[Senate Hearing 113-123]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-123
NUCLEAR WASTE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TO
RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON S. 1240, THE NUCLEAR WASTE ADMINISTRATION ACT OF
2013
__________
JULY 30, 2013
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
RON WYDEN, Oregon, Chairman
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE LEE, Utah
DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK UDALL, Colorado JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
Joshua Sheinkman, Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
Karen K. Billups, Republican Staff Director
Patrick J. McCormick III, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
Page
Boyd, David C., Chairman, National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners Committee on Electricity, Vice Chair,
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.......................... 46
Davis, Lynn E., The RAND Corporation............................. 86
Fertel, Marvin S., President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear
Energy Institute............................................... 56
Fettus, Geoffrey H., Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc................................................... 64
Garcia, Joe, Vice President, Southwest Area, National Congress of
American Indians............................................... 42
Jameson, Sally, Delegate to the Maryland House of Delegates,
Chair, Nuclear Legislative Working Group, National Conference
of State Legislatures.......................................... 39
Knopman, Debra, The RAND Corporation............................. 86
Lochbaum, David, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of
Concerned Scientists........................................... 75
Moniz, Hon. Ernest J., Secretary, Department of Energy........... 6
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska................... 5
Smith, Chuck, Jr., Council Member, Aiken County, SC, Vice Chair,
Energy Communities Alliance.................................... 51
Wyden, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator From Oregon........................ 1
APPENDIX
Responses to additional questions................................ 89
NUCLEAR WASTE
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TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room
SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Wyden,
chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
The Chairman. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee
will come to order.
Today the committee holds a legislative hearing on S. 1240,
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013. I want to begin
by expressing my appreciation to the bipartisan co-sponsors of
the legislation, Senator Murkowski, Senator Alexander and
Senator Feinstein for their exceptionally hard work and
cooperation in bringing this bill forward for consideration.
I also want to thank the members of the Blue Ribbon
Commission, including Secretary Moniz. He consulted with us and
helped us chart a path forward for national nuclear waste
policy.
Senator Feinstein has been a stalwart member of our team
and provided invaluable input on the bill. She's submitted a
statement for the record and without objection her statement
will be entered into the hearing record in its entirety.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator From
California
introduction
Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski, and members of the Energy
and Natural Resources Committee: thank you for providing me, a former
member of this esteemed committee, with the opportunity to testify on
this extremely important piece of legislation.
The byproducts of nuclear energy represent some of the nation's
most hazardous materials, but for decades we have failed to find a
solution for their safe storage and permanent disposal.
Most experts agree that this failure is not a scientific problem or
an engineering impossibility; it is a failure of government.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act would finally establish a
comprehensive nuclear waste policy, addressing the ever-growing amounts
of highly radioactive waste that are being stored in communities across
the country, costing taxpayers billions of dollars.
This issue is too important for politics as usual, which is why I'm
proud to join Senators Wyden, Alexander and Murkowski in introducing
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act.
This bipartisan legislation will establish a workable, long term
nuclear waste policy for the United States--something our nation lacks
today--by implementing the unanimous recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future.
the bill
First, the bill would create an independent entity--the Nuclear
Waste Administration--with the sole purpose of managing nuclear waste.
Second, the bill would authorize the siting and construction of
three types of waste facilities: (1) a ``pilot'' waste storage facility
for waste from shut down reactors, (2) additional storage facilities
for waste from other facilities, and (3) permanent repositories to
dispose of nuclear waste.
Third, the bill creates a consent-based siting process for both
storage facilities and repositories, based on the successful efforts to
build waste facilities in other countries.
Fourth, the bill would direct the fees currently collected from
nuclear power ratepayers to fund nuclear waste management.
Finally, the legislation ensures that the new Nuclear Waste
Administration will be held accountable for meeting Federal
responsibilities and stewarding Federal dollars.
the problem
The United States has 104 operating commercial nuclear power
reactors that supply one-fifth of our electricity and nearly 75 percent
of our emissions-free power.
However, production of this nuclear power has a significant
downside: it produces nuclear waste that will take hundreds of
thousands of years to decay. And unlike most nuclear nations, the
United States has no program to consolidate waste in centralized
facilities.
Instead, we leave the waste next to operating and shut down
reactors sitting in pools of water or in cement and steel dry casks.
Today, approximately 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste is stored at
commercial reactor sites. This total grows by 2,000 metric tons each
year.
In addition to commercial nuclear waste, we must also address waste
generated from creating our nuclear weapons stockpile and powering our
Navy.
Although the Federal government signed contracts committing to pick
up commercial waste beginning in 1998, the Federal government's waste
program has failed to take possession of a single fuel assembly.
Our government has not honored its contractual obligations. We have
been sued, and we have lost. So today, the Federal taxpayer is paying
power plant owners to store the waste at reactor sites all over the
nation. The cost of this liability is forecast to reach $20 billion by
2020.
As we try to manage our growing national debt, we simply cannot
tolerate continued inaction.
the solution
In January 2012, the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future completed a two-year comprehensive study and published unanimous
recommendations for fixing our nation's broken nuclear waste management
program.
The Commission found that the only long-term, technically feasible
solution for this waste is to dispose of it in a permanent underground
repository. Until such a facility is opened--which will take many
decades--spent nuclear fuel will continue to be an expensive, dangerous
burden.
That is why the Commission also recommended that we establish an
interim storage facility program to begin consolidating this dangerous
waste, in addition to working on a permanent repository.
Finally, after studying the experience of all nuclear nations, the
Commission found that siting these facilities is most likely to succeed
if the host states and communities are welcome and willing partners,
not adversaries. The Commission recommended that we adopt a consent
based nuclear facility siting process.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act would implement those
recommendations, putting us on a dual track toward interim and
permanent storage facilities. The bill also reflects much work by
former Senator Bingaman, who put forward a similar proposal as one of
the last bills he wrote.
In my view, one of the most important provisions in this
legislation is the pilot program to begin consolidating nuclear waste
at safer, more cost-efficient centralized facilities on an interim
basis. The legislation will facilitate interim storage of nuclear waste
in above-ground canisters called dry casks. These facilities would be
located in willing communities, away from population centers, and on
thoroughly assessed sites.
Some members of Congress argue that we should ignore the need to
interim storage sites and instead push forward with a plan to open
Yucca Mountain as a permanent storage site. Others argue that we should
push forward only with repository plans in new locations.
But the debate over Yucca Mountain--a controversial waste
repository proposed in the Nevada desert, which lacks state approval--
is unlikely to be settled any time soon.
I believe the debate over a permanent repository does not need to
be settled in order to recognize the need for interim storage. Even if
Congress and a future president reverse course and move forward with
Yucca Mountain, interim storage facilities would still be an essential
component of a badly needed national nuclear waste strategy.
By creating interim storage sites--a top recommendation of the Blue
Ribbon Commission--we would begin reducing federal liability while our
nation sites and builds a permanent repository.
Interim storage facilities could also provide alternative storage
locations in emergency situations requiring spent nuclear fuel to be
moved quickly from a reactor site.
Both short-and long-term storage programs are vital.
Permanently disposing of our current inventory of nuclear waste
will take several decades.
Because of that long timeline, interim storage facilities allow us
to achieve significant cost savings for taxpayers and utility
ratepayers by shuttering a number of nuclear plants.
conclusion
One thing is certain: inaction is the most costly and least safe
option.
Our longstanding stalemate is costly to taxpayers, utility
ratepayers and communities that are involuntarily saddled with waste
after local nuclear power plants have shut down.
And it leaves nuclear waste all over the country, stored in all
different ways.
It's long overdue for the government to honor its obligation to
safely dispose of the nation's nuclear waste.
This will be a long journey, but we must take the first step.
Thank you, Chairman Wyden and the committee.
The Chairman. Before we hear from Secretary Moniz and our
other witnesses, I'm going to make just a few points.
First, it's my strong belief that the country needs a way
to permanently dispose of nuclear waste from commercial nuclear
power plants and from Defense programs. Simply continuing to
pass the burden of safely disposing of nuclear waste to future
generations is not an option. That's true whether the waste is
at shuttered nuclear power plants or if it's in tanks alongside
the Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest.
The Federal Government is contractually obligated to take
spent fuel for disposal and this liability, already in the
billions of dollars, continues to grow with each passing day.
the Federal Government is morally obligated to make sure that
wastes from the Nation's nuclear weapons programs are safely
disposed of in a permanent repository.
Second, whether you happen to be for or against opening
Yucca Mountain, Yucca Mountain was not designed to be big
enough to handle all of the spent fuel in nuclear waste that
will need disposal. Today there are roughly 70,000 metric tons
of spent fuel already sitting at nuclear plants around our
country. The GAO, the Government Accountability Office,
estimates that that amount is going to double just from the
current generation of nuclear power plants, to over 140,000
metric tons.
Seventy thousand metric tons is the statutory capacity
limit for Yucca Mountain until there is a second repository.
That leaves no room for the commercial spent fuel that will be
generated this year or next year or the year after that.
It also leaves no room for the spent fuel from the Navy or
for the tens of thousands of canisters of high level waste
expected from Hanford and the other Department of Energy
nuclear weapons sites.
Third, continuing to keep spent fuel and high level waste
where they are today--in reactor pools that were not originally
designed to store large quantities of spent fuel for long
periods of time at DOE nuclear sites and at decommissioned
nuclear power plants--is an exercise in institutional inertia.
I was reminded of a harsh truth when I visited Fukushima.
Accidents don't always follow safety precautions. If plant
safety can be improved by reducing the amount of spent fuel
stored in existing pools, then there's an option that ought to
be on the table.
It also is time to come to terms with the fact that having
permanent disposal capacity for all of the waste that the
country is going to have is not going to be up and running any
time soon.
Fourth, no one who has commented on the subject believes
that the U.S. Department of Energy should continue to be in
charge of this program. S. 1240 would create a new agency with
a 5 member independent oversight board to site and manage the
government's nuclear waste, storage and disposal facilities.
There is also a general consensus that the Federal Government
needs to work with State and tribal governments in siting these
facilities, not in conflict with them.
Finally the bill would also authorize the Secretary of
Energy to revisit the decision made after the 1982 act was
passed to commingle commercial spent fuel and high level waste
in the same disposal system. S. 1240 would require the new
agency to begin right away to site new facilities for storage
of priority waste. Priority waste includes spent fuel at
decommissioned nuclear plants and emergency shipments of spent
fuel that present a hazard where they're stored.
However, storage is not permanent. It's temporary. The new
agency is required to also site a permanent repository.
Financial commitment to move ahead with the repository and
selection of potential sites for that repository are
prerequisites for any additional spent fuel storage facilities
to come online.
It has now been 3 decades since Congress passed the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982. In many ways the country is no closer
to having a permanent solution to these problems than it was
then. If anything, there is even less confidence in the
government's ability to solve these problems and meet its
commitments to utilities and their ratepayers.
Our goal with this legislation is to get the permanent
repository program back on track and to make sure spent fuel
and nuclear waste are handled safely until it is.
I want to recognize Senator Murkowski.
I just want to note that I think I misstated my judgment
with respect to Fukushima because really the harsh truth with
respect to Fukushima is accidents don't always follow safety
predictions. I believe I said, precautions. So in the broad
sweep of Western Civilization, perhaps not everyone noticed.
But I did. I appreciate the recorder correcting that.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So I thank my colleagues for their patience.
Let me recognize Senator Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for your leadership on this issue,
working with you, Senator Alexander, Senator Feinstein, in
trying to come together over the course of many months to
really find this path forward. I think it is because of your
leadership and the commitment of these others that we were able
to reach consensus on the language and have this hearing
relatively quickly after introduction. So again, thank you.
We know that there are provisions within this bill, there
are certain segments that are not universally supported, some
areas that were perhaps not addressed to everyone's
satisfaction. But I think that what we have tried to do is to
put forward legislation that can get us from where we are today
on the back side of the nuclear fuel cycle, namely a process
that has effectively mastered the art of going nowhere slowly,
to a place where actually progress has been made.
Where spent nuclear fuel is deposited into permanent
repositories.
Where the American taxpayer is no longer liable for the
government's breach of contract. A breach that has cost nearly
$3 billion so far and of course, is likely to grow upwards of
$20 billion if the government fails to accept used fuel by
2020. By some estimates may increase by as much as $500 million
each year thereafter if no action is taken.
So we're talking real dollars here.
One of the areas of significant discussions centered on the
structure of this new entity whether it should be led by a
single administrator, a person who essentially calls the shots
and is the person to go to if things are working or perhaps
aren't working or a board of directors as recommended by the
Blue Ribbon Commission. Either approach can work. Either
approach could fail.
We chose the single administrator structure with an
enhanced oversight board as a way to streamline the process and
get the casks moving.
We have essentially written in a 10-year window for this
new entity to show real results. I think we recognize that it
is an aggressive timeline. But hopefully it's doable. I believe
it sends an important message to the American people, to
industry, and to all those who follow nuclear issues that we
are not willing to wait another 30 plus years to resolve the
back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Now as the committee considers the approach that we have
offered. I'd like to mention an area that I think we're going
to need to address more comprehensibly during this committee
process and that's the transportation of waste in dry cask
storage to a storage facility or repository.
According to the NEI, more than 3,000 shipments of used
nuclear fuel have been made over the past 40 years by rail, by
truck and sometimes barge. While there are a handful of
transport containers that are certified by the NRC, there are
nearly 1700 dry cask units at operating reactors and stranded
and shut down sites representing over 19,000 metric tons of
used nuclear fuel. However, no transport containers have been
procured for those units in large part because they just don't
have any place to go.
But even if we were to pass this legislation tomorrow
significant work needs to be done at the stranded sites. The
priority sites that are identified in the bill just to get the
storage casks to a rail head. DOE's Office of Fuel Cycle
Technology estimates that it will likely take 12 to 15 years to
remove the waste from the stranded sites with the first 5 to 6
years needed to acquire the resources and to prepare the
infrastructure. So I do hope it is something that we'll have an
opportunity to discuss more within this committee.
I, too, Mr. Chairman, would like to recognize the work of
Secretary Moniz, his leadership on the Blue Ribbon Commission
and also the face that he was willing to consult with the 4 of
us as we attempted to address some of these difficult issues.
I'll be interested in hearing the comments from our second
panel here today on how we can better address the issues of our
nuclear waste within this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
First of all my thanks to you for your continued
cooperation as we've done a whole host of issues. I think your
point with respect to transportation is very well taken. I'm
anxious to work with you on it.
Several colleagues said that they were on a time crunch
with respect to this afternoon. I think Senator Heinrich said
that he may want to make a comment early on? Are there other
colleagues that would like to make a comment before we go to
Secretary Moniz?
Senator Heinrich. Actually, Chairman, I'll hold my opening
comments until we get to the questions.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Heinrich. First panel.
The Chairman. Any other colleagues?
OK, Secretary Moniz, welcome and again, our thanks for your
cooperation in a number of those meetings. I had real questions
about whether or not we were going to be able to get a
bipartisan agreement here. The fact that we did, to a great
extent, was sparked by your assistance and cooperation.
So we thank you.
We'll put your prepared remarks into the record in their
entirety. Just please proceed to outline your views.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Secretary Moniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Murkowski.
First of all let me say I want to thank you for, and your
colleagues, Senators Alexander and Feinstein for the chance to
discuss these issues some weeks ago. I think it was pretty
important for us to be able to exchange those views. I
appreciate that opportunity to work together.
So to both of you and members of the committee, thank you
for inviting me here to discuss the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013 and the activities this
Administration has ongoing to meet the challenge of managing
and disposing of used nuclear fuel and high level radioactive
waste.
I wish to commend, again, the 4 sponsoring Senators on
their leadership in crafting what I believe is a very
thoughtful approach to nuclear waste management in S. 1240.
While the Administration has not taken a formal position on the
legislation, I certainly believe it is very promising framework
for addressing the key issues.
It's based on the recommendations, as you have said, of the
Blue Ribbon Commission on which I had the pleasure of serving
under the leadership of Lee Hamilton and Brent Scowcroft.
The Administration embraces the principles of the
Commission's core recommendations and like, S. 1240, the
Administration supports the goals of establishing a new,
workable, long-term solution for nuclear waste management. I
appear before the committee today to reinforce that the
Administration is ready and willing to engage with both
chambers of Congress to move forward. I believe that S. 1240
provides a workable framework for that engagement.
Any workable solution for the final disposition of used
fuel and nuclear waste must be based not only on sound science,
but also on achieving public acceptance at the local, State and
tribal levels. When this Administration took office, the
timeline for opening Yucca Mountain had already been pushed
back by two decades, stalled by public protest and legal
opposition and with no end in sight. It was clear the stalemate
could continue indefinitely.
Rather than continuing to spend billions of dollars more on
a project that faces such strong opposition, the Administration
believes a pathway similar to that the Blue Ribbon Commission
laid out, a consent based solution for the long term management
of our used fuel and nuclear waste, is one that meets the
country's national and energy security needs, has the potential
to gain the necessary public acceptance and can scale to
accommodate the increased needs of the future that includes
expanded nuclear power deployment.
In January 2013 the Administration released its strategy
for the management and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high
level radioactive waste which, again, endorses the key
principles of the Commission's report. The strategy lays out
plans to implement, with the appropriate authorizations from
Congress, a long term program that begins operations of a pilot
interim storage facility, advances toward the siting and
licensing of a larger interim storage facility, and makes
demonstrable progress in the siting and characterization of
repository sites to facilitate the availability of one or more
geological repositories.
Consolidated interim storage is a critical component of an
overall used fuel, waste management system and offers a number
of benefits such as offering the opportunity to remove fuel
from shut down reactors, meeting the government's waste
acceptance obligations sooner and reducing the government's
liabilities caused by delayed waste acceptance. No matter how
many facilities or what specific form they take, a consent
based approach to siting is critical to success. The
Administration supports working with Congress to develop a
consent based process that is transparent, adaptive and
technically sound.
The Commission emphasized that flexibility, patience,
responsiveness and a heavy emphasis on consultation and
cooperation will all be necessary in the siting process and in
all aspects of implementation. The strategy also highlights the
need for new waste management and disposal organization to
provide the stability, focus and credibility to build public
trust and confidence. Again, there are multiple models that
exist along a continuum from government program to Federal
corporations. But as we've discussed, whatever form the new
entity takes, keys are organizational stability, an appropriate
level of autonomy, leadership continuity, oversight and
accountability and public credibility, all critical attributes
for future success.
So we feel we are facing a unique opportunity to address
the needs of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle by setting
it on a sustainable path and providing the flexibility needed
to engage potential host communities and anticipated
advancements in technology. We need to move forward with
tangible progress toward used fuel acceptance, initially from
closed reactor sites, providing more certainty to the nuclear
industry. This progress is critical to assure that the benefits
of nuclear power are available to current and future
generations.
I'll be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Moniz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest J. Moniz, Secretary, Department of
Energy
Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013 and the activities this Administration has
ongoing to meet the challenge of managing and disposing of used nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
The United States, like all countries, faces challenges associated
with ensuring its people have access to affordable, abundant, and
environmentally friendly sources of energy. President Obama has made
climate change mitigation a priority and set a goal of reducing
emissions in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. The
promise of nuclear power is clear. Electricity generation emits more
carbon dioxide in the United States than transportation or industry,
and nuclear power is already the largest source of carbon-free
electricity in this country. Nuclear power has an important role in
President Obama's all-of-the-above approach to energy, and will play a
significant part in reducing carbon pollution under the President's
Climate Action Plan. As the President noted in Korea last spring, ``in
the United States, we've restarted our nuclear industry as part of a
comprehensive strategy to develop every energy source.'' This includes
providing conditional commitments to loan guarantees to support the
first commercial reactors licensed and built in the U.S. in three
decades. Currently, we have five new commercial nuclear reactors under
construction, including four AP1000 reactors, with passively safe
features. The Department of Energy (DOE) is also helping accelerate the
commercialization of first generation of Small Modular Reactors (SMR)
through a cost shared program with industry. We believe SMRs will be
part of the future model of nuclear energy worldwide, where both SMRs
and gigawatt-class reactors are deployed depending on the requirements.
Nuclear power has reliably and economically contributed almost 20
percent of electrical generation in the U.S. over the past two decades.
It remains the United States' single largest contributor (more than 60
percent) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation. We
believe that nuclear energy will continue to be an important part of
the Nation's low carbon future.
I wish to commend Senators Wyden, Murkowski, Alexander, and
Feinstein on their leadership in crafting a thoughtful approach to
nuclear waste management in the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of
2013, S. 1240. While the Administration has not taken a position on the
legislation, I believe it is a promising framework for addressing key
issues. It is based on the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future, on which I had the pleasure of
serving under the leadership of Lee Hamilton and Brent Scowcroft. The
Administration embraces the principles of the Commission's core
recommendations and, like this legislation, supports the goals of the
establishing a new, workable, long-term solution for nuclear waste
management. I look forward to continuing to work with you and your
colleagues on the continued development of the new program.
Any workable solution for the final disposition of used fuel and
nuclear waste must be based not only on sound science but also on
achieving public acceptance at the local and state/tribal levels. When
this Administration took office, the timeline for opening Yucca
Mountain had already been pushed back by two decades, stalled by public
protest and legal opposition, with no end in sight. It was clear that
the stalemate could continue indefinitely. Rather than continuing to
spend billions of dollars more on a project that faces such strong
opposition, the Administration believes a pathway similar to that the
Blue Ribbon Commission laid out--a consent-based solution for the long
term management of our used fuel and nuclear waste--is one that meets
the country's national and energy security needs, has the potential to
gain the necessary public acceptance, and can scale to accommodate the
increased needs of a future that includes expanded nuclear power
deployment.
The Administration's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of
Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste provides a basis for
discussions between the Administration and Congress on a path forward
for disposal of nuclear waste and provides near-term actions to be
implemented by the Department of Energy pending enactment of new
legislation. We are facing a unique opportunity to address the needs of
the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle by setting it on a sustainable
path and providing the flexibility needed to engage potential host
communities and anticipate advancements in technology development. I
appear before this committee today to reinforce that the Administration
is ready and willing to engage with both chambers of Congress to move
forward.
strategy for the management and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste
Finding a solution to managing and disposing the nation's high-
level radioactive waste and used nuclear fuel is a long-standing
challenge. Such a solution, however, is necessary to assure the future
viability of an important carbon-free energy supply and further
strengthen America's standing as a global leader on issues of nuclear
safety and nonproliferation.
In FY 2010, Secretary Chu, at the direction of President Obama,
established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
(BRC, or the Commission) composed of representatives from government,
labor, academia and industry. The charter charged the Commission with
conducting a ``comprehensive review of policies for managing the back
end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the
storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear
fuel, high-level waste, and materials derived from nuclear activities.
. . [and to] provide advice, evaluate alternatives, and make
recommendations for a new plan to address these issues.'' The
Commission issued its final report on January 26, 2012.
The report included eight key recommendations:
1. A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear
waste management responsibilities.
2. A new organization dedicated solely to implementing the
waste management program and empowered with the authority and
resources to succeed.
3. Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are
providing for the purpose of nuclear waste management.
4. Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal
facilities.
5. Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage
facilities.
6. Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale
transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to
consolidated storage and disposal facilities when such
facilities become available.
7. Support for continued U.S. innovation in nuclear energy
technology and for workforce development.
8. Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address
safety, waste management, non-proliferation, and security
concerns.
In January 2013, the Administration released its Strategy for the
Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive
Waste, which endorses key principles of the Commission's report. The
Strategy lays out plans to implement, with the appropriate
authorizations from Congress, a long-term program that begins
operations of a pilot interim storage facility, advances toward the
siting and licensing of a larger interim storage facility, and makes
demonstrable progress on the siting and characterization of repository
sites to facilitate the availability of a geologic repository. It is
important to stress that neither the BRC recommendations, nor the
Administration's Strategy, make recommendations on siting of such
storage facilities or repositories.
As noted, the Administration's Strategy endorsed the concept of the
development of three different, but intimately related, facilities.
While the Strategy indicates one of each of three separate facilities,
it is conceivable, as the result of a consent-based siting process,
that some or all of these facilities could be co-located and/or more
than one of each type could be constructed.
Consolidated interim storage is a critical component of an overall
used fuel and waste management system and offers a number of benefits.
As outlined in the Strategy, it offers an opportunity to remove fuel
from shutdown reactors--places where in many cases removal of used fuel
is one of the last steps to releasing the site for other uses. There
are now twelve such sites. In addition, a consolidated interim storage
facility could enable the Federal government to begin meeting its waste
acceptance obligations sooner and ultimately reduce the government's
liabilities caused by its delay in meeting its obligations. These
liabilities are currently projected to be as much as $23 billion over
the next 50 years, assuming waste pick-up begins in 2020. Also, a
consolidated interim storage facility or facilities would provide
additional capability to receive spent fuel in emergency situations. It
would allow for repository designs for waste emplacement after a
sustained cooling period. Finally, an interim storage facility would
also support the repository by providing a buffer for disposal
operations and flexiblity for the system as a whole, even potentially
providing the capability to package waste for disposal prior to
shipment to the repository. The BRC recommended that the interim
storage facility include facilities to monitor and characterize waste
packages over time and to have or develop the capability for making
sure that the waste meets transportation criteria over time. In short,
the BRC viewed a storage strategy as important, independent of the
siting and timing of geologic repositories.
The Administration supports the development of a pilot interim
storage facility with an initial focus on accepting used nuclear fuel
from shut-down reactor sites. Acceptance of used nuclear fuel from
shut-down reactors provides a unique opportunity to build and
demonstrate the capability to safely transport and store used nuclear
fuel, and therefore to make progress on demonstrating the federal
commitment to addressing the used nuclear fuel issue. A pilot would
also build trust among stakeholders with regard to the consent-based
siting process and commitments made with a host community for the
facility itself, with jurisdictions along transportation routes, and
with communities currently hosting at-reactor storage facilities. There
are reports that a number of communities are exploring the possibility
of hosting a consolidated storage facility.
Beyond a pilot-scale facility, the Administration supports the
development of a larger consolidated interim storage facility with
greater capacity and capabilities that will provide flexibility in
operation of the transportation system and disposal facilities. A
larger-scale facility could take possession of sufficient quantities of
used nuclear fuel to make progress on the reduction of long-term
contractual liabilities, and could also accept defense wastes. In
parallel, as supported in the Administration's Strategy and recommended
by the BRC, DOE has initiated an analysis of the pros and cons of
commingling civilian and defense waste.
The rationale for deploying interim storage in no way minimizes the
need for a permanent disposal capability, and the Administration is
committed to advancing development of both interim storage and geologic
disposal facilities in parallel, even though they may become
operational at different times. The development of geologic disposal
capacity is currently the most cost-effective way of permanently
disposing of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste while
minimizing the burden on future generations. The Administration agrees
with the BRC that linkage between storage and disposal is critical to
maintaining confidence in the overall system. Therefore, efforts to
implement storage capabilities within the next 10 years will be
accompanied by actions to engage in a consent-based siting process and
initiate preliminary site investigations for a geologic repository.
No matter how many facilities or what specific form they take, a
consent-based approach to siting is critical to success. The
Administration supports working with Congress to develop a consent-
based process that is transparent, adaptive, and technically sound. The
BRC emphasized that flexibility, patience, responsiveness and a heavy
emphasis on consultation and cooperation will all be necessary in the
siting process and in all aspects of implementation. Experiences in
other countries indicate that a consent-based process--if developed
through engagement with states, tribes, local governments, key
stakeholders, and the public--can be successful. For example, Sweden
and Finland have successfully executed programs to select a site among
multiple volunteer communities. Others such as France, Switzerland, and
Canada, have programs underway that appear to be demonstrating some
success. DOE is currently evaluating critical success factors in the
siting of nuclear facilities in the U.S. and abroad to facilitate the
development of a siting process.
The Strategy highlights the need for a new waste management and
disposal organization to provide the stability, focus, and credibility
to build public trust and confidence. Again, there are multiple models
that exist along a continuum from a government program to federal
corporations--entities that report to a cabinet secretary and those
that have their own board of directors that report independently to the
President. Whatever form the new entity takes, organizational
stability, an appropriate level of autonomy, leadership continuity,
oversight and accountability, and public credibility are critical
attributes for future success. Further, the authorities and
responsibilities of the new organization are more important than the
specific form. The Administration will work with Congress to ensure
that the authorization of any new body established for this purpose
provides adequate authority and leadership as well as appropriate
oversight and controls.
The Administration also recognizes that providing predictable
funding is critical to the success of the nuclear waste mission. The
Strategy and the FY 2014 President's Budget propose a funding approach
that contains three critical elements: discretionary appropriations
within existing spending caps to pay for program management and
administrative support costs; legislative reclassification of annual
fee income from mandatory to discretionary or a direct mandatory
appropriation to make dedicated funds available in sufficient amounts
for multi-year projects and program activities without competing with
other government priorities; and eventual access to the existing
balance of the Nuclear Waste Fund in the Treasury.
Full implementation of this program will require legislation to
enable the timely deployment of the system elements noted above,
independent of the process to site storage and disposal facilities
using a consent-based approach. The Administration supports the goal of
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 recently introduced in the
Senate to establish a new, workable, long-term solution for nuclear
waste management and looks forward to working with Congress to move
forward on this important national issue. The constructive efforts and
dedication of Senators Wyden, Murkowski, Feinstein and Alexander are
deeply appreciated. In the meantime, the Administration, through the
Energy Department's Office of Nuclear Energy, is undertaking activities
consistent with existing Congressional authorizations and
appropriations to plan for the eventual transportation, storage, and
disposal of used nuclear fuel.
ongoing activities
Since the closure of the Yucca Mountain Project in 2010, the
Department of Energy has continued activities related to the management
and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste as
part of its Fuel Cycle Research and Development program. Initial
activities were outlined in DOE's Nuclear Energy Research and
Development Roadmap, sent to the Congress in 2010, and included
research into the performance of high burn-up used fuel in storage,
among other activities. The roadmap noted the establishment of the Blue
Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future and acknowledged that all
research and development activities and plans outlined would be
revisited and revised as needed to reflect the Commission's findings
and associated Administration decisions while, at the same time,
remaining consistent with existing statutes.
In December 2011, the President signed the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2012, which provided $60 million in funding for
used fuel management and disposal activities. Specifically, the Joint
Explanatory Statement accompanying the bill provided that DOE should
build upon its current knowledge base to fully understand all
repository media and storage options and their comparative advantages
and expand its capabilities for assessing issues related to storage of
spent fuel.
In its final report in January 2012, the Blue Ribbon Commission
noted the need for near-term actions that can lay the groundwork for
the next generation of nuclear waste policies and programs. For the
most part, these near-term activities identified by the BRC were
encompassed in activities already being undertaken by the Department.
It included in its recommendations:
Continuation of a research effort in used fuel and storage
system degradation phenomena, vulnerability to sabotage and
terrorism, and others.
Moving forward with geologic disposal through valuable, non-
site specific activities, including R&D on geological media,
work to design improved engineered barriers, and work on the
disposal requirements for advanced fuel cycles.
Development of a research, development, and demonstration
plan and roadmap for taking the borehole disposal concept to
the point of a licensed demonstration.
Performance of system analyses and design studies needed to
better integrate storage into the waste management system,
including standardization of dry cask storage systems and
development of a conceptual design for a flexible federal spent
fuel storage facility.
Development of a database to capture the experience and
knowledge gained from previous efforts to site nuclear waste
facilities in the United States and abroad.
Completion of policies and procedures for providing
technical assistance funds to states, tribes, and local
jurisdictions which are likely to be traversed by
transportation shipments.
The Administration's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of
Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste recognized the
ongoing research and development, analytical and planning activities
already underway and endorsed them as laying the groundwork for
implementation of the Strategy. DOE is currently undertaking activities
to address these recommendations. For example, DOE is working with
industry to conduct R&D (lab, field, and modeling) to further develop
the technical basis for continued safe storage. Specifically, a key
element of the storage R&D is to implement, on a cost-sharing basis
with industry, a full scale storage demonstration project focused on
getting field information on the long term storage of high burn-up
fuel. This demonstration project was awarded in April.
DOE is also working to analyze the characteristics of various
geologic media that are potentially appropriate for disposal of
radioactive waste. This research will help provide a sound technical
basis for a repository in various geologic media, and will help provide
confidence in whatever future decisions are made. To leverage expertise
and minimize costs, DOE is taking advantage of existing analyses
conducted by other countries that have studied similar issues.
With regard to borehole disposal, DOE is developing a draft plan
and roadmap for a deep borehole project. The project would evaluate the
safety, capacity, and feasibility of the deep borehole disposal concept
for the long-term isolation of nuclear waste. It would serve as a proof
of principle, but would not involve the disposal of actual waste. The
project would evaluate the feasibility of characterizing and
engineering deep boreholes, evaluate processes and operations for safe
waste emplacement and evaluate geologic controls over waste stability.
In FY 2012, DOE initiated system-level analyses for the overall
interface between at-reactor consolidated storage and geologic disposal
and the opportunities for use of standardized canisters, including the
development of supporting logistic simulation tools to better
understand aging of fuel and loading requirements. In addition, DOE
acquired services of the industry to develop design concepts for a
generic interim storage facility and in FY 2013 is evaluating their
submissions.
A database on experiences with siting radioactive materials
facilities both in the U.S. and abroad has been developed that will be
a public resource and will inform the planning process. A report on the
findings of the initial studies and an examination of case studies in
the database of siting experience is being prepared and will be
available this summer.
For transportation planning and engagement with stakeholders, DOE
has convened a Working Group comprised of Federal, State, and Tribal
governmental representatives to address training-related issues and
develop a revised policy for preparing public safety officials along
proposed transportation routes, as required by Section 180(c) of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The Working Group will analyze and, when
possible, make recommendations on specific issues related to Section
180(c) policy and implementation.
The Department has also initiated studies to evaluate whether
defense and commercial wastes should be ``commingled'' in a single
repository. While it has been the U.S. policy since 1985 to commingle
these wastes, the Strategy stated that the commingling of these waste
would be the subject of analysis going forward, consistent with the
urging of the BRC.
the president's fiscal year 2014 budget request
The President's FY 2014 budget request includes a multi-part
proposal to move ahead with developing the nation's used nuclear fuel
and high-level waste management system outlined in the Administration's
Strategy. First, it lays out a comprehensive funding reform proposal
that includes three elements. Ongoing discretionary appropriations
within existing funding caps are included to pay for planning,
management, and regulatory activities. . In addition, the proposal
includes reclassification of existing annual fees from mandatory to
discretionary or a direct mandatory appropriation, and eventual access
to the balance of the nuclear waste fund. Included in the amounts that
would be made available under this proposal are defense funds to pay
for the management and disposal of government-owned wastes within the
overall system. These elements, in combination with anticipated offsets
result in relatively modest pay-as-you-go cost of about $1.3 billion.
Significantly, the Administration proposes $5.6 billion in spending to
implement the Strategy over the next 10 years within the framework of
this funding proposal.
Second, for the first time, the budget baseline reflects a more
complete estimate of potential future costs of the liability associated
with continuing to pay utilities based on the Government's liability
for partially breaching its contract to dispose of used nuclear fuel.
The cost of the Government's growing liability for partial breach of
contracts with nuclear utilities is paid from the Judgment Fund of the
U.S. Government. While payments are extensively reviewed by Department
of Energy, and must be authorized by the Attorney General prior to
disbursement by the Department of the Treasury, as mandatory spending
they are not subject to Office of Management and Budget or
Congressional approval. Previously, judgments were recorded in the
budget largely after the fact, but until now the budget has included
only a partial estimate of the potential future cost of continued
insufficient action. To improve budget projections, the baseline for
the Judgment Fund in the FY 2014 budget request reflects a more
complete estimate of potential future cost of these liabilities. By
reflecting a more complete estimate of the liability payments in the
baseline, costs over the life of the nuclear waste management and
disposal program would eventually be offset (for the purposes of
scoring against the baseline) by reductions in liabilities as the
Government begins to pick up sufficient waste from commercial sites.
Third, the President's budget includes funding for the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin the review and update of
generic (non-site specific) disposal standards to help guide the siting
of used fuel and high-level waste facilities. Current EPA standards for
all sites other than Yucca Mountain are defined in 40 CFR Part 191,
``Environmental Radiation Standards for Management and Disposal of
Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes,''
and were last updated in 1993. The Administration agrees with the BRC
that generally applicable regulations are more likely to earn public
confidence than site-specific standards. In addition, having an updated
generic standard will support the efficient consideration and
examination of multiple sites.
Finally, in FY 2014, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy will support
the Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and
High-Level Waste by funding activities to lay the ground work for the
design of an integrated waste management system as well as related
research and development work. Specifically, in the used nuclear fuel
research and development area, the Department will work with industry
on conducting investigations into the extended storage of used nuclear
fuel and the transport of such fuel under a range of cask loadings. In
addition, ongoing research into alternative disposal environments,
including modeling, experiments, and field tests will be continued.
Finally, the Used Fuel Disposition program will undertake R&D
activities to further the understanding of hydro-geochemical, physical
geology, structural geology, geophysical state and engineering
properties of deep crystalline rocks for deep borehole disposal.
In the management and disposal system design area, DOE will conduct
system architecture and operating evaluations of various used fuel
management systems, including consolidated and/or regional storage
facilities, various repackaging scenarios and acceptance rates. DOE
will also update transportation and storage system models, and develop
cost databases. Further, DOE will conduct analyses for initial used
fuel shipments from shutdown reactor sites including staffing, routing,
procurement, operations, security, quality assurance, emergency
response, training, logistics, site servicing, mobilization,
operational readiness, and site servicing schedules. Work will also
continue on an evaluation of standardized containers for storage,
transportation, and potentially disposal. Outreach activities to
stakeholders on transportation planning will also continue. When the
new management organization is established in legislation, it will be
able take over many of these activities.
closing
The Administration looks forward to working with this Committee and
other Members of Congress on crafting a path forward for used nuclear
fuel and high-level waste management and disposal. This progress is
critical to assure that the benefits of nuclear power are available to
current and future generations. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
The Chairman. Dr. Moniz, thank you very much.
I think you know that the sponsors of the legislation made
the judgment right at the outset that we have to have a
permanent disposal process for nuclear waste. At the same time,
and this was reaffirmed both at Hanford and at Fukushima, our
sense was that there's going to be a lot of spent fuel and
nuclear waste that is going to continue to sit in temporary
storage for decades to come before it goes to a permanent
repository and that is the case wherever the repository is
located. The current storage pools and the tanks simply weren't
designed for long-term storage.
So what we thought to do in the bill is to create a new
program for the Federal Government to build new storage
facilities that are linked to continued progress on siting a
repository.
Do you agree with the judgment that our country needs a
Federal policy that includes both storage and disposal in a way
that makes sure that storage doesn't become the de facto
permanent solution?
Secretary Moniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
I certainly agree that, as did the Commission and does the
Administration strategy, that the parallel tracks of storage
and disposal facilities are both essential and frankly, are
both needed in a comprehensive system. I think the S. 1240 has
presented a specific and I think, again, workable approach to
this question of linkage of the two pathways.
The Chairman. Now, the Senators involved and Senator
Heinrich and others have made very constructive contributions
with respect to the debate about how tightly linked the two
programs, storage and disposal, ought to be. Now the bill, as
you know, calls for proceeding right away with storage for what
the sponsors have deemed to be priority waste. That means for
example, the spent fuel of decommissioned reactors would get
priority access for Federal storage. But under our bill not
every reactor gets priority access. Additional storage for non
priority waste is tied to progress on the permanent repository.
In your judgment and again, we appreciate we're just
talking about the concepts. Is this the right distinction to
draw? Any thoughts you have about the linkage that's been
proposed in the bill being sufficiently strong to assure
progress on the repository will proceed in parallel with
storage?
I think those two questions together.
Secretary Moniz. Yes.
So first of all, I personally agree. This was again, clear
on the Commission, that starting out with moving fuel from our
shut down reactors is something that, hopefully, we can
accomplish expeditiously. These sites really could be returned
to other uses if we could move this fuel. I think, again, S.
1240, lays out a fast track to get that pilot facility going.
I think this will also create, if done again in our consent
based approach, a lot of confidence. Again, it's moving down
the track. Then I think the bill, as you've described, then
moves into this, the linkage situation for future facilities.
Again, I think the Administration strategy is completely
consistent with that approach.
The Chairman. Your thoughts, Mr. Secretary, about the idea
of a new agency. I think it's fair to say that a fair number of
us were ambivalent about the whole proposition. Here we are in
a time of sequester. The Blue Ribbon Commission made that
recommendation. There's a little bit of an irony here.
I don't want to make you uncomfortable because you're
arriving in an agency and I don't want you to say anything bad
about your agency. But there was concern that keeping DOE in
charge of the Federal nuclear waste program was not the way to
go.
So what are your thoughts with respect to transferring the
program to a new agency and whether that kind of approach with
the independent oversight board is the right way to go?
Secretary Moniz. Again, the Administration strategy is
pretty clear in stating that we do need a new organization.
There are many organizational approaches. The S. 1240 has
certainly laid out a potentially workable solution.
But we feel, again, the keys really are the authorities
that go to this agency.
Second, something that was pointed out in the Commission's
report, but also in another report that I was part of some
years ago and this goes to Senator Murkowski's comment on
transportation, the National Academy Report on Transportation
of spent fuel and high level waste some years ago. The point
was made that this is a multi-decadal activity. It draws upon,
ultimately the waste fund, for example. We feel that a
dedicated organization that manages all aspects of the back end
is the right way to go.
The Chairman. Let me ask another question real quickly just
because of its importance to the Pacific Northwest.
As you know, Mr. Secretary, today Defense and civilian
high-level waste are stored separately. But the plan is to
dispose of them in the same repository. The proposed
repository, Yucca, was not designed to be big enough to dispose
of all the civilian spent fuel, much less the tens of thousands
of canisters of high-level waste expected to be produced at
Hanford and other Department of Energy sites.
On the other hand in his testimony today, Mr. Fertel, from
the Nuclear Energy Institute, suggests that spent fuel from the
Navy and the Department of Energy could be stored in the same
consolidated storage facilities as commercial spent fuel.
The bill would allow you, as Energy Secretary, to revisit
the way in which Defense and civilian wastes are stored and
disposed.
Would you agree that it is time to take another look at
this issue, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Moniz. I certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
Again, the outcome of a study is different from doing the
study. I agree with Mr. Fertel that technically these wastes
could be combined.
However, there may be advantages to not having them
combined certainly since the decision was made to comingle
there have been quite a few changes such as agreements. I note
with Idaho, for example, in terms of moving spent fuel and
waste with somewhat different conditions, Defense waste with
different conditions.
Second, I would note that it is true that there are
differences in how spent fuel and waste are packaged. There are
differences in that the much of the Defense waste came from so
called low burn up activity versus the higher burn ups in
commercial fuel.
So I think the issue is to study this. I will say that we
have launched that study. Hopefully sometime this fall we'll be
able to come back with how we balance the various factors.
The Chairman. That would be very helpful to be able to get
that this fall. We do intend to consult with Mr. Fertel and the
Institute and others and that would be part of the debate.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you've answered so many of these questions
that are, kind of, key to the construct of this legislation.
One of the things that we were wrestling with for quite
some time was this issue of the linkage. You've addressed that
with the Chairman here. But as we have built this bill, we have
a 10-year window effectively to get a storage facility up and
running. There's some discussion, I use the word aggressive in
my opening statement.
Do you believe that given the priority given to the
stranded fuel that 10 years is enough time, sufficient time, to
get a storage facility up and operating given the
infrastructure needs that we have?
Secretary Moniz. I do believe it is quite feasible. It's
aggressive, but quite feasible.
But of course, this will depend upon having the statutory
authorities available soon, hopefully this year or next year at
the outside.
That would allow us then to be very active. We, I should
say, we, DOE, or of course, in all cases potentially the new
nuclear waste agency, if those responsibilities novate. But to
really go out there and help support communities, who may want
to come forward in this consent based process and provide them
the technical assistance that they will need to go to the next
step.
Then, as you quoted earlier, our program estimates that to
actually then establish the first pilot interim storage
facility could be a 6-year project.
So I think if we all take our steps smartly, I think we
could do it in 10 years.
Senator Murkowski. As you point out our legislation is
neutral as to the site location for the facilities or for the
repositories. Is it your belief that given what we currently
have with our used nuclear fuel and what we will anticipate in
the future, that we will need more than one repository?
Secretary Moniz. Clearly if we look at the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act guidance of 70,000 metric tons. We will definitely
need the capacity for more than that.
Now clearly a lot of this will depend upon the trajectory
of nuclear power. But our view is that we should certainly be
enabling, at least, a future in which nuclear power may grow
substantially. If that happens I would guess we will almost
certainly need more than one repository.
As I said, it will depend upon the arrangements worked out
with the communities who come forward in terms of how many
there will be.
But if nuclear power grows to a level, even if maintaining
market share of 20 percent would almost certainly, I think,
drive us to more than one repository.
Senator Murkowski. Now when I made comment about the
transportation aspect of how we're dealing with our nuclear
waste, you were, kind of, nodding your head in agreement.
Secretary Moniz. Mm-hmm.
Senator Murkowski. So you would not disagree with the
numbers that I have outlined in terms of the numbers of years,
a multiyear process, to really get us to the place where we can
even move these casks to storage.
Secretary Moniz. Yes, it will take a quite a while to get
going certainly for a full bore program.
I believe you quoted the NEI number for the number of
movements that we've had so far in this country, several
thousand. I might also add and this goes back, I'm relying on
my memory from the National Academy report on transportation a
few years ago.
But if one looks at Europe there have been, roughly
speaking, as many movements of spent fuel as there will be in
the entire campaign of moving all the spent fuel we currently
have. That's had a very good safety record.
So I think there's a lot of evidence for being able to
manage this transportation program. Clearly, it's got to be
timed very, very carefully. There are issues of truck versus
rail there. But it's a big logistical enterprise. It will take
some time. It will take a dedicated organization, I think, to
manage that.
Senator Murkowski. Let me ask you one more then. This
speaks really to, I think, the future development and growth of
the nuclear industry within this country resolving the back end
of the nuclear fuel cycle and other nuclear related endeavors.
If we can get this resolved how do you see new development of
new nuclear plants moving forward?
Most particularly, the small modular reactors which many of
us are very interested in trying to advance.
Secretary Moniz. I think quite clearly, we need to solve
the back end to have any form of nuclear power going forward.
Small modular reactors will need storage and geologic
repository just as our current reactors do. They may have
different fuel forms depending upon their design. But we will
certainly need this back end resolved, for sure.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member
Murkowski for holding this hearing today.
First let me say I agree, we need to move forward on
nuclear waste in this country. At the same time I think we also
need to make sure that this legislation doesn't just lead to
short term progress but will get us all the way through to a
geologic, operating geologic repository for permanent disposal.
I hope we can work together to make sure that this legislation
will get us there.
I have a few concerns. I want to outline those.
One is that we're setting up a process potentially where
the interim storage facility could end up being permanent
because we don't have a clear link between creating temporary
storage and eventually siting a repository for spent fuel and
high level waste.
The other concern I have is that instead of focusing on
interim solutions, the legislation should assure that future
Congresses and future Administrations sustain the political
will and the financial will for the next 30 or 40 years that is
going to be required to open a geologic repository.
The BRC was clear. Communities must have confidence that
this time the government will actually meet its commitments to
dispose of waste in a geologic repository. I agree with that
conclusion. Certainly look forward to working with members of
the committee to achieve that goal.
So that leads me to my first question, Secretary Moniz.
Your written testimony says that you agree that linkage
between storage and disposal is critical to maintaining
confidence in the system. The Commission's final report
actually said quote, ``A program to establish consolidated
storage will succeed only in the context of a parallel disposal
program that is effective, focused and making discernible
progress.''
What in practical and specific terms did you and the
Commission mean by establishing positive linkages between
building storage facilities and opening the permanent geologic
repositories we're talking about?
Secretary Moniz. In the Commission context I would say--and
it's very similar to the strategy of the Administration--the
feeling is that first of all some communities may, of course,
come forward with the idea of having both storage and
repositories, others only storage or only repository.
For those coming forward for a storage facility the view
was simply that there has to be confidence that there's going
to be a pathway to geologic disposal. So quite simply that's
what's needed.
I think then we do believe that the initial storage
facilities can be established more rapidly, realistically, from
where we are today. The Administration plan lays out timelines.
So it's very important that as we move out that we have an
aggressive program for moving out on the repositories at the
same time as storage is being implemented.
That will require looking at different kinds of geologies,
characterizing potential sites, working with communities
intervally and flexibly.
Senator Heinrich. But how would you describe that linkage
because given the fact that we've spent 30 years and gone
through this with Yucca Mountain. My concern is that there may
be communities that may be interested in a storage facility but
not a permanent repository.
Secretary Moniz. Mm-hmm.
Senator Heinrich. If we move so aggressively forward on
storage and we don't address the steps needed to get to a
permanent geological repository those communities could end up
being de facto permanent storage. That, I believe, is someplace
we shouldn't be going.
So, how do we make sure that these things are sequential
and that there is a direct linkage that gives confidence to
those communities that temporary storage is not going to become
permanent storage rather than permanent disposal?
Secretary Moniz. Again, I think the issue is establishing
that program and funding it well moving out. Again, I would say
in S. 1240 there is this issue of tying the commitment of
resources to repositories for going forward with additional
storage. So I think we have to hold to that.
I think we need to have an aggressive program on
repositories. Also I might say this is something again, that
the Commission emphasized. We also should take a new look at
things like deep bore holes as a different kind of geological
isolation medium.
So I think we really just have to pick up the game and look
at these geological isolation issues aggressively. I do want to
repeat a statement made in the Commission's report. That is
that there is fundamentally a view in the scientific community
that long term geological isolation is sound.
We have to implement the programs appropriately.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Secretary.
Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
It seems very fitting that our next Senator in order of
appearance is Senator Alexander. I'm not going to put any words
in anybody's mouth and let Senator Alexander make his points.
But I think Senators know that this issue of linkage is one
that has consumed as much discussion as perhaps any other. It
obviously will be one we'll continue to have.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to continue with Senator Heinrich asked an excellent
question and one I hope we'll continue to discuss.
I want to thank you and Senator Murkowski, Senator
Feinstein and the Secretary for helping with the bill.
Mr. Secretary, I learned a lesson as Governor. We were
stuck on locating a prison. Nobody could locate one. I changed
it around. Said, OK, let's have a competition.
We were able to locate 3 in the next 5 years because we
weren't forcing it down the throat of a community. We were
saying if you want one, come apply for it and tell us under
what conditions you'll take the prison.
Now am I correct that as you read this legislation a new
long-term repository could only be located with the consent of
the State?
Secretary Moniz. Correct. We believe it's got to be both
local and State.
Senator Alexander. Consent.
Local and State.
That was----
Secretary Moniz. Tribal if appropriate.
Senator Alexander. It would be appropriate to say, I think,
that that was a main thrust of the bipartisan commission.
Secretary Moniz. In my view, that was the most important
recommendation of the bipartisan commission.
Senator Alexander. It's a part of the Administration's
strategy?
Secretary Moniz. Correct.
Senator Alexander. So that means if New Mexico or Oregon or
Alaska or Tennessee don't want one of these repositories, we
won't--or Nevada.
[Laughter.]
Senator Alexander. We won't have one.
Is that correct?
Secretary Moniz. Under this that's what consent based
means.
[Laughter.]
Senator Alexander. Now going to Senator Heinrich's
excellent question about linkages. As I understand your answer
to Senator Wyden, you said that the so called linkage along
parallel tracks. The idea that we would be going to a
repository long term and the consolidationsite, short term
would go along parallel tracks. But they need to be linked and
that the language in this legislation, in your opinion, was
sufficient minimum linkage.
Is that correct?
Secretary Moniz. Yes. As I said I think it's quite
workable.
Senator Alexander. But would you not agree that it is only
minimum linkage. Let's say that a New Mexico or Nevada or
Tennessee community wants a short term consolidationsite. But
we don't want it to turn into the next Yucca Mountain.
We can negotiate our own linkage, can't we?
Secretary Moniz. Sure.
Senator Alexander. I mean, we can come to the Department of
Energy and say in order to make sure that our short term site
doesn't become a repository we won't take it unless we
negotiate with the Federal Government these additional
requirements.
Secretary Moniz. Yes. The Administration strategy includes
the idea that we need to retain the flexibility for how linkage
is implemented in individual proposals.
Senator Alexander. So the Governor or the community might
create its own linkage which might be in addition to the
minimum linkage provided.
Secretary Moniz. That's all in a negotiation and consent
based process.
Senator Alexander. Let me shift gears a little bit to what
would happen if we don't have nuclear power. As I understand it
about half our nuclear capacity, the licenses on the plants end
in 2038. You understand that?
Secretary Moniz. That's of course, the 40-year licenses and
the 20-year extensions.
Senator Alexander. The combination would be about half our
capacity unless renewed.
Secretary Moniz. Correct.
Senator Alexander. Would be gone in 2038.
Secretary Moniz. Sure.
Senator Alexander. I understand that's about 20 percent of
our electricity production in the United States?
Secretary Moniz. Almost. Yes.
Senator Alexander. About 60 percent of our carbon free
electricity?
Secretary Moniz. Agreed.
Senator Alexander. I know you're concerned about the effect
of carbon production on climate change. What would be the
effect if in 2038 suddenly half our nuclear capacity was gone?
What would be the consequences to the United States?
Secretary Moniz. Again, my commitment is to a low carbon
economy.
Senator Alexander. Right.
Secretary Moniz. We do have multiple technologies, nuclear,
carbon capture and sequestration, potentially at large scale
and of course, renewables. In my view it's all of the above.
Senator Alexander. But nuclear is a base load.
Secretary Moniz. The job is much harder if we don't have
all----
Senator Alexander. The major base load are coal, gas and
nuclear, correct?
Secretary Moniz. Correct, and hydro in certain parts of the
country.
Senator Alexander. Hydro is 6 or 7 percent of the total.
But it would be substantial problem, would it not?
Secretary Moniz. Yes.
Senator Alexander. Would it not be both in terms of our
capacity to have clean, cheap electricity in the United States
if that did happen. If we do not solve this problem of where to
put used nuclear fuel we run the risk, do we not, of not being
able to build new nuclear plants.
Secretary Moniz. Yes. In particular, of course, different
State laws have issues with regard to so called waste
confidence rulings, etcetera. So it would certainly be a major
complication.
Senator Alexander. Right.
So and my last question is something you said. But one way
to say it is this, would you agree--well you said this and that
the legal capacity for Yucca Mountain is 70,000 metric tons.
Even if it were to be over the most eloquent and vigorous
opposition of my friend from Nevada, if for some reason we're
going to be filled up with all of the commercial used nuclear
fuel we have today. It would be about full. So we would
therefore need, at least, one more new repository.
Is that not what you said?
Secretary Moniz. With the assumption that the current
plants are going to run their lifetimes.
Senator Alexander. Yes.
Secretary Moniz. We are going to be way over 70,000 metric
tons.
Senator Alexander. So it would be fair to say that whether
you're for Yucca Mountain or against Yucca Mountain that one
could be for a bill, one should be for a bill that finds some
reasonable way to create new repositories and new consolidated
sites on a parallel track as long as they're consent based and
can't be crammed down the throat of a host community or State
which is perfectly free to negotiate its own linkage to make
sure that doesn't happen.
Secretary Moniz. That is core of the Administration
position and of S. 1240 as well.
Senator Alexander. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Franken.
Senator Franken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
In my State this issue directly affects Prairie Island
Indian Community. Some members live within or just 600 yards
from where the fuel is, the spent fuel sits in dry casks.
They'd like to see this removed. It's not the best use of land.
It was never intended for long term storage.
So I support the long term solution of this problem. I have
a number of questions.
You talk about in the end a repository or multiple
repositories for disposal. What is the distinction between
storage and disposal in terms of, I guess, disposal is a
permanent solution, but is it just storage in a permanent
repository? Is that what we're talking about? Is that disposal
versus storage?
Secretary Moniz. Of course, yes. I mean the difference
clearly is being 1,000 feet below ground for disposal.
Senator Franken. So how many----
Secretary Moniz. I think the assumption has always been,
but again this is a question of design of the next
repositories. It's something that has always been that there
would be a period of retrievability from an underground storage
site or disposal site and that ultimately upon monitoring,
etcetera, this would be a policy decision to be made later.
One could, in effect, assume like it's kind of closed up.
Whereas storage, we're talking about above ground, typically
dry cask storage in appropriate containers.
Senator Franken. How many geological formations are
candidates for this around the country? I mean, in other words
are we looking at a, you know, just a whole bevy of these or is
this, I mean, what are we looking at?
Secretary Moniz. In the original studies of the National
Academy going back decades there were multiple geologies
proposed. If you look at Europe where they're moving forward,
it's in hard rock. In Scandinavia it's in clay.
In France, granites, salts, multiple geological----
Senator Franken. It's almost an embarrassment of riches in
terms of things----
Secretary Moniz. There has to be specific site
investigation and understanding of groundwater movements,
etcetera.
Senator Franken. Yes, and consent.
Secretary Moniz. Yes. Yes, and incentives.
Senator Franken. That too.
In terms of transporting waste you talked about how Europe
does it. So then what do they do? Do they do it by rail mainly
or by truck or how?
Secretary Moniz. There's quite a bit of rail. In fact the
Academy report several years ago recommended going toward rail
as a principal mode. But clearly it has to be multimodal. You
would certainly need some trucks, some barges. It's that system
design that we need.
The Nuclear Energy Office at DOE has launched a number of
transportation studies over these last years. But once we get
to this stage, in some years, of major movements it will
require substantial planning and systems integration.
Senator Franken. Which would come first the choice of the
sites or the transportation, you know the basic----
Secretary Moniz. For example.
Senator Franken. Kinds of plants.
Secretary Moniz. If one starts with the so called pilot
facility, let's say a facility scaled to accept the spent fuel
from the 12 or so shut down reactor sites. It's a relatively
small amount. I would assume that rail would be the main mode,
at least in that initial phase.
Senator Franken. In the experience of Europe have there
been any incidents? Have there been any problems?
Secretary Moniz. I am not aware of there having been any
major incidents at all. I admit I'm out of date on that because
I was on that committee quite a few years ago and I haven't
really examined it.
But I'd be happy to get back to you on that.
Senator Franken. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), since 1971 there
have been over 7,000 shipments of used nuclear fuel transported in
Europe, totaling approximately 81,500 metric tons (MT). About half of
this inventory has been shipped from European reactors to reprocessing
facilities at La Hague, France. Another 30,000 MT were shipped within
the United Kingdom to the reprocessing facility at Sellafield, England.
Also included in the total are more than 7,000 MT shipped to La Hague
and Sellafield from Japan. In addition, Sweden has shipped 4,500 MT by
vessel to its centralized storage facility, and continues to make 80 or
more shipments per year. TN International, the AREVA subsidiary
responsible for shipping used fuel, reports that over 200 shipments per
year to La Hague are occurring from 58 reactors in France and others
throughout Europe. These shipments have been made using rail, truck,
ship, and combinations thereof.
WNA states that these shipments occurred ``over many million
kilometres with no property damage or personal injury, no breach of
containment, and very low dose rate to the personnel involved.''
Traffic accidents and incidents involving used fuel shipments have
occurred, as they have in the United States, but none resulted in any
release of the cask contents.
There have been a small number of incidents where loaded casks were
found to have surface contamination levels in excess of the regulatory
limits. A recent incident involved a cask of used fuel leaving the
Blayais nuclear power plant in France in December 2011, when a survey
conducted during transfer of the cask from a truck to a railcar near
the plant detected radiation levels above allowable limits. A formal
investigation found that ``the event had no real consequences to the
personnel, the environment or the safety of the installation.'' This
finding is consistent with other investigations involving surface-
contaminated casks that found no harmful radiological consequences.
Sources
Autorite de Surete Nucleaire (France's nuclear safety
authority), Experience Feedback on Transport of Radioactive
Material in France, 2012
National Academies Press, Going the Distance: the Safe
Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive
Waste in the United States, 2006
Catherine Shelton, TN International, A Unique, Proven Used
Fuel Transportation Experience (presentation to DOE's Office of
Nuclear Energy, May 29, 2013)
World Nuclear Association, Transport of Nuclear Materials,
July 2011
Senator Franken. I'll bet you if there had been a major
incident, you would be aware of it.
Secretary Moniz. Actually Mr. Fertel of the next panel
might have the answer.
Senator Franken. OK. OK. Thank you very much.
Yeah, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Franken.
Our next Senator is Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Moniz, thank you for coming today. You and I had
a lengthy discussion about the state of the law when you came
to see me.
Secretary Moniz. Mm-hmm.
Senator Risch. Regarding the fact that we have a law that
clearly designates where the permanent storage is, your staff
called my office just recently in preparation for this hearing
asking whether I was the one that you had the discussion with.
So I'm assuming you've had some time to think about this.
As you know when we talked I'm troubled by the fact that we
have, we're a Nation of laws. Whether we agree with the law or
not when a law is passed that's pretty much the way it is.
The executive branch has commanded to execute the laws that
by our Constitution is commanded to execute the laws that the
legislature passes. The executive branch indeed has commanded
to obey court orders when a court orders something.
What we have here is a situation where we have a law that
identifies Yucca Mountain for what it is. Whether you agree or
disagree it is the law. But yet for some reason nobody seems to
care.
I mean, for instance the Commission on which you served was
designated to do something other than what the law indicated.
But in any event we go around the world criticizing other
countries who don't obey their own laws that they're not
nations of laws. We have this law.
So with all due respect to my good friend from Nevada, we
have this law. I've read the report. The report is, as you
suggest, or we're waiting for a stampede of people to show up
and volunteer to have this storage facility in their State.
So far the crowd hasn't shown up. Indeed I'm not aware of
anybody who has shown up and raised their hand and said this is
what we want.
So where do we go if indeed no one does step up?
Secretary Moniz. First of all we expect that there will be
a number of communities coming forward with interest. It is----
Senator Risch. Have you had any inquiries?
Secretary Moniz. We are not at a position where we can
enter into that level of discussion. But there have been----
Senator Risch. Has anybody even suggested that maybe they'd
be interested?
Secretary Moniz. Absolutely.
Senator Risch. Who would that be?
Secretary Moniz. I really cannot discuss that. I think the
communities would have to speak for themselves.
Senator Risch. I'm not asking the communities. You're here.
Secretary Moniz. Yes.
Senator Risch. Who has contacted you?
That's not classified information.
Secretary Moniz. No one has contacted me personally.
Senator Risch. Alright.
Secretary Moniz. I would say----
Senator Risch. What states were you referring to when you
gave that answer?
Secretary Moniz. I really am, Senator, with all due
respect, I really cannot go there. Let's say there are media
reports in which a number of communities have expressed
interest.
Senator Risch. Can you recite the media reports then for
us.
Secretary Moniz. I believe there was one recently in
Mississippi, for example, that expressed interest.
Senator Risch. How many of those have you seen?
Media reports with people expressing interest?
Secretary Moniz. I would say published media reports, small
number. I would be hard pressed to remember which ones they
were.
Senator Risch. Small being in the low single digits?
Secretary Moniz. Single digits, yes. Yes.
Senator Risch. Alright. Let's go back to my question.
Suppose we don't get this consensus within a State where
the legislature or the Governor or the locals, everybody is on
board. Suppose that doesn't happen. Where do we go?
Secretary Moniz. Of course for the moment we have, what I
consider to be an unsatisfactory situation in terms of spent
fuel being stored in many, many locations. That's not been
suggested as unsafe, but it's not a very good way to run the
business.
Senator Risch. I think everyone agrees with you.
But the question is what's the alternative?
I read the report. I read that you're hoping you're going
to get this interest in this and people coming forward. You
know where I'm headed here.
I mean, we've got a law. At what point in time do we say,
OK, there's nobody of interest. We're going to go back to the
law.
When do we do that?
Secretary Moniz. First of all as you are quite aware there
is litigation going on right now in which we, the Department of
Energy, are not a party to that litigation. When that is
resolved we will see what the directives are and go from there.
But again, as we have seen by experience in the last 20
years, it's not workable without State consent. There are many
things that need to be done by the Congress and by the State to
make it work. Let's face it the default option is a highly
distributed storage.
Senator Risch. That is your default.
Secretary Moniz. It's not my default. That is the ground
truth.
That is the ground truth.
Senator Risch. That is the default option.
Secretary Moniz. That is the ground truth.
Senator Risch. At what point do we say, OK we're there.
This is the ground truth that's now coming into play or is that
where we are now?
Secretary Moniz. What I'm certainly hoping about is that we
have the authorities from Congress, as in S. 1240, to move
forward with this consent based approach to pursue the parallel
tracks of storage and disposal. This is a system which I think
has an excellent chance of, certainly a much better chance for
sure, than our current prescriptive approach.
Senator Risch. I appreciate your optimism. Of course
everyone wishes you well in that regard. But the question I
have again is at what point are we through with searching for a
single permanent storage facility?
Secretary Moniz. We will start the process of establishing
the new system once we have the authorities from Congress.
Senator Risch. OK.
What do you thinking that once you start? Ten years?
Fifteen years? Twenty years?
Secretary Moniz. As we've said, I'm optimistic. It's a hard
push. But I think within 10 years we could have a first storage
facility operating.
Senator Risch. My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Risch, thank you. We're going to
continue this discussion, you know, obviously. It seems to me
if you can't find a volunteer it stays where it is. I think
we'd all say that's unacceptable.
As of today the best people in the country, the people who
are most knowledgeable about these issues believe that we can
have a consent-driven approach. So I think this debate is going
to continue. I think your question is a valid one.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, we all hope you're right. As
you know, Idaho has an agreement with the Department of Energy
as a given date on which the material has to be moved. That's
why I'm very interested in seeing that the date is reached
because it can't stay where it is in Idaho per the agreement
between the State of Idaho and the Federal Government.
The Chairman. Having it not stay where it is, I think, is
something that we'll have widespread support. So we will
continue this and I thank you.
Senator Barrasso is next.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome back.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso. I'd like to discuss the impact of this
legislation, if enacted, what it would have on Yucca Mountain.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires the Department of
Energy to take Title II, collect and dispose of our Nation's
spent nuclear fuel. Federal law designates Yucca Mountain as
the site for permanent geologic repository. The American people
have spent about $15 billion developing a primary repository at
Yucca.
The 2010 Department of Energy tried to withdraw its license
application for Yucca pending at the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. NRC's review of this license application is now
subject to a lawsuit before a Federal court.
We're now considering a bill which would transfer many of
the Department's nuclear waste management responsibilities to a
new agency and terminate the Department's remaining nuclear
waste management responsibilities. So I'm concerned about the
effect that this bill might have on the Department's license
application for Yucca Mountain.
So the question is if Congress passes this bill what would
be the impact on the Department of Energy's license application
for Yucca Mountain and the NRC's review of that application?
Secretary Moniz. Senator, clearly as you've said, the
litigation is ongoing. We don't know the results. Certainly,
again, as I've said to Senator Risch before, we believe in
following the law.
That judgment, when it comes, if it directs the NRC to
resume the license review, all I can say is the Department of
Energy will do what it is called upon to do, subject to having
the funds, of course, to do it. So we'll go forward with that
if that's what the court rules.
Senator Barrasso. Are you saying that then the
Administration wouldn't argue that the bill has an impact on
the NRC's review of the Yucca license?
Secretary Moniz. I guess personally I don't see any strong
connection there. As I've said and others have said, the Blue
Ribbon Commission has said, we need a system, first of all,
that has storage and repositories in parallel. We need them
both for a system that has the appropriate flexibility and also
it's a system which, in our view, can accelerate waste
acceptance.
So we need that in any case.
Senator Barrasso. So could I ask about a consent based
process for siting of permanent repository for nuclear waste?
The bill requires the Federal Government obtain the consent
of the local community and the State prior to selecting a site
for the repository. This requirement is consistent with the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's
Nuclear Future. You served on the Commission, very familiar
with the report issued in 2012.
In that report the Commission explained that other country,
I think such as Sweden, have been able to select a site for a
permanent repository by obtaining the consent of the local
community.
There's plenty of evidence to suggest that local
communities throughout the country may be willing to host a
repository. There's Nye County in Nevada continues to support a
repository at Yucca Mountain. But I find little evidence to
suggest that states would consent to host a repository.
So the Commission's report references though the waste
isolation pilot plan in New Mexico. But however I understand
this facility stores low radioactivity waste not high level.
So, you know, kind of following on Senator Risch's question.
What, if any, evidence suggests that a State government
would consent to host a permanent repository for high level
waste?
Secretary Moniz. I think we have to go out and ask for
proposals.
Senator Barrasso. Start a competition like Senator
Alexander.
Secretary Moniz. Start a competition.
Senator Barrasso. The bill before us establishes a new
Federal agency called the Nuclear Waste Administration.
The bill would transfer many of the DOE's nuclear waste
management responsibilities to this new agency.
The Nuclear Waste Administration would be led by an
administrator appointed by the President, confirmed by the
Senate, 6 year term.
The bill would authorize the administrator to spend funds
collected from ratepayers to establish interim storage
facilities and a permanent repository without further
appropriation from Congress.
So I understand the purpose of establishing a new agency is
to ensure that the entity responsible for this nuclear waste
management would be insulated from political pressure from the
White House and from Congress.
To me it's unclear why we need to establish another Federal
bureaucracy and one subject to less accountability.
The bill requires the Federal Government to obtain the
consent of the local community and the State prior to siting
interim storage facilities and a permanent repository.
So if the local communities and states truly support the
siting process why do we need to reduce oversight of nuclear
waste management?
Secretary Moniz. Certainly the intent of the Administration
strategy is not to reduce oversight at all. It's just providing
oversight from Congress and others with a new entity. I mean,
any agency of the government has oversight. This one is
organized in a somewhat different way.
Furthermore the Administration has said in its strategy
that it could be quite flexible in terms of how an organization
is set up. But the Commission and the Administration's strategy
both feel that certainly a new organization is needed to
provide continuity, to have the authorities, for example, of
accessing the funds when they are needed.
So again, it's really a question of the authorities that
are vested in this organization. As I stressed in my opening
statement, has the appropriate, in italics, autonomy in order
to do its job.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
Senator Heller is next.
Senator Heller. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thanks for holding
this hearing.
Secretary, thanks for being here.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you.
Senator Heller. Certainly appreciate and it's good to see
you again. Obviously you and I have had this same conversation
when you came to my office. We'll continue, I'm sure, in the
future as we move on.
I am concerned that the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of
2013, of which we're talking about today, doesn't completely
take Yucca Mountain off the table. I am pleased that we are
discussing legislation that recognizes the need for realistic
solutions. I appreciate your candor and your optimism that we
can get there in the foreseeable future.
As you know Nevada is home to the proposed Yucca Mountain
nuclear waste repository. I have long had serious concerns, as
others in our delegation, including Senator Reid, our House
members about the safety of Yucca Mountain, the suitability of
Southern Nevada as the final resting place for these spent
nuclear material.
The amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1987
legally compelled Nevada, a State without any nuclear power
plants, to bear the sole burden of long term storage of the
Nation's nuclear waste. So with the stroke of a pen, objective
evaluation of Yucca Mountain, at that point ceased.
Many people here know that I don't trust the IRS. I don't
trust CSNA. I certainly don't trust the Federal Government to
appropriately manage a repository at this site.
So I hope that my position is clear.
The Chairman. It is.
[Laughter.]
Senator Heller. Thank you.
But I would like to shift the discussion briefly.
That is, as you know, the Department of Energy and the
State of Nevada have been discussing shipments of nuclear waste
from Oak Ridge, Tennessee to the Nevada test site. What I'm
concerned about any plan to bring nuclear waste to Nevada,
continued to be concerned about the reclassification of waste
for DOE's convenience. I believe that that's the motivating
factor here.
So my concern is that DOE wants a partner in the State of
Nevada on activities at the test site then we need DOE to act
like a partner. Let me explain what I mean by that, Mr.
Secretary.
That is we need, I believe the DOE needs to be more
responsible and more responsive to the Governor of the State,
Governor Sandoval. I was disappointed that he had to put in
repeated requests to discuss this particular issue with you.
But I am grateful that that conversation did finally take place
and that I hope that there are many more in the future.
Do you recall that conversation that you had with the
Governor?
Secretary Moniz. I certainly do, Senator. I would like to
clarify something for the record.
After the Governor's first letter the Deputy Secretary met
with him, there were considerable staff discussions. Then we
had a conversation directly. We're also trying to meet in
Nevada in August, although our schedules don't look like
they're matching up very well.
But we will get together in August or September.
Senator Heller. OK.
Secretary Moniz. But I do want to emphasize the Deputy
Secretary met with him in that intervening period.
Senator Heller. I appreciate the clarification on that. I
was unaware of that.
I think this discussion or this conversation that we had--
well, before I go there. Give me your insight on how that
conversation went with the Governor.
Secretary Moniz. I believe he called it frank and
straightforward. We want to work with the State and with the
Governor, with the delegation, on this and all other issues.
Obviously we have a lot of joint equities between the
Department and the State.
Senator Heller. Sure. Sure.
Secretary Moniz. Point out that there were long discussions
held. Many memos signed on specifically this particular low
level waste movement.
The Department agreed to special activities for the
disposal.
The Department agreed to do something unprecedented to move
this in secure transports.
So we are trying to work out an agreement to allow us to
move forward.
We've been encouraged. I mean, there's activity going on in
terms of appropriate State officials looking at the test site.
I believe going to go to Oak Ridge to look at the materials
directly.
So we are working together to try to get clarification on
all of these issues.
Senator Heller. I think the way he finally put it, we agree
to disagree.
What did you disagree on?
Secretary Moniz. The issue was one of the extent to which
we had the agreement of the State organizations, the State
government agency, for this transport. We frankly, and I
explained to the Governor that, you know, the exchange of memos
was saying this works with our special precautions. That
allowed us to stage the work in Oak Ridge in a certain
direction.
The delay now is costing us quite a bit of money.
Senator Heller. OK.
What I want to get out of this, Mr. Chairman, if I just can
be brief is a commitment that you'll work with our Governor and
have continued conversations. I think transparency in this
process, critically important for people in the State of Nevada
and frankly for everybody here that's asking questions and
those in the audience.
Secretary Moniz. Right.
Senator Heller. So if I can just get that commitment from
you that we can address these issues of transportation,
transparency.
Secretary Moniz. Yes.
Senator Heller. Collaboration.
Secretary Moniz. You have the commitment. He has the
commitment. Also, I might say, it was raised where there's a
discussion about potentially setting up, kind of, an ongoing
working group.
Senator Heller. Good.
Secretary Moniz. To make sure there's not miscommunication.
Senator Heller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heller.
Senator Murkowski made some important points about
transportation as well, so point well taken.
Senator Scott is next.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Moniz.
Secretary Moniz. Senator.
Senator Scott. Congratulations on becoming the Secretary or
condolences which one does it feel like so far?
[Laughter.]
Senator Scott. Don't answer that question.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Moniz. We will some other time.
Senator Scott. My concerns with this legislation are less
about the content, though I am a bit concerned about the
creating a new Federal bureaucracy, and more about why Congress
is allowing DOE to continue to break the law of the land, as we
know it today.
The law is very clear. Our Nation's spent nuclear fuel and
Defense waste should be deposited, disposed, at Yucca.
Unfortunately ignoring or failing to enforce laws that happen
to be politically inconvenient is becoming a regular occurrence
with the Obama Administration, even with laws they passed as we
have seen recently with the delay of the employer mandate on
Obama Care.
The lack of commitment by the Obama Administration to the
law and the international agreement is also true of the MOX
facility at the Savannah River site. This Administration has
abandoned its commitment to the people of South Carolina and
not only will it ultimately cost the taxpayers more money,
perhaps about a billion dollars more, but this August hundreds
of hard working South Carolinians could lose their jobs because
of decisions by the Obama Administration.
There is simply no excuse for this Administration to back
track on their commitments for political reasons whether it's
MOX, Yucca Mountain or Obama Care. I understand that some might
find Yucca to be political inconvenient, but that doesn't
really matter. It's still the law of the land.
The nuclear industry, like any other industry, needs
certainty. They need Yucca Mountain. What good are laws passed
by Congress if for any reason we can decide to enforce or not
enforce them?
What good are laws like Obama Care that the employer
mandate continues to be pushed back which perhaps sounds good
for a little while. But in the end it causes consternation and
lacks certainty.
The same is true in the nuclear footprint. We continue to
find ourselves finding ways out of the laws of the land as
opposed to the enforcement of the laws of the land. Apparently
our friends in the House, who just voted 335 to 81, to maintain
$25 million dedicated to restarting the review and construction
of Yucca Mountain would agree with this position.
My question for you, Dr. Moniz, are numerous. But we have
submitted these questions before on April 18, the Deputy
Secretary Poneman. But we haven't had any answers in about 4
months. We're still waiting for those answers to those
questions.
I have a question for you, sir.
I'd love for you to spend some time at the Savannah River
site. I know you've been there before.
Secretary Moniz. Mm-hmm.
Senator Scott. I'd love for you to commit to coming back
and perhaps touring it with me or coming back at some time in
the very near future so that we can take a look at the MOX
facility.
Look at the fact that we're between 50 to 60 percent
finished with the construction.
Take a look at the fact that there really are no other
options for us to honor the agreement to dispose of that 34
tons of nuclear waste.
Let's take our weapons grade nuclear waste.
I think if we were in a position to take a serious look at
the footprint. I understand the challenges that we face on the
site. The progress that we've made on the site. The ability for
the MOX facility to be that place where the agreement comes to
life in a place where the law of the land continues to be
honored. The place where the taxpayers don't foot a bill in
excess of $1 billion because the Administration changes its
direction, it would be a positive sign for you to be there.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you, Senator.
First of all let me say we will look into this question of
the unanswered questions for the Deputy Secretary. We'll look
into that and get back to you.
Senator Scott. That would be great.
[The information referred to follows:]
Responses of Hon. Ernest J. Moniz to Questions From Senator Scott
plutonium disposition
Question 1. How can the Administration reconcile a ``slowdown'' to
the program that could ultimately kill the MOX project, and
simultaneously pledge to uphold our agreement with the Russians?
Answer. The United States remains committed to achieving the
important nonproliferation mission associated with the disposition of
excess weapon-grade plutonium and to our agreement with Russia.
However, considering the unanticipated cost increases associated with
the MOX fuel approach and the current budget environment, the
Administration is conducting an analysis to determine whether there are
options to complete the mission more efficiently.
mox project
Question 2. How much will the slowdown of the MOX project affect
its cost and schedule?
Answer. As mentioned in response to your first question, the United
States remains committed to achieving the important nonproliferation
mission associated with the disposition of excess weapon-grade
plutonium and to our agreement with Russia. However, considering the
unanticipated cost increases associated with the MOX fuel approach and
the current budget environment, the Administration is conducting an
analysis to determine whether there are options to complete the mission
more efficiently. Cost and schedule impacts will be a central component
in determining next steps for fulfilling our plutonium disposition
commitments.
Question 3. What are NNSA's estimates on how much it would cost to
shut down the MOX project?
Answer. NNSA does not have a current estimate of the cost to
shutdown the MOX project.
Question 4. How much is the study expected to cost and where will
the money come from--NNSA, NE, EM or elsewhere?
Answer. The Administration is conducting an analysis of plutonium
disposition options, which is being funded primarily through NNSA.
Question 5. When is the study expected to be completed?
Answer. The Department intends to use the analysis in order to
inform the FY 2015 budget.
Question 6. What are the other alternatives and are they consistent
with the US-Russia agreement?
Answer. The analysis includes continuing the current path of
disposing of plutonium as MOX fuel as well as other technically and
financially feasible options. The U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement (PMDA) allows for other disposition paths if
agreed to by both parties.
Question 7. Will the US-Russia Agreement have to be amended if the
Obama Administration shuts down the MOX project to use an alternative?
Answer. The United States remains committed to achieving the
important nonproliferation mission associated with the disposition of
excess weapon-grade plutonium and to our agreement with Russia. The
U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA)
allows for other disposition paths if agreed to by both parties.
Question 8. What assurance do we have that Russia will be amenable
to something other the MOX process?
Answer. The U.S. will continue to engage Russia while conducting
the options analysis and will work to continue progress in implementing
the PMDA.
Question 9. What national security assessments will be made if the
MOX project is ultimately shut down?
Answer. The Department has not cancelled the MOX project, and we
cannot prejudge the outcome of the options analysis.
Question 10. What options have been previously reviewed and
eliminated and what has changed since the time of those studies that
these same options should be considered again? What new serious options
exist today that have not already been evaluated?
Answer. As previously mentioned, the United States remains
committed to achieving the important nonproliferation mission
associated with the disposition of excess weapon-grade plutonium and to
our agreement with Russia. However, considering the unanticipated cost
increases associated with the MOX fuel approach and the current budget
environment, the Administration is conducting an analysis to determine
whether there are options to complete the mission more efficiently. The
options include continuing the current path of disposing of plutonium
as MOX fuel as well as other technically and financially feasible
options. Previous reviews of the Administration's plutonium disposition
strategy will be taken into account in this new analysis. Some options
are being analyzed that have been considered in the past; however, the
new analysis will take into consideration new data and changes in the
operating plans of DOE facilities.
Question 11. How does the Administration intend to comply with the
agreement with the State of South Carolina for the permanent
disposition or removal of plutonium in the state?
Answer. The Department understands our commitments under current
legislation, and we will look to ensure compliance with the law as we
analyze plutonium disposition options.
Question 12. What will be the costs of complying with the agreement
with the State of South Carolina and of non-compliance?
Answer. Beginning in 2016, current law stipulates ``economic
assistance'' in the form of fines and penalties of $1 million per day
up to $100 million per year, subject to appropriations.
Question 13. Does the Administration have a contingency for the
removal of all the plutonium in the state of South Carolina?
Answer. The Department understands the provisions of current law,
and we will look to ensure compliance with the law as we analyze
options.
Question 14. If the MOX project is cancelled, will NNSA remove the
plutonium from SRS, and if so, to where? How much will it cost to
package, transport, safeguard and store this sensitive material?
Answer. The Department understands the provisions of the current
law, and we will evaluate the costs associated with meeting
requirements as the path forward is determined.
Question 15. If the plutonium storage facilities at Pantex are
getting full, or, as the DOE IG found earlier this year may not be able
to safely hold plutonium for much longer due to the age and condition
of the storage bunkers, what is NNSA's plan for the plutonium at SRS
and Pantex?
Answer. Although aged, the storage facilities at Pantex are safe
and continue to be maintained by NNSA as mission critical assets.
Additionally, a recent DOE IG study focused its concerns on bunkers
which comprise a portion of the facilities used for plutonium storage
at Pantex. As part of ongoing efforts to develop NNSA's plutonium
strategy, we are evaluating effective ways to safely store plutonium.
Question 16. How many taxpayer dollars have been spent to date on
DOE's rulemaking regarding set-top box energy conservation
requirements?
Answer. To date, DOE has spent a total of approximately $2.9
million in contract funding and approximately $300,000 on Federal
salary and benefits on the development of energy conservation standards
and test procedure development for set-top boxes. This includes the
development of the test procedure that is used to measure the energy
efficiency of the set-top boxes. These test procedures are necessary as
a foundation to both voluntary and regulatory programs.
Question 17. How many taxpayer dollars does DOE anticipate spending
during the lifecycle of this rulemaking process?
Answer. A typical energy conservation standards rulemaking takes
about 3 years to accomplish and costs approximately $3 to $5 million to
complete, depending on the complexity of the rulemaking being
performed. DOE is still early in the rulemaking process for set-top
boxes, and acknowledges that funding of the process is subject to
annual appropriations.
Question 18. Has DOE contracted any of this rulemaking out to third
parties? How much has been spent on the contractors?
Answer. Yes, DOE has contracted approximately $2.9 million for
energy conservation standards analysis and test procedure development
for set-top boxes to date. The analysis was provided to industry and
others and supported the voluntary agreement discussion. Test procedure
development and finalization is necessary for both voluntary agreements
and mandatory regulations. Contractors represent one way for DOE to
access the expertise it needs to advance a rulemaking for the timeframe
DOE requires that expertise.
Question 19. In terms of carbon dioxide emissions savings, what
percentage of the United States' total carbon dioxide emissions do you
anticipate DOE's set-top box energy conservation standards will save?
Answer. DOE has not proposed an energy conservation standard for
set-top boxes, so it is not yet possible to estimate the carbon dioxide
savings that could occur from an energy conservation standard at this
time. If DOE were to propose an energy conservation standard, the
proposed rulemaking would include an estimate of the potential carbon
dioxide savings.
Overall appliance and equipment standards are saving consumers
significant amounts on their energy bills and helping avoid significant
emissions of carbon dioxide. Based on a recent study by Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory\1\, Federal energy conservation standards
promulgated through 2011 saved consumers an estimated $42 billion on
their utility bills and carbon emissions reductions attributed to the
standards were realized at 176 million metric tons in 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Energy and Economic
Impacts of U.S. Federal Energy and Water Conservation Standards Adopted
From 1987 Through 2011 , http://ees.lbl.gov/pub/energy-and-economic-
impacts-us-federal-energy-and-water-conservation-standards-adopted-
1987-0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 20. What percentage of total global carbon dioxide
emissions do you anticipate DOE's set-top box energy conservation
standards will save?
Answer. DOE has not proposed an energy conservation standard for
set-top boxes. If DOE were to propose an energy conservation standard,
the proposed rulemaking would include an estimate of the potential
carbon dioxide savings.
Question 21. If industry is willing to achieve the same cost and
energy savings throughout a voluntary agreement, is it still DOE's
intention to proceed with a federal rulemaking process?
Answer. DOE strongly encourages and will consider any non-
regulatory agreement as an alternative to a regulatory standard. DOE
recognizes that voluntary or other non-regulatory efforts by
manufacturers, utilities, and other interested parties can result in
substantial improvements to energy efficiency or reductions in energy
consumption. In fact, as part of its rulemaking activities to consider
a regulatory efficiency standard, DOE prepares a regulatory impact
analysis. The regulatory impact analysis evaluates non-regulatory
alternatives to standards, in terms of their ability to achieve
significant energy savings at a reasonable cost, and compares the
effectiveness of each one to the effectiveness of the proposed
standards.
Question 22. Considering the American taxpayers are funding this
federal rule making process, how do additional layers of government
red-tape ultimately benefit the taxpayers considering the industry has
agreed to set-top box energy efficiency standards at no cost to the
taxpayer?
Answer. DOE's statutory requirement is to maximize energy
efficiency that is technologically feasible and economically justified
(42 USC 6295 (o) (2)). DOE's appliance standards program ensures that
taxpayers are receiving cost-effective energy savings as justified by a
thorough analysis of alternatives to determine which option conforms to
this statutory requirement.
DOE's appliance and equipment standards program seeks to deliver
significant benefits to consumers across the country across a wide
variety of products. Overall appliance and equipment standards are
saving consumers significant amounts on their energy bills and helping
avoid significant emissions of carbon dioxide. Based on a recent study
by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory\2\, Federal energy
conservation standards promulgated through 2011 saved consumers an
estimated $42 billion on their utility bills and carbon emissions
reductions attributed to the standards were realized at 176 million
metric tons in 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Energy and Economic
Impacts of U.S. Federal Energy and Water Conservation Standards Adopted
From 1987 Through 2011 , http://ees.lbl.gov/pub/energy-and-economic-
impacts-us-federal-energy-and-water-conservation-standards-adopted-
1987-0
Secretary Moniz. Second, of course, I want to emphasize the
Administration and the Department of Energy, I personally,
definitely, are committed to the law. With regard to the Yucca
Mountain license, as we have discussed already, there's
litigation going on with the NRC and until that is resolved the
path forward is unclear there.
I do want to emphasize that, and this is what underpins the
strong consent based approach embodied in the Blue Ribbon
Commission report, the Administration strategy and S. 1240, all
of the above, the fact is without both Federal and State laws
and permitting being aligned, we just cannot move forward.
So there are many issues.
With regard to MOX, I think as you're aware, in fact I had
a team at Savannah River when you were visiting it, recently.
Senator Scott. Yes.
Secretary Moniz. We have put a very high level team,
working very hard with the contractors trying to understand
their cost structure, why their costs went up so much. We are
looking at alternatives. We are committed to disposing of the
34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium.
So we will be doing that. But the cost escalation just
called for a re-examination of where we stand. Again, I would
say, the contractors, CBI and AREVA are being very forthcoming
in our discussions now, including, by the way, some management
changes they have made in the project since we started our
review.
Senator Scott. As relates to the questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Scott. About the questions I'm happy to provide
those questions for you so you can take them with you.
Secretary Moniz. OK.
Senator Scott. The second part is that I think it's really
important for us to, once again, highlight the fact that the
taxpayers are on the hook to the State of South Carolina for at
least a million dollars a day, up to $100 million for the delay
of the completion of this project. Frankly, other than the MOX
facility, the ability to dispose of the weapons grade plutonium
any other way and meet the agreement, as we discussed when you
were going through the process of being nominated, doesn't
exist. Classification doesn't get us there.
For us to have a strategic retreat would still cost the
taxpayers another billion dollars. So moving forward as we
uncover and understand perhaps the delays, the construction
costs, it would be an important part of the equation but moving
forward, we should.
Secretary Moniz. Sir, let me say first of all the
invitation to go to Savannah River. It's one that I intend to
take up. I think to make it productive we're waiting to get
through this review period so we know where things stand.
Second, obviously I'm aware of the issues in terms of
penalties, in terms of the plutonium that's been moved into
South Carolina. Let me say again, as with other of our sites,
we very much appreciate the long collaboration that we've had
with Savannah River, for sure.
Third, the whole point of our review--and I might say, I
think as you are aware, we are concerned about certainly
maintaining the skill base. We did have a reprogramming just
about 2 weeks ago to help protect that skill base at the site.
The point of the review, ultimately, is to make sure we are
doing the best for the taxpayer in disposing of those 34 tons
of plutonium.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
holding this hearing and trying to get a bipartisan approach on
this with the Ranking Member, Senator Murkowski.
I appreciate your focus both on civilian and Defense waste.
I think you mentioned something earlier, before I got here. We
were at a Commerce Committee markup and about this very issue
as it related to your legislation.
So I think your legislation takes an important step forward
in calling out Defense waste. I think it should go a little
further that Defense is not an afterthought. That we don't go
through this whole process again with the Blue Ribbon Committee
approach of dialoging and then come to the end and it's kind of
a footnote. We need this to be a central part of the
discussion. So that's what I would be looking for in
legislation.
People know that Hanford in Washington State continues to
make progress on an incredibly complex and costly endeavor.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary for visiting that site. But we need an
end point and a place for the recovered high level waste to go.
To me, it's unacceptable to our State, my constituents, to
think that Hanford is just going to end up being that
repository for that vast amount of high level Defense waste.
So earlier this year DOE determined that 6 of the single
shell waste tanks at Hanford are leaking radioactive, hazardous
materials into the ground. So I'm not telling you anything you
don't know, Mr. Secretary. But to me, establishing a disposal
site to isolate the high level Defense waste is the best, most
comprehensive, cost effective way to deal with the immediate
problem of a plan for the high level waste out of these tanks
and to have that comprehensive plan and make sure that we have
revisited this issue of comingling and come to a decision.
Hopefully then have this plan for Defense waste updated every 5
years so that we've addressed this problem.
So first, I guess my question is do you think our Nation
should have an explicit plan on dealing with the Defense waste?
How do we make sure that it doesn't get lost in the debate this
time around?
Secretary Moniz. Senator Cantwell, I certainly agree that
we need a plan for high level waste. I think we will have a
plan for high level waste. The question of comingling or not
comingling, as the approach, is one that we are studying right
now as recommended by the Commission and by the Administration
strategy. Specifically I would say endorsed by S. 1240.
So we really think it's an important study to do. We expect
to have results for you in the fall on that.
Senator Cantwell. That would explicitly re-evaluate whether
separating them is the right?
Secretary Moniz. It would look at all the factors involved
in terms of comingling or not.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Secretary Moniz. Recognizing that there are somewhat
different waste forms, but technically they could be stored
together. There's many factors. We are bringing all those
together in an ongoing study.
Senator Cantwell. I appreciate that before you said that a
relook was necessary. I, you know, since your Hanford visit and
you see the urgency.
Secretary Moniz. Mm-hmm.
Senator Cantwell. Having a plan that's cohesive with the
Defense waste that is going to be, you know, processed then a
place for storage. Those are real near term dates.
Secretary Moniz. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. Would you agree a great challenge to us,
as opposed to the commercial issues, which are longer and
separate, can be separate issues.
Secretary Moniz. They, yes.
Senator Cantwell. As it relates to the science and storage.
Secretary Moniz. Look, we're very, very committed to the
high level waste movement, as well as the spent fuel. At
Hanford there we have every intention of--there's both the
things in the future like the WTP waste that will be made into
glass. There's also other things like K-Basin fuel that's been
repackaged currently on the Central Plateau.
So we need to have a place to move all of this. Again, we
will come back with the results of our comingling study
probably in a couple months.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Secretary Moniz. Two, 3 months.
Senator Cantwell. Again, Mr. Chairman, this will be a key
sticking point for me on this legislation. But I really
appreciate you and Senator Murkowski's leadership on a
bipartisan effort.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
As you know I feel very strongly that the area you're
discussing, particularly with respect to Defense and civilian
waste, is a crucial one. We'll be working very closely with you
on----
Secretary Moniz. Mr. Chairman.
May I just make an editorial remark?
The Chairman. Editorial remarks? You have license for
editorializing.
Secretary Moniz. OK. I just wanted to say this is a little
bit off topic, but with both of you here. I just wanted to say
that my trip to Hanford was very interesting in seeing all the
challenges that we have.
I wanted to just add that not having been there, you know,
in quite a few years, at least not with the vision of someone
at Department of Energy. I was very impressed with the amount
of progress that was made as well at the site since that last
time.
I think that sometimes we lose sight of that fact and at
being able to have renewed access to a large part of the
Columbia River that goes through the site in 2015 and 2016. I
mean, it's really encouraging.
So I think this in no way minimizing the huge challenge
that we still have, but I do want to say that I was impressed
as well by the progress. The plutonium finishing plant is well
along in being removed and the new ground water pumping program
for chromium. I thought it was actually also uplifting, at
least in those ways.
Senator Cantwell. Yes, I know my time is expired, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Senator Cantwell. But I would just say, thank you for those
comments.
But I think and that begets the point that as we debate
this commercial issue we are going to make progress. DOE is
going to hold them accountable to this timeline. Then we're
going to be sitting there with all of this waste in need of a
repository that could be answered and dealt with just as we
have isolated these various projects around the country and
made progress or the sites within Hanford and made progress.
DOE could make significant progress on Defense waste with a
plan.
Thank you.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Nuclear waste legislation always passes unanimously.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. You could see that again today. But I think
you've been very, very constructive. We appreciate it. Suffice
it to say, we couldn't have gotten to this day where we
actually had a bipartisan bill, in my view, had we not had your
good counsel.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you so much.
The Chairman. So we'll excuse you at this time. I know
we'll be talking again very soon. Thank you.
Secretary Moniz. Thank you. Thank you, all.
The Chairman. Our next panel.
The Honorable Sally Young Jameson, Maryland Delegate,
National Conference of State Legislatures.
The Honorable David Boyd, National Committee on
Electricity--the Committee on Electricity for the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.
Mr. Marvin Fertel, President, Chief Executive Officer of
the Nuclear Energy Institute.
Mr. David Lochbaum, Director Nuclear Safety for the Union
of Concerned Scientists.
The Honorable Joe Garcia, Vice President, Southwest Area,
National Congress of American Indians.
The Honorable Chuck Smith, Vice Chair of the Energy
Communities Alliance.
Mr. Geoffrey H. Fettus, Senior Attorney for NRDC, the
Natural Resources Defense Council.
If you all would come forward.
Thank you all for your patience and for coming. We're going
to make your prepared remarks a part of the hearing record in
their entirety. I know there is always a compulsion to simply
start reading. We'll make your prepared remarks a part of the
hearing record in their entirety and if you could just take a
few minutes and talk to us and summarize your views that would
be helpful.
Ms. Jameson, welcome.
STATEMENT OF SALLY YOUNG JAMESON, DELEGATE TO THE MARYLAND
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, CHAIR, NUCLEAR LEGISLATIVE WORKING GROUP,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
Ms. Jameson. Good afternoon everyone.
Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski and distinguished
members of the committee, I am Sally Young Jameson, a member of
the Maryland House of Delegates as well as a member of the
National Conference of State Legislatures, Executive Committee,
and I also Chair NCSL's nuclear legislative working group. I
appear before you today on behalf of NCSL which is a bipartisan
organization representing the 50 State legislatures and the
legislation--legislatures of our Nation's commonwealths,
territories, possessions and the District of Columbia.
Mr. Chairman, we want to thank you for the opportunity to
testify. I would respectfully request that a copy of NCSL's
radioactive waste policy directive be submitted for the record
as you mentioned earlier.
The Chairman. Without objection, it's ordered.
Ms. Jameson. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, NCSL applauds your continued efforts, as well
as the efforts of Senator Murkowski, Feinstein and Alexander,
to develop bipartisan legislation needed to establish a program
to manage the Nation's spent nuclear fuel and high level
radioactive waste. The release of the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013 represents a good step forward in
this conversation. NCSL urges Congress to move expeditiously to
review and act on this legislation while taking into account
the proposals contained herein.
With regard to the potential siting of a repository or
interim storage facility, NCSL recognizes the need to develop
processes that are efficient and effective in order to enable a
constructive environment for these efforts. However, efforts to
streamline this process do not necessitate overlooking the role
of State legislatures in the process. In order to ensure that
such a decision accurately reflects appropriate levels of State
consensus, State legislatures and not just the State's
Governor, must be consulted regularly.
Ensuring such consultation respects the traditional role of
State legislatures in the appropriation of funds and performing
program oversight.
One option to consider would be to add the phrase,
presiding officer of each legislative chamber,'' to all
references to the Governor or the duly authorized official of
the State when mentioned with regards to site selection, study
and siting for both the repository and storage facility
processes. This would make it consistent with the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, section 117 which clearly states that the
Department of Energy shall consult and cooperate with the
Governor and legislature of such State.
NCSL supports the creation of a public/private partnership
to manage the back end of the fuel cycle as was recommended by
the final report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's
Nuclear Future rather than the establishment of a new Federal
agency as described in the bill. Given the importance placed on
State, local and tribal consultation in the bill, the committee
should consider adding such representation to the oversight
board and other advisory committees.
NCSL supports your efforts to direct annual funding within
the Nuclear Waste Administration Working Capital Fund and the
Nuclear Waste Fund for their intended purpose of managing
radioactive waste ensuring that the funds not be subject to
non-related, Federal discretionary spending. These funds should
be used for developing permanent disposal and consolidated
interim storage facilities as well as for the use of financing
mechanisms and incentives to host voluntary communities.
NCSL supports the bill's language that provides for
advanced notification to State, through which transportation of
spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste will take
place. Additionally State, local and tribal governments should
be involved in a meaningful manner with regard to the
development and implementation of transportation quality
assurance measures including radiation, emissions standards and
transportation equipment.
I would like to take just a moment and remove my NCSL hat.
The Chairman. We're just a little short of time, Ma'am
because you're over and we've got so many other witnesses.
Ms. Jameson. I'm sorry.
The Chairman. So if you could summarize, we will make
your--for all of you, every word will be a part of the
permanent record.
Ms. Jameson. I would just like to say that as a legislator
with a nuclear power plant, Calvert Cliffs, is in my region. I
just want you to know how important it is that we have a
national repository. We have over 72 modules of nuclear waste
already stored onsite. There's 60 more to be, you know, also
added.
We want to see that waste removed from our community. Our
constituents really would like to see the U.S. Government
fulfill its promise to its people.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jameson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sally Jameson, Delegate to the Maryland House of
Delegates, Chair, Nuclear Legislative Working Group, National
Conference of State Legislatures
developing a solution
Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski and distinguished members
of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, I am Sally
Jameson, member of the Maryland House of Delegates, as well as a member
of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) Executive
Committee and Chair of NCSL's Nuclear Legislative Working Group. I
appear before you today on behalf of NCSL, a bi-partisan organization
representing the 50 state legislatures and the legislatures of our
nation's commonwealths, territories, possessions and the District of
Columbia. We thank you for the opportunity to testify and inform you
and the other members of the committee about NCSL's work on nuclear
energy issues facing the nation including waste disposition and
storage.
Mr. Chairman, NCSL applauds your continued efforts as well as the
efforts of Senators Murkowski, Feinstein and Alexander to develop
bipartisan legislation needed to establish a program to manage the
nation's spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. NCSL has
long been on record in support of efforts by both Congress and the
administration, including testifying before the Blue Ribbon Commission
on America's Nuclear Future (BRC), to address the fundamental questions
necessary for developing a solution to address spent nuclear fuel
storage and high level radioactive waste management. The release of the
Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 (NWAA), represents a step
forward in this conversation, and NCSL urges Congress to move
expeditiously to review and act on this legislation, while taking into
account the proposals contained herein.
NCSL has an extensive history of working on nuclear energy issues
through its Nuclear Legislative Working Group, which is comprised of
state legislators from across the country who discuss issues
surrounding nuclear energy including the safe handling, storage and
transportation of waste. This long-standing group meets twice a year
and helps to form NCSL policy directives on this and other topics. I am
currently the chair of this working group and have valued the
opportunity to discuss these important issues with my peers from around
the country. I also have the privilege of serving on the NCSL Energy
Supply Task Force created in 2009 by the NCSL Executive Committee,
which explores current energy policies in the United States and also
makes recommendations for changes to current NCSL policy directives
related to energy issues.
NCSL recognizes that nuclear power is an integral part of a
national energy plan but also understands the need to address certain
issues including transportation, storage and disposal of used nuclear
fuel. State legislators can and do play a significant role in
developing nuclear energy policy, whether it be in statehouses across
the country, town hall meetings with our constituents or meetings with
our respective Congressional delegation.
It is critical that the Committee recognize the value of a strong
partnership with state legislators who can help move policy forward in
the states and in Congress. Together we can work on behalf of our
mutual interests and common goals. As you are aware, NCSL has several
applicable policy directives* on these topics, which have been
submitted along with my written remarks to the Committee in advance of
this hearing. NCSL's recently reauthorized Radioactive Waste Management
Policy Directive and National Energy Policy Directive serve as the
foundation for NCSL's recommendations to the committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Documents have been retained in committee files.
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consent based siting
With regard to the potential siting of a repository or interim
storage facility, NCSL recognizes the need to develop processes that
are efficient and effective in order to enable a constructive
environment for these efforts. However, efforts to streamline this
process do not necessitate overlooking the role of state legislatures
in the process. In order to ensure that such a decision accurately
reflects appropriate levels of state consensus, state legislators, and
not just a state's governor, must be consulted regularly. Ensuring such
consultation respects the traditional role of state legislatures in the
appropriation of funds and performing program oversight.
There are a number of legislative options to ensure that the
consultation process can integrate all aspects of state government and
ensure state legislative input. One option to consider would be to add
``presiding officer of each legislative chamber'' to all references to
the ``Governor or duly authorized official of the state,'' when
mentioned with regards to site selection, study and siting for both the
repository and storage facility processes. This would make it
consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 section 117, which
clearly states that the Department of Energy ``shall consult and
cooperate with the Governor and legislature of such State.'' NCSL
strongly urges this committee to ensure adherence to this requirement
as it moves forward to develop a program for the long-term treatment
and disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
nuclear waste administration
NCSL supports the creation of a public-private partnership to
manage the back end of the nuclear cycle, as was recommended by the
final report of the BRC, rather than the establishment of a new federal
agency as described in the NWAA. Additionally, NCSL would note that
given the importance placed on state, local, and tribal consultation in
the bill, the committee should consider adding such representation to
the Oversight Board and other advisory committees, as discussed in
Section 205. In order to not overburden the board structures, the
appointments could be made through the national organizations
representing state, local and tribal elected officials such as NCSL.
interim storage linkages
NCSL supports federal action to develop consolidated interim
storage facilities to temporarily house high level radioactive waste
inventories until a permanent repository is operational. With respect
to the issue of establishing a linkage between progress on development
of a repository and progress on development of a storage facility, NCSL
neither supports nor opposes such a linkage. However, NCSL does believe
that consolidated interim storage facilities should be licensed for a
specific, limited period of time not to exceed 25 years.
working capital fund
NCSL supports your efforts to direct annual funding within the
Nuclear Waste Administration Working Capital Fund and the Nuclear Waste
Fund for their intended purpose of managing radioactive wastes,
ensuring that the funds not be subject to non-related federal
discretionary spending. These funds should be isolated for developing
permanent disposal and consolidated interim storage facilities as well
as for the use of financing mechanisms and incentives to voluntary host
communities.
nuclear waste transportation
NCSL supports the bill's language that provides for advanced
notification to states through which transportation of spent nuclear
fuel and high level radioactive waste will take place. NCSL also
supports efforts to provide assistance to states from the administrator
of the Nuclear Waste Administration to train public safety officials,
acquire safety response equipment and other safety programs related to
the transportation of nuclear waste. Additionally, state, local and
tribal governments should be involved in a meaningful manner with
regard to development and implementation of transportation quality
assurance measures including radiation emissions standards, cask
designs, support facilities, and transportation equipment.
an issue close to home
I would like to take a minute and remove my NCSL hat and speak to
you as a Maryland legislator. The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,
located on the Western Shore of the Chesapeake Bay, sits just a few
miles outside of Maryland's 28th District, my home district. Calvert
Cliffs generally accounts for about one-third of the state's energy
generation, and produces enough power to light up every home and
business in Baltimore according to the Maryland Power Plant Research
Program. However, due to the lack of a national fuel repository or
interim storage site, the plant's used fuel is forced to remain on
site. The plant's independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)
currently contains 72 modules with a total of 1,920 fuel assemblies in
dry fuel storage and 1,432 fuel assemblies currently in storage in the
Spent Fuel Pool. Additionally, 24 more modules will be added later this
year and another 36 are anticipated to be added in the future. The
issue of developing a solution to the safe and secure storage of high-
level radioactive waste and used nuclear fuel is one of great
importance to both myself and my constituents.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 continues to move the
conversation on nuclear waste management issues forward and I urge
Congress to review the above proposals and act expeditiously on this
legislation. Again, thank you for the invitation to speak with you
today on these important issues. NCSL stands ready to work with this
committee to ensure that state policymakers are involved in creating a
timely, cost-effective solution to this important public policy
challenge.
The Chairman. Very good.
Mr. Garcia.
STATEMENT OF JOE GARCIA, SOUTHWEST AREA VICE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS
Mr. Garcia. Good afternoon, Honorable Chairman Wyden and
Ranking Member Murkowski and Energy committee members. Special
greetings to Senator Heinrich, but he just left, so he missed
that.
I'm Joe Garcia, Head Councilman from Ohkay Owingeh, former
president of the National Congress of American Indians and
currently serving as the NCAI Southwest Area Vice President.
The NCAI is the oldest and largest national tribal advocacy
organization in the country. On behalf of the NCAI membership
of over 250 tribes, we thank you for conducting this hearing
and inviting the NCAI to share some of the issues facing tribal
governments and communities regarding spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste storage disposal and transportation.
I fully understand this hearing is being held not as a
general overview of the nuclear waste problems existing in this
country, but about S. 1240 which addresses disposition of
commercial generated nuclear fuel. However, it is incumbent on
our organization to remind everyone of the long standing
detrimental impacts from environmental contamination and
environmental health issues that nuclear activities continue to
have on tribal lands that originated during the World War II
era.
Native peoples contributed a significant share in the war
effort as Native warriors volunteered, fought and died to
protect our homelands and this country. Tribal governments
surrendered hundreds of thousands of acres of tribal lands for
national defense purposes which were supposed to be returned to
the tribes. That has not occurred.
Additionally uranium mined and milled on tribal lands
supplied the atomic materials for research and development of
weaponry that ended the war. There are contaminated places that
require immediate mitigation.
Legacy radioactive defense waste has destroyed sacred
areas.
Stored radioisotopes are seeping into ground water.
River systems containing habitat for native fish and other
foods and medicines critical to the cultural survival of native
peoples.
The NCAI urges this committee to conduct an oversight
hearing to assess and address the myriad of issues mentioned.
Following enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, the NCAI managed a cooperative agreement with the
Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management to provide tribal governments with updates and
implementation of the act. Under the DOE the cooperative
agreement the NCAI created the National Indian Nuclear Waste
Policy Committee and coordinated numerous meetings involving
tribal government, DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
Federal emergency management officials to discuss siting and
transportation status and to relay tribal concerns.
Tribal governments varied in their view of NWPA
implementation. Many bands of Shoshone and Paiute tribes were
adamantly opposed to the siting of a permanent repository at
Yucca Mountain because the location is in the middle of their
traditional territory. Their resistance also came from being
left out of the early stages and eventual finding of no
significant impact of the environmental impact statement.
These tribes did not have the technical staff or the
resources to fund western science studies. But they are well
versed in traditional ecological knowledge. Nevertheless they
were rendered helpless by a systematic definition of ``affected
Indian tribes'' as defined in the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy
Act.
Tribes like the Prairie Island Indian Community, whose
island reservation is immediate adjacent to the Prairie Island
Nuclear Generating plant owned by Excel Energy, Inc., need to
have a repository built to lessen the risk to their tribal
communities. On Prairie Island spent nuclear fuel is stored in
above ground casks a mere 600 yards from the nearest tribal
citizen's homes and less than one mile from the Tribal Clinic
Government Offices Gaming Enterprise and other facilities.
The definition of affected Indian tribes should be amended
in both the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act to parallel the language of affected unit of
general local government section to include any Indian tribe
that are contiguous with the State or general local government
unit that has jurisdiction over the site of repository or
storage facility so that these and other similarly affected
tribes can participate fully in all activities and proceedings.
It appears I'm running out of time.
But in conclusion I would like to see that any efforts
having to do with S. 1240 that we are ensured that we have
meaningful collaboration and consultation with the tribes and
the members at large of whoever has jurisdiction. So we ensure
that this thing will happen. But it will lead to good,
successful effort from all across the land.
So we ask that of this committee. Thank you so much for
allowing NCAI to participate in this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joe Garcia, Southwest Area Vice President,
National Congress of American Indians
Honorable Chairman Wyden and Ranking Member Murkowski and Energy
Committee members:
I am Joe Garcia, Councilman from Ohkay Owingeh, and Southwest Area
Vice President for the National Congress of American Indians, the
oldest and largest national tribal advocacy organization in the
country. On behalf of the NCAI membership of over 250 tribes we thank
you for conducting this hearing and inviting the NCAI to share some of
the issues facing tribal governments and communities regarding spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste storage, disposal and
transportation.
I fully understand this hearing is being held not as a general
overview of the nuclear waste problems existing in this country, but
about S. 1240 which addresses disposition of commercial generated spent
nuclear fuel. However, it is incumbent on our organization to remind
everyone of the longstanding detrimental impacts from environmental
contamination and environmental health issues that nuclear activities
continue to have on tribal lands that originated during the World War
II era.
Native peoples contributed a significant share in the war effort as
native warriors volunteered, fought and died to protect our homelands
and this country. Tribal governments surrendered hundreds of thousands
of acres of tribal lands for national defense purposes which were
supposed to be returned to the tribes. That has not occurred.
Additionally uranium mined and milled on tribal lands supplied the
atomic materials for research and development of weaponry that ended
the war.
There are contaminated places that require immediate mitigation.
Legacy radioactive defense waste has destroyed sacred areas; stored
radioisotopes are seeping into groundwater, river systems containing
habitat for native fish and other foods and medicines critical to the
cultural survival of native peoples. The NCAI urges this committee to
conduct an oversight hearing to assess and address the myriad issues
mentioned.
Following enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the
NCAI managed a cooperative agreement with the Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to provide tribal
governments with updates on implementation of the Act. Under the DOE
cooperative agreement, the NCAI created the National Indian Nuclear
Waste Policy Committee and coordinated myriad meetings involving tribal
government, DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Federal Emergency
Management officials to discuss the siting and transportation status
and tribal concerns.
Tribal governments varied in their view of NWPA implementation.
Many bands of Shoshone and Paiute tribes were adamantly opposed to the
siting of a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain because the location
is in the middle of their traditional territory. Their resistance also
came from being left out of the early stages and eventual finding of no
significant impact of the Environmental Impact Statement. These tribes
did not have the technical staff or the resources to fund western
science studies but they are well versed in traditional ecological
knowledge. Nevertheless they were rendered helpless by the systematic
definition of ``affected Indian Tribes'' as defined in the 1982 Nuclear
Waste Policy Act.
Tribes like the Prairie Island Indian Community whose island
reservation is adjacent to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
owned by Excel Energy Incorporated, needs to have a repository built to
lessen the risk to their tribal community members which incudes tribal
government offices, tribal citizens' homes, and their gaming facility.
In the last search for an interim storage facility, Monitored
Retrieval Storage, several tribes were negotiating with the Office of
the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, the independent entity charged with this
responsibility. Five tribes and seven states had stepped forward before
the process was closed. The Skull Valley Goshute Tribe came the closest
despite some tribal community's citizens resisting the effort, however
the most damaging opposition was the state in enacting state laws and
lobby for federal legislation to derail the project.
These examples of self-determination in exercising tribal
sovereignty are intact and you will likely see a repeat of tribes
supporting and opposing in varying degrees S. 1240 implementation if it
is enacted.
It appears that recommendations from the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future are incorporated into S. 1240. One of the Blue
Ribbon Commission's Principal Findings on Siting Processes and Related
Issues states that, ````State, tribal and local and tribal officials
have primary responsibility for public safety and protection of the
environment. These officials should be fully involved in the
development of storage and transportation solutions and should be the
primary interface with their communities. Their cooperation and
involvement in past and ongoing projects has been a critical element of
success.''
S. 1240 contains provisions regarding the guidelines for the
consideration of storage facilities that call for the Administrator to
evaluate the extent that states and tribes will support the proposal.
We support this language, and encourage you to go even further in
ensuring consultation with affected tribal governments.
Section 205 of the S. 1240 would establish the Nuclear Waste
Oversight Board. Among the Board's duties is to oversee use of funds in
complying with the mission plan. The Oversight board should include
professional staff with experience in working with and for tribal
governments to ensure that there is ongoing tribal government
consultation regarding programmatic and policy development. The
professional staff should be able to assess the policy and programs
information dissemination and required consultation to fulfill trust
obligations regarding all impacts to trust lands and resources from
upon which the trust relationship is based.
One of the critical issues surrounding the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
and S. 1240 is transportation of spent nuclear fuel through state,
tribal and local jurisdictions. Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act calls for the safe and routine transportation of its
materials. Safe and routine transportation includes notice to state and
tribal governments, community and citizen public safety awareness and
radiological emergency response capability in the event of a
transportation accident.
Tribal governments have less emergency management capacity than
state counterparts due to tribal ineligibility to access the hundreds
of millions of dollars for these purposes which has been provided by
federal agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We urge that the
Committee to call upon DOE, FEMA, and the DHS to work with tribes on
potential transportation routes to assess current radiological
emergency response capability and develop programs and policies to
achieve the capability required for safe and routine transportation.
Otherwise this will be another unfunded mandate for tribal governments
which have public safety responsibility for the likelihood of triple
figure radioactive waste shipments but lack the necessary emergency
management infrastructure.
We believe tribal governments retain regulatory authority over
commercial radioactive waste shipments as they have over other
hazardous materials and are working to transportation departments with
inspection, permitting and other oversight authority. It is possible
that tribes impacted by the proposed spent nuclear fuel shipments may
seek to create and manage transportation departments to oversee
radioactive materials shipments, which is well within their rights.
However a tribal regulatory scheme also might include comity and shared
responsibilities with surrounding jurisdictions.
Last month the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its Final Rule
on Advanced Notification to Native American Tribes of Certain Shipments
of Nuclear Waste. The implementation action requires licensees to
provide advanced to federally recognized tribal governments notice of
certain shipments of irradiated reactor fuel and other nuclear wastes
that pass within or across their reservations. This rulemaking began
over 15 years ago but we believe the NRC is fulfilling its fiduciary
responsibility in following through with this Final Rule.
Our last issue, not specifically contained in S. 1240 but of equal
importance is that we need the committee's assistance to guide the DOE
to get back on track regarding its duties and responsibilities under
the DOE Indian Policy, to work on a government to government basis with
tribes regarding the overall impacts of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
and if enacted, the Nuclear Waste Administration Act.
The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy is currently funding several
interstate regional organizations to attend meetings and disseminate
information to state governments and citizens about current and
proposed radioactive waste transportation campaigns. To their benefit,
states have multiple streams of input into the process and issues.
However tribes do not have the same opportunity as the Office of
Nuclear Energy has chosen to not support an intertribal organization
for these purposes despite inquires and requests from tribal official
and the NCAI.
The absence of an entity to provide an opportunity and venue to
discuss the current status of DOE activities with tribal officials is
contradictory to the intent and purpose of the DOE Indian Policy. We
urge the Committee to inquire of the Office of Nuclear Energy their
reasons for not supporting an inter-tribal organization to serve the
tribes in the same capacity as currently funded inter-state
organizations.
As the effort to resolve accumulation of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste moves forward, we urge this committee to be mindful
of the legacy of impacts and the cost tribal governments and peoples
have borne in defense of their homelands and this country. We believe
the resolution of these problems will be beneficial to all citizens of
this country. Thank you again for the opportunity for the NCAI to share
the views of our organization and constituent tribal governments.
The Chairman. Mr. Garcia, thank you, sir.
The Honorable David Boyd.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. BOYD, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS COMMITTEE ON ELECTRICITY, VICE
CHAIR, MINNESOTA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
Mr. Boyd. Good afternoon, Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member
Murkowski and members of the committee. My name is David Boyd.
I'm a Commissioner with the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission and Chair of the Electricity Committee for the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners or
NARUC.
As economic regulators responsible for the rates paid by
commercial, industrial and residential ratepayers in the U.S.,
we have a long history and record of engagement on these
issues. In my State, Minnesota derives about 25 percent of its
electricity from 3 nuclear reactors on two sites. One that was
mentioned by the Senator and by Mr. Garcia and have contributed
approximately $750 million from those reactors to the Nuclear
Waste Fund.
While not directed included or excluded from the pending
legislation or the Blue Ribbon Commission report, NARUC's
position on the Yucca Mountain project is clearly articulated
via our numerous resolutions on the matter. As quasi judicial
bodies regulators are guided by statutes and rule on a daily
basis in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is crystal clear. Review
of the DOE license application is mandated by the law and
review of that license application must be completed.
More recently, however, we've also expressed support for
the BRC findings as outlined in a resolution from this past
February. Those recommendations in the Yucca Mountain situation
are not mutually exclusive. We believe that the two efforts can
be pursued in parallel in order to manage our Nation's used
nuclear fuel and create a sustainable program for such a
purpose.
With respect to S. 1240 we have a few observations.
But we do have concerns about liability. We feel that
requiring utilities to relinquish their rights to damages owed
in order to have access to storage facilities should not be
legislated. While this may relieve a burden on taxpayers it
improperly shifts that burden and liability to the ratepayers.
In terms of management of the program we do support moving
this program outside of the Department of Energy and feel
strongly that we must insulate the program from politics as
much as is possible.
Toward that end we prefer the single purpose, Federal
corporation model where at a minimum an entity with a board of
directors charged with selecting the corporation's chief
executive officer rather than a single administrator.
We do, very much, appreciate the changes from earlier
drafts of the bill but remained concerned that such proposed
structure would lead to an impasse like the one we have now.
Success will require clear legislative authority and
funding. We feel strongly that NARUC must be on any new boards
to represent the interest of the ratepayers.
We're pleased to see the nuclear waste fee assessments and
Defense contributions directed to the working Capital Fund of
the new entity and would suggest that interests, thrown off by
the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund and single one time
payments should be similarly directed to the working Capital
Fund. The corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund must be accessible
to this new organization. We know it's not needed now, but it
will be at some time in the future.
We could imagine phase transfers of that corpus over time
to the new entity or some other mechanism that you may decide
is reasonable and appropriate. But we feel it's important that
you clearly articulate how that fund will be available to the
new entity when it's needed.
We do support interim storage for shut down plants called
pilot storage facilities for priority waste in the bill. With
respect to additional storage facilities for non priority waste
details regarding scope, timeline and cost effectiveness remain
unsupported and unclear. Therefore the new management entity
should be directed to timely develop only those additional
storage facilities deemed necessary and cost effective
following extensive analysis and stakeholder input.
We support the consent based siting mechanism and feel that
that's a process that could be used for the second repository
as well as for interim facilities.
The Department of Energy should act now to facilitate
potential host interest. We'd emphasize the need to maintain
flexibility for potential hosts to negotiate creative and
effective solutions. The concern is that a cumbersome or
prescriptive process will actually stifle that kind of creative
dialog.
We also need to define what an enforceable agreement is as
soon as possible so that the Nation can plan for and rely on
these facilities.
Thank you for your leadership in advancing these issues. We
look forward to a continued engagement as we implement an
improved program for used nuclear fuel management. I'll gladly
attempt to answer your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boyd follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Boyd, Chairman, National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), Committee on Electricity,
Vice Chair, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
Good afternoon Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski, and
Members of the Committee. My name is David Boyd. I am a Commissioner
from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and the Chair of the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (or NARUC)
Committee on Electricity. I am honored by the invitation to appear
before you today.
NARUC was founded in 1889. Our members include utility commissions
in all fifty States, D.C., and U.S. Territories. Like Congress and this
Committee, NARUC is bipartisan. I represent a group of in-State experts
whose interests are precisely aligned with each Senator in this room.
It is unlikely any other stakeholder in this sector cares more about
the impact of the current impasse on Yucca Mountain and the continuing
build-up of waste in 33 States across the country on the citizens of
your States, than the NARUC member residing in your State. Our members
remain directly responsible for retail electricity rates and service in
each of your States.
As your States' electric utility regulators, we are intimately
aware of the rapidly accruing costs on both ratepayers and taxpayers.
Because of the program failures, your constituents, either through
electric rates or through the taxpayer-funded Judgment fund, have paid
billions for re-racking of the utility spent fuel pools to accommodate
more spent fuel, expensive on-site dry cask storage, increased security
and to characterize the Yucca Mountain repository site. And they
continue to pay.
NARUC member commissions in the 40 States served by nuclear-
generated electricity have been involved in the troubled history of
nuclear waste disposal since 1982. In the intervening thirty-plus
years, we have been an integral component of the waste disposal policy
debate, testifying frequently, engaging the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future (BRC) at multiple levels, and suing the
federal government to require compliance with the laws (i) mandating
review of the Yucca Licenses and (ii) requiring suspension of the
electric ratepayer surcharge when the government has effectively
dismantled the only currently lawful disposal alternative.
Significantly, this involvement is driven by consensus and
bipartisan advocacy resolutions passed by NARUC members. The most
recent, passed in February of this year, is appended to this testimony.
Since 1994, NARUC has passed 31 resolutions focused solely on this
issue. Since 1991, our witnesses have continually testified that ``the
government has our money--we have their waste.'' Fifteen years have
lapsed since the 1998 deadline for the Department of Energy (DOE), as
mandated by law, to accept waste. Instead of fulfilling their
obligations, the federal government has delayed and ultimately stopped
all work on the program, even though ratepayers continuing paying for a
permanent repository, taxpayers continuing paying for the DOE's
inability to dispose of the waste, and States continue storing the
government's waste. To put a finer point on it, the government now has
even more of our money and the States now have even more of their
waste.
I commend each of you for the efforts and tenacity that produced
this legislation and for holding this hearing today. Unquestionably,
some provisions of S.1240 are significant improvements over the status
quo. However, others seem problematic and could continue or even
potentially exacerbate the same problems which plague the current
management scheme. In this testimony, I will try to highlight both.
naruc principles
There are four substantive positions, which NARUC adopted in the
February 2013 resolution, that act as the foundation for my comments:
First, we have specifically urged adoption of the BRC recommendations
on the creation of a new organization outside of DOE with sole
responsibility to manage nuclear waste. Second, NARUC's member
commissioners are best positioned to protect ratepayer interests in
nuclear waste disposal issues and must be part of the board of
directors and any oversight bodies for the new entities. Third, the
federal government must improve its dismal record on waste disposal.
And, fourth, ``the Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
should comply with the law passed in 2002 approving Yucca Mountain as
the repository site by completing the licensing process.'' NARUC's
February 2013 resolution also points out that ratepayer costs for
permanent disposal should be minimized. Interim storage is not a
panacea, and should be used only where necessary and cost-effective. So
while NARUC has specifically endorsed some consolidated interim
storage, it is crucial that the amount, basis of need and duration of
such interim storage is examined and not allowed to divert or delay the
progress toward a permanent disposal site. Continued storage at
permanently shutdown plants is unacceptable because it imposes costs on
ratepayers without equivalent benefits and prohibits economic reuse of
the site, whereas, relocation and consolidation would likely reduce the
government's liability and improve security. Finally, NARUC joins with
others that urge Congress not to adopt any structure that replicates
the entire range of well-recognized problems that stymied progress on
both the Yucca Mountain license review and resulted in the wholesale
dismantling of the disposal program.
We believe your legislation is, overall, a step in the right
direction.
outstanding yucca mountain concerns
Geologic disposal is a critical element of a sustainable used
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste management program. While
not expressly reaffirming the requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (NWPA), the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 does not
preclude its long-overdue enforcement. The bill should be revised to
require action responding to the important statutory requirements to
complete the review of the still-pending license for nation's first
permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. NWPA is the law and should be
enforced. Congress should provide the appropriate funding and direction
to both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of
Energy for the completion of the NRC's review of the Yucca Mountain
license application for construction authorization. Ratepayers deserve
to know whether the billions they've invested in the Yucca Mountain
facility resulted in a safe site for the permanent disposal of high-
level radioactive waste as years of independent scientific research
indicates.
title ii--management of the nuclear waste program
In Title II, Sections 201-205, the bill sets up a new agency to
assume the responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy on siting,
licensing, construction and operation of nuclear waste facilities. An
Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and 5 member oversight board are
to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
This is an improvement over the discussion draft as S.1240 moves
the responsibility from DOE, an Executive agency, to an independent
agency and it no longer requires the appointment of three federal
officials to the Oversight Board. However, the proposed structure is
inferior to a single-purpose federal corporation. The BRC recommended a
similar approach to ensure accountability, insulate the organization
from political interference and excessive turnover, and develop and
implement a focused, integrated program. NARUC is on record
specifically endorsing the adoption of the Blue Ribbon Commission's
recommendations. As the BRC report suggests, a new management entity
should be created outside of the Department of Energy with the sole
purpose of managing the federal government's used nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste program. Key attributes of that entity
include clear legislative authority, access to needed funding, and
insulation from political interference. NARUC endorses a federal
corporation model. The structure proposed in S.1240 does not address
the political problems that plague the current management scheme--
problems that have stymied progress and wasted taxpayer and ratepayer
resources. A key aspect of this new ``gov-corp'' approach would be a
Board of Directors that included several of NARUC's members. It would
be logical to assign that Board, not the gov-corp, the responsibility
to evaluate the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund fees collected from
ratepayers.
title iii--functions
In Title III, S. 1240 outlines the functions of the new agency--
which includes in Section 303 a requirement for the Administrator to
site, construct and operate a pilot facility for storing priority
waste, one or more additional facilities for non-priority waste, and
one or more repositories. It outlines a consent-based procedure for
siting these new facilities.
NARUC is still carefully evaluating this section of the bill. In
our February resolution, we specifically endorse a consent-based
approach to siting by requesting that new legislation require, as S.
1240 does, any new waste management organization to ``engage with
States and local governments in a more collaborative manner that can be
guided by a negotiated consent agreement among the involved parties,
whether for storage or disposal facilities.''
The resolution also points out that:
[c]ontinued storage at permanently shutdown plants is
unacceptable because it imposes costs on ratepayers without
equivalent benefits and prohibits economic reuse of the site,
whereas, relocation and consolidation would likely reduce the
government's liability and improve security. The BRC report
cites a study that contends that the savings from consolidated
storage for this stranded spent fuel would be enough to pay for
the cost of the storage facility. On an interim basis, only,
pending development of full capacity of the permanent
repository, it is better to store spent fuel at one (or more)
central location(s) than to leave it at reactor sites. DOE and
the utilities should pursue any and all such possibilities with
a sense of urgency.
Laudably, this section of S.1240 recognizes the need for disposal.
However, the recognition is limited. S.1240 should provide strong
incentives for the agency to site a permanent disposal facility as soon
as possible. While providing a consent-based process for siting
additional repositories is positive, the bill's target date of December
2048 (Section 504(b)(C)) for such a repository to be operational is not
acceptable. The date is taken from the DOE Strategy's proposed
repository date. That document provides no support for this ``new''
target date--which is after all THIRTY FIVE YEARS from now. Such a
target date effectively eliminates any sense of urgency necessary to
timely compel government action. Moreover, the deadline is so distant
that potential hosts for consolidated storage facilities would be
justifiably nervous about becoming de facto permanent sites. Congress
and the Administration should instead support timely completion of the
Yucca Mountain process and call for a more reasonable (and far less
distant) date for an additional repository sited under a consent-based
approach.
title iv--funding and legal proceedings
In Title IV, Sections 401-403, the bill sets up a new Working
Capital Fund where ratepayer NWF assessments (currently about $765
million per year) are deposited and available to the agency without
further appropriation. It specifies that no fees can be paid into this
fund after December 31, 2025 unless the Administrator is operating a
nuclear waste facility by that date. The fees already collected in the
NWF (about $28.2 billion as of January 2013) remain subject to
appropriation. Significantly, the Administrator must take the costs
resulting from S.1240 into account when determining whether
insufficient or excess revenues are being collected to ensure cost
recovery.
Access to Annual Assessments
NARUC, obviously, has a strong interest in how the Nuclear Waste
Fund functions. We will have an equally strong interest in how any
Working Capital Fund will function. The federal government has
collected billions from ratepayers and in return has given them a very
expensive hole in the ground that the government is blocking any access
to. While not a perfect solution, S.1240's annual direct funding option
is a tremendous improvement over the current system. Ideally, S.1240
should assure ``full access to the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund''
limited to supporting ``achievement of repository program milestones''
without additional appropriations. However, the guarantee that the
putative entity, hopefully a gov-corp, will have access to fees on a
going-forward basis is one way around the pressures inherent in the
appropriations process. Still, this provision could be improved by also
requiring the transfer of future accrued interest on the Nuclear Waste
Fund and one time payments to the new Working Capital Fund.
Linkage to ``Nuclear Waste Facilities'' vs. a Repository
NARUC has not taken position on the specifics of any linkage
requiring action on a repository. However, the requirement to require
cut-off of assessments in 2025 is an improvement over the current
procedure. It should, however, be amended to specify a working
repository instead of just ``nuclear waste facilities.'' That would
provide strong incentives to expedite the repository siting process.
Evaluation of the Adequacy of Ratepayer Assessments
As noted earlier, the assessment of the adequacy of the fees should
be conducted by a Board that includes State commission members, not by
the Administrator. Moreover, the requirement on ratepayers to not only
fund a new agency but all the costs resulting from S.1240 is
inappropriate. For example, our February resolution specifies that:
``The DOE, not electric utility ratepayers, must be accountable for the
financial consequences of its failure to begin accepting waste in
1998.'' Section 406(b)(1)) of S.1240 requires utilities to settle
existing lawsuits against the federal government to have access to
future storage facilities. This effectively shifts the current
government liability for non-performance (via the taxpayer funded
Judgment fund) to electric ratepayers. NARUC has not endorsed and
likely will not endorse such an approach. Performance remains the key
to reducing the federal government's liability. Moreover, the
specification in Section 308(c) that the portion of the cost of
developing, constructing, and operating the repository or storage
facilities attributable to defense wastes ``shall be allocated to the
Federal Government and paid by the Federal Government into the Working
Capital Fund,'' is a welcome and necessary component of any disposal
plan.
NARUC's Resolution also specifies that the ``BRC Report
recommendations for consolidated interim storage represent a new use
for the Nuclear Waste Fund that should be authorized only after
consideration of the costs and benefits involved.'' It is far from
clear that the broad storage plans outlined in S.1240 reflect such
considerations. These interim storage costs are needed only because the
government has failed to permanently dispose waste in a working
repository. At the same time, it appears an interim storage facility to
concentrate waste currently stored at shuttered facilities may be
appropriate. The BRC report cites a study that contends the savings
from consolidated storage for this stranded spent fuel would be enough
to pay for the cost of the storage facility.
We continue to closely examine S.1240 and discuss various
provisions with other stakeholders. NARUC commends all of you for your
efforts to break the current logjam on nuclear waste policy. We will
help any way we can.
Note: Appendix A--Resolution Regarding Guiding Principles for
Management and Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste has been retained
in committee files.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Smith, we're going to welcome you.
Here's where we are.
Senator Murkowski just showed we're supposed to have 5
votes starting in about 5 minutes which would mean that we'd
have like 20 minutes to at least get everybody's testimony in.
There's 4 of you, so we ought to be able to be pretty close to
it.
If you could go maybe 4 minutes, that would be great.
Mr. Smith, we'll make your prepared remarks a part of the
record.
STATEMENT OF CHUCK SMITH, JR., COUNCIL MEMBER, AIKEN COUNTY,
SOUTH CAROLINA, VICE CHAIR, ENERGY COMMUNITIES ALLIANCE
Mr. Smith. Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
today making nuclear waste management solutions a priority
through bipartisan legislation.
I'm Chuck Smith, Council Member of Aiken County, South
Carolina and Vice Chairman of the Energy Communities Alliance,
ECA, the association of local communities that are adjacent to,
impacted by and support DOE facilities. I am testifying today
on behalf of ECA members that include local communities that
may potentially host a future consolidated storage facility or
geologic repository. ECA supports the goal of the legislation
to create a process to address nuclear waste.
As you consider this legislation ECA offers the following
recommendations.
One, local governments that are or may become host must be
included throughout the entire decisionmaking process.
No. 2, a consent agreement between the local government,
State and Federal entity must be legally enforceable and
reflect the terms and conditions under which a community will
host, agree to host, a nuclear waste facility.
On governance, local communities need to better understand
how a new comprehensive nuclear waste policy will be
implemented and by whom.
Disposition of Defense waste must be considered a priority.
Resources must be provided for educating local communities
on the technical, health and safety and other issues related to
nuclear waste.
Legislation must consider addressing impacts of
transportation on local governments.
If a site is deemed safe and suitable and certain
conditions are met several communities may be willing to host a
nuclear waste storage and disposal mission. But they must be
provided with the resources necessary to ensure their
involvement from the beginning of the decisionmaking process to
the end.
Support can only be built if a potential host community
trusts that their interests and priorities are being
meaningfully considered.
Funding is needed to develop public outreach and education
programs and ensure local communities understand the proposed
project including the potential risk and benefits.
These programs must start as early as possible in order to
determine if enough support exists for a community to
volunteer.
Our members recognize that there is no one size fit all
consent agreement. Rather the terms of the consent agreement
will be specific to each local host community and State. Local
governments are uniquely positioned to negotiate these
conditions on behalf of the impacted communities.
In regards to governance, whether the new Nuclear Waste
Administration or FedCorp is responsible for implementing the
Nuclear Waste Management program there needs to be clear
legislative authority, appropriate autonomy, oversight
mechanisms, access to required funding and transparent
decisionmaking.
ECA urges that a local government representative be
appointed to serve on the oversight board to ensure local and
community perspectives are represented.
The disposition of legacy Defense waste is a priority for
ECA. We recommend that it be addressed with more urgency. The
legislation fails to outline how or on what basis decisions
regarding Defense nuclear waste will be made. Many local
communities have become de facto storage sites for legacy
waste, some being stored in old tanks such as the one at
Hanford and Savannah River.
Defense waste is older and colder than the commercial spent
fuel. It can never be reused. It is ready to move. Failing to
prioritize this disposal keeps this waste in our communities
longer than originally planned and may adversely affect DOE's
cleanup program.
Much attention is paid to the liability associated with the
government's failure to take title to commercial spent nuclear
fuel. But the government also has an obligation to cleanup
Defense sites.
ECA recognizes the challenges associated with developing a
comprehensive nuclear waste policy. There are some outstanding
questions that need to be explored further such as what will
happen to Yucca Mountain.
Who will determine who is local in terms of affected
parties and on what basis?
Why was an independent government agency chosen rather than
a FedCorp?
We hope to work with the committee to provide input on
these issues.
In closing local communities agree that nuclear waste
management is a priority. A failure to address it increases a
risk to our communities. It also threatens our energy security,
impacts the economics of nuclear power as a viable energy
resource and limits prospects for new nuclear development in
keeping with all of the above energy strategy.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak on behalf of
our members.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. I know you
were running out of breath.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Smith. Four minutes.
[Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chuck Smith, Jr., Council Member, Aiken County,
SC, Vice Chair, Energy Communities Alliance
Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski and Members of the
Committee, I thank you for inviting me to testify on S. 1240, a bill to
establish a new organization to manage nuclear waste, provide a
consensual process for siting nuclear waste facilities, ensure adequate
funding for managing nuclear waste, and for other purposes. I am Chuck
Smith, Council Member of Aiken County, South Carolina, and Vice
Chairman of the Energy Communities Alliance (ECA), the association of
local governments and Community Reuse Organizations that are adjacent
to, impacted by, or support Department of Energy (DOE) activities. The
testimony I present to you today is on behalf of ECA's members, the
local elected and appointed officials at sites that send and receive
nuclear waste, and sites that may potentially host a future
consolidated storage facility, reprocessing facility or geologic
repository. ECA appreciates the efforts made by Chairman Wyden, and
Senators Murkowski, Feinstein and Alexander to introduce bipartisan
legislation and to make nuclear waste management a priority. ECA
supports the goal of the legislation--to create a process to address
nuclear waste.
ECA communities have been home to federally-owned and operated
nuclear facilities for over half a century. Local communities like mine
currently store high-level defense nuclear waste, and have operated on
good faith based on federal law, as codified in the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act (NWPA), that the waste would ultimately be disposed of in a
geologic repository. As hosts of DOE sites where this waste has been
produced and stored, our communities have unique health and safety
concerns. As potential hosts of future nuclear waste management and
disposal facilities, we play a critical role in mitigating concerns
through outreach and public education.
Local governments and others around ECA member sites meet together
regularly to discuss how local governments and communities can work
with each other and as partners with States and the federal government
to address the nuclear waste problem. In addition, the communities have
met with DOE and private companies to highlight key issues such as what
does consent based siting mean and what are the resources that the
communities need to be able to engage at a local and national level on
this critical issues.
As you consider this legislation, ECA offers the following
recommendations:
1. Local governments that are or may become hosts must be
included throughout the entire decision-making process.
2. A consent agreement between local government, state and a
federal entity must be legally enforceable and reflect the
terms and conditions under which a community will agree to host
a nuclear waste facility.
3. On governance, local communities need to better understand
how a new comprehensive nuclear waste policy will be
implemented and by whom.
4. Disposition of defense waste must be considered a
priority.
5. Resources must be provided for educating local communities
on the technical, health and safety and other issues related to
nuclear waste.
6. Legislation must consider and address the impacts of
transportation on local governments.
Local governments are engaged on this important issue since it
directly impacts our communities.
1. local governments that are or may become hosts must be included
throughout the entire decision-making process
ECA supports the role for local governments outlined in the
legislation specifically a consent-based siting process based on sound
science, ``meaningful collaboration with affected communities,''
flexibility, and transparency.
Several local governments have identified that, if a site is deemed
safe and suitable, and if certain conditions are met, the local
community may be willing to accept a high-level waste and used nuclear
fuel storage and/or disposal mission. The key conditions for local
governments are (1) to be involved in the entire decision-making
process and (2) to be provided with the resources necessary to ensure
local government involvement.
Local governments considering hosting nuclear waste storage and
disposal facilities need to become educated on nuclear issues. In turn,
they must also educate citizens within their communities and work with
their state governments to ensure everyone is involved in the decision.
The local community that hosts a facility should know as much as they
can about the health, safety and other issues that are inherent in
hosting a site. Support can only be built if a potential host community
understands the process, can choose independent experts to supply
scientific data, and most importantly, if they trust that their
interests, concerns and priorities are being meaningfully considered.
Once a community determines it is interested in hosting a new
facility, the local government remains responsible for outreach to the
community, as well as to state, regional and federal decision-makers.
History has shown that support will be needed at all these levels to
successfully site a new nuclear facility.
2. a consent agreement between local government, state and a federal
entity must be legally enforceable and reflect the terms and conditions
under which a community will agree to host a nuclear waste facility
ECA supports the consent-based siting process outlined in the
legislation. We agree that a successful siting process must allow ``the
affected communities to decide whether, and on what terms, the affected
communities will host a nuclear facility,'' in order to build long-
lasting support.
Our members met recently to discuss how a consent-based agreement
would be defined, concluding that there is no one-size fits all consent
agreement--rather the terms of a consent agreement will be specific to
each potential host community and State, as negotiated with the federal
government. As part of a consent agreement, ECA agrees that local
governments should broadly consider:
Financial compensation and incentives.
Economic development assistance.
Operational limitations or requirements.
Regulatory oversight authority.
ECA recommends that the strength and terms of the linkage between
storage and disposal programs should be negotiated between the federal
government, the State and the local government and included in the
consent agreement.
In addition, ECA suggests that potential hosts may want to
negotiate additional conditions to include in a consent agreement, such
as:
Amending existing compliance agreements or statutory
limitations.
An enforceable deadline for removing nuclear waste from a
storage facility.
Volume limitations.
Penalties to be incurred by the federal government and/or
State for failure to meet obligations under the consent
agreement.
Triggers for termination of the consent agreement.
Agreement of indemnification to allow local communities to
be compensated for any accidents or releases that impact their
community.
Opportunities for universities and community colleges
related to future nuclear energy missions and workforce
development.
Research and development projects in coordination with
national laboratories.
Designation of transportation routes to a storage facility
or repository.
Requiring a position on any proposed oversight board and/or
an advisory committee.
Local governments are uniquely positioned to negotiate these
conditions on behalf of the impacted community; as is a Governor for
the impacted State. If their conditions are met, a local community may
be willing to accept a High-Level Waste (HLW) and Spent Nuclear Fuel
(SNF) disposal mission.
ECA agrees that, once negotiated, the consent agreement should be
ratified by law, binding on all parties, and not amended or revoked
except by mutual agreement by the parties.
3. on governance, local communities need to better understand how a new
comprehensive nuclear waste policy will be implemented and by whom
Regardless of whether DOE, a new FedCorp, or the new Nuclear Waste
Administration outlined in this bill is responsible for implementing
the nuclear waste management program, there needs to be:
Clear legislative authority.
Appropriate autonomy.
Oversight mechanisms.
Access to required funding.
Transparent decision-making
Our members are concerned about the length of time it will take to
formally create this new entity and a new regulatory structure. For
communities currently storing nuclear waste, delays could result in
elevated risks to human health and the environment. As a result, these
communities should be given resources to mitigate impacts of storing
waste longer than expected.
In regards to the Oversight Board, ECA appreciates changes made
from the discussion draft to move from three federal officials to five
members selected through Presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation. ECA urges that a local government representative be
appointed to serve on the Oversight Board to ensure local and community
perspectives and concerns are identified and represented.
4. disposition of defense waste must be considered a priority
ECA recommends that legislation address the management and disposal
of legacy waste with more urgency. We do appreciate that the bill
differs from the discussion draft in that the Secretary of Energy will
have one rather than two years to determine whether to reevaluate the
decision to commingle defense waste from nuclear waste from civilian
nuclear power reactors; however, the legislation still fails to outline
how or when decisions regarding defense nuclear waste will be made.
Many local communities have become de facto storage sites for this
legacy waste, some being stored in old tanks such as the ones at
Hanford and Savannah River. The nation's defense waste is older and
colder than the commercial spent fuel, it has no value as it can never
be reused, and can be more easily transported to a storage or disposal
facility. Failing to prioritize its disposal increases the risk to
human health and the environment, adversely affects DOE's Office of
Environmental Management cleanup program and the costs associated with
legacy management. These local communities need to be given resources
to evaluate the impacts of keeping this waste in place for longer than
originally planned. Much attention is paid to the liabilities
associated with the government's failure to take title to commercial
SNF, but the government also has an obligation to clean up defense
sites. Further delays could violate legal commitments the federal
government has made with the State and could cause taxpayer dollars to
be spent on fines and litigation instead of invested in cleanup.
5. resources must be provided for educating local communities on the
technical, health, safety and other issues related to nuclear waste
Funding is needed to develop public outreach programs, to educate
stakeholders, government officials in county, city and town agencies,
students, employees and individuals involved with emergency response
and average citizens. Funding will also allow a community to bring in
experts it trusts and whose responsibilities are to that community.
Outreach programs will ensure local communities understand the
proposed project, the health and safety issues, the real vs. perceived
risks, and will provide awareness of potential benefits--such as job
creation or infrastructure development. Education and outreach efforts
may include: hosting meetings in the community; creating public
information campaigns; coordinating programs with local universities
and community colleges; building websites and producing written
material for distribution.
These programs must start as early as possible in order to
determine if enough support exists within a community for it to
volunteer for a nuclear waste mission.
6. legislation must consider and address the impacts of transportation
on local governments
While the bill specifically states that notification, financial and
technical assistance be provided to State and Indian tribes for
transportation planning purposes, local governments are not mentioned.
In order to maintain the strong track record that exists for
transporting nuclear waste, resources should also be provided at the
local level for training, equipment, emergency responders and public
education. This will help ensure consistency among all affected parties
as waste moves across the country.
conclusion
ECA recognizes the challenges associated with developing a nuclear
waste policy and siting waste facilities. This legislation reflects the
hard work done to address these challenges and implement the Blue
Ribbon Commission's recommendations. From the energy communities'
perspective, there are some outstanding questions that need to be
explored further, such as what will happen with Yucca Mountain? Who
will determine ``who is local'' in terms of affected parties and on
what basis? Why was an independent government agency chosen rather than
a FedCorp? What does the Committee see as the advantages? We hope to
work with the Committee and other nuclear stakeholders to provide input
on these issues.
In closing, ECA appreciates the opportunity to provide this
testimony. We applaud this Committee's work to address nuclear waste
management and implement the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission. Our members agree that nuclear waste management is a
priority, and a failure to address it increases the risks to the health
and environment of our communities. It also threatens our energy
security, impacts the economics of nuclear power as a viable energy
resource, and limits prospects for new nuclear development in keeping
with an ``all of the above'' strategy.
ECA looks forward to providing any assistance we can as your work
continues. More information about the Energy Communities Alliance can
be found at www.energyca.org.
The Chairman. I appreciate it.
Thank you also, Mr. Fertel, because I know you all have
been cooperating on the feasibility of onsite storage. We
appreciate it.
Mr. Fertel.
STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Chairman Wyden and Ranking Member
Murkowski for the opportunity to testify today.
It is industry's view that consolidated storage and a
willing host community and State is the quickest route for the
Federal Government to begin moving used fuel from commercial
and Federal sites and to reduce the taxpayer liabilities that
are estimated, as Ranking Member Murkowski said, to reach $20.8
billion by 2020. Consolidated storage is not a complete answer.
But is a prudent investment while continuing to pursue geologic
disposal and is a good contingency in case the repository
program suffers additional delays.
We're confident that a consolidated storage facility can be
operational in 10 years assuming a successful 3-year consent
based siting process.
However, in addition to consolidated storage the industry
continues to believe that consistent with existing law, the
Yucca Mountain licensing process must be completed.
I want to thank Senators Wyden, Murkowski, Feinstein and
Alexander for their effort to establish a sustainable program
under new management outside of the Department of Energy. The
industry believes that the operating characteristics of a new
management entity must closely resemble those of a corporation
rather than a Federal agency. It must come as close as possible
to the decisionmaking project management capability that is
characteristic of a corporate organization.
Congress and the Administration should retain an oversight
authority. The board of directors should be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. But the
chairman of the board should be elected by the board members.
The chief executive officer should be appointed by the
board and not subject to the political uncertainties associated
with Presidential appointments. It is also essential that the
CEO of the organization have the authority to hire his or her
senior staff and deputies rather than having them appointed by
the President.
Since this new management entity will be in existence as
long as commercial nuclear power is used in the United States
and beyond, the CEO must have flexibility to reorganize the
management structure when appropriate.
We would encourage the proposed legislation to be altered
to reflect our comments.
We agree with the comments made by Commissioner Boyd about
the importance of having access to the corpus of the Nuclear
Waste Fund as well as to move the interest and the onetime fee
into the Capital Fund.
The industry is committed to reducing the growing Federal
liability through the establishment and execution of a
sustainable program in a timely manner. However, we strongly
disagree with the legislative provision which intends to reduce
liability by requiring contract holders to settle all claims
against the United States as a condition precedent for taking
title and moving used fuel to a storage facility. This would be
a denial of a company's right under the standard contract to
have its used fuel taken unless it agreed to accept a
settlement on whatever terms the government wanted to impose.
We strongly recommend that this provision be removed from
the proposed bill.
Energy companies, their local communities and states, the
American taxpayers deserve to have confidence in a Federal
program that will meet the statutory and contractual
obligations to safely and securely accept transport, store and
ultimately dispose of used nuclear fuel and high level
radioactive waste. While the industry has and always will
manage its used nuclear fuel safely and securely, we believe
that action by Congress is necessary now to establish a
sustainable program and reduce the liabilities for the
taxpayers as soon as possible.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 is a
significant step forward. We look forward to working with the
committee and the Senators to have it come as legislation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marvin S. Fertel, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute
Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to speak today about the recently
introduced Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013. I am Marvin
Fertel, President and CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). NEI is
responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on
regulatory, financial, technical and legislative issues affecting the
industry. NEI members include all companies licensed to operate
commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant
designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities,
materials licensees, labor organizations, universities and other
organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
We welcome the Senate's leadership in addressing the federal
government's role in the safe and secure management and disposal of
commercial used nuclear fuel through this legislation. We also applaud
Senators Wyden, Murkowski, Feinstein, and Alexander for leading the
effort and for releasing a discussion draft to obtain stakeholder
comments before introducing the legislation; a process which resulted
in beneficial changes. Although the proposed legislation represents a
positive start to overhauling the federal program and incorporates some
of the stakeholder comments provided on the discussion draft,
additional enhancements should be made to ensure the creation of a
sustainable integrated program.
Over the past 70 years, applications of nuclear fission--including
research, medicine, naval propulsion and power production--have
produced immeasurable benefits for our society. They have also resulted
in a large and growing inventory of used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. The commercial nuclear industry and the federal
government have demonstrated that they can safely and securely store
used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive material. About 70,000
metric tons of uranium (MTU) of commercial used fuel is safely managed
at nuclear energy facilities, but storing the fuel on site was never
meant to be a long-term solution. By now, pursuant to the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act (NWPA), the Department of Energy (DOE) should have already
moved more than 28,000 MTU of reactor fuel from our sites and should be
moving an additional 3,000 MTU every year.
Consumers of electricity generated at nuclear energy facilities
have committed more than $35 billion since 1982 to the Nuclear Waste
Fund for the federal program that should have begun removing used fuel
from commercial nuclear power plant sites 15 years ago. The Department
of Energy continues to collect more than $750 million per year from
consumers, and the fund accrues more than $1 billion in investment
income on the remaining balance of over $28 billion. The collection of
Nuclear Waste Fund fees is ongoing, despite the fact that the
Department of Energy, without any technical basis, terminated the Yucca
Mountain repository project in 2010 and has yet to implement a new
program.
The industry and the DOE had been working for decades with
considerable success on the development of a deep geologic repository
in the United States for used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste, until the program was terminated and the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) dissolved in 2010. These decisions
were not supported by the industry and have resulted in court actions
that would have otherwise been unnecessary. The industry continues to
support the completion of the Yucca Mountain licensing process and, as
a result of the Administration's actions, the industry has filed suit
against DOE challenging the continued collection of the Nuclear Waste
Fee in the absence of a federal program. Oral arguments in the case are
scheduled for September.
the path to success
The nation would be best served by adherence to the following
principles that will ensure the establishment of a stable used nuclear
fuel management policy and program:
The United States must have a durable policy supported by a
dedicated and sustainable infrastructure to manage used nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste responsibly.
The United States must have a plan for the ultimate disposal
of the byproducts from nuclear energy.
An ideal technical solution is not required to begin
implementation of a new policy direction. Evolutionary, and
perhaps revolutionary, advances in technology improvements can
be incorporated over time without deferring decisions until
decades of research are completed.
The successes and failures of the past must be understood to
help guide future innovation, policies, and management, while
building public trust in the systems and facilities ultimately
developed.
Legislative action is needed to put such an enduring policy and
program in place. The industry supports an integrated used nuclear fuel
management strategy consisting of six basic elements:
A new management and disposal organization outside of the
Department of Energy (DOE).
Access to the Nuclear Waste Fund and annual fees for their
intended purpose, without reliance on the annual appropriations
process but with appropriate Congressional oversight.
Completion of the Yucca Mountain repository license review.
Nuclear electric consumers deserve to know whether Yucca
Mountain is a safe site for the permanent disposal of high-
level radioactive waste, as billions of dollars and years of
independent scientific research suggest.
A consolidated storage facility for used nuclear fuel and
DOE's high-level radioactive waste in a willing host community
and state and substantial progress toward developing the Yucca
Mountain site and/or a second geologic repository. A
consolidated storage facility would enable the DOE or a new
management entity to move used nuclear fuel from decommissioned
and operating plants long before a repository or recycling
facilities begin operations. Used fuel from decommissioned
commercial reactor sites without an operating reactor should
have priority when shipping commercial used fuel to the storage
facility.
Research, development and demonstration on improved or
advanced fuel-cycle technologies to close the nuclear fuel
cycle.
NRC's promulgation of a temporary storage rule and an
eventual legislative determination of waste confidence
supported by a sustainable federal program founded on the
elements above.
Since the Obama Administration suspended the NRC's review of the
Yucca Mountain repository license application in 2010, the federal
government has not had a viable used fuel management program. The
Administration's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
(BRC), established to recommend a new direction for the program,
published its final report in January 2012. Among its key
recommendations were:
A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste
management facilities.
A new organization dedicated solely to implementing the
waste management program and empowered with the authority and
resources to succeed.
Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are providing
for the purpose of nuclear waste management.
Prompt efforts to develop one or more geological disposal
facilities.
Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage
facilities.
The BRC's recommendations are generally consistent with the
industry's integrated used nuclear fuel management strategy and are
supported by the industry with the exception that the BRC did not
address the need to complete the Yucca Mountain licensing process.
In January 2013, the Obama Administration released its ``Strategy
for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste.'' This strategy is also generally consistent with
the industry strategy but is dependent upon Congress to establish
direction and create a program.
growing federal liability
Even before the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management was
closed, the urgency for DOE to fulfill its statutory and contractual
responsibilities to manage used fuel and high-level radioactive waste
was growing, as was the associated cost to the taxpayer. The DOE was
required by statute and contract to begin moving used fuel from reactor
sites in 1998. The taxpayers, through payments from the taxpayerfunded
Judgment Fund, are paying for court-awarded damages from DOE's partial
breach of its contracts with electric companies. The BRC report
estimated that the damage awards from the Judgment Fund will total
$20.8 billion if the federal government begins accepting used fuel in
2020 and may increase by as much as $500 million for each year after
2020 that DOE does not begin to accept used fuel. To date,
approximately $2 billion has already been paid in damage and settlement
awards. This expense, for which the taxpayer receives no benefit, is in
addition to monies paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund by consumers of
electricity produced from nuclear energy. Given the absence of any
federal program, it has become virtually impossible for the DOE to
begin to meet its obligation to move used fuel before 2020. The
industry is committed to reducing the growing federal liability through
the establishment of a sustainable federal program. The Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013 also recognizes the need to reduce the
federal liability as quickly as possible. However, the liability can
only be reduced through the establishment of a program and execution of
the program by the new management entity in a timely manner.
The industry disagrees with the provision in the draft legislation
which tries to reduce liability by requiring contract holders to settle
all claims against the United States as a condition precedent for
taking title to and moving used fuel to a storage facility. This forced
settlement provision should be removed from the proposed bill. The
industry has already demonstrated its commitment to negotiate
settlements in good faith. However, the effect of this provision would
be a denial of a utility's right under the Standard Contract to have
its used fuel taken by the federal government unless the utility agreed
to accept a settlement of its breach of contract claims on whatever
terms the government wanted to impose. That would effectively deprive
the utilities of their contractual rights, under which the government
is supposed to take their spent fuel in exchange for many hundreds of
millions of dollars in Nuclear Waste Fees paid to the government. A
more effective and fairer approach would be to direct the Department of
Justice to settle the breach of contract lawsuits on reasonable terms
with willing contract holders without imposing conditions on the
settlements.
a new federal used fuel management corporation is needed
A key element to the long-term success of a federal program is
establishing a new entity to assume program management responsibility
from the DOE. Industry and numerous stakeholders support the concept of
a federal corporation. The operating characteristics of a new
management entity must more closely resemble those of a corporation
with a clear mission rather than a federal agency in order to succeed.
The new management entity must come as close as possible to the
decision-making and project management capability and discipline that
is more characteristic of a corporate organization.
Similar to commercial companies, the chief executive officer of the
new management entity should be selected and appointed by a board of
directors. The board should be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate for terms that would span at least two
presidential administrations. The industry recommends that at least
three members of the board be appointed from entities that contribute
or have contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund and that at least two
members of the board be appointed from state public utility commissions
or representatives thereof. The legislation should also specify minimum
qualifications for board members and define a quorum as being simply
more than half of the standing directors. The chairman of the board
should be elected by its members. The CEO should not be subjected to
the political uncertainties associated with presidential appointments
so that he or she, while remaining accountable to the board, can focus
entirely on performing the task at hand with the requisite attention to
nuclear safety and security that is expected from all employees of a
nuclear industrial company. The instability that can be created as a
result of the political appointment process is wellillustrated by the
now-defunct Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM).
This office, whose director was appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, never realized stable long-term leadership
because of the turnover of directors associated with changes at the
White House. From 1983 to 2010, OCWRM had six appointed and confirmed
directors and nine acting directors. The incumbent director was
replaced with every new administration. It is also essential that the
CEO of the organization have the authority to hire his or her senior
staff and deputies, in consultation with the board as appropriate,
rather than having them appointed by the President. Since this new
management entity will be in existence as long as commercial nuclear
power is used in the United States, and beyond, the CEO must have the
flexibility to reorganize the management structure when appropriate,
without artificial constraints imposed by legislation.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013, as currently
structured, would not sufficiently insulate the new Nuclear Waste
Administration leadership from the political process since both the
administrator and deputy administrator would be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, as are the members
of the proposed oversight committee. Numerous studies of the management
issue have been carried out over the past decades, from the
Congressionally mandated Advisory Panel on Alternate Financing and
Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities Report in 1984 through the BRC
recommendations in 2012. The studies advocate consistently for a
management entity with a corporate structure providing continuity,
efficiency and an appropriate degree of insulation from undue political
influence.
When the new management entity is created, Congress and the
Administration should retain an oversight authority, but this role
should be structured to avoid creating an impediment to the efficient
operation of a new management entity. The Nuclear Waste Administration
Act of 2013 addresses Congressional oversight appropriately but, in one
instance, reduces this oversight compared to the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act by removing Congressional review of changes in the nuclear waste
fee. The industry recommends that Congressional oversight over the
nuclear waste fee be maintained.
direct access to sufficient funding
Enduring leadership is essential, but not sufficient in its own
right to create a successful and sustainable program. As the Nuclear
Waste Administration Act of 2013 recognizes and addresses, a new
management entity must have direct access to, and control over, the
funds necessary to implement the program. The industry and consumers
have provided and continue to provide these funds which should be
secure and available to program managers. Unfortunately, this has not
been the case. The Congressional budgeting and appropriations processes
have resulted in appropriations to OCRWM being considered in the
context of the overall DOE and federal government budget and not simply
in the context of the available funds in the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Historically, this resulted in lower appropriations than requested
which contributed to project and schedule delays. The BRC report, which
discusses the Nuclear Waste Fund in great detail, states that ``a
program that was intended to be fully self-financing now has to compete
for limited discretionary funding in the annual appropriations process,
while the contractual user fees intended to prevent this from happening
are treated just like tax revenues and used to reduce the apparent
deficit on the mandatory side of the federal budget (which deals with
expenditures and receipts that are not subject to annual
appropriations).'' Recognizing that these funds were collected with the
indisputable intention of supporting clear statutory and contractual
obligations, there is not a rational basis for considering their use
discretionary.
To avoid perpetuating the current funding limitations and
inequities, a new management entity must be given unrestricted access
to both the Nuclear Waste Fees and the Nuclear Waste Fund with
Congressional oversight of the efficient use of these funds continuing.
This will enable the new management entity to appropriately manage and
fund, without reliance on Congressional appropriations, the development
of storage and disposal facilities consistent with standard industry
practices for other large-scale nuclear safety-related projects. The
current legislation achieves this goal for the Nuclear Waste Fee
payments. The industry, though, believes that the corpus of the Nuclear
Waste Fund and its earned interest, in addition to the Nuclear Waste
Fees, also must be made available to the new management entity for its
intended purpose without being subject to competing appropriations.
This, however, could be accomplished with transfers to the new
management entity over a reasonable schedule defined within the
legislation.
geologic disposal and consolidated storage are critical
In the current fuel cycle and in all foreseeable advanced fuel
cycles, a geologic repository will be required. Pursuit of a geologic
repository and a consolidated storage facility should occur
simultaneously, as the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 would
require. A consolidated storage facility would enable the management
entity to move used nuclear fuel from shutdown and operating plants
long before a repository or recycling facilities begin operations and
is the quickest way to stem the increase in damage awards beyond the
estimated $20.8 billion through 2020.
Developing consolidated storage would be an appropriate use of
resources and a prudent financial investment that would permit the
federal government to begin meeting its obligations, limiting the
damages paid by the taxpayers, restoring faith in the federal program,
and paving the road for a repository. As the industry is well aware,
technical and political hurdles can arise which can significantly delay
a project or curtail the operation of a facility. A consolidated
storage program is a good contingency in case the repository program
suffers delays either as a result of funding issues or unforeseen
circumstances. In addition to the industry and the BRC, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, the governors of Maine, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont and many other organizations and political
leaders have all called publicly for action to implement the BRC
recommendations and, specifically, development of a consolidated
storage facility.
Attachment 1* provides a comparison of hypothetical timelines for
the development of a consolidated storage facility using a consent-
based siting process and the Yucca Mountain repository assuming that
both programs are underway in 2014. As the attachment illustrates, the
completion date for Yucca Mountain will be highly dependent on the rate
at which funds are expended. Despite the fact that the Nuclear Waste
Fund has more than sufficient funding to complete the Yucca Mountain
project, it is highly unlikely that, in the absence of a new management
entity with direct access to the Nuclear Waste Fees and Fund, the
program could be appropriated sufficient funding necessary (approaching
$2 billion annually) to complete licensing and construction in the near
term. The 2027 opening date for Yucca Mountain, shown in Attachment 1,
assumes successful NRC licensing, efficient management, full funding,
and positive support from the State of Nevada. Even if these
assumptions are met, it will still be challenging to complete the Yucca
Mountain project by 2027; an endeavor that will cost more than $14
billion in 2012 dollars. Until it is clear that all of these
assumptions can be met, the industry strongly believes that it is
prudent to pursue consolidated storage in parallel with repository
activities. If a second repository is pursued, the siting, licensing,
and construction will most likely take close to three decades. By 2040,
the damages paid by the taxpayer could be as much as $30 billion.
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* Illustration has been retained in committee files.
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A consolidated storage facility could be built at a fraction of the
cost of a repository. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
estimates a 40,000 MTU storage facility could be built for
approximately $525 million in 2012 dollars. As Attachment 1
illustrates, the industry estimates that a consolidated storage
facility could be opened by 2024 in a willing host community and state
if work begins in 2014. The main assumption in this estimate is the 3-
year time to execute a consent-based siting process. The industry feels
this is a reasonable assumption for a consolidated storage facility but
that a consent-based siting process for a second repository could take
substantially longer. The estimated times for design, licensing, and
construction are based on a review of licensed and constructed dry cask
storage facilities at reactor sites and the Idaho National Laboratory.
To ensure that the licensing process is efficient, the industry
requests that the legislation instruct the NRC to issue a final
decision approving or disapproving a license for a consolidated storage
facility no later than two years after the date of submission.
A consolidated storage facility would be used to meet DOE's
statutory and contractual obligations by removing used fuel from
commercial nuclear power sites, taking title to the used fuel, and
shipping it to the storage facility, which could be collocated with the
repository, where it would be stored until a final disposal or
alternate disposition pathway is available. In addition to storing used
nuclear fuel from commercial facilities, a consolidated storage
facility could also store DOE and U.S. naval reactor fuel. This could
provide a pathway for the federal government to meet its obligations to
remove this material from the various states where it is stored and
eventually prepare it for final disposal.
Although the industry supports the completion of the Yucca Mountain
licensing effort, we recognize that it may be appropriate for the new
management entity to begin efforts to site a second repository. Since
we expect nuclear power to continue to be a significant contributor of
electricity in the United States, used fuel will continue to be
produced. It is generally agreed that Yucca Mountain can accommodate
significantly more used fuel than the 70,000 MTU limit imposed in the
NWPA. Even though the limit is appropriately removed in this
legislation, it may still be necessary to site a second repository.
Since the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency have Yucca
Mountain repository-specific regulations and the generic repository
regulations are generally considered to be out of date, the industry
recommends that the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency be
instructed, in this legislation, to develop new generic repository
regulations. The search for a new repository will not be successful
unless the regulatory structure is properly defined prior to the
search.
priority to shutdown sites
The Department of Energy and eventually the new federal management
entity should collaborate with industry to ensure that transportation
issues, including efficient ordering of used fuel acceptance from
commercial sites, are addressed appropriately. Prior to removing used
fuel from operating plant sites, the industry agrees that priority
should be given to the shutdown commercial sites that no longer have an
operating reactor. This approach, supported by the BRC and the Nuclear
Waste Administration Act of 2013, has numerous advantages. It would
permit shutdown sites, which in many cases have only used fuel storage
remaining at the site, to be fully decommissioned and the land used for
other purposes. In addition, the taxpayer, through the taxpayer-funded
Judgment Fund, would no longer be liable for the continued cost of
storing used fuel at these shutdown sites at a cost of millions of
dollars per year per site.
consent-based facility siting
Strength of leadership and financial resources alone will not
guarantee success in siting new facilities. As the BRC recommends and
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 proposes, a consent-based
siting process is essential to developing enduring local and state
support for new facilities. Since the release of the BRC report, the
consent-based siting recommendation has received significant support
and prompted questions about how such a process would be implemented.
A consent-based siting process should not be defined
prescriptively, but permitted to develop organically among the
interested parties. Regardless of the specific process for developing
consent, success will be measured by an agreement among the interested
parties that is legally enforceable as described in the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013. During the process, the parties involved
must negotiate in good faith and be open to creative solutions to
address issues that arise, including oversight, incentives and
benefits. The industry does not believe that it is necessary to
establish multiple additional criteria--or linkage between development
of consolidated storage and permanent disposal--that, in essence, are
intended to ``protect'' the state, affected local community and/or
tribe from being forced to host an unwanted facility. In this regard,
we appreciate the changes made from the discussion draft that provide
more responsibility to the communities and states to establish the
framework and conditions under which they wish to operate a
consolidated storage facility. There are communities that would see
hosting such facilities as a benefit. The siting and operation of the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico is proof that such a process
can be successful.
conclusion
Energy companies, their local communities and states, and American
taxpayers deserve to have confidence in a federal program that will
meet its statutory and contractual obligations to safely and securely
accept, transport, store, and ultimately dispose of used nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste. The Nuclear Waste Administration Act
of 2013 is a significant step forward and, with the enhancements
proposed here, it could create a sustainable program that would garner
wide stakeholder support. In addition to the enhancements mentioned
above, the industry has developed legislative principles for nuclear
waste reform, included as Attachment 2*, which should also be
considered when revising the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013.
While the industry has and always will manage its used nuclear fuel
safely and securely, we believe that action by Congress is necessary
now to establish a sustainable program and reduce the liabilities for
the taxpayer as quickly as possible.
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* Document has been retained in committee files.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fettus.
STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY H. FETTUS, SENIOR ATTORNEY, NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC
Mr. Fettus. Yes, thank you.
I'm Geoffrey Fettus, an attorney with NRDC. Thank you so
much for having us.
Last year with the introduction of S. 3469 we were
optimistic meaningful solutions were achievable. We're less
optimistic today unfortunately. We worry that we could miss a
prime opportunity to put in place a durable, lasting nuclear
waste legislation that draws support from both sides of the
aisle. We hope this process can be salvaged.
I'll focus only on two points today.
Geologic repositories isolated from the biosphere are the
only technically, economically and morally viable solution for
nuclear waste. NRDC strongly supports the development of an
improved legislative pathway for geologic repositories. We're
disappointed that S. 1240, in our view, severs the link between
interim and final nuclear waste storage doing away with primacy
of repositories as a solution. Just as harmful, potentially
creating a de facto, long-term, above ground site that becomes
permanent.
Eviscerating the link between storage and disposal
guarantees a repeat of the mistakes we've seen made over the
past half century. We think virtually ensures a moribund
repository program. To give you an example of a well
constructed link between storage and disposal last year's bill
barred any future nuclear waste administration from taking
title to and storing spent fuel before ratification of the
consent agreements included in section 304 of last year's bill.
A provision that bars moving forward with interim storage
before a repository program is under full development wisely
puts the horse before the cart and ensures no temporary site
becomes permanent. This bill has no such provision and allows
interim storage to move forward regardless of the state of the
repository program.
Let there be no mistake, we support moving forward with
limited interim storage. But we urge a pilot project. Here I
stress pilot project, as in smaller scale and initial proof of
concept.
We think you can do it in a relatively short timeframe for
storage that can address stranded waste at the 13 closed
reactor sites or for spent fuel that fails to meet certain
safety thresholds. An example of such a site is the hardened
outhouse facility in Germany. Volunteer sites that have already
demonstrated consent are operating commercial reactors, far
less in the way of new infrastructure would be required and
capacity for fuel management and transportation, as noted by
Senator Murkowski as a significant concern, is already in place
along with the consent necessary for hosting nuclear facilities
in the first instance and by keeping consolidated interim
storage spent fuel under the guardianship of the industry that
produced the waste in the first place, Congress ensures careful
progress with a repository program because all parties will
know it's necessary.
Turning quickly to point two.
We applauded the consent based approach in last year's bill
and in the BRC. That approach, we think, has been lost in this
iteration. We urge you to rectify this mistake.
Further we urge you to consider that any consent based
process will enjoy a far higher probability of success if
Congress removes the Atomic Energy Act's exemptions for radio
nuclides from our Nation's water and hazardous waste laws.
These anachronous exemptions from environmental law are at the
heart of State and public distrust of both government and
nuclear facilities. We hope such a suggestion, with its
advancement of State rights, garner support from both sides of
the aisle.
If EPA and most importantly, the states, had full legal
authority and could treat radio nuclides as they do other
pollutants clear cleanup standards could be promulgated and we
could be much farther along in remediating the toxic legacy of
the cold war.
Further we could avoid some of the ongoing disputes over
operations at commercial sites. Even the BRC recognized this as
a noted New Mexico's regulation of the WIPP facility is a
critical element of public acceptance.
In conclusion, the committee should reinstate the primacy
of geologic repositories and ensure that no temporary site
becomes the de facto permanent site and already seen many
others could support such legislation.
I'll close with the overarching premise that we hope guides
your work. Years or decades from now others will face the same
predicament we face here today unless you create a transparent,
equitable process with strong public health and environmental
standards that can't be manipulated in order to license a site
that may not be suitable.
Thanks again for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fettus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoffrey H. Fettus, Senior Attorney, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc
i. introduction
Chairman Wyden and Ranking Member Murkowski, and members of the
Committee, thank you for providing the Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. (NRDC) this opportunity to present our views on S. 1240,
a bill [T]o establish a new organization to manage nuclear waste,
provide a consensual process for siting nuclear waste facilities,
ensure adequate funding for managing nuclear waste, and for other
purposes.
NRDC is a national, non-profit organization of scientists, lawyers,
and environmental specialists, dedicated to protecting public health
and the environment. Founded in 1970, NRDC serves more than one million
members, supporters and environmental activists with offices in New
York, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and Beijing. NRDC
has worked on nuclear waste issues for over four decades, and continues
to be engaged in shaping U.S. law and policy on the nuclear fuel cycle.
On September 12, 2012, NRDC testified before this committee on S.
3469, the template for S. 1240. We commended the preceding bill's
adherence to three principles that, in our view, must be complied with
if America is ever to develop an adequate, safe solution for nuclear
waste--(1) radioactive waste from the nation's commercial nuclear power
plants and nuclear weapons program must be buried in technically sound
deep geologic repositories, the waste permanently isolated from the
human and natural environments; (2) governing legislation must contain
a strong link between developing waste storage facilities and
establishing final deep geologic repositories that ensures no
``temporary'' storage facility becomes a permanent one; and (3) nuclear
waste legislation must embody the fundamental concept that the polluter
pays the bill for the contamination that the polluter creates.
NRDC cannot support S. 1240 in its present form, as described in
this testimony and consistent with our 2012 testimony and May 2013
comments filed on the Discussion Draft. NRDC cannot support S. 1240 in
its present form because the bill: 1) severs the crucial link between
storage and disposal; 2) places highest priority on establishing a
Federal interim storage facility at the expense of getting the geologic
repository program back on track; 3) fails to ensure that adequate
geologic repository standards will be in place before the search for
candidate geologic repositories sites commences; 4) fails to provide
states with adequate regulatory authority over radiation-related health
and safety issues associated with nuclear waste facilities in their
respective states; and 5) fails to prohibit the Administrator(or Board)
from using funds at his disposal to engage in, or support spent fuel
reprocessing (chemical or metallurgical), ostensibly to improve the
waste form for permanent disposal of spent fuel.
Regrettably, it appears that the authors of S. 1240 have rejected
several key recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission
for America's Nuclear Future (BRC). Instead, the bill wrongly
prioritizes the narrow aim of getting a government-run interim spent
fuel storage facility up and running as soon as possible--a priority
with potential financial benefits for business interests. However, we
believe S.1240 is salvageable and we look forward to engaging in
constructive efforts to address the shortcomings we present in this
testimony.
Of the five objections enumerated above, the first one--severing
the link between interim and final nuclear waste storage--is possibly
of greatest concern because it means the bill could result in the
creation of de facto long-term above-ground repositories. As we've
stressed since the initiation of the BRC process, law should establish
a strong linkage that bars an interim or temporary storage site from
becoming a de facto repository. NRDC concurs with the former Chairman
of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee who cautioned that
interim storage needs to be done ``only as an integral part of the
repository program and not as an alternative to, or de facto substitute
for, permanent disposal.''\1\ Such caution is consistent with decades
of national policy and the purpose of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA), 42 U.S.C. ' 10131(b)(1). Indeed, last year we expressed concern
that the pilot program in S. 3469 could lessen the impetus for a strong
repository program. Unfortunately S. 1240 goes further and effectively
eviscerates the link between storage and disposal. This guarantees a
repeat of the mistakes we have seen made over the past half century and
virtually ensures a moribund repository program. Further, NRDC believes
that if S. 1240 becomes law, a future Congress will be forced to deal
with this issue once again, with no meaningful disposal solution on the
horizon.
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\1\ See http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-
news?ID=490349a4-4b5e-4ac2-83e7-6e9a54c7aaf0
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After more than 55 years of failure, the history of U.S. nuclear
waste policy offers Congress all the lessons it needs and it can ignore
them only at its peril. Efforts such as the failed bedded salt
repository in Lyons, Kansas (1972) and the 1975 abandonment of the 100-
year Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF) are decades distant,
but directly relevant to this Committee's consideration of S. 1240.
Adopting a short-term, politically expedient course for interim storage
at the expense of durable solutions is the recipe for failure for both
storage and disposal facilities. The failed Yucca Mountain project is
merely the latest and largest of these debacles. While the BRC rightly
recognized the 1987 amendments to the NWPA were ``highly prescriptive''
and ``widely viewed as being driven too heavily by political
considerations,'' the BRC failed to take into account (or recount) all
that has transpired over the past three decades.
Put bluntly, first the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and then
Congress corrupted the site selection process that resulted in
selecting Yucca Mountain as the only option for a deep geologic
repository. The original NWPA strategy contemplated DOE first choosing
the best out of four or five geologic media, then selecting a best
candidate site in each medium. Next, DOE was to narrow the choices to
the best three alternatives, finally picking a preferred site for the
first of two repositories. A similar process was to be used for a
second repository. Such a process, if it had been allowed to play out
as intended, would have been consistent with elements of the adaptive,
phased, and science-based process the BRC Report later recommended.
But instead, DOE first selected sites it had pre-determined. Then
in May, 1986 DOE announced it was abandoning a search for a second
repository and narrowed the candidate sites from nine to three, leaving
in the mix the Hanford Reservation in Washington (in basalt medium),
Deaf Smith County, Texas (in bedded salt medium) and Yucca Mountain in
Nevada (in unsaturated volcanic tuff medium). All equity in the site
selection process was abandoned in 1987 when Congress, confronted with
cost of characterizing three sites and strong opposition to the DOE
program, amended the NWPA of 1982 to direct DOE to abandon the two-
repository strategy and to develop only the Yucca Mountain site. Not by
coincidence, at the time Yucca Mountain was DOE's preferred site, as
well as being the politically expedient choice for Congress. The
abandonment of the NWPA site selection process jettisoned any pretense
of a science-based approach, led directly to the loss of support from
the State of Nevada, diminished Congressional support (except to ensure
the proposed Yucca site remained the sole site), and eviscerated public
support for the Yucca Mountain project.
By ending all impetus for the disposal program, S. 1240 risks
sending the nation down another dead-end road. But we believe this
situation can be rectified. NRDC, relying on decades of scientific
consensus, supports the focus of developing geologic repositories and
ensuring a strong link between storage and disposal that ensures no
storage site will ever become a de facto repository. After detailing
the shortcomings of S. 1240, we offer specific suggestions for crafting
successful, durable legislation and a bill that can address the
longstanding national challenge of nuclear waste.
ii. specific comments on s. 1240 and the evolution of the brc process
A. Comments on Title I: Sections 101-103
Title I of S. 1240 closely tracks last year's S. 3469, which in
turn, recognized our generation's ethical obligation to future
generations regarding nuclear waste disposal. Unfortunately, subsequent
Sections of the bill sever the crucial link between storage and
disposal.
As we suggested last fall, the bill should include an explicit
adoption of the primary purpose of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),
42 U.S.C. Sec. 10131(b)(1), as the decision to isolate nuclear waste
from the biosphere implicates critical issues of security, including:
public health, environmental protection and financial security. Also,
the meaning of Section 102(4) should be expanded and clarified by
removing the word ``centralized'' and inserting the words ``safe,
environmentally sound and publicly accepted'' to address several of the
concepts we detail below.
B. Comments on Title II: Sections 201-206
With respect to creation of a Nuclear Waste Administration, as NRDC
has expressed numerous times over past years, the failures of the
Atomic Energy Commission and its successor agencies (the Energy
Research Development Agency, DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)) make the case that an alternative institutional vehicle for
nuclear waste disposal is necessary. However, we caution that any new
federal entity must be subject to all of the nation's environmental
laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 4321, et seq. We presume such is the case for this proposed
agency. Alternative language may be necessary to clarify specific
application of NEPA at certain junctures of the siting process (for
example, in support of the initial guidelines), but it is clear to us
that NEPA has full application to the newly proposed S. 1240. We hope
the Committee will speak to this matter in the record of this
proceeding including any report filed with the bill or, better yet,
simply clarify the matter in future and improved versions of the bill.
Further, as noted in our introduction, NRDC advises the new nuclear
waste entity be governed by a board of directors. The lengthier
processes associated with arriving at consensus decisions--as compared
to the decision-making capacity of a single administrator--can be
painful but are worthwhile in the end. A single administrator can upset
carefully crafted disposal progress in one term; a diverse board of
directors is less likely to do so. The BRC itself is a good example of
the benefits of a group decision-making structure, where a wide array
of viewpoints (though not nearly as diverse as we suggested or think
was necessary) can and did produce useful results.
In our May 2013 comments on the Discussion Draft of this bill, we
stated that representation on this board of directors should be
balanced by political party representation, by governmental affiliation
(i.e., federal, state, or tribal), and include representation by non-
governmental organizations in addition to industry. In addition, in
establishing the board of directors of the nuclear waste entity, the
legislation should have a provision explicitly prohibiting the majority
on the board from comprising members with existing or historical ties
to the nuclear industry. Such a requirement would recognize the
existing revolving door between government service at NRC, DOE and the
nuclear industry. Further, ensuring the board is not disproportionately
composed of members with existing or historical ties to the nuclear
industry would improve public trust and acceptance of the government's
newly legislated nuclear waste storage and disposal program.
We also note with concern changes to Section 205, the Nuclear Waste
Oversight Board. Here, the language of Section 205(a) has been
substantially refined to focus on financial aspects of the Nuclear
Waste Fund, the Working Capital Fund, and the performance of the
Administrator in fulfilling contracts. Stressing the importance of the
Oversight Board's review of financial aspects seems appropriate, but
the potential crucial functions of the Oversight Board--chiefly, review
of the progress of nuclear waste facilities--have been relegated to
Subsection (m). It is not clear to us why the bill includes this
apparent legislative devaluation, especially when the functions
delineated by Subsection (m) include oversight of the funds made
available to the Administrator, the adequacy of the fees, and the
liability of the United States to contract holders. We suggest
returning the functions (now in Subsection (m)) to primary placement at
the beginning (in Subsection (a)) and deleting the duplicative text of
Subsection (a)(1)(A)(B) and (C), saving such admonishment for the
Committee Report.
Additionally, it has long been NRDC's view that independent
oversight is critical to safe and environmentally sound operation of
DOE nuclear weapons production facilities and commercial nuclear
facilities regulated by the NRC. Indeed, while creating a review board
may be a useful first step, more importantly the full suite of existing
environmental laws should have full application to nuclear waste
matters, and the new Nuclear Waste Administration should be bound by,
and benefit from clearly defined external regulation. We address this
issue in more detail, infra at 10-12.
C. Comments on Title III: Sections 301-308
As noted in our introduction, disposal of nuclear waste in geologic
repositories should remain the core focus of this legislation.
Regrettably, by the inclusion of much of ``alternative'' Section 305
from the Nuclear Waste Discussion Draft,\2\ S. 1240 presents a
structure that advantages immediate introduction of interim storage
options over development of a sound geologic repository program. As a
preliminary matter, we stress NRDC supports commencing work on
consolidated interim storage with a specific focus on development of an
interim storage facility for stranded fuel. Indeed, we have proposed a
set of steps to develop such a pilot interim storage option and do so
again today, infra at 9-10.
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\2\ The Nuclear Waste Discussion Draft released by the Committee in
March of this year included a proposal for an alternative Section 305
as a suggested replacement of Section 304(b)-(g) of the draft bill. S.
1240 includes the replacement language, and while some elements of
alternative Section 305 have been altered in the interim, the majority
of the text remains the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) evolution of the interim storage issue subsequent to the brc
The nuclear waste legislative process has been moving in the wrong
direction. The BRC initially set out a phased, careful approach to
developing both repositories and storage sites with strong checks to
ensure storage sites could not become de facto repositories. This has
been transmogrified in S. 1240 to a measure that prioritizes
consolidated storage at the expense of a meaningful repository program.
In short, NRDC believes that if S. 1240 becomes law, a future Congress
will be forced to deal with this issue again, with no meaningful
disposal solution on the horizon, but with an even larger burden of
radioactive hazardous materials.
S. 1240 lacks, for example, the specific check on the development
of interim storage sites pending meaningful progress on the repository
program found in Section 306 of last year's S. 3469. The requirement in
Section 306(a) stated: ``The Administrator may not possess, take title
to, or store spent nuclear fuel at a storage facility licensed under
this Act before ratification of a consent agreement for a repository
under Section 304(f)(4).'' Such a provision wisely put the horse before
the cart and ensured the crucial linkage between storage and disposal
that the BRC acknowledges is necessary.\3\ Such language should be
included in S. 1240.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See BRC Final Report at xii, ``[A]t the same time, efforts to
develop consolidated storage must not hamper efforts to move forward
with the development of disposal capacity. To allay the concerns of
states and communities that a consolidated storage facility might
become a de facto disposal site, a program to establish consolidated
storage must be accompanied by a parallel disposal program that is
effective, focused, and making discernible progress in the eyes of key
stakeholders and the public.'' See also, ``[t]his means that a program
to establish consolidated storage will succeed only in the context of a
parallel disposal program that is effective, focused, and making
discernible progress in the eyes of key stakeholders and the public. A
robust repository program, in other words, will be as important to the
success of a consolidated storage program as the consolidated storage
program will be to the success of a disposal program. Progress on both
fronts is needed and must be sought without further delay.'' BRC Final
Report at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We expressed concern last year with an exception for 10,000 metric
tons of spent nuclear fuel destined for storage, and express similar
concerns about Section 309 of S. 1245 (Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 2014). But the language of S. 1240 merits our
outright objection and goes far beyond the careful, phased approach of
last year's bill, which very closely tracked the BRC Final Report.
Indeed, Section 305 of S. 1240 even does away with the Nuclear Waste
Discussion Draft's fig leaf Suspension For Lack Of Substantial
Progress, severing even the last minimal checks on interim storage in
the event no progress is made on a repository, leaving the repository
program and storage program on two entirely separate tracks.
(2) a comparison of s.3469 with s.1240
Sections 304, 305 and 306 of last year's S. 3469 went much of the
way toward structuring a result that would avoid repeating the failure
of the Yucca Mountain process. The 2012 version of Section 305(a)
directed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt, by
rule, broadly applicable standards for the protection of the general
environment from offsite releases from radioactive material in geologic
repositories. Further, last year's Section 305(b) directed NRC to then
amend its regulations governing the licensing of geological
repositories to be consistent with any relevant standard adopted by
EPA. These requirements and this phasing of agency actions in S. 3469
were appropriate (i.e., first EPA sets the standards and then NRC
ensures its licensing process meets those standards). In our earlier
testimony on S. 3469 we expressed concern that the timeline for this
phasing was inadequate, but those were concerns we hoped could be
addressed in a later version of that bill. Unfortunately, Section 307
of S. 1240 does not even approximate such requirements, and also
ignores the BRC's recommendation that new, applicable rules be in final
form before site selection.
Further, S. 3469's Section 304, the heart of the BRC's original
template, set forth a clear, linked and strongly similar process for
the development of both interim storage sites and repositories. The
original Section 304(a) set out the general terms of a process that
reflects the transparent, adaptive, consent-based qualities called for
by the BRC. Allowing affected communities to decide whether, and on
what terms, they would host a nuclear waste facility was an important
step forward that has not previously existed in nuclear legislation. S.
3469's Section 304(b) wisely provided for consistency with Section
112(a) of the NWPA but required the issuance of guidelines not later
than one year after the date of enactment of the Act. We thought this
one-year period was insufficient, but supported such consistency with
the enumerated provisions in Section 112(a). Last year's Section 304(c)
set up a process for determining candidate sites that, in general
terms, could chart a process arriving at protective disposal solution,
if it were: (1) undertaken subsequent to imposition of sound final site
screening and development criteria and sound final generic radiation
and environmental protection standards; and (2) not hamstrung or
corrupted by Congress, other federal agencies or the Executive Branch.
And Section 304(f) designed a consent process applicable to both
storage and disposal sites.
Ultimately, last year's bill, S. 3469, was attentive to BRC's
recommendation of a ``consent-based, adaptive, and phased approach''
for developing geologic disposal options. We agreed with the general
thrust of such a conceptual framework for developing repositories, but
suggested that any such ``consent-based'' process would enjoy a far
higher probability of success in concert with a simple, but profound,
change in the law--Congress with its firm understanding of federalism,
should legislate a role for states in nuclear waste disposal by
amending the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to remove its express exemptions
of radioactive material from environmental laws. We discuss this
further below.
(3) the failure to link storage and disposal in s. 1240
We turn now to the analogous Sections in the current bill, S. 1240,
and the contrasts are dismaying. The basic structure of the template
from S. 3469 is scattered in pieces throughout the current bill, and
the development of repositories and interim storage facilities have
been placed on very different tracks.
We find that Section 304 of S. 1240 has been truncated even
compared to the Discussion Draft and reduced to mere aspirations it
will structurally no longer be able to achieve. Section 305 spells out
the new process for Interim Storage facilities, in great measure
modeled on the ``alternative'' Section provided with the Discussion
Draft. Section 305 of S. 1240 requires requests for proposals (RFPs)
for interim storage sites not later than 180 days after enactment,
likely before an Administrator is even confirmed by the Senate. The
RFPs shall include general guidelines and, after one or more public
hearings, a process for site characterization, selection, and
licensing. Remaining links between storage and disposal are found in
Section 305(c), where the Administrator is urged (in the wispiest
terms) ``to seek to ensure'' that efforts to develop a storage site for
``nonpriority'' waste are accompanied by parallel efforts to develop a
repository.
In S. 1240, during the first 10 years after enactment, the
Administrator may issue RFPs for one or more storage sites for non-
priority waste, but may not issue additional RFPs unless the
Administrator has obligated funds for activities in the repository
program. After the first 10 years, the Administrator may not issue
additional RFPs for non-priority waste storage unless there is a
repository site under evaluation. There is no volume limit for the non-
priority storage site in either case.
And priority and preference in site selection for sites suitable
for co-location of a storage facility and a repository provide cold
comfort for the following reasons. Unfortunately, preference and
priority for co-location are not articulated as binding factors, no
matter how moribund a repository program. And even if they were
meaningfully binding, which they are currently not, such preference
presents a host of problems that could lead to the consolidated storage
site morphing into the de facto repository, regardless of the progress
in the repository program (if, e.g., the co-located repository program
derails late in the process for technical or institutional reasons).
Further, there is nothing in Title III barring the construction and
operation of facilities for repackaging nuclear spent fuel and nuclear
waste, which could include construction and operation of facilities for
spent fuel reprocessing (chemical or metallurgical). Indeed, NRDC is
already aware of multiple efforts and interest in co-locating storage
and reprocessing facilities.
In summary, there is nothing in S. 1240 to halt a governor
interested in hosting a potentially unlimited interim storage site and
associated reprocessing facility from putting the process on a fast
track before EPA's new radiation protection rules and NRC's new
licensing rules are in place; before a repository program has even
commenced meaningful work; and indeed, potentially before submission of
the final ``Mission Plan'' described in Section 504. Whether such a
situation could emerge in Idaho, New Mexico, Tennessee, South Carolina,
or other states, or even at Nevada's Yucca Mountain (with attendant
controversy and rancor) is beside the point because the phased, careful
process designed to achieve a publicly acceptable result outlined by
the BRC and included in last year's S. 3469 has been jettisoned by S.
1240's prioritizing of interim storage.
(4) the consent agreements of sections 305 and 306 are inadequate
The siting and consensus approval for storage and repository
facilities should be strongly consistent, if not identical. For storage
facilities, there is the possibility, but not the requirement, of a
``cooperative agreement'' in Section 305(b)(3)(C). The consent process
should require this minimal, initial agreement. The consent process of
Section 305(b)(4)(B) includes no provisions related to the contents or
terms and conditions of a consent agreement as were included in S.
3469. In addition to the lack of adequate technical requirements, this
lack of an adequate consent process is contrary to the purpose of
``establish[ing] a new consensual process'' (Section 102(3)) and makes
it unlikely that there will be successful siting of storage facilities.
The consent process for repositories still exists in Section 306(e)
of S. 1240. But the ratification requirement of S. 3469 Section
304(f)(4) is missing. Apparently, Congress could, at any time, choose
not to ratify the consent agreement, or ratify it with changed
conditions, or not provide funding or allow other provisions to be
implemented. It is not clear to NRDC why any state would consider this
to be an adequate ``consent'' process, when its requirements could be
arbitrarily overturned by Congress.
D. Comments on Title V--Sections 501-509
Unfortunately, the timeline found in the ``mission plan'' also do
not provide a meaningful linkage between storage and disposal. In
brief, the ``mission plan'' is the report required under Section 504,
presented to Congress, the Oversight Board, the NRC, the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board, and then released for public comment. All this
is to be done in short order. The proposed mission plan is due not
later than one year after the date of enactment of S. 1240. There is no
specific date for final issuance, and there is provision for revision
to reflect major changes, including from the ``consent'' process in the
planned activities, schedules, milestones, and cost estimates reported
in the mission plan.
The pertinent dates of the mission plan are found in Subsection
(b), where the Administrator is to set out schedules for operation of a
pilot facility not later than December 31, 2021; a storage facility for
``nonpriority'' waste not later than December 31, 2025; and a
repository not later than December 31, 2048, likely more than three
decades distant from the passage of any iteration of the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act. Any analysis of ``meaningful'' progress on the
repository during the first few years subsequent to the Act's enactment
is meaningless when weighed against a scale of more than 3 decades.
Further, the allowance for revision of the mission plan can be used to
simply shunt aside observations about problems in repository
development or rapid development of the interim storage sites.
The certification process and suspension proceedings in Subsections
(c) and (d) could prove to be politically fraught, but ultimately
meaningless in light of the time frames. Rather than the hard cap on
volume present in last year's S. 3469 or, as NRDC suggests, an interim
storage pilot project at operating commercial site(s) limited to the
stranded fuel, S. 1240 sets out a functionally meaningless process that
requires the Administrator to move quickly with consolidated interim
storage and posit (likely rosy) scenarios about repository development
decades away.
iii. how the evolution of the brc process can be saved: nrdc's
prescription
The Committee has the ability to reinstate the primacy of geologic
repositories as the solution for nuclear waste and to ensure strong
linkage between storage and disposal that ensures the former never
become de facto disposal sites. NRDC and many others could support such
legislation.
NRDC offers five recommendations to finally provide durable
legislation for nuclear waste. They are: (1) recognize that geologic
repositories must remain the core of any legislative effort; (2) create
a coherent legal framework before commencing any geologic repository or
interim storage site development process; (3) arrive at a consent-based
approach for nuclear waste storage and disposal via a fundamental
change in law; (4) address storage in a phased approach consistent with
the careful architecture of last year's S. 3469; and (5) exclude
distracting and polarizing closed fuel cycle and reprocessing options.
Importantly, our view on each aspect is premised on a single
overarching caution: to avoid repeating the mistakes of the last three
decades, whether in siting a repository or developing interim storage
options, Congress must create a transparent, equitable process
incorporating strong public health and environmental standards
insulated from political expediency or other distortions. That would
ensure, at the conclusion of the process, the licensing of a suitable
site (or sites). What follows is NRDC's detailed prescription for
amending S. 1240 and establishing a protective and robust nuclear waste
storage and disposal process.
A. Geologic Disposal Must Remain Primary
The primacy of geologic disposal as the solution for nuclear waste
is consistent with more than 50 years of scientific consensus and, most
recently, with the findings of the bipartisan BRC. No other solutions
are technically, economically or ethically viable over the long term
for the environment and human society. NRDC strongly supports the
development of a science-based repository program that acknowledges the
significant institutional challenges facing spent fuel storage and
disposal. Advancing S. 1240 without reinstating the primacy of geologic
disposal as the solution would gravely harm collective efforts to
establish lasting solutions for nuclear waste and would be contrary to
the efforts of the BRC.
B. Create a Coherent Legal Framework before Site Development
We have described the basis for this already in our discussion of
S. 3469's Section 305 and do not need to belabor the point, supra at 5.
Quite simply, if Congress ensures that rules for developing nuclear
waste facilities are in place before the selection of sites begins, it
will forestall a host of problems likely to emerge down the road. We
only need reflect on this history of Lyons, Yucca Mountain, Monitored
Retrievable Storage, and many other failed attempts.
C. Address Interim Storage in a Phased Approach Consistent With the BRC
We commence by reminding the Committee that the United States
attempted to sever the link between interim storage and final disposal
previously, only to conclude doing so was a mistake. Beginning in 1957,
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) pursued a geologic repository
program for high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in a salt deposit near
Lyons, Kansas. Opposition initially came from the Kansas Geological
Survey but soon spread. Concerns over conditions in the mine, the
presence of numerous oil and gas wells in the vicinity, and the fact
that there was solution mining at an operating adjacent salt mine
operated by American Salt Company forced the AEC to abandon the site in
1972. Following the demise of the Lyons repository effort, later in
1972 the AEC announced it intended to develop a 100-year Retrievable
Surface Storage Facility (RSSF). The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and others opposed this interim storage proposal because
it diverted attention and resources from efforts to find a permanent
geologic disposal solution. As a consequence of this opposition, the
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) abandoned its plans for a
RSSF in 1975. The similarities of this history with failed attempts to
force acceptance of the proposed Yucca site should be apparent.
We now offer four observations on interim storage:
1.) Consolidated storage of spent fuel from currently
operating reactor sites at an alternate, previously greenfield
site is unnecessary and ill-advised. Any pilot project for
consolidated storage should be limited to hardened, dry-cask
storage of stranded spent fuel from shut down reactor sites.
2.) If emergency conditions arise at an existing operating
reactor site, e.g., due to an earthquake, discovery of a fault
under the reactor(s), or a disaster related condition, that
threatens the environment and public health, the reactors
should be shut down and the spent fuel at the site would
qualify as stranded spent fuel.
3.) Existing and currently operating reactor sites have
government and implicit public consent for interim storage of
spent fuel.
4.) Consolidated spent fuel storage should not be viewed as a
step toward, or means of furthering, spent fuel reprocessing.
With those observations in mind, NRDC urges the Committee to write
legislative language for a pilot project to address the total stranded
spent fuel at closed reactor sites (currently 13 sites), currently
defined in S.1240 as ``priority fuel,'' where spent fuel would be
stored in dry casks within one or more hardened buildings similar to
the Ahaus facility in Germany. Potential volunteer sites already
demonstrating ``consent'' are found at operating commercial reactors.
The utility of using existing commercial operating reactor sites rather
than burdening new areas with spent nuclear fuel should be apparent:
existing sites require far less new infrastructure, already have the
capacity for fuel management and transportation and have the consent
necessary for hosting nuclear facilities. And by keeping consolidated,
interim-stored spent nuclear fuel under the guardianship of the nuclear
industry that produced the waste in the first instance, Congress
ensures that careful progress continues with the repository program
because all parties will know that it is necessary.
Further, S. 1240 is silent on an important matter--the current
configuration of spent fuel storage at a number of operating reactor
sites. The BRC cited no evidence for why continued reliance on densely
packed wet storage should be accepted as adequate in light of the
health, safety and security risks that interim wet storage poses. This
is true regardless of the seismic, population density, or other natural
factors that might create concern with the current storage
configuration. NRDC and our colleagues at the Union of Concerned
Scientists and many others noted the BRC was negligent in not
recommending that Congress statutorily direct movement of spent fuel
from wet pools to dry casks as soon as practical, i.e., as soon as
spent fuel has cooled sufficiently to permit safe dry cask storage,
generally about five to seven years following discharge from the
reactor. We again urge Congress to act on this issue in this
legislation or even in a stand-alone bill.
To reiterate, a pilot interim storage project housed at an existing
commercial reactor site that addresses issues of stranded fuel would go
far in dealing with a number of public safety and environmental harms,
would do no damage to a carefully constructed bill that focuses on
repository development.
D. Consent, Federalism, and a Fundamental Change In Law
(1) The Consent Agreements Suggested by BRC and Found In
Section 306 Are Inadequate To the Task
For all its laudable qualities, we believe the consent agreements
in Section 306 (for repositories and not for storage sites) will not
solve the fundamental problem facing nuclear waste disposal nor allow
States the oversight role necessary to create a durable, lasting
solution. Rather, Congress, with its firm understanding of federalism,
should legislate a role for states in nuclear waste disposal by
amending the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to remove its express exemptions
of radioactive material from environmental laws.
State, local and tribal governments must play a central role for a
repository and waste storage program to be successful, and regrettably
in S. 1240 they cannot. The BRC recognized as much and noted that
federal and state tensions are often central to nuclear waste disputes.
We note that the BRC's Final Report states in pertinent part:
We recognize that defining a meaningful and appropriate role
for states, tribes, and local governments under current law is
far from straightforward, given that the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over many
radioactive waste management issues. Nevertheless, we believe
it will be essential to affirm a role for states, tribes, and
local governments that is at once positive, proactive, and
substantively meaningful and thereby reduces rather than
increases the potential for conflict, confusion, and delay.
Final Report at 56 (citation omitted).
Without fundamental changes in S. 1240 to address such federal,
state and tribal tensions, we will never approach closure and consent
on transparent, phased, and adaptive decisions for nuclear waste
siting. Indeed, even if such a provision as Section 306(e) were
enacted, we think it likely disputes will continue unchecked, including
as the Administrator and state and local governments seek to negotiate
a consent agreement, unless Congress finally makes a decades-overdue
change in the law.
(2) NRDC's Prescription for Ensuring States' Authority--
Remove the AEA's Exemptions from Environmental Law
A meaningful and appropriate role for states in nuclear waste
storage and disposal siting can be accomplished in a straightforward
manner by amending the AEA to remove its express exemptions of
radioactive material from environmental laws. The exemptions of
radioactivity make it, in effect, a privileged pollutant. Exemptions
from the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) are at the foundation of state and, we submit, even fellow
federal agency distrust of both commercial and government-run nuclear
complexes.
As the Senate is aware, most federal environmental laws expressly
exclude ``source, special nuclear and byproduct material'' from the
scope of health, safety and environmental regulation by EPA or the
states, leaving the field to DOE and NRC. In the absence of clear
language in those statutes authorizing EPA (or states where
appropriate) to regulate the environmental and public health impacts of
radioactive waste, DOE retains broad authority over its vast amounts of
radioactive waste, with EPA and state regulators only able to push for
adequate cleanups at the margins of the process. Indeed, the BRC Report
discusses the State of New Mexico's efforts to regulate aspects of the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant under RCRA as a critical positive element
in the development of the currently active site (Final Report at 21).
The NRC also retains far reaching safety and environmental regulatory
authority over commercial nuclear facilities, with agreement states
able to assume NRC authority, but only on the federal agency's terms.
States are welcome to consult with NRC and DOE, but the agencies
can, and do, assert preemptive authority where they see fit. This has
happened time and again at both commercial and DOE nuclear facilities.
This outdated regulatory scheme is the focal point of the distrust that
has poisoned federal and state relationships involved in managing and
disposing of HLW and spent nuclear fuel, with resulting significant
impacts on public health and the environment.
If EPA and the states had full legal authority and could treat
radionuclides as they do other pollutants under environmental law,
clear cleanup standards could be promulgated, and the Nation could be
much farther along in remediating the toxic legacy of the Cold War.
Further, we could likely avoid some of the ongoing legal and regulatory
disputes over operations at commercial nuclear facilities. Any
regulatory change of this magnitude would have to be harmonized with
appropriate NRC licensing jurisdiction over facilities and waste and
harmonized with EPA's existing jurisdiction with respect to radiation
standards: but such a process is certainly within the capacity of the
current federal agencies and engaged stakeholders. Some states would
assume regulatory jurisdiction over radioactive material, others might
not. But in any event, substantially improved clarity in the regulatory
structure and a meaningful state oversight role would allow, for the
first time in this country, consent-based and transparent decisions to
take place on the matter of developing storage sites and geologic
repositories.
Section 306(e) allows a consent agreement with terms and conditions
including ``regulatory oversight authority.'' The attempt to remedy
regulatory deficiencies could be more simply and effectively handled by
ending exemptions under the AEA. Removing the ability of the United
States to unilaterally break the terms of the consent agreement could
potentially give a state some measure of comfort that the agreement it
had painstakingly negotiated over ``undue burdens'' or conflicting
compliance agreements will hold fast. But there would be nothing
stopping Congress from revisiting this law, ratifying the consent
agreement with conditions, and thereby removing whatever meaningful
restraint a state might assert. Thus, ultimately what is offered as a
thoughtful contract provision could be rendered inoperable, and could
eviscerate a state's protection against altered, less favorable terms.
By contrast, ending the anachronistic AEA exemptions solves the
matter of meaningful state oversight and does not carry with it
substantial likelihood of congressional terms and modifications exacted
from states years into a good faith negotiation on a site. Indeed,
while it would be possible for a future Congress to revisit the AEA and
re-insert exemptions from environmental law, it would have to do so in
a manner that would remove overdue jurisdictional authority from all
states (or Congress would have to single out one state for special
treatment). The difficulty of prevailing over the interest of all 50
states rather than simply amending legislation that affects the
interests of just one state should be apparent.
E. Exclude Distracting and Polarizing Closed Fuel Cycle and
Reprocessing Options
The unlimited interim storage allowed for in S. 1240, regardless of
the state of repository program, is a course of action benefitting the
narrow financial interests of industry, and it undermines final
repository solutions, and sets up a clear set of incentives for
reprocessing and fast reactors. This is an enormous step back from S.
3469. Last year former Chairman Bingaman noted:
Commission wisely resisted the allure of reprocessing,
concluding that there is ``no currently available or reasonably
foreseeable'' alternative to deep geologic disposal. In short,
we need a deep geologic repository. Even if we were to
reprocess spent fuel, with all of the costs and environmental
issues it involves, we would still need to dispose of the
radioactive waste streams that reprocessing itself produces and
we would need to do so in a deep geologic repository.
NRDC concurs. The lack of a limit on consolidated interim storage
increases the probability of continued efforts at reprocessing the
spent fuel, resulting in plutonium separations with no way to ensure
that the plutonium would not be used to make nuclear weapons. Inclusion
of incentives for reprocessing and fast reactors would necessitate
NRDC's further objection to such nuclear waste legislation. In
addition, reprocessing has proven to be expensive, environmentally
disastrous, and a serious non-proliferation threat. And as the BRC
found, reprocessing is also not a viable waste management strategy
because it does not significantly reduce the radioactivity of the waste
that must be stored in a repository. Indeed, just as for spent fuel, we
must also work to resolve the path to a repository for the millions of
gallons of dangerous, highly radioactive waste generated by spent
nuclear fuel reprocessing in the United States over the past half
century.
In contrast to this setup for reprocessing and fast reactor
facilities, NRDC's recommendation of an interim storage pilot project
that is strictly limited to existing commercial operating sites avoids
the likelihood that reprocessing would occur. First, our consolidated
pilot proposal gets the ball rolling on spent fuel almost all parties
agree is ``stranded.'' Second, with its strict limit to shut down
reactors and careful attention to establishing appropriate safety
criteria, any such interim site could solve immediate public safety
risks but not take the air out of meaningful progress geologic
repository program.
iv. conclusion
We share the frustrations of the Committee and the bill's sponsors
with the halting pace of efforts to find a disposal solution for
nuclear waste. But we urge you to not let such frustration result in
short-sighted ``solutions'' such as those found in S. 1240.
Efforts to ``streamline,'' ``reduce regulatory obligations'' or
simply force through projects by setting arbitrary deadlines, are in
significant measure how the original NWPA process and then the Yucca
project were derailed. Rather than trying to short circuit an imaginary
parade of onerous regulatory obligations, NRDC urges careful attention
to creating a coherent legal framework before commencing any geologic
repository or interim storage site development process. Then (and only
then) will it be possible to have a consent-based approach for nuclear
waste storage and disposal consistent with our history of federalism.
Simply, NRDC opposes interim storage configurations that remove the
necessity of a repository program and provide clear incentives for
reprocessing and fast reactors. Further, relying on the two-track
storage and disposal process presented in S. 1240 to provide the
meaningful oversight role States seek is another recipe for gridlock--
there is no provision in the storage Section for a consent agreement
and the provision in the repository Section does not bar Congress from
revisiting any negotiated agreement, ratifying the consent agreements
with conditions, and removing whatever meaningful restraint a state
might assert. This is a recipe for failure as highlighted by an ongoing
example. The Energy Department's current effort to reclassify high-
level radioactive waste and ship it to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in New Mexico illustrates just how an agency can and will take
such liberties (and simultaneously not solve any of the pressing
problems at the Hanford site).
In contrast to the difficulties in structuring state and federal
roles noted above, ending the anachronistic AEA exemptions solves the
matter of meaningful state oversight once and for all. It is past time
for Congress to take such a step and this is the legislation where it
should finally be done.
We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee on this
difficult topic and I am happy to answer any questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lochbaum.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY PROJECT,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Mr. Lochbaum. I thank Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member
Murkowski and all members of the committee for this
opportunity.
S. 1240 seeks to remedy problems resulting from the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act not attaining its specified outcome, namely a
Federal repository accepting spent fuel by January 1998. The
failure to open the repository means that spent fuel continues
accumulating at the plants. The departure from the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act forced nuclear plant owners to expand onsite
spent fuel storage capacities. Plant owners have sued the
Federal Government for recovery of these costs.
There was another consequence. Spent fuel pools initially
designed to hold slightly over one reactor core now hold up to
9 reactor cores. Large amounts of radioactive material which
should now be within a repository designed to isolate it from
the environment for at least 10,000 years, instead remain at
the plant sites.
UCS wants to see the status quo ended.
We strongly advocate accelerating the transfer from spent
fuel pools into dry storage.
Figure one in our written material contrasts the amount of
spent fuel actually stored at the nuclear plants with the
amount had the repository opened on schedule.
The triangles show onsite spent fuel storage amounts
steadily declining from a peak of about 38,000 metric tons in
1998 as some went to the repository.
The diamonds show the amounts instead climbing to over
67,000 metric tons.
Portions of S. 1240 address the cost implications of the
failure to accept spent fuel. This is fair and reasonable
because the plant owners incurred costs they would not have
otherwise encountered had the Federal Government met its
obligations.
But fairness dictates that another consequence from that
failure also be rectified. Had the Federal Government met its
obligations spent fuel pools would not contain up to 9 reactor
cores. If legislation addresses the financial implications than
it is only fair that it address the safety implications also.
If the Congress sends the President a nuclear waste bill that
fails to address this inequity it would have failed the public
in a major way.
That accelerating the transfer from spent fuel pools into
dry storage reduces risk as shown in Figure two of our written
testimony.
The columns labeled high density reflect the current
situation.
The columns labeled low density reflect the situation if
transfer into dry storage is expedited.
The low density columns also reflect the situation that
would now exist had the Federal Government met its obligations
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The risk reduction is
undeniable. The contaminated land area drops from 9400 square
miles to 170 square miles and the number of displaced persons
drops from 4.1 million to 81,000.
Dry storage is not inherently safe. But it provides
significantly better risk management.
For the record all of the contaminated area and displaced
persons in both cases is due to radioactivity released from
spent fuel pools. Not a single person is forced to leave from
their home, leave their home, due to radioactivity released
from dry storage.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's actions reinforce this
reality. Shortly after 9/11 the NRC issued ordered to upgrade
security at operating nuclear power plants, followed 3 months
later by orders for spent fuel pools, followed 5 months later
by orders for dry storage security.
The NRC triaged the relative hazards tackling the highest
first and the lowest last. After Fukushima the NRC directed its
inspectors to examine reactor core and spent fuel pool cooling
systems for vulnerabilities in the event of similar challenge.
The NRC did not instruct its inspectors to waste a minute
examining the low, dry storage hazard.
We urge the Congress to accelerate the transfer from spent
fuel pools into dry storage. This does not introduce an
additional step in the road to repository since spent fuel must
be removed from the pools to dry cask in order to be
transported. It merely entails taking this step sooner rather
than later.
Americans deserve this protection.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project,
Union of Concerned Scientists
On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I thank Chairman
Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski, Senator Feinstein, Senator Alexander,
and all members of the Energy and Natural Resources committee for this
opportunity to provide our views on S.1240, the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013.
S.1240 seeks to remedy problems resulting from the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 not attaining its specified outcome; namely, a
geological repository for spent fuel from civilian nuclear plants
operated by the federal government and accepting waste by January 31,
1998.
Had the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) been implemented as
enacted, the federal government would have begun accepting spent fuel
in 1998. The nominal 3,000 metric tons per year transfer rate from
plant sites to the federal repository exceeded the rate at which spent
fuel was being generated. Thus, the amount of spent fuel stored at
plant sites around the country would have peaked in 1998 at around
38,000 metric tons and steadily declined thereafter as shown in Figure
1.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figure 1 has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The delay in opening the federal repository meant that spent fuel
continued to accumulate at the plant sites. By year end 2011, over
67,000 metric tons remained at plant sites while 0 ounces resided in a
federal repository under the NWPA.
The departure from the NWPA plan forced nuclear plant owners to pay
for expanded onsite spent fuel storage capacity (e.g., replacing
original low-density storage racks in spent fuel pools with high-
density racks and building onsite dry storage facilities to supplement
storage in wet pools). Plant owners have sued the federal government
for recovery of costs they incurred for storing spent fuel at their
sites that should have been in a federal repository under the NWPA. The
U.S Government Accountability Office reported that these lawsuits cost
American taxpayers $1.6 billion with an estimated $19.1 billion of
additional liability through 2020.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Spent Nuclear Fuel:
Accumulating Quantities at Commercial Reactors Present Storage and
Other Challenges,'' GAO-12-797, August 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There was another consequence from expanded onsite spent fuel
storage. Spent fuel pools initially designed to hold slightly over one
reactor core's inventory of irradiated fuel now hold up to nearly 9
reactor cores of irradiated fuel. Unlike the reactor cores, the spent
fuel pools are not protected by redundant emergency makeup and cooling
systems and or housed within robust containment structures having
reinforced concrete walls several feet thick. Thus, large amounts of
radioactive material--which under the NWPA should be stored within a
federal repository designed to safely and securely isolate it from the
environment for at least 10,000 years--instead remains at the reactor
sites.
There is no easy solution to this situation. UCS applauds this
committee for trying to end the status quo. Unfortunately, it is not a
task of picking the best among an array of suitable options. It is the
more unpleasant chore of picking the lesser of many evils. UCS wants to
make it clear that sustaining the status quo is one of the evil
options. Under the status quo, costs and risks of onsite spent fuel
storage will continue to increase unnecessarily.
UCS wants to see the status quo ended by reducing the inventories
of irradiated fuel in spent fuel pools. We strongly advocate
accelerating the transfer of irradiated fuel from spent fuel pools to
dry storage. In our view, currently available and used dry storage
technologies can be used to substantially reduce the inventory of
irradiated fuel in spent fuel pools, with a goal of limiting it to the
equivalent of one or two reactor cores per pool.
Figure 1 contrasts the actual amount of spent fuel stored at
nuclear plants sites with the amount that would have been there had the
NWPA been implemented as intended. The green triangles represent onsite
spent fuel storage amounts steadily declining from a peak of about
38,000 metric tons in 1998 as fuel gets transported to the federal
repository at a rate of 3,000 metric tons per year (the red squares).
The blue diamonds show the amounts instead climbing to over 67,000
metric tons.
The lawsuits brought by nuclear plant owners and the financial
portions of S.1420 address the cost implications of the failure of the
federal government to accept spent fuel under the NWPA. This is fair
and reasonable because the plant owners have incurred costs they would
not have encountered had the federal government fulfilled its
obligations under the NWPA.
But fairness also dictates that the other primary consequence from
the federal government's failure also be rectified. Had the federal
government met its obligations under the NWPA, spent fuel pools would
not contain up to 9 reactor core's worth of irradiated fuel. More fuel
in the pools means a greater risk to the surrounding public if there is
a problem with the pools that releases radioactivity. If lawsuits and
legislation address the financial repercussions caused by the
performance gap identified in Figure 1, then it is only fair and
reasonable that this legislation also address the associated safety and
security implications. They are inseparable in reality and must also be
inseparable in law. If the Congress approves and sends to the president
a nuclear waste bill that fails to address this serious risk and
inequity, it will have failed the American public in a major way.
Accelerating the transfer of irradiated fuel from spent fuel pools
to onsite dry storage reduces the overall safety and security threat
profile of the plant as shown in Figure 2.* The columns labeled High
Density (1x4) reflect the current situation. The columns labeled Low
Density reflect the situation if irradiated fuel transfer into dry
storage is expedited. The risk reduction is undeniable: the
contaminated land area is reduced from 9,400 square miles to 170 square
miles and the number of people displaced from their communities for a
long time drops from 4,100,000 to 81,000. Dry storage is not absolutely
or inherently safe and secure; if so, the federal government's
repository problems would be solved. But dry storage provides
significantly better management of the onsite spent fuel storage risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figure 2 has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) actions illustrate this
point. After the tragic events of 9/11, the NRC issued orders to
upgrade security measures for nuclear facilities. On February 25, 2002,
the NRC issued orders to upgrade security for operating nuclear
reactors. On May 23, 2002, the NRC issued orders to upgrade security
for spent fuel pools. And on October 16, 2002, the NRC issued orders to
upgrade dry storage security. The NRC properly triaged the hazards,
tackling the highest first and the lowest last.
After the tragic events at Fukushima, the NRC instructed its
nuclear plant inspectors to look at capabilities for cooling the
reactor core and spent fuel pool in event of a beyond design basis
challenge like that faced in Japan. The NRC quite properly did not
instruct its inspectors to waste resources examining the low hazard
posed by onsite dry storage.
In March 2012, the NRC ordered plant owners to implement an array
of measures intended to better protect irradiated fuel in reactor cores
and spent fuel pools from damage. The NRC did not require owners to
take any additional measures to better protect irradiated fuel in dry
storage from damage. This low hazard was already adequately protected.
Because the federal government failed to meet its obligations under
the NWPA, spent fuel pools contain much more irradiated fuel and are
essentially loaded guns aimed at neighboring communities. The scope of
S.1420 must include removing some of these bullets.
We urge the Congress to accelerate the transfer of irradiated fuel
from spent fuel pools to dry storage. This does not introduce an
additional step in the road to a repository since spent fuel must be
moved from pools to dry casks in order to be transported; it merely
entails taking necessary steps on that path sooner rather than later.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We are going to call another audible here because I guess
we have a couple more minutes before we have votes. So I think
Senator Murkowski, we can each probably take 5 minutes or so
and at least have a chance to ask a few questions.
Mr. Lochbaum, let me begin with you.
The bill, as you know, sets up a program for the Federal
Government to build new storage facilities for spent fuel. It
was our sense that it was logical to move spent fuel if it was
going to be cheaper and safer. For example, decommissioned
nuclear power plants where there's not going to be the ongoing
operations.
However, at some nuclear power plants there are going to be
continued operations and maintenance and security and
environmental monitoring for a long time to come, maybe
decades. It might not be cheaper or safer to move the fuel to a
central storage site especially since it will need to be moved
again to the repository.
So my question to you is would it make sense to try to
figure out a way to perhaps make some payments for continued
onsite storage at nuclear power plant sites if overall that
would make an approach less expensive and safer?
Mr. Lochbaum. If I understand the question correctly, yes.
But if it just finances continuing the current practice where
we keep pools close to being filled and pays for onsite
storage, then there might be some cost savings but there's no
safety gain.
The Chairman. The idea is to get a twofer. If you can get a
twofer, if you can get more, an added measure of safety and it
costs less than the concept, in my view of providing some
payments for continued onsite storage, is worth looking at.
Mr. Lochbaum. Right.
The Chairman. You'll see now I'm going to ask a follow up.
I'm going to ask a question of you, Mr. Fertel.
Now you also have recommended, Mr. Lochbaum, accelerating
the transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry cask
storage and that was certainly my take away from going to
Fukushima is to look at an approach like that.
Are there other steps the Congress could take to encourage
movement of spent fuel out of reactor pools such as allowing
the Attorney General to enter into negotiations with utilities
to pursue voluntary agreements to transfer their waste to dry
cask storage as part of a settlement agreement in return for
providing interim storage?
Mr. Lochbaum. Certainly. There are a number of ways such as
that one. Also allowing the decommissioning fund that plant
owners have set aside to be used for expanded onsite dry cask
storage would also be a way to achieve the twofer that you
mentioned earlier.
The Chairman. OK.
The same question for you, Mr. Fertel, that I asked Mr.
Lochbaum. On this question of paying, looking at a way to make
some payments for continued onsite storage at nuclear power
plant sites when you hit what Mr. Lochbaum and I were talking
about, the added measure of safety and less cost.
Are you open to looking at something like that?
Mr. Fertel. Let me first say I totally respect your comment
when you visited Fukushima and said that it made you think
about events that people don't think can happen. So with that
as a context, if you look at the studies that have been done
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, by EPRI, a review by the AC
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, there is not a
significant difference in safety.
Now you can do assessments which show what David said as
far as if I have a release what's the difference. But if we're
talking about very, very, very, low probability events the
question isn't so much do you pay for it. It's how do you use
your resources to improve safety at the plants smart?
So we are right now, based upon Fukushima and based upon
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, taking steps to make sure
one, we know what's happening in a pool at the time through
instrumentation under any event.
Two, that we can get water to the pool under any event.
So you can definitely do things at our plants and get an
increment in safety in almost anything, Mr. Chairman. The
question is, is it there that you should get it? I would say
that right now what we're doing makes a lot of sense.
The pools did not fail at Fukushima. Though a lot of people
thought they did. They didn't.
The Chairman. As you know, there were continued predictions
about weather and the like. I'll tell you when I was there
looking at spent fuel rods, spent fuel pools and the proximity
to the water that is not a prescription for a happy ending.
Here's my point and then I'm going to go right to Senator
Murkowski.
I just hope we can stay flexible on this kind of topic. I
take your point as a thoughtful one. You've said, alright it
might be safer, but it might not be the best use of the safety
dollar.
Mr. Fertel. Right.
The Chairman. So be it. I just hope because, I mean, here's
my point and I'll let Senator Murkowski have the last word.
In a tough debate about energy and natural resources,
nobody gets what they want. Nobody gets what they believe they
deserve. The question is can people get, in effect, what they
need that as part of a solution that's good for the country.
I think we all understand that this issue falls into the
basket of essentially running longer than the Trojan War. It is
just gone on and on and on. Apropos, Senator Risch's point, we
sure don't do very well if we don't get a solution and
everything than everything just stays put.
So both of you have been thoughtful on this point. It's
representative of what we're going to have to do to try to find
some common ground.
So last questions and the last word for Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen and Ms. Jameson, thank you for your testimony
here this afternoon. You heard the discussion here earlier with
the Secretary on the issue of consent based approach. The
Secretary has pretty much summed it up saying that's the basis
on which the Blue Ribbon Commission came out and really so much
of what our legislation is formulated around is this consent
based siting.
I guess this would be a question to you, Mr. Garcia or
perhaps, Mr. Smith, any of you.
In terms of what we have provided in this bill do you think
that there is sufficient encouragement within the legislation
that would allow for communities, tribes, to step forward and
say, sure, we will be the host?
What would it take for a tribe, a community, a State, to
step up and say, we will be the host of a repository or a
permanent facility?
Mr. Garcia. I can answer. Thank you.
First of all that, you know, this legislation does allow
for opportunities for anyone who wants to host and in this case
tribal governments as such. If you remember some years ago
there were efforts and there were at least 5 to 7 tribes that
had said yes, we'll take on this opportunity. They looked at it
as an opportunity.
But what failed in that case is the states invoked some
legislation that disallowed a tribe to partner up in looking
for a facility. I think that so as long as there's a safeguard
beyond that. So we can't just leave it up to one of the
Senators suggested that it's up to the State.
It can't just be up to the State. It's got to be a
collaborative effort between the State and the tribe if a tribe
so desires to move in with this kind of an endeavor then it
should be up to the tribe as well. But I think those
opportunities are there.
So the other thing that tribe would like to be involved at
the onset. Not just establish the agency and then forget about
the Administration and forget about well, the bill is there.
But we'll get to it later.
So I think it's important to keep tabs and to move forward
consistently with collaborative efforts, not so much
consultation. I hate the word consultation. But collaborative
effort to moving forward with resolving because it could happen
because we looking at the country for the safety and well being
of all of our people.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Senator, I think that all of our communities
have expressed an interest in considering moving forward with
this process. You know, first they're looking for a path
forward and certainty out of this consent process. But they're
also looking for economic development opportunities and job
creation. I think that's got to come with it for communities
that are going to be willing to consider this mission.
Senator Murkowski. So I believe it was Senator Alexander
that mentioned a competition. I think it was Sweden that has
essentially put the idea forth in that regard allowing for a
competition.
Do you need to have a prize at the end or is the prize the
jobs and the economic activity that come with development?
Mr. Smith. Yes. I think the jobs and the economic
development that come with the activity are going to be
sufficient assuming that we go through the consent process and
local and State governments have full input into this process.
Senator Murkowski. Yes, back to the full collaboration.
Mr. Fertel.
Mr. Fertel. I think the only thing I would add and it was
said by one of the Senators, it's credibility of the Federal
program that you're going to actually implement effectively
over time. I think that's the other aspect that's got to be
very important to everybody.
Senator Murkowski. We kind of lost that credibility at this
point. Nobody believes that we're going to be----
Mr. Fertel. That's part of it. That's part of the problem
right now that I think we have. I know that you visited the
WIPP facility and saw that.
While it's a great success right now, it took them over 10
years, you know, to get to the point where they believed in it
and then they made it work.
Senator Murkowski. Let me ask the question since you
mentioned 10 years. As I asked the Secretary whether or not the
10-year period within which we've outlined in the legislation
is sufficient, is too aggressive?
Do you believe that we can get to that point where we have
the, a storage facility up and operating within a 10-year
period?
Mr. Fertel. I think to Geoff's comment on a pilot type
facility that's taking the decommissioned waste, I think that's
certainly possible the same way the Secretary said it. DOE is
looking at the infrastructure required right now at the sites
that are shut down.
What would they need there to be able to take the
canisters?
Would it be by truck to rail or by truck all the way?
So we think 10 years actually is good. It's a forcing
function, obviously not to cut any corners on safety or
anything, but a forcing function to be diligent in doing it.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, I do have some other
questions, but I'll submit them in writing as I'm sure some of
our colleagues will as well.
But thank you for the hearing and thank you to all of our
witnesses.
The Chairman. Very good point. We'll keep the hearing
record open for our colleagues who have additional questions.
Thank you to all of our witnesses for their patience.
Obviously we've got a lot of heavy lifting to do to get a
bipartisan bill like this enacted. But we're going to do
everything we can because it seems to me to just allow this to
go on and on and on as we heard in the discussion with Senator
Risch, means that we have a solution that, at least, everyone
agrees is unacceptable.
So we thank all of you. Thank you for your patience. The
Energy and Natural Resources Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
[The following statements were received for the record.]
Nuclear Waste Strategy Coaltion,
July 30, 2013.
Hon. Ron Wyden,
Chairman, Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee, 304 Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC,
Hon. Lisa Murkowski,
Ranking Member, Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee, 304
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Murkowski, and Senate ENR
Committee Members:
The Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition (NWSC)* appreciates your
continued commitment to advance the nuclear waste policy debate with
introduction of S.1240, the ``Nuclear Waste Administration Act of
2013.'' We offer the following comments for the record.
Upon reviewing the specific changes from the prior ``Discussion
Draft'' to the current bill as introduced, we were pleased to see
improvements in a few significant areas (e.g., removal of statutory
``linkage'' between pilot storage facilities and progress on a
repository; and removal of three federal officials as designated
appointees to the Nuclear Waste Oversight Board). It is an unusual and
appreciated step for Congress to seek comment on draft legislation, and
the revised language is responsive to concerns raised by stakeholders
in certain areas. However, we must be clear that additional
improvements are necessary to truly create a ``sustainable,
participatory process for managing nuclear waste,'' as intended by the
bill's authors. Respectfully, we outline key areas requiring additional
attention below.
settlement provision (sec 406(b)(1))
Because it requires utilities to settle existing lawsuits against
the federal government in order to have access to future storage
facilities (which utilities will have paid for through nuclear waste
fee collections from ratepayers), the NWSC must strongly oppose Section
406(b)(1) and seek its removal. Our members cannot support
relinquishing rights to damages owed to utilities and their consumers
for repeated and costly government failures. Clearly, settling
litigation may result in significant benefits for all affected parties,
and the NWSC supports voluntary efforts to negotiate mutually
acceptable resolutions. In fact, many contract holders (including NWSC
members) have settled claims suits with the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Recently, however, the DOJ has insisted contract holders give up
unrelated contractual rights as the ``price'' for settlement; it is
that fact, not reluctance by contract holders, that prevents more
settlements. While the NWSC appreciates the authors' attempts to
protect taxpayers from mounting liabilities associated with the federal
government's failure to perform, the approach in this provision is not
the solution. A legislative requirement to settle claims in order to
get something the government owes under current federal law--removal of
used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from plant sites--is
unjust and unnecessary. Performance remains the key to reducing the
federal government's liability.
management & oversight of nuclear waste program (title ii)
As noted previously, the Nuclear Waste Oversight Board proposed in
the discussion draft moved in a positive direction in that S.1240 no
longer requires the appointment of three designated federal officials
to constitute the Oversight Board. Having said that, the bill's
proposed duo of a Nuclear Waste Administration and an Oversight Board
remain vastly inferior to the single-purpose federal corporation model
(such as proposed in companion bills S.3322 and H.R.5979, by Senator
Voinovich and Representative Upton, respectively, in 2010) and models
that similarly establish a qualified board of directors to govern the
entity and select and oversee the chief executive. In multiple studies
over several decades, experts (most recently the Blue Ribbon Commission
on America's Nuclear Future (BRC)) repeatedly recommend such models to
ensure accountability, to reasonably insulate the organization from
political interference and excessive turnover, and to develop and
implement a focused, integrated program for the transportation,
storage, and disposal of nuclear waste. The nuclear waste program
cannot continue to be a politically-driven, ineffective process with no
assurance that the nation's consumers will receive what they have long
been owed; after all, consumers have paid and continue to pay for the
designated purpose of nuclear waste disposal in accordance with the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and government contracts with
utilities. While we remain extremely supportive of moving the program
out of the Department of Energy (DOE), we are concerned that the
proposed single administrator model falls short of addressing the
problems inherent in the current model and instead transfers them to a
new agency. Therefore, the NWSC continues to seek changes that will
establish a single-purpose federal corporation or models that similarly
establish a qualified board of directors to select and manage the chief
executive.
Additionally, key stakeholders who are knowledgeable about the
issues and committed to timely, effective solutions in accordance with
the law--representatives of the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC); the National Association of State
Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA); tribal, state, and local
governments affected by commercial dry cask storage; the Energy
Communities Alliance (ECA); and utility contract holders--should serve
on the board. While such stakeholders may serve in other advisory
capacities as well, they should not be relegated to advisory status
only, as their expertise and commitment are needed to ensure the chief
executive fulfills his or her duties.
The current language does not ensure that appointments to the
bill's Oversight Board include such qualified, knowledgeable, and
engaged stakeholders. In fact, despite their valuable expertise and
commitment to a timely resolution of these issues, utility contract
holders, and those with any financial interest in utility contract
holders, are expressly precluded from serving.
There are a variety of ways to provide for valuable stakeholder
representation on a board, and we offer two models here for your
consideration. First, we submit that Section 3103 of the aforementioned
H.R.5979 provides a preferable approach for populating a board of
directors. It calls for the President to appoint 9 members, of which at
least 3 were to be from stakeholder organizations that were
contributing or had contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund and at least
2 reserved for nominations from State public utility commissions.
Another approach may be to expressly provide for such a 9-member
board of directors to include, for example:
1 or more state utility commissioners from states with
nuclear power generation and/or commercial dry cask storage to
be selected by the President from a list of three nominations
per slot from NARUC;
1 consumer advocate from a state with nuclear power
generation and/or commercial dry cask storage to be selected by
the President from a list of three nominations from NASUCA;
1 or more representatives from tribal, state, or local
governments with commercial dry cask storage within their legal
boundaries to be selected by the President;
1 local government representative from a community that is
adjacent to or impacted by DOE activities to be selected by the
President from a list of three nominations from the ECA;
1 or more utility contract holders to be selected by the
President from a list of three nominations per slot from
Nuclear Energy Institute;
1 representative of an environmental organization that is
supportive of constructively solving the nuclear waste issue to
be selected by the President; and
Any others necessary to fill the remaining board slots to be
selected via an application process to be established by the
board members above.
Either of these approaches, especially when paired with a federal
corporation model, is far preferable to the approach for appointments
to the bill's Oversight Board. While the Oversight Board section
improved from the discussion draft, the bill still fails to (i) provide
for a board that selects and manages the chief executive; (ii) ensure
key, qualified stakeholder appointments to the board; and (iii) prevent
board appointees who are not working toward the safe and timely removal
and disposal of nuclear waste from current locations across the
country. Populating a board of directors or the bill's proposed
Oversight Board with any entity that is not supportive of
constructively solving the nuclear waste issue is unacceptable and
should be strictly prevented. We stress that regardless of one's
position on nuclear power, it is in the country's best interest to
resolve this issue in a responsible and timely manner.
Finally, regardless of the model chosen for transferring nuclear
waste management functions out of DOE, guidance to facilitate a smooth
transition would be helpful. Representative Upton's H.R.5979 called for
the President to appoint a ``Transition Manager'' to oversee this
important exercise, and we recommend such a provision for inclusion in
S.1240.
funding reform (title iv)
The NWSC strongly supports the bill's provision to ensure that
future payments collected by utilities from electric consumers are
directed to the new management entity for use in the program via
creation of a new Working Capital Fund (WCF) and without reliance on
the annual appropriations process. This is a marked improvement over
the current state of Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) operation and is similar
to the reforms proposed in the previously referenced companion bills
introduced in 2010, S.3322 and H.R.5979.
While S.1240's proposed approach to reform the nuclear waste
program's funding mechanism is the most positive aspect of the
legislation, it falls short in that it fails to:
maintain Congressional review of changes in the nuclear
waste fee;
transfer future accrued interest on the NWF to the new WCF;
transfer future 1-time fee payments to the new WCF; and most
importantly,
ensure the NWF corpus will be made available when needed for
future program needs without being subject to competing
appropriations--a challenging goal but one that could be
accomplished with transfers to the new management entity over a
reasonable schedule, preferably defined within the legislation.
We understand the complexity in addressing the entire funding
problems at once and commend the authors for this positive first step
to ensure access to future collections. However, we must continue to
argue for all consumer payments into the NWF to be preserved for
nuclear waste management and disposal as intended by the NWPA.
Likewise, we support the funding reform measure recommended by BRC
Co-Chairs Hamilton and Scowcroft in a December 2011 letter to the
President and repeated in their January 2012 report. They delineated
near-term steps designed to protect future payments by electric
consumers as follows:
We have recommended that your Administration offer to amend
the standard nuclear waste contract with nuclear utilities,
which you are authorized to do under current law, so that
utilities remit only the portion of the annual nuclear waste
fee that is appropriated for waste management each year. The
rest of the funding would be placed in a trust account, held by
a qualified third?party institution, to be available when
needed. At the same time, we have recommended that the Office
of Management and Budget work with the Congressional budget
committees and the Congressional Budget Office to change the
budgetary treatment of annual fee receipts so that these
receipts can directly offset appropriations for the waste
program.
Unfortunately, this recommendation does not appear to have been
pursued by the Administration despite its authority to take action
under current law, and no transparent explanation has been offered. We
respectfully ask for the consideration that this novel-yet-
straightforward approach deserves.
consent-based siting (title iii)
The NWSC sincerely hopes that consent may be achieved in siting
future nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities and believes that
DOE should be taking actions now to facilitate meaningful host
interest. Such efforts should complement (and not compete with) actions
to carry out the NWPA, which itself recognized the need for additional
nuclear waste facilities and provided for a degree of state and local
input into facility siting. In any consent-based siting process, the
NWSC emphasizes the need to (i) maintain flexibility so as not to limit
creative, effective solutions that may be proposed by potential hosts
and negotiated by the parties in consent agreements; and (ii) produce a
legally enforceable consent agreement as quickly as possible so that
the nation may, in a timely manner, plan for and rely on such
facilities. Regarding the former, we thank the authors for restoring a
degree of flexibility to potential hosts with two noteworthy changes
included in the filed bill: (1) removal of the prior ``linkage''
provisions pertaining to the pilot storage facility; and (2) removal of
the former requirement that the Administrator take into account ``undue
burdens'' on a state in siting process.
storage facilities (section 305)
To make progress in the removal of used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste, the NWSC supports pursuing consolidated storage with
priority for shutdown reactor fuel on a parallel track with current and
future pursuit of permanent disposal facilities. We are pleased that
the provisions pertaining to pilot storage facilities for priority
waste now contain no applicable linkage provisions that limit a
potential host's ability to negotiate contract terms as appropriate.
Regarding the bill's provisions for additional storage facilities for
nonpriority waste, details regarding scope, timeline, and cost-
effectiveness remain unsupported and unclear. Therefore, the new
management entity should be directed to timely develop only those
additional storage facilities deemed necessary and cost-effective
following extensive analysis and stakeholder input. Finally, while we
continue to believe statutory linkage is unnecessary, the linkage
pertaining to additional storage facilities is an improvement over the
linkage provisions in the discussion draft.
repositories (section 306)
Recognizing a need for disposal under any scenario, actions to
support the prompt removal of used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste must include establishing a permanent disposal
facility as soon as possible. The bill should, but does not, reaffirm
the need to carry out the important statutory requirements pertaining
to the nation's first permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. The NWPA
is the law of the land and should be enforced, and the critical next
step is the completion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
independent and well-advanced review of the Yucca Mountain license
application that was submitted by DOE in 2008. Specifically, we request
Congressional leadership in (i) appropriating the necessary funds to
facilitate timely completion of the licensing process; and (ii)
requesting a specific plan from DOE and NRC for completing the
licensing process, including identification of the resources required,
particularly in light of pending action by the US Court of Appeals for
the DC Circuit. Whether or not a consent-based process for future
disposal facilities is enacted and successful, the Yucca Mountain
repository was designated by Congress and merits the scientific review
begun years ago and required by law. Given the approximately $35
billion (including interest) paid by electric consumers for the purpose
of such disposal, it is time for the NRC to provide answers to the
public.
We agree with the bill's removal of the 70,000 MTU limit imposed on
the Yucca Mountain repository in the NWPA, but we recognize that it may
be appropriate for the new management entity to begin efforts to site a
second repository.
While providing a consent-based process for siting additional
repositories is in itself positive, the bill's target date of December
2048 for such a repository to be operational provides no sense of
urgency. It simply mirrors the DOE Strategy's proposed repository date,
which is unsupported and so distant that potential hosts for
consolidated storage facilities would be justifiably nervous about
becoming de facto permanent sites. It would be a far better signal to
such potential hosts and to the public for Congress and the
Administration to support (i) timely completion of the Yucca Mountain
process; and (ii) a more reasonable target date for an additional
repository sited under a consent-based approach. In addition to the
often-stated reasons for a permanent repository, some states are
precluded from using nuclear as a generation source until a repository
is operational, and thus, from pursuing an all-of the-above energy
strategy as recommended by the Administration.
Finally, the regulatory structure with respect to any new
repository should be properly defined. To place a new repository other
than Yucca Mountain into operation, the country needs workable generic
repository public health and safety standards. Unfortunately, none
exist today. With no generic standards in place, it is not clear how a
repository siting process can move forward. Even in the best case
scenario, experience indicates it will take the better part of a decade
to promulgate such standards. Therefore, the new management entity
should promote the prompt development of modern, workable repository
health and safety standards applicable on a generic basis to any
repository other than Yucca Mountain.
transportation (section 309)
DOE or the new management entity should facilitate the construction
and operation of infrastructure and systems necessary to transport
commercial used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive material (as
required in the NWPA) in existing and future NRC-licensed canisters to
consolidated storage and permanent disposal facilities as appropriate.
We were pleased to see that the bill reaffirms the need for technical
assistance and funding for the training of public safety officials in
local communities and tribes that are affected by used nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste transportation.
* * * * *
Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments and for the
time and attention you have devoted to these critical issues of
national importance. Your continued leadership is needed--to facilitate
the removal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from
existing and decommissioned reactor sites across the country and to
protect millions of electric consumers and all taxpayers. The NWSC
stands ready to work with you and your Congressional colleagues, the
Administration, and DOE to advance meaningful nuclear waste policy
reform.
Sincerely,
David C. Boyd,
Chairman, Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition,
Commissioner, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
*The NWSC is an ad hoc organization representing the collective
interests of member state utility regulators, consumer advocates,
tribal governments, local governments, electric utilities, and other
government and industry experts on nuclear waste policy matters. Its
primary focus is to protect electric consumer payments into the Nuclear
Waste Fund and to support the removal and ultimate disposal of used
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste currently stranded at
numerous sites across the country.
______
Statement of Lynn E. Davis & Debra Knopman\1\, The RAND Corporation, on
S. 1240--Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013\2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT398/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As lead authors of the 2012 RAND report Choosing a New Organization
for Management and Disposition of Commercial and Defense High-Level
Radioactive Materials,\3\ we would like to comment on the way in which
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act (S. 1240) appears to strike a
balance between the competing values of public accountability and
insulation from political influence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Lynn E. Davis, Debra Knopman, Michael D. Greenberg, Laurel E.
Miller, Abby Doll, Paul Steinberg, Bruce R. Nardulli, Tom LaTourrette,
Noreen Clancy, and Zhimin Mao, Choosing a New Organization for
Management and Disposition of Commercial and Defense High-Level
Radioactive Materials, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1230-
DOE, 2012, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1230. For a summary of
the research, see Options for an Organization to Manage and Dispose of
Radioactive Materials, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-9677-
DOE, 2012, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9677.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We share the view of the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC), the
administration, and (now) this Committee that there is a need to move
forward expeditiously with the establishment of a new organization
responsible for the management and disposition of nuclear waste.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act calls for a new, independent
agency, headed by a single administrator. A conclusion of the RAND
study, adopted by the administration in its Strategy for the Management
and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,\4\
is that either an independent government agency or a federal government
corporation could be established with the critical attributes of
accountability, transparent decisionmaking, autonomy, a public interest
mission, and organizational stability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. Department of Energy, Strategy for the Management and
Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, January
2013, http://energy.gov/downloads/strategy-management-and-disposal-
used-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RAND study also concluded that the choice between an
independent agency and a government corporation should hinge on how
Congress and the President wish to strike the balance between competing
sets of values: providing sufficient mechanisms for political
accountability to uphold the public interest, influencing the
operations of the organization, and maintaining the political
credibility to engage successfully with stakeholders, on the one hand,
and providing autonomy, insulating the organization from political
pressure, and ensuring its flexibility in conducting its activities, on
the other.
In proposing the establishment of a government agency, S. 1240
strikes the balance in favor of more political accountability: ensuring
that the public interest is taken into account in the organization's
operation and making available (through the relationship to the
President) the full resources of the federal government for the siting
of storage and disposal facilities. At the same time, S. 1240 sets the
term of the administrator to six years, with the option to serve
multiple terms. This will provide greater organizational stability and
political insulation than has been the case with the program being
managed by the Department of Energy.
As the Committee knows, the BRC struck a different balance in
recommending a federal government corporation, favoring greater
independence from executive branch oversight and, thus, more political
insulation and potentially even more organizational stability.
While the choice in S. 1240 of an independent government agency
clearly signals the sponsors' interest in more autonomy and
independence than offered by the status quo of continued program
management by the Department of Energy, the inclusion of the Oversight
Board in Section 205 indicates a desire to moderate that autonomy with
an additional layer of oversight between the administrator and the
executive branch and Congress. The President would appoint five members
to the board with the advice and consent of the Senate, with not more
than three members coming from the same political party. Members would
have staggered six-year terms to maintain the continuity of the board's
operations.
The RAND report assessed the various structural and procedural
features that either are inherent in the independent government agency
model or can be built into it to achieve more or less autonomy and
accountability.\5\ For example, the most common governance and
executive structure for an independent government agency is a
multimember board or commission, although several have only a single
administrator. The Federal Reserve Board has seven members; NASA and
EPA have single administrators; the U.S. Postal Service has a board of
governors appointed by the President, and this board appoints the
Postmaster General.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ This discussion can be found in Chapter Four and is summarized
in Table 4.3 of the RAND report.
\6\ See p. 32 of the RAND report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
S. 1240 would represent a departure from precedent by designating a
single administrator and then inserting the Oversight Board above the
administrator. Section 205(a)(1) and (a)(2) provide the board with
considerable scope in reviewing not only financial aspects of the
Nuclear Waste Administration's (NWA) operations but also the
performance of the administrator in carrying out his or her
responsibilities, the NWA's mission plan, and management reports. The
board will independently report to the President and Congress (Section
205[n]).
On the basis of our study, we have some concern that this structure
could lead to gridlock within the NWA. It is difficult to see how the
Oversight Board adds value in terms of accountability beyond what is
ordinarily provided by Congress and the executive branch, particularly
in the absence of a requirement that stakeholders be represented on the
board: states, local government, tribes, industry, and public interest
groups. In effect, the Oversight Board would be a third layer of
oversight scrutinizing the actions of the NWA administrator. The board
would be in addition to the Inspector General, a fourth layer of
accountability, established under Section 204.
We note that Section 502(c) of S.1240 provides for the
establishment of one or more advisory boards. Our view is that advisory
boards will provide the administrator with a transparent, manageable
mechanism for regularly garnering a range of views from stakeholders
and experts, and they will provide the executive branch and Congress
more generally with a sounding board regarding the policies,
management, and operations of the NWA.
In Chapter Two of the RAND report, we assess the several reasons
that past arrangements for the management and disposition of nuclear
waste failed. One of the primary difficulties that the Office of
Radioactive Waste Management in the Department of Energy faced over the
past 30 years in carrying out its mission under the 1982 Nuclear Waste
Policy Act was micromanagement on the part of the White House and
Congress. Without the inclusion of the Oversight Board, the NWA will
still have access to the normal oversight mechanisms within the
executive branch and in Congress, and it will have its own Inspector
General as a further backstop. The potential benefit of another layer
of oversight seems small in comparison to the potential cost of
organizational dysfunction.
APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Responses of Joe Garcia to Questions From Senator Wyden
Question 1. One of the central recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission is the need for a consent-based siting process where the
Federal Government works with States and Indian Tribes to pick a site,
and not in opposition to them. If there's a lesson that can be learned
from Yucca Mountain, it's that the Federal Government needs to do a
better job of working with States in picking nuclear waste sites.
However, I don't think you can have a process that puts what's
politically expedient ahead of safety. How can communities and the
States that surround them be assured that a consent-based siting
process is picking a safe site, not just the most politically popular
site?
Answer. The question needs to be rephrased to include tribal
governments and tribal communities regarding assurance of consent-based
siting. Tribal governments have common as well as different priorities
about criteria for siting as well as transportation issues. Early and
meaningful consultation and participation in the siting processes will
be important as well. There are federal consultation policies which
must be implemented as tribes tribal considerations were not considered
important in previous siting matters. Transportation issues are
important as spent nuclear fuel payloads destined for a repository or
interim storage facility will be transported through and near lands
under tribal government jurisdiction.
Question 2. Historically, citizens, local governments, and tribes
have expressed interest in hosting nuclear waste facilities, but state-
level opposition prevented any deals from being signed. Our bill tries
to address this problem by clearly spelling out a role for the state
from the beginning. Are there other measures that we should include to
address potential differences between local communities and broader,
state-wide interests?
Answer. states sought to undermine tribes interested in hosting a
repository. State congressional delegations introduced federal
legislation aimed at suppressing tribal participation that included
prohibition of building rail and highway routes through state and
federal lands for access to tribal lands for these purposes. Tribal
sovereignty has to be recognized in future siting processes.
Responses of Joe Garcia to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. The makeup of an Oversight Board should be identified and
must include a qualified tribal government official for the
participatory reasons stated above.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. A four year term may be more palatable with staggered term
appointments to overlap changes in the administration.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. Wherever the storage facilities and repositories, singular
or plural, are located, a significant factor should be that the
location should be in the immediate vicinity of the beneficiaries. If a
study was done, the previous locations of these proposed facilities on
and near tribal lands were beyond the service areas of the nuclear-
powered reactors. The customers who derive benefit from nuclear energy
operation and transmission should bear the risk of spent nuclear fuel
storage and disposition as a matter of equity. Ironically, Prairie
Island Indian Community which is adjacent to the Prairie Island Xcel
operations does not receive one kilowatt of power from the immediate
neighboring reactors.
Question 4. When it comes to a state, local community, or tribal
government interacting with the new entity, is it preferable to
interact with a single administrator type structure, or a board of
directors with a CEO?
Answer. The question creates creates the question of how much
decision-making authority a CEO has in representing the Board opinions,
but a board entity is preferable and more likely to be even-handed.
In Closing for the Record
There is concern from Indian Country about the current dynamic of
DOE consultation and outreach on these matters. As stated in testimony,
from the outset of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act the Department of
Energy created and fostered deep distrust by tribal governments and
communities by excluding them from meaningful participation. We are not
convinced that DOE learned any valuable lessons regarding the required
consultation embodied in Executive Order 13175 when it comes to federal
spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste repository, interim storage,
and transportation issues.
In addition to potential long term devastating impacts to tribal
lands, resources, peoples, and communities, there are places of great
cultural significance which places tribal cultural integrity at risk.
There should be an extensive effort by DOE to ensure that tribal
concerns are solicited and included in all phases and components of
managing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
Soliciting tribal impacts and concerns falls under the trust obligation
of the DOE.
There is even greater concern about the failure of the DOE Office
of Nuclear Energy (NE) to ensure dissemination of current and planned
programs and policies to Indian Country. DOE NE Nuclear Fuels Storage &
Transportation Planning Project management officials choose not to fund
a tribal entity that would help inform tribal officials about the
status of the transportation program despite repeated requests by
tribal representatives to fund a tribal entity for these same purposes.
DOE transportation officials contend they do not have an active
campaign or program to ship but are inviting tribal officials to
transportation meetings and even paying for travel. However DOE also is
funding several state regional organizations to convene forums and
meetings to meet with DOE officials and discuss relevant topics while
ignoring repeated requests to fund a similar entity for tribal
governments. In short, DOE has funded several state entities for the
benefit of states state constituents to express their concerns and
raise issues but DOE is not doing the same on behalf of tribal
governments and communities.
There may not be an active transportation program regarding spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste but obviously DOE is supporting
state entities and meetings are taking place. We request the Energy
Committee look into the how DOE is conducting outreach and consultation
with tribes on all aspects of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste
management and disposal.
______
Response of Hon. Ernest J. Moniz to Question From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. Do you think that future required R&D activities--those
that could be needed to address any outstanding issues, such as waste
storage and transportation issues are enabled by the proposed
legislation? Do we need to be more specific about the type of R&D that
DOE and/or the new administration should carry out? Also, do you think
that there are any open issues that may pose a challenge to get a
storage facility and/or repository sited, licensed and constructed with
the current timeline?
Answer. The Administration is still reviewing the draft
legislation, S. 1240.
While we expect there will be challenges in implementing the
program, the timeline and program laid out in the Strategy is
achievable but is dependent on legislation for full deployment. In the
meantime, the Administration, through the Department of Energy (DOE),
is undertaking activities within existing Congressional authorization
to plan for the eventual transportation, storage, and disposal of used
nuclear fuel. Activities range from examining waste management system
design concepts, to developing plans for consent-based siting
processes, to conducting research and development on the suitability of
various geologies for a repository.
Responses of Hon. Ernest J. Moniz to Questions From Senator Heinrich
Question 1. In a consent-based process, what would be the
appropriate range of terms and conditions for a state, tribe and local
community to consent to hosting a repository or an interim storage
facility? For example, in addition to a package of benefits and
compensation, do you think states and tribes should be given a role in
the regulatory, permitting and oversight of the storage facility or
repository?
Answer. Promising experiences in other countries indicate that a
consent-based process, developed through engagement with states,
tribes, local governments, key stakeholders, and the public, offers a
greater probability of success than a top down approach to siting.
Defining consent, deciding how that consent is codified, and
determining whether or how it is ratified by Congress are critical
first steps toward siting the storage facilities and repository. As
such, they are among the near-term activities to be undertaken by the
Administration in consultation with Congress and others. The Department
is currently gathering information from the siting of nuclear
facilities in the U.S. and elsewhere in order to better understand
critical success factors in these efforts and to facilitate the
development of a future siting process for a repository and storage
facilities. As part of this process the Department will consider the
question of host-requested terms and conditions. The Administration
looks forward to working with Congress to develop a consent-based
process that is transparent, adaptive, and technically sound.
The Administration's Strategy endorses the proposition that
prospective host jurisdictions must be recognized as partners. Public
trust and confidence is a prerequisite to the success of the overall
effort, as is a program that remains stable over many decades;
therefore, public perceptions must be addressed regarding the program's
ability to transport, store, and dispose of used nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste in a manner that is protective of the public's
health, safety, and security and protective of the environment.
Question 2. The BRC's proposed consent-based process calls for a
cooperative agreement for communities that host nuclear waste storage
or disposal facilities. Such an agreement could include substantial
financial commitments and possible regulatory roles not generally
provided to states. Under such a consent-based process, would states
and communities have greater confidence the government will actually
meet its commitments if Congress also ratified the agreements made with
the states, tribes and communities?
Answer. Promising experiences in other countries indicate that a
consent-based process, developed through engagement with states,
tribes, local governments, key stakeholders, and the public, offers a
greater probability of success than a top down approach to siting.
Defining consent, deciding how that consent is codified, and
determining whether or how it is ratified by Congress are critical
first steps toward siting the storage facilities and repository. As
such, they are among the near-term activities to be undertaken by the
Administration in consultation with Congress and others. The Department
is currently gathering information from the siting of nuclear
facilities in the U.S. and elsewhere in order to better understand
critical success factors in these efforts and to facilitate the
development of a future siting process for a repository and storage
facilities. The Administration looks forward to working with Congress
to develop a consent-based process that is transparent, adaptive, and
technically sound.
Question 3. In the cooperative agreement with the state, tribe and
local community for an interim storage facility, should there also be
an enforceable deadline with penalties for failing to remove the waste
from the storage facility? How large do you think such a penalty would
have to be to assure a repository was in operation in 2048 as required?
What would be the source of funds for the payment of penalties?
Answer. The BRC recommended that ``one or more consolidated
(interim) storage facilities be developed to start the orderly transfer
of used nuclear fuel from reactor sites to safe and secure centralized
facilities independent of the schedule for operating a permanent
repository.'' The Administration agrees that interim storage should be
included as a critical element in the waste management system. DOE has
initiated a planning project with the objective of pursuing activities
that can be conducted within the constraints of the NWPA and will
facilitate the development of an interim storage facility, of a
geologic repository, and of the supporting transportation
infrastructure, including evaluating operational options for
consolidated storage and furthering the design of a generic
consolidated storage facility. The Department will continue with these
activities within existing Congressional authorization while the
Administration and Congress work together on potential changes to the
nuclear waste management program.
Responses of Hon. Ernest J. Moniz to Questions From Senator Scott
plutonium disposition
Question 1. How can the Administration reconcile a ``slowdown'' to
the program that could ultimately kill the MOX project, and
simultaneously pledge to uphold our agreement with the Russians?
Answer. The United States remains committed to achieving the
important nonproliferation mission associated with the disposition of
excess weapon-grade plutonium and to our agreement with Russia.
However, considering the unanticipated cost increases associated with
the MOX fuel approach and the current budget environment, the
Administration is conducting an analysis to determine whether there are
options to complete the mission more efficiently.
mox project
Question 2. How much will the slowdown of the MOX project affect
its cost and schedule?
Answer. As mentioned in response to your first question, the United
States remains committed to achieving the important nonproliferation
mission associated with the disposition of excess weapon-grade
plutonium and to our agreement with Russia. However, considering the
unanticipated cost increases associated with the MOX fuel approach and
the current budget environment, the Administration is conducting an
analysis to determine whether there are options to complete the mission
more efficiently. Cost and schedule impacts will be a central component
in determining next steps for fulfilling our plutonium disposition
commitments.
Question 3. What are NNSA's estimates on how much it would cost to
shut down the MOX project?
Answer. NNSA does not have a current estimate of the cost to
shutdown the MOX project.
Question 4. How much is the study expected to cost and where will
the money come from-NNSA, NE, EM or elsewhere?
Answer. The Administration is conducting an analysis of plutonium
disposition options, which is being funded primarily through NNSA.
Question 5. When is the study expected to be completed?
Answer. The Department intends to use the analysis in order to
inform the FY 2015 budget.
Question 6. What are the other alternatives and are they consistent
with the US-Russia agreement?
Answer. The analysis includes continuing the current path of
disposing of plutonium as MOX fuel as well as other technically and
financially feasible options. The U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement (PMDA) allows for other disposition paths if
agreed to by both parties.
Question 7. Will the US-Russia Agreement have to be amended if the
Obama Administration shuts down the MOX project to use an alternative?
Answer. The United States remains committed to achieving the
important nonproliferation mission associated with the disposition of
excess weapon-grade plutonium and to our agreement with Russia. The
U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA)
allows for other disposition paths if agreed to by both parties.
Question 8. What assurance do we have that Russia will be amenable
to something other the MOX process?
Answer. The U.S. will continue to engage Russia while conducting
the options analysis and will work to continue progress in implementing
the PMDA.
Question 9. What national security assessments will be made if the
MOX project is ultimately shut down?
Answer. The Department has not cancelled the MOX project, and we
cannot prejudge the outcome of the options analysis.
Question 10. What options have been previously reviewed and
eliminated and what has changed since the time of those studies that
these same options should be considered again? What new serious options
exist today that have not already been evaluated?
Answer. As previously mentioned, the United States remains
committed to achieving the important nonproliferation mission
associated with the disposition of excess weapon-grade plutonium and to
our agreement with Russia. However, considering the unanticipated cost
increases associated with the MOX fuel approach and the current budget
environment, the Administration is conducting an analysis to determine
whether there are options to complete the mission more efficiently. The
options include continuing the current path of disposing of plutonium
as MOX fuel as well as other technically and financially feasible
options. Previous reviews of the Administration's plutonium disposition
strategy will be taken into account in this new analysis. Some options
are being analyzed that have been considered in the past; however, the
new analysis will take into consideration new data and changes in the
operating plans of DOE facilities.
Question 11. How does the Administration intend to comply with the
agreement with the State of South Carolina for the permanent
disposition or removal of plutonium in the state?
Answer. The Department understands our commitments under current
legislation, and we will look to ensure compliance with the law as we
analyze plutonium disposition options.
Question 12. What will be the costs of complying with the agreement
with the State of South Carolina and of non-compliance?
Answer. Beginning in 2016, current law stipulates ``economic
assistance'' in the form of fines and penalties of $1 million per day
up to $100 million per year, subject to appropriations.
Question 13. Does the Administration have a contingency for the
removal of all the plutonium in the state of South Carolina?
Answer. The Department understands the provisions of current law,
and we will look to ensure compliance with the law as we analyze
options.
Question 14. If the MOX project is cancelled, will NNSA remove the
plutonium from SRS, and if so, to where? How much will it cost to
package, transport, safeguard and store this sensitive material?
Answer. The Department understands the provisions of the current
law, and we will evaluate the costs associated with meeting
requirements as the path forward is determined.
Question 15. If the plutonium storage facilities at Pantex are
getting full, or, as the DOE IG found earlier this year may not be able
to safely hold plutonium for much longer due to the age and condition
of the storage bunkers, what is NNSA's plan for the plutonium at SRS
and Pantex?
Answer. Although aged, the storage facilities at Pantex are safe
and continue to be maintained by NNSA as mission critical assets.
Additionally, a recent DOE IG study focused its concerns on bunkers
which comprise a portion of the facilities used for plutonium storage
at Pantex. As part of ongoing efforts to develop NNSA's plutonium
strategy, we are evaluating effective ways to safely store plutonium.
set-top boxes
Question 1. How many taxpayer dollars have been spent to date on
DOE's rulemaking regarding set-top box energy conservation
requirements?
Answer. To date, DOE has spent a total of approximately $2.9
million in contract funding and approximately $300,000 on Federal
salary and benefits on the development of energy conservation standards
and test procedure development for set-top boxes. This includes the
development of the test procedure that is used to measure the energy
efficiency of the set-top boxes. These test procedures are necessary as
a foundation to both voluntary and regulatory programs.
Question 2. How many taxpayer dollars does DOE anticipate spending
during the lifecycle of this rulemaking process?
Answer. A typical energy conservation standards rulemaking takes
about 3 years to accomplish and costs approximately $3 to $5 million to
complete, depending on the complexity of the rulemaking being
performed. DOE is still early in the rulemaking process for set-top
boxes, and acknowledges that funding of the process is subject to
annual appropriations.
Question 3. Has DOE contracted any of this rulemaking out to third
parties? How much has been spent on the contractors?
Answer. Yes, DOE has contracted approximately $2.9 million for
energy conservation standards analysis and test procedure development
for set-top boxes to date. The analysis was provided to industry and
others and supported the voluntary agreement discussion. Test procedure
development and finalization is necessary for both voluntary agreements
and mandatory regulations. Contractors represent one way for DOE to
access the expertise it needs to advance a rulemaking for the timeframe
DOE requires that expertise.
Question 4. In terms of carbon dioxide emissions savings, what
percentage of the United States' total carbon dioxide emissions do you
anticipate DOE's set-top box energy conservation standards will save?
Answer. DOE has not proposed an energy conservation standard for
set-top boxes, so it is not yet possible to estimate the carbon dioxide
savings that could occur from an energy conservation standard at this
time. If DOE were to propose an energy conservation standard, the
proposed rulemaking would include an estimate of the potential carbon
dioxide savings.
Overall appliance and equipment standards are saving consumers
significant amounts on their energy bills and helping avoid significant
emissions of carbon dioxide. Based on a recent study by Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory\1\, Federal energy conservation standards
promulgated through 2011 saved consumers an estimated $42 billion on
their utility bills and carbon emissions reductions attributed to the
standards were realized at 176 million metric tons in 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Energy and Economic
Impacts of U.S. Federal Energy and Water Conservation Standards Adopted
From 1987 Through 2011 , http://ees.lbl.gov/pub/energy-and-economic-
impacts-us-federal-energy-and-water-conservation-standards-adopted-
1987-0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 5. What percentage of total global carbon dioxide
emissions do you anticipate DOE's set-top box energy conservation
standards will save?
Answer. DOE has not proposed an energy conservation standard for
set-top boxes. If DOE were to propose an energy conservation standard,
the proposed rulemaking would include an estimate of the potential
carbon dioxide savings.
Question 6. If industry is willing to achieve the same cost and
energy savings throughout a voluntary agreement, is it still DOE's
intention to proceed with a federal rulemaking process?
Answer. DOE strongly encourages and will consider any non-
regulatory agreement as an alternative to a regulatory standard. DOE
recognizes that voluntary or other non-regulatory efforts by
manufacturers, utilities, and other interested parties can result in
substantial improvements to energy efficiency or reductions in energy
consumption. In fact, as part of its rulemaking activities to consider
a regulatory efficiency standard, DOE prepares a regulatory impact
analysis. The regulatory impact analysis evaluates non-regulatory
alternatives to standards, in terms of their ability to achieve
significant energy savings at a reasonable cost, and compares the
effectiveness of each one to the effectiveness of the proposed
standards.
Question 7. Considering the American taxpayers are funding this
federal rule making process, how do additional layers of government
red-tape ultimately benefit the taxpayers considering the industry has
agreed to set-top box energy efficiency standards at no cost to the
taxpayer?
Answer. DOE's statutory requirement is to maximize energy
efficiency that is technologically feasible and economically justified
(42 USC 6295 (o) (2)). DOE's appliance standards program ensures that
taxpayers are receiving cost-effective energy savings as justified by a
thorough analysis of alternatives to determine which option conforms to
this statutory requirement.
DOE's appliance and equipment standards program seeks to deliver
significant benefits to consumers across the country across a wide
variety of products. Overall appliance and equipment standards are
saving consumers significant amounts on their energy bills and helping
avoid significant emissions of carbon dioxide. Based on a recent study
by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory\2\, Federal energy
conservation standards promulgated through 2011 saved consumers an
estimated $42 billion on their utility bills and carbon emissions
reductions attributed to the standards were realized at 176 million
metric tons in 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Energy and Economic
Impacts of U.S. Federal Energy and Water Conservation Standards Adopted
From 1987 Through 2011 , http://ees.lbl.gov/pub/energy-and-economic-
impacts-us-federal-energy-and-water-conservation-standards-adopted-
1987-0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responses of Hon. Ernest J. Moniz to Questions From Senator Baldwin
Question 1. You mention in your testimony the subject of
commingling defense and commercial waste in the same repository as
being a matter of policy since 1985. It is my understanding that the
repository requirements for defense high-level waste and commercial
spent fuel are quite different. In order to avoid further delays in
nuclear waste processing, clarity about regulatory authority for both
defense high-level and commercial waste is essential. Given the
opportunity, do you think that the US would benefit by re-separating
these waste streams? And if so, do you think that the defense waste
should remain with the Department of Energy or be transferred to the
proposed Nuclear Waste Administration for management?
Answer. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires that either a
commingled repository or a defense-only repository be regulated by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). As I indicated in my appearance
before the Committee, the Department has a study underway to reevaluate
whether or not the wastes should be commingled, which draws upon
previous work done by the Department. Because the reevaluation is not
complete, it is not yet clear what the results will be about
commingling and what organization should have the responsibility.
Question 2. The NWAA specifically calls for a pilot interim storage
facility that accepts 'priority' used fuel. After Kewaunee Power
Station closed in May of this year, along with the LaCrosse Boiling
Water Reactor, the state of Wisconsin now has two shuttered plants
whose fuel in residence would qualify as 'priority'. In the
Administration's current Used Fuel Disposition 'Strategy', is there a
similar priority placed on fuel residing at shuttered plants? Can you
please elaborate on the Administration's position on the storage of
'priority' versus 'nonpriority' used fuel as it differs from the
proposed Nuclear Waste Administration Act?
Answer. The Administration is still reviewing the draft
legislation, S. 1240. However, the Administration's Strategy
specifically supports the development of a pilot interim storage
facility with an initial focus on accepting fuel from shut-down reactor
sites: ``At its core, this Strategy endorses a waste management system
containing a pilot interim storage facility; a larger, full-scale
interim storage facility; and a geologic repository in a timeframe that
demonstrates the federal commitment to addressing the nuclear waste
issue, builds capability to implement a program to meet that
commitment, and prioritizes the acceptance of fuel from shut-down
reactors...The Administration supports a nuclear waste management
system with the following elements:
A pilot interim storage facility with limited capacity
capable of accepting used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste and initially focused on serving shut-down
reactor sites;
A larger, consolidated interim storage facility, potentially
co-located with the pilot facility and/or with a geologic
repository, that provides the needed flexibility in the waste
management system and allows for important near-term progress
in implementing the federal commitment; and
A permanent geologic repository for the disposal of used
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.''
______
Response of Geoffrey H. Fettus to Question From Wyden
Question 1. One of the central recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission is the need for a consent-based siting process where the
Federal Government works with States and Indian Tribes to pick a site,
and not in opposition to them. If there's a lesson that can be learned
from Yucca Mountain, it's that the Federal Government needs to do a
better job of working with States in picking nuclear waste sites.
However, I don't think you can have a process that puts what's
politically expedient ahead of safety. How can communities and the
States that surround them be assured that a consent-based siting
process is picking a safe site, not just the most politically popular
site?
Answer. Communities and the States surrounding potential sites can
be assured a safe, technically adequate site--as opposed to a site that
is only politically popular--when Congress has ensured that two crucial
principles are in effect. First, make sure the public safety and
environmental rules are in place before site selection begins. Second,
provide States with meaningful and explicit regulatory authority.
make sure the rules are in place before site selection begins
NRDC joins with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission for
America's Nuclear Future (BRC) in urging Congress ensure radiation
protection standards and licensing rules for developing nuclear waste
facilities be in place before the selection of sites begins, and thus,
forestalling a host of problems likely to emerge down the road. If
there are rules in place before site selection commences, any sites
investigated will have to meet (hopefully) protective rules. Further,
with rules in place it will be substantially harder to pressure the
agencies to weaken established rules in order to allow a pre-selected
site to go forward, a primary reason for the failure of the Yucca
Mountain process.
Sections 304, 305 and 306 of last year's S. 3469 went much of the
way toward having rules in place prior to site selection, thus
structuring a result that would avoid repeating the failure of the
Yucca Mountain process. Specifically, S. 3469's Section 305(a) directed
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt, by rule,
broadly applicable standards for the protection of the general
environment from offsite releases from radioactive material in geologic
repositories. And S. 3469's Section 305(b) directed NRC to then amend
its regulations governing the licensing of geological repositories to
be consistent with any relevant standard adopted by EPA. These
requirements and this phasing of agency actions in S. 3469 were
appropriate (i.e., first EPA sets the standards and then NRC ensures
its licensing process meets those standards). All of this would take
place prior to the time site selection would begin in earnest.
Unfortunately, Section 307 of S. 1240 does not even approximate such
requirements, and ignores the BRC's recommendation that new, applicable
rules be in final form before site selection.
provide states with meaningful regulatory authority
Second, as detailed in our written testimony, we will not approach
closure and consent on transparent, phased, and adaptive decisions for
nuclear waste siting unless a meaningful and appropriate role for
states is provided. This can be done simply by amending the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) to remove its express exemptions of radioactive
material from environmental laws. The exemptions of radioactivity make
it, in effect, a privileged pollutant. Exemptions from the Clean Water
Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) are at the
foundation of state and, we submit, even fellow federal agency distrust
of both commercial and government-run nuclear complexes.
As the Chairman is aware, most federal environmental laws expressly
exclude ``source, special nuclear and byproduct material'' from the
scope of health, safety and environmental regulation by EPA or the
states, leaving the field to DOE and NRC. In the absence of clear
language in those statutes authorizing EPA (or states where
appropriate) to regulate the environmental and public health impacts of
radioactive waste, DOE thereby retains broad authority over its vast
amounts of radioactive waste, with EPA and state regulators then only
able to push for stringent cleanups on the margins of the process.
Indeed, the BRC Report discusses the State of New Mexico's efforts to
regulate aspects of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant through RCRA as
critical positive element in the development of the currently active
site. Final Report at 21.\1\ The NRC also retains far reaching safety
and environmental regulatory authority over commercial nuclear
facilities, with agreement states able to assume NRC authority, but
only on the federal agency's terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The BRC Report omits discussion of the fierce effort New Mexico
waged to obtain RCRA authority over the site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States are welcome to consult with the NRC and the DOE, but the
agencies can, and will, assert preemptive authority where they see fit.
This has happened time and again at both commercial and DOE nuclear
facilities. Indeed, disputes over cleanup at the Hanford Reservation
have gone on for decades and show little sign of subsiding. This
outdated regulatory scheme is the focal point of the distrust that has
poisoned federal and state relationships involved in managing and
disposing of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel,
with resulting significant impacts on public health and the
environment.
If EPA and the states had full legal authority and could treat
radionuclides as they do other pollutants under environmental law,
clear cleanup standards could be promulgated, and we could be much
farther along in remediating the toxic legacy of the Cold War. Further,
we could likely avoid some of the ongoing legal and regulatory disputes
over operations at commercial nuclear facilities. Any regulatory change
of this magnitude would have to be harmonized with appropriate NRC
licensing jurisdiction over facilities and waste and harmonized with
EPA's existing jurisdiction with respect to radiation standards: but
such a process is certainly within the capacity of the current federal
agencies and engaged stakeholders. Some states would assume regulatory
jurisdiction over radioactive material, others might not. But in any
event, substantially improved clarity in the regulatory structure and a
meaningful state oversight role would allow, for the first time in this
country, consent-based and transparent decisions to take place on the
matter of developing storage sites and geologic repositories.
Ending the anachronistic AEA exemptions solves the matter of
meaningful state oversight and does not carry with it substantial
likelihood of congressional terms and modifications exacted from states
years into a good faith negotiation on a site. Indeed, while it would
be possible for a future Congress to revisit the AEA and re-insert
exemptions from environmental law, it would have to do so in a manner
that would remove overdue jurisdictional authority from all states (or
Congress would have to single out one state for special treatment). The
difficulty of prevailing over the interest of all 50 states rather than
simply amending legislation that affects the interests of just one
state should be apparent.
Responses of Geoffrey H. Fettus to Questions From Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. Yes. In our May 2013 comments on the Discussion Draft of
this bill, we asserted representation on this board of directors should
be balanced by political party representation, by governmental
affiliation (i.e., federal, state, or tribal), and include
representation by non-governmental organizations in addition to
industry. We hold the same concerns for any Oversight Board and make
similar suggestions. In establishing an Oversight Board for whatever
nuclear waste entity is created, the legislation should have a
provision explicitly prohibiting the majority on the board from
comprising members with existing or historical ties to the nuclear
industry. Such a requirement would recognize the existing revolving
door between government service at NRC, DOE and the nuclear industry.
Further, ensuring the Oversight Board is not disproportionately
composed of members with existing or historical ties to the nuclear
industry would improve public trust and acceptance of the government's
newly legislated nuclear waste storage and disposal program.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. Assuming a single Administrator approach is retained, we
think a four year term commensurate with the appointing Administration
is appropriate. Despite our concern a single administrator can undo or
upset carefully crafted decisions in a short time frame (as opposed to
a more balanced board), the likelihood of strong tension and an
inability to carry out policy options between an administrator and
President of differing parties (or, for that matter, differences with
Congress) weighs strongly in favor allowing the Executive Branch to
appoint its selected manager.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. While we expect at least two repositories will ultimately
need to be developed, NRDC has no precise number of repositories or
storage facilities in mind for management and disposal of nuclear
waste. Our nation already manages nuclear waste at more than 100
operating or retired commercial nuclear reactors and at dozens of
legacy nuclear weapons sites. For political reasons and institutional
reasons well documented by the BRC and any cursory review of the last
55 years, we think it unlikely a repository program focused on a single
site is tenable.
With respect to repositories in particular, NRDC submits that
development of multiple repositories is not an impossible Gordian knot.
No one can guarantee solutions in the future but we can learn from the
past and avoid at least the most obvious pitfalls, such as pre-
selecting sites and then weakening regulatory standards in order for
the site to be licensed. Further, providing States with meaningful
regulatory oversight, as described in our written testimony and in
answer to Chairman Wyden's question, can allow states in our federal
system the comfort and control necessary to allow for technically
adequate and publicly accepted sites to go forward without fear of
political retribution. Thus, we can start to solve the problem of how
many repositories might be necessary with fundamental changes in the
law to address such federal, state and tribal tensions over nuclear
waste--the institutional blockages in our federal system that will
never disappear but can only be managed.
With respect to a number of storage sites, as we noted in written
testimony, a pilot interim storage project housed at an existing
commercial reactor site that addresses issues of stranded fuel would go
far in dealing with a number of public safety and environmental harms,
would do no damage to a carefully constructed bill that focuses on
repository development.
Specifically, we urged the Committee to write legislative language
for a pilot project to address the total stranded spent fuel at closed
reactor sites (13 sites), currently defined in S.1240 as ``priority
fuel,'' where spent fuel would be stored in dry casks within one or
more hardened buildings similar to the Ahaus facility in Germany.
Potential volunteer sites already demonstrating ``consent'' are found
at operating commercial reactors. The utility of using existing
commercial operating reactor sites rather than burdening new areas with
spent nuclear fuel should be apparent: existing sites require far less
new infrastructure, already have the capacity for fuel management and
transportation and have the local community and state de facto consent
for spent fuel storage necessary for hosting nuclear facilities. And by
keeping consolidated, interim-stored spent nuclear fuel under the
guardianship of the nuclear industry that produced the waste in the
first instance, Congress ensures that careful progress continues with
the repository program because all parties will know that it is
necessary. Such a pilot project demonstrates proof of concept for safe
storage, reduces the number of sites where spent nuclear fuel is
stored, and, importantly, does not pollute a green-field site that
could also be adopted for divisive and unwise closed fuel cycle
activities.
We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee on this
difficult topic.
______
Responses of David C. Boyd to Questions From Senator Wyden
Question 1. The BRC cites the Government's liability for breaching
its contractual commitment to dispose of the utilities' nuclear waste
as one of the main arguments supporting development of interim storage
facilities. The Government is liable for billions of dollars in damages
for failing to begin disposing of the utilities' waste in 1998, but it
is under no obligation to take title to the utilities' waste and remove
it from the reactor sites until the Government has a repository in
which to put it. The proposed legislation solves this problem by
authorizing the Government to begin storing the utilities' waste before
a repository is built, but in return, asks the utilities to settle
their lawsuits. The BRC urged settlement or arbitration of these suits.
Why shouldn't the bill require the Attorney General and the utilities
to settle the lawsuits, on a mutually agreeable basis, in return for
providing interim storage and taking the waste off the utilities' hands
sooner than it would without the new legislation?
Answer. The fundamental premise of this question is inaccurate. DOE
has a current obligation to take possession of the waste. In 1995, DOE
issued a ``Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance
issues.''\1\ There, just as this question presumes, DOE found it did
not have an unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to accept
high-level waste and spent fuel beginning January 31, 1998 in the
absence of a repository or interim storage facility constructed under
the NWPA. However, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed, noting, inter
alia:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Issues, 60 Fed.Reg.
21,793 (1995)
DOE's duty under subsection (B) to dispose of the SNF is
conditioned on the payment of fees by the owner and is
triggered, at the latest, by the arrival of January 31, 1998.
Nowhere, however, does the statute indicate that the obligation
established in subsection (B) is somehow tied to the
commencement of repository operations referred to in subsection
(A). . . Thus, we hold that section 302(a)(5)(B) creates an
obligation in DOE, reciprocal to the utilities' obligation to
pay, to start disposing of the SNF no later than January 31,
1998.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, Indiana Michigan Power Company v. Department of Energy,
Case Nos. 95-1279 et al. (DC Circuit 1996), available online at: http:/
/caselaw.findlaw.com/us-dc-circuit/1278574.html.
DOE's obligation to physically take possession of the waste, which
is the basis of its liability, is clear. Once the government, through
the new program established in new legislation, is positioned to accept
waste, they can move it without proposed Section 406(b)(1). That
section requires the contract holder to settle all claims for breach of
contract for the disposal of nuclear waste as a condition for the
Administrator to ``take title to and store the nuclear waste of the
contract holder at a storage facility.'' The section is not necessary
and actually removes incentives for government action.
As a direct consequence of DOE action that complies with the
contracts, there will necessarily also be specific reductions in
liability associated with the waste actually taken for interim storage.
Performance should remain the key component to reducing the federal
government's liability. Given the history of this program, i.e., the
federal government's difficulty and sometime recalcitrance with
complying with the law, an ever-increasing federal liability is the
only incentive for action. There is no question that, as fiscal
pressure on the Judgment Fund grows, it can only ratchet up political
pressure for action. History suggests little else has an impact.
Aside from the fact that Section 406(b)(1) eliminates perhaps the
strongest incentive for government action, it also unfairly and
inappropriately shifts liability from taxpayers generally to electric
ratepayers before the DOE takes actual possession of the waste. Under
the new legislation, ratepayers are already on the hook to pay for
interim storage, and the associated additional transportation that will
be required--costs that would not be necessary if the government
fulfilled its responsibility to establish a working geological
repository.
Question 1, Subpart 1. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act asks nuclear
ratepayers to pay one-tenth a cent per kilowatt-hour on nuclear-
generated electricity. DOE hasn't met its contractual obligation to
begin disposing of the utilities waste, but neither has it raised the
disposal fee in 30 years--not even for inflation. And the additional
cost to the utilities of storing their waste at their reactors is being
paid out of the Treasury's Judgment Fund, not by raising the fee on
ratepayers. How would ratepayers be harmed by requiring the Attorney
General to settle the pending lawsuits by seeking a reduction in future
damage payments in return for taking the waste off the utilities' hands
sooner, thereby reducing the damages the utilities would otherwise be
owed?
Answer. NARUC has challenged the current NWF fees as unjustified.
As a matter of both fact and law, prior fee assessments conducted by
federal government indicated that the fund was ``sufficient'' to cover
the costs of disposal without increases--even to reflect inflation. The
effort to equate the non-performance by the government to the fact that
the fee has not increased is illogical. As noted in our first response,
it is difficult to understand how a settlement affecting waste that
remains onsite will do anything to incent DOE to move more quickly to
``take the waste off the utilities' hands.'' The incentive for that
action is outstanding with no additional legislation. Ratepayers have
upheld their side of the contract. They have paid the fees for years,
and, so far, have not received the service for which they have paid.
Even if one discounts NARUC's contention that such settlements would
make it less, not more, likely that the Government will act in a timely
manner, there is still no way to gauge the actual impact of
settlements. The bill does not detail how they will be structured, how
much liability is shifted to ratepayers, or even provide a reasonable
explanation for how or why the settlements will actually ``incent''
government action. Future expenditures due to contract breaches by the
federal government not covered under the settlements will fall on
ratepayers, because the bill requires that settlements release the
federal government of all existing and future liability before the
waste is actually moved. Should additional on-site storage be necessary
due to future delays, then those costs will also fall exclusively upon
the ratepayer. And then there is always the question of this or a
future Administration's compliance with the law. Given past practice,
it is certainly possible that settlements could be reached and an
Administration will decide that compliance with the law--no matter how
clear--is ``not practical.'' The fundamental question remains: Why is
it necessary for the federal government to receive some sort of
dispensation or additional consideration/compensation for doing what
they agreed to do decades ago?
Question 2. DOE stated in its response to the BRC report its goal
to have a repository constructed and operating by 2048. 35 years is a
long time to wait. Is this goal reasonable, and if not, what do you
believe is a more logical timeframe?
Answer. Based on the history of the repository program, we are not
confident a repository will be operating by 2048. In the April 18, 1983
Federal Register, DOE made this statement, ``The 1998 date (to begin
permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel) is called for in the Act, and
we believe it to be a realistic date. Our performance will be judged by
meeting that date.'' Performance to-date is non-existent. The bill's
target date of December 2048 (Section 504(b)(C)) for such a repository
to be operational is not acceptable. The date is taken from the DOE
Strategy's proposed repository date. That document provides zero
support or rationale for this ``new'' target date. The only thing that
is clear is that no one involved with this issue today is likely to be
around to accept responsibility for non-compliance. Obviously, a target
date so far in the future effectively eliminates any sense of urgency
necessary to compel timely government action. Moreover, the deadline is
so distant that potential hosts for consolidated storage facilities
would be justifiably nervous about becoming de facto permanent sites.
We believe there is no way to come up with a timeframe, logical or not,
unless this Administration and future Administrations commit to
upholding the law and this Congress as well as future Congresses
appropriate the necessary funds that have been and continue to be
collected for this purpose.
Responses of David C. Boyd to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. Electricity ratepayers are funding the bulk of the
government's permanent disposal operations. Given that State Utility
Commissioners are intimately concerned with disposal and related cost
issues, a minimum of a third of any board should be, at the time of
their nomination, serving State Commissioners nominated by NARUC only
from States with working nuclear power plants or commercial/defense
waste slated for permanent disposal by the federal government. If they
leave public service for a position with another stakeholder group on
waste disposal issues, NARUC should be allowed to nominate a
replacement to finish out that term.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. NARUC, as an organization, has not taken a specific
position on the issue of length of service. Logic suggests a Federally-
chartered corporation structure with an executive officer and Board, as
recommended by the BRC, will provide a more successful vehicle for
disposal activities. However, it does appear that a six year term is
too short for an Administrator. A longer fixed term for the
Administrator--one that spans multiple administrations perhaps 10-14
years or more--would enhance the stability and political insulation of
the position.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. NARUC, as an organization, has not taken a specific
position on either issue. Many argue that even if the license for Yucca
Mountain is approved and additional waste storage is authorized there,
a new geological repository may be required. Logic suggests that, if
collocation is a scientifically safe option, it can only reduce the
complexity and cost of both transport and security.
Question 4. Do you support the language we have included in the
legislation under Section 401 to cut off fee collection after December
31, 2025 unless the Administrator is operating a nuclear waste facility
by that date?
Answer. While not perfect, the requirement to require cut-off of
assessments in 2025 is certainly an improvement over the current
circumstances. The provision should, however, be amended to specify a
working repository instead of just ``nuclear waste facilities.'' That
would provide strong incentives to expedite the repository siting
process.
______
Responses of Marvin S. Fertel to Questions From Senator Wyden
Question 1. Several states have laws prohibiting construction of
new nuclear power plants until a solution has been found for nuclear
waste. To what extent do you see the uncertainty of US policy on spent
fuel storage and disposal to be a barrier to the future use of nuclear
power?
Answer. A few states do have moratoria on construction until a
disposal pathway is available. In some instances, these bans are being
reconsidered and may be lifted. While these bans do create a barrier to
the construction of new nuclear plants in those specific states, the
primary barriers are the economic fundamentals of electricity
generation, low economic growth and no growth in electricity demand,
which has led to excess generating capacity in most parts of the
country, and the low cost of natural gas. Five new reactors are
currently under construction in the United States and, in these
instances, used fuel management was not a significant consideration in
the final decision to authorize the projects. The current lack of a
federal program, however, did contribute to the Court's decision to
vacate NRC's temporary storage rule (waste confidence rule). This has
resulted in a temporary halt to licensing of new reactors and
completion of licensing renewals. So it is imperative that a
sustainable program be established as soon as possible.
Question 2. The BRC cites the Government's liability for breaching
its contractual commitment to dispose of the utilities' nuclear waste
as one of the main arguments supporting development of interim storage
facilities. The Government is liable for billions of dollars in damages
for failing to begin disposing of the utilities' waste in 1998, but it
is under no obligation to take title to the utilities' waste and remove
it from the reactor sites until the Government has a repository in
which to put it. The proposed legislation solves this problem by
authorizing the Government to begin storing the utilities' waste before
a repository is built, but in return, asks the utilities to settle
their lawsuits. Your organization has expressed concern about this
provision. The law generally favors settlement of litigation. The BRC
urged settlement or arbitration of these suits. Why shouldn't the bill
require the Attorney General and the utilities to settle the lawsuits,
on a mutually agreeable basis, in return for providing interim storage
and taking the waste off the utilities' hands sooner than it would
without the new legislation?
Answer. The Government has already paid out billions of dollars in
damages for its breach of its contractual obligation to begin taking
the utilities' spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998. The longer it
takes for the Government to begin to meet its obligations, the larger
the damages. Even if the government were to begin to perform by 2020,
the Secretary of Energy has estimated that damages would exceed $20
billion.
Since the Government's 1998 obligation, first breached 15 years
ago, can be met either by DOE taking spent fuel initially for interim
storage or directly to a repository, the proposed legislation does not
create any new rights for the utilities. Until the DOE can accept the
utilities' spent fuel either at a repository or an interim storage
facility, it will continue to be in breach and the utilities will
continue to be able to recover as damages their added costs imposed by
that breach.
We certainly agree that settlements should be favored, and many
utilities have voluntarily entered into settlements of their breach of
contract claims. In any case, while we support the concept of
encouraging settlements, the provisions of the bill would go far beyond
encouraging and would for all practical purposes give the Government
the complete ability to force on the utilities any terms it wanted as
the price for the Government meeting the contractual obligations that
it is already subject to. Such a settlement would most likely not be
``mutually agreeable,'' since the utilities would have to agree to
whatever terms the Government insisted upon in order to receive the
performance that it has been paying for. Should Congress impose such a
one-sided deal on the utilities, it would be in essence breaching the
Standard Contract, since the Contract as described below does not limit
the requirement for the Government's performance to the existence of a
repository. The Supreme Court in the Winstar cases has held that
Congressional legislation in such circumstances is itself a contractual
breach, entitling the private party to recover damages from the
Government. By making the DOE's obligation to provide interim storage
subject to the utilities agreeing to a settlement, the legislation
imposes a one-sided sanction, since there would be no incentive on the
Government's part for a true negotiated settlement. That's why a more
effective and fairer approach would be to direct the Department of
Justice to settle the breach of contract lawsuits on reasonable terms
with willing contract holders without the legislation imposing
conditions on the settlements.
The assumption underlying Question 2 seems to be that the
Government's obligation to perform is tied to the existence of a
repository. This assumption was explicitly rejected by the US Court of
Appeals for the DC Circuit in Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. DOE, 88
F.3d 1272 (DC Cir. 1996). The Court was clear that DOE's statutory
obligation to perform and its liability for breaching that obligation
was not tied to the existence of a repository. Nor is DOE's contractual
obligation to start taking the utilities' spent fuel tied to the
existence of a repository. The Standard Contract, 10 CFR Part 961,
requires DOE to begin its services ``after commencement of facility
operations, not later than January 31, 1998.'' Article II. And
``facility'' is defined in Article I.10 to include both ``a facility .
. . for the purpose of disposing of spent nuclear fuel . . ., or such
other facility(ies) to which spent nuclear fuel . . may be shipped by
DOE prior to its transportation to a disposal facility.'' In other
words, neither DOE's obligation to accept nor its liability for
nonperformance is tied to the existence of a repository.
In terms of DOE's obligation to take title to the utilities' spent
fuel, again the Standard Contract does not tie this obligation to the
existence of a repository. Article VII (Title) says that ``Title to all
SNF . . . accepted by DOE for disposal shall pass to DOE at the
Purchaser's site as provided for in Article VI hereof.'' Article VI in
turn sets forth general requirements as to the specifications for
acceptable spent fuel, procedures for acceptance, priorities, and
consequences of improperly described spent fuel. Article VI says
nothing about where the spent fuel is to be shipped. And the wording in
Article VII the spent fuel has to be ``accepted by DOE for disposal''
does not mean that once the spent fuel is accepted, it must immediately
be shipped to a repository, rather than initially to an interim storage
facility. Since DOE will ultimately dispose of the spent fuel, whether
or not the spent fuel is first shipped to a repository or an interim
storage facility, in either case it is being ``accepted . . . for
disposal.''
To the extent that the Question is based on an interpretation of
section 123 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, that interpretation is not
correct. Section 123 states that ``Delivery, and acceptance by the
Secretary, of any . . . spent nuclear fuel for a repository constructed
under this subtitle shall constitute a transfer to the Secretary of
title to such . . . spent fuel.'' As with the wording of Article VII of
the Standard Contract, when DOE takes spent fuel from a utility, it is
taking that spent fuel for ultimate disposal at a repository, even if
it first goes to DOE interim storage. So here too, the Government's
obligation is not tied to the existence of a repository. Nor does
Section 123 state that it is the only way that title can transfer to
the Government.
Question 3. S.1240 establishes a category for priority waste that
literally gets priority when it comes to access to Federal storage.
This includes spent fuel at decommissioned power plants, for example.
Are there other categories of spent fuel shipments that should get
priority that have not been included? For example, should nuclear power
plants that have had particular types of safety problems and have more
often received a worse-than-``green'' rating from the NRC get priority?
Answer. The industry is supportive of initially giving priority to
used fuel from shutdown plants without an operating reactor. Moving
this used fuel would permit the new management entity to ramp-up
operations while achieving immediate results and a reduction in
liabilities for the taxpayers and it would permit sites which have only
used fuel storage remaining to be fully decommissioned and the land
used for other purposes. The order in which used fuel will be picked up
from commercial reactors is governed by the principle of ``oldest fuel
first'' as outlined in the contracts between the companies and the
Department of Energy. The Department of Energy collects used fuel
discharge information and, based on this information, creates a queue
for prioritizing shipments. This approach for shipping used fuel from
commercial nuclear reactors provides a good legal framework but does
not provide a practical and efficient framework for moving used fuel.
At the appropriate time, the structure of the queue must be addressed
by the commercial entities. The goal at that time should be to
establish a priority list for used fuel that minimizes operational
burdens on operating reactors while optimizing overall system
efficiency and cost.
The industry currently safely and securely manages used fuel at
reactor sites and decommissioned sites. Operational issues that are
identified by either the industry or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
are appropriately resolved through the existing regulatory framework.
While the industry is committed to continual safety improvement,
priority should be given to those areas that will achieve the largest
safety benefit. For example, the industry's resources should be devoted
to those safety improvements associated with reactor operations and
spent fuel pool monitoring (a lesson learned from the Fukushima
accident--see question 5 for additional information) and not
arbitrarily reducing the inventory of the pools as a result of a worse-
than-``green'' rating from NRC, which in and of itself may not be very
safety significant. The legislation as currently drafted provides for
``emergency'' shipments. This category, in addition to the defined
``priority'' shipments, provides the new management entity and the
industry with sufficient flexibility to manage used fuel without
legislatively establishing additional criteria for prioritizing used
fuel shipments.
Question 4. DOE stated in its response to the BRC report its goal
to have a repository constructed and operating by 2048. 35 years is a
long time to wait. Is this goal reasonable, and if not, what do you
believe is a more logical timeframe?
Answer. The industry reacted with frustration to the target date of
2048 for the opening of a new repository. The industry still supports
the completion of the Yucca Mountain licensing process and believes
that if successfully licensed and appropriately managed and funded the
Yucca Mountain repository could be opened well before 2048. However, if
a second repository program is initiated, the industry believes that
the target date for beginning operations should be no more than 25
years after program commencement. Being able to meet or exceed this
time period, though, will require a focused effort from beginning to
end from a new management entity solely dedicated to the project with
unfettered access to the Nuclear Waste Fee payments and the corpus of
the Nuclear Waste Fund. Key aspects of this effort must include generic
repository (NRC and/or EPA) regulations prior to completion of siting,
and a requirement for the NRC to complete the licensing review in three
years similar to the review period for the Yucca Mountain license
application.
Question 5. This bill sets up a program for the Federal Government
to build new storage facilities for spent fuel. I think it makes sense
to move spent fuel if it's going to be cheaper and safer, for example,
at decommissioned nuclear power plants where there's not going to be
ongoing operations. However, at some nuclear power plants, there are
going to be continued operations, and maintenance, and security, and
environmental monitoring for decades to come. It might NOT be cheaper
or safer to move this fuel to a central storage site, especially since
it will need to be moved again to the repository. Should the bill
include a program to help pay for continued on-site storage at nuclear
power plant sites if that would be safer and less expensive?
What else could Congress do to encourage movement of spent fuel out
of reactor pools, such as allowing the Attorney General to enter into
negotiations with the utilities to seek their voluntary agreement to
transfer their waste to dry cask storage as part of a settlement
agreement in return for providing interim storage off-site?
Answer. The new management entity should work closely with the
industry to maximize the efficiency of the used fuel program while
minimizing the total program cost. As the pilot consolidated storage
facility and repository are being developed, the new management entity
should assess the situation to determine how much used fuel should be
shipped to a consolidated storage facility. The new management entity
should also determine the long-term role of a consolidated storage
facility. For example, the new management entity could choose to
utilize the consolidated storage facility as the front-end processing
and repackaging (if necessary) facility for the repository and such a
facility could be co-located with the repository if practical. Opening
a consolidated storage facility will enable the new management entity
to begin performing under the standard contract and to begin reducing
taxpayer liability. However, the lawsuits for partial breach of
contract will continue well beyond the date that the new management
entity begins accepting used fuel.
The industry has, and always will, safely and securely manage used
fuel at our sites. We do not believe that reducing the inventory in the
spent fuel pools will increase safety margins sufficiently compared to
other safety enhancements currently underway. The industry has
extensively reviewed the Fukushima tragedy and is making the
appropriate changes to improve monitoring and instrumentation of spent
fuel pool water level as a result of the lessons learned from the
accident. It should be noted that the primary release of radiation
during the accident was from the reactors and not the spent fuel pools.
In fact, the water level in the spent fuel pools never fell below the
top of the used fuel assemblies and the spent fuel pool structures
withstood the hydrogen explosions while maintaining structural
integrity. A review of the accident confirms that industry resources
are appropriately being devoted to safety improvements associated with
reactor operations and spent fuel pool monitoring and not reducing the
inventory of the pools. The industry's FLEX program, which provides
multiple redundant resources to maintain water in the reactor and in
the spent fuel pool under unforeseen circumstances, is a prime example
of prioritized safety enhancements. Ultimately, the quickest way to
reduce the inventory in the pools is to establish a sustainable program
that can move used fuel off the sites quicker than it is being
generated. The industry is committed to the establishment of such a
program and will work with the new management entity to maximize
efficiency and minimize program cost.
Responses of Marvin S. Fertel to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. The industry has advocated that the new management entity
should have a corporate structure with a Board of Directors and a CEO
that is chosen and hired by the Board. At a basic level, the elements
of the management structure desired by the industry and that proposed
in the legislation are similar: each approach has a board that provides
oversight for the organization and each has a leader that is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the entity and is the
person to be contacted when significant problems occur. There are,
however, significant differences in how the industry believes these
management elements should be implemented compared to the legislation.
In the industry model, the Board of Directors would provide policy
direction, hold the CEO accountable for performance (including
dismissal if necessary), and ultimately approve the management budget.
The CEO should be an individual that has experience managing large
organizations, is well versed in the culture of commercial nuclear
facilities and has requisite attention to nuclear safety and security
that is expected from all employees of a nuclear industrial company. In
the case of the legislation, both the Administrator and Deputy
Administrator are political appointments and cannot be reprimanded or
dismissed by the oversight board. While it is essential that a
corporate CEO has relevant and successful management experience, the
political appointment process does not ensure that the individuals
chosen to lead government agencies have such experience. In a corporate
environment, significant cost overruns and project delays on billion
dollar projects could result in the dismissal of the CEO. In government
agencies senior leadership is not held responsible for cost overruns
and project delays as evidenced by numerous project failures and delays
within the Department of Energy and other agencies.
Corporate boards are typically focused on the entity's balance
sheet and its financial strength. For that reason, they pay most
attention to issues associated with financing (where is the money
coming from) and liabilities (how much might the company owe). In that
context, it would authorize a major capital project including its cost
and financing plan, and then monitor its progress to assure it is
staying on track. The scope of the Board's responsibilities should be
clearly defined in legislation. In our testimony, NEI did advocate for
particular seats on the Board to be reserved for certain stakeholders.
The legislation should ensure that the Board includes representation
from stakeholders both inside and outside of government. The Board
should include members from entities that contribute or have
contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund. Other members of the Board
should be appointed from state public utility commissions or
representatives thereof. NEI recommends that an individual must be a
citizen of the U.S. and have management, financial, technical or other
appropriate expertise to be eligible for appointment to the Board.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. The industry does not believe a government agency structure
with an Administrator will ever deliver a sustainable and successful
program. The new management entity must come as close as possible to a
corporate structure, with the project management capability and
discipline associated with the corporate structure. Compare the
experience with the on-going Vogtle and V. C. Summer nuclear plant
expansions in Georgia and South Carolina and any recent Department of
Energy high dollar value construction project. The DOE projects are
regularly years behind schedule and over budget whereas the Vogtle and
V. C. Summer projects, in contrast, are close to on-time and on-budget.
The difference between the performance of government projects and
commercial projects can be attributed largely to the management
oversight of the contractors and not the contractors themselves. For
this reason, the industry strongly recommends a corporate structure (as
described above in the response to question 1) as opposed to a
government agency, even one run by a single administrator. In response
to the question, however, NEI would recommend that the Administrator's
term be on the order of ten years, similar to the Director of the FBI,
in order to ensure political stability and continuity, especially
during a change of Administration. The Administrator should also be
permitted to serve multiple concurrent terms.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. As an estimate, the U.S. commercial nuclear industry has
about 70,000 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reactor sites around
the country presently (not including defense waste). The commercial
industry produces another 2,000 metric tons of used fuel each year. The
number of storage facilities and repositories needed would depend
ultimately on the outcomes of the recommended consent-based siting
process and the resolution of the Yucca Mountain licensing process. An
effective consent-based siting process will permit the state, affected
local community and/or tribe to determine what size facility they are
willing to host. So the number of facilities greatly depends on what
sites come forward during the consent-based process and how much
nuclear waste each site can technically and politically accommodate.
The number of nuclear waste management facilities also depends on
the schedule for when such facilities become operational. If the Yucca
Mountain repository was operational and the statutory limit of 70,000
metric tons was removed, the U.S. may only need that one disposal site
as it is generally agreed, based on technical studies performed by the
Department of Energy and the Electric Power Research Institute, that
Yucca Mountain can accommodate significantly more used fuel than the
statutory limit. As the pilot consolidated storage facility and
repository are being developed, the new management entity should assess
the situation to determine how much used fuel should be shipped to a
consolidated storage facility. The new management entity should also
determine the long-term role of a consolidated storage facility vis-`-
vis the progress made on developing a repository.
Co-locating a repository and storage facility would have
advantages. However, NEI believes that the timelines for determining if
a site is suitable to host a repository will be considerably longer
than for a storage facility. As a result, NEI questions whether
attempting to comply with this preference may create unforeseen
challenges to siting a facility. If multiple sites for storage and
repository are needed, the industry would support geographically
diverse locations to minimize the transportation of nuclear waste over
long distances. Multiple locations also provide redundancy that would
greatly enhance the reliability of the whole nuclear waste management
system.
Question 4. Do you support the language we have included in the
legislation under Section 401 to cut off fee collection after December
31, 2025 unless the Administrator is operating a nuclear waste facility
by that date?
Answer. The industry supports the inclusion of this subsection that
would suspend waste fee payments if a disposal or storage facility is
not open by the end of 2025. We suggest that the language be modified
to address the conditions under which the waste fee payments would be
restarted. The industry continues to support the completion of the
Yucca Mountain licensing process and, as a result of the
Administration's actions, the industry has filed suit against DOE
challenging the continued collection of the Nuclear Waste Fee in the
absence of a federal program. Oral arguments in the case are scheduled
for September.
Question 5. Your testimony refers to an EPRI study that suggests a
storage facility could be constructed for $525 million. Given that this
legislation makes the fuel at decommissioned and stranded sites a
priority, does that amount include what will be necessary to rebuild
the infrastructure at those sites to get the casks to railhead? How
much do you estimate it would cost to rebuild that infrastructure?
Answer. The EPRI study referenced in NEI's testimony does include
some costs for transportation infrastructure, although not for any
specific site where fuel is to be removed. As the EPRI report states
``the costs associated with development of the transportation
infrastructure for a generic interim storage facility will be highly
dependent upon the site chosen for the facility. Costs will depend upon
the site's proximity to rail transportation corridors and the resulting
length of a rail spur or heavy haul route to the site. The costs
associated with the design and construction of site access roads will
depend upon the existing transportation infrastructure, site
topography, etc.'' The total cost that EPRI included was $176.5
million, which included access road improvements, rail spur and the
various rail car components needed for transport (locomotive, escort,
buffer).
The Department of Energy has studied the existing infrastructure at
the decommissioned plant sites and issued a report about developments
that are needed. The report, ``Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used
Nuclear Fuel from Nine Shutdown Sites,'' issued on April 30, 2013,
includes characterizations of each site. It does not, however, include
any cost estimations for the infrastructure developments needed at each
site. But this type of analysis (including costs) will be needed to
move the casks off the site regardless if the fuel is bound for a
repository or consolidated storage facility.
______
Responses of Sally Jameson to Questions From Senator Wyden
Question 1. Several states have laws prohibiting construction of
new nuclear power plants until a solution has been found for nuclear
waste. To what extent do you see the uncertainty of US policy on spent
fuel storage and disposal to be a barrier to the future use of nuclear
power?
Answer. Speaking for myself as a Maryland state legislator, even
though a few states have rescinded their prohibition in the last
several years, not having a solution for the removal of spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) certainly gives those who oppose nuclear power plants an
argument that creates a certain level of fear in the public. Even
though NCSL has no formal policy admonishing a state for prohibiting
nuclear power, it is clear to me that nuclear power is the only base
load power source that is virtually carbon free. NCSL also has policies
related to federal clean air climate change actions.
Additionally, there is no question that not having a solution for
SNF has clearly propagated questions about fuel pool safety, over
packing of pools two to ten times their design capacity and storing
spent fuel in highly populated areas or adjacent to populations.
Establishing interim storage sites and repositories would provide
evidence to the states that we as a nation are serious about climate
change, safety and nuclear power, which I see as a solution to carbon
free, base load electricity.
Question 2. One of the central recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission is the need for a consent-based siting process where the
Federal Government works with States and Indian Tribes to pick a site,
and not in opposition to them. If there's a lesson that can be learned
from Yucca Mountain, it's that the Federal Government needs to do a
better job of working with States in picking nuclear waste sites.
However, I don't think you can have a process that puts what's
politically expedient ahead of safety. How can communities and the
States that surround them be assured that a consent-based siting
process is picking a safe site, not just the most politically popular
site?
Answer. Again, in speaking for myself as a Marylandstate
legislator, the siting process for the Monitored Retrievable System
(MRS) program and for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), now
known as the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation
(IFNEC), includes basic geographic and geologic criteria that were
established for any applicant to meet the sniff test for acceptability.
Such criteria as distance from populations, known water table depths,
historical geologic stability, dryness of area, air traffic, distance
from waterways, rivers, lakes, etc. are considered. Fundamental known
geology of an area and the geography of a site is the beginning
criteria for finding safe sites and eliminates those that will present
a hazard. If the facility is a repository there must be some known geo-
technical information that would make the medium for a facility
location preliminarily acceptable. Once the preliminary criteria are
met then there must be political acceptance by the affected city
councils and county commissions by resolution of support who are
typically close to their community residents and are able to represent
the consent of their area constituents. The next big leap is to have a
letter from the governor of the state, with approval from the
legislature, asking for money from the Department of Energy (DOE) to
begin the education process statewide, as well as with the legislature,
regarding the pros and cons of a facility and to develop the precepts
of a consent agreement. This process requires a request by the governor
and an expression of interest on behalf of the state, but does not
require a commitment. Then, assuming the education and consent process
goes well and the public has had significant opportunity to have input
into a ``consent agreement'' and there is an understanding of
acceptance of the facility, the legislature and governor would
collaborate on a final agreement to be offered to DOE. Upon receipt of
that state document, DOE would then embark on geo-technical
confirmation of the site at DOE's expense. That evaluation should be at
least equivalent to the Safety Analysis Report and other geo-technical
requirements of an NRC license. The NRC is a very tough regulator, and
safety is their sole objective when it comes to nuclear facilities.
Assuming this all passes NRC standards, the path to an NRC license
application should be paved. At this point, with no geo-technical
issues standing in the way of licensing, the state and DOE would
complete final negotiations on the contract, which must be irrevocable
by either party and completely enforceable in a court of competent
jurisdiction. The project would then begin post haste. The state will
obviously have health, safety, environmental, and financial assurance
of closure or decommissioning, a benefit package for the state and
local governments and probably other conditions such as an NRC license,
co-inspections by the state, fines for non-performance, public
involvement, reporting, and other terms and conditions.
This process is very public and includes local, county, state
elected officials every step of the way and into the future. It
concludes with a contract that is enforceable and creates transparency.
As a final recommendation, I would suggest that DOE not only
provide money in the first tranche for the ``consent process,'' but
also include enough funds for the state to hire an expert team of
lawyers and scientists solely responsible to the state to make sure the
state is well informed as to the NRC process, DOE standards and federal
contracting to enhance confidence. Most states lack this expertise
within any of their departments.
Question 3. Historically, citizens, local governments, and tribes
have expressed interest in hosting nuclear waste facilities, but state-
level opposition prevented any deals from being signed. Our bill tries
to address this problem by clearly spelling out a role for the state
from the beginning. Are there other measures that we should include to
address potential differences between local communities and broader,
state-wide interests?
Answer. As I described in my written testimony, there are a number
of legislative options for ensuring the consultation process can
integrate all aspects of state government and assure state legislative
input. As state legislators represent local communities, ensuring state
legislator participation in the consent process would build a system
for addressing any potential differences between local communities and
state-wide interests.
Specifically, one option to consider would be to add ``presiding
officer of each legislative chamber'' to all references to the
``Governor or duly authorized official of the state'' when mentioned
with regards to site selection, study and siting for both the
repository and storage facility processes. This would make it
consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 section 117, which
clearly states that the Department of Energy ``shall consult and
cooperate with the Governor and legislature of such State.'' NCSL
strongly urges this committee, as it moves forward to develop a program
for the long-term treatment and disposal of high-level radioactive
waste, to ensure adherence to this requirement.
Responses of Sally Jameson to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. Given the importance placed on state, local, and tribal
consultation in the draft, NCSL would recommend adding such
representation to the Oversight Board and other advisory committees, as
discussed in Section 205. In order to not overburden the board
structures, the appointments could be made through the national
organizations representing state, local and tribal elected officials
such as NCSL.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. NCSL has not yet taken a position on this issue.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. NCSL has not yet taken a position on this specific issue
regarding the geographic placement and co-locating of sites. However,
NCSL does support one of the main recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission regarding the need for a consent-based siting process where
the federal government works with states and Indian Tribes to pick a
site.
Question 4. When it comes to a state, local community, or tribal
government interacting with the new entity, is it preferable to
interact with a single administrator type structure, or a board of
directors with a CEO?
Answer. NCSL has not yet taken a position on this issue.
______
Union of Concerned Scientists,
Chattanooga, TN, August 8, 2013.
Hon. Ron Wyden,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Lisa Murkowski,
Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Murkowski: On behalf of the
Union of Concerned Scientists, I appreciate your Committee conducting
the July 30 hearing on the draft S.1240, the Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2013, and for inviting me to share our views on
the matter during the hearing. Onsite spent fuel storage is one of
UCS's primary nuclear safety concerns and we view this draft bill as
the best opportunity in many years to make substantive progress in
dealing with this issue. We are very mindful of and appreciative for
the key roles you have played as co-authors of the bill and leaders of
the Committee in creating this opportunity. We pledge our support in
getting legislation enacted that provides significant, tangible
improvements from the current situation.
Enclosed are my responses to the Questions for the Record from the
July 30 hearing. If I can provide additional or clarifying information,
please let me know.
Sincerely,
David Lochbaum,
Director, Nuclear Safety Project.
[Enclosure.]
Responses to Questions From Senator Wyden
Question 1. Our bill establishes a category for priority waste that
literally gets priority when it comes to access to Federal storage.
This includes spent fuel at decommissioned power plants, for example.
Are there other categories of spent fuel shipments that should get
priority that have not been included? For example, should nuclear power
plants that have had particular types of safety problems and have more
often received a worse-than-``green'' rating from the NRC get priority?
Answer. During the July 30 hearing, Chairman Wyden spoke of spent
fuel storage measures that can reduce costs while improving safety.
Those reasonable principles may identify spent fuel shipments having
secondary priority. For example, dry storage methods are long lasting
but not immortal. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued
Information Notice 2012-20 (available online at http://
pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1231/ML12319A440.pdf) last fall about potential
chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking of dry cask storage system
canisters. Last year the NRC also issued Information Notice 2012-13
(available online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1216/
ML121660156.pdf) about aging degradation of safety materials in spent
fuel pools. Owners of operating reactors could pay for the measures
necessary to protect safety margins from such degradation mechanisms.
There is also the potential for an existing onsite dry storage facility
to become filled, requiring its owner to pay for supplemental onsite
storage capacity (e.g, construct additional horizontal concrete vaults
or pour larger concrete pads for vertical casks). In such cases,
shipment from operating reactor sites to a Federal storage site might
reduce overall system costs while also increasing safety levels or
preserving safety margins. The bill should empower the entity tasked
with managing the Federal storage program to authorize spent fuel
shipments from operating reactor sites as a secondary priority based on
safety management and cost savings grounds.
Question 2. This bill sets up a program for the Federal Government
to build new storage facilities for spent fuel. I think it makes sense
to move spent fuel if it's going to be cheaper and safer, for example,
at decommissioned nuclear power plants where there's not going to be
ongoing operations. However, at some nuclear power plants, there are
going to be continued operations, and maintenance, and security, and
environmental monitoring for decades to come. It might NOT be cheaper
or safer to move this fuel to a central storage site, especially since
it will need to be moved again to the repository. Should the bill
include a program to help pay for continued on-site storage at nuclear
power plant sites if that would be safer and less expensive?
Answer. Yes, the bill should provide funding for continued onsite
storage at operating reactor sites when it reduces risk and saves
money. The bill should not fund higher risk and higher cost onsite
storage methods. For example, operating reactors with spent fuel pools
nearly filled to capacity may be required to shuffle the fuel
assemblies within the pools to maintain the desired old fuel/new fuel
configuration or be required to implement additional maintenance/
monitoring measures to mitigate the neutron absorber degradation
problem the NRC described last year in Information Notice 2012-13
(available online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1216/
ML121660156.pdf). Because the cheaper and lower risk alternative would
be to offload fuel assemblies from overcrowded spent fuel pools into
dry storage onsite, the bill should not finance this folly. But the
bill would improve safety and lower costs by providing financial
incentives for owners to accelerate the transfer from spent fuel pools
to dry storage. The bill could do so by paying for the dry storage
canisters and the costs of loading them.
Question 3. You have recommended accelerating the transfer of spent
fuel from the spent fuel pools to dry-cask storage. What else could
Congress do to encourage movement of spent fuel out of reactor pools,
such as allowing the Attorney General to enter into negotiations with
the utilities to seek their voluntary agreement to transfer their waste
to dry cask storage as part of a settlement agreement in return for
providing interim storage off-site?
Answer. In the past, some owners have explored using money from
their decommissioning funds to pay for onsite dry storage but have not
been allowed to do so. Regulation 10 CFR 50.75 (available online at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-
0075.html) requires owners to establish decommissioning funds.
Regulation 10 CFR 50.82 (available online at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0082.html) governs when
and how the decommissioning funds can be used. Once an owner has
notified the NRC per 10 CFR 50.82 that a reactor has permanently shut
down, decommissioning funds can be used to pay for onsite dry storage.
But decommissioning funds cannot readily be used to pay for onsite dry
storage for an operating reactor. Onsite dry storage can be considered
a pre-decommissioning or early decommissioning step consistent with the
overall goals of 10 CFR 50.75 and 10 CFR 50.82. Thus, the bill might
clearly authorize owners of operating reactors to use decommissioning
funds to pay for onsite dry storage.
Responses to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. No, the legislation handles the Oversight Board similar to
how appointments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are handled. Both
feature five-member panels of qualified individuals appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate with a provision that no more
than three members be from the same political party. The existing
provisions of the legislation provide the bi-partisan panel of diverse
viewpoints and interests to fulfill the role intended for the Oversight
Board.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. The six-year term, with the option for additional term(s)
as provided in the legislation, seems appropriate. It is long enough to
provide continuity of leadership yet short enough to avoid imposing the
``burnout'' burden on any individual.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. Science and the consent-based selection process provided
for in the legislation should answer these questions rather than the
legislation itself. As Senator Alexander suggested during the July 30
committee hearing, a site might require conditions on its acceptance of
a storage facility or repository. Those conditions might cap the amount
of material received at the site or require that it not be used for
both interim storage and ultimate disposal of nuclear waste. The
Nuclear Waste Administration would also be a party in the site
selection process and would presumably not authorize selection of a
site that would result in the need to find too many other sites. If the
legislation were to specify x locations with some here and others
there, it could impede the ability of the Nuclear Waste Administration
and the consent-based process from finding the best answers to these
key questions.
Response to Question From Senator Baldwin
Question 1. The departure from the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act
plan forced nuclear plant operators to pay for expanded onsite spent
fuel storage capacity. In order to meet this increased need, nuclear
plants simply crowded their existing spent fuel pools, placing
radioactive materials very close to one another, increasing the risk of
a meltdown. Dry cask storage can reduce the crowding of irradiated fuel
in spent fuel pools, bringing the pools back to housing a safe level of
reactor cores. I am concerned about the safety of workers and the
communities adjacent to nuclear plants with crowded fuel pools. Dry
cask storage is currently housing only 30 percent of Wisconsin's
nuclear waste. In order to safeguard communities and plant workers, how
can the Department of Energy, or the Nuclear Waste Administration if
applicable, incentivize nuclear plant operators to switch to dry
storage technology?
Answer. UCS strongly advocates accelerating the transfer of
irradiated fuel assemblies from spent fuel pools into dry storage via
either the carrot or stick approach. The stick approach could entail
measures in the bill that require owners to transfer all irradiated
fuel discharged from the reactor more than 10 years ago into dry
storage within 20 years of enactment and then to sustain transfers to
limit residence time in spent fuel pools to only irradiated fuel
discharged from reactors within 10 years. Another stick might be to
codify guidelines adopted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
after 9/11 to reduce risk of spent fuel pool sabotage. For example, the
bill could require that all spent fuel pools be reconfigured to a 1x4
arrangement (one irradiated fuel assembly with three empty storage
cells) within 5 years of enactment. On the carrot side, the bill could
pay for dry storage canisters and associated transfers. Another carrot
might be for the bill to clearly allow owners of operating reactors to
use the decommissioning funds required under 10 CFR 50.75 (available
online at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/
part050-0075.html) to pay for onsite dry storage. Or, the bill could
provide a carrot in the form of treating any nuclear plant site that
has reduced the inventory or irradiated fuel assemblies within its
spent fuel pools to less than the equivalent of two reactor cores as
having Priority Waste eligible for shipment to a Nuclear Waste
Facility. The bill might also feature a combination of carrot(s) and
stick(s)--carrot(s) to reward owners who pro-actively undertake
accelerated transfers into dry storage and stick(s) to protect the
public from further undue lagging.
______
Responses of Chuck Smith to Questions From Senator Wyden
Question 1. One of the central recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission is the need for a consent-based siting process where the
Federal Government works with States and Indian Tribes to pick a site,
and not in opposition to them. If there's a lesson that can be learned
from Yucca Mountain, it's that the Federal Government needs to do a
better job of working with S tates in picking nuclear waste sites.
However, I don't think you can have a process that puts what's
politically expedient ahead of safety. How can communities and the
States that surround them be assured that a consent -based siting
process is picking a safe site, not just the most politically popular
site?
Answer. Education, involvement and technical feasibility will be
keys picking a safe site. There are activities at the federal and local
level that can help assure communities and states that a consent-based
siting process is picking a safe site.
At the local level, to the extent the site is technically feasible,
support can only be built if a potential host community understands the
process for selection of the site, contraction and long-term operations
and if the community trusts that its interests, concerns and priorities
are being meaningfully considered and will be addressed. To that end,
local governments must be (1) involved in the entire decision -making
process from site analysis, selection, construction and operation and
(2) provided with the resources necessary to enable their independent
involvement throughout all of the phases of the project.
Local governments considering hosting nuclear waste storage and
disposal facilities need to become educated on nuclear issues. Funding
is needed to develop public outreach and education programs for
stakeholders, government officials in county, city and town agencies,
students, employees and individuals involved with emergency response
and average citizens. Funding will also allow a community to bring in
experts it trusts and whose responsibilities are to that community.
Outreach programs will ensure local communities understand the
proposed project, the health and safety issues, the real vs. perceived
risks, and will provide awareness of potential benefits -- such as job
creation or infrastructure development. Education and outreach efforts
may include: hosting meetings in the community; creating public
information campaigns; coordinating programs with local universities
and community colleges; building websites and producing written
material for distribution.
These programs must start as early as possible in order to
determine if enough support exists within a community for it to
volunteer for a nuclear waste mission. Also, these programs must
continue for the long-term in the community.
At the federal level, ECA recommends re-examination of work done in
the 1980s, when the Federal government identified technically feasible
sites in a variety of geologic media across the United States. That
work can be supplemented and amended to create a list of suitable
disposal mediums and where they exist. ECA further recommends that the
Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) immediately develop
scientifically-based health and environmental standards, model state
laws and regulations to help guide the siting process.
Finally, ECA recommends consideration of lessons learned at Yucca
Mountain. Billions of dollars were invested in scientific research
resulting in a majority of technical experts recommending the site as
safe and suitable. However the Administration's decision that Yucca
Mountain is ``unworkable'' after years of characterization and without
completing the licensing process, has eroded trust that the federal
government will follow the law.
It is fair to expect that unanimity will not be reached at any one
site, so the process has to be defensible and binding agreements with
local governments, states and tribes regarding future site evaluations
will be required. Over the long-term ``safety'' will need to be
reviewed and analyzed by the regulators and community continuously.
Question 2. Historically, citizens, local governments, and tribes
have expressed interest in hosting nuclear waste facilities, but state-
level opposition prevented any deals from being signed. Our bill tries
to address this problem by clearly spelling out a role for the state
from the beginning. Are there other measures that we should include to
address potential differences between local communities and broader,
state-wide interests?
Answer. As noted above funding for education will be a key to
permitting the state to participate in the process and to ensure that
the public in the state understands (and possibly supports) the
initiative to site a facility in the state. A key to the legislation
will be the authorization of grant funding for the state to analyze the
technical issues independently from any federal entity and to use the
funds to educate the state on safety issues and the economic benefits
and other benefits to the state.
While ECA has concluded that there is no one-size fits all consent
agreement--the terms of a consent agreement will be specific to each
potential host community and state, as negotiated with the federal
government--the more clarity there is, the less likely interest will be
reversed over time. To that end, the federal government should provide
resources now for site studies and education as the local government of
an interested community is responsible for outreach to the community as
well as to the state. Local communities can provide information on the
risks and benefits of a project and help educate state officials
regarding the safe transportation and operational records of facilities
like the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and private disposal
facilities. Unlike the last siting effort, there is now a defensible
safety record for state officials to consider. It would also be helpful
if the Federal government could better define the level of benefits
available for states or local governments considering hosting a nuclear
waste facility.
ECA agrees with the legislation that, once negotiated, the consent
agreement should be ratified by law, binding on all parties, and not
amended or revoked except by mutual agreement by the parties. The
question of when consent needs to be reached is one that requires
further discussion. It has been suggested that consent be obtained
early in the process contingent on NRC approval of licensing. If NRC
licensing proves to be problematic, all benefits accrued should be
retained by the state and local community.
Responses of Chuck Smith to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. With regard to the Oversight Board, the legislation
leaves it to the President to determine who should be appointed--with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Some have recommended that seats
be reserved for various entities. Do you believe this legislation
should provide more specificity as to who should be appointed to the
Board?
Answer. Yes, there should be seats specifically for key
stakeholders. ECA urges that a local government representative from an
affected local jurisdiction be appointed to ensure community
perspectives and concerns are represented. This is important to build
public trust and confidence in the system.
In addition, membership on the board should be specific as to
purpose and responsibilities, i.e., technical, scientific, policy,
regulatory and political, and defined in legislation to promote
accountability.
Political influence must be limited to the extent possible.
Question 2. While I understand that some of you would prefer a
Board of Directors structure to the new entity, assume that the single
Administrator approach is retained. Is the six-year service term
appropriate? Should it be longer/shorter?
Answer. It has been estimated that it will take about two decades
to site, license, construct and begin operations of a high-level
radioactive waste centralized storage facility. A repository will take
until 2048 according to DOE's latest estimate, which is optimistic. A
six-year term should allow sufficient time to make progress, but may
not preclude political manipulation.
Question 3. How many storage facilities and repositories do you
believe will be needed to handle this nation's nuclear waste? Should
they be co-located? Should they be geographically spread across the
country?
Answer. ECA supports focusing on achieving public acceptance and
siting, characterizing, licensing and opening one storage facility and
one repository. Our collective inability to do so thus far has been the
real issue. ECA does not have position on whether there should be more
than one storage facility or repository but most experts agree that
more than one facility and repository will likely be needed.
It would be ideal and beneficial for a storage facility to be co-
located in order to consolidate and stage the waste. However, it should
not be a requirement as safe transportation has been demonstrated.
Finally, while geographically distributed sites may be desirable,
the location of a repository should be science-based on the most
suitable geology available and public acceptance. However, it should be
noted that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed principally because
there was an agreement that no one state would have to take all the
waste.
Question 4. When it comes to a state, local community, or tribal
government interacting with the new entity, is it preferable to
interact with a single administrator type structure, or a board of
directors with a CEO?
Answer. Both can work if managed properly. ECA urges that a
representative of the state and local government hosting the nuclear
waste facility have a position directly on any oversight or advisory
board.