    [Senate Hearing 113-444]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 113-444

                        LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON

                          MARATHON BOMBINGS: IMPROVING

                      INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON

                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 30, 2014

                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    89-528                    WASHINGTON : 2014
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
    Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
    area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104  Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
    20402-0001

            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                      THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    JON TESTER, Montana                  RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota

                   John P. Kilvington, Acting Staff Director
               Jason M. Yanussi, Senior Professional Staff Member
                Harlan C. Geer, Senior Professional Staff Member
              Jason T. Barnosky, Senior Professional Staff Member
                   Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
             Christopher J. Barkley, Minority Deputy Staff Director
             Daniel P. Lips, Minority Director of Homeland Security
              William H.W. McKenna, Minority Investigative Counsel
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Lauren M. Corcoran, Hearing Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Carper...............................................     1
        Senator Coburn...............................................     3
        Senator Ayotte...............................................     9
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Carper...............................................    19

                                   WITNESSES
                           Wednesday, April 30, 2014

    Hon. I. Charles McCullough III, Inspector General of the
      Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National
      Intelligence; accompanied by Hon. John Roth, Inspector General,
      U.S. Department of Homeland Security Richard Serino, Deputy
      Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
      Department of Homeland Security; Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
      General, U.S. Department of Justice; and Hon. David B. Buckley,
      Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency.................     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared joint statement of the Inspectors General...............    21

                        LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON

                          MARATHON BOMBINGS: IMPROVING

                      INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
    Carper, presiding.
        Present: Senators Carper, Coburn, Johnson, and Ayotte.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER

        Chairman Carper. The hearing will come to order.
        We want to welcome our witnesses and our other guests here
    this morning. Thank you for coming. Thank you for your
    preparation for your testimony and for your willingness to
    respond to our questions.
        It has been, as we know, just over a year since the
    cowardly attack on the Boston Marathon. Today's hearing is an
    opportunity for us to review what lessons have been learned
    from the actions and events leading up to the attack in order
    to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, a similar incident
    from ever happening again.
        We do this, in part, to honor the memory of the four people
    killed that day in April of last year as well as the sacrifices
    that have been made by nearly 300 people injured during those
    attacks. In particular, we mourn with friends and families of
    those killed on April 15, 2013, Krystle Marie Campbell, Martin
    William Richard, Lu Lingzi, and for the Massachusetts Institute
    of Technology (MIT) police officer who was slain, Sean Collier,
    shot by the suspects 3 days later.
        This is our Committee's second hearing on the Boston
    Marathon bombing. It is part of our ongoing oversight to
    understand what went right that fateful day and what we can do
    better. Our first hearing focused on preparedness and response
    and found, by and large, that the State of Massachusetts, the
    city of Boston, and the surrounding communities were extremely
    well trained, coordinated, and prepared. In my view, this was
    due in no small part to the assistance provided by the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through Federal grants.
        Our focus today is different. We will examine the
    intelligence collection and information sharing by U.S.
    agencies with respect to the Tsarnaev family both before and
    after the attack to see what lessons we can learn. I often say
    that everything I do, I know I can do better. I think that is
    true of all of us, and I think it is true for most Federal
    programs. It is also true of counterterrorism activities that
    we are going to be discussing this morning.
        My sense is that our information sharing systems work well,
    but having said that, I know we can always improve on them.
    Identifying and deterring terrorist plots by lone wolves and
    the Tsarnaev brothers is extremely challenging, but we need to
    continue to refine our efforts to help identify these types of
    people before the attack and before lives are lost.
        I want to thank our four Inspectors General (IGs), one who
    is brand new on the job. Mr. Roth, it is very nice to see you
    sitting here as a confirmed Inspector General. We want to thank
    you for being with us today. We want to thank your staffs who
    have worked diligently over the past year to complete this
    report.
        While some of the details of the report can only be
    discussed in the classified portion of today's hearing, I also
    want to thank our IGs for releasing an unclassified summary of
    their findings. That summary will better inform the American
    people. I hope it will also serve to reassure our citizens that
    their Federal authorities are working tirelessly and learning
    from what worked and what did not, not only in the run-up to
    the tragedy but also in its aftermath, in order to improve our
    ability to prevent future attacks from occurring.
        I believe there are at least two key findings in the report
    by our Inspectors General. First, the IGs found that Federal
    agencies generally did share information with one another and
    they followed the appropriate procedures that were put in place
    after 9/11.
        And, second, the Inspectors General identified a number of
    adjustments and refinements that should be made to further
    improve our intelligence and information sharing systems. It
    appears unlikely, however, that any of these changes could have
    prevented the attack.
        Still, I was struck by the passages in the report detailing
    the fact that if the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    personnel had received more explicit information from a foreign
    government about Tamerlan Tsarnaev's apparent interest in
    committing acts of terror, the FBI would likely have taken
    additional steps to learn more about him and his intentions. I
    plan to explore this conclusion further today with our
    witnesses.
        Meanwhile, let me say that I am pleased to learn through
    this report that U.S. security intelligence agencies have
    already begun addressing some of the issues identified in the
    report and in other after-action reports, and the Inspectors
    General have also put forward two recommendations for further
    strengthening and improving terrorist-related information
    sharing practices. We look forward to having a discussion about
    these findings and these recommendations today, and I also look
    forward to the opportunity to discuss the refinements that
    agencies have already begun making in the classified briefing
    that the Committee will hold with the agencies after this
    hearing.
        Again, we thank you all for joining us and I am pleased to
    turn the microphone over to Dr. Coburn.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN

        Senator Coburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to welcome each of you and tell you,
    first of all, how much we appreciate the important work that
    you do, the independence of what you do, and also to express
    that we have confidence in you. So, thank you, one, for what
    you are doing, and two, we appreciate the importance of this
    second eye looking inside the agencies.
        The purpose of this morning is not to be a Monday morning
    quarterback, and most of my questions are going to be only
    asked in the classified setting. I think your report raises a
    lot of questions. I take a little bit different look at it than
    Senator Carper does. And the other thing is, it makes only two
    very modest recommendations, and I want to probe those as we
    get into the classified briefing. But, I would highlight a few
    issues for the public for the benefit of this open hearing.
        First is the FBI should review its internal procedures for
    information sharing and investigations. Sitting on the Senate
    Intelligence Committee and this Committee gives me additional
    information that there are some areas there I think we need to
    discuss, and we will do that in the closed hearing.
        Second, I think we did do some information sharing, but I
    think one of the things that is obvious is we could have done
    better, and that is the Intelligence Community as a whole in
    terms of information sharing.
        And then, finally, one of the things that I think we have a
    weakness is in terms of sharing information accurately and
    adequately with local law enforcement, and also creating a
    receptivity to where we can get information from them, making
    it easy for that information to flow.
        So, I want to thank you for your hard work. I look forward
    to the discussion. And, as I stated, most of my questions will
    be in the closed hearing.
        Chairman Carper. OK. Thank you, Dr. Coburn.
        I want to welcome Senator Johnson and Senator Ayotte. Thank
    you both very much for being here today and for participating
    with us.
        Some brief introductions, if I could, and then we will turn
    it over to our witnesses.
        Charles McCullough is the Inspector General for the
    Intelligence Community (IC). He is responsible for overseeing
    the work of a number of intelligence agencies, including the
    National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Welcome.
        John Roth, who was recently confirmed, came here before us
    not that many months ago as a nominee, and we are happy to see
    you confirmed and on the job as the Inspector General of the
    Department of Homeland Security. As such, his office is
    responsible for overseeing the work of the U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
    Service (USCIS), among other components.
        Michael Horowitz--nice to see you, Mr. Horowitz--is the
    Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and is
    responsible for overseeing the FBI and other key law
    enforcement agencies.
        And David Buckley, the Inspector General of the Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA), is a key member of the U.S.
    Intelligence Community.
        I think my notes here say Mr. McCullough will provide an
    opening statement on behalf of all the IGs. He has been the
    Inspector General for the Intelligence Community, I think,
    since November 2011. We thank you again, all, for joining us.
    We look forward to your testimony and for a chance to ask some
    questions. Please proceed.

    TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE I. CHARLES MCCULLOUGH III, INSPECTOR
     GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
      OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE JOHN
    ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
      THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
      DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND THE HONORABLE DAVID B. BUCKLEY,
           INSPECTOR GENERAL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\1\

        Mr. McCullough. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Carper,
    Ranking Member Coburn, and distinguished Members of the
    Committee, thank you for holding this hearing and for the
    opportunity to discuss the conclusions of the review we
    conducted over the last year.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared joint statement of the Inspectors General appears
    in the Appendix on page 21.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We share yours and the Committee Members' deep sympathies
    for the victims and their families. As we know, on April 15,
    2013, two pressure cooker bombs placed near the finish line of
    the Boston Marathon detonated within seconds of each other,
    killing three, maiming many, and injuring more than 200 people.
    Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officials identified
    brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev as primary suspects in
    the bombings. After an extensive search for the suspects, law
    enforcement officials encountered the brothers in Watertown,
    Massachusetts. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed during the
    encounter, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who fled the scene, was
    apprehended the following day and remains in Federal custody
    awaiting trial.
        In the days that followed, Members of Congress asked
    questions of the FBI Director, the Director of National
    Intelligence (DNI), and other Government officials about the
    handling and sharing of information by the U.S. Government
    concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to the bombings. With the
    DNI's support, the Inspectors General of the Intelligence
    Community, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
    Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security determined to
    conduct a coordinated review of the handling and sharing of the
    information available to the U.S. Government prior to the
    Boston Marathon bombings.
        Our review had three objectives. First, to determine the
    extent of the information available to the U.S. Government
    regarding these individuals and events preceding the Boston
    Marathon bombings. Second, whether the sharing of information
    was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S.
    counterterrorism and information sharing policies, regulations,
    and U.S. laws. And, third, whether there were weaknesses in
    protocols and procedures that impact our ability to detect
    potential threats to national security.
        In order to satisfy these objectives, we looked at three
    distinct areas of scope. First, we examined the information
    that was known to the U.S. Government prior to the bombing.
    Second, we examined any information that existed within the
    U.S. Government's reach before the bombing, but had not been
    obtained, accessed, or reviewed until after the bombing. And,
    third, we examined whether U.S. Government officials reasonably
    could have been expected to have known this information existed
    prior to the bombing.
        For nearly a year, the inspectors, investigators, and
    auditors of our offices combed through thousands of documents
    and interviewed more than 150 witnesses. Due to the classified
    subjects and detailed accounting of interactions between the
    Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, the full
    results of our review are in a classified report that has been
    submitted to the Congress. We also thought it extremely
    important to publish an unclassified summary that we submit for
    the record.
        Overall, we found no basis to make broad recommendations
    for changes to U.S. Government procedures for information
    handling and sharing because we found the FBI, CIA, DHS, and
    NCTC generally shared information and correctly followed
    procedures. We did find some specific areas where broader
    information sharing between agencies may have been required or
    where broader information sharing in the future should be
    considered.
        As a result, we made two recommendations to enhance the
    Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) alert procedures and expand
    the FBI's sharing of threat information with State and local
    partners. However, in this particular case, we found that
    broader information sharing likely would not have resulted in
    providing additional helpful information to the FBI.
        We also found that given the limited information available
    to the Boston JTTF in March 2011 concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev,
    the FBI's decision to open the matter at the assessment level
    of investigation was an application of the least intrusive
    method principle within its investigative discretion. Because
    the lead included information about Tsarnaev's mother, Zubeidat
    Tsarnaeva, we believe the FBI should have given greater
    consideration to opening an assessment on her. However, given
    the bulk of the derogatory information in the lead focused on
    Tamerlan Tsarnaev, we concluded that it was within the FBI's
    discretion not to open an assessment on Zubeidat Tsarnaeva.
        We also concluded that additional investigative steps by
    the FBI would have resulted in a more thorough assessment,
    including conducting additional database searches, asking
    questions of Tsarnaev and his parents to elicit information
    about any plans he may have had to travel to Russia, as well as
    interviewing his former girlfriend and wife. However, we
    determined that the additional database searches would not have
    revealed any information that was not already known to the FBI
    agent conducting the assessment. In addition, we found that it
    is impossible to know what the former girlfriend and wife would
    have told the FBI in 2011, before the Boston Marathon bombings,
    and while Tsarnaev was still alive. Therefore, it cannot be
    known whether these additional interviews would have yielded
    additional information relevant to lead information from the
    Russian government.
        With respect to post-assessment activities, we believe that
    Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travel to Russia in 2012 was significant
    and warranted further FBI investigative action, although we
    determined that none was taken. That said, we believe it is
    impossible to know what would have happened had different
    investigative judgments been made prior to the bombings.
        Finally, we concluded that DHS generally followed
    procedures and policies when adjudicating the Tsarnaev family's
    immigration benefits and screening the family's travel.
        This review, which was conducted across four separate IG
    offices, is precisely the type of coordinated work that the
    Congress expected when it created the Intelligence Community
    Inspectors General Forum. Collectively, we broke new ground in
    many areas of cooperation, and as a result, there is today far
    stronger independent oversight of the Intelligence Community.
        On behalf of my fellow Inspectors General, I would like to
    thank the Committee for its continued support and for the
    opportunity to have this important public discussion. We owe it
    to the Nation and especially those victims and families
    directly affected by the bombings to openly discuss what we
    have learned in this review.
        Also deserving of our thanks are the agency directors whose
    support reflects their shared belief in independent and
    objective analysis.
        Last, I would like to express my gratitude for the men and
    women within our offices who over the past year painstakingly
    reviewed mountains of data and conducted dozens of interviews.
    Their diligence and objectivity exemplify professionalism and
    excellence in service to our country.
        This concludes my remarks. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        Chairman Carper. Thanks so much, Mr. McCullough. I
    certainly want to agree with your last part of your statement
    very much. Thank you.
        Mr. McCullough. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Carper. As I mentioned earlier in my opening
    statement, I think it appears that one of your key findings is
    that during--this would be really for you, Mr. McCullough, this
    question--but one of your key findings is that during the lead-
    up to the attack, the U.S. agencies you oversee correctly
    followed their procedures when they investigated, ultimately
    cleared, and later shared information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev.
    Would it be fair to say that while some elements of our
    information sharing system could have been improved, there was
    no silver bullet available to U.S. authorities that would have
    allowed us to avert the attack?
        Mr. McCullough. Yes, Senator, that would be fair to say,
    that there was no silver bullet. There was no one single event
    that we uncovered that we believed would have prevented these
    attacks.
        Chairman Carper. OK. Do any of our other witnesses want to
    comment on this, on that first question?
        [No response.]
        OK. Again, this would be for Mr. Horowitz, if I could. Mr.
    Horowitz, your report also seemed to indicate that if the
    Russians or any foreign intelligence partners had shared more
    specific information, the FBI likely would have dug deeper and
    been able to use more of the tools in their toolbox. It seems
    to me that getting additional intelligence from foreign
    authorities might have been the only key factor that could have
    helped to prevent this attack from occurring. Are those fair
    characterizations of your findings?
        Mr. Horowitz. I think it is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that
    that would have been, as we indicated, an important piece of
    information, and as we outlined the requests that were made by
    the FBI to the foreign entity, there were several other items
    that we identified in the report that the FBI could have
    followed up on, including, in particular, the travel that was
    identified of Tamerlan Tsarnaev to Russia.
        Chairman Carper. All right. This would be a question for
    all of our witnesses. Mr. Roth, if you would like to lead off
    on this, you are welcome to. But, this is a question on how to
    improve information sharing. Our system for preventing
    terrorist attacks cannot and should not depend on the
    willingness of foreign governments to share information with
    us. Your review found that many actions taken were appropriate
    and in accordance with policy. For example, two of the
    Department of Homeland Security's key agencies, U.S.
    Citizenship and Immigration Services and U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection, appropriately adjudicated immigration
    applications for the Tsarnaev family and tracked Tamerlan's
    travel to and from Russia.
        And this attack shows we can do better. Could you please
    take a minute to highlight for our Committee what the FBI, the
    Intelligence Community, and the Department of Homeland Security
    should be doing in the future to prevent this kind of attack
    and which of these steps have already been taken.
        Mr. Roth. Thank you for the question, Senator. Certainly, I
    think that in any situation like this, there is room for
    improvement. One of the things that we discovered in the course
    of our analysis is that immediately after the bombing, when the
    facts were discovered, both CBP as well as USCIS, speaking just
    for DHS, engaged in an after-action sort of look-back to see
    what it is that we could be doing better.
        One of the things that particularly CBP found was the
    outbound analysis of the Tsarnaev's travel--Tsarnaev, as the
    report says, was on a specific list, a fairly long list. The
    outbound CBP inspectors did not have the opportunity to engage
    in an outbound inspection of him. They were unaware, for
    example, that there was a specific alert that had been placed
    within the DHS data systems Treasury Enforcement Communications
    System (TECS) to do so.
        So, one of the things they have fixed as a result of this
    incident, independent of the IG investigation, was to ensure
    that those outbound inspectors now take a look at the
    underlying documentation on each individual within a list of
    people to look at for outbound.
        Chairman Carper. All right. Let me ask each of our other
    IGs to respond to the same question, if you would, please.
        Mr. Horowitz. From the FBI's standpoint, I think there were
    a couple of places where the information sharing as well as the
    followup could have been better. We identify them. Again, the
    most significant being the travel that occurred in January
    2012. We were unable to definitively determine, for example,
    when the notice went to the CBP agent, whether that information
    was passed to the FBI agent. We concluded it likely did happen,
    based on the information we had, but that was largely based on
    a practice of a CBP agent putting a sticky note on an FBI
    agent's desk in that instance, and that should not be the way
    information is passed. There has apparently been followup on
    that and improving that information system flow so there is
    documentation of those notices.
        But also in this instance, when Tsarnaev traveled to
    Russia, that was the basis for the Russian notice to us and the
    request to us. There was not further followup on that by the
    FBI, and that was, as we noted, a significant incident.
        Chairman Carper. All right. I would welcome any comments
    you have, Mr. Buckley, on the same question, please.
        Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that when we
    talk about the information that was shared between the CIA and
    the law enforcement/Homeland Security elements of the U.S.
    Federal Government, we did not find anything from a sharing
    standpoint that could be improved upon. What I would like to do
    in the closed session that follows is talk about some specifics
    regarding some things that the CIA may have been able to
    provide in addition and perhaps some greater collaboration at
    the worker level.
        Chairman Carper. And, Mr. McCullough, would you respond to
    the same question, and then I am going to yield to Dr. Coburn.
        Mr. McCullough. Mr. Chair, I think the same thing as Mr.
    Buckley just said. I would have some comments on that in the
    closed session.
        The one thing I could say in the open session with respect
    to the NCTC, there has been an enhancement of the data input
    into certain Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
    so that there is more complete data there now than there was,
    and that has already been accomplished since the bombing.
        Chairman Carper. All right. My thanks to each of you. Dr.
    Coburn.
        Senator Coburn. I just have one question for the open
    session, and it is when we have people who immigrate here under
    an asylum visa and come and then we see returning to the areas
    from which they sought asylum from, do we have any method at
    all which raises a flag that says, you came here seeking asylum
    from persecution in X country and now you are going back to X
    country. Is there anything in our system, anywhere, that raises
    that up, because if, in fact, you are seeking asylum, the last
    thing I would think is you are going back to the place from
    which you sought asylum. Do we have anything that we can talk
    about in open session?
        Mr. Roth. Senator, you raise a very good question. That is,
    unfortunately, beyond the scope of what it is that we looked at
    during the course of our inquiry here, but you do raise a very
    good question.
        Senator Coburn. Well, I do not think that----
        [Comments off microphone.]
        Never mind. I cannot finish this line of questioning in
    open session.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE

        Chairman Carper. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for
    being here.
        This is obviously a very important topic, and certainly
    where I live in Nashua, New Hampshire, is 45 minutes away from
    where these bombings occurred. And, in fact, a lot of the law
    enforcement officers in New Hampshire went down--the Manchester
    Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team, the Nashua Special
    React Team, the New Hampshire State Police and Seacoast
    Emergency Response Team. And, of course, so this is local for
    us. In fact, Jeff Bauman, who is really a hero in these
    circumstances, his family lives in New Hampshire and he was
    heroic that day, and everything that he suffered, and all of
    the victims. So, I really appreciate the work that you have
    done on this because this is incredibly important for the
    country.
        I wanted to ask about, first of all, the JTTF issue. When
    Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis came before our Committee,
    that was where he focused his attention. He was very concerned,
    and I know you have talked about it in your report, as well,
    about the fact that on the JTTF Task Forces--and I served as
    State Attorney General, so I worked with that Task Force in
    that capacity--that it was too much of a one-way street. In
    other words, the information coming in was not then
    communicated downward. And, as all of you know, it is really
    the line police officers on the street that are likely to
    encounter this type of individual first.
        So, can you help us understand, what improvements have been
    made at this point with regard to JTTF communication issues in
    terms of the type of back and forth that Senator Coburn also
    talked about and are necessary to make sure that that
    information first flows downward, but then also flows back
    upward once that police officer on the ground receives
    information.
        Mr. Horowitz. Let me take that, first, at least. Senator,
    it is an important part of this report and our finding, and we
    had the good fortune and benefit of hearing from Commissioner
    Davis in the course of our work, who described to us many of
    his concerns that you have outlined.
        One of the things we noted specifically in our report was
    the failure of the FBI, when an incident or issue like this
    came up as to a person, to alert those local officers, the
    community that could be impacted by an individual like that,
    both from the standpoint of learning if they had information
    back, but also allowing them to be prepared if there were any
    particular issues or concerns.
        We also heard from Commissioner Davis about the concern
    that the information was flowing one way, but also that there
    was a general attitude on the JTTF that you only gave
    information to the locals if there was a need to know, not as
    part of a routine relationship, not as something that occurred
    regularly, but on a need to know basis. The likelihood was that
    unless it was very clear there was a need to know, that was not
    happening as frequently as it could.
        We understand that the FBI has sent memos out and is
    addressing that now. That is a recommendation we have made and
    that is something we will be following up on.
        Senator Ayotte. So, they are already taking steps to
    implement better information sharing?
        Mr. Horowitz. We have been told that, and as we do in all
    of our work, we will followup and make our own conclusion on
    whether that has been effective.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, I will tell you this, that the memo
    is important, but it is also the attitude. So----
        Mr. Horowitz. Right.
        Senator Ayotte [continuing]. Having worked in cases where
    it is Federal, State, local, sometimes county, as well, the
    attitude, I think, that we need to get at, that is the pre-9/11
    attitude of we are going to hold this information in as the
    FBI, as opposed to really realizing that we have all these
    partnerships of people who are on the street every day that can
    help us and we can work together.
        And so I have talked to Director Jim Comey about this, and
    I am hoping that in addition to changes in policy, that it is
    really an outreach issue by the FBI to reach out to the heads
    of the JTTFs as well as the local officers to really say, we
    get it. We really understand how important this is in terms of
    preventing terrorist attacks and other types of criminal
    behavior even beyond terrorism. So, I think that that attitude
    issue, I would love to see, as you look at this issue in the
    followup with the FBI, what is it that the local officers feel
    has been the attitude change on the ground, because that is
    what is going to make the biggest difference here.
        Mr. Horowitz. Right. And that is what Commissioner Davis
    mentioned, as well, and it clearly is the culture of the
    organization and the culture of the relationship that is
    critical. You can put all the rules in place that you want, but
    if folks do not feel like they should be talking to one
    another, it just will not happen.
        Senator Ayotte. Can I also suggest that engaging the U.S.
    Attorneys and also engaging the Attorneys General on this, at
    the State law enforcement level, at the Federal level, because
    I know when I served as our Attorney General, I had the role of
    being a chief law enforcement officer, so I could get very much
    my message across in meetings I had with law enforcement about
    how we were going to emphasize these issues. So, I think this
    has to be a holistic approach where you are also engaging the
    prosecutors they work with on a regular basis to say, hey, this
    is important and this attitude is what is going to help us
    protect America, working together. So, I appreciate that
    emphasis.
        One thing I looked at that is--I am trying to understand,
    and to the extent that you are able to answer this in the open
    setting, but this followup issue on the CBP and as they notify,
    you said it was done with a sticky note, basically, the trip to
    Russia by Tsarnaev. Those procedures, as I understand it, have
    now been changed and formalized, is that right?
        Mr. Horowitz. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. So, the question I have is, assuming that
    formal designation, how does the FBI then determine whether
    there will be a followup? Is there a procedure there? Is there
    a standard there that we can understand when the FBI is
    actually assuming formal notification from CBP, as they should
    be, not with some sticky----
        Mr. Horowitz. Right.
        Senator Ayotte [continuing]. So that is a very important
    improvement. Then, will they make the decision on, we have to
    go, then, do some more investigative work.
        Mr. Horowitz. As it was then--as I believe it still
    remains--it is the agent who gets notified and it is their
    responsibility to make a determination as to whether to
    proceed. I think there is a strong argument to be made that in
    that situation, an agent should, at a minimum, be consulting
    with their supervisor when, particularly in an instance like
    this, the nub of the information sent to the FBI by the Russian
    authorities was, he is going to travel to Russia to join these
    groups, as we outline here. That is precisely what he did in
    January 2012 in terms of at least the travel. We do not know
    what he did there. But as to the information that went to the
    FBI, that he is going to travel to Russia, that is exactly what
    information was learned because of the ping and the notice that
    went on.
        Senator Ayotte. Absolutely, this seems like pretty
    compelling information from the Russians. So, I would hope that
    it would not just be left with the discretion of the agent,
    that you actually would have some type of consulting to make
    sure that in those circumstances, we do have a followup
    investigation that needs to be conducted to find out what his
    activities were in Russia, and, in fact, did he meet with these
    groups that are associated with terrorist activities, because
    that would have probably changed, to some extent, the prism
    upon which he was viewed.
        Mr. Horowitz. Correct. That is correct, because it also, in
    part, corroborated the information that had been sent to the
    FBI, so it demonstrated some credibility on that information.
    It could have resulted in additional followup within the United
    States. It also could have resulted in a notice to the foreign
    country, to Russia, in response to the information they had
    sent to us.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I know my time is up,
    and I think this is a very important issue. I want to thank
    both the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this
    hearing and for the work done by the investigators, all of the
    Inspectors General here. Thank you.
        Chairman Carper. Thanks for those questions.
        I want to be sensitive to what you can say in a public
    setting and what you cannot, but I have a couple questions that
    relate to Mrs. Tsarnaev, and to the extent that you discuss her
    role in all of this and that you can share with us in a public
    setting, I would welcome that. I have a couple of specific
    questions, but are there any more general comments you would
    like to make about how you address her role in all this that
    you can share with us in a public setting?
        Mr. Horowitz. Well, I will just say, the one thing that we
    can say from the standpoint from what we looked at, the lead
    information included information about her, not just Tamerlan.
    The judgment was made to only look at--to only open on
    Tamerlan, but we found there was certainly sufficient
    information, if the FBI had wanted, to open on her, as well,
    that they could have done so. They made the judgment not to,
    and that was a decision made right at the outset, in March
    2011.
        Chairman Carper. OK. Others, please.
        Mr. McCullough. I would agree that there was information
    that we found when we examined the post-bombing information
    that was collected, and I think probably that would have to be
    discussed in the classified session. But, there was information
    that we found post-bombing that would relate to that, Senator.
        Chairman Carper. Mr. Buckley.
        Mr. Buckley. Mr. Chairman, I, too, have information that I
    will impart in the closed session regarding this.
        Chairman Carper. All right. Let me ask a couple of followup
    questions, more specific followup questions. If you can respond
    to these in an open setting, that is fine. If you cannot, we
    will ask them again in a closed setting.
        But, looking back, it seems that one of the key moments in
    the case occurred when the FBI's initial investigation into
    Tamerlan concluded that he did not pose a threat to the United
    States. Can you give us your assessment of whether or not the
    FBI's investigation of Tamerlan and his mother was thorough
    enough. Mr. Horowitz.
        Mr. Horowitz. Yes. I think we found there were several
    steps that could have been taken that would have made it more
    thorough, among them, doing additional database searches. On
    that, we were able to go back and do those ourselves and
    concluded there actually was not much there in the databases
    that would have been helpful, but nevertheless believed a more
    thorough assessment would have included those database
    searches.
        There could have been interviews of his then-wife, his ex-
    girlfriend, who had filed charges against him, as well as
    questioning both him and his parents about the specific
    allegations that had come in from the Russian authorities,
    again, particularly the travel that was known about back in
    March 2011, before the assessment was closed and before later
    learning that the travel had actually been undertaken.
        Chairman Carper. OK. Let me just do a followup on that, Mr.
    Horowitz, if I could. While the Russians did not provide us
    with a whole lot of information, they did warn that both
    Tamerlan and his mother were adherents to radical Islam, as I
    recall. However, the report states that a separate
    investigation was not opened on Tamerlan's mother. Do you
    think--and we have talked about this a little bit, but I want
    to come back to it--do you think that this was an appropriate
    decision by the FBI, and should the FBI be permitted to
    exercise this type of discretion in opting to open or not open
    cases?
        Mr. Horowitz. From our standpoint, we think that more
    consideration should have been given to opening an assessment
    on Zubeidat, as well as Tamerlan. The explanation given to us
    was that the information largely focused on Tamerlan and the
    judgment was made, therefore, to open only on Tamerlan. Based
    on the rules in place and the FBI procedures, that was a
    judgment they made that was within their authority to make.
    Again, I think, from our standpoint, the supervisor should
    have--and this is really a supervisor decision--should have
    given more consideration to opening on her.
        Chairman Carper. All right. If I could, Mr. Buckley, a
    different question, please. Two agencies, the FBI and the CIA,
    received the same initial information from Russian authorities,
    but only the CIA decided to nominate Tamerlan for the Terrorist
    Watch List, as I recall. I understand the reasons for this is
    specific and classified, but I wanted to ask both you and maybe
    Mr. McCullough, if I could, if there was anything you believe
    intelligence agencies can or should do to make these decisions
    in a more collaborative way so that we can ensure that everyone
    is working off the same information.
        Mr. Buckley. Mr. Chairman, the answer to your question is
    yes. As I indicated earlier, beyond information sharing, we did
    identify opportunities where, had there been further
    collaboration, person-to-person, office-to-office, speculating,
    it might have led to a different decisionmaking matrix.
        Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you. I am going to ask
    one more question, and then I am going to yield back over to
    Senator Ayotte for additional questions that she might have.
        Mr. Horowitz, this will be a followup question regarding
    discretion to determine the type of FBI investigation. Your
    report notes that the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force
    agents have some discretion to determine what level of
    investigation to open on a person of interest and typically try
    to use a standard, I think it is called the least intrusive
    method. Could you explain why that discretion and standard are
    important.
        Mr. Horowitz. Under the FBI's Domestic Investigations and
    Operations Guide (DIOG), which is the manual that they use to
    consider what level of assessment to undertake, there are three
    choices. There is an assessment, which is what was done here,
    the next step up being a preliminary investigation, and the
    third step being a full investigation, the latter two requiring
    some predication to do those steps. The FBI's manual informs
    their agents and supervisors to choose the least intrusive
    method, recognizing that they might have more than one choice.
    And in this case, the agent and the supervisor both told us
    they chose as the least intrusive method the assessment.
        It is important to note that none of the steps I indicated
    that could have been taken to make it a more thorough
    assessment were in any way limited by that choice. So, the fact
    that it was an assessment still allowed the steps to be taken.
    And, similarly, had there been an interest in following up on
    the travel in January 2012, that could have been done even at
    the assessment level and allowed a determination to be made
    then whether to escalate it to a preliminary investigation or a
    full investigation.
        Chairman Carper. OK. Thanks. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. I just had one followup to the Chairman's
    question regarding better collaboration between the CIA and
    FBI. One thing that leapt out at me on this that has bothered
    me is that the FBI receives information from the Russian
    Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russian intelligence
    agency, and the FBI follows up, does their assessment, finds no
    nexus with terrorism. Then, of course, we have been talking
    about the fact that then Tsarnaev goes to Russia again and
    there was no followup, which I think we all agree doing a
    followup there would have been important.
        That said, what bothered me, also, was the fact that the
    FBI got this information from the FSB--they get that in March.
    In September, the FSB also reaches out to the CIA. Why is it
    not that the FBI would not notify the CIA in those
    circumstances as opposed to having a foreign government,
    waiting for them to actually notify an agency, a separate
    agency within our own government? That really leapt out at me
    and it bothered me, and can you help us understand that?
        Mr. Horowitz. Yes. I agree, Senator. As we noted in the
    report, that was a failing of the sharing that occurred. The
    FBI should have alerted in March 2011, when they learned this
    information, their counterparts at the CIA. They did not do
    that. Ultimately, the Russian authorities did do that in
    September 2011, and as we later learned, because of that
    notice, the CIA did not have--the delay in that notice did not
    have an impact on the assessment, ultimately. But,
    nevertheless, that notice should have occurred earlier.
        Senator Ayotte. Is there now a procedure in place that
    would have a more formal notification process between the FBI
    and the CIA, because you can see a scenario where this type of
    situation could make a very significant difference.
        Mr. Horowitz. There is already, a memorandum of
    understanding (MOU) in place that should have been followed
    here that----
        Senator Ayotte. It just was not followed.
        Mr. Horowitz. So, what is required here is further training
    and an understanding among FBI that they need to do that, and,
    in fact, there was one of the three followups that they did
    that went to the FSB, they did not notify the CIA of that. That
    was another place where that notification should have occurred.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, this is, I think, important, because
    we have the issue of Federal, State, local information sharing,
    but also information sharing, of course, thinking after 9/11,
    the improvements and work we have done to make sure our own
    agencies are sharing. So, I hope that there will also be an
    emphasis on this as we look at the followup to this to make
    sure that the procedures are being followed or that the people
    understand what their responsibilities are. Thank you.
        Chairman Carper. Mr. McCullough, if I could, maybe one or
    two more and then we will wrap it up here. But, if the Russians
    had not shared their initial tip, would we have had any way to
    detect Tamerlan's radicalization?
        Mr. McCullough. There were----
        Chairman Carper. What I am going to get at here is just
    homegrown terrorism and our ability to ferret them out-----
        Mr. McCullough. Right.
        Chairman Carper [continuing]. And understand what is going
    on, if someone is being radicalized, and what its implications
    might be for us.
        Mr. McCullough. Well, the Bureau's actions stem from the
    memo from the FSB, and so that led to everything else in this
    chain of events here. You are saying, if that memo did not
    exist, would he have turned up some other way? I do not know. I
    think in the classified session, we can talk about some of the
    post-bombing forensics and what was found and that sort of
    thing and you can see when that radicalization was happening.
        And so I would think that this would have come up, yes. At
    some point it would have presented itself to law enforcement
    and to the Intelligence Community, possibly not as early as the
    FSB memo, it did not. But, I think that it would have come up
    at some point, noting what we found post-bombing.
        Chairman Carper. Sometimes we ask people, and sometimes
    they ask us what keeps us up at night, and one of the things
    that keeps me up at night is concern about homegrown
    radicalization. It is one thing to have folks in other parts of
    the world who want to do us harm, and it is hard enough to find
    out about that and to track and to deter, to counter it. But,
    it is another kettle of fish when the threat comes from within.
        And, the question I will ask here--and if you feel
    comfortable in answering it here, fine, if not, we will get
    into it in our closed session--but, I would just come back to
    this issue and say, is our counterterrorism and homegrown
    security system capable of detecting and maybe preventing
    attacks like this?
        Mr. McCullough. I believe it is, Chairman Carper. I believe
    it is.
        Chairman Carper. All right. We will drill down on that a
    little bit more in our closed session.
        My last question would be for--and, you all were good
    enough to give us at least one opening statement. I am going to
    ask you each to take maybe a minute and give us a closing
    statement, and what I would like you to focus on in your
    closing statement is I want to look to see where there is
    consensus and agreement on things that we could have done
    better, or lessons learned, things we could have done better.
    Dr. Coburn and I, we are not interested in holding ``gotcha''
    hearings and Monday morning quarterbacking, but we all are
    interested in finding what we could have done better, and maybe
    just remind us of the areas that we could have done better and
    those where we actually are doing better now and maybe some
    others which are still works in process.
        In fact, let us just go right to that question.
        And, do you want to lead off, Mr. Buckley.
        Mr. Buckley. Sure, Mr. Chairman. I will take a stab at it.
    I think, in this specific case and generally, the agency could
    have done better in looking at certain records that it had that
    might have provided a slightly fuller picture when it made the
    nomination. However, our assessment was that if they had, it
    would not have given that much more information to cause
    anybody to do anything differently. But, they did not, so we do
    recommend that they do check available databases and give a
    more fulsome record when they make such nominations.
        Of course, there is a constant balance and a struggle that
    takes place when you are talking about the CIA and its
    involvement at all and U.S. persons, whether they are citizens,
    naturalized or born, and adverse information that comes from
    foreign governments pertaining to U.S. citizens. So, there is a
    line, and it is blurry, and that requires individual employees
    and their supervisors to make case-by-case determinations on
    what is appropriate and what is not, and so it is very hard for
    the Inspector General--for me, anyway--to look back and say, in
    this case, you should have done that, and in that case, you
    dare not.
        So, this is very much a human enterprise, assisted by
    machines, but the human decision, at the end of the day, is
    what we ought to either stand by or criticize. So, I think that
    a little bit more records checking, making some more fulsome
    disclosures to NCTC, the FBI, and others, as they did in the
    nomination, could be done better. It would not have made a
    difference in this case.
        Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you. Mr. Horowitz.
        Mr. Horowitz. Let me just echo what Mr. Buckley just said.
    Ultimately, on much of what we have talked about on the
    assessment, those were human judgments made by an agent and a
    supervisor, and those judgments are going to be made in
    hundreds, if not thousands, of cases.
        In terms of protocols and sharing and the culture that we
    talked about a little bit earlier, about making sure there is
    that sharing, I think you saw a few things here that are
    indicative of the issues. The State and local issue that we
    talked about--there needs to be a recognition that information
    flow should be both ways and the culture should be one of
    information flow.
        Second, there needs to be following of MOUs within the
    Federal Government, the sharing that could have occurred in
    several places with the FBI and the CIA did not. While it would
    not have had an impact, perhaps, nevertheless, should be
    occurring regularly. That should be one of the first thoughts
    happening, not something that is forgotten about.
        And then, finally, in light of the travel that occurred,
    another place where consideration should have been given to not
    only followup on the travel, but also, again, the question of
    whether that information should have been shared with the
    Russian authorities that had, in fact, sent us the lead about
    that very travel.
        Chairman Carper. Mr. Roth.
        Mr. Roth. DHS had largely a supporting role in the entire
    episode. That being said, there were things that they could
    have done that they, I think, are improving as we speak, one of
    which is assessing the outbound travel to determine whether or
    not individuals ought to be inspected. It is an enormous task.
    A place like John F. Kennedy International Airport has
    something like 13 million passengers in any given year, 200 in-
    bound flights per day. So, it is a very difficult situation to
    get right, but certainly, I think, that is an area that could
    use some improvement.
        Likewise, with transliteration of names and matching names
    within a database, here, we had an example of two separate
    entries in which there was a misspelling, that those names were
    not matched. I think there is room for improvement there,
    which, I think, is taking place.
        Chairman Carper. Thank you.
        Mr. McCullough, same question.
        Mr. McCullough. Mr. Chair, just to kind of summarize, we
    did find the information sharing mechanisms in the government
    did work here. Information was shared. There were errors,
    inaccuracies. There may have been a lack of completeness or
    thoroughness with the information that was being shared. But,
    certainly, the institutions and the mechanisms that are in
    place to share the information were doing that.
        Despite everything that occurred between the FSB
    information going to the FBI and then going separately to the
    CIA, the CIA with the NCTC, the TIDE nomination over to the
    Terrorist Screening Center, a parallel track from the FBI's
    JTTF TECS, despite all of this, despite the misspellings or the
    distinct spellings, there were different translations of
    certain pieces of material between different intelligence
    elements, on January 18, when Tamerlan Tsarnaev was going to
    travel to Russia--this is 3 days before his travel to Russia--a
    Customs officer got a ping. Despite all of those errors and
    inaccuracies, the mechanisms worked. That Customs officer was
    notified that this individual was going to be traveling to
    Russia.
        And that was the goal. That is the goal of the information
    sharing. We had a Guardian assessment that occurred, and at the
    end of the day, we would like to know when he is traveling, the
    Customs officer got that ping. I believe the DOJ IG found, as a
    matter of fact, that it is highly likely that that ping, that
    information, was conveyed to the FBI when that occurred.
        And, we can talk about the judgments that were made with
    respect to the action that was taken with that information.
    But, I do think that information was shared here. There were
    some errors. There were some inaccuracies. And we have made
    some recommendations and drawn some conclusions to address
    these. But, at the end of the day, there is not a ``smoking
    gun,'' there is not a single event or a singular event or a
    series of events that we can say, had this happened, that most
    certainly would have changed the scenario here. Had this
    happened, that would have stopped the bombing. We did not find
    anything like that.
        Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you.
        Dr. Coburn, any closing statement you would like to make?
        Senator Coburn. That is all for me. It will be in
    classified.
        Chairman Carper. OK. Let me just wrap up by saying I think
    we have had a productive session here today. A lot of work has
    gone into preparing for this, and we are grateful for that. We
    look forward to moving to a secure setting and to being able to
    ask you a few more questions and for you to be able to share
    with us some information that you are not able to share here.
        I just want to say, though, on the anniversary of the
    Boston Marathon and the running of the marathon earlier this
    month, that our thoughts go back to a year ago and the loss of
    life and injuries, and how the lives of some people were taken
    away and other lives were shattered. But, the crowd that was
    chanting as the runners went through their course and ran--I
    say this as a runner myself, my son is a runner, used to live
    in Boston--I missed qualifying for the Boston Marathon by a
    minute a couple of years ago, by the way--it is one thing to
    take a punch, in this case a sucker punch, and it is another
    thing to bounce back, and, boy, we bounced back. And, I am
    proud for everybody who turned to, in the face of adversity,
    calamity, mayhem a year ago--I am very proud for the way that
    we have demonstrated our strength this year.
        The last thing I would say is, were there some mistakes
    made? Were there some things we could have done better?
    Clearly, there were. We have drilled down on those. We are
    going to continue to drill down on those and make sure we can
    get as close to perfect as we can, and there is a lot riding on
    that.
        With that, we are going to conclude here. The hearing
    record will remain open for 15 days, until May 15 at 5 p.m.,
    for the submission of additional statements and questions for
    the record. So, if you get some, please respond to those.
        And with that, we are adjourned at this point in time and
    will reconvene in just a few minutes. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the Committee recessed and
    proceeded to closed session.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]