[Senate Hearing 113-444]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-444
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON
MARATHON BOMBINGS: IMPROVING
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2014
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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89-528 WASHINGTON : 2014
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
John P. Kilvington, Acting Staff Director
Jason M. Yanussi, Senior Professional Staff Member
Harlan C. Geer, Senior Professional Staff Member
Jason T. Barnosky, Senior Professional Staff Member
Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
Christopher J. Barkley, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Daniel P. Lips, Minority Director of Homeland Security
William H.W. McKenna, Minority Investigative Counsel
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Lauren M. Corcoran, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Carper............................................... 1
Senator Coburn............................................... 3
Senator Ayotte............................................... 9
Prepared statements:
Senator Carper............................................... 19
WITNESSES
Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Hon. I. Charles McCullough III, Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence; accompanied by Hon. John Roth, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Richard Serino, Deputy
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Justice; and Hon. David B. Buckley,
Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency................. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared joint statement of the Inspectors General............... 21
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON
MARATHON BOMBINGS: IMPROVING
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
Carper, presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Coburn, Johnson, and Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER
Chairman Carper. The hearing will come to order.
We want to welcome our witnesses and our other guests here
this morning. Thank you for coming. Thank you for your
preparation for your testimony and for your willingness to
respond to our questions.
It has been, as we know, just over a year since the
cowardly attack on the Boston Marathon. Today's hearing is an
opportunity for us to review what lessons have been learned
from the actions and events leading up to the attack in order
to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, a similar incident
from ever happening again.
We do this, in part, to honor the memory of the four people
killed that day in April of last year as well as the sacrifices
that have been made by nearly 300 people injured during those
attacks. In particular, we mourn with friends and families of
those killed on April 15, 2013, Krystle Marie Campbell, Martin
William Richard, Lu Lingzi, and for the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) police officer who was slain, Sean Collier,
shot by the suspects 3 days later.
This is our Committee's second hearing on the Boston
Marathon bombing. It is part of our ongoing oversight to
understand what went right that fateful day and what we can do
better. Our first hearing focused on preparedness and response
and found, by and large, that the State of Massachusetts, the
city of Boston, and the surrounding communities were extremely
well trained, coordinated, and prepared. In my view, this was
due in no small part to the assistance provided by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through Federal grants.
Our focus today is different. We will examine the
intelligence collection and information sharing by U.S.
agencies with respect to the Tsarnaev family both before and
after the attack to see what lessons we can learn. I often say
that everything I do, I know I can do better. I think that is
true of all of us, and I think it is true for most Federal
programs. It is also true of counterterrorism activities that
we are going to be discussing this morning.
My sense is that our information sharing systems work well,
but having said that, I know we can always improve on them.
Identifying and deterring terrorist plots by lone wolves and
the Tsarnaev brothers is extremely challenging, but we need to
continue to refine our efforts to help identify these types of
people before the attack and before lives are lost.
I want to thank our four Inspectors General (IGs), one who
is brand new on the job. Mr. Roth, it is very nice to see you
sitting here as a confirmed Inspector General. We want to thank
you for being with us today. We want to thank your staffs who
have worked diligently over the past year to complete this
report.
While some of the details of the report can only be
discussed in the classified portion of today's hearing, I also
want to thank our IGs for releasing an unclassified summary of
their findings. That summary will better inform the American
people. I hope it will also serve to reassure our citizens that
their Federal authorities are working tirelessly and learning
from what worked and what did not, not only in the run-up to
the tragedy but also in its aftermath, in order to improve our
ability to prevent future attacks from occurring.
I believe there are at least two key findings in the report
by our Inspectors General. First, the IGs found that Federal
agencies generally did share information with one another and
they followed the appropriate procedures that were put in place
after 9/11.
And, second, the Inspectors General identified a number of
adjustments and refinements that should be made to further
improve our intelligence and information sharing systems. It
appears unlikely, however, that any of these changes could have
prevented the attack.
Still, I was struck by the passages in the report detailing
the fact that if the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
personnel had received more explicit information from a foreign
government about Tamerlan Tsarnaev's apparent interest in
committing acts of terror, the FBI would likely have taken
additional steps to learn more about him and his intentions. I
plan to explore this conclusion further today with our
witnesses.
Meanwhile, let me say that I am pleased to learn through
this report that U.S. security intelligence agencies have
already begun addressing some of the issues identified in the
report and in other after-action reports, and the Inspectors
General have also put forward two recommendations for further
strengthening and improving terrorist-related information
sharing practices. We look forward to having a discussion about
these findings and these recommendations today, and I also look
forward to the opportunity to discuss the refinements that
agencies have already begun making in the classified briefing
that the Committee will hold with the agencies after this
hearing.
Again, we thank you all for joining us and I am pleased to
turn the microphone over to Dr. Coburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to welcome each of you and tell you,
first of all, how much we appreciate the important work that
you do, the independence of what you do, and also to express
that we have confidence in you. So, thank you, one, for what
you are doing, and two, we appreciate the importance of this
second eye looking inside the agencies.
The purpose of this morning is not to be a Monday morning
quarterback, and most of my questions are going to be only
asked in the classified setting. I think your report raises a
lot of questions. I take a little bit different look at it than
Senator Carper does. And the other thing is, it makes only two
very modest recommendations, and I want to probe those as we
get into the classified briefing. But, I would highlight a few
issues for the public for the benefit of this open hearing.
First is the FBI should review its internal procedures for
information sharing and investigations. Sitting on the Senate
Intelligence Committee and this Committee gives me additional
information that there are some areas there I think we need to
discuss, and we will do that in the closed hearing.
Second, I think we did do some information sharing, but I
think one of the things that is obvious is we could have done
better, and that is the Intelligence Community as a whole in
terms of information sharing.
And then, finally, one of the things that I think we have a
weakness is in terms of sharing information accurately and
adequately with local law enforcement, and also creating a
receptivity to where we can get information from them, making
it easy for that information to flow.
So, I want to thank you for your hard work. I look forward
to the discussion. And, as I stated, most of my questions will
be in the closed hearing.
Chairman Carper. OK. Thank you, Dr. Coburn.
I want to welcome Senator Johnson and Senator Ayotte. Thank
you both very much for being here today and for participating
with us.
Some brief introductions, if I could, and then we will turn
it over to our witnesses.
Charles McCullough is the Inspector General for the
Intelligence Community (IC). He is responsible for overseeing
the work of a number of intelligence agencies, including the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Welcome.
John Roth, who was recently confirmed, came here before us
not that many months ago as a nominee, and we are happy to see
you confirmed and on the job as the Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security. As such, his office is
responsible for overseeing the work of the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service (USCIS), among other components.
Michael Horowitz--nice to see you, Mr. Horowitz--is the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and is
responsible for overseeing the FBI and other key law
enforcement agencies.
And David Buckley, the Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), is a key member of the U.S.
Intelligence Community.
I think my notes here say Mr. McCullough will provide an
opening statement on behalf of all the IGs. He has been the
Inspector General for the Intelligence Community, I think,
since November 2011. We thank you again, all, for joining us.
We look forward to your testimony and for a chance to ask some
questions. Please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE I. CHARLES MCCULLOUGH III, INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE JOHN
ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND THE HONORABLE DAVID B. BUCKLEY,
INSPECTOR GENERAL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\1\
Mr. McCullough. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Carper,
Ranking Member Coburn, and distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for holding this hearing and for the
opportunity to discuss the conclusions of the review we
conducted over the last year.
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\1\ The prepared joint statement of the Inspectors General appears
in the Appendix on page 21.
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We share yours and the Committee Members' deep sympathies
for the victims and their families. As we know, on April 15,
2013, two pressure cooker bombs placed near the finish line of
the Boston Marathon detonated within seconds of each other,
killing three, maiming many, and injuring more than 200 people.
Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officials identified
brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev as primary suspects in
the bombings. After an extensive search for the suspects, law
enforcement officials encountered the brothers in Watertown,
Massachusetts. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed during the
encounter, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who fled the scene, was
apprehended the following day and remains in Federal custody
awaiting trial.
In the days that followed, Members of Congress asked
questions of the FBI Director, the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), and other Government officials about the
handling and sharing of information by the U.S. Government
concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to the bombings. With the
DNI's support, the Inspectors General of the Intelligence
Community, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security determined to
conduct a coordinated review of the handling and sharing of the
information available to the U.S. Government prior to the
Boston Marathon bombings.
Our review had three objectives. First, to determine the
extent of the information available to the U.S. Government
regarding these individuals and events preceding the Boston
Marathon bombings. Second, whether the sharing of information
was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S.
counterterrorism and information sharing policies, regulations,
and U.S. laws. And, third, whether there were weaknesses in
protocols and procedures that impact our ability to detect
potential threats to national security.
In order to satisfy these objectives, we looked at three
distinct areas of scope. First, we examined the information
that was known to the U.S. Government prior to the bombing.
Second, we examined any information that existed within the
U.S. Government's reach before the bombing, but had not been
obtained, accessed, or reviewed until after the bombing. And,
third, we examined whether U.S. Government officials reasonably
could have been expected to have known this information existed
prior to the bombing.
For nearly a year, the inspectors, investigators, and
auditors of our offices combed through thousands of documents
and interviewed more than 150 witnesses. Due to the classified
subjects and detailed accounting of interactions between the
Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, the full
results of our review are in a classified report that has been
submitted to the Congress. We also thought it extremely
important to publish an unclassified summary that we submit for
the record.
Overall, we found no basis to make broad recommendations
for changes to U.S. Government procedures for information
handling and sharing because we found the FBI, CIA, DHS, and
NCTC generally shared information and correctly followed
procedures. We did find some specific areas where broader
information sharing between agencies may have been required or
where broader information sharing in the future should be
considered.
As a result, we made two recommendations to enhance the
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) alert procedures and expand
the FBI's sharing of threat information with State and local
partners. However, in this particular case, we found that
broader information sharing likely would not have resulted in
providing additional helpful information to the FBI.
We also found that given the limited information available
to the Boston JTTF in March 2011 concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev,
the FBI's decision to open the matter at the assessment level
of investigation was an application of the least intrusive
method principle within its investigative discretion. Because
the lead included information about Tsarnaev's mother, Zubeidat
Tsarnaeva, we believe the FBI should have given greater
consideration to opening an assessment on her. However, given
the bulk of the derogatory information in the lead focused on
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, we concluded that it was within the FBI's
discretion not to open an assessment on Zubeidat Tsarnaeva.
We also concluded that additional investigative steps by
the FBI would have resulted in a more thorough assessment,
including conducting additional database searches, asking
questions of Tsarnaev and his parents to elicit information
about any plans he may have had to travel to Russia, as well as
interviewing his former girlfriend and wife. However, we
determined that the additional database searches would not have
revealed any information that was not already known to the FBI
agent conducting the assessment. In addition, we found that it
is impossible to know what the former girlfriend and wife would
have told the FBI in 2011, before the Boston Marathon bombings,
and while Tsarnaev was still alive. Therefore, it cannot be
known whether these additional interviews would have yielded
additional information relevant to lead information from the
Russian government.
With respect to post-assessment activities, we believe that
Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travel to Russia in 2012 was significant
and warranted further FBI investigative action, although we
determined that none was taken. That said, we believe it is
impossible to know what would have happened had different
investigative judgments been made prior to the bombings.
Finally, we concluded that DHS generally followed
procedures and policies when adjudicating the Tsarnaev family's
immigration benefits and screening the family's travel.
This review, which was conducted across four separate IG
offices, is precisely the type of coordinated work that the
Congress expected when it created the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum. Collectively, we broke new ground in
many areas of cooperation, and as a result, there is today far
stronger independent oversight of the Intelligence Community.
On behalf of my fellow Inspectors General, I would like to
thank the Committee for its continued support and for the
opportunity to have this important public discussion. We owe it
to the Nation and especially those victims and families
directly affected by the bombings to openly discuss what we
have learned in this review.
Also deserving of our thanks are the agency directors whose
support reflects their shared belief in independent and
objective analysis.
Last, I would like to express my gratitude for the men and
women within our offices who over the past year painstakingly
reviewed mountains of data and conducted dozens of interviews.
Their diligence and objectivity exemplify professionalism and
excellence in service to our country.
This concludes my remarks. I look forward to answering your
questions.
Chairman Carper. Thanks so much, Mr. McCullough. I
certainly want to agree with your last part of your statement
very much. Thank you.
Mr. McCullough. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Carper. As I mentioned earlier in my opening
statement, I think it appears that one of your key findings is
that during--this would be really for you, Mr. McCullough, this
question--but one of your key findings is that during the lead-
up to the attack, the U.S. agencies you oversee correctly
followed their procedures when they investigated, ultimately
cleared, and later shared information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev.
Would it be fair to say that while some elements of our
information sharing system could have been improved, there was
no silver bullet available to U.S. authorities that would have
allowed us to avert the attack?
Mr. McCullough. Yes, Senator, that would be fair to say,
that there was no silver bullet. There was no one single event
that we uncovered that we believed would have prevented these
attacks.
Chairman Carper. OK. Do any of our other witnesses want to
comment on this, on that first question?
[No response.]
OK. Again, this would be for Mr. Horowitz, if I could. Mr.
Horowitz, your report also seemed to indicate that if the
Russians or any foreign intelligence partners had shared more
specific information, the FBI likely would have dug deeper and
been able to use more of the tools in their toolbox. It seems
to me that getting additional intelligence from foreign
authorities might have been the only key factor that could have
helped to prevent this attack from occurring. Are those fair
characterizations of your findings?
Mr. Horowitz. I think it is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that
that would have been, as we indicated, an important piece of
information, and as we outlined the requests that were made by
the FBI to the foreign entity, there were several other items
that we identified in the report that the FBI could have
followed up on, including, in particular, the travel that was
identified of Tamerlan Tsarnaev to Russia.
Chairman Carper. All right. This would be a question for
all of our witnesses. Mr. Roth, if you would like to lead off
on this, you are welcome to. But, this is a question on how to
improve information sharing. Our system for preventing
terrorist attacks cannot and should not depend on the
willingness of foreign governments to share information with
us. Your review found that many actions taken were appropriate
and in accordance with policy. For example, two of the
Department of Homeland Security's key agencies, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, appropriately adjudicated immigration
applications for the Tsarnaev family and tracked Tamerlan's
travel to and from Russia.
And this attack shows we can do better. Could you please
take a minute to highlight for our Committee what the FBI, the
Intelligence Community, and the Department of Homeland Security
should be doing in the future to prevent this kind of attack
and which of these steps have already been taken.
Mr. Roth. Thank you for the question, Senator. Certainly, I
think that in any situation like this, there is room for
improvement. One of the things that we discovered in the course
of our analysis is that immediately after the bombing, when the
facts were discovered, both CBP as well as USCIS, speaking just
for DHS, engaged in an after-action sort of look-back to see
what it is that we could be doing better.
One of the things that particularly CBP found was the
outbound analysis of the Tsarnaev's travel--Tsarnaev, as the
report says, was on a specific list, a fairly long list. The
outbound CBP inspectors did not have the opportunity to engage
in an outbound inspection of him. They were unaware, for
example, that there was a specific alert that had been placed
within the DHS data systems Treasury Enforcement Communications
System (TECS) to do so.
So, one of the things they have fixed as a result of this
incident, independent of the IG investigation, was to ensure
that those outbound inspectors now take a look at the
underlying documentation on each individual within a list of
people to look at for outbound.
Chairman Carper. All right. Let me ask each of our other
IGs to respond to the same question, if you would, please.
Mr. Horowitz. From the FBI's standpoint, I think there were
a couple of places where the information sharing as well as the
followup could have been better. We identify them. Again, the
most significant being the travel that occurred in January
2012. We were unable to definitively determine, for example,
when the notice went to the CBP agent, whether that information
was passed to the FBI agent. We concluded it likely did happen,
based on the information we had, but that was largely based on
a practice of a CBP agent putting a sticky note on an FBI
agent's desk in that instance, and that should not be the way
information is passed. There has apparently been followup on
that and improving that information system flow so there is
documentation of those notices.
But also in this instance, when Tsarnaev traveled to
Russia, that was the basis for the Russian notice to us and the
request to us. There was not further followup on that by the
FBI, and that was, as we noted, a significant incident.
Chairman Carper. All right. I would welcome any comments
you have, Mr. Buckley, on the same question, please.
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that when we
talk about the information that was shared between the CIA and
the law enforcement/Homeland Security elements of the U.S.
Federal Government, we did not find anything from a sharing
standpoint that could be improved upon. What I would like to do
in the closed session that follows is talk about some specifics
regarding some things that the CIA may have been able to
provide in addition and perhaps some greater collaboration at
the worker level.
Chairman Carper. And, Mr. McCullough, would you respond to
the same question, and then I am going to yield to Dr. Coburn.
Mr. McCullough. Mr. Chair, I think the same thing as Mr.
Buckley just said. I would have some comments on that in the
closed session.
The one thing I could say in the open session with respect
to the NCTC, there has been an enhancement of the data input
into certain Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
so that there is more complete data there now than there was,
and that has already been accomplished since the bombing.
Chairman Carper. All right. My thanks to each of you. Dr.
Coburn.
Senator Coburn. I just have one question for the open
session, and it is when we have people who immigrate here under
an asylum visa and come and then we see returning to the areas
from which they sought asylum from, do we have any method at
all which raises a flag that says, you came here seeking asylum
from persecution in X country and now you are going back to X
country. Is there anything in our system, anywhere, that raises
that up, because if, in fact, you are seeking asylum, the last
thing I would think is you are going back to the place from
which you sought asylum. Do we have anything that we can talk
about in open session?
Mr. Roth. Senator, you raise a very good question. That is,
unfortunately, beyond the scope of what it is that we looked at
during the course of our inquiry here, but you do raise a very
good question.
Senator Coburn. Well, I do not think that----
[Comments off microphone.]
Never mind. I cannot finish this line of questioning in
open session.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE
Chairman Carper. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for
being here.
This is obviously a very important topic, and certainly
where I live in Nashua, New Hampshire, is 45 minutes away from
where these bombings occurred. And, in fact, a lot of the law
enforcement officers in New Hampshire went down--the Manchester
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team, the Nashua Special
React Team, the New Hampshire State Police and Seacoast
Emergency Response Team. And, of course, so this is local for
us. In fact, Jeff Bauman, who is really a hero in these
circumstances, his family lives in New Hampshire and he was
heroic that day, and everything that he suffered, and all of
the victims. So, I really appreciate the work that you have
done on this because this is incredibly important for the
country.
I wanted to ask about, first of all, the JTTF issue. When
Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis came before our Committee,
that was where he focused his attention. He was very concerned,
and I know you have talked about it in your report, as well,
about the fact that on the JTTF Task Forces--and I served as
State Attorney General, so I worked with that Task Force in
that capacity--that it was too much of a one-way street. In
other words, the information coming in was not then
communicated downward. And, as all of you know, it is really
the line police officers on the street that are likely to
encounter this type of individual first.
So, can you help us understand, what improvements have been
made at this point with regard to JTTF communication issues in
terms of the type of back and forth that Senator Coburn also
talked about and are necessary to make sure that that
information first flows downward, but then also flows back
upward once that police officer on the ground receives
information.
Mr. Horowitz. Let me take that, first, at least. Senator,
it is an important part of this report and our finding, and we
had the good fortune and benefit of hearing from Commissioner
Davis in the course of our work, who described to us many of
his concerns that you have outlined.
One of the things we noted specifically in our report was
the failure of the FBI, when an incident or issue like this
came up as to a person, to alert those local officers, the
community that could be impacted by an individual like that,
both from the standpoint of learning if they had information
back, but also allowing them to be prepared if there were any
particular issues or concerns.
We also heard from Commissioner Davis about the concern
that the information was flowing one way, but also that there
was a general attitude on the JTTF that you only gave
information to the locals if there was a need to know, not as
part of a routine relationship, not as something that occurred
regularly, but on a need to know basis. The likelihood was that
unless it was very clear there was a need to know, that was not
happening as frequently as it could.
We understand that the FBI has sent memos out and is
addressing that now. That is a recommendation we have made and
that is something we will be following up on.
Senator Ayotte. So, they are already taking steps to
implement better information sharing?
Mr. Horowitz. We have been told that, and as we do in all
of our work, we will followup and make our own conclusion on
whether that has been effective.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I will tell you this, that the memo
is important, but it is also the attitude. So----
Mr. Horowitz. Right.
Senator Ayotte [continuing]. Having worked in cases where
it is Federal, State, local, sometimes county, as well, the
attitude, I think, that we need to get at, that is the pre-9/11
attitude of we are going to hold this information in as the
FBI, as opposed to really realizing that we have all these
partnerships of people who are on the street every day that can
help us and we can work together.
And so I have talked to Director Jim Comey about this, and
I am hoping that in addition to changes in policy, that it is
really an outreach issue by the FBI to reach out to the heads
of the JTTFs as well as the local officers to really say, we
get it. We really understand how important this is in terms of
preventing terrorist attacks and other types of criminal
behavior even beyond terrorism. So, I think that that attitude
issue, I would love to see, as you look at this issue in the
followup with the FBI, what is it that the local officers feel
has been the attitude change on the ground, because that is
what is going to make the biggest difference here.
Mr. Horowitz. Right. And that is what Commissioner Davis
mentioned, as well, and it clearly is the culture of the
organization and the culture of the relationship that is
critical. You can put all the rules in place that you want, but
if folks do not feel like they should be talking to one
another, it just will not happen.
Senator Ayotte. Can I also suggest that engaging the U.S.
Attorneys and also engaging the Attorneys General on this, at
the State law enforcement level, at the Federal level, because
I know when I served as our Attorney General, I had the role of
being a chief law enforcement officer, so I could get very much
my message across in meetings I had with law enforcement about
how we were going to emphasize these issues. So, I think this
has to be a holistic approach where you are also engaging the
prosecutors they work with on a regular basis to say, hey, this
is important and this attitude is what is going to help us
protect America, working together. So, I appreciate that
emphasis.
One thing I looked at that is--I am trying to understand,
and to the extent that you are able to answer this in the open
setting, but this followup issue on the CBP and as they notify,
you said it was done with a sticky note, basically, the trip to
Russia by Tsarnaev. Those procedures, as I understand it, have
now been changed and formalized, is that right?
Mr. Horowitz. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. So, the question I have is, assuming that
formal designation, how does the FBI then determine whether
there will be a followup? Is there a procedure there? Is there
a standard there that we can understand when the FBI is
actually assuming formal notification from CBP, as they should
be, not with some sticky----
Mr. Horowitz. Right.
Senator Ayotte [continuing]. So that is a very important
improvement. Then, will they make the decision on, we have to
go, then, do some more investigative work.
Mr. Horowitz. As it was then--as I believe it still
remains--it is the agent who gets notified and it is their
responsibility to make a determination as to whether to
proceed. I think there is a strong argument to be made that in
that situation, an agent should, at a minimum, be consulting
with their supervisor when, particularly in an instance like
this, the nub of the information sent to the FBI by the Russian
authorities was, he is going to travel to Russia to join these
groups, as we outline here. That is precisely what he did in
January 2012 in terms of at least the travel. We do not know
what he did there. But as to the information that went to the
FBI, that he is going to travel to Russia, that is exactly what
information was learned because of the ping and the notice that
went on.
Senator Ayotte. Absolutely, this seems like pretty
compelling information from the Russians. So, I would hope that
it would not just be left with the discretion of the agent,
that you actually would have some type of consulting to make
sure that in those circumstances, we do have a followup
investigation that needs to be conducted to find out what his
activities were in Russia, and, in fact, did he meet with these
groups that are associated with terrorist activities, because
that would have probably changed, to some extent, the prism
upon which he was viewed.
Mr. Horowitz. Correct. That is correct, because it also, in
part, corroborated the information that had been sent to the
FBI, so it demonstrated some credibility on that information.
It could have resulted in additional followup within the United
States. It also could have resulted in a notice to the foreign
country, to Russia, in response to the information they had
sent to us.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I know my time is up,
and I think this is a very important issue. I want to thank
both the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this
hearing and for the work done by the investigators, all of the
Inspectors General here. Thank you.
Chairman Carper. Thanks for those questions.
I want to be sensitive to what you can say in a public
setting and what you cannot, but I have a couple questions that
relate to Mrs. Tsarnaev, and to the extent that you discuss her
role in all of this and that you can share with us in a public
setting, I would welcome that. I have a couple of specific
questions, but are there any more general comments you would
like to make about how you address her role in all this that
you can share with us in a public setting?
Mr. Horowitz. Well, I will just say, the one thing that we
can say from the standpoint from what we looked at, the lead
information included information about her, not just Tamerlan.
The judgment was made to only look at--to only open on
Tamerlan, but we found there was certainly sufficient
information, if the FBI had wanted, to open on her, as well,
that they could have done so. They made the judgment not to,
and that was a decision made right at the outset, in March
2011.
Chairman Carper. OK. Others, please.
Mr. McCullough. I would agree that there was information
that we found when we examined the post-bombing information
that was collected, and I think probably that would have to be
discussed in the classified session. But, there was information
that we found post-bombing that would relate to that, Senator.
Chairman Carper. Mr. Buckley.
Mr. Buckley. Mr. Chairman, I, too, have information that I
will impart in the closed session regarding this.
Chairman Carper. All right. Let me ask a couple of followup
questions, more specific followup questions. If you can respond
to these in an open setting, that is fine. If you cannot, we
will ask them again in a closed setting.
But, looking back, it seems that one of the key moments in
the case occurred when the FBI's initial investigation into
Tamerlan concluded that he did not pose a threat to the United
States. Can you give us your assessment of whether or not the
FBI's investigation of Tamerlan and his mother was thorough
enough. Mr. Horowitz.
Mr. Horowitz. Yes. I think we found there were several
steps that could have been taken that would have made it more
thorough, among them, doing additional database searches. On
that, we were able to go back and do those ourselves and
concluded there actually was not much there in the databases
that would have been helpful, but nevertheless believed a more
thorough assessment would have included those database
searches.
There could have been interviews of his then-wife, his ex-
girlfriend, who had filed charges against him, as well as
questioning both him and his parents about the specific
allegations that had come in from the Russian authorities,
again, particularly the travel that was known about back in
March 2011, before the assessment was closed and before later
learning that the travel had actually been undertaken.
Chairman Carper. OK. Let me just do a followup on that, Mr.
Horowitz, if I could. While the Russians did not provide us
with a whole lot of information, they did warn that both
Tamerlan and his mother were adherents to radical Islam, as I
recall. However, the report states that a separate
investigation was not opened on Tamerlan's mother. Do you
think--and we have talked about this a little bit, but I want
to come back to it--do you think that this was an appropriate
decision by the FBI, and should the FBI be permitted to
exercise this type of discretion in opting to open or not open
cases?
Mr. Horowitz. From our standpoint, we think that more
consideration should have been given to opening an assessment
on Zubeidat, as well as Tamerlan. The explanation given to us
was that the information largely focused on Tamerlan and the
judgment was made, therefore, to open only on Tamerlan. Based
on the rules in place and the FBI procedures, that was a
judgment they made that was within their authority to make.
Again, I think, from our standpoint, the supervisor should
have--and this is really a supervisor decision--should have
given more consideration to opening on her.
Chairman Carper. All right. If I could, Mr. Buckley, a
different question, please. Two agencies, the FBI and the CIA,
received the same initial information from Russian authorities,
but only the CIA decided to nominate Tamerlan for the Terrorist
Watch List, as I recall. I understand the reasons for this is
specific and classified, but I wanted to ask both you and maybe
Mr. McCullough, if I could, if there was anything you believe
intelligence agencies can or should do to make these decisions
in a more collaborative way so that we can ensure that everyone
is working off the same information.
Mr. Buckley. Mr. Chairman, the answer to your question is
yes. As I indicated earlier, beyond information sharing, we did
identify opportunities where, had there been further
collaboration, person-to-person, office-to-office, speculating,
it might have led to a different decisionmaking matrix.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you. I am going to ask
one more question, and then I am going to yield back over to
Senator Ayotte for additional questions that she might have.
Mr. Horowitz, this will be a followup question regarding
discretion to determine the type of FBI investigation. Your
report notes that the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force
agents have some discretion to determine what level of
investigation to open on a person of interest and typically try
to use a standard, I think it is called the least intrusive
method. Could you explain why that discretion and standard are
important.
Mr. Horowitz. Under the FBI's Domestic Investigations and
Operations Guide (DIOG), which is the manual that they use to
consider what level of assessment to undertake, there are three
choices. There is an assessment, which is what was done here,
the next step up being a preliminary investigation, and the
third step being a full investigation, the latter two requiring
some predication to do those steps. The FBI's manual informs
their agents and supervisors to choose the least intrusive
method, recognizing that they might have more than one choice.
And in this case, the agent and the supervisor both told us
they chose as the least intrusive method the assessment.
It is important to note that none of the steps I indicated
that could have been taken to make it a more thorough
assessment were in any way limited by that choice. So, the fact
that it was an assessment still allowed the steps to be taken.
And, similarly, had there been an interest in following up on
the travel in January 2012, that could have been done even at
the assessment level and allowed a determination to be made
then whether to escalate it to a preliminary investigation or a
full investigation.
Chairman Carper. OK. Thanks. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I just had one followup to the Chairman's
question regarding better collaboration between the CIA and
FBI. One thing that leapt out at me on this that has bothered
me is that the FBI receives information from the Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russian intelligence
agency, and the FBI follows up, does their assessment, finds no
nexus with terrorism. Then, of course, we have been talking
about the fact that then Tsarnaev goes to Russia again and
there was no followup, which I think we all agree doing a
followup there would have been important.
That said, what bothered me, also, was the fact that the
FBI got this information from the FSB--they get that in March.
In September, the FSB also reaches out to the CIA. Why is it
not that the FBI would not notify the CIA in those
circumstances as opposed to having a foreign government,
waiting for them to actually notify an agency, a separate
agency within our own government? That really leapt out at me
and it bothered me, and can you help us understand that?
Mr. Horowitz. Yes. I agree, Senator. As we noted in the
report, that was a failing of the sharing that occurred. The
FBI should have alerted in March 2011, when they learned this
information, their counterparts at the CIA. They did not do
that. Ultimately, the Russian authorities did do that in
September 2011, and as we later learned, because of that
notice, the CIA did not have--the delay in that notice did not
have an impact on the assessment, ultimately. But,
nevertheless, that notice should have occurred earlier.
Senator Ayotte. Is there now a procedure in place that
would have a more formal notification process between the FBI
and the CIA, because you can see a scenario where this type of
situation could make a very significant difference.
Mr. Horowitz. There is already, a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) in place that should have been followed
here that----
Senator Ayotte. It just was not followed.
Mr. Horowitz. So, what is required here is further training
and an understanding among FBI that they need to do that, and,
in fact, there was one of the three followups that they did
that went to the FSB, they did not notify the CIA of that. That
was another place where that notification should have occurred.
Senator Ayotte. Well, this is, I think, important, because
we have the issue of Federal, State, local information sharing,
but also information sharing, of course, thinking after 9/11,
the improvements and work we have done to make sure our own
agencies are sharing. So, I hope that there will also be an
emphasis on this as we look at the followup to this to make
sure that the procedures are being followed or that the people
understand what their responsibilities are. Thank you.
Chairman Carper. Mr. McCullough, if I could, maybe one or
two more and then we will wrap it up here. But, if the Russians
had not shared their initial tip, would we have had any way to
detect Tamerlan's radicalization?
Mr. McCullough. There were----
Chairman Carper. What I am going to get at here is just
homegrown terrorism and our ability to ferret them out-----
Mr. McCullough. Right.
Chairman Carper [continuing]. And understand what is going
on, if someone is being radicalized, and what its implications
might be for us.
Mr. McCullough. Well, the Bureau's actions stem from the
memo from the FSB, and so that led to everything else in this
chain of events here. You are saying, if that memo did not
exist, would he have turned up some other way? I do not know. I
think in the classified session, we can talk about some of the
post-bombing forensics and what was found and that sort of
thing and you can see when that radicalization was happening.
And so I would think that this would have come up, yes. At
some point it would have presented itself to law enforcement
and to the Intelligence Community, possibly not as early as the
FSB memo, it did not. But, I think that it would have come up
at some point, noting what we found post-bombing.
Chairman Carper. Sometimes we ask people, and sometimes
they ask us what keeps us up at night, and one of the things
that keeps me up at night is concern about homegrown
radicalization. It is one thing to have folks in other parts of
the world who want to do us harm, and it is hard enough to find
out about that and to track and to deter, to counter it. But,
it is another kettle of fish when the threat comes from within.
And, the question I will ask here--and if you feel
comfortable in answering it here, fine, if not, we will get
into it in our closed session--but, I would just come back to
this issue and say, is our counterterrorism and homegrown
security system capable of detecting and maybe preventing
attacks like this?
Mr. McCullough. I believe it is, Chairman Carper. I believe
it is.
Chairman Carper. All right. We will drill down on that a
little bit more in our closed session.
My last question would be for--and, you all were good
enough to give us at least one opening statement. I am going to
ask you each to take maybe a minute and give us a closing
statement, and what I would like you to focus on in your
closing statement is I want to look to see where there is
consensus and agreement on things that we could have done
better, or lessons learned, things we could have done better.
Dr. Coburn and I, we are not interested in holding ``gotcha''
hearings and Monday morning quarterbacking, but we all are
interested in finding what we could have done better, and maybe
just remind us of the areas that we could have done better and
those where we actually are doing better now and maybe some
others which are still works in process.
In fact, let us just go right to that question.
And, do you want to lead off, Mr. Buckley.
Mr. Buckley. Sure, Mr. Chairman. I will take a stab at it.
I think, in this specific case and generally, the agency could
have done better in looking at certain records that it had that
might have provided a slightly fuller picture when it made the
nomination. However, our assessment was that if they had, it
would not have given that much more information to cause
anybody to do anything differently. But, they did not, so we do
recommend that they do check available databases and give a
more fulsome record when they make such nominations.
Of course, there is a constant balance and a struggle that
takes place when you are talking about the CIA and its
involvement at all and U.S. persons, whether they are citizens,
naturalized or born, and adverse information that comes from
foreign governments pertaining to U.S. citizens. So, there is a
line, and it is blurry, and that requires individual employees
and their supervisors to make case-by-case determinations on
what is appropriate and what is not, and so it is very hard for
the Inspector General--for me, anyway--to look back and say, in
this case, you should have done that, and in that case, you
dare not.
So, this is very much a human enterprise, assisted by
machines, but the human decision, at the end of the day, is
what we ought to either stand by or criticize. So, I think that
a little bit more records checking, making some more fulsome
disclosures to NCTC, the FBI, and others, as they did in the
nomination, could be done better. It would not have made a
difference in this case.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you. Mr. Horowitz.
Mr. Horowitz. Let me just echo what Mr. Buckley just said.
Ultimately, on much of what we have talked about on the
assessment, those were human judgments made by an agent and a
supervisor, and those judgments are going to be made in
hundreds, if not thousands, of cases.
In terms of protocols and sharing and the culture that we
talked about a little bit earlier, about making sure there is
that sharing, I think you saw a few things here that are
indicative of the issues. The State and local issue that we
talked about--there needs to be a recognition that information
flow should be both ways and the culture should be one of
information flow.
Second, there needs to be following of MOUs within the
Federal Government, the sharing that could have occurred in
several places with the FBI and the CIA did not. While it would
not have had an impact, perhaps, nevertheless, should be
occurring regularly. That should be one of the first thoughts
happening, not something that is forgotten about.
And then, finally, in light of the travel that occurred,
another place where consideration should have been given to not
only followup on the travel, but also, again, the question of
whether that information should have been shared with the
Russian authorities that had, in fact, sent us the lead about
that very travel.
Chairman Carper. Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth. DHS had largely a supporting role in the entire
episode. That being said, there were things that they could
have done that they, I think, are improving as we speak, one of
which is assessing the outbound travel to determine whether or
not individuals ought to be inspected. It is an enormous task.
A place like John F. Kennedy International Airport has
something like 13 million passengers in any given year, 200 in-
bound flights per day. So, it is a very difficult situation to
get right, but certainly, I think, that is an area that could
use some improvement.
Likewise, with transliteration of names and matching names
within a database, here, we had an example of two separate
entries in which there was a misspelling, that those names were
not matched. I think there is room for improvement there,
which, I think, is taking place.
Chairman Carper. Thank you.
Mr. McCullough, same question.
Mr. McCullough. Mr. Chair, just to kind of summarize, we
did find the information sharing mechanisms in the government
did work here. Information was shared. There were errors,
inaccuracies. There may have been a lack of completeness or
thoroughness with the information that was being shared. But,
certainly, the institutions and the mechanisms that are in
place to share the information were doing that.
Despite everything that occurred between the FSB
information going to the FBI and then going separately to the
CIA, the CIA with the NCTC, the TIDE nomination over to the
Terrorist Screening Center, a parallel track from the FBI's
JTTF TECS, despite all of this, despite the misspellings or the
distinct spellings, there were different translations of
certain pieces of material between different intelligence
elements, on January 18, when Tamerlan Tsarnaev was going to
travel to Russia--this is 3 days before his travel to Russia--a
Customs officer got a ping. Despite all of those errors and
inaccuracies, the mechanisms worked. That Customs officer was
notified that this individual was going to be traveling to
Russia.
And that was the goal. That is the goal of the information
sharing. We had a Guardian assessment that occurred, and at the
end of the day, we would like to know when he is traveling, the
Customs officer got that ping. I believe the DOJ IG found, as a
matter of fact, that it is highly likely that that ping, that
information, was conveyed to the FBI when that occurred.
And, we can talk about the judgments that were made with
respect to the action that was taken with that information.
But, I do think that information was shared here. There were
some errors. There were some inaccuracies. And we have made
some recommendations and drawn some conclusions to address
these. But, at the end of the day, there is not a ``smoking
gun,'' there is not a single event or a singular event or a
series of events that we can say, had this happened, that most
certainly would have changed the scenario here. Had this
happened, that would have stopped the bombing. We did not find
anything like that.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you.
Dr. Coburn, any closing statement you would like to make?
Senator Coburn. That is all for me. It will be in
classified.
Chairman Carper. OK. Let me just wrap up by saying I think
we have had a productive session here today. A lot of work has
gone into preparing for this, and we are grateful for that. We
look forward to moving to a secure setting and to being able to
ask you a few more questions and for you to be able to share
with us some information that you are not able to share here.
I just want to say, though, on the anniversary of the
Boston Marathon and the running of the marathon earlier this
month, that our thoughts go back to a year ago and the loss of
life and injuries, and how the lives of some people were taken
away and other lives were shattered. But, the crowd that was
chanting as the runners went through their course and ran--I
say this as a runner myself, my son is a runner, used to live
in Boston--I missed qualifying for the Boston Marathon by a
minute a couple of years ago, by the way--it is one thing to
take a punch, in this case a sucker punch, and it is another
thing to bounce back, and, boy, we bounced back. And, I am
proud for everybody who turned to, in the face of adversity,
calamity, mayhem a year ago--I am very proud for the way that
we have demonstrated our strength this year.
The last thing I would say is, were there some mistakes
made? Were there some things we could have done better?
Clearly, there were. We have drilled down on those. We are
going to continue to drill down on those and make sure we can
get as close to perfect as we can, and there is a lot riding on
that.
With that, we are going to conclude here. The hearing
record will remain open for 15 days, until May 15 at 5 p.m.,
for the submission of additional statements and questions for
the record. So, if you get some, please respond to those.
And with that, we are adjourned at this point in time and
will reconvene in just a few minutes. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the Committee recessed and
proceeded to closed session.]
A P P E N D I X
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