[Senate Hearing 113-116]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-116
ASSESSING U.S. PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
IN THE ARCTIC: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES OF INCREASED MARINE ACTIVITY
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 27, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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85-764 WASHINGTON : 2013
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DEAN HELLER, Nevada
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK WARNER, Virginia TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska TED CRUZ, Texas
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES,
AND COAST GUARD
MARK BEGICH, Alaska, Chairman MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida Member
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAN COATS, Indiana
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts TED CRUZ, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 27, 2013................................... 1
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 1
Witnesses
Tommy P. Beaudreau, Acting Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals
Management, U.S. Department of the Interior.................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Rear Admiral Thomas P. Ostebo, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard
Seventeenth District........................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Peter E. Slaiby, Vice President, Shell Alaska.................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Helen Brohl, Executive Director, U.S. Committee on the Marine
Transportation System.......................................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Captain Edward Page, USCG (Retired), Executive Director, Marine
Exchange of Alaska............................................. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Eleanor Huffines, Manager, U.S. Arctic Program, The Pew
Charitable Trusts.............................................. 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Matt Ganley, Vice President, Resources and External Affairs,
Bering Straits Native Corporation.............................. 51
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Jack Omelak, Executive Director, Alaska Nanuuq Commission and
Member, Arctic Marine Mammal Coalition......................... 55
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Letter dated January 30, 2013 from Rear Admiral Thomas P.
Ostebo, U.S. Coast Guard................................... 57
Appendix
Christopher M. Reddy, Ph.D., Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 69
Letter dated September 20, 2012 from the Alaska Eskimo Whaling
Commission, Alaska Beluga Whale Committee, Eskimo Walrus
Commission, Alaska Nanuuq Commission and Ice Seal Committee.... 71
ASSESSING U.S. PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE IN THE ARCTIC:
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
OF INCREASED MARINE ACTIVITY
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and
Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Anchorage, AK.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
room 307, University of Alaska Anchorage Campus, Hon. Mark
Begich, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Let's go ahead and
call the meeting of the Oceans subcommittee hearing on Arctic
matters to order, and we thank everyone for attending and being
here, and we appreciate it. To our guests, we appreciate that
they are also here.
We have two government witnesses joining us by
teleconference, videoconference actually, and we thank them.
This is part of what you see with budget reductions. They can't
be here, but we have tuned them in here, which we think is just
as good. Alaskans are used to videoconferencing, so we thank
them for being here. I will introduce them in a moment.
As Chair of the Oceans Senate subcommittee, this is the
fifth hearing on the opportunities and challenges facing Alaska
with coming Arctic development. We have had hearings in
Washington, D.C., Barrow, Anchorage, as well as several trips
to communities in-between to engage Alaskans, investors,
developers, policymakers and regulators in this discussion.
Some question the future of Arctic development. I would
like to say it's here, whether people like it or not. Arctic
development, oil and gas exploration, shipping, tourism is
happening in our Arctic waters now. The question is whether the
U.S. will set the bar for doing it right by using strong
science and data, by incorporating local and traditional
knowledge with critical supporting infrastructure and under
effective regulation to protect our Arctic people and
communities and subsistence resources upon which they live.
Since coming to the U.S. Senate, I have put together a
package of legislation to help get us there, to improve our
scientific understanding of the Arctic, to research Arctic
health needs, develop the ports and other infrastructure we
need, to share the Arctic generated revenues with its
communities and tribes and strengthen our international profile
in Arctic affairs.
I am also working closely with the administration to make
the right investments now to ensure safe and responsible
development, such as adequate icebreaking capacity.
Today our goal is to look specifically at current and
anticipated future Marine activity in the Arctic. Let's be
clear: this hearing is about the broad context of increased
maritime activity, not just about oil and gas development or
the KULLUK grounding this winter. The KULLUK was a high profile
example of challenges posed to marine transportation in the
Arctic. In 2012, there were more than 250 vessels operating in
the Arctic Ocean, over 480 transiting through the Bering
Strait. This, of course, is due to declining Arctic sea ice,
which allows increased access for longer periods. It creates
increased economic incentives for shipping to move through the
Bering Strait and the Arctic Ocean.
I've also said we face greater risks from the increasing
traffic we are seeing along the Russian Northern Sea route and
later through the Canadian Northwest Passage than we do from
oil and gas drilling in the Arctic. In the challenging Arctic
maritime environment, where there are no harbors or refuges and
few aids to navigation or search and rescue assets, mariners
also have less accurate weather forecasts and charts where
there are dozens of miles between accurate depths and readings.
Unlike oil and gas interests, which have incentives to work
closely with Arctic communities, shipping interests are more
transient and have fewer resources to mitigate risk and respond
to problems.
What I would like to now hear--we have two panels set up
today--from our experts is what to expect in the short-term,
medium and long-term, what we need and what we need to prepare
for, which I hope our panels will address. I plan to take what
I hear today back to Washington to move ahead on our Arctic
legislation. This is timely because we are now considering the
Coast Guard authorization bill. It seems like we just finished
one, but we will be back into it, energy legislation,
infrastructure investment, bills for the Army Corps,
transportation, environmental protection agencies. A variety of
issues are going to be in front of us for the next several
months. So we look forward to the testimony today.
Our first panel is made up of three individuals. Tommy
Beaudreau is from the Department of Interior, who is joining us
by VTC.
One moment, Tommy. I will have you speak.
Rear Admiral Tom Ostebo, Commander of the Coast Guard
District 17. We were just joking a little bit there. We have
this routine where we're always back together again.
And Pete Slaiby, Vice President of Exploration of Shell.
Again, this is our first panel. We'll have a second panel
after this, and we thank all three of you for being willing to
attend and be part of this testimony. Again, our goal is to
focus on not only what we did this last year but where do we
see the next stages of future Arctic development.
Let me first turn to Assistant Secretary Tommy Beaudreau.
Tommy?
STATEMENT OF TOMMY P. BEAUDREAU, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Mr. Beaudreau. Thank you, Chairman Begich. I appreciate
very much the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on
Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard to discuss the
extremely important and timely topic, ``Assessing U.S.
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic: The Opportunities and
Challenges of Increased Marine Activity.'' I apologize for
being unable to appear at the field hearing in person in
Anchorage, my hometown, and I'm grateful for the work of the
Committee staff to facilitate this video connection, and I
trust it's working.
Senator Begich. Absolutely. It's only 75 degrees here, and
it's sunny.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. But still, I'm glad to have you.
Mr. Beaudreau. Spring is a little bit late in D.C., too.
It's my sincere pleasure to appear on this panel,
particularly with United States Coast Guard Rear Admiral
Ostebo, for whom I have tremendous respect. No one understands
more deeply the unique maritime challenges of working safely in
offshore Alaska than Admiral Ostebo and the men and women of
the Coast Guard 17th District.
The Interior Department works closely with the Coast Guard
on a range of strategic and oversight issues relating to Alaska
and the U.S. Arctic, including offshore oil and gas
exploration. The Coast Guard performed extremely well in
planning for and playing a central role in overseeing Shell's
2012 Alaska offshore oil and gas exploration program. In
particular, I admire the courage and professionalism of the
Coast Guard emergency response personnel, who safely rescued
all crew members of the KULLUK drilling rig after the rig lost
its tow during a severe storm in the Gulf of Alaska at the end
of last December.
I would like to start by emphasizing the strategic and
economic importance of the Alaskan Arctic to the United States.
The U.S. Arctic Outer Continental Shelf holds tremendous energy
resource potential. For example, my agency, the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, estimates that the Chukchi Sea contains more
than 15 billion barrels of undiscovered recoverable oil, which
is second only to the central Gulf of Mexico in terms of its
offshore conventional energy potential.
The United States is a leader among Arctic nations in
evaluating the economic and energy potential of safe and
environmentally responsible offshore oil and gas development in
the Arctic, as well as the multitude of challenges facing the
region, including the consequences of rapid climate change. It
is essential that the United States understand the resource
potential of the Arctic, and offshore oil and gas exploration
has a key role in developing that understanding.
However, exploration must be conducted cautiously, safely,
and responsibly in light of the sensitive Arctic environment
and the Alaska Natives who are closely connected to the Arctic
Ocean for subsistence and fundamental aspects of their culture
and traditions.
DOI's recent review of Shell's 2012 Beaufort Sea and
Chukchi Sea program, which I led, identified a number of
principles for safe and responsible offshore oil and gas
exploration in the Arctic for the future.
First, all phases of an offshore Arctic program, including
preparations, drilling, maritime and emergency response
operations, must be integrated and subject to strong operator
management and government oversight.
Second, Arctic offshore operations must be well planned,
fully ready, and have a clear objective in advance of the
drilling season.
These first two principles are fundamental to working
safely offshore Alaska. Arctic offshore operations are
extremely complex, and there are substantial environmental
challenges and operational risks throughout every phase of the
endeavor.
Moreover, because of the inherent geographic, logistical
and environmental challenges associated with working on the
Arctic OCS, the operating plan and objectives of any offshore
Arctic program must be well planned and designed to provide
operational clarity, while also allowing for ample flexibility
in light of variable and changing conditions and the need for
safe demobilization.
Third, operators must maintain strong, direct management
and oversight of their contractors.
Fourth, operators must understand and plan for the
variability and challenges of Alaskan conditions. Reliable
weather and ice forecasting play a significant role in ensuring
safe operations offshore Alaska, including but not limited to
the Arctic. Robust forecasting and tracking technology,
information sharing among industry and government, and local
knowledge and experience are essential to managing the
substantial challenges and risks that Alaskan conditions pose
for all offshore operations.
Finally, respect for and coordination with local
communities are paramount. It is imperative that offshore
exploration in the Arctic be harmonized with the needs of North
Slope communities, including traditional subsistence use.
Our report also identified important principles for
government oversight of offshore drilling activity in the
Arctic that must be carried forward and further developed. The
Federal Government, including DOI, Coast Guard, NOAA, EPA and
others engaged in strong and in an unprecedented level of
interagency coordination, information sharing, and cooperation
related to the regulatory approval process and oversight of
Shell's 2012 program. Senator Begich, I know this is an area
that has been important to you and that you have championed.
This is an area of success from the 2012 experience that should
be carried forward and improved upon further in the future.
Finally, government and industry should continue to
evaluate appropriate Arctic-specific standards relating to
offshore operations. For example, operators working in the
Arctic should be encouraged to enter into resource sharing and
mutual aid agreements to provide each other with access to
operational and emergency response resources. This is an issue
Admiral Ostebo and I have discussed at some length. A
cooperative model offers potential logistical and commercial
efficiency, as well as safety and environmental advantages and
the reduction of cumulative operational risks and footprints,
including air emissions.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beaudreau follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tommy P. Beaudreau, Acting Assistant Secretary,
Land and Minerals Management, U.S. Department of the Interior
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you
for this timely hearing to examine the current and anticipated future
offshore activity in the Arctic. On March 8, I delivered a report to
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar regarding the review I led of
Shell's 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Program (Report),
which the Department of the Interior (DOI) released to the public on
March 14. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss this review, as well
as long term planning with respect to offshore exploration in the
Arctic.
Offshore oil and gas development is a key component of the
Administration's all-of-the-above energy strategy to grow America's
economy, reduce our dependence on foreign oil and to create jobs here
at home. As is emphasized in the Report, the Administration is
committed to supporting safe and responsible exploration of potential
energy resources in frontier areas such as the Arctic. The Arctic holds
substantial oil and gas potential, but also presents unique technical
challenges as well as environmental and cultural considerations. The
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) estimates that the Chukchi Sea
Planning Area alone holds more than 15 billion barrels of undiscovered,
technically recoverable oil and 76 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
which is second only to the Central Gulf of Mexico in terms of resource
potential on the United States outer continental shelf (OCS). BOEM also
estimates that the Beaufort Sea Planning Area holds more than 8 billion
barrels of oil and 27 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Offshore oil
and gas exploration in the Arctic must proceed cautiously and in a way
that is safe, responsible, and respectful of the unique environment and
culture of the Arctic and its communities.
Prior to last summer, most exploration wells in Federal waters in
the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas in the Alaskan Arctic were drilled during
the late 1970s through the mid-1980s. Industry previously drilled a
total of 30 exploratory wells in the Federal waters of the Beaufort
Sea. Federal waters in the Chukchi Sea have a more limited history of
exploration, with five exploration wells drilled between 1989 and
1991--all resulting in the discovery of hydrocarbons.
In 2012, DOI allowed Shell to move forward cautiously with limited
drilling activities in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Shell constructed
top-hole sections for one well each in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.
Shell's well at the Burger prospect in the Chukchi Sea was the first
new well spud in that area in over two decades. Shell's 2012 offshore
drilling program was subject to strong Federal oversight, including a
range of Arctic-specific conditions and standards, such as requiring
deployment of subsea containment systems as a prerequisite to drilling
into hydrocarbon-bearing zones, limitations on the Chukchi Sea drilling
season to provide time for open-water emergency response, a blackout on
drilling activity during the subsistence hunts in the Beaufort Sea, and
surrounding vessels with pre-laid boom during fuel transfers. DOI's
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) had inspectors
onboard both of Shell's rigs around the clock throughout drilling
operations, and the U.S. Coast Guard was a constant presence in the
Arctic as well.
We learned a great deal from activities last summer--from both the
successes and the problems Shell experienced--and it is important that
we use all of the information that we learned from last summer in
planning for the future.
Review of Shell's 2012 Operations
On January 8, 2013, Secretary Salazar directed me to lead a high-
level assessment of Shell's 2012 offshore drilling program in the
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, including a review of the problems that
Shell experienced last year with the certification of its containment
vessel, the ARCTIC CHALLENGER; the deployment test of its containment
dome; and its two drilling rigs, the NOBLE DISCOVERER and the KULLUK.
The review team included BSEE Director Jim Watson, as well as
senior leadership from BOEM and BSEE and a technical advisor from the
U.S. Coast Guard. DOI retained the international consulting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) to provide expertise and support in
reviewing issues related to safety and operational management systems.
The review team received significant participation and contributions
from the other Federal agencies involved in overseeing Shell's 2012
activities, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Coast Guard,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Shell cooperated with our review. Our review team conducted
meetings and interviews with Shell and its contractors in Washington,
D.C., Alaska, Washington State and Houston. The review team also met
with Alaska State legislators and regulatory officials, the North Slope
Borough, Alaska Native organizations, environmental groups, independent
engineers and economists, marine contractors, and oil and gas
companies.
On February 27, Shell announced its decision to pause exploration
drilling activity for 2013 in both the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas to
focus on preparation of equipment and plans before resuming its Arctic
exploration program.
The Report's Findings
The review focused on Shell's safety management systems, its
oversight of contracted services, and its ability to meet the strict
standards in place for Arctic development. It found that Shell entered
the 2012 drilling season without having finalized key components of its
program, including its ARCTIC CHALLENGER containment system, which put
pressure on Shell's operations and schedule and limited Shell from
drilling into oil-bearing zones last summer. Weaknesses in Shell's
management of contractors on whom they relied for many critical aspects
of its program--including development of its containment system,
emission controls to comply with air permits, and maritime operations--
led to many of the problems that the company experienced.
Accordingly, the Report makes a number of findings with respect to
Shell's activities last year, and offers principles and recommendations
for Shell, other operators, and government to support planning for
future operations.
First, the report found that all phases of an Arctic offshore
program--including drilling, maritime and emergency response
operations--must be integrated and subject to strong operator
management and oversight. Before Shell resumes its Arctic program, the
Report recommends that the company should submit to the Department of
the Interior a comprehensive, integrated plan describing every phase of
its operation from preparations through demobilization. Any future
Arctic exploration program proposed by Shell should be well planned and
finalized in advance of the drilling season.
Operators must also maintain strong, direct management and
oversight of their contractors, and have rigorous management systems
tailored to the Arctic environment. This was an area where Shell fell
short- contributing in large part to many of the problems Shell
experienced last year, including its inability to deploy a functioning
containment system, violation of the emission standards set in its air
permits, and problems with both of its drilling rigs, including the
KULLUK which was grounded near Kodiak Island during a towing operation
in the Gulf of Alaska. Accordingly, the Report recommends that Shell
complete a full third-party management system audit that will confirm
that the company's management systems are appropriately tailored for
Arctic operations.
Offshore operators choosing to work in the Arctic must also
recognize the reality of the unique challenges posed by the Arctic
environment like extreme weather and limited infrastructure. Companies
must understand and plan for the variability and challenges of
conditions in Alaska, and work with people who are knowledgeable about
and experienced with these tough conditions.
The Report also stresses the critical need for coordination--across
the Federal Government and with State and local partners, as well as
with companies, local communities and other stakeholders. Following the
process initiated by the Alaska Interagency Working Group established
by Presidential Executive Order 13580 for the coordination of
permitting of domestic energy projects in Alaska, the Federal
Government--including DOI, NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, EPA and others--
engaged in a robust and unprecedented level of interagency
coordination, information-sharing and cooperation related to the
regulatory approval process and oversight of Shell's 2012 program. This
process led to the more efficient and effective reviews of permits and
approvals, stronger oversight of Shell's operations, better
communication with local communities, greater awareness by Federal
agencies of activities potentially impacting their areas of
responsibility, and more efficient use of limited Federal resources.
Public engagement by Federal agencies, including providing as much
transparency and opportunity for public input as reasonably possible,
is also important. This is an area of success from the 2012 experience
that should be carried forward and improved upon in the future.
Developing a Region-Specific Model for Exploration in the Arctic Ocean
The Report also strongly recommends implementation of a region-
specific model for offshore oil and gas exploration in the Alaskan
Arctic. As Shell's 2012 experience has made absolutely clear, the
Arctic OCS presents unique challenges associated with environmental and
weather conditions, geographical remoteness, social and cultural
considerations, and the absence of fixed infrastructure to support oil
and gas activity, including resources necessary to respond in the event
of an emergency. Shell's 2012 drilling program was subject to a number
of Arctic-specific conditions and standards--including, among others,
deployment of subsea containment systems as a prerequisite to drilling
into hydrocarbon-bearing zones, limitations on the Chukchi Sea drilling
season to provide time for open-water emergency response, a blackout on
drilling activity during the subsistence hunts in the Beaufort Sea, and
deploying pre-laid boom around vessels during fuel transfers. Shell
also undertook additional measures, such as agreeing to transport out
drilling muds and cuttings from its Beaufort Sea operation instead of
discharging them into the ocean.
Government and industry should continue to evaluate the potential
development of additional Arctic-specific standards in the areas of
drilling and maritime safety and emergency response equipment and
systems. The United States has a leading role among Arctic nations in
establishing appropriately high standards for safety, environmental
protection and emergency response governing offshore oil and gas
exploration in the Arctic Ocean. It is incumbent, therefore, on the
United States to lead the way in establishing an operating model and
standards tailored specifically to the extreme, unpredictable and
rapidly changing conditions that exist in the Arctic even during the
open water season.
Finally, operators working in the Arctic should be encouraged to
enter into resource sharing and mutual aid agreements to provide each
other with access to operational and emergency response resources. The
traditional operator-specific, ``go it alone'' model common with
exploration programs in other regions is not appropriate for Arctic
offshore operations. A cooperative, consortium-based model offers
potential logistical and commercial efficiencies, as well as safety and
environmental advantages through the reduction of cumulative
operational risks and footprints (including air emissions). Following
the Deepwater Horizon blowout and spill and after DOI's establishment
of clear guidance requiring subsea containment in support of all
deepwater drilling operations, industry pulled together resources,
equipment and expertise to establish consortia designed to provide
offshore operators with access to critical safety and emergency
response equipment, such as capping stacks and other equipment
necessary to respond to a subsea blowout. Arguably the need for mutual
assistance and resource sharing covering both operational and emergency
response assets and resources may be even greater in the Arctic.
Conclusion
The information we collect from offshore exploration will be
critical to longer-term planning for the Arctic OCS. For example, any
information about geology and resource potential that may be developed
from exploratory drilling or from geological and geophysical (G&G)
exploration will be utilized in potential future lease sales in the
Beaufort and Chukchi Sea Planning Areas. As offshore oil and gas
exploration moves forward, information can also be utilized in planning
for near and long-term associated infrastructure, spill response
preparedness, and safety and environmental standards.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Let me now move to Admiral Ostebo. Thank you very much for
your continued interest in the Arctic and your robust work,
especially in this last season. So, please, let me have you go
and testify.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS P. OSTEBO, COMMANDER, U.S.
COAST GUARD SEVENTEENTH DISTRICT
Admiral Ostebo. Senator Begich, distinguished colleagues--
Tommy, it's good to see you again. As always, I enjoy speaking
on the great work that your Coast Guard is doing here in
Alaska. I am pleased to discuss the Coast Guard's Arctic
responsibilities and operations. This past summer we prepared
for Arctic operations driven by increased offshore maritime
activity and industry's planned drilling operations in the
Chukchi and the Beaufort Sea.
Collaborating closely with Federal, local, state, and
tribal government partners, we worked with industry to regulate
all parties operating offshore. The lessons we have learned
from this past year will inform our planning and strategy to
ensure that we remain always ready to ensure safety, security
and stewardship in the emerging maritime frontier of the
Arctic.
Coast Guard operations in the Arctic last year consisted of
Arctic Shield 2012, which will be an ongoing Coast Guard
operation in perpetuity for the Arctic. The Coast Guard has
been operating in the Arctic since 1867, when Alaska was just a
territory. Then as now, our mission is to assist scientific
exploration, chart the waters, provide humanitarian assistance
to native tribes, conduct search and rescue, and enforce U.S.
laws and regulations throughout the region.
In Alaska, the Coast Guard's aircraft and vessels monitor
more than 950,000 square miles of water off the Alaskan coast
to enforce U.S. laws. We patrol an even larger area of the
North Pacific, as you know, sir, to stop large-scale high-seas
drift net fishing and other illegal fishing practices,
including foreign incursions into the U.S. EEZ. We also conduct
marine safety and environmental protection missions throughout
the region.
The Coast Guard continues to push forward to assess our
capabilities to conduct operations in the Arctic. Since 2008,
we have set up temporary forward operating locations on the
North Slope, in Prudhoe Bay, Nome, Barrow, Kotzebue, to test
our capabilities with cutters, boats, helicopters,
communications equipment, and maritime safety and security
teams. We also deployed our light icebreaking-capable ships,
our 225-foot ocean-going buoy tenders to test our equipment,
train our crews, and increase our awareness of the activity
going on offshore.
Additionally, each year from April to November we have
flown two sorties a month to assess maritime activities in the
region and to ensure maritime domain awareness. To protect the
Arctic environment, we are reaching out to industry and the
private sector to address their significant responsibilities
for pollution prevention, preparedness and response. Those
engaged in offshore commercial activity in the Arctic must also
plan and prepare for emergency response in the face of a harsh
environment, long transient distances for air and surface
assets, and limited response resources.
We continue to work to improve awareness, contingency
planning and communications. We are also actively participating
with Department of Interior-led interagency working group on
coordination of domestic energy development and permitting in
Alaska, established by Executive Order 13580, to synchronize
the efforts of the Federal agencies responsible for overseeing
safe and responsible development of Alaska's offshore energy
opportunities.
While prevention is critical, the Coast Guard must also be
able to manage the response to pollution incidents where
responsible parties are not known or fail to adequately
respond. Last year we exercised our Vessel of Opportunity
Skimming System, VOSS, and our Spill Oil Recovery System, SORS,
in the Alaskan waters as part of Arctic Shield 12 in the
vicinity of Barrow.
Fisheries are also a concern in the region. The National
Maritime Fisheries Service, based upon a recommendation from
the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council, which the Coast
Guard participates in, has imposed a moratorium on fishing
within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone north of the Bering
Strait until an assessment of the practicality of sustained
commercial fishing is completed.
The Coast Guard will continue to carry out its mission to
enforce and protect living marine resources in the high
latitudes. We are employing our Waterways Analysis and
Management System to assess vessel traffic, which is continuing
to grow, and the density to determine the need for improved
aids to navigation and other safety requirements. We are also
moving forward with the Bering Strait Port Access Route Study
in coordination with our international partners, which is a
primary analysis to evaluate vessel traffic management and
appropriate ship routing measures in the Bering Strait.
The Coast Guard continues to support international
multilateral organizations, studies, projects and initiatives.
We are actively working with the Arctic Council, International
Maritime Organization and other respected working groups. We
are leading the U.S. delegation of the Arctic Council's All
Spill Task Force, which is developing international instruments
on Arctic maritime oil pollution preparedness and response, and
are conducting joint contingency response exercises with
Canada.
Last month, we hosted representatives from Russia, their
State Maritime Pollution Control Salvage and Rescue
Administration, to sign an expanded memorandum of understanding
and joint contingency planning to foster cooperation between
our two nations in the event of an oil spill in the region. We
will continue to engage Arctic nations, international
organizations, industry, academia, Alaska state, local, and
tribal governments to strengthen our partnerships and agencies.
Our engagement with the Alaska Native tribes continues to
be highly beneficial. We are working hard to ensure tribal
equities are recognized and that the indigenous people and
their way of life are protected. We look forward to continuing
to strengthen our partnership with Alaska Natives.
Looking ahead, over the next 10 to 15 years, the Coast
Guard's regional mission profile will continue to evolve.
Increased human activity will increase the significance and the
volume of maritime issues throughout the region, issues such as
freedom of navigation, offshore resource exploration, and
environmental preservation.
The Coast Guard's strategic approach will pursue the
capabilities in the future to perform our statutory missions as
necessary in the Arctic to ensure a safe, secure, and
environmentally sustainable operation to take place. This
strategy will be consistent with our services approach to
performing maritime safety and security and stewardship
functions across all of our 11 statutory missions.
Finally, the MODU KULLUK and NOBLE DISCOVERER, I need to
mention the two of them. The Coast Guard certainly shares
concerns regarding the recent grounding of MODU KULLUK, an
event which highlights the rigors of operating in Alaskan
waters. In January, I directed a marine casualty safety
investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
grounding of the KULLUK. Members of the Coast Guard's
investigation national center of expertise are leading the
investigation and coordinating with local Coast Guard commands
to utilize the technical expertise necessary to find out what
happened. The National Transportation Safety Board, the Bureau
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement are also involved to
examine all aspects of the vessel casualty.
Additionally, I also referred the casualty investigation of
the drill ship Noble Discoverer, also operating in Alaska
waters, to the Department of Justice for their review and
potential follow-on action. Last week, I also referred a
separate KULLUK investigation into potential violations from
2012 to the Department of Justice for their review and
potential follow-on action. As the Coast Guard and the
Department of Justice are still actively engaged in these
investigations, it would not be appropriate for me to provide
additional information at this time. However, as soon as the
investigation is complete and final reports are issued,
Senator, I will ensure that you get a copy of them, and your
staff does as well.
In conclusion, Senator Begich and distinguished colleagues,
the Coast Guard in Alaska will continue building its strategy
using a whole-of-government approach that will inform national
dialogue and policy and development of the Arctic region. While
there are many challenges, the increasingly open Arctic Ocean
also presents unique opportunities for our nation, and
specifically for the people of Alaska. We look forward to
working with the Congress on how the Coast Guard can continue
to support our national Arctic objectives, protect its fragile
environment, and remain semper paratus, always ready in the new
ocean and for the people of Alaska.
Thank you, sir, for this opportunity to testify here today.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ostebo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas P. Ostebo, Commander,
U.S. Coast Guard Seventeenth District
Senator Begich and distinguished colleagues, thank you for the
opportunity to join you today. I am pleased to discuss Coast Guard
Arctic responsibilities and operations. This past summer we prepared
for Arctic activity driven by the oil industry's planned drilling
operations in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Partnering closely with
Federal, State, Local, and Tribal government partners, and working with
industry as the regulated parties, the Coast Guard was ready for
operations in the Arctic with Operation Arctic Shield. The lessons we
learned this past year will inform our planning and strategy, to ensure
we remain always ready to ensure the safety, security and stewardship
of the emerging maritime frontier of the Arctic.
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Kulluk Grounding--On-Going
Investigation
The Coast Guard shares your concerns regarding the grounding of the
MODU KULLUK on December 31, 2012, which highlights the rigors of
operating in Alaskan waters. The Coast Guard last inspected the KULLUK
on December 20, 2012. The Coast Guard inspected and certificated the
newly constructed Offshore Supply Vessel AIVIQ on April 20, 2012.
In January, I directed a marine casualty safety investigation into
the facts and circumstances surrounding the grounding of the KULLUK.
Members of the Coast Guard's Investigation National Center of Expertise
are leading the investigation, coordinating with local Coast Guard
commands, and utilizing the technical expertise of the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement to examine all aspects of this vessel casualty.
Furthermore, in order to provide timely feedback to the American public
and the marine industry, the investigators have been authorized to make
interim safety recommendations prior to the final release of the
report.
As my investigating officer is still actively engaged in the
investigation, it would not be appropriate to provide additional
information at this time. As soon as the investigation is complete, and
the final report is issued, I will ensure a copy is provided to you and
your staff.
Additionally, in January I also referred the casualty investigation
of the Drill Ship NOBLE DISCOVERER, also operating in Alaskan waters,
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for their review and potential
follow-on action. Since the Coast Guard is actively assisting DOJ with
the case, it would not be appropriate for me to provide information
regarding this on-going investigation and I would refer any questions
to DOJ.
The Coast Guard in Alaska and the Arctic Region
The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic Ocean since 1867,
when Alaska was just a territory. Then, as now, our mission is to
assist scientific exploration, chart the waters, provide humanitarian
assistance to native tribes, conduct search and rescue, and enforce
U.S. laws and regulations.
In Alaska, Coast Guard aircraft and vessels monitor more than
950,000 square miles off the Alaskan coast to enforce U.S. laws. We
patrol an even larger area of the North Pacific Ocean to stop large-
scale high seas drift netting and other illegal fishing practices,
including foreign incursions into the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. We
also conduct marine safety and environmental protection missions in the
region.
To protect the Arctic environment, we are engaging industry and the
private sector to address their significant responsibilities for
pollution prevention, preparedness, and response. Recognizing that
pollution response is significantly more difficult in cold, ice, and
darkness, enhancing preventative measures is critical. Those engaging
in offshore commercial activity in the Arctic must also plan and
prepare for emergency response in the face of a harsh environment, long
transit distances for air and surface assets, and limited response
resources. We continue to work to improve awareness, contingency
planning, and communications.
We are also actively participating in the Department of Interior-
led interagency working group on Coordination of Domestic Energy
Development and Permitting in Alaska (established by Executive Order
13580) to synchronize the efforts of Federal agencies responsible for
overseeing the safe and responsible development of Alaska's onshore and
offshore energy.
While prevention is critical, the Coast Guard must be able to
manage the response to pollution incidents where responsible parties
are not known or fail to adequately respond. In 2010, we deployed an
emergency vessel towing system north of the Arctic Circle. We have also
exercised the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) and the
Spilled Oil Recovery System (SORS) in Alaskan waters, but we had yet to
conduct exercises north of the Arctic Circle until this summer. Both of
these systems enable vessels to collect oil in the event of a
discharge, however, these systems have limited capacity and are only
effective in ice-free conditions. As part of Arctic Shield 2012, we
conducted the furthest northern deployment and testing of the SORS in
the vicinity of Barrow.
Fisheries are also a concern in the region. The National Marine
Fisheries Service, based upon a recommendation from the North Pacific
Fisheries Management Council, has imposed a moratorium on fishing
within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone north of the Bering Strait
until an assessment of the practicality of sustained commercial fishing
is completed. The Coast Guard will continue to carry out its mission to
enforce and protect living marine resources in the high latitudes.
We are employing our Waterways Analysis and Management System to
assess vessel traffic density and determine the need for improved aids
to navigation and other safety requirements. We are also moving forward
with a Bering Strait Port Access Route Study, in coordination with our
international partners, which is a preliminary analysis to evaluate
vessel traffic management and appropriate ship routing measures.
The Coast Guard continues to support international and multilateral
organizations, studies, projects and initiatives. We are actively
working with the Arctic Council, International Maritime Organization
and their respective working groups. We are leading the U.S. delegation
to the Arctic Council Oil Spill Task Force that is developing an
International Instrument on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness
and Response. We are also conducting joint contingency response
exercises with Canada and we maintain communications and working
relationships with Canadian and Russian agencies responsible for
regional operations including Search and Rescue, law enforcement and
oil spill response. We maintain bilateral response relationships with
Canada and Russia, and last month we hosted representatives from the
Russian State Marine Pollution Control Salvage and Rescue
Administration to sign an expanded Memorandum of Understanding and
Joint Contingency Plan to foster closer cooperation in oil spill
response. We will continue to engage Arctic nations, international
organizations, industry, academia and Alaskan state, local and tribal
governments to strengthen our partnerships and inter-operability.
Our engagement with Alaska Native Tribes continues to be highly
beneficial. Our continued partnership has made our operations safer and
more successful. We are working hard to ensure tribal equities are
recognized, and that indigenous peoples and their way of life are
protected. We look forward to continuing to strengthen our partnerships
with our Alaskan Native partners.
The Coast Guard continues to push forward and assess our
capabilities to conduct operations in the Arctic. Since 2008, we set up
small, temporary Forward Operating Locations on the North Slope in
Prudhoe Bay, Nome, Barrow and Kotzebue to test our capabilities with
boats, helicopters, and Maritime Safety and Security Teams. We also
deployed our light-ice capable 225-foot ocean-going buoy tenders to
test our equipment, train our crews and increase our awareness of
activity. Additionally, each year from April to November we have flown
two sorties a month to evaluate activities in the region.
Looking ahead over the next 10-15 years, the Coast Guard's regional
mission profile will continue to evolve. Increasing human activity will
increase the significance and volume of maritime issues, such as
freedom of navigation, offshore resource exploration, and environmental
preservation. While summer sea ice is forecast to diminish further in
the coming decades, the region will still be largely ice covered in the
winter. Thus, ice will continue to present hazards even in the summer
time.
The Coast Guard in Context of National Arctic Policy
U.S. Arctic policy is set forth in the 2009 National Security
Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25.
For the past four years, as we are today with Arctic Shield 2012, we
have been conducting limited Arctic operations during open water
periods. However, we face many challenges looking into the future. Some
Arctic operations demand specialized capabilities and personnel trained
and equipped to operate in extreme climates. Our assessments of the
Nation's requirements for operating in ice-laden waters will consider
infrastructure requirements to support operations, and requirements for
personnel and equipment to operate in extreme cold and ice.
Given the scope of these challenges, we have been conducting oil-
in-ice research since 2010 to evaluate, develop, and test equipment and
techniques that can be used to successfully track and recover oil in
any ice filled waters, and have explored promising technologies, such
as heated skimmers. The Coast Guard's strategic approach is to ensure
we pursue the capabilities in the future to perform our statutory
missions so we can ensure the Arctic is safe, secure, and
environmentally sustainable. This strategy is consistent with our
Service's approach to performing its Maritime Safety, Security, and
Stewardship functions.
Conclusion
Arctic Shield 2012 was an appropriate plan to meet projected
mission requirements this past year. Moving forward, we will continue
building our strategy using a whole-of-government approach that will
inform national dialogue and policy development for this critical
region.
While there are many challenges, the increasingly open Arctic Ocean
also presents unique opportunities. We look forward to working with the
Congress on how our Coast Guard can continue to support our national
Arctic objectives, protect its fragile environment and remain Semper
Paratus--Always Ready in this new ocean.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Let me move now to Pete Slaiby, who is the Vice President
of Shell exploration.
STATEMENT OF PETER E. SLAIBY, VICE PRESIDENT,
SHELL ALASKA
Mr. Slaiby. Thank you very much, Senator Begich, Mr. Chair.
I am Pete Slaiby, Vice President of Shell Alaska. I appreciate
the opportunity today regarding this opportunity to testify
about our activities in the Arctic. My presence here is no
doubt related to Shell's exploration program offshore Alaska in
2012. The program does involve marine activity. Today I will
describe Shell's 2012 drilling operations in the Chukchi and
the Beaufort Seas, with a focus on this maritime activity, and
the activities that supported those operations. Then I am going
to very briefly highlight some of the government and industry
initiatives that contribute to the dialogue about maritime
activities in the Arctic.
I have put recommendations for policymakers in my written
testimony, but because of time I won't be able to testify or
speak to that today.
In 2012, Shell drilled a portion of two wells, one in the
Beaufort and one in the Chukchi, what we call top holes.
Although the wells didn't reach hydrocarbon objectives because
of the time constraints, they did mark an historic reentry into
the U.S. Arctic offshore. These were the first wells drilled in
open water offshore Alaska in more than 15 years and the first
step to validating the enormous offshore resource potential.
Shell's drilling program, supported by our logistics teams,
oil spill response assets, and with serious attention to
stakeholder expectations, was carried out safely and
successfully. Let me say that again. Our drilling operations
were completed safely and successfully. After the drilling
ceased, we demobilized our vessels, including the DISCOVERER,
the NOBLE DISCOVERER and the KULLUK drilling rigs, south of the
U.S. Arctic theater. It was while leaving the theater of
operations that issues with the DISCOVERER were identified by
the Coast Guard and the KULLUK ran aground. These incidents are
the subject of ongoing government investigations and I will not
talk about them today.
I would like to acknowledge publicly the efforts of over
700 men and women who worked 24/7 on behalf of Shell and the
incident command to ensure that that incident, the KULLUK
grounding, did not escalate. Shell's offshore and onshore
response teams put forward a Herculean effort in a very short
amount of time. That included immediate escalation in the
notifications to the appropriate government agencies,
deployment of Shell air and marine assets, 19 tugs and
approximately 20 aircraft, forward mobilized personnel to the
impacted communities, and a suite of oil spill response
equipment into the region.
As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, no people were harmed, and
there was minimal impact to the environment as the result of
the KULLUK grounding. Finally, the assets I referred to played
a key role in the recovery of the KULLUK, in many ways mirrored
the marine and air assets that we have available during our
drilling operations in the Arctic in 2012.
Of course, the story wouldn't be complete without me
acknowledging a couple of people in the room. Admiral Ostebo
and the work that the Coast Guard played in that was absolutely
key, as well as Captain Mehler. The amount of time that we
spent together over New Year's in the Marriott was significant,
and I feel that I know a lot about both of those gentlemen as
well.
We were also very, very happy to have spent and had a
successful relationship with the people of Kodiak. One of the
things I will share with you, Mr. Chair, is that during that
time we did bring people in from Old Harbor in those areas, and
they frankly said, you know, you have a very, very difficult
situation here. You have the KULLUK on the beach, and we
appreciate the fact that you have stood up 700 people, but we
don't think that you will ever be able to get that rig off the
beach.
Of course, in my position, you can't predict what will
happen. But I did promise that we would do everything we could
to move the rig off the beach. So I am equally pleased that we
were able to do what we did and promise what we did through the
work of the Coast Guard, Shell, State of Alaska, the
communities, and Smith Salvage. I'm very, very pleased that we
were able to do what was arguably one of the most difficult
marine salvage operations attempted on the Alaskan coast.
Now, let me focus on some of the efforts on Shell's 2012
exploration program that relate to marine operations and
highlight some of the steps we took to ensure that these
operations were completed safely and successfully.
Going into the Alaskan Arctic, we understood that there was
limited infrastructure. We assembled and brought the majority
of the assets that we required, both onshore and offshore, with
us. We did so with a commitment of setting the bar higher for
an environmentally responsible program in the Arctic. We
pursued the goal of having the smallest possible footprint and
no significant influence or impact on the North Slope
communities and the traditional hunting activities. At every
step, we worked with Federal agencies, the State of Alaska,
local governments and, most importantly, stakeholders on the
North Slope to develop a program that aspired to the highest
technical, operational, and environmental standards.
Let me give you a few facts and figures on the marine and
aviation logistics as far as accomplishments. They included
approximately a quarter of a million miles traveled in 2012 by
23 vessels; 500 vessel-to-vessel transfers; 3,250,000 gallons
of ultra-low sulfur diesel transferred; 10 vessels built and
six modified in shipyards across the U.S.; 250,000 tons of
cargo transferred at sea; 20,000 protected species
observations--walrus, seals, whales, et cetera--that continue
to develop a very important data base; 11,877 personnel
transfers; jobs for Alaskans; 562 rotary wing and 535 fixed
wing flights. In short, we secured the tools and technologies
needed to keep people safe and conserve the environment.
As you are aware, maritime activities in the Arctic will
increase and routes will open and oil and gas activity expand
across the Arctic. Oil and gas development is underway, as you
alluded, in the U.S., as well as offshore Russia, Canada,
Norway and Greenland. Governments are considering appropriate
policy responses through various international organizations
such as the Arctic Council.
Industry is contributing to the dialogue through a range of
assessments and assignments and joint venture industry programs
that increase knowledge about the Arctic. Such government and
private sector initiatives must continue.
I hope these remarks are useful and informative, and I
thank the Senator for the opportunity today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Slaiby follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter E. Slaiby, Vice President, Shell Alaska
Mr. Chairman, I am Pete Slaiby, Vice President of Shell Alaska. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding maritime
activities in the Arctic. My presence here is no doubt related to
Shell's exploration program off the coast of Alaska--a program that
involves maritime activity.
Today, I will describe Shell's 2012 drilling operations in the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas with a focus on the maritime activities that
supported those operations. Then, I will highlight some of the
government and joint government-industry initiatives that will
contribute to the dialogue about maritime activity in the Arctic.
Finally, I will offer some recommendations for policymakers to
consider.
Shell Alaska 2012
In 2012 Shell drilled portions of two wells--one well in the
Chukchi and one in the Beaufort. Although the wells did not reach the
hydrocarbon objective, they did mark an historic re-entry into the U.S.
Arctic offshore. They were the first wells drilled in the open water
offshore Alaska in over 15 years; and the first step to validating the
enormous offshore resource potential. Shell's drilling program,
supported by our logistics team, oil spill-response assets, and with
serious attention to stakeholder expectations, was carried out safely
and successfully. Let me say that again--our drilling operations were
completed safely and successfully.
After drilling ceased, we demobilized our vessels, including the
Discoverer and Kulluk drilling rigs south of the U.S. Arctic theatre.
It was while leaving the theatre of operations that issues with the
Discoverer were identified by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Kulluk ran
aground. These incidents are the subject of ongoing government review,
and therefore, I will not talk about them.
I would like to acknowledge, publicly, the effort of the over 700
hundred men and women who worked 24/7 on behalf of Shell and Incident
Command to ensure the incident did not escalate. Shell's onshore and
offshore response teams put forward a herculean effort in a time of
need. That includes the immediate escalation and notifications to the
proper agencies, deployment of Shell air and marine assets (19 tugs/
vessels and 20 aircraft), forward-mobilized personnel to impacted
communities and a suite of oil-spill-response equipment to the region.
As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, no people were harmed, and there
was minimal impact to the environment as a result of the Kulluk's
grounding. Finally, the assets I referred to that played a key role in
the recovery of the Kulluk, in many ways, mirrored the marine and air
assets we assembled and had available during our drilling operations in
the Arctic in 2012.
Now, I will focus in some detail on aspects of Shell's 2012
exploration program that relate to maritime operations; and highlight
some of the steps we took to ensure that these operations were safe and
successful.
Going into the Alaska Arctic, we understood that there was limited
infrastructure. We had to assemble and bring the majority of onshore
and offshore infrastructure with us. And we did so with a commitment to
setting the bar for an environmentally responsible Arctic program. We
pursued the goal of having the smallest possible footprint and no
significant negative impact on North Slope communities and their
traditional subsistence hunting activities.
At every step, we worked with Federal agencies, the State of
Alaska, local governments and most importantly, the residents of
Alaska's North Slope, to develop a program that aspired to the highest
technical, operational and environmental standards.
Let me give you some facts and figures on our marine and aviation
logistics accomplishments.
Marine: 240,000 total nautical miles travelled in 2012 by 23
vessels
500 vessel-to-vessel personnel transfers
3,250,000 gallons of Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel transferred
10 vessels built or modified in 6 shipyards
25,000 tons of cargo moved at sea
20,000 protected species observations (whales, walrus,
seals, etc..) from vessels and aircraft
11,877 personnel transfers
562 rotary-wing and 535 fixed-wing flights
In short, we secured the tools and technology needed to keep people
safe and conserve the environment.
Additionally, Shell undertook a number of programs and
initiatives--all designed to ensure safe and responsible maritime
operations. The following programs and initiatives played an enormous
role in our 2012 program, and I will describe them in more detail after
listing them.
Shell Ice and Weather Advisory Center (SIWAC)
Vessel Tracking System
Simultaneous Operations Center
Conflict Avoidance Agreement
Oil Spill Contingency Agreement
Communications Centers/Subsistence Advisor Program
SIWAC--Shell Ice and Weather Advisory Center
Shell's commitment to ensuring safe and responsible maritime
operations is underpinned by our investment in ice and weather
forecasting systems. Shell developed and now operates the Shell Ice and
Weather Advisory Center (SIWAC) and has done so since 2007. SIWAC is an
integrated ice hazard detection and forecasting service that has
evolved to be the most comprehensive and focused ice and weather
operation covering the offshore and coastal areas from the Gulf of
Alaska to the Canadian Beaufort. SIWAC staff integrate a constant
stream of weather, sea, and ice data from many sources, including
satellite imagery, Metocean buoy, field observers, high frequency Radar
sites, and publically available data; Shell also planned and executed a
total of 23 dedicated ice reconnaissance missions in 2012.
At no time was the value of these professionals more evident than
when we made the decision to moveoff the Burger well site in the
Chukchi Sea one day after we commenced drilling. As frustrating as that
was, it was the right call and one made possible by the world-class ice
and weather forecasting we employ in the U.S. Arctic.
Mr. Chairman, as you are acutely aware, Shell takes additional
steps to ensure that others can benefit from these Arctic forecasts.
For example, in 2012 SIWAC entered into a collaborative agreement
with NOAA to share both near real-time and archived environmental data,
such as buoy data and sea ice charts, which improves forecast products
poduced by NOAA for the U.S. Arctic. Moreover, Shell also maintains a
data-sharing agreement with NOAA regarding hydrography. The sea floor
in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas continues to be mapped, as Shell
vessels transit these seas we collect hydrographic data and provide it
to NOAA. We also engage in discussions to focus on mapping priorities.
Vessel Tracking
Mr. Chairman, 23 Shell vessels traveled 240,000 nautical miles in
the course of mobilization, demobilization, and season operations.
Shell's marine activities to support operations in the Beaufort and
Chukchi seas are bounded by a number of factors, including compliance
with air and other permits and authorizations, management of protected
species interactions, whaling blackout commitments, and significant
steaming distances--many of which I will further describe. When active,
Shell vessels provided real-time position data via vessel tracking
systems to BOEM, the USCG, and the Alaska Marine Exchange. Shell vessel
movement data was remotely monitored for internal safety, compliance,
and operational reasons, and this data was also used in a Shell-
developed Graphical Information System which allowed data such as ice
interpretations and temperature to be overlaid on maps.
Communication Centers and Subsistence Advisor Program
Shell also carried out significant activities to communicate our
operational and maritime activities with local communities, allowing us
to minimize impacts on their subsistence and cultural activities. For
example, Shell employed Subsistence Advisors in the local communities.
Through twice-daily calls, we learned what hunting activities were
occurring, how animals were migrating, and received feedback that
helped us plan and adjust our operations so as to avoid interference
and impacts. This worked very well and allowed for real-time
adaptation. Shell also funded the operation of Communications Centers
in each of the coastal communities. All Shell vessels called in to
these centers every six hours around the clock, to state current
location, current activities, and planned activities. These
communications were made public, free and available to anyone who
wanted information. This worked well for Shell and helped supply
information to communities.
SIMOPS--Simultaneous Operations Center
To enhance communication with the greater maritime communities and
regulators, Shell also operated a forum for managing Simultaneous
Operations in Barrow to facilitate mutual aid and conflict avoidance.
In this forum, Shell staff brought forward information from the
Subsistence Advisors and vessel tracking programs, incorporated data
from other parties and conducted a daily information exchange via
teleconference. All entities with operational activities--USCG, other
agencies, communities--could use the forum for information exchange to
keep tabs on Shell's activities, as well as other shipping activities
to the extent possible. We have run this for the last five years, and
it has worked well.
CAA--Conflict Avoidance Agreement
As previously noted, Shell understands the importance of
subsistence to local communities and has negotiated and signed key
agreements to minimize our impacts on them. For example, Shell signed
and abided by a Conflict Avoidance Agreement with the Alaska Eskimo
Whaling Commission, which allowed operations following certain criteria
and outside blackout times. This agreement also required zero discharge
of drillig muds and cuttings and other treated waste streams in the
Beaufort, the communication centers in coastal villages, protected
species observers on marine vessels and overflights, transit and
logistical requriements during the hunt, and providing assistance to
whalers in the event of an emergency. Protected Species Observers have
been used on all our vessels and have a critical role, being tasked
with observing and reporting protected species and advising the vessel
master to take appropriate mitigations, such as altering course and/or
reducing vessel speed.
Good Neighbor Policy or Oil Spill Contingency Agreement
Shell has a ``Good Neighbor Policy'', also known as the Oil Spill
Contingency Agreement, among Shell, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling
Commission, the North Slope Borough, and Inupiat Community of the
Arctic Slope whereby Shell agrees to provide the financial and/or
logistical support to facilitate an affected community's subsistence
hunt in the event such hunt is impacted by an oil spill from Shell's
exploration driling.
Science
In the scientific arena, Shell has a long history of investing in
environmental studies necessary to properly characterize and assess
potential impacts to important ecological areas of the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas and the terrestrial areas of the North Slope. Shell
invested $35 million in environmental monitoring and research in 2012
alone, and we plan to continue our work in anticipation of future
drilling. Shell also has an agreement with the North Slope Borough to
invest annually $5 million in science projects related to oil and gas
activities offshore.
The bottom line is this: Shell continues to go above and beyond in
putting a structure and systems in place that managed our operations in
a safe and responsible manner and served to build confidence in our
programs among stakeholders closest to the resource and, I'm proud to
say, strong relationships built on trust. Most of what I just described
to you was not required by government regulation, but reflects a
corporate desire to do things right. All of these activities--as well
as the professionalism of the people who carried them out--contributed
to safe and successful offshore maritime and drilling operations.
Shell will also continue to be an active collaborator with
intergovernmental scientific planning and review boards, and Shell is
pleased that Dr. Michael Macrander, our science team lead for the
Arctic, is a member of the National Academy of Science's panel on
Emerging Research Questions in the Arctic
Arctic Maritime Activity: Challenges Going Forward and Policy Responses
Marine activity in the Arctic will increase as northern routes open
and oil and gas activity expands across the Arctic. Oil and gas
development is happening in the U.S. Arctic, as well as offshore
Russia, Canada, Norway, and Greenland. Governments are considering the
appropriate policy responses through various international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council. Industry is contributing to
the dialogue through a range of assessments and joint industry programs
that increase knowledge about the Arctic. Such government and private
sector initiatives should continue and be coordinated. There is a
shared goal to ensure that as maritime operations expand in the Arctic
they go forward safely.
Policymakers should consider the following:
Strong support for the Arctic Council--The Arctic Council is
proving to be a viable forum for Arctic nations to come to agreement on
mutually beneficial programs that can make a significant contribution
to maritime safety and protection of the environment. The Arctic
Council has several relevant working groups, such as the Arctic
Monitoring & Assessment Programs; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness &
Response and the Task Force on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response;
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; and Sustainable
Development Working Group. Given the proximity of oil and gas basins
and the likelihood of oil and gas development stretching across
national borders, the Arctic Council is best positioned to encourage
harmonization of regulatory standards covering industrial development
in the Arctic. This will facilitate development by reducing costly
duplication or conflicting requirements in a single development basin.
Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty--The U.S. is one of the
few countries in the world that has not ratified the Treaty. Broad and
diverse industry groups and companies support ratification.
Support Industry Efforts to Set Arctic Shipping Standards. IMO is
currently developing a draft International code of safety for ships
operating in polar waters (Polar Code), which would cover the full
range of design, construction, equipment, operational, training,
stability, search and rescue and environmental protection matters
relevant to ships operating in the waters surrounding the two poles.
Support Additional Arctic Scientific Research and Technology
Development. Technology development is essential for taking safe
operational practice and making it safer and enhancing mitigations to
further protect the environment. These are areas where Shell invests.
Shell is supporting the ongoing Arctic oil spill response joint
industry project that is advancing capability in this important area.
Revenue Sharing for Alaska
I want to acknowledge the effort you and Senator Murkowski are
spearheading in Washington D.C. to extend OCS revenue sharing for
Alaska. Current law provides that revenue from OCS leases in the Gulf
of Mexico is shared with the Gulf States of Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas. It is not fair that revenue from OCS leases off
the coast of Alaska is not shared. Congress should approve legislation
that gives Alaska a portion of the Federal revenue generated by
production on current and future leases.
Revenues shared with Alaska could then be available to invest into
coastal marine infrastructure such as ports and harbors, community-
based support equipment, airports and other shore-based logistic
infrastructure available for all marine users to benefit.
Conclusion
I hope these remarks are useful and informative. Thank you, Senator
Begich. I am happy to answer questions.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Pete, and thank you
for the recommendations in your written testimony. I'll ask you
some questions on that in just a second.
What I'd like to do is ask Tommy Beaudreau first a series
of questions. I know at a quarter till we have to sign you off
to hook up another VTC, so I'll try to go through my questions
fairly rapidly here, if you can bear with me.
First is, as we're working through the sequestration, the
budget cuts that were automatically implemented throughout all
the different agencies, do you see those reductions and
sequestration having an impact in doing permits in a timely
manner for 2014?
Mr. Beaudreau. So sequestration, as you know, Senator,
presents enormous challenges across the Federal Government, and
that's certainly true of agencies for which I am responsible,
in particular BOEM and BSEE. BOEM and BSEE are nothing if not
can-do agencies. I expect that we will do our utmost, as we
always have, to complete our work in a very thorough way,
demand compliance with our high standards, but complete our
work promptly as well.
This will require a lot of resource management and,
frankly, I am concerned about the potential impact of
sequester. Remember the history of MMS and the reason BOEM and
BSEE are in existence in the first place. MMS was a severely
under-resourced agency. We have worked with Congress in
connection with our reform efforts to remedy that in large
part, and I am concerned that sequester presents a step
backward from that.
But we will continue to do everything we can to fulfill our
responsibilities, and do so thoroughly, and do so promptly.
Senator Begich. Let me, if I can follow up on that, I know
you now have new requirements to do the--you took over what EPA
used to do on air permits for drilling. Is that also now--I
guess the first question is have you been able to gear up under
these conditions of sequestration, and are you seeing also a
potential of a slowdown in that process? As you know, that's a
new piece of your equation taken from EPA. Can you give me a
little comment on that, or is that similar to what you have
just described for the sequestration overall?
Mr. Beaudreau. Well, it's similar, but we are very far
along in establishing our air quality program with respect to
the Arctic OCS. That requires and we have conducted very close
work with EPA. The EPA was quite far along, actually, in
reviewing air permits emissions from, for example, Conoco
Phillips. So we have been able to piggyback from that work
moving forward, which I think has been great assistance to the
program.
As you know, Senator, there are significant differences
between the air quality program administered under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act and EPA's authorities. So we are
carrying forward the quality of the air quality analysis
through a combination of application of our regs, as well as
NEPA, but also implementing what I hope will be a very
efficient and clear process.
So there are budget challenges associated with all of this,
but we are trying to address those challenges bureau-wide, not
merely in the region.
Senator Begich. Will you be able to--and I'm going to move
to another subject here in a second, but just to finish up on
the budgetary issues, will you be able to at some point, from
your department or from the broader perspective of the Interior
Department, be able to report to us here is where you think
there might be slowdowns or impacts enough where we can get a
longer-term picture? Because, as you know, you know it better
than probably most in your department because you are from
Alaska, that the timetable of how you do this permitting is
critical, because you can literally be off a few months and
change a year or a year-and-a-half of development because of
the timetable of development that occurs here in Alaska versus
the Gulf of Mexico, as an example.
Will you be able to report to us at some point?
Mr. Beaudreau. Yes, I am absolutely willing to continue
communicating on a real-time basis with this issue. Permitting
in Alaska presents the challenge you describe. You have to have
a very efficient and timely process given the limited drilling
window. From a regulatory perspective, it also offers certain
advantages in that the volume is not as large as, say, the Gulf
of Mexico, for example, and you are able to do some advance
planning, particularly now that, for example, Shell has paused
its program. So we are really looking at 2014 potentially for
Shell, as well as for Conoco Phillips. So that offers, in my
mind, opportunity for advance planning, including around
internal resources.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you two other quick questions,
and then, while you were talking, a thing flashed across here
telling us we have just minutes left with you. You can't see
that. We can only see it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Beaudreau. That wasn't my doing.
Senator Begich. I know.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. It's a new technology. I like it now. You
guys probably love this from your end of testimony. You get
this little sign that flashes up. I know it wasn't your doing.
Let me ask you, because Conoco Phillips will be doing a
different type of drilling. I think it's a jack-up rig and how
the blowout preventers are situated. They're not down on the
ocean floor. They're on the rig itself.
Maybe you can't answer this yet. Are you going to require
Conoco Phillips to have a containment dome similar to what
Shell has done, or are you going to just utilize the blowout
preventers on the surface? Give me a sense there. Maybe you
can't answer this yet because it is still in process, but can
you give me a little sense there on that?
Mr. Beaudreau. Yes. Generally, we're going to look for the
same things from Conoco Phillips that we looked for with
respect to Shell's operation, which is a performance standard
around the ability to address any loss of well control at the
source. That is extremely important, particularly in the Arctic
environment, where opportunities for a spill response in the
event of a loss of well control are limited by the remoteness
of the geography, encroachment of sea ice, and a host of other
factors.
So we will be working very closely with Conoco Phillips on
their ability to perform with respect to source control. We
don't prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution to this issue, but
we will be very demanding on this issue.
Senator Begich. I will end with this, and again, I want to
thank you for your testimony, thank you for participating. I
know we will have more questions for you we will present
through the record. But I think this is a simple question, and
that is the interagency working group, I'm assuming that it is
working well, and if you have recommendations, not necessarily
right now but if you have recommendations to improve that, I
would be very interested in hearing that at some point, because
I know it's something I am very obviously active around. I
think it's been working, but maybe you can give a quick comment
on that, and then we will look for recommendations later.
Mr. Beaudreau. Yes, it is working quite well. The focus and
the genesis of the working group was around permitting issues.
That remains one of the core focuses of the working group. But
we are taking it further under Deputy Secretary Hayes'
leadership to improve the overall quality, as well as the
efficiency of Federal oversight in Alaska, including
coordination with the public and stakeholder outreach.
As you know, we, in executing our statutory
responsibilities, place a significant interest in public
outreach and outreach with Native communities. There are real
opportunities through the working group to ensure that that
input is shared broadly through the Federal Government, as well
as to minimize the burden on local communities from all the
Federal agencies seeking their input. So there are real
opportunities there that we will be carrying forth.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Tommy. Right across,
you cannot see it, it says, ``This meeting will end in 1
minute,'' so your timing was perfect.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. So let me just say thank you very much.
Thank you for testifying. I appreciate you doing this by VTC.
We, of course, as you know, in Alaska, it's not unusual for us
to do this, and I think it worked very well. So I thank you for
your testimony and thank you for participating. I think they
will do something to you momentarily and you will vanish from
our screen, but I'm going to continue with the two other folks
here. So, thank you again for being here.
Mr. Beaudreau. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Begich. We are still on screen, so be careful what
you do.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. Let me ask Admiral Ostebo, you had a couple
of things that I thought were interesting to me, and one is--
you mentioned this not only in your last testimony last year we
had, but also here, the ongoing concern of--you know, oil and
gas development is important, but in the sense of shipping, the
amount of movement of ships in the Arctic and the Bering Sea is
increasing at a dramatic pace, more than I think most people in
the country realize, and that creates unique challenges.
There was one note I made, and it was on the International
Maritime Organization polar code, which is all about what is
the standard we will all operate under in this region. Can you
give me an update on kind of where that is at?
For folks that are here, and also listening, this is not
just about shipping. It's also the many vessels that Pete
Slaiby talked about that he utilized. They all have to transit
through there. So it's a multifaceted use of that area.
But tell me how that is coming about and what we see as
long-term to make sure that we have some standards, because a
lot of those ships are foreign flagged, and we have no clue
about their capacity, their condition. Hopefully we know what
they have in them, but even that may be of concern. So give me
your thoughts on where we are on that and where we think we
might be going.
Admiral Ostebo. Yes, Sir. Sir, that's a great question, and
it hits a number of facets I can cover in one, hopefully not
too long response.
You mentioned, sir, almost 500 vessels went through the
Bering Strait last year. Twenty-two of them were Shell's. The
rest of them belong to somebody else. Who did they belong to,
where were they going, what were they carrying, what were their
qualifications, were there mariners on board, what was the
material condition of the ships varied greatly. If it was a
ship that was leaving from a U.S. port going to another U.S.
port, if it was a shipping or a barge combination that was
engaged in U.S. traffic and trade, we had a lot of oversight on
that. But if it is, as you said, a foreign flagged vessel with
a foreign crew going from one foreign port on the north side of
Russia, for example, to Singapore or China, there is very
little that the U.S. can demand and very little that the Coast
Guard can do to become informed about that or to demand certain
standards of care on board those ships.
To address that problem, what is being done through the IMO
is this idea of let's have a polar code that addresses not only
the standards of operation----
Senator Begich. IMO is International Maritime Organization.
Admiral Ostebo. International Maritime Organization under
the United Nations. So to take a look at what would be the
appropriate material conditions and requirements on ships that
operate in the Arctic, hull thickness, propulsion requirements,
endurance requirements, firefighting requirements, those kinds
of safety standards.
Senator Begich. So safety requirements.
Admiral Ostebo. Safety of life at sea we call it, SOLAS
requirements. What would those look like in the Arctic? What
would be the prudent set there? Also, what would be a prudent
set of qualifications for the mariners that operate those?
Would they have to be ice pilots? Would they have to have a
certain amount of training to operate in the Arctic? Both of
those things would have to go together. Obviously, having the
greatest ship in the world with inappropriately trained folks,
it doesn't really help you out. They both have to come
together.
That is moving forward. The Coast Guard is heavily involved
in structuring that. But as you know, sir, as a major
international agreement, it takes time to move that forward.
Since the time that that initiative began, things have changed
in the Arctic. So things like the offshore mobile drilling
rigs, they are not necessarily covered. The carbon footprint
for ships is not necessarily covered. There is going to be an
opportunity to go back and modify some of our requirements in
the polar code, but currently it's primarily about safety of
life at sea, firefighting and response capabilities on board
the ship, and the mariner qualifications, and it is moving
forward slowly through the IMO process.
Senator Begich. And do you feel the other countries are
participating in a way that is going to produce an end product?
Admiral Ostebo. Yes, sir. The other Arctic nations I think
are working very closely and collaboratively together. One of
the things that we see happening through the Arctic Council and
through some observer status is that a lot of other countries
that might not--you wouldn't normally think of involved in the
Arctic are working hard to have their contributions put in
there. For example, I recently met with the Singapore
Ambassador, and he is very interested in influencing the polar
code. So the more people that come to this, as you know, from a
committee perspective, it's harder to do, Senator.
Senator Begich. Very good. Let me ask you on this same
subject, and I know it's a concern, but tell me, as the Admiral
for the 17th District, both are probably concerns of oil and
gas development and shipping, but what is the bigger of the two
over the long haul here?
We are about to have someone else--OK, hang on one second.
Helen, you are on the next panel. We haven't gotten to you
yet, so be patient. You can sit there patiently, or you can
come back to the screen when we call on you. But just so you
know, you are on screen. So whatever you do, we will be
watching you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. It's your choice. So don't feel like you
have to sit there and watch us go through this. We are closing
out the second panel, or first panel here. So, thank you very
much for being here.
So, what is the biggest risk? One of the things I've said
is the shipping is what I'm always worried about. There are
multiple standards on oil and gas industry from many different
agencies, but on shipping it makes me more nervous. Tell me
where do you see the risk in the Arctic and the Bering Sea,
because they are connected in the way of the transportation
route.
Admiral Ostebo. Senator, first, in my job, I am worried
about everything.
Senator Begich. I knew that answer.
Admiral Ostebo. So I never sleep. And certainly when it
comes to environmental issues, it's hard to say whether a
gallon of oil on the water is not a problem or is a problem.
Anything going in the water that shouldn't be there is a
concern to us, including anything that produces a sheen on the
U.S. waters is something that we need to be involved with.
With that said, when I look at risk, and when I look at the
resources that I have, you have to take that risk apart a
little bit. There is the consequence side of risk, how big the
consequence is from something that happens, and the likelihood
of something happening. So when I look at likelihood and I look
at the numbers of ships that are coming through the Bering, and
I look at the number of incidents we've had in the Alaskan
waters--fires, emissions, collisions, groundings, people
falling overboard--when the KULLUK incident happened, we had 15
other cases going on in the State of Alaska at the same time.
Senator Begich. At the same time.
Admiral Ostebo. At the same moment, the same day. When I
look at the numbers of groundings that we have, we have one
which I brought some pictures of that is very much a big
concern to me today with a Pacific producer who is aground on
Kodiak Island. The highest probability----
Senator Begich. Hold on a second, Admiral. I want to make
sure that--they are working on it, so go ahead.
Admiral Ostebo. The highest probability of incidents is
clearly in the increased maritime traffic across the board.
That is clearly the number one spot.
Senator Begich. Is it because it is so multifaceted that
you don't have one person to go to to say, OK, here is what we
need to do?
Admiral Ostebo. If you look at the work that we had working
with industry last year, we knew where all their ships were. We
were all over them. We had people on board them. We inspected
them. They were all covered by AIS. They were very informed----
Senator Begich. You had a higher standard.
Admiral Ostebo. A higher standard. It was like we gang-
tackled that problem of drilling two holes in the Arctic last
year, and they brought a lot of resources with them. You had
two drilling rigs. Like I said, there were 22 vessels out
there. All those other vessels were there to support that. You
don't have that when you have a liquid condensate vessel coming
from the North Slope of Russia through the Bering Strait,
unannounced, with unknown crew and millions of gallons of
product on board. Those things can seriously bother me. I don't
know what route they are taking, and they show up on our screen
randomly.
Senator Begich. Let me ask two quick questions, and then
I'll move to Pete Slaiby, and then I'll close out. But again, I
thank you for your patience here.
With the activity that occurred this year, and you
mentioned the comment that Arctic Shell is kind of in
perpetuity at different levels, depending on activity, I'm
assuming.
Admiral Ostebo. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Do you feel like 2014, again, anticipating
that Shell will be back in the waters, as well as potentially
Conoco Phillips, that you are prepared even under the
sequestration levels that we are at, or is that a risk factor
that we have to calculate in and do what we can, obviously, on
our end? And that may have been an answer to the question by
the question I gave you, but tell me what you are thinking for
2014. With sequestration, with Shell, Conoco Phillips
potentially, now you have two kind of overlapping inside that
region.
Admiral Ostebo. Senator, I would submit that Coast Guard
activities in the region are going to grow and be persistent,
obviously changed by the amount of activity that goes on there,
and oil and gas exploration is one part of that. If there is no
more oil and gas exploration in the Arctic, the Coast Guard's
presence will continue to grow there with all this other
activity we have talked about.
So we are attenuating our efforts based on the need that we
see. Clearly, the summer of 2013, this coming summer, the Coast
Guard will be there. We will have a national security cutter up
there. We are looking to move a buoy tender up there. We're
going to do some more experiments and exercise work. We have a
whole list of things we're going to continue to do, although
oil and gas exploration is not going to be taking place like it
did last year. So you can rest assured----
Senator Begich. There will still be activity there, but
just on the level of training and testing, and also being aware
because there is other activity outside of oil and gas going
on.
Admiral Ostebo. Yes, sir. And this also actually gives us
an opportunity to focus more on the Bering Strait. So we'll put
a lot of assets in there, and we will continue with our
outreach with the local communities up there that we have
started and that I think is going very well.
In the summer of 2014, if Shell decides to drill, if Conoco
Phillips shows up to drill, if our Canadian friends decide to
move forward, as they are planning on doing, if our Russian
friends decide to do the same, and with Pt. Thompson--I think
it is important for a lot of folks to realize that Pt. Thompson
is opening up. There are some 30 or 40 barges with a whole city
that is going to go there to open up that field. That is all
going to be from offshore. That is all going to be
international traffic that brings that there. Equipment that's
built in China and Singapore and other places will all have to
come in, and the Coast Guard will be all over that because that
provides lots of opportunity for accidents.
So the Coast Guard will be there in the summer of 2013 and
the summer of 2014 and beyond, a lot more I would suspect in
the summer of 2014.
Sequestration. Clearly, as Director Beaudreau brought up,
sequestration is an issue for all of us, and the Coast Guard,
particularly District 17, is working hard to figure out how
best to manage the risks and the impacts of sequestration. We
have a reduction in our flight hours, and our offshore maritime
activity is being reduced because of that. The exact impacts, I
will be getting a briefing before the end of this week,
actually tomorrow, from my staff on how exactly they will
recommend I adjust to that.
Now, as far as 2014 goes in sequestration, Senator, as you
know, that could be a million years from now.
Senator Begich. Right. In Senate time, it is.
Admiral Ostebo. Everything is changing. So we had a
continuing resolution, then we had sequestration, now have a
new continuing resolution, and we are still trying to balance
all those books and see how we can do it.
I will finally end with this is the Coast Guard issue,
Senator, and not just my issue here in District 17. It is an
all-hands-on-deck event for the United States Coast Guard
around the Nation. So forces do flow from elsewhere as we look
to balance the Coast Guard activities to Alaska to address
this. So it's not just myself out here trying to figure this
out on my own. Thank you very much.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Pete, thank you very much for being patient here. I know
that because of limitations of the reports that are being done
and the work that is done by different agencies that you
responded to on the KULLUK, let me ask you if I can ask you
maybe a general question. You had an incredible operation at--I
think it was the Marriott, if I remember right, the incident
command, and you had lots of pieces to it, lots of people, lots
of other activities. In your process--and again, if you can't
comment now, but in the process of when you prepare the reports
for the different agencies, are you going to talk about what
you can do to improve that, or was it what you thought it would
be, or what can you tell us now?
It seemed to be a lot of people, and I know you're probably
doing an internal analysis, I'm assuming, of how that went,
where are some tweaks or where changes could be made. Can you
comment on any of that at this point, or is that something that
has to be limited because of the work you are doing with the
Justice Department, as well as the Interior Department and the
Coast Guard?
Mr. Slaiby. We can comment on the response itself. It's
really, I think, more out with the investigation.
Senator Begich. Sure.
Mr. Slaiby. We were very happy that we were able to stand
up and bring all those folks together basically over New Year's
and the period thereafter. As we said, actually a little over
700 people. We were able to mobilize assets that we had,
frankly, put away for the winter. Our oil spill response
capacity was located both in Seward and Dutch Harbor,
tremendous responses from some of our local companies here.
You know, over the years, we had done a lot of oil spill
training with folks at ASRC, their energy services, with UIC,
with Alaska Clean Seas. And very, very quickly, within a matter
of two or 3 days, we were literally able to take the snow off
some of these assets in Seward and bring them up and mobilize
them. Between the assets that were mobilized in Dutch and
Seward, I think we were able to address a lot of the concerns
the stakeholders had, that the incident command had, in a very
short order.
One of the things that worked very well, obviously, because
of the proximity to Kodiak, was the access to the helicopters
and the crews on those rescue helicopters. If this were to have
been an incident in the Slope, we would have been a little
closer to where our air assets were.
And finally I will say as well for my industry partners.
Clearly, the Coast Guard came through. We had a number of
vessels that we were able to pull through, but we called and
got a helicopter released from our colleagues at Exxon Mobil in
17 minutes from the time we made the call.
Senator Begich. So as you examine it and as you move
forward, you will probably do some internal recommendations as
you improve or enhance it. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Slaiby. We worked an awful lot with the Coast Guard,
again Captain Mehler and Admiral Ostebo will testify. We had a
number of full call-out drills last year. We had two drills
going into 2012 where we actually flew a number of folks up
from out of state to help us in there. So we had practiced what
was going on, and fortune favors the prepared. I do feel that
the success we had in getting the KULLUK off the rocks was due
to the work we had done with the Coast Guard, with the State of
Alaska, and with other Federal agencies.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you two quick questions, and
then I'm going to have to close things off. But one, you did a
conflict avoidance agreement with the whaling captains in the
communities up there. How do you feel that worked out?
Obviously, this would be from your perspective. But how do you
think that worked, that kind of sitting down and working this
out? Tell me your thoughts on that.
Mr. Slaiby. We think it worked pretty well. You know, we
had talked in my testimony, Senator, about the fact that we
weren't able to get our wells through hydrocarbon sessions. We
obviously had reasons that we couldn't do that. But one of the
things we had to work with was the whaling activities in the
Beaufort, and we had agreed through the conflict avoidance
agreement that we would not engage in activities during whaling
on Cross Island, and what's going on in Kaktovik as well. It's
very difficult to do, but it's something we said we would do,
and we honored.
Senator Begich. Now the last question, regarding the
interagency working group. You had stated the last time we had
a hearing, your desire--your sense was that it was working, but
your desire was to determine how you make this more permanent
so it's not just at the whim of the current president or what
might happen administratively. Is that still your position, to
see this more permanent so there is some long-term structure?
Mr. Slaiby. Yes, absolutely. I think the work that Deputy
Secretary Hayes did was excellent, and I'm sure Deputy
Secretary Beaudreau will continue down the same line. But we do
need to make it sustainable through a number of different
operators, through Conoco and Statoil and eventually others
that might come on. I think the work that it's doing does need
to survive political transitions----
Senator Begich. Personnel and political----
Mr. Slaiby. Yes, but it has been. It has been a sea change
practically in how things have been done. I also think that in
a time of sequester and in a time when we are really looking to
up the quality of permits, you are getting a better quality
program at potentially a more efficient cost structure, and
everybody benefits with that in place.
Senator Begich. Very good. Let me end there, and I do have
some other questions. I will just submit them for the record,
if that's OK.
Mr. Slaiby. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Begich. I appreciate all of you being here. And
again, thank you for giving your testimony. We have your
written testimony, and then I know Pete Slaiby gave some
recommendations, and I am probably going to correspond with you
on some of those thoughts there.
Mr. Slaiby. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Begich. Thank you all very much. We will dismiss
this panel.
We will have the next panel assemble very quickly here.
Helen, we will be going to you first, so be prepared here.
Thank you very much. Give us a second here to set up. Thank you
very much.
Our next panel, if staff can set those up, great. We have
one, two, three, four, five, and we'll try to go through those.
Helen Brohl, Executive Director of U.S. Committee on Marine
Transportation System.
Mr. Ed Page, Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of
Alaska.
Ms. Eleanor Huffines, Manager, U.S. Arctic Campaign, Pew
Charitable Trusts.
Matt Ganley, Vice President, Bering Straits Native Corp.
And we've had an additional one.
And then Mr. Jack Omelak, of Nanuuq Commission. Thank you
very much.
Let me go ahead and again thank the panel for being here.
Thank you for participating. Again, you got a sense if we can
keep your testimony close to 5 minutes each, that would be
appropriate, and we'll start right off the bat. Again, this is
our second panel, again talking about the Arctic in a broader
sense. Again, we appreciate Helen Brohl, Executive Director,
U.S. Committee on Marine Transportation Systems, being here on
video teleconference.
As I mentioned earlier, Helen, before you got on, that due
to sequester and other budget reductions, we couldn't have you
here in person. You're missing 70-degree summer weather here,
no snow. But we think this is great that you're able to
participate. The last testimony we had from Tommy Beaudreau
went very well. It works very clean. So again, thank you for
your willingness to testify here, and it saves a little money
to the Federal Government. We like doing that. So again,
appreciate your time.
I'll open with you, and if you want to go ahead with your
testimony, we greatly appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HELEN BROHL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
U.S. COMMITTEE ON THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Ms. Brohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm just testing. Can
you hear me okay, sir?
Senator Begich. We can hear you perfect.
Ms. Brohl. Thank you so much. Chairman Begich, thank you
for the opportunity to provide testimony today to you and the
Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere,
Fisheries, and Coast Guard's field hearing in Anchorage. Thank
you again for allowing us to participate by VTC from our
headquarters in Washington.
The Committee on the Marine Transportation System, or CMTS,
originated as a Federal cabinet-level interagency committee
established at the direction of the President in 2004. This
past December, Congress institutionalized the Committee in
statute in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of
2012.
The CMTS includes 28 member departments, independent
agencies and White House offices, including DHS, the Coast
Guard, and the Department of Interior. The Secretary of
Transportation serves as the Chair.
The CMTS is identified as the U.S. Marine Transportation
System and is within the purview of over 35 individual Federal
agencies. The purpose of the CMTS is to assess the adequacy of
the marine transportation system, which includes ports,
waterways, channels, and their intermodal connections; and to
promote the integration of the MTS with other modes of
transportation and other uses of the marine environment; and
coordinate recommendations with regard to Federal policies that
impact the MTS.
The United States is an Arctic nation. As climate change,
including the loss of sea ice, creates a more accessible
Arctic, we must conserve the need for future action and
guidance that will facilitate safe and efficient navigation,
permit supplies and property, reduce the risk of environmental
damage to the region, and preserve the way of life of the
Native Alaskan tribes.
So the U.S. Arctic MTS should be capable of meeting the
safety, security, and environmental protection needs of present
and future Arctic stakeholders and activities.
Under Section 307 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2010, the CMTS was directed to coordinate the establishment of
domestic transportation policies in the Arctic. This
coordination includes the consideration of national policies
and guidance related to safe and secure maritime shipping in
the Arctic.
To advance this coordination, the CMTS created an
interagency action team to oversee the development of a draft
report titled, ``U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System:
Overview and Priorities for Action 2013.'' This draft report is
currently on the CMTS website at www.cmts.gov for public
inspection with a 45-day public comment period which ends on
April 22. The CMTS expects to finalize the report once public
comments have been compiled and assessed.
The draft CMTS Arctic MTS Report identifies existing Arctic
MTS policies; assesses present and projected uses of the
Arctic; describes the essential components of a U.S. Arctic
MTS; describes the potential benefits of a U.S. Arctic MTS;
provides an evaluation of the current condition of the U.S.
Arctic MTS; and recommends actions through which CMTS agencies
can, working with stakeholders, strengthen the MTS to meet the
Nation's goals for safe Arctic economic activity and
environmental protection.
As part of its assessment, the CMTS identified five
components and 16 sub-elements of the U.S. Arctic MTS. The five
main components include: navigable waterways, which includes
things like places of refuge for ships; physical
infrastructures such as geodetic control infrastructure; MTS
information infrastructure such as hydrographic surveys; MTS
response surveys such as escort services and icebreaking; and
vessels, including crew standards and training.
For each of the 16 sub-elements within these five
components, the draft report provides a description of the
issue, its status, associated challenges, current Federal
activities, and future Federal actions needed. These issue
papers are located under Chapter 3 and also identify non-
Federal partners.
Taken together, the Arctic MTS issue papers recognize the
Arctic MTS as a nascent system that would need considerable
public/private investment to support increased Arctic traffic
if projected future growth in regional and trans-Arctic
shipping is realized.
As it has been stated, changing conditions in the Arctic
create an opportunity for the United States to develop a new
Arctic marine transportation system. Working cooperatively with
Federal, state, local and tribal authorities, the MTS may be
sustainably managed to the benefit of all stakeholders.
CMTS, in its draft U.S. Arctic MTS Overview and Action
report, puts forward short-term and long-term recommendations,
and a comprehensive strategy to address the development of the
Arctic MTS and supporting elements across all MTS components
and stakeholders. I would like to note that many of these
recommendations are complementary to the soon-to-be-released
National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan.
If an Arctic MTS is to be developed, the CMTS recognizes
the interdependent nature of marine transportation system
elements and recommends that the United States first focus to
improve the Arctic MTS in two primary MTS component areas.
These are information infrastructure, including sea ice and
marine weather forecasts, mapping and charting, communications,
and AIS coverage; and response services, including
environmental response management, search and rescue, and ice-
breaking capability.
While not yet final, an appropriate mix of MTS services is
called for in the MTS report to bridge existing gaps and
provide a safe, secure, and environmentally sound MTS to
address the full range of issues impacting the U.S. Arctic and
the Arctic region at large.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate again the opportunity
to testify, and I'll be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brohl follows:]
Prepared Statement of the United States Committee on the Marine
Transportation System
I. Introduction
The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS)
appreciates the opportunity to participate in the Senate Commerce
Committee, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast
Guard's field hearing in Anchorage, Alaska to discuss Arctic maritime
safety.
The United States is an Arctic nation. As climate change, including
the loss of sea ice create a more accessible Arctic, we must consider
the need for future action and guidance that will facilitate safe and
efficient navigation, prevent loss of life and property, and reduce the
risk of environmental damage in the region. Safe marine transportation
is fundamental to each of these pursuits. For this reason, a U.S.
Arctic Marine Transportation System (MTS) should be capable of meeting
the safety, security and environmental protection needs of present and
future Arctic stakeholders and activities.
II. CMTS and the Coordination of Domestic Arctic Transportation
Policies
The Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) originated
as a Federal cabinet-level, interagency committee established at the
direction of the President in 2004. Congress institutionalized the
Committee in statute (P.L. 112-213) in December 2012. The CMTS has 28
member departments, agencies and White House offices. The Secretary of
Transportation serves as its Chair. The movement of people and goods
through the U.S. MTS is within the purview of many individual Federal
agencies and programs. As specified in P.L. 112-213, the purpose of the
CMTS is to assess the adequacy of the marine transportation system
(including ports, waterways, channels, and their intermodal
connections); promote the integration of the marine transportation
system with other modes of transportation and other uses of the marine
environment; and coordinate recommendations with regard to Federal
policies that impact the marine transportation system.
Under section 307 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, the
CMTS was directed to coordinate the establishment of domestic
transportation policies in the Arctic. This coordination includes the
consideration of national policies and guidance related to safe and
secure maritime shipping in the Arctic. To advance this coordination,
the CMTS Coordinating Board created a nine-member interagency
subcommittee (integrated action team or ``IAT'') led by the Maritime
Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and
the U.S. Coast Guard.
The IAT oversaw development of a draft report titled U.S. Arctic
Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action 2013.
The CMTS has made the draft report available for public inspection with
a 45-day public comment period ending April 22, 2013. The draft report
is available on the CMTS website, www.cmts.gov. The CMTS expects to
finalize the report once public comments have been complied and
assessed.
Briefly, the draft report:
Identifies existing Arctic MTS Federal policies;
Assesses present and projected uses of the Arctic, and
reported implications for U.S. transportation policies and a
U.S. Arctic MTS;
Describes the essential components of a U.S. Arctic MTS that
would provide for safe, secure, environmentally sustainable and
reliable navigation;
Describes the potential benefits of a U.S. Arctic MTS for
maritime commerce, indigenous peoples and communities, and the
environment;
Provides an evaluation of the current condition of the U.S.
Arctic MTS, including physical and information infrastructure
and human capital; and,
Recommends actions through which CMTS agencies can, working
with stakeholders, strengthen the U.S. Arctic MTS to meet the
Nation's goals for safe Arctic economic activity and
environmental protection.
Current and Future State of Arctic Shipping
Commercial shipping activity in the U.S. Arctic is primarily
regional; it is centered on the limited use of maritime transport of
natural resources from the Arctic. The most recent and reliable data
provided by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Alaska Marine Exchange reports
that ``for 2008 to 2012, total annual vessel traffic in the Arctic
region grew from 120 to 250 regional transits. The growth rate was
highest for tanker vessels, with tugs and other cargo vessels being the
second and third largest categories of movements. Bering Strait
transits from 2008 to 2012 rose from 220 to 480.
An ice-diminished Arctic is now creating growth potential for
commercial shipping on trans-Arctic routes. Various media reports
suggest that Russia is interested in developing a Northern Sea Route
(NSR) for transit between Europe and Asia. According to the Barents
Observer, (http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2012/11/46-vessels-
through-northern-sea-route-23-11) 46 vessels transited this NSR in
2012. A significant increase in Arctic marine traffic via the NSR could
eventually raise the geostrategic profile of the Bering Strait. The
draft report concludes that while the number of vessels in the Arctic
is relatively small when compared to the tens of thousands of vessels
that come in and out of U.S. ports on an annual basis, maritime
shipping in and through the U.S. Arctic is on the rise.
During ice-diminished periods and in ice-free locations, the most
economic means of maritime transportation of general cargo and supplies
to communities is usually by tug and barge. Shallow draft Alaska tug
and barge businesses haul fuel, gravel and supplies to Prudhoe Bay, Red
Dog Mine and Alaska coastal communities (predominately Alaska Native
villages). Tugs support offshore oil and gas operations for ice
management and towing duties. Tugs and barges also support and help
respond to pollution events. The need for tug and barge operations will
continue as local communities grow and, in some cases, relocate due to
coastal erosion.
Offshore oil exploration and eventually, production, will depend on
safe marine transportation for vessels that staff the drill site, move
the resources from site to customer, and, in the event of an incident,
support a spill response or other emergency. For example, in advance of
summer 2012 offshore Arctic exploratory drilling programs in the
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, Shell Oil Company received conditional
approval for its exploration plans from the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management and full approval on its Oil Spill Response Plans from the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). Both programs
included a flotilla of up to 22 vessels to drill, supply the 14 Darya
rigs, and support oil spill response. Shell plans to delay exploration
in 2013, but continue exploration in 2014. ConocoPhillips, which also
holds leases in the Chukchi Sea, is making similar preparations for
potential exploratory drilling in 2014.
Within the U.S. Arctic, marine-based tourism is currently very
limited. Only Hapag-Lloyd Cruises offers voyages through the Northwest
Passages with stops at ports within the U.S. Arctic in Nome, Point Hope
and Barrow, AK.\1\ Cruising in such cold, remote waters poses special
challenges to normal contingency planning. In an ice-diminished Arctic,
the rise of tourism and passenger traffic, as well as commercial
shipping, may require adjustment to existing safety regulations as well
as forward basing of Federal and state response and rescue
capabilities.
In the U.S. Arctic, fishing is currently concentrated in the Bering
Sea. The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council has closed the
Arctic Management Area in U.S. waters in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.
If increasing temperatures and changing ocean conditions shift
distribution of some fish species into the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas,
sustainable harvests north of the Bering Sea may in time be authorized,
possibly resulting in a commensurate increase in fishing operations;
thus, creating another future source of increased vessel traffic in
U.S. Arctic waters.
IV. Components and Current Condition of a U.S. Arctic Marine
Transportation System (MTS)
As part of it assessment of Arctic marine transportation, the CMTS
identified five components and 16 elements of a U.S. Arctic marine
transportation system. Based on traditional components and elements of
other U.S. regional marine transportation systems, the components and
elements needed to develop a U.S. Arctic MTS would include:
Navigable Waterways
Places of Refuge for Ships
Areas of Heightened Ecological Significance
Physical Infrastructure
Ports and Associated Facilities
Geodetic Control Infrastructure
MTS Information Infrastructure
Hydrographic Surveys
Shoreline Mapping
Aids to Navigation (AtoN)
Communications
Marine Weather and Sea Ice Forecasts
Real-Time Navigation Information
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
MTS Response Services
Vessel Escort and Icebreaking
Environmental Response Management
Search and Rescue/Emergency Response
Vessels
Polar Code/Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters
Crew Standards/Training
For each of these 16 U.S. Arctic MTS elements the draft report
provides an issue description, its status, challenges, current Federal
activities, and future Federal actions needed. These issues papers also
identify non-federal partners.
V. Current Condition of the Arctic MTS
Taken together the Arctic MTS issue papers recognize the Arctic MTS
as a nascent system that would need considerable public/private
investment to support increased Arctic traffic if projected future
growth in regional and trans Arctic shipping is realized. This is
particularly true in the U.S. Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Less than 1
percent of charted navigationally significant Arctic waters have been
surveyed with modern technology to determine depths and depict hazards
to navigation. There are no harbors of refuge or deep-water port
facilities in this region, and there are no aids to navigation north of
the Bering Strait, except for eight buoys supporting the Red Dog mine.
There have been advances in Automatic Identification System (AIS)
coverage of vessel movements in the Bering Strait and along the North
Slope and insurance-driven concerns are motivating the shipping
industry to address region-specific safety concerns. There are
currently 19 AIS receiving stations for the Bering Sea including the
Aleutian Islands and 11 AIS receiving stations for the Bering Sea
northward. All of these AIS stations are operated by the Marine
Exchange of Alaska, data from which is made available to the USCG.
Additionally, the Coast Guard (USCG) continues to push forward and
assess its capabilities to conduct operations in the Arctic. Since
2008, USCG set up small, temporary Forward Operating Locations on the
North Slope in Prudhoe Bay, Nome, Barrow and Kotzebue to test their
capabilities with boats, helicopters, and Maritime Safety and Security
Teams. They also deployed light-ice capable 225-foot ocean-going buoy
tenders to test their equipment, train crews and increase awareness of
activity. Additionally, each year from April to November USCG has flown
two sorties a month to evaluate activities in the region.
Similar to navigation charting, an Arctic MTS will depend on timely
Arctic weather forecasts and sea ice predictions. Currently reliable
Arctic forecasts are available two to three days out, compared with
five to seven-day predictive capabilities in the rest of the United
States. Atmospheric and oceanographic observations, including useful
forecasts of marine weather and sea ice for the Arctic Ocean, are the
fundamental information necessary to support MTS services.
Lastly, the harsh Arctic conditions impose unique requirements for
safe vessel operation, especially in the ice-covered waters of the
higher latitudes. Governmental agencies and commercial companies
engaged in maritime operations in the U.S. Arctic will need ice-capable
vessels to safely navigate in ice-covered waters. While there are no
specialized qualifications, training or certifications currently in
existence for crews of vessels that operate in polar waters, the U.S.
is participating in IMO Polar Code development that will provide
guidelines for crew standards, including specialized qualifications,
training and certification guidelines. Foreign ice-breaking vessels are
allowed to work in ice-covered U.S. waters under an exemption that
expires in 2017.
VI. Conclusion
As climate change, including the resulting loss of sea ice create a
more accessible Arctic, there is a corresponding Federal responsibility
to review beneficial opportunities for commerce, specifically regional
and trans Arctic maritime transportation.
Compared to maritime transit around the rest of the continental
United States, the Arctic is an intensely harsh operating environment,
with extreme cold, heavy fog, severe storms, and the added elements of
unpredictable ice flows and changing sea ice conditions.
Changing conditions in the Arctic create an opportunity for the
United States to develop a new Arctic MTS. Working cooperatively with
federal, state, local and tribal authorities, the MTS may be
sustainably managed to the benefit of all stakeholders. Each
stakeholder must responsibly embrace their respective role to ensure
optimal use of resources, and with collective dedication to protect
indigenous cultures, rare and endangered wildlife, and the environment.
CMTS, in its draft U.S. Arctic MTS: Overview and Priorities for Action
report, puts forward short term and long term recommendations, and a
comprehensive strategy to address the development of the Arctic MTS and
supporting elements across all MTS components and stakeholders. I would
like to note that many of these recommendations are complementary to
the soon-to-be-released National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan.
(NOC) If an Arctic MTS is to be developed, the CMTS recognizes the
interdependent nature of marine transportation system elements, and
recommends that the United States first focus efforts to improve the
Arctic MTS in two primary MTS component areas:
MTS Information Infrastructure, including sea ice and marine
weather forecasts, mapping and charting, communications, and
AIS coverage, and
MTS Response Services, including environmental response
management, search and rescue, and ice breaking capability.
While not yet final, an appropriate mix of MTS services, actions
and notice and comment regulation is called for in the Arctic MTS
report to bridge existing gaps and provide a safe, secure and
environmentally sound MTS to address the full range of issues impacting
the U.S. Arctic and the Arctic region at large.
Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this hearing,
Chairman Begich. I would be glad to respond to any questions you may
have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. It came across very
well and we could hear you perfect. So again, thank you. Be
patient as we go through a couple more testimonies, and then
I'll come back to you first for questions. So we will recognize
your time and limitations.
The next person I have is Ed Page, Executive Director of
the Marine Exchange of Alaska. I have visited your facility and
it's impressive, what you're doing down there. So, please.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD PAGE, USCG (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA
Mr. Page. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to
speak today on these pressing issues in Alaska.
Having served in the maritime profession in Alaska for over
24 years as a prior Coast Guard Officer and presently as the
Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska, I have
seen firsthand the changes in maritime activity in Alaska and
appreciate the importance of ensuring safe, environmentally
sound maritime operations in the Arctic.
I have sailed on Coast Guard vessels, oil tankers,
container ships, fishing vessels, tugs, oil exploration support
vessels, oil spill response vessels, cruise ships, and cargo
ships in Alaskan waters. I can attest to the fact that
operating in water does, in fact, present some unique
challenges, and having responded to search and rescue cases
where mariners have perished, as well as numerous oil spills,
including the Exxon Valdez oil spill, I have recognized the
need for having better information on vessels' locations or
maritime awareness, which is the common term used, capable of
both prevention and response to maritime casualties.
Senator Begich. Hold it, Ed.
[Telephone.]
Senator Begich. Sorry, Ed. Please go ahead.
That will embarrass Jim for a long time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Page. While serving as Captain of the Port for Los
Angeles Long Beach, the Coast Guard and I, in my capacity as
Captain of the Port, partnered with the legacy Marine Exchange
of Southern California, which is also a nonprofit organization,
and the State of California to build and operate a vessel
traffic system for that port area that utilized a 25-mile
radar, which certainly is not adequate for Alaska waters.
But the model of shared marine history and government
partnership is, in fact, a model that has been taken and
brought up to Alaska. But due to the enormity of our state, the
Marine Exchange of Alaska utilized emerging and newer
technologies, including the use of automatic identification
systems, or AIS is the acronym, a satellite tracking technology
that is largely funded today by the maritime industry, the
State of Alaska, and the Coast Guard.
It was adopted by the IMO, the International Maritime
Organization. Most vessels engaged in international trade are
required to be equipped with AIS transponders that broadcast
the vessel location, type, speed, course, and other valuable
information several times a minute over VHF radio frequencies.
This substantially enhances maritime safety as it is received
and processed by other vessels in the area, as well as by shore
and satellite AIS receivers, and this information is
disseminated to the Coast Guard, state agencies, and to the
maritime community.
In 2005, the Marine Exchange built and operates today over
95 AIS receiver sites in Alaska and throughout the Arctic, out
to the Aleutian Islands and down to Ketchikan. This system is
providing historical and real-time information on vessels'
locations and has been used in coordinating responses to vessel
distress and to locate vessels that are the source of oil
spills. Most recently, it was used by the Coast Guard and Shell
during the fuel platform KULLUK incident in Alaska.
The system also monitors compliance with vessel speed
restrictions in well-protected areas. It triggers alerts to
prevent the presence of both high-profile vessels and aircraft
in the flight path of the Kodiak Airport, and alarms when a
vessel sets anchor on an underwater fiber cable serving Alaska
so they can know where to effect the repairs.
In fact, Shell Oil has been one of the more proactive users
of the system and has employed the Marine Exchange to send
alerts when their contracted vessels approach a vicinity of
areas that are restricted by permits issued to do the drilling.
When a vessel approaches these restricted areas, the Marine
Exchange's 24-hour operation center alerted both the vessel
operator and Shell. As a result of this proactive measure,
there were no incursions in Ledger Bay this past year.
The Marine Exchange's Arctic network has provided
information on vessel activity over the last several years to
the Coast Guard and to other agencies to assess the extent of
increasing traffic and the risks that they present. Our system
tracks vessels and reaches across through Russian waters and
receives the AIS transmissions of all vessels equipped with AIS
that are transiting the Bering Strait to and from the Arctic.
So many reports that you see and the graphics of traffic
through the Arctic, as you well know, Senator, are from the
Marine Exchange's vessel tracking system.
While it is often somewhat difficult to find actual traffic
activity because there are many different ways of counting
vessels and metrics and whether a ship is a tug and what-have-
you, as noted earlier, it is somewhere in the neighborhood of
400 vessels that have gone through the Bering Straits this past
year. It is reflecting a modest increase over the last several
years, as we contracted for about 5 years now. Each year there
are more vessels going across and different types of vessels
going across, and most recently exploration vessels, and of
course Russia is now bringing more vessels across the top.
While the risks presented by maritime traffic in the region
do exist, I think they are somewhat modest when you compare it
to the ports of Seattle and San Francisco and L.A., provided
that in those places, where there is Coast Guard monitoring,
oversight and presence, there is also the same in the Arctic.
Certainly, the Coast Guard is much like a policeman on the
highway. Their presence influences the behavior of vessel
operators and ensures compliance with various regulations and
safety standards.
I feel this is an appropriate time to start implementing
this risk reduction mechanism, not after an accident but before
they happen. So this focus and a hearing such as this are
certainly appropriate and timely. When we reflect back, there
was no government surveillance when the Exxon Valdez ran
aground in 1989 because the vessel was sailed past the Coast
Guard's radar coverage. Of course, today there is complete
coverage provided by AIS of Prince William Sound. So it is
under the watchful eye of the Coast Guard, and vessels'
behavior is influenced accordingly.
Here is where I find some improvement in maritime safety in
the Arctic can be realized, expanding the Coast Guard AIS
carriage requirements for vessels to all commercial vessels,
and not only to vessels engaged in international trade. There
were regulations drafted some four years ago by the Coast Guard
to address this issue. In fact, other nations around the world
have done so. But today, the regulations do not require most of
those vessels operating up in the Arctic on domestic trade, the
Shell vessels in particular, they are not required to have AIS.
The vessels are exceeding the regulatory requirements by having
AIS on board and allowing that visibility.
Regulations should be published, the draft regulations
should be published to provide a level playing field to make
sure all vessels operating in the Arctic have AIS. This in turn
will allow the Coast Guard to monitor surveillance and ensure
compliance with the various safety requirements. This concept
comports with the 1989 International Arctic Maritime Shipping
Assessment that recommended--I believe it was 1999, actually,
or 2009, sorry--that recommended all commercial vessels
operating in the Arctic be equipped with AIS. So it is not just
Ed Page saying this. Others have also found merit in AIS.
AIS is also from the outset designed to provide two-way
communications. In other words, you can disseminate safety
information over the same system. It has greater range, it's
clear, it's digital, and it can provide more information. In
our case, we have developed, working with the Alaska Ocean
Observing System that provided some support and funding, the
capability--we bought the equipment, and we tested it, and we
have demonstrated it works--to send ice information and weather
information to vessels over AIS.
However, we can't receive the permits to do it. So even
though we can't turn it on, and we have turned it on and tested
it, but we can't legally turn it on to send information out
because we can't get the permits to do so even though it has
been done in Europe. I believe that the agency should be more
proactive in facilitating this ability to provide safety
information to vessels through this newer technology. That
would enhance maritime safety in this region, as well as other
regions.
Last, I believe the implementation of long-delayed Coast
Guard non-tank vessel regulations, which seem to be having some
movement as of late, will reduce the risk and consequences of
oil spills as the regulation will require cargo and other non-
tank vessels to contribute to the commercial oil spill
prevention and response capabilities in Alaska. Right now,
these regulations only apply to tankers, and they are footing
the bill, and they pay for the response capability. But we can
expand capabilities if and when non-tank vessels are also
required. Of course, this is a law that was passed by Congress
10 years ago, I believe. So I think it's time to implement the
regulations.
While our work is not done at the Marine Exchange, there
are many more AIS stations that we need to build and increase
the range of, as well as fully implement the weather sensors
and weather transmitters and safety information to vessels,
those capabilities. If it was not for the Coast Guard, the
State of Alaska and the marine industry's shared commitment to
improve maritime safety, this system simply would not exist.
This private/public partnership is a cost-effective solution
that no other government agency or contractor was willing or
able to do, and this operation and maintenance of the 24-hour
operation center and extensive tracking network is provided at
a total cost of about $2.5 million per year.
Those are the end of my comments, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Page follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Edward Page, USCG (Retired), Executive
Director, Marine Exchange of Alaska
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Rockefeller and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here today to discuss the
preparedness and response in the Arctic and the opportunities and
challenges of increased maritime activity.
Having served in the maritime profession in Alaska for over 24
years as a prior Coast Guard officer and presently as Executive
Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska I have seen firsthand the
changes in maritime activity in Alaska and appreciate the import of
ensuring safe and environmentally sound maritime operations in the
Arctic. I have sailed on Coast Guard vessels, oil tankers, container
ships, fishing vessels, tugs, oil exploration and support vessels, oil
spill response vessels, cruise ships and cargo ships in Alaska waters
and can attest to the fact operating in Alaska presents unique
challenges. Having responded to search and rescue cases where mariners
have perished and numerous oil spills, including the EXXON VALDEZ oil
spill, I have recognized the need for having better information on
vessels' locations or maritime domain awareness to aid both prevention
of and response to maritime casualties. While serving as Captain of the
Port for Los Angeles/Long Beach the Coast Guard partnered with the
legacy Marine Exchange of Southern California and the State of
California to build and operate a Vessel Tracking System for that port
area that utilized a 25 mile range radar to track vessels. This
successful model of shared marine industry and government partnership
has been replicated in Alaska, however, due to the enormity of this
state, the Marine Exchange of Alaska utilizes emerging vessel tracking
technologies of Automatic Identification Systems or AIS and satellite
tracking that is largely funded by the maritime industry, the State of
Alaska and the Coast Guard.
As adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) most
vessels engaged in international trade are required to be equipped with
AIS transponders that broadcast the vessel's location, type, speed,
course, destination and other valuable information several times a
minute over VHF radio frequencies. This data substantially enhances
maritime safety as it is received and processed by other vessels in the
area as well as by shore and satellite AIS receivers and disseminated
to the Coast Guard, state agencies and the maritime community. Since
2005, the Marine Exchange of Alaska has built and operates over 95 AIS
receiving sites in Alaska that have provided historical and real time
information on vessels locations. This vessel tracking system has been
used to aid coordinating responses to vessels in distress and to locate
vessels that are the source of oil spills. Most recently it was used by
the Coast Guard and Shell during the drill platform KULLUK incident in
Alaska. This system also monitors compliance with vessel speed
restrictions in whale protected areas, triggers alerts to prevent the
presence of both high profile vessels and aircraft in the flight path
of an airport and alarms when a vessel sets anchor on an underwater
fiber cable serving Alaska.
Shell Oil has been one of the more proactive users of this system
and has employed the Marine Exchange to send alerts when their
contracted vessels approach the vicinity of areas restricted by
permits. When a vessel approached these restricted areas the Marine
Exchange 24 hour operations center alerted both the vessel operator and
Shell. As a result of this proactive measure, there were no incursions
in Ledyard Bay this year.
The Marine Exchange's Arctic network has provided information on
vessel activity over the last several years to the Coast Guard and
other agencies to assess the extent of increasing traffic. The system's
range reaches across to Russia and receives the AIS transmissions of
all vessels transiting the Bering Strait to and from the Arctic. While
it is difficult to define the level of traffic in the Arctic as there
are various metrics that are being used, the Marine Exchange system
received data from approximately 350 commercial vessels transiting the
Bering Strait in 2012, reflecting a modest increase in traffic over the
last several years. In light of receding ice, Russia's increased
maritime activity and oil exploration operations we anticipate maritime
traffic will continue to grow. The risks presented by maritime traffic
in this region are modest and manageable provided there is Coast Guard
monitoring, oversight and presence. This is the time to implement risk
reduction measures. There was no government surveillance when the Exxon
Valdez sailed past the Coast Guard's radar coverage in Prince William
Sound in 1989. There is complete AIS surveillance of the area today.
Areas where improvements in maritime safety in the Arctic can be
realized are in expanding the Coast Guard AIS carriage requirements to
all commercial vessels and not only vessels engaged in international
trade. Draft regulations were published four years ago to address this
but were never finalized. Presently, responsible U.S. vessels operating
in the Arctic are exceeding the Coast Guard regulations and are
equipped with AIS. The regulations will level the playing field and
require all commercial vessels to be equipped with AIS that in turn
aids Coast Guard monitoring and surveillance. This comports with the
1989 International Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment that recommended
all commercial vessels operating in the Arctic be equipped with AIS.
AIS is designed to provide two way communications, and in Europe
and some areas of the U.S. AIS is being used to transmit weather and
safety information. While the Marine Exchange has secured funds from
the Alaska Ocean Observing System to develop the ability to transmit
environmental information including weather and the presence of ice or
whales via AIS, the permitting agencies have not processed our requests
to allow transmitting this and other safety information via the Alaska
AIS network. While we have developed the technology, procured,
installed and tested the equipment to do this, we don't have permission
to turn it on. We need NOAA, the Coast Guard and FCC to expedite
processing our permit requests.
Lastly, implementation of the long delayed draft Coast Guard non-
tank vessel regulations will reduce the risk and consequence of oil
spills as they will require cargo and other non-tank vessels to
contribute to the commercial oil spill prevention and response
capabilities in Alaska.
Conclusion
While the Marine Exchange's work is not done, and many more AIS
stations augmented with weather sensors and AIS transmitters will need
to be built and maintained, if not for the Coast Guard, State of Alaska
and the marine industry's shared commitment to improve maritime safety,
the Alaska maritime safety net would not exist. This private public
partnership is a cost effective solution that no other government
agency or contractor was willing or able to do. The operation,
maintenance, expansion of this extensive Alaska vessel tracking system
and 24x7 monitoring is provided at a total cost of $2.5 million per
year.
Enclosures:
1. Arctic Maritime Activity in 2012 and AIS Sites in Alaska
2. Tracking of Oil Exploration Fleet and other vessels in Alaska
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Ed.
Next we have Eleanor Huffines, Manager, U.S. Arctic
Campaign, Pew Charitable Trusts.
Eleanor?
STATEMENT OF ELEANOR HUFFINES, MANAGER, U.S. ARCTIC PROGRAM,
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Ms. Huffines. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much for
the opportunity to be here today. As an initial matter, Pew is
very appreciative of your continued focus on the Arctic. In
fact, in a July 2012 letter, the President, you and Senator
Murkowski rightly identified the need for the U.S. to develop a
comprehensive U.S. Arctic policy to better address the
challenges and opportunities we're facing in the region. And so
we're very supportive of that initiative.
The future of the Arctic does not need to be an endless
battle of perceived tradeoffs between culture, environment and
economics. Developing a plan that addresses the full range of
human activities and interactions with the environment creates
an opportunity to assess and address the multiple stressors
already present or projected to start or increase from vessel
traffic, offshore energy, and shipping.
To be effective, Pew believes the comprehensive U.S. Arctic
policy must be driven by four guiding principles. Many of these
principles have been mentioned in testimony earlier today, but
we believe they are so significant they should be repeated, so
I apologize for some of the repetition you all will experience.
First, local communities must have a meaningful voice in
decisionmaking. Residents of Arctic communities are an integral
part of the region's rich ecosystem. The Federal Government
must ensure meaningful opportunities for local governments,
tribes, co-management organizations, regional non-profits and
ANCSA corporations are involved from the beginning of
decisionmaking.
The Federal Government is required to consult fully with
Alaska Native tribes on a government-to-government basis, and
any governance framework needs to incorporate consultation and
traditional knowledge well in advance of management decisions,
including a strategy for sharing information and providing
feedback about indigenous concerns back to them in the region
before the decisions are announced.
Second, a comprehensive U.S. Arctic policy should include
an understanding that ecosystem health is essential for
maintaining a subsistence way of life and that areas of the
ocean are important for maintaining the ecosystem, integrity
and function of those areas must be safeguarded.
For many residents of the Arctic, there is a direct
connection between the continued health of the marine
environment and the health of their food supply, their culture
and themselves. The Federal Government must take a careful look
at the potential impact to subsistence resources and show its
commitment toward ensuring these resources are protected.
Areas within an ecosystem are not equal in ecological
terms. Some areas contribute disproportionately to ecosystem
structure and functioning. Important ecological areas may
include places that are important for subsistence that are used
for maintaining the viability of a species or contribute
disproportionately to an ecosystem's productivity, biodiversity
or resilience. The Federal Government needs to undertake a
process to identify and protect these areas in the Bering,
Beaufort, and Chukchi Seas.
Third, science must guide decisionmaking. To make informed
management decisions, it will be critical to have a better
understanding of the cumulative effects of climate change,
ocean acidification, and industrial stresses on the marine
environment and how these stresses interact with one another to
affect the ecosystems, species, and the people of the region.
Developing a vigorous and lasting monitoring program will be
essential to generate reliable information and reduce the
degree of uncertainty in the knowledge of our Arctic ecosystem.
There has been significant progress in the past two years
in information and data gathered in efforts by both government
and industry, including synthesis efforts like PacMARS and
SOAR. Yet despite these efforts, the Arctic marine environment
remains a difficult place to study and understand. Senate Bill
272, your bill, the Arctic Research Monitoring and Observing
Act of 2013, offers several solutions to these challenges. If
passed, the bill's provisions could perform the backbone of a
long-term research and monitoring program, something that Pew
has long advocated for in the Arctic.
And finally, as part of the government's commitment to
developing Alaska resources cautiously and subject to the
highest safety and environmental standards, Arctic-specific oil
spill prevention and response standards must be developed and
applied to all companies operating in the region, for all
industrial activities, including offshore oil and gas and
vessel traffic. These standards should account for an area's
remote location, lack of infrastructure, and unique operating
conditions due to severe and changing climate.
The Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee recommendations
and the Department of Interior's review represent a welcome
first step toward identifying necessary safety and system
improvements. These four core principles should serve as the
foundation for any U.S. Arctic policy or management decision.
Given the limited amount of time here today, I cannot do
the region, the people, or the issues justice, so I
respectfully request that you refer to our written testimony
for very specific recommendations on strengthening Alaska's
offshore oil and gas program and enhancing vessel traffic in
the Bering Strait--not the traffic, the safety of the traffic
in the Bering Strait and Arctic Ocean. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Huffines follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eleanor Huffines, Manager, U.S. Arctic Program,
The Pew Charitable Trusts
Chairman Begich, thank you for the invitation to participate in
today's hearing. My name is Eleanor Huffines, and I am testifying in my
capacity as the Manager of the U.S. Arctic program for The Pew
Charitable Trusts.
The Pew Charitable Trusts applies a rigorous, analytical approach
to improve public policy, inform the public, and stimulate civic life.
Pew's U.S. Arctic program promotes science and community-based
conservation that reduces risks to the Arctic from climate change and
industrial development, including oil and gas activities, commercial
fishing, and industrial shipping. The program works closely with
scientists, Alaska Natives, the U.S. government, local communities, and
conservation groups to achieve key policy goals for protecting the
health of the Arctic ecosystem.
You have invited me here today to discuss two broad topics: first,
industry and Federal preparedness for Arctic offshore oil and gas
development, as well as what lessons can be drawn from Shell's 2012
drilling season; second, the challenges and opportunities that an
increase in Arctic activity and development present for environmental
and natural resources stewardship.
As an initial matter, Pew is grateful for your continued focus on
and attention to the Arctic. Alaska's Arctic waters are unlike other
areas of the ocean. Sea ice covers the northern Bering, Chukchi, and
Beaufort seas for much of the year. The region is subject to severe
weather, but it is also remarkably productive. Fish and wildlife--
including a wide variety of marine mammals and seabirds--make extensive
use of Arctic waters. The Bering Strait in particular is a vital
migration corridor for many species. Residents of Arctic communities
have lived an irreplaceable way of life that has existed and endured
across thousands of years. They are an integral part of the region's
rich ecosystem.
Arctic marine waters face more acute changes than other ocean
regions. The Arctic is warming at twice the rate of the rest of the
planet \1\and will almost certainly be one of the first regions
substantially impacted by ocean acidification. The warming is having
immediate, compounded effects on Arctic people and ecosystems,
including coastal erosion, altered weather patterns, and loss of
important habitat. The most dramatic of these impacts is the incredible
loss of Arctic sea ice. Arctic communities rely on sea ice for hunting,
fishing, and other activities necessary for survival. Sea ice also
serves as a platform for birthing seals, feeding walruses, roaming
polar bears, and other Arctic life. The loss of sea ice cover opens the
Arctic to an expansion of industrial activities that, unless sensibly
regulated, will further threaten the region.
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\1\ James A. Screen, Ian Simmonds. The central role of diminishing
sea ice in recent Arctic temperature amplification. Nature, 2010; 464
(7293): 1334 Available at: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v464/
n7293/full/nature09051.html
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The challenges posed by these changes are immense, and they call
for a more cooperative and forward-thinking approach than has been
employed in the past. The current approach, in which some individual
agencies consider approval of projects in isolation and without full
consideration of the projects' cumulative impacts, or how they fit into
a broader conservation or development strategy, is not adequate. In a
July 13, 2012, letter to President Obama, you and Senator Murkowski
rightly urged the administration to develop a comprehensive U.S. Arctic
strategy to better address the challenges and opportunities facing the
region.
I. Core Elements of a Comprehensive U.S. Arctic Policy
The future of U.S. Arctic waters need not be an endless battle over
perceived trade-offs between culture, environment, and economics.
Instead, careful planning and management can reduce losses and increase
gains wherever possible, providing a better overall outcome than the
single-minded pursuit of one goal to the exclusion of other interests.
Sound economic development can support cultural programs. Environmental
oversight can reduce the likelihood of accidents, simultaneously
avoiding catastrophic costs and severe environmental damage. The
cultural tradition of respect for hunted animals is a strong
conservation ethic that benefits the ecosystem, including its human
inhabitants.
Developing a plan that addresses the multiple needs and aspirations
of cultural, environmental, and economic interests requires the
involvement of more than just one organization or even one sector.
Including the full range of human activities and their interactions
within the environment creates the opportunity to assess and address
multiple stressors already present or projected to start or increase,
including climate change, offshore energy, vessel traffic, and
fisheries.
Core elements to a comprehensive U.S. Arctic Policy should include
but not be limited to the following principles:
A. Ensure local communities have a meaningful voice in decision-
making.
Arctic indigenous residents have valuable knowledge about their
home and its resources that can help inform planning and decision-
making. Their experience and their traditional way of life--passed down
through untold generations--have given them great knowledge of their
environment and the species with which they share it.
Gathering and using traditional knowledge will require both a
precautionary and adaptive approach. The Federal Government should make
a better effort to ensure that traditional knowledge truly informs the
decision-making process in the Arctic environment. To be meaningful,
traditional knowledge should be incorporated before committing to
management decisions that may adversely affect subsistence resources.
Arctic peoples' ocean-based subsistence activities are central to their
culture and sense of identity. In this context--where a management
mistake could have cascading effects that jeopardize subsistence and
cultural traditions--extra caution, such as the consideration of
deferrals, is warranted.
In the end, residents of the Arctic must live with the consequences
of Arctic policy and management decisions. For all these reasons, the
Federal Government must ensure meaningful opportunities for
participation by local communities, governments, tribes, co-management
organizations, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)
corporations, and similar Alaska Native organizations. The Federal
Government is required to consult fully with Alaska Native tribes on a
government-to-government basis. Any governance framework needs to
incorporate consultation well in advance of management and include a
strategy for sharing information and providing feedback about
indigenous resident's concerns.
B. Protect ecosystem health important for a subsistence way of
life; safeguard areas of the ocean important for maintaining ecosystem
integrity and function.
Subsistence resources have long provided a source of healthy food
for Arctic communities. Subsistence foods are high in nutritional value
and protect against health problems such as high blood pressure,
obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease. Subsistence hunting is
an important aspect of the Inupiaq and Yup'ik culture. Negative impacts
to subsistence resources, such as reduced abundance or contaminated
habitats, could decrease food security, encourage consumption of store-
bought foods with less nutritional value, and deteriorate the cultural
fabric of Alaska Native communities. Thus, when industrial activities
adversely affect subsistence resources, they also harm the people who
value those resources. For many residents of the Arctic, there is a
direct connection between the continued health of the marine
environment and the health of their food supply, their culture, and
themselves. The Federal Government must take a careful look at
potential impacts to subsistence resources and show its commitment
towards ensuring these resources are protected.
Areas within an ecosystem are not equal in ecological terms; some
areas contribute disproportionately to ecosystem structure and
functioning, including use by human populations. Important ecological
areas may include areas of the ocean that are used for subsistence
purposes; have distinguishing ecological characteristics; are important
for maintaining habitat heterogeneity or the viability of a species; or
contribute disproportionately to an ecosystem's health, including its
productivity, biodiversity, functioning, structure, or resilience.
Among scientists, there is general consensus that time and/or place
restrictions designed to protect high value habitat are one of the most
effective means of reducing potential impacts and disturbance. The
current understanding of ecological functioning in the Chukchi,
Beaufort, and Bering seas indicates that a number of sensitive marine
habitats are especially important to the region's ecological
functioning. The Federal Government needs to undertake a process to
identify and protect these habitats.
C. Science must guide decision-making.
To make informed management decisions, it will be critical to have
a better understanding of the cumulative effects of climate change,
ocean acidification, and industrial stresses on the marine and
terrestrial environments, and how these stresses interact with one
another to affect the ecosystems, species, and people of the region.
Developing a vigorous and lasting research and monitoring program is
essential to generate reliable information, including trends, and
reduce the degree of uncertainty in our knowledge of Arctic ecosystems.
Perfect knowledge, like zero risk, is unattainable. Nonetheless,
some standards can be applied. The ability to assess impacts requires
sufficient knowledge about an ecosystem to be able to identify
functional relationships between species and the physical environment.
As climate change alters patterns in the Arctic, we also need to be
able to anticipate changes and plan accordingly to develop procedures
for adjusting policies and regulations in light of new information.
There have been significant advancements in the past two years,
both in information and data gathered and in commitments to further
cooperate to bolster science and understanding of ocean and coastal
resources in the Arctic. These advancements include the Interagency
Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) Fiscal Year 2013-2017 Arctic
Research Plan, the Pacific Marine Arctic Regional Synthesis of the
Northern Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort seas (PacMARS) and the Synthesis
of Arctic Research (SOAR).
Yet despite these efforts, the Arctic marine environment remains a
difficult place to study and understand. It is cold, remote, and
covered with sea ice for over half the year. Conditions vary greatly
from one year to the next, making it difficult to generalize from the
results of a single field season or to detect patterns across multiple
years. And now the Arctic is undergoing rapid and profound
environmental change due to global warming. This new information must
be integrated with existing scientific and traditional understanding
developed over past decades to develop an improved understanding of
present and future conditions.
Senate Bill 272, ``The Arctic Research, Monitoring, and Observing
Act of 2013,'' offers several solutions to these challenges:
First, the bill calls for the establishment of a permanent
Arctic science program to conduct research, monitoring, and
observing activities in the region--both to promote productive
and resilient ecosystems and to facilitate effective natural
resource management.
Second, it proposes funding a merit-based grant program to
support new scientific research and field-work in the Arctic.
Third, it would fund and support long-term ocean observing
systems and monitoring programs in the Arctic Ocean, Bering
Sea, and North Pacific.
If Congress passes Senate Bill 272 and it is implemented
effectively, the bill's provisions could form the backbone of a long-
term, integrated research and monitoring program for the Arctic--
something that Pew has long advocated.
II. Strengthening Alaska's Offshore Oil and Gas Program
Pew believes that decisions about whether, where, and how oil and
gas activities are conducted in the U.S. Arctic Ocean must be based on
sound scientific information, thoughtful planning, and with the full
involvement of the people most affected. A balanced and careful
approach to offshore development in the Arctic must account for
environmental protection and for the social, cultural, and subsistence
needs of Alaskan communities.
The Federal Government can take steps now to ensure that offshore
Arctic development is done as safely and sustainably as possible.
First, it must incorporate world-class, Arctic-specific safety,
spill prevention, and response standards into Federal regulations that
apply to every company operating in the region. These standards should
account for the area's remote location, lack of infrastructure, and
unique operating conditions due to the severe and changing climate.
Equipment and techniques used in temperate waters are simply not
transferable to the Arctic.
The Federal Government must also protect areas that are
biologically important or used for hunting and fishing by indigenous
communities. The local communities should have a voice on what kind of
development is appropriate, where it should take place, and what
safeguards are needed. Alaska Natives' traditional knowledge and
concerns should be a critical piece of any decisions about development
in the Arctic. Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils provide one model
for citizen engagement and oversight of development of Arctic energy
resources.
The Federal Government should recognize that for science and
conservation to guide decision-making, a long-term monitoring program
must be put in place and sustained to assess the cumulative effects of
multiple, interacting stresses. Such stresses include changes in
climate, plus noise and pollution from vessel traffic and drilling
operations, which can disrupt habitat, migration patterns, and
communications for whales and other marine mammals.
A. Lessons Learned and the Need for Arctic Specific Standards
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico,
the United States, along with other Arctic countries such as Canada and
Greenland, examined whether existing regulatory standards for arctic
oil and gas exploration and development were sufficient to prevent a
similar disaster and whether there was capability to respond to a major
oil spill in ice-infested waters. The United States commissioned a
committee, the Ocean Energy Safety Committee (OESC), to examine current
Department of the Interior (DOI) regulations for Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) oil and gas exploration, development, and production
operations and make recommendations.
The Ocean Energy Safety Committee concluded that there is a need to
modernize DOI regulations to include Arctic-specific standards for oil
spill prevention, safety, containment, and response preparedness in the
Arctic OCS, among other recommendations that more broadly applied to
all OCS operations. On January 25, 2013, Ocean Energy Safety Committee
Chairman Dr. Tom Hunter submitted the Committee's formal
recommendations to the Department of the Interior for consideration and
action. Pew supports the Ocean Energy Safety Committee's
recommendations.
Also in January of this year, Secretary Salazar launched an
expedited assessment of Shell's 2012 Alaska offshore drilling program
after a Shell oil rig ran aground near Alaska's Kodiak Island on New
Year's Eve. The KULLUK was on its way to the Pacific Northwest from its
Arctic drilling site when its tow vessel lost power, the towlines
broke, and the rig hit the rocks.
It wasn't the drilling season's sole mishap. Both the KULLUK and a
second rig, the NOBLE DISCOVERER, are now being towed to Asia for
inspection and repairs. A U.S. Coast Guard investigation of the NOBLE
DISCOVERER found 16 violations of safety and pollution-control
regulations. A U.S. Department of Justice criminal investigation is now
under way based on the violations.
But the issues go beyond any single accident or oil company. The
KULLUK ran aground in the Gulf of Alaska only 50 miles from the closest
U.S. Coast Guard station, yet the current targets for drilling lie
1,000 miles farther north in the Arctic Ocean. Helicopters, planes, and
vessels were on hand to evacuate the crew of the KULLUK and assist in
the salvage. But farther north, there are no major ports, airports, or
roads. Hurricane-force winds, subzero temperatures, shifting sea ice,
and long periods of fog and darkness could shut down a rescue operation
or spill response altogether.
On March 14, 2013, Secretary Salazar announced the findings of the
review. Pew supports DOI's seven key findings and recommendations.
Specifically:
1. All phases of an offshore Arctic program--including preparations,
drilling, maritime, and emergency response operations--must be
integrated and subject to strong operator management and
government oversight.
2. Arctic offshore operations must be well-planned, fully ready, and
have clear objectives in advance of the drilling season.
3. Operators must maintain strong, direct management and oversight
of their contractors.
4. Operators must understand and plan for the variability and
challenges of Alaskan conditions.
5. Respect for and coordination with local communities is essential.
6. Continued strong coordination across government agencies also is
essential.
7. Industry and government must develop an Arctic-specific offshore
model for oil and gas development.
The Department of Interior findings reinforce the importance of
taking a regionally specific approach to offshore oil and gas
exploration the Arctic. The Federal Government must recognize and
account for the unique challenges of this region, which holds energy
potential, but where issues like environmental and climate conditions,
limited infrastructure, and the subsistence needs of North Slope
communities demand specialized planning and consideration.
C. Arctic Standards for Oil Spill Prevention and Response
The Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee (OESC) recommendations
and Department of Interior's (DOI) review represent a welcome first
step toward identifying safety and systems failures in Alaska's
offshore drilling program. Only by taking additional steps to
strengthen Federal review and regulation of these operations, however,
can the Federal Government show its commitment to responsible Arctic
Ocean development.
Common operating practices and Arctic-specific standards should be
established and met before any operator is approved to explore or
develop. Examples of Arctic specific standards for oil spill prevention
and response include but are not limited to:
1. Purpose Built Polar Class Drilling Rigs and Associated Support
Vessels--DOI should require drilling rig performance standards for
Arctic OCS operations. These standards should include rigs that are
built-for-purpose and meet Polar Class,\2\ or equivalent,\3\ standard
and third party audits of the rig before it is used. The drilling rig
is a critical component of a safe drilling program; however, DOI
regulations do not currently include Arctic-specific criteria for rigs
used in exploration drilling.
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\2\ International Association of classification Societies,
Requirements Concerning Polar Class (2011).
\3\ International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Ships
Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters (2010).
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The situation of most concern is a late season well blowout that
requires drilling to continue into late fall-early winter ice, which
will require Polar Class rigs. While the plan may be to avoid
interaction with the ice by implementing an ice monitoring and rig
retreat plan, drilling rig retreat will not be an option when a blowout
occurs and relief well rig must remain in position to drill a relief
well in the weather and ice conditions that may be present.
This recommendation is consistent with the International Maritime
Organization's (IMO) Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters; the Canada National Energy Board (NEB) Filing
Requirements for Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic,\4\ and with
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
recommendations, where the Commission recommended the safety and
environmental management system requirements for drilling to include
third party audits.\5\
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\4\ Canada National Energy Board (NEB), Filing Requirements for
Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic, 2011, page 27.
\5\ National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling Report, Recommendation A3 (January 11, 2011)
(recommending that the safety and environmental system requirements for
drilling be expanded to include third-party audits at three to five
year intervals and certification).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, operators should be required to provide a sufficient
number of Polar Class and icebreaking vessels in the U.S. Arctic Ocean
region to support safe operation, provide towing assistance, and to
support source control and spill response operations. These vessels
should include a sufficient number of shallow draft vessels capable of
operating in ice-infested waters.
2. Seasonal Drilling Restrictions--DOI's regulations should also
include seasonal drilling limitations for periods when oil spill
response is not possible in the Arctic. More specifically, Arctic
offshore operations drilling through hydrocarbon bearing zones should
be limited to periods of time when the drilling rig and its associated
oil spill response system is capable of working and cleaning up a spill
in Arctic conditions, minus the time required to drill a relief well
before ice encroaches on the drill site and the time required to clean
up the spilled oil from the last day that a spill could occur.
Drilling restrictions that limit OCS offshore operations in the
Arctic to summer periods ensures there is sufficient time left in the
operating season to cap a blown out well, drill a relief well, and
clean up spilled oil in open water, thereby providing a critical margin
of safety in the proposed plan. Seasonal drilling restrictions, with
these specific components, are not included in existing regulations.
Routine drilling operations that extend to the very last day that
it is safe to drill do not allow time to respond to a well control
event before winter conditions set in and equipment must leave the
Chukchi and Beaufort seas because it becomes unsafe to operate in ice,
freezing conditions, and darkness. A spill in the Chukchi and Beaufort
seas not contained by freeze-up could continue unabated through the
winter could have catastrophic long-lasting consequences.
There are no specific regulations requiring operators to follow
seasonal drilling limitations for Arctic operations. Although DOI
effectively applied seasonal drilling limits to Shell's 2012 Chukchi
Sea OCS Drilling Project \6\, similar limits have not been imposed on
all projects. For example, DOI did not apply seasonal drilling limits
to Shell's 2012 Beaufort Sea OCS Drilling Project allowing drilling and
relief well operations to be scheduled into dangerous multi-year ice
conditions of October, November and early December. Therefore, there is
a need to establish standards that would be applied consistently across
all projects.
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\6\ ``BOEM Issues Conditional Approval for Shell 2012 Chukchi Sea
Exploration Plan'' http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Press-Releases/
2011/press12162011.aspx
3. Capping and Containment System and Relief Rig Located in the
Arctic and Rapidly Deployed--DOI's regulations should also mandate the
requirement to have an Arctic well capping and containment system and
an Arctic relief well rig located in the Arctic to provide immediate
oil spill source control capability. More specifically, Arctic oil and
gas operators should own, or have on contract, a relief well rig and
capping and containment system that is capable of being onsite and
ready to commence operations within 24 hours.
The capping and containment system should be built to arctic
engineering specifications. The system should include Polar Class
vessels to ensure it can remain onsite during ice conditions that may
be encountered during the entire period of operation. Additionally, the
system should be staffed by trained and qualified personnel with Arctic
experience who are capable of completing a well control operation in
Arctic conditions. Finally, the system should be subject to independent
third party expert review and an arctic engineering expert, prior to
the drilling season.
The Arctic relief well rig should be capable of drilling a relief
well at the proposed location for the period of time required to
complete the relief well. The Arctic design should be equivalent to, or
more robust, than the rig used to drill the original well requiring
relief well assistance. The relief well rig must be a second rig. The
operator cannot assume that the primary drilling rig where the well
blowout occurred is capable of moving away from the well blowout and
drilling its own relief well. The period of time required for relief
well drilling should be defined as the period between the first day the
well is spudded and when the well is plugged, abandoned, and secured
with at least two well control barriers, plus an additional period of
at least 60 days or longer if indicated by a site-specific analysis.
Both Canada and Greenland have a two-rig drilling policy and required
that a relief well rig be located in the same area of drilling at the
same time.\7\,\8\
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\7\ Canada National Energy Board (NEB), Filing Requirements for
Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic, 2011.
\8\ Government of Greenland, Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum,
Approval of up to 7 (Seven) Exploration Wells in Accordance with
Section 15 of Licences 2002/15, 2005/06, 2008/11 and 2011/16, Cairn
Energy License Approval Letter, May 2011
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOI regulations do not currently require a capping and containment
system or a designated relief well rig. In the Arctic, there is a very
limited time window to drill a relief well. The size of a worst-case
well blowout and the amount of oil spilled into the environment will be
a function of the time required to transport a relief well rig to the
drilling site and drill the relief well. While well capping may arrest
the blowout prior to drilling a relief well, this is not always the
case.
4. Adequate Trained Personnel and Equipment to Respond to a Spill
in Arctic Conditions--Arctic response equipment, including mechanical
and in-situ burning materials, and training standards should be
established to ensure there is sufficient in-region capability to
respond to the oil spill in Arctic conditions.
The OSRP should include evidence that the operator either owns, or
has under contract, adequate in-region Arctic-grade equipment and
personnel trained and qualified to operate that equipment and capable
of cleaning up the entire spill.
Arctic-grade equipment should include, but not be limited to:
Arctic-grade skimmers, ice-boom, viscous oil pumps, winterization
enclosures and heating systems to protect equipment and prevent
freezing, systems to thaw frozen equipment, Polar Class vessels
(icebreakers, storage and recovery vessels), shallow draft vessels
capable of operating in ice-infested water and able to provide
nearshore response access, landing craft capable of accessing remote
shores where docks are not present, and cold-weather Personnel
Protective Equipment.
Personnel should have training and qualifications in arctic
mechanical response, in-situ burning, and deployment and operation, and
vessel captains and pilots should have experience navigating in the
Arctic.
DOI regulations do not currently require any specific standards for
Arctic mechanical response equipment or training. Canada, by
comparison, requires that an operator demonstrate, including field
exercises in arctic conditions, that its oil spill response equipment
and personnel are trained and equipped to work in the Arctic.\9\
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\9\ Canada National Energy Board (NEB), Filing Requirements for
Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic, 2011, pages 22-23.
5. Equipment Tests and Drills in Arctic Conditions--DOI's
regulations should also include Arctic offshore field tests to verify
spill response tactics and strategies prior to OCS operations. Oil and
gas operators should be required to conduct field tests prior to
conducting OCS operations to verify that arctic spill response
techniques, equipment, and methodologies will be effective and are the
best available technology for use in the Arctic environment. Field
tests should be conducted in the environments they plan to operate in
and in areas where a spill from their operations could reach. Each
tactic and strategy relied upon in an oil spill response plan should be
field-tested and verified as a viable oil spill removal strategy prior
to conducting OCS operations where there is a risk of spilling
significant oil.
Equipment that has not been tested in Arctic conditions already
including mechanical equipment and capping and containment systems
should be physically tested in the arctic conditions that the applicant
may need to use the system in prior to the drilling season and proven
to be successful and reliable for the intended purpose.
There are currently no requirements for operators, or the Oil Spill
Removal Organizations (OSROs) they utilize, to field test and verify
that its proposed ``on-paper'' tactics and strategies are efficient and
effective in the Arctic prior to starting drilling operations.
To verify that Arctic oil spill response techniques, equipment, and
methodologies will be adequate and effective in an actual response,
operators should plan for and conduct field tests in a range of Arctic
conditions, including broken ice.
D. Need for More Comprehensive Review of Alaska's Offshore Program
The previous recommendations address one narrow aspect of Alaska's
offshore oil and gas program: oil spill prevention and response
standards specific to the Department of Interior. As part of the
government's commitment to developing Alaska's energy resources
cautiously and subject to the highest safety and environmental
standards, all Federal agencies with oversight responsibilities must
thoroughly review standards for other aspects of the offshore program.
Federal agencies should also make information available to the
public in a timely fashion and on a proactive basis. Relatively simple
steps--like publishing letters, approvals, and data on agency websites
and committing to accepting public comments on spill response plans--
would go a long way toward building trust and improving public
participation in the decision-making process.
At stake is not only the safety of workers, but also a rich and
complex ecosystem found nowhere else in the United States. The Arctic
Ocean is home to bowhead whales, walruses, polar bears, and other
magnificent marine mammals as well as millions of migratory birds. A
healthy ocean is important for the continuation of hunting and fishing
traditions practiced by Alaska Native communities for time immemorial.
III. Enhance Vessel Traffic Safety Through the Bering Strait and in the
Arctic Ocean
The Bering Strait is the gateway in and out of the western Arctic
Ocean for migrating marine mammals and seabirds. A mere 50 nautical
miles at its narrowest point, this exceptional place provides habitat
and migrating routes for beluga and bowhead whales; more than 50
species of seabirds and their massive breeding colonies; ringed,
spotted and bearded seals; walrus; and forage fish such as arctic cod
and arctic char. Indigenous Arctic communities have subsisted and
nurtured a culture intertwined intimately with these waters and
resources for thousands of years.
The Bering Strait is already experiencing increasing vessel
traffic, and that trend is expected to continue and accelerate in the
future. The growth in Arctic marine operations is due in large part to
natural resource development within the region and the Arctic's growing
economic ties to the global economy. At a meeting in Nome on vessel
traffic, U.S. Coast Guard Commander James Houck noted that 480-plus
vessels transited the Bering Strait in 2012.\10\ Ships include tankers,
cargo ships, container ships, tugs, offshore supply vessels, landing
craft, fishing vessels, passenger vessels, offshore drill ships, oil
spill response vessels, and cruise ships of various sizes. While vessel
activity is light compared to other regions of the world, the capacity
to provide aid and support for these vessels is extremely limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ CMDR Houck presentation: http://seagrant.uaf.edu/conferences/
2013/bering-strait-maritime/program.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vessels navigating these narrow passages pose numerous threats.
They may discharge oil, waste, or ballast water that contains invasive
species. Marine mammals are susceptible to vessel noise, which could
alter their behavioral and migratory patterns. Vessels could strike
marine mammals such as the slow-moving bowhead whale, particularly
during twice-yearly migration times when the majority of the Western
Arctic population moves through this corridor. They may have an
accident, lose steerage or become grounded-posing a threat or danger to
personnel aboard. Also of real concern is the potential for interfering
with subsistence activities and/or compromising the safety of hunters,
some of whom travel 100 miles from shore in small boats. Lastly, vessel
traffic may disrupt ecosystem integrity and function, which is vital to
indigenous Arctic communities; a healthy ecosystem supports the marine
mammals and fish populations that ensure a strong subsistence way of
life.
Given the cultural, ecological, and economic importance of the
region, the consequences of an accident are considerable. We are at a
critical point at which to begin developing an appropriate standard of
care for vessel traffic in the region. Local communities should be
actively involved and play a leadership role with other stakeholders in
this effort. It cannot be emphasized enough that any mandatory or
voluntary measures should be developed with the involvement of the
tribal governments, regional Alaska Native non-profit organizations,
co-management organizations, and ANCSA corporations.
Below are some concepts and ideas that should be further explored
to enhance vessel traffic safety:
A. Improve and Update Tools to Enhance Safer Voyage Planning
As a first step to help prevent accidents, mariners should have
access to accurate and updated information.
1. Update Nautical Charts--Hydrographic charting in the Bering
Strait and Arctic Ocean are inadequate and those that exist are
outdated, with the majority of charting occurring prior to 1970.\11\ In
a recent report the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System
stated that ``less than one percent of navigationally significant
Arctic waters have been surveyed with modern technology to determine
depths and depict hazards to navigation.'' \12\
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\11\ LT Matt Forney, NOAA, Office of Coast Survey, presentation at
the Bering Strait Maritime Symposium. Feb. 2013. http://
seagrant.uaf.edu/conferences/2013/bering-strait-maritime/program.php
\12\ U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, ``U.S.
Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action
2013.'' (2013). Available at: http://www.cmts.gov/downloads/
CMTS_Draft_Arctic_MTS_Overview_and_Priorities_Paper_for_Public_Co
mment-Feb2013.pdf
2. Improve Forecasting--Weather, sea ice, and sea state are
critical elements to safe voyage planning in Arctic waters. This
information, however, is not widely available. Improving forecasting is
listed amongst the top priorities in the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's Arctic Vision and Strategy.\13\
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\13\ Priorities include: forecast sea ice, strengthen foundational
science to understand and detect Arctic climate and ecosystem changes,
improve weather and water forecasts and warnings, enhance international
and national partnerships, improve stewardship and management of ocean
and coastal resources in the Arctic, and advance resilient and healthy
Arctic communities and economies. Available at: http://
www.arctic.noaa.gov/docs/NOAAArctic_V_S_2011.pdf
3. Add and Supplement Community Information in the Coast Pilot--
NOAA's Office of Coast Survey issues the Coast Pilot, a series of
nautical books that provide information that is difficult to show on a
nautical chart. Topics covered include, for example, currents, tide and
water levels, weather, sea ice, dangers, and routes.\14\ Coastal
communities should be consulted regarding what information to add. They
have knowledge from traveling local waters, often farther offshore than
most mariners in the lower latitudes, and could help further safe
routes and hazards not currently included in the most recent edition.
Communities may, for example, want to include local VHF channels for
mariners to communicate and/or additional information on seasonal
species migrations or important seasons when communities will be on the
water.
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\14\ Office of Coast Survey, United States Coast Pilot. http://
www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/nsd/cpdownload.htm
4. Require Additional and Continued Research, Monitoring and
Observation--Balanced management of Arctic waters will require more
complete information about species and ecosystem functioning, followed
by continued monitoring and observation of key species and processes.
This information will not only benefit resource management but also
vessel traffic management to better facilitate safe shipping. As
traffic increases and the climate changes, ongoing input from local
communities and scientific information will be important to measure and
mitigate impacts.
B. Implement Measures to Mitigate Marine Impacts from Vessel Traffic
Mandatory measures to regulate vessels through the Bering Strait
may need to go through a lengthy, international process. Voluntary
measures, however, are achievable in the short term and have been
effective in other areas of the United States. Listed below are
examples of measures, some of which have been discussed by the U.S.
Coast Guard \15\ that could be utilized to reduce impacts from
increasing vessel traffic in the Bering Strait and Arctic Ocean.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ CMDR Houck, ``Rules of the Road--A Bering Strait Overview'',
presentation at the Bering Strait Maritime Symposium. Feb. 2013. http:/
/seagrant.uaf.edu/conferences/2013/bering-strait-maritime/program.php
1. Shipping Lanes--Shipping lanes are designed to confine vessel
traffic to specific areas. This helps create regular traffic patterns
while avoiding potentially dangerous locations or culturally or
environmentally sensitive areas. Shipping lanes also help avoid
accidents because vessels follow expected routes. This measure is
commonly used in narrow straits and areas of vessel congestion such as
harbor entrances. Shipping lanes also ensure that vessels maintain a
safe distance offshore in case a problem affects maneuverability. This
gives the vessel's crew time to make repairs, set anchor, or get
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assistance before drifting aground.
2. Areas To Be Avoided (ATBAs)--If shipping lanes tell vessel where
to go, ``areas to be avoided'' tell mariners where they should never
go. These areas may be designated because of marine hazards, such as
shoals or strong currents. They may also be designated for
environmental and cultural reasons. In a remote region such as the
Bering Strait, ``areas to be avoided'' may also be used to keep
sufficient space between vessels and shorelines to reduce the chance
that a disabled vessel drifts ashore before help can arrive.
3. Vessel speed--For some hazards, including ship-to-ship
collisions and ship strikes of whales, vessel speed is a crucial factor
in the damage that may occur. For example, whales are far less likely
to be killed by large vessels (cargo ships, tankers, large cruise
liners) traveling 12 knots or slower than by large vessels moving
faster.\16\ In areas with limited maneuvering room for avoiding
hazards, speed restrictions can greatly reduce impacts and risks.
Vessel speed can be monitored using commercially available vessel
tracking devices. Vessel speed restrictions are being used, in concert
with routing measures, in the northeast Atlantic to help reduce ship
strikes of the endangered North Atlantic Right Whale.\17\
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\16\ Gende, S. et al., ``A Bayesian approach for understanding the
role of ship speed in whale-ship encounters'' 2011. Ecological
Applications, 21(6), pp.2232-2240.
\17\ NOAA Fisheries, Office of Protected Species: ``Reducing Ship
Strikes to North Atlantic Right Whales'' http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
shipstrike/
4. Ship Reporting (Automated Vessel Tracking, Reporting Location to
Local Hunters, Reporting Hazards Such As Sea Ice or Marine Mammals)--
Most vessels now are required to have automatic tracking systems on
board (Automated Information Systems, or AIS), which allow their
progress to be monitored. Reporting systems may create an additional
requirement to announce when the vessel enters and leaves designated
areas or enters and exits a shipping lane. (This can be automated.)
Additional communication requirements could include, for example,
making an announcement on local radio channels in case there are
hunters out in boats, or checking with a local communication center
upon arriving within radio range of that location, or describing
hazards, such as sea ice or marine mammal aggregation, to other
vessels.
Current AIS technology allows for ``watchdog'' alarms to be
triggered when vessels cross a line of demarcation or enter a specific
area. The information on the vessel can be automatically transmitted to
other vessels, government agencies, and other entities. The U.S. Coast
Guard monitors vessel movements and can identify ships that appear to
be having trouble of some kind. This can help a timely emergency
response. The AIS can also be used to inform vessels that they are
outside shipping lanes or to transmit safety or other information as
needed. In some places such as the Malacca Strait, these systems have
received extensive funding from the shippers themselves. In the Bering
Strait region and coastal areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, if
receiving equipment is made available, AIS also can be used by local
communities to track vessel movement to help ensure the safety of
subsistence hunting boats and other small craft used locally.
C. Enhance Emergency Preparedness
1. Increase Spill Response Planning and Capability--Spill response
planning and capacity should be met by professional oil spill removal
organizations and enhanced community capability. Communities should be
equipped and trained to use spill response equipment and aid in
protecting shoreline resources. Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils
can provide communities with a structure to review spill response
planning, as well as train and practice responding to oil spills. Non-
tank vessels should be required to have approved vessel response plans.
These response plans will require increase capacity along the coasts.
Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSROs) capacity should be enhanced to
meet this demand.
2. Deep Water Port and Emergency Towing Capacity--There are no
major ports in western Alaska or along the Arctic coastline. There
should be additional emergency towing systems available along the
Bering Strait coast as well as on the North Slope. A deep water port in
the Northern Bering Sea could provide a place to station a tug to
assist distressed vessels.
D. Foster International Cooperation
The Bering Strait's international jurisdiction should not prevent
the United States from taking careful, preventative measures to reduce
and also prepare for an emergency. In the long term, however, it is
important that the United States continue to foster a cooperative
relationship with Russia and work towards a mutual set of measures to
help manage this narrow strait.
The Arctic Council's Search and Rescue Agreement is a good step
towards ensuring international cooperation in these shared waters.
Additionally, the United States should continue to play a leadership
role in the development of a mandatory Polar Code at the International
Maritime Organization. The Polar Code is an important tool, setting
international standards for vessels fit to travel in Arctic waters. In
addition to vessel design and strength, however, measures should be
included that set baseline standards for discharge, waste, noise and
light pollution, and interaction with marine mammals.
Pew strongly supports ratification of the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea. The oceans have been called, ``the last global
commons,'' and their sustained global health can best be maintained by
a stable, universally accepted convention that promotes the key
interests of the United States, its allies and its trading partners.
Ratification would ensure our ability to participate in interpreting
and applying the convention to the changing realities of the global
maritime environment and preserves our ability to protect our domestic
interests, including our extended continental shelf claims.
IV. Conclusion
The United States is in the unique and privileged position of being
an Arctic nation. This privilege brings with it national obligations.
We must ensure that strategy, policies, and adequate Federal resources
are in place today in order to effectively manage and prepare for these
challenges tomorrow. The consequences of losing a treasure like the
Arctic are simply unacceptable.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, and you did have some
good suggestions in your written testimony, so I appreciate
that. Thank you.
What I'd like to now ask is Matt Ganley, Vice President of
Bering Straits Native Corporation. Matt?
STATEMENT OF MATT GANLEY, VICE PRESIDENT,
RESOURCES AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
BERING STRAITS NATIVE CORPORATION
Mr. Ganley. On behalf of the shareholders and the Board of
Directors of Bering Straits Native Corporation, which I will
refer to as BSNC, just to shorten things, I thank you for the
opportunity to present testimony related to developments in
Alaska's Arctic waters.
I am Matt Ganley, Vice President of Resources and External
Affairs for Bering Straits Native Corporation. I have worked in
Western Alaska, Northwest Alaska for the past 30 years, the
last 20 of those years with Bering Straits Native Corporation.
Bering Straits Native Corporation is a regional corporation
established pursuant to ANCSA or the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971. The region encompasses the Seward
Peninsula and adjacent waters, including Sledge Island, King
and Diomede Islands, and the shorelines of two seas, as well as
the whole shoreline of Norton Sound. Seventeen villages are
within the BSNC regional organization.
Traveling north to south along the shoreline, we have
Shishmaref on the Chukchi Sea; Wales and Diomede on Bering
Strait; Teller and Brevig Mission on the eastern boundary of
Port Clarence; Nome on the Bering Sea; then further east to
Solomon, Golovin, Koyuk, and south to Shaktoolik, Unalakleet,
Stebbins and St. Michael, all within Norton Sound.
Recent developments, including diminished sea ice,
increased vessel traffic through the Northern Sea Route and
Northwest Passage, and oil and gas exploration in the Beaufort
and Chukchi, including Russian waters to the West, have rapidly
brought the Bering Straits region into sharp focus. Though
certainly challenging, we view these developments with concern
as well as guarded optimism.
Over the past 2 years, agencies and organizations have held
meetings to discuss numerous topics related to increased
shipping and vessel traffic in the northern waters. From one
gathering to the next, I watched as the anxiety level has risen
among participants at these meetings who are attending as
representatives from the coastal communities in Bering Straits.
Discussions and reports detailing spill and disaster response
needs, increased traffic-related exploration, as well as the
potential for offshore oil development, have not addressed a
glaring gap between the information scenarios presented and the
utility of that information for the resident stakeholders.
Strategies, however, have been developed. Specifically, I
will refer to a state program called the Geographic Response
Strategy, which, if implemented in a material sense, would
place the tools and expertise in the hands of the communities
to respond at a local level to fuel spills and unanticipated
discharges near shore marine waters. Staging of the necessary
hardware in communities, combined with the proper training,
would provide communities with an investment in what is
occurring in their neighborhoods. It would also give
communities an active role in protecting their subsistence
resource base, the very thing that the residents are the most
anxious about.
I offer the GRS as an example because it highlights
something that the BSNC has been emphasizing in recent
discussions related to the Arctic ports. There is no single
location or, for that matter, response plan that is going to
fulfill the many needs facing industry, government, or the
residents of the Arctic. The extent of the coastline, the lack
of intermodal transportation, the extreme environment, and the
relative absence of sufficiently deep water require a non-
centralized, modular approach to infrastructure development in
the Arctic. Rather than focus on a single port-for-port
development with the intent of constructing the Arctic port, we
encourage agencies, planners and government, both state and
Federal, to promulgate rules that encourage private
development, as well as the public-private partnerships
discussed in the recent port studies.
It would also be prudent when legislation is developed to
be certain that, one, not all of the resources are invested for
political expediency at one location; and two, that the options
available for port development, particularly in the private
sector, are not unnecessarily restricted through new or
additional administrative regimes.
Since its creation in 1971 with the passage of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act, BSNC has endeavored to anticipate
what would occur in the region with regards to resource
development and commerce. This was the underlying intent of
ANCSA and the corporate structure imposed by the Act.
BSNC selected the lands located at Point Spencer, commonly
known as Point Clarence in 1976 pursuant to Section 14(h)(8) of
ANCSA, and we subsequently prioritized this tract 10 years ago.
It was selected with the understanding that the BSNC would
accept conveyance at such time as it became available. Until
2010, the year that the Coast Guard decommissioned the Loran
facility, Port Clarence served as an important link in the
communication navigation system for Alaska's waters. We have
been working with the Coast Guard and have had initial
discussions with the Department of Natural Resources to
determine the most expedient manner to have the property
conveyed to BSNC to fulfill the corporation's ANCSA
entitlement.
As we all know, there are currently no adequate staging,
support, and disaster response facilities in the area of Bering
Strait, and BSNC intends to utilize this property for
infrastructure development that will positively benefit the
shipping safety, search and rescue capability, security, and
economic development in the region. It will also provide jobs
and economic opportunities in one of the most economically
depressed areas in the United States. We believe Port Clarence
can be responsibly developed in partnership with private
industry to meet the needs of marine safety and national
security throughout Alaska's northern Arctic waters.
Thank you, Senator, for allowing this testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ganley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matt Ganley, Vice President, Resources and
External Affairs, Bering Straits Native Corporation
On behalf of the Shareholders and Board of Directors of Bering
Straits Native Corporation (BSNC), I thank Senator Begich for the
opportunity to present testimony related to developments in Alaska's
Arctic Waters. I am Matt Ganley, Vice President of Resources and
External Affairs for Bering Straits Native Corporation and have worked
in western and northwest Alaska for the past 30 years-the last 20 of
those years with Bering Straits Native Corporation.
Bering Straits Native Corporation is the regional corporation
established by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971. Our
region encompasses the Seward Peninsula and adjacent waters, including
Sledge, King and Diomede Islands, and the shorelines of two Seas as
well the whole shoreline of Norton Sound. Seventeen villages are within
the BSNC regional organization. Most of the communities lie along the
coastline: from Shishmaref on the Chukchi Sea; Wales and Diomede
(Inalik) in Bering Strait; Teller and Brevig Mission on the eastern
boundary of Port Clarence; Nome on the Bering Sea; then further east to
and Solomon, Golovin, Koyuk, and south to Shaktoolik, Unalakleet,
Stebbins and St. Michael on eastern Norton Sound.
Recent developments, including diminished sea ice, increased vessel
traffic through the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, and oil
and gas exploration in the Beaufort and Chukchi (including Russian
waters to the west), have rapidly brought the region into sharp focus.
Though certainly challenging, we view these developments with concern
as well as guarded optimism.
Over the past two years agencies and organizations have held
meetings to discuss numerous topics related to increased shipping and
vessel traffic in Northern waters. From one gathering to the next I
have watched as the anxiety level has risen among participants at the
meetings who are attending as representatives from the coastal
communities of Bering Strait. Discussions and reports detailing spill
and disaster response needs, increased traffic related to exploration
as well as the potential for offshore oil development have not
addressed a glaring gap between the information and scenarios
presented, and the utility of that information for the resident
stakeholders. Strategies have been developed-specifically the
Geographic Response Strategies report-which, if implemented in a
materiel sense, would place the tools and expertise in the hands of the
communities to respond at the local level to fuel spills and
unanticipated discharges in near shore marine waters. Staging of the
necessary hardware in the communities, combined with proper training
would provide communities with an investment in what is occurring in
their neighborhoods. It would also give communities an active role in
protecting their subsistence resource base: the very thing our
residents are most anxious about.
I offer the GRS example because it highlights something that BSNC
has been emphasizing in recent discussions related to Arctic ports.
There is no single port location or, for that matter, response plan
that is going to fulfill the many needs facing industry, government and
residents in the Arctic. The extent of the coastline, the lack of
intermodal transportation, the extreme environment, and the relative
absence of sufficiently deep water require a non-centralized, modular
approach to infrastructure development in the Arctic. Rather than focus
on a single point for port development with the intent of constructing
The Arctic Port, we encourage agencies, planners and government (State
and Federal) to promulgate rules that encourage private development as
well as the public-private partnerships discussed in recent Port
Studies. It would also be prudent when legislation is developed, to be
certain that 1) Not all of the resources are invested, for political
expediency, at one location and 2) that the options available for port
development, particularly in the private sector are not unnecessarily
restricted, through new or additional administrative regimes.
Since its creation in 1971 with the passage of the Alaska Native
Land Claims Settlement Act, BSNC has endeavored to anticipate what
would occur in our region with regards to resource development and
commerce. This was the underlying intent of ANCSA and the corporate
structure imposed by that Act. BSNC selected the lands located on Point
Spencer, commonly known as Port Clarence in 1976 (case file number
AKFF023051), pursuant to Section 14(h)(8) of the Alaska Native Claim
Settlement Act, and subsequently prioritized this tract of
approximately 2300 acres. It was selected with the understanding that
BSNC would accept conveyance at such time as it became available. Until
2010, the year that USCG decommissioned the Loran facility, Port
Clarence served as an important link in the communication and
navigation system for Alaska's waters. We have been working with the
USCG and have had initial discussions with the State Department of
Natural Resources to determine the most expedient manner to have the
property conveyed to BSNC to fulfill our corporation's ANCSA
entitlement.
There are currently no adequate staging, support, and disaster
response facilities in the area of Bering Strait and BSNC intends to
utilize this property for infrastructure development that will
positively benefit the safety, security, and economic development of
the region. It will also provide jobs and economic opportunities to one
of the most economically depressed areas in the United States. We
believe Port Clarence can be responsibly developed in partnership with
private industry to meet the needs of marine safety and national
security in Alaska's Arctic waters.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. And again, I'll have
questions for several of you.
The next person is Jack Omelak, Alaska Nanuuq Commission
Executive Director.
Thank you very much, Jack, for being here.
STATEMENT OF JACK OMELAK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ALASKA NANUUQ COMMISSION AND MEMBER,
ARCTIC MARINE MAMMAL COALITION
Mr. Omelak. Can everybody hear me?
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. Omelak. First of all, good morning, Senator Begich.
It's a pleasure to meet you. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify on this behalf.
My name is Jack Omelak. I am the Executive Director of the
Alaska Nanuuq Commission. We represent 15 coastal villages from
Kaktovik to St. Lawrence Island in the domestic and
international management of polar bears.
Recently, the Alaska Nanuuq Commission took part in the
formation of the Arctic Marine Mammal Coalition. The members of
this coalition include the Alaska Nanuuq Commission, the Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission, the Eskimo Walrus Commission, the
Alaska Beluga Whale Committee, and the Ice Seal Committee. We
primarily represent the groups through the Bering Strait into
the Beaufort Sea.
I'd just like to speak briefly. I'm going to go ahead and
abridge my verbal presentation. I've given you a complete
written testimony. But I'd like to speak briefly on some points
of concern to the groups in regards to the increasing traffic
through the Straits.
Of course, our concerns are about the potential impacts in
regards to our long-term food security. That's primarily the
reason why we decided to come together and form the AMMC. Our
goal as this coalition is to speak more efficiently as a
unified voice. We all know about how difficult it is to reach
stakeholders. This is one of the primary reasons why we decided
such an agency should be formed, to increase the communication
between local stakeholders and people such as yourself.
So in 2012, in September, we got together and met, formed
the coalition, and then sent a letter to the U.S. Coast Guard
17th District making recommendations on vessel management
measures as part of the process to develop the port access
route study. A copy of this letter is also attached to my
written testimony.
So the main points that we agreed to in this letter was
that we felt it would be necessary to establish areas to be
avoided, protecting the subsistence use areas of coastal
communities. We also think we need to deploy receivers and
computer monitors in villages so that residents can track
vessels using the AIS system which was spoken to earlier.
Ship strikes on whales, especially bowheads, are very
serious concerns to residents of our whaling communities. For
this reason, we would like to see recommendations for speed
restrictions for vessels transiting the Bering and the Anadyr
Straits during the spring and fall migratory periods.
To protect marine mammals during biologically important
activities, we would like to see recommendations for speed
restrictions and possible diversionary measures in the presence
of feeding marine mammals. I'd like to note here that these
recommendations for speed restrictions and diversionary
measures is patterned after mitigation measures in the Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission's Open Water Season Conflict
Avoidance Agreement.
This new coalition's work is focused primarily on
commercial traffic vessels, but I think it's relevant to state
that the oil and gas operators working in the Arctic have been
willing to adhere to these measures during vessel transit for
many years.
Also, to maintain the health of our waters, we feel very
strongly that commercial vessels should be required to treat
the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas as zero discharge zones
for ballast water and vessel waste.
Given the lack of infrastructure and the relatively limited
Coast Guard presence, providing emergency response training and
equipment to our coastal communities should be part of any
program aimed at emergency response in the Arctic.
And finally, Senator, we all know that it's absolutely
critical that funding for these types of issues are addressed.
We're committed to the safety and well-being of our
residents, our subsistence resources, as well as the many
humans transiting our ocean now and in the future.
I'm pleased to report that on January 30 of this year, the
Arctic Marine Mammal Coalition received a response to our
letter from Admiral Ostebo. The Admiral's letter offers several
very helpful recommendations for opportunities to pursue the
types of management measures we have recommended. The Admiral
also expressed interest in further collaboration with our
communities and our coalition. We're grateful for this response
and intend to pursue on behalf of our subsistence hunters both
the Coast Guard's recommendations and the Admiral's offer of
further collaborations. This letter is attached to my comments.
Thank you again, Senator, for the opportunity, and on
behalf of the marine mammal hunters of our Arctic coastal
communities, I'd like to express our sincere gratitude for your
recognition of the fact of allowing us to be here to give
testimony today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Omelak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jack Omelak, Executive Director, Alaska Nanuuq
Commission and Member, Arctic Marine Mammal Coalition
Good morning, Senator Begich. Thank you for the opportunity to
speak here today.
My name is Jack Omelak. I am the Executive Director of the Alaska
Nanuuq Commission. The ANC is a member of the newly formed Arctic
Marine Mammal Coalition, or AMMC. The members of the AMMC are the five
principal marine mammal hunter groups from the Bering Straits Region
north through the Beaufort Sea. Those are: the ANC, the Alaska Eskimo
Whaling Commission, the Eskimo Walrus Commission, the Alaska Beluga
Whale Committee, and the Ice Seal Committee.
I would like to speak briefly on points of concern to our hunter
groups as we observe the ever-increasing numbers of large oceangoing
vessels in our coastal waters. These concerns extend, as well, to the
many large vessels transiting our waters that are out of sight of our
coastal communities. Our concerns about the potential adverse impacts
of this increasing traffic to our subsistence resources, the ecosystem
of our waters, and our longterm food security led our groups to come
together. Our goal as a coalition is to speak with one voice on the
need for rational management of this traffic, both domestically and
internationally.
On September 20, 2012, the members of the AMMC sent a letter to the
U.S. Coast Guard's 17th District, making recommendations on vessel
management measures as part of the process to develop a Port Access
Route Study. A copy of this letter is attached to my written testimony.
To touch briefly on the main points agreed to by the members of the
AMMC and set forth in that letter:
It will be necessary to establish Areas To Be Avoided, to
protect the subsistence use areas of our coastal communities.
One very important area is to the west of St. Lawrence Island.
We need to deploy receivers and computer monitors in our
villages so that residents can track vessels, using the
Automated Information System.
The ability to monitor vessel movements and
communicate with ships will be important in helping us to
protect subsistence hunting opportunities.
The communications centers set up along the Beaufort
and Chukchi Sea coasts by oil and gas operators are logical
places to begin deployment of AIS monitoring equipment.
Ship strikes on whales, especially bowhead whales, are a
very serious concern to the residents of our whaling
communities. For this reason, we would like to see
recommendations for speed restrictions for vessels transiting
the Bering and Anadyr Straits during the spring and fall
migratory periods.
To protect marine mammals during biologically important
activities, we would like to see recommendations for speed
restrictions and possible diversionary measures in the presence
of feeding whales, walrus, seals, and polar bears. We also
would like to see similar restrictions near any aggregations of
these same species.
I would like to note here that this recommendation for speed
restrictions and diversionary measures is patterned after
mitigation measures in the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission's
Open Water Season Conflict Avoidance Agreement. The AMMC's work
is focused primarily on commercial vessel traffic. But it is
significant that the oil and gas operators working in the
Arctic have been willing to adhere to these measures during
vessel transit for many years.
To maintain the health of our waters, we feel very strongly
that commercial vessels should be required to treat the Bering,
Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas as zero discharge zones for ballast
water and vessel waste.
Given the lack of infrastructure and limited Coast Guard
presence, providing emergency response training and equipment
to our coastal communities should be part of any program aimed
at emergency response in the Arctic.
And finally, Senator, as you know all too well, funding for
these initiatives will be critical to their success and to the
safety and wellbeing of our residents and our subsistence
resources, as well as the many humans transiting our ocean, now
and in the future.
I am pleased to report that on January 30th of this year, the AMMC
received a response to our letter from Admiral Ostebo of the 17th Coast
Guard District. The Admiral's letter offers several very helpful
recommendations for opportunities to pursue the types of management
measures we have recommended. The Admiral also expressed an interest in
further collaboration with our communities and our coalition. We are
grateful for this response and intend to pursue, on behalf of our
subsistence hunters, both the Coast Guard's recommendations and the
Admiral's offer of further collaboration.
I have attached the Admiral's letter to my comments.
Thank you, again, Senator for giving me the opportunity to speak
here today. On behalf of the marine mammal hunters of our arctic
coastal communities, I would like to expression our appreciation for
your recognition of the fact that the issues discussed here go to the
heart of our survival. And I would like to personally thank you for
allowing our hunters' voice to be heard in this public forum.
______
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Juneau, AK, 30 JAN 2013
United States Coast Guard
Commander Seventeenth District
Dear Arctic Marine Mammal Coalition Members:
I would like to provide a response to your letter of September 20,
2012, which included a variety of questions and concerns regarding
vessel operations in Arctic waters. I fully understand the importance
of your concerns, and hope that you recognize this understanding
through our ongoing Coast Guard efforts to engage with Tribes, Alaska
Native Organizations, and other groups and residents of the Arctic
region.
As you noted in your letter, we have been working to obtain input
for the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Polar Code revision,
as well as the Bering Strait Port Access Routing Study (PARS). It is
important to note the role that the Coast Guard's 17th District plays
in both of these initiatives as they are not quite the same. Coast
Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC serves as the ``action office''
that is responsible both for soliciting input for the IMO Polar Code
initiative as well as eventually promulgating any resulting regulations
that are developed.
In contrast, District 17 in Alaska has the lead role in completing
the Bering Strait PARS. Once completed, the PARS study recommendations
will need several additional levels of approval within the Federal
Government before it can be considered for adoption at the IMO. We
continue to work with other Federal agencies on topics of importance in
the Arctic, and I will also forward this letter to those relevant
agencies for specific items noted below that are under their
jurisdiction. Due to the range of issues in your letter, I will
specifically address each item below for clarity:
1. Migration and Vessel Transit Routes near Saint Lawrence Island:
The Coast Guard does anticipate that Areas to be Avoided (ATBA)
will be included as PARS study recommendations, although the
precise locations and sizes are still being developed. In
addition to minimizing impacts to marine mammals, Areas to be
Avoided also provide additional response time in the event that
a vessel becomes disabled and may drift aground. The Coast
Guard understands the rationale for your input to route all
traffic to the east of St. Lawrence Island, but the commercial
traffic in this area includes vessels destined for both the
United States and Russia, including a significant amount of
traffic that runs along both the US/Russian maritime border and
along the Russian Coast. Routing more traffic to the East of
St. Lawrence Island will add significant distance to some
transits and we do not have a good sense yet if this type of
ship routing scheme would be supported by the Russian
Federation or at the IMO.
2. Open Water Transits in the Beaufort/Chukchi 35 Miles Offshore to
Avoid Open-Leads: The Coast Guard is familiar with the
subsistence uses in these areas, as well as other initiatives
such as the Conflict Avoidance Agreement, that are in place to
mitigate impacts. Amplifying information regarding the specific
types of vessels that this type of measure would apply to would
be very useful. There are instances in some locations where
Areas to be Avoided are established to provide a ``buffer
zone'' this wide, or even wider for certain types of vessels,
such as tank vessels carrying petroleum products. We request
clarification if your recommendation is intended to include all
destinational traffic, such as research vessels, or tugs/barges
delivering supplies to coastal villages. Please keep in mind
that most IMO approved ship routing measures are not mandatory,
and if overly cumbersome routing measures are adopted, there is
the possibility that vessels will elect not to participate.
The Coast Guard does believe that there is a need for an enhanced
level of governance regarding the issues associated with
growing levels of marine traffic throughout Arctic waters. In
many other areas of the country, Harbor Safety Committees have
been established that bring together stakeholders from
industry, the Coast Guard, Ports, other government agency
representatives, and stakeholders that represent local
interests. This might be a future alternative that the AMMC
would like to consider and help establish. The Coast Guard
would be very willing to participate in a project of this
nature if initiated by the AMMC or other stakeholders.
3. Avoiding Marine Mammal Feeding Areas: The measures you list,
where vessels reduce speed and/or divert away from marine
mammals are part of the commonly accepted practices for
managing vessel interactions with these species. ``Takes'' of
marine mammals by vessels operating in U.S. territorial waters
under both the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) are liberally defined and include
vessel operations which disrupt feeding behavior patterns, so
laws and regulations are already in place to deal with vessels
that fail to take appropriate actions upon encountering
aggregations of or feeding marine mammals.
4. 10 Knot Seasonal Speed Restrictions in the Anadyr and Bering
Straits: The Coast Guard understands the rationale for
additional protections during times when whale migrations
occur. We are also well aware that ship strikes are of
particular concern for the Bowhead Whale, based on many
conversations in which your members have imparted traditional
knowledge on the topic. Based on our conversations with our
headquarters staff who routinely work with the IMO, we believe
that an attempt to impose a vessel speed limit through an
international instrument will not likely be successful, as the
IMO does not recognize speed restrictions as an accepted ship
routing measure. In locations elsewhere in the country where
speed restrictions have been imposed, those regulations were
promulgated by NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service, and
not the Coast Guard. We will continue to work with NOAA as our
PARS process continues and forward your comments to the
appropriate office here in Juneau. Please also keep in mind
that before any recommendations resulting from PARS are
forwarded to IMO, the recommendations will also undergo a
review under the National Environmental Policy Act which will
include consultations with NOAA and USFWS under both the MMPA
and Section 7 of the ESA.
5. Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Sea Discharge Zones: We have
submitted your letter to Coast Guard Headquarters for addition
to the docket for the Polar Code initiative. .
6. Vessel-Subsistence Hunter Communications: Regulations such as the
Bridge to Bridge Radiotelephone Act and communications
equipment carriage requirements promulgated under the Safety of
Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) already ensure that nearly all
commercial vessels maintain and use VHF marine band radios in
order to facilitate safe vessel operations worldwide. While the
Coast Guard is not currently contemplating an IMO sanctioned
vessel reporting system as part of the PARS recommendation, we
do believe that a voluntary set of practices, such as ships
making ``Securite'' calls to announce their presence at defined
points along their route would go a long way toward ensuring
that anyone engaged in subsistence activity could remain aware
of commercial vessels in the area through use of a VHF radio.
Any additional input on specific locations where vessel
Securite calls would be most beneficial would be appreciated.
7. Automatic Identification System (AIS): The Coast Guard generally
supports deployment of AIS systems as they enhance navigation
safety and provide the agency with enhanced awareness of what
is occurring in our maritime domain. These systems cost money,
however, and at some point, a balance point is reached where
the cost/benefit of deploying these systems on smaller vessels
may not be warranted. At present, the Coast Guard intends to
require AIS on all commercial vessels greater than 65 feet in
length. This is not to say that smaller vessels would be
prohibited from installing AIS. On the contrary, we would
encourage voluntary use of AIS on all vessels operating in the
region. The question of who has access to the AIS information
can also be contentious. Your comments will also be included in
the docket for the Polar Code.
8. Bering Strait Subsistence Impact Fund: The Bering Strait is an
international strait, so there are limits to the jurisdiction
that can be exerted over foreign vessels that enjoy the rights
of freedom of navigation outside 12 nautical miles, and
innocent passage through the Bering Strait within 12 nautical
miles of the coast. Thus, development of a management authority
with jurisdiction over all vessel traffic in the Bering Strait
or mandating Subsistence Impact Fund contributions would be
problematic. Additionally, establishing this type of fund is
outside the Coast Guard's authority.
9. Emergency Response Training and Equipment Funding: Funding for
emergency response equipment and training is available to
Alaska communities through grants to local government entities
from the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, which manages certain grant funds as available from
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency
Management Agency. We recommend that you work with local
community governments regarding this opportunity. More
information can be found on the Alaska Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management Website at: http://
ww.ready.alaska.gov.
10. Alaska Marine Mammal Observers: While the Coast Guard does enforce
laws pertaining to marine mammal observers, typically on board
fishing vessels, new requirements for marine mammal observers
are not within the Coast Guards regulatory purview. Your
comments will be forwarded to NOAA's National Marine Fisheries
Service.
As discussed above, I recognize that increased maritime activity in
the Arctic may have an impact on residents of the Arctic region. I
appreciate your candid acknowledgement that the Bering Strait PARS and
development of the Polar Code will not fully address every concern. You
may rest assured that your concerns about impacts to subsistence are
heard and understood, and that where possible, the Coast Guard will
work within our processes to protect subsistence activities to the
extent that these two policy tools allow. In those areas where the
Coast Guard's jurisdictional role or responsibility is not exclusive,
we will work our partnerships with other agencies to stress the
importance of subsistence activities as decisions are made.
Please feel free to contact me regarding further issues, or my
Tribal Liaison, Ms. Sudie Hargis. Additionally, Commander James Houck
of my Waterways Management Branch is the Action Officer for the Bering
Strait PARS. He is available to discuss this particular initiative in
greater detail.
Sincerely,
Thomas P. Ostebo,
Rear Admiral,
U.S. Coast Guard.
Copy: Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission
Alaska Beluga Whale Committee
Eskimo Walrus Commission
Alaska Nanuuq Commission
Ice Seal Committee
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
testimony. Thank all of you, all five of you, for your
testimony.
Let me start, if I can, Helen--I know, again, time
restrictions on the VTC, so let me ask you a couple of quick
questions. I'm going to note that you had mentioned on MTS
services two things that were important, response services as
well as information sharing. That's kind of one of the two
priorities that you wanted to do. Keeping that in mind, under
the sequestration, for all agencies that are being impacted,
how does this or will this impact your ability to move forward
in that arena, those specific issues? But also, will it impact
other work you're trying to do around the Arctic analysis and
information you are gathering?
Ms. Brohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, the
limitation in funds has impacted the way in which you can
address financial--for the entire national marine
transportation system, as well as the Arctic MTS. In respect to
MTS related to Federal agencies, they are addressing the ways
in which they can make positive improvements under the limited
funding.
It is our hope that the CMTS report and the infrastructure
investment work that we are doing under another integrated
action team under the CMTS provides foundational information
from which agencies or the White House can determine their
priorities under the limited funding.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you on the infrastructure,
because we will have some additional questions here about
infrastructure and ports, how--I know in Russia's case they are
making some significant investments on the Northern Sea Route,
establishing 10 rescue centers throughout the region. When you
talk about the report and the work you are doing both with what
we just talked about, the MTS, but also the other integrated
agencies working together, do you see this as part of the need?
I think Matt said it very clearly. It's not about
necessarily one port or one super port. It's about kind of a
sequence of resources available. Is that how DOT sees it, or
can you give me a sense here? I know the report is still being
worked on with other agencies, but give me your sense of how
you see the infrastructure for the Arctic, not only from an oil
and gas perspective but the shipping and other things that
might be going on.
Ms. Brohl. So, the CMTS is, obviously, interdepartmental,
and while collectively we can make recommendations on
priorities for infrastructure that we had mentioned, ultimately
the individual departments must deal with it under their own
prioritization and the normal Federal budget process.
One of our goals in developing this report was really to
collect all the information from all of the agencies and
departments, all of the Federal policies, to have them in one
spot in order to take that more holistic look, rather than just
agency by agency. Ultimately, though, we hope that the White
House work on a national strategy--excuse me--and Arctic
strategy will help to reinforce those priorities from which a
solid budget or a more holistic budget perhaps can be
developed.
Senator Begich. I know that----
Ms. Brohl. I was going to say with regard to looking at
what other nations are doing, we clearly looked through all the
reports, the activities of the Arctic nations. It certainly
informed our report by the basic information from which we
determine what is the current and future trends for the Arctic.
Certainly, we are aware of the infrastructure capabilities of,
let's say, Russia with regard to icebreaking capabilities. But
our report in particular is not an implementation plan. So we
can't say exactly what percentage of dollars would go to the
Arctic MTS, let alone the national MTS, as compared to
individual priorities of respective agencies.
We can tell you, though, that there is a real groundswell
within the Federal Government to address this in a holistic
manner. Our report has informed other Federal reports,
including the Integrated Arctic Management Report that may have
been mentioned by the Department of Interior. It's informing
the strategic Arctic strategy being followed by the national
security staff at the White House. It is complementary to the
National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan.
To get to your original point, there are restricted funds.
There are lots of big issues to consider. We hope that our
report provides enough basic information so that the powers
that be can look at the whole, look at it as a system and
prioritize accordingly.
Senator Begich. So just to make sure I got this right, I
know that Under Secretary Hayes is working on a broader Arctic
policy for the White House and developing that through the
Secretary's office and the Interior Department. Yours will feed
into that to some degree, along with others, to develop this
longer-range policy that will include infrastructure as a piece
of it. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Brohl. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much.
Let me move, if I can. Eleanor, thank you very much again
for your recommendations in your written testimony. Give me a
sense from your perspective as an NGO kind of looking and
watching what is going on in the Arctic, do you think the
relationship between the oil and gas industry and local
communities has been adequate? And I will use Shell first, and
that's the one that has kind of been on the ground the longest,
I guess I would say. Others have been on the ground, but in
Arctic development and engaging local communities. You think
that's been adequate? Do you think there should be some
standards that we need to implement in order to ensure that
other companies do the same thing, or is that naturally
happening because the pressures from local community groups
really are putting the pressure on them? Tell me your sense of
that.
Ms. Huffines. Well, I can provide my sense, but I should
say I obviously cannot speak for the communities of the
hunters.
Senator Begich. Don't worry, I'm going to ask Jack the same
question.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Huffines. Right. I'll share my perspective----
Senator Begich. If you answer wrong, Jack, I'll correct
you.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Huffines. Jack, I hope you will correct me.
I will share what I have learned from people and what they
have shared with me. I think there are some positive steps. One
of the challenges is that--one of the success stories has been
the conflict avoidance agreement, but that is very specific to
bowhead whales in the Beaufort. So I think that is a model that
has been successful, and the whalers will tell you that there
have been some positive changes from that.
The difficulty is, as Jack mentioned, there are a great
deal of very other important species for marine mammals, and
for marine mammal subsistence hunters, and that doesn't get at
the challenges of the migration through the Bering Strait and
noise and cumulative effects. So I think there are models that
have worked in isolated instances in isolated species, but
looking more broadly at the cumulative effects of the traffic
and more than one company in more than one sea, if you look at
the Chukchi and the Beaufort and going through the Bering
Strait, we have not yet been successful.
I also say that every community is different, and so every
community has different perspectives. Some people will say
there has been success, and some people will say there hasn't
been. So I would reference that additional species, cumulative
effects, additional consultation is still needed.
Senator Begich. Do you think what has been going on with
the bowhead whale in the sense of the work with the whaling
captains is a base model that can be used especially as we deal
with shipping issues? Is that a model that might be utilized
with shippers? And again, as an example of something that at
least in the broader sense is working. There may be some fine-
tuning to be done.
Ms. Huffines. Again, I would defer to Jack and the marine
mammal co-management organizations. But I think as a model, it
has at least produced some good mitigation measures. It hasn't
addressed the broader issue of where in the ocean are
subsistence areas, areas to be avoided in the broader context.
That model addresses mitigation. It doesn't address the broader
context of some places for resting and feeding critical habitat
where there is no activity. So I think you need to do both
mitigation and protection of some areas.
Senator Begich. And I think I know the answer to this, so
I'm just going to say it, and I think I know your answer, and
that is thank you for mentioning S. 272. But I think on all
research, a continual known funding stream is what is critical,
because without it--this is kind of a statement. I think your
acknowledgement will be yes, but without it you have these ups
and downs in research. So you might set a pattern, have some
money for it, and then 2 years later, through whatever act of
Congress, we delete it, and now that research gets interrupted,
which is really, when you are trying to do this long-term
research on habitat, it's a longer-term view, not a 1-year plan
or a 2-year plan. It's multi-year. So is that how you see it? I
just want to make sure I'm on the same path.
Ms. Huffines. No, I totally agree. I think one of the
challenges, as the scientists will tell you, and they talked
about this in the National Academy research project last week,
is that in the Arctic in particular, there are varying seasons
in varying years. So you really need a long-term monitoring,
cumulative effects approach to really be successful in managing
the resource.
Senator Begich. That's one of your four points, correct?
Ms. Huffines. Yes.
Senator Begich. Yes. OK, good. Let me, if I can, I will
move to Jack, and after I'm done I'll go to Matt.
Jack, I want to follow up on that. Give me your
perspective. I think your comments--and you had some good
recommendations, and I think that's what triggered my thinking
on this. My sense from your comments is that there is some
activity going on with the whaling captains, but when you talk
about the shipping corridor, there's not as much going on there
with the shippers, and that's a glaring gap. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. Omelak. Yes. Thank you, Senator. That's true. One of
the things I wrote down here, it's relatively easy to sit up
here and talk about things that are going wrong. It's much more
difficult to provide solutions, but I'll give it a shot.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. Please come to Washington for a little
while.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Omelak. Anyway, so we agree. There are other agencies
who have taken the lead on this, and I think the reason why we
decided to form this marine mammal coalition and model it sort
of after the relationship that the AWC has is, as co-management
agencies, we are sort of bound to this limited perspective of
Federal and international resource management.
So take, for instance, the Alaska Commission says we are
concerned about increased shipping, development and its impacts
on other things, and the Department of the Interior says that's
something for the Department of Commerce. We take our issues to
the Department of Commerce, and they say that's something for
the Department of Interior.
Senator Begich. I feel your pain.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Omelak. So we think this is an opportunity for the
marine mammal coalition to address these broader impacts. The
reason why this is so difficult is there are so many elements
of society wrapped up into this international shipping. We
haven't just got elements of culture, but economics as well,
international relationships.
So in this marine mammal coalition, we understand how key
it is in these changing times that Federal and international
agencies need to speak with groups that sort of are unified,
because we can't reach everybody. So the messages--we're trying
to break out of our rigid resource management strategies and
address these broader issues. So we are going to follow the
lead with the AWC. I hope I've answered your question.
Senator Begich. You just made me think of something. I
know, Helen, I told you I wouldn't ask you another question,
but I'm wondering is your group connected with the U.S.
committee on the marine transportation system that Helen is
part of? Helen, do tap into this group at all, this new
organization that has kind of been formed?
Ms. Brohl. No, sir. We do not currently. We probably would
tap through our member agencies such as NOAA or Department of
Interior agencies. But I've made a note of it, including some
of the other recommendations today. We are doing some strategic
planning overall for the marine transportation system, and this
is certainly information that I'll take back to those members.
Senator Begich. That's good. I was trying to make a
connection here, because it seems that you have done something,
Jack, that is very unique in a way to bring all these different
organizations together. I know from our office, we deal with
them individually. They come in, and one group has one view,
and one has another view, and having them in a coordinated
effort, especially around the shipping issue, I think is going
to be very beneficial for us as we move forward on marine
transportation through the Bering Sea, as well as connected to
the Arctic in the broader sense, the Beaufort and Chukchi. So I
am very impressed with the group.
I didn't mean to interrupt you, but you were about to say
something additional.
Mr. Omelak. I think there are two key points that I should
mention. One, the Arctic marine mammal coalition was just
formally established after ratification through our own
agencies in December.
Senator Begich. OK, so very new.
Mr. Omelak. We did produce this document of September.
And then second, we have begun the process--I think we've
been working with the Coast Guard here.
Senator Begich. Excellent. You can count on our ability and
whatever we can do to help. I'm glad you've done this from the
longer viewpoint.
Because of time, Matt, let me ask you, I appreciate your
comment regarding the idea of let's not make--I can't remember
the exact words, but kind of a legislative fix versus pour it
all into one port and hope it all works out. I think what I
heard and gathered from your testimony is Port Clarence is one
piece of the equation, but not the answer only by itself. But
there is a sequence of ports that will ensure our ability to
better manage the Bering Sea, and also, to be frank with you,
to attract business to our shores rather than to the shores of
Russia and elsewhere. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Ganley. Fair statement. I think there are a lot of
environmental drivers there, too. The Strait itself, the ice-
free period is a bit longer, so it makes sense for something to
be there. And then, of course, with the drilling in the Chukchi
and Beaufort, we have to have facilities and infrastructure
there for response and safety.
Senator Begich. And if you can give me just a quick update,
how is your--I know we attempted toward the end of the last
session, trying to move forward on a land swap and arrangement
with the Coast Guard and others. Can you give me a sense? Is
that moving forward?
Mr. Ganley. Yes. What we're doing now is we are in a
discussion phase with the Coast Guard. We have opened up formal
discussions. The concern, of course, is budget, with everybody.
But the concern also is what is the mission of the Coast Guard
in the future, and I think the Admiral touched on that today.
He does see this increasing presence with oil exploration or
without it, because of the shipping. So they need to be--I
really don't want to speak for the Coast Guard, but I think the
need there is to assure some footprint there. So we are
discussing----
Senator Begich. How to accomplish both.
Mr. Ganley.--how to accomplish both. And from our
standpoint at Bering Straits, safety is a huge issue. Response
is a huge issue. There really isn't anything there now, and
unless that land is brought in, into play in some way, and the
only really expedient way to do that is conveyance of Bering
Straits at this point in time, because we don't know what the
budget is going to bring for other developments there.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you, and you might have caught
my comments to the legislature regarding port development, and
we introduced a piece of legislation to put together an Arctic
port development strategy with loan guarantees up to $3 billion
worth, because we think the need is multifaceted in the Arctic
and we can't just throw nickels and dimes at it and hope it all
works out at the end of the day. We have to be robust about it.
I challenged the state legislature, which, of course, I'm
sure they were excited to hear from me on this, that they need
to put some money on the table, and I suggested upwards of $2
billion, because when you do these port developments, it's a
combination of private sector money, equity, some free capital,
grants, and reasonable-cost loans. Is that a fair statement of
how we could manage this?
I don't know how we build this network without some larger
state participation. I know some legislators thought they were
doing a lot with the last bond they did, and I supported the
bond, but it seemed to be small in the big picture of what we
need to do here, not just for the Bering Sea but all the other
port activity throughout Alaska that is developing. These are
not small projects.
Mr. Ganley. No, these are not small projects. But I think
the point needs to be made too here with Bering Straits'
involvement, is that in discussions we thought, OK, as part of
the ANCSA selection, this is going to be an important site. I
think the elders, many of them that are gone now, knew this in
the 1970s.
Senator Begich. The elders had a lot of wisdom that we
should have paid attention to.
Mr. Ganley. I think if the property had been released
longer ago by the Coast Guard, if it was in Bering Straits'
hands at this point in time, there would be something occurring
there now.
Senator Begich. Some development would be happening.
Mr. Ganley. There is enough interest on the part of
industry to have the safeguards in place and have staging
areas, and have lay-down yards. I think public funding,
private-public partnerships, equity, these are all really--I
mean, they are important long-range, but I think there is
enough momentum here with what's going on in the Arctic. As I
said about a year ago, industry moves quite a bit faster than
government.
Senator Begich. Even this building, one of the buildings in
the UA campus----
Mr. Ganley. Yes, and we are pursuing this. We think it is
in the interest of the region and the Nation. And the shipping,
I think we are in the same position as the Coast Guard.
Regardless of oil development, the shipping is going to
increase. We need to get things in place there that are going
to be some economic advantages for the region. The region needs
industry of some type, but also provide a safety net for what
is occurring there as far as commerce goes.
Senator Begich. Very good. Before I ask Ed, I have one
quick question for you.
Helen, your clock is about to expire, because I saw a one-
minute thing come up in front of us, and I want to just thank
you in advance for being here. Thank you for participating. We
will have probably some additional questions for you for the
record.
There we go. She was disconnected. I tried my best to be
quick, but I have Senate-itis, which means everything is
longer.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. But I thank her.
Ed, last question for you. So you think with the Bering
Straits, there needs to be now a Bering Straits vessel traffic
control center?
Mr. Page. I don't think----
Senator Begich. That was a pretty broad, sweeping question,
but do you think you have the capacity where you are and some
tweaks need to be added to it?
Mr. Page. The traditional vessel traffic center or vessel
traffic monitoring centers or whatever around the country--
Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, what have you--it's much
more engaged, talking to mariners back and forth, have radar
coverage. And for much more active ports, L.A. Long Beach, have
100,000 transits a year, versus maybe 1,000 here.
But the fortunate thing is that technology moved so quickly
over the last several years that some of the things I talked
about as far as keeping aircraft from hitting ships in Kodiak,
or sending automatic e-mails to the Park Service when a cruise
ship exceeds the speed limit for a whale-protected area, which
never happens now because it's like having a ticket issued the
moment you do it at a traffic light or something like that.
This technology of having alerts and alarms go off, and
then through AIS can send a message back immediately through
the program and say you are outside of the traffic lane,
request advise, something along that nature, would have a
dramatic positive impact on ensuring maritime traffic comports
with whatever standards of care or traffic schemes or ATBAs and
other risk reduction measures and environmental protection
measures, all those. We have a higher level of compliance
through technology than you ever could beforehand.
Senator Begich. Let me say for all of you on this panel, I
have to say that each one of you gave recommendations which,
I've done a lot of different hearings, and sometimes you get
the testimony, but it never leads, and then they say good luck.
So I want to thank you all because you did give some very
specific recommendations on technology, how to change some of
the ways we operate; Helen, some of your ideas, and Eleanor,
some of yours. Helen being online I think was important,
because hearing this aspect of what we're talking about on a
local level is important for us to deliver back to D.C. So I
thank you all for your recommendations.
Jack, let me say that, again, I want to echo, thank you for
putting your organization together. It is helpful on many
levels, from a policymaker, I can tell you from NGO's, from
agencies to private sector, to know that there is a place and a
point that you can go to that attempts to represent--I don't
want to say always because I know how that goes. It's like
telling the fishing community everyone speaks with one voice.
That doesn't happen. As the Chair of this subcommittee, knowing
that, of fisheries.
But I want to thank you for doing that, and we look forward
to your progression in that, and anything we can do to assist,
we will be happy to do that.
Thank you all very much. I appreciate the time, and we are
adjourned. The record will be open for two more weeks for
additional questions and comments.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Christopher M. Reddy, Ph.D.,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Chairman Begich and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am submitting this statement for the record to provide the
Subcommittee with additional information regarding challenges
associated with petroleum spills in Arctic waters. This statement
reflects my personal professional views and does not represent those of
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
I am a Senior Scientist in the Department of Marine Chemistry and
Geochemistry at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Woods Hole,
Massachusetts. I principally investigate marine pollution and have
published more than 125 peer-reviewed scientific journal articles and
several book chapters on the chemistry of oil, how it interacts with
the natural environment, and related subjects. I have studied or am
studying the aftermaths of oil spills that occurred in 1969, 1974,
1996, 2003, and two in 2007, as well as natural oil seeps off the coast
of Santa Barbara, California, and for most of the last three years, the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. I am also investigating samples of
sediments contaminated from the Exxon Valdez spill and leaking oil from
a Japanese warship that sank in 1945.
Overlooked Factors
Drilling for oil in the Arctic poses many challenges and a high
probability for oil spills. We need to frame oil spills much like
buying a house: It's ``location, location, location.'' The Arctic is a
pristine, fertile, remote region that, if oiled, will be difficult and
expensive to rescue and remediate. The volume released in a spill is
only one factor in determining potential impacts. One must also include
coastal geology, the organisms living within and outside the water
column, water temperatures, and type of products spilled.
Let me shine a spotlight on the latter two factors, which are often
overlooked. First, let's consider temperature. After spills, a
significant amount of the product evaporates. This is generally
considered a good thing because it mitigates negative impacts. However,
in colder temperatures, as in the Arctic, hydrocarbons floating on oil
films will evaporate more slowly, allowing them to persist longer in
the environment. In addition, each individual hydrocarbon has unique
properties that drive how and whether it will evaporate or dissolve. I
have calculated that colder air and water temperatures create the
conditions for more oil to stay in the water, where it can damage and
kill wildlife, rather than evaporate.
Second, let's consider different types of products. Many people
focus only on crude oil spills, such as the Exxon Valdez, during the
recovery and transport of the product. But in the initial stages of
exploration, I am more concerned about spills with diesel fuel, which
drilling rigs, supply vessels, crew boats, cargo boats use for
propulsion and machinery. Of course with reduced ice coverage, there
will be an increase in commercial and cruise ship traffic.
The volumes are not trivial; drilling rigs can carry as many as one
million gallons. Smaller vessels carry closer to 50,000 to 500,000
gallons. As the industry gets under way in the Arctic, high ship
traffic poses high risk of diesel fuel spills and that risk will
continue during operations. Only a few months ago, the Shell Alaska oil
rig, the Kulluk, offered an example. On its way to Sitkalidak Island,
it lost power and was dangerously close to running aground while
carrying 150 thousand gallons of fuel and oil. Similarly, commercial
and cruise ships can carry 500 thousand and 2 million gallons of fuel.
Compared with the 13 million and 160 million gallons of crude oil
released by the Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon, respectively, some
would discount spills of 50,000 to one million gallons of diesel fuel
as trivial. This is a misinformed view. Here is why.
My laboratory has studied three diesel fuel spills. The first
occurred in 1969 when the barge Florida ran aground in Buzzards Bay,
Massachusetts, causing a massive kill of fish, worms, crustaceans, and
mollusks within a few days. Marsh grasses died in weeks. Because the
spill happened in September, local residents referred to this disaster
as ``Silent Autumn.'' In addition to these short-term effects, it took
five to seven years for marsh grasses to begin to regrow after this
spill. Forty years later, the effects of this spill persist, as crabs,
grasses, and mussels are significantly impaired by residual diesel at
the site of the spill, relative to non-oiled marshes in the bay.
Another diesel fuel spill in 1974 several miles from the above
spill resulted in massive erosion of the coastline due to the loss of
marsh grasses and oil still detectable today. It is noteworthy that
conventional wisdom, at the time of both of these spills, argued that
the oil would be gone in days.
The third diesel fuel spill is more recent: the barge North Cape,
which ran aground off the coast of Rhode Island in 1996, in a confined
coastal area with features similar to the Alaskan coastline. This spill
caused the deaths of 10 million lobsters, 2,000 birds, and 20 million
surf clams and the closure of 200 square miles of shellfishing beds for
as long as five months.
Crude oils spills are visually obvious but the very nature of this
product allows it to be tracked and cleaned up more easily than diesel
fuel. Crude oil can be boomed and skimmed, and crude oil-covered
objects along shorelines can be removed. Diesel fuel, in contrast, is
less viscous and harder to contain and recover. Once in the water,
diesel fuel hydrocarbons are taken up by plants and animals and
insinuated into ecosystems. Toxicity is always difficult to define, but
in short, pound-for-pound, diesel fuel is significantly more lethal
than crude oil with the potential to leave behind longer-lasting
damage.
Prior to Deepwater Horizon, oil spill research had taken a back
seat to other priorities such as homeland security and climate change
science. To some degree, it also has been a victim of its own success.
Lessons learned and knowledge gained from the devastating Exxon Valdez
spill--along with passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90),
which provides a wide framework for diminishing the chances of spills
and assessing damages and restoring the environment after a spill--have
led to a significantly decreased numbers of spills. For example, before
Deepwater Horizon, the annual number of oil spills greater than 5,000
gallons documented by the U.S. Coast Guard between 1991 to 2004
decreased from 55 to 14, with none more than 1 million gallons.
However, those lessons and that research did not prepare us for new
and different potential problems of drilling in new and different
areas, such as deep water. Research on the Deepwater Horizon, already
done and to be done with BP settlement funds, will provide new
knowledge and new mitigation strategies. But not all of that knowledge
is transferrable to the Arctic. If we are to press ahead with drilling
in the Arctic, as we did in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico, we should
do our research before, not after, the fact. I recommend a greater
sustained effort on Arctic research--starting with something as
straightforward and basic as how spilled diesel fuel behaves in cold
waters; where information is limited and based on spills in lower
latitudes and warmer climes.
Basic understanding of the chemical and physical behavior of
spilled oils, from diesel fuel to crude and in warm and cold
conditions, is critical to developing measures to combat spills.
Laboratory experiments have their place, but it is more accurate to
reproduce real-world conditions. Hence, I recommend that controlled
spills be performed as the best means to understand how oil behaves in
the Arctic. This has been a significant hurdle due to several polices,
but if handled properly like several European countries, offers
critical information for making the most well informed decisions and
assessing damages post spill.
I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with the
Subcommittee and am available to discuss my recommendation or provide
additional input upon request.
______
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission
Eskimo Walrus Commission
Alaska Beluga Whale Committee
Alaska Nanuuq Commission
Ice Seal Committee
September 20, 2012
Docket Numbers USCG-2012-0720 and USCG-2010-0833
Dear Sir or Madam:
The undersigned federally-recognized and tribally authorized
organizations: the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Alaska Beluga
Whale Committee, Eskimo Walrus Commission, Ice Seal Committee, and
Alaska Nanuuq (Polar Bear) Commission want to address the expected
impacts of increased shipping traffic in the Arctic on our way of life
and subsistence activities. Each of our organizations carries out co-
management responsibilities under the Marine Mammal Protection Act for
our subject species pursuant to management agreements with Federal
regulatory agencies.
Our groups have come together to form a coalition (the Arctic
Marine Mammal Coalition) to address shipping impacts with one voice. We
have concluded that, unless effectively managed, increasing ship
traffic in the northern Bering Sea, Bering Strait, Chukchi Sea, and
Beaufort Sea (collectively ``Arctic waters'') has the very real
potential to have significant adverse affects on marine mammals and
subsistence activities which are vital to the health, safety, food
security, and vitality of our communities.
The Arctic waters are important foraging and breeding habitat for
the marine mammals that have sustained the Yup'ik, St. Lawrence Island
Yupik, and Inupiat cultures of the region for at least 2,000 years.
While some of the species are hunted year-round, spring and summer
hunting of northward migrating marine mammals has always been a
particularly critical component of the food security, and continued
survival, for the communities of the Bering Strait region and the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Bowhead whales, beluga whales, walruses, ice
seals, and polar bears are all hunted during the spring and early
summer. Late summer and fall hunting of migrating bowhead whales has
also long been essential to the Beaufort Sea villages. Sea ice changes
in recent decades have altered many of these subsistence practices,
leading to the emergence of fall and winter bowhead whale hunting along
the Chukchi Sea coast and at St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea.
However, the importance of the subsistence practices themselves remains
undeniable. Currently, during much of each.year, hunting vessels and
marine mammals ply waters being increasingly used by large ocean-going
vessels. Based on our long-standing and irreplaceable dependence on
whales, walruses, seals, and polar bears, our primary concern is that
increasing shipping traffic will reduce the availability of these
animals, which continue to nurture the long-term health of our
communities. Through the mitigation measures we suggest in this letter,
we urge you to help us ensure that we do not bear the burden of risk
from these new economic activities.
In addition, we are concerned about the threat to human life posed
by large vessels steaming through our traditional hunting areas, where
we hunt in small, open boats that are not easily visible and lack radar
or other safety devices. The frequency and close proximity of large
vessels to small hunting boats increases the probability of a
collision. Such a collision would almost certainly result in serious
injuries or loss of life for the hunters. These unforgiving conditions
in which we already operate out of necessity to find food demand that
the U.S. Government support mandatory measures to ensure that the
increase in vessel traffic in Arctic waters does not adversely affect
our subsistence activities. As the Coast Guard is aware, these
subsistence activities, and the marine mammals on which they depend,
are protected under Federal law. 16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.
Our organizations support the ongoing efforts that the U.S.
Government is participating in at the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to adopt a mandatory Polar Code, as well as the
preliminary steps regarding vessel navigation being taken by the Coast
Guard in beginning the Bering Strait Port Access Routing Study
(BSPARS). We also support the Coast Guard's continuing dialog with the
Russian Federation on these matters, and hope that the United States
will continue to press the Russian Federation to adopt reciprocal
measures to protect shared marine mammals and subsistence hunting
throughout the region. In addition, our communities appreciate the U.S.
leadership role in the IMO's adoption of a circular providing guidance
on avoiding ship strikes on cetaceans (MEPC.1-Circ 674). We would like
to see each of these efforts expanded to include mandatory measures to
protect subsistence activities and resources in Arctic waters.
In moving forward, we are fortunate to be able to draw on at least
two prior experiences. In the North Atlantic, coordinated efforts among
a wide array of stakeholders, government agencies, and the IMO greatly
reduced the impacts on marine mammals from shipping. These efforts
should be used to inform actions in the Bering Strait where there is
the critical additional need of protecting the safety of subsistence
hunters and their food security. The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission's
(AEWC) twenty-seven years of experience working with the offshore oil
and gas industry to successfully mitigate industrial threats to
subsistence hunting for bowhead whales is similarly valuable. This
experience culminated in the Conflict Avoidance Agreement (CAA), an
important multi-use management process that has led to the industry-
funded annual practice of negotiating an agreement between oil and gas
operators and the AEWC that allows subsistence whalers and offshore oil
and gas developers to share Arctic waters. Successful traffic
management provisions of the CAA have been adapted for use here and are
set forth below.
At the upcoming meeting of the IMO's Marine Environmental
Protection Committee (MEPC), it is our understanding that environmental
issues like voyage planning, underwater noise, marine mammal impacts,
vessel discharges (both air and water), invasive species, and pollution
response will all be considered. We are all agreed that environmental
issues should be part of the mandatory Polar Code, and would like to
see the U.S. Government advocate that MEPC support inclusion of
mandatory provisions to address these environmental issues. In doing so
it is important to note that changes in the environment affect
subsistence resource distribution and thus our hunting practices, and
also that changes in industry operations (for example an increase in
traffic compared to prior years) can result in new or different
measures being needed to protect subsistence hunters, so the U.S.
Government should seek to include in the Polar Code, and any mandatory
navigation measures, mechanisms to ensure regular consultation (ideally
annual) between the U.S. Coast Guard and subsistence hunters to allow
for adjustments to the measures when needed.
We request that the U.S. Government support an ongoing dialogue to
continually identify emerging issues related to shipping in an already
rapidly changing environment, and the following specific
recommendations regarding mitigation measures that should be made
mandatory immediately:
(1) due to the presence of large number of marine mammals of several
species and subsistence hunting crews during spring and fall
migration, we recommend that international vessels should
transit to the east of St. Lawrence Island and at least 10
miles offshore during the migration;
(2) during periods of open water, vessels should transit at least
thirty five miles offshore in the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea
to avoid the open-lead system and near-shore hunting;
(3) when operating in the presence of feeding whales, walrus, seals
and polar bears; and aggregations of these same species,
vessels should reduce speed to less than 10 knots and/or divert
away from the animals.
(4) all vessels transiting the Anadyr Strait and Bering Strait
should do so at no more than 10 knots from 1 April to 10 July
and 1 October to 1 December each year;
(5) The Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas should be zero discharge
zones;
(6) the Coast Guard should establish a communications scheme to
ensure that vessels transiting the area have a means of
communicating with subsistence hunters;
(7) all vessels greater than 30 feet should be required to carry and
report using an Automated Information System (AIS);
(8) all vessels transiting the Bering Strait should be required to
contribute to a fund, managed by this coalition, to support
ongoing efforts to assess and mitigate adverse impacts from
vessel transits upon subsistence;
(9) funding for emergency response training and equipment should be
provided to coastal communities to supplement search and rescue
or accident response capability in the Arctic; and
(10) Alaska marine mammal observers should be on all transiting
vessels greater than 30 feet in the region between Kaktovik and
St. Lawrence Island.
We recognize that the IMO's and Coast Guard's guidance for the
Polar Code and BSPARS, respectively, are primarily focused on vessel
and personnel safety. Neither policy tool fully encompasses the
environmental or cultural needs that are necessary to ensure continued
health of our villages. Consequently, we urge the U.S. Government to
conduct and respond to a gap analysis, in consultation with our
coalition, of key issues raised during these discussions that fall
outside of the Polar Code or BSPARS, but could be addressed under
alternate policy tools, such as through a Particularly Sensitive Sea
Area designation.
We appreciate your patience while we worked to develop the
necessary structure and organization in which to address these new
challenges in our ancestral home. As noted above, each of our
respective organizations has a cooperative agreement with Federal
agencies regarding management of specific subsistence resources; these
cooperative agreements include a consultation mechanism. Given the
critical importance to our communities of the issues created by
increased arctic shipping, we would like to engage, through this
coalition, in an ongoing consultative process with the Coast Guard on
these matters.
Respectfully,