[Senate Hearing 113-108, Part 5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-108 Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
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HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1197
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
MARCH 19; APRIL 9, 18, 23, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine
Peter K. Levine, Staff Director
John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats And Capabilities
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York TED CRUZ, Texas
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
A Briefing on Cybersecurity Threats
march 19, 2013
Page
Mandia, Mr. Kevin, Chief Executive Officer, Mandiant Corporation;
Accompanied by Mr. Richard Bejtlich, Chief Security Officer,
Mandiant Corporation........................................... 4
Annex: The report titled: Mandiant Report, ``APT1 - Exposing One
of China's Cyber Espionage Units''............................. 19
Department of Defense Programs and Policies with Respect to Emerging
Counterterrorism Threats
april 9, 2013
Sheehan, Hon. Michael A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities.................................... 98
Chollet, Hon. Derek H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 101
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 107
The Role of the Department of Defense Science and Technology Enterprise
for Innovation and Affordability
april 18, 2012
Shaffer, Mr. Alan R., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering....................................... 137
Prabhakar, Dr. Arati, Director, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency................................................ 157
Miller, Ms. Mary J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research and Technology........................................ 164
Lacey, Ms. Mary E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.................... 174
Walker, Dr. David E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Science, Technology, and Engineering....................... 180
(iii)
Proliferation Prevention Programs at the Department of Energy and at
the Department of Defense
april 23, 2013
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, Department of Defense................ 217
Myers, Mr. Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, Department of Defense, and Director, U.S. Strategic
Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction....... 224
Harrington, Ms. Anne, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 233
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
A BRIEFING ON CYBERSECURITY THREATS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Fischer.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Thomas K.
McConnell, professional staff member; and Robie I. Samanta Roy,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Bradley
S. Watson, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Christopher Cannon, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator
Fischer; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; Joshua
Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Blunt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Hagan. I would like to bring this Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee to order. I want to welcome
everybody to our first meeting of this congressional year. I
really want to welcome Senator Deb Fischer as the ranking
member of this subcommittee. I'm looking forward to working
together with you, Senator Fischer. Last 2 years we certainly
had a great working relationship with Senator Portman and I
know we will, too. So thank you.
Today we meet to receive a briefing on cybersecurity
threats. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper,
recently testified that cyber threats are for the first time
leading the list of specific threats to our security. The
purpose of this briefing will be to help us gain a better and
deeper understanding of the nature, variety, and seriousness of
the cyber threats to our national security, including their
impacts on the Department of Defense's (DOD) networks and
operations.
Cyber threats can range from individual hackers to criminal
groups stealing financial data to nation states with
sophisticated intelligence-gathering disruptive or offensive
capabilities that could steal classified information or harm
our critical infrastructure and computer networks.
Before we get started, I do want to outline that we're
going to hear from our witnesses in both this open session and
in the closed session that will follow. We'll start with an
unclassified briefing here. Then we will reconvene in the
Office of Senate Security for the classified portion of today's
hearing.
I do want to encourage members to certainly take the time
to go over to the Capitol for the classified briefing. We're
going to be briefed there by Ms. Stephanie O'Sullivan, the
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. She will
brief us on a recent national intelligence estimate on cyber
and will be focusing her remarks on cyber industrial espionage,
why it's happening, what role it plays in the national policy
of certain countries, who benefits, and so forth. This
information, I think, is going to be very useful for all of us
who are concerned about this matter, in thinking about what we
need to be doing next.
Then the other briefer in the closed session will be
Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis, USMC, the Deputy Commander of
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). General Davis will brief us on
the cyber threat as seen from CYBERCOM, which has the
responsibility to defend the Nation against cyber attacks that
rise to the level of use of force or aggression, to defend the
networks of DOD, and to carry out operations in cyber space in
support of our combatant commands.
The unclassified briefing we are about to receive here from
Mr. Kevin Mandia, who is the founder and the chief executive
officer of the Mandiant Corporation, should require little in
the way of introduction since it has certainly been widely
reported in the media. The Mandiant Report is in many respects
a summation and a confirmation of untold numbers of previous
reports and developments. But it's also a unique achievement in
the depth of the research and the scope of its documentation.
The report is impressive too for its professionalism and lack
of sensationalism, and it lets the facts speak for themselves.
This report has provided an important service for our
public. The Mandiant Corporation has produced an Intelligence
Community-quality report without the benefit of the tools and
authorities of our government and without the accompanying
classification restrictions. So this is an unclassified report
that was put together that is being presented to us.
[The information referred to follows:]
See Annex: Mandiant Report, ``APT1 - Exposing One of China's Cyber
Espionage Units,'' dated February 18, 2013, at the end of this hearing.
Senator Hagan. So based on this report, there's simply
nothing left in my mind for the public to doubt about the
magnitude or relentless character of China's theft of American
technology and other valuable business information.
Since this is a briefing format, I'm hoping we can be less
formal than in a normal hearing. I want to encourage all of us
to feel free to ask questions or to seek clarifications during
the presentation. So if we can just have an opportunity to ask
questions and have a give and take, I think it will be a very
useful briefing.
I want to conclude this portion of the briefing at 3:20
p.m. so that we can move to the Capitol for the closed portion.
Before I call on Mr. Mandia, and thank you so much for your
report and for being here, I wanted to ask Senator Fischer for
any comments that she may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It's an honor
to serve as ranking member of this subcommittee with you. Thank
you.
It's also an honor to look forward to the briefings that we
will have today and throughout our time. Just last week, in
testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated the
threat of cyber attack has become the top security threat
facing the Nation, overtaking the threat of terrorism. This
assessment makes clear the risks associated with the cyber
domain and it is vitally important that the United States meets
them head on.
Thus far, our defense-first policies have failed to deter
hostile actors from attacking the United States in cyber space.
I believe we must begin to assign accountability and impose
consequences on those responsible for aggressive attacks on our
systems. Little else will influence those nation states,
terrorist organizations, and criminals who seek to hold our
national security and our economy at risk through exploitation
of the cyber domain.
The issues are complex, technical, and can at times seem
very academic. But make no mistake, the consequences are real
and potentially far-reaching.
I look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Mandia, at this
open portion of the briefing and I applaud you and your team
for your work. I also look forward to our second panel, where
we will receive the classified briefing. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Mr. Mandia, once again, thank you for being here. Thank you
for the report that your company has presented. We look forward
to your presentation.
STATEMENT OF MR. KEVIN MANDIA, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
MANDIANT CORPORATION; ACCOMPANIED BY MR. RICHARD BEJTLICH,
CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, MANDIANT CORPORATION
Mr. Mandia. Sure, thank you. Madam Chairman, may I ask that
I be joined by my colleague, Richard Bejtlich, who will be
offering some additional color and commentary to some of the
details in the report that we presented to you?
Senator Hagan. Certainly, and if he could say his name one
more time for the record?
Mr. Mandia. Sure.
Mr. Bejtlich. Richard Bejtlich, spelled B-e-j-t-l-i-c-h.
Senator Hagan. Great.
Mr. Mandia. Thank you, Richard.
I'd like to begin by just summarizing the report that
Mandiant published, called ``Exposing One of China's Cyber
Espionage Units.'' It's important to note that we only exposed
one advanced persistent threat (APT) group, or threat actor,
that we refer to as APT1. We exposed them based on a couple of
reasons, one of those reasons being that we felt that their
tools, tactics, and procedures had stagnated over the 7 years
that we've been responding to them. We also just felt that in
both the private and public sectors that the general feeling or
emotion was that it was time to bring this to a head. You could
sense it and feel it.
So when we published this document, it was very important
to us that we showed that it wasn't just attacks that were
coming out of China targeting the intellectual property of blue
chip American and Western European countries that was targeting
our internet protocol (IP), it was not just the Chinese, but
actually an army unit in China.
The way we did that is we followed two threads of
investigation. First, we followed the technical threads of
doing 141 investigations where the malware being used or the
computers being used to do the attacks were all synonymous with
what we ended up grouping as APT1. That's just an arbitrary
name we at Mandiant assigned this group. As we responded to
them, the transition to practice or the fingerprints of this
intrusion group married up at 141 different victim companies.
As we followed that technical thread, it brought us from
computer to computer to computer, to basically a region in
Shanghai. Anecdotally, we also started doing open source
collections. What is in that region of China on Datong Road in
the Pudong Region? We went with the nontechnical evidence and
we learned of a Unit 61398, whose charter was to do computer
network operations, where their people needed to speak English.
When I say computer network operations, by the way, I mean both
computer network attack as well as computer network defend.
We had a location of this unit in the Pudong New Area of
Shanghai on Datong Road, and just the nontechnical open source
evidence brought us to the exact same location. So when we
looked at the mission of APT1, as we witnessed them stealing
hundreds of terabytes of data from 141 companies, we witnessed
them send fake emails speaking perfect English, we witnessed
APT1 use nearly 1,000 different computer systems over 7 years,
and then we witnessed them using IP addresses or computers in
China, as well as the Chinese character set, and we married
their location up with the mission and the scope and
capabilities of this Unit 61398, it was absolutely the exact
same place.
We had the same region, we had the same mission, and we had
the same scope of capabilities. So we felt that the Mandiant
Report brings the reader and brings the public right up to the
front door of this building. We couldn't fly people over there
and run down the third floor taking photos, but there were only
two options: APT1 that Mandiant has tracked for 7 years is, in
fact, Unit 61398; or, in one of the most closed societies in
the world, where they monitor Internet use of your Gmail access
or of your Yahoo searches or Google searches, that somehow the
Chinese Government is flat-out missing a 7-year campaign to
pilfer millions and billions of documents from hundreds of U.S.
companies. It's just hard to fathom that that's a real
alternative.
So we believe there's no valid conclusion other than a unit
of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has, in fact, been
chartered to compromise the U.S. infrastructure and steal our
intellectual property.
Senator Hagan. Impressive opening comments.
Let me just ask you a question on the scope. Multiple times
in the report it stressed that even the massive activities that
you've directly observed and catalogued is perhaps dwarfed by
what you haven't seen, and that you judged that you have
observed only a small fraction of what the APT1 unit alone is
doing. So can you expand on that?
Mr. Mandia. Absolutely. Mandiant can only know the lowest
bounds. So we reported on what was in plain view to Mandiant as
we were hired by different victim organizations to respond. So
our knowledge of APT1 is what I call lateral. We were hired by
Company A to respond to APT1, then Company B, and then go on
through----
Senator Hagan. That was 141 companies?
Mr. Mandia. You bet, over time it was over 100 companies.
As we respond to each one and we see the same types of malware,
the same modus operandi, the same fingerprints, I call them
digital fingerprints, tracking it back to APT1, we only know
what we know. So all we've done is establish the lowest bounds.
There could be thousands of companies that were compromised by
APT1 where Mandiant wasn't hired to respond and some other
companies were.
Senator Hagan. You also said the non-technical unit in the
Pudong Region. Explain that again to me?
Mr. Mandia. What I meant is the non-technical resource that
we did at Mandiant brought us to the same place where the
technical threads and technical evidence brought us to, a small
quadrant of Shanghai.
Senator Hagan. What is your non-technical?
Mr. Mandia. Non-technical is open source collections,
literally Googling for the Chinese character set of Unit 61398.
We Googled to find this place, essentially.
Mr. Bejtlich. Madam Chairman, if I could add some color to
that. One of the things we did was say: If you were to run an
operation for 7 years controlling thousands of computers,
targeting at least hundreds or probably thousands of western
companies, what would you need to do that? You would need a
headquarters, you would need power, you would need
telecommunications links, and you would need infrastructure to
support these people.
The activity started, at least from our perspective that we
were able to see, in 2006, and in 2007 this building, 130,000
square feet. We got a copy of the document that ran the
telecommunications line to this building saying: This is for
Unit 61398, and if you don't know who they are, they're very
important. They're the second bureau of the third department of
the PLA, which does signals intelligence work.
So putting that all together, thinking if this unit
existed, what would it look like for them on the ground, and
there it is. You have the technical indicators, you have the
non-technical indicators. It matched very well.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Mandia, is it APT1?
Mr. Mandia. Yes.
Senator Hagan. It's a military intelligence unit, but it's
marauding through this whole portion of the broad U.S.
industrial base. Should we conclude that the Chinese Government
sees the theft of U.S. technology and know-how as a key element
of their national security? If so, is this because they see
this theft as important to their economic growth, and is this
economic growth critical to their regime's stability?
Mr. Mandia. Sure. I'll start with that and then pass it to
Richard. From my experience, this is an extensive effort to
pilfer intellectual property out of this country. It's been
supported monetarily. It would take thousands of people,
thousands of systems. You'd have to have your computer
intruders--and those are normally very different people than
the folks who benefit from these intrusions, meaning the folks
who would read the emails or read the documents that have been
pilfered. So the mere infrastructure alone and the time and
duration and scope of this effort to steal our secrets has gone
on for so long that there's a large amount of investment in it.
Based on that investment, it's hard to conclude anything other
than that there's an advantage being gained from that
investment.
Mr. Bejtlich. If you look at what the Chinese have stated
as far as their objectives and their different areas of
priority, the number one concern for the PLA, or really for the
party, is the preservation of the party in power. The number
two concern is their economic development. That's why this
theft is really a national security concern for them. It isn't
an economic concern in the sense that the United States thinks
of the economy as the basis for our military power. The Chinese
think in terms of the economic and military being together as a
national security concern.
So that's why we're a little skeptical that simply telling
them to stop, they will stop, because they think this is the
engine of growth, this is how we're going to provide jobs for
our people, create world-leading brands. We're going to take
this innovation from the West and put it into our own products
and services. So they do see it as--probably the number two
priority in their country.
Mr. Mandia. One of the more interesting things that we did
is as we were doing open source collections, as I call it,
Googling for evidence to some extent, we were finding things in
China that--we're all familiar with Kentucky Fried Chicken. We
were finding pictures of absolute replicas in China of Kentucky
Fried Chicken, absolute replicas of Starbucks in China.
So as you see these things emerging from there, it's not a
great leap to say that the computer intrusions to steal our IP
are, in fact, to shortcut the research and development process.
It's to shortcut learning what our marketing plans are, what
our sales plans are, how much we charge for things, what our
road map is for our products and technologies, how we build
things, how we manufacture. All those materials have been taken
and what we're starting to see is imitations of it popping up.
Senator Hagan. Do you want to ask a question?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
In your 7-year investigation, did you find other digital
fingerprints out there? I would imagine you did. To translate
that into numbers, how many other groups like this do you think
there are, and what's the damage in numbers to companies here
in this country?
Mr. Bejtlich. Yes, ma'am. APT1 is one of at least two dozen
numbered groups that Mandiant tracks. Not all of them are
Chinese, but many of them are because the Chinese are the most
prolific perpetrators of this type of activity. APT1 is one of
those groups that is very broad in itself, but it's just one
element of a large campaign. There are other teams working in
other cities in other parts of the country that in some cases
target other areas of the economy, but in other cases they
interact.
We've done work for victims where we've seen two, three, up
to five or six independent groups all competing to get access
to information of a western company simultaneously. So there
is--we wonder in our government about deconfliction of
priorities and different military units and such. The Chinese
probably have that same concern because they have so many teams
stealing data at the same time.
As far as impact, it's tough to----
Senator Fischer. Could I just interrupt you?
Mr. Bejtlich. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Are you saying that most of them are army
computers that are doing this?
Mr. Bejtlich. We can say with confidence that they're
Chinese units. We don't know if they're necessarily military.
There's a certain hierarchy in China----
Senator Fischer. Would you say they're government?
Mr. Bejtlich. I would say they're at least government-
sanctioned. We can't say for sure, these other units, whether
they are uniform-wearing military or if they're contractors or
if they're outsourced third parties.
The way to think about the Chinese effort is there's three
levels. There's patriotic hacking, there's state-backed
militias that are closely affiliated with the universities, and
then finally there are the military or military-associated
units. APT1 is an example of that, of that top level. But even
then, APT1 is not the top of the hierarchy. We do see other
teams that have other capabilities.
Senator Fischer. What's ``patriotic hacking''?
Mr. Bejtlich. A patriotic hacker is someone who says they
are sympathetic to China's sense of itself in the world, they
believe that it is their duty to attack western individuals or
companies, and the Chinese Government tolerates that activity,
whereas in the United States if we had someone doing that same
activity they would most likely be arrested.
Now, that's not to say the Chinese don't arrest hackers. If
you are a hacker in China, or Russia, for that matter, and you
hack another citizen, they will arrest you and in some cases
there's fairly significant consequences. So that's one of the
ways that they say: Look, Chinese Government, we arrest
hackers; we don't like this. They're arresting the ones who are
hacking each other.
A good example of that is some hackers set up fake
universities in China and were taking in tuition payments and
putting out fake degrees. This was all fake and the government
ended up shutting it down.
You see the same dynamic in Russia. If you're a Russian
hacking another Russian, you're going to go to jail. But if
you're a Russian hacking an American, no problem.
Senator Fischer. If you're a Chinese hacking an American,
are you doing it to disrupt or are you doing it to gain
information?
Mr. Bejtlich. At the patriotic hacker level it's generally
disruption. But what happens is that indicates that you have an
interest and a capability, and you will be recruited into a
university. Then if you show even more capability, you may end
up in a military unit.
Senator Fischer. I know you said the second type of hacker
was university--you used some other term. What was that?
Mr. Bejtlich. Kevin and I were both in the military. It's a
tough situation to have people who want to volunteer their
service other than the formal National Guard, Reserve, or
Active Duty. In China you can be in a militia that's a nebulous
organization and be allowed to hack, and the more you hack the
better. The best of them are chosen to go into the military.
Mr. Mandia. I'd like to expound a little bit on the
characteristics of the advanced persistent threat hackers that
we mostly see and make some generalities about the attacks
we're seeing out of China. First and foremost, these attacks
are against companies; they're not against individuals at the
highest level. It's to steal corporate secrets, not individual
secrets necessarily.
But the second thing that's insidious about these attacks
is that they actually target humans, though, and they target
human weakness. That's why there's been such a complication in
fixing the problem. Just, hey, why don't we stop this? But it's
more complex than stopping it, because the intrusions that APT1
and other groups like them are doing are exploiting human
weakness.
They do it by sending emails purporting to be from someone
you know, and you get these emails, and you may get them to
your mobile devices or to your laptop or your desktop at work,
and they're soliciting you in pretty darn good English to click
on a link, to see a Word document or a Powerpoint document or
something that you would expect to get even. Just by clicking
on that link or downloading or opening that attachment to that
email, you're compromising yourself.
So they're leveraging human weaknesses and human
vulnerability and trust to break into these organizations. But
they are not targeting an individual at home. It's very clear
to us, after responding to Chinese intrusions for nearly 15
years now in my career, the attacks do follow a rule of
engagement, but it's to steal IP, but I've never witnessed
Chinese intruders, other than to breach the confidentiality of
documents, I've never seen them change things. They're not
changing the integrity of the data or making it unavailable
intentionally, meaning they're not just shutting down machines
and making it so that no one can connect to a machine.
So there has been rules of engagement during the 15 years
that I've responded to these types of intruders. But make no
mistake, they are targeting our IP. It's very obvious from the
moment they break in that they're just pilfering every pdf,
Word doc, Powerpoint doc, and email related to the projects or
work that they're interested in.
Mr. Bejtlich. The one exception to the individual part is
if you're an activist, a Tibetan activist, Falun Gong, those
people are targeted incessantly. I met with an activist, a
Tibetan activist, in Toronto yesterday and she described a 10-
year campaign that her organization has been enduring. She has
5 years of evidence. She kept all these emails with all these
malicious attachments like Kevin described.
They have had to rely on the human defense of, I have to
make the decision, do I trust this email. It says that I'm a
Tibetan, I need money, I'm going to be arrested. So they've
tried to figure that out as best they can. But outside of that,
it is truly an espionage campaign like you've never seen.
Senator Fischer. With businesses, how much would an
American company spend on cybersecurity and what's the cost to
consumers?
Mr. Bejtlich. Prior to working at Mandiant, I was the
director of incident response at General Electric, and I had a
budget of $13.33 per employee per year to spend on my team of
40 people. With that budget--with 300,000 employees, you can do
the math and figure out what the budget was--I was able to hold
the line against that group.
What that will tell you is that unless you are a top
company who can hire top talent and scale it out, scale those
costs across the business, you can't afford the fences that
will stop a Chinese military unit or a Russian unit or anyone
else. It is truly a problem that is not--small and medium
business, as an example, have an exceptionally difficult time
dealing with this because they just can't support a team to
hold back a military unit, or even a non-military unit that's
very well-skilled.
Mr. Mandia. Thinking about the impact of it, I think we're
on the early onset of determining the cost to the consumer,
because there's a certain amount of time that needs to elapse
to benefit from all the intellectual property that's been
stolen. So I think we're on the front end of the power curve,
learning from these intrusions to see what would be the
consequences, how many jobs might we lose, how much competitive
pricing pressure might we get from exports coming out of that
region.
So I think we're still learning what was benefited from
this enormous data theft, and we'll learn more over the next
few years.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. I'm sure we have a series of questions. On
that topic about protecting, and from GE's perspective, or any
customer, is it possible to keep the adversaries out of our
networks by technical means alone? I mean, techniques such as
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, antivirus products, and
the like. Or is it necessary to actively monitor and constantly
search for the intruders?
I ask this because it should affect the standards that the
government is developing for critical infrastructure under the
new cyber executive order. If we need investigative processes
as well as ``good hygiene,'' that needs to be included in the
standards that the National Institute of Standards and
Technology is developing. I'd love to hear both of your
comments on that.
Mr. Mandia. I'll give you the high-level results. As we
improve our security posture--and by the way, throughout my 20
years of doing cybersecurity, for the most part, the security
in this country is getting better. It's been going in the right
direction.
But as we do that, what we're really doing is reducing the
target area for the attacker. What's lacking is that no matter
what we do there's always going to be a gap in our security.
There's always going to be technologies that are deployed
faster than the means to secure them, and attackers will always
take advantage of that.
But that doesn't mean that we just give up. So we have to
come up with a process where we mind the security gap that's
always going to exist. That's one of the things that I've
observed over the last 20 years is missing. We have this
Maginot Line of preventive forces and we've established it, and
we keep extending it, and we keep narrowing the gap. But what
we haven't done a great job of necessarily is minding that gap,
observing when are the bad guys getting around our defenses.
So that's the high-level overture of where we're at as a
country. The gap is shrinking, but we're not minding it as well
as we could.
Mr. Bejtlich. Madam Chair, the techniques we've seen in the
highest-performing organizations, whether they're the military
or the government or private corporations, people accept that
you will be compromised, but you have to find it quickly, scope
it effectively so you know the size of the breach, and then
contain it. So you detect quickly, you respond quickly, and you
contain quickly.
It's not you deploy some type of technology and you assume
it will keep the bad guy out. You have to say that's going to
fail, there's going to be a security gap, like Kevin mentioned,
and once that gap is exploited, you react to it quickly.
Senator Hagan. Back to the APT1 unit. Who receives the
stolen information that has been hacked? Is it state-owned
enterprises, private companies? Then what do they do with it? I
have examples of companies in North Carolina that were making
outdoor recreation equipment, small scale, and yet all of a
sudden they received requests for replacement parts because the
parts that the people had purchased were not the original, it
was not their design, it was not their product. Yet, now they
are being told that you're responsible for this defect, when it
had been hacked, it had been copied, and obviously not used the
sturdy material that this company used.
Mr. Mandia. I'll answer first on that. From our
perspective--and Richard's going to have a different answer,
but I don't know where the information goes after the
intrusion. As we respond to these incidents, our consultants
are in plain view of so much stolen information we can't
possibly go through it all, nor do we. So I just want to leave
you with the thought, it's mind-boggling how many people it
would take to go through terabytes and terabytes of
information.
When you hear the word terabyte, most people don't even
know what the heck that is. But I can assure you, in your whole
life you're never going to read a terabyte of information. I
don't think you'll ever get through it. I can only conclude
there are a lot of folks. If you want to go through all this
information, there has to be a whole engine that can take this
electronic information in, create what's called an index for it
so you can search it quickly, like a card catalogue, and you
have to have the experts or the expertise that can benefit from
it, because we're seeing design documents that make no sense to
anyone but the engineers who made them, and you have to have a
proficiency and an expertise in very specific topic areas to
take benefits of it.
But just from the volume we've seen, it would take an
immense and costly effort, with lots of resources, to go
through this data.
Mr. Bejtlich. This is the great question for us. There's
either a great intelligence report or a Ph.D. or a book waiting
in it. We try to think in terms of similar activities. Kevin
talked about the size of what an activity like that might look
like. We know that the Chinese employs tens of thousands, if
not more, people who do nothing but censorship. These are
people who watch Sina Waibo and these other chat technologies
looking for key words, that they then remove; they delete these
posts. So if the Chinese are willing to devote tens of
thousands of people simply to monitor their own Internet usage,
we could be sure that they would have plenty of resources to
throw at going through these documents.
However, that clean case of get the information, get it to
the right place, and then duplicate the product or service,
that's a tough one for a company like ours to make that. We
don't have people in China. We haven't found people who are
willing to talk about what they have seen. It would be great if
there were some defectors or something who would give us some
insight into that process.
Senator Hagan. Let me talk about countering the
proliferation of cyber weapons. Export controls and other
methods to control the proliferation of dangerous weapons have
been in place for decades. Cyber weapons have the potential to
cause damage on the scale of weapons of mass destruction, and
it's common knowledge that there is a flourishing black market
where one can buy or rent the cyber tools that can penetrate
just about any computer system that's in use today, as well as
the infrastructure to carry out even large-scale operations,
such as the large collection of compromised computers, commonly
referred to as a botnet.
This cyber black market is a dangerous source of
capabilities for terrorists, for criminals, and even nation
states. Mr. Mandia, from your perspective as a security expert
in the private sector, do you believe that it would be possible
to develop a system of export controls for cyber weapons
analogous to those that we have for other weapons? Do you think
that such an idea is workable or even worth considering?
Mr. Mandia. I can only offer you the perspective of a
cybersecurity practitioner. I immediately went to the technical
complications. No matter what we try to impose via legislation,
the ability to surreptitiously communicate on the Internet
exists. You can have an encrypted end point speak to an
encrypted end point and it's very hard to know the content of
those communications.
The challenge of cyber weaponry is that it's highly
scaleable. Someone with great expertise here at one site can
just email it via an encrypted protocol to somebody with far
less capability and technical wherewithal, and yet they have
now been empowered to do a Stuxnet-like attack. So that's the
challenge. It's almost like trying to put the cat back in the
bag. There's encryption that's free, publicly available. There
are anonymization techniques that you use on the Internet----
Senator Hagan. There is what now?
Mr. Mandia. Anonymization techniques. That's a big word for
it's hard to pierce anonymity on the Internet sometimes when
people are trying to remain anonymous.
So because of encryption and the anonymity on the Internet,
cyber weapons could be traded. I think it would probably be
easier to catch any money that might pass hands, quite frankly,
because you can trade the actual electronic bits and bytes
surreptitiously.
Mr. Bejtlich. Madam Chair, I was at a conference in Toronto
where this very subject came up. I'm neither a lawyer nor an
export control expert, but it was made apparent to us that
there are laws in place that cover preventing the export of
items of torture or these sorts of--from the 1970s, where the
United States is prohibited from exporting this sort of stuff.
I think if you define certain types of tools as being used
for that type of behavior--in other words, some type of
software that's used to conduct surveillance on an activist in
Syria, and that person is arrested by virtue of the government
buying that tool, the Syrian Government buying that tool, or
something to that effect, I think that we have the legal
framework in place to control that sort of export. I'd like to
see that happen. I think it's not an easy case, but I think you
can make a good case that we should not be exporting software
that's then used for that sort of behavior.
If you're looking at other types of software, though, this
same tool that can be used to break into a network I can use to
test my network to make sure that a bad guy can't break into my
own company. So that becomes very difficult. Sometimes it comes
down to what the marketing is. Is this tool marketed for
nefarious purposes or is it marketed for legitimate purposes to
try to improve your own security?
One of the best ways we know to find out if you're
vulnerable, one is to check to see if intruders are there; and
then the second one is to simulate an intruder. If an
intruder--if you simulate the intruder and you can't get access
to a certain computer, then you know you're doing pretty well.
To do that sort of work, you need that tool.
So that's where it becomes difficult to try to regulate
that sort of software. But I do think there's room to sort of
carve out the clearly malicious software from the software that
has a legitimate purpose.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Mandia, your company's report and other
such reporting from the private sector, I think, is very
helpful for educating the American people about this threat in
cyber space. It's also very helpful, I believe, in getting
China's attention to this matter and letting them know that we
know perfectly well what they are doing. We have certainly seen
that in the last several weeks since your report came out.
I realize that you sacrifice something when you reveal what
you know. China probably will now change some aspects of how
they operate and this may make it harder for you to track them
in the future. But it seems to me that, as you say, you just
can't prevent and deter a crime if all we do is observe the
criminals to gather the intelligence. We can't just sit and
watch China stealing this property.
If your company was able to collect all of this information
on an unclassified basis, it seems to me that the government
could also make such releases without undue damage to source
and methods. What are your views on the gain versus loss
calculation?
Mr. Mandia. I think that's a great question, and it
becomes, is there a network-enabling effect of sharing
intelligence? That's pretty complex. I can share this with you.
Mandiant, when we obtain intelligence, we do it what I call
laterally. We have to go from company to company to company to
company. I think that the government is uniquely positioned at
the top of the pyramid where they can get information from the
bottom, which means they will have a top-down view that should
be and is more comprehensive in scope than what Mandiant can
provide going laterally.
So the government is uniquely positioned to know more, have
better intelligence, and be able to make that actionable should
they be able to share it with prospective victims or imminent
victims, meaning the intelligence showing that something's
about to happen or is pending.
I think that the criteria that go into that decision, does
the gains outweigh the negative effects, I feel that once you
have the capabilities to observe and orient on an attacker, you
actually gain intelligence sometimes when you deal the attacker
what I call the Mike Tyson upper cut, where if you change their
behaviors, but you're able to swivel and observe and orient
quickly again, to some extent you're now in charge of the game
that you're being played.
So I think there's a tremendous advantage at times to share
the intelligence, but you also need to be postured to swivel
for where they go next. The nice thing about it is as we take
control of the game and start pushing the mouse into other
directions, we can start predicting what they're going to do. I
think the minute we're predicting what their reactions will be,
we're starting to win at the game.
Senator Hagan. Interesting.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
The Chinese premier has made comments since your report has
been released. Have you seen those?
Mr. Bejtlich. Yes, I have.
Senator Fischer. He said: ``I think we shouldn't make
groundless accusations against each other and spend more time
doing practical things that will contribute to cybersecurity.''
Also, the foreign minister said: ``Anyone who tries to
fabricate or piece together a sensational story to serve a
political motive will not be able to blacken the name of others
nor whitewash themselves.''
What's your response to that?
Mr. Bejtlich. The main response that I've seen from the
Chinese that I find curious is that they claim that our
attribution is based on IP addresses, when clearly it's not. IP
addresses are but one component. Even an IP address has value
when it's the same IP address, the number that's assigned to a
computer is the same for 7 years. I mean, that tells you
something.
But what's funny is that they say you can't use that
measurement to assign attribution, and yet in the very next
breath they turn around and say: ``American IP addresses are
attacking us.'' So they think that somehow it's logical to deny
our part of the argument, but then to use it for their
purposes.
I think they were stunned by this. I'm waiting for them to
write a report. I just don't know if they'll be able to do it,
because I feel that they may have some abilities, but to be
thorough and professional and just to lay the facts out, I
don't know if they're in a position to do that. They've not had
a very sophisticated response if all they can do is talk about
IP addresses that were seen attacking.
Because our report isn't an attack report and other reports
that we've seen come out since then, those are all attack
reports. Our report's an intrusion report. This shows companies
were broken into and data was stolen. 356 days on average an
intruder was inside a company, terabytes of data stolen. One
company was compromised for almost 5 years. That's much, much
different than seeing an attack that gets bounced off of
someone's firewall or another technical defense.
Mr. Mandia. I think you always run the risk when you deny,
deny, deny that overwhelming facts come to the public light. I
think that over time we should see a tapering of the denials
coming out of China on this. There is no doubt when we released
this report one of the factors that brought me to the cusp of
let's release it was the response to the New York Times article
that came out in February. The New York Times said: Hey, we
were compromised by the Chinese and here's what they did. The
Chinese once again came back with the statement: ``It's
irresponsible and unprofessional to accuse us.'' I went: ``You
know, let's accuse them.''
I think that the more they deny something, the more likely
we'll entertain sharing more information.
Senator Fischer. Have you seen a change in the APT1's
practices since your report's been released?
Mr. Bejtlich. Yes, we have. We've seen them try to clean up
some of their online presence.
Senator Fischer. How would they do that?
Mr. Bejtlich. Some of the public databases that we or other
security researchers can use to identify them, they've changed
some of those entries. But what's interesting about that is by
noticing the entries were changed it revealed something about
who did it.
We've seen them change some of their infrastructure, so the
computers they were using to hop from China to the West, some
of that has been changed. But we've been able to keep up with
them on that perspective as well.
I think what's also fascinating is that since the report
was published there's been at least 25, upwards of 30,
derivative, either efforts or reports, that built on our own
research. You may have seen a wonderful story in the L.A. Times
where some of their on-the-ground reporters found the blog of
what apparently is one of the members of these units, where he
described the drudgery of working in this unit over the period
of several years, how he disliked the fact that it was away
from the main city, which this headquarters is often in not a
very interesting part of town. He missed his girlfriend. He
felt like he was working in a prison because he would work from
8 a.m. until 8 p.m.
It was very interesting to get a firsthand account from
someone who was one of these, self-identified as a Chinese
military hacker, in uniform and so forth. So we hope that by
bringing the report forward we'll get more and more of this
sort of derivative analysis that gives even more detail.
Senator Fischer. Do you think that with these hackers being
able to have access to American companies, can they also shut
them down? Does that access give them the ability to shut them
down?
Mr. Mandia. Yes.
Senator Fischer. But they choose not to at this point?
Mr. Mandia. Yes. We've responded to APT1 over 100 times,
and these other APT groups hundreds and hundreds of times, and
we have never seen what I would describe as destructive
activities. We may see every once in a while they'll clear a
log file to erase some evidence. So I think that the tools they
have in place a lot of the times, not all of them, but some of
them do have the access required to do a shutdown. Some of them
even have in their back doors, that surreptitious way to access
a machine, the ability to shut it down.
Haven't seen it happen yet and I don't anticipate that the
Chinese will be a threat that starts shutting down machines. I
think other cyber threats will emerge before they do, meaning
the Chinese, before they take advantage of that capability.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned back doors. Are back doors
set up in the manufacturing of computers or software? Is that a
point we need to be concerned about at the very beginning of
where we get our computers?
Mr. Bejtlich. I would be more concerned with just overall
software quality. To the extent software is not very well-coded
and there are vulnerabilities that make it possible for someone
to take over that computer, that's a concern. But when we write
about back doors in our report, we're talking about methods of
access that the Chinese have either introduced or stolen. They
start out with using their own tools, but then they evolve to
using the tools that you have. In other words, if you connect
via a virtual private network as a user so that you can work
from home, that's what they steal, so that now it looks like
they're a normal user.
So half of the time when we work these intrusions,
eventually they look just like a normal user. That's what makes
it very difficult for a company to find them and why they're
able to stay active for so many years.
Mr. Mandia. My opinion is we have to be mindful of our
supply chain. That's what we're really talking about. I think
the minute we turn our backs on that, that obviously that'll be
a way to exploit our country again. So traditionally, though,
it's so easy to break in right now by exploiting human trust
and putting the traditional back doors that we've seen for 20
years on systems. That's what people do today.
But if we ignore the supply chain down to the chip, over
time that might sneak up on us and be a challenge. I have not
personally--well, that's not true. Throughout my career there
have been publicized cases of software having what's called
``Easter eggs'' in it or some kind of unwanted surprise in it.
But I think that's a future problem, but if we ignore it it'll
come faster.
Mr. Bejtlich. We did document a case in our latest M-Trends
report that was released this last month where a hard target
who had been experiencing this problem for many years found
that they were being attacked by a partner and by an outsourced
information technology supplier who was compromised. So this is
the trend now, that if your primary target is hard enough you
come in through others. It doesn't necessarily mean you come in
through the actual laptop that you buy or that sort of thing,
but you come in through partner organizations. As those harden,
like Kevin said, then I think the true supply chain will be the
issue.
Senator Fischer. My last question would be: how do we deter
them?
Mr. Bejtlich. I think signaling is one way. I don't have
privy to how the decision was made, but when I saw that General
Alexander was talking about offense explicitly I think that was
a signal. I think that stating that we see you and that this is
not acceptable is proper as well.
We need them to scale back their activity to meet the level
that we see from other adversaries such as the Russians.
There's a sense with the Russians that there are certain lines
we don't cross and certain activity stays at a certain level.
With the Chinese, they take the gloves off and they go after
far too many industries who simply cannot defend themselves.
Mr. Mandia. My answer is at a higher level of abstraction.
There's going to be technical solutions and non-technical
solutions, and neither one in and of itself is going to be 100
percent successful. So we'll probably never get to perfection
here, because I can't think of one technical way to prevent all
attacks. Technology is just evolving too quickly. But I believe
that technology is advancing. We're limiting the consequences
of intrusions far better today than 5 years ago.
The up side of a lot of the attacks we've seen, if you want
to think of it that way, is we're much better postured in many
organizations to withstand the next generation attacks that may
come without the code of ethics we've witnessed for 15 years
out of Russia and China. It may come from Iran, may come from a
non-nation state, or a terrorist group. So that the security
has come up based on a lot of these activities, but it's the
non-technical solutions that I just don't have the proficiency
or expertise to advise you on. But you can't get there with
just technology. Technology is not--there's not going to be a
silver bullet, so we're going to have to have a diplomatic as
well as technology to approach the problem.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. Before we close, do you think that the
political leadership in China has been told by their cyber
forces that what they've been doing was undetectable? If so,
then would there be some pretty tough questions going on right
now from the political leaders to their cyber forces?
Mr. Bejtlich. I'm loathe to speculate, but my guess is they
didn't say that it was undetectable, but they would have said
it's tolerated. Now we're signaling to them that it's not
tolerated.
Senator Hagan. Then I have one more, final wrap-up question
and this is what I ask all the generals that I talk to on this
issue, too, and other companies. Tell me about your employee
base as far as the educational component of science,
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education in our
country for the kind of people that you need to be hiring to do
this kind of work?
I know that STEM is certainly an area of focus that we in
our country have to be paying a lot more attention to, so that
we can be sure that we have the people within our military,
within our government, within our private industries, within
the companies that come to you to help them from an intrusion
standpoint. Can you talk a little bit about what you see from
your perspective?
Mr. Bejtlich. Hiring is our biggest challenge. We struggle
to find the types of people that will meet our needs. But there
are good signs. 15 years ago when I started, when Kevin
started, there weren't programs that you could attend to learn
how to defend yourself. There were computer science programs,
but there were not computer security programs. So we're seeing
more of that, which is good.
I still think there's a disconnect between the theory
that's taught and then what you really need to do on the job.
It would be--both Kevin and I are authors. We write books that
people use in school and they learn how to do the real deal as
opposed to learning about cryptography, which may or may not be
helpful.
So I think we're getting there. I think that the fact that
in the military and in the FBI and some other places there are
career paths now--that's what's difficult. When you take
someone in uniform and they don't have a career path to stay
doing this work, that's tough. I think that's changed now and
that's encouraging. Even having CYBERCOM, I think, as a home
for people like that, is very encouraging.
But there's still plenty more to do. The fact that the
Chinese can muster so many people and encourage so many people
to learn how to hack and in the United States we still have
trouble with that--not that I'm encouraging anyone to learn how
to hack necessarily, but to do it for educational purposes and
then do it as a job. This is the greatest job in the world as
far as I'm concerned and I would love to have more people
banging down our doors to try to do it with us.
Mr. Mandia. The bottom line is there is a shortage, and
we're doing what many other companies are doing, supporting
local colleges, supporting students, trying to get more people
into it. I always believe wherever money goes crime follows.
Pretty soon we'll all be paying for things with our Android
phones and our iPhones, and the minute we're doing all-digital
money we're going to see more digital crime and we're going to
need more expertise, and we need to build technology that
expands at the scope of those expertises as well.
So we're in an interesting time, but we're trying to make
more--as I say, we're trying to groom more cyber pilots to help
us.
Senator Hagan. We certainly thank you for your report.
Thank you for your company's making this public and sharing it
with us. We certainly do thank you for your testimony at this
briefing today.
We will adjourn. Thank you.
ANNEX
[The report titled: Mandiant Report, ``APT1 - Exposing One
of China's Cyber Espionage Units'' follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO EMERGING
COUNTERTERRORISM THREATS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Nelson, Fischer,
McCain, and Blunt.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and Robie I. Samanta Roy,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; and Thomas W. Goffus, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A.
Kulenkampff, John L. Principato, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Christopher Cannon, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain;
and Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Hagan. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee will come to order, and my first official apology.
I, for some reason, had it in my head this was at 2:30 instead
of 2:15. So I do apologize.
Good afternoon, everybody, and thanks. Today the
subcommittee welcomes Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Derek Chollet--thank you for
being here--Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Mike Sheehan--thank you--
and the Commander of Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
Admiral Bill McRaven--thank you--for us to receive testimony on
the Department of Defense (DOD) programs, policies, and
operations with respect to countering emerging terrorism
threats, in preparation for the committee's markup of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. We
look forward to your testimony today.
Since the subcommittee held a similar hearing last year,
the global landscape has continued to evolve and the demands
being placed on our Nation's military continue to morph as
well. Assistant Secretary Chollet, the subcommittee requested
your participation today because the most acute terrorism
threats our Nation faces today are located in the geographic
area for which you are responsible.
A few examples come to mind quickly. In Syria, the Al-Nusra
Front, which is closely connected with al Qaeda in Iraq, has
demonstrated remarkable strength over the past few months
against the military and Mafia-like forces of President Assad
and his inner circle. In Yemen, despite a number of notable
counterterrorism (CT) successes by our Nation's CT
professionals, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to
plan strikes against the United States and our interests. In
Somalia, a massive investment by the international community in
the African Union Peacekeeping Force, coupled with targeted
training by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) of deploying
units, has paid dividends that may put the Somali people and
their nascent national government on a path to a better future.
In North and West Africa, the political instability created
by the Arab Spring, as well as the multilateral military
intervention in Libya, has created a security vacuum in a vast
region of the world where the reach of national government does
not often extend beyond the major population centers. Al
Qaeda's franchise in the region, al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb, as well as a number of other local violent
extremist groups, have seized on this instability and the
availability of the weapons to undermine the governments in
Mali and elsewhere.
I know the issues surrounding this region have consumed a
great deal of attention for all three of our witnesses today
and we look forward to hearing your views on the situation on
the ground as well as the support the United States, that we
are providing to regional and international efforts to combat
this instability.
I also understand this situation serves as a good way to
highlight some of the complex security assistance challenges
that our defense professionals have sought to address in recent
years. Secretary Sheehan and Admiral McRaven, I hope that you
will also address these matters today.
Another issue which I know the full committee chairman and
ranking member have focused on in recent years is the U.S.
Support Mission to Central Africa efforts to remove the
leadership of the Lord's Resistance Army from the battlefield.
Given the recent coup in the Central African Republic, the
subcommittee looks forward to an update on this mission and the
Department's plans for it in the coming months.
Admiral McRaven and Secretary Sheehan, over the past year
the Department has placed an emphasis on innovative, low-cost,
and small footprint approaches to achieve national security
objectives. This describes one of the hallmarks of our SOF and
the demand for those forces we know remain high.
While the residual threat from al Qaeda, fiscal realities
facing the Department, and the sensitivity of many of our
partners to a large or visible presence of U.S. military
personnel will drive continued deployments of SOF for our CT
operations and engagement activities designed to improve the
capacity of foreign security forces to confront the mutual
security challenges.
Upon taking command of SOCOM in August 2011, Admiral
McRaven began developing your vision for the future of our SOF.
One element of that vision is what you've referred to as
``enhancing the global Special Operations network.'' I know
that published reports indicate that you're seeking a series of
changes to your command's authority and DOD policy, which we
have discussed, that would give you more control over the
deployment and utilization of SOF. In some cases these
proposals have generated speculation, and please use today's
hearing as an opportunity to provide specifics on what you are
hoping to achieve and what changes you believe are necessary to
enhance the effectiveness of the SOF in carrying out these
assigned missions.
Secretaries Sheehan and Chollet, as the civilians with
primary policy oversight the committee looks forward to hearing
your thoughts on these issues.
On the issue of security assistance authorities, I hope all
three of our witnesses will offer views on the authorities this
subcommittee has helped provide to the Department to address
the multitude of security issues our Nation confronts. These
include the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), the
targeted authorities for Yemen and the Horn of Africa, the
Section 1208 authority, DOD's counternarcotics authority, and
other issues that you would like to share your thoughts with
us.
Recent news reports have also discussed U.S. CT operations,
including those conducted using remotely piloted aircraft, or
drones, and whether they preponderance of such operations
should be conducted under Title 10 of DOD authorities. The
public statement of several senior administration officials
suggest that changes along these lines may be under
consideration. So I hope you'll also provide testimony on that.
Before our witnesses provide brief opening remarks, I'll
turn to Ranking Member Fischer for any opening remarks that she
has to make.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Once again,
this is our first official hearing. I would like to tell you
what an honor and a pleasure it is to serve as the ranking
member on your subcommittee.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses today and I thank
them for their many years of service. Their testimony will play
an important role in informing our efforts to craft the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
Over the last month the full committee has heard from many
of our most respected civilian and military leaders regarding
the threats within their respective areas of responsibilities.
What was made abundantly clear from their testimony is that
this country and our partners are facing a global security
environment that is as complex and daunting as any time in our
history.
Terrorists and other illicit networks are increasingly
interconnected and are no longer confined to geographic
boundaries. As you have stated previously, Admiral McRaven,
there is no such thing as a local problem. While the security
environment is becoming increasingly dynamic, I worry that our
strategy to confront these threats is struggling to keep pace.
What I hope to gain from our hearing today is a better
understanding of what threats cause our witnesses the greatest
concern and whether current strategy, resourcing, and legal
authorities are sufficient to meet those threats. More simply,
how do we most effectively address the growing threats to this
country and our interests around the world, particularly in a
time of growing budgetary uncertainty?
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Ranking Member Fischer.
I want to recognize our witnesses. First, Secretary
Sheehan, if you could give your opening statement, and then
Secretary Chollet and then Admiral McRaven.
Secretary Sheehan.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND
INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Hagan, and
thank you, Senator Fischer, as well. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak today from the Department about our
emerging CT threats. I've provided a longer statement for the
record that will address many of the issues both of you raised
in your opening comments, but I also touch upon them in my
opening remarks as well.
Today I'd like to talk about the evolving threat of al
Qaeda and its affiliates, our counterterrorism efforts, and a
few words about the role of SOF in our strategy. As you
mentioned, Senator Hagan, the Secretary of Defense and the
President announced in our new defense strategy that we're
going to develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint
approaches to achieve our security objectives. The Secretary of
Defense also stated that the task of training, advising, and
partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved
from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our
armed services. I would add that for SOF this has always been
one of our quintessential missions.
Today we shall expand upon our defense strategy and discuss
how in the context of the dynamic threat posed by al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups, how our CT effort is progressing. In
the past year alone, we've already seen this strategy begin to
take shape and have some success, particularly in Somalia and
in Yemen. I'll come back to those.
But before I talk about the strategy, a few words about the
threat as I see it. In the past 10 years we've had enormous
success against al Qaeda, particularly in their ability to
strike our Homeland and other strategic interests abroad, and
it's important to recognize this success and understand what
has been responsible for that success.
However, al Qaeda's core threat to our Homeland continues
to evolve and emanate around the world. But I will say that I
still consider the main threat from al Qaeda from its two
traditional strongholds, in the mountainous area between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the AFPAK region, number one, and
second from its other traditional stronghold in Yemen. Those
remain the most traditional and to me still the most important
threats for al Qaeda, direct threats for our Homeland today,
those two, even as al Qaeda morphs and seeks to find
sanctuaries in other parts of the world, and we'll talk about
those.
Right now al Qaeda has begun to take advantage of
uncontrolled space in other parts of the world. Now, we
mentioned Somalia and we've had some great success there.
That's perhaps the third area after AFPAK and Yemen, then
Somalia. Then the two most emerging areas that we all know of
and that you mentioned in your opening remarks, Senator Hagan,
is North Africa, West Africa, and of course Syria. In both
cases, al Qaeda has taken advantage of ungoverned space and
moved into both those areas to begin to establish its networks.
In North Africa they were able to join with a local Touareg
rebellion, then eject that leadership of that rebellion and
take over a large part of Mali, and we know the story of the
French pushing them back since last January.
In Syria the Al-Nusra Front, an al Qaeda of Iraq affiliate,
another al Qaeda affiliate, has also taken advantage of the
ungoverned space in the war in Syria to establish a foothold
there, and it continues to operate, primarily with its efforts
against the Assad regime.
Let me take a few words to talk about our strategy against
al Qaeda around the world. First I want to say a few words
about direct action. Our direction----
Senator Hagan. Secretary Sheehan, one other comment is
let's make them pretty brief, because what my plan is is to be
in here until 3:20 p.m.
Mr. Sheehan. Okay. I was planning on 5 minutes.
Senator Hagan. Okay, that's fine. Then we'll go to the
closed session and have another hearing.
Mr. Sheehan. All right.
Senator Hagan. That's fine.
Mr. Sheehan. I'll go through this briefly.
We use several components of our strategy. One is the
direct action or the lethal action. We've become very
proficient at that in the Special Operations community, and it
helps us target the key leadership and networks of al Qaeda. As
you're aware, the President has made clear that he wants to
continue to engage Congress and assure not only that our
targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remain
consistent with our laws and systems of checks and balances,
but our efforts are even more transparent with the American
people and the world.
The second component of our strategy is security force
assistance. This is our building partners' capacity. You
asked--I'll make a few comments about some of the instruments
that Congress has provided to us particularly since September
11, 2001, to give us tools to do that. Section 1206, the train-
and-equip, and section 1207, particularly for Yemen and East
Africa, have been fundamental for us building the capacity in
Yemen and in Eastern Africa, where we have had success rolling
back al Qaeda's sanctuary over the past year.
A year ago if I testified from here I would have been
talking about al Qaeda controlling massive swaths of territory
in Yemen and massive swaths of territory in Somalia. In both
cases they've been rolled back. The programs that you've
provided us with those authorities were central to that.
We have a new experimental program, the GSCF, a pilot
program, that is also assisting us in building capacity around
the world and I can talk a little bit about later and our
evaluation of that.
Section 1208, although not a building capacity program per
se, is also fundamental for our ability to work with surrogates
to pursue our interests in operational aspects of CT. But we're
increasingly using it as well to develop partner elite units
that also become very operationally important to us in North
Africa and other parts of the world.
In the future I think it's extremely important, Senator
Hagan, that we look to codify those authorities that have been
provided to DOD, provide those multi-year authorities, make
them permanent and make sure the funding streams and
authorities are clear.
I want to spend a few minutes talking about denying
sanctuary. When I was following al Qaeda prior to September 11,
we learned then that you cannot allow al Qaeda to have
sanctuary with impunity. What we try to do whenever al Qaeda
has sanctuary is try to either work with the host country or,
if they're not capable, increasingly now we're working with
multinational forces to deny al Qaeda sanctuary.
In Yemen, where we had a capable country leadership with
the new leadership of Hadi, we're working with the Yemenis to
roll back al Qaeda in Yemen. In Somalia, where we didn't have a
functioning government, we've worked with the African Union and
a United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operation and have
successfully ejected al Shabaab, the al Qaeda affiliate, out of
the major cities in Somalia. In Mali right now, the French have
pushed the al Qaeda Islamic Magheb (AQIM) out of the major
cities in north Mali, and we're working to create a U.N.
operation to follow that so the French can focus on the high-
value targets and eventually turn over that security to the
host country.
That's really what we're trying to do with our strategy, is
turn it back over to the host country and local forces. We can
assist them, but really the responsibility for ensuring the
security of their sovereign territory is their national
responsibility. That is the future and those tools that I just
talked about and you mentioned, Senator Hagan, are absolutely
fundamental for our ability to do that. We're looking at
modifying those and coming up with some new ideas that Admiral
McRaven and we have presented that we think will even better
our ability to pursue those objectives.
Let me conclude by saying that after a decade of great
success in pounding al Qaeda leadership, typically in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but around the world, harassing them
with partners and by ourselves, we've had success against the
al Qaeda organization. We need to continue to be adaptive and
flexible in order to continue to have that success and make
sure we have the proper authorities, the proper funding. I
believe we can do that together, and I look forward to
continuing the discussion of how we do that in the rest of this
session.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chollet.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK H. CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Chollet. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer,
distinguished members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the
opportunity to join this hearing to speak about how today's
emerging CT threats impact our defense relationships in Africa
and the Middle East and what we are doing to build strong
partners in these critical regions.
The dramatic events of the past 2 years throughout the
Middle East and Africa offer both opportunities and challenges
as we work to combat al Qaeda and associated threats. On the
positive side, these developments hold great promise for people
long denied freedom, dignity, and opportunity. Ultimately, we
believe that democratic transitions will discredit violent
extremists, provide a more enduring foundation for stability
and cooperation, and better align our values and our interests.
We are also aware of the significant risks inherent in such
historic change. In particular, al Qaeda and other extremist
organizations are seeking to exploit the resulting uncertainty
to establish new operating environments in ungoverned or poorly
governed spaces. In order to mitigate these risks, DOD is
strengthening our military-to-military relationships with
partners, working to enable effective local capacity, and
supporting international and regional responses to terrorist
and extremist threats.
In all of these efforts, we are working closely with our
allies in the regions as well as Europe to leverage our
collective capabilities, especially as we adjust to the new
realities of more austere budgets.
In the interest of time, I'll briefly comment on four
countries in particular, several of which you've mentioned,
Madam Chairman, in your opening statement, and I'll look
forward to your questions.
First in Yemen. As part of a ``whole-of-government''
approach to combatting al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), DOD
is providing training and equipment to Yemeni security forces
to build capacity and to conduct counterterrorism operations.
Also, in concert with our European Union (EU) and Jordanian
partners, we are providing advice to the Yemeni military as it
reorganizes under a single chain of command under President
Hadi. A unified professional Yemeni military will be more
effective in the fight against AQAP and will contribute to
greater political stability.
Second, we remain supportive of Libya's transition in the
aftermath of the Benghazi attacks and seek to assist the
Government of Libya as it strives to secure its borders,
control its various militias, and counter violent extremists.
DOD is willing and able to expand cooperation with the Libyan
armed forces, but we are challenged by a heightened security
threat and a diminished personnel presence at our embassy in
Tripoli. As the security situation improves and the Libyans are
better positioned to provide funding to support their armed
forces modernization, we hope that our relationship will
expand.
Third, in Mali we are very concerned about the instability
and the risk--instability in Mali and the risk it poses to
regional stability and our interests in the region. We share,
as Secretary Sheehan has pointed out, we share the French goals
to shrink the AQIM safe haven, to contribute to the restoration
of Malian territorial integrity, and to set the enabling
conditions for elections.
Since soon after the French forces entered Mali in January,
the United States has been supporting them in critical ways
through intelligence-sharing, airlift, and aerial refueling, to
enable their operations. While there is no consideration of
putting U.S. combat forces on the ground in Mali, we continue
to support Mali's neighbors through training and assistance to
counter regional threats.
Finally but perhaps most troubling, we are keenly focused
on events in Syria and the suffering of the Syrian people and
the impact on regional stability generally. As President Obama
said last mont during his visit to Israel and Jordan, we are
very concerned about Syria becoming an enclave for extremism,
which is why we're working with the international community to
help accelerate a viable political transition and helping the
Syrian opposition be more cohesive and capable.
The United States is the single largest humanitarian donor
to the Syrian people and is working closely with partners like
Jordan and Turkey to help deal with the significant
humanitarian and security challenges they face as a result of
this conflict.
Madam Chairman, Senator Fischer, the situation in Syria
along with that in Yemen, Mali, Libya, and elsewhere, serves as
a stark reminder that, as Secretary Hagel said last week in his
speech at the National Defense University, ``The world remains
combustible and complex.'' That's why, especially in these
fiscally challenging times, we will continue to rely upon the
leadership of this subcommittee and the full committee and
Congress as a whole in supporting the Department and our men
and women in uniform to defend our interests.
Thank you again and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan and Mr.
Chollet follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael A. Sheehan
and Hon. Derek H. Chollet
Madam Chairman, Senator Fischer, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to speak about how we, at
the Department of Defense, are addressing today's emerging
counterterrorism threats.
While the past decade has been marked by two major wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we have not lost sight of the more pervasive and immediate
threat of terrorism, especially from al Qaeda and its affiliate
networks. To combat this widespread and evolving threat, we have
engaged with willing nations around the world, building their
capabilities and strengthening our partnerships with them. We have also
leveraged a whole-of-government approach, characterized by diplomatic,
economic, intelligence, law enforcement, informational, financial, and
military instruments. In doing so, and with support from many of you in
this room today, we have protected the American people.
In January 2012, the President and the Secretary of Defense
released new defense strategic guidance, which emphasized the need to
rebalance towards Asia/Pacific, while retaining our focus on
counterterrorism and irregular warfare capabilities. Specifically, it
stated that ``our [CT] efforts will become more widely distributed and
will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force
assistance,'' and that we will ``continue to build and sustain tailored
capabilities appropriate for [CT] and irregular warfare.''
Today we wish to expand upon our defense strategy and discuss how--
in the context of the dynamic threat posed by al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups--our CT efforts are progressing. We will also speak to
the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the context of this
new defense strategy.
Only 1 year into the strategy, we are already witnessing its
impact, particularly in Somalia and Yemen. For example, in Yemen we've
taken key leaders off the battlefield and Yemeni security forces have
pushed them out of safe havens in the South. We are not about to claim
victory; however, we have made significant progress in achieving our
objectives and greatly diminishing the al Qaeda network's ability to
recruit, train and launch effective attacks in the 12 years since
September 11.
We'd like to talk first about the persistent and evolving threat
from al Qaeda and its affiliates.
the threat
Al Qaeda is significantly diminished in some theaters but still a
persistent threat. Core al Qaeda's leaders are still based in the
mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As we wind down
U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, we cannot lose focus on this
area. But al Qaeda and its affiliates are also evolving to exploit
opportunities and fragile environments in Africa and the Middle East
brought on by the unrest there over the last several years.
Outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Yemen has been a safe
haven for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen remains a
place where terrorists aspire to attack the United States and our
allies, and AQAP is bent on using violence to disrupt the ongoing
political transition there.
In the Horn of Africa, al Qaeda commenced its global terrorist
campaigns with attacks against U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam in 1998. Today East Africa-based al Qaeda associates are closely
intertwined with al-Shabaab, which itself aspires to establish a
Taliban-like Islamic State and launch regional and transnational
terrorist attacks. Most of the key East Africa-based al Qaeda and al-
Shabaab leaders have been removed from the battlefield. Despite the
incredible progress in Somalia over the past few years, including the
establishment of the first elected government in decades, some remnants
of al Qaeda remain and are seeking to regroup.
Meanwhile, outside of their traditional strongholds, al Qaeda and
other extremist organizations are adapting and regenerating in
ungoverned or poorly governed spaces, carving out new sanctuaries, and
threatening our overseas interests and those of our regional partners.
In particular, they are taking advantage of the instability and turmoil
resulting from the Arab Awakening, in places like Syria and Libya. We
saw the dangers manifest through this combination of extremism and weak
governance at our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, where we lost an
Ambassador and three other Americans; in Algeria, during the attack by
a Mali-based terrorist group on the British Petroleum facility at In
Amenas; in Nigeria, where al Qaeda affiliates have kidnapped and
executed western hostages and bombed the U.N. Headquarters in Abuja;
and in northern Mali, where al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies were expanding their control over some
population centers until the French and regional partner forces--many
of them trained and supported by the United States--intervened to
counter the terrorists and reverse their momentum.
In North and West Africa, AQIM is exploiting volatility in the
region and a lack of state control over significant swaths of territory
to establish new operating environments. Weapons from Libya and money
from kidnappings and illicit trafficking are enabling al Qaeda activity
that stretches from the Mediterranean to Mali and down to Nigeria. We
rely on an indirect approach in the region, building the capacity of
partner states to counter shared threats. Limited government capacity
and frequent political instability--such as coups d'etats--pose
challenges to our efforts. But such challenges make a regional approach
even more critical and are why we are working with a wide range of
partners, including the United Nations and regional security
organizations, to counter these threats.
In Syria, during an almost 2-year-long violent uprising to depose
President Assad, al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) network in Syria--operating
under the moniker al-Nusrah Front--has sought to portray itself as part
of the legitimate Syrian opposition. Al-Nusrah Front is, in fact, an
attempt by AQI to hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own
malign purposes--attempting to establish an al Qaeda-governed state in
the region.
The threat is also metastasizing. New groups, many with links to al
Qaeda, are beginning to develop, such as Ahrar al Sham in Syria,
Muhammad Jamal Group in Egypt, Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia,
Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa in Mali, as well as Boko Haram in
Nigeria. Although many of their operatives are focused on local targets
and goals, many of these organizations have external operations agendas
and can be expected to turn to international targeting if left
unopposed. In some cases, as groups become entrenched, they begin to
establish more sophisticated training camps. Although these camps do
not match the scale witnessed in pre-September 11 Afghanistan, they are
specialized, mobile, and attractive to new recruits. Some of these
camps provide advanced explosive training and tradecraft, radicalize
personnel, and are a means to provide funding and weapons, which when
combined, enables them to become a strategic threat. It is also
critical to enable effective local capacity before the threats grow too
large for local security forces to manage.
We have learned from experiences in Libya and Algeria that these
groups will take advantage of U.S. engagement and interests in fragile
and conflict-affected areas to target our citizens. These opportunistic
attacks can be challenging to predict and costly when executed. As we
saw in the case of Algeria, these groups could target industrial or
humanitarian compounds and threaten U.S. personnel and interests. This
has reinforced our need to strengthen our relationships with regional
partners to advance our common security objectives.
Development of persistent relationships with capable units in host
nations is critical so that we can ensure agile and capable responses
to a range of contingencies. SOF and other forces focused on security
force assistance are skilled at taking country-specific approaches and
seeking opportunities to establish critical operational and
intelligence relationships needed to: (1) maintain constant pressure on
al Qaeda-affiliated groups; and (2) ultimately defeat them. As we
examine indicators and trends shaping our future security environment,
regional specialization and the ability to operate independently in
austere and denied areas will enable enhanced security for U.S.
overseas personnel, facilities, and interests.
elements of a counterterrorism strategy
We cannot allow al Qaeda to benefit from sanctuary with impunity,
as they did in Afghanistan during the 1990s. To attack al Qaeda and
diminish its influence, we must continue to employ a unique range of
tools and activities. Along those lines and as mentioned earlier, the
New Defense Strategy describes the requirement for a mix of direct
action and security force assistance.
direct action
The high-profile success stories of the last decade have often
resulted from direct action precision strikes and raids, which have
disrupted some attack plans and degraded elements of al Qaeda. But we
cannot rely solely on precision strikes to defeat enemy networks and
foster stability--these operations buy us time but do not provide a
lasting solution. Ultimately, the decisive battle to defeat these
groups must be fought--and won--``by, with, and through'' host nation
efforts.
We must now transition to a period with partners in the lead but we
will always reserve the right to defend ourselves. For this reason, we
must retain high end capabilities to deploy and strike swiftly and
precisely anywhere in the world.
security force assistance
The effort to build the capabilities of partner nations' special
operations forces can serve two purposes: (1) to deny space and
sanctuary and (2) to develop partner capability to conduct specialized
missions, including direct action against key terrorist group leaders
but also elite capabilities to respond to a range of contingencies and
threats as they emerge.
Helping our foreign partners to provide for their own security and
contribute to regional stability is an investment that pays immediate
and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S.
interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S.
interests. These activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our
national security posture by building lasting relationships and
alliances with partner nations. Efforts to build partners' capacity to
conduct their own operations against terrorist threats are a
fundamental aspect of our strategy. Capable partners mitigate the
burden on U.S. forces and serve as the basis for future cooperation,
improved U.S. access, and combined operations.
Security Force Assistance is often conducted by our special
operations forces, whose history and proficiency at working ``by, with,
and through'' partner forces makes them our provider of choice for this
mission. SOF operate through persistent engagement in key countries,
which generates ``operational context.'' Operational context is the
thorough understanding and, in fact, expertise that is uniquely gained
through multiple visits to the same areas. This includes understanding
local culture, society, language, economy, history and politics. In
short, SOF operators have valuable insights on the physical and human
terrain of their areas, which allow them to be more precise and
therefore successful in their enabling activities.
Beyond Afghanistan, SOF have been deployed to dozens of countries
across the globe, conducting low-visibility, highly-sensitive missions
that are putting pressure on and constraining the ability of the al
Qaeda network to plan, train, and prepare for terrorist attacks.
There is nothing new about this mission, for the United States or
for our SOF. Prior to September 11, U.S. SOF were working around the
world to train, equip, advise, and assist host nation forces to combat
threats to security and U.S. interests.
For example, in Colombia, U.S. Army Special Forces trained and
assisted host-nation forces to combat the drug smuggling and violence
instigated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The successful rescue of
three U.S. hostages in 2009 marked the culmination of 2 decades of
persistent SOF efforts to build Colombian SOF capabilities. Now, we are
encouraged to see that Colombia is in turn providing justice sector and
security force assistance of their own to other U.S. partner nations
across the Americas and in Africa.
More recently, SOF have played a key role in places like the
Philippines, where their decade-long engagement has yielded more
capable partner forces that have made significant progress countering
terrorism. The ongoing relationship between SOF and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) strengthened when SOF deployed in 2002 to act in
a non-combat role to advise and assist the AFP in operations against
the Abu Sayyaf Group, a terrorist entity taking advantage of safe
havens in the southern Philippines. The units first engaged with local
residents to learn their basic needs. This allowed U.S. SOF to then
work with the AFP to address grievances in the community, severing
their ties with the terrorist groups. As SOF trained and advised the
AFP personnel, they helped coordinate security efforts and
interagency--sometimes international--programs to address key issues
such as water, medical care, transportation, and education.
Currently, our CT cooperation with the Yemenis has placed
unprecedented pressure on AQAP, and we continue to support the
development of Yemeni capacity to conduct intelligence-driven CT
operations in a manner that respects human rights and makes every
effort to avoid civilian casualties.
In North and West Africa, we are providing support to the French in
their efforts to degrade the capacity of AQIM. We have moved assets and
provided intelligence to enable the French to effectively prevent AQIM,
its off-shoots, and allied insurgents from advancing farther south into
Mali. These efforts illustrate that partners in the lead can include
key allies, like France, as well as host nations such as Niger and
Chad.
In Somalia, the United States works through the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). We have provided advising and assistance
to AMISOM which has reduced al Shabaab's freedom of movement in south
and central Somalia.
In order to conduct these security force assistance activities, SOF
must leverage a wide variety of authorities available to the geographic
combatant commands (GCCs). While many of these authorities contain
valuable elements that enable our SOF to build capacities in key areas,
we still face a pervasive management challenge matching various
authorities and timelines in order to accomplish key missions can be
burdensome even when individual programs are executed efficiently.
Further, no authority exists that is specifically tailored to allow our
SOF to rapidly engage where necessary in order to build critical SOF
capabilities during windows of opportunity that might be fleeting.
current special operations efforts
Since September 11, a key mission of SOF and U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) has focused on combating terrorism around
the world, and that CT fight will not abate anytime soon. SOF will
continue to work actively to deter, disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda and its associated forces and affiliates.
Section 1208, a valuable authority that allows us to enable and
leverage willing partners to support SOF operations to combat
terrorism, has produced significant and tangible operational effects
that greatly impact our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. In today's
amorphous global threat environment, it is more important than ever
that the GCCs have this critical tool to rely on the access and
placement that our forces cannot attain unilaterally.
The need for persistent engagement around the globe and growth of
mission requirements have resulted in an unprecedented growth in
Special Operations Forces--in fact, the largest expansion of SOF
personnel, force structure, budget and enablers since Vietnam.
This expansion will help support Admiral McRaven's vision of a
global SOF network. This informal, global network of international
Special Operations Forces will allow us to rapidly and persistently
address regional contingencies and threats to our stability. This type
of persistent engagement will develop trust, a common operating
picture, and future cooperation operations against mutual threats. To
develop this concept, we are excited to see the development and success
of the supporting Theatre Special Operations Commands. These commands
are present at each geographic combatant command and help manage the
SOF elements in that area of responsibility. As we expand these Theater
Special Operations Commands (TSOC), we hope to better integrate SOF
efforts across the areas of responsibility to ensure plans and strategy
development as well as their expertise are available to the geographic
combatant command I'd like to emphasize that our successes have come at
a cost. The continuous deployments over the past decade have placed
extraordinary operational requirements on Special Operators. For
example, 85 percent of the force has been engaged as front-line
warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and since 2001, we should not forget
that more than 400 Special Operators have been killed and over 3,000
have been injured.
future of counterterrorism and sof
Relative to the aforementioned, new defense strategy, the
Department of Defense will take a strategic approach to security
cooperation and ensure we have comprehensive and integrated
capabilities in key regions in order to confront critical security
challenges.
Over the past decade, much of the strategic emphasis in security
cooperation has rightly focused on supporting current operations and
helping states address internal instability. As we draw down from a
decade of large-scale conflict, we will place additional strategic
emphasis on preparing our network of allies and partners to confront
the evolving threat of al Qaeda and its affiliates.
To do this, we require security cooperation tools that are
calibrated to optimally prepare the United States optimally to exploit
emerging opportunities and counter potential threats- this means
lowering the barriers to defense cooperation and being prepared to
leverage opportunities rapidly with like-minded partners. To better
combat al Qaeda, Congress has granted temporary authorities to the
Department of Defense. Tools such as the section 1206 Global Train and
Equip Program--an indispensable and proven authority; section 1203
Support to Yemen and East Africa; section 1208 Support of Military
Operations by U.S. SOF to Combat Terrorism Program; and the Combating
Terrorism Fellowship Program are indispensable to maintain constant
pressure on al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide. We will also
continue to work closely with the State Department and other
departments and agencies to ensure that the Department of Defense's
efforts are agile in responding to partners' needs while being
implemented with effective oversight in a manner that reinforces
overarching U.S. foreign policy goals.
As we evolve to respond to the new set of demands, we cannot afford
to lose sight of what makes our force truly great--the SOF Operator.
Here we must stick to our principles--namely the first SOF truth--that
``Humans are more important than hardware.'' There are two key
attributes of the future SOF operator that will need to be sharpened:
(1) regional specialization; and (2) the ability to operate
independently in austere environments. Our best hedge against an
uncertain future is a well-educated and highly trained special
operator.
SOF were designed to conduct operations in hostile, denied or
politically sensitive areas to achieve national objectives by
unconventional means. Executing the new strategy will demand the same
level of regional acumen that SOF has always pursued. To meet combatant
commander requirements for foreign internal defense, security sector
assistance and unconventional warfare, SOF will need to continue
sharpening their proficiency in language and regional expertise so they
are conversant with the cultural and military history of regions where
they will be deploying.
Probably the single greatest thing we could do to prepare our SOF
for the expanded mission set of the future operating environment is to
manage SOF talent properly and in a way that incentivizes the
``indirect action'' career path for the SOF operator. There is a range
of ways through which to accomplish this goal. A critical component of
our effort to implement the new strategy will be working with SOCOM to
develop appropriate Force Management practices to develop the SOF cadre
needed in the future.
Equally important is our need to care for the SOF operator. This
includes providing tailored services for post-deployment that consider
the unique stresses a career in SOF places on one's family. Admiral
McRaven has taken strong steps towards these objectives, and we fully
support his initiatives.
conclusion
We are confident that SOF will provide our national policy leaders
a steady and established option to engage--consistent with our national
and defense strategies--with a low footprint and a focus on enabling
our partners.
Supporting and relying on these partner nation forces come with
risk. We wish to close by discussing the difficult trade-offs that we,
as policymakers, will face in the next decade.
The most evident risk is to the safety of our personnel. SOF are
operating in dangerous locations against ruthless enemies where death
or injury are real possibilities. We also risk being drawn into broader
fights beyond our narrow CT objectives. We note: It is often difficult
to draw the line between our CT objectives and regional, ethnic or
sectarian fights wherein we have limited or no interest in becoming
involved. There is always the risk of the proverbial ``slippery
slope''--a gradual increasing of U.S. commitment that outpaces our
national interest. There is no easy answer and no easy formula for
deciding where and at what level to engage. There are sometimes risks
to not doing enough to support a fledgling state, confronted by robust
international terrorist groups with access to external financing,
weapons and fighters. We risk allowing terrorist threats to fester and
grow until they directly threaten us.
We also risk association with poorly trained and undisciplined
partners. Some have weak legal systems and demonstrate a poor history
of respect for the rule of law. AThese partners may make mistakes--or
operate in ways that we would not fully approve--which may tarnish our
image, challenge our value sets, and--in some cases--force us to
disengage. But these are the areas in which our SOF are required to
work--not in countries with strong and mature defense establishments.
Our challenge is two-fold: (1) to provide the capabilities to meet
military challenges; and (2) to do so in a way that respects the rule
of law and legitimate governments. Our SOF can and will pursue U.S.
national interests in a collaborative way with key partners, helping to
counter the evolving al Qaeda threat.
The Department of Defense is committed to working to build our SOF
to be the best, most effective force we have and to countering emerging
threats to the United States and its interests. As the United States
faces an ever-more dynamic security environment and adaptive threats,
such as global terrorism, we must develop and support our SOF community
so that our next decade is even more effective than the last.
Madam Chairman, Senator Fischer, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you and testify on
the Department's perspective on emerging counterterrorism threats. This
concludes our statement.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral McRaven. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer,
distinguished members of the committee: I appreciate the
opportunity to come before you today and talk about the
magnificent work being accomplished around the globe by the men
and women of SOCOM. I have submitted a formal statement and ask
that it be included in the record.
Madam Chairman, this is my first opportunity to address
this committee since I took command in the summer of 2011.
Since that time, I'm proud to say that we have continued the
great work initiated by my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson. At
the same time, we have adapted to the changing strategic and
fiscal environment to keep SOF relevant now and in the future.
In Afghanistan, we established a new SOF command structure
which brought the various NATO and SOF elements into alignment
under a two-star headquarters. This has allowed us to have a
common view of the enemy and synchronize our SOF to achieve a
common end state. This change has made SOF even more effective
than ever before. Partnered with our Afghan SOF, we have
continued to attrite the enemy leadership while at the same
time building and training Afghan security forces so that they
can stand on their own against this determined threat.
Globally, SOF is in approximately 78 countries around the
world helping to build partner capacity so that the host
nations can deal with their own security problems. I recently
returned from Colombia and the Philippines, where our long-term
investment with their SOF has dramatically helped change the
security situation in those countries. I believe that these
efforts, that is building allied SOF capacity and capability,
represent the best approach to dealing with some of the world's
more complex security problems.
In support of the Secretary's defense strategic guidance,
SOCOM is working to strengthen these international partnerships
and to build lasting networks both formally and informally so
that we or our allies can create a secure environment in
unstable areas and, if necessary, react to emerging crises
rapidly and effectively.
In all cases, those SOF deployed to foreign lands are
working for the geographic combatant commander, with the
approval of the chief of mission, and always in support of U.S.
policy goals.
Finally, I have made caring for our force and their
families my top priority. In the past year my command sergeant
major and I have met with soldiers and their families from
around the SOCOM enterprise. We have listened to their concerns
and, with the support of the services, we are aggressively
implementing programs and plans to help with the physical,
mental, and spiritual wellbeing of the force. We have a
professional and moral obligation to take care of our warriors
and their families and we greatly appreciate the support of
your committee and other members on the Hill in our efforts to
take care of these men and women.
Thank you again for your commitment to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines and civilians of DOD, and
specifically to those great warriors who make up SOCOM. I look
forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM William H. McRaven, USN
Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, thank you for this opportunity to address this
subcommittee as the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM).
SOCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, yet it is distinct
in that it exercises numerous Service, military department, and defense
agency-like responsibilities. Under title 10 U.S.C., sections 164 and
167, it is my legal responsibility to organize, train, and equip my
force; to build a strategy that supports the goals and objectives of
the Defense Strategic Guidance; and to provide combat ready forces to
the President and the Secretary of Defense to meet the challenges of
today's security environment.
soccom strategy--sof 2020
In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued his Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Chairman followed with his Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The DSG describes the Joint Force
of the future as ``agile, flexible, ready'' and possessing global
reach, thereby directing ``the joint force to capitalize on networks
and interdependency to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and
evolving war.'' Building on this imperative, the CCJO envisions a
``globally postured Joint Force . . . that quickly combine[s]
capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons,
geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.'' Special
Operations Forces are uniquely suited to implement the guidance
outlined in these documents. Specifically, SOF are ``rapidly deployable
. . . have operational reach . . . [are] persistent . . . and do not
constitute an irreversible policy commitment.'' General Dempsey
concluded his Capstone Document with the statement that military
success in today's environment is ``about building a stronger network
to defeat the networks that confront us.''
We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly
networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around
the world. These networks are diversifying their activities, resulting
in the convergence of threats that were once linear. In today's
environment, this convergence can have explosive and destabilizing
effects--there is no such thing as a local problem. In the words of
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ``Extremist networks
squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a
cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu
virus in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and
globalization have made our countries and our communities
interdependent and interconnected. Today's threats have become so
complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever
hope to solve them alone.''
To address these problems, we must adopt a global perspective. With
SOF deployed in over 75 countries on a daily basis, I can provide a
global view of the problem and help link and synchronize global effects
across geographic boundaries. However, as the SOCOM Commander, with
some unique exceptions, I do not command and control any forces in
combat or crisis. I am a ``supporting commander'' to the geographic
combatant commanders and the Chiefs of Mission (COMs). It is my job to
provide them the best Special Operations Force in the world. It is
their job, to employ those forces in support of U.S. policy. Special
Operations Forces do nothing, absolutely nothing, without the approval
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the geographic combatant
commanders and the Chiefs of Mission--nothing. To best serve the
interest of the GCCs and the Chiefs of Mission, SOCOM is developing a
plan to enhance its already global force by networking with our U.S.
interagency counterparts, and our foreign allies and partners around
the globe. We aim to provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with improved
special operations capacity and are aligning structures, processes, and
authorities that enable the network.
the global sof network
Given strategic guidance, increasing fiscal constraints, and the
networked and dispersed nature of conflict, SOF will play an
increasingly critical role in the Joint Force of the future. Although
SOF usually only garner attention for high-stakes raids and rescues,
direct action missions are only a small part of what we do, albeit a
very important part. SOCOM will continue to ensure our Nation has the
best precision strike force in the world. We will not let up on that
front. However, I'd like to emphasize that, in fact, on any given day
SOF are working with our allies around the world, helping build
indigenous special operations capacity so that our partners can
effectively deal with the threat of violent extremist groups,
insurgents, and narco-terrorists--themselves. Indeed, SOF focuses
intently on building partner capacity and security force assistance so
that local and regional threats do not become global and thus more
costly--both in blood and treasure.
Accordingly, with the support of the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission,
SOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our interagency
and international partners in order to gain expanded situational
awareness of emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables
small, persistent presence in critical locations, and facilitates
engagement where necessary or appropriate--all under the authority of
the GCC and COM.
Through civil-military support elements and support to public
diplomacy, SOF directly support interagency efforts to counter violent
extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al Qaeda
and other terrorists exploit. These efforts to prevent terrorist
radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are critical to defeating
this dangerous ideology in the future; neither we nor our partners can
kill our way to victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity
and perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the
potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the
governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the long-
run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American
lives, and reduce the need for expensive response to terrorist attacks.
To this end, using already programmed force structure, SOCOM is
methodically enhancing the capabilities of the Theater Special
Operations Commands (TSOCs) based on a multi-year deliberate process
supported by detailed analysis and war gaming. The goal is to increase
the capacity and capabilities of the TSOC and their assigned forces to
the GCCs to conduct full spectrum special operations--ranging from
building partner capacity (particularly in austere, high-risk or
sensitive environments) to irregular warfare and counterterrorism.
In partnership with the GCCs, COM, TSOCs, other U.S. Government
agencies and partner nations, SOCOM is working to develop opportunities
to improve our partnership with regional Special Operations Forces.
This approach was very successful in NATO, with the establishment of
the NATO SOF Headquarters which allowed U.S. and partner nations to
share information, improve interoperability and, when necessary, work
together abroad. While the NATO construct is unique in the world, we
believe there are other low-key opportunities that may present
themselves in other regions of the world.
In addition to the SOF capacity inherent in all GCCs through the
TSOCs, SOCOM also employs Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs)
in key U.S. embassies around the world. SOLOs are in-country SOF
advisors to the U.S. Country Team. They advise and assist partner
nation SOF and help to synchronize activities with the host nation.
Currently, there are SOLOs in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom,
Jordan, Poland, Colombia, France, Turkey, Kenya, and Italy.
Similarly, as part of the global SOF network here at home, one- to
three-person Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) work with our
interagency partners in the National Capital Region (NCR). They
comprise the SOF liaison network that assists in synchronizing DOD
planning for training, exercises, and operations. Currently, we have
SOSTs working within 19 U.S. Government departments and agencies.
Given the importance of interagency collaboration, SOCOM is placing
greater emphasis on its presence in the NCR to better support
coordination and decision making with interagency partners. Thus, SOCOM
began to consolidate its presence in the NCR in early 2012. This is not
a duplication of effort. We are focused instead on consolidating SOCOM
elements in the Washington, DC, region under the leadership of the
SOCOM Vice Commander--who resides in Washington. Specifically, SOCOM-
NCR ensures that the perspectives and capabilities of interagency and
international mission partners are incorporated into all phases of SOF
planning efforts. The SOCOM NCR also conducts outreach to academia,
non-governmental organizations, industry and other private sector
organizations to get their perspective on complex issues affecting SOF.
At the SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, the staff will serve as the
focal point for coordinating information that supports SOCOM
warfighters. It is here that SOCOM will maintain the global perspective
on all SOF activities in support of the GCCs and U.S. Chiefs of
Mission. As such, SOCOM will support operations, intelligence,
logistics, planning, communications, and provide critical information
to enable forward deployed SOF to meet mission requirements. SOCOM will
monitor SOF supporting campaigns, ensure that the Command is satisfying
GCC theater requirements, maintain the global common operating picture
for the SOF network, and monitor the readiness and availability of all
U.S. SOF capabilities. The entire network will be enabled by the
existing communications infrastructure. However, communication and
information sharing must facilitate interconnectedness beyond the U.S.-
only realm, and improve partner-nation capacity, interagency
coordination, and stakeholder situational awareness by providing
information technology infrastructure and communications services to
unite U.S. and partner-nation SOF, plus other mission partners. This
communications infrastructure will leverage existing networks and
systems to avoid duplication of effort.
As a whole, the SOF network represents a way to improve the support
to the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission and to empower a global effort with
capable allies and partners. Recognizing that we have much to learn
from each other, working with partner SOF will build mutual trust,
foster enduring relationships, and provide new opportunities to affect
shared challenges.
To this end, the SECDEF's authority to support foreign forces,
irregular forces, and groups or individuals who support or facilitate
ongoing military operations to combat terrorism--namely section 1208 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005--remains critical to Special Operations.
The drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will not diminish the need for
1208 authority. In fact, GCCs' demand for 1208 authority has increased,
and the authority's utility is recognized as mission essential in
winning their current fight.
preserve the force and families
A SOF Universal Truth is that ``people are more important than
hardware.'' We recognize that none of the efforts described in
preceding paragraphs are possible without having the dedicated,
professional SOF warriors to bring them to fruition. Hence, it is
imperative that we do all that we can to preserve the force and care
for their families. Therefore, to lessen the strain, we are seeking
improvements in the predictability of SOF schedules--training,
education, deployment, and rest.
SOCOM must ensure our SOF warriors and their families are properly
cared for and that we work to help them reduce the stress they face
related to high operational tempos. Difficulty also occurs as forces
reconnect and reintegrate into garrison and family activities. DOD
provides preventive and responsive counseling, medical, psychological,
and rehabilitative care to institutionalize the resiliency of our SOF
warriors and their families.
Everyone in the fight has been significantly changed by their
experiences. Providing the treatment our troops need and reducing the
stigma associated with asking for help is a top priority for all SOCOM
leaders. For our servicemembers and their families, we are implementing
programs identified as best practices and aggressively
institutionalizing education for our Chaplains and Mental Health
professionals to emphasize prevention-oriented care. Through human
performance improvement, readiness, and spiritual growth, we hope to
preserve our forces for the duration of their careers. Recognizing that
the readiness of many of our servicemembers is inextricably tied to the
well-being and happiness of their families, we have sought to bolster
the care afforded to them. Additionally, to increase the predictability
of servicemembers' time, SOCOM will redouble our efforts to reach out
to families by opening up communication channels at all levels of the
command through innovative use of varied media. We are committed to
sustaining our force and families and will not break faith with our SOF
family.
Maximizing SOF readiness also requires an enhanced capacity to
anticipate and proactively preserve and manage the future force. I am
implementing an enterprise-wide PERSTEMPO capability that will provide
commanders increased visibility, fidelity, and ability to manage SOF
readiness down to the individual servicemember level. Once fully
implemented throughout the command by fiscal year 2014, SOF commanders
from the O-5 level and above will have a near real-time common
operating picture of SOF readiness. This new capability further
enhances commanders' force management decision making, improves the
quality of life for the SOF force, and offers promise for maximizing
force readiness through improved recruitment, retention, and protection
of investments in SOF personnel and the resources that enable them.
acquisition excellence
Mobility, lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and survivability remain critical SOF enablers for the full spectrum of
SOF operations. SOCOM's unique acquisition authorities remain critical
to meeting the rapid, information sensitive and operationally peculiar
demands of Special Operations. Specifically, SOCOM employs rapid and
tailored acquisition strategies to modify Service-common equipment,
enhance commercial items, or--when required--develop, procure and field
SOF-peculiar equipment and services to respond to global requirements.
SOCOM will continue its emphasis on equipping SOF operators as a
system. Development, procurement and fielding of the SOF individual
equipment system (i.e. individual protection, visual augmentation
systems, weapons and sights) needs to suit the wide variety of SOF
tasks and environments. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care system and
use of Freeze Dried Plasma will combine to help care for wounded
operators in remote and challenging environments, often at great
distance from primary care facilities.
To meet the wide range of SOF missions, SOCOM employs platforms
that are both versatile and agile. For example, current acquisition
efforts focus on equipping both manned and unmanned fixed wing assets
with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
suitable for diverse global requirements. The Non-Standard Aviation
fleet of aircraft supports SOF intra-theater mobility, Aviation Foreign
Internal Defense, and manned ISR. The SOF fleet of Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA)--ranging from the manportable RQ-20A Puma to the medium
altitude MQ-9 Reaper--provides essential ISR capabilities and cutting
edge sensor and communication technologies. SOCOM's ability to
efficiently modify service common ISR assets with capabilities such as
high definition (HD) full motion video (FMV) provides game-changing,
operational effects at relatively small investment. SOCOM is continuing
to execute programs to modernize its rotary wing and maritime mobility
fleets, replacing legacy equipment such as the MH-60 K/L, Mark V Naval
Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable boat, and SEAL Delivery Vehicle
in the coming years. On the ground, SOCOM will maintain a family of
special operations tactical combat vehicles with customizable, mission-
specific payloads. A nonstandard commercial vehicle capability enables
SOF operators to maintain a low profile among indigenous populations
while providing necessary mobility and protection.
Global SOF rely on the SOF Information Environment (SIE) to achieve
full operational potential. Within the SIE, SOCOM will continue to
incorporate a SOF Deployable Node (SDN), a family of Wide Band SATCOM
systems, and increased access to SIE voice, data and video services to
deployed headquarters and operational elements. Simultaneously, SOCOM
will continue its efforts to downsize system profiles and footprint
through engineering efficiencies of common and scalable components
amongst SDN variants, provide SIE access to tactical wireless users
through SDN, and focus current efforts on providing SIE access to
maritime and ground mobility platforms.
SOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate continues to
pursue technology innovation, and utilizes a Special Operations
Advanced Technology collaborative process for SOF-centric, S&T
development. This process allows better synchronization of SOF-related
technology initiatives with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other
government agencies to leverage external capital opportunities that
address SOF capability gaps. S&T's near-term technology development
efforts are focused on providing SOF operators with all-digital, multi-
spectral visual augmentation systems and advanced novel materials to
improve protection and survivability for personnel and platforms.
responsible resourcing and service support
Despite an increase in operational commitments over the last
decade, we have been able to sustain our obligation to appropriately
organize, train, and equip the warriors from whom we ask so much. We
are aware of current budget uncertainties, and are therefore committed
to only prudent use of resources provided to us by the taxpayers. I am
committed to exercising common-sense steps to cost-cutting and cost-
avoidance. The Command has begun to restructure and realign resources
to support the SOF 2020 vision which reflects the Nation's strategic
priorities. Currently, we are able to execute the vision I have
outlined in this document without any increase in either civilian or
military manpower outside of current programmed growth or additional
funding. I will continue to manage cost-growth in acquisition programs,
and implement requirements of the combatant commanders, Executive order
mandates, and DOD auditability guidance.
SOCOM has successfully used the Rapid Acquisition Authority to
source a validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities. SOCOM will
rely more heavily on this authority within the future fiscal
environment.
The Command's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its materiel
and service programs is essential to deliver and field critical
requirements and new technologies. SOCOM's capacity to maintain a
competitive advantage on the battlefield depends on out-thinking and
outpacing the enemy in speed, technology, equipment, and
maneuverability. SOF capabilities are directly related to investments
we make through our procurement budget.
SOCOM, like the Services, has seen an extraordinary increase in
operational tempo. Through advanced technologies, the battlefield has
become smaller, highlighting a need for continued interoperability
among the Services and SOF. SOF's reliance on the Services for
institutional training, installation services and support--particularly
in forward deployed locations where SOF can only sustain itself for
short periods of time--remains critical. The Services' support for
SOF's global persistent presence and annual deployments to over 100
countries is both vital and very much appreciated.
conclusion
Budget uncertainties which face the DOD and SOCOM are of great
concern in fiscal year 2013. The SOF network, as a vital tool to
support the President and the Secretary of Defense's national defense
strategy, seeks a strong and flexible global network of SOF, U.S.
Government partners, and partner nations. We are working tirelessly to
provide SOF capabilities and capacity to GCCs and Chiefs of Mission;
capabilities and capacities that are supported by the required
structures, processes, and authorities necessary for success. In the
immediate future, and as stated by Chairman Dempsey, the ``Joint Force
2020 must protect . . . against threats that routinely span regional
boundaries.'' Notably, as presented by former Secretary Clinton at the
International Special Operations Forces Week in May of last year,
``Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic of smart power--fast
and flexible, constantly adapting, learning new languages and cultures,
dedicated to forming partnerships where we can work together.'' Your
support will ensure SOCOM's continued ability to successfully address
the most challenging security demands of our Nation.
Senator Hagan. I want to thank all three witnesses for your
service to our country. So I thank you very much.
Admiral McRaven, I'm very pleased to hear about the
attention being paid to the families, especially from a
physical, mental, and obviously spiritual. I think that's key
to have our SOF working like they do. Obviously, the families
are very important.
What I'd like to do is have a round of 8-minute questions
and then we can--I would like to go to the closed session
around 3:20 p.m. if we can.
I want to ask a question to the panel on Syria. A common
refrain of administration officials testifying before Congress
is that our intelligence community does not know enough about
the Syrian opposition to make sound decisions about which, if
any, elements the United States should support. However, in
recent weeks reports have emerged that there are some elements
in the southern region of the country that are moderate in
their views and in their intentions. So if the three of you
could address: Do you agree that the United States should
provide additional support to elements in Syria that share our
views and interests? What is the relationship between the Al-
Nusra Front, a Sunni extremist group in Syria, and the al Qaeda
in Iraq, and do these groups provide support to each other?
Then to what extent is there a risk that the violence in Syria
will spill across the border into western Iraq and strengthen
al Qaeda in Iraq? Secretary Sheehan, if you could start.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you. Actually, Senator, I think I'll
defer to start to Assistant Secretary Chollet, who's our lead
on this issue.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Mr. Sheehan. I'll take a first crack. Senator, it's an
excellent question. In terms of a picture of the opposition,
and we can get into some of this in more detail perhaps in the
closed session in terms of the intel picture, but as you
suggest in your question, it is a mosaic, the opposition. There
are, depending on who you ask and on what day, there are at
least 10s, if not over 100, different pockets of the
opposition.
We are working closely with the opposition. It's an effort
that our State Department colleagues have been in the lead on
with the Syrian Opposition Council and the Syrian Military
Committee. As Secretary Kerry announced several weeks ago, we
are in the process of providing them more support. We've
provided them a significant amount of support thus far, over
$100 million, and we're in the process of fulfilling that
commitment. It's mainly been on the political side, on the
civilian side, in training civilians and helping them get
better governance capacity, in helping their communications
abilities.
But the decision that was announced several weeks ago was
that we would provide nonlethal assistance to the armed
opposition and we're in the process of implementing that
commitment. That's mainly in the form of medical supplies and
food assistance right now.
But every day we learn more about the opposition. I believe
today or tomorrow in London Secretary Kerry will be meeting
with members of the opposition at a G-8 Ministerial meeting,
but on the margins of that he'll be meeting with them. So we
every day learn more, and we not only do it in our own
contacts, but working with our close partners in Jordan and
Turkey in particular, who have a lot of contacts with the
Syrian opposition.
So I think that there are folks we can work with. We're
very concerned about Al-Nusra, as you mentioned. They clearly
do not wish us well, and what we have seen is that, although
they have been in some cases effective on the battlefield, they
are also losing the hearts and minds of many of the Syrian
people as they seek to impose their rather rigid ideological
views on the Syrian people. So we believe that there is an
opportunity, with our support and the rest of the international
community's support to the opposition that we are working with,
to build up the opposition that we want to see achieve a Syria
that is inclusive, that is tolerant, and that allows the Syrian
people to meet their aspirations.
I'll just comment briefly on the spillover because you
asked about spillover. It's something that we are keenly
focused on, primarily mainly with our partners in Jordan and
Turkey because of the significant refugee problems that both
countries face. In Jordan there is up to 500,000 refugees. It's
about 10 percent of the Jordanian population right now. So we
work very closely with those countries to help alleviate their
immediate refugee concerns, but also work with them as they're
thinking through what steps would be necessary to ensure their
stability when the situation gets worse on the ground.
Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven.
Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, I'm not sure there's much I can add
to that in this forum. I'm certainly--I'd be more than happy to
talk to you in a little bit more detail in the closed session
on what we're doing.
Mr. Sheehan. The same thing, Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. I've also heard that the refugees in Jordan
are up at 600,000 and they're talking about before the end of
the summer perhaps going to a million, 1.2 million. I don't
know what those numbers are, but they certainly seem to be
aggressive, individuals moving quickly into Jordan. Obviously,
looking at the size of Jordan, the complications that come with
that, too.
Secretary Sheehan, I know you spoke about the situation in
Mali. What I'd like to know too is what is your assessment of
the French operation, and then the strength of AQIM, and
whether the U.S. support to the operation will continue, the
status and capability of the forces that are deploying to the
region?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. Actually, Secretary Chollet, too.
Mr. Sheehan. I think the French operation was absolutely
excellent. They moved very quickly to the region on January 11
when the AQIM moved south of the Niger River and quickly
started descending upon the capital in Bamako, which caught
pretty much everybody by surprise, perhaps even AQIM itself. I
don't think they expected to go that far that quickly.
The French reacted very fast. They got forces in there very
quickly and very rapidly pushed AQIM back across the Niger
River and took control of the major cities, Timbuktu, Gao, and
Kidal and others up north, pushing AQIM back up into the
desert, up into the mountainous area bordering on Algeria, and
some others may have squirted into the eastern and western
countries. But mainly they're still hanging out in remote parts
of Mali.
So the French were very successful. Now they're shifting
their focus to tracking down these individuals and trying to
eliminate them from the battlefield. So I think it's been a
very good operation. They understand as well as we understand
that much of al Qaeda's leadership has escaped. They have not
been killed or captured. But they have disrupted this very
threatening sanctuary that they had established between mid-
summer last year and January of this year. That was something
that could not stand and we're very grateful for the French
taking the lead to doing that.
Senator Hagan. Let me ask you one question on that, too.
What in your view is the impact of the restrictions, statutory
and policy restrictions, that prohibit the United States from
engaging the armed forces of Mali?
Mr. Sheehan. I think right now, Madam Chairman, that right
now we don't need the Malian army per se. The French are
working with the Malian army in the north, helping them to take
on their security responsibilities, and it's a very weak army,
notwithstanding all the aid that we provided them over the last
5 years or so. It's an organization, because of the coup and
because of Captain Sanogo and his thugs that are still hanging
around the margins of this army, it remains to be seen how it
will evolve and develop into a professional force.
The EU has taken on the mission of retraining and
reprofessionalizing them. We have policy restrictions against
that, and I think the EU is starting to move in that direction
and we'll see over time how well the Malian army is able to
coalesce and get its act together. It remains very much to be
seen.
In the short term, the next answer after the French will be
a U.N.-authorized mission coming out of the African-led
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission which really
hasn't been really up to the task. With U.N. blue-hatted
mission being contemplated in the Security Council now, that
type of force should be able to take back those cities and
allow the French to focus its force in the future on the high-
value targets.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I tell you, I'm going to move to Senator Fischer for her
questions. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I have a question for all three of you gentlemen. Some
observers have criticized the United States because they think
we are in too many places. When we're looking at defense budget
cuts, with sequestration, and with the economy in the shape
it's in, how do you go about answering those charges that the
United States may be spread too thin? How would you prioritize
where we need to be?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, thank you. I'm not sure I
think we are spread too thin. Right now, on any day of the year
you will find SOF in somewhere between 70 and 90 countries
around the world. Some of these are onesies and twosies and
some of them are 100 or thousands, as is the case of
Afghanistan.
I think we have to define and really decide early on what
we think our U.S. policy is vis a vis building partner capacity
in our relationships with other nations. We, SOCOM, provide a
very cost-effective, small footprint, culturally sensitive,
language-trained force that can work with a number of these
nations to build their capacity to deal with their own
problems. I think this is really the thrust, as Secretary
Sheehan mentioned early on, the thrust of what we in the SOF
community provide, is an ability to help other nations deal
with their own problems before we have to surge additional
forces in to help them, to help them out.
So I guess it depends on where our U.S. interests lie and
that really--in my case, I defer to the policymakers on that.
Senator Fischer. I guess I would ask you about those tools.
Before you gentlemen comment, if I could ask you, Admiral,
about the tools that the Secretary mentioned. 1206, it's, I've
been told, a slow plan approval process, and so it's difficult
to have implementation happen quickly. Is that an issue when
trying to work with our partners and you're looking at 2 years
down the road to get a plan implemented?
Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, I won't talk specifically to 1206,
but I will tell you that we have a large number of authorities.
In order for us to really build a long-term plan and have a
long-term engagement with any nation, invariably we have to
piecemeal these authorities together.
So whether it's 1206 or 1208 or the JSET authorities or the
GSCF, all of these as we try to look out and say, if you want
to build a professional military over the next 5 years, how do
you develop a plan to do that, well, the only way we can
develop a plan right now is on a year-by-year basis. There are
some limitations in the authorities we have, and as you
mentioned in some cases there are delays in the process that
make some of that problematic.
Again, I wouldn't focus just on 1206. I think we can
improve the process on all of our authorities to make us more
agile in dealing with other countries.
Senator Fischer. Do our troops have enough time to rest?
Admiral McRaven. I think they do now, and certainly they
will more so as we----
Senator Fischer. What's their deployment schedule? Can you
speak to that?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, I can. It depends on their
military operational specialty, their MOS, as we refer to it.
In some cases you have these very high demand, low density
MOSs, so folks that are in kind of high demand at every
location, but we don't have a whole lot of them. So in those
cases you see some of those folks that are almost on back to
back rotations. In a lot of cases it is they're forward for a
period of time and they're back for .8. So we say one to .8,
which is really unacceptable, and we work hard to try and
mitigate that as best we can.
Where we're driving to is to make sure that we can get to a
one to two or, better yet, a one to three rotation, so that the
folks back home have time to spend with their families. It gets
back to preserving the force and the families to make sure that
they are resilient and that we can improve their physical
health, their mental health, and their spiritual health, not
necessarily religious but broader spiritual health, so that
they are energized when they go back downrange.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral.
Would you two gentlemen like to address the prioritization
process and also how you view using these tools, whether it's
1206, 1207, or 1208?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator Fischer, I would like to talk
about 1206 and some of the others. First of all, I would like
to thank Congress for its wisdom to provide these authorities
post-September 11. 1206, 1207, 1208 did not exist prior to
September 11. Without those authorities--they're not perfect,
but without those authorities I don't think we would have had
the success we've had globally going against al Qaeda networks.
1206--if I look at security assistance on a spectrum, on
one end I'd put FMF, the Cold War, foreign military sales
programs to provide to a country F-16s, ships, big equipment.
It's the slowest. It's the most politically sensitive. It's
more of a political-military relationship and big items, very
slow.
On the other end in terms of speed and agility is section
1208, not a security assistance program, but a program where we
work at DOD--normally those plans are written up by Special
Operations staffs in the geographic combatant commands, go
rapidly through DOD, through the chief of mission for approval,
and through Washington much quicker. We can turn those around
very quickly.
In between is 1206 and then 1207 or GSCF. The faster it
is--when the State Department has the lead and both State and
DOD have to concur and coordinate, it just takes a lot longer
to do. When it's a DOD lead and the State Department only
coordinates on it, it goes quicker. That's really the bottom
line. It's just a matter of process. We're getting better. The
State Department works----
Senator Fischer. Does that process need to be changed then
in order for it to respond more quickly to the issues that are
out there?
Mr. Sheehan. I think it's a fair question, Senator. Part of
it is the State Department and DOD committed to each other to
make it work faster. However, I would opine in this committee
that I believe that our legislative proposal, 171, that's one
of Admiral McRaven's important proposals for a SOF network, and
other changes that we've made that provide more of a DOD lead
in this authority, would make things more rapid, yet preserve
the State Department's role in approving at the chief of
mission level and concurring at the Washington level on all of
these programs.
But I think that those type of adjustments to these
programs would enable us to have more rapid and effective
programs to do the type of partnership-building that we've
talked about on this panel.
Mr. Chollet. I'll just add in the brief time left that I
concur completely with what Secretary Sheehan said just on the
process issues. Just going back to kind of the core of your
question of are we stretched too thin and how we prioritize, I
think one of the reasons why the Secretary in the new defense
strategy has put a premium on building partner capacity also
working with others is that we can leverage the capabilities
that we uniquely have and better enable those to work with us
or in some cases carry the primary burden.
I think Mali is actually a pretty good example of that,
where the French have stepped up in a big way to take some
pretty serious action. We have supported them with refueling
and with logistics and with some intel support, but they are
carrying the lion's share of the burden.
Now we and them and our other European allies are working
with regional players to try to beef up the African forces so
that over time, under a U.N. helmet authorization, a U.N. blue
helmet, they can go forward and this can be an African-led
effort in Mali.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Madam Chairman, I have a number of
questions, but they need to be done in a closed session because
of classification.
I would in the open session just ask you about the fact
that a British study found that newer converts to Islam were in
much higher percentages being the ones that were being
recruited as U.S. citizens into terrorist groups. Any comment
on that in this session?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I've spent about the last 15 years
trying to study al Qaeda and what makes an operative. There is
a phenomenon I've often noticed, and some of this was picked up
in this study, of the second generation type of adherent, who
may be newly radicalized, may be more receptive to becoming
operationalized by the organization. So the British study talks
a little bit to that. We have seen that in the past, but I'm
not sure I would say that this is an overwhelming trend. I
think that it's a little bit too simplistic.
Having said that, when I was at NYPD working with the
Metropolitan Police in London, we both tracked that phenomenon
of the newly recruited either second generation British or
second generation American citizen and how they were
radicalized by these extremist groups. So it's an issue that
domestic folks, FBI, and local police, are very much aware of
in terms of the radicalization process for those folks.
Senator Nelson. Is this radicalization in the United
Kingdom?
Mr. Sheehan. In the United Kingdom and in the United
States.
Senator Nelson. And the United States?
Mr. Sheehan. Oh, absolutely. Globally.
Senator Nelson. Did you find in the study a difference
between the radicalization in the United Kingdom and in the
United States?
Mr. Sheehan. I would say that we saw a lot of parallels.
But the United Kingdom had some differences that actually
showed the strength of the American system. In the United
Kingdom. they found that their communities were more isolated
than in the United States. The United States has an incredible
capacity to accept minorities, particularly New York City. If
you drive through Queens and Brooklyn, on every corner you see
a different minority, but they are very well assimilated. In
the United Kingdom they had more ghetto-ized immigrant
communities, and we talked to them extensively about that
issue.
Senator Nelson. That's one of the great strengths of our
country, is that we assimilate people.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to this
classified session.
Senator Hagan. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I guess my first question for the three witnesses: Is the
tide of war receding? Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. I think it's changing.
Senator McCain. I'm asking if it's receding.
Mr. Chollet. I think clearly we pulled back from Iraq. We
are on the pathway out of Afghanistan.
Senator McCain. How did things turn out there? Pretty good?
Mr. Chollet. I think Iraq is more stable today than many
thought several years ago.
Senator McCain. Really? You really think that?
Mr. Chollet. I do.
Senator McCain. You're uninformed.
Mr. Sheehan, is the tide of war receding?
Mr. Sheehan. There's no question in my mind in terms of al
Qaeda and its affiliates, my principal threat, that we have
pounded al Qaeda's strategic capability over the last 11 years
and we continue to do so relentlessly in their primary
sanctuaries. I would footnote that by saying that al Qaeda has
shown some resiliency and potential to reestablish strategic
capability in a few years, but has yet to do so.
Senator McCain. A few areas, Mr. Sheehan?
Mr. Sheehan. They have yet to demonstrate strategic
capability in those new areas as of yet--as of yet, none.
Senator McCain. Libya?
Mr. Sheehan. None.
Senator McCain. None?
Mr. Sheehan. Very little. As a matter of fact, there have
been no strategic attacks----
Senator McCain. I just came from Libya, Mr. Sheehan.
That's patently false. That is a false statement.
How about Mali? Do you think that they're going to be able
to reconstitute themselves once the French leave?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I've been studying al Qaeda for 15
years----
Senator McCain. So have I, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan.--and I know exactly what it takes for them----
Senator McCain. Mr. Sheehan, I have too. I'm asking you a
question, and do you believe that once the French are leaving
do you think that al Qaeda will reconstitute itself in Mali?
Mr. Sheehan. They will attempt to reconstitute themselves.
Senator McCain. Do you think they will, since the people,
and Africa Command, have no logistics capability whatsoever?
Mr. Sheehan. First of all, they haven't been totally
defeated yet, so the question will be----
Senator McCain. But the French are leaving.
Mr. Sheehan. They are leaving.
Senator McCain. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. We'll see whether AQIM will be able to
establish a strategic capability from there over the years
ahead.
Senator McCain. Did you happen to notice today that al
Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda in Syria have announced their joint
partnership?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, I did, Senator, and we've been tracking
that relationship. It's a very close relationship they've had
for quite a long time.
Senator McCain. I see. In Syria is there an increasing
radicalization and penetration and increasing influence by al
Qaeda?
Mr. Sheehan. We are very concerned about Al-Nusra group,
which is an al Qaeda affiliate.
Senator McCain. I'd like to have an answer to the question.
It's a pretty straightforward question. Is al Qaeda gaining
traction and significant influence in Syria? It's a pretty
straightforward question.
Mr. Sheehan. I would say that marginally, yes.
Senator McCain. Marginally----
Mr. Sheehan. It depends on how you measure it.
Senator McCain. Marginally al Qaeda is gaining more and
more influence in Syria? Marginally?
Mr. Sheehan. When I measure al Qaeda in terms of its threat
to the United States, I measure its strategic threat.
Senator McCain. The question I asked was: Is al Qaeda
gaining more and more influence and control in Syria?
Mr. Sheehan. Al-Nusra threat is increasing its capability
in Syria.
Senator McCain. Now, did you recommend or is it your
personal opinion we should provide arms to the Syrian
resistance?
Mr. Sheehan. That's not part of the discussion here.
Senator McCain. Did you, in your confirmation hearings,
agree that when asked for your personal opinion, that you would
respond with your personal opinion?
Mr. Sheehan. I'm not sure I was asked about that.
Senator McCain. You're not sure? You didn't pay attention
at your confirmation hearings?
Mr. Sheehan. I was not asked that, Senator. If I discussed
that kind of policy deliberation I would want to do it in a
closed session.
Senator McCain. The American people should not know how
officials of our DOD feel about an issue of slaughter of 70,000
or more people and millions of refugees.
Well, let me ask this: Do you believe that there's a great
risk of both Libya--of both Jordan and Lebanon being
destabilized with the present course of events as they are
proceeding?
Mr. Sheehan. That's not something I track as much, ask Mr.
Chollet.
Senator McCain. Okay. Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, I'm worried about that.
Senator McCain. Would you say that over the last 2 years
that there has been greater and greater influence by jihadists
and radical Islamic forces in Syria?
Mr. Chollet. Over the last 2 years?
Senator McCain. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Senator McCain. As regards to Libya, do you think that we
are providing sufficient assistance to the Libyans which they
can pay for in the form of border security, in the form of
training and equipping their military so that they can gain
more control over their country, particularly in the eastern
part?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I stated previously that we fully
support doing more for Libya. Frankly, we were doing more
before the unfortunate events of last September. There's a
certain logistical reality which you're well aware of from
having been there so often, that we don't have a very big
footprint in the country right now, for good reason, for
security reasons.
So some of the good programs that we were doing, for
example, to try to build up their ministry of defense, some of
the mentoring that we were doing on the civilian side, have
stopped dead in their tracks really in the last 9 months. So
those are programs we hope to build back up. Border security
has to be a huge priority. Libya is a country the size of
Alaska and it has borders that have been ungoverned for many
years. We need to do more about that, no doubt about it.
Senator McCain. Having just returned from Libya, I can
assure you that the Libyan Government finds nothing but
frustration in dealing with this administration. They can pay
for these things, but as many issues have been raised in ways
not to assist as, and it isn't all the United States' fault,
but it clearly is, and the situation in Libya is clearly the
result of the ``light footprint'' that was part of our policy
after the fall of Qadafi.
I'd like to go back to Mali a second. Do you have
confidence that when the French leave that the situation will
not deteriorate back to a situation that basically is the same
as before the French intervened?
Mr. Chollet. I have some confidence, not high confidence.
We're in the early stages of this story here. The French want
to get out by July. The U.N. wants to stand up a force by July.
Ensuring that that force is capable to deal with the security
threats, because once the French leave the Malian army's not
going to be in a position to backfill. So that's why we'll work
through the U.N. to get a viable peacekeeping force in there
and to work to help train up the Africans as best we can.
I think we have a shot, but I wouldn't say that it's high
confidence.
Senator McCain. Having met with that African force who
would be there either under the aegis of the African group or
the U.N., I hope that you're aware they have no logistics
capability. They have no C-130s, they have no helicopters, they
have no way of getting around a country the size of Texas.
But you're hopeful that they'll be able to take over?
Mr. Chollet. I am hopeful, but I don't think we're there
yet, and that's why we have to work hard over the next 2 months
with our partners, 2 months and beyond, to ensure that as the
French stand down that we have a sufficient force able to
backfill to ensure that the gains, the significant gains, of
the last 2 months don't get lost.
Senator McCain. In 60 days I find it hard to envision that
we would train pilots and provide them with helicopters and C-
130s and the equipment, not to mention the ground equipment
that's necessary for them to be a viable force. They themselves
told me that they are not capable, not because of manpower, but
because there's not a single C-130. One of the airplanes they
had they crashed on the runway.
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, if I could comment on the situation
in Mali, right now the ECOWAS force there, AFISMA, is not
capable at all. What you saw there, and you're accurately
portraying it, is a completely incapable force. That has to
change. What will change over the next few months if we're able
to work it through the Security Council is a U.N. blue-helmeted
operation, which does have logistics capability, which does
have LH-1000s that can bring logistical support to it.
What we need to do in Africa, in Mali, is similar to what
we have done in Somalia: Not ask the international force to do
too much. In Somalia, we were successful in organizing and
helping support a U.N. force, AMISOM, that was capable of
kicking al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and out of Kismayo,
Ugandans in Mogadishu, the Kenyans in Kismayo, the Ethiopians
in the north.
Now, granted those are much more capable forces than we
might be able to cobble together for Mali. But we do have a
model where if we use a U.N.-supported logistical force and
keep the mission reasonable, in other words, those forces for
the U.N. mission in Mali won't be asked to take over all of
Mali. They'll be asked to maintain control of the cities now
occupied by the French, Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.
In terms of chasing AQIM out of the mountains and going
after its leadership and the remnant as they try to
reconstitute themselves, that is going to be a job for a much
more capable force. The U.N. cannot do that and we shouldn't
expect them to do that. That will be up to the French, perhaps
with our support, or other specialized units, perhaps the
Algerians if we can convince them to become more engaged, and
we're working with them, that we can track down the al Qaeda
leadership with much more capable CT forces.
The U.N. will have a much more modest goal and we think,
based on our experience in Somalia, a God-forsaken place 2
years ago, we might be able to achieve some modest objectives
in Mali with that operation.
Senator McCain. You might.
I thank you, Madam Chairman. My time has expired.
The fact is the reality on the ground is that arms and
people are flowing freely all across North Africa, many of them
coming into Syria, a surprising number of Tunisians. The
situation continues to become more radicalized in Syria as
80,000 or more people have been massacred while we sit by and
watch and figure out reasons why we can't intervene. We are
going to pay a very, very, very heavy price.
You ought to go to a refugee camp some time, both of you,
and meet the people there, and the woman who says: ``See all
these children; they will take revenge on those who failed to
help them, who failed to help.''
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. It's been disastrous.
I thank you, Madam Chairman, for interrupting me.
Senator Hagan. We are now going to ask any Senators who
wish to have other questions to submit them for the record, and
then we will move this. The closed session will be in Senate
Security, room SVC-217. Thank you, this open hearing is now
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
security forces assistance
1. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, it has been reported that you
are seeking new authorities that would allow you to spend up to $25
million in U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operation and
maintenance funds each year to train, equip, and advise partner nation
security forces. How would you define the strategic objectives that
this partner capacity building authority would be intended to serve?
Admiral McRaven. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous
meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout the Department of
State (DOS). Together, we are relooking the Global Security Contingency
Fund (GSCF) and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund
that will help meet Special Operations Forces (SOF) requirements. DOS
has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward
together.
That said, the primary objective is to develop SOF partners better
capable of detecting and dealing with local and regional threats before
they threaten U.S. vital interests or require more costly U.S.
Government action. The secondary goal is to ensure theater special
operations commands are fully capable of detecting leading indicators
of conflict and instability, and able to offer national security
decisionmakers timely mitigation options during crises.
2. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, what deficiencies in existing
security force assistance authorities--including both Department of
Defense (DOD) and DOS authorities--do you believe this new authority
would address?
Admiral McRaven. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous
meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are
relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in
that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very
responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.
However, the following reflects my position prior to the recent
meetings with DOS officials on the question of deficiencies in existing
security force assistance authorities.
Both section 1206 and GSCF were purpose-built to respond to
emerging opportunities and threats. Therefore, they leave Theater
Special Operations Commands (TSOC) without reliable authority and/or
resources to implement their Chief-of-Mission-approved regional
engagement plans. TSOCs would benefit from a comprehensive authority
that will help national security decisionmakers detect and potentially
mitigate emerging threats and instability before they require the use
of more reactive authorities like 1206 or GSCF.
Additionally, the current slate of foreign military assistance
authorities leaves TSOCs unable to plan or implement their unique
strategies for theater SOF engagement with any budgetary certainty.
Accordingly, as they develop their plans for partner engagement
activities, TSOCs are left to patch together several authorities
(almost universally intended for different purposes), resulting in
limited effectiveness due to legal, policy, and regulatory constraints.
3. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, do you believe current DOD and
DOS authorities could be modified to achieve your objectives?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, since my testimony on April 9, I have had
numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS.
Together, we are relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader
authorities in that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has
been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward
together.
4. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, security force assistance has
traditionally been the responsibility of DOS. Do you believe such an
authority for the DOD should be subject to the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, in addition to the relevant ambassador and
geographic combatant commander? Why or why not?
Admiral McRaven. Yes. Unless specifically directed by the President
or Secretary of Defense, U.S. SOF do not deploy or operate in a country
without the approval of the respective Chief(s) of Mission and
combatant commanders. SOCOM sees value in the Secretaries of Defense
and State jointly formulating an annual list of pre-approved countries
where such activities could be undertaken. Subsequent approvals
activities in these countries could be delegated to the assistant
secretary level. In cases of disagreement, the Departments could
elevate respective cases for more senior level reviews, to include the
Secretaries of State and Defense.
5. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, how would you ensure adequate
oversight and approval by appropriate civilian officials, including the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Ambassadors, and
Congress?
Admiral McRaven. As I've stated in my earlier responses, since my
testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with
colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and
attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help
meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope
that we can move forward together.
That said, U.S. SOF do not do anything anywhere in the world
without the concurrence of the respective Chief(s) of Mission and
combatant commander(s). SOCOM sees value in the Secretaries of Defense
and State jointly formulating an annual list of pre-approved countries
where such activities could be undertaken. In cases of disagreement,
the Departments could elevate respective cases for more senior level
reviews, to include the Secretaries of State and Defense.
Congressional oversight should mirror the oversight Congress
exercises over SOCOM for authorities such as 1208.
6. Senator Hagan. Secretary Sheehan and Secretary Chollet, what
role would your offices have in approving and overseeing activities
conducted under an authority like the one proposed by Admiral McRaven?
Mr. Sheehan. As with other authorities managed by SOCOM, we would
ensure application of the authority supports capacity-building needs
necessary to respond to near-term contingencies and foster persistent
relationships with our SOF partners. We would establish oversight and
implementation policies to ensure the execution of the authority
focuses on DOD and national security objectives, is adequately
coordinated with the relevant interagency partners, is fully compliant
with the law, and that programs are regularly assessed and evaluated.
Mr. Chollet. If enacted, the authority proposed by Admiral McRaven,
Commander, SOCOM, as with other authorities used by SOCOM, would be
managed within Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy through
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), which would establish
oversight and implementation policies. As a regionally focused
component, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ISA) would work closely with SO/LIC to
provide a regional perspective to ensure that implementation focused on
national security objectives as determined by the Secretary of Defense,
and in coordination with the relevant interagency partners.
acquisition authorities
7. Senator Hagan. Secretary Sheehan, SOCOM is unique within DOD as
the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding.
Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a
subordinate senior acquisition executive. Given your Service Secretary-
like responsibilities, how do you exercise oversight of SOCOM's
development and acquisition programs?
Secretary Sheehan. My staff and I provide policy and resource
guidance, as well as appropriate advice, to the Commander, SOCOM in
order to implement Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy priorities. I participate in SOCOM's monthly Decision
Roundtable meeting that oversees program and resource guidance and
decisions. My staff participates in the Special Operations Capabilities
Requirements Evaluation Board that validates SOCOM's requirements. My
staff also participates in budget and acquisition review processes at
SOCOM and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), along
with congressional budget justification.
My office also provides senior policy oversight to resolve special
operations acquisition issues, and adjudicates resourcing and
acquisition differences between SOCOM and the Services. As the lead
Defense official for SOF acquisition matters, I represent SOF
acquisition interests within DOD and before Congress. My office directs
and provides policy oversight to special operations technology
development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other
departmental, interagency, and international capability needs.
My staff also participates with OSD(AT&L) in the biannual SOF
Acquisition Summits.
8. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, given current fiscal challenges,
how do you ensure SOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced
against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition
program?
Admiral McRaven. Current fiscal challenges have reinforced SOCOM's
requirements (e.g., capability) vetting process; the resourcing segment
of SOCOM's Strategic Planning Process; and SOCOM's acquisition process.
Our SOCOM staff conducts rigorous analysis of all SOF requests along
with a determination of cost, schedule, and performance risk to planned
acquisition initiatives. We do this through a rigorous internal process
administered by the J8 and chaired by the Vice Commander. The
Requirements Evaluation Board provides a final holistic review and
assessment of SOCOM capabilities, particularly regarding the
integration of materiel, force structure, manpower, and military
construction considerations.
Validated requirements compete for limited MFP-11 funding in the
annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimate
Submission. The POM submission aligns with Defense Strategy, allocates
and synchronizes resources over the Future Years Defense Program and
sets conditions for effective and efficient budgeting and execution.
Once funding is approved, the Command's Acquisition Executive (AE)
and Chief Financial Officer execute the appropriated funds at the
direction of the Commander in accordance with appropriate regulations
and guidance. For acquisition programs, the AE provides guidance and
direction to all acquisition program managers to promote agility,
responsiveness, and transparency to the SOF enterprise.
global employment order
9. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, it has been reported that you
are seeking new authorities that would allow you to more rapidly move
SOF between geographic combatant commands--outside of the traditional
request for forces process managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
true, why do you believe such an authority is necessary?
Admiral McRaven. When I took command of SOCOM in 2011, I initiated
a rigorous, deliberate, and comprehensive assessment of SOF. It has
been informed by the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic
Guidance, and the Chairman's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. As
a result, in response to changes in the global security environment and
in line with national guidance, SOCOM is developing a more agile and
flexible force, ready to address future security challenges, primarily
through the provision of greater SOF support to the geographic
combatant commanders.
This vision for the future of SOF will be achieved through normal
DOD processes. To that end, on April 19, 2013, the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff issued a planning order (PLANORD) that directs SOCOM to
develop a campaign plan that ``persistently aligns SOF capability and
provides SOF support to the geographic combatant commanders' steady-
state requirements and national objectives. The results of the planning
process must increase requisite flexibility and responsiveness of SOF,
alone and in conjunction with general purpose forces, for crises and
theater-shaping activities for full-spectrum operations. This plan will
not supersede the global force management process. To the maximum
extent possible, [it will] utilize existing processes to support
identified requirements.''
My staff, in conjunction with appropriate stakeholders (to include
the geographic combatant commands, Theater Special Operations Commands,
Military Services, other defense agencies, and the interagency) is
currently developing a comprehensive campaign plan to respond to the
Chairman's PLANORD. My intent is for this plan to identify future SOF
requirements for all geographic combatant commands; posture the SOF
enterprise to fulfill these requirements to the greatest extent
possible; and outline the necessary authorities that will enable SOF to
meet theater and national objectives.
10. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, how would you ensure adequate
oversight and approval by appropriate civilian officials, including the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, ambassadors, and
Congress?
Admiral McRaven. Building upon my response to Question #9, the
SOCOM plan to provide a more flexible and agile force to the geographic
combatant commanders is aligned with national guidance and will be
achieved through normal DOD and interagency processes. Additionally, it
is worth reiterating that unless specifically directed by the President
or Secretary of Defense, SOF do not deploy or operate in a country
without the approval of the U.S. Chief of Mission. All SOF missions
require interagency coordination.
11. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, if a geographic combatant
commander, the Joint Staff, an ambassador, or another relevant official
disagrees with a planned movement of SOF, how would such an objection
be registered and adjudicated?
Admiral McRaven. I have no intention to command and control SOF in
the geographic combatant commanders' areas of responsibility. As I
stated in my response to Question #9, my vision for the future of SOF
will be achieved through normal DOD processes. My staff, in conjunction
with relevant stakeholders (to include the geographic combatant
commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, Military Services, other
defense agencies, and the interagency), is currently developing a
comprehensive campaign plan to identify future SOF requirements for all
geographic combatant commands; posture the SOF enterprise to fulfill
these requirements to the greatest extent possible; and outline the
necessary authorities that will enable SOF to meet theater and national
objectives. The content of this plan is currently in development with
our partners both in DOD and with the interagency. However, as directed
by the Joint Staff, SOCOM's plan will ``increase requisite flexibility
and responsiveness of SOF'' but ``will not supersede the global force
management process.''
12. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, would such an authority only
apply to forces engaged in training and other engagement activities
with partner nation forces or could it also apply to special operators
equipped for combat operations or conducting combat operations?
Admiral McRaven. The Global Employment Order would only apply to
training and other engagement activities. Any activities related to
combat would have to go through the Secretary of Defense for his
approval.
Building upon my previous responses, it is also worth reiterating
that unless specifically directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, SOF do not deploy or operate in a country without the approval
of the U.S. Chief of Mission. All SOF missions require interagency
coordination and I have no intention to command and control SOF in the
geographic combatant commanders' areas of responsibility.
My vision for the future of SOF will be achieved through normal DOD
processes. My staff, in conjunction with relevant stakeholders, is
currently developing a comprehensive campaign plan to identify future
SOF requirements for all geographic combatant commands; posture the SOF
enterprise to fulfill these requirements to the greatest extent
possible; and outline the necessary authorities that will enable SOF to
meet theater and national objectives. The content of this plan is
currently in development with our partners both in Department and with
the interagency. However, SOCOM's plan will ``increase requisite
flexibility and responsiveness of SOF'' but ``will not supersede the
global force management process.''
13. Senator Hagan. Secretary Sheehan, what role would you have in
reviewing and approving the redeployment of SOF, considering your
Service Secretary-like responsibilities for SOCOM?
Secretary Sheehan. My office will work closely with Headquarters,
SOCOM to develop the concept for posturing, deploying, and employing
SOF best to meet geographic combatant commanders' requirements and
National Strategic Objectives.
As with all SOF-related orders, I review and provide my
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for the deployment and
redeployment of SOF. At present there is no specific global employment
order. SOF posture and deployment will continue to utilize existing
posture and global force management processes. The employment aspects
remain under the purview of the geographical combatant commander except
when otherwise ordered by the Secretary of Defense.
regional special operations coordination centers
14. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, you have spoken frequently
about the need to build a Global Special Operations Network which
includes partner nation SOF. One element of your plan to achieve such a
network has been described as a series of Regional Special Operations
Coordination Centers (RSCC), modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Special Operations Headquarters created in 2007, to
strengthen partnerships and improve the capacity of partner forces. How
would such coordination centers work in other regions where a
multilateral framework, like NATO, doesn't exist?
Admiral McRaven. Ideally, RSCCs will be nested under an appropriate
pre-existing multinational framework (like NATO), but they need not be.
Even if such a framework does not exist, the RSCC will bring together
an international grouping of like-minded partners interested in
implementing regional solutions to regional problems and thus
increasing regional interoperability. Every RSCC will be built to suit
its region and will operate under a mutually agreed charter and/or
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) framework. The charter will detail
the common objectives, structure, and workings of the RSCC. Each
partner nation will have a role in the RSCC organization but will be
responsible to its national chain of command. In the case of the U.S.
personnel, they will report to the Theater Special Operations Command.
15. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, wouldn't special operations-
specific coordination centers duplicate other existing regional
coordination centers run by the geographic combatant commands and the
DOS?
Admiral McRaven. I do not believe RSCCs would be duplicative
efforts. First and foremost, they would focus on coordination,
education, and training of partner nation SOF and SOF-like
organizations. No matter the country of origin, SOF warriors share a
unique personality, skill set, and approach to their profession. The
RSCC would serve as a platform for the development of enduring
relationships among our partners based on trust, increased
interoperability, commonality of interests, and reciprocal respect. As
I've said before, you cannot surge trust among partners at the time of
crisis. That is simply too late. We must build understanding,
relationships, and interoperability consistently and over the long-
term.
Second, what would be unique about the RSCCs is that they would be
set up in such a way that our partners will have ``skin in the game''
by contributing leadership, funding, staff, and other resources. They
would not be U.S. organizations, but truly multi-national.
Third, RSCCs would fill the current void of operational-level
training and education. The RSCC would be geared toward the advancement
of mid- to senior-level officers and noncommissioned officers, to
include their government/civilian counterparts. This mid-level training
and education program better prepares students for senior leadership
positions and advanced international graduate-level education programs.
16. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, how would the locations of
these centers be determined--especially considering the risk of
upsetting partners who are not selected and sensitivities of many
countries to a visible presence of SOCOM personnel?
Admiral McRaven. Each geographic combatant command would have the
lead responsibility for DOD input into site selection and engagement
with regional partners. Further socialization would be required with
DOD offices, DOS regional bureaus, Chiefs of Mission, other interagency
organizations, and multinational stakeholders to provide a
comprehensive analysis of RSCC participant and location options.
Preference would be given to a host nation that is located within the
specified region and promotes maximum regional participation. Where
feasible, the RSCC would be nested under a suitable pre-existing
multinational framework or security cooperation agreement or
arrangement, but this is not essential.
17. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, how would such coordination
centers be funded and manned and would you need new legislative
authorities to create them?
Admiral McRaven. In the projected fiscal year 2014 budget
submission to Congress, the allotment for RSCCs is $14,725,000. These
funds support the planning, development, socialization, and
implementation efforts for RSCCs in the U.S. Pacific Command and the
U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility. This includes the
determination and creation of area-specific training and education
requirements as well as collaboration with subject matter experts for
coordination and support to multiple interagencies and ministries of
defense for organizational specific planning efforts. Also included are
planning, researching, resourcing, and sponsoring of education events
including the development of a SOF course catalog for global and
regionally specific training. Additionally, HQs SOCOM will incur costs
related to manpower, planning, and coordination in support of this
effort.
SOCOM will provide manning to RSCCs from within its ranks,
transferring positions and personnel as necessary. As they evolve, RSCC
staffs will also include partner nation personnel.
Currently, SOCOM is working across DOD to determine the current
authorities that exist to enable RSCC activities. If existing
authorities are not sufficient, we will explore new legislative
authorities with our interagency and congressional colleagues.
national capital region
18. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, I understand you have been
working to establish the SOCOM-National Capital Region (NCR) office
with the intent of consolidating various SOCOM elements in Washington,
DC, under the SOCOM Vice Commander to eliminate redundancies and
provide interagency partners with a focal point for coordination on
issues with special operations equities. However, the recently passed
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2013 prohibits further
spending on this effort until additional justification is given to the
congressional defense committees. I understand a significant portion of
the funds spent on this effort to date have been used to hire contract
personnel. Why do you believe such an office is necessary?
Admiral McRaven. In compliance with the explanatory report language
accompanying House Resolution 933, the Department of Defense, Military
Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, SOCOM is currently writing a report to
Congress to address questions such as the one above. Upon completion of
the report, copies will be distributed to all concerned parties to
increase understanding and respond to the questions initially posed by
Members of Congress. In the interim, please see ``SOF 2020: You Can's
Surge Trust''. This document explains the SOCOM vision for a Global SOF
Network, and the role of the SOCOM-NCR office within it.
19. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, will this new office be created
within SOCOM's current resourcing and manpower levels, including
contractors?
Admiral McRaven. The SOCOM-NCR will be comprised of the extant
Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP), the SOCOM Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction-Terrorism Support Program (SCSP), and DC-based J39
elements. Pursuant to receiving a Secretary of Defense relocation
waiver under section 8018 of H.R. 933, interagency coordination
functions formerly performed by the Interagency Task Force (IATF) at
the headquarters will be transferred to the SOCOM-NCR, and the IATF
will be disestablished. This initiative is intended to be a resource-
neutral internal reorganization, ensuring there is no duplication of
effort within the Command. We are requesting no new manpower growth to
establish the SOCOM-NCR.
20. Senator Hagan. Admiral McRaven, how is SOCOM responding to the
requirements of the Defense Appropriations Bill?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM is in full compliance with the Joint
Explanatory report language regarding the SOCOM-NCR initiative. The
language prohibits using fiscal year 2013 funds until a Secretary of
Defense waiver and report is submitted to the congressional committees.
Prior to the fiscal year 2013 appropriation, we were in Phase I
(Initial Concept Implementation). After passage of the Appropriation
Bill, we worked with the House Appropriations Committee-Defense staff
and moved the initiative back to Phase 0 (Administrative Planning and
Concept Development). Phase 0 can be maintained until the approval and
reporting requirements of the fiscal year 2013 appropriation language
is met. Resources in the fiscal year 2014 budget submission is funded
at the Phase 0 level.
SOCOM-NCR activities during Phase 0:
(1) Completing documentation relevant to the submission of a
Secretary of Defense waiver and the report to Congress (section 8018 of
H.R. 933).
(2) Providing management, guidance, and operational direction to
the SOCOM Special Operations Support Teams (SOST), which operates
within SOCOM's IAPP.
(3) Continuing to harmonize with the activities associated to
SOCOM elements in the NCR. All of these activities are being
coordinated under the leadership of the SOCOM Vice Commander.
21. Senator Hagan. Secretary Sheehan, do you support the creation
of this new office, and if so, what will be its relationship with your
office?
Secretary Sheehan. I endorse the concept of an enhanced and
consolidated SOCOM presence in the NCR and look forward to working with
the Commander, SOCOM to continue to develop and refine this initiative.
I believe the SOCOM-NCR presence will effectively consolidate SOF
functions currently executed in the NCR and serves to deepen
relationships and collaboration with key interagency,
intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental mission
partners.
My office will continue direct communication and cooperation with
SOCOM to provide policy and resource guidance and advice. I also
envision a close relationship with SOCOM-NCR personnel to ensure
accuracy and consistency in the communication of SOCOM initiatives
based on Department-wide priorities and strategy.
sudan
22. Senator Hagan. Secretary Chollet, over the past year, public
reports have suggested that the Government of Sudan has been
increasingly working with Iran and non-state violent extremists to
facilitate the flow of weapons into Gaza, and has supported the flow of
foreign fighters to North Africa. What is your assessment of the threat
posed by Sudan and their ongoing support to international terrorism?
Secretary Chollet. We are committed to working with our partners in
the region to prevent the flow of weapons into Gaza. Iranian attempts
to export weapons are violations of United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 (2007) (which was strengthened with additional
implementation provisions in UNSCR 1929 (2010)) and a threat to
regional stability.
As you are aware, the United States has longstanding concerns about
Sudan's approach to security issues in the broader region. In our
engagements with the Government of Sudan, we continue to express our
deep concern about its approach to international and domestic security
issues, including its approach to the conflicts in Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile, continued denial of humanitarian access to civilians
affected by ongoing conflicts, human trafficking, human rights
violations, and other governance challenges. Sudan remains on the U.S.
State Sponsors of Terrorism list, and U.S. policy toward Sudan has not
changed.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
assistance to foreign military forces
23. Senator Manchin. Secretary Sheehan and Secretary Chollet,
during the hearing you both mentioned that we have had some success in
rolling back al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia as a result of our train,
equip, and advise programs. Can you briefly describe the nature of our
training, equipping, and advising efforts in Yemen and Somalia and the
approximate cost of each during fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Sheehan. DOD works closely with the Yemeni Government,
Government of Somalia, and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to counter the respective terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda-aligned elements of al-
Shabaab.
Section 1206 ``Global Train and Equip'' and section 1207(n)
``Global Security Contingency Fund'' authorities have been used to
train and equip Yemeni forces engaged in driving AQAP from its safe
havens in Yemen, and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been
instrumental in the reorganization of the Yemeni military. In fiscal
year 2012, we provided $37.5 million in training and equipment under
section 1206 and $75 million under section 1207(n). Section 1206
programs provided equipment to increase the tactical effectiveness of
Yemen SOF. Section 1207(n) programs provided equipment and training to
enhance the ability of Yemen's MOI counterterrorism forces to conduct
operations against AQAP.
Section 1206 and section 1207(n) authorities have also been
instrumental in giving AMISOM and regional forces the capabilities and
effectiveness to drive al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other strongholds.
In fiscal year 2012, the United States also provided $18.8 million in
assistance under section 1206 to Uganda and Burundi for deployments in
support of AMISOM. On April 10, 2013, DOD also notified Congress of its
intent to provide an additional $27.6 million in section 1206 support
to Kenya and Uganda. We provided $41.3 million in training and
equipment under section 1207(n) to Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and
Uganda. The purpose of the fiscal year 2012 assistance is to improve
the tactical effectiveness, operational reach, and survivability of
these partner nation forces conducting counterterrorism operations
either on their own or as part of AMISOM in Somalia. The fiscal year
2013 programs will improve intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities to support AMISOM's expansion out of
Mogadishu.
In addition to DOD's efforts to build Yemeni capacity to conduct
counterterrorism operations, the DOD, in concert with our European and
Jordanian partners, is providing advice to the Yemeni military as it
reorganizes under a unified chain of command under President Hadi. A
unified, professional Yemeni military will be more effective in the
fight against AQAP, and it will contribute to greater political
stability. The Department's advisory support for the reorganization
began in May 2012 and is funded by a $643,560 FMF case.
Secretary Chollet. DOD works closely with the Yemeni Government to
counter the terrorist threat posed by AQAP, the most active and
dangerous affiliate of al Qaeda today. DOD also works with the
Government of Somalia and the AMISOM to counter the terrorist threat
posed by al Qaeda and al Qaeda-aligned elements of al-Shabaab. Our
train, advise, and equip programs are one of the key reasons that we
have been successful in countering al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia.
Section 1206 and section 1207(n) authority has been used to train and
equip Yemeni forces engaged in driving AQAP from its safe haven in
Yemen, and FMF has been instrumental in the reorganization of the
Yemeni military. Section 1206 and section 1207(n) authority has been
instrumental in giving AMISOM and regional forces the capabilities and
effectiveness to drive al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, Merka, and other
historical strongholds.
In fiscal year 2012, we provided $37.5 million in training and
equipment under the section 1206 global train counterterrorism
capacity-building authority and $75 million under section 1207(n), the
transitional authority provided by the GSCF legislation made available
to support Yemen Ministry of Interior (MOI) counterterrorism forces.
Section 1206 programs provided equipment to increase the tactical
effectiveness of Yemen SOF. Section 1207(n) programs provided equipment
and training to enhance the ability of Yemen's MOI counterterrorism
forces to conduct operations against AQAP.
In fiscal year 2012, the United States also provided $18.8 million
in assistance under section 1206 to Uganda and Burundi for deployments
in support of AMISOM. On April 10, 2013, DOD notified Congress of its
intent to provide an additional $27.6 million in section 1206 support
to Kenya and Uganda. The United States also provided $41.3 million in
training and equipment under section 1207(n), made available to support
East African countries, including Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda.
The purpose of the fiscal year 2012 assistance is to improve the
tactical effectiveness, operational reach, and survivability of these
partner nation forces conducting counterterrorism operations either on
their own or as part of AMISOM in Somalia. If executed, the fiscal year
2013 programs will improve operational and tactical intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support AMISOM's
expansion out of Mogadishu.
In addition to DOD's efforts to build Yemeni capacity to conduct
counterterrorism operations, the DOD, in concert with our European and
Jordanian partners, is providing advice to the Yemeni military as it
reorganizes under a unified chain of command under President Hadi. A
unified, professional Yemeni military will be more effective in the
fight against AQAP, and it will contribute to greater political
stability. The Department's advisory support for the reorganization
began in May 2012 and is funded by a $643,560 FMF case.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
global security contingency fund
24. Senator Fischer. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and
Secretary Chollet, 2 years ago, at the request of Secretary Clinton and
Secretary Gates, Congress created the GSCF--a joint program between DOS
and DOD to utilize security assistance to address national priorities.
However, I understand that since its creation, the GSCF has experienced
issues, including a cumbersome implementation process and diverging
priorities between DOS and DOD. Is the GSCF working as intended and if
not, do you believe modifications should be made to the GSCF to get it
back on track?
Admiral McRaven. GSCF was not intended to be an authority to meet
the peculiar requirements of SOF, so it is beyond the scope of my
purview to opine as to whether it is working as intended. Since my
testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with
colleagues throughout the DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and
attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help
meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope
that we can move forward together.
Mr. Sheehan. Standing up the GSCF has been challenging. This
authority differs from others in the extent of joint planning and
shared responsibility for both funding and execution. We have had to
develop processes and procedures to plan, notify, and execute the
programs, as well as addressing the logistics of transferring funds
into GSCF.
The GSCF is a new model for interagency collaboration that requires
developing new processes. We recognize that it takes time to establish
and operationalize new funding structures between two agencies with
different legal authorities and funds management processes and
procedures. DOD and DOS have made much progress on these and other GSCF
issues. DOD remains committed to GSCF as an integrated tool to address
foreign policy and national security interests.
Mr. Chollet. From a regional perspective, GSCF's objective--to
provide the legal authority for DOD and DOS to implement policy that
enhances strategic effects with partner nations on emergent needs--is
laudable. The first year has been challenging, but many of the
difficulties are due to divergent views between the Departments'
respective authorizing and appropriating committees on how this new
authority should be implemented.
As an OSD regional bureau, we jointly chair, with the DOS's
regional bureaus, the Policy Steering Group to ensure that GSCF
projects are coordinated with the relevant interagency partners. DOD
and DOS agree on priority projects. Challenges largely relate to
implementation, as no other authority requires the same extent of joint
planning and shared responsibility on funding and execution.
The GSCF is a new model for interagency collaboration that requires
new processes, which are still being created and validated. As we
complete staffing and notification of the first set of GSCF proposals,
we assess that clarifying the meaning of the terms ``training,''
``mentoring,'' and ``advising'' will allow for a more streamlined
approval process going forward.
DOD remains committed to the GSCF as a tool to address foreign
policy and national security interests. We welcome your continued
support and oversight as we move forward.
25. Senator Fischer. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and
Secretary Chollet, in what ways should the authority be revised to make
it more manageable and effective?
Admiral McRaven. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous
meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are
relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in
that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very
responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.
In partnership with DOS, we would like to enhance GSCF flexibility
in order to shift funding within and between cases. As circumstances
change, and efficiencies are found during case implementation, such
flexibility to move funds will be critical to successful outcomes.
Mr. Sheehan. DOD formally submitted a legislative proposal to
streamlining congressional notification requirements and allow DOD
funds to be transferred from all operation and maintenance accounts for
GSCF programs.
DOD recommends a single congressional notification per project that
covers transfer of funds into the GSCF account and intent to implement
activities using those funds. The current requirement of notifying
congressional committees of funds transfer, and separately of the
intent to initiate activities, is duplicative. The combined
notification would contain detailed information (e.g., name of country,
source of funds, justification, implementation plan with milestones,
budget, timeline, completion date). It would also fulfill the
requirements in section 8004 of the DOS, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012; section 8069 of the DOD
Appropriations Act, 2012; and section 8068 of the DOD Appropriations
Act, 2013.
Additionally, DOD would like to expand the source of transferred
funds to the broader Operation and Maintenance account to allow the
Secretary of Defense more latitude to prioritize amongst competing
budget requirements.
Mr. Chollet. From a regional perspective, International Security
Affairs supports a legislative proposal that aims to make the GSCF more
effective by streamlining congressional notification requirements, and
allowing DOD funds to be transferred from any Operation and Maintenance
account, not just the Defense-wide account. DOD would like to expand
the source of transferred funds to the broader Operation and
Maintenance account to allow the Secretary of Defense more latitude to
prioritize among competing budget requirements.
26. Senator Fischer. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and
Secretary Chollet, do you believe the fiscal year 2014 budget request
of $75 million for the GSCF will be sufficient to meet DOD plans?
Admiral McRaven. I will defer that answer to Secretary Sheehan, as
the SOF carve-out is not expected to repeat in 2014.
Mr. Sheehan. It is too early to tell whether our $75 million
request for GSCF will be sufficient to cover DOD's share of the fiscal
year 2014 GSCF projects. The amount requested is comparable to the
amount transferred in fiscal year 2012 and projected to be transferred
in fiscal year 2013 to complete the first six GSCF projects.
Mr. Chollet. It is too early to tell whether the $75 million
request for GSCF will be sufficient to cover DOD's share of the fiscal
year 2014 GSCF projects. From a regional perspective, there will likely
be no shortage of proposals competing for the allocated GSCF funds
based on emerging security challenges.
27. Senator Fischer. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and
Secretary Chollet, will DOD continue its policy of including a SOF
carve-out in the GSCF, and if so, what level of funding do you plan to
allocate to the SOF carve-out?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM has been told that the SOF carve-out was a
single year experiment and will not be repeated in 2014. We will assess
the results of the 2013 carve-out to drive our approach beyond 2014.
Mr. Sheehan. The SOF carve-out projects are the result a decision
by both Departments' senior leadership to explore the suitability of
the GSCF authority to address a set of small-scale, operationally-
driven requirements to meet SOF capacity-building needs. This allows
for important capacity-building tools, such as advising and mentoring
and small-scale construction critical to SOF-to-SOF engagement, that
complement or otherwise facilitate effective employment of the larger-
scale training or equipment delivered.
The statutory requirement for joint approval of both country
designations and assistance plans by both the Secretaries of Defense
and State, when combined with a lack of dedicated appropriation,
effectively narrows the Departments' focus to projects that are
national-level priorities that sufficiently justify the transfer of
funds away from other accounts.
Mr. Chollet. International Security Affairs is not responsible for
allocating SOF carve-out funding, but is supportive of the requests
that have been submitted to date by SOCOM and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy for countries in ISA's area of
responsibility.
security assistance authorities
28. Senator Fischer. Secretary Sheehan, in your testimony, you
referenced ``legislative proposal 171.'' Can you describe this
proposal?
Mr. Sheehan. My testimony was intended to highlight a set of
security sector assistance requirements that current authorities may
not adequately address. For example, SOF should have the ability to
build a network of capable, willing SOF partners able to respond to
near-term contingencies and share the burden of global responsibility
to address an array of security challenges. This would enable
persistent engagement with foreign SOF and prioritized SOF-to-SOF
engagement with our foreign partners. The global security environment
demands a flexible, agile security assistance authority that can be
both proactive and reactive. Likewise, the ability to work by, with,
and through partners with greater placement and access is crucial to
preventing crises and responding to near-term contingencies. In the
immediate future, we are working closely with the DOS to identify ways
to satisfy some of these requirements.
29. Senator Fischer. Secretary Sheehan, has this proposal been
shared with DOS, and if so, what changes has DOS requested be made to
your proposal?
Mr. Sheehan. We consult with our colleagues in the DOS in a range
of circumstances to develop future proposals that would establish
essential capacity-building tools to respond to near-term contingencies
and foster critical SOF-to-SOF relationships to address a range of
national security challenges; and identify ways to satisfy some of
these requirements through existing programs and within existing
authorities.
30. Senator Fischer. Admiral McRaven and Secretary Sheehan, both of
you testified on the importance of being able to provide security
assistance in a rapid and responsive manner. What impact does a lengthy
approval process impose on the efficacy of security assistance
missions?
Admiral McRaven. In short, we're unable to react to the changing
conditions and/or take advantage of opportunities as they present
themselves.
Persistent instability can most effectively be countered by
maintaining a persistent presence that anticipates and mitigates
volatile situations, but can also respond should a crisis occur. A
streamlined and expedited process to enable GSCF-type missions is
critical to address emerging security threats in a dynamic and complex
strategic environment, and ultimately serves to prevent larger military
operations of a reactive nature.
Mr. Sheehan. The authorities Congress provided since September 11,
2001, (e.g., section 1206, section 1207), have been instrumental in our
fight against al Qaeda. These authorities, however, do not necessarily
provide DOD with the full complement of tools required to rapidly
respond to evolving terrorist threats and instability challenges that
we will face for the foreseeable future. Contracting and procurement
challenges, and our general inability to work with Non-Ministry of
Defense partners, continue to hinder our responsiveness. More agile,
flexible authorities would also allow us to exploit fleeting
opportunities to provide assistance to our partners.
[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISE
FOR INNOVATION AND AFFORDABILITY
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Fischer.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; and Robie I. Samanta Roy,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; and Anthony J. Lazarski,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Kathleen
A. Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Christopher Cannon, assistant to
Senator Hagan; and Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator
Fischer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Hagan. We will bring to order the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee.
Good afternoon. We meet today to receive testimony on the
health and status of the Department of Defense (DOD) science
and technology (S&T) enterprise and its contributions to
developing innovative and affordable systems for the
warfighter. This hearing will delve deeper into some of the
important topics that we touched upon last year in our hearing
on the health and status of the DOD laboratory enterprise.
Despite the significant budgetary pressures we are facing
today, DOD should be given credit for trying to preserve, as
much as possible, the investments in S&T. Nevertheless, these
budgetary pressures, along with the pending drawdown of our
forces in combat overseas and the associated decrease in rapid
fielding requirements and the new defense strategic guidance,
all are forcing the S&T community to reevaluate the priorities.
Two key areas of significant concern to me are the
Department's ability to recruit and retain the best and
brightest for its S&T workforce--and I know I have spoken to
some of you about this--especially daunting when you look at
the sequestration environment that we are in today, and the
timeliness and affordability of the new weapons systems.
In order to address and understand some of these complex
issues and DOD's approach to them, we are pleased to have five
expert witnesses with us today. Mr. Alan R. Shaffer is the
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (R&E). I understand that is the second time for an
extended period of time over the last 10 years, so thank you.
Dr. Arati Prabhakar is the Director of Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, better known as DARPA. I understand
this too is your second time serving at DARPA, the first as a
program manager and the founding director of DARPA's
Microelectronics Technology Office.
Ms. Mary J. Miller is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Research and Technology, also in this position for the
second time.
Ms. Mary E. Lacey is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). As
I said, welcome back. You are the only witness on this panel to
date who was at the hearing that we had last year.
Dr. David E. Walker is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering.
I thank all of you today for your service in the cause for
our national security. We look forward to your testimony. In
order for us to have adequate time to discuss a broad range of
topics--and especially with five witnesses also--I ask that you
keep your opening remarks to, hopefully, 2 minutes. We are
going to include your full written statements in the hearing
record.
Before we hear from our panel, I want to turn to my good
friend, colleague, and ranking member, Senator Fischer, for any
opening remarks she would care to make. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
all for being here today. I truly appreciate your taking the
time to come here and go through this briefing with us and have
a conversation about the important issues before us.
I appreciate the innovative structures our military employs
to conduct cutting-edge research. In my State, the University
of Nebraska has partnered with the U.S. Strategic Command to
advance its mission to protect the United States from an attack
by weapons of mass destruction. General Kehler has noted the
clear value of this partnership.
As we prioritize our scarce defense resources, it is
critical that we continue to invest in advanced research and
potentially game-changing technologies. The American military
is the most advanced and effective fighting force in the world.
We must sustain our investment in the next generation of
technologies to maintain our technological superiority and stay
ahead of these developing threats.
Of course, these investments must be made wisely. I am
eager to hear from our witnesses on the steps they are taking
to scrutinize their investments and, in particular, improve
coordination and eliminate duplicative research.
The current fiscal environment also demands that defense
funds be devoted toward warfighting missions and capabilities.
Past years may have permitted the support of research that had
only marginal benefit to DOD, but I believe it is critical that
DOD's S&T funding have a strong and clear benefit to its core
mission: fighting and winning wars. DOD simply cannot afford to
foot the bill for projects that are more relevant to other
departments and agencies.
This subcommittee has its work cut out for it. Shedding
non-warfighting research while protecting investments that
could unlock the next generation of battlefield technology will
be a complex and difficult task. We need the help of these
witnesses to thread that needle.
So, thank you so much for being here.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Ranking Member Fischer.
What I would like to do is--I have had two charts handed
out and I just want everybody to look. My first question
actually relates to these talks. Oh, I am sorry. I apologize. I
am ready for these questions and I am already omitting your
opening statements. [Laughter.]
We will pull back on that. I know, I like my charts.
[Laughter.]
So, Dr. Shaffer, if you would start first, please.
STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN R. SHAFFER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Mr. Shaffer. Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Fischer, I am
pleased to represent the scientists and engineers of DOD, a
group that conceives, develops, and matures systems early in
the acquisition process. They work with multiple partners to
provide the unmatched operational advantage employed by our
Services' men and women.
By the way, we like the charts also. [Laughter.]
As we wind down in Afghanistan, the national security and
budget environments are changing. We are heading into
uncertainty. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request
for S&T is $12 billion, a nominal increase from 2013's $11.9
billion.
However, it is not possible to discuss the budget without
addressing the impact of the sequester, which takes 9 percent
from every single program in RDT&E. This reduction will delay
or terminate some efforts. We will reduce awards. For instance,
we will reduce university grants by roughly $200 million this
year alone and potentially reduce the number of new Science,
Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART)
scholarship for service program awardees this year to zero.
Because of the way the sequester was implemented, we will be
very limited in hiring new scientists this year and for the
coming several years. Each of these actions will have a
negative long-term impact to DOD and to national security.
The President and the Secretary of Defense depend upon us
to make key contributions to the defense of our Nation. S&T
should do three things for national security. First, we should
mitigate the current and emerging threats facing our Armed
Forces and Nation. Second, we should build affordability and
affordably enable our current and future weapons systems to
operate. Third, we should develop technology surprise to
prevent potential adversaries from threatening us. My written
testimony highlights specific programs in each of these areas.
In summary, DOD's R&E program is faced with the same
challenges as the rest of DOD and the Nation. But our people
are performing.
We appreciate the support of Congress to let us continue to
meet the national security needs of DOD and the Nation. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaffer follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Alan R. Shaffer
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today on behalf of the scientists
and engineers in the Department of Defense laboratories, as well as the
professional systems engineers and developmental test and evaluation
personnel who work to conceive, develop, and mature systems early in
the acquisition process. There are over 100,000 scientists and
engineers performing these functions. These professionals have worked
together, along with our partners in industry, academia, other
governmental agencies, and allied partners to develop the capabilities
and systems that have provided the unmatched operational advantage
employed by the men and women of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines, as well as other deployed U.S. and allied personnel.
I also represent the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)). Within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), ASD(R&E) is responsible for oversight of
Department-wide activity from concept to early acquisition. Our Science
and Technology (S&T) portfolio includes Basic Research, Applied
Research, and Advanced Technology Development. The Research and
Engineering (R&E) portfolio includes these budget activities as well as
Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (ACD&P). ACD&P covers the
technology transition from laboratory to operational use, and
investment for prototyping which includes systems engineering and early
developmental test and evaluation. Taken as a whole, these functions
define the technical boundaries and possibilities of programs early in
the Department's acquisition process.
When we step back and look at the capabilities developed and
delivered by the Department of Defense research and engineering
programs during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would contend that
the Nation has received a good return on investment. I will cite three
examples of capabilities developed during the past decade that were
developed and fielded from our ASD(R&E) programs.
Foreign Comparative Test program identified and tested
the first Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle systems,
vehicles that provide dramatically greater underbody protection
for passengers.
Quick Reaction Fund developed the Persistent Threat
Detection System (PTDS) and Persistent Ground Surveillance
System (PGSS) both of which are tethered aerostat systems that
provide constant surveillance around our forward operating
bases.
Rapid Reaction Fund developed and produced the Jungle
Advanced Under Dense Vegetation Imaging Technology (JAUDIT), a
laser radar system that can map very high resolution topography
and identify objects under canopy. The JAUDIT system
transitioned to a major acquisition program of record in the
Army; renamed Tactical Operational LIDAR (TACOP). As a next
generation improvement to JAUDIT, TACOP is deployed
operationally in Afghanistan today.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the
Services have also developed and fielded a myriad of capabilities for
our warfighters. For instance:
DARPA created and fielded a wide range of highly
effective tools including the High Altitude LIDAR Operational
Experiment (HALOE), a sensor that delivered three-dimensional
views of the battle space to operational and intelligence
users, and the Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER),
a radar pod that aided in the tracking of threat vehicles and
adversary dismounted personnel.
The Marine Corps Program Manager for Expeditionary
Power deployed the Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy System
(GREENS), a portable hybrid photovoltaic/battery power system
that contains stackable 1600-watt solar arrays and rechargeable
batteries combined to provide 300 watts of continuous
electricity while in remote locations--reducing the need for
fuel resupply.
The Air Force S&T program delivered Blue Devil Block
1, an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
asset. Blue Devil began as a response to satisfy multiple Joint
Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and was delivered to theater
in less than 280 days. It is the only ISR asset that integrates
both wide and narrow field-of-view high definition day and
night sensors. These technologies provide near-real-time
information to troops while simultaneously providing forensic
information to analysts. The Blue Devil ISR platform has now
flown thousands of sorties and saved countless American,
coalition, and civilian lives in Afghanistan.
The Army's Clinical and Rehabilitative Medicine
Research Program (CRMRP) made great strides in wound repair and
organ/tissue regeneration. To date, ten hand transplants have
been performed on six patients. CRMRP currently has burn repair
technologies in clinical trials with industry partners to meet
military needs.
These examples are only a few of the technologies we provide to the
forces deployed in theater. These technologies have given our military
unprecedented protection and situational awareness to address the
counter-insurgency first we face today. The research and engineering
community has performed remarkably to provide new and focused
capabilities to our warfighter over the past decade and will continue
to provide them into the future.
changes in security landscape
Over the past decade, the Nation and Department have been at war.
The Department is now entering a new strategic period and the budget
reflects changes in our mission. The strategic situation was well
summarized by President Obama in the forward to the Defense Strategy
``Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.''
On January 3, 2012, President Obama said in the forward to the
strategy:
``As we end today's wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we
will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for
the full range of contingencies. In particular, we will
continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future
success, including intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass
destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and
prevailing in all domains, including cyber.''
On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel directed senior leaders to
conduct a review to examine the choices that underlie the Department of
Defense's strategy, force posture, investments, and institutional
management. While Secretary Hagel has directed this review, the
``Sustaining Global Leadership'' document drove the development of the
fiscal year 2014 President's budget request just transmitted to
Congress. The current budget challenges are forcing a review of the
strategy but the S&T investment is crafted to address the still valid
strategic challenges.
Secretary Hagel addressed the National Defense University on April
3, 2013. In this address, he highlighted the need to invest in
technology during periods of austerity. He said:
``As the military grappled with incredible challenges to
morale and readiness after Vietnam it also made the transition
to an All-Volunteer Force and protected key investments in
technologies like stealth, precision weapons, and platforms
like the F-16 and Abrams tank. Even during the 1990s
procurement holiday, we invested in satellite guidance and
networking systems, as well as remotely piloted aircraft that
have been game-changers during the last decade of war. The goal
of the senior leadership of this Department today is to learn
from the miscalculations and mistakes of the past drawdowns,
and make the right decisions that will sustain our military
strength, advance our strategic interests, and protect our
Nation well into the future.''
While the future budget situation is uncertain, the emerging
national security challenges are stressing the Department in ways that
we have not seen in a number of years. These current challenges need to
be dealt with, in spite of a declining budget. I will cite five
emerging security challenges that the United States and our allies be
prepared to address. They are:
The instability in Syria, a state with weapons of mass
destruction that could fall out of state control;
The continued development by North Korea of its
nuclear weapons and missile programs;
The emergence of very sophisticated ``anti-access,
area-denial'' capabilities in a number of nations that could
prevent the freedom of movement and access of the United States
and our allies;
The emergence of sophisticated cyber exploitation and
attack; and
The existence and increase in sophistication of
advanced electronic attack capabilities of some of our
adversaries.
While there are other emerging security challenges, each of the
five challenges listed have strong technical challenges that should be
addressed by the entire S&T enterprise.
science and technology objectives
The guidance is clear; the President and the Secretary of Defense
depend on the S&T community to make key contributions to the defense of
our Nation. Those contributions can be summarized in the following
three objectives:
1. Mitigate new and emerging capabilities that could degrade U.S.
(and allied) capabilities
2. Affordably enable new or extended capabilities in existing
military systems
3. Develop technology surprise through science and engineering
applications to military problems
Each of these three objectives is important and is listed in order
of priority. Collectively, the Services and Defense Agencies work
together to address each of these objectives. The first objective is
aligned with defense of the homeland. The second objective addressees
DOD's need to make every system we own and buy more affordable. The
final objective, after we ensure the defense of the homeland and the
affordability of our current and future systems, is to develop new
concepts and technologies that create technology surprise. Pursuing
these objectives form the basis of a new strategy in response to the
evolving security situation.
On April 19, 2011, then Secretary of Defense Gates approved seven
S&T priority areas. These priorities are still valid, and support our
emerging strategy. While each priority has elements for all of these
objectives, three of the seven S&T priorities most strongly support
mitigating emerging threats--Cyber, Electronic Warfare (EW), and
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD). One of the priorities,
Engineered Resilient Systems (ERS), is directly aligned with
affordability, and the final three focus on developing technology
surprise--Autonomy, Data to Decisions, and Human Systems.
A key element of the S&T Defense enterprise are the Priority
Steering Councils (PSCs) which are groups of Senior Executive Service
members from each of the Services and Defense agencies with investments
in a technical area who work together to develop an integrated plan for
their areas. Each of the seven S&T priorities has a PSC. We will
describe the groups in more detail later, but these PSCs are
integrating programs in technical areas across the enterprise.
A final element of the emerging strategy is to develop a better
integrated R&E program across the entire Department. The job of OSD is
to coordinate, integrate, and if possible, optimize the total
Department-wide program. The components do a good job developing
Service-unique systems. We want OSD to focus on the technical areas
where multiple components have a substantial investment and provide
coordination, integration and if possible, optimization across the
Department. These technical areas align with areas no one owns but
everyone uses. This includes space, cyber space, the electromagnetic
spectrum, communications, and other specialty areas like materials
science.
Objective 1: Mitigation of Emerging Threat
For a number of reasons, we are seeing an increase in the type and
complexity of foreign systems and capabilities that could threaten the
Department's ability to perform its missions. Examples of the new
threats include, but are not limited to, cyber threats, advanced
electronic warfare systems, counter-satellite systems, and
proliferating short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. In
addition, old threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
become more acute when tied to extremist terrorist groups. The R&E
community must deal with all of these emerging threats. Many of the
specific emerging concepts are classified, but we can make some general
comments on how the Department is addressing the challenges. We will
address several areas.
(a) Cyber
The National Cybersecurity Coordinator, Michael Daniel, explained,
``The government's senior-most civilian, military, and
intelligence professionals all agree that inadequate
cybersecurity within this critical infrastructure poses a grave
threat to the security of the United States. Most recently, we
have seen an increased interest in targeting public and private
critical infrastructure systems by actors who seek to threaten
our national and economic security.''
In 2011, we established the Cyber PSC to focus the Department's
investment. The Cyber team is led by the Technical Director of the Air
Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York with representatives from
the Naval Research Laboratory, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics
Research, Development, and Engineering Center, the National Security
Agency, and OASD(R&E). This PSC is attempting to integrate the
investments of all three Services, DARPA, and others into an integrated
program. Across the Department, we estimate the investment in Cyber
related S&T to be roughly $500 million in fiscal year 2014.
The PSC has focused Cyber S&T investments into six areas:
Foundations of Trust - Establishing foundational
authentication, confidentiality, identity, attribution, and
authorization services that support secure DOD operational use
of cyberspace.
Cyber Resilience - Having the ability to absorb damage
and ensure continuity information technology in support of
mission operations even in the face of successful and
widespread cyber-attacks.
Cyber Agility - Ensuring that systems can adapt and
maneuver very rapidly in their configurations or location. By
being a moving target in cyberspace, agile operations make
successful attacks from our adversaries much more difficult.
Assuring Effective Missions - Allowing commanders,
decisionmakers, and operators to evaluate options, tradeoffs,
and outcomes to enable the orchestration of cyber elements in
support of kinetic and cyber missions.
Cyber Modeling and Simulation - Developing M&S
capabilities that are able to simulate the cyber environment in
which the DOD operates and enables a more robust measurement,
assessment and validation of cyber technologies.
Embedded, Mobile, and Tactical - Focusing on unique
cyber security challenges of the Department's weapons platforms
and systems beyond wired networking and standard computing
platforms.
I also want to highlight efforts that we are using to accelerate
cyber as a science. The Cyber Measurement Campaign invests to develop
new analytical methodologies, models, and experimental data sets to
establish metrics to measure a system's state of security.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Labs (MIT-LL) is the
ASD(R&E) designated study lead for this cross-federally funded research
and development center collaborative effort to start the campaign,
determine its direction, and perform initial experiments in the areas
of resiliency (Phase 1) and moving target technologies (Phase 2). Phase
1 goals were to demonstrate experiments to measure and quantify
resiliency with mature research prototypes. Phase 2 is focused on
moving target technologies, and will be evaluated during this year's
Terminal Fury exercise at U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).
(b) Space
As with Cyber, the last 5-10 years could be described as an era
when the United States space constellation has become more vulnerable.
Electronic jammers present challenges for U.S. global positioning, and
communications satellites. Both the United States and China have
demonstrated missiles against low-earth orbiting satellites. Other
threat capabilities have left the U.S. in a position where we must
better protect our space capabilities. Again, there are no easy answers
to deliver capability, so we need S&T. In fiscal year 2014, the
Department plans to invest approximately $550 million in Space S&T.
While not all encompassing, our preliminary analysis shows three areas
do need attention: precision navigation and timing (PNT), enhanced
communications, and space resiliency. The first two are areas where,
with S&T, the United States can reduce dependence on our current space
architecture; the third area will begin the process of providing a new
architecture.
1. Enhancement of Precision Navigation and Timing
The first area of engagement by the Department includes numerous
activities to enhance the robustness of PNT. Currently, PNT
capabilities are delivered primarily through the Global Positioning
System (GPS), a system vital to numerous missions, ranging from
conducting precision guided weapon strikes to synchronizing our
communications networks. In an anti-access/area (A2/AD) denial
scenario, it is reasonable to assume an adversary will seek to degrade
or deny our use of GPS. The GPS program of record is pursuing
modernization to further improve the anti-jamming and secure access of
the military GPS signals. These vital efforts must continue.
At the same time, the DOD S&T program is providing alternate means
to provide PNT for our forces. For example, cross-Service efforts are
in progress to develop next generation Inertial Measurement Units to
reduce their inherent drift thereby increasing operational time and
effectiveness in a GPS-denied environment. Army labs are pursing
efforts in relative navigation that will enable a combat team to
determine their position even if only one element of a team knows its
actual position. DARPA and the Navy are leading efforts to reduce the
size of atomic clocks to bring GPS-quality precision timing into
smaller systems. Additionally, we've reinvigorated efforts using non-
GPS external references like ground/terrain features, RF signals, and
stars--each excelling for certain applications. These near- and far-
term efforts are not intended to replace GPS. Instead they will provide
robustness in environments where GPS-based capabilities are being
degraded or denied either by environmental factors or adversary action.
2. Enhancement of Military Communications
Military operations depend on voice and data communications
networks that have robust reliability that exceeds most civil
communication infrastructures. Unfortunately, much like PNT,
sophisticated adversaries could degrade our space-based communication
networks. The S&T community is working to provide other options for
secure communications to our operational forces. Robust, cyber-
protected and adaptable networks are needed in all domains, as high-
priority traffic travels in surface, air and space layers to achieve
reliable connectivity.
To better understand assured communications, we have matured or
initiated several efforts, including:
The Battlefield Airborne Communications Network
(BACN); is a Rapid Reaction Fund effort that has turned into an
enduring podded capability to augment satellite communication,
fielded in Afghanistan and headed to Pacific Command.
The SpiderNet/Spectral Warrior program to enable
spectrum awareness by network operators while we continue to
assess the resiliency and control of space communications
assets aimed at offering increased survivability and effective
reactions within A2/AD conditions.
We are conducting a series of reviews with the Services to examine
the need for alternative means, such as hosted payloads, new orbits,
and layering of communications pathways across air and ground domains.
One capability included in the fiscal year 2014 budget is the
Asymmetric Broadband Command & Control (ABC2) demonstration, an
Iridium-based `leave-behind' prototype that should assist in portable
polar coverage in areas that traditionally experience sporadic and
unreliable communications.
3. Enhancement of Space Launch Responsiveness
Finally, our current space architecture is comprised mainly of
large satellites that may be vulnerable as some nations have
demonstrated the capability to shoot them down. Again the S&T program
should provide options. Recent technology developments, such as high
resolution, small imaging focal planes, micro-inertial control systems,
miniaturized thrusters and software programmable telecommunications,
provide opportunities for DOD to employ low-cost, small satellites,
ranging in the 10s to 100s of kilograms. When coupled with low cost
launch systems this could enable an entirely new space architecture.
We have invested in two Joint Capabilities Technology
Demonstrations (JCTDs) to examine these concepts. The Soldier-
Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer for Space (SWORDS) JCTD
provides a low cost, quick and predictable launch system for the
Combatant Commanders and is capable of responding to urgent requests
for augmentation of imagery or communications support. The Kestrel Eye
JCTD provides the capability to deploy multiple imaging satellites to
provide near-real-time situational awareness to the ground component
warfighter. The major benefit of Kestrel Eye is the ability of the
satellite to be tasked directly by the lowest echelons of command. This
benefit is achievable since the satellite is expected to have a low
per-unit cost (<$1.5 million) in production. With this low cost,
sufficient numbers of satellites could be made and deployed to provide
assured access, on-demand to the warfighter. Coupled together, these
two JCTDs provide a glimpse of the future of affordable responsive
space.
While constellations of small satellites cannot completely replace
our need for the main-line Defense and Intelligence spacecraft, our
ability to rapidly launch and, if necessary, quickly replenish
constellations of small satellites to maintain essential warfighting
capabilities could deter potential adversaries.
(c) Electronic Warfare/Electronic Protection
The third emergent threat area is electronic warfare (EW) and
electronic protection (EP). Simply put, the convergent maturation of
multiple technologies has resulted in significantly new EW
capabilities. The technologies include:
Digital electronics
New microelectronics providing increasing bandwidth,
reliability, and agility of sensing systems including radar
Digital/analog converters
Photonics
These technologies can, through direct adaptation, provide
potential adversaries capabilities that, in some case, could present
operational challenges to U.S. forces and systems. Such developments,
combined with longer range stand-off weapons and sheer numbers of
jammers and decoys, represent a substantially different challenge for
our forces, which for decades have routinely enjoyed virtually
uncontested dominance in the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. If
left uncontested, this situation could result in circumstances that
negate the value of some of our most expensive and sophisticated
sensors and weapons.
As with cyber, the Department established the EW PSC, led by the
Air Force with senior leaders from all the Services and OSD to guide
and focus Departmental investments in EW. The EW PSC has been meeting
to aggressively address the threats with a roadmap for coordinated
development of EW capabilities. Within ASD(R&E) our Electronic Warfare
and Countermeasures Office, in conjunction with the Research,
Development and Acquisition (RDA) Task Force, initiated several efforts
to regain U.S. dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum.
New emphasis is being placed on research and development to regain
U.S. electronic component superiority to mature the next generation of
electronic and photonic components with performance exceeding that of
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices and to demonstrate these
components in EW systems. To augment a substantial on-going EW S&T
investment, the Department launched a pilot effort in fiscal year 2013
to explore technologies that are essential to the superiority of future
U.S. EW systems. EW S&T research, at the component and system
techniques levels, is vital to the development of new, modern
electronic attack and protection technologies for the future. Hand-in-
hand with those key developments will be having the advanced testing
equipment to facilitate the development of future EW systems.
Test capabilities should adapt to the reality of adversary sensors
and weapons systems with advanced electronic components. In fiscal year
2014, the Department has increased investment by $480 million over the
Future Years Defense Program to provide major upgrades of our testing
facilities to include advanced radar sensors to represent the digitally
reprogrammable systems our potential adversaries are fielding. Not only
do we need to test against advanced sensors but also we anticipate
enemy weapons systems will be networked with sophisticated command and
control functions. Upgrades to our test facilities will provide our
advanced platforms with the signal densities from multiple netted
sensors that they would expect to encounter in combat. These upgrades
are not exclusive to open air ranges, although, that represents a
significant investment. We are upgrading laboratory and anechoic
chamber capabilities to the point that we will be able to employ
electronic attacks and EP in software in the lab with threat
representations validated by the intelligence community. As testing
progresses through the lab, to the chamber, and finally to open air
testing, we will progressively insert hardware in the loop while
maintaining consistency in the signal environment.
(d) Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
The final PSC in the emerging threat area, C-WMD, is focused on
advancing the Department's ability to locate, secure, monitor, tag,
track, interdict, eliminate, and attribute WMD weapons and materials.
In fiscal year 2014, the Department plans to invest approximately $87
million in C-WMD. This investment only represents the funding aligned
with finding loose fissile material. The Department recently concluded
an interagency planning effort to define a robust S&T program to
establish the science, technology base, and intellectual capabilities
needed to support current and future C-WMD operations. Since 2011, the
effort has been narrowly focused on finding and following nuclear
materials. However, the products produced by the PSC to identify threat
signatures and alternate ways of thinking about C-WMD, have broad
applications across the nuclear, chemical and biological domains. The
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is the principal research agency
in this domain and has support from all of the Military Departments and
several Defense Agencies in performing and supporting relevant
foundational research. Because DTRA is also a combatant support
command, there is strong connectivity between the technical and
operational challenges for this important mission. The DOD S&T program
coordinates and collaborates with critical stakeholders, including the
National Nuclear Security Agency, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Department of Health and Human Services. We also work closely
with international partners in areas of mutual interest.
The S&T support in C-WMD ranges from fundamental research in the
physical and biological sciences to more applied research for
mitigating the WMD threat. The latter includes technologies for
actively countering WMD weapons, sensors and personnel protection for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats,
modeling and simulation of WMD effects, and medical countermeasures
against chemical and biological threats. DOD S&T also develops tools
for use in reach-back response to chemical, biological, or nuclear
hazards. Technically, S&T continues to improve our detection and
advanced sensors, both active and passive, and novel combinations of
acoustic, radio-frequency, optical, and infrared sensing that may
provide definitive detection and characterization and network analysis.
Objective 2: Affordability Enables New or Extended Capabilities into
Existing Military Systems
The second objective focuses on affordability, which includes
affordability of new systems and their life-cycle upgrades,
interoperability between existing platforms, and design and prototyping
of new systems. All levels of leadership in the Department clearly
understand the need to be thoughtful about each and every dollar we
request and to carefully assess and justify the criticality of every
item in our budget. As the Department shapes its future plan to reflect
fiscal realities, it will continue to focus on efficiency and
affordability in everything we do. Acutely aware of budget pressures, a
key piece of our strategy is to make the most of our shrinking
portfolio with the Better Buying Power Initiative. Our approach has
been to maximize our investment dollars by improving design
capabilities and making the transition of technologies to acquisition
programs more effective and timely.
(a) Engineered Resilient Systems
One area where the Department has specifically focused attention on
S&T to improve efficiency has been on the design process itself. As
stated previously, one of our seven S&T priorities is ERS; an S&T
objective that organizes work across the Department focused on
rethinking the way we design and develop systems and to explore new
concepts, tools, and processes to allow complex design to occur faster,
smarter, and more cost-effectively.
The Department's investments in ERS form the bridge between S&T and
future engineering and test capabilities that aim to make our
warfighting systems more affordable and interoperable. In fiscal year
2014, the Department plans to invest roughly $470 million in ERS. The
S&T investment in ERS is focused on infrastructure, information, design
and decision support tools, and knowledge environments that:
Increase the speed of system development
Improve effectiveness of fielded systems
Minimize lifecycle costs
S&T efforts include integrating physics-based models with
acquisition, quantifying the effects of architecture changes on system
cost and performance, and automating trade-space analyses. ERS will
leverage Department investments in human systems and data to decisions
(D2D) to improve knowledge management and training during the entire
lifecycle. By 2022, the goal of ERS is to achieve:
A 75 percent reduction in the time to complete systems
by reducing rework;
A 100-fold increase in the number of parameters and
scenarios considered in setting requirements prior to Milestone
A;
Quantified adaptability to changing mission
requirements; and
Integrated producibility and lifecycle concepts across
acquisition
The Director of the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development
Center leads the ERS initiative with support from all the components.
The ERS lead monitors existing S&T programs, progress toward ERS goals,
and identifies gaps in the S&T portfolio related to ERS.
(b) Systems Engineering InitiativeS
Within the office of ASD(R&E), DASD (Systems Engineering) and DASD
(Developmental Testing and Evaluation) perform additional functions
mandated by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Each of
these offices has considerable influence on acquisition success by
ensuring that large acquisitions programs are properly planned, include
appropriate engineering efforts to map requirements into technical
specifications, realize those specifications in product and
sufficiently test those products throughout their development. Both of
these offices have undertaken significant initiatives to address
acquisition affordability by ensuring better technical planning even
earlier in the acquisition lifecycle--by engaging programs at the pre-
milestone A stage.
The ASD(R&E) Systems Engineering office has led the Department's
implementation of development planning, increasing early acquisition
program planning and enabling the Department to make more informed
early investment decisions based on a better understanding of technical
risks and opportunities. DASD(SE) established the Development Planning
Working Group (DPWG) in fiscal year 2011, involving key requirements
and acquisition stakeholders from across the Military Departments, OSD
and the Joint Staff to ensure a common understanding and consistent
implementation of development planning across the Department. The DPWG
has been effective in developing clear guidance on early phase
technical planning, providing sponsors and programs with a roadmap of
how to better formulate and execute effective program plans from a
program's beginning. With direct support to pre-major defense
acquisition program, DASD(SE) has helped establish programs with
realistic requirements, shape technical strategies, and support a
robust Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process that assesses technical
risks in areas such as reliability, maintainability, manufacturing, and
schedule. DASD(SE) has worked directly with program offices to develop
their Systems Engineering Plans, shape the Technology Development (TD)
phase technical approach, and review the program's draft requirements,
enabling informed requirements trade decisions that balance cost and
performance and properly manage technical risks. By engaging programs
early through development planning, DASD(SE) has helped to make the
Department's senior leadership more informed about early acquisition
investment decisions and more effective in planning and executing
programs.
(c) Developmental Test and Evaluation Initiatives
The DASD(DT&E) office has initiated an effort, entitled ``shift
left'' designed to engage acquisition programs earlier in the life
cycle, thereby ensuring a better understanding of program technical
risks and opportunities before major milestone decisions. The basic
premise of ``shift left'' is to find and fix problems before entering
production. This should save money. There are three key focus areas to
the ``shift left'' concept: earlier mission context, earlier
interoperability testing, and earlier cyber security testing. Improved
DT&E moves beyond the traditional technical focus to include testing in
the mission context to characterize capabilities and limitations.
Robust DT&E should also include all of the elements of interoperability
and cyber security testing that previously was not tested until late in
the acquisition life cycle.
DASD(DT&E) will focus attention on these areas and work with the
Program Manager, Chief Developmental Tester, and Lead DT&E Organization
to address these issues when they assemble the Test and Evaluation
Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) and write the Test and
Evaluation and Master Plan. In the areas of interoperability and cyber
security, DASD(DT&E) is working with all stakeholders to insert needed
testing early and define the right way to oversee these processes. It
is important that we be clear in our intent: our objective is to
establish processes to oversee the developmental testing activities
that support certification, not oversee the certification process.
Simply put, DASD(DT&E) is working hard to improve the Service
developmental testing functions.
(d) Data Reuse
The final specific area I would like to highlight is enhancing
affordability through data reuse, led by the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC). DTIC has the responsibility to develop,
coordinate, and enable a capability to store, reuse, and apply
technical information, data, and knowledge. DTIC has made tremendous
strides in the past several years to evolve from a library function to
an information exchange function, and in so doing has increased their
support of the entire DOD R&E program. In this role, DTIC fosters
information exchanges, empowers innovators with greater efficiency,
effectiveness, and agility that supports accelerating the delivery of
warfighting technology. The fiscal year 2014 budget request for DTIC is
$56 million.
DTIC connects scientists, engineers, researchers and warfighters by
enabling the R&E community to build on past work, collaborate on
current challenges, avoid duplication of effort, accelerate fielding
solutions at reduced costs, aid decision makers, and support management
of the S&T Enterprise. DTIC registered 6,857 new users and supported
3,771 average monthly active users in 2012. These new and returning
users have increased usage of DTIC collections by 20 percent.
Bringing together the mix of performers in the lab, operational,
and acquisition communities can pose technical and cultural challenges.
Colleagues are separated by geographical and organizational structures.
DTIC's information sharing efforts extend beyond official reports, to
include researcher provided insights, areas for questions and answers,
industry capabilities, and communication of DOD strategies and
opportunities to industry. DTIC works to break down barriers by
providing tools to support organization-to-organization connections and
person-to-person interactions. Tools like DOD Techipedia hold an online
electronic encyclopedia of knowledge and provide a platform where
organizations can share information on challenges and needs. The
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics community uses DOD Techipedia to
support management of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP).
Another recently developed tool is called DOD TechSpace, a tool similar
to Facebook, which allows teams to connect on work issues, share ideas,
and link to experts.
To support our diverse stakeholder community, DTIC ensures
appropriate users have easy access to relevant content while protecting
sensitive data through information security, cyber security, and
intellectual property safeguards. In support of the Better Buying Power
initiative, DTIC develops tools to analyze and visualize Independent
Research and Development (IR&D) investments for DOD decisionmakers to
strategically invest scarce resources.
Objective 3: Development of New Capabilities (Technology Surprise)
While the Department's S&T program is mitigating emerging threats
and striving for greater affordability, completing just these two
objectives is not satisfactory by itself. If all we do is react, the
Department does not lead change. A critical component in the
Department's ability to develop new capabilities is its investment in a
wide range of basic research and applied research in new areas that
have the potential to transition into major new technologies and
capabilities. DARPA lives in this space. Objective 3 tends to be mid-
to long-term focus and includes areas like quantum sciences, synthetic
biology, engineered nano-materials, and many others.
I will start with the Department's investment in basic research,
move through three PSCs that are focused on new capabilities (autonomy,
D2D and human systems), discuss a special area, medical science, and
then close with a new effort, to be hosted at DTIC, to better provide
for technology watch/horizon scanning of emerging technical areas.
(a) Basic Research
The Department's Basic Research program has a longstanding history
of investing in multidisciplinary and transformative research by
leading scientists and engineers. The strength of its program is its
ability to invest in research areas that have been identified as a
priority to the DOD. The fiscal year 2014 President's request of $2.2
billion with actual real growth compared to inflation, highlights the
importance and strong investment that the DOD places in its basic
research program. This investment supports literally hundreds of
individual grants.
While the Department invests heavily in traditional basic research
areas like chemistry and material sciences, the Department also
actively examines and assesses the global scientific landscape to
identify emerging scientific research areas that may develop into
gamechanging technologies in the future. Some of these areas that we
are focusing on for the future include:
Synthetic Biology, where novel products in diverse
areas such as bio-fuels, bio-sensors, vaccines, programmable
devices, and high-strength materials.
Quantum Information Science, whose applications might
lead to new forms of secure communications, greater precision
in the measurement of time and location, and simulation leading
to development of new classes of materials.
Cognitive Neuroscience, where increased understanding
of brain function can inform researchers about human learning,
decisionmaking, effective training methods, and the effect of
stress, sleep, and post-war trauma on our military personnel.
Understanding Human and Social Behavior, which can
further our understanding of how individuals, groups, and
nations work to enhance strategic and tactical decision making,
improve immersive training and mission rehearsal, and
facilitate cross-cultural coalition building.
Novel Engineered Materials, such as superconductors,
metamaterials, plasmonics and spintronics, which can be
designed to provide novel coatings, self-healing properties,
energy efficiency, and improved detection and computational
capability to existing materials.
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology, where increased
understanding of material properties at the nano-scale can open
doors to new classes of electronics and sensors, chemical
catalysts, high-strength materials, and energetic properties.
In fiscal year 2014, we are migrating the Historically Black
Colleges and Universities and Minority Institution (HBCU/MI) program
back to an OSD budget line, and re-categorizing the investment as basic
research. The HBCU/MI research and education program strives to build
the capacity of HBCU/MI to perform world-class research, as well as to
involve students in that research to foster their interest in pursuing
careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
disciplines. As part of our administration of that program, we
continually look for ways to increase the participation of HBCU/MI and
ensure that we involve these institutions in activities of mutual
benefit to them and DOD. Among our efforts during this past year was a
very successful workshop where we brought together HBCU researchers
from over 30 universities and their technical counterparts in the DOD
research offices in a forum that allowed the researchers to talk about
their research and understand DOD research priorities. We also seek to
ensure that the research and education role of HBCU/MI is recognized as
an integral part of the Department's larger research agenda by taking
into account HBCU/MI viewpoints and capabilities as we develop
initiatives and address challenges for the longer term. In fiscal year
2014 we plan to increase our HBCU/MI's investment to support the
development of Centers of Excellence at HBCU/MI around cutting-edge
research areas, such as cyber-security, autonomy, and D2D.
Since its inception in 1992, the DOD HBCU/MI program has funded
over 750 research and education grant awards, including awards for
investigator-initiated research and awards to acquire equipment and
instrumentation. More than 160 HBCU/MIs received these awards, which
totaled over $350M. The 150 funded HBCU/MI included 75 percent of the
designated HBCUs (76 out of 103) and about 85 percent the Tribal
Colleges and Universities (30 out 35), with most of the remaining
awards going to Hispanic-Serving Institutions.
(b) Autonomy
Autonomous technologies enable DOD warfighting systems to function
with greater independence from human interaction and with reduced
response times in stressed environments. The true value of autonomy is
not to provide a direct human replacement, but rather to extend and
complement human capability with autonomous systems. The Department's
fiscal year 2014 S&T investment in autonomy is approximately $300
million and focuses on developing systems that perform complex military
missions in dynamic environments with the right balance of warfighter
involvement. Such autonomous systems can extend warfighters reach via
unlimited persistent capabilities, offer warfighters more options and
flexibility to access hazardous environments, and react at speeds and
scales beyond human capability.
To implement autonomous capabilities, the Department has
established four technical autonomy focus areas: Human and Agent System
Interaction and Collaboration (HASIC); Scalable Teaming of Autonomous
Systems (STAS); Machine perception, Reasoning and Intelligence (MRI);
and Test, Evaluation, Validation, and Verification (TEVV) and has
developed a capability development roadmap for each area.
Additionally, the Department established the Autonomy Research
Pilot Initiative (ARPI), an initiative that will facilitate a
coordinated S&T program guided by feedback from operational experience
and evolving mission requirements. This program engages multiple
Department laboratories on an internal, inter-service competition of
autonomy-related applied research topics conducted by government
scientists and engineers. The ARPI source selections are ongoing for
the work to be performed in fiscal year 2014-2016.
Through the ARPI, the Department will allocate approximately $15
million for up to 3 consecutive years, totaling up to $45 million.
Advancement of technologies from investments in the four technical
areas will result in autonomous systems that provide more capability to
warfighters, lessen the cognitive load on operator/supervisors, and
lower overall operational cost. In addition, these investments will
facilitate harnessing the potential of autonomous systems and
strengthening mission effectiveness while maintaining fiscal
responsibility and optimizing interoperability across space, air,
ground, and maritime domains.
(c) Data to Decisions
The second area to develop new capabilities is D2D which brings in
elements of ``big data,'' data analytics, graph theory, and other
emerging concepts in the knowledge domain. The 2012 National Security
Strategy states that ``for the foreseeable future, the United States
will continue to take an active approach to countering [threats] by
monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide[.]'' D2D seeks
science and applications to reduce the time and manpower associated
with the analysis of large data, leading to actionable data. In fiscal
year 2014, the Department plans to invest approximately $535 million in
D2D. Investments in this new research priority area provides tools and
insight into the widely available data to discover patterns and trends,
analyze potential outcomes, and prevent strategic surprise. As a cross-
cutting and enabling priority area, the research foundations of
mathematics, statistics, and computational methods within D2D area are
relevant across many of the missions and business areas within the DOD
to include intelligence, operations, logistics, and personnel and
readiness.
For intelligence data, challenges persist in analyzing the
increasing amount of information resulting from improved sensor
performance and the widely available and relevant open source
information to support analysis and decision making. With this
abundance of data, the need to discover and identify patterns, such as
threat signatures, in complex, incomplete, imprecise and potentially
contradictory large data sets has become a critical issue in
decisionmaking processes within the DOD. It is beyond the abilities of
humans to read and assimilate such large data sets and create
comprehensive analytic products that leverage them. Said another way,
as the amount of data grows, extracting actionable information, and
fusing these results with relevant contextual or situational
information to inform effective and timely action becomes progressively
more challenging.
Some commercial technologies, such as cloud computing, are maturing
and are widely available, but the development and use of data analytics
to support DOD missions and business areas requires further research
and development to exploit these advancements. Additionally, the unique
challenges of the military tactical environment as well as the time and
manpower constraints of tactical missions complicates adaptation of
this technology as well as the development of data analytics to support
mission requirements. On a much broader level, the foundations of D2D
research can be used across many mission and business areas within the
DOD to use data more effectively to save time and manpower costs.
(d) Human Systems
Human Systems research is focused on maximizing warfighter
performance through focused and strategic research investments. The
Department's primary focus has been to foster true synchronization
between the hardware, software, and human elements of warfighter
systems. This synchronization will enable effective and efficient
mission performance, training, and warfighter selection, as well as
affordable and effective equipment to support and conduct military
operations. In fiscal year 2014, the Department plans to invest
approximately $270 million in human systems.
The Department's Human Systems research is focused on three
research areas: Personnel and Training, Human System Interfaces, and
Biology-based Innovation. The research area of Personnel and Training
focuses on improving warfighter training so that they are not using
yesterday's technology, methods, and strategies. The training must
address evolving mission complexities and dynamics. The Department has
made substantial progress in developing tailored training approaches,
mission essential competency development, fleet synthetic training,
intelligent adaptive training and enhanced cognitive competencies.
The research area of Human Systems Interfaces is addressing the
problem that most of the Department's current operating systems are
rigidly data-centric vice flexibly information-centric. Research in
this area is addressing these challenges with the realization that data
quantity will continue to increase nonlinearly. Substantial progress
has been made in human interaction with autonomous system and command
and control decisionmaking.
In summary, the human sciences provide guidance on how to modify
techniques, tactics, and procedures to achieve desired goals without an
expensive materiel solution. Human systems research can provide tools
for decisionmakers to evaluate whether non-materiel solutions or
modified materiel-solutions can meet desired requirements at lower
cost.
(e) Medical Research and Capability Development
A somewhat specialized area of investment in S&T is defense medical
research. The Department's research efforts in the biomedical arena
reflect the focus on taking care of our people throughout the full
spectrum of operations to include prevention of injury and disease both
in garrison and on the battlefield, diagnosis and treatment at the
point of injury, delivery of world-class medical care both en route to,
and within medical treatment facilities and rehabilitation. Over the
past decade, we have made remarkable progress in research areas aimed
at minimizing bleeding and preventing hemorrhagic shock. The major
investments in medical research; however, focus on acquiring a better
understanding of the underlying cellular mechanisms and functional
impacts associated with traumatic brain injury (TBI), particularly
those characterized as mild TBI or concussion. For the battlefield
commander, it is important to quickly assess the extent of this injury
after a blast or blunt head trauma, in order to get prompt and
appropriate medical care for the warfighter. To this end, the
Department's investment has led to the development of a high definition
fiber tracking method for use with existing magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) scanners to assess brain tracts for damage with much greater
sensitivity than ever before. Complementing this new imaging capability
is the development of a blood test for TBI to determine if brain cells
are physically damaged after a traumatic event. This test is now in
pivotal clinical trials for approval by the FDA and if successful, this
test is expected to be the first objective diagnostic test for the
presence and extent of TBI that may become part of the gold standard by
which this condition is diagnosed. With regard to brain functional
assessment, the Department's research efforts have led to a novel
method for assessment of brain injury that is based on eye tracking
metrics. This technology will also benefit the operational community by
enabling assessment of performance degradation due to stress and
fatigue.
Finally, and quite amazingly, we are now deploying servicemembers
back into theater with ruggedized prosthetic legs that can withstand
the rigors of the combat environment while dramatically improving
agility. These new legs allow the user to move rapidly across uneven
terrain with improved efficiency. The Department is capitalizing on
advances in understanding neuromuscular control to allow users to more
naturally control prosthetic devices by harnessing nerve signals from
the brain and linking them to the device. Although most of the
investment in prosthetics has focused on the lower extremities,
significant progress has been made in the development of a prosthetic
arm that mimics the natural function of the human arm. Future
investment will focus on reducing the weight and increasing the degrees
of freedom in the motions that can be achieved by these prosthetic
arms. Many of the Department's advances in rehabilitation are improving
the quality of life of amputees in the civilian population as well.
Important to the development of injury prevention measures, is the
knowledge and understanding of the mechanisms and forces involved in
creating the injury. To this end, our S&T research program has
developed a small, lightweight, multiple axis accelerometer/pressure
blast injury gauge that is worn by the warfighter and is capable of
storing the pressure and force profile of their exposure. This
information, combined with associated medical symptoms, will aid in
modifications of future designs of the warfighter's protective gear.
These gauges are currently deployed.
(f) Technology Watch/Horizon Scanning
In the fiscal year 2014 budget, we have a new low-cost, but high-
risk effort to apply advanced data analytics to try to isolate and
identify emerging ``hot'' science and technology areas. This type of
approach is fairly well defined in industry for short-term financial
prediction. We believe, but no one has proven, that the same non-
parametric methods will apply to technology watch/horizon scanning. We
will ask for industry bids to offer their software and modified for our
purposes, then host the application at DTIC, for all DOD users to be
able to access.
This is a high-risk initiative to bring emerging data analytics to
bear on identifying significant changes in the global technology
landscape. This effort will leverage a range of algorithms and data
streams to provide both leadership and program managers more insight
into evolving technical capabilities worldwide.
s&t infrastructure and human capital
In order to execute programs that are designed to solve problems,
an effective R&E enterprise must plan for and maximize its employment
of people, facilities, and planning processes.
1. People
Within the R&E functional areas, we have to both shepherd today's
workforce, as well as develop the future workforce. Over the past
several years, we have seen some initiatives that have increased our
flexibility for hiring people--this has helped.
While previous legislation has helped with recruiting new talent,
we have also made gains in the acquisition workforce due in part to the
hard work of the Acquisition Career Field functional managers, three of
whom reside in ASD(R&E)--Science and Technology, Systems Engineering,
and Test and Evaluation. The Department's responsible officials for
each are the Director, Defense Laboratories; the Deputy assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering; and the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation.
While we have made progress, I am concerned that the current budget and
sequestration pressures will make retaining this workforce difficult.
(a) Science and Technology Workforce
As part of the strategic workforce planning initiative, the
Department has completed two assessments of its Scientist and Engineer
(S&E) workforce this year--the Science and Technology (S&T) Functional
Community assessment and the Technical Workforce of the Science and
Technology Reinvention Laboratories (STRLs) assessment. The S&T
Functional Community assessment focused on the mission critical
occupation of Computer Scientists indicated that there is increasing
demand across the Department for highly-skilled and highly-trained
individuals in emerging fields like cyber research, quantum computing,
and artificial intelligence. The assessment also found that many of the
skills necessary for the Department are best cultivated in-house
because of the high degree of specialization needed and multi-
disciplinary requirements. The SMART program (Science, Mathematics, and
Research for Transformation) was identified as a critical tool for
successfully attracting, training, and preparing the future workforce.
Using SMART, we have been able to compete for very high-quality talent.
The Technical Workforce of the STRLs assessment examined the more
than 37,000 scientists and engineers working in the STRLs. The
assessment emphasized the successes of greater flexibilities for STRL
directors that legislative changes have produced, particularly Direct
Hiring Authority (DHA). DHA, which is available on a limited basis only
for individuals with advanced degrees, has reduced the average hiring
timeline from nearly 100 days to just under 30 days. This flexibility
was identified as critical to hiring the most talented scientists and
engineers in an extremely competitive market. Attrition due to
retirement has been identified as potentially impacting the ability of
the STRLs to maintain the critical skills and competencies necessary to
fulfill their mission. The assessment concluded that the ability of
STRL directors to be flexible and adaptive in the management of their
respective workforces is a key component to maintaining the scientific
and technical excellence across the STRLs.
(b) Systems Engineering Workforce
The scope of the DOD engineering enterprise represents a remarkable
investment of human capital. The Department, with its Services and
Agencies, is one of the largest engineering enterprises in the world,
with a nonconstruction engineering civilian workforce made up of nearly
76,000 engineers. The DASD(SE) serves as the Department's Functional
Leader for the technical subset of the Defense Acquisition Workforce,
which includes the Systems Planning, Research, Development and
Engineering (SPRDE) (about 39,000 civilian and military) and
Production, Quality and Manufacturing (about 9,000 civilian and
military) career fields.
Today's DOD weapons, combat systems, and technical activities
provide unprecedented capabilities to the Department and presents
engineering challenges to the Department's engineering workforce. The
Department has responded to these challenges, growing the SPRDE
workforce 3.5 percent per year from 34,537 at the end of fiscal year
2008 to 39,807 at the end of fiscal year 2012. A strong government
technical workforce balances the Department's partnership with industry
by providing greater capability for the government to manage complexity
and exercise technical judgment required to conceive, manage, invest in
and oversee development of advanced weapon systems. In view of the
programmed out-year weapons, combat systems and engineering
initiatives, this workload, and the Department's need for world class
engineering talent, is expected to continue well into the future. This
environment will place greater pressure on the Department's ability to
meet this continued demand for a multi-disciplined engineering
workforce and adequately support increased program requirements.
The Department's engineering community has evolved over time to
stay relevant to emerging defense challenges and, while systems
engineering has always been an essential function, it becomes even more
critical in a fiscally constrained environment. However, 12 percent of
the SPRDE workforce is eligible to retire immediately. Many of the
potential retirees will be those in senior and key lead SE positions on
major defense acquisition programs. This highlights not only the
potential loss of experienced SE workforce members, but also increases
performance risks in programs and further highlights the need for the
Department to continue support to maintain our engineering workforce as
a national asset and critical function in support of the warfighter.
DOD leadership is committed to further strengthening the systems
engineering capability and capacity to assure there is a pipeline of
qualified workforce members to serve current and future programs.
(c) Developmental Test and Evaluation Workforce
The DASD(DT&E) is the senior official responsible for the T&E
Career Field in the acquisition workforce. DASD(DT&E) has also made
significant progress in strengthening the T&E workforce, including
revising the core education requirements to advance technical
proficiency within the T&E profession, and the annual review to update
the Defense Acquisition University T&E curriculum to enhance the T&E
workforce's ability to meet tomorrow's challenges.
The current T&E acquisition workforce is 6,838 government and 1,765
military personnel for a total workforce of 8,603. The T&E workforce
has increased from 7,420 in 2008 to our current level of 8,603. We
continue to monitor impact of the budget pressures on the T&E workforce
by providing assessments of the T&E workforce in future DT&E Annual
Reports to Congress. The assessment will look at the ability to
attract, develop, retain, and reward T&E experience to meet the needs
of DOD.
(d) Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)
In addition to taking care of today's workforce, the ASD(R&E) has
responsibility for the S&E workforce of tomorrow. The Department
depends on over 100,000 S&E as well as other STEM professionals. In
2011, we established the STEM Executive Board which provides strategic
leadership to the Department's STEM initiatives. The Board is comprised
of Senior Executive Service-level representatives from the Services;
USD Personnel and Readiness; Intelligence; and representatives of key
acquisition components, and provides strategic coordination of DOD's
STEM investments. Specifically, the STEM Strategic Plan and
Implementation Plan align the Department's investments with DOD STEM
workforce requirements and with administration STEM guidance, including
robust, on-going impact assessments.
The future of the Department's STEM workforce depends on a robust
education system that provides diverse pathways into STEM to meet the
Department's mission. Numerous studies in recent years have called our
attention to the need to improve STEM skills of U.S. students, who have
fallen behind other nations. Through basic science workshops, increased
funding for university research and other dedicated STEM programs, we
are trying to stay connected to universities.
Within the ASD(R&E) portfolio, we have the National Defense
Education Program (NDEP). This program supports the scholarship-for-
service Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART)
program, which provides financial support for undergraduate and
graduate degrees in 19 STEM fields that are critical to the
Department's future. Under SMART, we have attracted over 1,500 top
quality researchers. To date over 700 students have completed their
degrees and entered the DOD workforce. Of these, 82 percent remain
employed in the DOD beyond their service commitment. We continue to
make use of the SMART program to improve our workforce.
2. Facilities
As part of a much larger Office of Science and Technology Policy
led effort to assess the overall status of infrastructure at our
government labs dedicated to national security, the Department is
currently conducting an assessment of Defense Laboratory facilities in
order to more quantitatively and comprehensively evaluate the current
state of DOD Laboratory facilities. The Department is also examining
the process of how the Services currently prioritize military
construction projects and how Laboratory projects are evaluated in this
context. There are general concerns both within and outside the
Department that Laboratory facilities are underfunded relative to the
non-lab infrastructure in the Services. We are in the process of
determining quantitatively if this is true. Without quantitative
evidence, it is impossible to develop proper solutions that adequately
address any problems.
Through this study, the Department will also be able to quantify
the nature and scope of deficiencies at the Laboratories and the
potential costs of rectifying them. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
Laboratories' sustainment, restoration, and modernization efforts lag
those of the rest of the Department, but by how much and to what extent
is unclear. The successful uses of the expansion of minor military
construction authorities to Laboratories suggest that there are indeed
gaps, and the Department is committed to eliminating them. With a more
accurate understanding of any gaps and their size, the Department can
take the necessary steps to ensure that our Laboratories' facilities
remain state-of-the-art and capable of supporting today's mission and
future requirements.
In addition to quality laboratories, the Department also needs
high-quality test facilities. Planned T&E infrastructure upgrades have
been partitioned between System Integration Laboratories (SIL),
Installed System Test Facilities (ISTF), and Open Air Ranges (OAR)
investment to provide a capability mix that effectively supports
technology experimentation and design performance verification testing.
This investment benefits S&T through providing more modern and
representative test facilities. Planned upgrades are focused in three
investment areas. First and foremost, the Department is improving its
System Integration Laboratories at Eglin Air Force Base, FL and Naval
Air Station Point Mugu, CA to allow programming of flight test mission
data files and EW libraries to reflect foreign integrated air defense
systems (IADS) threats. As mentioned earlier, the Department is
upgrading our next-generation EW emulators to mimic modern IADS and
finally, we are upgrading open-air ranges to better iterate live-
virtual demonstration exercises.
We are also very interested in enhancing our cyber test facilities.
The increasing demand for cyber test, training, and experimentation
will challenge our capabilities and capacity of our cyber ranges. We
have transitioned the National Cyber Range (NCR) from DARPA to the Test
Resource Management Center (TRMC), where we will operationalize its
capability to support test and training. The Department will continue
investment in this critical infrastructure to increase both capacity
and capability for cyber training, testing, and experimentation. Once
operational and accredited for the required level of classification,
the NCR will have increased capacity, with standard services, more
efficient sustainment of capability, and fail-over capability to
improve Cyber R&D.
3. Department R&E Planning Process
A key strength of DOD's S&T Enterprise is its substantial emphasis
on coordinated research planning. The Department's S&T components
devote great care and attention to ensuring that DOD's research
investments are well planned and coordinated. In these challenging
budgetary times, it is important to strengthen these efforts to ensure
that we receive the utmost value from our investments in science and
technology.
The overarching framework of the Department's S&T joint planning
and coordination process is called Reliance 21. We are resurrecting and
enhancing Reliance 21, a process with roots that go back several
decades, which has undergone continual renewal and refreshment as
circumstances evolved. The Reliance 21 framework is led by an S&T
Executive Committee (ExCom) that embraces the major Departmental S&T
organizations, including the Military Services and DARPA who sit at my
side at this hearing today. The S&T ExCom, and the S&T Deputies
Committee that serves as its primary operating arm, meet several times
per month to coordinate both strategically and at a tactical level to
harmonize resources and coherently address emerging challenges. Once
every year, the 3-star and 2-star members of the S&T ExCom conduct an
intensive multi-day planning exercise of the Department's out-year
research investments, to ensure proper attention to potential gap
areas, and to minimize unwarranted overlaps. This event is conducted in
close coordination with the future requirements specialists of the
Joint Staff.
Underpinning the S&T ExCom leadership is an ecosystem of technical
groups known as Communities of Interest (CoI) and S&T Priority Steering
Councils (PSCs). There are 18 of these groups that span almost all of
the cross-cutting areas of science and technology in the Department.
Examples of such areas include Advanced Electronics, Sensors &
Processing, and Cybersecurity, among many others. These groups are
populated by the Department's subject matter expert leaders drawn from
the Services, Defense Agencies, and from OSD. The subject matter
experts often have decades of experience in the Defense S&T research
enterprise and are an asset in DOD's efforts to generate technology
surprise and rapidly convert that surprise into operational
capabilities. Fundamentally, the subject matter experts guide and
coordinate the portfolios of research investments in each of the CoI
and PSC areas. They do this primarily through development of research
roadmaps and investment plans. The roadmaps are used extensively to
guide long-term budget decisions and to influence near-term investment
decisions in each of the components. The CoIs and PSCs also provide
forums for developing younger staff and for maintaining technical
awareness of S&T developments both inside and outside DOD. Each year,
roughly half of the PSCs and CoIs brief the health, direction, and
connectedness of the programs in their portfolio.
In addition to this coordinated approach across the Department, we
have taken steps to better leverage Industry's Independent Research &
Development (IR&D) for which DOD reimburses industry approximately $4
billion annually. IR&D projects are a critical source of technology
innovation for DOD. Under the Better Buying Power initiative, ASD(R&E)
was charged to reinvigorate IR&D. The key challenge identified was
communication--industry wanted information about Department investment
priorities to help them better plan their IR&D projects, and DOD
planning was hampered by limited insight into industry IR&D projects.
The Defense Innovation Marketplace website
(www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil) was developed to provide a one-
stop-resource for Department priorities so industry could better align
their R&D investments. Industry can also securely share IR&D projects
with the government, allowing S&T and acquisition program managers to
leverage this data to inform future program planning.
budget priorities
1. DOD S&T Trends
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request (PBR) for S&T is
$11.98 billion, which represents a nominal growth from the fiscal year
2013 PBR of $11.86. For R&E, the fiscal year 2014 PBR is $24.04
billion, which is a 2.6 percent decline from the fiscal year 2013 PBR
of $24.27 billion. This is because the budget category of Advanced
Component Development and Prototypes declined 4.47 percent, in real
buying power. See table:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We must continue to balance the investment with all our partners
across Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. We also recognize R&E
provides lower cost options which become more important during budget
austerity. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget represents a
strategic choice made by the Department to preserve, to the greatest
extent possible, technology-based options for the future. While we
expect continued pressure on the S&T and R&E budgets over the next
several years, it is significant to note that there is recognition of
the value of preserving future options--a characteristic of R&E. Taking
a longer term view, the chart below shows the actual S&T investment in
constant year 2013 dollars, since 1962. The budget request for S&T has
been largely flat since about 2003. This highlights another key
characteristic of a healthy S&T program: long-term stability. It is
important to not have big fluctuations in R&E funding from year to year
so as to maintain a stable workforce.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Another macro trend we see in the DOD S&T budget is highlighted in
the next chart. Since the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request,
we have made a conscious choice to focus more of the investment to the
Services, in relation to Defense agencies and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. We still have an investment of $5.48 billion in
the Defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for S&T
in fiscal year 2014, but this is down from a figure of $6.09 billion as
recently as fiscal year 2010. Much of these funds were with programs
that devolved to the Services.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Finally, the chart below displays the S&T investment by major
components. Investment in S&T for the three Services is between $2.0
and $2.2 billion and DARPA remains the single largest investment with
$2.8 billion in fiscal year 2014. The other components make up a much
smaller piece of the S&T portfolio.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The fiscal year 2014 S&T budget also supports White House
priorities in the areas of advanced manufacturing, robotics and
autonomous systems, cyber security, hypersonics, and electronic warfare
described in earlier sections.
2. ASD(R&E) Portfolio
Shifting focus from the overall DOD S&T to the ASD (R&E) investment
portfolio, the fiscal year 2014 S&T budget of $738 million is 5.5
percent higher than fiscal year 2013 budget of $700 million. The fiscal
year 2014 budget reflects a significant change in major investments
that align to the defense strategy, DOD S&T priorities and OMB
priorities described above. These fiscal year 2014 S&T investment
changes include:
Termination of five existing programs/program elements
to create a new $45 million 6.2 Applied Research for the
Advancement of S&T Priorities Program to focus on the seven S&T
priorities, applied research projects, concept explorations,
and technology solutions for future military needs. In fiscal
year 2014, this new program will support the aforementioned
autonomy pilot and acceleration of engineered resilient
systems. The remaining funds will be competitively allocated to
the other PSCs generated proposals. All funding in this program
will be executed by the components.
Transfer of responsibility and $16 million in funding
for the Historically Black Colleges/Minority Institutes program
from Army to OSD consistent with the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 including realignment of
additional $15 million for Centers of Excellence.
Realignment of $13.8 million in the Emerging
Capabilities Technology Demonstration program to address
developmental prototyping.
Realignment of $60 million from three existing
programs for the standup of a new Strategic Capabilities Office
(SCO) responsible for analyses of emerging threats with
emphasis on innovative and architecture-level concepts,
intelligence concepts, red teaming, and conducting disruptive
technology demonstrations.
Realignment of $130 million for the Advanced
Innovative Technologies Program to accelerate a land-based
prototype of an electromagnetic railgun for improved theater
missile defense capability. This program is not S&T, but ACD&P.
legislative proposals
Prize Authority
The Defense Budget Priorities and Choices guidance, issued in
January 2012, calls for ``cutting-edge capabilities that exploit our
technological, joint, and networked advantage.'' Extending the
authority for Prizes for Advanced Technology Achievements, requested by
this proposal, will allow the Department to continue the cutting-edge
technology prototyping that results from the prize challenges.
Partnerships created under this legislation also strengthen the ties of
the Department with industry and universities. Prize competitions are
unlikely to replace the traditional acquisition process in the DOD, but
for specific technology problems, it is a method that has demonstrated
to be tremendously useful for stimulating and incentivizing a broad
spectrum of individuals to offer solutions to problems of significant
interest to our Nation's warfighters.
SMART
The Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART)
is a Scholarship-for-Service program designed to produce the next
generation of DOD S&T Leaders as our current workforce is aging and
eligible to retire. The program accomplishes this goal by providing
support to undergraduate and graduate students for their educational
expenses in exchange for service in our DOD facilities. This program
matches the SMART scholars with DOD laboratories and other Defense
agencies where mentors transfer their STEM knowledge to the students
and introduce them to the DOD culture beginning with internships and
culminating in full-time employment at those facilities. The Department
is asking for a revision of the SMART legislation that would create
three major benefits; (1) increased flexibility to administer the
program, (2) reduced stipends to make them more consistent with other
Federal scholarship-for service programs, and (3) removal of the
restriction that only U.S. citizens can participate in the program.
Software Licensing
The DOD develops significant quantities of computer software in a
variety of areas such as modeling and simulation, training, and command
and control. A legislative proposal has been prepared to allow the DOD
to protect its software and to facilitate the license process for
transfer to commercial firms. In the course of that licensing action,
it would be protected from release to the general public in response to
a Freedom of Information Act request for up to 5 years providing the
commercial licensing partner adequate time to develop the product,
prepare user documentation, and deploy to both military and commercial
markets. At the same time the commercial firm's investment of funds to
underwrite these product activities is protected from undue
competition. The request is for a 5 year limit on this pilot program.
This provides adequate time for DOD to develop data that would justify
a future request for extension, modification, or cancellation of this
authority.
summary
I would be remiss if I did not mention the impact of sequestration.
At the macro level, the reduction to S&T investment is roughly $1
billion in fiscal year 2013. Since in many cases, the work in S&T is
sequential, the work planned for fiscal year 2013 will be deferred to
fiscal year 2014--and reduces the work planned in fiscal year 2014 by
that same $1 billion. Some of this reduction will be seen at our
government labs, but other impacts will be seen in government and
universities. For example, we expect the total investment in
universities to decline by about $250 million.
In closing, I am proud to say our R&E enterprise is delivering
capability and value for the Department and Nation. I would also like
to thank Congress for your continued support of the S&T program of the
Department of Defense. As we enter a new strategic era, it is important
to examine all Department investments. It is just as important to
understand the value of investments like R&E that strengthen the
overall capabilities of the Department. With your support of the fiscal
year 2014 President's budget request for RDT&E, you will allow our
community to continue to deliver future capabilities for the
Department.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Prabhakar.
STATEMENT OF DR. ARATI PRABHAKAR, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Senator
Fischer. It is really a pleasure to be here with you today.
DARPA's objective is a new generation of technology for
national security, and to realize this new set of military
capabilities and systems is going to take a lot of
organizations and people. But DARPA's role in that is to make
the pivotal early investments that change what is possible,
that really lets us take big steps forward in our capabilities
for the future.
So today, that means that we are investing in a host of
areas. We are building a future where our warfighters can have
cyber as a tactical tool that is fully integrated into the
kinetic fight. We are building a new generation of electronic
warfare that leapfrogs what others around the world are able to
do with widely, globally-available semiconductor technology. It
means we are investing in new technologies for position
navigation and timing so that our people on our platforms are
not critically reliant, as they are today, on the Global
Positioning System. We are investing in a new generation of
space and robotics, advanced weapons systems, new platforms.
Beneath all of that, we are building a new foundational
infrastructure of emerging technologies in different areas of
software and electronics and material science, but also today
new technologies that are emerging from the biological
sciences.
Now, with all of that together, if we are all successful,
our aim is to create for our future commanders and leaders real
options, powerful options, for whatever threats our Nation
faces in the years ahead. That work is the driver behind all of
our programs. It is the reason that the people at DARPA run to
work every morning with their hair on fire because they know
that they are part of a mission that really does matter for our
future security as a country.
I really want to thank this subcommittee for the work that
you have done to support us in many ways, including flexible
hiring authorities as well as budget support. That has been
essential in our ability to do our work.
I look forward to taking your questions, along with my
colleagues.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Prabhakar follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Arati Prabhakar
Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Fischer, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I am Arati Prabhakar, Director of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA).
Three major factors drew me back to DARPA last summer after 19
years in other roles. The first was DARPA's disproportionately large
impact on our current national security and technology capabilities.
The second was the challenge of driving the technologies that will be
cornerstones of our national security in the complex world we face in
the years ahead. The third was the privilege of leading this unique
agency, filled with people who come to work each day in vigorous
pursuit of our important mission.
Today I'd like to tell you about each of these aspects of DARPA. I
will include a discussion of our objectives and strategies, specific
areas of investment, and our budget in the President's fiscal year 2014
request.
The starting point for our discussion today is the future security
of the United States. We all understand the world is complex and
changing in ways that will pose new threats to our national security.
We all understand that resources will be constrained as we reshape
defense budgets. But U.S. security capabilities must remain second to
none despite these uncertainties and pressures. New technology has
consistently created better options for our leadership--and better
security outcomes for our Nation. Today, it is vitally important to
continue to focus on the technology investments that will lead to a new
generation of national security capabilities for our future. This
commitment is reflected in the President's budget request for DARPA in
fiscal year 2014.
Before turning to DARPA itself, I'd like to set the context for our
Agency in our Nation's research and development (R&D) efforts. DARPA is
a projects agency, and we accomplish our objectives through deep
engagement with companies, universities, Department of Defense (DOD)
and other labs. Our success hinges on having a healthy U.S. R&D
ecosystem. Within DOD Science and Technology (S&T) efforts, our role is
to invest in high-payoff opportunities that often require taking
significant risk. We work closely with our colleagues in the Service
S&T organizations, sometimes building on their early research and
drawing on their technical expertise, and often relying on them to help
us transition successful results to military use.
darpa's impact
DARPA's recent transitions won recognition last fall when then-
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta gave the Agency the Joint Meritorious
Unit Award, recognizing numerous contributions for the war effort. The
award singles out the ``creative intellect and keen expertise'' that
delivered ``innovative cutting-edge technology to save lives and
improve mission success amidst constantly evolving threats.''
Responding to urgent needs from troops on the ground, DARPA created and
fielded a wide range of highly effective tools. These included a system
that delivered three-dimensional views of the battlespace to
operational and intelligence users, a radar pod to track threat
vehicles and dismounted personnel, a radio system capable of
interoperable communications and large data transmissions, a detection
system that assesses blast exposure and medical risk to personnel, and
a framework for the analysis of large amounts of data that provided
unique and valuable insights to help answer key strategic and
operational questions.
DARPA program managers, staff, and our partners were all excited to
receive this recognition for what we work towards every day: creating
new technological solutions and transitioning them into practice.
Because DARPA's enduring mission is to change the game in our favor
when it comes to U.S. security capabilities in a rapidly shifting
global context--and to do that by creating surprise for our adversaries
and preventing surprises to our own forces--our warfighters long have
depended upon many military systems that originated in earlier DARPA
work. Aircraft with stealth capabilities, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), night vision for our warfighters who now essentially ``own the
night'' largely because of infrared imaging, the seemingly omnipresent
global positioning satellite (GPS) capabilities for navigation and
precision guided weapons, an arsenal of advanced communications and
computing capabilities, and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) are all well known and publicized examples. The
list goes on and on, and it includes revolutionary changes in how the
world thinks about important areas of science and technology, including
information technology and materials science. The list also includes
some elegant and important advances that do not get public attention by
the nature of their applications. Simply put, our military has taken
DARPA-initiated advances and used them to change warfighting
dramatically. This is how we keep the scales tipped in our direction.
looking to the future: technologies for the next generation of national
security
Today, as the Nation moves to the end of the active engagements of
the last many years, it is time to look ahead and ask the fundamental
questions for DARPA's mission. How do we create highly effective
options for our future leaders in the face of the national security
challenges of the coming decades? How do we dramatically change
warfighting, once again changing the game in our favor faster than
others can respond? How will we deter and defeat the many kinds of
threats that many kinds of actors around the globe will attempt?
DARPA's new framework, captured in a document transmitted to this
committee recently along with the President's fiscal year 2014 budget
request, describes how we think about this all-important question.
``Driving Technological Surprise: DARPA's Mission in a Changing World''
places great importance on the rapidly changing context in which our
military leaders, warfighters, and DARPA now are operating. It explains
how we anticipate, explore, and achieve the concepts and technology on
which the Nation's future deterrent and defense capabilities depend. I
will draw in part on that framework in my testimony.
The United States has seen great change that has affected our
civilian and defense capabilities, positioning, and plans that
challenges us every day. There is nothing new about needing to deal
with changes in our adversary's capabilities. That is a big part of the
history of armed conflict and its prevention or successful execution.
Today's Environment and DARPA's Strategic Objectives
But today's environment is different from the past. First, the
Nation faces complex security challenges. Some are very real and some
are potential in nature--but all demand viable options for our Nation's
leadership. We are finishing a counterinsurgency operation and building
local security capabilities in Afghanistan. An array of diplomatic,
intelligence, and possible military measures must be ready if needed to
address nuclear uncertainties posed by Iran and North Korea. Our
government and private networks deal with the growing onslaught of more
capable and frequent cyber-attacks from many sources on an ongoing
basis. Potential adversaries are deploying sophisticated capabilities
to contest our ability to project military power. A look into the
future only adds uncertainty. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons of mass destruction or terror; the flare-up of
tensions among nations in hot spots around the world; growing pressures
in the urbanizing developing world; and the globalization of technology
and new R&D are all trends we can see.
This shifting, unpredictable national security environment demands
a wide range of capabilities for the future and the agility to both
anticipate and respond to whatever comes.
I want to underscore a point: the technology base upon which our
military systems are critically reliant is highly globalized. This
introduces potential vulnerability in both the assurance of supplies
and the security of the supply chain. At the same time, other players
have the same access to this supply of highly capable components, and
many have used them to quickly develop weapons systems with highly
advanced capabilities. This pattern of globalization, wide
availability, and growing vulnerability pervades most of the core
technologies upon which our defense systems rely. Our challenge is to
create an edge for U.S. national security purposes in this environment.
The second significant factor driving our objectives going forward
is the possibility of a change in public investment for national
security. Because DARPA's prime directive is to prevent strategic
surprise and enable our superiority, we must consider what will be
required to meet the Nation's security needs even in these
circumstances.
The uncertainties we face--threat uncertainties and fiscal
uncertainties--do not change the fact that the Nation relies on DOD to
deter war and protect the security of our country, and DARPA's role
here is vital.
DARPA's Approach
Our first two primary objectives are:
(1) Demonstrate breakthrough capabilities for national security,
and
(2) Catalyze a differentiated and highly capable U.S. technology
base--critical to achieving the first objective.
Several approaches shape our thinking as we attack the need for
breakthrough capabilities for national security:
(1) Game-changing new systems technologies. Today's warfighters
rely on systems from aircraft to navigation to communications that
trace their history to earlier DARPA work. Looking ahead, some of these
may become vulnerabilities as sophisticated adversaries also understand
how crucial these systems are to warfighting. So, DARPA seeks to create
the next generation of new capabilities that once again changes the
game in our favor faster than others can respond.
(2) Layered, multi-technology warfighting concepts. Modern
warfighting is too complex for a single new capability to deliver
sustained superiority across a variety of scenarios. But combining
multiple technology advances by layering and integrating them can lead
to a revolution in capabilities. Looking ahead, we can imagine
coordinated local position, navigation, and timing (PNT); adaptive
electronic warfare; manned and unmanned systems working in harmony;
tactical cyber effects; and advanced ISR--all woven together in ways
that create decisive surprise in tomorrow's conflicts.
(3) Adaptable systems and solutions. While military technology and
weapon systems have continued to evolve and mature over time, our
military engagements of the last 20 years have been fought with systems
developed largely for Cold War scenarios. Our warfighters have had to
adapt for the realities on the ground. Today when we consider future
engagements, we can more readily imagine a host of diverse environments
and adversaries. In an uncertain world, adaptability is critical. We
won't always know what we will need for tomorrow's battle, and our
adversaries will change their tactics and technologies over time. So
systems that can be readily upgraded and adapted in real time to
changing surroundings and conditions will play an important role.
(4) Innovation to invert the cost equation. Today we seek to use
innovation to radically invert the cost dynamic. How can we impose more
cost on our adversaries and less on ourselves, thereby increasing our
deterrent? Can innovative systems architectures, autonomy,
adaptability, and new processes offer new possibilities? These
approaches may allow us to reinvent development, production, logistics,
operations, and maintenance in ways that radically change the cost
equation.
Two themes shape our efforts to catalyze a differentiated and
highly capable U.S. technology base:
(1) Exploiting and transcending commercially available
technologies. We seek to be the best user of globally available
technologies--to use them with greater creativity to solve problems
more quickly, efficiently, and flexibly. This means novel systems
architectures as well as integrating specialized niche technologies
with commercially available components to create unique solutions.
(2) Catalyzing new national technology capabilities. Entirely new
technologies open the door to national security applications that can't
even be imagined beforehand. We recognize that many of these
technologies will also globalize. But the time advantage to the United
States, if we pursue them first, can be substantial and make all the
difference. We approach this challenge in several ways:
Exploring new technology possibilities from
fertile basic and interdisciplinary research.
Universities, government labs, and private R&D
organizations are bubbling with intriguing new research
across many disciplines and new interdisciplinary
fields. Some hold the seeds for the next technology
revolution. We actively search for these promising
activities and explore where these new insights might
lead.
Building foundational technology
infrastructure and communities. DARPA has a long
history of building technology infrastructure that
becomes the foundation for wide arrays of applications.
Today, we are using the same approach in new fields.
Our programs create the tools, techniques, and
communities that scale well beyond the period of our
investment.
Demonstrating the new capabilities that
technology enables. Changing minds about what's
possible rarely happens just through writing papers and
reports. Projects that build prototypes show how
technical breakthroughs enable new capabilities.
The President's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget
The President's fiscal year 2014 budget proposal for DARPA is
$2.865 billion. This is on par with the $2.817 billion originally
budgeted for DARPA in fiscal year 2013, but has now been reduced to
$2.785 billion following congressional action. The fiscal year 2013
budget has been further reduced by approximately $223 million as a
consequence of sequestration.
Before discussing our fiscal year 2014 plan, let me explain our
fiscal year 2013 status under sequestration. As I'm sure you know,
sequestration is having a significant effect on our work during this
fiscal year. At DARPA, we have prioritized within each Program Element
to execute cuts as intelligently as possible, but with cuts of this
size there are real consequences. We are projecting up to 14 days of
furloughs for our civilian government employees, and we are delaying or
eliminating programs as a result of the 8 percent cut in each Program
Element. While the planned furlough days are of course a financial
concern for our employees, our people are also deeply frustrated they
will not be allowed to do their jobs on these days. This unfortunate
message makes it that much harder to recruit and retain the stellar
individuals we need to accomplish our mission. Programs across the
Agency are affected by the sequestration cuts. Two examples include
Plan X and the Microtechnology for Positioning, Navigation and Timing
(microPNT) program. Plan X, which aims to integrate cyberwarfare and
kinetic fighting, is being cut by 43 percent in fiscal year 2013,
delaying its start by 5 months. The microPNT program, which is
developing the capability for precise, self-contained PNT in severe
environments, will see a 9 percent cut, delaying testing with the Air
Force and driving additional schedule extensions.
Looking forward, the proposed fiscal year 2014 budget would provide
us with resources to address or--in some cases, begin to address--our
essential programs. I'd like to highlight a number of areas that range
from particular military systems to broader, enabling technologies.
Cyber foundations for a scalable new trajectory: DARPA's cyber
programs tackle two aspects of this broad challenge that are redefining
the rules of warfighting. One is to create the capabilities that will
allow us to move beyond today's ``detect and patch'' approach to a more
fundamental defense of our cyber systems. We aim to provide
cybersecurity and survivability solutions that enable DOD information
systems to operate correctly and continuously even when attacked. The
second aspect focuses on cyber effects in tactical warfighting
scenarios. We can readily imagine a future in which cyber warfare is
fully integrated with kinetic warfare. DARPA's cyber offense efforts
aim to create the tools that bridge these domains, for example, by
providing simulations of cyber effects, battle-damage assessments, and
layers of authority and control.
Cost-effective space systems in a newly contested environment:
Unsustainable cost growth has materially affected the development of
future U.S. capabilities in the all-important environment of space upon
which DOD, the intelligence community, and commercial sectors rely.
DARPA is tackling these challenges by focusing on affordable routine
access, agile systems development at lower cost, survivable and
resilient systems, disaggregated and simplified systems, and a holistic
approach to space situational awareness. For example, one DARPA effort
is striving to drive the cost of space access down to $1 million per
launch and increase the tempo to single-day turnarounds. Creatively--
and ambitiously--another program is exploring cooperatively harvesting
and reusing valuable retired satellite components to build an entire
new space system in geosynchronous orbit. If successful, this would be
a major contribution to achieving the goal of reducing today's overall
satellite system cost by 90 percent.
Air Dominance: Our forces have had the upper hand in air combat for
many years now. But as others use globally available technologies to
build new and sophisticated systems, resting on our laurels would be a
dangerous course. With the support and endorsement of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Frank
Kendall, DARPA has teamed with the Air Force and Navy to study the
challenges of air dominance for the next generation. The working group
is investigating how we can build on our current capabilities with new
technologies and concepts, inverting the cost equation to force future
adversaries to spend much more to counter than we do to field and
employ. The team is taking a broad, integrated approach, looking at
electronic warfare and sensing across the electromagnetic spectrum,
communications and networking, space, cyber, weapons, and platforms. We
anticipate this study effort will lead to new initiatives, with the
ultimate goal of ensuring the United States continues its air
superiority in the 2020-2050 timeframe.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): We are pursuing
efforts to increase efficacy and accelerate the timeline for bioweapon
threat response, including novel techniques that will enable the human
body to directly manufacture its own vaccines, bypassing traditional
vaccine manufacturing processes that can take months. In addition, we
are studying current challenges in countering chemical and nuclear WMD
threats. For example, we are investigating a defense-in-depth approach,
combining novel detection methods and big data intelligence analytics
to achieve a more robust, layered solution. We are also looking into
new medical countermeasures for increasing the survivability of victims
of acute radiation poisoning.
Position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities beyond our
critical reliance on GPS: DARPA's recent programs in PNT originally
sought to take GPS-like capability to the places where GPS currently
does not operate, such as indoors, underwater or underground. As
concerns surfaced about our critical dependence on GPS, those initial
investments are starting to create GPS alternatives, as well as new
enablers for future military systems. We have developed micro-PNT
technologies and are transitioning them to use. We are developing new
inertial measurement units and clocks that use atom interferometry for
very long duration missions, as well as techniques that use available
signals--from television, radio, cell towers, or even lightning--to
augment or replace the location information that GPS currently
provides. In keeping with the drive for adaptability, our new approach
to full navigation systems integration could provide rapidly
configurable solutions for the many types of platforms that require
advanced PNT.
Electronic warfare (EW) to counter and move beyond adversaries'
advancing capabilities: We face important challenges as we seek to
protect our assets and deploy EW capabilities. Not the least of these
is the reality that 90 percent of the electronics needed in an EW
system can now be bought commercially. DARPA is attacking these
challenges. For instance, DARPA is developing a new architecture for
the radar antenna arrays with which ships and planes transmit and
receive radar pulses. The goal is to make them in modular fashion,
obviating the need for unique designs for each new application and
permitting new and multiple modes of use. This has the potential to
drive future radar costs down significantly, while simultaneously
improving performance. Another challenge, and there are many, is that
the system performance of many radios and radar units is constrained by
the performance limits of electronic components inside those units.
DARPA aims to drive technology capabilities well beyond commercial
specifications and to extend important electronic components to
performance regimes unreachable by commercial technology.
Engineering biology tools to engineer microorganisms for materials
with new properties: Engineering biology is emerging as a new field as
researchers across multi-disciplinary labs have started to design and
construct genetic pathways, networks, and systems to harness the
powerful synthetic and functional capabilities of biology. We can see
the potential to develop new and transformative materials, sensing
capabilities, and therapeutics. But synthetic biology today is still a
multi-year, ad hoc, trial-and-error process constrained to a limited
number of simple products. DARPA's investments in the Living Foundries
program are developing the tools and technologies to create a new
engineering practice, speeding the biological design-build-test cycle
and the rate at which we realize novel products and capabilities.
Drawing upon and building on the research base, these efforts will
begin to create the foundational infrastructure for engineering
biology. Some of the first outputs may include new materials and
medicines such as antifungals, lubricants, and energetic materials.
Beyond these are a new generation of products with properties we can
only imagine today.
Big data capabilities to draw insight from multiple data sources:
Exponential improvements in computing power, network bandwidth and
storage density combined with ever more pervasive sensing and
measurement technologies give us enhanced tools for drawing information
and insights from massive, heterogeneous data sets. In the national
security realm, harnessing big data offers special challenges. National
security often involves actors with a vested interest in remaining
unobserved. Data sets may be corrupted, incomplete, or disaggregated to
the point that sophisticated technologies are required for cleanup.
Data sets may be multimodal, real time-streamed, or on a scale for
which storage isn't feasible and requires new processing approaches.
Moreover, in many national security applications, inferences must be
drawn, relationships deduced, or anomalies detected working solely from
data sets that are weak proxies for the underlying quantities of
interest. The varied ways in which data are gathered pose challenges in
fusion. While the cost of investigating false alarms is often high, the
consequences of a missed detection are even greater. These challenges
are being addressed across DARPA's big data portfolio. The effort
begins at the basic science level and also addresses fundamental
computational issues such as novel algorithm design, natural language
processing, and architectures for efficient processing of streamed
data. At the other end, DARPA is working closely with national security
agencies on operational data to ensure continuous transition of tools
as programs progress.
Brain function research: DARPA plans to build on its past and
ongoing research to help advance a new understanding of brain function
to treat injury, create new brain-machine interfaces, and inspire new
algorithms and hardware. Earlier this month the President announced an
initiative to revolutionize our understanding of the human brain.
DARPA's brain function research will play an important role in the
initiative, with the goal of understanding the dynamic functions of the
brain and demonstrating breakthrough applications based on these
insights. DARPA aims to develop a new set of tools to capture and
process dynamic neural and synaptic activities, and explore ways to
dramatically improve the way we diagnose and treat warfighters who are
suffering from post-traumatic stress, brain injury and memory loss.
I want to note that we pursue technologies like these because of
their promise, but we understand that in this pursuit, we might be
working in areas that raise ethical, legal, security, or policy
questions. Here, our job is twofold. We must be fearless about
exploring new technologies and their capabilities; this is our core
function and our Nation is best served if we push these frontiers ahead
of other countries. At the same time, we must raise the broader
societal questions and engage those who can address them. We ensure our
work adheres to laws and regulations. In new and uncharted territory,
we reach out to a variety of experts and stakeholders with different
points of view. In many instances, technology solutions can be part of
the answer to new concerns. But we recognize that at their heart, these
are societal questions that require a broader community be engaged as
we explore the technological frontier.
A wide array of other DARPA programs also reflects our investment
approaches for breakthrough systems and technologies. They include
programs in maritime and undersea systems, hypersonics, communications,
ISR, robotic systems, innovative manufacturing technologies, adaptable
sensor systems, and unconventional computing platforms. More broadly,
we also invest in early-stage research efforts across physics,
materials science, mathematics, and interdisciplinary fields with the
potential for future technological applications. The President's fiscal
year 2014 budget includes funding for this critical work.
keeping darpa robust and vibrant
To accomplish our vital mission, it is essential that we keep DARPA
robust and vibrant. So our third objective is to ensure a highly
functional environment and the foundation for a strong culture.
With just 210 government employees we carry out 250 programs across
5 technology offices. How is this possible? In addition to having a
cadre of very capable support functions and contractors, we rely
heavily on active engagement with the technical community and users, as
I emphasized earlier. Our success hinges on our ability to work with
tiny companies to universities and major contractors to labs of every
stripe. It hinges on our relationships with and the work of the users
of our results across DOD.
DARPA's program managers are the core of our organization, and they
are stellar. Each is a leader who brings to DARPA an adventurous spirit
and a deep conviction that his or her technology vision will change the
world. They come to DARPA because this is the place that gives them the
opportunity to take breakthrough technologies to fruition. Our program
managers generally serve 3- to 5-year terms, leading to a constant flow
of new people and fresh views.
That is why our hiring authorities are so important to us. DARPA
uses a dynamic mix of hiring and retention authorities enabling the
Agency to continue to hire and retain the Nation's most qualified
technical experts from industry, academia, and the private sector with
speed and flexibility not allowed by standard civil services processes.
Moving forward, maintaining and fostering a robust and vibrant DARPA
hinges on our continued ability to recruit and retain the people who
will meet the challenges of an ever-changing threat environment.
I would like to thank the subcommittee for its continued support of
DARPA's hiring authorities. It has been enormously helpful to us, and
we simply could not attain our high caliber staff without it.
from basic science to military advantage: how a clock could make a
difference
Let me conclude with a specific example of how we do our work--one
of the numerous individual efforts underway in our portfolio today.
Earlier in my testimony I cited our important work on position,
navigation, and timing systems as we strive to develop capabilities
beyond what GPS systems offer us today. Position and time is oxygen for
our warfighters, but GPS signals can be degraded or denied by
adversaries who aim to jam or spoof our signals.
One of our novel PNT approaches captures how DARPA's ability to
think outside the box, and our constant search for new ideas and
surprises, can lead to the hard-nosed practical solutions we must have
for technological superiority in national security.
Frequency and timing devices are essential components in modern
military systems. The stability and accuracy of these devices affect
the performance of communication, navigation, surveillance, and missile
guidance systems. Atomic clocks are at the core of many of these
systems, either directly or by synchronization with a master clock.
DARPA is now building on exquisite Nobel Prize-winning science
conducted in the mid-1980s that enlisted lasers to cool and trap atoms,
and work from the late 1990s to precisely read out these atomic states.
Although it was far from apparent then, these fundamental physics
discoveries, and the basic science work that followed over the next two
decades, now holds the promise of allowing DOD to develop a
dramatically improved atomic clock device.
But the best atomic clocks operate only in lab environments--large
rooms with scientists to tend their complicated laser systems. That
severely limits practical applications. Still, DARPA recognized the
promise that timekeeping-related advances held for military uses. So we
aimed to develop simpler clock architectures based on the initial Nobel
Prize research and related work that would still meet our needs.
That is much, much easier said than done, of course. After some
very hard work by a very talented team, we are now developing a
shoebox-sized optical atomic clock that offers dramatic reductions in
size, weight, and power requirements. It aims for unheard of accuracies
for a device of its size (within one billionth of a second over the
course of a year). The payoffs will be huge if we are successful:
secure data routing, communication systems that are insensitive to
jamming, high-resolution coherent radar, and more reliable and robust
global positioning. An accurate local clock would be one critical
enabler of continued operation of military systems in the absence of
GPS.
If successful, in combination with other technologies we are
working on, this new clock developed under the QuASAR program will lead
to a new set of PNT technologies--a pillar of the next generation
capabilities that DARPA is building. In short, this device, along with
the many other technologies we are driving, can transform war fighting
for our future needs. That would be a true game-changer--and that,
after all, is what DARPA is all about: changing the game in our
Nation's favor.
Thank you for your support of DARPA, and for allowing me to testify
before you today. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Miller.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARY J. MILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
Ms. Miller. Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Fischer, thank
you for this opportunity to discuss the Army's S&T program for
fiscal year 2014.
Over the course of these past 12 years of war, the world
has seen firsthand the value and impact that technology brings
to the battlefield and how capabilities enabled by technology
are critical to the soldiers and their success.
As a recent example, research done at the Night Vision and
Electronics Systems Directorate in ground-penetrating radar
resulted in the Husky Mounted Mine Detection System used widely
in both Iraq and Afghanistan to detect improvised explosive
devices. This system is now becoming an Army program of record.
However, given the current budget environment, the Army has
initiated a comprehensive strategic modernization strategy to
better facilitate informed decisions based on long-term
objectives. The role of the S&T enterprise is to research,
develop, and demonstrate high payoff technology solutions for
hard problems faced by the soldiers in ever-changing, complex
environments, solutions that are both affordable and versatile.
As good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, it is critical
that we use finite Government resources to maximize development
of technologies to meet Army-unique challenges and constraints.
It is important that we complement what the private sector is
already developing and that we leverage the work being done by
our sister Services, national labs, academia, and partner
nations. Most importantly, our investments today must translate
into capabilities that we successfully field to the Army of the
future.
It goes without saying that the underpinning of all Army
S&T efforts is a strong research program that builds an agile
and adaptive workforce and technology base to be able to
respond to future threats. Investments in S&T are a critical
hedge to acquiring technological superiority with revolutionary
and paradigm-shifting technologies. This includes the
development of the next generation of Army scientists and
engineers. Investing wisely in people with innovative ideas is
our best hope for new discoveries to enable the Army of the
future.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Mary J. Miller
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Army's Science and Technology (S&T) Program for fiscal year 2014.
Over the course of these past almost 12 years of war, the world has
seen first-hand the value and impact that technology brings to the
battlefield and how capabilities, enabled by technology, are critical
to our soldiers and their success. The U.S. Army depends on its S&T
Enterprise to research, develop, and demonstrate high pay-off
technology solutions for hard problems faced by soldiers in ever-
changing, complex environments against an increasingly diverse set of
threats. Uncertainty and complexity are at the heart of the Army's
challenges. The Army of the future requires solutions that are both
affordable and versatile and relies on the S&T community's
contributions to ensure that they remain the most capable in the world.
We are grateful to the members of this committee for your sustained
support of our soldiers, your support of our laboratories and centers
and your continued commitment to ensure that funding is available to
provide our current and future soldiers with the technology that
enables them to defend America's interests and those of our allies
around the world.
To ensure our effectiveness in meeting the Army's needs, the S&T
Enterprise must remain innovative and agile, staffed with scientists
and engineers who can develop solutions for identified problems while
understanding the constraints that Army operations require. The
overarching vision for Army S&T is to foster innovation, maturation,
and demonstration of technology that provides increased capability to
the warfighter. Our mission includes the transition of both the
understanding and knowledge acquired while developing technology
solutions as well as the materiel. While the very nature of S&T puts
our focus clearly on providing capabilities for the future, we continue
to exploit opportunities to transition solutions to the current force.
strategy
As the war in Afghanistan draws down and budgets decline, it is
clear that we, the Department of Army, have some significant choices to
make. We are facing an environment in which we have procured a lot of
military equipment over the past decade. Systems such as the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which proved to be so
valuable to saving the lives of soldiers in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
will now join the ranks of the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker as a part
of our Army combat capability. The Army is assessing which urgently
fielded war-time systems will come back and join the ranks of formal
programs of record as a part of our enduring Army capability. These
decisions will, by necessity, impact the Army strategy for future
investment and research.
This is not the only impact, however. The National Military
Strategy and its focus on operations in the Pacific Rim adds another
level of complexity. As we expand our focus from the current fight to
prepare for the future, we find ourselves in a situation where we may
face a more capable enemy in an environment that is much more contested
and complex. Our recent experiences, while challenging, have been
against a less technically astute enemy. Our focus has been on
mitigating those threats to the troops. The next fight may well be
against a near-peer capability--one for which we have not fully
prepared. We intend to avoid the old adage that we always prepare to
fight the last war. We are investing now to understand our potential
vulnerabilities and in developing capabilities that will help us be
prepared for a more technically savvy opponent.
Given the current budget environment and prospects for funding in
the future, it has become even more important than ever that we clearly
understand our current capabilities and what we need in the future as
we face ever evolving threats. With that in mind, the Army has
initiated a comprehensive investment and modernization strategy to
better facilitate informed decisions based on long-term objectives in a
resource constrained environment.
The Army traditionally plans and budgets through the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) process. This 5 year look allows us to
project with a fair level of certainty what we are doing in the next
few years, but it does not lend itself well to making decisions with an
understanding of how those same decisions impact the Army of the
future. The desire to look more holistically across the lifecycle of
programs and to facilitate better decisions was a key driver to
establishing a new process within the Department of the Army.
To that end, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) has initiated the Long-Range
Investment Analysis (LRIA) process where the Army looks out 30 years
beyond the POM at the equipping and sustaining needs of the Programs of
Record (PoRs). This longer-term approach covers the entire acquisition
lifecycle, to include sustainment. With the renewed emphasis on
assessing the impacts of near-term investment decisions on the life-
cycle costs and desired capabilities of PoRs, it is increasingly
important to have a sustainment strategy that is synchronized with the
modernization strategy. It is essential to align S&T investments to
support these PoRs and to understand where we can capitalize on
opportunities for insertion of new, more affordable capability.
The LRIA feeds well into the ASA(ALT)'s desire for a more strategic
modernization plan. This approach to modernization includes an
awareness of existing and potential warfighting gaps, an understanding
of emerging threats, knowledge of state-of-the-art commercial,
academic, and government research, as well as a clear appreciation for
the competing needs of limited resources.
I recognize that projections of this length are rarely accurate.
However, going out 30+ years requires us to think beyond the easy
answer of just doing what we are doing now but for a bit longer. It
forces a new look at what else might need to happen. The world of 2040-
2045 is clearly NOT going to look like the world of today. The threats
we face and capabilities needed to address those threats may in fact
look very different than what we have fielded today. To prepare for an
uncertain future requires an approach to modernization that includes an
awareness of existing and potential threats, an understanding of peer
nation capabilities, knowledge of state-of-the-art commercial,
academic, and government research, as well as a clear understanding of
competing needs for limited resources. This is done through close
collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
Intel Communities to not only assess foreign systems that we see under
development but to conduct a technology watch that can provide
indicators on what foreign countries are investigating that may become
our next set of threats. This exercise challenges us to look at those
eventualities.
This new way to approach our planning has put rigor into the
analysis and forces the communities who pay for the development of
materiel and the long-term sustainment of materiel to work together to
maximize the Army's capabilities over time. From an S&T perspective, it
clearly starts to inform the community as to when technology is needed
for insertion as part of a planned upgrade. It also cues us as to when
to start investing for replacement platforms. A great example of that
is our aviation portfolio where we are conducting the S&T underpinnings
of the next PoR planned to replace both the AH-64 Apache and UH-60
Blackhawk. The Army S&T community has already initiated the Joint
Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR TD) effort as the foundation
for the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL)-Medium PoR. This demonstrator
program will create two flying prototypes that will help inform
requirements for the FVL-Medium as well as define what should be asked
for within the Request for Proposal. The S&T tech demo is being well
coordinated with Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation and the
Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker to ensure that we are
working a solution that will fit and inform the Army's needs.
Aside from the obvious benefit achieved by laying out the Army's
programs and seeing where we may have generated unrealizable fiscal
challenges, this 30 year look has reinvigorated the relationships and
strengthened the ties between the S&T community and their PEO partners.
We have had significant engagements over these past 7 months--working
to identify technical opportunities and the potential insertion of new
capabilities across this 30-year timeframe.
Goals and Commitments
There are some persistent (and challenging) areas in which the Army
invests its S&T resources to ensure that we remain the most lethal and
effective Army in the world. The challenges include the obvious (we
need better force protection) to the less obvious (retrograde). All are
consistent, however, with the message that we have gotten from the
Training and Doctrine Command over the past decade. These are
challenges that remain ever relevant to the Army and its ability to win
the fight. The S&T community is committed to addressing these
challenges which include:
Enabling greater force protection for soldiers, air
and ground platforms, and bases (e.g., lighter and stronger
body armor, helmets, pelvic protection, enhanced vehicle
survivability, integrated base protection)
Ease overburdened soldiers in small units (e.g.,
lighter weight multi-functional material)
Enabling timely mission command and tactical
intelligence to provide situation awareness and communications
in ALL environments (mountainous, forested, desert, urban,
jamming, etc.)
Reduce logistic burden of storing, transporting,
distributing and retrograde of materials
Create operational overmatch (enhance lethality and
accuracy)
Achieve operational maneuverability in all
environments and at high operational tempo (e.g., greater
mobility, greater range, ability to operate in high/hot
environment)
Enable ability to operate in Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBNRE) environment
Enable early detection and treatment for Traumatic
Brain Injury (TBI) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Improve operational energy (e.g., power management,
micro-grids, increased fuel efficiency engines, higher
efficiency generators, etc.)
Improve individual and team training (e.g., live-
virtual-constructive training)
Reduce lifecycle cost of future Army capabilities
In addition, to these enduring challenges, the S&T community
conducts research and technology that impacts our ability to maintain
an agile and every ready force. This includes efforts such as
establishing environmentally compatible installations and materiel
without compromising readiness or training, leader selection
methodologies, new test tools that can save resources and reduce test
time and methods and measures to improve soldier/unit readiness and
resilience.
S&T Portfolio highlights
To be able to address the needs of the Army of the future, the S&T
Enterprise must maintain a balanced investment--one that ensures the
growth and development of innovative S&Es and the pursuit of critical
technology that will ensure the Army remains preeminent in the world.
Currently the portfolio includes about 20 percent in far-term, basic
research for discovery and understanding of phenomena; 40 percent in
mid-term, applied research for laboratory concept demonstrations (proof
of concept); and 40 percent in near-term, advanced technology
demonstrations of subsystems and components in a relevant environment
(experimentation).
Our S&T program request for BA1-3 for fiscal year 2014 is $2.205
billion--a 0.2 percent decrease from our fiscal year 2013 request. BA3
programs decrease by $8.6 million, BA1 programs decrease by $7.3
million and BA2 programs increase by $11.2 million.
In fiscal year 2014 the Army is placing increased emphasis in
research areas to support the Army's role in the National Military
Strategy, such as vulnerability assessments, Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD) technologies and long-range fires. We are mindful however that
the Army will continue to be called on for missions around the globe.
The Army is currently deployed in 160 countries conducting missions
that range from humanitarian support to stability operations to major
theater warfare.
The efforts of the S&T Enterprise are managed by portfolio to
ensure maximum synergy of efforts and reduction of unnecessary
duplication. There are currently six portfolios. Three are platform
specific portfolios: Soldier, Ground, Air; the other three are enabling
technology portfolios: C\3\I, Innovation Enablers, and Basic Research.
Each affords the Army with unique capability. To facilitate this broad
spectrum of capabilities, we are creating a culture of affordability
and from a technology perspective have increased our focus on reducing
lifecycle costs.
soldier portfolio
The soldier portfolio is broad in nature--it extends from research
in enhancing soldier performance to improved soldier equipment to new
medical treatments. This portfolio touches all of the challenges listed
above in some capacity. Focus areas include achieving technical
advances based on future threats and environments in force protection,
lethality, mobility, leader development, training, combat casualty care
and rehabilitation medicine, as well as psychological and physical
health treatments. In fiscal year 2014 we are requesting $376.7 million
for our soldier portfolio.
The efforts in this portfolio are designed to address future threat
environments while maximizing the effectiveness of Squad performance as
a collective formation. They result in state of the art changes to
equipment and training tools and inform changes to policies, personnel
selection and classification, and individual and collective training.
Major initiatives include the integration of lethality assets,
individual protection, and dismounted soldier power. In the coming
years, improving mission performance in a complex and dynamic
environment will rely on improving the integration of cognitive and
physical performance with emerging technology solutions leading to the
advancements necessary to reduce the soldier's load. Successful recent
efforts include a collaborative effort with PEO soldier to improve the
form and fit of the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) for female
soldiers. The existing IOTV designs were cut for a standard male and
impeded the ability for female soldiers to operate weapons and
equipment effectively. The S&T community assessed the needs of the
female soldiers and as a result developed better waist and torso
adjustment straps and less bulky collar and throat protection.
In keeping with our holistic approach to Army challenges, research
will address the entire chain of services and technologies which touch
our soldiers and squads from pre-deployment to mission capabilities
needed on the battlefield to their return to civilian life. Pre-
deployment and return to civilian life research includes important
areas such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain
Injury (TBI) which continue to be a source of serious concern. The U.S.
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) has ongoing efforts
to address these devastating conditions. Basic research efforts include
furthering our understanding of cell death signals and neuroprotection
mechanisms, as well as identifying critical thresholds for secondary
injury comprising TBI. When cells die they release signals in the form
of proteins. These proteins can be measured using different biological
assays, which can tell you what type of response a cell has mounted
against different types of injuries to include TBI, so you can quantify
the level of injury.
We are also focused on investigating selective brain cooling and
other nontraditional therapies for TBI, and identifying ``combination''
therapeutics that substantially mitigate or reduce TBI-induced brain
damage and seizures for advanced development and clinical trials. We
have had some recent successes in this area, including completion of a
Food and Drug Administration effectiveness study on a candidate
neuroprotective drug for treatment of TBI and completion of a pivotal
trial for a bench-top assay for use in hospitals for the detection of
TBI.
Research in the area of personnel selection, classification and
training must also be looked at in light of future threats and evolving
mission scenarios such as cyber and robotic interactions. Technologies
which support future mission capabilities needed on the battlefield
include efforts to reduce chronic conditions which may result from
load-related injuries. Material and equipment design efforts focus on
innovative decision and mission planning tools and the integration of
individual and squad weapons, weapon sights, munitions and fire control
while mitigating cognitive and physical burden on the increasingly
complex battlefield. Finally, we are working on new materials and
modular armor designs to optimize individual protective equipment to
fully consider survivability in relation to mobility, lethality, and
other aspects of human performance. This work is aligned with PEO
soldier's planned Soldier Protection Systems PoR which affords many
opportunities for technology transition out of the S&T community.
ground portfolio
The Ground portfolio includes technologies for medium- and long-
range munitions and missiles; directed energy weapons; combat and
tactical vehicle; unmanned ground systems; countermine and counter
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) detection and neutralization; and
base protection technologies. As with the soldier portfolio, the ground
portfolio addresses a number of the Army's enduring challenges
including force protection, improved mobility and overmatch, increased
operational energy and reduced life cycle costs. In fiscal year 2014 we
are requesting $607.1 million for our Ground Portfolio.
The Ground Portfolio has shifted to focus on developing A2/AD
through Long-Range Fires and Counter Unmanned Aircraft technologies.
S&T is focusing on advanced seeker technologies to enable acquisition
of low signature threats at extended ranges, along with dual pulse
solid rocket motor propulsion to provide longer range rockets and
extend the protected areas of air defense systems. We also continue to
develop Solid State High Energy Lasers to provide low cost defeat of
rockets, artillery, mortars, and unmanned aircraft.
Also as part of A2/AD, we have increased funding for evaluation of
austere ports of entry and infrastructure to better enable our ability
to enter areas of conflict. We are maintaining technology investments
in detection and neutralization of mines and improvised explosive
devices (IED) to ensure freedom of maneuver.
In the past, we have designed vehicles with little consideration
for accommodating soldiers who have to operate in them. Now we are
beginning to explore ways to design vehicles around soldiers.
Increasing protection levels of the platforms means impacting interior
volumes reducing mobility, maneuverability, and freedom of movement for
occupants, and leads to heavier platforms. The ongoing Occupant Centric
Survivability (OCS) effort provides the mechanism to develop, design,
demonstrate, and document an occupant centered Army ground vehicle
design philosophy that improves vehicle survivability, as well as force
protection, by mitigating warfighter injury due to underbody IED and
mine blast, vehicle rollover, and vehicle crash events. This design
philosophy considers the warfighter first, integrates occupant
protection technologies, and builds the vehicle to surround and support
the warfighter and the warfighter's mission. To this end, we are
developing an OCS concept design demonstrator, as well as, platform-
specific demonstrators with unique occupant protection technologies
tailored to the platform design constraints. Subsystems and components
designed and evaluated by this effort may transition to current and
future ground vehicle Programs of Record. This focused effort will
facilitate the development and publication of standards for occupant
centric design guidelines, test procedures and safety specifications.
Armor remains an Army-unique challenge and we have persistent
investments for combat and tactical vehicle armor, focusing not only on
protection but affordability and weight. We continue to invest in armor
technologies to meet the Ground Combat Vehicle's (GCV) objective
protection requirements. Armor formulations developed at the Army
Research Lab (ARL) and matured at the Tank Automotive Research
Development and Engineering Command have transitioned and been offered
to the GCV vendors. In addition to the continued emphasis on lighter,
more capable armor solutions, we are beginning to develop an
architecture standard to enable the integration of active protection
technologies onto ground vehicles, reducing the need for as much heavy
armor plating.
We continue to develop technologies to increase available power to
ground vehicles and improve fuel efficiency. Additionally, we are
maturing architecture standards to manage electrical power and data,
providing industry a standard interface for integrating communications
and sensor components to ground vehicles.
air portfolio
The Army is the lead service for rotorcraft, owning and operating
over 80 percent of the Department of Defense's vertical lift aircraft.
As such, the preponderance of rotorcraft technology research and
development takes place within the Army. The Air portfolio addresses
many of the same challenges as the ground portfolio and its key
initiative, the JMR TD program, is focused on addressing the A2/AD need
for longer range and more effective combat profiles. Our vision for
Army aviation S&T is to provide the best possible aviation technology
enabled capabilities to deliver soldiers, weapons, supplies, and
equipment where they are needed, when they are needed. For fiscal year
2014 we are requesting $162.6 million for our Air Portfolio.
In order to provide soldier support over future Areas of Operation
(AO) that may be 16 times larger than current AOs, the Army needs a
faster, more efficient rotorcraft, with significantly improved
survivability against current and future threats. Operating in
conditions of 6,000 feet and 95 degrees (high/hot), this aircraft will
need to transport and supply troops while providing close air support
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
As I mentioned before, a major effort currently underway within S&T
is technology development for the Department of Defense's next
potential ``clean sheet'' design rotorcraft--the JMR aircraft. Three
different configurations of JMR aircraft have been designed--a
conventional helicopter, a large-wing slowed rotor compound helicopter,
and a tilt rotor helicopter. We are investigating various design
excursions to fully explore the size and environmental characteristics
of interest to the DOD including shipboard operations. As part of the
JMR TD program, an industry/government Configuration Trades and
Analysis effort (including Operations Analyses to assess concept
effectiveness), is nearing completion. Four contracts were
competitively awarded to assist in defining the trade space for Phase 1
of the JMR TD, Air Vehicle Demonstration. Two of the contractors will
be downselected for the Phase 1 awards in September 2013, which will
include the design, fabrication, and test of two flight demonstrator
vehicles, with first flights to occur in the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2017. The JMR TD objectives are to validate critical aircraft
configurations, technologies and designs at the vehicle system level,
and demonstrate vertical lift capabilities superior to those in the
current fleet. Phase 2 of the JMR TD is focused on assessing Mission
Systems Effectiveness. Six contracts have been awarded to conduct these
trades. The overall JMR TD effort will use integrated government/
industry platform design teams and exercise agile prototyping
approaches.
One of the biggest causes of aircraft loss comes from accidents
while operating in a Degraded Visual Environments (DVE). To address
this, we are currently conducting a synchronized, collaborative effort
with PEO Aviation and the S&T community to define control system,
cueing, and pilotage sensor combinations which enable maximum
operational mitigation of DVE. This effort will result in a prioritized
list of compatible, affordable DVE mitigation technologies, and
operational specification development that will help inform future Army
decisions. This program is tightly coupled with the PEO Aviation
strategy and potential technology off-ramps will be transitioned to the
acquisition community along the way, when feasible.
Unmanned systems have a potentially broad impact on how the Army
conducts close air support. Army S&T is focused on improving the
capability of unmanned systems to be a force multiplier through the
introduction of unmanned and teaming operations technologies with the
potential to offer game changing future capabilities. Efforts include
advancing human systems interface and algorithms for synergistic and
intelligent manned unmanned teaming, and image/data processing
algorithms to allow objective driven perception. In fiscal year 2014 we
plan to initiate a new applied research program to develop micro/small
scale unmanned air systems. This new effort will allow for the
transition of technology from the Micro-Autonomous Systems Technology
Collaborative Technology Alliance basic research effort.
While many of our rotorcraft research efforts are focused on the
development of technology for transition to new platforms in 2025 and
beyond, we are also maintaining an investment to keep the current fleet
effective. One recent transition success has been the Advanced
Affordable Turbine Engine (AATE), a 3,000 shaft horsepower engine with
25 percent improved fuel efficiency, and 35 percent reduced lifecycle
costs. In fiscal year 2013, final bench testing will be completed and
the AATE program will transition to PM Utility for Engineering and
Manufacturing Development under the Improved Turbine Engine Program,
which will re-engine our Blackhawk and Apache fleet.
c\3\i portfolio
The C\3\I portfolio provides enabling capability across many of the
challenges, but specifically seeks to provide mission command and
tactical intelligence--working to ensure soldiers from the sustaining
base to the tactical edge have trusted and responsive sensors,
communications, and information adaptable in dynamic, austere
environments to support battlefield operations and non-kinetic warfare.
For fiscal year 2014 we are requesting $320.0 million for our C\3\I
Portfolio.
New efforts in this portfolio include development of secure
wireless personal area networks for the soldier. We are also re-
investing in Electronic Warfare (EW) vulnerability analysis to perform
characterization and analysis of radio frequency devices to develop
detection and characterization techniques, tactics, and technologies to
mitigate the effects of contested environments (such as jamming) on
Army C\4\ISR systems.
Given the potential challenges that we face while operating in a
more contested environment, we are placing additional emphasis in
assured Position, Navigation and Timing, developing technologies that
allow navigation in Global Positioning System (GPS) denied/degraded
environments for mounted and dismounted soldiers and unmanned vehicles
such as exploiting signals of opportunity. Improvements will be studied
for high sensitivity GPS receivers that could allow acquisition and
tracking under triple tree canopy, in urban locations, and inside
buildings, which is not currently possible. We are developing an Anti-
Jam capability as well as supporting mission command with interference
source detection, measurement of signal strength, and locating
interference sources, enabling the Army to conduct its mission in
challenging electromagnetic environments.
The C\3\I Portfolio also houses our efforts in cyber, both
defensive and offensive. Defensive efforts in cyber security will
investigate and develop software, algorithms and devices to protect
wireless tactical networks against computer network attacks. Effort
includes technologies that are proactive rather than reactive in
countering attacks against tactical military networks.
We are developing sophisticated software assurance algorithms to
differentiate between stealthy life cycle attacks and software coding
errors and design and assess secure coding methodologies that can
detect and self correct against malicious code insertion. We are also
investigating theoretical techniques for improvements in malware
detection that can detect malware variants incorporating polymorphic
and metamorphic transformation engines. We will research and design
sophisticated, optimized cyber maneuver capabilities that incorporate
the use of reasoning, intuition, and perception while determining the
optimal scenario on when to maneuver, as well as the ability to map and
manage the network to determine probable attack paths and the
likelihood of exploitation. Additionally we will investigate
dynamically and efficiently altering tactical network services, ports,
protocols and systems to inhibit red force ability to perform malicious
network reconnaissance to determine location of critical networking
services.
On the offensive side of cyber operations, we will develop
integrated electronic attack (EA) and computer network operations (CNO)
hardware and software to execute force protection, EA, electronic
surveillance (ES) and signals intelligence missions in a dynamic,
distributed and coordinated fashion, resulting in the capability to
engage a multitude of diverse multi-node, multi-waveform, multi-
platform and cyber (internetworked computers) targets while maximizing
overall network efficiency and effectiveness, and preserving blue
force/noncombatant communications.
We will demonstrate protocol exploitation software and techniques
that allow users to remotely coordinate, plan, control, and manage
tactical EW and Cyber assets; develop techniques to exploit protocols
of threat devices not conventionally viewed as Cyber to expand total
situational awareness by providing access to and control of adversary
electronic devices in an area of operations.
innovation enablers
The Innovation Enablers portfolio includes many of the activities
that are not directly tied to programs of record, yet enable the Army
to be successful. It is within this portfolio that we conduct the
research that helps to ensure that we have training ranges upon which
our soldiers can train as they fight, support our High Performance
Computing Centers which facilitate highly complex research and system
design, and conduct Technology Maturation Initiatives that partner the
S&T community directly with PEOs to conduct experimentation that not
only informs realistic requirements but also drives down programmatic
risk. For fiscal year 2014 we are requesting $302.0 million for our
Innovation Enablers Portfolio.
Under this portfolio we focus on many of those technologies which,
while not specific to warfighter functions, are essential to ensuring
that warfighters can conduct their missions. As the largest land-owner/
user within the DOD, it is incumbent upon the Army to be good stewards
in their protection of the environment. Within this portfolio, we
develop and validate lifecycle models for sustainable facilities;
create dynamic resource planning/management tools for contingency
basing; develop decision tools for infrastructure protection and
resiliency; and assess the impact of sustainable materials/systems This
includes the development of geo-environmental intelligence/advanced
sensing capabilities and predictive computational tools for fate,
transport and effects of existing and emerging chemicals and materials
used by the Army as well as new formulations for munitions and
obscurants that have minimal environmental impacts. We also focus on
developing sustainable and environmentally friendly practices that not
only reduce or eliminate soldier exposure to hazardous and carcinogenic
materials but also minimize environmental impacts during maintenance
and depot activities such as painting and plating.
In addition, we conduct blast noise assessment and develop
mitigation technologies to ensure that we remain ``good neighbors''
within Army communities and work to protect endangered species while we
ensure that the Army mission can continue. Ensuring current and future
use of the Army's training ranges will become even more important as
they will be where soldiers get their experience, vice deployment in
theater. As a result, we are even developing planning and response
tools to determine impacts on mission critical natural infrastructure
and adaptable training land configuration technologies to ensure our
soldiers are given maximum access to training ranges and lands. This
supports the Army's ability to address evolving mission requirements
while protecting our current resources.
basic research
Underpinning all of our efforts and impacting all of the enduring
Army challenges is a strong basic research program. The vision for Army
basic research is to advance the frontiers of fundamental science and
technology and drive long-term, game-changing capabilities for the Army
through a multi-disciplinary portfolio teaming our in-house researchers
with the global academic community. For fiscal year 2014 we are
requesting $436.7 million for Basic Research.
Two high pay-off areas of research investment are Neuroscience and
Materials Science. Neuroscience is a high priority research area--
understanding the brain's structure and function is a top foundational
research theme for the Obama administration and the National Academies.
The Army is leveraging the opportunities afforded by the large medical
research base in neuroscience to move neuroscience from the bench to
the battlefield. Making this transition will enable a broad range of
scientific discoveries that fundamentally shift how we understand how
the brain (and thus soldiers) works.
A new area of promising research is our effort in Multi-scale
Modeling of Materials. The goal of this research is to realize the
capability to design materials at the atomic level to provide the exact
properties we need for an end product. In other words, we plan to
demonstrate a comprehensive ``materials by design'' capability for
electronic and protection materials. The pay-off could be protection
materials with one-third savings in weight of current systems, and
batteries with triple the energy density, 30 percent longer lifetimes,
and 20-30 percent more efficiency all at a lower cost.
Another new area of basic research investment in fiscal year 2014
is Cyber Security, where we are standing up a Cyber Security
Collaborative Research Alliance (CRA), a competitively selected
consortium, to advance the theoretical foundations of cyber science in
the context of Army networks. This CRA consists of academia, industry
and government researchers working jointly with the objective of
developing a fundamental understanding of cyber phenomena so that laws,
theories, and theoretically grounded and empirically validated models
can be applied to a broad range of Army domains, applications, and
environments. The overarching goals of cyber security are to
significantly decrease the adversary's return on investment when
considering cyber attack on Army networks, and minimizing the impact on
Army network performance related to implementing cyber security. The
CRA research creates a framework that effectively integrates the
knowledge of cyber assets and potential adversary capabilities and
approaches, and provides defense mechanisms that dynamically adjust to
changes related to mission, assets, vulnerability state, and defense
mechanisms.
We had a number of technology spin-offs and transitions from basic
research this past year. An example is in Helmet Mounted Displays. A
researcher from the Institute for Creative Technologies, an Army funded
University Affiliated Research Center, created a game-changer in the
world of virtual reality (VR) headsets by providing a 3-D, wide field
of view, tracking enabled VR headset at a cost of $300 (in contrast to
an Army Helmet Mounted Display device that costs $70,000). The VR
device called Oculus Rift won Wired Magazine's best of the Consumer
Electronics Show (CES) 2013 and the Electronic Entertainment Expo (E3)
best of award. Oculus Rift disrupts the supply chain and creates the
option for a low cost tool developed by Army-sponsored research that
the Army will leverage for training. The hope is that the Oculus Rift
will be the first of many commercial applications that will be
incorporated into our Army systems--increasing competition and
decreasing costs.
cross-portfolio activities
Across all of our portfolios, we maintain our focus on power and
energy. As we develop technology enabled capabilities, we work to
reduce the burden in both weight and logistics that comes from
increased energy consumption by the increasing amount of electronic
equipment we need in our operations. The Army modernization investment
in operational energy provides efficient, reliable and maintainable
systems that increase capabilities and maintain dominance. Our
objectives are to improve efficiency and reduce consumption while
increasing functionality and developing smart energy-saving designs.
Our existing programs are integrated with, and complementary to, the
operational energy strategy of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations, Energy, and the Environment. In the fiscal year 2014
budget request we have, interspersed among our portfolios, $145.3
million for power and energy projects, in addition to efforts such as
efficient vehicle design and light weight materials which also impact
the Army's energy usage.
The Army continues to make use of the Rapid Innovation Fund,
established by Congress in fiscal year 2011. We are currently funding
48 efforts in a variety of areas and have an additional 43 proposals
under review. I believe that this initiative is providing value to the
Army and opening up more collaborative opportunities for small and
nontraditional businesses, and we plan to solicit further proposals for
fiscal year 2013 in the near future.
The Army Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) program
is another way the Army gets access to innovative ideas and products.
The SBIR program is designed to provide small, high-tech businesses the
opportunity to propose innovative research and development solutions in
response to critical Army needs. In fiscal year 2011, the Army SBIR
office generated 139 topics based on inputs from laboratories, the Army
Training and Doctrine Command and the Program Executive Officers (PEO).
In response to these topics, small businesses submitted over 3000
proposals. The Army SBIR office approved more than 600 Phase I and
Phase II awards. Since 2000 there have been 575 Phase III Army SBIR
projects put under contract for a total obligated value of $1.4 billion
(Phase III SBIRs are Phase II projects that have been picked up by
either the government (PEO/PM) or industry).
the s&t enterprise workforce
Without the world-class cadre of over 12,000 scientists and
engineers and the infrastructure that supports their work, the Army S&T
enterprise would be unable to support the needs of the Army. To
maintain technological superiority now and in the future, the Army must
maintain an agile workforce. Despite this current environment of unease
within the government civilian workforce, I'm proud to say that in
2012, the Army was recognized by Thompson Reuters as one of the Top 100
Global Innovators, with over 300 patents documented in the previous 3
years. We have an exceptional workforce. But we must continue to
attract and retain the best science and engineering talent into the
Army Laboratories and Centers and this is becoming more and more
challenging. Our laboratory personnel demonstrations give us the
flexibility to enhance recruiting and afford the opportunity to reshape
our workforce, and I appreciate Congress' continued support for these
authorities. With one exception (the Army Research Institute (ARI) for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences), all of our laboratories and
centers are operating under this program (ARI was never designated a
Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory and given its small size,
has not sought to enter into a demo system). These initiatives are
unique to each laboratory, allowing the maximum management flexibility
for the laboratory directors to shape their workforce and remain
competitive with the private sector.
In terms of infrastructure, we completed a survey of our laboratory
infrastructure and find that it is aging, with an average approximate
age of 50 years. However, we do acknowledge that much of the Army is in
a similar position. Despite this, we continue to make improvements to
our infrastructure at the margins, and where possible we have used
military construction, through your generous support, Defense Base
Realignment and Closure Commission, and unspecified minor construction
to modernize facilities and infrastructure. This is not a long-term
solution. While the authorities that you have given us have been
helpful, they alone are not enough, and we are still faced with the
difficulty of competing within the Army for scarce military
construction dollars at the levels needed to properly maintain world-
class research facilities. This will be one of our major challenges in
the years to come and I look forward to working with OSD and Congress
to find a solution to this issue.
Army S&T enterprise cannot survive without developing the next
generation of scientists and engineers. We are lucky to have an amazing
group of young scientists and engineers to serve as role models for the
next generation. Last year, Dr. Maria Urso, a researcher at the U.S.
Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine's Military
Performance Division at Natick Soldier System's Center in Natick, MA,
was named by President Obama as one of the Nation's Outstanding Early
Career Scientists. She received the award for her scientific
contributions in the area of cellular mechanisms of musculoskeletal
injury and repair and for her incredible service to both military and
civilian communities. The Presidential Early Career Awards for
Scientists and Engineers are the highest honor bestowed by the U.S.
Government on science and engineering professionals in the early stages
of their independent research careers, and we are lucky to have
researchers like Dr. Urso to mentor the next generation.
The Army S&T Enterprise contributes to the future success in
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) education through the
Army Educational Outreach Program (AEOP) which is comprised of 17
outreach efforts, either through direct oversight or through active
participation. In the 2011-2012 academic year AEOP was able to place
less than half of the student online applicants, engaged nearly 53,000
students as well as 835 teachers, involved 17 Army laboratories or
installations, and 111 universities or colleges and utilized the
experience and personal commitment from many of our Army scientists and
engineers. Mostly executed under the Army Educational Cooperative
Agreement (COA) which brings together government and a consortium of
organizations working collaboratively to further STEM education and
outreach efforts nationwide, AEOP provides a cohesive and coordinated
approach to STEM education across the Army. Major accomplishments in
fiscal year 2012 included ongoing annual in-depth evaluative
assessments of seven programs and recommendations for evidence-based
program improvements. We completed a marketing campaign that
centralized all the individual programs into a single branding to
leverage resources as well as promote a continuation of Army STEM
experiences that work together to build a highly competitive STEM
literate talent pool for Army scholarship and workforce initiatives. We
continue to enhance the online, comprehensive application tool located
on the AEOP website which will be complete in fiscal year 2013. The
application tool will provide important data that assess attitudes,
motivation, qualifications, and experiences that gauge program
effectiveness. The website and the online application tool as well as
the COA will work together to provide a coherent and coordinated
approach to address the STEM workforce shortfall throughout the Army.
For fiscal year 2014, we are concentrating on further program
assessment, implementing evidence-based program improvements,
strengthening additional joint service sponsored efforts, and
identifying ways to expand the reach and influence of successful
existing programs by leveraging partnerships and resources with other
agencies, industry and academia.
Finally, we are increasingly mindful of the globalization of S&T
capabilities and expertise. Our International S&T strategy provides a
framework to leverage cutting edge foreign science and technology
enabled capabilities through Global S&T Watch, engagement with allies
and leadership initiatives. Global Science and Technology Watch is a
systematic process for identifying, assessing, and documenting relevant
foreign research and technology developments. The Research, Development
and Engineering Command's International Technology Centers (ITCs) and
Medical Research Materiel Command's OCONUS laboratories identify and
document relevant foreign S&T developments. We also selectively engage
our allies when their technologies and materiel developments can
contribute to Army needs and facilitate coalition interoperability.
These bilateral leadership forums with Israel, Canada, Germany and the
United Kingdom provide both visibility of and management decisions on
allied developments that merit follow-up for possible collaboration.
summary
The underpinning all of Army S&T efforts is a strong research
program that builds an agile and adaptive workforce and technology base
to be able to respond to future threats. Investments in S&T are a
critical hedge in acquiring technological superiority with
revolutionary and paradigm-shifting technologies. This includes the
development of the next generation of Army Scientists and Engineers.
Investing wisely in people with innovative ideas is our best hope
for new discoveries to enable the ``Army of the Future.''
In this fiscally constrained environment, we will emphasize S&T
areas that address truly Army-unique challenges and leverage everything
else. We will collaborate across the Services, National Labs, academia,
industry and partner Nations, to solve common challenges. As good
stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, it is critical that we use finite
government resources to maximize development of technologies to meet
Army-unique challenges and constraints, and it is important that we
complement what the private sector is already developing. Most
importantly, our investments today must translate into capabilities we
successfully field to the Army of the future.
As the ASA(ALT) said in her February 28, 2013 testimony to the
House Armed Services Committee on Sequestration `` . . . the Army will
provide soldiers with the best equipment available as needed; their
sacrifice deserves no less. All equipping programs and priorities will
be negatively affected by the application of sequestration. Likewise
the defense industrial base will be adversely impacted and critical
skill sets will be lost.'' These words apply equally to the Army's S&T
program--forcing us to take a hard look at our investments and undoing
much of the work that we have set in place to increase our
efficiencies.
This is an interesting, yet challenging, time to be in the Army.
Despite this, we remain an Army that is looking towards the future
while taking care of the soldiers today. I hope that we can continue to
count on your support as we move forward, and I would like to again
thank the members of the committee again for all you do for our
soldiers. I would be happy to take any questions you have.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Lacey.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARY E. LACEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Ms. Lacey. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman Hagan, Ranking
Member Fischer. It is an honor to appear here today before you
to discuss the Navy's research and development (R&D)
enterprise.
In the year since I last appeared, we as a department have
performed an extensive strategic review of our RDT&E resources,
and the Secretary has established a corporate board to provide
strategic oversight to our RDT&E investments and priorities and
to further embed into our day-to-day business the urgency and
flexibility we honed during a decade of a wartime posture.
Sequestration decreases our RDT&E accounts $1.5 billion in
fiscal year 2013. This impacts all 282 program elements within
the account. In S&T, we expect to place 300 less grants and
cancel up to half of our new start functional naval capability
projects. In development, we will delay most programs by about
3 months.
The Navy has historically made deliberate and measured
investments to ensure stability and the right capacity within
the organic technical workforce. Section 219 of the 2009
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has proven invaluable
to maintaining the health of our Navy labs, warfare, and
systems centers. The Navy has used section 219 authority to
refresh the technical capabilities of our workforce while
enabling innovation. We are also placing greater emphasis on
technical discipline on approaches that change the cost
equation with things such as automated testing, open
architecture, and corrosion prevention.
Investment in our workforce is critical, but it must be
coupled with an appropriate investment in infrastructure. Based
on the direction of this subcommittee, the Navy has expanded
our ongoing test and evaluation infrastructure capabilities
look to include our R&D enterprise. We are about halfway
completed in our initial data gathering and we will use that in
the future to make some strategic investment in our facilities.
In these exceptionally challenging technological and
budgetary times, our goal continues to be to provide our
sailors and marines with technically superior capabilities. We
can ensure this through disciplined processes focused on
affordability executed by a skilled workforce with technical
capabilities second to none.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lacey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Mary E. Lacey
introduction
Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor to appear before you today to report on the efforts of the
Department of Navy (DON) Science and Technology (S&T) Laboratory
Enterprise. Its ultimate goal is to develop and rapidly deliver
innovation to our warfighters more efficiently through the effective
use of the technological resources of our Nation within the commercial
sector, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs),
University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), and our Naval
Laboratories and Warfare Centers.
The military dominance of the United States and U.S. Naval Forces
in particular, is closely coupled to technical superiority of our
military equipment and systems. With the future budget challenges we
must continue to encourage the creativity of our scientists and
engineers to meet the challenges of our adversaries while focusing on
the affordability of our current and future weapon systems and
platforms. I would like to thank the committee for your continued
support of our Nation's science and engineering base who continue to
provide new and improved affordable warfighting capabilities to sustain
the technology leadership our sailors and marines enjoy.
In the year since I last appeared before you the DoN has performed
an extensive strategic review of our research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) resources to move the possibilities offered by
science and technology into practical applications executed through
engineering to benefit our Navy and Marine Corps. This includes ongoing
reviews of the RDT&E accounts; focused efforts by DoN leadership to
accelerate game-changer technologies into fieldable systems,
collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering on efforts to improve communications and collaboration
between the Industrial base and our technical community through the
Defense Innovation Marketplace, and ongoing efforts of the Naval
Laboratory Center Coordinating Group (NLCCG) to invest in the technical
capabilities of in-house technical workforce and their critical
infrastructure. The technological threats to the Navy and Marine Corps
are constantly changing. The anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities of our potential adversaries are one example of the
constantly changing threat environment that impacts the ability of our
forces to maintain technological superiority. The Navy has come a long
way over the last few years in achieving balance in our technical
workforce and infrastructure to ensure technical capabilities critical
to the Navy are maintained in our Naval Laboratories and Warfare
Centers. There still remain many significant challenges, including an
examination of how best to utilize FFRDCs and UARCS to address the
challenges ahead but we continue to make strides in understanding the
full strategic potential of our national resources to affordably
deliver game changing technologies to the DoN.
Strategic reviews
To ensure the future technological superiority of our Fleet and
Force it is critical that prudent DoN RDT&E investments provide combat
effectiveness, affordability and improved reliability and
maintainability in our current and future weapon systems. With
increasing fiscal pressure, it is imperative that the DoN ensure its
RDT&E investments: target the correct warfighter missions, are aligned
across all RDT&E accounts, and expeditiously transition required
technologies to Fleet and Force operators.
The RDT&E Corporate Board provides governance of the Department of
the Navy's (DoN) RDT&E investments and activities of RDT&E (Budget
Activity 1-7) portfolios, programs, and priorities. It will ensure the
Department's RDT&E budget and execution decisions support near- and
long-term acquisition programs. Additionally, the Corporate Board
provides advice and assistance in developing policies for rapid
technology transition by reviewing transition processes that move S&T
projects into acquisition RDT&E programs of record, including Rapid
Fielding Efforts (e.g., CNO Speed-to-Fleet).
We have recently initiated our second rounds of review of DoN RDT&E
investments. Our focus is to ensure we are effectively balancing
tactical and strategic requirements against our current and future
technical capabilities. We want to shift our decisions from reactive
and stovepiped to a broader holistic approach where decisions are made
at the appropriate level to ensure the wisest use of our resources and
intellectual capital. Through the rigor of review, the DoN is looking
for game changers. These are innovations that effectively integrate
technology with policy and business to deliver real solutions for our
sailors and marines. The basic concepts of Integration and
Interoperability cause us to look across the kill-chain to see how
systems really work together.
From these reviews, we will have some tactical course corrections
that will properly align RDT&E projects in a more accurate budget
activity. With the RDT&E investments properly characterized, the RDT&E
Corporate Board can start to address the strategic direction of the
appropriation to foster sharing of technological developments across
warfare areas; orderly transition of innovation (e.g., disruptive
technologies); and future business/policy/technology game changers like
Open Architecture and Automatic Test and Re-Test. Two current areas of
emphasis in the RDT&E portfolio are directed energy weapons and non-
acoustic anti-submarine warfare.
Directed energy weapons offer the Navy game-changing capability in
terms of speed-of-light engagement, deep magazines, multi-mission
functionality and affordable solutions. High-energy laser weapons are
extremely affordable due to their very low engagement costs (low cost
per shot), which is critical in the current fiscal environment. High
energy laser weapons are capable of deterring asymmetric threats,
including swarming small boats, UAVs, and other low-cost, widely
available weapons. The Navy continues to invest in rapid fielding
initiatives and technical demonstrations to introduce these new
technologies to the Fleet and develop future capabilities. The Navy
maintains a broad portfolio of directed energy weapons programs
comprising shipboard, airborne, and ground-based systems. Recent Navy
investments in laser technology includes the first high-energy laser
aboard a moving Navy surface combatant, the Maritime Laser
Demonstration; the Mk38 Tactical Laser System also demonstrated against
small boats as well as other targets; while the LaWS (Laser Weapon
System) demonstration successfully countered remotely piloted drones
from USS Dewey in 2012. As part of a CNO-directed demonstration
program, the Navy intends to install a prototype LaWS aboard USS Ponce
(AFSB 1), which is currently forward deployed to the 5th Fleet AOR.
This demonstration, which will begin in fiscal year 2014, is the latest
in a series of technical maturation efforts designed to provide an
operational laser to the fleet.
A key to future Navy warfighting capabilities is the rapid
development, prioritization, and deployment of Non-Acoustic Anti-
Submarine Warfare capabilities. This can be accomplished through
efficient technology transitions, acquisition, and management across
the Navy Enterprise and coordination with the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Aside from the development and fielding of Non-Acoustic
Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities and/or systems, the DoN must also
plan for the employment of these same types of capabilities by our
adversaries. The DoN must be cognizant of this emerging threat and must
understand the operational vulnerabilities and thus guide the
development of mitigation strategies and capabilities.
Workforce and Infrastructure
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation, I have oversight responsibility to
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition for all RDT&E accounts, systems engineering and overall
stewardship responsibilities for the Naval Laboratories and Warfare
Centers. The DoN has 15 activities that compose the In-house research
and development capacity. It is comprised of the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL) and 14 Warfare and Systems Centers aligned to 3
Systems Commands: Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR), and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).
The Navy's principal Laboratory, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
was created by Congress in 1923. Over half of the work NRL performs is
fundamental science and technology, nearly all in partnership or in
collaboration with academia and researchers in other government
laboratories and activities. The Warfare and Systems Centers, while
being involved in basic science, play most strongly in technology and
engineering, often in partnership with industry, and government program
offices. They too have long histories, some dating back to the 1800s,
and were created to respond to a specific threat or technological
challenge. The NLCCG is our principal coordinating body for our in-
house activities. The group has been very active over the last year in
meeting the challenges I set before them to define core technical
capabilities and to determine how to optimally integrate all these
capabilities to meet the affordability challenges of today's platform
and systems acquisition while planning integrating and delivering
transformational technologies for the Navy-After-Next. Their focus was
to:
Align processes for the work we accept from customers;
Establish common processes for measuring the technical
health of our workforce;
Establish Department of Navy wide definitions for core
capabilities and competencies; and
Ensure consistency and transparency in program costing
practices to ensure we make every dollar count within the Navy
Working Capital Fund model.
The Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers constitute a diverse,
highly skilled workforce of over 43,000 employees with over 24,000
scientists and engineers. Among the scientists and engineers over 8,000
hold advanced degrees in science, engineering, or mathematics. The Navy
continues its efforts to revitalize and maintain the technical
capabilities of the acquisition workforce by hiring over 2,000
technical personnel at the Warfare centers in the technical career
fields of Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering, Test
and Evaluation (T&E), Information Technology (IT) and Production,
Quality, and Manufacturing.
The DON DT&E Self-Assessment Report for 2012 showed that our T&E
workforce continues to be adequately structured to support the needs
and demands of our acquisition programs. Continuous process improvement
efforts resulted in significant gains this past year for our T&E
workforce with slight growth in numbers, continuation of organizational
alignment efforts, enhanced T&E training opportunities and enhanced T&E
awards. At the leadership level, DON continues to use the Gate review
process to monitor the activities and progress of acquisition programs,
to include T&E. Naval Systems Commands and affiliated Program Executive
Offices/Program Management Offices continue to structure their
organizations to meet workload demands and provide for the overall T&E
competency expertise. DON continues to work close with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to address acquisition reform
initiatives, workforce improvement efforts, and T&E efficiency and
effectiveness mandates.
The Department of Navy was honored to receive the 2012 Top 100
Global Innovator Award from Thomson Reuters which identified the Navy
as one of the world's most innovative organizations. The Navy was the
top ranked government organization granted this award that is based on
the objective criteria of overall patent volume, patent grant success
rate, global reach of the portfolio and patent influence as evidenced
by citations. In addition the Navy continues to be recognized by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the industry
based Intellectual Property Intelligence Quotient patent board as a top
10 performer in innovation worldwide.
Section 219
The DoN has historically made deliberate and measured investments
to ensure stability within the organic workforce. During this period of
refreshing our workforce, section 219 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009
has proven invaluable to maintaining the health of the Navy Labs,
Warfare and Systems Centers. The Naval Innovative Science and
Engineering (NISE) program grew to nearly $100 million in fiscal year
2012. The NISE investments have been critical in refreshing aging
infrastructure through investments in updating and creating new
technical facilities. The NISE program has allowed the Navy Labs,
Warfare and Systems Centers to revitalize and refresh the technical
capabilities of the workforce through training and the support of
advanced degrees and certifications. NISE programs have provided
breakthrough research and been responsible for the maturation and
transition of technology to the warfighter and programs of record. The
NISE has encouraged cross-organizational multi-disciplinary projects
that include partnerships with academia and industry. Finally, the NISE
program has allowed the Navy to recruit and retain top technical talent
in support of the Fleet. We want to thank you for extending the sunset
clause until 2016. We would encourage you to make this a permanent
authorization.
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
Our ability to support the warfighter depends on our ability to
sustain a Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)
workforce--with Discovery and Innovation investments supporting STEM
outreach from kindergarten through post-doctoral education. One of our
greatest challenges involves our concern that the number of U.S.
citizen STEM graduates will not keep up with future U.S. demand or with
international competition for the same talent.
Our investments seek to increase diversity and numbers of students
pursuing STEM degrees. Areas of emphasis include: (1) freshman and
sophomore STEM retention in college; (2) hands-on STEM programs in
urban and rural middle schools; (3) teacher training in naval-relevant
fields of study; and (4) mission-critical graduate student and post-
doctoral support. Programs incorporate naval content, metrics to
measure impact, and coordinate with other Federal STEM programs.
Further, programs are selected based on potential for growth and
geographic expansion, as well as ability to serve underrepresented
student populations. We are in the process of developing a
comprehensive metrics and evaluation plan for all STEM programs, which
measures not only numbers of students and teachers, but assesses our
ability to fulfill naval requirements.
Our investment in our workforce is critical but so too is our
investment in our infrastructure. The Naval Infrastructure Capabilities
Assessment (NICAP) initiative started in fiscal year 2010 at NAVAIR.
Based on the direction of this subcommittee, DoN expanded it in fiscal
year 2012 to include all RDT&E capabilities at the Warfare Centers. The
expanded NICAP initiative will collect a limited amount of readily
available data and is expected to be complete by the end of this fiscal
year. In March of this year, we began the initial collection of
information at NAVAIR, NAVSEA, and SPAWAR. Because each of the SYSCOMs
use a different taxonomy to classify and manage their RDT&E
capabilities, we believe that there will be some challenges in
correlating the data and do not expect to be able to conduct a full
comparative analysis across all of our mission areas. As such, there is
a strong possibility that we will have to revisit the data in fiscal
year 2014 to address areas where there are disconnects in the data
provided and to implement additional tools to make the data more
consistent.
The NICAP review initiative captures the ``AS-IS'' capability
baseline to enable the integrated assessment of the RDT&E capabilities
across the Department of Navy. Initial areas of focus include
capability distribution, capability integration, capability alignment,
capability availability and capability sustainment requirements. The
NICAP provides dynamically-generated assessment views, statistical and
tabular reports supporting each of the five major objective areas.
These views and reports enable the comparative assessment of the
current Naval RDT&E capability baseline and relevant supporting
analyses for emerging infrastructure reviews.
When completed, NICAP will have captured and base lined technical
information on hundreds of buildings with more than 500 different
capabilities spread across 68 different geographical locations of our
14 Laboratories and Warfare Centers. The depth and the breadth of their
capabilities is exceptional; in spite of some of the less than ideal
conditions our scientists and engineers must perform their work.
The authority for unspecified minor construction up to $4 million,
under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2805, continues to hold significant potential for
the revitalization of Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers. We have
initiated the review and approval process for our first use of this
authority at NRL. As our program begins to gain strength, we anticipate
it becoming a valuable resource.
Balancing the infrastructure needs of our laboratories with the
needs of the fleet and our warfighters will always be a challenge. With
the current constrained budget environment, the minor construction
authority granted under section 2805 becomes even more important to the
revitalization of our technical infrastructure.
Improving processes to improve effectiveness
Similar to the challenge we face to maintain excellence in our
technical workforce and infrastructure is the requirement to continue
to push for technological innovation within the framework of
affordability. The Navy's is aggressively pursuing Integration and
Interoperability (I&I) with the goal of maintaining technical and
operational cohesiveness across mission areas in a fiscally-constrained
environment while increasing the overall capability for the warfighter.
Front end assessments based on operational evaluations that include
the integration and interoperability of multiple systems ensure
accuracy in determining capability gaps that will lead to better
acquisition decisions to provide readiness of the Fleet. The overall
objective is to produce a data informed Warfighting Capability Plan as
part of the PPBS to eliminate financial waste, increase competition,
and procure more relevant products. As part of this plan, the I&I
initiative is not limited to just material solutions, but is evaluating
probable solutions across the Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy spectrum. This
approach takes a holistic viewpoint across domains and functionalities
to ensure coordination and collaboration. This is in part being
accomplished by modifying the Systems Engineering Test Review and Gate
Review Requirements to identify problems early in the development
process and thus drive for better success in the production of
integrated and interoperable systems while gaining more pre-Milestone B
trade space. The I&I initiative is bringing to light the organizational
requirements that must be satisfied to successfully implement this
approach.
The Department of Navy (DoN) acquisition leadership continues to
promote the adoption of Open Systems Architecture (OSA) to support
innovation, reduce the time needed to integrate improved technologies
(cycle time), and lower systems' lifetime (total ownership) costs. On
November 26, 2012, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition), Mr. Sean Stackley signed out an updated
Naval OSA Strategy. This strategy outlines an aggressive 4-year plan
for business and technical changes. The result of executing the
strategy will be affordable, open platforms (ships, airplanes,
submarines, etc.) which will readily accommodate OSA-crafted modular
systems (weapons, sensors, control systems, etc.). The strategy update
addresses tightly coupled legacy systems and includes time and tools to
evolve those to an OSA. The Naval OSA Strategy complements Better
Buying Power 2.0 (BBP 2.0), recently issued by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Mr. Frank Kendall.
BBP 2.0 and Naval OSA continues the pursuit for greater efficiency and
productivity in defense spending and are focused on total ownership
costs across the lifecycle by emphasizing reuse, measurements,
modularity, and reducing redundancy. Competition, using the
Government's intellectual property and data rights, and breaking
vendor-lock are key attributes of both Naval OSA and BBP 2.0.
With the ramp down of Urgent Operational Needs Statements (UONS)
the Navy is incorporating the best of breed resources and techniques
from exemplar programs such as OSD's Quick Reaction Fund (QRF) and
Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) as well as the Navy's CNO's Speed to Fleet,
Tech Solutions, Technology Insertion for Program Savings (TIPS),
SwampWorks, Future Naval Capability (FNC), and Rapid Technology
Transition (RTT) into our core programs. Institutionalizing these
techniques will result in more affordable, rapid fielding of innovative
capability to the Fleet.
The defense industrial base is a critical component of the Navy's
S&T strategy. As part of the Department's Better Buying Power's
initiative to incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and
government, the Navy is leveraging the OSD developed Defense Innovation
Marketplace website (www.DefenseInnovationMarketplace.mil). The website
allows for a one-stop-resource to keep industry and academia apprised
of critical department and Navy S&T and acquisition information. These
materials allow industry to better align their independent research and
development (IR&D) efforts, providing Navy personnel stronger
connection to projects with potential leverage for current programs and
future planning. The Marketplace search functionality (now in Beta test
phase) will enhance the continued communication between government and
industry, as Navy acquisition community will be able to stay informed
about industry's IR&D efforts. The Navy's continues to make good use of
the DOD's Manufacturing Technology Program (ManTech) for industrial
preparedness. As an example the Navy's ManTech portfolio contains 70
projects aimed at cost reduction efforts of the Virginia-class
submarine with a potential for savings in of $25 million/hull.
The DoN continues to pursue partnerships with academia and industry
as a critical part of our strategy to provide a cutting technological
edge to the fleet. Work for Private Parties (WFPP) authorities in
conjunction with Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and other technology
transfer authorities provide a variety of tools that the Navy has
successfully applied for affordable and effective technology
development and fielding. The DoN continues to utilize its Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) authority. A CRADA allows
partners (government and non-Federal) to save money and valuable time
in achieving mutually desirable results. A non-Federal partner can
provide facilities, equipment, personnel, and funding to the CRADA. DoN
uses its CRADA authority to strengthen the U.S. industrial base and the
transfer and acceptance of commercial off-the-shelf technology for
government. DoN has entered into 3,262 CRADAs since 1989. These CRADAs
directly support ongoing research projects at the DoN laboratories.
There were 192 CRADAs signed in fiscal year 2012 as well as
modifications to a number of existing CRADAs.
summary
With all the technological and budgetary challenges we face our
goal remains the same: to ensure our sailors and marines are armed with
technically superior capabilities. We can ensure this continues through
disciplined processes focused on affordability, executed by a skilled
workforce with technical capabilities second to none who perform state-
of-the-art science and engineering in facilities that enable creativity
and innovation. We have made great strides over this last year and we
look forward to the continuing challenges. Thank you for your continued
support and the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Walker.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID E. WALKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENGINEERING
Dr. Walker. Chairman Hagan and Ranking Member Fischer, I am
pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony on the
2014 Air Force S&T program.
As our Chief of Staff, General Welsh, recently stated in
his vision for airmen, our Service is fueled by innovation. The
Air Force's single, fully-integrated S&T program and our
outstanding scientists and engineers are truly at the forefront
of this innovative spirit.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2014 budget request for S&T is
approximately $2.3 billion. These investments support a robust
and balanced foundation of basic and applied research and
advanced technology development that will provide demonstrated
transition options and support future warfighting capabilities.
This year's budget reflects a strong support of S&T from our
leadership in this challenging fiscal environment and is
balanced across the warfighters' needs for rapid reaction
solutions, mid-term technology development, and revolutionary
far-term capabilities.
Despite the strong support, the Air Force S&T program is
not immune to the impacts of sequestration. So far, the Air
Force research laboratory has notified over 40 universities and
20 contractors regarding grants and contracts that will be
terminated, delayed, or rescoped.
We are also concerned about the negative impact of
sequestration on our ability to attract and retain exceptional
scientists and engineers.
The total impact of the Air Force research, technology, and
development activities remains unclear, but it is safe to say
that many of the new and promising technologies will be delayed
in their transition to the warfighter.
While there are still uncertainties with sequestration, the
budget does reflect a promise of the future warfighting
capabilities, enabled by technologies developed in our
laboratory.
Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Fischer, I am pleased to
present the Air Force program and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. David E. Walker
introduction
Chairman Hagan, members of the subcommittee, and staff, I am
pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal year
2014 Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program. This is my first
chance to address you as the Deputy assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Science, Technology and Engineering, a position I assumed in
August 2012.
As the nature and sources of conflict throughout the globe have
become more diverse and less predictable, our Nation continues to face
a complex set of current and future security challenges many of which
are outlined in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense, the defense strategic guidance issued by the President
in January 2012. This guidance directed a renewed focus on the Asia-
Pacific region, as well as continued emphasis on the current conflicts
in the Middle East. The Air Force's enduring contributions to national
security as part of the joint team are more important now than ever
before and we must remain agile, flexible, ready and technologically-
advanced. Over the last year, the Air Force has aligned our S&T efforts
to best support the Defense Strategic Guidance within current fiscal
constraints. Our S&T Program supports the Air Force capabilities
fundamental to the major priorities of the guidance, such as deterring
and defeating aggression, projecting power in anti-access and area
denial environments, operating in the space and cyberspace domains, and
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The Air
Force S&T Program plays a vital role in our Nation's security by
creating compelling air, space and cyberspace capabilities for precise
and reliable global vigilance, reach and power.
The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Mark Welsh III,
recently stated in his vision for Airmen that our Service is ``fueled
by innovation.'' Our single, fully integrated S&T Program is truly at
the forefront of this innovative spirit and stems from several enduring
tenets. First, we must prepare for an uncertain future and investigate
game-changing technologies to affordably transition the art-of-the-
possible into military capabilities. To support the Air Force Core
Functions, we must create technology options across a wide spectrum
ranging from institutionalizing irregular warfare capabilities to
providing new capabilities to operate effectively in cyberspace and
across all domains. We must demonstrate advanced technologies that
address affordability by promoting efficiencies, enhancing the
effectiveness, readiness, and availability of today's systems, and
addressing life cycle costs of future systems. In keeping with our
Service heritage, we must continue to foster an appreciation for the
value of technology as a force-multiplier throughout the Air Force. We
must maintain the requisite expertise to support the acquisition and
operational communities and modernize and improve the sustainability of
unique research facilities and infrastructure. Finally, we will
leverage and remain vigilant over global S&T developments and emerging
capabilities to avoid technological surprise and exploit art-of-the-
possible technologies for our military advantage.
air force s&t fiscal year 2014 program
The Air Force fiscal year 2014 S&T Program investments support a
robust and balanced foundation of basic research, applied research, and
advanced technology development that will provide demonstrated
transition options to support future warfighting capabilities.
As a brief overview, adjustments were made within the S&T portfolio
to focus investments in the most promising technologies to develop
future warfighting capability. We are continuing emphasis in our
propulsion portfolio by investing in the development of adaptive
turbine engine technologies which will provide optimized fuel
efficiency and increased performance capabilities over a wide range of
flight regimes. We have emphasized research in hypersonics technologies
and in electronic warfare areas to provide the capability to counter
adversary anti-access and area denial approaches and effectively engage
time sensitive targets. Based on the current and forecasted cyberspace
capabilities, threats, vulnerabilities and consequences outlined in our
recently published Cyber Vision 2025 document, we aligned and
emphasized our cyber S&T investment in four areas: mission assurance,
agility and resilience, optimized human-machine systems, and
foundations of trust. We have also emphasized the development of
technologies to address limiting capability factors of human
performance in military missions including autonomy, data to decisions
and human systems research. I will highlight some of these adjustments
later in my testimony.
air force s&t program priorities
The Air Force fiscal year 2014 S&T Program supports the following
overarching priorities that are detailed in our Air Force S&T Strategy
document.
Priority 1: Support the Current Fight While Advancing Breakthrough S&T
for Tomorrow's Dominant Warfighting Capabilities
While developing technologies to equip our forces of tomorrow is
the primary objective of any S&T portfolio, our dedicated scientists
and engineers have been equally motivated over the last decade to
ensuring needed technologies get into the hands of our warfighters
today. This valuable near-term S&T investment has saved lives in the
current fights and continues to pay dividends as we transition to other
focus areas in the long term. I would like to share with you a few
examples of how we have supported our warfighters over the last year
and how those technologies are being poised to sustain and increase
military capabilities of the future.
As an example of one method, the Air Force has executed a rapid
reaction process through the Air Force Research Laboratory since 2005
which has provided rapid S&T solutions to the urgent needs of Air Force
Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and other Defense
agencies. Through focused interaction with warfighters and often
partnership with other Agencies, the process leverages the breadth and
depth of knowledge within the laboratory and its external ``innovation
network'' of academia and industry to deliver accelerated technology
solutions in approximately 1 year or less.
This rapid reaction process has been used to develop warfighting
capabilities to meet U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Urgent
Operational Needs including efforts such as Blue Devil Block 1. Blue
Devil Block 1 is a persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability demonstrating the first-ever
integration of wide area field-of-view and narrow field-of-view high
definition day and night sensors cued by advanced signals intelligence
sensors. Imagery and data are transmitted in near-real-time to an
individual soldier on the ground or a Blue Devil ground station where
multiple sensor data is rapidly fused for real time cueing and
decisions. This new technology and lessons learned from testing in
theater will improve capabilities in future systems, especially those
poised for engagements where reaction timelines and aircraft access
will be more challenging. In addition, the Air Force is rapidly working
a variety of S&T solutions to address MAJCOM operational needs for
rapid landing site survey and preparation, improved collaboration using
existing infrastructure and information, and increased global command,
control and communication (C3) connectivity. The Air Force has a strong
record of nurturing these types of game-changing concepts using modest
S&T funds along with partnerships with customers to transition
technologies quickly to warfighters while leveraging the investment to
inform and enhance the development of future technologies.
Even outside of the defined rapid reaction process, the Air Force
S&T Program has been instrumental in quickly bringing new or enhanced
operational capabilities to warfighters worldwide. For example, we are
improving awareness of the global space operations through Air Force
S&T support to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) at Vandenberg
AFB, CA. In 2011, the Air Force Research Laboratory deployed a modern
data fusion and display prototype which provides a Windows-type user
interface for the 20,000 object space catalogue, modernizing from the
text-based system used for the last 50 years. The prototype system
provides near real-time monitoring of all orbiting U.S., commercial and
foreign spacecraft assets within a common operating picture reducing
operator workload while alerting them to events in a more timely
fashion. It was used in October 2012 to monitor the breakup of a
Russian Breeze-M rocket body and ensure that orbiting operational space
assets were safe from the newly created space debris. As this
technology is transitioning to the operational Air Force through the
JSPOC Mission System (JMS) program at the Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC), the Air Force Research Laboratory now provides continued
upgrades for space operations on tight, 6-month spirals and accelerates
transition of critical S&T products to Air Force capability.
The models of development for these technologies, as well as
lessons learned, are now informing our research efforts to effectively
manage and utilize the volumes of data created by the vast array of
fielded sensors. While we have developed tools to fuse data from
multiple sensors and sources to assist intelligence analysts in
exploiting the data, most of these tools have not yet been integrated
into our standard tactical intelligence processing system, the Defense
Common Ground Station (DCGS). To facilitate this transition, we are
building a Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing and
Exploitation, Analysis and Production, and Dissemination (PCPAD)-
Experimental Cell, or PCPAD-X. This will be an operationally-
representative environment and innovative approach for research,
development, experimentation, demonstration, and objective evaluation
to facilitate transition of technologies for mission driven PCPAD. It
will provide a realistic ``analyst-in-the-loop'' environment which does
not exist today, complete with validated subjective and objective
performance metrics, for testing potential analysis capability
improvements. This environment will allow us to run existing and new
analytical tools through the PCPAD-X to more quickly and affordably
identify ``best of breed'' tools for transition.
The Air Force S&T Program is also supporting the current F-22
Raptor fleet while planning to enhance warfighter effectiveness in next
generation platforms. The Air Force Research Laboratory supported the
Safety Investigation Board, Scientific Advisory Board, the Root Cause
Corrective Action analysis, and is a major participant in the Air
Combat Command-led F-22 Life Support Systems Task Force. To address
life support issues, laboratory personnel provided expertise on oxygen
systems, toxicology, aerospace medicine/physiology, epidemiology, and
bio-environmental engineering. Scientists and engineers from the
laboratory identified on-board oxygen generating system (OBOGS)
limitations and recommended parameters for OBOGS challenge testing,
resulting in a new Department of Defense (DOD) Air Quality Standard.
They also developed and flew a helmet-mounted pulse oximeter for use on
the F-22 in 90 days and then transitioned the design for fleet-wide
operational fielding. To address multiple Air Force demand signals and
future concerns due to the increasingly complex and capable fighter
aircraft in development, the Air Force has begun reconstituting
aerospace physiology/toxicology core competencies at the Air Force
Research Laboratory. Using research and technology developed in
response to the F-22 issues, this program will provide evidence-based
understanding of pilot physiologic response to new air platforms,
characterize physiologic performance for new flight envelopes,
understand physiologic impacts due to toxic exposure, and understand
unexplained cognitive dysfunction that can occur in some pilots.
Priority 2: Execute a Balanced, Integrated S&T Program that is
Responsive to Air Force Service Core Functions
Our Nation depends on the Air Force to counter a broad range of
threats that could limit our ability to project global reach, global
power, and global vigilance. Even as we emphasize focus on the Asia-
Pacific region, we are aware that we cannot predict with certainty the
time, place, or nature of the next contingency where airpower will be
needed. The Air Force's technological advantage is threatened by the
worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons and advanced technologies,
including integrated air defenses, long-range ballistic missiles, and
advanced air combat capabilities. In addition, advances in adversarial
capabilities in space control and cyber warfare may limit Air Force
operations in air, space, and cyberspace. Some of these technologies
are attained with relatively minimal cost; greatly reducing the
barriers to entry that have historically limited the reach and power of
non-state actors, organized militias, and radical extremists. Today's
strategic environment indicates the military need for flexibility and
versatility which requires a shift to inherently agile, deployable, and
networked technologies and systems--including legacy systems--designed
to accomplish a multitude of missions.
Through prioritization and planning, the Air Force fiscal year 2014
S&T Program provides the technical edge to affordably meet these
threats during this time of fiscal constraint. Since high-payoff
technologies are needed to sustain our air, space, and cyberspace
superiority in an increasingly competitive environment, we are smartly
investing in a broad portfolio of technologies aligned with the Defense
Strategic Guidance that are balanced across the warfighter's need for
near-term, rapid-reaction solutions; mid-term technology development;
and revolutionary, far-term capabilities.
At the Service level, the Air Force has matured its S&T planning
processes a great deal over the last year by improving the alignment
between S&T efforts and capability gaps outlined in Air Force Core
Function Master Plans (CFMPs). Our robust research program pushes the
technological state of the art across a range of areas for potential
military application as well as being responsive to technology needs
expressed by the operational community. The established S&T planning
governance process ensures S&T investments are well understood,
structured for success, and poised for transition when completed. This
process is the backbone of Air Force S&T contributions to the larger
DOD priorities and strategies and has provided us opportunities to lead
the Department's research and strategic planning efforts in some areas
including cyber, autonomy, electronic warfare and manufacturing
technology. These planning efforts also support the Department's Better
Buying Power 2.0 initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies in
acquisition, including developing stronger partnerships with the
requirements community, using the technology development phase for true
risk reduction and incentivizing productivity and innovation in
industry.
To illustrate how the Air Force S&T Program is supporting our
national security by providing the necessary speed, range, flexibility,
precision, persistence, and lethality across all domains (air, space,
and cyber), I would like to highlight some of our efforts in the areas
we are leading for the Department as well as across our portfolio of
contributions:
Speed can contribute to survivability of Air Force systems and
allow us to engage time sensitive targets even in the anti-access/area-
denial environments we increasingly expect to encounter in the future.
Starting in early fiscal year 2011, the Air Force S&T community--in
collaboration with industry--developed roadmaps for high speed
technology options for Air Force missions in anti-access/area-denial
environments. The Air Force focused its S&T investments in two key
areas: technology for survivable, time-critical strike in the near term
and a far-term penetrating regional Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.
Our survivable, time critical strike technology effort includes
research and advanced technology development efforts that support the
maturation to Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) of Mach 5.0 plus
cruise missile technology. Detailed roadmaps have been developed, which
include advanced guidance technology, selectable effects ordnance,
airframe technology, and expendable cruise propulsion. The technologies
requiring early flight testing are included in a demonstration effort
that will begin later in fiscal year 2013 called the High Speed Strike
Weapon (HSSW).
HSSW is an integrated technology demonstration that was proposed by
the same Air Force and industry team who developed the overall Air
Force S&T plan/roadmaps in the high speed area. Key to HSSW's tactical
relevance is its compatibility with Air Force 5th generation platforms
to include geometric and weight limits for internal B-2 Spirit bomber
carriage and external F-35 Lightening II fighter carriage. It will also
include a tactically compliant engine start capability and launch from
a relevant altitude. The flight demonstration will be the first
tactically-relevant demonstration of Mach 5.0 plus airbreathing missile
technology. This effort addresses many of those items necessary to
realize a missile in this speed regime including: modeling and
simulation; ramjet/scramjet propulsion; high temperature materials;
guidance, navigation, and control; seekers and their required
apertures; warhead and subsystems; thermal protection and management;
manufacturing technology; and compact energetic booster technologies.
The Air Force is actively pursuing a partnership with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on this demonstration to
leverage their recent experience in hypersonic technologies that are
relevant to HSSW and other hypersonic systems.
Analysis of challenges in the future security environment has made
clear that our advanced munitions technology like the HSSW and other
existing or advanced munitions will need to operate when the Global
Positioning System (GPS) signal is either degraded or perhaps even
denied entirely. As such, we have focused on pursuing a number of
munitions guidance technologies that will allow us to continue to
operate much as we have become accustomed today. These include
technologies that expand upon our current anti-jam GPS navigation
capabilities and novel technical approaches to navigation such as optic
field flow techniques and multi-sensor fusion. These techniques allow
the Air Force to harvest information regarding these systems as they
traverse through their flight environment and infer the necessary
navigation information.
The importance of dominance in the cyberspace domain cannot be
overstated as it is a foundation for global vigilance, reach and power.
Cyberspace is a domain in which, from which and through which all
military missions are performed and is becoming increasingly contested
or denied. The Air Force has placed great emphasis on S&T efforts to
overcome threats and provide systems and methods that are affordable
and resilient. The Chief Scientist of the Information Directorate of
the Air Force Research Laboratory located in Rome, NY (``Rome Lab''),
has been charged to chair the collaborative, Joint cyber S&T road-
mapping efforts for DOD based on the Laboratory's history of
exceptional cutting-edge cyber research.
Recognizing that sound strategies are the foundation for wise
investments, the Air Force Office of the Chief Scientist partnered with
operators and technologists from across the Air Force, government,
industry, academia, National Laboratories, and Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers to develop Cyber Vision 2025 last
year. Cyber Vision 2025 describes the Air Force vision and blueprint
for cyber S&T spanning cyberspace, air, space, command and control,
intelligence, and mission support. It provides a long-range vision for
cyberspace to identify and analyze current and forecasted capabilities,
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences across core Air Force
missions in order to identify key S&T gaps and opportunities. The Air
Force's cyber S&T investments are aligned to the four themes identified
in Cyber Vision 2025: Mission Assurance, Agility and Resilience,
Optimized Human-Machine Systems, and Foundations of Trust. Cyber Vision
2025 and our associated cyber S&T strategy guides the research
conducted at the Air Force Research Laboratory ensuring the relevance
and efficiency of our technology development for Air Force and national
security users.
Air Force S&T efforts in Mission Assurance seek to ensure
survivability and freedom of action in contested and denied
environments through enhanced cyber situational awareness for air,
space, and cyber commanders. Research efforts in automating network and
mission mapping are working to provide warfighters with the ability to
detect and operate through cyber attacks with threat warning,
integrated intelligence, and real-time forensics/attribution. We are
also focused on developing technologies to achieve cross-domain
integrated effects and determine cross-domain measures of effectiveness
(MOEs), including cyber battle damage assessment.
Our research in Agility and Survivability is focused on minimizing
future system risk by reducing attack surfaces, segregating critical
mission systems, and developing methods to contain attacks. Air Force
S&T efforts are creating dynamic, randomizable, reconfigurable
architectures capable of autonomously detecting compromises, repairing
and recovering from damage, and evading threats in real-time. The Air
Force is also enhancing cyber resiliency through an effective mix of
redundancy, diversity, and fractionation (i.e., distributed
functionality).
We are also working to maximize the human and machine potential
through the measurement of physiological, perceptual, and cognitive
states to enable personnel selection, customized training, and user-,
mission-, and environment-tailored augmented cognition. Air Force S&T
efforts are developing high performance visualization and analytic
tools to enhance situational awareness, accelerate threat discovery,
and empower task performance.
The Air Force is developing secure foundations of computing
including trusted fabrication technologies, anti-tamper technologies,
and supply chain assurance, as well as effective mixes of government,
commercial off the shelf, and open source software to provide operator
trust in systems (e.g., sensors, communications, navigation, command
and control). Research into formal verification and validation of
complex, large scale, interdependent systems as well as vulnerability
analysis, automated reverse engineering, and real-time forensics tools
will improve security at all levels of technology implementation.
Further, efforts exploring high speed encryption, quantum communication
and, eventually, quantum encryption will further increase the
confidentiality and integrity of supporting infrastructure.
The security atmosphere of today, and that which we can visualize
in the future, requires our military aircraft to operate in highly
contested environments. Manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum--
called electronic warfare--can help us negate the integrated air
defenses of our adversaries. Over the years, we have developed stand-
off, on-board, and off-board capabilities to protect fighter and bomber
aircraft; however, our adversaries continue to evolve their
capabilities at the same time. As the lead for the DOD Electronic
Warfare Priority Steering Committee, the Air Force has been charged to
facilitate road-mapping efforts for research in new technologies and
techniques to be effective against the new threats involving ways to
defeat new sensors operating in new frequencies, more elaborate
detection methods, and greater computational and networking
capabilities of adversaries. The new technologies and techniques being
created feed into Air Force and Navy upgrades to a range of military
aircraft including fighters, bombers, support and decoy aircraft. For
example, the Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS)
effort for the F-15 Eagle is leveraging the Air Force Research
Laboratory Sensors Directorate work in advanced digital receiver
technology as one key architecture option.
Research in our Directed Energy portfolio has also shown promise in
the development of capabilities to defeat our adversary's electronic
systems on the ground. In October 2012, the Air Force successfully
flight tested a system called the Counter Electronics High Powered
Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP). During the flight test, the
CHAMP cruise missile navigated a pre-programmed flight plan and emitted
bursts of high-powered microwaves at targets containing a wide range of
representative electronic equipment, effectively delivering a
functional disable of the systems without harmful effect on people or
structures in and around the target area. This successful test
culminated the CHAMP Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration and
moved the Air Force closer to providing combatant commanders with a
non-kinetic counter electronics capability as a complement to lethal
measures, increasing mission options for the warfighter.
The Defense Strategic Guidance pivot to emphasis on the Asia-
Pacific region means missions with expanded duration, intermittent
communication disruptions, high rate of changing situations, and a
larger array of asset capability. These realities require research in
both human systems and performance to better enable warfighters to
enhance military capabilities as well as autonomous systems which can
extend human reach by providing potentially unlimited persistent
capabilities without degradation due to fatigue or lack of attention.
Since they are investment priorities, the Department has established
cross-Service steering groups for both human systems and autonomy to
roadmap and coordinate research efforts in these areas. The Air Force
is leading the autonomy steering group and is an active member of the
human systems group.
The Air Force envisions that the greater use of autonomous systems
will enable United States forces to operate well within the ``decision
loops'' of our adversaries. Such increases in machine autonomy will
require humans and automated systems to work as a team, with some level
of decisionmaking delegated to the machine counterpart. We seek to
enable the right balance of human and machine capability to meet Air
Force challenges in the future and are focused on growing autonomous
system capability, integrated with the human capacity to perform in a
high-tempo, complex decision environment, and to optimize humans
working together with machines, both effectively and efficiently.
To achieve this, the Air Force is developing technologies to enable
Airmen and machines to work together, with each understanding mission
context, sharing understanding and situation awareness, and adapting to
the needs/capabilities of the other. The keys to maximizing this human-
machine interaction are: instilling confidence and trust among the team
members; understanding of each member's tasks, intentions, capabilities
and progress; and ensuring effective and timely communication. This
must all be provided within a flexible architecture for autonomy,
facilitating different levels of authority, control and collaboration.
Current research is focused on understanding human cognition and
applying these concepts to machine learning. For example, we are
developing efficient interfaces for an operator to supervise multiple
MQ-9 Reaper platforms and tools for ISR analysts to better identify and
track targets of interest. We are also conducting human systems
research in the areas of decisionmaking, training, bioeffects, and
human-centered ISR. We have increased our emphasis in training research
with the objective of providing live, virtual, and constructive
rehearsal capabilities to increase affordability by reducing training
time by 30 percent, increasing training effectiveness by 15 percent,
and creating common methods for cross-mission application. As a result
of this research, the Air Force will be more efficient and effective
while tailoring training and rehearsal to the point-of-need to keep
pace with rapidly evolving and complex threats.
Today there is little cross-platform interaction or coordination
without a human engaging in the interaction. Therefore, the Air Force
is developing cooperation technologies that will allow machines to
autonomously synchronize activity and information to take our military
capabilities beyond human limitations. Systems that coordinate
location, status, mission intent, intelligence and surveillance data
can provide redundancy, increased coverage, decreased costs and/or
increased capability. The Air Force's research efforts are focused on
developing control software to enable multiple, small unmanned air
systems to coordinate mission tasking with other air systems or with
ground sensors and also on developing munition sensors and guidance
systems that will increase operator trust, validation, and flexibility
while capitalizing on the growing ability of munitions to autonomously
search a region of interest, provide additional situational awareness,
plan optimum flight paths, de-conflict trajectories, optimize weapon-
to-target orientation, and cooperate to achieve optimum effects.
The Air Force's mission to fly, fight and win in air, space and
cyberspace, requires a tremendous amount of energy. In fact, our
Service uses approximately 2.5 billion gallons of aviation fuel per
year and is the largest fuel consumer in the Federal Government. As
such, we are pursuing research into technologies to reduce energy
demand for both legacy and future aircraft.
For example, in conjunction with Air Mobility Command, the Air
Force Research Laboratory is conducting promising research to reduce
drag on C-130 Hercules aircraft, one of the primary fuel consumers in
our legacy fleet. This low-cost aft-body flow control research,
consisting of microvanes and finlets, will reduce the flow separation
around the cargo ramp and the horizontal junction with the fuselage.
Flight testing to date has shown that these devices can save 3 to 5
percent of total aircraft drag during normal flight conditions. The Air
Force has developed and funded a two-phase flight test process to
optimize the design of the devices to provide the maximum fuel savings
possible without having detrimental effects on airdrop operations,
basic loadability, handling qualities and structural dynamics. Phase I
(early operational assessment) testing was successfully completed at
Yuma Proving Ground in November 2012. Phase II (fuel flow, handling
qualities and structural dynamics) testing is on schedule for late
spring of this year. This modest research investment could save
approximately $130,000 per year, per aircraft and the resulting
production versions are installable at the field level, meaning minimal
downtime for the warfighter and depot level maintenance savings.
For the longer term reduction in energy demand, the Air Force is
investing in the development of adaptive turbine engine technologies
which have the potential to reduce fuel consumption by 25 percent in
comparison to current turbine engines by enabling optimized performance
over a wide range of flight conditions. These technologies also
increase capability in anti-access/area denial environments by
increasing range by 25 to 30 percent or increasing time-on-station by
33 to 40 percent.
The Air Force initiated investment in adaptive engine technology
through the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) program. This
research is being leveraged by our current Adaptive Engine Technology
Development (AETD) program. AETD will mature ADVENT and additional
technologies, including inlet and exhaust systems, to TRL 6 to reduce
risk for follow-on activities and facilitate integration into multiple
platforms to realize operational benefits. Investments in these efforts
helps us reduce energy demand, bridge the ``valley of death'' between
S&T and potential acquisition programs, and help maintain the U.S.
industrial technological edge and lead in turbine engines.
The Air Force is also the lead for the Department in the
development and demonstration of technology solutions that decrease
manufacturing risk and increase weapon system affordability for
aerospace propulsion, structures and ISR systems. Simply stated, a more
capable and lean warfighting force requires a much more efficient and
responsive manufacturing and industrial base than we currently have
today. The Air Force Manufacturing Technology program explores
strategic issues and opportunities in manufacturing and industrial
readiness including moving manufacturing considerations to bear earlier
in the design cycle to reduce acquisition cost and risk; enabling a
seamless life-cycle value stream management through a cradle-to-cradle
digital design thread to improve process control, optimization, and
agility; integrating the industrial base enterprise to predict,
identify, and react to supply chain issues; and creating the factory of
the future with flexible, robust tooling and machine cells for limited
part runs.
For example, the Air Force Manufacturing Technologies program
conducts Manufacturing Readiness Assessments on new technology,
components, processes, and subsystems in order to define the current
level of manufacturing maturity and identify associated risk. A number
of major DOD weapon system suppliers and Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) have integrated manufacturing readiness levels
into their gated technology transition processes to help decide when a
technology is mature enough to use in a product design. As a result,
prime contractors and other OEMs are making better decisions about
which technologies to include in product designs resulting in reduced
cost, schedule and performance risk. This past year, the advanced
manufacturing propulsion initiative continued activities to reduce the
weight and cost of turbine engines through advanced manufacturing of
light weight castings and ceramic composites. The advanced next
generation radar and coatings affordability projects continue to reduce
technology cost and manufacturing risk to systems such as the F-22 and
F-35 aircraft.
The Air Force S&T Program is also supporting the President's
Materials Genome Initiative (MGI) aimed at doubling the speed and
reducing the cost of discovering, developing and deploying new advanced
materials. The MGI is engaging all stakeholders in the materials
development community which spans academic institutions, small
businesses, large industrial enterprises, professional societies, and
government. Our supporting effort is called Integrated Computational
Materials Science and Engineering (ICMSE) and its objective is to
develop quantitative and predictive techniques for the field of
materials science and engineering (MSE) to bring similar benefits to
MSE that have been realized from Finite Element Analysis or
Computational Fluid Dynamics in aircraft design.
ICMSE requires new, science-based capabilities in order to create
fresh approaches for the design of materials. Coupled with materials
design is the need to develop a robust, two-way conduit between
materials design, manufacturing, and component design. The Air Force,
Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Illinois have teamed to
form a center-of-excellence (COE) to innovate new solutions for
pervasive ICMSE issues, including physics-based multi-scale modeling
and uncertainty quantification. While the COE explores basic science
underpinnings for ICMSE, nearer-term approaches to integrate the
continuum spanning materials design and vehicle design are being
explored in concert with vehicle/component designers, manufacturers,
materials suppliers, and materials developers. Two Air Force-relevant
engineering problems (high-temperature metals and composites) establish
the scope on which to develop, test and demonstrate approaches for
ICMSE.
Research in our space portfolio also addresses how to accomplish
the Air Force mission with resiliency and affordability. For example,
we are seeking to provide added protection to our satellites by
increasing the robustness and resiliency of the most susceptible
spacecraft components which will provide affordable options for a more-
defendable space capability. The Air Force collaborates with NASA on
research in space communications to extend the frequency trade space
and create options for future space communication satellites. We are
also continuing to mature technology for next-generation GPS user
equipment with anti-jam capability for contested theater operations,
including the transitioning of the cold atom technology from basic to
applied research which offers great promise for operating in GPS-denied
environments. In the space situational awareness area, the Air Force
S&T enterprise operates two 3.5 meter class telescopes and several
smaller ones that, as well as performing research, are used to support
satellite owners in determining the health/status of their satellites
using high resolution optical images instead of the traditional radar.
To reduce the cost of space access, the Air Force is researching
ways to improve Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle capability through
increased use of multiple payloads. Air Force S&T maintains a long-term
investment in pervasive spacecraft technologies, such as more efficient
space solar cells that can reduce solar array mass by 40 percent.
Space experiments, such as the current Advanced Responsive
Tactically Effective Military Imaging Spectrometer payload on TacSat-3
and the Communications/Navigation Outage Forecasting System, are a
critical tool used to develop and prove new technologies and
phenomenologies. Future experimental satellites include the Automated
Navigation and Guidance Experiment for Local Space, which will research
local space surveillance, and the Demonstration and Science Experiment,
which will research approaches to counter a space nuclear detonation.
Development of revolutionary, far-term capabilities begins with
scientific discovery and the building of foundational knowledge with
our investment in basic research. Based on visions of the future
established by Air Force leadership, Air Force scientists and engineers
identify, nurture and harvest the best basic research to transform
leading-edge scientific discoveries into new technologies with
substantial military potential. These technologies transform the art-
of-the-possible into near-state-of-the-art and offer new and better
ways for the acquisition community to address far-term warfighter
needs. While it can be more of a challenge to quantify long-term basic
research, with the scientists and engineers at the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research within the Air Force Research Laboratory actively
engaged in worldwide technical communities, the Air Force has leveraged
significant investments made by other defense and Federal agencies, as
well as non-defense and international laboratories, in its on-going
efforts to advance basic science.
For example, an Air Force basic research funded project in quantum
storage at the University of Maryland has demonstrated for first time
that multiple images can be stored and retrieved at different times
based on interaction between light and matter. In this atomic memory,
light signals can now be stored as patterns in a room-temperature vapor
of atoms that are tailored to absorb and later re-emit messages on
demand. Quantum storage capabilities will exploit quantum effects for
computing and communications are vital to increasing the speed,
capacity and security of our networks and computer systems of the
future. The researchers are continuing to understand entangled quantum
memories for use in securing long distance transmission of secure
information through optical fiber systems.
While most of our investments in the Air Force S&T Program focus on
developing and advancing technologies for the future, S&T also has an
important role to play in providing technology options to increase the
availability and decrease the life cycle costs of our legacy platforms
now. Many of the Air Force's current aircraft were manufactured decades
ago and are experiencing age-related issues, such as cracking and
corrosion, especially after nearly 20 years of unabated use. Our S&T
efforts to address sustainment issues not only pay dividends now but
also provide options when designing and building future systems. We are
focusing our sustainment efforts in three areas: inserting new
technologies in legacy systems to better and more affordably sustain
the fleet, developing technology-based approaches to improving fleet
health management and introducing new design approaches for future
systems and components.
For example, over the last year our research had yielded results in
addressing critical cracking issues with the C-5 Galaxy aircraft floor
bulkhead end fittings. The cracks, caused by stress corrosion, led to
increased maintenance costs and reduced the amount of cargo that could
be carried on the aircraft. Using a new, more stress corrosion-
resistant aluminum alloy, researchers developed a new die forging
process by which all of the 92 fitting shapes required for the C-5
bulkhead could be produced using only two separate forging dies. The
new technology, which has now been transitioned to the Warner Robins
Air Logistics Center, provides many benefits including a 25 percent
overall cost savings, an 80 percent reduction in fabrication time and a
60 percent increase in service life of the fittings.
The Air Force is also a key member of the multi-Service Advanced
Technology Demonstration (ATD) addressing propulsion sustainment for
current and future aircraft. The team is working to provide hot section
component durability which is a significant driver of maintenance
costs. This effort is focused on advanced turbine cooling and
aerodynamics technologies that reduce weight and allow engines to run
hotter at the same material temperature thereby producing more thrust.
These types of technologies are aimed at benefitting turbine engine
programs across DOD including current programs, such as the F-35, as
well as future Air Force programs, such as the Long-Range Strike
bomber.
Priority 3: Retain and Shape the Critical Competencies Needed to
Address the Full Range of S&T Product and Support Capabilities
The U.S. Air Force is the most technologically advanced air force
in the world - and we intend to keep it that way. Technology is part of
every mission we perform, and innovative and technically-savvy Airmen
are our most important asset. The Air Force ensures we continue to have
war-winning technology by careful and proactive management of our
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) workforce.
Through implementation of Bright Horizons, the Air Force STEM
Workforce Strategic Roadmap, and the Air Force Systems Engineering
Strategic Plan, we continue to develop and retain a workforce with the
skill sets necessary to create compelling air, space and cyberspace
capabilities for precise and reliable global vigilance, reach and
power. The Air Force is progressively developing a highly qualified
engineering workforce with the engineering competencies required to
support the acquisition of warfighting systems. We continue to be
appreciative of the Laboratory Demonstration authority and are
investigating opportunities to expand the program to our entire STEM
workforce.
The Air Force conducted an in-depth review of our STEM requirements
and is revamping our accession and recruiting processes to help career
field managers obtain the right skill sets. Over last 8 years in the
Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART)
Scholarship Program, the Air Force averaged 60 scholarships per year to
scientists and engineers; after payback commitment, we retained 88
percent of scholars in Air Force jobs. Through an innovative Section
219 (of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 2009)
workforce initiative, the Information Assurance Internship funds 10 to
20 college juniors and seniors in STEM disciplines to study the science
of information assurance and information warfare on Air Force problems.
For instance, last year's interns, who averaged a 3.8 grade point
average, developed a mathematical model for the MQ-9 Reaper remotely
piloted vehicle in a contested cyber environment. The Air Force
utilizes this initiative to attract and offer employment to the best
and brightest cyber students. An objective of our workforce strategy is
to improve the pool of diverse candidates available to enter our STEM
workforce. We also continue to have a vibrant relationship with
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority Serving
Institutions (HBCU/MI), who conduct research projects, improve
infrastructure, and intern with the Air Force Research Laboratory in
support of the Air Force mission. The Air Force uses essential tools,
such as the SMART Program and the Information Assurance Internship, to
renew and grow the required skill sets critical for Air Force mission
success. The Air Force remains dedicated to improving our force
management processes to attract, recruit and retain STEM talent.
Priority 4: Ensure the Air Force S&T Program Addresses the Highest
Priority Capability Needs of the Air Force
As discussed earlier, the Air Force S&T planning and governance
process ensures the Air Force S&T program addresses the highest
priority capability needs of our Service. The Air Force Core Function
Master Plans (CFMPs) play a critical role in this process by
identifying S&T needs as they relate to capability gaps, requirements,
and potential materiel solutions.
Among other things, this process has allowed us to create and
execute Air Force Flagship Capability Concepts (FCCs). Key factors in
commissioning this type of an Air Force-level technology demonstration
effort include having a well-defined scope and specific objectives
desired by a MAJCOM. The technologies are matured by the Air Force
Research Laboratory with the intent to transition to the acquisition
community for eventual deployment to an end user. These FCCs are
sponsored by the using command and are vetted through the S&T
Governance Structure and Air Force Requirements Oversight Council to
ensure they align with Air Force strategic priorities. Currently, the
Air Force is working on three FCCs: the High Velocity Penetrating
Weapon (HVPW), Precision Airdrop (PAD), and Selective Cyber Operations
Technology Integration (SCOTI).
The HVPW FCC was established to demonstrate critical technologies
to reduce the technical risk for a new generation of penetrating
weapons to defeat difficult, hard targets. This FCC is maturing
technologies that can be applied to the hard target munitions
acquisition including guidance and control, terminal seeker, fuze,
energetic materials and warhead case design. This effort is developing
improved penetration capability of hard, deep targets containing high
strength concrete with up to 2,500 feet per second (boosted velocity)
impact in a GPS-degraded environment. This technology will demonstrate
penetration capability of a 5,000 pound-class gravity weapon with a
2,000 pound weapon thus increasing the loadout for bombers and
fighters. Testing in 2013 has demonstrated warhead survivability and
several sled tests are scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year
2014.
The PAD FCC was commissioned in 2011 in response to a request from
the Commander of Air Mobility Command for technologies to improve
airdrop accuracy and effectiveness while minimizing risk to our
aircrews. The Air Force Research Laboratory, Aeronautical Systems
Center, and Air Mobility Command members established a working group to
explore all aspects of the airdrop missions from re-supplying our
warfighters in the field to providing humanitarian aid to people in
need across the globe. To date, PAD FCC efforts have focused on: early
systems engineering analysis to determine major error sources, data
collection, flying with crews, wind profiling, designing high density
pallet rollers, and designing modeling and simulation (M&S) activities.
We expect demonstrations to begin in late calendar year 2013.
The SCOTI FCC is executing smoothly toward providing cyber
technologies capable of affecting multiple nodes for the purposes of
achieving a military objective. SCOTI directly meets the needs of a
major capability area in the Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core
Function Master Plan and provides a non-kinetic alternative to an
adversary's operations. The standardized delivery platform being
developed is scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2013 and will
serve as a baseline for current and future integrated cyber tools. The
SCOTI stakeholders signed the finalized Technology Transition Plan in
March, clearly identifying how SCOTI is expected to transition to the
warfighters for operational use. SCOTI is on track to be delivered to
the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center in fiscal year 2013 for
integration with additional mission software, and Initial Operational
Capability can be achieved as early as fiscal year 2016. In the past
year, the stakeholders also completed SCOTI's Test Master Plan, and
warfighters from the 166th Air National Guard conducted system-level
tests on two development spirals of SCOTI technology with positive
results. SCOTI is on track to meet all eight of its technical
performance measures and provide the desired capability to the
warfighter.
To ensure these FCCs and other advanced technology development
efforts are postured for successful transitions to warfighting
capability, the Air Force is continuing deliberate efforts to better
align S&T planning, technology transition planning, and development
planning. The linkages between these planning activities are critical
to initiating acquisition programs with more mature technologies and
credible cost estimates, and we are mandating this linkage in new Air
Force policy.
The Air Force is also engaging small businesses through the Rapid
Innovation Fund (RIF) to rapidly insert innovative technologies into
acquisition programs that meet critical national security needs. In the
first year (fiscal year 2011), the Air Force solicited innovative
technologies in five broad thrust areas for this program: (1) Rapid
Fielding to Support Overseas Contingency Operations; (2) Cyberspace
Superiority and Mission Assurance; (3) Improved System Sustainment; (4)
Power Generation and Energy for Platforms; and (5) Joint Urgent
Operational Needs with an Air Force interest. After receiving 729 white
paper proposals from vendors in 44 States, the Air Force awarded 46
contracts, all of which went to small businesses.
We have experienced a similar reaction from industry to our fiscal
year 2012 RIF broad agency announcement which solicited innovative
technologies from more than 40 thrust areas submitted by the Air
Force's Program Executive Offices (PEOs). The more than 700 white paper
proposals received will be evaluated by a team from across the Air
Force. We expect to make award notifications for the fiscal year 2012
RIF program in the spring of this year.
Overall, the Rapid Innovation Fund presents an opportunity to
transition innovative technology into Service programs. The Rapid
Innovation Fund provides a vehicle for businesses (especially small
businesses) to easily submit their innovative technologies where they
feel it will best meet military needs. The Air Force benefits by having
the ability to evaluate proposed innovative technologies against
critical needs and selecting the most compelling for contract award.
Through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)/Small
Business Technology Transfer Program, the Air Force continues to garner
the creative, innovative, and entrepreneurial spirit of small
businesses to solve many technological problems. In that regard, we are
pleased that the SBIR program was reauthorized through 2017 and many of
its provisions expanded or made permanent. As we implement the
provisions of the reauthorization, we intend to collaborate with other
Federal agencies, where practical, to ensure that our processes are
streamlined, efficient, and that small businesses continue to be a
major driver of high-technology innovation and economic growth in the
United States.
conclusion
Our emphasis areas reflect our re-focused S&T portfolio given
budgetary challenges and the Defense Strategic Guidance. I believe
these areas also reflect the promise of future warfighting capability
enabled by the technologies that will be developed with Air Force S&T
Program investment. We recognize that these challenges will not
disappear tomorrow, and that is why we have improved our processes to
make better investment decisions and to capitalize on these investments
to efficiently deliver capability to our warfighters. We continue to
institutionalize these initiatives in our policies and procedures
across the Air Force. The S&T portfolio we present to you today, after
all, is the genesis of our warfighting capability of tomorrow. Our
Airmen and our Nation are depending on it!
Chairman Hagan, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today and thank you for your continuing support of the Air Force S&T
Program.
Senator Hagan. I thank all of you very much.
I know sequestration really has had a negative impact on
all of these disciplines, and it is something, I am sure, we
will be talking about more. It really does concern me greatly
especially, Dr. Walker, your last comment about the ability to
retain the current scientists and as engineers that are
currently working throughout the disciplines of civilians in
DOD.
So let us look at my handouts, the two charts.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Hagan. These two charts were taken from a DARPA
presentation on the defense aircraft industry last year. The
first one titled: ``Threats evolve faster than we develop
systems,'' depicts an example of how these threats evolve much
faster than the time it takes for us to actually develop these
systems, such as the F-22 fighter. During the time from the
initial requirement of the advanced technical fighter in the
early 1980s to the first F-22 delivered in 2003, this chart
depicts how the world had significantly changed, both in terms
of threat and in terms of technologies. Especially today when
we are talking about the budget, the sequestration, the impact
of the time alone certainly would impact the budgeting
consequences and issues.
Then the second chart titled: ``Clear time trend in defense
new start aircraft developments,'' shows the time that it has
taken DOD to develop the aircraft from an historical
perspective. The chart shows the time it took from the start of
an aircraft program to the time it first flew in an operational
capability over the years, once again from the 1940s until now.
Note that this time from program start to first operational
flight has significantly increased.
The interesting thing, I think, too on this chart is it
shows a comparison of development time for commercial aircraft
and then the commercial automotive sector. As you can see, they
are diametrically opposed to what it is from the military.
Now, I know that we have to heavily caveat these charts
because these increasing delays over time are due to a host of
issues, including budget pressures and I know the acquisition
system inefficiencies, change orders, et cetera. So I am not
implying that this is solely a S&T issue.
But to me, these charts really do stress a key concern that
is relevant to the panel today. With the rapid pace of global
technological development, we no longer have the luxury of
thinking about an idea, developing it, waiting a decade or more
to field these weapons systems.
So I would like each of you to address the following. What
is the DOD S&T enterprise doing to ensure that DOD is able to
take advantage of the latest technological developments and
make sure that they are infused in a timely and affordable
manner into current and future programs of record? Mr. Shaffer,
if you would like to start, and we can just go down the panel.
Mr. Shaffer. Certainly. I would like to highlight two
things that DOD is doing in S&T.
The first is we are trying to put more developmental
prototyping in our 6-3 program. The reason we are trying to do
that is it is much cheaper to test out concepts and
capabilities in S&T than it is in full-up acquisition. In fact,
if you look at your chart here, the period where we were flat
with very short delivery--and there are certainly a number of
factors--happens to coincide when DOD and NASA were in full
scale with their X-plane prototype period. We had the X-1, X-2,
through the X-15. None of those were designed to be fully
operational systems, but we actually prototyped parts of those
systems very early. Mr. Kendall has asked myself and asked also
DARPA to take a look at doing additional prototyping in these
spaces to drive down the cost and time.
The second thing that we are doing, and this is really with
DARPA and the Services--is we are gathering up all of our folks
in our laboratories who are working in the area of system
design. We have a program--they are terrible names--Engineering
Resilient Systems, and it is led by Dr. Jeff Holland, who is
the technical director at the Army Corps of Engineering Lab in
Vicksburg, a strange place for it, but he has a very big
effort.
We are looking at how do we do more system design in
computers so you can do a much broader range of trades in
computers rather than bending metal and also design in things
like open systems to the maximum extent possible. So as we have
long developments, we can do very easy modular changes to the
design and we can do that in a computer instead of on an
assembly line.
I highlight those two areas. If those two pan out, we will
dramatically reduce the cost of new systems, the time to
develop, and also importantly, we will stock the cupboard for
when the acquisition budget grows again so we will have
capabilities to keep our forces safe.
Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Prabhakar?
Dr. Prabhakar. Let me start by just putting my comments in
the context that you started with, which is to recognize that
there are so many factors behind any of these phenomena.
From the technology end, what we are really seeking are
some technical approaches and demonstrations that might serve
to poke that system and show that there are some different ways
of doing business in the hope that that will help trigger a
change in the overall process because that is really what it is
going to take.
I want to break the question into two pieces. First, is the
platforms that we build, and the aircraft that these charts
focus on are a great example of that, the major vehicle systems
that we build. Then second, the capabilities that go on them,
be it electronic warfare or communications or sensing whatever
job we are trying to do. I think that there are important
innovations in both of those.
On the platform side, a key theme that I think many of us
see is that as these acquisition processes stretch out, that
just creates more time for requirements to continue to change
and for more and more iterations which creates a situation
where it is literally decades and the whole thing does not
really close. So one of the key concepts that is behind several
of our programs is: are there approaches that will collapse
that time so that we can much more quickly get to a capability
and not have this long period of time during which we are
continuing to move the requirements around. We are working
towards that in some of our manufacturing programs.
As well, when we do X-plane or other X-platform projects,
these are not acquisition programs, but at the R&D stage, we
are really looking at innovative business models and have had
some very good success in doing demonstrations that are much
faster and for far fewer dollars than anyone thinks is possible
simply by building the right incentive structures, by having
very specific objectives that do not change, some of those
kinds of practices. So that is platforms.
I think I am actually much more encouraged by what is going
to be possible as we change the systems that go onto our
platforms, and electronic warfare is a particularly good
example. Today when we build a new electronic warfare system,
we are building something that is monolithic and it is very
complex. When our adversary changes what part of the
electromagnetic spectrum they are working then we have to start
all over and redesign the whole thing. We are building a new
architecture that will allow us to be extremely agile so that
when the threat changes, we can adapt in real time without
having to ditch that whole thing and go through this next
laborious acquisition process.
So those are a couple of the ideas.
The big point in my mind is that for so many years
affordability has been the conversation you have after you do
the innovation. A challenge that we are really putting out to
the leading edge technical community is to say where are the
innovations that will completely flip the cost equation, not
just make incremental changes because I think that can be
powerful, but it has not been historically the question that we
have been asking.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Miller?
Ms. Miller. Thank you.
As Mr. Shaffer said, prototyping is a big activity that we
are doing to try to better inform our requirements,
requirements that often are reaching a little bit too far and
take us a long time to achieve. What we have been doing within
the Army is working with our requirements community and our S&T
community to better inform those requirements. The prototypes
help to set us up for good capacity in that regard because we
can show what is technically achievable and we can drive down
risk.
In addition, within the Army, I mentioned our strategic
modernization strategy we are developing. This is a 35-year
look out into the future. What it does is it allows us to align
the programs of record and their lifecycles against where they
need technology insertion and where we need to have new
platforms, perhaps, to replace them. That helps to, again,
inform requirements and helps to baseline our S&T investments
so that we can do this insertion. It is actually aligning us so
that our technology is there when it is needed, not too early,
not too late, and we will, again, try to shorten up our----
Senator Hagan. It seems 35 years is an awfully long time
from a planning perspective in today's highly technical
architecture and field.
Ms. Miller. Yes, ma'am. I wish I could say that we did not
have platforms that lasted that long, but ma'am, we do and we
do need to have technical upgrades as we go along. That is why
it is important to understand the lifecycle of the platforms
and when we can have technical insertions.
I would also argue, and it has been mentioned, that we do
not really know what threat will be there in 30 or 35 years,
but the fact is, if you stretch something out that far, you
certainly know the world is going to be different. It breaks
people from saying I am just going to do what I am doing now
for a little bit longer. They have to think differently. It has
opened some new trains of thought with people that pretty much
have been closed thinking.
Senator Hagan. That is why I like, Dr. Prabhakar, your
comment about when the threat changes, that you can quickly
adapt.
Ms. Miller. Absolutely.
The other aspect that we are doing is looking to the
international community and what technologies they can bring
in. We talked about open architectures and systems engineering,
and we are looking at the international community to see what
they can bring in and augment the Army's capabilities. I am
certain that is true across all of the Services and DARPA
because we are never going to say that we are the smartest
people here. Everybody has good ideas. We need to know how to
use them.
Senator Hagan. I am already running close. We are going to
have 10-minute sessions. So let us move on. Thank you, Ms.
Miller.
Ms. Lacey?
Ms. Lacey. So I will agree with everyone, all the comments
that have been made so far.
I will cite two specific examples. One is a rapid
prototyping that you probably heard a lot about in the last
couple of weeks, our high-energy laser demo on an operational
platform in the Gulf. So that should give us some context, some
learning, some understanding, so we can make sure that as we
move into the development phase, that we have provided a
capability that the warfighter can actually use.
Senator Hagan. What does this laser do?
Ms. Lacey. It is a high energy laser and it will shoot down
air targets or fast attack craft targets close in on the
surface. So we are going to be doing a demonstration of that
coming up in 2014. I am very excited about it.
The comment I would like to make about open architecture--
we too are moving in that direction. It is not so much driven
by S&T, but it is certainly enabled by it. But the real key is
to open up what you already have. As Ms. Miller pointed out, we
are going to have systems for 35 years. In our case, we have
aircraft carriers for 50 years. If we do not open those systems
up now, we are not going to be able to take advantage of these
S&T breakthroughs as they happen. So we in the Navy are
spending a lot of time doing that as we move forward.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Walker?
Dr. Walker. The Air Force is in lockstep with the other
Services and the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for R&E
as well.
A couple of things I did want to address, though, is I
really like your slide because I am doing a study right now
that our chief scientist, Dr. Mark Maybury, is running on
Global Horizons, which is really looking at the future of S&T
and how we take that to improve the Air Force of the future. I
am leading a team that is doing mission support which is really
how do we improve the acquisition system so that we can bring
in new technology faster. This slide is my number one trend
slide that I am using.
It was interesting. When I started looking into this, we
really have driven ourselves into a long acquisition process.
We are not following the trends of other agencies, and we want
to take advantage of that. We started asking questions. The
automobile industry, which is actually coming down--they
actually are using four times the number of lines of code in a
modern automobile than we use in the F-35. Yet, they are able
to do it faster. One of the reasons is because they learned to
use loosely coupled software, use loosely coupled systems as
opposed to our approach which has been highly integrated
systems.
So when you start looking at how do we have an evolvable
system, which is really addressing that issue of requirements--
requirements change over time. From the time you define what
you want to have to the time you actually have it fielded and,
much worse, 60 years later when you are still using it like we
are using some of our aircraft, you have to be able to evolve
and you need to design the system so it can evolve along the
way. Having loosely coupled, where possible, allows you to do
that and is much more flexible.
Taking advantage of the digital design and building a
digital thread, taking advantage of advanced manufacturing
capabilities--these are all ideas of how we can improve our
ability to get from technology ideas into warfighting systems.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I would just like to follow up with you on the line of
discussion that Chairman Hagan was discussing. When we talk
about collapsing time and looking at the changes that are
occurring and looking out 35 years and adapting and evolving,
is that happening now? Is that happening now or is that your
plan and goal for the future? Is that the direction you want to
head or are you headed in that direction now? If you are headed
there now, have you had any successes that you could share with
us where you have been more able to adapt in a quicker manner?
Dr. Prabhakar. I will kick off.
Let me just shift to a different realm than aircraft. An
example I really love of adaptability--your big question was
are we doing this yet. I would say we have been trying for a
while and it is slow progress, but there are some examples
where we are making progress.
One that I really like has to do with the situation our
soldiers on the ground were facing in Afghanistan. The
intelligence that is collected from the battlefield all gets
pulled up, but the soldiers on patrol from 1 day to the next do
not really have the kind of immediate, fresh information from
their colleagues as they go every day when they go out on
patrol. So one of the projects that we did, we would hear
sometimes from these young soldiers that they had left a
civilian world where they could walk around with maps on their
iPhones and know where they are and post text notes to their
friends. Now they are in Afghanistan and all of that is gone
when they really could have used it.
It turns out those things are much harder to provide in a
battlefield environment. Security is a real concern. The
connectivity does not really exist. You need secure and
physically hardened devices. So there was a whole host of
challenges.
In some work that we did where we did get real devices in
the hands of soldiers, we were able to give them handhelds
where they would have these kinds of applications that looked
like the applications that they used in the civilian world, and
they used these applications in just very practical ways. So
soldiers would go out, they are going out on patrol, they are
recording the local observations of what is this farmer doing
in this field or what is the scuttlebutt that they are picking
up as they are talking to people. That is immediately fed to
their colleagues and to the guy that is going out on patrol the
next day.
Senator Fischer. So it is not just going up. It is really--
--
Dr. Prabhakar. It is laterally. Exactly.
The thing that I think is really great about this, because
I love what we are doing for the soldiers today, but really the
exciting thing to me is we are introducing this element of
adaptability because the applications that they use one day
tell them what the applications are that they need the next
day. The development team that we have sitting next to them
then will spin up that application, and a few days later, they
are able to have a new capability that matches the particular
thing that they are trying to track or a particular way that
our adversary might have adapted on the other side.
So it is just one little example, but when you see the
power of that kind of ability to react, I think it does tell
you where we could go.
Senator Fischer. Good. That is good to hear.
I would like to talk about sequestration and the effect
that that is going to have on the groups that you are
representing. Sequestration could reduce the Federal R&D
spending by $57.5 billion, or 8.4 percent, through 2017.
Spending on defense R&D could be cut by $33.5 billion, or 9.1
percent. That is going to bring the spending levels for defense
down to the 2002 level.
Do you have any specific S&T sequestration funding numbers
for fiscal year 2013 and a breakdown of how it is going to
impact your programs?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, ma'am, and we can provide that to you. I
mean, I do not have it in my pocket.
[The information referred to follows:]
The fiscal year 2013 sequester amount for science and technology
(S&T) program is $1.035 billion less than the President's budget
request of $11.861 billion as shown in the below chart, this was
roughly a 9 percent reduction.
[In billions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sequestration Cuts President's Budget
President's Budget to President's Request 2014
Request 2013 Budget Request (Fiscal Year 2013
2013 CY $)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic Research (6.1)............................. 2.117 -0.176 2.164 (2.128)
Applied Research (6.2)........................... 4.478 -0.403 4.627 (4.549)
Advanced Technology Development (6.3)............ 5.266 -0.456 5.192 (5.105)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Defense Science and Technology... 11.861 -1.035 11.984 (11.782)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impact to S&T programs were varied and resulted in outright program
reductions and delays. In many cases, work in S&T is sequential, the
work planned for fiscal year 2013 will be deferred to fiscal year
2014--and reduces the work planned in fiscal year 2014 by that same $1
billion. Some of the reduction will be seen at our government labs, but
other impacts will be seen in government and universities. For example,
we expect the total investment in universities to decline by about $250
million. This will reduce our overall number of grants going out to
universities by somewhere between 500 and 1,000 grants. Since manpower
in our S&T laboratories is funded with Applied Research, we were left
with the choice of reduce program content or people. A reduction of
$400 million within Applied Research equates to more than 1,500
scientists and engineers; we forestalled these layoffs in fiscal year
2013 but not for much longer. Sequestration cuts have also impacted the
S&T laboratories to hire scientists and engineers into critical
positions. Within the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering portfolio, there will be no new technology demonstrations
in fiscal year 2013. These specific examples are only an illustration
of $1.035 billion cut to the DOD S&T program. The impact of these cuts
will not only affect today's S&T program but will have lasting effects
in the future.
Mr. Shaffer. The basic rule of thumb, 9 percent to every
program element and project across DOD in RDT&E. So you can
take whatever was appropriated in fiscal year 2013, subtract 9
percent from that. That will cause terminations in some cases.
It will cause certainly slowdowns to all of our programs.
The place that it will hurt, I think, the worst is the
reduction in the number of grants and new awards. We heard Ms.
Lacey say that the future naval capability new starts are cut
in half. I will start no new technology demonstrations for
fiscal year 2013. We will reduce our overall number of grants
going out to universities by somewhere between 500 and 1,000.
That does not sound like much, but when we in the United States
are struggling to have enough scientists and engineers to work
on national security problems, I do not know which of those 500
or 1,000 grants might give me a very good scientist or engineer
to come work in my laboratory. But if we reduce the pool, we
reduce the future. Those are the impacts of sequestration.
We are all in the business of an uncertain future. We were
talking before this hearing started. We have some members in
uniform who say, just fund the basic research projects that are
going to pan out. We wish we were that good. You have to fund a
number of things and then some of them will bubble up. By
reducing the pool, we are going to reduce the future.
I want to point out one thing that we are talking about
within DOD. In previous periods, the last two big budget
contractions for DOD, Secretary Perry was involved in both of
those. He made a strategic choice to maintain investment in R&D
because we are cheaper and we provide options. We are working
through that argument. I do not know if that is going to hold
for this time or not. But in the past, there has been a
strategic choice in our Government to maintain the future.
Senator Fischer. Would it be more helpful if you had
flexibility to decide where you were going to make those cuts
and make them more targeted?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Fischer. Would it be less harmful to the programs
that you deal with?
Mr. Shaffer. Absolutely.
Senator Fischer. So you could make wiser decisions if we
would give you the flexibility to let you make those decisions
within your department?
Mr. Shaffer. Absolutely.
Senator Fischer. Did anyone wish to add anything on that
point?
I happen to believe that we need to make sure that the
funding and the programs need to be focused on our warfighters.
So while sequestration may impact each of your organizations,
the impact I am concerned with is, what is going to happen with
regard to those warfighters and the warfighting capabilities?
So what specific aspects and impacts will those cuts due to
sequestration have on our warfighters and those specific
capabilities?
Ms. Miller. I guess I will start.
Senator Fischer. If it remains like it is now and you do
not have the options to make decisions yourself.
Ms. Miller. As you have already heard, sequestration is not
only impacting our programs. In some cases, we will terminate
some of our S&T efforts, efforts that may well have produced
capability for the warfighter. We are also certainly going to
constitute a delay in what we can deliver. It will be an impact
to getting things through the acquisition system and improving
what we have.
Certainly in the Army, we have a lot of systems that are
coming back out of the war, becoming programs of record,
becoming part of our main set of equipment, and it would be up
to the S&T community to make sure that those pieces of
equipment then are operational and can be upgraded and perform
much more capably and affordably. So we will look to try to
invest our resources, what we have of them, to make sure that
we have platforms that are affordable and that do not cost as
much money and perhaps not make as many new designs based on
the limitation in the funding, certainly tied to what the
warfighter wants.
Senator Fischer. The budget that you were looking at, the
five of you, was the budget introduced by the President. Is
that correct?
Ms. Miller. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. So that did not account for sequestration.
If we are going to account for sequestration, have you dug into
that even deeper to find out what will need to be done? Have
you looked at that at all?
Mr. Shaffer. Are you asking have we gone through a
prioritization to begin to understand how we would deal with it
in 2014 if sequestration actually hits? Yes, ma'am, we are
doing it.
Senator Fischer. Well, it has hit.
Mr. Shaffer. It has hit.
Senator Fischer. It has hit, but the budget that was
introduced did not have that accounted for in it.
Mr. Shaffer. That is absolutely correct.
Of course, we are looking at how we would prioritize. Yes,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. The rest of you, would you answer please?
Dr. Prabhakar. Absolutely.
Just for context, in our work, which is projects-driven, we
do not have standing laboratories for the work that we do at
DARPA. We are in a constant process of prioritizing in the
normal course of business. So when something like sequestration
hit in fiscal year 2013, of course, we started with our lowest
priority programs that were struggling already or, for whatever
reason, there was a problem. But when the cut is as substantial
as it was in fiscal year 2013, it does cut into the things that
we very much would have wanted to do. So the consequences there
included delays to important programs. Plan X, which is our
cyber offense program that is just beginning, is an example.
Delays on transition.
One of the very interesting things we are seeing is the
secondary effects because we do so much of our work with our
partners in the Services, be it contracting or when things are
more mature when we are going to field tests or going to test
ranges. We are finding that all of those schedules now are
delayed and pushed out.
So the net effect from a 1-year hit in fiscal year 2013
tends to be a series of delays. It is not the end of the world
for our mission in the long-term. It is just very corrosive and
extremely demoralizing to our program managers that we worked
very hard to get in the door.
One time, you can absorb that. My concern, about if this
continues, is then it does start getting at our fundamental
ability to create, in our case, these big leap-ahead
technologies. So, instead of just a few months of delay, if we
end up starting to have to cut into the actual work and drop
things on the ground, that is where I think the bigger impacts
loom, which would be much more dangerous.
Senator Fischer. Just maybe a quick answer from the other
three. I am way over my time.
Ms. Miller. Yes, ma'am. We are looking at prioritization
and what we will no longer be doing and aligning it with our
programs of record and what the warfighter needs.
Ms. Lacey. We are doing that as well in the Navy and the
Marine Corps.
Dr. Walker. We are also in the Air Force. The alignment to
a given program element and the hits on certain programs will
cause us to have to either realign programs within the Air
Force or to delay in some of the key programs, particularly the
bigger demonstrations that are closer to warfighter needs.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I am glad to hear that you are
all being very realistic about the current law that we are
under and the budget situation that we face. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Prabhakar, you just mentioned the Plan X, and I wanted
to address that. The President and the leadership of DOD from
the Secretary on down have emphasized the importance of cyber
to our Nation's security and prosperity and continue to
increase investment in this area despite the declining overall
budgets.
DOD has turned to DARPA for substantial investment in this
leap-ahead technology. DARPA's role is especially critical as a
highly credible source of alternative approaches to operating
in cyberspace from those developed by the National Security
Agency and the cryptologic services of the Army and the Navy
and the Air Force. It is very concerning to see that DARPA has
levied a 43 percent cut on this flagship cyber program called
Plan X in allocating sequester reductions in the portfolio.
Why is this flagship cyber program being cut so
significantly, and what are the broader implications because of
this 43 percent cut?
Dr. Prabhakar. That is a great example of the unfortunate
impact of sequestration because when we are done making the
cuts that we can live with, then we get to the things that we
are not very happy about having to live with.
The Plan X program that you cited is one component in an
overall set of activities that we are doing in cyber. I do not
want you to take away a notion that it is a 43 percent cut to
our entire cyber portfolio. The Plan X program is just ramping
up, and that was one of the reasons that we felt that was the
right place to take that portion of the cut within that program
element relative to the other hundreds of contracts that were
underway in that program element. We had to choose among our
children there.
But just to paint a little bit broader picture, you are
absolutely right. Cyber is something about which there is
enormous concern in terms of cybersecurity. DARPA's role very
much as in other fields is not operational. There are many
other parts of DOD and the Intelligence Community as well that
are focused on the operational mission. I think they are
putting enormous effort into keeping up with this growing
threat.
What we are trying to do is come up with the technology
ideas that change the trajectory because right now the threat
keeps growing and all we really have as solutions is to hire
people, of which there are not enough because they need special
training, and every time there is an attack, we patch and then
we hope. That is essentially all we can do.
We have two themes and Plan X is one of them. The other
piece is about cyber defense, first of all, which is trying to
build--and I think we actually have some phenomenal programs
that will build--the technical ability to create a more
fundamental defense, ways to assess legacy systems and assure
that they are secure and also then to build new systems, for
example, embedded systems that might go into our advanced
military platforms, build them in a way that is much more
inherently secure. So I think with those technologies, we can
get to a place where we get beyond just throwing people at it
and get to a much more automated future for security.
Then for cyber offense, back to the Plan X story, the dream
here is right now our warfighters are engaged in, and they know
how to fight a kinetic fight. Electronic warfare is a fully
integrated part of that. But cyber sits off on the side. It is
not a tool that someone engaged in that kinetic activity can
really bring to bear in an active situation. It is because
cyber offense tools are things that are exquisite pieces of
software that you write. You really do not know for sure what
they are going to take out when you launch them. Once you
launch them, you do not really know what other collateral
damage they have. They really are not weapons in the
conventional warfighting sense. Building those capabilities is
what the research program in Plan X will do, and that is,
obviously, why we are very excited about pushing it forward as
aggressively as we can.
Senator Hagan. So do you feel comfortable, or somewhat
comfortable, with the funding for the defensive part of
cybersecurity issues?
Dr. Prabhakar. I think we have been able to size that at a
place where we are making the investments that have the
greatest promise for big impacts. So, yes, I am comfortable
with that.
Senator Hagan. We certainly need to go back and look at
Plan X too, in my estimation, going forward, for sure.
Mr. Shaffer, last month Mr. Frank Kendall, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and
Logistics, was quoted at a conference saying that he is
considering a strategy of funding R&D projects despite the
ongoing budget pressures. His objective is to fund R&D projects
to keep the leading edge of the industrial base working on
advanced technologies when budget pressures are significantly
impacting major acquisition programs.
Two thoughts, two questions. What are you doing to
implement this strategy?
Then also, in the President's budget, you have more than
doubled the funding for the emerging capabilities technology
budget line from $25 million to $62 million and have also
created a new applied research for the advancement of S&T
priorities with $45 million. Can you describe what this funding
is for and how will it address the key issues of increasing
responsiveness to develop and to deploy new technologies and
affordability?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, ma'am. There are actually two threads in
there, so let me start with the first one.
We have touched on this a little bit already. Mr. Kendall
is asking us to take a look at prototyping, late development
prototyping demonstrations for a couple of reasons. One is to
develop new capabilities. A second is to keep design teams
employed when we are going through periods where we are not
buying them out of equipment. So when you look at advanced
technology, the real secret sauce are those really smart design
team engineers who will go ahead and create the new trades and
possibilities. So we will do some prototyping in some of those
areas, I believe, to make sure that we keep the national
intellectual capital viable for when we need the next set of
systems.
So that is where Mr. Kendall is looking. He is looking,
through DARPA, at something called the next generation air
dominance initiative to really look at what are the pieces for
the next generation fighter or network set of fighters that we
need to keep in place so that when we actually go to the next
generation aircraft, hopefully it will not take 30 years to
develop and that we will have the right smart people in place.
The second question you asked, and by the way, and I have
in my own lines in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
increased the funding for prototyping in the emerging
capabilities technology demonstration program. They will be
doing prototyping in things like very advanced electronic
warfare systems and things like some cyber capabilities. It is
where we have to address new and emerging capabilities.
The $45 million for the applied technology program actually
is not a new start, new set of money. I took five or six of my
old programs and collapsed those into a single program element
to be able to fund good ideas competitively across DOD in the
cross-cutting areas that everybody has S&T programs in:
communications, cyber, electronic warfare, materials, those
types of things that all of my partners here are funding at
some level. We want to have a program to put connective tissue
to make their programs better. All of that $45 million will be
executed through the Services. So it is a new way of thinking
about how are we going to get more bang for the buck by funding
internally competitively proposed projects in those certain
cross-cutting areas.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Miller, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, in the fiscal year
2014 budget request, DOD has more or less preserved its top
line funding for S&T. In part, this is due to increases in
basic and applied research at the expense of advanced
technology development. While increased basic research is
important, there are concerns over decreases in more applied
research funding and for activities that can help transition
technologies across what has classically been labeled the
valley of death, the gap between the labs and then the military
users.
Do you feel the balance between basic research, applied
research, and advanced technology development is right, and
what is your assessment of our funding for technology
development across the valley of death? Ms. Miller?
Ms. Miller. I will start, ma'am.
I think that the balance needs to be looked at. I think
that we have done a good job in pushing resources down into
basic research and now applied research, but it has caused an
even earlier valley of death.
Senator Hagan. If you have any examples, I love examples.
Ms. Miller. I would tell you in this budget development, we
ended up decreasing our budget activity 3, advanced tech
development resources, on the order of $140 million pushed into
other 6-2 areas, and we took our tech maturity, so I should
start with the Army established a 6-4 line for their S&T
activities to help do prototyping and to cross the valley of
death. Those resources have also been reprogrammed into the 6-1
and 6-2 at this time to make sure that we could meet compliance
and have those next generation capabilities.
But at this point, we need to start being cognizant of the
ability to take those good ideas that are developed in earlier
research veins and be able to transition them through. We will
be looking to try to get a better balance from here on out.
Ms. Lacey. I too agree that the balance needs to be
relooked. We have seen that valley of death or the
interpretation of it being a valley of death widen over the
years. In reality, what we have done is we have moved things
that historically had been in procurement accounts back into
the R&D accounts. We have a lot of pressure on our 6-4 accounts
that we currently have today, which is the traditional
transition zone, and 94 percent of our money in what is BA-4
through BA-7 in the Navy is tied to programs of record. We have
very little that is focused on that transition area, and that
is something we need to look at very, very carefully DOD-wide.
By preserving the 6-1 and 6-2, a very noble thing to do, at the
expense of the 6-3 and 6-4, we are actually widening that
valley.
Dr. Walker. In the 2014 budget submission, we were actually
able to increase our 6-3 at a greater rate than our 6-1 and 6-2
trying to reverse a trend that we have had over the last few
years. 6-1 and 6-2 tended to dominate the S&T budget. But we
have the same problem as the Navy. Our 6-4 program, our BA-4 is
primarily tied to programs of record, and we miss that
opportunity to move beyond the laboratory and into a
demonstration and development program getting ready prior to a
program of record being in place. That is an area that we think
we need to improve as well.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I would like to talk about furloughs for civilian personnel
that you may have. We know that it causes loss of productivity.
I think it will harm our military readiness at a time when we
are facing, I think, more serious threats than many other times
in history for this country. Furloughs will have a significant
impact on employees' families and also on our States'
economies.
While DOD has decided to reduce the number of furlough
days, I remain deeply concerned about the impact of those
furloughs on the things that I mentioned. Your scientists, your
engineers, your program managers play a critical role in
maintaining our superiority on the battlefield because of the
research that you are doing. I have heard that the Navy and the
Marine Corps have funds available to avoid furloughs, but DOD,
the Army, and the Air Force will have furloughs for their
civilian employees.
I have three questions for you. What is the current status
of furloughs in each of your organizations? What would be the
impact if you had to furlough some or all of your civilian
employees? Would any of your civilian employees be exempt?
Mr. Shaffer. Ma'am, the actual implementation of furloughs
is still an ongoing process, but right now it looks like across
the board in DOD, the policy will be 14 days for civilian
personnel taken over the last 14 weeks of the year.
The reason that this step is being taken is because of the
inability to move money between accounts from one to the other.
We, DOD, are in what I consider to be a very terrible place. We
either fund the ongoing war efforts for our deployed forces or
we furlough. So there are other ways at the margin to get
there, but at the end of the day, we are so underfunded in our
operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts right now in DOD that
we have to take the drastic steps. None of us particularly like
furloughs. I have talked to Dr. Prabhakar and she actually has
a different problem. She hires people for 4 years and they want
to come in and do things. It is going to be very upsetting that
they are not going to be allowed to do things.
I also want to point out that while we have a furlough of
14 days, it is not just the 14 days that is going to impact us.
One of our Services, in fact, all of our Services, are
dramatically under-represented in contracting officers. In
addition to furloughs, people who are currently being paid
overtime will no longer be paid overtime. They will not be
allowed to work overtime. So it is not going to be just the cut
of 14 days, it is going to be a reduction in many cases of
people who are putting in 50- to 60-hour weeks and getting paid
for it being cut to 32 hours. So that will impact getting money
out the door and on contract.
There is a whole host of second-order impacts due to
sequestration, but those are all going to hurt everybody on
this panel and it is going to hurt our young people. We are
breaking faith with our young people, many of whom, at least in
this area, are living very close to the margin and have
mortgages to make and that type of thing.
So this is a very serious step. None of us like it. We
understand why DOD is taking it. It is where we are, ma'am.
Dr. Prabhakar. I think Mr. Shaffer said it all.
I will just add you asked about exemptions. In my
organization, the furlough applies to civilian Government
employees and we will be taking that across the board,
including myself and my deputy. We have one civilian Government
employee who is in Afghanistan for some of the field test work
that we are doing, and we are sorting out that situation. But
that would be the only exemption, if there is one.
Ms. Miller. Pretty much what Mr. Shaffer said applies to
all the rest of us.
Ms. Lacey. In terms of exemptions, we are looking at health
and safety issues as potentials at the moment.
Dr. Walker. For us in the S&T workforce, it will be no
exemptions, just for the health and safety issues, but right
now, we do not have any of those.
Senator Fischer. Once again, I would ask you with regard to
flexibility, if we would be able to give you flexibility to
make decisions within your own programs, would that help with
the furlough situation?
Mr. Shaffer. Ma'am, I think that this is all tied into
flexibility with O&M accounts and because of the way we have to
spend money, funding the war efforts forward. We are rapidly
running out of time because O&M for the Army and the Navy are
1-year money. So even if we start to get flexibility late in
the summer, it is going to be very hard to move money from one
account to O&M and then get that spent. So we have a double
whammy going on. It is the color of money but it is also the
time of the year and whether or not we would actually be able
to expend it.
Mr. Hale, a wonderful guy, I am surprised he has any hair
left because every time I go by him, he is pulling more of it
out. It is a very difficult management problem.
Senator Fischer. So are you saying with regard to the
furloughs, the flexibility really would not help at this point
at all?
Mr. Shaffer. It is beyond our ability to deal with. This is
really a larger issue coming from Dr. Carter, the comptroller,
and Secretary Hagel and how they would be able to manage the
war effort. That is what is driving everything. Internally, I
do not think that it would help much.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
I would like to move on to infrastructure, if I could, with
modernization and duplication. The lab enterprise includes 62
organizations spread across 22 States, with a total workforce
of about 60,000 employees, more than half of whom are degreed
scientists and engineers. That infrastructure supports this
enterprise like the rest of DOD and continues to age with no
military construction (MILCON) funding in sight to modernize
your facilities.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 Senate Report required DOD,
the Air Force, and the Navy to conduct a survey of its
laboratory infrastructure and brief the congressional defense
committees on the results of their surveys no later than March
1, 2013. I believe the Army has provided their survey, but we
are waiting to receive some surveys from DOD and the Navy.
What is the overall status of your facilities and how does
that status and the state of your infrastructure affect your
mission?
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, where we are in the Navy, we have
actually baselined the buildings that we have, and we can quote
a number. But that is not very informative when it comes to
understanding what can you do with that building. You have to
couple it with the equipment that is in it and the people so
that we can understand the real capability. That is where we
are right now is trying to make sure we understand that.
Senator Fischer. Are you completing your survey now? Will
we be receiving a briefing on that?
Ms. Lacey. We can give you a briefing, but I want to be
careful here. We have completed our survey on the facilities
themselves, the building piece. What we really are interested
in is the capability piece, and we are only about halfway
through that. So we expect that it will be sometime early next
fiscal year before we have our first look at that.
But do we have old buildings? Yes. The fact of the matter
is that our scientists and engineers are very dedicated folks
that do amazing work despite the buildings that some of them
have to operate in. Would I like it to be better? Absolutely.
But we are trying to determine right now what we really need to
invest in. Making every building very nice may not be the right
answer for the Navy for the long term.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Walker?
Dr. Walker. I believe we have turned in our survey. The Air
Force survey of the building facilities is like Ms. Lacey was
saying. About 90 percent of our buildings are actually in
fairly good shape. We put a lot of effort into this, both in
good support from Air Force MILCON, MILCON inserts that we have
gotten over the time, and the recent base realignment and
closure allowed us to modernize a number of our areas.
We have also taken advantage of section 219 to really work
the lab piece of it and start to modernize the interior of the
buildings because a lot of our buildings were built in the
1960s and 1970s and they do not need to be replaced. They just
need to be modernized in place. We have also modernized older
buildings with the recent MILCON at Wright-Patterson where we
took a shell of a building and completely rebuilt the interior
of it to make a world-class, modern power lab for the Aerospace
Systems Directorate. So we have taken advantage of this. The
Air Force has been very good to us.
We realize in this day and age of where we are in the
fiscal environment, we are probably not going to get MILCON for
a time in the Air Force, but we have actually taken advantage
and using section 219 are able to keep the labs to the par that
we would like to have them on.
Senator Fischer. Have you looked at what it would cost if
you truly were going to modernize for not your wants but your
needs for your mission?
Dr. Walker. We have taken the surveys of that. I do not
have that number off the top of my head, but it is not a small
number.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Just so the panel knows, we are going to
stop the meeting right before 4 p.m.
I have a question on the Rapid Innovation Program. Three
years ago, Congress established the Rapid Innovation Program to
help fund the rapid transition of innovative technologies
largely from the small business community to the warfighter.
This was an environment where rapid fielding of technologies
was driving a significant level of the effort on the S&T
community. As we draw down our combat operations overseas, the
demand for rapid fielding may diminish.
What are your views on the Rapid Innovation Program? From
my understanding, this program is not included in the fiscal
year 2014 budget request. Is this program not useful now to DOD
in the current environment? Mr. Shaffer?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, ma'am. The reason it is not in the 2014
budget request is that we have just gone through and we have
done the first year's worth of awards. We are waiting to see
how this program pans out and the types of products that come
out of it before we put in a budget request. It is not clear
that we would get new money.
There would be other ways we could do this. As you
mentioned, most of the Rapid Innovation Program comes through
the small business community. We could include this as part of
the Small Business Innovative Research Program in the future,
and that is one of the things we are considering. But before we
jump off the cliff, we really would like to have a year's worth
of evaluation of the programs to see if we actually got value
for money.
Senator Hagan. How much money did you put out?
Mr. Shaffer. We got everything out that was appropriated. I
am trying to remember. In the first year, it was $200 million,
$500 million, somewhere in there, yes.
Senator Hagan. $400 million?
Mr. Shaffer. $400 million, yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. Thanks. Ms. Lacey, Ms. Miller, anybody?
Ms. Lacey. We have not completed the first round, but we do
have one early completion expected next month, but the vast
majority are not going to finish up for another 12 to 18
months.
Dr. Walker. We put $105 million out to 44 different small
businesses working across the rapid response for the
warfighter, cyber, sustainment. So far things are looking good
and showing promise, and we will see as the program goes on. We
are looking forward again to our next round somewhere around 18
to 20 awards coming out this year out of the 2012 money.
The other thing that we are getting out of this is that
there is huge interest in the program because we have had over
700 white papers both years that we put out the announcement.
So there are a lot of people out there with good ideas that we
are able to take a look at and screen through the program.
Senator Hagan. Ms. Miller?
Ms. Miller. The Army was the same as well. We have no early
indicators yet. We know that we got a lot of interested
parties, and it certainly gets connectivity to small business.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Over the years, there also has been much discussion over
the pros and cons of various management models of DOD labs that
are government-owned and government-operated (GOGO) versus the
Department of Energy labs that are government-owned and
contractor-operated (GOCO).
So, Ms. Miller, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, if you were
going to start a new basic and/or applied research laboratory,
what type of business model would you use for the management
and operation of that laboratory? Dr. Walker, why don't we
start with you and go back?
Dr. Walker. I have run two directorates in the Air Force
research laboratory and we have pretty much operated under the
government-owned with the contractor collaboration with a
strong in-house contractor representation. It gives us some
flexibility in being able to turn over workforce, identify and
bring in new workforce into both the Government and the
contractor side and have flexibility as we change the thrust of
the research that we are doing at any given time. This has been
a very successful model for the Air Force. We studied the GOCO
model back in the mid-1990s and we decided to go with the
collaborator-assisted model instead, and it has been very
successful. I think I would follow that model into the future.
Ms. Lacey. In the Navy, we have a GOGO philosophy which is
a little different than the Air Force. However, we do use a
significant amount of contractor personnel, perhaps not as
fully embedded as you might see in the Air Force. We are very
comfortable with our model. We are continuously overseeing how
they are doing and ensuring that they are focused on the things
that we need them to do and not out there freelancing and
creating duplicate capability in their various areas. But as I
say, it is something the Navy has become very comfortable with
and very good at operating. So it works for us.
Ms. Miller. The Army model is very much like the Navy
model. We are very happy with how we are performing our work.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Go ahead. Ask another question.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
In my last question, I asked about the infrastructure and
the modernization. We did not get to the duplication part.
What kind of process do you have set up that would address
if there is unneeded facilities out there?
We talked the other day, yesterday I believe, about
programs and how do you keep track of all the programs and the
research that you are running to make sure that what the Navy
is doing, the Army is further along it, and you really do not
need to be doing it. How do you prioritize it? How do you work
together? How do you make sure that your efforts are being
utilized wisely?
Mr. Shaffer. I always hate to sound like a Washington
bureaucrat and talk process.
Senator Fischer. But you will. [Laughter.]
Mr. Shaffer. I will. [Laughter.]
What we have done is reinstituted and strengthened
something we call Reliance 21. We are taking a portfolio
approach in about 18 of these big areas that all of us have
investment in. Now, I cannot track every one of the 10,000
programs. But we have SES-level members, senior executive
service members, in each one of the Services who we charge to
get the best that they can out of their program. So we have
created a portfolio review with the SESs having to come back to
report back to us and tell us what they are doing.
DARPA plays in a slightly different way in this process
because we do not want DARPA on any Services' critical path. We
want DARPA to disrupt that critical path. So how DARPA plays is
they will come in and brief these portfolio managers, and each
one is chaired by someone from the Service, brief the portfolio
managers on what they are doing so the portfolio managers have
that awareness.
But if we cannot trust our SESs to get rid of duplication
between themselves, because they are all charged with
delivering capability, if we cannot trust our flag-level
civilians to drive down duplication, it is very hard for us to
do it from the top of the mountaintop.
So this is strengthened. We are in our second to third year
of this process. This year we are having the first six of these
portfolio managers come back in roughly two half-day sessions
brief out their programs to myself, Ms. Miller, Admiral
Klunder, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, and we are going to see how
well we are able to drive out duplication. Sometimes you want
to have intended duplication, but it has to be a conscious
choice. But fundamentally, we have to push that process down to
our senior executives to come back and report to us.
Senator Fischer. Have you ended any programs if you found
that there was duplication taking place?
Mr. Shaffer. I know that programs have ended. Typically
when our SESs find out that there is a little bit of
duplication, we do not have to end the program. They figure out
who is in the lead, who is going to take that piece on so
someone else does another portion of the work. These portfolio
folks have come back and told us where they have modified their
portfolio to get more bang for the buck.
Senator Fischer. Are you in touch with universities or
private industry that is doing research as well and trying to
monitor what they are doing and work together or else let one
or the other of you move ahead on that project?
Mr. Shaffer. The answer is yes, and I think Dr. Prabhakar
has the best answer.
Dr. Prabhakar. I hope I do since I volunteered to try to
answer that. [Laughter.]
Senator Fischer. She had a good one in my office.
Dr. Prabhakar. Just following on what Mr. Shaffer was
describing as a formal process, a thing I really look to is our
core program managers at DARPA to make sure that they know what
is going on across the Services but very much, as you said, in
the broader technical community. The first way we do that is we
recruit program managers who come out of the best parts of the
technical community. I think only about 10 percent of my
program managers come from other parts of Government. Most of
them come from universities or have worked in companies. So
they are already from that broader community. Then their day
job is to be out and engaged with that community. That is how
they build their programs. It is where they get their
inspiration for the next generation. They are so personally
driven to make an impact with their programs that the last
thing they want to do is waste a nickel on something that
someone else is already going to do. So that is the bottoms-up
part that I think augments what we do as a management team.
Dr. Walker. From an industry perspective, when we are
building road maps, we want industry involved with our road-
mapping process so they understand what it is that we are
trying to do and what contributions they can make, as well as
how they can align their independent R&D to what is important
to the government. So it is really a collaborative effort
across academia, industry, and the government to ensure that we
have the right technology development moving forward to where
we want to be in the future.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Ms. Lacey, I was going to ask you about the laser on the
ship. This is just for my own personal interest because I read
an article on it and it just sounded fabulous. But how is that
working out? Can you tell us? What do you think the future
holds for lasers?
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, we would be happy to come in and brief
you on this, and if you are ever in Bahrain, we can take you on
the USS Ponce and show it to you.
We have been working on laser programs collaboratively with
our sister Services for decades, and what we are doing is
installing this on a ship that is available in theater to do a
demonstration against realistic targets again and to understand
the operational domain.
But what we are fundamentally trying to do here is prove to
ourselves that we have the capability and we can develop the
tactics, techniques, and procedures to change the cost
equation. We are talking about taking a shot for a dollar as
opposed to--yes, whatever it takes to generate the electricity
on board that ship to defeat that threat. That is a huge game
changer when it comes to the cost equation. As opposed to using
a $3 million missile to take out a $50,000 target, we are
talking about dollars. It is a big deal. So we have reached the
point where we are comfortable that we can put it in an
operational theater to learn even more lessons about it.
We would be happy to come show you what we are doing,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. I may take you up on that. Thank you very
much. Thank you all very much. I appreciate it.
Madam Chair?
Senator Hagan. I know I have a couple more questions, and I
am running out of time. So I might submit some for the record
for your reply and certainly Senator Fischer too.
Mr. Shaffer, I know that DARPA has just completed its
strategic framework. I was just wondering about another
strategic framework for your division. I know last year the
Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a study of DOD's basic
research portfolio, and one key finding was that DOD needed a
technology strategy that would not only be invaluable in
alignment of R&E but an alignment of systems, missions, and
national security affairs more broadly. Then they listed a
vision, an assessment of emerging areas of S&T, particularly
areas of rapid change and substantial promise, realistic
objectives, an approach to achieve the vision, and detailed
plans on how to achieve the objectives.
Are you developing a more comprehensive strategy with the
elements just outlined?
Mr. Shaffer. Senator Hagan, a couple of things.
The short answer is yes, but not at the detail listed in
the DSB report. I commented that I do not like a lot of
bureaucracy.
One of the other things I will note in Washington is more
is written than is ever read.
Senator Hagan. I agree with that.
Mr. Shaffer. So this strategy that is outlined by the DSB
is really an implementation plan. We have developed a strategy
and we are waiting to see what happens with the political
process. But the strategy that I have written is very much like
DARPA's framework. It is a very short document that outlines
where we want to go and the tools that will be available to the
people.
Following from that, the rest of these things that are in
the DSB report is really an implementation plan, and that
should be pushed down to the people who actually are going to
execute the program to come back up and tell us. So these
things that are in this plan are in those portfolio managers'
responsibilities that I just mentioned.
We are on the path. We are not there yet. I have a strategy
drafted. I have shown it to Mr. Kendall, the Under Secretary,
and now we are just waiting to see what happens with all the
political process.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. To all of our witnesses, I really do
appreciate your time, the service that you give to our country,
and in particular, the detail, the approaches for the long-term
using the technology that you are developing right now. I think
it is very, very important to our country, to the warfighters,
and to the national security. Thank you for being here.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
oversight of laboratory personnel
1. Senator Hagan. Mr. Shaffer, the Department of Defense (DOD)
Laboratory Quality Improvement Program (LQIP) established in 1993 seeks
to improve the efficiency of the labs by streamlining their business
practices and granting the heads of the labs increased authority to
operate their organizations in a business-like fashion. One of the
outcomes of LQIP was the creation of a panel to provide recommendations
on DOD lab personnel issues. Currently, the LQIP panel for personnel
falls under your oversight. What has this panel recently accomplished?
Mr. Shaffer. The LQIP Personnel Panel is the most active group
within the LQIP and meets quarterly to exchange best practices and
experiences on the variety of unique authorities given to each lab. The
most notable accomplishment of the panel is its contribution to the
implementation of expanded direct hiring authority for scientists and
engineers with advanced degrees. Also, through the efforts of the LQIP
Personnel Panel, 95 percent of the defense laboratory workforce is
included in a Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory also known
as ``Demonstration Program'' personnel program as of the end of fiscal
year 2012. In addition, the Personnel Panel was instrumental in
gathering data and assisting in analysis of information in support of
the soon to be submitted DOD Human Capital Workforce Strategic Plan.
2. Senator Hagan. Ms. Miller, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, what are
your views on the effectiveness of the LQIP and should there be other
panels under LQIP, for instance, for laboratory infrastructure?
Ms. Miller. The Laboratory Quality Enhancement Program (LQEP)
(formerly the Laboratory Quality Improvement Program) is restarting
after being dormant for more than a decade. While the main program has
been dormant, a subpanel of the program focused on the Science and
Technology Reinvention Laboratories has been very active and effective
at addressing issues related to the Laboratory Demonstration Program.
There has been continuing dialog amongst the LQEP members with regard
to initiation of additional subpanels, to include one on laboratory
infrastructure. However, no additional subpanels have been chartered.
LQEP members do see value in having subpanels meeting at the working
level to address focused issues prior to senior leader engagement and
decisionmaking.
Ms. Lacey. LQIP provides a forum for the Department of Navy to
collaborate with our sister Services to address issues of long-term
sustainability of our research and development infrastructure. The
cross Service nature of this panel allows the Navy to consider common
approaches to shared issues such as streamlining authorities,
infrastructure investments, and workforce revitalization that affect
all DOD labs.
The LQIP already allows the sharing of best practices and lessons
learned that impact all DOD laboratories. As currently structured, the
LQIP is an effective forum for the exchange of ideas and information
and does not need to be expanded beyond the existing panel.
Dr. Walker. The LQIP is now known as the LQEP. Over the last 2
decades, the LQEP has provided a means for the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) and the other DOD laboratories to articulate and
propose approaches to address problems that are unique to the
laboratory community. For example, the Personnel subpanel has been
vital to the continued success of the demonstration project authorities
by focusing on the mission and associated needs of each individual
laboratory. The subpanel's efforts have resulted in authorities and
legislation that have provided AFRL the control and flexibility needed
to manage its workforce and improved and strengthened AFRL's ability to
compete for critical personnel.
The LQEP no longer has a dedicated subpanel to address laboratory
infrastructure issues; however, the panel as a whole continues to work
common infrastructure issues among the laboratories. This approach is
working well. With resources at a premium--both personnel and dollars--
the Air Force does not recommend the establishment of a separate
infrastructure subpanel at this time.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Fischer, and
Graham.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Lauren M. Gillis, Daniel J.
Harder, and Kathleen A. Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Christopher Cannon, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen;
Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; and Craig
Abele and Matthew Rimkunas, assistants to Senator Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Hagan. Good afternoon. The Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee meets today to review the President's
fiscal year 2014 request for nonproliferation programs at the
Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE). We
plan to have a hard stop here at 3:20 p.m. so that we can
adjourn to the Office of Senate Security in room SVC-217 of the
Capitol Visitor Center for a closed session with our witnesses
today.
In the interest of time, I want to ask that the witnesses,
if you would give a short, 2 minutes or so, opening statement.
We have your written testimony and we obviously have that for
the record.
We are joined today by three expert witnesses to help us
understand the programs under way in both of these Departments.
Madelyn Creedon is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, who is responsible for the policy
aspects of these programs at DOD, and we welcome you back to
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Kenneth Myers is the Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) at DOD, which is focused on reducing
the threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The agency
is responsible for executing the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program. He is also the Director of the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) Center for Combating (SCC) WMD, located at
the agency.
Anne Harrington is the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) at DOE.
We thank you all for your service and thank you for joining
us here today.
For fiscal year 2014, DOD and DOE propose to spend on the
order of $2.6 billion in nonproliferation activities to help
stem the flow of the WMD. For the past 20 years, the CTR has
achieved remarkable accomplishments in Russia and the former
Soviet states in helping to secure or to destroy the world's
largest stockpiles of WMD and their materials. I understand a
new CTR umbrella agreement between the U.S. and Russia is under
negotiation and we would like to hear the administration's
objectives for the new agreement.
Also, we are now transitioning many CTR programs to
countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and
for the first time we may see as much CTR funding outside the
former Soviet Union as in it.
We'll want to hear what strategic approach you have
implemented to assess how these funds would be most effectively
spent. For instance, the Cooperative Biological Engagement
Program now has 61 projects in 19 countries. Within DOE's NNSA,
I understand the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel program is considering
a strategic pause due to significant cost overruns of as much
as $3 billion and a 3-year delay. The purpose of the 14-year-
old program is to turn 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade
plutonium into commercial reactor fuel, with the Russians doing
the same, a laudable nonproliferation goal.
My understanding is DOE is now estimating a life cycle cost
of up to $27 billion over 15 years to produce the MOX fuel. So
I look forward to hearing from Ms. Harrington what DOE is
thinking with the existing MOX program and how long it will
take DOE to get back to Congress with the results from the
reevaluation of this program.
Again, thank you for being here today. We look forward to
your testimony. I want to turn to my colleague and ranking
member, Senator Fischer, for her comments.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I join you in
thanking our witnesses for being here today. While I look
forward to their testimony on these essential proliferation
prevention programs, I am concerned by the prevalent argument
that the United States can persuade the rest of the world to
halt nuclear proliferation by reducing its own arsenal. I know
that the Strategic Forces Subcommittee oversees our nuclear
enterprise, but its critical contribution here is also worth
highlighting.
In fact, a robust U.S. nuclear deterrent, often referred to
as the nuclear umbrella, provides a strong disincentive for
other nations, including our partners and allies, to develop
WMD. Moreover, there's little evidence that U.S. nuclear
reductions from a high of 30,000 nuclear weapons in 1967 to
just 5,000 today have reduced nuclear proliferation. North
Korea and Iran stand as recent evidence to the contrary.
While some in the United States and in the west view
nuclear weapons as outdated Cold War relics, other nations are
increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons, much as the
United States did after World War II. The United States will
not change this reality by reducing its arsenal. Overlooking
this fact and dogmatically pursuing the reduction of U.S.
nuclear forces, instead of addressing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to rogue states, will lead to a lack of
confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees. As a result,
adversaries won't be deterred and nations that have not pursued
nuclear capabilities, such as South Korea, Japan, Turkey, and
Saudi Arabia, may reconsider.
Transparency and strategic stability must be our goals with
respect to Russia and China. Dealing with North Korea, Iran,
and potential nuclear terrorists requires a different set of
priorities and different programmatic tools, some of which we
intend to discuss here today.
The important proliferation prevention agencies represented
here today, underpinned by a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent, are
critical to our national security.
So I thank the chair and I look forward to our questions.
Thank you so much for being here.
Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, if you would like to go
first with your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator Hagan, Ranking Member
Fischer. It's a pleasure to be here, also to be here today with
colleagues of longstanding duration from both the DTRA and from
the NNSA.
As we all are very well aware, we face a number of
significant WMD challenges and the three of us together are
aggressively pursuing the President's vision to keep WMD out of
the hands of terrorists and states of concern. These states of
concern, of course, include North Korea, Iran, and Syria, just
to mention a few.
One of the most worrisome scenarios we face is the prospect
of a dangerous WMD crisis involving the theft or loss of
control of weapons or materials of concern that end up in the
hands of hostile actors. As the situation in Syria illustrates,
instability in states pursuing or possessing WMD could lead to
just such a crisis. To meet these challenges, DOD has focused
on three areas: preventing WMD acquisition, containing and
rolling back the threats, and responding to a WMD crisis.
Preventing the WMD acquisition requires cooperation with
our international partners and the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) is a good example of that. This is 29 partners
together who participate in, among other things, exercises. The
United Arab Emirates hosted the most recent one. We are now on
the verge of celebrating PSI's 10th anniversary and our Polish
allies will be hosting that particular celebration of the
accomplishments and also looking forward to the next 10 years.
PSI is an interesting concept with our allies and for the
United States. It's not included in any budget line as it comes
out of general exercise money. But in the fiscal environment
that we're now facing, we are looking at the idea of developing
a specific line item dedicated for PSI activities and will
probably be presenting this in the construct of the fiscal year
2015 budget.
But beyond preventing acquisition, which is one of our
priorities, we're also containing and rolling back WMD threats.
One of the most important tools we use to accomplish this is
the CTR program. The flexibility of the CTR legislation has
allowed the program to expand its work both geographically,
most recently in the Middle East, and now also functionally.
A major focus of CTR is addressing the threat posed by
Syria's chemical weapons. To address the proliferation threat
from these weapons, CTR is funding the second portion of
Jordan's border security project, which will increase Jordan's
ability to mitigate proliferation along a 256-kilometer border
with Syria.
CTR also works in Africa to improve the safety and security
and hopefully destroy, in an excellent partnership that's just
developing with Germany, Libya's chemical weapons stockpile.
CTR is also working to improve biological security and
increasing partner capacity in Kenya and Uganda and to enhance
maritime surveillance capabilities and capacity in Southeast
Asia.
The functional expansions that I mentioned were developed
initially to assist with the close collaboration that we enjoy
with DOD. DOE negotiates high-priority transfers of material,
mostly nuclear material, to more secure locations for storage
and reprocessing, and DOD has specific capabilities and
training to transport this material. As a result, we are
developing a transportation determination that will allow more
nimble collaboration with DOE.
These examples also demonstrate that the CTR program
remains responsive to the current and emerging security
environment. We have pushed the envelope and we will continue
to do so when we believe it will reduce WMD threats.
If our efforts to contain and roll back WMD threats fail,
we must be prepared to respond. The recently activated Standing
Joint Force Headquarters-Elimination (SJFHQ-E) has this
responsibility. In addition to the unique support it provides
to the combatant commands, this year the SJFHQ-E participated
in major exercises with South Korea, France, and the United
Kingdom. We're committed to meeting the Nation's countering WMD
requirements while taking into account shrinking DOD budgets.
None of the efforts I have described would be possible
without the continuing support of Congress. I thank you for
your support for our fiscal 2014 budget and look forward to
your continuing cooperation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon
introduction
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today about the progress the
Department of Defense (DOD) has made in carrying out a wide range of
activities to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We continue to
pursue aggressively the President's vision for countering WMD by
keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists and states of concern,
locking down dangerous nuclear and biological materials, eliminating
chemical weapons, destroying legacy weapons, and building capabilities
and conducting operations to prevent acquisition, contain and roll back
threats, and respond to WMD crises.
I am pleased to be here today with two colleagues whose efforts are
critical to addressing these important issues: Mr. Kenneth A. Myers
III, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); and
Ms. Anne M. Harrington, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). Together, we are supporting a whole-of-government effort to
make the United States, and the world, safer from WMD threats.
In my role as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Strategic Affairs (GSA), I oversee all Defense efforts to counter WMD,
as well as nuclear, missile defense, space, and cyber policies. The
great team at GSA develops defense strategies and policies, sets
Departmental priorities based on guidance from the Secretary of
Defense, and manages interagency and international relationships for
the Department in these functional areas. Under the leadership of Mr.
Myers, DTRA implements GSA's countering WMD guidance through the
management and execution of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program and other non- and counter-proliferation activities. Mr. Andrew
Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs, provides acquisition guidance and
oversight for DTRA's work. Together, we work with the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, the Services, national labs, and other implementing
partners to execute DOD's counter WMD responsibilities. DOD also works
closely in this area with Ms. Harrington and her team at NNSA, as well
as other interagency partners.
Our mission is straightforward--DOD is working to ensure that no
additional states or non-state actors acquire WMD; those possessing WMD
do not use them; and if WMD are used, the effects are minimized. In a
constrained fiscal environment, we are focusing our efforts on
preventing acquisition and countering the most likely threats.
Accordingly, we are emphasizing early cooperative action in order to
shape the security environment and disrupt proliferation networks
through pathway defeat--deliberate actions taken against actors of
concern and their networks to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise
complicate WMD-related activities. We are prioritizing capabilities
that counter operationally significant risks and that are not resident
elsewhere in the U.S. Government, in order to avoid wasteful or
duplicative expenditures.
wmd challenges
The current strategic environment presents a number of WMD
challenges stemming from those who possess WMD and those seeking to
acquire new and expanded capabilities, including North Korea, Iran,
Syria, and certain non-state actors. Both state and non-state actors
who are actively seeking or already possess WMD present a significant
intelligence and defense planning challenge. Their strategic
intentions, proliferation pathways, decisionmaking processes, and
capabilities are difficult to assess and influence. Their relative risk
tolerance and isolation can create further challenges for the United
States to dissuade and deter these actors from acquiring or using WMD.
For example, North Korea has recently taken a series of provocative and
destabilizing actions and Iran continues to defy the calls of the
international community for transparency into its nuclear activities
and a demonstration that these activities are solely for legitimate,
peaceful purposes. Certain non-state actors continue to seek WMD, and
WMD technologies.
Technological advances and the availability of expertise,
materials, and technology through a variety of networks increase the
likelihood that both state and non-state actors will gain access to WMD
and related capabilities. Those who provide support--including WMD and
related capabilities--to other governments and non-state actors also
threaten U.S. security and destabilize the international system.
Furthermore, such proliferation increases the likelihood that a
recipient may employ WMD independently or as a proxy.
Despite significant progress in securing vulnerable WMD materials,
new avenues for access continuously emerge. Fragile or failed states
with WMD programs or capabilities are particularly ripe for
exploitation. One of our most worrisome scenarios is the prospect of a
crisis involving the theft or loss of control of weapons or material of
concern that results in the WMD ending up in the hands of hostile
actors. Instability in states pursuing or possessing WMD or related
capabilities could lead to just such a crisis. The potential
convergence of violent extremism, political instability, and inadequate
WMD security is also a most troubling scenario. If highly motivated
non-state actors determined to obtain and employ WMD took advantage of
these types of situations, they would no doubt be difficult, if not
impossible, to deter.
Violent extremists are expanding their geographic reach into
ungoverned territories. Recent events in Mali involving Al Qaeda and
affiliates demonstrate this problem. Such territories could be used to
support illicit activities, including undetected and unwarned
development and proliferation of WMD-related capabilities. These safe
havens enhance adversaries' freedom of action and make our task all the
more difficult.
addressing the challenges
When making strategic resourcing decisions, DOD consistently has
protected countering WMD (CWMD) efforts. In today's fiscal environment,
however, our goals will be tougher than ever to sustain. We are
accepting increased risk in areas where WMD use is less plausible, less
feasible, or would have limited effects, allowing us to prioritize more
likely scenarios for WMD acquisition and use.
To maximize effectiveness and because this is not a DOD mission
alone, we are incorporating our CWMD efforts, as reflected in the
broader plans and operations within DOD, across the U.S. Government and
with international partners. Partnering serves as a force multiplier:
it extends DOD's strategy and capabilities through increased
interoperability with other U.S. departments and agencies, allies and
friends, and international bodies. DOD seeks to leverage and enhance,
but not duplicate, capabilities resident elsewhere in the U.S.
Government or activities best executed by our interagency partners, for
which other agencies and departments have lead responsibilities. DOD
stands ready to support these other agencies and departments as needed.
Today's complex security environment presents significant
challenges that require increased emphasis on early cooperative action
to shape the environment and disrupt networks. The dynamic structures
of WMD networks present challenges, but they also offer opportunities
for exploitation through flexible, innovative, and adaptive approaches
that target these networks and their hubs. Understanding, monitoring,
and targeting these networks can help deter acquisition, bolster
prevention activities, and reduce reliance on measures that carry
higher political, military, and humanitarian risks.
Deterrence strategies supported by credible CWMD capabilities will
remain an effective approach against many WMD-armed adversaries. Toward
that end, the Department equips and trains forces and develops
capabilities that can be employed in three broad categories: (1)
prevent acquisition; (2) contain and roll back threats; and (3) respond
to WMD crises.
1. Preventing Acquisition
To further reduce incentives for WMD acquisition, DOD continues to
support the efforts of our State Department colleagues and others to
strengthen international treaties, conventions, and regimes, and to
implement sanctions. We support discussions among the permanent five
(P5) states of the U.N. Security Council to meet our obligations under
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to make progress under the
action Plan agreed to at the last Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Review Conference. In this context, DOD is developing, in conjunction
with interagency partners, common approaches to reporting and
definitions. Such confidence-building measures, when reciprocated by
other members of the P5, increase transparency and stability among
nuclear weapon states. DOD also supports efforts to begin negotiating a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). We support the P5's moratorium
on the production of new fissile material for use in nuclear devices,
and believe its continuance is part of the foundation that is needed in
order to make progress on an FMCT. To meet U.S. obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention, DOD has destroyed almost 90 percent of our
chemical weapons stockpile while continuing to assist other states in
the destruction of their stockpiles. We also continue to support U.S.
transparency efforts in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC) and to uphold longstanding U.S. commitments under the
BWC Confidence-Building Measures by reporting on biodefense research
activities taking place at DOD biological facilities.
Another example of our commitment to preventing proliferation of
WMD is our support to an interagency effort to develop and implement a
U.S. policy for Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). As was highlighted
during national and international discussions in 2012 concerning H5N1
avian influenza research, biological research, while critical for the
betterment of the health, welfare, and safety of mankind, also has the
potential to be misused. As a Federal research funding agency, DOD has
now implemented the 29 March 2012 ``United States Policy for Oversight
of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern,'' and reviews the life
sciences research it funds and conducts to ensure that dual use issues
are adequately addressed from the outset. In addition, we continue to
actively engage in interagency efforts to further develop additional
policies in this area as our understanding of this challenge evolves.
DOD is raising barriers to the acquisition and proliferation of WMD
through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners. This
May, our Polish allies will host meetings marking the 10th anniversary
of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Through its exercises
and leadership in PSI's operational experts group, DOD has steadily
worked with partners to address all aspects of the proliferation
threat. Twenty-nine partners participated in our most recent exercise,
Leading Edge, which was co-hosted by the United Arab Emirates and
included full maritime, air, and land interdiction activities. PSI is
an activity, not a program, and as such has no dedicated budget. In a
time of increasing resource constraints, previous methods of funding
PSI activities are becoming less available, and it is time we addressed
the need for a dedicated PSI funding line.
DOD is also engaged in what we refer to as pathway defeat
activities. These activities seek to identify various pathways that are
or could be used to conceptualize, develop, acquire, or proliferate WMD
and related capabilities and develop methodologies to deny, delay,
disrupt, or destroy these WMD pathways. The pathway defeat work focuses
on the specific nodes and linkages in the networks that constitute an
adversary's WMD acquisition pathway. By disrupting these networks, we
raise barriers to acquisition and enhance efforts to detect, identify,
and respond to acquisition attempts, especially those shielded by
legitimate activities such as nuclear power generation; chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defensive programs;
biomedical research; and the global chemical industry.
2. Containing and Rolling Back Threats
DOD is containing and rolling back WMD proliferation threats by
restricting the supply of WMD-relevant materials and technologies,
including delivery systems, available for illicit uses. One of the most
important tools we use to accomplish this is the CTR Program. The
President recently commemorated CTR on its 20th anniversary. He stated,
``This is one of our most important national security programs. It's a
perfect example of the kind of partnerships that we need, working
together to meet challenges that no nation can address on its own . . .
That's why, over the past 4 years, we've continued to make critical
investments in our threat reduction programs--not just at DOD, but at
Energy and at State. In fact, we've been increasing funding, and
sustaining it. Even as we make some very tough fiscal choices, we're
going to keep investing in these programs--because our national
security depends on it.'' Among other achievements in securing and
eliminating WMD materials and in preventing WMD proliferation, the CTR
Program can take credit for assisting three former members of the
Soviet Union in deactivating and properly disposing of over 13,000
nuclear warheads.
As WMD threats have changed since the end of the Cold War and
dissolution of the Soviet Union, so has the CTR Program's focus and
partnerships. In support of this geographic and functional expansion,
the President has requested $528.5 million in fiscal year 2014 for DOD
CTR activities, an increase of approximately $9 million over the fiscal
year 2013 appropriated level. These funds will continue ongoing
partnerships in the former Soviet Union, support new partnerships in
Africa, and expand work in the Middle East, South Asia, and South East
Asia. It is important to note that CTR remains a threat-based program
focused on supporting DOD's mission. To strengthen our stewardship of
program resources, the Department is developing a comprehensive metrics
approach to improve program management and ensure investments directly
advance strategic threat reduction goals. When fully implemented, CTR
Program metrics will track material inventory, training activities,
equipment utilization, and major program milestones, such as the
completion of transfer of custody. These inputs will help us track
project plans against our completed activities in a tailored way.
Importantly, this will improve the dialogue between Congress and the
Department of Defense when evaluating the success of the DOD CTR
Program. Additional information on the CTR metrics will be included in
the CTR annual report to Congress, which will be submitted later this
spring.
The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretaries of State and Energy,
recently approved the expansion of CTR activities to the Middle East.
Through enhanced border security and threat reduction train and equip
support, CTR will work with partner countries to help mitigate the
threat posed by the potential proliferation or use of Syria's chemical
weapons or materials and other WMD. With this new authority the CTR
Program is working with our regional partners to increase their
awareness of the threat posed by the potential proliferation or use of
Syria's chemical weapons, materials, or other WMD; build and expand
border protection capabilities to prevent illicit transfers of chemical
weapons materials; and operate in a potentially contaminated
environment. The CTR Program is proving to be exceptionally valuable to
our partners and to existing partnerships in the face of this emerging
threat. For example, CTR is funding Phase 2 of the Jordan Border
Security Project, which will integrate technology and training to
increase Jordan's visibility and ability to mitigate proliferation
along the remaining 256-kilometer stretch of border with Syria.
Another focus area for the CTR Program is to enhance maritime
domain awareness capabilities for maritime surveillance in Southeast
Asia, providing the ability to detect illicit transfers of WMD
materials and strategic delivery systems. In particular, we are
engaging Vietnam to improve maritime law enforcement awareness and
security. This program is working to improve logistics and maintenance
as well as providing equipment and developing a training center to
enable more efficient efforts to thwart illegal smuggling of WMD and
related equipment.
CTR is also countering biological threats. CTR's partnerships
decrease the vulnerability of biological agents to theft by nefarious
actors and increase partners' abilities to detect, diagnose, contain,
and report outbreaks of public health and national security concerns.
Our hope is that current partners will, in the future, become sources
of best practices and resources for other countries looking to improve
their domestic biological security, outbreak surveillance, and response
capabilities. GSA has briefed this committee in the past on improved
biosecurity partnerships in East Africa, and I am proud to inform you
that key facilities housing some of the world's most dangerous
pathogens are now secure thanks to collaborative efforts among partner
countries and the Departments of Defense and State.
But gates and guards are not the only solution. We are also working
to enhance the culture of security within the life sciences community.
Insufficient security leaves us all vulnerable to misuse of biological
material. As new challenges of dual-use and global access to
biotechnologies demand new approaches, we are developing non-
traditional partnerships, including collaboration with the World Health
Organization (WHO) to leverage their technical capabilities and global
networks. While a DOD-WHO partnership may seem counterintuitive to
some, we do in fact share many biosafety and biosecurity objectives.
The WHO's International Health Regulations specifically call out these
areas as requirements and sets guidelines for active and passive
biological surveillance, which are the best means for detecting
naturally occurring outbreaks and biological terror events. Compliance
with these guidelines reinforces DOD objectives and enhances U.S. and
international security. Direct and continued engagement with the WHO
and similar organizations provides CTR with significantly more
opportunities to enhance a culture of security within the existing life
sciences communities that can recognize, report and aid in countering
the grave threat posed by biological weapons development or use.
Further, partnership with such organizations increases the likelihood
that CTR-provided investments will be sustained in the future.
I highlight these efforts in particular to note new levels of
responsiveness in the CTR Program as it expands. We are advancing our
approaches to threat reduction in appreciation of the dynamic threat
environment. We have pushed the envelope, and we will continue to do so
where we believe it will reduce WMD threats.
DOD will also encourage and support--through direct and indirect
assistance--states that have already committed to secure and dispose of
WMD and reduce or dismantle WMD programs. In Libya, the CTR Program is
working now to increase the safety and security of Libya's recently-
discovered chemical weapons stockpile, and we are also working to
finalize a destruction agreement.
Indeed, even beyond the projects and partnerships mentioned here,
we are considering other, novel applications of the CTR Program. One is
to transport vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials to more
secure locations for storage or reprocessing. The Departments of
Defense and Energy collaborate closely in threat reduction, drawing on
each department's respective strengths. The Department of Energy is
negotiating high-priority transfers of material to more secure
locations for storage or reprocessing, and DOD has specific
capabilities and training for secure transportation internationally. We
are, therefore, working cooperatively to achieve overall U.S.
objectives in nuclear and radiological security.
Touching briefly on the future, DOD's CTR program is at a
transition. We are now funding roughly as much work outside of the
former Soviet Union as we are inside the former Soviet Union. Based on
emerging threats, our aperture has widened substantially and we are
increasing the flexibility of the program to be successful as a global
effort. Developments in Libya and the Middle East this past year
exemplify this requirement. We look forward to engaging with you and
your congressional colleagues in the future about how to continue this
update to the CTR program and increase its effectiveness.
3. Responding to Crises
DOD works to manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or
failed states and safe havens. Where hostile actors persist in making
significant progress toward acquiring WMD, the Department is prepared
to undertake or support a full range of actions to stop such
capabilities from being fully realized. We will convey to fragile
states that proliferation undermines security and stability and work
with them to enhance WMD security. We must deny non-state actors the
means to manipulate and acquire the tools and resources of state actors
and prevent them from achieving territorial freedom of action.
The Department is continuing to develop tailored plans and
capabilities to deter specific actors of concern, including those who
may be serving as proxies, from employing WMD. DOD will also be
prepared to locate, characterize, secure, exploit, and destroy WMD. We
are seeing immediate successes in this area with the activation of the
Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Elimination (SJFHQ-E). In addition to
its unique support to the Combatant Commands, this year the SJFHQ-E
participated in major exercises jointly with South Korea, France, and
the United Kingdom. We are already seeing how this capability is able
to address a range of challenges under varying security and political
conditions.
Given the prevalence of coalition operations in contemporary
military campaigns, helping allies and partners understand WMD risks to
develop effective defenses is an important element of our mutual
defense. Such practical security cooperation focused on countering
regional WMD threats helps partners resist incentives to acquire WMD in
response to changes in the security environment. With this in mind, we
have active bilateral CBRN defense partnerships with Japan, South
Korea, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, and members of other
countries as well as with NATO.
The Department is also prepared to sustain operations and support
continuity-of-government efforts following a WMD incident. Forces and
operational areas must be able to function with minimal residual
limitations resulting from chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear (CBRN) exposure or contamination. In support of the warfighter,
we will build on the successes of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program by continuing to improve the training of CBRN forces and
advisors, developing medical and physical countermeasures, and
advancing protective equipment and platforms for physical protection
and decontamination. In addition, DOD is prepared to support civil
authorities with CBRN response capabilities to mitigate the
consequences of events in the homeland and abroad, including through
the provision of timely technical forensics to enable strategic
decision-making. DOD may also lead or assist in the disposal of
residual adversary WMD capabilities until such time that a civilian or
international entity can assume these responsibilities.
conclusion
We are committed to meeting the Nation's countering WMD
requirements while taking into account a shrinking Department of
Defense budget. DOD will continue to pursue CWMD activities that span a
range of unilateral and multilateral counter-proliferation and non-
proliferation efforts, and we will continue to coordinate our efforts
within the interagency and with our international partners to prevent
and protect against these most dangerous threats. None of the efforts I
have described to you today would be possible without the continuing
support of Congress. I thank you for your support for our fiscal year
2014 budget request and look forward to our continued partnership.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Secretary Creedon.
Director Myers.
STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND DIRECTOR, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Fischer,
members of the subcommittee: It's an honor to be here today.
I'm pleased to share with you the work being done to counter
the threats of WMD by the DTRA and the SCC WMD.
As a combat support agency, we are available 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, to support the combatant commanders and
Military Services in responding to any WMD threat. As a defense
agency, we manage a research and development portfolio to
develop tools and capabilities needed in a WMD environment. In
fact, DTRA provides U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
with the tools they need to address counterproliferation
threats.
As a STRATCOM center, we synchronize U.S. efforts to
counter WMD, and the complementary SJFHQ-E provides direct
operational support for U.S. military task forces in hostile
environments. As STRATCOM Commander General Bob Kehler recently
noted: ``DTRA-SCC is where the country's expertise is. This is
the focus point. This is where it all comes together, right
here.''
The events of the past week have reminded us once again
that terrorists are determined to strike at any opportunity. Al
Qaeda encourages their mujahedin brothers with degrees in
microbiology or chemistry to create poisons and an effective
delivery method. Because of our success in limiting access to
materials in the former Soviet Union, groups and states seeking
WMD have shifted their attention to other geographic areas and
potential WMD sources.
This evolution has required a shift in our thinking and
strategy and is the reason why we have authorized the expansion
of the Nunn-Lugar program and other programs to nearly 80
countries. Today we are confronting potential WMD threats all
over the world. We must be prepared for any geopolitical or
military event.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I'm happy
to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III
Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Fischer, and members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to share with you the
work being done to counter the threats of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S.
Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD).
The threat posed by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical
weapons is immediate, growing in scope, and evolving in its potential
applications. Those who wish to harm us understand that the use of such
weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic,
political, and social damage on a global scale.
President Obama has made it clear that countering weapons of mass
destruction (CWMD) is a critical national security priority for our
Nation. Quite simply, the Agency and Center's focus is to keep WMD out
of the hands of terrorists and other enemies by locking down dangerous
nuclear and biological materials, destroying legacy weapons, preparing
for, and responding to WMD incidents, and developing technologies to
prevent, defend against, and counter a WMD attack.
mission
Our mission spans the scope of nonproliferation--reducing WMD at
their source; counterproliferation--the deterrence, interdiction, and
defeat of WMD threats, and consequence management--the minimization of
the operational effects of WMD attacks and mitigation of their
consequences.
DTRA and the STRATCOM Center, and the companion Standing Joint
Force Headquarters for Elimination are a one-stop shop in addressing
these threats. If these organizations were compared to a grocery store,
not only would we provide access to nearly every kind of food product
one could ask for but we have partnerships to deliver what we do not
carry in-house. Our store would not only bring in the produce but would
also work with the farmers in the field to improve productivity. We
would not only bring your groceries to the car but we would also come
home with you to help cook the meal. In fact, we would provide our own
recipes. Now obviously we are not a grocery store nor do we stock
shelves with inventory, but through our partnerships and expertise, we
are built lean and flexible to fill very unique and specialized CWMD
roles for a wide variety of customers. What is most impactful about
these three organizations is not just the depth of our mission but the
broad span of services we provide, all of which are necessary for
successfully countering WMD. Each of these initiatives, whether large
or small in scope add up to create a very strong proactive and reactive
shield for our security and that of our allies.
Regardless of the time or day, our building housing DTRA and the
SCC is constantly buzzing with activity and with a diverse and
remarkable collection of talented workers. As you enter our building
and walk through the hallways, you encounter personnel with highly
advanced technical degrees and skills related to physics, chemistry,
microbiology, and nuclear engineering. They are working right alongside
those with expansive experience with program management, logistics,
planning, special operations, targeting and military operations. Our
operation is often described as unique in this way, and it is true.
Let me give you a simple example of exactly how our agency works.
On our Science and Technology (S&T) side, we are developing the
technologies necessary to verify arms-control commitments. We must make
sure that the equipment we are producing in our research and
development efforts fit the needs and the constraints and the
conditions under which our inspectors are going to have to operate. It
has to be rugged, compact, transportable, easy to use and most of all
effective in a variety of diverse and often difficult environmental
conditions. Consistent with our one-stop shop mission, we bring
everything needed to wherever the mission is to be performed.
On the other side, our operations experts have to be properly
trained to make full use of the technology, make repairs, work with
foreign governments and personnel, and get the job done under tight
timelines. These two parallel processes, S&T and operations, must be
able to support each other and the workforce must be dynamic enough to
fill both roles.
What binds our mission together are the consequences of the world's
most dangerous weapons. The processes to create chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons are all
different and each represents different challenges in terms of
approach, destruction, and impact. As a result, there are over 2,000
people who work for DTRA/SCC-WMD in 11 sites within the United States
and 9 sites around the world. In fact, nearly 30 percent of DTRA/SCC's
workforce performs work outside of the DC area. While these individuals
are specialized, they are focused on one mission, protecting the United
States and our allies from weapons of mass destruction.
The truth is that countering and combating weapons of mass
destruction has to be performed on a larger scale than just our single
institution. No one Federal Department, no single geographic region, no
single country can marshal the necessary capabilities alone to
successfully fight the WMD threats we face in this day and age. It
requires careful collaboration not only across a variety of U.S.
Government agencies but also with our allies and other partner nations
abroad. As a result, the design and approach of our agency is
intentionally open to collaborative partnerships and outward
engagement.
For example, it is not enough to turn back a shipment of WMD
materials at an overseas border crossing. The actors' motives and
intent need to be dissected and analyzed. The WMD material itself needs
to be analyzed so we can better understand its strength, how it was
made, and trace it back to its source. The materials at hand must be
safely secured and disposed. The DTRA and SCC role in all of this
provides the support necessary to do just that.
On any given day, tens to hundreds of DTRA and Center experts are
dispatched overseas, and in certain cases to some of the most dangerous
and sensitive of areas, in order to provide analysis, research,
testing, training and operational expertise.
Our nuclear experts are supporting global nuclear weapons lockdown
efforts, helping to protect and ensure surety of our own nuclear
weapons, and survivability of U.S. Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications.
Our biologists are consolidating and improving the security of
dangerous pathogen collections across the planet, collaborating closely
with other like-minded nations to prevent nefarious distribution of
biological materials. They are also working cooperatively with
international partners to counter emerging and potentially genetically
altered or weaponized infectious diseases and developing new means for
protecting our military personnel against biological terrorism.
Our chemical weapons experts are assisting with the safety,
security, and cooperative destruction of chemical weapons (CW) in the
United States and Russia. They are also assisting with safety and
security at Libya's CW storage facility and developing plans to assist
them with CW destruction activities. In addition to addressing this
urgent need, our S&T efforts also address potential future chemical
weapons threats.
DTRA structural dynamics experts are working on solutions to
protect military and related government facilities at risk while also
developing new means for mitigating blast effects resulting from
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices against structures and other
infrastructure.
Our DTRA and Center workforce performs CWMD planning and exercise
support and provides expertise to the combatant commands and other
customers.
Our CWMD Science and Technology development is conducted in
parallel with our operational capabilities in a complimentary and
collaborative fashion. DTRA does not own or operate any functional
laboratory, but we are able to select from the full range of national
expertise, wherever that may be. Our performers include the DOD and
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/
NNSA) labs, contractors, Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers, University-Associated Research Centers, and academia. We
provide and operate test and evaluation capabilities at government
facilities in New Mexico and Nevada to meet our own mission
requirements, and those of our various customers and stakeholders.
As our STRATCOM Commander General Bob Kehler recently noted while
visiting DTRA and the Center, ``this campus right here is where the
experts are, this is where the country's expertise is. This is the
focus point; this is where it all comes together, right here.''
structure
DTRA was created from a number of other national security entities
whose combined history includes the Manhattan Project, the Defense
Nuclear Agency, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and the Chemical
and Biological Defense and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs, to name a few.
As a Combat Support Agency we are available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, to support the combatant commanders and Services in preparing
for, preventing, or if necessary, responding to any WMD threat or
challenge that they might face whether it be here or abroad. In the
laboratory, planning sessions, or on the battlefield, our experts
provide or utilize collaborative partnerships to address every CWMD
contingency.
As a Defense Agency, one of our prime responsibilities is to
perform and to manage a research and development portfolio to develop
tools and capabilities that the warfighter will need to address and to
operate in a WMD environment, whether that be nuclear or other CWMD
detection, chemical and biological protection gear, uniforms, or
detectors.
As the STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, I
report to General Bob Kehler, Commander, STRATCOM. Our Center supports
the Commander, STRATCOM with the Unified Command Plan responsibility to
synchronize the planning for DOD CWMD efforts and advocate for CWMD
capabilities.
The Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination was stood up
by General Kehler last year to provide direct operational support to
on-scene task forces that need CWMD expertise. To be clear, I am not
the commander of the Standing Headquarters, but it is commanded by the
flag officer that serves as my Deputy Director of the STRATCOM Center
collocated in DTRA. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters is
intentionally designed to expand our threat reduction activity to
nonpermissive environments, or one in which we are not permitted a
cooperative opportunity to reduce weapons of mass destruction.
DTRA, the SCC and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters all have
technically different roles in the counter-WMD mission area but they
are located together so we can all leverage the most out of the
resources that Congress provides and the capabilities that we develop
and deploy together.
To quote General Kehler again, if a joint commander ``needs help
with an SCC-WMD issue, he turns to Mr. Myers . . . and if Mr. Myers
can't help him with his SCC-WMD hat on, he can flip on his other hat
and turn to DTRA . . . all of the expertise to deal with these problems
is here . . . and it makes all the sense in the world.''
DTRA performs its programs in response to direction provided by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in direct support of each
combatant commander on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and General Kehler as Commander of STRATCOM. As the Director of
DTRA, I report through Mr. Andrew Weber, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
We also work in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.
strategies and goals--layered attack
One of our major strategies is erecting layers of defense between
the threats and the American people. It is just common sense to go
where the problem begins and attempt to counteract and eliminate these
threats as far away from American soil as possible.
nonproliferation
The most well-known nonproliferation program was created by your
former colleagues Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn. The Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has been a true
success story and has made incredible contributions to U.S. national
security in the last 20 years.
The program has now helped to destroy more than 7,616 warheads
created for the purpose of hitting targets in the United States. This
is chilling when you consider that any one warhead could take out the
city the size of Charlotte in one shot. As of the end of February this
year, we have destroyed 912 intercontental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
197 ICBM mobile launchers, 906 air-launched cruise missiles, and
eliminated 33 nuclear powered submarines (SSBN) capable of launching
ballistic missiles (SLBMs); eliminated 498 ICBM silos, 155 bombers, 492
SLBM launchers, and 695 SLBMs; sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and
holes; safely and securely transported 607 nuclear weapons train
shipments; upgraded 24 nuclear weapons storage sites; and secured 47
Biological Threat Reduction Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories.
This past year, we eliminated 21 SS-24 ICBM rocket motors in
Ukraine and destroyed over 791.8 metric tons of Russian nerve agents.
We have also secured four bio labs in Ukraine and Georgia, and opened a
Biosafety Level 2 laboratory in Georgia to help us with global bio
surveillance. This is just scratching the surface of the Nunn-Lugar
program's accomplishments. As President Barack Obama recently stated at
a Nunn-Lugar Program 20th anniversary celebration, ``missile by
missile, warhead by warhead, shell by shell, we're putting a bygone era
behind us.''
The evolution of Nunn-Lugar has been remarkable. We are no longer
building large, expensive missile dismantlement facilities or large
chemical weapons destruction sites. Missile and submarine elimination
projects are now being tracked alongside smaller, yet equally critical
biological material projects in sub-Saharan Africa and proliferation
prevention projects in Southeast Asia. Because of our success in
eliminating access to materials in the former Soviet Union, groups and
states seeking WMD have shifted their attention to other geographic
areas and potential WMD sources. This evolution has required a shift in
our thinking as well and is the reason why we have expanded Nunn-Lugar
authority to nearly 80 countries, with close collaboration with our
partners at the State Department and the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
In most cases, our new partners have no WMD aspirations. But,
endemic diseases, man-made or otherwise, are not constrained by
geographic or political boundaries. So it is up to us to go to the
source. It requires us to form cooperative partnerships to ensure that
consequential WMD proliferation does not occur.
For example, DTRA/SCC-WMD is focused on helping African nations
secure naturally occurring dangerous pathogens. Deadly African diseases
like Ebola, Marburg, and Anthrax that were once used to make biological
weapons during the Cold War are being safeguarded, cataloged, and, if
needed, destroyed as part of the Cooperative Biological Engagement
Program, now the largest activity within the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program. For a relatively small investment, the
program is reducing access to biological materials and expanding
international partnerships to better counter natural and man-made
biological events.
For example, the laboratories I visited in Africa in 2011 had
broken windows, rusty locks, meager electrical capabilities, and
insecure fencing. Keep in mind that these facilities stored Anthrax,
Ebola, Marburg, and Brucellosis. During one of my visits I casually
walked into an unlocked room in an unsecure building that had seven
unlocked freezers. In those freezers, situated next to countless other
diseases, were many vials containing several grams of Anthrax. Just 2
grams of Anthrax killed five Americans in the postal mail attack on the
U.S. Senate in 2001. The anthrax that I saw was not weaponized;
however, those vials could serve as the foundation for a biological
weapon. In fact, during the Cold War, the Soviets reached into Africa
to obtain the Anthrax which filled the 300 metric ton fermenters at
Stepnogorsk. Through Nunn-Lugar we are working with our partners in
Kenya and Uganda to ensure that those vials of Anthrax will not be
weaponized and will not fall into the hands of terrorists.
Timing is everything with biodefense. DTRA works closely with the
Departments of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease
Control and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and others to maximize
our expertise and relationships within the global health community to
improve early warning and detection capabilities and mitigate pandemic
disease threats. We are even working on a mobile testing device which
would allow for us to diagnose both threat and infectious bio-agents in
humans in potentially remote areas. We are also creating partnerships
with industry for advanced development and manufacturing of medical
countermeasures to counter emerging bio threats and infectious
diseases.
counterproliferation
If our programs and our efforts at the source are unable to stop
these WMD threats before they leak out, we help combatant commanders
and military Service components to engage the threat on someone else's
soil. Detection, interdiction, and if need be, destruction of these
weapons and materials are the goal, thus disrupting the supply or
smuggling routes and providing our national leadership with knowledge
concerning important threat details. Working with our International
partners, our goal is to deter, dissuade, and deny those who both
produce and attempt to gain access to these materials and drive them
out of business.
For example, the Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) enhances
the capacity of partner countries to deter, detect, investigate, and
respond to the attempted proliferation of WMD. It provides specialized
equipment, training, and facility upgrades for partner nation border
security and law enforcement organizations. Training is
institutionalized through a train-the-trainer approach and sustained
with periodic local and regional WMD Integrated Exercises which enable
students to use program skills and equipment within a realistic
training environment. The PPP's partners span the Caucuses, Eastern
Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
One example of the impact of PPP can be seen with the country of
Ukraine. During an exercise in 2007, Ukrainian border guard personnel
intercepted a vehicle with an unmarked container filled with a
suspicious white powder. PPP observers witnessed the border guards
opening the container and literally smelling it to determine whether or
not the contents were nefarious. Fast forward to today and we have
fully institutionalized a ``WMD Inspection'' course at the State Border
Guard Service of Ukraine. DTRA was able to accomplish this by providing
appropriate training and training equipment. Furthermore, Ukraine has
taken the initiative to offer training to its neighbors as a regional
training center. They have hosted Moldovan border guards already and
will soon be hosting Armenian Border Guard Forces in addition to the
regular training that they provide for their own forces.
Because of our success in interdicting and eliminating weapons at
the source, we have literally driven the enemy underground. As a
result, our national security leadership and military commanders need
non-nuclear capability to strike at Hard and Deeply Buried Targets
(HDBT). DTRA works closely with the Defense Intelligence Agency to find
these targets and provide Combatant Commanders and Service Components
with effective CWMD contingency responses. For example, the U.S. Air
Force now owns and can employ a DTRA initiated product--the Massive
Ordnance Penetrator Program (MOP). The MOP is a 30,000 pound
conventional penetrating weapon designed to provide substantial
improvements in accuracy and lethality over current weapons in the
inventory to defeat hardened deeply buried targets.
Another aspect of our work is to ensure the complete and successful
stewardship of our nuclear weapons stockpile. We have systems in place
to guarantee that we have complete control and accounting of our
nuclear weapons at all times. In fact, last year we conducted 18
inspections of U.S. nuclear capable units. We make sure every safety
system is in place, maintained and in working order, and put the
operations, maintenance and security forces through drills and
exercises to ensure that everyone knows their job, they know the proper
procedures and they know how to react when the situation changes. Our
collective goal is to protect, control and serve the Nation with 100
percent assured predictability, reliability and confidence in our
nuclear weapons stewardship.
consequence management
DTRA's roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when it
provided technical and operational nuclear weapons effects expertise to
the Military Services. This mission continues with additional services
for the combatant commands and their ability to respond to WMD threats.
DTRA's Technical Reachback capabilities support any CBRNE
decisionmaking capability both here and abroad. We give the troops on
the front line access to some of the smartest subject matter experts in
real time. Last year, we fielded 1,492 Technical Reachback requests.
The Consequence Management Assistance Program (CMAP) has active
engagements in the Middle East, South East Asia, East Africa, and
Eastern Europe. One recent success story occurred in Jordan where CMAP
worked to enhance their capability to respond to incidents involving
WMD. This was the first time that representatives from 28 Jordanian
civilian and military organizations--including the Jordanian Armed
Forces, Civil Defense, Ministries of Water and Irrigation, Religious
Affairs, Education, and Trade and Commerce--sat together for the
express purpose of revising a national emergency response plan. This
engagement produced a more focused response to chemical and biological
threats and better coordination among their ministries.
regional contingency teams
In my testimony last year, I shared with the Committee DTRA's work
to provide real-time technical assistance to our U.S. Armed Forces in
Japan and the Japanese government in dealing with the estimated 9.0
magnitude earthquake that rocked the east coast of Honshu, Japan,
causing enormous damage and destruction. The earthquake was followed by
a devastating tsunami that resulted in even more damage and tremendous
loss of life. As damage reports from the earthquake and tsunami reached
the Japanese Government leadership, the Tokyo Electric Power Company
was working to prevent a third disaster--nuclear meltdown.
As a close ally, the United States offered its consequence
management support and DTRA provided radiological sensor data to
produce models of the radiological plume. We provided daily update
briefings and video teleconferences and worked to educate our military
leaders about possible impacts to the Japanese population and our own
troops in the area. In fact, the Japanese Ambassador even commented to
me, ``We wish we had a DTRA.''
Following this and other missions, DTRA began to review how to best
utilize their assets and maximize both results and efficiency during
fast-paced, real-time events. As a result, we created Regional
Contingency Teams (RCTs) for certain national security situations to
ensure that when we face a crisis, we have in place the best and most
appropriate and complimentary technical, planning, and operations staff
from all three of our organizations. Likewise, we set up beforehand
whatever necessary equipment and coordination among combatant commands,
Joint Staff, other DOD offices, other U.S. Government agencies and even
our international partners. This approach enhances our planning and
response time and allows for the best, most integrated information to
be available across the board. We didn't just alter the stove pipes; in
this case we blew them up.
This concept sounds simple but it is often difficult as stove pipes
are hard and thick and take considerable effort to break down. This is
especially true when you consider the depth and breadth of our mission
and the various roles that each organization fulfills. Communication
and coordination across mission areas is sometimes difficult to
accomplish. Nevertheless, it must be done--and we are making progress--
but there is much left to do.
Events in the Levant, North Africa, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere
have tested our model and the impact that we have seen is very
positive. Our Requests for Information (RFIs) from our customers are up
and the information disseminated is more timely, accurate and complete.
Our fiscal year 2014 budget request helps us to continue this cross-
cutting, collaborative approach.
northeast asia, syria
Within this framework, DTRA is playing a critical role in current
U.S. national security issues around the world. Events in North Korea,
Syria, and the Middle East are well publicized and our agency is
engaged in these matters. While I would prefer to discuss our agency's
involvement in these issues during the closed session, I share the
member's interest in these issues.
budget
We accept that the overall budget situation will likely remain
difficult and that additional pressures are expected to continue. This
is significant as DTRA's annual appropriations have remained relatively
flat since fiscal year 1999, despite the continuing importance,
evolution, and transformation of CWMD mission requirements.
We are working very hard to become more effective and efficient
with the resources we have. We are prioritizing. We have shut down a
number of offices. We did a complete prioritization of programs and
eliminated those we felt could be covered in other ways. We are
utilizing technology to reduce the need to travel and attend
conferences and other administrative costs.
One of the other ways we have worked to improve the efficiency of
our organization is to expand partnerships that enable us to leverage
expertise and capabilities from across DOD and other Federal agencies.
For example, we coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security on
development of nuclear detection and forensics, and piggyback on
service technology development, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles
as platforms for WMD search detection and interdiction. We also
leverage the CDC's global partnerships and technical expertise to
implement biological research and capacity building projects that help
our international partners increase capacities through improved disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and reporting.
Today, DTRA and SCC-WMD remain capable of executing our missions.
However, I believe that General Kehler and I speak with one voice when
I describe my most serious concern as the direct impact that this
continuing fiscal uncertainty is having on our people. Uniformed
servicemembers and civilian Federal employees alike have successfully
withstood the effects of round-the-world mission accomplishment and
hectic operational tempos. They willingly accept the uncertainties and
risks which accompany mission performance. But they are anxious about
what financial risks do to their families.
Our workforce will cope with the effects of financial uncertainty
in the near term. But, like General Kehler, I worry that over time our
most experienced professionals and our most promising younger people
will vote with their feet to pursue more stable opportunities
elsewhere.
fiscal year 2014 dtra budget request overview
Our budget request for fiscal year 2014 is $1.49 billion and
comprises Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation;
Operations and Maintenance; Procurement; and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA
executes the $449.3 million Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the
DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the
funds manager for the remainder of that program's funding, $1.05
billion. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately
$2.99 billion. Details and highlights for these requests follow.
Operations and Maintenance Funding
Nearly 85 percent of DTRA O&M funding directly supports the
warfighters and national missions as it pays for planning, training,
exercises, and other means for collaboration across DOD and the U.S.
Government, and with international partners. O&M funding is the fuel
that enables us to reach out to our components and personnel, the
warfighters, and international partners across the globe.
The requested O&M funding would be applied as follows:
Nonproliferation Activities ($67.3 million) for arms
control activities including the conduct of U.S. Government
inspections of foreign facilities, territories, or events;
coordination and conduct of the escort of inspection teams for
inspections or continuous monitoring activities in the United
States and at U.S. facilities overseas; and the acquisition and
fielding of technology capabilities required to implement,
comply with, and allow full exercise of U.S. rights and
prerogatives under existing and projected arms control treaties
and agreements.
WMD Combat Support and Operations ($180.2 million) for
a wide range of combat and warfighter support to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and military forces
as they engage the WMD threat and challenges posed to the
United States, its forces, and allies. DTRA supports the
essential WMD response capabilities, functions, activities, and
tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces
within their area of responsibility at all levels of war.
U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD ($11.8
million) for DTRA direct support to the SCC-WMD including
development of tools; providing strategic and contingency
planning, policy, and analytical support; developing
interagency relationships; and working closely with STRATCOM
partners to establish the means for assessing and exercising
capabilities to combat WMD.
Core Mission Sustainment ($185.1 million) for a wide
range of enabling capabilities which include information
management; resource management; security and asset protection;
acquisition and logistics management; strategic planning;
leadership and professional development; and provide the
safety, security, and efficiency necessary for mission success.
In recent years, DTRA has increased investment in its
Information Technology systems to provide secure and dependable
connectivity for global mission execution.
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
The request of $528.5 million for this important program would be
used as follows:
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ($10 million) for
elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms in Russia and the
storage and elimination in Ukraine of rocket motors from
dismantled SS-24 ICBMs. Due to diminishing elimination
activities needed for the Russian Federation to meet the New
START Treaty requirements, the DOD intends to transition
remaining responsibility for elimination activities to the
Russian Federation in 2014.
Chemical Weapons Destruction ($21.3 million) for
technical support to the Russian chemical weapons destruction
operations at Shchuch'ye and the Kizner Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facilities. Russia began chemical weapons
destruction operations at Shchuch'ye in March 2009 and, as of
April of this year, has destroyed over 1.6 million munitions
and 4014 metric tons of nerve agent. Funding is also provided
under this account for technical expertise and resources to
support chemical weapons destruction in Libya.
Global Nuclear Security ($86.5 million) for improving
nuclear material security, including security for nuclear
warheads and weapons-usable nuclear material. This program also
assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other
qualifying nuclear material to dismantlement facilities, secure
storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition.
Cooperative Biological Engagement ($306.3 million) for
combating the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring
biological materials and expertise that could be used to
develop or deploy biological materials and weapons. This
program destroys or secures certain biological agents at their
source, and works in partnerships to ensure a secure disease
surveillance system. This program works closely with other U.S.
Government departments and agencies, international partners,
and the private sector.
Proliferation Prevention ($73.8 million) to enhance
the capability of non-Russian, Former Soviet Union (FSU) states
and other partner countries to deter, detect, report, and
interdict illicit WMD trafficking across international borders.
Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the Proliferation Prevention
program began expansion outside of the FSU to Southeast Asia.
In fiscal year 2013 and 2014, Proliferation Prevention will
continue expansion activities in the Southeast Asia region on a
bilateral and regional basis and begin to work with partners in
the Middle East.
Threat Reduction Engagement ($2.4 million) to develop
active and positive relationships between the defense,
military, and security establishments of the United States and
the states of Eurasia and Central Asia. This program engages
military and defense officials in activities that promote
regional stability, counterproliferation, and defense reform;
build security cooperation with the partner states; and promote
exchanges that enhance interoperability with U.S. and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces for multinational
operations.
Other Assessments/Administrative Support ($28.2
million) to ensure that DOD-provided equipment, services, and
related training are fully accounted for and used effectively
and efficiently for their intended purposes. This account also
funds CTR program travel, translator/interpreter support, and
other agency support to include support to program personnel
assigned to U.S. Embassy offices in partner states.
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
DTRA RDT&E programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges
including stand-off detection, tracking, and interdiction of WMD;
modeling and simulation to support weapons effects and hazard
predictions; classified support to Special Operations Forces; defeat of
WMD agents and underground facilities; and protection of people,
systems, and infrastructure against WMD effects.
DTRA RDT&E is unique in being focused solely on CBRNE; tied closely
with the agency's Combat Support responsibilities; has a top-notch in-
house field test capability; relies upon competitive bids, the national
labs, industry, and academia rather than an in-house laboratory
infrastructure, allowing for a ``best of breed'' approach to performer
selection; and is nimble and responsive to urgent needs.
The agency has a comprehensive, balanced CBRNE S&T portfolio that
supports DOD goals and is well connected with DOD customers, as well as
interagency and international partners. Our RDT&E approach balances the
need for near-term pay-off with the need for long-term knowledge and
expertise, and is centered upon the following projects: Basic Research,
Applied Research, Advanced Research, and System Development and
Demonstration. The requested RDT&E funding includes $45.9 million in
Basic Research to provide for the discovery and development of
fundamental knowledge and understanding by researchers primarily in
academia and world-class research institutes in government and
industry.
The DTRA fiscal year 2014 request also includes $175.3 million for
WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research, $274 million for
Proliferation Prevention and Defeat Advanced Research, and $12.9 for
WMD Defeat Capabilities System Development and Demonstration.
Chemical and Biological Defense Program S&T
The Department's CBDP S&T programs support DOD-wide efforts to
research, develop, and acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated
defense against CBRN agents; better understand potential threats;
secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent
potential attacks. Although funding for the CBDP is not part of the
DTRA budget request, the agency executes the S&T portion of this
program, for which the Department has requested approximately $449.3
million in fiscal year 2014. The agency also manages funding execution
in support of CBDP advanced development and procurement.
conclusion
Madame Chairwoman, in closing my testimony I would like to
highlight a recent speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter who
spoke at a celebration of the Nunn-Lugar program's 20th anniversary.
``Historians should look back at what might have happened, but didn't
thanks to Nunn-Lugar. Imagine the alternative if loose nukes from the
former Soviet Union had gotten into Bin Laden's hands; into the hands
of other terrorists with odious causes; or rogue states . . .
contemplate all of that and you see the enduring value of Nunn-Lugar.''
This analogy is a perfect snap-shot of why what our Agency and
Center does is important. What would happen if we didn't do all of the
things I have described today? What would happen if we were not funded
enough to accomplish our mission? These are serious questions which
strike at the heart of our national security challenges. We hope that
we will continue to earn the committee's trust and support in meeting
these threats and ensuring our security. Thank you, again, for the
opportunity to be here today. I would be pleased to respond to your
questions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Now Ms. Harrington.
STATEMENT OF MS. ANNE HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Harrington. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer:
Thank you for having me here to discuss the President's fiscal
year 2014 budget request for the DOE's NNSA defense nuclear
nonproliferation account. I am particularly pleased to appear
here today with my colleagues from DOD and DTRA. We share a
strong commitment to the security of the Nation and to finding
ways for our programs to work together to that end.
Earlier this month the President released the 2014 budget
and allocated $2.1 billion for NNSA's nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and emergency response programs. The defense
nuclear nonproliferation appropriation account of the fiscal
year 2014 budget request has been restructured to include
nuclear counterterrorism and incident response programs and the
counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs. By drawing
these NNSA programs together with the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation Programs in a single appropriation, we
strengthen existing synergies and cooperation among these
functions. We already work together very strongly and we see
that this is a good way to grow in that direction in the
future.
Both the President and members of this committee have shown
strong support for NNSA's mission in recent years. With your
help and under the President's 4-year goal to remove dangerous
nuclear materials and secure them, 10 additional countries are
now free of highly enriched uranium and 3 more countries will
be de-inventoried of highly enriched uranium by the end of
2013.
But there is still much to be done. I want to stress how
vital your continued support of NNSA's nonproliferation
programs is to reducing the threat of dangerous nuclear
materials.
In today's budget-constrained environment, we have to
ensure that we are continuously improving how we do business.
NNSA is an organization that is modernizing in every way and we
are holding our people, both contractors and Federal employees,
accountable. We owe it to the American people to continually
review our work and make strategic decisions for the future.
This includes our plutonium disposition strategy. The
United States is firmly committed to disposing excess weapons
plutonium, but, given the rising costs associated with the MOX
project, we must step back and take a thoughtful look at the
MOX project and our plutonium disposition options.
I'm sure you have a number of questions. I look forward to
the opportunity to talking with you today. I want to thank you
for acknowledging the value of our work and for your support in
previous years that has helped us accomplish many things that
have made the American people safer.
I look forward to working with you to implement the
President's budget. I am ready for any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Anne Harrington
introduction
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for having me here to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2014 budget request for the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation account. The Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation appropriation budget request of $2.14 billion provides
the funding necessary to implement the President's nuclear security
priorities. I am particularly pleased to appear today with my
colleagues from the Department of Defense and the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. We share a strong commitment to the security of the
Nation and to finding ways for our programs to work together to that
end.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation account of the
fiscal year 2014 budget request has been restructured to include
Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response Program (NCTIR) and
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Programs (CTCP), both of
which include activities transferred out of the Weapons Activities
appropriation. By drawing these NNSA programs together with the Office
of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs in a single appropriation,
we strengthen existing synergies and cooperation among these functions.
In doing so, we provide priority and emphasis to the NNSA programs that
are responsible for implementing the President's nuclear security
priorities and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which ``outlines
the administration's approach to promoting the President's agenda for
reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without
nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security
interests.'' This change in budget structure will present with greater
clarity the total funding and level of activity undertaken by the NNSA
in this area, which the NPR identifies as the highest priority nuclear
threat facing the Nation. At the same time, this realignment ensures
that the Weapons Activities appropriation is now more focused on the
nuclear weapons stockpile and related activities.
As we look to the future, we see challenges and opportunities
across the globe. Over the past 4 years we have seen increased focus,
determination and expansion of activities with our international
partners. This has been due largely to the momentum created by the
Nuclear Security Summit process to meet shared nuclear security goals.
Russia, for example, has announced its intention to be a full partner
with us, and remains a critical partner in the efforts to secure the
most vulnerable nuclear materials and keep them out of the hands of
proliferators and terrorists. The Russians are not alone, and dozens of
countries have stood alongside President Obama and the United States at
two Nuclear Security Summits to show their commitment to our shared
cause. The fiscal year 2014 Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
budget request provides $1.92 billion to harness the international
momentum created by the Nuclear Security Summit process and address our
most pressing nonproliferation challenges.
One of our most important accomplishments has been to support the
President's call for an international effort to secure vulnerable
nuclear material across the globe in 4 years. The President's 4-year
effort is an unprecedented global undertaking, led by the United
States, with significant contributions from dozens of countries around
the world. The White House, in close coordination with our interagency
and international colleagues, is leading and implementing a
comprehensive three-tiered strategy to secure vulnerable material at
the individual site level, the national level and the global level. I
am pleased to report that NNSA has made important contributions to the
U.S. Government's efforts in each of these strategic areas. Since 2009,
our efforts to secure plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)
around the world have accelerated to make it significantly more
difficult to acquire and traffic the materials to make an improvised
nuclear device. I am proud to say that we are very close to meeting our
goals to remove or dispose of 4,353 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium in foreign countries by the end of 2013, and
equip 229 buildings containing weapons-usable material with state-of-
the-art security upgrades, though some challenges remain.
On April 5, 2013, we completed the removal of all HEU from the
Czech Republic, making it the 10th country to be completely de-
inventoried of HEU in the last 4 years. The NNSA will complete
prioritized removal of vulnerable nuclear material from three more
countries this year.
The fiscal year 2014 budget request provides $424.5 million to the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative. While this is a decrease in funding
compared to years past, this budget reflects the expected successful
conclusion of the 4-year effort.
The 4-year effort allowed us to accelerate some of our most
important work, but it has been accurately described as ``a sprint in
the middle of a marathon.'' After our 4-year sprint, there will be much
left to complete in the areas of the elimination, consolidation and
securing of nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Nuclear and
radiological terrorism continues to be a grave threat, nuclear and
radiological WMD technology and expertise remain at risk, and materials
of concern, such as plutonium, are still being produced. While the
challenges are substantial, they are not insurmountable.
GTRI's fiscal year 2014 budget will address these challenges head-
on by funding the removal of an additional 565 kilograms of HEU and
Plutonium, the shutdown or conversion of an additional 4 HEU research
reactors, and the completion of security upgrades for an additional 105
high-priority nuclear and radiological buildings.
In addition to GTRI's material security and elimination efforts,
the fiscal year 2014 budget provides $369.6 million for another
important element of the President's nuclear security agenda-- the
Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC). The
fiscal year 2014 IMPC budget reflects the completion of a number of
major initiatives in several program areas as well as a shift to a
sustainability phase with the Russian Federation.
The fiscal year 2014 budget funds comprehensive MPC&A upgrades at 8
more buildings in Russia that store and process weapons-usable nuclear
material, converts 0.8 Metric Tons of HEU to LEU and continues
engagement with China, India, and other countries on MPC&A best
practices. The fiscal year 2014 IMPC budget will also provide $140
million to the Second Line of Defense program to implement the
conclusions of the strategic review briefed to the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture (GNDA) interagency working group, including
supporting fixed radiation detection at 25 sites in 8 countries,
focusing more on mobile detection technologies, and on strengthening
the GNDA.
In addition to physical security and material detection, the fiscal
year 2014 budget provides $141.7 million to the Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS). The decrease from
the fiscal year 2013 budget reflects a reduction in HEU transparency
activities as the U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement nears completion.
The fiscal year 2014 request funds NIS efforts to safeguard nuclear
material and facilities, control illicit trafficking of nuclear WMD-
related technology and expertise, verify compliance with international
arms control and nonproliferation treaties, and develop and implement
policy to reduce nuclear dangers.
A key element of our nuclear security and nonproliferation strategy
is the development of capabilities to monitor nuclear treaties, weapons
development activities, and detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2014
budget provides $389 million to the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation Research and Development to address these core goals
including producing nuclear detection satellite payloads.
We will continue to pursue a multi-layered approach to protect and
account for material at its source; remove, down-blend or eliminate
material when possible, detect, deter, and reduce the risk of
additional states acquiring nuclear weapons; and support the
development of new technologies to detect nuclear trafficking and
proliferation, as well as verify arms control treaties.
We owe it to the American people to continually reevaluate our work
and make strategic decisions for the future. The fiscal year 2014
budget request takes a thoughtful look at the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Fabrication Facility project and our plutonium disposition options. The
United States remains committed to disposing of excess plutonium, to
working in partnership with the Russian Federation in our parallel
plutonium disposition efforts under the Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement, and to engaging with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the disposition. The U.S. plan to
dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by irradiating it as MOX
fuel has proven more costly to construct and operate than anticipated.
Considering these unanticipated cost increases and the current budget
environment, the administration has begun assessing alternative
plutonium disposition strategies and identifying options for fiscal
year 2014 and the out-years. Naturally, this assessment of technologies
will also include the Mixed Oxide approach. During the assessment
period, the Department will slow down the MOX project and will actively
engage key program partners and stakeholders as the assessment of
alternative plutonium disposition strategies is developed. We believe
the plutonium disposition assessment will ensure that we are able to
follow-through on our mission in the decades to come.
nuclear counterterrorism incident response
This year, the request for NCTIR will support a strategy focused on
reducing nuclear dangers through integration of its subprograms:
Emergency Management, Emergency Response, Forensics and International
activities supported by training and operations.
In fiscal year 2014, the program will invest in unattended sensing
capabilities for the Nuclear Emergency Support Team, maintain training
of the Consequence Management Home Team, sustain stabilization cities,
complete improvements to U12P-tunnel, address and sustain emergency
management requirements, maintain the Emergency Communications Network,
and continue supporting international partners. The NCTIR program will
continue to maintain essential components of the Nation's capability to
respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear incidents
domestically and internationally, and continue to conduct programs to
train and equip response organizations on the technical aspects of
nuclear counterterrorism.
counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs
The aforementioned budget realignment includes the CTCP program
office, which we stood up last year. The funding request for CTCP
includes the transfer of the discontinued National Security
Applications funding into a consolidated and substantially revised
budget line to support the highest priority counterterrorism and
counterproliferation technical work, including the study of Improvised
Nuclear Devices and other non-stockpile nuclear device threats. This
increased funding will support unique nuclear device-related technical
contributions derived from NNSA's core nuclear science and technology
expertise. This activity supports interagency policy execution, DOD and
Intelligence Community customers, and DOE's own emergency response
operations.
conclusion
Our continued focus on nonproliferation, nuclear security, and
nuclear counterterrorism efforts is vital. The threat of nuclear
terrorism and WMD proliferation remains. Detonation of a nuclear device
anywhere in the world could lead to significant loss of life, and
extraordinary economic, political, and psychological consequences. In
these challenging budget times, we must not lose site of the critical
role played by these programs and the protections they provide by
reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and WMD proliferation.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I do expect some other Senators to come in, so right now we
will take about 6-minute questions for the Senators.
Secretary Creedon, I wanted to talk about the CTR umbrella
agreement. I know that the United States is negotiating a new
umbrella agreement with Russia on the continuing CTR activities
there. Can you please explain the high-level goals and
objectives you hope to achieve in a new agreement?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator. When we look back over the
20 years of success of the CTR program, it is really striking
how much we have accomplished with the Russian Government. When
you look at the scorecard, which has been the longstanding
metric for a lot of the accomplishments, this program has not
only substantially reduced the number of warheads and delivery
systems associated with the former Soviet Union, but it also
was instrumental in removing entire countries from being
weapons states and helping them to completely denuclearize.
This relationship has been able to survive all of the ups
and downs of the broader U.S.-Russia relationship over the
course of the last 20 years. So at the very highest levels, it
is important that we maintain the ability to work with Russia
on these topics of major concern to both countries.
How we actually will do that going forward in the future is
still not resolved, as the umbrella negotiations are going on
pretty much even as we speak today in Geneva. But it's
maintaining that ability to work together. We're going to
change, obviously, how we work. Many of the programs at DOD
were on a natural glide path for completion over the course of
the next several years. We want to make sure that as we
transition out of these programs that Russia is going to be
able to sustain them, that they have the budget-making and
funding capability to sustain these programs. But we want to
also figure out ways that as we look for changes in this
relationship that we can work together on certain things. So
maybe there are opportunities in the future where we can take
our combined knowledge and share it with other countries. It's
that sort of a strategic relationship that we hope in the
future we'll be able to sustain.
I think practically a lot of the work in Russia is really
coming to completion, the actual work is probably less
important at this point, although I don't want ever to
underplay or undersell it. But it's that strategic relationship
that's important in the future.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
In 2012 you made two determinations with respect to using
CTR funding in the Middle East and Syria. Can you explain again
what was accomplished in this past year and your long-term
objectives for these activities?
Ms. Creedon. As is very obvious, this is a region of
significant turmoil, not the least of which is in the last 18
months or so with Syria. So one of the main things that we've
done with this new authority is to work with the Jordanians in
developing a substantial border program, as I mentioned in my
statement, that will provide border security capability to the
Jordanians for over 250 kilometers of the shared border with
Syria, to help prevent the leakage or the proliferation,
primarily of chemical weapons, but also of technology. One of
the fears is that something along the line may be stolen or
someone may try to get it out of the country.
We're also working with several of the other border
countries, and we've also done a fair amount of work with the
Jordanian military, helping them to also be able to respond in
some sort of a chemical environment.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Harrington, in the fiscal year 2014 budget it proposes
to take, as I said earlier, a strategy pause in the MOX fuel
program after the large cost growth in the overall effort. Can
you explain why DOE has taken this strategic pause?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Yes, we are
developing a plan to assess the options for moving forward on
plutonium disposition, emphasizing the fact that we remain at
the highest levels in the administration fully committed to
fulfilling our commitments under the plutonium management
disposition agreement and to involving the International Atomic
Energy Agency in verifying the disposition of those materials.
So those two principles remain steadfast. But in the face
of rising costs and schedule slips and the prospect of
rebaselined projected costs near $8 billion, we thought it was
prudent and responsible to the taxpayers whose funds actually
support this program to take a step back to ensure that we are
carrying out this commitment in the smartest possible way.
Senator Hagan. I'm sure we'll have more questions. My time
has run out. I will go to Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I'd like to continue with the CTR, if I may. Secretary
Creedon or Director Myers, there has been a large reduction in
the warheads within the former Soviet Union and I believe
that's a very great accomplishment. In fact, I believe that the
work that all of you do is vital and very important. I want to
thank you for the service that you provide to our country and
to the citizens of our country in this very important work.
When you're looking at moving on--you said work is nearing
completion. How do you judge when work is complete? What are
some of the benchmarks that you use?
Ms. Creedon. I'll take two of those, just for example, and
then ask Ken to do some additional ones. One of the ones that
my office has been particularly focused on is understanding
when we've completed or are nearing completion of the
elimination of the strategic offensive delivery systems. So
these would be, for instance, the intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM), the various ICBMs that were from the Soviet
era. We are for the most part completed. We've almost completed
all of that work. So that is an example of we've gotten rid of
all the legacy systems, we're moving out, we've done all that
work, and that's almost finished.
The other one of these big examples is also the chemical
weapons destruction work. When we started off, the United
States and Russia had the largest chemical weapons stockpiles.
In the work, primarily at Shucha, the Russians have built one
facility and the United States built another facility. This
facility is working through the bulk of the Russian stockpile.
There are several other facilities, but again this is one where
they are about, I want to say, 70 percent complete of the
stockpile that's out there. So this is another example of
significant success and significant progress.
Senator Fischer. How do you prioritize in which area you
begin? Do you prioritize the nuclear over the chemical or the
biological? How do you do that?
Ms. Creedon. Are you speaking like historically within
Russia or looking forward?
Senator Fischer. Well, both.
Ms. Creedon. Both.
Senator Fischer. Let's look at both.
Ms. Creedon. Historically we really focused initially on
the nuclear side because that was the concern that Senator Nunn
and Senator Lugar had when they kicked off these programs. As
that relationship was built, we were able to venture into both
the biological and the chemical weapons side as well. So it was
a little bit of discovery and then building cooperation and
more discovery and then more opportunities presented
themselves.
As we look to the future, we want to maintain this threat
focus. So we look out and see what are the threats. So it could
be a specific threat from a specific country in a specific
material, or it could be one that we just think is maybe
underaddressed, and the biological threat fits in that one at
the moment.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Myers. Senator, let me add a couple of points. First,
one of the other specific areas that we cooperate with the
Russians on is on nuclear warhead security, helping them
transport nuclear warheads for dismantlement and ensuring that
their storage facilities are safe and secure. One of the ways
that that was measured was in the Bratislava agreement which
set up the cooperation. We were basically able to establish
metrics and we were able to really judge how far along in that
process we are.
Secretary Creedon also mentioned our work on chemical
demilitarization. In addition to Shucha, we provide some
technical support to Kisner and other locations and facilities.
Than obviously we watch how quickly and how they move forward
through the reports to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons as to progress they make moving forward.
The third category I would point out is there has also been
efforts when the United States and Russia have worked together
in third countries. That's also been a very important building
block for the strategic relationship, specifically in places
like Kazakhstan and elsewhere. Obviously, in those types of
situations we're able to measure our effectiveness together and
with equal responsibilities, either in-kind contributions or in
monetary contributions.
I would also just echo what Secretary Creedon mentioned. As
we move forward with these efforts in new countries, we are
focused primarily on the threat, but we're also coordinating
very closely with the combatant commands and working closely
with them in terms of opportunities, in terms of building
relationships, and the like. Obviously, the combatant commands
also have an opportunity to make recommendations or make
requests, and we'll work with them as we expand the program to
new areas and new regions.
Senator Fischer. Countries have to invite the United States
in to do this work, correct? That's been the case with Russia,
and you say that there has been a good working relationship and
it's continued as you move on to other nations, correct?
Mr. Myers. Just to be clear, Senator, yes, the relationship
with Russia is very professional. The relationship where we
work together in third countries has been very professional.
But they have not been partners in all of the countries we work
in.
Senator Fischer. Do you see this partnership being
available in countries such as Syria?
Mr. Myers. It's unclear. We'll have to look forward to
continuing the conversations and discussions and see what the
opportunities provide us in the future.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I'll try to do
this in 6 minutes.
Ms. Harrington, we'll have a discussion here in a moment,
but I want to let the chairman and the ranking member know
about my concern about the MOX program. Back in the 1990s,
under the Clinton administration, South Carolina agreed to
accept 34 metric tons of plutonium, weapons-grade plutonium, in
excess of our defense needs. There was an agreement negotiated
between the Clinton administration and the Russian Government
where we would take 34 metric tons of plutonium in excess of
our defense needs, weapons material, and the Russians would
take 34 metric tons and we would dispose of it.
We've been dealing with this issue for over a decade now,
well over a decade, and the Obama administration comes along
and they actually begin to build the MOX facility. I'm sure
you're aware of it because of Duke Power, but in case people
are not, there's a technology that's been tested and it works,
where you can take weapons-grade plutonium, blend it down, and
make commercial-grade fuel out of it. So, you're taking a sword
and making it into a plowshare. The MOX facility at Savannah
River Site is somewhere toward halfway being completed.
Last year, the statute that Senator Thurmond wrote when he
was in the Senate and I was in the House, because there was so
much pushback in South Carolina about accepting this plutonium,
the fear was we're going to hold this stuff and have no way
forward--well, guess what, Yucca Mountain shut down. So MOX
gives you a way forward. It becomes commercial-grade fuel.
But the statute we wrote back in the early part of this
century, I believe 2000, required a $100 million fine to DOE if
they didn't stay on track. Last year they were off track in
terms of the timetable, but I sat down with the Obama
administration and said: ``Listen, we don't want the $100
million; we want the MOX facility.'' So we extended the time
period for 2 years.
I can assure you, I would not have done that if I had known
this year in the President's budget they would be suspending
the MOX program for a study. We have studied this thing to
death. It is now time to get on and getting it built.
Ms. Harrington, we do have an agreement with the Russians
regarding the 34 metric tons, is that correct?
Ms. Harrington. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Graham. In 2010 the agreement was amended to say
that the disposition path would be MOX, is that correct?
Ms. Harrington. That is correct.
Senator Graham. We rejected vitrification because if you're
going to vitrify all of this stuff we're not going to store it
at Savannah River Site. We're not a storage site.
So if we do something other than MOX, how can we meet our
obligations under the treaty?
Ms. Harrington. First, I'd like to clarify that in this
assessment pause that we have included in the budget, MOX
remains clearly on the table. It is not that we are
disregarding MOX as a viable option.
Senator Graham. Ms. Harrington, I don't mean to be rude.
You're a very smart lady. It's not on the table. It's the
pathway forward. It's not subject to debate. I wouldn't have
done anything I did last year if I thought there was one chance
in a million that we'd be debating a year later whether or not
MOX is the way to go. I don't want the $100 million. I want to
get this stuff off the table in America and particularly in
Russia, given the times in which we live in.
So what I would suggest to you is that the $2 billion
overrun concerns me, too. I met with the Deputy Secretary of
Energy, and here's what I'm willing to do. I'm willing to sit
down with DOE and the contractor to try to get the cost down
below $8 billion.
Now, at Savannah River Site the pit disassembly facility
was going to be a third separate building. This is where you
take the pit out of the warhead and that's what's blended down
into MOX fuel. It's the plutonium bullet. We were able to avoid
building that facility and save $2 billion right there.
Over the past decade, Savannah River Site has been very
forward-leaning when it comes to saving money in a responsible
manner. We have 54 tanks full of Cold War residual material,
high-level toxic waste, and we agreed back in 2002, I believe
it was, to leave a portion of the waste in the bottom of the
tank, in the heel of the tank, rather than scraping it all out,
and that saved $16 billion. We thought we could close the tanks
up with some high-level waste that would be treated, and that
saved $16 billion.
So, Ms. Harrington, we in South Carolina and Georgia have
tried to be good stewards of taxpayers' money, and I'm just
here to tell you that I will work with the administration--I
talked with Denis McDonough about this last night--to get the
cost down. But I will not entertain for 1 minute a disposition
plan other than MOX. We're halfway through. There is no other
way to do it. We have an agreement with the Russians and now is
not the time to break that agreement, given the world in which
we live in. When it comes to studying another way to do it,
count me out.
Have a good day.
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, sir.
Senator Hagan. All right.
Mr. Myers, can you please give us an unclassified summary
now of the role of the SCC WMD to support planning for any
contingencies with the chemical weapons in Syria?
Mr. Myers. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Yes. The SCC, DTRA,
and the SJFHQ-E, working together as an integrated team, are
working on planning across DOD. We are playing a key role in
multiple planning initiatives. We are reaching out across DOD
to identify pockets of chemical weapons expertise,
capabilities, and equipment.
We have developed internally an entity called the Regional
Contingency Team to bring the three organizations together in
an effective and efficient manner, and together we are
synchronizing planning efforts across the combatant commands,
identifying and applying specialized WMD knowledge and
expertise to the challenges at hand. We're looking to mitigate
the gaps that might currently exist.
How that planning might be applied is obviously a decision
for our leadership and for the President. But that's the best
unclassified answer I can give you. I'm happy to go into more
detail in closed session.
Senator Hagan. Great.
Secretary Creedon, with the CTR program moving to countries
outside Russia and the former Soviet Union, we understand you
have developed a strategic approach or guidance for
prioritizing what activities the CTR program will undertake.
Please explain this strategic approach and what metrics you
will use to assess the success of future programs?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator. The new CTR strategic
guidance has just been issued, and I should also mention we're
also working on a broader guidance document that would be more
largely for WMD. The combination of these two should help DOD
focus on the threats as they emerge to prevent the acquisition,
to prevent the transition of technologies, and if all that
fails, to be able to interdict. It's some of what I mentioned
in my opening statement.
But mostly we want to be able to position DOD to be
responsive to all of the various national security objectives
and threats. We want to make sure that we've integrated all of
the tools within WMD to bring to this program. We want to make
sure that as we go forward that we are good stewards of the
taxpayers' money, so that DOD really focuses on what DOD does
best and works in collaboration with our international and
interagency partners to do things that they can do. The
transportation determination in our partnership with DOE is an
example of one of those things.
The other thing that we are going to continue to focus to
the extent that we are able to do so in a cooperative
environment is dismantle and destroy where we can. We want to
make sure that what's out there is also accounted for and
secure. Then we want to also expand our capabilities to prevent
and detect. So understanding when something is missing,
detection of when it's in transit, figuring out how to
interdict it.
All of these are the construct in which we'll work with the
CTR program going forward.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Myers, is this your chart?
Mr. Myers. Yes.
[The chart referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Hagan. On the second page, can you just go over
this chart with me? I love charts, by the way.
Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, you have me at a disadvantage.
I don't have that chart.
Senator Hagan. Oh, you don't have the chart.
Mr. Myers. But I probably have it memorized, if you give me
a hint.
Senator Hagan. Why don't we give you a copy of it.
Mr. Myers. That would be great. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Since you have the chart too, right?
[Pause.]
Then what I really want to ask you--if you can give him the
second one, too.
The way I read this, you're showing the reductions as of
2013, the target in 2017, and the percent achieved.
Mr. Myers. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagan. Then did you get the next one, too?
Mr. Myers. Yes, Senator, I did.
Senator Hagan. The one, ``Nonproliferation,
Counterproliferation, and Consequence Management''?
Mr. Myers. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagan. That's the one I need, where you talk about
best practices and best of breed or behavioral hallmarks.
Explain best of breed to me?
Mr. Myers. Best of breed--DTRA does not have a laboratory.
We do not have a specific relationship with any one entity,
which leaves us with the flexibility to search high and wide
for the best technology and the best performers to confront
specific challenges, whether that be in the nuclear, chemical,
or biological arena, whether that be in the nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, or consequence management.
So when we say best in breed, we have the opportunity to
reach across the entire U.S. Government, academia, as well as
the private sector here in the United States. We utilize that
flexibility to the maximum extent possible, because many of the
challenges that we're dealing with are obviously very difficult
and very complicated. Very often we have to build partnerships,
build partnerships between different entities in different
sectors of our government and in the private sector.
We do that, and the nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and consequence management is really the scope, the breadth,
and depth of our mission area.
Senator Hagan. Consequence management is defined from your
perspective as? Explain that section?
Mr. Myers. Nonproliferation, let me start there, I would
argue that that is when we're preventing the proliferation of
weapons, not allowing them to leak or to move forward.
Counterproliferation I would suggest is defeating those weapons
or materials should they proliferate from their source.
Consequence management obviously is the worst case scenario, in
which we are responding to a WMD event or accident or incident.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. If I could ask all of you this question.
The Government Accountability Office has reviewed a number of
your programs and often recommended a comprehensive review of
structure and scope to better target initiatives and prevent
overlap. Can you describe what measures are in place to prevent
that duplication across the proliferation prevention programs?
Mr. Myers, let's begin with you.
Mr. Myers. Senator, I would tell you that we work very hard
with our partners at NNSA and at the Department of State (DOS)
to ensure that we do not have overlap and duplication. In fact,
the three of us meet on a regular basis. The employees of the
organizations meet almost on a daily basis and communicate on
an hourly basis to ensure that we do not duplicate, to ensure
that we do not overlap.
The recommendations that have been made in the past in
terms of implementation, especially at the DTRA, have been
adopted and we have moved forward with them.
Senator Fischer. Could you give me an example of one?
Mr. Myers. Yes, I'll give you a good example. In one case
we had cost overruns in some of the cooperative projects that
we were doing in Russia, and they made a number of different
recommendations in terms of meeting on a regular, semi-annual
basis to ensure that both the United States and the Russian
side remained on the very same page, with the same goals, the
same metrics in mind to make sure. It was a very commonsensical
recommendation that we concurred with and have been
implementing ever since, and it has proven very effective in
terms of identifying potential differences of opinion long
before they become an issue for programmatic purposes.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, do you have anything to add to that?
Ms. Creedon. Just very briefly. Not only do we all meet
with a pretty high degree of frequency, but we also bring in
our DOS partner as well, so that we understand what the
overarching U.S. Government approach is.
The other thing is, as you might imagine, this is a very
active White House in this field as well. So we have a lot of
meetings with the White House, with the various interagency
teams, to tackle various problems so that we make sure that
we're all coordinated in our various approaches. Then amongst
the DOD and DOE, we also pretty carefully decide who's going to
do what and who's going to focus on something. So whereas DOE
focuses on nuclear materials, DOD will focus on the delivery
systems. DOD focuses on biological and chemical, DOE doesn't do
that.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned you work with the DOS. Do
you also work with your combatant commands?
Ms. Creedon. We work very closely with our combatant
commands, particularly on the planning side, and that was what
Mr. Myers was talking about. DTRA provides a lot of the
technical support to the combatant commands to do the planning
and the policy role is to work with the combatant commands as
they develop those plans. So there's a good relationship. We
get the commands coming and going. DTRA helps them build the
plans and we help review the plans.
Senator Fischer. If you look at a timeline, I would guess
that it's the combatant commands that possibly come up with a
nation that you should be looking at partnering with? Or how
does that work? Who finds this?
Mr. Myers. Senator, much of what we work on is focused on
where the threat is in terms of denying that, those threats
from coming to fruition. But we work hand-in-glove with the
combatant commands. DTRA and the SCC have a physical presence
in each of the commands to facilitate communication and the
discussion back and forth.
So I would suggest to you that as we do the planning, as we
provide the subject matter expertise to the combatant commands
and share with them where we believe the threats are, why we
believe we should move in one direction or another, it really
does become a team effort, that we then move forward and
obviously bring to Congress for authorization and
appropriation.
Senator Fischer. Ms. Harrington?
Ms. Harrington. Both Mr. Myers and Ms. Creedon have talked
about this coordination mechanism. In fact, we meet next week.
It is called the bridge meeting because it bridges among us. It
is a standing group. It meets typically on a quarterly basis.
We have some standing working groups of our staffs underneath
it, other ad hoc groups. Sometimes they look at exactly the
question you asked, which is, which countries are ripe for
engagement, where must we think creatively about how to engage.
So we task those sorts of things to our staffs. Next week
we will look specifically at what the impacts of the 2014
budget might have on our ability to collaborate and cooperate
and really have good synergy.
Another issue that's already come up today is the
transportation process that DOD is going through. One of the
reasons we launched that is because we discovered and were able
to discuss in this mechanism the fact that we ended up on a
removal from a country using the U.S. Transportation Command
assets, but not having a way to actually coordinate that
directly with the CTR program because the mechanism wasn't in
place.
So we figured out that it actually costs the U.S.
Government double, because it wasn't in place, what it would
have cost had it been in place. So we just decided, okay, let's
get this finished, let's set this up so that in the future we
have the flexibility and the cost effectiveness to be able to
do this in the most efficient way.
So I think those are just a couple more examples of why
this interaction among us, including among our research and
development groups and at other levels, is so valuable, not
only in terms of program implementation, but in terms of budget
efficiency.
Senator Fischer. On your core groups that meet, does that
stay the same group all the time or does it vary depending on
what nation the United States may be in at the time?
Mr. Myers. We obviously will augment the working groups
with regional expertise or specific subject matter expertise if
it's needed.
Senator Fischer. Where does the expertise come from?
Mr. Myers. A little bit from all of us, quite honest with
you. Obviously, Secretary Creedon's colleagues in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense-Policy, our colleagues at NNSA, as
well as from the DOS, their country desks, their regional
bureaus, and obviously the technical support comes from all
three of us as well, and sometimes from outside our three
organizations and the DOS.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Ms. Creedon. Just to add there, not only from Policy; we
pull in all of our regional offices, and we also then can tap
into the Joint Staff as well and so bring in their expertise.
Ms. Harrington. We also have staffs at a limited number of
embassies overseas in critical countries. So both DOE and DOD
work with DOS and work through the embassies to also engage
that network in our work.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. I have one more question I wanted to ask in
the open forum and certainly Senator Fischer can, too. I wanted
to ask Ms. Harrington, last year I asked a similar question and
I wanted to follow up on it this year. It pertains to the
production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 using low
enriched uranium and converting Russian reactors that produce
it from highly enriched to low enriched uranium. What is the
status of that work?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, Senator. The minimization of the
use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes is one of
our high target programs, because that is where a good deal of
the highly enriched uranium lies across the world.
In Russia we are working on two tracks. One is to convert
their research reactors in general to low enriched uranium. We
have completed six studies in that area. Two reactors are ready
to go forward. The Russians have made a public statement that
they intend to complete the first conversion by the time of the
2014 nuclear security summit. So that's a good step in the
right direction. The second reactor should follow soon after
that, and hopefully more after. The Russians have made
significant public statements to the effect that they will
underwrite a significant portion of the cost of those
conversions and shutdowns.
On the moly-99 conversion, we also are working with them on
that, but in a somewhat different venue. The Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA), which is headquartered in Paris, has a committee
that looks specifically at the isotope production worldwide.
Through that committee, we are developing a global strategy for
full-cost recovery production of low-enriched uranium-based
moly-99.
As you may know, we've already made significant progress
with our European partners moving in that direction. South
Africa really was the first major step in that direction.
Russia is moving in that direction and we will continue to push
on them both bilaterally and through the NEA. That is an
important goal for us.
We have worked within the administration, I think, to do
some fairly creative things that we're holding out as models to
other countries. For example, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, Medicare, government programs that deliver medical
services and use this isotope in those medical services can
give preference to low-enriched uranium-based moly-99. This can
do a lot in terms of encouraging the marketplace to move in
that direction.
So those are things that indeed are very helpful. We also
are working with national regulatory agencies like our Federal
Food and Drug Administration to license the low-enriched
uranium-produced moly-99 so it can be used in more countries.
But that's a long answer and it's not totally specific to
Russia, but it's a complicated, more global issue because
ensuring a consistent supply of this is absolutely critical.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Other questions?
Senator Fischer. Madam Chair, I yield back my time. Thank
you.
Senator Hagan. What I'd like to do now is we will adjourn
this open session and we will go over to the Capitol to the
closed session. Thank you. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
new 4-year nuclear security initiative
1. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, in April 2009 President Obama
announced a new international initiative to secure all vulnerable
nuclear material worldwide within 4 years. However, the administration
appears to have moved the goal posts for the initiative, and adjusted
its scope to focus on only securing the most vulnerable nuclear
materials. What are the criteria for determining the most vulnerable
materials, and can they specify how the original scope of work has been
changed and what countries and facilities are no longer encompassed by
the 4-year initiative?
Ms. Harrington. The National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) goal under the 4-year effort is to remove or dispose of a
cumulative total of 4,353 kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material
(highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium) by December 31, 2013, and
this goal has not changed. The criteria that determines the highest
priority work for securing vulnerable nuclear material includes the
type of material (HEU, Pu, different radiological sources, et cetera),
the form of the material (metal vs. alloys vs. oxides, et cetera), the
quantity of the material, and a number of other factors that can be
expanded upon in a classified briefing.
As of May 2013, NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
has removed and/or confirmed the disposition of 3,641 kilograms of HEU
and plutonium. GTRI must remove or confirm the disposition of another
712 kilograms of HEU and/or plutonium by the end of 2013 to meet this
goal and we are currently on track to achieve this metric. In addition,
over the past 4 years GTRI has removed all HEU and plutonium from 10
countries for a cumulative total of 23 countries deinventoried of these
dangerous materials.
From the perspective of security upgrades to buildings containing
weapons usable nuclear material, that aspect of the 4-year plan will be
complete once 229 buildings are upgraded. All of the original 229
buildings identified are still part of the plan for upgrades. To date,
we have completed security upgrades at 218 of the 229 buildings. The
remaining 11 buildings are located at a single large nuclear site in
Russia and we are working with our Russian counterparts to complete
those upgrades on schedule.
Four years of accelerated effort helped NNSA make a significant
contribution to global security, but it is accurately described as ``a
sprint in the middle of a marathon.'' Significant stockpiles of HEU
still exist in too many places, and global inventories of plutonium are
steadily rising. NNSA will continue to work with international partners
to eliminate additional stocks of HEU and plutonium after the
completion of the 4-year effort.
2. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported in December 2010 that a comprehensive strategy
for the initiative did not exist and it raised many questions on the
scope, timeframe, costs, and challenges associated with the initiative.
The GAO recommended that the administration develop a comprehensive
plan for implementing the initiative identifying the scope of
facilities, U.S. programs responsible for addressing each location, and
estimated timeframes and costs to address each site. To your knowledge,
has the administration made any effort to develop such a comprehensive
plan, and why not, if it hasn't?
Ms. Harrington. Yes, the administration has developed a
comprehensive classified U.S. Government strategy to lock down nuclear
materials that identifies and prioritizes facilities and other nuclear
security goals and allocates U.S. programs for addressing facilities,
national capabilities, and the global nuclear security architecture. We
routinely participate in interagency meetings led by the National
Security Staff to discuss the status of NNSA's efforts that support the
comprehensive strategy and ensure we remain coordinated on implementing
a comprehensive plan. If you require additional information, NNSA will
brief appropriately cleared staff in a classified setting.
3. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, many of the programs involved in
working with other countries to secure nuclear materials have been in
place and working internationally for many years, including the NNSA's
nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) program
and the GTRI. How much more work do these programs have to do, what are
their key priorities, and how much longer do they need to achieve their
goals?
Ms. Harrington. The GTRI program has identified 5,350 kilograms of
HEU and plutonium that needs to be removed or dispositioned by the end
of 2019, which leaves about 1,000 kilograms to remove after the 4-year
plan ends in December 2013. GTRI is also focused on the conversion of
research reactors and isotope production facilities from HEU to low
enriched uranium (LEU). To date, GTRI has successfully converted or
verified the shutdown of 88 of the 200 HEU fuel research reactors and
isotope production facilities.
Additionally, GTRI estimates that there are more than 13,000
civilian buildings (70,000 devices) worldwide in over 100 countries
that maintain high activity radiological sources of concern, with 8,500
in the United States and in other-than-high-income countries. GTRI and
the interagency have identified the five most prevalent isotopes of
concern as Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Americium-241, Iridium-192, and
Strontium-90. While the quantity of material sufficient to create a
significant radiological dispersal device'' varies by isotope, GTRI has
categorized the most high-risk quantities into two levels: Category 1
thresholds generally have a radioactive activity of 1,000 curies and
greater (such as a cesium-chloride capsule the size of a pencil), and
Category 2 thresholds as 10-1,000 curies (such as a capsule of iridium
the size of a pencil eraser). To date, GTRI has upgraded the security
at 1,529 civilian buildings housing radiological sources (1,013
internationally and 516 domestically). Based on current projections,
GTRI anticipates a protection program completion date of 2044, with
GTRI planning on completing the highest priority sites as soon as
possible.
The MPC&A program has completed a significant amount of work to
secure vulnerable nuclear material. However, we continue to seek
opportunities to partner with our Russian counterparts on further
improvements to security systems and practices in that country due to
Russia's very large material stockpiles. Nuclear security is not a
static concept; rather it requires continual analysis and testing of
system performance against a range of evolving threats. This has been a
significant theme in our cooperation with Russia, and we have been able
to work with counterpart organizations over the years to continue to
improve security at these sites by addressing additional gaps that have
been identified. For example, in recent years we have redoubled our
efforts to ensure the security upgrades we support are effective in
mitigating insider threats and have made important improvements in that
area. Nevertheless, important work remains to be done such as improving
personnel reliability programs and continuing to enhance nuclear
security culture. Another example is the material consolidation efforts
that are underway at two locations in Russia under this cooperation,
which will significantly reduce the security requirements and the long-
term cost of meeting those requirements at these two sites. There may
be additional opportunities to engage in this kind of effort.
Additionally, there are several HEU-fueled research reactors, more than
70 radioisotope thermoelectric generators, and hundreds of civilian
buildings with high-activity radiological sources in Russia that
require conversion, recovery, and/or physical protection upgrades.
Russia has continued to fund an increasing share of costs for new
upgrades and sustainability measures related to nuclear security, but
it is the assessment of NNSA that the U.S. needs to remain actively
engaged in Russia. An ongoing nuclear security partnership with Russia
will continue to foster broad improvements in nuclear security best
practices there and will facilitate faster and more effective solutions
to meeting the security challenges that both countries consider
critically important.
nuclear security summits
4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Ms. Harrington, the
administration has initiated and supported a biennial Nuclear Security
Summit process that has brought together dozens of world leaders to
build consensus on practical steps that can be taken to improve nuclear
security worldwide. The next Summit is scheduled for 2014. What goals
and expectations do you have for the 2014 Summit?
Ms. Creedon. The broad goals of the Nuclear Security Summit process
are for participating countries and international organizations to come
to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to
agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material, and to prevent
nuclear smuggling and terrorism. Those overarching objectives have not
changed. President Obama has recently committed to attending the 2014
Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, and the Department of Defense (DOD)
will continue to support the Nuclear Security Summit process actively.
Ms. Harrington. The White House is leading the U.S. Government
efforts for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and would be best able to
provide details. For its part, NNSA actively participates in this U.S.
interagency summit process, and what we do know is that U.S. priorities
going into 2014 fall into three broad areas:
(1) strengthening the global nuclear security architecture
(treaties, institutions (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)), informal collectives, and national regulations that govern
nuclear security behavior);
(2) maintaining a high rate of execution on the national
commitments from the 2010/12 Summits and identifying further tangible
security outcomes (i.e., HEU removals); and
(3) expanding on a relatively new concept of international
assurances (things done by a state or others to provide confidence in
the effectiveness of nuclear security). Our nonproliferation programs
continue to work towards implementing all of the commitments made
during the two previous Nuclear Security Summits, and NNSA will be
prepared to support the administration's global nuclear security agenda
at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, and beyond.
5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Ms. Harrington, it is
unclear whether the administration supports continuing this summit
process beyond 2014, which has raised questions about how the global
nuclear security agenda can grow and maintain a high profile without
U.S. leadership. What are your views on the security summit process and
whether it should be sustained beyond 2014?
Ms. Creedon. The Nuclear Security Summit process has provided
participating countries and international organizations much-needed
impetus and an important forum for discussing and thinking critically
about how to improve nuclear security. One of the goals of the Nuclear
Security Summit process is to expand, enhance, empower, and energize
the existing institutions and structures aimed at advancing nuclear
security. The 2012 Seoul Communique identified the central role of the
IAEA in this field; the United Nations and INTERPOL have their own
areas of responsibility and competence as regards nuclear security.
Therefore, regardless of whether the Summit participants decide to
sustain the Summit process beyond 2014, we should work to ensure that
these institutions have the human and financial resources, technology,
and authorities they need to fulfill their respective mandates and
execute their different but related missions--thereby reaching new
levels of effectiveness in nuclear security.
Ms. Harrington. The Nuclear Security Summit process has provided a
critical political boost and brought the highest level of attention to
improving nuclear and radiological security around the world. The
Summits have invigorated important multilateral platforms and
accelerated projects in dozens of countries to secure, remove, detect,
and intercept material. In his speech in Berlin in June, the President
has announced that the United States will host a fourth Nuclear
Security Summit in 2016. We welcome this announcement and will work
closely with the administration to ensure its success.
foreign costsharing
6. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, in December 2011, GAO reported
that NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs have made efforts to
obtain greater costsharing with foreign countries where these programs
are implemented, but GAO noted difficulties NNSA faces in collecting
such information and that NNSA is not systematically tracking such data
when it is available. Has NNSA been able to make any progress in
developing better costsharing information from recipient countries, and
has it developed a system for tracking and maintaining costsharing data
across all nonproliferation programs?
Ms. Harrington. NNSA's nonproliferation programs consistently work
with foreign partners to promote costsharing as a programmatic best
practice and to encourage partner countries to build nuclear security
capacity and financially support as much of the global nonproliferation
effort as possible. Specifically, we have developed several new
costsharing efforts and maintain a number of ongoing successful
costsharing partnerships, which include:
Recoveries of Russian radioisotope thermoelectric
generators (RTG).
Nuclear forensics development with the IAEA, European
Union, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT), and the Association of South East Asian Nations
Regional Forum members.
Cooperative seismic monitoring efforts with Thailand
and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Preparatory Commission.
Joint export control training with European, Russian,
and Kazakhstani outreach partners.
International export control, nuclear safeguards, and
nuclear security outreach with approximately 25 bilateral
partners.
Costsharing with Russia for various MPC&A upgrades
projects and increasing share of maintenance and sustainability
support.
Russian Ministry of Defense funding for all
maintenance, sustainability, and retrofit costs for all U.S.
funded security upgrades for warhead sites.
Equal costsharing for radiation detection systems
deployed in Russia with maintenance and sustainability costs
increasingly taken over by the Russian Federation.
Costsharing with China for the expansion of radiation
detection at borders, ports, and airports and the Nuclear
Security Center of Excellence.
Costsharing with the Republic of Korea and Japan for
their Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence and nuclear
security course development and regional workshops.
While this program information helps inform planning and country
engagement, a system for tracking and maintaining costsharing data
across all nonproliferation programs is neither practical nor cost-
effective due to the inability to audit another country's accounting
records, and is complicated by uncertainties associated with variations
in foreign labor rates, labor hours, material costs, and overhead
rates. In addition, there may be situations where estimates of
costsharing can be made only on the basis of cost-avoidance if NNSA had
to bear the full cost of the project. Upon initiating engagement, NNSA
carefully considers the financial capacity of foreign partners and
encourages them to have a vested interest in the outcome of assistance
or collaborative programs.
7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, have Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) been able to make any progress in developing better
costsharing information with recipient countries and has it developed a
way for foreign nations to be able to fund some of your efforts?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, we are implementing new costsharing models with
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) partners so they can share the costs
of projects, thereby demonstrating both a financial and a political
commitment to mutual proliferation prevention goals. One example is the
Philippines where we are costsharing construction expenses of the new
Philippines' National Coast Watch Center; another example is Azerbaijan
where they funded construction of the Central Reference Laboratory and
the CTR will fund equipment and training costs. Additionally, CTR is
exercising the authority provided by Congress to utilize contributions
to the DOD CTR program from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany.
Mr. Myers. Yes, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program has made progress in
both costsharing with recipient countries and in developing a process
for foreign nations to contribute to our efforts.
The CTR program encourages costsharing with recipient countries due
to the cooperative nature of the projects. By instituting detailed
joint project implementation plans, CTR is able to establish the
various roles and responsibilities between the CTR program and the host
nation, to include specific tasks for which the host nation is
responsible.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public
Law 111-84, section 1303, provided CTR program authority to receive
outside contributions. We have developed a process, working with the
Department of State (DOS), U.S. Treasury, and the Office of Management
and Budget, by which outside contributions have begun to come into the
program. The first contribution was received in March 2013 from the
Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland for $685,000. Those funds will be contractually awarded in
support of CTR's Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) with
scientific studies into avian influenza virus in the country of
Georgia. There are two more contributions awaiting the finalization of
memorandums of understanding with donors from Canada and Germany as
well. We look forward to working with your committee to renew this
authority before it expires.
engaging new countries
8. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, what work are you doing to
secure large stockpiles of nuclear materials in countries outside of
the former Soviet Union, where programs like MPC&A have not
traditionally worked and where access has been problematic, including
China and India?
Ms. Harrington. There is a multilayered strategy that guides U.S.
Government nuclear security engagement. Where possible, we remove or
secure large stockpiles of materials. Where that is not possible, we
engage in activities that promote nuclear security best practices
through training and workshops. NNSA partners with China and India to
develop Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence (COE), which are
intended to serve as central venues for domestic and regional nuclear
security training.
During the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, China announced a
commitment to create a nuclear security training COE that will build on
the best practices program that has been underway between DOE/NNSA and
the China Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) since 2004. The COE reflects the
commitment of the Chinese Government to strengthen their cooperation on
nonproliferation, nuclear security, and combating nuclear terrorism.
China has the responsibility for constructing the physical facility,
while NNSA is working with DOD and the CAEA on a design for the Center,
as well as defining detailed equipment specifications, providing some
equipment, and participating in technical consultations. To date,
approximately 40 technical exchanges, including best practices and
training workshops, have been conducted with Chinese experts. These
include many technical discussions on the COE as well as best practices
workshops on such topics as Secure Transportation, Mitigating Insider
Threat, Domestic Inspections, Measurement Control, and Nuclear Security
Culture.
In the case of India, the pace of the collaboration is proceeding
more slowly. NNSA hosted a delegation of Indian officials at U.S.
nuclear security training centers in July 2012 to further thinking on
their training center requirements. The Indian delegation expressed
interest in continued bilateral collaboration on the Global Centre for
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP), including curriculum development
and facility design consultation. The Indians have reported that they
are actively working on internal approvals and planning for the GCNEP.
A meeting is scheduled this summer to explore further partnership
opportunities. Similar to the China COE, the Indian side is expected to
fully fund the construction of the GCNEP.
nuclear smuggling overlap and fragmentation
9. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Ms. Harrington, in
December 2011, GAO identified potential fragmentation and overlapping
functions among some Federal programs--including those at DOD, NNSA,
and DOS--working to counter smuggling of nuclear materials, equipment,
and technologies overseas, especially those providing equipment and
training to foreign border security and customs services. Among other
things, GAO recommended that the administration undertake a
comprehensive review of the structure, scope, and composition of
agencies and programs across the Federal Government involved in
combating nuclear smuggling overseas. This review would assess the
level of overlap and duplication among agencies and programs, potential
for consolidation of these functions to fewer programs and agencies,
and the feasibility, costs, and benefits of establishing a special
coordinator for U.S. counter-nuclear-smuggling assistance to foreign
nations. Has such a review occurred, and if so, what are the
conclusions; and if not, why not?
Ms. Creedon. The National Security Staff has led an interagency
process to review the integration of the various programs and agencies
contributing to the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), with
particular focus on programs and agencies providing equipment and
training to foreign border security and customs services to counter
smuggling of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies overseas.
DOD, DOS, and NNSA contributed significantly to the resulting GNDA
International Implementation Plan, which establishes coordinating
mechanisms for improved collaboration and programmatic coverage, and
establishes priority regions of focus to assist programs and agencies
in reducing overlap and duplication of effort. The GNDA report, which
references the International Implementation Plan, was submitted to
Congress in April 2013. Following this report, the International
Implementation Plan was approved in January 2013 via the Interagency
Policy Committee (IPC) process, but has not yet been submitted to
Congress.
Ms. Harrington. The National Security Staff has led the Countering
Nuclear Threats Sub-Interagency Policy Council (Sub-IPC) to take stock
of the requirements of a GNDA and create an International
Implementation Plan that reflects those requirements and identifies
needed actions. This group has served as a cross-government mechanism
to coordinate related efforts among participating agencies to prevent
overlap and duplication in the areas which fall under the broad rubric
of the international (outer) layer of the GNDA. In concert with this
effort, the Second Line of Defense Program conducted an extensive
strategic review in fiscal year 2012. This review, and the broader
coordination efforts undertaken by this Sub-IPC, involved all relevant
U.S. Government agencies including the Departments of State, Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and others.
radiological risks
10. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon, Mr. Myers, and Ms.
Harrington, as terrible as last week's bombings in Boston were, had
those bombs been so-called dirty bombs containing radioactive material,
the effects could have been much more serious, complicating clean-up,
inhibiting evidence gathering, and posing untold remediation and health
costs. What steps is the administration taking to secure nuclear and
radiological materials within the United States and to prevent
trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials into the country?
Ms. Creedon. DOD takes the security of nuclear and radiological
materials very seriously and, as such, we work to complement and
support a number of U.S. programs aimed at preventing nuclear and
radiological trafficking. Consistent with law and at the request of the
Attorney General, DOD provides support to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for preventing acts of radiological and nuclear
terrorism inside of the United States. DOD provides such support in
accordance with the Prevention Framework, which is anticipated to be
released May 2013, as one of the five National Preparedness Frameworks
of Presidential Policy Directive-8. DOD also has overseas programs such
as the Prevention Proliferation Program (PPP), previously called the
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Prevention Initiative
(PPI), which addresses the vulnerability of partner countries to
trafficking of WMD and related components. In addition, the Global
Nuclear Security Program (GNS) works with partner countries to account
for and secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.
I defer to DOE, NNSA, and FBI on the domestic aspects of securing
nuclear and radiological materials and I would direct your question to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pertaining to preventing
trafficking into our country.
DOD coordinates both the PPP and GNS programs very closely with
NNSA and other interagency partners.
Mr. Myers. DTRA defers to DOE/NNSA, FBI, and DHS on the prevention
aspects of securing domestic nuclear and radiological materials and
preventing trafficking into U.S. territory.
Within the United States, DTRA provides operational and technical
support to DOD components to sustain a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal. We conduct independent nuclear surety inspections of
units responsible for the assembly, maintenance, and storage of nuclear
weapon systems, and oversight of military inspection teams. We provide
research, development, test, and evaluation support to OSD and the
military for nuclear weapons physical security, including force-on-
force tests to examine DOD policies on nuclear physical security. We
coordinate and collaborate with DOE/NNSA on our nuclear stockpile
stewardship responsibilities.
Overseas, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program focuses on eliminating,
securing, and consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated
delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner
countries and also preventing the proliferation of WMD materials in
transit across international borders. DTRA also implements the DOD/FBI/
DHS International Counterproliferation Program (ICP). The goal of ICP
is to build partner capacity among border, customs, and law enforcement
officials to detect, interdict, and investigate illicit WMD
trafficking. Additionally, DTRA/U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Center for Combating (SCC)-WMD directly supports the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) activities, in cooperation with geographic
combatant commands and other parts of the U.S. Government. This
includes design, planning, and participation to support U.S.-led and
foreign-hosted multinational PSI exercises and workshops as part of a
global effort to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern.
One final DTRA program bears special mention. The DTRA Nimble Elder
program provides the combatant commanders with the capability to search
for, locate, and identify lost or stolen radiological devices and/or
radioactive material in all operational environments.
Ms. Harrington. Just prior to the tragic bombings in Boston, NNSA's
GTRI successfully completed the recovery of two high-activity
radiological devices from Boston, MA. The first device, containing
nearly 700 curies of cobalt-60, was recovered from St. Elizabeth's
Medical Center, and the second, containing more than 1,200 curies of
cesium-137 sources, from the Dana Farber Cancer Institute. These are
but 2 of the more than 32,000 radiological sources recovered by GTRI in
the United States over the past 20 years. GTRI does this because there
are no commercial disposal options for these dangerous radioactive
materials.
In addition, GTRI has partnered with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), DHS, and FBI to further strengthen security of high
activity radiological sources in the United States. The NRC and State
regulatory agencies have worked together to create a strong and
effective regulatory framework that includes licensing, inspection, and
enforcement of facilities with high-activity radiological materials.
This framework provides a common baseline level of security to ensure
adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense
and security. To assist in that effort, GTRI works with the NRC, the
materials licensees, State, local, and tribal governments, and other
Federal agencies, to build on the existing regulatory requirements by
providing voluntary security enhancements. GTRI's voluntary upgrades
complement NRC regulations to ensure the highest possible protection
for U.S. locations with high-activity radiological sources.
GTRI implements security systems with remote monitoring
capabilities to alert local law enforcement and to counter insider
threats. GTRI has also developed an Alarm Response Training course that
brings together site radiation protection staff, on-site security, and
local law enforcement to train in realistic scenarios using actual
radioactive sources. GTRI efforts are important because most site
guards are unarmed and local law enforcement is outside the NRC's
regulatory control. These domestic radiological security efforts
complement similar efforts GTRI is undertaking with nearly 100 other
countries.
11. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon, Mr. Myers, and Ms.
Harrington, in light of the proposed fiscal year 2014 budget cuts to
the GTRI program, should we have concerns that preventing radiological
terrorism in the United States is not a high administration priority?
Ms. Creedon. No. WMD terrorism, including radiological terrorism,
is one of the highest priorities of the Obama administration. DOD, in
partnership with NNSA, DHS, and FBI, take the prevention of
radiological terrorism very seriously and, as such, we have a number of
programs to reduce the possibility of such an event. To complement the
efforts of other parts of the government such as DOE, DHS, and FBI, DOD
has overseas programs such as the PPP, previously called the WMD PPI,
which addresses the vulnerability of partner countries to trafficking
of WMD and related components. DOD works closely with all of these
agencies to coordinate our respective programs and prevent duplication
and unnecessary overlap.
Mr. Myers. DTRA defers to DOE/NNSA on this question given their
responsibility for oversight and implementation of the GTRI program.
DTRA fully supports the administration's priority as evidenced by
our participation in defense support to civil authorities via
assistance to U.S. Northern Command and/or U.S. Pacific Command.
Ms. Harrington. Preventing radiological terrorism remains one of
the highest priorities for the administration and NNSA. We are working
with our domestic and international partners to secure radiological
materials in the most effective, efficient, and timely manner possible.
second line of defense program
12. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, the Second Line of Defense
(SLD) program at NNSA, which works with foreign countries to install
and maintain nuclear smuggling detection capabilities, has a proposed
fiscal year 2014 budget of $140 million, or a 54 percent reduction from
its fiscal year 2013 funding of $263.7 million. The fiscal year 2013
budget for the program was also sharply reduced while the
administration took a strategic pause to reevaluate the program. In
this context, what changes are being made to the SLD program and its
approach to combating nuclear smuggling?
Ms. Harrington. In fiscal year 2012, the SLD program, in
coordination with interagency partners, completed a thorough strategic
review and analysis to determine the most efficient and effective
approach to closing key gaps in the global nuclear detection
architecture and increase the impact of detection and deterrence using
fixed and mobile deployments. The review incorporated a broad range of
data, including: known trafficking pathways; smuggling information;
country geography and border porosity based on imagery and other
sources; updated maritime shipping system information and trends; the
availability of existing infrastructure to support detection equipment;
the availability of financial and technical resources to continue
operation and maintenance of SLD-provided equipment over the long-term;
results of interviews with key partner country stakeholders;
deployments in place by SLD and others; and political developments such
as the expanding Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. The review
considered specific site and country information as part of a regional
context to more effectively target resources. It also identified the
point of diminishing returns after which equipping more ports produced
limited benefit with respect to the volume of global and U.S.-bound
cargo being scanned for radiation. Sensitive to budget realities in
today's fiscal environment, the review also overlaid fiscal constraints
so that the optimal approach could be taken to close critical gaps in
the detection architecture and improve performance effectiveness.
The strategic review recommended a plan to address remaining fixed
detection gaps, expand mobile detection, and fully fund sustainability.
The review also resulted in the reorganization of SLD Core and
Megaports programs under joint implementation and sustainability
subprograms. The changes being implemented to program strategy include
an accelerated effort to target deployments of fixed radiation portal
monitors (RPM) to address critical gaps in the existing detection
architecture surrounding Russia, made more complicated by the creation
of a new Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Belarus. At this time, only 17 percent of that work remains to be
completed. The SLD program also intends to expand the provision of
mobile radiation detection equipment to foreign law enforcement as part
of an adaptable, flexible detection approach. The program has developed
a reduced Megaports scope that will focus primarily on equipping the
key hubs that process the most container traffic and cover the highest
threat areas within the maritime system and maximizing SLD's global
deterrence effect. Additionally, we have launched special initiatives
in strategic focus areas including: enhancing deterrence through
discreet monitoring and messaging, enhancing international capability
to respond to information alerts related to smuggling through rapid
asset mobilization planning, and developing a geospatial data interface
that maps SLD capabilities worldwide and can be used in coordination
with U.S. Government partners. Finally, SLD has increased technical
exchange outreach efforts to recruit donor countries, industry and
international organizations to accept a greater financial share of RPM
deployments, while continuing an emphasis on the performance and
effectiveness of the systems.
13. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, how will the decrease in
funding affect SLD's future plans and commitments with partner
countries?
Ms. Harrington. SLD's strategic review considered a variety of
factors, including existing trafficking pathways, assessments of border
porosity, existing architecture, the ability of partner countries to
sustain radiation detection capabilities, and existing fiscal
constraints. The result of SLD's assessment led to a streamlined
approach with fewer sites/ports and leveraged multiple types of
resources to continue to mitigate threats.
For border sites, SLD reduced the program goal from approximately
650 sites to 585. The decrease is a result of removing deployments at
crossings on opposite sides of the border, where possible, and areas
that were impacted by the Customs Union (Russia-Belarus, Kazakhstan-
Russia, and Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan). For large ports, SLD reduced the
program goal from 100 to 73, which includes the completed 45 ports,
plus 14 fully-funded and cost-shared ports, and 14 that would be
completed via full financial support of host country or industry
partner (technical exchanges). This revision in scope equips the
highest threat and volume ports, focusing resources on those ports
where the benefit of the RPM installations are apt to have the greatest
impact. Though not among highest priority ports, SLD will remain open
to considering technical consultations on detection at the 27 ports
that have been removed from the program goals should the host country
or port operator request it.
With regard to meeting the sustainability commitments that we have
made to our partner countries, we remain committed to having a robust
sustainability program that focuses on capacity building and
maintaining system effectiveness. SLD typically provides between 3 to 5
years of sustainability support to each partner country, including
training and maintenance support, data analysis, SLD Help Desk support,
workshops, exercises, and assurance visits. Further, during the
transition period, SLD conducts quarterly assessments of partner
country capabilities to progress to building the requisite indigenous
capabilities. SLD will strive to maintain this standard within the new
funding profile.
global security through science partnerships program
14. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Harrington, in 2008, GAO raised many
concerns and problems surrounding NNSA's Global Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program, following a series of earlier
GAO reports on this program and other agency WMD scientist engagement
programs. NNSA is now recasting the GIPP program as a Global Security
through Science Partnerships (GSSP) program. What assurances can you
give that significant program improvements have been made to the
program, including the extent to which GAO's recommendations have been
implemented, to ensure the new program will be addressing real threats,
using funding cost-effectively, and generating real, measurable
results?
Ms. Harrington. In response to the concerns raised by GAO and
Congress in 2008, NNSA took immediate action to address all of the
recommendations for the GIPP including:
Implementation of more uniform interagency review and
approval procedures for scientist engagement projects overseen
by the National Security Council, strengthening an already
comprehensive review process.
Completion of a comprehensive institute risk
assessment in order to target resources where they are most
needed to prevent proliferation of WMD expertise.
Revised project criteria including a requirement in
Russia and the former Soviet Union to involve institutes that
have been assessed as high priority.
Management reforms to streamline the program,
producing significant results, including the reduction of
uncosted balances to meet the DOE carryover threshold.
Based on recommendations from Congress, NNSA completed an all-
source assessment of the expertise proliferation threat that included
an extensive intelligence component. The assessment concluded that
there is a significant WMD expertise proliferation threat that no
longer is limited to expertise acquired by direct involvement in
weapons programs, and that the threat is exacerbated by the increasing
global availability and accessibility of weapons-usable information and
knowledge. In response to the assessment, NNSA decided to transform its
approach to scientist engagement to better address current threats. The
GSSP program will be a distinct program from GIPP, but will build on
lessons learned over almost 20 years of scientist engagement in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere. GSSP will mitigate the risks of WMD
expertise proliferation by refocusing its efforts geographically;
leveraging complementary NNSA and U.S. Government programs in a whole-
of-government approach; and using new engagement methods that emphasize
partnership over assistance or redirection.
The program incorporates all relevant improvements recommended by
GAO, and includes a comprehensive prioritization system to identify
countries for engagement that includes an assessment of vulnerability,
capability, and interagency coordination. Moreover, GSSP has developed
an approach to identifying priority areas of ``at risk expertise'' that
are vulnerable to recruitment. By engaging ``at risk'' populations in
priority countries, GSSP will ensure that projects meet
nonproliferation objectives. GSSP will coordinate closely with other
U.S. Government nonproliferation and nuclear security programs to
prioritize the allocation of its resources to those countries that
present the highest current and near-term risk of WMD-usable expertise
proliferation. GSSP will use a combination of quantitative metrics,
expert assessments, and whole-of-government considerations to evaluate
its impact in engaged states and to ensure that GSSP effectively
supports national priorities and programs. GSSP also will employ
objective, weighted indicators to track each state's progress through
five levels, with a desired minimal end state of achieving sustainable
capacity to address expertise proliferation, corresponding to level
three.
cooperative threat reduction engagement priorities
15. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, currently
about 60 percent of the CTR program is used for the CBEP. After the
previous sharp focus on nuclear weapons in former Soviet Union
countries, how did you determine the need to shift resources to
biological issues?
Ms. Creedon. Most of DOD's CTR effort to enhance security for
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union will be complete in 2013.
While CTR's foundation in the former Soviet Union is nuclear non-
proliferation, we noted the importance of addressing the biological
threat in the former Soviet Union many years ago and established the
Biological Threat Reduction Program to eliminate offensive biological
weapons. Much of the elimination work has been completed and we are now
focusing on biological security risks, which have grown in recent
years. The close proximity of organizations with intentions to acquire
dangerous pathogens for use against the United States or its allies to
potential sources of biological agents of concern is especially
troublesome. As stewards of CTR program funding, we take a targeted
approach and prioritize expansion efforts based on threat awareness,
support for broader U.S. nonproliferation objectives, and opportunities
to enhance strategic relationships with partner countries. Thus far,
this has led the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, to expand CBEP activities to Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, India, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
Mr. Myers. We dedicate resources and make priority decisions based
on the risks and threats that we are facing in close coordination with
the Intelligence Community, the U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant and regional commands. Although a
real and catastrophic threat, the capability to build, test, produce,
and use nuclear weapons is constrained to a select few countries. The
program's nuclear security efforts were previously completed in all
former Soviet Union countries except Russia. Russia and the United
States are in agreement that this is an appropriate time for the
Russian Ministry of Defense to assume responsibility for security of
its nuclear weapons. The biological threat has no boundaries. Diseases
caused by especially dangerous pathogens occur every day, and the
technologies to manipulate, store, isolate, and diagnose these
pathogens for scientific research or medical diagnosis are becoming
increasingly effective as biological sciences and biotechnology
continue to rapidly evolve. Unfortunately, these technologies are
becoming increasingly accessible to those with evil intent. The same
technologies used to support medical and scientific research can also
be used to support the production of biological weapons or toxins. The
Nunn-Lugar CBEP provides an avenue to work with an ever increasing
group of countries to safely secure and store especially dangerous
pathogens. Simultaneously, CBEP actively engages their scientists in
the areas of biological research, biosafety, biosecurity, and
bioethics, thus reducing the possibility that diseases stored at these
foreign facilities could fall in to the wrong hands, and be used for
nefarious purposes.
securing facilities in kenya and uganda
16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, your written
testimony indicates success securing facilities in Kenya and Uganda
that store Anthrax and Ebola. Can you describe your work in those
countries and how you identified these particular nations to work with?
Ms. Creedon. Kenya and Uganda both have a high prevalence of
endemic diseases of concern to the United States, weak disease
diagnosis and reporting systems, and active terrorist groups in the
region. We have recently completed critical biosafety and biosecurity
(BS&S) updates at key facilities in both Kenya and Uganda. In Kenya we
recently completed construction of a perimeter security wall and
installation of an incinerator ash pit at the Kenyan Medical Research
Institute (KEMRI). We also completed construction of the perimeter
security wall and guardhouses, provision of basic laboratory materials,
and installation of three autoclaves at the Central Veterinary
Laboratory (CVL) in Nairobi. In Uganda, we conducted initial BS&S at
the Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) and National Animal Disease
Diagnostics and Epidemiology Center (NADDEC), including the
installation of a perimeter security fence/wall, guard station, and
facility lighting, as well as laboratory material and equipment, at
both locations.
Mr. Myers.
In November 2010, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Program, the Honorable Andrew C. Weber,
identified BS&S gaps during a visit to KEMRI and CVL in Kenya
and UVRI and NADDEC in Uganda.
DTRA CTR was given authority to expend funds on the
Africa continent in March 2011.
BS&S upgrades at KEMRI were completed in February
2013; the upgrades consisted of construction of a perimeter
security wall and installation of an incinerator ash pit.
CVL BS&S upgrades were completed in May 2012 and
consisted of construction of the perimeter security wall and
guardhouses, provision of basic laboratory materials, and
installation of three autoclaves.
BS&S at UVRI included the installation of the
following: perimeter security fence/wall, guard station, and
facility lighting. This also included BS&S upgrades at NADDEC
and included installation of the following: perimeter security
fence/wall, guard station, facility lighting, wheel wash,
medical and animal waste incinerator, and incinerator ash pit;
procurements of guard station equipment as well as laboratory
materials and equipment were included for both locations; the
upgrades at UVRI were completed by February 5, 2013, and all
physical construction at NADDEC.
future identifying highest risk countries
17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, what is your
systemic way of identifying the highest risk countries to work with in
the future?
Ms. Creedon. We use a threat-based approach and determine how CTR
is able to best support national and departmental priorities such as
those established the National Security Strategy, the National Defense
Strategy for Countering WMD, and the Guidance for the Employment of the
Force (GEF). Based on these and other similar inputs, we consider four
factors when identifying and prioritizing CTR efforts:
We evaluate threats, risks, and vulnerability and
evaluate the ability--in cooperation with partner countries and
applicable local, regional, and international organizations--to
directly and appreciably prevent proliferation and/or terrorist
acquisition of materials and expertise to develop and utilize
WMD.
We consider the ability of the CTR program to create,
strengthen, or sustain partnerships on issues of bilateral,
regional, and global concern with countries in existing and
emerging centers of influence.
We consider the ability of the CTR program to
influence partner countries' views and behaviors toward
international and regional countering WMD and nonproliferation
regimes and to enable them to meet such commitments, encourage
and improve compliance, and encourage others to do the same.
We evaluate the ability of the CTR program to
contribute unique threat reduction capabilities, resources, or
partnerships that other DOD and U.S. Government threat
reduction and related programs cannot contribute.
Combined, these criteria guide us in a systematic way to identify
the highest risk countries with which the CTR program should partner.
We also use these criteria to continuously evaluate the benefit of
maintaining existing CTR program projects with current partners.
Mr. Myers. Annually, DTRA assists DOD in concert with other
expertise across the U.S. Government to make the best judgments
possible concerning where/what/why we should focus limited resources
based on congressionally-mandated Nunn-Lugar CTR goals and guidance. We
dedicate resources and make priority decisions based on the risks and
threats that the United States is facing--in close coordination with
the Intelligence Community, STRATCOM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the combatant and regional commands. Working closely with CTR partner
countries and interagency partners, we thoroughly evaluate risks and
identify opportunities that would have the highest impact to reduce or
mitigate the WMD threat and support DOD's strategic objectives. On a
yearly basis, Ms. Creedon and her staff host roundtable discussions to
take a systematic approach in evaluating countries for future
engagement.
18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, your written
testimony indicates that we are helping countries set up disease
surveillance systems. Why is DOD rather than the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) executing the disease surveillance function?
Ms. Creedon. The CDC has a public health mission to protect the
public from infectious disease outbreaks. DOD's CTR program has a
security mission to reduce the threat to the United States and its
allies from WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise,
including associated delivery systems and infrastructure. One way in
which CTR reduces biological threats is by working with partner
countries to build capacity to rapidly and accurately prevent and
detect the use of biological weapons. Often the first indicator of a
biological weapons attack or accidental release of biological weapons-
related material is through disease surveillance. DOD CTR therefore
provides the tools, techniques, laboratory, and disease surveillance
capacity to improve partner countries' readiness to detect and report
all disease outbreaks, naturally occurring or otherwise. DOD CTR's
biosurveillance efforts are carefully nests within a whole-of-
government approach to ensure our efforts are coordinated and
deconflicted with our foreign partners. Toward this end, the national
security players--the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy--work
in concert with the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS),
Agriculture, Commerce, and Homeland Security, the FBI, the U.S. Agency
for International Development, and a wide range of international and
nongovernmental partners to address problems that are of shared
concern.
Mr. Myers. It is safer, more secure, cheaper, most efficient, and
most effective to address WMD threats at the source and as far away
from our shores as possible. DOD's mission is to assist the U.S.
Government and partner nations with the security of extremely dangerous
pathogens that can be weaponized or used to conduct a bioterrorist
attack. This is a different mission than the CDC public health mission.
The CDC has great experience and networks operating in Africa and
Southeast Asia where many of these biological agents can be found. We
can, and do, leverage their expertise, access, and existing
institutional relationships by bringing the DOD defense-in-depth
security mindset and expertise together with CDC's public health work.
This allows the U.S. Government to focus all of its capabilities
against a pandemic health and security threat as quickly, and as
effectively, as possible.
Funding provided by DOD leverages CDC's expertise to develop
epidemiological training courses, laboratory-based surveillance
systems, laboratory quality management programs, build workforce
capability, and create electronic disease data collection systems
globally focused towards meeting the legislatively-mandated security
goals for CTR.
DOD, through the Nunn-Lugar CTR's CBEP, works to enhance the
partner country's capability to detect, diagnose, and report pathogens
of security concern from natural outbreaks (endemic and epidemic) and
bioterror attacks as well as potential pandemics. CBEP also ensures
that the developed capabilities are designed to be secure, safe, and
sustainable. CBEP's primary efforts focus on the infrastructure and
networks, within DOD core capabilities, to rapidly identify and report
any outbreaks of pathogens of security concern (biological weapons-
related) in order to differentiate a natural versus terror attack as
well as identify any potential outbreaks/pandemics which could impact
our national security. These activities are carefully coordinated with
the CDC, and other relevant agencies, in a collaborative manner.
19. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, how do you
work with and deconflict your efforts with the CDC on biological
issues?
Ms. Creedon. We consistently communicate and coordinate with all
U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the CDC and HHS. At
a strategic- and policy-level, IPC meetings provide opportunities to
align and deconflict CTR efforts with those of other interagency
partners and to ensure we are working in concert to advance national
strategies and objectives. With respect to biological threat reduction
issues, DOD, HHS, and CDC all participate in regular Global Health
Security IPCs and sub-IPCs such as the International Biological
Engagement Working Group. At a working level, we host quarterly
regional forums to brief interagency partners on our biological
engagement programs and to coordinate activities and raise issues or
concerns. In the field we also engage with the Health Team at the U.S.
Embassy--typically composed of CDC, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and other interagency partners--and we invite CDC
colleagues to join DOD delegations when meeting with foreign partners,
when appropriate. Combined, these efforts increase our collective
awareness of similar or related activities across the U.S. Government
as well as help identify areas in which the CTR program can leverage
another department's or agency's capabilities.
Mr. Myers. It is safer, cheaper, and most effective to address WMD
threats at the source and as far away from our shores as possible.
DOD's mission is the security of extremely dangerous pathogens that can
be weaponized or used to conduct a bioterrorist attack. The CDC has
great experience and networks operating in Africa and Southeast Asia
where many of these biological agents can be found. We can leverage
their expertise by bringing the DOD security culture together with
CDC's public health work. CDC and DTRA collaborate regularly to reduce
the potential for duplication of effort regarding biological issues.
DTRA's collaboration with CDC occurs at the programmatic level. For
example, DTRA's Nunn-Lugar CTR (through the CBEP) works in coordination
with the CDC's Global Disease Detection and Emergency Response to
resource and execute efforts to reduce global health security threats.
Recently, DTRA and CDC have increased collaboration beyond the
programmatic level. This broader strategic partnership will leverage
the strengths of each organization and introduce capabilities that can
enhance each other's overall capabilities to execute our missions. For
example, increased collaboration on modeling and simulations helps to
enhance situational awareness necessary for supporting decisionmaking
regarding global health threats.
measuring success of programs
20. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon and Mr. Myers, CTR has
eliminated over 7,600 warheads--a fantastic accomplishment. How do you
measure your success for CTR programs so you know when a program in a
particular country is complete and needs to be concluded?
Ms. Creedon. First and foremost, we measure success by our ability
to directly and appreciably achieve strategic threat reduction
objectives, which include:
Dismantle and destroy stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery that
partner countries own, possess, or have in their control.
To account for, safeguard, and secure nuclear,
chemical, and biological materials, equipment, or expertise
that, if vulnerable to theft or diversion, could result in WMD
threats.
To prevent and detect acquisition, proliferation, and
use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, weapons-usable
and related materials, equipment, means of delivery, and
knowledge.
We also measure success by whether partners can sustain these
capabilities when CTR funding is no longer available. This sustainment
consideration is a significant factor in determining when and how to
conclude CTR programs.
We also consider other indicators of success that are more
qualitative yet provide a broader sense of the strategic value of
initiating, maintaining, and concluding CTR engagements. For example,
we evaluate the benefit of continued CTR engagement to the overall
bilateral relationship. We also consider the contribution of CTR
engagements to improving our partners' compliance with and commitment
to countering WMD and nonproliferation agreements and frameworks, such
as the Biological Weapons Convention and United Nations Security
Resolution 1540.
Mr. Myers. Secretary Creedon's response has outlined how DOD
broadly measures success for Nunn-Lugar CTR programs. DTRA, as the
program's implementing agency, is responsible for managing the
programming, contracting, and funding aspects of the program. DTRA
develops Joint Requirements and Implementation Plans (JRIPs) that
prescribe mutually acknowledged and agreed-upon requirements,
assumptions, major milestones, contract approaches, risk assessments,
and responsibilities. DTRA's program and project managers routinely
measure progress against the agreed upon JRIPs, and evaluate the
progress of a partner nation to sustain capabilities. The CTR program
has developed program-level metrics for all of its program areas and
projects, as well as an electronic database tool that permits
collection of the relevant data to track program-level metrics and
measure progress. All of what DTRA does as the implementing agency
provides feedback to DOD to make the broader determination as to when a
program in a particular country is complete and can be concluded.
challenges associated with working as non-permissive environments
21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, the CTR program works in permissive
environments with fairly long-time horizons. What are your challenges
associated with supporting combatant commanders who are generally
working on shorter timelines and want counter-WMD solutions for non-
permissive environments?
Mr. Myers. Counter-WMD operations in non-permissive environments
present inherent challenges not present in permissive, cooperative
environments.
First, in the area of planning, contingency scenarios necessitate
compressed planning timelines with no room for error. While CTR
planning might span months or years, counter-WMD contingency planning
might have to be measured in weeks, days, or even hours. Second, a
significant difference is the provision of security for agency
personnel, to include military, civilian, and contract personnel, who
will perform many of the counter-WMD operations. CTR contractors
operate in relatively stable environments with little worry that they
will be fired upon by hostile forces. In contingency scenarios,
however, we have to make provisions for the security of our personnel
to include the possible arming of contract personnel. Additionally,
normal protections under Status of Forces Agreement may not be in
place. Third, counter-WMD operations, such as transportation, storage,
and elimination generally require bilateral agreements with host nation
authorities regarding such things as liability coverage, tax exemption,
and the like--that might not be possible in non-permissive
environments.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) was
intentionally established in STRATCOM by the Secretary of Defense to
provide direct operational counter-WMD support to the geographic
combatant commands to assist dealing with such challenges. To be clear,
I am not the commander of the standing headquarters, but the general
officer who commands the headquarters also serves as my Deputy Director
of the STRATCOM Center for Combating (SCC) WMD. The co-location of the
headquarters with DTRA facilitates close collaboration with DTRA's
extensive technical expertise and prior planning for follow-on
nonproliferation activities.
22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, do you need changes to your
authorities to be more effective in this realm?
Mr. Myers. Yes, I would ask for your support for DOD's legislative
proposal 117 to authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide WMD
incident response training and basic equipment to foreign military and
civilian first responders at all levels of government who may or may
not be part of a national security force--this authority does not
currently exist. The Secretary of Defense would exercise this authority
and activities would be funded through DTRA using Defense-wide
Operation and Maintenance funds in targeted partner nations.
DTRA executes DOD's Consequence Management Assistance Program
(CMAP) in coordination with the supported strategic priorities of the
combatant commanders. However, no specific authority exists to allow
the use of Defense-wide Operation and Maintenance funds to train and
provide basic response equipment to foreign military and civilian WMD
incident first-responders.
Consistent with the current requirements, DTRA's proposal would
allow DOD to train foreign country forces based on mission rather than
organization. Partner nation first-response forces are often organized
differently from those in the United States; they may perform military
functions and require military capabilities, but may or may not be a
part of a military organization. The ability of DOD to provide training
to foreign military and civilian first-responders is critical to
fulfilling the current requirements of the agency.
Furthermore, the ability to provide low-cost, high-demand equipment
to partner organizations is essential to realistic and effective
training and integration. This equipment would provide an initial
capability and would take the form of basic equipment or supplies. Such
equipment would be made available for use by both the host nation and
U.S. forces that may be called upon to support the host nation.
This requires close coordination and collaboration with Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, STRATCOM, and relevant geographic
combatant commands. Funding for these activities is included in DTRA's
fiscal year 2014 budget request and no additional funds are required.
23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, Regional Contingency Teams (RCT)
look to be an important initiative to better support the warfighter.
Can you describe the concept in further detail, including the number of
people, their typical functional areas of responsibility, and how you
see them being employed?
Mr. Myers. The DTRA/SCC-WMD/SJFHQ-E RCTs reach across all three
organizations to unite subject matter experts in response to
contingencies that require quick and coordinated responses to combatant
commanders, OSD, and other parts of the U.S. Government. Two RCTs are
currently activated: RCT-1 for contingencies in the Levant, and RCT-2
for contingencies in the Asia Pacific region. Each is led by an O-6--a
uniformed military senior officer--who reports directly to DTRA/SCC-
WMD/SJFHQ-E senior leadership and has the ability to leverage the
expertise of any of the 2,000+ people across the organization. These
RCTs integrate planning support, WMD technical expertise, intelligence
support, deployable operational teams, treaty requirements, and
regional experts to support U.S. Government response to WMD
contingencies in all phases of military readiness preparation,
reaction, and response. The RCTs also reach out to subject matter
experts across the U.S. Government to ensure that RCT products include
the best possible information, and produce the most effective outcomes.
RCT products are regularly briefed to senior U.S. Government leaders to
aid in high-stakes decisionmaking. RCTs are flexible and can be
activated at any time. Typically, RCTs are activated because of new
information identified through intelligence channels or requests for
high levels of support from other parts of the U.S. Government.
strategic offensive arms elimination program
24. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon, your funding of the
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) program is dropping off
fairly rapidly, from about $28 million in 2012 to $10 million in the
2014 request. What work is left to accomplish in Ukraine and Russia
under this program?
Ms. Creedon. For a number of years, Russia has requested support
for the elimination of a decreasing number of missiles and launchers.
DOD continuously assesses the ongoing threat reduction value of CTR
projects, and our assessment is that Russia is willing and able to
conduct missile and launcher eliminations independently. For this
reason, Russia is in the process of taking full responsibility for
missile and land-based launcher elimination. DOD is prepared to assist
with such eliminations through the first half of fiscal year 2014, but
Russia may accept full responsibility sooner due to the timing of its
budget cycle and the timelines reflected in our current bilateral CTR
Agreement. The SOAE program also anticipates assisting Russia with the
elimination of a Delta III strategic submarine in fiscal year 2014.
DOD also assists Ukraine with the storage and elimination of solid
rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs and will remain prepared to
respond to any WMD delivery systems elimination requirements in other
countries. 101 SS-24 solid rocket motors currently remain in Ukraine,
and they are scheduled to be eliminated by fiscal year 2016.
umbrella agreement with russia
25. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon, if the Umbrella Agreement
with Russia lapses and there is a gap before a follow-on agreement can
be signed, what specific lines of effort will need to be suspended?
Ms. Creedon. Under the current agreement, DOD conducts five kinds
of cooperative efforts in Russia: (1) Nuclear Weapons Storage Security;
(2) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security; (3) Spent Nuclear Fuel/
Fissile Material Disposition; (4) Chemical Weapons Destruction; and (5)
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination. At the end of the current
agreement, it is likely that some of these efforts will shift to
Russian responsibility or will shift to a post-CTR, peer-to-peer
exchange. If, however, the Umbrella Agreement lapses before follow-on
arrangements can be applied, each of these efforts would need to be
suspended.
In addition to the DOD efforts, DOE also conducts nuclear material
protection control and accountability activities that are subject to
the Umbrella Agreement.
chemical weapons destruction in libya and syria
26. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, what is the status of the
destruction of chemical weapons in Libya?
Mr. Myers. On May 4, 2013, the Libyan National Authority (LNA) for
the Chemical Weapons Convention completed destruction of Libya's bulk
liquid mustard using the hydrolysis and neutralization system they had
previously procured (destroyed 8.819 metric tons).
The LNA accepted the U.S. offer of destruction assistance for
Libya's recently discovered munitions shortly after it was offered in
early 2013. DOD's CTR will perform the work through a team of
contractors, with the intent of completing destruction of Libya's
category 1 munitions stockpile by December 2013, though that is an
extremely tight timeline. The team commenced work at the Ruwagha
Chemical Weapons Storage Facility in May 2013. Their efforts build on
work that has been done by DOD CTR since early this year to strengthen
the safety and security of the stockpile at that site. In support of
the destruction efforts, a team of contractors is currently in country
(a mix of U.S. and non-U.S. citizens) to coordinate logistics, perform
soil sampling, clear unexploded ordnances, and conduct/oversee
preparations for the destruction equipment site and worker camp. We
anticipate continuing these efforts through 2013. We will respect all
security guidance from the DOS, United Nations Department of Security
Services, the U.S. Africa Command, and other key sources, when
assessing the ability of our contractors to continue their work.
27. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, what lessons learned will you
transfer to the situation in Syria?
Mr. Myers. [Deleted].
28. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, in his briefing on Syria to the
Senate Armed Services Committee last week, Secretary Hagel indicated
DOD is funding over $70 million for activities in Jordan, ``including
providing training and equipment to detect and stop any chemical
weapons transfers along its border with Syria and developing Jordanian
capacity to identify and secure chemical weapons assets.'' I assume
this is part of the WMD proliferation prevention program under CTR. Can
you give me more details on the kind of work that DTRA has been doing
in Jordan under this program?
Mr. Myers. DTRA's work through the DOD Nunn-Lugar CTR program, and
through close coordination with the U.S. Central Command, is focused on
building the capacities of relevant Jordanian military and civilian
ministries to interdict, secure, identify, and manage the consequences
of chemical weapons through the provision of training and equipment.
Specifically, DTRA is expanding upon the existing Jordan border
security program to provide additional remote sensor equipment and
relevant training to improve Jordanian capabilities to detect and track
attempts to cross green borders. This effort extends the 110km
surveillance system along the final 256km of the Jordan-Syrian border,
and supplements the existing system with chemical detection and
identification equipment and training. In addition, CTR supported a
series of workshops that trained the Jordanians on the protection of
personnel and critical equipment in the event of a chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) hazard
release. This capability is further supplemented through the
replacement and refitting of outdated Jordanian decontamination
equipment and the provision of new personal protective, identification,
and sampling equipment with associated training.
DTRA's CMAP has also worked with the Colorado National Guard and
the Jordanian Armed Forces Chemical Support Unit to conduct an exchange
of information about mission, capabilities, and operations of the
Colorado National Guard WMD Civil Support Team and CBRNE Enhanced
Response Force Package during March 2013. Another event is currently
being planned to be held in Centennial, CO in June to continue to
develop a National Guard Bureau/State Partnership Program CBRNE
Exchange on June 17-21, 2013. Also, a CMAP, State Partnership Program,
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Jordanian National Centre for
Security and Crisis Management exercise planning workshop is scheduled
for August 15-20, 2013. Finally, CMAP recently completed a Collective
Protection of Critical Infrastructure, High-Value Resources, Personnel,
and Civilian Population from Chemical Threats and Contamination
workshop with the Jordanian Armed Forces in April 2013.
threat reduction engagement program
29. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Creedon, only $2.4 million was
requested for the Threat Reduction Engagement program that builds
relationships for CTR program development in new geographic areas. But
this looks potentially like an outreach program that might already be
covered by other departments or agencies, such as the DOS. Can you
please explain why a separate funding line is required for this
program?
Ms. Creedon. The Threat Reduction Engagement Program (TREP) is a
unique, low-cost tool in the CTR program's toolkit that allows us to
initiate and establish relationships with new partners prior to
obtaining Secretary of Defense determination, with Secretary of State
concurrence, to establish a full CTR partnership. It also allows us to
maintain strategic relationships after CTR projects and activities are
completed. All TREP-funded activities directly advance the CTR
program's mission and have some connection to eliminating or preventing
the proliferation of WMD or related materials. For example, this year
we utilized TREP funding to jump-start our deepening border security
relationship with Jordan, to support an important joint WMD-
interdiction exercise with the United Arab Emirates, and to continue
our countering WMD engagement with Yemen.
securing chemical weapons in syria
30. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, what specific areas is DTRA
providing support to Syria planning efforts in order to help secure
chemical weapons in Syria should the chemical weapons sites become
unsecure and manage the consequences should Assad use chemical weapons
on his own people?
Mr. Myers. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, in the briefing on Syria to the
Senate Armed Services Committee last week, when Senator McCain asked
Chairman Dempsey if he could secure chemical weapons in Syria, Chairman
Dempsey said, ``Not as I sit here today simply because they have been
moving it and the number of sites is quite numerous.'' What are the
capability gaps that you see as the experts in countering WMD
proliferation in Syria?
Mr. Myers. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, what efforts are we doing to close
those gaps?
Mr. Myers. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, if contaminated refugees begin
approaching Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq borders, are these countries
prepared to handle them?
Mr. Myers. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Myers, what are we doing with our partners
in the region (Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Israel) and partners outside
the region (United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) to address Syrian chemical weapons issues?
Mr. Myers.[Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]