[Senate Hearing 113-374]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-374
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine
Peter K. Levine, Staff Director
John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
april 18, 2013
Page
Clapper, Hon. James R., Jr., Director of National Intelligence... 5
Flynn, LTG Michael T., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 31
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, King, Inhofe, McCain, Ayotte, Graham, and
Cruz.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason W.
Maroney, Counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff
member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
William S. Castle, minority general counsel; Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: John L. Principato, Bradley S.
Watson, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Mara Boggs and Patrick Hayes,
assistants to Senator Manchin; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant
to Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator
Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton
IV and Elizabeth Lopez, assistants to Senator McCain; T. Finch
Fulton and Lenwood Landrum, assistants to Senator Sessions;
Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Brad Bowman,
assistant to Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator
Graham; and Brooke Bacak, assistant to Senator Cruz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to hear from the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), the Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.; and
from Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), on current and future
worldwide threats to our national security. The DIA along with
the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office,
and the intelligence components of the Military Services, are
parts of the Department of Defense (DOD) that are also elements
of the Intelligence Community (IC) that Director Clapper heads.
Director Clapper, while much of the information that you
provide to policymakers, including Members of Congress, cannot
be shared with the public because of its sensitivity and
classification, the people who elected us to serve deserve the
best information that we can publicly provide them. So we're
glad that you and General Flynn are with us this morning to do
just that.
Among the challenges that we face is a self-inflicted
wound, one with effects that Director Clapper has rightly said
amplify the other threats that we confront around the world.
That challenge is the unprioritized cuts required by
sequestration. This committee is interested in hearing from
both of you today about the impact of the fiscal year 2013
sequestration and the impact that it is having on the IC's
ability to provide us with the timely and the accurate
information that we need for our national security.
This self-inflicted wound is all the more unfortunate
because our national security professionals already have plenty
to worry about. As the most open and interconnected society on
Earth, the United States is uniquely vulnerable to attacks on
computer networks that are critical to our economy, to the
provision of public services, and to national security. Hostile
nations such as Iran and North Korea are clearly trying to
acquire offensive capabilities in cyber space and are widely
believed already to be responsible for some such attacks.
China and Russia possess formidable capabilities for cyber
theft, such as the theft of valuable intellectual property, as
well as the more traditional areas of espionage such as spying
on our military weapons systems, plans, and capabilities.
China, in particular, appears to observe no limits on the theft
of American commercial technology. That cyber theft is a threat
that cannot be tolerated, and I hope we'll hear from our
witnesses about the extent of the problem and the steps that we
can and should take to counter it.
In the Asia-Pacific region, another round of belligerence
from the dictatorial regime in North Korea has caused concern
here in the United States and among our allies in the Pacific.
That regime has announced its intention to resume plutonium
production, has tested a nuclear device in February that
appears to have had a greater yield than previous tests, and
has threatened at any time to launch a missile that could
further exacerbate tensions.
We have read about conflicting intelligence assessments of
North Korea's ability to put a nuclear warhead on a long-range
missile. We hope our witnesses will be able to clear that issue
up.
In the Middle East, Iran continues to flout the
international community in pursuit of a nuclear program that is
a significant challenge to our Nation and to most of the world.
While a diplomatic arrangement in which Iran joins, or rejoins,
the responsible community of nations remains the preferred
outcome, obviously, there is a consensus in much of the world
that a nuclear-armed Iran is not acceptable, and that all
options must remain on the table to prevent such an outcome. We
look forward to our witnesses' assessment of Iran's nuclear
program, the impact of international sanctions on Iran, the
significance of the upcoming Iranian elections, and related
issues.
Yesterday afternoon we received an update from the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) on the situation in Syria. That situation
continues to grow worse by the day, with an estimated 75,000
dead and a population of refugees and internally displaced
Syrians now running in the millions.
Yesterday the Secretary and the Chairman indicated that
questions about issues like Syria's use of chemical weapons,
the nature and composition of the Syrian opposition, and the
extent of the times between the al Nusra Front and al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) would be better directed to today's witnesses.
Syria is just one of many Arab or Muslim nations
experiencing rapid political change and upheaval. While the
rise of long-oppressed citizens of these nations holds promise,
we've also seen in Libya, Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere that it
can also have undesired effects. Our witnesses' assessment of
this phenomenon and the challenges and opportunities that it
presents us would be very welcome.
We've been engaged for more than a decade now in
Afghanistan and, despite the media's focus on the negative,
there are real signs of progress. Afghan forces are
increasingly taking the fight to the Taliban on their own and
plans to end our major combat presence there by 2014 are on
track.
The greatest challenge to Afghanistan's security isn't the
Taliban, but the Pakistan-based sanctuaries for militant
extremists launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. I
hope our witnesses can provide us with their assessment of
whether there is any evidence of a growing Pakistani
willingness to take action against the Afghan Taliban, which
has been given sanctuary in Pakistan.
A common thread connecting many troubled areas of the world
is illicit trafficking of people, weapons, drugs, and money.
From weapons trafficking in North Africa that has helped
empower al Qaeda there to Iran's network of terrorist and
criminal organizations that enable its reckless pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability, those flows directly threaten our
national security and the world's well-being. Our government
has not yet fully developed an effective range of tools to
identify and disrupt such networks, particularly with regard to
facilitation and financing mechanisms.
Our witnesses this morning hold vital positions in helping
us assess, understand, and counter these and other threats. We
are grateful for your service, for your advice, as we consider
the President's budget request.
Before I ask Senator Inhofe for his opening remarks, let me
remind everyone that if necessary a closed session will be held
following the open portion of this hearing.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the reasons my opening remarks are always shorter is
because I cross off things that you've already said and that
dramatically shortens mine, because I am in total agreement
with your comments, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our witnesses for
being here.
The hearing comes at a time when our Nation's security is
being challenged like never before. When you look around the
world today, the inability and violence raging throughout North
Africa, Central Africa, and the Middle East, rising tensions in
the Korean Peninsula, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to deliver it, and
the growing cyber threats against our infrastructure, it's hard
to take seriously the President's claim that the tide of war is
receding. I'm greatly concerned that such claims underlie the
foundation of this administration's naive view of the world.
It's driving the administration's misguided search for a
peace dividend that I don't believe exists. We went through
that once before back in the 1990s. I always remember that
discussion. It's driving drastic cuts to our military that
undermine readiness and capabilities, and it's driving
reductions to our nuclear arsenal at a time when our
adversaries are expanding theirs and we should be expanding
ours.
Further, the cuts associated with sequestration are having
a significant impact on the capabilities and the reach of our
IC just at a time when we are really needing it the most.
Director Clapper, when asked about the effects of sequestration
on the IC, you stated--and I will quote now and I've quoted you
several times on this; I think it's very profound: ``We're
cutting real capability and accepting greater risk. For
intelligence, this is not quite like shorter hours for public
parks or longer lines at the airports. For intelligence, it's
insidious. The capability we cut out today, you won't know
about that until you notice it. The public won't notice it. You
will notice it only when we have a failure.''
I believe in that, and that's the reason for this hearing
today. That's exactly what I'm concerned about. Not only will
our military be less prepared to deal with growing threats
around the world, but we know less and less about the true
nature of these threats as our IC loses capability. We're going
down a foolhardy and dangerous path. It's out of touch with
reality and it's making America less safe.
I look to our witnesses to explain how the current budget
cuts will impact their ability to understand and accurately
assess these threats, particularly in places like Africa that
already suffer from a lack of resources. We've talked about the
lack of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in
Africa relative to other continents.
What this all comes down to is risk, and risk means lives,
and we're very much concerned about that. As the challenges to
our security and interests around the world are proliferating,
we're on track to cut over $1 trillion from our national
security budget. Contrary to the best wishes of some, the
threats to our security are growing, not decreasing. Again, the
issue there does affect American lives.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Director Clapper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.,
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Clapper. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee:
We're here to present the 2013 worldwide threat assessment,
although between the two statements much of this, I think, will
be repetitive. I'm joined today by my friend and colleague DIA
Director Lieutenant General Mike Flynn. These remarks and our
two statements for the record, one from each of us that is
unclassified, and a much more detailed classified one, reflect
the collective judgments of the extraordinary men and women of
the U.S. Intelligence Community.
As you alluded, the topic that's foremost on the minds of
the IC leadership this year is sequestration. I raise this in
this hearing because the effects of sequestration amplify and
magnify the threats that face this Nation. You haven't seen a
lot of public discourse on the impact of these indiscriminate
cuts on intelligence, so let me now be blunt for you and for
the American people. Sequestration forces the IC to reduce all
intelligence activities and functions without regard to impact
on our mission. In my considered judgment as the Nation's
senior intelligence officer, sequestration jeopardizes our
Nation's safety and security and this jeopardy will increase
over time.
Now, in response to this we started with the premise that
our mission comes first. Therefore, our two highest priorities
are: One, to protect our most valuable resource, our civilian
workforce, so it can focus on the threats we face; and two, to
support overseas operations.
Let me emphasize that we're not arguing against taking our
share of budget reductions. What I am saying is that we must
adjust to this budget crisis and sustain our vital missions,
but in doing so accept the inevitable risk that we're
incurring.
I must tell you, I've seen this movie before, as Senator
Inhofe alluded. 20 years ago I served as Director of DIA, the
job Mike Flynn has now, and we were then enjoined to reap the
peace dividend occasioned by the end of the Cold War. We
reduced the IC by about 23 percent. During the mid- and late-
1990s we closed many Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
stations, reduced human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, cut
analysts, allowed our overhead architecture to atrophy,
neglected basic infrastructure needs such as power, space, and
cooling, and let our facilities decay. Most damagingly, we
badly distorted the workforce.
All that, of course, was reversed in the wake of September
11. Thanks to the support of Congress, over the last decade
we've rebuilt the IC into the premier capability we have today.
But now if we're not careful we risk another damaging downward
spiral.
Just to repeat the quote, unlike more directly observable
sequestration impacts like shorter hours in the parks or longer
security lines at airports, the degradation to intelligence
will be insidious. It'll be gradual and almost invisible,
until, of course, we have an intelligence failure.
With that preface as a backdrop, let me turn now to a brief
wavetop review of global threat trends and challenges, many of
which, Chairman Levin, you've already alluded to. I will say
that in my almost 50 years of intelligence, I do not recall a
period in which we confronted a more diverse array of threats,
crises, and challenges around the world. To me at least, this
makes sequestration even more incongruous.
This year's threat assessment illustrates how dramatically
the world and our threat environment is changing. Threats are
more interconnected and viral. Events which at first blush seem
local and irrelevant can quickly set off transnational
disruptions that affect U.S. national interests.
I'd like to turn now to a few of the issues we identify in
our statements for the record. Our statements this year lead
with cyber. As more and more state and nonstate actors gain
cyber expertise, its importance and reach as a global threat
cannot be overstated.
This year our discussion of natural resources is also more
prominent because shifts in human geography, climate, disease,
and competition for natural resources have huge national
security implications. Many countries important to the U.S.
interests are living with extreme water and food stress that
can destabilize governments, force human migrations, and
trigger conflicts.
On the issue of terrorism, the threat from al Qaeda and the
potential for a massive coordinated attack on the United States
may be diminished, but the jihadist movement is more diffuse.
As the President stated on Tuesday about the Boston Marathon
bombing, we don't know yet whether the attack was planned and
executed by a terrorist organization, foreign or domestic, or
if it was an individual act. Lone wolves, domestic extremists,
and jihad-inspired or affiliated groups are certainly
determined to attack.
The turmoil in the Arab world has brought a spike in
threats to U.S. interests. The rise of new governments in
Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya, along with ongoing unrest in
Syria and Mali, provide openings for opportunistic individuals
and groups. In these and other regions of the world, extremists
can take advantage of diminished counterterrorism capabilities,
porous borders, easy availability of weapons, and internal
stresses, most especially a high proportion of unemployed,
frustrated young males who deeply resent our power, wealth, and
culture.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development and
proliferation is another persistent threat to U.S. interests.
As you alluded, North Korea has already demonstrated
capabilities that threaten the United States and the security
environment in East Asia. North Korea announced in February
that it conducted a third nuclear test and vowed to restart its
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, and last year about this time
displayed what appears to be a road-mobile ICBM.
We believe Pyongyang has already taken initial steps
towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. It
also used its Taepoedong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in
orbit in December, thus demonstrating its long-range missile
technology. These developments have been accompanied with
extremely belligerent, aggressive public rhetoric toward the
United States and South Korea.
North Korea has not, however, fully developed, tested, or
demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a
nuclear-armed missile. Characterizing such capabilities for us
in intelligence is a complex and nuanced process requiring
sophisticated and highly technical analysis. It is indeed
rocket science. We're dealing with many shades of grey here,
not black and white.
I'll digress here briefly to comment on last week's
revelation of a DIA assessment on North Korean nuclear weapons
capabilities. The statement in question was one sentence in a
seven-page classified report and was mistakenly miscategorized
as unclassified. But this revelation is illustrative of the
standard dilemma we face in the IC in portraying what we know
to be fact in contrast to what we attempt to impute from those
facts.
We lack uniform agreement on assessing many things in North
Korea. Its actual nuclear capabilities are no exception. As DIA
or others in the IC have similar or differing positions, there
can also be varying degrees of confidence in those positions.
This is where the subtleties really play havoc with certitude.
For those looking to find infighting within the IC on North
Korea, I'm sorry to disappoint. To the contrary, this reflects
an integrated, collaborative, and competitive analysis process
that's open to all views.
We are, by the way, in the process of generating an IC
assessment on this matter, which will formally engage all
members of the IC. If we all agree, great. If we don't, that's
healthy, too. We will clearly portray the various views of the
community to our consumers, to include Consumer No. 1.
DIA is a crucial part of the IC and its views are valued
and respected. I say this having proudly served as its director
2 decades ago. I have confidence in the agency, its great
people, and its current Director, Mike Flynn. He and I would
welcome the opportunity to discuss details of this with you
further in closed session.
I make this request in the interest of both protecting the
fragile intelligence we do have on North Korea as well as
avoiding further advancement of Kim Jung Un's narrative by yet
more public discussion and media hyperventilation. As I can
attest, another hard-won lesson: Adversaries watch these
proceedings, too.
Let me again add some historical perspective. While I
served as Director of NGA in the early 2000s, I put my
fingerprints on the infamous National Intelligence Estimate on
WMD in Iraq published almost 10 years ago. Afterwards the
community was roundly criticized for group-think for not
vetting sources, for not questioning assumptions, for
suppressing dissent, and for dismissing alternative views. So
we've learned some hard lessons from that experience, I can
assure you. That all said, the IC continues to monitor
developments in anticipation of North Korea's next provocative
step.
Moving elsewhere, Iran continues to develop technical
expertise in uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors,
weaponization, and ballistic missiles from which it could draw
if it decides to build missile-deliverable weapons, nuclear
weapons. Clearly, Tehran has the scientific, technical, and
industrial capacity to produce them. So the central issue is
its political will to do so. Such a decision, we believe, will
be made by the Supreme Leader and, at this point, we don't know
if he'll eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.
The United States and our allies are tracking Syria's
munitions stockpiles, particularly its chemical and biological
warfare agents, which are all part of a large, complex, and
geographically dispersed program. Its advanced chemical weapons
program has the potential to inflict mass casualties. The
increasingly beleaguered regime, having found that its
escalation of violence through conventional means is not
working, appears quite willing to use chemical weapons against
its own people. All the worse, nongovernmental groups or
individuals in Syria could also gain access to such materials.
We receive many claims of chemical warfare use in Syria
each day and we take them all seriously and we do all we can to
investigate them. We can't provide additional details on these
efforts in this setting, to protect the fragile critical
intelligence we need to assess the situation, but we certainly
can talk about this in closed session.
Looking at geographic threats around the world, some
nations in the Mideast and North Africa are making progress
towards democratic rule, but most are experiencing violence and
political backsliding. In Iran, leaders are exploiting the
unrest in the Arab world to spread influence and undermine the
United States and our allies. But Tehran also faces a worsening
financial outlook and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria
would be a huge strategic loss for Iran.
In Iraq, tensions are rising between the majority Shia and
the minority Sunni, as well as with the Kurds. To this point,
AQI has not mustered the strength yet to overwhelm Iraqi
security forces and Iraq is producing and exporting oil at its
highest levels in 2 decades.
Islamic actors have been the chief beneficiaries of the
political openings in Islamist parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and
Morocco and they'll probably solidify their influence this
year.
After more than 2 years of conflict in Syria, the erosion
of the regime's capabilities is accelerating. We see this in
its territorial losses, military manpower shortfalls, and
logistics deficiencies. The opposition is slowly but surely
gaining the upper hand. Assad's days are numbered. We just
don't know the exact number.
The regime's aggressive violence and the deteriorating
security conditions have led to increased civilian casualties,
now estimated at at least 70,000. The violence and economic
dislocation have also led to approximately 3.6 million Syrians
being displaced and a further 1.3 million refugees having fled
Syria, which intensifies the pressure on its neighbors.
Egyptian elections, originally scheduled for this month,
will now probably be pushed to the fall. The longer they are
postponed, the greater the potential for more public
dissatisfaction, even violence in the streets, particularly
against the backdrop of Egypt's profound economic challenges.
In sub-Saharan Africa, we're monitoring unresolved discord
between Sudan and South Sudan, fighting in Somalia, extremist
attacks in Nigeria, the collapse of governance in northern
Mali, and renewed conflict in the Great Lakes region. Mali's
security hinges on France's efforts to undermine terrorist
networks in the region, as well as by efforts by the African-
led International Support Mission to Mali or by future United
Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. West African countries
have deployed troops to help stabilize northern Mali.
Moving to Asia, the Taliban-led insurgency has diminished
in some areas of Afghanistan, but it is still resilient and
capable of challenging U.S. and international goals. The
coalition drawdown will have an impact on Afghanistan's
economy, which is likely to decline after 2014. In Pakistan,
the government has not instituted much-needed policy and tax
reforms, and the country faces no real prospects for
sustainable economic growth. On a somewhat more positive note,
this past year the armed forces continued their operations in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which have been
safe havens for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan has
established national provincial assembly elections for May 11
that will mark an historic first if they transition to the new
government peacefully.
In China, last month Xi Jinping became president. His
country continues to supplement its growing and impressive
military capabilities by bolstering maritime law enforcement to
support its claims and the South and East China Seas.
Russia will continue to resist putting more international
pressure on Syria or Iran. It will also continue to display
great sensitivity to missile defense.
Closer to home, despite positive trends toward democracy
and economic development, Latin America and the Caribbean
contend with weak institutions, slow recovery from devastating
natural disasters, and drug-related violence and trafficking.
In Venezuela, the presidential election occurred 4 days ago to
decide a 6-year term in the wake of former President Chavez's
death in early March. Officially announced results indicate
ruling party candidate Nicolas Madura won in a narrow victory.
So in sum, given the magnitude and complexity of our global
responsibilities, insightful, persistent, and comprehensive
intelligence, at least in my mind, has never been more
important or more urgent. So I have trouble reconciling this
imperative with sequestration.
With that, I thank you for your attention and now turn to
General Flynn for his statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. James R. Clapper, Jr.
Introduction
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the U.S. Intelligence
Community's 2013 assessment of threats to U.S. national security. My
statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence
Community's extraordinary men and women, whom it is my privilege and
honor to lead.
This year, in both content and organization, this statement
illustrates how quickly and radically the world--and our threat
environment--are changing. This environment is demanding reevaluations
of the way we do business, expanding our analytic envelope, and
altering the vocabulary of intelligence. Threats are more diverse,
interconnected, and viral than at any time in history. Attacks, which
might involve cyber and financial weapons, can be deniable and
unattributable. Destruction can be invisible, latent, and progressive.
We now monitor shifts in human geography, climate, disease, and
competition for natural resources because they fuel tensions and
conflicts. Local events that might seem irrelevant are more likely to
affect U.S. national security in accelerated timeframes.
In this threat environment, the importance and urgency of
intelligence integration cannot be overstated. Our progress cannot
stop. The Intelligence Community must continue to promote collaboration
among experts in every field, from the political and social sciences to
natural sciences, medicine, military issues, and space. Collectors and
analysts need vision across disciplines to understand how and why
developments--and both state and unaffiliated actors--can spark sudden
changes with international implications.
The Intelligence Community is committed every day to providing the
nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, diplomats,
warfighters, and international and domestic law enforcement need to
protect American lives and America's interests anywhere in the world.
Information as of 7 March 2013 was used in the preparation of this
assessment.
Global Threats
cyber
We are in a major transformation because our critical
infrastructures, economy, personal lives, and even basic understanding
of--and interaction with--the world are becoming more intertwined with
digital technologies and the Internet. In some cases, the world is
applying digital technologies faster than our ability to understand the
security implications and mitigate potential risks.
State and nonstate actors increasingly exploit the Internet to
achieve strategic objectives, while many governments--shaken by the
role the Internet has played in political instability and regime
change--seek to increase their control over content in cyberspace. The
growing use of cyber capabilities to achieve strategic goals is also
outpacing the development of a shared understanding of norms of
behavior, increasing the chances for miscalculations and
misunderstandings that could lead to unintended escalation.
Compounding these developments are uncertainty and doubt as we face
new and unpredictable cyber threats. In response to the trends and
events that happen in cyberspace, the choices we and other actors make
in coming years will shape cyberspace for decades to come, with
potentially profound implications for U.S. economic and national
security.
In the United States, we define cyber threats in terms of cyber
attacks and cyber espionage. A cyber attack is a non-kinetic offensive
operation intended to create physical effects or to manipulate,
disrupt, or delete data. It might range from a denial-of-service
operation that temporarily prevents access to a website, to an attack
on a power turbine that causes physical damage and an outage lasting
for days. Cyber espionage refers to intrusions into networks to access
sensitive diplomatic, military, or economic information.
Increasing Risk to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
We judge that there is a remote chance of a major cyber attack
against U.S. critical infrastructure systems during the next 2 years
that would result in long-term, wide-scale disruption of services, such
as a regional power outage. The level of technical expertise and
operational sophistication required for such an attack--including the
ability to create physical damage or overcome mitigation factors like
manual overrides--will be out of reach for most actors during this
timeframe. Advanced cyber actors--such as Russia and China--are
unlikely to launch such a devastating attack against the United States
outside of a military conflict or crisis that they believe threatens
their vital interests.
However, isolated state or nonstate actors might deploy less
sophisticated cyber attacks as a form of retaliation or provocation.
These less advanced but highly motivated actors could access some
poorly protected U.S. networks that control core functions, such as
power generation, during the next 2 years, although their ability to
leverage that access to cause high-impact, systemic disruptions will
probably be limited. At the same time, there is a risk that
unsophisticated attacks would have significant outcomes due to
unexpected system configurations and mistakes, or that vulnerability at
one node might spill over and contaminate other parts of a networked
system.
Within the past year, in a denial-of-service campaign
against the public websites of multiple U.S. banks and stock
exchanges, actors flooded servers with traffic and prevented
some customers from accessing their accounts via the Internet
for a limited period, although the attacks did not alter
customers' accounts or affect other financial functions.
In an August 2012 attack against Saudi oil company
Aramco, malicious actors rendered more than 30,000 computers on
Aramco's business network unusable. The attack did not impair
production capabilities.
Eroding U.S. Economic and National Security
Foreign intelligence and security services have penetrated numerous
computer networks of U.S. Government, business, academic, and private
sector entities. Most detected activity has targeted unclassified
networks connected to the Internet, but foreign cyber actors are also
targeting classified networks. Importantly, much of the Nation's
critical proprietary data are on sensitive but unclassified networks;
the same is true for most of our closest allies.
We assess that highly networked business practices and
information technology are providing opportunities for foreign
intelligence and security services, trusted insiders, hackers,
and others to target and collect sensitive U.S. national
security and economic data. This is almost certainly allowing
our adversaries to close the technological gap between our
respective militaries, slowly neutralizing one of our key
advantages in the international arena.
It is very difficult to quantify the value of
proprietary technologies and sensitive business information
and, therefore, the impact of economic cyber espionage
activities. However, we assess that economic cyber espionage
will probably allow the actors who take this information to
reap unfair gains in some industries.
Information Control and Internet Governance
Online information control is a key issue among the United States
and other actors. However, some countries, including Russia, China, and
Iran, focus on ``cyber influence'' and the risk that Internet content
might contribute to political instability and regime change. The United
States focuses on cyber security and the risks to the reliability and
integrity of our networks and systems. This is a fundamental difference
in how we define cyber threats.
The current multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance provides
a forum for governments, the commercial sector, academia, and civil
society to deliberate and reach consensus on Internet organization and
technical standards. However, a movement to reshape Internet governance
toward a national government-based model would contradict many of our
policy goals, particularly those to protect freedom of expression and
the free flow of online information and ensure a free marketplace for
information technology products and services.
These issues were a core part of the discussions as
countries negotiated a global telecommunications treaty in
Dubai in December. The contentious new text that resulted led
many countries, including the United States, not to sign the
treaty because of its language on network security, spam
control, and expansion of the U.N.'s role in Internet
governance. The negotiations demonstrated that disagreements on
these issues will be long-running challenges in bilateral and
multilateral engagements.
Internet governance revision based on the state-management model
could result in international regulations over online content,
restricted exchange of information across borders, substantial slowdown
of technical innovation, and increased opportunities for foreign
intelligence and surveillance operations on the Internet in the near
term.
Other Actors
We track cyber developments among nonstate actors, including
terrorist groups, hacktivists, and cyber criminals. We have seen
indications that some terrorist organizations have heightened interest
in developing offensive cyber capabilities, but they will probably be
constrained by inherent resource and organizational limitations and
competing priorities.
Hacktivists continue to target a wide range of companies and
organizations in denial-of-service attacks, but we have not observed a
significant change in their capabilities or intentions during the last
year. Most hacktivists use short-term denial-of-service operations or
expose personally identifiable information held by target companies, as
forms of political protest. However, a more radical group might form to
inflict more systemic impacts--such as disrupting financial networks--
or accidentally trigger unintended consequences that could be
misinterpreted as a state-sponsored attack.
Cybercriminals also threaten U.S. economic interests. They are
selling tools, via a growing black market, that might enable access to
critical infrastructure systems or get into the hands of state and
nonstate actors. In addition, a handful of commercial companies sell
computer intrusion kits on the open market. These hardware and software
packages can give governments and cybercriminals the capability to
steal, manipulate, or delete information on targeted systems. Even more
companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to support
cyber operations--often branding these tools as lawful-intercept or
defensive security research products. Foreign governments already use
some of these tools to target U.S. systems.
terrorism and transnational organized crime
Terrorism
Terrorist threats are in a transition period as the global jihadist
movement becomes increasingly decentralized. In addition, the Arab
Spring has generated a spike in threats to U.S. interests in the region
that likely will endure until political upheaval stabilizes and
security forces regain their capabilities. We also face uncertainty
about potential threats from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, which see the
United States and Israel as their principal enemies.
Evolving Homeland Threat Landscape
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Attacks on U.S. soil will
remain part of AQAP's transnational strategy; the group continues to
adjust its tactics, techniques and procedures for targeting the West.
AQAP leaders will have to weigh the priority they give to U.S. plotting
against other internal and regional objectives, as well as the extent
to which they have individuals who can manage, train, and deploy
operatives for U.S. operations.
Al Qaeda-Inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE). Al Qaeda-
inspired HVEs--whom we assess will continue to be involved in fewer
than 10 domestic plots per year--will be motivated to engage in violent
action by global jihadist propaganda, including English-language
material, such as AQAP's Inspire magazine; events in the United States
or abroad perceived as threatening to Muslims; the perceived success of
other HVE plots, such as the November 2009 attack at Fort Hood, TX, and
the March 2012 attacks by an al Qaeda-inspired extremist in Toulouse,
France; and their own grievances. HVE planning in 2012 was consistent
with tactics and targets seen in previous HVE plots and showed
continued interest in improvised explosive devices (IED) and U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) targets.
Core al Qaeda. Senior personnel losses in 2012, amplifying losses
and setbacks since 2008, have degraded core al Qaeda to a point that
the group is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks
in the west. However, the group has held essentially the same strategic
goals since its initial public declaration of war against the United
States in 1996, and to the extent that the group endures, its leaders
will not abandon the aspiration to attack inside the United States.
The Global Jihadist Threat Overseas: Affiliates, Allies, and
Sympathizers
In 2011, al Qaeda and its affiliates played little or no role in
the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa and, with the
exception of AQAP, were not well positioned to take advantage of
events. At the same time, the rise of new or transitional governments
in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya, and ongoing unrest in Syria and
Mali, have offered opportunities for established affiliates, aspiring
groups, and like-minded individuals to conduct attacks against U.S.
interests. Weakened or diminished counterterrorism capabilities, border
control mechanisms, internal security priorities, and other
shortcomings in these countries--combined with anti-U.S. grievances or
triggering events--will sustain the threats to U.S. interests
throughout the region. The dispersed and decentralized nature of the
terrorist networks active in the region highlights that the threat to
U.S. and Western interests overseas is more likely to be unpredictable.
The 2012 attack on the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and the 2013
attack on Algeria's In-Amenas oil facility demonstrate the threat to
U.S. interests from splinter groups, ad hoc coalitions, or individual
terrorists who can conduct anti-U.S. operations, even in the absence of
official direction or guidance from leaders of established al Qaeda
affiliates.
Al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) goals inside Iraq will almost
certainly take precedence over U.S. plotting, but the group
will remain committed to al Qaeda's global ideology. Since the
2011 withdrawal of U.S. forces, AQI has conducted nearly
monthly, simultaneous, coordinated country-wide attacks against
government, security, and Shia civilian targets. AQI's Syria-
based network, the Nusrah Front, is one of the best organized
and most capable of the Sunni terrorist groups.
Somalia-based al-Shabaab will remain focused on local
and regional challenges, including its longstanding leadership
rivalries and its fights against forces from the Somali and
Ethiopian Governments and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). The group will probably also continue to plot attacks
designed to weaken regional adversaries, including targeting
U.S. and Western interests in East Africa.
Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM)
intentions and capability remain focused on local, U.S., and
Western interests in north and west Africa.
Nigeria-based Boko Haram will continue to select
targets for attacks to destabilize the country and advance its
extreme vision of Islamist rule.
Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayibba (LT) will continue to
be the most multifaceted and problematic of the Pakistani
militant groups. The group has the long-term potential to
evolve into a permanent and even HAMAS/Hizballah-like presence
in Pakistan.
Iran and Lebanese Hizballah
The failed 2011 plot against the Saudi Ambassador in Washington
shows that Iran may be more willing to seize opportunities to attack in
the United States in response to perceived offenses against the regime.
Iran is also an emerging and increasingly aggressive cyber actor.
However, we have not changed our assessment that Iran prefers to avoid
direct confrontation with the United States because regime preservation
is its top priority.
Hizballah's overseas terrorist activity has been focused on
Israel--an example is the Bulgarian Government's announcement that
Hizballah was responsible for the July 2012 bus bombing at the Burgas
airport that killed five Israeli citizens. We continue to assess that
the group maintains a strong anti-U.S. agenda but is reluctant to
confront the United States directly outside the Middle East.
Transnational Organized Crime
Transnational organized crime (TOC) networks erode good governance,
cripple the rule of law through corruption, hinder economic
competitiveness, steal vast amounts of money, and traffic millions of
people around the globe. (Cybercrime, an expanding for-profit TOC
enterprise, is addressed in the Cyber section.) TOC threatens U.S.
national interests in a number of ways:
Drug Activity. Drug trafficking is a major TOC threat to the United
States and emanates primarily from the Western Hemisphere. Mexico is
the dominant foreign producer of heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamines for the U.S. market. Colombia produces the
overwhelming majority of the cocaine that reaches the United States,
although the amount of cocaine available to U.S. consumers has
substantially decreased in the past 5 years due to Colombian
eradication and security efforts, U.S. transit zone interdiction and
capacity-building activities, and warfare among Mexican trafficking
organizations. However, high U.S. demand--still twice that of Europe--
the capacity of Colombia's remaining drug trafficking organizations,
and weak penal and judicial institutions suggest that Colombia's
decades-long struggle with the drug threat will continue for a number
of years. In addition to the threat inside the United States, the drug
trade undermines U.S. interests abroad; for example, it erodes
stability in West and North Africa and remains a significant source of
revenue for the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Facilitating Terrorist Activity. The Intelligence Community is
monitoring the expanding scope and diversity of ``facilitation
networks,'' which include semi-legitimate travel experts, attorneys,
and other types of professionals, as well as corrupt officials, who
provide support services to criminal and terrorist groups.
Money Laundering. The scope of worldwide money laundering is
subject to significant uncertainty but measures more than a trillion
dollars annually, often exploiting governments' difficulties
coordinating law enforcement across national boundaries. Criminals'
reliance on the U.S. dollar also exposes the U.S. financial system to
illicit financial flows. Inadequate anti-money laundering regulations,
lax enforcement of existing ones, misuse of front companies to obscure
those responsible for illicit flows, and new forms of electronic money
challenge international law enforcement efforts.
Corruption. Corruption exists at some level in all countries;
however, the interaction between government officials and TOC networks
is particularly pernicious in some countries. Among numerous examples,
we assess that Guinea-Bissau has become a narco-state, where
traffickers use the country as a transit hub with impunity; and in
Russia, the nexus among organized crime, some state officials, the
intelligence services, and business blurs the distinction between state
policy and private gain.
Human Trafficking. President Obama recently noted that upwards of
20 million human beings are being trafficked around the world. The U.S.
State Department and our law enforcement organizations have led U.S.
Government efforts against human trafficking, and the Intelligence
Community has increased collection and analytic efforts to support law
enforcement and the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.
Virtually every country in the world is a source, transit point, and/or
destination for individuals being trafficked.
For example, in 2012 a Ukrainian National was
sentenced to life-plus-20-years in prison for operating a human
trafficking organization that smuggled young Ukrainians into
the United States. For 7 years, he and his brothers arranged to
move unsuspecting immigrants through Mexico into the United
States. With debts of $10,000 to $50,000, victims were forced
to live in squalid conditions, enslaved, and subjected to rape,
beatings, and other forms of physical attack. Threats against
their families in Ukraine were used to dissuade them from
attempting to escape.
Environmental Crime. Illicit trade in wildlife, timber, and marine
resources constitutes a multi-billion dollar industry annually,
endangers the environment, and threatens to disrupt the rule of law in
important countries around the world. These criminal activities are
often part of larger illicit trade networks linking disparate actors--
from government and military personnel to members of insurgent groups
and transnational organized crime organizations.
weapons of mass destruction proliferation
Nation-state efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitute a major threat
to the security of our Nation, deployed troops, and allies. The
Intelligence Community is focused on the threat and destabilizing
effects of nuclear proliferation, proliferation of chemical and
biological warfare (CBW)-related materials, and development of WMD
delivery systems.
Traditionally, international agreements and diplomacy have deterred
most nation-states from acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapons, but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing
terrorist groups from doing so. The time when only a few states had
access to the most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and
chemical materials and technologies, almost always dual-use, move
easily in our globalized economy, as do the personnel with scientific
expertise to design and use them. The latest discoveries in the life
sciences also diffuse globally and rapidly.
Iran and North Korea Developing WMD-Applicable Capabilities
We assess Iran is developing nuclear capabilities to enhance its
security, prestige, and regional influence and give it the ability to
develop nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. We do not
know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.
Tehran has developed technical expertise in a number of areas--
including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic
missiles--from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-
deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen
our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial
capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central
issue its political will to do so.
Of particular note, Iran has made progress during the past year
that better positions it to produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU) using
its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, should it choose to do
so. Despite this progress, we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded
material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU before this activity is
discovered.
We judge Iran's nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit
approach, which offers the international community opportunities to
influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran's security,
prestige and influence, as well as the international political and
security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
In this context, we judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting
objectives. It wants to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities
and avoid severe repercussions--such as a military strike or regime
threatening sanctions.
We judge Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its
preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon, if one is ever
fielded. Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of delivering WMD. In
addition, Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites,
and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps--along
with a regime hostile toward the United States and our allies--provide
Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space-launch
vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM).
Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication
of its ballistic missile arsenal. Iran's growing ballistic missile
inventory and its domestic production of anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCM) and development of its first long-range land attack cruise
missile provide capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran
views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its
strategy to deter--and if necessary retaliate against--forces in the
region, including U.S. forces.
North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious
threat to the United States and to the security environment in East
Asia, a region with some of the world's largest populations,
militaries, and economies. North Korea's export of ballistic missiles
and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and
Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor,
destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation
activities. Despite the Six-Party Joint Statements issued in 2005 and
2007, in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer
nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the
possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology.
North Korea announced on 12 February that it conducted its third
nuclear test. It has also displayed what appears to be a road-mobile
ICBM and in December 2012 placed a satellite in orbit using its Taepo
Dong 2 launch vehicle. These programs demonstrate North Korea's
commitment to develop long-range missile technology that could pose a
direct threat to the United States, and its efforts to produce and
market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security
concerns.
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces,
North Korean leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. The
Intelligence Community has long assessed that, in Pyongyang's view, its
nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international
prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang's nuclear
doctrine or employment concepts. Although we assess with low confidence
that the North would only attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S.
forces or allies to preserve the Kim regime, we do not know what would
constitute, from the North's perspective, crossing that threshold.
WMD Security in Syria
We assess Syria has a highly active chemical warfare (CW) program
and maintains a stockpile of sulfur mustard, sarin, and VX. We assess
that Syria has a stockpile of munitions--including missiles, aerial
bombs, and possibly artillery rockets--that can be used to deliver CW
agents. Syria's overall CW program is large, complex, and
geographically dispersed, with sites for storage, production, and
preparation. This advanced CW program has the potential to inflict mass
casualties, and we assess that an increasingly beleaguered regime,
having found its escalation of violence through conventional means
inadequate, might be prepared to use CW against the Syrian people. In
addition, groups or individuals in Syria could gain access to CW-
related materials. The United States and our allies are monitoring
Syria's chemical weapons stockpile.
Based on the duration of Syria's longstanding biological warfare
(BW) program, we judge that some elements of the program may have
advanced beyond the research and development stage and may be capable
of limited agent production. Syria is not known to have successfully
weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery system, but it
possesses conventional and chemical weapon systems that could be
modified for biological agent delivery.
counterintelligence
Foreign intelligence services, along with terrorist groups,
transnational criminal organizations, and other nonstate actors, are
targeting and acquiring our national security information, undermining
our economic and technological advantages, and seeking to influence our
national policies and processes covertly. These foreign intelligence
efforts employ traditional methods of espionage and, with growing
frequency, innovative technical means. Among significant foreign
threats, Russia and China remain the most capable and persistent
intelligence threats and are aggressive practitioners of economic
espionage against the United States. Countering such foreign
intelligence threats is a top priority for the Intelligence Community
for the year ahead. Moreover, vulnerabilities in global supply chains
open opportunities for adversaries to exploit U.S. critical
infrastructure. (For a discussion of cyber espionage, see the Cyber
section.)
Threats to U.S. Government Supply Chains
The United States and other national economies have grown more
dependent on global networks of supply chains. These web-like
relationships, based on contracts and subcontracts for component parts,
services, and manufacturing, obscure transparency into those supply
chains. Additionally, reliance on foreign equipment, combined with a
contracting pool of suppliers in the information technology,
telecommunications, and energy sectors, creates opportunities for
exploitation of, and increased impact on, U.S. critical infrastructures
and systems.
Interdependence of information technologies and integration of
foreign technology in U.S. information technology, telecommunications,
and energy sectors will increase the potential scope and impact of
foreign intelligence and security services' supply chain operations.
The likely continued consolidation of infrastructure suppliers--which
means that critical infrastructures and networks will be built from a
more limited set of provider and equipment options--will also increase
the scope and impact of potential supply chain subversions.
counterspace
Space systems and their supporting infrastructures enable a wide
range of services, including communication; position, navigation, and
timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and
meteorology, which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific,
and economic benefits. Other nations recognize these benefits to the
United States and seek to counter the U.S. strategic advantage by
pursuing capabilities to deny or destroy our access to space services.
Threats to vital U.S. space services will increase during the next
decade as disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities are
developed. In 2007, China conducted a destructive antisatellite test.
In a 2009 press article, a senior Russian military leader stated that
Moscow was developing counterspace capabilities.
natural resources: insecurity and competition
Competition and scarcity involving natural resources--food, water,
minerals, and energy--are growing security threats. Many countries
important to the United States are vulnerable to natural resource
shocks that degrade economic development, frustrate attempts to
democratize, raise the risk of regime-threatening instability, and
aggravate regional tensions. Extreme weather events (floods, droughts,
heat waves) will increasingly disrupt food and energy markets,
exacerbating state weakness, forcing human migrations, and triggering
riots, civil disobedience, and vandalism. Criminal or terrorist
elements can exploit any of these weaknesses to conduct illicit
activity and/or recruitment and training. Social disruptions are
magnified in growing urban areas where information technology transmits
grievances to larger--often youthful and unemployed--audiences, and
relatively ``small'' events can generate significant effects across
regions or the world.
Food
Natural food-supply disruptions, due to floods, droughts, heat
waves, and diseases, as well as policy choices, probably will stress
the global food system in the immediate term, resulting in sustained
volatility in global food prices. Policy choices can include export
bans; diversions of arable lands for other uses, such as urban
development; and foreign land leases and acquisitions. Many resource-
strapped countries have been losing confidence in the global
marketplace to supply vital resources, and increasingly looking to
shield their populations in ways that will almost certainly threaten
global food production. For example, emerging powers and Gulf States
are buying up arable and grazing land around the world as hedges
against growing domestic demand and strained resources. Food supplies
are also at risk from plant diseases that affect grain and oilseed
crops and from transmittable animal diseases, such as H5N1 and foot and
mouth disease. At the same time, agricultural inputs--water,
fertilizer, land, and fuel oil--are becoming more scarce and/or costly,
exacerbating the upward pressure on food prices.
In the coming year, markets for agricultural commodities will
remain tight, due in part to drought and crop failures in the
midwestern United States last summer. Rising demand for biofuels and
animal feed exerts particular pressures on corn prices, and extreme
weather will cause episodic deficits in production. We will also see
growing demand and high price volatility for wheat. Significant wheat
production occurs in water-stressed and climate-vulnerable regions in
Asia, where markets will remain susceptible to harvest shocks. A near-
term supply disruption could result when a plant disease known as Ug99
stem rust--already spreading across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East--
arrives in South Asia, which is likely to happen within the next few
years. Wheat production is growing in Eastern Europe, but output is
variable, and governments have demonstrated a readiness to impose
export controls.
Although food-related state-on-state conflict is unlikely in the
near term, the risk of conflict between farmers and livestock owners--
often in separate states--will increase as population growth and crop
expansion infringe on livestock grazing areas, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Disputes over fisheries are also
likely to increase as water scarcity emerges in major river basins, and
marine fisheries are depleted. Shrinking marine fisheries--for example,
in the South China Sea--will lead to diplomatic disputes as fishermen
are forced to travel further from shore. In addition, government grants
of state-owned land to domestic and foreign agricultural developers are
likely to stoke conflict in areas without well-defined land ownership
laws and regulations.
Terrorists, militants, and international crime organizations can
use declining local food security to promote their own legitimacy and
undermine government authority. Growing food insecurity in weakly
governed countries could lead to political violence and provide
opportunities for existing insurgent groups to capitalize on poor
conditions, exploit international food aid, and discredit governments
for their inability to address basic needs. In addition, intentional
introduction of a livestock or plant disease might be a greater threat
to the United States and the global food system than a direct attack on
food supplies intended to kill humans.
Water
Risks to freshwater supplies--due to shortages, poor quality,
floods, and climate change--are growing. These forces will hinder the
ability of key countries to produce food and generate energy,
potentially undermining global food markets and hobbling economic
growth. As a result of demographic and economic development pressures,
North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia face particular
difficulty coping with water problems.
Lack of adequate water is a destabilizing factor in countries that
do not have the management mechanisms, financial resources, or
technical ability to solve their internal water problems. Some states
are further stressed by heavy dependence on river water controlled by
upstream nations with unresolved water-sharing issues. Wealthier
developing countries probably will experience increasing water-related
social disruptions, although they are capable of addressing water
problems without risk of state failure.
Historically, water tensions have led to more water-sharing
agreements than violent conflicts. However, where water-sharing
agreements are ignored, or when infrastructure development--for
electric power generation or agriculture--is seen as a threat to water
resources, states tend to exert leverage over their neighbors to
preserve their water interests. This leverage has been applied in
international forums and has included pressuring investors,
nongovernmental organizations, and donor countries to support or halt
water infrastructure projects. In addition, some nonstate terrorists or
extremists will almost certainly target vulnerable water infrastructure
to achieve their objectives and continue to use water-related
grievances as recruitment and fundraising tools.
Many countries are using groundwater faster than aquifers can
replenish in order to satisfy food demand. In the long term, without
mitigation actions (drip irrigation, reduction of distortive
electricity-for-water pump subsidies, access to new agricultural
technology, and better food distribution networks), exhaustion of
groundwater sources will cause food demand to be satisfied through
increasingly stressed global markets.
Water shortages and pollution will also harm the economic
performance of important U.S. trading partners. Economic output will
suffer if countries do not have sufficient clean water to generate
electrical power or to maintain and expand manufacturing and resource
extraction. In some countries, water shortages are already having an
impact on power generation, and frequent droughts are undermining long-
term plans to increase hydropower capacity. With climate change, these
conditions will continue to deteriorate.
Minerals: China's Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements
Rare earth elements (REE) are essential to civilian and military
technologies and to the 21st century global economy, including
development of green technologies and advanced defense systems. China
holds a commanding monopoly over world REE supplies, controlling about
95 percent of mined production and refining. China's dominance and
policies on pricing and exports are leading other countries to pursue
mitigation strategies, but those strategies probably will have only
limited impact within the next 5 years and will almost certainly not
end Chinese REE dominance. REE prices spiked after China enacted a 40-
percent export quota cut in July 2010, peaking at record highs in mid-
2011. As of December 2012, REE prices had receded but still remained at
least 80 percent, and as much as 600 percent (depending on the type of
REE), above pre-July 2010 levels.
Mines in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Malawi, the United States, and
Vietnam are expected to be operational in less than 5 years. However,
even as production at non-Chinese mines come online, initial REE
processing outside of China will remain limited because of technical
difficulties, regulatory hurdles, and capital costs associated with the
startup of new or dormant processing capabilities and facilities. China
will also continue to dominate production of the most scarce and
expensive REEs, known as heavy REEs, which are critical to defense
systems.
Energy
Oil prices will remain highly sensitive to political instability in
the Middle East, tensions with Iran, and global economic growth. In
2012 increasing U.S., Iraqi, and Libyan output, combined with slow
economic growth, helped ease upward pressure on prices. In the coming
year, most growth in new production probably will come from North
America and Iraq, while production from some major producers stagnates
or declines because of policies that discourage investment.
Sustained oil prices above $80 per barrel would support the growth
in North American oil production. That growth is being propelled by the
production of tight oil, due to the application of horizontal drilling
and hydrolic fracturing. Many Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) members are increasingly dependent on high oil prices
to support government spending. However, the budgets of countries that
subsidize domestic fuel consumption will come under greater stress with
high oil prices and rising domestic demand.
Natural gas prices will remain regionally based, with North
American consumers probably paying one-third the price of European
importers and one-fourth that of Asian consumers. With the prospects
for U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports made possible by the
growth in shale gas production, along with other global LNG exports,
major European and Asian importers probably will continue to pressure
their suppliers to de-link their prices from oil. Weather, economic
indicators, and energy policies in Japan probably will have the
strongest influence on global LNG prices. Australia is poised to become
a top LNG exporter but faces project cost inflation that could slow
development.
Climate Change and Demographics
Food security has been aggravated partly because the world's land
masses are being affected by weather conditions outside of historical
norms, including more frequent and extreme floods, droughts, wildfires,
tornadoes, coastal high water, and heat waves. Rising temperature, for
example, although enhanced in the Arctic, is not solely a high-latitude
phenomenon. Recent scientific work shows that temperature anomalies
during growing seasons and persistent droughts have hampered
agricultural productivity and extended wildfire seasons. Persistent
droughts during the past decade have also diminished flows in the Nile,
Tigris-Euphrates, Niger, Amazon, and Mekong river basins.
Demographic trends will also aggravate the medium- to long-term
outlooks for resources and energy. Through roughly 2030, the global
population is expected to rise from 7.1 billion to about 8.3 billion;
the size of the world's population in the middle class will expand from
the current 1 billion to more than 2 billion; and the proportion of the
world's population in urban areas will grow from 50 percent to about 60
percent--all putting intense pressure on food, water, minerals, and
energy.
health and pandemic threats
Scientists continue to discover previously unknown pathogens in
humans that made the ``jump'' from animals--zoonotic diseases. Examples
are: a prion disease in cattle that jumped in the 1980s to cause
variant Creutzeldt-Jacob disease; a bat henipavirus that in 1999 became
known as the human Nipah Virus; a bat corona virus that jumped to
humans in 2002 to cause Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); and
another SARS-like corona virus recently identified in individuals who
have been in Saudi Arabia, which might also have bat origins. Human and
livestock population growth and encroachment into jungles increase
human exposure to crossovers. No one can predict which pathogen will be
the next to spread to humans, or when or where such a development will
occur, but humans will continue to be vulnerable to pandemics, most of
which will probably originate in animals.
An easily transmissible, novel respiratory pathogen that kills or
incapacitates more than 1 percent of its victims is among the most
disruptive events possible. Such an outbreak would result in a global
pandemic that causes suffering and death in every corner of the world,
probably in fewer than 6 months. This is not a hypothetical threat.
History is replete with examples of pathogens sweeping populations that
lack immunity, causing political and economic upheaval, and influencing
the outcomes of wars--for example, the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic
affected military operations during World War I and caused global
economic disruptions.
The World Health Organization has described one influenza pandemic
as ``the epidemiological equivalent of a flash flood.'' However, slow-
spreading pathogens, such as HIV/AIDS, have been just as deadly, if not
more so. Such a pathogen with pandemic potential may have already
jumped to humans somewhere; HIV/AIDS entered the human population more
than 50 years before it was recognized and identified. In addition,
targeted therapeutics and vaccines might be inadequate to keep up with
the size and speed of the threat, and drug-resistant forms of diseases,
such as tuberculosis, gonorrhea, and Staphylococcus aureus, have
already emerged.
mass atrocities
Mass atrocities continue to be a recurring feature of the global
landscape. Most of the time they occur in the context of major
instability events. Since the turn of the last century, hundreds of
thousands of civilians have lost their lives as a result of atrocities
occurring during conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan and in the
eastern Congo (Kinshasa). Recent atrocities in Syria, where tens of
thousands of civilians have lost their lives within the past 2 years,
have occurred against a backdrop of major political upheaval,
illustrating how most mass atrocities tend to be perpetrated by ruling
elites or rebels who use violence against civilians to assert or retain
control. Consistent with this trend, mass atrocities also are more
likely in places where governments discriminate against minorities,
socioeconomic conditions are poor, or local powerbrokers operate with
impunity. In addition, terrorists and insurgents might exploit such
conditions to conduct attacks against civilians, as in Boko Haram's
attacks on churches in Nigeria. Less frequently, violence between
sectarian or ethnic groups can create the conditions for mass
atrocities.
Regional Threats
middle east and north africa
Arab Spring
Although some countries have made progress towards democratic rule,
most are experiencing uncertainty, violence, and political backsliding.
The toppling of leaders and weakening of regimes have also unleashed
destabilizing ethnic and sectarian rivalries. Islamist actors have been
the chief electoral beneficiaries of the political openings, and
Islamist parties in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco will likely solidify
their influence in the coming year. The success of transitioning states
will depend, in part, on their ability to integrate these actors into
national politics and to integrate--or marginalize--political,
military, tribal, and business groups that were part of or benefitted
from the old regimes. At the same time, transitions that fail to
address public demands for change are likely to revive unrest and
heighten the appeal of authoritarian or extremist solutions.
Three issues, in particular, will affect U.S. interests:
Ungoverned Spaces. The struggles of new governments in
places like Tripoli and Sanaa to extend their writs, as well as
the worsening internal conflict in Syria, have created
opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned space
from which to destabilize the new governments and prepare
attacks against western interests inside those countries.
Economic Hardships. Many states face economic
distress--specifically, high rates of unemployment--that is
unlikely to be alleviated by current levels of Western aid and
will require assistance from wealthy Arab countries as well as
reforms and pro-growth policies. Failure to meet heightened
popular expectations for economic improvement could set back
transitions in places such as Egypt and destabilize vulnerable
regimes such as Jordan. Gulf states provide assistance only
incrementally and are wary of new governments' foreign policies
and their ability to absorb funds.
Negative Views of the United States. Some
transitioning governments are more skeptical than their
predecessors about cooperating with the United States and are
concerned about protecting sovereignty and resisting foreign
interference. This has the potential to hamper U.S.
counterterrorism efforts and other initiatives to engage
transitioning governments.
Egypt
Since his election in June 2012, Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi
has worked to consolidate control of the instruments of state power and
loosen the Egyptian military's grip on the government. Mursi has taken
actions that have advanced his party's agenda and his international
reputation, including his late-2012 role brokering a HAMAS-Israeli
cease-fire. However, his decree in November 2012 that temporarily
increased his authorities at the expense of the judiciary angered large
numbers of Egyptians--especially secular activists--and brought
protesters back to the streets.
Quelling popular dissatisfaction and building popular support for
his administration and policies are critical for Mursi and will have a
direct bearing on the Freedom and Justice Party's success in upcoming
parliamentary elections. A key element of Mursi's ability to build
support will be improving living standards and the economy; GDP growth
fell to 1.5 percent in 2012 from just over 5 percent in 2010, and
unemployment was roughly 12.6 percent in mid-2012.
Syria
Almost 2 years into the unrest in Syria, we assess that the erosion
of the Syrian regime's capabilities is accelerating. Although the Asad
regime has prevented insurgents from seizing key cities-- such as
Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs--it has been unable to dislodge them from
these areas. Insurgent forces also have been gaining strength in rural
areas of northern and eastern Syria, particularly Idlib Province along
the border with Turkey, where their progress could lead to a more
permanent base for insurgent operations. Prolonged instability is also
allowing al Qaeda's Nusrah Front to establish a presence within Syria.
(For details on Syria's weapons and chemical and biological warfare
programs, see the Proliferation section.)
Sanctions and violence have stifled trade, commercial
activity, and foreign investment, and reduced the regime's
financial resources--as many as 2.5 million people are
internally displaced and roughly 700,000 have fled to
neighboring countries since March 2011. The Syrian economy
contracted by 10 to 15 percent in 2012, which has forced the
regime to prioritize security spending and cut back on
providing basic services, food and fuel, and health and
education services for the public.
Iran
Iran is growing more autocratic at home and more assertive abroad
as it faces elite and popular grievances, a deteriorating economy, and
an uncertain regional dynamic. Supreme Leader Khamenei's power and
authority are now virtually unchecked, and security institutions,
particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have greater
influence at the expense of popularly elected and clerical
institutions. Khamenei and his allies will have to weigh carefully
their desire to control the 14 June Iranian presidential election,
while boosting voter turnout to increase the appearance of regime
legitimacy and avoid a repeat of the disputed 2009 election. Meanwhile,
the regime is adopting more oppressive social policies to increase its
control over the population, such as further limiting educational and
career choices for women.
Iran's financial outlook has worsened since the 2012 implementation
of sanctions on its oil exports and Central Bank. Iran's economy
contracted in 2012 for the first time in more than two decades. Iran's
access to foreign exchange Reserves held overseas has diminished, and
preliminary data suggest that it suffered its first trade deficit in 14
years. Meanwhile, the rial reached an all-time low in late January,
with the exchange rate falling from about 15,000 rials per dollar at
the beginning of 2012 to nearly 40,000 rials per dollar, and inflation
and unemployment are growing.
Growing public frustration with the government's socioeconomic
policies has not led to widespread political unrest because of
Iranians' pervasive fear of the security services and the lack of
effective opposition organization and leadership. To buoy the regime's
popularity and forestall widespread civil unrest, Iranian leaders are
trying to soften the economic hardships on the poorer segments of the
population. Khamenei has publicly called on the population to pursue a
``resistance economy,'' reminiscent of the hardships that Iran suffered
immediately after the Iranian Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war.
However, the willingness of contemporary Iranians to withstand
additional economic austerity is unclear because most Iranians do not
remember those times; 60 percent of the population was born after 1980
and 40 percent after 1988.
In its efforts to spread influence abroad and undermine the United
States and our allies, Iran is trying to exploit the fighting and
unrest in the Arab world. It supports surrogates, including Palestinian
militants engaged in the recent conflict with Israel. To take advantage
of the U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, it will continue
efforts to strengthen political and economic ties with central and
local governments, while providing select militants with lethal
assistance. Iran's efforts to secure regional hegemony, however, have
achieved limited results, and the fall of the Asad regime in Syria
would be a major strategic loss for Tehran. (For details on Iran's
weapons programs, see the Proliferation section.)
Iraq
Since the U.S. departure, the Iraqi Government has remained
generally stable, with the major parties pursuing change through the
political process rather than violence. However, there are rising
tensions between Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan Regional
Government President Masud Barzani and an increase in anti-regime Sunni
protests since the end of 2012. Maliki is pressing for greater
authority over disputed territories in northern Iraq, and Barzani is
pushing forward to export hydrocarbons independent of Baghdad.
AQI conducted more vehicle and suicide bombings in 2012 than in
2011, almost exclusively against Iraqi targets. However, AQI and other
insurgent groups almost certainly lack sufficient strength to overwhelm
Iraqi Security Forces, which has put pressure on these groups through
arrests of key individuals.
Iraq is producing and exporting oil at the highest levels in two
decades, bolstering finances for a government that derives 90 to 95
percent of its revenue from oil exports. Iraq increased production
capacity from about 2.4 million barrels per day in 2010 to roughly 3.3
million barrels per day in 2012. However, it is still wrestling with
the challenges of diversifying its economy and providing essential
services.
Yemen
We judge that Yemen's new president, Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi, has
diminished the power of former President Salih and his family and kept
the political transition on track, but Salih's lingering influence,
AQAP's presence, and the tenuous economy are significant challenges.
Yemen's humanitarian situation is dire, with nearly half of the
population considered ``food insecure.'' Obtaining foreign aid and
keeping its oil pipeline open will be crucial to Sanaa's potential
economic improvement. The next key political milestone will be the
successful completion of an inclusive National Dialogue that keeps
Yemen on course for elections in 2014, although some southern leaders
are threatening non-participation. Hadi's government will also have to
maintain pressure on AQAP following a military offensive this past
summer that displaced the group from its southern strongholds.
Lebanon
Lebanon's stability will remain fragile during the next year
primarily because of the tensions triggered by the Syrian conflict. We
expect Lebanon will be able to avoid destabilizing sectarian violence,
but it is likely to experience occasional, localized clashes between
pro- and anti-Asad sectarian militias. Thus far, political leaders have
succeeded in muting popular outrage over the October 2012 bombing that
killed a popular Sunni figure, and the Lebanese Armed Forces remain
effective at controlling small-scale violence.
Libya
Libya's leaders are struggling to rebuild after the revolution and
the collapse of the Qadhafi regime. The institutional vacuum caused by
Qadhafi's removal increased terrorist activity and gave rise to
hundreds of well-armed regional militias, many of which played key
roles in overthrowing the regime but now complicate Libya's stability.
The transitional government is struggling to control the militias, but
it remains reliant on some to provide security in the absence of
cohesive and capable security institutions. Eastern Libya has been
traditional hubs of extremists, and if left unchecked by Libyan
authorities and allied militias, groups operating from there could pose
a recurring threat to Western interests.
The government is also working to rebuild its administrative
capacity as it manages the post-revolutionary transition and is
overseeing the drafting of a constitution, which will set the stage for
elections as soon as this year. Libya has quickly resumed high levels
of oil production, which is critical to rebuilding the economy. As of
late 2012, it restored crude oil output to near preconflict levels of
1.6 million barrels per day, but Tripoli will need the expertise and
support of international oil companies to sustain, if not boost,
overall supply.
south asia
Afghanistan
The upcoming presidential election is scheduled for April 2014,
while the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is completing
its drawdown.
We assess that the Taliban-led insurgency has diminished in some
areas of Afghanistan but remains resilient and capable of challenging
U.S. and international goals. Taliban senior leaders also continue to
be based in Pakistan, which allows them to provide strategic guidance
to the insurgency without fear for their safety. Al Qaeda's influence
on the insurgency is limited, although its propaganda gains from
participating in insurgent attacks far outweigh its actual battlefield
impact.
Security gains are especially fragile in areas where ISAF surge
forces have been concentrated since 2010 and are now transitioning the
security lead to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANSF will
require international assistance through 2014 and beyond. The Afghan
National Army and Afghan National Police have proven capable of
providing security in major cities, nearby rural areas, and key ground
lines of communication in the vicinity of government-controlled areas.
The Afghan Air Force has made very little progress. The National
Directorate of Security remains Afghanistan's premier national
intelligence service and likely will play a larger role in regime
security over time.
In addition, Afghanistan's economy, which has been expanding at a
steady rate, is likely to slow after 2014. Kabul has little hope of
offsetting the coming drop in Western aid and military spending, which
have fueled growth in the construction and services sectors. Its licit
agricultural sector and small businesses have also benefited from
development projects and assistance from nongovernmental organizations,
but the country faces high rates of poverty, unemployment, food
insecurity, and poppy cultivation.
Pakistan
Pakistan is preparing for national and provincial assembly
elections, which must be held no later than May 2013, and a
presidential election later in the year. Pakistani officials note that
these elections are a milestone--the first time a civilian government
has completed a 5-year term and conducted a transfer to a new
government through the electoral process.
Islamabad is intently focused on Afghanistan in anticipation of the
ISAF drawdown. The Pakistani Government has attempted to improve
relations with Kabul and ensure that its views are taken into
consideration during the transition period. The military this year
continued operations in the federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
and, as of late 2012, had forces in place for an operation against
anti-Pakistan militants in the North Waziristan Agency of the FATA.
There were fewer domestic attacks by the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan this
year than in the previous several years.
Economically, trouble looms. Pakistan, with its small tax base,
poor system of tax collection, and reliance on foreign aid, faces no
real prospects for sustainable economic growth. The government has been
unwilling to address economic problems that continue to constrain
economic growth. The government has made no real effort to persuade its
disparate coalition members to accept much-needed policy and tax
reforms, because members are focused on retaining their seats in
upcoming elections. Sustained remittances from overseas Pakistanis
(roughly $13 billion from July 2011 to June 2012, according to
Pakistan's central bank) have helped to slow the loss of Reserves.
However, Pakistan has to repay the IMF $1.7 billion for the rest of
this fiscal year for money borrowed as part of its 2008 bailout
agreement; growth was around 3.5 percent in 2012; and foreign direct
investment and domestic investment have both declined substantially.
India
Both India and Pakistan have made calculated decisions to improve
ties, despite deep-rooted mistrust. They held a series of meetings in
the past year and will probably continue to achieve incremental
progress on economic relations, such as trade, while deferring serious
discussion on the more contentious issues of territorial disputes and
terrorism. Even modest progress, however, could easily be undone by a
terrorist attack against India linked to Pakistan, which could trigger
a new crisis and prompt New Delhi to freeze bilateral dialogue.
India will continue to support the current Afghan Government to
ensure a stable and friendly Afghanistan. India furthered its
engagement with Afghanistan in 2012 and signed an additional four
memoranda of understanding on mining, youth affairs, small development
projects, and fertilizers during President Karzai's visit to New Delhi
in November 2012. We judge that India sees its goals in Afghanistan as
consistent with U.S. objectives, and favors sustained ISAF and U.S.
presence in the country. India will almost certainly cooperate with the
United States and Afghanistan in bilateral and multilateral frameworks
to identify assistance activities that will help bolster civil society,
develop capacity, and strengthen political structures in Afghanistan.
Moreover, India consistently ranks in the top three nations that
Afghans see as helping their country rebuild. As of April 2012, India
ranked as Afghanistan's fifth largest bilateral donor.
Neither India nor China currently seeks to overturn the strategic
balance on the border or commit provocations that would destabilize the
relationship. However, India and China are each increasing their
military abilities to respond to a border crisis. Both consider these
moves to be defensive, but they are probably fueling mutual suspicion
and raising the stakes in a potential crisis. As a result, periodic,
low-level intrusions between forces along the border could escalate if
either side saw political benefit in more forcefully and publicly
asserting its territorial claims or responding more decisively to
perceived aggression. However, existing mechanisms, as well as a shared
desire for stability by political and military leaders from both sides,
will likely act as an effective break against escalation.
africa
Throughout Africa, violence, corruption, and extremism pose
challenges to U.S. interests in 2013. As in 2012, Africa's stability
will be threatened not only by unresolved discord between Sudan and
South Sudan, fighting in Somalia, and extremist attacks in Nigeria, but
also by the collapse of governance in northern Mali and renewed
conflict in the Great Lakes region. Elsewhere, African countries are
vulnerable to political crises, democratic backsliding, and natural
disasters. On the positive side, in parts of the continent, development
is advancing--for example, in Ghana--and, in Somalia, international
efforts and domestic support are widening areas of tenuous stability.
Sudan and South Sudan
Sudan's President Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) are
confronting a range of challenges, including public dissatisfaction
over economic decline and insurgencies on Sudan's southern and western
borders. Sudanese economic conditions have deteriorated since South
Sudan's independence, when South Sudan took control of the majority of
oil reserves. The country now faces a decline in economic growth that
jeopardizes political stability and fuels opposition to Bashir and the
NCP. Khartoum is likely to resort to heavy-handed tactics to prevent
protests from escalating and will pursue a military response to
provocations by Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)
rebels in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. An uptick in violence
in Sudan's western Darfur region toward the end of the rainy season in
October 2012 will probably continue through 2013. Islamist extremists
remain active in Sudan potentially threatening the security of the
Sudanese Government as well as U.S. and other western interests.
South Sudan in 2013 will face issues that threaten to destabilize
its fragile, untested, poorly resourced government. Festering ethnic
disputes are likely to undermine national cohesion, and the southern
government will struggle to provide security, manage rampant
corruption, and deliver basic services. Despite a series of agreements
in the wake of Juba's incursion into Sudan in April 2012, controversial
unresolved disputes, such as the future of Abyei, risk a return to
conflict between the two countries. Animosity and lack of trust between
Khartoum and Juba also threaten to undermine the implementation of
agreements signed in September 2012. South Sudan's economy suffered
significant setbacks after Juba shut down oil production in early 2012,
and it will struggle to rebound because unresolved security conflicts
with Sudan have delayed the restart of oil production, despite a signed
deal with Khartoum in September 2012. Ethnic conflict in South Sudan is
likely to continue as the South Sudanese military struggles to disarm
ethnic militias and provide security across the country. We assess the
ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) will continue to turn
to the international community, specifically the United States, for
assistance.
Somalia
Somalia's political transition in 2012 installed new political
players and degraded the influence of old guard politicians responsible
for corruption and mismanagement of government resources under the
transitional government system. The country's nascent institutions,
ill-equipped to provide social services, along with pervasive
technical, political, and administrative challenges at the national
level, will test Mogadishu's ability to govern effectively in 2013.
Command and control of AMISOM forces and their proxies, along with
facilitating cooperation between Mogadishu and AMISOM forces operating
in southern Somalia, will also be distinct challenges for the
government.
Al-Shabaab, the al Qaeda-affiliated insurgency that has terrorized
populations and destabilized the transitional government since 2008, is
largely in retreat, ameliorating instability and opening space for
legitimate governing entities to exert control in southern Somalia.
Despite its fractious state, al-Shabaab continues to plan attacks in
Somalia and has returned to launching asymmetric attacks in a meager
attempt to reassert control in key areas, including Mogadishu and the
port city of Kismaayo. The group also poses a threat to U.S. and
Western interests in Somalia and regionally, particularly in Kenya, and
leverages its operatives and networks in these locales for attacks.
Mali
In January 2012, after the return of heavily armed Tuareg fighters
from Libya, the secular-based National Movement for the Liberation of
the Azawad (MNLA) and the extremist Islamist Tuareg rebel group Ansar
al-Din launched a rebellion against the Malian Government. Following a
21 March military coup, Ansar al-Din--with help from AQIM--and the MNLA
quickly drove the Malian military out of the north. After taking
control of northern Mali, AQIM worked closely with Ansar al-Din and
AQIM-offshoot Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (TWJWA) to
consolidate gains in the region and impose a hard-line version of
sharia.
Armed conflict between Malian Armed Forces and Islamist forces
renewed in early 2013 when Islamist forces attacked Malian military
outposts near Islamist-held territory. French forces quickly intervened
with ground forces and airstrikes, halting AQIM and its allies'
advances and eventually pushing them out of key northern Malian
population centers. Regional forces and Chadian troops have begun to
deploy to Mali, where European Union trainers will begin the training
cycle of designated forces. Several countries have now offered
significant contributions to the deploying force but lack adequate
troops, training, and logistics to provide a capable force.
Mali's fragile interim government faces an uphill effort to reunite
the country and hold democratic elections by mid-2013--especially
elections the north perceives as credible. In addition to planning
elections, local and regional actors are pursuing diplomatic options,
including negotiations, to address instability in northern Mali and
counter AQIM's influence.
Nigeria
The Nigerian state is acutely challenged by uneven governance,
endemic corruption, inadequate infrastructure, weak health and
education systems, and recurring outbreaks of sectarian, ethnic, and
communal violence. Abuja also faces Boko Haram--a northern Sunni
extremist group with ties to AQIM--whose attacks on Christians and
fellow Muslims in Nigeria have heightened religious and ethnic tensions
and raised concerns of possible attacks against U.S. interests in the
country. Communal violence is down from last year, but Boko Haram has
made moves to incite it, and the Nigerian Government is scarcely
addressing the underlying causes, such as socioeconomic conditions in
troubled northern Nigeria, despite pledges to do so. In the Niger
Delta, Abuja is struggling to extricate itself from open-ended
financial commitments and has not made progress rehabilitating,
retraining, and reintegrating disgruntled former militants. Militant/
criminal attacks on land-based oil infrastructure in Nigeria's coastal
areas, along with hijackings, kidnappings, and piracy attacks off the
coast, continue at a steady pace.
Central Africa
The Great Lakes region of Central Africa has a total population of
128 million and includes parts or all of Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa), and
Uganda. Despite gains in peace and security in the past decade, the
region endures the chronic pressures of weak governance, ethnic
cleavages, and active rebel groups. U.S. Government-sponsored modeling
suggests that Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa), and Uganda are all at risk of
violent instability during the next year. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in
Eastern Congo in 2012 engaged the Armed Forces of Congo and U.N.
peacekeepers in the worst fighting since 2008, displacing more than a
quarter-million civilians. Other armed groups will likely increase
predatory activity, encouraged by Congolese President Kabila's flawed
election in 2011 and his deteriorating control. Several of these
nations have become U.S. Government security partners in recent years.
Ugandan and Burundian troops compose the vanguard of AMISOM, and Rwanda
is a vital part of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur.
Since 2008, Uganda has deployed troops across Congo, South Sudan,
and Central African Republic to pursue Joseph Kony and the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA), with U.S. assistance, including approximately
100 U.S. military advisors. While LRA foot soldiers terrorize civilians
in the region, Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants evade detection and
tracking by keeping low profiles and moving in scattered bands across a
remote region.
east asia
China
Regional Dynamics
During 2012, Beijing adopted strong, uncompromising positions in
maritime territorial disputes with several of its neighbors. In each
case, China sought to expand its control over the relevant territories
and obstructed regional efforts to manage the disputes. Beijing's
regional activities appear to be, in part, a response to the U.S.
strategic rebalance toward Asia-Pacific, which Chinese leaders believe
is aimed at undermining China's position in the region. Globally,
Beijing has both assisted and hindered U.S. policy objectives on such
issues as Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and North Korea, and it continues
to expand its economic influence and to try to parlay it into greater
political influence.
The leadership transition in Beijing continues to unfold as Chinese
leaders grapple with a confluence of domestic problems--including
lagging economic indicators, corruption, and pressure for political
reform--that are fueling leadership fears about the potential for
serious domestic unrest.
The leadership team that is confronting these internal challenges
is also likely to maintain uncompromising positions on foreign policy
issues, especially those involving maritime and territorial disputes in
the South and East China Seas. Meanwhile, China-Taiwan relations
remained relatively calm in 2012, due in part to the continuity
provided by Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's reelection last January.
However, progress in cross-strait dialogue almost certainly will
continue to be gradual, and the cross-strait military and economic
balance will keep shifting in China's favor.
Military Developments
China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization
designed to enable China's armed forces to achieve success on a 21st
century battlefield. China's military investments favor capabilities
designed to strengthen its nuclear deterrent and strategic strike,
counter foreign military intervention in a regional crisis, and provide
limited, albeit growing, capacity for power projection. During 2012,
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) introduced advanced weapons into
its inventory and reached milestones in the development of key systems,
thereby sustaining the modernization program that has been underway
since the late 1990s. For example, in August, the PLA Navy commissioned
the Liaoning, China's first aircraft carrier, which Beijing probably
sees as a significant step in developing a military commensurate with
great-power status. Additionally, China has continued to develop
advanced ballistic missiles.
Developments in Chinese military capabilities support an expansion
of PLA operations to secure Chinese interests beyond territorial
issues. To expand operations--specifically in the Indian Ocean-- China
is pursuing more effective logistical support arrangements with
countries in the region. Beijing is also maintaining a multi-ship
antipiracy task force in the Gulf of Aden for the fourth straight year
to protect commercial shipping. The task force operates independently
of international efforts, but is making a tangible contribution to
protecting shipping through this heavily pirated area.
China is also supplementing its more advanced military capabilities
by bolstering maritime law enforcement (MLE) activities in support of
its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. In the
territorial disputes with the Philippines and Japan last year, the
Chinese Navy stayed over the horizon as MLE vessels provided Beijing's
on-scene presence and response.
North Korea
Kim Jong Un has quickly consolidated power since taking over as
leader of North Korea when his father, Kim Jong Il, died in December
2011. Kim has publicly focused on improving the country's troubled
economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people, but we have yet
to see any signs of serious economic reform.
North Korea maintains a large, conventional military force held in
check by the more powerful South Korean-U.S. military alliance.
Nevertheless, the North Korean military is well postured to conduct
limited attacks with little or no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of
a South Korean warship and the artillery bombardment of a South Korean
island along the Northern Limit Line. (For information on North Korea's
nuclear weapons program and intentions, see the Proliferation section.)
russia and eurasia
Russia
Domestic Political Developments
During the next year, Russia's political system of managed
democracy will come under greater strain as the Kremlin grapples with
growing social discontent and a society that is increasingly in flux.
Important sectors of the Russian public are frustrated with the
country's sluggish economy and are no longer content with a political
system that lacks any real pluralism and suffers from poor and
arbitrary governance and endemic corruption. All of these factors
present Russian President Vladimir Putin with far greater challenges
than any he faced during his two previous terms in office.
Putin's return to the presidency in 2012 was intended to restore
strength and vigor to a system that he believed had weakened under
President Dmitriy Medvedev. Instead, antipathy over the Putin-Medvedev
job swap touched off some of the largest political protests Russia has
seen since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Despite these unprecedented
protests, the Russian leadership has demonstrated firm resolve to
preserve the system, while a disparate opposition movement struggles to
become more cohesive, broaden its base, and build momentum. After
initially tolerating demonstrations and offering a few political
reforms in the hope of dividing the opposition, the Kremlin took a more
aggressive approach, adopting measures to restrict opposition
activities, such as targeting opposition figures for harassment and
using legislative and judicial means to confront, intimidate, and
arrest opponents. These actions have helped to thwart the opposition's
ability to build momentum and preserve the Kremlin's control of the
political system, but they have not addressed the sources of bitterness
and dissatisfaction.
Foreign Policy
Russian foreign policy is unlikely to deviate significantly from
its current course in the next year, but domestic political factors
almost certainly will exert greater influence on foreign policy. Putin
is sensitive to any U.S. criticisms of Russian domestic political
practices, which he perceives as meddling in Russia's internal affairs.
Nevertheless, he sees benefits in cooperating with the United States on
certain issues.
Missile defense will remain a sensitive issue for Russia. Russian
leaders are wary that in the long run U.S. pursuit of a ``missile
shield'' will result in systems that enable the United States to
undercut Russia's nuclear deterrent and retaliatory capabilities.
Russian leaders also see aspects of U.S. plans for missile defense in
Europe as serious threats to their core national security interests.
The Kremlin will continue to look to the United States and our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners for guarantees that any
system will not be directed at Russia. On Syria, Russia is likely to
remain a difficult interlocutor. The Kremlin will remain focused on
preventing outside military intervention aimed at ousting the Asad
regime. Moscow is troubled by the Libyan precedent and believes the
west is pursuing a reckless policy of regime change that will
destabilize the region and could be used against Russia. The Russians
point to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the terrorist
attacks against U.S. diplomats in Libya last September as evidence
supporting their arguments.
Moscow is not likely to change its diplomatic approach to Iran's
nuclear program. Russia argues that confidence-building measures and an
incremental system of rewards are the best ways to persuade Iran to
cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Despite
disagreements over missile defense and the problems of Iran's nuclear
program and Syria, Moscow supports U.S.-led NATO military operations in
Afghanistan. It sees its support of the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN) as a pillar of U.S.-Russia relations that also helps stabilize
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Russia is suspicious of U.S. intentions in
Afghanistan and wary of any U.S. efforts to maintain a residual
military presence after 2014 without a U.N. mandate, which could put
Moscow's cooperation beyond this period in doubt.
Although the bilateral relationship with the United States will
remain important for Russia, Moscow is most likely to focus its foreign
policy efforts on strengthening its influence over the states of the
former U.S.SR by binding them closer through integration initiatives,
such as the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union or Putin's proposed
Eurasian Union.
The Military
Russian military forces, both nuclear and conventional, support
deterrence and enhance Moscow's geopolitical clout. Since late 2008 the
Kremlin has embraced a wide-ranging military reform and modernization
program to field a smaller, more mobile, better-trained, and high-tech
force during the next decade. This plan represents a radical break with
historical Soviet approaches to manpower, force structure, and
training. The initial phases, mainly focused on force reorganization
and cuts in the mobilization base and officer corps, have been largely
implemented and are being institutionalized. The ground forces alone
have reduced about 60 percent of armor and infantry battalions since
2008, while the Ministry of Defense cut about 135,000 officer
positions, many at field grade.
Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of
rearmament and professionalization. In 2010, a 10-year procurement plan
was approved to replace Soviet-era hardware and bolster deterrence with
a balanced set of modern conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear
capabilities. However, funding, bureaucratic, and cultural hurdles--
coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a military industrial base
that deteriorated for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse--
complicate Russian efforts.
The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that
will allow the Russian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller
neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet
space, but they will not--and are not intended to--enable Moscow to
conduct sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively. In
addition, the steep decline in conventional capabilities since the
collapse of the Soviet Union has compelled Moscow to invest significant
capital to modernize its conventional forces. At least until Russia's
high precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility,
Moscow will embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its
defense planning. It still views its nuclear forces as critical for
ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the world stage and for
offsetting its military weaknesses vis-a-vis potential opponents with
stronger militaries.
The Caucasus and Central Asia
Recent developments in Georgia, following the victory of Prime
Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream party in the October 2012
parliamentary elections, offer new hope for easing bilateral Russian-
Georgian tensions. Prime Minister Ivanishvili has expressed interest in
normalizing relations with Russia and has sought to improve the tone of
the dialogue with Moscow. However, after nearly a decade of President
Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement party rule, Georgia
faces a challenging political transition and an increased risk of
domestic political instability.
The standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Armenian-
occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region remains a potential flashpoint.
Heightened rhetoric, distrust on both sides, and recurring violence
along the Line of Contact increase the risk of miscalculations that
could escalate the situation with little warning.
The threat of instability remains in the states of Central Asia.
Central Asian leaders have prioritized regime stability over political
and economic reforms that could improve long-term governance and
legitimacy. Most fear any signs of Arab Spring-type uprisings and
repress even small signs of discontent. The Central Asian states have
not built constructive relationships with each other; personal
rivalries and longstanding disputes over borders, water, and energy
create bilateral frictions between neighbors and potential flashpoints
for conflict. Ethnic conflicts are also possible and could emerge with
little warning. Clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern
Kyrgyzstan following the 2010 overthrow of the government resulted in
the deaths of more than 400 people, and in the absence of government
efforts to lead reconciliation, tensions between these ethnic groups
remain high.
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova
In Belarus, Lukashenko has weathered an economic crisis that
presented him with the greatest challenge to his rule since he took
power in 1994. Corrective measures and financial assistance from Russia
have eased some of the more harmful consequences of the crisis, and
opposition movements, such as the Revolution through Social Networks,
have petered out. Nevertheless, Belarus's economic situation remains
precarious, and Lukashenko's refusal to institute structural economic
reforms raises the likelihood that Belarus will fall into another
economic crisis in 2013.
Under President Yanukovych, Ukraine is drifting towards
authoritarianism. The October 2012 parliamentary elections were marred
by irregularities and fell far short of Western standards for free and
fair elections, representing a step backwards from prior Ukrainian
elections. Yanukovych also shows few signs that he intends to release
imprisoned opposition leader former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
any time soon, a key condition to improving Ukraine's relations with
the West. The government appears to be ``doubling down,'' preparing
additional criminal charges against Tymoshenko that could keep her
behind bars for life. In addition, the lack of structural economic
reforms coupled with a precarious financial situation raises the risk
of economic crisis in 2013.
The status quo in Moldova is likely to prevail during the next
year. Electing new leaders in Moldova and in the separatist region of
Transnistria has improved the tone of relations between Chisinau and
Tiraspol. A renewed focus on confidence-building measures, such as
easing restrictions on the movement of people and goods, generated
cautious optimism in early 2012 about progress toward eventual
settlement of the Transnistria conflict. However, the negotiating
positions of both sides later hardened, and a settlement to the
conflict is highly unlikely in the next year.
latin america and the caribbean
Positive trends in much of Latin America include the deepening of
democratic principles, economic growth, and resilience in the face of
the global financial crisis. Income inequality in the region is also
showing a steady decline. In some areas, however, economic stagnation,
high rates of violent crime and impunity, ruling party efforts to
manipulate democratic institutions to consolidate power, and slow
recovery from natural disasters are challenging these strides.
Initiatives to strengthen regional integration are leading some
countries to try to limit U.S. influence, but they are hampered by
ideological differences and regional rivalries.
Iran has been reaching out to Latin America and the Caribbean to
decrease its international isolation. President Ahmadinejad traveled to
the region twice in 2012. Tehran has cultivated ties to leaders of the
Venezuelan-led Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) in
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and maintains cordial
relations with Cuba and Nicaragua. Relations with Tehran offer these
governments a way to stake out independent positions on the
international issue of Iran, while extracting financial aid and
investment for economic and social projects.
The drug threat to the United States emanates primarily from the
Western Hemisphere; the overwhelming majority of drugs now consumed in
the United States are produced in Mexico, Colombia, Canada, and the
United States. Patterns in drug marketing and trafficking create
conditions that could fuel this trend and further undermine citizen
security in several countries in the region. Central American
Governments, especially Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, are trying
to cope with some of the highest violent crime and homicide rates in
the world. In addition, weak and corrupt institutions in these
countries foster permissive environments for gang and criminal
activity, limit democratic freedom, encourage systemic corruption, and
slow recovery.
Mexico
Recently inaugurated Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto inherited
a complex security situation marked by confrontation between the state
and drug cartels, strong public concern over levels of violence, and
unprecedented security cooperation with the United States. Pena Nieto
has said he will prioritize efforts to reduce violence and push reforms
aimed at strengthening the rule of law, including: Mexico's transition
to an accusatory system of justice, a more effective counter-illicit
finance regime, police professionalization, and bolstered government
intelligence capabilities.
President Calderon turned over the presidency to Pena Nieto on 1
December, having made headway against several cartels, in particular
Los Zetas, the Beltran Leyva Organization, and the Gulf Cartel. Drug-
related homicides have increased significantly since 2007--Calderon's
first full year in office--and remain high; more than 50,000 Mexicans
have died as a result of drug-related violence since that year.
Pena Nieto promised to push forward Calderon's landmark 2008
constitutional reform to overhaul Mexico's judicial system. The
judicial reform process has been uneven across Mexico's states, and
many are unlikely to meet the 2016 implementation deadline. On police
reform, Pena Nieto plans to create a new gendarmerie, or paramilitary
police, to gradually take over policing duties from the military. He
also has publicly endorsed efforts to reform and modernize the Federal
police, as well as state and municipal-level police forces. Pena
Nieto's plans to emphasize anti-money laundering efforts will be
strengthened by a recently passed law that restricts high-value dollar
and peso purchases commonly used to launder drug proceeds, such as in
real estate sales, and requires government entities to provide data to
support money-laundering prosecutions.
Venezuela
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's death on 5 March has triggered
preparations for a new election in which we expect Vice President
Nicolas Maduro to compete against Miranda Governor and former
presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski. Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Elias Jaua announced that Maduro will take over as interim
president and that an election will be held within 30 days. Maduro is a
long-time Chavez loyalist and will almost certainly continue Chavez's
socialist policies.
The Venezuelan Government will be up against the consequences of an
increasingly deteriorating business environment and growing
macroeconomic imbalances. Debt obligations will consume a growing share
of Venezuela's oil revenues, even if oil prices remain high. Lingering
citizen concerns that Caracas will face in the next year also include
personal safety, which has been threatened by a rising tide of violent
crime.
Cuba
Cuban President Raul Castro is proceeding cautiously with economic
reforms to reduce the state's direct role in the economy and diversify
trade relations, while preserving socialism and the regime. Measures
implemented since 2011 to expand self-employment, permit sales of
vehicles and property, and lease state lands to farmers are generally
popular but have failed to produce much growth. With their primary
patron Hugo Chavez's death, Cuba's leaders are urgently trying to
attract foreign investment partners and increase their access to hard
currency and foreign credit.
A priority for Cuban leaders is ensuring that economic reform does
not increase pressure for a political opening and greater individual
rights. There is no indication that Castro's efforts, including his
stated interest in laying the groundwork for a generational transition
in leadership, will loosen the regime's grip on power. The stiff prison
term imposed on the U.S. Agency for International Development
subcontractor Alan Gross for facilitating uncensored Internet
connectivity demonstrates the Castro regime's sensitivity to public
access to technology and information beyond its control. Indeed, harsh
government repression of peaceful protests and an upswing in short-term
arrests of dissidents indicate economic changes will not be coupled
with political changes.
Havana recently announced a new travel and migration policy for
most Cubans that will no longer require exit permits and extends the
time Cubans can remain abroad without forfeiting property and other
rights. The new policy has thus far only prompted a modest boost in
U.S. visas. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana recently implemented
process improvements that dramatically reduced wait times for non-
immigrant visa appointments. Countries around the region are watching
for any indication of significant increases in Cuban nationals arriving
under the new travel policy, but to date they have seen no such
increases.
Haiti
Stability in Haiti is fragile because of the country's weak
governing institutions. Strained relations between President Michel
Martelly, in office since May 2011, and the opposition-dominated
legislature are delaying progress on several fronts, including plans to
hold overdue Senate and local elections and advance the President's
agenda to create jobs, improve education, and attract foreign
investment. Although Martelly is generally still popular, the risk of
social unrest could grow because of unmet expectations over living
conditions and the lack of economic opportunities. President Martelly
will likely face continued protests--some possibly violent and
organized by his enemies--over rising food costs.
President Martelly and Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe intend to
prioritize private-sector-led growth and end dependence on aid.
However, Haiti will remain dependent on the international community for
the foreseeable future because of the devastating effects of the
earthquake in January 2010 on infrastructure and production capacity,
several recent natural disasters that ruined staple food crops, and the
unsettled political and security climate. Of the estimated 1.5 million
Haitians displaced by the earthquake, more than 350,000 are still in
tent encampments. We assess that the current threat of a mass migration
from Haiti is relatively low because Haitians are aware of the standing
U.S. policy of rapid repatriation of migrants intercepted at sea.
europe
Euro-Zone Crisis
European leaders are still grappling with the euro-zone crisis--the
euro zone's economy slipped back into recession in 2012 following 2
years of slow economic growth. We noted last year that the outcome of
the crisis has major implications not just for the United States but
also for the world economy. The risk of an unmanaged breakup of the
euro zone is lower this year because European Union (EU) leaders have
taken steps to strengthen banking and fiscal integration, but economic
deterioration in Europe threatens to depress world growth.
This year, rising anger over austerity could affect Europe's social
and political fabric. Given high unemployment--particularly among
youth--throughout the peripheral euro-zone states (Greece, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain), there has been an uptick in strikes and violent
protests. The greatest risk to stability is austerity- and reform-
fatigue spreading across Europe. In November 2012, tens of thousands
marched--mostly in southern Europe but also in Belgium and France--in
the first pan-EU labor union action against budget cuts. The crisis has
already led most European states to cut defense spending, reducing the
capability of allies to support NATO and other U.S. security interests
around the world.
Turkey
Turkey's activist foreign policy has changed fundamentally during
the past year, mostly in reaction to Asad's brutal approach to the
opposition-led unrest in Syria. Ankara has since begun to support
overtly the Syrian political opposition by hosting its members in
Turkey. This is a departure from Turkey's ruling Justice and
Development party (AKP)-designed foreign policy approach, which
emphasized engagement and incentives for shaping behavior but is now
driven by the destabilizing regional effects of the Asad regime's
actions. Turkey continues to call on the international community to
take action against Asad and is increasingly turning to the United
States and NATO for assistance in managing the crisis.
The Turkish Kurdish terrorist group Kurdistan People's Congress
(KGK/former PKK) is Ankara's primary security threat. Turkey's Kurdish
issue, marked by armed struggle against insurgent KGK forces now
entering its fourth decade, is increasingly challenging Ankara
domestically with regional implications. KGK-initiated violence inside
of Turkey is at its deadliest level in more than a decade. This
development is fueling public opposition to much-needed constitutional
reforms to address the Turkish Kurdish minority's legitimate demands
for political and cultural rights. The sharp rise in violence has
pushed Ankara to lean more toward military, vice political, means to
deal with the KGK, although efforts are underway to relaunch talks with
the KGK leadership. Kurds in Syria are taking advantage of unrest
fomented by the opposition to Asad, which is stoking Turkish fears of
Kurdish separatism in Turkey.
Turkish relations with Iraq are strained. Turkish leaders are
concerned about what they perceive to be increasingly authoritarian
tendencies of the Maliki-led government, relations among communities
within Iraq, and perceived trends in Iraq's foreign policy. Iraq has
been angered by Turkey's efforts to expand political and energy ties
with Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region without consulting
Baghdad.
The Turkey-Israel bilateral relationship remains troubled. In a
September 2012 speech, Erdogan said Turkey would not normalize
relations with Israel until Israel met Ankara's three conditions:
publicly apologizing for the 2010 incident in which Israel interdicted
an aid flotilla headed for Gaza and killed nine aboard the ship Mavi
Marmara; providing reparations to the families of the Mavi Marmara
victims; and lifting the Gaza blockade. Israel's late 2012 operation
against HAMAS and other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza further
hardened Turkish attitudes. There seem to be few prospects for
improving relations between Israel and Turkey.
The Balkans
Ethnic and internal political divides in the Western Balkans will
continue to pose the greatest risk to regional stability in 2013. Many
fragile states in the region suffer from economic stagnation, high
unemployment, corruption, and weak rule of law. Although the security
situation in Kosovo's Serb-majority north has improved since fall 2011,
Western diplomatic and security engagement is needed to implement many
of the agreements reached in EU-sponsored talks.
As the EU-facilitated dialogue to help normalize relations between
Kosovo and Serbia gains traction, the risk of threats and violence by
ethnic Serb hardliners in northern Kosovo probably will increase.
Serbia gained EU candidacy status in March 2012 and would like a date
to begin EU accession talks. However, the relatively new government
(elected last May) faces large hurdles in fulfilling EU accession
criteria and reconciling Serbia's constitutional claims to Kosovo with
the fact that Kosovo is independent. Kosovo's supervised independence
ended in September 2012, and Pristina will likely seek to expand its
instruments of sovereignty over its territory. The Kosovo Government
opened the Mitrovica North Administrative Office in July 2012,
extending government services to the Serb-majority region. In June
2013, Kosovo law allows the government to change the mandate of
Pristina's potential efforts to transition the Kosovo Security Force
(KSF). This warrants attention to avoid negative responses from
Belgrade and the Kosovo Serb community in northern Kosovo.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), differences among Serb, Croat, and
Bosniak elites are intensifying, threatening BiH's state institutions
and posing obstacles to further Euro-Atlantic integration. A series of
political crises have distracted attention from pursuing needed reforms
for EU and NATO integration, and secessionist rhetoric from the
leadership of the political entity Republika Srpska has further
challenged Bosnia's internal cohesion. In Macedonia, we do not expect a
return to the civil war violence of a decade ago. However, disputes
between Albanian and Macedonian communities might become more polarized
in the coming year. Tension between Macedonia and Bulgaria warrants
attention. In addition, Greece's ongoing objection to the country using
the name ``Macedonia'' is another source of friction, and blocks
Macedonia's EU and NATO aspirations. In Albania, government
institutions suffer from corruption and excessive political influence.
In the lead-up to the June 2013 parliamentary elections, there is worry
about a return to the heated, partisan conflict that erupted after the
2009 parliamentary elections, when the opposition party contested the
election and boycotted parliament on-and-off for nearly 2 years.
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Flynn. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Levin,
Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the
committee:
Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your
continued support to the dedicated intelligence professionals
of the DIA and the entire defense intelligence enterprise, many
of whom are forward-deployed directly supporting U.S. and
allied military forces in Afghanistan, as well as in 141
countries in 262 locations around the world. I have been the
Director of DIA for nearly 8 months now and I cannot
overemphasize how proud and privileged I am to serve our Nation
in this capacity.
As our defense strategy highlights, our Nation is at a
moment of transition. The global security environment, as
Director Clapper just stated, presents increasingly complex
challenges and a growing list of threats and adversaries. The
demands on the U.S. intelligence system have skyrocketed in
recent years and these demands are only expected to increase.
The United States faces an uncertain security environment
marked by a broad spectrum of dissimilar threats from nation
states, non-nation state actors, transnational organized
criminal groups, highly adaptive transnational terrorist
networks, the proliferation of WMD, and the ever-looming and
very dangerous threat of cyber attacks against our defense
industrial base as well as against other critical components of
our Nation's infrastructure. I view this latter threat as the
most dangerous threat we face today.
This opening statement, along with my more thorough
statement for the record, reflects DIA's best analysis and it
is based on DIA's worldwide human intelligence, technical
intelligence, counterintelligence, and measurement and
signature intelligence collection, as well as our world-class
national-level document and media exploitation capabilities.
Additionally, our mission is executed in close collaboration
with our IC partners, our international coalition partners, as
well as utilizing the full range of open sources available in
today's information environment.
Our customers run the gamut from the President of the
United States on down to our warfighting combatant commanders.
But the most important customer we serve are the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who serve our Nation
around the world and who are willing to stand in harm's way to
protect our country.
Without restating what Director Clapper has already
addressed, I will simply say we face a complex and
interconnected global operational environment characterized by
a multitude of actors. This unprecedented array of threats and
challenges include the continuing threats from the Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan, al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
organizations in the Middle East and Africa, terrorist havens
in Pakistan, the popular upheavals and their aftermath in
Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran's
sustained nuclear and missile developments, North Korea's
continuing nuclear and missile provocations, the growing
seriousness of cyber threats to our defense industrial base,
our Nation's critical infrastructure, government networks, and
the American business community, particularly from China and
Iran, and finally the growth in China's economic and military
power. All of these factors place significant demands on the
DIA and the entire defense intelligence enterprise.
As stated above, I believe the most pressing threat facing
our country is the threat from cyber attacks. The daily
occurrences of attacks are damaging on a variety of levels and
they are not only persistent and dangerous; the likelihood of
serious damage to our national security is very real.
Potential adversaries are increasingly more capable of
conducting cyber operations. Cyber attacks remain an important
and increasing transnational threat to the security of the
United States, with state actors such as China, Russia, Iran,
and North Korea integrating these capabilities into their
intelligence-gathering methods and warfare doctrine. Malicious
actors, including terrorist organizations, have also
demonstrated the willingness, though limited capability, to use
cyber as a means to attack U.S. interests.
One final point regarding cyber attacks that we need to
keep in mind: Behind these attacks are human beings. Some are
non-state individuals, some part of state-sponsored networks,
but each with increasing capabilities and harmful intentions
doing damage to our national security.
Lastly, since DIA's mission includes providing our DOD
strategic warning, given the enduring impact of the Arab
Spring, the ongoing turmoil in Syria, persistent territorial
disputes globally, and emerging transnational threats
previously described, all these challenges underscore our need
for effective strategic warning and long-range foresight to
prevent strategic surprise.
Strategic problems such as proliferation of WMD, state-on-
state conflict, instability, resource scarcity, and terrorism
remain at the forefront of U.S. warning concerns, however
strategic surprise not only as a goal of the deliberate
deception efforts by our adversaries, but now also stemming
from human and social dynamics. Those small and varied
interactions with seemingly no immediate relevance to DOD can
rapidly evolve and radically alter U.S. policy.
To uncover these challenges, DIA in partnership with the
IC, our combatant commands, and our closest international
partners, monitors the interactions between military,
political, technological, economic, and social developments. We
place these events in the context of history, culture,
religion, and physical and human geography. Our ability to
understand these interactions provides decision advantage in
the face of unforeseen events to anticipate surprise.
Technological change has the potential to create surprise.
Less developed countries and non-state actors may surge with
innovative capabilities that could counter some U.S. military
capabilities. Proliferation of advanced technology and the
rapid improvements in commercial off-the-shelf technology will
aid development of new commercially-enabled asymmetric threats
and improvements in communications will speed the proliferation
of advanced and commercially available technologies.
In order to meet these challenges, DIA through our strategy
and our transformative Vision 2020, Driving Change Through
Integration Project, has undertaken several initiatives
intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of DIA
and the defense intelligence enterprise, the single biggest
component of which is our need to take the right lessons
learned from a decade of war and more closely integrate our
intelligence operations with our uniformed Services, our
combatant commands, our IC teammates, and our allies and
coalition partners.
To conclude, today's focus on combat operations in
Afghanistan against insurgents and transnational terrorism
around the world does not preclude the potential that other
threats will come to the fore, including conflicts among major
countries that could intersect vital U.S. interests. Defense
intelligence must be able to provide timely and actionable
intelligence across the entire threat spectrum.
In close collaboration with the IC, DIA is strengthening
collection and analysis and sharing more information across
intelligence disciplines and with our Nation's closest allies.
The men and women of DIA and our entire defense
intelligence enterprise know they have a unique responsibility
to the American people and take great pride in their work. I am
honored and privileged to serve with them and present their
analysis to you. On behalf of the men and women of DIA and the
entire enterprise, thank you for your continuing confidence.
Your support is vital to us as well as our national security,
and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Flynn follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA
Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and member of
the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your
continued support to the dedicated men and women of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), many of whom are forward-deployed directly
supporting U.S. and allied military forces in Afghanistan and other
places around the world.
The United States faces a complex security environment marked by a
broad spectrum of dissimilar threats and emerging from countries and
highly adaptive transnational terrorist networks. This testimony
reflects DIA's best analysis, based on the agency's worldwide human
intelligence, technical intelligence, counterintelligence, and document
and media exploitation capabilities, along with formation from DIA's
Intelligence Community (IC) partners, international allies, and open
sources.
I will begin my testimony first with an assessment of Afghanistan,
where the Department of Defense (DOD), the IC, DIA, and our coalition
partners remain actively engaged supporting military operations against
the threat of al Qaeda and other anti-goyernment of Afghanistan forces.
conflict in afghanistan
As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continues the
transition in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government and the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) will seek to complete a Bilateral
Security Agreement in 2013, assume full security lead for all
ofAfghanistan, and conduct presidential and provincial council
elections in 2014.
The Afghan Army and Police have performed well over the course of
2012. Increasing independent and Afghan-led operations, along with
joint operations with ISAF, have countered insurgent influence in key
urban centers in southern and eastern AfghanistIDt. Afghan Security
Forces have proven more capable and better coordinated in responding to
sustained high-profile attacks in Kabul, managing nationwide civil
unrest, and have additionally improved their capability to secure roads
and critical transportation corridors in the country's north. As an
auxiliary to Afghanistan's formal security forces, the Afghan Local
Police (ALP) have disrupted insurgent activity in rural areas that
might otherwise lack central government security presence.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) met
their recruitment goals for 2012. Overall force generation also remains
on track to support Afghan assumption of security lead for all of
Afghanistan by 2014. Future recruiting figures are expected to
fluctuate as recruiting requirements change to compensate for
attrition. However, we expect the force to remain within authorized
manning levels despite these fluctuations.
Operationally, the ANA has shown some improvement in capability and
effectiveness, but require sustained mentoring and direct support from
ISAF for combat enabling capabilities such as close air support;
medical evacuation; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and
counter-improvised explosive device (IED) expertise and technology.
This reliance on ISAF for combat enabler functions limits the ANA's
ability to independently project force outside of large urban areas and
logistical hubs. Despite these limitations, the Afghan population
continues to view the Army positively.
The Afghan Police are steadily improving although sustained
improvements to their development and capability will rely on continued
ISAF oversight, partnering, and support. ANP development challenges are
further compounded by a difficult dual mission of simultaneously
building law enforcement capability and serving as a paramilitary
backstop to the ANA. The Afghan Minister of Interior recognizes the
strain this dual role places on the ANP's already limited capacity and
has pledged to begin shifting the organization's focus toward the law
enforcement mission. The Afghan population holds the ANP in lower
regard than the Army, chiefly owing to perceptions of ineffectiveness
and corruption.
An emerging trend of concern is the recent rise of insider attacks
within the Afghan security forces, which accounted for 12 percent of
U.S. military casualties in 2012. Perpetrator motivations are known in
only about half the attacks, with causation roughly split between
personal acrimony and insurgent influence. Although the Afghan
Government has begun implementing a counter-intelligence plan for
reducing infiltration, many of the causes behind these incidents are
expected to persist absent systematic improvements in the quality of
leadership within the security forces.
Over the course of 2013, the Afghan Government will face several
pivotal issues. Negotiations over a Bilateral Security Agreement with
the United States will likely increase tension over issues related to
Afghan sovereignty such as the footprint and activities of U.S. forces
post 2014 Technical and political preparations for the 2014
presidential election will begin in earnest, potentially distracting
from other governance initiatives and reforms. Persistent human capital
shortages and weak institutions will continue to limit the reach of the
central government, impede service delivery, and erode the government's
connection to the population. These challenges will be especially
pronounced as Kabul struggles to extend its writ in heavily contested
and geographically remote areas of Afghanistan which are expected to
transition next year. Corruption at all levels of the government is
expected to persist, despite President Karzai's renewed focus on
reforms, as powerbrokers strengthen their patronage networks in
anticipation of an uncertain future post-2014.
Regarding Iranian influence in Afghanistan, Iran maintains a degree
of economic leverage over Afghanistan, which it has attempted to use to
extract political concessions from the Afghan Government. Iran is a key
trade partner, providing critical imports of fuel to Afghanistan. Iran
also hosts approximately 3 million Afghan refugees and, in May of last
year, threatened their expulsion if the Afghan parliament approved the
U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Although the threat was
unsuccessful in deterring the Agreement, a mass deportation from Iran
would cause a significant humanitarian crisis inside Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda leaders continue to view participation in attacks against
the coalition as a key element showcasing al Qaeda as the leader of the
global jihad. However, the group's operational capacity in Afghanistan
is limited. There is a small al Qaeda presence in the northeastern
mountains in addition to pockets of al Qaeda fighters elsewhere in the
country. Despite recent Taliban statements distancing the Taliban from
international terrorism, we expect al Qaeda to continue its limited
support to the Afghan insurgency and to use media statements to hail
the pending 2014 draw down as a victory for jihadists.
transnational terrorist threat
Transnational and regional terrorist threat organizations continue
to impact governments and U.S. interests around the world, particularly
al Qaeda and its associated groups.
al qaeda
Several years of sustained counterterrorism pressure have degraded
al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership. Al Qaeda is now forced to rely on
a limited cadre of experienced leaders, who are restricted to operating
primarily inside a Haqqani Taliban Network-facilitated safehaven in
North Waziristan. This pressure has made it difficult for al Qaeda to
replenish its senior ranks with the experienced leaders, trainers, and
attack planners it was able to promote in previous years. It has also
limited the group's ability to mount sophisticated, complex attacks in
the west similar to the attempted 2006 transatlantic airliner plot.
Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda retains the intent, though not the
robust capability, to plan and conduct terrorist attacks against the
west, including the United States. al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan
continues to inspire and guide its regional nodes, allies, and like-
minded extremists to engage in terrorism against the west. Looking
ahead, only sustained counterterrorism pressure against al Qaeda in
Pakistan and Afghanistan will diminish the group's operational
capabilities in the long term.
In addition, Pakistan-based al Qaeda will retain its leadership
role, guiding the al Qaeda-associated movement over the next 6 to 12
months. Even if continued counterterrorism pressure further diminishes
the leadership, the remaining al Qaeda senior leaders will retain at
least a symbolic leadership role through public statements and
strategic guidance to regional nodes.
Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains
resolute in targeting the U.S. Homeland, as well as U.S. and western
interests in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. However, ongoing
counterterrorism efforts against the group's leaders are likely slowing
progress of operational coordination. Over the next 6 months, the group
will likely focus on attacks against U.S., Western, Yemeni, and Saudi
interests in the Arabian Peninsula while simultaneously pursuing
external plotting in the west.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) exhibits resilience through its sustained
ability to conduct periodic coordinated and complex attacks throughout
Iraq. The group directs the majority of its propaganda and attacks
against Iraqi Government, security, and Shia civilian targets hoping to
destabilize the government and inflame sectarian tensions. Since the
departure of U.S. forces, AQI has exploited the more permissive
security environment to increase its operations and presence in many
locations. AQI also has expanded into Syria, participating in the
conflict there under the name ofal-Nusrah Front. Since mid-2011, AQI
has dispatched personnel, money, and materiel from Iraq to support the
formation and development of al-Nusrah Front, and in December the State
Department designated al-Nusrah Front as an alias for AQI.
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies
have proven resilient despite the French-led military intervention in
northern Mali. Although these groups no longer control key strategic
towns, we continue to judge they retain the capability to launch
attacks within Mali and neighboring countries. Exploiting the
permissive Libyan security environment, AQIM acquired new weapons
including probably a small number ofMan-portable Air Defense Systems.
Further, AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-
associated terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, throughout
the region to influence and support attack planning.
other terrorist groups/areas of concern
In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remains resilient despite the
Somali Government, African Union Mission in Somalia, and Ethiopian
National Defense Force's coalition ability to maintain pressure on the
group. Despite its loss of territory, al-Shabaab will continue
asymmetric and terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya during 2013.
Concurrently, al-Shabaab-associated foreign fighters are expected to
increasingly plot attacks regionally.
Iran supports and arms terrorist and militant groups in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and the Levant. The Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) trains and provides
weapons and logistic support to Lebanese Hizballah. In turn, Lebanese
Hizballah trains Iraqi Shia insurgents and terrorists in Iraq, Iran,
Lebanon providing them with tactics and technology which pose a threat
to U.S. interests. Iran's security forces, since mid-2012 have also
provided training, advice, money, weapons and equipment for Jaysh al
Sha'bi a Syrian pro-regime militia. This training, some of which has
taken place in Iran at government facilities, has enabled Jaysh al
Sha'bi to operate rifles, mortars and rocket propelled grenades. The
October 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United
States, the disrupted attacks in Azerbaijan, Thailand, and Kenya, and
the February 13, 2012, attacks in India and Georgia illustrate the
terrorist threat posed by Tehran.
Since 2011, terrorist and militia groups with ties to al Qaeda have
been exploiting Libya's security environment to establish a permanent
presence and target U.S. and Western interests, as demonstrated by the
June 6 and September 11 attacks against the U.S. mission in Benghazi.
Since the revolution, they have established training camps, acquired
weapons, and strengthened and thickened networks to support attacks
throughout the region.
Southeast Asia (SEA) remains a facilitation hub for transnational
terrorist groups. Transnational and regional Islamic terrorists and
insurgents exploit porous borders and limited security cooperation
between SEA nations, enabling movement of personnel and logistics
throughout the region. Although authorities have arrested several
terrorists with ties to al Qaeda, al Qaeda remains interested in
maintaining links to associated networks and persistent efforts by al
Qaeda to reestablish a foothold in SEA remain a long-term threat.
In Latin America, Iran and Lebanese Hizballah are trying to expand
influence and have regional networks that support global contingency
planning. The fall 2011 Iranian plot to use Mexico as an operational
platform to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States
illustrates the potential Iranian terrorist threat in the Western
Hemisphere. Hizballah supporters and sympathizers exploit lax financial
laws, widespread corruption, and porous borders throughout the Western
Hemisphere. These individuals focus on cultivating relationships
through cultural and religious organizations; expanding political
agendas; and overtly increasing international support from sympathetic
governments, Shia communities, and Lebanese expatriates. Some of these
sympathizers and supporters are also active in criminal enterprises in
the region, to include money laundering, document forgery, and the drug
trade.
In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
poses the most significant continuing threat to U.S. personnel and
interests in 2013. The FARC considers U.S. personnel and interests in
Colombia as legitimate targets, and U.S. personnel collocated with host
nation forces remain at risk. Separately, the National Liberation Army
(ELN) will maintain its current limited operational tempo in Colombia,
but we believe the group will present no direct terrorist threat to
U.S. personnel in 2013. Both groups derive a large portion of their
operational funding from the drug trade, though the ELN is less of a
trafficking threat than the FARC, which remains Colombia's largest drug
trafficking organization, and other purely criminal groups.
homegrown violent extremist and insider threats
Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) are a growing threat to the
DOD, as evidenced by numerous disrupted plots targeting DOD facilities,
installations, and personnel since 2009. The majority of HVE plots are
unsophisticated, use readily available weapons, and target nearby
facilities. While they are less likely to generate spectacular, mass
casualty attacks than transnational terror groups, HVE attacks are
considerably more difficult for law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to detect and disrupt.
Since 2009 a small number of individuals working for or with access
to DOD personnel and facilities have acted on behalf of or have been
inspired by terrorist groups. We anticipate terrorist groups and
sympathetic extremists will seek to establish relationships with
individuals associated with DOD to collect information and conduct
attacks both inside and outside of the United States. This is why our
counterintelligence efforts to thwart these types of attacks must
maintain a robust and ready component of our overall force posture.
cyber threat
Potential adversaries are increasingly more capable of conducting
cyber operations. The continually increasing transnational threat of a
cyber attack remains of vital interest to the security of the United
States.
As the United States, the DOD, and our interdependent defense
systems and critical infrastructure continue to grow more reliant on
the convergence of networks and the Internet, any uncertainty as to how
state or non-state actors will use cyber warfare capabilities will
threaten our ability to appropriately defend our critical defense
systems and infrastructure, as well as our ability to plan for military
responses. The recent Aramco attacks in Saudi Arabia as well as the
distributed denial of service against U.S. financial institutions
highlight developing challenges in this area.
Some of the most advanced cyber state actors probably will not
launch a devastating cyber attack against the United States absent a
military conflict or other existential threat within the next 2 years,
however, continued cyber reconnaissance and exploitation from a myriad
of cyber actors will continue.
Another significant global cyber development is the role. The
Internet plays in political stability and regime change, as governments
are trying to increase their content control in cyber space; several
nations are advocating control policies and restrictive Internet
governance. The Arab Spring and recent online releases from Syria
underscore the interconnected nature of our global society and the ease
by which developing events can be portrayed and disseminated in near
real time, significantly challenging oppressive governmental authority.
nations and regions of interest
Iran
Shifting focus to Iran, Tehran poses a major threat to U.S.
interests through its regional ambitions, support to terrorist and
militant groups, and improving military capabilities and nuclear
ambitions. Iran continues efforts to gain regional power by countering
Western influence, expanding ties with its neighbors, and advocating
Islamic solidarity while supporting and arming groups in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the Levant.
Iran has threatened to temporarily restrict commercial and military
vessels from accessing the Strait ofHormuz if it is attacked or in
response to further sanctions on its oil exports. Iran has also
threatened to launch missiles against U.S. targets and our regional
allies in response to an attack. Tehran could also employ its terrorist
surrogates worldwide in response to an attack or provocation. However,
it is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict or
launch a preemptive attack.
In its relationship to Iraq, Iran generally has strong relations
with Baghdad, despite some points of friction. Tehran supports Prime
Minister Maliki and wants to maintain a friendly, Shia Islamist-led
government in Baghdad. Iran welcomed the U.S. drawdown, and Supreme
Leader Khamenei and senior Iranian military officials view the U.S.
military withdrawal as a strategic defeat for the United States. Over
the long-term, Iran is concerned a strong Iraq could once again emerge
as a regional rival, particularly given unresolved issues such as
border demarcation.
Iran is attempting to expand its influence with new regional
governments that Tehran perceives to be allies of the United States.
Tehran also continues to build ties with groups it perceives to be
hostile to U.S. interests, particularly the Huthis in Yemen. Iran is
seriously concerned by the conflict in Syria, a country which is
essential to Tehran's strategy in the Levant. Iran's strategy in Syria
includes providing variety of lethal and non-lethal support to the
Syrian regime, led predominately by the Qods Force.
Iran is making steady improvement to its military capabilities. The
navy, in particular, is developing faster, more lethal surface vessels,
growing its submarine force, expanding its cruise missile defense
strategy, and increasing its presence in the Gulf of Oman, the Persian
Gulf, and the Caspian Sea. The navy continues to conduct out of area
deployments, to include near continuous counter-piracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea as well as a deployment to the
Mediterranean Sea in early 2012, and aspires to travel as far as the
Atlantic Ocean.
Iran can strike targets throughout the region and into Eastern
Europe. In addition to its growing missile and rocket inventories, Iran
is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing systems
with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is developing
an anti-ship ballistic missile called Khalij Fars, which could threaten
maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.
Iran's Simorgh space launch vehicle shows the country's intent to
develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) technology.
Iran constitutes the most significant counterintelligence threat in
the mid-east. Iran's highest priority intelligence targets are the
U.S., Israel and internal opposition groups. Iran's intelligence
services, the Ministry ofIntelligence and Security (MOIS) and IRGC-QF,
target DOD interests throughout the world, most markedly in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Iran's intelligence services also play a vital role projecting
Iranian influence beyond its borders. The Qods Force plays a central--
yet often hidden--role in formulating and implementing Iran's Foreign
Policy, particularly in areas considered vital to Iran's national
security interests, like Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran's intelligence
services continue to improve their technical capabilities and expand
Iran's influence into Latin American and Africa.
North Korea
Turning to East Asia nations, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea's (DPRK) primary national goals are preserving its current system
of government, improving its poor economy, and building national
support for its current leader, Kim Jong Un. North Korea's leadership
is emphasizing policy continuity under Kim Jong Un, including continued
pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities for strategic deterrence,
international prestige, and to gain economic and political concessions.
Kim Jong Un is firmly in control of the DPRK and he has assumed all
significant senior Party and military positions, including Supreme
Commander of the Korean Peoples' Army, First Secretary of the Korea
Workers' Party Secretariat, and First Chairman of the National Defense
Commission. The younger Kim possesses a charisma that his father did
not and is depicted as a caring but firm leader, much in the image of
his grandfather, Kim II Sung. Kim Jong Un has asserted his authority by
replacing and reassigning senior officials and by strengthening Party
control over the Military.
We believe North Korea sees benefit in negotiations with the United
States, but is no longer willing to negotiate over eliminating its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Convinced of its need to
possess nuclear weapons as a guarantor of its national security, North
Korea is more likely now to push for negotiations over security
guarantees, a peace treaty, and elimination of economic sanctions. In
the process, North Korea will likely seek international recognition as
a nuclear power and acceptance of its right to a space program.
In response to United Nations Security Council condemnation of its
December Taepo-Dong-2 space launch and apparent nuclear test in
February, North Korea has threatened additional coercive actions which
may include long range ballistic missile launches and more nuclear
tests. While these actions leave North Korea more isolated economically
and diplomatically, we believe North Korea's intent ultimately is to
convince the United States of the futility of continued sanctions and
force the United States back to negotiations on terms more favorable to
North Korea.
North Korea's large, forward-positioned military can attack South
Korea with little or no warning, but it suffers from logistic
shortages, aging equipment, and poor training. Pyongyang likely knows
it cannot reunite the Korean Peninsula by force and is unlikely to
attack on a scale that would risk the survival of its regime, but has
improved its capability to conduct military provocations, especially
along the disputed maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. Pyongyang is
also making efforts to upgrade conventional weapons, including
modernizing every aspect of its deployed missile forces.
The regime is pursuing a uranium enrichment capability for nuclear
weapons. It also seeks ballistic missiles with nuclear capability and
continues to develop the Taepo-Dong-2, as well as a road mobile ICBM,
which it paraded in April 2012. North Korea has already taken some
initial steps towards fielding this mobile system. It also used its
Taepo-Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus
demonstrating its long-range missile technology.
North Korea conducted Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming in
April-May 2012 that reportedly interfered with maritime and aviation
navigation.
China
Turning to China, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is building a
modern military capable of defending China's ``core interests'' of
protecting territorial integrity (which includes Taiwan and other
territorial and maritime claims around China's border), preserving
China's political system and ensuring sustainable economic and social
development. Preparation for a Taiwan conflict with U.S. intervention
remains the primary driver of the PLA's evolving force structure,
weapons development, operational planning and training.
China has spent as much as $215 billion on military-related goods
and services in 2012, in contrast to the $107 billion Beijing reported
in its official military budget. This budget omits major categories,
but it does show spending increases for domestic military production
and programs to improve professionalism and the quality of life for
military personnel.
Even as the Chinese military plans for conflict and continues its
build-up across from Taiwan, cross-Strait relations have remained good
following Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's January 2012 re-election.
Both sides continue to strengthen economic and cultural engagement and
have largely adhered to a diplomatic truce in the competition to
persuade other countries to switch diplomatic recognition.
Disputed areas in the East and South China Seas remain flashpoints,
with Chinese assertion of sovereignty frustrating Japan's and Southeast
Asian claimants' determination to exploit their claimed exclusive
economic zones. The tensions raise prospects for further incidents,
although interest by all sides in avoiding serious conflict reduces
chances for an escalation involving military force.
China's ground force is seeking to restructure itself into a
mechanized, modular force that can respond to support joint operations
anywhere along China's borders. This goal is currently taking shape
with an emphasis on building and outfitting brigades as the main
operational unit while upgrading their command staffs know-how in
information technology and automated command systems.
The PLA navy is developing the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine and JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which
may reach initial operational capability around 2014. China's
investment in naval weapons primarily focuses on anti-air and anti-
surface capabilities to achieve periodic and local sea and air
superiority within the first island chain. China's first aircraft
carrier, which commissioned in late 2012, will not reach its full
potential until it acquires an operational fixed-wing air regiment in
several years.
China's air force is transforming from a force oriented solely on
territorial defense into one capable of both offshore offensive and
defensive roles, including strike, air and missile defense, and early
warning and reconnaissance. It is also seeking to improve its strategic
projection by increasing its long-range transport and logistical
capabilities. Modernization efforts include investing in stealth
technology, as evidenced by testing of a fifth generation fighter
prototype in 2011 and the roll-out and testing of a smaller fifth
generation fighter in 2012.
China's nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75
ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-
mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited
range CSS-3 (DF-3). Of these systems, less than 50 can range the
continental United States. To modernize the nuclear missile force,
China is adding more survivable road-mobile systems, enhancing its
silo-based systems, and developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent. They
are also augmenting the over 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic
missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a limited but growing number of
conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. China is also developing a tiered
ballistic missile defense system and has successfully tested the upper-
tier capability on two occasions.
China's space program enhances China's conventional military
capabilities. China operates satellites for communications, navigation,
earth resources, weather, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, in addition to manned space and space exploration
missions. China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) missile in 2007, and is developing other counterspace
capabilities.
China poses a significant intelligence threat as well. It uses non-
traditional collectors with no overt ties to the Chinese Government as
well as its formal intelligence services to gather U.S. defense
information, target civilian dual-use research, and obtain sensitive
U.S. military technologies. Economic espionage, illicit procurement,
and the theft of trade secrets and dual-use or military technology have
revealed pervasive Chinese collection efforts, resulting in multiple
indictments and convictions.
Pakistan
In Pakistan, tension in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship eased with
the July 2012 reopening of the U.S./NATO supply lines in Pakistan after
an 8-month closure and an apparent decision by Pakistan to reset the
relationship. Although dialogue has resumed, anti-U.S. sentiment and
criticism of Pakistan's cooperation with the United States among the
population remains high.
Islamabad is currently focused on the upcoming spring 2013
elections, which would represent the first transition of a civilian
government to another democratically elected civilian government.
Pakistan's Army chief Kayani is also scheduled to retire from his post
in late 2013.
Approximately one-third of Pakistan's army and paramilitary forces
are deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP) to support combat operations at any
given time. Over the past year, Pakistan conducted efforts to counter
militants in the FATA and KPP which directly threaten Pakistan's
internal security. Despite some success disrupting Pakistan-focused
militant activity, Pakistan continues to struggle to maintain security
due to its continued counter-insurgency fight and the extremely
difficult terrain. Islamabad has stated its intention to conduct large-
scale military operations against militants in North Waziristan,
although it is unclear when these operations will commence.
Pakistan has taken steps to improve bilateral ties with Kabul over
the past year. Tension with Kabul increased after Kabul implicated
Islamabad in the 2011 assassination ofAfghanistan's High Peace Council
Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani. After bilateral relations resumed in
February 2012, Pakistan acquiesced to long-time Afghan requests by
publicly calling on the Taliban to join reconciliation efforts and
releasing some Taliban prisoners to energize the Afghan peace process.
However, longstanding issues including cross-border shelling by
Pakistan and alleged Afghan safe havens for anti-Pakistan militant
groups continue to impede broader cooperation.
Pakistan and India continue to no progress on economic and trade
issues, despite deeply held mistrust, but little progress has been made
on territorial issues. A major terrorist attack against India linked to
Pakistan, would result in renewed tension and potential for escalation.
India
While the India-Pakistan rivalry continues to overlay regional and
military competition between the two nations, relations between New
Delhi and Islamabad improved in 2012. India and Pakistan agreed to
expand trade, and continue to discuss implementation of Pakistan's
decision to grant India Most Favored Nation trade status. They are
expected to continue holding talks on nuclear and conventional
confidence-building measures through the year.
New Delhi and Beijing continue to conduct military-to-military
engagement and discuss their longstanding border dispute. India is
concerned over Chinese logistical improvements and is taking steps to
improve its own capabilities. India is raising additional ground
forces, improving logistical capacity, and has based advanced fighter
aircraft opposite China. India remains concerned over China's activity
in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, and seeks to ensure access
to resources and maritime trade routes.
In 2012, India expanded its efforts to increase regional economic
and military ties. India and Japan conducted their first bilateral
naval exercise, and India and Vietnam increased their naval engagement.
Additionally, in the summer of 2012 India requested full membership in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the focus of which now
includes military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and
counterterrorism.
India seeks a moderate government in Afghanistan that will deny
anti-Indian militant groups the use of its territory from which to
launch attacks on India. New Delhi has pledged economic and development
assistance and provides limited training to Afghan National Security
Force personnel at military institutions in India.
India is in the midst of a major military modernization effort--
undertaken by all three Military Services--to address problems with its
aging equipment and to posture itself to defend against Pakistan and to
a lesser extent China. Military modernization is progressing slowly due
to India's bureaucratic procurement process and a defense industry,
which fails to provide equipment to the services that meet
requirements. Currently, India fulfills over 70 percent of its Military
Service equipment requirements through foreign acquisitions; New Delhi
would like to reverse this percentage, sourcing 70 percent of
requirements from indigenous defense industries.
India conducts periodic tests of its nuclear-capable missiles to
enhance and verify missile reliability and capabilities. India's
delivery systems include nuclear-capable fighter aircraft and ballistic
missiles. India is developing a nuclear-capable 6,000 km range
intercontinental ballistic missile that will eventually carry multiple
warheads. Its first flight test occurred in April 2012 with a single
warhead.
arab spring
The Arab Spring unleashed powerful new populist forces in the Arab
world-long suppressed by autocratic regimes--leading to a high degree
of uncertainty. With the formation of new governments only now
beginning across North Africa, the political and security outcomes
remain unclear. Various forms of Islam will play more prominent roles
in governments than in the past. However, new governments face the same
significant economic challenges that hastened their predecessors'
downfall, suggesting that these governments will struggle to satisfy
newly emboldened electorates, making future unrest likely.
The outcome in countries still facing unrest, such as Syria, is
similarly unclear. Syria remains a stalemate between a cohesive, but
embattled regime, and a fractured opposition that appears to be gaining
ground but has yet to either coalesce into a force capable of
overthrowing the regime or convince the majority of the population they
are a viable alternative. The regime has lost enough legitimacy that
its long-term survival is unlikely, but when and how the stalemate will
break is uncertain.
Libya
The first free elections in over 40 years took place in Libya on
July 7, 2012. Moderate parties with pro-western leanings outperformed
Islamists, but the ideological character of the interim government
remains unclear. This government will write a new constitution and form
a permanent government over the next year. It also faces issues left
unresolved by its predecessor, including reintegrating militias,
rebuilding security institutions, and allocating resources, including
oil and fresh water.
Libya's national military has minimal capabilities following the
revolution. The government therefore relies on affiliated militias to
help maintain order, but the continued existence of heavily armed
militias established along ethnic, tribal and religious lines threatens
stability. Attempts are underway to rein in these militias, mainly by
absorption into an organization called Libya Shield under the Army
Chief of Staff.
Libya, a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in
February 2004, previously declared a stockpile of bulk liquid sulfur
mustard, jellified mustard heel, and liquid precursors. An equipment
malfunction required a suspension of destruction activities in early
February 2011, just before the outbreak of hostilities. Libyan forces
also discovered additional chemical weapons or material in Libya and
the government has indicated that it intends to continue cooperation
with the international community regarding existing CW stockpiles.
Tripoli is consulting regularly with the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) regarding resumption of
destruction activities and will probably complete destruction of the
stockpiles.
Syria
After 2 years of unrest, Syrian President Asad's hold on power is
becoming tenuous, due to the improved effectiveness of Syria's internal
armed opposition and deteriorating security situation in the country.
Asad's inner circle appears to be largely cohesive. The Syrian
military, despite casualties, desertions, and defections, remains
largely cohesive, but is likely stretched thin by constant operations.
The military has not been able to quash opposition activity in the
vital cities of Damascus and Aleppo--despite employing increasingly
lethal tactics--and appears to be straining to maintain operations in
other parts of the country.
The Syrian regime maintains the military advantage--particularly in
firepower and air superiority--but continues to struggle with
defections, morale problems, and an overall inability to decisively
defeat the opposition. Opposition fighters have gained control of
territory in the east and along the strategic northern border with
Turkey, which serves as the insurgents' primary supply line.
Coordination has improved among some internal armed opposition groups;
however, ties with external groups, including nominal Free Syrian Army
(FSA) leaders in Turkey, are increasingly strained.
Syria's most prominent external political opposition group, the
Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), is attempting to gain internal
legitimacy, but no group has been able to unite the diverse groups
behind a strategy for replacing the regime. Regional pressure has
increased as the Arab League (AL) continues calling on the regime to
end violence while other states provide increased amounts of lethal and
non-lethal support to opposition forces.
Damascus continues its strategic partnership with Hizballah and
perceives it as an extension of its defense against Israel and internal
opposition. Since early 2011, Hizballah has provided training, advice,
and extensive logistic support to the Syrian Government and its
supporters. Hizballah--has directly trained Syrian Government personnel
inside Syria and has facilitated IRGC-QF training of some Syrian
forces. Hizballah also has played a substantial role in efforts to
expel Syrian opposition forces from areas within Syria. Iran also has
actively supported the Syrian regime in its fight against the
opposition.
Syria, not a state party to the CWC, maintains an advanced Chemical
Weapons (CW) program and has a stockpile that includes either complete
or binary components of sarin, mustard, and VX. During the past several
years, Damascus has continued to seek CW-related precursors and
technology from foreign sources. Syria has signed, but did not ratify
the Biological Weapons (BW) Convention. We do not believe Syria has
achieved a capability to use biological agents as effective mass-
casualty weapons. We also remain concerned terrorists, including al
Qaeda in Iraq's Syria-based group al-Nusrah Front, will seek to obtain
Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) should security fail in the
wake of the unrest, as al Qaeda and its regional node al Qaeda in Iraq
have aspired to obtain WMD in the past.
Syria has several hundred SCUD-B, -C, and -D, and SS-21 SRBMs and
may have chemical warheads available for a portion of its SCUD
missiles. Syria also has a domestic version of the Iranian 600 mm
Fateh-110 SRBM. All of Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach much
of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch
sites well within the country. Damascus relies on foreign help, mainly
from Iran, to advance its solid-propellant rocket and missile
development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant
missile program depends on essential foreign equipment and assistance,
primarily from North Korean entities.
Egypt
Turning to Egypt, civil-military relations are in flux after
President Mohamed Mursi--the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice
(FJP) candidate elected in June--retired Egypt's military leadership.
The military is now under the leadership of Defense Minister General
Abd al-Fatah el-Sisi, who appears responsive to Mursi. Islamist/secular
tension remains high following the referendum that approved Egypt's new
constitution. President Mursi's November 22 declaration expanded his
executive powers and removed the majority of judicial oversight of the
president; the subsequent and ongoing violent protests throughout the
country underscore the growing divide within Egyptian society over the
future of the revolution. Domestic security and terrorist threats,
especially in the Sinai, continue to challenge the government as it
concurrently focuses resources on reforming the Ministry of Interior
and tackling Egypt's economic crisis.
Domestic security remains a challenge for the Mursi Government, as
the police are alienate from the public following their role in tamping
down protests during the 2011 revolution. Nearly 2 years following the
revolution, the military continues to fulfill some domestic security
functions as police and security forces attempt to regain their
capabilities and legitimacy. For example, Egyptian security forces
struggled to control protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo in mid-
September, resulting in perimeter breaches. Meanwhile, the Sinai
security situation continues to deteriorate and terrorist networks
build their capabilities amid the security vacuum.
remaining levant
In Israel, there is increasing concern that regional instability
will increase threats and undermine longstanding peace agreements.
Israel and Jordan are particularly concerned about the prospects for
chaos and long-term instability in Syria. The primary worry is the
security of Syria's chemical and biological weapons, but Jordan's
fragile economy is stressed by a growing number ofSyrian refugees and
the need for military vigilance on its border with Syria. Unrest in
Syria has heightened sectarian tensions in Lebanon and sporadic
violence is likely in the coming year, especially as the spring
parliamentary elections approach. Israel-Egypt military relationships
are intact, despite increasing tension at senior levels over the past
several months related to increased weapons smuggling and terrorism
from Sinai.
The Gaza Strip, since the mid-November conflict, has been the
quietest it has been for years, with virtually no rocket or mortar
attacks on Israel. HAMAS remains preoccupied with internal Palestinian
issues but is attempting to obtain more advanced weapons from Iran and
Libya. The Palestinian Popular Resistance Committees and al Qaeda-
associated terrorists are exploiting the post-revolutionary environment
in the Sinai to expand their operational capabilities. Increased
international cooperation against HAMAS and Iranian arms smuggling
could hamper HAMAS' access to weapons, but will not affect its ability
to control the Gaza Strip.
Hizballah is focused on internal Lebanese political issues and
improving its paramilitary capabilities. Israel and Hizballah are
preparing for another round of fighting, but Hizballah currently
appears to have no interest in renewing the conflict. Hizballah' s
attack against an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria on July 18, which killed
five Israelis, reflects the group's aggressive posture and ability to
maintain plausible deniability. Israel's next battle with Hizballah is
likely to involve more ground forces early in the conflict and may
extend much deeper into Lebanon.
Iraq
Since formally ending the Iraq mission in December 2011, the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) have demonstrated progress in providing security
and will probably be able to maintain internal security over the next
year. While sectarian tensions have increased due to the government's
unwillingness to share power and the growing crisis in Syria, the
violence in Iraq is expected to remain consistent with levels observed
since late 2009 as long as the Syrian regime stays in power and the
spillover of violence is limited. The ISF is becoming more capable
having led Iraqi security operations since late 2010, but can quickly
become overwhelmed as they still require training and assistance in a
number of areas including logistics, intelligence, and employment of
newly acquired equipment. The ISF have demonstrated an ability to put
forces on the street, conduct static security of high-profile sites,
and operate checkpoints. However, numerous security vulnerabilities
remain due to manning shortages, logistical shortfalls, and overly
centralized command and control. The ISF are still unable to defend
against external threats especially from the air, having no ability to
defend their airspace.
Although Interior Ministry police forces have taken the lead for
internal security in some locations, they are not prepared to take
overall responsibility from the Iraqi Army. Outside of select Iraqi
counterterrorism units, Iraqi police forces are understaffed, ill-
equipped, and vulnerable to terrorist attack, infiltration, and
corruption.
Iraq's Sunni population is increasingly distraught over its
fortunes in Iraq and continued targeting by the Shia-led government in
Baghdad. The arrest of Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi's security
team only a year after a similar action against former Sunni Vice
President Tariq al-Hashimi set off large-scale demonstrations in Iraq's
three major Sunni provinces. Although the demonstrations thus far have
been mostly peaceful, if Sunnis do not see progress through the
political process or concessions from the Iraqi Government, some may
seek change through force rather than the ballot box.
Sunni insurgent groups will remain persistent security challenges
for the Iraqi Government and remaining U.S. personnel, but they are
unlikely to threaten the existence of the Iraqi Government over the
next year. Nationalist insurgent Sunni groups have downsize as members
motivated by opposition to the U.S. presence have ceased operations and
moved to support Sunni groups in Syria, however a core of fighters
remain committed to attacking the Iraqi Government. Additionally former
Sunni insurgent, tribal, and political leaders are uniting under a
peaceful movement that some have labeled the ``Sunni Spring'' in a bid
to secure more political power from Baghdad. While the Sunni movement
is peaceful now, it could quickly spiral into violent movement if the
ISF overreacts, the Sunnis fail to gain concessions from Baghdad, or
the Sunnis begin to fracture into move violent groups. While Shia armed
groups have not conducted attacks this year, likely because they
perceive attacks against the United States are not currently in their
interest--however, they remain capable of resuming violence and are
preparing for any spill over of violence from Syria that could embolden
a renewed Sunni insurgency.
Iraq recently has pursued numerous foreign military sales contracts
to overcome equipment shortfalls. However, we expect it will take
several years for the new acquisitions to improve Iraqi military
capabilities. In October 2012, Iraq negotiated preliminary arms deals
worth over $4 billion with Russia that included attack helicopters and
air defense systems, they will probably sign those contracts in 2013.
Iraq will attempt to balance its relationship with the Sunni Arab
states, Iran, Turkey, and the United States over the coming year. Iraq
advocates a negotiated transition for the Syrian Government to restore
stability and prevent a spillover of violence in Iraq. Iran will
continue to broaden its diplomatic, security and economic ties with
Iraq while Sunni Arab states will remain suspicious of Baghdad's Shia-
led government and its ties to Tehran. We expect Baghdad will support
policies Iraqi leaders perceive are consistent with their strategic
goal of ensuring a stable, Shia-dominated Iraq.
Arabian Gulf
The security situation throughout Yemen remains tenuous, with
government security forces focused either on providing security in
Sanaa or working to counter AQAP. Iranian meddling in Yemen's domestic
affairs--including support to the Huthi movement in the north and
secessionists in the south--presents an additional security risk. The
political transition and military reorganization are positive
improvements, but both are proceeding extremely slowly. Yemen's failing
economy, dwindling water resources, and food insecurity will further
complicate efforts to stabilize the country.
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia continue to experience opposition
protests, however they do not pose existential threats to the regimes.
In Bahrain, low-level street violence has become the norm, with radical
youth groups regularly using Molotov cocktails, IEDs and other homemade
weapons to attack police patrols. There were a number of violent
clashes and protests in Bahrain leading up to February 14th, the 2-year
anniversary of the Shia uprising; however, Bahraini security forces
consistently use less-than-lethal measures to disperse these protests.
Shia in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province also conduct sporadic protests.
While the Saudi Government has generally practiced restraint, a few
Shia have died during clashes.
Russia
Moscow has serious concerns about missile defense plans in Europe
and is using diplomacy and public relations to try to shape
implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach--the U.S.
contribution to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense
system. Moscow insists on legal guarantees that missile defense systems
would not target Russia's strategic capabilities. Russian leaders have
threatened to take military countermeasures if the impasse in missile
defense negotiations persists.
Russia continues to cooperate in Afghanistan with the United States
and NATO. Russia's Afghanistan policy reflects an uneasy balance
between Moscow's wish for stability in Afghanistan and its suspicion
that Washington is pursuing anti-Russian geopolitical objectives in
Central Asia. With the drawdown of U.S. forces set for 2014, Russia is
increasingly worried about security threats flowing from Afghanistan.
Moscow will likely continue to allow supplies to pass through Russia,
but will resist a long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia.
Russia also will likely reach out to countries in the region, such as
Pakistan, in an attempt to shape the security environment leading up to
and after the planned withdrawal.
Moscow's 10-year rearmament plan is a top priority for the Armed
Forces, but it faces funding and implementation risks owing in part to
a potential decline in oil and gas revenues, spending inefficiencies,
an aging industrial base, and corruption. Russia spent an announced
$63.2 billion on its Armed Forces this year, and the current budget
plan calls for a 9.8 percent inflation-adjusted increase in 2013.
Multiple demands on the Russia budget, including President Putin's
insistence the current budget fund his social spending decrees, have
caused the defense budget to grow at a slower pace than Moscow
originally intended.
The general purpose forces--to include dual-use nonstrategic
nuclear forces--will continue to acquire new equipment for the near-
term, but deliveries will be small and largely consist of modernized
Soviet-era weapons. Russia is also planning to buy select foreign
systems, such as France's Mistral amphibious assault ship and Italian
light armored vehicles. Russia will field more SS-26 short-range
ballistic missiles. The development of the PAK-FA, Russia's new fifth-
generation fighter, will continue, though deployment will not occur for
several years.
Priorities for the strategic nuclear forces include force
modernization and underground command and control facilities upgrades.
Russia will field more road-mobile SS-27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles. It also will continue
development of the Dolgorukiy/SS-NX-32 Bulava fleet ballistic missile
submarine/submarine-launched ballistic missile and next-generation air-
launched cruise missiles.
Russia recognizes the strategic value of space. Russia has
significant space capabilities and is improving its navigation,
communications, ballistic missile launch detection, and intelligence-
gathering satellites. Russia is also researching and developing
capabilities that could target satellites.
Russia's space sector has experienced a series of failures in
recent years but is taking steps to correct quality control problems
within its satellite and space launch vehicle industries. In the past
year, Russia completed population of its GLONASS navigation satellite
constellation and is making gradual improvements to its communications,
ballistic missile launch detection, and intelligence-gathering
satellites. Moscow has extensive space surveillance and tracking
assets, a prerequisite for performing a full range of space activities,
and is on track to modernize and expand these capabilities by 2020.
Russia continues to destroy chemical agent stockpiles in accordance
with the ewe, although continued funding shortfalls, safety incidents,
and technical challenges will delay completion by several years past
its announced date of December 31, 2015. Russian entities remain
engaged in some dual-use, biological activities. It is unclear whether
these activities are inconsistent with the BWC.
Africa
Africa faces a myriad of challenges that will require continued
U.S. attention. Although slight progress in Somalia has been gradual,
resulting from territorial gains by nascent government forces supported
by the African Union and Ethiopia, governments in the Sahel and West
Africa are stressed by instability and insufficient government control,
conditions that encourage the growth of terrorism. Mali, in particular,
was plunged into turmoil after a northern insurgency begun in early
2012 seized control of the country's north; a decline in government
influence that was exacerbated by a March 2012 coup. In the weeks
following a January, 2013 French-led intervention in Mali, extremist
forces have been driven from main northern population centers; however,
Malian security capacity and governance remain weak, and the country is
likely to remain dependent on external support to consolidate security
gains and facilitate the return of a democratically-elected government
in Bamako. Instability persists in Africa's Great Lakes Region, where
proxy militia forces threaten stability within border areas of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda. The
most notorious, the Lord's Resistance Army, has been pursued by a
regional coalition that relies on U.S. support. Longstanding Chinese
influence and growing Iranian involvement pose additional challenges to
U.S. interests.
Latin America
Turning to Latin America, Mexico elected Enrique Pena Nieto from
the opposition Institutional Revolutionary Party. He is expected to
build upon former President Felipe Calderon's security efforts; his
strategy will be to mitigate transnational organized crime and violence
by designing security policies to reduce kidnapping, homicides, and
extortion, in addition to conducting anti-cartel operations. Pena
Nieto's proposals include nationwide police reform, strengthening
judicial institutions, and enhancing bilateral relationship with the
United States based not only on security issues, but also on increasing
trade, commerce, and economic relations. Pena Nieto will continue
Calderon's policy of using the military as the lead public security
element to combat drug trafficking and violence until the police are
able to adequately assume the responsibilities.
As of February 2013, security forces--the Army, Navy and police--
had captured or killed 23 of Mexico's 37 most wanted traffickers in
operations since March 2009, causing cartels to fracture, but also
spurring violence in key areas. Two other were killed in internal
purges. Approximately 60,000 people have died in drug-related violence
since Calderon took office in December 2006; however, 2012 experienced
the first yearly decrease in drug murders during his administration.
The proliferation of drug cartels and violence in Central America
is prompting leaders in countries such as Honduras and Guatemala to
continue to use the military to combat drug trafficking and perform
traditional law enforcement functions.
Venezuela peacefully transitioned to an interim government in the
aftermath of President Hugo Chavez's death on 5 March. Acting President
Nicolas Maduro-Chavez's designated successor-narrowly won the April 14
special presidential election. The opposition has refused to concede
and called for a full recount. Election day mostly was peaceful and the
military safeguarded the voting, a duty it has performed since 1958.
The military continues to modernize and will receive additional Chinese
and Russian equipment deliveries; Caracas took possession of two
Chinese medium transport aircraft in November and Russian surface-to-
air missile systems in April.
Brazil postponed its decision on the purchase of a new fighter
aircraft and likely will choose the aircraft that offers the most
favorable technology transfer package that it can utilize in its own
defense industry. A decision is likely no earlier than June 2013.
In Cuba, President Raul Castro's reform efforts, including his
recent announcement to step down upon completion of his term in 2018,
are unlikely to loosen the regime's grip on power. The government
continues to exert control of the populace through a security apparatus
that is capable of maintaining and quelling internal unrest. The Cuban
intelligence services have proven very capable of penetrating key U.S.
and DOD targets, and will remain a major threat for the foreseeable
future. Despite Havana's recent relaxation on migration rules, a mass
migration from Cuba is unlikely.
other transnational issues of concern
WMD and Delivery System Proliferation
The proliferation and potential for use of WMD and ballistic
missiles remains a grave and enduring threat. Securing nuclear weapons
and materials is a worldwide imperative to prevent accidents and the
potential diversion of fissile or radiological materials. Chemical and
biological weapons are becoming more technically sophisticated as
technology proliferates. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are
working to acquire and employ chemical, biological, and nuclear
materials. They are most likely to use low-level Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) agents, such as ricin, botulinum toxin,
radiological. dispersal devices, and toxic industrial chemicals like
cyanide and chlorine as low cost alternatives.
We are concerned about the potential for terrorists to acquire
Syrian WMD materials. While Syria's chemical and biological weapons
stockpiles are currently under the control of the regime, al Qaeda and
its regional node, al Qaeda in Iraq, could seek to obtain Syrian
stockpiles should security fail.
Many advanced nations are cooperating to stop WMD proliferation;
however some aspects of WMD-related research and technology are beyond
their direct control, including scientific advances, scientists'
enthusiasm for sharing their research, and the availability of
information about dual-use threats or technologies. For example, the
availability of naturally occurring pathogens of proven virulence
exploitable from actual disease outbreaks presents a low-cost, low-
risk, low-complexity alternative to obtaining such organisms from
either a secured laboratory facility or an environmental reservoir.
Determined groups and individuals, as well as the proliferation
networks they tie into, often sidestep or outpace international
detection and export-control regimes. They supply WMD and ballistic
missile-related materials and technologies to countries of concern by
regularly changing the names of their front companies, operating in
countries with permissive environments or lax enforcement, and avoiding
international financial institutions.
theater ballistic missiles
Ballistic missiles continue to pose a threat as they become more
survivable, reliable, and accurate at greater ranges. Potential
adversaries are basing more missiles on mobile platforms at sea and on
land. Technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses
also are increasing. China, Iran, and North Korea, for example,
exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to
saturate missile defenses. Countries are designing missiles to launch
from multiple transporters against a broad array of targets, enhancing
their mobility and effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter launch-
preparation times and smaller footprints are making new systems more
survivable, and many have measures to defeat missile defenses.
global narcotics
The multi-billion dollar global narcotics trade is a major and
growing source of crime, violence, and political instability in Latin
America, Europe, Africa, and Asia undermining the rule of law, sapping
legitimate economic development, and inflicting high socio-economic
costs. The production and trafficking of the two drugs most associated
with conflict, insurgency, and insecurity are cocaine and heroin. The
total retail market value of these two drugs alone exceeds $150 billion
while the overall value of the global illicit drug market is over $320
billion. Traffickers often bribe officials and buy military-grade
weapons and sophisticated communications equipment that give them
state-like intelligence and security capabilities. As drug consumption
expands in the developing world, anti-government groups will
increasingly exploit growing drug market opportunities to supplement
other sources of funding.
foreign intelligence threats
In addition to the transnational threats discussed above, the
United States and DOD face a persistent and significant intelligence
threat posed by numerous countries and a few subnational actors.
Effective counterintelligence is a significant priority for the DIA,
the Military Services, other defense agencies, and the DOD. Foreign
intelligence services conduct a wide range of intelligence activities
to degrade our national security interests worldwide. They target our
Armed Forces, our military and commercial research, development, and
acquisition activities, our national intelligence system, and our
government's perceptions and decision processes. A few transnational
terrorist groups have developed their own intelligence collection and
counterintelligence capabilities. An emerging threat that concerns the
department involves the potential for compromise of our supply chain by
inserting malicious code into or otherwise corrupting key components
bound for important warfighting systems.
hard, deep, buried targets/underground facilities
The use of underground facilities (UGF) to conceal and protect
critical military and civilian assets and functions is widespread and
expanding. China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Russia, Pakistan, and
Lebanese Hezbollah have active underground programs. UGFs conceal and
increase the survivability of strategic command and control, leadership
protection and relocation, military research and development,
industrial production, and strategic military assets. A significant
trend of concern is the basing of ballistic and cruise missiles and
other systems designed for anti-access/area denial weapons directly
within UGFs.
In addition, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea operate national-
level military denial and deception programs. These programs are
designed to counter U.S. technical reconnaissance, conceal military
research and development, misrepresent major weapon systems and
capabilities designed for use against the United States or U.S. allies,
and degrade U.S. kinetic targeting. These four countries, and others,
plan and execute military denial and deception based on knowledge of
U.S. reconnaissance capabilities and intelligence sources and methods
derived from espionage, space surveillance, unauthorized disclosures
and open source materials.
advanced conventional munition proliferation
Another transnational military issue is the proliferation of
advanced conventional weapons, especially air defense systems and anti-
ship cruise missiles. We remain concerned especially with Russia's
exports of these arms, including the SA-17, SA-22, and SA-20 surface-
to-air missile systems, as well as the supersonic Yakhont anti-ship
cruise missile. Russia has exported several of these systems to
countries of concern, including the SA-17 to Venezuela, and the SA-17,
SA-22 and Yakhont to Syria. The 300-km range Yakhont poses a major
threat to naval operations particularly in the eastern Mediterranean.
In terms of weapons in development, Russia continues testing the Club-K
cruise missile system, a family of weapons deployed inside standardized
shipping containers similar to those found on merchant vessels, freight
rail trains and road vehicles. The covert nature of this weapon would
render identifying threat platforms very difficult and reduce warning
of an attack.
global health security
Our ability to mitigate and control health threats before they
impact U.S. interests relies on early warning, despite the absence of
precise indicators of when and where new diseases will emerge or
chemical incidents will occur. In less well-governed regions, naturally
occurring disease-causing organisms and insecure chemical stockpiles
present low-cost, low-risk, low-complexity alternatives for non-state
actor acquisition, vice obtaining such agents from secured facilities.
Less than fully transparent foreign government vulnerabilities in
health preparedness, consequence management, and resilience impact U.S.
national security interests through second-, third-, and fourth-order
effects, during natural disasters, worldwide events such as the
Olympics and G8 Summits, and catastrophic human disease outbreaks.
Governments utilize health care delivery to advance diplomatic
intentions abroad. Non-state actors and extremists take advantage of
governments' inabilities to meet the needs of their populations by
providing health services to increase influence, internally and
internationally.
potential for strategic surpise (warning)
The enduring impact of the Arab Spring, the ongoing turmoil in
Syria, persistent territorial disputes globally, and emerging
challenges underscore the need for effective strategic warning and
long-range foresight to prevent strategic surprise.
Strategic problems such as proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, state-on-state conflict, instability, resource scarcity,
and terrorism remain at the forefront of U.S. warning concerns.
However, strategic surprise, not only as a goal of the deliberate
deception efforts by our adversaries, but now also often stemming from
human and social dynamics--those small and varied interactions with
seemingly no immediate relevance to the DOD--can rapidly evolve and
radically alter U.S. policy. To uncover these challenges DIA, in
partnership with the IC and combatant commands, monitors the
interactions between military, political, technological, economic, and
social developments. We place the events in the context of history,
culture, religion, and physical and human geography. Our ability to
understand these interactions provides decision-advantage in the face
of unforeseen events to anticipate surprise.
Technological change has the potential to create surprise. Less-
developed countries and non-state actors may surge with innovative
capabilities that could challenge or counter some U.S. military
capabilities. Proliferation of advanced technology and the rapid
improvements in commercial off-the-shelf technology will aid
development of new commercially enabled asymmetric threats.
Improvements in communications will speed the proliferation of advanced
and commercially available technologies.
investment strategy for scientific and technical intelligence analysis
and collection
Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) is foundational to all
aspects of DIA's mission. DIA's efforts in the area of S&TI are
intended to anticipate development of foreign advanced weapons, provide
characteristics and performance of foreign systems, deliver onboard
intelligence mission data to maximize the effectiveness of our military
systems, characterize advance in denial and deception, and generate
warning of the disruptive use of existing and emerging technologies by
both state and non-actors. In recent years we have noted, for example,
the appearance of sophisticated threats to our naval forces, efforts to
counter our advantages in precision guidance and low-observable systems
and the ability of terrorist groups and insurgents to rapidly adapt
improvised explosive devices to newly introduced countermeasures. We
have also seen the appearance on the horizon of technologies such as
quantum computing or electromagnetic weapons that may eventually pose a
threat to our information security, computer capabilities, and
communications backbone.
In order to meet these challenges DIA, as the functional manager
for all-source analysis within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, has
undertaken several initiatives intended to increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of DIA and Defense Intelligence Enterprise S&TI efforts.
The Defense Technology and Long-Range Analysis Office (formerly the
Defense Warning Office) established the Defense Intelligence Disruptive
Technologies Analysis Committee (DIDTAC); Since its origin, the DIDTAC
has refined collaborative procedures for tasking and synchronization,
is being integrated into an advanced Warning construct, and is
addressing a complex analytic issue assoCiated with autonomy and
autonomous systems. We have also launched a Technology Targeting
capability to identify methods that key U.S. defense technology is
being acquired by foreign countries. DIA has established an S&TI
framework to better support the needs of the acquisition, policy, and
warfighter communities. As part of this framework, we have established
the Defense Intelligence Officer for S&TI to integrate intelligence
functions (collection, analysis, international partnerships, etc.)
across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. In addition, through the
S&TI framework we are working towards better integration of the DOD and
national Laboratories to better leverage U.S. capabilities.
conclusion
Today's focus on combat operations against insurgents and
transnational terrorists does not preclude the potential that other
threats will come to the fore, including conflicts among major
countries that could intersect vital U.S. interests. Defense
intelligence must be able to provide timely and actionable intelligence
across the entire threat spectrum.
In cooperation with the IC, DIA is strengthening collection and
analysis and sharing more information across intelligence disciplines,
and with our Nation's close allies.
The men and women of DIA know they have a unique responsibility to
the American people and take great pride in their work. I am privileged
to serve with them and present their analysis to you.
On behalf of the men and women of DIA and the defense intelligence
enterprise, thank you for your continuing confidence. Your support is
vital to us.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
We'll start with an 8-minute first round.
Director Clapper, Iran has been enriching and continues to
enrich uranium, and to stockpile that uranium, currently under
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The
concern, however, is that Iran might be able to stockpile
enough uranium to enrich weapons-grade uranium and to produce
nuclear weapons in a relatively short period.
Your prepared statement includes an important assessment
that Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a
weapon's worth of uranium before this activity is discovered.
Can you tell us about how much warning you believe we would
have?
Mr. Clapper. We continue to hold the most likely
assessment, our assessment is that if they were to move to
highly enriched uranium, which would be a dead giveaway--
there's no other reason that it would be produced other than
for a weapon--the most likely scenario is they would do that
covertly, which would actually slow the time--actually lengthen
the time in which they could develop a testable single weapon.
Clearly, if they were to do a breakout using the facilities
they have now to enrich uranium, which is, as you indicated,
under safeguard and under IAEA supervision, that clearly is a
real bellwether. That would be a big warning. If they were to
do that, which we think is the least likely scenario, it would
be a fairly brief time, as we indicated in the statement.
Chairman Levin. A fairly brief time?
Mr. Clapper. There are imponderables there on how--because
there's an industrial process here involved and so there's all
kinds of factors that could affect that time. But we're talking
probably a period of months, not years.
Chairman Levin. All right. Have they made a decision, in
your assessment, to produce nuclear weapons?
Mr. Clapper. They have not. We continue to hold that they
have not yet made that decision, and that decision would be
made singly by the Supreme Leader.
Chairman Levin. Can you give us your assessment of the
impact of the current sanctions regime against Iran?
Mr. Clapper. It is having a huge impact on their economy,
there is no question about that. Any measure you use--
inflation, unemployment, unavailability of commodities, et
cetera, it's having a tremendous impact on their economy by any
measure. That said, it has not yet induced a change in their
policy.
Chairman Levin. General Flynn and Director Clapper both,
relative to Pakistan: Has Pakistan changed its strategic
calculation with respect to Afghanistan? More specifically, is
there any change that we have determined in Pakistan's so far
unwillingness to deal with the Afghan Taliban which has been
given sanctuary in Pakistan? Is that still their on-the-ground
position, that they are not going to take on or deal with or
put in jeopardy the Afghan Taliban that is again inside
Pakistan?
Mr. Clapper. I will say that the tenet to remember here is
that the primary strategic interest of Pakistan is India, and
so they view whatever they do in Afghanistan through that lens
of their preeminent threat, and what they are most consumed
with is India. So to the extent that they can maintain
visibility and influence in Afghanistan, I believe they will
continue to do so.
Chairman Levin. So there's no change that we have discerned
in Pakistan and so far their unwillingness to take on the
Taliban inside Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban?
Mr. Clapper. Inside Pakistan, the sect of the Taliban
that's in Pakistan certainly poses, does pose a threat to the
Pakistanis and they have, when they could----
Chairman Levin. The Afghan----
Mr. Clapper. They have also, I need to point out, lost
thousands of troops in the FATA in pursuit of militants.
Chairman Levin. But I'm talking about the Afghan Taliban
that they have given sanctuary in Pakistan.
Mr. Clapper. That's correct, that's correct.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask General Flynn: Is there any
change in that?
General Flynn. Not basically.
Chairman Levin. All right. Now, in terms of North Korea,
you've indicated, I believe, that the difference that's been
publicly stated between the IC, writ large, and the DIA on the
issue of whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon
capable of delivery by a ballistic missile, that is in your
judgment a small part of a bigger picture, Director Clapper,
and that is a nuanced issue, as you point out.
I would think that because of the public leak here and the
description of this that the best way to determine that it's a
nuanced difference is to deal with the nuance.
Mr. Clapper. The best way to deal with it would be to know
about it.
Chairman Levin. I understand.
Mr. Clapper. So, as I pointed out, the issue here is what
we know, in fact, which we've outlined, and what we impute from
those facts, and that's where you get into the differences and
confidence levels that people have.
Chairman Levin. Can you, just since it's now in the public,
give us an idea as to why you think it's nuanced, give us what
that difference is?
Mr. Clapper. The difference has to do with the confidence
level in the actual ability of the North Koreans to make a
weapon that will work in a missile. Neither we nor the North
Koreans know whether that will actually work, whether they have
such a capability, if they have it whether it will actually
work. So DIA has a higher confidence level than the rest of the
community on that, on that capability. That's the difference.
Chairman Levin. Okay, that's helpful.
In Syria, the President set forth a red line in terms of
chemical weapons. Without getting into the question of that
which you prefer to deal with in a classified setting, can you
tell us whether, in your judgment, Director, that red line has
been crossed?
Mr. Clapper. That is a policy question and not one for
intelligence to comment on.
Chairman Levin. So there is no assessment that you've
made--without getting into it in public, have you made an
assessment as to whether that red line has been crossed?
Mr. Clapper. I have not, and nor will we.
Chairman Levin. All right. You talked about the global
jihadist movement, Director, in your opening statement. Does
the continuing operation of the detention facility at
Guantanamo serve as a recruitment tool for a global jihadist
movement?
Mr. Clapper. I'm sorry?
Chairman Levin. Is the continued operation of the facility
at Guantanamo a recruiting tool for the global jihadist
movement?
Mr. Clapper. This has been a long subject of debate ever
since Guantanamo was established, and there are those who
believe that in the past it has been used or cited certainly in
jihadist literature and on their websites.
Chairman Levin. General Flynn, do you have an opinion on
that?
General Flynn. I agree with what Director Clapper has
stated here. I think that we just have to pay attention to not
just Guantanamo, but also other places where individuals are
being held by other countries, and pay very close attention to
what happens to the disposition of those individuals in those
other countries.
Chairman Levin. As it might relate to----
General Flynn. As it might relate to their returning to the
battlefield, so to speak.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wasn't going to mention Guantanamo, but just for the
record, I've always observed this is one of the few good deals
that we have. It's still only $4,000 a year and about half the
time, they don't even bill us for it.
But I'd like, for the record, you to tell me, what do we
have--where is an alternative to Guantanamo? Because I think
that's a great resource and it's been used, politically, in the
wrong way in my opinion.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Flynn. Within the Department of Defense, this would be
handled by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Senator Inhofe. The statement that you made, Director
Clapper, we couldn't find in your written statement. So I sent
for it and I found it. I'm going to read this really quickly. I
was overwhelmed. You said: ``In almost 50 years of
intelligence, I don't remember when we've had a more diverse
array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal
with.''
Mr. Chairman, I think that's about as strong a statement as
I've heard.
General Flynn, do you agree with that statement?
General Flynn. I do.
Senator Inhofe. Director Clapper, I was going to bring up
this, the last time we went through this, because I was in the
Senate at the time we went through the last peace dividend. I
remember the euphoria that was out there. The Cold War is over,
we no longer need all of this. We actually did a lot of cuts in
terms of--I have one that, it's somewhere around a 30 percent
cut in our capability. At the same time, China, during that
same decade of the 1990s, was increasing by about 300 percent.
Do you see--what other similarities--now, you've covered
that and I appreciate it. What other similarities do you recall
that happened during that peace dividend facade back in the
1990s and what we're facing today? Anything else?
Mr. Clapper. Looking back, because of the cuts we were
taking I often wonder whether we failed to fully appreciate the
onset of terrorism. I remember I first got religion about
terrorism when I did the Khobar Towers investigation in 1996. I
had just left DIA as its Director. That occurred in June 1996
and I had left DIA as Director in September 1995, and had
occasion to go back and critique myself, and I saw how little
my former agency, now General Flynn's, was devoting to
terrorism. A lot of it was because of, I think, the cuts and
still trying to get over the preoccupation with the Soviet
Union.
Senator Inhofe. You would probably say that we need to
remember the lessons of that currently, I'm sure?
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely, sir. That's why I said I fear I've
seen this movie before.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir. That's a good way of putting it.
Director Clapper, I've said sometimes we say things so many
times we forget what the original source was. I do remember,
though, back in, I think it was 2007, that our intelligence did
come to the conclusion that Iran was going to have the
capability that we're looking at now by 2015. That's the first
time that I remember that date, and that really hasn't changed
much since then. Am I accurate in my recollection?
Mr. Clapper. Specifically, sir, what capability are you
referring to?
Senator Inhofe. I'm talking about a nuclear capability and
delivery system.
Mr. Clapper. That date is good. The Iranians are pursuing
the development of two systems that potentially could have
intercontinental capability and the belief is that about the
first time they'd be ready to do that would be as early as
2015.
Senator Inhofe. For both of you: Recently, we had a Senate
Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this year when we
asked General Mattis this question. We said: ``Do you believe
that current economic and diplomatic efforts to stop Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability have been successful?''
His answer was: ``No.'' Do you agree with his answer?
Mr. Clapper. My answer to that--and I've been asked that,
to comment on General Mattis's comment--was that the sanctions
are having a huge impact on their economy, but it has not yet
induced a change in their policy.
Senator Inhofe. How about you, General Flynn?
General Flynn. I would agree. Their behavior, and their
intention, is to achieve that capability.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
One of the concerns I have, and you did cover it, Director
Clapper, briefly anyway, and that is the continent of Africa.
We were all concerned back when that was under three commands
and now, of course, it's under one command. But the resources
for that command come from U.S. European Command (EUCOM). We've
talked to both Admiral Stavridis, the current one, and of
course General Breedlove is going to become the EUCOM
commander, and they're all very much concerned, as I have been
for a long time, in the lack of, even currently, without
reducing resources due to sequestration, the lack of resources
that we have facing the potential threats on that continent.
Now, you talked about Mali, some of what's going on now. We
remember going through the Somalia problem. Sudan, Southern
Sudan--I've been to Southern Sudan twice and I've seen this new
country being developed, and I'm very concerned about the fact
that we were short of intelligence in that whole region.
It's not just the countries that you mentioned. You did
mention Nigeria. But there's other places in West Africa, all
the way from Togo, Ghana, and then down into the gulf, where
once they are developing the oil resources down there and that
money emerges, problems emerge with it. So we're going to, I'm
sure, have to expand our ISR capability in that area.
Do you have any thoughts about the parts of Africa that you
did not mention that are potentially a great threat?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, I think you covered it very well. I would
just comment that if you look at northern Africa, say from
Mauritania or Senegal on the west all the way to Sudan on the
east, it's about 475 million people, and very porous borders,
weak security services, and of course the place is awash in
weapons. Most importantly, most importantly, a very high
proportion of the population are young and unemployed males,
who are frustrated and are easily attracted to the jihadist
causes.
So that whole area I believe is, and the other countries
you mentioned, I think is going to be a tremendous challenge,
certainly for us in the intelligence business, a big challenge.
We don't cover the Earth like Sherwin-Williams paint equally.
So we have focused on other areas. So the challenge will be how
to bring to bear more, particularly in the ISR arena,
capability to Africa.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, Africa is unique in another way, too.
You can find a place right now where we have adequate
intelligence, there's not a real threat there. But when they
change leadership in these countries--look at Cote d'Ivoire.
When the Gbagbos were taken over--I know the Department of
State (DOS) doesn't agree with my assessment of this, but when
they were taken over by this Alassane Ouattara, who is actually
from Burkina Faso, all of a sudden you have a new threat that's
out there. To stay ahead of that, while it wasn't necessary to
get a lot of intelligence prior to that time under the Gbagbo
regime, in my opinion, now it is because you're dealing with
people who have terrorism in their background.
So I would just hope that we look at some of the potential
problems that are there, because they're very real in that
country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator King.
Senator King. Director Clapper, you've given us an
appalling list of risks today, a long list of threats and
problems that we face. You started your testimony talking about
the effect of the sequester and I think it's important to
emphasize that the sequester is not a 1-year proposition. It is
written into law to continue.
Given that list of threats and given the increase in risk
that's occasioned, would it be fair to say that the sequester
itself is the most serious security risk this country faces
right now?
Mr. Clapper. It's certainly what--as I indicated in my
testimony, it is certainly consuming us, the IC leadership, for
what we see happening to the capability and, importantly, the
expectations that people seem to have for our having this
global insight. That's going to be very hard.
If we sustain sequestration through 2021, which is what the
law calls for, in fact, we go through another year of
sequestration, as I said in my testimony to the Senate
Intelligence Committee and the day before the House
Intelligence Committee, we collectively are going to have to
rethink what people expect from the IC, because it isn't going
to be the same.
Senator King. General Flynn?
General Flynn. Yes, if I could add to that, because I just
want to reemphasize this as another senior leader in the IC.
Just to reemphasize what Director Clapper talked about, we are
about people and we do not want to damage that vital component
of our capability. The sequestration, as you all know, provides
us almost no flexibility, not just this year, but over the long
haul.
One other thing I'd like to remind everybody is our
adversaries won't take a strategic pause to wait for us to
correct ourselves. The real cost--and I think Director Clapper
highlighted it very well--is what I would describe as public
insecurity and the potential for strategic surprise. We really
won't know what we've missed, given the potential damage that
sequestration will have on us. So I think his word
``insidious'' is appropriate.
Senator King. We won't know what we've missed until
something blows up.
Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Let me change the subject to a more specific
one. I asked General Dempsey this the other day. In
Afghanistan, as we are transitioning out it seems to me one of
the key questions is: Who do the people of Afghanistan support?
From an intelligence perspective, are they with the Karzai
regime? Are they with the government? Are they with the
Taliban? What is the status of the on-the-ground public opinion
in that country?
Mr. Clapper. I think it's very much a mixed bag and I think
the forthcoming election, assuming it's held on time, has
already generated a great deal of political activity. I think
that's going to be a real indicator of where these loyalties
lie. In the areas controlled by the Taliban--that's principally
in the rural areas--I think they're probably in control and
hold sway. In the urban areas, particularly in Kabul, probably
the central government under Karzai has more attraction.
But bear in mind, Afghanistan is very much a tribal
country, somewhat artificial as a country in the conventional
sense that we think about countries. So loyalties, I think, lie
mostly on a tribal basis.
Senator King. One other more specific question on the
sequester and the dollars. As I read the figures that you have
supplied, Director Clapper, we're talking about absolute cuts
in real dollars, not cuts in growth, is that correct?
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely. We had to cut about $4 billion in
7 months and in a classified setting I'd be happy to go through
the litany of actual capabilities that we're cutting.
Senator King. But that continues over time.
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely.
Senator King. It will be some time before you actually
reach the amount of nominal dollars that you were at in 2012,
is that not correct?
Mr. Clapper. If you start with the base of 2012 and take
sequestration and the other actions that have been taken, it is
a substantial cut and we don't start to get well until about
2022 or 2023.
Senator King. Thank you.
One other question on Iran. We've had some discussion. This
morning in the New York Times there was an article headlining a
report led by former Ambassador Pickering, who is very well
respected in the field, who argues that the sanctions in Iran
are not affecting the decisionmakers and, in fact, may be
driving them in the other direction.
Could you comment on that thought?
Mr. Clapper. That's certainly one thesis. There are those
in the IC that have pointed that out, that that's a
possibility, that you would reach a certain tipping point where
maybe that would prompt the Supreme Leader to go ahead and
build a nuclear weapon. That's clearly a possibility. But at
the same time, at least right now, we don't think that
decision's been made.
Senator King. It seems to me the problem with sanctions
against countries that are essentially autocratic is that the
sanctions affect everybody in the street and they don't
necessarily affect the decisionmaker. The Supreme Leader could
hang on. He's not going to have any problem getting bread in
the marketplace.
Mr. Clapper. Right, it won't affect him that way. What they
do worry about, though, is sufficient restiveness in the street
that would actually jeopardize the regime. I think they are
concerned about that.
Senator King. That was going to be my follow-on question:
Does political pressure in a country like Iran mean anything?
Mr. Clapper. Political pressure from outside or----
Senator King. No, no, no. From within, in the streets.
Mr. Clapper. Oh, I think it can. I think it can. I think
again perhaps--don't know, but perhaps this will play out in
the forthcoming Iranian election. You have the Ahmedinejad
faction who will put up a candidate not exactly embraced by the
Supreme Leader. This could create an interesting political
dynamic. But I don't know. We'll have to see.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses for their being here
and their continued service. I don't want to beat a dead horse
here on the sequestration, but I believe both witnesses--is it
true that if this continues our ability to provide the
necessary intelligence information for the decisionmakers will
be jeopardized, thereby jeopardizing our national security?
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Clapper. I would.
Senator McCain. General Flynn?
General Flynn. 100 percent.
Senator McCain. We seem to be living in some kind of
parallel universe here. We get testimony from you and other
military leaders and yet there's nothing from the White House
and there's nothing here in Congress, effort to repeal what is
clearly a threat to our national security. But some of us will
keep on trying.
General Clapper, you and the Secretary of State, as we now
know, and then-Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS some time ago
had supported arming the rebels. Why did you take that
position?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, I have never spoken publicly about the
position I took in that regard and I don't think it's
appropriate for me to do so. Advice I render the President,
that's between him and me, and I don't think it's appropriate
to talk publicly about it.
Senator McCain. You don't think it's appropriate to talk to
Members of Congress about your views on a situation that's
going on where some 80,000 people have been massacred?
Mr. Clapper. I'll talk about that. Specifically----
Senator McCain. Then the question----
Mr. Clapper.--on the advice, the advice I rendered the
President on the issue of arming the opposition----
Senator McCain. The question is what advice do you give to
Congress as far as arming the rebels?
Mr. Clapper. I believe at this point there are lots and
lots of weapons in Syria, and if we're going to expend
resources in support of the opposition I am not convinced now
that arming--our supplying yet additional weaponry to the
opposition would have the desired impact, based on cost-
benefit.
Senator McCain. Would a no-fly zone do that?
Mr. Clapper. That's a possibility. Again, that in the end
is a policy thing, not an intelligence question. Certainly if
and as the opposition gains control of sufficient geography on
the ground, then that's a possibility. But doing a no-fly zone,
even a partial one, is not a trivial undertaking. There is, as
I mentioned, a tremendous array of weaponry in Syria, to
include a very sophisticated air defense capability, depending
on who's operating it. So a no-fly zone would not be without
cost.
Senator McCain. Even though General Mattis and Admiral
Stavridis both testified that we could with cruise missiles and
moving the Patriot missiles in the right places, that we could
establish a no-fly zone?
Mr. Clapper. Patriot missiles, I'm getting out of my league
here. It's a better discussion with DOD. But that's essentially
a point weapon. The theory is that you could position Patriot
missiles outside of Syria and somehow provide security over a
zone. Given the nature of the Patriot weapon, which is a point,
it's not an area protector, that would be tough.
Senator McCain. You know what's fascinating here, General,
is that now you are saying, and so did the CJCS, that the
situation has deteriorated so much that you now have questions
whether we should supply weapons to the rebels or not, which
then argues that we should have supplied them back when you
recommended it, according to published reports, as well as the
Secretary of State, as well as the CJCS.
It's remarkable. So now you and the administration sit here
and say: Well, we don't know where the weapons are going. Well,
maybe if we had helped the people who were fighting from the
beginning, before all these jihadists flowed into the fighting
in Israel, we might have been able to have some beneficial
effect. Meanwhile, we sit by and watch 80,000, the countries--
would you agree that both Lebanon and Jordan have been
destabilized?
Mr. Clapper. It's had a huge impact on the neighboring
countries. Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq have absorbed a huge
number of refugees, yes, not to mention the humanitarian
aspects, but the spillover of the fighting.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Is support flown into Syria over Iraqi air space?
Mr. Clapper. Happy to talk about all that in closed
session.
Senator McCain. Okay. Do you believe Iran will seek to keep
Assad in power at all costs?
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely. His fall would be a huge strategic
loss to Iran.
Senator McCain. A huge strategic loss to Iran. But yet we
don't seem to know of any real way to assist them. That's quite
remarkable commentary on the capability or the commitment of
the United States of America.
How would you characterize Russian interests within Syria?
Mr. Clapper. That represents their last bastion, I guess,
in the Mideast where they have influence. It's been a huge
weapons client of theirs. There is the general aversion to just
being in opposition to us, and as well, I think, the Russians
have concerns about their own homeland from the standpoint of
jihadist influence, particularly in the Caucasus. So there's a
number of factors, I think, that motivate the Russians.
But I also think they are concerned about what would follow
Assad, in the ``be careful what you ask for'' department.
Senator McCain. Is Iranian support for the Assad regime
increasing? We hear reports, for example, they're taking people
to Iran and training them and sending them back to Syria.
Mr. Clapper. There's some of that that has been going on,
yes.
Senator McCain. There was an article in the Wall Street
Journal I think yesterday: ``U.S. Fears Syria Rebel Victory For
Now.'' Is that your view?
Mr. Clapper. I'm sorry, sir. What was the headline?
Senator McCain. It says: ``Senior Obama administration
officials have caught some lawmakers and allies by surprise in
recent weeks with an amended approach to Syria. They don't want
an outright rebel military victory right now because they
believe, in the words of one senior official, `that the good
guys may not come out on top.' ''
Mr. Clapper. That depends on your definition of ``good
guys.'' Certainly the jihadists, the Sunni-dominated groups,
the fighting groups in the opposition, most notably al Nusra,
which has been punching way above its weight in terms of its
size, who have recently pledged allegiance to al Qaeda, that is
a great concern. They are present in 13 of the 14 provinces in
Syria and are starting to establish municipal services, provide
humanitarian aid, food, hospitals, and sharia law courts.
Senator McCain. All of this might have been avoided if we
hadn't sat by and watched it happen.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for not only your testimony, but for
your service.
The issue obviously that you've brought front and center is
sequestration. I just have more a procedural question. First of
all, as I understand it, your appropriation is part of the
defense appropriations bill as a classified annex, that we did,
in fact, pass a defense appropriations bill. We didn't do a lot
of those. Most agencies have Continuing Resolutions, and that
within the context of that bill, were you able to achieve at
least flexibility and prioritization in order to cope with what
we all recognize as decreased funding?
Mr. Clapper. The National Intelligence Program (NIP), which
I manage, straddles six Cabinet departments and two independent
agencies. The bulk of the program is carried in the DOD budget.
So not to get into sequestration arcana here----
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clapper.--but the NIP, the program I operate and
manage, was divided into 700 Plan Program Activities (PPA),
which covers the entire extent of the NIP. Every one of those
700 PPAs had to be equally taxed. Congress imposed a more
onerous, more restrictive array, rule set, limiting my ability
to move money from PPA to PPA. So I have these very small PPAs
with not a lot of money in them and many of them are only
people, and for whatever reason, they decided that there needed
to be more control over the NIP.
The effect of the fiscal year 2013 appropriations act did
help us in that it allowed us to move some money around so that
we could move the money into the pots that we were already
committed to by virtue of the fact we were 5 months into the
fiscal year before we got a bill. So it would have been a
disaster without it.
The down side, of course: It kept the PPA structure. It did
allow new starts, which was good, but it also for most
accounts, with three specific exceptions which I can't discuss
here, it was less money at the end of the day with the
appropriations act. Of course, the impact of sequestration was
actually doubled because we had to take it in 7 months, so the
real cut there was about 13 percent, the realistic impact.
Senator Reed. That's helpful because I think it provides
more of a context of things we might be able to do.
We have a macro issue with the sequestration which
everyone, I think, recognizes has huge and accelerating impacts
on your programs. But are there legislative, both
authorization, not on this committee but on the Intelligence
Committee, and appropriations matters that could at least give
you flexibility, give you the ability to, whatever the top line
is, spend it more wisely?
Mr. Clapper. As I said, we will pay our fair share of the
tax here and we have, and by the way done it in such a way we
can avoid--where we can protect our people, we think, from
furloughs.
So I guess if I had to ask, my wish list of one would be
some relief on our PPA structure, or just at least treat me
like the big DOD, where I'd have larger PPAs.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir. That's something that could be
done, not as a macro solution to sequestration, but as a
micro----
Mr. Clapper. In the bill Senator Feinstein and Senator
Chambliss, chair and ranking of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, sought to do that, and that failed.
Senator Reed. That's valuable insight. Thank you, sir.
I know you have a range of issues and you have multiple
programs. But in a simplistic approach, there always seems to
be two major areas, HUMINT and technical intelligence. Harking
back to the 1990s, one of the things that seemed to be
sacrificed was HUMINT, to our chagrin. Can you balance those
programs? Without getting into detail, obviously, in open
session, is there one area that's going to suffer more than the
other? Again it goes back to this question: Can we give you at
least flexibility to manage better?
Mr. Clapper. Again, not to be a Johnny One-Note, but
that's--in this environment, the one thing that I would ask for
is more latitude on how we take the cuts and allowing us, the
IC leadership, to put the money where the most important payoff
is.
With respect to the question you raise, sir, it's an age-
old one in intelligence. The approach that I've tried to take
here in the last 2 years as our budget's gone down is to try to
protect and invest in those capabilities that give us the most
general coverage. That's why I'm very strong on sustaining our
overhead reconnaissance capability, because that covers the
Earth, denied area or not.
Similarly, even when times were thin in the late 1990s,
HUMINT capabilities were extremely important. That's why I am a
huge proponent of what Dr. Vickers and General Flynn are doing
with the Defense Clandestine Service, which isn't really an
increase as much as it is a reshaping, a recasting of an
organization I started when I was Director of DIA in 1992
called the Defense HUMINT Service. Better integration with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA, more
clandestine case officers, who are worth their weight in gold.
That's a unique capability that no other part of the IC can
render.
So as we make these reductions, we are going to have to
focus much, much more on quality and the quality of our
investments, since we're not going to have safety in numbers.
Senator Reed. I want General Flynn to be able to just make
a comment, but I have one quick question. Syria has come up a
number of times, and there is clear evidence, public evidence,
of Iranian involvement. My presumption, though, is that there
are regional forces who are operating inside Syria who are
supporting the efforts of the rebels, opposing Iranian----
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Senator Reed. So this is not a situation where there is
only one player, one external player in the field, and that's
the Iranians. This is actually a complicated situation where
there are conscious and capable people from other countries on
the ground assisting the rebels.
Mr. Clapper. Yes, that's true. It is a very complex
situation there. One of the phenomena that makes it even more
difficult for us to assess good guys and bad guys is they will
portray a different face depending on whether they're looking
westward or some other way. So that makes it even more
complicated.
One of the great concerns we have is the magnet that Syria
has turned into, particularly for foreign fighters. The
Europeans are very concerned about the 400-plus Europeans that
have gone to Syria to fight the great fight. So it's a very
complex situation, and there are bad guys and good guys and a
large number of shades of grey in between.
Senator Reed. My time has expired. General Flynn, I hope
there's a second round and I can come back. I'd just simply say
that we in Rhode Island are very proud of you and your brother,
almost as proud as your mother. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and for
your service to our country.
I wanted to ask, General Flynn, in your written statement
you say that Iran is providing money and funding to the Syrian
regime, the Assad regime. We know that Iran also provides funds
to Hezbollah. Can you let me know, either Director Clapper or
General Flynn, in order to support Hezbollah and the Assad
regime is Tehran using the Lebanese banking system or financial
sector? What access to the financial system do they have in
contravention to our sanctions and our international sanctions?
Mr. Clapper. You're speaking specifically of Iranian
financial support to Hezbollah?
Senator Ayotte. Using the Lebanese banking system. Two
things: Hezbollah, Assad regime.
Mr. Clapper. It'd probably be better to take that for the
record.
Senator Ayotte. Okay.
Mr. Clapper. We'll get back. Off the top of my head, I do
not know the specifics of that.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Ayotte. Okay. I would appreciate that. Thank you
very much.
I also wanted to ask both of you: How has Tehran
characterized the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq without a follow-on
force?
Mr. Clapper. How would they characterize it?
Senator Ayotte. How have they previously characterized it?
As I understand it, in your written testimony, General Flynn,
you said that Supreme Leader Khamenei and senior Iranian
military officials view the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq
as a strategic defeat for the United States. Is that true?
General Flynn. I would say that is correct in their
perception, what we assess as their perception, yes.
Senator Ayotte. So how might Tehran characterize a
precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan? How do you think
that would: (a) be viewed by Iran; and (b) what activities do
you believe that would precipitate in Afghanistan by the
Iranians?
Mr. Clapper. The Iranians have never cared for having us on
either of their borders. So just as they welcome our departure
from Iraq, so will they from Afghanistan. Their interest, of
course, is sustaining their influence in both those neighboring
countries, as in Iraq. They make that attempt in Afghanistan.
Don't think they'll be as successful or influential in
Afghanistan as they might have been--might be in Iraq.
Senator Ayotte. Although I will say that General Dunford
expressed concerns about that in the western part of
Afghanistan at our hearing the other day.
What is Iran doing now in Iraq and how is Iran using Iraq,
including their air space?
Mr. Clapper. The main thing, at least I worry about, is
their supplying of weaponry or explosives to the western part
of Iraq, or Iran--Afghanistan, excuse me.
Mike, do you want to add anything?
General Flynn. First, on your first issue, I think we have
to understand how you're defining ``precipitous'' and also the
implications, also the perception of the region and clearly
Iran. As we continue through our transition, I think we all
need to be paying attention to how we are doing that, and we
need to do it very smartly, and I think General Dunford laid
that out very clearly in his testimony. But the perceptions of
that region in all the different players are something that we
pay very close attention to.
In specifically Iranian influence, I would add potential
training to that as well of some of the kinds of capabilities
and weapons systems that we have seen applied inside of
Afghanistan, particularly out in the west.
Senator Ayotte. When you say training, what do you mean by
that, General?
General Flynn. Just training on small arms, things like
that, that we have become aware of over the years, as we saw
applied in Iraq as well.
Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, I wanted to ask you about
the September 11 attack on our diplomatic facility in Benghazi,
and I particularly wanted to ask you about the prior attacks on
our consulate, both on April 6 and June 6, that occurred before
the September 11 attack, obviously, where four brave Americans
were murdered.
I wanted to ask you about the IC's assessment of those
attacks and whether you or the DNI briefed President Obama or
Secretary Clinton about the two preceding attacks and the
deteriorating security situation in Benghazi prior to September
11?
Mr. Clapper. I did not personally brief them, but we
certainly had reported those in all of our intelligence
vehicles.
Senator Ayotte. Your intelligence vehicles would have
included the prior attacks on the consulate?
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Do you believe that the IC had a sufficient
picture of the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi?
Mr. Clapper. I think we had a general idea of the situation
in eastern Libya. We probably didn't have the fidelity on the
exact situation in Benghazi, but we certainly knew the lack of
control that the central government in Tripoli had over the
militias in that part of the country. That's a historical
tradition and that continued even after the fall of Qadafi.
Senator Ayotte. You said that the intelligence briefings
that would have been prepared by the DNI talked about the prior
attacks I just referenced in April and June prior to the
September 11 attack. Would they have also included the
assessment of the British closing their facility, as well as
the Red Cross?
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Are those the types of intelligence that's
reported up the chain of command, despite not having a specific
conversation, would you say, with the President?
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Just to be clear, you didn't have any
specific conversations with Secretary Clinton about this issue?
Mr. Clapper. We had many conversations about it. I don't
recall specifically a conversation with her prior to the attack
on September 11. I just don't remember. We could have. I just
don't remember.
Senator Ayotte. I thank both of you.
I also wanted to ask, General Flynn, about the Chinese
development of a fifth generation fighter and where they are
with that. Also, if you could comment on the Russian
development of a fifth generation fighter?
General Flynn. A couple of more technical answers to that
would have to go to closed session. But I would just offer that
the capabilities that we are seeing being developed and the
investments being made by both China and Russia are concerning.
We pay very close attention to these investments and to these
capabilities and we work very closely with not only our
commands that are out in the various theaters, both EUCOM and
U.S. Pacific Command, but also our strong partners out in the
region, to ensure that we clearly understand how good these
capabilities are.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Director Clapper, finally, given the assessment of the IC
regarding eastern Libya, what lessons do you take from the
situation that happened in Benghazi?
Mr. Clapper. One, don't do unclassified talking points for
Members of Congress. That's one of the lessons I learned from
that experience.
Clearly we've gone to school on that situation,
particularly the whole subject of support to both enhancing
security and providing intelligence to--more tactical level
intelligence for these facilities. That said, we have plans
here, but obviously sequestration is going to have an impact on
that.
Senator Ayotte. I know that my time is up, but the lesson
can't be not to do talking points for Members of Congress. How
about getting the talking points right?
Thank you.
Mr. Clapper. They were right.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, thank you. General, thank you.
I apologize if some of these questions have been asked. I
had to step out for a few minutes.
When you look at North Korea and the decisionmaking chain
there, how is that working exactly right now?
Mr. Clapper. That's a great question. I think there isn't
much of a chain. It's probably vested in the new young leader,
Kim Jong Un. So there isn't a lot of upward flow of information
or flow of decision options. I think they're all pretty much
centered in one person.
Senator Donnelly. So for want of a better way to put it,
are decisions being made basically in a seat-of-the-pants way?
Mr. Clapper. That's kind of my impression, yes, sir. I
think he's driven by the need to prove his position,
consolidate his power, and a lot of what he's doing and saying
are driven by both messages to a domestic audience and the
international audience.
Senator Donnelly. Do the generals play any role other than
to tell him what he wants to hear?
Mr. Clapper. Pretty much, that's our impression, that it's
``Yes, sir, yes, sir, three bags full'' from the military there
right now.
Senator Donnelly. The Chinese, is there a point where they
are no longer willing to just let them continue this way?
Mr. Clapper. I don't know that the Chinese have reached
that point, but we see indications that the Chinese are
certainly rethinking their relationship, particularly with the
new administration in China.
Senator Donnelly. With North Korea, what is the extent, in
however much you can tell us, of North Korea and Iran's
collaboration on nuclear missile technology?
Mr. Clapper. Not much. The Iranians are a little wary of
the North Koreans.
Senator Donnelly. As to sanctions on both countries, are
those sanctions working or are you seeing them having an
effect? Are they affecting not only the lives of the people in
the country, but are they affecting decisionmaking at all?
Mr. Clapper. We discussed this a little bit before, but
yes, the sanctions are having an impact in Iran. No question
they've had huge impact on their economy. By any measure, it's
been affected. But has it changed the policy on their nuclear
activity? No.
In North Korea, pretty much isolated anyway, the lone
benefactor for North Korea is, of course, China, and China in
my view--to the extent that anyone has leverage over North
Korea it's China.
Senator Donnelly. Switching neighborhoods, as we draw down
in Afghanistan, does the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
have the capability to conduct adequate intelligence and
counterintelligence operations?
Mr. Clapper. That is an enabler that they need continued
advice and assistance. Their national organization, the
National Directorate of Security, is pretty good. They've had a
long relationship with us. But I think their military
intelligence and counterintelligence probably need more work.
Senator Donnelly. Is that going to be one of the things
that we focus on as we draw down our people who are remaining?
General Flynn. A couple of things on the ANSF. First, I
think it just needs to be stated that we're achieving the
numbers that we said we were going to achieve, and I think the
number is around 352,000. I was in Afghanistan in June 2002
when we graduated the very first battalion. So to be able to
see the growth and the development and certainly the capability
to get to this level--what we assess, as you are highlighting,
is they still have challenges with what we would call enabling
capabilities, and intelligence is clearly one of them, as well
as a few others.
But their ability to do on a scale of--on one end would be
high-end operations, totally independent, to another scale
which would be just being able to run a basic checkpoint,
there's a range in the middle there. But they range that full
scale. They have certainly some units that have full capability
to do completely independent operations, all the way down to
where they need a lot of advice and assist, and we'll continue
to do that.
Senator Donnelly. As to their ability to do intelligence
and counterintelligence, how do you see that moving forward? Is
that an area that we're going to have to work closely with them
on?
General Flynn. It is, and we do constantly. Particularly
within the entire defense structure, the defense intelligence
structure, we are all engaged with our counterparts there on a
daily basis in helping them develop that capability, teaching
them, training them, working with them. We'll continue to do
that as we transition.
Senator Donnelly. As you look at Afghanistan, in the border
areas and just across in Pakistan, and especially in the
frontier provinces, those areas, once the Taliban goes in
there, is there any pressure from the Pakistan army or any
efforts on the part of the Government of Pakistan to try to
push back up there? Or is their greatest danger our drones and
other methods?
General Flynn. We were talking about this earlier, but the
Pakistan military has been engaged for the last decade
conducting operations inside their own territory to help not
only themselves with some of these militias and terrorist
organizations, insurgent organizations, in their own country,
but also to help us out on the Afghan side. There's been a lot
of cooperation, border cooperation, between our units in
Regional Command East, South, Southwest, with some of their
counterparts in the various corps along the Pakistani border.
So a lot has occurred. A lot of action has taken place.
More needs to be done. We need to continue to keep the dialogue
open between not only the international community and the
region there, Afghanistan and Pakistan particularly, but also
between the Afghan military and the Pakistani military. We have
to help move that dialogue along.
But as Director Clapper said earlier, he mentioned that
Pakistan's number one issue is how they view India, and that's
really the bigger, wider regional issue.
Senator Donnelly. Is the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
buying into this effort to try to work and clean up the
frontier areas as well?
Mr. Clapper. I'd be happy to talk to you about that in
closed session. John Brennan, the new Director of CIA, was just
out there and had a pretty good meeting with the Director of
ISI. I'd be happy to fill you in on that in closed session.
Senator Donnelly. That's fair.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you both for your testimony today and
thank you also for your service at a time of great risk
throughout the world. I'd like to ask questions focusing on two
regions of the world: first of all, Benghazi; and then second,
North Korea.
With respect to Benghazi, during the 7\1/2\ hours of the
attack on September 11 in Benghazi did either of you, Director
Clapper, General Flynn, during those 7\1/2\ hours have any
conversations with the President concerning what was happening
there?
Mr. Clapper. I did not during that period, no.
General Flynn. I did not.
Senator Cruz. Did either of you during those 7\1/2\ hours
have any conversations with Secretary Clinton during that
attack?
Mr. Clapper. I did not.
General Flynn. No, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Okay, thank you.
Previously this committee had a hearing with then-Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta and General Dempsey in which Benghazi
was discussed at considerable length. General Dempsey at the
time expressed his views--and I'm paraphrasing, but--that the
nature of the attack, and in particular the fact that multiple
mortar shells hit a rooftop, demonstrated to him at the time
that it was an organized military attack. He said something to
the effect of that he thought it was obvious that it was an
organized military effect.
I would be interested with both of you if you agree with
that assessment that it was obvious at the time?
Mr. Clapper. No, sir, it was not. The one thing they did--
there were really two or three phases of the attack. I would
characterize the attack on the Temporary Mission Facility much
more of a vandalism and looting thing. The mortar attack which
took place, it took about 10 or 11 minutes, demonstrated some
operational proficiency.
I would commend to you, which I don't know if you've seen
it, sir, a briefing that we put together that visually
recreates as best we could what were the actual events. I'd be
happy to have that brought to you so you could see our best
replication of what occurred during the phases of the attacks.
Senator Cruz. I would be appreciative of that, thank you.
General Flynn, do you have anything to add on that?
General Flynn. I would just say that personally my
instincts were that what we were watching was, particularly on
the specific date, was clearly something that was not what I
would call normal activity, based on the strategy assessments
that had already been made over the last number of months. I
know that from our perspective there was a sense that this was
probably more organized, and we, of course, judged that over
the next few days.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
One additional question on Benghazi. Have we made any
significant progress in identifying and apprehending the
terrorists who carried out those attacks?
Mr. Clapper. The FBI is leading that investigation and has
made some progress on identifying them. Again, I'm sure they'd
be happy to brief you on the state of play with their
investigation.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
At this point I'd like to shift to North Korea. General
Clapper, in your prepared testimony you stated that North
Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious
threat to the United States. I'd like to invite you to
elaborate on that threat, if you might?
Mr. Clapper. They've been at the nuclear business for 50
years. They have the technical infrastructure and technical
expertise, as we've seen with Yongbyon and their other
facilities. They have pursued missiles. They've conducted--
developed building missiles and conducted three underground
tests. They launched the Taepodong-2.
So they have what appears to be the basic ingredients for
nuclear-equipped missiles. At the same time, there's a lot we
don't know and that's what gives rise to the debate that is
going on in the IC, and the varying degrees of confidence
levels that components in the IC have about the actual
technical knowledge of whether they've actually built a weapon
that will go in a missile and if it'll work.
So if they launch this Musudan missile that'll be of great
interest to both them and us, to see if it actually works,
because they've never launched one. The same is true with their
long-range ICBM. They've displayed it in a parade, but we've
never seen them test it.
Senator Cruz. Director Clapper, on March 15th the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said publicly that he believes the
North Koreans, quote, ``probably''--North Korea, quote,
``probably does have the range to reach the United States in
particular the KNO8.'' Do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Clapper. That's his assessment. I can't argue with it.
We've just never seen that tested or proven.
Senator Cruz. General Flynn, I'd like to get your views on
the same question.
General Flynn. One of the things that I think is
highlighted from the last couple of weeks of what we've been
talking about with North Korea--and Director Clapper said it
earlier today--and where we are today as a community is we
ensure that all views are stated, all views are known. We do
challenge each other's assumptions. Those views are presented
to every level of customer, to include the President on down to
all of our combatant commanders.
I think that the assumptions that we make are the
components of which, without going into any details, and of
course we can get into much greater detail in another session.
But I think the assumptions is where we really need to keep
looking at, examining, challenging each other, and ensure that
those assumptions are presented. I know, based on the way
Director Clapper has encouraged all of us to present our views,
we do that.
Senator Cruz. Now, General Flynn, I guess in the past week
a statement was made public from a report that DIA assesses
with moderate confidence that the North [Korea] currently has
nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles,
however the reliability will be low. What was the timeframe?
What was the date of that assessment?
General Flynn. That was a--first of all, it was a seven-
page document. It was a classified document, the date of which
was the March timeframe. To not beat a dead horse, I guess,
what we really have is, as I was just saying, a difference in
how we judge assumptions in this case. And there's some other
components that go into the methodology that we use and I'd
rather not discuss that here, and more than welcome to get into
excruciating detail in closed session.
Senator Cruz. I look forward to that.
If I could ask one final question, which is, if I
understood your testimony today, you currently have a higher
level of confidence as to that assessment. Am I understanding
you correctly? If so, could you provide some of the basis for
that?
General Flynn. The differences of levels of assessment
within the community are, there's a difference, those
differences are known, and the reasons why, the factors that
play into that, are known. The answer to the latter part of
your question is yes, in closed session.
Mr. Clapper. I'd just say, sir, that the debate for us
centers around the facts we know versus what we impute to those
facts. That's where there is, I think, healthy debate and
healthy disagreement. So analysts at DIA may have a different
confidence level in that judgment than the rest of the
community. That's fine. Eliminating those or coming up with a
common denominator, I'm not sure that's a good thing, either.
Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Just to clarify that: They have a higher
level of confidence, is that fair to say?
Mr. Clapper. DIA does, yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let's continue that line of questioning just for a moment.
If nothing changes in North Korea, if they continue to be a
military totalitarian state, where they spend most of their
money on their military at the expense of their own people, and
they continue to develop technology, it's just a matter of time
before they have technology to reach us. Do you agree with
that?
Mr. Clapper. Probably so. I think if they keep working at
it--and clearly they are of a single-minded focus on this.
Particularly the current leader, even more--perhaps maybe more
intensely than his father--I think feels that that is the key
to their survival, nuclear weapons.
Senator Graham. I think that's a good honest assessment.
Let's put in the bucket of threats that the Nation faces a more
nuclearly capable North Korea with larger missiles and probably
smaller bombs in the future. Do you think, General Flynn,
that's a reasonable threat we should be planning to guard
against if nothing changes?
General Flynn. I do believe that's a reasonable threat.
Senator Graham. Okay, all right.
Syria. Do they have enough chemical weapons in Syria to
kill millions of people or thousands of people?
Mr. Clapper. Potentially, yes. Of course, that's very
dependent on lots of things, the number of casualties that
could be incurred if they employ chemical weapons.
Senator Graham. But they have a lot of the stuff?
Mr. Clapper. They have a lot of that stuff.
Senator Graham. That could kill lots of people?
Mr. Clapper. That's correct.
Senator Graham. So that's another threat that we face.
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Senator Graham. All right. Then the Iranian nuclear
program. Over the last 6 months as we've been imposing
sanctions and negotiating through the P5+1 regime, do they have
more or less enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, we'll get you the exact numbers in a
closed context.
Senator Graham. Can I just say it's more? Probably?
Mr. Clapper. Not highly enriched, but up to the 20 percent
level.
Senator Graham. They're marching in the wrong direction. We
talk, they enrich. So let's put that in the bucket.
We have China. Are they building up their military, General
Flynn, or are they reducing their military?
General Flynn. China is investing money in their military,
absolutely.
Senator Graham. Can you give me a good explanation, in
light of all this, why Congress would do sequestration?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, I don't think we want to go there.
We have spoken intensely about the impacts of sequestration
on----
Senator Graham. Let's just finish it out, and I'm not going
to get you to go there. General Flynn, if sequestration was
fully implemented over the next decade, how would it affect
your agency's ability to defend us against the threats we know
we face today and could come up tomorrow?
General Flynn. Senator, thanks for asking the question. I
think it is part of our mission, probably the single biggest
threat for us is our ability to provide strategic warning, not
only for DOD, but for this country. I think that that would be
severely impacted.
Senator Graham. On a scale of 1 to 10 in terms of impact,
10 being terrible and 1 being not so bad, where would you put
sequestration over a decade?
General Flynn. Ten.
Mr. Clapper. A 10 over a decade.
General Flynn. Yes.
Mr. Clapper. Of course, the law right now runs through
2021. So if we continue these mindless cuts, as I said to my
two authorizing committees Monday and Tuesday, we need to do a
serious rethink on just what it is we expect of the U.S.
intelligence enterprise, because it would be something much,
much less than what we've had.
Senator Graham. Let's get back to Syria. Are you familiar
with the opposition council, I think it's the Syrian Opposition
Council (SOC)?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, I know about it and know what it is.
Senator Graham. Have you met with those folks?
Mr. Clapper. No.
Senator Graham. I wrote a letter along with four other
members of the Senate who recently visited Jordan, Turkey, and
Israel, asking the SOC, which is the political component of the
opposition, to allow the IC the day after Assad falls to come
in and secure the chemical weapons sites and tell the world
that they would be okay with the chemical weapons being
destroyed. I'm waiting on a response.
Do you think that is a good thing for us to ask of the
people who may take over Syria?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir, I do think it would be a good thing
to ask. I think the issue is the extent to which any of these
external groups, whether it's the SOC now or others, have sway
or insight or influence inside the country.
Senator Graham. But once Assad falls, someone's going to
take over.
Mr. Clapper. Our assessment is that it will be
fractionated. Again, this is a projection. We don't know. But
we believe the most likely option when Assad falls--and we
think it is a question of time--will be factions controlling
various parts of the country.
Senator Graham. The SOC is a coalition of factions, and my
hope is that they will be able to create some governing
capacity. But since they're the organ that we're working with,
the organization, I will continue to press them to renounce
ownership of chemical weapons in the new Syria. I'd appreciate
any help you could give us there.
One of the fears I have after my visit is that radicals
have gotten more involved, not less, on the ground in Syria. So
I think that observation is correct.
Mr. Clapper. It is.
Senator Graham. A big fear is that the casualties of Syria,
the list of casualties, could be the King of Jordan. Almost
500,000 refugees have spilled over into Jordan. The King was
incredibly concerned and he said the longer this war goes on
the worse it is for him. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Clapper. I do.
Senator Graham. If we'd looked back a year ago, the threats
on the ground--is Syria getting better or worse over the last
year?
Mr. Clapper. There is no good trend I can tell you about in
Syria.
Senator Graham. So let's play it out. A year from now, you
could have millions of refugees in Jordan and Turkey if
something doesn't happen; do you agree with that?
Mr. Clapper. I do. I think as the infrastructure and the
conditions in Syria continue to deteriorate, there are going to
be more and more people----
Senator Graham. I just hope the international community is
listening to you and we find a way to end this war. To me,
winning now would be having the King survive, controlling the
chemical weapons, and the second war between the factions
that's surely to come with the radicals would be small in scope
and short in duration. I think that's the best we can hope for
at this point.
General Flynn, you said 352,000 Afghan security forces
under arms. Do you recommend to this committee we continue that
level of ANSF through 2018, the 352,000?
General Flynn. That's really, that's really a policy issue.
From my standpoint, Senator----
Senator Graham. Would that be wise----
General Flynn. I think that the ANSF, especially the Afghan
National Army, is a threat to a resurgent Taliban coming back--
--
Senator Graham. General Allen thought it was----
General Flynn.--as well as the Afghan National Police.
Senator Graham. Would you disagree with General Allen when
he said he thought it would be wise?
Mr. Clapper. Sorry, sir?
Senator Graham. Do you have any reason to discount what
General Allen said when he thought it would be wise to continue
the 352,000, keep them at 352,000?
Mr. Clapper. From an intelligence perspective, no. That's
the guy that you should listen to.
Senator Graham. One last question. I think he's a good guy
for us to listen to.
Drones. During the last 5 years particularly, would you
agree with me that the drone program particularly in the FATA,
the tribal regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan and, quite
frankly, throughout the world in ungoverned areas, has paid
dividends to this country in terms of our safety?
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely. If I can speak globally so that I
can speak publicly, yes.
Senator Graham. Would you like to continue that program to
maintain our national security?
Mr. Clapper. I think it is a tremendous capability, yes.
Senator Graham. Thank you both for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We're going to have a 3-minute second round, because I
think two votes are scheduled still for noon.
Director, you have said that the sanctions against Iran are
having a huge effect on their economy; they've not yet induced
a change in their policy. Just very quickly: Do you believe
that the combination of keeping those options in place and
strengthening them, if possible, plus keeping military options
on the table, continuing our efforts in multilateral diplomacy,
gives us a reasonable chance of convincing Iran they should not
build nuclear weapons?
Mr. Clapper. That is also a policy question.
Chairman Levin. What's your assessment?
Mr. Clapper. I'll speak personally and my answer would be
yes.
Chairman Levin. Now, the issue of Benghazi has come up. I
want to just understand exactly what your role was in terms of
the point papers. Did you approve, Director, the talking
points?
Mr. Clapper. I did not. I did not. People below me did, but
I did not see them until after the fact.
Chairman Levin. You indicated here in your quick back and
forth with Senator Ayotte that you thought that those talking
points were right.
Mr. Clapper. They were the best we could do at the time.
Also, in light of our concerns from both an intelligence and
investigatory standpoint, that is as much as we should say at
the time. That is illustrative of the dilemma of speaking in
public about intelligence things, which is somewhat--can often
be an oxymoron.
Chairman Levin. But you believed that they were accurate at
the time?
Mr. Clapper. It was our--it was--well, it wasn't completely
accurate because there were some things, particularly from a
source and methods and because of investigatory concerns that
the FBI had. No, it wasn't completely accurate. It's the best
we could do at the time and still protect those equities.
Chairman Levin. Did you believe at the time that it was
accurate? Did you believe it was inaccurate?
Mr. Clapper. Well, we've since----
Chairman Levin. At the time?
Mr. Clapper. There's an issue about the spontaneity of the
demonstration.
Chairman Levin. I know there's an issue now. I'm saying
when they were written did you, whoever wrote them, believe
they were accurate?
Mr. Clapper. We believed them to be, as tempered by our
concerns for intelligence and investigatory equities.
Chairman Levin. Okay, I understand that. Given all that
temperance, at the time that they were produced you believed
that they were accurate?
Mr. Clapper. That was my response to Senator Ayotte, yes.
Chairman Levin. Is that your response?
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Now, those were the same talking points
that Secretary Rice followed, right?
Mr. Clapper. Yes.
Chairman Levin. When she was highly criticized for
following them, what was your feeling inside, your own personal
belief? Did you think it was fair that she be criticized?
Mr. Clapper. I thought it was unfair because the hit she
took, I didn't think that was appropriate. She was going on
what we had given her, and that was our collective best
judgment at the time as to what should have been said.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. When we had Mr. Brennan before this
committee, and I had talked to him in my office before,
referring to the annex--that's the second wave of the Benghazi
attacks--he said, and then repeated it here:
``Unequivocally''--he used that word--``we all knew that that
was an organized terrorist attack.''
You disagreed with that?
Mr. Clapper. No, I don't. That's the one thing that
happened that had the earmark of some organization and
proficiency, was the 11-minute mortar attack on the annex
facility.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that because that's not
the--I know that's what you were thinking when you answered the
question of someone over here, but it sounded like--I'll go
back and read the transcript. I appreciate that answer very
much.
Now, lastly, and this is the last thing I do have, is: As
withdrawal takes place in Afghanistan, number one, will that
necessarily withdraw a likely percentage of our ISR capability?
Number two, should it?
Mr. Clapper. We obviously--I say ``we.'' The intelligence
capabilities in Afghanistan will be drawing down as well. That
is, though, a function of the footprint, whatever residual
footprint that remains for DOD, and then whatever footprint the
DOS has. Then we tuck up underneath those.
So the exact profile that we'll have has not been
determined yet. Of course, our main concern is detecting a
potential threat to the Homeland. By virtue of the fact that we
are already drawing down and closing bases and we don't have as
many places that gives us access for intelligence purposes,
that is certainly going to change the landscape as far as we're
concerned.
Senator Inhofe. Then the second part of the question was:
Should it? It's a hard question to answer because, as we talked
before about all the needs that are there, West Africa and
other places, it's a matter of resources. But I keep hearing
that on a percentage basis the withdrawal is going to also
impair to about the same degree your international capability
and resources.
Mr. Clapper. That's probably a fair statement.
Senator Inhofe. If that happens, is that proper? Should it?
Mr. Clapper. Our intent is, as I say, Senator Inhofe, to
sustain sufficient presence there to monitor the situation, not
to the fidelity and the degree that we have today with the
large force footprint.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator King.
Senator King. One very brief question, Senator. Thank you.
The sequester has come up a lot today and there's an
ongoing discussion in Congress about flexibility and giving you
the flexibility to have more ability to move the cuts around.
My question is, is giving you flexibility enough to solve the
problem or is the sequester still a problem in terms of the
absolute dollars no matter how much flexibility you have?
Mr. Clapper. That's a great question, sir. Obviously, I
don't know of any professional intelligence officer when asked,
could you use more resources, wouldn't say ``absolutely.'' At
the same time, with the financial cuts that we're absorbing
this year, which will have impact, there's no question about
it, we're going to do away with capabilities we can't get back.
We've discussed that at the hearing on Tuesday.
My great concern is sustaining this, particularly the
impact that's going to have on our most valuable resource,
which is our people.
General Flynn. If I can add just to that, Senator. I think
the other point, it's not just the IC and the requests that we
believe we need to be able to do our mission. But it's also all
of our customers, not just the Customer No. 1 at the White
House, but it's every one of our combatant commanders, every
one of our joint task force commanders, every one of our
leaders out there that are conducting operations around the
world, the demands that they are putting on because of the
variety of threats and challenges that we've described today.
That's where the demand signal is coming from.
Senator King. On the issue of your people, Federal
employees haven't had a raise in 3 or 4 years. There's the
threat of furlough days, which you've indicated you've been
able to avoid. But are you seeing an impact in terms of
retention and recruitment? Because one of the things you
testified in the beginning was one of our grave mistakes in the
1990s was the hollowing out of the human capacity. Is that a
threat in this situation?
Mr. Clapper. It will be. I have to say that whether or not
we're going to have furloughs has not been completely resolved
yet, particularly with the intelligence components in DOD.
Our attrition rate has run the last 3 or 4 years around
4.2, 4.4 percent across the entire IC, which is pretty low. We
have a number of people who will be eligible to retire that's
around 10 percent of the entire IC can retire now and in the
next 5 years another 15 percent.
I think if we go to drastically reduce the IC, to include
its people, we would need, if I may--I'm talking out of school
here because I haven't got the permission of the Office of
Management and Budget, but we basically have the same
incentives or inducements for people to retire as we did in the
1990s, the same amount of money and all that sort of thing,
which isn't much of an incentive these days.
So if we have to do some dramatic reshaping of the
workforce, again having the latitude to induce people to leave,
to end their careers in government, because it's very
important, it's crucial, something that we didn't do very well
in the late 1990s, that we continue to bring on new people, new
blood, and new energy to the IC, rather than letting the
workforce age out.
General Flynn. If I could just add specifically to DIA, in
the last 10 years we have gone from a roughly 25 percent of
workforce, of employees, in their 20s and 30s to 50 percent in
the last 10 years. What I'm afraid of is that those young
people who have, many of which, over 6,000 from our
organization, deployed to places like Iraq and Afghanistan over
the last decade, will feel as though this life that they have
decided to dedicate themselves to in defense of our country
will--they will walk away from this. I'm really concerned about
that, and I think that there's an awful lot of uncertainty,
especially as I talk to many of these young people in our
organization. I think it's unfair.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
Thank you both, gentlemen, for your service and your
testimony today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Now I'm going to call on Senator Blumenthal in a moment.
But the vote has begun. I'm going to leave in a few minutes,
and if you would, Senator Blumenthal, when you're done with
your questions, if you would adjourn the committee, I'd
appreciate it.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal [presiding]. I will be brief because of
the vote that we have ongoing right now.
I wanted to ask generally, in terms of our collaboration
with the Israeli IC, are you satisfied that there is a complete
and cooperative flow of information both ways?
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely, sir. I have been associated with
Israeli intelligence in one capacity or another for 30, 35
years. It's never been closer or more pervasive.
Senator Blumenthal. Without asking you the specific
assessments with respect to the Iranian development of a
nuclear capability, would you say that the assessment on your
part and the Israelis is the same?
Mr. Clapper. Generally speaking, yes. But we have this--and
this is, I think, a commentary on the intimacy of the
relationship. We have the same dialogue, the same debates, the
same arguments analytically, but generally speaking we're on
the same page.
Senator Blumenthal. The same page based on more or less the
same facts and the same kind of availability of information?
Mr. Clapper. Generally speaking, yes. They have unique
sources, we have unique sources. But generally, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you share the information coming
from those separate unique sources?
Mr. Clapper. Pretty much.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Let me turn now to the Pakistani situation. Are you
satisfied that the Pakistani military and its government are
taking sufficient steps to safeguard its nuclear arms?
Mr. Clapper. I'd much prefer to discuss that in closed
session.
Senator Blumenthal. Maybe without asking you for
information that you would feel uncomfortable disclosing, and I
certainly don't want to press you on that score, can you tell
us simply whether you believe there is more that can and should
be done?
Mr. Clapper. I'm sorry, sir?
Senator Blumenthal. More that can and should be done by the
Pakistani military to safeguard?
Mr. Clapper. I'd prefer to discuss that in closed session,
sir.
Senator Blumenthal. I understand. Thank you.
Let me turn to Venezuela. Could you give us some idea of
what the current fraud or irregularities that are ongoing in
their electoral process?
Mr. Clapper. That's unclear that there have been any. There
may have been some. I think the issue would be whether they're
of sufficient magnitude under their system that would merit a
recount, and it at least at this juncture doesn't appear to me
to be the case.
Senator Blumenthal. In your view there would be no
sufficient requirement for a recount?
Mr. Clapper. As far as I know now, no.
Senator Blumenthal. Finally, you spoke a few minutes ago
about the challenges of recruiting and keeping the best minds
in America, which all of us want, to be available to the
American IC. Is there anything that we can do to encourage or
support that effort?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, it would be nice if they got a pay raise
occasionally, and it would be nice not to be threatened with
furloughs.
Senator Blumenthal. I take that to heart and to mind.
With that, sir, let me say thank you to both of you for
your service to this Nation, which has been extraordinarily
distinguished and able. I will, if there's no objection,
adjourn this hearing. Thank you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
north korea
1. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, recent aggressive behavior
from North Korea appears to be following a pattern we came to expect
from both Kim Jong-Il and Kim Il-Sung. However, given Kim Jong-Un's
recent accent to power, it might be difficult to predict how the North
will respond to actions taken by outside actors, such as the United
States, South Korea, and China. What is the Intelligence Community's
current assessment of Kim Jong-Un's likelihood to react in ways we came
to expect from his father and grandfather?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
taliban intelligence network
2. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, the drawdown of U.S. and
coalition forces from Afghanistan has the potential to create security
gaps that can be exploited by Taliban and other forces. The Taliban's
intelligence network has demonstrated the ability to identify targets
and exploit opportunities, such as the September 2012 attack on Camp
Bastion that resulted in the destruction of a squadron of Marine Corps
AV-8B Harrier jets and the death of two U.S. marines. What is your
current assessment of the quality and capability of the Taliban's
intelligence network?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
3. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, is the quality and
capability of the Taliban's intelligence network degrading or
improving?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
chechnya
4. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, it has been reported that
at least one of the brothers involved in the Boston Marathon bombing
recently travelled to the Russian Caucuses and Chechnya. He was also
interviewed by the FBI in 2011 at the request of the Russian Government
regarding possible ties to extremist groups. Is there any concern that
other individuals or groups that are already in the United States with
ties to Chechen terrorists will target Americans as part of a larger
threat that we haven't seen here before?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
5. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, since the Russian
Government has dealt with numerous Chechen terrorist attacks, have they
provided any information regarding this attack as well as past plots or
future threats against U.S. interests?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
venezuela
6. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, in your written testimony
you said: ``Iran has been reaching out to Latin America and the
Caribbean to decrease its international isolation. President
Ahmadinejad traveled to the region twice in 2012. Tehran has cultivated
ties to leaders of the Venezuelan-led Alliance for the Peoples of our
Americas in Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and
maintains cordial relations with Cuba and Nicaragua.'' What does the
death of former President Hugo Chavez and the election of President
Nicolas Maduro mean for Venezuela's relationship with Iran?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
china and cyber security
7. Senator Manchin. Director Clapper, the Obama administration has
continually stated that cyber security is among its top national
security concerns. A February report accused a Chinese military unit of
being responsible for a number of hacking attacks here in the United
States. During his recent visit to China, however, Secretary Kerry
announced a U.S.-China pact on fighting cyber attacks. Given the recent
attacks, what are your thoughts on this newly formed partnership with
China to increase action on cyber security?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
political dysfunction
8. Senator Manchin. Director Clapper and General Flynn, former
Secretary Gates also said: ``The major threat to the United States is
the dysfunction in America's political system . . . the best laws have
come from the vital center and usually as the result of compromise . .
. politicians are more concerned with winning elections and scoring
political points than protecting our country.'' Do you see our
political dysfunction as a threat to our national security?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Flynn. [Deleted.]
______
Question Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
cooperation in border area security
9. Senator Donnelly. Director Clapper and General Flynn, during the
hearing, you, General Flynn, testified that the Pakistan military has
cooperated on the border with Afghanistan in addressing threats from
terrorist organizations operating in that area. I inquired what role
the Inter-Services Intelligence; the Pakistan intelligence agency, has
been playing in addressing these threats, and you, Director Clapper,
responded that you could address this issue in a closed session. Would
you please provide the information on the role of the Inter-Services
Intelligence in addressing terrorist threats along the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Flynn. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
iranian ballistic missile capability
10. Senator Inhofe. Director Clapper and General Flynn, you noted
in your prepared testimony, Director Clapper, that Iranian ballistic
missiles are capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction and that
Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites. The
Department of Defense continues to assess that Iran could flight test
an ICBM by 2015. Given that Iran has launched satellites into space,
why couldn't they be capable of testing an ICBM sooner than 2015?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Flynn. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Inhofe. Director Clapper and General Flynn, could the
Iranians test an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of
reaching Paris or London sooner than 2015?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Flynn. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Inhofe. Director Clapper and General Flynn, do you
believe Iran would want to have the capability to reach the United
States and its Western European allies with a ballistic missile, and if
so, for what purpose?
Mr. Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Flynn. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]