[Senate Hearing 113-321]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-321
THE IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 7, 2013
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine
Peter K. Levine, Staff Director
John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Impact of Sequestration on the National Defense
November 7, 2013
Page
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 4
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 13
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 22
Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 28
(iii)
THE IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2013
U.S. Senate.
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Udall,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter, Blunt, Lee, and Cruz.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel; Jason W.
Maroney, counsel; Mariah K. McNamara, special assistant to the
staff director; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member;
Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; William S. Castle, minority
general counsel; Allen M. Edwards, professional staff member;
Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional
staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
Gregory R. Lilly, minority clerk; and Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Daniel J. Harder, John L.
Principato, and Brendan J. Sawyer.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher R. Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Patrick T. Day and Joshua Lucas, assistants to
Senator Shaheen; Brooke Jamison, assistant to Senator
Gillibrand; Ethan A. Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal;
Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen E. Courington, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Stephen M. Smith, assistant to Senator King;
Donelle Harder, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Paul C. Hutton IV,
assistant to Senator McCain; Todd P. Harmer, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Joseph G. Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker;
Bradley L. Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Craig R. Abele,
assistant to Senator Graham; Joshua S. Hodges, assistant to
Senator Vitter; Charles W. Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt;
Robert C. Moore, assistant to Senator Lee; and Jeremy H. Hayes,
assistant to Senator Cruz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to consider the impact on our national
security of sequestration required by the Budget Control Act
(BCA). We welcome today our Nation's Service Chiefs: Chief of
Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno; Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert; the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General James Amos; and the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, General Mark Welsh.
I'd like to thank our witnesses on behalf of the committee
for their service to our Nation and for the service provided by
the men and women with whom they serve, many of whom as we meet
here are in harm's way. We also appreciate the important
contribution made by our 800,000 Department of Defense (DOD)
civilians, a talented workforce that has been hard hit by both
sequestration and the government shutdown.
Sequestration is arbitrary and irrational. While we will
learn more today about its impacts on our national defense,
with sequestration, as with Continuing Resolutions (CR),
government shutdowns, and the recurring looming threat of a
default on the Nation's debt, we not only fail to sustain our
national security, but also fail to meet our shared obligation
to protect and promote public safety, health, transportation,
education, and the environment. When we allow this to happen,
we put at risk much of what we do and stand for as a Nation and
we undermine our position in the world.
Throughout the 2 years since the enactment of the BCA and
its provisions for sequestration, our military leaders have
been warning us of its harmful consequences. If sequestration
continues, the Services will have to cut Active and Reserve
component end strength, reduce force structure, defer repair of
equipment, delay or cancel modernization programs, and allow
training levels to seriously decline, which will reduce our
ability to respond to global crises, thereby increasing our
Nation's strategic risk.
Sequestration has raised questions among our allies about
our ability to manage our affairs, has introduced uncertainty
into the availability of resources to support operations in
Afghanistan and around the world, has accelerated the decline
of a non-deployed force whose reduction was seriously
underfunded for more than a decade before sequestration, and
has painfully furloughed much of our dedicated defense civilian
workforce.
I know that our senior military leaders are deeply troubled
by the impact of sequestration on morale of both our military
and civilian workforces. It makes little sense to tell members
of our military that we'll pay their salaries, but we can't
afford to train them. We can't justify telling our dedicated
civilian workforce, many of whom are veterans and some of whom
are disabled veterans, that they aren't essential and that
they're going to be furloughed and they're not going to be
paid.
Another year of sequestration only compounds the damage
that will be done to our forces and our national security. If
sequestration is allowed to continue into fiscal year 2014 and
beyond, we will be left with a smaller and less ready military
that is significantly less capable of protecting our interests
around the world.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on the
impact that sequestration is already having and will have on
DOD and on our national security.
We're all delighted to have Jim Inhofe back with us today
in full force and looking terrific. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. I had made a request to have this hearing and
another one before this after the House had their Strategic
Choices and Management Review (SCMR) hearing. It's my concern,
Mr. Chairman, that everything you said is true, but the general
public is not aware of the crisis that we're faced with right
now.
Over the last 5 years, the significant cuts to our national
security spending have forced our men and women to endure a
steep and damaging drop in capabilities and readiness. We'll
have a chance to talk about this, incidentally, during the
questions. Our naval fleet is at a historical low level, the
Air Force the smallest in its history. The Army may shrink to a
force we haven't seen since the turn of the 20th century.
As our security is being threatened by terrorism, China and
rising rogue nations like Iran and North Korea, the men and
women charged with protecting this Nation are being undermined
and forced to endure devastating cuts to the tools that they
need to keep America safe. We've been told that over the next 3
years as much as $150 billion in sequester cuts will be taken
from accounts used to make sure that our military men and women
are better trained and equipped. We'll show that with these
charts.
I know some Americans are wondering why this matters. These
cuts may affect their everyday lives. The simple reality is
that the world around us is not getting any safer. I've often
said that recently--I look back wistfully at the days of the
Cold War. Things were predictable. That's not the case anymore.
You have rogue nations that have the ability and are developing
the ability to have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
delivery systems, and we know that's happening. It's just
something that, hopefully, this hearing will bring this to the
attention of the American people.
The tide of war isn't receding. It's America's leadership,
trust in American security partners, and our ability to protect
this country that's receding. We're already seeing the effects
of an absent America. We're at a point where our allies don't
trust us and our enemies don't fear us.
As America retreats from its role as a global leader, we'll
have more failed states like Syria and Libya as breeding
grounds for terrorism. We'll have more brutal dictators like
Kim Jong-un acquiring WMD and more aggressive adversaries like
China attempting to bully our partners in the South China Sea,
but we'll have fewer options of how to deal with them.
This is why I'm so troubled with the disastrous path that
we're on. In the face of the mounting threats to America, we're
crippling our military, the very people who are vital to our
security. Our military leaders use the term ``hollow'' to
define the forces of the future.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs warned us that continued
national security cuts will, and I'm quoting now, ``severely
limit our ability to implement our defense strategy, it will
put the Nation at greater risk of coercion, and it will break
faith with the American people.''
Another quote that I carry with me is one that Admiral
Winnefeld, our number two person in the overall military that
we have, said: ``There could be a time--it would be for the
first time in my career instances where we may be asked to
respond to a crisis and we'll have to say that we cannot.''
This faith is sacred to me. Our Nation relies on a small
part of our population to volunteer to risk their lives in our
behalf. The faith is being threatened by a growing divide
between the security our Nation expects and the resources being
provided them to give us that security.
Our witnesses testified before the House in September about
the potential of not having the readiness capabilities to
succeed in even one major contingency operation (MCO). Now,
that's something that all of us assume and most Americans
assume, that we still could defend against two MCOs. It's just
not true. In fact, if we have to go through with sequestration
we may not be able to do even one. That's why it's so important
that we hear from you folks that have the credibility to make
sure that the American people understand this.
I think about peace obtained through strength. We know that
Ronald Reagan's probably rolling over in his grave right now,
seeing what's happened to the military strength of this
country. That's what this hearing's all about, Mr. Chairman,
and I look forward to this being an opportunity for all of us
at this table to use the information that comes from this
hearing to make America aware of the problems that are facing
us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
General Odierno.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe--
sir, it's great to see you back--and other distinguished
members of this committee: Thank you for the invitation to
speak today.
If you'd just indulge me for just a few seconds, I'd like
to begin by recognizing the exceptional service and life of
Congressman Ike Skelton. As the Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, he was an incredible leader, mentor, and
champion of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. What
was interesting, though, in his farewell address, he made a
comment that I think is appropriate for the conversation we're
having today when he remarked:
``I've always considered each young man and woman in
uniform as a son or daughter. They are national treasures and
their sacrifices cannot be taken for granted. They are not
chess pieces to be moved upon a board. Each and every one is
irreplaceable.''
I think those words are very important today as we talk
about the readiness of our force and as we consider future
budget cuts and their impact on our national defense. It is
imperative that we keep foremost in our minds the impact that
this has on the young men and women, our soldiers, who we ask
to go forward and protect this Nation.
Previous drawdowns have taught us that the full burden of
an unprepared and hollow force will fall on the shoulders of
our men and women in uniform. We have experienced this too many
times in our Nation's history to repeat this egregious error
again.
It may be popular to proclaim that we are entering a new
age where land wars are obsolete. Yet history is rife with the
wars that leaders knew would never be fought. In the summer of
1914, an influential British journal declared that, ``The world
is moving away from military ideals and a period of peace,
industry, and worldwide friendship is dawning.'' New
technologies, such as airplanes, machine guns, dynamite, and
radios were said to make war ridiculous and impossible. Yet,
the next year we will mark the 100th anniversary of the War to
End All Wars.
I could give you an example like that for every major
conflict we've been in, that before that conflict there were
many comments that said we would never fight wars again, we
would never send our soldiers into harm's way, but we did. In
each case it was significant consequences to the men and women
who wore the uniform, whether it be in Korea with Task Force
Smith or whether it be in Vietnam in the initial days of
Vietnam. We cannot allow that to happen again.
Throughout our Nation's history, the United States has
drawn down military forces at the close of every war. This
time, however, we are drawing down our Army not only before a
war is over, but at a time where unprecedented uncertainty
remains in the international security environment. The total
Army--the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S.
Army Reserves--remains heavily committed in operations overseas
as well as at home.
As we sit here today, more than 70,000 U.S. Army soldiers
are deployed to contingency operations, with nearly 50,000
soldiers in Afghanistan alone. Additionally, there are more
than 87,000 soldiers forward stationed across the globe in
nearly 120 countries.
During my more than 37 years of service, the U.S. Army has
deployed soldiers and fought in more than 10 conflicts,
including Afghanistan, the longest war in our Nation's history.
No one desires peace more than the soldier who has lived
through war. But it is our duty as soldiers to prepare for it.
As Chief of Staff, it's my responsibility to man, train, and
equip the force to provide America with the best Army possible.
As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it's my
responsibility to provide my best military advice to ensure the
Army is capable of meeting our national security needs.
If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude, method,
and speed of the reductions under the BCA with sequestration,
the Army will be forced to make significant reductions in force
structure and end strength. Such reductions will not allow us
to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and will
make it very difficult to conduct even one sustained major
combat operation.
From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2017, as we draw down
and restructure the Army into a smaller force, the Army will
have a degraded readiness and extensive modernization program
shortfalls. We'll be required to end, restructure, or delay
over 100 acquisition programs, putting at risk programs such as
the Ground Combat Vehicle, the Armed Aerial Scout, the
production and modernization of our other aviation programs,
system upgrades for unmanned aerial vehicles, and the
modernization of our air defense command and control systems,
just to name a few.
From fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2022, we will begin to
rebalance readiness and modernization. However, this will only
come at the expense of significant reductions in the end
strength and force structure. The Army will be forced to take
additional end strength cuts from a wartime high of 570,000 in
the Active Army, 385,000 in the Army National Guard, and
205,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves to no more than 420,000 in
the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard, and
185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves.
This will represent a total Army end strength reduction of
more than 18 percent over 7 years, a 26 percent reduction in
the Active component, a 12 percent reduction in the National
Guard, and a 9 percent reduction in the U.S. Army Reserves.
This will also cause us to reduce our brigade combat teams by
45 percent.
Ultimately, the size of our Army will be determined by the
guidance and funding provided by Congress. It is imperative
that Congress take action to mitigate the needed sequestration
reductions.
I do not consider myself an alarmist. I consider myself a
realist. Today's international environment's emerging threats
require a joint force with a ground component that has the
capability and capacity to deter and compel adversaries who
threaten our national security interests. The BCA and
sequestration severely threaten our ability to do this.
In the end, our decisions today and in the near future will
impact our Nation's security posture for the next 10 years.
We've already accepted nearly $700 billion in cuts to DOD.
Today, we have the premier Army in the world. It is our shared
responsibility to ensure we remain the premier Army and the
premier joint force in the world.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to talk.
[The prepared statement of General Odierno follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with
you about the reduced discretionary caps in 2014 and the continued
threat of sequestration under current law, as well as the strategic
choices facing the Army.
Let me begin by thanking each member of the committee for your
support and commitment to U.S. Army soldiers, civilians, and families
particularly while we remain at war and with the specter of great
fiscal challenges and strategic uncertainty. The Nation's investment in
the Army over the past decade has been decisive in ensuring the success
of American soldiers on the battlefield and achieving our national
security objectives.
resourcing the army
Throughout our history, we have drawn down military forces at the
close of every war. This time, however, we are drawing down our Army
before the war is over and at a time when there is grave uncertainty in
the international security environment. Today, the Total Army--the
Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve--
remains heavily committed in operations overseas and at home. More than
70,000 soldiers are deployed, including nearly 50,000 soldiers in
Afghanistan, and more than 87,000 soldiers are forward-stationed across
the globe.
We have also learned repeatedly from previous drawdowns that the
costs of creating an under-resourced and under-prepared Army will
ultimately fall on the shoulders of our soldiers who will deploy and
respond to future contingencies. We have experienced this too many
times to repeat this egregious error again. As Chief of Staff, it is my
responsibility to provide my best military advice in order to ensure
the Army will meet our national security needs in the complex,
uncertain environment of the future. It is imperative that we preserve
decision space for the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense,
and Congress. Together, we must ensure our Army can deliver a trained
and ready force that deters conflict and compels our adversaries and,
when necessary, has the capability and the capacity to execute a
sustained, successful major combat operation.
During my more than 37 years of service, the U.S. Army has deployed
soldiers and fought in more than 10 conflicts including in Afghanistan,
the longest war in our Nation's history. No one can predict where the
next contingency will arise; we only know the lessons of the past. In
every decade since World War II, the United States has deployed U.S.
Army soldiers to defend our national security interests. Unfortunately,
there is little to convince me that we will not ask our soldiers to
deploy again in the near future.
If the magnitude and speed of the discretionary cap reductions
remain, the Army will not be able to fully execute the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance requirements. From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year
2017, as we continue to draw down and restructure the Army into a
smaller force, the Army will have significantly degraded readiness and
extensive modernization program shortfalls. Only in fiscal year 2018 to
fiscal year 2023 will we begin to rebalance readiness and
modernization. But this will come at the expense of significant
reductions in force structure and end strength, which will not allow us
to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and, in my opinion, will
make it very difficult for the Army to conduct one sustained major
combat operation.
past budgetary priorities and reductions
In the years since 2003, the Army has relied heavily on Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to build and maintain the core
competencies and readiness for operations overseas. OCO funds have been
used to meet immediate operational needs and to fill voids in soldier
training and modernization procurement.
Prior to 2003, the Army used major exercises at our combat training
centers to ensure the readiness of our brigade combat teams (BCT). The
Army began shifting the focus of these exercises from training for the
full range of combat operations to preparing for more limited stability
or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in support of ongoing wars. In
2011, the Army began reintroducing training for combined arms with
scenarios replicating the complex nature of future warfare in an effort
to restore the core warfighting skills that had atrophied after a
decade of COIN-focused operations. The Army had intended in 2013 for
all Army brigades not scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan to train for
these critical combat functions in their Combat Training Center (CTC)
exercises. Unfortunately, our goal to begin rebuilding these core
warfighting skills in fiscal year 2013 has not been realized due to the
effects of sequestration. This will be compounded as we potentially
face further reductions to our training accounts in fiscal year 2014
and fiscal year 2015 due to the reduced caps.
Over the past 3 years, the Army has absorbed several budget
reductions in the midst of conducting operations overseas and
rebalancing the force to the wider array of missions called for in the
2012 Defense Strategy Guidance. In 2010, under Secretary Gates, DOD
developed a 10-year plan to achieve nearly $300 billion in
efficiencies. To comply with the discretionary caps outlined in the
Budget Control Act of 2011, the fiscal year 2013 budget proposed $487
billion in DOD funding reductions over 10 years, of which the Army's
share is an estimated $170 billion. With the end of the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars and after the collaborative development of the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance, the Army agreed to reduce our end strength in order
to maintain a balanced, ready and modern force. Ninety-eight percent of
the Army's end strength reductions were taken from the Active Army. As
a result, we are in the process of shrinking our Active Army by 14
percent from a wartime high of 570,000 to 490,000. At the same time, we
are keeping the Army National Guard relatively constant, with a 2
percent reduction from 358,000 to 350,000, and retaining the Army
Reserve at 205,000.
In conjunction with end strength reductions, on 25 June 2013, we
announced changes to the Army force structure to reorganize 45 BCTs
into 32 BCTs. In doing so, we will eliminate excess headquarters
infrastructure while reinvesting the greater combat power of 95 of 98
combat battalions across the remaining BCTs. All of these end strength
and force structure decisions were developed to respond to previous
budget cuts and prior to the implementation of sequestration.
If the additional discretionary cap reductions required under
current law continue, we will be forced to further reduce the Army end
strength to 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National
Guard, and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. This would represent a
Total Army endstrength reduction of more than 18 percent over 7 years--
a 26 percent reduction in the Active Army end strength, to include a 45
percent reduction in Active Army BCTs; a 12 percent reduction in the
Army National Guard; and a 9 percent in the U.S. Army Reserve.
sequestration impacts in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014
Sequestration has had a profound effect on our efforts to prepare
units for future contingency operations. The continued implementation
of the reduced discretionary caps, beginning in fiscal year 2014, will
have drastic impacts across all aspects of Army readiness in training,
equipment sustainment and modernization, military and civilian manning,
and installation support.
training
In fiscal year 2013, the Army was forced to cancel CTC rotations
for seven BCTs--the equivalent of two divisions--that were not slated
to deploy to Afghanistan or serve in the Global Response Force. We had
intended for all Active Army brigades not scheduled to deploy to
Afghanistan to train on their critical core competencies, but we were
forced to cancel all CTC rotations for nondeploying units, a total of
seven cancelled CTC rotations. As a result, the Army has lost leader
development opportunities for approximately 231 company commanders, 112
field grade officers, and 42 battalion commanders.
If sequestration-level reductions continue into fiscal year 2014,
85 percent of the Army's Active and Reserve component BCTs will not
meet readiness levels appropriate for contingency requirements. Even
the seven BCTs that have been funded for collective training at a CTC
in preparation for an Afghanistan deployment will only be trained for
the Train and Assist mission required for that theater; they will not
be prepared for any other contingency operation.
Significant reductions in home station training combined with
canceled CTC rotations equates to readiness levels that leave our BCTs
unprepared to deploy. In the event of a crisis, we will deploy these
units at significantly lower readiness levels. Our soldiers are
adaptive and agile; over time they may accomplish their mission, but
their success will come with the greater cost of higher casualties.
This means that if these units are called upon to defend South Korea,
or to secure chemical and biological weapons in Syria, the Commander in
Chief will be forced to send soldiers into harm's way who have not
trained as an integrated brigade combined arms team.
Twelve years of conflict have resulted in an extensive backlog in
our leadership education and training programs due to reductions in
schoolhouse capacity. For example, only 68 percent of majors, 75
percent of warrant officers, and 71 percent of noncommissioned officers
have completed their critical professional military education (PME)
courses necessary to effectively lead soldiers in current and future
assignments. The opportunities lost to train the Army's mid-grade and
senior leaders in CTC rotations, collective training, and institutional
education will result in the promotion of Army leaders, who are not
trained to maneuver units under fire and in combat, leading larger
units and organizations. Finally, there continue to be extensive
shortfalls in critical specialties and backlogs in institutional
training. Fiscal year 2014 cuts will increase the current 200-seat
backlog in Aviation Flight Training and will continue to erode the
capacity in our sniper, Ranger, and language schools. Risk taken in
training readiness cannot be quickly recovered. It takes an Active Army
BCT 1 year to build full training readiness for unified land
operations. Missed leader development opportunities will create a
deficit that cannot be recovered.
equipment sustainment and modernization
Sequestration caused the Army to defer approximately $716 million
of fiscal year 2013 equipment reset (maintenance) into fiscal year 2014
and fiscal year 2015. For example, the fiscal year 2013 Continuing
Resolution coupled with sequestration has contributed to a backlog of
172 aircraft awaiting maintenance. Sequestration has also postponed the
reset of nearly 700 vehicles, almost 2,000 weapons, over 10,000 pieces
of communications equipment, Army Prepositioned Stocks, and numerous
soldier equipment and clothing items. The Army was forced to cut
routine maintenance for nondeployed units thereby creating an
additional $73.5 million in deferred maintenance costs that will carry
over into fiscal year 2014. Sequestration also limited the Army's
ability field software upgrades necessary to sustain network
operations; creating substantial risk in the 135 systems that affect
network security, systems operations, integration and information
assurance. Altogether sequestration resulted in the release of nearly
2,600 civilian and contract personnel, eroding critical trade skills in
fields such as engineering.
The Army is responsible for maintaining prepositioned sets of
equipment that serve as the strategic hedge in critical regions of the
world in order to allow for rapid deployment of soldiers in times of
crisis. Sequestration has forced the Army to defer maintenance and
delay the new equipment fielding of these sets--impacting each of the
combatant commander's war plans.
In the event sequestration-level discretionary caps continue into
fiscal year 2014, we will assume significant risk in our combat vehicle
development and delay the fielding of Abrams training simulators by 2
years. In our aviation program, we cannot afford to procure a new Armed
Aerial Scout helicopter; we will have to develop new organizational
concepts to mitigate our shortfalls in Aerial Reconnaissance. We will
reduce system upgrades for unmanned aerial vehicles. We will delay the
modernization of our Apache helicopters. We will delay the
modernization of Air Defense Command and Control systems. We will also
delay modernization of critical Mission Command systems and the
development of the Common Operating Environment that leverages
enterprise technology to gain better interoperability, information
security, and capability in our Mission Command software applications.
If reductions of that magnitude continue into fiscal year 2015 and
beyond, every acquisition program will be affected. These reductions
will significantly impact 100 modernization programs by not
transitioning to production, terminating their funding, restructuring
the program or significantly delaying their completion. This will be
necessary to facilitate our ability to concentrate the available funds
on priority programs in science and technology, Paladin Integrated
Management, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle and the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle and multi-year aviation contracts.
Fiscal year 2013 sequestration cuts greatly impacted Army science
and technology (S&T)--the seed corn of Army modernization and
innovation. Sequestration nearly halved new basic research grants in
fiscal year 2013 and affected grants at more than 120 universities in
38 States. If additional reductions continue, we expect that increasing
numbers of Army scientists and engineers will move to private sector
jobs, impacting Army S&T now and the development of new capabilities
for the future. Applied research and advanced technology development
efforts in key capability areas will be further impacted across all
areas, including armor, high-energy lasers, anti-access/area denial
technologies, electronic warfare, cyber, mission command, night vision,
soldier training, medical research, operation and sustainment cost-
cutting initiatives for Army systems and manufacturing technology
efforts.
As these lower funding levels continue, we are increasingly
concerned about the health of the industrial base and the subsequent
consequences for the Army. Shrinking demands and production rates will
tend to lead to higher proportional overhead costs and unit costs.
Lower demand will also lead to the loss of trained and experienced
workers, which will reduce industry's ability to respond to future
requirements. Small businesses, which provide components and
subcomponents for large end items and are less likely to have the
capital resources to survive gaps in production, may shutter or leave
the sector. The engineering and technical workforce necessary to design
and develop new systems may migrate to other sectors or retire.
Manufacturing skills in highly specialized areas such as aircraft
integration and large caliber weapons are likewise difficult to replace
if lost due to downsizing.
manning
Military Manning
The Army will strive to retain its most talented soldiers but will
be forced to separate large numbers of high quality experienced, combat
Veterans. For example, in fiscal year 2014, the Army will begin to
convene boards to separate up to 30 percent of the Captains from Year
Groups 2007, 2008, and 2009, the majority of whom have served multiple
deployments in combat. The loss of experienced manpower will negatively
impact short-term readiness and is likely to affect future recruitment
and retention. Reductions in end strength will also impair manning
readiness, as the pool of non-available soldiers is averaging about 13
percent per year after 12 years of continuous operations.
Civilian Manning
This year, we furloughed approximately 197,000 civilian employees,
48 percent of whom are Veterans, forcing them to take a 20 percent pay
cut for 6 weeks. Furloughs delayed maintenance services; slowed
contracting; and decremented nearly every support function to include
medical and family services at every installation. Furloughs have also
begun to have a tremendous effect on morale as they come on the heels
of 2 years of frozen pay and performance-based bonuses; we have begun
to see some of our highest quality personnel seeking employment in the
private sector. Given the lower discretionary caps and the continued
threat of sequestration we are preparing to reduce civilian end
strength to levels proportional to military end strength reductions--an
estimated 14 percent cut to our dedicated civilian workforce.
installations support
In fiscal year 2013, we reduced our base sustainment funds by $2
billion, a 70 percent drop from historic levels of funding. In fiscal
year 2014, facilities sustainment will receive 36 percent of historic
funding levels which will meet minimum requirements for installation
sustainment of buildings for Health, Life and Safety, but otherwise
will significantly impact every service program including municipal,
fire and emergency, logistics, facilities engineering, and family
programs. For example, we will not be able to fund municipal services
contracts for custodial, pest control, or other services and we will be
forced to eliminate nearly all preventative maintenance programs. The
backlog of approximately 158,000 work orders is 500 percent above this
time last year, and will increase future sustainment costs throughout
the year by 31 percent. We will suspend all restoration and
modernization projects which includes those projects needed to support
the consolidation of bases in Europe. The degradation of services to
soldiers, civilians, and their families, particularly as units continue
to deploy into and return from theater and in the midst of the
drawdown, will significantly erode recruitment and retention. Likewise,
funding for military construction, to include large-scale renovations
of older infrastructure, will be more than 50 percent below historic
norms.
fiscal year 2014
The Army remains fully committed to the enactment of President's
budget for fiscal year 2014. The Army's portion of that budget, $129.7
billion, is necessary in its entirety to ensure that the Army meets the
requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. The fiscal year
2014 budget, however, does not provide the funds necessary to address
decaying readiness that is the result of earlier cuts made to our
training programs. As a result, I submitted a $3.2 billion Unfunded
Request Memo on 6 June 2013. In addition to the fiscal year 2014 base
budget, the Army has submitted a separate request of $47.6 billion in
fiscal year 2014 OCO funding for operations in Afghanistan; it is
critical that this request be fully funded to support our soldiers
currently deployed and those soon to deploy into theater.
However, given the necessity to prepare for the reduced
discretionary caps and threat of sequestration in fiscal year 2014, the
Army's execution of the fiscal year 2014 budget will proceed along five
avenues. First, Secretary McHugh and I have directed that we accelerate
the deliberate downsizing of the Army's Active end strength from its
current level of 532,530 to 490,000 by fiscal year 2015 instead of
fiscal year 2017. Second, we are implementing force structure changes--
including the reorganization of our BCTs--to reduce brigade level
headquarters while sustaining combat power. Third, we will be forced to
implement a drastic tiered readiness system in which about 20 percent
of the operating force will receive the funds necessary to conduct
collective training to reach appropriate readiness levels. Fourth, we
will reprioritize our modernization programs and determine which ones
are most critical to filling capability gaps and which ones will be
delayed or cancelled. Fifth, we will make every effort to recruit and
retain a high quality, professional, and disciplined All-Volunteer
Force while we support our veterans transitioning back to civilian
life.
strategic choices
In March of this year, Secretary Hagel directed a 4-month long
Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR). The SCMR was a valuable
forum to discuss the projected impacts of sequestration and to
formulate the choices facing us in the areas of end strength, force
structure, readiness, and modernization.
The SCMR review concluded that the Total Army must reduce its end
strength, combat formations, readiness, and modernization programs
dramatically to keep pace with each of the proposed budget options. The
SCMR process concluded that the Active Army end strength could be as
low as 420,000 while the Army National Guard could be as low as
290,000. Because the U.S. Army Reserve structure is based on their
combat support role, the SCMR concluded that their end strength and
structure should not change.
We must strike the right balance between end strength, readiness,
and modernization across the Active Army, the Army National Guard and
the U.S. Army Reserve as we reduce the size of the force. To date, 98
percent of end strength reductions have been borne by the Active Army;
the entire force has been affected by reductions to readiness and
modernization accounts. If reduced discretionary caps and sequestration
continue, we will be required to reduce end strength and force
structure in the Army National Guard and take modest end strength
reductions in the U.S. Army Reserve in order to ensure we retain a
ready force. I am committed to every Army soldier and every Army
formation being ready and prepared to meet the requirements of the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance. However, if we retain too great a force
structure in either the Active Army or the Army National Guard, we will
not have sufficient money to train those units.
Ultimately, the size of our Army will be determined by the guidance
and amount of funding provided by Congress. To that end, the SCMR
looked at two different funding levels, one that reflects the
President's budget proposal and another that reflects the reductions to
the discretionary caps required under current law. In both cases, the
Army takes significant budget reductions.
Under the funding levels of the President's budget proposal, which
defers the effects of sequestration for several years, the Army will
reach what I believe is the absolute minimum size to fully execute the
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance: 450,000 in the Active Army, 335,000 in
the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve which
would include a total of at least 52 BCTs. In this case, because the
President is proposing to defer the largest funding reductions until
2018, we can maintain a ready force, albeit a smaller one, that across
the Total Army, can meet the requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance. At this size, however, we are at high risk for reacting to
any strategic surprise that requires a larger force to respond. In
addition, the Army will only be able to maintain an adequate level of
future readiness by accepting a high degree of risk across every
modernization program.
The second case examined by the SCMR was how to achieve the
additional budget cuts called for under the current law. In this case,
the Army was ``sized-to-budget,'' meaning that in order to build and
sustain a ready force, the Army would be reduced to 420,000 in the
Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard, and 185,000 in the
U.S. Army Reserve which would include significantly less than the 52
BCTs I believe we need. Additionally, it would require us to reduce our
modernization accounts by nearly 25 percent, with no program
unaffected. While we have made no final decisions yet, major weapon
programs will be delayed and while we tried to protect certain
programs, the impact on the industrial base is likely to be severe.
In my professional military judgment, these projected end strength
and force structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary one
major combat operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of
an adversary in a second theater. Additionally, it is unlikely that the
Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should
they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat
operation. Whatever budget decision made by Congress, the Secretary of
the Army and I have determined that we will reduce the size of the Army
as needed to ensure that all units--Active Army, the Army National
Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve--will be ready for their assigned
missions. Therefore, our deliberations should not solely pivot around a
discussion of the future Army end strength but also upon the readiness
and capabilities of the Army given the resources available.
congressional action
As I have detailed above, the fiscal outlook today and in the near
future continues to be exceedingly difficult due to the blunt
instrument of sequestration. It is imperative that Congress avoid
future cuts through the vehicle of sequestration. Sequestration
continues to have a devastating impact on our ability to train, man,
and equip the Army. As you continue to work through the issue of
Continuing Resolutions and dealing with sequestration, we ask you to
consider the following actions that will allow us to deal with these
cuts in a more reasonable and rational way.
Compensation Reform
We are extremely grateful for the high quality care and
compensation our Nation has shown to our service men and women over the
last decade. Military manpower costs remain at historic highs and
consume 46 percent of the Army budget today. As we go forward, we must
develop compensation packages that reduce future costs but at the same
time recognize and reward our soldiers and their families for their
commitment and sacrifice. If we do not slow the rate of growth of
soldier compensation, it will consume a higher, disproportionate
percentage of the Army's budget and we will be forced to reduce the
Army's size below sequestration levels of end strength and further
reduce investments in training, and modernization. We will not be able
to afford a force of sufficient capacity, readiness and modernization
without compensation reform. It is our solemn duty to our soldiers and
the Nation to ensure that our soldiers are ready to fight when called
to do so. We must make choices that preserve the high quality, All-
Volunteer Force as the most critical component of a ready Army.
Civilian Workforce
The furloughing of our civilian workforce in fiscal year 2013
caused much disruption across our Army and impacted our ability to
remain focused on critical mission requirements. As we move forward,
the shaping and restructuring of the Army civilian workforce is
necessary to ensure we have the right mix of talent and skills to
support our Army for the future. Additional authorities to increase the
cap on the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program and the ability to
offer Voluntary Early Retirement are crucial to us in order to maintain
our professional and capable civilian workforce.
Base Realignment and Closure
Due to reductions in military and civilian end strength, force
structure, and industrial base demand, a future round of base
realignment and closure is essential to divest excess Army
infrastructure. BRAC would also allow for a systematic review of
existing DOD installations to ensure effective joint and multi-service
component utilization. If we do not make the tough decisions necessary
to identify inefficiencies and eliminate unused facilities, we will
divert scarce resources away from training, readiness, and family
programs and the quality of our installation services will suffer.
conclusion
We must develop a leaner, smaller Army that remains the most
highly-trained and professional All-Volunteer land force in the world;
one that is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to
provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint Force, and is
ready to perform the range of military operations in support of
combatant commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and
abroad, both today and against emerging threats.
To ensure that we align resources to set ourselves on course to
realize this Army, I have established five strategic priorities for the
force:
1. Develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world;
2. Build a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army;
3. Provide a ready and modern Army;
4. Strengthen our commitment to our Army profession; and
5. Sustain the premier All-Volunteer Army.
The impact of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 coupled with the
threat of continued sequestration levels of funding are forcing the
Army to implement significant reductions to end strength, readiness,
and modernization in order to generate short-term cost savings.
However, this will leave Congress, future administrations, and the
Nation with severely reduced options for action. The next
administration will have less capability to deter conflict and would be
increasingly reliant upon allies in any future conflict, with no
guarantee that our allies would be willing or able to provide the
assistance needed to meet U.S. national security goals. In the event of
a strategic surprise or upon the completion of hostilities, an
undersized Army would be unable to conduct long-term stability and
transition operations.
The choices we must make to meet reduced funding levels by
sequestration could force us to reduce our Army in size and capability
to levels that I, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, am not comfortable
with. For those that present the choice as one between capacity and
capability, I want to remind them that for the Army, soldiers are our
capability. Unlike other Services that man their equipment, the Army
must train and equip soldiers to achieve decisive strategic results on
the ground. If the funding dictates a smaller Army, then we must be
prepared for both reduced capacity and reduced capability. Today, we
have the best Army in the world. It is our charge, Congress and DOD
working together, to ensure that by the end of this decade, we still
have the best Army in the world. Thank you for taking the time to
listen to us about our budgetary concerns.
The strength of our Nation is our Army
The strength of our Army is our Soldiers
The strength of our Soldiers is our Families.
This is what makes us Army Strong!
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Odierno.
Admiral Greenert.
STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN,
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Greenert. Chairman Levin, thank you very much for
mentioning our civilian personnel. Those are our shipmates and
we still have quite a few who are hurting from the tragedy at
the Navy Yard. So I appreciate your mentioning them in your
opening statement.
Senator Inhofe, welcome back. It's good to have you here.
We all miss Congressman Ike Skelton, all of us in the
military.
Distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the short- and the long-term effects
of sequestration and our perspective on the SCMR. This morning
I will address two main points: our budget situation and our
plan for fiscal year 2014; and the near- and long-term impacts
of sequestration.
Mr. Chairman, presence, that remains our mandate, your
Navy's mandate. We have to operate forward, where it matters,
and we have to be ready when it matters. We have to be able to
respond to contingencies with acceptable readiness. Recent
events this year alone have clearly demonstrated our ability to
do that with deployed forces. Navy assets were on station
within a few days, where needed, and offered options to the
President whenever the situation dictated it, in North Korea,
Egypt, and in Syria as an example. Now, this ability to be
present reassures our allies and it ensures that the interests
of the United States around the world are properly served.
In 2014, sequestration will further reduce our readiness
and will surely reduce our ship and aircraft investment. The
BCA revised discretionary caps will preclude our ability to
execute the 2012 DSG, both in the near-term and the long-term.
Restrictions associated with the CR preclude transferring funds
across programs, increasing needed program quantities, and
starting important new programs.
The impacts of sequestration will be realized in two main
categories: readiness and investment. There are several
operational impacts, but the most concerning to me is that
reduction in our operation and maintenance will result in only
one non-deployed carrier strike group and one amphibious ready
group trained and ready for contingency response. Our covenant
with the combatant commanders is to have at least two carrier
strike groups and two amphibious ready groups deployed and to
have another three of each in or around the continental United
States ready to respond to a crisis on short notice.
So for example, right now we have one carrier strike group
deployed in both the Arabian Gulf and in the Western Pacific,
and our one response carrier strike group, the USS Nimitz, is
in the eastern Mediterranean. So consequently, because of
fiscal limitations and the situation we're in, we do not
currently have another carrier strike group trained and ready
to respond on short notice in case of a contingency. We're
tapped out.
In 2014 we'll be forced to cancel aircraft and ship
maintenance and this will inevitably lead to reduced life in
our ships and our aircraft. Ashore, we will conduct only
safety-essential renovation of facilities, further increasing
the large backlog in that area. We will be compelled to keep a
hiring freeze in place for most of our civilian positions and
that will further degrade the distribution of skill,
experience, and the balance in a civilian workforce which is so
critical.
We will not be able to use prior-year funds to mitigate
sequestration cuts in our investment accounts, like we did in
fiscal year 2013. Without congressional action, we will be
required to cancel the planned procurement of a Virginia-class
submarine, a Littoral Combat Ship, and an Afloat Forward
Staging Base ship, and we will be forced to delay the delivery
of the next aircraft carrier, the USS Ford, and delay the mid-
life overhaul of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington.
Also, we'll have to cancel procurement of at least 11 tactical
aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, the key to a balanced portfolio is a spending
bill and secondarily the option to propose to Congress the
transfer of money between accounts. This at least would enable
us to pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new
projects, increase production quantities, and complete the
ships we have under construction. Just to meet minimum
readiness needs, we need to transfer or reprogram about $1
billion into the operation and maintenance (O&M) account and
about $1 billion into our procurement accounts, mostly for
shipbuilding, and we need to do this by January.
After the SCMR was completed, our focus has been on
crafting a balanced portfolio of programs within the fiscal
guidance that we were provided. Further details of our approach
into what we call the alternative program objective memorandum
(POM) are outlined in detail in my written statement, which I
request be entered for the record.
Now, in summary, we will maintain a credible and modern
sea-based strategic deterrent, we will maximize forward
presence to the extent we can using ready deployed forces, and
we will continue investing in asymmetric capabilities, while,
with this committee's help, we'll do our best to sustain a
relevant industrial base. However, there are several missions
and needed capabilities which are specified in the DSG that we
cannot perform or keep apace with potential adversaries, and
these will preclude us from meeting the operational plan
requirements as currently written and defined by our combatant
commanders with acceptable risk. These also are detailed in my
written statement.
Applying 1 fiscal and programmatic scenario, we would end
up with a resultant fleet of about 255 ships in 2020. That's
about 30 less than we have today. It's about 40 less than was
planned in our program, our President's budget 2014 submission,
and it's 51 less than our force structure assessment which we
validated and submitted of 306 ships.
So, Mr. Chairman, I understand the pressing need for our
Nation to get its fiscal house in order, and I'm on board with
that endeavor. But its imperative that we do so in a thoughtful
manner to ensure that we sustain the appropriate warfighting
capability, the appropriate forward presence, and that we be
ready. Those are the attributes we depend on from our Navy.
I look forward to working with Congress to find the
solutions that will ensure our Navy retains the ability to
organize, to train, and to equip our great sailors and our
civilians and their families in the defense of our Nation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the
committee thank you for the opportunity to testify about the impact of
sequestration on the national defense.
In this statement, I will explain the impacts of sequestration
having occurred in fiscal year 2013 and why I believe current law
imposing reduced discretionary caps in future years will preclude our
ability to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) in the
long term. In the near-term, sequestration in fiscal year 2014 will
negatively impact our readiness and investments, further degrading
programs in all appropriations except military personnel. Combined with
the restrictions associated with a Continuing Resolution on
transferring funds, increasing program quantities and starting new
projects, these impacts will be considerably worse in fiscal year 2014
than they were in fiscal year 2013.
The Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) directed by the
Secretary of Defense was an exercise to produce options and identify
choices that would prepare the way for the Department of Defense (DOD)
to comply with the BCA. Now that the SCMR is complete, the Navy's focus
is development of a balanced portfolio of programs within the fiscal
guidance (fiscal reductions) provided by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. That work is in progress. It is not complete.
The standard that guides our current planning, programming and
budgeting is the DSG and its objectives for the Joint Force; this
guidance is benchmarked to the year 2020. The DSG incorporated the
first set of BCA-mandated budget reductions and directed the military
to address ``the projected security environment'' and to ``recalibrate
its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed
in the missions'' of the Armed Forces.
our president's budget submission for fiscal year 2014 (pb-14)
Our PB-14 submission was designed to execute the DSG with
acceptable risk. Applying the reduced discretionary caps through 2021
will prevent the Navy from executing the DSG. Our January 2013 ``Force
Structure Assessment'' (FSA) is foundational in this discussion as it
is our DOD-validated requirement for ships and reflects the direction
of the DSG in each mission of the Armed Forces.
The DSG highlights the value of forward presence to support
partners, sustain U.S. influence and maintain stability. The Navy's PB-
14 submission and associated plans build a fleet that will provide the
presence required by the DSG. If executed as planned, it will result in
a fleet of approximately 295 ships in 2020 (300 in fiscal year 2019),
about 10 more than are in service today. This ``2020 Fleet'' would do
the following in support of the DSG mission to Provide a Stabilizing
Presence:
Increase our global deployed presence from about 95
ships today to about 115 in 2020.
Increase presence in the Asia-Pacific from about 50
ships today to about 60 ships in 2020, consistent with the
DSG's direction to rebalance to that region.
``Continue to place a premium on U.S. military
presence in--and in support of--partner nations'' in the Middle
East, with about 30 ships. This will include continuous
presence of a rotationally-deployed Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), ballistic missile defense
(BMD) capable destroyers, and attack submarines. These
rotational forces will be augmented by an Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB), patrol coastal (PC) and mine
countermeasures (MCM) ships homeported in Bahrain, which (late
in this decade) will be replaced by forward-stationed littoral
combat ships (LCS).
``Evolve our posture'' in Europe by meeting our
ballistic missile defense European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable destroyers homeported
in Rota, Spain, and two land-based sites in Romania and Poland.
Additional presence will be provided by forward operating Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSV), Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships,
an AFSB, and rotationally deployed combatants.
Provide ``innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint
approaches'' to security in Africa and South America by
deploying on average one JHSV and one LCS continuously to both
regions, and maintaining an AFSB off of Africa.
Our PB-14 budget submission invests in the capabilities and
capacity required for the other missions described in the DSG with the
following results:
Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare
We would have the capacity to conduct widely distributed
Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW) missions. According to
our FSA, this requires one AFSB in the Arabian Gulf and one AFSB in the
Gulf of Aden, four LCS, with two deployed in various locations
worldwide and six MQ-8B/C Fire Scout unmanned air vehicles operating
from these platforms.
Deter and Defeat Aggression
We would be able to ``conduct one large-scale operation and also
counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor'' in a second theater
as required by the DSG. According to the analysis conducted as part of
our FSA, this requires 11 aircraft carriers (CVN), 88 large surface
combatants (LSC)--cruisers (CG) and destroyers (DDG), 48 attack
submarines (SSN), 11 large amphibious assault ships (LHA/D), 11
amphibious transport docks (LPD), 11 dock landing ships (LSD), 52 small
surface combatants (LCS, frigates and MCM) and 29 combat logistics
force (CLF) ships. Maintained at an appropriate level of readiness in
accordance with our Fleet Response Plan, this force structure yields
three non-deployed CSG and three ARG ready to deploy in response to a
contingency within about 14 days and an appropriate number of CSG, ARG,
LSC and SSN able to surge forward in response to crisis. These forces
would augment and relieve our presence forces described above, which
includes two CSG and two ARG. Our FSA analysis also determined this
overall force at the appropriate level of readiness would be sufficient
to execute Navy elements of the DSG mission to Conduct Stability and
Counterinsurgency Operations.
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
The Joint Force requires assured access to meet security
commitments to allies and partners, deter aggression and conduct
military operations from counterterrorism to disaster response. Our PB-
14 submission would implement the Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC) and the Air-Sea Battle concept through investments in:
Undersea capabilities, including:
An inventory of P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol
aircraft that meets the program and warfighting
requirement of 117 aircraft in 2019, completing
transition from the legacy P-3C Orion by 2019.
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combat system
upgrades will be installed in all DDG forward
homeported in the Western Pacific by 2018, including
addition of a Multifunction Towed Array (MFTA) sonar.
An ASW mission package that will be fielded on
LCS in 2016, which increases surface ship ASW capacity
and delivers improved capability by using a MFTA in
combination with a variable depth sonar (VDS).
Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedoes to
equip all of our helicopters, SSN, and P-8A in the
Western Pacific by 2018. PB-14 includes 1,286 Mk 54
advanced lightweight torpedoes for aircraft and 809
improved Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes for submarines.
The Virginia Payload Module (VPM) fielded in
Virginia-class submarines in 2027 to enable Virginia-
class SSN to replace land attack capacity from guided
missile submarines (SSGN) that begin retiring in 2026.
An LCS mine countermeasures mission package
that employs unmanned vehicles and offboard sensors to
locate and neutralize mines while keeping the LCS and
its crew outside the mine threat area. The first
increment of this mission package will be fielded in
2015, and the second in 2019.
Air and missile defenses, including:
The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement
Program (SEWIP), that delivers upgraded electromagnetic
sensing capabilities in 2014 and upgraded jamming and
deception capabilities in 2017. Both of these upgrades
are required to counter advances in adversary anti-ship
cruise missiles.
The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
to be fielded on seven Flight III Arleigh Burke DDG
that deliver between 2021 and 2024. Longer-range, more
accurate, and more agile than legacy ship-based radars,
AMDR is needed to counter advanced anti-ship weapons
and jamming.
The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block
II, an improved short-range, ship-based missile that
counters attacks by multiple cruise missiles at low
altitude, as well as adversary jamming and radar
deception. It will be fielded in 2020 with 80 missiles
going to the fleet.
The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, introduced into
the fleet by 2019, will integrate into our carrier air
wing (CVW) forward homeported in the Western Pacific in
2020. The F-35C's advanced sensors, coupled with its
data sharing capability and ability to operate closer
to threats, will enhance the CVW's ability to find
targets and coordinate attacks.
An improved air-to-air ``kill chain'' based on
infrared (IR) sensors and weapons that circumvent
adversary radar jamming and deception. The Infrared
Search and Track (IRST) sensor system will be fielded
in 2016 and an improved version with extended range
will be fielded in 2019. The longer range and accuracy
of IRST will be employed by the AIM-9X Block III IR-
guided missile that delivers in 2021.
An improved air-to-air radio-frequency (RF)
``kill chain'' that defeats enemy jamming and operates
at longer ranges through upgrades to every F/A-18E/F
Block II Super Hornet will be fielded by 2018. This
radar will be used with the longer-range ``fire and
forget'' AIM-120D, which will be fielded in 2014 and
integrated into all Pacific CVW by 2020.
The Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
(NIFC-CA) network, which integrates aircraft and ship
sensor and weapons capabilities. Fielding begins with
the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft in 2015 and fully
equips six CVW by 2020. Full transition to the E-2D
will be complete by 2022.
Operate Effectively in Space and Cyber Space
Cyberspace is a domain in which attacks and intelligence gathering
already occur every day. In a conflict, we will use our advantages in
this domain to help defeat adversaries' ability to see, communicate and
coordinate their forces. Our PB-14 submission places priority on cyber
defense and efforts to build the Navy's portion of DOD's Cyber Mission
Forces. It would recruit, hire, and train 976 additional cyber
operators and form 40 computer attack and defense teams by 2017.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
We would sustain today's ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force
and ensure the future SSBN(X) delivers in 2030 to replace retiring
Ohio-class while meeting requirements for SSBN presence and surge.
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
In accordance with Secretary of Defense direction and the FSA, the
capacity required for these missions is 1 CSG, 1 ARG, 2 P-8A, 4 CG or
DDG and 10 LCS that are not deployed and ready for all homeland defense
missions. Our PB-14 submission would maintain this capacity.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Our FSA analysis determined that these missions will be met by
sustaining a continuous overseas presence of two CSG with an additional
CSG half the year and three ARG to conduct counter-proliferation
activities and six BMD DDG to counter weapons delivered by ballistic
missiles. Our PB-14 submission would maintain this level of presence.
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
Our FSA analysis determined that a presence of two ARG and nine
JHSV is sufficient to conduct these operations. Our PB-14 submission
would maintain this level of presence.
impact of a potential future scenario: ``fiscally constrained to bca
caps: fiscal year 2015-2023''
Consistent with what the Deputy Secretary of Defense told this
committee in August, if fiscally constrained to the revised
discretionary caps, over the long-term (2013-2023), the Navy of 2020
would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG. There
are numerous ways to adjust Navy's portfolio of programs to meet the
BCA revised discretionary caps. These are currently under deliberation
within the department. As requested, the following provides perspective
on the level and type of adjustments that will need to be made.
Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law
must include sufficient readiness, capability and manpower to
complement the force structure capacity of ships and aircraft. This
balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be
effective, even if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG.
There are, however, many ways to balance between force structure,
readiness, capability, and manpower.
One potential fiscal and programmatic scenario would result in a
``2020 Fleet'' of about 255-260 ships, about 30 less than today, and
about 40 less than Navy's PB-14 submission. It would include 1-2 fewer
CSG, and 1-2 fewer ARG than today. This 2020 fleet would not meet the
DSG requirements for the mission to Provide a Stabilizing Presence. As
a result, Navy would be less able to reinforce deterrence, build
alliances and partnerships, and influence events abroad.
Navy would not increase our global deployed presence,
which would remain at about 95 ships in 2020. The lethality
inherent in this presence, based on ship type deployed, would
be less than today's 95-ship presence.
Navy would not increase presence in the Asia-Pacific,
which would stay at about 50 ships in 2020. This would largely
negate the ship force structure portion of our plan to
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region directed by the DSG.
Navy would not ``place a premium on U.S. military
presence in--and in support of--partner nations'' in the Middle
East, since presence would decrease and, assuming we use the
same ship deployment scheme in the future, there would be gaps
in CSG presence totaling 2-3 months each year.
Navy would still ``evolve our posture'' in Europe by
meeting our ballistic missile defense EPAA requirements with
four BMD-capable DDG homeported in Rota, Spain and two land
based sites in Romania and Poland. Additional presence would
still be provided by forward operating JHSV, MLP, AFSB and some
rotationally deployed combatants.
Navy would still provide ``innovative, low-cost, and
small-footprint approaches'' to security in Africa and South
America by deploying, on average, one JHSV and one LCS
continuously to both regions and maintaining an AFSB in
AFRICOM's area of responsibility.
In order to sustain a balance of force structure (current and
future), modernization and personnel within our portfolio, continued
compliance with the BCA revised discretionary caps would compel us to
reduce our investments in force structure and modernization, which
would result in a ``2020 Fleet'' that would not meet DSG direction in
the following mission areas:
Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare
We would not have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW
missions, as defined in the DSG. There would be inadequate LCS
available to allocate to this non-core Navy mission, in the amount
defined by the FSA and concurred upon by Special Operations Command.
Deter and Defeat Aggression
We would not be able to conduct one large-scale operation and also
counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in a second theater.
In this scenario, the fleet would have 9 to 10 CVN/CSG and 9 to 10 LHA/
D and ARG. We would be able to sustain about one non-deployed CSG and
one non-deployed ARG fully certified and able to surge on required
timelines. Together, our presence and surge forces would be sufficient
to conduct all missions associated with only one large-scale operation,
as defined today. This overall force and associated readiness would,
however, be sufficient to execute Navy elements of the DSG mission to
Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
Overall, in this scenario, development of our capabilities to
project power would not stay ahead of potential adversaries' Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. We will not meet the projected
capability requirements to assure Joint access in a plausible
operational scenario in 2020 due to shortfalls, in particular, in air
and missile defense:
Some undersea capabilities will be slowed:
Attainment of the required P-8A inventory
(117) would be delayed from 2019 to 2020, and
transition from the P-3C to the P-8A would be delayed
from 2019 to 2020.
Anti-submarine warfare combat system upgrades
for DDGs and MFTA installations would not be affected.
The LCS ASW Mission Package would be delayed
from 2016 to 2017.
Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedo
procurement would still equip all of our helicopters,
SSN, and P-8A in the Western Pacific by 2018.
Virginia Payload Module (VPM) would still be
fielded in 2027 to enable Virginia-class SSN to replace
SSGN that begin retiring in 2026.
The LCS mine warfare mission package would
still field its first increment in 2015 and the second
in 2019.
Air and missile defense improvements would be slowed:
SEWIP upgraded electromagnetic sensing and
upgraded jamming and deception capabilities would both
be delayed 1 year (to 2015 and 2018, respectively).
Both of these upgrades are required to counter advances
in adversary anti-ship cruise missiles.
The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
would be delivered on only four ships, as compared to
seven under our PB-14 submission, between 2021 and
2024.
The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block
II would still be fielded in 2020, with 80 missiles
being delivered to deployed ships.
The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, would still field
in 2019 and join our CVW forward homeported in the
Western Pacific in 2020. Overall, the number of F-35
procured would decrease by about 30 aircraft in 2020.
All components of the improved air-to-air IR
``kill chain'' that circumvents adversary radar jamming
would be delayed by 2 years. The Infrared Search and
Track (IRST) sensor system would field in 2018 and the
improved longer-range IRST would not deliver until
2021. The new longer-range AIM-9X Block III missile
would not be fielded until 2023.
Improvements to the air-to-air RF ``kill
chain'' would be slowed down as F/A-18E/F Block II
Super Hornet anti-jamming upgrades would be delayed to
2020. The longer-range AIM-120D missile would still
field in 2014 but equipping of all Pacific carrier air
wings would be delayed by 2 years to 2022.
The Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
(NIFC-CA) network would still initially field with the
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in 2015, but only four CVW
(compared to six in our PB-14 submission) would have it
by 2020. Transition to the E-2D would be delayed 3
years to 2025.
Operate Effectively in Space and Cyber Space
Plans to recruit, hire, and train 976 additional cyber operators
and form 40 computer operations teams by 2017 would not be impacted.
This is a priority in any fiscal scenario. However, the BCA's reduced
funding levels would delay replacement of our cyber systems and
decrease our ability to defend our networks.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
We would still be able to sustain today's ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) force. The SSBN(X) would still deliver in 2030 to
replace retiring Ohio-class SSBN while meeting requirements for SSBN
presence and surge. This is the top priority program for the Navy.
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
We would still meet the capacity requirements for these missions.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
We would still meet the presence requirements for this mission.
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
We would still meet the presence requirements for this mission.
The extent of the fiscal changes in the BCA, when compared to
current program and budget levels, would compel Navy to request relief
from several program mandates and force structure capacity limits, in
order to sustain and build a fleet with a balance of ship types. For
example, mandated limits govern the size of the force, minimum funding
for certain activities and facilities, and changes to the number of
personnel at a base.
the impact of fiscal year 2013 sequestration
Looking at the nearer term, the fiscal year 2013 sequestration
reductions compelled us to reduce our afloat and ashore operations and
created a significant shore maintenance backlog. However, the effects
were barely manageable because we received authorization to reprogram
funds into appropriate maintenance accounts, and we were able to use
prior-year investment balances to mitigate reductions to investment
programs. Impact to Navy programs, caused by the combination of a
Continuing Resolution and sequestration, included:
Cancelled five ship deployments.
Delayed deployment of USS Harry S Truman strike group
by 6 months.
Planned inactivation, instead of repairing, USS Miami
due to rising cost and inadequate maintenance funds.
Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by
about 30 percent.
Furloughed DON civilian employees for 6 days, which,
combined with a hiring freeze, reduced our maintenance and
sustainment capacity by taking away logisticians, comptrollers,
engineers, contracting officers, and planners.
Reduced base operations, including port and airfield
operations, by about 20 percent.
Cancelled the Blue Angels' season and most non-
essential port visits for Fleet Weeks.
The prospect of sequestration and a Continuing Resolution in fiscal
year 2014
Sequestration in fiscal year 2014, particularly if combined with
restrictions of a Continuing Resolution (CR), will reduce our readiness
in the near-term and in the long-term exacerbate program impacts from
budget reductions required under current law. The impacts below assume
an approximate 10 percent cut to the Navy's budget; however, with
military personnel accounts exempted, the cut could increase to 14
percent in all other appropriations. In addition, the restrictions
imposed by a CR will reduce our ability to manage the impact of
sequestration. The impacts of this reduced funding will be realized in
two main categories of budget accounts: (1) operations and maintenance
and (2) investments.
(1) Operation and maintenance accounts will absorb a larger
reduction than in fiscal year 2013 from a smaller overall amount of
money; in addition we must begin to address deferred ``carry over''
bills from fiscal year 2013 that total approximately $2.3 billion over
the next 5 years. Because we will prioritize meeting current presence
requirements, we will be able to preserve 95 percent of the forward
presence originally directed under the fiscal year 2014 Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). However, this is still only about
half of the Combatant Commander's original request. To ensure adequate
funding for the most important deployments, we were compelled to adjust
the plan in advance of fiscal year 2014 to remove the deployment of one
CG to the Middle East, two salvage ships to Africa and South America
and five large surface combatants to the Western Pacific. Most
concerning, however, we will have two thirds less surge capacity in
fiscal year 2014. Our planned presence to meet the GFMAP in fiscal year
2015 and beyond will also be at risk because maintenance cancelled in
fiscal year 2014 may result in ships being unable to deploy in future
years. At a minimum this lost maintenance will reduce the service life
of these ships.
Because of the mechanics of sequestration, we cannot reprogram
(move) funds from other accounts into operations and maintenance to
make up for the sequestered amount. As a result, within operations and
maintenance, we have to ``go where the money is'' and find savings in
training, maintenance, civilian personnel, and shore facilities. The
reductions in fleet training we are compelled to make will result in
only one non-deployed CSG and one ARG trained and ready for surge
operations--notionally without these reductions there would be three of
each ready to deploy within about 2 weeks.
We will be compelled to cancel or defer planned fiscal year 2014
fleet maintenance, including 34 of 55 surface ship maintenance periods
totaling about $950 million--all in private shipyards--and 191 of about
700 aircraft depot maintenance actions. This missed maintenance will
inevitably take time off the expected service life of our ships and
aircraft, which in turn will make it harder to sustain even the smaller
fleet we will have if the BCA caps remain in place for the long term.
For example, a recent Center for Naval Analysis study estimated
cancelling and not making up one maintenance period at the 10-year
point in a DDG's life will shorten its overall service life by about 5
years.
We will be compelled to keep in place our freeze on hiring for most
civilian positions. Ashore we will continue to conduct only safety-
essential renovation and modernization of facilities, further
increasing the large backlog in that area.
(2) Investment accounts will be particularly impacted by
sequestration in fiscal year 2014, and we will not be able to use
prior-year funds to mitigate shortfalls as we did in fiscal year 2013.
Without congressional action or mitigating circumstances, the
reductions imposed by sequestration and the limitations of a CR will
compel us to:
Cancel planned fiscal year 2014 procurement of an SSN,
an LCS and an AFSB; also, delay an SSN planned for fiscal year
2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the
reduction in fleet size, described earlier in this statement,
that the BCA would compel us to make over the long term.
Delay the planned start of construction on the first
SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence
requirements when the Ohio-class SSBN retires.
Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G
Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, 2 P-8A
Poseidon, 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons, exacerbating
future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities to project
power despite A2/AD threats.
Delay delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) by 2
years, extending the period of 10 CVN in service, and lowering
surge capacity.
Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS George Washington
(CVN 73) scheduled for fiscal year 2016, disrupting today's
``heel-to-toe'' CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term
CVN capacity.
In order to avoid or remedy some of the fiscal year 2014 impacts
described above, we need Congress to approve authorization and
appropriations bills. This would enable the Navy to transfer funds,
pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new projects, increase
production quantities, and complete ships. This would:
Keep SSBN(X) on schedule to sustain required SSBN
capacity after the Ohio class begins to retire.
Buy two Virginia-class SSN in fiscal year 2014 as
planned and keep fiscal year 2015 SSN procurement on schedule.
These actions will help maintain our undersea dominance and
ability to project power despite A2/AD threats.
Protect CVN-73's mid-life overhaul and complete CVN-78
on time to sustain CVN capacity.
Build the planned AFSB in fiscal year 2014, which is
needed to meet DSG and combatant commander presence
requirements for CT/IW capability.
Restore half of the cancelled surface ship maintenance
availabilities to protect fiscal year 2015 presence.
conclusion
We understand the pressing need for the Nation to get its fiscal
house in order. DOD should do its part, but it is imperative we do so
in a coherent and thoughtful manner to ensure appropriate readiness,
warfighting capability, and forward presence--the attributes we depend
upon from our Navy. Specifically, we need to be able to establish and
pursue a deliberate plan for future force development. Regardless of
the level of funding we receive, having a predictable budget and
associated authorities will enable us to develop and execute an
achievable strategy. This strategy would guide our efforts to sustain
the appropriate readiness in today's Navy while building a future fleet
that is able to deliver the most important presence and capabilities
and address the most important warfighting scenarios.
We will continue to view each of our choices through the lens of
the three tenets I established when I took office as CNO: Warfighting
First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready. But with each year of
sequestration, the loss of force structure, readiness, and future
investments will cause our options to become increasingly constrained
and drastic; our ability to contribute to the Nation's security will be
reduced.
We look forward to working with Congress to find solutions that
will ensure our Navy remains preeminent and preserve the Nation's
security and prosperity.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
Now, General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC,
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe--
welcome back, sir--committee members: Thank you for your
consistently strong support for your military forces and for
your obvious love of our country and justified concern for its
defense. All of us sitting before you this morning, my
colleagues, are mindful of your collective and individual
sacrifices and are grateful for your unflagging fidelity.
The sequester defense budget falls short in meeting Marine
Corps requirements and those of the joint force. Your Marine
Corps is ready today, but in order to maintain readiness within
the current fiscal environment we are mortgaging the readiness
of tomorrow's Marine Corps to do so. We are ready today because
your marines are resilient and determined to defend the United
States of America. Despite year after year of CRs, the BCA,
furloughs, and the government shutdown, the men and women who
wear my cloth are patriots first. The defense of our fellow
Americans and our way of life is our number one priority, even
over the comforts of self.
Last month's furlough of more than 14,000 of our civilian
marines was a grave disservice to an honorable and dedicated
workforce who wants nothing more than to advance the security
of the American people. Our civilian marines are a vital part
of our team. They are the technicians, the experts, the
teachers, the clerks in our commissaries and our exchanges.
They are our corporate memory. They are our surge capacity at
our depots who provide unique skills in support of the Active
and Reserve Force.
They deserve better, quite frankly. I'm ashamed about the
way they've been treated through the furloughs and the
uncertainty.
During this first year of sequestration, I have realigned
funds within my authorities to maintain unit readiness to the
highest extent possible. My priorities have remained
consistent: first and foremost, the near-term readiness of our
forward-deployed forces, followed thereafter by those that are
next to deploy. But this readiness comes at the expense of
infrastructure, sustainment, and modernization. We are funding
today's readiness by curtailing future investment in equipment
and in our facilities.
This year we are spending approximately 68 percent of what
is required at a bare minimum to maintain our barracks, our
facilities, our bases and stations, and our training ranges.
This is unsustainable and it can't continue over the long term.
If we are to succeed in future conflicts, we must modernize our
equipment and maintain the infrastructure that enables our
training.
We must also invest in our people. To meet the requirements
of the DSG, we need a Marine Corps of 186,800 Active Duty. A
force of 186,800 allows us to meet our steady state operations
and fight a single major war. It preserves the 1-to-3 dwell for
our marines and their families. Under the 2011 BCA, the $487
billion reduction cut our end strength further, to 182,000.
With sequestration, I can no longer afford a force of 182,000.
In February, we initiated a parallel study to DOD's SCMR.
Our internal review determined the force size that I could
afford under a fully sequestered budget. This was not a
strategy-driven effort. It was a budget-driven effort, pure and
simple. Our exhaustive research, backed by independent
analysis, determined that a force of 174,000 marines, quite
simply, is the largest force that we can afford. Assuming that
the requirements for marines remain the same over the
foreseeable future, a force of 174,000 will drive the Marine
Corps to a 1-to-2 dwell. It will be that way for virtually all
my operational units: 6 months deployed, 12 months home
recuperating, resetting, and training, and 6 months deployed
once again.
This is dangerously close to the same combat operational
tempo we had in Iraq and Afghanistan while fighting in multiple
theaters and while maintaining steady state amphibious
operations around the world.
The 174,000 force accepts great risk when our Nation
commits itself to the next major theater war as there are
significant reductions in my Service in ground combat and
aviation units available for the fight.
Under sequestration, we will effectively lose a Marine
Corps division's worth of combat power. This is a Marine Corps
that would deploy to a major contingency, fight, and not return
until the war was over. We will empty the entire bench. There
would be no rotational relief like we had in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Marines who joined the Corps during that war would
likely go straight from the drill field to the battlefield,
without the benefit of pre-combat training.
We will have fewer forces, arriving less trained, arriving
later to the fight. This would delay the buildup of combat
power, allow the enemy more time to build its defenses, and
would likely prolong combat operations altogether. This is a
formula for more American casualties.
We only need to look to 1950 and the onset of the Korean
War to see the hazard and the fallacy in this approach.
Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you.
I'll continue to work with the members of this committee to fix
the problems we are faced with. I'm prepared to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC
introduction
The Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness.
We are our Nation's hedge against uncertainty; a national insurance
policy of sorts. Deployed forces, and units in training alike, are
poised to swiftly respond to crisis and disaster, offering immediate
options for strategic decisionmakers, while simultaneously buying time
for the follow on joint force. We mitigate the risk inherent in an
uncertain world by being ready to respond to today's crisis--with
today's force--today.
The Nation and the Defense Department are faced with unprecedented
budget uncertainty. My fellow Service Chiefs and I are here to talk
about the effects of sequestration on the budget. We fill two distinct
roles in this discussion--as chiefs of our respective Services and as
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my role as Commandant, I am
deeply concerned about our inability to get a budget approved that
facilitates the sound management of precious personnel and limited
resources from 1 year to the next. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, I am equally concerned with our military's ability to support
the President's Defense Strategic Guidance and meet the requirements of
the combatant commanders across the globe.
Your marines take seriously their sacred oath to defend our Nation,
our Constitution, and the American people. As we speak, marines are
deployed to Afghanistan supporting the transition of security and
responsibility to the Afghan Government and people. As a naval force,
marines remain afloat on amphibious warships to provide forward
presence, while engaging our allies and partners. These naval
expeditionary forces are maneuverable, self-sustaining, operate without
reliance on host country basing or over flight permissions, and present
our Nation with flexible force options.
In the Pacific, we are aggressively rebalancing our force posture,
to include our Unit Deployment Program in Okinawa. Rotational Marine
units are training and strengthening our relationship with Australia.
Additionally, marines stand their posts guarding our embassies, and
train diligently at our installations to prepare for the next
contingency. Marines stand ready to answer the Nation's call to action.
We are keenly aware of the global security environment where our
collective actions are closely watched, and we share the, concern that
a disruption of our Nation's ability to protect its global interests
will have strategic consequences.
In these troubled times, the Marine Corps remains your frugal
force. As good stewards of the taxpayer dollar, we will continue to
prioritize our requirements, determine what is good enough and only ask
for what is essential for our marines and sailors to succeed every time
they are called into harm's way. For a small portion of the Department
of the Defense budget, we continue to provide a strategically mobile,
rapidly deployable force. While other nations seek to reinvent
themselves for the new security environment, the American people have
already invested in a Navy-Marine Corps team that is suited for this
environment.
As Commandant, I assure you that we will do everything in our power
to ensure the security of the American people and protect the global
interests that secure our prosperity. As we have for 238 years, we will
meet our responsibility to rapidly respond to crises wherever they may
occur. Marines will be always faithful to the American people and our
Nation. We cannot afford to allow our adversaries the opportunity to
seize the initiative and undermine global security. Already a lean
organization, your marines will continue to give you the first and best
option for crisis response.
force structure
Beginning in 2006, the Marine Corps increased its end strength to
202k to meet global commitments and to reduce the dwell time of marines
in combat zones. Three years ago, the Marine Corps initiated a Force
Structure Review with the mission of reshaping the Marine Corps for a
post-Afghanistan environment. This review sought to find ways to meet
our national security responsibilities in a resource-efficient manner.
Our goal was to provide the most ready, capable, and cost-effective
Marine Corps our Nation could afford as the security environment
changed. Balancing the President's Defense Strategic Guidance with our
internal review, we designed a force of 186,800 which was the optimal-
sized Marine Corps considering the likely global security environment.
As a result of new factors driven by the Budget Control Act (BCA),
the 186.8K force is no longer affordable. Accordingly, I repo1tecl to
Congress last year on our multi-year plan to draw clown the Co1ps below
186.8K reaching 182.1K by the end of fiscal year 2016. This force
structure goal adjusted our end strength, and assumed more risk by
making reductions across all elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force, while still enabling the Marine Corps to support the President's
strategy. A year ago, we believed a budget deal would be made. Today,
with sequestration having occurred and current law imposing continued
cuts in future years we are planning on reducing the Corps even more.
If cuts of this size continue, we will not be able to afford the 182k
force structure; the fiscal environment will subsequently put the
Nation's ability to respond to crisis around the globe at risk.
resources and readiness
I am alarmed by the prospect of even deeper reductions in the next
fiscal year. There should be no misunderstanding: cuts of this
magnitude will have a significant impact on the global security
climate, the perceptions of our enemies, and the confidence of our
allies. In a so-called ``new normal'' environment of brushfire
instabilities, violent extremism, non-state threats and struggling
sovereign entities, the United States will continue to have a role as a
leader. Our ability to affect this global environment may be measured
in ready crisis response forces, i.e., ships at sea, planes in the air,
partnerships on the ground and trust among our allies. In a word, our
posture and our stature as a global leader in a challenging world is
measured in READINESS. Readiness is the aggregate of the investment in
personnel, training, and equipment to ensure that units are prepared to
perform missions at any given time. Our ability to project a ready
force is gauged and respected by our friends. But make no mistake about
it, our foes and those who would challenge us, are measuring our
readiness just as closely.
Readiness is directly linked to resources. Sequestration-level cuts
in fiscal year 2014 will force us to forfeit long-term priorities to
fund near-term readiness. In fiscal year 2013, the final enacted
appropriations bill addressed many of our funding priorities; however,
as we enter a new fiscal year, a full year of sequester matched with
the likelihood of a Continuing Resolution (CR) provides the context for
our fiscal planning as we move forward. While I think we all can agree
that defense resources must be highly scrutinized, the scale and abrupt
implementation of prospective resource changes have the potential for
devastating impacts on readiness beginning in the very near future. We
realize this is not a temporary condition, and are bracing for the
continued challenges of these lower funding levels.
The impacts we face in terms of readiness have primary and
secondary effects. While the primary effects on short-term readiness
will begin to be observable in fiscal year 2014, the longer-term
effects will be even more devastating. We are realigning funds from
longer-term activities to protect the short-term readiness of our
combat deployed marines. While these adaptations are necessary, the
continued maintenance of the short-term readiness of our current force
comes at the expense of those who will follow in their footsteps. We
are consuming tomorrow's `seed corn' to feed today's requirements,
leaving ever less to plant for the future.
marine corps readiness degradation
The Defense Strategic Guidance remains a clear articulation of
future threats, challenges, and opportunities--I continue to support
its full implementation. Given the continuing threat of sequestration,
we face an extended period of severely reduced funding bound by rules
that provide little flexibility to efficiently apply the mandated
reductions. Analyzing and applying constrained resources requires
decisions now; decisions that will have strategic impact.
When we describe our crisis response mandate, we are describing our
forward deployed forces as well as those marines and units training at
home. Even when not deployed, Marine units are on a short tether and
thus required to maintain high levels of readiness. They must be
prepared to deploy on short notice, with the necessary equipment and
training to dominate any adversary or confront any crisis. ``Tiered
readiness'' amongst non-deployed Marine units is unacceptable. Over
time, tiered readiness creates a hollow force. Degradation in training,
equipment and manning underpin shallow, unsustainable combat-ready
forces. America expects her marines to remain most ready when the
Nation is least ready.
Our marines on the forward edge of our Nation's security remain my
number one priority. The forces that currently support the Afghanistan
mission, those engaged in countering terrorism globally, and those
preparing to go, will receive the full support they need. We also are
prioritizing our wounded warriors support services; however, our focus
on deployed forces, families, and our wounded warriors, comes at a
cost. As we move forward under sequestration, I will be forced to
reduce activities necessary to the long-term readiness of the force,
such as organizational and intermediate maintenance of equipment
returning from theater, to ensure the full support to our most engaged
units. For forces not deploying to Afghanistan, the fuel, ammunition,
and other support necessary for training will be reduced precluding our
ability to provide fully-trained individuals and ready units to meet
emerging crises--ultimately impacting even Amphibious Ready Groups and
Marine Expeditionary Units.
The abruptness and inflexibility of sequestration will force us to
mortgage the condition of our equipment and could erode our readiness
to dangerous levels. The indiscriminate nature of sequestration is
creating its very own national security problem. Within a year, we will
see real impact to all home station units and the beginning of impacts
to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces . . . the beginnings of
a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid.
mitigating sequestration
We have worked diligently to mitigate the effects of sequestration
and the likelihood of a CR as we enter into fiscal year 2014. As we
look ahead, our task has been made more challenging by the ever
increasing demand for ready marines. A resumption of the Marine Unit
Deployment Program in the Pacific has reestablished a key component of
our Nation's stabilizing presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The
establishment of a rotational presence of marines in Darwin, Australia
has already had a positive impact on the confidence of our allies and
our ability to respond to crises in the South and Southeast Asian
littoral. The planned ramp-up of Marine security forces for our
embassies and consulates is a necessary artifact of the ``new normal.''
Marines are in high demand to support the growth of special operations
and cyber forces as well.
Maintaining near-term readiness and operational commitments will
continue to come at the expense of investment in our modernization,
infrastructure and quality of life accounts. As an example of our
trade-offs, I am forced to reduce the necessary funding to maintain our
facilities onboard our bases and stations to support operational
commitments. Unfortunately, reducing funding levels will accelerate the
rate of degradation and increase the long-term costs to return these
facilities to acceptable levels. Our family housing overseas, where the
preponderance of forward stationed marines and their families reside,
will not receive planned renovations. Stateside housing will likely
face reduced oversight, which breaches our priority to 'Keep Faith'
with our families. Sequestered levels of funding will also cut base
operating support funding severely, resulting in funding levels well
below the requirement. Overall, degraded quality of life for our
marines, sailors, and their families will impact unit and family
readiness, as well as our efforts to recruit and retain high quality
people in the All-Volunteer Force.
While the Marine Corps has a lean civilian workforce with 95
percent working outside the National Capital Region, sequestration will
also result in reductions to this force. Since our civilians play
critical roles in ground equipment maintenance, training range
operations, installation support services to include police, fire and
rescue services, housing maintenance and base utilities support, and
all of our family support programs, fewer civilians over time will
impact home station readiness. Some essential programs at our bases and
stations, such as our Wounded Warrior programs, will continue. Other
very important but less critical programs, like morale and family
support services, to include the availability of child care, will be
reduced or eliminated to fund readiness. Additionally, the specter of
further furloughs or reductions-in-force present significant challenges
to our ability to attract and retain the talent we need. Sequestration
undeniably impacts our individual marines as well as every aspect of
our Corps from the readiness of our next-to-deploy forces to the
readiness of our depots, maintenance and stations.
strategic choices
The Marine Corps is first and foremost a warfighting organization
committed to winning our Nation's battles. I do not share the view that
as the United States transitions out of Afghanistan, our enemies are
through with us. Instead, this world remains a dangerous place. We do
not know what is going to happen in Egypt, Syria and Libya, but we know
terrorist organizations will continue to fester in areas of the world
ripe for harboring illicit and de-stabilizing actors. We do not know
what the future is for North Korea. The Marine Corps is going to have
to operate within this reality. Despite sequestration, history has
taught us that we must maintain a ready force capable of responding to
crises anywhere in the world and at a moment's notice. This is why
America invests in the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Four months ago, Secretary Hagel directed the Strategic Choices and
Management Review (SCMR) to better inform DOD's preparation for the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In February, I stood up a working
group focused solely on designing a future force based on likely
resource constraints. This effort was informed by the realization that,
if faced with sequestration, the Marine Corps would continue to face
budget shortfalls and lose its ability to maintain its edge as the
Nation's force in readiness. As such, we rebuilt a force design
structure that was based on a reduced fiscal framework that, by
necessity, assumed greater risk in supporting the requirements of the
President's national security strategy.
Although a significant po1tion of the SCMR process addressed Major
Combat Operation (MCO) requirements, which represent the most dangerous
of possibilities, we focused on forward presence and crisis response,
which are the most likely . . . we believe that is what America needs
from the Marine Corps. America will always need a Marine Corps that is
ready, forward deployed, and able to respond to crisis on a moment's
notice.
As noted above, in the past decade with congressional support, we
grew to 202K to meet the Nation's defense needs as a Marine Corps
forward deployed and engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we complete
our mission and bring home our service men and women, we are planning
to reshape our force size to meet the new national strategy. As current
law threatens to further reduce budgets, we proactively initiated an
examination of further end strength reductions. Let me be clear, the
primary driver behind the development of this new force strength
initiative was not the national strategy. The President's National
Security Strategy is optimized with a Marine Corps of 186,800. The BCA
forced us to 182,100. Our examination determined that an end strength
of 174,000 was the best we could do in addressing the operational
requirements of steady state deployments, crisis response activities,
and potential major combat operations, while preserving institutional
health and readiness. As we actively participate in the QDR, this is
the force that the Marine Corps will use as the recommended basis for
our contribution to the Nation's defense. Based on extensive analysis,
falling below this force structure number will significantly increase
risk in to our steady state security posture, crisis response and major
combat operations.
Our working group set out with the basic premise to design a range
of possible force structures and subject them to both internal and
external risk analysis. In concert with the Defense Strategic Guidance,
we designed a force that was also fiscally supportable. We decided to
accept risk with MCOs, to ensure adequate capability and capacity
remained in the areas of forward presence and crisis response. Great
care was taken to ensure that both the strategic landscape and emerging
demands were properly balanced against force design risks. We had to
make sure our method avoided simple linear reductions of numbers from
our current planned end state of 182.1K to achieve a force design that
kept the Marine Corps as ready as fiscally possible and relevant to the
security challenges of today and tomorrow. At the end of the day, we
needed to be modernized, ready and biased for action, integrated into
the Joint Force structure, expeditionary and right sized, while
retaining our core combined arms and amphibious structure and
competencies.
As a part of our methodology, we began by first looking at what
marines are doing today and then widened our aperture to include those
emerging trends that would ultimately frame the future operating
environment. Today, marines are still joined with the international
coalition in Afghanistan, providing crisis response in the Middle East,
providing a stabilizing presence in Africa and the Pacific, and
standing ready to respond to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
(HA/DR) efforts around the globe. Today's Marine Corps also has the
capability and capacity to conduct special operations and cyber
warfare. We can foresee an increasing demand for these capabilities in
the future operating environment. The bottom line is, we are asking a
tremendous amount out of our marines today--a trend that will likely
continue and further bound our future.
Tomorrow's marines will see violent extremism, battles for
influence, disruptive societal transitions, natural disasters,
extremist messages and manipulative politics. We will see criminal
enterprises wield combat power formerly only associated with nation
states. We will see separatism, extremism and intolerance that will
lead to terrorism, protests and violence. We will see new technologies
place modern weapons into the hands of developing states and non-state
actors while the development and proliferation of advanced conventional
weapons challenges our ability to project power or gain access. In this
security environment, it will be the forward presence, strategic
mobility, rapid response, and effective power projection capabilities
of the Marine Corps that define those minimum attributes that must
endure and frame our future force design. We must maintain a force that
can balance a focus on the Asia-Pacific with a sustainable emphasis on
the Middle East, combined with a continuous effort to counter violent
extremists operating across multiple domains.
Based on the detailed planning of our working group, in conjunction
with independent analysis, we have determined that within
sequestration-level budgets that our force design of 174,000 is the
lowest temporary level that can retain America's crisis response force.
This provides a minimum acceptable level of readiness, while
maintaining forward presence as a part of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Further reductions will incur heightened, and in some cases prohibitive
risk to the National Security Strategy.
The Marine Corps has faced this challenge before. As was the case
in the past, our manpower and investments fluctuated with the onset and
conclusion of wars. We are heading down a similar path today. As our
Nation reduces its overseas forces, marines will bridge the gap. We
will maintain forward presence. We will remain on scene to engage with
partners and allies. We will provide our Nation access where our
adversaries try to deny it. We will respond to crises around the globe.
Given a smaller force size our marines will face a greater operational
tempo, and we will plan for reduced dwell time as a necessary measure
to meet our global commitments.
For the foreseeable future, there remains a heightened requirement
for a very capable crisis response force that can deploy anywhere
quickly, provide a variety of response options, and buy time for
national decisionmakers when the need arises. The Marine Corps is and
will continue to be the answer to this need, and through congressional
support, we will retain the capability and capacity to do so.
conclusion
Since it emerged in the late 19th century as a great power, the
United States has needed a capable and well-trained crisis response
force. Now, more than ever, Congress is faced with difficult choices to
determine where to appropriate the necessary funds for our national
defense. Some of the recommendations being offered present illusory and
short-term thrift . . . America has carefully invested over the years
and produced the most agile and responsive military force within the
Navy-Marine Corps team. Our foes, cunning and adaptive, watch carefully
to take advantage of any decline in American ability or willingness to
lead in a partnered global order that supports the common good. The
continued prosperity and security interests of our Nation are dependent
on resourcing long-term success.
The Marine Corps is the most ready when the Nation is least ready.
It is who we are. Paired with the Navy, we are the elements of the
joint force that must be maintained at high levels of readiness. We are
the Nation's risk mitigation for the additional cuts that will affect
other elements of the Department of Defense.
While Congress and this committee carefully execute its
responsibility to validate every taxpayer dollar they appropriate to
our Nation's defense, I can assure you that the Marine Corps will
continue to uphold our share of this sacred trust. Our reputation as
the ``frugal force'' comes from an ethos that values both high combat
readiness and careful stewardship. The Marine Corps will ask only for
what it needs, not for what it wants. I am committed to building the
most ready Marine Corps that the Nation can afford. Working together,
we can map out a resource strategy that protects our global interests
as a nation, keeps faith with our servicemembers, and provides the
greatest value to the American people. I thank you for the opportunity
to engage in this dialogue, for your service to our Nation, and for
your continued support of your marines. Semper Fidelis.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Amos.
General Welsh.
STATEMENT OF GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
General Welsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member
Inhofe, welcome back. I hope you have your landing currency
reset.
Members of the committee: It's always an honor to be here
with you. Thank you for everything you do for our Nation.
The real and projected impacts of sequestration are
sobering. If sequestration remains in place for fiscal year
2014, our Air Force will be forced to cut flying hours to the
extent that within 3 to 4 months many of our flying units won't
be able to maintain full mission readiness. We'll cancel or
significantly curtail major exercises again, and we'll reduce
our initial pilot production targets, which we were able to
avoid in fiscal year 2013 because prior year unobligated funds
helped offset about 25 percent of our sequestration bill last
year. Those funds are no longer available.
While we hope to build a viable plan to slow the growth of
personnel costs over time and to reduce infrastructure costs
when able, the only way to pay the full sequestration bill is
by reducing force structure, readiness, and modernization. Over
the next 5 years, the Air Force could be forced to cut up to
25,000 airmen and up to 550 aircraft, which is about 9 percent
of our inventory. To achieve the necessary cost savings in
aircraft force structure, we'll be forced to divest entire
fleets of aircraft. We can't do it by cutting a few aircraft
from each fleet.
As we look at which force structure we need to maintain,
we'll prioritize global long-range capabilities and multi-role
platforms required to operate in a highly contested
environment. We plan to protect readiness as much as possible.
We also plan to prioritize full-spectrum training, because if
we're not ready for all possible scenarios, then we're
accepting the notion that it's okay to get to the fight late,
we're accepting the notion that the joint team may take longer
to win, and we're accepting the notion that our warfighters
will be placed at greater risk. We should never accept those
notions.
If sequestration continues, our modernization and
recapitalization forecasts are bleak. It will impact every one
of our programs and over time these disruptions will cost more
money to rectify contract breaches, raise unit costs, and delay
delivery of critical equipment. We're looking at cutting up to
50 percent of our modernization programs if the fully
sequestered POM remains reality. We'll favor recapitalization
over modernization whenever that decision is required. That's
why our top three acquisition programs remain the F-35, the KC-
46, and the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).
Your Air Force is the best in the world and it's a vital
piece of the world's best military team. That won't change even
if sequester persists, but what and how much we'll be capable
of doing will absolutely change.
Thank you for your efforts to pass a bill that gives us
stability and predictability over time. Those two things are
essential as we try to move forward. My personal thanks for
your continued support of airmen and their families.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Welsh follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Mark A. Welsh III, USAF
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the
committee, it's an honor to appear before you. Thank you for your
continued support of our airmen and their families.
The U.S. Air Force is the very best at what we do. We hire the best
people we can find and train them better than any other airmen in the
world. We bring five core missions to our great joint warfighting team.
Those missions haven't fundamentally changed since we became a separate
Service in 1947. We still do: (1) air superiority (we've added space
superiority); (2) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
(3) rapid global mobility; (4) global strike; and (5) command and
control. We do these missions in and through three domains--air, space,
and cyberspace. The result of the great work our airmen do in those
mission areas is Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for
America.
Our airmen know this, and are proud of the critical role they play
in our Nation's defense. My job is to ensure that whenever America
calls, our airmen are capable of fighting and winning our Nation's
wars. As we plan for various budget scenarios, we seek to be ready in
2014 for a full range of combat operations, while also building an Air
Force capable of executing our five core missions against a determined,
well-armed, and well-trained adversary in 2023 and beyond.
We know the Air Force has a role in helping our Nation get its
fiscal house in order. However, the abrupt and arbitrary nature of
sequestration drives the Air Force into a ``ready force today'' versus
a ``modern force tomorrow'' dilemma. This dilemma is dangerous and
avoidable. If we are given the flexibility to make prudent cuts over
time, we can achieve the savings required under current law. However,
sequestration robs us of that flexibility. We're left with options that
simply don't make business sense. We need your help. We need funding
bills that give us stability so we can achieve real savings in a
strategically and managerially sound way.
guiding principles
Sequestration has forced the Air Force and the entire Department of
Defense (DOD) to plan for and react to a wide range of budget
scenarios. This past March, Secretary Hagel directed the Department to
conduct a Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) to help
prepare for some of these scenarios. The SCMR analyzed every aspect of
the defense establishment to find savings while preserving the key
tenets of the Defense Strategic Guidance.
As a result of the SCMR, the Air Force established four guiding
principles to steer our strategy and budget processes. (1) No matter
the size of our force, we must remain ready for the full spectrum of
military operations. (2) When forced to cut capabilities (tooth), we
must also cut the associated structure and overhead (tail). (3) We will
maximize the contribution of the Total Force. And, (4) we will remain
strategy driven by focusing on the unique capabilities we provide the
joint force and our ability to execute those capabilities against a
high-end threat.
strategic choices and management review findings
(1) In all of the budget scenarios we considered, we need
flexibility. Compensation reform and infrastructure reduction are
critical. If they are not addressed, then the cuts must come entirely
from readiness and modernization. This will result in reduced combat
power from a smaller, less capable, and less ready force, thereby
increasing national security risk. We appreciate the reprogramming
assistance Congress has provided, and will seek continued congressional
support in transferring money between appropriations.
(2) The SCMR found that, over time, the DOD could achieve the level
of cuts required under current law, but there is no strategically and
managerially sound approach to close that gap within the next few
years. If we must make cuts of this magnitude immediately, the
draconian measures that we're forced to take will have serious negative
effects on people, weapons systems, munitions accounts, readiness, and
modernization.
(3) The SCMR found that the President's fiscal year 2014 budget
proposal is the most prudent option of those currently being
considered. Force reductions in this scenario will still be necessary,
but if accompanied by efficiency and compensation reforms, they can be
made in a way that minimizes the additional risk to our national
defense.
sequestration near-term impacts
We understand the national fiscal challenge, and the defense budget
can be cut, but the abrupt, arbitrary mechanism of sequestration is not
the right approach. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
said, ``We don't know how much money we're going to have. We don't know
when we will know how much money we're going to have. We don't know
what the rules are going to be when we know.'' As a result, if
sequestration continues, the Air Force will not be able to meet the
current defense strategy.
The fiscal year 2013 effects of sequestration are well-documented.
We were forced to stand down 31 squadrons, including 13 combat-coded
squadrons. An additional seven squadrons were reduced to flying rates
that only enable proficiency in basic tasks, such as takeoff and
landing. It will now cost a minimum of 10 percent more flying hours to
retrain these squadrons than it would have to simply keep them trained
all along.
In addition, we were forced to break faith with our civilian airmen
by furloughing 164,000 civilians, including Guard and Reserve civilian
technicians, for 8 hours a week, over a 6 week period. On top of the
financial hardship of losing 20 percent of their pay during this
period, we as an Air Force lost 7.8 million man-hours of productivity
affecting every mission area, including some where civilians are the
entire mission area, such as Air Education and Training Command
aircraft maintenance. Sadly, we also sent a message to our civilian
airmen that we don't sufficiently value their contributions. It will
take us years to earn back their trust.
If the reduced discretionary caps, with the threat of
sequestration, remain in place for fiscal year 2014, we could be forced
to cut flying hours by as much as 15 percent. As a result, many of our
flying units will be unable to fly at the rates required to maintain
mission readiness for 3 to 4 months at a time, we'll cancel or
significantly curtail major exercises, and we'll reduce our initial
pilot production targets. We have no plans to furlough civilians in
fiscal year 2014.
Sequestration also impacts our space mission. Continued
sequestration would force us to reduce our network of space launch, on-
orbit, and missile warning sensors to single points of failure.
Specifically, we would turn off redundant systems and reduce routine
maintenance on the primary systems. Furthermore, it would slow our
ability to determine whether space mishaps (collisions in space) are
equipment failures, hostile actions, or environmental events.
continuing resolution
On top of sequestration's current impacts, the longer we are forced
to operate under a Continuing Resolution, the greater the damage in
fiscal year 2014 and beyond. In fiscal year 2013, we paid much of our
sequestration bill with prior year unobligated funds which we no longer
have. Meanwhile, our bow wave of future bills continues to grow. For
example, we're currently doing only critical infrastructure
sustainment, we're in a civilian hiring freeze, and we have a large
backlog of aircraft that need to go to the depot. A Continuing
Resolution would not allow us to address this bow wave, we wouldn't be
able to start new programs, and it would take away the little
flexibility we currently have. Beyond these near-term effects, if
reductions of this magnitude continue, we will be forced to pursue the
following long-term actions in force structure, readiness, and
modernization.
sequestration's long-term impacts to . . .
Force Structure
We will be forced to get smaller . . . both in terms of people and
aircraft. When I entered the Air Force in 1976 we had 725,000 Total
Force military airmen, including 585,000 on active duty. Today we have
506,000 Total Force military airmen with only 329,000 on active duty.
There is a limit to how small we can get and still fulfill the DSG
because our ``supply'' of forces is equal to the strategic ``demand''
with almost no margin in capacity. If the reduced discretionary caps
continue, over the next 5 years we may be forced to cut approximately
25,000 (5 percent) Total Force airmen and approximately 550 (9 percent)
aircraft.
Although we employ fewer people, compensation costs continue to
climb at unsustainable rates. Together we must address the issue of
compensation or it will consume our warfighting spending over the next
few decades. Our airmen and retirees deserve every dollar they earn.
However, we need to find the right balance going forward and slow the
rate of growth in compensation. Specifically, I think we need to look
at slowing pay raises, reforming how housing allowances are determined,
and restructuring health care to ensure world-class care at a
sustainable cost. We also need to find the right Total Force mix and
maximize the unique benefits of the Guard and Reserve, who serve as
critical force multipliers.
In terms of aircraft, the same story holds true. We are currently
smaller and older than ever before. Our aircraft inventory averages 24
years old and the mainstays of our bomber and air refueling fleets are
both from the Eisenhower era (B-52 & KC-135).
As we seek to find savings in aircraft force structure, we will
prioritize global, long-range capabilities and multi-role platforms
that are required to operate in highly contested environments.
Moreover, because every aircraft fleet has relatively fixed costs such
as depot, training programs, software development, weapons integration,
spare parts, and logistics support . . . only by divesting entire
fleets rather than aircraft from multiple fleets will we achieve
savings measured in the billions rather than ``just'' millions of
dollars. Therefore, we may have to divest entire fleets with less
relevance in highly contested airspace, as well as platforms where we
have excess capacity when measured against the DSG.
As we get smaller, our excess infrastructure will continue to grow.
We will seek savings by collocating people and aircraft based on most
efficient use of people and space. We will continue to seek
congressional approval to begin the base realignment and closure
process. While we know we'll lose capacity, we'll work hard to retain
the warfighting capability to be ready in 2014 for any required
operations, and to ensure we're able to execute our five core missions
in 2023 against a high-end threat.
Readiness
When the Air Force talks about readiness, we're talking about our
ability to quickly respond to our Nation's demands with Airpower
delivered by airmen who are appropriately trained and equipped to
accomplish the mission at hand . . . and then return home safely. Under
the reduced discretionary caps or if we're further sequestered, our
ability to do this is severely threatened. Therefore, we will protect
readiness to the maximum extent of our authority.
Our Air Force has performed exceptionally well over the last 22
years in a variety of combat and humanitarian operations. However, this
high operational tempo has come at a cost to our training and
readiness. Since 2003, we've honed our skills in counterinsurgency
warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan at the expense of full-spectrum
training. For this reason, now more than ever, it is vital to ensure
readiness across the full-spectrum of operations. We need to continue
advanced training in exercises like Red Flag and weapons school
classes. We build international warfighting partnerships and develop
Ph.D. level instructors in these training areas. If we don't train for
all scenarios, including a future high-end fight, we are forced to
accept unnecessary risk. Risk for the Air Force means we may not get
there in time, it may take the joint team longer to win, and our people
will be placed in greater danger.
In addition to full-spectrum training, our Air Force must be
prepared to act at a moment's notice. Speed is an inherent advantage of
airpower. Airpower offers the ability to rapidly deliver strategic
effects anywhere on Earth. With intercontinental ballistic missiles,
forward basing, stealth technology, tankers, bombers, strategic
airlifters, and highly-qualified Special Operations Forces . . . we are
a global Air Force that can hold any target at risk at any time.
However, if our squadrons are grounded, if it takes weeks or months to
generate global combat power, then we negate the responsiveness that is
one of airpower's natural advantages and deprive our Nation of
deterrence, diplomatic influence, and contingency options.
For these reasons, we will prioritize funding for training and
readiness. Despite this prioritization, under a full sequestration
reduction, we will still see significant eroding of our readiness in
the near term. Whatever the funding level, we need congressional help
to ensure that we have the budget flexibility to regain full-spectrum
readiness and avoid a hollow force.
modernization
As with force structure and readiness, if the reduced caps under
current law continue, our modernization forecasts are bleak. This
funding level will impact every one of our modernization programs.
These disruptions will, over time, cost more taxpayer dollars to
rectify contract breaches, raise unit costs, and delay delivery of
critical equipment. When it comes to future investment and
modernization, the public may not recognize the effects of these
reductions initially. The damage will be insidious. However, should we
face a high-end threat in the future--the impact of not modernizing
will be blatant and deadly. While failing to achieve national
objectives in the next counterinsurgency fight would be distressing,
losing a major full-spectrum fight would be catastrophic. If America
expects its Air Force to dominate the skies in the future battlespace,
modernization and recapitalization are not optional.
As we are forced to make tough decisions, we will favor
recapitalization over modernization. We cannot continue to bandage old
airplanes as potential adversaries roll new ones off the assembly line.
For example, the backbone of our bomber and tanker fleets, the B-52 and
KC-135, are as old as I am, and our fourth generation fighters average
25 years of age. That's why our top three acquisition priorities remain
the KC-46, the F-35, and the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The KC-
46 will begin to replace our aging tanker fleet in 2016, but even when
the program is complete in 2028 we will have replaced less than half of
the current tanker fleet and will still be flying 200+ KC-135s.
Similarly, our average bomber is 32 years old . . . we need the range,
speed, survivability, and punch that the LRS-B will provide. Tankers
are the lifeblood of our joint force's ability to respond to crisis and
contingencies, and bombers are essential to keeping our Air Force
viable as a global force. We must recapitalize these fleets.
The F-35 is essential to any future conflict with a high-end foe.
The very clear bottom line is that a fourth generation fighter cannot
successfully compete with a fifth generation fighter in combat, nor can
it survive and operate inside the advanced, integrated air defenses
that some countries have today, and many more will have in the future.
To defeat those networks, we need the capabilities the F-35 will bring.
For the past 2 years, the program has remained steadily on track; now
it needs stability.
Sequestration-level cuts and/or an extended Continuing Resolution
will severely threaten each of our top priority programs as well every
single lower priority program. We cannot afford to mortgage the future
of our Air Force and the defense of our Nation. Modernization is not
optional, and it is required to execute our core missions against a
high-end threat in 2023.
conclusion
The U.S. Air Force is the best in the world and is a vital piece of
the best military in the world. This will not change even if sequester
persists. When we are called, we will answer, and we will win. But the
likelihood of conflict may increase as potential adversaries sense
weakness and vulnerability.
Our analysis on the impacts of sequestration to national defense is
sobering. We understand the national fiscal environment and recognize
that continued budget reductions are necessary. But the Nation will be
more secure and will achieve more sustainable savings if reductions in
defense spending are made in a more reasoned way than the abrupt,
arbitrary mechanism of sequestration. Being forced into decisions to
balance between a ``ready force today'' and a ``modern force tomorrow''
is dangerous for our national defense. This dilemma is avoidable.
Through increased budget flexibility, prudent cuts, and an expectation
that real savings will occur in the latter years of the Future Years
Defense Program, we can be both ready today and modern in the future.
However, we will need Congress' support for the tough decisions that
will be necessary to align our future force to the needs of the
strategy.
Therefore, I ask Congress to pass funding bills that give us
stability, both in the near term and the long term. If not, we'll have
these same conversations year after year. Help us be ready in 2014 and
still able to win in 2023. Let us focus on combat capability, on our
five core missions, and on Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global
Power for America. Our airmen deserve it, our joint team needs it, and
our Nation expects it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you all for your testimony, and thank
you also for--by the way, we're going to have a fairly short
first round because we have votes at 11:45 a.m., two of them,
and we also have a large number of Senators here. So we're
going to have to start with a 6-minute first round.
Thank you for mentioning Congressman Skelton. Most of us
have worked with Ike Skelton for a long time. Our memories of
him are extraordinarily fond and warm. He was a unique and
wonderful human being, and we really appreciate what he did for
this Nation in war and in peace and we are grateful that you
made a reference to him, something, frankly, I should have done
and have already done in a different way, but should have done
here. Thank you for that reference.
The successful conclusion of the budget conference between
the Senate and the House is essential if we're going to address
the problem of sequestration. They are hopefully looking at
various alternatives for getting rid of a mindless, irrational
way of budgeting for 2014, the way it was for 2013, but much is
going to ride on their success in finding a different approach
to deficit reduction.
Now, many of us have made suggestions to them as to how to
come up with a balanced approach to deficit reduction which can
substitute a sensible approach for a irrational approach called
sequestration. We're not going to ask you to get into that kind
of detail in terms of the work of the Budget Committee, or the
conference, because, number one, I doubt that you are privy to
it, but number two, it's a little bit off the subject here
today, which are the impacts of sequestration, and the clearer
those impacts are laid out--and you have laid them out very
clearly--the more likely it is, I believe, that that budget
conference will find a path to replace the sequestration in
2014 with something which makes sense in terms of fiscal
responsibility, but something that makes sense in terms of the
security of this Nation.
As you have very powerfully pointed out in both your oral
testimony, your written testimony, and our prior testimonies,
sequestration is damaging to the national security of this
country.
In fiscal year 2013, DOD was able to minimize impacts, in
part by using unobligated funds that were carried over from
previous years, in part by deferring program costs into future
years, in part by utilizing short-term cost reduction measures
such as civilian furloughs and reductions in training and
maintenance, rather than making program decisions that would be
more difficult to reverse.
So my question of each of you is: If sequestration
continues into fiscal year 2014 and beyond, will DOD be able to
continue to rely on those types of temporary measures? Or, as I
think you've clearly testified, would you have to start
reducing force structure and cancelling or curtailing major
acquisition programs?
I think you've given us the answer to the second half, but
can you go into the first half of that question. You were able
to scramble around to a significant degree in 2013. Are you
going to be able to rely on those kind of temporary ad hoc
scrambling measures if sequestration continues into 2014?
General Odierno?
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we, as you put
it very well, scrambled in 2013 to come up with the dollars to
meet our sequestration marks, there's things we did that,
frankly, mortgage our future. One is obviously we had to take
money out of two places: readiness, because we could do that
very quickly, so we stopped training. We stopped sending
individuals to be prepared at the National Training Center, the
Joint Readiness Training Center. You can't ever recapture that.
So it delays the buildup of future readiness. So we will
have to pay that price somewhere down the road because we
simply cannot ever get that back. So although we were able to
do it for 1 year, it comes at risk, our risk to respond, our
risk to do--if we have a contingency, will our forces be ready?
That's a really incredible risk that I am definitely not
comfortable with.
The second piece if we've had to furlough individuals
who've worked for this government and, frankly, they're
beginning to lose faith in their government. Will they be able
to work, will they be able to continue to serve? So it has an
impact on the force as well.
So those are temporary measures that we do not want to
revisit again, and that we have to have more permanent
solutions.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. Mr. Chairman, first of all, we have a
$2.3 billion carryover. So in 2013, we deferred it into 2014.
Here it is. So that's sitting there, and we have to pay about
$1 billion of that. You can't defer it. These are contracts and
things of that nature. So that's issue one.
Two, in 2013, we actually had a quarter of maintenance and
training, because we didn't start dealing with this until the
new calendar year. Well, we got a lot of maintenance done there
that we won't be able to get done this year. So 34 out of 55
ship maintenance availabilities we have will be gone. Training;
we were able to get some training done there; we can't get that
there.
So we will have air wings--of the nine air wings, we'll
have five of them in what we call minimum sustaining, it's
called tactical hard deck.
But the one that will affect us the most now will be
investment. As you mentioned, we used prior year funds. What
concerns me the most is our SSBN-X. That is our top nuclear
strategic deterrent follow-on. The fact of the matter is it's
on a CR and because we want to grow that, that program, in
2014, we're $500 million off. So that comes to roost in the
schedule that--and we're heel to toe.
Other shipbuilding: We'll lose a Virginia-class submarine,
a Littoral Combat Ship, an Afloat Forward Staging Base, and a
lot of costs continue. The Ford-class carriers, as I mentioned
in my oral statement, we need about $500 million again to
finish that carrier, and by spring we stop work on it, which is
not very smart because it's almost done.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Amos, can we continue the kind of temporary actions
that we took in fiscal year 2013 into fiscal year 2014?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, there's no more money in the
carryover from 2013 into 2014. We were 99.8 percent obligated
at the end of 2013. There's simply no money to bring over. So
our account is dry. We're going to live with what we have in
2014 under the CR.
We've taken measures in the past to lean the force.
Civilian hiring was frozen 2 years ago. We've already gone
through our T&E travel accounts. We've taken our Reserves,
taken them off Active Duty, to reduce the T&E cost. We've done
all that, sir. There's really no more fat on our bones.
Chairman Levin. General Welsh?
General Welsh. Mr. Chairman, I'd echo what you've already
heard. We paid, as I mentioned, about $1.5 billion out of prior
year unobligated funds against our sequestration bill last
year. That was about 25 percent. That will not be available
this year. We start on a CR for the beginning of 2014 that is
roughly, just on our O&M account, $500 million less than we had
programmed for 2014. The program didn't include the funding
required to recover the readiness that we set aside last year.
We are behind the power curve and dropping farther behind the
power curve.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like the chairman, I appreciate bringing up Ike Skelton.
There are a lot of people at this table up here who never had
the opportunity to know him. During the years I served in the
House, we sat next to each other every Thursday morning at the
House Prayer Breakfast, and I got to know him quite well, and
he's sorely missed.
I had asked to have this chart placed up here so you can
see it. I think the four of you can see this. This chart was
put together by both the minority and the majority staff on the
Senate Armed Services Committee to try to put into perspective
where we are and where we're going with this thing. I know that
a lot of improvements have to be made. We had a discussion
yesterday on the Republican side about some of the things that
will have to be done with personnel, with TRICARE, and some of
those things.
[The chart referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. I would remind you that all of that you
would find in the blue section down below. So it's not going to
really address the problem that we have, even though it is
important.
Force structure, you can see how important that is. You're
talking about fiscal years 2014, 2015 on through fiscal year
2023. So the force structure is a very serious problem.
Modernization program. The modernization, we all know when
things get tight modernization is one of the things that goes.
By far of greatest concern is the orange area. It shows
clearly that that is where readiness is. That's where training
takes place. I would like to have each one of you respond to
your concern about that particular part of this chart, the
orange part. I've always said that readiness equals risk, risk
affects lives, lives lost. I'd like to have each one of you
tell what you think in terms of the people being at risk and
lives lost might be affected by what you're going to have to do
in this next fiscal year according to this chart.
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. This chart describes
exactly the problem that the Army has. We have three levers--
end strength, modernization, and readiness. We are taking down
our end strength and we are looking at speeding up taking down
our end strength, but you can only speed it up so fast when you
start to lose the money that you gain by taking end strength
out.
So we have a huge readiness issue between 2014 to 2017
that, frankly, will significantly impact our ability to respond
in the way we expect to respond.
The other piece is we'll have to stop some of our
modernization programs, which means we'll delay getting new
equipment 5 to 10 years because we have to stop programs. We'll
have to restart them later on when we get back into balance.
So for us, it is significant readiness issues. We will not
be able to train them for the mission they're going to have to
do. We will have to send them without the proper training and
actually maybe proper equipment that they need in order to do
this. So that always relates to potentially higher casualties
if we have to respond.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert?
Admiral Greenert. For us it is force structure--we man
equipment, Senator. To deal with a reduction like this, we have
to reduce force structure. So this chart would underestimate in
the Navy how much force structure we would have to give up in
the nearer term in order to garner savings. That means, what do
you do now? For me it's forward presence, so I make sure the
forces forward are ready, but those that are there for crisis
response, right now I'm sitting at two-thirds reduction in that
alone.
So you have to be there with confident and proficient
people, and if they're not confident and proficient then you're
talking more casualties, and you have to keep apace with the
capabilities of the future or you're unable to deal with a
potential adversary, and that's increased casualties.
So we will be slipping behind in capability, reduced force
structure, and reduced contingency response. If we're not
there, then somebody is out there and they're going to have
increased casualties.
Senator Inhofe. General Amos, you covered this in a lot of
detail. Anything you want to add from your opening statement in
terms of this readiness sacrifices, how it relates to risk and
lives?
General Amos. Senator, as I said in my opening statement,
we've moved money to minimize risk. Each Service has a
different orange wedge. Mine is smaller than that, but that's
for the near term right now because I'm paying that price to
maintain that readiness to be your crisis response force.
But that will only last probably not later than 2017. I'll
start seeing erosion in about a year and a half. So we are
paying that with other money--infrastructure, training.
Senator Inhofe. That's what you referred to when you said
in your opening statement, you used the phrase ``a formula for
more American casualties?''
General Amos. Absolutely, yes, sir, Senator. We are headed
towards a force in not too many years that will be hollow back
home and not ready to deploy. If they do deploy in harm's way
we'll end up with more casualties.
Senator Inhofe. In responding to the question, General
Welsh, I heard yesterday someone talking to you about an
experience that you had up in Alaska. Could you share that with
me in terms of some of our flyers? I'd remind people as they
hear this that the cost, not necessarily for an F-22, but to
get someone to a level of proficiency on an F-15, F-16, is
about $7 million. We're talking about huge investments in
personnel.
Would you like to repeat the statement you made?
General Welsh. Senator, I've actually had this conversation
multiple places in the Air Force. At one of our bases recently
I was talking to a group of young pilots who are eligible for
our aviation career incentive bonus. Of that group--there were
six to eight in the group--none of them had accepted the bonus
to that point in time.
Senator Inhofe. Not one?
General Welsh. Not one. That doesn't necessarily mean
they're planning to leave the Air Force, but it certainly means
they're keeping their options open, as a minimum.
By the way, it's not just pilots. I was at another base
where a couple of very young airmen told me that they loved the
Air Force, but they were bored. Their particular squadrons were
not flying. They were sitting on the ramp because of the
reductions last year. They said at the end of their enlistment
they planned to find work that they thought was a little more
exciting. I haven't heard anybody in our military say they were
bored in quite some time. So that got my attention.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. My time has expired, but
I just want to read one thing, one of the most alarming
concerns that we have had raised was the belief that your
Service may not be able to support even one major contingency.
I'd like for the record--now, when you stop and think about the
collective service of the four of you is 156 years, so we're
talking about a lot of experience, a lot of history, and I'd
like to have you for the record respond to that in terms of not
being able to meet even one MCO, if you'd do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Odierno. The effects of unresolved budget shortfalls,
budget uncertainty, and sequestration will threaten the Army's
capability to conduct a multi-phase, combined arms, joint campaign in a
complex environment that includes a conventional opponent, irregular
warfare, and counterinsurgency. It is unlikely that the Army would be
able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be
called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat operation.
The Army will arrive later to the fight with fewer and less-trained
trained forces, which will delay the buildup of combat power, allow the
enemy more time to build its defenses, and, likely, prolong combat
operations altogether.
Admiral Greenert. If we are constrained to the Budget Control Act
revised discretionary caps in the long term, one potential fiscal and
programmatic scenario would result in a 2020 Fleet with 9 to 10 CVN/CSG
and 9 to 10 LHA/D and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). We would be able to
sustain about one nondeployed Carrier Strike Group and one nondeployed
ARG fully certified and able to surge on required timelines to meet all
missions associated with one large-scale operation, as defined today.
However, Navy would not be able to conduct one large-scale operation
and also counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in a second
theater.
General Amos. To be clear, the Marine Corps at 174,000 will be able
to respond to a major contingency operation. The challenge is that we
will not be able to respond to a major contingency operation while
simultaneously covering our current global requirements and maintaining
a one-to-two deployment to dwell ratio. In the event the Marine Corps
is required to respond to a major contingency operation we will be
required to accept risk in other capacities. This could mean
reposturing crisis response forces or current forward deployed theater
presence from U.S. Pacific Command while deploying CONUS-based forces
below a one-to-two deployment to dwell. This is a Marine Corps that
would deploy to a major contingency, fight, and not return until the
war was over. We will have the capacity to respond, but will empty the
entire bench to do so.
General Welsh. With sequestration-level funding, we will be forced
to get smaller, both in terms of people and aircraft. When I entered
the Air Force in 1976, we had 725,000 Total Force military airmen,
including 585,000 on Active Duty. Today, we have 506,000 Total Force
military airmen with only 329,000 on Active Duty. There is a limit to
how small we can get and still fulfill the Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG) because our ``supply'' of forces is equal to the strategic
``demand'' with almost no margin in capacity. If the reduced
discretionary caps continue, over the next 5 years we may be forced to
cut approximately 25,000 (5 percent) Total Force airmen and
approximately 550 (9 percent) aircraft.
A reduction in our overall warfighting capability diminishes our
ability to deter war, and any reduction in our ability to deter war
increases the risk not only for our Homeland, but our national security
interests abroad. We cannot simultaneously and fully execute all 10 DSG
missions. If sequestration were to continue, the Air Force's ability to
execute multiple missions listed in the DSG will continue to erode.
The U.S. Air Force is the best in the world and is a vital piece of
the best military in the world. This will not change even if sequester
persists. When we are called, we will answer, and we will win. But the
likelihood of conflict may increase as potential adversaries sense
weakness and vulnerability.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation. I
think one of the issues that we have to ask, because so much
turns on readiness, is ready for what? That'll be answered in
some respects in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which
will be affected by the budget, regardless of whether we're
able to work our way through these obvious problems.
So could you give us a sense, General Odierno, from the
Army's perspective, as to what you're looking at in terms of
ready for what?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. As we learn from the
past and look to the future, it's about having a capability to
do a multi-phase, combined arms, joint campaign that operates
in a very complex environment that includes a conventional
opponent, irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, because that's
where future warfare is going. So we have to train our forces
to do that.
Right now the Army is great in counterinsurgency. We want
to continue to keep that expertise, but we have to build our
combined arms and joint capability to do a multi-phase campaign
for a MCO. We were supposed to begin training for that in 2013.
We were not able to because of the cuts we had to make in our
training dollars. So we are now behind, and that's the problem
we have.
Right now we have a limited number of brigades that are
capable of doing that right now, and we're falling further
behind as we move forward.
Senator Reed. One of the reasons that we are so well
schooled in counterinsurgency is we invested over the last
decade billions of dollars in counterinsurgency. Looking
forward, is that going to be a primary sort of mission or
ancillary mission in your view as you're looking to the QDR? If
that's the case, we invested a lot of money for a capability
that we might not be using.
General Odierno. I would say that it is a capability that's
going to be needed, but will not be at the forefront as it has
been in the past.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Greenert, the same question, essentially. I think
it embraces a lot of the issues that we want to talk about.
Admiral Greenert. For us it's ensuring that we have the
sea-based strategic deterrent on track. That's the top priority
for us.
Senator Reed. That's the Ohio-class replacement?
Admiral Greenert. The Ohio-class replacement, yes, sir. So
subject to my comments in my opening statement, this issue we
have with 2014--the CR. We need to grow the program. I can't do
that until we get a bill in 2014. With sequestration we lose
$150 million. It sounds sort of nagging, but we have to get
design engineers hired. So even when we get the money, you
can't click your fingers and hire 600 specialized design
engineers. So we have to keep this coherent as we go along
because we're on a very tight schedule, when the Ohio-class
phases out, to deliver on time.
For us also it's the undersea domain. We have to own it,
quite simply. It's my job as the Navy and to keep that on
track. So I'm concerned we fall behind in anti-submarine
warfare, keeping apace of our potential adversaries. So that's
a priority regardless of sequestration. We will invest in that.
It's integrated air and missile defense, and that gets into
the electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, and electronic warfare,
and bringing those new capabilities in, from jammers to cyber
warriors, et cetera. It's also just flat-out presence. Quantity
has a quality of its own, as we state. Being sure that we have
the right ships with the right capability with my partners to
my left, the Navy-Marine Corps team, that we can be where we
need to to take care of these little crises day-in and day-out
so they don't fester and become bigger crises and we get in the
situation of a major contingency.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
General Amos and then General Welsh.
General Amos. Senator, the priorities for the Marine Corps
are forward presence and the ability to respond to any crisis
today, not a week from now, not a month from now, but today. So
as we moved money around, as I've said earlier, to maintain
that level of readiness, we're trying to keep a balanced force.
So as you go forward into this sequestered force, the QDR
force, when it's finally settled out, what we need to have in
my Service is a balance between modernization, readiness, and
personnel, the right amount, not hollow, but high state of
readiness forces.
So to do that we are balancing this thing down, dialing all
the dials, trying to make sure that we end up with something
that is not a hollow force and that is a ready force.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the replacement for our 40-plus-
year-old tractors, is the number one priority for me, followed
right after that by the F-35B, which is performing well.
So as we go forward my focus, regardless of how big the
Marine Corps ends up being as a result or how much money I get,
will be a balanced, high state of readiness force, ready to
respond to today's crisis today.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
General Welsh, please.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. I think the dilemma that we all
face is the choice of readiness today versus a modern, capable
force tomorrow. The Air Force is no different. That's the thin
line we're trying to walk.
For us, we have a requirement for readiness to respond
rapidly. That's what we bring to the joint force. We also have
a requirement to be viable against the threat 10 years from
now. We are a high technology force. We are platform-based as a
force, much like the Navy. We have to invest now to make sure
we have the proper capability 10 years from now. That's why
modernization of the F-35, the KC-46, and the LRSB are so
critical to us.
The other thing that is a major concern for me is getting
back to full spectrum training, much like Ray Odierno is
worried about. We have walked away from that over the last few
years because of the demand of the war in Afghanistan. Last
year, we canceled our Red Flag exercises, which are our high-
end training profiles, and we even canceled some of our weapons
instructor courses because we didn't have enough money to
conduct them. That is where we train our Ph.D.-level
warfighters to lead and train the rest of the force. We have to
get back to that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Just a final brief comment, is that from the appropriations
perspective giving certainty in terms of a budget, not a CR
because that would be very difficult in terms of no new starts,
but 2 years of certainty and some relief, in fact total relief,
from sequestration would probably put you in the best position.
I see, let the record show, nodding heads.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses and I wish that every member
of Congress and every American were tuning in to your testimony
today so that we would have a sense of urgency that,
unfortunately, is certainly not significant enough to bring us
back into, I think, a rational approach to our Nation's
defense.
I thank you for your service and we're very appreciative to
be around four Americans who have the respect and admiration of
the American people.
I share all of your views, but you've left out a couple of
items. One of them is the continued cost overruns of our
weapons systems. Admiral Greenert, you just talked about you
need $500 million additional for the USS Gerald R. Ford; is
that correct? You just mentioned that?
Admiral Greenert. That's correct, Senator.
Senator McCain. Now, you didn't mention that we have a $2
billion cost overrun in the USS Gerald R. Ford. Tell me, has
anybody been fired from their job as a result of a $2 billion
cost overrun of an aircraft carrier?
Admiral Greenert. I don't know, Senator.
Senator McCain. You don't know. Actually, you should know.
You should know, Admiral, when we have a $2 billion cost
overrun on a single ship and now you're asking for $500 million
more.
I would ask the same question of General Welsh: Has anybody
been fired because of the cost overruns of the F-35? I don't
think so. We've had hearing after hearing after hearing in this
committee concerning the first trillion dollar defense
acquisition in history.
The numbers are astronomical as to the size, increases in
size of your staffs. We have seen doubling and redoubling size
of the staffs of the major commands and your own. That's never
been brought under control.
We now have 1.5 million civilian contractors and employees,
civilians and their contractors and employees, and only 1.3
million uniformed personnel. That has to be cut back, the
number of civilians, contractors, and personnel. They don't
fight. They do great jobs, but they don't fight. You're going
to have to, and this committee may have to, impose cuts in the
size of your staffs. They have grown astronomically, by the
thousands.
Finally, despite what some may think, I agree with former
Secretary of Defense Gates, who said the ``entitlements are
eating us alive,'' the major one being growth of health care
costs, consuming a larger and larger and larger percentage of
our budget.
I'd ask if you would favorably be inclined to address: one,
retirement as far as increasing gradually, prospectively, the
number of years before retirement; two, increasing fees for
TRICARE, which there's not been an increase since 1989; and
also perhaps even looking at things like the contribution that
used to be made for off-base housing and other costs that have
grown so dramatically.
Maybe I could begin with you, General Odierno. Not only
would I like you to answer that question, I'd be glad to hear
you respond to my comments, particularly about cost overruns.
General Odierno. First, on compensation, we have to grapple
with compensation within the military. The Joint Chiefs are
working very hard with this issue. The cost of a soldier has
doubled since 2001. It's going to almost double again by 2025.
We can't go on like this. So we have to come up with a
compensation package which deals with this. Not taking money
away, but reducing the rate of pay increases, of base housing
allowance, as you brought up; look at the commissaries, look at
health care. We have to have a total package that allows us to
reduce this cost.
Senator McCain. Could I interrupt one second. Do you know
of a single soldier, airman, or marine that joined the military
because of TRICARE?
General Odierno. It would be difficult to answer that
question. What I would tell you, though, Senator, is they do
come with very large families and health care is a big issue
for them. But that doesn't mean we can't work with that.
In terms of cost overruns, I agree with you. We are
tackling this problem. What I would tell you is we are holding
people accountable, but we are not holding them accountable
enough, and we have to continue to work that, specifically with
the issue that you brought up.
Admiral Greenert. Senator, these attributes of changes to
compensation I would look at favorably. You're speaking my
language, and I'm sure my colleagues feel the same way. It's
about 50 percent of every dollar in DOD goes to personnel.
Predominantly it's compensation, and if we keep going this way
it'll be at 60 and then it'll be at 70 in about a decade plus.
We can't do that. I think it's our responsibility to take a
hard look at it.
When I talk to my people, they say: ``My quality of life's
pretty good, Admiral.'' That's the pay, the compensation, the
stuff you mentioned. They say, ``but my quality of work, I need
some help; I have gaps; I want training; where's my chief? I
want to go to the bin and get spare parts.'' That's what I want
to do with that kind of money.
Senator McCain. It's been referred to some of the best and
the brightest are considering their options, which is something
that never shows up on a profit and loss basis. Is that
correct?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, you're absolutely right.
If I could talk to headquarters staff just a second, we've
been assigned a goal of 20 percent as we're working to build
our budget. We're going beyond that. We have a goal of money.
We're looking at four times that reduction. We were looking
at--we had a goal of 400, for example, civilian personnel.
We're looking at five times that. We're taking a hard look at
that, Senator, and we're going beyond the big headquarters.
We're working our way down to the sub-headquarters.
So as you look at this orange and you look at the blue
efficiencies, our piece of that to get at that, we're looking
at about 25 percent of our reduction is in overhead and
contractors. So we're taking a pretty robust look, and we look
forward to briefing your staff when the time comes.
General Amos. Senator, you'll find, I think, a ready
audience up here for benefits. There's more than just TRICARE.
It's everything that all fits underneath the personnel. I pay
62 cents on the dollar right now for manpower. That's not
because marines are more expensive. It's just my portion of the
budget is smaller. That's going to go well over 70 percent by
the end of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) if something
is not done.
So you're going to see the Joint Chiefs come to Congress
through the President talking about a package of cuts and
reductions, how we can cut that down. So that's en route. As
you're aware, the folks are looking at the retirement. So we're
open to just about anything. It's in our best interest and our
Nation's best interest.
We're reducing the Marine Corps, if we stay on the
sequester budget, by 28,000 marines. Inside that, a well over
20 percent of headquarters reduction. So I'm eliminating an
entire Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), a three-star
headquarters on the east coast, three MEF--excuse me, two MEF.
It goes away. I'm reducing infantry battalions, regiments, air
groups, pretty significantly. So we are paring that down,
Senator.
As it relates to somebody getting fired, I can't speak to
that. I can talk pretty intimately about the maneuvering around
within the F-35 program with the management both at Lockheed
Martin and the program manager's office and within my Service.
We've paid very close attention to it. There have been cost
overruns, but our vector is actually heading in the right
direction on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
General Welsh. Senator, the short answer is, yes, I
absolutely agree with the need to get entitlements and benefit
reform. There's no question about that. I hope that we would
roll the savings we can make from that back into the tools and
the training our people need to be fully ready. If we did that,
they would understand the reason and they would see the result
in a meaningful way. If we take the money and use it for
something else, it'll be a bigger problem for them.
Cost overruns and growth, I fully agree with everything
you've said. There's no excuse. We have to fix it.
We're looking at every headquarters, from the Air Staff to
the component warfighting staffs. We're in the process in the
Air Force right now of internally reducing 2 four-stars, 15
three-star positions, and decreasing the number of people in
headquarters around them. We have to take this seriously,
Senator. There's no other option.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Good morning, gentlemen.
I'll admit that I'm frustrated that this committee's once
again asked you to come up here and testify about the harm
caused by sequestration. We in Congress created this monster
and we keep dragging you up to the Hill to have you tell us how
much damage that it's done.
I've met recently with my constituents in the great
community of Colorado Springs last month. They made it real
clear to me that they're tired of Congress' unwillingness to
compromise and solve the problem. That view is echoed
everywhere I travel.
The bottom line is that we all know that we've done serious
harm to critical programs and our people, and it's very clear
that none of this is really going to save us any money. I think
you have made that case very powerfully. In fact, it's going to
cost us more in the long-run than if we'd just buckled down and
put in place strategic budget architecture based, for example,
on the Simpson-Bowles plan.
You and the people you lead have been paying the price for
our failure to lead and to act and I'm sorry for that. I
apologize for that. But what we've been hearing from our
constituents and from you should make it clear that we need to
reach a bipartisan agreement, pass a budget, and get back on
track.
Let me, in that spirit, General Welsh, turn to you. In your
opening statement you said that if you were given the
flexibility to make prudent cuts over time we could make the
savings required under current law. Could you be more specific
about the kind of flexibility that you're asking for? I've been
working with Senator Collins and others on pushing for better
budget flexibility when it comes to making cuts government-
wide, and it's important to know how we could get this right
and how it could be most helpful.
General Welsh. Senator, in my view--and I think everybody
in the room would agree--sequestration is a horrible business
model. The mechanism of sequestration is a horrible business
model. No successful business would try and downsize its
product line or its costs doing it this way. Anybody would take
a time period, determine what kind of savings you needed over
the time period or what kind of reductions you needed over the
time period. You take the beginning of that time period to
actually close product lines, reinvest the capital or the
manpower or the force structure saved into the successful
product lines you wanted to continue, restructure your
organization, and create savings at the back end of this.
If we had nothing more than a 10-year period to save
whatever the number is, we understand we have to be part of the
solution for the Nation, the financial solution for the Nation.
No one is resisting that. This mechanism that makes us take big
chunks of money the first 2 years is what is putting us into
the readiness versus modernization dilemma. The overall cost of
sequestration reduces our capability and capacity over time,
but it doesn't break us. The mechanism is what breaks us.
So I would just say that if we had the trust available to
believe that DOD would return $1.3 trillion over 10 years and
we could show you a plan of how to do that, eliminating this
abrupt nature of the mechanism at the front end would be a
much, much more sensible approach.
Senator Udall. General, that's very helpful. I know this
committee is going to listen as we move forward.
Let me turn to the economies of the military communities if
sequestration remains in place. I was thinking about, General
Odierno, the situation you face. We're cutting down to 450,000,
perhaps as low as 390,000. There could be real damage done to
cities like Colorado Springs and many around the country. The
same, General Welsh, would apply to the Air Force if you were
forced to roll back more critical space and aviation missions.
In Colorado over the last couple years, we've had some real
challenges. We've had to battle floods and wildfires. Without
the incredible support from soldiers and airmen, I can't
imagine how much worse the losses would have been if we didn't
have assets like the new aviation brigade at Fort Carson or the
great airmen at Peterson and Schriever.
Could you comment on that and whether those studies have
been done and what additional information we might need to be
smart about how these cuts are made?
General Odierno. What a lot of people don't understand is
in many cases--Fort Carson in Colorado, Fort Hood in Texas,
Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Campbell in Kentucky--they
are probably some of the biggest generators of revenue for the
States, period. They don't realize that as installations go
away you're just not losing the soldiers and what they do; all
the businesses that are around those installations for probably
a 50-mile radius are impacted by the shutdown and the loss of
the impact of those installations losing people.
So the impact to the local and State governments is
substantial. We have studies. I don't have the numbers with me
for every installation, but we have numbers for every
installation. When I go visit, they always brief me: This is
the first, this is the leading employer of the State, second.
It's either first, second, third, but it's very close to the
top of leading employer in the State. People, many forget about
this as we look at these reductions. So that's in addition to
what I'm concerned about is the national security impacts it
has.
Senator Udall. General Welsh, would you care to comment?
General Welsh. Senator, a $1.3 trillion reduction to DOD
over 10 years is going to leave a bruise in lots of places. We
have to understand how significant the pain is at each place
before we make final decisions. But I think it's going to
affect a lot of people in a lot of places.
I was just in Colorado, by the way, sir, visiting with a
bunch of the firefighters from Fort Carson, from Colorado
Springs, from the Air Force Academy, and Schriever and
Peterson, and walking through the actions they took in battling
the fires last year and this year. I was struck by the
contribution they make to the community every day, not just
when catastrophes occur. Nobody wants to reduce that
contribution.
We lost, just the civilian furloughs last year, as a
corporate body 7.8 million man-hours of work. Now, double that
for the government shutdown impact on our civilian workforce.
That's also 7.8 million hours of pay that doesn't go into the
community in which those people live. So you can start to see
the effects when we have these short-term losses of income.
Long-term it would be more dramatic, obviously.
Senator Udall. Thank you, General.
I see my time has expired, but I want to make a couple of
very quick comments. I want to thank the members of the
National Guard units who came to coalition from Kansas,
Montana, Utah, and of course our Colorado Guard, for the
incredible work they've done, not only immediately after our
floods, but now to help rebuild our highways. We're reopening
these highways months ahead of schedule and it's really a
testament to the work ethic and the teamwork that those units
brought to our State.
Second, I want to again thank you all for coming. I'm sorry
we're here under these circumstances, but I'm pleased to see
Senator Inhofe here. He's too tough to let a few blocked
arteries keep him from doing his work.
Then finally, I want to associate myself with all the
remarks about Congressman and Chairman Skelton. He was a
wonderful man. He was a mentor to me. He had a habit of saying:
``I'm just an old country lawyer.'' But that was the moment at
which I would really listen to what Ike Skelton had to say, and
I know everybody who served with him felt the same way.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this important
hearing. We have to get this right.
Thank you all.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Likewise, thanks to you for being here today, gentlemen. In
my 20 years serving on the House Armed Services Committee and
the Senate Armed Services Committee, we've never had, in my
opinion, four finer leaders of our respective branches than the
four of you. So thanks for what you do every day.
As we look at what we're going to do relative to defense
spending, I'm one of those who thinks without question that we
need to spend more money, that sequestration, as each of you
have said, is going to become a bigger and bigger problem. But
I also feel very strongly about the fact that whatever we are
able to add to DOD spending, that we have to offset it somehow.
We've simply got to get our fiscal house in order.
I think if we're going to do that the first place we have
to look for offsets is at DOD itself. We asked in a hearing
that Senator Ayotte and Senator Shaheen called on Tuesday of
this week, we asked of General Dempsey, Senator Manchin did,
for a list of programs or expenditures that DOD does not want
to spend money on, that have been mandated by Congress.
We thought we would have that list by today. I understand
now we're not going to get it until next week. But I think for
certain one item that's going to be on that list, General
Odierno, is the purchase of Abrams tanks that you have been
somewhat vocal on, that Congress keeps demanding that you buy,
that you don't need.
My understanding is that you are requesting a delay or a
halt in production until 2017 and that the cost of that was
going to be--the savings was going to be somewhere between $436
million and $3 billion over 3 years. I don't know what the
exact number is, but either one of those is pretty significant.
Is that still the case, that you'd prefer to spend that money
somewhere else?
General Odierno. It is. We have the most modernized tank
fleet we've ever had right now. It is in great shape, and, in
fact, we're reducing our force structure, so we're going to
need less tanks. But yet we're purchasing more tanks that we
don't need. So the savings could be used in many different
areas of our modernization programs that we need, for example,
aviation.
Senator Chambliss. As we go into the authorization bill,
rest assured that it's issues like that that are going to be
addressed. As we talk about sequestration, I know that a lot of
these programs have taken years to develop and produce. So
these programs that I'm going to mention weren't necessarily
created or authorized on the watch of the four of you, but they
are significant.
General Welsh, I understand there are 12 brand-new C-27J
Spartans that will roll right off the assembly line and
immediately mothballed. Since 2007, DOD has spent $567 million
on 21 of these airplanes, but only 16 of them have been
delivered, and a majority of those are sitting in storage
somewhere.
Also, there were 20 C-27As that cost the taxpayers $596
million and they sit unused and are sitting in Afghanistan and
are slated to be destroyed, although there may be some movement
to try to send those to another agency or entity. But the
maintenance contract on those airplanes I understand was
canceled in March of this year and therefore they're unuseable.
General Odierno, the Army spent $297 million to develop the
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle, which is a blimp-
like aircraft that would hover over the battlefield, that was
canceled after one test flight and sold back to the contractor
for $301,000.
The Army and the Marine Corps are moving ahead, as I
understand it, to purchase 55,000 trucks known as the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle to replace your current fleet of High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), which is
probably understandable. But it's also my understanding that
the committed cost of these per vehicle was $250,000 and now
it's gone to something like $400,000 per vehicle, not unlike
what Senator McCain alluded to earlier.
General Welsh, also a recent audit by the DOD Inspector
General found that a contractor had overcharged the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) for spare aircraft parts. There was one
part, an aluminum bearing sleeve, that should have cost $10,
that DLA paid $2,286 per item, and it resulted in a $10 million
overcharge.
Now, again, as I say, those are items that weren't
necessarily created on your watch, but you're in the process
right now of looking forward with respect to weapons systems,
and I just hope you'll keep that in mind.
There's one area that I just want to mention as we look for
savings, and that's in the area of medical research. Now, I'm a
beneficiary of the research that's been done in this country on
prostate cancer and I'm very thankful for that. They do a great
job at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on prostate
cancer research and every other kind of cancer research.
But what I don't understand is why the military is spending
$80 million a year on prostate cancer research, why we're
spending $25 million a year on ovarian cancer research, and
$150 million on breast cancer research. We're also doing lung
cancer research. Now, if there are particular needs that the
military has regarding military research--and there are some
because of particularly the casualties that we've suffered
recently--I can understand it. But these are types of research
that simply have no place, in my opinion, at DOD. They ought to
be done at NIH.
I understand further that there is not real coordination
between the research done, medical research done at NIH and
what is done at DOD.
So, Mr. Chairman, that's not an item that these gentlemen
have a lot of control over, but it's certainly an item that we
need to look at, and the money would be better spent as a
replacement for sequestration. My good friend, a good friend to
a lot of us, Senator Ted Stevens, was one of the ones who first
asked for prostate cancer research money to go to DOD. Several
years later, he announced on the floor of the Senate that he
had made a mistake, he should never have done that, and that
that money ought to be spent on research, but it ought to be
spent at NIH and not at DOD.
So as we go forward, gentlemen, in the defense
authorization bill in the next couple of weeks, I look forward
to seeing that list that General Dempsey gets to us with
respect to items that come out of each of your budgets, that
hopefully we can have the spine to stand up and say,
irrespective of our parochial interests, we have to look after
our men and women and they need this money to be spent in other
areas rather than in areas where the military themselves say we
don't need to spend it.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Inhofe, for holding this hearing today.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I would hope, as the
sentiments expressed by some of our colleagues, that this
Congress would deal with sequestration in a way that means that
you don't have to be here year after year after year talking
about the challenges that our military faces because we haven't
done our jobs here in Congress.
Admiral Greenert, I would like to begin with you, because
we believe that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is the premier
shipyard for modernization and maintenance of our nuclear
fleet. I have a letter this morning from the president of the
Metal Trades Council, Paul O'Connor, who talks about the impact
of sequestration on the workers at the shipyard. I'm going to
ask you to comment, but I wanted to read just two phrases from
this letter because I think it epitomizes the challenges that
they're feeling from sequestration.
He says: ``With 9\1/2\ more years of sequestration hanging
over our heads, 9\1/2\ more years of furloughs and layoffs, how
will we attract the best and brightest young men and women to
our most technologically sophisticated, complex, precision-
based industry?''
He goes on to say: ``The insecurity, instability, and
volatility of sequestration on our shipyard and national
workforce cannot be understated. The personal impact, mission
impact, and national security impact are real and contrary to
the best interests of America.''
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask that this letter be entered
into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Shaheen. Admiral Greenert, I wonder if you could
talk about what you're seeing with respect to the long-term
impacts of sequestration? You've mentioned some of those, but
if you could elaborate further.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Senator. I'm glad we get to
see that letter because it very clearly states the debilitating
effects of doing this year after year. It's inefficient and you
lose productivity, and this fine gentleman described there: You
can't hire people, so you can't distribute your workforce, and
you furlough them here and there. So where else are they going
to--they're going to go elsewhere.
Somebody has to write the contracts. Somebody has to get
the logistics done. Those are the people who, regrettably, we
furloughed. We thought we had workers, but you can stand with a
wrench in your hand and a welding rod, but you need the
paperwork. Hey, it's all a team and it's a long chain.
We think we are saving costs. We're just avoiding costs,
and we aren't even doing that. We're deferring costs, and then
it's a one-point fill-in-the-blank factor later on. So that
right there describes the maintenance conundrum that we have.
By the way, that's in a nuclear shipyard, which is one of
our more stable enterprises out there because we hire people
for the longer term, long planning, and all that. It is a
premier shipyard and we have lots of use for it, if you will,
in the future.
I'm concerned about--and I didn't mention earlier, but the
shore infrastructure. We have reduced dramatically the shore
infrastructure in order to keep forces forward. So we went from
80 percent, if you will, of our motto, which is nothing I'm
necessarily all excited about, down to 55 percent. We're
deferring work that's going to come to roost.
Fortunately, in fiscal year 2013 we were able to meet,
thanks to Congress, a reprogramming and getting that 6 percent
requirement done to recapitalize. But in fiscal year 2014 I'm
very concerned. We have $1 million we need to get to do that
right. Hopefully we'll get reprogramming or a means or a bill
to do that. But that infrastructure is very important to us.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Welsh, Senator Chambliss talked about some of the
areas where there is money being spent that may not be most
efficient. One of the things that we've looked at on the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee is the Air
Force's proposal to spend about $260 million for two hardened
hangers in Guam. Now, my understanding is that hardened hangers
cost about twice as much as those that are not hardened.
I wonder if you could prioritize the need for that versus
the other needs that you and the other members of the panel
have identified with respect to readiness and training and the
other challenges that we're facing?
General Welsh. Thanks, Senator. I don't think it's a matter
of comparing them in every case. In this particular case, the
hardened facilities on Guam are a response to a combatant
commander request to provide more resilient capability on Guam
because of an increased threat of surface-to-surface missile
attack. He didn't request that everything be hardened, just
those things that are key facilities that you couldn't
improvise for if there was damage on an airfield. That's what
those facilities are based on. So we are trying to support U.S.
Pacific Command in that effort to meet his war plan
requirements.
The readiness and modernization requirements are much
bigger than $256 million. So I don't think that's the reason we
can't be more ready today, although every dollar will help. But
the readiness problem we face over time is significant. To
fully restore our normal readiness levels over the FYDP would
be almost $3 billion.
So we're looking with sequestration at a long-range problem
that is significant. It's going to take us 10-plus years to get
readiness back to the level we want under a fully sequestered
budget, and we'll only get there by reducing the force enough
that we can keep a smaller force ready, which means less
capacity, less capability to respond globally, less options for
the national decisionmaker.
Senator Shaheen. I think we certainly all appreciate that.
But, as Senator Chambliss ticked off a number of projects that
have significant cost to them, this is one that also has some
significant cost. When you add up those $250 million projects,
pretty soon we're talking real money. So I do hope that this is
one that you will continue to look very carefully at.
General Welsh. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
all of you for your service and for your leadership during
these challenging times.
Let me just echo what my colleague from New Hampshire has
just said about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Admiral. Where
are we as we go forward with sequester in terms of fleet size
and the attack submarine fleet? I know you mentioned in your
opening testimony that one less Virginia-class submarine would
be built during the period that we would like to build it. So
can you give us a picture of what the overall fleet looks like?
Admiral Greenert. As I mentioned, the undersea domain is
critically important. We need 45 to 55. Our goal is 55. We'd be
down to 48 submarines in 2020. I use that as a benchmark year.
Unfortunately, due to sequestration, we lost the USS Miami,
which was a project Portsmouth had. But the overruns, the
furloughs, and the need to have to go to a commercial workforce
instead of using Federal workforce, it was just too much. We
couldn't afford that submarine and continue to do the other.
Senator Ayotte. My understanding is that we aren't meeting
combatant commanders' needs with respect to the requests they
make for assistance from the fleet now. What's the rough
meeting of where we are in terms of combatant commander
requests?
Admiral Greenert. Just in submarines, the combatant
commanders as they look at the world distribution of submarines
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), they
need about 19 submarines at any time deployed. We can support
about 10 to 11 and we distribute them--we broker how that
works. So we're about 50 percent, and that's pretty reflective
of the overall fleet request versus what we can provide today.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you, Admiral.
General Welsh, when do you expect the F-35A to achieve full
operational capability?
General Welsh. We hope that happens in 2021, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Okay, thank you.
General Odierno, let me ask you. You and I talked about it
when we met. What is your assessment of the A-10 and its close
air support capability? How important is the A-10 to the Army?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. As I know General
Welsh would say, the A-10 is the best close air support
platform that we have today. In Afghanistan when they put the
Litening targeting pod on it became the most complete close air
support system, that combined with the Remotely Operated Video
Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) capability, its gun systems. It's
performed incredibly well in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our soldiers
are very confident in the system as it goes forward. It's a
great close air support aircraft.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Can I ask you something? We talk about the savings issue
and something that I know this whole committee actually signed
off on, but I fought very hard to not get money appropriated
for, but I think it highlights the issue that you've heard from
Senator Chambliss and you've heard as well from Senator Shaheen
on some examples of, we're all concerned about sequester, but
also making sure that we use the money that's allocated in the
best way possible for our men and women in uniform.
One of them that leaps to mind on my end is the Medium
Extended Air Defense System program, where we spent $3 billion
between fiscal years 2004 and 2011. I look at some of the
choices that you're asked to make today. I just hope that we're
not going to continue to spend any more money on programs like
that. Please tell me, General, that we aren't?
General Odierno. We're very focused now. We have to make
tough choices. We have to spend money on programs that are best
for us.
I would make one comment, and I'll make a general comment.
You have to remember that as you look at cost per vehicle and
things like that, the reason some of them are going up is
because we're purchasing less of them because we have less
money and we have less force structure, and that drives the
cost up on some programs.
But we are looking very carefully. It's only the programs
we need that we're going to invest in. We're not investing in
programs we actually do need, and so it's important we don't
use money for programs that aren't going to directly impact our
soldiers.
Senator Ayotte. Before we leave I want to ask about one
particular topic, General Odierno and General Amos, we've
talked about it--Afghanistan. How do you assess the situation
in Afghanistan right now? I'm worried that so many of our
colleagues, frankly, aren't focusing on the fact that we still
have men and women who are serving in Afghanistan.
What is it that we need to do to secure our interests in
Afghanistan? Can you tell us, where are we on this decision on
what the follow-on force structure will be? With that decision,
can we get to a point where whatever that follow-on is, it's
actually too small to make sure that we need to achieve not
only the ISR issues that we have to address in Afghanistan, but
ensuring that our own forces are protected?
So, General, you and I talked about that. Where are we on
Afghanistan?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. First, until we get
the Bilateral Strategic Agreement (BSA) approved, that's when
we'll start discussing what the end strength is post-2014.
We're certainly hopeful that we will get that agreement with
the Afghan Government that allows our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines to continue to operate in Afghanistan.
What we have to--what I would say is--and the other thing I
would say is I believe we're making incredible progress in
Afghanistan, by the way. We don't talk about that a lot. The
Afghans have taken over. It's working. They are taking
responsibility. But we have to stay with them. It's important
that we stay with them and they continue to have the confidence
with the multinational force behind them, both the United
States and others. That's key as we move forward.
As we make decisions on residual forces, there comes a time
when if we get too small then our ability to protect our own
forces is at risk, and then we have to make sure that we
communicate that to the President. The Joint Chiefs have had
these discussions and we will communicate that as we move
forward.
Senator Ayotte. I understand certainly the feeling that
people have, given the conflicts we've been involved in, of
wanting to withdraw. So what are our interests that are at
stake in Afghanistan in terms of getting the BSA right and
getting the correct ratio of follow-on forces? I know my time
is up, but I think this is an important question.
General Odierno. First off, we need the BSA to protect our
soldiers. Once we get soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
that are operating there, that allows them to do their job and
continue to support the Afghans.
In Afghanistan, it has come so far. It's hard to describe
to someone who has never been there how far that country has
come, the progress that has been made, the security that the
people feel, the fact that the Afghan security forces are
stepping up in a big way to support their own people.
But they're not ready to completely do that on their own,
so it's important. We have to provide new kinds of support,
training, advising, building their institutions, making sure
they can continue to move forward, because there are those that
want to go back and take control and there are extremist
organizations that will directly threaten the United States. We
have come too far, we have invested too much, for us to back
away from that now, because we are close on the cusp, I think,
of being successful.
I think it's important that we understand that and that we
should draw lessons from what we're seeing in Iraq, by the way,
to that as we move forward.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
all of you. It is an honor to have you serving and leading our
country.
General Odierno, I was privileged to serve with Ike Skelton
and he was to me the model of how to serve--dignity, humble,
hardworking, incredibly smart. As I know you know, his reading
list was also required reading for the rest of us as well.
The question I have is--and this ties in, Admiral Greenert,
to a conversation we once had. You mentioned earlier today
about at one time pay and benefits was one-third, it looks like
it's heading for two-thirds. For each of you: What is about the
proper balance in terms of those kind of costs and everything
else? Generally, you had mentioned that it's 70 percent now or
heading there. What is about the right balance for each of your
forces?
General Odierno, if you'd like to start.
General Odierno. Best case for us is we want personnel
costs to be somewhere between 42 and 45 percent of our total
budget, and we're past that now. We're over that at this point.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. I would agree with General Odierno. Right
now we're at about 50 percent. I think that's okay. That's
about right. But then we need to look internally and say, okay,
what's growing the fastest and what does it mean to our
constituency? Does it really affect them that much in what
makes them a better sailor, soldier, airman, or marine? So
there's that piece too of a balance across all those
entitlements.
General Amos. Senator, I think somewhere--I'd be thrilled
if I was in the low 50 percent. I don't know that it's
realistic that I'll ever get in the 45 to 50 percent mark.
Senator Donnelly. I think we recognize it's different for
each force.
General Amos. It is, it is. It's a shared budget with the
Navy. It's just a function of being able to get that down, and
there are ways we can do that and we absolutely have to commit
ourselves as a DOD and as a Congress to help us do that.
That's going to just erode my buying power to the point--I
saw a study, we took a brief probably 3 or 4 weeks ago, that
said if we stay on the course we're on, somewhere around 2025
we'll have 98 cents of every dollar going for benefits. You
just project it out, extrapolate.
[The following information is provided to supplement the
hearing record. Specifically, General Amos wrote to Chairman
Levin requesting to correct the record by clarifying the
paragraph above in his exchange with Senator Donnelly:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Donnelly. Right.
General Welsh. Senator, depending on what you include in
your accounting of the pay, entitlements, and benefits package,
we're somewhere between 30 percent and 50 percent right now.
The problem for us is that range would be fine; it's the growth
that we're worried about.
By the way, I think we owe you and the other members of
this committee and Congress a vote of thanks for the incredible
job you've done compensating the great men and women who serve
in all of our Services over the last 20 years. But the growth
in that category is now the threat to modernization and
readiness. So we just believe we need to control that growth
over time.
Senator Donnelly. As a follow-up--and I know you're all
doing this--it would be helpful to get your best ideas on how
to accomplish that on our end, as well as we look forward to
how we put these budgets together for the future to hit that
proper and right mix.
Does flexibility help all of you and how significant would
that be?
General Odierno. Senator, it depends on how you define
``flexibility.'' If you're saying flexibility within each
budget year, it helps a little bit, but in my mind it helps
just around the fringes, probably different for every Service.
What we need is flexibility across the whole sequester action,
as General Welsh, I think, mentioned earlier. That's what's
helpful because of the front-loaded nature of it, it throws us
off skew of how we sustain our balance.
So if you gave us year-to-year flexibility, there are some
things we can do, but in my mind that's only around the edges
and it doesn't really solve the problem.
Senator Donnelly. This would be to all of you, but in
particular, General Odierno and General Amos. I was in
Afghanistan in late April, early May. I was at Helmand Province
as well. We had metrics that we were looking at and saying, if
we're able to keep on these metrics by December 2014, we'll be
in a position to basically turn everything over to the Afghans
with some presence of residual forces.
There was some controversy--I shouldn't say controversy,
but disagreement by some there and others there: Are we able to
continue to hit these metrics and stay on target? I was just
wondering if you could fill us in on where we are.
General Odierno. What I would tell you is we're ahead of
those metrics. In fact, we've turned over responsibility to the
Afghans in really over 90 percent of all of Afghanistan.
There's only a very few places where they have not taken
complete control of their own security. So, in my mind I think
they're a bit ahead of the metrics that we originally had
established back at that time frame, and they continue to move
forward and do better than we expected, faster than we
expected.
General Amos. Senator, we're in exactly the same position.
Just to give you a sense of what I'm talking about, we've
transitioned about a year ago to train, advise, and assist
missions instead of offensive combat operations. So we changed
the training of our marines going in there. We put more senior
leaders on the ground so that they could partner with the
Afghan Kandaks, the battalions.
So we built that structure, and we put a one-star general
in charge of it, specifically to focus on that while the other
stuff was going on. We've just cut that force back by 50
percent, brought the one-star general home, not because we're
trying to cut the force structure, but because it's been met
with such great success.
By December 2014, will it be just phenomenal? No. But I
tell you what, I'm confident we will have set the conditions
for the greatest opportunity for the Afghan people to take
charge of their lives. I actually feel very good about it.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you. I see my time is up, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
of our witnesses, particularly for all of your service to our
country. We all appreciate that.
Number one, I understand that you have clearly articulated
real problems in readiness; and number two, that lack of
readiness costs lives and lives are directly at stake. That
concerns us all.
I think the last time this possibility of a real hollow
force and a significant lack of readiness happened was in the
1990s. General Odierno, I'll start with you. Would you consider
the challenge today greater or lesser than that challenge then?
General Odierno. I believe our challenge is much greater
today than it has been since I've been in the Army in terms of
readiness. This is the lowest readiness levels I have seen
within our Army since I've been serving for the last 37 years.
Senator Vitter. General, I agree, and I think the numbers
confirm that. For instance, in the 1990s, this general episode
I'm describing, at that problem the military described 80
percent of conventional and unconventional forces as acceptable
with pockets of deficiency. Today, in contrast, at least on the
Army side, you have said that only 15 percent of Army forces
are acceptable, with 85 percent being below that; is that
correct?
General Odierno. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Vitter. That certainly puts numbers on exactly what
you said. But today's situation is much worse. In the 1990s
there was a response to that. The administration, President
Clinton's administration, made a specific proposal and worked
with everyone, including Republicans in Congress, to get $25
billion allocated for readiness. Will there be a specific
administration proposal any time soon to this far greater
challenge?
General Odierno. I think I can't answer your question,
Senator. What I would say is, I think it has to do, as the
chairman said earlier, with the negotiations that are going on
for the budget deal, and out of that we hope that there will be
something that comes back to DOD that allows us to deal with
this 3- to 4-year window we've talked about and readiness
challenges that we have and get rid of this sequestration,
which is, as everyone has said here numerous times, a horrible
way to do business.
Senator Vitter. I'm familiar with those negotiations. I
don't think anything is being discussed currently that
approaches a specific concrete response to this particular
problem. I know you aren't the ultimate decisionmakers, but I
would urge the administration to put forward a specific
proposal, as President Clinton did in the 1990s in a situation
that I believe you're correct in saying was far less
challenging, although it was serious.
General, I also want to ask about some readiness issues
regarding joint readiness training and the like. I have a
particular interest in that because some of that happens at
Fort Polk in Louisiana. Sequestration has forced the
cancellation of several Combat Training Center rotations. Can
you describe how important those rotations are and the impact
on that readiness?
General Odierno. In fiscal year 2013 we had to cancel seven
rotations. What that means is you have--usually it's a force of
about 5,000 to 8,000 men and women who go there, who get a
chance to train and really get certified in the kind of
operations that we think they might have to deploy and do. So
we weren't able to do that.
Not only that; you lose a significant amount of experience
that is gained by your leaders. For example, that equates to
about 250 company commanders, about 50 battalion commanders,
and 7 brigade commanders who did not get the training that is
necessary for them to do the operations. That also includes
their soldiers. So that in effect keeps happening; it just
continually degrades the readiness.
So in 2014, what we're going to have to do is, we're going
to focus all of our dollars to seven brigade elements, so at
least I can get seven brigades trained, because that's the only
money I have to do that. Everyone else is going to go
untrained. They will not be able to do the training necessary.
Senator Vitter. So if that is accomplished for seven
brigades only and no more, how would you describe the impact on
critical core competencies and readiness?
General Odierno. What that means is we're going to have
about a little over 20 percent of the force, maybe 25 percent
of the force, that is trained in its core competency. The rest
will not be trained in their core competencies.
Senator Vitter. General, I just want to underscore. The
specific training we're talking about is the training that's
most relevant to the sort of operations we face today, is that
correct?
General Odierno. That's correct. If we had to deploy in the
Middle East, if we had to deploy to Korea, if we had to deploy
anywhere, that's the kind of training they are not receiving.
So what keeps me up at night is that if something happens and
we're required to send soldiers, they might not be prepared in
the way I think the American people expect us to have them
prepared.
Senator Vitter. A final question for any or all of you. Has
the standards in terms of what we are preparing for, in fact,
been lowered over the last few years, the readiness
requirements?
General Odierno. Lowering? I don't know if I'd say
lowering. So what we've done is--let's take Afghanistan, for
example. The units that are getting ready to go to Afghanistan
are training very differently today. As General Amos mentioned,
they're being trained to do training and advisory missions.
They're not training to do full spectrum operations, which we
would normally train them to do, because they are just going to
do that. They have not been trained in that, in the things that
we think are important as we develop the readiness levels in
order to respond to contingencies.
Senator Vitter. I guess what I'm asking--let me try to be
clear--overall, in 2010 in the QDR the requirement was to fight
two wars on multiple fronts and win while engaged in
significant counterterrorism operations. Hasn't that bar been
lowered significantly?
General Odierno. It has.
Senator Vitter. As that bar has been lowered significantly,
do you think the world has become a safer place?
General Odierno. No. As I stated earlier, I believe this is
the most uncertain I've ever seen the international security
environment.
Senator Vitter. Thank you. That's all I have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service and for acknowledging the
contributions and service of Congressman Ike Skelton, with whom
I had the privilege of serving in the U.S. House of
Representatives.
You've all testified with quite a lot of specificity about
the negative impacts of sequestration. I look at the DSG, and I
think each of you have acknowledged that this is an
articulation of future threats, challenges, and opportunities.
We face enough challenges, i.e., cost overruns, the cost of
energy to DOD, increasing personnel costs, without--and meeting
the goals of the DSG--the mindlessness of sequestration.
There are some who say that we should just give you more
flexibility. But in my view, giving you flexibility which takes
sequestration as a starting point is like moving the deck
chairs on the Titanic. Would you agree with that?
General Welsh. Senator, flexibility is not the ideal
solution. It's getting rid of the mechanism of sequestration.
Senator Hirono. Yes, we need to replace it.
General Welsh. Flexibility is a help if we can't do that.
Senator Hirono. So would you agree that what we need to do
is replace sequestration with a more rational approach to what
you need to do?
General Welsh. Absolutely.
Senator Hirono. All of you agree with that?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. There were some questions relating to the
unsustainability of the percentage that personnel costs are
with regard to all of your budgets. I would like to know, as we
go forward you must have done some thinking on what kind of
factors would you apply in making recommendations on changes to
your personnel costs? What would be your philosophical
perspective going forward in making your recommendations?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, I'll take a crack at it if you
don't mind. One, we'd look at things that would be reversible.
For example, if we were to slow pay raises or something of that
regard, something that, when done, look at the impact on the
constituency and can that be reversed, because we have to
maintain the All-Volunteer Force. That's very important.
Two, it has to be transparent. Our folks, we have to speak
to them, make sure they understand why, what, how, and what is
the purpose, and where this all fits in, and their families, so
that they see that.
Three, I believe there has to be a balance. I alluded to
this before. Pay, housing, TRICARE, these sorts of things,
tuition assistance, to be able to go get a degree, is the
quality of their life. But also, when they go to work what is
that quality? Do they feel appreciated in that job? Do they
have what they need, tools, personnel, oversight, leadership,
and the training, so that they're proud of what they do and
they can do that?
I think we need to balance those too as we look at it.
General Amos. Senator, I think there are from my
perspective a couple of categories. The first one is internal
controls on things like bonuses and everything from real estate
to things we do to recruit and assess marines. We have gone
back into that in the last 12 months and culled out some
significant savings. So internally those are the mechanisms
that we are balancing with regards to retention and
recruitment.
But to Admiral Greenert's point, this holistic package of
the force, I have a piece that we're writing on be careful we
don't break the All-Volunteer Force. I think there's plenty of
room to maneuver, by the way, before you get there. I'm not
advocating there's not. But we just need to be mindful that
we've had this All-Volunteer Force, we've asked a lot of it,
and they've actually done remarkably well, and it's probably a
model for every nation around the world.
But inside of that there is room to maneuver on health care
costs. We talked about TRICARE premiums. There is room to
maneuver, perhaps, on pay raises. There is room to maneuver on
basic allowance for housing. Right now it's typically on a 2 to
3 percent rise every year. Do we need to do that while we're in
this?
So there are things like that that we're working on.
Senator Hirono. My time is almost up, but I take it that
all of you would make these kinds of recommendations with a
view to make sure that we are really mindful of the need to
support our troops and to support their families, so that we
are not going to take away the kinds of benefits and programs
that they rely upon as you move forward to decrease these
personnel costs.
General Odierno. Senator, that's exactly right. We have to
take into consideration what it takes to maintain the premier
All-Volunteer Army. We all understand that and that's forefront
in our minds. But if you get out of balance--I talk about the
best way to take care of a soldier and their family is make
sure he's properly trained, has the right readiness levels, and
when he goes somewhere he comes back to his family. We have to
balance that part of it with making sure they can live the
quality of life for the service that they're giving to our
Nation, and we certainly understand that. So it's finding that
right balance, and we think we have methods to do that,
Senator.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, my time is almost up, but I
do have some questions that I will be submitting for the record
having to do with how sequester is impacting the research and
development efforts across all of our Services and making sure
that we maintain an industrial base, as one of you--I think it
was Admiral Greenert, who mentioned that it is really important
to maintain our defense industrial base, and the impact of
sequester on that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for your service to our country and
for joining us today. I deeply appreciate it and, on behalf of
constituents that I have back in Utah, I express my deepest
gratitude to you and those who serve under your command.
For the last 2 years, we've heard a lot from a lot of high-
ranking military officers like yourselves, who have come before
this committee and others, in front of the men and women that
they command, in front of the American people, to express the
grave concerns they have about sequestration and what it could
do to our military, our military readiness, and everything we
do through our military.
I've heard Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle
and on both ends of the Capitol express grave concerns about
the impacts of sequestration, about what could happen. I've
heard my own constituents, people from throughout Utah, many of
whom are currently serving or have served in the military,
express similar concerns. It's an interesting conversation.
It's sad that we have to be having this conversation,
especially since sequestration was something put into law at a
time when nobody believed it would ever happen. It was supposed
to be so bad that we would do anything and everything possible
in order to avoid it, and yet it has arrived.
So my first question, which I'll leave open to any of you
who might want to answer it, I'd like to know a little bit
about the means by which, the format by which, the regularity
with which you communicate these kinds of concerns, the sorts
of concerns we're talking about today, about sequestration's
impact on readiness and on DOD generally. How and in what way
do you communicate those concerns to the White House?
General Odierno. I would say that, first off, as the Joint
Chiefs we meet twice a week to discuss many key issues, to
include policy issues, health of the force issues. We clearly
have discussions, and then the Chairman, as the Chairman, takes
those to the White House.
But we also have periodic meetings with the White House. In
fact, we have one next week, where we'll have the opportunity
to go over and discuss many of these issues with the President.
I think he's been very open in meeting with the Joint Chiefs on
these types of things. So there are forums in place to do that.
We also obviously meet on a regular basis with the
Secretary of Defense, where we have the opportunity to talk
about the issues we have, and he also takes those forward. I
think there's avenues there that are open to us that we use on
a quite regular basis.
Senator Lee. If I understand it, General Odierno, you do
meet regularly with the White House and you're able to
communicate these openly, effectively, to people in the White
House at the highest levels, including the President and the
Secretary of Defense? Okay, that is good to hear.
My concern and one of the things that animates that
question is that I have not sensed quite the same level of
alarm coming from the White House as I have sensed when I've
met with each of you. I have not sensed that same level of
concern. We've seen a lot of action, a lot of energy from the
White House going into efforts involving everything from gun
control to defending Obamacare, to fixing the web site, and so
forth. I have not heard the same level of concern, the level of
alarm, that I'm hearing from you. That does cause me some
concern.
It seems to me that if the administration did, in fact,
think this situation was this dire, as dire as you are
explaining it to us, I would expect to see that issue, those
sets of issues, receive a lot more time and attention and
energy from our Commander in Chief.
Going along with that, instructions on preparing for
sequestration in 2013 were not even initiated until just a few
months before it went into effect. The President didn't
consider the possibility of sequestration in his 2014 budget
request, despite the fact that it is law, despite the fact that
that law has not been repealed, it has not been modified in a
way that makes it irrelevant or less relevant.
So can you, any of you, describe for the committee what
instructions, if any, you're receiving from the White House and
from the Office of Management and Budget with regard to how to
deal with sequestration in 2014 and the budget for fiscal year
2015?
Admiral Greenert. We've been directed and we're in the
process, as we described before, to put together a budget
that--we call it ``the alternate POM,'' Program Objective
Memorandum--which assumes sequestration levels, BCA caps. That
is being prepared and today we are deliberating on that, called
a program budget review, in DOD.
There is also a secondary level that is under consideration
at a higher level, that we also will deliberate over, so that
there's an option available. But we are focusing on in DOD
right now the alternative, that is the BCA cap levels, if you
will. But there are two, there are two options.
Senator Lee. Okay. Thank you, Admiral, for that. When you
say, ``so there is an option available,'' meaning so we have
options on the table, options?
Admiral Greenert. There are options. So what option will be
chosen and under what circumstances, I really couldn't tell
you, Senator. But you wanted to know what are we directed to do
and that is what we're doing, just again those two levels.
Senator Lee. So presumably those options will be considered
by the President and the Secretary of Defense, and at some
point a decision will be made?
Admiral Greenert. Presumably, yes, sir.
Senator Lee. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lee.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There's a lot of discussion about flexibility. It seems to
me in this situation a way to think about it is we're telling
you that you have to cut a finger off and you get to decide
which one. That's an unattractive form of having to make
decisions.
I want to talk about morale and the effect of this. Senator
Levin and I were in the Middle East this summer and the biggest
impression I came back with was an extremely favorable
impression of the young people that we have working for the
U.S. Government in the military, in the Intelligence Community,
in the State Department. These are idealistic, hard-working,
dedicated people, who we're frankly not treating very well.
They've been through furloughs, they've been through a
shutdown. They have the sequester. They don't know what the
future of their benefit programs are.
Is this starting to play itself out in terms of retention
and recruitment and morale in the Services, General Odierno?
General Odierno. Senator, thank you for the question. I
would say that there are two pieces to that, the civilian
workforce and the military workforce. The civilian workforce,
we are seeing, I'm not saying significant morale issues, but
there are questions by the civilian workforce because they've
been through a furlough, they went through shutdown, and a
reduction along with that. So they are questioning, how stable
is their work environment, especially since it's still on the
table.
In terms of the soldiers, the way I explained it is morale
is good, but tenuous. Reenlistments are fine, recruiting's
going okay. Soldiers--there's a lot of angst and the angst is
kind of what you just said, people talking about benefits,
people are talking about--obviously, in the Army we're
significantly reducing the size of the force, so they're
worried about their future.
But what makes me feel so damn good about it is what you
just described, is that their morale is high, they're doing
exactly what we ask them to do. They're training as hard as
they can with the money we give them. When they deploy, they
are there trying to accomplish the mission to the best of their
ability. That's what's so frustrating to me personally, because
of their personal dedication to our Nation and to our Army, and
yet they have a lot of angst both individually and with their
families because of all this discussion that's going on, the
fact they might lose their job, they might lose benefits, they
might--but they continue.
What's inspiring is they continue to do what we ask them,
and they do it to the best of their ability. That's the best
way to describe it to you, Senator.
General Amos. Senator, I think our civilians--I don't have
any metrics for this yet because it's too soon to tell. But
when I talk to our civilian marines, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, our civilian marines are looking at this
saying: ``I'm not sure. I love the institution, I love being a
civilian marine, I like what it stands for; I just don't have
confidence in it now.''
They're looking at this, not only what they've just gone
through, but they're looking at the fact that sequester they
know is going to require a cut in civilian personnel over the
next 10 years. It will require a cut in civilian personnel,
there's no question about it.
So you look at all the things they've gone through and
they're saying: ``Boy, maybe I ought to look around.''
So I don't see people jumping ship, but I do worry about it
because they're the professionals. That's the civilian side of
the house and they are the shock absorbers for us, and they're
the corporate memory.
Inside my force, the Marine Corps is a young Marine Corps.
67 percent of all the marines on Active Duty today are on their
first enlistment. They're somewhere between 18-years-old and
probably 22-years-old. They didn't come in to sit back at home
stations and be a garrison marine. They actually like
deploying. When you go visit them in Afghanistan, in the
Western Pacific (WESTPAC), you don't get questions like:
``Well, shoot, what's sequester going to do to me?'' They know
how to spell it, but that's about it.
They want to know: ``Hey, Commandant, is this going to be
the last deployment I'm going to get on, or am I going to
actually be able to go to combat again or be able to go to
WESTPAC again?'' So our morale's pretty high right now and I
think it's going to stay high as long as we give them something
to look forward to. The reorientation to the Asia-Pacific
region has just reenergized a lot of marines as they think
about Afghanistan. My gosh, we're coming out of there in 2014.
What's left? We talk about Darwin, Australia, we talk about
Japan, we talk about Guam, and their eyes light up.
So the morale in my Service is pretty high.
Admiral Greenert. Senator, an anecdote. I had two of my
systems commands, major engineering systems, ship and air, they
have a lot of civilians and they came to me and said: ``You're
not going to have to worry about headquarters reduction and
have a reduction in force; we'll do it with attrition. We have
a lot of people retiring.'' That struck me because that's a lot
of seniority and talent and experience going out that top and
we don't have a lot going in the bottom. We'll be out of
balance, and I spoke about that in my oral statement.
One other anecdote. General Welsh mentioned kids getting
bored. In the Navy we're starting to develop a situation where
when you get ready to deploy you're going to be ready, but,
boy, you're going to do it fast and you're going to do it hard.
So our pilots, a lot of our air wings--carrier strike groups
about the air wing, they're flying a lot and training a lot for
about 7 months, and they barely have time to get their legal
will done and get their power of attorney done and then they're
deploying and they're gone for 6, 7, 8 months.
Then they come back and they just longingly look out the
window at their Hornet aircraft and say: ``Gee, I wish I could
fly again.'' So that have and have-not, when that gets into
service records you're going to get a have and have-not feeling
about it. I'd worry about that in morale and in eventually
retention.
Senator King. I want to just--I would commend to you, all
of you gentlemen, an extraordinary speech by Robert Gates that
was given just in the last couple of weeks. He put it--what
you've been saying all morning, he put it very bluntly and
succinctly. He said: ``The greatest threat to American national
security now lies within the square mile that encompasses
Capitol Hill and the White House,'' and that we are the
problem.
It was very stark. I think that's the point that you've
been making today. What we're talking about here isn't
academic, it's not dollars on a balance sheet; it's lives,
readiness, and the ability to defend this Nation.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would add my thanks to you four gentlemen for your
service to this country, and also my thanks to the men and
women who serve under you for their commitment to keeping us
all safe.
I would like to go on a different track here a little bit.
At the end of July, Secretary Hagel released a statement on the
SCMR. It's basically how DOD is going to cope with the
sequestration over the next 10 years.
General Odierno, in your testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee you stated that the SCRM was based on
assumptions which you described as ``rosy'' and ``somewhat
dangerous.'' Specifically, you pointed out that it assumes
conflicts will last just 6 months, little to no casualties will
be sustained, no follow-up stability operations will be
necessary, U.S. Forces deployed elsewhere will be able to
complete, disengage, and redeploy to support a major regional
contingency, and the use of WMD wasn't even considered.
Can you elaborate on those assumptions and the danger you
referred to about building force structure based on those
assumptions?
Admiral Greenert. If you reduce the requirement, you reduce
the amount of forces that are necessary. So what happens is we
do not have the ability to replace our soldiers that have to
accomplish the mission. We don't have enough. It's about
quantity. So for example, the assumption that a war in Korea
would last less than a year. There's nothing that makes me feel
that that's a good assumption, that we won't have any
casualties during a war somewhere around the world.
The fact that we do full disengagement, we just fought two
wars, Iraq and Afghanistan. We did not disengage from other
places around the world. It's just not assumptions that I
believe are appropriate.
What I worry about is that in the end the weight of those
assumptions are not going to be on me. It's going to be on our
soldiers, our young men and women who are asked to do a mission
that they simply do not have the capability and quantity of
capability to accomplish. It results in more casualties, and it
results--which is the most, in my mind, critical thing. It also
makes rosy assumptions about our ability to quickly build a
larger force.
In the 2000s, while we were fighting two wars, first, it
took us 4 years to make a decision to say we can grow the Army.
Then once we did that, it took us about 32 months to do it,
because you have to recruit them and then you have to train
them. So you can't do that within a 6- or 8-month period. It's
impossible to do, and we made assumptions that we would
magically be able to build this huge Army in a very short
period of time.
It doesn't happen that way, unless we go to the national
mobilization, we go back to a draft, we go back to many other
things. Even then, it would take longer than 6 months to a
year--it would probably still take 2 years plus--to build
another. So it's substances like that that are incredibly risky
as we go forward.
Senator Fischer. Do you think this review is helpful in any
way, to help planning within your different departments and DOD
as a whole?
General Odierno. It is. There are some things that are good
about it. Some things about priorities are good, some things
about efficiencies. A lot of people have mentioned that there
are clearly efficiencies that we still have to garner out of
our own budgets, and we have to do that. I think some of that
is very good.
But I do significantly worry about these assumptions that
we make about our warfighting capabilities, which I think are
rosy and somewhat dangerous.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Admiral, do you have anything to add on the SCMR?
Admiral Greenert. I think we need to keep in mind, it was
options for a future, which was described. As General Odierno
said: ``Okay, well, that's nice, but we've never been able to
predict that future.'' So it's kind of dangerous if you're
wrong and in the world that I live with, of conducting presence
if we reduce force structure to a level where we are not out
and about, our allies wondering of our reliability. Our
allies--therefore potential adversaries can get out of hand, if
you will. Then we can pretty much have a mess because we're not
deterring those by being together with our allies, and that's a
great deterrent effect.
But lastly, I would say the ability to produce ready
forces--you have to look into that very closely. As General
Odierno said, there were some assumptions made, and we've
talked about the debilitating effects here on the industrial
base. That can be quite extraordinary and we need to consider
that.
Senator Fischer. I've had some comments made to me that
President Reagan was able to build up the force fairly quickly
when he became President. Would you agree with that? Both of
you have said that it's difficult to build the force up
quickly. Has it happened in the past? Do you think President
Reagan did?
General Odierno. What he did was he didn't increase the
size; what he did is he increased the investment into the
force. During the Reagan buildup what we did is we increased
our readiness, we significantly increased our modernization
programs, which had an incredible impact on the capability that
was developed during those time frames in the Army.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am. The delivery of, in my world,
the ships and the aircraft took place quite a bit after the
investment, if you will. So the same thing occurs when you draw
down. Boom, they're gone and you say, ``well, I want to stand
it up again.'' You have to make sure you have shipbuilders and
aircraftbuilders as well.
So President Reagan was fortunate in that regard that he
had a broad enough industrial base to be able to respond.
Senator Fischer. General Amos and General Welsh, just
briefly?
General Amos. Ma'am, I'm with my colleagues on President
Reagan. We lived with his legacy through the 1990s. We had the
Reagan buildup, so when we went through the 1990s, the Gulf
War, we used the equipment that came from the Reagan buildup.
We sustained that even through the 25, 28 percent reduction-in-
force of the late 1990s and the revolution in military affairs.
But it takes a long time to build the force, the people.
But in today's market, programmatically it takes a long time to
develop ships, airplanes. We're seeing that right now with the
JSF.
Senator Fischer. Your opinion of the assumptions in the
SCMR, General Amos? Did you have an opinion on those?
General Amos. Ma'am, say that again, please?
Senator Fischer. On the assumptions that are listed in the
SCMR, did you have any thoughts you wanted to share on that?
General Amos. I share my colleagues' apprehensions about
the assumptions. I think they were too altruistic. I do think
it was helpful, though, because it gave a range. It gave a
range of what a Service should look like, and I think that's
helpful, because it energized the dialogue and got everybody
moving.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Welsh. Ma'am, another assumption that was in there
that is significant based on where we are today is that SCMR
was underlined by an assumption that our force was fully ready,
and that allowed you to execute the strategy. We're clearly not
there today.
The other thing I would mention about the Reagan buildup is
for the Air Force specifically, during that time we purchased
about 2,600 new aircraft to modernize our force. In the latest
buildup of our top-line budget between about 2000 and 2008, we
built 260. So we did not modernize as the top line went up. A
lot of that is due to the rise in personnel costs that we've
already discussed. So the force still needs to be modernized in
some pretty critical areas.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To the witnesses,
we appreciate your patience with us.
The effect of sequester on Virginia is just so palpable in
all the communities that I visit. I gave my maiden speech on
the 27th of February as a Senator. I think most maiden speeches
are ``Here's who I am'' or ``Let me tell you about my State''
or ``Let me tell you what I want to do.'' I don't think many
maiden speeches were like mine: ``Let's not do something
stupid.'' I had to make my maiden speech about ``Let's not do
something stupid'' because it was right on the eve of the
sequester kicking in.
We cast a vote in the Senate to turn off the sequester and
there were 53 votes for that. But because of the ability to
insist upon 60 votes, 53 votes wasn't enough to turn off the
sequester.
I just think it's always very important that we say this,
and you can be more diplomatic than I'll be: It's because of
Congress. Sequester is because Congress hasn't done a budget.
Sequester is because we haven't been able to find a deal in
normal order, we haven't been able to find a deal in
supercommittees, we haven't been able to do anything other than
kick the can down the road, CRs.
Congress could have fixed this. Congress shouldn't have put
it in place. Congress can fix it, and the one bit of good news
about this is there's a budget conference finally going on
right now. One of the things I would certainly ask--everyone
connected with the military or who loves it, whether you're
Active Duty, veteran, or just a patriot: Tell the budget
conferees--and there are some of us around this table; Angus
and I are both budget conferees. Tell us to get a budget deal
by the 13th of December, because what you need is certainty and
a path out of sequester.
There have been some questions today, Mr. Chairman, along
the lines of: Have you explained to the President how sequester
is hurting national security? I found those questions kind of
odd. The President submits a budget every year to Congress and
I imagine that you talk to the President about your needs. If
Congress would just pass the President's budget or pass the DOD
portion of the President's budget or pass something within the
general time zone of the DOD portion of the President's budget,
would our readiness issues be much easier to deal with than
they are under the sequester?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, they would. The President's
budget that we submitted and testified to, I for one found it
was acceptable.
Senator Kaine. So there isn't a need for a President to
come and bring a special request for, we're having readiness
problems, here's my proposal for how we deal with readiness
problems. All we have to do is pass a budget and get in the
general time zone or area of what the President is proposing
vis-a-vis the DOD and, while it wouldn't eliminate all the
challenges we have, we wouldn't be here looking at charts like
this, would we?
General Amos, I want to ask you a question. I looked
through your written testimony quickly. You said something
pretty blunt in your opening comment. I think I heard you use
the word ``ashamed,'' and I think it was in connection with
you're ashamed about the way we are treating maybe some of our
civilians with respect to the furloughs. I didn't write down
the precise quote and when I went back through your written
testimony I couldn't find it.
Could you just refresh me on exactly what you said, because
I want to ask you what you meant by it?
General Amos. I just handed my oral statement back, but I
said I'm ashamed of the way we treated our civilian marines. As
I look back at how we went through the furlough and how we went
through the government shutdown, I'm looking at them--and by
the way, we required them as soon as they came back to help us
get this budget put in, get all the contracting done, close out
all the deals at the end of the year.
These are the professionals that do that, Senator. It's
typically not military people that are trying to get the
contracts in, trying to get all the money obligated--the
professionals that are working on our airplanes, our ships, our
tanks, our equipment. So to be honest with you, when I look
them in the eye I'm embarrassed, I'm ashamed. I think they are
every bit as much patriots as we that wear the uniform are, and
I think we treated them poorly. That's what I meant by that.
Senator Kaine. I appreciate your saying that because,
again, we really are dealing with a problem that Congress
created and only Congress can fix. Peppering you with more
questions about whether you're appropriately informing the
Commander in Chief about these effects is an effort to avoid
looking in the mirror. We just have to look in the mirror in
this place.
Again, Mr. Chairman, we do have a good opportunity right
now, because the budget conference that should have started in
March is now under way to try to find some certainty. General
Dempsey was with a number of us the other day and he said:
``The problem with sequester is it's money, it's timing, and
it's flexibility, and all three of those create problems.''
I worry about your planners. I think you have some superb
planners in all your branches and with DOD. But instead of
letting your planners run free to plan how to deal with an
uncertain world, we're tying up their time making them figure
out how to deal with an uncertain budgetary situation.
You don't have a budgetary number yet now. You don't know
when you'll have a number. You don't know what the rules will
be about the number that you will eventually get at some
uncertain time.
So in an uncertain world, we are making your task almost
impossible. So I feel ashamed. I feel ashamed to have you come
back here again and again and again and tell us the same thing
and not see any action to do anything about it.
General Amos. Senator, could I comment? We're under a CR.
You know that. It's a forced diet that prevents us from signing
multi-year contracts. I have $815 million worth of military
construction in 2014. Three-quarters of it is for the
President's strategy, the rebalance to the Pacific. I'm not
going to be able to commit to that, I'm not going to be able to
do those kinds of things.
I was just looking through some numbers in preparation for
this hearing. As a result of sequester alone and the amount
of--my share is $10.2 billion or 3 percent over 10 years. Just
in Marine Aviation alone, it's going to cost me $6.5 billion of
inefficiency.
So when we talk about cost overruns and we talk about all
the other things we're going to try to call the money out, $6.5
billion, and that's because multi-year contracts were--I either
can't sign or I have to cancel, so I have to pay penalties now
and buying airplanes on an individual basis.
At the end of that, that's four JSF squadrons and two MV-22
Osprey squadrons, simply because of the inefficient way we're
going about doing business in this sequester.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chairman, I just hope if we have another
hearing on this, I'm going to suggest something that you're all
too diplomatic and reasonable to do. But if we have another
hearing on sequestration, I would suggest that you can bring
whatever charts you want, but I would suggest you just bring a
bunch of mirrors and put them up so that we can look at
ourselves in our faces as we're talking about this. It's the
only place we're going to solve this. This isn't on you to
solve, it's not on the President to solve. Only a Congress can
pass a budget. A congressional budget doesn't even really go to
the President for signature. It's just fully within this body.
It's fully within our power to solve this, and I pray that we
will.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. The public gets this, Mr. Chairman. The
public understands this. That's why our approval rating is
below al Qaeda's. It's a sad state.
Chairman Levin. Two quick requests. One, did each of you
support the President's budget request?
General Odierno. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, I did.
General Amos. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
General Welsh. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. Second, would you give us,
General Amos, the breakdown for the record of that $6.5 billion
that you made reference to.
[The information referred to follows:]
The 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA), with 10 years of sequestration,
will have a $6.5 billion impact on Marine aviation. Across the duration
of the BCA, sequestration costs to Marine aviation's major defense
acquisition programs (MDAP) are $5 billion due to program delays,
inefficiencies (e.g. single-year pricing versus multi-year pricing) and
reduced acquisition quantities over a longer period of time.
Additionally, $1.5 billion will have to be reprioritized from
procurement and modernization accounts to ensure deploying combat-ready
units maintain required readiness levels (C2 or better).
Using the President's budget request for fiscal year 2013 as a
baseline, Marine aviation program cost growth due to procurement
quantity decreases and schedule extensions associated with
sequestration are based on the assumption that all MDAPs will be
decremented 10 percent per year, with no flexibility, for the duration
of the BCA through fiscal year 2021. Marine aviation program cost
growth due to procurement quantity decreases and schedule extensions
associated with sequestration will impact the following programs at a
total cost of $5 billion:
Reduction in quantity of 21 F-35B/C during the BCA
period at a cost of $250 million.
MV-22 multi-year procurement contract breach at a cost
of $1.6 billion.
Reduction in quantity of 21 H-1 aircraft during the
BCA period, resulting in a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach and
a cost of $511 million.
Two-year delay in the low-rate initial production of
CH-53K aircraft with a reduction in procurement of 39 aircraft
during the BCA period. This results in the reduction in
quantity of 57 aircraft from the original production ramp at a
cost of $2.6 billion.
Reduced procurement quantities of the Ground/Air Task
Oriented Radar during the BCA period at a cost of $156 million.
Sequestration's impact on Marine aviation readiness is calculated
with the assumption of a 10 percent reduction to yearly flight hours
for each of the 51 Marine Corps flying squadrons. This equates to a
yearly cut of approximately 350 flight hours per flying squadron, or
17,850 total flight hours across all Marine Corps flying squadrons.
With the average cost per flight hour at $10,500, the yearly decrement
to Marine Corps flight hours due to sequestration is $187 million.
Prioritizing readiness by preventing a flight hour reduction requires
the funding shortfall to be covered by investment accounts (i.e.
procurement and modernization). The total cost of funding a $187
million flight hour shortfall over the remaining 8 year duration of the
BCA will be $1.5 billion.
Chairman Levin. Now, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Chairman, I realize we're in a
vote, so I'm going to be very brief. First, I understand, Mr.
Chairman, in a glaring omission on the part of our----
Chairman Levin. I'm going to turn the gavel over to you. Is
it safe?
Senator Blumenthal [presiding]. It's an awesome
responsibility, but I think I'm capable of it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you all. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. We are in the middle of a vote, so I'm
going to be very brief. First, I understand, Mr. Chairman, in a
glaring omission on the part of our committee, we have not yet
wished General Amos a happy birthday, even though it's a little
bit earlier. Happy birthday, General Amos.
General Amos. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask, for the record--I don't
want to take your time with this. But I agree with what Senator
Kaine has just said the responsibility being on the part of
Congress. I think part of the way to deal with this crisis--and
it really is a crisis--is to perhaps modify some of the
contracts, long-term some of the percent process, which is not
your doing. You aren't the ones who in effect burden the
Services with the way we do procurement and how do we do
procurement. The contracts which in effect, penalized the
United States when it fails to make certain orders, or when
there are cost overruns that are not your doing.
So I would like the panel to look at some of the
procurement decisions, such as General Amos has just described,
where we are in effect going to pay a lot more for weapons
systems, whether it's airplanes or ships, as a consequence of
sequester, so that we have some examples. They don't have to be
in charts, but we need to be able to convince the American
people about what the impact of sequester is, because right now
it's a word, it's a term that has little or no meaning to 99.9
percent of the American people.
One of the other weapons systems--you described one,
General Amos. But, Admiral Greenert, I understand that the
Virginia Payload Module which results in a $743 million design
change to their Virginia-class submarine, has been undermined
by some potential cuts in the 2014 budget. I support that
design, the $443 million for the design program. I think it
will measurably and materially and significantly add to the
capability of those submarines. To remove the money for
designing and researching I believe will be really a loss of a
tremendous opportunity; would you agree?
Senator Greenert. Yes, sir, I would. As I stated before,
we're talking about the undersea domain. It's a high priority
for us. So as I discussed the concept of reprogramming, we'll
search for that money. We're fortunate it's a long-term program
in one of the early phases. But obviously the impact if we
continue this will be dramatic.
Senator Blumenthal. I also want to raise again, as I've
done it previously with General Odierno, the Mi-17 helicopter
issue, where I understand there may be limits to what we can do
to reprogram money--I just want to state for the record, $1
billion to buy helicopters from the Russian export agency that
is also selling arms to Syria, when we don't have Afghan-
trained personnel to maintain those helicopters will strike
most Americans as a tremendous waste of money, first, because
we're not buying American helicopters, which we should be doing
if we have to provide helicopters at all; and second, because
the Afghans can't use them as we would hope they would.
I understand that you may have a different position,
``you'' meaning the U.S. Army or DOD. But if we're going to buy
those helicopters, we should be buying them from American
manufacturers and training the Afghans how to use them.
General Odierno. I would just say, Senator, that I want to
make it clear we're not buying those helicopters for our
forces. I want to make that very clear.
Senator Blumenthal. I understand.
General Odierno. Second, that's a decision that was made
in-theater based on their assessment of the ability for the
Afghans. They think they could, in fact, learn and train on the
Mi-17s because that's what they've had in the past and that's
why we're purchasing them. So we're the agent to purchase those
aircraft for them, but that's a decision that was made by those
closest to that issue.
Senator Blumenthal. I understand we're not using--we're not
buying those helicopters for American forces. They're being
bought for the Afghans. But we are using American taxpayers'
dollars, which could be used for the Virginia Payload Module or
any other of the very important needs that you have and that we
need to address.
So I understand that those decisions have been made as a
result of our recommendations by commanders in the field, and I
just want to state for the record my reservations about that
decision.
Thank you very much. Thank you to each of you for your
service to our Nation. I think I am in charge of gaveling to a
close, even though I don't have the gavel.Thank you very much
for being here and your excellent testimony.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
force structure in north carolina
1. Senator Hagan. General Amos, currently there are almost 54,000
Active-Duty marines in North Carolina. Under the Budget Control Act
(BCA) of 2011, the Marine Corps was reduced in total structure from
202,000 to 182,100, with 7,000 marines coming from North Carolina. If
sequestration is allowed to continue, I understand that this could
result in a further reduction down to 174,000, with 4,000 marines
coming from North Carolina. How would these further reductions impact
the Marine Corps' ability to meet current operational demands and
respond to contingencies in the future?
General Amos. Assuming that the requirements for marines remained
the same over the foreseeable future, a force of 175,000 will drive the
Marine Corps to a 1-to-2 dwell. It will be that way for virtually all
operational units. Six months deployed, 12 months home recuperating,
resetting, and training, and 6 months deployed once again. The 175,000
force accepts greater risk when our Nation commits itself to the next
major theater war, as there are significant reductions in Marine Corps
ground combat and aviation units available for the fight.
Under sequestration, the Marine Corps would effectively lose a
division's worth of combat power. This is a Marine Corps that would
deploy to a major contingency, fight, and not return until the war was
over. The entire bench would be emptied. There would be no rotational
relief like in Iraq and Afghanistan. Marines who joined the Corps
during that war would likely go straight from the drill field to the
battlefield without the benefit of pre-combat training.
The Marine Corps would have fewer forces arriving less-trained and
arriving later to the fight. This would delay the buildup of combat
power, allow the enemy more time to build its defenses, and likely
prolong combat operations. This is a formula for more American
casualties. We only need to look to 1950 and the onset of the Korean
War to see the hazard and the fallacy in this approach.
deferred and canceled maintenance
2. Senator Hagan. Admiral Greenert, in fiscal year 2013, operation
and maintenance (O&M) accounts were hit particularly hard by
sequestration and in many cases this resulted in deferred maintenance.
As an example of this impact, Fleet Readiness Center-East at Cherry
Point, NC, saw a reduction of 200,000 labor hours and a 12 percent
reduction in throughput. As you well know, we have to pay for
maintenance eventually, and the longer we put it off, the more it is
likely to cost us in the end. How do you think these actions will
affect the Navy in the short- and the long-term?
Admiral Greenert. Fiscal year 2013 sequestration resulted in
airframe/engine inductions and deliveries that were pushed into fiscal
year 2014. Continued sequestration is projected to drive an additional
backlog of approximately 190 airframe maintenance actions (of about 700
planned) in fiscal year 2014. Additionally, fiscal year 2014
sequestration may result in significant manpower effects including
reduced overtime, contractor reductions, and civilian reductions. These
effects would have the greatest impact in the third and fourth quarters
of fiscal year 2014 which will greatly limit our ability to recover if
funds become available.
basic allowance for housing
3. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, there is talk of reducing the Basic Allowance for
Housing (BAH) that servicemembers receive relative to the determined
cost of living for a given area. Do you feel that we should pass our
fiscal burdens on to our servicemembers by reducing their BAH?
General Odierno. I am opposed to any initiative that would simply
pass fiscal burdens on to soldiers. However, we find ourselves needing
to review all expenses in order to maintain the appropriate balance as
a result of the BCA with full sequestration. Even under the Department
of Defense's (DOD) plan to slow the growth of military compensation,
military members continue to receive a robust package of pay and
benefits that compares favorably with private-sector compensation.
Providing competitive pay and benefits and the best possible
training and equipment in the current fiscal and political environment
is a monumental challenge. However, this balance must be found if we
are to maintain the highest quality, ready, and modern military force
we have today far into the future.
Admiral Greenert. Reductions in BAH would likely be a disservice to
the force. However, I do believe it is important to examine all
components of military compensation and benefits in order to find
opportunities to slow growth in some areas. We also must balance
quality of life components such as basic pay, BAH, health care, and
tuition benefits with our sailors' quality of work. We must ensure that
when they go to work, we give them the tools and training they need to
succeed.
General Amos. Slowing the growth of BAH is a reasonable measure to
meet the BCA. The origins of BAH provide to the servicemember no more
than 80 percent of housing costs. Accordingly, the average
servicemember had at least 20 percent in out-of-pocket expenses. In
2000, the Secretary of Defense committed to reducing the average out-
of-pocket expense for the median member to zero by 2005. Given the
current and future fiscal environment, marginal increases in out-of-
pocket expenses for members is a reasonable consideration.
General Welsh. Given the current fiscal environment and continued
projections of increasing compensation growth, we must review the
current compensation package for potential reforms and to slow the
growth. We cannot look at programs in isolation, but rather in
totality, balanced across all beneficiaries, and then assess the impact
on the total force.
4. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, how do you believe this will affect morale and
retention of the force?
General Odierno. No decision has been made on any changes to
military compensation packages. I am concerned about any piecemeal
initiative that does not consider second- and third-order effects on
the All-Volunteer Force (AVF).
Even under DOD's plan to slow the growth of military compensation,
military members continue to receive a robust package of pay and
benefits that compares favorably with private-sector compensation.
Providing competitive pay and benefits and the best possible
training and equipment in the current fiscal and political environment
is a monumental challenge. However, this balance must be found if we
are to maintain the highest quality, ready, and modern military force
we have today far into the future.
Admiral Greenert. I think it is possible to reduce the growth of
personnel costs and keep total pay and compensation competitive with
civilian counterparts. It is also important for us to balance quality-
of-life components such as basic pay, BAH, health care, and tuition
benefits with our sailors' quality of work. We must ensure that when
they go to work we give them the tools and training they need to
succeed. It is this balance of quality-of-life and quality-of-work that
will maintain sailor morale and help us meet our retention and
recruiting needs.
General Amos. The current military compensation package enables us
to achieve recruiting and retention goals. Any adjustments must be made
carefully to avoid adverse impacts to recruiting and retention.
However, military compensation cannot continue to grow
disproportionately as DOD's overall budget shrinks. We believe as we
plan our budget, reasonable efficiencies, such as reducing BAH, must be
considered to protect modernization, investments, and infrastructure.
General Welsh. We must be careful to not look at various
compensation programs in isolation, but rather in totality, balanced
across all beneficiaries, and assess the impact on the total force
before making decisions. A competitive compensation package is crucial
to maintaining our required force profile, and we must also continue to
use special and incentive pay programs to recruit and retain critical
skills.
tuition assistance
5. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, please briefly explain to me what your intent for
tuition assistance (TA) is in fiscal year 2014.
General Odierno. TA continues to be a successful program that
enhances Army readiness, recruiting/retention, and leader development.
TA provides financial assistance for voluntary off-duty education in
support of soldiers' professional and personal self-development goals.
We are in the process of reviewing the TA program for fiscal year
2014 to maximize use of TA for soldiers across all components, while
being mindful of a constrained budget.
TA supports my strategic priorities to develop adaptive Army
leaders for a complex world, prepare a ready and modern Army, and
commit soldiers to our Army profession. Finally, TA supports the United
States' premiere All-Volunteer Army. We remain committed to this
important program.
Admiral Greenert. Currently, TA is fully funded in fiscal year
2014, at the same level as fiscal year 2013. This is a Navy priority
and we have no plans to change the fiscal year 2014 program execution.
However, sequestration in fiscal year 2014 may add some risk to the
program funding.
General Amos. The Marine Corps continues to support the TA program.
However, given the uncertainty of both the Continuing Resolution (CR)
unknown outcomes of the BCA, and discussions regarding the full year
funding levels, the Marine Corps has taken measures to protect near-
term readiness, which results in reduced funding for some programs,
including TA. Until these issues are resolved, it is premature to
determine full funding levels for TA for the remainder of the fiscal
year.
The Marine Corps has taken additional actions to ensure that TA is
being run to meet the appropriate financial management controls of the
Marine Corps and support personal and professional goals of marines.
The Marine Corps requires that first time TA applicants have a minimum
time in service of 24 months, must complete the Marine Corps
Institution orientation class called ``Personal Financial Management,''
and will be approved for only one course unless the first-time students
have completed an Associate Degree or 60 academic credits with a
minimum 2.5 grade point average.
These requirements on first-time students ensure marines focus on
the objectives of their initial MOS training and their primary Marine
Corps mission.
General Welsh. The Air Force recognizes the vital role higher
education plays in developing the critical thinking skills of airmen at
all levels. The Air Force is committed to funding the military TA
program in fiscal year 2014; however, budgetary constraints remain a
challenge.
family services programs
6. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, how will sequestration impact family services like
the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) and mental health programs
provided by your Services?
General Odierno. As a result of sequestration, we continue to
review all soldier and family programs to determine where we can reduce
services with the lowest possible risk. Resourcing for the EFMP as well
as mental/behavioral health programs remain fully funded at this time.
The U.S. Army Medical Command Behavioral Health Service Line
includes programs to provide behavioral health services to Army
children and families. However, sequestration, furloughs, and the
October 2013 government shutdown, in addition the threat of future
furloughs, contributed to a loss of behavioral health providers who
specialize in family behavioral health services, specifically in child
and adolescent fields. Historically, these providers have been
difficult to recruit and retain. These complexities are magnified in
the current fiscal environment. The difficulties in retaining and
hiring behavioral health providers who mainly work with family members
has significantly decreased the Army's ability to provide and
adequately sustain behavioral health support to Army spouses and
children.
Admiral Greenert. I am committed to protecting, to the maximum
extent possible, these important family support services, such as the
EFMP and mental health programs, from sequestration funding reductions
in order to minimize possible impacts upon our sailors and families.
Navy protected all family programs from sequestration impacts in fiscal
year 2013, in accordance with DOD guidance, and intends to sustain this
funding priority in fiscal year 2014.
General Amos. We are not expecting significant impacts to the
direct care and services of our marine family programs as a result of
sequestration in fiscal year 2014. In anticipation of sequestration
cuts, we are planning to absorb these cuts at headquarters level for
marine and family programs rather than cuts to programs directly.
Sequestration cuts at the headquarters level will impact staffing,
training, and other resources used by staff. We are concerned however
of sequestration in future years which may result in fiscal cuts to
programs directly.
Additionally, if we are forced to furlough our civilian marines in
the future, it is likely our family programs will be impacted through
loss of direct service hours, resulting in longer wait times, reduction
in hours of operations, and modifications to programs.
General Welsh. Sequestration will impact Air Force airman and
family readiness programs. In addition to morale concerns caused by
budget uncertainties, constrained operating budgets and hiring
limitations affect the ability to adequately fill appropriated staff
positions. Additionally, sequestration may reduce hours of operation
and program opportunities across the broader umbrella of child and
youth programs to include child care for working parents, youth sports,
instructional classes, school support, recreational opportunities, and
outreach support to Guard/Reserve youth.
The effect of sequestration can be challenging for any program;
but, the loss of availability of support services for the EFMP creates
significant challenges for Air Force families with members with mild,
moderate, and severe needs. With over 24,000 Air Force exceptional
family member families and a 30 percent increase in enrollment since
2010, family support services are necessary to provide comfort,
stability, and reduce anxiety during times of transition.
Mental health services remain a top priority and the Air Force is
committed to sustaining them, especially in support of Wounded Warrior
programs.
impacts on special operations forces
7. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, what has been the impact on the readiness of your
Services' Special Operations Forces (SOF) under the recent shutdown and
fiscal year 2013 implementation of sequestration?
General Odierno. Although initial indications of a downward trend
are starting to manifest as a result of the recent shutdown and fiscal
year 2013 sequestration, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)
readiness across our tactical/combat units remains relatively high due
to MFP-11 funding from U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and
Army's prioritization of SOF support through personnel fills and
Service Provided Capabilities (SPC).
At the strategic level, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) continues to reprioritize ARSOF personnel and assets to
support the geographic combatant commanders' and Joint Warfighting
Headquarters. In doing this, USASOC reduced targeted SOF capacity to
preserve readiness and the capabilities of their deploying units of
action. USASOC assumed risk in global areas of operation, outside of
the Named Operations and Advanced Skills Training, to meet anticipated
strategic and operational demands. The anticipated reduction in the
ability of the Services to support future SOF training, exercises, and
operational enabler requirements, remains a primary concern.
Admiral Greenert. Sequestration and the recent government shutdown
have had an impact on near-term readiness by reducing training
opportunities for nondeployed forces. Navy continues to fully resource
readiness for deployed forces. SOCOM is responsible for the overall
readiness of SOF and would be able to provide more detailed information
on the effects of sequestration on SOF readiness.
General Amos. Like all SOF, Marine Special Operations Forces
(MARSOC) operators train rigorously to prepare for deployment. Their
pre-deployment training cycle is carefully orchestrated to make time
for all the necessary training events while still giving our marines
time to reconnect with their families between deployments. The
uncertainty of the sequestration, shutdown, and the sometimes
conflicting implementation guidance makes it extremely difficult to
coordinate all of these events and is demoralizing for our marines and
their families.
The sequester and CR cuts in fiscal year 2013 significantly
impacted MARSOC's training schedule. Courses were cut or consolidated,
contracted instructors were eliminated, and mission rehearsal exercises
were scaled back. Courses cancelled in October and November due to the
shutdown and subsequent travel restrictions will take months to
reschedule. Without this training, MARSOC operators had significantly
fewer opportunities to train in varied environments and integrate
battlefield capabilities into their tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Deploying MARSOC teams have less redundancy in individual
operator skills, causing greater risk to mission, and reducing their
expeditionary advantages.
General Welsh. The recent government shutdown and fiscal year 2013
implementation of sequestration impacted the readiness of Air Force
Special Operations Forces in a variety of functional areas. Major
exercises were cancelled due to current fiscal uncertainty, resulting
in a loss of interoperability training and proficiency of our Special
Operators with their coalition, joint, and general purpose partners.
Air Force Special Operations Forces are highly dependent upon Air
Force-provided capabilities as well as those from our sister Services.
In the operations support arena, we were forced to incrementally fund
major service contracts, resulting in the deferment of several million
dollars' worth of sustainment requirements including the repair of
deteriorated airfields, roadways, and fire suppression systems.
Important but non-mission critical expenditures were also delayed or
cancelled, such as morale, welfare, and recreation facilities, further
challenging force preservation for our already highly-stressed special
operators and their families. Finally, the long-term consequences of
the government shutdown and sequestration, considered by many of our
military and civilian personnel to be a break in faith, are yet to be
determined.
8. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, what, in your views, are the likely impacts of
continued sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and beyond on the readiness
of SOF?
General Odierno. ARSOF readiness remains relatively high at the
beginning of fiscal year 2014. At sequestration spending levels, USASOC
predicts readiness will degrade, while undergoing force structure
adjustments, before things improve around fiscal year 2017. The need
for persistent force capacity in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
eclipsed ARSOF's ability to fully source theater-setting activities in
support of other theater campaign plans. Currently, three-fourths of
deployed forces are directly tied to the fight in Afghanistan and other
named operations. ARSOF requirements increased 56 percent since 2008;
despite Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn ending, ARSOF
remains unable to meet all geographic combatant commander and Theater
SOCOM requirements. The increase in Global Force Management Allocation
Plan (GFMAP) requirements consumes nearly all of ARSOF's readiness.
Moreover, in order to meet urgent and/or critical operational demands,
USASOC assumed risk in its regional alignment structure, which hinders
development with partner nations and potential allies.
USASOC receives the majority of its baseline and O&M funding from
SOCOM. At this time, USASOC cannot report the final impacts and
corresponding second and third order effects associated with continued
sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and beyond until decisions are made
and guidance is published concerning Army Program Objective Memorandum
(POM). Nonetheless, USASOC will reduce targeted SOF capacity in order
to preserve and regenerate a more globally-oriented force.
Assuming a President's budget for 2014 level of funding across the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and the additive effects of the
Services' own reductions, USASOC will reduce combat formations across
the ARSOF enterprise in an effort to absorb O&M/baseline reductions and
assume risk in the following areas: Organic Mobility/Strike Capacity,
Critical Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) Capacity,
Engagement and Crisis Response Capacity, Joint Combined Exercises for
Training, Force Modernization, and Language Training and Recruiting.
USASOC will redistribute forces to protect critical capabilities, such
as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and regionally-
aligned ground forces, which are critical to fulfilling the tenets of
the Global SOF Campaign Plan. The Services' reduced ability to provide
forces for ARSOF pre-deployment training and operational deployments
remains a primary concern. Bottom line, USASOC remains committed to
retaining capability by reducing capacity and continues to closely
monitor and mitigate readiness impacts at the tactical and operational
levels.
Admiral Greenert. Similar to other naval forces, sequestration will
result in reduced training and readiness for nondeployed SOF, reducing
surge capacity. Navy will continue to maintain the readiness of
deployed forces. SOCOM is responsible for the overall readiness of SOF
and would be able to provide more detailed information on the effects
of sequestration of SOF readiness.
General Amos. SOCOM predicts that the future demand for SOF will
increase, that SOF will be more specialized with more advanced training
to meet regional challenges, and that SOF will still be ready to
support major combat operations. As the Global SOF Network expands, so
will the demand on some of the service provided enabling capabilities.
Reduced Marine Corps end strength will limit my ability to fully
support MARSOC requirements for combat support and combat service
support personnel. This shortfall will either be answered through
additional contractor support which will require additional funding, or
it will result in a degradation of materiel and operational readiness
(or both).
Similar to the larger Marine Corps, I expect that SOCOM will have
to sacrifice future capabilities in order to preserve readiness.
Maintenance and recapitalization of equipment, both SOF and service
provided, will be deferred, despite years of extensive use in
operations and training. This is a difficult choice that may lead SOCOM
to lose the comparative advantage if sequestration persists.
I expect morale within the SOF community, like the rest of the
Marine Corps, will also be impacted. Career progression, deployment
cycles, family support services, and the like will be affected creating
more stress on the force. We take our responsibility to our young men
and women and their families very seriously, but there is little doubt
that all of these issues will impact readiness of the SOF community if
the sequester continues.
General Welsh. Continued sequestration will cause Air Force SOF to
consider further force-shaping initiatives and further complicate the
balance between near-term readiness and long-term capability. The
impacts would not only be felt by the joint SOF community, but
throughout every geographic command. Air Force SOF are highly dependent
upon Air Force-provided capabilities as well as those from our sister
Services. Examples of difficult decisions include reduced Air Force
flying hours supporting SOF, incremental funding of service contracts,
and reduced base operating services and operations support. Continued
sequestration will negatively affect the ongoing recapitalization of
our legacy MC-130 and AC-130 fleets, desynchronize global ISR supply
and demand, and ill-posture our force for future contested environments
and near-peer challenges.
9. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, how has sequestration impacted the ability of your
Services to provide critical enabling capabilities to SOF? What if
sequestration continues in fiscal year 2014 and beyond?
General Odierno. Army sourcing of SOCOM Service Provided
Capabilities (SPC) requests to support CAMPLAN 7500 in fiscal year 2014
is 59 percent of the requested total with a forecasted sourcing of 58
percent of total SPC requested in fiscal year 2015. However, it remains
to be seen at what readiness level these SPCs will be maintained given
the current and projected reductions in Army manning and funding.
Army's current intent is for contingency forces to train to T1 (highest
level of readiness) and sustain T2 (next level down) during the
available year.
USASOC does not have organic echelon above brigade (EAB)
maintenance capabilities. Army's Installation Logistic Readiness
Centers (LRC), formerly Directorate of Logistics (DOL), provide USASOC
with core maintenance capabilities and support, such as: painting,
fabrication, corrosion repair, load testing, and maintenance. Providing
logistics support to ARSOF will always be a top Army priority. Although
sequestration reductions have negatively impacted Army readiness, the
Army has a plan to move funds between accounts to ensure continuous
support to these high priority Special Operations Forces.
Admiral Greenert. To date, sequestration has not directly impacted
support to deployed SOF. However, if fiscally constrained to
sequestration level funding over the long term, one potential scenario
would result in insufficient capacity to conduct widely distributed
Counter-Terrorism/Irregular Warfare missions, as defined in the Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG). There would be inadequate force structure
available to allocate to this mission, in the amount defined by the
Force Structure Assessment and concurred upon by SOCOM.
General Amos. Reduction of Marine Corps end strength significantly
degrades my ability to directly support MARSOC, as well as the larger
SOCOM enterprise. Under a full sequester and a 175,000 strong Marine
Corps, I will be unable to meet MARSOC's full requirement of 3,112
Active Duty marines. Per the Defense Secretary's guidance to all
Service Chiefs, MARSOC will be frozen at fiscal year 2013 end strength
and thus capped at 2,742 marines--a reduction of nearly 12 percent.
While MARSOC will still be able to conduct its most critical tasks,
this unrealized growth eliminates certain key combat service support
and enabler personnel. MARSOC will rely on service provided
augmentation, adding additional stress to an already fully tasked
Marine Corps. In the likely event that the Marine Corps is unable to
meet the MARSOC request for enablers, they will be forced to use
contracted personnel for logistics, maintenance, and training. More
contractors will require additional non-programmed funding and is
contrary to the guidance to reduce reliance on contracted personnel.
Sequestration cuts will also increase demand on Marine air-ground
task force assets that may not be available to support SOF when needed,
or will reduce our ability to support other global priorities. Other
service cuts to critical capabilities which support SOF, particularly
maritime unmanned aerial assets and rotary wing mobility, will drive
SOF to request additional support from the Marine Corps in the littoral
zones. This again will compete with the Marine Corps' ability to meet
other operational demands.
General Welsh. Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF) are highly
dependent upon Air Force-provided capabilities as well as those from
our sister Services. If sequestration continues in fiscal year 2014,
the further degradation of supporting conventional forces due to
diminished resources will increase operational risk and curtail both
the range of missions and level of operations tempo that Air Force SOF
can execute in support of SOCOM's Global SOF Campaign Plan and other
combatant command demands. Examples include decreased or lost training
and operational capacity in critical command and control, ISR, close
air support, global mobility, and training range assets, all negatively
impacting our special operators' ability to train for and execute
missions worldwide.
10. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, current plans call for increasing SOF from 66,000
across DOD to 72,000 by 2017. Is this plan sustainable under full
sequestration?
General Odierno. Increasing SOF manpower to 72,000 without the
adequate resourcing, impacts readiness and SOF's ability to deploy
properly trained and equipped troops forward. SOF continually assesses
its force to ensure an optimal mix of Active, Reserve, Guard, and
civilians required to meet current operational deployments and
unforeseen emerging threats. Operating under a full sequestration
condition would significantly hamper SOF's ability to provide a
flexible force capable of adapting to rapidly changing situations and
unexpected contingencies.
Admiral Greenert. Without a substantive change to defense strategy
that significantly reduces the demands placed on regular Navy forces,
this plan is not sustainable if we are held to the BCA revised
discretionary caps in the long term. Trades between manpower, training,
and costs to equip SOF will be balanced to maintain the readiness of
regular Navy forces.
General Amos. No. Under a full sequester and a 175,000 strong
Marine Corps, I will be unable to meet MARSOC's full requirement of
3,112 Active Duty marines. Per the Defense Secretary's guidance to all
Service Chiefs, MARSOC will be frozen at fiscal year 2013 end strength
and thus capped at 2,742 marines--a reduction of nearly 12 percent.
While MARSOC will still be able to conduct its most critical tasks,
this unrealized growth eliminates certain key combat service support
and enabler personnel. MARSOC will rely on service provided
augmentation, adding additional stress to an already fully tasked
Marine Corps. In the likely event that the Marine Corps is unable to
meet the MARSOC request for enablers, they will be forced to use
contracted personnel for logistics, maintenance, and training. More
contractors will require additional non-programmed funding and is
contrary to the guidance to reduce reliance on contracted personnel. If
the Marine Corps is forced to downsize below 175,000 marines,
additional cuts to MARSOC may be required that will reduce operational
capabilities and availability and directly degrade our ability to
attain the Nation's military strategic objectives.
General Welsh. SOF growth is not sustainable while under
sequestration as it would require the Air Force to offset this growth
with reductions in non-SOF mission capabilities. Given our tentative
plans to reduce 500+ aircraft and 25,000 personnel, the Air Force would
face great difficulty in absorbing additional SOF growth without relief
from sequestration.
11. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, what service equipment sustainment or modernization
cancellations, delays, or restructuring will also affect your SOF
troops and units?
General Odierno. The majority of all USASOC equipment comes from
the Army as Service-provided equipment. This includes everything from
soldier equipment, such as boots, uniforms, body armor, weapons and
optics, to organizational equipment, such as vehicles, generators,
unmanned aerial systems, and other aviation platforms. To date, ARSOF
has not experienced any significant effects of Army sequestration-
related cuts on either new equipment fielding or on equipment reset.
However, if funding reductions brought on as a result of sequestration,
it is likely that ARSOF will be impacted in the future. It would
require the Army to reduce our modernization accounts by nearly 25
percent with no program unaffected, including ARSOF. Gauging the
precise impacts these cuts might have is difficult at this time, as
final decisions on what to cut or restructure have not been made.
Admiral Greenert. If fiscally constrained to the revised
discretionary caps over the long-term, one potential scenario would
result in the cancellation of one Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)
procurement, which would have a longer-term impact on the ability to
support SOF requirements in CENTCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
currently being mitigated with the Interim AFSB and use of leased
vessels in PACOM. In addition, reduced force structure would result in
insufficient capacity to fully support the Counter Terrorism and
Irregular Warfare missions of the DSG, as defined in the Force
Structure Assessment and concurred upon by SOCOM.
General Amos. With the budget-driven reduction of the Marine Corps
to 175,000, MARSOC will be capped at 2,742 Active Duty marines and will
not realize planned growth. This has forced MARSOC to reorganize its
personnel to continue to provide the same amount of operational
capability with reduced end strength. Along with a reorganization of
personnel, MARSOC has also done a thorough review of equipment to make
sure they have the optimal mix to support operations and training.
Approximately 80 percent of MARSOC equipment is provided by the Marine
Corps, and I feel confident that MARSOC will continue to be supported
to the same standards as the rest of the Marine Corps Forces. None of
the cuts to major Marine Corps programs will have substantial impacts
to MARSOC.
I do have concerns that other service cuts will shift the burden of
SOF support to the Marine Corps. I am particularly concerned about cuts
to maritime unmanned aerial assets, rotary wing support, and maritime
platforms that will support SOF afloat. While it is too soon to know
precisely the impacts of these cuts, we can assume that the capacity
available will be insufficient to support both SOF and Marine Corps
needs, particularly in maritime and littoral environments. Reductions
of these types of high demand, low density capabilities will likely
force some difficult prioritizations and impact readiness and
operations.
General Welsh. The Air Force's fiscal year 2015 budget is still
working through the DOD's program and budget review process and is pre-
decisional at this time. Given the magnitude of budget reductions the
Air Force faced to meet BCA guidelines, all avenues to maximize savings
while minimizing mission impact were considered during the development
of our fiscal year 2015 budget. The Air Force made tough decisions to
meet today's challenges while protecting our ability to modernize for
tomorrow's fight. Recapitalization of aging aircraft fleets, as well as
critical modifications and upgrades to current fleets, were some of the
reductions we were forced to make across all commands as a result of
sequestration.
12. Senator Hagan. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, how do you plan to manage these challenges and
mitigate their impact on the important role SOF plays in operations
around the world?
General Odierno. In fiscal year 2013, the Army coordinated with
USASOC to ensure equipment reset activities remained uninterrupted in
spite of sequestration related funding reductions. However, if
sequestration remains in effect, we may be forced to transition to a
tiered readiness system to ensure deployed units and those preparing to
deploy receive priority for personnel, training, equipment, and
maintenance resources. Hence, USASOC's primary effort remains the
optimization of limited resources to train and conduct combat
operations in the future operating environment. This effort hinges on
the collaborative efforts of SOF-Conventional Force Interdependence.
Given the continuous deployment cycles across ARSOF to support the
GFMAP and CAMPLAN 7500 requirements, we expect USASOC to remain high on
our prioritization list, which reduces the immediate impacts associated
with tiered readiness across ARSOF. However, as the Army continues to
refine equipping and sustaining priorities to support significant
budget and personnel reductions, the Army and USASOC will continue to
coordinate to ensure ARSOF requirements remain visible within the
context of ARFORGEN's (Army Force Generation model) resourcing
priorities. In addition, USASOC will continue to monitor and track base
operations support and Service Provided Capabilities. Both base
operations support and Service Provided Capabilities could impact
ARSOF's readiness to deploy in crisis response, in support of
persistent engagements, and other named operations around the globe.
Admiral Greenert. To overcome the challenges and mitigate the
impacts of sequestration, we are looking at alternative platforms to
support SOF, such as LCS and MLP (AFSB). We are also enhancing our
interoperability by integrating SOF into the Amphibious Readiness
Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) to improve our ability to
support Theater SOCOM and forward deployed SOF forces.
General Amos. The Marine Corps and SOCOM share a similar commitment
to providing agile, expeditionary, and above all, responsive forces to
meet our Nation's global demands. The Marine Corps provides a
complimentary capability that can be leveraged to support the Global
SOF Network. The SOF Liaison Element is the initial mechanism to
enhance this relationship: a team of six SOF operators, representing
each of the SOF components, will embark with the Marine Expeditionary
Units to increase collaboration between the TSOCs and Marine forces
afloat. Admiral McRaven and I believe that through this relatively
small investment, we can expand the ways in which the Marine Corps can
support SOF operations in the maritime and littoral environments. Even
faced with our current fiscal challenges, enhanced interoperability and
integration between the Marine Corps and SOCOM remains one of my top
priorities.
Although MARSOC will be capped at 2,742 marines due to sequester-
driven reductions, they are looking toward the post-Afghanistan
environment by regionally aligning each of the Marine Special
Operations Battalions (MSOB). Forward postured, fully enabled Marine
Special Operations Companies (MSOC) will now support the Global SOF
Network in SOCPAC, SOCAFRICA, and SOCCENT. Targeted language programs,
enhanced logistical networks, and specialized training will enable
MARSOC forces to build and maintain enduring relationships with our
critical partners. Seasoned, mature MARSOC marines will bring their
knowledge and experience of working in expeditionary and often austere
environments to the benefit of both SOCOM and the Marine Corps.
General Welsh. The Air Force is striving to mitigate the impact on
SOF by prioritizing near-term readiness and weapons system
recapitalization, paired with a focus on full-spectrum training and
long-term investments. Near-term readiness will ensure our unique
enabling capabilities are sustained for our SOF supporting the
combatant commands. Full-spectrum training will be supported through
the continuation of special operations-focused exercises and an
increasing emphasis on live-virtual-constructive training. Special
operations long-term investments favor recapitalization over
modernization, primarily through the full recapitalization of the MC-
130 and AC-130 fleets.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
active component and reserve component force mix
13. Senator Manchin. General Odierno and General Welsh, for 6 years
as Governor, I sent troops to war at our Nation's request and responded
to numerous natural disasters. Each time the citizen soldiers performed
flawlessly and never failed to respond to or accomplish a mission.
Knowing that the Reserve component is dual-missioned, costs less, and
has a proven track record, why are we not considering realignment that
adjusts the Active component/Reserve component mix to maintain
capability at a reduced cost?
General Odierno. The BCA imposes significant reductions on the size
of the Army and creates substantial challenges in meeting the Defense
Strategy. We may be forced to reduce the total Army an additional
100,000 soldiers if sequestration continues. The Army is conducting
deliberate analyses now to determine which capabilities should be
reduced or adjusted to meet strategic requirements. The Army will
deliberately and thoroughly review all options that impact Active
component/Reserve component mix as it downsizes and reorganizes to meet
the Nation's needs in an era of reduced resources.
The Army National Guard and Army Reserve play significant roles as
part of our Total Force. It is imperative not to lose the gains made in
Reserve component readiness, equipment modernization, and experience by
continuing to employ Reserve component forces to meet combatant
commander operational requirements in a fashion that is predictable and
sustainable, within the resources afforded to us. Prudent use of those
resources allows the Army to minimize challenges to interoperability
between the Reserve and Active component during future crises, while
providing valuable leadership development and experience to members of
the Reserve component.
However, we also must be realistic. Reserve component soldiers cost
less when not on active duty. When activated for mobilization or
operational support, Reserve component units cost the same as their
Active component counterparts. Additionally, they can require more
extensive training periods to meet readiness standards based on the
mission, which costs both dollars and time.
The Army National Guard dual-mission requirement must also be
considered. We should not commit large numbers of title 32 priority
forces from a state or region, especially during specific times of the
year, unless the mission is one with significant national defense
urgency. In the past, we have been able to synchronize deployments
across the Active component and Reserve component to avoid impacts to
state missions. Finally, given the drawdown in Afghanistan, Reserve
component forces will have fewer opportunities for employment, which
will challenge us all to maintain their current state of training and
readiness over time.
General Welsh. The Air Force's fiscal year 2015 budget is working
through the DOD's program and budget review process and is
predecisional at this time. Given the magnitude of budget reductions
the Air Force faced to meet BCA guidelines, all avenues to maximize
savings while minimizing mission impact were considered during the
development of our fiscal year 2015 budget, to include the cost-saving
realignments that you suggest. Finding the appropriate balance, which
varies by mission, requires extensive analysis to ensure we maintain
operational capability and responsiveness. We are currently evaluating
all mission areas to see where we can maintain critical Air Force-
provided capabilities at a reduced cost--and in some cases at reduced
capacities--by realigning missions into the Reserve component. In
addition to cost considerations, however, sustainable total military
force mission contributions by each component are analytically
evaluated with respect to four other major factors: (1) total strategy-
based warfighting and training demands; (2) required manpower; (3)
projected equipment inventory; and (4) deployment policy.
14. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, Time magazine recently ran an
article titled, ``The War Within the U.S. Army.'' In the article,
Lawrence Korb, the Pentagon personnel chief during the Reagan
administration, said the following: ``We should be moving toward a
small, more agile Active-Duty Army and save the bigger mission for the
Reserves.'' What are your thoughts on this?
General Odierno. An undersized Army would lack the capacity to meet
the land force requirements of combatant commanders. Continuing 2011
BCA funding levels will adversely affect the Army's ability to rapidly
provide fully trained and equipped units to combatant commanders over
the next several years. The Army must maintain an optimal mix of Active
and Reserve component forces in order to achieve the correct force size
at the lowest cost. I do not envision significant migration of force
structure between the Active and Reserve components. Active-Duty Forces
provide a rotational, worldwide presence to ensure stability and deter
conflicts, and to rapidly surge capabilities to respond to unexpected
contingencies. Reserve component forces are best suited for
predictable, infrequent deployments and for providing operational and
strategic depth. Due to sequestration impacts to the Army's budget, the
Army may be forced to implement drastic reductions to end strength,
unit inventory, and overall readiness, with detrimental impacts to the
Army's capacity and capability to respond across the range of military
operations.
military child abuse and neglect
15. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, Senator McCain and I recently sent a letter to
Secretary Hagel about child abuse and neglect in the military, which is
a growing problem. I received a response, but it is just the start of a
solution. Even with declining budgets, we need to do right by our kids.
What are your thoughts on forming a section within the Defense Centers
of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain
Injury (PH/TBI) with the issues of child abuse and neglect?
General Odierno. A Center of Excellence for child abuse and neglect
already exists within the Army's Family Advocacy Program (FAP). Along
with the FAP managers, the resources provided by the congressional set-
aside for FAP have been judiciously used to provide adequate staff,
policy, training, and research into the issues of child abuse and
domestic violence. The Army, along with our Sister Services, leads the
Nation in developing risk assessment tools to prevent domestic abuse
and for the standardizing the definitions for family maltreatment.
Admiral Greenert. The FAP initiates an effective coordinated
community response with medical and civilian resources in addressing
incidents of child abuse and neglect. Children requiring medical
treatment resulting from psychological and/or traumatic brain injury
are immediately referred to the appropriate Military Treatment Facility
(MTF) or civilian hospital for assessment and treatment services.
Family member children and adolescent victims of abuse or neglect have
access to the full range of assessment and treatment services for
psychological problems and traumatic brain injuries regardless of their
geographic location. Navy MTFs, in conjunction with their network
partners, provide subspecialty PH/TBI services spanning the entire
continuum of care, to include outpatient, intensive outpatient,
inpatient, and rehabilitation services specific to pediatrics. While
the mission of DCoE for PH/TBI is to provide expertise on DOD policies
related to PH/TBI care, it is the role of the Services' medical
departments to actually deliver this care.
General Amos. Child abuse and neglect within the military is an
issue that requires a uniformed system of prevention, education,
research, and service delivery across various programs and at every
level. Unfortunately, risk factors that make child abuse more likely
are often present in military families. These factors may include
increased numbers of young families without social or family support;
frequent deployment or absences from the home by the military member;
financial stressors; relationship conflict; and other stressors related
to deployment. Combating child abuse within the military population
requires a concentrated, specialized response.
The Marine Corps continues to work at combating child abuse through
our various programs including the FAP. FAP is responsible for the
prevention, intervention, and treatment of family violence. We continue
to see a decrease in number of child care incidents that meet criteria
with our programs. The Marine Corps is always supportive of additional
research support whether it is with other Federal agencies or private/
public partnerships. The Marine Corps has an existing working
relationship with the DCoE for PH/TBI that has been helpful in our
research approach at preventing, intervening and treating family
violence.
General Welsh. While we are pleased with the intent to ensure the
issue of child abuse and neglect is addressed even in lean budgetary
times, the Air Force believes that broadening the scope of the DCoE for
PH/TBI is not the answer. The issue is really not related to the need
for more dollars spent on centralized policy and strategy, as would be
the case in using DCoE. A better use of scarce resources would be to
expand funding for prevention services within the Air Force's
successful New Parent Support Program (NPSP), which would allow for
more robust prevention efforts for high risk families. Expansion of
NPSP would result in increased outreach and screening of the target
population as well as increased engagement in services. Providing
services early in the family life-cycle may prevent maltreatment for
the most vulnerable children (birth to 3-years-old), as well as setting
the foundation for positive parenting practices in the future.
16. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, could you comment on child abuse in the
military, and commit to working on that issue with me?
General Odierno. Reduction and elimination of child abuse remains a
top Army priority. We look forward to working with you and other
Members of Congress to continue addressing all domestic violence issues
within the ranks of the Army.
The Army's FAP is dedicated to the prevention, education,
intervention, reporting, investigation, and treatment of spouse and
child abuse. The program provides a variety of counseling, relationship
building, and other services to soldiers and families. Each
installation FAP manager is responsible for directing the activities of
the program.
Preventing domestic violence is a command priority and leader
responsibility. All commanders receive FAP training. The Army also
provides soldiers annual FAP awareness training. A basic course is
conducted for newly assigned personnel, and a series of advanced
courses are available for clinical health care providers. In addition,
two specialized courses for military police and criminal investigators
intervening in Family violence are taught at the U.S. Army Military
Police School.
Admiral Greenert. I remain committed to working with you on the
prevention of military child abuse. Our data indicates a decrease in
substantiated child abuse incidents between fiscal years 2004 and 2006,
and the number of incidents remained at steady state through fiscal
year 2012.
An increase in substantiated cases this past year is a cause for
concern; we are monitoring this closely. Our New Parent Support Home
Visitor Program provides face-to-face contacts to new parents through
information and referrals, individualized consultation, and educational
services. Nearly 99 percent of parents who participated in the program
did not have an incident of abusive parenting within 12 months of
receiving services.
General Amos. Multiple efforts are being made to combat the
occurrence of child abuse in the Marine Corps, through preventative
efforts, awareness campaigns, parent education, and treatment. The
Marine Corps continues to work at combating child abuse through our
various programs including the FAP. Marine Corps FAP's role in
prevention is to establish clear standards for personal behavior,
provide early detection of potential problems, and intervene before
abuse occurs. FAP is responsible for the prevention, education,
intervention, and treatment of family violence; reviews of alleged
abuse; clinical treatment for families involved in violence; home
visits for new parent support efforts; counseling; and 24-hours, 7-
days-a-week, victim advocacy. The FAP investigates allegations of child
abuse, and makes recommendations for treatment and services for
affected children and families. Services include clinical treatment,
New Parent Support Program services, and various other military, and
community family services.
Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS), FAP staff, military police,
legal offices, chaplains, and our civilian counterparts have joined
forces to reduce child abuse on our bases, stations, and the
surrounding areas. FAP equips its staff with the right tools for
success, providing ongoing training and support for adopting new
practices.
General Welsh. In the past 3 fiscal years, child abuse has
increased only slightly in the Air Force. This parallels similar rate
increases seen across DOD. The increase in rates has been identified as
primarily driven by child neglect incidents. The rates for emotional,
physical, and sexual abuse incidents have remained very stable during
this time period.
Yes, the Air Force is committed to continuing to address the issue
of child abuse, and we appreciate Congress' support. The Air Force FAP
has a number of prevention and treatment programs aimed at reducing
child abuse and neglect. FAP also has a robust research component and
partners with highly regarded family violence researchers to continue
development of effective prevention and treatment programs, as well as
monitoring clinical and program outcomes.
military headquarters staff cuts
17. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, I applauded Secretary Hagel when he ordered a
20 percent cut to the staff of military headquarters. However, my
concern is that no one really knows--with any precision--how many
contractors there are. Therefore, the required cuts might tend to focus
on uniformed personnel and government civilians, but not contractors.
Contractors are the first place we should target for cuts. How are you
implementing the staff reductions to ensure that contractors are part
of the original baseline and also included in the cuts?
General Odierno. The Army's first priority is to reduce service
contracts as much as feasible. We are committed to analyzing all labor
sources for potential reductions and to preventing the burden of budget
cuts from falling disproportionately onto our civilian or military
personnel. This is why the Secretary and I have directed that funding
for contracted capabilities at all commands will be reduced at levels
equal to or greater than those for military and civilian reductions.
The Army tracks Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) not the number of
individual contractor employees, as service contracts involve the
performance of a function, rather than the hiring of an individual
person. The Army has approximately 28,700 contractor FTEs supporting
Army Management Headquarters Activities at the two-star level or
higher. These numbers were submitted to Congress in July 2013 as part
of the fiscal year 2012 Inventory of Contract Services, and reflect the
items in the Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) database
that support requiring activities with an Army management headquarters
Unit Identification Code at the two-star level and higher.
As part of this effort, the Army intends to use the CMRA data to
measure our headquarters reductions and ensure a balanced approach.
CMRA data is increasingly being leveraged to build budgets and manage
the Total Force, in fulfillment of both statutory requirements and
commitments made to Congress in reports and testimony.
Admiral Greenert. The 1 July Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) fiscal guidance directed the Services to reduce spending on
headquarters 20 percent by fiscal year 2019, relative to the amount
currently planned for fiscal year 2018. Although the 20 percent cut
applies to budget dollars, the Secretary of Defense stated his intent
that we should also strive for a goal of 20 percent reductions in
government civilians and military personnel.
In executing this direction, the Navy plans to balance the cuts
appropriately among contractor, military, and civilian employees within
individual Navy headquarters organizations. However, not all
headquarters will be reduced by the same percentage. To support the
Navy's strategy of rebalancing to the Pacific and continuing to execute
ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), the Navy applied a
lesser level of reduction to fleet operational headquarters' staffs and
shifted more burden to non-deployed/non-operational staffs. With fleet
operational staffs having the preponderance of military manpower among
headquarters organizations, the military received an overall smaller
reduction percentage than civilian personnel and the contractor
workforce. The Navy intends to cut the contractor workforce by at least
the same percentage as the civilian workforce.
General Amos. The Marine Corps plans to achieve the 20 percent
reduction to headquarters by reducing marines in specified headquarters
as well as eliminating or combining specific headquarters. In addition,
we plan to reduce funding on associated civilian billets at specific
headquarters activities, as well as service contract spending at
headquarters activities which will ultimately result in fewer
contractors working in our headquarters. Many military billets will be
transferred to operational units while civilian billets and contractors
functions/activities will be eliminated. We further anticipate the
total cost of contracts that support our headquarters will be reduced.
General Welsh. When we assessed the military headquarters
workforce, the Air Force explicitly included contractors as part of the
labor and cost baseline. As we conduct our redesign and workforce
adjustments, we continue to look at reducing contractors as well as the
military and government civilian force. The Air Force recognizes the
need to employ government personnel in certain positions and will
continue to meet that need.
eliminating redundant or ineffective weapons systems
18. Senator Manchin. General Odierno and General Welsh, I have been
a big supporter of the Bowles-Simpson approach to getting our finances
in order. It is the only truly bipartisan approach out there. The
Bowles-Simpson plan outlined some cost-savings measures for defense
that have not been acted upon. For example, the Bowles-Simpson plan
recommended that Congress consider developing a commission for trimming
redundant or ineffective weapons from the DOD inventory. This process
could help give added flexibility to the Services and let them better
prioritize weapons systems. What is your opinion on this?
General Odierno. We do not believe that such a commission is
necessary. The assessment of whether a system is redundant or
ineffective currently occurs as part of a process through which the
military Services, the Joint Staff, and the OSD review requirements,
programs, and budgets. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
process assesses whether a program is redundant to those of other
Services and, along with the acquisition review of programs, determines
if weapons provide the needed capability or if the requirement can be
met by other systems. While the system is not perfect, it provides the
Services flexibility to pursue separate solutions when a common
solution may be too costly or too complex.
The Army, like the other Services, also reviews its weapon systems
internally to identify equipment within the Service that is no longer
needed, does not meet existing requirements, or is redundant.
General Welsh. Generally speaking, the Air Force supports
initiatives aimed at cutting redundant and less capable weapon systems,
especially in this fiscally constrained environment. In some cases,
redundancy is an operational requirement, but we cannot afford to fund
ineffective weapon systems. During the development of our fiscal year
2015 budget, under the requirements and fiscal guidance of the BCA, we
were compelled to cut capacity and lower priority platforms, and
programs that are disproportionately expensive relative to the
capabilities they provide.
19. Senator Manchin. General Odierno and General Welsh, please
provide a list of equipment and/or programs that you recommend
terminating so that funds can be transferred to higher-priority needs.
General Odierno. The Army cannot recommend any individual programs
for termination at this time. All current weapon systems and
modernization programs serve to fill warfighter-identified and JROC
approved capability gaps.
General Welsh. The Air Force's budget recommendations for fiscal
year 2015 are currently being deliberated in the DOD's Program and
Budget Review and are pre-decisional at this time. However, in order to
reduce the size of the Air Force to comply with the magnitude of the
spending caps established by the BCA and the fiscal guidance we
received to formulate our budget--while still maintaining a relevant
force to meet current and future challenges--we employed a guiding
principle of taking vertical cuts from our programs. That is, as
opposed to weakening many programs with fair share cuts, we opted to
terminate complete programs, to include all of the associated support
elements of the terminated program(s). This includes force structure in
areas such as single purpose aircraft, lower-end ISR assets, and
programs that are disproportionately expensive relative to the
capabilities they provide.
all-volunteer force
20. Senator Manchin. General Odierno and General Amos, the last
drafted soldier retired in 2011. It is hard to believe that the modern
All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is only approximately 30-years-old. I grew up
in an era where the draft was a fact of life. I'm concerned that the
AVF has isolated those that serve from the rest of the country. There
are large financial costs associated with maintaining an AVF. I read
that the Army spends about $20,000 per recruit in advertising costs
alone. In your judgment, should we be rethinking at least some aspects
and unintended consequences of the AVF?
General Odierno. The Army continues to support the AVF as the right
path to man the Force. The AVF has successfully manned the Army for
over 40 years, including most recently 12 years of war. The Army, fully
manned by volunteers, has accomplished all the missions the Nation has
called upon it to perform. This AVF is of a much higher quality and
professionalism than what was ever seen during conscription.
The regular Army cost per accession for fiscal year 2012 was
$22,386 including recruiting, recruiter support, bonuses, and
advertising. In past studies, analysts concluded that the AVF would be
cheaper than a conscripted force, given a constant level of force
effectiveness. In a 1988 study by the GAO, a volunteer force was
determined to be less expensive than a draft by more than $2.5 billion
(over $4 billion today), when taking into account reaching equivalent
force effectiveness over 24 months.
That being said, recruiting is expected to be more challenging in
fiscal year 2014 in part due to the declining eligible recruiting pool.
The Army and the Nation still face challenges such as rising obesity
rates and decreasing high school graduation rates as we recruit the
AVF.
In the recent past a favorable economic environment allowed us to
reduce enlistment incentive amounts and the number of Army occupations
offered bonuses or education incentives. However, we must retain the
flexibility to continue necessary advertising and to apply incentives
as necessary to recruit and retain soldiers with critical or
specialized skills. The continued authorities and funding of these
programs by Congress remain critical to the sustainment of the Army.
Last, we should always be concerned about any isolation of our
soldiers from the rest of society, as well as a society that is
disconnected from its soldiers. In this respect, it is imperative that
the Army be reflective of all 50 States and across all demographic
groups--an Army that represents all of America. We are also mindful
that it is important to tell the Army story to the American people,
using all appropriate venues available to us. In addition, we know that
training and education are critical to a professional force, but that
broadening experiences away from the Army such as training with
industry, fellowships, and civilian education may be equally important.
In the end, I share your interest in ensuring the Army stay
``connected'' to those whom we serve.
General Amos. I could not be more proud of today's AVF, and it has
done superbly for the past 4 decades. The draft has a place, but should
be reserved for use only when it has been determined that the AVF is
inadequate to meet the Nation's needs during a national emergency. That
is where the draft is more cost-effective.
On the surface it may appear reinstituting some form of the draft
is an attractive savings over the AVF. However, it is important to view
what has been achieved by investing in the AVF. For example, within the
Marine Corps the quality, experience, and professionalism of your
marines are at the highest levels I've seen in my 43 years. These young
ethical warriors are the most well-trained and ready to meet the
demands of a complex strategic environment. More importantly, we are a
force that is made up of men and women who have made the conscious
decision to volunteer to serve their country. That is a significant
difference from a force that is built through the draft.
It may be true that more citizens are unfamiliar with military
service due to the lack of a draft. To counter that reality, it is
essential that awareness and outreach efforts are consistently
resourced at levels that will maintain connections with the citizens we
serve.
syria
21. Senator Manchin. Admiral Greenert, during the recent crisis in
Syria, we positioned additional destroyers and aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean to be able to quickly react as the crisis evolved. I was
not supportive of using military force in Syria, but I am interested in
understanding the financial impact of this crisis during a time of
sequestration. Do you have a general sense of how much it cost to
deploy these assets to the region?
Admiral Greenert. Navy assets in the operating area that were
scheduled to return to homeport were instead extended in the region to
support this mission. Total fiscal year 2013 costs were $42 million. To
fund the forward deployed assets in fiscal year 2013, Navy canceled the
port visits that these assets were scheduled to complete before
returning to homeport.
Fiscal year 2014 costs to support the mission total $45 million
through the end of October 2013. Navy anticipates fiscal year 2014
costs to total approximately $70 million to $80 million by completion
of the mission.
22. Senator Manchin. Admiral Greenert, what trades-offs did you
have to make in order to support the President's Syria policy?
Admiral Greenert. Navy assets in the operating area that were
scheduled to return to homeport were instead extended in the region to
support this mission. Total fiscal year 2013 costs were $42 million. To
fund the forward deployed assets in fiscal year 2013, Navy canceled the
port visits that these assets were scheduled to complete before
returning to homeport.
Fiscal year 2014 costs to support the mission total $45 million
through the end of October 2013. Navy anticipates fiscal year 2014
costs to total approximately $70 million to $80 million by completion
of the mission.
Some of the specific operational trade-offs included:
The USS Nimitz's extension to support Syria operations
resulted in the loss of an opportunity to conduct dual-Carrier
Strike Group (CSG) operations in the South China Sea.
The Navy extended six ship deployments in length, by
an average of 40 days per ship. This extension pushed the
deployment length to over 10 months for two ships (USS
Stockdale and USS Shoup) and reduced dwell (time in homeport
between deployments) for each of the affected ships.
Due to schedule limitations, the Nimitz CSG escort
ships returned to homeport ahead of Nimitz. This required U.S.
Pacific Fleet to sortie an unplanned escort ship. USS Spruance
lost an opportunity to conduct sustainment training with the
George Washington CSG as a result of this escort duty.
Extended deployments resulted in a delay to the start
of critical maintenance periods for five ships (USS Nimitz, USS
Princeton, USS Barry, USS Gravely, and USS Monterey). The
extension resulted in a slow start due to the loss of time to
conduct pre-shipyard preparations and assessments.
sequestration effects on future procurement and modernization programs
23. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, up to this point, the Services have not had to
make major changes to their procurement and modernization programs.
What weapon systems or modernization programs are at risk, if full
sequestration continues into 2014 and beyond?
General Odierno. The Army must develop and field versatile and
tailorable equipment that is affordable, sustainable, cost-effective,
and enables our soldiers to fight and win across the range of conflict.
Every program and every portfolio of weapon systems in the Army
would be directly affected if the cuts from full sequestration occur.
That said, the Army remains committed to providing the warfighter with
a superior tactical advantage on any battlefield. Last year, the Army
was able to mitigate many of the impacts that would otherwise have come
to fruition against a number of programs by offsetting sequestration
reductions with prior year unobligated funds.
As prior year funds become increasingly scarce, the reality is that
all weapon system programs would be affected in some way by
sequestration reductions in 2014. We will first look to improve
existing systems like the Paladin Integrated Management Program, our
Abrams tank fleet to include procuring sufficient M1A2SEP tanks to
complete the two-variant fleet strategy, the Bradley Infantry Fighting
Vehicle, and our soldier systems to include the conversion of M4
carbines to M4A1 carbines.
We will invest in developmental modernization programs in select
cases. For example, the Army will continue to pursue development and
production of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which is needed
to fill the capability gap between the High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
family of vehicles. Additionally, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) is intended to replace the M113 family of vehicles, the primary
vehicle for many of the Army's important capabilities, such as mortars,
medical evacuation, and command and control vehicles.
If full sequestration continues into 2014 and beyond, the Army's
ability to pursue modernization efforts to replace several aging
platforms, such as the Armed Aerial Scout and the Ground Combat Vehicle
for example, would be placed at risk.
Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2013 sequestration reductions
compelled us to reduce our afloat and ashore operations and created a
significant shore maintenance backlog. The effects were barely
manageable because we received authorization to reprogram funds into
appropriate maintenance accounts, and we were able to use prior-year
investment balances to mitigate reductions to investment programs.
If sequestration continues into fiscal year 2014, we will not be
able to use prior-year funds to mitigate shortfalls in investment
accounts as we did in fiscal year 2013. Without congressional action or
mitigating circumstances, the reductions imposed by sequestration and
the limitations of a Continuing Resolution will compel us to:
Cancel planned fiscal year 2014 procurement of an SSN,
an LCS and an AFSB; also, delay an SSN planned for fiscal year
2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the
reduction in fleet size that the BCA would compel us to make
over the long term.
Delay the planned start of construction on the first
SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence
requirements when the Ohio-class SSBN retires.
Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G
Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, 2 P-8A
Poseidon, 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons, exacerbating
future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities to project
power despite anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats.
Delay delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) by 2
years, extending the period of 10 CVN in service, and lowering
surge capacity.
Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS George Washington
(CVN 73) scheduled for fiscal year 2016, disrupting today's
``heel-to-toe'' CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term
CVN capacity.
Cancel or defer planning fiscal year 2014 fleet
maintenance, including 34 of 55 surface ship maintenance
periods totaling about $950 million--all in private shipyards--
and 191 of about 700 aircraft depot maintenance actions. This
missed maintenance will inevitably take time off the expected
service life of our ships and aircraft, which in turn will make
it harder to sustain even the smaller fleet we will have if the
revised discretionary caps remain in place for the long term.
We will be compelled to keep in place our freeze on
hiring for most civilian positions.
Ashore we will continue to conduct only safety-
essential renovation and modernization of facilities, further
increasing the large backlog in that area.
General Amos. If sequestration were fully implemented, the Marine
Corps would have to reassess every program. Sequestration will cause
interruptions across program acquisitions that increase total program
costs. As schedules slip and delays are created due to these fiscally
induced interruptions, we will see longer contracts, losses of
efficiencies, negative impacts on development and production schedules,
restructuring of programs, and Nunn-McCurdy breaches. In procurement,
existing contracts will have to be renegotiated which will prevent the
Marine Corps from receiving Economic Order Quantity pricing.
The Marine Corps will have to sustain legacy systems longer than
planned which will drive up current operation and support costs. We
will have to shift our attention to developing and replacing
obsolescent parts for legacy systems, which will lead the workforce to
focus on reengineering old and inefficient technologies (i.e.
sustaining 5 legacy radar systems will cost more than employing one new
Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)). Finally, technologies
designed to improve efficiencies (e.g. fuel, lightweight armor,
alternative energies) will have to be postponed, preventing the Marine
Corps from realizing planned, future savings.
General Welsh. The effects of sequestration disrupt major defense
acquisition programs throughout the development and fielding phases.
The single largest impact of sequestration and current budgetary
unknowns is the very serious impact they have on the meticulous cost
and schedule planning mandated in numerous public laws and DOD
acquisition policy. The increasing budgetary inefficiency makes it very
difficult, if not impossible, for our program managers to adequately do
their jobs.
Sequestration cuts deep into Air Force investment accounts, which
under this law must be applied equally at the program, project, and
activity level; consequently, it impacts every one of the Air Force's
acquisition programs. For example, a potential fiscal year 2014
sequestration impact for the F-35A low rate initial production,
relative to the request, could be the loss of 4 to 5 aircraft from the
requested amount of 19. This potential reduction will increase unit
costs resulting in production funding shortfalls.
The cuts brought on by sequestration-level funding will force the
Air Force to make profound reductions to readiness and major defense
acquisition programs funded out of investment accounts to achieve the
targeted decreased amounts in the first few years of the FYDP. When
forced to make tough decisions, we will favor new capabilities over
upgrades to our legacy forces; our top three acquisition priorities
remain the KC-46, the F-35, and the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
weather satellites
24. Senator Donnelly. General Welsh, according to a study by the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), DOD weather satellites are
critical for use with the Intelligence Community to position spy
satellites and airborne imaging assets. The AIA also cites that these
satellites provide critical environmental intelligence to the
warfighter and the SOF community--ensuring our forces are not
unnecessarily harmed by rough weather we could have anticipated. There
have also been reports in the press that if DOD fails to invest in new
weather satellite capabilities, it could find itself using Chinese
weather satellite data should a problem occur with National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather systems. Weather information
is critical to mission operations, yet DOD is considering not flying
its own weather satellites and relying on NOAA and international assets
which would likely include China because of budget concerns. At the
same time, the Air Force is paying $70 million a year in storage costs
for a weather satellite unlikely to fly--shouldn't we take that money
and go buy a new weather satellite? I am told the cost would be about
$200 million, which is less than 3 years of storage.
General Welsh. The Air Force's Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP) will provide seamless operational coverage through at
least 2021. DMSP is the DOD's current polar-orbiting weather satellite
system providing the U.S. military and Intelligence Community assured
access to global environmental information. Its imagery and data is
used for battlespace awareness, resource protection, and mission
planning and execution at high latitudes and in data denied and data
sparse regions. There are two DMSP satellites (F-19 and F-20) that
remain available for launch, and both satellites completed Service Life
Extension Program modifications in 2013. Currently, DMSP F-19 is being
prepared to launch in April 2014; with an expected 7-year service life,
F-19 will provide operational coverage to 2021.
DOD currently relies on a combination of DOD, civil, and
international partner weather satellites for worldwide environmental
monitoring operations. The combination of these systems provide global
coverage, continuous data and awareness of environmental conditions and
are primary sources of data for weather forecast models and
environmental applications operated by the Air Force, Army, and Navy.
According to the 2010 National Space Policy, ``The Secretary of
Commerce, through the NOAA Administrator, the Secretary of Defense,
through the Secretary of the Air Force, and the NASA Administrator
shall work together and with their international partners to ensure
uninterrupted, operational polar-orbiting environmental satellite
observations.'' Irrespective of future uncertainties in U.S. civil and
international weather satellite systems' availability, there is no plan
for the DOD Space-Based Environmental Monitoring baseline to be reliant
upon Chinese weather data.
Regarding reference to a new weather satellite, the Air Force
recently completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) that assessed the
need for a DOD weather satellite solution within the context of 12
space-based environmental monitoring collection gaps endorsed by the
JROC. The Air Force is reviewing the final results of the AoA before
releasing the results for the JROC review. The results of the JROC
review will contribute to defining a DOD materiel solution to succeed
DMSP and the collection gaps such a follow-on system may address.
25. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Greenert, some of the ideas proposed
by industry to maintain DOD weather imaging capabilities include
leveraging innovative partnerships with the Canadians that will bolster
coverage in the Arctic. This concept was recently touted by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ms. Madelyn R. Creedon. What kinds of
concerns do you have within the Arctic region as the ice continues to
melt and as the Russians and Chinese step up their presence there?
Admiral Greenert. My greatest concern is that we must continue
close cooperation with the Nations who share our interest in the
region. It is unlikely that any one nation will be capable of
addressing all the information needs of the future Arctic environment.
Weather imaging for safety and a better understanding of arctic ice
processes are perfect examples of areas where we need to communicate
mutual concerns and cooperate toward shared investments, data, and
knowledge.
26. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Greenert, what are your needs when it
comes to weather data and observations within the Arctic?
Admiral Greenert. We will need enhanced sensing capabilities in the
following areas:
Ocean properties
Atmospheric properties
Sea ice extent
Iceberg analysis and enhanced information about
iceberg lifecycles
Seasonal ice zone reconnaissance
Ice and snow thickness
Ice/sea/air interaction
The current Navy capability is sufficient for the extent of our
operations today, but as our future presence increases, so will our
needs for increased observations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
research and development
27. Senator Hirono. Admiral Greenert, research and development
(R&D) funding has been affected by sequestration. With the mandate to
leave personnel accounts untouched, it has taken an even larger
proportion of the cut than originally anticipated. R&D is very
important in order to help advance our technologies and develop systems
to assist in executing our defense strategy. What effects is
sequestration having on the Navy's R&D efforts?
Admiral Greenert. If sequestration continues, automatic percentage
cuts are required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance,
or priorities, resulting in adverse impact to almost every program and
project within the Navy. Sequestration would adversely impact many of
our R&D programs through contract cancellations, contract terminations,
and undetermined cost increases caused by inefficient contracting and
schedule delays. These impacts will reduce and delay our R&D efforts
and negatively impact key procurement strategies in future years.
28. Senator Hirono. Admiral Greenert, what are the effects on
programs such as the Virginia Payload Module (VPM)?
Admiral Greenert. VPM is a top Navy priority to recapitalize the
undersea land attack capacity of our guided missile submarines that
begin retiring in 2026. This solution is the lowest-cost approach to
satisfy combatant commander undersea strike capability.
The Navy is committed to fully funding the VPM design to support
incorporation in the Virginia-class Block V beginning construction in
fiscal year 2019. Sequestration would increase the risk of design
maturity to support Block V incorporation. This would further
exacerbate the reduction in undersea payload volume as our guided
missile submarines begin retiring in 2026.
29. Senator Hirono. Admiral Greenert, in your estimation, how
important is this program in terms of our National Security Strategy?
Admiral Greenert. VPM is a top Navy priority to recapitalize the
undersea land attack capacity of our guided missile submarines that
begin retiring in 2026. This solution is the lowest-cost approach to
satisfy combatant commander undersea strike capability.
rebalance strategy
30. Senator Hirono. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, while the
administration plans a significant strategic commitment to the Asia-
Pacific region through its rebalance, the Services face force structure
adjustments and sequester-related resource constraints. What are the
potential risks and challenges facing DOD with the new strategy and
resource constraints resulting from sequestration?
Admiral Greenert. I remain committed to providing support to our
allies in the Asia-Pacific region and our fiscal year 2014 President's
budget submission proposed increasing presence in the Asia-Pacific
region from about 50 ships today to about 60 ships in 2020, consistent
with the DSG's direction to rebalance to that region. We are
considering numerous options, including forward basing more of our
forces overseas to maximize the presence they provide. With our
priorities focused on the Asia-Pacific region, we will have to take
risk elsewhere.
General Amos. The President has made clear that the rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific region, including restationing within and off Okinawa,
is a whole-of-government effort that is the result of our enduring U.S.
interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Our enduring interests will not
change however the budget constraints of sequestration may require a
change to the pace and scope of DOD's activities in the Asia-Pacific
region.
We have and will continue to meet the demand for marine presence in
the Pacific. We are concerned that continued sequestration, when
applied in the midst of our planned redistribution of forces in the
Pacific, will impose significant risks to our operational readiness and
responsiveness. Sequestration will further impact our ability to
maintain deterrence, project power, respond to crises, and contribute
to stability, in accordance with combatant commander requirements and
timelines. Sequestration will also result in delays in facilities and
force posture restructuring necessary to achieve the distributed
laydown plan, inducing additional risk for Marine Corps forces in the
Pacific. The effects of sequestration on Strategic Mobility in the
Pacific region highlight another area of concern. The Marine Corps'
ability to project power, participate in Theater Security Cooperation
events with allies and partners and respond to crises in the Pacific
could be impacted with reduced U.S. Navy ship availability and the
higher usage costs of other forms of intra-theater lift.
challenges facing the defense industrial base
31. Senator Hirono. General Welsh, our defense industrial base has
played a major role in the national security of our country for many
years. It has led the way on many technological advances which also
served civilian uses as well. The industry also employs many of our
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduates who
are in search of high-tech opportunities to challenge them. The
professionals in this industry serve our country and play a large role
in the economic security and national defense of this country. Needless
to say, the industry is very important to the Nation. What are the
challenges facing the defense industrial base under current
sequestration cuts, and what looms in the future if it continues?
General Welsh. The Air Force, regardless of its future size, will
continue to rely on the national technology and industrial base to
develop, produce, and sustain the weapon systems and equipment so that
airmen can fly, fight, and win in the air, space, and cyber domains. As
our force structure adjusts to the emerging fiscal realities under the
BCA, so will the demands the Air Force places on the industrial base.
With regard to the impacts of the BCA, the cuts imposed had the
same type of impact on the companies that supply the Air Force with
goods and services as the cuts had on the Air Force itself. The impacts
were both across the board and instantaneous with associated increased
levels of risk and uncertainty. As has been reported in the press, the
larger companies are reducing and reorganizing to better cope with the
emerging fiscal realities. Information concerning smaller companies is
not as well covered by the press. However, the Air Force relies on many
of those smaller firms for specialized products and services that
enable our capabilities.
As I look ahead, I am concerned about ensuring a critical mass of
engineering and design talent to produce the next generation of unique
military capabilities. While the Air Force leverages the capabilities
of the global commercial industrial base where possible, there are
distinct skills and knowledge needed to provide the technical advantage
for your airmen to continue to be successful in the tactical
environment.
32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Greenert, I'm particularly interested
in the potential effects on the manufacturing of Virginia-class
submarines, many of which will be vital to our rebalance strategy.
Currently, the Navy is scheduled to acquire two Virginia-class
submarines per year. If budget restraints force the production delays
or quantity cuts, what is the impact this would have on our ability to
maintain and grow our high-tech manufacturing workforce and maintain
our production capabilities?
Admiral Greenert. Production instability and budget uncertainty
present two major risks to the submarine industrial base and
manufacturing workforce and could result in increased acquisition costs
and reduced procurements. Production delays or quantity cuts due to
budget restraints translate into reduced retention of skilled labor,
less material purchasing power, inefficient workforce and financial
planning, weak learning curve performance, and less willingness for
industry to invest in facility improvements; all resulting in less
efficient ship construction and a more expensive shipbuilding program.
DOD and the Navy have made hard decisions in the last few budget cycles
to maintain a stable, efficient production rate. Maintaining the
current production rate ensures workforce and schedule alignment with
the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine. Further budget
restraints or reductions make maintaining this efficient production
rate more challenging and less likely.
The greater risk to the submarine industrial base is associated
with budget uncertainty, particularly the disruption and inefficiency
caused by sequestration, and delayed authorization and appropriations
associated with CRs. To a degree, we can work with our industrial
partners, our shipbuilders and the vendor base to mitigate the impact
of disruptions that we can foresee. A CR beyond January 15, 2014,
places at risk the award of two fiscal year 2014 submarines as part of
the Block IV MYP and causes significant outyear bills and erosion of
savings due to loss of funding for Advance Procurement and Economic
Order Quantity material. Sequestration is causing future year cost-to-
complete bills in all shipbuilding programs, not just submarines,
compounding the challenges of maintaining production with smaller
budgets.
national security strategy
33. Senator Hirono. General Odierno and General Welsh, you have
made it very clear that sequestration is affecting readiness and
modernization efforts. How is sequestration affecting our ability to
execute our defense strategy?
General Odierno. If Congress does not act to mitigate the
magnitude, method, and speed of the reductions under the BCA caps, the
Army will be forced to make significant reductions-in-force structure
and end strength. Such reductions will not allow us to execute the 2012
DSG, and will make it very difficult to conduct even one sustained
major combat operation. The Army will have a degraded readiness and
extensive modernization program shortfalls from fiscal year 2014 to
fiscal year 2017 as we draw down and restructure the Army into a
smaller force. We will be required to end, restructure, or delay over
100 acquisition programs, putting at risk programs such as the Ground
Combat Vehicle and the Armed Aerial Scout. Likewise, it will put the
production and modernization of our other aviation programs, system
upgrades, unmanned aerial vehicles, and our air defense command and
control systems at risk.
General Welsh. The abrupt and arbitrary nature of sequestration
drives the Air Force into a ``ready force today'' versus a ``modern
force tomorrow'' dilemma. This dilemma is dangerous and avoidable. If
we are given the flexibility to make prudent cuts over time, we can
achieve the savings required under current law and still maintain our
ability to provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for
the Nation. However, sequestration robs us of that flexibility.
With sequestration we are unable to maintain mission readiness
levels, our training programs will be unable to meet current production
targets, and we are creating a bow wave in critical aircraft
maintenance. Compensation reform and infrastructure reduction are
critical. If they are not addressed, then the cuts must come entirely
from readiness and modernization. This will result in reduced combat
power from a smaller, less capable, and less ready force, thereby
increasing national security risk. As a result, if sequestration
continues, the Air Force will not be able to support the current
defense strategy.
34. Senator Hirono. General Odierno and General Welsh, are we doing
less of what we want to do or are we doing the same things but
accepting more risk?
General Odierno. Both. We're doing less of what we need to do to
support the National Military Strategy (NMS)--especially in the realm
of shaping military relationships and deterring conflict.
Simultaneously, the Army is sustaining current operational commitments
within the context of the reduced fiscal authorities, which is
jeopardizing our contingency response capabilities. In the totality,
both of these actions are increasing strategic risk.
General Welsh. Our operational commitments have remained the same,
but the fiscal reductions have caused us to forgo needed training and
exercises. As our current budget constraints force a reduction in our
readiness and modernization efforts, we are forced to accept greater
risk as we defend our Nation's interests. As we reduce force structure,
we are certainly not able to do as much as we have done in the past.
When I entered the Air Force in 1976, we had 725,000 Total Force
military airmen, including 585,000 on Active Duty. Today we have
506,000 Total Force military airmen with only 329,000 on Active Duty.
There is a limit to how small we can get and still fulfill the DSG
because our supply of forces is equal to the strategic demand with
almost no margin in capacity. We will be forced to get smaller, both in
terms of people and aircraft. If the reduced discretionary caps
continue, over the next 5 years we may be forced to cut approximately
25,000 (5 percent) Total Force airmen and approximately 550 (9 percent)
aircraft.
35. Senator Hirono. General Odierno and General Welsh, how do you
reconcile the strategy with the budget reductions?
General Odierno. The Army is incapable of executing the DSG with
the resources allocated by the BCA. Further, there are long-term
consequences for Army readiness. We have mortgaged our future by
removing money from our readiness account and halting critical
training. We intended for all Active Army brigades not scheduled to
deploy to Afghanistan to train on their critical core competencies, but
we were forced to cancel all Combat Training Center rotations for
nondeploying units. Canceling rotations for seven brigade combat teams
(BCT) at either the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness
Training Center, deprived our future leaders of critical developmental
experiences. We will inevitably pay a price down the road because we
simply cannot ever recover that absence of training and readiness back
for those leaders and their soldiers.
General Welsh. Budget reductions will not change the Air Force's
enduring contributions to national security, or the responsibilities
set forth by the DSG. However, these reductions will require the Air
Force to make difficult choices and tradeoffs between being ready today
or preparing for tomorrow's challenges driving increased risk to the
Air Force's ability to meet current and future national security
obligations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
risk
36. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how far down the path are we on to a force
that is so degraded and so unready that it will be immoral to use it?
General Odierno. I have been warning for some time that unless the
budget situation is changed significantly, we are heading for a
hollowing of the force and critical degradation of our overall
readiness. That said, we are taking steps to ensure we retain the
capability to respond to threats by preserving the readiness of
deploying units and of a force package able to respond to immediate
contingency requirements. Absent budgetary relief, this is the only
logical approach we can take to ensure we send first-deploying units
into harms' way that are combat ready in terms of manning, equipping,
and training. However, the longer we must accept risk in readiness by
deferring training for the rest of the force, the longer it will take
to regain acceptable level of readiness.
My other concern is that by reducing the capacity and capability of
the Army, the United States invites miscalculations by future
adversaries, making military conflict more, not less, likely. Potential
adversaries could misjudge the potential costs and consequences of
their planned actions and behaviors against the perceived ability and
will of the United States to protect U.S. national interests.
I will always do everything in my power to ensure that whenever we
send soldiers into battle, their units are properly manned, trained,
and equipped. In the end, the national defense strategy and decisions
to use military force cannot be out of line with the Army the Nation
has decided it can afford.
Admiral Greenert. We will continue to deploy only forces that are
fully trained and ready. The reductions in O&M funding imposed by
current law allow us to train only those forces that are next up to
deploy and compel us to reduce training and readiness of other non-
deployed forces. This will result in only one non-deployed CSG and one
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) trained and ready for contingency
response. Our covenant with the combatant commanders is to have at
least two CSG and two ARG deployed and another three of each in or
around the continental United States (CONUS), ready to respond to a
crisis.
This reduced capacity for contingency response will occur in fiscal
year 2014 if we are subject to sequestration and also in the long term
if we continue to be constrained to the BCA's revised discretionary
caps. With this reduction, our fully trained presence and surge forces
would be sufficient to conduct only one large-scale operation, as
defined today.
General Amos. During this first year of sequestration, I have
realigned funds within my authorities to maintain the near-term
readiness of our forward deployed forces and those units preparing to
deploy. Marines on the forward edge of our Nation's security remain my
number one priority. The forces that currently support the Afghanistan
mission, those engaged in countering terrorism globally, and those
preparing to deploy forward, will receive the full support they need.
The cascading effects of the necessary internal budget realignment
will start to catch up to the Marine Corps no later than 2017. It will
manifest itself in fewer Active component marines, less investment in
training and infrastructure, and forgone modernization. If allowed to
continue along this path slope, we will risk a force that is tiered in
its capabilities. Forces rotated or deployed forward will leave CONUS
best dressed, but most of those remaining back at their home base or
station will be degraded. In aggregate, the force will likely be one
that is less trained, equipped, and ready for war than what the
American people have come to expect from their all-volunteer military.
General Welsh. Air Force readiness is on a 20+ year downward trend
and sequestration only serves to accelerate this decline. With recent
sequestration-driven cuts, our forces may not be sufficiently equipped,
trained, and ready, which increases survivability risk to the force and
risk in our ability to achieve desired operational and strategic
outcomes. The degree of risk depends on a number of factors--such as
the threat environment and our strategic and operational objectives.
Increased risk alters our--and our adversaries'--decision calculus,
which can effectively limit strategic options for the President and
combatant commanders. It is our Title 10 responsibility and sworn duty
to provide airmen the required training, resources, and equipment so
that they can successfully accomplish their assigned missions with an
acceptable level of risk. However, sequestration has forced us to make
very difficult choices in our efforts to manage this risk so that the
Air Force can field ready forces for combatant commanders.
37. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, given the overwhelming impact to readiness
accounts over the next 2 years, when will we reach the point where the
force is so degraded it will be immoral to use it?
General Odierno. We are taking steps to ensure we retain the
capability to respond to threats, by preserving the readiness of
deploying units and of a force package able to respond to immediate
contingency requirements. If sequestration level reductions continue
into fiscal year 2014, the Army will begin a period of degraded
readiness, leaving our BCTs unprepared to deploy. In the event of a
crisis, we will deploy these units at significantly lower readiness
levels.
My other concern is that by reducing the capacity and capability of
the Army, the United States invites miscalculations by future
adversaries, making military conflict more likely. Potential
adversaries could misjudge the potential costs and consequences of
their planned actions and behaviors against the perceived ability and
will of the United States to protect U.S. national interests.
Our soldiers are adaptive and agile; over time they will accomplish
their mission, but their success will come with the greater cost of
higher casualties.
Admiral Greenert. We will continue to deploy only forces that are
fully trained and ready. The reductions in O&M funding imposed by
current law allow us to train only those forces that are next up to
deploy and compel us to reduce training and readiness of other
nondeployed forces. This will result in only one nondeployed CSG and
one ARG trained and ready for contingency response. Our covenant with
the combatant commanders is to have at least two CSG and two ARG
deployed and another three of each in or around the CONUS, ready to
respond to a crisis.
This reduced capacity for contingency response will occur in fiscal
year 2014 if we are subject to sequestration and also in the long term
if we continue to be constrained to the BCA revised discretionary caps.
With this reduction, our fully trained presence and surge forces would
be sufficient to conduct only one large-scale operation, as defined
today.
General Amos. During this first year of sequestration, I have
realigned funds within my authorities to maintain the near-term
readiness of our forward deployed forces and those units preparing to
deploy. Marines on the forward edge of our Nation's security remain my
number one priority. The forces that currently support the Afghanistan
mission, those engaged in countering terrorism globally, and those
preparing to deploy forward, will receive the full support they need.
The cascading effects of the necessary internal budget realignment
will start to catch up to the Marine Corps no later than 2017. It will
manifest itself in fewer Active component marines, less investment in
training and infrastructure, and forgone modernization. If allowed to
continue along this path slope, we will risk a force that is tiered in
its capabilities. Forces rotated or deployed forward will leave CONUS
best dressed, but most of those remaining back at their home base or
station will be degraded. In aggregate, the force will likely be one
that is less trained, equipped, and ready for war than what the
American people have come to expect from their All-Volunteer military.
General Welsh. It is our title 10 responsibility to provide airmen
the required training, resources, and equipment so that they can
successfully accomplish their assigned missions with an acceptable
level of risk. However, Air Force readiness is on a 20+ year downward
trend and sequestration only serves to accelerate this decline. With
recent sequestration-driven cuts, our forces may not be sufficiently
equipped, trained, and ready, which increases survivability risk to the
force and risk in our ability to achieve desired operational and
strategic outcomes. The degree of risk depends on a number of factors--
such as the threat environment and our strategic and operational
objectives. Increased risk alters our--and our adversaries'--decision
calculus, which can effectively limit strategic options for the
President and combatant commanders.
defense strategy and national security impacts
38. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, the American people are not hearing your
warnings and do not believe your message because thus far your warnings
have been abstract and fail to define the consequences to our safety
and security. So, in plain terms, what does it mean that you won't be
able to implement the DSG requirements and will we be less safe as a
result?
General Odierno. The DSG outlines the strategy our Nation has
adopted to ensure the safety of our citizens and reassure our allies
and partners. The Army's inability to execute this strategy leads to
increased risk to stability and decreased safety for American citizens.
The fundamental premise of the DSG is to protect our Nation with
broad efforts to redirect and reduce international competition, which
is the primary driver of the types of conflicts most dangerous to
America's citizens and its interests. Sustaining global leadership is
key to this strategy, and military superiority as an element of
national power and is one of our Nation's most critical and unique
advantages.
America's military superiority rests on the strength and readiness
of its Army. As the most verstatile Service, the U.S. Army is the only
land force that can deploy several thousand troops anywhere in the
world and sustain them indefinitely. Further, the Army underpins the
Joint Force by sustaining the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy,
allowing the other Services to conduct operations in the maritime and
air domains as well.
This is a unique advantage that allows the Army to prevent the
outbreak of significant conflicts across the globe, shape the
environment in ways favorable to the United States, and win wars and
end conflicts on terms that are favorable to the safety of America's
citizens, when necessary.
As a result of the first round of defense cuts, the Army is less
ready to prevent conflicts, conduct decisive land operations, as well
as provide support to the other Services. Further reductions under the
BCA will, over time, result in greater global instability, longer wars,
increased risk to U.S. citizens, and higher casualties. Our Nation
cannot predict when or where American soldiers will be needed next, and
a moderate investment in a properly resourced Army will hedge against
the significant costs of having an under-resourced Army.
Admiral Greenert. The BCA revised discretionary caps will preclude
our ability to execute the 2012 DSG in the near-term and the long-term.
Applying one fiscal and programmatic scenario, we would end with a
fleet of about 255 ships in 2020. That is about 30 less than we have
today, about 40 less than was planned in our fiscal year 2014
President's budget submission, and 51 less than our force structure
assessment indicates is required.
Presence remains the Navy's mandate. We must operate forward where
it matters and we must be ready when it matters. This posture enables
us to respond to contingencies. Our forward presence reassures our
allies and ensures U.S. interests around the world are properly served.
The 2020 fleet described above would not meet the DSG requirements
for the mission to Provide a Stabilizing Presence. Navy would be less
able to reinforce deterrence, build alliances and partnerships, and
influence events abroad. Navy would not increase our global deployed
presence, which would remain at about 95 ships in 2020. The lethality
inherent in this presence, based on ship type deployed, would be less
than today's 95-ship presence.
We would also not increase our presence in the Asia-Pacific, which
would stay at about 50 ships in 2020. This would largely negate the
ship force structure portion of our plan to rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific region directed by the DSG.
Under the same planning scenario, the reduction in our O&M would
result in only one nondeployed CSG and one ARG trained and ready for
contingency response. We would not fulfill our covenant with the
combatant commanders to have at least two CSGs and two ARGs deployed
and to have another three of each in or around the CONUS ready to
respond to a crisis on short notice.
In this planning scenario, we would not be able to conduct one
large-scale operation and also counter aggression by an opportunistic
aggressor in a second theater as required by the DSG. The Fleet would
only be sufficient to conduct all missions associated with only one
large-scale operation, as defined today.
General Amos. To satisfy the requirements of the DSG, we need a
Marine Corps of 186,800 Active Duty marines. Under the 2011 BCA, we
estimated that a force of 182,100 Active component marines could still
be afforded, albeit with reduced modernization and infrastructure
support. Under continued sequestration, an Active-Duty Force of
175,000--far less than is warranted and not accounting for additional
embassy security marines--is frankly all we can afford even with very
steep cuts to modernization accounts and infrastructure. This
significantly reduced force could meet steady state requirements and be
able to deter or defeat aggression in one region albeit with
significant strain on the force and increased risk to mission
accomplishment. When engaged in a major contingency operation, an
Active component Marine Corps of 175,000 would be incapable of denying
the objectives of an aggressor in a second region or respond to other
crises around the globe. This weakened posture makes the Nation, as
well as many of our security partners, vulnerable to opportunistic
regional or non-state actors seeking to capitalize on our diminished
capacity knowing we have no credible response.
General Welsh. If reductions of the magnitude identified by
sequestration continue, we will be forced to pursue the following long-
term actions:
(1) Force Structure: We will be forced to get smaller, both in
terms of people and aircraft. Right now we anticipate potential
reductions of as many as 25,000 people and 550 aircraft. There is a
limit to how small we can get and still fulfill the DSG because our
supply of forces is equal to the strategic demand with almost no margin
in capacity.
(2) Readiness: When the Air Force talks about readiness, we're
talking about our ability to quickly respond to our Nation's demands
with airpower delivered by airmen who are appropriately trained and
equipped to accomplish the mission at hand. We will prioritize funding
for training and readiness. Despite this prioritization, under a full
sequestration reduction, we will still see significant eroding of our
readiness in the near-term. The long-term effects of which will be
detrimental and cannot be fully quantified at this time.
(3) Modernization: If the reduced caps under current law continue,
our modernization forecasts are bleak. This funding level will impact
every one of our modernization programs. These disruptions will, over
time, cost more taxpayer dollars to rectify contract breaches, raise
unit costs, and delay delivery of critical equipment. The public may
not recognize the effects of these reductions initially. The damage
will be insidious. However, should we face a high-end threat in the
future--the impact of not modernizing will be blatant and deadly.
While failing to achieve national objectives in the next
counterinsurgency fight would be distressing, losing a major full-
spectrum fight would be catastrophic. If America expects its Air Force
to dominate the skies in the future battlespace, modernization and
recapitalization are not optional.
strategic choices and management review
39. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, do you agree that if allowed to proceed,
sequester will do unspeakable damage to our national security? Please
elaborate on the risks resulting from those cuts.
General Odierno. Emerging threats in today's environment require a
joint force with a ground component that has the capability and
capacity to deter and compel adversaries who threaten our national
security interests. The BCA and sequestration severely threaten our
ability to do this. The magnitude, method, and speed of reductions will
not allow us to execute the 2012 DSG, and will make it very difficult
to conduct even one sustained major combat operation.
The DSG outlines the strategy our Nation has adopted to ensure the
safety of our citizens and reassure our allies and partners. The Army's
inability to execute this strategy leads to increased risk to stability
and decreased safety for American citizens.
The fundamental premise of the DSG is to protect our Nation with
broad efforts to redirect and reduce international competition, which
is the primary driver of the types of conflicts most dangerous to
America's citizens and its interests. Sustaining global leadership is
key to this strategy, and military superiority as an element of
national power is one of our Nation's most critical and unique
advantages.
America's military superiority rests on the strength and readiness
of its Army. As the most versatile Service, the U.S. Army is the only
land force that can deploy several thousand troops anywhere in the
world and sustain them indefinitely. Further, the Army underpins the
Joint Force by sustaining the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the
Navy, allowing the other Services to conduct operations in the maritime
and air domains as well.
This is a unique advantage that allows the Army to prevent the
outbreak of significant conflicts across the globe, shape the
environment in ways favorable to the United States, and win wars and
end conflicts on terms that are favorable to the safety of America's
citizens, when necessary.
As a result of the first round of defense cuts, the Army is less
ready to prevent conflicts, conduct decisive land operations, as well
as provide support to the other Services. Further reductions under the
BCA will, over time, result in greater global instability, longer wars,
increased risk to U.S. citizens, and higher casualties. Our Nation
cannot predict when or where American soldiers will be needed next, and
a moderate investment in a properly resourced Army will hedge against
the significant costs of having an under-resourced Army.
Admiral Greenert. We understand the pressing need for the Nation to
get its fiscal house in order. DOD should do its part, but it is
imperative we do so in a coherent and thoughtful manner to ensure
appropriate readiness, warfighting capability, and forward presence--
the attributes we depend upon from our Navy.
We will continue to view each of our choices through the lens of
the three tenets I established when I took office as CNO: Warfighting
First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready. But with each year of
sequestration, the loss of force structure, readiness, and future
investments will cause our options to become increasingly constrained
and drastic; our ability to contribute to the Nation's security will be
reduced
General Amos. The effects of the 2011 BCA and the subsequent
sequester are already damaging our national security. By forcing the
Marine Corps and the other Services essentially to mortgage the future
capability and capacity of the force to fund readiness we are heading
down a path towards a brittle and hollow force that will be less
capable of meeting the security needs of the Nation.
General Welsh. The Air Force offers five enduring contributions to
our national defense: (1) air and space superiority; (2) ISR; (3) rapid
global mobility; (4) global strike; and (5) command and control.
If the reduced discretionary caps with the threat of sequestration
remain in place for fiscal year 2014, we could be forced to cut flying
hours by as much as 15 percent. As a result, many of our flying units
will be unable to fly at the rates required to maintain mission
readiness for 3 to 4 months at a time, we'll cancel or significantly
curtail major exercises, and we'll reduce our initial pilot production
targets.
Additionally, sequestration-level cuts and/or an extended CR
severely threatens each of our top priority programs as well as every
single lower priority program. For example, today the average age of
our fourth generation fighters, which are critical to both air and
space superiority and global strike, is over 25 years of age. These
fighters are simply unable to survive or operate inside the advanced,
integrated air defenses some countries have today. The B-52 and the KC-
135 fleets providing part of our global mobility and global strike
capability are over 50 years old. They too, are unable to survive and
operate in the sophisticated air defense environments we face today,
and in the future. The F-35, the KC-46, and the LRS-B programs are just
three of the modernization programs vital to our modernization effort.
We cannot afford to mortgage the future of our Air Force and the
defense of our Nation. Modernization is required to execute our core
missions against a high-end threat in 2023.
40. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, are the plans you presented for the Strategic
Choices and Management Review (SCMR) a reflection of the capacity and
capabilities you can provide for a given level of funding or are they
informed by the level of resources necessary to meet our strategic
needs?
General Odierno. Both. The start point for the SCMR was to first
consider the resources required to execute the defense strategy and
meet the needs of the combatant commanders. Afterwards, we were
directed to look at what we would be able to do at decremented funding
levels by showing the increased risks associated with lower levels of
readiness, modernization, and force structure.
Admiral Greenert. The SCMR options reflect the capacity and
capability choices necessary if the revised discretionary caps continue
in the long-term. Our fiscal year 2014 President's budget submission
reflects the resources necessary to execute the DSG with acceptable
risk.
General Amos. The series of choices developed through the SCMR
process are a reflection of the capacity and capabilities the Marine
Corps could provide for a range of lower funding levels. However, it is
important to note that in the course of developing those fiscally
constrained choices, we ensured the judicious application of resources
to best meet the strategic needs of the Nation.
For the Marine Corps, our portion of the SCMR examined several
possible end strength reductions. The strategy driven force is
approximately 186,800 Active-Duty marines, and that was not one of the
options examined in the SCMR process. Instead, the SCMR end strength
options were a reflection of the capacity and capabilities the Marine
Corps could provide for an approximate (lower) level of funding; the
result is a 175,000 Marine Corps, which is a viable, fiscally driven
end strength. However, we did not simply accept a linear reduction;
instead, we conducted a detailed analysis to determine the optimal
designed force based on the strategic needs of the Nation. We
understand that the Nation requires a smaller, redesigned, and ready
force that is able to respond quickly to the most likely threats facing
the Nation, and we optimized the distribution of capacity and
capability within our 175,000 force to meet that strategic imperative.
For example, we eliminated a MEF HQ and provided permanent structure
for two Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). We chose
to take risk in warfighting headquarters rather than smaller, forward
deployed crisis response units because of the strategic needs of the
Nation. Ultimately, although 175,000 is a fiscally driven force, the
strategic needs of the Nation were paramount in each decision.
General Welsh. The current plans are informed by the levels of
funding for the capacity and capabilities we can provide for each of
the funding levels laid out in SCMR. Budget uncertainty required us to
look at strategic trades across multiple budget scenarios to align
choices and tradeoffs with strategic priorities to meet sequestration
cuts if required.
41. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how were the SCMR funding levels for each
Service determined?
General Odierno. Three budget options were discussed during the
SCMR: (1) a President's budget to ``sustain'' the DSG; (2) an In-
Between Budget to ``bend'' the DSG, and (3) the BCA which would
``break'' the DSG. The OSD did not present the methodology on how
Service shares were generated for these three options.
Admiral Greenert. The SCMR was directed by the Office of Secretary
of Defense (OSD) to produce options and identify choices that would
prepare the way for DOD to comply with the revised discretionary caps
of the BCA of 2011. Secretary Hagel directed the SCMR to generate a
menu of options built around the following budget scenarios:
First, the President's fiscal year 2014 budget, which
incorporates the carefully calibrated and largely backloaded
$150 billion reduction in defense spending over the next 10
years.
Second, the BCA sequester level caps, which would cut
another $52 billion from defense spending in fiscal year 2014,
with $500 billion in reductions for the DOD over the next 10
years.
Third, an in-between scenario that would reduce
defense spending by about $250 billion over the next 10 years,
but would be largely back-loaded.
In July 2013, OSD provided fiscal guidance to the Services
directing the development of two fiscal years 2015-2019 budget
submissions: one at the President's budget 2014 level and the other at
the BCA level. The OSD fiscal guidance included base budget toplines
for each Service at each level.
General Amos. The budget scenarios considered in the SCMR process
ranged from the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2014 and
beyond (cuts of about $150 billion applied heavily to later years) to
full compliance with the BCA caps (cuts every year of about $50
billion). This range of planning scenarios is consistent with OMB
guidance. The SCMR examined large blocks of capabilities across DOD (we
called them Force Elements), and assessed incremental reductions in
capability and capacity. Some of these Force Elements were unique to a
single Service, some of them crossed Service lines. We studied
reductions in all Force Elements, across all Services--nothing was off
the table--but no single Service was assigned a specific targeted
funding level that they had to meet.
General Welsh. Per OSD's guidance, the budget scenarios considered
in the SCMR ranged from the President's budget proposal for fiscal year
2014 and beyond (cuts of about $150 billion applied heavily to later
years) to full compliance with the BCA caps (cuts every year of about
$50 billion). This range of planning scenarios is consistent with OMB
guidance. OSD's fiscal guidance is structured around those two budget
scenarios and is intended to enable execution of the strategic
rebalancing effort.
42. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, Secretary Hagel has stated that a basic
tradeoff in funding will be between capacity and capability. How do you
intend to address this tradeoff?
General Odierno. Given the necessity to prepare for the reduced
discretionary caps and threat of sequestration in fiscal year 2014, the
Army's execution of the fiscal year 2014 budget will proceed along five
avenues. First, Secretary McHugh and I have directed that we accelerate
the deliberate downsizing of the Army's Active end strength from its
current level of 532,530 to 490,000 by fiscal year 2015 instead of
fiscal year 2017. Second, we are implementing force structure changes--
including the reorganization of our BCTs--to reduce brigade level
headquarters while sustaining combat power. Third, we will be forced to
concentrate readiness funding into few units, resulting in readiness
shortfalls during fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2017. Fourth, we will
reprioritize our modernization programs and determine which ones are
most critical to filling capability gaps and which ones will be delayed
or cancelled. Fifth, we will make every effort to recruit and retain a
high quality, professional, and disciplined AVF while we support our
veterans transitioning back to civilian life.
Admiral Greenert. There are numerous ways to adjust Navy's
portfolio of programs to meet the BCA of 2011 revised discretionary
caps. These are currently under deliberation within DOD.
Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law
must include sufficient readiness, capability, and manpower to
complement the force structure capacity of ships and aircraft. This
balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be
effective, even if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG.
There are, however, many ways to balance between force structure,
readiness, capability, and manpower.
To provide perspective on the level and type of adjustments that
will need to be made, one potential fiscal and programmatic scenario
would result in a 2020 Fleet of about 255 to 260 ships, about 30 less
than today, and about 40 less than Navy's fiscal year 2014 President's
budget submission. It would include 1 to 2 fewer CSG, and 1 to 2 fewer
ARG than today. This 2020 fleet would not meet the DSG requirements.
General Amos. Within the Marine Corps, we see it as a triad--
capability, capacity, and readiness, but on a fundamental level, yes,
we will need to make tradeoffs across those areas. However, it's not an
either/or proposition; it's about striking the right balance given the
current and future security and fiscal environments. Under
sequestration, the Marine Corps will take risk in capacity and
capability in order to preserve near term readiness--it's happening
already. Our end strength is coming down to 175,000 by the end of
fiscal year 2017; that's the maximum glideslope possible that will
allow us to keep faith with marines and their families that have been
strained for the last decade. Additionally, we have made large
reductions to our modernization accounts--delaying key programs and
completely eliminating others. We have made those hard choices in order
to preserve near-term readiness, because that's what we bring the Joint
Force and that's what the Nation expects of her marines. We will be
smaller, we will be leaner, but we will remain ready to respond to
today's crisis, with today's force, today.
General Welsh. The blunt and indiscriminate mechanism of
sequestration is forcing the Air Force to choose between a ready and
right-sized force today or a modern force tomorrow. One of the
foundations of our fiscal year 2015 POM was to protect our future
warfighting capabilities; to achieve this--while maintaining a
credible, ready force capable of fighting today's fight--we will be
required to divest some force structure in order to avoid a hollow
force. The Air Force carefully designed our fiscal year 2015 budget
recommendations to provide a right-sized force that is able to meet
today's challenges while protecting our ability to modernize for
tomorrow's fight. However, despite our best efforts, the reality is
that this fiscally constrained environment also means accepting the
tradeoffs of an Air Force that has less capacity and capability, will
take longer to prosecute the Nation's call to national security
exigencies, and may suffer higher casualties and attrition against
adversaries in doing so.
43. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, have any of you developed a plan for
addressing or implementing this SCMR tradeoff in fiscal year 2014, and
if so, when do plan to inform Congress of the changes needed in your
fiscal year 2014 budget plans?
General Odierno. The impact of sequestration in fiscal year 2013
coupled with the threat of fiscal year 2014 sequestration levels of
funding are forcing the Army to implement significant reductions to
endstrength, readiness, and modernization in order to generate short-
term cost savings. However, this will leave Congress, future
administrations, and the Nation with severely reduced options for
action. The next administration will have less capability to deter
conflict and would be increasingly reliant upon allies in any future
conflict, with no guarantee that our allies would be willing or able to
provide the assistance needed to meet U.S. national security goals. In
the event of a strategic surprise or upon the completion of
hostilities, an undersized Army would be unable to conduct long-term
stability and transition operations.
The Army remains fully committed to the enactment of President's
budget for fiscal year 2014. The Army's portion of that base budget,
$129.7 billion, is necessary in its entirety to ensure that the Army
meets the requirements of the 2012 DSG. The fiscal year 2014 budget,
however, does not provide the funds necessary to address decaying
readiness that is the result of earlier agreements with DOD. As a
result, I submitted a $3.2 billion Unfunded Request Memo on 6 June
2013. In addition to the fiscal year 2014 base budget, the Army has
submitted a separate request of $47.6 billion in fiscal year 2014 OCO
funding for operations in Afghanistan; it is critical that this request
be fully funded to support our soldiers currently deployed and those
soon to deploy into theater.
The SCMR was a valuable forum to discuss the projected impacts of
sequestration and to formulate the choices facing us in the areas of
end strength, force structure, readiness, and modernization. The Army
is working closely with the DOD to provide detailed plans to operate
during fiscal year 2014 at the base budget funding level consistent
with the fiscal year 2014 funding caps in the BCA of 2011, as amended.
DOD is currently consolidating all Services input and will provide
Congress a potential BCA level implementation plan in mid-December.
Admiral Greenert. The mechanical implementation of sequestration
does not allow us to plan for a tradeoff between capacity and
capability. However, if Congress authorizes reprogramming, Navy can
work to restore balance between readiness, force structure,
modernization, and manpower. Just to meet minimum readiness needs, we
need to transfer or reprogram about $1 billion into the O&M account and
about $1 billion into our procurement accounts, mostly for
shipbuilding, by January 2014.
For fiscal year 2014, Navy will prioritize meeting our global
presence requirements, but with reduced capacity to surge additional
forces to respond to crises. Maintaining current readiness and forward
presence to the extent possible under sequestration comes at expense to
our investment in future readiness. My written statement for this
hearing details the programs at risk if sequestration continues in
fiscal year 2014.
General Amos. Upon finalization of the fiscal year 2015 President's
budget, we will review those programs most impacted by the SCMR
decisions to determine the best approach to pursue in fiscal year 2014.
When possible, savings will be reallocated to the higher priority U.S.
Marine Corps programs that enhance near-term readiness. The
incorporation of SCMR decisions into the fiscal year 2015 budget limits
the Marine Corps' ability to make substantial changes to our execution
of the fiscal year 2014 budget.
General Welsh. SCMR findings were used to inform the fiscal year
2015 POM submission. Those results will be submitted with the budget in
February 2014.
44. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, what tradeoffs will be necessary to ensure
there is a balance between organic and commercial depot work?
General Odierno. The Army's Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan
establishes the framework needed to properly balance organic and
commercial depot workload. The organic facilities will focus on the
workload necessary to support core capabilities. The Army will also
continue to pursue public-private partnerships, performance based
logistics agreements and outsourcing for workload that is not required
to support our core capabilities. This helps to balance the depot level
workload between organic and commercial sources and to meet our 50/50
statutory requirements.
Admiral Greenert. Regardless of force structure decisions that
would occur as a result of continued sequestration, Navy will continue
to balance depot work between the public and private sector in
accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. section 2464 and section 2466 to
maximize the readiness of the Fleet. Our aircraft carrier and submarine
depot-level maintenance is nuclear-related and is conducted primarily
in the four public sector naval shipyards, while most of the surface
ship depot-level maintenance is conducted in the private sector. Each
of these capabilities requires a highly skilled workforce that is
trained and equipped for that specific type of work. Neither skill set
is easily reconstituted if lost.
General Amos. Federal law (10 U.S.C. section 2466) states that not
more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year for
depot-level maintenance may be used for commercial depot work, and the
Marine Corps continuously seeks to make optimal use of depot
maintenance resources by using all available sources of repair within
the limitations of the law. Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
2012, the Marine Corps' public-sector depot expenses averaged 87.78
percent, and private-sector expenses averaged 12.22 percent. During
those years, the low percentage of total workload executed in the
private sector was attributed to the Marine Corps' need to leverage
core organic depot capability to rapidly meet emerging requirements in
Iraq and Afghanistan. This included application of significant
survivability upgrades/modifications and design/build of systems to
meet immediate acquisition demands. Examples include the HMMWV and 7-
ton armor application/upgrade, Logistics Vehicle System and MRAP
survivability upgrades, and design/build of mine rollers, egress
trainers, and the Mobile Trauma Bay. As the Marine Corps transitions to
a post-OCO environment and depot maintenance resources become
increasingly constrained, we will continue to make optimal use of
resources by selecting those sources of repair that meet our
requirements and timelines, comply with depot source of repair
decisions, and provide the best value for the government.
General Welsh. The Air Force will continue to manage public-private
depot workload through its standing processes (i.e., the Depot Source
of Repair Process (DSOR) for depot maintenance workload). The use of
the DSOR process ensures a ready and controlled source of repair for
workloads that sustain a core capability for the Air Force. In addition
the DSOR process is used to ensure compliance with the 50/50 law. In
the last 50/50 report to Congress the Air Force reported for fiscal
year 2012 51.8 percent organic and 48.2 percent contract and projected
compliance in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.
45. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, do you assume that you will have to move away
from installations given the severe reduction in funding, and if so,
which ones did you plan for?
General Odierno. The Army has not planned to move away from any
specific installations. The Army will make closure or realignment
recommendations upon approval from Congress as part of a Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round.
As the Army's end strength and force structure decline alongside
its funding, millions of dollars will be wasted maintaining
underutilized buildings and infrastructure. In a very short period,
trying to spread a smaller budget over the same number of installations
and facilities will result in rapid decline in the overall condition of
Army facilities. Without a future round of BRAC, the Army will be
constrained in closing or realigning any installations to reduce
overhead. This empty space tax on our warfighters will simply result in
cuts to capabilities elsewhere in the budget.
A future BRAC is essential to identify and divest excess Army
infrastructure as the Army reduces its force structure. BRAC also
allows for a systematic review of existing DOD installations to ensure
effective joint and multi-service component utilization. A BRAC round
is necessary to identify inefficiencies and eliminate unused
facilities, so that we do not divert scarce resources away from
training, readiness, and family programs.
Admiral Greenert. We do not plan to move away from installations.
Our Navy functions best when our shore infrastructure is aligned with
our force structure and laydown. If Congress authorizes a new BRAC
round, the Navy will evaluate our activities objectively by measuring
military value, alignment with force structure, cost, and impact to the
surrounding communities.
General Amos. Our installations are the deployment platforms from
which Marine expeditionary forces prepare to fight and win the Nation's
battles. They provide MAGTFs ground and aerial training areas, ranges,
airfields and logistics support to hone battle readiness. In addition,
installations support our marines' families, to include security and
quality of life programs.
Due to diminishing resources, our Installation Commanders make
difficult choices on a daily basis in order to fulfill operational
requirements; often at the expense of near-term facilities maintenance
requirements. There is no plan to reduce the number of installations
within the Marine Corps. Rather, our focus is to balance our limited
resources across our 24 installations without jeopardizing operating
force readiness, safety, or the well-being of our marines and their
families. To date, we have been successful and intend to manage our
resources based on a directed review of each installation's
requirements.
General Welsh. The sequester will necessitate reductions that will
make it difficult to keep force structure at all bases and maintain
required readiness levels. However, estimating the exact number of base
closures across the Air Force is premature without BRAC authority. We
require BRAC legislation to allow the Air Force to complete a thorough
analysis of infrastructure and excess capacity. Only with enactment of
BRAC authority can the Air Force conduct a definitive BRAC analysis,
authoritatively measure and compare force structure and infrastructure
requirements, and determine excess capacity.
46. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, can each of you describe what capabilities
your Service is offering as choices that will no longer be able to be
provided for national defense as a result of sequestration?
General Odierno. Sequestration directly threatens the Army's
capability to conduct a multi-phase, combined arms, joint campaign in a
complex environment that includes a conventional opponent, irregular
warfare, and counterinsurgency.
Right now the Army is well-trained in counterinsurgency operations.
We want to continue to maintain that expertise, while also increasing
proficiency for combined arms, joint capabilities for a multi-phase
campaign for a major contingency operation. We were scheduled to begin
this training in fiscal year 2013. Instead, the Army was forced to
cancel most of this training in fiscal year 2013 because of the
sequestration-related cuts to readiness. As a result, the Army now has
a limited number of brigades that are capable of doing full spectrum
operations.
Admiral Greenert. Currently, the reductions in fleet training we
are compelled to make result in only one non-deployed CSG and one non-
deployed ARG trained and ready for surge operations, while some
combatant commander plans notionally require three of each ready to
deploy within about 2 weeks of a crisis occurring. Sequestration in
fiscal year 2014, particularly if combined with restrictions of a CR,
will continue to reduce our readiness in the near-term.
General Amos. Sequestration is impacting U.S. Marine Corps
modernization capabilities that are necessary to deal with future
threats. These modernization reductions include Major Defense
Acquisition Programs like the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) delayed by 3 years), the JLTV (IOC delayed
by 1 year), the G/ATOR Block II (Ground Weapon Locating Radar--GWLR)
(IOC delayed by 2 years), and the Marine Personnel Carrier
(terminated). These reductions also include 95 of 112 smaller
procurement programs, reducing critical maneuver capabilities, net-
centric and interoperable capabilities, persistent ground surveillance
capabilities, and command and control capabilities. All Marine Corps
reductions in equipment modernization could have a significant negative
impact on the defense industrial base, and will also negatively affect
long-term readiness.
We are also planning and implementing reductions in end strength
that will require the remaining marines to deploy more frequently and
with less time on home station between deployments. We are reducing our
already lean civilian labor by 10 percent, and we are reducing our
Reserve Forces by over 1,000 Marine reservists. At the same time, we
have been asked to provide additional marines security guards to
reinforce embassies around the world, and we continue to support the
rebalance to the Pacific. We meet these increasing steady state demands
by accepting risk in major combat operations, eliminating one of our
three Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters, reducing the number of
tank companies and artillery batteries, and eliminating six infantry
battalions.
General Welsh. The Air Force is not removing capabilities. To meet
OSD fiscal guidance for the fiscal year 2015 POM, the Air Force is
considering reducing force structure in areas such as single-mission
platforms as well as retiring entire fleets of aging and costly
platforms that are less capable and less survivable in highly contested
airspace. While the Air Force works to maintain its capabilities, it
will decrease in size. This size reduction will increase risk due to
reduced capacity.
readiness concerns
47. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, given the current trends in the readiness of
your combat units, are you concerned about the emergence of a hollow
force?
General Odierno. Yes, I am very concerned that the BCA's spending
caps create the long-term conditions of a hollow force. I view a hollow
force as one in which there is prolonged and disproportionate
investment across manpower, O&M, modernization, and procurement without
corresponding adjustments to strategy. Some examples of the potential
impacts are as follows:
Available personnel would be continually shifted from
non-deployed to deploying forces in order to meet operational
demands. This would exacerbate personnel shortfalls and place
combatant commander operational plans at higher risk.
Shortage of repair parts would drive cannibalization
and reduced training events would significantly impact our
ability to build readiness. This would have a compounding
effect on the capability of our equipment and the effectiveness
of Army units.
Perhaps no other example is as important as soldier
training. We would not be able to fully train our soldiers,
whether through individual professional military education or
collective unit training, in a way that would enable them to
operate successfully in a joint, interagency environment across
the range of military operations (from stability operations to
decisive action). After the current fiscal year, the deficit in
trained forces will place us in jeopardy of being unable to
meet the requirements of our higher end war plans.
Admiral Greenert. We will continue to deploy only forces that are
fully trained and ready. The reductions in O&M funding imposed by
current law allow us to train only those forces that are next up to
deploy and compel us to reduce training and readiness of other non-
deployed forces. This will result in only one non-deployed CSG and one
ARG trained and ready for contingency response. Our covenant with the
combatant commanders is to have at least two CSG and two ARG deployed
and another three of each in or around the CONUS, ready to respond to a
crisis.
This reduced capacity for contingency response will occur in fiscal
year 2014 if we are subject to sequestration and also in the long term
if we continue to be constrained to the BCA revised discretionary caps.
With this reduction, our fully trained presence and surge forces would
be sufficient to conduct only one large-scale operation, as defined
today.
General Amos. Yes. My concerns against a hollow force are not new.
Earlier this year, under the precept that additional budgetary
constraints were imminent, I directed my staff to conduct an internal
study to identify the future Marine Corps force structure. Under my
guidance, the redesigned force must meet the National Security Strategy
requirements, at a high rate of readiness, within the confines of
future budgetary constraints. Our study concluded that a Marine Corps
of 175,000 would provide the operational requirements of steady state
deployments, crisis response activities, and potential major combat
operations while preserving institutional health and readiness. At
175,000 the Corps leverages its crisis response capability, which is
crucial for the current and future threat environments through lighter,
agile, forward-deployed forces. The force provides a balanced force of
MAGTFs that range from the Special Purpose MAGTF to the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) levels. The 175,000 strong force supports and
prioritizes the rebalance to the Pacific, includes the 1,000 Marine
Corps Embassy Security Group, and supports Marine Corps Forces SOCOM
and Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command.
Under sequestration, the Marine Corps will take risk in capacity
and capability in order to preserve near term readiness--it's happening
already. Our reduction to 175,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017 will
allow the Marine Corps to maintain a high state of readiness while
maintaining an end strength reduction glideslope that will allow us to
keep faith with marines and their families that have been strained for
the last decade. My priority will remain to provide a ready force. That
is what the Nation expects of its Marine Corps. Continued sequestration
budgetary cuts will cause us to adjust further in capacity and
capability to maintain a ready force and ensure that we can respond
when the Nation calls.
General Welsh. Hollowness is best described in terms of risk--risk
to the survivability of the force and risk in our ability to
effectively carry out the DSG. Under sequester, it has become
exceedingly difficult for the Air Force to manage these risks. For the
Air Force, a hollow force is one that appears good on paper, but has
more units, equipment, and installations that it can effectively
support; lacks the resources to adequately man, train, and maintain
them; lacks sufficient logistical support to employ its forces
effectively; and is not provided with enough capable equipment and
weapons to perform assigned missions.
To avoid the emergence of a hollow force, one of the Air Force's
main focuses for fiscal year 2014 will be on units that were stood down
in 2013 and returning them at least to the same, albeit, previously low
levels of readiness to prevent further erosion in their capabilities.
However, if we do not receive sufficient funding in fiscal year 2014,
the Air Force will again be forced to stand down units or fly them at a
reduced training rate, similar to the actions we took in fiscal year
2013 while under sequester. If sequester remains in place for the
entire fiscal year 2014, the Air Force will be forced to cut flying
hours to the extent that most flying units will not be ready.
Recovering Air Force readiness levels required to meet DSG requirements
will take a combination of time, additional resources, and reductions
in operational tempo.
48. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how will sequestration affect your ability to
train your forces for the full range of assigned missions?
General Odierno. Until we can adjust to sequestration funding
levels, the Army will not be able to train all units for the full range
of assigned missions. With the limited resources available for training
after sequestration, only units with high-priority missions, such as
the Global Response Force or Korea, are able to build readiness for
decisive action across a broad range of military operations. Deploying
units will continue to receive all resources required to train for
their assigned missions. Other units will only receive sufficient
resources to train at the lowest unit proficiency levels, generally
squad or platoon. While our doctrine guides us to train for decisive
action in support of unified land operations, most of our units are not
receiving sufficient resources to support training to the battalion or
brigade level of proficiency. This means that in order to deploy at the
highest level of unit proficiency, those units would require additional
time and resources for training before they would be ready for the full
range of missions.
Admiral Greenert. We will continue to deploy only forces that are
fully trained and ready. The reductions in O&M funding imposed by
current law allow us to train only those forces that are next up to
deploy and compel us to reduce training and readiness of other non-
deployed forces. This will result in only one non-deployed CSG and one
ARG trained and ready for contingency response. Our covenant with the
combatant commanders is to have at least two CSG and two ARG deployed
and another three of each in or around the CONUS, ready to respond to a
crisis.
This reduced capacity for contingency response will occur in fiscal
year 2014 if we are subject to sequestration and also in the long term
if we continue to be constrained to the BCA revised discretionary caps.
With this reduction, our fully trained presence and surge forces would
be sufficient to conduct only one large-scale operation, as defined
today.
General Amos. Pre-deployment training of OEF-bound units remains a
top priority; this capability is resourced primarily through OCO
funding. Post-OEF training priorities reflect where risk will and will
not be accepted from reduced funding. Those priorities are:
Transform civilians into marines
Provide initial MOS, functional, and skill progression
training
Provide education to develop marines who are capable
of commanding/leading at appropriate levels
Develop, execute, and maintain a Service-level
exercise program
Provide the operating forces with unit training
enablers
Establish and maintain ranges
Establish and maintain live, virtual, and constructive
training capability
Provide civilian training
Provide other directed training and education
Anticipating funding challenges in fiscal year 2014, we identified
trade-offs in training development and delivery. Those tradeoffs accept
risk primarily in the area of home station training enablers. Ranges
will be maintained to current standards, but modernization and
investment will be limited, circumscribing the ability to meet emerging
operational training requirements. Reductions in simulations and
training devices support are also anticipated, limiting access to
relevant simulations, thereby impacting our units' ability to maintain
proficiency. Reductions in flight hours and aviation depot throughput
would adversely impact Marine Corps' aviation training and surge
capability. An anticipated reduced availability of amphibious and
maritime prepositioning shipping, for training and deployment, would
also impact readiness.
General Welsh. One of the Air Force's main focuses for fiscal year
2014 will be on units that were stood down in 2013 and returning them
back to operational levels of readiness to prevent further erosion in
their capabilities. However, if we do not receive sufficient funding in
fiscal year 2014, the Air Force will again be forced to stand down
units or fly them at a reduced training rate, similar to the actions we
took in fiscal year 2013 while under sequester. If sequester remains in
place for the entire fiscal year 2014, the Air Force will be forced to
cut flying hours to the extent that within 3 to 4 months, many flying
units will not be able even to maintain already low levels of mission
readiness. The Air Force will also be forced to cancel or significantly
curtail major joint and combined training exercises yet again.
This sequester-induced readiness posture will degrade our ability
to carry out OPLAN and Secretary of Defense-ordered missions, continue
to degrade our depot maintenance and modernization programs, and will
significantly erode our training and force development efforts,
creating long-term readiness shortfalls. Overall, this readiness
posture prevents us from attaining required mission ready status in
fiscal year 2014, creates heightened risk, and will not meet the
operational demands of the DSG. Recovering Air Force readiness levels
required to meet the DSG will take a combination of time, additional
resources, and reductions in operational tempo.
49. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, with the increases in threats around the
world, how would a hollow force affect the risks to the lives of our
military men and women?
General Odierno. We have not provided the collective training
necessary to operate in the complex environments we face. We should
never waiver from ensuring our men and women have the resources to
train to the highest levels of readiness. In the end, this saves lives
and guarantees success.
Admiral Greenert. We will continue to deploy only forces that are
fully trained and ready. The reductions in O&M funding imposed by
current law allow us to train only those forces that are next up to
deploy and compel us to reduce training and readiness of other
nondeployed forces. This will result in only one nondeployed CSG and
one ARG trained and ready for contingency response. Our covenant with
the combatant commanders is to have at least two CSG and two ARG
deployed and another three of each in or around the CONUS, ready to
respond to a crisis.
This reduced capacity for contingency response will occur in fiscal
year 2014 if we are subject to sequestration and also in the long-term
if we continue to be constrained to the BCA revised discretionary caps.
With this reduction, our fully trained presence and surge forces would
be sufficient to conduct only one large-scale operation, as defined
today
General Amos. The Marine Corps provides the Nation an ability to
respond to today's crisis, with today's force, today. In order to
provide that capability, I must ensure that our brave men and women
wearing our uniform are trained and equipped to answer the call
whenever it may come. A hollow force limits those marines forward
deployed and those forces trained and ready to respond when
contingencies arise.
Under sustained sequestration for forces not deploying to
Afghanistan, the fuel, ammunition, and other support necessary for
training will be reduced precluding our ability to provide fully-
trained individuals and ready units to meet emerging crises--ultimately
impacting even Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units.
Within a year, we will see real impact to all home station units and
the beginning of impacts to our next-to-deploy and some deployed
forces, the beginnings of a hollow force we have fought so hard to
avoid.
Sacrificing training and readiness is not the right answer to our
budgetary shortfalls. History shows us that we will be challenged
again. When that happens, we cannot change the status of our forces at
that time. We have what we have. And the Marine Corps will respond as
it always has. The reality is that we would have fewer forces arriving
less-trained and arriving later to the fight. This would delay the
buildup of combat power, allow the enemy more time to build its
defenses, and likely prolong combat operations. This is a formula for
more American casualties. We only need to look to 1950 and the onset of
the Korean War to see the hazard and the fallacy in this approach.
General Welsh. As we are forced to cut back on modernization and
readiness, risk to our military men and women, as well as the risk to
our Nation, will only increase. Since the Korean War, we have provided
unprecedented control over the skies above our soldiers, sailors,
marines, and airmen, enabling them to accomplish their missions free
from enemy air attack. One only has to look at recent conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan to understand the extraordinary advantages airpower
brings to our joint force. However, as our readiness and modernization
budgets decrease, not only will the risk to our airmen increase as they
conduct their missions, but the risk to every soldier, sailor, and
marine we protect will also increase. In addition, our ability to
strike the required targets, maintain battlespace awareness, rapidly
move our Nation's resources where needed, and exercise precise command
and control over all these missions, will be degraded.
50. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, can your Service execute all of the combatant
commanders' operation plans, given current and projected readiness
levels of your forces--personnel, equipment, and training?
General Odierno. The magnitude and speed of the budget, combined
with ongoing war operations, restrict the ability of the Army to manage
the transition and risks creating a hollow force. Therefore, over the
next 3 to 4 years, there will be significant impacts on manning,
equipping, sustaining, training, and installations. We will be forced
to implement a severely tiered readiness strategy in which only 20
percent of the operational force will be trained to the highest level.
This will continue until we can reduce the size of the force to bring
into balance readiness, modernization, and endstrength. But, the size
of the Army could be too small to appropriately respond to a sustained
major contingency.
Admiral Greenert. The BCA reduced discretionary caps over the long
term will preclude our ability to execute all the missions required by
the 2012 DSG. We will maintain a credible and modern sea-based
strategic deterrent, maximize forward presence to the extent possible
using ready deployed forces, and continue investing in asymmetric
capabilities while doing our best to sustain a relevant industrial
base.
There are several missions and needed capabilities specified in the
DSG that we cannot perform or keep pace with potential adversaries.
These will preclude us from meeting the operational plan requirements
as currently written and defined by our combatant commanders with
acceptable risk. The reductions in force structure will limit our
ability to meet the presence requirements of the DSG, resulting in a
Navy less able to reinforce deterrence, build alliances and
partnerships, and influence events abroad.
General Amos. Combatant commanders report shortfalls in many of
their major contingency plans that may require modification of
objectives and/or timelines should we actually have to execute those
plans. Sequestration exacerbates these shortfalls.
General Welsh. While under the BCA, Air Force readiness is now--and
is projected to remain--below what is required to provide ready forces
to meet the DSG. The Air Force can currently execute any individual
combatant commanders' operational plan; however, we face some
capability gaps and challenges in certain plans. If we do not receive
sufficient funding in fiscal year 2014, we may have to rotationally
stand down units or fly them at a reduced rate, similar to the actions
taken in fiscal year 2013. This sequester-induced readiness posture
will impact our ability to fill OPLAN and Secretary of Defense-ordered
missions, continue to degrade our depot maintenance and modernization
programs, and will significantly erode our training and force
development efforts. Our force structure does not have excess capacity
to facilitate rotational readiness and our OPLAN requirements do not
provide the time for the Air Force to recover from this readiness
posture. In the short-term, we will continue to make resource-informed
evaluations of our plans and modify them as necessary in order to meet
the objectives.
51. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Amos, the Army and
the Marine Corps were forced to forgo critical OCO funding for fiscal
year 2013 reset. This, coupled with reductions related to fiscal year
2013 sequestration, has seriously eroded readiness. Given that nothing
has been done to address sequestration, what do you see as the long-
term impact of sequestration on readiness?
General Odierno. The short-term fiscal impacts of sequestration
combined with the lingering funding shortfalls to OCO are forcing the
Army to reduce funding, across all areas: readiness, personnel,
modernization, and training. The Army, in the near- to mid-term, would
then be challenged to provide the full spectrum of associated
capabilities of strategic land power to combatant commanders as part of
a crisis contingency force.
These short-term decisions will over the long-term impact Army
capabilities that are necessary and enduring components of strategic
land power within the Joint Team. For example, as Army rotary wing
aircraft--which provide critical tactical and operational maneuver and
humanitarian relief--continue to age without programmed modernization
or replacements (50 percent of aviation fleets have exceeded the 20-
year programmed life), future combatant commanders will be left with
limited military options.
Additionally, leader development is negatively impacted and affects
the long-term health of a professional force. For example, from 2004 to
2011, nearly 5,500 company commanders and over 3,500 field grade
officers missed the professional and leader developmental opportunities
associated with combined arms maneuver training, focusing instead on
stability and support operations in a counterinsurgency environment.
The cancellation of combat training center (CTC) rotations in fiscal
years 2013 to 2014 will widen this professional knowledge and
experience gap and take years to overcome.
General Amos. Sustained sequestration would mean an extended period
of severely reduced funding bound by rules that provide little
flexibility to efficiently apply mandated reductions. The Marine Corps
would realign funds from long-term investment activities to protect the
short-term readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy units. Maintaining
near-term readiness and operational commitments would be achieved at
the expense of investment in modernization, infrastructure, and
quality-of-life accounts. These reduced investments would accelerate
the rate of infrastructure degradation and increase the long-term costs
to return facilities to acceptable levels. Decreased funding for
equipment modernization would put at risk the ability to effectively
respond to tomorrow's threats.
major contingency operations
52. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, in your opinion, does the sad reality that the
U.S. military may no longer be able to support even one major
contingency operation diminish our ability to deter war?
General Odierno. Military superiority rests on the strength and
readiness of its ground, air, and sea components. When we become out of
balance, it impacts our ability to deter and compel our adversaries.
They will weigh the potential costs and consequences of their
planned actions and behaviors against the perceived ability and will of
the United States to protect U.S. national interests. My concern is
that by reducing the capacity and capability of the Army, the United
States invites miscalculations by future adversaries, making military
conflict more likely.
Admiral Greenert. Under sustained reduced BCA-level funding, one
potential scenario would result in a 2020 Fleet that would not be able
to conduct one large-scale operation and also counter aggression by an
opportunistic aggressor in a second theater, as required by the 2012
DSG. Our presence and surge forces would be sufficient to conduct all
missions associated with only one large-scale operation, as defined
today. Our inability to meet this mission requirement will diminish our
ability to deter aggression.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is currently capable of supporting a
single major contingency operation. To satisfy the requirements of the
DSG, we need a Marine Corps of 186,800 Active Duty marines to
participate in steady state operations, fight a major war, and deter
regional aggression. Under sequestration, an Active-Duty Force of
174,000 is all we can afford in 2017. This force would remain capable
of meeting steady state requirements and would be able to participate
in one major contingency operation, albeit with significant strain on
the force and increased risk to mission accomplishment. The Marine
Corps will always stand ready to answer the call of the Nation;
however, an Active-Duty Force of less than 174,000 marines would
greatly diminish our ability to deter and defeat aggression in the
future.
General Welsh. A reduction in our overall warfighting capability
diminishes our ability to deter war, and any reduction in our ability
to deter war increases the risk not only for our Homeland, but our
national security interests abroad. We are at increased risk in
numerous regions around the globe today, but are capable of sustaining
our deterrence force for the foreseeable future. However, we cannot
simultaneously and fully execute all 10 DSG missions. If sequestration
were to continue, the Air Force's ability to execute multiple missions
listed in the DSG will continue to erode.
53. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, would you agree that that means the military's
ability to protect U.S. national interests and citizens abroad are
significantly degraded?
General Odierno. I agree that budget shortfalls, budget
uncertainty, and sequestration directly threaten the Army's capability
to conduct multi-phase, combined arms, joint campaign in a complex
environment that includes a conventional opponent, irregular warfare,
and counterinsurgency.
Right now the Army is well-trained in counterinsurgency operations.
We want to continue to maintain that expertise, while also increasing
proficiency for combined arms, joint capabilities for a multi-phase
campaign for a major contingency operation. We were scheduled to begin
training for that in fiscal year 2013. Instead, the Army was forced to
cancel most of this training in fiscal year 2013 because of the
sequestration-related cuts to readiness. As a result, the Army now has
a limited number of brigades that are capable of doing full spectrum
operations, since we are reducing the capability and capacity of the
Army and depending on the contingency that would impact our ability to
protect and interests.
Admiral Greenert. The BCA reduced discretionary caps over the long-
term will preclude our ability to execute all the missions required by
the 2012 DSG. We will maintain a credible and modern sea-based
strategic deterrent, maximize forward presence to the extent possible
using ready deployed forces, and continue investing in asymmetric
capabilities while doing our best to sustain a relevant industrial
base.
There are several missions and needed capabilities specified in the
DSG that we cannot perform or keep pace with potential adversaries.
These will preclude us from meeting the operational plan requirements
as currently written and defined by our combatant commanders with
acceptable risk. The reductions in force structure will limit our
ability to meet the presence requirements of the DSG, resulting in a
Navy less able to reinforce deterrence, build alliances and
partnerships, and influence events abroad.
General Amos. The priority for the Marine Corps remains forward
presence and the ability to respond rapidly to any crisis threatening
U.S. national interests and citizens abroad. An Active component Marine
Corps of 186,800 is required to achieve the objectives of the 2010
National Security Strategy and the 2012 DSG. Any decrease in the Active
component of the Marine Corps therefor will result in a commensurate
increase in risk to both U.S. national interests and citizens abroad.
General Welsh. The U.S. Air Force is the best in the world and is a
vital piece of the best military in the world. This will not change
even if sequester persists. When we are called, we will answer, and we
will win. But the likelihood of conflict may increase as potential
adversaries sense weakness and vulnerability. Any reduction in our
ability to conduct contingency operations and deter wars reduces our
ability to protect our citizens abroad and defend our national
interests. A smaller, less capable and less ready force will certainly
increase the risk to our national security interests at home and
abroad.
modernization program funding levels
54. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, to what extent does the lack of prior-year
funding impact your ability to address the impacts of sequester on your
procurement programs in fiscal year 2014?
General Odierno. Despite the potential increase in sequestration
impacts to procurement programs, the Army has $3.1 billion less in
prior year funding to leverage in fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year
2013, there was $11.5 billion of prior year funding available to
address the fiscal year 2013 sequestration reductions to procurement
programs. In fiscal year 2014, there is only $8.4 billion of prior year
funding to address the potential fiscal year 2014 sequestration
reductions to procurement programs. The Army will leverage the reduced
amount of prior year funding with fiscal year 2014 procurement funding.
This lower amount reduces the Army's buying power for critical weapon
systems and reduces the Army's flexibility to address sequestration
impacts. In fiscal year 2013, the Army used prior year funds to
mitigate many of the impacts that would otherwise have come to fruition
by offsetting sequestration reductions with unobligated funds. As prior
year funds become increasingly scarce, the grim reality is that no
weapon system or modernization program will go untouched by
sequestration reductions in 2014. For some programs that have already
seen reductions, continued sequestration could terminate key
warfighting capabilities.
Admiral Greenert. The effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester
were barely manageable because we received authorization to reprogram
funds into appropriate maintenance accounts, and we were able to use
prior-year investment balances to mitigate reductions to investment
programs.
If sequestration continues into fiscal year 2014, we will not be
able to use prior-year funds to mitigate shortfalls in procurement
accounts as we did in fiscal year 2013. Without congressional action or
mitigating circumstances, the reductions imposed by sequestration and
the limitations of a CR will compel us to:
Cancel planned fiscal year 2014 procurement of an SSN,
an LCS, and an AFSB; also, delay an SSN planned for fiscal year
2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the
reduction in fleet size that the BCA would compel us to make
over the long term.
Delay the planned start of construction on the first
SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence
requirements when the Ohio-class SSBN retires.
Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G
Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, 2 P-8A
Poseidon, and 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons,
exacerbating future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities
to project power despite A2/AD threats.
Delay delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) by 2
years, extending the period of 10 CVN in service, and lowering
surge capacity.
Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS George Washington
(CVN 73) scheduled for fiscal year 2016, disrupting today's
heel-to-toe CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term CVN
capacity.
General Amos. If there is a mechanical sequester on fiscal year
2014 funding, the impact will be greater if the Department is not
provided the flexibility to distribute or to utilize prior-year
unobligated funding. A mechanical distribution at the line item level
does not allow for informed decisions of targeting budgetary
reductions.
If sequestration continues into fiscal year 2014, the Marine Corps
would have to continue to assess every program. Sequestration will
cause interruptions during program acquisition that increases the total
program cost, as schedules slip and delays result in longer contracts,
loss of efficiencies, negative impacts on development and production
schedules, program restructures, and could potentially cause Nunn-
McCurdy breaches. In procurement, existing contracts may have to be
renegotiated which will prevent the Marine Corps from receiving
Economic Order Quantity pricing.
The Marine Corps will also have to sustain legacy systems longer
than planned, which will ultimately drive up current operation and
support costs. We will have to shift our attention to developing and
replacing obsolescent parts for legacy systems that are no longer
available in the market place, which will shift the workforce to a
focus of reengineering old and inefficient technology (e.g. sustaining
five legacy radar systems will cost more than employing one new G/
ATOR). Finally, technologies designed to improve efficiencies (fuel,
lightweight armor, etc.) will have to be postponed, preventing the
Marine Corps from reaping planned savings while simultaneously driving
up costs due to the use of older, more expensive technologies.
General Welsh. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force used $1.5 billion
in unobligated prior year funds that were not available in fiscal year
2014. Sequestration cuts deeply into fiscal year 2014 Air Force
investment accounts, which under the law must be applied equally at the
program, project, and activity level; consequently, it impacts every
one of the Air Force's acquisition programs. For example, a potential
fiscal year 2014 sequestration impact for the F-35A low rate initial
production, relative to the request, could be the loss of 4 to 5
aircraft from the requested amount of 19. This potential reduction will
increase unit costs resulting in production funding shortfalls.
The deep cuts brought on by sequestration-level funding will force
the Air Force to make profound cuts to readiness and major defense
acquisition programs funded out of investment accounts to achieve the
targeted reduction amounts in the first few years of the fiscal year
defense plan. When forced to make tough decisions, we will favor new
capabilities over upgrades to our legacy forces and our top three
acquisition priorities remain the KC-46, the F-35, and the LRS-B.
The Air Force would like to be granted the ability to move funds to
mitigate, to the maximum extent possible, devastation to the highest
priority programs. However, even with flexibility, the Air Force may
not eliminate all risks associated with meeting the combatant commander
requirements.
55. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, will the lack of prior-year funds force you to
cancel or renegotiate procurement programs?
General Odierno. The lack of prior year funding significantly
reduces the Army's flexibility and increases risk. In fiscal year 2013,
the Army was able to mitigate many of the impacts on a number of
programs by offsetting sequestration reductions with prior year
unobligated funds. As prior year funds become increasingly scarce, all
weapon system programs will be affected in some way by sequestration
reductions in 2014. This confluence of factors will cause more severe
impacts in fiscal year 2014 than in the prior year and will necessitate
many modifications to contracts across the Army.
Admiral Greenert. If sequestration continues into fiscal year 2014,
the lack of prior-year funds will create more significant impacts to
our procurement programs than in fiscal year 2013. Without
congressional action or mitigating circumstances, the reductions
imposed by sequestration and the limitations of a CR will compel us to:
Cancel planned fiscal year 2014 procurement of an SSN,
an LCS, and an AFSB; also, delay an SSN planned for fiscal year
2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the
reduction in fleet size that the BCA would compel us to make
over the long-term.
Delay the planned start of construction on the first
SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence
requirements when the Ohio-class SSBN retires.
Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G
Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, 2 P-8A
Poseidon, and 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons,
exacerbating future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities
to project power despite A2/AD threats.
Delay delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) by 2
years, extending the period of 10 CVN in service, and lowering
surge capacity.
Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS George Washington
(CVN 73) scheduled for fiscal year 2016, disrupting today's
heel-to-toe CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term CVN
capacity.
In order to avoid or remedy some of the fiscal year 2014 impacts
described above, we need Congress to approve authorization and
appropriations bills. This would enable the Navy to transfer funds,
pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new projects, increase
production quantities, and complete ships.
General Amos. There is no direct negative impact on current
procurement programs resulting from less funding being available in
prior-years. The Marine Corps was able to mitigate impacts from
sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Unobligated balances were available
due to a reduction in requirements resulting from the Operation
Enduring Freedom drawdown, contracting efficiencies, and acquisition
strategy changes to promote competition.
General Welsh. The lacks of prior-year funds to reduce fiscal year
2014 sequester bills may require the Air Force to negotiate a reduction
in the required number of items, or level of service that affects the
current year acquisition. Multi-year (MY) procurements generally assume
some constant level of production or service; if fiscal year 2014
sequestration causes a reduction of product or service requirements, it
will likely result in the following: increased unit prices, a
requirement to pay for subcontracted items delivered early to need per
the MY agreement, and could even result in a breach of contract
entirely if the requirements fall below a minimum commitment in the MY
agreement.
hollow plans
56. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, do we have hollow plans today, even before we
have felt the full effects of sequestration?
General Odierno. Previously, there were some risks with the
execution of Army plans. However, sequestration has exponentially
increased those risks. Recent reviews and assessments of the Army's
most resource intensive plans have aided in current posture decisions
and positioning in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center for Army
Analysis' ``Hollow Army'' study found that the increased interval for
achieving readiness and the possibility of employing forces at
readiness levels below optimum will yield dramatic increases in
attrition and casualties for U.S. forces placing U.S. lives and mission
accomplishment at risk. Under sequestration, the required force
structure of Army operational plans would lose critical training
resources that would otherwise prevent these lags, exacerbating the
hollow plan phenomena.
Admiral Greenert. As a force provider, Navy's responsibility is to
provide properly manned, trained, and equipped forces to execute the
combatant commanders' plans. We are challenged to do so within current
planning timelines under a sequestered budget. With continuation of the
fiscal constraints under current law, Navy will not be able to execute
the full requirements of the DSG in 2020 and our presence and surge
forces would be sufficient to conduct one large-scale operation, as
defined today. However, any future budget scenario must include
sufficient readiness, capability, and manpower to complement the force
structure of ships and aircraft. Failure to do so increases risk to
current operations and future contingencies.
General Amos. Combatant commanders report shortfalls in many of
their major contingency plans that may require modification of
objectives and/or timelines should we actually have to execute those
plans. Sequestration exacerbates these shortfalls.
General Welsh. Our current plans are not hollow, but executable
based on achieving DOD defined end states. As we look forward to future
fiscal year budgets and constraints, we will have to make smart,
resource-informed modifications to these plans in order to keep them
viable.
The Air Force has been able to meet all Secretary of Defense
ordered missions remaining in fiscal year 2013 by maintaining combat
ready status for only select units. However, sequester jeopardizes our
ability to surge additional forces to meet contingency and emergent
combatant commander requirements. Based on our Global Vigilance, the
sequester-induced rotational readiness we are currently experiencing
has placed us beyond the red-line, or tipping point, in terms of risk.
This risk will, however, only be evident outside of DOD in the event of
a crisis requiring rapid and robust response.
57. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, in your opinion, are our potential adversaries
getting weaker or stronger?
General Odierno. We expect to encounter a wide spectrum of possible
threats under conditions of uncertainty and chaos and thus cannot make
blanket statements about all potential adversaries. What worries us is
that over the last year a number of dangerous trends have deteriorated
to the point that they are now threatening stability across entire
regions. Throughout the Middle East and Africa, the Arab Spring
transition has lead to instability and violence, providing arms and
increasing the operating space for terrorists. Political instability in
Syria degenerated into a civil and sectarian war. Iranian meddling in
Syria has torn open a Sunni-Shia fissure across the Middle East drawing
regional and distant countries into the conflict. China escalated its
pressure on neighboring states over territorial issues and hardened its
diplomatic position resulting in increased anxiety among United States
friends and allies in the region and an emerging Asian arms race. The
security environment in Syria, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea has
become increasingly uncertain and highlights concerns over the use,
proliferation, and controls on weapons of mass destruction. While these
crises have worsened, the defense budgets of our NATO allies are
declining, which will likely affect their contribution and capabilities
in future coalition operations.
Admiral Greenert. The United States will continue to face a wide
range of conventional and asymmetric threats from state and non-state
actors. These threats are becoming more diverse and wide-spread through
the proliferation of military and dual use technologies by legitimate
and illicit means. In particular, our primary strategic competitors are
improving their military capabilities through military modernization
programs geared towards their individual strategic goals.
General Amos. In general, our key adversaries are growing stronger.
China is growing stronger both militarily and
technologically and continues to expand its ability to project
power and influence regionally across multiple domains. China
is increasingly assertive in the South China Sea and continue
to expand their influence in the greater Pacific region.
Iran is gaining more freedom of movement and enhancing
its lethality and capability to threaten our interests but is
still hampered by a weak economy, exacerbated by sanctions.
Iran stands to gain influence in Afghanistan as the coalition
presence is reduced.
Russia is working hard to re-establish and grow its
military capability and is becoming more assertive despite
economic and demographic challenges that will impede its
ability to do so.
Radical Islamic Militants are stronger globally and
are morphing and expanding. Individual groups are not
necessarily stronger but their interconnectivity and ability to
adapt to meet conventional force capabilities makes them
increasingly lethal. Al Qaeda is gaining strength in Syria, and
holding its own in Iraq, Yemen, and Africa despite increased
security force capabilities and efforts.
Transnational criminal groups are increasingly active
and linked to cyber criminals and extremist groups, affording
both access to capabilities they wouldn't otherwise have.
General Welsh. Our potential adversaries are getting stronger.
China's surge in defense spending is reflected in a military
modernization program that places a strong emphasis on regional power
projection by way of ballistic missiles, air power, and a growing navy.
A resurgent Russia has laid out ambitious plans to trim its military to
a lean fighting force armed with the latest technologies from a
reinvigorated defense sector. Despite its ongoing civil war, Syria has
continued to receive and integrate advanced Russian weapons to
complement its vast inventory of legacy systems. Iran has also acquired
new military equipment from Russia, and is putting significant
resources towards developing its domestic defense industries, including
ballistic missiles and a potential nuclear capability. Even a
relatively stagnant country such as North Korea has shown signs of
modernization, showcasing new, never-before-seen systems at military
parades and testing advanced missile systems and nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, the rest of the world is finding advanced military and dual-
use technology more accessible than ever, and cyber warfare offers
countries, non-state groups and even individuals the ability to strike
at our information infrastructure with little risk of retaliation. As a
result, even those future adversaries we have not yet identified will
be better equipped and better prepared to challenge us in the years to
come.
58. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, if plans are being revised to account for
decreased funding, as opposed to the estimates of an adversary's
capabilities, are we increasing the risk of lives and missions?
General Odierno. There are numerous global crises with potential
challenges and adversaries. The Army expects to face a broad spectrum
of challenges from Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response to
irregular combatants to full conventional operations. The Army remains
committed to our endstates and strategy. Revised operational plans
incorporating reduced funding will increase the interval for achieving
readiness for follow-on forces creating expanded timelines for mission
accomplishment. The Center for Army Analysis' ``Hollow Army'' study
found that an increased interval for achieving readiness and the
possibility of employing forces at below-optimum readiness levels will
result in more casualties and potentially put the mission at risk.
Finally, decreasing force structure to include substituting long-range
fires capabilities for maneuver units will leave critical
vulnerabilities in the operational plans' execution, particularly with
respect to counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which
could lead to increased threats to the United States in the long-term.
Admiral Greenert. As a force provider, Navy's responsibility is to
provide properly manned, trained, and equipped forces to execute the
combatant commanders' plans. We are challenged to do so within current
planning timelines under a sequestered budget. With continuation of the
fiscal constraints under current law, Navy will not be able to execute
the full requirements of the DSG in 2020. However, any future budget
scenario must include sufficient readiness, capability, and manpower to
complement the force structure of ships and aircraft. Failure to do so
increases risk to current operations and future contingencies.
General Amos. Ideally, war planning should be predicated against
our enemies' capabilities. There is almost always tension between what
a commander assesses is needed to accomplish the mission and what is
available. I have stated that DOD must do its part in helping reduce
the Nation's budget woes, and I have pledged to give you the best
Marine Corps the Nation can afford. But sequestration is a damaging way
to do this.
Combatant commanders report shortfalls in many of their major
contingency plans that may require modification of objectives and/or
timelines should we actually have to execute those plans. Sequestration
exacerbates these shortfalls, thereby increasing risk to mission and
American lives.
General Welsh. Plans must always be adjusted to account for both
available resources and the adversary's capabilities. The revised plans
will balance the risk to life and mission. With reduced resources
available, conflicts may take longer and result in larger losses, than
if more resources were available.
59. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, are you comfortable with defense strategy
based on budgets, as opposed to providing the means for adequate levels
of national security?
General Odierno. I am concerned with some of the assumptions that
were made in the SCMR when determining the resources needed to meet the
defense strategy. I have offered my best military advice, cautioning
against best case and somewhat dangerous assumptions. I am not
comfortable assuming that we can quickly rebuild a larger force, that a
conflict will last just 6 months, that little to no casualties will be
sustained, or that no follow-up stability operations will be necessary.
Similarly we should not assume that U.S. forces deployed elsewhere will
be able to complete their task at hand, disengage and redeploy to
support a major regional contingency. Further, an adversary's use of
weapons of mass destruction was not considered during the SCMR process.
In the end, the weight of those assumptions will be on our soldiers,
our young men and women asked to do a mission that they simply will not
have the capability and capacity to accomplish.
Admiral Greenert. We understand the pressing need for the Nation to
get its fiscal house in order. DOD should do its part, but it is
imperative we do so in a coherent and thoughtful manner to ensure
appropriate readiness, warfighting capability, and forward presence--
the attributes we depend upon from our Navy. Specifically, we need to
be able to establish and pursue a deliberate plan for future force
development. Regardless of the level of funding we receive, having a
predictable budget and associated authorities will enable us to develop
and execute an achievable strategy. This strategy would guide our
efforts to sustain the appropriate readiness in today's Navy while
building a future fleet that is able to deliver the most important
presence and capabilities and address the most important warfighting
scenarios
General Amos. The President's DSG is the defense strategy for the
Nation; it identifies our strategic interests and guides defense
priorities over the coming decade. As a Service Chief and member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is part of my responsibility to realign funds
within my authority to maintain the near-term readiness of our forward-
deployed forces while continuing to invest in infrastructure
sustainment and modernization requirements necessary to succeed in
future conflicts. Under the 2011 BCA and the subsequent commencement of
sequestration, I am not able to do all these adequately. The available
resources cannot meet all of our defense requirements, and we face an
increased level of risk to American forces if they are called upon to
fight in a major combat operation.
General Welsh. If we accept that our defense strategy is devised
and implemented within the bounds of constrained resources, in the
budgetary environment we find ourselves in now, the strategy represents
the ``ends'' for national security. It follows then that the Total
Obligation Authority provided to the Air Force represents the
``means.'' How we specifically spend those ``means'' represents the
``ways'' in which we seek to maintain the capability and capacity to
provide ready forces to win today and tomorrow's fight, as called upon
by our Nation. As such, an effective strategy must be informed by
predictable levels of resourcing to connect ``means'' to ``ways,'' and
ultimately to the national security ``ends.''
morale and resources
60. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how worried are you about the morale of your
personnel as a result of 4 years of budget cuts?
General Odierno. I am personally concerned with anything that may
affect our Army's ability to fight and win on the battlefield. And
continued budget cuts certainly have the potential to cripple morale if
soldiers believe they are not be supported in a manner that allows them
to do training to do what they came in the Army to do. However, despite
budget reductions, and reductions in training readiness and equipment
readiness, overall soldier morale has remained relatively stable for
over a decade. We realize that this constrained budget is creating a
lot of angst, especially when we begin talking about changes and
reductions in benefits. Nevertheless, soldiers understand that the Army
must be manned, trained, and equipped. Despite the uncertain future,
soldiers are doing exactly what we ask them to do. They are training as
hard as they can with the money we give them. When they deploy, they
accomplish the mission to the best of their ability.
Admiral Greenert. The morale of the force is something that I take
seriously. I am concerned about how budget cuts will affect both the
Quality of Life of Sailors and their Quality of Work. We have thus far
protected our Quality of Life programs to the extent possible (pay and
allowances continue to be exempted). However, Quality of Work has been
impacted. The material conditions in warehouses, barracks, hangar bays,
piers, etc. have had to be mortgaged to pay these bills. Supply part
availability and depth of repairable inventories are suffering under
sequestration. All of these things impact quality of work--our sailors
understand why we have to make these choices, but they do lead to
frustration on the part of our personnel, which will ultimately impact
morale.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is extremely concerned about the
impact of the budget on the morale of not only marines, but their
families and our civilian personnel. It is vital to keeping faith with
our marines, their families, and our civilian marines. However, marines
and their families are resilient and morale remains high.
The Marine Corps is currently prioritizing support services for
marines returning from Afghanistan and transitioning out of the Marine
Corps and limit direct services impacts to marines and their families.
However, continual cuts will start to impact these direct services,
which will result in an impact on morale. Marines and their families
are no different than their fellow citizens. With prolonged budgetary
uncertainty and cuts, employee stress will increase, morale will
decline, and at some point productivity will begin to suffer.
We will need to be fiscally responsible during this challenging
budget environment and continue to critically assess the needs of our
marines and family members and prioritize available resources. While
the Marine Corps has always been frugal money managers, going forward
we are seeing greater innovation and more creative partnerships and
leverage of supporting organizations at the State and Federal level.
The Marine Corps continues assess our programs and make fiscal
adjustments as necessary. If reductions ensue, the results can be
reduction in hours of operation, longer wait time for services, and
modifications to programs such as in family care, family readiness, and
behavioral health programs, all of which can result in an impact in
morale.
General Welsh. I remain worried about the impact of budget cuts
upon morale across the Air Force. No personnel program or Airman and
Family Support program has gone untouched. Furlough, pay, and hiring
freezes have created pay concerns for our civilian airmen.
Sequestration's combined effects have impacted military personnel
readiness training, airmen support programs, and increased airmen's
workload, all of which negatively impact morale.
61. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, is there a point where the demands on our
military will overwhelm the resources provided to them, resulting in a
broken force?
General Odierno. The answer depends on exactly what the Army is
asked to do. Based on our current projected fiscal year 2015 end
strength of 490,000, the Army could successfully implement the 2012
DSG. However, the end result of sequestration-related cuts to readiness
is that the Army will arrive later to the fight with fewer and less-
trained trained forces. Additionally, the Army will lack the capacity
to replace units that face combat attrition or rotate units out of
longer duration conflicts. This will delay the buildup of combat power,
allow the enemy more time to build its defenses, and, likely, prolong
combat operations altogether. This is a formula for more American
casualties.
Admiral Greenert. There is, of course, a point at which that would
be true of any military force. As a force provider, Navy's
responsibility is to provide properly manned, trained, and equipped
forces to execute the combatant commanders' plans. We are challenged to
do so within current planning timelines under a sequestered budget.
With continuation of the fiscal constraints under current law, Navy
will not be able to execute the full requirements of the DSG in 2020.
Specifically, our presence and surge forces would be sufficient to
conduct only one large-scale operation, as defined today.
Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law
must include sufficient readiness, capability, and manpower to
complement the force structure capacity of ships and aircraft. This
balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be
effective, even if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG.
There are, however, many ways to balance between force structure,
readiness, capability, and manpower. Additionally, any future budget
scenario must include sufficient funding to balance readiness,
capability, and manpower with our force structure of ships and
aircraft. Failure to do so increases risk to current operations and our
ability to sustainably support future operations.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is continually prioritizing support
services for marines returning from Afghanistan and transitioning out
of the Marine Corps. We will continue to look for opportunities that
will allow us to leverage our resources, as well as resources from
supporting organizations at the State, Federal, and local levels, to
minimize any direct impact to services for our marines and families.
The Marine Corps has diligently looked to the future and
anticipated sequestration cuts in programs, such as the Marine and
Family Programs. In order to absorb these cuts in the immediate future
we have decided to focus reductions at headquarter levels rather than
cuts to the programs directly. However, continual cuts and furloughs
will impact these direct services, which will result in an impact on
morale. Marines and their families are no different than their fellow
citizens. With prolonged budgetary uncertainty and cuts, stress will
increase on our marines and civilian marines, morale will decline, and
productivity will suffer. To mitigate any impact on morale, the Marine
Corps is being frugal money managers, going forward we are seeing
greater innovation and more creative partnerships and leverage of
supporting organizations at the State and Federal level. The Marine
Corps will continue to assess our programs and make fiscal adjustments
when it is called upon us to find more savings.
General Welsh. Current demands on the Air Force are overwhelming
our resources, which drives a continual downward trend in readiness.
Continued sequestration-level funding will force difficult choices
between readiness and modernization.
62. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, in your opinion, are we breaking the sacred
vow we have with a volunteer force to provide them with the adequate
resources and training needed to safely prevail on the battlefield?
General Odierno. The Army trains to ensure that deploying soldiers
and units are combat-ready to prevail on the battlefield. Reduced
funding limits training and delays our ability to deploy forces. The
Army is prioritizing resources to ensure that the forces with the
highest priority missions have adequate resources and training. Until
the Army can adjust to lower total obligation authority and transition
to a fully-supportable force structure, we can only ensure a portion of
the force is adequately trained to respond on time to support planned
contingency operations. Other forces will prepare as best they can with
available resources. In order to deploy at the highest level of unit
proficiency, those units will require additional time and resources for
training before they are ready for the full range of missions.
Admiral Greenert. No, we have not broken our vow with our sailors.
We have purposely targeted our reductions to areas that do not have
direct impact on our sailors or their ability to prevail in any
conflict. Cuts to our programs have been in our shore establishment,
management, and business operations in our systems commands/procurement
processes, non-deployed force training and sustainment--we have ensured
combat readiness of our forward deployed forces were protected as our
first priority. While this has been an effective approach so far, we
are accumulating risk in the material condition of our base
infrastructure and are seeing increasing backlogs in ship and aircraft
maintenance. We cannot continue to take these risks indefinitely; at
some point, we will begin to see operational impacts from the non-
operational choices we are making today. The tipping point will be a
function of the breadth, depth, and timing of continued sequestration.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is extremely concerned about
ensuring our marines are properly resourced and trained to accomplish
their mission. As I stated in my testimony, I am concerned that with
continual fiscal uncertainty we may be breaking faith, but our marines
and families continue to be resilient.
The Marine Corps has been faced with challenges in light of
sequestration and drawdown in end strength. In response, the Marine
Corps is prioritizing support services for marines returning from
Afghanistan and transitioning out of the Marine Corps and limiting
direct services impacts to marines and their families. We are being
frugal money managers looking for greater innovation and more creative
partnerships, leveraging support organizations at the State and Federal
level, and currently absorbing fiscal cuts at the headquarters level to
minimize any impact on direct services to marines and families.
General Welsh. It is our title 10 responsibility and solemn duty to
provide airmen the required training, resources, and equipment so that
they can successfully accomplish their assigned missions. Recruiting
and developing high-quality, innovative airmen will remain a
fundamental tenet of the Air Force. Our airmen have delivered
incredible airpower for the Nation, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365
days a year. However, sequestration has forced us to make very
difficult choices in our efforts to manage risk to the force. The Air
Force will do everything in its power to maintain faith with the
Nation's airmen, but the lack of resources provided the Air Force under
sequester will impede our ability to meet our title 10
responsibilities.
weapons systems modernization and technological superiority
63. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how will sequester impact our ability to
provide our men and women in uniform with the modern 21st century tools
and technologies they need to defeat 21st century adversaries, like
China?
General Odierno. The indiscriminate nature of sequestration has
forced inefficient program changes and delays in equipment
modernization that affects our ability to sustain current systems
effectively and obtain the capabilities needed for future operations.
Not only is there a reduction in available dollars, but the buying
power of those dollars has been severely restricted because of
reoccuring CRs to fund the military rather than timely budgets. We know
that over the long-term, the effects of reduced funding under the BCA
will significantly increase the costs of vital soldier weapon systems
and reduce investment in future Army capabilities, while our potential
adversaries continue to develop destructive technologies and weapons.
For example, we cannot afford to procure a new Armed Aerial Scout
helicopter and there will be a delay for the modernization of Air
Defense Command and Control systems. From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal
year 2017, the Army will have extensive modernization program
shortfalls. Only in fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2023, will we begin
to rebalance readiness and modernization to a level that is appropriate
to fully execute the DSG.
Admiral Greenert. If Navy is fiscally constrained to the
sequestration-level funding at the revised discretionary caps over the
long-term (fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2023), one potential
scenario would result in the development of our capabilities to project
power not staying ahead of potential adversaries' anti-access/area
denial capabilities. We will not meet the projected capability
requirements to assure Joint access in a plausible operational scenario
in 2020 due to shortfalls, specifically:
Some undersea capabilities will be slowed:
Attainment of the required P-8A inventory
(117) would be delayed from 2019 to 2020, and
transition from the P-3C to the P-8A would be delayed
from 2019 to 2020.
The LCS ASW Mission Package would be delayed
from 2016 to 2017.
Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedo
procurement would still equip all of our helicopters,
SSN, and P-8A in the Western Pacific by 2018.
VPM would still be fielded in 2027 to enable
Virginia-class SSN to replace SSGN that begin retiring
in 2026.
The LCS mine warfare mission package would
still field its first increment in 2015 and the second
in 2019.
Air and missile defense improvements would be slowed:
SEWIP upgraded electromagnetic sensing and
upgraded jamming and deception capabilities would both
be delayed 1 year (to 2015 and 2018, respectively).
Both of these upgrades are required to counter advances
in adversary anti-ship cruise missiles.
The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
would be delivered on only four ships, as compared to
seven under our President's budget for 2014 submission,
between 2021 and 2024.
The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block II would
still be fielded in 2020, with 80 missiles being
delivered to deployed ships.
The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, would still field
in 2019 and join our CVW forward homeported in the
Western Pacific in 2020. Overall, the number of F-35
procured would decrease by about 30 aircraft in 2020.
All components of the improved air-to-air IR
kill chain that circumvents adversary radar jamming
would be delayed by 2 years. The Infrared Search and
Track (IRST) sensor system would field in 2018 and the
improved longer-range IRST would not deliver until
2021. The new longer-range AIM-9X Block III missile
would not be fielded until 2023.
Improvements to the air-to-air RF kill chain
would be slowed down as F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet
anti-jamming upgrades would be delayed to 2020. The
longer-range AIM-120D missile would still field in 2014
but equipping of all Pacific carrier air wings would be
delayed by 2 years to 2022.
The Navy Integrated Fire Control--Counter Air
network would still initially field with the E-2D
Advanced Hawkeye in 2015, but only four CVW (compared
to six in our President's budget submission for 2014)
would have it by 2020. Transition to the E-2D would be
delayed 3 years to 2025.
General Amos. Although we are seeing an increase in the type and
complexity of Chinese systems and capabilities that are challenging and
of concern to all the Service Chiefs, I am confident that we will
continue to make the right investments to outpace these threats. My
focus has been and will continue to be on ensuring the readiness of the
Marine Corps--to provide the Nation's forward deployed crisis response
capability. These capabilities will not be aimed at countering one
specific threat but must be able to respond to crises that have yet to
be identified.
We have consciously shifted some of our funding to maintaining a
current level of readiness, and sacrificed some modernization efforts.
However, we continue to invest in reducing the weight of our tactical
vehicles while providing the requisite protection for our marines. This
will make greater use of autonomy, and to expand our command and
control, ISR, and expeditionary logistics capabilities to the tactical
edge. These capabilities when paired with fifth generation aircraft
such as the F-35B, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, and forward deployed
amphibious warships will enable future MAGTFs to continue to serve as
an insurance policy against future threats. However, continued
sequestration will further restrict the adjustments and choices I will
be able to make to long-term modernization efforts while maintaining
near-term readiness.
General Welsh. Sequestration-level cuts will impact every one of
our investment programs. Modernization/recapitalization is required in
order to execute our core missions against the spectrum of threats,
including a high-end adversary. Failing to achieve national objectives
in a major full-spectrum fight against a near-peer adversary, due to a
lack of modernization or recapitalization, is unacceptable. If the
budget reduction under current law continues, erosion of our efforts to
modernize the force will impact our ability to meet the future
technological challenges presented by a near-peer adversary, while also
impacting required readiness necessary for contributing to the joint
force. Given adequate resources our airmen will innovate and find new
and better ways of approaching future military challenges.
64. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, do you agree that under sequester we risk
ceding our technological advantage over the Chinese?
General Odierno. I agree that the indiscriminate nature of the
sequestration reductions to Army science and technology (S&T) efforts
risks ceding our technological advantage over the long-term.
Investments in S&T are a critical hedge in developing technological
superiority through enabling and revolutionary technologies.
Sequestration has already had a significant impact on the Army's
S&T programs, with the most serious effects felt by the civilian
workforce at our labs and research, development, and engineering
centers. Due to sequestration impacts (including furloughs, associated
impacts such as travel and conference restrictions, and hiring and pay
freezes), the Army is losing personnel with specialized critical
expertise. For example, the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors
Directorate lost 8 personnel in June and July 2013 alone, compared to
an average annual loss of around 19 personnel. These pressures also
make it more difficult to attract top talent, especially in areas of
new technical emphasis within the DOD such as cyber research and
systems biology. The loss of key personnel and the inability to attract
new talent will have long-term effects that will be difficult to
recover from, even after sequestration has ended.
Sequestration also forced a large (nearly 50 percent) reduction in
new basic research grants in fiscal year. Army basic research advances
the frontiers of fundamental S&T and drives long-term, leap-ahead
capabilities for the Army through a multi-disciplinary portfolio
teaming our in-house researchers with researchers and graduate students
at 120 universities in 38 States.
Sequestration has caused cancelations and delays in applied
research and technology development areas as well. For example, we have
delayed the Extended Area Protection and Survivability program by 6
months. This program supports DOD's strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific
region through the development of new technologies for counter unmanned
aerial systems and counter cruise missile missions. Continued
sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and beyond will greatly exacerbate
these challenges.
Admiral Greenert. If fiscally constrained to the revised
discretionary caps over the long-term, one potential scenario would
result in the development of Navy's capabilities to project power not
staying ahead of potential adversaries' A2/AD capabilities, effectively
ceding our technological advantage.
General Amos. Although we are seeing an increase in the type and
complexity of Chinese systems and capabilities that are challenging and
of concern to all the Service Chiefs, I am confident that we will
continue to make the right investments to outpace these threats. My
focus has been and will continue to be on ensuring the readiness of the
Marine Corps--to provide the Nation's forward deployed crisis response
capability.
Marine Corps S&T efforts are fully integrated into the Office of
Naval Research. Our relatively modest U.S. Marine Corps investment in
S&T is not focused on China per se. We are focusing on our traditional
expeditionary capabilities in the pivot to the expansive Asia-Pacific
theater. We are investing in programs that will support lightening the
MAGTF for rapid employment while retaining sufficient combat power to
prevail against threats in the littorals.
The A2/AD challenges of concern to the Navy are of equal concern to
the Marine Corps, and will impact the ability of the Marine Corps to
provide effective crisis response throughout the littorals of the Asia-
Pacific theater. The emphasis/priorities that naval S&T has placed on
future disruptive/game changing technologies in directed energy,
lasers, electronic warfare, cyber, autonomy, and mine counter measures,
will enable our continued technological advantage in this environment.
These critical technologies in concert with others that support Navy
specific requirements ensure the Nation's naval team has the ability to
assure access, project power, and provide for an integrated defense of
our amphibious forces, carrier battle groups, and other Joint Forces.
General Welsh. The impact of sequester has introduced uncertainty
into rebuilding unit readiness, investment to restore infrastructure,
and modernization/recapitalization efforts. The uncertainty introduced
into our force structure planning efforts will impact the operational
availability of some of our most technologically advanced capabilities
and could impact the Air Force's ability to execute its mission. In the
face of this increased uncertainty, the Air Force continues to strive
to present a modern and technologically advanced force to combatant
commanders. The fiscally informed decisions we make now will transform
today's Air Force into a ready, smaller, highly-trained, and modern
force prepared to provide global vigilance, reach, and power against
technologically-advancing near-peers.
65. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how will sequester impact the defense
industrial base and its ability to increase production of critical
capabilities in response to a contingency?
General Odierno. The Army expects that sequestration will impact
the defense industrial base and its ability to increase production of
critical capabilities in response to a contingency in the following
ways:
Shrinking demand and production rates will lead to
higher proportional unit and overhead costs.
Lower production rates will lead to shrinkage in the
labor force. The loss of trained and experienced workers may
reduce industry's ability to quickly respond to future
requirements.
Long-term reductions in funding will threaten the
Army's future modernization efforts and place major acquisition
programs at risk, thereby providing fewer opportunities to
maintain design and manufacturing skills in the industrial
base.
The Army is conducting assessments of the industrial base, both on
its own and in conjunction with broader DOD initiatives assessing the
defense sector. The AT Kearney Combat Vehicle Industrial Base
assessment, and the DOD's sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis are
focused on identifying potential weak points in the industrial base and
guiding efforts that support critical elements found to be at risk.
Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request
requires the BCA of 2011's discretionary budget caps be replaced in
fiscal year 2014 and beyond. If the discretionary caps are not revised,
our fiscal year 2014 obligation authority could be reduced $10 to $14
billion. This would compel Navy to again reduce operations,
maintenance, and procurement in fiscal year 2014, negatively impacting
the industrial base.
Delayed weapon system production and cancelled or deferred
maintenance and repair will impact ship, aircraft, missile, and land
system manufacturers and our industrial supplier base. The projected
loss of planned work in fiscal year 2014 due to sequestration will
further stress smaller businesses that provide supplies and services to
major manufacturers, which have already been impacted due to the
general downward trend in defense spending.
General Amos. Sequestration has had, and will continue to have, a
deleterious impact on our Marine Corps industrial base. Under Secretary
Hale testified in March 2013 that sequestration disrupted as many as
2,500 investment programs--driving up unit costs at the very time DOD
is trying to hold them down. The persistence of sequestration will
cause additional cost increases, schedule delays, and adverse effects
on our piece of the larger defense industrial base.
The Marine Corps relies on the non-DOD base for much of the
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) that nets us our
advanced technology and systems. Sequestration is placing pressure on
commercial industry's ability to maintain expertise in critical
technologies and core competencies, as well as its ability to avoid
contraction, which could lead to less cost-effective solutions in
support of our warfighting capability. The small businesses the Marine
Corps relies on, either as prime or sub-prime partners, are hard-
pressed to absorb delays in receipt of contract awards. In order to
stay in business, they will need timely and predictable contract award
actions.
At Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM), our artisans perform
repairs on the full spectrum of Marine Corps equipment. The LOGCOM
workforce consists of skilled and seasoned artisans not found in
commercial industry near our production plants. Many of these artisans
require highly specialized, technical skill sets and certifications
that are low-density in commercial industry and take years to develop.
Examples include specialized metals and coatings workers, electro-optic
workers, and engineers capable of design and fabrication of parts for
our legacy systems that are no longer manufactured. If the Marine Corps
is forced to make precipitous cuts to the LOGCOM workforce, it would
take time to regrow the workforce and requisite skill sets, putting at
risk our capability and capacity to surge in response to unforeseen
contingencies.
General Welsh. The impacts of sequestration on the Air Force flowed
across the broad network of companies, large and small, that provide
the goods and services that enable the Global Reach, Global Vision, and
Global Power of Air Force capabilities. Companies have already
responded to the new fiscal reality. Some companies have made cuts in
personnel, consolidated their operations, and stopped selling to the
military. The net result is a smaller defense industrial base.
This smaller industrial base, in general, will be less capable of
responding to a sudden increase in demand or a production surge. There
will be reduced workers at fewer locations with less raw materials
readily available. At the same time, the demands from the Air Force and
other Services are no longer for simple industrial age products but for
precision weapons and systems with highly advanced technical
capabilities. The combination of starting from a reduced position and
producing systems that are both complicated and complex, presents the
industrial base with a significant challenge when attempting to surge.
My hope is that the Nation will have the time needed for the industrial
base to respond. The airmen who will be called upon to fly, fight, and
win will need those capabilities.
66. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, what are your priorities for critical
capabilities that need to be protected at all costs?
General Odierno. The Army will protect its critical capabilities by
continuing to engage in activities that ensure the commercial and
organic portions of the Army industrial base meet the needs of the
warfighter.
The Army is conducting assessments of the industrial base, both on
its own and with AT Kearney. The AT Kearney Combat Vehicle Industrial
Base assessment, and the DOD's Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier program
are focused on identifying potential weak points in the industrial base
and then guiding efforts that support critical elements and
capabilities found to be at risk.
Through implementation of its Army Organic Industrial Base
Strategic Plan, the Army continually assesses the organic industrial
base to identify core depot and critical manufacturing capabilities,
areas of risk, and present and future organic industrial base
requirements. This will ensure that depot and arsenal workforces and
infrastructures are sized and adjusted accordingly over time to sustain
core depot and critical manufacturing capabilities to support the needs
of the warfighter during current and future contingency operations.
Admiral Greenert. There are several missions and needed
capabilities specified in the 2012 DSG that we cannot perform or keep
pace with potential adversaries if constrained to the BCA reduced
discretionary caps in the long-term. However, our highest priority
missions are to maintain a credible and modern sea-based strategic
deterrent, maximize foreign presence to the extent possible using ready
deployed forces, and continue investing in asymmetric capabilities
while doing our best to sustain a relevant industrial base.
General Amos.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle
F-35B, Joint Strike Fighter
Amphibious Warships
General Welsh. As we plan for various budget scenarios, we will
remain strategy driven by focusing on the unique capabilities we
provide the joint force and our ability to execute those capabilities
against a high-end threat. We seek to be ready in 2014 for a full range
of combat operations, while also building an Air Force capable of
executing our five core missions. However, with a sequestered budget,
we will not be able to protect our critical capabilities, and will not
be able to train or equip our forces or for the full range of
operations against a determined, well-armed, and well-trained
adversary. The U.S. Air Force provides Global Vigilance, Global Reach,
and Global Power to defend our great Nation. At all costs, we must
preserve our enduring contributions in air and space superiority; ISR;
rapid global mobility; global strike; and command and control. Each of
these effects is only provided through the synergy of the right airmen,
with the right training, possessing the right equipment. We must make
prudent choices to ensure the Air Force is able to unleash the full
potential of airpower today, tomorrow, and in the future.
To strengthen our unique and enduring contributions, the Air Force
will: deter and defeat adversaries with a credible first-look, first-
shot, and first-kill capability; hold our adversaries and what they
value at risk while operating on a global scale with unmatched joint
integration; exploit and defend air, space, and cyberspace, especially
in contested environments, while denying our adversaries unrestricted
use of the same. In addition, we believe excess infrastructure is an
issue we must address and believe there are precious dollars to be
saved in infrastructure reductions and interoperability improvements.
We must integrate and organize our Active, Reserve, and Guard forces to
leverage the unique strengths and perspectives of each to seamlessly
execute Air Force missions; enhance relationships and interoperability
with our sister Services, other government agencies, allies, and
partners. The money saved from these efforts must be redirected towards
readiness and training. We must better train airmen to bring their
unique specialties together in more realistic, intense, and diverse
environments to advance integrated airpower operations. Then we must
take the highly trained force and do everything in our power to keep
the force ready. An emphasis on readiness to ensure the highest quality
force, regardless of size; and modernize our capabilities to reduce
operating costs while attaining desired effects with greater
persistence, survivability, longer range, and more versatile payloads
is absolutely essential.
nuclear modernization
67. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, because of budget reductions,
the replacement for our aging nuclear ballistic missile submarines has
been delayed by 2 years. As a result, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
and the Navy believe this will impose moderate operational risk in
approximately the 2030 timeframe. Will the sequester cause an even
greater delay in this program?
Admiral Greenert. Due to its national importance, the Navy will
maintain a credible and modernized sea-based strategic deterrent even
if it results in taking risks in other missions of the Navy. However,
without congressional action or mitigating circumstances, sequestration
in fiscal year 2014 will delay the planned start of construction of the
first SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet STRATCOM presence requirements when the
Ohio-class SSBN retires.
68. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the replacement for the nuclear
air-launched cruise missile (carried by strategic bombers) is the long-
range standoff (LRSO) missile, which has been delayed by 2 years. Can
we expect further delays due to sequestration?
General Welsh. The LRSO program is a high priority nuclear
deterrence operations capability, and the Air Force has had to make
difficult strategic trades affecting other modernization programs in
order to minimize the impact of sequestration to LRSO. The program is
currently on track to achieve Milestone A in fiscal year 2014 and a
Technology Demonstration contract award in fiscal year 2015. However,
it is highly likely LRSO could be further delayed if sequestration
continues based on impacts to the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) ability to produce a warhead synchronized with
the DOD timeline requirement. NNSA planned to start the LRSO warhead
Life Extension Program (LEP) in fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014
based on their fiscal year 2014 budget submission. NNSA is reviewing
their budget priorities to include impacts of sequestration, and will
resolve prior to the submission of their fiscal year 2015 budget.
69. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how could sequestration and
further budget reductions impact the current Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) force and the development of a follow-on system?
General Welsh. Sequestration will slow our fuze modernization
program, upgrades to cryptographic and code handling media, and
replacement of aging missile transport support, and reentry vehicle
test equipment for the Minuteman III ICBM. Technology maturation,
system analysis, and acquisition planning for a follow-on system will
continue as planned with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
AoA completing in June 2014. However, should sequestration continue
into fiscal year 2015 and beyond, GBSD could be placed at risk along
with other critical nuclear modernization programs.
70. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, would DOD consider eliminating a
squadron or wing of ICBMs due to budget cuts?
General Welsh. DOD is currently reviewing force structure options
to comply with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Speaking for the Air Force, any near-term ICBM reductions will be tied
to treaty compliance, rather than to meet a specific budget level. As
we look to the future, there are a number of major modernization
challenges facing the triad. This will require an honest debate as a
Nation on what we can afford, and what is required to support our
national strategy.
71. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Welsh, why are any
reductions in the nuclear forces necessary, when the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Ash Carter, told the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
in August, that nuclear forces are not a big swinger of the defense
budget?
Admiral Greenert. Strategic nuclear force structure will comply
with the agreed upon limits under the New START treaty. The 2010
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded that stable deterrence can be
maintained while reducing accountable strategic delivery vehicles and
warheads below the 2002 Moscow Treaty levels.
General Welsh. DOD must reduce strategic nuclear forces to comply
with the central limits agreed to in the New START treaty by February
5, 2018. The Treaty allows the United States to maintain and modernize
our strategic nuclear forces in a way that best protects our national
security interests, within the overall central limits of the Treaty.
72. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Welsh, wouldn't
the United States have to increase reliance on its nuclear forces if
budget cuts continue to hollow-out our conventional forces?
Admiral Greenert. No. As stated in the 2010 NPR, the United States
would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances
to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
partners. In many cases, it would be inappropriate and counter-
productive to assign nuclear forces to the type of missions that are
carried out by conventional forces.
General Welsh. As stated in the 2010 NPR, the fundamental role of
U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States,
our allies, and partners. Although sequestration will have an impact on
future Air Force conventional capabilities and readiness, the Air Force
is not aware of any administration or DOD changes to policy that direct
an increase in reliance on strategic forces to compensate for potential
gaps in conventional capabilities that may result from reductions in
defense spending.
fiscal year 2015 budget decisions
73. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, what are some of the issues that are currently
being discussed for the fiscal year 2015 budget?
General Odierno. The SCMR review concluded that the Total Army must
reduce its endstrength, combat formations, readiness, and modernization
programs dramatically to keep pace with each of the proposed budget
options. We must strike the right balance between end-strength,
readiness, and modernization across the active Army, the Army National
Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve as we reduce the size of the force.
If the magnitude and speed of the discretionary cap reductions
remain, causing Army end strength to drop below 450,000, the Army will
not be able to fully execute the 2012 DSG requirements. From fiscal
year 2014 to fiscal year 2017, as we continue to draw down and
restructure the Army into a smaller force, the Army will have
significantly degraded readiness and extensive modernization program
shortfalls. Only in fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2023 will we begin
to rebalance readiness and modernization. This rebalance will come at
the expense of significant reductions in force structure and end
strength, which may not allow us to execute the DSG and, in my opinion,
will add significant risk for the Army to conduct even one sustained
major combat operation.
The Army is continuing to examine future year readiness and
investment impacts as a result of fiscal uncertainty.
Admiral Greenert. We have been directed by the OSD to build a
budget, called the alternate POM, which assumes funding levels at the
revised discretionary caps over the long-term. This is being prepared
and we are currently deliberating on the alternate POM in program
budget reviews within DOD. There is also a secondary funding level that
is under consideration at a higher level to provide additional options,
but we are focusing on the alternate POM right now.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is focused on how to maintain a
ready force postured for crisis response and forward presence in an
uncertain and declining fiscal environment. Readiness remains our
primary concern, but adverse impacts upon training and longer term
investment and modernization become more critical each year
sequestration continues.
General Welsh. Given the magnitude of the cuts the Air Force and
the rest of DOD face, all options were considered during the
development of our fiscal year 2015 budget. As a result, the Air Force
divested less capable aircraft that are optimized for a single mission
and, instead, prioritized multi-role survivable aircraft; reduced
modernization while protecting critical initiatives including our top
acquisition priorities (F-35A, KC-46A, LRS-B, space strategic warning,
secure communications, and space situational awareness); protected
readiness to the maximum extent possible; and reduced headquarters
staff.
74. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, help me understand the significance of the
trades that sequestration is forcing you to make as you look to
finalize the fiscal year 2015 budget.
General Odierno. The choices we must make to meet reduced funding
levels caused by sequestration could force us to reduce our Army in
size and capability to levels that I am not comfortable with as the
Chief of Staff of the Army. We must develop a leaner, smaller Army that
remains the most highly-trained and professional All-Volunteer land
force in the world; one that is uniquely organized with the capability
and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint
Force, and is ready to perform the range of military operations in
support of combatant commanders to defend the Nation and its interests
at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats. For those
who present the choice as one between capacity and capability, I would
remind them that for the Army, soldiers are our capability. The Army
must train and equip soldiers to achieve decisive strategic results on
the ground. If the funding dictates a smaller Army, then we must be
prepared for both reduced capacity and reduced capability.
Ultimately, the size of our Army will be determined by the guidance
and amount of funding provided by Congress. Under the proposed SCMR
funding levels, the Army was sized-to-budget, meaning that in order to
build and sustain a ready force, the Army would be reduced to no more
than 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard,
and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. This results in significantly
less than the 52 BCTs I believe we need. Additionally, it would require
us to reduce our modernization accounts by nearly 25 percent; leaving
no program unaffected. While we have not made our final decisions at
this point, major weapon programs will inevitably be delayed. The
impact on the industrial base is likely to be severe.
The Army is continuing to assess the impacts and potential trades
as a direct result of sequestration in fiscal year 2014. The results of
current deliberations will be presented during the fiscal year 2015
budget briefings to Congress.
Admiral Greenert. Consistent with what the Deputy Secretary of
Defense told this committee in August, if fiscally constrained to the
BCA revised discretionary caps over the long-term (2013 to 2023), the
Navy of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the
2012 DSG. There are numerous ways to adjust the Navy's portfolio of
programs to meet the revised discretionary caps. These are currently
under deliberation within DOD.
Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law
must include sufficient readiness, capability, and manpower to
complement the force structure capacity of ships and aircraft. This
balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be
effective, even if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG.
There are, however, many ways to balance between force structure,
readiness, capability, and manpower.
General Amos. The Marine Corps will protect near-term readiness at
the expense of significantly increased risk in equipment modernization
and infrastructure sustainment which creates imbalances across the
Corps. The Marine Corps will rebalance to the Pacific and prioritize
crisis response and support of deployed and next to deploy units.
However, if sequestration remains in effect, the Marine Corps would be
forced to reduce its permanent Active Duty end strength to 175,000
which accepts risk in Major Combat Operations (MCO) as operating forces
will be engaged in one theater thus reducing forces available for MEUs,
SPMAGTFs, TSC operations, and other operational commitments. This risk
cannot be continued indefinitely as less funding for equipment
maintenance, training, ranges, and facilities ultimately impacts
readiness for next-to-deploy and home station crisis response forces.
Additionally, the conditions of our facilities--across the board--
will reduce from fair to poor within the FYDP in conjunction with
minimum funding for base operating support functions (utilities, life/
safety/heath, et cetera) and significant reductions to MILCON/facility
sustainment, restoration, and modernization. Finally, reductions to
equipment modernization result in deferred Initial Operating Capability
(IOC) and reductions to critical capabilities such as maneuver, net-
centric, interoperable, persistent ground surveillance, and command and
control.
General Welsh. The significance of the trades we were required to
make in our fiscal year 2015 budget are clear: the caps established by
the BCA and sequestration will result in an Air Force that has less
capability and less capacity. Additionally, the front-loading of the
BCA cuts also forced us to consider tradeoffs in current readiness
versus future preparedness. Collectively, in formulating an Air Force
budget that complied with the BCA and the fiscal guidance, we had to
accept that we could not fund an Air Force that would be fully capable,
retain capacity, appropriately ready for near-term contingencies, and
recapitalized for the future. Instead, you will see an Air Force
lacking the capacity and capability needed to implement the DSG,
quickly compel adversaries, and avoid unprecedented levels of risk to
the lives of servicemen and women called into conflict.
impact of sequestration on military medical readiness
75. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, how are effects of sequestration expected to
impact the health of our men and women in uniform?
General Odierno. The health of our soldiers directly impacts the
security of our Nation. The soldier is the primary weapon system of the
U.S. Army. Accordingly, soldiers' health equates to readiness. Military
medical health and readiness are directly tied to the Military Health
System's (MHS) ability to provide the right care at the right time. We
must maintain a stable fiscal platform that allows us to focus on our
priorities of Combat Casualty Care, Readiness and Health of the Force,
a Ready and Deployable Medical Force, and Health of Our Families and
Retirees.
Sequestration has placed tremendous pressure on Army medicine to
provide adequate care to soldiers and other beneficiaries. Fiscal
uncertainty has led to a decrease in patient encounters, enrollment,
and overall patient satisfaction. We expect the trend to continue if
sequestration remains in place.
Over one third of our civilian medical workforce was furloughed as
a result of the most recent government shut down. Previously, 83
percent were furloughed due to sequestration. The uncertainty caused by
such furloughs is taking a toll on our personnel and creating hardship.
The Army Medical Command has lost over 4,000 medical workforce members,
representing nearly 10 percent of the civilian workforce. Continued
turbulence for our civilian workforce adversely impacts the Total Army
medical team morale, which will negatively impact retention of both
military and civilian staff. In the long-term, continued uncertainty
will likely cause civilian personnel to migrate to the civilian health
care sector and prevent us from maintaining the right talent we need
for the future.
Sequestration also negatively impacts the long-term R&D of new
medical treatments and solutions for the battlefield. The funding
requirements for military medical R&D are not tied to the size of the
force, but to the diversity of medical challenges imposed by
operational and environmental health threats that will increase with a
change in operational focus to the Pacific.
More than a decade of war has led to tremendous advances in
knowledge and care of combat-related wounds, both physical and mental.
Our decisions today must preserve the Army's core medical research
competencies and, through continued medical research investments,
sustain a productive capability to ensure strategic flexibility and
respond to current and future threats. If forced sequestration cuts
continue to reduce the Army budget in fiscal year 2014 and beyond, we
will risk losing our core medical research competencies and
compromising our ability to prevent technological surprise and deliver
medical solutions necessary to address the gaps discovered during 12
years of combat operations.
Admiral Greenert. Our sailors must be medically ready to meet their
demanding responsibilities. Just as importantly, they need to be
confident when they are deployed that their families have access to
quality health care. The Navy is committed to maintaining access to
health care for all our beneficiaries; however, I remain concerned
about the impact of sequestration at our medical centers, hospitals,
and clinics. With planned reductions, Navy MTFs will have fewer
resources to address the needs of our beneficiaries at a time when we
are seeing an increase in the number of patients in our facilities and
an increase in demand for health care services. In order to address the
anticipated increased demand for access to care at MTFs, fiscal year
2014 sequestration cuts will continue to be channeled to decreasing
facilities sustainment (restoration and modernization), equipment
purchases, and travel, and descoping healthcare support and service
contracts.
General Amos. Our sailors supporting the Marine Corps are committed
to providing the highest level of quality patient care and access for
wounded warriors and beneficiaries. However, sequestration will
adversely impact medical research targeted for wounded warriors and
impact long-term cost saving initiatives, such as the Marine-Centered
Medical Home. Sequestration will also undermine restoration,
modernization efforts, and facility repair, thereby decreasing access
to quality care and the patient experience.
General Welsh. To date, the Air Force has not experienced any
visible impact from sequestration on the health of our airmen; we have
worked very hard to ensure our airmen and their families continue to
receive quality and timely health care. In the short-term,
sequestration impacts to staffing could result in delays in some
services, and the need to send some patients to the civilian network
for care. Long-term impacts of continued sequestration on readiness are
of great concern. Continued cuts to R&D programs could delay critical
advancements in military medicine that allow us to provide cutting-edge
care on the battlefield and prepare us for the next war. Prolonged
delays in acquisition of medical equipment or funding of medical
military construction and facility sustainment projects, traditional
bill payers during constrained budget periods, will also result in the
Air Force no longer providing state-of-the-art care to our members and
families. When this occurs, we will eventually see an impact on the
recruiting and retention of highly qualified medical providers as they
become dissatisfied with their working environment and the ability to
maintain their wartime skills at proficiency level. Ultimately, all of
these factors would reflect on the care we are able to provide to
ensure our force is healthy and fit. We are committed to supporting our
airmen and their families and, if sequestration continues, will make
adjustments in an effort to focus our resources where they are most
needed.
76. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, what impact does a medically unfit fighting
force have on our national security?
General Odierno. A medically unfit fighting force negatively
affects the Army's ability to support the NMS because of a decreased
number of combat-deployable soldiers. Currently, the number of
medically non-available soldiers has remained consistent at 65,000
across the Active and Reserve components. Because all these soldiers
count against the Army components' end strength numbers, it will
exacerbate the Army's personnel readiness posture as we also work
through a deliberate drawdown. The greater the percentage of medically
unavailable soldiers becomes against the Army's decreasing end
strength, the fewer soldiers are available to deploy to achieve NMS
objectives.
Admiral Greenert. Our sailors must be physically and mentally
capable to fulfill their demanding operational responsibilities. The
medical readiness of sailors is directly linked to Fleet readiness;
when they are medically unfit, it impacts their ability to contribute
to the mission of their ship or command. This in turn harms our ability
to deliver the appropriate readiness, warfighting capability, and
forward presence the Nation depends upon from our Navy.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is America's premier crisis response
force. As such our readiness is directly tied to confronting emerging
threats whenever and whenever they may next strike. Medically unfit
marines reduce strategic and operational options available to combatant
commanders, reduce the size of the force and decrease readiness.
Service men and women of the Marine Corps will continually be called
upon to fight the Nation's wars and to protect American's freedoms.
Marines must be in top physical condition, which translates into being
healthy and fit to perform their mission. A medically unfit fighting
force presents a difficult challenge to military preparedness and to
force health protection, and may lead to significant implications for
national security.
General Welsh. Each component of a mission-critical system, to
include the airmen operating the system, must be properly maintained
(or fit) to ensure optimal function. A medically unfit airman threatens
system success and endangers the Air Force's ability to prosecute our
national strategic objectives. This has the potential to put our
national security interests at risk.
research and development, science and technology
77. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, R&D and S&T budgets are typically the first to
be cut when budgets are constrained. What roles do R&D and S&T play in
the ability of your Services to provide for the security of this Nation
and its people?
General Odierno. The Army's S&T vision is to foster innovation,
maturation, and demonstration of technology enabled capabilities that
empower, unburden, and protect the warfighter of the future while
exploiting opportunities to transition increased capability to the
current force. S&T, an early component of R&D, enables soldiers to
dominate the battlefield today and tomorrow. Investments in R&D and S&T
are critical to our efforts to maintain technological superiority. The
Army depends on its S&T programs to research, develop, and demonstrate
high-pay-off technological solutions to threats faced by soldiers in
complex environments across the full spectrum of conflict. In order to
prevent, shape, and win future conflicts in an uncertain and complex
world, Army S&T must deliver timely technology solutions that address
the Army's top priority capability gaps.
The R&D mission leverages advancements developed through the S&T
programs and brings those ideas/technologies to bear, fulfilling the
cornerstone of our NMS to always have the technological advantage.
Both S&T and R&D provide a wealth of knowledge, invention, and
discovery. In addition, investment in S&T and R&D provides the Army
with the foundation necessary to support the development of a spectrum
of capabilities from revolutionary and disruptive capability
development via new programs of record (POR) to evolutionary
advancements in capability through existing PORs. However, constant
fluctuation and uncertainty due to the current fiscal environment
inhibits our ability to develop and mature key technologies that ensure
our warfighters maintain a technological edge over our adversaries.
Admiral Greenert. Naval R&D and S&T deliver new affordable
capabilities to the Navy that ensure continued superiority of the U.S.
naval forces of today and the warfighters of the future. Naval S&T
supports a Navy that is capable of prevailing in any environment by
focusing on S&T areas with big payoffs, encouraging innovative thinking
and business processes, and striving to improve the transition of S&T
into acquisition programs in the most cost-effective means possible--
striking the right balance between responsive near-term technology
insertion and long-term basic research. S&T investments enable the
technical superiority of our naval forces by producing knowledge and
transitions, and growing a healthy science and engineering workforce.
If sequestration continues, there would be adverse impacts to many
of our R&D programs due to contract cancellations, contract
terminations, and undetermined cost increases caused by inefficient
contracting and schedule delays. These impacts will reduce and delay
our R&D efforts and negatively impact key procurement strategies in
future years.
General Amos. Marine Corps Naval R&D and S&T investments enable new
affordable capabilities that ensure the continued technical superiority
of our warfighters today and into the future. Without an adequate
investment in S&T, we are in jeopardy of employing obsolete legacy
technology. Many programs such as the Amphibious Combat Vehicle rely on
these investments to make affordable and effective material solutions
feasible.
The Marine Corps S&T program is fully integrated into the Office of
Naval Research. Naval S&T investments support a Navy and Marine Corps
that is capable of prevailing in any environment by focusing on areas
with sizeable payoffs, encouraging innovative thinking and business
processes, and striving to improve the transition of S&T into
acquisition programs in the most cost-effective means possible--
striking the right balance between responsive near-term technology
insertion and long-term basic research. Our U.S. Marine Corps S&T
investments enable technical superiority by producing knowledge
products, enhancing current programs of record, and transitioning new
capabilities into emerging programs of record. Our R&D and S&T funding
also supports an essential science and engineering workforce, keeping
it technically relevant and capable of developing and evaluating
technology enhancements for warfighter applications. Maintaining an
appropriate investment in our technology base is critical to ensure the
ability to keep pace with future threats and opportunities. The Marine
Corps S&T Strategic Plan establishes priorities and provides the combat
developer's guidance and direction for investments in areas that will
enable future operational concepts.
General Welsh. Since its inception, the U.S. Air Force has
protected the Nation through technical innovation. The Air Force S&T
program prepares and equips the warfighter to face threats in an
uncertain future. The Air Force S&T program investigates game-changing
technologies to affordably transition the art-of-the-possible into
military capabilities. We invest in research that addresses urgent,
near-term warfighter needs as well as research that will provide
revolutionary capabilities in the future. The Air Force S&T program is
multifaceted and flexible; it maintains a strong core of in-house
expertise, pursues technologies in coordination with industry and
academia, and leverages global S&T developments and emerging
capabilities.
Even in these tenuous fiscal times, maintaining investment in S&T
is crucial to the future safety of the Nation. The rapid-fire rate of
technological development across the globe necessitates that America
remains a technologically superior Nation--and the Air Force S&T
program leads the charge in creating a secure, technologically-advanced
future for our warfighters.
impact of sequestration on the war in afghanistan
78. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, do you agree that funds used to pay for
ongoing efforts in Afghanistan do not soften or lessen the impact of
sequestration?
General Odierno. Yes. The Army fenced the OCO funds directly
supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan and did not use them to
lessen the impact of sequestration.
Admiral Greenert. Funds provided by Congress to Navy for OCO do not
lessen the impacts of sequestration. OCO funds provide for incremental
operating costs associated with efforts in Afghanistan and cannot be
realigned to other Navy efforts impacted by sequestration if they do
not support the OCO mission.
General Amos. Yes. Funds allocated towards our Afghanistan forces
do not soften the impact of sequestration.
My number one priority remains those forces in Afghanistan and
forward deployed and we will ensure they are supported and ready. The
funding provided by Congress in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
funds the additional temporary end strength, the pre- and post-
deployment training, the deployed units, and the retrograde and reset
of equipment. As a result, this funding does not lessen the impact of
sequestration on installation support and equipment maintenance.
General Welsh. Any additional OCO funding required in the year of
execution, not covered by the OCO appropriation, adds complexity to the
challenge of covering sequester as the additional funds needed are
supported from our baseline appropriated dollars.
79. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, isn't it true that last year you were forced
to take money out of your base budgets to pay for shortfalls in the
Afghanistan warfighting effort because the White House chose not to
request additional supplemental funding?
General Odierno. The Army used $4.54 billion in base funding and
$2.16 billion from other DOD funding sources to pay for the $6.7
billion shortfall in OCO funds in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom.
Admiral Greenert. Navy provided $0.2 billion in baseline military
personnel and R&D amounts to fund fiscal year 2013 OCO requirements in
second destination transportation for equipment movements and
retrograde operations. The second destination transportation
requirement is funded through Army.
General Amos. In fiscal year 2013, the Marine Corps OCO request was
fully supported by the administration and Congress.
General Welsh. OCO costs exceeded original estimates in fiscal year
2013. These emerging expenses were met through scrubbing OCO
requirements, deferring contracts in order to mitigate costs, and
funding transfers ($.854 billion) between investment and O&M
appropriations.
looming retention problems
80. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, due to sequestration, we have: cancelled a
deployment of a carrier battle group; cancelled training and exercises
at every level; grounded aircraft; cancelled or postponed weapons and
advanced training schools and courses; reduced the amount of ammunition
our service men and women can use during training; required our
military to train without the proper equipment--equipment they will use
in Afghanistan and around the world; postponed required maintenance on
all our military equipment; and delayed or cancelled replacement of
that equipment. Our men and women in uniform are unable to do what they
signed up to do. Do you see any indicators of a looming retention
problem? Please provide examples of these indicators.
General Odierno. Despite budget reductions, the morale of our
Active component soldiers remains high, though tenuous. There are
currently no indications of a looming retention problem within the
Active component. In fact, the Active Army continues to reenlist
soldiers at rates that are consistent with historical trends (fiscal
year 2013--113 percent). Retention has remained high throughout the
war; despite the hardships, soldiers have reenlisted to remain a part
of the team, and continue to do so. We expect the trend to continue and
currently see nothing that indicates an inability to meet our retention
goals. However, as the Army reduces end strength and addresses the
impact of reduced budgets, we will continue to monitor reenlistment
rates and trends to determine any shift in program accomplishments.
During the government shutdown, unit battle assemblies were
canceled, and career counselors were not able to travel. This may have
impacted reenlistment opportunities for certain reenlistment eligible
soldiers. Soldiers who exited during this period may have erroneously
believed that they did not have any option to extend due to the
government shutdown. Army Reserve Careers Division is currently
tracking and contacting all affected soldiers who subsequently exited
during this period. Any additional shutdowns could impact hundreds of
soldiers in the reenlistment eligibility window, thus reducing the
year-to-date reenlistment mission and impacting U.S. Army Reserve end
strength, and the readiness of under strength units. Once a soldier
separates from the Army, it is a lengthy process to bring them back.
The number of Army National Guard reenlistments has steadily
increased over the last 3 fiscal years in line with the increasing
number of reenlistment eligible soldiers. The fiscal year 2013
retention mission set a very aggressive goal to maximize Army National
Guard reenlistments. The Army National Guard leadership continues to
maintain significant emphasis on the retention of qualified,
experienced soldiers and anticipates no issues with meeting future
retention goals.
Admiral Greenert. Fiscal year 2014 retention is currently exceeding
expected levels in all enlisted categories. We do not anticipate any
significant aggregate or community-specific officer retention problems.
General Amos. There is some evidence of a potential future
retention problem. As a part of our drawdown efforts, the Marine Corps
is currently accessing the right balance of officers and enlisted
personnel numbers needed to meet our requirements. In the future, we
believe that in order to meet end strength requirements, the Marine
Corps will require a higher percentage of reenlistments and lower
attrition rates. In general, higher retention requirements/lower
attrition requires greater incentives, and often a larger Selective
Reenlistment Bonus budget, to be able to achieve retention goals.
General Welsh. Overall officer and enlisted retention remains
strong; our airmen love what they do for the Air Force and our Nation.
Given the many personal factors affecting an airmen's decision to stay
or depart the force, it is too difficult to ascertain how sequestration
will affect retention. However; it would not be surprising to find that
airmen might waiver in their commitment to future service under the
conditions adversely impacted by sequestration.
rephasing sequestration cuts
81. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Amos, and General Welsh, do you agree that a rephasing of the sequester
cuts--like the table below proposes--in a way that won't devastate
readiness or undermine our security here at home, would be beneficial
and would allow each of you to make smarter decisions that reduce some
near-term risk?
REDISTRIBUTION OF SEQUESTER CUTS UNDER SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE'S BILL
[In billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year DOD Cut Add/Sub
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014............................ 10.0.............. -44.7
2015............................ 30.0.............. -24.7
2016............................ 61.7.............. +07.0
2017............................ 63.7.............. +09.0
2018............................ 63.7.............. +09.0
2019............................ 66.7.............. +12.0
2020............................ 69.7.............. +15.0
2021............................ 72.1.............. +17.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Odierno. Yes. Currently, the severity and immediacy of
sequestration is having devastating impacts to the Army. Under current
constraints, readiness, and modernization are the only sources
available to offset the reduced funding in the early years until force
structure and end strength reductions produce savings in the future
(typically 3 to 5 years). This causes the Army to be out of balance
across force structure, readiness and modernization for 5 to 8 years.
Re-phasing the reductions to the future would enable the Army to better
manage the impacts and maintain better balance as we drawdown and adapt
to fiscal realities.
Admiral Greenert. The challenge of sequestration as a mechanism for
deficit resolution comes from both the size of the cuts and the
indiscriminate mechanical nature of the cuts as required by law. If
sequestration levels of funding are sustained for 10 years, the Navy of
2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG.
Navy will do our part to get the Nation's fiscal house in order,
but it is imperative we do so in a coherent and thoughtful manner to
ensure appropriate readiness, warfighting capability, and forward
presence. The SCMR demonstrated that making cuts strategically is only
possible if they are back-loaded. While no agency welcomes additional
budget cuts, a scenario where we have additional time to implement
reductions, such as in the President's budget, would be far preferable
to the deep cuts of sequestration. If these abrupt cuts remain, we risk
fielding a force that over the next few years is unprepared due to a
lack of training, maintenance, and the latest equipment.
There is some benefit to rephasing the sequester cuts. However, the
proposed plan resulting in deeper out-year reductions also poses
challenges, particularly for our investment accounts. To responsibly
manage the fiscal year 2013 sequester impact, Navy deferred costs to
future years for many of our investment programs. The funds necessary
to ensure these programs remain whole may not be available in the above
plan with cuts greater than current sequestration levels in the out-
years.
General Amos. Yes. The rephasing of sequester cuts would alleviate
some of the near-term risks to readiness, installations, and equipment
modernization. However, with continued or increased reductions in the
out-years, the Marine Corps will still have to make difficult decisions
regarding manpower (our most expensive resource) which continues to
result in risk to our operating forces, specifically our MCO
capabilities.
General Welsh. Sequestration is very harmful to Air Force readiness
and our airmen. The Nation will be more secure and will achieve more
sustainable savings if reductions in defense spending are made in a
more reasoned way than the abrupt, arbitrary mechanism of
sequestration. With Congress' support for the tough decisions that will
be necessary to align our future force to the needs of the strategy and
a sensible alternative to the indiscriminate sequestration cuts, we can
be both ready today and modern in the future. We need Congress to pass
funding bills that provide stability both in the near-term and the
long-term.
______
questions submitted by senator mike lee
readiness issues
82. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, you all have testified about the readiness crisis we
will be facing in the coming years if sequestration continues. The
problem is that savings from changes in force structure and
efficiencies can only be realized in later years, so in the earlier
years of sequestration, more of the annual cuts will have to come out
of readiness. Can you specifically speak to what changes in force
structure will be necessary to regain readiness at the funding levels
under sequestration?
General Odierno. If further budget cuts are directed in conjunction
with the BCA of 2011, and end strength goes below 490,000 in the Active
component, the Army would need to reduce up to an additional 100,000
soldiers from the Active component, the Army National Guard, and U.S.
Army Reserve. These reductions would result in an Army that is
undersized and subject to prolonged and disproportionate investment
across manpower, O&M, modernization, and procurement without
corresponding adjustments to strategy. In the face of fiscal year 2014
budget uncertainty, the Army will ensure units with high-priority
missions have the resources they need to be fully prepared, and must
accept risk in lower non-priority units. Lowest priority forces may not
be able to fully execute broader-focused training strategies since they
would have to constrain training activity to the squad/crew/team level.
Restoring adequate readiness across the force will take years to
complete and require significantly more resources to maintain the
necessary readiness in a stable fashion.
Admiral Greenert. If sequestration continues in fiscal year 2014,
we will need to request to transfer or reprogram funds from other
accounts into O&M to make up for the sequestered amount and regain
readiness. Just to meet minimum readiness needs, we need to transfer or
reprogram about $1 billion into the O&M account. Procurement programs
would have to be reduced to achieve near-term savings from changes in
force structure. For example, cancelling procurement of 11 tactical
aircraft (4 EA-18G Growler, 1 F-35C Lightning II, 1 E-2D Advanced
Hawkeye, 2 P-8A Poseidon, and 3 MH-60 Seahawk) and about 400 weapons,
exacerbating future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities to
project power despite A2/AD threats.
General Amos. Concerned with the likelihood of future sequestration
budgets beyond 2013, the Marine Corps initiated a study to identify the
Marine Corps force structure that would best meet the National Security
Strategy requirements, at a high rate of readiness, within the confines
of future budgetary constraints. A redesigned 175,000 force emerged as
the best force the Corps could provide in addressing the operational
requirements of steady state deployments, crisis response activities,
and potential major combat operations while preserving institutional
health and readiness. At 175,000, the Corps leverages its crisis
response capability, which is crucial for the current and future threat
environments through lighter, agile, forward-deployed forces. The force
provides a balanced force of MAGTFs that range from the Special Purpose
MAGTF to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) levels. Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEU) with parent Marine Expeditionary Brigades
(MEB) would optimize amphibious training opportunities within each MEF.
Standing MEBs would be capable of high-entry operations from the
seabase and employment as a Global Response Force to provide the
combatant commanders with a middleweight force for a broad range of
mission sets. The 175,000 force supports the rebalance to the Pacific,
includes the 1,000 Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, and supports
Marine Corps Forces SOCOM and Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command.
It accepts risk, however, in the ability to carry out major combat
operations at the high end of the range of military operations. Some of
the force structure changes will be:
Headquarters above the MEF will be reduced by 20
percent
II MEF and MARFORCOM commands will be combined
Marine Logistics Groups will be reorganized into
functional battalions
The quantities of artillery batteries and tactical
aviation squadrons will be reduced
General Welsh. The readiness problem the Air Force faces over time
is significant. Recovering Air Force readiness levels required to meet
DSG requirements will take a combination of time, additional resources,
and reductions in operational tempo. The Air Force can only achieve
these readiness levels by reducing force structure enough so that we
can keep a smaller force ready, which in turn means less capacity, less
capability to respond globally, and less options for national strategic
decisionmaking. If reduced sequestration-level funding caps continue,
over the next 5 years, the Air Force could be forced to cut up to
25,000 total force airmen (about 5 percent) and up to 550 aircraft
(about 9 percent of the inventory). While fiscal constraints make it
necessary to reduce force structure, a smaller force will not
automatically be more ready. To achieve desired readiness levels, we
must also manage the operational taskings so that our forces have the
time to conduct necessary training to achieve readiness.
83. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, will it require a BRAC round? If so, how extensive
will the BRAC need to be and how extensive would downsizing need to be
for each of the Services?
General Odierno. Yes. The Army's end strength and force structure
is declining as funding decreases creating additional excess capacity.
We simply cannot afford spending millions of dollars maintaining
underutilized buildings and infrastructure. In a very short period,
trying to spread a smaller budget over the same number of installations
and facilities will inevitably result in rapid decline in the condition
of Army facilities. Without a future round of BRAC, the Army will be
constrained in closing or realigning installations to reduce overhead.
This empty space tax on our warfighters will simply result in cuts to
capabilities elsewhere in the budget.
BRAC 2005 was a restructuring effort that is currently saving the
Army a net of $1 billion a year, even though the Army's force structure
and end strength increased during the implementation period. During the
late 1980s and 1990s, the Army's force structure and end strength
declined significantly, which initiated efficiency rounds of BRAC that
are saving the Army an additional $1 billion a year. The Army would use
a future round of BRAC to seek efficiencies similar to the rounds of
BRAC from this period.
The Army is unsure exactly how much excess capacity will be created
when the Army's Active component force structure declines to 490,000
soldiers. A June 2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
concluded that use of 2004 and 1998 capacity data for ``calculating
pre-BRAC estimates of excess capacity ha[s] limitations.'' These
capacity analyses identified upwards of 20 percent excess capacity in
Army installations.
A BRAC round is necessary to identify inefficiencies and eliminate
unused facilities, so that we do not divert scarce resources away from
training, readiness, and family programs.
Admiral Greenert. Our Navy functions best when our shore
infrastructure is aligned with our force structure and laydown. If
Congress authorizes a new BRAC round, the Navy will evaluate our
activities objectively by measuring military value, alignment with
force structure, cost, and impact to the surrounding communities.
General Amos. Our bases and stations provide the training areas,
ranges, and facilities necessary to prepare and sustain forward
deployed marines. The Marine Corps views its installations as an
indispensable element to operating force readiness and we continue to
seek efficiencies in every facet of installation management. Since
installation readiness and operational readiness are intertwined,
installations and operating forces must be viewed through one
supporting prism and we continue to aggressively seek efficiencies and
will find our trade space in the selective divesture of aging
infrastructure. We recognize the necessity of BRAC deliberations across
the Services. However, we don't believe we have excess infrastructure.
In fact, our assessment is that we are currently right-sized and will
need to maintain the current number of bases to support the future
force.
General Welsh. Yes, we require BRAC legislation to allow the Air
Force to complete a thorough analysis of infrastructure and excess
capacity. Only with enactment of BRAC authority can the Air Force
conduct a definitive BRAC analysis, authoritatively measure and compare
force structure and infrastructure requirements, and determine excess
capacity.
84. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, what will happen to military readiness if the
continued growth in personnel costs--such as pay, benefits, healthcare,
and retirement--are not changed?
General Odierno. Military manpower costs remain at historic highs
and consume roughly 44 percent of the Army budget today. If we do not
slow the rate of growth of soldier compensation, it will consume a
higher, disproportionate percentage of the Army's budget. As a result,
we will be forced to reduce the Army's size below sequestration levels
of end strength and further reduce investments in training and
modernization which will inevitably adversely affect readiness. We must
balance compensation with capacity, readiness, and modernization. It is
imperative that we develop compensation and benefits packages that
reduce the rate of growth, while honoring our commitment to soldiers
and their families and maintaining the quality of the AVF.
Admiral Greenert. Military compensation is roughly half of the DOD
budget. If left unchecked, the growth of pay and benefits will impact
our readiness and modernization efforts, resulting in a far less
capable force that is well-compensated, but poorly trained and poorly
equipped.
General Amos. Controlling the growth of personnel costs is
essential to maintaining a balanced, high state of readiness force as
we tighten our spending to meet the requirements in the BCA. The
proposals to reduce pay and health care costs--in the President's 2014
budget submission--will allow us to continue to recruit and retain
high-quality marines. If action is not taken to slow compensation
growth, personnel costs will continue to increase; thereby, putting
greater pressure on readiness and modernization.
General Welsh. Readiness is at a critical point in our history. We
have to take a deliberate and comprehensive look at compensation and
benefits to be sure we have the right balance between people, programs,
readiness, weapons systems sustainment, and modernization.
85. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, do you believe these changes to personnel costs
would need to be made even if sequestration were not a factor?
General Odierno. Yes. The cost of a soldier has doubled since 2001
and unless DOD, with congressional support, can bend the cost curve of
military compensation, it will grow to a disproportionate share of the
budget. This especially impacts the Army, which has the largest end
strength of all the Services. As we go forward, we must develop
compensation packages that control future costs, but at the same time
continue to recognize and reward our soldiers and their families for
their commitment and sacrifice.
Admiral Greenert. Yes. I support our fiscal year 2014 President's
budget submission, which included modest compensation-related reforms.
People are our most important asset, and we must sustain compensation
packages that recruit and retain the finest military in the world.
Overall, personnel costs in DOD have risen approximately 40 percent
above inflation since 2001, we cannot afford to sustain this growth
under the current fiscal realities.
General Amos. Yes. The Marine Corps currently spends 62 cents on
the dollar to cover manpower and personnel costs. If action is not
taken, that number will approach 70 cents by the end of the FYDP.
Limiting the growth of military compensation is still a necessary
aspect of force modernization. Measured and competent adjustments to
areas, such as basic pay and BAH, are responsible ways to adapt to the
current fiscal environment without hollowing out the AVF.
General Welsh. The Air Force must employ a fair and competitive
compensation package to recruit and retain quality airmen to maintain
the experience in our technology-based force. This will require
thoughtful and strategic compensation modernization and reform under
most any budget environment.
strategic shift to the asia-pacific region
86. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, how will the President's strategic shift to the
Asia-Pacific region be effected by an ongoing sequester?
General Odierno. The Army continues to prioritize and implement
requirements that support the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, but
ongoing budget reductions may raise doubts in the region about
America's commitment. In the short-term, sequestration primarily
degrades the readiness of Army forces to participate in shaping
activities and to respond to contingencies in the region. In the
medium- to long-term, sequestration limits our ability to most
effectively modernize or restructure forces to meet future regional
security challenges. The Army maintains a robust, forward presence in
the region including 8 Active component BCTs, 12 Patriot batteries, and
numerous theater enabling units. Yet the nature of the sequestration
cuts has led to a sharp reduction in training budgets, leaving most
units assigned to the theater at reduced readiness levels. Without
ready forces, we will find it increasingly difficult to sustain the
quality and quantity of activities that demonstrate American leadership
and commitment. As the Army continues to balance global obligations, we
have prioritized key assets and capabilities and aligned a Corps
Headquarters and additional enabler units to the region. We presently
consider these commitments and capabilities sustainable, but a
prolonged sequester may require cuts in both force structure and
modernization that significantly decrease the Army's ability to meet
future security challenges. At a time when many Asia-Pacific nations
are using their recent prosperity to modernize or expand their
militaries, the Army cannot continue to play a stabilizing role in the
region if investments in force structure and future capabilities do not
at least keep pace.
Admiral Greenert. I remain committed to providing support to our
allies in the Asia-Pacific region and our fiscal year 2014 President's
budget submission proposed increasing presence in the Asia-Pacific
region from about 50 ships today to about 60 ships in 2020, consistent
with the DSG's direction to rebalance to that region. We are
considering numerous options, including forward basing more of our
forces overseas to maximize the presence they provide. With our
priorities focused on the Asia-Pacific region, we will have to take
risk elsewhere.
General Amos. The President has made clear that the rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific region, including restationing within and off Okinawa,
is a whole-of-government effort that is the result of our enduring U.S.
interests in the Asia-Pacific region. While our interests will endure,
the budget constraints of sequestration may require a change in the
pace and scope of some of DOD's activities in the Asia-Pacific region,
but not the priority of the region to the United States.
In the long-term, sequestration will delay and potentially lengthen
the timeframe for completion of the U.S. Government/Government of Japan
Distributed Laydown. Additionally, sequestration reduces strategic
mobility, or Intra-theater lift requirements and the ability of those
Pacific-based forces, such as the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and
Marine Air Group-12 which use Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands training ranges for sustainment of unit-level and MAGTF
training.
General Welsh. Sequestration will pose many challenges for the Air
Force in the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Despite these
challenges, sequestration is providing an opportunity to relook at how
we do business while we continue to prepare for high intensity
conflict. Ensuring we provide deterrence in Asia, in close
collaboration with the other Services and our allies, is critical to
our success.
One of the ways the United States demonstrates its commitment to
the region is by stationing the majority of the Air Force's permanent
overseas forces in the Asia-Pacific region. This airpower regional
presence, combined with CONUS-based forces, provides critical
operational capabilities to the PACOM Commander. We must work to
protect and preserve our forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Under sequestration-level funding, we are unable to maintain
mission readiness levels, our training programs will be unable to meet
current production targets, and we are creating a bow wave in critical
aircraft maintenance and modernization. This will result in reduced
combat power from a smaller, less capable, and less ready force,
thereby increasing national security risk.
Additionally, major components of the Air Force's Asia-Pacific
rebalance strategy include Theater Security Cooperation, Joint
Cooperation/Operational Concept Development (Air-Sea Battle), Force
Posture, Base Resiliency, and Investment/Modernization. Specifically,
we have programmed substantial funding to enhance our capability for
expedient repair of our major Pacific bases. While less visible than
aircraft on the ramp, this represents a major commitment to the region.
The Air Force continues to work on Pacific Airpower Resiliency studies
to inform our future priorities. The United States has done virtually
no hardening for some 30 years.
Regardless of the budget levels, the Air Force remains committed to
the key tenets of the DSG. Sequestration may slow our efforts, but we
cannot let it stop them. Between force presence and infrastructure
improvements, our warfighting credibility and our operational
resiliency commitment will be demonstrated to our partners and allies
and messaged to our potential adversaries.
87. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, will we be able to shift to the Pacific and still
maintain our ability to fight terrorism and deter the Iranian threat in
the Middle East?
General Odierno. Unless something is done to mitigate the
magnitude, method, and speed of the reductions under the BCA, the Army
will be forced to make significant reductions in force structure and
end strength. Such reductions will not allow us to fully execute the
2012 DSG and will make it very difficult to conduct even one sustained
major combat operation.
Admiral Greenert. Our fiscal year 2014 President's budget
submission planned to increase presence in the Asia-Pacific region from
about 50 ships today to about 60 ships in 2020, consistent with the
DSG's direction to rebalance to that region. If fiscally constrained to
the revised discretionary caps over the long-term, the Navy of 2020
would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG. In one
potential scenario, Navy would not increase presence in the Asia-
Pacific region, which would stay at about 50 ships in 2020. This would
largely negate the ship force structure portion of our plan to
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region directed by the DSG.
The Navy's fiscal year 2014 President's budget submission would
``place a premium on U.S. military presence in-and in support of-
partner nations'' in the Middle East. Since presence would decrease
and, assuming we use the same ship deployment scheme in the future,
there would be gaps in CSG presence totaling 2 to 3 months each year.
Under the fiscal year 2014 President's budget, we would have the
capacity to conduct widely distributed counterterrorism and irregular
warfare missions. According to our FSA, this requires one AFSB in the
Arabian Gulf and one AFSB in the Gulf of Aden, four LCS, with two
deployed in various locations worldwide and six MQ-8B/C Fire Scout
unmanned air vehicles operating from these platforms. Under long-term
revised discretionary caps, we would not have the capacity to conduct
widely distributed counterterrorism and irregular warfare missions, as
defined in the DSG.
General Amos. We must maintain a force that can balance a focus on
the Asia-Pacific region with a sustainable emphasis on the Middle East,
combined with a continuous effort to counter violent extremists
operating across multiple domains.
Based on the detailed planning the Marine Corps has done, a force
design of 175,000 is the lowest temporary level that can retain
America's crisis response force within sequestration level budgets.
This provides a minimum acceptable level of readiness, while
maintaining forward presence as a part of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Further reductions will incur heightened, and in some cases prohibitive
risk to the National Security Strategy.
General Welsh. The Air Force's ability to provide the joint force
with Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power make it
particularly well-suited for the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region,
while still maintaining our ability to deter aggression in the Middle
East. The arbitrary nature of sequestration, however, puts that ability
in jeopardy due to reduced flying hours, curtailed major exercises, and
overall reductions in force structure, readiness, and modernization. We
will become a smaller force, but there is a limit to how small we can
get and still fulfill our DSG obligations due to an increasingly slim
margin in capacity.
sequestration and the quadrennial defense review
88. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, how is sequestration factoring into the writing of
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for next year?
General Odierno. The QDR is evaluating the demands of the emerging
security environment and examining a wide range of options for sizing
and shaping U.S. forces accordingly. The review has been undertaken in
the context of generally tightening resource constraints on DOD and
includes consideration of the potential implications of sequestration
on the Nation's ability to execute an appropriate defense strategy. I
anticipate that the QDR report will address those implications when
published.
Admiral Greenert. As stated in the QDR Terms of Reference, ``The
QDR will update the defense strategy as appropriate, aiming to provide
a strategy that is executable at low-to-medium risk, while accounting
for the prevailing financial outlook of potential deep cuts to the
Department's budgetary top line, in both level and backloaded
profiles.''
General Amos. In contrast to the SCMR process, which was fiscally
constrained, the QDR is fiscally informed. In other words, the QDR
focus is different--it is focused on developing the right strategy and
force planning construct for the future security environment, not on
meeting targeted budget reductions. Our staff involved in the QDR
process fully understands that we must account for today's fiscal
pressures as we develop the right strategy and force planning
construct. We must ensure that we are developing an affordable
strategy, but we also need to be clear on what capabilities DOD needs
to protect or even enhance, despite fiscal pressures. Striking that
balance is the challenge of the QDR, and I believe that we are on the
correct path to achieve that balance.
General Welsh. The QDR is a comprehensive examination of national
defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, budget plan amongst other elements of the defense
program, and policies as required by title 10 U.S.C. section 118. Along
this line, sequestration constraints will be considered when developing
near-term and long-term defense strategy, force structure, and
capabilities to ensure a realistic and implementable national defense
strategy. However, as OSD has previously stated, considerations of
national objectives, threats, strategy, and military capabilities
should be wide-ranging enough to provide decisionmakers with insights
about consequences and associated levels of risk for different levels
of resources.
89. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, will we see changes in our strategic objectives and
priorities because of budget restraints?
General Odierno. While the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are better positioned to answer this
question, I think it is clear that we can expect to see some refinement
of our strategic objectives and priorities as DOD fully implements the
2011 BCA.
The President's January 2012 DSG provides a starting point for
refining objectives and priorities. As you will recall, the guidance
directs that the Armed Forces not size for large-scale, long-term
stability operations. To the Army, that means reducing or taking risk
in the forces providing depth and endurance for post-conflict
operations designed to transform battlefield success into enduring
political and security stability. We have regularly mobilized and
deployed many of these forces over the past 12 years, but the January
2012 guidance reduces that priority.
Clearly articulating to the President and Congress what our Armed
Forces can and cannot do at reduced funding levels, and the associated
risk, is a critically important step in this process. We owe it to our
political leaders, as well as our soldiers and their families, not to
create political expectations that our military cannot achieve.
As we look to the future, we will need to see the world as it is,
not as we might like it to be. A host of factors including weapons
proliferation, climate change, cultural and religious differences,
wealth disparity, and access to global information, will likely
increase challenges faced by many governments, some of whom are
important to the security the United States and our allies. Security
challenges related to failing states and ungoverned territories will
likely remain for the foreseeable future. Addressing these challenges,
alongside key allies and interested partners, will remain a
fundamentally human endeavor, requiring U.S. ground forces that are
well-led, well-equipped, and well-trained. These past 12 years of war
have taught us, as a Nation, that there is no substitute for an
adequately sized, ready, and responsive Army that helps to shape the
world in which we live, prevent miscalculation and conflict, and
decisively defeat aggression directed against American citizens,
territory, and interests.
Admiral Greenert. The standard that guides our current planning,
programming, and budgeting is the 2012 DSG and its objectives for the
Joint Force. Our 2014 President's budget submission was designed to
execute the DSG with acceptable risk. The DSG incorporated the first
set of BCA-mandated budget reductions and directed the military to
address ``the projected security environment'' and to ``recalibrate its
capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in
the missions'' of the Armed Forces. If fiscally constrained to the
revised discretionary caps, over the long-term (2013 to 2023) the Navy
of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG,
requiring a reassessment of our strategic objectives and priorities.
General Amos. Without modification to either the defense strategy
or the budget, the mid- and far-term effects of sequestration will
force DOD to re-evaluate its objectives and priorities.
General Welsh. The overall strategic objectives and priorities for
DOD will not change, however the fiscal realities of sequestration will
require hard choices and tradeoffs. These choices will be informed by
the strategic priorities laid out in the QDR.
biggest threats facing the united states in the next decade
90. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, what do you think are the biggest threats the United
States will have to face in the next decade?
General Odierno. Al Qaeda core and its regional allies and
franchises will remain capable of threatening U.S. regional allies and
interests, and are continuing to seek opportunities to conduct
international attacks. Additionally, new terrorist groups aided by
infusions of al Qaeda personnel have emerged in the wake of the Arab
Spring.
Political turbulence and the ensuing instability initiated with the
Arab Awakening in early 2011 will continue to generate challenges for
domestic and regional security in the Middle East. Nascent Governments
in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq will struggle to satisfy
national demands while confronting extremists attempting to shape
government policy through violence. The United States will be the
object of dissident frustrations and terrorist attacks ranging from
isolated incidents against local western interests to military and
diplomatic missions. The U.S. Army will be called upon to assist
regional partners in strengthening security service capabilities and
responding to emergency stability operations that likely will include
protecting U.S. citizens and interests in the region.
Even with the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program, the
Persian Gulf will continue to experience regional tensions and
continued Iranian initiated subversive activities that include attacks
on U.S. regional interests.
Although China and the United States share many interests, China
continues to modernize and expand its armed forces while claiming
sovereignty over territories in the East and South China Seas that are
also claimed by U.S. friends and allies. China's uncompromising and
assertive behavior is heightening tensions and increasing the danger of
accidental escalation. Prospects for a near-term Taiwan crisis appear
low, but the balance of regional military forces continues to shift in
China's favor.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains a critical
security challenge. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated its
willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior,
including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK). Its pursuit of
nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles and willingness to
proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements
and United Nations Security Council Resolutions further highlights its
threat to the region.
North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains
the capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite
significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. The North Korean
military is also well-postured to conduct limited attacks with little
or no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship and
the artillery bombardment of a South Korean island along the Northern
Limit Line.
Russia still views the United States/North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) as its primary threat and is increasing its
military budget in order to modernize and reform its armed forces. It
is using its military capabilities, energy resources, and growing
economic power to intimidate countries in its ``near abroad'' into
joining Russian-dominated military and economic organizations. Russia
continues to support the Syrian regime and is attempting to reduce
United States influence globally, especially in the Middle East and
Africa through increased arms sales. Russia is aggressively asserting
greater territorial claims in the Arctic.
In Latin America, transnational criminal organizations (TCO) are an
expanding problem. Particularly in Central America, TCOs have grown so
large and well-financed that they are threatening the authority of the
governments and the political and economic stability of the countries.
Approximately half the forces of the militaries of Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador are tasked with fighting and assisting police against
the TCOs. The regional militaries are asking for additional help
combating TCOs.
The terror threat from al Qaeda linked groups in Africa has been
growing steadily. Africa's Islamists are able to take advantage of the
continent's porous borders; weak and corrupt central governments;
undertrained and underequipped militaries; flourishing drug trades that
provide a steady source of income; and, vast lawless spaces.
NATO and our European allies make critical contributions to our
global operations, but they face significant defense cuts that will
reduce the size and capability of their ground forces with possible
adverse effects on future coalition operations.
Admiral Greenert. It is hard to predict future threats and our
historical record in this is poor. However, we believe we will face a
broad array of diverse threats and challenges to the Nation's security
over the next 10 years. Among the most concerning are cyber, threats to
access, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and militant
extremism.
General Amos. The DSG describes future threats, challenges, and
opportunities--I continue to support its full implementation. Future
threats to the United States will emanate from a security environment
defined by violent extremism, battles for influence, disruptive
societal transitions, natural disasters, extremist messages, and
manipulative politics. We must be prepared to confront them
successfully. Over the next decade, the world will see criminal
enterprises wield combat power formerly only associated with nation
states and experience separatism, extremism, and intolerance that will
lead to terrorism, protests, and violence. In this context, new
technologies will place modern weapons into the hands of developing
states and non-state actors while the development and proliferation of
advanced conventional weapons challenges our ability to project power
or gain access.
General Welsh. From an Air Force perspective, we will see
adversaries possess the capability to degrade our ability to operate in
air, space, and cyberspace. A growing number of adversaries will be
able to sustain effective interference in multiple domains, creating
highly-contested environments. High-end threats from integrated
advanced technologies, systems, and training will increase. In the mid-
term, a near-peer competitor will emerge capable of producing,
acquiring, and integrating high-end air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities that rival or equal our own. The growth of highly-
contested environments will overmatch the Air Force's current
capabilities.
91. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, will we have the readiness in coming years to
execute operational plans to neutralize these threats?
General Odierno. Under the funding levels of the President's budget
proposal, which defer the largest funding reductions until 2018, we can
maintain a ready force, albeit a smaller one, that can meet the
requirements of the 2012 DSG.
Under the funding levels of the current law, in contrast, the Army
will be ``sized-to-budget.'' In my professional military judgment,
these projected end strength and force structure levels would not
enable the Army to fully execute the 2012 DSG requirements to defeat an
adversary in one major combat operation while simultaneously denying
the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. Additionally, it is
unlikely that the Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and
decisively should they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained
major combat operation.
Admiral Greenert. Currently, the reductions in fleet training we
are compelled to make result in only one nondeployed CSG and one non-
deployed ARG trained and ready for surge operations, while some
combatant commander plans notionally require three of each ready to
deploy within about 2 weeks of a crisis occurring. Sequestration in
fiscal year 2014, particularly if combined with restrictions of a CR,
will continue to reduce our readiness in the near-term.
General Amos. The impacts we face in terms of readiness have
primary and secondary effects. While the primary effects on short-term
readiness will begin to be observable in fiscal year 2014, the longer-
term effects will be even more devastating. We are realigning funds
from longer-term activities to protect the short-term readiness of our
combat deployed marines. While these adaptations are necessary, the
continued maintenance of the short-term readiness of our current force
comes at the expense of those who will follow in their footsteps. We
are consuming tomorrow's seed corn to feed today's requirements,
leaving ever less to plant for the future.
The abruptness and inflexibility of sequestration will force us to
mortgage the condition of our equipment and could erode our readiness
to dangerous levels. The indiscriminate nature of sequestration is
creating its very own national security problem. Within a year, we will
see real impact to all home station units and the beginning of impacts
to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces . . . the beginnings of
a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid.
General Welsh. The Air Force was below its readiness requirements
to meet the DSG before sequester as a result of 20+ years of continuous
combat operations. The 2014 President's budget request represented a
deliberate attempt to regain and restore Air Force full-spectrum
readiness. Unfortunately, fiscal year 2013 sequester impacts, coupled
with the government shutdown and continued budgetary uncertainties,
have caused readiness to continue to decline. Although today, the Air
Force maintains the capability to prevail in a single conflict, it
comes at a cost to the full-spectrum training and readiness for any
additional operational plan or contingency execution. If budgetary
constraints continue, it is highly unlikely the Air Force will have the
required ready units to meet its wartime requirements with ready forces
for the foreseeable future.
92. Senator Lee. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos,
and General Welsh, if we have to engage in military action against
these threats, what further effect will it have on our readiness gap?
General Odierno. To meet the military needs of the Nation, the Army
must have a capability to do a multi-phase, combined arms, joint
campaign in a very complex environment that includes a conventional
opponent, irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency. A single major
conflict will exhaust this capability, depleting any ready forces for
another contingency.
Admiral Greenert. If constrained to the BCA revised discretionary
caps in the long-term, we would not be able to conduct one large-scale
operation and also counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in
a second theater. Under one fiscal and programmatic scenario, the fleet
in 2020 would have 9 to 10 CVN/CSG and 9 to 10 LHA/D and ARG. We would
be able to sustain about one non-deployed CSG and one non-deployed ARG
fully certified and able to surge on required timelines. Together, our
presence and surge forces would be sufficient to conduct all missions
associated with only one large-scale operation, as defined today.
General Amos. As a result of the BCA and sequestration, the Marine
Corps' readiness model is already out of balance. To maintain
readiness, I have been forced to realign funds from longer-term
activities to protect the near-term readiness of our currently deployed
forces. If we have to send our forces into combat before the force is
fully reset, it will only widen the current readiness gap.
Sustained combat operations in the Middle East have placed enormous
demands on our equipment. The Marine Corps does not anticipate a post-
OEF operational pause whereby the Service will have the luxury of
focusing exclusively on reset and reconstitution. The Marine Corps must
remain ready to respond to unforeseen crises. This means reset will
occur in stride with current operations and the larger reconstitution
effort to ensure operating forces go to combat fully equipped, with
mission capable equipment.
A current Marine Corps operating assumption is that we will be
funded to our identified reset liability level. Appropriations short of
this amount already jeopardize our required readiness levels for post
Operation Enduring Freedom reset.
General Welsh. Engaging in military action against a threat will
have a negative impact to our readiness levels. While engaged with a
threat, airmen do not retain proficiency in other core skills required
to maintain readiness. The Air Force is already on a 20+ year downward
trend in readiness due to continued operational demand, coupled with a
shrinking force. Add to this trend the recent sequestration driven cuts
and our forces may not be sufficiently trained and ready to meet a
future threat. These factors increase risk to personnel and equipment
and could put desired outcomes in jeopardy. Unfortunately, it takes
even more sorties and money to retrain a squadron whose readiness has
atrophied than it takes to keep it trained and ready. These factors
will only widen the readiness gap until we can change our current
course.
depot and modernization work delays
93. Senator Lee. General Welsh, I appreciate the time we have spent
discussing issues important to the Air Force. In the House Armed
Services Committee sequestration hearing in September, you outlined the
F-35, the KC-46, and the new LRB as the Service's top priorities, but
stated that the sequester could threaten those programs, as well as
programs of lower priority. Can you describe your concerns about what
specifically could happen to new acquisitions and to legacy platforms
that require depot work and modernization?
General Welsh. The effects of sequestration disrupt major defense
acquisition programs throughout the development, fielding, and
sustainment phases. The effects may not be immediately apparent to the
American public, but the damage could be disastrous. Should we face a
high-end threat in the future, the impact of not investing in new
technologies and modernization will be deadly. Program disruptions and
acquisition delays will, over time, cost more taxpayer dollars to
rectify contract breaches, will raise unit costs, and will ultimately
delay delivery of critical equipment to combatant commanders.
We must continue to maintain and modernize legacy platforms
essential to a full range of combat operations. Under continued
sequester, we face delays to depot maintenance through both organic and
contract sources on critical aircraft, engines, and space systems. Over
time, delays will add to a bow wave of maintenance that will eventually
ground aircraft and disrupt capabilities to critical combat support
systems in air, space, and cyberspace domains. Delays in depot
maintenance and upgrades to missile warning and space surveillance
tracking will significantly impact national missile defense and space
situational awareness, ultimately hurting our intelligence community.
Relief from sequester and investment in these weapon systems is
essential to prevent the looming impact to combat readiness.
Sequestration cuts deeply into Air Force investment accounts, which
under the law must be applied equally at the program, project, and
activity level; consequently, it impacts every one of the Air Force's
acquisition programs. For example, a potential fiscal year 2014
sequestration impact for the F-35A low rate initial production,
relative to the request, could be the loss of 4 to 5 aircraft from the
requested amount of 19. This potential reduction will increase unit
costs resulting in production funding shortfalls.
94. Senator Lee. General Welsh, will it be more expensive to delay
depot and modernization work that will have to be made up in the
future?
General Welsh. Delays to depot maintenance create a bow wave of
requirements. As the bow wave builds, stress on depot capacity
increases. Eventually, aircraft will be grounded awaiting depot
maintenance, which will decrease aircraft availability to the
warfighter. It is essential that we fund and execute depot maintenance
and modernization to preclude these costs. Further, planned maintenance
in the current fiscal year that is delayed to future fiscal years can
drive idle production shops and degrade workforce proficiency and
productivity. Ultimately, a loss of efficiency can drive future
volatility to labor rates and operational costs. These impacts may also
carry forward to our industry partners driving unanticipated bills to
the Air Force as we try to best utilize our limited funds to meet our
highest priority requirements. All of these sequestration impacts will
affect the Air Force's ability to maintain full-spectrum readiness.
nuclear forces
95. Senator Lee. Admiral Greenert and General Welsh, can you
outline what effect the prolonged sequestration will have on our
current ICBM, ballistic missile submarine, and strategic bomber forces?
Admiral Greenert. Due to its national importance, the Navy will
maintain a credible and modernized sea-based strategic deterrent even
if it results in taking risks in other missions of the Navy. However,
without congressional action or mitigating circumstances, sequestration
in fiscal year 2014 will delay the planned start of construction of the
first SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet STRATCOM presence requirements when the
Ohio-class SSBN retires.
General Welsh. The Air Force will ensure continued focus on
maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, but prolonged sequestration
will force difficult choices concerning nuclear modernization and
sustainment programs. Prolonged sequestration would drive changes to
modernization and sustainment schedules, including badly needed
sustainment of maintenance and storage facilities. These schedule
changes would delay our ability to field the capabilities necessary to
meet critical weapon system requirements, and might also result in the
need for costly, currently unplanned, life extension programs.
96. Senator Lee. Admiral Greenert and General Welsh, what effect do
you believe it will have on our overall strategic deterrent?
Admiral Greenert. Due to its national importance, the Navy will
maintain a credible and modernized sea-based strategic deterrent even
if it results in taking risks in other missions of the Navy. However,
without congressional action or mitigating circumstances, sequestration
in fiscal year 2014 will delay the planned start of construction of the
first SSBN(X) from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. This would
cause us to be unable to meet STRATCOM presence requirements when the
Ohio-class SSBN retires.
General Welsh. Our nuclear triad continues to play an essential
role in deterring potential adversaries, providing extended deterrence,
and reassuring our allies and partners of our commitment to their
security. As reflected in the 2010 NPR, maintaining and modernizing the
air and land-based legs of the triad is critical to our national
security and remains a top Air Force priority.
In the near-term, the Air Force has successfully managed the impact
of sequestration on nuclear deterrence operations--ensuring that our
strategic forces remain safe, secure, and effective day-to-day.
However, beyond the current fiscal year, the impacts of prolonged
sequestration are largely unknown and are cause for concern. Continued
sequestration would create significant risks to sustainment and
modernization programs for our nuclear-capable bomber, dual-capable
aircraft, and ICBM forces, resulting in negative mission impacts and
potentially undermining core readiness of our nuclear deterrent.
missile defense
97. Senator Lee. Admiral Greenert, what effect will a continued
sequester have on our missile defense plans in Europe and the
deployment of naval assets with the Aegis System?
Admiral Greenert. Even if the sequester continues in fiscal year
2014 and beyond, Navy would still evolve our posture in Europe by
meeting our ballistic missile defense (BMD) European Phased Adaptive
Approach requirements with four BMD-capable DDGs homeported in Rota,
Spain, and two land-based sites in Romania and Poland.
98. Senator Lee. Admiral Greenert, what will be the cumulative
effect on our ability to guard against missile threats from the Middle
East or North Korea?
Admiral Greenert. Prolonged sequestration, with BCA-level top
lines, would hamper Navy's ability to guard against missile threats and
pace the advancements of potential adversary A2/AD capabilities by
decreasing our forward presence and requiring us to slow the fielding
of the AMDR aboard DDG-51 Flight III warships.
mix of foreign- and home-based troops
99. Senator Lee. General Odierno and General Amos, at a speech at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Tuesday,
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that DOD would reconsider its
mix of Active-Duty and Reserve Forces, as well as the mix of foreign-
based and home-stationed troops. Do you have any further information on
these plans?
General Odierno. The Army must maintain a balance between end
strength, readiness, and modernization as we consider future strategic
implications. As for force mix, I do not envision significant migration
of force structure between the Active and Reserve components. As we
drawdown and rebalance, I would continue to see the Active component as
that portion of the force best suited for unpredictable and frequent
employments, for dealing with complex operational environments, and for
dealing with unexpected contingencies. I would see the Reserve
components best suited for predictable and infrequent deployments, for
providing title 32 support to State and local authorities, and for
providing operational and strategic depth. The first two brigades the
Army reduced were two of the four stationed in Europe. The decision to
reduce these two brigades first was based on a joint Army DOD
reassessment of the U.S. global strategy and posture in the European
Command area of responsibility in light of the emerging defense
strategy. There are no plans to reduce additional overseas units.
General Amos. The Marine Corps has done a considerable amount of
analysis of the mix of Active Duty and Reserve component forces. In our
analysis we have determined that a Reserve Force of 39,600 is robust
enough to provide us the strategic depth to augment the Active
component in the event of multiple major contingency operations while
being manageable enough for us to man, train, and equip. This size
Reserve Force also affords the Marine Corps enough capacity to provide
operational tempo relief critical for those types of forces that are in
high demand during steady state operations.
With respect to foreign-based and home-stationed troops, we have
taken a very close look at the distribution of our force as we look to
re-posture to the Pacific. We feel that our current disposition affords
the Nation a great deal of responsiveness as demonstrated most recently
by the timely response by the Navy/Marine Corps team to the
humanitarian operations in the Philippines. Our posture in the Pacific
also provides the Nation a significant strategic capability by having
forces in a position to rapidly respond to a major contingency
operation in the Pacific.
100. Senator Lee. General Odierno and General Amos, are you
considering reducing the number of Active-Duty Forces and increasing
Reserve and Guard Forces, and downsizing our overseas presence?
General Odierno. The Army must maintain a balance between end
strength, readiness, and modernization as we consider future strategic
implications. As for force mix, I do not envision significant migration
of force structure between the Active and Reserve components. As for
overseas basing, the first two brigades the Army reduced were two of
the four stationed in Europe. The decision to reduce these two brigades
first was based on a joint Army DOD re-assessment of the U.S. global
strategy and posture in the European Command area of responsibility in
light of the emerging defense strategy. There are no plans to reduce
additional overseas units.
General Amos. No. In 2010, the Service conducted a Force Structure
Review, which reduced the Active component force from 202,000 in fiscal
year 2011 to 186,800 by fiscal year 2016. As part of this reduction
there was some capability that was transferred from the Active to the
Reserve component such as an additional tank company, a bridge company,
combat engineer company, and amphibious assault company. However, the
overall end strength of the Reserve component (39,600) was not changed.
In subsequent service structure reviews, the Active end strength
was reduced from 186,800 to 182,100 and finally to 175,000 by fiscal
year 2017. During this last Active component reduction there was a loss
of capacity but not capability, and the Reserve component was also
reduced to 38,500 by fiscal year 2017. This reduction was based on the
future mission requirements of the Marine Corps Total Force and what
Reserve component support was required.
Future end strength reductions for either the Active component or
Reserve component will be considered based on future mission
requirements as well as budgetary limitations. Additionally, while
overall Active component billet requirements reduced, the overseas
billet requirements actually increased at the same time. A summary is
below:
Fiscal Year 2011 (202k): 18,204;
Fiscal Year 2016 (182k): 19,708; and
Fiscal Year 2017 (175k): 19,358.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[all]