[Senate Hearing 113-257]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-257
STAYING ON TRACK: NEXT STEPS IN IMPROVING PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL
SAFETY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK WARNER, Virginia DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 19, 2013.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Johnson..................................... 42
Article dated May 13, 2013 from the Washington Post by George
F. Will.................................................... 42
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 46
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 48
Witnesses
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
United States Government Accountability Office................. 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association of American Railroads.............................. 54
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Kathryn Waters, Executive Vice President, Member Services,
American Public Transportation Association..................... 80
Prepared statement........................................... 82
James A. Stem, Jr., National Legislative Director, Transportation
Division, Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation (SMART)
Union.......................................................... 87
Prepared statement........................................... 89
James P. Redeker, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of
Transportation................................................. 151
Prepared statement........................................... 153
Michelle Teel, P.E., PTOE, Multimodal Operations Director,
Missouri Department of Transportation.......................... 156
Prepared statement........................................... 157
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
by:
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 169
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 171
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to:
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman.................................... 172
Edward R. Hamberger.......................................... 173
Kathryn Waters............................................... 173
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John Thune to:
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo......................................... 174
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman.................................... 177
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman...................................... 177
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John Thune to:
Susan A. Fleming............................................. 178
Edward R. Hamberger.......................................... 179
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Edward R. Hamberger............................................ 179
Response to written question submitted to Kathryn Waters by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 179
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 180
Response to written question submitted by Hon. John Thune to
James P. Redeker............................................... 181
STAYING ON TRACK: NEXT STEPS
IN IMPROVING PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL SAFETY
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard
Blumenthal, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Good morning, everyone. I am calling to
order this hearing of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee, which has the very important and profoundly
significant task of hearing testimony from some really
excellent witnesses on the issue of rail safety.
And I want to begin by thanking Chairman Rockefeller for
the opportunity to have this hearing, which is important not
only to the Northeast and to the Midwest, Missouri, but really
to the entire country. And I know Chairman Rockefeller has
demonstrated his commitment to improving rail safety over many,
many years. And I am humbled and honored to have this
opportunity.
And I also want to thank Senator Lautenberg for his
tireless and relentless effort on this subject. And his loss is
a personal loss to me, because he was a mentor and model, but
also a loss to the country as a leader in transportation safety
and reliability.
And I want to thank the staff of this committee for its
excellent work in putting together this hearing, in calling the
really very, very well-qualified witnesses that we have, and
also in preparing for it.
Let me begin by saying that anybody who questions the need
for this hearing has only to read today's headlines. The
derailment yesterday of a Long Island railroad train, carrying
about 1,000 passengers leaving Penn Station, which essentially
paralyzed rail traffic in much of the Northeast Corridor for a
substantial period of time, inconveniencing many, many people,
and delaying freight and travel.
During the month of May, in a span of less than 2 weeks,
our nation witnessed major railroad tragedy, the first of them
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where an eastbound train derailed
and then was struck by a westbound train seconds later.
Days later, this same commuter line saw one of its own, a
dedicated Metro-North worker, killed by a passing train while
he was inspecting track in that vicinity.
And on May 25, just about a week later, two freight trains
collided in Missouri.
Only a few days after that event, a railroad grade crossing
accident and explosion occurred in White Marsh, Maryland.
We know that rail safety is improving, but these incidents
certainly challenge the public's trust and confidence in the
system, and the credibility of claims that rail safety is in
fact improving.
I think that in many instances, pictures speak louder than
words. In fact, as the saying goes, a picture is worth 1,000
words. And we are going to see two pictures in the course of
this hearing. One of them is of a shunt system that Chairman
Hersman will be presenting in the course of her testimony. This
very rudimentary appearing piece of equipment could have saved
the life of that Metro-North worker who was killed in West
Haven.
The cost? About $200. And thankfully, the NTSB has now
recommended, in an urgent recommendation, that Metro-North use
this equipment systemwide. But for Robert Luden, it is too
late.
And for American railroads, it is too late for adoption and
implementation of many of these, literally, life-saving
technologies, which are simple, feasible, inexpensive, and
cost-effective.
So this hearing is about new technology that may help save
lives and dollars. But it is also about existing systems that
can and should be implemented.
The other picture, which we are going to see, is of the
inspection report that was released in the wake of the
collision in Bridgeport, Connecticut. This came to my office
just yesterday, but it is the inspection report that was done
on May 15, just 2 days before the May 17 derailment and
collision.
What it shows, again, as the NTSB has pointed out in its
preliminary statement, is that the defect that very likely was
responsible for the derailment was found by an inspector at
track 4, catenary 734. And the finding was that there were
hanging ties and pumping load at that point.
The NTSB has not reached any final conclusions, but I am
willing to say at this point that this deficiency very
substantially contributed, if it did not actually cause, that
derailment. It was found 2 days before.
Whether it should have been corrected, in my view, is
indisputable. It should have been. Whether it is the only cause
or the probable cause remains open for debate.
But what is astonishing about this report is not only that
finding, but all the other defects found on that day at
different points on that same track. Any of them could have
caused a similar derailment and collision.
So the state of our railroads, literally, is in question.
And that is the reason we are here today.
A couple points before I go to Senator Blunt, the Ranking
Member.
Clearly, there is a need for infrastructure investment. It
may be extremely costly. We have not decided how to pay for it.
I have proposed a national rail trust fund, and I will continue
to support the creation of a national infrastructure bank.
But the issues for today concern the very simple and cost-
effective options out there right now. And one of them actually
concerns the technology that exists for better inspection, the
Sperry Rail, which produces a better form of inspection, based
in the state of Connecticut.
Another concern of mine is the amount of time it takes to
do both investigations and rulemaking. Investigations by the
NTSB, we are going to learn more about the amount of time it
takes to complete those investigations. But in my view, 12 to
18 months is simply unacceptable as the amount of time to
complete investigations. We need answers quicker, so that we
can solve problems sooner.
And on rulemaking, I am concerned about delays in the FRA's
rules. My understanding is that there were 17 rules that were
due to be promulgated and finalized, many of them not completed
yet; others delayed and, in fact, delayed in their effective
dates; and compliance manuals still due.
So there is work to be done here. A lot has been done to
make our rail lines safer, but we can and we should, we must,
do more.
And passenger and rail freight growth is projected to
continue. At the same time, this industry is really at a
crossroads, because it has to earn and keep the trust of the
American public.
Again, my thanks to our witnesses for being here today. I
look forward to your testimony.
And I am now going to turn to Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. And thanks
for chairing this hearing today.
I know Senator Blumenthal and I and others on this
subcommittee, particularly me as the new Ranking Member, looked
forward to the chance to work with Senator Lautenberg who knew
so much and cared so much about railroads. And we miss his
understanding of these issues and his leadership on these
issues.
But Senator Blumenthal's efforts to have this hearing today
I particularly appreciate.
I am also particularly glad that Michelle Teel is here. She
is the Multimodal Director from the Missouri Department of
Transportation and will be on the second panel. We have two
extraordinary panels today, and I look forward, as everybody
does, to hearing from them.
As Senator Blumenthal has suggested, this is a very current
issue. A day before yesterday, on the front page of the Wall
Street Journal, there was a big article about conflicting
pressures on the industry to do something very expensive and
very new, and to maintain a system that is challenging to
maintain. I mean, the rail industry is extremely capital
intensive. It involves lots of investment on infrastructure
that is needed to last 20, sometimes 30, years or longer.
Knowing those cost considerations, it is good to hear from
the dedication of all the people who are represented on these
panels today to both supervise this and to make this important
industry work.
It is an industry that is growing as we use it in more
aggressive ways, both for rail and for passenger. The amount of
time, resources, and money that the Federal Government and the
private rail line operators have put into increasing safety is
important at rail crossings, increasing awareness about the
hazards of trespassing, and basically, increasing the overall
safety of our actual rail infrastructure. It is a good thing to
see this focused on.
If you did not know any better, you would think, if you
were an outside observer, that not much was changing. But, of
course, in the last few decades, an incredible amount of change
has occurred in the rail industry. And it is a dramatically
different industry than it was just a few years ago.
But the technological advancement, what I think has really
been a nimble regulatory approach by the Federal Railroad
Administration and the dedication to improving service has been
impressive. But we want to hear about how it could be better,
and what the Government can do to both encourage it to be
better and to make it less complicated, so that you can achieve
those better results.
I am very interested to hear about the status of the system
today. I am specifically interested to hear about the progress
being made on the implementation of positive train control,
which, as almost everyone in this room knows, is supposed to be
fully operable by the end of 2015. Most things I see suggest
that is a very hard goal to meet.
This mandate, of course, requires possibly more than $10
billion and hours and hours of work to complete.
We had the nominated Chairman for the FCC in this very room
yesterday, and I asked him about building all these towers,
22,000 towers. How does that happen in 3 years, unless the FCC
figures out ways to be much more aggressive in their view of
this than they are on the 2,000 or 3,000 towers that they
generally maximize out in being able to permit every year?
I am also anxious to hear about the passenger and commuter
rail networks, how they are managing this mandate. And so
positive train control is something I hope to leave here
knowing about more than I do today, and to know where we should
be headed in the Senate, in the Congress, and on this
committee.
And again, Mr. Blumenthal, he and I came to the Senate
together. We are proud to be in this hearing together. And this
is a dynamic and important industry that we need to appreciate
for what it is.
So, Chairman, thank you for conducting this hearing today.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Let me introduce the witnesses, and then ask each of you to
begin with opening remarks.
First, Joseph Szabo, who is Administrator of the Federal
Railroad Administration, he was nominated on March 22, 2009,
and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on April 29, 2009. And he is
the 12th administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration,
and the first to come from the ranks of rail workers.
He leads a staff of over 900 professionals located in
Washington, D.C., and field offices across the United States
who develop and enforce safety regulations. They also manage
financial assistance programs, and oversee research and
technology development programs.
Mr. Szabo is a fifth-generation railroader, who between
2006 and 2009 was Vice President of the Illinois AFL-CIO. And
he also has served as Mayor of Riverdale, Illinois, and a
member of the South Suburban Mayors Transportation Committee.
He has held various other public service positions.
And we welcome you, Mr. Szabo, to the hearing and
particularly for your long expertise and your experience in
this area.
Chairman Deborah Hersman of the National Transportation
Safety Board is recognized as one of the most passionate and
visionary safety leaders for all modes of transportation. Among
her initiatives include the actions and attention focused on
distracted driving, child passenger safety, and helping
accident victims and their family.
She has been a Board Member on the scene for 19 major
transportation accidents. And she has chaired dozens of NTSB
hearings, forums, events, and she regularly testifies before
Congress. Her leadership has made the NTSB a better
organization, and we are proud to welcome her today.
Susan Fleming, who is Director of Physical Infrastructure
Issues in the Government Accountability Office is with us as
well, the third witness. She has been a member of the GAO staff
for some time. The GAO, as you know, is headed by the
Comptroller General of the United States, who is appointed for
a 15-year term by the President of the United States from a
slate of candidates whom the Congress proposes. And the United
States General Accounting Office is an independent, nonpartisan
agency that works for the Congress. It is often called the
congressional watchdog.
And we welcome you, Ms. Fleming, today. Thank you for being
here.
So let us begin with Mr. Szabo.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Szabo. Thank you, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member
Blunt, and members of the Committee. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify.
Rail is an extremely safe mode of transportation, but I
personally know firsthand the impact that train accidents can
have on families and communities. I have been the mayor of a
railroad town that has had its share of accidents and hazardous
spills. I have been a railroader who was lucky enough to
survive a close call and not fall victim to a fatality.
As a conductor, I have experienced firsthand my share of
grade crossing fatalities. And over the course of my railroad
career, I have had five good friends killed on duty.
The members of my FRA staff, like me, live and breathe
railroad safety. As unprecedented private and public
investments position rail for its growing role in moving both
people and freight, FRA has sharpened its focus on enhanced
safety.
2012 was the safest year in railroading history. Since the
Rail Safety Improvement Act was passed in 2008, railroad
accidents have declined for 5 straight years, part of a 43
percent drop over the past decade.
And this has not occurred by mistake. It reflects our
comprehensive approach to railroad safety. We have used good
data to increase audits and spot inspections in strategic
locations. We have taken steps to ensure the competency of
locomotive engineers and conductors. We have issued
requirements to have emergency notification systems at every
highway rail grade crossing. We have updated our track and
passenger equipment safety standards to ensure the safe
introduction of high-speed rail service at speeds of up to 220
mph, embracing a performance-based safety approach that will
allow proven high-speed train set designs to be used in the
United States.
But we must always do better. Our goal always is for
continuous safety improvement.
So as we work with the industry to install positive train
control, we have placed an increased emphasis on analyzing
human factors. This includes advancing risk reduction programs
like the confidential close call reporting system, and system
safety programs for passenger operations. Our most mature
confidential close call reporting system pilot project so far
has yielded remarkable results, a 70 percent reduction in
accidents.
Looking ahead, the President's 2014 FRA budget request
includes funding to expand close call reporting nationally,
furthering our understanding of root causes behind accidents,
which will help railroads establish prevention measures in
advance of an accident.
The key here is, we want to know what is going on before an
accident occurs. With our two core authorizations set to
expire, our budget also proposes a new 5-year, $40 billion rail
authorization, including a national high performance rail
system program to fund essential development projects for both
passenger and freight rail.
And there is a fundamental link between a higher performing
rail network and higher levels of safety, achieving both a
state-of-good-repair and advancing new safety technologies.
Consider our investment in 110 mph service in the Midwest,
which will upgrade more than 200 grade crossings with what we
are calling smart technology that will detect any intrusion
into that grade crossing protected area in advance of an
accident occurring.
Our investments in North Carolina, which, in addition to
improving speeds and reliability, will close some 50 grade
crossings and construct strategically placed overpasses and
underpasses, enhancing safety for trains, pedestrians, and
vehicles.
Under our budget proposal, projects would be eligible to
compete for funding through a national high performance rail
program. And to fund these efforts, we propose establishing a
new rail account within the transportation trust fund, putting
rail on par with other transportation modes that benefit from
sustained funding sources. And we can provide the
predictability in funding that will empower states, local
governments, and the private sector to invest in a rail network
that is unquestionably safe.
Rail is an extremely safe mode of transportation. But like
you, I am not satisfied. With your support, we can lay a deeper
foundation for continuous safety improvements. We can increase
the use of advanced technology, capture and analyze data from
programs like close calls, and close dangerous grade crossings.
Together, we can ensure that rail remains safe, reliable,
and efficient. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Szabo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of Secretary
LaHood, to discuss the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) rail
safety program. Rail is a particularly safe mode of transportation, and
one that Americans are choosing more than ever before. In this
testimony, I will detail recent accomplishments, including the status
of FRA's implementation of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
(RSIA), and I will discuss current challenges. We would like to note
that some railroad accidents widely reported in the press during the
last few months do not reflect the positive trends in safety statistics
and annual records that we have seen in safety data. In closing, I will
describe FRA's preliminary reauthorization proposals, which we view as
key components for improving our safety program.
FRA's mission is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient
movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the
future. This testimony will explain how we are fulfilling that mission.
Recent Accomplishments
FRA's top priority is safety, and 2012 was the safest year on
record, continuing our year-over-year reductions in incidents. Since
2003:
Total train accidents have declined by 43 percent.
Total derailments have declined by 41 percent.
Total highway-rail grade crossing accidents have declined by
34 percent.
These safety improvements have contributed to 18-percent fewer
fatalities and 14-percent fewer injuries over ten years, the annual
totals falling from 865 fatalities to 706 fatalities, and 9,264
injuries to 7,993 injuries.
This achievement is even more noteworthy because Amtrak ridership
reached an all-time high, rail was the fastest-growing mode of public
transit, and intermodal freight traffic surged toward a new record.
Statistical Accident Reductions since 2003
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FRA is committed to continuously improving safety. Although safety
performance has steadily improved, we are committed to working towards
that goal. Accidents in Missouri, Connecticut, and Maryland demonstrate
the varied risks to rail safety. FRA approaches rail safety
comprehensively. We are building on research and development,
continuing to establish minimum safety requirements, conducting
outreach and collaborating with stakeholders, performing compliance
inspections and audits, and implementing and administering enforcement
policies.
FRA's multidimensional safety strategy is intended to foster a
safety culture evolution toward hazard analysis, accident prevention,
and innovation, leading to a continual process of safety improvement.
Positive train control (PTC) systems will be the technology backbone
that promotes safety improvement through the reduction of certain
human-factor-related incidents and should complement FRA's other safety
efforts, such as implementation of safety Risk Reduction Programs (RRP)
as well as crash energy management.
RSIA Implementation and Other FRA Safety Actions
Congress acted to address rail safety issues in 2008 through the
passage of RSIA, which reauthorized FRA's safety program for five years
and mandated that FRA develop approximately 40 final rules, guidance
documents, model State laws, studies, and reports as well as three
annual reports and hundreds of periodic accident reporting audits. RSIA
also requires certain railroads to implement PTC systems by the end of
2015; provides FRA, as the Secretary's designee, with regulatory
authority over the hours of service of passenger train crews; and
extensively amends the hours of service laws.
FRA has finalized 59 percent of RSIA-mandated rules and 69 percent
of the required studies, while continuing to pursue completion of the
remaining provisions of the Act. The appendix to this testimony lists
the rulemakings, non-periodic reports, guidance, and model State laws
that FRA has completed as of June 1, 2013, that were mandated,
explicitly or implicitly, by RSIA.
FRA's regulatory program maximizes safety by developing rules based
on facts, incident and accident causation analysis, comparison of
alternative mitigation measures, and cost-beneficial solutions. FRA
rules consider current and future industry capabilities, compliance
burden and cost, and other economic and social realities. Within this
context, FRA makes every effort to reach statutory milestones with its
available resources. FRA often works with its Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee (RSAC) to improve the quality and transparency of FRA's rule
development. FRA has maintained a continuous planning effort, through
the Department's regulatory review process and consultations with
stakeholders, since RSIA's enactment.
To promote compliance with rules, FRA has built a safety oversight
workforce that is highly motivated, well trained, and expertly skilled
in numerous technical disciplines and specialties. Many inspectors and
specialists come to FRA with decades of operational experience, which
we build on and refine through continuous, comprehensive guidance,
classroom and on-the-job training, mentoring, and developmental
opportunities. New inspectors receive up to 120 hours of formal
classroom training within their first year on board. They also go
through 56 hours of additional formal classroom training related to
accident investigation fundamentals. Historical accident and inspection
data ensures optimal allocation of resources. FRA uses its Staffing
Allocation Model for allocating its inspection resources among its
eight regions and core disciplines and its National Inspection Plan
(NIP) to facilitate inspectors' focusing their efforts on specific
railroads and locations that are likely to have safety problems. NIP
provides guidance to an inspector on the amount of time that he or she
should spend on each railroad in his or her territory based on
historical risk analysis. An inspector following NIP guidance should be
more effective finding unsafe conditions that he or she can bring to
the attention of railroad officials to correct.
The NIP also provides guidance to each regional office on how its
inspectors, who each specialize in one of the five inspection
disciplines, should divide their work by railroad and by State. The NIP
produces an initial baseline plan for each of the Agency's eight
regions based on an analysis of historical accident and inspection data
and then allows the regional administrators to adjust the goals for
their respective regions based on local knowledge and emerging issues.
FRA also partners with participating State rail safety programs in
enforcing the rail safety laws.
As noted, FRA has made significant progress fulfilling
unprecedented mandates set forth by RSIA, including the following
measures to address some of the prevalent safety issues:
To address track-caused accidents--
FRA issued regulations on concrete ties, completed a
study of track inspection practices, and issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on rail integrity.
FRA has started a research and development program
with the goal of achieving reliable long life from concrete
ties. The program involves freight railroads, Amtrak,
manufacturers and universities.
In addition, on its own initiative, using its general
rulemaking authority, FRA published a final rule on
vehicle/track interaction safety standards. The final rule
achieved unanimous approval by RSAC. The rule was based on
research into vehicle/track interaction. The rule promotes
the safe interaction of rail vehicles with the track over
which they operate under a variety of conditions at speeds
up to 220 mph. The rule also adds flexibility for safely
permitting high cant deficiency train operations through
curves at more conventional speeds so that both freight and
passenger trains may better sustain maximum allowable
speeds through curved track.
To enhance and improve grade crossing safety--
FRA issued standards requiring railroads to establish
and maintain toll-free ``1-800'' emergency notification
systems by which the public can telephone the proper
railroad about a stalled vehicle or other safety problem at
a specifically identified grade crossing.
FRA promulgated regulations requiring 10 states to
issue State-specific action plans to improve safety at
highway-rail grade crossings. FRA issued model State laws
on highway users' sight distance at passively signed
crossings and on highway motorists' violations of grade
crossing warning devices.
FRA published a proposed rule specifying the types of
information that railroads would have to report to the
Department's National Crossing Inventory. FRA also issued
guidance addressing pedestrian safety at or near passenger
rail stations, developed a five-year strategy to improve
highway-rail grade crossing safety, and conducts an audit
every two years of Class I railroads' highway-rail grade
crossing accident reports to ensure that these railroads
are accurately reporting these incidents and such audits
every five years of other railroads.
FRA continues to research new technologies for
improving grade crossing safety. One project that has
significant potential is implementation of Intelligent
Transportation Systems at grade crossings. FRA is also
conducting human-factors research to understand the
behavior of highway users when they approach grade
crossings. This is expected to lead to recommendations for
improved signage and warning systems. FRA also released a
grade crossing information smartphone application, which is
further detailed below.
To enhance the accountability of railroads for their own
safety--
FRA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
that would require certain passenger railroads to develop
and implement Risk Reduction Plans (RRPs), and another NPRM
on requiring freight railroads to establish RRPs is in
clearance in the Executive Branch. These regulations are
designed to encourage railroads to develop and implement
systematic risk-based approaches to ensuring continuous
safety improvement.
To address human-factors-caused accidents and resulting
casualties--
FRA issued final rules to enable nationwide
implementation of PTC systems as well as final rules on
camp cars used as railroad employee sleeping quarters and
on the hours of service of passenger train employees. The
latter draws on detailed research into the causes of train
operator fatigue and analysis of thousands of operator work
patterns. A final rule on minimum training standards and
plans is under Departmental review.
FRA published in the Federal Register detailed interim
and final interpretations of the hours of service laws as
amended by RSIA, and a second set of interim
interpretations to be published in the Federal Register,
addressing additional issues, is in review in the Executive
Branch.
FRA issued a final rule requiring owners of railroad
bridges to implement programs for inspection, maintenance,
and management of those structures.
In addition to working on RSIA mandates, FRA has been advancing
safety through other initiatives:
FRA is supporting the safety of proposed passenger rail
operations, including line extensions, and shared-use and high-
speed operations by providing technical outreach, including
training and information regarding safety regulations and
system safety, to many new start commuter railroads, and FRA is
currently working with several new operators.
From funding provided for high-speed rail research and
development, FRA has identified several key risk factors for
corridors shared by passenger and freight operations. Research
to better understand these risks and find mitigations are
currently underway.
FRA is making important strides to address human-factors
issues through an industry-wide initiative to combat the
dangers of electronic device distraction in the railroad
workplace.
FRA is implementing a voluntary, Confidential Close Call
Reporting System program (C3RS) for railroads and
their employees to report close calls without receiving
disciplinary action. The FY 2014 Budget proposes expanding the
C3RS from a limited pilot project to a nation-wide
rollout. Experience at C3RS pilot sites has
contributed, we believe, to a nearly 70-percent reduction in
certain accidents at one of the most mature pilot sites.
Reductions in accidents come from a proactive culture of safety
that uses real data far beyond that which can be pulled from
accident investigations on a reactive basis. Effective safety
oversight is helped by having accurate data. The magnitude of
the information provided from proactive programs like
C3RS in comparison to traditional data from
accidents and injuries is illustrated below:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
These achievements are not cause for complacency, but a foundation
to build on, as we look for more and better cost-effective ways to
improve the safety of our country's rail network.
Key Challenges to Railroad Safety
By law, railroads are required to report an expansive universe of
accidents, incidents, and events that occur in the course of
operations. FRA also investigates certain railroad accidents, and
analyzes the data it receives and collects. This information assists
FRA in allocating and deploying inspection and oversight resources
effectively, where they have the greatest positive impacts.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Train Accident Causes--2012
As illustrated above, 71 percent of all train accidents were the
result of either human factors or the condition of railroad track in
2012. FRA has focused on the reduction of those two accident categories
as our highest priority.
Human Factors
The leading cause of train accidents is human factors.
Positive Train Control Systems
RSIA provides that ``the term `positive train control system' means
a system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-speed
derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the
movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.'' 49
U.S.C. 20157(i)(3). FRA continues to work to support railroads in their
implementation of PTC systems prior to RSIA's December 31, 2015
statutory deadline. In our August 2012 Report to Congress on PTC, FRA
pointed out the technical and programmatic obstacles to meeting the
statutory deadline. Some railroads have publicly acknowledged that they
will not be able to complete PTC implementation by the deadline. FRA
will continue to provide field engineering support and system testing
oversight for PTC systems, and hopes to provide formal approval and
system certification for the Southern California Regional Rail
Authority's PTC system this year.
Further, FRA is working to eliminate obstacles to timely PTC system
implementation by working with railroads, suppliers, and other
government agencies to resolve critical path issues. In the coming
years, FRA will continue to work towards the certification of the
systems used by other railroads and provide additional engineering
support. FRA will also work with Congress if it decides to change the
statutory deadline.
Defective Track
The second-leading cause of train accidents is defective track.
Track defects comprise a wide universe of conditions, some serious and
some relatively innocuous or inconsequential. Some defects develop
simply due to rail's exposure to the natural environment, while others
are the result of the stress of routine operations. FRA's Track Safety
Standards govern all aspects of track structure and geometry, and
require specific inspection and maintenance actions by railroads. In
addition to the recent and pending track rulemakings, which have
already been discussed, FRA has embarked on an aggressive program to
focus its track-related enforcement efforts on the most likely accident
causes. These efforts have helped move the track-caused accident rate
in the proper direction. Here, too, our research and development
efforts are a critical component of our regulatory efforts and provide
the basis for revisions to those regulations and best industry
practices.
Most track-caused derailments occur at slow speed and are of minor
consequence. FRA has safety standards for all track, including low-
speed track and the types of yard and industrial track on which the
majority of these incidents occur. However, more serious derailments
can occur on mainline tracks that support passenger and high-tonnage
freight trains at higher speeds.
To reduce the likelihood of track-caused derailments, FRA has taken
action on several fronts:
Our track inspection program includes FRA track experts who
routinely accompany railroad track inspectors as they perform
their duties inspecting all types of railroad track, switches
and station areas.
FRA track personnel help assure that track defects are
discovered, properly documented, and repaired to monitor the
condition of the track structure better.
FRA uses a small fleet of very specialized railcars that
accurately measure track geometry. These cars find track
defects and send out notifications to FRA and to the individual
railroad that owns the track. These cars are also used as
``platforms'' on which new inspection technologies can be tried
and perfected. These new technologies have improved the
accuracy of track defect detection. FRA geometry cars are
world-class in their technology and accuracy. Research and
development are underway to automate many of these inspection
technologies, which will enable FRA and the industry to monitor
cost-effectively the state of repair of the rail network on a
regular basis.
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing and Trespasser Safety
More than 90 percent of all rail-related fatalities in recent years
have been the result of either trespassing on railroad rights of way or
else accidents at highway-rail grade crossings.
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
In recent years, highway-rail grade crossing accidents have
resulted in the second-largest number of rail-related deaths in the
United States, 33 percent of the total. Yet grade crossing safety has
shown vast improvement, as a result of substantial public investment in
crossing warning devices and greater public awareness of the risks at
grade crossings. Accordingly, the number of grade crossing accident
deaths has declined by 30 percent over the last decade. FRA is fully
committed to reducing the number, frequency, and severity of collisions
at highway-rail grade crossings.
Our multi-faceted approach to addressing highway-rail crossing
safety is referred to as the ``Three Es'': Engineering, Enforcement,
and Education. Engineering activities include numerous rulemakings
(Locomotive Auxiliary Lights; Rail Car Reflectorization; Inspection,
Testing and Maintenance Procedures for Grade Crossing Signal Systems;
Use of Locomotive Horns at Public Crossings; and Telephonic Emergency
Notification Systems) and advancing the state of technologies that
improve safety for drivers, rail employees, and passengers. FRA has
long partnered with Operation Lifesaver, Inc., and State and local law
enforcement authorities to facilitate grade crossing collision
investigation courses and encourage consistent enforcement of highway
traffic laws governing motorist behavior at crossings.
With funding from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), states
have installed and upgraded crossing warning devices, especially at
high-risk crossings. Currently, $220 million is authorized annually for
states to use to improve highway-rail grade crossings, and more than $4
billion has been spent on crossings since 1974. Determinations about
which projects receive funding are made by State departments of
transportation or public utility commissions, and must be based on
objective analysis of the relative safety risks associated with each
public highway-rail crossing. In addition, under the grant program
pursuant to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act,
section 1103(c), highway-rail grade crossings along designated high-
speed rail corridors were eligible to receive Federal funding for a
number of grade crossing hazard elimination activities. FRA and FHWA
jointly managed this program. This funding was continued in subsequent
surface transportation bills through SAFETEA-LU, and in FY 2012, $15
million was available for grants under the program. Applications were
received from 12 states for $25.5 million.
Because fully one-half of all train-highway vehicle collisions
occur at crossings that are equipped with active warning devices
reported to be functioning as intended, FRA believes that rigorous
enforcement of State laws with stiff sanctions for motorist violations
of grade crossing signal and traffic laws is an effective strategy to
reduce violations and collisions at crossings. In September 2011, FRA
provided model State legislation on highway-rail grade crossing
violations by motorists. FRA reviewed and evaluated existing State laws
and drafted a model law that can be used by states seeking to
strengthen their traffic laws.
New Technological Applications
Just this week, FRA announced the launch of a new smartphone
application, available in the Apple App store, designed to help reduce
the number of highway-rail grade crossing accidents. The Grade Crossing
Locator Application allows people to access information about highway-
rail grade crossings in their area, helping them to make better
decisions around the more than 200,000 highway-rail grade crossings in
the United States.
The Grade Crossing Locator Application will enable people not only
to locate highway-rail grade crossings in their area, but also to find
out what type of traffic control devices are present, the physical
characteristics of the crossing, and how many trains pass through
daily. FRA is using technology to innovate and connect with Americans
about grade-crossing safety because we believe more information leads
to smarter choices, driving down the number of accidents and saving
lives.
Crossing and Trespassing Fatalities since 2003
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Trespassing
The number of trespassing fatalities has decreased by 12 percent
since 2003 (there were 498 fatalities in 2003 and 439 fatalities in
2012), but crossing fatalities have decreased more quickly. Extremely
difficult to address, trespassing is the most significant cause of
death attributable to railroad operations in the United States.
Approximately 60 percent of all rail-related fatalities occur to
individuals that are not authorized to be on railroad rights-of-way.
FRA, through its research and development program, also developed a
five-year strategy addressing trespassing and conducted a trespasser
demographic study to better target trespass prevention efforts. The
study will be released shortly. In addition, FRA sponsored a targeted,
trespass prevention effort in West Palm Beach, Florida to develop a
community-oriented mitigation measure that can be utilized by other
communities. In 2012, FRA co-sponsored with the Federal Transit
Administration a Right-of-Way and Trespass Prevention Workshop that was
attended by 174 industry stakeholders. Twenty-three initiatives were
identified for reducing trespass accidents. These will form the core of
FRA's research and development work on this topic for the next two or
three years.
Reauthorization Priorities
As you know, portions of two important rail laws expire at the end
of FY 2013: RSIA and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
of 2008 (PRIIA). The President's FY 2014 budget for FRA lays out a
comprehensive, multi-year reauthorization blueprint for moving forward.
The fundamental goal of this proposal is to take a more coordinated
approach to enhancing the Nation's rail system-an integrated strategy
that addresses safety and passenger and freight service improvements.
This new approach better reflects the complex reality of how rail works
in the United States-most track is privately-owned and carries a mix of
passenger and freight trains. Safety is improved not just through
regulations and inspections but also through capital investments;
chokepoints often hinder the efficient movement of intercity passenger,
commuter, and freight trains, while the elimination of grade crossings
with strategic placement of overpasses and underpasses enhance rail,
vehicular, and pedestrian safety.
FRA's reauthorization proposal's key priorities include the
following:
Enhancing world-class rail safety. Rail is already among the
safest modes of transportation, and rail safety has only been
improving in recent years. Nevertheless, better safety
performance is imperative, and with innovative safety practices
and new technologies, the railroad industry can achieve this
goal.
Modernizing our rail infrastructure. Past generations of
Americans invested heavily in building the infrastructure we
rely on today. Most segments of the Northeast Corridor were
built more than a century ago, for example. Maintaining and
modernizing these assets will lower long-term costs and result
in a safer, more reliable rail system.
Meeting the growing market demand. With 100 million more
Americans expected by 2050, the national transportation system
must be prepared to handle substantial increases in the
movement of people and goods. Given the existing capacity
constraints on other modes, rail will play an increasingly
vital role in balancing America's transportation system by
accommodating this growth, resulting in public benefits such as
reduced reliance on foreign oil, reduced air pollution,
increased safety, and more travel options. This budget
incorporates market-based investments in building or improving
passenger rail corridors, eliminating rail chokepoints, adding
freight capacity, and conducting comprehensive planning.
Promoting innovation. FRA's vision is for the domestic rail
industry to be again world-leading-we want U.S. companies to
develop patents for state-of-the-art rail technology, to supply
rail operators throughout the world, and to employ the best
engineers and railway workers. The United States should be
exporting intellectual capital and rail products, not importing
them.
Ensuring transparency and accountability. Accomplishing the
priorities described above can only occur if these programs are
managed through a transparent process that makes it clear what
public benefits and service improvements the American people
are ``buying'' with their investments. The roles and
responsibilities of the Federal government, States, Amtrak,
freight railroads, and other stakeholders must be clear and
based on sound public policy.
Need for Predictable Funding
An overarching issue that runs across all of these priorities is
the need for sustained and predictable Federal funding for rail
programs, similar to the treatment of other modes of transportation.
Congress has for decades funded highway infrastructure and safety,
transit, and aviation programs through multi-year authorizations that
provide guaranteed funding. This enables States, local governments, and
other stakeholders to plan for and make large-scale infrastructure
investments on a year-to-year basis. Likewise, internationally, other
major rail systems have been planned and developed through a
predictable multi-year funding program.
The Administration proposes adopting this budgeting approach for
rail, including authorizing mandatory contract authority through FY
2018 for FRA's new rail programs. The programs would be funded from
resources in a new Rail Account of the Transportation Trust Fund.
Rail Safety Reauthorization Proposals
RSIA was a key piece of legislation to enhance rail safety
comprehensively. The Act authorized 200 new safety positions over a
five-year period, but less than a quarter were funded through
appropriations. The Act also required FRA to establish a railroad
safety technology grant program with $50 million in funding annually
for FYs 2009 through FY 2013, but FRA received only one year of
funding. For the last four and a half years, FRA has focused on
establishing and implementing the regulations, programs, and other
measures required by RSIA. Looking ahead, FRA is poised to begin fully
implementing these regulations in an effort to drive safety rates to
further record lows. In FRA's FY 2014 budget proposal, we have
requested 30 new safety staff including 10 regional safety inspectors
and 20 railroad safety specialists to directly support implementation
of RSIA. The culture of continuous improvement in FRA's safety programs
requires forward-thinking policies and proactive work to address future
challenges. FRA is exploring options for addressing a number of
important safety regulatory issues, including the following:
PTC--As discussed earlier, RSIA mandates that PTC be
implemented across a significant portion of the Nation's rail
network by December 31, 2015. With limited exceptions and
exclusions, PTC is required to be installed and implemented on
Class I railroad main lines (i.e., lines with over 5 million
gross tons annually), over which any poisonous-or toxic-
inhalation hazard commodities are transported; and on any
railroad's main lines over which regularly scheduled intercity
passenger or commuter operations are operated.
- In all, approximately 70,000 miles of track and 20,000 locomotives
will have to be equipped with interoperable PTC technology.
While some railroads will meet the deadline, many are likely to
be challenged by technological and programmatic barriers.
- In a report to Congress last year, FRA highlighted radio frequency
spectrum challenges that could impact timely PTC system
implementation. In addition, the railroads must secure
licensing approval from the Federal Communications Commission
to install the approximately 22,000 antennas necessary to
implement PTC.
- FRA's report also detailed obstacles faced by the industry and
outlined mitigation strategies for Congressional consideration,
including the extension of the PTC implementation deadline and
alternative methods of mitigating the risks prevented by PTC
systems.
Hours of service--In 2011 FRA issued fatigue-science-based
hours of service regulations for passenger train employees
under new authority granted by RSIA. FRA would like to evaluate
the benefits and costs of continuing on this course and focus
on addressing other fatigue issues with possible expanded
authority to regulate the hours of service of other train
employees, signal employees, and dispatching service employees
based on sound science. Other modal administrations within the
U.S. Department of Transportation already have broad safety
regulatory authority over hours of service. It may not be
necessary to regulate in these areas.
Grade crossing analyses--FRA would welcome the opportunity
to work with Congress to establish an appropriate framework for
addressing grade crossing issues related to blocked crossings
and commercial motor vehicle accidents and incidents at
crossings.
Harmonize operating rules--FRA plans to evaluate the
benefits and costs of harmonizing railroad operating rules.
Each railroad has its own set of operating rules that may
differ significantly from one division to another and from one
railroad to another. Many operating crew employees are required
to learn multiple different operating rules in order to operate
safely in a single tour of duty. Harmonizing operating rules
will likely reduce unnecessary confusion and create a safer
working environment.
Improve protection of risk reduction and system safety
analyses with respect to property damage claims--For a risk
reduction program to be effective, FRA must have confidence
that railroads are conducting robust analyses to accurately
identify risks present. FRA will continue to work to balance
the interests of safety and the public interest with respect to
the litigation protection afforded the railroads in conducting
these analyses.
Modernize statutory safety requirements--FRA would also like
to modernize certain existing statutory requirements to better
reflect current and future innovations and technologies. For
instance, statutory requirements related to the movement of
defective equipment could be updated to provide greater
flexibility to FRA in handling such issues. Similarly, existing
statutory language related to locomotives could be revised to
account for modern locomotive and locomotive tender design and
allow FRA to more readily tackle the safety issues related to
the industry's recently expressed desire to achieve fuel
efficiencies through use of liquefied natural gas-powered
locomotives.
Encourage noise mitigation--Current Environmental Protection
Agency rules for railroad noise emissions do not consider the
use of noise mitigation technologies and may be an obstacle to
the deployment of high-speed passenger rail. Alternative rules
may encourage railroads to reduce the impact of noise emissions
on communities surrounding rail operations.
Research, Development, and Technology--To date, FRA's
research has centered on core rail safety issues such as hours
of service and train control systems. The President's vision
for rail includes expanding passenger service across the Nation
and increasing train speed. While developing a modern rail
system, FRA must continue to ensure that rail remains an
extremely safe mode of transportation. Consequently, FRA must
undertake a new line of research that solves the technical and
associated issues necessary for implementing a comprehensive
high-performance rail system. FRA proposes a new Research
Development and Technology Program, funded at $55 million in FY
2014. Through this program, FRA will make upgrades to the
Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado that will
allow new rail equipment to be tested. This will result in
stronger safety standards and early identification of
reliability issues, saving maintenance costs over the long run,
developing a domestic workforce for rail initiatives, and
ensuring better passenger service.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Safety is
FRA's number one priority, and we appreciate your attention and focus
on such an important issue for the American public. We look forward to
working with this Committee to pursue improvements in our safety
programs and make our rail network as safe, reliable, and efficient as
possible. I will be happy to respond to your questions.
______
Appendix
FRA Rulemakings Completed as of June 1, 2013, that Were Mandated,
Explicitly or Implicitly, by RSIA
1. To specify the essential functionalities of mandated PTC systems,
define related statutory terms, and identify additional lines
for implementation. (Sec. 104).
2. To establish substantive hours of service requirements for
passenger train employees. (Sec. 108(d)).
3. To update existing hours of service recordkeeping regulations.
(Sec.108(f)).
4. To require State-specific action plans from certain states to
improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 202).
5. To require toll-free telephone emergency notification numbers for
reporting problems at public and private highway-rail grade
crossings. (Sec. 205).
6. To require the certification of conductors. (Sec. 402).
7. On concrete ties. (Sec. 403(d)).
8. To require owners of railroad bridges to implement programs for
inspection, maintenance, and management of those structures.
(Sec. 417).
9. On camp cars used as railroad employee sleeping quarters. (Sec.
420).
10. On prohibition of individuals from performing safety-sensitive
functions for a violation of hazardous materials transportation
law. (Sec. 305).
11. On emergency waivers. (Sec. 308).
12. Increase the ordinary maximum and aggravated maximum civil
penalties per violation for rail safety violations to $25,000
and $100,000, respectively. (Sec. 302).
13. Amending regulations of the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation to provide that the Secretary delegates to the
Administrator of FRA the responsibility to carry out the
Secretary's responsibilities under RSIA.
Completed RSIA-Mandated Guidance and Model State Laws
1. On pedestrian safety at or near rail passenger stations (guidance).
(Sec. 201).
2. For the administration of the authority to buy items of nominal
value and distribute them to the public as part of a crossing
safety or railroad trespass prevention program (guidance).
(Sec. 208(c)).
3. Model State law on highway users' sight distances at passively
signed highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 203).
4. Model State law on motorists' violations of grade crossing warning
devices. (Sec. 208).
Completed RSIA-Mandated Non-periodic Reports or Studies
1. Report to Congress on DOT's long-term (minimum 5-year) strategy for
improving rail safety, including annual plans and schedules for
achieving specified statutory goals, to be submitted with the
President's annual budget. (Sec. 102).
2. Report to Congress on the progress of railroads' implementation of
PTC. (Sec. 104).
3. Conduct study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest to
withhold from discovery or admission, in certain judicial
proceedings for damages, the reports and data compiled to
implement, etc., a required risk reduction program. (Sec. 109).
4. Evaluate and review current local, State, and Federal laws
regarding trespassing on railroad property, vandalism affecting
railroad safety, and violations of highway-rail grade crossing
warning devices. (Sec. 208(a)).
5. Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about track
inspection intervals, etc. (Sec. 403(a)-(b)).
6. Conduct study of methods to improve or correct passenger station
platform gaps (Sec. 404).
7. Report to Congress detailing the results of DOT research about use
of personal electronic devices in the locomotive cab by safety-
related railroad employees. (Sec. 405).
8. Report to Congress on DOT research about the effects of repealing a
provision exempting Consolidated Rail Corporation, etc., from
certain labor-related laws (45 U.S.C. Sec. 797j). (Sec. 408).
9. Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about exposure of
railroad employees and others to radiation. (Sec. 411).
10. Report to Congress on DOT study on the expected safety effects of
reducing inspection frequency of diesel-electric locomotives in
limited service by railroad museums. (Sec. 415).
11. Report to Congress on model plans and recommendations, to be
developed through a task force to be established by DOT, to
help railroads respond to passenger rail accidents. (Sec. 503).
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Administrator Szabo.
Chairman Hersman?
STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Hersman. Thank you. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal,
Senator Blunt, and members of the Committee.
The NTSB sent investigative teams to Connecticut, Missouri,
and Maryland last month for four different accident
investigations. In each of these accidents, there were problems
that the NTSB has seen in our prior investigations.
On May 17, during the evening rush home, a Metro-North
eastbound train derailed in Bridgeport. About 20 seconds after
that train came to rest, it was struck by a westbound train.
There were over 70 injuries.
Two days prior to the crash, a Metro-North inspection found
a lack of ballast support at an insulated rail joint near the
point of derailment. While this problem did not violate FRA
track safety standards, the NTSB is evaluating the damaged
section of track, as well as the adequacy of existing
inspection standards.
A second Metro-North accident occurred on May 28, when a
track foreman was struck and killed by a train that was on
track that should have been out of service.
The NTSB has issued previous recommendations to the FRA to
require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, to
prevent this type of accident.
On Monday, we reiterated this recommendation to the FRA,
and issued an urgent recommendation to Metro-North to require
this redundant protection.
A track shunt is a device that crews can attach to the
rails in work zones that alert the controller and give the
approaching trains a stop signal. Shunting tracks is simple,
feasible, and the equipment is readily available for a few
hundred dollars. Workers' lives will be saved as a result of
redundant protection.
In Baltimore County, Maryland, on May 28, a dump truck was
struck at a highway rail grade crossing by a CSX freight train.
This was a passive crossing, meaning that it had no lights or
crossing gates. The markings that were present were dilapidated
and faded. The collision resulted in the release of hazardous
materials and a subsequent fire. The truck driver was seriously
injured, and one responder and three nearby workers were also
injured.
On May 25, in Chaffee, Missouri, a BNSF freight train was
occupying the tracks in an interlocking when it was struck by a
Union Pacific freight train. The resulting derailment caused a
fire and the highway overpass above to collapse. Two U.P.
crewmembers were injured and five motorists were injured as a
result of the bridge collapse.
We believe that positive train control, or PTC, which the
NTSB has called for since the 1970s, could have prevented or
mitigated this crash.
Just yesterday, the NTSB held a board meeting on a head-on
collision between two U.P. freight trains that resulted in
three crewmember fatalities near Goodwell, Oklahoma, that also
could have been prevented by positive train control.
PTC is a technology that serves as a backup for human
error. When trains approach a red signal without slowing, PTC
would stop the train.
Congress has imposed a deadline of 2015 for implementing
PTC. Some railroads will meet this deadline. For those
railroads that have made the difficult decisions and invested
millions of dollars, they have demonstrated leadership.
For those railroads that will not meet the deadline, there
should be a transparent accounting for actions taken and not
taken to meet the 2015 deadline, so that regulators and
policymakers can make informed decisions.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National
Transportation Safety Board
Good morning Senator Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today
concerning the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) ongoing
efforts to ensure rail transportation safety, including our ongoing
investigations of the recent Metro-North passenger train derailment and
sideswipe in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and the collision and derailment
of two freight trains in Chaffee, Missouri.
Rail Transportation Safety in General
The NTSB has been extremely active in investigating train
collisions and derailments. During the past 12 months, we have launched
12 rail investigations, including 2 that involve highway-rail grade
crossings. Of these 12 rail launches, 4 have occurred within the past 5
weeks. In addition to tragic fatalities and serious injuries to
passengers, crew members, and other individuals resulting from these
crashes, 3 of the derailments also involved the release of hazardous
materials that required the evacuation of local residents in Columbus,
Ohio, Paulsboro, New Jersey, and Rosedale, Maryland. Also, yesterday
the NTSB met to consider and take final action on the agency's
investigation of the head-on collision of two freight trains in
Goodwell, Oklahoma, on June 24, 2012.
Despite the workload of the NTSB rail investigators and the spate
of train collisions and derailments during the past year, overall,
train crash numbers are improving. According to Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) data, total rail accident/incident rates have
declined from 19.67 occurrences per 1 million train miles in 2004 to
14.18 in March 2013, a 28 percent decrease. In addition, the highway-
rail grade crossing accident rate has improved significantly in the
past decade. These rail safety achievements have occurred during a
period of increased demand for rail transportation in the United
States. In 2011, the seven largest freight rail carriers had operating
revenues of $67 billion compared to $47.8 billion in 2009--an increase
of over $19 billion.\1\ Also, intercity passenger rail and commuter
rail providers have recently experienced load factor increases. For
example, according to Amtrak, a record 31.2 million passengers rode its
trains last year and data compiled by the American Public
Transportation Association also show increased public transportation
ridership levels in calendar year 2012 compared to the previous year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Back on Track: The Quiet Success of America's Freight Railways,
The Economist, April 13, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the transportation of people and goods by rail has played
an increasingly important role in the Nation's economy, we must not
become complacent when it comes to rail safety. The following summary
of three of the rail collisions and derailments subject to NTSB
investigations demonstrate the need for additional investments in
safety technology. The NTSB's Most Wanted List also highlights
important rail safety initiatives like Positive Train Control (PTC),
limiting distraction, and investments in transportation infrastructure.
Finally, safety would benefit from additional efforts to enforce rail
safety legislative and regulatory requirements. For all of the ongoing
investigations that are described, a probable cause has not yet been
determined.
Derailment and Collision--Bridgeport, Connecticut, May 17, 2013
As described in the NTSB's preliminary report, at 6:01 pm on
Friday, May 17, 2013, eastbound Metro-North Railroad passenger train,
1548, derailed. About 20 seconds after the eastbound train came to
rest, it was struck by westbound Metro-North passenger train, 1581. As
a result of the collision, 73 passengers, 2 engineers, and a conductor
were transported to local hospitals with injuries. Damage was estimated
by Metro-North at $18.5 million.
The Metro-North Commuter Railroad's New Haven Line runs east-west
between Bronx, New York and New Haven, Connecticut. In the vicinity of
the crash, the track structure consists of four main tracks. The
maximum authorized speed on the four main tracks in the vicinity of the
crash is 70 mph with no posted speed restrictions.
Train movements on the New Haven line are governed by the Metro-
North Commuter Railroad operating rules and the signal indications of a
traffic control signal system supplemented with cab signals and train
control.
The more than 60 miles of track on the New Haven Line are visually
inspected by Metro-North personnel three times per week. This track
inspection is performed with the use of a hi-rail vehicle or on foot.
The last track inspection prior to the derailment was performed on May
15, 2013, by hi-rail. The inspection found an insulated rail joint with
inadequate supporting ballast and indications of vertical movement of
the track system under load at catenary No. 734 on track 4 near
milepost (MP) 53.3. It is important to note that this inspection
finding did not disclose a violation of the FRA's Track Safety
Standards (49 CFR Part 213). As part of its ongoing investigation,
however, the NTSB is undertaking a comprehensive review of Metro-North
track inspections and follow-up work and is also looking at the
adequacy of the FRA's Track Safety Standards.
Preliminary indications are that the derailment occurred at MP
53.3. Sections of this rail containing rail joint bars are at the NTSB
materials laboratory in Washington, DC, for further examination.
Initial information obtained from onboard event recorders indicates
that the eastbound train was traveling at about 70 mph when it
derailed. After the eastbound train came to rest, it was fouling the
adjacent track, track 2, and was struck about 20 seconds later by the
westbound train. Initial information from the event recorders indicates
that the westbound train engineer applied the emergency brakes, slowing
from 70 mph to 23 mph prior to striking the eastbound train.
The parties to the investigation include Metro-North Railroad, the
FRA, the Association of Commuter Rail Employee, the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority Police Department, Connecticut Department of
Transportation, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen,
United Transportation Union, and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees Division.
The NTSB will conduct a thorough investigation of this event,
complete it in an expeditious manner, establish its probable cause, and
issue recommendations to prevent this type of event in the future.
Railroad Employee Fatality, West Haven, Connecticut, May 28, 2013
The NTSB is also investigating the tragic death of a Metro-North
track foreman in a track work zone in West Haven, on the New Haven
Line. We are working with the FRA, Metro-North, and the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority Police Department and, among other things,
examining the communications with the Metro-North rail traffic control
center.
We have issued safety recommendations to the FRA in the past
concerning additional safety requirements to protect maintenance-of-way
work crews.\2\ The NTSB submitted comments in response to an FRA notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) issued last August to amend its Roadway
Worker Protection regulation (49 CFR Part 214). In the NPRM, the FRA
specifically asked for comments in response to one of the two NTSB
safety recommendations concerning additional safety requirements for
rail work crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Collision of Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Train 322 and Track Maintenance Equipment near Woburn, Massachusetts,
January 9, 2007, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-08/01 (Washington,
D.C.: NTSB, 2008) and Recommendation R-08-06 to the FRA:
Require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, for
maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train dispatcher to
provide signal protection.
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Railroad Grade Crossing Crash, Rosedale, Maryland, May 28, 2013
On May 28, a three-axle roll-off straight truck approached and
crossed a rail grade crossing consisting of two tracks. The truck was
struck by a CSX freight train while it was crossing the tracks. This
crossing is a passive crossing, which means there were no lights or
crossing gate in place. The crossing was marked with cross buck signs
and non-standard stop signs which were yellow. The paint on both stop
signs was significantly faded and both were displaced from their
original location, including one that hung upside down and faced away
from oncoming traffic. The truck driver did not stop at the grade
crossing.
The train, travelling at 49 miles per hour, struck the truck on the
right side near the rear axle. The impact caused 15 train cars to
derail. The seventh car carried sodium chlorate and the ninth through
twelfth cars carried terephthalic acid, and these cars released their
products. Additionally, there was a post-crash fire and subsequent
explosion that was felt at least one mile away.
The truck driver was seriously injured, and four people responding
to the accident or working nearby sustained injuries from minor to
serious.
Railroad Train Collision, Resulting in a Highway Bridge Collapse,
Chaffee, Missouri, May 25, 2013
On Saturday, May 25, 2013, at about 2:30 a.m., central daylight
time, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train, 2ASMAR-25, collided
with BNSF Railway (BNSF) freight train U-KCKHKMO-O5T near Chaffee,
Missouri. The crash occurred where UP and BNSF tracks cross at grade at
a railroad interlocking (Rockview Junction). The BNSF train was
occupying the interlocking when the UP train struck the 12th car behind
the locomotives of the BNSF train. As a result of the collision, 13
cars of the BNSF train were derailed. Two locomotives and 11 cars of
the UP train were derailed. Spilled diesel fuel from the derailed UP
locomotives caught fire. Missouri State Highway M Bridge is above the
Rockview Junction interlocking; collision forces resulted in the
collapse of portions of the highway bridge. Thankfully, there were no
fatalities on the trains or the roadway, but the UP engineer and
conductor were injured and transported to a local hospital. Also,
subsequent to the highway bridge collapse, two motor vehicles struck
damaged highway elements and were involved in fires. Five occupants of
the motor vehicles were injured and transported to a local hospital.
The UP train consisted of 2 locomotives and 60 cars. The BNSF train
consisted of 3 locomotives and 75 cars. The weather was clear and 48+ F
at the time of the crash. The preliminary damage was estimated to be
$11 million.
Event recorder data from the locomotives of both trains, as well as
recorded data from the signal system, is being examined to determine
train speeds and signal aspects prior to the collision. Initial data
review indicates that the UP train was traveling about 49 mph when it
struck the side of the BNSF train, which was traveling about 22 mph.
Preliminary data indicate that the BNSF train received a signal
indication permitting it to proceed through the interlocking, while the
UP train received a stop signal indication at the interlocking. No PTC
system is currently installed at this location.
Parties to the investigation are the FRA, Missouri Department of
Transportation, Scott County Emergency Management Agency, Union Pacific
Railroad, BNSF Railway, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen, United Transportation Union, and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Signalmen.
The NTSB's Most Wanted List and Rail Safety
Each year, the NTSB issues a Most Wanted List of top transportation
safety priorities designed to increase industry, Congressional, and
public awareness of these important issues and recommended safety
solutions. The current Most Wanted List includes three issue areas that
pertain either specifically or more generally to the rail industry.
These issues are: Positive Train Control, Distraction, and Preserving
the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure. Next, I will address
each of these areas.
Positive Train Control (PTC)
In the NTSB's nearly half century of investigating railroad
crashes, including hundreds of train collisions and over-speed
derailments, we have seen mechanical defects, maintenance issues and
track failures, but the biggest safety challenge is human error--and
that's the area where technology can be so important. Since 2005, the
NTSB has completed 16 investigations of rail crashes that could have
been prevented or mitigated with positive train control. These 16
crashes claimed 52 lives and injured 942 more. The damages totaled
hundreds of millions of dollars and in each of these crashes, the NTSB
concluded that PTC would have provided critical redundancy that would
have prevented the crash.
PTC prevents train-to-train collisions and overspeed derailments.
Although human error cannot be eradicated, PTC technology is capable of
supplementing the human operation of trains. Such systems provide a
safety redundancy by slowing or stopping a train that is not being
operated in accordance with signal systems and operating rules, as was
the case in each of the 16 crashes referenced previously. For years, it
has been in place on Amtrak trains in the Northeast and Michigan, but
for PTC to reach its greatest safety potential, it must be implemented
on all passenger and freight lines. With this technology, even if the
train operator has fallen asleep or is distracted in some way, human
lives will not be at risk. PTC however, would not have prevented the
derailment and crash of the Metro-North trains in Bridgeport because
they were operating on separate tracks. Nonetheless, in numerous rail
collisions investigated by the NTSB, including the Goodwell, Oklahoma,
crash the NTSB reviewed yesterday, the agency has concluded that had a
PTC system been available, the collisions would have been prevented.
Because of the NTSB's repeated findings that technology based
collision avoidance systems could provide the needed safety redundancy
to prevent rail crashes, PTC was placed on the NTSB Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements at the inception of that list in
1990. Following the tragic head-on collision between a passenger train
and a freight train in Chatsworth, California, on September 12, 2008,
which resulted in 25 fatalities and more than 130 injuries, Congress
enacted the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA). This law
requires each Class I railroad over which poisonous-by-inhalation or
toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials is transported and regularly
scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation travel to
implement a PTC system by December 31, 2015. Encouraged by this
legislative action, the NTSB's Safety Recommendation calling for PTC to
be installed on railroads, was classified as closed and was removed
from the Most Wanted List in October 2008.
As a result of the May 2011 rear-end collision between two CSX
freight trains in Mineral Springs, North Carolina, and last June's
collision of two UP trains in Goodwell, Oklahoma, collisions which
killed five crewmembers, destroyed cars and goods, and put tracks out
of service for days, the NTSB decided to refocus on rail safety and
added PTC to our 2013 Most Wanted List.
In 2005, NTSB held a symposium on PTC to learn about the industry's
progress on this issue and to reinvigorate dialogue among rail
carriers, component manufacturers and government agencies. During that
2-day meeting, the NTSB examined each of the major aspects of PTC
systems including safety, efficiency, and operational issues. This past
February, the NTSB held a 1-day public forum on PTC. In opening the
forum, I acknowledged there are real hurdles to clear in meeting the
RSIA's December 31, 2015, mandate to implement PTC technologies. In
particular, many public operators do not have the available capital
they need to not only maintain but also upgrade their systems. Although
a number of presenters at the forum addressed a variety of regulatory,
technical, budgetary, product and spectrum availability, and legal
issues associated with implementing PTC, the NTSB also heard from other
presenters who described various success stories where carriers' PTC
systems have already received type approvals and certification by the
FRA.
There is much debate by policymakers over whether to extend the
2015 deadline established by RSIA. There are some railroads that have
already met and others that plan to meet the 2015 deadline. For those
railroads that have made the difficult decisions and invested millions
of dollars, they should not be penalized for their leadership. For
those railroads that will not meet the deadline, there should be
accountability. Lives depend on it.
Distraction
As we all know, the serious public health and safety issues
associated with distraction are not limited to road and highway travel.
The NTSB has been concerned for many years about the danger of
distraction across all transportation modes. For example, within the
rail industry, in 2003, the NTSB issued an accident report concerning
the May 28, 2002, head-on collision of two Burlington Northern Santa Fe
(BNSF) freight trains near Clarendon, Texas, that resulted in the death
of one of the train's engineers, injuries to the three other
crewmembers, and damages exceeding $8 million. The NTSB determined the
probable cause of the collision was one of the engineer's uses of a
cell phone during the time he should have been attending to the
requirements of the track warrant his train was operating under.
The NTSB focused again on the danger of distraction in the rail
industry in investigating another head-on collision of two BNSF freight
trains that occurred near Gunter, Texas, on May 19, 2004. The NTSB had
determined that 25 calls were made by crewmembers from both trains
during the trip and up to the time of the collision, and that 22 of
those calls were of a personal nature. Similarly, in the tragic
Chatsworth, California, Metrolink crash mentioned above, the NTSB
determined that during the time periods the engineer was responsible
for operating a train, the train operator sent 21 text messages,
received 20 text messages, and made four outgoing telephone calls.
As a result of the Clarendon, Texas, collision, the NTSB issued a
recommendation in 2003 to the FRA to issue regulations to control the
use of cellular telephones and other wireless communication devices by
railroad operating employees while on duty. In response to the
recommendation, the FRA and its Rail Safety Advisory Committee closely
examined the issue and, on October 7, 2008, published in the Federal
Register Emergency Order No. 26, to restrict on-duty railroad operating
employees from improperly using cellular telephones and other
distracting electronic and electrical devices. On September 27, 2010,
the FRA issued a final rule that supplanted Emergency Order No. 26 and
codified most its requirements in a new subpart C, titled ``Electronic
Devices,'' to Part 220, of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. This
recommendation has been closed because of this positive action by the
FRA.
Preserving the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure
As the American Society of Civil Engineers' 2013 Report Card for
America's Infrastructure points out, the U.S. freight and passenger
rail network consists of more than 160,000 miles of track, 76,000 rail
bridges, and 800 tunnels. The Report notes both freight and passengers
railroads have made significant investments in their infrastructure,
using both public and private funding, but meeting capacity demands
will be an increasing challenge as rail ridership and freight rail
continue to increase. Of the 16 infrastructure categories evaluated in
the Report Card, including aviation, inland waterways, ports, roads,
and transit, Solid Waste (trash disposal) received the highest assigned
rating--B- (Good). Rail and Bridges received the second highest
assigned rating--C+ (Mediocre).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ www.infrastructurereportcard.org (March 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB Most Wanted List item on transportation infrastructure
points to the need for periodic, standard railway inspections for
railcars and track used to replace defective segments as well as track
originally laid down. For example, after investigating a March, 2001,
derailment of Amtrak's California Zephyr, near Nodaway, Iowa, while
operating on track owned by BNSF, resulting in 1 fatality and injuries
to 78 people, the NTSB determined the probable cause of the derailment
was the failure of the rail beneath the train, due to undetected
internal defects.
Similarly, the NTSB investigated the January 18, 2002, derailment
of 31 of 112 cars of a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train near
Minot, North Dakota. Five tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, a
liquefied compressed gas, catastrophically ruptured, and a vapor plume
covered the derailment site and surrounding area. One resident was
fatally injured, and 60 to 65 residents of the neighborhood nearest the
derailment site were rescued. As a result of the crash, 11 people
sustained serious injuries, and 322 people, including the 2 train
crewmembers, sustained minor injuries. Damages exceeded $2 million, and
more than $8 million was spent for environmental remediation. The
NTSB's report indicated the probable cause of the derailment was an
ineffective inspection and maintenance program that did not identify
and replace cracked joint bars before they completely fractured and led
to the breaking of the rail at the joint. Contributing to the severity
of the accident was the catastrophic failure of five tank cars and the
instantaneous release of about 146,700 gallons of anhydrous ammonia.
Other Important NTSB Rail Safety Recommendations
The NTSB has long advocated in-cab recording devices in order to
better understand crew activities leading up to serious accidents. As a
result of its investigation of the collision between a Maryland Rail
Commuter train and an Amtrak train near Silver Spring, Maryland, on
February 16, 1996, in which all operating crewmembers were fatally
injured, the NTSB was unable to determine whether certain crewmember
activities leading up to the crash may have contributed to the crash.
Consequently, the NTSB recommended that the FRA
Amend 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 229 to require the
recording of train crewmembers' voice communications for
exclusive use in accident investigations and with appropriate
limitations on the public release of such recordings. (Safety
Recommendation R-97-9)
After its investigation of another railroad crash with no surviving
crewmembers that occurred in 1999 in Bryan, Ohio, the NTSB reiterated
Safety Recommendation R-97-9 to the FRA. The FRA responded that it
. . . has reluctantly come to the conclusion that this
recommendation should not be implemented at the present time. .
. . [The] FRA appreciates that, as time passes and other uses
are found for recording media that may create synergies with
other public and private purposes, the Board`s recommendation
may warrant re-examination.
Based on this response and further meetings, the NTSB classified
Safety Recommendation R-97-9 ``Closed--Unacceptable Action.''
Since the refusal by the FRA to act on the recommendation regarding
in-cab recorders, the NTSB has continued to investigate crashes in
which such recorders would have provided valuable information to help
determine probable cause and develop safety recommendations. As a
result of its investigation of the July 10, 2005, collision of two CN
freight trains in Anding, Mississippi, the NTSB made the following
safety recommendation to the FRA:
Require the installation of a crash-and fire-protected
locomotive cab voice recorder, or a combined voice and video
recorder, (for the exclusive use in accident investigations and
with appropriate limitations on the public release of such
recordings) in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car
operating compartments. The recorder should have a minimum 2-
hour continuous recording capability, microphones capable of
capturing crewmembers' voices and sounds generated within the
cab, and a channel to record all radio conversations to and
from crewmembers. (Safety Recommendation R-07-3)
Most recently, as a result of the investigation into Chatsworth,
California, head-on collision between a Metrolink commuter passenger
train and a Union Pacific freight train, the NTSB reclassified Safety
Recommendation R-07-03 ``Closed--Unacceptable Action/Superseded.'' In
that investigation, the NTSB noted that:
In all too many accidents, the individuals directly involved
are either limited in their recollection of events or, as in
the case of the Chatsworth accident, are not available to be
interviewed because of fatal injuries. In a number of accidents
the NTSB has investigated, a better knowledge of crewmembers'
actions before an accident would have helped reveal the key
causal factors and would perhaps have facilitated the
development of more effective safety recommendations.
The NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation R-07-3 ``Closed--
Unacceptable Action/Superseded,'' when it issued Safety Recommendation
R-10-1 to the FRA:
Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs
and cab car operating compartments, of crash- and fire-
protected inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders
capable of providing recordings to verify that train crew
actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
essential to safety as well as train operating conditions. The
devices should have a minimum 12-hour continuous recording
capability with recordings that are easily accessible for
review, with appropriate limitations on public release, for the
investigation of accidents or for use by management in carrying
out efficiency testing and systemwide performance monitoring
programs. (R-10-1)
The NTSB also issued the following Safety Recommendation to the
FRA:
Require that railroads regularly review and use in-cab audio
and image recordings (with appropriate limitations on public
release), in conjunction with other performance data, to verify
that train crew actions are in accordance with rules and
procedures that are essential to safety. (R-10-2)
Recommendations R-10-1 and R-10-2 are currently classified as
``Open--Acceptable Response.''
Based on the important safety and investigative role of inward-
facing video and audio monitoring devices, the NTSB reiterated Safety
Recommendations R-10-01 and -02 in its report \4\ concerning collision
of a BNSF coal train with the rear end of a standing BNSF maintenance-
of-way equipment train near Red Oak, Iowa. As a result of the
collision, both crewmembers on the striking train were fatally injured.
Damage was in excess of $8.7 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Collision of BNSF Coal Train 322 With the Rear End of
Standing BNSF Maintenance-of-Way Equipment Train, Red Oak, Iowa, April
17, 2011, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-12/02 (Washington, D.C.:
NTSB, 2012)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the NTSB stated in its report, the rear-end collision near Red
Oak again demonstrated the need for in-cab recording devices to better
understand (and thereby prevent) serious railroad crashes that claim
the lives of crewmembers, passengers, and the public. While video
recorders will assist in the investigation of crashes, their value in
preventing crashes cannot be overstated. Installation of inward-facing
cameras can also assist railroads in monitoring rules compliance and
identifying fatigued engineers. Such monitoring can lead to
interventions before a crash occurs.
Closing
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
rail safety and I am prepared to answer your questions.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Chairman Hersman.
Ms. Fleming?
STATEMENT OF SUSAN A. FLEMING, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Fleming. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Blunt, and other members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss rail safety.
As you heard, 2012 was the safest year in railroad history.
And overall, rail safety has improved significantly with the
accident rate dropping by almost 50 percent between 2004 and
2012.
However, as we heard, recent accidents in Connecticut,
Missouri, and Maryland demonstrate the need for vigilance and
further improvements in rail safety.
My statement is based on work currently being performed at
the request of this committee and other members of the Senate,
and will cover FRA's rail safety oversight, including existing
and emerging challenges, as well as positive train control
implementation. Our reports will be issued later this fall.
FRA is charged with regulatory oversight of the safety of
U.S. railroads, both passenger and freight. Combined, the
freight and commuter rail systems, plus Amtrak, have about
230,000 employees, over 1 million cars, and 200,000 miles of
track in operation.
FRA primarily monitors railroad compliance with Federal
safety regulations through routine inspections at specific
sites on railroad systems. FRA's relatively small safety staff,
about 640, including State inspectors, makes the railroads with
their own inspectors the principal guarantors of railroad
safety.
FRA has developed two models that use past accident,
incident, and inspection data to help focus its oversight
efforts. One targets inspection and the other seeks to allocate
FRA's inspectors across its eight regions.
Both models are updated at least annually and are reviewed
by FRA officials who may suggest modifications.
However, several FRA regional officials told us that the
staffing decisions based on model results do not necessarily
align inspectors with their perspective of the needs of the
region, nor does it take a region's geography into account.
As we continue our work, we will further assess how FRA
officials use these tools to accommodate changing safety risk
and allocate inspectors.
Based on our work to date, we have identified several
existing and emerging challenges affecting rail oversight.
First, rail safety stakeholders, including FRA, face a
continued challenge of trying to reduce highway rail grade
crossings and trespasser incidents. Stakeholders told us that
this involves educating the public about the potential safety
hazards and cooperating with other Federal, State, and local
government agencies that have responsibility for funding road
projects or closing those crossings.
Additionally, changes to freight flows such as the recent
increase in train and truck traffic due to gas and petroleum
drilling in the Midwest can increase the risk of highway rail
grade crossing accidents.
Second, in the next 5 years, over 30 percent of FRA
inspectors in its current safety disciplines will be eligible
to retire. FRA does not have a specific plan to replace its
aging inspector work force. In addition, it can take from 1 to
4 years to hire, train, and certify an inspector, depending on
the inspector's level of experience.
Finally, FRA officials told us that they do not yet have
sufficient staff with the required expertise to provide safety
oversight of PTC and other emerging safety technologies.
Moving on to PTC implementation, as you know, the Rail
Safety Improvement Act of 2008 called for PTC implementation on
rail lines carrying either inner-city or commuter passengers,
or cargo that carries certain toxic materials, by December 31,
2015. However, we have heard that most railroads report that
they will not meet this deadline.
There are numerous interrelated challenges that are causing
this delay, including the development of PTC components and
their installation; system integration and field testing; and
limited FRA resources to review railroads' PTC implementation
and safety plans, and to certify those systems.
Commuter railroads face these same exact challenges and
more, including dependency on implementation by the freight
railroads and Amtrak, whose tracks they use, and obtaining
sufficient radio frequency spectrum for radios.
It appears unlikely that PTC will be implemented by more
than a small number of railroads by the deadline.
In its August 2000 report to Congress, FRA requested
authorities, such as granting provisional certification of PTC
systems to railroads, which would provide flexibility to
meeting the deadline. FRA officials say these authorities could
enable them to conduct oversight more realistically, by
acknowledging the current state of implementation, and in turn
could help better manage their and the railroads' limited
resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my statement, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fleming follows:]
Rail Safety
Preliminary Observations on Federal Rail Safety Oversight
and Positive Train Control Implementation
Why GAO Did This Study
The rail network is one of America's safest modes of
transportation, although several recent rail accidents have reinforced
the need for constant effort from the private and public sectors to
ensure safety for rail passengers, the public, and railroad employees.
FRA, the Federal agency responsible for railroad safety, works with
freight, commuter, and intercity passenger railroads and certain states
to ensure the safety of the U.S. railroad network.
In 2007, FRA developed and implemented a risk-based approach to its
safety inspections of the railroad network. In 2008, RSIA was enacted
and, among other things, reauthorized FRA's rail safety program and
included several new rail safety provisions, such as the implementation
of PTC and creation of rail safety risk reduction plans.
This statement discusses GAO's preliminary observations about (1)
how FRA oversees rail safety, (2) challenges to rail safety, and (3)
PTC implementation by the U.S. rail industry. GAO examined FRA's
overall rail safety framework and interviewed state rail safety
officials and officials from FRA; selected Class I, II, and III
railroads; and Amtrak on rail safety and PTC implementation.
GAO plans to issue reports on reviews of rail safety and PTC in the
fall of 2013.
What GAO Found
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) primarily monitors
railroads' compliance with Federal safety regulations through routine
inspections by individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads'
systems. Thirty states also employ railroad safety inspectors, who
participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct supplemental
safety oversight activities based on FRA rail safety regulations and
enforce state railroad safety laws. FRA applies a quantitative, risk-
based approach, the National Inspection Plan, to inform its rail safety
oversight efforts using analyses of past accident and inspection data
and other information to target inspections in each region. FRA also
uses a planning and evaluation tool, the Staffing Allocation Model
(SAM), to distribute its inspection resources across each FRA region.
However, according to several FRA regional administrators that GAO
spoke with, the staffing decisions based on SAM results do not
necessarily align with their perspectives on the inspector needs for
their regions.
Based on GAO's work to date, there are several potential challenges
affecting FRA's rail safety oversight. First, the Rail Safety
Improvement Act (RSIA) required FRA to issue regulations requiring
certain railroads to submit risk reduction plans within 4 years. FRA
has not yet issued a final rule on the plans. Second, FRA does not have
a specific plan to replace its aging inspector workforce. According to
FRA officials, in the next 5 years, about 32 percent of FRA inspectors
will be eligible to retire. Although FRA officials said that they
anticipate being able to replace inspectors, it can take 1 to 2 years
to find, hire, train, and certify a new inspector. Finally, FRA faces
other ongoing and emerging safety challenges like addressing adverse
weather conditions and their impact on railroad operations and
equipment, educating the public on the potential hazards of rail-
highway crossings, accommodating changes in rail safety risks including
new freight flows that affect the need for inspections, and hiring and
training a specialized inspector workforce to provide adequate safety
oversight for emerging technologies including positive train control
(PTC), a communications-based system designed to prevent train
accidents caused by human factors.
GAO's work to date indicates that railroads may not be able to
fully implement PTC by the 2015 deadline established in RSIA. This is
because of the many interrelated challenges caused by the complexity
and breadth of PTC implementation. For example, PTC components, such as
the back office servers, which are needed to communicate vital
information between locomotives and wayside signals, are still under
development. In addition, the need to integrate PTC components and
field test the system is a time- and resource-consuming process.
Finally, some railroads had concerns with FRA's limited resources and
ability to verify field testing and certify the system once it is fully
implemented. Officials from freight railroads and FRA stated they will
not compromise PTC safety functions and will ensure PTC is implemented
to meet the requirements of the RSIA mandate. However, in attempting to
implement PTC by the 2015 deadline, railroads may be making choices
that could introduce financial and operational risks. For example,
freight railroad representatives told us that without adequate time for
field testing, PTC systems could potentially malfunction or fail more
frequently, causing system disruptions.
Prepared Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, United States Government Accountability Office
Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the
Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing to
discuss the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) rail safety
oversight activities. The rail network is one of America's safest modes
of transportation, although several recent rail accidents, including
the Metro-North commuter rail accident in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the
collision of BNSF and UP trains in Chaffee, Missouri, and the collision
of a CSX train and a truck in Rosedale, Maryland, have reinforced the
need for constant effort from both the private and public sectors to
ensure that rail transportation remains safe for passengers, the
public, and railroad employees. My statement will discuss our ongoing
reviews of FRA's rail safety oversight and the implementation of
positive train control, a communications-based system designed to
prevent train accidents caused by human factors.
This testimony provides our preliminary observations from our
ongoing work, being performed at the request of this committee and
other Members of the Senate, regarding: (1) FRA's framework for safety
oversight, (2) existing and emerging challenges to rail safety, and (3)
PTC implementation. Our preliminary assessments of FRA's rail safety
framework and the quantitative tools FRA uses to implement that
framework are based on our reviews of FRA documentation and interviews
with FRA headquarters and regional officials. In addition, we
interviewed state rail safety officials and freight railroad officials
from selected Class I, II, and III railroads.\1\ We selected the
railroads based on the class of railroad (as a proxy for size), types
of railroads (long distance versus local service or a railroad that
serves a small area such as a port or rail yard), and type of ownership
(publicly held, privately held, or owned by a public agency) to get a
range of different kinds of freight railroads. For our assessment of
PTC implementation, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials
from FRA and railroad associations, the four largest freight railroads,
commuter railroads that were selected based on PTC implementation
status and ridership levels (among other things), and Amtrak. We also
selected PTC suppliers and independent PTC experts based on their
involvement with PTC and recommendations from FRA, industry
associations, and others.
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\1\ The Surface Transportation Board classifies railroads based on
annual revenues. As of 2011 (the last year of data available), Class I
freight railroads are those railroads that earn more than $433 million
annually, Class II earn from about $35 million to $432 million annually
and Class III railroads earn less than about $35 million annually.
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We conducted our ongoing work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. We provided a draft copy of this
statement to FRA for their review. The agency had no comment. We plan
to report the final results of our reviews in the fall of 2013.
Background
According to FRA data, 2012 was the safest year in railroad
history. Overall, rail safety--measured by the train accident rate per
million train miles--has improved markedly since 1980, as shown in
figure 1. In addition, the accident rate dropped by almost 50 percent
from 2004 to 2012.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: FRA.
Even with the significant reduction in accident rates, however,
roughly 300 people were injured and 10 people were killed in train
accidents on average each year, from 2003 to 2012.\2\ Further, recent
rail accidents underscore the importance of continued, consistent
efforts to ensure rail safety.
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\2\ These figures do not include highway-railroad grade crossing or
trespasser accidents.
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FRA provides regulatory oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads,
both passenger and freight. FRA develops and enforces regulations for
the railroad industry that include numerous requirements related to
safety, including requirements governing track; signal and train
control systems; grade-crossing warning device systems; mechanical
equipment, such as locomotives and tank cars; and railroad-operating
practices. FRA also enforces hazardous materials regulations that
relate to the safe transportation of such materials by rail.
The Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 was the first
authorization of FRA's safety activities since 1994 and is due to be
reauthorized in 2013.\3\ RSIA overhauled Federal rail safety
requirements by directing the FRA to, among other things, promulgate
additional new rail safety regulations and guidance in areas such as
railroad risk reduction plans, track inspections standards, and
highway-rail grade crossing safety.
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\3\ Pub. L. No. 110-432, div. A, 122 Stat. 4848.
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RSIA also required railroads to develop and submit a plan to FRA
for implementing a PTC system on rail lines that carry intercity or
commuter passengers or toxic-inhalation-hazard cargo by December 31,
2015.\4\ Under RSIA, FRA is responsible for approving railroads' PTC
implementation plans and certifying PTC systems prior to installation.
PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent some accidents
caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and
derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. It is also designed to
prevent incursions into work zones and movement of trains through
switches left in the wrong position. By preventing trains from either
entering a segment of track occupied by another train or moving through
an improperly aligned switch, PTC could prevent accidents such as the
one in the Chatsworth neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.\5\
Railroads that are required to implement PTC can choose different PTC
systems; however, railroads' PTC systems must be interoperable. This
means that the components of different PTC systems must be able to
communicate with one another in a manner to provide for the seamless
movement of trains as they cross tracks owned by different railroads
that may be using different PTC systems.\6\,\7\
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\4\ Failure to complete PTC system installation on track where PTC
is required prior to the deadline is subject to a $16,000 penalty per
violation and $25,000 per willful violation. See 49 C.F.R. Appendix A
to Part 236.
\5\ In September 2008, a commuter train operator missed a red
signal, causing the train to collide with a Union Pacific freight
train, resulting in 25 deaths and over 100 injuries.
\6\ Major freight railroads in the United States are implementing
Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) and Amtrak,
which provides intercity passenger rail and predominantly owns the
Northeast Corridor track that runs from Washington, D.C., to Boston, is
implementing Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). Although
ACSES and I-ETMS are functionally the same, they represent different
technical approaches.
\7\ GAO, Rail Safety: Federal Railroad Administration Should Report
on Risks to the Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety
Technology, GAO-11-133 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010) and Federal
Railroad Administration, Report to Congress: Positive Train Control
Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts (August 2012).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Source: GAO.
a Train location information is determined through
various methods depending on the specific PTC system, including through
satellite-based positioning systems and sensors installed along the
track.
b Although RSIA does not require PTC systems to issue
such warnings, the PTC systems that most railroads are implementing
will do so.
FRA's Rail Safety Framework Includes Data to Inform Its Rail Safety
Oversight Efforts but Faces Potential Oversight Challenges
FRA's Oversight Framework Primarily Uses Federal and State Inspectors
to Oversee Railroad Safety Efforts
Our work to date indicates that FRA primarily monitors railroads'
compliance with Federal safety regulations through routine inspections
by individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads' systems. This
inspection approach focuses on direct observations of train components,
related equipment, and railroad property--including the track and
signal systems--as well as operating practices to determine whether
they meet FRA's standards. Inspectors also examine railroads'
inspection and maintenance records. FRA's inspectors generally
specialize in one of five areas, called inspection disciplines: (1)
operating practices, (2) track, (3) hazardous materials, (4) signal and
train control, and (5) motive power and equipment.\8\ Inspectors
typically cover a range of standards within their discipline during
inspections. FRA's policy is for inspectors to encourage railroads to
comply with Federal rail safety regulations voluntarily. When railroads
do not comply voluntarily or identified problems are serious, FRA may
cite violations and in certain instances take enforcement actions,
including the assessment of civil penalties, to ensure compliance.\9\
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\8\ Inspectors in this specialty inspect railroad locomotives,
passenger and freight cars, and their safety appliances such as air
brakes.
\9\ For Fiscal Year 2012, FRA's final civil penalty assessments and
settlements totaled about $16.6 million for about 6,400 violation
reports.
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Our preliminary work has found that thirty states also employ
railroad safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program
with FRA to conduct safety oversight activities, supplemental to FRA's
activities, based on FRA rail safety regulations and to enforce state
railroad safety laws. FRA trains and certifies state inspectors and
includes them in its inspection planning efforts. However, FRA's
relationship and coordination with each state is unique. For example,
according to one state rail safety administrator we talked to, the
Federal and state track inspectors have divided one state's territory
to ensure that the inspectors' territories do not overlap. In addition,
an FRA regional administrator mentioned that while his FRA and state
inspectors' territories overlapped, effective coordination between
inspectors avoids duplicative inspections. According to FRA officials,
while state inspectors ensure compliance with state requirements, state
inspectors are also responsible for ensuring compliance with Federal
safety regulations.
In addition to Federal and state inspectors, the railroads have
their own inspectors who are responsible for ensuring that railroad
equipment, track, and operations meet Federal rail safety standards.
Each railroad has its own inspectors or contracts with third parties to
conduct the required inspections depending on the railroad's resources
and FRA-mandated inspection responsibilities.
FRA is a small agency relative to the railroad industry, making the
railroads themselves the primary guarantors of railroad safety. Based
on our work to date, FRA has about 470 inspectors in its headquarters
and regional offices, in addition to about 170 state inspectors.\10\ In
contrast, the U.S. railroad system consists of about 760 railroads with
about 230,000 employees and 200,000 miles of track in operation. FRA is
also responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for commuter
railroads and Amtrak.\11\ Amtrak and commuter railroads operating
outside of the Northeast Corridor operate largely over freight railroad
tracks and carry over 670 million passengers a year over 23 billion
miles. The FRA works with railroads to get their input on proposed
regulations and rules through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
(RSAC) process.\12\ Several railroad officials we spoke with thought
that the RSAC process was an improvement over the prior process, that
they believe had been less collaborative and did not promote
discussions among FRA, the railroads, and labor unions to share and
understand each other's views on proposed Federal railroad safety
regulations.
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\10\ Six of these states (California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and West Virginia) comprise over 50 percent of the total number
of state inspectors.
\11\ There are currently 28 commuter railroads.
\12\ FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC)
in 1996 to develop new regulatory standards, through a collaborative
process, with all segments of the rail community, including railroads,
shippers and other stakeholders, to fashion mutually satisfactory
solutions on rail safety regulatory issues.
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FRA Targets Its Inspections Based on Analyses of Past Accident and
Inspection Data and Other Information
In 2006, FRA implemented a risk-based approach, using its National
Inspection Plan (NIP), to allocate its limited inspection resources to
ensure rail safety. The NIP consists of three elements: (1) a baseline
plan that establishes safety goals for each railroad and state, (2)
review and adjustment by regional administrators, (3) monitoring and
evaluation of inspection activity.
The NIP's baseline plan attempts to minimize the predicted number
and severity of railroad accidents given the number of available FRA
inspectors in each FRA region. The quantitative model uses data
including: (1) the most recent 3 years of accident data from reports
that railroads are required to file about accidents that occur on their
tracks; (2) data from FRA's inspection activity; and (3) information on
railroad activities such as train miles and other data, to determine
the scope of what FRA's inspectors should inspect in a given year.\13\
In the middle of each calendar year, FRA updates the NIP with new
accident data to estimate where the highest safety risks are and uses
the results to create annual inspection targets for each inspector.
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\13\ Railroads are required to report monthly accident data within
a month of the accident occurring and it may take 2 to 3 more months
for FRA to review the information and make it available for use in the
NIP. The NIP excludes highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser
accidents from its analysis.
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Our preliminary work indicates that after the baseline is
established, FRA's regional management propose modifications to the
inspection targets produced for each region using their judgment and
knowledge of which railroads or disciplines may require more FRA
oversight than the NIP's model indicates. Subsequently, FRA allows for
a mid-year correction of the NIP, based on input from FRA's regional
management. FRA regional administrators we spoke with indicated that
this flexibility allows them to accommodate new or emerging rail safety
risks by deviating from the original NIP targets. For example, they
stated that they sometimes re-allocate inspectors to railroads that
have had recent accidents, or because inspectors indicate a need for
more oversight at a certain railroad based on assessments made during
their regular inspection duties. Additionally, the effects of
hurricanes, storms, or prolonged periods of adverse weather, such as
heat or cold that could cause track failures, may require the
reallocation of inspection resources. Throughout the year, FRA
headquarters and regional management monitor the inspection activities
against the modified inspection baseline to determine if the inspection
targets are being met.
FRA has also developed the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), which
is a planning and evaluation tool used to assess its inspection
resources from a nationwide perspective. Our work to date shows that
FRA uses the SAM to establish targets for the number of inspectors in
each FRA region and inspection discipline. In using the targets to help
allocate and balance staff among disciplines and regions, FRA expects
to minimize the resulting casualties and estimated costs of train
accidents. FRA uses the SAM results to determine where they may need to
adjust the number of inspectors in a given region and discipline. FRA
rebalanced its workforce using the SAM model in 2007 and officials
stated that more recent SAM results have not indicated the need for
major movements of inspectors between regions or disciplines. However,
FRA officials stated that when the SAM has shown a change in the
distribution of their inspectors they are somewhat constrained from
implementing the model's results due to budget constraints. FRA
officials also told us that while the SAM model has been refined based
on what they have learned from making improvements to the NIP, the SAM
is not designed to take into account certain changes--such as
increasing freight train volume or accidents in a particular region--as
the SAM uses past accident data to provide a baseline for the
nationwide distribution of its inspectors. FRA officials stated that
they handle those types of changes on an as-needed basis through
temporary detail assignment of FRA inspectors from other regions or
headquarters.
In addition, our preliminary review indicates that FRA regional
administrators also can provide input on the model's results based on
their views on how many inspectors the region needs. However, FRA
regional officials we talked to stated that the staffing decisions
based on SAM results do not necessarily align their inspectors with
their perspective of the needs in their region nor does it take a
region's geography into account. While FRA headquarters officials
anticipate that there may be minor variations from SAM's targets as a
result of natural turnovers of inspectors (e.g., retirements), they do
not believe that these variations will have long-term impacts on FRA's
safety activities in the regions. However, regional administrators
expressed concern over the staffing pressures this can create. For
example, one FRA regional administrator stated that when the staffing
decisions did not provide for a replacement for a certain discipline,
he was forced to cover that discipline's inspection load with
inspectors from other states for 3 years until a replacement could be
approved, hired, trained, and qualified.
As we continue our on-going work on rail safety oversight, we will
further assess how FRA officials use these tools to accommodate
changing rail safety risks and allocate inspectors across regions and
inspection disciplines.
FRA Faces Several Potential Challenges to Its Rail Safety Oversight
Mission
Based on our work to date, we have identified several potential
challenges affecting FRA's rail safety oversight, including lack of a
final rule requiring the submission of Risk Reduction Plans by
specified railroads, lack of succession planning to ensure sufficient
staff numbers and expertise, and other ongoing and emerging challenges.
Risk Reduction Plans
RSIA required FRA to develop a rulemaking requiring certain
railroads to submit risk reduction plans, within 4 years of enactment,
which was October 2012.\14\ Our preliminary work has identified several
reasons why a final rule has not yet been issued, according to FRA,
including the need to resolve the issue of protection of sensitive
business and safety information in the railroad's risk reduction plans.
FRA officials told us that these plans would allow them to have a more
proactive view of rail safety for these railroads that will complement
FRA's current compliance-based approach. FRA officials also told us
that they anticipate issuing a final rule in September 2014 and that
they expect that the railroads will have risk reduction plans in place
by 2016.
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\14\ Specifically, RSIA required all Class I freight, intercity
passenger, and commuter railroads (as well as any railroad whose safety
performance was determined to be inadequate by the Secretary of
Transportation) to develop and submit plans for DOT to review that
would identify and propose to manage the rail safety risks on the
railroad, such as rail safety technology and human fatigue management.
Succession Planning
Our work to date has found that FRA does not yet have a specific
plan to replace its aging inspector workforce. According to FRA
officials, in the next 5 years, 150 of FRA's 470 inspectors (about 32
percent) will be eligible to retire. FRA officials told us, however,
that they have been able to find and hire qualified candidates in the
past. However, other FRA headquarters officials and regional
administrators we spoke with stated that replacing qualified inspectors
is difficult, especially for the signal discipline, and getting
inspectors fully qualified takes time. For example, FRA regional
officials stated that it takes about 1 to 2 years to find, hire, train,
and certify a new experienced inspector and 3 to 4 years to get an
inexperienced trainee certified by FRA as a qualified inspector.
Additionally, FRA officials stated that budget constraints may prohibit
their current practice of hiring new inspectors before retiring
inspectors leave so that some overlap can occur to facilitate the
transfer of knowledge.
Other Challenges
Our preliminary work has identified several other ongoing and
emerging rail safety challenges that FRA faces.
The effects of weather on railroad operations are an ongoing
challenge. FRA and the railroads continuously keep abreast of
adverse weather conditions that can cause accidents, such as
high temperatures that can cause tracks to go out of alignment
and cause a derailment. FRA has issued several weather-related
regulations concerning tracks, operating practices, and
railroad equipment, and the railroads we spoke with adjust
their operating practices to account for adverse weather.
All rail safety stakeholders face the continued challenge of
trying to reduce highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser
incidents. Reducing these kinds of accidents represents a
different challenge to FRA's current rail safety framework.
Rail safety stakeholders stated that this involves educating
the general public about the potential safety hazards that
trains represent to cars, trucks, and pedestrians at grade
crossings as well as cooperating with several other federal,
state, and local government agencies that have responsibility
for funding road projects or closing those crossings. Changes
to freight flows, such as the recent increase in train and
truck traffic experienced due to increased gas and petroleum
drilling in the upper Midwest, can add train or truck traffic
to previously low traffic areas increasing the risk of highway-
railroad grade crossing accidents.
New technologies, such as PTC systems, are another challenge
that FRA will have to incorporate into its rail safety
oversight framework. For example, because PTC systems are
extremely complex command, control, and communications systems,
the FRA believes it will require a specialized inspector
workforce--which FRA currently does not have--to provide
adequate safety oversight.
As we continue our on-going work, we will further assess the extent
to which FRA is incorporating these existing and emerging challenges
into its safety oversight framework.
Most Railroads Report They Will Miss the 2015 PTC Implementation
Deadline Due to a Number of Challenges
Our work to date indicates that most railroads will not complete
PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline due to numerous, interrelated
challenges caused by the breadth and complexity of PTC.\15\ Of the four
major freight railroads we included in our review,\16\ only one
railroad expects to meet the 2015 deadline. Of the three remaining
freight railroads we spoke to, representatives believe they will likely
not have PTC fully implemented until 2017 or later. Commuter railroads,
which primarily operate on routes that are owned and managed by freight
railroads, generally must wait for freight railroads and Amtrak to roll
out their PTC systems. Our preliminary analysis indicates that freight
and commuter railroads' inability to meet the 2015 deadline is due to a
number of challenges.
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\15\ In its May 2013 report, the Association of American Railroads
noted that most railroads would not make the deadline.
\16\ The four major freight railroads included in our review are
BNSF, Norfolk Southern, CSX and Union Pacific--the largest Class I
railroads based on operating revenue.
Developing PTC components and PTC installation: Some PTC
components are still in development--most notably the PTC back-
office server. One or more of these servers will be installed
in over a dozen railroads' back offices and are needed to
communicate vital information between the back office,
locomotives, and waysides. According to the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) and the railroads, back office system
delays are due to system complexity, interfaces to other
systems, and lack of supplier resources. Nearly all of the
freight railroads included in our review anticipate they will
not have a final version of the back office system until 2014
and have identified it as one of the significant factors
preventing them from meeting the deadline. In addition, PTC
installation is a time-and resource-consuming process. For
example, railroads collectively will have to install
approximately 38,000 wayside interface units.\17\ According to
AAR and freight railroads, the volume and complexity of
installing these units is another significant reason most
railroads cannot meet the 2015 deadline. Our ongoing work has
found that railroads have also encountered unexpected delays
while installing PTC. For example, in May 2013, FRA officials
told us the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently
requested railroads to halt their construction of radio
antennae towers to allow FCC to clarify regulatory oversight of
the towers being installed for PTC.\18\ According to FRA
officials, FCC halted the construction of these towers to
ensure proper installation procedures were being followed
including consulting with either the tribal or state historical
authorities prior to the towers construction and installation.
FRA officials told us they did not anticipate this issue but
are working with FCC to resolve it as quickly as possible.
However, the impact of halting construction on the towers may
result in additional delays in railroads' time frames.
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\17\ Wayside interface units receive information from signals and
in turn communicate signal aspect information to the locomotive
directly or through railroads' back offices.
\18\ According to the FCC website, new tower construction must go
through an FCC approval process and also a three stage review process
depending on its location which includes: 1) environmental impact
review, 2) state historical impact review, and 3) tribal land impact
review. FCC notifies federally recognized tribes, Native Hawaiian
Organizations, and State Historic Preservation Officers of proposed
communications towers and allows these organizations to respond
directly to the companies about their concerns.
System integration and field testing: Our work to date
indicates that successful PTC implementation involves several
components working together, many of which are first-generation
technologies being designed and developed. All components must
function both independently and together, or the PTC system
could fail. To ensure successful integration, multiple testing
phases must be conducted by the railroads--first in a lab
environment, then in the field--before components are installed
across the network. Most of the freight railroads we spoke with
expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized
the importance of field testing to ensure the system performs
the way it is intended. Multiple phases of testing must take
place to identify any defects, which then must be analyzed and
corrected, and the system re-tested. One railroad
representative with whom we spoke said that the PTC system
components behaved differently in some field tests than in the
laboratory tests. Identifying the source of such problems,
correcting them, and re-testing could further contribute to
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railroads not meeting the 2015 deadline.
FRA resources: Although most railroads we spoke with said
they have worked closely with FRA throughout the PTC
implementation process, some railroads cited concerns with
FRA's limited resources and the agency's ability to help
facilitate railroads' PTC implementation. Our work to date
indicates that these concerns were based around two activities:
field testing and certification. First, FRA officials must
verify the field testing of PTC. However, FRA reported that it
lacks the staffing resources to embed a dedicated FRA inspector
at each railroad for regular, detailed, and unfiltered
reporting on a railroads' PTC progress. To address the lack of
staff to verify field testing, FRA has taken on an audit
approach, whereby railroads submit field test results for
approval as part of their safety plans.\19\ Second, a PTC
system must be certified before a railroad can operate it in
revenue service. FRA certifies a PTC system by approving a
railroad's safety plan. FRA set no specific deadline for
railroads to submit the safety plans, and according to FRA, to
date only one railroad has submitted a final plan, which FRA
has approved. As FRA stated in its 2012 report to Congress,
FRA's PTC staff consists of 10 PTC specialists and 1 supervisor
who are responsible for the review and approval of all PTC
system certification documentation for 38 railroads. FRA has
expressed concern that railroads will submit their safety plans
to FRA at roughly the same time. Our initial analysis suggests
that this timing creates the potential that FRA's review of
these plans will become backlogged, since each of the
railroad's plans will consist of hundreds, perhaps thousands,
of pages of detailed technical information. FRA officials told
us that they are dedicated to the timely approval of safety
plans and that their oversight will not impede railroads from
meeting the deadline. However, railroads report that their time
frames are based on a quick turnaround from FRA; if quick
turnaround does not occur, it could further delay PTC
implementation.\20\
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\19\ The PTC safety plan must include information about planned
procedures for testing the system during and after installation, as
well as information about safety hazards and risks the system will
address, among other requirements.
\20\ Railroads have developed common portions of the safety plan
and submitted drafts to FRA for preliminary review to expedite final
review. This way FRA staff will be familiar with portions of the plan
that are common across plans before the finalized plan is submitted.
Based on our work to date, it appears that commuter railroads face
these same PTC implementation challenges as well as others. First,
because commuter railroads are generally using the PTC systems
developed by freight railroads and Amtrak, they are captive in many
respects to the pace of development of these entities and have few
means to influence implementation schedules. In addition, commuter
railroads also face challenges in funding PTC implementation due to the
overall lack of federal, state, and local funding available to make
investments in commuter rail. According to the American Public
Transportation Association, PTC implementation will cost commuter
railroads a minimum of $2 billion. Commuter railroads are non-profit,
public operations that are funded by passenger fares and contributions
from federal, state, and local sources. Economic challenges such as the
recession have eroded state and local revenue sources that
traditionally support commuter rail capital expenses, and competing
expenses such as state of good repair upgrades, leaving the commuter
railroads limited in their funding to implement PTC.
Finally, commuter railroads report that obtaining radio frequency
spectrum--essential for PTC communications--can be a lengthy and
difficult process.\21\ The FCC has directed commuter railroads to
secure spectrum on the secondary market.\22\ According to the FCC,
spectrum is available in the secondary market to meet PTC needs.\23\
While freight railroads have secured most of the spectrum needed for
PTC implementation, commuter railroads have reported difficulty
acquiring spectrum in the 220 MHz band, which is required to operate
the data radios that communicate information between PTC
components.\24\ In particular, railroad officials have said that
obtaining spectrum is a critical challenge in high density urban areas.
Based on our preliminary work, without acquiring sufficient spectrum,
railroads may be unable to adequately test their PTC systems,
potentially causing further delays in meeting the 2015 PTC
deadline.\25\
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\21\ Radio frequency spectrum is the medium for wireless
communications and supports a vast array of commercial and governmental
services. Commercial entities use spectrum to provide a variety of
wireless services, including mobile voice and data, paging, broadcast
television and radio, and satellite services.
\22\ Secondary market policies and rules allow spectrum permit
licensees to share their spectrum resource through spectrum lease
arrangements. Users negotiate their own terms for sharing spectrum and
FCC tracks these secondary market transactions. For more information on
spectrum markets, see Spectrum Management: Incentives, Opportunities,
and Testing Needed to Enhance Spectrum Sharing, GAO-13-7 (Washington,
D.C.: November 2013).
\23\ Presentation to the National Transportation Safety Board.
``Positive Train Control: Is it on Track?'' FCC, February 27, 2013.
\24\ Seven freight railroads (Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific,
BNSF, CSX Transportation, Canadian National, Canadian Pacific, and
Kansas City Southern) together comprise PTC 220 LLC, a company that
owns spectrum licenses. According to a PTC 220 LLC representative,
these seven freight railroads will lease spectrum from PTC 220 LLC and
will lease spectrum to other railroads based on availability for a fee.
\25\ Amtrak officials also report that securing spectrum has been a
major challenge in PTC implementation for them and has led to
implementation delays.
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Our work to date also indicates that by attempting to implement PTC
by the 2015 deadline, railroads may be making choices that could
introduce financial and operational risks to PTC implementation.
Representatives from freight railroads and FRA told us railroads will
not compromise the safety functions of the PTC system and will ensure
that PTC is implemented meeting RSIA requirements. However, freight
railroad representatives also told us that they compressed time frames
and undertook processes in parallel rather than sequentially--
potentially increasing the financial and operational risk of PTC
implementation. For example, railroads took a ``double touch'' approach
to equipping locomotives, which involves taking locomotives out of
service twice in order to begin installation while software was being
developed.\26\ Railroad representatives told us this approach is more
expensive than installing the equipment once after the software is
fully developed, as it involves more labor hours and more time that
locomotives are offline rather than in operation. In addition,
representatives from all freight railroads we spoke to expressed
concern regarding the reliability of PTC and noted the importance of
field testing as much as necessary to identify and correct problems.
These representatives noted that without adequate testing, PTC systems
could potentially malfunction or fail more frequently, causing system
disruptions. FRA officials also expressed concern that if pressured to
meet the 2015 deadline, railroads may rush through field testing and
potentially implement a PTC system that is not entirely reliable
leading to operational inefficiencies through slower trains or
congestion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Double touch'' installation refers to partially installing
groundwork equipment on thousands of locomotives, which will later need
to be taken out of service to install the remaining equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its August 2012 report to Congress, FRA identified areas for
consideration in the event that Congress chooses to amend RSIA.
Specifically, FRA requested the authority to extend the deadline for
certain rail lines, grant provisional certification of PTC systems and
approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of PTC.\27\
FRA officials told us these authorities could enable them to conduct
oversight more effectively by acknowledging the current state of PTC
implementation and better manage FRA's limited resources. Although to
date there are few details on how these authorities would be applied,
according to FRA officials, these authorities could assist in better
managing resources allowing the agency to oversee and manage PTC
implementation past the current deadline of December 31, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ According to FRA, this would allow a railroad to apply for
provisional certification to operate a PTC system pending final
submission, review, and approval of the railroad's safety plan by FRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on our preliminary work, it appears unlikely that PTC will be
implemented by more than a few railroads by the December 31, 2015,
deadline. As we have discussed, PTC implementation is a massive,
complex, and expensive undertaking--with valid challenges to meeting
the deadline. However, although most railroads will not meet the PTC
deadline, it does not necessarily suggest that they have not made a
concerted effort to make progress in the implementation of PTC.
Railroads and FRA both report continuing to search for ways to speed
progress while maintaining safe rail operations in order to achieve
complete deployment as soon as possible. Nonetheless, given the state
of PTC technology and the myriad of PTC components that are required to
work seamlessly in order for PTC to work reliably, concerns regarding
the potential risks railroads may be taking in attempting to meet the
deadline should be considered. Accordingly, FRA has requested
authorities that could provide railroads the flexibility they need to
successfully implement PTC.
Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the
Committee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I am happy to respond to
any questions that you may have at this time.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Ms. Fleming, for calling
attention to the array of potential dangers, in terms of rail
safety, and, in particular, the succession problem, which is a
major challenge for this industry. A lot of people have
observed on it.
And, Administrator Szabo, thank you for also highlighting
the need to be concerned about the safety of the folks who work
on our railroads.
And with that in mind, let me begin by asking Chairman
Hersman, if this shunt had been used at the time that Robert
Luden was working in West Haven, and a rail traffic controller
in New York returned to service the track on which he was
working, would his life had been saved?
Ms. Hersman. We believe if the shunt had been used
properly, that both the controller in New York and a train
trying to enter that track would have received an indication
that that track block was occupied.
Senator Blumenthal. And the train, therefore, would have
been stopped?
Ms. Hersman. Yes, we expect that those redundant safety
measures could have saved that track worker's life.
Senator Blumenthal. And that is the reason that you have
recommended in the past that this kind of system, which by the
way, I think costs about $200; am I right about that?
Ms. Hersman. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. You have recommended that it be adopted
by Metro-North and other railroads around the country?
Ms. Hersman. That is right. MBTA experienced several worker
fatalities in Woburn, Massachusetts when a shunt was not used,
despite having shunting policies. The track was inappropriately
released, a train entered that track, killing the track
workers.
Some railroads do use shunts, and we have recommended that
all of them do it.
Senator Blumenthal. And you have with you, do you not, the
inspection report that was done on May 15, 2 days before the
May 17 collision?
Ms. Hersman. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Blumenthal. I would like to ask you to submit your
copy for the record. You were very kind in providing me with a
copy.
And if there is no objection, I will ask that it be made a
part of the record.
[The information requested follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Blumenthal. Chairman Hersman, as you look at this
report, calling your attention to the line that you pointed out
to me yesterday when we discussed it, that makes reference to
track 4, catenary 734, could you read that, so folks here can
know what it says exactly?
Ms. Hersman. There is a handwritten notation on this page,
under insulated joints, frogs and switches, that says ``track
4, catenary 734, insulated joint, hanging ties, pumping under
load.''
Senator Blumenthal. And if I understand correctly, I am
going to try to put it in layman's terms, essentially, the tie
was insufficiently supported. And, therefore, the track was
unstable, so that the joint linking the two tracks at their
connection was weakened by repeated travel over the track. And
very likely, the cause of the derailment was eventually the
splitting of that rail, when the joint failed to work properly.
Is that correct?
Ms. Hersman. The joint joins two separate sections of rail
that are already separate. It is the joint bars that join those
two sections of track. The hanging ties indicates that the rail
and the ties were unsupported underneath, with insufficient
ballast. And that concern, when they saw loads going over that
section of track, the pumping that they describe, is that
flexing that is occurring at the joint over and over again as
the train wheels pass over that section of track, creating,
certainly, a risk area and unstable condition.
The NTSB identified the point of derailment at that
location. We are examining those fractured joint bars in the
rail in our lab now.
Senator Blumenthal. So if I said to you, my view is that
this defect caused the derailment, you wouldn't disagree with
me, would you?
Ms. Hersman. At the NTSB, we conduct a very thorough
investigation, and we ensure that we gather all of the facts
before we reach any conclusions.
Yesterday, the NTSB held a Board Meeting on an accident
that occurred in Oklahoma about one year ago, and this
investigation contained facts relevant to the probable cause
that were not revealed until months into the investigation.
When we first went on scene in this investigation, we knew
a crew had run a red signal, but we did not know why. When we
looked at their medical records, they had passed the required
vision and hearing tests, but we dug deeper to see if there was
something else that we should understand about this.
We issued requests for his medical records, and we found
that this engineer, in the 33 months prior to the accident, had
12 procedures on his eyes and over 50 visits to eye care
providers. We did not get that from U.P. in the beginning of
the investigation. But about halfway through from his
optometrist, ophthalmologist, and physician, we were able to
get this.
We had a locomotive engineer who was colorblind and whose
visual acuity would not pass the tests. He could not see the
signals.
Two years before the crash, he had told his eye doctors
that he could not see train signals.
In the end, our probable cause for that accident was based
on his inability to see those signals. But we also defined, in
our investigation, that the vision testing standards that
currently exist, testing vision and hearing every 3 years, are
not adequate. They are not consistent with what we see in the
medical standards required for pilots, for mariners, and for
truck drivers. We recommended changes that we would like to see
the FRA and the railroads make.
Our investigations do take a long time before we reach a
probable cause, but the parties involved in an investigation
can take action at any time to address safety issues.
Metro-North and FRA can move immediately on the things we
are finding today, and the NTSB can issue urgent
recommendations, as we did in the West Haven accident.
Senator Blumenthal. Don't you think your report and final
conclusions ought to be done more quickly than 18 months after
the May 17 and May 27 accidents?
Ms. Hersman. Senator, I absolutely believe that we would
like to have them done sooner. The reality is that, due to our
workload, we simply cannot complete everything.
I know you have two accidents. Senator Blunt, you have one
that we are investigating.
We have about 20 investigators in our rail pipeline and
hazardous materials division, and they are handling 11
concurrent rail accidents. Some of those investigators traveled
straight from one accident site last month to another. They are
handling multiple investigations at the same time.
Our work requires us to take a look at a lot of different
factors and really develop comprehensive solutions.
Through our party process, we do make sure that people have
information to act on quickly. Metro-North and FRA are parties
to the investigation, and they can act on safety issues at any
time.
Just last week, I met with Metro-North. They are working to
address over 200 of those joints on their property during the
summer, to put them in a better state of safety.
These improvements should take place immediately, and we
support parties taking those actions.
Senator Blumenthal. I am going to turn to Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Mr. Szabo, Ms. Fleming said that on positive train control,
if I heard her comments correctly, and I guess I could have
checked the testimony, but I didn't, I think as I made notes
here that PTC components were not available at this point, that
field testing had not been done yet in an adequate way, that
you had limited capacity to review what was happening, and the
frequency to communicate had not been obtained yet. I guess I
have a couple questions. One is, what have I left out of that
list? And two is, do you think, based on those factors, it is
workable to get there industrywide by 2015?
Mr. Szabo. If you go back and take a look at the report
that we provided to Congress last fall, it really articulates
the range of challenges that the industry has in meeting full
PTC deployment by December 31, 2015.
And I think that is the key word there, full deployment. We
absolutely believe that partial deployment can and will be
achieved. But between the availability of spectrum; the
availability of radios; the ability to get the technology
necessary to set up back offices; the fact that the entire
industry, as well as my agency sometimes, are competing for a
very limited pool of expertise in implementing, there is no
question that there are challenges that are going to be a
roadblock to full deployment.
I think Chairwoman Hersman said it well, that should
Congress consider an extension? What we recommended in our
report was that FRA be given limited flexibility to, in
essence, extend on a case-by-case basis. It should not be a
blanket extension.
We really have to find this appropriate balance between
keeping feet to the fire for expeditious implementation while
also making sure that we allow the appropriate amount of time
to ensure that it is done safely and reliably. And that is the
challenge.
And so we would like to have the ability to actually weigh
that due diligence. Actually, the terms that the chairwoman
used was accountability for actions or the lack of actions on
implementation, to actually be able to measure that as we
determine what type of extension might be necessary on a case-
by-case basis.
Senator Blunt. But your view is that case-by-case extension
made by your agency would be what you would prefer to see
happen?
Mr. Szabo. You know, again, it is part of ensuring that
balance between timely implementation while also making sure
that it is done safely and reliably.
Senator Blunt. Do you have an estimate of cost of what this
system--some of the notes I have here is over $10 billion, some
say $12 billion. What is your----
Mr. Szabo. I can provide it to you for the record, but you
are in the right range. It is a significant cost. It presents a
challenge for the commuter industry.
Senator Blunt. Have you had any discussions with the
Federal Communications Commission about this, the spectrum, and
the permitting? And how would you characterize those
discussions?
Mr. Szabo. Yes, we have been having conversations with FCC
on both of those, spectrum availability as well as the need to
find a much better approach to siting these antennas.
I would call the conversation on spectrum availability
considerably more of a challenge. FCC is conflicted in their
mandate between the need to ensure resources are used
efficiently, government resources used efficiently, and the
need, from their perspective, to not give it away, vs. what we
believe is a legitimate public safety issue, in particular for
the commuter agencies and public agencies.
I think the conversations relative to siting the antennas
are in a much better place, that there is a clear recognition
now of the urgency of finding an alternative means, given the
fact that there are some 22,000 antennas that need to be sited,
and FCC's traditional process sites about 2,000 a year.
And, in particular, given that the vast majority of these,
better than 95 percent, I believe, by one estimate, are just
stick antennas that have minimal obstruction, minimal
environmental impact, that perhaps we can find a way to be much
more expeditious in siting those as we work through an
alternative approach on the bigger antennas that may have some
environmental issues.
Senator Blunt. Ms. Hersman, this is just to clarify for me,
you mentioned I think one head-on collision where a train
derailed, and 20 seconds later, another train hit it.
Do I have that 20 seconds right?
Ms. Hersman. Actually, in that one, there was a train that
derailed, and it was struck by another train that was on a
different track from the train that derailed.
Senator Blunt. Headed in the opposite direction on a
different track that they would have passed, right?
Ms. Hersman. That is right. If the train had been upright,
they would have passed each other. But the train was not
upright and was fouling the track area, as the other train was
passing through.
Senator Blunt. I am just assuming that no system could
totally prevent that, that you are going to have trains that
pass each other in opposite directions, and at some second
interval, no system is going to stop a train from derailing
that does not get hit by the train that is approaching it? I am
not sure how many seconds that would be, but 20--no system
prevents that.
But train maintenance, track maintenance, and other things
go a long way toward anticipating it, and equipment
maintenance. But not a system, am I right, in thinking that?
Ms. Hersman. Absolutely. Attention to track and a
maintenance could have prevented the initial derailment. This
is not an accident that would have been prevented by positive
train control. But I will tell you that the engineer on the
oncoming train saved a lot of lives. He threw the train into
emergency and was able to get it slowed down to 23 mph when the
collision occurred.
Senator Blumenthal saw firsthand the incredible damage,
even at 23 mph. There would have been much more damage and
potential lives lost if the train had not been slowed.
Human beings are still very good at making decisions in
unusual situations. And in this case, the engineer could see
the threat ahead and stop the train.
Senator Blunt. Right, but nothing in positive train control
would stop----
Ms. Hersman. No, sir, this was not----
Senator Blunt.--trains from passing each other on opposite
tracks at the same time, obviously, or you would not have a
system that worked.
Ms. Hersman. Right. That is true.
Senator Blunt. You said in your testimony that some rail
operators have already complied, or will have complied by 2015.
You want to tell me what you are saying there?
Ms. Hersman. Yes. We held a forum in February about the
status of positive train control implementation. We heard from
a number of witnesses. We asked the FRA who they thought would
comply by the 2015 deadline. We were told that four operators
would likely meet the 2015 deadline: Amtrak, Metrolink, Alaska
Railroad and BNSF freight line.
Senator Blunt. So, Ms. Fleming, in the case of all the sort
of obstacles, there would be ways around all those obstacles
for at least some people by 2015? The equipment availability,
the testing, the FRA capacity, you think there is a way around
that?
Ms. Fleming. I think that Metrolink and BNSF are unique
examples, in the sense that because of the accident, they were
able to hit the ground running. BNSF has been using and testing
PTC for decades, and so they have been on the forefront of
that. Metrolink, right after the accident, really moved forward
on that.
And one or both of them basically is not waiting for the
first generation back-office server and is in fact purchasing
their own and doing things a little bit differently than some
of the other railroads are. So they have made a conscious
effort to put the money into it.
Amtrak, it's our understanding that they will be in
compliance with Michigan and the Northeast corridor, but they
do not have the financial resources to actually equip their
locomotives. So again, that is more of a partial 2015
implementation.
Senator Blunt. Thank you. I will probably have more
questions for the record.
Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. We can also do a second round, a brief
second round of questions, for this panel, because it is a very
important panel.
I'm going to call on Senator Johnson.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Szabo, the FRA, do you do Pareto analysis, Pareto
charts, on the causation? Or maybe NTSB, do you do that
analysis of what is the primary cause of these accidents?
Mr. Szabo. We do very deep root-cause analysis. In fact, if
you take a look at the 43 percent reduction in accidents we
have had over the past decade, it has been by aggressively
using the data, the accident data that is available, to be much
more strategic in coming up with our solutions.
Senator Johnson. Can you tell us the top five categories of
causes of rail accidents?
Mr. Szabo. From the broadest standpoint, the number one
risk area would be human factors. Second would be track-caused.
And combined, those two probably are the chief causation for
about 72 percent of all railroad accidents.
So, so much of our efforts over the last 5 years have been
on drilling down on human factors and track causation, because
we believe that gives us the biggest opportunity for continuous
safety improvement.
Senator Johnson. I have heard the word resources used a
couple times. I believe Ms. Fleming said limited resources,
which is true.
Does anybody have the information in terms of how much
capital expenditure per year is available to the industry? How
much do they spend on capital improvements?
Mr. Szabo. We can get you that for the record. Perhaps Ed
Hamberger on the second panel would be able to address that for
the class I railroads, for the private railroads. And certainly
we can get it to you for Amtrak and try to get it on the
commuter railroads. But it is substantial.
Senator Johnson. OK. There was an interesting article, a
column written by George Will on May 31, 2013 I would like to
enter into the record.
[The information requested follows:]
``A mandate that is off the rails''
By George F. Will
WASHINGTON--Texting while driving is dangerous, especially if you
are driving a train. A commuter train engineer was texting on Sept. 12,
2008, near Los Angeles, when he missed a stop signal and crashed into a
freight train. Twenty-five people died.
Congress supposedly is incapable of acting quickly, and we are
supposed to regret this. In 2008, however, Congress acted with
dispatch. We should regret that it did. Herewith another lesson about
the costs of the regulatory state, especially when it is excited, eager
to make a gesture, and propelled by an uninformed consensus.
On Jan. 6, 2005, nine people had been killed in Graniteville, S.C.,
by chlorine gas leaking from a derailed freight train, but Congress did
not spring into action. In 2008, however, California's 53-person
congressional delegation was 12 percent of the House, and 24 percent of
a House majority. So in less than a month after the commuter train
collision, Congress, with scant opposition from railroads, and without
meaningful cost-benefit analyses, passed legislation requiring most
railroads to implement, by 2015, Positive Train Control (PTC), a
technology to stop trains by overriding some human mistakes.
So far, railroads have spent more than $2.7 billion on a system
estimated to cost $10 billion to $14 billion--plus perhaps $1 billion
in annual maintenance. PTC has not been installed, partly because it is
not sufficiently developed. CSX Corp., which includes railroads among
its assets, says the railroad industry is the Nation's most capital-
intensive--and the $11 billion combined capital investments of all U.S.
railroads in 2010 were approximately equal to the cost of PTC. The 2015
mandate will not be met.
The Federal Railroad Administration estimates that were PTC to be
installed on thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of miles of
track, it would prevent perhaps 2 percent of the approximately 2,000
collisions and derailments, preventing seven deaths and 22 injuries
annually. But because a dollar spent on X cannot be spent on Y, the PTC
mandate must mean the sacrifice of other investments crucial to
railroad safety (and efficiency).
Before returning to Harvard Law School, Cass Sunstein was Barack
Obama's administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, measuring the benefits of regulations against their costs.
Testifying to a House subcommittee on Jan. 26, 2011, Sunstein was asked
if he could identify an administration regulation whose ``benefits have
not justified the cost.'' He replied:
``There is only one big one that comes to mind. It is called
Positive Train Control, and it is a statutory requirement, and
the Department of Transportation had to issue it as a matter of
law even though the monetizable benefits are lower than the
monetizable costs. There aren't a lot like that.''
Concerning Sunstein's sanguine conclusion, skepticism is permitted.
Wayne Crews of the Competitive Enterprise Institute has recently
published his ``Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the
Federal Regulatory State.'' This year's 20th-anniversary edition notes
that regulation, the ``hidden tax,'' costs almost $2 trillion not
counted among the official Federal outlays. Using mostly government
data, Crews concludes:
The cost of regulations ($1.806 trillion) is now more than half
the size of the Federal budget and 11.6 percent of GDP. This
costs $14,768 per U.S. household, equal to 23 percent of the
average household income of $63,685. Regulatory compliance
costs exceed the combined sum of income taxes paid by
corporations ($237 billion) and individuals ($1.165 trillion).
Then add $61 billion in on-budget spending by agencies that
administer regulations.
Crews' ``Anti-Democracy Index'' measures ``the ratio of regulations
issued by agencies relative to laws passed by Congress.'' In 2012, the
index was 29, meaning that 29 times more regulations were issued by
agencies than there were laws passed by Congress. ``This disparity,''
Crews writes, ``highlights a substantial delegation of lawmaking power
to unelected agency officials.''
Congress relishes such delegation of lawmaking because
responsibility is time-consuming and potentially hazardous politically.
Hence the Senate refuses to pass legislation the House passed in 2011
to require Congress to vote approval of any ``major'' regulation,
defined as any with an economic impact of $100 million or more. If
Congress were more clearly responsible for burdening the economy with
such regulations, it would be less likely to pass them as sincerity
gestures.
Internal Revenue Service misbehavior in the regulation of political
advocacy, combined with the imminent expansion of the IRS to enable it
to administer the coercions that are Obamacare, is sensitizing
Americans to some of the costs of the regulatory state. There are many
others, hidden but huge.
George Will's e-mail address is [email protected].
Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
Senator Johnson. He is talking about positive train
control. The number he is using is that so far the railroads
have spent about $2.7 billion on it. They are estimating
somewhere between $10 billion and $14 billion of CapEx, about
$1 billion per year in annual maintenance. He is listing that,
in 2010, the total capital investment of the railroads is about
$11 billion.
He is also, in this article, saying that Cass Sunstein, who
was the former administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, when he was testifying before Congress,
talked about positive train control in this way, he said that
it is a statutory requirement of the Department of
Transportation issued as a matter of law, even though monetized
benefits are lower than monetized costs. He said there are not
a lot like that.
So, I guess, with limited resources, I guess I just kind of
want to get your evaluation, as much as we all love the concept
of that, are we devoting too many resources, and are we
imposing that too quickly? I mean, earlier in the column, he
said this was really passed a month after a train accident in
California, very rapid response by Congress.
Did we think that thing through well enough? And are we
really demanding the railroads put too much money toward this
one, again, potentially lifesaving and very wonderful
technology, but is that at the expense of other potentially
more beneficial technologies or capital expenditures on other
safety areas?
Mr. Szabo. There is no question that PTC is a game changer
in safety for the industry.
When I talk about human factors being the number one
causation for roughly 40 percent of all railroad accidents,
that is exactly what PTC is designed to prevent.
And so we have to recognize the tremendous safety benefits.
It will, without question, drive down accident rates and lead
to that continuous safety improvement. But we also have to be
smart about how we implement it.
And that is why we are looking to see it implemented as
expeditiously as possible while ensuring that it is done safely
and reliably.
There is a balancing act here, Senator, and we have to make
sure that we achieve it, that if we force deployment without
having the chance to work the kinks out, we do run the risk of
actually making the industry, on a short-term basis, less safe,
as well as gumming up capacity.
And so there is a lot that has to be balanced to make sure
that it is done right, while also being done expeditiously.
Senator Johnson. Do you disagree with Cass Sunstein's
characterization that the monetized benefits are lower than the
monetized costs?
Mr. Szabo. No, he has the actual figures there. But again,
this was a congressional mandate. So our job was to implement
what Congress required of us, and do it in the most cost-
effective way possible.
Senator Johnson. So again, you are not disputing the fact
that this is going to cost more than the benefit, which is not
a real good sign for Federal regulation.
And the problem with that is that it is going to cost
money, it's going to spend limited resources that may be spent
better elsewhere. That is my question.
Mr. Szabo. I do not dispute the numbers that are in the
calculation there. They are our numbers. My economists came up
with those numbers.
But I will also say, in regulations of this nature, there
are always benefits we believe that are not adequately
measured.
Let's not dismiss the game-changing impact PTC can have on
railroads.
Senator Johnson. Again, I am always concerned about
unintended consequences. And the unintended consequence I am
concerned about here is money spent on PTC not getting very
good bang for the buck, relatively. Could that money be spent
better elsewhere?
That is really what I was talking about with the Pareto
analysis, in terms of directing those dollars spent in
different areas.
I am just asking, what other areas would we be spending
that money on, had you not been directed by Congress to spend
it in PTC?
Do you understand the question? I will open it up to
anybody who would like to respond to that. Are there other
areas that the industry would rather spend the money on to
improve safety that might be more effective, that might
actually have a better benefit than the cost?
Mr. Szabo. I think the question would be better answered by
the industry. But certainly, from our perspective, driving down
human factors has to be first and foremost in our minds from a
safety regime.
Senator Johnson. Ms. Hersman, do you have anything to add
to that?
Ms. Hersman. Well, I would certainly defer to the industry
to share what they would invest in otherwise.
But I will say this is a technology that we have
recommended since the 1970s. It is a technology that the
Federal Government has been funding through pilot programs for
decades. And we know that there will be more accidents that PTC
would prevent.
We are investigating accidents right now that could have
been prevented by PTC.
PTC prevents the most catastrophic accidents, the ones
where you have loss of life. And yes, you are right, I think
the last straw that finally triggered congressional action was
the Metrolink accident that killed 25 in Southern California.
We had a texting locomotive engineer who ran a red signal. It
was a PTC preventable accident.
But we also would like to see PTC prevent accidents that
result in major hazmat releases and evacuations from
communities, and the things that are the most catastrophic. We
know that PTC is the solution to these catastrophic accidents.
It is expensive, but it is important.
Senator Johnson. Could you just name the one area that you
might spend money on next then? If this is number one, what
would be the number two?
Ms. Hersman. I would agree with Administrator Szabo. When I
look at the 11 investigations that we have ongoing right now,
they basically break down into human factors and track.
And so improving rail infrastructure, that is also an issue
that the NTSB has focused on. We have 10 items on our most
wanted list of transportation safety improvements. PTC is one
of them, but so is maintaining the integrity of our nation's
infrastructure.
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Ms. Fleming. May I add a comment?
Senator Johnson. Sure.
Ms. Fleming. I think one thing that we are not talking
about here is reducing highway rail grade crossing and
trespasser accidents. And actually, if you look at that, it has
obviously gone down as well, but it is actually a higher
percentage of overall accidents and fatalities. And it is
something that is difficult to address, but it really involves
working with multiple stakeholders. But it is something that
really has to be tackled.
So I think when you think of rail safety, you have to
really address it on a number of fronts.
Technology, I think, PTC is very promising. Our point is
that it has to be installed in a way that ensures that the
system functions as intended and is reliable. Our work has
shown that there are a number of interrelated challenges that
also pose risk and should be considered.
And I think other things, other technologies hold promise
as well.
So from our perspective, we can't overlook reducing highway
rail grade crossings and trespasser accidents, and really make
sure that PTC is ready for prime time.
Senator Johnson. Can I just ask, what makes for the most
dangerous rail crossing? Is it just traffic flow? Is there one
big cause there?
Ms. Fleming. I would probably defer to Administrator Szabo
or Ms. Hersman. But I think, obviously, if you have a high
traffic area, that certainly poses a risk. But I am probably
not the best person to answer that.
Mr. Szabo. I do not know if there is one definitive risk
that drives grade crossing accidents. I mean, more than 50
percent of them occur at grade crossings that are fully
protected with gates and flashing lights and bells.
Really, we are trying to advance the position that the
safest grade crossing is one that does not exist at all. And we
really need to take a look at a more systematic approach. We
proposed in our budget proposal eliminating grade crossings,
strategic placement of overpasses and underpasses. And this
advances safety for the rail network, for vehicles, for
pedestrians, and improves the fluidity of traffic for all of
the above also.
But the fundamentals in grade crossing safety come back to
three Es: education, enforcement, and engineering. And so we
need to continue to engineer improvements. We need to continue
to work with local communities to enforce the laws that are in
place. And we need to continue to work with educating drivers
to not put themselves at risk by illegally trespassing through
a crossing.
Senator Johnson. Thank you very much.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. In talking about PTC, and I know that
before I arrived, you discussed it with Senator Blunt, about a
case-by-case basis extension. To quote you in your last answer,
you said that we have to be careful that we do not make it less
safe and gumming up capacity.
Aren't you a little bit worried that, rather than just
biting the bullet and acknowledging that we are not going to be
ready to roll this out in a way that is sound and safe and
universal, that you are going to get a piecemeal approach that
could do exactly what you indicated you are worried about
doing, which is making it less safe and gumming up capacity?
Mr. Szabo. Senator, obviously, we have responsibility to
ensure that does not happen. Believe me, a lot of people are
doing a lot of good work in making significant progress.
And so the approach that we are proposing is to make sure
that we find that right balance between ensuring that good
progress continues to be made, that people are making that
legitimate effort while also recognizing the challenges that
are there, the risk to not getting it right, and making sure
that the appropriate amount of time is provided for those
tweaks that are necessary to ensure we get it right.
Senator McCaskill. I think I kind of get it. You want and
not let----
Mr. Szabo. There cannot be a full ride.
Senator McCaskill. You don't want to let the pressure off
of getting this done.
Mr. Szabo. Right.
Senator McCaskill. I get that. You want to ``hold their
feet to the fire'' to push. But my sense is that everyone is
really working on this and trying to make this happen. And this
is just one of those areas, we see it with available technology
and capacity in many other areas that the Federal Government
tries to influence in terms of rules and regulations.
Do you get a sense that anybody is dragging their feet on
this?
Mr. Szabo. For the most part, I think the effort is there,
in that due diligence is being applied. But we need to make
sure that we do not create an environment where people feel
that there is a free out, and that that effort can be reduced.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I hope that you can do that in a
way that does not lead to this case-by-case basis. Because
first of all, case-by-case basis, whenever you do a case-by-
case basis with the Federal Government, you are talking about
something that is hard on its face, because that means each
individual company has to figure out the Rubik's cube of how do
they get the extension. And the amount of time, energy, and
resources that goes into figuring that out, when if a really
thorough look at the efforts that are being made and the
timetable that is reasonable would indicate that maybe 2015 is
not the right moment in time to say everybody has to be
compliant, maybe it is 2016, but with maybe some way you can
have a--forcing them to show you, which I think they are doing
now. Aren't they showing you the progress as it goes along?
Mr. Szabo. Well, they have implementation plans, which we
have reviewed and approved. But actually, we do believe that we
can very systematically achieve this case-by-case approach that
we are talking about by working with each one of the carriers
on the amendments to their implementation plan. Since each one
has already had to develop one now, all right, let's go back
and do the assessment of where they are at, what are the very
specific challenges that each railroad is facing, because while
many of them are the same, some are different. And then work
with them to make an amendment in each case to their
implementation plans, and manage it accordingly.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I think we obviously need to
continue oversight in that way. And if you manage case-by-case
basis without any byzantine bureaucratic problems, then we have
got to somehow lift you up and celebrate you in this town,
because I am not sure that a case-by-case basis is music to the
ears of anybody who is regulated by the Federal Government. So
hopefully we can accomplish that.
I would also like to talk about the train horn rule. I
promised one of my colleagues who is not on this committee that
has strong feelings about this, Senator Bennet from Colorado,
that I would inquire about this.
I know that there is a workaround for communities for quiet
zones, but can you talk a little bit about the flexibility on
those workarounds and whether or not we have embraced
sufficient flexibility where we obviously are protecting
safety, but obviously the horn thing is a huge problem for many
communities that are ``bedroom communities.''
And what is being required of them in terms of a
workaround, I think, in some instances may be slightly too
onerous, but I am certainly willing and open to hear your views
on it.
Mr. Szabo. No, thank you for that question, because it is a
great one. And as I said at the opening, I would like to remind
you, I am a former mayor of what was a railroad community, two
major rail yards, five railroads slicing through town. So I
have lived both as a citizen as well as a municipal leader
these challenges on a daily basis.
We are open to the utmost, highest level of flexibility,
provided that an equivalent level of safety can be achieved.
And that is the goal. That is all we need, is that good science
be applied to show that whatever creative approach a community
is choosing to use will generate an equivalent or superior
level of safety.
There is no question, if you take a look at the statistics,
that the whistleblower regulation has worked, how significantly
grade crossing accidents have come down since my agency
implemented that regulation about a decade ago.
So we are here today talking about a tragic grade crossing
accident in Baltimore. So we need to make sure that, you bet,
we will provide flexibility. Our goal is to be performance-
based in our approach to safety. What we care about is the
outcome, not telling you that you must do it this one and only
way.
Senator McCaskill. OK, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Thune?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the
hearing today. We are here because we have had a lot of rail
accidents of late, and that has brought additional attention to
the importance of rail safety. And I want to thank our
witnesses, both this panel and the one to follow, for coming
today to tell us about some of the lessons we can learn from
these accidents.
I think it is important to look at the overall context of
the rail industry over a long period of time. If you look since
the passage of Staggers back in 1980, where the industry was
partially deregulated, the train accident rate has fallen by 76
percent. So there has been a lot of progress made, a lot of
gains made.
The railroads also last year invested $25 billion--I think
somebody was asking a question earlier--in capital
improvements. These are investments that help keep the railroad
system safe, and ensure the efficient movement of freight
throughout our country, which is something that many of us who
represent states who are dependent upon railroads to move
freight are very interested in.
And I think it is important that we, as a Congress, be
careful not to impose undue regulation on the railroad
industry, especially if these regulations force the railroads
to spend money that might otherwise be used for needed
infrastructure improvements.
I have been and continue to be especially concerned about
the subject that my colleagues are talking about today, and
that is the mandate that freight railroads and passenger rail
lines install PTC technology by December of 2015. I think that
is an overly aggressive timeline that railroads are going to
have a very difficult time meeting for a number of reasons.
In order to implement PTC by the date mandated, they are
going to have to defer more pressing maintenance and
infrastructure improvements.
So I hope to introduce legislation in the coming weeks,
along with others, that will reasonably extend the deadline for
PTC implementation. I think we need to have additional
flexibility for the railroads, if we truly want to see PTC
systems installed in a manner that recognizes the technological
challenges that currently exist for wide adoption and ensures
that other necessary safety measures are not sidelined.
So I guess I would count myself among those who have
expressed concern about that mandate and what it is going to
mean in terms of overall safety and the investment that could
be made in other areas. So I appreciate the insights that you
all are sharing with us today.
And I guess I would like to ask, if I might, one question,
and it has kind of been touched on in different ways today, Mr.
Chairman. But this whole issue of case-by-case analysis vs. a
sort of a blanket extension, there was a 5-year extension
proposed in the House. The Senate had proposed allowing FRA to
approve PTC extensions on a case-by-case basis.
And, Mr. Szabo, I am interested in knowing, if the FRA were
to consider extensions on a case-by-case basis, based on the
technological, financial, and logistical challenges that would
be associated with that, how long would it likely take FRA to
consider an application and to make a decision?
Mr. Szabo. You mean to get through our process?
Senator Thune. Right.
Mr. Szabo. Assuming all information was complete, we
believe that we could have it done in 30 to 45 days.
Senator Thune. And how much would you have to devote in
terms of resources? Is that a resource-intensive process?
Mr. Szabo. Well, it certainly consumes resources, but in
our 2014 budget request, we are comfortable that we have
requested the personnel necessary to execute our entire safety
regime, which would include implementation of PTC.
Senator Thune. Well, if I might just express a concern that
has already been raised here, and that is there is not a high
level of confidence, I would argue, right now, particularly,
with regard to government agencies evaluating these issues on a
case-by-case basis, which has already been alluded to. And it
strikes me, at least, that it would make a lot more sense if we
are talking about doing some sort of an extension for
compliance with this, to do it in a way that recognizes that
all the railroads are going to have to comply with that and do
some sort of a blanket extension.
But again, we certainly welcome your input as we consider
that. And I think it is really important that this be done in
the right way, because if it is not, if it is rushed, I think
it puts, perhaps, people even at greater peril and greater
risk.
Mr. Szabo. Senator, ultimately, Congress acts, and we
execute. So we will execute whatever direction Congress
provides for us.
And I think we are all saying the same thing, that,
ultimately, it is about finding that right balance between
ensuring that this is done expeditiously while also making sure
that it is done in a safe and reliable manner.
So I think we want the same outcome. And it is just a
matter of working through details on how we get there.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Thune.
I have some additional questions, which I am going to ask
now, as part of a brief second round, anyone else who has
additional questions.
But just very briefly, you are not saying, are you,
Administrator Szabo, that you are willing to forgo or abandon
PTC? It is just a question of timing?
Mr. Szabo. Again, ultimately, that decision is made by
Congress. But we believe that this is a game-changing safety
technology. And again, if you take a look at where the biggest
risk is in railroad accidents, it has a significant impact on
safety for the public, as well as rail workers.
Senator Blumenthal. And I want to bring you back, Chairman
Hersman, to the report of December 15. As I read through this
report, I see references to erosion of dirt, the same kind of
weakness in ballast that almost certainly contributed to, if it
did not cause that derailment and collision; the need for new
ties; the need for other kinds of correction and repair on
different parts of that track and neighboring tracks in that
vicinity.
Wouldn't you agree, and you spoke earlier of
infrastructure, bringing it down to the real life, so to speak,
isn't this a searing indictment of the quality of that track?
Ms. Hersman. What this demonstrates is an inspection over
30 miles of track. You have two employees riding in a high rail
vehicle, and they are inspecting four lines, four separate
tracks during a shift. They are identifying the defects that
they have found.
This is certainly indicative of what we see in our
investigations, and I know what the FRA sees in the railway
environment. The track environment is one that is constantly
deteriorating. You have to maintain it. You have to be
vigilant. You have to be on top of it. You have to identify
these defects. You have to put them into your workplan, figure
out how they are going to be addressed. It is important for
them to do inspections.
They are required to do inspections twice a week. Metro-
North told our investigators they were doing them three times a
week.
But yes, you are right. Here we have recorded defects that
are similar to the one that we have identified that was near
the point of derailment. These are all risks, and they need to
be addressed.
And so what we need to understand is, this is one
inspection. The NTSB will look back at all previous
inspections, to see if this is a chronic problem, if it was
dealt with effectively over time, if the fixes were
appropriate, if their prioritization was appropriate, if their
inspection intervals were appropriate for the circumstances.
This document tells us that they did an inspection and
identified a number of defects. We have to understand if the
FRA standards are adequate, or if things need to change and
standards need to be strengthened.
Mr. Szabo. Senator, if I may add, just one comment on that.
To me, my bigger concern as we drill down on this is better
understanding the safety culture that exists on the property.
And in due time, we will determine for sure whether this was or
was not a violation----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, the safety culture, I do not mean
to interrupt, but the safety culture is a somewhat vague term.
There are FRA standards. And apparently, these defects did not
violate those minimal standards.
Mr. Szabo. And that is my point, Senator. That is actually
the point I am trying to make, that we should not be
approaching this as to whether it meets a minimal standard or
not, but if something is identified that could cause risk, the
culture needs to be that we immediately take the safe course of
action.
Senator Blumenthal. So if these were not violations of
present FRA standards, maybe they should be?
Mr. Szabo. That is possible. In fact, we are not willing to
say yet that it is not a violation.
I know NTSB has drawn that conclusion. We continue to hold
that open.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me----
Ms. Hersman. Just to be clear----
Senator Blumenthal. Yes, Chairman?
Ms. Hersman.--this is Metro-North's position that it did
not rise to the level of an FRA defect. If Metro-North believed
that it had risen to the level of an FRA defect, it would have
been noted on the front of the report that it was to be
repaired immediately.
The NTSB is still investigating. We are providing
commentary on what Metro-North has presented.
Senator Blumenthal. That is a very important point. You may
well find that these defects violated the existing Federal
standards.
Mr. Szabo. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me just close by asking you, Mr.
Szabo, speaking of standards and rules, my understanding is
that the FRA missed deadlines set by law in a number of the 17
rail safety rulemakings that were required by the FRA. In fact,
your agency has yet to finalize nine remaining rules, that two
out of the five compliance manuals have been completed, but
three remain outstanding to be done, and in fact, in the final
rules, the effective date of those rules have sometimes been
postponed.
Can you give us an explanation for the delays and the
failure to meet deadlines?
Mr. Szabo. Sure. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
mandated FRA complete more than 40 rulemakings, major studies,
reports. It also promised us 200 more individuals, and,
ultimately, we were only allowed to hire 31 of those 200.
But with more than 40 major rulemakings, reports, studies,
we had to prioritize and try to work through them in a
systematic order in approaching those first that we felt would
have the most significant impact on safety, the greatest
impact, the most immediate effect on safety.
So obviously, positive train control was made the highest
priority and consumed the majority of our resources.
So we have continued to work down that list in a systematic
manner. I look forward to completing the remaining work that is
outstanding.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I know you do not disagree
that meeting those Federal deadlines is important.
Mr. Szabo. It is always important.
Senator Blumenthal. Not just because it is the law, but it
is important to the rail workers as well as passengers and
businesses that depend on the reliability and safety of freight
transportation.
I want to thank all of this panel. I have additional
questions that I am going to be submitting for the record. I do
not want to keep both my colleagues and our next panel waiting,
but I do want to just close by thanking all of the dedicated
people who work for you in your agencies.
I have worked, for example, with the NTSB folks who came to
Connecticut in the wake of that collision and derailment, and I
know how much time they put in and how promptly they responded.
So thank you very much for your testimony, and thanks for
the work that your agencies are doing. Thank you.
We will follow with the next panel. Let me welcome our next
panel, equally distinguished and important, and say to you,
thank you for being here.
First of all, let me introduce Ed Hamberger, who is
President and CEO of the Association of American Railroads
based here in Washington, D.C. Mr. Hamberger joined AAR in July
1998. He was a Managing Partner in the office of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell, and he came to that firm in
1989 after serving as Assistant Secretary for Governmental
Affairs at the Department of Transportation.
He began his career in transportation in 1977 as General
Counsel of the National Transportation Policy Study Commission.
And in 1985, he was appointed as a member of the private sector
advisory panel on infrastructure financing. And in 1994, he
served as a member of the Presidential Commission on Intermodal
Transportation. He has served on a variety of public service
assignments. For example, he serves on a blue ribbon panel of
transportation experts appointed by the National Surface
Transportation Policy and Revenue Study.
He received his juris doctorate and both master of science
and bachelor of science in foreign service from Georgetown
University.
Kathryn Waters is Executive Vice President for Member
Services at the American Public Transportation Association. She
came to APTA in November 2007 from the Maryland Transit
Administration in Baltimore, where she was Senior Deputy
Administrator and responsible for all public transit operations
departments, as well as the transit police.
She has more than 25 years of experience in the transit and
railroad industry, serving in positions of leadership,
including vice president of commuter rail and railroad
management with the Dallas Area Rapid Transit District. She
worked for 20 years with MTA's MARC train service.
Before joining the APTA staff, she chaired the APTA
commuter rail committee and was Vice Chair of commuter and
inner-city rail on APTA's executive committee. She too has been
cited with numerous industry awards and recognition.
And we welcome you here, Ms. Waters.
Mr. James Stem is National Legislative Director of the
transportation division, International Association of Sheet
Metal Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers. His railroad
career began in 1966 as a trainman for the Seaboard Air Line
Railroad in Raleigh, and he joined the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen. He has worked as a trainman, switchman, hostler,
helper, fireman, locomotive engineer, and he currently holds
seniority as a locomotive engineer on CSX between Richmond,
Virginia, and Abbeville, South Carolina.
He became interested in the union movement and became
active in Local 1129 in Raleigh. He worked part-time as a
special UTU organizer from 1973 through 1976, and was elected
Secretary-Treasurer of Local 1129 in 1975. He also held the
elected position of local Chairman and Legislative
Representative, and has served as a delegate to five UTU
international conventions from 1979 to 1995.
I want to extend a particular welcome to our next witness,
Jim Redeker. He is Commissioner of Connecticut's Department of
Transportation, and he has a long and distinguished career in
transportation, most particularly, beginning with his career in
the New Jersey Transportation Department. In 1978, he joined NJ
Transit when it was first created. The following year he helped
to build NJ Transit into the third-largest transit agency in
the country.
In 30 years since, he has held positions of increasing
responsibility. His portfolio of experience includes strategic
planning and policy, capital programming, transportation
planning, transit service planning and scheduling, and many
other areas of expertise and experience. But perhaps most
prominently, and importantly, he has served with extraordinary
dedication and success as the Commissioner of Transportation
for Connecticut. He has pioneered and championed with great
vision and courage new means of transit and new developments
and investment in our Connecticut railroads and other areas of
transit in Connecticut.
He has been a very strong environmental steward, as well as
a champion of better, cleaner, more efficient transportation in
Connecticut, and has worked closely with me and other
officials, members of our delegation and other State officials.
And I thank Commissioner Redeker for joining us today and
bringing to us the firsthand experience that he has had with
some of the problems that we have been discussing with the
earlier panel.
And to Michelle Teel, also a very hearty welcome. She is
now head of the Missouri Department of Transportation's
multimodal division. She has worked at Missouri DOT for 15
years and most recently as the local program's administrator
for the design division, and assistant director of the motor
carrier services division.
In her new capacity, Ms. Teel will oversee the division
responsible for administering State and Federal programs that
fund and support aviation, railroads, transit, waterways, and
freight development.
She has a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from
Washington University in St. Louis and a master's degree in
business administration from the William Woods University in
Fulton. And she is a licensed professional engineer and also a
certified professional traffic operations engineer.
We welcome all of you and will begin with Mr. Hamberger.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here on behalf of members of the Association
of American Railroads.
For our members, commitment to safety is job number one. It
is not only good business, but it is the right thing to do, and
we are committed to making sure that each of our 200,000
employees gets home after their shift safely every day.
And in fact, our record is good and getting better. 2012
was the safest year on record, and that exceeded the previous
safest year on record of 2011, which itself exceeded the
previous safest year on record of 2010.
According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
railroads today have lower employee injury rates than other
transportation modes and most other industries, including
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction.
Available data also indicate that U.S. railroads are safer
than most major foreign railroads.
One of the reasons, and Senator Johnson put your finger on
it, is the amount of money that we invest back into the
infrastructure, $25 billion this year and $25 billion last
year, $.40 of every dollar of private sector money back into
the infrastructure.
Now, what does that mean? In the last 5 years, we bought
22,669 new state-of-the-art locomotives. We have installed
nearly 77 million new crossties, 2.9 million tons of new rail,
and poured nearly 61 million cubic yards of ballast.
And I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that the very foundation
of rail safety is a network that is well-maintained. And if we
did not believe that before, the testimony from the NTSB today
certainly underscores that a well-maintained network is a safer
network.
Another product of industry investment is the development
of trackside instruments and inspection vehicles that traverse
over the rail. These use technologies such as acoustics, radar,
machine vision, lasers, optical geometry to identify safety
issues in the track, on the wheels, and on the axles as the
cars go by.
Many of these technological advances have been incorporated
into the rail industries' equipment health monitoring
initiative. It is a predictive and proactive maintenance system
designed to detect and report potential safety problems and
poorly performing equipment before they result in accidents or
damage.
As an aside, Mr. Chairman, much of this work is being done
at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado,
which is a research center the AAR runs under contract to the
FRA. And the center has just been hired by Metro-North to help
them develop track inspection procedures, so we are pleased to
be able to bring our expertise to bear.
Let me turn to the technology that we have been talking
about today, positive train control. Such a system requires
highly complex technologies able to analyze and incorporate a
large number of variables that affect train operations. A
simple example: the length of time it takes to stop a train,
what we affectionately call the breaking algorithm, depends on
train speed, terrain, the weight and length of the train, the
number and distribution of locomotives, the number of loaded or
empty freight cars on the train, and other factors. This system
must be able to take all these factors into account
automatically, reliably, and accurately, and be able to do it
across every operating railroad company, including passenger
and freight.
PTC development implementation includes a daunting array of
tasks that railroads must perform and technologies that must be
developed.
I agree with both Chairwoman Hersman and Administrator
Szabo, this must be a transparent process. And that is why last
year, both APTA and the AAR submitted a white paper on the
progress to date and the work yet to be done. As part of my
testimony today, we have submitted an update as to where we are
by railroad, what needs to be done by year.
We want to be transparent, but we do believe that while
there will be some PTC in operation by 2015, 60,000 miles,
22,000 locomotives, the interoperability will not be
achievable. Therefore, we are asking Congress to consider a
straight 3-year extension from December 31, 2015, to December
31, 2018. I agree with Senator McCaskill and Senator Thune,
this cannot be done piecemeal.
We are a network. One-third or more of our traffic
intertwines between two railroads on any given day. We operate
with commuter rail, Amtrak. This must be something we can
depend on, some certainty in a 3-year extension.
Beyond that, I think there could be some authority given to
the Department of Transportation to extend, if something that
we do not know about pops up. And so that would be something
that the Department of Transportation could do for a year or
two.
And additionally, to ensure that railroads can operate
safely and efficiently with the PTC system, the imposition of
PTC-related operational requirements and associated penalties
should be deferred until all PTC systems are fully integrated
and testing has been completed.
My last point, Mr. Chairman, and I will make it brief, the
FCC and PTC antennas, I know Mr. Blunt brought that up with the
first panel and with Mr. Wheeler yesterday at his confirmation
hearing. We appreciate you putting that on his radar screen. We
are meeting with the FCC and FRA over the next couple days. We
hope to be able to resolve that so we can go forward. But right
now, we are under a stop order to not install any of the 22,000
antennas yet to be installed.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions,
and I apologize for running a minute late.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss rail safety. AAR freight
railroad members, which include the seven large U.S. Class I railroads
as well as approximately 170 short line and regional railroads, account
for the vast majority of freight railroad mileage, employees, and
traffic in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Amtrak and several
commuter railroads are also members of the AAR. In my testimony below,
I will discuss several important topics associated with rail safety,
ways that railroads are working to advance safety in those areas, and
steps that we believe policymakers should take to promote rail safety.
Overview of Rail Safety
It's important to note at the outset that for our nation's freight
and passenger railroads, pursuing safe operations is an absolute
imperative. It makes business sense and it's the right thing to do.
Through massive private investments in safety-enhancing infrastructure,
equipment, and technology; cooperative efforts with rail labor,
suppliers, customers, communities, and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA); extensive employee training; and cutting-edge
research and development, railroads are at the forefront of advancing
safety.
The rail industry's strong and pervasive commitment to safety is
reflected in its excellent safety record. In fact, 2012 was the safest
year ever for America's railroads, breaking the previous record set in
2011. From 1980 to 2012, the train accident rate fell 80 percent, the
rail employee injury rate fell 85 percent, and the grade crossing
collision rate fell 82 percent. Since 2000, the declines have been 44
percent, 51 percent, and 45 percent, respectively, indicating that rail
safety continues to improve. 2012 saw record lows in each of these
categories.
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According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, railroads
today have lower employee injury rates than other transportation modes
(including trucks, inland water transportation, and airlines) and most
other major industries, including agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
and construction. Available data also indicate that U.S. railroads have
employee injury rates well below those of most major foreign railroads.
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Virtually every aspect of rail operations is subject to strict
safety oversight by the FRA. Among many other areas, railroads are
subject to FRA regulation regarding track and equipment inspections;
employee certification; allowable operating speeds; and the
capabilities and performance of signaling systems. Hundreds of FRA
personnel perform regular inspections of rail facilities and operations
throughout the country. In many states, FRA safety inspectors are
supplemented by state safety inspectors. Railroads are also subject to
safety oversight by additional Federal agencies, including the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and the Department of
Homeland Security.
A Healthy Balance Sheet is Important to Safety
A commitment to safety demonstrated day in and day out in the
workplace is critical to promoting safety. Railroads have this
commitment. That said, a financially viable railroad is in a much
better position to invest in safety enhancements and risk reduction
strategies than a financially challenged railroad.
In recent years, railroads have been reinvesting more private
capital than ever before in their infrastructure and equipment,
including a record $25.5 billion in 2012. From 2008 to 2012, Class I
railroads purchased 2,669 new state-of-the-art locomotives and rebuilt
another 845 locomotives to improve their capabilities. Over the same
time period, railroads installed nearly 77 million new crossties,
installed 2.9 million tons of new rail, and placed nearly 61 million
cubic yards of ballast. In addition, as described later in this
testimony, railroads in recent years have devoted substantial resources
to developing and implementing innovative new technologies. These
investments have made railroads much safer. In fact, as the charts
below show, there is a clear correlation between rail reinvestments and
rail safety improvements.
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Positive Train Control
The term ``positive train control'' (PTC) describes technologies
designed to automatically stop or slow a train before certain accidents
caused by human error occur. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
(RSIA) requires passenger railroads and U.S. Class I freight railroads
to install PTC by the end of 2015 on main lines used to transport
passengers or toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) materials.\1\ Specifically, PTC
as mandated by Congress must be designed to prevent train-to-train
collisions; derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized
incursions by trains onto sections of track where maintenance
activities are taking place; and the movement of a train through a
track switch left in the wrong position.\2\
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\1\ TIH materials are gases or liquids, such as chlorine and
anhydrous ammonia that are especially hazardous if released into the
atmosphere.
\2\ A switch is equipment that controls the path of trains where
two sets of track diverge.
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Unprecedented Technological Challenge
Positive train control is an unprecedented technological challenge.
A properly functioning, fully interoperable PTC system must be able to
determine the precise location, direction, and speed of trains; warn
train operators of potential problems; and take immediate action if the
operator does not respond to the warning provided by the PTC system.
For example, if a train operator fails to begin stopping a train before
a stop signal or slowing down for a speed-restricted area, the PTC
system would apply the brakes automatically before the train passed the
stop signal or entered the speed-restricted area.
Such a system requires highly complex technologies able to analyze
and incorporate the huge number of variables that affect train
operations. A simple example: the length of time it takes to stop a
train depends on train speed, terrain, the weight and length of the
train, the number and distribution of locomotives and loaded and empty
freight cars on the train, and other factors. A PTC system must be able
to take all of these factors into account automatically, reliably, and
accurately to safely stop the train.
PTC development and implementation includes a daunting array of
tasks that railroads must perform, including:
A complete physical survey and highly precise geo-mapping of
the 60,000 miles of railroad right-of-way on which PTC
technology will be installed, including geo-mapping of nearly
474,000 field assets (mileposts, curves, grade crossings,
switches, signals, and much more) along that right of way.
Installing PTC technology on approximately 22,000
locomotives.
Installing approximately 36,000 ``wayside interface units''
(WIU) that provide the mechanism for transmitting information
to locomotives and the train dispatching office from signal and
switch locations along the right of way.
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Installing PTC technology on nearly 4,800 switches in non-
signaled territory and completing more than 12,300 signal
replacement projects at locations where the existing signal
equipment cannot accommodate PTC technology.
Developing, producing, and deploying a new radio system and
new radios specifically designed for the massive data
transmission requirements of PTC at 4,200 base stations, 33,700
trackside locations, and on approximately 22,000 locomotives.
Developing back office systems and upgrading dispatching
software to incorporate the data and precision required for PTC
systems.
Installing more than 20,000 new antenna structures
nationwide to transmit PTC signals.
Freight railroads have enlisted massive resources to meet the PTC
mandate. They've retained more than 2,200 additional signal system
personnel to implement PTC, and to date have collectively spent
approximately $3 billion of their own funds on PTC development and
deployment. Class I freight railroads expect to spend an additional $5
billion before development and installation is complete. Currently, the
estimated total cost to freight railroads for PTC development and
deployment is around $8 billion, with hundreds of millions of
additional dollars needed each year after that to maintain the system.
Despite railroads' best efforts, due to PTC's complexity and the
enormity of the implementation task--and the fact that much of the
technology PTC requires simply did not exist when the PTC mandate was
passed and has been required to be developed from scratch--much work
remains to be done. Most of the effort to date has been directed toward
development, deployment, and initial testing of technology that can
meet the requirements of the legislation and which can be scaled to the
huge requirements of a national system.
The task is made particularly complex by the need to ensure that
PTC systems are fully interoperable \3\ across all of the Nation's
major railroads, and that the many potential failure points and failure
modes in PTC systems are identified, isolated, and corrected--all
without negatively affecting the safe movement of freight and
passengers by rail throughout the country. In addition, the FRA must
review each railroad's PTC safety plan and certify the railroads' PTC
systems after the development and testing of the components are
complete. Only then can a fully operable PTC installation be completed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Interoperability means that the PTC system on any railroad's
locomotives can seamlessly interface with the systems of any other
railroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FCC and PTC Antennas
Railroads also face non-technological barriers to timely PTC
implementation. One such challenge that railroads are struggling to
overcome right now involves regulatory barriers to the construction of
antenna structures.
As part of PTC implementation, railroads must install tens of
thousands of new antenna structures nationwide to transmit PTC signals.
Approximately 97 percent of these structures will be relatively small
poles, between 6 and 60 feet high, installed on railroad rights-of-way
alongside railroad tracks. The remainder, approximately three percent,
will be larger base stations similar to traditional telecommunication
towers. Depending on the location, these larger structures may or may
not be located on a railroad's right-of-way.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains that all PTC
antenna structures, regardless of their size or location on the right-
of-way, are subject to the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)
and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). The FCC's current
interpretation of its rules implementing these acts would subject every
PTC antenna structure to a separate environmental evaluation process at
the FCC. Depending on the outcome of this evaluation, a more
comprehensive environmental assessment (EA) might be required.
According to the FCC, as part of each environmental evaluation,
railroads must provide certain information on each antenna structure
(height, location, etc.) to historic preservation officers within state
governments and Native American tribes (depending on where the antenna
structure will be installed) so that the state or tribe can determine
if the installation will negatively impact areas of historic, cultural
or religious significance. Notice of the construction must even be
provided to tribes that do not currently reside along the railroad
right-of-way but who have previously expressed interest in the county
in which the antenna structure will be installed.
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On May 15 of this year, representatives of the railroads met with
FCC staff to discuss the PTC antenna issue. The railroad
representatives explained why the FCC's current approval process is
unworkable for a deployment on the scale of PTC in the time-frame
mandated by the RSIA and FRA's rules. Meanwhile, the FCC staff stated
that railroads should not construct any antenna structures for PTC that
have not gone through the complete environmental evaluation process,
including tribal notice, while they consider ways to streamline the
state and tribal approval processes. The railroad industry, the FRA,
and the FCC are consulting to try to find a workable solution that will
protect the interests of Native American tribes and allow the timely
deployment of PTC. While the AAR is hopeful that a solution can be
found, today construction of antenna structures is on hold. If our
efforts with the FCC and the FRA cannot reach a workable solution to
avoid antenna-by-antenna review, the timeline for ultimate deployment
of PTC will be delayed.
Pending FRA Regulations
There are important PTC regulatory issues that are unresolved. For
example, the current rules inadvertently subject yard movements over
PTC-equipped main line track to PTC requirements. There are a number of
technical and operational reasons making PTC impractical for yard
movements. It was never anticipated that yard movements would be
subject to PTC and doing so would adversely affect the efficiency of
rail transportation. Another issue concerns en route failures of
locomotives equipped with PTC. The current regulations impose
operational restrictions so severe that, again, the fluidity of the
rail network would be drastically impaired, despite the existence of
the underlying safety systems and additional safety precautions that
could be put in place. Finally, the regulations purport to exempt lines
where there are very small amounts of TIH traffic and no passenger
traffic, but the de minimis regulations are constructed so that they
fail to achieve this objective. It is important to resolve these issues
and AAR appreciates that FRA is considering them in a current
rulemaking proceeding.
Extending the Statutory Deadline
In addition to the challenges presented by both the FCC and FRA
issues, another critical variable to the successful implementation of a
nationwide PTC network is the question of the proper operation of the
system. Does the system work? To effectively answer this question,
railroads will need adequate time to ensure that PTC works as intended
and that the systems are communicating accurately. The industry
believes it can achieve the objectives of the mandate with an
implementation schedule that allows the technology to be developed as
well as tested and proven so the safety and operational efficiency of
the Nation's rail system are not put at risk.
Freight railroads will continue to aggressively pursue the
implementation, activation and testing of PTC systems. However, due to
both technological and non-technological uncertainties associated with
the development and installation of PTC, it is a challenge to identify
an exact date of completion of all necessary components to ensure the
successful implementation of an interoperable system. Critical aspects
include, but are not limited to, the testing and activation of PTC
systems.
Consequently, the current PTC implementation deadline mandated by
the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 should be extended by at least
three years from December 31, 2015, to December 31, 2018. Given the
unprecedented nature of PTC and the uncertainties--both known and
unknown--flexibility beyond December of 2018 should also be addressed,
with the authority for that flexibility residing with the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation. Additionally, in order to ensure that
railroads can operate safely and efficiently with the PTC system, the
imposition of PTC-related operational requirements and associated
penalties should be deferred until all PTC systems are fully integrated
and testing has been completed.
Railroads have been working extremely hard to meet the 2015
deadline. While the deadline for completion is important, ensuring that
the testing and development of PTC proceeds appropriately is paramount.
The intent and the goal is to ensure a new system that enhances safety.
A December 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office
supports this view. The GAO noted that ``implementing an immature
system to meet the deadline could pose serious safety risks,'' and that
``[i]dentifying and mitigating risks sooner, rather than later, would
better ensure a reliable PTC system can be fully implemented to provide
the intended safety benefits of this technology without resulting in
unintended consequences.'' \4\
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\4\ Government Accountability Office, ``Rail Safety: Federal
Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the Successful
Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology,'' Report No. GAO-11-133,
December 2010. The quotes are from pages 22 and 46, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an August 2012 report, the FRA confirmed that, ``Given the
current state of development and availability of the required hardware
and software, along with deployment considerations, most railroads will
likely not be able to complete full RSIA-required implementation of PTC
by December 31, 2015.'' \5\ The FRA report notes that PTC
implementation on the scale required by the RSIA has never been
attempted anywhere in the world.
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\5\ Federal Railroad Administration, ``Positive Train Control:
Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts,'' August 2012, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For a more thorough analysis and understanding of freight rail
industry efforts, implementation progress, and existing challenges, the
Association of American Railroads' 2013 report, PTC Implementation: The
Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the Entire Nationwide Network
by the 2015 Deadline, is included as ``Attachment A.''
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings and Trespassers
Collisions at grade crossings, along with incidents involving
trespassers on railroad rights-of-way, are critical safety problems.
These two categories typically account for more than 95 percent of
rail-related fatalities. Although these incidents usually arise from
factors that are largely outside of railroad control, and even though
highway-rail crossing warning devices are properly considered motor
vehicle warning devices there for the benefit of motorists, not trains,
railroads are committed to efforts aimed at further reducing the
frequency of crossing and trespasser incidents.
Much success has already been achieved. From 1980 through 2012, the
number of grade crossing collisions fell 82 percent; injuries
associated with collisions fell 76 percent; and fatalities fell 72
percent. Since 2000, the declines have been 44 percent, 24 percent, and
45 percent, respectively, indicating that grade crossing safety
continues to improve. The grade crossing collision rate has fallen
nearly every year since 1980; from 1980 through 2012, it fell 82
percent. And because total exposure (train-miles multiplied by motor
vehicle-miles) has risen sharply over time, the reduction in crossing
incidents and casualties per unit of exposure has been even higher.
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America's freight railroads spend hundreds of millions of dollars
each year to maintain and improve grade crossings. They also:
Cooperate with state agencies to install and upgrade warning
devices and signals, and bear the cost of maintaining them in
perpetuity.
Help pay to close unneeded crossings.
Support Operation Lifesaver, a nationwide non-profit
organization that educates the public about the need for proper
behavior at grade crossings and on railroad property.
Work with law enforcement and others to keep grade crossings
safe.
Solicit assistance from the public. In June 2012, the FRA
issued a final rule requiring railroads to install signs at
grade crossings with telephone numbers the public can use to
alert railroads to unsafe conditions.
Under the Federal ``Section 130'' program, $220 million in Federal
funds are divided among the states each year for installing new active
warning devices, upgrading existing devices, and improving grade
crossing surfaces. Several years ago, FRA noted that the Section 130
program ``has helped prevent over 10,500 fatalities and 51,000 nonfatal
injuries.'' Those figures are surely much higher now.
Without a budgetary set-aside like the Section 130 program, grade
crossing needs would fare poorly in competition with more traditional
highway needs such as highway construction and maintenance. Indeed, one
of the primary reasons the Section 130 program was created in the first
place was that highway safety--and especially grade crossing safety--
traditionally received low funding priority. The surface transportation
bill signed into law on July 6, 2012 will continue dedicated funding
for this important program for two more years and will mean more
injuries averted and more lives saved.
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The vast majority of grade crossing collisions are the result of
motorists' actions. Consequently, grade crossing accidents can best be
reduced through a mix of education, engineering, and enforcement.
An organization that deserves special commendation for its efforts
to educate the public about the dangers of grade crossings and
trespassing on railroad rights-of-way is Operation Lifesaver. Operation
Lifesaver--a non-profit whose mantra is ``look, listen, and live''--
started in Idaho in 1972 and now has chapters in the 48 contiguous
states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. Operation Lifesaver's
presenters, many of whom are current or retired rail industry
employees, have provided free safety presentations to millions of
Americans, including school children, driver's education students,
business leaders, truck drivers, and bus drivers. I urge you to
generously fund this important educational organization. Railroads also
believe that grade crossing safety should be part of commercial
driver's license educational curricula.
Education alone is not enough to reduce the number of tragic grade
crossing accidents. Engineering and enforcement actions are also
critical. Railroads support research regarding the effectiveness of
innovative types of warning devices, such as four quadrant gates.
Because maximum safety can be realized if crossings are eliminated, the
closing of crossings (and, where appropriate, grade separation) is the
ultimate engineering improvement. In that regard, we recommend that
Congress consider measures that would help incentivize grade crossing
closures. Finally, there should be tough penalties for grade crossing
traffic violations.
Grade crossing safety is only part of the public safety challenge.
Trespassing is another area of concern. It is an unfortunate reality
that too many people inappropriately use railroad property for short
cuts, recreation, or other purposes, sometimes with tragic results.
Railroads are engaged in ongoing efforts with Operation Lifesaver and
others to educate the public that, for their own safety, they should
stay off rail property.
The Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Rail
Although many types of chemicals pose little or no threat to anyone
or anything, some chemicals are classified as hazardous. Depending on
the year, U.S. railroads transport around 1.8 million carloads of
hazardous materials. ``Toxic inhalation hazard'' (TIH) materials--gases
or liquids, such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, that are especially
hazardous if released into the atmosphere--are a subset of hazardous
materials. In 2010 (the most recent year for which data have been
tabulated), U.S. railroads carried some 77,000 TIH carloads. Hazardous
materials accounted for 6 percent of rail carloads in 2010; TIH
materials accounted for 0.3 percent.
The rail hazmat safety record is excellent. In 2010, 99.998 percent
of rail hazmat shipments reached their destination without a release
caused by a train accident. Rail hazmat accident rates are down 91
percent since 1980 and 38 percent since 2000.
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In fact, railroads are the safest mode for transporting hazmat.
Railroads and trucks have roughly equal hazmat ton-mileage, but
railroads have only about 5 percent of the hazmat incidents that trucks
have. In other words, trucks are about 20 times more likely to have a
hazmat incident than a train. Since 1982, railroads have incurred 15
fatalities due to hazmat transport; trucks have incurred 113.
Railroads and tank car builders are taking concrete steps to make
chemical and hazmat transportation safer and more reliable. For
example, they are enhancing tank car safety. Nearly half of all
chemicals, and nearly all TIH materials, are transported in tank cars.
Tank cars built today are vastly improved over earlier generations of
tank cars, with higher grade steel, better thermal protection, improved
valves and fittings, often thicker tanks, and many other improvements.
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The industry committee responsible for establishing tank car design
standards has adopted a proposal that will enhance the robustness of
tank cars that carry TIH materials. That standard was the basis of a
recent FRA rulemaking on TIH tank cars. Another proposed industry
standard addresses ways to make petroleum and ethanol cars safer.
The railroad industry is also a key partner in the ``Advanced Tank
Car Collaborative Research Program'' (ATCCRP), a cooperative effort
involving the railroads, shippers (represented by the American
Chemistry Council, the Fertilizer Institute, and the Chlorine
Institute), tank car builders and owners (represented by the Railway
Supply Institute), and several U.S. and Canadian government agencies.
The program is sponsoring cutting-edge research aimed at further
improving TIH tank car safety.
In addition, railroads work cooperatively with various Federal
agencies--including the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), the FRA, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)--to help ensure safe and secure rail transport. For example:
FEMA, FRA, PHMSA, TSA, and the railroads have jointly
developed the Rail Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS), a
sophisticated statistical routing model designed to ensure that
TIH materials are transported on routes that pose the least
overall safety and security risk. The model uses a minimum of
27 risk factors to assess the safety and security of rail
routes, including hazmat volume, trip length, population
density along the route, and emergency response capability.
When transporting TIH materials, railroads must use the routes
deemed safest and most secure by the routing model.
Railroads follow stringent TSA ``chain of custody''
requirements for rail cars carrying TIH materials. Transfer of
TIH cars from a shipper to a railroad, from one railroad to
another, and from a railroad to a receiver must be carefully
documented. Rail cars carrying TIH materials cannot be left
unattended while in certain high-threat urban areas.
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TSA regulations require railroads to track TIH shipments.
Within five minutes following a TSA request, railroads must be
able to identify the location of a particular tank car carrying
TIH. Within a half hour, railroads must be able to report the
location of all TIH tank cars currently on the rail network.
PHMSA requires railroads to develop and implement security
plans that include an assessment of security risks for hazmat
shipments; background vetting and training of employees who
work in hazmat transport; measures to restrict unauthorized
access to hazmat cars; and coordination with shippers and
receivers to minimize the duration of storage in transit.
Railroads equip train dispatchers and crews with information
about hazmat on individual trains and detailed emergency
response information. In addition, railroads maintain contact
lists for local emergency response agencies.
Railroads provide hazmat awareness training to all employees
who are involved in hazmat transportation. Employees
responsible for emergency hazmat response efforts receive far
more in-depth training.
Rail industry personnel are in constant communication with
the TSA, other agencies within DHS, the Department of Defense,
DOT, the FBI, and state and local law enforcement agencies to
share intelligence and security information.
More than 25 years ago, the AAR established what is now the
Security and Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC), a
world-class facility that is part of TTCI in Pueblo, Colorado.
The SERTC has provided in-depth hazmat emergency response
training to more than 40,000 emergency responders and railroad
and chemical industry employees.
The rail transport of crude oil, which is considered a hazardous
material, has been the subject of much discussion lately. Over the past
couple of years, technological advances, along with relatively high
crude oil prices, have led to sharply higher U.S. crude oil production.
Historically, most crude oil has moved from production areas to
refineries by pipeline. However, much of the recent increases in crude
oil output has moved by rail. In 2008, U.S. freight railroads
originated just 9,500 carloads of crude oil. In 2012, they originated
nearly 234,000 carloads. Based on the approximately 97,000 rail
carloads of crude oil in the first quarter of this year, more than
400,000 carloads are possible in 2013. Today, railroads transport
approximately 10 percent of U.S. crude oil production, up from a
miniscule percentage just a few years ago.
Railroads have an excellent crude oil safety record. Based on data
from PHMSA, the ``spill rate'' for railroads from 2002-2012 was just
2.2 gallons per million crude oil ton-miles generated. The fact is,
both pipelines and railroads are safe, reliable ways to transport crude
oil. Each enhances our energy security and benefits consumers.
Safety-Enhancing Technologies
At a very basic level, railroading today seems similar to
railroading 150 years ago: it still consists of steel wheels traveling
on steel rails. This apparent similarity, however, masks a widespread
application of modern technology and a huge variety of ongoing
initiatives to research, test, and apply advanced technologies to
promote a safer and more efficient railroad environment.
Many of these advancements were developed or refined at the finest
rail research facility in the world: the Transportation Technology
Center, Inc. (TTCI) in Pueblo, Colorado. TTCI is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads. Its 48 miles of
test tracks, highly-sophisticated testing equipment, metallurgy labs,
simulators, and other diagnostic tools are used to test track
structure, evaluate freight car and locomotive performance, assess
component reliability, and much more. The facility is owned by the FRA
but has been operated (under a competitively-bid contract with the FRA)
by TTCI since 1984. TTCI is responsible for all the facility's
operating costs and some capital costs. We extend a standing invitation
to all members of this committee and others in Congress to visit TTCI
and see firsthand the tremendous research and emergency response
training that is being done there.
Among many other things, TTCI has been actively involved in the
rail industry's research and technology development efforts to improve
the performance of track and freight car component designs and
materials. The most significant of these are improved suspension truck
designs, improved maintenance of the wheel-rail interface, wheel
inspection and cleanliness standards, and improved wheel and rail
metallurgy.
In addition, TTCI continues to work with track suppliers and
railroads to test and evaluate wear-and fatigue-resistant rail steels,
innovative special track work and bridge designs, improved tie/fastener
systems, and maintenance practices at its Facility for Accelerated
Service Testing (FAST). As a result of these efforts, derailments
caused by broken rails have decreased significantly over the past ten
years.
A few of the many other examples of new safety-enhancing rail
technologies developed in recent years or now being developed include:
Wayside detectors identify defects on passing rail cars,
including overheated bearings and damaged wheels, dragging
hoses, deteriorating bearings, cracked wheels, and excessively
high and wide loads.
Trackside acoustic detector systems use ``acoustic
signatures'' to evaluate the sound of internal bearings to
identify those nearing failure. These systems supplement or
replace systems that measure the heat bearings generate to
identify those in the process of failing.
Rail defect detector cars detect internal flaws in rails
which are caused by fatigue and impurities introduced during
manufacturing. A prototype of an advanced system dubbed the
``phased-array'' rail inspection system is being developed and
tested at TTCI to detect hard-to-find internal rail defects.
Advanced track geometry cars use sophisticated electronic
and optical instruments to inspect track alignment, gauge,
curvature, and other track conditions. A new system called the
``vehicle track interaction system'' is also used to locate
difficult-to-find track geometry defects. This information
helps railroads determine when track needs maintenance.
Ground-penetrating radar is being used to help identify
problems below the ground (such as excessive water penetration
and deteriorated ballast) that hinder track stability.
Because a relatively small percentage of freight cars causes
an inordinately high percentage of track damage and have a
higher than usual propensity to derail, TTCI is working on ways
to use optical geometry detectors to identify poorly performing
freight trucks.\6\
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\6\ In terms of rail cars, ``truck'' refers to the complete four-
wheel assembly that supports the car body.
New automated detector systems are being tested and
evaluated at TTCI to inspect the under carriage, safety
appliances and truck components using machine-vision-based car
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inspection systems.
Railroads are expanding their use of advanced communications
systems. For example, the Integrated Railway Remote Information
Service (InteRRIS), an advanced Internet database with wide
potential applicability, was developed at TTCI. An early
project using InteRRIS collects data from wheel impact load
detector systems (which identify wheel defects by measuring the
force generated by wheels on tracks) and detectors that monitor
the undercarriage of rail cars (which identify structural
defects or missing components such as key fasteners). InteRRIS
processes the information to produce vehicle condition reports.
Many of these technological advances have been incorporated in the
rail industry's Equipment Health Monitoring Initiative, a predictive
and proactive maintenance system designed to detect and report
potential safety problems and poorly performing equipment before they
result in accidents or damage. In addition to reliably detecting cars
that exhibit high levels of stress and reduce derailments, one of the
purposes of EHMS is to work with freight car owners to develop
efficient methods to proactively maintain the freight car fleet and
keep out-of-service time to a minimum.
Rail industry safety will also be enhanced by the Asset Health
Strategic Initiative (AHSI), a multi-year rail industry program
initiated in December 2011 that will apply information technology
solutions and processes to improve the safety and performance of
freight cars and locomotives across North America.
In a nutshell, AHSI aims to improve safety and reduce costs across
the rail industry by addressing mechanical service interruptions,
inspection quality, and yard and shop efficiency. It is based on the
recognition that improving asset health means more than just focusing
on railcar and locomotive repair. Rather, it encompasses the entire
rolling stock health cycle, incorporating prevention, detection,
planning, movement, and repair.
For example, the Comprehensive Equipment Performance Monitoring
(CEPM) program, which is just one part of the AHSI initiative, is a
web-based application that captures data for railcar equipment
components, including repair histories, the mileage the freight cars
incorporating the components have traveled, and the current and past
health status of the equipment. CEPM will make it much easier to track
the health of individual railcar components and will provide crucial
information on the health of entire classes of components, making early
identification of potential safety problems much more likely.
As noted above, in recent years railroads have been reinvesting
more than ever before back into their networks. These investments have
had a pronounced positive impact on asset health and, as a result,
improved safety. However, a strategic focus at the network level--like
that provided by AHSI--will provide more significant returns and
greater efficiencies than furthering incremental or local efforts. AHSI
builds on existing industry capabilities and defect detector systems,
including many of those described above, to provide a more
comprehensive assessment of rail car and locomotive health. It's just
one of many efforts by railroads to harness the power of advanced
technologies for the benefit of their customers, their employees, and
the communities they serve.
Safety and Passenger Rail
In the United States, freight railroads provide the foundation for
most passenger rail. Around 70 percent of the miles traveled by Amtrak
trains are on tracks owned by freight railroads, and dozens of commuter
railroads operate, or plan to operate, at least partially on freight-
owned corridors. In addition, most of the high speed and intercity
passenger rail projects under development nationwide plan to use
freight-owned facilities.
Freight railroads agree that passenger railroading can play a key
role in alleviating highway and airport congestion, decreasing
dependence on foreign oil, reducing pollution, and enhancing mobility.
But safety has to come first when it comes to passenger trains sharing
track or rights-of-way with freight trains. Among other things, this
means that in some cases--depending on train speeds and frequency,
track standards, and other factors--separate tracks for passenger and
freight trains might be needed. AAR believes that safety would be
enhanced if these separate tracks were sufficiently far apart to
minimize the likelihood that a derailment on one track could foul an
adjacent track and lead to a collision involving a freight and
passenger train.
Railroads and Fatigue
Railroads want properly rested crews--it's not in a railroad's best
interest to have employees who are too tired to perform their duties
properly. That's why railroads have long been working to find
innovative, effective solutions to fatigue-related problems. Combating
fatigue in the rail industry is a shared responsibility: employers need
to provide an environment that allows employees to rest during off-duty
hours, and employees must set aside time when off duty to obtain the
rest they need.
Because factors that can result in fatigue are multiple, complex,
and frequently intertwined, there is no single solution, and efforts to
combat fatigue should be based on sound scientific research, not on
anecdotes or isolated events. That's why railroads and their employees
are pursuing a variety of scientifically-based fatigue countermeasures.
Not every countermeasure is appropriate for every railroad, or even for
different parts of the same railroad, because circumstances unique to
each railroad influence the effectiveness and practicality of specific
countermeasures. That said, individual railroads have been using the
following countermeasures (among others) to help combat fatigue:
Increasing the minimum number of hours off duty and
providing more predictable calling assignments and rest
opportunities between shifts.
Focusing, when possible, on returning crews home rather than
lodging them away from home and making away-from-home lodging
more rest-inducing.
Allowing employees to request an extra rest period when they
report off duty if they feel excessively fatigued.
Devising systems (including websites, e-mails, pagers, and
automated telephone systems) to improve communication between
crew callers and employees.
Allowing employees who have been off work more than 72 hours
(e.g., on vacation) to begin their first shift in the morning
rather than at night.
Encouraging confidential sleep disorder screening and
treatment.
Offering fatigue education programs for employees and their
families. Education is critical, since the effectiveness of
fatigue initiatives depends on the actions of employees while
off duty. Employees must make appropriate choices regarding how
they spend their off-duty time, and education is important in
encouraging sound decision making.
Conclusion
Railroads are proud of their safety record, which results from
their recognition of their responsibilities regarding safety and the
enormous resources they devote to its advancement. At the same time,
railroads want rail safety to continue to improve. The rail industry is
always willing to work cooperatively with you, other policymakers, the
FRA, its employees, and others to find practical, effective ways to
make this happen.
Attachment A--Association of American Railroads
PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the
Entire Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline--May 2013 Update
Table of Contents
I. Introduction and Executive Summary
II. PTC Components
A. Locomotives
B. Wayside Technology
C. Switches
D. Communications
E. PTC Back Office
1. Back Office Server
2. Geographical Information System (GIS)
3. Dispatch
III. The Integration Challenge and Testing
IV. The Certification Process Could Take Considerable Time
V. Interoperability: The Current Implementation Schedules Could
Adversely Affect the Reliability and Effectiveness of PTC
A. Phasing in PTC
B. Interoperability Standards
VI. Rolling Out PTC
VII. Conclusion
______
PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the
Entire Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline--May 2013 Update
I. Introduction and Executive Summary
On January 18, 2012, the Association of American Railroads (AAR)
submitted a status paper to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
titled ``PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC
on the Entire Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline'' (``ISP,''
Attachment A). The ISP discussed the challenges faced in developing an
interoperable PTC system and provided detailed data showing the
progress that had been made.\1\ The ISP concluded by stating that a
nationwide, interoperable PTC network cannot be completed by the
December 31, 2015, statutory deadline.
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\1\ This paper is based on information provided by the following
eight railroads, which have to install PTC on routes over which TIH or
passengers, or both TIH and passengers, are transported: the Alaska
Railroad (ARR), BNSF Railway (BNSF), Canadian National (CN), Canadian
Pacific (CP), CSX Transportation (CSX), Kansas City Southern (KCS),
Norfolk Southern (NS), and Union Pacific (UP). passengers, or both TIH
and passengers, are transported: the Alaska Railroad (ARR), BNSF
Railway (BNSF), Canadian National (CN), Canadian Pacific (CP), CSX
Transportation (CSX), Kansas City Southern (KCS), Norfolk Southern
(NS), and Union Pacific (UP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 10, 2012, the American Public Transportation
Association (APTA) filed a companion paper with FRA, concurring with
AAR that a nationwide interoperable PTC network is not achievable by
December 31, 2015. In addition, in August 2012 FRA issued a report to
Congress titled, ``Positive Train Control Implementation Status,
Issues, and Impacts.'' In this report, FRA reached a similar
conclusion, stating, ``[b]ased on the results of this report, FRA
believes that the majority of railroads will not be able to complete
PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline.''
This paper updates the ISP and the tables that were attached to the
ISP.\2\ While enormous challenges remain in regard to developing a
nationwide interoperable PTC system, there were many positive
developments during 2012. These include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ This 2013 Update is intended to be read in conjunction with and
as a supplement to the ISP. Attachment B updates the information in the
various tables that were included in the ISP.
the first Geographical Information System (GIS) subdivision
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
validations with FRA;
the development and manufacture of 220 MHz radios;
significant progress with locomotive installations;
improvements in the availability of Wayside Interface Units
(WIUs);
radio frequency propagation studies of Chicago, Kansas City,
Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis,
Toledo, and other congested metropolitan areas have been
completed or are in progress;
FRA's modification of its regulations that permits railroads
to base PTC installation on projected traffic in 2015;
progress on the PTC Safety Plan that must be submitted to
FRA before a PTC system can be certified; and
FRA's recognition that activation of PTC should proceed from
less complex to more complex areas.
Despite the positive developments in 2012 and the railroads
spending approximately $2.8 billion to date to install PTC, the year
confirmed and increased our understanding of the challenges that remain
to completing a nationwide, interoperable PTC system. The most
significant are:
Wayside implementation continues to be constrained by the
limited number of firms that provide signal design services.
The signal system must still be individually redesigned and
replaced at more than 7,000 locations before PTC wayside
technology can be installed at those locations. Approximately
26,000 WIUs remain to be installed. This work must be
accomplished without compromising signal system safety or the
ability of the railroads to efficiently move the Nation's
freight. Based on current experience and available resources,
it is likely that wayside design and installation will extend
into 2018.
The track database, including critical features such as the
presence of signals and switches, must be validated. The
railroads must ensure that what is displayed to the train crew
via the track database and onboard system reflects what is
shown by railroad signals. It is a time-consuming and labor-
intensive process.
There is limited expertise available to accelerate design
and development. The railroads have been developing expertise
as they build the onboard, wayside, and back office segments.
Core software delivery dates continue to slip, particularly
in connection with the Back Office Server (BOS) for I-ETMS. The
railroads do not expect the final release of core software,
which is necessary before the PTC system can be lab and field
tested, certified, and used in revenue service, until mid-2014.
Full system testing will likely continue into 2015, as will
the need to address issues with PTC components and software
identified by the testing.
Over 75 percent of the industry's employees must receive PTC
training. From the perspective of the employee retaining the
material and understanding its relevance, the optimal time to
train an employee is when PTC is rolled out on the employee's
territory.
Once testing is complete, the limited number of FRA
personnel available to work on PTC must still review each
railroad's individual Safety Plan and certify the PTC system.
While the provisional certification concept advanced by FRA
could reduce the delay associated with certification, even a
provisional certification will require time and review by FRA.
Portions of the PTC regulation are still not final, with
potential changes that could impact the scope of the
implementation effort.
As the potential for failure of individual components became
clear, systems have been designed with more redundancy, thus
lengthening the design process.
PTC cannot be rolled out on an entire railroad all at once.
Implementation of PTC must occur in phases and location by
location, starting with less complex areas and proceeding to
the more operationally complex areas, incorporating lessons
learned at each step.
It is abundantly clear that the railroad industry cannot install
interoperable PTC on the entire nationwide network by the December 31,
2015, deadline.
II. PTC Components
A. Locomotives
Approximately 22,000 locomotives, which constitute most of the
Class I railroads' locomotive fleet, must be equipped with PTC
technology.\3\ The ISP identified several reasons why equipping
locomotives with PTC technology is taking longer than projected in the
railroads' original implementation plans.\4\ However, several of those
challenges were resolved or became less of a concern in 2012:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ All the estimates in this paper are premised on the PTC
regulations in existence on April 1, 2013. The industry has requested
amendments to those regulations that would reduce certain estimates,
including the number of locomotives that would need to be equipped with
PTC.
\4\ ISP at 4.
vendor supply chain issues and capacity have improved and
available hardware (but not software) components are generally
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
being delivered on time;
production of the 220MHz locomotive radio began in 2012; and
hardware design changes necessary to support the messaging
system on some railroads were completed.
These positive developments aided the railroads in making
significant progress on their ``double touch'' strategy for equipping
locomotives in 2012.\5\ Over 3,000 locomotives were equipped or
partially equipped in 2012; over 6,000 locomotives have been equipped
or partially equipped to date. While the good news is that the number
of equipped or partially equipped locomotives continued to climb in
2012, most of these locomotives were only partially equipped and will
have to be cycled back through a shop to complete installation and
perform PTC commissioning tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Double touch'' refers to shopping locomotives twice to equip
them with PTC, partially installing PTC equipment at the first
shopping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A significant development hurdle remains with the development of
the onboard software that runs on the Train Management Computer (TMC)
for the railroads using I-ETMS. The complexity of the software,
combined with the many interfaces with other components of the PTC
system, has resulted in multiple reviews of the design. The delivery
date for this critical software component slipped several times over
the course of 2012 and at the present time there is no delivery date
for the final version of the onboard software. Nevertheless, sufficient
progress has been made so that railroads plan to begin fully equipping
locomotives with all necessary PTC equipment in 2013 rather than
continuing to employ the double touch strategy.
While much work remains to be done in regard to equipping
locomotives, the industry plans to have approximately \3/4\ of the
locomotives required to be equipped with PTC technology fully equipped
by December 31, 2015.\6\
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\6\ See Table 1 in Attachment B.
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B. Wayside Technology
For the reasons described in the ISP, tens of thousands of miles of
existing signal system infrastructure still need to be replaced. As
discussed previously, each of the approximately 12,300 replacement
projects is complicated and lengthy, requiring individual analysis and
design and signal replacements or upgrades before the WIU's can be
installed at these locations.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ISP at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualified signal personnel are needed for design, installation, and
validation, both in the lab and in the field. The limited number of
qualified signal design firms and personnel available to the railroad
industry continues to constrain how quickly railroads can complete the
design, upgrade, installation, and testing required for PTC signal
projects. The railroads have hired over 2,200 signal personnel
specifically for PTC.\8\ However, the great majority of these new hires
provide assistance only with the installation of PTC at wayside
locations, not with the more complicated analysis and design work that
is typically handled by established signal design firms. Personnel
hired for installation work are, of course, limited to performing work
at locations where designs have been completed. Product availability
has improved, although it continues to be a concern along with the
extensive lab and field testing required for these products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Table 2 in Attachment B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these factors, railroads made considerable progress with
installation of wayside technology in 2012. Over 7,000 WIU's were
installed in 2012, bringing the total installed to approximately 9,700.
That leaves approximately 26,000 WIU's of the approximately 36,000
total WIU's needed remaining to be installed.\9\ Similarly,
approximately 3,700 signal replacement projects were completed in 2012,
bringing the total completed to over 5,000. However, that still leaves
over 7,000 of the approximately 12,300 PTC signal replacement projects
identified by the industry to be completed.\10\ The sheer volume and
complexity of this safety-critical work, which impacts the functioning
of railroad signal systems as well as PTC, is one of the most
significant reasons that the railroad industry cannot meet the 2015
deadline. This work is expected to extend into 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Tables 3 and 4 in Attachment B.
\10\ See Table 5 in Attachment B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Switches
Most of the work involved in upgrading switches in non-signaled
territory remains. In analyzing the technology required for switches,
railroads have determined that these will be mostly turnkey solutions
currently under development by several suppliers. In 2012, 227 switches
were equipped with power, bringing the total so equipped to 436; 236
were equipped with WIU's, bringing the total so equipped to 361; and 36
were equipped with switch monitors, bringing the total so equipped to
148. Over 4,400 switches still need to be equipped with power and WIUs,
and approximately 3,400 switch position monitors still need to be
installed.\11\
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\11\ See Table 6 in Attachment B.
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D. Communications
As explained in the ISP, all PTC wayside locations and all PTC-
enabled locomotives must be equipped with a complex, interoperable,
wireless communications infrastructure.\12\ Railroads have created a
private radio frequency network capable of transmitting and receiving
the data necessary to support an interoperable PTC network using
spectrum in the 220 MHz band as the interoperability communications
standard. To date, the seven Class I railroads have invested
approximately $40 million in acquiring and managing 220 MHz spectrum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ISP at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Production quantities of PTC radios were first available in May
2012. Since then, railroads have been procuring and installing them. In
parallel, railroads have undertaken numerous associated activities,
including coverage analyses, site selection, antennae installation, and
upgrading power supplies.
One of the key challenges that has emerged is deploying a national
220 MHz communications network for PTC that includes adequate
coordination between railroads to avoid interference. Various tools are
being developed to help mitigate interference, but this will continue
to be a substantial task.
Some additional complexities associated with the design and
implementation of the communications system became apparent in 2012.
Complete signal wayside design and GIS data and train movement data are
all necessary to properly design the radio network; each of these data
elements must be taken into account to ensure there is adequate
capacity to handle all the data. In addition, as new users roll out
their PTC systems in locations where other railroads are already
testing or using PTC, railroads will likely have to re-engineer their
radio networks to address potential interference and ensure the
additional demand for data can be met. Another issue that has emerged
is the potential for delays associated with the Federal Communications
Commission's environmental rules, including the separate completion of
the environmental and historic preservation processes for each of the
over 20,000 antenna structures required for PTC.
Four railroads have invested approximately $180 million to date in
the development and installation of 220 MHz radios for base stations,
wayside locations, and locomotives, each of which requires a distinct
type of radio. Still, over 3,800 base station radios, over 31,000
wayside radios, and over 21,000 locomotive radios need to be
manufactured and installed.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Table 7 in Attachment B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in 2012 railroads studied spectrum needs in congested
metropolitan areas and confirmed that railroads will need to acquire
additional spectrum in Chicago. Other areas being studied include
Kansas City, New York, Toledo, St. Louis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and New
Orleans. The adequacy of coverage in congested metropolitan areas will
not be fully known until the PTC system is implemented and operational
in those areas.
E. PTC Back Office
The pace of development of the Back Office Segment and PTC-related
back office systems remains challenged by design complexity,
availability of supplier resources, and scalability of the solution.
Insofar as the I-ETMS BOS is concerned, the railroads and their
contractors continued development in 2012, but a ``final'' version is
not expected to be available until mid-2014.
The need to test thoroughly the PTC back office systems, including
the BOS, and address issues and defects identified during the testing
process also significantly impact the pace of development. Lab testing
of the related technologies and systems will generally find some
defects, as was the case with the initial software release for the BOS,
requiring subsequent revisions of the technologies or systems that fix
the defects. Unavailability of the final production version of the BOS
is one of the critical factors preventing the railroads from installing
PTC on the entire nationwide network by the current 2015 implementation
date.
1. Back Office Server
For the over one dozen railroads implementing the I-ETMS BOS, the
software version that includes essential requirements for vital overlay
PTC system certification is now scheduled to be ready for testing in
mid-2014. A production version of the BOS software will be unavailable
until after the required lab testing, likely late 2014 at the earliest.
While the railroads are considering all possible strategies to expedite
this schedule, at this time there is no apparent alternative strategy
or approach that would significantly accelerate the delivery date. As
with the software for the locomotive, the complexity of the BOS
software combined with the many interfaces with other components of the
PTC system has required detailed design and analysis to ensure proper
operation.
2. Geographical Information System (GIS)
The railroads made substantial progress with respect to the GIS
component of PTC systems in 2012. The industry developed a common
approach to validation and verification of the data to ensure all
essential data elements are captured. A common approach facilitates
review by FRA and also provides non-Class I railroads a template they
can use. Over 13,000 track miles were GIS mapped in 2012, bringing the
total miles GIS mapped to approximately 80,000; approximately 15,800
track miles were data processed in 2012, bringing this total to over
41,000; and over 6,000 track miles of GIS data were converted to PTC
subdivision files in 2012, bringing the total of converted track miles
to over 9,000. However, much work remains to be done. Over 17,000 track
miles remain to be GIS mapped; almost 56,000 miles remain to be data
processed; and almost 88,000 miles remain to be converted to the PTC
subdivision files needed for the locomotive's PTC system.\14\
Furthermore, substantial work remains to be done to develop and
implement sustainable processes to document and update the GIS
coordinates every time one of the over 470,000 critical PTC assets are
moved by more than 1 foot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Table 8 in Attachment B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Dispatch
The dispatch system must interact with the PTC system via a common
interoperable interface with the BOS. For some railroads, the
enhancements needed for the dispatch system are extensive and have
taken considerable analysis and effort to design, code, and test.
Additionally, changes made to the BOS require an analysis of the effect
on the interface of the dispatch system with the PTC system. At least
four railroads will not have a PTC-capable dispatch system until
2014.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Table 9 in Attachment B.
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III. The Integration and Testing Challenge
The challenges and risks associated with integrating and testing
the many components of PTC have not diminished. Many of the 20 plus PTC
components have been tested by the supplier and some ``nearest
neighbor'' testing of interfacing components has started with
preliminary releases of software during 2012. However, end-to-end
testing of the final system of interoperable software, with all known
hazards mitigated, is still one to two years away.
Railroads have been nimble in adjusting to the testing challenge.
As component releases are delayed due to the complexity of the design
or the need to fix defects, the interaction of those components can
quickly get out of sync on the release cycle timeline. Nevertheless,
railroads have revised test plans and realigned resources to conduct
nearest neighbor testing with intermediate versions of software as
software delivery schedules have slipped. They have taken advantage of
opportunities to test releases of software and hardware to ferret out
defects and issues early in the release continuum, when more extensive
integration testing is not yet possible. To keep the schedule moving
forward to the extent possible, railroads have undertaken preliminary
testing using software written to interim versions of ``interface
control documents'' (ICDs) and written translators to bridge the gap
between the different ICDs.\16\ In some cases these stop-gap
assemblages of software have been tested in the field with a hi-rail
vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ICDs contain the format for how systems communicate with each
other.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad testing has identified more than 600 software defects to
date, underscoring the importance of thorough testing to ensure the
integrity of the PTC system. While these efforts successfully
identified potential defects, only true end-to-end testing with final
software will determine whether the integration of all the PTC
components is effective. Based on current schedules, this will not
begin until late 2014. At that time any additional defects discovered
will have to be analyzed and remediated, further delaying the time at
which widespread PTC implementation can proceed.
IV. The Certification Process Could Take Considerable Time
AAR remains concerned that the certification process could take a
considerable amount of time and that FRA will not have the resources to
review and certify PTC systems expeditiously. As FRA acknowledged in
its August 2012 Report to Congress, FRA will need at least 6 to 9
months to review PTC Safety Plans, and approximately 38 railroads will
need certification.\17\ In an attempt to expedite final review, in 2012
the Class I railroads' Joint Rail Safety Team (JSRT) developed a format
and common portions of a PTC Safety Plan and submitted drafts for FRA
review and comment. In addition, in 2012 FRA and the JRST began holding
quarterly meetings to facilitate communications between the parties,
discuss FRA's concerns about implementation, and clarify FRA's
interpretation of the PTC regulations. The meetings continue to foster
a good working relationship between the industry and FRA. However,
while this joint effort of the railroads and FRA is helpful, each
railroad will have a unique PTC safety plan that FRA will need to
review and approve. Furthermore, while railroads have been and will
continue partial installation of PTC equipment prior to certification,
the time required for FRA certification is one of the critical elements
impacting the date by which the PTC mandate can be implemented.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ FRA Report to Congress, p. 41. Based upon the nearly 18 months
that it took for FRA to approve the PTC Development Plan, a less
complex document, the approval period could take even longer than
estimated by FRA.
\18\ FRA in its August 2012 Report to Congress suggested a
legislative change that would permit FRA to provisionally certify PTC
systems. Once provisionally certified, a railroad could operate its PTC
system pending final review. While a constructive suggestion that could
assist in evaluating PTC systems in operation, this change would not
alter the fact that the railroads cannot install PTC on the entire
nationwide network by the 2015 deadline. Even provisional certification
will require a review and approval process for FRA. It is difficult to
imagine that process will take less than 6 months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As FRA also noted in its Report to Congress, the shortage of
qualified people extends to FRA. FRA noted that its PTC staff consists
of 10 PTC specialists and 1 supervisor, who are responsible for
monitoring PTC system installation and testing nationwide and for the
technical review and approval of all documentation associated with the
statutorily-required PTC system certification.\19\ Railroads will be
submitting PTC Safety Plans, amendments to their PTC filings, and other
related documents. FRA, as do the railroads, faces the challenge of key
personnel retiring as well as other resource constraints that impact
the agency's ability to review, comment, and approve the required
documentation. As FRA noted in its Report to Congress, the industry
remains concerned that the continued shortage of FRA resources could
delay the implementation of an interoperable PTC system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ FRA Report to Congress, p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Interoperability: The Current Implementation Schedules Could
Adversely Affect the Reliability and Effectiveness of PTC
A. Phasing in PTC
Attachment B to the ISP discussed problems that could arise from
implementation schedules under which PTC is deployed first in locations
presenting complex interoperability issues. The railroads suggested a
phased approach to PTC under which PTC will be implemented in less
operationally complex areas first, which is a departure from current
implementation plans. FRA has indicated that it agrees with this
general approach. Accordingly, the railroads intend to update the
implementation schedules in their respective PTC Implementation Plans
to take these complex interoperability issues into account.
The PTC Reliability Study recently provided by AAR to FRA raises
significant concerns over the reliability of the fully assembled PTC
system. The Study underscores the need for a phased approach for
implementation that will allow the railroads to assess the PTC system
in operation so that failures, while they will occur, can be reduced to
the extent possible and the efficiency of the railroad network
maintained to the greatest extent feasible. The time needed to phase in
PTC is another reason why the industry cannot meet the current 2015
deadline to implement PTC on the entire nationwide network.
B. Interoperability Standards
Ensuring the interoperability of PTC requires numerous
interoperability standards. AAR and its member railroads made
considerable progress towards developing those standards in 2012.
Attachment C describes the status of the interoperability standards
required for PTC. Of the 34 standards being developed, 18 have been
finalized. Drafts of 12 more have been published for public comment.
In 2012 it became clear that the railroads also need to adopt
industry standards for the ongoing use and operation of PTC. These
standards are necessary in order for the railroads operating a PTC
system to ensure that updates to PTC hardware and software are
acceptable. In the absence of such standards, there is no assurance
that upgraded PTC components and software will be compatible with and
continue to work with other components of the PTC system or that
interoperability will be maintained.
VI. Rolling Out PTC
As noted above and in the ISP, PTC cannot be rolled out on an
entire railroad system at the same time. It must be implemented in
phases and location by location, typically on a subdivision basis.
Furthermore, as also stated in the ISP, training employees remains
a daunting task that places practical limits on the speed with which
PTC can be safely and effectively rolled out across a railroad system.
While training courses and materials continue to be developed, the
railroads recognize that this training must occur in a phased approach.
Employees on each subdivision will have to receive significant training
immediately prior to activation of PTC on the subdivision where they
work. On the Class I railroads alone, approximately 68,000 engineers
and conductors, 7,200 signal employees, 2,500 dispatchers, and
thousands of others, including mechanics, electricians, and
supervisors, will have to be trained on PTC. Delays in designing and
installing PTC affect the pace of training railroad employees.
VII. Conclusion
The railroad industry has invested a tremendous amount of time,
effort and money to complete a nationwide interoperable PTC-system as
quickly as possible. As of the end of 2012, the railroads had invested
approximately $2.8 billion (up from $1.6 billion at the end of 2011)
and had also devoted millions of man-hours to the development of
PTC.\20\ However, as demonstrated above, the railroads will not be able
to implement PTC on the entire nationwide network by December 31, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See Table 10 in Attachment B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of all the uncertainties associated with the development
and installation of PTC, it is impossible to set forth a precise
timeline for completion of a nationwide, interoperable PTC network.
Factors that affect a railroad's timeline for completion of PTC on its
system, include variations in geography; type and age of the railroad's
wayside signaling infrastructure (legacy relay technology must be
converted to solid state technology); the density of train operations;
the number of rail-to-rail interlockings; the number of connections
with other railroads; and the number of operating environments (with
different combinations of these factors) that must be addressed. In
addition, until a railroad tests and installs its PTC system, it is
impossible to know what other difficulties will be encountered and how
they might affect progress in completing the railroad's PTC network. As
discussed previously, the critical software for the back office server
for I-ETMS will not be fully tested and ready to be installed until
late 2014 at the earliest. Finally, the scope of the PTC network will
impact a railroad's ultimate completion date.
Taking into account the above factors, the eight railroads
providing data for this paper anticipate that by December 31, 2018, all
PTC hardware will be installed and PTC will be in operation on most of
the mandated PTC routes. (The date by which PTC will be in operation on
all of a railroad's mandated PTC routes will vary by railroad.) The
industry continues to seek ways to speed progress while maintaining
safe operations in order to achieve complete deployment as soon as
possible. Thus, while current projections show that a portion of the
PTC network will not be completed by the end of 2018, that certainly
could change.
Keeping in mind the uncertainty in projecting a completion date,
Table 11 shows the railroads' current expectations regarding future
annual PTC expenditures and annual installations of wayside interface
units, base station radios, and PTC equipment on locomotives, as well
as the number of employees they expect will be trained. (Table 11 is
premised on the PTC network required by the current regulations.) Table
11 also shows by year the extent to which the railroads will have
installed PTC on the routes that will have PTC capability. The year
``2018 and beyond'' column includes data for what the railroads
currently project will remain to be done in and beyond 2018. The eight
railroads anticipate they will have spent $8 billion by the end of 2018
on PTC.
This paper shows that the railroad industry has done its utmost to
install a nationwide, interoperable PTC network. However, much work
remains to be done. While substantial progress toward completing the
network will have been made by the end of 2015, the entire project will
not be complete by that date.
Attachment B
PTC Data \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The data in this Attachment is based on estimates as of
December 31, 2012, current PTC implementation plans on file with FRA
(including amendments to plans that have been approved by FRA), and the
regulations in existence on December 31, 2012.
Table 1.--Equipping Locomotives with PTC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# to be equipped 54 4,000 1,000 1,143 4,100 591 3,811 7,267 21,966
# partially equipped to date 53 917 58 163 1,705 40 1,383 1,591 5,910
# fully equipped 0 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 146
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--Railroad Signal Personnel Hired or Retained Due to PTC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARR 4
BNSF 820
CN 32
CP 35
CSX 494
KCS 36
NS 300
UP 539
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2,260
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.--Integrated WIU Installation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# integrated WIUs required to 54 5,709 1,061 491 5,029 620 4,249 11,895 29,108
be deployed
# integrated WIUs deployed to 0 4,518 67 49 487 238 597 3,003 8,959
date
# integrated WIUs remaining to 54 1,191 994 442 4,542 382 3,652 8,892 20,149
be deployed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.--Stand-alone WIU Installation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# stand-alone WIUs required to 38 1,180 699 620 1,167 217 1,096 1,934 6,951
be deployed
# stand-alone WIUs deployed to 0 209 0 15 10 42 39 452 767
date
# stand-alone WIUs remaining to 38 971 699 605 1,157 175 1,057 1,482 6,184
be deployed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5.--Signal Replacement Projects
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# locations of signal 0 3,965 134 66 1724 364 1,850 4,200 12,303
replacement required
# locations replaced to date 0 2,490 89 26 561 180 597 1,255 5,198
# locations remaining to be 0 1,475 45 40 1,163 184 1253 2945 7,105
replaced
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 6.--Switches in Non-Signal PTC Territory
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# needed 64 1,180 227 481 973 148 728 974 4,775
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# non-signaled # equipped with 4 209 0 11 85 30 39 58 436
switch locations power to date
needing power &
WIUs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# remaining to be 60 971 227 470 888 118 689 916 4,339
equipped with
power
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# equipped with 4 209 0 11 10 30 39 58 361
WIUs to date
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*# remaining to be 60 971 227 470 963 118 689 916 4,414
equipped with
WIUs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# non-signaled # needed 0 0 227 481 973 148 728 974 3,531
switch locations
needing switch
position monitors
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# equipped to date 0 0 0 11 10 30 39 58 148
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# remaining to be 0 0 227 470 963 118 689 916 3,383
equipped
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7.--Communications Deployment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# needed 33 731 181 134 1,285 120 700 1,036 4,220
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Base station # installed 3 297 0 0 30 0 62 4 396
220 MHz radios
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of future 30 434 181 134 1,255 120 638 1,046 3,838
installations
needed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Wayside # needed 78 5,863 1,751 687 5,299 828 5,478 13,700 33,684
location 220 MHz
radios
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# installed 0 1,282 0 0 748 0 78 102 2,210
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of future 78 4,581 1,751 687 4,551 828 5,400 13,598 31,474
installations
needed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Locomotive 220 # needed 54 4,000 1,000 1,143 4,100 591 3,811 7,267 21,966
MHz radios
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# installed 0 146 0 1 20 0 0 2 169
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of locomotives 54 3,854 1,000 1,142 4,080 591 3,811 7,265 21,797
remaining to be
equipped
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.--Status of PTC GIS Projects
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# PTC assets to be * mapped and extracted for GIS 2,800 95,925 25,630 17,802 114,731 9,641 77,000 130,000 473,529
consumption ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------
# track miles required to be 600 13,925 80 865 21,455 1,977 16,107 25,000 80,009
GIS mapped # miles mapped to date
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# miles to be mapped 0 10,562 4,300 1,871 110 250 0 0 17,093
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# track miles required to be # miles processed to date 600 9,758 20 273 7,742 153 231 22,500 41,277
data processed
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# miles remaining to be 0 14,729 4300 2,463 13,823 2,074 16,107 2,500 55,996
processed
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# track miles GIS data to be # converted to date 600 6,455 0 273 1,420 153 231 300 9,432
converted to PTC subdiv files
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# remaining to be converted 0 18,032 4,300 2,463 20,145 2,074 16,107 24,700 87,821
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The calculation of assets to be mapped includes the following: integer mileposts; signals; crossings; switches; interlockings/control point locations;
permanent speed restrictions; the beginning and ending limits of track detection circuits in non-signaled territory; clearance point locations for
every switch location installed on the main and siding tracks; and inside switches equipped with switch circuit controllers.
Table 9.--Status of PTC Dispatch System Projects
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Date System will be PTC-capable
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARR April 2013
BNSF Completed
CN 1st quarter 2014
CP June 2014
CSX 3rd quarter 2014
KCS 1st quarter 2014
NS 3rd quarter 2013
UP Completed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 10.--PTC Investment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PTC investment through December
Railroad 31, 2012 ($)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARR 34,000,000
BNSF 739,694,000
CN 55,900,000
CP 102,340,000
CSX 585,000,000
KCS 50,374,000
NS 443,466,772
UP $759,000,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $2,769,774,772.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attachment C
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revised and
Sent to
Delivered Railway Final
to AAR and Electronics Version
ITC Sourced Specifications Total Started Published Standards Released
for Committee by AAR
Comment for
Adoption
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interface Control Documents 8 8 4 3 3
Requirements Specifications 14 14 12 9 8
Architectural Specifications 2 2 2 2 2
Database Definitions 2 2 4 3 2
Protocol Specifications 3 3 3 3 2
Recommended Practices 1 1 1 0 0
Test Plans 1 1 1 1 1
Test Reports 0 0 0 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Specifications 31 31 27 21 18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.--PTC Timeline Based on PTC Regulations as of 12/31/2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Class
----------------------------------------- 1s 2018
--------- 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 and Totals
Component Thru beyond*
2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Locomotives Partially Equipped 6,031 4,242 1,365 678 650 314 77 13,357
Locomotives Fully Equipped 224 987 6,948 7,425 4,425 1,509 448 21,966
Percent Complete 1% 6% 37% 71% 91% 98% 100%
Wayside Interface Units installed 9,726 5,300 4,950 5,837 4,210 3,988 2,048 36,059
Percent Complete 27% 42% 55% 72% 83% 94% 100%
Base Station Radios Installed 403 976 1,285 1,267 222 52 34 4,239
Percent Complete 10% 33% 63% 93% 98% 99% 100%
PTC Route Miles Implemented 207 1,085 8,320 15,516 11,983 12,760 12,341 62,213
Percent Complete 0% 2% 15% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Employees Trained 5,724 4,013 10,930 28,692 16,520 13,276 17,545 96,700
Percent Complete 6% 10% 21% 51% 68% 82% 100%
PTC Spending ($M) 2,770 1,377 1,403 1,221 572 393 241 7,978
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Spending ($M) 2,770 4,147 5,549 6,771 7,343 7,736 7,978
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The year 2018 and beyond column includes data for what the railroads currently project will remain to be done
in and beyond 2018.Because of all the uncertainties associated with the development and installation of PTC,
it is impossible to set forth a precise completion date. The railroads currently project that by the end of
2018, all hardware will be installed and PTC will be in operation on approximately 90 percent of the mandated
PTC routes, by mileage. The industry continues to seek ways to speed progress while maintaining safe
operations in order to achieve complete deployment as soon as possible.
Assumptions:
1--70% confidence factor in accomplishing the above metrics.
2--No FRA accomodation on yard movements in PTC territory. The spreadsheet only reflects the cost of equipping
yard locomotives. The spreadsheet does not reflect the potential cost of operational impacts such as reduced
operational efficiency and potential expenses that will be associated with resolving technical issues such as
overloaded communications systems and the potential impossibility of accommodating PTC equipment on remote
control locomotives.
3--Costs represent capital expenses only, no operating or maintenance expenses.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger.
Ms. Waters?
STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WATERS, EXECUTIVE VICE
PRESIDENT, MEMBER SERVICES, AMERICAN
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
Ms. Waters. Good morning, Chairman Blumenthal, Senator
Blunt, and members of the Committee. On behalf of the American
Public Transportation Association, I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on commuter rail safety. You have our
written submission, and I will now try to summarize the key
points.
As you said, my name is Kathryn Waters. I am APTA's
Executive Vice President for Member Services. Before coming to
APTA, I served as Senior Deputy Administrator in the Maryland
Transit Administration in Baltimore. Before that, with Dallas
Area Rapid Transit as Vice President for Commuter Rail and
Railroad Management, where I had responsibility for the
commuter rail system between Dallas and Fort Worth. And for
many years, I worked in different capacities with the MARC
train service in Maryland, culminating as Chief Operating
Officer.
APTA is committed to safety. Passenger and employee safety
is our number one priority for our commuter railroads.
Since 1882, APTA and its predecessor associations have been
advocates for safety improvements. With that said, we are
always working to make our industry safer.
While our testimony speaks to PTC, an effective safety
system is about more than one specific procedure or technology.
A culture of safety begins with a commitment by the senior
leadership working with employees to adopt and adhere to common
safety goals and practices. APTA's voluntary standard
development program and the safety audit program are examples
of the ways that the industry promotes safety. Both programs
are described in my written statement.
APTA has consistently supported the concept of PTC, long
before the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, provided that
proven technology, resources, and radio spectrum were
available. APTA is working with its member railroads as we
speak to meet the law's requirements on the Nation's commuter
railroads.
We want to work with this committee on the best way to get
PTC systems installed on commuter railroads. PTC, as you know,
is defined as a system designed to prevent train-to-train
collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions into established
work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch
left in the wrong position.
Some commuter railroads already have collision avoidance
systems, some of which have been in place for many years.
However, there is still no off-the-shelf technology capable of
achieving all of the law's safety objectives today.
Key components of PTC systems, such as the software
upgrades and revisions, and the roadway worker protection
components, are still under development. This technology is
also heavily dependent on the transmission of huge amounts of
digital data, requiring newly designed radios and significant
amounts of radio spectrum to deliver information to trains.
All of this is essentially untested in the actual commuter
rail operating environment. Moreover, implementation costs are
challenging, especially for publicly operated commuter
railroads trying to deal with hundreds of state-of-good-repair
projects unrelated to PTC, but many of which impact directly
and significantly on the safety of operations.
Congress has appropriated only $50 million of the $250
million authorized for PTC, while implementation costs for
commuter railroads are well in excess of $2 billion, and that
excludes operating and inspection costs. As you know, many
railroads in the East Coast are now also trying to deal with
repair and rehabilitation costs related to Hurricane Sandy.
We have known about these challenges for some time. We have
told Congress for several years that we are concerned about our
ability to implement PTC by the deadline. We sought Federal
funding to help commuter rail pay for the costs of the
implementation. We have asked the FCC and Congress to provide
radio spectrum without cost for PTC implementation. We have
also recommended the deadline for implementation be extended
from 2015 to 2018.
And as Mr. Hamberger mentioned, we have been working with
the FRA and with the freight railroads. We did do a report
jointly with AAR concerning the challenges of meeting the
deadline.
In its report to Congress, FRA recommended that it be
allowed to approve a railroad to use alternative safety
technologies on specified line segments in lieu of PTC,
particularly in areas with low safety risk, if appropriately
and properly justified to FRA. We support the FRA's
recommendation to make such decisions.
We have also urged Congress to provide resources needed to
do FRA inspections and reviews for approval of PTC systems, and
to ensure that open standards on PTC technology are in place so
that railroads can buy equipment and services in a competitive
marketplace.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and would be
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Waters follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathryn Waters, Executive Vice President, Member
Services, American Public Transportation Association
Introduction
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Thune, Acting Chairman Blumenthal and
Senator Blunt, and members of the Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee, on behalf of the American Public Transportation Association
(APTA) and its more than 1,500 member organizations, I thank you for
this opportunity to testify on rail safety as it relates to the
nation's commuter railroads. In particular, I will update the Committee
on progress and challenges related to the implementation of positive
train control (PTC) on the nation's commuter railroads.
My name is Kathryn Waters. I am APTA's Executive Vice President,
Member Services, here in Washington, D.C. Before coming to APTA, I was
Deputy Administrator at the Maryland Transit Administration in
Baltimore, where I was responsible for all transit operations
departments. Previously, I worked at the Dallas Area Rapid Transit
(DART) in several positions, including Vice President--Commuter Rail
and Railroad Management, and earlier, for MARC Train Service in
Maryland, culminating as manager and chief operating officer.
As an APTA member, I served as chair of APTA's Commuter Rail
Committee, and on APTA's Executive Committee as vice chair--commuter
and intercity rail. I have represented APTA for more than 15 years on
the rail safety advisory committee of the Federal Railroad
Administration.
Overview
First and foremost, please let me state that APTA is unequivocally
committed to safety: passenger and employee safety is the number one
priority on our Nation's commuter railroads. Since its inception, APTA
and its predecessor associations have been vocal advocates and active
instigators for safety improvements. In the mid-1990s, APTA developed
the Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) program to
develop safety standards for commuter rail cars. More recently, our
commitment to safety was heralded by the rail industry regulator,
Federal Railroad Administrator (FRA) Joe Szabo, who announced safety
statistics citing that 2012 was the safest year in railroad industry
history. With that said, we are always working to make our industry
safer.
APTA consistently supported the concept of positive train control
(PTC) long before the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008,
provided that proven technology, resources and radio spectrum necessary
were available to put PTC into practice. We are working with our member
railroads to meet the law's requirements that all of the Nation's
commuter railroads have federally approved systems that help protect
against accidents. We urge the Committee to focus on how to best
install these still developing systems on an enormous and complicated
network of interconnected railroads in a way that maximizes all of an
operator's safety considerations while efficiently moving toward
implementation. Commuter systems provide important transportation in
and around many of our metropolitan regions, and demand for service and
ridership continues to grow.
Commuter rail safety has improved in recent years, but we continue
to strive for improved safety. Commuter rail ridership has grown by 42
percent since 1990, going from just under 328 million trips then to
more than 466 million trips in 2012, and safety on the Nation's
commuter systems has improved. Over the past 10 years, fatalities have
declined from just above 0.9 per 100 million passenger miles to 0.5 per
100 million miles in 2011. While commuter rail operators will always
seek to improve and enhance safety, it is clear that travel by commuter
railroad is among the safest modes of travel in the U.S.
About APTA
The American Public Transportation Association is a non-profit
international association of more than 1,500 public and private member
organizations, including transit systems and high-speed, intercity, and
commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance
firms; product and service providers; academic institutions, transit
associations and state departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
APTA member systems.
Culture of Safety
While we address in this testimony a very significant element of
the RSIA in the requirement to implement PTC, it is important that we
make clear that PTC is but one element of an overall integrated
approach to system safety. An effective safety culture is more
important than any one specific procedure or technology. It begins with
the commitment of the organization and senior leadership, working in
collaboration with employees and labor in adopting common safety goals
and expectations. It involves recognition that responsibility for
safety lies at all levels and with all staff. One way our commuter rail
agencies demonstrate their commitment is by having a comprehensive
safety plan in place. It includes having sound policies and procedures,
training, maintenance practices that include asset management and state
of good repair considerations, data tracking for monitoring trends in
operational, equipment, and infrastructure performance, and systems in
place for auditing and assessing that performance. The transit and
commuter rail industries have been leading on safety improvements over
a 20 plus year evolution during which a great deal of attention and
effort has been directed toward development of standardized systems and
approaches to the delivery of safe service and work environments.
As an example, all commuter rail agencies have developed Safety
Management Program Plans, the framework of which was based upon APTA's
Safety Audit Program. The APTA Safety Audit program is a voluntary,
comprehensive program developed over a decade ago when a number of
North American rail transit systems requested APTA to develop and
implement a standardized format for rail system safety and to provide
an auditing service that would enable a transit system to determine the
degree to which the standardized elements for rail transit system
safety were being addressed. By way of the adaptation of existing
industry best practices and system safety standards from the aerospace
industry, the APTA Rail Safety Audit Program was inaugurated in 1989.
This program was subsequently adopted in 1996 by the U.S. Department of
Transportation Federal Transit Administration as the base guideline for
its Federal state safety oversight requirements.
Currently there are dozens of rail transit systems and bus transit
systems participating in APTA safety audit programs. These systems
include mass transit/subway systems, light rail systems, automated
guide-ways, heavy rail commuter systems, and bus transit operations
across North America and Asia. Modal programs have been developed that
are specific to urban rail, commuter rail, and bus safety management
processes. The benefits derived from participation in the APTA Safety
Management Program include:
Adoption of safety management practices that have been
established as an industry standard;
Building and enhancing safety management processes for
service delivery and workplace safety;
Providing a tool for demonstrating transit system diligence
for safety; and
Providing a mechanism for continual improvement of system
safety
Effective Safety Program Implementation includes policies and
procedures on: Facilities Maintenance and Inspection; Vehicle
Maintenance, Inspection and Repair; Rules and Procedures Review;
Training and Certification; Emergency Planning and Response; Workplace
Safety Program; Passenger and Public Safety; Rail Corridor Operational
Study; and Environmental Management Programs. These are just a portion
of the lengthy list of considerations involved in ensuring a safe
system.
Additionally, industry developed standards (such as PRESS and
others) are contributing greatly to ongoing safety improvement. APTA
has written over 270 standards and recommended practices, 71 of which
address particular safety needs for mainline rail equipment, and over
111 for rail transit alone. Standards help improve the safety of public
transportation systems by addressing vehicle crashworthiness, passenger
door systems, emergency lighting and evacuation, and new standards to
improve the safety of vehicle interiors including seat attachment
strength and safer workstation tables. APTA has initiated new efforts
within its standards body to improve current standards on vehicle
design affecting derailments and has initiation new studies to better
understand the potential for derailments at slow operating speed.
Standards also define safe operating practices, inspection and
maintenance of equipment, train control maintenance requirements,
electrical propulsion system design, catenary electrical distribution
wire maintenance, and wheel and axle assembly procedures among many
other areas of a general nature including cyber and physical security,
railcar procurement, tunnel ventilation, and sustainability.
Finally, APTA partners with the FRA, AAR and labor in developing
rules to help design, build and operate safe transportation systems. In
this regard, APTA is very active as an industry representative within
the Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). Recently FRA and industry
have collaborated on the development of language for new safety rules
particular to high speed rail equipment. The public transportation
industry and especially our commuter rail agencies will continue to
maintain a strong emphasis on safety.
RSIA and PTC
As the members of this committee know, the Rail Safety Improvement
Act (RSIA) of 2008 mandated that PTC technology be implemented on
passenger railroad and certain freight railroads by December 31, 2015,
and it authorized funding of $250 million over five years to assist
with implementation. As defined in the statute, a positive control
system is a ``system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions,
over speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits,
and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong
position.'' When the RSIA was drafted in 2008, there was no off the
shelf technology capable of achieving these safety objectives for all
railroads--as is still the case today. Yet many commuter railroads have
long made use of collision avoidance systems that would have protected
against accidents that have occurred in recent years. Since the
enactment of RSIA, APTA and its commuter rail members across the
country have aggressively pursued the funding and technology necessary
to implement this safety mandate by the current statutory deadline.
However, challenges beyond our control have presented obstacles to
implementation.
The initial conservative estimate for PTC implementation on
commuter railroads was more than $2 billion, with more than 4,000
locomotives and passenger cars with control cabs and 8,500 track miles
to be equipped. Since this initial estimate, as commuter railroads have
begun their contracting and technology acquisitions, the estimated
costs of implementation have risen well beyond the initial $2 billion
estimate. These estimates do not include costs related to the
acquisition and operation of the radio spectrum necessary to meet the
interoperability requirements set forth under RSIA and they do not
include costs associated with operating PTC systems.
To date, Congress has only appropriated $50 million of the total
authorized amount. At a time when critical State of Good Repair
backlogs are creeping above nearly $80 billion dollars on our nations
public transportation systems, commuter railroads are being forced to
choose between performing critical system safety maintenance projects
and implementing PTC by 2015. Insufficient funding is a significant
impediment to implementation for publicly funded railroads.
While Congress authorized $250 million for PTC implementation in
the five Fiscal Years 2009 to 2013, only $50 million was appropriated
during those years. It has also been suggested that Federal funding for
high-speed rail projects can be used for PTC implementation costs, but
this is only the case where existing commuter rail service and
potential high-speed intercity passenger rail alignments are identical,
and unfortunately that is not the case for most of the Nation's
commuter rail operators. Similarly, debt financing and Railroad
Rehabilitation & Improvement Financing (RRIF) loans have been suggested
as a way to pay for PTC implementation, but many of the agencies
charged with installing PTC on their commuter rail systems are carrying
enormous debt service and many have substantial state of good repair
capital projects--which are also necessary to ensure safe operations--
that are competing for scarce resources.
Key components of PTC systems are still in the developmental phase,
such as software upgrades and revisions, and roadway worker protection.
Absent these essential elements, full implementation by 2015 will be
impeded, even for those railroads that have secured the necessary
funding. Moreover, the inability of most commuter railroads to acquire
necessary radio spectrum is also impeding full implementation by 2015.
The FCC has not responded to APTA's requests to make available spectrum
available as a public safety imperative and insisted that the necessary
bandwidth can be purchased on the open market. One railroad purchased
spectrum only to have it now held up while the courts decide who owns
the rights to sell the spectrum.
In 2011, after several years of working towards implementation and
complying in good faith with FRA reporting requirements on PTC
implementation plans, the APTA Commuter Rail CEOs committee concluded
that the industry would not be able to fully implement interoperable
PTC systems on all commuter railroads by the current deadline. Thus,
APTA approved a policy position recommending that the deadline for PTC
implementation be extended to December 31, 2018. It is important to add
that APTA's position also states that extending the deadline shall not
inhibit efforts to implement PTC on some commuter railroads prior to
the existing deadline and in fact urges Congress to prioritize funding
for those efforts. The hope was that lessons learned from early
implementers such as Metrolink, would serve to facilitate and expedite
implementation for other commuter railroads. Other APTA positions
adopted in 2011 included recommendations that Congress appropriate
Federal funding to cover 80 percent of PTC implementation costs for
commuter railroads and direct the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to provide radio spectrum, without cost, required for PTC
implementation by publicly funded commuter railroads.
I should note that representatives from commuter rail systems
across the Nation and APTA staff have conducted numerous meetings with
Members of Congress and staff from congressional committees of
jurisdiction to explain APTA's views and the challenges faced trying to
implement PTC. While we have always expressed a commitment to implement
PTC technologies, industry experience indicated that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to implement PTC on all of the Nation's
commuter railroads by the 2015 deadline. We believe we acted
responsibly by coming to Congress well before the deadline, rather than
waiting for the deadline to become imminent.
Further, in January 2012, APTA shared a report with Congress which
documented the technical challenges of implementing PTC. This report,
which was written jointly with the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), also outlined the technical challenges that freight railroads
are experiencing in their effort to implement PTC and reached the
shared conclusion that implementing a fully interoperable PTC network
was not achievable by December 31, 2015.
Federal Railroad Administration Report to Congress
Under the Rail Safety Improvement Act, the FRA was statutorily
required to transmit a PTC implementation status report to Congress in
2012. The goal of the report was to update Congress on the status of
implementation, to identify major issues and to offer potential risk
mitigation solutions. The FRA report which was issued in August 2012,
stated, as part of the report's executive summary recommendations:
``Based on the results of this report, FRA believes that a majority of
railroads will not be able to complete PTC implementation by the 2015
deadline.'' It went on to say: ``FRA recommends that it be allowed to
approve a railroad to use alternative safety technologies on specified
line segments in lieu of PTC, particularly in areas with lower safety
risks, if appropriately and properly justified to FRA.'' Further, in
its report to Congress, the Federal Railroad Administration recommended
that:
``Congress consider legislation that allows FRA to approve the
use of alternative risk mitigation technologies in lieu of a
PTC system on specified line segments if:
The use of the alternative technologies will not result in
a decrease in the level of safety from that which currently
exists.
The alternative technologies proposed provide an
appropriate level of risk mitigation with regards to
preventing train-to-train collisions, overspeed
derailments, protection of roadway workers within their
authorized work zones, and movement of a train through
misaligned switches.
The alternative risk mitigation technology implementation
plan, submitted as part of a petition to substitute
alternative risk mitigation technologies for a PTC system,
implements the alternative risk mitigation technologies in
order from areas of least risk to areas of greater risk.
The alternative technologies are installed as soon as
feasible.
APTA strongly supports the language contained in the FRA Report to
Congress and recently adopted a policy in support of the FRA's
recommendation to Congress. As adopted, the policy requests the FRA be
allowed to consider alternative technologies in lieu of a PTC system on
specified line segments. We believe that the statutory mandate for PTC
implementation will only be strengthened by taking a system safety
approach, rather than a ``one size fits all'' approach.
Additional APTA Recommendations
Alternative Risk Mitigation Technology
All APTA member railroads fully support initiatives that enhance
safety. Not all railroads have the same operating environments, safety
challenges or risk exposures. Some commuter railroads already have
collision avoidance systems in place (some for many years) that protect
against the occurrence of a train to train collisions such as
Chatsworth. APTA in no way supports any blanket exceptions in this
regard, but supports the FRA's recommendation that it be permitted to
examine the feasibility of the use of alternative technologies on a
line by line basis, and permit such uses only after rigorous analysis
and evaluation of overall risk reductions.
While the vast majority of railroads would still require PTC, there
would be some that could then prioritize their safety enhancement
projects to address their most urgent safety risks first; freeing up
the pipeline for procurement of PTC components and other resources in
order to expedite implementation for other railroads.
In terms of any concerns regarding interoperability, there is
nothing in the APTA policy or in the FRA's report to Congress that
would change the statutory and regulatory requirements for
interoperability. Any railroad's controlling locomotive that operates
on another railroad must be able to communicate with and respond to the
PTC system that will be installed. Similarly, if FRA is able to approve
any alternative technologies, then any controlling locomotive operating
on a line or segment where the alternative technology is installed must
be able to communicate with that technology. If rolling stock will
operate on lines with different technologies or even different PTC
systems, more than one type of onboard equipment may need to be
installed. For example, some commuter railroads that operate on the
Northeast Corridor and a freight railroad must be able to interoperate
with both the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) PTC
system used by Amtrak as well as the Interoperable Electronics Train
Management System (I-ETMS) PTC system being used by freight railroads,
and anticipate having to install onboard equipment for both types of
PTC systems to achieve interoperability.
In this regard, and while the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) is still conducting its investigation and has issued no
findings, the unfortunate accident on the Metro-North Railroad in
Connecticut makes clear that there is no one size fits all approach to
rail safety for all situations. While we cannot comment on the details
of the accident before the NTSB completes its investigation, their
press release dated May 24, 2013 stated: ``Positive train control is a
technology that prevents two trains, traveling on a single track, from
colliding with one another. The Metro-North trains involved in this
accident were traveling on two separate but parallel tracks. The
collision occurred after the eastbound train derailed. Because the
trains were not traveling on a single track, it is not believed that
PTC would have prevented the accident.'' We should also note that the
Metro-North passenger rail cars damaged in the accident were designed
according to specific strength requirements for the ends of cars that
are intended to protect occupants in such a collision. They performed
as designed, according to standards developed in part under the
Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) program that APTA
developed and administered in cooperation with FRA in the 1990s, as
mentioned earlier in our testimony.
Open Standards/Federal Inspections
In addition to language concerning alternative technologies, APTA
also recently approved policy positions requesting the FRA to
promulgate open interface and communication standards permitting
interoperability of products within PTC system hardware architecture to
foster competition among providers. APTA also approved language put
forth by Metrolink, requesting that Congress allocate additional
funding to the FRA and other regulatory bodies to ensure adequate
resources are available to inspect, review and authorize PTC
implementation.
Conclusion
In closing, we want to reiterate the long standing and continued
commitment the public transportation and commuter rail industry has for
advancing the safety of our riders, employees and communities. We would
also underscore that none of the PTC policies adopted by APTA are
intended to prevent early implementation by those commuter railroads
which seek to implement by or before the existing deadline. In fact,
APTA has a long-standing policy and record of urging Congress to
prioritize funding for early implementation efforts. As with any major
initiative for nationwide implementation of a complex new technology,
PTC implementation has posed, and is certain to continue to create,
challenges that could not have been foreseen by legislators, regulators
or implementers at the time of enactment.
On behalf of APTA and its members, we appreciate the work that this
committee has done to enhance safety on our Nation's railroads. We look
forward to continuing to work with you and your staff on this and many
other common issues that face public transportation agencies.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Ms. Waters.
Mr. Stem?
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. STEM, JR., NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR,
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL AND
TRANSPORTATION (SMART) UNION
Mr. Stem. Good morning and thank you. Thank you, Senators
Blumenthal and Blunt and Johnson. I am going to focus my verbal
comments this morning on PTC and fatigue.
From the employee's viewpoint, any discussion concerning
rail safety should always start with employee fatigue as a
first topic. Our railroad corporations, as you heard this
morning, are reinvesting more than $20 billion annually in
upgrading, maintaining, and expanding their infrastructure, but
are unwilling to invest anything in resolving the most pressing
human factor and fatal safety issue. That is unpredictable work
schedule, coupled with employee availability policies applied
to the operating crews.
The Federal Railroad Administration, rail management, and
rail labor, all agree that passenger hours of service
regulations should be separated from freight hours of service
regulations, because of the significant safety advantages of
the predictable work schedules in passenger service.
The new passenger hours of service regulation also
requires, for the first time, the use of scientific models to
help create safe and efficient work schedules for operating
crews. The resulting predictable work schedules in passenger
service resolve most fatigue issues for these crews.
Contained in my packet of testimony were the
recommendations from NTSB for two groups of issues, fatigue and
positive train control.
A review of these recommendations leads to the obvious
conclusion that fatigue of operating railroad employees was the
basis for most of the recommendations, both for positive train
control and for fatigue mitigation programs.
Before 1970, operating railroad employees could work and
were often required to work 16-hour shifts, 7 days a week. The
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1970 changed that and reduced
that so that our crews could only be required to work 12 hours
a day, 7 days a week.
During the conversations and conferences that occurred
after the RSIA of 2008 passed the House, the railroads' only
suggestion for improving the predictability of work schedules
and mitigating fatigue was to limit the total hours that a
safety critical employee could be required to work to 276 hours
each month. That is 23 12-hour shifts. That 276-hour limit made
its way into the RSIA and was signed into law.
The RSIA did contain provisions for two pilot projects
sponsored by FRA for improving work schedules and employee
notification. We have urged all the class I railroads to
participate in a pilot project, but have not had a single
railroad agree to do that.
Our suggested solution to the employee fatigue provides
three options. Number one, give the employee that works in
safety critical service a regular start time, so he or she
knows days in advance when they must come to work. A large
majority of our members have a regular start time and do not
consider fatigue to be a safety issue. Employees with regular
start times are not the employees who are dying in fatigue-
related collisions that Ms. Hersman discussed earlier today.
If number one is not available, the second option that we
are proposing is to notify the employee before going off duty
what time they will be required to return to work for their
next tour of duty. This option actually improves the
availability of the employee by allowing the employee to return
to service after only 10 hours off duty.
If neither one or two options are available, then we are
suggesting move the required 10 hour of undisturbed rest that
now immediately follows service to 10 hours of rest immediately
preceding service. This is a 10-hour call which provides a
significant improvement in the predictability of the work
schedule. The result is the employee has at least 10 hours to
rest and prepare for service.
The high level of professionalism and dedication of the
operating crews running our railroads today are the only
reasons that accidents like the one at Chaffee, Missouri, and
the other ones highlighted here today aren't more frequent.
Positive train control. There are a few segments of our
industry, as you have heard, that are asking Congress to grant
a blanket extension of 3 to 5 years. The current required date
for implementation is more than 30 months away today and was 7
years and 3 months from the time RSIA was passed.
If Congress chooses to grant a blanket extension for PTC,
the railroads that are behind on their implementation schedule
today will further slow or just stop the process until that new
extension also expires.
Some railroads, including Amtrak, BNSF, and Metrolink, and
Alaska Railroad, have announced that they will be able to meet
the statutory deadline. Others will be partially complete.
The key point here that I have not heard in any other
testimony is that, if PTC were applied today to the industry,
it only requires implementation on 39 percent of the total
mainline track.
So when Mr. Hamberger and others refer to 20,000
locomotives and thousands of miles of track, keep in mind that
the current regulation only requires 39 percent of the track be
implemented.
PTC also would end a very unsafe practice of using after-
arrival blocks. That is a separate topic that was discussed in
my testimony.
And I also want to point out and acknowledge that BNSF CEO
Matt Rose was in the room earlier this morning. He had to
leave. I think he was embarrassed that Mr. Hamberger would not
give him his seat.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Stem. But I would encourage this committee and each
individual Senator to discuss with Matt Rose the thought
processes and how they arranged to have the deadline complied
with by BNSF.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stem follows:]
Prepared Statement of James A. Stem, Jr., National Legislative
Director, SMART--Transportation Division
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, Subcommittee Chairman
Blumenthal, Senator Blunt, Members of the Commerce Committee, my name
is James Stem and I am the National Legislative Director of the
Transportation Division of the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, Transportation
Union (SMART) The SMART Transportation Division, formally the United
Transportation Union, is an organization representing approximately
80,000 transportation employees with active rail members working in all
operating crafts (engineers, conductors, yardmasters, trainmen,
switchmen). Our members have a vested interest in the policies that
impact our freight and passenger national rail network. Our
organization has worked jointly with the rail industry and government
entities for almost 150 years on transportation policies.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and present our
views on improving rail safety. The rail industry is the source of tens
of thousands of good middle-class union jobs. Railroad jobs are more
than just jobs. . .they are careers with many of our members working
30, 40 and even 50 years for a single employer. These jobs are highly
skilled with many of them requiring Federal certification.
Overall we are optimistic about the future prospects of the
railroad industry. The freight side of the industry is investing more
than $20 billion annually in its infrastructure and is well positioned
to handle any additional freight that comes its way. One bright example
of growth is oil shipments from the Bakken oil fields, where railroads
are now shipping between 60 and 70 percent of that crude oil to
destinations across the country. The oil boom in North Dakota would not
be nearly as robust if it were not for the ability of the two railroads
there to ship the crude out of the state. Coal shipments on the other
hand are down and could be reduced dramatically in the coming months
and years because of low natural gas prices and very challenging
environmental regulations. Passenger rail is also doing well. With
America's continued population growth, passenger rail is in a good
position to respond to our Nation's mobility needs. We are excited
about the numerous passenger rail service expansions that are occurring
across the country and Amtrak's continued success.
America's passenger and freight railroads are involved in a rail
renaissance that should bring decades of growth to both.
We are proud to be a part of the industry today, positioned to
handle the additional freight which must come to rail from our
highways, and also, prepared to provide flexible services like ``mobile
pipelines for oil'', and efficient handling of multi-modal
containerized shipments. With a significant growth in our population,
passenger rail is the most economic and environmentally friendly
alternative to the mobility challenges facing our country. Our career
rail employees have earned the equity to participate in the policy
decisions that will impact our industry.
We are pro-active in our support for the industry and take an
active role in policy discussions supporting the expansion of freight
and passenger rail across the country. We also work with all segments
of our rail and transit industries in legislative activities designed
to highlight the advantages of rail. The long term growth and stability
of the industry also relies upon safe and reliable operations.
While we are optimistic about rail's future and we take a pro-
active role in supporting the industry, the long term growth and
stability of the industry relies upon operating our railroads safely.
UTU (SMART) and most of rail labor have a long history of cooperation
and joint efforts in partnership with all segments of the rail industry
on a variety of pertinent issues. We think one of the success stories
of partnership that should be recognized is the Rail Safety Advisory
Committee (RSAC) that is sponsored by the Federal Railroad
Administration. The RSAC was originally chartered during the Clinton
administration, and was the first time that railroad management, rail
labor, rail suppliers, and the FRA were all gathered together in an
informal setting to participate in problem solving, an exchange of
thoughts, and an opportunity for suggestions on improved safety, with
the conclusion being a collaborative rule making process. RSAC
continued to function productively through the Bush administration, and
continues today. Our rail industry today is safer because of RSAC.
Employee Fatigue
Any discussion concerning rail safety should rightfully always
start with Employee Fatigue as the first topic. Our railroad
corporations are re-investing more than $20 billion annually in
upgrading, maintaining, and expanding their infrastructure, but are
unwilling to invest anything in resolving the most pressing and fatal
of safety issues--Unpredictable work schedules coupled with employee
availability policies.
The Federal Railroad Administration, rail management, and rail
labor all agreed that Passenger Hours of Service regulations should be
separated from freight hours of service regulations because of the
significant safety advantages of the predictable work schedules in long
distance and commuter rail passenger service. The new passenger hours
of service regulation also requires the use of scientific models to
help create safe and efficient work schedules for operating crews. The
predictable work schedules in passenger service prevent most issues
with fatigue for these crews.
However, work needs to be done on the freight side. There is no
single issue that will provide more positive movement in safety
improvement than resolving the employee fatigue issues associated with
freight rail operations and many freight rail accidents in recent
years. The first NTSB recommendations for implementation of Positive
Train Control (PTC) in the early 1990s were a result of numerous rail
accidents caused by employee fatigue and totally unpredictable work
schedules of operating rail employees.
The safe movement of a freight train or a passenger train today is
a complex operation requiring train handling skills, years of training
and territorial qualifications over the specific track segment, and the
ability to manage multiple priorities of speed restrictions, normal
radio communications, and roadway worker authorities, highway crossings
at grade, signals, and track authorities. One momentary lapse of
situational awareness by a member of the operating crew can have
disastrous results.
A working definition: ``Fatigue means a complex state that is
characterized by a lack of alertness and reduced mental and physical
performance, often accompanied by drowsiness.''
The unpredictable work schedules that apply to a large majority of
crews operating trains between terminals require the crews to report
for duty with two hours of notification, or less, regardless of the
commitments that the railroad had made to the effected employees with
previous lineups and forecasts. Aggravating this dangerous practice
even further are the new terminologies of ``Dropped Turns'' and ``Paper
Deadheads''. These terms are interchangeable and used by all the
railroads to identify when the crew management system made a unilateral
change in the employees' position for call. These new practices are
used to justify holding the employee accountable for being in place for
call well in advance of when his designated position should be called.
The practical application of this process is to require a safety
critical employee to come to work when called out of turn, or face
disciplinary sanctions which often times include suspension and
termination.
Also directly connected to the unpredictable work schedules and the
new practices of ``Dropped Turns'' and ``Paper Deadheads'' are the
railroads unilateral ``Attendance Policies'' that can only be intended
to require a safety critical employee to come to work when they are
fatigued or sick.
If the current FRA regulation proposal for PTC were implemented, it
would only require PTC be installed on less than 39 percent of the main
line track in this country, with more than 60 percent of main line
track continuing with the same system of operation, and, unfortunately,
the same failed process of employee utilization. The railroads response
to requests for pilot projects and improvements in predictable work
schedules for the unassigned employees that work on call has been more
of the same failed policies. As the amount of freight continues to grow
in coming years, the non PTC main line track will have to absorb a
large percentage of the growth with this major safety issue of fatigue
unresolved.
Today, an employee working in unassigned service receives a ``train
lineup'' when going off duty that is intended to provide an estimate
about when their next reporting time will be. These lineups are
accurate sometimes, but more often the lineups are inaccurate by many
hours.
A human being can prepare for irregular work schedules if they know
when they must start the tour of duty, but even our youngest and
strongest employees cannot function safely if told they will go to work
at 7 AM in the morning and then are called to work at 10 PM the night
before. Predictable reporting times and notifying the employees when
they are going to work are the only solution to this major safety
issue.
We look forward to working with this Committee during the
reauthorization of the Rail Safety Improvement Act to address these
needed improvements in employee fatigue. For the past 18 years, the
employees have been asking Congress and the railroads for a solution to
fatigue but have met with little success.
When our operating employees are asked about safety improvements,
the number one response is always ``Just tell me when I must come to
work. I will manage my personal life to be rested and alert if I only
know when I must report.''
Our suggested solution to employee fatigue provides three options:
(1) Give the employee a regular start time so he/she knows days in
advance when they must come to work. A large majority of our
employees have a regular start time and do not consider fatigue
to be a safety issue. Employees with regular start times are
not the employees who are dying in fatigue related collisions.
Or
(2) Notify the employee before going off duty what time the employee
will be required to return to work for the next tour of duty.
This option actually improves the availability of the employee
by allowing the employee to return to service after only ten
hours off duty. And if neither (1) or (2) are not a viable
option, then
(3) Move the required ten hours of undisturbed rest immediately
following service that is now required to ten hours of
undisturbed rest immediately preceding service by giving the
employee at least ten hours of notification prior to reporting
for service. This is a ten hour call which provides a
significant improvement in the predictability of the work
schedule. The result is the employee has at least ten hours to
prepare for service.
The high level of professionalism and dedication of the operating
crews running our railroads today are the only reasons that accidents
and collisions are not more frequent. Attached with this testimony are
references concerning accidents that have recently occurred where
fatigue was a contributing factor, like the ones that occurred near
Chaffee, Missouri on May 25, 2013, near Goodwell, Oklahoma in late
June, 2012, and also near Two Harbors, Minnesota on September 30, 2010.
Also attached with this testimony are the numerous recommendations
(177) that the NTSB has made to railroads over the past few decades to
deal with employee fatigue. Most of these recommendations are still
pending.
Positive Train Control
There are a few segments of our industry that are hoping Congress
will grant a blanket extension of three--five years for PTC
implementation. The current required date for implementation is more
than 30 months away now on December 31, 2015.
If Congress chooses to grant a blanket extension for PTC, the
railroads that are behind on their implementation schedule will further
slow their progress, or just stop the process until that new extension
expires.
Some railroads, including Amtrak, BNSF, and Metrolink in
California, have announced that they will be able to meet the statutory
deadline and are continuing the implementation and testing of the PTC
components.
Any extension for PTC implementation should be on an individual
basis, short in duration, and only after identifying the exact reasons
that the current implementation date is not obtainable.
The PTC systems that are being implemented today contain all the
information on the display screen that is necessary to operate a train
safely. This will be the first time that the operating crews on the
locomotive will have all that information contained in one place and
displayed in real time. The quality of that information on the screen
will significantly reduce the complexity of safely operating the train.
The information contained on the screen is the crux of the safety
advantage, not the enforcement of the system.
PTC has been debated for more than 20 years as a significant safety
overlay for rail operations. It is time for PTC to be implemented to
preserve the lives of rail operating crews and the safety of the
communities served by our rail industry.
Attached with this testimony are two relevant documents for this
discussion on implementation of PTC. First are the numerous
recommendations (27) that NTSB has made the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to mandate PTC, and to our railroads concerning
the need for PTC Second, is the presentation made at the February 27,
2013 NTSB Public Forum on Positive Train Control Systems by retired FRA
Associate Administrator of Safety Grady Cothen. Mr. Cothen is
recognized as one of the leading authorities on PTC, and it is with his
permission that I attach this document for guidance and reference; this
document is a summary of the history of PTC.
Amtrak
I need not remind this Committee about the importance of Amtrak.
It's America's passenger railroad, rising up from the ashes of a cadre
of bankrupt private service providers and charged with providing vital
rail passenger service across America.
Amtrak is a partner with our private freight railroads, and has
negotiated operating agreements with them for more than 40 years.
Amtrak's employees, many of whom are federally certified, know and
understand the complex operating rules that govern freight railroads,
making Amtrak the right fit to operate this vital nation-wide service.
Since its inception, Amtrak has done a remarkable job with often
inadequate resources. While setting ridership records in recent years
their safety record remains solid. Amtrak's growing passenger volumes
has made them far more self-sufficient than in the past recovering 79
percent of their operating costs from ticket revenue. The high price of
fuel, growing highway and airport congestion, and the significant
increase in the number of passenger rail options, all contribute to the
constant increases in ridership on Amtrak.
Even with their remarkable progress Amtrak has had no shortage of
congressional critics who expect Amtrak to be the world's only
profitable passenger railroad. We ask that your Committee take a fresh
look at this American success story and work with the leaders of Amtrak
and others to help ``America's Railroad'' build on their 40 plus years
of success. Amtrak was created because the demand for rail passenger
services remained strong, and the private railroads could not make a
profit operating their own passenger trains.
Hazardous Material Shipments
The safest and most efficient form of movement of commodities that
qualify as hazardous materials is by rail. These haz mat shipments
require special handling by our rail operating crews, which include
documentation and secure hand off procedures at interchange or crew
change points. These products are given the extra attention that they
require when moved by rail.
As our American manufacturing industries grow, these industries
will require new chemical products that are available today. An
increase in the quantity and number of products that qualify as
hazardous materials is the expectation, and this will result in
significant increases in rail hazmat shipments.
Switching haz mat cars also requires additional precautions. As
some major shippers seek Congressional support for switching haz mat
cars much more frequently in and out of trains to somehow achieve lower
freight rates, we want to make sure that you understand the significant
safety concerns that are involved in those choices. Switching and
interchanging containers of very dangerous substances packaged in
containers weighing 100 tons or more, is not an academic or a sanitary
exercise.
We would like the opportunity to offer additional input to this
Committee, should the consideration of mandating additional switching
of haz mat cars to require changes in freight rates come before this
Committee. The employees do have ``skin in the game'' when significant
increases in switching of haz mat cars is under consideration. From our
vantage point, this debate is not just about one group of large
corporations attempting to involve Congress in their negotiations with
another group of large corporations; rather, this debate centers on the
safety of the operation and the current processes involving the proper
handling of placarded hazardous materials. We hope this conversation
never occurs in this Committee.
New Technology
Our railroads have historically been very slow in accepting and
applying new technologies in the industry. Change is the hardest thing
to accept in most work places, and it is also the only thing constant
in continuing operations.
The use of new technologies for detection of flaws in wheels and
hot journals is not universally applied, or required by FRA regulation.
Most railroads choose to use some type of defect detectors, but the
latest technologies are applied in very few locations.
New technology for detection of internal flaws in rail also is not
required by regulation and used infrequently. The frequency of track
inspections by Sperry Rail Services and similar rail flaw and track
geometry detectors is an appropriate subject for additional questions.
When a detector of any type discovers a flaw in a segment of rail, the
FRA regulations require that defect to be either repaired or protected
immediately. This process often means a multitude of ten mile per hour
slow orders on a subdivision immediately following the Sperry rail
inspections or similar operations. Some railroads indicate that not
knowing about the defects and not having many slow orders in place are
preferable to the new inspection technologies; the defects are then
repaired when discovered through traditional means, including signal
indications, visual inspections, or derailments.
Also, deferred maintenance normally brings concerns about rail
flaws and cross tie replacements into many accident investigations.
Rail replacement and routine track maintenance schedules are based on
the amount of train traffic, weather conditions, and the stability of
the road bed.
Our rail industry is also dealing with the distractions that some
new technology brings to our workplace. The use of cell phones and
Smart phones that allow texting and Internet connections have proven to
be safety concerns for safety critical employees. We are working with
the industry and FRA to get the best from technology and eliminate the
distractions from inappropriate use.
Training
With tens of thousands of new employees coming into the freight and
passenger rail industry in the near future, adequate and appropriate
training is a major safety concern.
One requirement of the RSIA of 2008 was to require FRA to implement
training standards for safety-related employees. The RSAC process
collaboratively developed proposals for FRA to consider and on February
7, 2012 FRA issued an NPRM. Under the proposed rule, railroads will be
required to develop comprehensive training programs for safety-related
employees and then submit those programs to FRA for review and
approval. Since the rule has not been finalized and thus there have
been no training programs submitted the effectiveness of this effort is
unknown. We are however happy to see that there is this focus on the
need for the adequate training or our members.
Our experience is that the training of our members varies widely
from railroad to railroad. Some of the larger railroads are reported to
have excellent initial training programs for conductors and engineers
and then rely almost exclusively on computer based training for follow-
up training or what I call ``training on your own.'' Railroads no
longer use the traditional model of mentoring or apprenticeship where a
new employee has the advantage of working with more mature employees
with experience, skills, and good technique.
Forty years ago there were five members of a train crew and you
spent years working as a brakeman before becoming a conductor and
likewise years as a fireman before becoming an engineer. Today the
standard crew size is two. Now railroads hire people off the street and
train them to be a conductor in several short months. Then oftentimes
this conductor moves right into training to become an engineer and in a
year's time he is operating a locomotive at high speed across the
country. We have reports of crews where both the conductor and engineer
have very little experience and are charged with operating trains in
challenging operating conditions. We are concerned about the long term
impact of insufficient training processes that create employees that
lack the confidence in their abilities to stop the movement when they
suspect something is wrong.
It's expensive to train new people, so like some American
companies, railroads when left to their own desires, will reduce
training costs as much as possible for the short term gains involved.
Truck Size and Truck Weight Increases
Increasing truck weight limits would have serious implications for
our environment. Many transportation professionals are working to find
innovative ways to shift more freight shipments from our highways to
our railroads as a congestion mitigation strategy, and also as a
highway maintenance schedule strategy. Railroads move cargo nearly four
times as far as trucks per gallon of fuel and emit one-third the
pollutants per ton mile when compared to trucks. By allowing heavier
trucks on the road and increasing taxpayer subsidies, Congress would be
incentivizing more shipments of freight by trucks using public highways
rather than by more fuel-efficient modes like rail. This is the reason
why increases in truck weights have never resulted in fewer trucks on
our highways.
Our railroads today do an excellent job of moving heavy loads
around our country on privately owned and privately maintained rights
of way. Our public infrastructure cannot absorb this additional burden.
An increase in highway maintenance expense and highway bridge
replacements triggered by ignoring the current DOT bridge formulas and
the engineering specifications for highways and bridges that created
the current limits on truck size and weight will also have a negative
impact on railroad safety. As many commuter rail authorities are
seeking help in the funding of new safety technologies, including PTC,
any increase in highway and bridge maintenance costs will absorb
potential sources of revenue for safety improvements of rail passenger
operations.
We urge this committee to take no action on any consideration of
increases in truck size and truck weights until DOT completes the
mandated study of costs. We think a required decrease in truck weight
will be the conclusion drawn by the study.
Conclusion
As Congress struggles to deal with problems of inadequate and
crumbling infrastructure, environmental concerns and energy issues, we
ask that you keep in mind railroads as an important means to help
address all these problems.
If many of us sitting in this room today had been successful over
the past twenty years in getting a National Transportation Policy and a
National Energy Policy, there is no argument that both freight and
passenger rail would be a focus for energy efficiency, relieving
highway congestion, preserving existing highway and bridge maintenance
schedules, and also providing flexible viable options as our population
continues to grow. The lack of either a Transportation or Energy policy
has contributed to the struggle for appropriate solutions for our
constant transportation problems.
As the price of fuel in this country continues to spiral upwards,
we look forward to working with this Committee to find fresh ideas on
how best to improve Amtrak and other rail passenger services to provide
new travel options for our citizens around the country. Each time I
pass through a major airport, I marvel at the number of flights listed
on the board for destinations that are 350 miles or less from that
airport. Higher speed rail and high speed rail would complement, not
compete, with air travel services. If we shifted the passengers that
are scheduled to fly 300 miles to higher speed rail, in most cases the
passenger would arrive in the same amount of time. Open airport slots
could then be filled with longer distance flights, and postpone the
construction of new airports or new runways.
Faced with the problem of highway congestion, part of the answer
should be to develop policies that shift freight and passenger traffic
to railroads. A single freight train can take 280 trucks off the
highway with a greatly improved use of fuel resources. The railroads
have shared the fact that today our railroads can move one ton of
freight almost 500 miles with one gallon of fuel oil. A high speed rail
corridor can transport as many passengers as eight new lanes of
interstate highway.
Looking at ways to address environmental concerns, keep in mind
freight and passenger trains produce a fraction of the pollutants that
trucks and automobiles use in moving the comparable number of tons and
passengers.
In attempting to make America energy independent, consider trains
are almost five times more fuel efficient than trucks. Another point
should be under consideration--trains operate on privately owned and
maintained rights of way and pay 100 percent of the cost of their use
of that right of way. It is not the rail industry that is asking
Congress to rebuild all the off ramps of the Interstate Highway system
and forgive the extra bridge maintenance needed to increase the size
and weight of big trucks moving on our highways.
When deciding about whether or not to pour new seas of concrete at
airports and around cities, I urge this Committee to think about the
less expensive and better alternative of building high and higher speed
rail. A new commuter rail system is one of the solutions to local
highway congestion.
Thanks again for the opportunity to appear here today and we look
forward to working with this Committee to find ways to meet our
Nation's transportation needs.
I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee members may
have.
Exhibit 1
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Exhibit 2
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Exhibit 3
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Exhibit 4
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Exhibit 5
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Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Stem.
Commissioner Redeker?
STATEMENT OF JAMES P. REDEKER, COMMISSIONER, CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Redeker. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal, Senator
Blunt, Senator Johnson. I am honored to be here this morning,
representing the Connecticut Department of Transportation, as
well as the Chair of the Northeast Corridor Commission.
Connecticut's rail freight and passenger freight system is
significant. The New Haven line is the busiest rail line in the
country for commuter trains. We also have Shoreline East,
several branch lines, and Amtrak intercity service operates on
the Northeast Corridor and through the inland route to
Springfield.
The State of Connecticut has a unique role in the Northeast
Corridor, as we are the owner of 46 miles of the Northeast
Corridor, second only to Amtrak in ownership.
As owner, we have invested significant amounts of money to
provide a safe infrastructure. In the last 10 years alone, we
have invested over $3.2 billion in the New Haven line while
Amtrak has invested only $64 million.
Of the $3.2 billion, $2 billion comes from State of
Connecticut bond dollars, while the remainder is Federal
Transit Administration rail formula or discretionary funding.
Despite the progress, there is a $4.5 billion backlog in
critical state-of-good-repair that needs to be addressed in the
near term. A critical priority is the replacement of cab signal
automated train control. And while this system is extremely
effective, it must be upgraded, and this occurs at the same
time as the implementation of positive train control, which, as
you heard, has both financial and implementation challenges.
I should note that PTC is estimated to cost Connecticut
$130 million in addition to cab signal upgrades, and that it
will impact our ability to continue the pace of investment and
state-of-good-repair.
Now, Connecticut is not alone in addressing the backlog of
state-of-good-repair investments. The Northeast corridor relies
on over 1,000 bridges and tunnels, many of which were
constructed over a century ago, and in desperate need of
repair.
Key segments are at capacity or overcapacity. In 2010, the
Northeast Corridor infrastructure master plan identified a need
for an expenditure of $2.6 billion in annual expenditures over
20 years to achieve state-of-good-repair.
The Northeast Corridor Commission is now updating that
capital plan report. There is a critical needs and
infrastructure report that identifies long-term needs and will
be delivering a 5-year plan at the end of this year.
Now turning to the maintenance and operation of the New
Haven line, Connecticut has an operating agreement with Metro-
North to provide for the delivery of operations, as well as the
maintenance of facilities, track, bridges, power signals, and
rolling stock. Amtrak maintains its portion.
Metro-North's track inspection programs all comply with
relevant Federal guidelines and standards. All track is
inspected twice each week or more. All bridges are inspected
annually. And our track inspectors are trained to identify
deviations and defects. And critically, they have the
responsibility and authority to take a track out of service or
to repair it immediately, if necessary.
Metro-North also inspects with specialized equipment,
Sperry rail cars and track geometry cars, twice a year, which
exceeds the Federal Railroad Administration.
Our track inspectors meet all the qualifications of FRA.
They are all foremen possessing high level of skills and
experience, so they can detect deviations from track standards.
And we are in compliance with all the Rail Safety
Improvement Act of 2008 programs that have had deadlines
established for them.
With regard to employee safety, Metro-North has worked to
completely transform the safety culture and has been actually
commended through the APTA audit of safety and been given kudos
for its clearly demonstrated leadership in the safety and
security of customers and employees as a top priority.
Now the derailment that occurred on May 17 has been talked
about before. When we look at what happened there, I should
note that service had to be suspended on the entire Northeast
Corridor in Connecticut. The derailment destroyed track signals
and catenary, and the remaining two tracks that could have been
used were out of service due to long-term repairs that
Connecticut is investing in to deal with the backlog of the
state-of-good-repair.
Now, amazingly, we put 2,000 feet of track back in just a
couple days. And within 5 days, full service was restored.
A critical point: Connecticut's level of investment in that
state-of-good-repair is programmed over the next decade to take
care of that backlog. But it will take a decade where two
tracks may still be out of service on the Northeast Corridor's
busiest commuter rail line--two out of four tracks for a
decade.
The incident with the track foreman that was struck and
killed was an unfortunate incident. Metro-North has taken many
procedures in place to try to address the safety protocols to
prevent that in the future.
A preliminary report on June 4 noted that Metro-North
inspectors, they found a defect 2 days before the derailment.
But, as noted, that was not a requirement to immediately take
it out of service. It was just, rather, put into a priority for
future maintenance, as are all inspections in terms of their
protocols.
With regard to the latest NTSB finding and recommendation,
Metro-North has acted upon that immediately. And they are
taking both technological and procedural aspects of their
protocols to prevent any future incidents.
I will commend Metro-North for taking action well in
advance of any NTSB findings and working with the
Transportation Technology Center doing extra inspections,
increasing the right-of-way inspections, and exploring
solutions to better employee safety.
And I am convinced that together, Connecticut DOT, Metro-
North, and NTSB will work together to significantly and even
more improve the quality and safety of our right-of-way and our
service.
And I appreciate this time, and appreciate any questions at
the end of the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Redeker follows:]
Prepared Statement of James P. Redeker, Commissioner,
Connecticut Department of Transportation
Good morning Senator Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members
of the Subcommittee. I am Jim Redeker, Commissioner of the Connecticut
Department of Transportation (CTDOT). I am also the current Chair of
the Northeast Corridor Commission. I am honored to have the opportunity
to discuss passenger and freight rail safety on the Northeast Corridor
and in particular, on the rail lines within the State of Connecticut.
Connecticut's Rail Infrastructure and Investments
Connecticut's rail freight and passenger system is strategically
located between New York City and Boston. There are numerous freight
railroads, ranging from a large Class I railroad to shorter regional
and local railroads. There are also three passenger rail operations;
the New Haven Line (NHL) commuter service operates between New Haven,
Connecticut and Grand Central Terminal in New York City with connecting
branches to New Canaan, Danbury, and Waterbury; the Shore Line East
(SLE) commuter service which operates between New Haven and New London;
and Amtrak intercity passenger service provided along the Northeast
Corridor (NEC) between Washington and Boston, and the inland route
between New Haven and Springfield, Massachusetts.
The State of Connecticut has a unique role on the NEC, since the
state owns 46 miles of the NEC infrastructure between New Haven and the
New York border as well as three branch lines. In total, Connecticut
owns 235 track miles on the NEC and the three branch lines.
As the owner, Connecticut has invested significant state and
Federal resources to upgrade the rail infrastructure, including track,
catenary and bridges. Connecticut has funded the complete replacement
of 405 New Haven Line electric passenger vehicles and the construction
of related new maintenance facilities to support that fleet. As a
result of the State's investment, progress toward a State of Good
Repair has been strong. It is important to note that the Connecticut
portion of the NEC is not part of the Amtrak capital program. As a
result, almost all of the funding for the infrastructure is solely a
state responsibility. In the last 10 years, Connecticut has invested
over $3.2 billion in the NHL, while Amtrak has invested $64 million in
track-related. Of the $3.2 billion, two-thirds, or over $2 billion has
been funded by state bond funds, while the remainder is Federal Transit
Administration rail formula or discretionary funding.
Despite the progress, there is an estimated $4.5 billion backlog in
critical State of Good repair needs that have to be addressed in the
near-term. Included in this backlog are catenary replacement, four
major moveable bridges between Greenwich and New Haven as well as
numerous fixed bridges on the line. The State has invested substantial
dollars over the years to maintain these bridges in order to meet the
demand for passenger and freight service on one of the most heavily
traveled rail lines in the country. A critical priority is replacement
of the cab signal automatic train control system; while this system is
extremely effective, it must be upgraded. This occurs at the same time
as the implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC). PTC requirements
present both financial and implementation challenges. CTDOT continues
to work collaboratively with MNR to advance this effort by the 2015
deadline. I should note that PTC is estimated to cost CTDOT $130
million in addition to the cab signal upgrades, and that will impact
our ability to maintain the pace of SOGR normalized replacement of
assets as well as desired capacity improvements.
Northeast Corridor Infrastructure and Investments
Connecticut is not alone in addressing the backlog of SOGR
investments. The NEC relies on over 1,000 bridges and tunnels, many of
which were constructed over a century ago and are in desperate need of
replacement or repair. Key segments of the NEC are operating at or near
capacity, such as the Hudson River Tunnels between NY and NJ, which
carry over 70,000 riders daily and have no space for additional trains
during rush hour. Major components of the NEC's electrical and
signaling systems date back to the 1910s, making service on the line
highly susceptible to malfunctions and delay. Major investment in the
Corridor is essential to reduce delays, achieve a state-of-good-repair,
and build capacity for growth. In 2010, the NEC Infrastructure Master
Plan (Master Plan) estimated that the Corridor required approximately
$2.6 billion in annual expenditures over twenty years ($52 billion
total) in order to achieve state-of-good-repair and build
infrastructure capable of supporting passenger rail demand forecasts
for 2030. Investment levels over the past several decades have been
critical in supporting the NEC's enviable record of continuous safe
operation but have barely covered the costs of normalized replacement
of basic components. They fall far short of the levels needed to
address repair backlogs and meet future needs. The NEC Commission is
currently in the process of developing an updated capital investment
plan for the NEC that will address the needs of freight, commuter and
intercity services. A copy of a report entitled, ``Critical
Infrastructure Needs on the Northeast Corridor'' is available on the
NEC Commission website at www.nec-commission.com. The Commission is
scheduled to complete the capital plan by the end of this year.
Safety of Connecticut Rail Operations
Turning to operations and maintenance of the NHL, CTDOT has an
operating agreement with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's
Metro-North Railroad (MTA/MNR) to operate the NHL. This agreement
assigns responsibility to MNR for maintenance of rail facilities
including track, bridges, culverts, power and signals, and rolling
stock. AMTRAK is responsible for maintaining the infrastructure they
own and provides those services as part of the operating agreement
CTDOT has for Shore Line East service.
Metro-North's track inspection programs are designed to comply with
all relevant Federal guidelines and standards. All track is visually
inspected twice each week. All bridges are inspected annually. Track
inspectors are trained to identify deviations and defects. Critically,
they have the authority and responsibility to take immediate action, if
necessary, such as reducing train speeds or taking the section of track
out of service entirely. In addition to defects that require immediate
action, FRA guidelines and standards require track inspectors to make
note of ANY deviations to the basic track structure. These other types
of deviations are noted so that there can be follow-up--either by
programmed maintenance or in the next visual inspection. MNR also
inspects the right-of-way with specialized equipment (track geometry
car/Sperry Rail Car) twice a year--exceeding FRA requirements.
Federal track safety standards also identify requirements for the
qualifications of inspectors. All of MN track inspectors are qualified
foremen, possessing a higher level of experience and knowledge so that
they can accurately detect deviations from track standards.
I would also note that MNR is in compliance with all provisions of
the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 that have had program
implementation dates established. There are elements of RSIA--such as
PTC--that are still in process, but we are in compliance with the
interim deadlines required under the Act.
Employee Safety
With regard to employee safety, Metro-North has worked to
completely transform the safety culture throughout MNR over the past
two decades. As a result, there has been a drastic reduction of FRA
reportable employee injuries from 1,000 per year in the early 1990s to
the current, sustained annual average of below 200 per year since 2008
(a reduction of 500 percent). MNR was the last recipient of the MTA
Chairman's Safety Award (2011) for its stellar safety record amongst
the MTA family.
In 2011, the American Public Transit Association (APTA) conducted
an audit of the MNR System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) which resulted in
the following commendation, ``APTA commends the management staff at MNR
for its commitment and openness to further improve its system safety
and security programs. MNR has clearly demonstrated that the safety and
security of its customers and employees are its first priority. This
open commitment to improving safety and security provides an excellent
foundation for a proactive safety and security culture that is
ultimately supported by all employees. APTA supports this proactive
management approach to continuous improvement in the areas of safety
and security performance.'' Moving forward, MNR will continue to focus
on customer and employee safety as the railroad's top priority.
Recent Derailment and Employee Fatality
Despite an excellent safety record and maintenance efforts, MNR
experienced two safety events this May. At approximately 6 p.m. on May
17, an eastbound NHL passenger train derailed and was struck by a
westbound train between Bridgeport and Fairfield, Connecticut. About
250 passengers were on each train at the time of the incident. 73
passengers and 3 MNR personnel were transported to area hospitals with
injuries. The NTSB arrived at the scene within hours of the incident.
Service on the NHL was suspended between South Norwalk and New
Haven and Amtrak NEC service was suspended between Boston and New York.
The derailment destroyed track, signal and catenary systems on two
tracks. The remaining two tracks are out of service due to a CTDOT
project to replace 100 year old catenary and fixed bridges in the area
of the derailment. As a result, the 4 track capacity of the NEC was
reduced to 2 tracks, and both of those were fouled by the derailment.
Amazingly, 2,000 feet of the 2 track infrastructure was completely
rebuilt, tested and restored to service four days later and full
service was restored the following day.
I would like to pause to make an important point. CTDOT's current
level of state and rail formula funding has been programmed over the
next decade to address the backlog of replacement or major
rehabilitation of the NHL infrastructure. That includes 20 moveable and
fixed bridges, 80 miles of catenary replacement, a new signal system,
and PTC. Without additional funding, CTDOT anticipates that additional
2 track outages will be required on sections of the NEC for the next
decade, eliminating critical capacity and redundancy through
Connecticut.
On May 28, 2013, a Metro-North track foreman was struck and killed
by a Metro-North passenger train traveling at 70 mph in West Haven,
Conn. The foreman had requested the section of track be taken out of
service for maintenance. Two Metro-North rail traffic controllers, one
of whom was a student controller, placed the section out of service.
But the student controller reopened the track a little more than an
hour later without the approval of the qualified controller or the
foreman.
Prior to this incident, on May 4, 2013, another Metro-North rail
traffic controller mistakenly placed out-of-service track back in
service. Two days later, Metro-North instituted additional operations
control procedures, but these procedures did not prevent the May 28
fatal incident.
NTSB Preliminary Reports and Recommendations
A preliminary report by the NTSB issued on June 4 noted that Metro-
North inspectors found a track defect two days before the May 17
derailment. However, NTSB further indicated that the Federal standards
and guidelines currently in place did not require immediate action for
any of those track defects noted.
On June 17, the National Transportation Safety Board issued an
urgent safety recommendation to Metro-North Railroad to provide
redundant protection for track maintenance crews who depend on train
dispatchers to provide signal protection. The NTSB is urgently
recommending that Metro-North require redundant signal protection, such
as shunting, in these circumstances. A shunt is a device that crews can
attach to the rails in a work zone that alerts the controller and gives
approaching trains a stop signal.
Metro-North received NTSB's recommendation and will implement
safety improvements as quickly as possible. Metro-North acted
immediately after the fatal accident to activate a new procedure to
prevent a Rail Traffic Controller from removing a block on a track
without the explicit approval of the Chief Rail Traffic Controller.
Previously a block could be removed by an RTC with the verbal
permission of the roadway worker on the scene of the track work. In
addition, the railroad already has begun working on a technological
solution beyond the current system of verbal confirmations. It will
require mechanical input from the roadway worker to implement and
relinquish all blocks.
Current Actions by Metro-North/MTA
While the NTSB investigation is ongoing, in consultation with
CTDOT, Metro-North has already taken action to review its existing
programs and processes in advance of formal NTSB recommendations. These
actions include:
Retaining Transportation Technology Center Inc. TTCI is the
internationally-renowned research affiliate of the American
Association of Railroads which will assess our track
maintenance and inspection programs, and to identify ways we
can improve our efforts to maintain our right-of-way.
Inspecting and conducting an inventory of all similar
joints--it is important to note that no joint bar defects were
found.
Increasing inspections of our right-of-way using specialized
equipment on loan from other railroads.
Exploring solutions to better protect railroad employees
working in the right-of-way.
Building in additional safeguards to our procedures in the
railroad's operations control center regarding returning tracks
to revenue service.
CTDOT and Metro-North will continue to support the NTSB's
investigation and will also implement any recommendations.
Closing
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
rail safety and I am prepared to address any questions you have.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Commissioner.
And now Ms. Teel?
STATEMENT OF MICHELLE TEEL, P.E., PTOE,
MULTIMODAL OPERATIONS DIRECTOR,
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Teel. Thank you, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member
Blunt, and Senator Johnson. I am pleased to be here to share
the State experience of freight and rail passenger safety.
Missouri has a long history with railroads, from James Eads
building the first Mississippi River railroad bridge crossing,
to the Jesse James gang robbing trains, to today's unit trains
carrying oil from northern hydraulic fracking operations.
Missouri's railroads have seen and done it all.
Missouri is the fourth most rail-intensive state. In 2012,
Missouri railroads carried 438 million tons of goods, more than
any other mode in our state, even trucks.
Missouri is home to the second and third largest U.S. rail
hubs in Kansas City and St. Louis, respectively. Missouri has
4,000 miles of mainline tracks, 7,000 public and private rail
crossings, four intercity passenger rail routes. And six of the
Nation's seven class I railroads operate in Missouri.
With such a massive amount of rail traffic, the potential
for danger is around every corner, and in every rail yard.
As you heard, just 3 weeks ago in Southeast Missouri, two
trains collided at a railroad diamond intersection. When these
trains collided, they also hit a MoDOT bridge, causing it to
collapse. A total of seven people were involved in the
incident, and amazingly, the worst injury was a broken bone.
But this incident speaks to the importance of railroad
safety and the need to systematically and constantly work to
improve it.
One week after this incident, a barge carrying an extremely
large crane broke loose, floated downriver, and became wedged
under a Missouri River rail crossing in St. Louis. It took
nearly 3 days to remove the crane.
Interstate commerce is the driver of the Missouri and U.S.
economy, and incidents like these can have far-reaching
consequences.
Missouri is one of a handful of states with strict State
railroad safety regulations. It includes requirements for
operating practices, reporting, grade crossing safety, tariffs,
train equipment, and training.
Missouri assesses each operating railroad for intrastate
revenues to fund four railroad safety inspectors. These
inspectors also enforce Federal regulations, so we coordinate
closely with the Federal Railroad Administration inspectors.
Another area of concern is grade crossing safety. From 2008
to 2012, there were 192 grade crossing incidents resulting in
41 fatalities in our state. This put Missouri as fifth worse in
the U.S. The funding Congress provides for improving this
crossings makes up approximately 80 percent of the funds MoDOT
has available for this purpose.
Railroads have never been safer, but there is still so much
to do.
Missouri is also home to four passenger rail routes. The
Missouri River Runner is a State-sponsored route from Kansas
City to St. Louis. There are also two national routes, the
Texas Eagle and the Southwest Chief. Finally, an Illinois
State-sponsored route, the Lincoln Service, originates in St.
Louis, Missouri.
These routes are experiencing high ridership growth, and
the Missouri River Runners growth is exceptional. Since 2007,
ridership is up 74 percent. Ticket revenue is up 112 percent.
On-time performance is around 90 percent. And customer
satisfaction for this route has gone from last in the country
to seventh.
Missouri was awarded $50 million in the FRA's high-speed
intercity passenger rail program funding. This leveraged
another $20 million investment from railroads in our state.
These investments target on-time performance and safety for
both freight and passenger rail.
Missouri, Illinois, California, and Michigan all worked as
a team to acquire new and safer passenger rail equipment, which
is currently in the procurement process. Without Federal
investment, this new equipment would not be possible.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share information on
Missouri's role in freight and passenger rail safety. The
opportunities for additional rail investment are tremendous.
Missouri recently completed a rail plan that identified $1.4
billion in unmet needs for passenger and freight rail in our
state.
I urge you to continue investment in railroads, as it is
key to the success of America's transportation system and
economy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Teel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michelle Teel, P.E., PTOE, Multimodal Operations
Director, Missouri Department of Transportation
Introduction
Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Thune, for
inviting me to participate in this hearing. I am Michelle Teel, the
Missouri Department of Transportation's Multimodal Operations Director.
I'm so pleased to be here to share the state experience of freight and
passenger rail safety in America's transportation system. The nation's
rail system is an essential part of surface transportation. Missouri
has a long history with railroads, from James Eads building the first
Mississippi River railroad bridge to the Jesse James gang robbing
trains to today's unit trains carrying oil from northern hydraulic
fracking operations, Missouri's railroads have seen and done it all.
I am here today to share Missouri's unique story regarding
railroads and railroad safety.
Missouri's Rail System
Missouri is the fourth most rail intensive state. In 2012, Missouri
railroads carried 438 million tons of goods, more than any other mode
in our state, even trucks. This amount of freight equates to nearly 11
million fully loaded trucks. If lined up end-to-end, they would circle
the earth six times.
Missouri's central U.S. location makes it the crossroads for
freight. Missouri is home to the second and third largest U.S. rail
hubs in Kansas City and St. Louis, respectively. Missouri is second
only to Chicago, Illinois. These figures are based on size. If tonnage
is used for comparison; Kansas City's terminal experiences the most
tonnage in the U.S. Missouri has 4,000 miles of main line track, 7,000
public and private rail crossings, four intercity passenger rail
routes, and six of the nations seven Class I railroads operate in
Missouri. With such a massive amount of rail traffic, the potential for
danger is around every corner and in every rail yard.
Just three weeks ago, in southeast Missouri, a Union Pacific train
collided with a Burlington Northern Santa Fe train at a railroad
diamond intersection. When these two trains collided, they also hit a
MoDOT bridge causing it to collapse. A total of seven people were
involved in the incident and, amazingly, the worst injury was a broken
bone, but this incident speaks to the importance of railroad safety and
the need to systematically and constantly work to improve it.
One week after this incident, a barge carrying an extremely large
crane (being used on a MoDOT bridge replacement project) broke loose.
It floated down river, took out major power lines and became wedged
under and against Norfolk Southern's Missouri River crossing in St.
Louis. It took nearly three days to remove the crane. Norfolk
Southern's midwestern train operations came to a grinding halt.
Interstate commerce is a driver of the Missouri and U.S. economy.
Incidents like these can have far reaching consequences.
Freight Rail Safety
Missouri is one of a handful of states with strict state railroad
safety regulations. They include requirements for operating practices,
reporting, grade crossing safety, tariffs, train equipment, and
training. Missouri assesses each operating railroad for intrastate
revenue to fund four railroad safety inspectors. Each of these safety
inspectors specializes in disciplines to ensure coverage of the state
regulations. Because MoDOT railroad safety inspectors become certified
inspectors through the Federal Railroad Administration's program, they
also enforce Federal regulations. If you recall, I mentioned there are
approximately 4,000 miles of main line track in Missouri. This is an
immense amount of territory for four inspectors to cover, so we
coordinate closely with the Federal Railroad Administration inspectors.
Another area of concern is grade-crossing safety. Missouri has
3,800 public crossings scattered statewide. They require significant
attention. From 2008 to 2012, there were 192 grade crossing incidents
resulting in 41 fatalities. This put Missouri as fifth-worst in the
U.S. The funding Congress provides for improving these crossings makes
up approximately 80 percent of the funds MoDOT has available for this
purpose. This is very important to Missouri and I urge you to continue
to invest in these critical safety improvements. To give you some
scale, Missouri receives approximately $6 million per year in Federal
highway funding for 3,800 public crossings. The state invests
approximately $1.2 million. Railroads have never been safer, but there
is still much to do.
Safety data is a key tool used to address railroad safety. This
data helps our MoDOT railroad staff prioritize crossing improvements.
It also helps our railroad safety inspectors focus on particular
regions of the state, given what the data is showing. For example, in
2012, MoDOT focused on 11 of Missouri's 114 counties. More than 50
percent of all railroad incidents occurred within these counties.
Through engineering, enforcement, education, and emergency medical
services, Missouri makes every attempt to use the data to be as
strategic as possible with limited resources.
Passenger Rail Safety
Missouri is home to four passenger rail routes. The Missouri River
Runner is the state-sponsored route from Kansas City to St. Louis.
There are also two national routes, the Texas Eagle and the Southwest
Chief. Finally, Illinois' state sponsored Lincoln Service originates in
St. Louis, Missouri. These routes are experiencing ridership growth.
There is a need for continued investment to help ensure the safety of
the passengers and crews. In addition, continued investment is needed
to address capacity issues. Both freight and intercity passenger rail
are experiencing growth in the same corridor.
The Missouri River Runner's growth is exceptional since 2007.
Ridership is up 74 percent, ticket revenue is up 112 percent, on-time
performance is around 90 percent and customer satisfaction for the
route has gone from last in the country to seventh. The railroad the
Missouri River Runner operates on is a Union Pacific road which is also
seeing increases in traffic. MoDOT is committed to ensuring the
viability and safety of both freight and passenger movements.
Missouri was awarded $50 million in the Federal Railroad
Administration's High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program funding.
This leveraged another $20 million in investment from host railroads.
These investments along the Missouri River Runner route target on-time
performance and safety for both freight and passenger rail. They have
and will continue to contribute to both of these goals for the
foreseeable future. However, continued investment in passenger rail is
necessary to address increasing passenger movements.
Passenger rail safety also comes in the way of equipment. Missouri,
Illinois, California and Michigan all worked as a team to acquire new
and safer passenger rail equipment, which is currently in the
procurement process. Without Federal investment, this new equipment
would not be possible. Missouri is an active member in the Next
Generation Equipment Committee and committed to the goals and
objectives of this important body, consisting of the FRA, Amtrak and
interested states.
Conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to share information on
Missouri's role in freight and passenger rail safety. The opportunities
for additional rail investment are tremendous. Missouri recently
completed a state rail plan which identified $1.4 billion in unmet
needs for passenger and freight rail. I urge you to continue investment
in railroads, as it is key to the success of America's transportation
system and economy.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Ms. Teel.
We are going to begin our questioning with Senator Johnson,
and then Senator Blunt and I will follow.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
that. I am sorry I am going to have to leave earlier.
But I just really have one question for as many people who
really want to speak to the issue.
Mr. Redeker, you basically were talking about the point I
was trying to make with the earlier panel. As much as we would
all love to see positive train control fully implemented and
saving lives, the investment in that has a cost. And that cost
is investment in other areas of safety.
And my other concern--and again, I want whoever wants to
weigh in on this to give be given that opportunity.
There seems to be challenges technologically, whether it is
even possible. There are challenges in terms of whether the
spectrum is even going to be made available.
So I would just like, starting with you, Mr. Redeker, to
speak to that point.
Is this even possible? Is Congress trying to force
something that just simply cannot be done?
Mr. Redeker. I would like to point out that Connecticut's
capital program identifies PTC as a priority, but I think the
timeframes are unrealistic in terms of being able to achieve
them.
I also should note that on the New Haven-Hartford-
Springfield high-speed intercity corridor route, that project
includes installation of a new signal system and positive train
control, which, frankly, would have been born by Amtrak, if it
was not being borne by the state of Connecticut in that
corridor.
But we have, as a result, had to spread out some of our
other investments for state-of-good-repair projects, or
capacity expansion projects, over a longer period of time.
So it is a tradeoff that we have made of deferring some
additional investments, be it for capacity or for state-of-
good-repair, with a priority being PTC. And we are partnering
with Metro-North because we are part of their overall system,
and actually being part of the first pilot segment for the
Metro-North system, so Connecticut is leading in that.
So we are committed to safety. We have made some tradeoffs
in timing for other projects. And we are, frankly, struggling
with all the issues everyone else is struggling with in terms
of spectrum and radios and integration and cost.
Senator Johnson. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Yes, I would like to speak specifically to a
few of our member railroads and what they are doing and what
their challenges are.
The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, or
SEPTA, operates commuter rail, as well as other transit modes
in the Philadelphia region. SEPTA is one that is anticipating
to meet the target. They have set that as a priority. You may
have read recently, earlier this week, they are putting a
bridge out of service, probably next month. They have already
spent $130 million to stay on track to meet the 2015 deadline.
Much more in expenditures to come between now and then.
But to get there, they had to defer their bridge
replacement program. And so there is a bridge over the
Schuylkill where trains will not be running most likely next
month. And that means that the service on that line will be
disrupted for some indeterminable amount of time with alternate
bus transportation. And most of us know that, comparing the
travel times between the bus and the rail, that those customers
will be back in their single occupancy vehicle on the highways.
We have another member, we spoke, I think, Ms. Hersman
spoke about Alaska Railroad being one that expected to be on
time, and they certainly do, and are continuing to work
aggressively to meet the deadline. They are having significant
challenges with the spectrum.
In fact, they are having an interesting challenge in that
apparently they are negotiating with PTC-220, and they cannot
obtain or afford the insurance that is required.
Hopefully, they will be able to work through that, but that
is potential delay, nonetheless, for one railroad that is
committed and expecting to be on time.
We have a small Northwestern commuter railroad that, about
a year ago, essentially went on record to say they just do not
have the funds. It is a small operation, about 30 trains a day,
pretty much only in the a.m. and p.m. peak. They operate on a
short line railroad with very light freight traffic.
They said, we just simply cannot afford to do this. And
their alternatives are, one, to reduce their service by about
two-thirds to come under the threshold required for PTC, which
I believe is 12 trains a day; or to simply on December 31,
2015, discontinue service.
Senator Johnson. So there are real costs.
Mr. Hamberger, very quickly. I am about out of time.
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
And let me just say, before I answer the question, I want
to get in on the record, we are not seeking repeal of this
mandate. We have $3 billion into it. We have too much work into
it, and this is a decision from the CEO level on down, we are
committed to getting this done. We need more time to do it.
If we were back in 2008 and you said, how could you spend
$10 billion to improve safety, PTC would be part of the mix,
but it would be more of the roadside detectors, more of the
capital projects and maintenance projects that I referenced. We
have a safe railroad. But the list of projects is never ending.
And so we would be spending even more money on the basic
blocking and tackling, along with some of these other
technologies.
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Senator Johnson.
Senator Blunt?
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. A truly great Chairman
lets the other members ask their questions so they can get on
to the things that we are already behind on. And I thank you,
Chairman, for doing that.
Also, great panel. Thanks to all of you for being here.
Lots of good information. I am sure I will have other questions
to ask in writing for your response later.
Mr. Redeker, on the choices you said you were having to
make about more customer service and maintenance, if you did
not have the PTC requirement, even though Mr. Hamberger says
the railroads want to now finish this up, would you have chosen
to prioritize PTC? I am going to have to have pretty quick
answers here.
Mr. Redeker. I think we have a very efficient and effective
cab signaling system today. It needs to be upgraded, and that
would have been our top priority.
Senator Blunt. OK.
Ms. Teel, thanks for being here. Every state thinks they
have the top of whatever the hearing is about. I think we do
have the busiest rail state in the country. And if you look at
a railroad map of the country, I believe that would bear that
out.
The Chaffee accident, where I think a bridge went down, a
highway bridge, it was the overpass bridge, who takes care of
replacing that bridge? And how is the process going?
Ms. Teel. That process is going well. The railroads have
indicated that they are--one in particular is going to take
care of the cost for that. And once the investigation is final,
all those determinations will be finalized. But we have a
really good partnership with those class I railroads, and we
feel confident that those costs are going to be taken care of
by the railroad.
Senator Blunt. And did you say that crossing accidents were
the big percentage of accidents that happen, in our state, at
least?
Ms. Teel. Correct.
Senator Blunt. And I believe, Mr. Hamberger, between
crossing and trespassing, you get almost to 100 percent. It is
like 90 some percent of all----
Mr. Hamberger. Over 95 percent of fatalities, yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. All right, crossings and people who should
not be on the track, who are on the track.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir. And, unfortunately, our research
shows that about a third of those trespassers are suicides.
Senator Blunt. They intend to be on the track?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. About a third.
Ms. Teel, the working relationship between what you do at
the Missouri Department of Transportation and both the NTSB and
the FRA, how would you explain that setup?
Ms. Teel. Senator, it is a great working relationship. In
fact, we also enforce the Federal Railroad Administration
regulations and work closely with the regional office in Kansas
City and have also worked with NTSB on the investigation in
Chaffee, Missouri. And we are proud of the partnership that we
have not only with those agencies, but also with the railroads
in our state.
Senator Blunt. Mr. Stem, is there any difference now
between the way passenger work schedules go out for passenger
rail or freight rail?
Mr. Stem. Yes, sir. Passenger rail now has its own hours of
service regimen. They are based on predictable work schedules,
and they do have to, by regulation, apply the science that is
available.
Senator Blunt. And your testimony was really focusing on
making those even better. They are already different, but your
testimony was focused that they should be even better?
Mr. Stem. My testimony indicates that the problem is with
the freight hours of service and the totally unpredictable work
schedules and the new pressures that are being applied by the
railroads in an attempt to significantly reduce the numbers of
safety critical employees that they have to have on staff to
continue the level of service that is present today.
Senator Blunt. So if I heard that right, you think the
passenger service efforts are actually better than the freight?
Mr. Stem. Yes, sir. They are a model for us to aim for with
improvements in the fatigue mitigation strategies and plans
that are now being required.
Senator Blunt. OK.
Mr. Hamberger, on that topic, and then the topic of only
needing to apply to 39 percent, I want to be sure I have your
sense.
Mr. Hamberger. My sense is that 39 percent is low. We are a
90,000-mile network, and we are putting PTC on 60,000 miles.
That does not quite equal 39 percent by my math.
With respect to fatigue management, Mr. Stem is correct.
That is something that both labor and management are working on
cooperatively across the board in many areas. With respect to
the predictability of our network, a freight railroad is not a
passenger railroad. We do have predictable time for yard
service and for local service. But for over the line long-
distance trains, that can be dependent upon what our customers
want, when they are ready to have their shipments go.
We cannot have a 10-hour call window. If someone is
scheduled to report at 12 and calls up at 10 and says I am ill,
I cannot get there, then what? We have to wait to give someone
else a 10-hour notice, so that train that was going to leave at
12 has to wait 10 hours until a replacement crew can get there?
We are a 140,000-mile, including the short lines, outdoor
assembly line. We have mudslides, snow, washouts, all of which
makes this schedule unpredictable. We support the 10-hour
uninterrupted call, but right after the work ends in the first
place.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, and I will have some questions, a
few more questions for some of you. Thank you all.
Mr. Stem. Senator Blunt, if I may add, 39 percent figure is
not my figure. That is the Federal Railroad Administration
estimate: 140,000-mile network, including some short lines that
will be required to apply PTC. And I think Mr. Hamberger is
close. It was 60,000 miles of a 140,000-mile segment, and they
have been able to negotiate that mileage down to 50,000 miles.
So that is the FRA figure.
Senator Blunt. Since we have come back to this, does the
system, Mr. Hamberger, have to be interoperable?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir. It is so that a railroad, just to
use a name, a Union Pacific locomotive that goes through
Chicago has to be interoperable with Metro, the commuter rail
there, with Amtrak operating there, with every other class I
railroad operating there. And if that Union Pacific, we have
what is called run through power, if that locomotive goes
through Chicago and continues on its way on a CSX track, it has
to be able to talk to the CSX back office.
And that is one of the challenges, that we do not even have
that software yet for the back office. It is going to be
delivered sometime this summer.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
And thank you, Mr. Stem, for clarifying that point.
Let me begin my questioning, if I may, with Commissioner
Redeker.
You made what, for me, is an extraordinarily important
point about the investment that Connecticut taxpayers are
making in these lines. I think the numbers that you used were
$3.2 billion over the last 10 years, as compared to $60 million
invested by Amtrak, which I think attests to the leadership
that you have provided, along with the Governors and the
continuing vision and commitment going forward to make the
investment by State taxpayers, which I think is done in other
states as well, maybe not to the same extent, but certainly not
without great fiscal challenge and difficulty at a time when
State governments face tremendous deficits. We talk a lot here
about our Federal deficit, but obviously the states have been
extremely challenged fiscally.
And so let me begin by asking you about the continuing work
that is ongoing on the Northeast Corridor, which has reduced
capacity in certain areas from four tracks to two. Did that
reduction in capacity exacerbate or aggravate the disruption
that occurred as a result of the collision and derailment?
Mr. Redeker. Yes, Senator. We have about 15 miles of two
tracks out of service. Our bridge structures, which are being
rehabilitated concurrently with catenary replacement, are two-
track structures. So in that section, we are doing several
bridges. And that means that those tracks are out of service.
They have been for almost 2 years, and we are about ready to
complete that this year.
But we have about 80 more miles of catenary and several
more miles, many, many more bridges to do, which means that at
the pace of the investment that the state has been able to
make, which is significant, nonetheless, the backlog is
extraordinary. And it is going to take another decade to
complete that, to bring that system to a state-of-good-repair.
Now that is a historical anomaly, in some sense, because
the state of Connecticut chose to be unique among many, and own
the Northeast Corridor instead of Amtrak in the time period
when those decisions were being made. And as a result of
legislation, we have not been part of the Amtrak capital plan.
We are not eligible for that funding source. Although the new
high-speed rail program in its latest incarnation does allow
Connecticut to apply for high-speed money, and we are preparing
to do that if there is a resource available and an
appropriation that comes forward.
So we have a lot to do. We are committed to doing it
because of the real important economic engine that the
Northeast Corridor means for the state of Connecticut.
Senator Blumenthal. Some of those bridges are more than 100
years old. Is that right?
Mr. Redeker. That is correct. A hundred years is probably
our average.
Senator Blumenthal. And the funding responsibilities may be
anomalous, but the aging state of our infrastructure is common
across the United States, is it not?
Mr. Redeker. That is correct. We are about 1910 vintage for
across the Northeast Corridor. So, therefore, the nature of
that infrastructure, the need for rehabilitation, and some of
the capacity constraints, which are felt not just by
Connecticut with tracks out, but two-track systems in New
Jersey, two-track systems in Baltimore that, in the long run,
are really the constraints for the Corridor to grow, and to
have redundancy in cases where you need to rebuild.
So the Corridor is challenged. Working through the
Commission, we are trying to identify the next 5-year capital
program to address the most critical needs based on the
utilization and priority, which I think is unique for the
Commission. It is a new challenge. But we think we will be able
to be up to that and deliver a capital plan that both states
and the Federal Government and freight rail partners can invest
in to bring that system as quickly as possible to state-of-
good-repair.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Ms. Teel, let me ask you also on the issue of state
commitment and impacts of these kinds of incidents, I look at
the picture of what happened in Chaffee, Missouri, on May 25,
and miraculously, apparently, nobody was killed in this
incident. But I can see from what happened to the highway as a
result of the train collision and bridge collapse there that
there must be very, very substantial State costs in repairing
this major highway. Is that correct?
Ms. Teel. Mr. Chairman, the railroad has worked very
closely with the state, and we are confident that the railroad
is going to fully reimburse the state for those costs. In fact,
they had the bridge that you have that photo of removed in a
day. It was absolutely remarkable to see the work that the
railroad has put into making this as efficient as possible and
making the lines correct again.
And I am confident that because of these strong
partnerships and because of--well, certainly, we will have to
wait for the investigation to be complete, but I am confident
that the railroad will indeed have those expenses and not the
state of Missouri.
Senator Blumenthal. And are you faced in Missouri with the
same kinds of need to upgrade infrastructure, not just routine
maintenance but also bridges that are aging, track that is in
need of replacement?
Ms. Teel. Correct, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, we have those
infrastructure needs in our system in Missouri.
We have a very large highway system in Missouri, 32,000
miles of highway, 10,000 bridges. We do not own any railroad
track in the state. However, we certainly have the grade
crossings, 7,000 grade crossings in our state. Half of those
are public. Only half of those have lights and gates, so there
is huge opportunity for continued State investment and Federal
investment to make those grade crossings safer. And also, there
is the inspection role that we have of all of the track in our
state that we work together with the Federal Railroad
Administration.
But certainly, Missouri is no different from any other
state. We have critical funding needs, aging infrastructure,
and it is an absolute concern in our state as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Stem, you may have heard Ms. Teel
talk about the Missouri railroads, and she said that the
Missouri railroads have seen and done it all. I kind of have
the feeling that you have seen and done it all in the course of
your career in working on the railroads. And I wonder if you
could give this committee your personal view of the current
state of safety on the railroads, particularly as it affects
the men and women who do the kind of work that you have done
for your life.
Mr. Stem. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, for the question.
I agree with Mr. Hamberger's initial statement, that safety
is improving in our industry today. We still have work to do.
We are reducing the number of fender-benders. We are focusing
on reducing the minor incidents, and we are being successful at
that.
My testimony indicates that the big-ticket items, the fatal
collisions, are going up, not down. And there is a whole menu
of reasons for that.
As you heard Mr. Szabo and Ms. Hersman testify earlier,
human factors are the number one cause of accidents. Now
sometimes those human factors are unaccounted for in design or
a piece of equipment that was manufactured that malfunctioned,
and it also does not address the specifically deferred
maintenance on tracks.
But knowing what we know today about positive train control
and fatigue mitigation, that is where the low-hanging fruit is.
That is the best opportunity for significant improvement in the
overall safety.
It is not just for the employees. Every time we have one of
these major collisions that kills an employee, the surrounding
community is also involved, many times with evacuations.
The amount and number of hazardous material products that
are moving by rail today is growing. That is the safest form of
transportation for those products, and that is exactly where
they should be. But that means that any time there is an
incident, anytime there is a collision, the local community's
equity goes up in that collision.
So I encourage the Committee to continue to work on that,
to help us with fatigue mitigation. From the employee's
standpoint, that is exactly why PTC was mandated.
And on that 61 percent of the mainline track that will not
be equipped with PTC, some of which will be short line track,
we will continue the same level of operation that we have
today, and the same fatigue mitigation failures that we have
today, unless Congress acts.
Senator Blumenthal. Your view is that the fender-benders
have diminished in frequency but the higher costs and more
disastrous kinds of incidents are occurring more frequently?
Mr. Stem. Yes, sir. That is correct. And, overall, the
statistics show that safety is improving in our industry. And I
am thankful for that. And we are overall reducing the number of
employee on-duty fatalities.
And many of those were result of switching accidents, which
are still occurring.
But fatigue, positive train control, was designed to help
us get those fatal injuries to employees down.
Senator Blumenthal. Ms. Waters and Mr. Hamberger, do you
agree with that view?
Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Mr. Hamberger?
Mr. Hamberger. No. The employee injury rate, which is, I
believe, the single best indicator of ``are we getting safer''
in terms of our employees, continues to go down. And when I
said it was the safest year on record in 2012, and again in
2011 and again in 2010, the employee injury rate is one of
those three indicators to say it is the safest year on record.
That continues to go down.
2012, there was an unfortunate 16 employees killed. That is
16 too many. We are dedicated to getting that to zero.
But it is something that we are focused on, some of those,
it is my understanding, in fact, were fatalities of employees
in automobile accidents while on duty. And so we are focused.
I want to say to Mr. Stem, he said it, that the
professionalism of our employee base is what helps drive
safety, and that is absolutely right. It is professionalism and
dedication, peer-to-peer counseling, and those are important
programs. And so we are looking forward to continuing on
fatigue management, employee training, employee education, any
number of issues that we are working together on.
So it is something that we take very seriously and are
indeed focused on. So hopefully, I will be back here next year,
and tell you that 2013 was even safer than 2012 in terms of
employee injuries.
Senator Blumenthal. I hope so, too.
Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. I would concur with Ed. I am not going to
expand upon that.
Senator Blumenthal. I have a couple more questions, just
briefly.
Commissioner Redeker, on the plus side, on the bright side
of infrastructure investment, am I correct in the view that the
investment in the M8 cars, which were involved in the
derailment collisions in May, probably prevented more
catastrophic injuries and even deaths, because of the
structural advances that those cars reflect?
Mr. Redeker. Yes, we invested as the State and as partner
with Metro-North on the newest cars manufactured to the newest
standards for buff strength for a commuter rail coach. They
certainly held up well in that accident. I cannot speak to what
would have happened were they not there, but I think it is a
measure of our commitment to safety, our investment in that.
That was another 100 percent State-funded investment in an
entire rolling stock to bring the latest standards to the
commuters in Connecticut.
Senator Blumenthal. And reference has been made to the
inspection by Sperry Rail cars. Could you describe that method,
and why it is superior to the high-rail method?
Mr. Redeker. I think it is just another means for
inspection. We have terrific inspectors. They are well-
qualified. Their experience within high-rail vehicles is
probably unmatched, in terms of what they can bring to an
inspection report. They can feel it, they know it, they have
experience.
Technology brings a lot more to the table, and I think
adding significant layers of additional inspection help. But
not every defect is going to be found by a Sperry Rail car and
not every defect is going to be found, necessarily, by a high-
rail vehicle. So by applying several techniques, we are trying
to have redundant inspections, maximize what we can prioritize,
and then address the defects that are found as quickly as
possible in priority order. And that is the practice that
Metro-North uses, again, all in compliance with the current
guidelines from FRA.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you had an opportunity to review
the inspection report that we have made a part of the record
that was done on May 15?
Mr. Redeker. Yes, in fact, I got it yesterday from your
staff.
Senator Blumenthal. And are you concerned by the findings
there as to defects in the ballast and support and rail joints
and other areas of the track?
Mr. Redeker. Actually, no. That is a standard inspection
report. The kinds of things that were found and noted are
addressed on a regular, routine basis. And they are addressed
quickly.
Any defect, and I think it was mentioned, any defect found
on the front of that page required immediate attention and is
done immediately. And if anything was found that was identified
as a real safety hazard, that track would have been put out of
service or repairs done immediately.
So I think it is a measure of a system that constantly
needs maintenance. It is the heaviest utilized commuter
railroad in the country, and it has significant freight over it
each and every day. It requires this kind of inspection and
then a regular program each and every day of going out to
maintain.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you receive these inspection reports
regularly?
Mr. Redeker. No, I do not. Metro-North collects those,
maintains them, and Connecticut DOT, as the contractor, has
oversight responsibilities. And we do inspect those records and
audit them on a regular basis.
Senator Blumenthal. How often do you inspect them?
Mr. Redeker. We go out on a monthly basis to Metro-North
offices and review all of their practices and all their files
in terms of how they operate and maintain the system.
Senator Blumenthal. And then do you check on whether the
repairs are made?
Mr. Redeker. We do on an audit basis. Otherwise, we leave
that to Metro-North.
Senator Blumenthal. And how often is the audit?
Mr. Redeker. Again, monthly, we go down and check, and we
will pull a few samples and see how that process worked.
Senator Blumenthal. And do you know whether this kind of
routine practice is in accord with what other states do?
Mr. Redeker. I am sure it is, because the routine track
inspection and maintenance program is a guideline from FRA, and
that is what all railroads are following at this point.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I want to thank the entire panel. This has been an
excellent morning, both panels, but particularly your panel for
the excellent hands-on views that you have provided and the
perspective that you have given us, and we really appreciate
your taking the time in being with us today. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Hamberger. Mr. Chairman, if I might, it has been a long
morning, and Mr. Stem and I do not always agree on every
detail, but today is his birthday, so please join me in saying
happy birthday.
Senator Blumenthal. Congratulations on your 35th birthday.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Stem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. And we will take all of your statements
for the record, along with the exhibits and keep the record
open for a week, in case you want to submit anything further.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. When does the FRA anticipate completing its final rules
clarifying the requirements if a PTC failure occurs en route, and
whether or not PTC will be required in railyards? Can you commit to
completing those rules by the end of this calendar year? The railroads
have said that getting those requirements clarified and finalized is
absolutely essential as they move forward with PTC deployment.
Answer. As of the date of this hearing, the draft of the PTC final
rule is being finalized.. FRA understands the importance of regulatory
certainty for the industry to properly plan for PTC implementation, and
FRA will move the rule as quickly as possible.
Question 2. How is the FRA working with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to ensure that spectrum challenges are resolved
quickly so that PTC can be implemented nationwide? Also, how is the FRA
working with the FCC to clarify the FCC's new requirements for tower
and antenna applications?
Answer. FRA is providing the FCC technical advice on the
communications requirements of PTC. Ultimately, however, spectrum
allocation is in the purview of the FCC. The FCC shares spectrum
management responsibilities and functions with the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). While the FCC
has authority over commercial spectrum usage as well as that of local
and State governments, NTIA manages the Federal government's use of
spectrum for defense and other Federal purposes.
FRA has no statutory or regulatory authority over spectrum
allocation or availability. FRA and the FCC are working together with
the railroad carriers and Tribal and other stakeholders in developing
an expedited tower approval process that satisfies FCC and carrier
requirements for compliance with National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA) and National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The FCC is
developing a proposed Program Comment to govern review for PTC wayside
facilities under section 106 of the NHPA. While a revised FCC process
is likely necessary to increase the rate of processing of the volume of
tower approval requests generated by PTC deployment, the requirement
for NEPA and NHPA act requirements are not ``new''; the NEPA was
enacted in 1969, and the NHPA, in 1986.
Question 3. Your testimony stated that the FRA should be able to
certify the Southern California Regional Rail Authority's (Metrolink's)
PTC system later this year. Most of the passenger and freight rail
operators in California have told me they will meet the 2015 deadline.
Why has California been able to stay on track for meeting the deadline,
while other regions are struggling?
Answer. The passenger, commuter, and freight railroads in
California have suffered from the same technical challenges experienced
by freight railroads elsewhere in the country. Resolution of these
issues has resulted in significant schedule slippage. With the
exception of Metrolink and its freight partners Union Pacific Railroad
Company (UP) and BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), the other California
passenger and commuter railroads are still in the system-design phase
and have not begun the system-test phase. Based on the technical
challenges that Metrolink, UP, and BNSF have experienced, and the other
railroads' state of progress, FRA believes it unlikely these other
railroads will be able to fully complete system development and
approval by the 2015 deadline. Many will, however, be able to
accomplish partial to substantial deployment. Even Metrolink, with the
technical support of UP and BNSF, has found it necessary to delay the
operational start of the PTC system from 2012 to 2014.
As previously indicated in the FRA August 2012 report to Congress,
there is a limited pool of qualified personnel with PTC implementation
experience. Many of these people have been diverted to support
Metrolink and southern California PTC deployment efforts, which have
left a shortage of qualified personnel to carry out PTC deployment in
other locations.
In addition to personnel shortages, there are component
development, supply, installation, and integration/testing issues. Any
development must include sufficient testing to make sure the systems
work as intended. The current requirement, at a minimum, makes
sufficient testing very difficult.
Regarding the development of PTC components and the installation of
PTC systems, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported in
its August 2013 PTC report that ``some PTC components are still in
development--most notably the [PTC] back office server. One or more of
these servers will be installed in over a dozen railroads' back offices
and are needed to communicate vital information between the back
office, locomotives, and waysides. According to the [Association of
American Railroads (AAR)] and the railroads, back office system delays
are due to system complexity, interfaces to other systems, and lack of
supplier resources. Nearly all of the freight railroads included in our
review anticipate they will not have a final version of the back office
system until 2014 and have identified it as one of the significant
factors preventing them from meeting the deadline. In addition, PTC
installation is a time-and resource-consuming process. For example,
railroads collectively will have to install approximately 38,000
wayside interface units. According to AAR and freight railroads, the
volume and complexity of installing these units is another significant
reason most railroads cannot meet the 2015 deadline.
As to PTC system integration and field testing, GAO has said in the
same report that its work to date indicates that ``[s]uccessful PTC
implementation will require numerous components to work together, many
of which are first-generation technologies being designed and developed
for PTC. All components must properly function when integrated or the
PTC system could fail. To ensure successful integration, railroads must
conduct multiple phases of testing--first in a laboratory environment,
then in the field--before installation across the network.
Representatives from all of the freight railroads [GAO] spoke with
expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized the
importance of field testing to ensure the system performs the way it is
intended and that potential defects are identified, corrected, and re-
tested. One railroad representative [GAO] spoke with said that in some
field tests, the PTC system components behaved differently than in the
laboratory tests because labs do not reflect field conditions
completely. Identifying the source of these types of problems is an
iterative process; consequently, correcting the problems and re-testing
can be time-consuming and potentially further contribute to railroads
not meeting the 2015 deadline.''
Question 4. Some passenger rail operators argue they will miss the
2015 PTC deadline because Congress has not provided sufficient funding.
However, as you know, Congress recently appropriated $10.6 billion for
high speed and intercity passenger rail investments, for which PTC was
an explicit authorized use. Several California rail operators received
grants from this program explicitly for PTC, and plan to meet the 2015
deadline. I understand that Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Financing (RRIF) loans can also be used for PTC. Is it true that few
rail operators outside of California chose to apply to the HSIPR or
RRIF programs for the purpose of implementing PTC, and instead put
other capital investments ahead of PTC as their top priorities?
Answer. The mandate for the High-Speed Passenger Rail Program
(HISPR) was to help address the Nation's transportation challenges by
making strategic investments in an efficient network of passenger rail
corridors that connect communities across the country through a
competitive grant process. HISPR funding was provided to several
California railroads to install PTC in support of the California High
Speed Rail initiative. With the exception of California, which has
already made significant infrastructure investments, non-California
railroads are at earlier phases of high-speed rail infrastructure
investment. Completion of these essential track infrastructure
improvements are a prerequisite for the installation and use of PTC in
high-speed operations.
Unlike grant programs, the Railroad Rehabilitation & Improvement
Financing (RRIF) program is a direct loan and loan guarantee program.
Direct loans may fund up to 100 percent of a railroad project with
repayment periods of up to 35 years and interest rates equal to the
cost of borrowing to the Federal government. The willingness of
railroads to take advantage of the RRIF is governed in a large part by
their ability (either actual or perceived) to make the required
repayments.
Finally, FRA has anecdotal evidence that some railroads have put
``state of good repair'' projects necessary to provide passenger/
commuter service ahead of PTC projects. ``State of good repair''
projects correct past deferred maintenance, or replace capital assets
that have exceeded their useful life. Failure to make the ``state of
good repair'' repairs to existing infrastructure and equipment would
increase the probability and gravity of a system failure, thereby
decreasing system safety. Failure to make the ``state of good repair''
repairs would also necessitate reduction or termination of service,
which could adversely impact the public, and in the latter situation
make installation of PTC a moot point.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. Mr. Szabo, PTC technology holds great promise to reduce
the number of train accidents caused by excessive speed, conflicting
train movements, and failure to obey signals, but there are significant
challenges in implementing these systems.
Short line railroad companies in Minnesota, for example, have
concerns about the implementation costs of PTC as well as their ability
to meet the deadline. In fact, in the FRA report to Congress on the
status of PTC deployment, FRA reported that ``Given the current state
of development and availability of the required hardware and software,
along with deployment considerations, most railroads will likely not be
able to complete full . . . implementation of PTC by Dec. 31, 2015,''
adding that only partial deployment could be accomplished by the
deadline.
Has there been any consideration given to providing funding for
Class II and III railroads that are significantly impacted by the
initial capital and ongoing maintenance and software upgrade costs
associated with PTC in order to help them meet the deadline? Has there
been any consideration given to re-visit the requirements necessary for
Class II and III railroads that operate on Class I PTC equipped tracks?
Answer. FRA first notes that the PTC mandate does not apply to
Class II and Class III railroads directly, but a small number of Class
II and Class III railroads are required to install PTC where they
interoperate with Class I railroads. FRA has already provided several
regulatory exceptions for small railroads that allow them to avoid the
installation of PTC in situations where they operate over a Class I
railroad's track (see 49 C.F.R. 236.1006(b)(4) and 49 C.F.R.
236.1019(a)) during the initial PTC roll-out period.
However, FRA also recognizes that there may be circumstances in
previously-executed private agreements under which Class I railroads
would be entitled to require the Class II or Class III railroad to use
a controlling locomotive equipped with PTC as a condition of operating.
FRA believes that the proposed exceptions, when issued, will provide
Class II and Class III railroads an appropriate exemption from PTC
installation consistent with tenant-host commercial agreements and the
statutory PTC mandate. If Congress were to amend the PTC mandate, FRA
would re-visit the exceptions available to Class II and Class III
railroads to be consistent with the revised mandate.
Further, FRA has in the past implemented grant funding programs to
support installation of PTC, for which Class II and Class II railroads
would be eligible. However, Congress did not appropriate that funding
beyond one year. Finally, Class II and Class III railroads are also
eligible to apply for Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing
(RRIF) loans to fund PTC projects.
Question 2. Mr. Szabo, according to the Department of
Transportation there are more than 250,000 highway-rail grade crossings
in the U.S. Although the highway safety picture has improved
considerably over the last decade, 300-400 people are killed every year
and more than 1,100 are injured at grade crossings. According to the
rail safety group Operation Lifesaver, eight people were killed at rail
grade crossings in Minnesota in 2012. As you're aware, the safety at
rural crossings remains a significant problem. What is the Federal
Railroad Administration doing to advance alternative lower cost grade
crossing safety technology for better protection at the thousands of
rural crossings across the country? Federal funding for the United
States Department of Transportation Railway-Highway Crossings Program
is $220 million per year. Is this funding level sufficient in your
view?
Answer. In recent years, highway-rail grade crossing accidents have
resulted in the second-largest number of rail-related deaths in the
United States, 33 percent of the total. Yet grade crossing safety has
shown vast improvement, as a result of substantial public investment in
crossing warning devices and greater public awareness of the risks at
grade crossings. Accordingly, the number of grade crossing accident
deaths has declined by 30 percent over the last decade. FRA is fully
committed to reducing the number, frequency, and severity of collisions
at highway-rail grade crossings.
Currently, there are 212,212 at-grade highway-rail grade crossings
and dedicated pathway-rail grade crossings, which include public,
private, and pathway (pedestrian) crossings. Approximately 55 percent
of public crossings are equipped with automatic warning devices. Many
of the public crossings that do not have automatic warning devices are
in rural areas where highway traffic volumes are low. FRA currently is
studying the use of warning signs that are enhanced by the use of
flashing LEDs, which make the signs more noticeable to an approaching
motorist. FRA is a participant in the Department's Connected Vehicle
research initiative. With additional research, Connected Vehicle
technology, coupled with PTC, may serve as a potential future low-cost
warning system for highway-rail grade crossings.
When engineering and construction solutions are necessary to
improve safety, communities can incur costs. This is why FRA's Fiscal
Year 2014 budget proposal includes funding for mitigating community
impacts, including safety enhancements.
The Railway-Highway Grade Crossing Program (section 130 of title 23
of the United States Code), which is administered by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) has proved to be effective in the
reduction of highway-rail grade crossing collisions and related
fatalities. FRA strongly supports the continuation of the program.
Additional funding would enable states to treat additional crossings,
many of which may be in rural areas.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. Some rail operators have suggested that PTC would only
be able to prevent a small fraction of train accidents. How would you
respond to that?
Answer. The vast majority or railroad accidents are minor in nature
and, thankfully, do not result in fatalities or significant injuries.
The accidents which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has
investigated involve significant damage, including fatalities and
injuries.
Despite more reliable equipment and increased redundancies within
the operating environment, NTSB investigations continue to reveal human
factors that contribute to accidents. The two largest causes of
accidents in recent years include human-factor and derailments due to
track problems. Operational accidents, or those classified as human-
factor related, can be prevented with technology, notably positive
train control (PTC).
Further, PTC preventable human-factor caused accidents can have
catastrophic consequences. For example, train passenger deaths as
occurred in the 1997 Silver Spring, Maryland, and the 2008 Chatsworth,
California collisions, or significant releases of hazardous materials
that affect communities and result in exposure fatalities that occurred
in the 2004 Macdona, Texas and the 2005 Graniteville, South Carolina
accidents can be prevented by PTC. While small in number, these
catastrophic accidents are the ones we want to prevent.
Question 2. When did the NTSB first propose that PTC systems be
implemented, and when did this issue make it onto the NTSB's ``Most
Wanted List''? How long after that did it take for the FRA and rail
operators to begin making a significant effort to implement PTC?
Answer. The NTSB first recommended an advanced train control
system, a PTC predecessor, in 1970. This recommendation was addressed
to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and recommended:
If it receives additional statutory authority under legislation
now in progress, study the feasibility of requiring a form of
automatic train control at points where passenger trains are
required to meet other trains. (R-70-20)
The NTSB's original ``Most Wanted'' list (MWL) of
Transportation Safety Improvements was adopted in September
1990. Positive Train Separation was on the original MWL. (The
NTSB changed ``Positive Train Separation'' to ``Positive Train
Control Systems'' in May 2001.)
Congressional funding for joint FRA-industry pilot programs
addressing PTC development started in the early 1990s. In 1997, the
FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which advises FRA on
many of its rulemakings, established a working group, which included
representatives of the railroad industry, to address PTC. The group was
tasked to address the Federal regulations and their applicability to
new train control systems under development and to draft new
regulations as necessary. The FRA published a final rule in,
``Standards for Development and Use of Processor-Based Signal and Train
Control Systems,'' which was effective on June 6, 2005. This rule
established performance-based standards for processor-based signal and
train control systems but did not require implementation.
Most railroads, however, did not make a significant effort to
implement PTC until Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act
(RSIA) of 2008, following the 2008 Chatsworth, California collision
that claimed 25 lives. Some railroads were independently developing PTC
systems but had not agreed on one design standard to allow
interoperability. Interoperability is critical in allowing trains to
operate over tracks owned by various entities, particularly in the case
of passenger trains that operate on multiple railroads under trackage
rights agreements.
Following the enactment of RSIA, the NTSB closed the following
recommendation and removed PTC from the MWL.
Facilitate actions necessary for development and implementation of
positive train control systems that include collision avoidance, and
require implementation of positive train control systems on main line
tracks, establishing priority requirements for high-risk corridors,
such as those where commuter and intercity passenger railroads operate.
(R-01-6)
In 2012, the NTSB adopted a new MWL which included PTC in large
part because it appeared that implementation plans were stalled in the
railroad industry.
There has been great resistance from some in the railroad community
to implement PTC, but there is no greater hazard than two trains
colliding. The loss of life, property, and the environment can be
significant.
Question 3. The NTSB hosted a forum on PTC in February. What did
you learn about rail operators' progress in implementing PTC? Does it
appear most rail operators have done everything possible within their
powers to meet the 2015 deadline?
Answer. The NTSB acknowledged during its PTC forum that there are
significant hurdles towards meeting the December 31, 2015, deadline in
RSIA to implement PTC. In particular, many commuter agencies do not
have the available capital needed to maintain their systems nor upgrade
them. A number of presenters at the forum addressed a variety of
regulatory, technical, budgetary, and legal hurdles to implementing
PTC. However, the NTSB also heard from other presenters who described
various success stories where carriers implementing PTC systems have
already received approvals and certifications from the FRA.
The NTSB learned there are some railroads that have already met,
and others that plan to meet, the 2015 deadline. Railroads that have
made the difficult decisions and invested millions of dollars should be
commended for their leadership in promoting rail safety. For those
railroads that will not meet the 2015 deadline, for whatever reason,
there needs to be transparency and accountability to comply with the
PTC mandate that was set by Congress.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. The Interoperable Train Control Committee is developing
key standards for software and hardware that will allow different rail
operators' PTC systems to be fully interoperable. Standards for some
key features are months behind schedule, hindering the pace of the
entire industry. What is the status of the remaining standards the
Committee is working to develop?
Answer. There are a total of 52 Railway Electronic Standards
related to PTC. Of these, 42 standards have been developed and released
for industry use. All of the remaining standards are in development and
are being progressed. The members of the Interoperable Train Control
Committee and its various subcommittees are working aggressively to
address the remaining standards. The goal is for these standards to be
published this year.
Question 2. What pressure can be brought to bear on key software
and hardware vendors to speed up their process of delivering the
necessary components of PTC? I understand that they are behind
schedule. As their customers, how does the rail industry intend to help
resolve these delays?
Answer. The biggest problem has been the development of the back
office server software which is a year late. This software enables
communications between the various railroad dispatch centers and all
locomotives in operation. In other words, this is the key to
interoperability. That software was released for field testing on July
15 which will likely last well into 2014.
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Kathryn Waters
Question 1. Administrator Szabo of the FRA testified that the
leading cause of train accidents is human factors (38 percent). Since
PTC is largely designed to prevent accidents caused by human error,
does APTA believe investing in PTC be a high budgetary priority for
passenger rail operators?
Answer. As a statutory mandate, PTC is already a high budgetary
priority for our members. However, it should be noted that PTC does not
prevent all human factors accidents, nor can railroads ignore attending
to, and the funding of, necessary activities to reduce the risks
associated with the other 62 percent of train accidents.
In 2010, the FTA released a report stating that the current backlog
of state of good repair projects on our Nation's transit assets totaled
nearly $80 billion. This number does not include the over $2.75 billion
necessary to implement PTC on commuter railroads, nor the millions
needed to purchase or lease radio spectrum for interoperability.
Despite the tremendous cost, Congress has appropriated only $50 million
to assist publicly funded commuter railroads with implementing Positive
Train Control.
Question 2. I understand that there are two major technological
platforms in use as rail operators implement PTC throughout the nation,
but some passenger rail operators are considering using other
alternatives. How would those technologies be interoperable with rail
lines using the existing technological platforms? Can you assure me
that the alternative technologies would provide an equivalent level of
safety?
Answer. In addition to the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System
(ACSES) and the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-
ETMS), the FRA has already approved the Port Authority Trans Hudson
(PATH) commuter railroad in New York/New Jersey to install
Communications Based Train Control (CBTC). CBTC is a system more
aligned with and in use in some metro/subway operations, with
protections similar to PTC. It is not interoperable with either ACSES
or I-ETMS. FRA has also approved Incremental Train Control System
(ITCS) for use in the Amtrak High Speed PTC systems in Michigan from
Chicago to Dearborn, and the Communications Based Overlay Signal System
(CBOSS), a mix of ITCS and I-ETMS, under development by Caltrain in
California.
Similarly, if any alternative technologies are approved for use,
ALL trains that operate on that system or line segment must be able to
communicate with that technology. For example, a train equipped with I-
ETMS will not be interoperable with the ACSES system installed on the
Northeast corridor, unless that train is additionally equipped with
ACSES or the waysides are equipped with the capacity to transmit both
ACSES and I-ETMS messages; a commuter railroad operating in California
that does not operate on the Northeast Corridor will not be equipped
with ASCES, and therefore will not be interoperable with that system,
but it will be interoperable with all the trains that operate on its
lines in California.
As we stated in our testimony, not all railroads operate in the
same environments or face the same risks and hazards, and yet the PTC
statute requires that some install a PTC technology to protect against
risks that may not be present on that railroad. For example, on low
risk line segments with light traffic density, slower speeds, and/or
reduced comingling of freight and passenger traffic, alternative
technologies may provide sufficient mitigation. APTA supports the FRA's
recommendation for possible approval of alternative technologies that
are equivalent in protection based on the actual level of risk and
exposure, as evaluated by the FRA on a line segment by line segment
basis, and not a blanket or unilateral approval of any technology on an
entire line or railroad.
Question 3. Given the very long lead time to developing a
certifiable PTC system, any alternative PTC technologies should be well
defined and developed by now. What specific types of alternative
technologies do your members intend to use in lieu of existing PTC
platforms?
Answer. As stated in our testimony, all APTA member commuter
railroads are moving forward diligently to prepare for PTC
implementation, as that is the current requirement.
The PTC Interoperable Train Control Committee (ITC), which is
composed of many members of the freight railroad community, has drafted
numerous standards covering Positive Train Control systems, subsystems
and interfaces. (Passenger railroads are not voting members of the ITC
and are therefore dependent upon the ITC to include passenger
standards.) The expectation is that it will now be possible for systems
integrators and manufacturers to produce new systems which will
interface with I-ETMS and be compatible with the requirements of the
PTC rule, thus reducing the lead time going forward.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. In her written testimony, Ms. Fleming of GAO wrote that
``FBA's PTC staff consists of 10 PTC specialists and one supervisor who
are responsible for the review and approval of all PTC system
certification documentation for 38 railroads. FRA has expressed concern
that railroads will submit their safety plans to FRA at roughly the
same time. Our initial analysis suggests that this timing creates the
potential that FBA's review of these plans will consist of hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of pages of detailed technical information.'' How do
you assess this statement by GAO? Is there a potential for a backlog of
PTC applications?
Answer. The GAO assessment of the situation is accurate and only
adds to the myriad issues with the PTC statutory requirement, the most
notable of which is its billions of dollars in regulatory costs over
and above its quantified safety benefits. For this issue, in order to
help mitigate the potential backlog in PTC applications, FRA plans to
augment the dedicated PTC staff with support from senior technical
staff. The additional staff consists of a Senior Scientist/Technical
Advisor, a Program Manager for Advanced Technologies, a Senior
Electronics Engineer, and two Electronics Engineers. Even with the
augmented staff, there remains a potential for application backlogs,
and the addition of these staff members to the review process may cause
them to be diverted from their primary assignments.
Indications are that FRA will receive the majority of the safety
technical documentation for review simultaneously in the period just
before the December 31, 2015, deadline.
Let me emphasize that until railroads complete PTC system design,
development, integration, and testing, they will have insufficient data
to finish the required safety documentation to be sent to FRA. Let me
also emphasize that railroads' completion of PTC system design,
development, integration, and testing requires prior resolution of
many, if not all of the technical and programmatic issues identified
both in the FRA August 2012 report to Congress entitled ``Positive
Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts'' (http://
www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L03718) as well as in GAO's June 2013
report (http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655298.pdf).
As you know, FRA's report listed the following seven types of
technical obstacles to complete PTC implementation that had been
identified so far: lack of necessary radio frequency spectrum; lack of
necessary radios; lack of necessary design specifications; lack of
necessary back office servers (which contain the mechanism that enables
interoperability of PTC systems between different railroads) and lack
of necessary dispatch systems; need for verification of track databases
with accuracy more precise than that needed in a non-PTC environment;
need for engineering related to the installation of PTC system
components; and need for proof of the reliability and availability of
installed PTC systems in order both to provide the desired level of
safety and to minimize any adverse impact on the railroad's operations.
In addition, FRA's report noted two types of programmatic issues:
issues related to budgeting and contracting (e.g., the tightening of
public-sector budgets and the need to comply with procurement
regulations) and issues related to an insufficient supply of qualified
personnel and essential PTC system components, since railroads subject
to the PTC mandate are all competing for a limited set of these
resources.
In the same vein, the GAO report cited ``the numerous, interrelated
challenges caused by the breadth and complexity of PTC.'' First, GAO
highlighted that some key PTC components are still in development and
that the installation of PTC components ``is a time-and resource-
consuming process.'' Regarding the installation phase of PTC
implementation, GAO gave the example of the Federal Communications
Commission's request that railroads halt their construction of PTC-
related antennas ``to ensure proper installation procedures were being
followed including consulting with either the tribal or state
historical authorities prior to. . .installation.'' Second, GAO pointed
to the need for system integration and field testing of PTC components,
``many of which are first-generation technologies being designed and
developed.'' Third, GAO underscored its concern about FRA resources, a
point I will return to now.
The additional time required to solve all of these technical and
programmatic obstacles to PTC implementation, coupled with the
statutory completion date of December 31, 2015, results in significant
schedule compression, with a subsequent reduction in the time available
for FRA personnel to complete the necessary certification review and
approval of railroads' safety documentation submissions before the
existing 2015 statutory deadline.
While there may be some commonality in safety documentation
submissions because of the use of similar technology that may
facilitate the review process, each of the railroads is unique, which
will require separate review of their individual applications. These
two factors (schedule compression and railroad uniqueness) aggravate
FRA's staffing limitations.
Further, the number of railroad applications requiring FRA review
and approval has been reduced from 38 to 37. FRA, in conjunction with
the 38th railroad, was able to qualify the railroad for a regulatory
exemption from PTC installation. FRA is, however, beginning discussions
with a number of ``new start'' railroads on their requirements for PTC
installation that may lead to an increase in the number of railroad
applications requiring FRA approval above the 37 applications currently
identified, which would worsen the FRA staffing issue. FRA's FY 2014
budget proposal includes funding levels that would be sufficient for
implementing the agency's complete safety program, including work
associated with PTC implementation.
Question 2. How would your assessment change if Congress decides to
provide a PTC extension that requires FRA approval on a case by case
basis and these requests for questions are presented at roughly the
same time as the safety plans?
Answer. In general, FRA believes a PTC extension, especially
coupled with the allowance of alternative technologies that enhance
safety in a more cost-effective way, has the potential to generate
significant quantifiable regulatory cost savings. As FRA's 2009
regulatory impact analysis showed,\1\ and several subsequent reports
have confirmed, PTC is expected to have about $10 billion in net costs
over 20 years (costs over and above the quantified safety benefits).
FRA expects the costs to be about 20 times greater than the benefits.
Not only would a PTC extension, together with permitting alternative
technologies that improve safety more cost-effectively, change our
assessment of the GAO's findings on our possible staffing issues, it
would generate net benefits to society as a whole compared to current
law, though quantification of these benefits would depend on the
industry providing relevant cost-benefit information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For this analysis, please see: http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=FRA-2008-0132-0060.
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To the extent that railroads have differing completion dates, an
extension of the completion date mandated by the Rail Safety
Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) would reduce the number of applications
requiring concurrent review by FRA. The enactment of legislation
providing for extension of the PTC implementation deadline would have
the effect of mitigating backlogs, but the scope of the review process
would not change. FRA believes that obtaining the authority to approve
the use of proven, mature, traditional signal and train control systems
on low-risk lines in lieu of PTC would accelerate PTC-deployment
efforts in a way that would greatly enhance railroad safety at lower
costs. Existing technologies, such as Automatic Train Stop and
Automatic Train Control, have over 90 years of safe, successful
operation and are not relatively high-risk, software-centric
development efforts such as PTC.
If the RSIA were amended so as to provide the Secretary with
authority to permit an extension in an individual case, FRA would not
expect that a railroad would submit a request for such an extension
concurrently with its PTC Safety Plan. The review process for such an
extension would be addressed separately.
Question 3. Of the 38 railroads that will need to submit
certification documents, how many applications do you think will be
approved in enough time to have their PTC system implemented by
December 31, 2015? What percentage of required PTC equipped rail lines
will this represent?
Answer. FRA has requested that railroads resubmit their PTC
Implementation Plans, modifying them to reflect their anticipated
completion dates based on known technical and programmatic issues. The
resubmitted plans are to reflect their ``best case'' estimates for
completion, irrespective of the current RSIA deadline. Revision of PTC-
deployment schedules to reflect the impact of programmatic and
technical issues, if permitted by Congress, would reduce schedule and
cost pressures arising from the December 31, 2015 completion date. Once
FRA has received and reviewed these plans, FRA will be able to better
estimate what percentage will be complete by the December 31, 2015,
deadline. Of course, the current statutory deadline is extremely
difficult and expensive for many railroads to meet.
Question 4. Understanding that not all railroads will implement PTC
by the mandated deadline, what options would FRA have? Will these
railroads be able to continue to operate?
Answer. If the existing statutory deadline remains in place, FRA
would continue its work with stakeholders to ensure PTC is implemented
as efficiently, reliably, and safely as possible. However, even with
efficient and reliable work from FRA, the agency continues to emphasize
that PTC would impose billions of dollars in costs over and above the
quantified safety benefits. It is worth noting that the 2009,
``expected case'' cost-benefit ratio of 22 to 1 was calculated before
FRA and the GAO identified the significant implementation challenges
associated with PTC, and it is reasonable to assume that certain costs
have increased as a result of these challenges.
While taking note of the overall implementation issues, the agency
has considerable discretion to decide whether to take enforcement
action. FRA has numerous options available if enforcement action is
appropriate including civil monetary penalties, emergency orders, and
individual liability actions. However the effectiveness of these
actions is greatly reduced because of the significant costs associated
with PTC deployment. Railroads, especially passenger railroads, are
already facing significant financial shortfalls that are delaying their
resolution of the known technical and programmatic PTC-deployment
issues. Enforcement actions based on an inability to complete
deployment by December 31, 2015 would only further delay railroads'
completion of PTC by requiring their reprogramming funds to address FRA
enforcement actions, away from PTC deployment efforts.
Although PTC implementation may not be complete, railroads must
retain their current methods of operation and levels of safety. In
calendar year 2012, the train accident rate for all accidents for all
causes was only 2.34 per million train-miles. This represents over a
40-percent decrease in train accidents since 2003. Also, in recent
years FRA has implemented a number of new regulations to reduce some of
the human-factor causes of accidents that PTC is intended to prevent.
For example, FBA's 2011 final rule governing the hours of service of
passenger train crews, which draws on detailed, scientific research
into the cause of train operator fatigue, should help improve the
alertness of engineers and conductors operating passenger trains.
Similarly, another FRA final rule issued the same year sets minimum
safety standards for the eligibility, training, testing, certification,
and monitoring of train conductors, which should improve the safety
performance of train conductors on both passenger and freight trains.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question. It is likely that certain railroads will be able to
implement PTC by the December 31, 2015, deadline while others will not.
Is there any danger to this ``piecemeal'' approach? Can all of PTC's
safety potential be met?
Answer. The full benefits of a PTC system will be realized when
railroads operate their trains equipped with PTC enforcement on tracks
in PTC territory. During implementation, non-equipped trains operating
on PTC territories will still pose a risk, since non-equipped trains
will still be susceptible to the single-point failure that the human
factors present (dispatcher, train crew, or roadway worker). Once PTC
is fully implemented, there will still be provisions in the regulations
to operate non-equipped trains on PTC territories to accommodate
enroute failures, very similar to how trains operating in cab signal
territory are accommodated presently.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. Chairman Hersman, I believe that we should possibly be
expecting a rule on the use of PTC in rail yards. Do you believe the
use of PTC in rail yards, where the speed is usually less than five
miles per hour, is a good use of the technology?
Answer. Train movements within rail yards can involve the transfer,
shuttle or switching of rail cars that are done without using the air
brake system on the section of cars involved in the movement. These
types of movements diminish the effectiveness of any PTC system since
PTC calculates braking distance using train consist information and
relies on adequate braking from every car instead of just locomotive
braking. In addition, train movements in yard limits have limited speed
(not to exceed 20 mph) and sight requirements. Current PTC technology
does not enforce train separation for train movements below 20 mph.
A proposal has been made to the FRA that yard limits be defined as
20 miles in all directions on the main track from yards, allowing
trains to operate non-equipped trains on the main track for a 20 mile
radius in conflict with equipped trains. If this proposal is agreed
upon by the FRA, non-equipped trains will pose a risk within this 40
mile distance and be susceptible to the single-point failure that human
factors present.
Question 2. Chairman Hersman, you noted that in-cab recording
devices could be used to ``better understand crew activities leading up
to serious accidents.'' Do any rail companies currently use these
devices? Do you know what the cost is for the device, and for
implementation? It seems like a commonsense recommendation, I'm
wondering why there would be hesitancy on installing these devices?
Answer. Some railroads currently use this equipment. Following the
2008 fatal collision in Chatsworth, CA, the Southern California Rail
Authority (Metrolink) installed inward facing cameras in cabs. BNSF has
installed video cameras in motor vehicles (highway vehicles) to enhance
safe operations and has plans to install this equipment on hi-rail
vehicles.
On July 25, 2013, a U.S. District Court issued a ruling that
allowed the Kansas City Southern (KCS) Railway to install inward facing
cameras in the cabs of its locomotives (Kansas City Southern Railway
Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen, et al.). The
ruling declared that any disputes between the unions and the railroad
would be considered as a ``minor dispute'' under the Railway Labor Act
and subject to be resolved through binding arbitration. This ruling may
pave the way for other railroads to move forward with the installation
of inward facing cameras.
The NTSB does not have information on the cost of installing this
equipment, but we can provide contact information for Metrolink, KCS,
and BNSF to discuss their costs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Susan A. Fleming
Question 1. I understand that GAO is in the process of conducting a
study examining the challenges railroads face in fully implementing PTC
by the December 31, 2015, deadline. What are some of these challenges?
Answer. Challenges to meeting the 2015 deadline are complex and
interrelated. In addition, PTC installation is a time-and resource-
consuming process and to-date railroads have encountered some
unexpected delays while installing PTC. There are three key challenges
including:
Developing system components and PTC installation: Many of
the PTC components had not been developed before RSIA was
enacted and some continue to be in various stages of
development, most notably the I-ETMS back office server. Nearly
all of the freight railroads included in our review anticipate
they will not have a final version of the back office system
until 2014 and have identified it as one of the critical
factors preventing them from meeting the deadline.
System integration and field testing: In order to ensure
successful integration of PTC components, many of which are
first generations components, railroads must conduct multiple
phases of testing before being installed across the network.
Representatives from most of the freight railroads we spoke
with expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and
emphasized the importance of field testing to ensure that the
system performs the way it is intended. Field testing is an
iterative process; consequently, correcting the problems and
re-testing can be time-consuming and potentially further
contribute to railroads not meeting the 2015 deadline.
FRA resources: Concerns with FRA's limited staffing
resources and the agency's ability to help facilitate
railroads' implementation of PTC are focused on two of FRA's
responsibilities: PTC field testing and PTC system
certification. First, FRA has reported that it lacks the
staffing resources to embed a dedicated FRA inspector at each
railroad and has taken an audit approach to field testing,
whereby railroads submit field test results for approval as
part of their safety plans. Second, FRA set no specific
deadline for railroads to submit the safety plans for system
certification and according to FRA; to-date only one railroad
has submitted a final plan, which FRA has approved. FRA and
railroads have expressed concern that railroads will submit
their final safety plans to FRA at approximately the same time,
resulting in a review backlog particularly since each plan is
expected to consist of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages of
detailed technical information.
Finally, generally commuter railroads face these same PTC
implementation challenges, as well as other challenges including an
overall lack of funding available to make investments in commuter rail
and challenges related to difficulties in acquiring spectrum in the 220
MHz band, which is required to operate the data radios that communicate
information between PTC components.
Question 2. What obstacles does FRA face in approving applications
for PTC systems in a timely manner? In your written testimony you noted
that FRA has only 10 PTC specialists and a PTC supervisor. Is this
staffing level adequate to approve plans in time to meet the December
31, 2015, deadline?
Answer. Both FRA and railroads voiced concerns that FRA's staffing
level is not adequate to approve plans in time to meet the December 31,
2015 deadline. However, FRA officials told us that they are dedicated
to the timely approval of safety plans and that their oversight will
not impede railroads from meeting the deadline. In an effort to help
facilitate the safety plan review, some railroads told us they have
submitted draft portions of their safety plans to FRA for preliminary
review to expedite the process. This way FRA staff will be familiar
with portions of the plan that are common across plans before the
finalized plan is submitted. In addition, FRA has asked for additional
authority for deadline extensions on a case-by-case basis and
provisional certification which may also provide an opportunity to
manage limited resources.
Question 2a. Assuming it is adequate, if Congress provided a case
by case PTC extension, would the FRA be able to handle this additional
workload?
Answer. Flexibility in extending the deadline may help FRA better
manage limited resources by, for example, preventing a potential review
backlog resulting from final safety plans being submitted at the same
time--a concern raised by both the freight railroads and FRA. In
addition, we found railroads at various stages in their implementation
process; providing flexibility in extending the deadline for certain
railroads acknowledges these differences and also may help railroads
mitigate risks and ensure PTC is implemented in a safe and reliable
manner.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. How much money has the freight rail industry spent to
date to implement PTC?
Answer. To date, railroads have collectively spent approximately $3
billion of their own funds on PTC development and deployment.
Question 2. How much more do you estimate will be needed?
Answer. Currently, the estimated total cost to freight railroads
for PTC development and deployment is around $8 billion, with hundreds
of millions of additional dollars needed each year after that to
maintain the system.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question. Since the implementation of PTC was mandated by the
Federal government, I am wondering if you could give me some insight on
other safety measures you all have considered, but have been unable to
move ahead with due to challenges with PTC implementation. What are
your other safety priorities, apart from PTC, and why?
Answer. PTC-preventable accidents account for only 4 percent of
mainline accidents. In contrast, track-caused accidents account for 35
percent of mainline accidents and equipment-caused accidents account
for 21 percent of mainline accidents. It is no surprise that the
industry devotes significant resources to addressing these primary
causes of accidents. In fact, the industry is investing more than ever
before in its infrastructure and equipment, including a record $25.5
billion in 2012.
In addition, the industry continues to invest in research to
improve its performance. AAR operates the leading rail research
facility in the world, the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., in
Pueblo Colorado. As mentioned in AAR's testimony, TTCI has undertaken
extensive research in the track area, including evaluating steel with
potentially improved fatigue resistance, improved track fastener
systems, and better inspection technologies. On the equipment side,
TTCI is investigating improved suspensions, better wheel metallurgy,
and trackside detectors that can detect rail car defects. AAR's written
testimony contains more information on these and other important
initiatives.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Kathryn Waters
Question. How much money have commuter railroads spent to date to
implement PTC? How much more do you estimate will be needed?
Answer. Commuter Railroads have informed APTA that, to date, they
have spent approximately $458.5 million and they currently estimate
that their costs to implement PTC will exceed $2.75 billion (2 commuter
rail agencies did not respond to our inquiry). The latter estimate is
already in excess of the $2 billion estimate that APTA had previously
stated. Given the remaining unknown aspects of this implementation,
that cost estimate could continue to change.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Kathryn Waters
Question. Ms. Waters, you note in your testimony that the FCC has
not responded to your requests to make available spectrum for PTC
implementation.
Question 1a. How much spectrum would be necessary, in your
estimate, to meet the needs of PTC systems?
Answer. Spectrum Requirements: Commuter rail spectrum needs are
localized to their operational corridors and the amount required is
specific to each Economic Area (EA). While it is not appropriate to
aggregate the national total of local needs, we are seeking individual
blocks in the local EAs. Original industry needs were specified for
each commuter rail operation in a study conducted for APTA and the
Federal Transit Administration, with funding provided through the
Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Project J-6, Quick Response
for Special Needs. The TCRP is sponsored by the Federal Transit
Administration; directed by the Transit Development Corporation, the
education and research arm of the American Public Transportation
Association; and administered by The National Academies, through the
Transportation Research Board. We are providing the Committee with a
copy of the TCRP J-6 Report (see Appendix A--Spectrum Estimate
Details). Also, in response to the inquiry of the Committee, we asked
our member agencies whether they had new estimates that differed from
the TCRP report estimates. Also attached with this response is a table
reflecting the known differences from the report's estimates.
Question 1b. Is it possible to utilize spectrum sharing for these
purposes?
Answer. Spectrum sharing: In some cases, commuter rail agencies are
currently planning to share spectrum with freight rail hosts or Amtrak,
or to piggyback on their procurement of the required spectrum. However,
in some cases, commuter rail agencies simply do not yet have sufficient
information regarding the decisions that may be made by the freight
rail carriers. The findings of the TCRP report indicated that ``the
freight railroads have acquired various nationwide and regional
channels in the 220 band (via an organization called PTC-220 LLC) for
PTC use along their freight rail lines, however they have also
indicated sharing of these frequencies is possible in shared freight/
passenger service rail corridors.''
[Attachment to Ms. Waters' responses.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
James P. Redeker
Question. At the hearing you mentioned that implementing PTC will
cost the State of Connecticut $130 million, and will prevent you from
performing other needed rail repairs. How can diverting funds to PTC
implementation have a negative effect on commuter rail safety? Are
there specific projects you have had to delay or cancel?
Answer. First and foremost, rail safety projects are a top priority
for the Connecticut Department of Transportation and are treated as
such in the development of the Department's Five Year Capital Program.
The Program for the Office of Rail also includes numerous unfunded
state-of-good-repair, modernization and capacity improvement projects,
including:
Fixed and movable bridge replacement on the New Haven Line
Signal system replacement on the New Haven Line (last two
phases)
New Haven-Hartford-Springfield corridor improvements
Rail Station parking improvements and expansions
High level platform rehabilitation
Customer service initiatives
The Department manages all of these systems to maintain safe
operations, however, there may eventually be reliability and/or
capacity issues that arise.