[Senate Hearing 113-174]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-174
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
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APRIL 16, 2013
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine
Peter K. Levine, Staff Director
John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Situation in Afghanistan
april 16, 2013
Page
Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan.................................................... 5
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
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TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Udall, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King,
Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Ayotte, Graham, Blunt, and Lee.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William
G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; and Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Bradley S. Watson and Lauren M.
Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora and Susie Perez Quinn,
assistants to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Mara Boggs and David LaPorte, assistants to
Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly;
Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Christian Brose,
assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant
to Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham;
Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt; and Peter Blair,
assistant to Senator Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Before we begin, I
want to take a moment to reflect on the tragedy in Boston.
Thousands of people had gathered there yesterday accepting the
physical and mental challenge of running a marathon. The city
celebrated its annual Patriots Day holiday in remembrance of
Boston's role in our Nation's founding.
Whoever was responsible for targeting that celebration,
whatever their twisted motives, they will fail. America has
demonstrated a remarkable resilience throughout its history and
a firm determination to bring justice to those who target the
innocent. The perpetrators of this attack will feel the full
weight of that justice.
Every member of this committee, this Congress, and all of
our people mourn the tragic loss of life. Our prayers go out to
the victims and their families, and we hope for the swift
recovery of those who are injured.
This morning, the committee hears from and welcomes General
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Commander of the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and Commander of U.S.
Forces, Afghanistan. This is General Dunford's first appearance
before this committee since taking command of U.S. and
coalition forces in early February.
General, it can be difficult for us and the American people
to get the full picture of how things are progressing in
Afghanistan as negative stories tend to get front-page
coverage, while good news may not get covered at all. Based on
my dozen or so visits to Afghanistan, most recently in January,
it strikes me that there are real signs of progress. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training mission has made
significant strides in building the Afghan Security Forces
(ASF) to its target level of 352,000 personnel. Afghan forces
are already responsible for security in areas where 90 percent
of Afghans live, and by later this spring, they are expected to
take the security lead throughout all of Afghanistan with
coalition forces shifting to a supporting role.
When Senator Jack Reed and I visited Regional Command East
in January, we were told that in under 2 years, the ASF had
gone from conducting less than 30 percent of operations in that
region totally on their own--that is, without coalition forces
present--to about 80 percent now.
Now, there are other signs of progress as well. For
instance, under the Taliban rule, roughly 800,000 Afghan
children were in school, and girls were denied an education.
Now, more than 8 million students attend Afghan schools, and
more than 40 percent of them are female. In 2001, Afghanistan
had 20,000 teachers, all male. Today there are 200,000
teachers, including 60,000 women. The number of schools in
Afghanistan has grown from 3,400 in 2001 to more than 16,000
today. More than 18 million Afghans now have telephone access
compared to about 1 million in 2002.
Earlier this year, President Obama announced plans for
drawing down 34,000 of the 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by
February 2014. This has been interpreted as meaning that the
bulk of the forthcoming troop reductions will be put off until
the end of this year. For several reasons, it would be better,
in my view, to stick to the ``steady pace approach'' that the
President at one point said he contemplated for those
reductions. It would drive home to Afghans and the Taliban the
success of the ASF, whose performance our commanders tell us
has exceeded expectations.
Maintaining a steady pace of reductions would also send an
important message to President Karzai. The Afghan president's
use of anti-coalition rhetoric, while possibly serving some
domestic political purpose, shows an insensitivity to the
sacrifices made by our troops and coalition forces over the
last decade, and creates a chill on the idea of a long-term
partnership.
It is in everyone's interest to promptly set the conditions
for any post-2014 partnership with Afghanistan. NATO defense
ministers have already begun consideration of the size and
mission for a post-2014 force in Afghanistan. One factor that
will influence that decision is the size and capacity of the
ASF. In this regard, the recent decision by NATO defense
ministers to support maintaining the ASF at the current 352,000
level through 2018, rather than reducing the support to a level
of 230,000 as previously planned, is the right thing to do. It
sends an important signal of our continued commitment to a safe
and secure Afghanistan, and may make it feasible for us to have
a smaller U.S. and coalition presence after 2014.
The greatest challenge to Afghanistan's security is not the
Taliban, but the Pakistan base sanctuaries for militant
extremists launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
Pakistan has said that it supports a stable and secure
Afghanistan, but its actions belie its words. The U.S.-Pakistan
relationship will not be normalized so long as those
extremists' safe havens exist on Pakistani territory.
Another large challenge to a stable Afghanistan are the
continuing shortcomings of the Afghan Government in meeting the
needs of the Afghan people and its lack of a willingness to
fight corruption by government officials.
General, you have already demonstrated that you are
carrying on the tradition of a highly-distinguished group of
U.S. commanders in Afghanistan. You are right in that
tradition. You are carrying it forward brilliantly. We look
forward to your helping us understand how far the Afghans and
the coalition have come and what remains to be done.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I and all of the
rest up here identify with your comments about the tragedy
yesterday in Boston. It is very hard to believe that that
happened.
Also, I thank you for commenting about, because very few
people do it, the successes, the women who are voting, and
getting all these good things that are happening. We don't hear
that often enough.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. As we discussed in my office last week, I
have been to Afghanistan several times over the past decade,
and I am greatly concerned that we will repeat the mistakes of
Iraq and squander the enormous sacrifice of American lives and
treasure by a precipitous withdrawal of forces at the end of
2014.
In Iraq, the Obama administration's decision to abruptly
withdraw U.S. troops in 2011 has resulted in the resurgence of
al Qaeda, increasing sectarian violence, and a growing Iranian
influence. The future of Iraq looks increasingly violent.
In Afghanistan, President Obama is making the same mistake
of deciding on troop levels based on arbitrary timelines and
without defining the underlying objectives, strategy, and
mission. This is backwards. The strategy drives the troop
requirements, not the other way around.
In my office last week, General Dunford and I discussed the
need to have capability to support the Afghanistan National
Security Forces (ANSF) and counterterrorism efforts in all
regions of Afghanistan in an area four times the size of my
State of Oklahoma. When making decisions about our mission in
Afghanistan, the President should listen more to his
professional military commanders on the front lines and less to
the political advisors in the West Wing.
General Mattis told this committee that he recommends
approximately 20,000 troops remain in Afghanistan after 2014.
That would be about 13,600 U.S. troops, about half that many
international forces. Our commanders tell me the mission should
be to continue counterterrorism efforts and to train and advise
ASF. For those missions across Afghanistan, they tell me that
8,000 to 12,000 troops is an unreasonable target. The fact that
this administration has floated the idea of zero troops is
patently irresponsible.
A force of only 10,000 will barely be able to protect
itself and would likely result in ceding the city of Herat to
Iranian authorities, which is a scary thought, and the city of
Mazar-e-Sharif in the north to drug traffickers and warlords.
On my frequent trips to Afghanistan, I have seen the progress
improve professionalization of the ANSF. The increased ability
of the Afghanistan forces to lead security operations gives me
hope, but also makes clear that the job of training, advising,
and assisting is far from complete.
The number and types of ANSF sustained past 2014 needs to
match the security conditions on the ground. To be successful,
they have to be able to maintain both the security and the
confidence of the Afghan people.
I look forward to General Dunford's recommendation on the
number of Afghan forces that are needed in the post-2014
environment. From my previous discussions with General Allen,
General Mattis, and General Dunford, it is obvious that the
right level is closer to the 352,000 than it is to the 230,000,
at least through 2018.
Although I am intently focused on the post-2014 security
environment, I am mindful that the 2013 and 2014 fighting
seasons are critical to setting conditions for success, and I
worry that inadequate funding will erode the fighting
capability of our troops on the front line. The President's
budget proposal last week fails to address the unprecedented
resource challenges facing our military and will hurt the
readiness of our military.
To preserve our foreign combat capabilities in places like
Afghanistan and North Korea, the Navy is tying up carrier
strike groups at the pier. The Air Force is grounding squadrons
of combat aircraft, and the Army is cancelling brigade size
combat training rotations. The effect of this deteriorating
readiness will be felt by the fighting forces in 2014, the men
and women we send into combat in Afghanistan next year. The
President must set aside political posturing and get serious
about working with Congress on the lasting solution to the
challenges facing our military. The troops fighting for this
Nation deserve nothing less.
I thank you very much, General Dunford, for all of your
activity and your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
General Dunford, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
General Dunford. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking
Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning
and represent the men and women of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.
Thanks to your leadership and support, they are well-trained
and well-equipped. Their extraordinary courage and performance
reflects that support.
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan remains focused on denying safe
haven in Afghanistan to the al Qaeda terrorists who attacked
our Nation on September 11, and denying the Taliban, who
harbored them, the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government.
We recognize that our national interests in the region are
served by a secure and stable Afghanistan at peace with its
neighbors.
I appear before you this morning confident in the cardinal
direction of the campaign. My confidence is based on the very
real progress we have made since the surge of forces that began
in late 2009, and that surge allowed us to move the campaign
forward. The constant pressure we have exerted on the remnants
of al Qaeda in Afghanistan has disrupted their ability to plan
and conduct operations against the West.
Our coalition Afghan partner operations have pushed the
Taliban away from the populated areas and prevented them from
meeting their campaigns objectives in 2012. While they remain
resilient, they are less of an existential threat to the Afghan
Government than they were in 2011. Most significantly, our
efforts since 2009 have provided the Afghan forces the time and
space necessary to grow and assume the lead.
As the chairman mentioned, today the ANSF has recruited and
fielded most of its authorized strength of 352,000. They are
leading approximately 80 percent of all combat operations being
conducted, and they have the lead security responsibility for
territory where nearly 90 percent of the population lives.
Later this spring, in line with the plan outlined at Lisbon and
Chicago summits, Afghan forces will be in the lead for combat
operations across the Nation.
Today's hearing truly comes at an inflection point in the
Afghan campaign, and there are many reasons to be optimistic.
That said, there are several significant challenges we must
overcome to meet our objectives.
Up to this point, it is fair to say we are focused on
growing the size of the ANSF. We are now focused on improving
the quality of the ANSF. In the months ahead, we will continue
to focus on a wide range of issues to include leadership
development, ministerial capacity, aviation, and the systems,
processes, and institutions needed to sustain a modern
professional force.
In the coming months, we will also need to address very
real political and psychological factors that will affect the
outcome of the campaign. With regard to political factors, we
are at a point in the campaign where there is real tension
between increasing aspirations of Afghan sovereignty and the
reality of operations conducted in accordance with the U.N.
Security Council mandate, the law of armed conflict, and the
military technical agreement. Properly managing that tension is
now a campaign imperative. The psychological aspect of the
campaign is equally important right now. Psychology will
influence the performance of the Afghan forces this summer and
affect the critical elections of 2014.
We confront growing uncertainty in Afghanistan and in the
region. Many Afghans have told me they no longer fear the
Taliban as much as they fear what will happen after 2014. One
Afghan described it as the Y2K effect. There is a growing sense
that December 2014 is a cliff for the Afghan people. That
dynamic must be addressed with a credible, compelling narrative
of U.S. commitment. Absent confidence and the hope for a
brighter future, Afghan leaders, the Afghan people, and
regional actors will continue to hedge and plan for the worst
case. The behavior associated with that mindset has the very
real potential to undermine the campaign.
In closing, there is a great deal to be optimistic about at
this point, but we are in the decisive phase of transition. The
progress we have made to date provides real opportunity, but
not inevitability. There will continue to be challenges that
will test our will and endurance. But in the end, if we define
winning as completing political and security transition while
rendering al Qaeda operationally ineffective. If we define
winning as setting the conditions for the Afghans to exploit
the decade of opportunity that will begin in 2015, I firmly
believe we can win.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
this morning. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC
AFGHANISTAN: PROGRESS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND COMMITMENT
WHERE WE ARE--STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
The conflict in Afghanistan has now shifted into a fundamentally
new phase. For the past 11 years, the United States and our coalition
allies have been leading combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking
over, and ISAF is stepping back into a supporting role. The progress
made by the ISAF-led surge over the past 3 years has put the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in control of all
Afghanistan's major cities and 34 provincial capitals, and driven the
insurgency away from the population. ISAF's primary focus is now
shifting from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and expand
these gains.
The progress made by the ANSF enabled President Obama and President
Karzai to agree at the January Summit that Milestone 2013--Afghan
security lead throughout the country--will be announced later this
spring. This announcement will mark ISAF's official transition to its
supporting role: fully focused on training, advising, and assisting the
ANSF. In fact, this transition has largely taken place. The ANSF are
now leading the vast majority of operations countrywide. ISAF
casualties are lower than they have been since 2008. The majority of
ISAF bases have been transferred to the ANSF or closed, and
construction is complete on the majority of ANSF bases. The United
States will redeploy 34,000 troops by February 2014, and the ANSF have
grown to nearly 352,000 personnel. Afghanistan's populated areas are
increasingly secure, and the ANSF have successfully maintained security
gains in areas that have already been transitioned. Still, the ANSF
will continue to need training, advising, and key combat support from
ISAF, including close air support, logistics, and intelligence, through
the end of the ISAF combat mission in December 2014.
However, security challenges remain. The insurgency's sanctuaries
in Pakistan, limited GIRoA institutional capacity, and endemic
corruption remain the greatest impediments to long-term stability and
sustainable security in Afghanistan. ISAF will continue to work with
GIRoA to address its challenges in order to deliver effective
governance to the Afghan people.
WHERE WE ARE--STATE OF THE ANSF
The ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now responsible
for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the insurgency.
Despite the early recognition that Afghan security would depend on
indigenous security forces, building the ANSF lagged in the initial
years after we forced the Taliban Government from power. In late 2009,
a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was initiated with the goal of
generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements and
getting them into the fight. Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF
forces--enabled by the U.S. troop surge ordered by President Obama--
provided the ANSF the space to develop combat capabilities and
leadership skills from the tactical level on up. GIRoA and ISAF
deliberately focused first on ANSF growth (force size), followed by the
development of enablers and the professionalization of the ranks. This
decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built
to size by 2012, would experience some initial shortfalls in equipment,
logistics, personnel, and leadership--foreseeable challenges that would
be overcome in the 2012-2014 period as Afghan knowledge, capacity, and
experience increased.
Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts
a combined ANSF and Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) force of over
350,000 personnel who have secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan's
population, and are leading 80 percent of all conventional operations.
These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved
leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They
are a source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people--
factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and
effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes.
As of early 2013, most of our coalition partnerships with the ANSF
have evolved into advise and assist relationships; these relationships
are designed to provide tailored support and to continue increasing
ANSF confidence and capabilities. Those advisory roles are designed to
evolve and reduce over time until ANSF units can fully stand on their
own in a sustainable manner.
The ANSF continue to improve at a steady pace with marked quality
increases seen in units capable of conducting independent operations.
Over the last year, only 1 of the 23 Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade
headquarters was conducting independent operations. Today the ANA has 1
corps/division headquarters, 5 brigade headquarters, and 27 battalions
(4 of the 27 are garrison support units) capable of operating
independently. The growing ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has
also made strides towards becoming an independent and effective force--
with the vast majority of ANA Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions,
to include night operations, being Afghan-led.
Evidence of the ANSF's growing capacity to conduct their own
increasingly sophisticated operations can be seen in Laghman, Kabul,
and Paktika provinces. Here, the ANSF have implemented the layered
security concept that decreases vulnerabilities in any single arm of
the force by leveraging the capabilities of the entire ANSF (e.g. ALP,
ANASOF, ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP),
National Directorate of Security (NDS), etc.), providing security to
the Afghan people with minimal assistance from the coalition. This
``web'' of enduring security starts locally, then spreads from the
bottom up to the population centers, through the rural areas, and out
to the borders.
Layered security consists of all ANSF elements having a defined
role within an established network, each one responsible for a specific
security operation's focus defined geographically (Border, Village,
District, Province), or by other objectives outlined in a security
strategy. For example, a layered security operation might consist of
the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) patrolling a population center and
its highways, while the ABP provides an outer security layer by
controlling border crossings. Simultaneously, the ANA conduct combat
patrols and operations based on NDS intelligence providing a security
layer in between the border and population center. Command, control,
coordination and intelligence for the entire layered security operation
is conducted at the Operational Coordination Center (OCC). The OCCs are
designed to manage and disseminate information and intelligence
proactively or in response to an incident, and laterally share
information that enables rapid joint action at the provincial level and
below. This integrated combination of information sharing, decision
support, and the ability to direct operations makes it more difficult
for criminals or insurgents to succeed. The Afghan ability to implement
this layered security environment will increase once the Afghan Air
Force (AAF) becomes fully capable. This ANSF collective effort is an
example of how Afghans have taken responsibility for their own security
and are making marked and sustainable progress on the ground.
In the last year, the coalition has begun transitioning districts
and provinces in the east and south. There have been setbacks during
these operations, as we expected in any transition as dramatic as the
ones described above. But, the Afghans are learning from their mistakes
and are pressing on to become increasingly independent and effective.
This is a part of a larger story of resilience and resolution.
Throughout last summer and fall, the ANSF fought increasingly on their
own, with decreasing enabling support from U.S. and coalition forces.
In Kandahar's Zharey District, for example, we reduced U.S. troops from
3,500 to 300 last October. Afghan soldiers are now patrolling
independently and attacks have not increased. We estimate that the
number of Taliban fighters have fallen from 900 to 100. In neighboring
Panjwai District, local villages have risen up against the Taliban and
their harsh tactics. When they did, Afghan police quickly reinforced
the villagers, enabling them to survive a Taliban counterattack.
In another branch of the ANSF, the Afghan Air Force's (AAF)
emerging capability was recently demonstrated in Regional Command (RC)-
East, where winter flight missions were successfully conducted to
resupply the ANSF at forward operating bases in Nuristan Province. In
another example, the AAF provided direct support to the ABP mission to
supply local villages and secure contested territory in RC-South. While
many challenges remain, the progress across the ANSF has been genuine
and is already creating a significant impact on both the physical and
psychological aspects of the fight.
ANSF Challenges and Gaps in 2013
Having realized the initial goal of growing and equipping the ANSF
into an organization that will be capable of assuming the lead security
role, we have shifted emphasis to building capacity and fielding more
complex and technologically advanced capabilities. ANSF progress
towards advanced capabilities has been measured. Significant gaps in
some ANSF capabilities persist. The ANSF will continue to require ISAF
support in areas including battle command, intelligence fusion,
logistics, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device (C-IED), surface fires, engineer and explosive ordnance, and
aviation. Current ISAF support and the subsequent Resolute Support
mission (the NATO post-2014 mission) force must take a tailored
approach to provide train, advise, and assist support focused on very
specific capabilities to maintain the current ANSF development
trajectory.
The ANSF have made some progress in enablers such as logistics and
they are increasingly taking responsibility for distribution,
maintenance, ammunition management, fuel, and other classes of supply
at the national and regional logistics nodes and institutions. ANSF
intelligence capability has seen improvements. ANA Military
Intelligence Companies with human intelligence, signals intelligence,
and counterintelligence sections are currently integrated at the Corps
level to support several ANSF mission sets. The Afghan Air Force is
improving its ability to provide air support to the ANSF. These and
other capabilities that need further development have been identified
for inclusion in the current ISAF and subsequent Resolute Support
train, advise, and assist effort. Capabilities that will require
continued development after 2014 include aviation, explosive ordnance
disposal, engineer, and personnel management. While not exhaustive,
current capability gaps include:
The need for continued assistance with planning,
coordination, fire support integration, control of CAS,
intelligence, medical evacuation, and command and control, as
highlighted by the recent 209th Corps Operations in Badakhshan.
Intelligence sharing exists, but is not a capability
that has been cultivated and standardized across the ANSF.
Information sharing between the NDS and ANA remains uneven. In
an effort to cultivate intelligence sharing, the ANSF
Operational Coordination Centers are increasingly focused on
facilitating intelligence sharing at the regional and
provincial levels, where we see some success. However, despite
the progress, ANSF commanders tend to rely on what they are
most familiar with, such as tactical-level source operations
and intelligence sharing based on personal relationships.
The AAF will require increased capability and capacity
going into 2015 due to late equipment fielding, contracting
problems, and personnel shortfalls. ISAF currently predicts
that this gap will exist through 2016. Coalition advisors will
continue working to build sufficient fixed-wing, rotary-wing,
close-combat attack, and intelligence air platform
capabilities.
While route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) capabilities continue to improve throughout the ANA,
significant challenges exist for generating fully manned,
trained, and equipped EOD teams. The majority of ANSF
casualties come from IEDs. As of February 2013, the ANA has
only 59 validated EOD teams out of an authorized 230, and the
ANP has 14 validated teams out of an authorized 88. This gap
will likely endure through 2015 and beyond.
ANSF personnel issues, like that of many militaries,
are varied and range from shortages, literacy, retention,
attrition, and desertion. The ANSF continue to suffer from
noncommissioned officer (NCO) shortages. The ANA requires over
10,000 NCOs, while the ANP requires over 5,000. In the ANA, the
core limitations in NCO generation remain the limited number of
functionally literate applicants. Just as in many regional
armies, the professionalization of the ANSF NCO corps has not
yet occurred, with NCOs being underrepresented across the
forces and lacking authorities required to effectively lead
troops.
Attrition within the ANA also continues to be a
significant challenge, creating a burden on recruiting and
training structures. The ANA's sustained high attrition rates
remain a significant concern and threaten the growth and
development of a professional, competent, and capable force.
Vacancies are not always filled quickly or with properly
trained personnel, presenting challenges for units at the
operational level. Furthermore, attrition creates a burden on
recruiting and training assets, increasing the overall cost of
the force. The ANA attrition rate continues to exceed the
monthly target rate of 1.4 percent; for the last year the
monthly average was 2.7 percent per month. This attrition rate
equates to the loss of around 5,000 personnel per month or
60,000 per annum. The ANA leadership tracks attrition data and
the reasons most often cited for leaving the army are issues of
leadership, family separation, leave, and operational tempo.
Since many of the underlying issues with attrition pertain to
leadership, Minister of Defense Mohammadi formed an Evaluation
Commission to assess his commanders, and if need be, replace
unsatisfactory leaders from battalion through corps levels.
Mitigation Efforts into 2014
In most battlefield enabler and functional areas, ANSF capabilities
will never equal those of the coalition. But parity between coalition
and Afghan forces is not necessary for the requirements of Afghan
security, and is therefore not the right measure of Afghan
capabilities. In most areas, the ANSF will do things differently than
the coalition has done them. They will utilize different tools and
techniques to achieve the same net effect. Indirect fires, for example,
can be provided by mortars rather than close air support; CASEVAC can
be accomplished by ground rather than air; and planning will be
accomplished in an Afghan way. In some cases, too, the ANSF may simply
choose not to do some things that they would have undertaken while
partnered with us. But it is a mistake to discount organic Afghan
capabilities and techniques because they do not meet Western
standards--the ANSF have other advantages (local familiarity with the
culture and terrain, in-depth understanding of their enemies tactics
and techniques, ingenuity, etc.) that they can leverage to defeat the
security challenges they face. These organic capabilities and methods
will most often be sufficient to preserve their own confidence and that
of the Afghan people. Where the ANSF lack sufficient independent
capability, we will continue to provide security force assistance to
close the gaps until such time as the Afghans are able to provide their
own capacity and capabilities for themselves.
Although the ANSF are developing solutions to provide needed
enabler capabilities, continued support will be required for the
foreseeable future. We have developed a tailored plan to accelerate key
enablers as a part of transition to help improve the future self-
sufficiency of the ANSF to protect the Afghan population, manage
violence, and contain the insurgency through sustained layered security
operations. We anticipate most of these enablers to be fielded by the
end of 2014 with capability development continuing through the Resolute
Support mission.
WHERE WE ARE--STATE OF THE INSURGENCY
U.S. and coalition forces, working side by side with our Afghan
partners, have reversed the insurgency's momentum and pushed insurgents
out of population centers. By the end of last year's fighting season,
the ANSF and ISAF had deprived the insurgents of key safe havens,
command and control nodes, and support zones. They are now less
capable, less popular, and less of a threat to the Afghan Government
than a year ago.
Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and
sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to provide Taliban senior leadership
some freedom of movement and freedom of action, facilitating the
training of fighters, and the planning of operations. The Afghan
Taliban and all its sub-groups, including the Haqqani Network, remain
capable of conducting high profile attacks, though counterterrorism
pressure has degraded this ability. However, the Taliban remain firm in
their conviction that ISAF's drawdown and perceived ANSF weakness,
especially when supplemented with continued external support and with
sanctuary in Pakistan that the Taliban exploit, will translate into a
restoration of their pre-surge military capabilities and influence.
Sustained counterterrorism operations have also eliminated dozens
of al Qaeda enablers and exerted pressure on al Qaeda personnel,
restricting their movement to isolated areas of northeastern
Afghanistan. Despite effective counterterrorism pressure on al Qaeda
and its Taliban enablers, and on the small number of al Qaeda fighters
in Afghanistan, al Qaeda's relationship with local Afghan Taliban
remains intact.
CHALLENGES
Establishing a Constructive ANSF-Pakistan Military Relationship
The security, especially along the border, of Afghanistan and
Pakistan is an interdependent issue that requires a cooperative effort
between the two countries.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has ebbed and flowed over
time, but both nations acknowledge that stability in Afghanistan
impacts Pakistan and vice versa. The unresolved border issues between
Afghanistan and Pakistan are a historical source of friction between
the two countries. Actions by both sides exacerbated this friction and
contributed significantly to the loss of trust necessary for a
meaningful relationship between each country's military forces. Last
fall, as a step toward improving this relationship, ISAF led the
development of a Tripartite Border Standard Operating Procedure. This
document is designed to improve cross border coordination between ISAF,
the ANSF, and the Pakistan military. ISAF continues to work to improve
the cooperation, participation and commitment of the Afghans and
Pakistanis.
Recently the ANSF established a more robust Tripartite Joint
Operations Center in Kabul, providing general officers on both sides
with direct access to their respective Ministries. Ongoing Border Flag
Meetings continue to address border issues and are key to develop and
improve cross-border relations. While we see some initial progress,
serious challenges remain. Our goal remains to develop the trust
necessary between the two countries so that they will eventually be
able to maintain a constructive bilateral military-to-military
relationship.
Insider Threat
One tactic the insurgents use to sow distrust and attack our
resolve is infiltration in friendly forces for the purposes of
attacking from the inside, sometimes described as ``Green on Blue'' or
``Green on Green'' attacks. We recognize the insider attacks are a
threat to Afghan and coalition forces and take this issue very
seriously. ISAF is a learning, adaptive organization, and we have
devoted a tremendous amount of time and energy to better understand
this threat. Together, ISAF and the Afghan Government have undertaken
numerous measures to reduce the risk of insider attacks, including
improved vetting and screening, counterintelligence, and cultural
awareness. We are constantly refining our approach.
Our actions are based upon the three pillars: Force Protection,
Situational Awareness, and Counter-Intelligence (CI). Our Force
Protection (FP) efforts include the assignment of a dedicated FP
Officer to provide a daily risk assessment and adjust FPO measures as
appropriate. We have also instituted guidance to employ Guardian Angels
to prevent insider attacks or reduce the effects of these attacks. We
have brought in outside support to provide Insider Threat Situational
Awareness Training with mobile training teams. These teams provide a
sophisticated understanding of Human Behavior Pattern Recognition
Analysis, helping to identify predictive indicators of potential
insider attacks. Our final pillar encompasses the expansion of our CI
teams for both the coalition and Afghan National Army; we have
accomplished this by employing additional resources from Allied Command
Counter-Intelligence, while the Afghans have transferred CI personnel
from the Ministry of Interior and National Directorate of Security over
to the Afghan National Army.
Civilian Casualties
The protection of the Afghan population remains a top ISAF
priority, and avoidance of civilian casualties is one of ISAF's highest
priorities. We have taken significant actions over the past year to
minimize these tragic events. As a result, ISAF-caused civilian
casualties have been reduced by almost half in comparing 2011 to 2012.
These casualties are, rightly, a concern to the people and the
President of Afghanistan. We are working with the GIRoA to further
reduce ISAF-caused civilian casualties and maintain the trust and
support of the Afghan Government and the Afghan people.
ISAF continues to work closely with its Afghan counterparts to
ensure accurate and timely reporting of civilian casualties. Supporting
security transition is the transfer of responsibility for civilian
casualties avoidance and mitigation measures, procedures, and
capabilities to the ANSF. In order to support effective protection of
the Afghan population, in December the Ministry of Defense hosted its
first Population Protection Conference to discuss and address these
issues.
Lessons Learned
Detention Facility in Parwan
The transfer of the Detention Facility in Parwan to the Afghan
Government reaffirmed Afghan sovereignty, while preserving our force
protection requirements. Now known as the Afghan National Detention
Facility-Parwan, the facility represents an emerging sense of
sovereignty for the Afghan people, allowing them to assume
responsibility for the detention and prosecution of detainees under the
authority of the Afghan constitution. During the transfer ceremony,
GIRoA officials highlighted their responsibilities for detention
operations in accordance with the Afghan rule of law, due process, and
international standards for the humane treatment of detainees. While
the day represented a transfer of authority, there is still work in
progress to transition the management functions of the facility. We
still have an appropriate presence at the facility in support of Afghan
forces. We will continue to train, advise, and assist the Detentions
Operations Command, the Afghan Review Board process, and the Justice
Center at Parwan as Afghanistan's capability to operate independently
fully develops.
We did not arrive at this juncture overnight; the original
Memorandum of Understanding was signed on March 9, 2012, and it took a
year of continued work at the facility to build sufficient Afghan
capacity and capabilities to finalize the transfer of authority--that
work continues as we mark another milestone in the transition of this
mission. The Agreement that determined the final requirements for the
transfer reaffirms our mutual commitment to the lawful and humane
treatment of detainees, while ensuring proper protection of Afghan,
U.S., and coalition forces. This transfer improved our strategic
partnership with Afghanistan, sets the stage for increased cooperation
in the broader transition framework, and fulfilled the pledges made by
President Obama and President Karzai during their joint statement in
January.
ISSUES
Elections in 2014
A peaceful and successful transition of the Afghan Presidency in
2014 will be a crucial step toward a confident, secure, and stable way
ahead in Afghanistan. Elections must be seen to be inclusive, free, and
fair to the Afghan people. A successful political transition is also a
precondition for the continued flow of resources as described in the
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Donor confidence and sustained
flow of pledged funding are critical for continued progress in a stable
Afghanistan. ISAF will support the ANSF as they provide security for
the elections process.
Force Posture
As the Campaign transitions in the coming 20 months to the Resolute
Support train, advise, and assist mission in support of the ANSF, we
will also be redeploying U.S. forces to reach our 34K force structure
by February 2014 and retrograde equipment. Following that, we will
further redeploy forces to a level yet to be determined by the end of
2014. Although challenged by geography, weather, and occasional
disruptions in the land routes, we can complete retrograde and
redeployment of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan. We have sufficient
transportation capacity to meet redeployment and retrograde
requirements. The combined capabilities of the Multi-Modal (M/M)
network, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and the Pakistan
ground lines of communication (PAK GLOCs) provide redundant
capabilities to meet our requirements.
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) redeployment and retrograde
operations began in 2012 with the recovery of surge forces. From
January 2012 through March 2013, USFOR-A reduced force levels by 28
percent, reduced U.S. bases by 70 percent, reduced rolling stock
equipment by 45 percent, and reduced non-rolling stock equipment and
supplies by 26 percent. We are confident in our ability to successfully
continue redeployment and retrograde operations through 2014 as we
transition to the post-2014 mission.
Contractor Drawdown
In concert with our mission requirements and overall retrograde and
base closure/transfer, we are responsibly drawing down the contractor
footprint, both in terms of personnel and equipment. In August 2012, we
stood up the Operational Contract Support Drawdown Cell, and tasked
them with this specific mission, giving particular emphasis to applying
lessons learned from Iraq. With this cell in place, we put our primary
focus on the largest contracts in theater and are currently executing a
plan that will yield a reduction in contractor personnel by
approximately 25,000 ( 25 percent) by the end of calendar year 2013. A
combination of base closure and a further descoping of contract
requirements will allow us to continue to reduce contractor footprint
through calendar year 2014. We are also putting great emphasis on
responsible disposition of contractor-managed government-owned
equipment in theater. To make this happen, we are collaborating closely
with Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, and
other key stakeholders to ensure we have a fiscally responsible and
logistically feasible plan for materiel reduction of this equipment.
Over the next 21 months, this approach will result in a responsible
contractor reduction that appropriately balances mission risk with our
need for retrograde, base closure/transfer, and materiel reduction.
During this transition, commanders will move to more expeditionary
standards and balance quality of life, safety, fiscal stewardship, and
mission. For example, we will reduce our in-theater food stock by
changing the meal cycle to two Meals Ready-to-Eat and two hot meals, we
will reduce the use of non-tactical vehicles on our bases, and we will
begin to descope the services provided to our soldiers and civilians
such as contract laundry. We will continue to provide wireless internet
services as long as possible which is important to the morale of our
force and provides a vital link to their families.
STEWARDSHIP OF RESOURCES REMAINS A KEY TASK
Afghan Security Force Funds
A critical tool in our efforts to support the development of the
ANSF has been the use of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
which provides the resources required to train, sustain, and equip a
force of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police as well as 30,000 Afghan
local police. A combination of ongoing Department of Defense reviews,
Department of Defense reprogramming, and congressional reallocation
reduced the original fiscal year 2012 request from $12.8 billion to
$9.2 billion. ASFF received $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2013 against a
request of $5.7 billion. This reduction will result in the delay in
deploying some needed enabling capabilities. The fiscal year 2013
budget shifted emphasis from building, equipping, and training to
professionalizing and sustaining the force. It will include some key
enabler builds as well as equipping and infrastructure requirements for
the Afghan Air Forces and Special Operations Forces as they continue to
build their capabilities.
Commander's Emergency Response Program
The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains
important; although it will reduce as our forces reduce. Working
collaboratively with the Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction and the Army Audit Agency, we have made significant
improvements in policy and execution that provided significant return
on investment. In fiscal year 2012, ISAF was able to reduce CERP
projects in both number and scale due to improving security conditions
and a decreasing requirement for humanitarian relief and
reconstruction. Even so, the right-sizing of this critical enabling
program continued to emphasize small-scale, high-impact projects that
delivered immediate assistance to the local population with 96 percent
of the projects executed in fiscal year 2012 valued at less than
$100,000 each and 90 percent under $10,000 each. CERP remains a
critical tool for our commanders on the ground.
Military Construction
Despite a dynamic and evolving operational environment, ISAF and
USFOR-A remain firmly committed to efficiently managing congressionally
appropriated Military Construction (MILCON) funds to support our
warfighters. By establishing a deliberate process to review, validate,
and adapt this multi-billion dollar investment, the command ensured
effective resource stewardship while providing the quality facilities
needed by our troops. As a result, since 2011, we have recommended and
received approval for the cancellation/descope of over 100 MILCON
projects with an estimated cost avoidance/savings of nearly $1.3
billion.
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) is a Department of Defense
funding source that uses 2-year funds for the execution of critical
infrastructure projects in the power, water, transportation, and rule-
of-law sectors. The projects are carefully selected, assessed, and
coordinated with GIRoA, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development to ensure that they are both
sustainable and congruent with Afghanistan's future infrastructure
priorities. AIF projects are critical to locking in stability gains and
providing a foundation for internal economic growth that is less
reliant on external aid. Nearly all AIF funds (99 percent) are spent in
the east, south, and southwest areas of Afghanistan where they provide
positive counter-insurgency effects in support of the ANSF and
encourage long-term security and stability. In addition, 2-year funds
enable USFOR-A to execute large, complex projects that were not
possible with CERP. Most importantly, the AIF program serves as an
effective counter to the insurgent narrative of abandonment.
WHAT WINNING LOOKS LIKE
Despite the remaining challenges, we can win in Afghanistan. The
key elements of our success include:
The transition of security responsibility to a
confident, self-reliant and sustainable ANSF capable of
protecting the population and securing a legitimate Afghan
Government.
An operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of a
safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations outside
the area.
An acceptable political transition, defined by
inclusive, free, fair elections and Afghan Government adherence
to the Mutual Accountability Framework.
A constructive ANSF-Pakistan military relationship.
We will have reached the end state of our combat operations when
security conditions are set for the Afghan people to exploit a Decade
of Opportunity. All of this is achievable--but it is not inevitable.
Winning in Afghanistan will require us to remain focused on why we are
there and firmly committed to achieving our objectives.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. We will
follow the 8-minute rule this morning.
General, I made reference to the media characterization of
events in Afghanistan. Recent news reports have described a
number of high profile Taliban attacks that suggest a declining
security situation in Afghanistan. A Taliban attack and a
hostage standoff in Farah Province was said to ``highlight the
crumbling security situation'' and the ``deteriorating security
situation'' in that western province.
A Taliban assault on a remote outpost in eastern
Afghanistan was said to be a ``serious blow'' to one of the
Afghan army's most elite units. The tragic death of a U.S.
civilian advisor and five other Americans in an attack in
southern Afghanistan was said to highlight the ``escalating
violence'' associated with the Taliban's attempt to regain
momentum.
Could you tell us whether in your view those articles,
those characterizations, taken together provide an accurate
impression of the security situation in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, in the aggregate, those
incidents remind us that we are still at war, and there is
still violence in Afghanistan. Having said that, it is
important to note that 80 percent of the violence currently
occurs where 20 percent of the population lives. By and large,
the population in Afghanistan has been free from violence. The
Talibani enemy have been pushed away from the populated areas.
Each of those incidents that you referred to was a separate
incident. In Farah, as an example, we know that the enemy at
this point is relying on high profile attacks, improvised
explosive devices (IED), and assassination attempts in order to
achieve their effect because they are unable to influence the
population in the way that they were a short time ago.
The issue at the remote outpost that you referred to was
frankly a breakdown in leadership. It had nothing to do with
the capabilities of the ASF in the aggregate. In fact, what I
was impressed with was that the Afghan leadership took
immediate action against the leadership that were responsible
for that particular incident. So what we see is increasingly
ASF and the leadership in the ASF being held accountable when
they fail to properly perform their duties. In this case, that
is exactly what happened.
With regard to the tragic loss of life of our young
Department of State (DOS) employee, that also indicates what
the enemy is intent to do in order to erode our will. But in
general terms, Mr. Chairman, what I would tell you is that that
does not reflect the level of violence across the country at
this time. The level of violence has significantly reduced over
the past 2 years. As I mentioned, the surge had the desired
effect, and, most importantly, not only has the violence been
reduced in the populated areas, but that security is currently
being provided by ASF largely and not coalition forces.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. General, do you support
maintaining the ASF at the higher level of 352,000 through 2018
rather than reducing those forces to 230,000?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I do support extending the
352,000. That decision has not been made and it is conditional
on Afghan negotiations related to the bilateral security
agreement (BSA) and our enduring presence in Afghanistan, but I
would support that. It mitigates risk during the period of a
transition. It mitigates risk during a period of what we
project to be economic downturn. I think it provides that
demonstrated commitment that you referred to in your opening
remarks.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. General, do you support the
President's decision to draw down 34,000 of the 66,000 U.S.
troops from Afghanistan by February 2014?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I do support it. What is
critical about the drawdown this year is that it allows us to
stay engaged at the battalion or Kandak level with the ASF
during their first summer in the lead. We have the flexibility
to conduct the drawdown to allow us to stay engaged with our
train, advise, and assist mission at the appropriate level this
summer.
Chairman Levin. There was an article, General, in
yesterday's New York Times about the threats that are faced by
many Afghans that spent the last 11 years, or part of the last
11 years, helping us in Afghanistan by interpreting so that we
could proceed more effectively in Afghanistan. These
interpreters are supposed to be protected by a visa program,
which I remember very vividly that Senator Kennedy and many of
us worked very hard to achieve.
Can you personally take whatever steps you are able to take
to make sure that those visas are provided as contemplated by
law?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, we owe a tremendous debt of
gratitude to the interpreters that have supported us over the
last 11 years. It is fair to say we could not have accomplished
the mission without them, so I would fully support that.
What we are doing now on the ground is ensuring that their
applications make it through the process, at least through the
U.S. embassy, and come back here to Washington, DC. We are
personally tracking those on an individual basis, in many
cases, to ensure that those interpreters who most deserve to
come to our country can do that. But I absolutely would support
that.
Chairman Levin. Will you take whatever steps you can with
DOS, beyond what you have already done, to tell them that it is
really important to our security, and to what our security
demands have been, that those visas be forthcoming?
General Dunford. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We will also be writing a letter to the DOS
relative to that matter.
In terms of our relations with President Karzai, did we
recently work out an agreement with President Karzai in a
province where he said that our Special Operations Forces (SOF)
would have to leave within 2 weeks? Did we get that
straightened out so that, in fact, we worked out an acceptable
agreement, a mutual agreement?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, we did. That was the Wardak
Province. In February, President Karzai had directed that all
U.S. Special Forces be removed from the province. That was as a
result of allegations that proved to be unsubstantiated.
At the time President Karzai gave us that direction, I let
the President know that that would be unacceptable both from a
force protection perspective and from our ability to accomplish
our objectives. He afforded us the opportunity to work with the
Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior and come up with a
transition plan for the Wardak Province. Since that time, we
have removed U.S. Special Forces from one district inside of
that province. There are nine districts in the province. We
removed SOF from one of those districts, and we replaced them
with effective ASF.
So in honesty, Mr. Chairman, what I told President Karzai
when that was over, frankly that turned out to be a model for
transition. We had broad guidance from President Karzai. We
were able to work with the Minister of Defense and Minister of
Interior to transition. It is exactly what is happening across
the rest of the country. We are in the process of transitioning
from provinces, and so this particular incident worked out.
From my perspective, we have an effective solution.
Chairman Levin. I might just note that President Karzai
made a statement, and it got huge publicity. But when the
resolution was achieved by you and the Afghans, it got very
little publicity. I am afraid that is too typical of what the
media situation is here.
My final question is on Pakistan. You met with General
Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan army staff, also with Afghan
military leaders, I believe. It was a trilateral meeting. Can
you tell us what your assessment is of Pakistan's current role
as to whether they have in any way changed their behavior in
terms of ending the safe havens that exist in Pakistan that
have been used to attack our forces, Afghan forces?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, at this point I could only
tell you that the rhetoric from Pakistan has changed. General
Kayani has pledged cooperation. We have seen at the tactical
level increased levels of cooperation since the fall. We did
sign a trilateral, tripartite border agreement between
Afghanistan and the coalition and Pakistan in November. We have
conducted an exchange of officers. I have a Pakistani liaison,
flag officer, in my headquarters. We have several Pakistanis in
our headquarters to deconflict border issues.
We have seen increased cooperation on the ground lines of
communication as we have tried to move our equipment back and
forth through Pakistan. General Kayani has pledged that we will
meet with him on a monthly basis individually, and we also will
have routine meetings at the trilateral level with Afghan
leadership, as well as General Kayani.
So the rhetoric and the degree of our engagement has
increased. We are still obviously concerned with the results,
and I think there is still some time to see before we can make
a judgment on that.
Chairman Levin. Would you give us an update by the end of
May as to whether that rhetoric has been followed by any change
in action? Could you give us that--just send us a report by the
end of May?
General Dunford. I will do that, Mr. Chairman. Just so you
know, President Karzai and I think it is significant. I
proposed and he approved 2 weeks ago to have General Kayani and
the senior leadership from Pakistan come to Kabul and attend a
meeting hosted by us with the minister of defense from
Afghanistan and the chief of the general staff from
Afghanistan. This is a significant step forward. I will be able
to report on that in May.
[The information referred to follows:]
Our regular engagement with the Pakistani military leadership on a
number of bilateral and trilateral issues (involving Afghan leaders)
continues, and we have achieved some positive effects through those
engagements. Most notably, our efforts to bring senior Afghan and
Pakistani military officers together to discuss issues related to the
contested border between the two countries have reduced tensions. In
early May, a series of tri-lateral meetings prevented what may have
become a more significant distraction--not only for the campaign in
Afghanistan but for Pakistani security forces during that country's
historic election of a new civilian government.
However, as yet, we have not witnessed a demonstrable shift in
Pakistani willingness to address the persistent challenge of insurgent
safe havens. This is undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the domestic
security requirements related to Pakistan's presidential elections and
the military's focus on limiting violence and guaranteeing the
population's right to participate in the democratic process. With a new
government forming and preparing to take power, we will remain closely
engaged with our Pakistani counterparts, encouraging them to follow
through on their commitment to address threats to our mutual security.
That said, there is a growing realization within the military
leadership that insurgents and terrorists pose an increasing problem
that destabilizes Pakistan. However currently, Pakistani efforts are
focused only on the direct threat posed by Terik-e-Taliban.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I told you in my office, General Dunford, it is hard for
me to believe that it has been 10 years since we started our
active training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The reason I
am particularly sensitive to that is that this began with the
Oklahoma 45th Infantry Brigade, their first duty over there,
and I spent quite a bit of time there at that time. That is
what kicked it off.
Then later on with the Kabul Military Training Center, that
is so incredibly impressive. It is almost like you are looking
at Fort Sill, and the resources they have and who has taken
that over. On any given day, there might be 10,000 ANA trainees
crawling through the mud and busting down doors. That facility
is now 20,000 acres, I think.
My concern is that, with the changes that we are talking
about in this hearing today, is that going to negatively impact
this real success? I think the chairman here talked about the
great successes that we have had over there, and I agree with
that. But one of the successes is in that training capability,
and that particular center, you have spent a lot of time there,
I am sure. Is that going to suffer at all with the changes that
we are looking at now?
General Dunford. Sir, what is important, and I think you
are alluding to the post-2014 presence, what is important I
think when we look at post-2014 are a couple of factors. One is
geography. I believe we need to be in the four corners of the
country. Much of the training takes place at regional training
centers, and it is important after 2014 that we continue to be
at those regional training centers with an effective advise and
assist effort.
The other is the level at which we advise and assist the
Afghan forces. This summer as we go into the Afghan first
summer in the lead, they will be advised and assisted at the
selected battalion level, lieutenant colonel level, the Kandak
level. As we get to the fall, we will lift off to the brigade
level, and post-2014, current planning would be either at the
brigade or the corps level, and that decision has not been made
yet.
But in any event, we recognize that what you pointed out is
critical, and that is we maintain a robust train, advise, and
assist effort at the training center level. We would expect
that to be at the institutional training center level in Kabul,
as well as those four corners of Afghanistan at the regional
training center. So from my perspective, what is really
important is as we look at our enduring presence, it would be
sufficient to address that particular function that you
referred to.
Senator Inhofe. I have heard about some of the changes that
perhaps we are going to make, maybe go into a regional level.
But that facility is so impressive, I just want to make sure we
are going to continue it at the level it is now. The number of
people that are going through to sustain numbers that we talked
about in this area so far, it is going to be necessary to do
that. I am sure that you are equally impressed with the
successes we have had at that Kabul military training center.
With the elections coming up, it is their constitution that
causes Karzai to have to drop out, and we know there are many
areas of the world where they have a constitutional prohibition
that would require people to stop. Yousemeni comes to mind in
Uganda. Has there been any talk at all of any kind of an effort
on his behalf to be able to remain there? I understand there is
not, but I just wanted to get that into the record.
General Dunford. Senator, there has not been any public
discussion about that. In fact, in several meetings that I have
attended, both one-on-one or with the Ambassador, with
President Karzai, with Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on
each occasion, President Karzai has expressed his intent to
stand down in April 2014. I also attended his address to
parliament, somewhat equivalent to our State of the Union, a
month ago where he announced to the parliament that he also
intended to step down on the April 5, 2014.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that. Is there any talk about
who might succeed him?
General Dunford. Senator, there is a tremendous amount of
political activity ongoing on in Afghanistan right now, but it
would be difficult for me to select a favorite at this point.
Senator Inhofe. There is a history that when rogues are on
their way out, they clean up their act. Have you seen a more
positive Karzai than we have seen in the past?
General Dunford. Senator, over the past 2 months, we have
worked through very difficult issues, President Karzai and I,
and we have come in each case to an effective solution. So the
relationship I have had on the ground over the last 2 months
has been cooperative.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that when this takes place,
when the change takes place, that our intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activity is going to be
dramatically reduced. I would ask you, first of all, is that
really necessary, or do we have the resources to sustain it,
and should we do that?
General Dunford. Senator, my perspective is I will need a
sustained ISR effort post-2014. In fact, there is not a direct
relationship between the numbers of forces on the ground and
the ISR effort in that we cannot reduce ISR commensurate with
the forces. In fact, at the time that we reduce forces, ISR
actually becomes as important or more important.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, that was our thinking. We have talked
about this in the past because they have had several things in
the media that would reduce proportionally. You make a very
good point that that actually could be better to increase the
presence of ISR capability.
I think you have talked about, the chairman asked the
question, and you answered the question about the 352,000
versus the 230,000. I agree with you. Is your feeling agreed
with by General Mattis and by your other counterparts?
General Dunford. It is, Senator, but I think collectively
we also agree that our support for 352,000 for any additional
enabling support for the Afghans and our sustainability for the
ASF post-2014 ought to be conditional. It ought to be
conditional based on Afghan behavior, and so that is part of
our calculus. But we believe that our interests will be best
served by extending the 352,000 through 2018.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, General, for your service. I want to associate myself with
the chairman's remarks about the Boston Marathon. It is
particularly poignant because it is not just a Boston
tradition. It is a New England tradition, and so many Rhode
Islanders participate. Obviously, our sympathy goes out to the
victims and also our respect for the first responders and
everyone who helped out. I know you have connections, too. Your
father is a retired Boston police officer. So thank you for
that service, too.
You talked about in your opening comments what success
might look at in winning. Can you elaborate on that?
General Dunford. I can, Senator. For the last few years,
many people have shied away from the using the word ``win.'' I
personally have used that word since arriving in Afghanistan.
My predecessor uses that word. I frankly think that when we are
talking to 18-, 19-, 20-, 21-year-old soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines, we ought to talk in those terms.
From my perspective, winning is achievable, and I described
it briefly in my opening remarks. First of all, the transition
to an ASF lead in affecting security transition in 2014 is an
important component of winning. I think we have a plan that is
in place to do that, and I think we can see through 2014 where
the Afghans can successfully assume responsibility for security
after 2014, given the projection we make about the security
environment post-2014.
Another critical component of our winning would be
supporting the political process that would lead to inclusive,
fair, and free elections in 2014. Again, I think that is very
achievable, and of course, remembering why we went there in the
first place, an important component of our winning is to ensure
that we deny sanctuary to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and we
contribute to regional stability where we have national
interests.
Those three components are important. There are
subcomponents to include our posturing to force and setting our
counterterrorism posture post-2014, continuing to sustain the
ASF post-2014. But if we do those three things--effect security
transition, affect political transition, and deny al Qaeda
sanctuary--I believe at the end of 2014, as we transition
missions, as we change authorities, we can look at the families
and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that have served
over the last 11 years, and say we won because we provided then
the Afghans the opportunity to seize the decade of opportunity
that starts in 2015. It very much at that point is up to the
Afghans to seize the opportunity that we provided them.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Let us focus on the ANSF and
a comment that the chairman made. Often their successes are not
as visible as their lapses and you are on the ground. The
chairman and I were on the ground in January. We were
impressed. Recently we have heard of commando operations in
Anbar Province, which is 203rd Corps successfully operating,
and Paktika Province.
It seems to me that the first measure is obviously
protecting population centers, but then exerting control over
the entire country. Can you give us your assessment right now
of the capacity and capability, and maybe even some successes
that have not been noted by the press?
General Dunford. Senator, I can. Like many members of the
committee, I have had many visits to Afghanistan over the
years. I can remember one visit in particular in 2008 in the
Helmand Province. At that time, the ratio of Afghans to
coalition partners, more properly, coalition to Afghans, was we
had 10 U.S. marines to every 1 Afghan that was in the Helmand
Province, as recently as 2008.
The ratio today, of course, across the country is there are
3 Afghans for every 1 member of the coalition that is serving
right now, and we have talked about the statistics, the
percentage of operations they conduct, the percentage of
population they secure. Most impressive is they are actually
conducting independent combined arms operations at the brigade
and the corps level. That is with a minimal amount of advise
and assist by coalition forces.
I'll be honest with you, Senator. Even as someone who is
generally a glass-half-full individual, I could not have
foreseen that in 2008. I think the progress that we have made
since 2009 is nothing short of profound in terms of where they
are on a day-to-day basis. What is really important to note is
that when we go to Milestone 2013 this summer, and we talked
about the transition, we are going to have inside of formations
of 600 or 700 Afghans. We are going to have 16 or 17 members of
the coalition in an advise and assist role. We will have
thousands of Afghans providing security in each of the
provinces--each of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. We will
have some few hundred members of the coalition providing advise
and assist at that level, and then by exception, combat
support, largely coastal air support, some planning, and some
logistics capability.
So when we talk about what the Afghans are doing right now
and when we talk about the security environment, although we
formally go to transition at Milestone 2013 later this spring
and summer, early summer, in fact, on the ground today we are
at that point already where the Afghans have taken the lead.
They are providing security for the Afghanistan people, and
every day they improve a little bit.
Again, I would caveat by saying that this progress we have
made from 2009 until today is largely quantity. They are out
there. They are in a fight. At the battalion level and the
brigade level, they are certainly very effective. But in order
to sustain those gains, we still have challenges to ensure that
at the institutional level, the logistics that we have to
have--planning, programming, budgeting--those kinds of tasks
are still the work that remains. But all that addresses the
quality of the force, the quantity of the force, and their
ability to take the fight to the enemy on a day-to-day basis is
real, and it is on the ground today.
Senator Reed. As the fighting season, which is critical
this year, is underway already because of the weather
conditions, the ANSF are planning very aggressive operations
going forward this summer?
General Dunford. Senator, they have conducted the planning
for operations this summer. This has been an Afghan-led
process. I attended what they called the campaign
synchronization conference about 6 or 7 weeks ago. I attended
as a guest with the senior leadership from the coalition. It
was led by the National Security Advisor, Minister of Defense,
and Minister of Interior. They outlined their plan--Afghan
plan--for the summer of 2013. Each one of the corps commanders
and brigade commanders stepped up and briefed their plan. Over
the course of 8 or 9 hours, they integrated their planning
effort for the summer of 2013. So what we are seeing right now
is very much an Afghan-led, Afghan-executed security plan for
the summer of 2013.
Senator Reed. Just a final question. The Afghan local
police (ALP) have been a component. In fact, as we visited in
January, touted by our military commanders on the ground as a
real turning point because it combines not just the military,
but also a village, a local connection, a governmental capacity
connection. Can you comment on the future of the ALP?
General Dunford. Senator, that has been a very successful
program for the reasons you alluded to. Number one, the
individuals in the ALP are closely vetted in conjunction with
local leadership. Number two, it is part of the ANSF
architecture the ALP work directly for district police.
In terms of clear, hold, and build, and counterinsurgency,
it has proven to be the most effective hold force. Frankly, my
assessment is less relevant than the assessment of the Taliban.
We know from our intelligence that the most feared organization
out there right now is ALP because the Taliban realize they
cannot make inroads where we have effective local police in
place. Again, it is that relationship between local leadership,
the local people, and the ALP that has made this so effective.
We learned a lot over the last several years about properly
vetting, and we put those proper vetting procedures in place.
We have learned a lot over the years about proper chain of
command and ensuring that there is oversight both from a
logistics and a command and control perspective. They are fully
plugged into, again, the Minister of Interior. More
importantly, we are implementing what we call layered security
in each one of the provinces. The ALP are inextricably linked
to the overall concept of layered security in each one of the
provinces.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you for your
service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome back,
General.
First of all, in your written statement, you have ``what
winning looks like,'' and you have four bullet points. One of
them says, ``an operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of
its safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations
outside the area.'' Have you seen any change there?
General Dunford. Over the years I have, Senator.
Senator McCain. They do not have a safe haven anymore in
Pakistan?
General Dunford. They have a safe haven inside of
Afghanistan. In some areas, we are disrupting them, but they
have a sanctuary in Pakistan.
Senator McCain. So have you seen any progress there, the
safe haven they have in Pakistan?
General Dunford. The progress I have seen inside of
Afghanistan first, Senator, has been that our----
Senator McCain. My question is Pakistan.
General Dunford. They have not been able to conduct
effective operations, nor plan effective operations from
Pakistan, Senator.
Senator McCain. They do not have a safe haven in Pakistan?
General Dunford. They are still physically there, Senator.
They are not able to plan and conduct operations from there at
this point.
Senator McCain. That is very interesting news. Today in a
press clip it says, ``Production of Opium by Afghans is Up
Again.'' According to the Nation's top counter narcotics
official, Afghanistan is already the world's largest producer
of opium, and last year accounted for 75 percent of the world's
opium supply. Is that of concern to you, General?
General Dunford. It is of concern, Senator. It is a
destabilizing effect. It breeds a criminal element, and it also
supports the Taliban.
Senator McCain. I thought one of our objectives back in
2001 was to eliminate opium as a crop of interest, a crop that
would be so very important when now apparently, according to
this news report, it might provide 75 to 90 percent of the
world's supply.
General Dunford. Senator, in that area, our success has not
been satisfactory.
Senator McCain. As we watch the situation unravel in Iraq
because of our failure, among other things, but primarily
because of our failure to leave a residual force there, we
continue to hear mixed reports about the size of the force that
would be left behind. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General
Dempsey, recently testified that a combined U.S.-NATO post-2014
force between 8,000 and 12,000 would be ``a reasonable
target.'' General Mattis, former Commander of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) testified before this committee, reflecting
the opinion of your predecessor was to keep 13,600 troops in
Afghanistan, with several thousand additional NATO forces on
top of that. What is your view, General? What is your number?
General Dunford. Senator, I am not going to give you a
number. I am going to give you a range. My best military advice
at this point is that we leave it as a range of numbers, and
here are the reasons. Number one, I think we need to see how
the Afghans do in their first summer in the lead, and make an
assessment in November 2013. The other variables that need to
be considered are how effective political transition is in
2014, and then the strategic landscape within which we expect
to be operating post-2014, which addresses the strength of the
enemy to include the Taliban, al Qaeda, as well as the
cooperation of regional actors.
Senator McCain. So you have no number to tell this
committee right now?
General Dunford. Senator, I have not provided my number to
the President yet. We are still in the process of crafting our
best military advice. But my strongest military advice is not
to pin down a number right now because the number is----
Senator McCain. Do you not understand, General, that one of
the reasons why we are having so much difficulty in some areas
is because the Afghans do not know what our commitment is? They
saw what happened in Iraq where we had a commitment. Do you not
know that they want to know sooner or later what the American
commitment is post-2014? Do you not understand how critical
that is to them, because that is what they all tell me?
General Dunford. Senator, I do. I think the most important
physical manifestation of our commitment is the signing of the
BSA with a range of numbers and the level of commitment that we
will provide post-2014. I have spoken to my Afghan
counterparts. I do not believe a specific number is anywhere
near as important as an assured commitment in the context of
the BSA, and knowing that we will provide the level of advise
and assist in the counterterrorism effort necessary for post-
2014.
Senator McCain. I cannot tell you how disappointed I am in
your testimony, General, because they see what happened in
Iraq. They see us withdrawing every place in the world. They
see what is happening in Syria. They see a lack of commitment
to the United States in Libya, for example, post-Gadhafi, and
they know which way the wind is blowing.
For you to tell this committee that we will make that
decision later on, they are making accommodation for United
States departure right now. That is one of the reasons why we
are seeing a lot of the difficulties that we are seeing. I
strongly urge you to do what General Mattis said, and that is
to give us an estimate of what the--General Mattis was not
concerned--did not voice all the concerns that you just--and
caveats that you just articulated. We know that the Afghans
want to know what the size of our commitment is and what the
size of the army that we will support is critical for their
planning in the future.
So I strongly urge you to come up with a number to tell
this committee and the American people. We have a
responsibility as well. For you to say, we are just going to
see how things turn out, it will determine the size of the
post-2014 force, I believe is a tragic and terrible mistake for
which we may pay a very heavy price.
I have no further questions.
General Dunford. Senator, can I comment on that?
Senator McCain. Sure.
General Dunford. Senator, to be clear, I did not say to
leave it completely vague. We are today advising and assisting
at the battalion level. We are going to lift off to the brigade
level here this fall. The number of post-2014 is inextricably
linked to the level that we believe we need to provide advise
and assist post-2014----
Senator McCain. You are going to have to wait until 2014 to
determine that?
General Dunford. We do not, Senator. What I suggested was
that this is the Afghan's first summer in the lead. I believe
this summer will be the bellwether for Afghan performance and
in 2014 and beyond.
Senator McCain. General, Senator Graham and I, we talk to
the Afghans all the time. They are not sure of what the U.S.
commitment will be, and many of them are making various
accommodations for a repeat of what happened in Iraq. That is
why we got a specific number from General Mattis, but we
somehow cannot get that from you. It is very disappointing.
I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Udall is not here.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in regards to the BSA, how does that stand, and
what are the expectations on that?
General Dunford. Senator, the negotiations for the BSA are
ongoing. The next meeting between the Afghans and the United
States is in the month of May. I think we are down to several
issues that have to be addressed inside the negotiations.
My sense is that the Afghanistan people as a whole want the
BSA, so I am optimistic that we will get it signed at some
point. But there are some difficult issues that are being
negotiated at this time.
Senator Donnelly. Is there an understanding on the Afghan
side that if we do not conclude a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA), it is very difficult to leave our men and women there?
General Dunford. Senator, it is absolutely clear to the
Afghans that we will not leave our men and women there without
appropriate SOFA in the context of the BSA.
Senator Donnelly. What kind of timing are you looking at to
conclude that?
General Dunford. Initially, that was identified as being
signed not later than November 2013. From my perspective, as
soon as we can sign it, it would be helpful. It would address
what Senator McCain spoke about a minute ago and something that
we are dealing with, which is an environment of uncertainty. I
believe that the commitment that would be manifest in that BSA
would be helpful in addressing uncertainty.
Senator Donnelly. How much control does Pakistan have over
the Afghan Taliban?
General Dunford. I do not believe the Pakistanis have
control over the Afghan Taliban. I do think that the Afghan
Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network, has sanctuary inside
of Pakistan, and they get support from individuals in Pakistan.
But I do not believe anybody controls them.
Senator Donnelly. Do you think the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) is working with them?
General Dunford. There have been intelligence reports that
link the ISI particularly to the Haqqani network.
Senator Donnelly. What control does the Pakistan army have
over the ISI, in your opinion?
General Dunford. Senator, I do not know. I do not know. I
think they nominally, of course, work for General Kayani.
General Kayani is a former Director of the ISI. My sense is
that anything the ISI does is known by General Kayani, but I
cannot confirm that.
Senator Donnelly. Where do you see the primary source for
the Afghan Taliban of the financial resources they receive, the
military resources they receive? Where do you see that coming
from?
General Dunford. A percentage of it comes from the drug
trade, some probably 35 or 40 percent comes from the drug
trade. Some money comes from taxes, illicit taxes that they get
from Afghan people, and some money comes from external support
from outside the region.
Senator Donnelly. Now, when you look at the places that
they go in Pakistan, the frontier areas, do you believe
Pakistan, number one, has control over those areas; and, number
two, can get control over those areas if they do not?
General Dunford. Senator, Pakistan does not have control
over those areas right now. They have had over 15,000 killed or
wounded in operations in that area over the past decade. They
have had hundreds killed or wounded just in the past several
weeks as they have tried to gain control of regions in the
Khyber agency against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the
Pakistan Taliban. So I think that is a clear indication that
they cannot control their border area, and they cannot control
the Taliban that are operating freely inside of that border
area.
Senator Donnelly. What do you see as a role for the
Taliban, if any, in a future Afghan Government? As we
transition out, as discussions are taking place, how do you
envision that future Afghan Government? Obviously there are
elections coming up, but how are we looking at the transition
for the Afghan Government as we move forward?
General Dunford. Senator, DOS has the lead now on working
on a reconciliation process and trying to bring together the
Afghan Government as well as the Taliban. I do not have any
insight today that would lead me to believe that the Taliban
will be part of the political process in 2014.
At some point, this war will have to be resolved through
political means. There will have to be some political
accommodations made. But I do not have any indication to
believe that that will be in the near term.
Senator Donnelly. As we look at the Afghan citizens, and
obviously there are different parts of the country that react
in a different way based on where they are located. But when
the different provinces and the provincial leaders are making
their decisions, and the people in the towns are making their
decisions, looking at post-2014, what do you think are the most
important things they are looking for from the current Afghan
Government, from the army, to provide them with some certainty
that come the next night, the Taliban are not going to come
back and cause havoc and turn their world upside down?
General Dunford. Senator, in addition to being secure and
not having those illicit taxes collected, and not having the
kind of oppression associated with the Taliban in the 1990s,
one of the major concerns that young Afghans have today is
jobs. Sixty percent of the population is 25-years-old or less,
and so in addition to security and a stable environment and
free from the oppression of the Taliban, they are also very
concerned about the economy post-2014 and their ability to seek
proper employment.
The good news the chairman has outlined is that we have 8
million that are in school today. The issue is that we raised
expectations, and those expectations will have to be met with
an economy that will support adequate jobs.
Senator Donnelly. As we look towards the end of 2014, is
there a detailed transition plan with DOS and with the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) for many of the
projects that have been begun, many that are on the books?
Where do those projects go as we look forward?
General Dunford. Senator, there is a very detailed
transition process. We established a headquarters just to
oversee transition. We are completely interlinked with USAID
and the DOS, as well as other international organizations. Not
only do we have a broad transition plan for every task and we
have knocked that list down from some thousands to a handful of
tasks now that still remain to be worked out in terms of the
detailed transition plan, but every project that is out there
right now will have a detailed transition plan as well.
Senator Donnelly. You mentioned before about security zones
in the country, areas that are safer than others. As you look
forward to the next year and then to 2014, what are the things
that you are most concerned about that could go wrong?
General Dunford. We are going to transition the final
tranche of areas over to the Afghans here this summer. That
final tranche is on the eastern part of the country along the
borders. That is where the most virulent strains of the
insurgency are. That is where the most difficult challenges
from a security perspective are. So as we deal with tranche
five, that will be difficult.
My major concern is making sure that by the fall of 2013,
we have created the perception in Afghanistan that supports the
political process that will begin in earnest. We will have
candidates announcing for elections in 2014, here this fall in
2013. We have talked about inclusive, free, and fair elections,
so ensuring that we provide security in the areas of what are
now some 7,000 polling stations is a primary focus that we have
in conjunction with our Afghan counterparts.
Senator Donnelly. That whole eastern region as you look
forward to that, are there metrics that you look at and you go,
``we have accomplished this by now, we have accomplished this
by now, we are at this point.'' Do you have a game-plan of by
the end of 2013, here is where we hope to be in those
provinces?
General Dunford. We do, Senator. We are in the process of
what we call a geographical and functional gap analysis. As I
alluded to earlier, we want to affect a concept known as
layered security in each one of the provinces. Layered security
is successful when you have everything from the ALP, to the
Afghan uniform police, to the border police, and the ANA
working together, coordinated by an operational coordination
center and independent with advisors. So our metrics are very
much based on the performance of the ANSF and their ability,
with limited support, to provide security in each of the 34
provinces in Afghanistan. But as we have been discussing, the
most difficult provinces will be those in the east.
Senator Donnelly. General, thank you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too,
would like to express my sympathy for those who were lost in
Boston. If it were to turn out to be that it was a terrorist al
Qaeda connected operation, I think two things are important for
us to remember. One is that perfect security is not possible.
The United States is a great Nation. It is vulnerable, and we
will always be vulnerable to some attacks. But the offensive
approach in which we go after those who are organized and
dedicated to attacking us is the right approach. It does reduce
the amount of attacks that can occur, in my opinion.
General Dunford, I think you are what winning looks like,
and your statement is a conclusion to this effort in
Afghanistan that I can support. I think it is a reasonable and
legitimate definition of success.
I am concerned, along with Senator McCain's comments, that
success cannot be just removing our troops. After our men and
women have given so much, this Nation has sacrificed treasure,
and we have lost some of our finest in this combat. To not
finish strong, to not end this effort in a way that gives us
maximum opportunity for this kind of success would be a deep
and great failure of our country.
Do you feel a commitment to those who have served, who
committed themselves to this effort, and want to see a
successful conclusion occur?
General Dunford. Senator, I feel an absolute commitment to
the men and women who have sacrificed over the past 11 years
and to the families of the fallen. That, frankly, is my
motivation for performing my duties on a day-to-day basis.
Senator Sessions. You have told us you believe successful
conclusion is possible.
General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely believe that the
things I outlined in my statement and that I referred to a
minute ago in terms of what winning looks like are absolutely
achievable.
Senator Sessions. This is an important observation, but I
am concerned, and I will follow up a little bit on what Senator
McCain--the question he raised. I am looking at an April 2nd
Bloomberg article. It goes on in some depth about our group of
former U.S. officials who visited there, and they say that
President Obama--I will quote the first sentence: ``President
Obama's failure to spell out his plans in Afghanistan is adding
to the risk that some Afghans will start negotiating deals with
the Taliban, according to former U.S. officials who visited the
country,'' one of those being former Under Secretary of
Defense, Michele Flournoy, who all of us know, was President
Obama's appointee there.
Do you think that is a risk that is occurring?
General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely agree that today we
are dealing with uncertainty that must be addressed, and that
uncertainty has to be addressed by a clear commitment from the
United States. What I was attempting to do earlier was allude
to the fact that it is about more than a specific number. Our
commitment post-2014 and support for the ASF, it is support for
the political process, and it is advising and assisting in the
counterterrorism effort. So it is an entire package that
transcends the importance of any one number.
Senator Sessions. All right. I respect that. This is a
quote from former Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy:
``In Afghanistan right now, there is a huge amount of anxiety
about the scale and nature of U.S. commitment long term.'' Do
you think there are actions that we can take to eliminate that
huge amount of anxiety, and would that not help us be
successful?
General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely believe there are
things we can do, and I absolutely believe that the environment
within which the Afghans will assume the lead this year, it is
critical that we shape that environment with this idea of
commitment.
I mentioned the BSA a minute ago. From my perspective,
signing the BSA, of course that takes both the Afghans and the
United States to agree on the modalities. But signing that will
be a clear manifestation of our commitment post-2014. I do
think that continued emphasis on the resources and the
commitment we provide from an advise and assist in a
counterterrorism perspective post-2014 is important. It cannot
be one day we make a message and then allow it to go some
months before we say it again.
I think a constant drumbeat of our commitment post-2014 is
necessary to overcome the uncertainty that is very real and
very counterproductive inside of Afghanistan right now.
Senator Sessions. This article notes that there is a
historical paranoia in Afghanistan, the result of the previous
abandonment of Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to take
over. Do you think that is an accurate assessment, that there
is a sense of uncertainty and paranoia among the people?
General Dunford. Senator, I see evidence of that. I
mentioned the age of Afghans. Even those Afghans who were not
alive in 1992 talk about the beginnings of civil war in the
1990s and a desire not to return back to those days.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy went on to say that
spelling out U.S. intentions, including how many troops will
stay, would ``reduce counterproductive hedging behavior on the
part of various parties in Afghanistan and in the broader
region.'' Do you think that is a valuable observation?
General Dunford. I think providing a specific range of
numbers right now with a demonstrated commitment at the level
that we provide support would be helpful.
Senator Sessions. Are you aware that one White House
advisor has said no troops may remain in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Senator, I read that in the newspaper.
Senator Sessions. Would that create uncertainty in
Afghanistan if that were thought to be a reasonable, or a
potential policy of the United States?
General Dunford. Senator, having no forces and no presence
post-2014, in my mind, would undermine our campaign success.
Senator Sessions. In this article, I just found it to be a
pretty good summary of some of the difficult choices we are
wrestling with and you are having to deal with. You are not the
commander in chief. Ultimately, President Obama, the Commander
in Chief, will decide how many troops are there. You will make
a recommendation up through the chain, is that correct?
General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. One of the things that was troubling to
me is our Commander in Chief, President Obama, has been there 5
years, and we have troops on the ground in harm's way right
this minute. This is what Mr. Michael O'Hanlon, the defense
analyst at Brookings, said in this article, April 2, one of the
most consistent observers of our operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq of anybody in America. From the beginning, he has been
observing, commenting, and writing about it, and this is the
liberal Brookings Institution.
He says the absence of a clear message from Obama about the
continuing U.S. presence in Afghanistan may be an indication--
excuse me. He is not saying this. This is what the writer said:
`` `The absence of a clear message may be an indication that
the President has not made up his mind,' said Michael O'Hanlon,
defense analyst at Brookings. `Obviously Obama was of two minds
about keeping U.S. troops in Iraq after the war ended there,'
O'Hanlon said. `He may have similar ambivalence in
Afghanistan.' ''
So if the President is ambivalent about the future--I will
not ask you to respond to that. I would just say if the
President is ambivalent about the future, what will happen in
Afghanistan? I will observe I think without a doubt it makes
your job more difficult and makes success more difficult. We
have to get our act together. I think we have to have a clear
message.
I appreciate your firm view that success is possible. I
think that should be the goal, and the goal should not be to
meet some political vision of troop levels unconnected to the
reality in Afghanistan.
Thank you for your service. We appreciate it, and all the
men and women that serve with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join
in thanking you for your service over many years in the
position you have now and many others, and the men and women
who perform so courageously under your command. I want to thank
you particularly for your very helpful and informative
testimony here today, which is encouraging in many respects,
but also sobering.
I find it sobering in two respects particularly. First of
all, your reference to the continuing threat from IEDs, a
problem that has bedeviled and perplexed and stymied our
efforts in Afghanistan as well as Iraq over the years. I want
to ask in particular whether you view there having been any
progress in the Pakistani's action against the flow of
fertilizer and other bombmaking materials from their country
into Afghanistan? Apparently the casualties and deaths and from
IEDs are still the biggest single source of the threat in
Afghanistan to life and limb there, both to our forces and to
the ANA and ANSF. So I wonder if you could comment on whether
the Pakistanis have been more cooperative and helpful?
General Dunford. Senator, I can, and this is another area
where we have seen a lot of rhetoric exchanged over the last
couple of months. We are now meeting with the Pakistanis
specifically on the IED threat. They also recognize the threat
of IEDs inside of Pakistan, which I think has heightened their
concern.
The Joint IED Defeat Office has had some success in working
with manufacturers in Pakistan to perhaps change the
composition of the chemicals inside of the fertilizer that
would make it less explosive, less likely to be used in IEDs.
We have some increased cooperation at the border, but, Senator,
I am not satisfied with the output of all those activities yet.
We still see a large amount of ammonium nitrate moving back and
forth from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and sadly that provides
the materials for the preponderance of the IEDs that we are
dealing with.
Largely, by the way, at this point, the effects of IEDs are
being felt by the ASF even more than our forces today.
Senator Blumenthal. My impression over the years from my
first visit, and I have been three times and asked these
questions every time I visited, is that there have been more
words than action from the Pakistanis, and the continuing
rhetoric, as you refer to it, over the years has produced less
action than there should be.
General Dunford. Senator, I think it is fair to say there
is less action than there should be, less action than there
needs to be.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me then go to the second sobering
part of your testimony, which refers to the attrition rates in
the ANA, what you refer to as a significant challenge, quoting
you. Is this problem solvable? Is the ANA going to be able to
recruit and train the forces that it needs to contain and repel
and conquer the Taliban?
General Dunford. Senator, I believe there is room to make a
significant improvement in this attrition issue. I mentioned
earlier that we had focused on growing the quantity of force
over the last several years. The vetting process that is in
place today is much better than the vetting process that we had
in place a couple of years ago.
The other thing that gives me room for hope is there is a
direct correlation between the attrition in the ANSF and
leadership. Where we have seen effective Afghan leaders, we see
low levels of attrition. Even though some of the factors are
beyond leadership that have to be addressed, there is a direct
correlation between leadership and attrition.
The minister of defense has recently directed a study be
done of all lieutenant colonels and above in the ASF. They have
completed that study and 30 general officers were recommended
for relief from their duties; 55 additional general officers we
recommended for retirement, that they hit retirement age.
Minister Mohammadi, the minister of defense, decentralized
decisionmaking for personnel for captains and below, so we see
some decentralization taking place to enhance accountability of
leadership. These are the steps that I believe have to be
taken. I am mindful of the challenges we have in the U.S.
military when I came in as a platoon commander in the 1970s,
and we had significant attrition in the U.S. Marine Corps at
that time, and we had significant attrition in the U.S. Army. A
big part of that was a function of leadership, and as leaders
were held accountable and held to standard, we addressed that
attrition problem.
I think a similar process can take place and is taking
place in the ASF, but it is not something that will happen
overnight. This idea of leadership development is a 2-, 3-, 5-
year process, but we are moving in the right direction. The
thing that I find most encouraging is that Afghan leadership
are being held accountable today by the Afghan chain of
command. When they fail to perform, they are being removed from
their duties. When they fail to perform, they are being
dismissed. I think that is a positive sign.
Senator Blumenthal. That effort will really depend on the
credibility and confidence and the integrity of the Afghan
Government, will it not, in part, to assure that kind of
leadership?
General Dunford. Over time, effective political transition
is absolutely critical to security. They are inextricably
linked, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me then go to the question of
corruption in the Afghan Government, which affects the United
States as well. I am very concerned with the contracts
involving taxpayers' dollars of the United States that may go
to companies that, in effect, benefit our enemy. Senator Ayotte
and I have helped to spearhead efforts to improve that
contracting law that will enable more effective prosecution of
those kinds of corrupt contracts.
Do you have any observations about whether there have been
improvements generally in corruption within the Afghan
Government, and specifically relating to U.S. contracts for
goods and services?
General Dunford. Senator, the National Defense
Authorization Act in 2012 that allowed us to cease contracting
with the enemy was extraordinarily helpful in that we had
decisionmaking authority decentralized where if you had an
indication that a contractor or a subcontractor was associated
with the enemy, we could immediately stop that contract.
I read the recent Inspector General of Afghanistan's report
making some recommendations how to take that legislation
further. Conceptually, I absolutely support that. It would
expand that beyond the Department of Defense (DOD) so that
other U.S. Government agencies can also have the same
authorities that we have been given as a result of that very
helpful legislation, and also to address a different level of
contracts. In the past, there had been over $100,000, and this
would bring it to a level below that.
So I do think we have had some improvement in that
particular area as a result of that legislation. I think to
continue to move in that same direction would be very helpful,
Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. One last question, and I
have a lot more questions, but my time is about to expire. The
chairman asked you, I believe, about the Afghan interpreters
that were the subject of a recent piece in the New York Times.
I am very concerned about providing the kinds of visas that are
necessary often for the survival of these interpreters. I have
talked to a number of our marines coming back, and they are
concerned as well with the kind of service that these
interpreters and others have provided that may endanger them,
in fact, very severely so, their lives.
Do you have any observations about what we can do to
improve that process?
General Dunford. Senator, I think raising the visibility is
very important, and I would put a personal face on it. One of
the individuals that is waiting for a visa, one of the
individuals who has applied to come back to the United States
for many years, was the interpreter that was with Sergeant
Dakota Meyer the day he received the Congressional Medal of
Honor. There is an individual who was part of that fight, fully
supportive of the advisors who that day their lives were lost,
or in the case of Sergeant Meyer, certainly threatened. There
are many interpreters like those who have fought alongside of
us, who have supported the mission. As I mentioned before, our
success could not have been possible without them.
I think having visibility and recognition of their
contribution, and facilitating their coming to our country
through the bureaucratic process would be very helpful.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General. Thank you for your
service, and thank you to the men and women who are under your
command.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, General. I thank you and your
staff for doing a very good job, an exceptional job, in
difficult circumstances.
I would like to revisit an exchange you had with Senator
McCain about the al Qaeda presence in the tribal regions. You
said al Qaeda is still present on the Pakistan side of the
border, but they are--how did you term it, ``not as
effective?'' What did you say?
General Dunford. Senator, what I was trying to get at was I
believe our operations, and of course, those not being
conducted by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, but it seems to me that
there are operations being conducted in Pakistan that are
disrupting al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Senator Graham. Would you agree that having SOFs on the
Afghan side of the border has been helpful?
General Dunford. It has been extraordinarily helpful, and
we have had a disrupting effect on al Qaeda as a result of our
SOFs in Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. How many SOFs do we have in Afghanistan
today?
General Dunford. Senator, I can give you that number, but I
would prefer not to give it to you here.
Senator Graham. Absolutely. But it is thousands I would
suggest.
General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. One of the reasons that we have
contained al Qaeda is that we have other agencies in the fight,
but we have a lot of intelligence capability in that part of
the country. Is that correct?
General Dunford. We do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. We have the ability to strike in that
part of the country as well. I guess my point is that when you
look at a post-2014 force, it would be a very unwise move to
take that infrastructure down. Do you agree with that?
General Dunford. I do agree with that, Senator.
Senator Graham. So I want my colleagues to understand the
infrastructure in place that diminishes al Qaeda's
effectiveness along the tribal regions inside of Pakistan is
the direct result of infrastructure that we have in
Afghanistan, as well as other agencies' capabilities.
When you talk about winning, what would losing look like?
General Dunford. Senator, I think losing would look like
Afghanistan devolving, Afghanistan returning to chaos,
Afghanistan being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the people of
Afghanistan once again being subjected to the oppression of the
Taliban in the 1990s, a sanctuary from which security and
stability in Pakistan can be threatened. All those would be
components of losing.
Senator Graham. The ability of al Qaeda to regenerate would
be greater under a losing scenario, is that correct?
General Dunford. I do not think there is any question about
that, Senator.
Senator Graham. If we were seen as losing in Afghanistan,
it would be hard to convince the Iranians to change their
behavior?
General Dunford. I think a credible outcome in Afghanistan
certainly will influence those who would do harm.
Senator Graham. Okay. Now, when it comes to future hands to
be played or cards to be played, the follow-on force, let us
say for a moment there were no troops in 2014. We decided to
pull out completely like we did in Iraq. What would your
evaluation of the outcome be under that scenario?
General Dunford. I think if we did not have a presence
post-2014 and we did not provide security assistance to the
ANSF post-2014, it would be a question of time before they
would devolve.
Senator Graham. So we would eventually lose all we have
gained?
General Dunford. I believe that Afghanistan would be at
great risk of instability if we would leave before 2014.
Senator Graham. Do you think that would be true if we had
2,000 troops left?
General Dunford. Senator, we would not be able to
accomplish both of our missions. We have two missions. One is
to deal with the terrorist threat, the other is to deal with
security and stability, and to prevent the Taliban from coming
back. It would be difficult to accomplish those missions at a
force level of 2,000.
Senator Graham. One of the goals of this BSA is to solidify
the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan for
at least a 10-year period. Is that correct?
General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. People are evaluating what bets to make as
I speak in Afghanistan and the region. The sooner that we can
make this announcement in a bold way, the better off. Do you
agree with that?
General Dunford. I do agree with that, Senator.
Senator Graham. Now, Senator Levin and I have been on the
same sheet of music for a very long time about the size of the
Afghan army. It is 352,000. As I understand, it costs us about
$6.5 billion a year to maintain that force. Does that sound
about right?
General Dunford. It is going to be $4.1 billion for the
program of record. Increasing the program of record and
sustaining past 352,000 is somewhere between $5 and $6 billion.
So that is the aggregate cost of the force. Only a small part
of that is what is the cost of the program of record to 352,000
through 2018.
Senator Graham. Okay. So what percentage do we pay?
General Dunford. Of the $4.1 billion program of record, our
coalition partners pay $1.3 billion, the Afghans have pledged
$500 million, and we pay the difference.
Senator Graham. The difference between 352,000 and, say,
230,000, is how much?
General Dunford. In any given year, it is somewhere between
$400 and $600 million a year, Senator.
Senator Graham. The difference in capability, would you
say, is significant between 352,000 and 230,000?
General Dunford. I think both from a capability and a
psychology perspective, it would be significant.
Senator Graham. Do you believe it would be a wise
investment for American taxpayers to continue to invest in the
ANSF at 352,000?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. The more they have, the less they need us,
is that correct? The more capable they are?
General Dunford. I absolutely think there is a relationship
between our post-2014 presence and the capabilities and
capacities of the Afghans.
Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to detention, we have
just entered into a new agreement with the Afghan Government.
Could you give us a 1-minute overview of that agreement?
General Dunford. Senator, we transferred authority for
detention operations to the Afghans in March 2013. What that
means is that now there will be a criminal process that affects
detainees. We have an agreement to keep the enduring security
threats that are in detention at this particular time, and
future enduring security threats, and we also are partnered at
the facility, the detention facility at Parwan, to ensure that
we continue to have humane treatment, and that we have
visibility of detainees post the transfer.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that we do not have a
disposition planned for the third country nationals we hold at
Parwan?
General Dunford. We still have custody and control of third
country nationals, Senator, and I do not know what the plan is
right now post-2014. It is part of a process that is ongoing.
Senator Graham. Some of these are definitely transnational
terrorism--terrorists who have been in the fight for quite a
while.
General Dunford. They are, Senator.
Senator Graham. Have drones helped the operations in
Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Significantly, Senator. That is one of the
ways that we put pressure on al Qaeda, as an example, but they
are effective across all of our operations.
Senator Graham. Under the Rules of War, if you see an al
Qaeda operative out in the open walking down the road and we
get a good signature on this person, do we have to wait until
they take up arms to fire, or can we shoot when we see them?
General Dunford. If they are designated, we do not have to
wait until they take up arms, Senator.
Senator Graham. Which makes common sense. Do you agree with
that?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Now, as to the future of Afghanistan, you
have Pakistan as a potential threat because of the safe havens.
You have al Qaeda, the Taliban, and you have Afghan governance.
The Government of Afghanistan in many ways is one of the
enemies we are fighting here.
You indicated that the military will get better over time
as leadership evolves and people are held more accountable. Do
you believe that the corruption we see today in Afghanistan
among different ministries and throughout the country can get
better over time as these young people we have been mentoring
take over in the future?
General Dunford. Senator, I believe it can get better, but
the operative part of your phrase is ``over time.''
Senator Graham. We are talking about a 10- or 15-year
window in that regard.
General Dunford. We are talking a significant period of
time. I think we are talking about this population now that is
25 years or less assuming positions of increased responsibility
in the future.
Senator Graham. Do you believe it is a good investment on
our part to stay partnered with these young people?
General Dunford. I think it is a critical investment,
Senator.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator King.
Senator King. General, thank you very much. It seems to me
that what we are facing in Afghanistan, and particularly what
the Afghanistan Government faces after 2014, amounts to a
guerilla war. The doctrine of guerilla war, as I remember Mao
Tse-Tung, was that the guerilla has to swim in the sea of the
people or something to that effect.
How do the people of Afghanistan feel about this conflict?
Can the Taliban and al Qaeda find a warm, hospitable sea to
swim in, or are the people loyal to the government and what we
have tried to accomplish?
General Dunford. Senator, there is no question in my mind
that the Afghan people do not want to return to the oppression
of the Taliban that was there in the 1990s. We have survey
after survey that indicates that the Taliban are increasingly
unpopular amongst the Afghan people. That has not yet made a
direct correlation to support for the Afghan Government. So
while they are absolutely opposed to the Taliban returning to
power and they are absolutely opposed to what the Taliban
stands for, they do not yet have the full confidence in the
Government of Afghanistan to provide it full support.
Senator King. That might apply here. The people of America
are not too crazy about Congress either. It is a different
subject.
You were involved in Iraq, is that correct?
General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
Senator King. What lessons do you take from Iraq, and
particularly from the unwinding of our involvement in Iraq,
that can be applied to this circumstance that we are now
facing, ending our involvement in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Senator, I think one of the most important
lessons from Iraq is that we waited too late to work through
the details of a BSA. In any event, we were unable to conclude
the successful BSA.
We have started that process much earlier. That is why I
have highlighted the BSA this morning. I think we have had a
discussion about it. I think the key lesson learned is to
ensure that we have a smooth transition post-2014, that we
provide the Afghan people with our sense of commitment post-
2014. We should view 2014 today, December 2014, as nothing more
than a change in the mandate, in a change in the authorities,
but a continuity of commitment post-2014. If we are able to do
that, I think we will have internalized the most important
lesson from our Iraq experience.
Senator King. So you think that essentially 2014 should be
a seamless transition to a competent and sufficient Afghan
force to essentially take over what we have been doing.
General Dunford. I do, Senator. What January 2015 ought to
look like is we have completed political transition. We have
completed security transition. But we are still there
decisively in an advise and assist in a counterterrorism role
under different authorities and now at the exact request of the
Afghan people in the context of a BSA.
What will be different is we will not be under a United
Nations (U.N.) mandate. We will not be under the law of armed
conflict. We will not be under the military technical
agreement. But we will still be there and be able to provide
the requisite support both politically and from a security
perspective.
Senator King. You mentioned that the Afghan force is
anticipated to be somewhere around 350,000. What are the
estimates of the size of the Taliban or al Qaeda or the
aggregate enemy group, if you will?
General Dunford. Senator, that is a question that frankly
we ask all the time, and we do not know. There are some
estimates that talk about 20,000 to 30,000 Taliban. But I think
because you have such various levels of Taliban, those that are
actually ideologically committed, Taliban senior leadership in
Quetta is certainly different than day-to-day people who might
fight on the ground that it is very difficult to capture a
number when you talk about the Taliban.
Senator King. I would suggest, therefore, given the small
number, that the view of the people at large, as we discussed
at the beginning, is going to be critical as to whether or not
they can really gain any power in the situation. They are going
to have to have the support of the public, would you not agree?
General Dunford. Senator, what gives me optimism and the
reason why I am optimistic about the campaign is it is all
about the ASF's ability to provide security to the population,
and every day we are improving in that particular area. That
reduces the freedom of movement. That reduces the ability for
the Taliban to influence the population.
I honestly believe--there used to be an expression that the
Taliban have the time and we have the watches. I do not believe
that is any longer the case. I think the Taliban are going to
wake up at some point and they are going to realize this is not
their father's ANSF, and they are going to be unable to
influence the population in the way that they have done in the
past.
Senator King. Let me change the subject for a minute. What
is the situation on green on blue attacks? Has that declined?
Do you feel that is under control? Does that indicate
significant infiltration of the ASF?
General Dunford. Senator, that is one of the most insidious
risks to the force, and in 2012, we had a significant challenge
with insider attacks. As a result, we significantly improved
our training. We added counterintelligence capability both in
the coalition as well as inside the Afghan forces. We revised
our tactics, techniques, and procedures, and we have a much
more routine and effective dialogue with our Afghan partners to
mitigate the risk of the insider attacks.
I will not for a second be complacent. Indications are that
we have made some progress just based on numbers. We have had 3
in 2013; during that same period of time, we had 20 last year
in 2012. But of the issues that keep me awake at night and the
ones that I want to stay focused on, the insider threat is
absolutely one of those.
It erodes trust between our coalition and our Afghan
partners, and, more importantly, it erodes the will of the
American people. I recognize that.
Senator King. What is your analysis of the leadership of
the Afghan force? That is important. The quality and character
of the leadership is a crucial element to any enterprise
success. You know these people, I presume, personally. Do you
have confidence that these are strong and effective leaders?
General Dunford. Senator, I would characterize the Afghan
leadership as improving. There are a number of leaders, and we
are fortunate right now that both the Minister of Defense and
Minister of Interior have fallen into this category. There are
a number of leaders who have vision, that have commitment, that
have strong leadership, and are taking appropriate action.
It is going to take time before we have the depth of
leadership that we need to have across the forces, the
consistency, the continuity of leadership. Where we see good
leadership we see good units. Where we see deficient
leadership, we have some challenges. That is one of our areas,
again, as we focus on quality over the next couple of years,
leadership development is really important, not only officers,
but noncommissioned officers (NCO).
As an example, we are currently short 10,000 NCOs in the
Army and about 6,000 in the police. Addressing that deficiency
and developing those leaders is a key part of what we need to
do over the next couple of years to make sure that our progress
is sustained.
Senator King. Are we going to maintain after 2014 any role
at all in training--in leadership and that kind of professional
development, if you will?
General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator. That really is
probably the primary focus of our post-2014 contribution will
be advising and assisting in the institutions where we grow
NCOs, where we grow officers, and where we develop integrated
combined arms capability. Among the more important tasks we
have post-2014 is leadership development. That is the same for
our coalition partners who will also contribute.
Senator King. General, thank you very much for your
service, and particularly for your service in this very
difficult and important period.
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General,
for joining us and for the service you provide to our country.
If the United States and Afghanistan reach an agreement to
keep a U.S. troop presence in that country beyond 2014, what
are some of the tangible goals that the United States would be
looking for to achieve in that country? Is there a certain
security metric, a certain measurable level of security we are
hoping to reach? In other words, going along with that, what
would it take for you to be comfortable in saying that we would
no longer at some point need a troop presence in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Senator, the focus post-2014 is all about
growing capabilities and capacities of the Afghans. Some of the
remaining challenges, they started at the ministerial level. So
Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, they cannot
manage a budget right now. As an example, last year the
minister of defense only executed a very small percentage of
the budget they actually had. It was not due to corruption, it
was due to bureaucratic inefficiency. So growing the
capabilities and capacities of the ministry are very important
to be able to sustain our efforts.
By the same token, there are logistics issues, so having a
logistics infrastructure in place, taking a sure distribution
of supplies and parts all the way down to the lowest tactical
level is an area that needs to continue to be worked on. I
spoke about a minute ago, leadership development is also
important.
So when I start to look at what we need to do past 2014, to
be clear, our effort will not be to provide security inside of
Afghanistan. Our effort will be to advise the ASF so that what
we have done over the past several years is actually
sustainable, and we will be able to measure that sustainability
over time and gradually reduce our presence.
Senator Lee. You have the metrics in place to do that?
General Dunford. We do have the metrics in place, Senator,
that both address where we have to be for proficiency at the
ministerial level, as well as we have 14 functional areas that
we evaluate in our tactical units that allow us to determine
where they are and what support they may need to improve to
take it to the next level.
Senator Lee. DOD is currently spending about $10 billion
more conducting the war effort in Afghanistan this year than
was estimated would be necessary. From what we understand, in
order to make up for this underestimation, DOD will, of course,
have to pull from other funds from its base budget, which is,
of course, difficult because of the cuts we are facing as a
result of sequestration and the other long-term spending limits
imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011.
I understand the problems with trying to budget and plan
for a war a year in advance and how unforeseen costs can arise.
At the same time, a $10 billion miscalculation is a little bit
alarming, especially just given all the other pressures that we
face in DOD.
So, General, can you explain to us how that underestimation
occurred?
General Dunford. Senator, I am not aware that we inside of
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan underestimated by $10 billion our
requirements for this year. I can assure you that we have gone
back and looked at every dollar that we are spending to make
sure we are spending it to good effect. We have significantly
reduced, in fact, particularly in the area of military
construction, significantly reduced the money that we are
spending in Afghanistan.
I will go back and take a look at where that projection
came from and why we are in the position we are in right now.
But that is not something I was aware of.
Senator Lee. Okay, we can follow up with that with you
after this hearing. So let me talk about Pakistan for a minute
because it is impossible to cover the gamut of issues that we
face in Afghanistan without also discussing the influence of
Pakistan and Pakistan's behavior.
We have spent billions of dollars in Pakistan since
September 11th, 2001, for security and for economic assistance.
But Pakistan, some would say, can at times seem to be more of
an obstacle than a partner in the progress of the region, from
closing the borders to NATO supplies, to the ties of the ISI to
extremist groups, to the lack of cooperation in the hunt for
Osama bin Laden, and to the imprisonment of Dr. Afridi for his
assistance to the United States.
What is your personal assessment, General, of the
relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and the
relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan moving forward?
General Dunford. Senator, in the first place, I think we
would agree that we have vital national interests in Pakistan
in the sense that the nexus between extremism and nuclear
weapons would be catastrophic.
I personally have watched how we have dealt with Pakistan
over the years. In the 1990s, we decided to isolate Pakistan as
a result of the Pressler amendment, and then we stopped
conducting military-to-military engagements. I now see the
adverse effect of that policy that took place for over a decade
because my generation of leaders does not have personal
relationships with our Pakistani counterparts to work through
some of these issues.
So I think there has to be balance. I think it is in our
interest to have a strategic partnership with Pakistan, and we
need to manage the relationship with the end in sight, which is
that professional and deep strategic partnership over time,
which of course today is something that needs work.
With regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan, my objective
before transition in 2014 is to ensure that we have a
constructive military-to-military relationship, between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will absolutely be at the tactical
level, but I think it can be a foundation for a deeper
relationship over time. The relationship will take much effort.
I am optimistic because, as I mentioned earlier, General
Kayani and his leaders, as well as Afghan leaders, will meet
with me later this month. We do have a number of exchanges
going on right now.
Senator Lee. So looking forward then to a post-2014
environment, do you believe these multibillion payments to
Pakistan ought to continue regardless of whether, or to what
extent, there is a continued American presence or a continued
NATO troop presence in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Senator, I believe we need to maintain a
very constructive, effective relationship with Pakistan. We
need to recognize the very real threat that Pakistan has inside
of its own borders. From my perspective, we ought to do
whatever it takes to ensure our vital national interests in
that particular part of the world are protected.
Senator Lee. Okay. One of the things that I am always
looking to in that kind of aid is whether or not it does serve
the military purpose. You are saying we need to do whatever it
takes to continue that relationship. Are you saying that
payments of that size and of that nature are what is going to
be required in the long run?
General Dunford. Senator, I believe it is in our best
interest to continue to develop the Pakistani army and to
ensure that they can effectively deal with security within
their borders. I would not tell you that every single program
that we have in place right now is one we ought to sustain in
the future. That is not something I pay particular attention to
right now in my current duties, but I am absolutely adamant
that we ought to maintain a close relationship with Pakistan
and help them to develop the resources to be able to provide
security.
Senator Lee. Your fear would be that if we were to cut all
of that off abruptly, that we could end up in the same kind of
dynamic that you are describing where the military-to-military
relationships do not exist.
General Dunford. Senator, I believe that Pakistan has a
very real threat inside their borders right now, and I do not
believe that they can deal with that particular threat without
external support.
Senator Lee. Okay. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
General. Thank you, of course, for being here and for your
incredible sacrifice and service to our country.
Let me move right to the Afghan general elections in 2014.
When we met, we agreed that it would be difficult to overstate
the importance of those elections. In your assessment, what
needs to happen between now and April 2014 to ensure that the
elections are not only free and fair, but recognized to be free
and fair by the Afghan public?
General Dunford. Senator, the first precondition for
successful elections is obviously the security environment. So
as I mentioned earlier, summer of 2013, from my perspective, is
very important. We need to emerge from the summer of 2013 with
security in those areas, particularly those areas that are
important to the elections. We need to emerge from the summer
of 2013 with the perception of security so that people want to
participate in the elections.
I think one of the things that will determine whether they
are viewed as free and fair is if they are inclusive. I imagine
there are 7,000 polling stations, and we need to make sure that
there is security such that people have access to those polling
stations in April. So from a security perspective, that is very
important.
The Minister of Interior has the lead on security. We are
decisively engaged, and my intent is to provide whatever
support the ANSF need us to provide to make sure the elections
are successful in 2014.
Senator Udall. Let me move to the ALP. We talked about
their important role, and you talked about how the Taliban sees
that program. If my memory is right, you said that the ALP is
one of the most significant issues that the Taliban will have
to address in order to be successful. Do you still hold that
view? To what extent does the ALP need to be funded and manned
at high levels? Is the ALP a sustainable initiative as we draw
down our coalition troops?
General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely continue to believe
that the ALP is critical to our success. It is an important
component in that layered security concept I spoke to earlier.
For all the reasons I spoke about, I have confidence in their
ability.
We have about 21,000 what they call guardians or member of
the ALP today. There is planned growth for 30,000. The Minister
of Interior has requested to grow that figure to 45,000. What I
have asked my staff to do is review that in June or July this
year to ensure that we do not look at the ALP other than in the
full context of ASF and the effect that we are trying to
achieve post-2014.
But I am a big believer in the ALP initiative. I believe it
is one of the critical components of security post-2014. I
believe it is sustainable, and it has Afghan ownership right
now. In many cases, it is the Afghans who are identifying the
areas where they want ALP to be established.
Senator Udall. Yes, I do not think you could overstate or I
could overstate the utility of local ownership in the sense
that these police forces work for us, not for the coalition,
not for anybody else, but for the local communities.
Let me move to the heavy responsibility you have, and that
is that you are simultaneously preparing for this year's
fighting season and you are planning for troop reductions over
the next 20 months. In your opening statement, you mentioned a
range of capabilities and units that the ASF currently lack.
In that light, would you recommend that aviation assets,
DOD support, and other capabilities be provided by our military
after 2014? On a related note, will the U.S. Government
civilian agencies be able to sustain their current levels of
personnel and assistance without having a robust NATO military
network in place?
General Dunford. Senator, there are certain capability
gaps, and you highlighted the most important ones, and I would
say the most important one would be close air support (CAS). So
I would recommend where appropriate that we would provide CAS
to the Afghans post-2014. We have seen several times recently
where the absence of that kind of CAS created difficulties for
Afghan forces, and we will not have addressed the capabilities
of the Afghanistan air forces until 2015 or 2016. That is the
program of record as it currently exists. So there will be a
gap between 2014 in the full operational capability of the
Afghan air force. When that gap exists, where it is important
to sustain our success, I would recommend that we provide that
support.
With regard to the civilian agencies, earlier I mentioned
that I believe we should be in the four corners of Afghanistan
post-2014. One of the reasons why I believe that is not only to
provide the right level of advise and assist to our Afghan
counterparts, but also to support the U.S. Government
interagency. Ambassador Cunningham in Kabul and I have complete
integration in terms of planning for post-2014. I understand
what his requirements are from an embassy perspective, and they
are part of our planning for post-2014.
Senator Udall. I will not ask you to answer this question,
but I think it is incumbent on all of us to think about the
president's, as in President Karzai's, behaviors and comments
at times about air support, about our SOFs and the like. We
should consider what his reaction will be to the continuation
of CAS moving forward. I just make that comment.
Let me turn to sequestration, if I might. What are your
concerns? To what extent will sequestration have a negative
effect on the mission and the readiness of the troops that will
rotate into that theater between now and 2014, and perhaps
beyond?
General Dunford. Senator, you hit it exactly right. From my
perspective, I have been told that sequestration will not
affect the resources that we have available to our men and
women on the ground inside of Afghanistan, and I believe that.
My greatest concerns is that it will impact the readiness of
those units who are at home station preparing to deploy to
Afghanistan.
I think one of the great success stories over the last 10
years has been the quality training and equipping that we
provided to our young men and women in uniform. Training today,
there is no comparison to what training was earlier in my
career. That is as a result of the support of Congress. That is
as a result of leadership learning lessons over the last 10
years, and I think it is very important that we sustain that
same high level of training in the coming years because we will
still have people in harm's way.
Senator Udall. Let me move back to the Taliban and the
threats that they present, but also the opportunity for the
Afghan Government and for us. I think we share a concern that
the Taliban could become viewed by the public as the best
arbitrator in dispute resolutions. If the national government
or even provincial officials are viewed as corrupt, then
Afghans could be tempted to turn to the Taliban and their
courts to resolve their problems. Then if you add into that the
sense that the Afghan Government is a predatory actor that
takes private land unfairly or without compensation, that
provides the Taliban power and influence potentially.
Is it reasonable to expect that these types of practices
which are counterproductive can be halted?
General Dunford. Senator, I believe it is not so much
halting them as providing an alternative which would cause them
to be irrelevant. I do believe that dispute resolution is a
core function of subnational governance in Afghanistan, and it
is one of the critical areas. The rule of law in general is one
of the critical areas that the Afghans have to improve in order
for our success to be sustainable in the future. There is no
question about it.
Senator Udall. General, again, thank you for your service.
Thanks for making the long trip here from theater. I look
forward to working with you as we move forward at this crucial
point in time in our involvement in Afghanistan.
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Your mic.
Senator Blunt. Almost turned it on. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you, General, for spending time with us
today.
I want to follow up first on Senator Graham's comments on
the detention of somebody we capture, a third country national.
My impression is that there is really no plan as to what to do
with them in the future.
General Dunford. Senator, we do not have a decision on what
to do with them in the future. In fact, next week we have a
team led by the Office of Secretary of Defense to come over and
to work through this issue. This issue is not a new issue. It
has been worked.
Senator Blunt. Right.
General Dunford. I just do not have the decision about the
disposition of those detainees as we approach 2014.
Senator Blunt. What would be the risk of not agreeing to a
plan for those detainees?
General Dunford. Senator, these are people that absolutely
have to be kept behind bars, so we need a plan to detain these
individuals, in most cases, on an enduring basis.
Senator Blunt. Is it our view that the Afghans would not be
the best people to be in charge of these detainees?
General Dunford. Senator, I do not know if that is a viable
alternative right now. First of all, I do not know what the
Afghan desire would be for those third country nationals or the
legal framework within which the Afghans would be able to keep
them.
The Afghans have moved to an evidence-based process now for
detention operations. We, of course, use the Law of Armed
Conflict framework. I am not sure that the Afghan process would
allow us to keep those third country nationals detained beyond
2014. That is something we would have to take a very close look
at.
Senator Blunt. Okay, thank you. On the force, you mentioned
about 350,000 Afghan forces. This would not be the police
forces, but the other forces?
General Dunford. No, Senator, that is the aggregate of both
the police and the army, less the ALP. So the 352,000 would be
all the Afghan uniformed police, all the Afghan army, the
border police, and then over and above that 352,000 right now
is the ALP, which are approved for a level of 30,000.
Senator Blunt. How big a problem does attrition continue to
be?
General Dunford. Attrition in the Afghan army is a
significant challenge. We have nearly 30 percent attrition. In
the police, it is much better. It is at or above the goal of 15
to 16 percent. The local police is very low and so the army is
the area where attrition is of greatest concern.
Senator Blunt. Is it highest as you get closer to fighting
season?
General Dunford. Senator, we have not seen a direct
correlation between the fighting season and the attrition. We
have seen a direct correlation between leadership and
attrition.
Senator Blunt. What size force as you contemplate us
leaving--I guess I want two questions here. First, what size
force do we have to leave to get people and equipment out
successfully? Then second, what size force should we hope that
the Afghans can maintain and sustain?
General Dunford. Senator, with regard to our equipment,
there are really three aspects of closing down in Afghanistan.
One is the retrograde of equipment that would come back here to
the United States to reset our Services. The others are base
closure and material reduction.
The equipment that is needed to reset our forces, we will
get that equipment out by the end of 2014. We still in all
likelihood will be closing out bases and reducing materials,
that is, returning the ground to the way we found it, post-
2014, and so we will need some element to be able to do that.
Currently, the size of that element is 2,500 soldiers that help
us with that. I expect we will need some similar organization
post-2014. That is called from CENTCOM. It is a logistics unit
that actually works in CENTCOM.
With regard to the Afghans, I think we now are looking at
that 352,000 force being sustained through 2018 as being the
best recommendation.
Senator Blunt. What level of help will the Afghans need
from outside to sustain a force that big?
General Dunford. In accordance with the Chicago Conference,
Senator, through 2018, the vast majority of the money necessary
to sustain that force is going to come from the United States
and international partners.
Senator Blunt. The vast majority of that money will come
from outside?
General Dunford. Absolutely, of about $5 billion to sustain
that force, the Afghans will pay approximately $500 million. So
the preponderance of the resources necessary to sustain Afghan
forces post-2014 would come from the international community
and the United States.
Senator Blunt. On removing our people from Afghanistan, at
what point do you leave--at what point do the people that are
there face real danger, and how many people do we need to leave
there to safely get everything--the other people out?
General Dunford. Senator, there are a couple of things. One
is that we will make that decision based on the security
environment, based on the capabilities and capacities of the
Afghans, who will provide the security environment within which
we draw down. But as General Dempsey says, we are never going
to ask 10 soldiers to do more than 10 soldiers' worth of work.
We will very much shrink the perimeter, figuratively speaking,
in Afghanistan in a way that keeps protection first and
foremost.
Senator Blunt. One other question on facilities that we
have there. You mentioned returning the situation back to the
way it was before the facility was built. Do we have any kind
of process we go through with the Afghans to decide if they
would like things left there that otherwise are just of no
value?
General Dunford. We do, Senator. We have a very detailed
plan for Afghan infrastructure to sustain Afghan forces post-
2014. Some of that infrastructure is being transitioned from
coalition forces to Afghans, but all the infrastructure that is
over and above their ability to sustain over time. We have a
very detailed plan that links the infrastructure that the
Afghans will maintain post-2014 with the resources we project
will be available to sustain that infrastructure. We want to
make sure there is a balance between the projected resources
for sustainment and the numbers of facilities that the Afghans
keep. So those facilities that cannot be sustained post-2014
are the ones I talked about that we would reduce back to the
way we found it.
Senator Blunt. Do we go beyond just the military use of
those facilities to hospital, school, some other use? Do we
have a checklist like that or not?
General Dunford. We do, Senator. In fact, that is led by
the Afghan Government, the Minister of Finance. So if local
governments want to have infrastructure, they submit a request
up to the Minister of Finance. The Afghan Government is
responsible for determining the sustainability of that, and
then the Minister of Finance would come to us with a request
for a specific piece of infrastructure to be maintained.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, General. You have had a tough
assignment, and it looks like to me it is not going to get a
lot easier. I wish you well with it, you and those people you
work with. Thank you for what you do for us.
General Dunford. Thanks, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Good morning, General Dunford. Thank you for
appearing before us today. I want to ask about a couple of
items starting with budgetary questions, and there have been a
number already about sequester. I did a tour of Langley Air
Force Base in Virginia a couple of weeks back, and we talked
about this issue of the warfighter being protected in
sequester. But I was surprised to find that many of the
military personnel that maintain the F-22s are not defined as
warfighters. So some of the sequester and budgetary issues are
affecting their ability to maintain aircraft, and that is one
of the factors that then leads to the step down of readiness of
some of the F-22 units.
As you are--with 60,000 folks under your command in
Afghanistan, while the warfighters may be protected, how does
the sequester and some of the other budgetary challenges
impinge upon your mission? In particular, I think about things
about the retrograding of equipment. Is that something that is
viewed as a core warfighting mission, or is that a part of the
mission that is subject to some of these budgetary reductions?
General Dunford. Senator, all the functions that we are
performing inside of Afghanistan to include retrograde are
considered warfighting functions. So I have been assured by the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that there will not be an adverse impact in those areas.
But I think you highlighted a really important point, and that
is units that are at home station, and I know from my previous
assignment as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, it
is very difficult to say we will properly resource those units
that are next to deploy and not support those who are not next
to deploy. It is not that clean.
So as we start to see degradation of readiness at home
station, there is absolutely no doubt that that degradation of
readiness in home station will affect both units that are next
to deploy as well as those not slated currently for deployment.
Senator Kaine. On the retrograding question, and there may
have been a question asked about this before I came over from
the Senate floor. But just talk about the current status of the
relationship with Pakistan as it affects retrograding of
equipment out of Afghanistan.
General Dunford. Senator, we just completed about 2 months
of proofs of principle to move equipment from Afghanistan into
Pakistan and through the Port of Karachi, as well as to move
the backlogged equipment that has been there for almost a year
from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In fact, we are largely clear
of the backlog that was in Pakistan, moving it into
Afghanistan.
We also have successfully completed those proofs of
principle, and so we now will be looking over the next 45 to 60
days to actually maximize the movement across the ground lines
of communication into Pakistan.
So at this point, it is moving in the right direction after
a very long period of time where those ground lines of
communication were not available. We are in a good place.
Senator Kaine. General, you had a good colloquy with
Senator Lee that I was watching about Pakistan, about the
importance of the relationship. I think many members of the
committee and many Senators look at certain actions that the
Pakistani Government with a lot of concern, the imprisonment of
Dr. Afridi and others. At the same time, we also understand
that Pakistan has lost as many people in the fight against
terrorism, and al Qaeda, and the Taliban, and other elements as
any of our allies.
You alluded to, but did not go too deeply into, the
question of the nuclear arsenal in Pakistan. From a security
standpoint, is not one of the main issues that the United
States needs to worry about is an unstable Pakistan that could
potentially jeopardize the security of the nuclear arsenal
there. That is one of the reasons that we need to be so
diligent in not distancing ourselves from Pakistan, but
continuing to work to the greatest degree we can as partners
for the ultimate security of that nuclear arsenal.
General Dunford. Senator, I believe we have common cause
with the Pakistanis in that regard. I think they increasingly
recognize the threat of extremism. We certainly have been
dealing with that for some years. So, to the extent that I
think we have at least an effective relationship in dealing
with that extremist threat over the next couple of years, I
think Pakistan's increased appreciation of the threat will be
helpful in that regard.
Senator Kaine. General, you talked with Senator Graham a
little bit about drones and the use of drones, and I would like
to expand and go deeper into that question. There is a strong
military rationale, and we have been able to use drones in a
way that have provided us significant advantage in the military
mission. Yet we also, as a body, as a military, as a Congress,
weigh the effect of the drone program on the civilian
populations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Talk to us a little bit about the current state of affairs
in Afghanistan in terms of how our drone program affects the
civilian population's acceptance of our mission and whether it
leads to additional violence against our troops.
General Dunford. Senator, we employ unmanned vehicles in
Afghanistan. We have the same standard for proportionality and
discrimination with those as we do with manned vehicles. So
mitigation of civilian casualties is no different whether there
is a pilot in the cockpit or not.
Before we would employ force in Afghanistan, we ensure that
we have positive identification of target. We identify
individuals with hostile intent, and we do a very clear
assessment of the collateral damage that might be associated
with a particular strike.
I am actually quite proud of our forces over the last 18
months in terms of all that we have done to mitigate the risk
of civilian casualties. But I do not think there is a direct
relationship between a method, a tool--which is what an
unmanned vehicle is--and collateral damage or civilian
casualties. I think it is the employment of that tool which is
most important, and I think we are employing those tools in a
way that mitigates the risk of civilian casualties.
Senator Kaine. General, even beyond civilian casualties,
because I have a high degree of confidence that you are
deploying the tool in that way to minimize collateral damage
and civilian casualties. How about the civilian perception, the
attitudes that the drone program brings about? Even if we are
doing it perfectly, if it creates a great deal of controversy
within the civilian community, that can make our challenge more
difficult down the road. What is your perception of the Afghan
civilian population's understanding of the program as we
implement it?
General Dunford. Inside of Afghanistan, Senator, I have not
detected any concern by the average civilians over those
vehicles. I think that is in large part because of the way we
employ them. I would tell you that the Taliban are very
concerned about those vehicles, and they talk about them all
the time.
Senator Kaine. Let me move to another issue about the
presidential elections. I think our presence post-2014 is
designed to address two conflicting issues: first, that we are
not an occupying force; but second, we are not going to abandon
Afghanistan. Trying to meet both of those goals is challenging.
What do you think our recent announcements and policy in
this country about post-2014 troop levels, what effect are they
likely to have on the outcome of the 2014 presidential
elections?
General Dunford. Senator, you are exactly right. The
message of occupier and abandonment, while seemingly
inconsistent, exists in the same space. I am optimistic that we
can address this as we set the condition for the elections in
2014 in a couple of ways. One is the message of us as an
occupier is actually not going to resonate as the Afghans
assume the lead in 2013. What the Afghan people will see on a
day-to-day basis is ASF providing security. So the message that
the Taliban have had of us an occupier, or the Afghans being a
tool of occupiers, I do not believe will resonate in 2013 as
the Afghans take the lead.
With regard to the message of abandonment, the BSA is a
commitment post-2014 is a component. But what really is
necessary is that the United States and the international
community convey a credible, consistent, and comprehensive
message of commitment post-2014. Together with that commitment
and the Afghans in the lead, I think both the message of us an
occupier and the message of us abandoning the Afghan people
gets undermined.
I think what you are alluding to is really important in
that it is the information environment that will in large part
determine the success of the elections in 2014. The messaging
that we are talking about here is very important. A strong
narrative of commitment and a strong narrative of Afghans'
credible, to the fore, in the lead for providing security, I
believe is a critical component to success of the elections in
2014.
Senator Kaine. General Dunford, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford,
thank you very much for your service and for taking on this
very challenging job at such a critical time.
I want to go back to further discussion about the
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan because I agree
with your view of it. That is critical. Whatever we can do to
help smooth that relationship and really foster it is very
important.
Now, President Karzai has repeatedly accused Islamabad of
trying to undermine the peace process between Afghanistan and
the Taliban. Does Karzai's accusation have any substance to it?
Can you update us on whether or not there is actually a
reconciliation process underway?
General Dunford. Senator, I do not know if there is any
credibility to President Karzai's statement about Pakistan
undermining the peace process with the Taliban. The DOS, of
course, is working very hard. The President has identified
political reconciliation as one of his priorities; that is,
President Obama. So, I know the DOS is working very hard to do
that.
There is an office being opened in Doha. I think we are
waiting now for the Taliban to meet their end of the bargain in
terms of moving the process ahead. But that is not a process
that I am deeply engaged in on a routine basis. From my
perspective, my job is to set the conditions that would
facilitate reconciliation; that is, the conditions on the
ground.
But with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan and President
Karzai's comments, I think they merely highlight the very deep
mistrust that currently exists and has historically existed
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think what we have to do
is, in our efforts to bring, especially in a military-to-
military perspective, is if we can bring that relationship
together in a constructive way and establish a foundation of
trust, I think just like our Nation when we do military-to-
military engagements, that can be the foundation of something
deeper, some strategic partnership that would obviously take
years to develop.
But I believe that that military-to-military bilateral
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be one
of our objectives. It is--and I did not mention it earlier; I
should have--one of the components I believe is critical to
winning is affecting a constructive bilateral relationship
between Afghanistan and Pakistan so that tactical issues along
the border area do not actually have an adverse strategic
impact.
Senator Shaheen. One of the areas of tension, as you point
out, has been that border. When I was there in 2011, we saw
that very directly. One of the things that you talk about in
your testimony is the effort to improve that cross border
coordination with the tripartite border standard operating
procedure, I think you called it.
Can you talk about whether that has actually improved as
the result of that, and what the potential is to keep that
going post-2014 when obviously those border issues will
continue because there is a basic disagreement about where the
border--who controls what along the border.
General Dunford. Senator, I can. We did sign that agreement
back in the fall, and as a result now, we have an exchange of
information. In the event of cross border firing and so forth,
that is very helpful.
I can give you a recent example. About 3 weeks ago, the
Pakistanis began to do some construction on a border post that
is in the border region. So it is disputed as to where exactly
that border post is, whether it is in Afghan territory or
Pakistani territory.
Initially, the Pakistanis brought forces up to the border
point because of tensions. The Afghans indicated that they were
not going to stand for that border post being approved, and
their forces were given the authority to use force in the event
that was necessary.
We used the tripartite process called border flags process
to bring together senior Afghan leadership, senior Pakistan
leadership, and coalition forces. We did that as recently as
yesterday, again with the border flags meeting, that attempts
to de-escalate the situation.
In this particular case, the issue is still out there. It
is not permanently resolved, but over the last 3 weeks we have
been able to de-escalate and manage the crisis as a result of
this tripartite agreement.
What is most important is that we eventually migrate that
to a bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
But I actually think it is not only possible, it is happening
right now, and I think both the leadership on the Pakistani
side as well as the Afghan side recognize that tactical issues
must be addressed at a tactical level and not allowed to bleed
over into the strategic relationship. Even President Karzai has
acknowledged that to me, and he is very supportive of a
military-to-military relationship in order to address these
disputes.
So, Senator, I think that while cautiously optimistic, I am
optimistic that we are moving in the right direction.
Senator Shaheen. That is encouraging. You have talked a
fair amount this morning about what our presence might look
like post-2014. Can you talk about the commitment of our NATO
partners after 2014, and how robust that might be, and whether
there is agreement about what that presence should look like?
General Dunford. Senator, I attended the defense
ministerial in Brussels in February, and at that time, the
collective defense ministers agreed that they would contribute
between 8,000 to 12,000 forces for post-2014. They gave that
guidance for general planning to take place.
I think it is fair to say that our coalition partners are
very much looking to see what the U.S. contribution will be
post-2014 before making a commitment. Also in many cases, our
coalition partners will need U.S. enabling support before they
are able to commit. By enabling support, in most cases I mean
specifically casualty evacuation, medical evacuation, post-
2014, which they cannot provide, but would need that to be in
place in order for them to be committed post-2014.
Senator Shaheen. Is there anything that we should be doing
in the lead up to 2014 to provide those assurances to folks so
that everybody is in agreement on what happens?
General Dunford. I do, Senator. I know that the President
is deliberating now, but as he makes a decision about the basic
framework--he already committed to President Karzai as recently
as January that we would be there in some significant way post-
2014. But as President Obama makes his specific decision, then
I think it is going to be incumbent upon all of us at all
levels to engage our coalition partners to ensure that we build
the same effective coalition post-2014 that we have had over
the past several years.
I think it is a huge success story the way we brought NATO
together to accomplish the mission inside of Afghanistan. I
think it is important that we maintain that same level of
commitment for the alliance post-2014.
So I think in terms of sequencing, once the President makes
his decision and certainly discusses that with his counterparts
in the coalition, I think we will then start to see the
coalition partners make their own decisions. But their ability
to generate the political will to contribute post-2014 and do
the budgetary planning necessary for post-2014 in large part
rests with the U.S. decision and what our presence will be
post-2014.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. My time is up, but I
should say, just offer my condolences. As a Boston native, I am
sure you share the concern that we all felt yesterday looking
at what happened at the Boston Marathon. So hopefully you did
not have any family members who were affected.
General Dunford. No. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Hi, General.
General Dunford. Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much for being here today and
for your service to our country. We appreciate very much your
leadership.
I wanted to ask, first of all, about the transfer of the
detainees into Afghan control for the Parwan detention
facility, and how is that going. Can you also tell me if we
capture, for example, a target, in particular, a foreign
national or a high value target, even who is an Afghan, that
may have intelligence that is helpful to preventing future
attacks. How do you we handle that situation in light of the
detention transfer?
General Dunford. Senator, I can talk to you about the
transfer. One of the last things I did before I left
Afghanistan, and it was about 10 days after the transfer, I
walked down to Parwan, spent about 4 hours on the ground with
the leadership down there, and walked through each and every
function that is being performed inside the facility to ensure
that the partnership arrangement that we had with the Afghans
protected our interests. I am satisfied right now that it does
in the sense that we still have good control over the
detainees, we have visibility, and we are in a position to
ensure that there is humane treatment taking place inside of
the facility.
With regard to future targets, a couple of things. One is
we have a commitment by Afghanistan that they will not only
keep in detention the enduring security threats that we have
identified in the past, but any future enduring security
threats would also be detained.
I would prefer to talk about the intelligence piece in a
closed forum.
Senator Ayotte. Okay.
General Dunford. But I would tell you in this forum that I
am satisfied that we will have appropriate access and
intelligence sharing with the Afghans.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General. I appreciate that, and
we can follow up in a more appropriate forum on the
intelligence gathering.
You said that the enduring security threats, those that are
detainees obviously that would continue to represent a threat,
you are satisfied that the Afghans will maintain control of
those individuals. So I think you and I both would want to
avoid a Daqduq type situation. So, can you assure us that, how
this agreement is with the Afghans, and to your satisfaction,
that we will not have that kind of situation?
General Dunford. Senator, we have a commitment from
President Karzai to President Obama that those individuals will
be detained. What I have said to the Chairman and what I have
said to the chain of command is that were Afghanistan not to
meet their commitment, we would have real operational and
policy issues to address at that particular time. I think it
would change in some way the fundamental nature of our
operations, and certainly change the nature of support that we
might provide to Afghanistan in the future.
So what I am saying now is that we have an agreement with
Afghanistan to keep those enduring security threats detained.
Were they to violate that commitment, I am satisfied that that
would be a significant change in our relationship, a
significant change in the nature of operations, and we would
have to deal with that at the time.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you, General. I wanted to
follow up on the questions that Senator Blumenthal asked you
about, and I appreciated your testimony. Senator Brown and I
were original sponsors of the No Contracting With the Enemy
provisions, and Senator Blumenthal and I had the opportunity to
travel to Afghanistan in January together. As a result of that,
we have introduced legislation called Never Contracting With
the Enemy--to try to fill in some of the gaps to improve--we
made significant progress with the No Contracting With the
Enemy, but to fill in some of the gaps, including to drop the
contract level from $100,000 to $20,000 as you had mentioned
earlier.
But it is not just the DOD that is contracting. What other
agencies are contracting in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. USAID, Senator. I think that, as you are
describing the new legislation, it will be critical that not
only DOD that has contracts, but the DOS, and, specific, USAID,
which has a significant role in contracting in Afghanistan.
They would have the same authorities that we do; that is, do
not contract with the enemy.
Senator Ayotte. From your perspective, have we already been
able to save taxpayers' dollars with the No Contracting With
the Enemy provisions?
General Dunford. Senator, we have been able to save
taxpayers' dollars, but, more importantly, we have been able to
prevent those dollars from being in the hands of the enemy who
would do us harm.
Senator Ayotte. With our legislation that Senator
Blumenthal raised to you, is this something you would endorse
that we hopefully would get passed this year?
General Dunford. Senator, I would. I think anything that
would keep resources out of the hands of the enemy would be a
positive step. So far the legislation has been very effective
both with subcontractors and contractors, and expanding that to
include non-DOD organizations makes a lot of sense.
Senator Ayotte. Great, thank you. Major General Longo was
very helpful to us in helping us put together this legislation,
so we are grateful certainly for his support as well. So thank
you for that.
I wanted to ask you about the follow-on for us in 2014 and
beyond. With each area of Afghanistan, thinking about the
follow-on recommendations that you will make to the President,
how important is it that we have a presence in all four regions
of Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Senator, I think it is very important that
we be in all four regions. From my perspective, it starts with,
I think, the lowest level at which we should advise and assist
post-2014 is at the Afghanistan corps level. They have six
corps level headquarters, and they are in the four corners of
the country.
I also think being in the four corners of the country will
help us to better support the DOS mission. As I mentioned
earlier, I am completely integrated with Ambassador Cunningham
in terms of planning for U.S. presence post-2014. So I believe
being in the four corners is going to be necessary for us to
ensure that the gains that we have made with the Afghan forces
are sustainable post-2014.
Senator Ayotte. When we look at Iran and their role in
Afghanistan, thinking particularly post-2014, what area of the
country are you most worried about with respect to Iran in
terms of having a presence?
General Dunford. It is in the west, Senator. It is in the
Herat region, and we certainly see today evidence of malign
Iranian influence. We certainly see today great effort made by
Iran to control what goes on inside of Afghanistan.
I am happy to report that many of the resources have not
fallen on fertile ground. They have tried to do things that
they have been unsuccessful in doing. But they absolutely have
great interest and influence in the western part of the
country.
Senator Ayotte. If we were not to have a presence or a
sufficient presence in the western part of the country looking
at our post-2014 posture, along with our NATO allies, what type
of influence do you think Iran would have, and what do you
think that they would do with that?
General Dunford. I think it is fair to say that they would
have influence in the western part of the country. I think it
is also fair to say if past is prologue, that that influence
would be malign and could be destabilizing for Afghanistan.
Senator Ayotte. How is it going in terms of negotiating the
BSA?
General Dunford. Senator, the next meeting of the BSA is
May. The last thing I did before I left was I met with
Ambassador Hakimi, the Afghan Ambassador to the United States.
He is the primary negotiator for Afghanistan. All I can say is
that at least on the Afghan side, his sense was that things
were moving in the right direction. He was positive that we
would be able to sign the BSA. President Karzai has said the
same thing to me.
There are two or three difficult issues that we are working
through right now. They are non-negotiable from a U.S.
perspective. So I think the team is working very hard to
address that right now.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, General. I appreciate
your leadership and all of those that serve underneath you. You
do an excellent job.
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thanks.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
I just have a few additional questions, General. One is the
use of the term ``safe haven'' and ``sanctuary.'' I have always
used them interchangeably, and obviously you do not. At least I
think that became obvious in some of your early conversation
this morning. Can you explain to us the difference in your
vocabulary between the two? Who has what where?
General Dunford. I can, Mr. Chairman. We use the term
``safe haven'' in an area from which we cannot get at the enemy
or in an area within which the enemy has freedom of movement.
Inside of Afghanistan, we use the term ``safe haven.''
``Sanctuary,'' we use that with regard to Pakistan.
So when we talk about enemy safe havens, just so we are
clear, inside the force. When we talk about enemy safe havens,
we are talking about areas that are geographically within
Afghanistan, and then obviously sanctuaries being those areas
outside of Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. I think there is some confusion about those
terms. I will just talk about my mind. I will not talk about
others, but I am confident that colleagues also have used the
terms interchangeably, and that that may have led to some of
the comments this morning. I am guessing on that because you
said that--I believe you said that--I thought you were
referring to the Taliban not having a sanctuary in Pakistan,
but I think you would agree that the Taliban does have a
sanctuary inside Pakistan. The Afghans--excuse me--the Afghan
Taliban. Would you agree?
General Dunford. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. In the exchange
earlier, I thought we were talking about al Qaeda.
Chairman Levin. Yes, and you may have been. I may have
misheard it, but I think there was some real uncertainty, at
least my staff also felt--I am not talking about your comments
necessarily, but in the exchange, that there was some
uncertainty as to what was being referred to in Afghanistan
because it is clear that there is a sanctuary for the Afghan
Taliban inside of Pakistan. Is that correct?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt. There is
also the Pakistani Taliban moving, in some cases, freely in the
eastern part of Afghanistan and back into Pakistan.
Chairman Levin. All right. I think probably in the future,
it would be wise for you to pin that down when talking to
Members of Congress because I have heard it repeatedly used
interchangeably. Again, I will just point to myself, not to
others. I am not saying it is a mistake one way or the other,
but it is used interchangeably by many colleagues, I believe,
and it surely is myself. So I am going to try to be more
accurate in the future, particularly when I am talking to one
of our military leaders. But I think in the common ordinary
sense of the word out in the public, that there has not been
that distinction which has been made, and you should be aware
of that if I am accurate, okay?
General Dunford. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Second, I want to ask you about the
time table for the decision as to the number of troops that
would be there after 2014. I think that most of us, maybe all
of us, agree that we need to have a credible commitment, the
earlier the better. That is important, for the uncertainty that
does exist in Afghanistan to be removed both in the eyes of the
people, the government, that clearly want an ongoing presence
that is credible. It is also important for the Taliban to
understand there will be an ongoing, credible commitment from
the United States.
As to the specific number of that, you have not made a--
numerically what that commitment would amount to in terms of
troops, you have not made your recommendation yet, and you have
indicated today that there are a number of factors which can
affect your judgment as to what that proper number or range
would be. So far, am I right?
General Dunford. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, the one issue, however, that,
and you have spoken on this and I want to be real clear on, is
that in your mind in making your recommendation, that it is
essential that there be a BSA that protects whatever number of
troops we have that are there, for instance. Another is on the
sovereignty issue. We are very careful about protecting our
troops that are in a foreign country so that they are not, if
it is not appropriate, subject to the judicial arm of other
countries if we do not think that it is appropriate for that to
be the case, and under what circumstances will an American
soldier or marine or whatever, be subject to foreign
jurisdiction. We are very protective of our troops. Is that
correct?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely correct.
Chairman Levin. That is set out in a BSA. It is supposed to
be set forth, is that right?
General Dunford. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman. In
other countries, of course, it is the SOFA, and that really is
a subset of the BSA.
Chairman Levin. All right. Whatever commitment that is
made, in your judgment, should be conditional upon a working
out of a BSA. Is that fair to say?
General Dunford. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Any authority
that we have to operate post-2014 would be within the framework
of a BSA. As the U.N. mandate expires in December 2014, and the
military technical agreement expires in 2014, our presence
post-2014 would be based on the BSA that we make with the
Afghan Government.
Chairman Levin. Not only would it be dependent on that
authority, but my point is that whatever number we have could
only be committed if we have a BSA. We need a BSA before troops
are actually left there after 2014, is that correct?
General Dunford. That is exactly right.
Chairman Levin. So that whatever number, whether it is
8,000, 10,000, 12,000, 6,000, or 14,000, whatever the number
is, is our share of the total number of troops there. That
would only be accomplished if, in fact, there is a BSA between
our two countries.
General Dunford. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Again, we all thank you very much for
your service. You have really done a superb job there following
a superb number of commanders that have preceded you. You are
carrying out a very impressive tradition, and we commend you
for it. We thank you for it and those who work with you.
General Dunford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
2013 FIGHTING SEASON
1. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, this fighting season will have
the Afghans in the lead for security operations with support from the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). What are your strategic
military objectives for the 2013 fighting season?
General Dunford. This will be the first fighting season with the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the lead across Afghanistan.
In many parts of Afghanistan, the ANSF have been responsible for their
own security for some time. Our objective is simple--we want the ANSF
to be successful. We will help the ANSF achieve success by being a good
supporting partner as they take charge of security at the national
level. This will improve ANSF confidence in their own ability to stand
against the insurgency and terrorism. This in turn will improve the
confidence of the Afghan people in their government to deliver security
across Afghanistan. Improved security delivered by the ANSF will set
the conditions for successful Afghan presidential elections and the
peaceful transfer of presidential power in Afghanistan for the first
time in history. This will allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to transition from combat operations to a mission focused on
train, advise, and assist of the ANSF.
2. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, how does the 2013 fighting
season set the conditions for success in 2014 and beyond?
General Dunford. By the conclusion of fighting season 2013, the
ANSF will have had their first full fighting season in the lead for
security. The significance of a successful fighting season means a
confident ANSF, one in which the people of Afghanistan can be proud.
When the ANSF succeed in fighting season 2013, the people, the
candidates, and most importantly, the political parties will feel
secure about the elections process for 2014. The 2013 fighting season
refines the narrative about the Taliban--they are losing and are
progressively marginalized in their influence. An Afghan process owned
by Afghans and delivered by the Taliban has been their strategic focus.
Instead, the Afghans will have taken ownership of their own security
and political process without them (unless they turn to
reconciliation). The election, the security institutions, and a
government acceptable to the Afghan people all help set conditions for
a sustainable Afghan future: each are related to successes during this
fighting season.
3. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, in the draw down to 34,000 U.S.
forces by February 2014, what will be the size of the international
forces?
General Dunford. By February 2014, total requirements for ISAF
forces will total 52,000 troops. Of that, 18,000 troop requirements
have been identified for sourcing by the 49 other troop-contributing
nations. Sourcing of these requirements will occur in June at the NATO
Force Generation Conference and that will determine the final number of
troops pledged against the campaign.
4. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, do you sense that our
international partners are heading for the exits and how do you manage
that issue?
General Dunford. I can emphatically state that our international
partners are not heading for the exits. Much like the United States,
they are managing force reductions in accordance with the decreased
troop requirements as the ISAF campaign progresses and the capabilities
of the ANSF increase. I actively engage with our international partners
in conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the NATO Senior
Civilian Representative in a synchronized engagement plan to ensure
that we send a common message about our current and future requirements
to heads of state, ambassadors, and senior defense officials from all
50 nations in the coalition. The coalition remains solid in their
commitment to the obligations of this mission.
2014 FIGHTING SEASON AND ELECTIONS
5. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, two major challenges for 2014
will be supporting the Afghan presidential elections in April 2014 and
drawing down to the appropriate force size by the end of 2014. The
smooth transition of power is critical to the democratic, peaceful, and
secure future of Afghanistan. Will 34,000 U.S. troops and a
commensurate number of allied and partner forces, in support of the
ANSF, be enough to provide security for the Afghan elections in April
2014?
General Dunford. Based on our current estimates and plans, ISAF
will require approximately 52,000 troops to support the ANSF in
providing security throughout Afghanistan for the 2014 national
elections. The 34,000 troops that the United States has provided and
18,000 troops that we have requested that Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe provide from the troop contributing nations is sufficient
to complete this mission.
6. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the critical military
tasks after the April elections for the remainder of 2014 for your
forces?
General Dunford. Assuming that the Afghan presidential elections go
as planned, in April 2014, and the political transition is successful,
then our critical tasks will remain supporting and enabling the ANSF to
neutralize the threats. Our Special Operations Forces will continue to
partner with their ANSF counterparts and we will continue to advise the
security ministries at the corps and brigade levels. The decisive point
of our post-election train, advise, and assist mission will remain at
the brigade level. Other critical tasks will include a theater reserve
and quick reaction force for our forces, the civil authorities we
enable, and the international community.
POST-2014
7. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what missions do you believe we
should be performing in post-2014 Afghanistan to preserve the
investment of American lives and treasure we have invested over the
last decade?
General Dunford. We will conduct three missions in the post-2014
environment: train, advise, and assist at the brigade level and above;
counterterrorism; and support to civil authority. We will be conducting
the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan for a few more years. In
extremis support to civil authority will remain a part of planning in
Afghanistan.
8. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what is your professional
opinion on whether it would be better to train at the brigade or the
corps level post-2014?
General Dunford. Optimally, I believe that post-2014 we need to
maintain a robust train, advise, and assist presence with all of the
Afghan National Army (ANA) corps and regional police commands. The
decisive point for train, advise, and assist to the ANSF is at the
brigade level. We are exploring options for how best to configure the
NATO and U.S. force to best support the ANSF. We fully expect the
Afghan security institution leadership (Ministries of Defense and
Interior) are contemplating Afghan military command and control
constructs and may reorganize based on their own lessons learned from
the upcoming fighting season. In addition, we will require the ability
to reach out and conduct regular train, advise, and assist visits to
the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to monitor the
effective use of the international donor community's continued
investment in the ANSF.
9. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, if you had to make a
recommendation at this point in time, would your recommendation be to
train at the brigade or at the corps level?
General Dunford. The Afghans are making significant progress as
they are poised to take the lead for security during this fighting
season. The Afghan units engaged in the fight today are at varying
levels of performance and have tailored Security Force Assistance teams
from the coalition from the corps down to the tactical level. Some
Afghans units are conducting successful un-partnered operations. The
performance of the Afghans during this fighting season will drive us to
refine our partnering model for the 2014 elections period and the 2014
fighting season. The Afghans are also expected to reorganize their
command and control structures in both the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Those variables will drive how we
partner with the Afghans in the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission.
10. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, in your testimony, you said
that your recommendation of required post-2014 troop levels would
depend in a large part on the performance of the Afghan forces in the
2014 fighting season. What are the key dimensions of their performance
that you will use to determine the appropriate post-2014 force size?
General Dunford. At the end of the fighting season in 2013, the
most important performance measure is the ability of the ANSF to be
responsible for their own security at the national level. Specific
areas I will look at this year will be proficiency of ANSF leadership
and unit training. I am also interested in the progress of developing
command and control, logistics, and combined arms capabilities.
11. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, why is it important, from a
security and military perspective, for the United States to stay
engaged post-2014 in all four regions of Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Our efforts post-2014 will be regionally-based and
focused on the Afghan corps throughout the country. This will maintain
the momentum achieved by ISAF, align us with the Afghans security and
military force lay down, and build upon current coalition and
coalition/Afghan relationships. The post-2014 military mission will
conduct training, advising, and assisting with a focus at the Afghan
national and institutional level at the corps level. This will support
the development of a sustainable level of skills and capabilities which
will enable the ANSF at corps level to deal effectively with residual
insurgent threats.
12. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, is it your sense that the
Afghan Government would object to 20,000 or more U.S. and international
troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2014 for training and assisting
and counterterrorism?
General Dunford. No, although, I do believe that 20,000 is the top
end of what the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA) would probably find acceptable in Afghanistan.
13. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the risks if the
residual U.S. force size in Afghanistan is too low?
General Dunford. The post-2014 mission, under NATO authorities is
predicated on a role without combat. This portion of the mission is
focused on continued train, advise, and assist of the fielded Afghan
forces and training institutions for both the ANA and ANP.
Additionally, a portion of the force will also be dedicated to
improving capacity in the Afghan security institutions and the civilian
oversight of the military. These two NATO missions will be balanced by
a coalition of the willing, under U.S. leadership, focused on
counterterrorism against transnational terrorists. It is important to
note, that a sufficient force must be dedicated against the train,
advise, and assist mission to ensure the ANSF deliver long-term
security to Afghanistan, while the coalition of the willing with our
Afghan partners ensure that transnational terrorists do not take
advantage of the mission shift to try and re-establish their safe
havens in Afghanistan. A too-small force will not allow a balanced
effort between these interlinked missions.
14. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the primary lessons
learned from the drawdown in Iraq that you are attempting to apply in
Afghanistan?
General Dunford. There are a number of lessons learned from Iraq
that U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the International Security
Forces Afghanistan are applying now and will be over the course of the
next 20 months with regards to retrograde activities. One of the
primary lessons learned that I would like to highlight from the
drawdown in Iraq is the need for a Single Logistics Command and Control
(C2) system in theater. This lesson was applied in Afghanistan since
the spring of last year and has been critical to the Combined Joint
Operations Area (CJOA) and theater sustainment and retrograde
processes. This concept basically placed the pre-2012 logistics command
structure under the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC).
The TSC has been able to bring strategic partners into the CJOA as
a single point of contact linking them at the operational level. This
did not happen in the Iraq drawdown causing inefficiencies. This also
enabled U.S. Army Central Command to start to execute certain Army
Forces tasks such as Class VII equipment management and asset
visibility. With the proper enablers, the TSC can smooth out CJOA
processes.
Single Logistics C2 must be integrated into corps operations,
unlike Iraq, or we will lose the opportunity to ``operationalize'' both
sustainment and retrograde. This is happening now and represents some
improvements from our Iraq experiences. The lesson lies in our ability
to codify the proper command and support relationship in order to
ensure sustainment and retrograde are nested with the operational plan/
execution.
DRUG TRAFFICKING
15. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, the United Nations says opium
poppy cultivation will increase for a third year in a row and is
heading for a record high and provides 75 percent of the global crop.
What do you think will be the effect of the drawdown of both U.S.
troops and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) presence in
Afghanistan on the drug trade in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. The reduction of U.S. troops and DEA presence in
Afghanistan will limit the ability to support certain Afghan-led
counterdrug operations, especially in remote areas heavily influenced
by the Taliban. However, DEA's enduring mentoring and training mission,
combined with continued international training, advice, and assistance
from NATO after the ISAF mission, will ensure Afghan counterdrug forces
have the ability to continue to operate in many areas of the country.
As the recent arrest, conviction, and 20-year jail sentence by Afghan
authorities of U.S. kingpin Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai demonstrates, Afghan
capability to locate and arrest dangerous narcotics traffickers has
advanced significantly. Sustained mentorship and support to Afghanistan
law enforcement will be necessary to prevent insurgents and criminal
elements from evading law enforcement, threatening the population, and
potentially allowing sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups.
16. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, will the Taliban receive a
boost in funding from increased drug trafficking?
General Dunford. Yes. The Taliban profits from all aspects of the
narcotics trade, but a key source of drug revenue for the insurgency is
taxes levied on illegal opium poppy cultivation. While there are no
official estimates yet for the size of the 2013 crop, there are
indicators that this year's poppy crop could be among the largest of
the last decade. A larger opium crop will also generate more revenue
for the insurgency from Taliban extortion of drug movement, processing,
and trafficking networks. Furthermore, they have become more deeply
involved in all aspects of narcotics trafficking and where they own the
cycle from processing to export, as the recent kingpin designation of
senior Taliban commander Naim Barich demonstrated.
PAKISTAN
17. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, as you have indicated, the
stability of Afghanistan affects the stability of Pakistan and vice
versa. What aspects of the relationship between Afghanistan and
Pakistan are the most critical and what are the indicators that would
tell you the relationship is heading in the right direction versus
wrong direction?
General Dunford. Pakistan and Afghanistan's ability to engage
consistently and constructively--both diplomatically and militarily--is
critical to overcoming their mutual deep-seated mistrust and improving
their relationship. An irritant in this relationship is the countries'
shared porous border and hostilities that arise when each nation
attempts to protect sovereign territory--which is not clearly defined.
ISAF has been working to mitigate this irritant in the relationship by
facilitating engagement between the Pakistan and Afghanistan's
militaries, institutionalizing communications processes, and brokering
a framework to manage military border incidents. Improvements in these
areas would indicate the relationship is maturing; however, the
countries are not yet independently able to manage cross-border
disputes. Although progress is slow and fragile, Pakistan and
Afghanistan have also held a number of bilateral and multilateral
engagements which indicate the relationship is heading in the right
direction, but there is more work to do. Of note is Afghan Minister of
Defense Mohammadi's February visit to Pakistan and a series of
trilateral sessions hosted by United Kingdom Prime Minister Cameron
which included President Karzai, Prime Minister Ashraf, and
representatives from both Afghan and Pakistani political and security
establishments.
18. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the best roles or
tasks for the United States to assist in the improvement of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship?
General Dunford. I do not assess there will be a deep, strategic
partnership between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but I am encouraged by
the degree of coordination and cooperation that's taken place at the
military-to-military level, that improves in fits and starts. We would
like to take the fundamental relationship we're building in a
trilateral fashion between the militaries, and use it as the
underpinnings for a solid bilateral relationship between the Afghans
and the Pakistanis by the end of 2014. We'll continue to mature this
effort over the next 20 months, with the understanding that there is
distrust over such things as the border, but significant areas of
potential agreement in other parts of their relationship such as
training. The United States has significant influence with both nations
and can continue to provide positive opportunities for each nation to
deepen its trust of the other.
19. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, if Afghanistan is stable and
security steadily improves, will that send more or less extremist/
terrorist elements into Pakistan?
General Dunford. Even a stable and secure Afghanistan will have
difficulty preventing terrorist and extremist elements from operating
in some rural, rugged areas near the Pakistan border without continued
counterterrorism pressure. Improvements in stability and security in
Afghanistan would make it more difficult for these groups to operate
and could force some extremists and terrorists to move to Pakistan.
20. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, in your professional military
opinion, has our security assistance to Pakistan been effective at
helping Pakistan and in reducing the flow of extremists and instability
from Pakistan to Afghanistan?
General Dunford. U.S. security assistance programs are an important
tool in building strong partnerships and equipping states with military
capabilities to address their security requirements. Internal threats
from extremism, coupled with a nuclear arsenal, make Pakistan a state
wherein we have vital national interest.
In my opinion, our security assistance programs help us build a
long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. U.S. security assistance
programs assist the Government of Pakistan in coping with extremism
within their own borders and enhance security and stability. However,
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for executing security
assistance programs in Pakistan and can best assess the effectiveness
of these programs.
21. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what changes to our security
assistance to Pakistan would improve regional stability?
General Dunford. Security assistance programs are critical in
helping us build a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan and
providing capabilities to enhance security and stability. CENTCOM is
responsible for executing security assistance programs in Pakistan and
can best assess what specific capabilities might improve regional
stability.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
22. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, you have indicated that many
Afghans fear uncertainty about the future support of the United States
and the international community more than they fear the Taliban. What
specific U.S. actions or elements of U.S. policy do you consider most
important to reducing the uncertainty which contributes to potential
instability and the hedging of actors both within Afghanistan and in
the region?
General Dunford. A clear and unambiguous commitment of U.S. and
international support beyond 2014, such as a Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) or a NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), would help
reduce uncertainty and hedging by actors within Afghanistan and the
region. There is anecdotal information now that Afghans, certainly the
Afghan elite, are preparing for an uncertain future making plans to
depart Afghanistan prior to the end of 2014. Afghanistan has a societal
memory of the post-Soviet war period, when the international community
turned their attention away from the country, and they fear a relapse
to the fighting that defined that period.
We do not believe we can fully mitigate Afghan and regional hedging
behavior, as it is rooted into the culture of a society that has seen
over 35 years of warfare. However, international assurances--especially
binding pledges or transparent announcements of post-2014 intentions--
should help to mitigate hedging behavior.
23. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, sustainment of infrastructure
programs and projects in Afghanistan is one of the key variables
Congress will need to decide upon going forward. Which of the
infrastructure programs and projects do you consider most important to
sustain, and why?
General Dunford. The Department of Defense (DOD) through the use of
Afghanistan Infrastructure Program (AIP) fund has been able to secure
$400 million for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012, and $325
million in fiscal year 2013, 2-year funds, by demonstrating the link
between Department of State (DOS) investments with that of the GIRoA's
priorities. Those national priorities include infrastructure needs such
as power, water, and transportation. USFOR-A and the U.S. Agency for
International Development engage with the GIRoA at the local,
provincial, and ministerial levels to synchronize project planning and
execution with GIRoA priorities and assessment for sustainment as the
leading indicators. The funding allocated by Congress promotes economic
growth and agricultural yields, while connecting Afghans to services,
civil society, and improved governance at all levels.
24. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, based on your interaction with
the Afghanistan Government and conditions on the ground, which of the
most important Afghan ministries are most capable and which require the
most improvement to secure the peaceful future of Afghanistan?
General Dunford. The peaceful future of Afghanistan will rely on
what the Afghan people want. The security conditions achieved in 2013
and an effective political transition in 2014 will allow Afghans to
exploit the decade of opportunity. The focus of the post-2014 mission
is all about growing capabilities and capacities of the Afghans. As I
have said before, some of the remaining challenges we will have to deal
with start at the ministerial level. There is no metric to determine
``the most important'' Afghan ministries. All 17 ministries of the
Afghan Government are important for the Afghan people, whether it is
the MOD, the MOI, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, or the
Ministry of Women's Affairs, to name a few--they are all important to
their nation's success. It is my view today that there are various
levels of improvements needed across the board to secure the peaceful
future of Afghanistan. We have the metrics in place that both address
where we have to be for proficiency at the ministerial level, as well
as 14 functional areas that we evaluate in our tactical units that
allow us to determine where they are and what support they may need to
improve to take it to the next level.
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) employs the same
capability milestone ratings to assess ministerial development.
Additionally, NTM-A assesses ANSF institutional progress towards
autonomous operations for ANSF training institutions, regional military
hospitals, and logistics nodes. Both ministerial and institutional
development is rated against the following capability milestones:
1A: Autonomous Operations
1B: Coalition Oversight
2A: Reduced Coalition Advising
2B: Regular Coalition Advising
3: Coalition Partnering
4: Initial Capability
25. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the key elements you
recommend should be a part of U.S. policy and policy implementation to
fight the problem of corruption within the Afghan Government?
General Dunford. Holding the GIRoA to the terms of the Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework is the key to ensuring the political will to
fight corruption in Afghanistan. If you ask most people who are
tracking the issue in Afghanistan how to curb high-level corruption,
they will tell you: ``by the International Community better controlling
its own purse strings.'' Donor countries must withhold funding to
institutions and ministries that make little or no progress in fighting
corruption. The Afghan system of having to pay for official positions
seems to be a driving factor fueling corruption in the security forces.
We recommend a systematic approach by donor nations to address the
system of impunity and interference with the judicial system within
GIRoA.
26. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what should the U.S. role be
in the Afghan reconciliation process?
General Dunford. The DOS has lead for reconciliation policies. From
my perspective, the United States, through ISAF, needs to set the
conditions on the ground that would facilitate the dialogue between the
Afghan Government and the Taliban.
27. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, how has Congress been the most
helpful to your efforts as a military commander in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Congress has been extremely helpful in a number of
ways.
First, thanks to Congress' leadership and support, the men and
women of U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan today are well-trained and
well-equipped. It is important that the fiscal commitments that permit
such a premier fighting force are sustained in the future.
Second, Congress' funding of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
has been instrumental in building and equipping the ANSF. As a result
of your support, the ANSF will shortly assume responsibility for
security throughout Afghanistan. ASFF will continue to be vitally
important to the ANSF in sustaining the very force we just helped build
and to secure those gains for which we have paid so dearly.
Third, Congress' passage of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012 was effective in halting contracts to entities and
individuals supporting an insurgency or opposing coalition forces.
TRANSPORT MISCALCULATIONS
28. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, at the April 10, 2013, news
briefing on the defense budget, Under Secretary Robert Hale stated in
answer to a question that costs in Afghanistan were $7 to $10 billion
higher this year than what we anticipated. This is very troubling in
any environment, but especially under the constraints that DOD is
currently under. Can you verify if this is correct, and can you give a
detailed account for such a massive underestimation?
General Dunford. The $7 to $10 billion shortfall range is correct.
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets are put together 1 to 2
years before execution; a difficult task given the uncertainties that
exist in war. In the fiscal year 2013 OCO budget request, DOD estimated
that many of the operating costs would decline proportionately with the
reduction of troops. What we are seeing in actual execution is that
many of these costs will not decline until bases are closed. In
addition, DOD did not forecast the closure of the Pakistan ground lines
of communication for such an extended period of time, so higher
transportation costs arose from using more expensive means and routes.
DOD also did not have a good estimate of the total equipment retrograde
requirement. In late fiscal year 2012, CENTCOM stood up a Material
Retrograde Element to manage the retrograde efforts and can now provide
a better estimate of the retrograde requirement.
ARTICLE 60 MODIFICATIONS
29. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, we trust you to make decisions
that may result in the loss of life in order to protect the Nation and
accomplish the mission. Every day, commanders must make decisions to
correct underperformers with training or education, and, when
necessary, to discipline troops or possibly relieve commanders.
Ultimately, our Nation charges them, and you, with the responsibility
to establish cohesive, mission-ready combat units. While we trust you
with our sons' and daughters' lives, the proposed modifications to
Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) seem to
suggest that we do not trust your discretion when it comes to the UCMJ
offenses. Do you, as a commander, consider the UCMJ as it is currently
structured, to be a viable tool to help you maintain and enhance the
cohesiveness and fighting capabilities of your combat units?
General Dunford. Yes. I believe the UCMJ, as currently structured,
is important for commanders to maintain and enhance cohesiveness and
fighting capabilities, and to maintain good order and discipline.
30. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, have you seen any evidence
that commanders are abusing their discretion as the convening authority
to adjust sentencing?
General Dunford. No. In my experience, commanders exercise their
judicial responsibilities under the UCMJ very carefully and with
deliberation for the interests of all personnel involved, including
victims of offenses.
31. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, how would the proposed changes
to the UCMJ impact your effectiveness as a commander?
General Dunford. I will continue to exercise my responsibilities as
a Convening Authority as authorized under the UCMJ, with due
consideration for all personnel involved.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
GREEN ON BLUE ATTACKS
32. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, over the span of the Afghan
conflict there have been many instances of attacks by Afghan forces on
U.S. and coalition personnel. A January 2013 Foreign Policy article
noted that 52 coalition soldiers died as a result of 37 green on blue
attacks in 2012. Despite improvements in the overall quality and
capabilities of the ANA's personnel that you noted in your testimony,
the data indicates that green on blue attacks escalated last year. As
we continue to hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan
Government, I am concerned that we may not fully understand the
motivations and allegiances of our ANA counterparts. Are you seeing a
similar trend developing this year with regard to green on blue
attacks?
General Dunford. Because no single definitive countermeasure can
prevent insider attacks, ISAF and the ANSF introduced a program of
countermeasures, which applied collectively, are reducing the threat
posed by insider attacks. These measures include strengthening the
vetting processes for new recruits and those returning from extended
leave; increasing the number and training for counterintelligence
agents; and enhancing force protection for ISAF troops operating in
small units or in remote areas.
Additionally, I am encouraged by the joint, integrated ISAF-ANSF
approach and level of the Afghan Government's commitment to reducing
this mutual threat. For example, ISAF and ANSF established the three-
star-led Insider Threat Action Group, which they co-chair, as well as
the Joint Casualty Assessment Team, that investigates every incident in
order to identify lessons and required actions for the future.
33. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, how many such attacks have
occurred thus far in 2013?
General Dunford. From January 1 to April 16, 2013, there have been
four green on blue attacks.
34. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, do you believe that the
screening program for prospective Afghan military and police forces is
sufficient?
General Dunford. The Afghans have established sound procedures for
vetting ANSF personnel. The challenge is the quality of compliance with
those standards and working through the high volume of personnel. The
Afghan Government has significantly increased the number of
counterintelligence personnel in the ANSF, in order to ensure that they
have sufficient personnel with the appropriate training to ensure
compliance with those standards. The Afghans understand that this is a
threat both to us and to our relationship with them. This also affects
the will of the coalition at the strategic level and erodes the trust
between our forces. The coalition has also significantly increased the
number of counterintelligence resources being provided in Afghanistan
and developed additional measures to mitigate threats against our
personnel.
35. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, are there additional
capabilities that need to be made available to change the trend?
General Dunford. First and foremost, the insider threat is a force
protection issue. ISAF has taken a comprehensive approach to the
insider threat, both at home station in terms of enhanced training and
additional measures that take place once forces are deployed to
Afghanistan. There has also been a significant increase in the number
of counterintelligence resources provided in Afghanistan, both on the
part of the coalition as well as within the ANSF. This is starting to
bear fruit as over 400 ANSF members have been arrested as a result of
this increased scrutiny, and additional investigations continue. This
critical issue is far from being solved, but progress is being made.
AFGHAN ARMORED VEHICLES
36. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, the Army intends to sign a
sole source contract for 135 additional Mobile Strike Force Vehicles
(MSFV) for Afghan Security Forces. The cost under this contract is
estimated at $1.0 to $1.5 million per vehicle. With respect to our
current fiscal challenges, the sole-source procurement of new vehicles
appears less cost-effective than the upgrade and transfer of hundreds
of existing Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that are
already in Afghanistan. Have you considered the upgrade and transfer of
the in-country MRAP vehicles to the Afghans?
General Dunford. The initial decision to procure 488 MSFVs was made
in fiscal year 2010 after market research determined that the MRAP
variants did not meet the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) operational requirements relating to an enclosed
turret with day/night sight. In June 2012, an additional requirement of
135 MSFVs to outfit additional units was validated and implemented. The
justification to sole-source the additional 135 MSFVs was based on the
following factors:
- Maintaining fleet commonality to increase operational
flexibility and reduce procurement, logistical, and training
burdens.
- Preventing an unacceptable program delay which would
severely and negatively impact the ANSF's ability to maintain
security and achieve dominant combat capability prior to the
transition on December 31, 2014.
- Reducing substantive duplicate costs incurred by issuing a
competitive solicitation. The estimated costs associated with
competitive procurement would have exceeded $125 million and
would not have been recovered through competition.
37. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, will you provide written
justification for the sole-source contract for the MFSVs?
General Dunford. See attached Justification and Approval (J&A).
38. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, has ISAF or CENTCOM conducted
a cost analysis that provides a side-by-side comparison of executing
the sole-source contract for the MSFVs against upgrading and
transferring the in-country MRAP vehicles to the Afghans?
General Dunford. Yes. The initial decision to procure 488 MSFVs was
made in fiscal year 2010 after market research determined that the MRAP
variants did not meet the CSTC-A's operational requirements relating to
an enclosed turret with day/night sight. In June 2012, an additional
requirement of 135 MSFVs to outfit additional units was validated and
implemented. The justification to sole-source the additional 135 MSFVs
was based on the following:
- maintaining fleet commonality to increase operational
flexibility and reduce procurement, logistical, and training
burdens.
- preventing an unacceptable program delay which would
severely and negatively impacted the ANSF's ability to maintain
security and achieve dominant combat capability prior to the
transition on December 31, 2014.
- reducing substantive duplicate costs incurred by issuing a
competitive solicitation. The estimated costs associated with
competitive procurement would have exceeded $125 million and
would not have been recovered through competition.
Additional rationale considered:
- The MSFV is distinguished by armored protection around both
the occupants and the major automotive platform as opposed to
the occupant-centric tactical vehicle protection provided to
MRAPs, where the engine and transmission are more vulnerable to
small arms and other attacks.
- The chosen way-ahead leverages the only known source
(Textron Marine and Land Systems) with the knowledge and
expertise to fulfill the requirement without adversely
impacting the cost, schedule, and continuity of the existing
ANSF fleet.
STATUS OF DR. SHAKEEL AFRIDI
39. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, there is no doubt that our
operations against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations rely upon
assistance from foreign nationals who are willing to risk their lives
to help us. It is widely understood that Dr. Shakeel Afridi played an
important role in helping the United States determine the whereabouts
of Osama Bin Laden. His bravery was rewarded by a 33-year jail sentence
for treason. I am concerned that our failure to secure the release of
Dr. Afridi will be seen by others as an indication that the risk of
aiding the United States is too great, no matter how important the
target. Can you provide me a status update on Dr. Afridi? If your
office is unable to, would you request that your colleagues in CENTCOM
provide me with this update?
General Dunford. The DOS is responsible for handling and working
the details of Dr. Afridi's situation and can better update you on his
status.
40. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, are you aware of ongoing
efforts by the United States to secure his freedom?
General Dunford. The DOS is responsible for handling and working
the details of Dr. Afridi's situation and can better update you on his
status.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
SERGEANT BOWE BERGDAHL
41. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, Sergeant Bergdahl was captured
by the Taliban on June 30, 2009, in Paktika province. Can you provide
an update on Sergeant Bergdahl's situation, as well as your efforts to
find him and bring him home?
General Dunford. I can assure you that finding and rescuing
Sergeant Bergdahl remains a top priority. The military effort to bring
Sergeant Bergdahl home is as strong as it has ever been and there are
many people, within DOD and throughout the U.S. Government, who are
committed to this goal. This effort will not cease until it is
successful and he is safely brought back to the United States and
reunited with his family.
FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN
42. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if we rush to the exits or
provide an insufficient force after 2014, what would failure in
Afghanistan potentially look like?
General Dunford. A drawdown that is too hasty would pose risks to
the viability of the Afghan Government. We would expect a resurgence in
insurgent influence. Diminished access to resources would exacerbate
tendencies to aggregate wealth, leading to intense competition and a
probable return to factional fighting (renewed civil war) as
powerbrokers--including insurgent commanders--sought to secure their
positions and interests. The conflict between these groups would likely
be protracted, as regional players would become entangled in providing
calibrated support to groups deemed favorable to the interests of those
regional actors. Government and powerbroker groups have already amassed
the degree of resources required to extend a conflict for resources. We
would likely see a refugee outpouring similar to the early 1980s, if
renewed civil war hindered Afghans' abilities to provide for their
families. An increase in ungoverned spaces would allow hostile non-
state actors the freedom to train and operate in Afghanistan.
43. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if we fail in Afghanistan,
what could be the impact on U.S. national security interests?
General Dunford. We came to Afghanistan as a result of September 11
to ensure that the Taliban did not harbor al Qaeda and al Qaeda didn't
have the space within which they could plan and conduct further
operations against Western interests. We also wanted to preclude a
resurgence of Taliban rule, which provided the opportunity to al Qaeda
to operate from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Those objectives are
unchanged and continue to retain international support as evidenced by
the 50-nation coalition created over the last decade.
Failure in Afghanistan would provide an opportunity for al Qaeda
and other extremist groups to reestablish safe havens from which to
plan and conduct transnational terrorist acts. Furthermore, failure in
Afghanistan would have detrimental effects on the stability of
Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons that is already battling a
significant terrorist problem.
AFGHAN FIGHTING SEASON
44. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do you have the forces and
resources you need for this fighting season?
General Dunford. Yes, I have all the forces and resources that I
require to support the ANSF as they take the security lead for the 2013
fighting season. ISAF will have approximately 97,000 troops during the
upcoming fighting season. The troop requirements for this fighting
season reflect a bottom-up developed plan that reflects the troop
requirements as seen by subordinate commanders in support of the
overall ISAF campaign plan and the subordinate commands' seasonal
orders framework. This plan was presented to and approved by Joint
Forces Command-Brunssum and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
45. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do you anticipate having to
drawdown U.S. forces during the fighting season?
General Dunford. Our current planning does include significant
troop reductions during the fighting season as we transition from the
68,000 to 34,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In order to reduce
turbulence, we will execute as many troop reductions as possible during
already planned troop rotation periods. This is accomplished by not
replacing troops as they reach the scheduled end of their deployments.
Some of these troop rotations will occur during the fighting season.
46. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do you believe you have the
discretion to wait until after the fighting season concludes?
General Dunford. Yes. Based upon the guidance I have received from
my chain of command, I believe I have the flexibility to manage the
transition from the 68,000 force to the 34,000 force as I deem best
supports the mission as long as I accomplish this transition by the
February 12, 2014, date directed by the President in his State of the
Union address.
47. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, what would be the dangers to
our mission, and to our troops, if the plan was changed and you were
forced to withdraw a significant number of troops during this fighting
season?
General Dunford. An accelerated reduction of troops during the
fighting season would jeopardize our ability to provide the support
that our ANSF partners require as they transition into the lead for
national security for the first time during this campaign. This would
also challenge our ability to maintain coalition cohesion as many of
our international partners count on valuable enabler support that we
provide, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, route
clearance, and medical evacuation.
An accelerated withdrawal would also increase our vulnerabilities
to attack as it would challenge my ability to balance the flow of troop
withdrawal with maintaining the capabilities required to secure our
base camps and our lines of communication at a time when the enemy is
at his strongest. Most importantly, though, would be the erosion in
confidence within the ANSF, the GIRoA, the Afghan people, and within
our coalition. This fighting season will be critical to establishing
confidence in a positive future in Afghanistan.
48. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if at any point this year or
next year you feel that the pace of the drawdown is endangering our
troops or the mission outcome, will you provide that professional
military judgment not only to your chain of command, but also to this
committee?
General Dunford. Yes.
49. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, how are your subordinate
leaders going to manage the competing demands of conducting the mission
while preparing to withdraw?
General Dunford. We have done a great deal of planning to examine
the methodology for our redeployment. This is not necessarily new, as
we did reduce our force level from the height of the surge in 2012. As
the ANSF take the lead for security across Afghanistan in the summer of
2013 and effectively counter the insurgency, the nature of our mission
will change to a supporting role. We will still be supporting the ANSF
this year in great enough numbers to ensure their success, but our
mission demands will lessen and enable us to redeploy forces, balancing
risk to mission and risk to force.
AFGHAN ELECTIONS
50. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, compared to previous
elections, to what extent will U.S. and NATO forces be able to offer
point and/or area security during key electoral processes--particularly
on Election Day and during an extended election results aggregation
period lasting several weeks?
General Dunford. We are going to do whatever we need to do to
support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational
environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take
place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections
that are accepted as legitimate, we're going to have the right security
environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to support the ANSF
as they set the environment within which the elections take place. The
ANSF are planning to provide layered security with a unity of effort
during the elections period, integrating Afghan Local Police, Afghan
Uniformed Police, ANA, and Afghan Special Forces. Confidence from a
successful 2013 fighting season will set the conditions for successful
presidential elections. ISAF's role will be to support the ANSF and to
be prepared to provide in extremis support to the international
community, if required.
51. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, in the previous election,
women candidates and candidates representing ethnic minorities had
their election activities severely curtailed due to physical security
concerns. What actions and support can the international forces offer
in this regard?
General Dunford. We are going to do whatever we need to do to
support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational
environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take
place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections
that are accepted as legitimate, we're going to have the right security
environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support,
such as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a
secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place.
52. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, what about for other
candidates, voters, and poll workers in insecure areas?
General Dunford. We are going to do whatever we need to do to
support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational
environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take
place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections
that are accepted as legitimate, we're going to have the right security
environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support,
such as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a
secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place.
53. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, some elements within the
Afghan Security Forces contributed to electoral fraud and malpractice
problems in 2009 and 2010. To a certain extent this was due to
insufficient training on their roles and responsibilities during the
electoral process, generally, and on Election Day, in particular. What
is the U.S. military planning that will ensure the ANA, ANP, and Afghan
Local Police are better prepared in 2014?
General Dunford. We have focused over the last few years on growing
the quantity of the Afghan forces. Now that we have the quantity and
the structure in place, we are focused on improving the quality of the
force. When I look out at the security environment right now and the
relative strength of the Taliban and the relative strength of the ANSF,
I know they will be able to provide adequate security for the elections
in 2014 with our support. Additionally, the Afghans have started the
planning process to support the elections much earlier than in previous
elections, nearly 14 months ahead, giving the ANSF more time to
adequately prepare. The ISAF has also developed a supporting plan to
ensure that ISAF is better prepared to support the ANSF in its security
role for the 2014 elections. Credible ANSF stewardship is crucial to
the successful completion of elections; their preparation will include
training on proper procedures, actions, roles, and responsibilities in
support of Afghanistan's free, fair, and legitimate elections.
54. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, additionally, a significant
amount of electoral fraud in 2010 was committed during counting and
tabulation of results. The Independent Electoral Commission is
currently contemplating moving the count from 6,000 polling centers to
large provincial count centers. This means there would be large
stationary targets counting ballots for weeks. Would international
security forces and Afghan Security Forces be able to secure such
vulnerable temporary compounds for such a length of time?
General Dunford. Yes. We are going to do whatever we need to do to
support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational
environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take
place; this includes ensuring Afghan security forces will be capable of
securing large temporary count centers during the election period. To
have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are
accepted as legitimate, we're going to have to have a secure
environment. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support to the ANSF
so they may ensure a secure environment within which the elections take
place.
55. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if there is a provincial
count--what training would the military be able to provide,
specifically on ballot security from polling station to counting
centers?
General Dunford. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support,
such as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a
secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place.
The ANSF will provide the necessary security along lines of
communication between polling stations and counting centers and are
capable of conducting route security training to meet these
requirements.
U.S. COMMITMENT
56. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do some Afghans fear that the
United States may abandon Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Abandonment is a key theme of the Taliban
narrative. We do not believe wide segments of the Afghan population
view the ISAF drawdown as abandonment. Afghans are uncertain about
their future and that of Afghanistan. Perceptions of ISAF
``abandonment'' would likely derive from two primary anxieties: (1)
deteriorating security conditions and increase of local violence as
ISAF reduces its footprint; and (2) Afghanistan's economic viability
post-2014. We believe Afghans delink the ISAF drawdown and the
provision of security: according to the Afghan National Quarterly
Assessment Report, 80 percent of Afghans believe the government is the
primary provider of security in Afghanistan. However, we believe
Afghans are concerned about their future, and likely link fears of a
precipitous drop in post-2014 international economic assistance with
anxieties over ``abandonment.''
57. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, what are the implications of
those sentiments?
General Dunford. Although we believe the majority of Afghans harbor
concerns about the post-2014 environment, potentially negative outcomes
likely to trigger hedging behavior are too remote for most Afghans to
pursue hedging measures now. At this juncture, non-elites are likely
preserving their options, and their current hedging posture is best
described as minimal or preliminary. Elite Afghans have greater access
to information and resources with which to hedge. Accordingly, we have
observed examples of elites hedging, but for most of the population, we
assess conditions have not yet reached a point where Afghans feel they
need to firmly commit to hedging strategies.
58. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, how can we best convey an
enduring U.S. commitment to the Afghan people?
General Dunford. Political reconciliation and elections remain our
strategic priorities. We can support both processes and significantly
change the dynamic for the 2013 fighting season with an expeditious
signing of the U.S.-Afghan BSA and NATO SOFA. The BSA and NATO SOFA
will form the cornerstone of our narrative.
Timely completion of these international agreements, properly
integrated with our transition to train, advise, and assist, will
undermine the Taliban's messages of abandonment and characterization of
the coalition forces as occupiers. Today, a clear demonstration of our
will, endurance, and commitment is required to advance the campaign. A
reinvigorated and credible narrative in conjunction with Milestone 2013
will positively influence the strategic landscape both within
Afghanistan and throughout the region. A consistent and clear
coalition-Afghan narrative will set favorable conditions for the
political process and enhance prospects of success for Afghans in their
first fighting season in the lead.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
AFGHANISTAN BUDGET UNDERESTIMATION
59. Senator Lee. General Dunford, at the April 10, 2013, news
briefing on the defense budget, Under Secretary Robert Hale stated in
answer to a question that costs in Afghanistan were $7 to $10 billion
higher this year than what we anticipated. This is very troubling in
any environment, but especially under the constraints that DOD is
currently under. Can you verify if this is correct and give a detailed
account for such a massive underestimation?
General Dunford. The $7 to $10 billion shortfall range is correct.
OCO budgets are put together 1 to 2 years before execution; a difficult
task given the uncertainties that exist in war. In the fiscal year 2013
OCO budget request, DOD estimated that many of the operating costs
would decline proportionately with the reduction of troops. What we are
seeing in actual execution is that many of these costs will not decline
until bases are closed. In addition, DOD did not forecast the closure
of the Pakistan ground lines of communication for such an extended
period of time, so higher transportation costs arose from using more
expensive means and routes. DOD also did not have a good estimate of
the total equipment retrograde requirement. In late fiscal year 2012,
CENTCOM stood up a Material Retrograde Element to manage the retrograde
efforts and can now provide a better estimate of the retrograde
requirement.
60. Senator Lee. General Dunford, as the United States and
Afghanistan negotiate for a troops presence in the country, can we
continue to expect similar miscalculations in the future as referenced
in the question above?
General Dunford. I believe that as our force footprint is reduced
and we enter into a more stable train, advise, and assist relationship
with Afghanistan after 2014, budget fluctuations will become more
predictable and less distinct in magnitude. I would also like to note
that USFOR-A is committed to being a good steward of our citizens' tax
dollars. Within USFOR-A, for example, we have self-identified over $9
billion in cost savings and cost avoidance during fiscal years 2012 and
2013.
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
61. Senator Lee. General Dunford, a U.N. report in February stated
that Afghanistan lost $3.9 billion in 2012 due to public sector
corruption. That's twice the domestic revenue of the entire Afghan
Government. The high level of corruption in Afghanistan poses a great
problem for ISAF and the future of Afghanistan. What is your assessment
of the level of corruption at all levels of government in Afghanistan
and the anti-corruption efforts of the Afghan Government?
General Dunford. I am convinced that corruption represents a
strategic risk to Afghanistan and contributes to negative perceptions
of the government by the Afghan people and donor nations. The climate
of impunity, as well as a lack of control mechanisms, must be addressed
in the coming years in order for the GIRoA to succeed and endure.
While conditions vary significantly by ministry or agency, I assess
that there is corruption at differing levels of the Afghan Government.
That said, certain GIRoA ministries are performing better than others.
The February 2013 Transparency International Report assessed levels of
corruption within the Afghan MOD as lower than in other ministries and
better than in many other emerging nations.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned.]