and their
            employees to report close calls. Results from one C\3\RS pilot
            site indicate nearly a 70-percent reduction in certain
            accidents. C\3\RS helps develop a positive and proactive safety
            culture, using detailed data far beyond what is obtained during
            accident investigations. The magnitude of the information
            provided from proactive programs like C\3\RS in comparison to
            traditional data from accidents and injuries is illustrated
            below:

        Programs like Confidential Close Calls Reporting allow us to gather
    data before an accident occurs and to develop risk mitigation
    strategies well in advance.
    Pillar III. Capital investments, including robust research and
            development
        As you know, portions of two important rail laws expired at the end
    of FY 2013: RSIA and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
    of 2008 (PRIIA). The President's FY 2014 budget for FRA laid out a
    comprehensive, multi-year reauthorization blueprint for moving forward.
    The fundamental goal of this proposal is to develop a coordinated
    approach to enhancing the Nation's rail system-an integrated strategy
    that addresses safety and passenger and freight service improvements.
    This new approach reflects the complex reality of how rail works in the
    United States-most track is privately-owned and carries a mix of
    passenger and freight trains. Safety is improved not just through
    regulations and inspections but also through capital investments and
    research and development.
        For example, chokepoints often hinder the efficient movement of
    intercity passenger, commuter, and freight trains, while the
    elimination of grade crossings with strategic placement of overpasses
    and underpasses enhances rail, vehicular, and pedestrian safety.
        FRA's reauthorization proposal's key priorities include the
    following:

       Modernizing our rail infrastructure. Past generations of
            Americans invested heavily in building the infrastructure we
            rely on today. Most segments of the Northeast Corridor were
            built more than a century ago. Maintaining and modernizing
            these assets will lower long-term costs and result in a safer,
            more efficient and reliable rail system.

       Meeting the growing market demand. With 100 million more
            Americans expected by 2050, the national transportation system
            must be prepared to handle substantial increases in the
            movement of people and goods. Given the existing capacity
            constraints on other modes, rail will play an increasingly
            vital role in balancing America's transportation system by
            accommodating this growth, resulting in public benefits such as
            reduced reliance on foreign oil, reduced air pollution,
            increased safety, and more travel options. The budget
            incorporates market-based investments in building or improving
            passenger rail corridors, eliminating rail chokepoints, adding
            freight capacity, and conducting comprehensive planning.

       Successfully implementing PTC. The mandated deadline of
            December 2015 will likely not be reached by many railroads.
            Commuter rail operations are cash-strapped and unable to attain
            certain necessities for implementation, such as communications
            spectrum. FRA's budget proposes grants for those commuter
            railroads and research and development for new technologies to
            improve rail safety. FRA's August 2012 Report to Congress
            ``Positive Train Control: Implementation Status, Issues, and
            Impacts'' summarized the major technical and programmatic
            challenges and obstacles associated with PTC implementation
            that FRA had identified so far. \3\ Subsequent to the report's
            submission, a new issue regarding PTC communications towers
            deployment arose under the jurisdiction of the Federal
            Communications Commission.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ ``Positive Train Control: Implementation Status, Issues, and
    Impacts''--http://www.fra
    .dot.gov/Elib/Details/L03718

       Promoting innovation. FRA's vision is for the domestic rail
            industry to be again world-leading. We want U.S. companies to
            develop patents for state-of-the-art rail technology, to supply
            rail operators throughout the world, and to employ the best
            engineers and railway workers. The United States should be
            exporting intellectual capital and rail products, not importing
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            them.

       Mitigating rail's impacts on communities. Improving quality
            of life by eliminating grade crossings, sealing corridors,
            reducing noise impacts, and including safety enhancements that
            allow for service improvements and economic growth.

       Research and Development. Implementing new technology will
            be a key driver for future safety improvement. Here are a few
            examples of important research:

         Track inspection technologies that detect defects
                before they become failures in service.

         Computer modeling capabilities to improve
                understanding of vehicle/track interaction, wheel and rail
                profiles, and contact conditions.

         Autonomous recording methods to provide more frequent
                and cost-effective measurements of track condition.

         Research to develop new methods for monitoring
                difficult-to-detect safety issues such as longitudinal rail
                force, ballast lateral restraint, and ballast condition.

         High-speed rail research and development, which has
                identified several key risk factors for corridors shared by
                passenger and freight operations. Research to understand
                these risks and mitigate them is ongoing.

         Research on new technologies for improving grade
                crossing safety. One project that has significant potential
                is implementation of Intelligent Transportation Systems at
                grade crossings. FRA is also conducting human-factors
                research to understand the behavior of highway users when
                they approach grade crossings. This research is expected to
                lead to recommendations for improved signage and warning
                systems. FRA will consider the benefits and costs, and
                feasible alternatives, for any recommendation.

         A research and development program to achieve
                reliable, long life from concrete ties. The program
                involves freight railroads, Amtrak, manufacturers, and
                universities.

         The National Cooperative Rail Research Program, which
                enhances the development of technical skills for a capable
                workforce to design and operate the next generation of safe
                railroads.
    The Need for Predictable Funding
        An overarching issue that runs across all of these priorities is
    the need for sustained and predictable Federal funding for rail
    programs, similar to the treatment of other modes of transportation.
    Congress has for decades funded highway infrastructure and safety,
    transit, and aviation programs through multi-year authorizations that
    provide guaranteed funding. This enables States, local governments, and
    other stakeholders to plan and make large-scale infrastructure
    investments on a year-to-year basis. Likewise, internationally, other
    major rail systems have been planned and developed through a
    predictable multi-year funding program.
    Conclusion
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify and answer your questions
    today. Safety is FRA's number one priority, and we appreciate your
    attention and focus on such an important issue for the American public.
    Our vision for the next generation of rail safety balances a
    comprehensive and effective regulatory framework with innovative,
    proactive ideas and capital investment, including critical research and
    development. We look forward to working with this Committee to improve
    our programs and make the American rail network as safe, reliable, and
    efficient as possible. I will be happy to respond to your questions.
                                   Appendix 1
    FRA Rulemakings Completed as of March 5, 2014, that Were Mandated,
            Explicitly or Implicitly, by RSIA \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ In addition, FRA commenced a rulemaking to define ``critical
    incident'' for purposes of the mandated rulemaking on critical incident
    stress plans as specifically required by Sec. 410(c)).

       1.  To specify the essential functionalities of mandated PTC
            systems, define related statutory terms, and identify
            additional lines for implementation. (Sec. 104).\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ In addition, FRA has issued two final rules on PTC, and another
    final rule on PTC is in clearance in the Executive Branch.

       2.  To establish substantive hours of service requirements for
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            passenger train employees. (Sec. 108(d)).

       3.  To update existing hours of service recordkeeping regulations.
            (Sec.108(f)).

       4.  To require State-specific action plans from certain states to
            improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 202).

       5.  To require toll-free telephone emergency notification numbers
            for reporting problems at public and private highway-rail grade
            crossings. (Sec. 205).

       6.  Increase the ordinary maximum and aggravated maximum civil
            penalties per violation for rail safety violations to $25,000
            and $100,000, respectively. (Sec. 302).

       7.  On prohibition of individuals from performing safety-sensitive
            functions in the railroad industry for a violation of hazardous
            materials transportation law. (Sec. 305).

       8.  On procedures for emergency waivers. (Sec. 308).

       9.  To require the certification of conductors. (Sec. 402).

      10.  On the results of FRA's study of track inspection intervals and
            other track issues. (Sec. 403(c)).

      11.  On concrete ties. (Sec. 403(d)).

      12.  To require owners of railroad bridges to implement programs for
            inspection, maintenance, and management of those structures.
            (Sec. 417).

      13.  On camp cars used as railroad employee sleeping quarters. (Sec.
            420).

      14.  Amending regulations of the Office of the Secretary of
            Transportation to provide that the Secretary delegates to the
            Administrator of FRA the responsibility to carry out the
            Secretary's responsibilities under RSIA.
    Completed RSIA-Mandated Guidance and Model State Laws \6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ In addition, FRA has published three guidance documents on the
    hours of service laws as amended by RSIA in the Federal Register.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       1.  Guidance on pedestrian safety at or near rail passenger
            stations. (Sec. 201).

       2.  Guidance for the administration of the authority to buy items of
            nominal value and distribute them to the public as part of a
            crossing safety or railroad trespass prevention program. (Sec.
            208(c)).

       3.  Model State law on highway users' sight distances at passively
            signed highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 203).

       4.  Model State law on motorists' violations of grade crossing
            warning devices. (Sec. 208).
    Completed RSIA-Mandated Non-periodic Reports or Studies
       1.  Report to Congress on DOT's long-term (minimum 5-year) strategy
            for improving rail safety, including annual plans and schedules
            for achieving specified statutory goals, to be submitted with
            the President's annual budget. (Sec. 102).

       2.  Report to Congress on the progress of railroads' implementation
            of PTC. (Sec. 104).

       3.  Conduct study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest
            to withhold from discovery or admission, in certain judicial
            proceedings for damages, the reports and data compiled to
            implement, etc., a required risk reduction program. (Sec. 109).

       4.  Evaluate and review current local, State, and Federal laws
            regarding trespassing on railroad property, vandalism affecting
            railroad safety, and violations of highway-rail grade crossing
            warning devices. (Sec. 208(a)).

       5.  Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about track
            inspection intervals, etc. (Sec. 403(a)-(b)).

       6.  Conduct study of methods to improve or correct passenger station
            platform gaps (Sec. 404).

       7.  Report to Congress detailing the results of DOT research about
            use of personal electronic devices in the locomotive cab by
            safety-related railroad employees. (Sec. 405).

       8.  Report to Congress on DOT research about the effects of
            repealing a provision exempting Consolidated Rail Corporation,
            etc., from certain labor-related laws (45 U.S.C. Sec. 797j).
            (Sec. 408).

       9.  Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about exposure
            of railroad employees and others to radiation. (Sec. 411).

      10.  Report to Congress on DOT study on the expected safety effects
            of reducing inspection frequency of diesel-electric locomotives
            in limited service by railroad museums. (Sec. 415).

      11.  Report to Congress on model plans and recommendations, to be
            developed through a task force to be established by DOT, to
            help railroads respond to passenger rail accidents. (Sec. 503).
                                   Appendix 2
        Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) is the second
    largest commuter railroad in the nation, with an annual ridership of
    82,953,628.\7\ It is a subsidiary agency of the Metropolitan
    Transportation Authority, a New York State Authority.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ http://web.mta.info/mta/network.htm#statsmnr

       Three main lines, the Hudson, Harlem, and New Haven Lines,
            branch northward out of Grand Central Terminal, located in mid-
            town Manhattan, into suburban New York and Connecticut. Metro-
            North maintains the equipment and infrastructure and operates
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            and controls the trains on these lines.

       Amtrak operates on the Hudson Line, between Spuyten Duyvil
            and Poughkeepsie, and on the New Haven Line, between New
            Rochelle and New Haven.

       The West of Hudson Service, the Port Jervis and the Pascack
            Valley Lines, operates from New Jersey Transit Rail Operations'
            (NJ Transit) Hoboken terminal, providing service to Rockland
            and Orange counties. NJ Transit maintains the equipment and
            operates and controls the trains. Metro-North maintains the
            infrastructure.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Szabo.
        I'm going to interrupt because the votes have been called.
    We should have a ten-minute recess and we'll come back and
    resume.
        Thank you.
        [Pause.]
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you all for your patience.
        Please proceed.

                STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN,

            ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

        SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

        Ms. Quarterman. Good morning. Chairman Blumenthal and
    Ranking Member Blunt, members of the Subcommittee, Senators
    Heitkamp and Hoeven, thank you for your leadership on advancing
    rail safety and for the opportunity to appear here today to
    discuss PHMSA's comprehensive approach to ensure the safe
    transportation of crude by rail.
        Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, for the
    Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and all of its sister
    modes. We all work diligently to protect the American people
    and the environment from hazardous material transportation
    incidents.
        As you know, energy production in the United States has
    markedly increased. The use of rail to move crude has increased
    exponentially in the past few years, especially crude from the
    Bakken region. In fact, crude oil production in that area has
    elevated North Dakota to the second largest oil-producing state
    in the Nation. As recently as November 2013, approximately
    600,000 barrels per day of oil produced in North Dakota were
    transported by rail; going from less than 11,000 carloads in
    2009 to close to 400,000 in 2013. This increase in crude
    shipments by rail, and recent incidents, underscore how
    important it is to be ever vigilant in protecting local
    communities and the environment.
        To deal with this challenge, the department has taken a
    comprehensive approach to address the risks associated with
    transporting crude by rail. Together, PHMSA and FRA are
    focusing on regulatory and non-regulatory methods to, in the
    first instance, prevent incidents from occurring by putting in
    place necessary operational controls and improving track
    integrity to lessen the likelihood of an incident. In case an
    incident does occur, we are looking to mitigate the effects and
    ensuring effective emergency response.
        PHMSA and FRA have been working together to issue
    guidelines and rulemakings; participate in rail safety
    committees and public meetings; enhance inspection and
    enforcement; and coordinate with other agencies to improve
    public safety. As one example, this past summer PHMSA, FRA, and
    FMCSA teamed together to implement Operation Classification.
    This was an unprecedented initiative with DOT inspectors
    performing unannounced inspections and testing crude oil
    samples to verify that the materials were being properly
    characterized and classified for transportation.
        In January, Secretary Foxx issued a call to action, asking
    crude oil and rail stakeholders to commit to taking immediate
    steps to improve the transportation of crude oil. The Secretary
    identified some actions the department was considering and
    challenged those industries to take such preventive and
    mitigative steps immediately.
        To date, the call to action has been a success for safety.
    We've received firm commitments from rail and crude oil
    industries to take immediate actions to improve safety. Those
    actions include increased track inspections to prevent
    derailments, and a litany of mitigative steps to reduce speed,
    use alternate routes, improve braking, improve crude oil
    testing and classification, and improve emergency responder
    preparedness and training.
        In addition to regulatory and non-regulatory efforts to
    improve rail safety, we've increased our efforts to improve the
    public awareness and understanding of hazardous materials'
    regulatory requirements. Our efforts include enforcement and
    outreach efforts focused on proper classification and
    characterization, safety and security planning, and ensuring
    emergency responders and the public are aware of hazmat
    transportation requirements.
        As I've stated earlier, PHMSA is committing to improving
    transportation safety and I believe our comprehensive approach
    to addressing safety is working. Our aggressive first step and
    continuing focus on this issue will help to prevent and
    mitigate incidents and move us closer to our goal of zero
    deaths and injuries.
        Thank you, again, for the opportunity to speak today. We
    look forward to continue to work with Congress to address rail
    safety issues, specifically those dealing with the
    transportation of flammable liquids. I would be pleased to
    answer any questions the Committee may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Quarterman follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator,
    Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department
                               of Transportation
        Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the
    Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss
    the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA)
    comprehensive approach to address the risks associated with increased
    bulk shipments of flammable liquids by rail. I would also like to thank
    you for your leadership and for your efforts to advance rail safety.
    While rail safety is improving, high-profile train accidents like the
    ones we've seen in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, Canada; Aliceville, Alabama;
    and Casselton, North Dakota underscore how important it is to be ever-
    vigilant in protecting local communities and the environment.
        Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, everyone at PHMSA,
    and the other modes in the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
    PHMSA continues to work diligently to protect the American people and
    the environment from the risks of hazardous materials transportation by
    all modes, including rail. PHMSA works to achieve its safety mission
    through efforts to prevent and mitigate accidents by developing
    regulations and guidance, taking rigorous enforcement actions,
    collaborating with stakeholders, and educating emergency responders and
    the public.
        This testimony will focus on the risks posed by the transport of
    bulk shipment of flammable liquids, including petroleum crude oil, by
    rail and PHMSA's efforts to both prevent and mitigate those risks.
    First, I will provide an overview of the current state of petroleum
    crude oil (crude oil) transportation in the United States. Second, I
    will discuss our comprehensive approach to prevent and mitigate the
    damage caused by rail accidents involving hazardous materials.
    I. State of Crude Oil Transportation by Rail
        As energy production in the United States increases, so does the
    transportation of more products in their various forms by multiple
    modes. The epicenter of the increased crude oil production is the
    Bakken Formation, occupying about 200,000 square miles (520,000 square
    kilometers \2\) of the subsurface underlying parts of Montana and North
    Dakota, and Saskatchewan and Manitoba in Canada. Production from the
    Bakken in recent years has elevated North Dakota to the second largest
    oil producing State, and it is one of the most important sources of oil
    in the United States. While most new Bakken drilling and production has
    been in North Dakota, drilling operations also extend into Montana,
    Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. As of 2013, the Bakken produced more than
    ten percent of all oil in the United States. In November 2013, 10,022
    Bakken wells extracted approximately 29 million barrels of oil and 32
    million cubic feet of gas. This equates to over 900,000 barrels of oil
    produced daily (See Table 1).\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Data from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources
    website: https://www
    .dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf

        Approximately 71 percent of all oil produced in North Dakota, or
    around 800,000 barrels per day, was transported by rail in November
    2013, according to the North Dakota Public Service Commission.\2\
    Corresponding with increased production, the volume of crude oil moving
    by rail has quadrupled in less than a decade (See Table 2--a Class I
    railroad is a railroad having annual inflation-adjusted operating
    revenues for three consecutive years of $250 million or more as the
    figure $250 million is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue
    deflator formula).\3\ While overall train volume has increased, train
    accidents declined by 43 percent, and train accidents involving a
    hazardous materials release are down 16 percent between 2003 and
    2012.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/usa-rail-regulator-
    idINL2N0KQ1WN20140116
        \3\ The Surface Transportation Board Website indicates that the
    inflation-adjusted dollar amount for 2012 (the most recent year for
    which a complete year of annual operating revenue data is available) is
    $452,653,248 or more for a Class I railroad. Figures in table are
    quarterly totals. Source: Association of American Railroads
        \4\ Data from 2003-2012 compiled by FRA Office of Safety Analysis.

        Despite this decline in such accidents, there is always the
    potential for low-probability, high-consequence events to occur that
    could have devastating consequences to the public, communities, and the
    environment. Recent incidents in the United States and Canada
    demonstrate the need for a renewed focus on rail safety efforts. PHMSA
    works in partnership with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to
    address and mitigate the risks associated with the rail transport of
    hazardous materials. Here are a few incidents that have sharpened our
    focus on the safe transportation of high-hazard flammable liquids by
    rail.
        On July 6, 2013, a catastrophic derailment involving an unattended
    freight train containing 72 loaded DOT Specification 111 tank cars of
    crude oil occurred in the town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec. The train,
    which was 4,701 feet long and weighed 10,287 tons, was not properly
    secured and rolled down a descending grade, subsequently derailing near
    the center of Lac-Megantic. The locomotives separated from the train
    and came to a stop about a half mile east of the derailment. In the
    course of the accident, 63 tank cars derailed. Several derailed tank
    cars released crude oil, causing fires that killed 47 people,
    extensively damaged the town center, and required the evacuation of
    about 2,000 people from the surrounding area. Transport Canada is
    currently investigating the accident, with the assistance of the
    National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and DOT.
        On November 7, 2013, a train carrying crude oil to the Gulf Coast
    from North Dakota derailed in Aliceville, Alabama, spilling crude oil
    in a nearby wetland and igniting into flames. There were a total of 88
    DOT 111 tank cars containing crude oil in the 90-car train. Twenty-six
    DOT Specification 111 tank cars derailed, 21 of which released all or
    part of their contents. The NTSB is currently investigating the
    accident, with the assistance of DOT.
        On December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude oil derailed and
    ignited near Casselton, North Dakota, prompting authorities to issue a
    voluntary evacuation of the city and surrounding area. A collision with
    a disabled train blocking the track caused 20 DOT Specification 111
    tank cars to derail. Estimates indicate that those cars lost 476,436
    gallons of product. NTSB is investigating the accident, with the
    assistance of DOT.
        Accidents like these demonstrate both the inherent dangers of
    transporting hazardous materials and the various factors that may cause
    accidents and the unintentional release of hazardous materials. PHMSA
    strives to prevent these accidents from occurring and, in the event
    they do occur, helps to mitigate the consequences of these types of
    accidents. Train accidents involving hazardous materials releases like
    the ones previously described highlight the need for a robust hazardous
    materials transportation regulatory system, strong enforcement
    capabilities, and wide-reaching communication with and training of
    hazardous materials stakeholders, including the public, hazardous
    materials transporters, and emergency responders.
    II. Comprehensive Approach to Prevent and Mitigate Rail Hazardous
            Materials Accidents and Incidents
        PHMSA's safety mission involves working to ensure that the
    transportation system is functioning as it should. With regard to rail
    safety, PHMSA and FRA have taken a comprehensive approach to mitigating
    the risks posed by the bulk transport of hazardous materials by rail.
    Specifically, PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, is focusing on methods
    to prevent accidents and incidents from occurring and ways to mitigate
    the effects of those events that do occur. On the prevention front, we
    are working together to implement necessary operational controls and
    ensure rail track integrity to lessen the likelihood of accidents.
    PHMSA has requirements in place to mitigate effects of potential
    accidents through appropriate classification of the materials being
    transported; appropriate packaging of the materials, including ensuring
    materials are in the appropriate container; and effectively
    communicating to transportation workers and first responders what
    material is involved so they can handle or respond correctly to any
    accidents associated with the material. This approach is designed to
    prevent the occurrence of a hazardous materials release in the course
    of rail transportation and mitigate the damage caused should a
    hazardous material release occur.
        PHMSA has a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory tools to
    address the risks of the bulk transport of flammable materials,
    including crude oil, by rail. In the wake of increased crude oil
    movements by rail and recent incidents, PHMSA has used many of these
    tools to improve safety. Most recently, PHMSA has issued guidance and
    an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, participated in rail safety
    committees, held public meetings, enhanced enforcement and inspection
    efforts, and coordinated with other agencies to improve the safety of
    the public.
    Regulatory Efforts by PHMSA and FRA
        On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule (HM-233A) to amend
    the Hazardous Materials Regulations to incorporate provisions contained
    in certain widely used or longstanding special permits that have an
    established safety record.\5\ As part of that rulemaking, PHMSA adopted
    a requirement that would allow certain rail tank cars transporting
    hazardous materials to exceed the gross weight on rail limitation of
    263,000 pounds upon approval by FRA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ See Federal Register http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-
    25/pdf/2011-1414.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On January 25, 2011, FRA issued a Federal Register notice of FRA's
    approval pursuant to PHMSA's May 14, 2010 final rule.\6\ The approval
    established detailed conditions for manufacturing and operating certain
    tank cars in hazardous materials service, including the DOT
    Specification 111 tank car, which is the tank car used for the
    transportation of flammable liquids, such as crude oil, that weigh
    between 263,000 and 286,000 pounds. These actions provided tank car
    manufacturers with the authority to build a 286,000-pound tank car.
    Rail car manufacturers have used that authority to manufacture an
    enhanced DOT Specification 111 tank car (CPC-1232) under the conditions
    outlined in the January 25, 2011 approval. Specific improvements to the
    car include the following: normalized steel, puncture resistance, head
    shields, and top fitting protection. Should a manufacturer choose to
    design a car outside the conditions of that approval, it can seek
    another approval in accordance with section 179.13 of the Hazardous
    Materials Regulations in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
    To date, PHMSA and FRA have not received any requests to design a car
    that deviates from the January 25, 2011 approved design.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ See Federal Register http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-
    25/pdf/2011-1342.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Following the publication of the PHMSA final rule and the
    subsequent FRA approval, PHMSA received a petition (P-1577) \7\ from
    the Association of American Railroads (AAR) on March 9, 2011,
    requesting changes to PHMSA's specifications for the DOT Specification
    111 tank car used to transport Packing Group I and II materials \8\
    (See Table 4 for tank car comparison).\9\ During the summer of 2011,
    the AAR Tank Car Committee (TCC) created a task force (Task Force),
    which included PHMSA and FRA participation, with a dual responsibility
    to develop an industry standard for tank cars used to transport crude
    oil, denatured alcohol, and ethanol/gasoline mixtures and to consider
    operating requirements to reduce the risk of derailment of tank cars
    carrying crude oil classified as Packing Group I and II, or ethanol.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2011-
    0059-0001
        \8\ ``Packing Group'' designates the hazard level posed by a class
    of materials. Class 3 (flammable liquids) Packing Group I materials
    have a low boiling point and represent a high flammability risk.
    Packing Group II materials have a higher boiling point and a low flash
    point and represent a slightly lower flammability risk.
        \9\ Table 4 provides a comparison of the DOT Specification 111 tank
    car currently authorized in the Hazardous Materials Regulations, the
    minimum standards for the DOT approved tank car pursuant to the January
    25, 2011 Federal Register Notice and the tank car proposed for
    incorporation in petition (P-1577) by AAR.

        The Task Force worked to address the root cause, severity, and
    consequences of derailments, and its recommendations were finalized on
    March 1, 2012. As a result PHMSA, with FRA's agreement, initiated an
    advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) to arrive at a more
    comprehensive solution.
        In May 2012, PHMSA began drafting an ANPRM to consider revisions to
    the Hazardous Materials Regulations to improve the crashworthiness of
    railroad tank cars and identify and address operational improvements.
    The draft ANPRM addressed several Petitions for Rulemaking submitted by
    industry and recommendations issued by the NTSB.\10\ The draft ANPRM
    posed a series of questions to the regulated community designed to
    solicit comments on potential operational and tank car design
    improvements that could improve rail safety, along with the costs of
    these improvements. The draft ANPRM was also designed to build and
    improve on the Task Force recommendations and examined the differences
    in the DOT-approved tank car (pursuant to the January 25, 2011 Federal
    Register Notice) and the tank car proposed in AAR's petition.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ See NTSB recommendations: R-07-4, R-12-5, R-12-6, and R-12-7
    http://www.phmsa
    .dot.gov/hazmat/regs/ntsb/rail
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Concurrent with completing the first draft of its ANPRM in May
    2012, between April 2012 and October 2012, PHMSA received three
    additional petitions (P-1587, P-1595, and P-1612) and one modification
    of a previously filed petition (P-1612). These petitions were submitted
    by concerned communities and various industry associations requesting
    further modification to the tank car standards. In response to this
    additional information, PHMSA published an ANPRM on September 6,
    2013,\11\ which addressed all of the petitions and NTSB recommendations
    related to rail safety, including tank car and operational standards
    for flammable liquids.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ See Federal Register http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-
    06/pdf/2013-21621.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Public interest in this rulemaking was significant. We received
    comments from local communities, cities and towns, rail carriers,
    shippers, equipment suppliers, tank car manufacturers, environmental
    groups, and the NTSB. PHMSA is reviewing the extensive public comments
    received during the comment period, which ended on December 5, 2013,
    and will use the comments to assess possible future regulatory changes.
    PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, is considering all regulatory avenues
    available to improve rail safety.
        Tank cars are only one part of the chain of delivery, and we must
    identify and evaluate all of the risks associated with bulk movements
    of highly hazardous material, such as crude oil and ethanol, and then
    work to reduce or eliminate those risks.
        In addition to the rulemaking activity by PHMSA, DOT took
    additional regulatory action following the Lac-Megantic derailment. On
    August 7, 2013, FRA, in coordination with PHMSA, issued an emergency
    order \12\ addressing the immediate hazard of death, personal injury,
    or significant harm to the environment, by instituting requirements
    related to attending and securing certain hazardous materials trains
    and cars, including crude oil and ethanol unit trains. The emergency
    order addressed the leading factors identified in preliminary findings
    in the Lac-Megantic investigation, and PHMSA and FRA are conducting
    field inspections and investigations to monitor compliance with the
    emergency order.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-19215
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On February 25, 2014, the Department issued another emergency order
    \13\ to improve the safe transportation of crude oil by rail. The
    emergency order requires those who offer crude oil for transportation
    by rail to ensure the product is properly tested and classified in
    accordance with Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations. All Class III
    crude oil shipments must now be designated as Packing Group I or II,
    thereby requiring the use of a more robust tank car. (Previously some
    Class III crude oil shipments were allowed to be designated as Packing
    Group III.) As our efforts in testing crude oil samples have uncovered
    evidence of misclassification, the emergency order highlights the
    importance of properly testing and classifying crude oil prior to
    shipping to ensure the product is being transported in containers that
    are designed to safely store the hazardous material while in transit.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ See DOT website: http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/dot-issues-
    emergency-order-requiring-stricter-standards-transport-crude-oil-rail
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Non-regulatory efforts
        Concurrent with FRA's August 7, 2013 emergency order, PHMSA and FRA
    published a joint Safety Advisory \14\ that addressed preliminary
    findings of the Lac-Megantic investigation and made the following
    safety and security recommendations: (1) reminding railroads to review
    the adequacy of their crew staffing requirements for trains
    transporting hazardous materials; (2) requiring system-wide evaluations
    to identify particular hazards that may make it more difficult to
    secure a train or pose other safety risks; and (3) requiring that
    procedures be developed to mitigate those risks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-19211
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The joint Safety Advisory also announced an emergency meeting of
    FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to address rail safety
    concerns, which was held on August 29, 2013.\15\ During the emergency
    meeting, PHMSA and FRA explained the safety requirements in the August
    7, 2013 emergency order and the recommendations in the joint Safety
    Advisory, and proposed that an RSAC working group be formed to address
    hazardous materials transportation requirements. RSAC members discussed
    the formulation of a task statement regarding appropriate train crew
    size, hazard classes, and quantities of hazardous materials that should
    trigger additional operating procedures, including attendance and
    securement requirements. PHMSA continues to participate in FRA's RSAC
    meetings on hazardous materials transport by rail. The RSAC plans to
    provide its recommendations regarding hazardous materials rail safety
    by April 2014 to FRA, who will forward the recommendations to PHMSA for
    further evaluation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-19471
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to participating in the RSAC meetings, PHMSA, as
    mentioned above, has been a participant in and an observer of the TCC.
    This committee is comprised of representatives of the Class I, short
    line, and regional railroads; rail tank car owners, manufacturers, and
    repair facilities; and shippers and customers of hazardous materials by
    rail, as well as participants from PHMSA, FRA, Transport Canada, and
    the NTSB. The TCC works together to develop technical standards for how
    tank cars, including those used to move hazardous materials, are
    designed and constructed. PHMSA also participates as a working member
    of other rail task forces.
        On August 27-28, 2013, before the RSAC meeting, PHMSA and FRA held
    a public meeting to review the requirements in the Hazardous Materials
    Regulations applicable to rail operations.\16\ PHMSA and FRA conducted
    this meeting as part of a comprehensive review of operational factors
    that affect the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail.
    This meeting provided the opportunity for public input on requirements
    related to rail operations.\17\ PHMSA and FRA are currently reviewing
    the transcript and public comments and will use the comments to inform
    their future possible regulatory changes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-17201
        \17\ See public comments http://www.regulations.gov/
    #!docketDetail;D=FRA-2013-0067
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On November 20, 2013, PHMSA and FRA issued another joint Safety
    Advisory to reinforce the importance of proper characterization,
    classification, and selection of a packing group for Class 3 materials
    (flammable liquids) and the corresponding regulations for safety and
    security planning.\18\ This Safety Advisory noted that we expect
    offerors of hazardous material by rail and rail carriers transporting
    hazardous material to revise their safety and security plans as
    required under the Hazardous Materials Regulations, including the
    required risk assessments, to address the safety and security issues
    identified in FRA's August 7, 2013 emergency order and the August 7,
    2013 joint Safety Advisory. FRA has initiated a focused effort to audit
    security plans, specifically at railroads that move unit trains of
    flammable liquids.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-27785
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On January 2, 2014, PHMSA issued a Safety Alert warning of the
    variability in certain crude oil and emphasizing that proper and
    sufficient testing to ensure accurate characterization and
    classification should be performed.\19\ Proper characterization and
    classification are integral for the Hazardous Materials Regulations to
    function as they were designed. Characterization and classification
    ultimately determine the appropriate and permitted packaging for a
    given hazardous material. This Safety Alert addressed the initial
    findings of ``Operation Classification,'' a compliance initiative
    (described below) involving unannounced inspections and testing of
    crude oil samples to verify that offerors of the materials have
    properly characterized and classified the hazardous materials. The
    Safety Alert expressed PHMSA's concern that unprocessed crude oil may
    affect the integrity of the packaging or present additional hazards,
    related to corrosivity, sulfur content, and dissolved gas content. The
    alert also noted (1) that preliminary testing had focused on the
    classification and packing group assignments that have been selected
    and certified by offerors of crude oil, and (2) that PHMSA has found it
    necessary to expand the scope of its testing to measure other factors
    that might affect the proper characterization and classification of the
    materials.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ See safety alert http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/
    DownloadableFiles/1_2
    _14%20Rail_Safety_Alert.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Call to Action
        On January 9, 2014, the Secretary issued a ``Call to Action'' to
    actively engage stakeholders in the crude oil and rail industries to
    take immediate steps to improve the transportation of crude by rail. On
    January 16, 2014, the Secretary held a meeting where the Administrators
    of PHMSA, FRA, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
    challenged representatives of all stakeholders to identify prevention
    and mitigation strategies that can be implemented quickly.
        Specifically, the ``Call to Action'' discussed (1) operational
    controls and track maintenance measures that could prevent accidents
    and (2) the proper classification and characterization of hazardous
    materials. The meeting was an open and constructive dialogue on how,
    collaboratively, industry and government can make America's railways
    and other modes of transportation for hazardous materials safer, since
    the misclassification of a hazardous material affects more than just
    the railroad industry. During the meeting, the rail and crude oil
    industries agreed to consider potential actions they could take to
    enhance safety, including speed restrictions in high-consequence areas,
    alternative routing, the use of distributive power to improve braking,
    increased track inspections, improvements to crude oil testing and
    classification processes, and emergency response preparedness and
    training. In addition, the participants agreed to return to the TCC for
    discussions on further improvements to the tank car standard. On
    January 22, 2014, the Secretary sent a letter to the attendees
    recapping the meeting and stressing the importance of this issue.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ See Call to Action follow-up letter at http://phmsa.dot.gov/
    staticfiles/PHMSA/Down
    loadableFiles/Files/
    Letter_from_Secretary_Foxx_Follow_up_to_January_16.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the weeks following the ``Call to Action'' meeting, PHMSA has
    worked closely with industry stakeholders to advance the safety
    initiatives. We have received voluntary agreements from the AAR, the
    American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, and the American
    Petroleum Institute to consider ways to quickly implement the
    approaches to safety discussed during the meeting.
    Enhanced Enforcement and Outreach
        In addition to regulatory and non-regulatory efforts to improve
    rail safety, PHMSA has increased its efforts to improve awareness and
    understanding of, and compliance with, the Hazardous Materials
    Regulations. These efforts include enforcement and outreach activities
    that are focused on proper classification and characterization of
    hazardous materials, development of safety and security plans, and the
    awareness and understanding of Hazardous Materials Regulations. PHMSA
    has focused on addressing the considerable public, media, and
    congressional interest in the subject of crude oil transport by rail.
        As mentioned above, PHMSA launched ``Operation Classification,'' a
    compliance initiative involving unannounced inspections and testing of
    crude oil samples to verify that offerors of the materials have
    properly classified and described the materials being shipped. In
    January 2013, PHMSA and FRA began planning this initiative and
    officially launched ``Operation Classification'' in August 2013. This
    initiative is an ongoing effort, and PHMSA will continue to collect
    samples and test them to determine the characteristics of Bakken crude
    oil, as well as oil from west Texas. To date, PHMSA has taken 58
    samples to collect some preliminary information about the hazards
    associated with these oils. PHMSA has uncovered 11 potential
    violations, primarily related to improper packaging group assignment,
    and plans to release the findings of Operation Classification publicly
    upon conclusion of the effort. PHMSA has initiated enforcement actions
    on potential violators. In addition, as these violations could indicate
    further non-compliance issues, PHMSA continues to expand the scope of
    its investigations. PHMSA will use the results of the findings to
    consider the benefits, costs, and alternatives of any future regulatory
    action.
        On January 17, 2014, PHMSA published a Web Page entitled
    ``Operation Safe Delivery: Enhancing the Safe Transport of Flammable
    Liquids.'' \21\ This site describes the Department's efforts to enhance
    the safe transport of flammable materials by rail and serves as a
    valuable resource for enhancing the safe transport of flammable
    liquids. The site will receive regular updates to provide progress
    reports on industry commitments as part of the ``Call to Action'' and
    additional Departmental activities related to rail safety initiatives.
    This site also displays the Department's rail safety action plan.
    Although the site was only recently unveiled, it has already received
    considerable traffic and is an educational resource for industry and
    the general public.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Website available at http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/
    menuitem.6f23687cf7b00
    b0f22e4c6962d9c8789/
    ?vgnextoid=c5ff6d96d8283410VgnVCM100000d2c97898RCRD&vgnextcha
    nnel=0f0b143389d8c010VgnVCM1000008049a8c0RCRD&vgnextfmt=print
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        PHMSA is also diligently responding to both congressional and media
    inquiries on the subject of crude oil transport by rail. Since the
    beginning of 2013, PHMSA has received and responded to over twenty
    letters from Members of Congress requesting information on this topic.
    Finally, PHMSA is coordinating with the Government Accountability
    Office on an audit of the transportation infrastructure of the United
    States used to accommodate increased shale oil and gas production.
    III. Closing Remarks
        During my four years as PHMSA's Administrator, I have experienced
    marked changes in our hazardous materials transportation landscape. The
    emergence of the United States as the world's leading energy producer
    has undoubtedly changed our transportation system and provided new
    challenges for PHMSA. I have seen these changes and the evolution of
    the energy industry firsthand. I have also seen the lasting
    consequences that transportation incidents can have on the public and
    local communities nearby. We must prepare for these new and shifting
    demands right now and ensure that we protect our communities and the
    environment. Effective standards and regulations are important
    mechanisms for keeping America's people and its environment safe while
    providing for the transportation of the Nation's energy supplies, and
    we will continue to use our authorities to improve the effectiveness of
    our standards and regulations. PHMSA's oversight and enforcement
    capabilities, along with those of our Federal and State partners, are
    critically important.
        PHMSA and FRA are committed to improving the safety of the
    transportation of hazardous materials by rail and other modes. With
    this in mind, I believe that our comprehensive approach to rail safety
    is working, but we must continue to adapt our approach as we identify
    changing risks. Improvement in tank car integrity is one part of the
    ongoing effort to address the changes in the risks associated with
    transportation of hazardous materials. Furthermore, PHMSA and FRA are
    not alone in our safety efforts. As the ``Call to Action''
    demonstrated, the rail and crude oil industries are integral partners
    in improving transportation safety, and PHMSA will continue to work
    collaboratively to improve safety. We have a long way to go to reach no
    deaths, injuries, environmental or property damage, or transportation
    disruptions, but I truly believe our efforts are helping prevent
    accidents and will help mitigate their damage.
        In closing, we look forward to continuing to work with Congress to
    address rail safety issues, specifically those dealing with the bulk
    shipment of flammable liquids. Together, we will strive to keep
    America's people and its environment safe while providing for the
    reliable transportation of the Nation's energy supplies. Everyone at
    PHMSA is dedicated and committed to fulfilling our safety
    responsibility to the American people. It is an honor to serve the
    American people and to work with the dedicated public servants at
    PHMSA. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I
    would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
        Mr. Hart.

    STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
                      TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

        Mr. Hart. Thank you, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member
    Blunt, and members of the Subcommittee for inviting the NTSB to
    discuss lessons learned from accidents that can help improve
    rail safety.
        Rail safety in America is improving, as we have already
    heard, with total accidents and incidents down almost 23
    percent since 2004. However, a spate of recent accidents
    reminds us that our railroad system can and must be made safer.
        Improving rail safety requires a comprehensive approach
    starting with actions to prevent accidents such as the December
    1 Metro-North rail accident in the Bronx, which resulted in
    four fatalities. This tragedy has led to NTSB recommendations
    that will help prevent future accidents.
        We must also take action to make accidents less severe.
    Last July, a crude oil train derailed near the town center of
    Lac-Megantic, Quebec, triggering an intense crude oil fire; 47
    people died and the town center was destroyed. This tragedy
    demonstrates that until we have figured out how to prevent
    accidents completely, it's also important to mitigate the
    consequences.
        One of the major improvements the NTSB has been
    recommending for decades to help prevent accidents is positive
    train control. The tragic Metro-North accident in the Bronx was
    one type of accident that PTC is designed to prevent. PTC could
    have also prevented at least 25 other freight and passenger
    rail accidents that the NTSB has investigated since 2004.
    Congress has mandated the implementation of PTC by the end of
    2015. This deadline is the law of the land. PTC must be
    implemented by that deadline to prevent future accidents.
        The NTSB has recommended a transparent accounting of the
    railroad industry's actions taken and not taken to meet the
    statutory deadline. The NTSB is very disappointed and concerned
    that the FRA will not proactively release the railroads' PTC
    progress reports. The public interest would best be served by a
    full and transparent accounting of progress toward PTC.
        Another way to prevent accidents is to make sure that the
    Nation's rail infrastructure is adequately maintained. Broken
    rail and other track defects are a major cause of derailments.
    Accordingly, the NTSB continues to call for more robust track
    inspections to identify and fix problems before they cause
    derailments.
        We must also mitigate the consequences of accidents,
    especially those that involve flammable or toxic liquids such
    as crude oil and ethanol. We've already heard that rail
    carriage of both ethanol and crude oil increased more than 440
    percent between 2005 and 2010. In 2012, ethanol was the most
    frequently transported hazardous material in the railroad
    system.
        On December 30, near Casselton, North Dakota, 20 cars of a
    crude oil train derailed spilling about half a million gallons
    of crude oil and igniting a fire that burned for 24 hours.
    Fourteen hundred people were evacuated from their homes. As I
    mentioned earlier, in Lac-Megantic, last July, a crude oil
    train derailment resulted in the deaths of 47 people. In
    coordination with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada,
    the NTSB issued recommendations to the FRA and to PHMSA
    addressing specific improvements related to the safe transport
    of flammable liquids by rail.
        More broadly, the NTSB has publicly stated since 1991 that
    DOT-111 tank cars, which are the primary means of transporting
    crude oil and ethanol by rail, are too easily damaged even in
    low speed derailments. Their continued use to ship flammable
    liquids poses an unacceptable risk to the public. The revised
    DOT-111 design implemented by industry since 2011--the CPC-1232
    specification car needs further changes to improve its
    crashworthiness. An improved Federal tank car design standard
    must include enhanced head shields and tank jackets and
    increased tank shell thickness.
        The NTSB is encouraged that industry stakeholders and PHMSA
    are in broad agreement over the need to improve the DOT-111
    design. We will monitor the PHMSA rulemaking closely, although
    the improvements are long overdue. Next month, we will hold a
    tank car safety forum dealing with the transportation of
    flammable liquids by rail, and we will address tank car issues,
    operations issues, and the emergency response issues.
        Accident mitigation also requires that first responders
    have the training and resources necessary to safely and
    effectively respond to hazardous materials accidents. Railroads
    have a key role in helping prepare first responders and quickly
    responding to hazmat derailments. You've heard reference to the
    announcement by the Association of American Railroads and DOT
    Secretary Foxx of a series of new voluntary freight rail safety
    measures including measures to improve emergency response. As
    you may be aware, railroads and the DOT participate with the
    NTSB in our rail accident investigations and many of the newly-
    announced voluntary measures related to issues that we are
    examining in our ongoing investigations.
        Meanwhile, we continue to investigate the Casselton, ND
    accident and the four accidents involving Metro-North. Already
    in 2014 we have issued three safety recommendations to Metro-
    North. We will issue additional recommendations if needed
    without waiting on the completion of that final report. Our
    investigators are doing the methodical, comprehensive job that
    the American people expect from the NTSB. We anticipate issuing
    final reports and recommendations addressing more than ten rail
    accidents by the end of this year.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward
    to answering the Subcommittee's questions.
        Thank you very much for inviting the NTSB to participate in
    this hearing.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, On
               Behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board
        Good afternoon, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and
    Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
    and to update you on our ongoing work to improve railroad safety by
    investigating railroad accidents and issuing safety recommendations.
    Our nation's economy depends on a safe, reliable rail transportation
    system, and the American public expects and deserves nothing less.
    Recent railroad accidents under active investigation, including fatal
    accidents, remind us of the clear imperative to stay vigilant and stand
    ready to make improvements to the safety of railroad transportation.
    Our Nation's railroad system is safe, but evolving demands on the
    railroad system mean evolving safety challenges, and much work is ahead
    in our shared mission of making our Nation's railroad system as safe as
    it can be.
        Recent events have placed railroad safety at the forefront of the
    national conversation. Last May, in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 76 people
    were injured when a Metro-North Railroad (Metro-North) commuter train
    derailed, fouled the adjacent track, and was struck by a train
    approaching on that adjacent track. Just more than a week later, a
    Metro-North track foreman was struck by a train and killed in West
    Haven, Connecticut. In July, a CSX train operating on Metro-North
    tracks derailed in The Bronx. In December, four people lost their lives
    and 59 others were injured when a Metro-North commuter train derailed
    in The Bronx after entering a curve with a 30-mile-per-hour (mph) speed
    limit at 82 mph. One month later, 2014 dawned with a team of NTSB
    investigators working the scene of a serious railroad accident near
    Casselton, North Dakota, where 20 cars of a 106-car BNSF petroleum
    crude oil unit train ignited after colliding with cars from a derailed
    BNSF grain train.\1\ More than 476,000 gallons of crude oil were
    released in the accident, and the massive fire triggered a voluntary
    evacuation of 1,400 people from the surrounding area and resulted in
    millions of dollars in damage.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ A unit train is a train made up of cars carrying the same
    product.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our investigations into these accidents continue, and the second
    portion of this written testimony will update the Subcommittee on what
    we have learned so far. Last week, we issued three recommendations to
    Metro-North that Metro-North install signs to clearly warn train crews
    that they are approaching areas of permanent speed restrictions and
    that Metro-North install and review inward-and outward-facing audio and
    video recorders in locomotives and control cars, which is a
    longstanding NTSB recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration
    (FRA).
    Current Safety Issues
        First, I would like to offer some perspectives on safety issues
    including, (1) safety deficiencies in the design of thousands of
    railroad tank cars; (2) the need for widespread implementation of
    positive train control (PTC) systems; (3) the need for installation of
    inward-and outward-facing locomotive cameras; and (4) the need for
    focused, industrywide efforts to foster top-down safety cultures in
    which safety thrives. There is not one approach that will improve rail
    safety, but it must be addressed by implementing varied approaches
    that, when working together, can help drive down the number and
    frequency of accidents or mitigate the severity of accidents.
    Railroad Tank Car Design
        The Nation's railroad network is taking on an expanding role--one
    that has profound economic importance--as a major channel for the
    transportation of crude oil and other hazardous products. As the NTSB
    noted recently, the American Association of Railroads' 2012 Annual
    Report of Hazardous Materials Transported by Rail states that crude oil
    traffic has increased by 443 percent since 2005 and that this growth is
    expected to continue for the foreseeable future. According to the FRA,
    the volume of crude oil transported by rail has increased dramatically
    in recent years, from approximately 65,600 carloads in 2011 to
    approximately 257,450 \2\ carloads in 2012--an increase of 292
    percent.\3\ Moreover, not only is more crude oil being transported by
    rail, but some of the crude oil being moved on the Nation's railroad
    system--such as that originating in the Bakken formation--may have more
    volatile properties. Last month, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a safety alert advising ``the
    general public, emergency responders and shippers and carriers that. .
    .the type of crude oil being transported from the Bakken region may be
    more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil,'' with the results of
    further tests of Bakken crude oil forthcoming.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The capacity of a tank car is about 30,000 gallons or 675
    barrels of oil.
        \3\ FRA Emerg. Order No. 28, 78 Fed. Reg. 48218, 48220 (Aug. 7,
    2013).
        \4\ PHMSA Safety Alert: Preliminary Guidance from Operation
    Classification (Jan. 2, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Furthermore, ethanol traffic transported by railroad increased 442
    percent between 2005 and 2010; in 2012, ethanol was the most frequently
    transported hazardous material in the railroad system.\5\ The evolving
    role of our Nation's railroad network in the transportation of
    flammable crude oil and ethanol requires interested parties to take a
    comprehensive approach to eliminate or significantly reduce the safety
    risks. This approach must include improvements to track inspection and
    maintenance programs and the crashworthiness of the tank cars that
    transport these materials.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ FRA Emerg. Order No. 28, 78 Fed. Reg. at 48221; see also NTSB,
    Letter to The Honorable Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline
    and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
    Transportation (Jan. 21, 2014), at 7 n. 11-13 (and citations therein).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Indeed, as the volume of flammable materials transported by rail
    grows the Casselton, North Dakota, accident has become an increasingly
    commonplace story--and multiple recent serious and fatal accidents
    reflect substantial shortcomings in tank car design that create an
    unacceptable public risk. The crude oil unit train involved in the
    Casselton accident consisted of railroad tank cars designed and
    manufactured to Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 111-
    A100W1 (DOT-111)--a design that presents demonstrated and serious
    safety concerns when used to transport hazardous materials such as
    crude oil. Specifically, the NTSB has identified vulnerabilities in
    DOT-111 tank car design with respect to tank heads, shells, and
    fittings that create the unnecessary and demonstrated risk that, in an
    accident, hazardous materials could be released and, in the case of
    flammable materials such as crude oil and ethanol, could ignite and
    cause catastrophic damage.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ See, e.g., NTSB, Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691-18 With
    Subsequent Hazardous Materials Release and Fire Cherry Valley,
    Illinois, June 19, 2009, Accident Rpt. No. NTSB/RAR-12/01 (Feb. 14,
    2012), at 88 (concluding that, in accident involving breaches of DOT-
    111 tank cars, ``If enhanced tank head and shell puncture-resistance
    systems such as head shields, tank jackets, and increased shell
    thicknesses had been features of the DOT-111 tank cars involved in this
    accident, the release of hazardous materials likely would have been
    significantly reduced, mitigating the severity of the accident.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The NTSB continues to find that accidents involving the rupture of
    DOT-111 tank cars carrying hazardous materials often have violent and
    destructive results. For example, on July 6, 2013, a 4,700-foot-long
    train that included 72 DOT-111 tank cars loaded with crude oil from the
    Bakken fields derailed in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, triggering an intense
    fire fed by crude oil released from at least 60 cars. The fire engulfed
    the surrounding area and completely destroyed buildings and property.
    Forty-seven people died. The NTSB is assisting the Transportation
    Safety Board of Canada (TSB) in its investigation of that accident, and
    last month both the NTSB and TSB issued safety recommendations asking
    FRA and PHMSA, as appropriate, to require railroads to evaluate the
    safety and security risks of crude oil train routes and select routes
    that avoid populous and other sensitive areas, require railroads to
    develop comprehensive emergency response plans for worst-case releases
    resulting from accidents, and require shippers to sufficiently test and
    properly classify hazardous materials such as crude oil prior to
    shipment. With respect in particular to the recommendation on
    classification of crude oil, PHMSA's safety alert regarding Bakken
    crude oil underscores the critical importance of accurate
    classification of flammable materials. We look forward to working with
    PHMSA and FRA on implementing these recommendations.
        In addition, the NTSB is investigating, or has investigated, a
    spate of recent similar accidents in the United States that demonstrate
    the destructive results when DOT-111 tank cars containing hazardous
    materials are punctured, including:

       The July 11, 2012, Norfolk Southern Railway Company train
            derailment in a Columbus, Ohio, industrial area in which three
            derailed DOT-111 tank cars released about 54,000 gallons of
            ethanol, with energetic rupture of one tank car in a post-
            accident fire.

       The October 7, 2011, Tiskilwa, Illinois, train derailment of
            10 DOT-111 tank cars resulting in fire, energetic rupture of
            several tank cars, and the release of 162,000 gallons of
            ethanol.

       The June 19, 2009, Canadian National Railway train
            derailment in Cherry Valley, Illinois, in which 13 of 19
            derailed DOT-111 tank cars were breached, caught fire, and
            released about 324,000 gallons of ethanol. The post-accident
            fire resulted in one death, nine injuries, and the evacuation
            of 600 houses within half a mile of the accident.

       The October 20, 2006, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, Norfolk
            Southern Railway Company train derailment in which 23 DOT-111
            tank cars derailed, fell from a bridge, caught fire, and
            released more than 485,000 gallons of ethanol.

        Federal requirements simply have not kept pace with evolving
    demands placed on the railroad industry and evolving technology and
    knowledge about hazardous materials and accidents. In fact, the current
    American Association of Railroads (AAR) industry standards adopted for
    DOT-111 tank cars ordered after October 1, 2011 that are used to
    transport packing group I and II crude oil, impose a level of
    protection greater than corresponding Federal requirements. \7\ At this
    point, however, the NTSB is not convinced that these modifications
    offer significant safety improvements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ These new standards, for example, call for DOT-111 tank cars
    that transport flammable liquids in packing groups I and II (the
    highest-risk of the three packing groups, classified according to flash
    and boiling points) to be built with protective ``jackets'' around
    their tanks, constructed of normalized steel at least 7/16 inch thick,
    and call for non-jacketed tanks to be constructed from normalized steel
    (steel that has been subjected to a heat-treating process that improves
    its material properties) at least half an inch thick. See American
    Assoc. of Railroads, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices:
    Specifications for Tank Cars, M-1002. Corresponding Federal regulations
    require steel thickness of at least 7/16 inch, but they allow for the
    use of non-normalized steel and do not require incorporation of jackets
    or head shields. See 49 C.F.R. part 179, subpart D.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The NTSB continues to assert that DOT-111 tank cars, or tank cars
    of any successor specification, that transport hazardous materials
    should incorporate more effective puncture-resistant and thermal
    protection systems. This can be accomplished through the incorporation
    of additional protective features such as full head shields, jackets,
    thermal insulation, and thicker head and shell materials. Because the
    average service life of a tank car may run 20-30 years, it is
    imperative that industry, the FRA, and PHMSA take action now to address
    hazards that otherwise would exist for another half-generation or
    longer.
        Following the 2011 Cherry Valley, Illinois, accident the NTSB
    recommended that PHMSA improve DOT-111 tank car crashworthiness by:

            [r]equir[ing] that all newly manufactured and existing general
            service tank cars authorized for transportation of. . .crude
            oil in Packing Groups I and II have enhanced tank head and
            shell puncture-resistance systems and top fittings protection
            that exceeds existing design requirements for DOT-111 tank
            cars.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ See NTSB, Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691 With Subsequent
    Hazardous Materials Release and Fire, Cherry Valley, Illinois, June 19,
    2009, RAR-12/01 (2012); NTSB Recommendation No. R-12-5 (2012).

        The NTSB also recommended that PHMSA improve requirements for
    bottom outlet valves so that they remain closed during accidents
    involving impact forces \9\ and require improved center sill or draft
    sill attachment designs,\10\ and the NTSB reiterated its prior
    recommendation that PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, require that
    railroads immediately provide emergency responders with accurate, real-
    time information on hazardous materials on a train.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-12-6.
        \10\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-12-7.
        \11\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-07-4.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The importance of providing correct information to first responders
    highlights a related issue. Following the freight train derailment in
    Paulsboro, New Jersey, on November 30, 2012, which is the subject of an
    ongoing NTSB investigation, the NTSB learned of the critical importance
    to first responders of immediate, accurate information about the
    contents of a derailed tank car so that first responders may tailor
    their emergency response in a manner that best protects life and
    property. First responders' ability to make good decisions in
    responding to a hazardous-materials release depends on their clear
    understanding of what is in a tank car. Any improvement to railroad
    tank car safety must proceed hand-in-hand with an improved approach to
    ensuring first responders have adequate information to take appropriate
    life-saving actions. PHMSA indicates it, along with FRA, is working to
    implement this recommendation.
        Although important decisions are clearly ahead for regulators and
    industry, the NTSB is pleased that at least some progress has been
    made. PHMSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM)
    on September 6, 2013, for potential safety improvements to DOT-111 tank
    cars, and we remain engaged in that rulemaking proceeding. In NTSB
    comments on the ANPRM dated December 5, 2013, we urged PHMSA to
    promptly address the four recommendations that were included in the
    NTSB report on the Cherry Valley accident, described above, and to
    issue improved and effective regulations that reduce the risks
    associated with DOT-111 tank cars. We will continue to carefully
    monitor PHMSA's progress and will ensure decision-makers have the full
    benefit the lessons the NTSB has learned through its investigations.
    The NTSB also continues to call on industry stakeholders to rise to the
    challenge and explore measures that will improve tank car design in the
    interim. Industry and Department of Transportation leaders met in
    January to discuss development of an industry plan to make certain
    safety improvements.\12\ This dialogue is encouraging, and the NTSB
    will continue to urge regulators and industry stakeholders to follow
    through on any commitments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ ``Rail, Oil Industries Weigh New Safety Measures in Wake of
    Derailments, Explosions,'' NBC News Investigations, Jan. 16, 2014,
    available at http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/16/
    22328508-rail-oil-industries-weigh-new-safety-measures-in-wake-of-
    derail
    ments-explosions?lite.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Implementation of PTC Systems
        PTC systems help prevent (a) derailments caused by overspeeding,
    (b) train-to-train collisions by slowing or stopping trains that are
    not being operated in accordance with the signal systems and operating
    rules, and (c) injury to track workers. The first NTSB-investigated
    accident that train control technology would have prevented occurred in
    1969, when four people died and 43 were injured in the collision of two
    Penn Central commuter trains in Darien, Connecticut. The NTSB
    recommended in response to that accident that FRA study the feasibility
    of requiring railroads to install an automatic train control system,
    the precursor to today's PTC systems.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-70-020.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More recently, in 2008, more lives were lost in a PTC-preventable
    accident when a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific freight
    train collided head-on in Chatsworth, California, killing 25 people and
    injuring 102 others. The NTSB concluded that the Metrolink engineer's
    use of a cell phone to send text messages distracted him from his
    duties. PTC would have prevented the tragedy that resulted. In the
    aftermath of the Chatsworth accident, Congress enacted the Rail Safety
    Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008, which requires each class I rail
    carrier and each provider of regularly scheduled intercity passenger or
    commuter rail transportation to implement a PTC system by December 31,
    2015, on each line over which intercity passenger or commuter service
    is operated or over which poison-or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous
    materials are transported.\14\ In 2012, however, FRA exempted about
    10,000 miles of track from the PTC mandate, and several rail carriers
    and transit authorities have stated that they will not meet the 2015
    deadline.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
    Sec. 104 (2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We continue to see accidents that could be prevented by PTC. The
    December 1 Metro-North accident in the Bronx, which killed four people
    and injured 59 others, would have been prevented by PTC. We also are
    examining the role PTC could have played in the May 28 roadway worker
    fatality. Since 2004 alone, in the 25 PTC-preventable freight and
    passenger rail accidents that NTSB investigated, 65 people died, more
    than 1,100 were injured, and damages totaled millions of dollars.\15\
    With each PTC-preventable accident, the case for PTC only grows
    stronger, yet progress toward industry-wide implementation has been
    slow.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ These accidents do not include Metro-North accidents.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Implementation of PTC systems was included on the NTSB's Most
    Wanted List when the list was first published in 1990 and has remained
    on the list almost continuously since that time. We may never eliminate
    human error from the railroad system, but PTC provides a level of
    redundancy to protect trains and those on board when human factors,
    such as distraction or fatigue, might otherwise set an accident
    sequence into motion.
        Some rail carriers have installed PTC or are working to meet the
    2015 deadline. However, in August 2013, the Government Accountability
    Office reported to the U.S. Senate that, due to a number of complex and
    interrelated challenges, the majority of railroads will not complete
    PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline.\16\ NTSB files are filled with
    accidents that could have been prevented by PTC, and for each and every
    day that PTC implementation is delayed, the risk of an accident
    remains. For PTC to reach its greatest safety potential, it must be
    implemented on all passenger and freight lines subject to the
    installation requirements specified in the RSIA. Lives depend on it.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Gov't Accountability Office, Positive Train Control:
    Additional Authorities Could Benefit Implementation, GAO Rpt. No. GAO-
    13-720 (August 2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
    656975.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There is much debate by policymakers over whether to extend the
    2015 deadline established by RSIA. If Congress were to delay the
    statutory deadline, railroads that had delayed planning PTC
    implementation would be rewarded and railroads that had moved ahead
    with planning for PTC implementation by the deadline would essentially
    be punished. If the deadline remains unaltered, the NTSB would
    encourage FRA to take appropriate action to ensure railroads are
    complying with all applicable requirements regarding PTC
    implementation.
        Following the head-on collision of two Union Pacific freight trains
    in Goodwell, Oklahoma, NTSB issued the following recommendation to the
    railroads covered under the RSIA mandate:

            Provide positive train control implementation update reports to
            the Federal Railroad Administration every 6 months until
            positive train control implementation is complete. The update
            reports should consist of two sections: components and
            training. The components section should include a description
            of the positive train control component to be implemented, the
            number of components, the number of components completed on the
            report date, the number of components that remain to be
            completed, the overall completion percentage, and the estimated
            completion date. Components are defined as locomotives, wayside
            units, switches, base station radios, wayside radios,
            locomotive radios, and any new and novel technologies that are
            part of a positive train control system. The training section
            should include the number of safety-related employees and
            equivalent railroad carrier contractors and subcontractors that
            need to be trained, by class and craft; minimum training
            standards for those employees and contractors, meaning the
            knowledge of and ability to comply with Federal railroad safety
            laws and regulations and carrier rules and procedures to
            implement positive train control; the percentage of employees
            who have completed training; the percentage of employees who
            remain to be trained; and the estimated date that training will
            be completed.

        Additionally, the NTSB recommended that FRA:

            Publish the positive train control implementation update
            reports submitted by all railroads subject to the positive
            train control provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of
            2008 and make the reports available on your website within 30
            days of report receipt.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ See NTSB, Head-On Collision of Two Union Pacific Railroad
    Freight Trains Near Goodwell, Oklahoma June 24, 2012, Rpt. No. NTSB/
    RAR-13/02 (June 18, 2013); Recommendations Nos. R-13-23 and R-13-27
    (2013).

        The NTSB believes this information should be made available online
    to ensure a transparent accounting for actions taken and not taken to
    meet the 2015 deadline so that regulators and policymakers can make
    informed decisions. However, because of FRA's lack of sufficient action
    on its recommendation, this week we classified this recommendation as
    ``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
    Inward-and Outward-Facing Locomotive Audio and Image Recorders
        The December 1, Metro-North accident in The Bronx raised questions
    about the actions of the engineer prior to the crash. The NTSB has
    repeatedly called for railroad carriers to install inward-and outward-
    facing audio and image records to answer similar questions that have
    arisen in other accidents. Recorders in locomotives and cab car
    operating compartments are critically important not only because they
    would assist NTSB investigators and others understand what was
    happening in a train in the minutes and seconds before an accident, but
    also because they would help railroad management prevent accidents by
    identifying and responsibly addressing safety issues before they lead
    to injuries and loss of life and allow for the development of material
    that can be a valuable training and coaching tool.
        The Chatsworth tragedy in 2008 again made the case crystal-clear
    for understanding crewmembers' activities in the minutes and seconds
    leading up to accidents. Discussing the strong safety case for a
    requirement for inward-facing cameras in locomotives, the NTSB noted
    that

            [i]n all too many accidents, the individuals directly involved
            are either limited in their recollection of events or, as in
            the case of the Chatsworth accident, are not available to be
            interviewed because of fatal injuries. In a number of accidents
            the NTSB has investigated, a better knowledge of crewmembers'
            actions before an accident would have helped reveal the key
            causal factors and would perhaps have facilitated the
            development of more effective safety recommendations.

        On the basis of that reasoning, the NTSB recommended that FRA
    require the installation, in control compartments, of ``crash-and fire-
    protected inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable
    of providing recordings [for at least 12 hours] to verify that train
    crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
    essential to safety as well as train operating conditions.'' \18\ The
    NTSB also recommended that FRA ``[r]equire that railroads regularly
    review and use in-cab audio and image recordings . . . to verify that
    train crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
    essential to safety.'' \19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-10-1.
        \19\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-10-2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The NTSB recently reiterated these important recommendations in its
    report on the collision of a BNSF coal train with the rear end of a
    standing BNSF maintenance-of-way equipment train near Red Oak, Iowa,
    which resulted in fatal injuries to the two crewmembers of the striking
    train. Damage was in excess of $8.7 million. As the NTSB stated in its
    report, the accident again demonstrated the need for in-cab recording
    devices to better understand (and thereby prevent) serious railroad
    crashes that claim the lives of crewmembers, passengers, and the
    public.
        Last week, we issued our longstanding recommendation on this
    subject directly to Metro-North Railroad. An industry-wide FRA-mandated
    approach would be far more effective, but failing that, we will address
    the recommendation on an individual basis.
    Safety Culture
        Fostering the development of transparent, top-to-bottom safety
    cultures in transportation is an important priority of the NTSB.
    Creating and nurturing a thriving safety culture within rail carriers
    is even more imperative in light of the expanding role of the Nation's
    railroad system as a main transporter of flammable materials.
        The NTSB held a public forum on September 10 and 11, 2013, on
    successes and challenges associated with creating and maintaining
    strong safety cultures across the transportation modes, including rail.
    Panels of experts from academia, industry, and Federal regulatory
    agencies, such as the FRA, offered their perspectives on the
    significant organizational commitments and managerial work that are
    required to maintain safety cultures across large, complex
    organizations such as transportation carriers.
        As Members of the Subcommittee well remember, organizational
    factors at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
    contributed to the fatal June 22, 2009, Metrorail train collision near
    the Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C. The NTSB found that WMATA
    leaders did not take sufficient action to make safety a priority and to
    identify and address safety issues from the top down: the WMATA General
    Manager did not provide adequate information about critical safety
    issues; the WMATA Board of Directors did not seek information about
    critical safety issues; and the Board of Directors did not exercise
    oversight responsibility for system safety.
        While WMATA has addressed many of these issues, the NTSB is
    examining the role of safety culture in the Metro-North accident
    investigations. The NTSB public investigative hearing regarding last
    May's two Metro-North accidents examined the importance of an
    organizational safety culture and the critical role that organizational
    culture plays in preventing accidents. The NTSB learned during the
    hearing that Metro-North has undertaken efforts to foster a stronger
    safety culture but that challenges remain. The then-president of Metro-
    North, spoke of the ``challenge'' associated with creating ``a clear
    understanding across the organization that safety is the core value and
    we're not looking for shortcuts, and that we want people to work
    safely.'' \20\ Metro-North officials and labor stakeholders further
    assured the NTSB that Metro-North is taking action to address safety
    issues from the top to the bottom. Organizational issues within the
    railroad industry will continue to be an area of examination as the
    NTSB investigations of the Bridgeport, West Haven, and two Bronx
    accidents continue. In particular, the Bridgeport accident underscores
    the critical importance of regular, vigorous, and robust inspections of
    tracks. Railroad management must afford track workers adequate time and
    opportunity to conduct inspections and make repairs as necessary. As
    part of its ongoing investigation, the NTSB is undertaking a
    comprehensive review of Metro-North track inspections and follow-up
    work and is also looking at the adequacy of the FRA's Track Safety
    Standards.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ NTSB, Board of Inquiry in the Matter of Two Metro-North Rail
    Accidents: Bridgeport Train Derailment on May 17, 2013 and West Haven
    Collision Death of a Metro-North Track Foreman on May 28, 2013, Tr.
    Vol. II at 329 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 7, 2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The importance of building relationships between management and
    employees that foster a vibrant safety culture cannot be overlooked.
    Trust is an essential ingredient in those relationships. A culture in
    which front-line employees may openly report operational errors and
    safety issues without fear of reprisal is absolutely critical, and, as
    we have seen in the aviation context, improves safety.
        The NTSB will continue to urge Federal regulators, such as FRA and
    the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), to facilitate establishment
    of appropriate safety cultures. The WMATA accident, in particular,
    underscored the critical need for rail mass transit operators to
    enhance and nourish safety cultures. Our 2014 Most Wanted List
    reaffirms our view that:

            [t]he FTA should consider the elements of safety culture, crew
            resource management, fatigue risk management, and technology,
            as well as lessons learned from the rail industry, as it moves
            forward with [new legislative authority to set and enforce new
            safety standards and conduct investigations]. Identifying and
            implementing these will be key to saving lives and preventing
            injuries.
    Updates on Ongoing Investigations
        I would now like to update the Subcommittee on developments in
    several recent investigations that are keeping the NTSB's railroad
    investigators very busy and demonstrate the need for continued
    vigilance in the railroad operating environment.
    Metro-North Railroad Accidents
        On December 1, 2013, the NTSB launched an investigative team to The
    Bronx, where a Metro-North Railroad commuter train with approximately
    115 passengers on board derailed shortly after 7:15 a.m. near the
    Spuyten Duyvil station, while going from Poughkeepsie to Grand Central
    Station in New York City. Four passengers died in this Thanksgiving
    holiday weekend accident and at least 59 others sustained injuries
    requiring medical treatment. Metro-North estimated damage in excess of
    $9 million.
        The NTSB issued a preliminary factual report on the accident on
    January 14, 2014. Based on evidence obtained to this point, our
    investigators have found that the accident train was traveling at
    approximately 82 mph when it derailed in the curve on approach to the
    Spuyten Duyvil station. The speed limit for the curve was 30 mph. PTC
    would have prevented this accident. Metro-North does not have a PTC
    system and has stated it will not meet the deadline, but it thought its
    system would be as robust as PTC. This accident clearly demonstrated
    that it was not.
        Investigators have conducted detailed inspections and testing of
    the signal system, train brakes, and other mechanical equipment, and
    thus far have found no anomalies. They found no pre-accident anomalies
    in the track in the derailment area. Investigators have interviewed the
    train crewmembers, including the engineer and first responders and will
    continue to obtain and examine evidence from NTSB headquarters as the
    investigation proceeds. We are receiving excellent cooperation from the
    parties to the investigation: the FRA, Metro-North, the New York Public
    Transportation Safety Board, Teamsters Local 808, the New York Police
    Department, the New York Fire Department, and Bombardier
    Transportation, which manufactured the cars involved in the accident.
        Last week, as I stated earlier, the NTSB issued three safety
    recommendations to Metro-North. We recommended that Metro-North install
    signs to clearly warn train crews that they are approaching areas of
    permanent speed restrictions; install inward-and outward-facing audio
    and video recorders in locomotives and control cars, and regularly
    review and use in-cab audio and image recordings in conjunction with
    other performance data, to verify train crew actions are in accordance
    with rules and procedures that are essential to safety. As our
    investigation proceeds, the NTSB will be prepared to issue additional
    safety recommendations if we determine any further safety improvements
    are necessary pending completion of our investigation.
        The Bronx derailment was the fourth accident involving Metro-North
    property to trigger an NTSB investigation in 2013. Last June, the NTSB
    issued an urgent safety recommendation following the May 28 accident in
    which the track foreman died, calling upon Metro-North to immediately
    implement redundant measures to ensure the safety of track workers \21\
    (Metro-North indicates it is implementing this recommendation), and the
    NTSB reiterated a safety recommendation to the FRA to require redundant
    signal protection, such as shunting, for maintenance-of-way work crews
    who depend on the train dispatcher to provide signal protection.\22\
    That recommendation is currently classified as open with an acceptable
    response.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-13-17.
        \22\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-08-6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am pleased to inform the Subcommittee that Metro-North has fully
    cooperated in all these investigations, at a difficult time for the
    railroad and its employees in the wake of several closely-spaced
    accidents. We anticipate and look forward to Metro-North's continued
    cooperation as the investigations proceed.
        Although it is still too early in our investigations of these
    accidents to draw definitive conclusions, we will seek answers to the
    following questions, among others: What caused these accidents? Are
    there common threads among the accidents? What improvements can Metro-
    North, regulators, and others adopt that will prevent similar accidents
    from occurring in the future?
        The NTSB tentatively expects to complete our investigations of all
    four accidents involving Metro-North trains or property in the second
    half of this year. We recognize and share the Subcommittee's sense of
    urgency to understand what lessons can be drawn from these accidents
    and to ensure that the railroad industry and its regulators implement
    appropriate safety improvements to prevent recurrences, and if our
    investigation reveals problems that need immediate attention, we will
    not hesitate to issue appropriate recommendations before we complete
    the investigation.
    Freight Train Collision and Crude Oil Release near Casselton, N.D.
        As I noted above, the NTSB is investigating the December 30, 2013,
    Casselton, North Dakota, accident that resulted in a significant post-
    crash fire that triggered a voluntary evacuation of about 1,400 people
    from the surrounding community.
        The accident sequence began shortly after 2 p.m. when 13 cars of a
    112-car westbound BNSF Railway grain train derailed. One of the
    derailed cars came to rest on the adjacent track. Shortly afterward, a
    BNSF 106-car petroleum crude oil unit train travelling east on the
    parallel track collided with the derailed grain car. The collision
    caused the head-end locomotives and the first 21 cars of the crude oil
    train to derail. Some of the crude oil tank cars were punctured during
    the accident releasing crude oil that ignited and caused the energetic
    rupture of several other tank cars. Dense smoke and concern over
    expanding fires resulted in voluntary evacuation of the surrounding
    area.
        The crews on the two trains were uninjured. No injuries to the
    public were reported. Damage was estimated at $6.1 million.
        On a preliminary basis, we have found that, of the 20 tank cars
    that derailed, 18 tank cars were breached and more than 476,000 gallons
    of crude oil were released. NTSB investigators have completed the on-
    scene portion of the investigation, including interviews with the train
    crews and first responders. A broken axle and two wheels were shipped
    to the NTSB materials laboratory in Washington, D.C., for further
    evaluation and analysis, as well as the locomotive event and video
    recorders. The parties to the investigation include the FRA; PHMSA; the
    BNSF; the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen; the
    International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation
    Workers, formerly known as the United Transportation Union; Trinity
    Rail Car; and Standard Steel, LLC.
    Conclusion
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and to provide
    updates on our ongoing investigations as well as NTSB perspectives on
    several compelling safety issues. Please be assured that the NTSB will
    remain engaged on these and all issues affecting transportation safety.
    I look forward to answering the Subcommittee's questions.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Hart.
        Mr. Blackwell.

               STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY C. BLACKWELL, CHIEF,

             OFFICE OF NATIVE AFFAIRS AND POLICY, CONSUMER

        AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
                               COMMISSION

        Mr. Blackwell. Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt,
    and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
    to testify today concerning the FCC's role in enhancing rail
    safety.
        The FCC recognizes that positive train control has the
    power to save lives, prevent injury, and avoid property damage.
    It is the top priority of the FCC to work with all parties to
    help them fulfill their legal obligations and advance the
    deployment of PTC as prescribed by the Rail Safety Improvement
    Act of 2008. At the same time, we recognize the need to balance
    the very legitimate concerns regarding the potential impacts of
    such a major infrastructure deployment on historic properties
    including sites of religious and cultural significance to
    tribal nations.
        This imperative is reflected in the FCC's statutory
    obligations under Section 106 of the National Historic
    Preservation Act as well as the National Environmental Policy
    Act. Regulations developed by the Advisory Council on Historic
    Preservation, require that the FCC review and assess whether a
    proposed communications facility may have an adverse effect on
    historic properties and consult with federally-recognized
    tribal nations as part of the review process. The NHPA and our
    rules require that applicants ascertain prior to initiating
    construction, whether their construction could have a
    significant environmental impact including an adverse effect on
    historic properties.
        A cornerstone of the Commission's implementation of Section
    106 is the Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS). TCNS
    is a secure online system that allows parties constructing
    communications towers to ascertain whether their proposed
    construction would implicate a tribal nation's interest in
    culturally or religiously significant sites. A parallel system,
    E106, exists to facilitate review of towers by State Historic
    Preservation Officers (SHPO). TCNS and E106 provide an easy and
    efficient way to exchange information among FCC staff, tribal
    nations, State Historic Preservation Officers, and applicants.
        In the spring of 2013, the railroads informed us that they
    intended to deploy PTC using a system that required the
    construction of approximately 22,000 wayside poles. We
    immediately sought to develop alternative ways to leverage TCNS
    and E106 to facilitate the deployment of this necessary
    infrastructure while also ensuring compliance with all the
    relevant statutes and our rules.
        The TCNS and E106 systems are tried and true; designed to
    ensure efficient reviews, but were not designed for the sheer
    volume of the PTC wayside antenna structures. TCNS and E106 do,
    however, offer unique efficiencies that will provide many
    advantages to all the parties involved.
        Being mindful of the FCC's trust responsibility to consult
    with tribal governments prior to implementing a regulatory
    action, we took the following steps: First, we consulted with
    the Council on Environmental Quality and the Advisory Council
    on Historic Preservation (ACHP) on the best path forward with
    the conclusion being that the most expeditious is for the
    Commission to tailor its historic preservation review processes
    is to develop a Program Comment. This is a document adopted and
    issued by the Advisory Council that allows the FCC to follow
    alternative historic preservation review processes.
        Second, on September 27, we released a Section 106 Scoping
    Document as an initial step in developing a Program Comment. We
    then held tribal consultations in South Dakota in November, and
    Oklahoma in December. In unprecedented fashion, these meetings
    with tribal officials also included demonstration and
    presentation sessions by the railroads.
        Third, on January 29, we released a draft Program Comment
    which seeks to promote administrative efficiency by providing
    for submission of poles in batches while ensuring that SHPOs
    and tribal nations will receive sufficient information about
    each pole to evaluate its effects on historic properties.
        Comments on the draft Program Comment were due February 12.
    The Program Comment was formally submitted to the Advisory
    Council this past Tuesday, March 4. And under its rules, ACHP
    would act on the Program Comment by mid-April.
        Once adopted, the Commission is prepared immediately to
    begin accepting railroad submissions for the up to 20,000
    additional constructions now expected. Complicating our work to
    create an efficient process for new PTC construction is the
    fact that we must consider more than 10,000 PTC constructions
    that were undertaken without completing the environmental and
    historic preservation review clearly required by Federal laws
    and regulations. This issue has figured prominently in our
    discussions with SHPOs and tribal nations as we seek to create
    an efficient review process.
        Based on those discussions, it is clear to us that issues
    related to prior construction must be resolved at the same time
    as the issues surrounding future PTC infrastructure.
        In closing, let me reiterate that the Commission recognizes
    the importance of PTC to enhancing rail safety and is committed
    to creating an efficient and timely review process. This
    process will ensure full consideration of the effects of PTC
    wayside poles on historic properties including sites of
    religious and cultural significance to tribal nations in a
    manner that allows the railroads to complete construction by
    the statutory deadline.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look
    forward to answering any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Blackwell follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Geoffrey C. Blackwell, Chief, Office of Native
         Affairs and Policy, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,
                       Federal Communications Commission
        Chairman Warner, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today
    concerning the Federal Communications Commission's role in enhancing
    rail safety. My name is Geoffrey Blackwell, and I am the Chief of the
    Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Office of Native Affairs and
    Policy, or ONAP, which is part of the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
    Bureau. ONAP was established in August 2010 to promote the deployment
    and adoption of communications services and technologies throughout
    Tribal Lands and Native Communities and to ensure robust government-to-
    government consultation with federally-recognized Tribal Governments
    and increased coordination with Native Organizations, including on
    environmental and historic preservation reviews and related matters.
    Along with other Commission Bureaus and Offices, ONAP is part of the
    internal infrastructure team at the Commission that coordinates closely
    on the matters involved in this hearing.
        The Commission recognizes that positive train control (PTC) is a
    transformative technology that has the power to save lives, prevent
    injuries, and avoid extensive property damage. Clearly, PTC deployment
    is a top priority of all of the agencies and companies represented at
    the table today. It is also a top priority of the Commission to work
    with all parties to help them fulfill their various legal obligations
    and responsibilities and advance the deployment of PTC within the time-
    frame prescribed by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA).
        At the same time, we recognize the need to balance legitimate
    concerns regarding the potential impacts of such a major infrastructure
    deployment on historic properties, including sites of religious and
    cultural significance to Tribal Nations. This imperative is reflected
    in the FCC's statutory obligations under Section 106 of the National
    Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), as well as the National Environmental
    Policy Act (NEPA). Most notably, NHPA regulations developed by the
    Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) require that the FCC
    review and assess whether a proposed communications facility may have
    an adverse effect on historic properties, and consult with Federally
    recognized Tribal Nations as part of its review process.
        For example, railroad tracks often follow historical trade and
    navigation routes that have been used for centuries, both by European
    settlers and by Native peoples before and since European settlement.
    Construction along the tracks therefore has the potential to affect a
    number of cultural or religious properties, from traditional burial
    sites to sacred landscapes. Our consultations with Tribal Nations
    revealed such specific histories. According to the Tribal Historic
    Preservation Officer (THPO) of the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, when the
    railroad was constructed through historical Quapaw community lands in
    the southern plains, the soil of multiple burial mounds was bulldozed
    into the right-of-way to build up the track bed. According to the THPO
    of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, the largest Tribal cemetery
    ever discovered in the state of Mississippi was found under a railroad
    right-of-way. Several THPOs for Tribal Nations resident in both North
    and South Dakota have identified village sites that lie underneath
    existing rail lines. Likewise, Tribal Nations with an interest in the
    Columbia River Gorge have identified sacred sites and petroglyphs that
    are either underneath or alongside the existing tracks. Construction
    along railroad tracks can also affect historic properties that are not
    of cultural and religious significance to Tribal Nations. For example,
    the Pennsylvania, Georgia, Montana, Wyoming, and New Mexico SHPOS have
    identified historic districts in their states that lie astride rail
    lines.
        Accordingly, to address these concerns the Commission is dedicating
    substantial resources to establishing a specially-designed review
    process that would allow the railroads to deploy PTC wayside
    infrastructure by the December 31, 2015, statutory deadline, while also
    ensuring that it meets its statutory obligation to fully consider the
    effects of this infrastructure on historic properties, including sites
    of religious and cultural significance to Tribal Nations.
    Background
        RSIA requires that freight and passenger railroads deploy by
    December 31, 2015, interoperable PTC systems along routes transporting
    passengers and certain hazardous cargoes. While the Federal Railroad
    Administration (FRA) is responsible for overseeing the railroads'
    implementation of PTC by the statutory deadline, the FCC plays a role
    in two aspects of PTC deployment. First, the FCC regulates access to
    spectrum, and many railroads are installing PTC systems that require
    licensed spectrum to enable wireless communication. Second, it is well
    established--and has been upheld by the D.C. Circuit--that a Commission
    licensee's construction of a facility (e.g., a communications tower) to
    use Commission-licensed spectrum constitutes a major Federal action and
    Federal undertaking within the meaning of NEPA and the NHPA. Thus, the
    FCC has a legal responsibility to review the environmental and historic
    preservation impacts, including impacts on properties of religious and
    cultural significance to Tribal Nations, of infrastructure projects,
    like PTC, that will provide wireless services using FCC-licensed
    spectrum. It is a common misperception that the responsibility to
    ensure that Tribal Nations have an opportunity to participate in this
    process arises only with respect to the lands upon which Tribal Nations
    currently reside. In fact, the NHPA requires a nationwide scope, and
    Tribal involvement in the FCC process is typically most important on
    non-Tribal lands. These previously inhabited areas are precisely where
    Tribal governments do not presently own the land or have the authority
    to protect their religious and cultural properties, except through the
    NHPA.
    Providing Spectrum
        Broadly speaking, the FCC understands that two types of PTC systems
    will be implemented in the United States. While they both use
    frequencies in the 217 to 222 megahertz range, they have different
    spectrum requirements. In the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak and the
    commuter railroads intend to implement Amtrak's Advanced Civil Speed
    Enforcement System (ACSES), via 12.5 kHz spectrum channels. Outside of
    the Northeast Corridor, commuter railroads, Amtrak and the freight
    railroads intend to implement a system developed by the freight
    railroads, Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS),
    via 25 kHz channels.
        Since 2010, FCC staff has been working with freight and commuter
    rails to identify spectrum that is suitable and available for the
    deployment of an interoperable PTC system. PTC-220, a consortium of the
    Nation's seven Class I freight railroads, has acquired a substantial
    block of nationwide spectrum, as well as additional spectrum in dense
    urban markets, for the purpose of implementing PTC systems. FCC staff
    continues to work with PTC-220 and other relevant stakeholders to
    enable more intensive use of PTC-220s spectrum holdings, which will
    allow other railroads, especially commuter railroads, to benefit from
    PTC-220s spectrum holdings and networks. Provided that pending and
    future FRA requirements do not materially impact PTC spectrum needs, we
    believe the seven Class I freight railroads generally have sufficient
    spectrum to deploy PTC. We also believe that an increasing number of
    commuter rails have access to sufficient spectrum to deploy PTC. We
    continue to work actively with those still seeking spectrum.
    Environmental and Historic Preservation Review
        The Commission's rules require that applicants ascertain--prior to
    initiating construction--whether a facility they wish to construct
    could have a significant environmental impact, including an adverse
    effect on historic properties. If the facility may have such an impact,
    the Commission's rules require the preparation of an Environmental
    Assessment (EA) and further environmental processing.
        To determine whether there will be an adverse effect on historic
    properties, the rules require the applicant to follow certain
    procedures set forth in the Commission's 2004 Nationwide Programmatic
    Agreement (NPA) with the ACHP and the National Conference of Historic
    Preservation Officers (NCSHPO). Intended to facilitate historic
    preservation review for communications projects, the NPA includes
    procedures for participation of Tribal Nations and, where necessary,
    referral to the Commission for government-to-government consultation.
    The NPA also improved the process for SHPO review and excluded some
    constructions from review under defined conditions. The Commission's
    rules also specify procedures for NEPA compliance. No formal regulatory
    action is required to adapt these procedures for PTC wayside poles, and
    the Commission staff is working with the railroads to make the
    necessary informal adjustments to the process.
        While the Commission's rules include certain exemptions and
    exclusions from NEPA and NHPA review, none currently available would
    categorically exclude the entire PTC wayside pole system. The creation
    of exemptions for infrastructure deployments like PTC would require not
    only consultation and negotiation with ACHP and NCSHPO, the other
    necessary signatories to our NPA under ACHP rules, but also a full
    notice and comment rulemaking proceeding at the Commission, a process
    that could take a year or longer.
        A cornerstone of the Commission's implementation of the NPA is the
    Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS), a secure technology
    solution that allows parties interested in constructing communications
    towers to ascertain whether their proposed construction would implicate
    a Tribal Nation's interest in culturally or religiously significant
    sites in the area of the proposed construction. TCNS is a non-public
    system that facilitates the notification, interactions, and review of
    proposed constructions, while protecting the private nature of both the
    particular applicant's proposed construction and the site of religious
    or cultural significance to a Tribal Nation. Use of TCNS immediately
    narrows the areas of interest of Tribal Nations to only those that they
    have indicated as relevant in this process and currently, every single
    Tribal Nation in the country has set their areas of interest to
    participate in the TCNS system. A parallel system, E-106, exists to
    facilitate review of communications towers by interested state historic
    preservation officers (SHPOs).
        On average the Commission processes more than 10,000applications a
    year for new or collocated communications infrastructure through these
    systems. TCNS and E-106 provide an easy way to exchange information
    among Commission staff, Tribal Nations, SHPOs and applicants.
    Facilitating Efficient PTC Infrastructure Deployment
        In the spring of 2013, the railroads informed FCC staff that they
    intended to deploy PTC using a system that required the construction of
    approximately 22,000 wayside poles with antennas along the railroad
    tracks. Through continued discussions with the railroads we concluded,
    and the railroads have agreed, that the Commission's TCNS and E-106
    processes, as they existed, were not suited to ensure efficient review
    of PTC wayside infrastructure on such a large scale. In fact, the
    existing TCNS and E-106 process was originally designed for tower-by-
    tower review and does not efficiently scale up to the large scale and
    linear nature of the proposed PTC projects. At the same time, we
    recognized that TCNS and E-106 do offer unique efficiencies that will
    provide many advantages to the railroads, FCC staff, SHPOs, and Tribal
    Nations. Consequently, the Commission immediately sought to develop
    alternative ways to leverage TCNS and E-106 so as to facilitate the
    deployment of necessary infrastructure while ensuring compliance with
    the relevant statutes and our rules. In doing so, we are mindful of the
    Commission's trust responsibility to consult with Tribal governments
    prior to implementing any regulatory action or policy that could
    significantly or uniquely affect Tribal governments, their land and
    resources.
        Complicating our work to create an efficient process for new
    construction of PTC infrastructure is the fact that we must consider
    more than ten thousand PTC infrastructure deployments that were
    undertaken by the railroads without completing the environmental and
    historic preservation review clearly required by Federal laws and
    regulations. This issue has figured prominently in our discussions with
    SHPOs and Tribal representatives, and in consultations with Tribal
    government officials, as we seek to create an efficient review process.
    Based on those discussions, it is clear to us that issues related to
    prior construction must be resolved contemporaneously with the issues
    surrounding future PTC infrastructure construction.
        In May 2013, FCC senior staff advised the major freight railroads
    to defer submission of requests seeking SHPO and Tribal review of
    wayside pole deployments until the FCC could develop a more streamlined
    process specifically tailored to PTC wayside poles. FCC staff has
    consistently advised commuter railroads, which will deploy a limited
    number of wayside poles, to continue using the TCNS and E-106 systems.
    The Program Comment
        Upon concluding that our existing processes were not suitable for
    PTC infrastructure review, FCC staff consulted with the
    Administration's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and with the
    ACHP on the best path forward. CEQ confirmed that we could not simply
    exclude PTC wayside poles from the required NEPA review without a
    formal notice and comment rulemaking process to develop a categorical
    exclusion. ACHP similarly confirmed that there was no ready path to a
    broad exclusion from NHPA review. ACHP further advised that the most
    expeditious way for the Commission to streamline its historic
    preservation review process is to develop a ``Program Comment.''
        A Program Comment is a document adopted and issued by the ACHP that
    allows a Federal agency such as the FCC to follow alternative historic
    preservation review processes that address specific needs of an agency.
    Under this approach, the FCC must develop a draft Program Comment and
    propose it to ACHP after consultation with all stakeholders, including
    government-to-government consultation with Tribal Nations. Adoption and
    implementation of the Program Comment does not require a formal FCC
    rulemaking.
        We released a Section 106 scoping document--an initial step in
    developing a Program Comment--on September 27, 2013. We then met with
    Tribal officials and railroad representatives, in Rapid City, South
    Dakota in November 2013, and Tulsa, Oklahoma in December 2013. In an
    unprecedented fashion, in addition to face-to-face consultations
    between Federal and Tribal officials, these meetings also included
    sessions with all interested parties present. At their request, we also
    coordinated with the railroads to facilitate live demonstrations of
    their PTC deployments to Tribal officials.
        As a result of those meetings and consultations, on January 8,
    2014, the Commission advised the Class I freight railroads to begin
    submitting through TCNS and E-106 proposed PTC infrastructure along
    segments of track that were discussed during the Rapid City and Tulsa
    meetings using a Beta version of the process we envision implementing
    in the Program Comment. While the TCNS and E106 systems are not
    designed for public inspection, and thus do not have public view
    versions, we believe it is a good indication of forward progress that
    one of the Class I freight railroads has voluntarily filed information
    in TCNS, and four have filed forms in the E-106 system.
        We began our PTC solutions dialogue with Indian Country in August
    of last year--the earliest practicable date--at the annual meeting of
    the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers in
    Billings, Montana. We are scheduling additional consultations with
    Tribal Nations in the Pacific Northwest and Southwest to gather input
    on the draft Program Comment and continue the productive conversations
    between the Tribal Nations and the railroads. We also conducted a
    dialogue last week with the Culture and Heritage Committee of the
    United South and Eastern Tribes, and we have conducted numerous other
    meetings with regional and national inter-Tribal organizations.
        FCC staff has also engaged numerous SHPOs on the proposal to create
    a more efficient review process. In particular, we provided information
    to the SHPOs by letter in July 2013, October 2013, and January 2014,
    and we have conducted four teleconferences with the SHPOs in August
    2013, December 2013, and February 2014.
        The FCC publicly released a draft Program Comment on January 29,
    2014. The draft Program Comment would apply to wayside infrastructure
    that will be constructed within existing railroad rights of way for use
    in the implementation and operation of PTC systems. Infrastructure
    eligible for the procedures of the Program Comment may support either
    wayside antennas or base stations, but must not: (1) be taller than 75
    feet; (2) create a foundation hole in excess of 15 inches in diameter
    (unless agreed to in the context of manual excavation); (3) require a
    foundation deeper than 15 feet; or (4) be situated outside the railroad
    right-of-way. Applicants using the proposed Program Comment must ensure
    that associated cultural resource reports are prepared by professionals
    who meet the relevant standards in the Secretary of the Interior's
    Professional Qualifications Standards. Additionally, applicants must be
    willing to support Tribal monitoring activities if requested and to
    compensate Tribal preservation offices for professional services in
    accordance with the ACHP's guidelines. The draft Program Comment seeks
    to promote administrative efficiency by providing for submission of
    poles in batches, rather than pole-by-pole, while ensuring that SHPOs
    and Tribal Nations will receive sufficient information about each pole
    to evaluate its effects on historic properties.
        Comments on the draft Program Comment were due yesterday. The
    Commission expects to submit the Program Comment to ACHP by the end of
    February. Under its rules, ACHP should act on the Program Comment by
    mid-April. Once adopted, the Commission is prepared immediately to
    begin accepting submissions from railroads under its terms.
    Collaboration
        Throughout this process, the Commission has been working closely
    with our partners at the Federal Railroad Administration, the National
    Transportation Safety Board, ACHP, CEQ, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
    Service to share information and ensure coordination between our
    agencies. As I stated we are also working closely with Tribal Nations
    and their cultural preservation officials, the SHPOs and, of course,
    the railroads subject to the PTC mandate. We will continue our close
    and productive collaboration with all of these parties to ensure that
    the Commission's processes do not inhibit the deployment of PTC by the
    statutory deadline.
        In closing, let me reiterate that the Commission recognizes the
    importance of PTC to enhancing rail safety, and is committed to doing
    what is necessary to allow for an efficient and timely review process
    that ensures full consideration of the effects of PTC wayside poles on
    historic properties, including sites of religious and cultural
    significance to Tribal Nations, in a manner that allows the railroads
    to complete construction by the statutory deadline.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look forward to
    answering any questions you may have.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Blackwell.
        Mr. Searles.

       STATEMENT OF PRENTISS SEARLES, MARKETING AND RAIL ISSUES
                 MANAGER, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

        Mr. Searles. Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt and
    members of the Subcommittee, Senators Heitkamp and Hoeven,
    thank you for the invitation to testify on this important and
    timely topic of enhancing rail safety.
        My name is Prentiss Searles. I am the Marketing and Rail
    Issues Manager for the American Petroleum Institute (API). I am
    testifying on behalf of my boss, Bob Greco, who has the flu
    today.
        API represents all segments of the oil and natural gas
    industry with more than 590 members who supply most of the
    Nation's energy. The revolution in North American energy
    development has been possible by technological breakthroughs
    and decades-old methods of energy development which has set
    this Nation on the path to energy security; a concept
    unthinkable just a few years ago.
        The energy policies we choose today will determine if our
    nation will continue its march toward global energy leadership;
    a unique and once-in-a-generation opportunity. America's
    dramatic increase in domestic energy production has
    fundamentally altered the global energy markets and, more
    broadly, the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, all
    while providing a much-needed boost to our economy.
        In order to achieve our Nation's full potential as a global
    energy leader, all of us have to work together to ensure that
    our energy infrastructure is capable of safely, reliably, and
    efficiently transporting ever increasing amounts of
    domestically produced energy whether by truck, barge, pipeline,
    or the focus of today's hearing, rail. Meaningful and lasting
    improvement in rail safety will only come from a holistic and
    collaborative approach to accident prevention, mitigation and
    response. And the oil and natural gas industry will continue to
    work with our colleagues in government, the rail industry, and
    others on continual safety improvement.
        The Memorandum of Understanding, recently released between
    the railroad industry and the Department of Transportation
    which outlines operational changes to improve rail safety, is
    an important step in our shared goal of improving the safety of
    America's freight rail system. While it's true that 99.997
    percent of hazardous materials transported by rail reach their
    destinations without incident, the oil and natural gas industry
    is committed to getting to zero rail incidents. Because, when
    it comes to safety, the only number that matters is zero
    incidents. Getting to zero will take the long-term commitment
    to working collaboratively with all stakeholders and applying
    our best science, research and real world data in a thoughtful
    and a deliberate manner.
        Being a safe steward of our Nation's energy resources and
    providing the leadership in raising the bar on industry
    performance isn't new to the oil and natural gas sector. For 90
    years, API has been the world leader in developing and
    improving equipment and operating standards, 600 and counting
    for oil and natural gas through a collaborative process that
    involves all stakeholders, as well as government regulators.
    This process is accredited by the American National Standards
    Institute, or ANSI, which is the same organization that
    accredits the government's national laboratories.
        We have already assembled the best experts from our
    industry, the railroad scientists and engineers, and others, to
    tackle some of the issues raised by the recent incidents
    involving the transport of crude by rail. PHMSA also committed
    to join our effort to develop a comprehensive standard that
    addresses the classification of crude oil to ensure that we are
    moving that product in the safest manner possible. This
    includes possible safety improvements for material
    characterization, transport classification, and quantity
    measurement of crude oils based on the best available science
    and data. This is part of our industry's longstanding
    commitment to safety.
        In 2011, the oil and natural gas industry helped lead the
    multi-industry effort that led to significant improvements in
    the design of tank cars and we moved forward voluntarily with
    those improvements so that, this year, we are approaching 40
    percent of the crude tank cars in use by our industry that
    exceed the current Federal safety standards. With this
    achievement, please keep in mind, as Administrator Quarterman
    said at last week's House hearing on rail safety, ``Getting a
    new tank car is not a silver bullet. First, we need to prevent
    derailments.''
        In the final analysis, the women and men of the rail and
    oil and natural gas industries, as well as the communities
    traversed by our Nation's freight rails, deserve our laser
    focus on these challenges. Our potential as a global energy
    leader is rooted in our ability to safely transport our game-
    changing energy resources safely every time, be it by truck,
    barge, pipeline, or rail.
        We look forward to continuing to work with our colleagues
    in government, in the rail industry, and with others to develop
    a long-term holistic and comprehensive approach to rail safety
    that includes prevention, mitigation and response, and moves us
    closer to what, I think, is our shared goal of zero rail
    incidents.
        Thank you for your time and attention.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Greco follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Bob Greco, Group Director of Downstream
                    Operations, American Petroleum Institute
        Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify on the important
    and timely topic of enhancing rail safety.
        My name is Bob Greco, Group Director of Downstream Operations at
    the American Petroleum Institute. API represents all segments of the
    oil and natural gas industry, with more than 590 members who supply
    most of the Nation's energy.
        The revolution in North American energy development has been made
    possible by technological breakthroughs in decades-old methods of
    energy development, which has set this Nation on the path to energy
    security, a concept unthinkable just a few years ago.
        The energy policies we choose today will determine if our Nation
    will continue its march toward global energy leadership; a unique and
    once in a generation opportunity. America's dramatic increase in
    domestic energy production has fundamentally altered the global energy
    markets and more broadly the geopolitical landscape for decades to
    come, all while providing a much needed boost to our economy.
        In order to achieve our Nation's full potential as a global energy
    leader, all of us have to work together to ensure that our energy
    infrastructure is capable of safely, reliably, and efficiently
    transporting ever-increasing amounts of domestically produced energy,
    whether by truck, barge, pipeline, or the focus of today's hearing,
    rail.
        Meaningful and lasting improvement in rail safety will only come
    from a holistic and collaborative approach to accident prevention,
    mitigation and response, and the oil and natural gas industry will
    continue to work with our colleagues in government, the rail industry,
    and others on continual safety improvement.
        The Memorandum of Understanding recently released between the
    railroad industry and the Department of Transportation, which outlines
    operational changes to improve rail safety, is an important step in our
    shared goal of improving the safety of America's freight rail system.
        While it's true that 99.997 percent of hazardous materials
    transported by rail reach their destinations without incident . . . the
    oil and natural gas industry is committed to getting to zero rail
    incidents. Because when it comes to safety the only number that matters
    is zero incidents.
        Getting to zero will take the long-term commitment to working
    collaboratively with all stakeholders and applying all of our best
    science, research, and real-world data in a thoughtful and deliberate
    manner.
        Being a safe steward of our Nation's energy resources and providing
    leadership in raising the bar on industry performance isn't new to the
    oil and natural gas sector. For 90 years, API has been the world leader
    in developing and improving equipment and operating standards--600 and
    counting--for oil and natural gas through a collaborative process that
    involves all stakeholders, as well as government regulators. This
    process is accredited by the American National Standards Institute, or
    ANSI, which is the same organization that accredits the government's
    national laboratories.
        We have already assembled the best experts from our industry, the
    railroads, scientists and engineers and others to tackle some of the
    issues raised by the recent rail incidents involving the transport of
    crude oil. PHMSA also committed to join our effort to develop a
    comprehensive standard that addresses the classification of crude oil
    to ensure we are moving that product in the safest manner possible.
    This includes possible safety improvements for material
    characterization, transport classification, and quantity measurement of
    crude oil based on the best available science and data.
        This is part of our industry's longstanding commitment to safety.
    In 2011, the oil and natural gas industry helped lead the multi-
    industry effort that led to significant improvements in the design of
    tank cars. And we moved forward voluntarily with those improvements--so
    that this year we are approaching 40 percent of the crude tank cars in
    use by our industry that exceed the current Federal safety standard.
    With this achievement please keep in mind, as Administrator Quarterman
    said at last week's House hearing on rail safety, ``getting a new tank
    car is not a silver bullet; first we need to prevent derailments.''
        In the final analysis, the women and men of the rail and oil and
    natural gas industries, as well as the communities traversed by our
    Nation's freight rails, deserve our laser focus on this challenge. Our
    potential as a global energy leader is rooted in our ability to safely
    transport our game-changing energy resources safely every time, be it
    by truck, barge, pipeline, or rail.
        We look forward to continuing to work with our colleagues in
    government, in the rail industry, and with others to develop a long-
    term, holistic and comprehensive approach to rail safety that includes
    prevention, mitigation, and response and moves us closer to what I
    think is our shared goal of zero rail incidents.
        Thank you for your time and attention.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Searles.
        Mr. Hamberger.

    STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
               OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS

        Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
    opportunity to appear here before you today, Ranking Member
    Blunt, members of the Subcommittee. I will be focusing on two
    important aspects of rail safety: moving energy by rail and
    positive train control. But obviously, stand ready to answer
    questions in any other safety area that interests the
    Subcommittee.
        Regarding moving crude by rail, as impressed as Senator
    Blunt is, the 200 some thousand carloads in 2012, 2013 looks to
    be about 410,000 carloads. And I think the 2015 and 2016 will
    continue to show that upward growth. Unfortunately, as we've
    all been discussing, several recent high-profile incidents have
    shaken the public confidence and have raised the question: Can
    railroads, in fact, move crude oil safely?
        I'm here to tell you, unequivocally, the answer to that
    question is yes. Not only can we--we do. 99.997 percent of the
    time, from origin to destination, without an accidental
    release. But we agree with Mr. Searles. The goal has to be 100
    percent. And to that end, we were pleased to sign an agreement
    with Secretary Foxx addressing voluntary action items that we
    hope and believe will continue to improve our safety record.
        When you take a look at how to address risk, there are
    three basic tranches, if you will, basic pots. One is to
    prevent. That's on us, prevention. Next is mitigation. To me,
    that is knowing what's going into the tank car and what is the
    tank car. And then, containment, working with the emergency
    responders in the local communities. The agreement we have with
    Secretary Foxx addresses all three of those.
        Briefly, under that agreement as far as prevention, we are
    going to be doing more frequent track inspections, speed
    restrictions in high-threat urban areas, enhanced braking, and
    the use of a sophisticated routing model, which we use now,
    developed by the Department of Homeland Security and others,
    for our toxic ventilation chemicals. We're going to use that
    now for crude oil as well. These steps are aimed, as they say,
    at accident prevention.
        One other way we, of course, improve safety is by
    investing. You mentioned, Chairman Blumenthal, the need to
    continually invest. We will put $26 billion of private capital
    into our network this year to maintain, expand and improve that
    network. That also improves safety.
        Turning to mitigation, we believe that the current tank car
    standard must be improved. We have adopted many of the
    recommendations from the NTSB. There's a detailed graphic in my
    written statement as to what we have recommended to PHMSA and
    we believe that existing tank cars, again consistent with the
    recommendation through the NTSB, must be retrofitted or phased
    out of moving flammable liquids as aggressively as possible.
        Finally, emergency response is crucial. We already train
    22,000 emergency responders through TRANSCAER, through
    individual actions by the railroads, 2,000 of those out in
    Pueblo, Colorado at the Emergency Response Training Center,
    which we run under contract with the FRA. We've committed to a
    $5 million investment in a very special training module on
    crude oil and a stipend to assist an additional 1,500 emergency
    responders to go to Pueblo for hands-on experience in dealing
    with tank cars carrying crude.
        Turning quickly to PTC, I have testified before this
    committee in the past about the challenges of the technology
    and the scope of PTC. We will not meet the 2015 deadline of
    having all 60,000 miles installed and operational. Not because
    of lack of trying; $4 billion to date, thousands of man-hours,
    but the technology and scope issues are still there. Another
    challenge addressed by our friend from the FCC--and I say our
    friend--we've worked closely with Mr. Blackwell, but it is
    still a challenge.
        As you pointed out, Senator Blunt, the whole point of PTC
    is communications. Communication between the back offices,
    between the locomotive, between the wayside interface units,
    what's coming, what's out there: the infrastructure of
    communication has to be there.
        Right now, we've been put on hold installing the 22,000
    additional poles that we need. But let me emphasize, these are
    poles about 40 feet high, on railroad right-of-way not on
    tribal nation lands, on railroad right-of-way, that has been
    disturbed, in many cases, for 100 or more years. We believe
    that the FCC has the authority to give a program exemption for
    those monopoles on the railroad right-of-way. About 97 percent
    of the 22,000 would be covered by that.
        I appreciate the fact that the FCC has decided not to go
    down that route and has tried to work with us on this Program
    Comment. A draft was delivered to us last evening. Best as we
    can tell, they have accepted several of our recommendations but
    some of the core problems still remain. It is still a pole-by-
    pole process, 22,000 of them. Pole by pole, it is still not a
    closed-end timeline. There is no enforceable deadline at the
    end. And third, and the most, I think, troubling, that it is up
    to the railroad to do the study to prove the negative. We have
    to go out and prove that there is no cultural or historic
    interest in a particular site, rather than having those who
    believe that there is an interest come forward with evidence as
    to why they believe there's an interest.
        So we think that--we appreciate the efforts. I've met with
    Chairman Tom Wheeler. Of course, Roger Sherman, Jeff Blackwell,
    who I think has been living this issue for the last 6 months,
    but we've already lost the 2013 construction season, 2014 is in
    jeopardy.
        Thank you for your attention. I apologize, Mr. Chairman,
    for running over.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
              Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
        On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads,
    thank you for the opportunity to discuss the current state of rail
    safety and specifically the transportation of crude oil by rail. AAR
    freight railroad members account for the vast majority of freight
    railroad mileage, employees, and traffic (including crude oil) in
    Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
        The development of shale oil represents a tremendous opportunity
    for our Nation to move closer to energy independence. The widespread
    benefits this would entail include reduced reliance on oil imports from
    unstable countries whose interests do not necessarily match up well
    with our own; increased economic development all over the country;
    thousands of new well-paying jobs; tens of billions in savings in our
    Nation's trade deficit every year; and substantial amounts of new tax
    revenue for governments at all levels. Rail has a critical role in
    delivering these crucial benefits to our country.
        Let me make clear at the outset that, for our Nation's freight
    railroads, pursuing safe operations is not an option, it's a business
    imperative. Most importantly, it's the right thing to do. Railroads are
    not just faceless corporations from somewhere far away. Rather, your
    neighbors are our neighbors. No matter where you live, chances are good
    that current or former rail industry employees live close by. We have
    an obligation to operate safely for their benefit and for the benefit
    of all members of the communities we serve.
        Unfortunately, several recent serious rail accidents in Canada and
    the United States have led some to question railroads' ability to
    operate safely. We are committed to restoring their confidence and
    demonstrating that nothing is more important to railroads than the
    safety of their employees, their customers, and the communities in
    which they operate.
        Railroads share the deep concern of members of this committee and
    the public at large regarding the safe transport of crude oil. From
    2000 through 2013, a period during which U.S. railroads originated
    approximately 832,000 carloads of crude oil, more than 99.98 percent of
    those carloads arrived at their destination without a release caused by
    an accident. That said, railroads continue to look for ways to be
    safer. As the tragic accident last year in Quebec showed, and as
    reinforced by recent oil spills in North Dakota and Alabama, more work
    must be done to ensure public confidence in the transportation of crude
    oil by rail.
        Working cooperatively with government agencies, our customers, our
    employees, and our suppliers, we're applying what we've learned over
    the past few years as rail crude oil traffic has surged to help ensure
    that our Nation is able to safely and reliably utilize the tremendous
    national asset that domestic crude oil represents. This will be a true
    team effort involving shared responsibility among everyone involved in
    crude oil production, delivery, and consumption.
        Railroads have long been doing their part--including taking actions
    that go beyond what legislation and regulations require--to maximize
    safety, and the industry will continue to take steps to further improve
    safety. As explained later in this testimony, these actions fall into
    three broad categories:
      Accident Prevention
       Railroads are continuing to reinvest record amounts--their
            own funds, not taxpayer funds--back into their infrastructure
            and equipment. Despite a weak economy, railroads have invested
            far more back into their networks over the past five years--
            approximately $115 billion--than in any five-year period in
            history. This year, we project that railroads will invest more
            than $26 billion in their networks, more than ever before. One
            of the major aims of these investments is to make the rail
            network more robust, so that the industry's decades-long record
            of declining accident rates continues.

       Railroads have voluntarily agreed to institute speed
            restrictions, additional inspections, and other operational
            modifications for trains carrying large amounts of crude oil.

       By July 1, 2014, railroads will begin using a sophisticated
            statistical routing model that takes into account a variety of
            variables, including population density, rail traffic volume,
            track conditions, and availability of alternative tracks, so
            that trains with large amounts of crude oil can move on routes
            that pose the least overall safety and security risk.
      Consequence Mitigation
       In 2011, the rail industry voluntarily adopted industry
            standards requiring new tank cars that carry crude oil to be
            built with additional safety features to reduce the probability
            of release should an accident occur. This year, railroads have
            called for even more robust new tank car standards for crude
            oil.

       Railroads have also called for an aggressive retrofit and
            phase out program for existing tank cars used to carry crude
            oil.
      Emergency Response
       Railroads help communities develop and evaluate emergency
            response plans, and they train tens of thousands of emergency
            responders each year. The industry has agreed to spend several
            million dollars this year to develop an emergency response
            training program at the Transportation Technology Center in
            Pueblo, Colorado specifically geared to crude oil spills and to
            provide tuition assistance for some 1,500 emergency responders
            from across the country to attend that training.
    Crude by Rail Meets Crude Oil Production Demand
        The huge increase in rail crude oil volume is a function of the
    massive, salutary development of North American oil resources in recent
    years, especially ``shale oil.'' U.S. crude oil production peaked in
    1970 at 9.6 million barrels per day, but by 2008 it had fallen to 5.0
    million barrels per day as depletion of older fields outpaced new
    production. Over the past couple of years, however, technological
    advances in the extraction of shale oil, along with relatively high
    crude oil prices, have led to sharply higher U.S. crude oil production.
    The Energy Information Administration (EIA) states that production rose
    to an average of 6.5 million barrels per day in 2012 and 7.5 million
    barrels per day in 2013. Barring unforeseen circumstances, deposits of
    crude oil in shale formations across the country will continue to be
    developed. As a result, the EIA projects that U.S. crude oil production
    will increase to 8.5 million barrels per day in 2014 and 9.3 billion
    barrels per day in 2015.

        Much of the recent increase in crude oil production has occurred in
    North Dakota, where crude oil production rose from an average of 81,000
    barrels per day in 2003 to 940,000 barrels per day by the fall of 2013,
    making North Dakota the second-largest oil producing state.

        Of course, crude oil has little value unless it can be transported
    to refineries, but most U.S. refineries are located in traditional
    crude oil production areas (Texas, Oklahoma) or on the coasts where
    crude oil transported by tanker is readily accessible (California,
    Washington, New England, Gulf of Mexico). In part because of the long
    process required to obtain permits to build new refineries, it's
    unlikely that new refineries will come on line quickly near the new
    production areas.

        Historically, most crude oil has moved from production areas to
    refineries by pipeline. However, in many of the new shale oil
    production areas, the existing pipeline network lacks the capacity to
    handle the higher volumes. Pipelines also lack the flexibility and
    geographic reach to serve many potential markets. Railroads, though,
    have the capacity and flexibility to fill this gap. In fact, the
    ability of a railroad to serve a refinery can make the difference
    between the refinery continuing to operate or closing down.
        Railroads have seen dramatic recent increases in demand to
    transport crude. In 2008, U.S. Class I railroads originated 9,500
    carloads of crude oil. By 2012, carloads had surged to nearly 234,000.
    Final numbers for 2013 aren't in yet, but we estimate that crude oil
    originations on Class I railroads in 2013 were around 408,000 carloads
    and terminations were around 434,000 carloads.\1\ In 2013, crude oil
    accounted for about 1.4 percent of total originated carloads on Class I
    railroads, up from just 0.03 percent in 2008.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Originations do not exactly equal terminations because some
    crude oil that originates on U.S. Class I railroads might be delivered
    to U.S. short lines or to railroads in Canada for termination and
    because some crude oil that terminates on U.S. Class I railroads might
    originate on railroads in Canada or on U.S. short line railroads.

        Assuming for simplicity that a rail tank car holds about 30,000
    gallons (714 barrels) of crude oil, the approximately 408,000 carloads
    of crude oil originated by Class I railroads in 2013 equal around
    800,000 barrels per day, or about 11 percent of U.S. crude oil
    production.
    Advantages to Our Nation of Transporting Crude Oil by Rail
        Looking ahead, both pipelines and railroads will be needed to
    provide safe, reliable crude oil transportation for our Nation. In
    addition to the critical fact that railroads provide transportation
    capacity in many areas where pipeline capacity is insufficient,
    railroads offer a number of other advantages for transporting crude
    oil:

       Geographical Flexibility. By serving almost every refinery
            in the United States and Canada, railroads offer market
            participants enormous flexibility to shift product quickly to
            different places in response to market needs.

       Responsiveness. Rail facilities can almost always be built
            or expanded much more quickly than pipelines and refineries can
            be. Essentially, railroads are the only transportation mode
            that can invest in facilities quickly enough to keep up with
            production growth in the emerging oil fields.

       Efficiency. As new rail facilities are developed, railroads
            are involved at every step, helping facility owners decide
            where to locate assets and how to lay out rail infrastructure
            to maximize safety and efficiency.

       Underlying Infrastructure and Equipment. Just over the past
            few years, railroads have invested tens of billions of dollars
            to replace and resurface tracks, buy new locomotives, build new
            terminals and track capacity, hire new employees, and take
            other steps to enhance their ability to transport crude oil.

        Notwithstanding these attributes of rail, railroads recognize that
    if we are to continue down the path of energy independence, other
    transportation modes--including, of course, pipelines--have crucial
    roles to play.
    Working to Prevent Rail Accidents
        We all know that, unfortunately, rail accidents happen, despite
    railroads' best efforts to prevent them, and some of those accidents
    have tragic consequences. Railroads take the challenge of moving the
    Nation's crude oil extremely seriously, and they recognize that
    improving safety is an ongoing process.

        The industry's commitment to safety is reflected in safety
    statistics from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The three
    most common safety measures used by the FRA are train accident rates,
    employee injury rates, and grade crossing collision rates. From 2000 to
    2013, the train accident rate fell 43 percent, with 2013 having the
    lowest rate ever, according to preliminary FRA data. The rail employee
    injury rate fell 48 percent from 2000 to 2013, with 2013 having the
    second-lowest rate ever (behind 2012). The grade crossing collision
    rate fell 42 percent from 2000 to 2013, with 2013 having the second-
    lowest rate ever (behind 2012).
        Collisions and derailments, two of the major categories that
    comprise the broader train accidents category, have fallen sharply over
    time as well. For example, according to FRA data, in 2000 there were
    739 derailments involving freight trains on main lines or sidings,
    equivalent to 1.35 per million freight train miles.\2\ In 2013,
    according to preliminary FRA data, there were 378 derailments (a 49
    percent decline), equivalent to 0.70 per million freight train-miles
    (48 percent lower). In 2000, there were 45 collisions involving freight
    trains on main lines or sidings, equivalent to 0.08 per million train-
    miles. In 2013, the comparable figures were 28 collisions (down 38
    percent) and 0.05 per million freight train-miles (down 37 percent).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ A train-mile is the movement of a train the distance of one-
    mile. For perspective, a million train-miles is roughly equivalent to
    300 train trips across the country.

        Railroads are proud that their overall safety record, as measured
    by FRA data, has been trending in the right direction for decades. That
    said, it is an unfortunate reality that rail accidents occur, despite
    railroads' capital and labor intensive efforts to prevent them, and we
    know that some of those accidents have tragic consequences. Given the
    extent and complexity of rail operations--the railroad ``factory
    floor'' is outdoors and approximately 140,000 miles long--
    infrastructure and equipment sometimes fail and it is impossible to
    eliminate all risk of accidents. And while railroads respect and
    applaud the professionalism and attention to safety that rail employees
    bring every day to their jobs, human error continues to be a leading
    cause of accidents. Our goal is zero rail accidents, but when accidents
    do occur, we want to minimize and mitigate their negative impacts.
        One of the most important ways that railroads have reduced
    accidents is through significant and consistent investments back into
    their networks. In fact, in recent years, America's freight railroads
    have been reinvesting more private capital than ever before to renew,
    upgrade, and expand their infrastructure and equipment, including a
    record $25.5 billion in 2012 and a comparable amount in 2013. Rail
    spending this year is expected to be even higher. The vast majority of
    these investments have improved rail safety directly or indirectly. In
    fact, for many of these investments, improving safety is the primary
    reason the investments are made.
        Just from 2008 to 2012, Class I railroads spent nearly $26 billion
    in capital expenditures on new crossties (77 million), new rail (2.9
    million tons), and new ballast (nearly 61 million cubic yards). Over
    the same period, they spent billions of additional capital expenditure
    dollars on signal and communications systems, bridges and tunnels, and
    machinery. These and other capital investments, as well as the billions
    of dollars railroads spend on maintenance of their networks each year,
    have made railroads much safer. And as the charts above show, there is
    a clear correlation between rail reinvestments and rail safety
    improvements.

    The Role of Safety-Enhancing Technologies
        At a basic level, railroading today seems similar to railroading
    150 years ago: it still consists of steel wheels traveling on steel
    rails. This apparent similarity, however, masks a widespread
    application of modern technology and a huge variety of ongoing
    initiatives to research, test, and apply advanced technologies to yield
    the safety record of continuous improvement experienced by the railroad
    industry.
        Many of these advancements were developed or refined at the
    Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), the finest rail research
    facility in the world, in Pueblo, Colorado. TTCI is a wholly owned
    subsidiary of the AAR. Forty-eight miles of test tracks, highly
    sophisticated testing equipment, metallurgy labs, simulators, and other
    diagnostic tools are used to test track structure, evaluate freight car
    and locomotive performance, assess component reliability, and much
    more. The facility is owned by the FRA but has been operated (under a
    competitively bid contract with the FRA) by TTCI since 1984.
        A few of the many examples of safety-enhancing rail technologies
    developed at TTCI or elsewhere that have come into widespread use or
    are in the process of being implemented include:

       Wayside detectors that identify defects on passing rail
            cars, including overheated bearings and damaged wheels,
            dragging hoses, deteriorating bearings, cracked wheels, and
            excessively high and wide loads.

       Internal rail inspection systems using induction or
            ultrasonic technology to detect internal flaws in rails which
            are caused by fatigue and impurities introduced during
            manufacturing.

       Track geometry vehicles that use electronic and optical
            instruments to inspect track alignment, gauge, curvature, and
            other track conditions. Processed data from track geometry cars
            can help railroads determine when track needs maintenance.

       New automated detector systems are being tested and
            evaluated by TTCI to inspect the under carriage, safety
            appliances and freight car components using machine-vision-
            based car inspection systems.

       Ground-penetrating radar that helps identify problems (such
            as excessive water penetration and deteriorated ballast) that
            hinder track stability.

       Because a relatively small share of freight cars cause an
            inordinately high percentage of track damage and have a higher
            than usual propensity to derail, TTCI is working on ways to use
            optical geometry detectors to identify poorly performing
            freight car trucks.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ In terms of rail cars, ``truck'' refers to the complete four-
    wheel assembly that supports the car body.

       Positive train control (PTC) systems, designed to
            automatically stop or slow a train before certain accidents
            occur, are being developed and implemented. PTC is discussed
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            more fully later in this testimony.

        Railroads and their suppliers will continue to pursue these and
    other technological advances that make rail transportation safer and
    more secure.
        Rail industry safety will also be enhanced by the Asset Health
    Strategic Initiative (AHSI), a multi-year rail industry program that
    will apply information technology processes to improve the safety and
    performance of freight cars and locomotives across North America. In a
    nutshell, AHSI aims to improve safety and reduce costs across the rail
    industry by addressing mechanical service interruptions, inspection
    quality, and yard and shop efficiency. It is based on the recognition
    that improving asset health means more than just focusing on railcar
    and locomotive repair. Rather, it encompasses the entire rolling stock
    health cycle, incorporating prevention, detection, planning, movement,
    and repair.
    Modifying Rail Industry Procedures to Enhance Crude Oil Safety
        To enhance the safety of crude oil movements, railroads are
    voluntarily making operational modifications for trains carrying large
    amounts of crude oil. These modifications are the result of
    consultations with Secretary Foxx and other officials at the U.S.
    Department of Transportation (DOT), Administrator Szabo at FRA,
    Administrator Quarterman at PHMSA, and other government policymakers.
    Railroads share their vision for making a safe rail network even safer,
    and we're pleased that we were able to work together to pinpoint new
    operating practices that enhance the safety of moving crude oil by
    rail.
        First, routing. Several years ago, the FRA, PHMSA, the
    Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency, and the railroads jointly developed the Rail
    Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS), a sophisticated statistical
    routing model designed to aid railroads in analyzing and identifying
    the overall safest and most secure routes for transporting TIH
    materials. The model uses a minimum of 27 risk factors--including
    hazmat volume, trip length, population density along the route,
    availability of alternate routes, and emergency response capability--to
    assess the overall safety and security of rail routes. The FRA
    regularly audits railroads' use of the RCRMS. Major railroads have
    agreed that, no later than July 1, 2014, they will begin using the
    RCRMS for trains carrying at least 20 carloads of crude oil.
        Second, speed restrictions. Back in August 2013, railroads self-
    imposed a 50-mph speed limit for trains carrying 20 or more carloads of
    crude oil. Beginning no later than July 1, 2014, if a train is carrying
    at least 20 cars of crude oil and at least one of those cars is an
    older ``DOT-111'' car (these cars are discussed further in the next
    section), that train will travel no faster than 40 mph when travelling
    within one of the 46 nationwide ``high threat urban areas'' designated
    by the Department of Homeland Security.\4\ In addition, railroads will
    continue to work with communities through which crude oil trains move
    to address, on a location-specific basis, concerns that the communities
    may have.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ In the United States, FRA regulations specify that freight rail
    trackage be classified into one of six track ``classes'' based on track
    quality. The class of a section of track determines the maximum FRA-
    allowable speed for that section. Freight train speed on ``excepted''
    and ``Class 1'' track cannot exceed 10 mph; on Class 2 track, 25 mph;
    on Class 3 track, 40 mph; on Class 4 track, 60 mph; and on Class 5
    track, 80 mph. In practice, it is common for railroads, for a variety
    of reasons, to operate at speeds lower than the FRA maximum. (For
    example, U.S. freight trains rarely, if ever, exceed 70 mph, even on
    the best Class 5 track.) If a track's class does not permit 40 or 50
    mph crude oil trains, those trains will travel no faster than the FRA
    limit. Our understanding is that, on U.S. Class I railroads, most of
    the trackage on which trains with large amounts of crude oil travel are
    Class 4 or 5 tracks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Third, inspections. Comprehensive FRA regulations dictate the
    various kinds of inspections railroads are required to perform and how
    often. A description of the full range of inspections that railroads
    undertake is beyond the scope of this testimony, but suffice it to say
    that the FRA-mandated inspection regime is comprehensive and thorough.
        New FRA regulations regarding inspections for internal rail defects
    will become effective on March 25th. Railroads have agreed that, going
    forward, for main line tracks on which trains carrying at least 20
    carloads of crude oil travel, they will perform at least one more
    internal rail inspection each calendar year than the new FRA
    regulations require. In addition, railroads will conduct at least two
    automated comprehensive track geometry inspections each year on main
    line routes over which trains with 20 or more loaded cars of crude oil
    are moving.\5\ The FRA regulations do not require railroads to perform
    automated comprehensive track geometry inspections.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Track geometry includes such parameters as track gauge,
    curvature, alignment, profile, and the cross level of the two rails.
    Track geometry inspections are generally performed by sophisticated
    stand-alone cars that use a variety of sensors, measuring systems, and
    data management systems to create a representation of the track being
    inspected.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Fourth, defect detectors. Railroads will make sure that specialized
    track side ``hot box'' detectors are installed at least every 40 miles
    along routes with trains carrying 20 or more cars containing crude
    oil.\6\ These detectors help prevent accidents by measuring if wheel
    bearings are generating excessive heat, which is a warning that the
    bearings are in the process of failing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ There may be cases where safety considerations (e.g., a track
    located on a grade) might dictate otherwise. In these cases, detectors
    will be installed as close to 40 miles as conditions allow.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Fifth, braking. By April 1, 2014, railroads will make sure that
    trains operating on main line tracks carrying at least 20 carloads of
    crude oil are equipped either with distributed power locomotives (i.e.,
    locomotives placed in locations other than the front of the train) or
    with two-way telemetry end-of-train devices. These technologies allow
    train crews to apply emergency brakes simultaneously from both the head
    end and locations further back in the train in order to stop the train
    faster.
    Mitigation Through Enhancing Tank Car Safety
        While railroads pursue continuous improvement in safe operations,
    including most recently the new voluntary actions described above, it's
    important also for tank car standards to evolve to mitigate the
    consequences of an incident when one occurs. Crude oil and thousands of
    other products are transported in tank cars. The total North American
    tank car fleet consists of about 335,000 cars. Railroads themselves own
    less than 1 percent of these cars; nearly all are owned by rail
    customers and leasing companies. The dozens of distinct types of tank
    cars are differentiated by characteristics (pressure or general
    service, insulated or non-insulated, how much they can carry, and so
    on) that make them suitable or not suitable for carrying particular
    commodities. Approximately 228,000 tank cars are so-called ``DOT-111''
    general service tank cars. These cars are considered the workhorses of
    the tank car fleet. According to the most recent figures, around 98,000
    DOT-111 cars are used to transport crude oil or other flammable
    liquids.

        In the United States, Federal regulations pertaining to tank cars
    are set by PHMSA. Transport Canada performs a similar role in Canada.
    In addition, the AAR Tank Car Committee sets industry standards
    regarding how tank cars used in North America are designed and
    constructed. These standards are often above and beyond Federal
    standards. The Tank Car Committee is comprised of railroads, rail car
    owners, rail car manufacturers, and rail hazmat customers, with active
    participation from the U.S. DOT, Transport Canada, and the National
    Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
        The rail industry has been aggressively searching for ways to
    improve tank car safety. For example, in March 2011, the AAR petitioned
    PHMSA to adopt more stringent requirements for new tank cars used to
    transport certain types of hazardous materials, including crude oil.
    These tougher standards called for more puncture resistance through the
    use of a thicker tank car shell or a jacket, extra protective half-
    height (at a minimum) ``head shields'' at both ends of tank cars, and
    additional protection for the fittings on the top of a car that enable
    access to the inside of the car.
        In July 2011, after it had become clear that PHMSA approval of the
    AAR's proposal was not imminent, the Tank Car Committee adopted what
    the AAR had proposed to PHMSA as the basis for new industry standards
    for tank cars used to carry ethanol or crude oil. The new standards,
    referred to as ``CPC-1232,'' apply to new tank cars ordered after
    October 1, 2011. To date, around 18,000 tanks cars have been built to
    this tougher CPC-1232 standard.
        More recently, in November 2013, the rail industry called on PHMSA
    to adopt standards even more stringent than CPC-1232 for new tank cars
    used to transport crude oil and ethanol. The November 2013 proposal
    also called for aggressively retrofitting or phasing out of tank cars
    (including CPC-1232 cars and the older DOT-111 cars) used to transport
    crude oil or ethanol. The November 2013 proposal recognizes that input
    is needed from shippers and tank car manufacturers to determine the
    precise parameters of a phase-out program and to identify the retrofits
    that should be required.
        Since the November 2013 proposal, the rail industry has continued
    to evaluate what other standards might be appropriate to make tank cars
    used to transport certain commodities, including crude oil, more
    robust. For example, railroads now support strengthening tank cars used
    to transport crude oil with thicker, 9/16th inch shells.\7\ Railroads
    also would require that tank cars be equipped with jackets and thermal
    protection, as well as full-height head shields, top fittings
    protections, and bottom outlet handles that will not open in a
    derailment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Some railroads also support 9/16th inch tank car shells for
    freight cars carrying ethanol.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The graphic on the next page summarizes proposed rail industry
    standards for tank cars carrying crude oil.
        Through these additional standards and other means, railroads are
    continuing to work with other stakeholders to enhance rail safety and
    provide certainty to all stakeholders. These efforts reflect the rail
    industry's long-standing belief that the safety of crude oil by rail is
    a shared responsibility among all stakeholders in the crude oil supply
    chain.
        The concept of shared responsibility also applies to accurate and
    timely determinations as to the chemical characteristics of the crude
    oil railroads are asked to transport. Under Federal regulations, the
    entity ``offering'' the crude oil to the railroad for transport (e.g.,
    the oil producer) is responsible for properly classifying the oil based
    on its level of hazard. On February 25, the FRA issued an executive
    order requiring that crude oil from the Bakken region be tested to
    ensure that it is properly classified before it is transported by rail.
    Railroads support the pursuit of proper classification and labeling of
    petroleum crude oil in tank cars by shippers prior to transport. This
    is essential to ensuring that first responders are able to safely and
    appropriately respond in the event of an accident or incident.

    Improving Emergency Response: Partnerships with First Responders and
            Shippers
        The railroads have extensive emergency response functions, which
    work in cooperation with federal, state and local governments,
    especially since 9/11. Sharing important information about shipments is
    part of that. Upon request, railroads provide appropriate local
    authorities with a list of the hazardous materials, including crude
    oil, transported through their communities. It is simply not true, as
    one sometimes hears, that railroads refuse to provide this type of
    information.
        Significantly, more than 25 years ago, the AAR established what is
    now the Security and Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC), a
    world-class facility in Pueblo, Colorado, that is operated by TTCI. The
    SERTC has provided in-depth hazmat emergency response training to more
    than 50,000 emergency responders and railroad and chemical industry
    employees.
        In 2007, Congress authorized the National Domestic Preparedness
    Consortium (NDPC), a consortium within the Department of Homeland
    Security and funded by FEMA. The purpose of the NDPC is to identify,
    develop, test, and deliver training to the Nation's emergency first
    responder community. Of the NDPC's seven members, only one--SERTC--is
    specifically designed to provide first responder training for rail and
    other surface transportation accidents. No other training center in the
    country possesses comparable infrastructure, including dozens of
    freight and passenger railcars, highway cargo tanks, intermodal
    containers, van trailer, and even a barge. Live simulations deliver
    tactical intervention training with unsurpassed realism.
        Unfortunately, since it was added to the NDPC in 2007, SERTC has
    received only $10 million from FEMA for surface transportation first
    responder training--$5 million in 2009 and $5 million in 2010. We
    understand that budgets throughout the Federal government have been
    challenged in recent years. That said, Congress provided an additional
    $5 million to the NDPC in the 2014 omnibus appropriations act,
    increasing NDPC funding from $93 million to $98 million. FEMA has yet
    to allocate those dollars among the NDPC members. We hope this
    committee would agree that allocating these funds to enhance the
    ability of first responders to respond to crude oil incidents would be
    a sensible step for FEMA to take.
        In addition to SERTC, as part of their regular operations,
    railroads and communities develop and evaluate emergency response plans
    and train more than 20,000 emergency responders each year. Through
    their own efforts and working in conjunction with the Transportation
    Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER),
    railroads will continue to work closely with emergency responders in
    the communities they serve so that damage caused by train accidents can
    be minimized.
        In addition to their other ongoing emergency response training
    efforts, the AAR recently announced that railroads will provide
    approximately $5 million by July 1 of this year to develop a
    specialized crude-by-rail training and tuition assistance program for
    local first responders. The funds will be used to design a curriculum
    at TTCI specifically devoted to crude oil emergency response, to
    provide tuition assistance for an estimated 1,500 first responders to
    attend TTCI for training, and to provide additional training to local
    emergency responders closer to home.
        By July 1, 2014, railroads will also develop an inventory of
    resources for emergency responders along routes over which trains with
    20 or more cars of crude oil operate. This inventory will include
    locations for the staging of emergency response equipment and contacts
    for the notification of communities. When the inventory is completed,
    railroads will provide the DOT with information on the deployment of
    the resources and will make the information available upon request to
    appropriate emergency responders.
        Finally, it is sometimes claimed that railroads bear no costs for
    cleanup of oil spills and that the entire response burden falls on
    local responders. That's not true. Emergency responders have control of
    railroad accidents in which crude oil (or any other hazardous material)
    is spilled, but railroads often provide the resources for mitigating
    the accident. As noted above, railroads have emergency response plans
    in place to mobilize the labor and equipment necessary to mitigate
    accidents. Railroads also reimburse local emergency agencies for the
    costs of materials the agencies expend in their response efforts.
    Address Safety Concerns, But Don't Lose Sight of the Benefits of
            Domestic Crude Oil
        The development of crude oil resources in recent years represents a
    tremendous opportunity for this country, including the opportunity to
    move toward energy independence. As a report earlier this year from the
    Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes, ``the prospect of U.S.
    energy independence is grounded in the production growth from tight oil
    formations such as the Bakken Formation in North Dakota and Montana,
    and the Eagle Ford Formation in Texas.'' \8\ CRS says that, ``Relative
    to other fuels, the United States is more dependent upon imports for
    its oil requirements, still accounting for almost 40 percent of
    consumption,'' but ``since June 2005, when crude oil imports reached a
    peak, they have dropped almost 3.3 million [barrels per day], or 23
    percent, through October 2013.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ ``An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas: Resources
    and Federal Actions,'' Congressional Research Service, January 23,
    2014.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It's difficult to overstate the economic and security benefits
    associated with continued growth in domestic crude oil production. Over
    time, it will mean reductions in the Nation's trade deficit of tens of
    billions of dollars every year. It will mean new and better employment
    opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Americans and better
    economic development opportunities for regions all over the country. It
    will mean billions of dollars in new tax revenues for governments at
    all levels. And it will mean less reliance on sources of oil from
    places in the world that are not secure and whose interests do not
    necessarily correspond well to those of the United States. The Peterson
    Institute, a well-respected, nonprofit, and nonpartisan research
    institution devoted to the study of international economic policy,
    recently found that, along with lower energy costs, the growth in
    domestic energy production should increase annual U.S. GDP growth
    between 0.09 and 0.19 percentage points through 2020. That adds up to
    hundreds of billions of dollars in higher GDP.
        As we discuss ways to enhance the safety of transporting crude oil
    by rail, these important benefits should be kept in mind.
    Positive Train Control
        The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) requires Class I
    freight railroads to install a fully functioning, nationwide positive
    train control (PTC) network by the end of 2015 on main lines used to
    transport passengers or TIH materials. Specifically, PTC as mandated by
    Congress must be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions;
    derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized incursions by
    trains onto sections of track where maintenance activities are taking
    place; and the movement of a train through a track switch left in the
    wrong position. The technology must also be fully interoperable,
    meaning that the system in place on any one railroad must be able to
    seamlessly interface with the system on any other railroad.
        PTC is an unprecedented challenge, both in terms of the
    technologies to be used and the integration of those technologies. A
    properly functioning PTC system must be able to determine the precise
    location, direction, and speed of trains; warn train operators of
    potential problems; and take immediate action if the operator does not
    respond to the warning provided by the PTC system. For example, if a
    train operator fails to begin stopping a train before a stop signal,
    the PTC system would apply the brakes automatically before the train
    passed the stop signal.
        Railroads have been devoting massive resources to PTC. They've
    retained more than 2,200 signal system personnel to implement PTC, and
    to date have spent approximately $4 billion (of their own funds, not
    public funds) on PTC development and deployment. They expect to spend
    that much again--approximately $8 billion in total--before development
    and installation is complete. Hundreds of millions of dollars will be
    spent each year after that to maintain the system.
        PTC's complexity, the enormity of the implementation task, and the
    fact that much of the technology and engineering applications PTC
    requires have had to be developed from scratch mean that, despite
    railroads' best efforts, much work remains to be done. The many
    potential failure points in PTC systems must be identified, isolated,
    and corrected, and the system must be made fully interoperable across
    all of the Nation's major railroads--all without negatively affecting
    existing rail operations.
        Railroads also face serious non-technological barriers to timely
    PTC implementation. Today, the most serious such challenge involves PTC
    antenna structures.
        At its heart, PTC is a massive communications system. Locomotives
    must be able to communicate with the ``back office'' concerning the
    train's speed, location, and many other parameters and receive
    information regarding, among many other things, the locations of other
    trains in the area, possible schedule changes, safety alerts, and so
    on.
        This back-and-forth communication can take place only if a
    sophisticated, comprehensive wireless communications network is in
    place. A key part of this network is a series of thousands of antennas,
    spaced (on average) every few miles along the 60,000 or so miles over
    which PTC is being installed on U.S. freight railroads. These antennas
    are generally around 40-feet tall, and the vast majority are to be
    installed directly adjacent to the tracks on existing railroad rights-
    of-way, owned by the railroads themselves, in holes just a few feet
    deep and a couple of feet wide. In total, approximately 22,000 PTC-
    related antennas need to be installed.
        The railroad industry began working several years ago with the
    Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to license the wireless
    spectrum necessary for PTC, and to its credit, the FCC has worked
    diligently to address spectrum-related issues. Nonetheless, the
    industry learned just last year that, under the FCC's interpretation of
    Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), railroads
    must ascertain, on an antenna-by-antenna basis, if the antennas will
    negatively impact areas of historic, cultural, or religious
    significance.
        At the center of the challenge is the FCC's required notification
    and evaluation process that utilizes the FCC's ``Tower Construction
    Notification System'' (TCNS) for review by Native American tribes.
    Under that system, railroads must input certain information into the
    TCNS. That information is then transmitted to any Native American tribe
    that has expressed interest in the county in which an antenna will be
    located.
        The initial information that railroads must input into the TCNS,
    such as the precise location of the antenna to be installed and its
    height, is relatively straightforward. That information is then
    transmitted to interested tribes through various means, and the tribe
    has up to a couple of months to expresses interest in the proposed
    antenna site. If it does so, it can demand much more comprehensive
    information about that site--such as a complete archaeological
    history--that can be difficult (if not impossible), costly, and time
    consuming for the railroad to obtain. Based on railroads' experiences
    to date, it takes, on average, three to five months between the time
    the railroad initially inputs information into the TCNS and the time
    when all necessary reviews are completed and the antenna can be cleared
    for installation. Multiply this process by 22,000 antennas and it
    becomes very clear why this is such a significant issue.

        As stated earlier, the vast majority of PTC antennas are not large
    and are to be installed in small holes on railroads' own rights-of-way.
    Many of the rail lines in question have been in use for decades, often
    for well over 100 years. Generally speaking, the rights-of-way at issue
    have been disturbed countless times in the past as railroads performed
    standard maintenance, installed other types of signal systems, built
    culverts, improved drainage, or undertook any of innumerable other
    activities related to rail operations and infrastructure construction
    and upkeep.
        Once railroads started using the TCNS last year, it quickly became
    clear that the system was woefully inadequate for a deployment on the
    scale of PTC and in the time frame mandated by the RSIA. In fact,
    shortly after railroads began using the TCNS, the FCC asked them to
    stop using it while the agency developed a new process for PTC
    antennas. That was around ten months ago.
        After nearly a year of discussion among various parties, during
    which the installation of wayside antennas ceased, on January 29, 2014,
    the FCC proposed what it calls a ``streamlined'' process for PTC-
    related reviews. Unfortunately, we do not believe the ``streamlined''
    process will lead to a meaningful reduction in the substantial and
    excessive delays associated with PTC antenna installation.
        Under the streamlined system, the FCC would still require an
    antenna-by-antenna evaluation. Perhaps most vexing, even when a tribe
    cannot identify any specific historic or cultural area or property that
    could potentially be impacted at any proposed individual antenna site,
    the tribe can still demand a comprehensive review of the site, which
    could include field work and the preparation of wide-ranging cultural
    resource reports and ethnographic studies. The tribe can also demand
    that railroads dig holes for antenna structures by hand. These demands,
    which the streamlined process allows, extend well beyond what is
    required under the NHPA. Moreover, the streamlined process does not
    establish firm deadlines by which the FCC will resolve disputes
    regarding sites, and it is not clear the agency has the resources to
    manage disputes around potentially thousands of antenna sites.
        Included as an appendix to this testimony is a copy of the AAR's
    recent comments on the FCC's streamlined proposal. As the AAR comments
    make clear, the FCC has ample authority to exempt all PTC-related
    infrastructure no taller than 75 feet located on the railroad right-of-
    way and not immediately proximate to a known historic property. We
    respectfully suggest that these antennas should be exempted. If the FCC
    decides not to pursue an exemption, it should put in place a process
    that really does expedite the historic review process, provides
    deadlines on the resolution of disputes, and encompasses all railroads'
    PTC infrastructure on the right-of-way. The existing ``streamlined''
    process does none of these things.
        Just to be clear, railroads are not seeking exemptions regarding
    PTC antenna installations on Native American reservations or similar
    areas, or in areas that are shown to be of significant historical or
    cultural interest. In these cases, railroads are happy to work with
    state preservation officials and tribes. Rather, railroads respectfully
    suggest that the NHPA was not designed and should not be used to impede
    PTC antenna installation in the way it has come to.
        The bottom line is that without further changes to the FCC approval
    process, the timeline for ultimate deployment of PTC will be delayed
    significantly. The 2013 construction season was lost for PTC wayside
    antennas. A new review process at the FCC will not be in place until at
    least April of this year. If that process takes several months to clear
    locations, the 2014 construction season will also be in jeopardy.
    Railroads will continue to work with the FRA and the FCC in good faith
    to try to find a workable solution to this issue. Please keep in mind,
    though, that these antennas are at the heart of the PTC network, and
    there is no realistic ``work around.'' Until railroads are able to
    install these antennas in large numbers, huge portions of the PTC
    testing and implementation process simply cannot proceed.
        Railroads have been working extremely hard to meet the 2015 PTC
    deadline, and they will continue to aggressively pursue PTC
    implementation. However, due to the significant technological
    challenges associated with PTC development and installation, the eight-
    month construction moratorium imposed by the FCC, and the remaining PTC
    regulatory uncertainty, railroads believe that the existing PTC
    implementation deadline of December 31, 2015 will need to be extended.
    Doing so would allow railroads, the FRA, and others to make sure PTC is
    done right.\9\ In the meantime, incremental PTC implementation would
    continue, meaning that more and more of the safety benefits of PTC
    would be coming on line.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Some of you may have seen an article in the January 29
    Washington Post on delays to the Washington metro's new ``Silver
    Line.'' The article points out that the line's automatic train control
    system has delayed the completion of the project for months and still
    is not working correctly. The metro's train control system is many
    orders of magnitude less complex than what freight railroads are
    implementing. Still, the metro's problems offer a clear example of why
    the rail industry--and policymakers--should be very concerned with PTC
    implementation and the importance of making sure that such a complex
    system operates as intended, no matter how long it takes. Unlike the
    Washington metro, railroads do not have the luxury of simply not
    operating a new line.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Conclusion
        Our nation's freight railroads share the urgency of this committee
    and the public at large regarding the need to augment the safe
    transport of products by rail. Railroads will continue to work with the
    Administration, their customers, and other stakeholders as necessary to
    identify additional safety enhancing steps that will make the North
    American rail network even safer.
                 Appendix to Mr. Hamberger's Prepared Statement
        Mr. Hamberger submitted to the Committee a copy of ``Comments of
    the Association of American Railroads'' submitted to the Federal
    Communications Commission (FCC) in the matter of ``Comment Sought on
    Draft Program Comment to Govern Review of Positive Train Control
    Facilities under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
    Act,'' WT Docket No. 13-240.
        The entire submission can be found at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/
    document/view?id=7521073012.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamberger, for
    your comments and all the witnesses.
        We're going to begin a 5-minute round of questions and we
    can do a second round if my colleagues wish to do so.
        You know, I want to thank you, Mr. Hamberger, for your
    comments on the voluntary agreement recently concluded with
    Secretary Foxx, which I welcome, but voluntary agreements are
    no substitutes for enforceable rules any more than they are out
    on the highway here when drivers travel our interstates. And I
    think that the laser focus that Mr. Searles mentioned certainly
    has to be applied with greater rigor and vigor.
        A lot of Americans, I think justifiably, are wondering
    whether the Federal authorities, the Federal watchdog, have
    been asleep or absent. And that goes to the recommendations
    that Mr. Hart mentioned, recommendations, for example, for
    cameras facing inward and outward.
        So let me begin the questioning by saying with respect to
    those recommendations, Mr. Szabo, why haven't they been
    implemented as orders?
        Mr. Szabo. We continue to work through our regulator
    priorities. Obviously, the list starts with the 42 mandates of
    the Rail Safety Improvement Act prioritizing those and
    completing those first. It was an unprecedented number of
    requirements in that Act. And so those additional
    recommendations that come in after what Congress has mandated
    to us get added to the hopper, but we believe that we have a
    responsibility to you to execute those things that you mandated
    of us first and foremost.
        On cameras, we started some good work with AAR with the
    industry and labor. About 10 months ago, based on that in
    November, I directed staff that that was to be a regulatory
    priority for 2014. And in fact, we have already now initiated
    efforts inside the Rail Safety Advisory Committee to start
    drafting those regulations.
        Senator Blumenthal. You know, we're now years after the
    first recommendation from the NTSB on cameras. We are still
    awaiting, as Mr. Hart mentioned, the PTC progress report.
        I've said before, and I'll say it again here, that four
    people might be alive today if some of these recommendations,
    including cameras facing inward and outward, alerters,
    automatic train control, had been implemented.
        Mr. Szabo. Mr. Chairman, if I may, our report on PTC
    implementation, in fact, was delivered to Congress about 18
    months ago, ahead of schedule. And so, we've delivered that to
    you with a set of recommendations that we have asked Congress
    to make.
        Senator Blumenthal. But coming back to the recommendations
    for specific measures that might have prevented many of these
    incidents, my view is that we're behind. We've been lax and
    lagging and the question is why haven't those orders been
    forthcoming from the----
        Mr. Szabo. Yes. And it's a matter, again, of putting things
    into what is a pipeline on regulatory priorities. When you're
    handed 42 in a Congressional mandate, and then additional
    recommendations continue to come in, you know, not only don't I
    have the resources, but if you understand the regulatory
    process----
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, you need a different----
        Mr. Szabo. It starts with us and feeds through a process.
        Senator Blumenthal. You need a different authority.
    Because, for example on cameras, is there a requirement that
    you go through the APA rulemaking process?
        Mr. Szabo. Well, if we're going to mandate it, we have to
    go through a rulemaking process.
        Mr. Chairman. And you need to get a different authority.
        Mr. Szabo. And of course, that's appropriate because,
    Senator, we owe it to everybody to get it right. And that's why
    it requires doing that due diligence.
        You know, certainly you can do things fast, but if you do
    them fast you run the risk of committing errors that actually
    can harm safety or harm capacity in the industry. And so, you
    really have to do your due diligence, make sure that all
    stakeholders have appropriate input, and make sure, when you
    put that reg out, you've got it right.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I don't differ with anything that
    you've just said. But the recommendation was made by the NTSB
    in 2008. We're here in 2014, so due diligence has required 6
    years and, in the meantime on that issue, cameras and on others
    where there were deadlines from Congress there still have been
    no regulations.
        Let me turn----
        Mr. Szabo. But Congress did not mandate that in 2008.
        Senator Blumenthal. Not that one, but others.
        Mr. Szabo. And so, those things that you chose to mandate
    were the things that we prioritized first. We feel we owe that
    to you.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask Mr. Hart.
        Will the investigation of Spuyten Duyvil, and the
    Bridgeport incident, and the collection of incidents relating
    to Metro-North, be done by a time-certain?
        Mr. Hart. Yes. We are planning to combine the four Metro-
    North accidents into one report to be issued in November.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired so I'm
    going to turn to Senator Blunt.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, why
    don't we have the tank standards yet? I think you all have been
    working on that for two and a half years. And, as quickly and
    briefly as you can explain that, why has it taken that long?
        Ms. Quarterman. Thank you, Senator Blunt. As you may know,
    the process started with both the entire department and PHMSA
    and FRA working very closely with AAR and their tank committee
    looking at advancements to tank car standards. The end of that
    process resulted in a tank car standard that the department was
    not willing to support, and it also did not address some of the
    operational issues that were on the table as part of that tank
    car committee and specialists.
        Senator Blunt. So your outside advisory group came back
    with standards that you didn't think were adequate?
        Ms. Quarterman. The AAR's outside advisory group, correct.
        And so we decided to go forward with a rulemaking process.
    That rulemaking process began in 2012 where we began to draft
    standards. As part of that process, we began to get a series of
    petitions that slowed down our finalizing and advanced notice
    of proposed rulemaking. That advanced notice went out in
    September. We got more than 150,000 individuals commenting on
    that.
        As of December 5, I can tell you that now FRA and PHMSA are
    sequestered together drafting an advanced--a notice of proposed
    rulemaking, we have our regulatory experts in the room, our
    financial experts that have to deal with the regulatory
    analysis that's required on that rule. And we are working
    extremely hard. I think we are close to a first draft. And I
    can tell you, I've never seen a rule drafted faster than that.
        Senator Blunt. I may come back to that if some of my
    colleagues don't answer other questions I have. And Mr. Hart,
    you said that you thought that positive train control, I think
    your quote was said, ``Must be implemented by the end of 2015
    to the maximum extent possible.'' Is that the deadline? When in
    2015 is the deadline?
        Mr. Hart. I'm referring to the Congressional deadline of
    the end of 2015.
        Senator Blunt. Right. And by, ``enacted by the maximum
    extent possible,'' you mean, some railroads would enact this
    and others without penalty wouldn't?
        Mr. Hart. The NTSB would like to see full implementation of
    PTC, but if it can't all be done, we'd like to see as much as
    possible by as many as possible as soon as possible.
        Senator Blunt. Mr. Szabo, do you want to comment on that?
        Mr. Szabo. Yes.
        The current Congressional mandate actually mandates full
    deployment by December 31, 2015 which, in our report to
    Congress, we indicate will not be achievable. We do believe
    that partial deployment is doable and partial deployment will
    provide very real safety benefits, but we need from Congress,
    we need from you, currently FRA does not have the ability to
    make any provisional certifications. It's either it's all done
    or it isn't. And so, we really need from Congress the tools and
    the authority to allow for provisional certification to, in
    fact, help achieve that partial deployment and achieve that
    accountability that Mr. Hart was talking about. Understanding
    the legitimacy of the challenges the industry has, along with
    the good faith effort that they've been making.
        Senator Blunt. You know, I would say, I'm not sure I have a
    final view on this yet, but I would say if we expand the law or
    expand the deadline, and there is some kind of partial
    deployment, I'd strongly encourage you to think about that as a
    trial run rather than having--we've seen what happens when you
    implement a technical system without going through a trial run,
    a trial run where maybe even information is widely shared but
    not where one company has to comply and another company
    doesn't. And you may use that as a laboratory time to test the
    system rather than to say, ``OK, you've worked harder than
    everybody else, so we're going to penalize you by putting you
    under full, positive train control and every other company has
    two more years,'' or something like that.
        Mr. Szabo. Senator, I think your point is very, very valid.
        You know, positive train control will, in fact, be the
    backbone of our future safety efforts relative to human
    factors, but it's critical that we get it right. There's never
    been an undertaking of this magnitude installing PTC anywhere
    else in the world. And so, actually taking a look at those
    places where it can be implemented most easily, ensure that we
    get the bugs out of it as we continue to advance, are best
    going to serve safety and make sure that we don't do anything
    to gum up capacity for the industry. There are a couple of
    threats here in getting it wrong. And so, provisional
    certification will allow us to make sure we get it right.
        Senator Blunt. Well, I'm going to follow the Chairman's
    very well determined lead here and wait for other questions for
    another round.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Blunt.
        Senator Cantwell.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    for holding the hearing. And thank you for the witnesses that
    are here and everybody that's working on this issue and for
    your voluntary efforts to date.
        I'm glad my colleagues from North Dakota are here because I
    know you see this issue, you know, from the perspective of your
    state but I want you to understand the perspective of our state
    because practically every newspaper in our state has
    editorialized on this. The state legislature is considering
    legislation. The city of Seattle is considering legislation.
    And the issue is that as this rail transports into our state
    from Spokane down to PASCO through the Columbia Gorge, to say
    nothing of the treachery and the unique environmental aspects
    of the Columbia Gorge, then through Vancouver, then up to
    Tacoma and perhaps on through Seattle, through Everett, up to
    Skagit County for processing. So you hit every population area
    in our state. OK? We're talking about population areas, three
    of them that are larger than your whole state, OK. We're
    talking about waterfronts that are integrated with ferry
    systems and in highly, you know, active waterfronts.
        So when people look at this issue for us, they see the
    volatility of this product moving through major population
    centers. Not one, but every population center in our state,
    save a few. So that's why our state is very anxious about this.
    And that's why, Mr. Chairman, I agree. I don't personally think
    that this is an issue about voluntary, although we appreciate
    voluntary. I think to protect our citizens we have to be clear
    about what it is we're willing to do.
        So I first have a question for Mr. Searles about these DOT-
    111 car issues that Mr. Hart has basically said are
    unacceptable public risk. That's what NTSB has said right now.
    They're unacceptable. So my question is when are the companies
    committed to ending the use of these cars?
        Mr. Searles. Thank you for the question, Senator.
        The first thing that we've done is we've stepped in and we
    developed over a 3-year period the upgraded tank car standards.
    So these are the CPC-1232 standard and that took 3 years to go
    in and look at all of the data that was required to understand
    the best approach that could be taken to make these cars safer.
    The industry concluded with consensus on that. And in the
    review of that consensus standard, the DOT led the review to
    determine whether or not we were going to have sufficient
    improvements there. And the conclusion was that we did and thus
    we petitioned the Federal Government to make the CPC-1232 the
    new standard. All of that was data-driven. Since that time, we
    have been building that tank car to the point that we have 40
    percent of the fleet this year will be the new tank car and 60
    percent by the end of 2015. So we have been leaning forward
    beyond what the DOT requirements were and are today. And
    believe that those tank cars are going to be sufficient to be
    able to move the tank car to be able to move the product from
    here forward.
        Senator Cantwell. So what year will all of them be off our
    rails?
        Mr. Searles. We are looking at the tank cars that were
    manufactured before the new standards came out. And in fact, in
    our comments to the ANPRM we asked for the FRA and PHMSA to
    lead a taskforce to review that. Since that time, we have been
    looking at the requirements to determine if retrofits are
    possible and whether or not there are meaningful improvements
    to those tank cars that can be made.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I guess I would say, since we've
    gone from 4 years ago, having basically nothing by rail on
    crude, to now having something like 480,000 carloads of crude,
    so about 11 trains per day, to our populations centers, this is
    a big deal.
        Mr. Searles. Absolutely.
        Senator Cantwell. So knowing when those cars that are going
    to be off those rails, that NTSB has already said are
    unacceptable, Mr. Chairman, this is a key issue for me and for
    my state. And then, I know I have 30 seconds left, I guess I
    would just say that I don't know when you have a voluntary
    system, not everybody complies with it. What do you do about
    that? And even when people sign a voluntary agreement and then
    have a violation, is there a penalty? Is there a risk against
    that, in stopping that behavior?
        So, Mr. Chairman, I think I'm more in the boat of where you
    are. I think we have to mandate the security that needs to be
    there because these population centers are just, you know--I
    don't know what our cities in jurisdictions are going to--they
    might decide to ban this altogether.
        I think we have to prove that the public is going to be
    safe here and, again, I know I'm out of time, but we haven't
    even gone to this issue of the highly flammable material and
    maybe somebody could tell me what safety precautions are going
    to be made in the future to change a Bakken oil into a
    transportable product that is not as flammable.
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
        Senator Heitkamp.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. HEIDI HEITKAMP,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA

        Senator Heitkamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
    Member. It's really quite an honor to be here and I am grateful
    for the invitation and grateful for the opportunity.
        I want to kind of start out where Maria left off. And I
    want to assure the Senator from Washington that where we may
    see it differently because we're producing but you're refining,
    you're refining Bakken crude in your state. And we all are
    concerned about safety. This is not a tradeoff of economics
    versus safety. We have to make the transportation of this
    material as safe as what is humanly possible on the rails. I
    don't think there's any doubt about it.
        Now, Mr. Hart, I want to go back to one of your comments,
    because we have focused a lot on the 111s and, you know, I'm
    always amused when people say 40 percent. I think the more
    important question that we have is how many of the 111s have
    been retired? You know, if you look at the 111s transporting
    this material, obviously if you're growing the fleet, which you
    have to in order meet the demand of transporting, of course
    you're going to have a lower percentage of 111s on the rail.
    But the concern is getting the 111s off.
        And Mr. Hart, I think following on that track, you also
    said that you think the 1232s are deficient, if I heard your
    testimony correctly. So I want you to reaffirm that and then I
    want to hear from both the Association of American Railroads
    and from API on what their reaction is to that. And we can talk
    about the regulation after that.
        Mr. Hart. Thank you for the question.
        Yes. I did say that the 1232s are still not adequate. As I
    mentioned, the NTSB is holding a forum on the transportation of
    crude oil and ethanol next month that will talk about not only
    rail cars but a variety of other associated issues, including
    operations and emergency response.
        Senator Heitkamp. I only have so much time, so I really
    want to just focus on getting kind of an immediate reaction to
    the comment about the 1232s. Yes.
        Mr. Hamberger. On behalf of the AAR, we filed comments at
    the PHMSA and the ANPRM recommending that new tank cars be
    built exceeding the 1232. We are requesting that they require
    the full-height head shields, the jacket, thermal protection,
    top fitting protection, high capacity pressure relief valve. So
    we think that the 1232 was a big step above the DOT-111s.
    Knowing what we do now about some of the volatility of some of
    the crude moving, we think we need to go even beyond the 1232s.
        Senator Heitkamp. Interested in API's response.
        Mr. Searles. Thank you.
        I think the information that has been, that AAR's referring
    to, has not been shared that substantiates the benefit of these
    improvements. You're starting to get down into a very narrow
    range of improvement and you go from very small number to an
    even smaller number. And so, we would look forward to having
    those discussions on that. However, I would say that the 1232,
    again, was studied for three years. Actually, it was studied
    for 2 years and then another third year was taken to review how
    sufficient that performance specification would be.
        Senator Heitkamp. So this is shaping up as a regulatory
    fight here, obviously, and it appears that PHMSA and FRA are
    moving in the direction of the Association of American
    Railroads in terms of recommendations on the tank cars. I think
    it's doubtful they're going--as she said already, she thinks
    the 1232s are deficient. That's why they didn't go through the
    process back when you guys requested their weighing-in on
    approving the tank car. This is very problematic from a public
    standpoint, because the public expects that we're going to make
    decisions and they're going to be fact-based.
        Now, we haven't had a major derailment that involved the
    1232s. We've obviously had major derailments that involve the
    111s and, I only have 42 seconds. So I'd like to ask Mr.
    Searles, how many 111s have been taken off the train?
        Mr. Searles. The 111s continue to be the tank car that was
    provided in the regulations.
        Senator Heitkamp. So we need to be careful when we say 40
    percent and it's going to be less because it had to mean we've
    taken these cars off the trains. It just means that we've grown
    the fleet to the point that their percentage involvement is
    dwindling; correct?
        Mr. Searles. The numbers indicate that we are moving in the
    direction that will bring us to these safer tank cars.
        Senator Heitkamp. But, as of today, there hasn't been any
    major movement of 111s off the rails?
        Mr. Searles. Not to my knowledge.
        Senator Heitkamp. Yes.
        Senator Blumenthal. Senator Hoeven.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HOEVEN,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA

        Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Thank you to
    Senator Blumenthal, also to Senator Blunt, for holding this
    hearing and appreciate all of you being here.
        The country is producing a lot more energy thanks, in very
    large part, to the states like North Dakota; very positive for
    the country in terms of knowledge, job creation, economic
    growth, but having affordable energy and from a national
    security standpoint. But we need the infrastructure to move
    that energy from where we produce it to the markets. That means
    pipelines, but that also means moving it as safely as possible
    by rail and by truck. And that's what today is all about. We
    need to do this safely and we need a comprehensive approach. A
    comprehensive approach that both prevents derailments and if a
    derailment occurs that we minimize the risk of fire or
    explosion. That means that everybody's got a role to play here:
    the regulators, the railroads, and the shippers.
        Obviously, oil companies own most of the cars. And so, you
    know, people, we've got to work together to get this done. And
    so, I'm going to have questions for each of you, which I'm
    obviously not going to get done in this session, but hopefully
    I'll have a follow-up opportunity and, you know, I want to
    start with inspections.
        And I'd like to ask Administrator Szabo, have you increased
    inspections? I know the answer to that is yes, but give us some
    sense of what you're doing. And also, do you need more
    inspectors to meet the demands of the increased volume?
        Mr. Szabo. Well, as I've stated in my testimony, our
    inspection and enforcement program is data driven. And so, we
    actually use statistical modeling to analyze that data and
    determine, you know, our National Inspection Plan and it's
    based on where there is risk.
        One of the reasons why I believe the agreement with AAR is
    so important is because it helps us determine the most safe and
    secure route to be used for the movement of this product using
    the 27 risk factors. And that also gets run through a computer
    analysis to determine the most safe and secure route. But then
    we mandate of the industry additional equipment and track
    inspections along those routes; as well as it allows me to
    better focus limited resources on those routes. Certainly, the
    45 additional employees that we received as part of the 2014
    budget package are going to help us tremendously but, you know,
    the truth of the matter is there can be an endless demand for
    resources.
        I have a responsibility to make sure that I am as smart and
    strategic as possible with the limited resources that you
    choose to provide me.
        Senator Hoeven. But at this point, you are making provision
    for additional inspectors and we certainly want to work with
    you through the appropriations process to see that you're able
    to do that in a sensible way, in a cost-effective, sensible
    way, but we need to make sure we're doing more inspections.
        Mr. Szabo. And, Senator, if I could add one more point
    that's an important piece to that. You know, we do have the
    state inspection partnership. And there are 30 states across
    the Nation that choose to hire their own inspectors. We train
    them. We absorb the cost of training them and certifying them,
    but then states are able to use these inspectors to supplement
    our inspection efforts in their own states and raise the bar
    that much higher.
        Senator Hoeven. Mr. Blackwell, how are we going to or how
    are the railroads going to implement positive train control,
    which is part of the safety solution, if they can't get the
    tower sited on their own right-of-ways? Does that require
    legislation or, I mean, is FCC going to just hold them up
    forever, or does it require legislation? Or what do we have to
    do to get positive train control out there?
        Senator Blackwell. There are, we believe, in our programs,
    on this----
        Pardon me, Senator.
        We believe the Program Comments strike the appropriate
    balance between front loading, the type of information that is
    usually requested and readily available, and with PTC's goals
    and deadlines. And in doing so, we prescribe much-ordered
    deadlines that are already streamlined processes. We don't
    expect that all the applications will take the maximum time
    allowed, but we've accelerated procedures and reduced the
    overall review process by 40 percent. Specifically, this
    includes shortened timeframes for initial responses and
    situations lacking responses. And we've also established a new
    deadline for our FCC review of resolutions and disputes.
        The Program Comment limits the scope of review to a smaller
    area of potential effect from one-half mile to one-quarter
    mile. And it also allows for exclusions of wayside structures,
    similar to nearby existing structures in the right-of-way, for
    wayside structures located within rail yards of at least 1,000
    square feet and from affects on the rails and the track beds
    themselves.
        The Program Comment, like the NHPA and our rules, also set
    standards for requesting additional information requiring
    tribal nations and State Historical Officer----
        Senator Hoeven. Mr. Blackwell, I'm over my time. We'll come
    back to this. But my question, very specifically, is going to
    be either you're going to commit to work with the railroads to
    get this done, or it's going to require legislation. But I am
    over my time and we can certainly come back to that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Hoeven.
        Welcome, and thank you to Senator Thune for joining us. If
    it's OK with you, I'm going to ask Senator Klobuchar to do her
    questions and then turn to you.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. Congratulations. You'll do a great job and you're
    working with a good guy with Senator Blunt. We once shared a
    committee together and I'm looking forward to both of you
    working on this important issue.
        I'm in the neighboring state of Minnesota and we've
    certainly seen the effects of increased rail. We're pleased
    that we have more of our own energy in this country. We think
    it's very important. But, at the same time, we can't lag behind
    for our capacity and our safety standards.
        I get very frustrated by government delay. I'll tell you
    that. So if you could answer your questions quickly, that'll
    show that we're on the right road.
        Ms. Quarterman, have you thought about what this rulemaking
    that's taken two and half years of trying to focus on the cars,
    the tank cars, that carry the most flammable and volatile
    liquid since the severe derailments have involved that to try
    and move that quicker?
        Ms. Quarterman. We've been moving as fast as we possibly
    can. We have been working on these rules very hard. And I will
    say the discussion at the panel among the witnesses today point
    to why, even though we are working fast, we need to be
    strategic and deliberative in our process. As you've seen, the
    tank car standard has evolved over the past several years.
        Senator Klobuchar. Do you think it's safer to have new tank
    cars or retrofitted cars?
        Ms. Quarterman. It depends on what the retrofit is.
        Senator Klobuchar. And do you think that we'll have the
    manufacturing capability to get those cars? I know Burlington
    Northern has just voluntarily agreed to buy 5,000.
        Can we get those off the factory floors fast enough?
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, I recently had a meeting with one of
    those manufacturers and they said they thought they could. I
    think they're eager to do so.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK.
        And, again, as many of us have urged here, just the sooner
    we can get this done, the better. We had a derailment with a
    train loaded with iron ore on December 5 of last year in Two
    Harbors, Minnesota. Seventy-six rail cars piled up and, others,
    17 cars loaded with iron ore pallets parked on an adjacent
    track were hit and derailed. Our reports indicated that,
    actually, it was Canadian National; that they hadn't removed
    the snow and ice from the tracks. As you know, we've had a lot
    recently, despite warning from crew members.
        Do you think the railroads have the appropriate lines of
    communication, and I think this is probably best a question for
    Mr. Hamberger, in place to ensure that crew members can easily
    report these kinds of concerns?
        Mr. Hamberger. I'm unaware of the specific that you're
    talking about but I've always said that when it comes to
    security and safety, the 180,000 crew members that we have are
    the first line of notification of whether something is not
    right if it happens to be a security issue, and the same for
    safety. So I believe every railroad has in place a
    communication systems to get those kinds of safety issues from
    the employees. So, I would think so.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK.
        Well, we'll follow up with you with getting the facts out
    there so we can talk about it further.
        The other thing I hear around our state on issues, things
    that have already been talked about, is that on not having the
    capacity to prepare for and respond to an event like a
    hazardous spill or a derailment. What do you think, Mr.
    Hamberger, that rail companies could do to assist communities
    to ensure that they're properly prepared should a disaster
    occur?
        Mr. Hamberger. Several things that they are already doing,
    and that is: working with the emergency responders and training
    and letting them know what is coming through their communities
    and designing training programs for the most dangerous things
    coming through the communities. But we're also--and the
    agreement with Secretary Foxx, as an industry, taking on an
    inventory of what are the emergency response equipment out
    there; whether it's foam or booms near water supplies and try
    to have that available both for other railroads but also share
    it with appropriate emergency responders so they know what's
    available.
        Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Szabo, do you think we have enough
    track inspectors out there?
        This is something I've heard from our own Department of
    Transportation, as well as some of the workers that aren't on
    the panel today, but I know they're concerned about this. Do
    you think we have enough track inspectors? And what can be done
    to address a shortage? I know, in our state, we only have a few
    of them.
        Mr. Szabo. Well, I think this is similar to the answer that
    I gave Senator Hoeven.
        You know, first off, the 45 additional employees that the
    2014 budget provided for us is going to help. The agreement
    that was signed with AAR requiring them to do additional
    inspections is going to help. My ability to more strategically
    focus on crude routes is going to help; and, you know,
    following our data is going to help, as well as the ability for
    states to supplement through our state partnerships. So you
    know, I think we've got the tools and we just need to execute.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK.
        And I'm out of time here but, Mr. Blackwell, I'll follow up
    on the record about some of the concerns raised by Senator
    Hoeven about trying to move on the PTC implementation and just
    the concern that this is something that could help and that
    this is just taking too long. So we'll follow up on the FCC
    role on what we can do to speed it up.
        Thank you.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
        Senator Thune, again welcome and the floor is yours.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
    you and Ranking Member Blunt for holding this hearing on a very
    important subject and I will follow up on Senator Klobuchar's
    issues on PTC but I do want to thank the panel for being here
    today.
        And, you know, one way we could get fewer trains in North
    Dakota is to horizontally drill from South Dakota.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Thune. Pull some of that energy back down into our
    state.
        Senator Hoeven. We're watching you.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Thune. You know I've had some experience. I worked
    as the State Rail Director in South Dakota prior to coming to
    this job. And the railroads are so important in our part of the
    country. The reason there's so much interest here, you can tell
    today, is that we're incredibly dependent. So much so that back
    when the Milwaukee Road abandoned the railroads in our state in
    the late 1970s, the State of South Dakota actually acquired the
    railroads, not the power and the rolling stock but the right-
    of-way and the track and everything to keep railroads active
    and going. It's the most efficient way to move freight and,
    obviously, critically important to our agricultural economy. So
    for many years, the State of South Dakota actually operated, or
    I shouldn't say operated, but contracted, for operations with
    some railroads and maintain the track and right-of-way; so this
    is a critically important issue in our state and to all the
    states that are represented here.
        I want to ask a question and this would be for Mr.
    Blackwell. And I appreciate it's been talked about a little bit
    already, the effort the FCC's taken to expedite the approval of
    PTC towers and I'm also encouraged that the FCC has issued a
    draft proposal. However, I'm still concerned about how long
    it's going to take before Class I railroads are going to be
    able to take advantage of this process. It's my understanding
    that that draft proposal was submitted to the Advisory Council
    for Historic Preservation this week and that the ACHP will then
    have 45 days to review and approve it.
        Given that timeline, what is the earliest date in which you
    think railroads will be able to begin installing towers under
    the new system?
        Mr. Blackwell. So, maybe a bit of the challenge, if you do
    the math right now, but it would be 45 days from the date of
    the transmittal. We would be ready to begin processing those up
    to 20,000 more. There's absolutely nothing holding everybody
    back now from preparing the information to be ready to go as
    soon as possible.
        Senator Thune. So after a tower is submitted for approval,
    how long do you anticipate it would take for final approval?
    And do you have any estimates on how this will compare to the
    timeline under the current approval process?
        Mr. Blackwell. Well, we did shorten the--by frontloading
    the system with an amount of information that's normally
    routinely gathered, we were able to shorten timelines
    significantly. Overall, it is 40 percent. We did also shorten
    timelines associated with the initial responses, lack of
    responses, and then encouraged the parties that may have
    disputes to come to the FCC. And we have a self-imposed 15 day
    deadline to deal with those.
        Senator Thune. OK.
        This would be a follow-up question for Mr. Hamberger.
        The railroads have run into a lot of obstacles and their
    efforts to meet this 2015 PTC deadline but the FCC approval
    process clearly has become a big impediment to that. Let me ask
    you what your overall assessment is of the FCC's draft proposal
    and do you think it will help expedite the process for that
    approval?
        Mr. Hamberger. I have not personally read what was
    submitted last evening but my lawyers, who have, so this is
    secondhand, advise me that some of our comments submitted in
    the process have been acknowledged but the core issue of not
    having an end date to when a decision has to be reached, there
    is a deadline on expressing an interest, but not on reaching a
    conclusion. And although we can file by county, each individual
    pole still has to be dealt with and the upfront submission of
    data that Mr. Blackwell is talking to is, I believe, it's an
    ethnographic study where we have to show, prove a negative,
    that there is no cultural or historic interest in that site
    pole by pole, by pole. We do not think that this solves the
    problem. Again, recognizing the amount of effort that has gone
    into it and I appreciate Chairman Wheeler's personal interest,
    but we are not there.
        Senator Thune. So in the interim, the FCC has initiated
    this beta process for PTC tower approval in which railroads are
    able to batch these applications, as was mentioned, up to 20
    PTC towers in the same county.
        Have railroads made use of that process?
        Mr. Hamberger. Yes.
        And in several cases they have gotten back automatic
    responses of that, not wanting to go forward in some cases. I'm
    told that not one of those have yet made it through the
    process.
        Senator Thune. Do you like that process? Do you see
    benefits to that process? Do you see limitations to that
    process?
        Mr. Hamberger. We went forward, as Mr. Blackwell indicated,
    in an informal process in dealing with the tribal nations that
    we knew had interest and have erected 10,000 poles. We think
    that the rules that FCC has allow that. They have told us that
    we cannot do that; that we have to work through the TCNS
    process.
        And I think that is a bureaucratic slowdown that is
    adversely affecting our ability to make progress. I was going
    to be delivering our white paper, effective of 12-31-2013, at
    which we had been projecting that we were going to be able to
    meet 40 percent of our implementation by the end of 2015.
    That's what we projected at the end of 2012; that we were going
    to be able to get about 24,000 miles up and running. We can no
    longer make that projection.
        And so I'm not in a position to submit that as part of my
    testimony today. We're still going back to the railroads and
    trying to get what the number might be. And unfortunately,
    until this process plays out, we don't know. We just don't know
    how long it's going to take.
        Senator Thune. And that 45-day clock hasn't started running
    yet.
        Mr. Blackwell. It started running Tuesday.
        Senator Thune. It did, OK. OK.
        So we're talking 45 days, middle of April, and then how
    many days after that to get a final rule?
        Mr. Blackwell. Well, we could start processing the
    applications immediately.
        Senator Thune. OK.
        And you're saying if they are submitting applications,
    doing all the preparatory work right now, that those
    applications could start being processed immediately when that
    45 days runs out?
        Mr. Blackwell. The submission process, under the Program
    Comment, would begin once the Program Comment became final.
    Forty-five days. The ACHP has it for 45 days.
        Senator Thune. OK. All right.
        Mr. Hamberger. That assumes they don't extend.
        Senator Thune. Right.
        Mr. Blackwell. I would clarify something, Senator, about
    the ethnographic studies that Mr. Hamberger just mentioned.
    This draft Program Comment does not require ethnographic
    studies. The reference is to help the railroads prepare
    materials that, based on our experience, are frequently asked
    for in the course of the Section 106 reviews.
        Senator Thune. Well, I guess the only thing I would say,
    Mr. Chairman, is there's a lot of pressure on the railroads,
    obviously, to comply with and to meet the 2015 deadline. And
    there are a number of us on the Committee who are co-sponsoring
    legislation that would extend that by a reasonable amount of
    time so the railroads have the time to comply. But the FCC has
    become a critical component in allowing that process to move
    forward. And I would hope that you will do everything you
    possibly can to expedite this process, because, for a lot of
    reasons, there's a sense of urgency attached to this and I hope
    that that's fully understood there at the Commission.
        Mr. Blackwell. Senator Thune, Senator Hoeven, the FCC is
    committed to tailoring the process in a way that will enable
    the railroads to meet their current statutory deadline fully
    committed.
        Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I'd like to
    ask consent to have in----
        Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South Dakota
        Thank you Senator Blumenthal, and Senator Blunt for holding this
    important hearing and I am glad that Senators Hoeven and Heitkamp are
    able to join us today to underscore their first-hand perspective when
    it comes to increased domestic oil and gas production from their home
    state and the recent accident that occurred there.
        The topic of this hearing is particularly timely, as we've seen
    several high-profile accidents in recent months involving both freight
    and passenger railroads, some of which have sadly resulted in the loss
    of life and injuries to rail passengers.
        As a Senator from South Dakota, I am particularly interested in the
    safety issues involved in transporting crude oil from the Bakken
    region, and I am encouraged to see railroads, the oil industry, and the
    various Federal safety agencies working together on this issue--
    including improvements when it comes to tank car safety to protect
    against releases of commodities that are increasingly moved via the
    second safest mode of bulk transportation.
        I am also interested in hearing from the Federal Communications
    Commission (FCC) and the Association of American Railroads on the work
    that is being done to speed up the approval process for the
    communications towers that railroads must install to fully implement
    Positive Train Control (PTC), which can certainly assist in reducing
    the incidence of some, but not all, rail accidents.
        While I agree that PTC is an important safety technology that
    railroads should work to install as quickly as possible, I worry that
    the current statutory deadline of December 2015 is unrealistic for most
    passenger and freight railroads. I think this is especially true in
    light of some of the delays that have occurred at the FCC that we will
    hear more about today.
        Along with Senators Blunt, McCaskill, and Pryor, I have introduced
    legislation, which is supported by other members of this committee, to
    extend the 2015 deadline in order to allow the railroads a realistic
    time-frame for full implementation. There are now 12 bipartisan co-
    sponsors of this legislation, and I hope that our committee will
    consider this bill in the coming months.
        At the end of the day, we have a shared interest in seeing PTC work
    as intended, and avoiding the unintended consequences of an unworkable
    timetable that could weaken the overall safety of our rail network. We
    all want PTC done right, and I appreciate the perspectives of our
    witnesses on how we can work together to make that happen.

        Senator Thune. Thank you.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        And I think that comment, by Senator Thune, points to a
    very real issue that the FCC has to address. I'm going to be
    meeting later in the day with Chairman Wheeler and certainly
    this topic is high on the agenda.
        I come away from the testimony, so far, with the feeling
    that your agencies collectively and individually need more
    authority to expedite these rules and make this system work
    better.
        Do any of you disagree? And, please, don't hesitate to
    disagree.
        Mr. Hamberger. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to jump in even
    though it's not exactly on the point to your comment because I
    don't want to let stand on the record without responding, but I
    know this is dangerous at the first hearing.
        I'm testifying before you as our new chair, but you talked
    about the inadequacy of voluntary actions. And I submit to you
    that every railroad has a voluntary rulebook which goes beyond
    the requirements of the FRA that really helps deliver the
    safest transportation mode America has. And you talked about
    inward-facing cameras; we're not waiting for the rule. Kansas
    City Southern has already gone through the process; had to go
    through----
        Senator Blumenthal. You may be right, Mr. Hamberger, and I
    apologize for interrupting, but I'm limited in terms of the
    time I have to ask my question.
        Mr. Hamberger. I'm sorry.
        Senator Blumenthal. You may be right about some railroads,
    but certainly not all. Metro-North is not moving ahead with
    cameras. The NTSB has recommended to Metro-North that it have
    those cameras, but we still have not seen them. It took a
    derailment with four fatalities to cause Metro-North to
    implement automatic train control, alerters, and other
    commonsense sensible measures still have not been implemented.
        There is a reason why Congress has mandated certain
    actions. And the rules necessary to enforce those laws still
    have not been issued in many instances despite deadlines that
    have been passed. And I am not, I hope, unfairly criticizing
    the FRA or PHMSA. I know that resources are an issue, but I'm
    asking really for authority; whether the agencies need
    authority to expedite these rules, to issue emergency orders.
        We're talking here about huge and humongous costs in lives
    and dollars, in the creditability and trust in our system,
    potential environmental affect. I was going to hold up--oh, we
    now have the--these issues unite and interlock the entire
    country. As you can see, what happens along those arteries of
    transportation affects the Midwest, the states that are
    represented here by my colleagues from North and South Dakota,
    Missouri, and eventually, potentially Long Island Sound as well
    as Albany, places in New York, the Northeast.
        So there has to be a sense of urgency here that, I think,
    may not be felt by all the railroads in all necessary respects
    about these rules. So, in terms of enforcement of our laws that
    protect safety and reliability, isn't there a need for more
    authority?
        And Mr. Blackwell, you seem to be on the verge of saying
    something. So let me call on you.
        Mr. Blackwell. I was. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We believe that we've identified the most expeditious
    process. We have not placed bureaucratic process above public
    safety. We take our responsibility with respect to public
    safety at the Commission deeply seriously.
        You asked about additional authority. Under the applicable
    statutes and regulations--and Mr. Hamberger suggested that the
    Commission might be able to do a wholesale exemption of
    positive train control. Under applicable statutes and
    regulations, a wholesale exemption of the infrastructures
    associated with PTC from NEPA and the National Historical
    Preservation Act would require negotiation with the Advisory
    Council on Historic Preservation and the National Conference of
    State Historic Preservation Officers and the full notice and
    comment rulemaking of the Commission including consultation
    with tribal nations. And that would take us well beyond the
    December 2015 deadline.
        Senator Blumenthal. Any other comment?
        And let me ask the same question with respect to resources;
    more authority clearly necessary. What about more resources?
    Also necessary; based on what I've heard today and what I've
    heard over years of learning and listening about this process.
        I know that Mr. Szabo would agree because we fought for
    more resources for the FRA. And what we've achieved, I will
    say, still is inadequate in spite of the increase that we
    managed to restore to the budget. So I think that one of the
    lessons of today is that we need both resources and authority.
        Let me ask, in particular, about the Operation
    Classification results so far. As I mentioned at the very
    outset, a very high proportion to samples--I think the majority
    of the samples taken indicated that the packing was
    inappropriate to the content of the crude. I know I'm probably
    misstating, in technical terms, the result but basically in the
    majority of samples, correct procedures were not followed.
        Ms. Quarterman. Within those particular samples that we're
    taking. We started this effort last August and we have gone out
    a series of times doing this testing. And each time we've gone
    out, we have extended the testing that we perform. We started
    by looking first at flash point, initial boiling point. As we
    learned more, we continued to go back and expand the tests. We
    now include vapor pressure and sulfur content. We're beginning
    to do corrosivity tests and flammable gas content. It's a
    learning experience in terms of trying to understand the
    characteristics of this particular crude oil.
        We have to all remember, we're talking about crude oil
    here. We're not talking about a refined product. And crude oil
    varies from region to region and place to place and we want to
    understand exactly what the characteristics of this particular
    crude are. Last week, we were out again. We had a multi-agency
    strike force in North Dakota with members of the FRA, the
    FMCSA, the North Dakota folks as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me just interrupt because I
    want to turn to Senator Blunt for our next round.
        On February 4, you released the first round of your test
    results which concluded that 11 of 18 samples, taken from cargo
    tanks delivering crude oil to loading facilities, we're not
    assigned to the correct transportation packing group. As a
    result, you issued notices of violation; $93,000 in fines to
    the shipping companies involved.
        Doesn't that give you a lot of alarm?
        Ms. Quarterman. It does, indeed. And that is why we, the
    Department, issued an emergency order related to classification
    and testing. We amended that order today, after we had some
    questions from operators about the order. And that's why we're
    out on the ground every day despite resource issues. I didn't
    respond to that question but certainly after have those.
        Senator Blumenthal. So maybe voluntary compliance isn't
    working as it should be.
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, I think we have to double-check on
    these things. Absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. I may have an opportunity to follow-up
    in a third round, I'm sure, to the chagrin of our witnesses but
    I'm going to turn to Senator Blunt because I've reached the end
    of my time this time.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
        Ms. Quarterman, what, on the strike force, were you testing
    a new rule or was this a rule that the railroad should have, or
    the shipper rather who complies here? The shipper or the
    person----
        Ms. Quarterman. The shipper or offerer is the person who
    needs to comply with the rules.
        Senator Blunt. And was this a new rule?
        Ms. Quarterman. No, it was not a new rule. It's an existing
    rule.
        Senator Blunt. So your view is that in the strike force, on
    a rule that was existing, it had been out there for how long;
    we talking years, months, days?
        Ms. Quarterman. Many, many years.
        Senator Blunt. That they were not complying in how many
    cases out of how many?
        Ms. Quarterman. I believe Senator Blumenthal was talking
    about, what was it, 11 out of 18 in one particular series of
    tests that we did. We've gone out about five or six different
    times and we haven't finished our enforcement actions,
    obviously, so there may be more coming.
        Senator Blunt. So in the total, is this 11 out of 18 or is
    this 11 out of a particular route? I'm interested in knowing
    more about that.
        Ms. Quarterman. It's 11 out of a particular 18. It was one
    trip.
        Senator Blunt. That was the total test in that one trip,
    was 18?
        Ms. Quarterman. That's my recollection, yes.
        Senator Blunt. And in terms of--are you going to change the
    way you require this testing? Is that in your proposed rule
    that we test for different things than we have?
        Ms. Quarterman. It certainly is on the table. We are
    looking at everything related to the movement of crude oil, so
    classification issues are something that we're looking at as
    well.
        Senator Blunt. Yes.
        On the tank cars, I thought Senator Heitkamp made a
    particularly helpful observation about, you know, you obviously
    have a lot more shipping going on so the cars that were out
    there could be out there.
        What I don't understand, Mr. Hamberger, is who owns these
    cars? I think, generally, they have been owned by the shipper
    but does that mean the orange juice cars are owned by the
    orange juice people and the milk cars are owned by the milk
    people. And what does that mean?
        Mr. Hamberger. Tank cars are a bit of an anomaly in that we
    own basically very few tank cars.
        Senator Blunt. ``We'' being the railroads.
        Mr. Hamberger. Being the railroads, yes, sir.
        They're owned either by producers or leasing companies who
    build them and then lease them out to the shippers. In other
    areas, boxcars, you know, automotive bi-levels, tri-levels,
    most of those, many of those at least, are owned by the
    railroads but some of those are also owned directly either by a
    shipper or by a leasing company. But in the tank car area, it
    is almost not, as you mentioned, BNSF did just announce they're
    going to purchase 5,000 but that is not the normal for us.
        Senator Blunt. Right. And I assume that these cars can be
    that the 111, if I'm using the right terminology, could still
    be used for something else even if we decide for--I'm seeing a
    number of heads shaking here. So taking 111s off the railroad
    is a different question than using them for another purpose.
        Mr. Hamberger. That is correct; yes.
        Our recommendation is not to use them for flammable
    liquids.
        Senator Blunt. Right. And Mr. Blackwell, how long have you
    worked for the FCC?
        Mr. Blackwell. Off and on for 15 years, sir.
        Senator Blunt. And how long in the current job?
        Mr. Blackwell. Four years.
        Senator Blunt. And when did the FCC realize that it had
    responsibilities under positive train control that was passed,
    I guess, in 2011?
        Mr. Blackwell. We first learned about the massive number of
    wayside poles, just under a year ago.
        Senator Blunt. So this is not--I can't go back and say what
    did you do though, you just didn't know how involved you were
    going to be? Mr. Hamberger, you want to help me with that?
        Mr. Hamberger. Well, that isn't exactly correct.
        I think Mr. Blackwell may have learned a year ago, but when
    the FCC awarded the spectrum to a group called PLC 220, it's
    the railroad organization that bought the spectrum for PTC, as
    part of that award there's a requirement that you submit to the
    bureau every 6 months what you're doing to make sure that
    you're using that spectrum because otherwise, why, you know,
    why should you get to keep it? So starting in 2009, we
    submitted statements to the FCC telling them what we were doing
    to implement the award of that spectrum including putting up
    poles along their right-of-way.
        Senator Blunt. And, I would say that the recent people that
    have appeared here that are now serving on the FCC seem to be
    much more aware of this and, Mr. Blackwell, I think you would--
    the Commission itself is responsible here to this committee and
    you're responsible to the Commission. But what I'm wondering at
    now, and I think I'm right here, you mentioned some dates. You
    said September the twenty-seventh. There was one day and that
    was last year. You're talking September 27, 2013; right?
        Mr. Blackwell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blunt. And then, January 29, 2014?
        Mr. Blackwell. That was the release of our draft Program
    Comment.
        Senator Blunt. And Senator Thune had you in sometime in
    mid-to-late April 2014. And then, you've got the whole 22,000
    towers to side, even if you group them? I'm having a hard time
    imagining, unless something changes, you get all that agreed
    to, all that done, by the end of 2015, let alone your assertion
    that there's plenty of time for the railroads to comply by the
    end of 2015. You're not going to have 22,000 people out there
    setting individual towers on a given day when you all are
    finally done with this, and 22,000 individual pieces of
    equipment. The idea that we can, the government, can drag its
    feet as long as it has and then suddenly, in the middle of the
    year before this has to be completed, the next year, the
    government can assert that there's plenty of time for the
    railroads to comply now that we've finally come up with our
    rules, I just think is ludicrous.
        Now, let me be sure I understand these poles, too. There
    are 22,000 towers and poles. How many of those would be the big
    tower that I would envision when I think about something like a
    telephone, cellular; any of them?
        Mr. Hamberger. No. The ones that we're talking about are
    what are called monopoles. They could be as high as 60 feet,
    could be as low as 20 feet depending on terrain. Generally
    speaking, go down into the ground six, eight, ten feet, maybe
    two feet diameter of a hole. Ninety-seven percent of them will
    be on the right-of-way of the railroad. Again, not in tribal
    nation land. We understand if it is tribal nation land that
    would be a different consideration. And if we were talking
    about the big radio towers, that obviously is a different
    consideration.
        Senator Blunt. Do we have to build any of those big towers?
        Mr. Hamberger. About 500, apparently.
        Senator Blunt. Five hundred----
        Mr. Hamberger. Of the 22,000?
        Senator Blunt.--cellular type towers and the others are----
        Mr. Hamberger. It's included in the 22,000; 500 in the
    22,000.
        Senator Blunt. So 40 feet, that's somewhere in the
    streetlight, telephone pole----
        Mr. Hamberger. That's my assessment, yes.
        Senator Blunt.--is the size that you're talking about.
        And I'm going to ask one more question and then I'm going
    to be done with this. On the wayside structures you mentioned
    in rail yards, can they build things there that they couldn't
    build in the right-of-way without approval from your
    organization, Mr. Blackwell?
        Mr. Blackwell. Senator Blunt, I should clarify a couple of
    things. Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act
    applies nationwide, not just on tribal lands. And it applies
    within the rights-of-way. In fact, these rights-of-way, because
    they're private in nature, there have not been surveys. Folks
    don't know what's in them. But the exceptions to that are
    identified under Program Comment do involve a rail yard. There
    are exceptions for wayside structures similar in nearby
    existing structures in the right-of-way. For wayside structures
    located within rail yards of at least 1,000 square feet--
    100,000 square feet, excuse me. And reviews are exempted from
    rails on the track--the review of the--impact for rails on the
    track beds themselves.
        Senator Blunt. Do you think you'll have all, assuming the
    railroad complies with every deadline you've set, do you think
    you'll have all these towers agreed to? When do you think is
    the last time you'll finish the approval process on the 22,000
    towers; the ones that are going to then be built by the end of
    2015?
        I'm going to keep track of this topic and if it's like
    November 2015, whenever it's finally done, I'm going to come
    back and ask you how you thought these towers were all supposed
    to be done by the end of 2015, which is exactly what you said
    here today. I just don't understand how you think there's--I'll
    let you answer the question, then I'm done.
        Mr. Blackwell. Well, there was a reference earlier to the
    base stations, those towers can go through the process right
    now; our regular process. We also developed a process that had
    been mentioned earlier on the beta testing process for railroad
    subdivisions that were demonstrated in our Oklahoma and in our
    South Dakota consultations. The FCC is fully committed to
    tailoring our process in a way that will enable the railroads
    to meet the current statutory deadline, Senator.
        Senator Blunt. I actually don't believe that's possible
    based on the sitings you have to do and the towers that still
    have to sited, but I'm going to watch this pretty closely and
    if the FCC is fully committed as you say they are, to have all
    of these towers in place by the end of 2015, you're going to
    have to be really quick to let them know that they can set
    these towers. Again, I'll just repeat, there aren't 22,000
    crews that are going to, on a given day, each set a tower.
        Senator Blumenthal. Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. And a question to follow up to that. I mean,
    once the towers are installed, you still have to test, you
    still need interoperability, you have a whole bunch of things
    that have to happen subsequent to that; correct?
        Mr. Hamberger. Correct.
        Senator Thune. So, I mean, this is a--yes. This is a
    process that's going to go on for some time.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for those excellent
    questions, Senator Blunt and Senator Thune.
        And I might just make the observation that even before
    November 2015, I think we may need to have a separate hearing
    on some of the question you've been raising because they are
    profoundly important and they go to the core of safety and
    reliability in both freight and passenger.
        If my colleagues would like, Senator Heitkamp.
        Senator Heitkamp. Yes. Just, quickly.
        You know, this really fits in kind of three categories for
    me. Number one, prevention of derailments. Second category is
    mitigating the consequences of derailments. And then, making
    sure that, in the third category, that we have in fact trained
    professionals who respond to these crises. And I want to just
    briefly hit each one.
        I was surprised, Mr. Szabo, that you didn't talk about
    technology very much when you were asked because I think
    technology is such that you could in fact inspect that track
    every time a train went over the track. And so, you know, I
    just want to lay that--I don't have a lot of time, so I just
    want to lay that marker down that we're interested in the
    relationship that you have with the Association of American
    Railroads so we make sure we get that technology deployed.
        In the category of mitigation, I think, you know, with all
    due respect, PHMSA doesn't have a very good record on this. And
    I know you said you're moving with all due diligence but that's
    not the past history on this. I think there was a lack of
    engagement. In fact, Senator Hoeven along with Senator
    Landrieu, sent a letter in December of 2012 asking where that
    collaboration was, where that discussion was. Now we're here,
    in crisis almost, trying to resolve this issue and I think it's
    a lesson for all of us to respond and react.
        Finally, I want to talk about classification. There hasn't
    been a lot of talk about how this product gets classified,
    except the Chairman raised this.
        I want to ask Ms. Quarterman. Taking a look at the range of
    violations, would it have changed how any of that product was
    actually shipped? It may have changed how people respond to it
    if there's a crisis, and I recognize the need to know exactly
    what that is for the first responders, but would it have
    changed how they shipped that product?
        Ms. Quarterman. I don't have a list of each of the
    violations that are listed there but we're talking here about
    cargo tanks, which are trucks on the highway. And there are
    differences between the tanks that are used for Packing Group I
    packages and Packing Group II packages.
        Senator Heitkamp. I just want to focus on the railroad. I
    want to focus on the rails.
        Ms. Quarterman. Once it went to a rail, whether it would
    have made a difference if the packing group were wrong?
        I don't know what the number was at that time. Packing
    Group I and Packing Group II are very similar.
        Senator Heitkamp. In terms of the requirement on how they
    ship.
        Ms. Quarterman. In terms of the requirement.
        Senator Heitkamp. So we just want to make sure that we're
    laying down the understanding that these classifications are
    relevant and important and must be met. But they may not
    change, in fact, how that product moves under current
    regulation.
        Finally, I want to talk a little bit about classification
    because in my discussions with API and with PHMSA, you know,
    this is facts. I mean, what actually is in the tank or what
    gets produced, it's chemically provable. But yet, we have all
    of this disagreement about what is this, what is this product.
    And I know that API has come up with a pretty extensive outline
    on process in terms of studying this and getting to the point,
    and I know you're currently moving. Are you guys communicating?
    Are you giving us what we need in terms of a process so the
    public can be guaranteed it's moving forward appropriately?
        Yes, API.
        Mr. Searles. Yes, thank you.
        We, indeed, are moving forward with the development of a
    standard that looks at classification of crude oil and what it
    does is look at all of the aspects that need to be resolved.
    There have been several questions that have come from PHMSA and
    we're addressing those and any other questions that come up
    during those meetings. So that is a group of scientists and
    engineers, and railroads and PHMSA will be participating in
    those meetings. In fact, they had somebody at the last meeting.
        Senator Heitkamp. So we're building consensus on how we're
    going to test this or what the standards are going to be, Ms.
    Quarterman?
        Ms. Quarterman. API has stepped forward to put together a
    standards creation body. We are participating in that body. We
    have, since we last met with Secretary Foxx, we have had a
    series of meetings with crude oil representatives including
    API, but also individual shippers to ask them what are the
    characteristics of the crude. And I've had a series of
    conversations over the past month with individual companies.
    Some are providing information on that and we have told them
    what we know about the crude so far.
        And, you know, we did probably as many tests last week as
    we had in the period before, so we will have a lot more
    information after we get the results from that.
        Senator Heitkamp. I think this is headed in the right
    direction.
        I just want to thank both the Chairman and the Ranking
    Member for this extraordinary opportunity to participate and
    ask if it's okay if I submit a statement for the record.
        Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Heitkamp follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Hon. Heidi Heitkamp,
                         U.S. Senator from North Dakota
        Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt--thank you for organizing
    this hearing on the critically important topic of rail safety.
        Right after the Casselton derailment, I spoke with Senators Warner
    and Blunt to request that this committee hold a comprehensive hearing
    to examine rail safety--and they didn't hesitate to commit to
    investigating the topic we will consider today.
        Thank you for the opportunity to participate as a guest of your
    subcommittee and, more importantly, thank you for you leadership and
    responsiveness on this important issue facing the country.
    Why We Need This Hearing
        Our country is in the midst of an energy revolution, and North
    Dakota is at the heart of it. Nearly a million barrels of oil are
    produced in my state each day, and additional growth is expected in the
    coming months and years.
        This energy boom is dramatically changing our country. It is
    putting us on the path to North American energy independence and
    helping wean us off of foreign oil. It increasing the competitiveness
    of American manufacturing. And it is providing thousands of jobs and
    creating new wealth in the countryside.
        But with all these benefits come additional costs. And just last
    month in Casselton, North Dakota, we saw what can happen if we don't
    properly manage those costs.
        Transporting crude by rail was so different even just a few years
    ago. Trains in the past would carry little if any crude. And when crude
    was carried by rail, it was in relatively small amounts mixed in with a
    diverse variety of grain and container shipments.
        Shipments of rail by crude have increased exponentially over the
    course of the previous five years. Trains have had to fill in where
    other forms of energy transportation are lacking. According to the
    Association of American Railroads, the number of railcars carrying
    crude oil on major freight railroads in the U.S. grew by more than
    6,000 percent between 2007 and 2013. Now we are seeing entire key
    trains of tanker cars carrying more than half a million barrels of
    crude to market.
        It's past time for industry and regulators to respond appropriately
    to the dramatic changes in the rail freight marketplace. I look forward
    to hearing from the railroads and oil producers today on their thoughts
    for the future of their respective industries. I also look forward to
    hearing the thoughts of the DOT regulators on what they believe we need
    to take to make the shipment of crude safer.
    What I Hope to Learn From this Hearing
        I've spoken with many of the officials and agencies here today. We
    have talked about the derailment in Casselton as we seek to find out
    what happened and learn about the steps that we can take to prevent
    them from happening in the future. We have spoken about railcar safety
    standards, train speed limits, accident clean up, routing, training for
    first responders, the packaging of crude, track inspections--the list
    goes on.
        But you get my point--I've been looking into these issues since the
    Lac Megantic derailment in Quebec last summer--even before the
    derailment in Casselton. We were very fortunate no one was hurt as a
    result of the Casselton derailment. But as we saw in Quebec, that isn't
    always the case.
        Today, I hope to get some more insight into these issues and hear
    about them in a public forum. North Dakotans need to know that as
    traffic continues to increase on our rail system, they will be safe in
    their homes and communities. I'm committed to making sure that's the
    case.
        Understandably, rail safety is on the minds of many North Dakotans
    following the Casselton derailment and subsequent explosions--and it's
    certainly an issue I'm very focused on. For many of us in the Senate,
    the Casselton derailment has trained our focus on efforts to improve
    safety for the rail shipments of crude oil--and we need to consider all
    angles to update needed standards and regulations.
        To truly improve safety, we need to work together. An effective and
    comprehensive response will require coordination and collaboration--
    from the industry, Federal regulators, and local governments. Everyone
    should want safety to be a top priority. And everyone should want to
    make sure we hit needed deadlines to show that safety is our top
    priority.
        DOT should set that example by leading the way. There are multiple
    jurisdictions within the DOT that are involved with the oversight and
    policy setting for the rail shipment of crude. It will be important
    that DOT provide the leadership to coordinate the activities of the
    multiple agencies involved and play an active role in guaranteeing the
    timely completion of the work of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Rail Administration (FRA)
    to improve the safety of crude rail transportation.
        I'm grateful to have Secretary Foxx at the helm, whom I believe is
    up to the task.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this ongoing
    discussion today.

        Senator Heitkamp. Thank you so much.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for joining us, Senator
    Heitkamp, and thank you for your excellent questions.
        Senator Hoeven.
        Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow up with Administrator Quarterman and
    PHMSA. I did write, along with Senator Landrieu, in December
    2012 and asked what you were doing and how soon we would get
    the regulations, understand the regulatory requirements for
    both the shipping industry, the shippers, as well as the
    railroads, so that they could go from the DOT-111 cars to the
    newer 1232 cars or whatever that model is going to be, what
    those requirements are going to be. And so, I come back to you
    today, and we've had some dialogue on it, but when are we going
    to see that standard so that the industry has some certainty
    and so we can move to the new cars as aggressively as possible?
        Ms. Quarterman. As I've said several times today, we're
    working very hard on getting that standard done, but a couple
    of things, I think, are important to remember here. The first
    is that the DOT-111 tank car itself was created in the 1960s
    and has had modifications over that time. So we're talking
    about a standard that could be in effect for decades.
        So we really need to get this right and, as you've heard
    from the panel today, from Vice Chairman Hart about his
    concerns about the 1232, the AAR about their modifications to
    their standards, and we're continuing, even though the
    rulemaking period has closed, to hear comments from many other
    stakeholders suggesting that the new standard should be
    different from either the 111 or the 1232. We really have to
    get all those comments together and look at the data and
    determine what the right new standard is for whatever number
    that new car because that's number one.
        Number two, the other important point to make is, as we
    have all said on this panel; this really requires a
    comprehensive approach. Do we need to improve the 111 tank car?
    Absolutely, we do. And we are working hard to make that happen,
    but that is a mitigative step. We need to first concentrate on
    prevention and do all these other things, like rerouting
    trains, perhaps slowing them down as we have with the AAR
    agreement, looking at braking mechanisms. We need to do all of
    those things together to improve and we're working on that
    hard.
        Senator Hoeven. Ms. Quarterman, of course we do. And that's
    what we've been talking about today. But I'm asking you when
    you're going to move forward with the new standard? That's the
    question I'm asking.
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, as I said earlier, FRA and PHMSA
    folks have been together working on a rule. We have a first
    draft of a rule. They are working on, what we call, a
    regulatory evaluation which is really the cost-benefit
    analysis; an important part of that----
        Senator Hoeven. Your rule has to go to OMB. Has that
    happened yet?
        Ms. Quarterman. It has not happened yet. No, it has not.
        Senator Hoeven. And they've talked about having a proposed
    rule out before the end of the year. Are you anticipating that
    timeline?
        Ms. Quarterman. I'm hopeful to beat that, yes.
        Senator Hoeven. OK. Now I'm going to turn to Mr. Searles
    and Mr. Hamberger.
        How can you two help make this happen in a way where we get
    it right and we get it done? And either one can start.
        Mr. Hamberger. In my humble opinion, one way to do it would
    be to split the rulemaking into two. Address the new tank car
    standard and then deal with the retrofits. There is a two-year
    backlog right now and those cars could be being built to a
    standard that a year from now is not deemed adequate. It seems
    to me that the message should be sent for certainty to, whether
    it's a railroad or shipper, a leasing company, whoever is
    buying a new car that this is the new car standard because it
    does have to last for 25 or 30 years. There is not a great deal
    of difference in the new car standard between some of the
    stakeholders that are talking to PHMSA. So that would be one
    thing that might be a way to show some progress. Because, the
    issue of the retrofit and phase-out, there are different types
    of DOT-111s; some of them actually have a jacket.
        And so, how do you deal with that? And, you know, what
    product is this for? And that, I think, is taking a lot of
    resources but it would just be an unasked-for thought, but
    since you asked that, maybe that would be one way to move
    forward at least on the new tank car standard.
        Senator Hoeven. Mr. Searles.
        Mr. Searles. Yes, thank you.
        I think that there are opportunities to move forward now
    with what we had consensus with 3 years ago. Those are safe
    cars; those are what are being built today; those are the
    things that will be the state-of-the-art. To that end, an
    interim final rule could be put forward today and you wouldn't
    have to worry about consistency and certainty taking place at
    that point. I agree that if you were looking at retrofits and
    those, there is more study that needs to be done. All of this
    needs to be done in a holistic and systematic way, as
    Administrator Quarterman suggested, because classification also
    has an impact to the tank car design. And we need to be able to
    get all of that information so that we are doing the right
    thing at the right time.
        Senator Hoeven. We had a meeting about 30 days ago with the
    regulators, with the railroads and with the shippers and we
    talked about a comprehensive plan with both short-term and
    long-term steps. We need to work together, we need to get it
    right, we need to be comprehensive, and we need to make this
    happen.
        I'd like to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member, not
    only for holding this hearing but I brought up the positive
    train control issue. Mr. Blackwell, I would strongly recommend
    that FCC put forward a plan to this committee as to how they're
    going to work with the railroads to actually facilitate or to
    empower them to get the PTC in place by the end of 2015. I
    think that there's a lot of confusion here on how that can
    actually happen. And it seems to me, you've got to show the
    path whereby the railroad is able to respond. They have a
    responsibility, obviously, to do it. The one question I'd ask
    is, will there be a different standard for freight and
    passenger trains with PTC or will that be a consistent
    standard?
        Mr. Blackwell. No. The freight train would be able to be
    treated the same--oh, sorry. It'd be the same standard.
        Senator Hoeven. So, it would be the same standard?
        Mr. Blackwell. Same standard, yes.
        Senator Hoeven. Well, I'd strongly urge that some
    visibility on this path--I think Senator Blunt did a marvelous
    job of laying it out. I don't understand how that's going to
    work yet. But if we're going to have a comprehensive plan that
    both prevents derailments to the extent possible and then we
    make sure that we reduce the risk of fire or explosion or other
    risks, as well as having a strong emergency response, we've got
    to have positive train control. So just like we've got to move
    forward on the tank car standards, we've got to move forward
    with things like PTC; as well as the technology, Mr. Szabo. And
    we're going to try to help in terms of making sure that there's
    funding to do it but with both people and technology to
    inspect.
        So, Mr. Blackwell, you were going to say something and I'll
    wrap up here, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Blackwell. I was going to say, just to add, Senator,
    that many commuter rails are installing a different type of PTC
    system and can use existing infrastructure to deploy and
    because it's a much smaller order of magnitude are utilizing
    our existing system right now.
        Mr. Szabo. Senator, if I may, just two comments.
        I mean, first off, thank you for bringing up technology as
    did Senator Heitkamp. While I touched on it in my testimony, I
    would truly appreciate additional questions for the record to
    allow me to talk about that quite a bit more because our R&D
    program and advancing technology is going to be a critical
    piece of driving the next generation of safety. And two, the
    debate on PTC. The challenges with siting the towers just adds
    one more reason why my agency needs the power to do provisional
    certification so we can get as many pieces, you know, as much
    deployed as quickly as possible, you know, and get up and
    achieve those safety benefits.
        Senator Hoeven. We'll work with you on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Hoeven.
        I think we're going to want all of you back and we're going
    to want you back soon. We're going to want to drill down--
    forgive me for using the oil well analogy.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Blumenthal. We don't have oil wells in Connecticut
    so I feel safe in using that term. But we do have freight, by
    the way. We have ten private freight railroad companies and
    they're moving ethanol. As a matter of fact, the amount of
    ethanol has grown from zero in 2011, to about 340 loads a month
    over two rail lines in 2012.
        So the issues that have been raised here, in terms of
    moving crude oil and moving fuel, are increasing in urgency and
    importance. And, just to follow up Senator Hoeven's comments,
    you know, a number of you said we need to get it right. Nobody
    disagrees that we need to get it right; we do need to get it
    right, but we need to get it done. And the delays that we've
    seen, for whatever the reasons, are putting people at risk.
    They're putting products and freight at risk, but they're also
    putting people at risk.
        And so, we need to develop a way to make this system work
    better. There has been general agreement that more authority
    and more resources are necessary. There will be questions for
    the record. I'm glad you raised that issue, Mr. Szabo. And I'm
    glad you would welcome them. We're going to keep the record
    open and a number of us will have questions for the record.
        I don't want to prolong this hearing now. I began by
    asking, Mr. Szabo, whether you could tell us anything about the
    results of Operation Deep Dive.
        Mr. Szabo. Yes. I committed that to you. We will have that
    report issued. Our deadline is March 17. We're endeavoring to
    meet that deadline and I promised you a personal briefing and
    that is still my commitment.
        And rest assured, while we're in the process of analyzing
    everything that's in the report, we're not just sitting back
    and waiting. We, in fact, have been in near daily contact with
    Metro-North on things that we believe deserve immediate
    improvement. And while there'll certainly be a, you know, a
    list of recommendations and perhaps other actions coming out of
    the report, we're not waiting for the issuants to issue all of
    those recommendations. We need fixes in real-time.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Well, fixes in real time is the message. And they have got
    to be real fixes in much realer time.
        And thank you all for being here today. Thank you to my
    colleagues, particularly Senator Blunt, for participating and
    thank you to the panel.
        This hearing is closed.
        [Whereupon, at 1:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

                    Prepared Statement of the City of Fargo
        Chairman Blumenthal and Ranking Member Blunt,

        In the past eight months there have been four train derailments
    involving cars carrying crude oil, three of which resulted in fire.
    Only one of those events resulted in the loss of life but the potential
    in the others was great.
        The derailment in Lac-Megantic first caught our attention last
    July. Our City Administrator, Pat Zavoral, and I met to discuss
    possible issues related to rail traffic as crude oil trains can be seen
    passing through the City of Fargo several times each day. We reached
    out to BNSF and held a teleconference with them to discuss the issues.
        Our first concern is the monitoring and maintenance of the rail
    lines that pass through Fargo. The shifting soils have long been noted
    to be a problem within our community. We were told the number of trains
    that pass through our community on a daily basis, are over 100 and
    climbing. This emphasizes the need to have a high level of security and
    extra maintenance efforts for the rail lines.
        The speed of trains that travel through our community is a concern
    as well. We recognize the impact that slowing and speeding up have on
    the travel time of the trains, but our main concern is the safety of
    the citizens around the rail lines. We have a full understanding of
    physics and the results of higher speeds and the resulting damage to
    the cars and adjacent properties when trains derail. Speed is a major
    component when we study the anatomy of a crash or derailment and we
    believe that slower speeds in major urban areas are essential to public
    safety.
        We recognize that slower speeds will make for a longer wait time at
    a rail crossing. Continued efforts to upgrade protection at grade
    crossings are essential. Grade crossings need to be looked at all along
    the lines not just within the borders of cities. This is evident to me
    daily, when the driving public will take the risk to quickly pass
    before a train reaches the crossing. Each time an engineer has to take
    emergency measures to slow a train to avoid a potential crash there
    becomes another opportunity to fatigue the parts on the cars and cause
    issues further down the line.
        The construction of the cars that carry crude is another area of
    concern. Everything we are learning about Bakken Crude Oil is that it
    is more flammable, has lower ignition points, and lower flash points.
    It is imperative for the public's safety that this material is treated
    and transported in a manner will commensurate with the volatility of
    the product. As newer, safer cars are built it is important that the
    railroad industry looks closely at the car's features as they put
    trains together.
        Recent discussions about railcar safety have indicated that new
    cars should have more protection at the bulkheads as well as better
    protection for the valves and other assemblies on the cars. The
    suggestions here are welcome, however; it is imperative that as train
    cars are arranged the old design and new designed cars will not be
    placed in close proximity to each other. The concern that we have is
    that an old car involved in a derailment will tear open and potentially
    ignite the crude inside.
        If a new car is the next car in the line, the protection that is
    afforded in that car could potentially be of great danger to responders
    to the incident. It is our fear that the newly designed car may act
    more like a pressurized vehicle if there is direct flame impingement on
    that car. As the crude inside heats and the pressure builds, the
    potential is there for a more violent and catastrophic explosion of
    that car. It would be our hope that only like constructed cars will be
    put in sequence when placing together a crude or ethanol train.
        The causes for all of the past derailments are different, from
    human error to broken equipment to weather. We will never be able to
    predict the next derailment or its cause. I believe it is imperative
    that congress work with the railroad to implement Positive Train
    Control (PTC). This will allow for earlier detection of issues along
    the line and will be able to slow the train traffic in an area if a
    problem is noted.
        This is of particular concern to Fargo as we have several trains
    that pass each other as they pass through our community. If we have a
    derailment of a train within the community, any measures that we can
    provide to prevent a potential issue should be put in place.
        We recognize the impact that the railroad has had in the
    development of our country. We recognize the impact that the railroad
    will have in the future expansion of our economy and interstate
    commerce. We support the use of rail to move products throughout our
    country. The BNSF has been a great partner with the Fargo Fire
    Department and we appreciate the support that we receive from them. As
    you consider measures that regulate railroad industry, we ask that you
    do so with public safety and the safety of first responders in mind.
                Thank you for your time,
                                             Steven J. Dirksen,
                                                            Fire Chief,
                                                         City of Fargo, ND.
    Cc: U.S. Senator Heidi Heitkamp
    U.S. Senator John Hoeven
    U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar
                                     ______

                Prepared Statement of Bruce Bennett, President,
                           Stage 8 Locking Fasteners
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member:

        Thank you very much for including my statement in the official
    record of this oversight hearing.
        Stage 8 Locking Fasteners is a small business located in San
    Rafael, California. The company has been designing and manufacturing
    only locking systems for standard and custom fasteners for a wide range
    of industrial application for 30 years. These industrial applications
    include power generation and distribution, automotive, construction
    equipment, farm machinery, and military applications to include
    critical applications on the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV).
    Railroad applications of Stage 8 Locking systems include locomotive
    components, critical track fasteners for crossings, switches and other
    components. All Stage 8 locking systems are designed to improve safety
    while increasing reliability.
        I would like to address a railroad safety issue that could
    ultimately affect the lives and safety of thousands of people. From
    2001 through 2010, the Federal Railroad Administration reported that
    there were some 8,092 derailments on U.S. railroads. The third largest
    cause was mechanical problems with the wheel sets. The remainder were
    caused by track defects, signal failures, miscellaneous and human
    factors. My company, Stage 8 Locking Fasteners, has worked closely with
    the Wheels, Axels, Bearings, and Lubrication (WABL) Committee of the
    American Association of Railroads (AAR) on an important safety device,
    a new Roller Bearing Cap Screw Locking Plate, which has been approved
    as an alternative to the standard locking plate. We have developed this
    system to prevent future derailments caused by loose roller bearings,
    focusing on the failure modes of freight car and passenger car wheel
    sets. We found through testing that vibrations associated with railroad
    use regularly loosened fasteners (e.g., nuts and bolts) in railway
    rolling stock, track and bridge structures. As a result, we have
    developed a safety system that ensures against cap screw fastener
    loosening and the resulting bearing failure. Roller Bearing Cap Screws
    are an important safety device which, when kept tight, significantly
    decrease failures of Roller Bearing components and derailments.
        In 2011, Stage 8 made two very impressive ``hands-on''
    demonstrations of their new safety system to individuals in the Offices
    of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), specifically in the
    Motive Power and Equipment Division within the Office of Safety
    Assurance and Compliance, as well as to the Deputy Associate FRA
    Director. The end result of those meetings was the recognition that the
    safety solution presented to them was indeed an ``excellent solution''
    in preventing future derailments. However, in both meetings, the FRA
    claimed ``their hands were tied'' because they had no regulatory power
    to influence the disposition of this type of equipment and that it was
    the job of the railroad industry to police their own.
        We are aware that the AAR has adopted a Manual of Standards
    (industry voluntary standards), designed to ensure safe operation of
    railroads and rail cars. One of its standards does mandate the torque
    values when applying the cap screws on the various end caps, on freight
    car wheels, and additionally mandates the breakaway torque, that should
    be there, when they remove the wheels for servicing. It is highly
    questionable the extent to which rail car companies are complying with
    the maintenance and replacement policies under this AAR voluntary
    industry standard. The FRA currently mandates that cars be removed from
    service if an end cap screw is loose, however it is my understanding
    that there is currently no way to check for loose cap screws prior to
    failure, and that this requirement is currently not enforced or
    enforceable. Our new Cap Screw Locking System provides for visual
    inspection which, at a glance, tells if the cap screw remains properly
    torqued.
        This safety locking system would prevent future derailments caused
    by roller bearing failure due to loosening cap screws, focusing on the
    failure modes of freight rail cars, as well as passenger cars. One of
    the company's experts--who was previously a Mechanical Design Engineer
    in the Mechanical Department of the Southern Pacific Transportation
    Company--spent the majority of his time analyzing the causes of
    derailments. He found that vibrations associated with railroad use
    regularly loosened fasteners (e.g., nuts and bolts) in railway rolling
    stock, track and bridge structures. As a result, years later the
    President and Founder of Stage 8 developed a safety system that would
    ensure against fastener loosening and derailments from premature
    rollerbearing failure caused by those loose fasteners.
        The Roller Bearing Manufacturers Engineering Committee (RBMEC)
    reports that 23 percent of all bearing Failure Progression Modes (FPM)
    are coded 'LO' for loose. The Stage 8 Cap Screw Locking system (CSLS)
    prevents loose roller bearings and provides a significant safety
    improvement. Canadian National Railroad internal MD-11 reports further
    support this data.
        Stage 8 subjected its safety locking system to a rigorous field
    test over the period from October 2010 to July 2013. Present at the
    test were John Hyde and Gerry Kubicka from Stage 8, Dr. Todd Snyder
    representing WABL, Dwight Porter, Justin Schrewsberry and shop
    personnel from Progress Rail. Attached is a summary of the test
    results. The highlights of the results are highly significant:

       Stage 8 and WABL conducted the tests over 150,000 miles
            hauling coal from Wyoming to Missouri.

       An equal number of wheel sets were equipped with the Stage 8
            Cap Screw Locking Systems (CSLS) and compared to the legacy cap
            screw locking systems installed on the other wheel set on the
            same truck.

       Twenty-nine percent of the wheel sets equipped with the
            standard locking plates were removed from service within 30
            days prior to the residual torque tests due to various failure
            reasons and were therefore not available for testing--
            classified as failed and removed.

       No Stage 8 wheel sets were taken out of service, for any
            reason, during the over 150,000 mile test period.

       All of the wheel sets equipped with the Stage 8 Cap Screw
            Locking System retained 100 percent of the initial torque
            applied

       Only 20 percent of the wheel sets equipped with the legacy
            cap screw locking system retained over 90 percent of the
            initial torque applied.

       74 percent of the wheel sets equipped with the legacy system
            retained between 50 percent and 90 percent of the initial
            torque applied.

       7 percent of the wheel sets equipped with the legacy cap
            screw locking system suffered total failure.

        The cost-benefit analysis of this technology demonstrates how this
    safety system could save the railroad industry millions of dollars. The
    analysis states:

            The overall cost to the railroad industry of wheel sets due to
            loosening roller bearing components was a staggering
            $223,590,820 in 2010 based on the number of wheel sets changed
            and the $1,940 cost per wheel set. According to a 2009
            University of Illinois Engineering Department study,
            derailments caused by loosening resulted in additional annual
            costs of $6.2 million. Derailment costs are not included in
            this analysis; however, the safety improvements of the CSLS
            must be taken into consideration when analyzing the overall
            advantages of the CSLS.

            It is estimated that installation of the CSLS will be completed
            on the entire fleet of 1,363,423 freight cars over a period of
            seven years, at a cost of $30,930,225 per year. This cost would
            be offset by the savings of $38,580,735 in the first year
            alone, resulting in the return of the initial investment plus
            $7,650,511. The overall net savings over the first seven years
            averages $607.61 per car for each and every car in the fleet.
            The end result is an annual return of $7 for every $1 invested
            in equipping a car with the CSLS.

        In March of 2011, Stage 8 presented this system to engineering
    experts in the Federal Rail Administration's Motive Power & Equipment
    Division of the Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance. The FRA
    officials assured us our safety system was an ``excellent solution'' to
    the problem and would certainly prevent future derailments due to loose
    bearings. However, notwithstanding the merits of our safety system, the
    Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance then informed us that the FRA
    could do nothing to ensure the railcar industry takes a hard look at
    this life-saving technology.
        We are astounded that a Federal agency charged with the
    responsibility of ensuring the safety of freight and passenger rail
    transportation admits to not having sufficient regulatory authority to
    take appropriate measures to prevent train derailments and cannot
    enforce existing regulations requiring the removal of wheel sets when
    they do not function properly.
        In the best interests of railroad safety, I would request that, in
    developing any broad rail safety legislation that legislative authority
    be included in the bill instructing the Federal Railroad Administration
    to commence in a rulemaking that would incorporate the current AAR
    safety standards as part of the agency's mandatory rules to enable the
    FRA to enforce these standards. Railroad companies and companies that
    own and operate freight and passenger rail cars would be required to
    comply with specific torque values for the end cap screws at
    installation and during service where it is most needed to ensure
    against premature or catastrophic failure, and upon removal.
        I would also like to request that reports and studies
    substantiating the nature of the problem addressed in my testimony and
    attached to my statement also be included in the hearing record.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question 1. The FRA's Operation Deep Dive, which is a 60 day
    comprehensive review of Metro-North's safety practices and standards,
    commenced on December 16, 2013 and was released on March 14, 2014. The
    FRA examined all safety related aspects of Metro-North Railroad
    including track quality, inspection methodology and quality of repair,
    signaling and train control functionality, and protection for on track
    crews. What can you share with us today about what the FRA has learned
    from its comprehensive review about Metro-North's safety culture?
        Answer. FRA learned that Metro-North had an unhealthy safety
    culture. They placed an emphasis on on-time performance, to the
    detriment of safety: track inspections were rushed, Metro-North track
    maintenance standards were not met, and mainline efficiency tests were
    not conducted so as to not adversely impact on-time performance. These
    issues were part of a faulty culture that Metro-North allowed to
    develop.
        FRA learned that Metro-North had no office or department, including
    its Safety Department, that proactively advocated for safety. No Metro-
    North office or department actively searched for unsafe conditions and
    practices, and once they were discovered, no one took ownership to
    ensure effective remediation.
        FRA also learned that safety-related training and management
    oversight were deficient across departments.
        FRA provided its detailed findings and recommendations in a report
    to Congress by March 17, 2014.

        Question 2. In a report published on April 17, 2013 the DOT
    Inspector General evinced findings that the FRA was delayed on issuing
    rules that Congress directed in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
    (RSIA). At the time of the report, FRA had not issued 9 of the 17 final
    rules mandated by RSIA.
        The DOT IG report also found that there were inefficiencies in the
    Railroad Safety Advisory Committee or RSAC process, namely that there
    were breakdowns in communication between FRA and the RSAC on several
    rulemakings and that certain critical documents were not shared with
    the stakeholders sitting on the RSAC.
        Because of these issues, the Inspector General concluded that the
    ``delayed promulgation of the RSIA required rules has delayed the
    mitigation of railroad industry safety hazards that Congress intended
    the rules to address.''
        The FRA, in January, did issue final rules for adjacent track work
    and rail integrity. FRA has also announced its plan to begin the
    rulemaking process for inward and outward facing cameras. This leaves 8
    rules left for the FRA to issue. Why hasn't the FRA done everything it
    can to protect passengers?
        Anyone who rides the rail in this country deserves a safe and
    reliable service. I am deeply concerned by the apparent failings at FRA
    to heed important safety recommendations by Congress and the NTSB, our
    Nation's top Federal safety organization. The NTSB has been calling for
    cameras in and on trains since 2008. It's 2014; why have you not acted?
    It's baffling that it took a major derailment in New York in December
    to get the FRA to commit to requiring cameras. I'm concerned that
    regulatory capture is getting in the way of the FRA's work, which is
    absolutely critical to protecting the traveling public. If you can
    simply issue an emergency order requiring cameras, why not do that?
    Commuters deserve more. What is the status of the inward/outward facing
    camera rule? What is the plan? What is the timeline for action? Action
    appears to be missing.
        What is the status of other delayed rules like the training
    standards for railroad employees rule? The FRA should be doing
    everything it can to protect passengers; but the failure to require
    even basic safety recommendations from the NTSB concerns me, many of my
    colleagues and many of the constituents I've spoken with.
        What are inefficiencies in the rulemaking process that you can
    improve to cut down the time it takes to develop new rules? Does the
    RSAC process work? Do you agree that the FRA has a problem with
    regulatory capture--if not, why not?
        Answer. FRA continues to act diligently in completing its
    regulatory workload, placing a priority on those rulemakings that will
    most effectively advance safety, particularly those required by
    Congressional mandate.
        As to how to reduce ``the inefficiencies of the rulemaking
    process'' in general, FRA has to strike a balance between speed and
    quality. ``Quality'' includes adherence to demanding procedural and
    substantive legal requirements. As you know, all three branches of the
    Federal Government--Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch--
    have established certain mandatory procedures and substantive
    requirements related to the rulemaking process (i.e., the development
    and issuance of regulations, including FRA safety regulations). With
    few exceptions, before FRA is permitted to issue a final rule, there
    must be public notice of the proposal and an opportunity for public
    comment; a reasonable response to any public comments; an articulated,
    rational basis for the rule; and consistency of the rule with any
    applicable laws.
        For many FRA rulemakings, other Federal agencies and offices are
    part of the clearance process: these draft rulemaking documents,
    cleared by FRA staff and by me as Administrator, go into a pipeline
    that extends from this agency to the Office of the Secretary of
    Transportation, which circulates the document to other agencies and
    offices within the Department, and then to the Office of Management and
    Budget, where the draft rule is circulated to relevant non-DOT agencies
    and offices.
        Costs and benefits of a draft proposed rule and draft final rule
    must be identified, analyzed, and weighed against each other. This
    evaluation can be very complex, but provides critical information to
    decision makers, reviewers, and the public. It should also be noted
    that the complex nature of the administrative review process for draft
    rulemaking documents means that widening one part of the pipeline
    (e.g., by adding resources) is not enough to expedite issuance of a
    rule if the rest of the pipeline remains narrow; the delay simply
    occurs at a different stage of the process. After FRA issues a final
    rule, FRA's procedural rules provide for the filing of petitions for
    reconsideration, a vehicle through which litigation is often avoided,
    thus conserving administrative and judicial resources. A final rule is
    also subject to judicial review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and may
    be set aside by the court. (By contrast, NTSB does not issue rules; it
    issues recommendations, and these recommendations are not subject to
    notice and comment, cost-benefit analysis, or judicial review.)
        Regarding inward- or outward-facing cameras, it is important to
    note they would not have prevented the December 1 Spuyten Duyvil
    derailment. FRA acted appropriately with Emergency Order 29 to require
    those measures that had a direct relationship to the accident and would
    provide immediate safety benefits to Metro-North's operation. While
    Congress could have mandated a camera when it passed the RSIA in 2008,
    it chose not to, so congressionally mandated rulemakings were given
    priority in the rulemaking process. FRA does believe that inward-and
    outward-facing cameras can provide value and will assist in accident
    investigations. That is why in the summer of 2013, while giving
    priority to finishing the 42 Congressional mandates established in the
    RSIA, FRA was involved in various camera projects occurring in the
    industry. Based on what we learned, FRA placed this issue on our
    internal rulemaking agenda in November of 2013 for action in 2014. As
    planned, the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) has accepted the
    task of formulating recommendations on the appropriate design and use
    of locomotive-mounted cameras and will begin RSAC working group
    meetings on the topic this summer, with recommendations due early next
    year.
        You asked whether FRA has a problem with ``regulatory capture.'' I
    can assure you that it does not. FRA is a data-driven agency, dedicated
    to achieving its safety mission for the good of the public, and subject
    to the highest ethical standards. FRA works tremendously hard to ensure
    that it prioritizes its rulemaking endeavors to address the most
    safety-critical issues in the timeliest fashion. Given the 42
    individual mandates imposed on the agency in the RSIA, FRA has utilized
    its limited resources in an efficient manner in order to advance and
    address the safety needs of the country and industry in a timely
    fashion. During the five-year period from February 1, 2009, to January
    31, 2014, FRA published approximately 76 major regulatory documents,
    including 66 advance notices of proposed rulemaking, notices of
    proposed rulemaking (NPRMs), and final rules; 3 emergency orders; and 7
    interpretations, for an average of more than 15 major regulatory
    documents per year. We are also actively involved in many pending
    rulemakings, including one on fatigue management, which will address
    the issue of sleep apnea and other fatigue-related issues.
        We believe our approach to handling and prioritizing rulemakings
    has increased the level of safety across the industry. This is
    evidenced by the historically low accident statistics during the last
    ten calendar years. During this period, total derailments decreased 48
    percent, total train accidents decreased 48 percent, and total highway-
    rail grade crossing accidents decreased 32 percent. The year 2012 had
    record low numbers of train accidents, and that safety record was
    surpassed in 2013. But we always owe the public better. Our goal is to
    drive continuous safety improvement. We expect this of ourselves and we
    expect it of the industry we regulate.
        You also asked if the RSAC process works. The RSAC process not only
    works, it is vital--especially for the difficult issues, which we tend
    to propose be handled there. It ensures the highest level of
    transparency and provides the highest level of public input. A
    chartered advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
    RSAC includes representatives of stakeholders throughout the railroad
    industry (rail labor, rail management, rail suppliers, rail passengers,
    State rail safety programs, and other organizations), and ensures that
    FRA hears a wide range of opinions early in the rulemaking process so
    that proposals are appropriately vetted early, clarified, and
    communicated. The RSAC's meetings are also open to the general public,
    announced in the Federal Register, and part of the agency's public
    docket system. The RSAC process saves time--especially at the end of
    the process--by making the cost-benefit analysis more accurate,
    minimizing petitions for reconsideration, and creating a rule that is
    understood by the regulated community.
        Regarding the current status of the rulemakings mandated by the
    RSIA, I refer you to a list attached to my prepared testimony,
    enumerating the FRA rulemakings completed as of today (March 6, 2014),
    that were mandated, explicitly or implicitly, by RSIA. Here is the
    status to date of the remaining RSIA-mandated rulemakings:

      1.  The critical incidents final rule was in the final stages of
            review at FRA.

      2.  The training standards final rule was in review in the Executive
            Branch.

      3.  The system safety plan final rule was being reviewed within FRA.

      4.  The NPRM on risk reduction plans was being reviewed within the
            Department of Transportation.

      5.  The NPRM to extend the alcohol and drug rule to maintenance-of-
            way workers had been redesignated by OMB as non-significant and
            was expected to be published in April.

      6.  The emergency escape breathing apparatus final rule was delayed
            due to competing priorities and need to reexamine data for an
            economical option to comply with the RSIA.

      7.  The dark territory rule was being held in abeyance because
            technology implementation plans expected in railroads' risk
            reduction and system safety plans will likely make the rule
            unnecessary for safety. (The mandate is for either a rule or
            guidance.)

        Question 3. As a result of Metro-North's series of recent accidents
    in the past year, the FRA issued several orders and recommendations to
    Metro-North to improve its safety standards in the short term. FRA
    ordered a safety stand down for Metro-North, directed the railroad to
    implement a confidential reporting system for employees, and issued an
    emergency order to Metro-North to modify its signal system at critical
    curves on the rail line.
        Most of the public orders and recommendations only came after
    Metro-North experienced its 4th major incident. Where was the FRA last
    spring? What actions did you immediately take after the first
    derailment in May 2013 in Bridgeport? The FRA seemed pretty quiet only
    until the December incident--what specific steps did you take
    immediately after the Bridgeport derailment to improve safety and
    reliability at our Nation's largest public transit provider?
        What assurances can you give to us today and to the commuting
    public that Metro-North has a trustworthy level of safety while FRA
    rules are being developed and finalized?
        Is there sufficient reason to have confidence in this railroad in
    the short-term while we develop long-term solutions?
        Answer. Following the May 2013 Bridgeport derailment, on June 2, I
    personally met with Metro-North President Howard Permut to discuss
    concerns about their safety culture and the need to implement a
    confidential close calls reporting program. From May through November
    2013, FRA conducted 245 inspections on the Metro-North system, and
    conducted a focused inspection of Metro-North's Roadway Worker
    Protection. Given that the joint NTSB-FRA investigation is focusing on
    a failure in a compromise joint in the track, FRA increased track
    inspections utilizing FRA track inspectors and an FRA Automated Track
    Inspection Program (ATIP) vehicle, which FRA uses to inspect track to
    determine whether the track conforms with the track geometry standards
    set in FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 C.F.R. part 213) (e.g., proper
    gage). (Between June 3-20, FRA's ATIP car covered the entire Metro-
    North territory.)
        On June 26, FRA facilitated a meeting on compromise joints hosted
    by Metro-North. In addition to Metro-North, participating railroads
    included Amtrak, Long Island Rail Road, New Jersey Transit Rail
    Operations, and Port Authority Trans-Hudson. The agenda covered
    compromise-joint protocol including inspection and maintenance, an FRA
    presentation on joint bar inspection technology, and a general
    discussion to identify best practices. This was followed by a second
    meeting with Metro-North, Amtrak, and Long Island Rail Road to discuss
    automated track inspection technology, with FRA again presenting.
    Metro-North indicated it would explore possible utilization of an
    automated ride-monitoring system to supplement periodic track-geometry
    surveys.
        On July 12, in a meeting with Metro-North President Howard Permut,
    FRA stressed that safety must take priority over on-time performance.
    Mud conditions on the Harlem Line were discussed, along with Positive
    Train Control for the New Haven Line, between New Rochelle and New
    Haven (on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor), and Metro-North's
    reconsideration of the possibility of participating in FRA's voluntary
    Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C\3\RS) program. Mr. Permut
    responded by noting the existence of numerous capital projects
    (bridges, stations, catenary, rail, and ties) and the absence or near-
    absence of funding from the State of Connecticut and the Federal
    Government.
        Throughout Operation Deep Dive, the FRA teams met regularly with
    Metro-North leadership and staff. Where appropriate and practicable,
    Metro-North immediately implemented corrective actions in response to
    the safety concerns that FRA identified.
        To provide an update to my March 6, 2014, testimony, Metro-North's
    new president has fully accepted FRA's March 17, 2014, Deep Dive
    Report, its findings, and directed actions and recommendations; has
    fully acknowledged the problems confronting the railroad; and has
    committed to working with FRA to restore the railroad to a level of
    safety preeminence. In light of this, FRA has confidence that progress
    is being achieved and will continue to be achieved.
        FRA will be conducting 30-day progress meetings to track Metro-
    North's advancement in addressing the safety issues identified through
    Operation Deep Dive and other actions to enhance safety. In addition,
    the FRA Deep Dive teams are returning to the Metro-North to observe and
    document the railroad's actions in response to FRA's findings. Some of
    FRA's directed actions and recommendations can be achieved in the short
    term; for others, more time is needed. The safety culture of the
    organization cannot be changed overnight, but there is reason to be
    confident that safety will be improved in both the short and long term,
    with the management of Metro-North, the railroad's employees, FRA, and
    other interested stakeholders working together.

        Question 4. Following Metro-North's incidents and coming
    immediately in the aftermath of the Spuyten Duyvil derailment, the FRA
    was able to issue several safety directives to Metro-North but was only
    able to issue an Emergency Order for the modification of the railroad's
    signal system. According to your office, Emergency Orders are difficult
    to issue, as there have only been 29 in the FRA's history. An Emergency
    Order for the other safety directives, for instance the confidential
    close call reporting system, could have been extremely beneficial for
    reasons of greater enforcement and oversight to ensure compliance. Does
    the FRA need more authority from Congress to be able to issue Emergency
    Orders more easily? Do you lack authority in other areas that Congress
    should review to help the FRA protect passengers?
        Answer. FRA's existing statutory authority to issue emergency
    orders, as well as other safety orders and regulations, properly
    requires an assessment that addresses all aspects of the public
    interest. The statutory language conferring the authority to issue an
    emergency order reads, in part, as follows:

      (1)  If, through testing, inspection, investigation, or research
            carried out under [49 U.S.C. chapter 201], the Secretary of
            Transportation decides that an unsafe condition or practice, or
            a combination of unsafe conditions and practices, causes an
            emergency situation involving a hazard of death, personal
            injury, or significant harm to the environment, the Secretary
            immediately may order restrictions and prohibitions, without
            regard to section 20103(e) of this title [i.e., prior notice
            and an opportunity for comment and oral presentation] that may
            be necessary to abate the situation.

      (2)  The order shall describe the condition or practice, or a
            combination of conditions and practices, that causes the
            emergency situation and prescribe standards and procedures for
            obtaining relief from the order. * * *

        49 U.S.C. 20104(a). The statute sets a high bar for issuing an
    emergency order, because it is issued without prior public notice and
    an opportunity for public comment. In that sense, it is difficult to
    issue an emergency order. An emergency order represents final agency
    action, which is subject to review both administratively and in the
    U.S. Courts of Appeals. 49 U.S.C. 20104(b), 20114(c).
        FRA's Emergency Order 29 was appropriate to address the immediate
    safety issues identified in the most effective way. In particular,
    Emergency Order 29 required Metro-North to take immediate action to
    prevent excessive train speeds by (1) identifying and prioritizing
    high-risk areas where operating rules required speeds to be reduced by
    more than 20 mph, (2) modifying its existing signal system to ensure
    speed limits are obeyed, and (3) ensuring a higher level of engagement
    and communication among operating crewmembers in higher risk locations.
    To date, FRA has not identified any instances of noncompliance with
    Emergency Order 29.
        Issuance of an emergency order to mandate a C\3\RS program on the
    railroad would have been inappropriate and unproductive. A confidential
    close call reporting program only works if an organization has ``buy
    in'' from employees and management at all levels so that it is
    voluntary, and only if appropriate protections are in place to ensure
    that employees have a confidential, discipline-free method to report
    close call events. It is not a quick fix. It is meant to provide
    valuable data that can be analyzed to improve safety over time.
        Notably, new leadership at Metro-North has agreed to implement a
    C\3\RS program, and FRA is currently in the development and
    implementation of such a program.

        Question 5. According to a 2012 report by the U.S. Government
    Accountability Office (GAO), FRA is only able to inspect about 1
    percent of the Nation's tracks each year with the resources they are
    allocated.
        The agency's rail-safety oversight framework relies on inspections
    to ensure railroads comply with Federal safety regulations. FRA
    inspects railroad infrastructure and operations, identifies safety
    defects, and may cite railroads for violations.
        The GAO has found that the FRA faces three major rail safety
    challenges--(1) implementation of its oversight of mandated safety
    measures and new railroad risk reduction plans, (2) adjusting to
    changing rail traffic flows, and (3) ensuring it has enough inspectors
    for its current and future oversight workload.
        Mr. Szabo: Has the FRA been able to increase the percentage of
    track inspected in one year since 2012? What can be done to increase
    this coverage? How much will the additional funding in the Safety and
    Operations Budget help?
        Answer. In FY 2014, FRA received $184.5 million for its Safety and
    Operations account, an increase of $15 million from FY 2013. This
    increase will allow FRA to hire 45 new staff and should enable FRA to
    have roughly 350 inspectors on board by the end of this fiscal year. By
    strategically using safety data, FRA assigns its inspectors across its
    eight regions and five safety disciplines to help ensure maximum safety
    benefits. To do this, FRA uses a mathematical staffing allocation model
    that is driven by statistical analysis, and then adjusts the allocation
    based on knowledge of local conditions and emerging safety issues.

        Question 6. Does the FRA use any automated inspection technology to
    oversee safety of the U.S. railroads?
        Answer. Yes. The primary automated inspection technology that FRA
    uses to oversee safety of the U.S. railroads is the ATIP program, which
    I described briefly earlier. The broad purpose of the ATIP program is
    to minimize the risk and severity of a train accident, which
    potentially includes a catastrophic hazardous materials incident, by
    accurately collecting and distributing track geometry information and
    intelligence, both to FRA and to the railroads whose track is being
    inspected by FRA. The data collected by the ATIP cars provides
    supplemental assistance to all railroad inspectors through advance
    detection of potential accident-causing hazards by identifying
    noncompliant and unsafe track geometry locations and conditions needing
    evaluation and remediation. ATIP prioritizes its surveys to maximize
    its capability to detect potential accident-causing hazards on higher
    risk routes, such as passenger, hazardous material, and higher speed
    track. The accurate track geometry information is disseminated to FRA
    and respective railroads for evaluation and remediation to minimize the
    risk of a passenger train accident or catastrophic hazardous material
    train accident.
        FRA also anticipates the potential need for ATIP to support
    requests from other U.S. Government agencies for track inspections,
    such as we have gotten in the past. These agencies include the
    Department of Energy (track inspections prior to rail shipments of
    nuclear fuel) and the Department of Defense (route surveys of the
    Strategic Rail Corridor Network, or STRACNET (which is an
    interconnected and continuous rail line network consisting of more than
    36,000 miles of track serving more than 130 defense installations)). In
    addition, FRA provides support for the Department of State.
        The ATIP survey miles for the past four years are listed in the
    table below:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Amtrak Assessment
       Calendar      ATIP Enforcement     (2010-2012)/ Remote    Total Miles
         Year                              operation (2013)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2010           52,760               29,245                        82,005
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2011           42,717               34,224                        76,941
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2012           53,225               21,896                        75,121
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2013           40,523               16,561                        57,084
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question 7. What technology does the FRA use to detect early signs
    of troubles before they become accidents?
        Answer. FRA is also working with railroads and labor organizations
    to implement voluntary programs to collect information about safety
    issues before they develop into accidents. Railroads that use the
    C\3\RS, for example, let their employees anonymously report unsafe
    track (and other) conditions to supplement FRA's ATIP inspections,
    FRA's regulatory inspections, and the carriers' own track inspections.
    C\3\RS is a key piece of FRA's efforts to proactively improve safety.
    It is designed to improve railroad safety practices by collecting and
    studying confidential close call reports detailing unsafe conditions or
    events, and developing and implementing targeted corrective actions. At
    its core, C\3\RS is voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive. FRA is
    currently engaged in expanding the program nationwide. C\3\RS programs
    are actively running on the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the
    National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak), New Jersey Transit
    Rail Operations, and the Strasburg Rail Road, and FRA is working with
    additional railroads, including Metro-North, and the Long Island Rail
    Road, to implement program sites.
        FRA also provides oversight of the rail inspection technology
    utilized by the railroads to perform rail inspections through the
    agency's Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Division. The Rail Integrity
    Branch within the Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Division was
    established to provide FRA oversight on railway non-destructive
    inspection technologies for detection of internal rail flaws and for
    other rail-related maintenance programs. This branch performs onsite
    inspections, investigations, and/or evaluations to determine the
    effectiveness of railroads' programs that address the inspection,
    maintenance, and replacement of rail.
        The branch provides oversight into the capabilities of the
    industry's various computerized non-destructive rail-inspection
    systems, the training and experience of the flaw detector car
    operators, and the accuracy of the defect verification/identification
    process utilized by the test car operator. Exposure to all phases of
    these processes has considerably increased total FRA safety oversight
    within the industry.
        As one example of how the Rail Integrity Branch is developing
    expertise that will potentially improve rail inspection technology and
    expand its deployment, the branch oversees waivers issued to CSX
    Transportation, Inc. (CSX), that allow relief from certain provisions
    of the Track Safety Standards. As a condition for granting these
    waivers, CSX has implemented an experimental process for continuous
    test rail inspection that has the potential to minimize risk associated
    with rail-flaw development by allowing the carrier to test its rail
    more frequently, control rail-flaw development, and reduce service
    failure and derailments. The inspection technology is referred to as an
    ``ultrasonic computer based test system.'' The project also shows
    significant potential to improve railway safety by increasing
    inspection speed and providing extended system coverage. Based on the
    results of initial trial performance of this technology, FRA believes
    that this experimental rail inspection system may ultimately prove to
    be more capable than the system previously used, in terms of its
    ability to identify rail flaws and to do so quickly. FRA is working
    with CSX to improve this continuous rail inspection process.

        Question 8. Does the FRA have its own means of verifying railroads'
    compliance with the Federal safety standards or does it depend on the
    railroads' own inspection data?
        Answer. FRA inspectors conduct routine inspections to verify
    railroads' compliance with the Federal railroad safety standards and
    the Hazardous Materials Regulations. FRA's inspections are conducted on
    track, signal systems (including signal systems installed on
    locomotives and signal systems installed along the track wayside),
    rolling stock (locomotives and railcars), operating practices, and the
    transportation of hazardous materials. We also carry out regular
    inspections of companies that offer hazardous material for
    transportation by rail (rail shippers) to determine their compliance
    with the Hazardous Materials Regulations. FRA also routinely audits
    railroads' bridge programs, as well as the accuracy of a railroad's
    accident and incident reporting. We also investigate hundreds of
    complaints submitted to FRA each year by private citizens alleging
    violations of Federal rail safety or hazardous materials requirements.
        FRA uses information technology to strategically analyze FRA's
    inspection and accident/incident data in order to identify trends and
    prioritize inspections. FRA's C\3\RS program also uses information
    technology to sort the C\3\RS data and identify emerging risks.
        And, as previously mentioned, FRA conducts an ATIP Program. It
    utilizes a fleet of track geometry vehicles. The ATIP vehicles traverse
    the Nation conducting track-geometry surveys, the results of which are
    shared with the railroad being inspected. The ATIP vehicles identify
    defective conditions and conditions that could eventually develop into
    defects, thus identifying early signs of trouble before they cause
    accidents. Note, however, that FRA's role is to monitor the railroads
    to determine whether their track is in compliance, not to inspect the
    track itself. The duty to inspect for compliance with the Track Safety
    Standards rests on the track owners, which are the railroads. Many
    railroads have their own automated track inspection vehicles to inspect
    their own track.

        Question 9. The FRA regulates railroads across the entire country.
    At NTSB's November hearings on the Metro-North Bridgeport derailment
    and the West Haven accident, a representative from the Long Island Rail
    Road (LIRR) testified that the LIRR conducts inspections at a higher
    rate than Metro-North and also employs automated inspection vehicles
    more frequently.
        At a meeting between Congress members, DOT and the FRA, Mr. Szabo,
    you spoke to the fact that alerter systems are good railroad practice
    and standard on most railroads across the country while Metro-North
    lacked these devices in each train cabin where an engineer operates.
    You stated that you were checking with the American Public
    Transportation Association (APTA) on whether any other railroad didn't
    have alerters as a standard device in each train cabin.
        In your opinion, how does Metro-North's standard of safety compare
    to other railroads' throughout the country? What other areas besides
    the aforementioned does Metro-North lag behind the rest of the Nation's
    railway system? Have you followed up with APTA on whether or not there
    are other railroads without alerters in every train cabin?
        Answer. Operation Deep Dive uncovered an unhealthy safety culture
    on Metro-North, one where an inappropriate overemphasis on on-time
    performance had adversely impacted safety. As resources permit, FRA
    will conduct similar efforts on other commuter operations to determine
    to what extent Metro-North is an outlier in safety culture.
        Overall, passenger railroad operations in this county are very
    safe. Nonetheless, there have been eight passenger fatalities resulting
    from commuter rail train accidents in the last five calendar years.
    However, this represents an improvement over the previous 5 year period
    in which there were 43 passenger fatalities. This safety improvement is
    due to work in many areas, including initiatives to improve accident
    avoidance and survivability. We owe the public a drive for continuous
    safety improvement.
        You also inquired about Metro-North's lack of an alerter in each of
    its train cabs. An alerter is a type of locomotive-mounted equipment
    that is used to assure that the locomotive operator is alert, not
    physically incapacitated, and aware of, and complying with, the
    indications of a signal system or other operational control system.
    Systems like Positive Train Control, or the signal upgrades the FRA
    required of Metro-North under Emergency Order 29, can provide a similar
    level of protection.
        Metro-North has the greatest number of units operating without
    alerters. Current Federal regulations require a working alerter on any
    locomotive, including a control cabin locomotive, ordered on or after
    September 8, 2000, or placed into service for the first time on or
    after September 9, 2002, if the locomotive is the controlling
    locomotive of a commuter or intercity passenger train. See 49 C.F.R.
    238.237. Most carriers have either retrofitted existing equipment,
    provided a similar level of protection through other technology, or are
    in the process of retrofitting their fleet; however, this provision
    does not apply to rebuilt locomotives. There are separate, higher
    requirements for alerters on high-speed passenger trains (i.e.,
    traveling at a speed more than 125 miles per hour but less than 150
    miles per hour; e.g., Acela Express); namely, there must be an alerter
    in the controlling cab of any high-speed passenger train. See 49 C.F.R.
    238.447(c) by operation of 49 C.F.R. 238.401. Finally, there are also
    separate requirements for alerters on locomotives used in freight
    service. See 49 C.F.R. 229.140.

        Question 10. On January 15, 2014, the Regional Planning Association
    released a report titled, ``Getting Back on Track: Unlocking the Full
    Potential of the New Haven Line.'' The RPA report concludes that the
    New Haven Line's largest issue is the severity of its aging and
    deteriorating infrastructure. Due to the state of the railroad's
    infrastructure, the New Haven Line (NHL) is extremely underfunded and
    requires tremendous increases in funding to reach a state of good
    repair. At current funding levels of less than $200 million a year, it
    would take 20 years to reach a state of good repair. Connecticut has
    dedicated $1 billion to the railroad in its 2013-2017 capital plan, but
    the RPA concludes that an additional $3.6 billion is needed to replace
    the railroad's obsolete infrastructure by 2020.
        These infrastructure needs, which include deteriorating bridges,
    some over 100 years old, worn track, and outdated signaling and power
    systems, pose threats to safety as seen in the Bridgeport derailment.
    Broken and ill-repaired track has put lives at risk and it's only a
    matter of time before such an incident reoccurs if nothing is done.
        How critical is sound infrastructure to the ensuring safety on the
    Nation's railway system? How many of the existing safety concerns can
    be solved by reaching a state of good repair for the Nation's
    railroads?
        Answer. A sound and safe infrastructure is critical to ensuring the
    safety of train operations. But so too are sound and safe rolling
    stock, sound and safe signal systems, sound and safe operating
    practices, sound and safe safety-critical personnel, and sound and safe
    intermodal intersections with railroad tracks (such as highway-rail
    grade crossings and railroad bridges over navigable waters). All the
    pieces need to be sound and safe to ensure we have a safe railroad
    system. In other words, a state of good repair means we have safe
    track, signal systems, rolling stock, operating practices, safety-
    critical personnel, and intermodal intersections.
        One of the keys to ensuring that the Nation's railroad system is
    maintained in a state of good repair is predictable, dedicated funding.
    Congress has for decades funded highway, transit, and aviation programs
    through multi-year authorizations that provide guaranteed funding. This
    enables States, local governments, and other stakeholders to plan for
    and to execute infrastructure investments in a comprehensive and
    efficient manner, with a view towards long-term safety and operational
    improvements.
        Reliance upon inadequate and unpredictable annual appropriations
    has made it extraordinarily difficult for the U.S. rail system to be
    maintained in a state of good repair. The Administration proposes to
    rectify this problem with legislation authorizing mandatory contract
    authority through FY 2018 for rail investment programs. The programs
    would be paid for with resources in a new Rail Account of the
    Transportation Trust Fund that will be funded with revenue from pro-
    growth business tax reform.

        Question 11. On December 1st, a Metro-North train derailed
    resulting in four casualties and close to seventy injuries. The train
    was travelling at approximately 82 mph in an area where speed was
    limited to 30 mph. The NTSB investigation is ongoing, but officials
    recently recommended that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing
    cameras on its trains. The NTSB has called on all railroads to install
    such cameras since a 2008 crash between a passenger and a freight train
    resulted in the death of 25 people. The FRA has recently indicated its
    decision to begin the rulemaking process on this issue.
        Following the December 2013 Metro-North derailment that resulted in
    four casualties and close to seventy injuries, the NTSB recommended
    that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing cameras. This is
    something the NTSB has been recommending since 2008.
        The FRA announced earlier this year that it would begin the
    rulemaking process for requiring inward-and outward-facing cameras in
    all locomotives and operating cabs. How will this rulemaking help
    address safety concerns? Some have raised privacy concerns with the
    cameras; can these issues be addressed in the rulemaking? Can you
    provide an update on where this rulemaking stands?
        Answer. FRA recognizes the potential value of both inward-and
    outward-facing camera recordings for accident investigation purposes
    and to advance safety. For these reasons, in the summer of 2013, FRA
    became involved in various camera projects occurring in industry, and
    in November 2013 placed the camera rulemaking on FRA's internal
    rulemaking agenda for 2014. Today a task statement pertaining to this
    issue was presented to the RSAC for its consideration, and the task was
    accepted by the RSAC. We expect the RSAC to report its recommendations
    on the issue by April 1, 2015.
        Although FRA recognizes the value of voice and image recordings for
    accident investigation purposes and as part of an operational testing
    program, FRA is also well aware of the significant privacy concerns
    presented by the installation and monitoring of these cameras.
    Accordingly, we must fully understand and address these privacy
    concerns and ensure that the technology is implemented with appropriate
    safeguards and controls in place that address the privacy concerns and
    also achieve the desired safety results. Addressing these concerns
    through the rulemaking process--through the RSAC process in
    particular--will ensure that these issues are appropriately analyzed
    and addressed and that the technology is implemented in as efficient a
    manner as possible.

        Question 12. The FRA has limited budgets and inspectors to address
    safety issues posed by crude transportation. While the volume of crude
    oil being shipped by rail has increased dramatically in the past few
    years, FRA and PHMSA have limited resources to ensure crude oil is
    transported safely. I believe we need to invest more in our
    infrastructure, particularly when it comes to the safety of our
    transportation systems. Mr. Szabo, do your current budgets provide an
    adequate number of inspectors and rail safety employees to cover all of
    the issues posed by the rail safety issues we've seen recently?
        Answer. It is important that FRA receive predictable and dedicated
    funding. I can assure you that FRA will make maximum use of whatever
    resources it is provided. As discussed above, FRA uses a staffing model
    that draws on the latest railroad accident and inspection data to
    strategically allocate its inspectors around the Nation and across
    safety disciplines. For FY 2014, FRA received a larger Safety and
    Operations budget, which will allow FRA to hire 10 new rail safety
    inspectors and 20 rail safety specialists.
        FRA has not requested new staff for FY 2015. However, the Office of
    the Secretary of Transportation (OST) has proposed a new $40 million
    Safe Transportation of Energy Products Fund, which would be available
    to FRA as well as the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration (FMCSA) to address issues surrounding the transportation
    of crude oil and other materials. FRA may be able use these funds to
    hire temporary staff as well as to conduct other activities such as
    research and testing.

        Question 13. How would increasing investments in rail safety
    programs help you better address safety needs?
        Answer. In addition to adding new railroad safety staff in FY 2014,
    FRA is increasing its investment in key safety programs. FRA is
    planning on spending an additional $1 million on its C\3\RS program to
    support nationwide implementation. As I said earlier, the program
    allows railroad employees to report close calls on a voluntary,
    confidential basis, without fear of disciplinary action. FRA also plans
    to spend almost $900,000 on high-speed rail safety certification to
    help ensure the safety of high-speed rail projects under construction
    before they enter into operation. Additionally, FRA plans to spend
    close to $700,000 to update its Railroad Safety Information System for
    enforcement of new safety regulations including those mandated by RSIA.
        For FY 2015, FRA requests significant new investment in the
    Nation's rail system--$4.8 billion in FY 2015 and $19 billion over 4
    years--that will directly improve safety. With these resources, FRA
    proposes to fund, among other things, positive train control
    implementation by commuter railroads and Amtrak. Moreover, FRA will
    fund state-of-good-repair work by Amtrak to improve Amtrak's
    reliability and increase the safety of its aging infrastructure.
    Moreover, some program funds would be eligible for grade crossing
    improvement and community rail safety initiatives.

        Question 14. Mr. Szabo, are there other ways that some of your
    costs could be offset?
        Answer. FRA's proposed rail investment program is fully paid for in
    the President's budget. FRA proposes that Congress fund rail programs
    through a 4-year reauthorization bill paid for through a Rail Account
    of the Transportation Trust Fund. The President's budget proposes this
    trust fund spending be supported by revenues generated from reforms to
    the corporate tax code. Details about the change in tax policy are
    listed in the President's budget.

        Question 15. DOT-111 tank cars were involved in the Lac-Megantic,
    Alabama, and North Dakota derailments and explosions. The DOT-111,
    which accounts for 69 percent of the U.S. tank car fleet, has a
    documented history of failure during accidents. AAR has asked DOT to
    adopt tougher standards for new tank cars, as well as requiring the
    retrofit or phase out of tank cars built to less stringent standards.
    API and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)--who represent tank car
    manufacturers--also support higher tank car standards, but have
    concerns about retrofit costs.
        For several decades, the NTSB has expressed concern about the DOT-
    111 tank car. Other stakeholders, including AAR, API, and RSI, have
    sought tougher tank car standards. DOT is almost a year behind on a
    rulemaking, which would propose updates to the DOT-111 standards, and
    does not anticipate issuing a final rule until next year. This is
    unacceptable to me and the thousands of people living in communities
    that see these train cars roll through their towns everyday--
    communities along these rail lines deserve more. Again, this seems to
    be another example of regulatory capture; the DOT for all intents and
    purposes outsourced tank car recommendations to industry back in 2011.
    And here we are 3 years and several high profile accidents later, and
    we're still talking about the need for stronger tank cars.
        What is taking so long to issue these rules? Why can't the process
    be sped up? Can we build a tank car strong enough to prevent all of
    these accidents from happening? How important is a comprehensive
    approach to addressing the safety issues posed by transporting crude?
        Answer. FRA is working closely with PHMSA to provide support and
    resources in an effort to expedite the development and issuance of an
    NPRM to address DOT-111 tank cars and also to comprehensively address
    the risks, and mitigate the consequences, of train accidents involving
    hazardous materials in general, and crude oil in particular. The
    Secretary has delegated to the Administrator of PHMSA the statutory
    authority to issue rules pertaining to the transportation of hazardous
    materials by all modes of transportation, including rail and I believe
    PHMSA provided testimony at the February 26, 2014, hearing of the House
    Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Railroads,
    Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials which summarizes the specific
    circumstances surrounding the development and progress of this rule.
        You also asked whether it is possible to build a railroad tank car
    strong enough to prevent the release of its contents during any
    accident scenario. The short answer is ``no,'' not given the current
    state of the art. Because improving tank car survivability cannot, by
    itself, prevent rail accidents and unintentional hazardous material
    releases, a comprehensive approach is necessary. Only if the risks of
    transporting petroleum crude oil are comprehensively addressed are real
    safety improvements going to be made. For this reason, FRA, in
    partnership with PHMSA, is aggressively pursuing comprehensive
    improvements to the rail transportation of crude oil, including
    improving railcar survivability through tank car design improvements,
    rail operational practices, and proper testing and classification of
    crude oil before being offered for transportation.
        We need strong tank cars that are highly puncture-resistant during
    train accidents as well as operating measures to prevent train
    accidents from occurring in the first place and to mitigate the
    seriousness of an accident if it does occur. No matter how many rail
    safety regulations are in place or how high the tank car standards are,
    it is necessary to have personnel and equipment in place to deal with a
    train accident and any unintentional release of hazardous material if
    it occurs during railroad transportation. In short, a comprehensive
    approach to the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail is
    essential.

        Question 16. In July, a train carrying crude derailed and exploded
    in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and destroying the city's
    downtown. On December 30th, a train in North Dakota carrying crude oil
    struck another train which set off an explosion and required the
    evacuation of more than 1,500 people. On January 7th, a train carrying
    crude and propane derailed and caught fire in New Brunswick, Canada
    forcing an evacuation less than 35 miles from the Maine border.
        A series of freight rail accidents over the past 8 months highlight
    the need for safety plans to be in place so that communities and first
    responders know how to respond when there is a train accident carrying
    crude, propane, or any other hazardous material. Training first
    responders is a good first step to improving the response to incidents,
    and I was glad to see that included in your recent agreement.
        Mr. Szabo, as part of your agreement, AAR committed to rerouting
    trains carrying at least 20 cars of crude oil to the ``safest and most
    secure routes.'' How will these routing decisions impact communities
    that are not currently seeing a large influx of crude-by-rail? Will
    other communities see an increase in crude trains and will additional
    resources be focused on these communities?
        Answer. AAR, on behalf of its member railroads, has committed to
    complying with the route analysis requirements of the Hazardous
    Materials Regulations (49 C.F.R. 172.820(c)-(f) and (i)) when operating
    trains transporting 20 or more loaded railroad tank cars containing
    crude oil. The route analysis rule requires railroads to collaborate
    with State and local officials on the routing of certain hazardous
    materials and to select the routes posing the least overall safety and
    security risk on which to transport those materials. The rule requires
    an evaluation of the safety and security of the routes currently used
    and alternative practicable routes over which a railroad has authority
    to operate. The rule also mandates, at a minimum, the consideration of
    27 specific safety and security risk factors. The identified risk
    factors include operational, infrastructure, and consequence elements,
    such as population centers, environmentally sensitive areas, and
    emergency response capabilities along the routes.
        It is difficult to predict the extent to which compliance with the
    route analysis requirements will alter specific crude rail routes.
    However, compliance with the regulation will ensure that crude oil is
    transported over the safest and most secure rail routes, which will
    reduce the risk of an accident in the first place and help to mitigate
    the effects of an accident should one occur.
        In addition, other commitments from the railroad industry will
    further enhance the resources available to communities through which
    large quantities of crude oil are transported. These additional
    railroad industry agreements are to develop an inventory of emergency-
    response resources along routes over which trains carrying large
    quantities of crude oil move; to make the relevant information
    available to appropriate emergency responders; to allocate $5 million
    to develop and provide a hazardous material transportation training
    curriculum applicable to crude oil transportation for emergency
    responders; and to fund a portion of this training through the end of
    2014.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question 1. With the number of crude oil rail shipments across the
    country expected to increase over the next several years, what actions
    has the FRA taken to identify rail corridor segments that are more
    susceptible to train derailments, either due to aging or faulty
    infrastructure, geographic terrain, or other means, and what actions
    have been taken to address to address this issue?
        Answer. FRA has taken action on multiple fronts to mitigate safety
    risks on rail corridors. In 2013 and 2014, FRA safety inspectors from
    FRA's five core disciplines--Hazardous Materials, Motive Power and
    Equipment, Operating Practices, Signal and Train Control, and Track--
    have performed approximately 3,500 inspections in the subdivisions over
    which unit trains of crude oil are moved.
        Major freight railroads also committed to using the Rail Corridor
    Risk Management System (a risk-based routing analysis tool developed in
    coordination with the Federal Government as part of the implementation
    of the rail routing amendments to the Hazardous Materials Regulations)
    to analyze the safety and security risks of particular routes and to
    ensure that trains transporting large quantities of crude oil are
    operated on the safest and most secure rail routes.
        In response to the Secretary's Call to Action, the Association of
    American Railroads committed to employing speed restrictions in 46
    federally designated high-threat urban areas, implementing train
    braking enhancements using distributed power or two-way telemetry end-
    of-train devices, more frequent rail and mechanical inspections,
    installation of wayside defective-bearing-detection equipment, and
    providing resources to enhance emergency response capabilities and
    community awareness along crude oil routes.
        In addition, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
    Association (ASLRRA) responded to the Call to Action by identifying
    specific actions that it believes small railroads can voluntarily take
    to contribute to a safer national rail network. For example, contingent
    upon securing a 6- to 12-month pilot project grant from FRA, ASLRRA
    plans to create the Short Line Safety Institute that will do the
    following:

       Begin with a focus on the transportation of crude oil by
            small railroads and then expand to the transportation of all
            commodities for Class III railroads.

       Work with FRA to develop and implement pilot safety
            inspection and evaluation projects for short line railroads.

       Work with FRA to evaluate the current safety and compliance
            attainment levels on small railroads; contract and train expert
            qualified inspectors; and develop training, assessment, and
            reporting document systems.

       Work with FRA to create benchmarks and objectives to measure
            the progress and effectiveness of the Short Line Safety
            Institute safety inspection programs.

        Question 2. What actions are being taken by your agency/
    organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
    preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
        Answer. FRA has provided a grant to the American Chemistry Council,
    which oversees the Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency
    Response (TRANSCAER) program. The TRANSCAER program is a voluntary
    outreach program that focuses on assisting communities to prepare for,
    and respond to, possible hazardous materials transportation incidents.
    TRANSCAER members consist of representatives from the following
    industries: chemical manufacturing, transportation (including
    railroads), distributors, and emergency response (including State and
    local agencies). Through the Department's ``Call to Action,'' both the
    railroad and petroleum industries have renewed their commitment to
    enhancing emergency response communications and training, most recently
    with the American Petroleum Institute (API) joining the TRANSCAER
    program and the railroad industry committing to developing an inventory
    of emergency response resources along routes over which trains
    transporting large amounts of crude oil operate. This inventory,
    relevant information from which will be made available to appropriate
    emergency responders, will include locations for staging emergency
    response equipment along the routes and contacts for the notification
    of communities. In addition, the railroad industry has committed
    approximately $5 million to develop and provide a hazardous material
    transportation training curriculum applicable to petroleum crude oil
    transport for emergency responders and to the fund a portion of the
    cost of this training through the end of 2014.
        FRA hazardous materials inspectors provide basic training to
    states, municipal governments, and local emergency response agencies.
    Knowledge gained from this training enables fire and police agencies to
    identify the type and positioning of hazardous commodities and to
    develop appropriate incident response or containment plans. The
    training provides detailed explanations of regulations pertaining to
    hazardous materials documentation, placement of hazardous materials
    within trains, appropriate packaging, and railroad communication
    protocols. FRA inspectors often demonstrate tank car safety features
    and describe train crew responsibilities to ensure that emergency
    responders know the appropriate railroad personnel to contact for train
    makeup information.
        FRA has also issued a grant to the American Chemistry Council,
    CHEMTREC, and TRANSCAER for the design and delivery of a training
    program focused on the needs of volunteer emergency responders,
    including fire fighters, emergency medical technicians, police
    agencies, and others. The training program will include approaching and
    managing a derailment, tank car recognition and damage assessment,
    chemical properties and hazards, hazard communication, firefighting
    techniques, environmental concerns, and other related topics. FRA is
    often an active participant in the training, conveying valuable
    insights based on experience and lessons learned.
        FRA's eight regional offices have law enforcement liaisons who
    focus on highway-rail grade crossing safety. Regional liaisons have
    been effective in getting rail safety awareness courses included in the
    accreditation process for law enforcement officers. FRA also provides
    information to local judges and prosecutors supporting consistent
    enforcement of highway-railroad safety laws.

        Question 3. What immediate measures can states, municipal
    governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
        Answer. In order to be prepared for the potential consequences of
    any rail accident involving hazardous materials and to mitigate those
    potential consequences, States, municipal governments, and local
    agencies can take advantage of both existing measures in place to
    ensure emergency responders are prepared for such incidents and the
    rail and oil industry's renewed commitments through the Department's
    ``Call to Action,'' as noted in my answer to your previous question.
    Through the TRANSCAER program, the railroad and hazardous materials
    shipping industries collaborate and cooperate with communities through
    which hazardous materials are transported. For example, in accordance
    with AAR Circular OT-55-N, railroads are to assist in implementing
    TRANSCAER's community outreach program to improve community awareness,
    emergency planning, and incident response for the transportation of
    hazardous materials. The same industry standard provides for the
    disclosure of certain commodity flow data upon request to local
    emergency response agencies and planning groups. At a minimum, such
    information must include rank-order identification of the top 25
    hazardous commodities transported through the community. Accordingly,
    appropriate emergency response personnel should be in communication
    with any railroads transporting hazardous materials through their
    jurisdictions in order to ensure that they have access to the most up-
    to-date information on the commodities being transported through their
    jurisdictions and the extent of emergency response resources available
    along the rail routes.
        States that currently do not have rail safety programs can join
    FRA's State Rail Safety Participation Program. Thirty states currently
    partner with FRA to regulate rail safety. State inspectors provide
    supplemental safety inspections that nonparticipating states do not
    receive. FRA does not reduce its inspection efforts in a state that
    elects to employ rail safety inspectors. Therefore, states that have
    rail safety inspectors receive a net gain in rail safety inspections. A
    larger rail safety inspection force results in correction of more
    safety defects, better response to public complaints and railroad
    accidents, and State expertise to directly address rail safety issues
    with railroad operating and maintenance personnel. Public safety
    concerns about unsafe rail operations can best be met by enhanced rail
    inspection using both State and Federal resources.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question 1. Can you provide me with an account of the research and
    development activities the FRA is currently engaged in to enhance track
    inspection efforts underway? How are the technologies being developed
    by FRA different than the technologies that are currently deployed by
    the railroad?
        Answer. FRA has conducted research and developed several new track
    inspection technologies, including the following:

       the Gage Restraining Measurement System: a train-based
            system to assess the performance of track components such as
            crossties and rail fasteners;

       the Portable Track Loading Fixture: a handheld device to
            assess the performance of rail fasteners;

       the Joint Bar Inspection System: a machine-vision system to
            detect rail joint bar defects and failures;

       the Portable Ride Quality Measurement System: to identify
            locations of poor track quality;

       the Autonomous Track Geometry Measurement System (ATGMS): an
            unmanned and cost-effective way of assessing track quality over
            large rail networks

       Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR): a system to detect poor
            track support; conditions such as foul ballast and waterlogged
            foundation; and

       Rail Defect Inspection Systems.

        In terms of the last category (rail defect inspection systems), we
    have developed a rail defect measurement system that does not require
    contact with the rail. This system does not detect all types of rail
    defects. It was designed to find the most prominent type of defect
    (transverse defect). Future generations of the system may be adapted to
    look for other types of rail flaws. Compared to conventional systems,
    the current system can operate at higher speeds and is not adversely
    affected by rail surface condition. Another rail defect inspection
    system that we are developing will accurately measure the size of
    defects so the appropriate corrective action can be taken. The system
    uses the Computed Tomography (CT) scan technology used in the medical
    field.
        ATIP is used by FRA to inspect track to determine whether it
    conforms to the track-geometry provisions of FRA's track safety
    regulations. The fundamental track geometry inspection technology
    employed in ATIP is used by both FRA and many railroads. The vision for
    the future is to use ATGMS to cover more mileage at lower cost and then
    schedule a manned vehicle with many of the inspection systems described
    above to fully assess the track conditions. The information from the
    ATGMS will be used for planning walking inspections and manned car
    inspections. The comprehensive information collected by the manned cars
    will be used by researchers to better understand the track behavior
    and, when warranted, will provide more guidelines to promote safety.
        FRA develops inspection technologies that are safety focused, with
    the intent to reduce the number of derailments and other types of
    railroad accidents/incidents and unintentional releases of hazardous
    material. Some of these technologies have a side benefit of aiding in
    the maintenance planning for the railroads.
        As to how the technologies being developed by FRA differ from the
    technologies that are currently deployed by the railroad, several of
    the technologies listed above are already in use today by railroads.
    Others are nearing the end of the research and development stage and
    are being transferred to the industry as prototypes.

        Question 2. What level of funding was provided to FRA for research
    and development in the current fiscal year? Does this level of funding
    provide adequate resources to your agency to complete your research and
    development missions?
        Answer. FRA received $35.1 million for FY 2014 for its Railroad
    Research and Development program, and has requested for $35.25 million
    for FY 2015. This amount supports FRA's ongoing research into railroad
    safety issues and the development of technologies that can reduce
    future accidents. The program's areas of focus are track, rolling
    stock, train control and communications, human factors, and railroad
    systems issues. Regardless of funding level, FRA will effectively use
    its budget to undertake meaningful research and development work.
        For FY 2015, FRA also requested new research program funding under
    the Rail Service Improvement Program to expand its work into emerging
    areas facing the rail industry. These include the following:

       Upgrades to the Transportation Technology Center ($15
            million): The Transportation Technology Center (the Center) in
            Pueblo, Colorado, does not have facilities for testing,
            evaluating, and demonstrating state-of-the-art high-performance
            rail infrastructure and equipment. Upgrading the Center will
            result in faster approvals for new equipment, stronger safety
            standards, and early identification of reliability issues,
            saving long-term maintenance costs and ensuring better
            passenger service.

       National Cooperative Rail Research Program ($5 million):
            Section 306 of Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
            established this program, managed by the National Academy of
            Sciences, to provide a rail research program similar to those
            for aviation, highways, and transit. FRA launched the program
            in 2012 to develop the intellectual infrastructure needed to
            advance effective rail policy, and proposes to continue funding
            the program.

        Question 3. I understand the President's budget would provide
    additional resources for FRA to hire inspectors. These inspectors would
    be in addition to the additional FTEs provided to the FRA in FY14. What
    are the greatest resource needs of the agency and how will additional
    hires--should additional FTEs be provided--be directed at addressing
    current capacity shortfalls at the agency?
        Answer. In its FY 2015 budget, FRA has not requested money to add
    new inspectors or other staff. However, OST has proposed a new $40
    million Safe Transportation of Energy Products Fund, which would be
    available to FRA as well as PHMSA and FMCSA to address issues
    surrounding the transportation of crude oil and other materials. It is
    possible that FRA may use these funds to hire temporary staff as well
    as to conduct other activities such as research and testing.
        In general, FRA strives to maximize the funding it receives,
    regardless of the amount. Regarding full-time equivalents, each year
    FRA rebalances its inspector workforce across the FRA regions and
    across safety disciplines based on analysis by its staffing allocation
    model and professional judgment by top FRA management. This year, FRA
    is particularly attuned to the need to address increased shipments
    crude oil and ethanol.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question 1. At the hearing you discussed the inspection
    partnerships that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has with
    several states. How many states participate in this program? Can you
    provide a list of these states for the Committee? How many additional
    inspectors are made available through this program? Will these
    inspectors be useful in approving Positive Train Control (PTC) systems?
        Answer. Thirty states currently participate in FRA's State Rail
    Safety Participation Program with 176 State inspector positions
    currently authorized by State programs. Please accept this table titled
    ``State Rail Safety Programs'' into the record of this hearing. The
    table provides a breakdown by State, with further details, such as the
    FRA Office of Railroad Safety region that works with the State program
    and the safety discipline of the State inspector(s) (e.g., motive power
    and equipment, operating practices, hazardous materials, and signal and
    train control). State inspectors will not be involved in the process to
    approve PTC systems.

        Question 2. What are the major safety issues accompanying the
    transportation of crude oil by rail and what have been the most common
    types of accidents that have occurred in the last five years?
        Answer. Crude oil, like ethanol, presents unique risks in
    transportation by rail because of flammability and volume of the
    material shipped in unit trains.\1\ Although it is rare to have only a
    single rail car breached that contains a flammable liquid, a breach of
    only a single tank car in a train accident followed by the ignition of
    a self-feeding pool fire \2\ can result in energetic ruptures of
    adjacent tank cars. Further, in derailments of unit trains of crude
    oil, adjacent tank cars containing crude oil will be involved.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ A ``unit train'' is defined as a train in which all the cars
    are shipped from the same origin to the same destination, without being
    split up or stored en route).
        \2\ A ``pool fire'' is a turbulent diffusion fire burning above a
    horizontal pool of vaporizing hydrocarbon fuel.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Also, crude oil facilities are coming online quickly and employing
    personnel with limited experience in loading and securing tank cars for
    transportation. These facilities and their operators are continually
    learning (through FRA and industry outreach activities) how to inspect
    and secure a tank car prior to offering it for transportation.
        Unlike the vast majority of other chemicals shipped by rail, which
    are produced to a specification under the auspices of a rigorous
    quality assurance program, crude oil is a naturally occurring, mined
    material with properties that vary based on location and time of
    extraction. The variability of the properties of crude oil, such as its
    flammability, gas content, corrosivity, and vapor pressure, make it
    difficult to determine the appropriate package for transportation. Tank
    car owners and shippers of crude oil must work together to ensure the
    equipment is not damaged by the crude oil with which it is loaded, by
    selecting compatible interior coatings, (if required), gaskets, and o-
    rings for service equipment.
        To answer your other question, about the most common kinds of
    accidents, FRA's accident/incident database indicates that during the
    5-year period between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2013, 41
    percent of train accidents were caused by defective track, road bed,
    and structures; 37 percent by human factors involving train operations
    or handling equipment, switches and derails; 11 percent by mechanical
    and electrical failures; 1 percent by signal and communications causes;
    and the remaining 10 percent by miscellaneous causes.
        Regarding train accidents in which crude oil was unintentionally
    released, there have been seven in the last 5 years in the United
    States as well as two in Canada. The Canadian accidents occurred at
    Lac-Megantic in Quebec and at Plaster Rock in New Brunswick--the
    Transportation Safety Board of Canada is investigating both. Based on
    the available information, the Lac-Megantic accident was a result of
    improper securement of the crude oil train; the Transportation Safety
    Board of Canada has not released an official report of the findings of
    their investigations. The accident in Casselton, ND, was a result of a
    unit train of crude oil colliding with a grain train fouling (blocking)
    the main line; the grain train had derailed as a result of a broken
    axle. Other U.S. train accidents during the last 5 years involving
    releases of crude oil include the following: Vandergrift, PA
    (mechanical causes); Aliceville, AL (broken rail); and New Augusta, MS
    (broken rail).\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The three other U.S. train accidents in the last 5 years that
    have resulted in the unintentional release of crude oil were at Havre,
    MT (November 1, 2010); Monroe, LA (December 1, 2011); and Parkers
    Prairie, MN (March 27, 2013).

        Question 3. One of the requirements in the Rail Safety Improvement
    Act of 2008 is that PTC technology be interoperable, meaning that the
    systems of different railroads operating over each other's track would
    be able to communicate with one another. How does the FRA plan to
    certify interoperability of the various PTC systems it is required to
    approve? Will certification of interoperability be more difficult if
    some railroads complete installation before others? How many FRA
    employees do you think will be needed to certify PTC systems? Do you
    worry that using these inspectors for this purpose will further limit
    the agency's ability to conduct oversight of rail safety generally?
        Answer. PTC system interoperability will be created primarily
    through two different, but complementary, approaches. One approach is
    for the railroads to select a single common shared industry standard
    technology. Currently, for example, the majority of freight and
    passenger commuter railroads outside of Northeast Corridor (NEC) are
    relying on Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS),
    and the NEC railroads are relying on the Advanced Civil Speed
    Enforcement System (ACSES). The second approach (where different
    railroads elect to implement different technologies) calls for the
    affected railroads to each implement all of the technologies involved.
    For example, freight and passenger railroads that implement both I-ETMS
    and ACSES would run the two systems in parallel. FRA views
    certification as the process of measuring, testing, and evaluating the
    effectiveness of the functions of the system prior to authorizing a
    system for operational use. In both approaches, the FRA certification
    process is focused on ensuring that the implementing railroads have:
    (1) correctly deployed the technology, (2) put in place adequate
    training and maintenance programs to ensure that the railroads can
    safely operate and maintain the systems, and (3) implemented technology
    that performs the required PTC statutory functions.
        The FRA personnel involved in the certification process are looking
    to see that an adequate series of tests and inspections have
    established that safeguards designed into the hardware and software of
    the system are operative, function as intended, and collectively
    constitute acceptable controls; and that the equipment supplier and the
    railroad have successfully implemented these safeguards and controls.
    Production models of a given system design need be tested only to
    verify that all safeguards are present and properly functioning.
    Specifications (procedures, tests, and inspections) for subsequent
    certification reviews must be produced as part of the design process.
    The FRA certification personnel are also verifying that an adequate
    series of tests and inspections is performed according to
    specifications established during the design phase to ensure that the
    required set of safeguards (hardware, software, and procedural) are
    present and operational in the installed equipment, and on all
    communication links. This work also examines the operational procedures
    and administrative structure of the organization that controls the
    equipment, and must establish that the procedural and administrative
    environment supplements and complements hardware and software
    safeguards, and that physical safeguards are appropriate. The FRA
    personnel involved in the certification must also ensure that an
    adequate series of tests and inspections is performed to establish that
    the system has continuous safeguards, that the system can make real-
    time checks on its performance, and that the system can search for
    loopholes once the system is operational or after any system
    malfunction, as well as after scheduled or unscheduled hardware or
    software maintenance or modification.
        Certifying computer systems is a very difficult issue. It involves
    an examination of the provided safeguards (hardware, software,
    procedural, and administrative), and ideally, a quantitative estimate
    of the probability of various failure modes. It is almost impossible to
    identify and protect against all possible failure modes of a system.
    The matter of overall equipment configuration becomes especially
    important in large systems containing many computers, either collocated
    or geographically distributed. The overall hardware configuration must
    be examined in order to establish the consequences of a total or
    partial loss of a major component in the system. This becomes more
    difficult when multiple certification requests must be processed
    simultaneously. Completion of the certification process by one railroad
    before another does not necessarily mean that one railroad's
    certification is any more difficult than the other. Depending on the
    specific implementation and the issues being examined, early completion
    of the certification process by one railroad potentially could
    facilitate the certification process of subsequent railroads since
    issues, especially those related to the system specification and
    design, may have already been adequately verified.
        FRA depends heavily on the vendors and railroads in the
    certification process. As a matter of practicality, without the
    proactive participation and good faith efforts of the vendors and
    railroads to ensure system safety through the entire design,
    implementation, and operation of the system, not only would timely
    certification of a system not be possible, but the level of safety
    oversight that would be provided would be inadequate relative to the
    system complexity. FRA staffing needs are therefore heavily dependent
    on the technology deployed, the capabilities of individual inspectors,
    as well as the level of effort and degree of objective safety oversight
    being expended by the vendors and railroads. In order to not detract
    from FRA's other safety inspection activities, FRA established a
    dedicated PTC Branch. The branch, consists of 8 regional specialists
    (GS-13) (1 per region), 2 senior specialists (GS-14), and a supervisor
    (GS-15) dedicated to PTC system certification and safety oversight.
    This group is augmented by a senior scientist (senior level (SL)/
    scientific (ST)) and senior electronics engineer (GS-15) as well as two
    senior signal engineers (GS-14) and contract engineer support as
    required.
        The complexity and size of the railroad-specific safety plans to
    support the certification request are immense. The safety plan
    associated with the Electronic Train Management System, for example, a
    simpler predecessor system to the proposed I-ETMS system, contained
    more than 6,000 pages of highly technical information. FRA will receive
    38 safety plans from the railroads, with some of equal or larger size.
    If these safety plans are received simultaneously, FRA staffing will
    not be able to process them concurrently. A best case scenario for the
    review process for a single plan would be 6 to 9 months. Although the
    railroads are working with FRA to coordinate these document reviews,
    this remains a new process with a scope not attempted previously by any
    of the participants--freight railroads, intercity passenger railroads,
    commuter railroads, and FRA.
        FRA approval of the PTC Development Plans (PTCDP), a significantly
    simpler document, took nearly 18 months. The PTC Safety Plans (PTCSP)
    will be more complex and voluminous than the PTCDPs. The FRA review may
    result in changes in the PTCSPs as a result of design, hardware, or
    software issues that would prevent certification, making the timeline
    for approval uncertain. The potential result could be delays in some
    certifications and the ability of the affected railroads to use
    deployed PTC systems.
        Although FRA support of the various railroads often provides a
    window into a railroad's progress, it by no means presents a complete
    picture of what is happening with a program or project. FRA support is
    usually requested when there are issues impeding progress. In
    situations where no FRA support is requested, FRA has only anecdotal
    evidence of progress, or lack thereof.
        For regular, detailed, and unfiltered reporting on a railroad's
    progress with PTC system implementation, it would be necessary to embed
    a dedicated FRA PTC-qualified inspector into each railroad's
    development and deployment team on a full-time basis. With the
    complexity of PTC systems, multiple inspectors may be required. FRA has
    not requested additional staff or funding to provide this level of
    oversight as we believe it is currently not warranted based on the
    railroads' actions and would introduce a high degree of Federal
    intrusion on railroad and vendor autonomy.

        Question 4. Beyond the rail and oil industries, what other
    industries has FRA consulted with, or does it plan to consult with, in
    its efforts to improve tank car safety?
        Answer. FRA's Office of Railroad Safety has regular interactions
    with all segments of the freight rail industry including the railroads,
    labor, shippers of hazardous materials, tank car manufacturers, tank
    car owners, and tank car inspection and repair facilities. These
    meetings are intended to both disseminate information related to our
    enforcement and regulatory objectives as well as understand the
    potential impacts of regulatory amendments and discuss non-regulatory
    measures to improve the safety of transportation of hazardous material
    by rail. For example, tank car manufacturers provided valuable insight
    relative to the possible design enhancements and retrofit options. They
    stressed the importance of developing a practical standard (one that
    will provide the needed improvements and can be built based on the
    current state of the manufacturing practices) as soon as possible to
    provide the certainty to make the needed investments in the next
    generation of tank cars. And in another example, ethanol shippers
    discussed preemptive actions taken to improve the safety in
    transporting denatured alcohol by rail, characterization sampling and
    testing to ensure accurate information is available for first
    responders, standard emergency response tactics, and training of
    emergency response trainers.

        Question 5. What role does FRA play in ensuring Amtrak's compliance
    with historic preservation and tribal consultation requirements under
    Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act? Did FRA play any
    role in ensuring Amtrak's compliance with these requirements when PTC
    towers were installed?
        Answer. FRA is responsible for complying with Section 106 of the
    National Historic Preservation Act when providing grants to Amtrak. For
    these grants, FRA works with Amtrak to ensure the appropriate analysis
    and consultation consistent with the legal requirements of Section 106
    is completed. This requirement would apply where the grant funds
    potential installation of any antennas required for PTC, but does not
    apply where antennas required for PTC are installed without grants from
    FRA.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question. Mr. Szabo, there has been a significant increase in the
    number of rail accidents that have garnered media attention. I realize
    that a number of investigations are ongoing but have there been any
    overarching trends in the causes of these accidents? Also, what, if
    any, would the impact be of some of the legislative proposals before us
    today and those currently being considered by the Federal Railroad
    Administration? Proposals such as Positive Train Control and mandatory
    two man train crews?
        Answer. Media attention is a poor metric for determining
    overarching trends in rail safety. FRA certainly understands the media
    focus on incidents involving passenger trains or the transportation of
    crude oil by rail, given their potential to directly affect the general
    public. With that said, FRA routinely generates analysis of overarching
    trends in rail safety, and those trends indicate that rail continues to
    grow safer as a mode of transportation.
        Growing safer does not mean, however, that there is not room for
    continuous safety improvement. FRA depends on its analysis of trends in
    rail safety to identify where improvements can best be made. FRA
    continues to work to address the leading cause of deaths related to
    railroad operations, which is trespassing on railroad property; and the
    second-leading cause of deaths related to railroad operations, which is
    highway-rail grade crossing incidents. Together, trespassing and grade
    crossing accidents account for more than 90 percent of all rail-related
    deaths. With respect to train accidents (i.e., rail equipment
    accidents/incidents that result in damage to railroad property in
    excess of the dollar reporting threshold and excluding highway-rail
    grade crossing accidents to avoid double-counting; e.g., derailments
    and train-to-train collisions), which have decreased by 48 percent in
    the last 10 years, the most common causes are human factors and track
    issues. FRA continues to work to address these issues. PTC systems will
    serve to prevent and reduce the risk of human factors train accidents
    and incidents. FRA is currently considering the safety effects of
    mandatory two person crews on certain trains. Meanwhile, FRA is
    conducting research on the detection of track defects and improving the
    Automated Track Inspection Program.
        With respect to pending and potential legislative proposals,
    however, it would be inappropriate to comment on them in this forum. If
    you were to request a letter expressing the views of the Executive
    Branch on such legislation, FRA would gladly provide input.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question 1. As you know, the rail car manufacturers were not
    present in the initial January meeting between the Secretary, the
    railroads, and the oil industry on tank car standard. What type of
    outreach is DOT doing to the manufacturing industry? How will the
    industry be involved in discussions and meetings going forward?
        Answer. It is important to note that the meeting hosted by the
    Secretary was not to discuss tank car standards, but was for the
    purpose of discussing oil classification and testing, and railroad
    operating modifications. In addition, representatives of FRA's Office
    of Railroad Safety met with representatives of the Railway Supply
    Institute (RSI), an industry association representing most of the tank
    car manufacturers and owners, as well as the individual manufacturers.
    RSI discussed the industry's position on tank car design and retrofit
    options for existing tank cars. Individually, manufacturers discussed
    innovative design ideas intended to improve the crashworthiness of tank
    cars and survivability of tank cars in a pool fire. The industry
    clearly understands that the safety of transporting flammable liquid is
    currently a focus issue, but the industry also realizes that tank car
    enhancements must be designed with all specifications of tank cars in
    mind, understanding that all hazardous materials pose a risk to public
    safety and the environment.
        Over the past 4 years, FRA's Tank Car Quality Assurance Team has
    audited all tank car manufacturing, inspection, and repair facilities.
    During these audits, FRA educated the facilities on how to meet the
    performance requirements, ensure the final product meets the
    specifications, identify non-conformances, and prevent reoccurrence of
    non-conformances.
        The Secretary of Transportation issued a letter to Association of
    American Railroads (AAR) President and Chief Executive Officer Edward
    Hamburger urging the AAR's Tank Car Committee (TCC) to develop a
    consensus standard for the next generation general purpose tank car.
    The TCC comprises representatives of Class I, II, and III railroads;
    tank car manufacturers; and shippers. At the spring 2014 TCC meeting,
    AAR hosted a special session intended to develop the consensus
    standard. A consensus could not be reached.
        The manufacturers, individually and in conjunction with the Railway
    Supply Institute, submitted comments to the docket for HM-251 (the DOT-
    111 tank car rule). Their comments were reviewed and closely considered
    relative to the Regulatory Impact Analysis and proposed regulatory
    amendments.

        Question 2. Late February, Metrolink commuter railroad held a PTC
    media event in California concerning the status of PTC implementation.
    Would you please provide the Committee with an updated status report on
    Metrolink's implementation of PTC, including development of its
    dispatching system, its PTC back office system, and status of PTC
    revenue service runs across Metrolink territory.
        Answer. Metrolink continues to make significant progress towards
    the completion of PTC implementation, although they have encountered a
    number of technical and other obstacles that have precluded completion
    as originally planned. Perhaps the most significant impediment was the
    inability of the original dispatch system and back office system
    contractor, Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC), to deliver a
    functioning dispatch system as originally required. The lack of a
    functioning dispatch system that could integrate with the PTC system
    components resulted in Metrolink's recently terminating ARINC for
    cause, and resulted in a 2-year delay in the program. Metrolink
    subsequently engaged Wabtec Corporation to develop the required
    dispatch and back office systems. Once completed, installed, and tested
    (which FRA believes will occur late in the second quarter of calendar
    year 2014 or early in the third quarter of calendar year 2014),
    Metrolink will be able to begin revenue demonstration operations on its
    own territory. Until the Metrolink dispatch and back office system is
    available, the railroad will be unable to conduct revenue demonstration
    operations on Metrolink territories.
        As a risk mitigation measure, and in order to gain experience with
    the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS),
    Metrolink began revenue demonstration operations over the BNSF
    Railway's (BNSF) San Bernardino subdivision on February 20, 2014, using
    one trainset and three trains per day. Metrolink experienced
    significant technical issues that necessitated placing the revenue
    demonstration on hold pending resolution of these issues. Engineering
    changes to address these issues were recently completed and
    successfully regression tested, with revenue demonstration on BNSF
    scheduled to recommence.
        Assuming there are no additional major technical issues discovered
    during Metrolink's dispatch and back office systems testing, subsequent
    integration and revenue demonstration operations over Metrolink
    territories, or during system testing by Union Pacific Railroad (UP),
    Amtrak, and BNSF, FRA anticipates receipt of the system certification
    request from Metrolink for I-ETMS in the first quarter of calendar year
    2015.
        Metrolink has completed its PTC track database asset mapping and
    validation as well as wayside interface unit verification and
    validation. Metrolink has also completed roughly one-third of the
    required brake testing and is conducting Los Angeles regional
    communications network design and testing with UP; BNSF; Amtrak; PTC
    220, LLC; Transportation Technology Center; and Meteorcomm
    Communications. The majority of the onboard system work has been
    completed on the rolling stock; however, additional hardware and
    software modifications will be required before the onboard systems will
    be fully completed. Employee training has also begun.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kelly Ayotte to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question. Recently, there have been significant public safety
    concerns raised in the New Hampshire towns of Newington, Stratham,
    Greenland, and the City of Portsmouth regarding a pending application
    from Sea-3, Inc. to expand its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) facilities
    in Newington.
        These communities are concerned about the condition and safety of
    the Portsmouth and Newington Industrial Tracks, given the potential
    danger associated with using them to transport highly flammable
    material. Currently, Pan Am Railways operates 2-3 trains per week, each
    with 7-12 rail cars, which are only allowed to travel 10 miles per hour
    due to track conditions.
        As you know, I recently sent a letter to you requesting that the
    FRA conduct an inspection of the Portsmouth and Newington Industrial
    Tracks, and that given the significant public safety concerns you or a
    representative from the FRA attend a public forum on track safety in
    our state.
        Can you commit to me that you will conduct an inspection of these
    tracks? Are you willing to attend a public forum on track safety in New
    Hampshire?
        Answer. On March 10, 2014, an FRA representative will attend a
    Newington town hall meeting in Newington, New Hampshire. At the
    meeting, the FRA representative will discuss when and how often the
    track and bridges are inspected, what is the current condition of the
    track, who owns the tank cars that the propane is moved in, and who
    checks the structural integrity.
        Previously, on January 23, 2014, an FRA railroad safety inspector
    conducted an inspection of the Portsmouth Branch and Newington
    Industrial track identifying three noncomplying defects to the Track
    Safety Standards. The Portsmouth Branch and Newington Industrial track
    last underwent a Sperry rail test in August 2013.
        During the week of April 28, 2014, the regional track safety
    specialist along with a railroad safety inspector will conduct a
    walking inspection of the entire Portsmouth Branch (10.5 miles), and
    the Newington Industrial track (3.7 miles). On May 14, 2014, the FRA
    Automated Track Inspection Program's track geometry car will conduct a
    field survey of the Portsmouth Branch and the Newington Industrial
    track.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Hoeven to
                              Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
        Question 1. The Federal Railroad Administration cites track and
    infrastructure failure as the second leading cause of train derailments
    in the United States. The incorrect interaction between moving vehicles
    and the track is a common cause of derailments. What research has your
    administration conducted to develop track inspection technologies, and
    what work are you doing to develop the next generation of rail defect
    prevention?
        Answer. FRA has conducted research and developed several new track
    inspection technologies including the following:

      a.  Gage Restraining Measurement System: a train-based system to
            assess the performance of track components such as crossties
            and rail fasteners;

      b.  Portable Track Loading Fixture: a handheld device to assess the
            performance of rail fasteners;

      c.  Joint Bar Inspection System: a machine-vision system to detect
            rail joint bar defects and failures;

      d.  Portable Ride Quality Measurement System: to identify locations
            of poor track quality;

      e.  Autonomous Track Geometry Measurement System: an unmanned and
            cost effective way of assessing track quality over large rail
            networks;

      f.   Ground Penetrating Radar: a system to detect poor track support
            conditions such as foul ballast and waterlogged foundation; and

      g.  Rail Defect Inspection Systems.

        We have developed a rail defect measurement system that does not
    require contact with the rail. Compared to conventional systems, it can
    operate at higher speeds and is not adversely affected by rail surface
    condition.
        Another rail defect inspection system we are developing will
    accurately measure the size of defects so the appropriate corrective
    action can be taken. The system uses the computed tomography (CT) scan
    technology used in the medical field.

        Question 2. In addition, how will the focus of research conducted
    through the Automated Track Inspection Program (ATIP) evolve to develop
    technical solutions to types of derailments we have seen of late?
        Answer. Currently, FRA's Automated Track Inspection Program
    monitors track geometry by periodically collecting track data to
    confirm that the track conforms to certain requirements of the FRA
    Track Safety Standards. The vision for the future is to use Autonomous
    Track Geometry Measurement Systems (ATGMS) to survey more mileage at
    lower costs. In addition to determining defective conditions, the
    increased coverage would allow track trending analysis; then, a manned
    vehicle with the inspection systems described above could be scheduled
    to fully assess the track conditions. The information from ATGMS will
    be used for planning walking inspections and manned car inspections.
    The comprehensive information collected by the manned cars will be used
    by researchers to better understand the track behavior and, when
    warranted, will provide more guidelines to promote safety.
        Attachment: ``State Rail Safety Programs''
                                   Attachment

                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
                         to Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question 1. In recent months, DOT officials concluded that eleven
    of eighteen samples taken from cargo tanks carrying Bakken crude were
    not labelled correctly. In addition, it has been revealed that the
    Bakken crude involved in the deadly Lac-Megantic accident was
    inaccurately labeled. Given your ongoing investigation of Bakken crude,
    how big of a problem is misclassification of crude? Is this happening
    frequently?
        Answer. During PHMSA's initial investigations in August 2013, PHMSA
    determined that some facilities were relying on old and broadly generic
    data, instead of conducting actual testing, to determine the proper
    classification and characterization of crude oil.
        (b) By November, 2013, PHMSA found that facilities began to
    periodically test (i.e., flash point and boiling point) crude oil to
    determine the classification and packing group selection in accordance
    with the hazardous materials regulations. Through PHMSA's
    investigations and continuous presence in North Dakota in February and
    March, concurrently, with release of the Secretary's Emergency Order,
    PHMSA documented that industry has increased its efforts to determine
    classification and packing group selection by conducting tests more
    frequently.

        Question 2. You recently announced an amended Emergency Order to
    address the testing of crude. Beyond the Emergency Order and your
    current investigation, what oversight procedures are in place to ensure
    that proper classification is being conducted? What long-term
    procedures need to be addressed to ensure that proper classification
    continues to be addressed?
        Answer. (a) PHMSA continues to have a presence in North Dakota.
    Investigators frequently visit rail loading facilities to oversee
    compliance with the Emergency Order. This includes review and
    collection of shipping papers, train consists, cargo tank load receipts
    laboratory test results, and Safety Data Sheets. In addition PHMSA
    recently hired an investigator to focus on the Bakken region and
    provide direct oversight of operations in North Dakota. In addition to
    regulatory efforts and with regard to longer-term strategies, PHMSA has
    supported the American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee
    initiative to develop industry standards for proper sampling
    techniques, testing criteria, and testing frequency for crude oil.
    PHMSA actively participated in the discussions during working groups
    sessions held thus far and will continue through expected completion in
    July, 2014.
        Furthermore, through the United States--Canada Regulatory
    Cooperation Council the two nations have collaborated on a variety of
    crude oil related efforts. Specifically, the United States and Canada
    have held meetings to discuss classification, testing and sampling
    issues that could have future ramifications on classification
    procedures for crude oil.

        Question 3. How do current requirements for shipping crude by rail
    differ from requirements for shipping by pipeline?
        Answer. The Hazardous Material Regulations set forth the criteria
    for classifying and describing crude oil for transportation, which
    directly correlate to authorized packagings, typically tank cars
    designed to withstand dynamic forces normally incident to
    transportation by rail. The HMR also require hazard communication
    (i.e., placards, shipping papers, emergency response information). For
    transportation by rail, the container and the material are in motion
    along fixed track and rail infrastructure regulated by FRA. The
    Pipeline Safety Regulations focus on the form of the material in
    transport, and crude oil is moved at specified flow rates through fixed
    pipeline infrastructure.

        Question 4. In January, API along with other stakeholders met with
    Secretary Foxx and Administrators Szabo and Quarterman to discuss the
    safe transport of crude oil by rail. At that meeting, DOT asked API to
    consider a number of additional safety measures, including sharing
    testing information. Both DOT and API have previously stated that you
    are working together to provide necessary information. However, on
    March 28, DOT provided a press statement saying,''we still lack data we
    requested and that energy stakeholders agreed to produce. The overall
    and ongoing lack of cooperation is disappointing, slows progress, and
    certainly raises concerns.''
        The recent DOT statement differs drastically from information you
    and your staff have previously and recently provided. What specific
    information have you asked the industry to provide and what information
    is still outstanding? Are discussions for data ongoing with the
    industry? If so, are there hurdles to the industry for providing data
    to DOT?
        Answer. The following questions were posed by PHMSA to API and
    Crude Oil shippers prior to two meetings held in early February 2014:

       What tests or methods do you use to determine the properties
            of the crude oil to include its vapor pressure, flammable gas
            content, flash point, boiling point, hydrogen sulfide content
            and corrosive properties prior to offering it in
            transportation?

       Who performs these tests and how frequently are they
            completed?

       When you find high levels of gases in crude, what actions do
            you require of your oilfield personnel before loading into a
            transport vehicle? What information about the crude oil
            properties, if any, is provided by the producers to you prior
            to transportation? How is this information communicated?

       What information do you share with truck and rail carriers
            about the crude oil properties?

       Are there any prescribed limits involving vapor pressure,
            flammable gas concentration or hydrogen sulfide content above
            which the crude oil is not placed into transportation? If so,
            what are these limits and how are they determined?

        While discussions are ongoing and PHMSA has received some testing
    information from individual crude oil companies, the data thus far has
    been limited. As part of its on-going efforts, PHMSA has supported the
    American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to develop
    industry standards for proper sampling techniques, testing criteria,
    and testing frequency for crude oil. PHMSA has actively participated in
    the discussions during working groups sessions held to date and plans
    to continue up through expected completion in July.

        Question 5. Please provide detailed information on how the industry
    has not been responsive, including information on when and how your
    requests for information have stalled or been denied.
        Answer. The Secretary's Call to Action in January 2014 specifically
    called on the crude oil industry to provide information and data on
    testing and classification procedures. In addition PHMSA held meetings
    with API and Crude Oil shippers in early February 2014 to follow up.
        While discussions are ongoing and PHMSA has received some testing
    information from individual crude oil companies, the data thus far has
    been limited. As part of its ongoing efforts, PHMSA has supported the
    American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to develop
    industry standards for proper sampling techniques, testing criteria,
    and testing frequency for crude oil. PHMSA has actively participated in
    the discussions during working groups sessions held to date and plans
    to continue up through expected completion in July.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
                           Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question 1. With the number of crude oil rail shipments across the
    country expected to increase over the next several years, population
    centers and fragile natural resource areas that are home to crude oil
    rail corridors will be more susceptible to rail traffic accidents. What
    actions has PHMSA taken to identify sensitive areas where crude oil
    train derailments could prove to be catastrophic, whether they are
    geographically, environmentally, or otherwise?
        Answer. Part 130 of PHMSA's regulations requires certain rail
    carriers to develop and maintain oil spill prevention and response
    plans as discussed below. These requirements are intended to prevent
    and contain spills of oil during transportation. More specifically,
    with regard to spill response planning, a basic response plan is
    required for oil shipment in a packaging having a capacity of 3,500
    gallons or more and a comprehensive response plan is require for oil
    shipment in a packaging containing 42,000 (1,000 barrels). Crude oil
    trains are currently subject to the basic oil spill response required
    by 49 CFR Part 130.
        PHMSA is committed to improving emergency response and recent
    efforts highlight this focus. On February 10, 2014, PHMSA held an
    emergency responder stakeholder engagement meeting. This discussion
    focused on the level of preparedness emergency responders and public
    safety officials have with regard to the rail transport of crude oil
    unit trains through their communities.
        In addition, on January 16, 2014, Secretary Foxx, FRA Administrator
    Szabo, FMCSA Administrator Ferro, and I issued a ``Call to Action.'' At
    that time, the Department asked crude oil stakeholders to identify
    prevention, mitigation and response strategies that could be
    implemented quickly to enhance the safe transportation of crude by
    rail. In regard to population centers and fragile natural resource
    areas, the following actions have been taken to address the concerns
    you raise:

       AAR agreed to, by no later than July 1, 2014, voluntarily
            expand routing requirements (Sec. 172.820) to trains carrying
            more than 20 cars of crude oil. In addition, AAR agreed to
            address risks of unit trains of crude oil by implementing speed
            restrictions of 50 mph for trains carrying more than 20 cars of
            crude and implementing speed restrictions of 40 mph for
            specific trains carrying more than 20 cars of crude in high
            threat urban areas designated by DHS.

       AAR agreed that rail carriers must assess available routes
            using, at a minimum, the 27 factors listed in Appendix D to
            Part 172 of the HMR to determine the safest, most secure routes
            for security-sensitive hazardous materials. These factors
            address safety and security issues, such as the condition of
            the track and supporting infrastructure; the presence or
            absence of signals; past incidents; population density along
            the route; environmentally-sensitive or significant areas;
            venues along the route (stations, events, places of
            congregation); emergency response capability along the route;
            measures and countermeasures already in place to address
            apparent safety and security risks; and proximity to iconic
            targets. The HMR requires carriers to make conscientious
            efforts to develop logical and defendable systems using these
            factors.

       The American Petroleum Institute (API) agreed to work with
            the railroads to enhance emergency response training through
            transportation community awareness and emergency response
            trainings. In addition, the AAR agreed to inventory crude oil
            routes and share this information with emergency responders,
            develop and provide a hands-on training curriculum applicable
            to crude transport for emergency responders, and work with
            communities on crude oil train routes to address location-
            specific concerns.

        These immediate actions by the regulated community and PHMSA's
    outreach to emergency responders are an important first step in
    improving emergency response. However, regulatory modifications may be
    necessary. Based on the recent occurrence of more accidents involving
    crude oil, the NTSB has recommended in two Safety Recommendations (R-
    14-4 and R-14-5) that PHMSA reconsider the threshold quantity for
    requiring the development of a comprehensive response plan for the
    shipment of oil and that PHMSA work with the FRA to expand hazardous
    materials route planning and selection requirements to include certain
    trains transporting large amounts of flammable liquids. PHMSA agrees
    with NTSB and plans to consider these issues in a future rulemaking.

        Question 2. What actions are being taken by your agency/
    organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
    preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
        Answer. PHMSA launched a comprehensive outreach plan to educate
    industry, first responders, and the general public on the risk and
    proper classification of transporting crude oil. PHMSA has provided
    extensive information on its public website and social media stream to
    include the Secretary's Call to Action, Safety Advisory Notices,
    Amended Emergency Order, a thorough list of questions and answers
    (Q&As) related to transporting crude oil. PHMSA's Hazardous Materials
    Safety Assistance Team (HMSAT) has scheduled a series of public
    workshops and seminars to educate industry and first responders about
    the properties of crude oil and how to be better prepared for
    responding to crude oil incidents. PHMSA also held a meeting with
    various members of the emergency response community to discuss the
    risks crude oil poses and the challenges associated with unit train
    incidents.
        In addition to PHMSA's outreach effort, the Secretary's Call to
    Action has prompted industry to establish rail safety measures for
    transporting crude oil. This includes emergency response. The American
    Petroleum Institute (API), the American Associations of Railroads
    (AAR), and American Short Line & Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
    have committed to assisting state and local communities with the
    development of response plans, sharing of information to include crude
    oil train routes, and providing training for responding to a crude oil
    incident.
        Lastly, since 1993, the HMEP grant program has provided funding to
    States, Territories, and Tribes to ensure local emergency responders
    are prepared and trained to effectively respond to and mitigate the
    consequences of hazmat transportation incidents. With the recent
    emphasis on crude oil shipments, PHMSA has encouraged grantees to
    allocate funding towards emergency preparedness activities such as
    developing/revising response plans, commodity flow studies, and
    response training applicable to a crude oil incident.
        PHMSA looks to intensify its outreach effort under the FY 2015
    proposed Emergency and Preparedness Information for Communities (EPIC)
    initiative that requests more resources to conduct outreach campaigns,
    site visits, and grassroots training with potential state, local, and
    tribal grantees.

        Question 3. What immediate measures can states, municipal
    governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
        Answer. Prompted by the Secretary's Call to Action, states,
    municipal governments, and local agencies are encouraged to reach out
    to the railroad industry to gain better understanding of the frequency
    and quantity of hazardous materials being transported by rail through
    their communities. Knowing this information, states and local agencies
    can adequately prepare by developing response plans and providing
    training for first responders in case of rail incidents involving crude
    oil.
        The Association of American Railroads has a program to provide
    local first responders (upon written request) a list of the top 25
    hazmat commodities transported through their communities on an annual
    basis in order to assist emergency responders with preparing for any
    emergency involving those materials.
        In addition, although not specifically related to transport, Local
    Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) under the EPA could provide
    valuable information related to risks in a specific community.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                           Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question 1. Ms. Quarterman, I don't know if you've been to
    Washington--but like many places in the west, our cities grew up
    around--and because of--railroads. It is a legacy that we are proud of.
    But it also means that there is a lot of rail freight moving through
    our population centers. So when people see these unsafe DOT-111 tank
    cars being used to move crude--they are concerned, just like I am
    concerned. Are you able to give us an actual date that the updated tank
    car standards will be finalized?
        Answer. PHMSA in cooperation with FRA, is in the process of
    developing a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, RIN 2137-AE91,
    ``Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
    Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.'' You can monitor progress
    at: www.reginfo.gov.

        Question 2. Does your agency have ample staff and expertise to keep
    moving this, and other safety-critical rulemakings, forward?
        Answer. PHMSA staff are subject matter experts in the field of
    hazardous materials transportation and have a high level of expertise.
    However, PHMSA is small agency relative to its national program
    responsibilities to ensure nearly one million shipments of hazardous
    materials arrive safely daily. In the FY 2015 budget, the
    Administration has requested $7 million (over the FY 2014 enacted
    level) additional funding for the hazmat program as well as $40 million
    to ensure the transportation of energy products.

        Question 3. What can we do in Congress to give you the resources to
    make sure these standards are kept up to date and don't get delayed?
        Answer. PHMSA's program operations continue to rely on 20-year-old
    legacy information management systems for data collection, integration,
    and analysis. This reliance on obsolete systems impacts operational
    efficiencies, including regulatory matters. Quality information is
    necessary to improve safety standards. The program would be better able
    to improve overall performance and efficiency if adequate funding were
    provided to consolidate disparate and obsolete data systems used by all
    internal programs that contribute to the extensive rulemaking process.
    In FY 2014, we requested $28.9 million for IT modernization of the
    hazmat safety program over a span of 7 years. To date we have received
    only $11.4 million of that necessary funding.
        PHMSA deals with very complex and technical public safety issues
    that require extensive review, as they should. In addition, there are
    very significant economic impacts associated with safety regulations
    that can require extensive regulatory evaluations (Safety Benefits and
    Cost). The rulemaking process is deliberative because it is crucial to
    receive and analyze input from a wide variety of stakeholders,
    including shippers and carriers, state and local officials, and
    concerned citizens.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
                           Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question 1. What is the timeline for release of PHMSA's findings
    regarding the chemical makeup of the U.S. crude samples as part of
    Operation Backpressure?
        Answer. PHMSA expects to release results in May 2014.

        Question 2. When will you be sharing the methodology used to arrive
    at your conclusions with producers and third-party independent
    verifiers?
        Answer. PHMSA is prepared to share the methodology that was used
    for testing at the same time it shares the test results in May 2014.

        Question 3. Is it true that the lab used when testing the
    characteristics of Bakken crude is the same lab used by many energy
    industry companies? Does the contracting lab use the same methodologies
    to test crude oil characteristics for PHMSA that they use for testing
    the samples from the oil and gas companies? If that is the case, would
    you say that using the same testing lab improves the ease with which
    oil companies would be able to share crude analysis data with PHMSA to
    support Operation Backpressure?
        Answer. Yes, the testing laboratory PHMSA has contracted with to
    perform tests is widely recognized and used by the industry. However,
    we have established a wall between the work performed for us and their
    industry clients.
        Yes, the contracting laboratory uses the same methodologies to test
    crude oil for energy industry companies as it does for PHMSA, with the
    exception of corrosion testing, which the industry is currently not
    performing.
        No, using the same lab and test methods does not necessarily lead
    to more data sharing, since there are contractual, proprietary, and
    legal issues governing the relationship between the laboratories and
    their clients. This information is protected and not releasable without
    proper authority. Nevertheless, PHMSA has invited producers and
    shippers to share information they have collected and PHMSA has
    recently received some results from some individual producers.

        Question 4. In terms of sample size, I understand that the sample
    size was not incredibly large or diverse in terms of well-site
    diversity. While you of course can't be expected to test every single
    well and shipment, do you view the current testing under way as an
    initial phase of testing? In other words, will you use the results from
    this testing to go back to the Bakken, take several more samples, to
    ensure that they all generally match or fall within some identifiable
    range of the samples you are testing now?
        Answer. PHMSA's plan of sample collection for testing is primarily
    based on the volume of shipments from rail loading facilities.
    According to the AAR, approximately 640,000 barrels of crude are moved
    out of North Dakota via rail per day. All of these facilities store
    crude oil processed from each of the over 10,000 wells in large storage
    tanks prior to loading on rail cars.
        Yes.
        Yes.

        Question 5. As part of the testing, is PHMSA collecting samples
    from multiple points along the line of delivery? Specifically, are
    samples being taken from the well head, the loading point and the
    delivery point?
        Answer. Yes, PHMSA has collected from multiple locations to include
    cargo tank and rail car loading points. PHMSA is currently working with
    producers to identify opportunities to collect samples at or near the
    well heads, as well as other delivery points, including destination
    points.

        Question 6. Your agency recently announced some fines against
    several producers in the Bakken for product mislabeling based on your
    tests and what you determined were shipments that were identified in
    the wrong Packing Group. Since that time I know my staff and staff from
    other offices and Committees have reached out to you, and while we take
    you at your word regarding the mislabeling and testing, it seemed that
    you had no clear answer as to how this product, based on a different
    Packing Group would be handled. Why is that? Do you not have clear,
    identifiable standards that a producer, shipper, third-party trucker
    can access?
        Answer. With regard to packing group, for rail shipments of
    flammable liquids, the packing group can trigger additional
    requirements including the need for a comprehensive security and safety
    plan that address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route
    security. In addition, a change in packing group can change the package
    which the commodity may be transported in, e.g., the tank cars or truck
    cargo tanks.
        The regulatory requirements for crude oil provide a uniform safety
    system that is globally recognized and harmonized. This regulatory
    system is well known and has been in place for decades. Because of this
    robust regulatory system, nearly one million shipments of hazardous
    materials arrive safely daily.

        Question 7. What are the different requirements that come with
    increasing packing standards from Class I to Class II? Fines were
    recently assigned from your agency for the mislabeling of crude
    carrying tanker cars, and standards should be enforced when they are
    required. However, it is unclear to the stakeholder community what the
    differences are in terms of their responsibilities--other than changing
    the label on the tanker--for Class I and Class II tankers. What are the
    differences between Class I and Class II with regard to operation
    requirements and the need for response plans?
        Answer. The accurate selection of the shipping description is
    important in determining the proper packaging, and the packing group
    can change the tank cars authorized. With regard to packing groups, for
    rail shipments of flammable liquids, the packing group can trigger
    additional requirements including the need for a comprehensive security
    and safety plan that addresses personnel security, unauthorized access,
    and en route security. As much of crude transport is multi-modal,
    assigning the wrong packing group can have serious downstream
    consequences. For example, different cargo tanks are used for packing
    groups I and II flammable liquids.
        With regard to response plans, the threshold for such plans is
    based on the quantity of oil, not packing group. Part 130 of the
    hazardous materials regulations provides the requirements for oil spill
    prevention and response plans. There are two types of response plans:
    Basic and Comprehensive. More specifically with regard to spill
    response planning, a basic response plan is required for oil shipment
    in a packaging with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more and a
    comprehensive response plan is required for oil shipment in a packaging
    containing 42,000 gallons (1,000 barrels).

        Question 8. Are you at the table with the oil producers, rail
    companies, and suppliers as they continue to game out and work on specs
    for tank cars? If not, why? And why were you not at the table with many
    of these same companies when they worked on new specs and standards
    after the 2009 Illinois ethanol derailment and explosion? I believe the
    new standards agreed upon, without input from PHMSA, were also then
    submitted to your agency for input, but PHMSA has failed to comment
    thus far on those proposed standards. Industry-wide standards that have
    now been in place since 2011.
        Answer. Yes, PHMSA has been continuously involved with development
    of tank car standards. Specifically, PHMSA engineers sit on the AAR
    Tank Car Committee (TCC) in an advisory capacity and participated in a
    2011 task force created with a dual charge to develop an industry
    standard for tank cars used to transport crude oil, denatured alcohol,
    and ethanol/gasoline mixtures, and to consider operating requirements
    to reduce the risk of derailment of tank cars carrying crude oil
    classified as packing group I and II and ethanol. PHMSA and FRA were
    highly involved in this task force and hoped that the activity would
    lead to a comprehensive approach. The task force promised to address
    the root cause, severity, and consequences of derailments and its
    recommendations were finalized on March 1, 2012. The AAR task force did
    not address many of the recommendations provided by PHMSA and FRA.
        After considering the outcome of the AAR task force, PHMSA decided
    to initiate an ANPRM. On September 6, 2013, PHMSA issued an ANPRM
    regarding tank car specifications. The comment period for the action
    closed on December 5, 2013.

        Question 9. While I think it's great to see various industries
    working together to come up with an accepted best-practice, in this
    newly designed tank cars, shouldn't the agency tasked with regulating
    the standards for movement of this product be both engaged on the front
    end, and offer feedback when new standards are adopted? We now have a
    tank car on the tracks since 2011 PHMSA has yet to offer comment on.
        Answer. As mentioned in response to question 8 above, PHMSA has
    been and continues to be involved.
        The Hazardous Materials regulations currently have such a review
    process in place. Section 179.4 requires proposed changes in or
    additions to specifications for tank cars to be submitted to the
    Executive Director--Tank Car Safety, AAR, for consideration by its Tank
    Car Committee. Following this, The Tank Car Committee will review the
    proposed specifications at its earliest convenience and report its
    recommendations through the Executive Director--Tank Car Safety to the
    Department. The recommendation will be considered by the Department in
    determining appropriate action.
        PHMSA engineers sit on the AAR TCC in an advisory capacity and
    participated in a 2011 task force created with a dual charge to develop
    an industry standard for tank cars used to transport crude oil,
    denatured alcohol, and ethanol/gasoline mixtures and to consider
    operating requirements to reduce the risk of derailment of tank cars
    carrying crude oil classified as packing group I and II and ethanol.
        On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule (HM-233A) to amend
    the Regulations to incorporate provisions contained in certain widely
    used or longstanding special permits that have an established safety
    record. As part of this rulemaking, PHMSA adopted a requirement that
    would allow certain rail tank cars transporting hazardous materials to
    exceed the gross weight on rail limitation of 263,000 pounds upon
    approval of FRA.
        On January 25, 2011, FRA issued a Federal Register notice of FRA's
    approval pursuant to PHMSA's May 14, 2010 final rule. The approval
    established detailed conditions for the manufacturing and operation of
    certain tank cars in hazardous materials service, including the DOT
    Specification 111, that weigh between 263,000 and 286,000 pounds. Taken
    as a whole, the PHMSA rulemaking and the FRA approval serve as the
    mechanism for tank car manufactures to build a 286,000 pound tank car.
    As such, rail car manufacturers currently have the ability to
    manufacture DOT/TC-111 tank cars meeting the CPC-1232 industry standard
    under the conditions outlined in the January 25, 2011 approval.

        Question 10. You mentioned that a Strike Force met in North Dakota
    the week prior to the March 6 hearing that was comprised of PHMSA, FRA,
    and FMCSA. Can you provide my office with details about that meeting?
    Were samples collected? From where? Has such a task force been deployed
    to other oil plays in different regions of the country?
        Answer. PHMSA organized a Multi-Agency Strike Force Operation
    during the week of February 23, 2014, which was the first such strike
    force of its kind deployed specifically in the oil fields.
    Participating agencies other than PHMSA, included the Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Customs
    and Border Protection, and the North Dakota Highway Patrol Commercial
    Motor Vehicle Enforcement. A total of 23 personnel formed five
    different teams to conduct inspections of crude oil shipments and
    assist each other with the expertise and regulatory jurisdiction
    normally exercised by each participating agency.
        Yes. Samples were collected from 14 petroleum crude oil loading
    facilities located throughout the western part of North Dakota. PHMSA
    investigators collected samples of crude oil from various locations
    including cargo tanks, storage tanks, and pipelines connected to rail
    cars.
        No.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                           Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question 1. What are the major safety issues accompanying the
    transportation of crude oil by rail and what have been the most common
    types of accidents that have occurred in the last five years?
        Answer. Transporting petroleum crude oil can be problematic if
    released into the environment because it is both flammable and causes
    environmental damage when spilled. The risk of flammability is
    compounded in the context of rail transportation because petroleum
    crude oil is commonly shipped in large unit trains. In the last five
    years there have been seven major accidents in the United States and
    Canada which involved crude oil. All of these incidents have occurred
    within the last ten months. Due to the investigation process, the type
    of five of these incidents is still to be determined (Four in the
    United States and one in Canada). The other two incidents types were
    Collision (Casselton, ND) and Lack of Securement of a Train (Lac-
    Megantic, Quebec).

        Question 2. Do you have concerns about whether industry will
    continue to adopt voluntary safety enhancements if Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's final rule ultimately
    obsoletes the $7 billion investment that has been made to manufacture
    cars to the CPC-1232 standard the development in which PHMSA
    participated?
        Answer. PHMSA understands the industry's needs to set best
    practices and industry standards. We encourage the development of such
    practices, however PHMSA has the responsibility of ensuring tank car
    standards continue to meet acceptable safety requirements. When
    considering these standards, PHMSA considers the points of views of
    stakeholders through its rulemaking process.

        Question 3. Beyond the rail and oil industries, what other
    industries has PHMSA consulted with, or plan to consult with, in its
    efforts to improve tank car safety?
        Answer. In addition to the rail and oil industries PHMSA continues
    to consult with tank car owners, tank car manufacturers, emergency
    responders, and other Federal agencies and local government.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
                           Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question. AAR has stated that rail is the safest way to transport
    crude oil. They contend, and I am quoting here, ``pipelines have
    spilled 55 percent more [hazardous materials] per ton-mile than have
    railroads.'' Do you agree with their assessment, if not what is the
    safest way to transport petroleum products?
        Answer. According to AAR the number of crude oil car loads
    originated by the members increased from 11,000 in 2009 to more than
    400,000 in 2013 with an expected increase. Over the last 10 years,
    while train volume has increased, train accidents have declined by 43
    percent and the number of train accidents involving hazardous materials
    has declined by 16 percent. Despite this decline in accidents,
    derailments can have lasting consequences to the public, communities,
    and environment. PHMSA recognizes opportunities to improve safety and
    are sharply focused on further reducing risks regardless of how this
    product is transported. Whether transported by rail or by pipeline, the
    shipment of crude oil must be done safely and in accordance with our
    regulations. This is a safety issue that applies to all modes of
    transportation.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
                           Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
        Question 1. Are there any precedents where the implementation of
    new regulations on tank cars that ship hazardous materials have also
    impacted an existing fleet?
        Answer. Yes there is. Most recently on January 13, 2009 PHMSA
    issued a final rule that improved the crashworthiness of railroad tank
    cars used to transport poisonous by inhalation (PIH) materials (i.e.,
    chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The final rule required PIH tank cars
    to have better puncture resistance head, side and strengthened valves,
    top fittings and nozzles.
        The final rule also imposed operational requirements and
    prioritized retirement or replacement of existing cars.

        Question 2. The Feb 25th DOT Emergency Order requires that all
    crude oil be classified in Packing Groups 1 and 2. I have heard from
    many oil producers that they already often treat crude oil as Packing
    Group 1 or 2. What type of data did PHMSA collect that led DOT to
    believe the Emergency Order requiring the practice was necessary? Do
    you have figures on how often shippers of crude oil use Packing Group
    3?
        Answer. One of the goals of the Emergency Order is to eliminate the
    use of a non-DOT spec tank standard for transporting bulk quantities of
    crude oil. In light of continued risks associated with petroleum crude
    oil shipments by rail, the further action described in this Amended
    Order is necessary to eliminate unsafe conditions and practices related
    to the classification and packaging of petroleum crude oil that create
    an imminent hazard to public health and safety and the environment.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                            Hon. Christopher A. Hart
        Question 1. The NTSB since has been in Connecticut on the New Haven
    Line investigating each Metro North incident that has occurred over the
    last year. You have done extensive discovery and have interviewed Metro
    North management, employees, and related parties for insight and
    feedback.
        You have also provided progress reports on your findings at NTSB
    held hearings and briefings to Congress. What is the status of NTSB's
    investigation report on the Metro North incidents? When can policy
    makers and other stakeholders except these reports? Why does it take a
    year to complete incident reports? It seems unnecessarily long.
        Answer. The NTSB plans to combine four of the Metro-North
    accidents--the May 17 derailment and collision in Bridgeport, CT; the
    May 28 worker fatality in West Haven, CT; the July 18 CSX trash train
    derailment on Metro-North tracks in The Bronx, New York; and the
    December 1 derailment also in The Bronx--in to one report that will be
    presented to the Board in mid-November 2014.
        As the investigations have progressed, we issued four safety
    recommendations to Metro-North and reiterated one safety recommendation
    to the FRA. These recommendations provide an early glimpse in to the
    investigation of the safety shortfalls we identified to date and can
    also be used by policymakers who are examining ways to improve safety
    at Metro-North.
        The NTSB has 10 rail investigators in our Office of Rail, Pipeline,
    and Hazardous Materials Investigations (RPH) who are currently
    investigating 23 rail accidents. We investigate all relevant aspects of
    all railroad accidents; operations, mechanical, signals, track, and
    human performance. Although we attempt to complete each investigation
    within 1 year, limited resources challenge our ability to reach that
    goal. The final reports will fully explain the various issues related
    to each accident, and will also provide policymakers with a great deal
    of information that will assist in their efforts to improve railroad
    safety.

        Question 2. At one point, you mentioned that if a common thread
    such as safety culture can be traced through each of Metro North's
    accidents, the NTSB would consider consolidating each incident into one
    report. Have you made a decision on whether or not to do this?
        Answer. As stated previously, the NTSB will consolidate 4 Metro-
    North accidents in to one report that will be presented to the Board in
    mid-November 2014.

        Question 3. One year seems like long to publish an investigation
    report. Can you accelerate this process? Does NTSB have a resource
    problem?
        Answer. The NTSB had been under a hiring freeze due to
    sequestration. The FY 2014 budget has allowed us to begin hiring
    actions again, with a priority on RPH positions. We hope to add 4
    people to the RPH office over the next few months, and these resources
    will help with the workload.
        The hiring freeze, which has left us unable even to replace those
    who retire, has impacted all modal offices at the NTSB, and even after
    hiring new staff, the training time will result in the new staff not
    being available to lead their own investigations for at least one year.
    The effects of sequestration will be felt for several years, and if
    sequestration is implemented again, the NTSB will face the same
    resource constraints and potentially delay accident reports even
    further.
        I am happy to talk with you further about the needs of the NTSB.

        Question 4. What type of follow up does the NTSB do once they issue
    a recommendation to the FRA or an individual operator such as Metro-
    North? The NTSB first recommended that the FRA requires cameras in
    2008--what follow up has occurred since that time with FRA? The NTSB
    should not have to recommend something twice but I would hope there is
    an ongoing dialogue with agencies and operators about their
    recommendations.
        Answer. We agree that it seems unnecessary to issue recommendations
    multiple times, but too often, we see no action on recommendations by
    the recipient. After issuing a recommendation, the NTSB tracks the
    progress via correspondence with the recipient. I can provide you with
    the correspondence history on any recommendation in which you are
    interested.
        In the case with redundant worker protections, like shunting, the
    NTSB issued that recommendation to the FRA in 2008, but six years
    later, this recommendation has not been implemented despite indications
    that the FRA would implement it.

        Question 5. The NTSB has made several recommendations to the FRA,
    Metro North, and the Nation's railroads in general following the string
    of Metro North accidents in 2013. Following the May 28, 2013 accident
    that resulted in the death of track foreman Robert Luden, the NTSB
    recommended the installation of shunting systems. The NTSB has also
    made recommendations for inward and outward facing cameras for the
    Nation's railroads as well as recommended to the FRA to issue an
    adjacent track rule which it now has.
        Mr. Hart, What other recommendations does the NTSB have to improve
    safety on the Nation's railroads in the short-term that can be
    implemented immediately and cost effectively?
        Answer. The focus of the NTSB is to issue recommendations to
    improve safety without conducting a cost-benefit analysis; therefore,
    it is difficult for me to discuss the cost effective component.
    However, there are several recommendations to the FRA that have been
    open for a number of years that would be relatively quick to implement.
    For example, the NTSB has recommended that the FRA develop and publish
    a guide for crewmembers on the hazards of using certain types of
    medications while on the job (R-00-002). This recommendation has been
    open since 2000 and despite the wealth of information that is available
    about the side effects of various drugs, no new regulations have been
    implemented.

        Question 6. What should we be focusing on as Federal regulators to
    improve safety on the Nation's rail system in the long run?
        Answer. There is no one ``silver bullet'' to improve rail safety,
    but at the NTSB, we have seen some themes in our investigations that,
    especially when taken together, go a long way to making our railroads
    safer. Current safety issues, or overarching trends, include: safety
    deficiencies in the design of thousands of railroad tank cars; the need
    for widespread implementation of positive train control (PTC) systems;
    the need for installation of inward-and outward-facing locomotive
    cameras; the need for improved medical programs; and the need for
    focused, industrywide efforts to foster top-down safety cultures in
    which safety thrives. There is not one approach that will improve rail
    safety, but it must be addressed by implementing varied approaches
    that, when working together, can help drive down the number and
    frequency of accidents or mitigate the severity of accidents.

      1.  Improved Tank Car Design. The NTSB has called for more robust
            tank cars for over 20 years. More recently, the accidents in
            Lac-Megantic, Quebec, Casselton, ND, and New Augusta, MS, and
            in Casselton, ND illustrate the continuing need for these
            improvements. Enhanced head shields, jackets, and thicker
            shells could reduce or mitigate the severity of these
            accidents.

      2.  Technology. The NTSB has called for positive train control (PTC)
            or its predecessor technology for over 40 years. This
            technology would prevent or mitigate head-on collisions,
            roadway worker fatalities, and other accidents that are the
            result of human factors deficiencies. PTC preventable accidents
            continue happening with the most recent occurring on December
            1, 2013, in The Bronx, NY, which killed four people and injured
            59 others. Since 2004, in the 25 PTC preventable accidents that
            the NTSB investigated, 65 people died, more than 1,100 were
            injured, and damages totaled millions of dollars.
            Unfortunately, we have been told by the railroad industry that
            many railroads will not meet the 2015 deadline for
            implementation. The NTSB has recommended that railroads provide
            PTC implementation update reports to the FRA every 6 months
            until PTC implementation is complete. The NTSB believes the FRA
            should make this information available online to ensure a
            transparent accounting for actions taken and not taken to meet
            the 2015 deadline so that regulators and policymakers can make
            informed decisions.

      3.  Inward-and Outward Facing Audio and Image Recorders. The December
            1, Metro-North accident in the Bronx raised questions about the
            actions of the engineer prior to the crash. The NTSB has
            repeatedly called for railroad carriers to install inward-and
            outward-facing audio and image records to answer similar
            questions that have arisen in other accidents. Recorders in
            locomotives and cab car operating compartments are critically
            important not only because they would assist NTSB investigators
            and others understand what happened in a train in the minutes
            and seconds before an accident, but also because they would
            help railroad management prevent accidents by identifying and
            responsibly addressing safety issues before they lead to
            injuries and loss of life and allow for the development of
            material that can be a valuable training and coaching tool.

      4.  Improved Medical Programs. Updating medical exams to include a
            review of drug-to-drug interaction, screening for sleep
            disorders, and thorough physical examinations; improved testing
            for color discrimination capabilities; and more frequent checks
            for personnel with chronic conditions. The most recent NTSB
            investigations illustrating this trend include Goodwell, OK and
            Red Oak, IA. Additionally, there is preliminary evidence to
            support the need for improved medical programs in current on-
            going investigations.

      5.  Top-down Safety Cultures. Fostering the development of
            transparent, top-to-bottom safety cultures in transportation is
            an important priority of the NTSB. Creating and nurturing a
            thriving safety culture within rail carriers is even more
            imperative in light of the expanding role of the Nation's
            railroad system as a main transporter of flammable materials
            and the continual increase in passenger ridership.

          The NTSB held a public forum on September 10 and 11, 2013, on
            successes and challenges associated creating and maintaining
            strong safety cultures across the transportation modes,
            including rail. Panels of experts from academia, industry, and
            Federal regulatory agencies, such as the FRA, offered their
            perspectives on the significant organizational commitments and
            managerial work that are required to maintain safety cultures
            across large complex organizations such as transportation
            carriers.

          Currently, the NTSB is examining the role of safety culture and
            the critical role that organizational culture plays in
            preventing accidents at the Metro-North Railroad. As we
            continue the on-going investigations into five Metro-North
            accidents, including the Bridgeport, CT, derailment on May 17
            where 76 people were injured, the West Haven, CT, roadway
            worker fatality on May 28, the derailment of a CSX train along
            Metro-North tracks on July 18, the derailment on December 1 in
            The Bronx where four people were killed, and most recently, an
            additional roadway worker fatality on March 10, 2014, in
            Manhattan, NY, we will examine organizational issues that
            likely impact the safety performance at Metro-North. The
            importance of building relationships between management and
            employees that foster a vibrant safety culture cannot be
            overlooked. Trust is an essential ingredient in those
            relationships. A culture in which front-line employees may
            openly report operational errors and safety issues without fear
            of reprisal is absolutely critical, and, as we have seen in the
            aviation context, improves safety.

      6.  Maintenance Issues. The Metro-North Bridgeport accident
            underscores the critical importance of regular, vigorous, and
            robust inspections of tracks. Railroad management must afford
            track workers adequate time and opportunity to conduct
            inspections and make repairs as necessary. As part of an
            ongoing investigation, the NTSB is looking at the adequacy of
            the FRA's Track Safety Standards.

        Question 7. What has your research showed about the importance of
    inward and outward facing cameras? Why is this such a critical tool for
    protecting passengers?
        Answer. Inward-and outward-facing video and audio recorders can
    provide vital information to investigators about what happened during
    an accident. This information can also be incorporated in to company
    training programs, which will improve passenger safety.

        Question 8. The NTSB investigates railroads across the entire
    country. At NTSB's November hearings on the Metro North Bridgeport
    derailment and the West Haven accident, a representative from the Long
    Island Railroad (LIRR) testified that the LIRR conducts inspections at
    a higher rate than Metro North and also employs automated inspection
    vehicles more frequently.
        At a meeting between Congress members, DOT and the FRA,
    Administrator Szabo spoke to the fact that alerter systems are good
    railroad practice and standard on most railroads across the country
    while Metro North lacked these devices in each train cabin where an
    engineer operates. He stated that he was checking with the American
    Public Transportation Association (APTA) on whether any other railroad
    didn't have alerters as a standard device in each train cabin.
        In your opinion, how does Metro North's standard of safety compare
    to other railroads throughout the country?
        Answer. Our on-going Metro-North accident investigations only focus
    on those specific accidents and do not enable us to generate an overall
    safety rating for Metro-North's total operations or to compare its
    overall safety with other railroads. That being said, we will likely
    issue recommendations as a result of these investigations that can be
    applied at other railroads to improve the safety throughout the
    country.
        Also, positive train control (PTC) is a technology that includes
    the role of the alerter, and the NTSB has been on the record for more
    than 40 years calling for PTC to be implemented throughout the rail
    industry. Accidents like the December 1, fatal accident could have been
    prevented or mitigated by PTC.

        Question 9. What other areas besides the aforementioned does Metro
    North lag behind the rest of the Nation's railway system?
        Answer. Our investigations have identified and will continue to
    identify safety shortcomings of Metro-North. The four recommendations
    issued up to this point clearly point to areas of improvement for
    Metro-North in the areas of worker protections, in-cab audio and video
    recorders, and speed control.
        We will not hesitate to act on other safety shortfalls at any time
    as the investigations proceed.

        Question 10. On December 1, a Metro-North train derailed resulting
    in four casualties and close to seventy injuries. The train was
    travelling at approximately 82 mph in an area where speed was limited
    to 30 mph. The NTSB investigation is ongoing, but officials recently
    recommended that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing cameras
    on its trains. The NTSB has called on all railroads to install such
    cameras since a 2008 crash between a passenger and a freight train
    resulted in the death of 25 people. The FRA has recently indicated its
    decision to begin the rulemaking process on this issue.
        Following the December 2013 Metro-North derailment that resulted in
    four casualties and close to seventy injuries, the NTSB recommended
    that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing cameras. This is
    something the NTSB has been recommending since 2008. What safety
    benefits does the NTSB see in requiring these cameras? Are some rail
    agencies already using this technology?
        Answer. In 2008, the NTSB recommended inward-and outward-facing
    audio and image recorders after the deadly rail accident in Chatsworth,
    CA, and we recently reiterated that recommendation in Goodwell, OK.
    This important crash protected information would assist investigators
    in reconstructing accident scenarios. Also, it could help railroad
    management prevent accidents by identifying and responsibly addressing
    safety issues before they lead to injuries and loss of life and allow
    for the development of material that can be a valuable training and
    coaching tool. In the future, image technology may well play a role in
    identifying fatigued engineers and allowing interventions.
        TO THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION: Establish an ongoing
    program to monitor, evaluate, report on, and continuously improve
    fatigue management systems implemented by operating railroads to
    identify, mitigate, and continuously reduce fatigue-related risks for
    personnel performing safety-critical tasks, with particular emphasis on
    biomathematical models of fatigue. (R-12-17)
        TO THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION: Conduct research on new and
    existing methods that can identify fatigue and mitigate performance
    decrements associated with fatigue in on-duty train crews. (R-12-18)
        In the investigation of the 2012 Goodwell, OK, head-on train
    collision, the NTSB made the following recommendation to all Class I
    railroads:
        Install in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car operating
    compartments crash-and fire-protected inward-and outward-facing audio
    and image recorders. The devices should have a minimum 12-hour
    continuous recording capability. (R-13-26)
        The NTSB continues to believe that inward-and outward-facing audio
    and image recorders improve the quality of accident investigations and
    provide the opportunity for proactive steps by railroad management to
    improve operational safety.
        On February 18, 2014, in the wake of several accidents at Metro-
    North Commuter Railroad, the NTSB issued the following two
    recommendations to Metro-North:

            Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs
            and cab car operating compartments of crash-and fire-protected
            inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable of
            providing recordings to verify that train crew actions are in
            accordance with rules and procedures that are essential to
            safety as well as train operating conditions. The devices
            should have a minimum 12-hour continuous recording capability
            with recordings that are easily accessible for review, with
            appropriate limitations on public release, for the
            investigation of accidents or for use by management in carrying
            out efficiency testing and systemwide performance monitoring
            programs. (R-14-08)

            Regularly review and use in-cab audio and image recordings in
            conjunction with other performance data, to verify that train
            crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that
            are essential to safety. (R-14-09)

        Some commuter and freight railroads have installed or are
    installing these cameras, and their use is a condition of employment.
    Voluntary installation is an excellent step forward, but we are not
    confident that all railroads will install cameras unless they are
    required by rule.

        Question 11. In July, a train carrying crude derailed and exploded
    in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and destroying the city's
    downtown. On December 30th, a train in North Dakota carrying crude oil
    struck another train which set off an explosion and required the
    evacuation of more than 1,500 people. On January 7th, a train carrying
    crude and propane derailed and caught fire in New Brunswick, Canada
    forcing an evacuation less than 35 miles from the Maine border.
        A series of freight rail accidents over the past 8 months highlight
    the need for safety plans to be in place so that communities and first
    responders know how to respond when there is a train accident carrying
    crude, propane, or any other hazardous material. Training first
    responders is a good first step to improving the response to incidents,
    and I was glad to see that included in your recent agreement. Mr. Hart,
    based on your response to safety incidents generally, what more should
    be done to ensure emergency responders are able to quickly and
    appropriately respond to these types of incidents?
        Answer. The NTSB has issued recommendations to the FRA and PHMSA to
    require the railroads to immediately provide to emergency responders
    accurate, real-time information regarding hazardous materials on a
    train in the event of an accident. These recommendations were issued in
    2007 as a result of an accident in Anding, MS, and we continue to see
    other rail accidents in which timely information to first responders
    results in a lack of coordinated response and can endanger the
    responders and the communities through which these trains travel.
        More can be done by railroads to provide real-time data on train
    manifests, especially when the manifest is available electronically. We
    look forward to working with you to ensure that our first responders
    are armed with up-to-date information in the aftermath of an accident.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
                            Hon. Christopher A. Hart
        Question 1. What actions are being taken by your agency/
    organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
    preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
        Answer. The NTSB believes there should be better coordination
    between first responders and the railroads travelling through their
    communities. To that end, the NTSB has issued recommendations to the
    FRA and PHMSA to require the railroads to immediately provide to
    emergency responders accurate, real-time information regarding
    hazardous materials on a train in the event of an accident. These
    recommendations were issued in 2007, but we continue to investigate
    rail accidents in which timely information to first responders results
    in a lack of coordinated response and can endanger the responders and
    the communities through which these trains travel.
        More can be done by railroads to provide real-time data on train
    manifests, especially when the manifest is available electronically. We
    look forward to working with you to ensure that our first responders
    are armed with up-to-date information in the aftermath of an accident.

        Question 2. What immediate measures can states, municipal
    governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
        Answer. The accident in Paulsboro, NJ, in November 2012, is an
    example in which first responders were not adequately trained to
    respond to the toxic release and did not have the necessary resources
    (air monitoring equipment, fire suppression equipment, etc.). Local and
    state governments should contact the railroad operators in their
    community and work to improve emergency responders' training and
    identify how resources will be provided and managed in the event of
    derailments involving hazardous liquids. It should include first
    responder training and routine refresher training. Also, public
    education programs for communities through which railroads transport
    hazardous materials can be developed. Lastly, municipalities should
    adequately identify and analyze risks, or adequately provide for
    response to releases of hazardous materials that are transported
    through communities.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
                            Hon. Christopher A. Hart
        Question 1. Local stakeholders have raised concerns about the
    conditions of the ground in and around Casselton that could potentially
    affect track quality or integrity. Is the NTSB, in its review of the
    Casselton Derailment, testing ground quality near the Casselton
    Interchange to determine whether or not it was a factor contributing to
    the derailment?
        Answer. The NTSB accident investigation is ongoing with many
    factors being reviewed. As part of the investigation, track conditions,
    including ground and subgrade, and maintenance records will be reviewed
    for their condition as well as for compliance with current FRA
    regulations and BNSF Railway established maintenance procedures.

        Question 2. When will the NTSB's investigation be completed? Will
    NTSB issue recommendations to the regulators based on these findings?
    Or will the independent agency reiterate previous recommendations that
    have not been acted upon--such as the recommendations from the findings
    of the 2009 Cherry Valley derailment?
        Answer. The NTSB goal is to complete its investigation of the
    Casselton, ND, accident in about one year. However, if we identify
    safety issues that need more immediate action, we can issue safety
    recommendations at any time before the report is complete. An example
    is found in safety recommendation R-14-10 issued on April 7, 2014, to
    the American Association of Railroads requiring that second-hand use
    axles undergo non-destructive testing specifically designed to locate
    internal material defects in axles.
        Regarding the Cherry Valley, IL, tank car recommendations, the NTSB
    is closely following the rulemaking actions at PHMSA, and we will
    comment on those efforts to ensure our lessons learned are part of the
    record on tank car design.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                             Geoffrey C. Blackwell
        Question 1. One key aspect to implementing PTC is providing the
    necessary spectrum. Various types of equipment owned by many different
    railroads must be able to communicate on any track equipped with PTC.
    It would be most efficient to utilize a single radio frequency band
    across the entire PTC system to minimize the cost of radio receivers
    and network equipment. A consortium of the Union Pacific, Norfolk
    Southern, CSX, and BNSF railroads, has purchased licenses to some
    frequencies in the 220 MHz range. Along with Amtrak and other
    railroads, the consortium has requested additional 217-222 MHz spectrum
    and appropriate license and rule changes, claiming 220 MHz will be
    insufficient in congested urban areas. Although frequencies may be
    available in various bands, the railroads prefer the 217-222 MHz range
    due to compatibility with current infrastructure and the radio
    communication technology they have chosen to employ. Because of
    uncertainty over spectrum needs, the FCC issued a public notice seeking
    comments from stakeholders on May 5, 2011, but has not instituted a
    formal rulemaking process regarding PTC radio spectrum issues.
        Mr. Blackwell, what is the status of the FCC's rulemaking for PTC
    radio spectrum? What did the FCC glean from the public comment period?
    Has progress been made based on the findings from the public comments?
    When can we expect a final rule on PTC spectrum?
        Answer. The Commission has not initiated a rulemaking with respect
    to PTC spectrum, focusing instead on directly helping the railroads
    secure the necessary spectrum. Also, Congress did not direct FCC to
    provide spectrum to commuter rails, or any railroads, in the Rail
    Safety Improvement Act of 2008. The public record from the 2011 Public
    Notice indicated that most commuter rails did not know how much
    spectrum they needed to deploy PTC and lacked familiarity with how to
    secure spectrum in the secondary markets by lease or acquisition. As a
    result, the Commission has worked to educate the commuter rails and the
    American Public Transportation Association (APTA) about securing
    spectrum in the secondary markets. In addition, we have granted
    substantial technical relief to enable PTC system implementation. In
    fact, Commission staff has been working closely with the freight and
    commuter railroads to identify available spectrum suitable for PTC
    deployment.
        We will continue to work with all parties on this issue and believe
    that we will be able to help the remaining railroads identify and
    secure sufficient spectrum for their PTC deployments. In fact, with the
    Commission's assistance, approximately 75 percent of the commuter
    railroads have acquired or are in discussions to lease spectrum. In
    lieu of a rulemaking, therefore, the Commission will continue to assist
    all railroads to acquire the necessary spectrum they need through
    secondary market transactions and technical relief.

        Question 2. As part of PTC implementation, railroads must install
    tens of thousands of new antenna structures nationwide to transmit PTC
    signals. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains that all
    PTC antenna structures are subject to the National Environmental
    Protection Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act
    (NHPA). The location of each antenna must be submitted to the FCC so
    Native American tribes can determine if the installation will
    negatively impact areas of historic, cultural or religious
    significance.
        In January 2014, the FCC released a proposal that was intended to
    expedite the review of PTC infrastructure.
        Mr. Blackwell, has the FCC processed this level of applications
    before? Do you agree with Mr. Hamberger's assessment? What additional
    challenges might the agency face in processing the applications
    quickly?
        Answer. The Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS) is a
    secure technology solution that allows parties interested in
    constructing communications towers to ascertain whether their proposed
    construction would implicate a Tribal Nation's interest in culturally
    or religiously significant sites in the area of the proposed
    construction. A parallel system, E-106, exists to facilitate review of
    communications towers by interested State Historic Preservation
    Officers (SHPOs). On average, the Commission processes more than 10,000
    applications a year for new or collocated communications infrastructure
    through these systems, which were originally designed for tower-by-
    tower review.
        When the railroads informed FCC staff of the extent of construction
    necessary to deploy PTC in the spring of 2013, and after continued
    discussions with the railroads, we concluded (and the railroads agreed)
    that the Commission's TCNS and E-106 processes, as they existed, were
    not suited to ensure efficient review of PTC wayside infrastructure on
    such a large scale. At the same time, we recognized that TCNS and E-106
    offer unique efficiencies that will provide many advantages to the
    railroads, Commission staff, SHPOs, and Tribal Nations. In consultation
    with Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) and the
    Administration's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Commission
    moved forward with drafting a Program Comment intended to streamline
    existing procedures and promote administrative efficiency for review of
    PTC wayside infrastructure.
        The Commission does not agree with the overall assessment of the
    program comment by Mr. Hamberger and the Association of American
    Railroads (AAR). In fact, many of the changes made to the Program
    Comment prior to submission to ACHP were based on comments from AAR and
    the individual railroads. Commission staff is fully committed to
    working with the railroads subject to the PTC deployment deadlines. We
    expect the procedures proposed in the Program Comment to materially
    reduce the time it will take railroads to complete required reviews of
    PTC infrastructure. Specifically, overall time limits for review are
    reduced by 40 percent and appeals must stop at the end of 90 days in
    most cases. The Program Comment is currently under review by ACHP, and
    we look forward to working with the railroads to help them take
    advantage of the new procedures once ACHP has completed its review.
        The existing poles constructed without NHPA and NEPA review pose
    the most significant challenge to moving forward expeditiously. The
    Commission is currently in discussions with the relevant stakeholders,
    including the railroads, Tribal Nations, and SHPOs, regarding multiple
    mitigation proposals so that we can help expedite resolution of the
    pre-construction issues and move forward toward completion of PTC
    deployment.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                             Geoffrey C. Blackwell
        Question. Mr. Blackwell, railroad companies are waiting on the
    Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to approve the siting,
    construction and replacement of an estimated 22,000 communication
    towers and antenna structures before they can move forward on
    implementation of positive train control (PTC) technology. What is the
    FCC doing to make this approval process more efficient? Aside from
    extending the deadline to allow more time for implementation, are there
    steps that the FCC could do to speed up the approval process?
        Answer. Commission staff is fully committed to working with the
    railroads subject to the PTC deployment deadlines. We have drafted a
    Program Comment intended to streamline existing procedures and promote
    administrative efficiency for review of PTC wayside infrastructure. We
    expect the procedures proposed in the Program Comment to materially
    reduce the time it will take railroads to complete required reviews of
    PTC infrastructure. Specifically, overall time limits for review are
    reduced by 40 percent and appeals must stop at the end of 90 days in
    most cases. The Program Comment is currently under review by the
    Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and we look forward
    to working with the railroads to help them take advantage of the new
    procedures once ACHP has completed its review.
        The draft program comment also includes a provision for individual
    railroads to enter into voluntary alternative arrangements with State
    Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO5) and Tribal Nations. One railroad
    has approached the Commission with ideas that might form the basis for
    such alternative arrangements, and we are working with that railroad to
    advance those ideas.
        Another issue is the roughly 10,000 poles that have already been
    constructed without the required review pursuant to Section 106 of the
    National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National
    Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The Commission is currently in
    discussions with the relevant stakeholders, including the railroads,
    Tribal Nations, and SHPOs, regarding multiple mitigation proposals so
    that we can help expedite resolution of the pre-construction issues and
    move forward to completion of PTC deployment.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
                             Geoffrey C. Blackwell
        Question. Please explain the challenges regarding PTC
    implementation before your agency and the steps that you are taking to
    address them.
        Answer. Commission staff is fully committed to working with the
    railroads subject to the PTC deployment deadlines. We have drafted a
    Program Comment intended to streamline existing procedures and promote
    administrative efficiency for review of PTC infrastructure. We expect
    the procedures proposed in the Program Comment to materially reduce the
    time it will take the railroads to complete required reviews of PTC
    infrastructure. Specifically, overall time limits for review are
    reduced by 40 percent and appeals must stop at the end of 90 days in
    most cases. The Program Comment is currently under review by the
    Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and we look forward
    to working with the railroads to help them take advantage of the new
    procedures once ACHP has completed its review.
        The draft program comment also includes a provision for individual
    railroads to enter into voluntary alternative arrangements with State
    Historic Preservation Offices (SHPOs) and Tribal Nations. One railroad
    has approached the Commission with ideas that might form the basis for
    such alternative arrangements, and we are working with that railroad to
    advance those ideas.
        Another challenge is the roughly 10,000 poles that have already
    been constructed without the required review pursuant to Section 106 of
    the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National
    Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The FCC is currently in
    discussions with the relevant stakeholders, including the railroads,
    Tribal Nations, and SHPOs, regarding multiple mitigation proposals so
    that we can help expedite resolution of the pre-construction issues and
    move forward with PTC deployment.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                                Prentiss Searles
        Question 1. ``Operation Classification'' is focused, in part, on
    classification and packing group assignments for Bakken crude. Tests
    are being conducted to measure the chemical properties of the crude.
    PHMSA recently urged API to share information on the composition of
    Bakken crude oil. Last week, PHMSA issued an emergency order requiring
    that crude oil shippers conduct ``sufficient testing'' before transport
    and they must cease shipping crude oil using the least restrictive
    hazardous materials packaging standards (known as Packing Group III).
        DOT has been testing Bakken crude and has found that there are
    ongoing concerns with the proper testing and classification of the
    crude oil. Mr. Searles, Federal regulations to test materials have been
    in place for many years and prior testimony from API has indicated that
    you have also been testing crude for years. How frequently do your
    members currently test materials? How do testing practices vary across
    companies? What oversight processes do companies have in place to
    maintain records of that data?
        Answer. API is developing a standard of best industry practices
    with regard to sampling and testing for classification of crude oil for
    rail transportation. The frequency of testing is dependent upon many
    different factors and must account for the variability of the material.
    Some criteria to determine the frequency of testing include:

       History of source of crude oil

       Stability of crude oil source

       New crude production or changes in production operations

       Type of rail car loading facility

        Testing practices are prescribed in standards published by API,
    ASTM and ISO. These standardized procedures stipulate the necessary
    steps for testing of crude oil and allow for little variability.
    Testing data can be supplied from multiple sources over different time
    frames. Nevertheless, documentation has to be retained by the shipping
    party for a minimum of two years.

        Question 2. DOT-111 tank cars were involved in the Lac-Megantic,
    Alabama, and North Dakota derailments and explosions. The DOT-111,
    which accounts for 69 percent of the U.S. tank car fleet, has a
    documented history of failure during accidents. AAR has asked DOT to
    adopt tougher standards for new tank cars, as well as requiring the
    retrofit or phase out of tank cars built to less stringent standards.
    API and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)--who represent tank car
    manufacturers--also support higher tank car standards, but have
    concerns about retrofit costs.
        For several decades, the NTSB has expressed concern about the DOT-
    111 tank car. Other stakeholders, including AAR, API, and RSI, have
    sought tougher tank car standards. DOT is almost a year behind on a
    rulemaking, which would propose updates to the DOT-111 standards, and
    does not anticipate issuing a final rule until next year. This is
    unacceptable to me and the thousands of people living in communities
    that see these train cars roll through their towns everyday--
    communities along these rail lines deserve more. Again, this seems to
    be another example of regulatory capture; the DOT for all intents and
    purposes outsourced tank car recommendations to industry back in 2011.
    And here we are 3 years and several high profile accidents later, and
    we're still talking about the need for stronger tank cars.
        Several companies have proposed using only newer tank cars and BNSF
    Railroad has stated that they will order even stronger tank cars. Would
    you agree that these actions will make transporting hazardous materials
    safer? Do your members have concerns about the cost implications for
    acquiring new cars? What is the industry doing to protect communities?
        Answer. The oil and gas industry is focused on a holistic approach
    to safety, which includes efforts relating to prevention, mitigation,
    and response. One component of mitigation is tank car design. Our
    members have been building state-of-the-art tank cars since 2011 based
    on designs that were developed over the course of several years through
    the evaluation of decades of data. Tank car design must be evaluated
    holistically so that changes to the tank cars do not result in
    unintended increases in risk elsewhere in the transportation process.
    Our industry is currently undertaking an integrated risk assessment so
    that we can understand what elements of the supply chain deserve more
    focus. Safety is a core value of the oil and gas industry, as such, we
    are evaluating tank car designs from a safety perspective.

        Question 3. In recent months, DOT officials concluded that eleven
    of eighteen samples taken from cargo tanks carrying Bakken crude were
    not labelled correctly. In addition, it has been revealed that the
    Bakken crude involved in the deadly Lac-Megantic accident was
    inaccurately labeled. What changes has the industry made to ensure the
    proper classification of crude?
        Answer. At a minimum, API member companies are required to test and
    classify their product according to Federal regulations. However, our
    members also understand the need to assess any potential new issues and
    as a result API is developing a standard that addresses the
    classification and loading of crude oil into rail tank cars so that we
    ensure that the industry has a standard set of recommended practices.
    We have also encouraged our members to supply sample data to PHMSA.

        Question 4. What issues led to the initial misclassification of
    crude? Is this happening frequently?
        Answer. The tragedy at Lac-Megantic is currently being studied
    extensively by safety experts. When that review is complete, API will
    work with other stakeholders to address any issues that contributed to
    the accident. However, we will point out, that the product was moved in
    a tank car that was designed for the higher packing group product
    (Hazard Class 3, Packing Group I) and the emergency response for that
    product whether it was a PG I, PG II or PG III, would have been the
    same, regardless. Tank cars are not normally run at 65 mph anywhere in
    the country (U.S. or Canada).

        Question 5. DOT recently announced an amended Emergency Order to
    address the testing of crude. What oversight procedures are in place to
    ensure that proper classification is being conducted? What long-term
    procedures need to be addressed to ensure that proper classification
    continues to be addressed?
        Answer. DOT oversees the transportation of crude by rail and ensure
    that proper classification is being conducted. The API standard will
    address this process and will ensure that the industry has a standard
    set of recommended practices for the classification and loading and
    unloading of crude oil into rail tank cars.

        Question 6. What steps, if any, can be taken before shipment to
    address the volatile content of Bakken crude?
        Answer. API members strive to follow all government regulations
    regarding the proper classification of crude oil, including testing for
    initial boiling point and flash point. Additionally, companies
    undertake a variety of processes prior to the loading of crude oil into
    tank cars depending on their business practices. As part of this
    process, produced crude oil moves from the well to an oil and gas
    separator (or heater treater) where gas, oil, and water are separated.
        API is currently developing a standard for the classification,
    loading, and unloading of crude oil into rail tank cars that will
    assess the characteristics of crude oil to determine which attributes,
    in addition to those already in the regulations, may need to be
    considered to develop the best handling procedures.

        Question 7. In January, API along with other stakeholders met with
    Secretary Foxx and Administrators Szabo and Quarterman, to discuss the
    safe transport of crude oil by rail. At that meeting, DOT asked API to
    consider a number of additional safety measures, including sharing
    testing information. Both DOT and API have previously stated that you
    are working together to provide necessary information. On March 28, DOT
    provided a press statement saying, ``we still lack data we requested
    and that energy stakeholders agreed to produce. The overall and ongoing
    lack of cooperation is disappointing, slows progress, and certainly
    raises concerns.''
        The recent DOT statement differs drastically from information you
    provided to the Committee. What specific information have you been
    asked to provide and what information is still outstanding? Are
    discussions for data ongoing with DOT? If so, are there hurdles to the
    industry for providing data to DOT? When will the industry provide all
    requested information to the DOT?
        Answer. There are three separate data collection efforts underway
    by: North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC), AFPM and individual
    companies. Generally there are seven characteristics of crude oil being
    collected (e.g., flash point, initial boiling point, vapor pressure,
    light end analysis, API gravity, sulfur, and H2S).
        API member companies are submitting data to PHMSA and sharing it
    with API. More than 150 samples have been submitted to PHMSA thus far
    and API continues to encourage our members to submit data to PHMSA. API
    is compiling the data shared by our members and members have met
    individually with PHMSA to discuss their data.
        In addition to the individual proprietary data, the North Dakota
    Petroleum Council (NDPC) has contracted to a third party to conduct
    quality assurance tests that will study the range and variability of
    Bakken crude oil qualities (ND and MT). They will collect 150 total
    samples--101 well and 49 rail and that data is from both well sites and
    rail facilities from a significant geographic area. The results will
    also be provided to PHMSA as a complement to the proprietary data that
    individual companies are already sharing. NDPC has provided updates to
    PHMSA on their progress.
        AFPM is collecting data from the loading rack and the refinery
    gate. AFPM has provided updates to PHMSA on their collection effort.
    Industry will look forward to collaborating with PHMSA to review the
    crude oil quality data compiled through Operation Classification and
    the industries data collection efforts.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
                                Prentiss Searles
        Question 1. What actions are being taken by your agency/
    organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
    preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
        Answer. In 2013, API published the Oil and Natural Gas Industry
    Preparedness Handbook. This Handbook, created in coordination with API,
    other industry trade associations (AFPM, ILTA, AGA, INGAA, SOCMA, PMAA,
    NATSO) and government partners (DOE, DHS, DOI, DOT, EPA, NSS, NASEO),
    is focused on preparing industry and government partners for incidents
    involving oil and natural gas operations from an all hazards
    perspective. API continues to promote the importance of planning for
    preparedness, mitigation and response through education, communication,
    the development of partnerships and the necessity of drills and
    exercises. API, as well as our members and other industry trades, meet
    regularly with federal, state and local partners to stress the
    importance of continuous communication and the development of plans to
    ensure the ready supply of oil and natural gas to first responders,
    communities and critical services. API also works internally with
    members, as well as with public partners, to document and share the
    expertise that exists within industry related to oil spill response,
    spill mitigation and clean up.

        Question 2. What immediate measures can states, municipal
    governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
        Answer. API designed the Oil and Natural Gas Industry Preparedness
    Handbook as a tool for industry, as well as for states, municipal
    governments, and local agencies. The strategy advocated for in the
    Handbook applies to all parties involved in incident response;
    communication and education prior to a response. The largest section of
    the Handbook is specific guidance for state and local partners. This
    section provides guidance on a few specific but critical areas. The
    first is to know who the critical partners are in your area upon which
    key resources or services depend. This includes roles and
    responsibilities, as well as the people who are empowered to make
    decisions in a crisis. The second is to know what not to do. This is as
    important to the private sector as it is to governments. Understanding
    the laws and regulations that can impede response, those that can
    facilitate response and those that may not take effect until a response
    occurs should be known and understood prior to a response. Thirdly, it
    is critical for all parties to understand what matters in an event. For
    localities and states, this is often identification of where critical
    resources and services are sourced, or where critical assets are
    located. Lastly, all of the previous concepts should be combined and
    integrated into exercises to ensure all parties understand these
    concepts, know what is needed, and to identify gaps in knowledge and
    process.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                Prentiss Searles
        Question 1. Mr. Searles, Federal officials and your industry seem
    to agree on one thing: that Bakken crude is light, sweet, and more
    combustible than most other crudes. This is obviously a factor in these
    explosions, and the correct labeling of these shipments is critically
    important. I believe some fines have already been assessed for
    misclassification.
        Misclassification means that first responders don't know what to
    expect when they approach a disaster site. And in a trade dependent-
    state like Washington, our rail lines run through major population
    centers. Consequences from an accident would be high--which is one of
    the reasons cities and newspapers across our state have expressed
    concern about the safe movement of crude. Could you tell us what steps
    your industry is taking to reduce the volatility of Bakken crude prior
    to transport?
        Answer. API members strive to follow all government regulations
    regarding the proper classification of crude oil, including testing for
    initial boiling point and flash point. Additionally, companies
    undertake a variety of processes prior to the loading of crude oil into
    tank cars depending on their business practices. As part of this
    process, produced crude oil moves from the well to an oil and gas
    separator (or heater treater) where gas, oil, and water are separated.
        API is currently developing a standard for the classification,
    loading, and unloading of crude oil into rail tank cars that will
    assess the characteristics of crude oil to determine which attributes,
    in addition to those already in the regulations, may need to be
    considered to develop the best handling procedures.

        Question 2. Could you tell us what steps your industry is taking to
    better understand the characteristics of crude prior to shipment?
        Answer. API has established a group of physical chemists who are
    specialists in crude oil properties. They are reviewing different
    properties of crude oil to determine in addition to those already
    required by PHMSA, those most suitable for classifying and
    characterizing the material for rail transportation. Furthermore, these
    specialists are also looking at the science behind crude oil properties
    used for rail car selection in order to identify those parameters that
    could impact rail car design.
        Guidance on this subject is being included in the development of
    the API standard, a process which is open to all stakeholders such as
    the railroad industry, tank car builders/owners and lessors, PHMSA,
    Transport Canada, as well as crude oil producers.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
                                Prentiss Searles
        Question 1. A consensus seems to be emerging that steps needs to be
    taken to fortify existing tanker cars or to build new and safer cars. I
    understand your members own roughly half of the tanker cars used to
    carry crude. The other half are owned by rail car leasing companies.
    Can you tell me at what stage in the depreciation schedule producer
    owned rail cars are? In other words, in general, how long have these
    cars been in service?
        Answer. The vast majority of tank cars in crude service were built
    after 2001 (over 80 percent) and approximately half of those cars were
    built in 2012 and 2013 so they are likely to not have been fully
    depreciated at this point.

        Question 2. If DOT-111s are phased out, the productive life of some
    of these assets will be shortened significantly. Would the American
    Petroleum Institute support changes to the tanker car depreciation
    schedules as an incentive for oil producers to invest in new tanker
    cars?
        Answer. We have no position on that proposal at this point.

        Question 3. At what stage of the depreciation schedule are the DOT-
    111 tanker cars in the current fleet? More specifically, what is the
    percentage of tankers cars that are nearing their life's end? What
    percentage of tanker cars are in the middle or early part of the 50
    year productivity window?
        Answer. The vast majority of tank cars in crude oil service are in
    the middle or early part of the 50-year productivity window. Over half
    of those are in the first few years of service life.

        Question 4. At the meeting you and I attended with Secretary Foxx,
    API committed on behalf of the industry to provide PHMSA with data
    regarding the crude in the Bakken. To date, what information has API
    been able to provide to PHMSA?
        Answer. There are three separate data collection efforts underway
    by: North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC), AFPM and individual
    companies. Generally there are seven characteristics of crude oil being
    collected (e.g., flash point, initial boiling point, vapor pressure,
    light end analysis, API gravity, sulfur, and H2S).
        API member companies are submitting data to PHMSA and sharing it
    with API. More than 250 samples have been submitted to PHMSA thus far
    and API continues to encourage our members to submit data to PHMSA. API
    is compiling the data shared by our members and members have met
    individually with PHMSA to discuss their data.
        In addition to the individual proprietary data, the North Dakota
    Petroleum Council (NDPC) has contracted to a third party to conduct
    quality assurance tests that will study the range and variability of
    Bakken crude oil qualities (ND and MT). They will collect 150 total
    samples--101 well and 49 rail and that data is from both well sites and
    rail facilities from a significant geographic area. The results will
    also be provided to PHMSA as a complement to the proprietary data that
    individual companies are already sharing. NDPC has provided updates to
    PHMSA on their progress.
        AFPM is collecting data from the loading rack and the refinery
    gate. AFPM has provided updates to PHMSA on their collection effort.
    Industry will look forward to collaborating with PHMSA to review the
    crude oil quality data compiled through Operation Classification and
    the industries data collection efforts.

        Question 5. Is it true that many of your members use the same
    contracting labs that are used by PHMSA to test the qualities and
    characteristics of Bakken crude? To your knowledge, do contracting labs
    use identical methodologies for multiple clients when testing for
    characteristics such as vapor pressure, viscosity, corrosiveness,
    boiling point and flash point? If that is the case, do you believe that
    oil companies testing crude oil are in a strong position to share data
    with PHMSA as part of Operation Backpressure?
        Answer. We do not know what labs PHMSA is using for its Operation
    Classification studies and I cannot speculate on whether they are using
    the same labs as the oil companies. To my knowledge, many of the test
    procedures for testing crude oil properties are the same, though some
    of the test procedures can have significant reproducibility variance.

        Question 6. At the end of this process, if additional requirements
    are mandated to further improve the safety of tanker cars beyond the
    1232 good faith tanker specifications--do you commit to cooperating in
    good faith to meet those standards?
        Answer. API will continue to cooperate to ensure that the most
    appropriate tank cars are chosen and that approach is based on the
    proven and available models. It is our understanding that API's members
    and the petroleum industry in general has been purchasing the CPC-1232
    standard tank car and we have already committed to adding the safety
    valves once they are designed and engineered (i.e., the low trigger,
    high-flow pressure relief device and the enhanced bottom outlet valve
    handle).

        Question 7. In your opinion, are the DOT-111 cars currently in use
    sufficiently safe for the transportation of crude?
        Answer. Under normal operating conditions, the existing DOT-111
    tank cars are safe. However, our members understand that in situations
    where prevention fails, there is a need to mitigate incidents. That
    said, our members continue to review whether there are possible
    improvements that would mitigate incidents if the tank cars are
    derailed. If we identify improvements and those are approved by DOT, it
    will be imperative that enough time is given to implement the changes
    so that the U.S. continues to benefit from our country's crude oil
    renaissance while simultaneously implementing changes that would
    improve safety.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                                Prentiss Searles
        Question. Can you explain for the Committee the logistics and
    ownership of tank cars when it comes to that fleet and how long it
    would take to cycle the existing fleet of new and older model DOT-111
    tank cars?
        Answer. There are approximately 100,000 DOT-111 rail tank cars in
    the U.S. fleet moving flammable liquids like crude oil and ethanol.\1\
    Of that fleet, there are over 42,000 in crude oil service and more than
    14,000 of those tank cars are built to the petition car standard.\2\
    The Railway Supply Institute has publically stated that there are
    another 37,800 tank cars that will be built to the petition car
    standard for crude oil service that will be delivered by December
    2015.\3\ There will be approximately 80,000 cars in crude oil service
    by that time. Tank cars are unique in that they are not owned by the
    railroads, they are owned by tank car leasing companies and shippers.
    Tank cars have an operating life of 30-50 years.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Third Quarter 2013 Data from AAR 11/9/13 Fleet Analysis
        \2\ AAR NTSB Presentation, 4/22/2014
        \3\ RSI NTSB Presentation, 4/22/2014
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The impact on each API member will vary depending on their business
    model and on the final PHMSA rule and timeframe. Specifically, the
    extent and complexity of a modification, whether companies purchase
    cars or lease them, the size of each fleet, the number of cars
    backordered, the make-up of the total fleet, the availability of
    materials, and access to repair shop or manufacturer capacity will all
    determine timing.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
                                Prentiss Searles
        Question. What would the impact of completing the Keystone XL
    pipeline be on the amount of petroleum products that are currently
    being transported by rail?
        Answer. API does not forecast, but when considering this question,
    the following may help better explain the options available to ship
    crude oil from Canada or our upper Plains states to domestic
    refineries--where we can take a raw material and make more valuable
    products. The Keystone XL pipeline is neither the only pipeline being
    considered, nor the only means available to ship Canadian or domestic
    crude oil. KXL is but one of 6 major pipeline proposals to bring
    Canadian crude to market. In addition, 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
    its capacity is set aside for Bakken crude production (according to the
    Department of State). However, Bakken production, is expected to
    increase by about 700,000 bpd by 2017 and by 1 million bpd by 2020.\4\
    The expected increase in Bakken production is seven to ten times larger
    than the set-aside Bakken capacity of KXL. . Rather, it may serve to
    reduce the increase in rail traffic that would occur absent KXL by 14
    percent in 2017 and 10 percent in 2020.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ ICF, 2014
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is important to keep in mind that the decision to ship crude to
    market via pipeline or rail is multifaceted. It is not a matter of
    pitting one mode against the other mode. Rail provides flexibility,
    shorter times to come on line. Pipeline approvals take time as we
    certainly have seen with KXL now, nearly 6 years under review. The
    Department of State found the proposed KXL to be the preferred means to
    bring Canada's crude from Alberta to our refineries in the Gulf along
    that route. Rail offers the option to deliver crude to refiners not
    served by pipelines, to help our domestic refiners utilize our own
    domestic production, rather than purchasing their crude from more
    distant, less friendly sources.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                              Edward R. Hamberger
        Question 1. On January 15, 2014, the Regional Planning Association
    released a report titled, ``Getting Back on Track: Unlocking the Full
    Potential of the New Haven Line. The RPA report concludes that the New
    Haven Line's largest issue is the severity of its aging and
    deteriorating infrastructure. Due to the state of the railroad's
    infrastructure, the New Haven Line (NHL) is extremely underfunded and
    requires tremendous increases in funding to reach a state of good
    repair. At current funding levels of less than $200 million a year, it
    would take 20 years to reach a state of good repair. Connecticut has
    dedicated $1 billion to the railroad in its 2013-2017 capital plan, but
    the RPA concludes that an additional $3.6 billion is needed to replace
    the railroad's obsolete infrastructure by 2020.
        These infrastructure needs, which include deteriorating bridges,
    some over 100 years old, worn track, and outdated signaling and power
    systems, pose threats to safety as seen in the Bridgeport derailment.
    Broken and ill-repaired track has put lives at risk and it's only a
    matter of time before such an incident reoccurs if nothing is done. How
    critical is sound infrastructure to the ensuring safety on the Nation's
    railway system?
        Answer. AAR has often testified that one of the most important ways
    that railroads have reduced accidents is through significant and
    consistent investments back into their networks. Since the enactment of
    Staggers, America's freight railroads have been reinvesting more
    private capital than ever before to renew, upgrade, and expand their
    infrastructure and equipment, including a record $25.5 billion in 2012
    and $25.1 billion in 2013. The vast majority of these investments have
    improved rail safety either directly or indirectly. For many of these
    investments, safety is the primary reason the expenditures were made.
    From 2008 to 2012 alone, Class I railroads spent nearly $26 billion in
    capital expenditures on new crossties (77 million), new rail (2.9
    million tons), and new ballast (nearly 61 million cubic yards). Over
    the same period, they spent billions of additional capital dollars on
    signal and communications systems, bridges and tunnels, and machinery.
    These and other investments, as well as the billions of dollars
    railroads spend on maintenance of their networks each year, have made
    railroads much safer. This assertion is borne out by the fact that from
    1980 to 2013, the train accident rate fell 79 percent, the rail
    employee injury rate fell 84 percent, and the grade crossing collision
    rate fell 81 percent.

        Question 2. How many of the existing safety concerns can be solved
    by reaching a state of good repair for the Nation's railroads?
        Answer. Clearly, a railroad in a state of good repair is safer than
    a railroad with significant amounts of deferred maintenance. Thanks
    largely to the $550 billion freight railroads have reinvested back into
    their networks since 1980, America's freight railroads are in better
    condition today than ever before. And because a financially viable
    railroad is in a much better position to reinvest in its network and in
    risk reduction strategies than a financially challenged railroad, it is
    critically important that the regulatory structure under which
    railroads operate recognize the need for railroads to continue to earn
    sufficient revenues to allow them to reinvest heavily back into their
    systems.

        Question 3. DOT-111 tank cars were involved in the Lac-Megantic,
    Alabama, and North Dakota derailments and explosions. The DOT-111,
    which accounts for 69 percent of the U.S. tank car fleet, has a
    documented history of failure during accidents. AAR has asked DOT to
    adopt tougher standards for new tank cars, as well as requiring the
    retrofit or phase out of tank cars built to less stringent standards.
    API and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)--who represent tank car
    manufacturers--also support higher tank car standards, but have
    concerns about retrofit costs.
        For several decades, the NTSB has expressed concern about the DOT-
    111 tank car. Other stakeholders, including AAR, API, and RSI, have
    sought tougher tank car standards. DOT is almost a year behind on a
    rulemaking, which would propose updates to the DOT-111 standards, and
    does not anticipate issuing a final rule until next year. This is
    unacceptable to me and the thousands of people living in communities
    that see these train cars roll through their towns everyday--
    communities along these rail lines deserve more. Again, this seems to
    be another example of regulatory capture; the DOT for all intents and
    purposes outsourced tank car recommendations to industry back in 2011.
    And here we are 3 years and several high profile accidents later, and
    we're still talking about the need for stronger tank cars.
        AAR recently called for additional changes to the proposed tank car
    standard. What prompted this change and how will those changes increase
    safety?
        Answer. In 2011, AAR petitioned PHMSA to adopt more stringent
    requirements for DOT-111 tank cars used to transport packing group I
    and II materials. That petition proposed that new tank cars used to
    transport those materials must have thicker shells than required by the
    current regulations, with current shell thicknesses permitted only for
    tank cars constructed of normalized steel and equipped with jackets and
    thermal protection. In addition, the petition proposed that tank cars
    be equipped with enhanced top fittings protection, reclosing pressure
    relief devices, and half-height head shields. Subsequently, AAR adopted
    an interchange standard (CPC-1232) with the same requirements
    applicable to tank cars used to transport crude oil and ethanol,
    effective for cars ordered after October 1, 2011.
        AAR now supports even more stringent standards for new tank cars
    used to transport these materials. Furthermore, AAR proposes additional
    requirements for tank cars transporting flammable liquids, including
    packing group III flammable liquids, retrofits of existing cars in
    flammable liquid service, and an aggressive phase-out of cars that
    cannot meet retrofit requirements. The phase-out program must take into
    account factors such as manufacturing capacity, the demand for new DOT-
    111 cars, shop capacity for any retrofits that will be undertaken, and
    the number of DOT-111 cars that need to be phased out of flammable
    liquid service. Input is needed from shippers and tank car
    manufacturers to determine the precise parameters of a phase-out
    program and identify retrofits that should be required.
        The discussion of new tank car standards takes place in the context
    of the accident that took place on July 6, 2013, in Lac-Megantic,
    Quebec. The Lac-Megantic accident has no parallel in recent times and
    over the last several decades the railroads' overall safety record has
    improved dramatically. Indisputably, railroads provide an efficient and
    safe way to transport hazardous materials such as crude oil and other
    flammable liquids.

        Question 3. In July, a train carrying crude derailed and exploded
    in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and destroying the city's
    downtown. On December 30th, a train in North Dakota carrying crude oil
    struck another train which set off an explosion and required the
    evacuation of more than 1,500 people. On January 7th, a train carrying
    crude and propane derailed and caught fire in New Brunswick, Canada
    forcing an evacuation less than 35 miles from the Maine border.
        A series of freight rail accidents over the past 8 months highlight
    the need for safety plans to be in place so that communities and first
    responders know how to respond when there is a train accident carrying
    crude, propane, or any other hazardous material. Training first
    responders is a good first step to improving the response to incidents,
    and I was glad to see that included in your recent agreement.
        As part of your agreement, AAR committed to rerouting trains
    carrying at least 20 cars of crude oil to the ``safest and most secure
    routes.'' How will these routing decisions impact communities that are
    not currently seeing a large influx of crude-by-rail? Will other
    communities see an increase in crude trains and will additional
    resources be focused on these communities?
        Answer. Since this aspect of the industry's commitments to USDOT
    will not take effect until July 1, 2014, it is premature to speculate
    on how the use of the RCRMS tool may impact crude oil routing
    decisions. That said, railroads seek to operate safely everywhere, and
    their safety record indicates that they succeed the vast majority of
    the time.

        Question 4. As part of PTC implementation, railroads must install
    tens of thousands of new antenna structures nationwide to transmit PTC
    signals. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains that all
    PTC antenna structures are subject to the National Environmental
    Protection Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act
    (NHPA). The location of each antenna must be submitted to the FCC so
    Native American tribes can determine if the installation will
    negatively impact areas of historic, cultural or religious
    significance.
        In January 2014, the FCC released a proposal that was intended to
    expedite the review of PTC infrastructure.
        How would the FCC's proposed process affect the ability of
    railroads to meet the Dec. 31, 2015 deadline? What are the major
    hurdles to efficiently moving forward on installation?
        Answer. The FCC elected to draft a program comment for
    consideration by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
    (``ACHP''). The railroad industry argued to the FCC that the FCC should
    recommend to the ACHP that a program comment exempt most PTC wayside
    infrastructure from Section 106 review under this standard. Such an
    approach would not require the FCC to pursue a rulemaking under its own
    rules. This approach would ensure that Tribal Nations and the State
    Historic Preservation Offices would be able to focus their attention on
    those poles that are most likely to implicate historic preservation
    concerns, while not causing unreasonable delay to PTC deployment.
    Unfortunately, the draft program comment that the FCC submitted to the
    ACHP created a process based on the FCC's existing location-by-location
    approach and, if adopted by the ACHP, would not streamline the review
    process in a meaningful way.
        While the railroad industry would not have been able to make the
    2015 deadline even if there had been no delay attributable to the FCC,
    the delay in installation of the antennas has set back the timeline for
    rolling out PTC. Last May, AAR projected that by December 31, 2015, the
    industry would have rolled out PTC on 40 percent of the route mileage
    required to be equipped with PTC. AAR has now reduced that December 31,
    2015, projection to 20 percent of the PTC route mileage and lacking a
    date certain by which approval to install PTC antennas will be granted,
    the industry cannot make any additional projections.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
                              Edward R. Hamberger
        Question 1. In your testimony before the Subcommittee, you
    mentioned that in light of recent accidents involving crude oil
    shipments, railroads are considering expanding the application of a
    number of procedures used for trains carrying toxic/hazardous materials
    to trains carrying large amounts of crude oil.
        Examples of such procedures include speed restrictions, more
    frequent train inspections, and the use of the Rail Corridor Risk
    Management System--developed jointly with the Federal government to aid
    railroads in identifying the safest and most secure rail routes. When
    will the railroads make this determination?
        Answer. Pursuant to the agreement with Secretary Foxx, railroads
    will adhere to speed restrictions for key crude oil trains within the
    limits of high-threat urban areas by no later than July 1, 2014;
    perform at least one additional internal rail inspection than is
    required each year by Federal regulation effective March 25, 2014; and
    begin using the Rail Corridor Risk Management System by no later than
    July 1, 2014.

        Question 2. What procedures expected to be used by crude oil trains
    are different than those procedures currently used by trains shipping
    toxic and hazardous substances, and which procedures currently used by
    trains shipping toxic and hazardous substances can be used by crude oil
    trains?
        Answer. AAR Circular OT-55-N specifies recommended railroad
    operating practices for the transportation of all hazardous materials,
    including crude oil. Earlier this year, USDOT Secretary Foxx called for
    the industry to identify steps that might be taken to address the new
    and unique challenges associated with crude oil transportation. In late
    February, the industry agreed to a series of additional voluntary
    actions for crude oil, including increased track inspections, upgraded
    braking systems, routing protocols, speed limits in certain areas,
    deployment of trackside safety technology and emergency response
    enhancements.

        Question 3. In your testimony before the Subcommittee, you
    mentioned that upon request, railroads provide appropriate local
    authorities with a list of the hazardous materials, including crude
    oil, transported through their communities. Why is it not general
    practice to automatically distribute this information to local
    authorities so they can implement the appropriate mitigation and
    emergency preparedness procedures in case of a disaster?
        Answer. AAR members provide bona fide emergency response agencies
    or planning groups with specific commodity flow information covering
    hazardous commodities transported through the community. The railroad
    industry considers this to be restricted information of a security
    sensitive nature and the recipient of the information must agree to
    release the information only to bona fide emergency response planning
    and response organizations and not distribute the information publicly
    without the railroad's express written permission.

        Question 4. What actions are being taken by your agency/
    organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
    preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
        Answer. All major railroads have teams of full-time personnel whose
    primary focus is hazmat safety and emergency response. Railroads also
    have teams of environmental, industrial hygiene, and medical
    professionals available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days
    a year to provide assistance during hazmat incidents. Railroads also
    maintain networks of hazmat response contractors and environmental
    consultants, strategically located throughout their service areas, who
    can handle virtually any air, water, waste or public health issue.
    These contractors, who are on call at all times of the day and night,
    have multiple offices and equipment storage locations and a vast array
    of monitoring equipment, containment booms, industrial pumps, and other
    spill response and heavy equipment. Finally, railroads have
    comprehensive ``standard of care'' protocols that ensure that impacts
    to the community--such as evacuations--are addressed promptly and
    professionally.
        In addition to relying on their own personnel, railroads have a
    long history of working closely with state and local emergency first
    responders and emergency planners in many different ways. Each year,
    railroads actively train well over 20,000 emergency responders
    throughout the country. This training ranges from general awareness
    training to much more in-depth offerings. The precise parameters of
    these emergency response training programs vary from railroad to
    railroad.
        In addition to individual railroad activities, some railroad hazmat
    training efforts fall under the auspices of the Transportation
    Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER).
    TRANSCAER is a national inter-industry partnership focused on assisting
    communities to prepare for, and to respond to, hazmat incidents.
    TRANSCAER offers classroom and hands-on training; emergency planning
    assistance; support for community drills and exercises; technical
    information, reference, and training materials; and national
    conferences and workshops for sharing best practices. TRANSCAER
    provides this training at no cost to emergency responders and has
    developed a well-earned reputation for quality and effectiveness.
        The rail industry is also deeply involved in improving our Nation's
    emergency response capability through its support of the Security and
    Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC), a world-class training
    facility that is part of TTCI in Pueblo, Colorado. The AAR established
    SERTC in 1985. Its original mission was to train railroad personnel to
    safely handle accidents involving tank cars carrying hazardous
    materials. Over time, though, its scope has been broadened to also
    serve the public sector emergency response community, other industries,
    government agencies, and emergency response contractors from all over
    the world.
        SERTC's primary focus is still freight rail safety, but SERTC also
    offers training covering other surface transportation modes. It
    recently implemented emergency response and planning programs related
    to passenger rail and mass transit. The Transportation Security
    Administration has been using SERTC for employee training since 2006.
    In fact, more than 2,100 TSA participants have trained at SERTC to date
    in such areas as ``Railroad 101,'' hazmat transportation, and safety
    compliance. FBI and National Guard personnel have also been trained at
    SERTC. Over the years, SERTC has provided in-depth, realistic, hands-on
    hazmat emergency response training to more than 50,000 local, state,
    and tribal emergency responders and railroad, chemical, and petroleum
    industry employees. Many railroads regularly provide financial
    assistance to emergency responders in their service areas to attend
    SERTC. Instructors at SERTC average more than 30 years of emergency
    response experience.

        Question 5. What immediate measures can states, municipal
    governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
        Answer. They should take advantage of the variety of opportunities
    railroads provide to help local emergency responders. As noted above,
    railroads have a long history of working closely with state and local
    emergency first responders and emergency planners in many different
    ways. These consist of a combination of some or all of the following:

            Safety Trains. Several railroads utilize ``hazmat safety
            trains'' and other training equipment that travel from
            community to community to allow for hands-on training for local
            first responders.

            Training Centers. Several railroads operate centralized hazmat
            training sites where they train employees, first responders,
            customers, and other railroad industry personnel in all aspects
            of dealing with hazmat incidents.

            Local Firehouse Visits. In aggregate, railroads visit hundreds
            of local firehouses each year to provide classroom and face-to-
            face hazmat training.

            Table Top Drills. Railroads regularly partner with local
            emergency responders to conduct simulations of emergency
            situations in which general problems and procedures in the
            context of an emergency scenario are discussed. The focus is on
            training and familiarization with roles, procedures, and
            responsibilities.

            Self-Study Training Courses. Railroads make available self-
            study programs for emergency responders that allow students to
            learn proper procedures at their own pace.

        Some railroads also provide related web-based training on hazmat
    and general rail safety issues.
        Railroads also regularly provide hazardous materials training to
    their customers and short line railroad partners. These comprehensive
    rail industry efforts point to the seriousness with which railroads
    take their responsibilities regarding the safety of the communities
    they serve.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                              Edward R. Hamberger
        Question 1. Mr. Hamberger, I think we are all in agreement that the
    voluntary crude-by-rail operating agreement is a step in the right
    direction.
        But city councils in places like Spokane and Bellingham, mayors,
    and Washington's major newspapers are telling me that they simply don't
    have enough information about what is being moved by rail to give them
    confidence that it is moving safely. The Spokesman Review expressed it
    pretty clearly, saying it was ``vital that feds create oil-by-rail
    safeguards,'' and speaking of the new agreement, ``if that result is
    also voluntary, then it won't bring much comfort.'' I agree with them,
    and hope--expect--your industry to allay their concerns by answering
    their questions about train movements in Washington communities and
    nationwide. Very frankly, the consequences are high for Washington
    state. We have rail lines, with at-grade crossings, running through the
    hearts of our major cities, so a crude derailment could be
    catastrophic.
        I think that is why folks are asking if voluntary agreements are
    strong enough. It is obviously impossible to completely eliminate all
    risk in these situations. But I think we all agree that we need to
    reduce it significantly to prevent another disaster like we witnessed
    in Lac-Megantic or Casselton, North Dakota. That includes improved tank
    car safety, oil classification, and rail operations. And on the
    operations side, I'm just not convinced that a voluntary, opt-in
    initiative is enough to hold bad actors accountable, considering the
    potential consequences of a derailment in one of our population
    centers.
        What penalties exist for railroads that don't sign the voluntary
    agreement?
        Answer. All Class I railroads have signed the voluntary agreement.

        Question 2. What penalties exist for railroads that opt-in to the
    voluntary agreement, and then violate it (whether they cause an
    accident or not)?
        Answer. The voluntary steps that were agreed to by freight
    railroads are memorialized in a letter of agreement to DOT containing
    the details of the steps. The signatures of the senior railroad
    officials affixed to the letter affirm the individual railroads' firm
    commitment to abide by the terms of the agreement. AAR does not expect
    there to be any compliance issues, but FRA inspectors can monitor
    compliance and FRA can undertake additional measures if compliance
    issues arise.

        Question 3. If industry is behind these voluntary procedures--do
    you believe we should be thinking about making them into a statute, or
    imposing fines for violating them?
        Answer. There would be no safety advantage. Class I signatories
    will comply and FRA can monitor compliance.

        Question 4. If no, why not?
        Answer. There would be no safety advantage.

        Question 5. If the good actors are already opting-in, does making
    the voluntary standards into law come at a cost?
        Answer. All Class I railroads have signed the voluntary agreement.

        Question 6. If accidents keep occurring even once this agreement is
    fully implemented, is your industry prepared to go further to reduce
    risk?
        Answer. There is every reason to expect the measures undertaken
    will reduce the probability of a crude oil release.

        Question 7. Mr. Hamberger, I think we are all pleased that your
    industry is working on new, specialized crude-by-rail training as part
    of the voluntary operating agreement. I believe that includes tuition
    assistance for 1,500 first responders to attend training in Colorado in
    2014. Obviously, there are a lot of communities, probably hundreds in
    Washington state, that are affected by crude traffic--so I'm a little
    worried that 1,500 nationwide is only a drop in the bucket.
        In Washington, rail lines run through the heart of our biggest
    cities--so this issue really hits home to my constituents. They want to
    see this product moving safely, and they want to know that their first
    responders have received adequate training from industry experts on how
    to respond.
        Has the industry considered making a commitment to extending
    additional funding for future years, to ensure that this training
    reaches a large number of first responders? If no, why not?
        Answer. It is important to understand that the training at TTCI
    represents only a fraction of the railroads' commitment to emergency
    response training. Railroads have a long history of working closely
    with state and local emergency first responders and emergency planners
    in many different ways. In addition, each year, railroads actively
    train well over 20,000 emergency responders throughout the country.
    This training ranges from general awareness training to much more in-
    depth offerings. The precise parameters of these emergency response
    training programs vary from railroad to railroad.
        Local responders should take advantage of the variety of
    opportunities railroads provide. These consist of a combination of some
    or all of the following:

            Safety Trains. Several railroads utilize ``hazmat safety
            trains'' and other training equipment that travel from
            community to community to allow for hands-on training for local
            first responders.

            Training Centers. Several railroads operate centralized hazmat
            training sites where they train employees, first responders,
            customers, and other railroad industry personnel in all aspects
            of dealing with hazmat incidents.

            Local Firehouse Visits. In aggregate, railroads visit hundreds
            of local firehouses each year to provide classroom and face-to-
            face hazmat training.

            Table Top Drills. Railroads regularly partner with local
            emergency responders to conduct simulations of emergency
            situations in which general problems and procedures in the
            context of an emergency scenario are discussed. The focus is on
            training and familiarization with roles, procedures, and
            responsibilities.

            Self-Study Training Courses. Railroads make available self-
            study programs for emergency responders that allow students to
            learn proper procedures at their own pace.

        Some railroads also provide related web-based training on hazmat
    and general rail safety issues.
        Railroads also regularly provide hazardous materials training to
    their customers and short line railroad partners. These comprehensive
    rail industry efforts point to the seriousness with which railroads
    take their responsibilities regarding the safety of the communities
    they serve.

        Question 8. Mr. Hamberger, as you know, especially in the West, we
    have freight rail lines running through the hearts of our cities--
    Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma, and Vancouver, just to name a few in my
    state. That makes my constituents concerned when they look at crude
    moving by rail. Consequences could be very high if there was to be a
    derailment in one of our population centers.
        What is your industry doing to invest in these population centers,
    far from the Bakken? I don't mean just normal maintenance. But is the
    railroad industry developing new standards for track and track types
    for areas where track runs through cities? Put another way: is there an
    engineering solution (not operations) you are developing as an industry
    to substantially lower the risk of any derailment in population
    centers?
        Answer. While railroading today seems similar to railroading 150
    years ago, this apparent similarity masks a widespread application of
    modern technology and a huge variety of ongoing initiatives to
    research, test, and apply advanced technologies to yield the safety
    record of continuous improvement experienced by the railroad industry.
        Many of these advancements were developed or refined at the
    Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), the finest rail research
    facility in the world, in Pueblo, Colorado. TTCI is a wholly owned
    subsidiary of the AAR. Forty-eight miles of test tracks, highly
    sophisticated testing equipment, metallurgy labs, simulators, and other
    diagnostic tools are used to test track structure, evaluate freight car
    and locomotive performance, assess component reliability, and much
    more.
        A few of the many examples of safety-enhancing rail technologies
    developed at TTCI or elsewhere that have come into widespread use or
    are in the process of being implemented include: wayside detectors that
    identify defects on passing rail cars, including overheated bearings
    and damaged wheels, dragging hoses, deteriorating bearings, cracked
    wheels, and excessively high and wide loads; internal rail inspection
    systems using induction or ultrasonic technology to detect internal
    flaws in rails which are caused by fatigue and impurities introduced
    during manufacturing; track geometry vehicles that use electronic and
    optical instruments to inspect track alignment, gauge, curvature, and
    other track conditions; ground-penetrating radar that helps identify
    problems (such as excessive water penetration and deteriorated ballast)
    that hinder track stability; and positive train control systems that
    are designed to automatically stop or slow a train before certain
    accidents occur. Railroads and their suppliers will continue to pursue
    these and other technological advances that make rail transportation
    safer and more secure.
        Separately, in response to USDOT Secretary Foxx's challenge to the
    rail industry to identify steps that might be taken to address the new
    and unique challenges associated with crude oil transportation, the
    industry announced in February 2014:

       Effective March 25, 2014, railroads began performing one
            additional internal-rail inspection each year above those
            required by new FRA regulations on main line routes over which
            trains moving 20 or more carloads of crude oil travel.
            Railroads will also conduct at least two high-tech track
            geometry inspections each year on main line routes over which
            trains with 20 or more loaded cars of crude oil are moving.

       Not later than July 1, 2014 railroads will begin installing
            additional wayside wheel bearing detectors if they are not
            already in place every 40 miles along tracks with trains
            carrying 20 or more crude oil cars, as other safety factors
            allow.

        Question 9. Mr. Hamberger, a number of commodity groups and
    shippers have come into my office in recent months with concerns that
    increasing crude-by-rail shipments is negatively impacting their
    businesses.
        This includes service issues regarding: (1) timely delivery of
    their products, (2) timely availability of rail cars, or (3) reduced
    rail capacity for non-crude shipments in a way that appears to
    eliminate rail as a viable transportation alternative. These concerns
    come on top of significant delays--in part caused by crude-by-rail
    growth and congestion--to the Amtrak Empire Builder between Seattle/
    Portland and Chicago. What steps is the rail industry taking to ensure
    sufficient access and reliable service for the broad range of commodity
    groups that have historically relied on rail service?
        Answer. The recent winter presented rail service challenges that
    were far worse than usual in many parts of the country. Railroads are
    working around the clock to overcome these challenges. It remains the
    railroads' goal to provide service at the high levels their customers
    expect.
        Having said this, AAR projects that the Nation's freight railroads
    will spend approximately $26 billion in 2014 to build, maintain, and
    upgrade their nationwide rail network. This year's projected record
    investments continue a decades-long trend of private railroad dollars
    that sustain America's freight rail network. The result is a rail
    network that is the best in the world, serving and expanding to meet
    both freight and passenger railroads.
        Freight railroads have invested approximately $550 billion of their
    own money into the rail network since 1980, including $118 billion in
    the past five years alone. From upgrades to bridges and tunnels to new
    tracks and facilities, freight rail infrastructure is constantly
    maintained and upgraded to meet the demands of an evolving economy.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
                              Edward R. Hamberger
        Question 1. The industry has been very cooperative with regulators
    throughout this process, and has even asked for the regulators to issue
    rules to give them more certainty. It is not often that you have an
    industry calling for more regulation. It is even rarer that the
    regulators don't response quickly to give the industry the certainty it
    needs. Related to this issue, can you tell me what areas of concern you
    have regarding the upcoming rules? Do you think that PHMSA and the FRA
    could go too far in responding to derailment Casselton? Are you
    convinced the regulators are on the right track? Or is it too early to
    know?
        Answer. Since DOT has not issued a notice of proposed rulemaking,
    AAR does not know the direction DOT might go in.

        Question 2. Can you please outline the steps the railroad industry
    has committed to taking in order to improve rail safety?
        Answer. The nation's major freight railroads recently joined
    Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx in announcing a rail operations
    safety initiative that will institute new voluntary operating practices
    for moving crude oil by rail. Additional issues relating to the safe
    transport of crude oil discussed in January with Secretary Foxx, such
    as tank car standards and proper shipper classification of crude oil,
    are being addressed separately. The voluntary initiative addresses
    crude by rail safety in eight important areas: routing analysis for
    crude trains; lowering crude train speeds in some areas; accident
    prevention through inspections; accident prevention with additional
    wayside technology; local emergency responder training and tuition
    assistance; railroad emergency response capabilities; and braking
    systems.

        Question 3. Will these changes be costly? And will they ultimately
    be passed on to your customers?
        Answer. Railroads take the challenge of moving the Nation's crude
    oil extremely seriously, and they recognize that improving safety is an
    ongoing process. Railroads are proud that their overall safety record,
    as measured by FRA data, has been trending in the right direction for
    decades. Having said this, AAR has no estimate of the cost of these
    changes.

        Question 4. To what extent do the different railroads disagree on
    what needs to be done to improve rail shipment of crude?
        Answer. There is no disagreement. Class I railroads all agree that
    actions falling into three categories are necessary to continue to
    improve safety. They are: accident prevention, consequence mitigation
    and emergency response. Likewise, Class I railroads all signed the
    recent letter of agreement with DOT laying out a series of voluntary
    crude oil action items.

        Question 5. If the railroads agree to industry wide standards to
    enhance the safety of the shipments of crude, will the industry have
    any issue with the regulators following the lead of industry in
    mandating these standards through rulemaking?
        Answer. Nothing in the voluntary crude oil agreement with USDOT
    would preclude the government from issuing additional safety
    regulations at any time. However, there is an advantage to industry
    standards. Industry can update its standards much quicker than DOT can
    change its standards. Thus, industry standards can offer the public a
    safety advantage where feasible.