[Senate Hearing 113-108, Part 4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-108 Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1197
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 4
AIRLAND
__________
APRIL 24 AND MAY 8, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine
Peter K. Levine, Staff Director
John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Airland
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Tactical Aircraft Programs
april 24, 2013
Page
Bogdan, Lt. Gen. Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer,
F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office......................... 8
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition.................................................... 15
Davis, Lt. Gen. Charles R., USAF, Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition........... 31
Army Modernization
may 8, 2013
Barclay, LTG James O., III, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Army (G-8)..................................................... 81
Phillips, LTG William N., USA, Principal Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology, and Director, Acquisition Career Management, and
Chief Integration Officer...................................... 87
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:04 p.m. in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Joe
Manchin III (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Manchin, Blumenthal,
McCain, and Wicker.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; William K. Sutey, professional staff
member; and Bradley S. Watson, special assistant for
investigations.
Minority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; and Anthony J. Lazarski,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: John L. Principato.
Committee members' assistants present: Mara Boggs, Patrick
Hayes, and David LaPorte, assistants to Senator Manchin; Paul
C. Hutton IV, assistant to Senator McCain; Todd Harmer,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; and Joseph Lai, assistant to
Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III, CHAIRMAN
Senator Manchin. The subcommittee will come to order and
thank you for being here. We want to apologize. Senator Wicker
and I were both together at a briefing that we attended and we
appreciate your understanding.
I want to extend a welcome to and thank each of our
witnesses for appearing before this subcommittee today. This is
my first hearing as a subcommittee chairman and, although he
has served for a number of years on the Senate Armed Services
Committee, this will be Senator Wicker's first hearing as the
Airland Subcommittee ranking member. Senator Wicker, I am
really looking forward to working with you on the subcommittee
this year.
On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you each of you
representing the men and women of our armed services for the
wonderful jobs that they are performing in Afghanistan and
around the world. We keep all those who are serving in our
thoughts and prayers every day.
Every year we are challenged to make decisions balancing a
number of competing demands of resources, including resources
for current operations and investments in future modernization.
In this case we will be assessing plans and programs regarding
the current status and future prospects for tactical aviation
programs. Complicating things this year is sequestration,
which, if Congress does not act to change things, could lead to
significant consequences for our current readiness and future
modernization.
We meet today to talk about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) program and other tactical aviation programs. We all know
that the JSF program is central to the long-term modernization
plan for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps for more than 15
years now. Given that fact, any change in cost, schedule, and
performance of the JSF program really sends shock waves
throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) and raises many
questions of achieving that balance between the demands of
maintaining readiness in the near-term and those of modernizing
for tomorrow.
For instance, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has estimated that extending the service lives of existing F-16
and F-18 aircraft would be approximately $5 billion. Today we
will seek a better understanding of implementation of the
corrective actions DOD has identified in the JSF program after
the Nunn-McCurdy certification 3 years ago and what levels of
risk remain in the development and fielding program.
General Bogdan, I know there were a couple of engine-
related problems since last year and, while we are always
concerned any time that we hear about engine problems during
the research and development (R&D) stage, I understand that you
have identified the problems and have mapped a way ahead to
minimize the effect of the problems on the testing and
development program. I hope you will discuss these programs and
solutions during your testimony.
In addition to the more immediate acquisition issues, we
also know there is significant concern about how much the F-35
is going to cost to operate during its life cycle. We do not
have the new selected acquisition reports (SARs) for major
defense acquisition programs yet this year, but last year DOD
was predicting the F-35 life cycle cost over 50 years would be
approximately $1 trillion. That is a large mountain of cost and
I hope that we can gather some insight today on what DOD is
doing to try to reduce those costs.
In addition, today we want to focus on a number of issues,
but primarily we want to understand how DOD has been executing
to the baseline for the F-35 program since last year, how the
Services are refining their responses to the JSF delays that
emerged 2 years ago, and what effects those delays may have on
our forces.
Today we are going to hear from Lieutenant General
Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF, the JSF Program Executive; Vice
Admiral W. Mark Skinner, USN, Principal Military Deputy in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition; and Lieutenant General Charles R.
Davis, USAF, the Military Deputy for the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
There are worrisome prospects for the future of tactical
aviation programs, particularly in terms of having the numbers
of aircraft that we need to keep from hollowing out our
tactical aviation forces. We've been following your progress in
trying to mitigate to close those gaps.
There are a number of other issues that we may discuss, but
in the interest of time I will stop here. Again, I want to
thank our witnesses. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Manchin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Joe Manchin III
The subcommittee will come to order. I want to extend a welcome and
thank each our witnesses for appearing before this subcommittee today.
I also appreciate your flexibility is delaying the hearing. This
afternoon, we are having a committee meeting with the King of Jordan
and two other subcommittee hearings beside this one.
This is my first hearing as subcommittee chairman and, although he
has served elsewhere in the committee, this will be Senator Wicker's
first hearing as Airland Subcommittee Ranking Member. Senator Wicker, I
am really looking forward to working with you on the subcommittee this
year.
On behalf of the committee, I want to thank each of you,
representing the men and women of our Armed Forces, for the wonderful
jobs they are performing in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world.
We keep all those who are serving right now in our thoughts and
prayers, and also remember that both they and their families are
serving and sacrificing every
Every year, we are challenged to make decisions balancing a number
of competing demands for resources, including resources for current
operations and investment in future modernization. In this case, we
will be assessing plans and programs regarding the current status and
future prospects for tactical aviation programs. Complicating things
this year is sequestration, which, if Congress does not act to change
things, could lead to significant consequences for our current
readiness and future modernization.
We meet today to talk about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program and other tactical aviation programs. We all know that the JSF
program is important, since it has been central to the long-term
modernization plans for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps for more
than 15 years now. Given that fact, any change in the cost, schedule,
and performance of the JSF program sends shock waves throughout the
Department and raises many questions of achieving that balance between
the demands of maintaining readiness in the near term and those of
modernizing for tomorrow. For instance, the Government Accountability
Office has estimated that extending the service lives of existing F-16
and F-18 aircraft would be approximately $5 billion.
Today, we will seek a better understanding of implementation of the
corrective actions the Department identified in the JSF program after
the Nunn-McCurdy certification 3 years ago, and what levels of risk
remains in the development and fielding program. General Bogdan, I know
that there were a couple of engine-related problems since last year,
and while we are always concerned anytime we hear about engine problems
during research and development, I understand that you have identified
the problems and have mapped a way ahead to minimize the effect of the
problems on the testing and development program. I hope you will
discuss these problems and solutions during your testimony.
In addition to the more immediate acquisition issues, we also know
there is significant concern about how much the F-35 is going to cost
to operate during its life cycle. We do not have the new Selected
Acquisition Reports for Major Defense Acquisition Programs yet this
year, but last year, the Department was predicting the F-35 life cycle
cost over 50 years would be approximately $1 trillion. That is a large
mountain of cost. I hope we can gather some insight today into what the
Department is doing to try to reduce those costs.
In addition today, we want to focus on a number of issues, but
primarily, we want to understand how the Department has been executing
to the baseline for the JSF program since last year, how the Services
are refining their responses to the JSF delays that emerged 2 years
ago, and what effects those delays may have on our forces.
Today we will hear from:
Lieutenant General Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF,
Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program
Vice Admiral Walter M. Skinner, USN Principal Military
Deputy Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition)
Lieutenant General Charles R. Davis, USAF, Military
Deputy Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition
There are worrisome prospects for the future of tactical aviation
programs, particularly in terms of having the numbers of aircraft we
need to keep from hollowing out our tactical aviation forces. We have
been following your progress in trying to mitigate or close these gaps.
For example, the subcommittee has have been following the
Department of the Navy's attempts to reduce the strike fighter
shortfall to manageable levels. Five years ago, the Department of the
Navy was estimating that we would be facing a shortfall in 2017 that,
optimistically, would amount to 125 tactical fighters needed to outfit
our 10 aircraft carrier air wings and 3 Marine Corps air wings. Three
years ago, based on further analysis, the Navy was estimating that the
maximum shortfall could be nearly twice that large, or roughly 250
aircraft. Within the past 2 years, the Navy has taken actions, such as
reducing squadron size, conducting service life extensions on some
aircraft, and reducing time aircraft spend in the depots, that could
reduce the gap to as small as 18 aircraft.
Unfortunately, there has been a similar story regarding the Air
Force. Previous Air Force witnesses at our aviation hearings have also
projected a potential shortfall of Air Force tactical fighters in
excess of 800 aircraft around 2025. Last year, the Air Force, as a part
of the new Defense strategy, reduced fighter force structure. It is not
clear to what extent this change in demand for tactical fighters has
ameliorated the shortfall that the Air Force had been projecting, but
we hope to hear more about that this afternoon.
Last year, the Air Force was also investigating ways to extend the
service lives of its A-10, F-15, and F-16 aircraft to help mitigate the
gap between requirements and aircraft that it foresees. We would like
to get an update on where these various life extension efforts stand
and the confidence with which we can pursue these efforts.
Although this is not necessarily a modernization issue yet, we
would also like to get an update from General Davis on the full flight
release of the F-22 aircraft after concerns about the F-22 life support
system and hypoxia, including a brief description on what the Air Force
has concluded and what actions you have taken to minimize the risk to
F-22 crews.
There are a number of other issues that we may discuss, but in the
interest of time, I will stop here. Again, I want to thank our
witnesses. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Manchin. I would now like to recognize Senator
Wicker, who will give his opening statement and ask questions.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding the hearing. Thank you for your kind words of welcome
to the subcommittee. Thank you to our three witnesses today for
your selfless service to our Nation. I look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Manchin, I also want to take a brief moment to
congratulate you on your appointment as chair of the Airland
Subcommittee. Our subcommittee responsibilities are immense.
They include programmatic and budget oversight of most Army and
Air Force programs, as well as oversight of the Navy and Marine
Corps tactical aviation activities. As ranking member I look
forward to working with you to ensure that our Armed Forces
remain the best trained, best equipped, and most professional
fighting force in the world.
I would like to begin by saying that I remain deeply
concerned about the fiscal year 2013 defense authorization
conference committee decision, made behind closed doors and
without consultation of all conferees, which enabled the Air
Force to begin implementation of its total force plan (TFP). I
am convinced that some elements of the TFP were shortsighted
and may adversely impact our intra-theater airlift capability
at a time when our Services are evolving toward a more
rotational deployment model.
Similar to our committee's bipartisan efforts last year, I
look forward to working with the chair on initiatives to help
ensure the Air Force makes its force structure decisions based
on the best possible understanding of long-term global force
requirements. These decisions should not be based solely on
self-imposed resource constraints.
Now, as to tactical air superiority, our military has
fought four major regional conflicts over the last 22 years--
Kuwait, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. America's security
challenges continue to persist across the globe, from the
defiance of a volatile and dangerous dictator in North Korea to
the scourge of transnational terrorism that persists in sub-
Saharan Africa. Effectively dealing with our current and
potential adversaries means we must be prepared to act across
the continuum of conflict, from lending humanitarian assistance
in the wake of natural disasters to combating terrorism and
cyber attacks, and we must be ready to fight and win a high-end
conventional war against a nuclear-armed foe. Air power will no
doubt continue to play a central role in our national security.
Since 1953, no U.S. ground personnel have been killed by an
attack from enemy aircraft. That is a success story. America's
superiority and dominance in the air protects our homeland,
deters potential adversaries, and ensures that our joint and
coalition forces never have to question whether the aircraft
flying above them is friend or foe.
However, our air dominance is being challenged. Both Russia
and China are currently fielding fifth generation fighters.
Like our ground forces, America's combat air assets are worn
out and spread thin after 2 decades of deferred modernization
programs and curtailed purchases of key platforms.
The service lives of many of these aircraft now extend
beyond 30 years, in some cases well beyond 30 years. These
extensions come at a price. Extending the lives of legacy
aircraft means increased operation and maintenance (O&M) costs,
as well as decreased technical superiority gaps.
America must continue to be able to deter or defeat any
threat, be it an asymmetric threat from a terrorist
organization or a conventional challenge from a near-peer
competitor. To do so we must be able to modernize and sustain
our military, including our tactical aircraft. We cannot
continue to kick the modernization can down the road, and I
hope we agree on that, Mr. Chairman.
Successfully modernizing means we must be cognizant of the
negative impact of the overly expensive and slow acquisition
process we currently have. We must find ways to deliver new and
innovative systems on time and on budget. Changing the system
will require the combined efforts of Congress, DOD, and
industry.
Specifically, number one, DOD must get its acquisition
process in order by defining program risks upfront, setting
realistic requirements, adequately prioritizing R&D, and
leveraging the power of competition.
Number two, DOD's industry partners must submit realistic
contract proposals and be held accountable to their contractual
obligations.
Number three, Congress must uphold our responsibility to
provide timely and adequate funding for key acquisition
programs to help ensure predictability and long-term
affordability for DOD and our foreign government partners.
Let me conclude by observing that national defense is
solely a Federal responsibility, but it requires assistance
from all levels of government and civilian industry. We need
our States to maintain or implement business-friendly policies
that will encourage the industrial base to grow and add high
tech manufacturing jobs. We need defense companies to meet
their contractual obligations to the taxpayer by delivering
products on time and on budget.
Finally, we need better cooperation and transparency
between the executive branch, DOD, and Congress, in order to
ensure all parties fully understand our national security
challenges and the means our military leaders require to meet
them.
I hope our witnesses today will elaborate on their
assessment of the long-term impact that reduced defense
spending will have on our industrial base and our ability to
acquire new tactical aircraft on time and on budget.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wicker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Roger F. Wicker
introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I thank our
witnesses for their attendance today and their selfless service to our
Nation. I look forward to your testimony.
Senator Manchin, I also want to take a brief moment to congratulate
you on your appointment as chairman of the Airland Subcommittee. Our
subcommittee responsibilities are immense. They include programmatic
and budget oversight of most Army and Air Force programs, as well as
oversight of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation activities. As
Ranking Member, I look forward to working with you to ensure that our
Armed Forces remain the best-trained, best-equipped, and most
professional fighting force in the world.
air force total force plan
Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak on a personal point of
privilege before I provide some brief comments on the tactical aviation
programs for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
I remain deeply concerned about the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2013 conference decision--made behind closed doors
and without consultation of all conferees--that enabled the Air Force
to begin implementation of its Total Force Plan (TFP).
I am convinced that some elements of the TFP were shortsighted.
They may adversely impact our intra-theater airlift capability at a
time when our Services are evolving towards a more rotational
deployment model. Mr. Chairman, similar to our committee's bipartisan
efforts last year, I look forward to working with you on initiatives to
help ensure the Air Force makes its force structure decisions based on
the best possible understanding of long-term global force requirements.
These decisions should not be based solely on self-imposed resource
constraints.
tactical air superiority
Our military has fought four major regional conflicts (Bosnia,
Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq) over the last 22 years. America's
security challenges continue to persist across the globe, from the
defiance of a petulant leader in North Korea, to the scourge of
transnational terrorism that persists in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Effectively dealing with our current and potential adversaries means we
must be prepared to act across the continuum of conflict, from lending
humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters to combatting
terrorism and cyber-attacks. We must be ready to fight and win a high-
end conventional war against a nuclear armed foe.
Airpower will no doubt continue to play a central role in our
national security. Many Americans may be surprised to learn that no
U.S. ground personnel have been killed in an attack by an enemy
aircraft since 1953. America's superiority and dominance in the air
protects our homeland, deters potential adversaries, and ensures that
our joint and coalition forces never have to question if the aircraft
flying above them is friend or foe.
However, our air dominance is being challenged; both Russia and
China are currently fielding fifth-generation fighters. Like our ground
forces, America's combat air assets are worn out and spread thin after
two decades of deferred modernization programs and curtailed purchases
of key platforms. The service lives of many of these aircraft now
extend beyond 30 years. These extensions come at a price. Extending the
lives of legacy aircraft means increased operation and maintenance
costs as well as decreased technical superiority gaps.
maintaining air dominance
America must continue to be able to deter or defeat any threat, be
it an asymmetric threat from a terrorist organization or a conventional
challenge from a near-peer competitor. To do so, we must be able to
continually modernize and sustain our military--including our tactical
aircraft. We cannot continue to kick the modernization can down the
road. Successfully modernizing means we must be cognizant of the
negative impact of the overly expensive and slow acquisition process we
currently have in place. We must find ways to deliver new and
innovative systems on time and on budget. Changing the system will
require the combined efforts of Congress, the Department of Defense,
and industry.
Specifically:
(1) DOD must get its acquisition process in order by defining
program risks upfront, setting realistic requirements, adequately
prioritizing research and development, and leveraging the power of
competition;
(2) DOD's industry partners must submit realistic contract
proposals and be held accountable to their contractual obligations; and
(3) Congress must uphold its responsibility to provide timely and
adequate funding for key acquisition programs to help ensure
predictability and long-term affordability for DOD and our foreign
government partners.
conclusion
Let me conclude by observing that national defense is a Federal
responsibility that requires assistance from all levels of government
and civilian industry. We need our States to maintain or implement
business-friendly policies that will encourage the industrial base to
grow and add high-tech manufacturing jobs. We need defense companies to
meet their contractual obligations to the taxpayer by delivering
products on time and on budget. Finally, we need better cooperation and
honesty between the executive branch, the Defense Department, and
Congress, in order to ensure all parties fully understand our national
security challenges and the means our military leaders require to meet
them.
As such, I hope our witnesses today will elaborate on their
assessment of the long-term impact that reduced defense spending will
have on our industrial base and our ability to acquire new tactical
aircraft on time and on budget.
With that in mind, I look forward to the testimony of all the
witnesses.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
I think at this time, Senator Wicker, I know that you have
to leave soon, we'll go back to regular order then, if we can.
We'll start with brief comments from our three presenters
today, if you will. General Bogdan, if you would like to start,
we'd like to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, F-35 LIGHTNING II JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
General Bogdan. Thank you, sir. Chairman Manchin, Senator
Wicker: Thank you for the opportunity to address this
subcommittee regarding the F-35 Lightning.
I first came to the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) in
August 2012, serving as the Deputy to the then-Program
Executive Officer (PEO), Vice Admiral Dave Venlet. On December
6, 2012, I took over as the PEO from Admiral Venlet, who left
me a program that was well on its way to getting its legs back
underneath.
Despite a turbulent past, the F-35 program is making steady
progress today. This progress may not be as fast as you and I
may like, but the size and the complexity of the program do
contribute to this inertia. I hope that I'll be able to leave
you today with an understanding of where the F-35 program is,
where it is headed in the future, and what we are doing to
ensure its success.
Today, the program continues to make slow but steady
progress and is moving forward in a disciplined manner. Let me
highlight a few of the program's accomplishments in 2012. We
conducted the first in-flight weapons releases from both the F-
35 A and B last year. We stood up our first operational F-35B
squadron at Yuma Marine Corps Air Station. Additionally, the
program began edge-of-the-flight envelope testing to the
aircraft's maximum speed and altitude, and we also began our
high angle of attack testing, all of which to date has been
very successful.
The program also successfully completed a U.S. Air Force
operational evaluation, clearing the way for them to begin
pilot and maintenance training at Eglin Air Force Base.
Additionally, the cost of producing the F-35 continues to come
down for each successive lot of airplanes. For example, Lot 5
airplanes cost 4 percent lower than the previous Lot 4
airplanes, and we expect such reductions to continue.
While the program has continued to progress, there are
still challenges and risks ahead. The biggest technical concern
on the program is the development of software. Although most of
the basic coding of software is complete, the integration of
this software, linking all the systems on the airplane
together, still has a ways to go.
Over the past 2 years, the program office has implemented
many changes in the way software is developed, tested, flight
tested, measured, and controlled by the program office. These
changes are beginning to have a positive effect, and as a
result we are moderately confident that the program will
successfully release our Block 2B and our Block 3I capabilities
in 2015 and 2016. Our Block 2B capability is our initial combat
capability, which we believe the U.S. Marine Corps will
potentially use to declare initial operating capability in
2015.
However, there is more risk to the delivery of our final
block, known as Block 3F, which is the Services' full
warfighting capability. We intend on delivering that by the end
of late 2017 and there is some risk there.
The program office will be conducting a Block 3 critical
design review this summer and that, coupled with at least 6
months of flight testing of the current 2B software, will allow
DOD to assess the likelihood of meeting the Block 3F final
capability requirements in 2017. I will have a better answer
for this committee and for the enterprise by the end of the
summer about how likely it is to meet that final block of
capability.
Other technical risks we continue to monitor include the
helmet-mounted display system, lightning protection, the
tailhook, the fuel dump system, and the maturity of our
autonomic logistics information system (ALIS). The program
office has been working with the contractors and the Navy and
the Air Force systems commands to arrive at solutions for all
these issues.
Affordability remains DOD's and my number one priority. The
program office must execute the development program with
discipline to ensure it can be completed within the time and
the money we have been given. DOD must also continue to drive
the cost of producing F-35s down and continue to attack the
long-term life cycle costs of the F-35 weapons system.
Let me tell you a few things DOD is doing today to ensure
that in the long-run this aircraft is affordable. First, we've
been studying all areas of sustainment to identify areas for
cost reduction in what we call our business case analysis. We
will continue this analysis through the summer and I will
report those results when it is completed.
Second, the program office intends on injecting competition
into various portions of the overall sustainment effort. We
conducted an industry day in November 2012 to see if there were
both domestic and foreign companies that had the capacity, the
capability, and the desire to compete for various sustainment
areas, including managing our global supply chain, producing
support equipment, operating our training centers, and
administering our ALIS.
Additionally, the program has instituted a robust
reliability and maintainability program that is systematically
identifying all the parts and systems on the aircraft that
today require repairs all too frequently, and DOD is standing
up its organic depots to improve the quality, throughput, and
turnaround times for parts repairs. DOD is committed to doing
everything it can to drive the cost of sustaining the F-35 down
to a level that is considered affordable by all the Services,
the partners, and foreign military sales (FMS) customers.
In summary, I believe the basic F-35 aircraft design is
sound and the program office can deliver on our commitments. As
in any complex development program, there are still challenges
and risks ahead. I intend to continue to lead this program with
discipline, transparency, and accountability and we will
continue to drive costs out of this program.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the F-35 and
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Bogdan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF
Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address this
subcommittee regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the Department of Defense`s
largest acquisition program, and its importance to our national
security is immense. The F-35 will form the backbone of U.S. air combat
superiority for generations to come. It will replace the legacy
tactical fighter fleets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps with a
dominant, multirole, fifth-generation aircraft, capable of projecting
U.S. power and deterring potential adversaries. For our international
partners and foreign military sales customers who are participating in
the program, the F-35 will become a linchpin for future coalition
operations and will help to close a crucial capability gap that will
enhance the strength of our security alliances. The fiscal year 2014
budget includes $8.4 billion for continued system development, test and
procurement of 29 F-35 aircraft.
It is our duty to produce the next generation fighter jet for the
United States and our allies, understanding that we live in a resource
constrained world. The current F-35 program is focused on completing
System Design and Development within the time and funding planned,
producing aircraft that are affordable and achieve mission needs, and
sustaining fielded aircraft in an effective and economical fashion.
This plan, which has been in place since 2012, is already resulting in
steady progress, however, I am pressing for faster and stronger
performance in the upcoming year. There are 29 F-35s now deployed in
operational and training squadrons at three locations and the program
has started a slow shift of focus to production and long-term
sustainment without losing the momentum we see in the development and
flight test programs. Affordability remains my number one priority. We
must use all of our energy finishing development within the time and
money we have, we must continue to drive the cost of producing F-35s
down, and we must start today to attack the long term life cycle costs
of the F-35 weapon system.
program accomplishments in the last year
The F-35 program team achieved a number of accomplishments in 2012,
such as the delivery of 30 aircraft, including the last System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) aircraft (CF-5, delivered to
Patuxent River) and jets delivered to training squadrons at Eglin Air
Force Base and the stand up of the first USMC operational squadron at
Yuma.
F-35s flew 1,984 sorties for a total of 3,118 hours last year,
bringing the total hours flown by F-35s to 5,487. We conducted the
first in-flight weapons releases from the F-35 A and B and enabled the
first stand up of an operational F-35B squadron at Yuma Marine Corps
Air Station. The F-35C has shown good progress in testing the modified
tailhook, although we have more work to do. Additionally, the program
began high angle of attack testing which has been successful to date,
completed the Air Force's F-35A Operational Utility Evaluation, and
enabled the start of pilot and maintenance training activities at Eglin
Air Force Base for both the Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. From a
business perspective, the F-35 program successfully closed negotiations
on the Lockheed Martin Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lot 5 and
modified SDD contracts. Additionally, negotiations for the Pratt &
Whitney engine contracts for LRIP lot 5 and modifications for the SDD
contract were completed in February, 2013.
impacts of the sequester
Sequestration, as well as congressionally directed reductions to
the System Design and Development program in fiscal year 2013, has the
potential to either stretch the development program out or reduce the
capabilities we can deliver to the warfighter. My first priority is to
preserve the development of Block 2B and 3I capabilities. Block 2B is
important because it is the initial warfighting capability of the F-35
and potentially the capability that could be used to declare USMC
Initial Operating Capability. I have moderate confidence that Block 2B
and 3I will be delivered on time with all the capability we have
promised. However, I am less optimistic about Block 3F, our final
capability. Without some form of payback of the SDD money we will lose
to Congressional cuts and sequestration, we will not be able to deliver
3F on time with full capability. Additionally, if the Department and
the Services decide to take reductions to procurement funding, fewer
aircraft may be ordered in LRIP Lot 7 (fiscal year 2013 budget) for
Department of the Navy and the Air Force. While this would slightly
lessen the cost burden imposed by concurrency, fewer aircraft in LRIP
Lot 7 would increase the unit cost of the remaining aircraft in Lot 7.
Our international partners are closely watching unit cost and are
highly sensitive to cost increases. These increases may result in
reduction of their aircraft quantities, which would in turn increase
unit costs even more and cause them to relook their commitment to the
program. Moreover, furloughing my government civilians will have
immediate negative consequences. As one example, due to the reduction
in personnel and base operating support, my test and evaluation program
will be reduced from currently operating on a 6-day a week schedule
with extended hours to one that will likely be limited to 4 days a week
and only 8 hours a day. I estimate that this could reduce the F-35
flight test program's productivity by nearly one-third, significantly
slowing the program's forward momentum.
international partnership
The F-35 program continues to be the Department of Defense's
largest cooperative program, with eight Partner countries participating
under Memorandums of Understanding for System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) and for Production, Sustainment and Follow-on
Development (PSFD). The eight partner countries include the United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark,
and Norway. The partners recently met and all expressed their continued
commitment and support for the program. However, as stated above, they
are all watching closely how the DOD deals with our budget cuts and the
impact this has on the cost of the program.
In October 2010, Israel signed a letter of offer and acceptance to
purchase 19 F-35A aircraft for $2.75 billion, with deliveries scheduled
to begin in 2016. In June 2012, Japan signed an agreement to purchase
the first 4 of a planned acquisition of 42 F-35A aircraft for $741
million with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2016. The F-35 team
developed a proposal to support the Republic of Korea's competitive
Request for Proposal for acquisition of its future fighter. Selection
is expected in the summer of 2013.
development program performance
The F-35 development program continues to execute to the baseline
approved at the March 2012 Milestone B recertification Defense
Acquisition Board. My biggest concern in development is software. I am
moderately confident that the program will successfully release the
Block 2B and 3I capability by 2015 and 2016, respectively. However, I
see more risk to the delivery of Block 3F, our full warfighting,
capability by 2017. I will have better information to assess if we can
meet our Block 3F promises after the Block 3 Critical Design Review and
after at least 6 months of flight test on our 2B software, both of
which are currently scheduled for early summer 2013.
In the past year, the F-35 program has implemented a major shift in
the oversight and management of software development, which has
resulted in reduced times to develop and integrate software, reduced
errors in the software code developed, and a marked increase in the
cooperation and understanding between the prime contractor and the
program office. I have directed a Capability Block Plan that is an
integrated roadmap that defines the incorporation of capabilities for
the F-35 program. Additionally, I have instituted a Block Review Board
which places the government in charge of all configuration, capability,
and schedule changes to software development. We have also implemented
robust systems engineering/technical review process for all development
work to provide greater knowledge and defined decision gates to
determine if the system configuration under consideration is mature
enough to proceed to the next phase. This, coupled with automated tools
and processes, has resulted in an almost 10-fold reduction in software
release build time, and we have seen corresponding improvements in
configuration management, test automation and error detection and
resolution. However, we still have challenges and the prime contractor
and its subs still need to improve both the speed and quality of
software development to be able to catch up from previous software
delays.
In addition to software challenges, the three F-35 variants are
encountering the types of development problems typically experienced on
advanced state-of-the-art, high performance aircraft development
programs at this stage of maturity. While we still have technical risks
on the program, I have confidence that the known technical issues we
have will be solved and properly integrated into the F-35. The Helmet
Mounted Display System (HMDS) for the F-35 is a major technological
advance and a design challenge. Issues faced by the program office over
the past year relative to the HMDS were ``green glow'' or insufficient
helmet display contrast, latency of the displayed information,
``jitter'' or lack of stability of the displayed symbology, night
vision acuity and alignment. We executed a short flight test program
from November 2012 to March 2013 dedicated solely to exploring and
understanding the helmet problems using developmental and operational
test pilots flying a number of operationally representative missions.
As a result of this testing, the program now understands and has
mitigated the effects of ''green glow'', latency, jitter and alignment.
Additional work still needs to be done to ensure that the program has a
night vision camera that is effective for operations as our testing
indicated that the current night vision camera is unsuitable for
operational use. As risk reduction, the program continues to fund
development of a night vision goggle-based alternative helmet solution.
The goggle-based helmet development will continue until we see
demonstrated improvement in all of the risk areas of the original
helmet and until the government has secured a price agreement with the
prime contractor showing significant cost reduction in the original
helmet.
During land-based ship suitability testing in 2011, the F-35C
tailhook did not catch the arresting wire at a rate considered to be
acceptable. A Critical Design Review was completed in February 2013 on
a redesigned arresting hook system and modeling and simulation
involving the redesigned hook showed a marked improvement in
performance. Ground test of this newly redesigned hook is scheduled at
Lakehurst, NJ in the fourth quarter of 2013, followed by aircraft
carrier qualifications in third quarter of 2014. Although work remains
to be done, I am confident this new hook will meet our needs.
Early Fuel Dump testing revealed that fuel was migrating within the
wing during fuel dumping and the fuel was impinging on the underside of
the wing. We have designed improved seals within the wing to mitigate
the migration issue and selected a new design of the fuel pump port on
the underside of the wing which appears from initial prototype testing
to resolve the fuel impingement issue.
The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) provides
maintenance, reliability, logistics, and training information to
support sustainment of F-35 aircraft. Currently, ALIS is exhibiting a
level of unreliable data tracking within its health management system.
Additionally, the software for ALIS requires development and time to
mature. I continue to closely watch the progress of ALIS and have put
in place a new systems engineering rigor and a new leadership structure
that has improved performance. The program is delivering incremental
software fixes to address problems more quickly and I have put into
place a plan for a complete end-to-end test to ensure the aircraft and
ALIS can operate together seamlessly.
In 2012, the F-35 SDD Flight Test program exceeded the number of
planned flights, but fell slightly behind in overall test points. The
ITF achieved 1,167 test flights, a 17 percent increase from the total
flights in 2011. The ITF also executed 9,319 test points, which was
roughly 2 percent shy of what was planned. This shortfall was largely
due to restrictions levied on the flight envelope due to problems with
the weapons bay flipper doors, as well as challenges due to software
maturity.
Pratt & Whitney SDD F135 engines have completed a total of 25,296
operating hours, 11,289 hours on flight-test engines, and a total of
4,566 hours of flying time on all three variants of F-35 aircraft.
Pratt & Whitney is currently supporting flight test on all three
variants at three locations. Various engine ``firsts'' were also
achieved including the completion of air-start testing and acceleration
to the F-35's maximum speed of 1.6 Mach.
The F-35 fleet experienced two fleet-wide groundings in January and
February 2013 due to issues with the F135 engines. The first incident
occurred in January 2013. An F-35B was forced to abort a take-off for
what would later be understood to be an improperly crimped fueldraulic
hose in the F135 engine. The F-35B fleet was grounded for 19 days, but
was returned to flight after confirming the integrity of all similar
hoses in the engines. The program office put in place activities to
better monitor and improve the quality of the hoses being provided for
the engine, and continues to track this closely. The second incident
grounded all variants of the F-35 for approximately 7 days and resulted
from a crack discovered in the third stage engine turbine blade. The
engine in question had been flying at the highest heat and most
significant stresses of any of the jets in the test and operational
fleets, which contributed to this crack. After confirming the source of
the crack, the fleet was inspected and returned to flight. Engineering
work continues to assess the long term implications of this turbine
blade crack on the life of the F-35 engine.
production program performance
Costs for production aircraft continue to come down for each
successive lot put on contract. In 2012, Lockheed Martin delivered 30
aircraft, a 57 percent increase over 2011. Lockheed Martin in 2012 did
not deliver all planned aircraft in large part due to a strike by the
International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers that
lasted from April 28th until all members went back to work on July 9th.
Since the strike, performance has been fairly stable and the program
has seen marked improvements in design stability, parts availability,
workforce stability, shop floor discipline and a reduction in scrap,
rework and repair. Overall, production performance is tracking to the
definitized baseline, with factory assembly performance only 2 days
behind plan. With the demonstrated improvements in all production areas
leading to delivery, my level of confidence in the program's ability to
produce high quality F-35s and our ability to eventually ramp up
production is strong.
Pratt & Whitney has delivered 85 engines and 38 lift fans to date.
For 2012, Pratt & Whitney has improved their delivery rate, increasing
from two per month average in 2011 to four per month average in 2012.
Pratt & Whitney product deliveries were interrupted on several
occasions due to technical issues and quality escapes resulting in
product delivery holds and material deficiencies. Lot 4 spare engine
modules and spare parts are tracking behind contract delivery dates and
will not be delivered within the contract period of performance, an
issue my team is addressing.
In September 2012, LM Aero notified the F-35 program office of the
discovery of a specialty metals noncompliance. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) approved
a waiver to allow the program to accept lot 4 through 9 aircraft with
noncompliant specialty metals (magnets) in the radar controller.
USD(AT&L) subsequently approved an amendment to allow the acceptance of
lot 4 aircraft with noncompliant specialty metals in the radar radio
frequency isolators also. A subsequent amendment will extend the waiver
to lot 5 aircraft. All lot 6 aircraft will have compliant radar radio
frequency isolators. I also directed a top-to-bottom assessment of all
companies within the F-35 supply chain. As a result, an additional part
procured from a non-qualifying country was identified. The subsequent
waiver for target assemblies (proximity magnets) approved by USD(AT&L)
was sent to you and the other Defense Committees earlier this month.
The program office, the contractor and the Defense Contract Management
Agency have jointly developed a corrective action plan to assess supply
chain compliance with all legal requirements.
concurrency
The Department of Defense established the F-35 program in 2001 with
a planned measure of concurrent development and production that
attempted to balance cost, risk, and the need for tactical aircraft
modernization. Changes that must be made to the production aircraft due
to problems found in testing are very real and affect schedule and cost
in hardware, software, test and production. However, concurrency is a
transient issue in which risks progressively decline through the end of
SDD and the test program. Concurrency risk will progressively recede
between now and 2015, when second-life fatigue testing should complete
for all variants and flight test will be through 80 percent of the
loads envelope.
Concurrency costs are primarily driven by span time for
incorporating changes; the program office and Lockheed Martin have
implemented a concurrency management system to control and expedite the
number of changes cut into production or requiring retrofits. Since
2011 the program has reduced average span times by 5 months, from 18
months to 13 months, as measured from engineering drawing releases to
new parts available for installation into production aircraft. The
continual reduction in span time will significantly reduce the
concurrency impact to the program.
Concurrency costs were originally estimated to be roughly 5 percent
to 8 percent of recurring flyaway costs. Over the past year, the F-35
program has worked with Lockheed Martin to refine the estimate of
concurrency costs based on actual F-35 discrete data results from
qualification events. As a result of this approach, our concurrency
estimate has decreased to 3 percent to 5 percent of recurring flyaway
costs.
operations and sustainment performance
2012 marked the first year of operational performance by F-35 A and
B models in the Air Force and Marine Corps. The program continues to
address the various issues arising from operating an aircraft still in
development and providing the operators improved technical data and
solutions to emerging issues. Overall, the reliability of the weapon
system is improving and the product support integrators are gradually
resolving issues with spares and repair cycle times.
In 2012, the F-35 program began pilot and maintenance training for
both F-35A and F-35B aircraft and as of today, has completed training
for the transition of 37 pilots and 686 maintainers. In cooperation
with the Joint Operational Test Team and Air Force Air Education and
Training Command, the program successfully completed the Ready for
Training Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) which found that the
training system is ``sufficient to meet the relatively low student
training sortie demand of the syllabus'' for the training of
experienced pilots.
In 2013, the focus will be on delivering sustainment capability as
we stand up new bases and squadrons at Edwards Air Force Base, Nellis
Air Force Base and Luke Air Force Base. Additionally, the program will
stand up depot activities for aircraft components at Jacksonville Naval
Air Station, Naval Aviation Depot San Diego, and Warner-Robins Air
Logistics Center, as well as modification lines at Cherry Point Marine
Corps Air Station and Ogden Air Logistics Center.
F-35 Sustainment costs remain a concern across the Department and
to me personally. While the F-35 Joint Program Office and the Services
continued to make progress in 2012 toward reducing sustainment
estimates, there is much more work to be done in this area, and it is
one of my highest priorities. The Services and the Department will
continue to support the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) in its
disciplined approach to analyzing and reducing sustainment costs. The
program office continues to pursue a sustainment Business Case Analysis
to identify areas for reduction. We conducted an Industry Day to foster
competition in several areas of the sustainment program, including
elements of the supply chain, support equipment, training operations
support and Autonomic Logistics Information System administration. The
program has instituted a robust Reliability and Maintainability program
that is systematically identifying cost drivers and optimizing the
maintenance approach for those components while continuing to institute
tighter contract standards for suppliers to drive down repair turn
times. Additionally, the program has instituted a Targeted
Affordability Program that provides an increased emphasis on operations
and sustainment and total ownership costs. We continue to work with the
prime contractors to achieve an efficient Performance Based Logistics
environment at the overarching weapon system level. The ultimate goal
of all of this work is to produce a mutually beneficial sustainment
enterprise that--with relevant metrics and incentives--operates,
manages and supports the global system, while meeting warfighter-
defined readiness and cost objectives.
airframe and propulsion contract actions
The fiscal year 2011 lot 5 airframe contract was definitized in
December 2012 following a ``Should Cost'' review and negotiations that
lasted nearly 14 months. This FPIF contract with Lockheed Martin is
valued at $3.8 billion and procures 32 aircraft (22 F-35A, 3 F-35B, and
7 F-35C) and ancillary equipment. Although negotiations were lengthy,
the parties reached a fair, well-reasoned settlement that caps the
government's liability at a ceiling price of 112 percent, as compared
to 120 percent of the target cost in the prior lot buy. In addition,
for the first time on this program, the government's cost risk is being
mitigated by transferring 50 percent of the cost responsibility for
concurrency to Lockheed Martin. The terms of the contract include a
``cost-sharing/no fee'' arrangement whereby the Government and Lockheed
Martin share equally (50/50) in these costs with no fee for the known
concurrency changes. Negotiations concluded on the fiscal year 2011
FPIF engine contract in February 2013 at a value of $588 million for 32
engines and spares. This contract reflects a 0/100 overrun shareline
with the contractor assuming all cost overrun risk and capping the
government's liability at the negotiated value of the contract, another
first for the program.
An Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) for lot 6 was awarded on
December 28, 2012 for the procurement of up to a total of 31 aircraft
(18 F-35A, 6 F-35B and 7 F-35C). Proposal evaluation is underway for
both the lot 6 (fiscal year 2012) and lot 7 (fiscal year 2013) airframe
procurements. We believe we can have a negotiation settlement for lots
6 and 7 by the end of May 2013, followed by final contract award in
June 2013. By negotiating both lots 6 and 7 together, the program is
striving to get out of the business of doing UCAs and attempting to
align contracting actions with our budget and the actual production of
aircraft. Concurrency sharing and a 0/100 overrun share (contractor
assumes all the risk) will also be part of these contracts. There is no
UCA for the lot 6 (fiscal year 2012) engine procurement and
negotiations are expected to commence this month (April) with closure
planned for summer 2013. The engine fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year
2013 buys will similarly be combined to regain a more appropriate
contracting cadence.
Fixed-price-type contracts are planned for future F-35 aircraft and
F135 engines procurements. The JSF Program Office will ensure that
future U.S. aircraft and engine procurements comply with Section 143 of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2012,
which provides: ``. . . [t]he Secretary of Defense shall ensure each of
the following: (1) That the contract is a fixed-price contract. (2)
That the contract requires the contractor to assume full responsibility
for costs under the contract above the target cost specified in the
contract.''
An effective Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is critical to
monitoring performance and controlling costs. In 2007, a Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) review found the Lockheed Martin
Aeronautics (LM Aero) EVMS to be noncompliant with EVM guidelines.
Although both DCMA and LM Aero engaged in a focused effort to bring the
LM Aero EVMS into compliance, appropriate corrections were not
completed and DCMA decertified the LM Aero EVMS in 2010. LM Aero
created its EVMS Corrective Action Plan (CAP) during 2012; actions
include development of new tools and processes as well as modifications
to core management processes. This CAP was accepted by the DCMA in
February 2013. After an 8-12 month timetable to complete elements of
the CAP, DCMA will start its re-certification process. In accordance
with DOD Federal Acquisition Regulations, the DCMA imposed a 5 percent
withhold against progress payments for new F-35 contracts, starting
with LRIP 5. This 5 percent withhold is a result of the disapproved
status of LM Aero's EVMS. The withhold will remain in place until LM
Aero's EVMS deficiencies are corrected and the EVMS is compliant with
EVM guidelines.
conclusion
My observations and assessments since my arrival on the program
give me reason to believe the basic aircraft design is sound and we can
deliver on our promises to you, the taxpayers and warfighters. While
there is still risk in the program, I have confidence in the resilience
of the plan to absorb expected further learning and discovery and stay
on track, so long as it remains properly resourced.
Software development remains one of my key focus areas. I have
observed past and current performance by industry on software that
gives me concern about the ability to deliver full capability within
the current schedule without improvement in software development and
test performance. The changes implemented by the combined government/
contractor team have improved this outlook, but more work still needs
to be done. The previous PEO developed a solid program baseline, and I
continue to refine the execution of this baseline. However, I need my
industry partners to step up to the plate and execute at the high
levels I know they are capable of.
As in any complex development program there are challenges, but I
believe the enhanced capability of the F-35 will provide the backbone
of the U.S. combat air superiority for generations to come. The
technological capabilities of the aircraft are sound. The program's
management is rising to the challenges of managing this complex system
with discipline, transparency and accountability. Our progress
continues at a slow but steady pace. I intend on completing this
program within the budget and schedule I have been given. I ask that
you hold me, my team, our stakeholders and contractors accountable over
the coming months and years to ensure that we develop and deliver the
warfighting capability this country needs.
Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter Program. I look forward to answering any questions you
have.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, General.
Now we'll hear from Admiral Skinner.
STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Admiral Skinner. Chairman Manchin, Senator Wicker: Thank
you for the opportunity to appear today before your
subcommittee to discuss the Department of the Navy's aviation
programs. On behalf of the Department of the Navy, I thank you
and all members for your steadfast support to our Navy and
Marine Corps who are meeting the Nation's commitments around
the world. I propose to provide a brief statement and submit a
separate formal statement for the record.
The Navy-Marine Corps team is forward-deployed and forward-
engaged performing missions around the globe. Today naval
aviation components are in the skies of Afghanistan protecting
troops and Afghan civilians on the ground, providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) off the
coast of Korea, over the Sea of Japan, the Persian Gulf, and
the Horn of Africa, and they are providing maritime security
along the world's vital sea lanes, and standing as a force of
deterrence to those who would do harm to our Nation or our
Nation's interests.
In support of the Defense Strategic Guidance, we are also
developing and recapitalizing to support the President and the
Secretary of Defense's strategic priorities to rebalance to the
Pacific, to ensure we provide the capability and the capacity
to maintain an important presence in this region today and for
the foreseeable future. We continue to assess and reshape our
naval aviation plan to reflect the priorities of this defense
strategy, with the reality of fact-of-life top-line reductions
consistent with the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. As such,
this year's aviation and strike weapons plan strikes a balance
between capacity, capability, affordability, and
maintainability of the industrial base.
To fulfill our Nation's commitments and strategic
priorities, the Department of the Navy's 2014 aviation budget
request includes funding for R&D and procurement of 165
aircraft and more than 2,400 strike weapons. We have important
work to do to close out-year capability gaps and risks. In
doing so, however, we are working to deliver the full
capability and capacity that our warfighters need in an
affordable manner.
For example, we are increasing implementation of new cost
reduction initiatives, like competition and early standup of
depot maintenance, striving to use multi-year procurement
strategies and strengthening an acquisition workforce culture
to ensure we provide the best return on investment and be the
best possible stewards of the taxpayers' monies.
Ultimately, we recognize that as we balance requirements,
manage the increasing pressure to our top line, and factor in
industrial base considerations, it is ever more important that
our naval aviation programs closely align with not only the
priorities outlined in the new defense strategy, but that
government and industry continues to work together to increase
efficiencies and improve affordability to support our current
forces and help us build the future force of naval aviation.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before your subcommittee today and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM W. Mark Skinner, USN
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, we thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Department of the Navy's aviation programs. Our
testimony will provide background and rationale for the Department's
fiscal year 2014 budget request for aviation programs aligning to our
strategic priorities and budgetary goals.
The United States is a maritime nation with global
responsibilities. Our Navy and Marine Corps' persistent presence and
multi-mission capability represent U.S. power projection across the
global commons. They move at will across the world's oceans, seas and
littorals, and they extend the effects of the sea-base deep inland.
Naval Aviation provides our Nation's leaders with ``offshore options.''
We enable global reach and access, regardless of changing
circumstances, and will continue to be the Nation's preeminent option
for employing deterrence through global presence, sea control, mission
flexibility and when necessary, interdiction. We are an agile strike
and amphibious power projection force in readiness, and such agility
requires that the aviation arm of our naval strike and expeditionary
forces remain strong.
There are several central themes to our 2014 Naval Aviation Budget
plan: fifth generation fighter/attack capability; persistent multi-role
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; supporting capabilities
such as electronic attack, maritime patrol, and vertical lift; robust
strike weapons programs; and targeted modernization of the force for
relevance and sustainability.
First, we are acquiring F-35 fifth generation fighter/attack
aircraft while maintaining sufficient legacy aircraft inventory
capacity. Our plan will integrate fifth generation technologies into
the carrier air-wing and expeditionary forces while maintaining and
modernizing the capability of the legacy fleet. The F-35B will replace
three Marine Corps legacy aircraft: F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B. The F-35C
will complement the capabilities of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E/A-
18G. We have maintained our F-35B and F-35C procurement profile
achieving the program procurement stability in line with the
improvements in program accountability, discipline and transparency.
The overall F-35 development program is adequately resourced and has
realistic schedule planning factors to complete System Development and
Demonstration (SDD). Although challenges still remain, the Navy and
Marine Corps are fully committed to the F-35B and F-35C variants as we
believe this aircraft is on sound footing towards delivering full Block
3 capabilities.
The F/A-18E/F will continue to receive capability enhancements to
sustain its lethality well into the next decade. Future avionics
upgrades will enable network-centric operations for situational
awareness and transfer of data to command-and-control nodes.
To meet the demand for persistent, multi-role intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, the Navy and Marine
Corps are building a balanced portfolio of manned and unmanned
aircraft, leveraging other service capacity where able, but valuing the
unique contribution of maritime ISR. Unmanned systems have experienced
high growth in the past decade and have proved to be invaluable assets
for the joint force commanders. Because of their increasing presence,
importance, and integration on the maritime and littoral battlefields,
the roadmaps for the unmanned air systems are now included alongside
the manned aircraft platforms in the mission categories they serve. The
Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) air
system will provide a persistent aircraft carrier-based reconnaissance
and strike capability to support carrier air-wing operations beginning
by the end of the decade. MQ-4C Triton will provide persistent land-
based maritime surveillance and complement our P-8 Multi-Mission
Maritime Aircraft; MQ-8 Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) will provide ISR support to our Littoral Combat
Ships (LCS); and smaller unmanned systems as the RQ-21A Small Tactical
Unmanned Aircraft System and RQ-7B Marine Corps Tactical Unmanned
Aerial System (UAS) will provide the shorter duration, line-of-sight
reconnaissance capability essential for the unit level.
The fiscal year 2014 budget request enables Naval Aviation to
continue recapitalization of our aging fleets of airborne early
warning, maritime patrol, electronic attack, and vertical lift
platforms.
The Department is recapitalizing our fleet of E-2C airborne early
warning aircraft with the E-2D. E-2D integrates a new electronically-
scanned radar that provides a two-generation leap in technology with
the capability to detect and track emerging air and cruise missile
threats in support of Integrated Air and Missile Defense. We continue
efforts to replace our aged fleet of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft with
a modern P-8A equipped with a sensor suite that provides persistent
undersea and anti-surface warfare capabilities. Electronic attack
capabilities, both carrier-based and expeditionary, continue to mature
with plans to field 16 EA-18G squadrons, while we also continue
development of the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) to replace the legacy
ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System.
The Navy and Marine Corps are participating in Joint Future
Vertical Lift efforts to identify leverage points for future rotorcraft
investment. Currently, the Department continues to modernize vertical
lift capability and capacity with procurement of MH-60R/S, AH-1Z, UH-
1Y, CH-53K, MV-22B, and the fleet of Presidential Helicopters (VXX
program).
Finally, within our fiscal year 2014 budget request, the Department
is continuing investments in the strike weapons programs that enable
any deterrence or combat operation to ultimately succeed. Strike
weapons investments include the Air Intercept
Missile/AIM-9X Block 2; Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II); the Joint
Standoff Weapon (JSOW C-1); Tactical Tomahawk Cruise Missiles (TACTOM/
BLK IV); and the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). These
capabilities ensure our Navy and Marine Corps warfighters can and will
dominate in the air, on the world's oceans, seas and littorals, and in
any land-combat operation.
tactical aviation (tacair)
F-35B/F-35C Lightning II
The Department of the Navy remains firmly committed to both the F-
35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant and the F-35C
Carrier Variant (CV) of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, as they
are essential to our immediate and long-range Navy and Marine Corps
aviation strategy and the Nation's security. F-35 will supplant the
Navy's aging TACAIR fleet by replacing the Navy and Marine Corps legacy
F/A-18 A-D Hornet and the Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier. The incorporation
of F-35B and F-35C aircraft into our naval force will provide the
dominant, multi-role, fifth-generation capabilities that are essential
across the full spectrum of combat operations to deter potential
adversaries and enable future naval aviation power projection.
The Marine Corps will leverage the F-35B's capabilities to ensure
our TACAIR is able to provide the fifth-generation benefits to our
ground warriors. The concept is one aircraft, capable of multiple
missions, providing the MAGTF with flexible expeditionary basing and
superior technology to dominate the fight. Our requirement for
expeditionary tactical aircraft has been demonstrated repeatedly since
the inception of Marine aviation almost 100 years ago today. From the
expeditionary airfields and agile jeep carriers, to close air support,
to forward basing on cratered runways and taxiways throughout Iraq, and
strikes from the sea in Libya to today's fight in Afghanistan, our
ability to tactically base fixed-wing aircraft has been instrumental to
our success on the battlefield. Given the threats we will face in the
future, the F-35B is clearly the aircraft of choice to meet our
expeditionary operating requirements at sea and ashore. It is the
interoperability catalyst that optimizes our TACAIR effectiveness and
will generate unprecedented strategic and operational agility within
our MAGTF's to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in
operational scenarios that cannot be addressed by current legacy
aircraft. Similarly, in the Carrier Battle Group, the F-35C complements
the F/A-18E/F Block II and EA-18G in providing survivable, long-range
strike capability and persistence in an access-denied environment. F-
35C will provide the Carrier Strike Group Commanders greater tactical
agility and strategic flexibility to counter a broad spectrum of
threats and win in operational scenarios that cannot be addressed by
current legacy aircraft.
With the resources applied to the F-35 program at the March 2012
Milestone B recertification and reflected in fiscal year 2014
President's budget request, the overall F-35 development program is
adequately resourced with realistic schedule planning factors to
complete SDD. The SDD contract renegotiation has been completed and
includes these updated planning factors. Although challenges still
remain, this plan has strong support within the Department of the Navy
as we believe it places the development program on sound footing
towards delivering full Block 3 capabilities.
DOD established the F-35 program with a planned measure of
concurrent development and production that balanced cost, risk, and
need for TACAIR modernization. Concurrency, however, is a transient
issue in which risks progressively decline through the end of SDD. Over
the past year, the F-35 program has worked with Lockheed Martin to
implement a concurrency management structure and refine the estimate of
concurrency costs based on discrete test and qualification events. As
more testing is completed, concurrency risks are progressively reduced
as the design is confirmed or issues identified requiring changes are
incorporated. Earlier aircraft are open to a greater need for changes,
and as succeeding Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots are built,
their cumulative requirements for retrofit modifications decline.
Furthermore, beginning with LRIP 5, Lockheed Martin is contractually
obligated to share in the costs associated with concurrency.
F-35 sustainment costs remain a concern. The Navy continues to
support the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) in its disciplined approach
to analyzing and reducing sustainment costs. While the JPO and the
Services made progress this past year identifying approximately $30
billion (callendar year 2012 money) in projected life-cycle savings,
there is more work to do in this area and the focus remains. The Navy,
working in concert with the JPO, will analyze options outside of the
Program Executive Office's (PEO) span of control to reduce operating
cost such as reviewing basing options and sequencing, unit level
manpower/squadron size, and discrete sustainment requirements. Through
these combined efforts, the Department believes the PEO can increase
convergence on an affordable F-35 sustainment strategy that both meets
the required level of Service/Partner performance and lowers the total
life cycle cost of the overall program.
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $1.0 billion in
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&E,N) to continue
the F-35 SDD program and $2.9 billion in Aircraft Procurement, Navy
(APN) for 10 F-35 aircraft (6 F-35B and 4 F-35C) with associated
aircraft hardware, modification requirements, and spares. The request
includes funding for Block 4 for systems engineering and planning to
achieve follow on capabilities for emerging and evolving threats.
Maintaining procurement rate, and an eventual optimum production ramp
rate, is critical towards achieving F-35 affordability goals and
preventing excessive expenditures on aircraft with limited service-life
and decreasing operational relevance.
The Navy is aware of the many challenges that remain on the F-35
program, but the program is improving and showing accountability,
discipline, and transparency. The F-35 is an essential future Navy/
Marine Corps Aviation capability and the Department is fully committed
to the F-35B and F-35C variants of this program. The Navy continues to
closely monitor all F-35 development, production, and sustainment to
ensure that this capability is obtained at the lowest cost, at the
earliest date possible, to meet our national security obligations.
F/A-18 Overview
The F/A-18 Hornets have consistently met readiness and operational
commitments. There are 24 Navy Super Hornet squadrons with 506 F/A-18E/
Fs; deliveries and squadron transitions will continue through 2016.
There are 11 Navy and 11 Marine Corps F/A-18 A-D squadrons with 621
legacy A-D Hornets. While the F/A-18 A-Ds transition to the F/A-18E/F
and F-35, the current inventory of F/A-18 A-Ds will comprise more than
half of the Navy's strike fighter inventory well into 2013. Super
Hornets and legacy Hornets have conducted more than 189,000 combat
missions since September 11, 2001. Over the last 12 years of combat
operations, deployed ashore and aboard our aircraft carriers at sea,
Department of the Navy F/A-18s have provided vital over watch and
direct support to our troops in combat, on the ground, and in multiple
theaters of operation, brought significant precision ordnance and
laser-guided munitions to the fight, and have employed thousands of
rounds of 20-millimeter ammunition supporting forces during strafing
runs.
Both the legacy Hornet and the Super Hornet were procured with an
objective of 20 years' time in service. The average legacy Hornet has
exceeded that goal (73 percent of legacy aircraft exceed 20 years of
age) and the Super Hornet is already at almost 30 percent of its
expected 20-year life. Based on current trends we anticipate that most
aircraft will substantially exceed 20 years in service.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D (Legacy) Hornet
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $59.5 million in
APN is for the continuation of a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
and system upgrades and obsolescence programs for the inventory of 621
legacy F/A-18 Hornets. Funds requested will procure and install SLEP
kits required to extend the service life of select candidate F/A-18 A-D
aircraft to 10,000 flight hours. The High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections
and SLEP modifications can extend the F/A-18 A-D service life beyond
8,000 flight hours. Continued investment in program related engineering
and program related logistics funds within the Operation and
Maintenance, Navy accounts is critical for sustaining the combat
relevancy of the Navy's legacy platforms through the TACAIR transition.
The F/A-18 A-D was designed for, and has achieved, a service life
of 6,000 flight hours. These aircraft have performed as expected
through their design life and now service life management of this
aircraft is intended to extend this platform well beyond its designed
6,000 flight hours. Naval Aviation has been successful in achieving
8,000 flight hours per aircraft and is pursuing a strategy to go as far
as 10,000 flight hours on select aircraft. Ongoing service life
management initiatives continue to demonstrate excellent return on
investment against the effort to close the strike fighter shortfall
gap.
Flying aircraft outside their design life is not without risk and
comes with less predictability and more variability. In order to
mitigate this risk, engineering analysis will continue to ensure our
ability to address these discoveries, lesson burden on the operating
forces, and ensure needed aircraft availability. Fleet Readiness
Centers have the capacity to execute the required number of HFH
inspections and SLEP modifications.
In order to maintain warfighting relevancy in a changing threat
environment, we will continue to procure and install advanced systems
such as Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), Multi-Function
Information Distribution System (MIDS), APG-73 radar enhancements,
Advanced Targeting FLIR (ATFLIR) upgrades, and Litening for the Marine
Corps on selected F/A-18 A-D aircraft.
The continued outstanding efforts of the Navy/Marine Corps team
will further define necessary actions required to manage aging F/A-18
A-D aircraft, address discovery of potentially greater than expected
fatigue and corrosion, and ensure required availability of aircraft
until JSF fleet introduction.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $206.5 million in
APN for tasks common to F/A-18E/F and EA-18G production; $491.9 million
in APN to implement aircraft commonality programs to maintain
capabilities and improve reliability/structural safety of the Super
Hornet fleet; and $21.9 million RDT&E,N to support the F/A-18E/F
Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP).
The F/A-18E/F significantly improves the survivability and strike
capability of the carrier air-wing. The Super Hornet provides increased
combat radius and endurance, and a 25 percent increase in weapons
payload over legacy Hornets. The production program continues to
deliver on-cost and on-schedule.
There are no F/A-18E/F aircraft programmed in fiscal year 2014;
only the 21 EA-18Gs. fiscal year 2013 is the final planned procurement
year to complete the program of record (POR) of 552 F/A-18E/F aircraft.
The congressional add of 11 F/A-18E/F in 2013 changes the total number
of aircraft to 563 which will be incorporated into the POR with the
next budget submission. A multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for 124
F/A-18E/F
Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers (fiscal years 2010 through 2013)
was signed on September 24, 2010. In December 2010, the Secretary of
Defense added 41 F/A-18E/F aircraft to the fiscal year 2012 President's
budget request in fiscal years 2012 through 2014.
All Lot 30 (fiscal year 2006) and beyond F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs
have the APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar system
installed in production, and a retrofit program exists to modify 133
Lot 26-29 Block II aircraft with the AESA Radar. More than 300 APG-79
AESA Radars have been produced to date. The Navy plans to equip all 415
Block II Super Hornets with AESA Radars, providing the Super Hornet a
significant increase in detection range, lethality and survivability
over the legacy Hornets. Successfully deployed since 2007, AESA Radar
equipped squadrons are highly valued by fleet commanders because of
their ability to share tactical battle space management data with the
non-AESA Radar Tactical Aircraft in the carrier battle group. The F/A-
18E/F and EA-18G with the APG-79 are force multipliers.
Production engineering support (PES) and integrated logistics
support (ILS) funded efforts common to both F/A-18E/F and EA-18G
aircraft are included in the F/A-18E/F budget lines independent of
whether F/A-18E/F aircraft are being procured. These two support cost
elements are not proportional to the number of aircraft being procured
and are not duplicative to the funding in PES and ILS of the EA-18G
budget.
The $491.9 million in APN implements commonality efforts to
maintain capabilities and improve reliability/structural safety of the
Super Hornet fleet. The Super Hornet uses an incremental development/
commonality approach to incorporate new technologies and capabilities,
to include: Digital Communication System Radio, MIDS, Joint Tactical
Radio System, JHMCS, ATFLIR with shared real-time video, Accurate
Navigation, Digital Memory Device, Distributing Targeting System,
Infrared Search and Track and continued advancement of the APG-79 AESA
Radar.
The $21.9 million RDT&E,N request supports the F/A-18E/F SLAP
requirement. Currently, the F/A-18E/F fleet has flown approximately 30
percent of the available 6,000 total flight hours. The remaining
service-life will not be adequate to meet operational commitments
through 2035. In 2008, the Navy commenced a three phased F/A-18E/F SLAP
to analyze actual usage versus structural test data and identify the
feasibility of extending F/A-18E/F service life from 6,000 to 9,000
flight hours via a follow-on SLEP. The F/A-18E/F SLAP will identify the
necessary inspections and modifications required to achieve 9,000
flight hours and increase total and arrested landings, and catapults
beyond currently defined life limits and is currently assessed as low
risk. The SLMP philosophy has been applied to the F/A-18E/F fleet at an
earlier point in its lifecycle than the F/A-18 A-D. This will optimize
fatigue life expended, flight hours, and total landings aligning
aircraft service life with fleet requirements.
TACAIR Inventory Management
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to carefully monitor strike
fighter inventory requirements and projected availability. The fiscal
year 2013 President's budget shortfall of 56 was assessed as
manageable. The strike fighter shortfall is currently predicted to peak
at 18 in 2023. The shortfall continues to fall primarily as a result of
decreased F/A-18E/F utilization rates and flight extensions for F/A-18
A-D aircraft after successful completion of the HFH inspections and
repair. The shortfall is based on the following assumptions: The Navy
will maintain its current tactical fixed-wing force structure;
utilization rates will not increase; the delivery rate of F-35B/C does
not slip further to the right; and SLEP efforts on legacy Hornets will
allow most of them to fly past 8,000 flight hours to an extended
authorization of 9,000 hours after completing the HFH inspections with
a subset of those aircraft attaining 10,000 flight hours with SLEP
modifications.
The Marine Corps has been driven to evaluate inventory availability
amongst its Harrier and Hornet fleet in the later years and adjust its
transition priorities and timing. The last active Marine F/A-18
squadron is currently scheduled to transition in 2026, and the current
F/A-18 Reserve squadron does not receive its F-35s until the year 2030.
Additional pressures are felt with an increase of F/A-18 A-D aircraft
reaching 8,000 flight hours and requiring extensive depot time to
inspect, repair, and extend service-life. The Harriers were expected to
complete their transitions in 2022 in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget, and then 2026 in fiscal year 2012 President's budget. The
Harriers are now planned to remain in service until 2030 due to reduced
F-35 ramp rates and the fact that they have more flight hour life
remaining than the Hornets.
As legacy F/A-18 squadrons are reduced, the service shortfall
number must be considered in proportion to the primary mission aircraft
inventory requirement. Due to a lower number of F/A-18 squadrons in the
2023 to 2026 timeframe, the shortfall number associated with the Marine
Corps will have a more significant impact on their few remaining F/A-18
operational squadrons.
Additionally, the AV-8B is operating with an 18 aircraft shortfall.
One AV-8B squadron will be retired at the end of fiscal year 2013 to
meet Marine Corps manpower reductions, allowing the remaining squadrons
to operate with a two aircraft shortfall. In fiscal year 2014, the Navy
will transition two additional squadrons from F/A-18C to F/A-18E and
then redistribute those F/A-18C aircraft amongst the Navy requirements.
The Navy continues to meticulously manage the fatigue life and
flight hours of our tactical aircraft. Since 2004, we have provided
fleet users guidance and actions to optimize aircraft utilization rates
while maximizing training and operational opportunities. The Inventory
Forecasting Tool (IFT) projects the combined effects of transition
plans, attrition, and pipeline requirements on the total strike fighter
aircraft inventory. The IFT is updated in conjunction with budget
submittals to provide forecasts of the strike fighter inventory
compared to the requirements. The tool utilizes these critical
variables to project future inventories--F/A-18E/F and F-35B/C
deliveries, force structure, aircraft usage rates, structural life
limits, depot turnaround time, fatigue life expenditure, arrested and
field landings, and catapult launches.
Airborne Electronic Attack/EA-6B Prowler
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request includes $19.7
million in RDT&E,N for electronic warfare (EW) counter response; $10.1
million RDT&E,N for MAGTF EW, $48.5 million in APN for common airborne
electronic attack (AEA) systems; $18.6 million in APN for all EA-6B
series aircraft; and $14.4 million APN for MAGTF EW.
Currently, 57 EA-6Bs in the Navy and Marine Corps support 51
operational aircraft in 10 Active squadrons, 1 Reserve squadron, and 2
test squadrons. This includes 24 Navy and Marine Corps Improved
Capability (ICAP) II aircraft and 27 ICAP III aircraft. Following the
final Navy EA-6B transition to EA-18G in 2015, all remaining ICAP III
EA-6Bs will transfer to and be operated by the Marine Corps, or be in
pipeline for final disposition. Final retirement of the EA-6B from the
Department's inventory will be in 2019.
Marine aviation is on a path towards a distributed AEA system of
systems that is a critical element in achieving the MAGTF EW vision: a
composite of manned and unmanned surface, air, and space assets, on a
fully collaborative network providing the MAGTF commander control of
the electromagnetic spectrum when and where desired. In development are
the ALQ-231 Intrepid Tiger II communications jammer, UAS EW payloads, a
software reprogrammable payload, and an EW services architecture to
facilitate collaborative networked electronic warfare battle
management.
The Intrepid Tiger II is currently carried on the AV-8B in U.S.
Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) and the 15th
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Intrepid Tiger II and similar
electronic warfare capabilities will eventually be fielded on unmanned,
fixed-wing, and rotary-wing platforms to provide direct AEA support to
the MAGTF. Intrepid Tiger II development and procurement is in response
to Marine Corps requirements for increased precision EW capability and
capacity across the MAGTF and provides EW capability directly to
tactical commanders without reliance upon the limited availability of
the low density/high demand EA-6B Prowler.
Airborne Electronic Attack/EA-18G Growler
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request is $2.0 billion in
APN for procurement of 21 EA-18G aircraft; $11.1 million in RDT&E,N for
integration of jamming techniques optimization improvements and
evolutionary software development; and $257.7 million RDT&E,N for NGJ.
The first EA-18G squadron deployed in an expeditionary role in
November 2010 to Iraq and subsequently redeployed on short notice to
Italy in March 2011, in support of Operation New Dawn (OND) and
Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Since the initial deployment,
Growlers have flown more than 2,300 combat missions. The EA-18G
received accolades from both CENTCOM and Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe for its enabling combat capability contributions to the
battlespace.
In 2009, the Navy began transition from EA-6Bs to EA-18Gs. The
first carrier-based EA-18G squadron deployed in May 2011. All three
active component Navy expeditionary squadrons and four of the 10
carrier based squadrons have completed transition to the EA-18G. The 10
carrier based EA-18G squadrons will fulfill Navy requirements for AEAs;
6 expeditionary EA-18G squadrons will fill the joint, high-intensity
AEA capability required by the Joint Forces Commander previously
fulfilled by the Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B. The Navy will be divested
of EA-6Bs by 2015; the Marine Corps by 2019. The POR is for 135 EA-18G
aircraft, of which 114 have been procured to date. The final
procurement of EA-18Gs is planned for 2014. The EA-18G fleet has flown
approximately 6 percent of the 7,500 total flight hours per aircraft
and are meeting all operational commitments.
The NGJ is new electronic warfare technology that replaces the 40-
year old ALQ-99 system. It is designed to provide modified escort power
in support of joint and coalition air, land, and sea tactical strike
missions. NGJ is critical to the Navy's vision for the future of AEA
strike warfare. Funding is vital to maintain schedule, allowing the
program to transition to the technology development phase and ensure
timely start of the EA-18G long lead integration activities.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $152.0 million in
RDT&E,N for continuation of SDD and added capabilities to include In-
Flight Refueling, Tactical Targeting Network Technology, Secret
Internet Protocol Router Chat, and the Advanced Mid-Term
Interoperability Improvement Program, and $1,264 million in APN for
five Full Rate Production (FRP) Lot 2 aircraft and advance procurement
(AP) for fiscal year 2015 FRP Lot 3 aircraft and EOQ funding for the
proposed MYP for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018.
The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) is the Navy's carrier-based
Airborne Early Warning and Battle Management Command and Control
system. The E-2D AHE provides theater air and missile defense and is
capable of synthesizing information from multiple onboard and off-board
sensors, making complex tactical decisions and then disseminating
actionable information to Joint Forces in a distributed, open-
architecture environment.
Utilizing the newly developed AN/APY-9 Mechanical Electronic Scan
Array radar and the Cooperative Engagement Capability system, the E-2D
AHE works in concert with surface combatants equipped with the Aegis
combat system to detect, track and defeat air and cruise missile
threats at extended range and provide Battle Group Commanders required
reaction time.
The E-2D AHE program is in FRP. On March 1, 2013, the Acquisition
Decision Memorandum was signed and the Secretary of Defense
certification for the fiscal year 2014-2018 MYP was sent to Congress.
Initial operational capability (IOC) is on track for first quarter
fiscal year 2015.
AV-8B Harrier
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $41.6 million in
APN funds to continue the incorporation of Obsolescence Replacement/
Readiness Management Plan systems; electrical and structural changes;
upgrades to air-to-air weapon system employment and integration
components; inventory sustainment and upgrade efforts to offset
obsolescence and attrition; Litening pod upgrades; and AV-8B F402-RR-
408 engine safety and operational changes.
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $35.8 million in
RDTE,N funds to continue design, development, integration and test of
various platform improvements such as: Engine Life Management Program,
escape systems, Joint Mission Planning System, and block upgrades to
various mission systems, communications systems, navigation equipment,
weapons carriage and countermeasures, and the Obsolescence Replacement
(OR)/Readiness Management Plan (RMP).
The AV-8B continues to be deployed heavily in support of
operational contingencies. Each MEU deploys with embarked AV-8Bs. The
AV-8B, equipped with precision weapons, Litening targeting pods with a
video downlink to Rover ground stations, and beyond visual range air-
to-air radar missiles, has continued to be a proven, invaluable asset
for the MAGTF and joint commander across the spectrum of operations. By
the end of 2013, the AV-8B will receive the H6.1 Operational Flight
Program enabling full integration of the Generation 4 Litening
Targeting pod. Based on current F-35B transition plans, the Harrier
out-of-service date has been extended from 2022 to 2030. As a result,
the AV-8B program must focus on sustainment efforts to mitigate
significant legacy inventory shortfalls, maintain airframe sustainment,
and address reliability and obsolescence issues of avionics and
subsystems. Additionally, this aircraft must be funded to maintain
combat relevance to include tactical datalink and sensor improvements
in order provide continued operation in support of operational
contingencies and transition qualified aircrew to the F-35. The current
digital aided close air support technology installed on the AV-8B is
obsolete.
Operation Odyssey Dawn confirmed the expeditionary advantages of
STOVL capabilities by placing the Harrier as the closest fixed-wing
asset to Libya. Such dynamic support slashed transit times to the
battlefield by two-thirds and kept close air support aircraft on
station without strategic tanking assets. Operation Enduring Freedom
has confirmed the sortie generation capability and multi-role nature of
the AV-8B Harrier. Capability upgrades, obsolescence mitigation, and
readiness initiatives must be funded to ensure the AV-8B remains
relevant, healthy and sustained through 2030.
assault support aircraft
MV-22
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $ 43.1 million in
RDT&E,N for continued product improvements and $1.49 billion in APN for
procurement and delivery of 18 MV-22s (Lot 18). fiscal year 2014 will
be the second year of the follow-on V-22 MYP contract covering fiscal
years 2013-2017. The funds requested in the fiscal year 2014
President's budget request fully fund Lot 18, procure long lead items
for Lot 19 and provide the balance of required economic order quantity
funding for the MYP. The Marine Corps continues to field and transition
aircraft on time. The APN request includes $160.8 million to support
the ongoing Operations and Safety Improvement Programs (OSIP),
including correction of deficiencies and readiness.
The follow-on MYP, which begins in fiscal year 2013, will procure
at least 91 MV-22s over 5 years and includes significant savings of
approximately $1 billion when compared to single year procurements. The
stability of the MYP supports the Marine Corps' need to retire old
aircraft and field new and better capabilities. This stability also
benefits the supplier base and facilitates cost reductions on the part
of both the prime contractor and sub-tier suppliers.
Through introduction of the Osprey tilt-rotor capability into
combat, the service has gained valuable insight with respect to
readiness and operating costs. These improvements continue to have a
clear effect on increasing aircraft availability and decreasing flight
hour costs. At the close of fiscal year 2012, the mission capability
rate of the MV-22 increased 8 percent over fiscal year 2011 and the
cost per flight hour decreased 6 percent in the same period. To keep
these improvements on track, a readiness OSIP was introduced into the
fiscal year 2012 President's budget. This OSIP provides a stable source
of crucial modification funding as the Ospreys continue to improve
readiness and reduce operating cost.
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Program
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $503.2 million
RDT&E,N to continue engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) of
the CH-53K. Since completing its critical design review in July 2010,
the CH-53K program commenced system capability and manufacturing
process demonstration, and started fabrication of the first five test
aircraft (one ground test aircraft, four flight test aircraft). During
fiscal year 2014, the program will assemble and check-out the first of
these test articles needed to support developmental test activities and
flight test of the CH-53K.
The new-build CH-53K will fulfill land and sea based heavy-lift
requirements not resident in any of today's platforms, and contribute
directly to the increased agility, lethality, and presence of joint
task forces and MAGTFs. The CH-53K will transport 27,000 pounds of
external cargo out to a range of 110 nautical miles, nearly tripling
the CH-53E's lift capability under similar environmental conditions,
while fitting into the same shipboard footprint. The CH-53K will also
provide unparalleled lift capability under high altitude, and hot
weather conditions, greatly expanding the commander's operational
reach.
Maintainability and reliability enhancements of the CH-53K will
improve aircraft availability and operational effectiveness over the
current CH-53E with improved cost effectiveness. Additionally,
survivability and force protection enhancements will dramatically
increase protection for both aircrew and passengers, thereby broadening
the depth and breadth of heavy lift operational support to the Joint
Task Force and MAGTF Commander. Expeditionary heavy-lift capabilities
will continue to be critical to successful land- and sea-based
operations in future anti-access, area-denial environments, enabling
sea-basing and the joint operating concepts of force application and
focused logistics.
The CH-53E aircraft currently in service continue to meet
unprecedented operational demand but are approaching 30 years of
service and growing ever more challenging to maintain. To keep the
``Echo'' viable until the ``Kilo'' enters service, the fiscal year 2014
President's budget requests $67.7 million APN for both near and mid-
term enhancements. These modifications include condition-based
maintenance software upgrades, T-64 engine reliability improvement
program kits, critical survivability upgrade, smart multifunctional
color display and sustainment efforts such as Kapton wiring replacement
and improved engine nacelles.
attack and utility aircraft
UH-1Y//AH-1Z
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $47.1 million in
RDT&E,N for continued product improvements and $821.0 million in APN
for 25 H-1 Upgrade aircraft: 15 UH-1Y and 10 AH-1Z aircraft. The
program is a key modernization effort designed to resolve existing
safety deficiencies, enhance operational effectiveness, and extend the
service-life of both aircraft. The 85 percent commonality between the
UH-1Y and AH-1Z will significantly reduce lifecycle costs and the
logistical footprint, while increasing the maintainability and
deployability of both aircraft. The program will provide the Marine
Corps with 349 H-1 aircraft through a combination of new production and
a limited quantity of remanufacturing.
The H-1 Upgrades Program is replacing the Marine Corps' UH-1N and
AH-1W helicopters with state-of-the-art UH-1Y ``Yankee'' and AH-1Z
``Zulu'' aircraft. The new aircraft are fielded with integrated glass
cockpits, world-class sensors, and advanced helmet-mounted sight and
display systems. The future growth plan includes a digitally-aided,
close air support system designed to tie these airframes, their
sensors, and their weapons systems together with ground combat forces
and capable DOD aircraft. Low-cost weapons such as the Advanced
Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) will increase lethality
while reducing collateral damage.
The UH-1Y aircraft achieved IOC in August 2008 and FRP in September
2008. The ``Yankee Forward'' procurement strategy prioritized UH-1Y
production in order to replace the under-powered UH-1N fleet as quickly
as possible. The AH-1Z completed its operational evaluation (OT-II3C)
in June 2010, and received approval for FRP in November 2010. The AH-1Z
achieved IOC in February 2011. As of March 30, 2013, 104 aircraft (74
UH-1Ys and 30 AH-1Zs) have been delivered to the Fleet Marine Force; an
additional 77 aircraft are on contract and in production. Lots 1-6
aircraft deliveries are complete. The last two aircraft from Lot 7 (the
first two AH-1Z build new (ZBN) aircraft) will deliver in fiscal year
2014. Lot 8 deliveries are progressing on or ahead of schedule. All
aircraft deliveries since Lot 3 have been completed ahead of the
contracted schedule date by an average of 33 days.
In December 2011, to address existing attack helicopter shortfalls,
the Marine Corps decided to pursue an all ZBN procurement strategy and
leave AH-1W airframes in the inventory rather than removing them from
service to begin the remanufacture process. The transition to an all
ZBN airframe strategy began with Lot 10 (fiscal year 2013) as reflected
in the current Marine Corps POR. The previous mix of 131 remanufactured
AH-1Z and 58 ZBN aircraft has been revised to delivery of 37
remanufactured AH-1Z and 152 ZBN aircraft. The total aircraft
procurement numbers remain the same at 160 UH-1Ys and 189 AH-1Zs for a
total of 349 aircraft.
executive support aircraft
VH-3D/VH-60N Executive Helicopter Series
The VH-3D and VH-60N are safely performing the executive lift
mission worldwide. As these aircraft continue to provide seamless
vertical lift for the President and Vice President of the United
States, the Department is working closely with HMX-1 and industry to
sustain these aircraft until a presidential replacement platform is
fielded. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests an investment
of $85.7 million to continue programs that will ensure the in-service
presidential fleet remains a safe and reliable platform. Ongoing
efforts include the Cockpit Upgrade Program for the VH-60N,
Communications Suite Upgrade, Structural Enhancement Program and the
Obsolescence Management Program. The VH-3D Cockpit Upgrade Program, a
fiscal year 2012 new start program, will provide a common cockpit with
the VH-60N and address a number of obsolescence issues. Continued
investments in the in-service fleet will ensure continued safe and
reliable execution of the executive lift mission. These technology
updates for legacy platforms will be directly leveraged for the benefit
of the ensuing replacement program (VXX).
VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request includes $94.2
million for continuing efforts on VXX, the follow-on program for
Presidential helicopters.
Significant progress has been made in the past year and the program
requirements and acquisition strategy have now been approved. The
acquisition approach includes full and open competition for integration
of mature subsystems into an air vehicle that is currently in
production. This strategy will enable the program to proceed directly
into the EMD phase. Contractor proposals are expected this summer for
the EMD effort, along with priced options for production. The milestone
B review and subsequent contract award are planned to occur during
fiscal year 2014. The first of the planned inventory of 21 aircraft
could begin fielding as early as 2020.
fixed-wing aircraft
KC-130J
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $166.7 million for
procurement of one KC-130J's included in the first year of the MYP
request and continued product improvements of $47.6 million. Targeted
improvements include air-to-air refueling hose reel reliability,
aircraft survivability through advanced electronic countermeasure
modernization, and obsolescence upgrades to the Harvest HAWK ISR/weapon
mission kit.
Fielded throughout our Active Force, the Marine Corps declared IOC
for the KC-130J transition in 2005; bringing increased capability,
performance and survivability with lower operating and sustainment
costs to the MAGTF. Continuously forward deployed in support of
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) since 2005, the
KC-130J continues to deliver marines, fuel and cargo whenever and
wherever needed. In 2012 the KC-130J remained in high demand, providing
tactical air-to-air refueling, assault support, close air support and
multi-sensor imagery reconnaissance (MIR) in support of OEF, Special
Purpose MAGTF Afghanistan, and deployed MEUs.
Continuously deployed in support of OEF since fielding in 2010, the
bolt-on/bolt-off Harvest HAWK ISR/weapon mission kit for the KC-130J
continues to provide the extended MIR and close air support required by
Marine forces in Afghanistan. Three mission kits have been fielded to
date, with three more kits on contract to deliver in fiscal year 2014.
Funding included in the fiscal year 2014 budget request will be used to
maintain operational relevance of this mission system through Hellfire
P4 compatibility and the addition of a full motion video transmit and
receive capability.
The Marine Corps has procured 48 KC-130Js, 31 aircraft short of the
79 aircraft POR. The 3 aircraft included in the fiscal year 2013 budget
will complete the Active component (AC) requirement of 51 aircraft. The
Marine Corps will use the AC backup aircraft to accelerate the Reserve
component (RC) transition from the legacy KC-130T aircraft to the more
capable, more efficient, KC-130J beginning in fiscal year 2015.
Aircraft requested in the fiscal year 2014 President's budget request
will further accelerate the RC transition. Delays in procurement would
force the Marine Corps to sustain the KC-130T aircraft longer than
planned at an increased cost.
P-8A Poseidon
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $317 million in
RDT&E,N for integrated development and associated testing and $3.503
billion for procurement of 16 FRP P-8A Poseidon aircraft which are
scheduled to begin delivery in May 2016. APN funding supports advanced
procurement (AP) for the subsequent FRP procurement lot. The P-8A
Poseidon recapitalizes the maritime patrol anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and armed ISR capability currently
resident in the P-3C Orion. The P-8A combines the proven reliability of
the commercial 737 airframe and avionics that enables integration of
modern sensors and robust communications. The program is on track for
IOC in late 2013 when the first squadron will have completed transition
and is ready to deploy. The P-8A program is meeting all cost, schedule,
and performance parameters in accordance with the approved Acquisition
Program Baseline.
In August 2010, the P-8A program obtained Milestone C approval,
authorizing the Navy to proceed with procurement of LRIP Lots 1, 2, and
3 for six aircraft in fiscal year 2010, seven aircraft in fiscal year
2011, and eleven aircraft in fiscal year 2012. The Navy has awarded
contracts for all LRIP aircraft. All six LRIP Lot 1 aircraft have been
delivered to Patrol Squadron 30 at Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL,
and LRIP Lot 2 deliveries are now commencing. The first Fleet squadron
(VP-16) has completed P-3C to P-8A transition training, and the second
squadron transition (VP-5) is underway and on-track. Patrol Squadron 16
continues preparations for the first operational P-8A deployment in
December 2013. The P-8A SDD effort has completed initial operational
test and evaluation (IOT&E), delivered software updates to address
previously identified deficiencies, and initiated testing of these
software updates in preparation for a first quarter fiscal year 2014
follow-on test and evaluation period. Results of operational testing
are being analyzed in preparation for release of the Beyond LRIP report
and subsequent FRP decision review. The production configuration has
been shown to be mature and stable throughout the integrated test and
IOT&E phases. The program has completed proposal evaluations and
expects to complete contract negotiations in time to award the fourth
production lot in June 2013. As fleet deliveries of the Increment 1
configuration accelerate, integration and testing of P-8A Increment 2
capability upgrades continue. In particular, Phase I of Increment 2
multi-static active coherent ASW capability is on-track for flight
testing in fiscal year 2014. fiscal year 2013 began prototyping and
development of the more extensive P-8A Increment 3 upgrades, which
expand the P-8A evolutionary acquisition strategy to deliver the next
level of required P-8A capability.
P-3C Orion
In fiscal year 2014, $37.4 million is requested for P-3C airframe
and mission systems sustainment. Over two-thirds ($26.7 million) is for
wing modifications to support the Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) ``P-3
Fleet Response Plan'', as well as supporting EP-3E requirements, which
are executed within the P-3 Airframe Sustainment Program. The legacy P-
3C fleet continues to provide ASW, ASUW, and ISR support for joint and
naval operations worldwide. The P-3C is being sustained to maintain
warfighting capability and capacity until completion of P-8A transition
in fiscal year 2018.
The P-3C aircraft is well beyond the original planned fatigue life
of 7,500 hours for critical components, with an average airframe usage
of over 18,000 hours. Since February 2005, 174 aircraft grounding
bulletins have impacted 131 P-3 aircraft. In December 2007, the Navy's
ongoing RDT&E funded P-3 Fatigue Life Management Program determined
that in addition to existing structural fatigue issues associated with
the forward lower wing section (Zones 2-4), the lower aft wing surface
(Zone 5) of the P-3 aircraft showed fatigue damage beyond acceptable
risk resulting in the grounding of 39 P-3 aircraft. As of February
2013, a total of 88 aircraft have been grounded for Zone 5 fatigue. P-3
groundings due to known material fatigue will continue for the
remainder of the P-3 program, and unknown fatigue issues will continue
to present persistent risk until P-8A transition is complete. A return
to pre-December 2007 aircraft availability numbers was achieved in
December 2010 and 85 P-3C mission aircraft are available today.
Preserving funding for Zone 5 and outer wing installations is critical
to sustaining the minimum number of P-3Cs until replaced by the P-8A.
The Navy will continue to closely manage the service life of the P-3C
through transition to the P-8A Poseidon.
EP-3 Aries Replacement/Sustainment
In fiscal year 2014, the President's budget request is $55.9
million in APN for EP-3 Aries replacement/sustainment. The APN request
supports the procurement and installation of multi-intelligence
capabilities and modifications necessary to meet emergent classified
requirements. These efforts are necessary to keep the platform viable
until the EP-3 capabilities are recapitalized.
The EP-3E Aries is the Navy's premier manned airborne intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (AISR&T) platform. The
joint airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) common configuration
includes SIGINT spiral upgrades. These upgrades, in conjunction with
Secretary of Defense and the ISR Task Force surge efforts, are fielding
a robust multi-intelligence capability inside the Future Years Defense
Program. Multi-intelligence sensors, robust communication, and data
links employed by the flexible and dependable P-3 air vehicle help
ensure effective AISR&T support to conventional and non-conventional
warfare across the current range of military operations. Operating
around the globe, the EP-3E continues to satisfy critical joint,
combatant commander, and Service airborne ISR priorities and
requirements.
The Navy is in the process of developing the AISR&T family of
systems construct to recapitalize the EP-3 AISR&T capabilities within
existing POR platforms: MQ-4C Triton, VTUAV, P-8A, H-60, and E-2D. The
strategy has been further refined to focus on module systems and
payloads required for the Navy to conduct AISR&T on a variety of
vehicles, providing combatant commanders with scalable capability and
capacity. The inclusive full-spectrum approach of the Navy's sea and
shore-based manned and unmanned platforms aligns with the CNO's
priorities.
unmanned aerial systems
MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aerial System
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget postpones the MQ-4C Triton
(formerly known as BAMS for Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) LRIP
until fiscal year 2015. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget
requests $375.2 million in RDT&E,N to continue Triton SDD; $52.0
million APN for procurement of long-lead materials for the first lot of
LRIP aircraft; and $79.2 million in MILCON to refurbish a maintenance
hangar at NAS Point Mugu, CA, as well as a forward operating base and
hangar for Pacific operations at Andersen AFB, Guam. Though LRIP is
delayed 1 year, Triton will start establishing five globally-
distributed, persistent maritime ISR orbits by providing operational
ISR beginning in fiscal year 2016. The program is scheduled to perform
First Flight this quarter, commencing a rigorous integrated flight test
program, to support Milestone C planned for fiscal year 2015. The MQ-4C
Triton is a key component of the Navy maritime patrol reconnaissance
force. Its persistent sensor dwell, combined with networked sensors,
will enable it to effectively meet ISR requirements in support of the
Navy Maritime Strategy.
The Navy procured two Air Force Global Hawk Block 10 UASs in fiscal
year 2004 for demonstration purposes and to perform risk reduction
activities for the Triton UAS Program. In April 2011, Navy accepted
three additional Block 10 aircraft from the Air Force to be utilized as
spare parts assets. These aircraft, known as BAMS-Demonstrators, have
been deployed to CENTCOM's AOR for over 4 years. These demonstration
assets are adequate to cover all Navy needs through the transition to
Triton in fiscal year 2016.
MQ-8B Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and
Associated Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) Efforts
The MQ-8 Fire Scout is an autonomous VTUAV designed to operate from
all air-capable ships, carry modular mission payloads, and operate
using the Tactical Control System and line-of-sight tactical common
data link. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $48.7
million of RDT&E,N to continue development of an endurance upgrade (MQ-
8C), to continue payload and LCS integration with the MQ-8B, and
integrate radar on the MQ-8B. The request includes $76.6 million of APN
for the production of one Fire Scout MQ-8C aircraft, multiple ship
control stations, and initial spares to support the MQ-8C rapid
deployment capability. Procurement of ship-based control stations is
aligned to both the LCS schedule and the outfitting of other ships to
support Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. Commonality of
avionics, software, and payloads between the MQ-8B and MQ-8C has been
maximized. The MQ-8B and MQ-8C use the same ship-based control station
and other ship ancillary equipment.
Fire Scout was deployed to Afghanistan in April 2011, and has
amassed more than 4,300 dedicated ISR flight hours in support of U.S.
and coalition forces. Successful deployments aboard USS Simpson, USS
Klakring, USS Bradley, and USS Samuel B. Roberts have supported SOF and
Navy operations since 2012. Fire Scout has flown more than 1,500 hours
from frigates, performing hundreds of autonomous ship board take-offs
and landings. The Fire Scout program will continue to support
integration and testing for LCS-based mission modules.
These unforeseen early deployments and high operational temp,
combined with previously undiscovered and corrected reliability issues
with the MQ-8B, have caused delays in IOT&E. Acquisition planning,
which leverages investments in VTUAV rapid deployment capabilities, is
in work to ensure Fire Scout will continue to support the LCS mission
packages.
Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D)
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $21 million in
RDT&E,N to complete the Navy UCAS-D efforts to research a tactical jet-
sized, carrier-suitable, low-observable-relevant, unmanned aircraft
system. The fiscal year 2014 budget request is to complete the
autonomous aerial refueling (AAR) demonstration with surrogate
aircraft, the Navy UCAS capstone artifacts to capture all lessons
learned, disposition of test articles, test beds, intellectual
properties, and contract close-out efforts. The UCAS-D program will
demonstrate UAS carrier operations and autonomous AAR, and mature
required technologies to Technology Readiness Level-six (TRL-6) in
support of potential follow on unmanned acquisition programs. The
aviation/ship integration portion of the program is meeting all
technical objectives, with surrogate aircraft flights in the vicinity
of aircraft carriers completed in 2009 and 2010. Since then, the X-47B
has completed envelope expansion testing, land-based carrier control
area and catapult testing, and is now completing the land-based
approach and trap build-up to conduct carrier qualification testing, to
include catapult and arrested landings, in the summer 2013. The latest
AAR testing period was completed in January 2012 utilizing a manned
surrogate aircraft, and AAR development and testing will continue
throughout 2013. The program is constrained by Navy CVN schedules and
planning. Currently the program is working closely with Navy leadership
to reduce risk and align program and CVN operational schedules to best
accommodate demonstration objectives.
Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $146.7 million in
RDT&E,N for UCLASS System efforts. The UCLASS system will enhance
carrier capability and versatility for the Joint Forces commander
through integration of a persistent and mission flexible unmanned
aircraft into the carrier air wing no later than fiscal year 2020. The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council issued a memorandum in December of
2013, reconfirming the need for an affordable, adaptable carrier-based
ISR platform with precision strike capability. The UCLASS system will
provide persistent ISR with precision strike capabilities for missions
ranging from permissive counterterrorism operations, to missions in
low-end contested environments. The UCLASS system will also provide
enabling capabilities for high-end denied operations from the carrier
strike group. It will be sustainable onboard an aircraft carrier, as
well as ashore, and will be designed to minimize the logistics
footprint of the current carrier air wing. The UCLASS system will have
the ability to pass command and control information along with sensor
data to other aircraft, naval vessels, and ground forces. Sensor data
will be transmitted, in either raw or processed forms, at appropriate
classification levels, to exploitation nodes afloat and ashore.
Interfaces will be provided with existing ship and land-based command
and control systems, including ISR tasking, as well as processing,
exploitation, and dissemination systems. The UCLASS system will achieve
these capabilities through the use of a carrier-suitable, semi-
autonomous, unmanned air segment, a control system and connectivity
segment, and a carrier segment.
Tactical Control Station
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $8.4 million in
RDT&E,N for the Tactical Control Station (TCS). TCS provides a
standards compliant, open architecture, with scalable command and
control capabilities for the VTUAV system. In fiscal year 2014, TCS
will continue to transition to the Linux operating system software to a
technology refreshed control station, enhance the VTUAV Ocean
Surveillance Initiative for ships automatic identification system and
sensor track generation, and develop an interface to an ISR process
exploit dissemination system. The Linux operating system conversion
overcomes hardware obsolescence issues with the Solaris based control
stations and provides lower cost software updates using DOD common
application software. In addition, the TCS Linux upgrade will enhance
collaboration with the Navy's future UAS common control station.
Cargo Unmanned Aerial System
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget is requesting funding for
continued Cargo Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) deployment in fiscal year
2014. CUAS operations started in November 2011, and have delivered over
three million pounds of cargo in 1,300 flight hours to date. The CUAS
is meeting rapid development capability goals and is also supporting
the development of UAS concept of operations (CONOPs).
The purpose of the Cargo UAS capability is to develop CONOPs to
``get trucks off the roads'' in combat zones, minimizing the improvised
explosive device threat to logistics convoys. The CUAS provides a low
risk, persistent, 24-hour capability for dispersed forces on the
battlefield. This capability mitigates the requirement for manned
ground vehicles to resupply forces in remote locations. The CUAS also
augments manned aviation assault support assets and airdrop methods
when the weather, terrain, and enemy pose an unsuitable level of risk.
CONOPs expansion in 2012 included autonomous cargo delivery to a way
point and cargo retrograde from spokes back to the main base.
RQ-21A Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $16.1 million in
RDT&E,N ($5.0 million Navy, $11.1 million Marine Corps) and $66.6
million in PMC for 5 RQ-21A systems which include 25 air vehicles that
will address Marine Corps ISR capability shortfalls currently supported
by service contracts. This Group 3 UAS will provide persistent ship and
land-based ISR support for tactical-level maneuver decisions and unit
level force defense and force protection missions. Milestone B and
contract award occurred in July 2010. Milestone C and LRIP decisions
are scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. RQ-21A will
enter into IOT&E no later than the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014.
RQ-7B Marine Corps Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $0.7 million in
RDT&E,N to continue development efforts and government engineering
support and $26.4 million in APN to support the continuation of
congressionally-mandated tactical control data link retrofits for RQ-7B
Shadow units. Marine Corps Shadow squadrons have seen continuous
service in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2007. The Marine Corps received
its 13th RQ-7B Shadow system in first quarter fiscal year 2012,
completing baseline fielding for four squadrons. The Marine Corps
Shadow systems are identical to Army Shadow systems, bringing
interoperability and commonality between Army and Marine Corps unmanned
aircraft units operating side-by-side in Afghanistan. An 18-month
initiative to weaponize two Marine Corps RQ-7B systems with a laser-
guided projectile was started in the first quarter of fiscal year 2012.
strike weapons programs
Tactical Tomahawk BLK IV Cruise Missile Program
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $312.5 million in
Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) for procurement of an additional 196
BLK IV weapons and associated support, $26.1 million in OPN for the
Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS), and $4.5 million in
RDT&E for capability updates of the weapon system. WPN resources will
be for the continued procurement of this versatile, combat-proven,
deep-strike weapon system in order to meet surface and subsurface ship-
fill load-outs and combat requirements. OPN resources will address the
resolution of TTWCS obsolescence and interoperability mandates. RDT&E
will be used to initiate engineering efforts for image navigation,
which provides an upgrade to reduce mission planning timelines and
reduce reliance upon GPS navigation.
Tomahawk Theater Mission Planning Center
Tomahawk Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC) is the mission
planning segment of the Tomahawk Weapon System. Under the umbrella of
TMPC, the Tomahawk Command and Control System (TC2S) develops and
distributes strike missions for the Tomahawk missile; provides for
precision strike planning, execution, coordination, control and
reporting; and enables Maritime Component Commanders the capability to
plan and/or modify conventional Tomahawk land-attack missile missions.
TC2S optimizes all aspects of the Tomahawk missile technology to
successfully engage a target. TC2S is a Mission Assurance Category 1
system vital to operational readiness and mission effectiveness of
deployed and contingency forces for content and timeliness. The fiscal
year 2014 President's budget requests $7.9 million in RDT&E and $45.5
million OPN for continued TMPC system upgrades and support. These
planned upgrades support integration, modernization and
interoperability efforts necessary to keep pace with changes, retain
capability and exploit capabilities of the Tomahawk missile and
external organizations to include providing an alternate GPS denied
navigation system (ImageNav), rewrite/update of Tomahawk planning
system's unsupported legacy software code, and technology refreshes to
reduce vulnerability to cyber attacks. These resources are critical for
the support of over 180 TC2S operational sites: cruise missile support
activities, Tomahawk Strike and Mission Planning Cells (5th, 6th, 7th
Fleet), carrier strike groups, command and control nodes, surface and
subsurface firing units and labs/training classrooms.
Sidewinder Air-Intercept Missile (AIM-9X)
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $39.2 million in
RDT&E and $117.2 million in WPN for this joint Navy and Air Force
program. RDT&E will be applied toward AIM-9X/BLK II developmental/
operational tests and requirements definition for Joint Staff directed
insensitive munitions requirements, as well as initial AIM-9X/Block III
development activities. WPN will be for production of a combined 225
all-up-rounds and captive air training missiles and missile-related
hardware. The AIM-9X/BLK II Sidewinder missile is the newest in the
Sidewinder family and is the only short-range infrared air-to-air
missile integrated on Navy/Marine Corps/Air Force strike-fighter
aircraft. This fifth-generation weapon incorporates high off-boresight
acquisition capability and increased seeker sensitivity through an
imaging infrared focal plane array seeker with advanced guidance
processing for improved target acquisition; a data link; and advanced
thrust vectoring capability to achieve superior maneuverability and
increase the probability of intercept of adversary aircraft.
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AIM-120)
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $2.6 million in
RDT&E and $95.4 million in WPN for production of 54 tactical missiles
and missile-related hardware. Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) is a joint Navy and Air Force missile that counters existing
aircraft and cruise-missile threats. It uses advanced electronic attack
capabilities at both high and low altitudes, and can engage from beyond
visual range as well as within visual range. AMRAAM provides an air-to-
air first look, first shot, first kill capability, while working within
a networked environment in support of the Navy's theater air and
missile defense mission area. Prior missile production delays due to
rocket-motor anomalies are being addressed. We now anticipate AIM-120D
production will recover for both the Air Force and the Navy in the mid-
2014 timeframe.
Small Diameter Bomb II
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $46 million in
RDT&E for the continued development of this joint Navy and Air Force
(lead) weapon and bomb-rack program. Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II)
provides an adverse weather, day or night standoff capability against
mobile, moving, and fixed targets, and enables target prosecution while
minimizing collateral damage. SDB II will be integrated into the
internal carriage of both the Navy (F-35C) and Marine Corps (F-35B)
variants of the JSF. The Joint Miniature Munitions Bomb Rack Unit (JMM
BRU) BRU-61A/A is being developed to meet the operational and
environmental integration requirements for internal bay carriage of the
SDB II in the F-35B and F-35C. SDB II entered Milestone B in August
2010 and successfully completed its Critical Design Review in January
2011. JMM BRU will enter technology development in July 2013.
Joint Standoff Weapon
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $0.4 million in
RDT&E for continued JSOW-C-1 test activity and $136.8 million in WPN
for production of 328 all-up rounds. The JSOW-C-1 variant fills a
critical gap by adding maritime moving-target capability to the highly
successful baseline JSOW C program. JSOW C-1 targeting is achieved via
a data-link and guidance software improvements.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $12.2 million of
RDT&E for the development of telemetry and flight termination sections
and the Block 1 follow-on development and test program and $111.9
million of WPN for production of 143 all-up-rounds and captive training
missiles. The AARGM cooperative program with Italy transforms the
legacy High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) into an affordable,
lethal, and flexible time-sensitive strike weapon system for conducting
destruction of enemy air defense missions. AARGM adds multi-spectral
targeting capability and targeting geospecificity to its supersonic
fly-out to destroy sophisticated enemy air defenses and expand upon the
HARM target set. Initial operational capability (IOC) on the F/A-18C/D
aircraft was reached in July 2012 and forward deployed to U.S. Pacific
Command. The program was approved for FRP on August 20, 2012, and the
first FRP contract was awarded on September 10, 2012.
Hellfire Weapon System
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $33.9 million in
WPN for 363 Hellfire all-up-rounds and training assets, to provide
maximum operational flexibility to our warfighters. The Hellfire is an
Army led program. The Navy continues to support legacy Hellfire weapons
as well as procure and support technology enhancements that will
provide the warfighter the flexibility to prosecute new and emerging
threats. The Hellfire missile continues to be a priority weapon for
current military operations as it enables our warfighters to prosecute
military operations on urban terrain and other high valued targets of
opportunity.
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $32.722 million in
PAN&MC, for procurement of 1,103 APKWS II precision guidance kits.
Milestone C was achieved in April 2010. IOT&E was successfully
completed in January 2012; declaring IOC in March 2012. The program
received a favorable FRP decision in March 2012 and the FRP contract
was awarded in July 2012. APKWS II provides an unprecedented precision
guidance capability to Navy unguided rocket inventories improving
accuracy and minimizing collateral damage. Program production is on
schedule to meet the needs of our warfighters in today's theaters of
operations.
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests $5.5 million in
RDT&E for continued extended technology development (TD) of Joint Air-
to-Ground Missile (JAGM). JAGM is a joint department of the Army/
Department of the Navy pre-major defense acquisition program with the
Army designated as the lead service. The Government utilized full and
open competition to initiate the TD phase of the JAGM program. In the
TD Phase, the two contractors completed a preliminary design review,
wind tunnel and ground testing, and flight testing in support of
initial Navy platform integration activities. The originally planned
27-month TD phase is complete, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) provided approval to extend
the JAGM TD Phase, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the
Department of the Navy's AH-1Z Cobra aircraft as a threshold platform
for the JAGM program. The Services recognize that Hellfire capability
and inventory issues need to be addressed and the requirement for JAGM
remains valid. The extended TD Phase addresses affordability concerns
with the JAGM missile, and discussions continue between the Navy, the
Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the path forward.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Admiral Skinner.
Now we'll hear from General Davis.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHARLES R. DAVIS, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY
TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION
General Davis. Chairman Manchin, Senator Wicker,
distinguished members of this subcommittee: I do appreciate the
opportunity. I know your time's precious here and I really look
forward to being able to give you a quick update on Air Force
combat aviation programs.
Today, your Air Force proudly provides this Nation the
ability to surveil and, if required, strike any spot on this
planet, while defending our borders and protecting our allies.
It is in this environment of fiscal uncertainty our focus
remains on our five core missions of: air and space
superiority; ISR; rapid global mobility; global strike; and
command and control, and that's by which we deliver global
reach, global power, and global vigilance.
I will remind everyone that just a short time ago we put B-
2s over the bellicose nation of Korea and it was interesting to
consider how they were probably sitting in their homes feeling
that they had absolutely not a thing they could do about it
during that period of time. That's the type of capability we
want to be able to continue to deliver with your U.S. Air
Force.
In 2012, though, however, Air Force global precision attack
aircraft flew over 28,000 sorties and 41,000 hours in support
of overseas contingency operations. In support of these
operations, our ISR airmen provided intelligence that shaped
combat plans for 33 named operations, enabled the removal of
700 enemy combatants from the fight, and built awareness for
coalition forces in over 250 troops and contact engagements.
Air Force Special Operations personnel executed over 1,600
strike missions and 7,700 specialized mobility missions.
On the home front, Air Force fighter, air refueling, and
early warning aircraft have flown almost 64,000 total sorties
supporting Operation Noble Eagle since September 11, 2001. As a
testament to our total force, the Air National Guard and Air
Force Reserve have flown more than 65 percent of these
Operation Noble Eagle sorties and the Air National Guard today
currently operates 17 of 18 air space control alert sites
across the United States.
The fiscal year 2014 budget attempts to retain this
critical force structure and maintains the Air Force ability to
rapidly respond to global mission demands. It evolved from a
concerted effort to balance risk, modernization, and force
structure reductions with a commitment to readiness and taking
care of our people. Yet there is still considerable uncertainty
in the fiscal year 2014 Air Force top-line level.
The 2014 budget will not reverse the damage done by the
fiscal year 2013 sequestration. Recovering the warfighting
capability that we lost and improving readiness will certainly
require some reduction in operations tempo and-or additional
resources. Reduced flying hours will cause some units to cease
flying operations, resulting in severe, rapid, and long-term
combat readiness degradation. Today, for the first time I can
remember, we have 12 squadrons, bombers and fighters, that will
not fly for the rest of the fiscal year. It's about 18 percent
of our flying hour, a 200,000-hour flying cut, by the end of
the year.
Cuts to the Air Force modernization programs will over time
cost the taxpayer more money. Sequestration will not save the
Air Force money. The resulting program inefficiencies and lost
quantities will raise remaining unit costs and delay delivery
of validated capabilities across our forces.
Yet, despite some of these ongoing budget concerns, many of
our fighters and weapons programs do have enhancements planned
for 2014. These include the A-10, F-15, F-16, F-22, and
Advanced Medium-Ranged Air-to-Missile weapons systems. For
example, we will modernize a portion of our legacy F-15 and F-
16 fleet with advanced radars, countermeasures, and additional
situation awareness systems.
But I have to caution you on how we use the context
``modernize'' in this discussion. These new systems and
enhancements really only bring capabilities and technologies
that have been in existence for years and in some cases fielded
to our legacy fleet.
More troubling to me is that half of our so-called
``modernization'' budget really goes just to maintain current
capability in the light of decreasing performance of these
systems and adds really no new capability. We are in a
situation today where primarily we are reacting to threats
outside of our Nation to try to keep our systems at least on
par with those. We are doing very little to bring new systems
on right now to be able to stay in front of that threat and
make the threat react to us. As an airman and a student of air
power, I realize very plainly that the last thing we want
somebody that conducts air space and air power to be is
predictable, because if you become predictable you just become
a target.
So we have to be very careful as we navigate this uncertain
way ahead to mitigate risk in critical areas like readiness,
force structure, and modernization. We will continue to work
with you and all the congressional committees to develop
executable options. But personally I worry that our end result
budget issues will threaten our ability to recapitalize our
aging fighter and bomber fleets.
We must be mindful of the fact that one nation that plays
prominently in our defense strategy recently flew two brand-new
advanced prototype aircraft within just a 22-month period. In
times of robust budget, this took us about 9 years.
Nonetheless, our objectives are to remain as ready as
possible today, set a course for full-spectrum readiness,
preserve a highly responsible and scaleable force, and overcome
force structure and modernization challenges to provide the
Nation with the world's most capable Air Force now and in the
future.
Thank you for these minutes and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Charles R. Davis, USAF
i. introduction
Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide you with
an update on Air Force tactical aviation programs. Today our Air Force
is engaged globally, supporting the combatant commanders requirements
and executing our national strategy.
In this environment of fiscal uncertainty our focus remains on our
five core missions of air and space superiority, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, rapid global mobility, global strike,
and command and control by which we deliver global reach, global power,
and global vigilance. It is more important than ever to balance near-
term budget realities with modernization efforts for the mid- and long-
term. Today's discussion is focused on air and space superiority and
global strike but covers all five core missions.
Our force structure meets most combatant commander requirements,
but the current fiscal environment will necessitate that we stand down
13 fighter and bomber squadrons in fiscal year 2013. Multiple
investment programs will be negatively impacted resulting in unit cost
increases, terminations and schedule delays. Sequestration impacts are
already occurring, and the fiscal year 2014 President's budget does not
assume the costs of recovering the readiness impacts from even a
partial year of sequestration. However the President's budget includes
balanced deficit reduction proposals that would allow Congress to
replace and repeal sequestration in fiscal year 2013 and the associated
cap reductions in fiscal years 2014-2021. If sequestration is not
replaced the Air Force will have to rebuild degraded unit readiness,
accept further delays to modernization, absorb the backlog in depot
maintenance inductions, and invest additional funding to restore
infrastructure.
As we work together through these difficult times, our objectives
are: to remain as ready as possible today, set a course toward full-
spectrum readiness, preserve a highly responsive and scalable force,
and overcome force structure and modernization challenges to provide
the Nation with the world's most capable combat Air Force now and in
the future.
ii. current environment and operations update
Today, the Air Force flies and fights in air, space, and
cyberspace--globally and reliably--as a valued member of our Joint and
coalition teams. Over 28,000 airmen are deployed across the globe,
including over 22,000 in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility, with another 138,000 committed in place. to defend the
homeland, command and control our nuclear forces, operate remotely
piloted aircraft, and support other combatant commander requirements.
The Air Force is an active partner in Department of Defense planning
that will shift our emphasis from today's wars to a broader range of
challenges and opportunities. The Department of Defense is currently
reassessing the strategic guidance issued last year, but we anticipate
continued emphasis on and planning for a rebalance to the Asia Pacific
region. Our challenge is to provide soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines who deploy in support of our global commitments with an Air
Force that is capable, agile, flexible, ready, and technologically
advanced.
In 2012, Air Force global precision attack aircraft flew over
28,000 sorties and 41,000 hours in support of overseas contingency
operations. In support of these operations, our intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance airmen provided intelligence that
shaped combat plans for 33 named operations, enabled the removal of 700
enemy combatants from the fight and built awareness for coalition
forces in over 250 ``troops-in-contact'' engagements. Air Force Special
Operations personnel executed over 1,600 strike missions and 7,700
specialized mobility missions. On the home front, Air Force fighter,
air refueling, and early warning aircraft have flown almost 64,000
total sorties supporting Operation Noble Eagle since September 11,
2001. As a testament to the capability of our Total Force, the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve have flown more than 65 percent of
these Operation Noble Eagle sorties with the Air National Guard
currently operating 17 of 18 aerospace control alert sites across the
United States.
Aviation is not without risk. In fiscal year 2012, there were 20
Class A aviation mishaps, including ten destroyed aircraft and nine
fatalities. This was an increase from the fiscal year 2011 numbers of
15 Class A, 8 aircraft destroyed, and 2 fatalities respectively.
Analysis of these events found trends similar to previous years, with
the top two mishap factors being compliance and decisionmaking errors.
There were 24 Class B aviation mishaps in fiscal year 2012,
significantly down from 53 in fiscal year 2011. Similarly, Class C
mishaps dropped to 443 from 482 the year prior. Additionally, fiscal
year 2012 unmanned aerial system mishaps decreased across the board in
Class A, B, and C mishaps from fiscal year 2011. Class A mishaps
dropped from 15 to 13, Class B mishaps from 8 to 4 and Class C from 18
to 17.
As we undergo further updates to Defense Strategy, we must
carefully balance our force between the Active and Reserve components.
To get a better understanding of our Total Force mixture, we launched
the Total Force Task Force, a team led by general officers from the
active Duty, Guard and Reserve components. The Total Force Task Force
is conducting a comprehensive review of Total Force requirements and
will develop strategic options to ensure that the Air Force correctly
balances the strengths of each component to sustain the capabilities
required in the years ahead. The team is scheduled to present their
findings by October 1, 2013.
Additionally, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air
Force, which is required by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013, will undertake a comprehensive study of the structure
of the Air Force to determine whether, and how, the structure should be
modified to best fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements
in a manner consistent with available resources. The panel is scheduled
to complete their report not later than February 1, 2014.
The fiscal year 2014 budget request retains critical force
structure and maintains the Air Force's ability to rapidly respond to
global mission demands. It evolved from a concerted effort to balance
risk, modernization and force structure reductions with a commitment to
readiness and taking care of our people.
However, sequestration forced the Air Force to implement immediate
actions to mitigate a fiscal year 2013 topline reduction. A major
impact of sequestration will be a marked decrease in readiness at the
beginning of fiscal year 2014. Reductions in flying hours will cause
unit stand downs, which will result in severe, rapid, and long-term
unit combat readiness degradation. Within 60 days of a stand down,
affected units will be unable to meet emergent or operations plans
requirements. Depot delays will require the grounding of some of the
affected aircraft. The deferments will result in idled production
shops, a degradation of workforce proficiency and productivity, and
corresponding future volatility and operational costs. Additionally,
sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will impact every one of
our investment programs. These program disruptions will, over time,
cost more taxpayer dollars to rectify contract restructures and program
inefficiencies, raise unit costs, and delay delivery of validated
capabilities to warfighters in the field. The impact to modernization
programs reduces our Air Force's competitive advantage and decreases
the probability of mission success in contested environments. The
fiscal year 2014 budget request however, includes balanced deficit
reduction proposals that would allow Congress to replace and repeal
sequestration in fiscal year 2013 and the associated cap reductions in
fiscal year 2014-2021.
iii. force structure and modernization
Fighters
Air Force fighter force structure is dependent on both fighter
aircraft and rated manning. Two years ago, the Air Force determined
through extensive analysis that a force structure of 1,200 primary
mission aircraft and 2,000 total aircraft was required to execute the
National Military Strategy with increased operational risk. Last year,
due to new strategic guidance and fiscal constraints, the Air Force
rebalanced our force structure across core functions. Analysis showed
the Air Force could decrease fighter force structure by approximately
100 aircraft with higher risk, resulting in the current fighter
requirement of 1,100 primary mission aircraft and 1,900 total aircraft.
The Air Force's fighter fleet is over 20 years old on average--the
oldest in our history. Without service life extensions and capability
upgrades, it will not be possible to manage risk. The Air Force is
pursuing programs that will modernize and extend the service life of
our remaining fleet. The F-35 is a key component in preserving future
force structure and mitigating risk. Any further delay in the F-35
program will create a serious shortfall (mid and far-term) in fighter
capabilities and force structure. The Air Force is very concerned with
recent budget reductions and continues to monitor how these cuts will
affect risk. It is absolutely critical that 4th Generation sustainment
and modernization efforts continue as programmed, the F-22 continues to
modernize, and the F-35 matures and begins full rate production.
In the fiscal year 2013 budget, the Air Force accepted risk in our
Combat Air Forces by retiring or reclassifying aircraft from seven
squadrons: five A-10 squadrons, one F-16 squadron, and one training/
support coded F-15 aggressor squadron. After reductions, we retained
sufficient combat-coded fighter squadrons to maintain the capabilities
and capacity required to meet the requirements of new strategic
guidance at increased risk while providing a bridge to the fifth
generation F-35.
Manning these aircraft is a challenge we are aggressively working.
Air Force mission success is dependent on fighter force structure
manning. The Air Force is currently 200 fighter pilots short of the
total manning requirement. Our projections indicate this deficit
growing to approximately 900 by 2022, excluding any additional negative
impact on flying training driven by sequestration. The shortfall
evolved from force structure reductions that cut active duty fighter
squadrons to a number that cannot sustain billet requirements. As a
result, the Air Force is currently unable to produce and absorb the
required number of fighter pilots across the total force. The Air Force
is prioritizing available manpower at significant risk to institutional
requirements. Projected impacts include reductions in air-operations
expertise during the development of war plans and a limited ability to
train and maintain combat readiness. Recent programming and policy
actions raised production and absorption capacity by fiscal year 2028;
however, even with these changes, the Air Force will only be able to
sustain a fighter pilot inventory capable of meeting 82 percent of our
overall requirement for fighter pilot expertise.
A-10
The A-10 provides our Joint Force Commanders responsive, lethal,
precise, and persistent firepower for close air support and combat
search and rescue. It has been a steady, stellar performer in all
recent conflicts. Notably, the A-10's very high operations tempo and
advanced age present substantial sustainment challenges. Most notably,
the wings on the aging aircraft must be replaced in order to keep the
fleet flying through 2035 and beyond.
Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Air Force will retire 61 of the
oldest A-10s. This will leave a fleet of 283 A-10s through 2035. The
fiscal year 2014 budget request reflects our commitment to fund A-10
modernization, sustainment, and life extension programs. Installation
of the Helmet Mounted Cueing System, now underway, will provide
increased situational awareness to the pilot. Operational flight
program upgrades will provide the A-10 with new combat capabilities to
employ a variety of smart weapons, improve situational awareness, and
enhance target identification and designation capability. Production
and installation of the new replacement wings are moving ahead at full-
rate production levels. Other critical updates include an upgrade to
the A-10's transponder, allowing for secure, military-only identify
friend or foe modes, and an improved engine turbine and aircraft
monitoring system used to identify and monitor structural fatigues and
stresses. Emphasis on the continued health and upgrade of the A-10 will
ensure the aircraft continues to excel in the close air support role
for the next 2 decades.
F-16
Our primary multi-role aircraft, the F-16 comprises 50 percent of
the current fighter fleet. The fiscal year 2014 budget request invests
approximately $1.32 billion across the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) for F-16 modernization, life extension, and continued
sustainment to meet critical warfighter needs to 2025 and beyond. The
majority of the efforts to accomplish this across the FYDP will focus
on the Legacy Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and Combat Avionics
Programmed Extension Suites (CAPES) modernization program for 300
aircraft. We believe we will have to SLEP and modernize more.
Legacy SLEP will extend airframe structural service life by
approximately 25 percent from the current 8,000 hours to 10,000+ hours,
adding about 6 to 8 years. The fiscal year 2014 budget request adds $18
million to continue design and development of structural modification
kits for the Block 40-52 fleet to be responsive to the Air Force's
total fighter requirement. Additionally, the Falcon Structural
Augmentation Roadmap program, which replaces known life-limited
structural components and maintains the original design airframe life
of 8,000 actual flight hours, has been rephased to complete in fiscal
year 2014.
The fiscal year 2014 budget request adds $44 million in
development, with a total of $489 million in development and
procurement funding laid in across the FYDP for F-16 CAPES. This will
allow for the development of capabilities for Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a new center cockpit display unit, data
link enhancements and an improved electronic warfare defensive suite.
These avionics upgrades must be done to keep the F-16 Block 40-52s
relevant in a contested environment until replaced by the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter.
F-15 C/D
The fiscal year 2014 budget request invests approximately $1.9
billion across the FYDP on modernization and sustainment programs for
the F-15C/D fleet. We project the F-15C/D fleet will remain viable
until at least 2035, with potential for an airframe service life
extension following full-scale fatigue testing. This test is underway
and will conclude in 2014. The Air Force manages the fleet through
scheduled field and depot inspections under an individual aircraft
tracking program.
We continue to modernize our F-15C/D fleet with AESA radars, a more
capable aircraft mission computer, and a new electronic warfare self-
protection suite, the Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System
(EPAWSS). We expect these efforts to enable 175 F-15C/D aircraft to
operate safely and effectively through at least 2035 as determined by
the full-scale fatigue test.
F-15E
The fiscal year 2014 budget request invests approximately $2.5
billion across the FYDP for F-15E modernization and sustainment
programs. This includes integrating the latest precision weapons to hit
targets accurately and reduce collateral damage, and adding a helmet
mounted cueing system for all front seat cockpits that will reduce the
F-15Es time to engage a target. Finally, we are adding a state-of-the-
art AESA radar system that advances capabilities to identify and engage
targets, a more capable aircraft mission computer, and a new self-
protection electronic warfare system (EPAWSS). The Air Force expects
the F-15E to be an integral part of the Nation's force through at least
2035. A full-scale fatigue test, due to be complete in 2015, will
provide data regarding the feasibility of a service life extension.
Fifth Generation Fighters
Vital elements of our Nation's defense and deterrent capability are
fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and F-35. These advanced,
state-of-the-art aircraft are absolutely essential to maintain our
current global superiority that permit air, sea, and ground forces
freedom of action. Each aircraft possess exclusive, complimentary and
indispensable capabilities that provide synergistic effects across the
spectrum of conflict. As future adversaries modernize, our legacy
fourth generation aircraft will have limited capability to operate in
an anti-access and area denial environment. Our Air Force must continue
to invest in fifth generation weapon systems, and begin looking even
further into the future, to ensure continued dominance of American
Airpower.
F-22
The F-22 Raptor is the only fielded U.S. fighter capable of
operating in anti-access and area denial environments. F-22 attributes
of stealth, super cruise, integrated avionics and sensors combine to
deliver the Raptor's unique operational capability. F-22 modernization
is required to counter advancing threats that specifically target F-22
capabilities. Accordingly, F-22 modernization is consistent with
Department of Defense Strategic Guidance to ``invest as required to
ensure [the] ability to operate effectively in [anti-access and area
denial] environments''. Focused on maintaining operational superiority
against the evolving threat, the fiscal year 2014 budget request for F-
22 modernization investment includes $459.6 million in RDT&E in
addition to $460.3 million in procurement in fiscal year 2014.
Increment 3.1 is fielding now and is scheduled to be complete in fiscal
year 2017, delivering advanced air-ground capabilities including
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) ground mapping, threat geolocation, and
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) carriage. Increments 3.2A/B remain on track
for fielding in 2014/2018 respectively, and will deliver advanced
electronic protection and combat identification, AIM-120D and AIM-9X
missiles, and significantly-improved ground threat geolocation.
The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Aviation Oxygen Generation
System Study made 8 near-term and 14 long-term recommendations for
corrective and mitigating actions to prevent hypoxia-like events that
led to the fleet stand-down in May-September 2011. The Air Force
completed all eight near-term actions to include replacement of the
emergency oxygen system activation handle; modification of the pilot
upper pressure garment and installation of an independent oxygen sensor
and helmet-mounted pulse oximeter. Additionally, 9 of 14 longer-term
recommendations were implemented, with the remaining 5 expected to be
complete by November 2014. Most notably, the retrofit of the Automatic
Back-up Oxygen System is on track for completion by 2015. The first 16
Raptors at Elmendorf Air Force Base are expected to be complete by mid-
April. The F-22 is operating safely worldwide, and flew over 38,000
hours since return to flight in September 2011. It has been over 12
months since the last unknown-cause hypoxia-like event occurred.
F-35
During fiscal year 2014, the Air Force will continue the balanced
approach across the global precision attack portfolio by prioritizing
investment in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining legacy
platforms as a bridge to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
The multi-role F-35A is the centerpiece of the Air Force's future
fighter precision attack capability. In addition to complementing the
F-22's world class air superiority capabilities, the F-35A is designed
to penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of precision
munitions. This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the added
benefit of increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing across
Services and eight partner nations. The fiscal year 2014 budget request
includes $4.5 billion for continued development and procurement of 19
F-35A, conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft. Aggressive
risk management resulted in considerable concurrency cost reductions of
approximately $1.7 billion. The program has made significant strides
overcoming software development delays and technical issues.
During calendar year 2012, the F-35 program team achieved a number
of significant milestones, including: Milestone B approval, Low Rate
Initial Production Lot 5 contract definitization, Lot 6 undefinitized
contract action, an Operational Utility Evaluation, a ready for
training declaration; the start of pilot training at Eglin Air Force
Base, completion of over 1,100 test flights, first weapon separation
test on an F-35A CTOL, and the delivery of 30 production aircraft to
the Air Force and Marine Corps. These early production deliveries to
our operational test and training fleet allows the Air Force to begin
the necessary operational test and validation efforts of the (F-35)
this year, while also building our initial cadre of instructors to
train our future generations of combat-ready pilots and maintainers.
In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force planned to procure 19 F-35A CTOL
aircraft. As a result of sequestration, the Air Force will have to
reduce the procurement quantity by at least three and potentially as
many as five aircraft.
The progress made so far and the steps we take today are crucial in
our efforts for declaring F-35 initial operational capability (IOC).
After last year's program rebaseline and Milestone B recertification,
the joint services were tasked to provide Congress our updated IOC
criteria and timeline estimates by June 1, 2013. The Air Force fully
expects to have our IOC position to you by this suspense.
One last area of F-35 development to address is the Autonomic
Logistics Information System (ALIS). The Air Force understands ALIS is
a necessary and integral element of the F-35 weapon system, and as
such, is a top program priority. As designed, ALIS will tie F-35
mission planning, operational flight, operation and maintenance
training, debrief, tech and flight manuals, prognostic health
management, and supply chain management into one seamless information
system. Early flight operations at Eglin Air Force Base demonstrated
ALIS initial capability to support training, flight, and maintenance
efforts. Although there were deficiencies identified and addressed
during these early flight operations, and significant challenges remain
through development, the Air Force remains cautiously optimistic
continued ALIS development will deliver the required F-35 sustainment
elements.
Air-to-Surface Weapons
All three mission areas (stand-off, direct attack, and penetrator
munitions) in the air-to-surface munitions inventory are short of
inventory objectives. The most critical are stand-off and penetrator
weapons. Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and SDB weapons
along with low observable platforms are force multipliers in an anti-
access and area denial environment and their shortage could increase
friendly force attrition and drive a much higher level of effort
enabling the attack of other critical targets. The shortage of
penetrator weapons
will result in some inability to target adversary critical
capabilities and increase risk. Direct attack munitions shortages drive
the use of non-preferred munitions that decrease effectiveness and
result in increased time and Air Force attrition accomplishing
combatant commander objectives.
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile-Extended Range
JASSM and JASSM-Extended Range (ER) are currently the Nation's only
stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave, stand-off missile
capable of fighter and bomber aircraft employment. It is capable of
penetrating next generation enemy air defenses to strike high value,
hardened, fixed, or mobile targets.
Currently, JASSM is in Lot 11 production with over 1,000 missiles
delivered and JASSM-ER is in Lot 2 production. The fiscal year 2014
procurement plans are to buy 182 missiles: 102 JASSMs and 80 JASSM-ERs.
fiscal year 2014 also funds reliability efforts and the JASSM Weapon
System Evaluation Program for flight testing of inventory assets. The
Air Force is ramping-up the JASSM production to the most efficient rate
(360 per year) by buying 224 missiles in fiscal year 2015 and 360 in
fiscal year 2016 and beyond. While the range of JASSM is more than 200
nautical miles, JASSM-ER's range is over twice that (over 500 nautical
miles). JASSM-ER completed initial operational test and evaluation in
January 2013 with 20 successful flight test shots out of 21, a success
rate of over 95 percent. The Full Rate Production decision for JASSM-ER
is December 2013, with a plan to transition to JASSM-ER only production
in fiscal year 2017 and beyond at the maximum production rate of 360
missiles per year.
Air-to-Air Weapons
AIM-120D AMRAAM
The AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is
the Department of Defense's premier beyond-visual-range missile to
counter existing and emerging air vehicle threats, operating at high or
low altitude with electronic attack capabilities. AMRAAM is a key
enabler for gaining air superiority and air dominance providing F-22,
F-16, F-15, and F/A-18 aircraft the ability to achieve multiple kills
per engagement. The latest evolution of AMRAAM is the AIM-120D, which
brings increased range and kinematics, improved high off-boresight
targeting, and an enhanced two-way data link for improved accuracy and
lethality at range. AIM-120D is an Acquisition Category 1C joint
program, with the Air Force as lead service in partnership with the
Navy. The AIM-120D Operational Test Readiness Review was successfully
completed in May 2012 and the program is currently in dedicated
operational testing. fiscal year 2014 plans are to complete dedicated
operational testing, to include captive carry and free flight, and
fielding on F/A-18 E/F and F-15 C/D aircraft. Force procurement for
fiscal year 2014 is 199 units; along with a purchase of 54 units by the
Navy. The program will continue to update the AMRAAM technical data
package to ensure a viable, producible design through the expected
production life of the AMRAAM program, and to maintain a robust
supplier base capable of sustaining production for the life of the
program.
Updates Requested by Congress
CV-22
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) uses the CV-22
Osprey's unique long range, speed, and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) characteristics to provide special operations warfighters with
specialized air mobility. In 2012, CV-22s completed 1,022 Operation
Enduring Freedom sorties, hauling over 135,000 pounds of cargo and
extracting 299 detainees. In 2013, we will station aircraft at RAF
Mildenhall, UK, the CV-22's first overseas squadron.
The current CV-22 fleet stands at 32 aircraft with the final buy
scheduled in fiscal year 2014 as part of the program's second multi-
year procurement. Current funding levels support the procurement of
four fiscal year 2013 aircraft and the final three aircraft in fiscal
year 2014. Declaration of full operational capability is scheduled
following the delivery of the last CV-22 in fiscal year 2016, for a
total of 49 operational AFSOC aircraft.
The Joint V-22 Program Office is increasing CV-22's capabilities
while executing an aggressive improvement program, which continues to
make significant progress. Since fiscal year 2010, aircraft
availability rates are up over 20 percent. Particular emphasis is being
placed on improving CV-22 engine time-on-wing, which has already seen a
62 percent increase since fiscal year 2010. These trends have continued
in the first half of fiscal year 2013. In fiscal year 2014, we will
start development of an improved engine inlet solution to address sand
ingestion problems that severely degrade engine performance and
necessitate costly engine removals and repairs due to operating and
training in austere desert environments.
Improvements to the CV-22 are being made in block increments and
each block includes a number of modification upgrades installed as they
become available. Retrofit modifications continue to bring the oldest
CV-22s to the most current configuration. Sequestration reductions will
delay installation of Block 20/C improvements on fielded aircraft.
Future modifications and improvements to the CV-22 will make the
aircraft even more reliable, productive, and cost-effective; thus
ensuring the AFSOC's long range VTOL capability is available and will
provide specialized air mobility wherever and whenever required.
Combat Rescue Helicopter
The Air Force is the only Service with a dedicated force that is
organized, trained, and equipped to execute personnel recovery.
Advanced helicopter capabilities, high-end tactically trained aircrews,
and Battlefield airmen who are trained in advanced battlefield trauma
medicine allow these forces to provide lifesaving measures at the point
of injury, anywhere in the world. These highly trained airmen support
Air Force, joint, coalition and Special Operations Forces in a wide
variety of mission areas. In addition to overseas contingency
deployments, these airmen also serve as first responders during
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, making them
some of the most highly stressed career fields in the U.S. military.
Since 2001, our combat rescue forces saved over 7,000 lives and in 2012
alone, they flew 4,500 missions saving 1,128 coalition, joint, and
partner nation lives in some of the harshest environments in the world.
The Air Force will continue to modify existing HH-60G helicopters
to keep them viable until we can fully recapitalize the fleet with the
combat rescue helicopter (CRH). This effort includes an operational
loss replacement program that returns the HH-60G fleet to numbers
capable of meeting our operational requirements. The operational loss
replacement program is only a temporary bridge to allow us to meet
operational demands until the entire fleet is recapitalized through
CRH.
The CRH will conduct day and night marginal weather combat search
and rescue in order to recover downed aircrew and isolated personnel in
hostile environments. The program replaces the legacy fleet of aging
HH-60G Pave Hawks. CRH is in source selection for 112 in-production
helicopters and training systems configured by the original equipment
manufacturer to meet the warfighter requirement. Our fiscal year 2014
budget supports contract award.
Command and Control
Command and Control (C2), as a core function, is fundamental for
all Air Force core functions. The C2 vision is to provide sufficiently
robust, scalable, flexible, and rapidly deployable C2 capabilities,
enabling commanders to fully exploit air, space and cyberspace
capabilities. Underpinning the proper employment of Airpower is the Air
Operations Center (AOC)--the senior element of the theater air control
system (TACS) which serves as the focal point for planning, directing,
and assessing air, space, and cyberspace operations to meet Joint Force
Air Component Commander operational objectives and guidance.
The C2 emphasis in the fiscal year 2013 budget complies with the
Department of Defense's budget reduction goals while maintaining an
adequate C2 capability. The fiscal year 2014 budget request supports
the AOC, E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS),
E-3 Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS), and Three-
Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR) programs.
Investments in JSTARS will sustain the fleet pending decisions from
the airborne SAR/moving target indicator (MTI)/JSTARS Mission Area
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), while the E-3 AWACS will continue the
Block 40/45 upgrades with the 3DELRR program pressing towards source
selection for a new ground based sensor.
Air Operations Center
The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air, space, and cyberspace
operations. The AOC coordinates closely with superior and subordinate
C2 nodes, as well as the headquarters of other functional and service
component commands to integrate the numerous aspects of air, space, and
cyberspace operations and accomplish its mission. To effectively
integrate the TACS elements, the AOC develops and establishes theater-
wide C2 guidance of regular and irregular warfare, providing
overarching direction to all the TACS elements. The baseline AOC
Weapons System (Increment 10.1) requires modernization to enable
collaboration, improve information accuracy, and provide enhanced
system security against known and projected cyber threats. The
sustainment of AOC Weapon System 10.1, and the continued development
and successful fielding of AOC Weapon System 10.2 is critical to
maintain joint interoperability and provide operational-level C2 to
assigned and apportioned forces.
E-8C JSTARS
The E-8C JSTARS is the world's premier airborne Command, Control,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platform for air-to-
ground battle management operations. It provides long-endurance, all-
weather, surveillance and targeting of moving and stationary targets
via GMTI and SAR technology.
The Air Force completed the airborne SAR/MTI JSTARS mission area
AOA in 2011, which concluded that the optimum choice for the future of
Air Force MTI was to use a business jet class aircraft with an advanced
radar and on-board battle management command and control (BMC2) suite.
The AOA also concluded that upgrading the current E-8C fleet with an
advanced radar and new BMC2 suite would be the next best solution, but
has significantly high lifecycle costs. In the current fiscal
environment, there is a lack of funding for a JSTARS replacement
surveillance aircraft. The Air Force continues to fund the operations
and support of the JSTARS platform to meet warfighter requirements.
Critical near term diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS) issues have
been addressed through the multifunctional information distribution
system joint tactical radio system and prime mission equipment DMS
efforts. It is currently estimated that DMS issues will not cause
grounding of any JSTARS platforms until 2025+. These modernization
efforts keep JSTARS viable to support the National Military Strategy.
The JSTARS weapons system has been in continuous surge operations
since 2004 and this level of tasking is expected to continue as
combatant commander requirements for ground and maritime moving target
surveillance continue to escalate. Current Global Force Management
Allocation Plan (GFMAP) taskings and projected E-8C GFMAP allocations
for fiscal years 2014-2015 will require continued deployment at these
rates, limiting E-8C worldwide availability in support of emerging
contingency responses.
E-3 Airborne Early Warning and Control System
The 31 aircraft E-3 AWACS fleet is the Department of Defense's
premier airborne surveillance and BMC2 weapon system. AWACS is a key
airborne element of TACS and delivers combat effects of BMC2,
battlespace awareness and decision superiority. As a rapidly deployable
system, the E-3 is often the first surveillance and BMC2 capability in
theater.
The E-3 fleet has struggled to consistently meet Air Combat
Command's mission capable requirement. Additionally, the depot is
seeing increased corrosion in the fuselage and wings leading to
expectations for increased aging aircraft issues in the next programmed
depot maintenance cycles. System mission capable rates will likely
deteriorate further when considering recent reductions to operations
and sustainment budgets.
AWACS, with its current modernization programs, is adequate for
executing the National Military Strategy. Current modernization efforts
focus on upgrading battle management mission systems through the 40/45
upgrade, as well as cockpit avionics to provide the AWACS with the
computing and communications architecture to participate in a net-
enabled battlespace, and avionics that are free from DMS issues to meet
worldwide airspace navigation requirements.
AWACS requires these future efforts to address adversary threats
and effectively participate in coalition and joint networked
battlespace. Future efforts include BMC2 enhancements and wide-band
communications to allow for net centric operations and data exchange
with other weapon systems and elements of the enterprise as well as
sensor upgrades to detect low/very low radar cross section air target
sets and improve operations in an electronic attack environment. Future
capability enhancements will depend on the priority and phasing
relative to other Department efforts and difficult choices may be
required to live within funding constraints.
Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar
Fundamental to the Air Force's ability to provide unparalleled,
expert, and sustained BMC2 is the ground-based Control and Reporting
Center (CRC) weapon system, is the replacement of its 1970s-era
technology primary sensor that is becoming unsupportable. The mission
of the CRC is to provide persistent tactical level BMC2 to joint and
combined air, land, and sea power assets in support of the Joint/
Combined Forces air component commander's objectives. The Three-
Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar is planned to be the
principal Air Force long-range, ground-based sensor to detect,
identify, track, and report aerial targets in support of theater
commanders, with the full operational capability for 35 radars
scheduled for 2025. Extensive operational analyses have resulted in
well-defined requirements based on current and future threats and
scenarios. After a $252 million cut to the program in the fiscal year
2013 budget, the Air Force identified cost/performance trades to enable
the program to move forward.
iv. conclusion
The Air Force is still assessing the exact impacts of sequestration
on Air Force total obligation authority in fiscal year 2014 and beyond.
Any further reductions to our fiscal year 2014 budget request will
drive additional risks to our readiness, force structure, and ability
to modernize an aging aircraft inventory. In addition, the outcome of
the strategic choices and management review may drive profound changes
across the Department of Defense.
As we navigate the uncertain way ahead, to mitigate risk in
critical areas like readiness, force structure and modernization, we
will continue to work with Congress to develop executable force shaping
options, and ask support for another BRAC round to reduce excess
infrastructure as a means to meet sizable budget reduction goals.
Our sister Services and allies expect the Air Force to provide
critical warfighting and enabling capabilities. We remain focused on
delivering global power, reach, and vigilance through our core missions
of air and space superiority, global strike, rapid global mobility,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and global command and
control. We look forward to working closely together as we address the
challenges of near-term uncertainty to provide the ability to deliver
combat air power for America when and where we are needed.
Senator Manchin. I want to thank all three of you for your
presentation, and without objection all prepared statements
will be made a part of the record.
With that, I will turn it over to Senator Wicker for his
questions.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
General Bogdan, let's start by talking about U.S. defense
exports to our allies. I've been a big supporter of this. I
believe robust defense trade increases interoperability with
our allies and reduces unit costs and it helps support U.S.
defense industrial base. I think it's a fact that we have 10
partner countries that are slated to receive the F-35
deliveries in the coming years: the United Kingdom, Turkey,
Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Japan,
Denmark, and Israel.
To what extent, General, have you kept our foreign partners
informed and engaged as to the JSF program status and schedule?
General Bogdan. Sir, our partners and our FMS customers are
a vital part of the program, as you said, not only from the
aspect of reducing costs to the U.S. Government, but the
synergistic effect of having our allies flying the same
airplane with us in the future with the same tactics and the
same capabilities, that's priceless in some ways.
It is difficult sometimes to ensure that information flow
through the JSF program gets to everybody in an equal manner.
It is difficult. What we do today in our program office is we
have--each of the eight partner countries has a deputy national
director who is located in the program office and they are part
of our everyday operating procedures in the program office. We
meet every day at 8:15 a.m., all of us, the leadership team,
and they're included.
Our FMS partners today, which are Japan and Israel, they
have personnel who are located in Crystal City, VA, near where
the JPO is, and once a week we meet with them to have
discussions with them also.
Probably the greatest challenge, however, sir, with our
partners and something that is going to require a lot of effort
in the future is, as we begin to produce and deliver airplanes
to them, they need the information about the airplane that we
in the United States have, and transferring a lot of that
information to our partners is difficult because at times some
of our ITAR restrictions prevent us from getting that
information to them.
Senator Wicker. For the record, tell us what ``ITAR''
means?
General Bogdan. International Trafficking in Arms
Regulation. Generally, the State Department has the purview
over what can and can't be released, especially relative to
industry.
But as I was saying, probably the most difficult thing on
the program right now having to do with the partners--and I
think if they were here they would tell you--that access to
information about the airplane and about the weapons system,
because previously it had been marked United States-only, when
it probably should have been marked differently, is an
impediment to the program today.
Senator Wicker. That decision to mark it as such was made
by the State Department?
General Bogdan. In most instances no, sir. The internal
paperwork on the program was initially marked based on what
Lockheed believed to be the appropriate rules for marking that
paperwork. As we move forward in the program, we have
recognized that I think both the JPO and Lockheed were being
overly conservative, because there is information that we have
to release to our partners now. We are systematically going
back and fixing that.
Senator Wicker. It's obvious you're working with our
partners. Let me ask you about three. Canada, Italy, and the
Netherlands have reduced their projected buys, am I correct?
General Bogdan. That's correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. What was the issue there? Assuming that we
can get no new buyers, how much would the cancellation of say
one foreign sale of an F-35 affect the unit cost for our
government?
General Bogdan. We'll take Italy for an example, sir. Italy
was originally planning on buying somewhere upwards of 140
airplanes. After the U.S. Department of Defense decided to
flatten out our ramp rate over the last 3 years and remove 149
of our airplanes from the forward portion of the buy to the
back end, Italy reduced their buy from 140 down to 90
airplanes.
That has an impact on the unit cost of each and every
airplane that we all buy, whether it's Italy or the Netherlands
or the three Services. So the partners play an important role
in keeping the production level of this program up.
The Canadians similarly are relooking at the process that
they used to determine whether they should have selected the F-
35. It's not so much that they are disputing whether the
airplane is good for them or not. It's the process in which
they came to that conclusion.
But more to your point, sir, it is vital for us to keep the
partners in this program. Without their support and without
them buying airplanes--and our partners without the FMS
customers are going to buy somewhere on the order of 660
airplanes. Any one of those partners pulling out of the program
will have a negative effect on how much it costs the Services
to buy airplanes, and then there's the potential for what we
call the death spiral, where you want to buy airplanes but
someone drops out and the price goes up, so you can't buy as
many, so now because you can't buy as many the price goes up
again, and you continue on that spiral until you get to a point
where you can't buy nearly as many airplanes as you wanted.
Senator Wicker. Why don't we say this: You'll take for the
record my sub-question about the unit cost----
General Bogdan. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker.--about each sale affecting the unit cost.
General Bogdan. I can get you that information.
[The information referred to follows:]
Unit cost is sensitive to the total quantity procured. Savings in
the cost of the aircraft can be realized through bulk purchases and
other economies of scale. The actual cost of an individual aircraft in
any given Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lot is largely influenced
by how many aircraft are being purchased, and how much production line
learning has been achieved to that point. Additional purchases take
advantage of economies of scale, but also provide additional learning
opportunities, which in turn drive down costs even further. Likewise,
aircraft reductions in any given LRIP lot would have the opposite
effect.
Senator Wicker. How are things going with Singapore,
General?
General Bogdan. Singapore has shown tremendous interest.
Every time I see anyone from the Singaporean Air Force, I can
tell you that they are quite enthused about the airplane. I
believe by this summer we will hear if Singapore is in the
program.
Senator Wicker. And South Korea, sir?
General Bogdan. South Korea should make their decision by
June of this year. They were originally scheduled to make their
decision on three different airplanes that they were looking at
in December. They extended that for 6 more months and we would
expect by June to hear about what their decision is. We're
cautiously optimistic.
Senator Wicker. General Davis, that country you referred
to, that's China, wasn't it?
General Davis. Yes, sir, it was.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Now, on the cutback of 18 percent of our training flights,
that is a function of 9 percent being jammed into 6 months, am
I correct?
General Davis. Sir, that was 18 percent of our total flying
hours, not just training hours.
Senator Wicker. Total flying hours.
General Davis. That was the direct result of the
sequestration 9 percent cuts.
Senator Wicker. Thank you for clearing that up.
When we get to next year, is spreading it across 12 months
going to ease that up a bit for us?
General Davis. Sir, our 2014 President's budget is roughly
flat compared to 2013.
Senator Wicker. But in terms of the flying hours?
General Davis. Sir, that's what I'm trying to get at.
Because some of our investment programs start to grow in 2014,
we will have to continue within the Air Force to figure out how
we balance modernization with readiness. If we assume that that
budget stays intact with no effect of the current Budget
Control Act, we will be able to buy back a lot of those flying
hours because we'll not have to pay that bill. So a lot of
those training hours, a lot of those lost sorties, a lot of
those combat squadrons that are no longer mission capable will
come back. So we'll have to just assume to be able to get there
that we get the full President's budget request for 2014.
If we have to deal with anything else in 2014, we'll have
to work that on a real-time basis.
Senator Wicker. Let me squeeze in, General Bogdan, the
hacking of our U.S. computer networks by the Chinese. How
confident are we going forward about our ability to secure
classified and sensitive data within these programs?
General Bogdan. Sir, I will tell you within DOD and within
the JSF program, I think over the last few years we have
implemented some fairly robust procedures to keep F-35 data
within the confines of DOD. I am a little less confident about
our industry partners, to be quite honest with you.
I can tell you from our partners' standpoint, they
recognize the huge responsibility that they have with the fifth
generation technology that we're giving them, and each and
every partner I know is taking security to the same level that
DOD is. So I would tell you on the partner side and on the U.S.
Services side I'm pretty confident that we have a robust
layered system in place to prevent that. I would tell you I'm
not that confident outside DOD.
Senator Wicker. Tell us what you need to help you work with
industry on this, and thank you for your service.
General Bogdan. I will take that for the record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The F-35 program continues to work aggressively with our industry
partners to ensure that F-35 data is appropriately protected in all
data mediums. I appreciate the critical role that Congress plays in
influencing the direction of our cyber security efforts. The continued
emphasis on cyber security issues related to the Department of Defense
by congressional members during interactions with industry further
emphasizes the importance of this key issue area. In addition, industry
can further support acquisition programs by applying industry best
cyber security practices and methods across all acquisition programs
without explicit direction from the Government.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator.
At this time we'll hear from Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you all for being here today and
thank you for your extraordinary service to our country in an
area that is critical to our national security.
If I may, General Davis, I think if I have it correctly you
outlined that the Air Force is about 200 fighter pilots short
of your total manning requirement. Am I correct in that
recollection?
General Davis. Sir, that number is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Could you explain to us what you view
as the primary causes for that shortfall, if I may refer to it
that way, whether it's recruiting and retention or funding for
training or where you see the causes are?
General Davis. Sir, in short it is the direct result of
drawing down force structure. Now let me explain. The airmen in
your Air Force bring a wide variety of expertise, not only in
flying fighters and bombers, but also in command and control of
the air in defense of everything. So we have very specific
billets all throughout the Air Force that requires that
expertise that a fighter pilot either learned from operational
deployments, brought from weapons school as our premier
instructors, or something.
So we depend on their expertise to do a lot of fairly
important jobs throughout the Air Force: running air operations
centers, helping command and control battles. So as we draw
down force structure and cockpits become less available, we
have no ability to absorb these individuals out of pilot
training, put them into a fighter squadron, get them some
experience so that they are now useful in an air operations
center over in the Middle East. So as a result, it perpetuates
itself. If we can't bring them in, we can't fill the slots and
the shortfall continues to grow.
So again, it goes back to what we're able to fly and how
many cockpits we're able and how much training opportunity
we're able to give these individuals.
Senator Blumenthal. So if I can put it in terms that might
be understandable to the average American, not that your
explanation hasn't been absolutely clear, but if I were giving
it to the Rotary Club, we're not providing enough aircraft for
training, enough slots where our pilots coming out of schools
can have the kind of useful experience that gives them the
ability to be sufficiently expert in the air to have them fly
for us?
General Davis. Senator, that's exactly right. It's a matter
of getting them expertise so they can contribute to the battle.
Senator Blumenthal. I heard what you said about that other
country, which we now know is China, and I wonder if you could
expand on that a little bit? What exactly have they done within
this short period of time that you cited?
General Davis. Sir, within about 22 months they flew
variants--and we can all debate the relevancy of those two
airplanes--the J-20 and the J-31, which were essentially, if
you look at them, they look very much like a version of the F-
35 and very much a version of the F-22. You asked General
Bogdan about hacking networks. There's no doubt that a large
amount of our unclassified data probably made it into those
designs in some shape, form, or fashion.
The fact that that country could find the resources and the
engineers to build two prototypes, two flying high performance
aircraft prototypes, in 22 months--and if you look a little bit
further within the intelligence, it wasn't just those two
airplanes. They flew a variety of airplanes in about a 3-year
period, to include an airlifter which looked very much like our
C-17, a helicopter, and other training aircraft.
So they have shown that they have acquired the beginnings
of a little bit of agility within the acquisition system that
we need to be mindful of, because, while we may think we're
comfortable and able to do things as we please, we're seeing
that other countries that we didn't care too much about in how
they produced weapons are starting to show that they have
capabilities. That's why I brought that up.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate your raising it with us,
and I find it somewhat alarming that the keystone to our air
superiority for the next decades can be so easily, in effect,
reproduced, which is probably a polite way of putting it, by
the Chinese in so short a period of time. Should I not be
reacting that way to what you've just said?
General Davis. Sir, I think we all need to be mindful of
the fact that they can go produce airplanes of a fighter, if
you will, variation in a short period of time. I would caution
the fact that probably the underpinnings behind that shell that
you see flying around may not be anywhere near the capabilities
that General Bogdan will bring with the F-35 or what we have
with the F-22 or the F-18E/F.
Just the fact they can produce and deliver prototypes.
There was a period in our time where we had nine different X-
plane variants sitting on the ramp at Edwards Air Force Base at
the same time. We produced 30-something X variants between 1947
and 1987 roughly. So now we've kind of set back on our laurels
and built some very exquisite, very capable designs that are
going to dominate the air, I have no doubt. But we now have
another country that I think we need to pay attention to a
little bit differently than we have in the past.
Senator Blumenthal. So they right now, they have
reengineered or managed to in effect reproduce the shell at
least, but we don't know whether the flying capabilities and
the attack abilities are commensurate with what we would regard
the F-35?
General Davis. Sir, that would be my personal opinion of
how I'd characterize that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator.
I just have a few questions and then Senator McCain has
joined us.
I'd like to ask each of the witnesses how will implementing
the reductions from sequestration affect each of your programs?
I think we've heard an overture on both of that. I might ask,
how would you be able to manage these adjustments if you had
flexibility? That's a big word we're all using on both sides of
the aisle, Democrats and Republicans. But basically still
meeting the goals of the cuts that have to be made, but doing
them with some discretion that you might have and flexibility,
if that would help you? If anybody can speak to that, whoever
wants to start? General Bogdan?
General Bogdan. Yes, sir. Flexibility would be a wonderful
gift for the F-35 program. If the sequestration were to take
place precisely as it was defined across the board, my program
would have problems. I would lose money in development and that
means that I may not be able to deliver the capability that the
warfighter needs on time. I would lose money in production,
which means we will lose airplanes in fiscal year 2013, which
has an effect on all the remaining airplane prices in 2013 and
possibly 2014 and beyond. I lose some part of my money that I
use for spares and sustaining and maintaining airplanes in the
field, which means today my operations at Eglin, where I'm
training pilots and I'm training maintainers, would also have
to slow down.
So without flexibility each of those pots of money will
take a hit and the program will be degraded in those areas.
With flexibility, the Services can decide how much money from
each of those pots do they really need to take, and at least we
can keep the program balanced. We may not be able to keep it
all at the same level, but at least in those different areas we
can keep it balanced. So from my point of view it would be a
great gift to have.
Senator Manchin. We're talking about still the $42.5
billion that needs to be reduced from defense and non-defense
between now and the end of September.
General Bogdan. That's correct, sir.
Senator Manchin. But with that flexibility, you, DOD, would
make the adjustments accordingly of whether are high priorities
or lower hanging fruit would be priorities. You don't have that
discretion today.
General Bogdan. I do not have as much discretion as I would
like, sir.
Senator Manchin. I got you, sir.
Admiral?
Admiral Skinner. Senator, thanks for the question. As my
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Secretary have
testified before, we lost about $6 billion out of our
investment accounts, another $4 billion out of readiness. We
have some authority that came in with the Public Law 113-6 that
allowed us some authorities. Those authorities were allocated
by DOD. But the flexibility beyond those authorities to move
money to handle our more pressing needs would be, as General
Bogdan said, a great gift.
The ability to go in and selectively fix our investment
programs that required fixing on a priority basis, the ability
to move money out of our investment accounts and handle our
more pressing readiness needs, for example our depot inductions
of airframes and engines, and in this case for the Navy's ship
maintenance--when we have those types of maintenance events, if
we miss them they're missed forever, until the next time around
we come in with the cycle. So the ability to handle that would
be a great gift.
Senator Manchin. General Davis?
General Davis. If we had the ability to put those cuts in
the areas that we thought we could most handle the risk and
take the force structure adjustments that we needed to, I think
that would be certainly a benefit to anything we want to do in
the Air Force.
When the public law was passed and the bill was passed,
certain key programs that we worried very much about were made
whole, notably the KC-46 tanker. That was one that was on a
fixed price contract we were worried greatly about about
whether we would have the ability to move the money in. But
even with that one being fixed, we have no doubt that with the
money we've lost out of the Air Force F-35 production lines, we
will lose some number of airplanes yet to be determined. Since
we have no ability to put that money back in and fix that, we
know that every other airplane--where Senator Wicker was
going--every other airplane everybody else buys will go up by
some small amount. So again, there the inefficiency starts to
grow.
So we would like to be able to have some flexibility to
pick the right spots. We had enough, I would say, engineering
change dollars and other money that we were trying to work
through simply because of the fact we had slowed down spending
across all Air Force programs in the continuing resolution. So
when we finally had to take the cut with the 2013 numbers, I'll
tell you the results were probably not as drastic, certainly in
investments. They were terrible in O&M, as I've talked about
the lost flying hours.
Just say this happens to continue and the Budget Control
Act continues through 2014. None of that flexibility exists. So
every single program will feel it very painfully in a very
deliberate fashion. So the flexibility would help on that.
Senator Manchin. Thank you all.
General Bogdan, in 2010 Secretary of Defense Gates at that
time withheld $614 million of Lockheed Martin's performance
fees on the JSF after performance targets were missed.
Secretary Gates said: ``I will withhold $614 million in
performance fees from the lead contractor since the taxpayers
should not have to bear the entire burden of getting the JSF
program back on track.''
So I would ask, what has happened to the $614 million fee?
How much has Lockheed earned back and how much did they lose,
and how much is there left for the company to earn?
General Bogdan. Yes, sir. I'll try and go through this and
try and avoid doing math in public here. But you are right,
there was $614 million of fee left post-Nunn-McCurdy breach
when we rebaselined the program. Immediately as we came out of
the Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Secretary of Defense took $190
million of that money and just took it away and said: Lockheed,
you will never have the opportunity to earn that money again.
So right off the bat he took $190 million.
Over the next 3 years from 2010 to 2012, there was award
fee in the total of about $101 million that Lockheed could have
earned. They only earned $34 million of that. So if you do the
math, the $190 million we took away, the $101 million they
could have earned over the last 3 years, what's left today is
$337 million.
When we came out of the Nunn-McCurdy breach, all of the fee
on this program for the development was in what we call award
fee. Award fee is a subjective fee, meaning that I, as the PEO,
take a look at Lockheed's performance and get to decide how
much they're going to get.
We transitioned the contract from award fee in 2012 to what
we call incentive fee. So every bit of that $337 million now is
in what we call incentive fee and there is very little
subjectivity. It's things that Lockheed has to do and has to
perform over the next 4 years to earn that money.
Let me give you an example. There's $100 million of that
$337 million that's broken up. If they deliver the 2B
capability on time, they get $40 million. If they deliver the
3I capability on time with all the capability, they'll earn $25
million. If they deliver the 3F capability on time with all the
capability, they'll earn $35 million. That's $100 million of
the remaining $337 million.
I've taken the last $237 million that's left over, I put it
at the end of the contract, and I've said to Lockheed Martin:
You must deliver me a weapons system that meets each and every
one of the system spec requirements. You must do that on time,
and you must do it within the budget I have remaining on the
development program. If you don't meet those criteria, you will
not earn a penny of that $237 million. That's where we have it
today, sir.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
At this time I want to turn it over to Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses.
General Bogdan, about I guess it was a couple months ago
you wrote, made some statements that were, I felt, rather
interesting, where basically you questioned the commitment of
Lockheed Martin to seeing this program through without profit
being the sole motive. I don't know if that's an awkward
description of your statement, but I thought it was a very
strong one and I was impressed by it. Would you care to explain
to the committee what you were saying there?
General Bogdan. Yes, sir. My comments were directed at
Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, and my intention was to
put them on notice that I needed to make sure that they were
committed in the long term to reducing costs on this program.
At the time when I made that comment, I was not so sure. Doing
business with both companies has been difficult. It is getting
better. I was seeing behaviors in which I thought over the next
30 or 40 years were not sustainable for a relationship between
us and either one of those industry partners. So fundamentally
this was a shot across the bow to them, letting them know that
I was watching and I was waiting for behavior changes.
Now, having said that, there are some things that I can
tell you, not necessarily directly related to my comments, but
over the past 9 months have seemed to taken hold on the program
which I am appreciative of. First and foremost, there have been
significant leadership changes in Lockheed Martin over the last
few months all the way up and down the F-35 chain. The deputy
program manager, the program manager, the president of Lockheed
Martin Aero, and the CEO have all changed out. I would tell you
that those four individuals in those positions now have a
different culture and a different attitude than when I first
walked in on this program 9 months ago. That is a good thing.
The other thing I have noticed, and whether it was as a
result of my comments or not doesn't matter because it's good
for the government anyway, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney
are beginning to share in the risks of this program. For
example, the last contract we negotiated in Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) 5, Lockheed Martin has to pay for half of all
our concurrency costs.
Senator McCain. Could I point out that part of that was
finally congressional mandate.
General Bogdan. Yes, sir. I was going to get to that part.
The concurrency part was a cost share. The part about the
overruns on the price of the production was clearly a
congressional mandate for us to start forcing the contractors
to take some responsibility for production cost overruns, and
we appreciate that. We do.
So there have been signs that Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney
do indeed want to sell us 3,164 airplanes and almost 4,000
engines. But the jury is still out. There's a long way to go.
There's two-thirds of the testing to go. There's only 10
percent of the production is done. So I will be continuing to
monitor this.
Senator McCain. GAO gives you pretty favorable marks for
your latest activities and that is encouraging. But you know, I
look at the sustainment costs. GAO reports that procurement
would average $12.6 billion a year through 2037. The DOD Cost
Assessment Program Evaluation Office estimates that JSF
operating and sustainment costs would exceed $18 billion a
year. That's $30 billion a year for this one program. Is that
affordable?
General Bogdan. I guess I can't answer the affordability
question. I'll look to my service brethren to answer that. But
more to your point, sir, you are exactly right. For our
partners, for the Services, for our FMS customers, if we don't
start today in reducing the overall operating and sustaining
costs of this airplane, it could spend--it could become very,
very expensive.
Senator McCain. Maybe I could ask our other two witnesses
if they have a view, and maybe not. I would point out in this
GAO report in 2001 it was going to be $69 million per aircraft
and now in March 2012 it's $137 million per aircraft. That's
pretty remarkable.
Admiral and General, do you have any comments?
Admiral Skinner. Senator, it's in the best interests of the
Department of the Navy and I think of DOD to drive the
production cost of this aircraft down. We're encouraged by
the----
Senator McCain. Have you seen any signs of that?
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir, we have. We've seen signs that
the production costs over the LRIP lots negotiated to date and
projected to be negotiated in the future are coming down the
learning curve and are getting more affordable.
But to your point, the numbers that you quoted earlier in
your question, they're a little hard to swallow. So what we
need to do is we need to do everything in our power to
cooperate with the program office and to drive the production
costs down, and then conversely the sustainment costs of our
jets and how we operate them.
General Davis. Senator, along with what Admiral Skinner
said, we've shown in the Air Force that on budget issues you
can make any program unaffordable as you decrease quantities.
So there's a component here. The cost needs to go down----
Senator McCain. I think we learned that lesson from the F-
22.
General Davis. Sir, we learned it from the F-22 and also
from the B-2, I think. As we tool up for a much larger program
and we start to have issues that are somewhat related to this
and we have budget issues that drive down the quantities, each
one goes up.
As I mentioned, the three to five airplanes we are possibly
to use out of our buy for fiscal year 2013, $3, $4, $5, $7
million impact to every other airplane not bought, simply
because quantity has changed. So there is that aspect of it.
The other aspect of it I will say is that we're all
concerned about what the hourly flying cost of the airplane
will be as it's computed now. But as we've learned over time on
F-18s and certainly in the Air Force on F-16s and F-15s, for a
lot of reasons if we end up constraining that flying hour cost
to whatever our budget is none of our legacy fighters right now
would be funded to 100 percent of their availability or 100
percent of their spares requirement. So we deal with that----
Senator McCain. Sooner or later, that gets into the
efficiency of the pilots.
General Davis. Yes, sir, it most certainly does. We fully
fund the airplanes and the pilots that are in contact in the
AOR and the folks back home will suffer for that a little bit.
We would like that suffering to be minimal, but----
Senator McCain. Not to mention the effect of sequestration,
obviously.
Thank you. Thank you, General.
The program, General Bogdan, is two-thirds only--it still
needs two-thirds of its developmental testing. Isn't that a
significant risk, particularly in the area of software
development? I notice in your statement that you were,
``moderately''--you had ``moderate confidence.'' None of us
around here seem to like the word ``moderate.''
General Bogdan. Yes, sir, so let me explain. Software is
the number one challenge on the program. When I use the word
``moderately confident,'' what I am speaking about is I am
moderately confident that the initial warfighting capability of
the airplane that we intend to deliver to the U.S. Marine Corps
in 2015 will be there with the full capability in 2015.
I am less confident that the final capability of the
airplane, which is due to be delivered at the end of 2017, will
happen in 2017 with the full capability. So the tough years for
us are 2016, 2017, and the beginning of 2018 for the software.
What I see today for 2013, 2014, and then 2015 for the 2B
capability, the initial capability, is a software process that
is improving. We have lots of metrics that we can show you, and
that in part is what causes me to say I'm moderately confident
up to 2015. I can honestly tell you, beyond 2015 I don't have a
great answer right now because there's a lot of things that
have to happen between now and 2015 to give me more confidence
in 2017, not the least of which is I have to finish the flight
test on this initial 2B software, as we call it.
Senator McCain. My time has expired, but let me just say,
we appreciate what all three of you have done. General Bogdan,
I think you've gotten a hold of this program in a way that
certainly the GAO is satisfied with the progress that's being
made. But the three of you together represent many years of
experience in the business, and the thing that bothers us the
most--well, let me say the thing that bothers me the most is
the whole acquisition system where we have so many years and so
many cost overruns, and we don't seem to have lessons learned.
General Davis was just mentioning the B-2 and the F-22 and
the cost overruns associated with that. Now, I understand the
tanker is doing pretty well. Is that right, General Davis?
General Davis. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator McCain. So what are we doing with the tanker, which
I understand is a much simpler--it's a flying gas station and I
understand it's much simpler than a tactical fighter weapons
system. But somewhere along the line we have to have people
like you tell us the lessons learned so we don't keep repeating
them, so we don't keep seeing this movie over and over again.
I would argue that there are some of us that have a long
record of being staunch defenders of national defense and
spending what it takes and believe we live in a dangerous
world, but we have to be able to go back to our constituents
and say: They're doing a lot better than they did in the F-22
and the F-35 and the sensing devices along the Mexico border,
where Boeing blew about $787 million. These cost overruns, the
American people make it hard for us to have credibility when we
speak for a strong national defense.
So maybe at some time we ought to have a hearing, Mr.
Chairman, on the lessons learned in these failures. I don't
know if legislation is necessary. We passed an acquisition
reform bill that Senator Levin and I authored and we have
placed restrictions on cost overruns. But at least in the eye
of our constituents, we aren't doing nearly the job that we
should.
So I don't know if you have any comment on that or not, but
I hope that you'll understand from our side of the dais it's a
greater and greater challenge for us to continue to support
these weapons systems when we are having the cost overruns that
we have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me this time.
Senator Manchin. Absolutely. While the Senator is still
here, I'd like to follow up because when these programs--I'm
understanding when these programs are coming to life there is a
competitive process you go through, like the so-called fly-off.
The companies that are competing have to build prototypes and
I'm sure that's where they got their cost estimate thinking it
would be a $69 million project per unit.
I think, to follow up on what the Senator was asking, how
did we let the control--how did we lose control of that cost?
They had a plane, they built a plane, they basically
demonstrated it. You picked one over the other, I'm sure,
however that process goes. You had pretty much a flying
prototype, and they could have figured out what their cost was
to get that prototype flying on that one unit, and then they
would estimate over the life if there's going to be 3,000 or
more where that cost, the competitive cost, could be.
That's usually a business--that's the way businesses in the
real world operate. But I think what we're doing--and the
Senator was being quite kind in saying, how come the military
doesn't use that same process? If it was your pocket and you
were paying, or your stockholders, that you were investing
their money, you wouldn't operate that way. We're not blaming
any of you directly. We're saying we would have--and I think
the Senator's suggestion about having a hearing strictly on the
process of how we got here--I heard him. I've been here 2\1/2\
years and I look to Senator McCain as being a champion in
leading not only the defense of our Nation, but also just the
common sense of getting the bang for your buck. It's hard to
look the taxpayers in the eye and say we've done it.
He's a staunch defender, but it's going to be pretty hard
to say let's keep pouring the money to it when they're saying
it was $69 million, now you're $137 million. How did you double
the cost and nobody had to pay the penalty for that and they're
still doing business, if you will.
I'm not saying that for any other reason, but I think that
we will call a hearing on that and we would like for you to be
prepared to show us the turn of events so that it basically has
a template, because if it happened with the B-2, if it's
happened with the F-22, it's happened with the Strike Fighter,
and the only thing that's come in relative to the cost has been
the tanker, I mean, pretty soon----
Admiral Skinner. We've had good luck with the F-18, sir.
Senator Manchin. You've had good luck with that?
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. With that being said, how are we going to
maintain this aircraft, this F-35? We look at it from the
standpoint--let me just--we'll come back to that.
If the Chinese Government can produce in 22 months a
competitive aircraft, there had to be piracy or espionage, had
to be.
Senator McCain. Both.
Senator Manchin. Both. Are we doing anything on that line?
I mean, if they're going to go ahead and copy what we have,
they ought to at least help pay a little bit for it. That's
all. That's a fair request, don't you think, Senator?
Have we pinpointed it? Has their government been put to the
task of--it's very obvious what they've done. I don't know if
you have any comment on that or if you could comment on that.
Admiral Skinner. We'll take that one for the record,
Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
With regard to the question of whether we, the Department of
Defense (DOD), are investigating and prosecuting persons involved in
the illicit acquisition and transfer of protected research and critical
technologies by the People's Republic of China, the following
information is provided by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS).
DOD counterintelligence, led by the military department
counterintelligence organizations, aggressively and collaboratively
engage in detecting, identifying, mitigating and defeating efforts by
foreign intelligence elements (FIE), including the People's Republic of
China (PRC), to illicitly acquire or exploit protected research and
critical technologies. Working closely with the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), Commerce, and other U.S. Government elements, the
Department of the Navy aggressively investigates and prosecutes
individuals or entities, foreign and domestic, involved in attempts to
compromise critical research, development, and acquisition, and fielded
sensitive technologies. Some recent examples of successful
investigations involving the PRC include:
Stolen U.S. Military night vision & optics to China and England--On
November 4, 2011, Phillip Andro Jamison, a former Gunner's Mate Petty
Officer First Class in the U.S. Navy stationed aboard Naval Amphibious
Base Coronado, was sentenced to serve 30 months in prison for violating
the Arms Export Control Act. Jamison pleaded guilty on April 28, 2011.
On September 9, 2010, he was indicted for trafficking in stolen
government property, interstate transportation of stolen goods and
exporting defense articles without a license. The indictment alleged
that Jamison, while assigned to work at his unit's armory, stole more
than 280 items from the U.S. Navy between October 2008 and September
2009 and then sold these items to customers via eBay, an Internet
auction and shopping website. The indictment further alleged that
Jamison illegally exported to Hong Kong and England combat-grade night
vision devices, riflescopes and laser aiming devices without first
obtaining the required export licenses from the State Department.
Jamison admitted stealing the items and illegally exporting some of the
technology to Hong Kong. The investigation was conducted by ICE and
NCIS.
Telecommunications equipment from China to Iraq--On April 10, 2007,
Andrew Huang, the owner of MacAndrew's, Inc, an international export
company, pleaded guilty in the District of Connecticut to one count of
making false statements to the FBI. Huang was charged in 2006 with
operating as a representative for the Chinese Electronic System
Engineering Corporation, the technology procurement arm of the
Government of China. According to court documents, Huang allegedly
helped broker the illegal sale and transfer of millions of dollars
worth of telecommunications equipment from China to Iraq between 1999
and 2001. Huang was sentenced to 2 years probation and a $5,000 fine.
The investigation was conducted by the FBI, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, NCIS, Internal Revenue Service, and BIS.
In addition to the above, NCIS is currently engaged in a number of
classified investigative and operational efforts to identify,
prosecute, or otherwise frustrate FIE efforts, including those
involving the PRC, to illicitly acquire protected information or
technologies. NCIS can provide additional, more specific information at
the appropriate classification should the committee so desire.
Despite these efforts, the United States remains a primary and
lucrative target for FIE engaged in the collection of such information
and technologies. Successful efforts by FIE results in significant loss
to the U.S. economic and military global advantage. In addition to
losses through fraud and theft, we contend with a wide array of other
techniques such as skilled elicitation efforts directed against our
scientists and engineers; exfiltration of sensitive or proprietary data
through cyber penetrations; espionage using insiders; and loss of
critical information through carelessness. Additionally, NCIS employs
an aggressive counterintelligence functional services effort to include
briefings, debriefings, insider threat awareness and
counterintelligence defensive awareness training.
Senator Manchin. Do you know if there's any proceedings on
anybody because of these programs that you've seen being able
to accelerate to the point they have? Are we investigating?
Have we prosecuted anybody? Are we on the tail of anybody?
Admiral Skinner. Sir, not to my knowledge at least. I won't
speak for General Bogdan or for General Davis, but not to my
knowledge. We have concentrated mainly in the Department of the
Navy on protecting our data and providing information assurance
for our data within our own lifelines in the government and
then subsequently with the contractors that we work with to
develop and produce these weapons systems.
Senator Manchin. This amazing speed of 22 months, would it
be part of the hacking system that we've been able to monitor
and watch what is going on? Probably.
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. I just have just one more. Senator, thank
you.
We mentioned the statement, I think, that--all of you have
mentioned, we talked about the F-35 life cycle over 50 years
would be approximately $1 trillion. General Bogdan, you said we
must start today to tackle long-term cycle costs of that
weapon. Can you describe what concrete steps that you're taking
other than what you've already just testified to? Is there
anything that you might have missed or that you'd like to add
to the testimony?
General Bogdan. Yes, sir. One of the first things we've
done is we've taken a look at the overall sustainment costs and
broken it down into different elements. We're trying to
identify areas where the JPO and the contractors can actually
work to reduce costs, and I'll talk about those. But there are
areas of the long-term operations and support costs that fall
within the Services' purview to deal with. For example, how
much flying time do you give each pilot relative to how much
time is used in the simulator? That ratio can greatly change
how costly your airplane is over the life of the airplane.
So the first thing we're doing is we're trying to separate
out those things that the JPO and industry can work on and
those things that the Services can take a look at and work on,
so that we cannot work at cross-purposes.
The second thing we're doing in the JPO today is we're
injecting competition into those long-term sustainment
activities. I learned a very good lesson as the PEO for the KC-
46 program that we just spoke about, what good competition can
bring. It is a good. So we are--there are various areas like
the supply chain, like the Avionics Lostitics Interaction
System administration, like developing and delivering support
equipment, like running our training centers for our pilots and
our maintainers, those are things that industry, not just
Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, have great capability and
capacity to do for us. There's no reason in the world why we
should not open that up and find the best companies that can
give the government the best value to do those things, and
we're doing that today, and we should start seeing over the
next few years some of those competitions come about and we
should see some of the estimated costs of doing that come down.
The last thing we're doing on the program today is, we have
about 6,000 hours of flying total on the fleet today. We are
starting to gather real information about the reliability and
the maintainability of the airplane and what parts on the
airplane are failing at a greater rate than we expected, which
parts are coming off the airplane and taking too long to
repair. We call that a reliability maintainability program and
we have a robust one going on in the JSF right now to identify
those cost drivers and then to do something about it. Either we
redesign a part or we qualify a second source to make that part
for us or we figure out the best way to repair that part
quicker and cheaper. Maybe it's organic standup of that repair
capability.
Those steps over the next 4 or 5 years ought to make at
least a dent in that huge $1.1 trillion number that we hear
about. So I'm committed to do everything I can for the
partners--they watch this every day--the Services--they watch
it every day. Our FMS customers watch it every day, and they're
all worried, and I think they should be and I'm working on it.
Admiral Skinner. Senator, if I may, from a Service
perspective we've made great progress over the course of the
last 3 years. We have a process in place led by the JPO that
allows us to generate those numbers. We have common
definitions. We have common cost allocation strategies across
the Services that we've all agreed to.
I know the Navy and the Marine Corps are doing exactly
referred to in his first point, which is we're going through
exactly how we fly our aircraft today and how we train our
pilots. We look at the capabilities of the F-35B and C. We take
a look at the high-fidelity simulation that is being provided
by the program. We determine how many weapons that each one of
our pilots need to drop a year to maintain proficiency, how
many air-to-air missiles they have to shoot, how many landings
they have to make per sortie.
All of that information needs to be fed into General
Bogdan's model in order to come up with an accurate sustainment
number. We're in the process of going through that information
in great detail and providing that data to his databases over
the course of the next few months.
So already we've noticed some discrepancies in our initial
data that we submitted to the program and what we think we
would be doing in the future. So we should see some progress in
that area from a Service perspective, at least the Department
of the Navy Service perspective.
General Davis. Sir, the lesson we have to learn through
this is that the F-35 is not an F-16, it's not an F-18.
Unfortunately, a lot of the models we use, a lot of the
decisions we make about what the cost per flying hour, is still
modeled very much on how we fly F-16s and F-18s. We've learning
from the F-22 that very little beneficial training is
accomplished in open air because the airplane is just, it's
just too smart. It sees everything, it knows everything. It's
an easy flight in the cockpit. The F-35 is going to be the same
way.
So you're going to have to train differently in a different
fashion, notably, as has been mentioned a couple times, with
some very high-fidelity sims, which would be a lot cheaper to
use than the airplane and get a lot higher quality training out
of that. I think we, all Services, are just coming to grips
that this is going to be a different animal when we get it
fielded and get it operational.
The same way we've put personnel on the flight line, the
same way we've managed and ordered spares, the same way we've
practiced weapons deliveries and weapons employment is just not
going to work for this airplane, and we're going to have to
come to grips with that. But we won't be able to until we get
enough of our operational guys out there flying it and enough
of our operational maintainers out there telling us how to do
it.
Every airplane I've seen fielded in the Air Force has been
fielded with an idea of how it's software was going to be used,
until you turned it over to the lieutenant or a captain that
had had some experience in a true situation, and basically
every operational concept of our airplanes, or at least the
software and the weapons systems on it was significantly
revised after it was put in an operational context. So we'll
see how that goes and what that does for us.
Senator Manchin. Let me thank all of you for your
testimonies today and I appreciate so much your cooperation and
helping us and working with us on this subcommittee. I tell
you, we will be a very active subcommittee. I want to make sure
you all know you have our full support. But we want to learn
also and try to be constructive in the support that we have,
not destructive. I know that happens an awful lot in this
political toxic atmosphere we have from time to time. But we
have a good subcommittee here and I think it really supports
what you do. We just want to make sure that the citizens are
getting the investments and getting return on investments.
I've always said there's two things we can do through tax
dollars. We can spend it or invest it. We've done a good job of
spending a lot of money and we just have to start investing it
a little bit wiser now. So you can help us, I think, make sure
our investments are better spent.
We will keep the hearing record open for 5 days to allow
members to submit additional questions. If there is no further
questions, I want to thank you all again. This hearing stands
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
tactical aircraft programs
1. Senator Manchin. General Bogdan, the F-35 is scheduled to enter
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) in January 2018. This
is the key phase during which the aircraft must demonstrate it is
operationally effective. What key technical and performance issues must
the aircraft demonstrate in the next 4 years before you'd be willing to
enter the aircraft into this phase?
General Bogdan. The operational test and evaluation (OT&E) for
Block 2 is scheduled to be held in 2015. This OT&E will validate the
requirements for the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) which require the aircraft to perform the following
missions:
USMC: Air Interdiction (Strike), Close Air Support, Offensive
Counter Air, Defensive Counter Air, and Armed Reconnaissance/Assault
Support Escort
USAF: Limited Strategic Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)/
Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD), Limited Tactical SEAD/DEAD,
Air Interdiction (Strike) and Close Air Support.
In order to perform these missions, the aircraft should demonstrate
the following operational capabilities:
Basic and combat air maneuvers,
Stealth,
Full combat range,
Full multi spectral sensor/multi ship fusion,
AIM-120, GBU-12, JDAM employment
Electronic protection/electronic attack/combat identification
High resolution synthetic aperture radar maps
Ground moving target indicator/tracker
Electronic support measures
Limited countermeasures
Full infrared distributed aperture system
Limited air-to-ground infrared targeting and air-to-air
infrared search and track
Variable message format, Link 16 and multifunction advanced
data link
The OT&E for Block 3 is scheduled for 2017-2018 and will validate
the requirements for Navy IOC which require the aircraft to be able to
perform the following missions: strategic SEAD/DEAD, Tactical SEAD/
DEAD, Air Interdiction (Strike), close air support, offensive counter
air, defensive counter air, anti-surface warfare and combat search and
rescue.
In order to perform these missions, the aircraft should demonstrate
the following operational capabilities:
Basic and combat air maneuvers,
Stealth,
Full combat range,
Full multi spectral sensor/multi ship fusion,
AIM-120, AIM-9X, GBU-12, JDAM, JSOW employment
Electronic protection/electronic attack/combat identification
High resolution synthetic aperture radar maps
Ground moving target indicator/tracker
Electronic support measures
Advanced automated countermeasures
Full infrared distributed aperture system
Limited air-to-ground infrared targeting
Air-to-air infrared search and track
Variable message format, Link 16 and multifunction advanced
data link
In addition, the Block 3 OT&E will fully validate the following F-
35 Program Key Performance Parameters: combat radius, F-35C recovery
speed, F-35B performance (short takeoff distance on a flat deck carrier
and on a United Kingdom carrier equipped with a ski jump and vertical
landing bring back weight), net readiness, radio frequency signature,
force protection, mission reliability, sortie generation rate, and
logistics footprint (C-17 loads, volume and weight).
2. Senator Manchin. General Bogdan, what is your current thinking
on whether the Joint Program Office (JPO) must buy a new helmet?
General Bogdan. To mitigate F-35 Helmet Mounted Display System
risk, an alternate helmet (BAE) is being pursued in case the primary
helmet (Rockwell Collins) does not meet the performance required for
the F-35 missions or proves to be unaffordable. Currently, both helmets
are being developed with a planned fly-off in 2014. Down-select is
planned after the fly-off, but the selection may be made earlier based
upon risk reduction efforts underway.
3. Senator Manchin. General Bogdan, what is the test plan for this
year as the JPO pursues its dual path of developing a second helmet?
General Bogdan. The Rockwell Collins helmet that is currently
integrated on the F-35 has completed a dedicated test period consisting
of over 45 flights. Testing will continue throughout the year on this
helmet consisting of weapons work, expanded envelope work, and night
operations. The next generation of the Rockwell Collins helmet will
begin integration/qualification work later this year with a planned
first F-35 flight in early 2014. The BAE helmet is not as far along in
its development and will continue with qualification this year with its
first F-35 flight planned for the spring of 2014.
4. Senator Manchin. General Bogdan, of all the issues the F-35 must
overcome, is a helmet among the top three?
General Bogdan. Yes, I would consider the helmet to be among the
top three of all of the F-35 issues. My other two priorities are long-
term affordability and software development.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
uh-1 replacement program
5. Senator Wicker. General Davis, the Air Force has long stated its
need to replace its 40-plus-year-old UH-1N fleet, yet you recently
cancelled its replacement program, the Common Vertical Lift Support
Platform (CVLSP). As I understand, the UH-1N aircraft provides support
for the nuclear missile security mission as well as myriad utility
missions. However, the Air Force cancelled the CVLSP program when it
was deemed unaffordable. As the committee understands, the Air Force
target unit price for that program was $20 million per copy. It has
recently been reported that one of the Air Force UH-1N user commands,
Air Force Global Strike Command, is looking at the new Combat Rescue
Helicopter (CRH) program as a possible option to replace the UH-1N.
Yet, the CRH platform is in the same category as what was previously
deemed unaffordable for the CVLSP requirement. Could you please help me
understand the requirements for the current UH-1N missions, not only
for the support provided to Air Force Global Strike Command but for all
of the mission sets supported by the UH-1N?
General Davis. Air Force Global Strike Command is not attempting
UH-1N fleet replacement via the CRH program. Instead, Air Force Global
Strike Command will continue to sustain the existing UH-1N fleet for
the foreseeable future and look for opportunities to acquire excess
aircraft from other DOD organizations at low/no cost to the Air Force.
The Air Force's UH-1N is flown by five major commands, which
include multiple unique mission sets: Air Force Global Strike's
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) helicopter security support,
the Air Force District of Washington's National Capital Region mass
passenger transport, Pacific Air Forces' Operational Support Airlift,
Air Education and Training Command's Air Force Survival School and UH-
1N Formal Training Support and Air Force Material Command's flight test
support. In addition to the UH-1N's military-specific mission sets, the
UH-1N also supports the Department of Homeland Security National
Response Plan and the National Search and Rescue Plan.
The current requirements for the various missions of the UH-1N are
documented in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's approved CVLSP
Capability Development Document. Although these requirements are no
longer tied to a specific acquisition program (i.e., the CVLSP), the
requirements for the UH-1N mission set remain valid.
6. Senator Wicker. General Davis, have the Air Force requirements
been reviewed and validated since the cancellation of the CVLSP?
General Davis. No, the CVLSP requirements were last formally
reviewed and validated before cancellation of the program by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council's approval of the CVSLP's Capability
Development Document in February 2010.
7. Senator Wicker. General Davis, what basis did the Air Force use
to determine that the CVLSP program was unaffordable when deciding to
terminate the program?
General Davis. Since issuance of new Defense Strategic Guidance in
January 2012, the Air Force has sought to differentiate between those
investments that need to be made today and those that can be deferred.
The CVLSP program was terminated in fiscal year 2013 after a cost-
benefit analysis determined that upgrading helicopter security was
deferrable, with additional risk. Ongoing modifications at ICBM launch
facilities, including the installation of remote visual assessment
cameras, reinforced concrete headworks, and faster maintenance access
hatches adequately address the risk of emerging threat technologies and
methods. Air Force Global Strike Command, the field expert, assessed
the priorities of the nuclear enterprise and offered to restructure or
terminate CVLSP. The Air Force chose termination and acceptance of
additional security risk. The termination provided the Air Force with
$134 million in savings in fiscal year 2013 and $950 million over the
Future Years Defense Program to use for other more immediate
priorities.
8. Senator Wicker. General Davis, I understand that the Air Force
issued its recent request for information (RFI) in part because of
lingering concerns over the sustainability of the UH-1N fleet. It is my
sense that it is potentially less costly and certainly less risky to
replace the UH-1N with a new modern aircraft than to do one, two, or a
series of modifications to a 40-plue-year-old airframe. Please detail
the findings and recommendations of the Air Force's RFI on UH-1N
Modernization. Specifically, please address the cost of UH-1N
modification versus replacement cost. In doing so, please consider
those items outlined in the RFI including, but not limited to, speed,
range, endurance, survivability, and sustainability.
General Davis. In the case of the UH-1N, as stated in the original
RFI, ``in terms of mission capability rates the UH-1 remains one of the
most reliable platforms within the USAF inventory.'' The purpose of the
Air Force's RFI on UH-1N Modernization was to determine the feasibility
of sustaining and making modest modernization enhancements to the
platform via low cost options. The industry day presentations
reaffirmed that the robust helicopter industry and the large number of
UH-1's operating globally will enable the Air Force to effectively
sustain the UH-1N until such a time that it can be replaced with an
aircraft that provides all required capabilities.
Air Force Global Strike Command has determined that the most cost
effective way ahead includes safety and simulator modifications
totaling just over $500,000 per aircraft in the near term. Follow-on
improvements to the forward looking infrared radar and secure
communications at $100,000-$200,000 per aircraft yield a total cost of
less than $1 million per aircraft over a 10-year period. Compared to
the previously assessed cost of the CVLSP program, or any other new
helicopter acquisition, this approach is far more cost effective for
the Air Force.
9. Senator Wicker. General Davis, the Air Force recently acquired
26 legacy UH-1 platforms from the Marine Corps to help mitigate their
sustainment issues with the UH-1N fleet. When the Army and the Marine
Corps faced similar issues with their UH-1 fleets, they opted for new
replacement aircraft, the UH-72 and the UH-1Y, respectively. By our
accounting, that leaves the Air Force as the only remaining Department
of Defense (DOD) operator of the UH-1N with a concerning path for
sustainment. Could you please discuss the current operational
availability of the UH-1N fleet and discuss any risk you foresee to
maintaining adequate readiness levels?
General Davis. The rationale for acquiring 26 excess Marine Corps
helicopters was to replace 3 crash-damaged aircraft and for Air Force
District of Washington's 1st Helicopter Squadron's approved fleet
growth of 8 additional aircraft. The remaining excess Marine Corps
aircraft will be held in storage to allow flexibility for future
operations replacement or sustainment needs. The current UH-1N aircraft
availability is 73.7, meeting the Air Force Global Strike Command-
established standard of 73.7. The future aircraft availability rate is
projected to continue to meet or exceed the 73.7 percent requirement.
We expect to maintain adequate readiness levels for the foreseeable
future.
10. Senator Wicker. General Davis, could you elaborate on the
effectiveness of the current UH-1N training and supply chains?
General Davis. UH-1N initial and upgrade training is performed by
Air Education and Training Command, at Kirtland AFB, NM. UH-1N
crewmember production is meeting or exceeding requirements for fiscal
year 2013. However, resource reductions, as a consequence of
sequestration, could reduce UH-1N crewmember production below
requirements in the future
The UH-1N supply response time has averaged 7.7 percent for the
past 36 months, beating the Air Force Global Strike Command standard of
10 percent. We expect to maintain adequate supply response time levels
for the foreseeable future.
11. Senator Wicker. General Davis, the committee has some knowledge
of approaches the other Services have taken to remedy similar issues
with the UH-1 fleet. The Army in particular operates the UH-72 which to
my understanding is the lowest cost and most reliable helicopter in DOD
production and has significantly greater mission performance capability
than the UH-1N. At under $6 million per copy it would seem that the UH-
72 or a similar alternative could provide a very low-cost solution for
the Air Force. Has the Air Force evaluated the UH-72 or other potential
replacement aircraft for any of the missions performed by the UH-1N? If
so, I would be interested in the Air Force's findings. If not, when
will you consider such alternatives?
General Davis. The USAF informally evaluated the UH-72 as a
candidate for the CVLSP program, which was intended to be a replacement
for the UH-1N fleet. UH-72 capabilities fall short of the stated
mission requirements for the UH-1N replacement, and the UH-72
manufacturer did not indicate any interest in proposing the UH-72 as a
candidate for the CVLSP program. The CVLSP program was canceled in the
fiscal year 2013 President's budget.
flying costs
12. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, a year ago, DOD's Cost
Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE) office said it would cost more
than $1 trillion to operate and support F-35s over the next 50 years.
The cost estimate includes categories such as engine spares, contractor
manpower, depot maintenance, component repair, indirect base support,
mission personnel, and fuel. The costs are then projected out 50 years
using inflation to come up with then-year dollars. I believe this is
the first big aircraft program that DOD has tried to project costs for
over a 50-year period. What is the current estimated 50-year operation
and support costs of the F-35?
General Bogdan. The operational and support (O&S) cost estimate for
the 2012 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) remained the same as the
2011 SAR [$1.1 trillion in then-year dollars (TY$).] However, the
Department will update the estimate for the annual Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) review of the F-35 program in the fall of 2013.
The current F-35 JPO O&S estimate is $857 billion (TY$).
The O&S estimate supports three aircraft type/model/series for 3
U.S. Services (Air Force/Marine Corps/Navy), 2,443 aircraft total, over
a 55 year span of operations.
13. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, do you believe this is a good
number or a bad number?
General Bogdan. The current O&S cost estimate was based on the
knowledge available to the program and the CAPE at the time it was
developed nearly 2 years ago. We have learned much about the aircraft
since then (7,000+ hours, 5,000+ flights) and the Services have also
learned much about how to operate the aircraft. The previous cost
estimate did not factor in this new knowledge. Additionally,
significant work has been done by the program to refine and reduce this
estimate and make the F-35 O&S cost more affordable. That said,
significant effort remains to continue to find cost efficiencies and
reduce this number even further. Affordability remains my number one
priority, and I expect these cost estimates to continue to go down over
the next several years as the program matures.
14. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, how does that number compare to
the F-16, F-18, F-15, and A-10?
General Bogdan. The F-35 program is the first program to attempt to
calculate costs out for 55 years. It is also the first to attempt to
estimate a total life cycle cost for a fleet of over 2,400 aircraft.
These alone make the program estimate significantly different from
legacy aircraft. Significant work is being done by the F-35 program
office, the CAPE and the Services to normalize the cost estimates
across a number of areas so that a better comparison can be made
between the F-35 and other aircraft.
15. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan and General Davis, Air Force
Secretary Donley said on April 23 that the F-35A will cost more per
hour to fly than the F-16 it replaces. Secretary Donley then said the
Air Force and the other fast jet-flying Services are trying to
normalize how they project the F-35's costs. Will it cost more to fly
the F-35 than the F-16? And if so, why?
General Bogdan. Despite ongoing cost reduction initiatives, it is
reasonable that the F-35 costs more to operate and sustain than certain
legacy aircraft given the significant increase in capability.
The F-16C/D costs were developed by the Air Force Cost Analysis
Agency and have been normalized for comparison to the F-35 cost
estimate. The 2012 SAR cost per flying hour (CPFH) for the F-16C/D is
$24,899. The F-35A CPFH was not updated for SAR 2012; therefore it
remains at $31,923. Significant work is being done by the F-35 program
office and the Services to reduce the F-35A CPFH.
General Davis. Yes, it will cost more to fly the F-35 than the F-
16. As stated in the 2012 SAR, the projected, steady-state F-35A CPFH
is approximately $31,923 and the actual F-16 C/D CPFH is $24,899. The
CPFH includes costs associated with unit level manpower, unit
operations, maintenance, sustaining support and continuing system
improvements.
The F-35A CPFH is 28 percent higher than the F-16 because we
estimate higher F-35A costs for fuel, consumables, depot level
repairables, contractor support and modifications. The F-35, however,
offers a significant capability improvement over legacy aircraft.
Compared to the legacy fleet, the F-35 offers unmatched levels of
survivability and lethality required to maintain the advantage against
new and evolving threats. Our legacy fleet offers little margin in
capability advantage over current and future adversaries and is rapidly
approaching the point where further modification cannot increase
capability enough.
16. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan and General Davis, do you
believe we have an accurate estimate of the future flying costs of the
F-35?
General Bogdan. I believe we are getting closer to an accurate
estimate of the future flying costs of the F-35A, but the work is not
yet done. As we field and operate more aircraft, we will be able to
collect greater amounts of actual data that will allow us to refine our
cost estimates.
General Davis. The F-35A CPFH contained in the SAR is our best
estimate given all available information. In the 2012 SAR, the
projected, steady-state F-35A CPFH is approximately $31,923. As the
program progresses, we will collect actual operational data which we
will use to refine the CPFH estimate.
sequestration and tactical aircraft programs
17. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, our fleet of
strike fighter aircraft continues to age along with the cost to operate
and maintain those aircraft. Sequestration will impact our ability to
maintain our aircraft as well as procure new weapons and weapons
systems. I see a growing readiness and acquisition bow wave that will
degrade the combat capabilities of our Services, negatively impacting
our national security. In 2011, the Air Force established a 2,000-
aircraft strike fighter requirement to execute the National Military
Strategy with increased operational risk. Last year, the Air Force
reduced the requirement by 100 aircraft with higher risk. This year,
because of sequestration, the Air Force will ground 12 combat-coded
squadrons to include F-22s from the 1st Fighter Wing that are deployed
to the Pacific right now. What is the impact of sequestration on our
tactical aircraft programs?
Admiral Skinner. Sequestration will have a large negative impact on
the DON TACAIR fleet. Reduction of funding will potentially preclude
capability upgrades or existing DON tactical aircraft, reduce
sustainment and support for our existing DON TACAIR fleet, and reduce
DON F-35 procurement. The aging fleet of DON TACAIR aircraft is already
experiencing increased ``out of service'' time due to increased depot
maintenance backlog and increased depot turnaround times that will be
exacerbated by sequestration. Adequate funding is necessary to allow
DON TACAIR aircraft to maintain a tactical advantage in the current and
projected threat environment.
General Davis. As of July 3, 2013, the following combat coded
squadrons are stood down: 6.5 combat-coded fighter squadrons, 2 combat-
coded AWACS squadrons, 2.66 combat-coded bomber squadrons, and 18
training squadrons. Additionally, two fighter squadrons are flying at a
reduced rate and are qualified for basic aircraft proficiency, but not
for tactical employment. As we enter fiscal year 2014, we will focus on
returning units that have been stood down to operational levels of
readiness to prevent further erosion in their capabilities. However, if
we do not receive sufficient funding in fiscal year 2014, we may have
to rotationally stand down units, or fly them at a reduced rate,
similar to the actions we've taken in fiscal year 2013.
Reductions in flying training are leaving immediate and lasting
impacts on our readiness. Response times and preparedness for going
into harm's way are negatively impacted.
Additionally, while the Air Force remains committed to our highest
priority major acquisition programs (i.e. F-35, KC-46, and Long-Range
Strike Bomber), we are assessing our overall priorities to meet
national strategy missions within the constraints of the current fiscal
environment. In general fiscal year 2013 sequestration has delayed
capability delivery due to extended schedules which will likely result
in increased life cycle costs. Continued sequestration in fiscal year
2014 and beyond will further increase these impacts.
Ultimately, without increased funding and decreased operations
tempo, sequestration reductions will lead to a hollow force. This
increases risk to both the warfighter and any civilian population we
should be protecting.
impacts of sequestration
18. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, does the
fiscal year 2014 budget include additional funding to make up for the
fiscal year 2013 impacts of sequestration?
Admiral Skinner. The 2014 presidential budget submission does not
contain additional funding to make up for the impacts of the 2013
Sequestration.
General Davis. The fiscal year 2014 request does not fix the fiscal
year 2013 bow wave. The Air Force requests full support of the fiscal
year 2014 PB to fund the requirements to execute the Air Force mission
and the flexibility to reprogram or realign funds to fix mission
critical requirement as a result of the bow wave from fiscal year 2013.
While we will have unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2014 as a
result of deferred workload and training necessitated caused by the
implementation of sequestration in fiscal year 2013, the full impact is
still being assessed. The Air Force has made every effort to minimize
impacts to readiness and people, but the bow wave of reductions,
deferments and cancelations challenge the strategic choices made in the
fiscal year 2014 request. It is clear that more reductions will drive
additional risks to our readiness, force structure, and ability to
modernize our aging aircraft inventory.
19. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, the fiscal year 2014 budget
does not include sequestration. Have you looked at the impact of fiscal
year 2014 sequestration on these programs?
Admiral Skinner. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget submission
has not been assessed for impacts of a fiscal year 2014 sequestration.
Navy is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the
Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) to inform the major
decision that must be made in the decade ahead to preserve and adapt
our defense strategy, our force, and our institutions under a range of
future budgetary scenarios. In the event sequestration is allowed to
occur in 2014, we will work with the Department to make the necessary
adjustments to continue to provide combatant commanders with ready and
capable naval forces while, to the extent practicable, protecting our
research base and ensuring that our people are properly resourced.
General Davis. Funding at the level submitted in the fiscal year
2014 President's budget is necessary to fund the most mission critical
requirements. This level of funding combined with additional
flexibilities will allow us to address bow wave requirements due to
sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Given the continuing uncertainty of
the fiscal year 2014 fiscal outlook, we have initiated a review to look
at a range of options under various budget scenarios that we could face
in fiscal year 2014.
20. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, what is the
impact of furloughs on these programs?
Admiral Skinner. Navy civilians play a critical role in our
Nation's efforts in war and peace. Furloughs will have adverse effects
on the livelihood, morale, and productivity of our civilians and may
adversely impact the Navy's ability to retain this skilled and talented
workforce. In broad terms, we will see impacts to many aspects of Naval
Aviation programs, to include, lower readiness levels as aviation depot
throughputs are reduced; extended weapon system test and evaluation
timelines as the availability of flight hours on test-ranges are
decreased; and potential force modernization delays as longer
acquisition timelines may result. However, the true impact of furloughs
on tactical/unmanned aircraft and strike weapons programs will not be
known until after the furlough occurs. There is still uncertainty as to
how many days personnel will be furloughed and who may be exempt.
Additionally, there are unknown secondary and tertiary ripple effects
that will not be fully understood for some time until after the
furlough takes place, to include, the long-term cost impacts due
extended program development timelines driven by reduced civilian
manning/capacity.
General Davis. The 32-hour work week will create schedule delays or
increased risk in at least 224 programs. For example, the
implementation of a furlough has a direct, negative impact on the KC-46
program critical design review; with civilians comprising 60 percent of
an already small, selectively manned unit, a cut of 11 working days
puts the CDR at risk. 80 programs are at risk for completing fiscal
year 2013 close out actions and/or fiscal year 2014 start-up risk and
40 programs may realize source selection delays. In addition, 50
programs will see contract requests for equitable adjustments or missed
milestones and there will be contracting action delays in 136 of these
programs of record.
21. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, DOD appears to have prioritized
the F-35 program with regards to sequestration and fiscal year 2014
budget cuts, but it too has been impacted. What are the impacts and
what would be the impact of sequestration in fiscal year 2014?
General Bogdan. Sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 in our
research, development, test, and evaluation accounts significantly
increase the risk to the development program and may result in deferral
of some Block 3F capabilities.
Civilian furloughs will also impact the development program. The
JPO estimates that the 11-day fiscal year 2013 furlough will put the
flight test program at least 1 month behind our planned schedule.
In the Procurement accounts, the sequestration reductions will
likely result in the inability to procure all authorized aircraft in
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lot 7. The reductions in fiscal year
2013 will result in a reduction in the number of aircraft the U.S.
Services buy (approximately three F-35As, one F-35B, and one F-35C).
This will also increase the unit cost of the aircraft remaining in the
total procurement profile for both the Services and the partner
nations.
If sequestration continues into fiscal year 2014, there is a
significant risk of not being able to deliver the full Block 3F combat
capability and a reduction in the number of aircraft the Services can
buy. This production cut will increase overall unit costs and has the
potential to cause our partners to reevaluate the number of aircraft
they intend to procure.
22. Senator Wicker. General Davis, in your written testimony, you
state the Air Force is 200 pilots short of the total manning
requirement with the number to grow to 900. Does this take into account
potential increase in airline hiring due to anticipated retirement of
senior pilots in the coming years?
General Davis. Our pilot inventory projections do include decreased
retention over the next few years due to airline hiring. We continue to
closely monitor airline hiring trends and update retention estimates as
circumstances change.
23. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner, are the Navy and Marine Corps
forecasting any pilot shortages?
Admiral Skinner. Since PB14 did not include sequestration, the Navy
and Marine Corps are not forecasting any pilot shortages with the PB14
budget submission.
If sequestration leads to a Military Personnel, Navy (MPN)
reduction in conjunction with force structure reductions (i.e. remove
all squadrons from a carrier air wing (CVW) and all squadron
personnel), then it is unlikely that Navy or Marine Corps will
experience pilot shortages.
f-35 joint strike fighter program
24. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, Admiral Skinner, and General
Davis, why do we need the F-35?
General Bogdan and Admiral Skinner. The F-35 provides a fifth
generation fighter aircraft to the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,
and partner nations and brings with it the ability to effectively
engage and survive a wide range of threats, both air and surface, in
contested airspace. It provides a ``day-one'' strike capability
enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required to counter
a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios that
cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including operations in
an anti-access/area denied environment.
The survivability and lethality of the F-35 is enhanced by very low
observable stealth characteristics, fusion of onboard and off-board
passive and active sensors and real-time integration with other F-35s,
DOD and allied assets, which provide a ``first detect/first shot''
capability throughout the battlespace. The F-35 will provide a
significant additive value when brought to bear in a joint/combined
warfighting arena.
General Davis. It is a fundamental truth of the modern battlefield
that to win the fight, you must ``own the skies.'' This means
protecting your own forces, while also holding the adversaries' dearest
targets at risk. This was a hard lesson learned during World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam, and used to our advantage in Operations Desert
Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Without it,
our troops in combat, whether in the air, on the ground, or on the
seas, are put at undue risk, and our chances of ultimately achieving
victory are diminished. Owning the skies is difficult to achieve, and
requires vigilance in maintaining this advantage through continued
investment and development in more capable aircraft, weapons and
mission systems. This is more than something simply tasked as a
requirement within the Defense Planning Guidance; it is something our
joint warfighters expect from their Air Force.
Our potential adversaries know this truth as well, and they
continue to seek ways to prevent us from achieving it. Applying lessons
from previous conflicts, they are investing in advanced technology for
their planes, weapons, and air defense systems that rival our own
capabilities and, in some cases, surpass them. We are also faced with
operating a fighter fleet that is smaller and older than at any time in
our Service's history. With the threat becoming more capable, and our
own fleet at its oldest and smallest, the challenges to our ability to
control the skies in any future conflict continue to grow.
To meet these challenges, we are investing in fifth generation
fighters to ensure we field a fleet that supports the mission-essential
requirement to own the skies. Fifth generation fighters like the F-35
have the capabilities needed to achieve unmatched levels of
survivability and lethality, which are required to maintain our air
advantage against the most challenging threats. These capabilities
include improved stealth, high maneuverability, advanced electronic
attack and protection, fused sensors for enhanced situational
awareness, advanced precision weapons, and multi-role capabilities.
Together, they provide our airmen the best tools available to ensure
they never have to face a ``fair fight in the sky,'' and they will
continue to own the skies in their mission to support and protect the
joint warfighter.
25. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, Admiral Skinner, and General
Davis, what is the threat that is driving procurement of this aircraft
and why can't we just purchase move F-16s and F/A-18 Super Hornets?
General Bogdan and Admiral Skinner. Emerging threats, particularly
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that are presently being
fielded in China and other nations require all the services' and
international partners to develop and procure a fifth generation
capability. The ability to survive and remain lethal in these threat
environments is critical to our warfighter's operational success. In
addition to enhanced survivability and lethality, F-35's integrated
active and passive sensor suite will bring increased situational
awareness not only for F-35 pilots, but other U.S. and coalition assets
networked via near real-time data links.
F-16s and F/A-18E/Fs remain highly capable strike and fighter
aircraft and will be operated for many additional years. However, these
aircraft have reduced operational effectiveness when facing advanced
A2/AD threat systems. To maintain the United States' ability to
function in this increased threat environment, a force that includes
fifth generation aircraft, like the F-35, is needed.
General Davis. Potential adversaries are developing newer planes,
weapons, and air defense systems to challenge our ability to ``control
the skies'' in any potential future conflict. They are developing and
fielding aircraft that rival or out-perform our legacy fleet with
improved speed and agility, the latest and most advanced radars,
avionics and electronic jamming, employing highly advanced and lethal
air-to-air weapons and levels of signature reduction never seen before
outside the United States. We are seeing the worldwide proliferation of
air defense systems with advanced early warning and target tracking
radars that are digital, agile, and equipped with better protection
against jamming. These advanced air defense systems are integrated into
robust and networked command and control centers, able to target and
engage unprecedented numbers of targets at greater ranges. We are also
seeing strategic and tactical surface-to-air-missiles with increased
range, maneuverability, target tracking capability and lethality.
Ultimately, we are seeing these types of systems evolve in both
complexity and capability, being sold worldwide, and being used
together to form integrated air defense systems that challenge our air
advantage.
While our current fourth generation fleet, such as the F-16,
secured a generation of air advantage in previous conflicts, they will
be severely challenged in future scenarios against evolving threats.
Our legacy fleet is rapidly approaching the point where additional
capability enhancements may be unable to ensure operational success
within acceptable levels of risk. In particular, the Air Force relies
on signature reducing ``stealth'' technologies to break adversary kill-
chains and negate engagements by advanced threats. Signature management
can't be simply ``added on,'' but from inception must be incorporated
into optimized aircraft designs and materials.
While our fourth generation fleet is decreasingly able to survive
and operate in these high-threat environments, they will remain a
critical part of our inventory for many years, complementing our fifth
generation fleet in reduced threat scenarios. Even in these reduced
threat scenarios, we have to honor the proliferation of advanced
threats by making targeted investments to increase our survivability
and lethality. This also means the Air Force is carefully choosing
modernization efforts that maximize the cooperative capabilities
between our fourth and fifth generation fleets to enable mission
success.
26. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, Admiral Skinner, and General
Davis, DOD plans to procure a total of 2,443 Joint Strike Fighters
(JSF) at a cost of approximately $323 billion (Air Force: 1,763 F-35As;
Marine Corps: 340 F-35Bs (STOVL); and Navy: 340 F-35Cs). Has there been
any change to these numbers?
General Bogdan and Admiral Skinner. The SAR 12 cost estimate to
procure 2,443 F-35s (Air Force: 1,763 F-35As; Marine Corps: 340 F-35Bs
(STOVL); and Navy: 340 F-35Cs) is $331.4 (TY$B). This is a decrease
from the SAR-11 cost estimate of $335.7 (TY$B) to procure the same
total of 2,443 F-35s.
General Davis. The estimated cost to procure 2,443 F-35s has
changed. The 2012 SAR cost estimate to procure 1,763 F-35As, 340 F-35Bs
and 340 F-35Cs is $331.4 billion (TY$). This is a decrease from the
2011 SAR cost estimate of $335.7 billion (TY$) to procure the same
number of aircraft, and is the result of revised escalation indices,
revised procurement profiles, lower labor rates and more accurate cost
estimating based on actual data.
27. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, Admiral Skinner, and General
Davis, there has been more information in the press on this program
than any other program I can remember in recent history. Overall, the
information about the JSF program is negative. It has become the poster
child of how not to run an acquisition program. However, a recent
Government Accountability Office report notes that the program is now
turning the corner with labor hours decreasing and aircraft deliveries
accelerating. What has changed since 2010 and why should this committee
support the funding requested in the fiscal year 2014 President's
budget?
General Bogdan and Admiral Skinner. In March 2010 the original
Milestone B certification for the F-35 program was rescinded following
a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. At that point, the program suffered
from uncontrolled cost growth and an unrealistic development schedule.
The program undertook a complete bottom up reassessment and
reorganization. The PEO position was elevated from a two-star to a
three-star flag or general officer. Key replan activities included
development of an integrated master schedule (IMS), execution of a
schedule risk assessment (SRA), and completion of the integrated
baseline review (IBR). These incorporated the 2010 technical baseline
review's recommendations including revised flight test rates, longer
software development spans, new systems engineering processes, and
reestablished technical performance measurement. This plan estimated
the time and resources realistically required for the development
program to deliver Block 3 capabilities. The F-35 development program
is now resourced with realistic planning factors to complete the
required Block 3 capability testing. Re-plan activities also
scrutinized production processes, particularly attention to
manufacturing quality metrics, including supplier quality, assembly and
test. The program now has oversight into the contractor's supplier risk
management process to timely identify problems in the supply chain.
The DAB reviewed the F-35 development, production, and sustainment
technical status and cost estimates in February 2012 and on March 28,
2012, OUSD (AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum that
officially recertified the program and granted MS B approval.
Since the March 2012 recertification, the program has largely
maintained the planned schedule and cost estimates while addressing the
normal technical issues that occur during the development of a program.
The fiscal year 2014 budget includes $8.4 billion for continued
system development and procurement of 29 F-35 aircraft. The F-35 will
form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to
come. It will replace the legacy tactical fighter fleets of the Air
Force and Marine Corps and provide a complementary capability to the
Navy's Super Hornet. The F 35 will provide a dominant, multirole,
fifth-generation aircraft, capable of projecting U.S. power and
deterring potential adversaries. For our international partners and
foreign military sales customers who are participating in the program,
the F-35 will become a linchpin for future coalition operations and
will help to close a crucial capability gap that will enhance the
strength of our security alliances.
The fiscal year 2014 funding is crucial to finishing development to
meet the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy initial operating capability
timelines to provide warfighting capability to the fleet. The program
continues to drive down procurement costs while attacking the long-term
life cycle costs of the F-35 weapon system to affect affordability--
fiscal year 2014 funds are critical to ensure both progress on
production learning curves as well as capabilities that reduce
maintenance and sustainment costs. The program must also sustain
currently fielded aircraft in an effective and economical fashion.
General Davis. In March 2010 the original Milestone (MS) B
certification for the F-35 program was rescinded following a critical
Nunn-McCurdy breach. At that point, the program suffered from
uncontrolled cost growth and an unrealistic development schedule.
The program undertook a complete bottom up reassessment and
reorganization. The Program Executive Officer position was elevated
from a two-star to a three-star leadership position. Key initiatives
included development of an IMS, execution of a SRA, and completion of
the IBR. These incorporated the 2010 Technical Baseline Review's
recommendations including revised flight test rates, longer software
development spans, new systems engineering processes, and reestablished
technical performance measurement. This plan estimated the time and
resources realistically required for the development program to deliver
Block 3 capabilities. The F-35 development program is now resourced
with realistic planning factors to complete the required Block 3
capability testing. Production processes were also scrutinized with
increased attention to manufacturing quality metrics, including
supplier quality, assembly and test. The program now has oversight into
the contractor's supplier risk management process to enable timely
identification of problems in the supply chain.
The DAB reviewed the F-35 development, production, and sustainment
technical status and cost estimates in February 2012. On March 28,
2012, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum that officially
recertified the program and granted MS B approval.
Since the March 2012 recertification, the program has largely
maintained the planned schedule and cost estimates while addressing the
normal technical issues that occur during the development of a program.
The fiscal year 2014 budget includes $8.4 billion for continued
system development and procurement of 29 F-35 aircraft. The Air Force
plans to increase the production ramp rate for the F-35A from 19
aircraft in fiscal year 2014 to 60 aircraft in fiscal year 2018. The F-
35 will form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for
generations to come. It will replace the legacy tactical fighter fleets
of the Air Force and Marine Corps and provide a complementary
capability to the Navy's Super Hornet. The F-35 will provide a
dominant, multirole, fifth-generation aircraft, capable of projecting
U.S. power and deterring potential adversaries. For our international
partners and foreign military sales customers who are participating in
the program, the F-35 will become a linchpin for future coalition
operations and will help to close a crucial capability gap that will
enhance the strength of our security alliances.
The fiscal year 2014 funding is crucial to finishing development to
meet the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy initial operating capability
timelines to provide warfighting capability to the fleet. The program
continues to drive down procurement costs while attacking long-term
life cycle costs. The program was able to negotiate a lower unit price
in LRIP lot 5 than was originally projected. This continues the trend
of actual unit costs being lower than original projections. fiscal year
2014 funds are critical to ensure both progress on production learning
curves as well as capabilities that reduce maintenance and sustainment
costs. The program must also sustain currently fielded aircraft in an
effective and economical fashion.
28. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, what is the
current cost of each version of the aircraft?
Admiral Skinner. LRIP 5 (fiscal year 2011) contract prices
(including engines) for each variant are as follows:
Air Force - $120 million per aircraft
Marine Corps - $153 million per aircraft
Navy - $140 million per aircraft
General Davis. The contract prices (including engines) for LRIP Lot
#5 (awarded in December 2012) are as follows:
F-35A (Air Force) - $120 million per aircraft
F-35B (Marine Corps) - $153 million per aircraft
F-35C (Navy) - $140 million per aircraft
The average unit recurring flyaway cost for the F-35A is $76.8
million (BY12$) based on the purchase of 1,763 F-35As.
29. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, has the cost
of the aircraft increased or decreased as production continues?
Admiral Skinner. The unit recurring flyaway (URF) cost continues to
decrease in each LRIP.
General Davis. The URF cost continues to decrease as production
continues. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the actual/projected conventional
take-off and landing air vehicle and F135 engine URF from LRIP Lot #1
through LRIP Lot #11. The curves for both show a steady URF decrease.
30. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner and General Davis, what is the
projected flyaway cost of each version of the F-35 when it reaches full
rate production?
Admiral Skinner. The F-35s (including engines) purchased in fiscal
year 2018 and delivered in fiscal year 2020 are projected to cost:
Air Force - $85 million
Marine Corps - $110 million
Navy - $100 million
General Davis. The first full-rate production lot of F-35s
(including engines) (purchased in fiscal year 2018 and delivered in
fiscal year 2020) are projected to each cost:
F-35A (Air Force) - $85 million
F-35B (Marine Corps) - $110 million
F-35C (Navy) - $100 million
31. Senator Wicker. General Davis, the last 2 budgets slowed
planned production from 40 and 50 aircraft per year to 30 aircraft per
year. What is the impact of continuing to push procurement to future
years?
General Davis. The actual cost of an individual aircraft in any
given LRIP lot is largely influenced by how many aircraft are being
purchased, and how much production line learning has been achieved to
that point. If jets are moved out of early LRIPs into later LRIPs, the
speed at which the production line becomes more efficient is slowed and
it takes longer to reap the benefits of production line learning.
Aircraft in earlier LRIP lots are therefore more expensive than
planned, which in turn drives all participants in the program to
reassess the number and timing of their aircraft purchases.
32. Senator Wicker. General Davis, does it save on concurrency
costs?
General Davis. While pushing procurement to future years saves on
concurrency costs in the short run, it also causes aircraft production
costs to be more expensive than planned. Additionally, doing this must
be balanced with maintaining a valid and cost efficient production
line. DOD recognized the need to balance a ramp up in production with
the costs incurred by concurrency changes and flat-lined the planned
production of F-35 aircraft in 2012-2014. This ensured that concurrency
costs were minimized to the best extent possible and that our ability
to learn from work that had already taken place in the production
program did not suffer.
Note: This question is related to SASCA-02-031.
33. Senator Wicker. General Davis, how does it impact overall
costs?
General Davis. Pushing production of aircraft into the future years
slows down learning so that the production line takes longer to reach
peak efficiency. This lag results in overall higher costs to the
program, as it takes longer to reduce the cost of the aircraft.
Note: This question is related to SASCA-02-031.
34. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, what is concurrency in this
program?
General Bogdan. Concurrency on the F-35 is the overlap in the
development, testing and production phases of the acquisition program.
Essentially, concurrency introduces risk that aircraft we build in
early LRIP lots will require post-production modifications and
retrofits due to discoveries we make during qualification, flight and
ground tests. Additionally, the fixes developed for these discoveries
must also be ``cut-in'' to the production line to correct aircraft not
yet produced. One example is the 496 Bulkhead where we discovered
cracking during structural and durability tests. That issue was
identified during LRIP 2 and the fix delivered to production at LRIP 4.
We now have to retrofit the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL)
jets that were produced in LRIP 2 & 3 with the corrected component
(planned to begin in 2014).
The specific costs associated with concurrency are production
labor, material delta costs, retrofit kit production and labor/
infrastructure costs for installing the retrofit. The nonrecurring
engineering costs associated with developing a fix are part of the
system development and demonstration (SDD) program costs. Planned and
scheduled block upgrades to each aircraft are handled separately and
are not considered concurrency costs. Concurrency costs will phase out
with the completion of SDD.
35. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, have the concurrency costs
increased or decreased?
General Bogdan. We have just completed the Second Report to
Congress on F-35 concurrency costs. In that new report, you will note
that the F-35 program concurrency estimate has decreased significantly
from when we last reported in September 2012. Overall, we estimate
concurrency costs have reduced from $2.8 billion to $1.7 billion. The
primary reason for the decrease is a change from using parametric
estimating to higher fidelity, discrete estimating techniques based on
known F-35 information. The new cost model reflects a detailed
engineering approach informed by the remaining F-35 qualification,
flight test, and ground test events. It accounts for technical issues
affecting air vehicle performance, mission systems required for combat
operations, and aircraft structures. Additionally, the actual cost of
concurrency is being reduced as the result of accelerating our
durability testing and reducing the time it takes to engineer solutions
and get them into the production line. We have seen a reduction in this
process of approximately 5 months (18 months to 13 months) and continue
to work to reduce it further.
36. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, how do the projected
concurrency costs compare to actual concurrency costs?
General Bogdan. Our estimated concurrency costs in 2013 are 32
percent below our previously projected estimates.
37. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, the F-35 recently went through
an operational test and evaluation and performed poorly. Can you
explain the test, what was tested, and why the aircraft performed so
poorly?
General Bogdan. The Air Force recently conducted an operational
utility evaluation (OUE), for which the Office for the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation wrote a report. This test was to assess
the readiness for the Air Force to start F-35A training operations. The
ability of the Air Force to conduct the training syllabus and achieve
useful training was tested.
The OUE Report concluded that the Block 1A.1 System is suitable for
the purpose of conducting Air Education Training Command's F-35A
training syllabus. However, the report also cited concerns with the
effectiveness of some elements of the System. The JPO is aware of and
agrees with the concerns related to the conduct of training. Specific
concerns raised by the report included comments on the limitations of
flight series data (FSD), use of the pilot training aid (PTA),
discomfort in use of the simulator helmet, and courseware correction
processes. Continuous improvements in these areas are underway,
including incremental updates to FSD, planned software updates to the
PTA, an update to the simulator helmet that follows the air vehicle
development plan, and additional courseware updates by Block. Once
fielded these improvements should completely address the concerns
raised by the OUE report.
38. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, can you tell me the status of
the helmet (jitter, night vision acuity, and latency), tail hook,
lightning protection, Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS),
fuel dump, and short-takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) operations?
General Bogdan. Helmet: Issues faced by the Rockwell Collins helmet
over the past year were ``green glow,'' or insufficient helmet display
contrast; latency of the displayed information; ``jitter,'' or lack of
stability of the displayed symbology as the aircraft maneuvers; night
vision acuity; and alignment of the displayed symbology. Last year, the
program made significant progress against these challenges using
dedicated helmet flight testing of over 45 flights to identify and
analyze acceptable helmet performance. As a result of testing, the
program has mitigated the effects of four of these helmet issues. More
work is planned this summer to ensure that the night vision camera is
effective for Marine Corps operations. The next generation Rockwell
Collins helmet will begin integration/qualification work later this
year, with its planned first F-35 flight in early 2014. The BAE helmet
is not as far along in its development and will continue with
qualification this year, with its first F-35 flight planned for the
spring of 2014.
Tail Hook: The F-35 program is completing design work on the
redesigned F-35C arresting hook and expects to conduct ground testing
at Lakehurst, N.J., in the fourth quarter of 2013. Technical planning
is underway for the first Carrier Sea Trials in the third quarter of
2014.
Lightning Protection: The program has completed the design work for
F-35 lightning protection and is currently working to incorporate the
fix into production.
Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS): ALIS 1.0.3 has been
fielded and is in use by the operational U.S. Marine Corps squadron at
Yuma and other locations. The F-35 program office is working to rapidly
respond to feedback from the field and has a number of data management
fixes underway. We expect improved usability and functionality by the
fall of 2013 and continue to work on future releases of capability.
Fuel Dump: The final production configuration has been identified,
is being confirmed through flight testing and is expected to be
finalized by the end of-summer 2013.
STOVL Operations: The F-35B continues to perform well in both
testing and operational activities. The aircraft has achieved over 400
vertical landings, over 400 slow landings and over 700 short takeoffs.
39. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, on February 22, 51 F-35s were
grounded after a routine inspection revealed a crack on a turbine
blade--heat due to an engine operating longer than usual at a high
temperature caused the crack. No other cracks were found. Why did this
happen and what is the impact?
General Bogdan. The F135 engine turbine blades are manufactured to
very high tolerances, but there are allowances for minor imperfections.
As you identified, this aircraft had been operating in a severe test
environment, going much longer in these extreme heat conditions than in
a normal operational aircraft. The combination of this extreme test
environment and an allowable manufacturing imperfection caused this
crack.
After extensive inspections on all engines in the F-35 fleet, no
other cracks have been found. Additional analysis indicates that only
one additional test asset has been operated near the extreme usage
levels of the original asset. None of the operational jets have been
operated near this level of stress. Analysis has also shown that the
type of minor imperfection discovered in this turbine blade is rare in
the fleet. Nevertheless, additional work is being done to assess what
the impact of this crack is to the overall projected lifetime of the
engine and if additional engineering work is needed to mitigate the
risk. This work is currently underway and should be completed by the
end of the summer.
40. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan and Admiral Skinner, the Marine
Corps has announced their plans to reach IOC next year, 2014. Some do
not believe the F-35B can reach IOC using Block 2B software installed
in the aircraft. What is Block 2B software and can the Marine Corps
reach IOC using that software?
General Bogdan and Admiral Skinner. The Marine Corps plans to
achieve IOC between July 2015 (objective date)) and December 2015
(threshold date). Though Block 2B software is necessary to enable the
aircraft mission system functionality required for IOC it is one of
many requirements the Marine Corps requires to declare IOC. Training,
manning, sustainment support, aircraft performance envelop, facilities
and infrastructure, L Class ship alterations, and an ability to sustain
IOC once declared are equally important aspects. Block 2B software
provides for the control precision guided weapons, sensor utilization,
and mission system management capabilities to execute close air
support, limited offensive and defensive counter air, air interdiction,
assault support escort, Armed Reconnaissance, and limited Suppression
of Enemy Air Defense missions in concert with Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) resources and capabilities. The F-35B with Block 2B
software and the other essential elements needed to declare IOC will
provide the Marine Corps with a complimentary TACAIR combat capability
for the MAGTF. Block 3 will leverage our Block 2B capabilities and
optimize our TACAIR effectiveness and will generate unprecedented
strategic and operational agility within our MAGTF's to counter a broad
spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios that cannot be
addressed by current legacy aircraft.
41. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner, the first operational squadron
stood up at Yuma, AZ, in November 2012 and the first delivery of
aircraft to Nellis Air Force Base occurred at the end of February 2013.
How many F-35s have been delivered and are they all currently flying?
Admiral Skinner. As of June 10, 2013, there have been 22 F-35A and
19 F-35B JSF aircraft delivered to U.S. training and operational
forces. For the Department of the Navy, the F-35B aircraft have been
delivered to the following 3 locations: 11 to VMFAT-501 for training
our initial F-35B pilots at Eglin AFB; 6 to VMFA-121, our first
operational squadron; and 2 F-35B aircraft on loan to Developmental
Test at Edwards AFB in preparation for Operational Test and Evaluation.
As a matter of routine operation and maintenance, not all aircraft fly
on a daily basis, but all are in a flyable state that supports the
operations at each of the locations.
42. Senator Wicker. Admiral Skinner, what is the current status of
the squadron at Yuma?
Admiral Skinner. The squadron at MCAS Yuma, VMFA-121, is in the
transition process of accepting aircraft from the factory, standing up
maintenance capabilities, and conducting initial flight operations. As
of 10 June 2013, VMFA-121 has received 6 aircraft with another 10
anticipated to be delivered by the end of September 2013, bringing the
squadron up to their full complement of 16 F-35B aircraft.
international partnerships
43. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, I have been an ardent champion
of U.S. defense exports to our allies, friends, and partners abroad.
Robust defense trade increases interoperability with our close allies
and partners, reduces unit costs for our own military, and helps
support a U.S. defense industrial base facing significant budget
uncertainty here at home. 10 countries (the United Kingdom, Turkey,
Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Japan, Denmark, and
Israel) are slated to receive JSF deliveries in the coming years.
Several foreign partners, like Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands, have
already reduced their projected buys or are reported to be considering
doing so. Assuming there are no new buyers, how much would the
cancellation of one foreign F-35 affect the unit cost of an American F-
35?
General Bogdan. Unit cost is sensitive to the total quantity
procured. Savings in the cost of the aircraft can be realized through
bulk purchases and other economies of scale. The actual cost of an
individual aircraft in any given LRIP lot is largely influenced by how
many aircraft are being purchased, and how much production line
learning has been achieved to that point. Loss of purchases will limit
the ability of the program to take advantage of economies of scale, as
well as reducing learning opportunities, which would drive the cost up.
As an example, when one partner reduced its purchase from 130 aircraft
to 90 aircraft, the unit cost went up 1 percent, which equates to over
$1M per jet. Specific numerical impact is largely dependent on the
country in question and the time at which the decision was made and
cannot be generalized.
44. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, when a foreign partner reduces
its buy, are we bound to return any portion of the money they invested
in development or is that considered a sunk cost?
General Bogdan. When a foreign partner reduces its purchases, we
are not bound to return any portion of the money provided by that
country for development.
45. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, the Marine Corps B model of the
F-35 is the most expensive version. If Singapore orders 75 Bs, as they
are reportedly about to, how much will that reduce the unit cost of an
American F-35B?
General Bogdan. The specific amount of the reduction in unit cost
is dependent on the years in which Singapore may decide to purchase
aircraft and can only be calculated after their order is finalized.
Unit cost is sensitive to the total quantity procured. Savings in
the cost of the aircraft can be realized through bulk purchases and
other economies of scale. The actual cost of an individual aircraft in
any given LRIP lot is largely influenced by how many aircraft are being
purchased, and how much production line learning has been achieved to
that point. Additional purchases take advantage of economies of scale,
but also provide additional learning opportunities, which in turn drive
down costs even further. Likewise, aircraft reductions in any given
LRIP lot would have the opposite effect.
46. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, what is the status of the
potential sale to South Korea?
General Bogdan. The U.S. Air Force and the F-35 JPO are in the
final weeks of completing requirements under the competitive process
laid out by the Korean Government beginning in January 2012. The
proposed sale of the F-35A has been reported to Congress and a draft
letter of offer and acceptance has been presented to the Korean
Government for consideration. It is anticipated that a final decision
by the Korean Government will be made this summer.
47. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, what other countries have asked
for formal briefings on the F-35?
General Bogdan. The F-35 JPO has briefed a number of countries
including Belgium, Spain, United Arab Emirates, Finland, and
Switzerland.
48. Senator Wicker. General Bogdan, what plane do you consider the
toughest international competitor for F-35, and what is the current
cost differential between the two?
General Bogdan. The leading international competitor for the F-35
is largely based on the requirements the countries' are trying to fill.
Each country currently looking to purchase an advanced fighter aircraft
has different requirements and limitations. This changes what is viewed
as the leading competitor. There are a number of options available on
the international market including the Typhoon, Rafale and Su-30MK, but
there is no reliable way to compare costs between them all, given the
proprietary nature of sales negotiations.
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY MODERNIZATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joe
Manchin III (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Manchin, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, and Wicker.
Majority staff member present: William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Daniel J. Harder.
Committee members' assistants present: Mara Boggs,
assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator
Blumenthal; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly;
and Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III, CHAIRMAN
Senator Manchin. The subcommittee will come to order and we
will get started. First of all, let me say to all of you, thank
you. Thank you for being here and we appreciate it very much.
So good morning and again thank you.
The Subcommittee on Airland meets today to receive
testimony on Army modernization programs in review of the
fiscal year 2014 budget request. I look forward to hearing from
the Army today along with my friend and colleague Senator
Wicker.
After a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, I'm always
inspired by the American soldier. Today's Army is seasoned by
years of combat in the harshest conditions against a ruthless
enemy. The soldiers of our Army have performed with remarkable
professionalism, courage, and no small measure of sacrifice.
This is true of the Army leaders, our soldiers, and their
families as well. I ask all Army leaders here with us today,
wherever, whenever you have a chance, to please thank our
soldiers and their families on our behalf, and our Nation is
deeply grateful.
The subject of today's hearing, Army modernization, merits
particular attention because of an exceptionally challenging
fiscal environment and the many initiatives over the last few
years to reorient and restructure the Army's acquisition
policies and programs. No doubt the Army is wary of being
reminded that its modernization efforts have not enjoyed a
great deal of success over the past 15 years, as strategies,
plans, and investment priorities appear to evolve with each
change in Department leadership. Army modernization has had
many names over the years, in the past 15 years, from
``Digitization'' to ``Force 21'' to ``Army After Next'' to
``Interim Force'' to ``Objective Force'' to ``Future Combat
Systems'' to ``Modularity and Capability Sets'', to what is now
known as a ``Balanced Equipment Modernization Strategy'', in
which the Army will remain on track to equip a smaller force
without sacrificing its decisive edge.
Yet, despite this turmoil and heartbreaking loss of time
and money, the Army always finds a way to give our soldiers the
equipment they need to get the job done. This doesn't mean we
should not insist upon more stability and efficiency in Army
modernization, but it's quite remarkable how American soldiers
always accomplish the mission. This has been a hallmark of the
American soldier in every one of our Nation's wars.
This year's hearing examines an Army modernization program
complicated by the scope of strategic changes, the challenges
of fiscal realities, and the natural uncertainty as our wars
wind down and our national priorities shift. We look forward to
our witnesses' testimony to address the underlying questions of
how the fiscal year 2014 budget request, linked to likely
changes to this year's appropriation and looking forward into
the near future, keeps our Army the best in the world, ready
today and tomorrow for whatever the Nation may ask it to do.
We look forward to this hearing, how Army requirements,
acquisitions, and modernization strategies support the Army we
have today and will have in 2017; how, given the uncertainty
about the availability of resources and the necessary changes
to the Army's size and structure, will the Army ensure that
equipment readiness, reset, and modernization programs are
appropriately prioritized, with tradeoff and risks managed,
while at the same time stable, achievable, and affordable.
In this regard, the witnesses can paint a picture for this
subcommittee of how the Budget Control Act, sequestration,
continuing resolutions (CR), and a pending reprogramming
request all figure into the dangers of an unstable,
unachievable, and unaffordable modernization program. How will
the Army identify and manage the inevitable and growing
strategic risk to the Army's combat and tactical vehicle
industrial base during times of declining budgets?
The Army's fiscal year 2014 modernization objective is to
maintain the technological advantage no matter where our wars
are fought. The base request, however, is $1.7 billion, almost
7 percent, less than last year's request. The Army is accepting
measured risk to accommodate a tightening fiscal environment
and manage precarious readiness shortfalls begun and carried
forward from last year.
These reductions for fiscal year 2014 are compounded by
modernization reductions started last year and likely further
reductions in a reprogramming request that we understand is
currently under review by the Department of Defense (DOD).
Clearly, the readiness of today's soldiers is Army leadership's
most important duty. It is not a question of balance at the
ground level. Units must be manned, trained, and equipped to
support operations in Afghanistan and other unforeseen
contingencies. The Nation plans for and resources the Army to
be ready, and therefore it is a strategic imperative that it
should always be so.
The Army is truly in transition during the period of
declining funding, yet must continue to equip soldiers for what
we ask them to do today. Frankly, the future, as is common in
periods of declining resources, is less important. But this
subcommittee's oversight responsibility is to ensure that the
tradeoffs, although necessary, are reasonable, realistic, and
manage risk in an appropriate manner relative to our defense
strategy and the Army's needs.
We welcome the witnesses who join us here today. Lieutenant
General William Phillips is the Army's principal officer
responsible for research, development, and acquisition. As
such, he has policy and program oversight of how the Army buys
new and maintains current equipment. Lieutenant General James
O. Barclay is the Army's principal officer responsible for
matching available resources to meet the Army's requirements
for mission success and to support soldiers by managing current
force needs and future force capabilities. We want to thank you
both for your many years of service to the Nation and the Army.
General Barclay, we are particularly grateful that you could
join us today and share your family's joy and pride in the safe
return home of your son from his deployment to Afghanistan.
Now, my good friend Senator Roger Wicker will give his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a profoundly
insightful and appropriate opening statement, and I join you in
your sentiments.
I thank our witnesses, General Barclay and General
Phillips. I appreciate your service and echo the appreciation
that this subcommittee has for your sons, General Barclay, and
for all the sons and daughters of Americans who've served with
capability and bravery in our military service.
Mr. Chairman, today we are here to discuss Army
modernization as part of the fiscal year 2014 budget. Our Army
is battle-tested after a decade of sustained combat operations.
America's soldiers demonstrate every day that they are the best
led, best trained, and most professional land force in the
world.
It's the responsibility of us in Congress and on this
subcommittee to do what's necessary to enable the Army to
maintain its hard-won combat superiority. Unfortunately, as the
chairman mentioned, the budget request before us today falls
short of that goal. The Army's base request for its
modernization accounts is $1.7 billion below the Army's fiscal
year 2013 request, 7 percent lower than last year.
The Army's fiscal year 2014 budget request cannot be
reviewed without looking at the Army's cumulative budget
situation. Prior to the passage of the CR in March, the Chief
of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, informed the committee
that the Army was facing a $17 to $18 billion deficit in its
operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts for the current fiscal
year. Even with the passage of the CR, Secretary McHugh and
General Odierno testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that the Army still faces a combined fiscal year 2013
shortfall of over $15 billion because of the combined effects
of sequestration and the unexpectedly high overseas contingency
operations (OCO) expenditures.
To address this critical O&M shortfall, the Army is being
forced to raid accounts within its own budget. I'm deeply
concerned that these cuts will fall on Army modernization
accounts and have debilitating effects on the Army's future
readiness.
The Army is facing significant challenges in its
modernization accounts. I want to highlight three issues that
are of concern to me. First, we must continue to support the
Army's effort to network the soldier. This network is the
centerpiece of the Army's equipment modernization program and
the key enabler in its efforts to integrate Army operations
with the joint force. By providing real-time networked
information to decisionmakers and warfighters at all levels,
the Army can become even more agile, adaptable, and capable
than it already is. While the Army has made great progress in
two of its major networking programs, namely the Warfighter
Information Network Tactical and the Distributed Common Ground
System, I still have concerns with the progress being made in
the hand-held and vehicular radio programs.
Second, the Army faces the dual task of modernizing its
rotorcraft fleet and sustaining America's rotorcraft industrial
base amid financial constraints. This is very important. As I
stated earlier, the President's request is $1.7 billion below
the fiscal year 2013 request. It appears the Army's aviation,
ammunition, and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) programs will bear
the brunt of these cuts. Perhaps the witnesses can address
these in their testimony.
The Army also had to make some difficult decisions
regarding the Apache and it continues to struggle with the
decision on how to proceed with the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS)
program. I strongly believe the Army must make the maintenance
of our fragile rotorcraft industrial base an integral part of
its long-term modernization strategy. In March, the Army
exercised admirable agility when it opted to keep existing
production lines open by accepting delivery of select Apache
helicopters to future contractor-funded retrofits. I applaud
the Army's foresight for this decision. Likewise, the impact of
the eventual decision to replace or upgrade the Kiowa Warrior
platform will no doubt be felt for decades to come. As such,
this decision must be carefully considered within the framework
of the long-term viability of the rotorcraft industrial base.
Third, the Army's combat vehicle procurement program should
be rooted in requirements and prioritized accordingly. The
written testimony submitted by our witnesses indicates that the
GCV, the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle, and the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) are the Army's priority combat vehicle
programs. At the same time, the Army is also addressing a
longstanding capability gap with the Paladin Integrated
Management Program, the self-propelled artillery, as well as
tackling the challenge of resetting vehicles returning from
Afghanistan.
I believe all members of the subcommittee will want to
understand fully the witnesses' program prioritization, given
our current fiscal environment.
So, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by once again observing
that you and I agree on many of the issues that we have both
talked about. Let me observe that our Army continues to perform
with remarkable courage, professionalism, and effectiveness
despite incredibly hard circumstances. It's our responsibility
to ensure that they have the resources to execute their mission
in the defense of our Nation.
Thank you.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator.
Let me say also to General Barclay that I know you have two
sons that have served, and we mentioned your one son just
returning. I want you to know this committee is still wishing a
speedy recovery for your second son, who was severely injured
in 2006. I hope he's doing well and I hope the family is doing
well also, sir.
Senator Wicker, thank you, and I understand that you're
going to have to join the Subcommittee on Seapower hearing
already in progress. So we're going to break from protocol if
you don't mind to quickly accommodate Senator Wicker. Senator
Donnelly, if you have a scheduling conflict let me know.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let the record reflect that the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Seapower, the distinguished senior Senator from
Arizona, just came in, realized he was in the wrong room, and
is scurrying over to the Subcommittee on Seapower hearing,
which is obviously not already in progress, unless it's in
progress without his presence.
I will soon try to join Senator McCain in that hearing.
Senator Manchin. He was wondering what we were doing
sitting in the seats.
Senator Wicker. Right. It's terrible that we have so many
things scheduled on top of each other. We're not going to be
able to hear the distinguished president of South Korea when
she addresses the joint meeting. But we're doing the best we
can.
Let me say this, gentlemen. I want to start with the Light
Utility Helicopter (LUH) and AAS, and say that I have concerns
with the Army's delayed efforts to acquire the new scout
helicopter and its impact on the industrial base. Have I
emphasized that enough? After the Comanche and Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter program terminations, one would
expect the Army to move forward quickly on a path that
addresses the critical scout requirements identified by the
Army.
Accordingly, I am distressed about the Army's decision to
cut Lakota production early. This decision could shut down
existing production lines when the Army has not made a final
decision on a replacement or modernization plan for its aging
OH-58 Kiowa Warrior Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter fleet.
Last year, the Army conducted a Voluntary Flight
Demonstration (VFD) for its proposed Kiowa Warrior replacement
program, known as the AAS. This demonstration was supposed to
help inform the decision on a solution to the Kiowa
replacement. In March, Congress was briefed on the outcomes of
the flight demonstration, which determined that more time would
be needed before the Army can determine whether to replace or
modernize the existing fleet.
As such, I question the Army's proposal to cut and
eventually terminate procurement of the Lakota. I believe we
have an obligation to maintain the vitality of our industrial
base and to preserve industrial base competition until the Army
determines a path forward on AAS.
So first to you, General Barclay, and then to General
Phillips. My understanding is the Army could field a
nondevelopmental aircraft for its reconnaissance helicopter,
which means the helicopter can be produced in a short
timeframe. Considering where the Army is with the decision to
produce a new scout helicopter, wouldn't it be better, and
wouldn't we be better served in terms of national security,
keeping the Lakota production line warm until the Army is ready
to field a new scout helicopter? General Barclay?
General Barclay. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
First of all, if you look at the two different programs, one is
the LUH program. The LUH program is a non-combat, off-the-shelf
procurement that we used or procured to cover those shortfalls
as we started moving our combat aircraft into theater. That was
the reason that we purchased this. It can only operate in
permissive environments. We only use it in the Homeland to
cover those mission sets and we do not deploy that.
Our decision to reduce the number--we've actually completed
all the buy except for 31 aircraft that we are not going to
buy, and those 31 are only for the Active component. We will
complete the buy for all of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and
U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) for their requirements for the LUH.
You're linking that with the industrial base, with the
manufacturer of that helicopter, which as I said is a
commercial, not a combat aircraft. When we link that, they were
one of the ones that came in on the VFD. We conducted that. I
think we had five different ones that came in that we reviewed.
What we have done now that we have gone back and briefed all of
those industry partners in the rotary wing industry about how
they fell out and what the results were based on their
demonstration of the aircraft they brought to the table.
We have taken that information internally within the Army
and we're laying that out against what the requirement for the
future is, which is an AAS. As we look at that, we're basing
that against what the uncertain times are with our fiscal
constraints, where we can go in the future, and what we can
afford to do.
So the Army is in the decision process now of making that
decision, hopefully some time later this summer or early next
fall, on whether we're going to procure or go for a procurement
of an AAS, which will be a new developmental program, or
whether we're going to do a service life extension program on
the current Kiowa Warrior fleet we have now.
Senator Wicker. You're going to give us a comprehensive
briefing at a date certain, or can we expect that late summer,
early fall?
General Barclay. That's the timeline we're on now. I think
based on where the Chief and the Secretary are on that and us
gathering the information, we're looking at a late summer to
early fall decision from the Army leaders on the path ahead, on
which path.
But regardless of whether we buy a new AAS or we do a
service life extension on the current, we still have what's
called the OH-58F Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP)
for the current fleet we have, and we have to continue that.
That allows us to address safety and obsolescence issues with
the current fleet we have, which will bridge us to either
decision we make, to procure new or to Shelf-Life Extension
Program the current fleet. We need to continue that program.
So it's really all linked together here as we move forward,
Senator. I'll let General Phillips address the acquisition
side.
General Phillips. Senator, great question. Just a quick
comment. The LUH at the end of the day has been a great
aircraft for the Army, is still a great aircraft, and it met
the mission requirements that General Barclay just described in
the Active and the Reserve component. But that aircraft is
really designed for a permissive environment only, so that's
flying in continental U.S. operations essentially.
We are working with and have worked with EADS North
America. We've met with the president of EADS just recently and
continue to work with him on the production schedule. Last week
they actually came forward and talked to us a little bit about
foreign military sales (FMS) and the potential for continuing
production using FMS and the facility in Mississippi.
At the same time, we have gone forward with the VFD, as
General Barclay just described. The results of that essentially
are this: we didn't find a single aircraft that was out there
that can meet the Army's requirements. So if we were to go
forward with an AAS, it would essentially be a development
program, and that decision when it's made, probably mid-summer,
sir, as we just described, we'll bring that decision forward to
Congress and to you, sir.
Senator Wicker. You do concede that the mission of flying
in a permissive environment has a vital national security
function, do you not?
General Barclay. Yes, sir, it does. Again, as I've stated,
on the LUH, we have bought all those requirements less 31 for
the Active component. The Active component had a very small
number of the total aircraft LUH that were bought. That was
basically to cover the gaps we had because of the Blackhawks
that we had to take out of the homeland and move forward into
the fight.
Now as we're drawing down--with Iraq we're out--we're
drawing down in Afghanistan, we now have those aircraft back.
So based on the fiscal uncertainty and where we were with the
budget and stuff, it was prudent to make the decision to not
purchase the last 31 aircraft for the Active component. The
rest, as I say, the rest of those aircraft for the ARNG and
USAR, which perform those missions--some of them are down
performing the mission on the southwest border. They perform
all those types of missions here that respond to the States and
the Governors and the like.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, you've been very accommodating. I have a
question for the record about the Apache helicopter supply
chain problems and I will submit that to the record, and ask
your leave so that I can go to the other subcommittee, with my
deepest appreciation.
Senator Manchin. Absolutely, Senator Wicker.
Also, my dear friend Senator Donnelly has to do the same.
If he may ask his questions now and, sir, I will stay here and
we'll conduct the meeting as intended. But thank you for your
indulgence.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Generals, thank you so very much. I just recently got back
Saturday night from Afghanistan. The pride you can take in all
of our servicemembers is breathtaking, the job they are doing.
I wanted to ask about the next generation of warfighting
vehicles, the JLTV. It is very critical in my mind that we
continue forward with this program, and I just wanted to get an
update on the JLTV as to where we are now and what effect
sequestration will have on it.
General Phillips. Sir, great question. As was mentioned
earlier, JLTV is one of the top modernization programs for the
Army. We have to have that vehicle. We intend to buy about
49,000. The Marines are teamed with us. The first vehicles that
will come off the production line when we make that production
contract will essentially go to the Marines because of their
need. It's critical for both of us and it is a joint program.
We have issued a contract for engineering, manufacturing,
development. There are three strong industry partners.
Senator Donnelly. One of them happens to be from my
hometown.
General Phillips. Yes, sir, and I'm very familiar with AM
General and the great work that they've done for the Army for
many years.
We're high on getting that program through the development
process and into production, when we can achieve Milestone C,
get through all the testing, and then issue that production
contract.
I want to emphasize this, though. Sequestration has an
impact on every modernization program that we have this year,
and in fiscal year 2014 it may have an even greater effect.
What it has done to the JLTV program, and we're trying to
mitigate this to the best we can, is potentially move back some
of the testing by about 3 months, maybe up to 4 months. So sir,
for JLTV today the impact of fiscal year 2013 is about a 3-
month slip at most, we think. We'll do our best to try to
mitigate that and bring it in.
Senator Donnelly. Obviously my primary concern is
protecting our warfighters.
General Phillips. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. I also wanted to ask you about what the
Army's intent is in regards to modernizing tactical radios to
improve communications on the battlefield?
General Phillips. Sir, the Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) program--just a slight bit of history. The Army took
this program on about 4 years ago from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD); it was a joint program managed by
them. We put a general officer in charge of JTRS, the first
time a general has really managed the program from the very
beginning. We have realigned every family of radios within the
JTRS program.
What we found as we looked with industry partners, those
that were a part of the program of record and those that were
not, is in many cases the industry partners that were not a
part of the program of record had actually done better in
developing better radios, that were cheaper, better capability,
and met almost all of our requirements in most cases.
So we're going forward with a full and open competitive
strategy for three of the key radios of that entire family, and
we think we have the right strategy going forward, sir.
Senator Donnelly. This next question, I know this is
something our chairman is very interested in as well, I would
just like to know, in regards to sequestration, if you had
flexibility would that be helpful to you?
General Barclay. Yes, sir, it would. Again, the challenges
we're facing this year with reprogramming and how we're looking
at that and the limits. Again, we were given some flexibility,
more so than we have had in previous years. But we think as we
move into the future, it still being very uncertain and unknown
about what those amounts are going to be, we would like to have
that flexibility where we could then move--because to us the
challenge is the short-term decisions we're making will have
long-term impacts. If we can have at least some type of ability
to project out and know that we have the ability or flexibility
to make and move and change, then that allows us to take care
of some of these programs, because right now we're just
reacting and having to try to sustain as much as we can,
without having a clear picture of the future. So yes, sir,
flexibility would be a tremendous help, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much. General Barclay,
thank you for your family's service and, General Phillips, for
your service and your family's service as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
For the record, Senator Donnelly's statements and questions
and also Senator Wicker's will be entered into the record.
With that, we're going to go ahead and get started with our
opening comments from today's witnesses. So we'll start with
General Barclay, if you would.
STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES O. BARCLAY III, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMY (G-8)
General Barclay. Chairman Manchin and the rest of the
members of the committee here and distinguished members of the
committee: Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Army's
fiscal year 2014 President's budget and as it relates to our
modernization plan. On behalf of Secretary McHugh and General
Odierno, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you for
your steadfast support and commitment to our Army and our
soldiers.
In your letter of invitation to come over and testify, you
asked that we address modernization and its relationship to
planned end strength and force structure changes. I want to
assure you that, although we're entering an incredibly
turbulent time for equipping our units, our number one priority
remains supporting our warfighters in Afghanistan. We owe these
brave soldiers nothing less.
Over the next 3 years, we not only have to deploy and
redeploy units still in combat or coming home from combat, we
also have to retrograde theater equipment that is there and get
it home in order to sustain our equipment on hand (EOH)
statuses. We're also reorganizing our brigade combat teams. We
have to keep Korea Force ready to fight and reestablish our
global and regional response force.
To do all this, we have to do it with substantially less
money than we had planned, due to sequestration. Failure to get
this right will impact the equipment modernization and
readiness of our units for years to come.
Throughout our history, we have drawn down our Army after
every war. What is different this time is that we are drawing
down our Army before the war is over. The previous drawdowns
have resulted in a less-than-ready and hollow force. The
effects on our equipment modernization will be dramatic because
in the near term we cannot reduce force structure in a rapid
manner, nor can we reduce the cost of the war quickly enough to
pay the Army's share of the sequestration bill. Therefore,
modernization is going to be taxed twice, once for its
proportional share and then again to pay for those war costs
and to meet the upcoming costs in the future.
Sequestration will result in delays or changes to every one
of our modernization programs, to include the GCV, the network,
our aviation systems, the JLTV, and in most cases increasing
their costs. It will also create an inability to reset our
equipment employed in the past 12 years of war, resulting in
significant delay in equipment readiness for six divisions.
All of these effects are in addition to the changes that we
made in the 2014 President's budget request that we're here to
discuss.
You also asked that we review the 2014 OCO request which
the administration will present to Congress in the next few
months. Since this request is not yet final, it's hard to
provide the specifics on it as we are still working the details
to try to meet those goals of what those costs are. But I would
like to point out that the costs of the war do not go down
immediately as our soldiers return. We've proven in Iraq that
as we're retrograding the costs go up as you're closing down
combat outposts and forward outposts, that those costs rise,
and you're also retrograding equipment, and also the reset
aspect of this.
In fact, we're going to need your support for funding for
the reset and replacement of our equipment for 3 years beyond
the return of our forces from Afghanistan. Failure to do this
would have a catastrophic effect to unit readiness.
We're all aware of the strains on the Federal treasury and
the desire to reduce war funds as soon as our soldiers return
home. I would ask that you support future requests for the
critical reset of our equipment.
In March of this year, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno
published their Army equipment modernization strategy. This
strategy focuses on our efforts to support our soldiers and
small unit formations while maintaining our advantage to be
able to deter and defeat potential adversaries. We'll do this
by identifying achievable requirements, applying best practices
in acquisition and sustainment, and seeking incremental
improvements, while harnessing network-enabled capabilities to
solve our near-term needs, all the while investing in military-
unique revolutionary and evolutionary technologies to solve
future needs.
The key to this strategy is procuring equipment that is
versatile and tailorable, yet cost-effective and affordable.
The centerpiece of our equipment modernization program is the
soldier and the squad. Our investment plan provides our small
units with a range of equipment, including individual and crew-
served weapons, next-generation optics and night vision
devices, and body armor and advanced individual protection
equipment, that provide lethality and force protection to the
soldier on the ground.
In order to provide our soldiers with an unparalleled
advantage, we intend to enhance our equipment with incremental
improvement by integrating technologies and applications that
empower, protect, and unburden soldiers and the formations by
improving our network in order to enable decisionmaking across
the joint force, while improving our vehicle fleet capabilities
by increasing the lethality and mobility, all the while
optimizing survivability and sustainability, and also improving
our aviation platforms.
Even without the effects of sequestration, the shift in the
defense strategies and the previous reductions in the defense
budget have caused the Army to make tough choices, resulting in
significant changes to almost 100 of our acquisition programs.
We have restructured almost 40 programs. We've slowed
deliveries in about 50 programs and made the decision to
accelerate very few.
As we determine the effects of sequestration in 2013 and
beyond, I am certain other programs will have to be adjusted as
well. I'd like to emphasize once again to the committee that
the effects of sequestration on our modernization account will
be felt. Within the Army, in addition to the approximately 10
percent across the board reductions, we will have to reprogram
modernization dollars to pay for operations in Afghanistan.
Equipment that we thought we were going to have and that our
plans were based upon will not be procured or reset.
In conclusion, sir, I've been the Army G-8 for 10 months,
and it is an honor for me to be here before you today
representing the great men and women of our Army. Every day in
peace and war, our soldiers, along with our airmen, sailors,
marines, and coast guard personnel, defend our Nation and all
that is asked of them. The state of our Nation's finances as
well as the financial struggles of our citizens are also on our
minds. We know that they are struggling financially, yet they
steadfastly provide our soldiers with the resources they need,
and we are grateful.
Our commitment to you is that we spend each and every
dollar wisely and only ask for that which we truly need. The
Secretary and the Chief have made this perfectly clear in their
equipment modernization strategy, as they have challenged us to
be both cost-effective and affordable.
I look forward to answering your questions today and
working with you in the future.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, General Barclay.
[The prepared statement of General Barclay follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG James O. Barclay III, USA
introduction
Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished members of
the Subcommittee on Airland, thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the Army's fiscal year 2014 President's budget as it pertains to Army
modernization. On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh,
and our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, I would like to take this
opportunity to thank you for your steadfast support and commitment to
your Army and our soldiers.
The generous support of the American people and Congress over the
past 11-plus years of conflict has provided us the resources necessary
to defeat our Nation's enemies, while protecting our soldiers and
sustaining the force. It has also allowed us to modernize the Army,
while reducing pre-2001 equipment shortages. We have significantly
increased modernization levels over the past 11 years in all of our
Army components.
Equipment shortages have been reduced significantly, particularly
in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). In
2001, the Active component (AC) had 85 percent of its equipment on
hand, the ARNG had 81 percent on hand, and the USAR had 75 percent on
hand. As of 2012, AC equipment on hand stood at 91 percent, ARNG at 89
percent, and USAR at 86 percent. The Army today is better modernized
and equipped than at any time in recent memory.
Yet today's fiscal realities endanger the progress we have made in
equipping. If the reductions in discretionary caps from fiscal year
2014 to fiscal year 2021 as outlined in current law--known as
sequestration--take effect, the Army may lose balance between end
strength, readiness, and modernization resulting in a hollow force.
To provide a guide for equipping our Army during these uncertain
fiscal times, we have developed a flexible Army Equipment Modernization
Strategy (AEMS). The AEMS is designed to account for normal cyclical
downturns in defense spending that occur after every war. The
reductions caused by sequestration, however, are occurring much sooner
and at a much steeper rate than anticipated. As a result, all
acquisition priorities and many equipment modernization programs may
face unanticipated schedule or cost impacts in the out years.
equipment modernization
The AEMS focuses our efforts on supporting our soldiers and small
unit formations with the network, vehicles, and other enablers, while
maintaining our advantages to deter and defeat potential adversaries
by: (1) identifying achievable requirements; applying best practices in
acquisition and sustainment; seeking incremental improvements; and
harnessing network enabled capabilities to solve near-term needs, while
(2) investing in military-unique revolutionary and evolutionary
technologies to solve future needs. The key to this strategy is
procuring equipment that is ``versatile and tailorable'' yet cost-
effective and affordable.
As a part of this strategy, the Army provides a wide range of
capabilities as an indispensable member of the Joint Force. Every day,
the Army maintains deployable contingency forces, employs forward-based
capabilities, and conducts multilateral exercises with partners and
allies. The Army also provides humanitarian assistance when necessary.
Army forces set theaters for the combatant commanders, constantly
maintaining the critical logistical, communications, intelligence,
medical, and inland ground transportation infrastructure to support all
U.S. Armed Forces plans and contingencies. Army units provide space,
air, and missile defense capabilities for the Joint Force. We build and
operate communication networks that connect our own units, the joint
community, and interagency and multinational partners. Soldiers provide
essential logistics infrastructure, delivering food, fuel, ammunition,
materiel and medical support that sustain joint operations ranging from
combat to humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Army collects and
analyzes the intelligence that informs our actions and measures our
progress, and provides the majority of the forces in U.S. Special
Operations Command.
We will take advantage of government and commercial technologies to
buy and integrate mature incremental improvements in the near-term,
while investing in revolutionary and evolutionary technologies for the
future. Through this approach, we will become more efficient, pursuing
smaller procurement objectives, leveraging the results of experiments
and demonstrations.
For example, the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) provides the
Army with valuable soldier-driven evaluations and assessments of
network technologies, while also aiding in the development of tactics,
techniques, and procedures for network capability. NIE also informs the
Army's capability requirements, and better informs industry on how to
refine and mature new and existing capabilities. Several industry
systems that participated in prior NIEs incorporated soldier feedback
into updated versions featuring both software and hardware
enhancements. NIE provides insights from multiple organizations and
stakeholders simultaneously, yielding better information to
decisionmakers faster. Unfortunately under sequestration, the Army may
be forced to reduce the scope of NIE, resulting in fewer systems,
vehicles, and industry participation, which will in turn result in
fewer operational test scenarios and less data collected. This will
ultimately delay the production and fielding of some acquisition
programs.
capability-based portfolios
The Army manages equipment modernization through capability-based
portfolios. The strategy for each portfolio is different and is
dependent on many factors to include the modernization level within the
portfolio, the threat gaps across the portfolio, and the status of the
industrial base. Each portfolio will look out over the near, mid, and
far term to determine investments and divestments across the Army.
In order to provide our soldiers with unparalleled advantage, our
equipment portfolios will incorporate incremental improvements by
integrating technologies and applications that empower, protect, and
unburden soldiers and formations by improving our network in order to
enable decisionmaking across the Joint Force; improving our vehicle
fleet capabilities by increasing lethality and mobility while
optimizing protection and sustainability; and improving our aviation
platforms with digitization and additional procurement of unmanned
aviation systems.
the soldier and the squad
The centerpiece of our equipment modernization program is the
soldier and the squad. Our investment plan provides our small units
with a range of equipment including individual and crew-served weapons,
next generation optics and night vision devices, and body armor and
advanced individual protection equipment, providing lethality and force
protection to the soldier on the ground. Tactical overmatch will be
created by a suite of small-unit systems including unmanned aircraft
systems, ground-based robots, counter-improvised explosive devices, and
the latest surveillance systems. The Army equipment modernization goal
is to build outwards from the soldier and squad and to sustain our
advantages in mobility; logistics; and command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels.
Planned improvements for dismounted soldiers include a mission
command system that allows soldiers to see each other's positions,
collaboratively mark hazards, and provides on-the-move broadband voice,
data and video. This unprecedented situational awareness, coupled with
advanced sensors and lightweight small arms systems, will ensure that
our soldiers are unmatched on the battlefield.
One of our highest priorities is to off-load weight and complexity
from the soldier, easing physical, training, and maintenance burdens,
standardizing mechanical and software interfaces and developing
consistent cognitive and physical ergonomics that maximize safety and
resilience. In the near term, the soldier and squad portfolio will
prioritize the modernization of existing weapons, leveraging ``off the
shelf'' technologies, and invest in the development of new weapons. In
the area of protection and mobility, the Army will incrementally
improve ballistic protection against existing enemy weapons while
lightening the soldier's load. For example, the female size Generation
III Improved Outer Tactical Vest continues to provide the same
unsurpassed ballistic protection of existing Army body armor, while
providing eight additional sizes in conjunction with other
modifications designed to provide a better fit.
mission command
Our Mission Command portfolio is an integrated and interoperable
network that connects all echelons from the soldier to the Joint Task
Force. It is designed to provide the right information from a myriad of
sensors and data sources, in time to enable soldiers to make sound
tactical decisions. The network also provides the squad connectivity to
other Army and Joint assets, allowing access to multiple firepower,
intelligence, and combat support systems even in the most demanding
physical terrain and complex human environments. The result is our
smaller forces are empowered with network-enabled capabilities. Our
fiscal year 2014 budget request will provide four Brigade Combat Team
sets of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment II,
Joint Battle Command-Platform, Nett Warrior, Rifleman Radio, Mounted
and Dismounted tactical networking radios, and the Maneuver Network
Vehicular Radio for Capability Set fiscal year 2015, while continuing
to develop WIN-T Increment 3, which includes an aerial layer and
increased bandwidth. WIN-T funding was increased in the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2014 to acquire additional quantities
needed to support testing and networking on-the-move capability. The
WIN-T Increment 2 networking on-the-move capability was recently
validated by 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division in a Mission Rehearsal
Exercise.
ground movement and maneuver
The Ground Movement and Maneuver portfolio provides soldiers the
protected mobility required to deliver them safely to, on, and from the
battlefield. The Army's priority combat and tactical vehicle programs
are the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and the Armored Multipurpose
Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). We will continue to make the necessary
adjustments in the GCV program--particularly as budget uncertainty
continues--to ensure that we deliver an effective and affordable
replacement for the aging Infantry Fighting Vehicle variant of the
Bradley. We will select one contractor in the Engineering and
Manufacturing Design phase of the GCV program, saving significant Army
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) resources that we
will reinvest in other modernization programs.
In the case of AMPV, it is a model program for cost constraints--
utilizing mature technologies, strict cost limits, and rigorous
analysis of requirements. Replacing our Vietnam-era M113 Personnel
Carrier is crucial to our Armored Brigade Combat Teams by providing
survivable, network enabled combat support vehicles with the necessary
protection and mobility.
Abrams funding in fiscal year 2014 provides continued RDT&E funding
for Abrams Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) development, which will
buy back power deficiencies, improve protection, and provide the
ability to accept future network and protection upgrades. Abrams
procurement funding supports continued armor production, safety
modifications, and operational field modifications.
Fiscal year 2014 funding for the Bradley Family of Vehicles program
includes procurement of ECP 1 for track and suspension upgrades,
transmission upgrades to ensure the vehicle can be safely operated at
full combat weight and completing fielding of Operation Desert Storm-
Situational Awareness variants to the Army National Guard.
In regard to Stryker, the Army has validated the enduring
requirement for the Double V-Hull (DVH) Stryker configuration and an
analysis is being conducted to determine distribution of the current
DVH vehicles within the nine Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
tactical wheeled vehicle strategy
Our objectives are to progressively modernize the Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle fleet to improve performance, payload, and protection, and
integrate the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Family of Vehicles into
our force structure. Currently, the Army is moving forward with
developing the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) with the Marine
Corps to fill capability gaps in the light vehicle fleet by carefully
balancing performance, payload, and protection. All JLTV are produced
armor-capable, and when armored can provide the same level of
protection as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle
(M-ATV), better network integration than the High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and better mobility and transportability than
the M-ATV.
Affordability is at the forefront of all decisions in this
portfolio. Solutions must carefully balance protection against cost and
mobility. Additionally, our strategy will take advantage of the young
fleet age and divest tens of thousands of wheeled vehicles to reduce
sustainment costs.
aviation
The Army has a continuing requirement for a light, armed helicopter
for manned, armed aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and light attack
missions. Currently this role is filled by the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior. The
Army is currently considering whether to compete a new start Armed
Aerial Scout program or to recapitalize the OH-58.
To address obsolescence and safety concerns until a viable
replacement is procured, the Army is investing in the Cockpit and
Sensor Upgrade Program for the Kiowa Warrior. It is a priority Army
aviation program due to the persistent high operational demand for this
capability and the need to modernize 1970s platforms.
The Army will procure remanufactured AH-64Es and will defer the
procurement of new build AH-64Es beyond fiscal year 2019, pending a
review of attack helicopter force structure. Both the Kiowa Warrior and
the Apache AH-64E platforms have been instrumental in both theaters,
and modernizing and remanufacturing them enhances our battlefield
capabilities while also reducing overall costs to the taxpayer.
Finally, the CH-47F multi-year procurement contract II, will fill all
Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Chinook requirements.
fiscal realities and modernization
Fiscal realities have caused the Army to make tough choices by
delaying, restructuring, and terminating programs in fiscal year 2014.
We will continue to revalidate modernization requirements, reexamine
programs' affordability and cost effectiveness, and determine if there
are alternatives that can satisfactorily meet the need at less cost.
In addition, the Army is continuously assessing its requirements
and resourcing processes. We have instituted processes in several large
programs, which involve the acquisition and requirements communities
working in close collaboration to screen requirements, and identify
areas where risk can be mitigated by adjusting requirements to avert
unnecessary cost or schedule impacts. The focus is on discerning the
true ``must-have'' capabilities in pursuit of affordable and achievable
programs. The GCV and the JLTV are two recent examples. In the case of
the GCV, high risk requirements were eliminated, and in the case of the
JLTV, requirements were prioritized to give industry the needed
flexibility to perform on budget.
closing comments
The goal of our Equipping Modernization Strategy is to ensure
soldiers are equipped for the current fight as well as future
contingencies. Although we are a force in transition during a period of
declining resources, we must continue to provide the Army with the best
equipped, most modernized, and most capable force that will prevail on
any battlefield against any enemy. In some cases this requires the
procurement of newly designed combat vehicles that incorporate the
lessons learned from more than 11 years of conflict, and the ability to
incorporate new networked technologies. In other cases it requires
modernizing equipment to account for new power, weight, or
obsolescence, and in some cases it only requires resetting existing
equipment to roll back years of excessive wear and tear as it returns
from Operation Enduring Freedom.
These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our
Army, and I assure you, the members of this subcommittee, that the
Army's senior leaders are working hard to address these challenges and
to meet the needs of the Nation now and in the future.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for
your steadfast and generous support of the outstanding men and women of
the U.S. Army, Army civilians, and their families. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Manchin. General Phillips.
STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM N. PHILLIPS, USA, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION,
LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, AND DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER
MANAGEMENT, AND CHIEF INTEGRATION OFFICER
General Phillips. Good morning. Chairman Manchin, Ranking
Member Wicker, and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Army's
modernization and acquisition program for fiscal year 2014. On
behalf of our Army, I thank you for your steadfast support to
provide our courageous men and women in uniform with world-
class weapons, systems, and equipment. Sir, at the end of the
day our Army is the most equipped in the world, and that
doesn't happen by chance. It happens because of a lot of hard
work and dedication from many, to include the members of this
committee. So, sir, we thank you.
Upfront, I would also like to extend my sincere
appreciation for your support for a number of critical
acquisition programs, to include the award of multi-year
contracts. This action alone will save taxpayers over $2
billion on the Chinook and Blackhawk programs alone.
Our Army and our Army acquisition face unprecedented fiscal
and budget challenges. Sequestration is having a devastating
effect on Army modernization. To best meet the physical
challenges we face, the Army has focused on driving
affordability and cost-effectiveness in every decision we make
and on every program. We remain committed to our modernization
strategy, which begins with the soldier, the most effective
weapon in the battlefield. The soldier and squad are the
foundation of our Army and the centerpiece of our modernization
programs. We will equip our squads for tactical overmatch in
all situations. We will connect soldiers to the network and we
will provide vehicles that improve mobility, lethality, and
survivability. We will provide the soldier and the squad with a
range of equipment, including individual and crew-served
weapons, next-generation optics, night vision devices, and the
world's best body armor. Our squad formation's tactical
superiority will be enabled by a suite of small unit systems
including unmanned aerial systems, ground-based robots,
counter-improvised explosive devices (IED), and the latest
surveillance systems.
We will connect the soldier to the Army's network to create
greater situational awareness and overwhelming superiority. It
provides the squad connectivity with the joint assets as well.
Our combat and tactical wheeled vehicle fleets are being
developed to connect this more capable squad with the network.
Our future vehicle fleets will also provide increased lethality
and mobility to squads while optimizing survivability through
the use of armor packages that can be scaled to meet mission
requirements.
Our modernization efforts are designed to prepare the
entire force for a complex and uncertain battlefield by putting
a squad with precise information and overmatch capability in
the right place at the right time to accomplish their mission.
For Army aviation, we will continue to successfully modify,
upgrade, and remanufacture existing platforms to extend the
life of our aircraft and keep our air crews safe. We will
continue to invest in science and technology for the future
fleet of aviation as well.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly address the defense
industrial base. The upcoming end of combat operations and the
changing fiscal environment are prompting the Army's commercial
and organic industrial base to adjust to a new reality of
reduced requirements and constrained resources. Of great
concern to the Army are the likely long-term effects, to
include the loss of critical skills, the loss of suppliers at
all tiers, and an increase in the number of single-point
failures in the supply chain affecting Army logistics and
industrial base operations. The Army is aggressively evaluating
how best to identify and preserve critical industrial base
capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, the Army continues to prioritize sound
program management, acquisition that drives affordability,
executable requirements, and achievable acquisition strategies.
We have taken specific steps to avert the leading causes of the
past program cancellations. In addition, the Army has fully
embraced the DOD Better Buying Power initiatives to address
cost and schedule and schedule risk in programs and achieve
better value for taxpayers. In 2012 alone, we achieved $370
million in should-cost initiatives that went across over 300
programs. During my 3 years in this position, we have made
significant improvements in the Army acquisition process.
In closing, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, these are difficult and challenging times. I
thank you again for your steadfast and strong support of our
courageous men and women in uniform. Sir, I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Phillips follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG William N. Phillips, USA
introduction
Chairman Manchin, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee on Airland, we thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the fiscal year 2014 budget and overseas contingency operations
requests as they pertain to Army Modernization as well as your
steadfast support and shared commitment in this endeavor on behalf of
the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John McHugh and the Army Chief
of Staff, General Ray Odierno. I would also like to thank you for help
in providing the Army the means to award multi-year contracts through
the passage of the Appropriations Bill which funds the Department of
Defense through the rest of the fiscal year. This alone will save the
taxpayer over $2 billion in cost avoidance. We are pleased to represent
U.S. Army leadership, members of the Army Acquisition workforce, and
the more than 1 million courageous men and women in uniform who have
deployed to combat over nearly 12 years, who have relied on us to
provide them with world-class weapon systems and equipment to ensure
mission success.
army equipment modernization strategy
As we look to the future, our priority is to maintain the best
equipped Army in the world and to ensure we are postured to fight and
win the next conflict. We recognize the need to shape the Army with an
understanding of both our national security obligations, the strategic
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region, and current fiscal constraints.
The theme of our Equipment Modernization Strategy is ``versatile and
tailorable, yet affordable and cost-effective.''
The centerpiece of this strategy is the soldier and squad, ensuring
that we continue to maintain advantages in mobility, logistics, command
and control, and intelligence. The soldier and squad must be enabled
through the network, facilitating decisionmaking across the Joint
Force, and delivering this capability with focused investments in key
enabling technologies. The Soldier and Squad Investment Plan provides
our small units with a range of equipment including individual and
crew-served weapons, next generation optics and night vision devices,
and body armor and advanced individual protection equipment, providing
lethality and force protection to the soldier on the ground. Our combat
and tactical vehicle fleets are also being developed to network this
more capable squad, provide increased lethality and mobility, while
optimizing survivability through the use of armor packages that can be
scaled to meet mission requirements. In the same manner, aviation
improvements will provide our forces with greater mobility and
responsiveness. Currently the Army is conducting a comprehensive study
of the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. At the completion of this study
and pending force structure decisions, the Army will update its
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy.
This approach helps achieve the optimal balance between
obsolescence of existing capabilities, innovation, and overmatch
capabilities through new technologies and weapon systems. As a result,
our approach must be agile and strategic moving forward, reflecting the
need to modernize equipment in key portfolios, leveraging mature
capabilities where appropriate, and addressing the needs of the
Industrial Base. Maintaining technological advantage over our
adversaries will be paramount, so our strategy must include a balanced
investment between mature technologies for system upgrades, and
research investments between evolutionary and disruptive technologies.
To achieve this strategy within our fiscal constraints, we must
make focused investments in capability. As such, we are engaged in a
detailed assessment of our various equipment portfolios to determine
our future investment, sustainment, and divestiture posture. This will
be the first time we have projected out 30 years, ensuring that we
understand the threat and associated capability gaps, and from that
developing our investment strategy across Science and Technology and
Acquisition Programs of Record. Alignment across this process, as well
as affordability, will be key. Maintaining critical Industrial Base
sectors and preserving the capacity to surge when the need arises will
also be a priority.
Our approach must consider rapid changes in technology, and where
our traditional process does not suffice, we must institutionalize new
processes for rapid acquisition that allow us to be responsive to the
threat and agile in delivering new capability. We will leverage the
government, academic, and commercial sectors to deliver this
capability, and will continue to execute efforts like the Network
Integration Evaluations (NIE). These evaluations ensure a holistic
approach to integration that assesses the latest, innovative
technologies while creating efficiencies across our test programs.
Key principles within our Equipment Modernization Strategy include:
Fostering competition to reduce cost and improve
quality
Reducing complexity to the soldier to use and maintain
equipment, thus reducing our training requirement
Emphasizing interfaces and interoperable standards
with our joint and coalition partners
Divesting equipment as a means to modernize with
limited resources
Balancing modernization with changing threats,
missions, and technologies, as we manage impacts on training
and sustainment
army network and ground systems modernization programs
The President's budget for fiscal year 2014 supports the 2013 Army
Equipment Modernization Plan, which identifies the Army's highest
modernization priorities. Nearly half of them are associated with the
network, which the Army is committed to developing and fielding as a
single entity. Network modernization seeks to provide the same basic
capabilities from home station to the lone dismounted soldier in
theater. The Army is also striving to become hardware agnostic by
focusing on software applications that meet our unique needs. These
applications must be able to operate on existing hardware, and meet
requirements for interoperability with other applications.
A major contributor to the successful development of new network
capabilities is the NIE, conducted on a semi-annual basis at Fort
Bliss, TX. Our latest NIE just began on May 4 and is scheduled to
conclude on May 27, 2013. The NIE provides an operational venue to
evaluate and integrate new commercial technologies and network
capabilities for possible inclusion into the network before it is
fielded to operational units, thereby relieving those units of the
integration burden. Resources have been added to the fiscal year 2014
budget request to allow procurement of commercial products evaluated
and recommended for fielding based on NIE results.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) provides a secure
and reliable broadband network that supports tactical communications
(voice, data, and video), enabling mission command while on-the-move.
It features the latest technology to plan, manage, fight, and defend
the network. This capability will be delivered in incremental stages.
WIN-T Increment 1 fielding was completed in fiscal year 2012 and the
budget request supports planned technology upgrades to enhance
interoperability with subsequent increments. WIN-T Increment 2, which
delivers a mobile network capability from company level to theater, is
currently being fielded to deploying units. The budget will procure
WIN-T Increment 2 equipment for four Brigade Combat Teams and two
Division Headquarters. The budget request supports WIN-T Increment 3
continued development of the full networking capability, including
additional connectivity via employment of an airborne tier.
Family of Network Tactical Radios
The Family of Network Tactical Radios, to include the former Joint
Tactical Radio System and the Mid-Tier Networked Vehicular Radio
programs, is the future deployable mobile communications family of
tactical radios, providing advanced joint tactical end-to-end
networking data and voice communications to dismounted troops,
aircraft, and watercraft platforms. The fiscal year 2014 budget request
provides an interoperable family of advanced single and dual-channel
radios providing soldiers, sensors, and platforms with tactical, lower
tier networking communications capability.
Ground Combat Vehicle
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is the Army's replacement for Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicles in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs).
Modernization imperatives include improved protection, mobility, and
capacity for a full nine soldier infantry squad, and sustainment;
built-in growth capacity; and network integration. The fiscal year 2014
budget request will allow the refinement of the GCV requirements set,
close out the Technology Development phase, and allow the awarding of
an Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract.
Stryker
The Stryker Double V-Hulls (DVH) have provided exceptional
protection in Afghanistan and are directly contributing to saving the
lives of soldiers. The Army is procuring DVH Strykers through new
production and flat bottom Stryker exchange. As of December 2012,
remaining new production consists of nine Anti-Tank Guided Missile
Variants scheduled for completion June 2013. Fifty-two Stryker DVHs
were completed in April 2013 though the exchange process. The Army has
validated the enduring requirement for the DVH Stryker configuration
and an analysis is being conducted to determine distribution of the
current DVH vehicles within the nine Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The
Army has approved Phase II of the Stryker Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) effort (design, prototype build, and test) focused on improving
electrical and engine power, enhancing the suspension and integrating
an in-vehicle network. A production decision for Phase II is projected
for the fiscal year 2017 timeframe.
M1 Abrams
The Abrams tank remains the best tank in the world as a result of
significant improvements over the last two decades. The Army will have
produced enough tanks to fully meet its requirement to equip all ABCTs
by June 2013. Currently the average age of the fleet is 3 to 4 years
old. A slow-down in Abrams Tank production has already begun and will
likely continue until the next major recapitalization of the Abrams
tank resumes in the fiscal year 2019 timeframe. The Army is assessing
mitigation alternatives, including the affordability of accelerating
production of the Abrams ECP improvements with the next Abrams
recapitalization, to provide a sustaining workload at the Anniston Army
Depot and Joint Systems Manufacturing Center for the foreseeable
future. In the meantime, the Army continues to aggressively apply
mitigation measures to preserve critical skills and the vendor/supplier
base.
M2 Bradley
The Army will have produced enough Bradley vehicles to fully meet
its requirements to equip all ABCTs by September 2013. At this point,
the average Bradley A3 and Operation Desert Storm-Saudi Arabia fleet
age is 4 years old. The Army awarded the contract to convert and
digitize 61 M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle variants to the standard M2
Infantry Fighting Vehicle in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013.
The Army has two ECP efforts planned for the Bradley. ECP 1 began in
fiscal year 2014 and includes mobility improvements (improved track and
suspension) to restore lost platform capability due to survivability
enhancements. ECP 2 is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2017 and
includes size, weight, power, and cooling improvements to accommodate
inbound technologies (improved engine, transmission and alternator,
network and power improvements). The Army will conduct an analysis to
determine the right combination of field modifications, production at
York, and work at the depot to complete the planned ECPs.
Paladin Integrated Management
The Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program replaces the
current M109A6 Paladin and M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Supply
Vehicle by incorporating Bradley common drive train and suspension
components with a new chassis design. PIM addresses a longstanding
capability gap in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about
by an aging fleet and the termination of prior modernization efforts.
The budget request supports continued PIM Developmental Testing and Low
Rate Initial Production of 18 PIM systems and non-recurring costs for
the production contract.
rotorcraft acquisition and modernization
The past decade of conflict has identified challenges faced by
rotary wing aircraft conducting operations in high, hot conditions,
limits to aircraft/passenger survivability, and high operational costs.
The Army's recent aviation modernization investments maximize AH-64 and
UH-60 fleet performance.
OH-58D/F Kiowa Warrior
The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior provides essential aerial reconnaissance
and security of ground maneuver forces and has the highest operational
demand of any Army rotary wing aircraft. The budget request supports
the OH-58F Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP) and continues OH-
58D fleet upgrades to include manned-unmanned teaming, weight
reduction, and resolution of current obsolescence issues. To address
long-term obsolescence in the Kiowa Warrior, the OH-58F CASUP improves
avionics through modernization of: interoperability; Aircraft
Survivability Equipment; armament and sensors; digital cockpit display,
improved processor; navigation guidance; and communication and
identification. The OH-58F CASUP capability improvements are largely
centered on the Nose-Mounted Sensor, which will replace the much less
capable Mast-Mounted Sensor. Additionally, CASUP will fully integrate
several aircraft systems that are currently federated, redesigns, and
replace the entire aircraft wiring harness, and add a capability to
integrate future digital weapon systems.
Improved Turbine Engine Program
Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) is the next generation
engine being developed to reduce fuel usage, increase performance,
improve reliability, and lower maintenance. The ITEP is striving for a
25 percent specific fuel consumption decrease, 35 percent production
and maintenance cost decrease, 65 percent horsepower to weight increase
with 20 percent engine life design increase, and may incorporate a
condition-based maintenance plus package.
CH-47F/MH-47G Chinook
The Army is fully committed to the procurement of 533 Army CH-47F
Chinook and U.S. Special Operations Command MH-47G aircraft, which are
meeting or exceeding all expectations in theater. The Army plans to
sign a second 5-year multi-year contract to procure the CH-47F Chinook,
which will yield a cost avoidance of 19.2 percent, or $810 million.
UH-60 Black Hawk
The Black Hawk program continues to move forward with continued
investments in modernization to keep the Blackhawk fleet relevant
through 2035. Current modernization efforts include cockpit
digitization and development and integration of the Improved Turbine
Engine. The Army awarded the 8-year multi-year contract for Black Hawk,
which has realized a cost avoidance of 15 percent, or $1.4 billion.
Armed Aerial Scout
The Army conducted a Voluntary Flight Demonstration (VFD) from June
to November 2012 to determine if industry had an aircraft readily
available that could satisfy Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) requirements.
Five submissions for potential AAS solutions provided aircraft for
demonstration. The Army is currently reviewing information obtained
through the VFD and industry responses to Requests for Information. The
Army will consider the limitations of the Kiowa Warrior, potential
capabilities of the AAS, and affordability in developing its
recommendation to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics). The Army projects that it will make a
recommendation in the third quarter fiscal year 2013.
As budgets decline, we recognize that it will be difficult to
resource Army Aviation at the same level in the future. We continue to
successfully modify, upgrade, and remanufacture existing platforms to
extend the life of our aircraft and keep our aircrews safe.
defense industrial base
The Army's Commercial and Organic Industrial Base (OIB) will adjust
to a new environment of constrained resources and reduced demand. The
current fiscal environment poses a number of concerns for the Army to
include the possible loss of critical skill sets, the loss of suppliers
at all tiers, and an increase in the number of single point failures in
the supply chain affecting Army logistics and OIB operations. The Army
is evaluating how to leverage facility modernization efforts to
preserve needed capabilities in the OIB. We continue to work with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on the sector-by-sector/tier-
by-tier (S2T2) survey to evaluate impacts on all DIB sectors.
The Army produces Industrial Base Baseline Assessments that assess
current operations, risks, and issues in the Army Industrial Base. The
Army has implemented long-range facilities and construction planning
for arsenals and ammunition plants, which include modernization
projects to upgrade facilities, and modernizing equipment and
manufacturing processes. Phase 1 of the S2T2 survey is complete, with
initial data from the Army Industrial Base under review to determine
critical impacts to skills, manufacturing capabilities, and expertise
the Army needs.
The Army is also conducting a comprehensive Combat Vehicle
Portfolio Industrial Base Study through A.T. Kearney, a global
management consulting firm. The 21-week study, expected to be completed
in June 2013, is assessing the commercial and organic combat vehicle
industrial base, viable strategic alternatives, and sustainment of the
combat vehicle industrial base in a constrained fiscal environment.
acquisition transformation
The Army continues to prioritize affordability, sound program
management, and achievable requirements in our acquisition efforts. The
Army has taken specific steps to address and avert the leading causes
of program cancellations in the past. Requirements and acquisition
strategies in our major programs (GCV, for example) have been carefully
tailored to mitigate risk and facilitate achievable results. An Army
blue ribbon panel review in 2010 recommended long-term improvements to
our processes. Implementation is nearly complete on this effort (55 of
63 recommendations have been implemented to date). The Army has also
embraced OSD Better Buying Power initiatives designed to address cost
and schedule risk in programs and achieve better value for the
taxpayer.
Ongoing improvements include revising our requirements development
process to facilitate cost-informed decisions on a collaborative and
timely basis. The Army is also revising requirements approval processes
to focus on truly ``must-have'' capabilities in an effort to control
costs. We are also expanding the use of multi-year contracts to achieve
efficiency, increasing our emphasis on mature technologies, and
improving the availability of analytic research in acquisition
decisions to achieve best value for the Army.
The Stryker program is one example of the effective application of
``should-cost'' estimates, incentivizing efficiency, and lower overall
costs. The Army achieved considerable savings combining the DVH and the
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle buys, while
pursuing efficiencies gained in test methodology. Existing test data
was effectively utilized and test events were also combined to achieve
efficiency.
closing comments
These are challenging times for the Nation and our Army. The next
several years will be pivotal for Army ground systems and rotorcraft.
The resources provided to the Army to conduct ongoing operations while
modernizing and posturing for the next generation of warfighter
capabilities will determine our continued ability to accomplish our
mission and meet future commitments. To execute these plans, we need
your continued advice and support.
We can assure the members of this subcommittee that your Army's
senior leaders remain focused and are working hard to address current
challenges and the needs of the Army now and in the future. We will do
this with affordability as our watchword as we endeavor to remain good
stewards of our Nation's resources.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, we thank you again for
your steadfast and generous support of the outstanding men and women in
uniform, our Army civilians, and their families.
Senator Manchin. Thank you both, General Barclay and
General Phillips.
Let me just start out with an observation. Being one of the
newer members of the Senate, coming from the State ranks, being
a governor before and being involved in the public process, if
you will, the sequestration is taking on a whole new life of
its own. My estimation is it's going to be here for 10 years.
With that being said, I think if you look at the overall
objective, it was supposed to be a draconian measure, which it
really is, but I think it's more draconian in the way it's
administered versus the amount of money that's involved.
With that, they're talking $1.2 trillion over 10 years, to
be fairly equal, if you will, half of it from defense and half
of it from non-defense. That would be $500 to $600 billion over
the 10-year period. So that's about $60 billion a year. Right
now, since it started a little bit later this year, it's going
to be deferred to the end of the back of the 10-year program,
so you have $42.5 billion.
I think Senator Donnelly asked a question which I think
everybody has answered the same as you, let us manage. Let us
manage, and that's what you're asking for. It makes all the
sense in the world. I'm sure over the years there's been
programs that you have been required as a mission statement
that you're going to do whether you thought it was the right
program or not, and you have always carried out your mission,
and I appreciate that.
What I'm saying--this is just me speaking for myself--is
that I believe that we should be working with you more than
telling you what to do and finding out what works and what
doesn't work and let you make recommendations on some
consolidation cuts and eliminations that need to be done. I
think if I were you, I would plan along those lines. That's
just my input, if you will.
If you're looking at over the 10-year period, you're going
to have DOD spend over $6 trillion over a 10-year period,
asking for a $600 billion reduction in that. So I would look
forward to the long-term planning. That's just my estimation in
what I'm seeing, unless we get a budget that really works. If
we do get a budget that works, it'll probably be along those
same lines, I would estimate. So that's my input on that.
So my questions would be along these lines. This is to both
of you. If you agree on our policies--no matter whether you do
agree on our policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think there's
one thing that all of us can agree on, that the soldiers have
sacrificed dearly and stepped up when so many others wouldn't.
As the wars come to a close, I'm reminded of Eisenhower's
words: ``Neither a wise nor a brave man lies down on the tracks
of history to wait for the train of the future to run over
him.'' Pretty wise. He had a lot of wise words way back then, I
think, and they're still true today.
Our soldiers have learned many lessons in Afghanistan. I
think we know that too many husbands, wives, brothers, sisters,
and daughters have been lost or severely injured, and we want
to make sure that they're not forgotten and the lessons that
we've learned should be learned and not repeated.
So I guess my question to both of you, whoever wants to
start out on this: What do you think we have learned from
Afghanistan and Iraq that we should heed in the future as this
dangerous world unfolds in front of us?
General Barclay. I'll start with this and then I'll let
General Phillips as he goes forward. You can probably
categorize the different areas where we have learned. Every
time we go into a conflict, whether it's small, large, or
medium, we always have lessons that we learn, and they fall out
in different areas, whether it's on the training venue, new
ways to do better adaptive training to meet the actual mission
set. As we know, first going into Iraq we thought we had one
type of mission going in and it quickly morphed into another
type of mission, so we had to change our training strategy. So
how we have become adaptive in looking at our training
capabilities, how we turn the training centers around and
develop them, where in the past they were revolving around the
old type of warfare, decisive action, we quickly changed them.
On the equipping side, I think we've learned several good
lessons. I think the Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicle is a great example of where--typically, where it takes
us anywhere from 9 to 12 to 14 years to field and get something
out, we saw we had a need, we had the requirement because of
the IEDs to protect these kids--as you mentioned, mine was one
of those that was in an up-armored HMMWV. We didn't have MRAPs
at that time. So that was something that we were able to turn
in a very rapid manner outside, around the normal processes,
and get that piece of equipment into the hands of soldiers and
protect them better. So I think that was really one of the
prime key success stories when you look at our acquisition
processes and being able to get around how that normally takes
us the time it takes us to put something into the hands of
soldiers.
Then again, I think as we look at soldier development and
individual leader development, it's hard to always categorize
that, but if you look at where our Army is now as a combat-
proven force and that piece of having that experience is
something that we have to ensure we continue to count on and
use as we move forward into the future, because that's
something that you cannot discount. You've heard the Secretary
and the Chief talk about the fact that we have a combat-
seasoned, hardened force that is ready and flexible and
adaptable to handle anything in the future.
General Phillips. I would add just a couple of things. At
the end of the day, our soldiers are just remarkable on the
field of battle. They're the most devastating weapon in terms
of engaging with the enemy and destroying them. Today it's
really one Army. I think one of the things we learned over the
last 12 years of war is it doesn't matter whether you're
Reserve, Active, National Guard. You can't go to Afghanistan,
and, sir, I know you've been over there, but you can't go to
Afghanistan and look at a soldier and tell what State they're
from or whether they're in the Active, Reserve, or National
Guard. It's one Army today, and they get the same training,
same equipment, that the Active Force does. That's important.
Jim just described really what I think is the big lesson
for us on the acquisition side, which is agility in how we
deliver programs, especially when it comes to soldier
protection and survivability. We've learned a lot from rapidly
equipping forces, from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization and others. We have a very deliberate,
formal acquisition process and I think we do rapid acquisition
very well. In some cases, somewhere in the middle is where we
maybe should be in terms of improving our processes and make
sure we can deliver capability quicker. That's one of the
lessons learned.
Also on the industrial base. I think at Lake City, the
ammunition plant that was back in 2000, 2001, making about 300
million rounds a year, and we didn't have enough ammunition to
go to war initially in Afghanistan. We reversed that and we did
it quickly. At one point Lake City was making 1.3 to 1.4
billion rounds.
So as we come out of this final phases of Afghanistan,
sustaining an initial industrial base capability and making
sure that's reversible is so critical.
I'll mention one other topic for me, sir, because I'm a
contracting officer by trade. I've been doing this in the Army
since 1985. We've learned a lot from contracting operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, a lot of hard lessons learned. We can't
lose our focus on the importance of contracting in any future
endeavor that we might get in, whether it's low on the spectrum
of combat operations, up to major combat operations, we have to
be ready.
Senator Manchin. I need to learn a lot more about the
contracting, but at face value it doesn't make economic sense,
when you look at the amount of money that we've spent on
contracting or private contractors versus what the soldiers
have done in the past and probably could do today. But I know
there's a rationale, and I'd love to learn more about that.
But I've looked at the graph and bar charts starting from
post-Korea to post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and now as we wind
down to a post-Iraq and Afghanistan. The numbers just don't add
up for me. But I'm happy to sit down with both of you and maybe
you can help me better understand.
What I will say is that the strategic guidance shifts away
from the large-scale nation-building operations. I never
thought our mission or goal was nation-building over in Iraq or
Afghanistan. It's going to regionally aligned forces,
conducting more regular, rational missions. If we're going to
get out of that nation-building mentality and go back to war on
terror and defend our country against terrorism, whatever it
may be, how are you positioning yourselves? Are we taking
assets out of the area that's not going to be needed for
nation-building and will be used here? Will it be scrapped?
Will it be lost?
A lot of people believe we just leave stuff; it has very
little value to it, so it's better to leave it behind or give
it to whoever in those nations than it is to bring it home.
Maybe you can bring me up to speed on that.
General Barclay. Sir, I'll start with this. As far as our
equipment retrograde coming out of theater, there's roughly
about $28 billion worth of equipment in Afghanistan. We see the
requirement as somewhere around $21 to $22 billion of that that
we need to bring home. That's important, that we retrograde. We
cannot just leave it there on the battlefield. It's important
to our units and ensuring that we can keep their EOH
percentages up.
Over the last 10 years we have done a great job, with the
support of Congress, in being able to raise our EOH and our
readiness levels of all of our components. If you look back,
when we started this war the EOH for the Active Force was in
the high 80s, the Guard was in the low 80s, the Reserves in the
70 percent. We are all now--the Active Force is sitting at
about 91 percent of EOH, the National Guard at about 88 to 89,
the Reserves about 86.
To get all of us above 90, we need to bring that equipment
home and reset that. That's very critical to our way ahead.
It also then ties into the uncertainty of the fiscal
environment, because if you don't bring it home then you're
going to have to replace it and you'll spend more dollars by
buying new and trying to figure out how you're going to equip
those forces and ensure that they can do the mission sets that
they're given. So that's very critical to us, that we get the
money to reset that equipment also when we bring it home from
theater.
Senator Manchin. Let me ask this question. I know we talked
about the contracting, and there are certain things that I
believe are best done by contractors, whether it's
manufacturing. I don't believe, from the retrofitting or
refurbishing--I've seen what the National Guard units can do in
my own State of West Virginia, the amount of money that can be
saved by them doing it, whether it's simple retrofitting the
tires or rebuilding HMMWVs or whatever it may be.
I don't know what direction you are going there. Is that
mostly a contract item? When you speak of contractors, are we
talking about contractors that are manufacturing, refurbishing,
or basically fighting?
General Phillips. None of our contractors are fighting that
we have under contract.
Senator Manchin. Or security.
General Phillips. Some of them are potentially doing
security.
Senator Manchin. Most of those, General, would mostly be
retired service people?
General Phillips. Some might be, sir. But it would be a
combination in terms of your private security contractors.
General Barclay. Sir, I will add, though, if you look now,
based on the fiscal uncertainty and sequestration and the CR,
the cuts, the Secretary of the Army has allowed those units now
that are back home to increase their borrowed military
manpower. We're restricted by how much we can use. DOD gives us
the levels. But we have some variances.
Senator Manchin. What do you mean by ``borrowed manpower''?
General Barclay. In other words, we use soldiers to do
those things that normally we would have contractors do on
bases, whether it's mowing the grass, pulling KP in the mess
hall, pulling security as gate guards now, picking that up,
where in the past it had been contractors. So we are putting
soldiers on some of those tasks that had been done by
contractors.
General Phillips. Sir, I would just add, the Army spent
$108 billion last year on contracts. A lot of that was money
from other Services as well and other agencies, not just pure
Army money. But a majority of that money goes to services
contracts. Under the Strategic Choices Management Review
process today, we are undergoing a significant review of how we
execute services contracts, not just in the Army but across all
DOD. Those results of those reviews will come forward as well,
sir.
Senator Manchin. We're being joined by Senator Blumenthal
and we appreciate having him here. I know everybody's kind of
cutting their times back and forth. We're just going through
the questioning period, Senator Blumenthal. So if you want to
go through yours, then let me know when you're prepared to ask
any of your questions, we'll get right to you.
Senator Blumenthal. I'm ready, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Manchin. You're ready to go. You came ready, didn't
you, sir?
At this time we'll have Senator Blumenthal ask his
questions.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you to both of our very
distinguished Army generals for being here today, and thank you
for your excellent service over many years to our country.
I would like to focus on the Improved Turbine Engine
Program (ITEP) that addresses the Blackhawk and Apache
helicopter requirements. I'm sure you're familiar with it, and
the next generation of future vertical lift helicopters. I
wonder if you could explain the value of the ITEP engine in
meeting our current and future operational requirements and
your plans to have the flyoff, which I understand will test the
prototypes?
General Barclay. Sir, I'll start that and General Phillips
may add in. The Army is committed to the ITEP engine. It's very
important. It's not only important to our future, but it's also
important to our current fleet of aircraft.
The goal of this engine program is, based on where we want
to go with it, a 25 percent reduction in fuel consumption. Then
we're also planning on a 65 percent improvement in overall
power capability once it gets on the platforms, and then a 20
percent improvement in design life, with 35 percent less
production and maintenance costs.
We're looking to put that in the current fleet of Apaches
and Blackhawks. We have roughly 3,600 rotary wing aircraft in
the Army and the Apaches and Blackhawks, they make up around
3,000. So if you're looking at replacing, that's about 75 to 80
percent of your rotary wing fleet that engine could go into.
So it's critical not only, as I said, currently, but then
again because of the future technology and the improvements in
those areas. We can tie that then to our future vertical lift
program, which we're looking at probably somewhere in the mid-
to late-30s, that program will come in, because the power gain
in this engine, plus the fuel savings and maintenance costs,
make it a viable candidate as it can continue to improve in
technology as it moves forward to be an engine possibly on that
platform.
So the ITEP engine is very important to us. Again, the
concern is in this fiscal uncertainty and the sequestration
stuff, all of our programs are taking cuts. Again, as we look
out to the future and trying to take those programs that are
into development in science and technology, we're weighing what
the cost-benefits are, and the importance of bringing them.
But, sir, I will tell you that both of us are Army aviators
and we can tell you that is something that we think the Army
needs to stay committed to in the future.
Senator Blumenthal. The benefits long- and even short-term
would more than justify the costs, as I understand what you're
saying.
General Barclay. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Even in a time when we're cutting
budgets, we ought to be mindful of those cost savings and the
cost-effectiveness of this program.
General Barclay. Yes, sir. That again, as you're looking to
the future, those future dollars you can save, it's worth
investing dollars today to get those savings in the out-years.
This is one of those programs, as I said, will not only start
providing you--for us, we're looking probably somewhere in the
mid-2020 timeframe to where we can start fielding, based on
where the schedule is now, but then also moving on out into the
late 2030s as we're looking at future types of aircraft.
So again, this is future savings, so the dollars we're
investing today we think are worth it.
General Phillips. Sir, I would just add that ITEP is
absolutely critical to Army aviation mid-term and long-term for
future vertical lift, as General Barclay just described. We're
moving forward with a Milestone A decision to formally begin
this program very quickly, probably in the next 90 days or so.
So we're committed to ITEP.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
With respect to the Blackhawk program, the 65, which I
understand is the number for 2014--am I correct about that
number, 65 Blackhawks?
General Barclay. Sir, I think you are. We're going to
procure 65 as part of the multi-year contract VIII, which is
the fiscal year 2012 through 2016 multi-year contract. So it's
65 now.
Senator Blumenthal. Does that number satisfy your needs and
requirements, General?
General Barclay. Sir, to be very honest with you, that's
the minimum number that we can do to keep the multi-year
program going. Again, these multi-year programs have brought
great savings, not only the Blackhawks, but the Chinooks, great
savings to our Army. So we're at the lower end to sustain that
multi-year contract.
Where we were going to complete some of the Mike model
fieldings, because of the fiscal constraints we are extending
all these programs, bringing them down to the lowest
procurement numbers. So you're going to see, I think now we're
forecasting, where we thought we would be done around 2024,
2025, we're looking now to 2026, 2027, before we will complete
that.
That also has an impact on the A to L conversions we're
doing for some Blackhawks. We're trying to convert the rest of
those. We're not going to buy all Mikes, so that A to L
conversion is going to also slow down. All this is moving into
the after the mid-20s to complete these.
Senator Blumenthal. As I understand your answer, and you
alluded to it earlier, going below 65 would entail significant
risk to the program?
General Phillips. Sir, I would add the way that we designed
the contract with Sikorsky, as General Barclay just mentioned,
has saved $1.2 billion by having a multi-year contract. So,
sir, thanks to you and this committee for allowing us to go
forward with a multi-year contract--great value for taxpayers
and helps us sustain that important industrial base.
But the Blackhawk program in particular, I would just add
is absolutely critical to the aviation modernization strategy.
But as we look at sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and out,
the pressure on the Blackhawk program, the Chinook program, and
every other program really is going to be significant as we
look at all those programs. As we bring forward the
reprogramming action that you'll see very soon, as the Army
looks at the $5 billion of transfer authority that we've been
given, underneath that many of the modernization programs that
we currently have will be listed in that reprogramming action.
That's to cover the $7.8 billion in OCO and OMO funding that
has to, in some way, cover those costs of the war in
Afghanistan. We have to get after that.
So we are very concerned in fiscal year 2014 and out about
the impacts of sequestration, not just on aviation, but other
platforms. But we will do everything possible to sustain the
multi-year contract with the Blackhawk and the Chinook program.
We would like that also for the Apache program as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I agree with you that these
modernization programs are absolutely vital to our defense and
national security needs. You can be assured of my support, my
continuing support at the very least, and I hope the committee,
the subcommittee's and the committee's as well.
Let me turn, if I may, to a different topic. I know you've
covered a lot of ground in this hearing already, so forgive me
if we're repeating some of it. But mobile electric power, which
has been very useful in Afghanistan, again very cost-effective,
a lot of this equipment in Afghanistan I believe may be coming
back, and I wonder if you could talk about the equipment coming
back and what you intend to refurbish or replace in terms of
mobile electric power. Either you, General Phillips, or General
Barclay.
General Phillips. Sir, I would just add that we have a
program manager that is working very closely with the forces in
Afghanistan. We've done some incredible work on operational
energy to put more efficient generators into Afghanistan,
generators that reduce the need for fuel, less maintenance,
less sustainment, et cetera, getting soldiers and convoys off
the road, incredible work that we've done on that end in
particular.
For particular generators that may or may not come back,
sir, I don't have any specifics on that. We'd have to get back
with you with some of those that we may or may not----
General Barclay. Sir, we can take that for the record and
get back to you on the generators. I answered a question
earlier on broad numbers. We know there's about $28 billion
worth of equipment in theater. About $21 to $22 billion we need
to retrograde back, and that's across the spectrum, to fill our
EOH numbers against the units' requirements.
But for specifics like the generator sets, we can get back
to you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army is currently replacing the family of Tactical Quiet
Generators (TQGs) with the Small Tactical Electric Power (STEP)
systems, the Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS), and the
Large Advanced Mobile Power Sources (LAMPS) which are significantly
enhanced by weight reduction (up to 10 percent), noise reduction (2
dBA) and improved fuel consumption (up to 21 percent).
The Army estimates it will return and reset 395 small, 173 medium,
and 29 large TQGs currently in theater. The Army is currently working
on a cost benefit analysis to determine if it is more economical to
bring back AMMPS from theater or procure new ones.
The Army will replace roughly 29,171 small, 37,049 medium, and 859
large TQGs with STEP, AMMPS and LAMPS respectively.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I'd appreciate that
additional information.
Finally, let me just return, or really continue, on the
equipment issue. I don't know whether the unmanned helicopters
that have been used for supply of our forward operating bases
in many instances are under your command, but I wonder if you
could talk about that program, if you have any knowledge of it.
General Barclay. Sir, that's not an Army program; that's a
Marine Corps program. All of our Unmanned Aircraft Systems are
unmanned. We do not have the resupply cargo one. That is a
Marine program that they're testing and working with what they
have in theater, trying to develop that.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you have plans for either
experimenting with that kind of program or----
General Barclay. Currently we do not, sir. That is not a
requirement that we have in the Army.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you very much to both of you again for your
information here today, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator.
Let me, just a couple clarifications, and then if you have
any closing statements or comments we'd love to hear from you.
The OCO, some people refer to that as ``loco money'', because
if you look at the accounting procedures of how that happens
it's kind of hard to really get a handle on.
But with that being said--and I don't mean that in a
disparaging way at all--but to use the $85 billion that was
required for the sequestering on defense and nondefense, to
come out of the OCO money. Did you follow that at all, and how
much damage would that have done if we start pulling money out
of OCO?
General Barclay. Sir, with sequestration, I can get the
numbers back to you, but there were some parts of that OCO that
was cut based on----
Senator Manchin. We know that, and I think there's a
requirement of $8.5 billion that you requested.
General Barclay. Well, we had $7.8 billion in shortfall the
Army has----
Senator Manchin. Right.
General Barclay.--against our OCO. That was part of that
$18 billion, and that $7.8 billion is the remaining left in OCO
and OMO costs that we're trying to cover. Part of that will be
the reprogramming action that's coming in, and that will cover
about $5 billion of our $7.8 billion shortfall.
Senator Manchin. If I'm hearing you accurately, you're
saying even with 2014, as we approach 2014 for the drawdown and
leaving Afghanistan, it's going to be quite expensive for us to
do it right.
General Barclay. Yes, sir. We know that the costs don't
become less as you're retrograding. Historically, we can show
coming out of Iraq that your costs go up in your last 12 to 14
months.
Senator Manchin. Do you have any accounting at all on how
many contractors that are still in Iraq and how many we still
have in Afghanistan? Do you have any idea?
General Phillips. Sir, I can get you the exact numbers.
Very few in Iraq. We look at those numbers periodically.
As of May 1, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) had
approximately 102,556 contractor personnel supporting the mission in
Afghanistan. As of May 8, 2013, DOD had approximately 11,748 contractor
personnel supporting the mission in Iraq.
The number of contractors in Afghanistan is reported by the U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan, Operational Contract Support Drawdown Cell, while
the source of the number of contractors in Iraq is the DOD Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker.
Senator Manchin. As far as Iraq goes, we don't have much of
a presence left in Iraq?
General Phillips. For contractors, it would be----
Senator Manchin. Or military?
General Barclay. No, sir. It's a very small number.
General Phillips. Afghanistan, sir, I believe it's a little
over 100,000 contractors that are over there today.
Senator Manchin. We have more contractors than we do men
and women in uniform, correct?
General Phillips. Yes, sir. It's about 1.3 or 1.4 to 1 in
terms of what contractors are doing, base support, life
support, mess hall operations.
Senator Manchin. I understand, and that's my problem, but
I'm just trying to get a handle on that.
But can you give me your evaluation on Iraq? Do you have
any thoughts on Iraq, where we are today with the country and
with what we've spent and what we've sacrificed there? Just a
fair evaluation from a military standpoint?
General Barclay. Sir, I'd like to take that for the record
and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Sir, what we need is a full contingent of Gray Eagles that would
outfit our 10 divisions with maybe some spare assets available as
necessary. But the reduction, I don't know, I have to research this.
Some of that reduction might be due to sequestration.
The Army had requested 19 aircraft and associated ground support
equipment in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request. The
Appropriations Act funded the 15 aircraft and associated ground support
equipment. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget requests 15 aircraft
and associated support equipment. With the late appropriation, the Army
did not have an opportunity to modify the President's budget 2014
request to adjust for the loss of four aircraft and associated ground
support equipment from the fiscal year 2013 Appropriation. During the
budget briefings to the professional staff members, the Army requested
committee support to permit the Army to purchase four additional
aircraft with fiscal year 2014 funding by shifting some other
requirements into fiscal year 2015. The House Armed Services Committee
has supported that request. These adjustments will allow us to complete
our purchase of 152 aircraft and associated ground support equipment
that supports the Chief of Staff of the Army's equipping strategy.
Senator Manchin. I don't want to put you on the spot. I
know it's very delicate.
General Barclay. Sir, if 2 years ago when I was working in
the G-3 operations side and watching the day-to-day operations,
I probably would have been more up to date on all this.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say for the general public--
and I'll just use my little State of West Virginia, a very
hawky State. We think that Iraq's not in any better shape today
than it was when we got there, and that we don't have any more
influence or control, or maybe not as much or even less than
what we had before, and Iran has a better foothold than we do.
I want to be accurate when I speak to my constituents from
a military standpoint if I could some time. So I'd be happy to
talk to you about that.
General Barclay. Sir, again, we'll take that for the
record. I'll get General Huggins, the G-3, and we'll come over
and set up with you.
Senator Manchin. Sure. If you can do that, I would
appreciate it, General.
General Barclay. We'll give you an update from our
perspective, and also the G-2, General Laguerre, who can give
you more of an insight from the intel picture.
Senator Manchin. This is one of the things; what did we
learn from our past experiences--Korea, Vietnam, Cold War? You
have to learn from every experience. This has been quite costly
in so many ways, human suffering and loss of life and also
money involved, invested by our country.
General Barclay. We'll take that on, sir.
Senator Manchin. Okay. The other thing--go ahead.
General Phillips. Could I just make one statement?
Senator Manchin. Sure thing.
General Phillips. Just to make clear, I mentioned the
Strategic Choices Management Review that's ongoing. The Army's
leading the Services contracts piece of that I mentioned
earlier. I wasn't clear, but the intent under Secretary Hagel's
leadership is to look deeply at how all of the Services are
using Services contracts and contractors and to come forward
with better strategies to be more efficient, more effective,
less costly, and only ensure that we're contracting for those
things that the Services truly need. So you'll see some changes
coming forward with that review.
Senator Manchin. I felt that and that's why I supported
Secretary Hagel as much as I did, for that reason.
If I could go back to the Apache transmission, that
Northstar of Canada, and I understand the financial problems.
It just doesn't make a lot of sense contractually from a
business standpoint of where we are in that whole procurement:
Boeing being responsible for a complete project, a complete
platform being delivered, General Phillips, and now we're
accepting it, I understand, we're accepting the delivery, and
then we're allowing them to come back and retrofit it with the
transmission.
How much of a risk factor is in that? Just on face value it
doesn't make like it's a good business arrangement.
General Phillips. Sir, I want to assure you and the
committee that this is a good business arrangement.
Senator Manchin. It is?
General Phillips. It's very good for the taxpayer, simply
from this perspective. If you look at the Apache industrial
base--and I was in the plant back in 1985 when it first started
in Mesa.
Senator Manchin. Right.
General Phillips. I've been out there periodically. I've
flown the aircraft. World's greatest attack helicopter. If you
look at the extensive industrial base that has supported that
from the very beginning, it's about 300 companies over 41
States. Even in the State of West Virginia there's companies
that support the Apache production.
Senator Manchin. Right.
General Phillips. About 20,000 people across the United
States and elsewhere in the world support the production of
that aircraft. If we were to stop production of the Apache
program, it would impact the production line and it would
impact many of those 300 companies and 20,000 workers, and then
you would start laying workers off, and that would cost the
taxpayers more.
The other piece I would emphasize is this doesn't cost the
government anything, to allow Boeing to have a rotatable pool
of transmissions to take the aircraft off the production line.
We do all the test flights. That reduces the timeline to accept
the aircraft. Then they may sit on the ramp for a period of
time, and then we actually put another transmission in the
aircraft and we take them away.
Also there is FMS, sir. It's important for our allies. 11
countries today fly the Apache program. Korea just signed for
another 36. It's important that we keep the production line
going.
We are working closely with Boeing and Northstar. I had the
president of Boeing Mesa or the vice president of Boeing Mesa--
--
Senator Manchin. Do you think contractually Boeing has full
responsibility and the U.S. taxpayer and DOD is held harmless,
with the contractual arrangement you have with Boeing?
General Phillips. Sir, it would cost us nothing, not one
penny.
Senator Manchin. I know that. But I'm saying the liability
factor.
General Phillips. Boeing is responsible for their sub-tier
contractor, which is Northstar, sir, as you mentioned, and
they're responsible for the management of that, and they've
taken on that responsibility. We've allowed them to have this
rotatable pool of----
Senator Manchin. You feel confident there's no liability?
They don't have any protections through their subcontracting
agreement that would hold them harmless?
General Phillips. Sir, Boeing is fully accountable today
under the contract to deliver a complete aircraft. What this
does is it essentially allows us to sustain that important
industrial base.
By the way, sir, I'd just add, the aircraft industrial base
as a whole is one of the strongest in the Nation in terms of
capability, and we want to sustain that strength.
Senator Manchin. The bottom line on the Lakota is we all
probably have strategically something being manufactured in our
State. But I think we've gotten to where the rubber hits the
road. We can't force you to do something that doesn't make
sense.
General Phillips. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. I can't be worried about if the taxpayer
support something that's not needed. I think we've gone beyond
that point, and now we have to get down to is it needed, is it
something strategic, is it an asset that has value? That's why
we have to look to you for expertise. So we're asking you
questions that might seem a little bit out of the ordinary or
redundant, but I don't have a problem, if my State's doing
something, that we can do it better and we can make it more
cost-effective for our country, we want to do that.
But I understand the Lakota is off-the-shelf. When I was
Governor, I flew in the Bells and did everything, so I
understand. You can probably go and buy this off the shelf for
the mission that you want it to be used for, correct?
General Barclay. For the permissive environment. That's why
we bought it off the shelf----
Senator Manchin. That's right.
General Barclay.--because it could do that mission.
Senator Manchin. So you don't feel compelled to keep that--
--
General Barclay. It can't perform the mission of the AAS.
The question is, you can't take a permissive aircraft, non-
combat aircraft, and put it into a combat environment.
Senator Manchin. Exactly.
General Barclay. So that's the challenge with that
airframe. But again, as I said, we have met the requirements
again that the National Guard and Reserve component needed, so
all those requirements across the States have been met. We made
that decision purposely that it would only impact the Active
component because we can cover that small, 31-aircraft number
with the Blackhawks as we redeploy.
Senator Manchin. I just think that you truly have a window
here to bring to us a common sense business plan that makes
sense and that we can defend and not perpetuate just because of
where we come from and who does what. I would urge you to do
that, because you're going to be held accountable for the money
and also for the sequestration or basically the whole financial
atmosphere that we're in right now, and it's going to be for
some time.
So with that being said, I have a lot of little questions
here, but we can talk about that when you come over. If I can
sit down and talk to you on the contracting and also on the
evaluation of Iraq and where we are and what it looks like it's
going to end up in Afghanistan, I would be very appreciative to
hear your comments. If you would come to my office, I would
appreciate that.
If you have any closing statements at all, we'd be happy
to, any comments for the record that you want to put in.
General Barclay. Sir, I just want to make one short
comment. We've talked about, and you have addressed it, but the
challenges of the future. We're dealing with 2013 issues now
and I know you're aware of what the Secretary and Chief talked
about, and all of those things that we pushed off and have not
been able to do in 2013 because of the cuts then rolled into
2014, which then will roll into 2015.
It's a cascading effect, and that's why it's critical as we
look ahead to allow us to have some of that flexibility so we
can start doing more than just year to year, because again it
pushes. We've already diverted reset from 2013 that we couldn't
afford because of sequestration, which now rolls into 2014. So
again, we've been telling everyone that it's 3 years after we
come home, but as we keep pushing that it could go again. So I
just want to reiterate that that's a----
Senator Manchin. I'm giving you my best evaluation and
observation: if the $1.2 trillion that is sequestered over 10
years is supposed to accomplish and achieve, we will end up
doing that. This is my observation. You can talk to other
people. I think it'll happen in some way, shape, or form.
If we know it's going to happen, then we should allow you
for that planning over a 10-year period with a budget request
and what you think it requires to run DOD to defend this
Nation, keep the strength of our Nation, and the defense of our
Nation as a high priority, to be able to do it in the most, I
think, the most common sense fashion. That's what I'm looking
for.
But I don't see anybody going back, because if we put a
grand bargain together, it'll still have cuts to defense.
General Barclay. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. If we don't put it together, we're forced
to buy what we weren't able to do on our own. Right now, with
the toxic atmosphere we have, coming to any type of agreement
makes it very difficult. The quicker we can acknowledge and let
you start your 10-year planning, long-term planning, and let's
work with you and start eliminating things, start consolidating
things, and start making sure that we have the assets and the
resources that are needed for our country, we'll be a much
better country.
So I hear you loud and clear, and we'll look forward to
meeting with you.
So, without any further comments--General Phillips?
General Phillips. Sir, I would just like to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and this committee for your extraordinary support for
our courageous men and women in uniform. Thank you.
Senator Manchin. I can't speak enough accolades from this
committee or the Senate as a whole and I think Congress as a
whole. It's just amazing what you continue to do and the
sacrifices that are made for this country and the people in
this country. I just want you to know it's not going unnoticed
and it's not going unappreciated, and it'll always be the first
and foremost thing we speak about.
My State of West Virginia is extremely proud to be part of
this, and the people that have served are extremely proud to be
a part of the greatest military might the world has ever seen,
and we want to make sure we stay that way, but we want to make
sure we also put you in a common sense position that we don't
make irrational decisions and we learn from our mistakes.
But thank you so much and God bless you all. Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
retrograde and modernization of vehicle restraints
1. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, as the
Army brings back all of this war materiel from Afghanistan and goes
through the process of retrograde and repairing that equipment, the
Service is looking closely at the lessons learned from the current
conflict. As an example, the prevalence of improvised explosive devices
has produced changes in vehicle armor and fire suppression. It could
produce further changes in the way vehicle restraints are designed. I
urge the Army to use the retrograde opportunity to ensure that vehicle
restraint systems are modernized to reduce the injuries encountered in
future conflicts. Can you share your thoughts on the current state of
vehicle restraints and will they need modernization?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The Army is committed to
maximizing soldier safety in our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet.
Based on lessons learned during the conflict, the Army has already
incorporated or may incorporate the following vehicle restraints into
its TWV fleet based on available resources:
1. Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP): The MRAP program has
upgraded the seating and restraints in a majority of the variants that
were originally fielded. The current seating/restraint configuration
represents the latest and most advanced seating and restraints
available and were incorporated as part of the MRAP All-Terrain
Vehicle's (MATV) Underbody Improvement Kit upgrade and the MaxxPro
Dash's MaxxPro Survivability Upgrade. All Army MRAP enduring
requirement platforms (with the exception of the MaxxPro Long Wheeled
Base (LWB) Ambulance) will be equipped with this seating/restraint
system. These specific seats are not dimensionally configurable to the
ambulance mission and therefore efforts are currently underway to
identify the best performing seating/restraint system for the MaxxPro
Ambulance. This `best solution' will be integrated into the MaxxPro LWB
Ambulance during reset activities.
2. Route Clearance Vehicles: All Panther vehicles will have highly
capable Gunner Restraint Systems installed. All joint explosive
ordnance rapid response vehicles were upgraded from a push to release
automotive four point harness to a rotary/cam release four point
harness, and also added gunner restraints and blast attenuating seats
with 5-point cam release inertial locking seat belts. RG-31 vehicles
already have 5-point seat restraints and blast attenuating rear crew
seats. During RG-31 recapitalization, the Gunner Restraint System will
have the restraint pass-through hole on the gunner stand modified to
allow for better restraint travel, and the existing Objective Gunner
Protection Kit (OGPK) bearing will be replaced by the slew bearing in
order to better restrain the OGPK. The Husky Seat Upgrade kit installed
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) incorporates a 5-point harness to
increase soldier comfort and safety. The Army is considering including
this seat upgrade for the Husky Program of Record fleet.
3. Heavy Tactical Vehicles (HTV): The Army began installing and
fielding underbody armor kits (C-kits) for the Heavy Expanded Mobility
Tactical Truck and Heavy Equipment Transport vehicles in OEF starting
in August 2011 in response to urgent warfighter requirements for
increased underbody blast protection. C-Kits for Line Haul Tractors and
Palletized Load System are in development. C-kits include blast
attenuating seats that utilize 5-point restraint systems integrated
into the seat structure. Restraint systems integrated into the seat
structure have been proven to increase survivability in underbody blast
events vice a traditional 3-point restraint system anchored to the cab
B-pillar. Future armor solutions for HTVs that include blast
attenuating seats will utilize seat restraints that are integrated into
the seat structure. Additionally, blast attenuating floor mats were
also incorporated into each C-kit to complement the seat and restraints
and to reduce the chance of injury to the occupant's legs.
4. Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV): The restraints used
in FMTV production meet all FMTV live fire testing requirements and are
compatible with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and U.S.
Department of Transportation requirements. No modernization of
restraint systems is projected in remaining production of the FMTV
(approximately 3,000 trucks). However, based on user feedback, the
Product Office developed a restraint system to improve soldier comfort.
Drawings have been produced for this configuration and are in the
Technical Data Package for future recapitalization efforts, should
additional funding become available.
5. Light Tactical Vehicles: Regarding crew restraints, as part of
the Modernized Extended Capacity Vehicle-Automotive and Modernized
Extended Capacity Vehicle-Survivability efforts, the product office is
considering airbag integration to restraints as well as other parts of
the vehicle to mitigate the likelihood of injuries sustained during
blast and rollover events. The High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle currently has a three-point restraint system for the occupants,
excluding the gunner position. Improved seats with energy absorbing
features as well as five-point restraints are being evaluated to assess
improved occupant protection capabilities that are available for
vehicle integration onto existing platforms. Regarding gunner
restraints, the vehicles are currently equipped with the Gunner
Restraint System but the product office is considering upgrading
vehicles with the Improved Gunner Restraint System to be common with
the MRAP family of vehicles.
6. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle: The program office is evaluating
advanced blast attenuating seats with energy absorbing features as well
as five-point restraints to assess improved occupant protection
capabilities. Each of the three Engineering and Manufacturing
Development vendors must select these components and integrate them
into their vehicles to meet soldier protection requirements and remain
within overall affordability goals for the vehicle. The program intends
to periodically evaluate upgrades to these key safety components during
production and sustainment.
joint tactical radio system
2. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, despite
the Army certifying in November that they would move to competition
during full-rate production of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS),
a third low-rate initial production (LRIP) buy of 3,100 radios is
scheduled for delivery in January 2014. This LRIP would be from General
Dynamics and not open to competition. A 2013 Government Accountability
Office report states that, ``The Manpack radio has not yet demonstrated
an Army-defined reliability requirement enabling it to have an 86
percent chance if completing a 72-hour mission without an essential
function failure. Department of Defense (DOD) test officials reported
that the radio was not operationally effective or suitable based on the
recent testing that concluded in May 2012. In October 2012, DOD testers
reported that the Manpack radios only demonstrated a 64 percent chance
of meeting reliability requirements under benign conditions.'' In light
of the performance issues associated with the Manpack radio, it would
seem that competition on production would be beneficial and enhance
quality. Can you speak to your commitment to compete the JTRS?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The Army remains committed to
conducting a full and open competition for the Handheld, Manpack, and
Small Form Fit (HMS) radio. The competition will be open to current and
new industry partners in compliance with the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA). The Army has already initiated the
solicitation process by releasing a draft Production Requirements
Document and Request for Information (RFI) to industry.
Industry feedback was that the interested new industry partners
could not be ready to submit production-representative prototypes for
government qualification testing prior to January 2014. In order to
prevent a break in the current program production, the Army is planning
to increase the total LRIP from the currently qualified industry
partners to 10 percent of the planned acquisition objective while the
new industry partners prepare for the required qualification testing.
According to industry feedback to the RFI, conducting the
qualification testing prior to January 2014 would likely result in only
the two currently qualified producers responding to the solicitation.
3. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, if the
performance of the Manpack radio is lacking, why would you continue
procurement in a non-competitive manner with an additional LRIP?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The PRC-155 is currently the
only National Security Agency certified two-channel manportable radio
capable of operating the required waveforms. Performance and
reliability of the PRC-155 have improved since the 2012 Defense
Operational Test and Evaluation operational assessment, as verified by
government testing conducted by the Electronics Proving Ground (EPG)
Distributed Test Team. The Army has requested additional procurement,
under LRIP of the PRC-155 radio until our industry partners can be
ready for a full-and-open competition.
4. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, the Army
has been struggling with developing the JTRS radio variants for many
years. What was the catalyst for the change in strategy to move to
commercially available alternatives to address the JTRS requirements?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The 2012 NDAA mandated a
change in acquisition strategy for the HMS program. The 2012 NDAA
directed the Army to conduct a full-and-open competition for HMS radios
in full rate production. The previous HMS acquisition strategy planned
to compete full rate production orders among the current two qualified
program of record vendors.
The Army acknowledges that industry has made significant
technological improvements in software defined radios over the past
several years due in large part to the efforts to fill operational gaps
in Afghanistan and Iraq. An assessment of the radio market identified
potential vendors other than the program of record vendors that are
able to compete with their hardware operating government-owned
waveforms.
manpack radios
5. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, DOD test
officials reported that the Manpack radio was not operationally
effective or suitable. In previous testing, the Manpack demonstrated
poor reliability, achieving only 162 hours of mean time between
essential function failures versus a requirement of 477 hours. Despite
reliability deficiencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
authorized additional LRIP quantities of Manpack radios. What is the
Army doing to address the shortcoming in reliability, operational
effectiveness, and suitability?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The contract to procure the
PRC-155 Manpack Radios is a firm, fixed price contract which requires
the contractor to correct the deficiencies noted in the 2012 Department
of Operational Test and Evaluation operational assessment as well as
those documented during structured government testing conducted at the
EPG. The contractor must correct all these deficiencies at no expense
to the government. The corrected deficiencies are being verified by a
series of government tests conducted at EPG, and ultimately will be
verified by an operational Verification of Corrected Deficiencies to be
conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command in Fiscal Year 2014.
6. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, what
strategies are in place to help ensure that the Army manages the
inherent risk in procuring additional radios that have not met
reliability thresholds?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The contract to procure the
PRC-155 Manpack Radios is a firm, fixed price contract which requires
the contractor to correct the deficiencies noted in the 2012 Department
of Operational Test and Evaluation operational assessment as well as
those documented during structured government testing conducted at the
EPG. The contractor must correct all these deficiencies at no expense
to the government. The corrected deficiencies are being verified by a
series of government tests conducted at EPG, and ultimately will be
verified by an operational Verification of Corrected Deficiencies to be
conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command in Fiscal Year 2014.
The contractor is required to retrofit any required modifications to
all LRIP PRC-155 radios at no expense to the government.
rifleman radios
7. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, the Army
is in a similar situation with Rifleman radios in buying additional
radios that have not come close to meeting reliability requirements. A
July 2012 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) authorized competitive
full-rate production of the Rifleman radio and approved additional LRIP
quantities. What is the Army doing to ensure that radios procured in
response to the July 2012 ADM are more reliable than earlier radios?
General Phillips and General Barclay. Since July 2012 and during
LRIP, General Dynamics and Thales have continued to develop the
Rifleman radio and have upgraded radio software four times. Additional
testing since July 2012 has stressed upgraded radio reliability and
functionality. The Army will not be able to independently attest to the
reliability of systems of new industry partners prior to the full and
open competition. During the full and open competition for production
of the Rifleman radio, all competitors will undergo Qualification
Testing for requirements such as call/message completion, range,
battery life, weight and Soldier Radio Waveform backwards compatibility
prior to contract award. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation to
measure reliability will be conducted after contract award and prior to
a full rate production decision.
8. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, one of the
Rifleman radio's key performance parameters is Position Location
Information (PLI), the ability to automatically transmit a soldier's
position location to team and squad leaders. The soldier's PLI is
calculated using a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver embedded in
the Rifleman radio. To address concerns about the spoofing of
commercially-based GPS receivers providing misleading information, DOD
policy generally requires all user equipment acquired after October 1,
2006, to employ the military's Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing
Module (SAASM). However, due to cost and power constraints of SAASM,
the first increments of the Rifleman radio were granted a waiver to
employ commercial GPS. What is the status of this waiver?
General Phillips and General Barclay. A February 23, 2012,
memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics
and Technology) from the DOD Chief Information Officer approved the
Army's request to use commercial GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS)
receivers in Rifleman radios. The waiver is valid through fiscal year
2016 for a quantity of 70,000 radios. The Army's waiver request is
supported by a risk mitigation strategy. The Army is authorized to use
the Rifleman radios GPS SPS capability as long as the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff G-3/5/7 is willing to accept the residual risks associated
with SPS use.
9. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, how many
Rifleman radios will be procured under this waiver?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The Army plans to procure
approximately 41,827 radios through fiscal year 2016 under this waiver
and may procure up to 70,000 Rifleman radios.
LRIP 1 authorized the procurement of 6,250 Rifleman radios. The
LRIP 2 authorized the procurement of 13,077 Rifleman radios for a total
of 19,327 radios. The Rifleman radio procurement contract will be an
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract that will provide the
potential for the Joint Services to procure up to 150,000 Rifleman
radios over 5 years. The Army plans to procure approximately 7,500
radios per year (22,500 during the waiver period through fiscal year
2016 for a total of 41,827 radios (19,327 LRIP radios, 22,500
production radios). In accordance with the Waiver to Procure GPS SPS
Receivers for Rifleman radio dated February 23, 2012, the entire waived
quantity of 70,000 radios will be available and may be procured by the
Army pending the availability of funding.
10. Senator Nelson. General Phillips and General Barclay, what are
the Army's current plans to develop and incorporate a SAASM-based
solution into future increments of the Rifleman radio?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The Army is required to use
GPS Precise Positioning Service (PPS) signals to meet the PLI Key
Performance Parameter in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
approved Rifleman Radio Capability Production Document. The Army
requested the GPS waiver for the Rifleman radio since there is not an
affordable SAASM-based solution into that can be embedded in the
Rifleman radio. The Army views use of GPS SPS as an interim solution to
meet the operational requirement until an affordable and operationally
effective PPS capability is available. The Army is not funding the
development of improved PPS technology through the Program of Record.
The program manager is continuously assessing the state of PPS
technology size, weight, power, and cost and all radios must
demonstrate the ability to incorporate a PPS capability into their
design in order to qualify for participation in the full and open
Rifleman radio contract award. The program manager will determine,
based on the state of the technology and the Army's position on
operational risk acceptance, whether to incorporate this capability in
future procurements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
modernization of army reserve and national guard
11. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, a widely recognized outcome
of a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan is the increased reliance of
all Active components of the Armed Forces on their Reserve component
counterparts. The Reserve components have always been part of the
operational force. They are organized and equipped to provide personnel
and units available for deployment in support of operations around the
world. However, there is talk now of the Reserve component as an
operational reserve rather than a strategic reserve. Operational
reserve is not a doctrinally defined or agreed upon military term, but
it implies a reserve capability relevant to the support of a theater
commander's conduct of missions and on timelines at the operational
level of war. A further implication, again nowhere defined in doctrine
or in policy, is that the Reserve component, as an operational reserve,
may be needed at a higher than perhaps traditional level of readiness
prior to mobilization. What in the Army's view does it mean for the
Reserve component to be an operational reserve?
General Barclay. ``Operational reserve'' is a shorthand term used
to describe the imperatives outlined in the DOD Directive entitled
``Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force'' and further
codified in the Army Total Force Policy. The Army interprets these
directives as an imperative not to lose the gains made in Reserve
component readiness, equipment, and experience by continuing to employ
Reserve component forces to meet combatant commander operational
requirements in a fashion that is predictable and sustainable, within
the resources afforded to us. Prudent use of those resources allows the
Army to minimize challenges to interoperability between the Reserve and
Active component during future crises, while providing valuable
leadership development and experience to members of the Reserve
component. This improves their overall capability and increases the
deterrence value of the Total Army.
12. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, what considerations do you
take into account in determining the pace and scope of modernization
and equipping the Army's Reserve components?
General Barclay. The Army's equipping guidance complies with DOD
Directive 1200.17, which states the ``Reserve components will be
equipped to provide the operational capabilities and strategic depth
required of an operational force.'' This means they will be
``consistently and predictably equipped'' and that the ``priority for
the distribution of new and combat-serviceable equipment, with
associated support and test equipment, shall be given to units
scheduled for mission deployment or employment first, regardless of
component.'' The pace and scope of equipment modernization for the Army
is defined by the Army Equipment Modernization Strategy (AEMS) and
equipment programming priorities are addressed by the Army as a whole
which factor in overall equipment age, interoperability, and deployment
needs.
Other considerations regarding the Reserve components include
ensuring equipment loaned to other components is replaced, and
sufficient equipment for domestic missions is on hand. Ensuring
equipment loaned from the Reserve components to the Active component
results in the development of a replacement plan and a memorandum of
agreement signed by both the losing and gaining components, as directed
by DOD Instruction 1225.06 ``Equipping the Reserve Component''. For
domestic missions, the Army develops equipment fielding plans that
provide the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)
with equipment that has been deemed critical to the execution of
Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities missions.
The Army's goal is to equip these units to no less than 80 percent of
their Critical Dual-Use (CDU) requirement.
Army leadership recognizes that the Reserve components play a
critical role in meeting Army force requirements and that the Reserve
components are an essential part of the Total Force. The Army ensures
that Reserve component equipping requirements are addressed in all
equipment distribution and modernization plans.
13. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, how would you characterize
the last 10 years of modernization efforts for the Army's Reserve
components?
General Barclay. The Reserve Forces have been critical to the
success of the Army over the past 10 years. The decision to make the
Reserves an operational vice strategic force has resulted in near
parity for equipment on hand (EOH) and comparable improvements in
modernization. The EOH levels for individual components as of December
2012 are: the Active component (AC) at 91 percent, ARNG at 89 percent,
and the USAR at 86 percent. The modernization levels for the individual
components as of December 2012 are as follows: AC at 72 percent, ARNG
at 71 percent, and the USAR at 65 percent. Shortages of modernized
equipment still exist and the Army, as a whole, works together to
improve modernization levels across the force, regardless of component.
To mitigate shortages, the Army moves equipment and uses Theater
Provided Equipment/Army Preposition Stocks to provide each deploying
soldier or unit, regardless of component, the most modern equipment.
14. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, how would you describe the
Army's process for requirements determination, prioritization,
programming, and execution of the Reserve component's modernization
strategy?
General Barclay. The Army uses established processes found in
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's Instruction 3170.01H (10 January
2012): Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to
determine the required capabilities for both the Active and the Reserve
components.
Equipment programming priorities are addressed by the Army as a
whole, not by component. The Army's highest programming priorities are
focused on improving soldier capabilities, enabling the network to
conduct mission command, and remaining prepared for decisive action.
These high priority requirements apply to both the Active and Reserve
components. A special emphasis is placed on resourcing systems for the
Reserve components that have a CDU mission for defense support to civil
authorities, such as trucks and communications equipment
Developing materiel capabilities is accomplished in accordance with
DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.
The procedures used are the same for all components.
Execution involves the actual distribution and redistribution of
equipment, based on Army priorities, and is achieved through a
collaborative process with all stakeholders--Active and Reserve. The
overall process has undergone a significant improvement in transparency
for all stakeholders. The Army tracks procurements and deliveries to
components and reports progress annually to Congress using the
Equipment Transparency Report.
15. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, what are the current agreed-
upon modernization strategy and priorities for the USAR and ARNG and
are these priorities documented? If so, where?
General Barclay. The Army organizes, mans, trains, and equips the
Active and Reserve components as an integrated operational force to
provide predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities. The Army
Equipment Modernization Plan and the AEMS provide the agreed-upon
strategy and priorities for the Total Force, which encompasses the AC,
the USAR, and the ARNG. The Army's equipping strategy ensures that the
procurement and equipping processes enable the total force to perform
its missions regardless of component. This strategy focuses our efforts
on supporting soldiers and small unit formations while maintaining our
advantages to deter and defeat potential adversaries. The key to this
strategy is procuring equipment that is versatile and tailorable, yet
cost-effective and affordable. The Army Equipment Modernization Plan
2014 summarizes the Army Research, Development, and Acquisition for 10
capability portfolio areas and the Science and Technology portion of
the fiscal year 2014 President's budget request. The plan reflects the
Army's modernization priorities: the soldier and squad, the network and
enhanced mobility, protection, and lethality.
16. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, in your view, what risks do
the Budget Control Act and sequestration pose to achieving this
strategy?
General Barclay. Sequestration is dramatically affecting Army
modernization programs. The resources provided to the Army to conduct
ongoing operations while modernizing and posturing for the next
generation of warfighter capabilities will determine our continued
ability to accomplish our mission and meet future commitments.
While the Army today is better modernized and equipped than at any
time in recent memory, ``fiscal realities endanger the progress we have
made in equipping.''
The fiscal reductions caused by sequestration are occurring much
sooner and at a much steeper rate than anticipated. As a result, all
acquisition priorities and many equipment modernization programs may
face unanticipated schedule or cost impacts in the out-years, including
the modernization of the USAR and ARNG.
Budget Control Act funding reductions will require cancelling or
reducing depot-level equipment maintenance, including the reset of
materiel returning from deployment.
The fiscal realities of sequestration have caused the Army to make
tough choices in almost 100 of our acquisition programs. Among the
changes in the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request is the
restructure of over 35 programs, the delay of 50 programs, and the
removal of funding from nearly 10 others. The Army re-examined the
affordability of some programs and is assessing options for less-costly
alternatives to others.
17. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, what are the risks to your
highest priority Reserve component modernization programs?
General Barclay. A lack of adequate funding needed to procure
modernized equipment and to maintain the industrial base is the primary
risk the Army faces in an era of constrained resources; specifically,
the Army needs additional funding to accomplish its highest
modernization priorities.
The priorities for the total Army force are to enhance soldiers for
broad Joint mission sets. The Army will accomplish this by providing
advanced technologies that help protect and unburden the soldier,
enabling the network for Mission Command by using commercial
technologies to build a safe and reliable network, the Army will
facilitate the decisionmaking abilities of leaders and soldiers.
Remaining prepared for decisive action, the Army will support the Joint
warfighter by addressing capability gaps in vehicle fleet lethality and
mobility while optimizing survivability and sustainability
In addition to these overarching modernization priorities, the Army
also recognizes the need to support the Reserve component's domestic
requirements and does this by resourcing CDU capabilities that also
support the title 10 mission.
As the Army moves forward in retrograding deployed forces and
equipment, we will need resources to restore equipment used in combat
operations to an acceptable level of readiness through reset
operations, which is a combination of repair, replacement,
recapitalization, and the resources allocated for second destination
transportation costs.
balancing people, readiness, and modernization
18. Senator Manchin. General Phillips and General Barclay, defense
leaders have said that the costs of military pay and benefits are
crowding out funds necessary for readiness and modernization of the
force. The Chief of Staff of the Army talks about balancing resources
for people, readiness, and modernization. Without a clear understanding
of the risks and tradeoffs associated with each, a balanced approach
may seem imprecise, somewhat indecisive, and perhaps risks allowing a
hollow force to emerge. The Army must manage risk and make tradeoffs to
field a trained and ready force regardless of its size or funds
available to buy new systems or develop next generation technologies.
How is the Army identifying and managing the distribution of risk
between personnel, training, and modernization?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The size and the steepness of
cuts required by sequestration make it impossible to downsize the force
in a deliberate, logical manner that allows the Army to sustain an
appropriate balance of readiness, modernization, and end strength.
Therefore, in the near term, the full weight of the sequester will
primarily fall on the modernization and readiness accounts, where such
drastic cuts will take years to overcome.
If we backload the budget reductions into the later years of the
sequester period, that would better allow the Army an opportunity to
properly plan and to sustain the balance we need in these uncertain
times.
19. Senator Manchin. General Phillips and General Barclay, have you
done any analysis to determine the red flags that signal that the Army
is becoming hollow?
General Phillips and General Barclay. Yes. The Army has an enduring
requirements analysis process for Army units to report their readiness,
per Army Regulation 220-1, on a monthly basis using the Unit Status
Report (USR). The USRs are reviewed at each higher level of command and
are briefed to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on a monthly basis
in the Strategic Readiness Update (SRU) process and the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process.
The SRU reports are the Army's authoritative source on unit
readiness and will flag readiness deficiencies in multiple areas--
reduced resources for manpower, training, EOH, equipment readiness, and
modernization efforts--that would lead to a hollow force.
20. Senator Manchin. General Phillips and General Barclay, can you
explain what those indications are and how you will know in time to
take the action necessary to avoid the consequences of hollowness?
General Phillips and General Barclay. An indicator of hollowness is
a force that lacks the right balance between end strength,
modernization, equipment readiness, and unit training. The Army is
seeing these indicators now. Our ability to train our soldiers and
sustain our equipment is becoming limited. This constrains the Army's
ability to ensure that it is able to deploy effectively and meet future
requirements, while exposing our soldiers to unnecessary risk as they
execute their mission.
A loss of the balance between end strength, modernization,
equipment readiness, and unit training eliminates our ability to
sustain `appropriate' levels of readiness in support of our current
defense strategy. If we continue along the current path of fiscal
uncertainty we will be unable to avoid the consequences of a hollow
army.
21. Senator Manchin. General Phillips and General Barclay, when you
program for equipment for the Army, do you plan to buy 100 percent of
the requirement? If not, why not?
General Phillips and General Barclay. Given the current fiscal
environment, projected drawdown of forces, and the rate of
technological change, buying 100 percent of our equipment requirements
is not always the best course of action. For example, technology may
change before production lines can produce enough equipment to fill the
entire Army requirement. Another example may be the case of a major
acquisition program where the Army can't afford to buy 100 percent of
the requirement within a narrow band of time. In both cases the Army
may use an incremental acquisition approach where it buys smaller
quantities more often to take advantage of technology opportunities.
Instead of procuring 100 percent of the requirement, the Army has
developed an equipping strategy that establishes goals and metrics for
achieving an affordable balance between requirements and resources. The
strategy is based on two lines of operation: equip units for their
missions, and increase readiness by redistributing equipment.
Equipping units for their missions provides increasing levels of
equipment as units move through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
cycle and prepare for deployment.
Increasing readiness by redistributing equipment requires careful
management of equipment inventories to include ``friction'' equipment,
such as filling equipment sets, equipment in reset, and equipment in
transit over strategic distances.
22. Senator Manchin. General Phillips and General Barclay, how does
this not negatively impact readiness?
General Phillips and General Barclay. Due to the declining fiscal
resources, we can't afford to procure equipment for every unit, forcing
prioritization of equipment allocations. Instead, we will mitigate
readiness impacts through various management techniques.
First, the Army moves equipment and uses Theater Provided Equipment
and Army Proposition Stocks to provide each deploying soldier or unit,
regardless of component, the most modern equipment available.
Second, we currently have a very high level of EOH at the aggregate
level across all components. While the Army is just under 90 percent of
its' required EOH, at the individual unit level we either have too much
or not enough. Part of the reason for misaligned equipment is that we
have equipment sets in Afghanistan, equipment in transit, and equipment
in depot maintenance being recapitalized or reset. Additionally,
because of the pace of combat operations and units deploying with
mission-tailored equipment packages, we have many units with equipment
excess to their authorizations that must be redistributed.
Third, the Army has established goals, metrics, and priorities for
achieving an affordable balance of equipment distribution using an
ARFORGEN based resourcing model. ARFORGEN provides for a minimum
quantity of equipment to support home station training and an
increasing level of equipment as a unit prepares to, and eventually
deploys.
23. Senator Manchin. General Phillips and General Barclay, do you
need to reduce the size of the Army below 490,000 in order to properly
equip it?
General Phillips and General Barclay. The Army does not have to
reduce the AC below 490,000 to properly equip it. The Army currently
has the highest levels of EOH and is the most modernized it has ever
been. Equipment will not drive force reductions; budget reductions in
the Budget Control Act and the full implementation of sequestration
through fiscal year 2021 will drive force reductions over time, as
previously stated in testimony. In the near term, the full weight of
sequestration will fall on the modernization and readiness accounts.
Once implemented, these drastic cuts will take years to overcome.
m1 abrams and m2 bradley production gaps
24. Senator Manchin. General Phillips, please explain the logic
behind the Army's plans for 3- to 4-year production gaps for M1 Abrams
tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles?
General Phillips. The Abrams tank remains the best tank in the
world as a result of significant improvements over the past 2 decades
while reducing the number of tank variants in the fleet from six to
two. The Army is currently funded to produce enough M1A2 System
Enhancement Package (SEP) v2 tanks to fully meet its current force
structure requirements, with production ending in December 2014. At
this point, the Abrams tank fleet will only be 3- to 4-years-old on
average. The Army's Two-Variant Fleet Strategy for Abrams tanks
(M1A2SEP v2 and M1A1 Situational Awareness [SA]) is fully
interoperable. The Abrams tank fleet strategy has been carefully
synchronized with the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) force
structure strategy and will be fully implemented in fiscal year 2015.
Pending future force structure decisions, the notion of pure-fleeting
the ARNG with the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 tank would not only cost
approximately $2 billion in a fiscally constrained environment, but
would also result in placing several hundred recently modernized M1A1
SA tanks into long-term storage.
The current slow-down in U.S. Army Abrams tank production will
likely continue until the next major recapitalization of the Abrams
tank in 2019. The Army is continually assessing mitigation alternatives
to provide a sustaining workload at the Joint Systems Manufacturing
Center (JSMC) in Lima, OH, for the foreseeable future, and this
includes Foreign Military Sales (FMS). We also recognize that FMS
inherently fluctuates and is influenced by the overall global economic
environment. However, currently there is every indication that both
``Firm'' and ``High Potential'' Abrams tank FMS production will
maintain a minimal level of sustaining work flow through fiscal year
2016.
In the near term, the Army is aggressively identifying mitigation
measures that may be needed to preserve critical manufacturing skills
and the supplier base. Specifically, we have extended our fiscal year
2012 production of 67 M1A2SEP v2 tanks for 2 years through December
2014. With the fiscal year 2013 congressional add of $181 million, the
Army is considering a range of options that could further extend
production of the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 tank for approximately 12-18 months
or help provide significant work for critical and fragile Tier II and
III suppliers. We anticipate reporting our specific mitigation approach
by the end of June 2013.
Bradley Fighting Vehicle:
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle has performed well in the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The high priority placed on the Ground Combat Vehicle
(GCV), which is slated to replace the Infantry Fighting Vehicle variant
of the Bradley family of vehicles, is a testament to the importance of
the armored-troop-carrying and direct engagement fighting vehicle with
its multiple functional configurations. From Operation Desert Storm to
the present, as the threat has adapted, the Army has upgraded the
Bradley with improved lethality, armor, fire controls, communications,
and situational awareness. With the fiscal year 2013 congressional add
of $140 million, the Army is considering a range of options that could
extend production of the M2A3 Operation Iraqi Freedom variant via
conversion from M3A3s for approximately 2 years and help provide
significant work for critical and fragile suppliers.
Army Industrial Base Study:
The Army is conducting a comprehensive study and analysis into the
current state of manufacturing within the overall combat vehicle
industrial base network. The analysis and planning for the future use
of JSMC is being accomplished within the context of this complex
network. We anticipate providing our preliminary findings in a separate
report primarily focused on the Supplier Base and Critical
Manufacturing Skills portion of the industrial base study by the end of
June 2013, with the final report forthcoming in December 2013.
25. Senator Manchin. General Phillips, what courses of action are
you studying to adequately deal with the potential loss of industrial
capability or capacity associated with these production gaps?
General Phillips. For Abrams and Bradley, the Army supports
maintaining an industrial base (IB) and remains especially attuned to
any impacts on critical suppliers and needed expertise as the Army
faces reduced budgets.
The Army is working to establish ways to measure the ability of its
IB to sustain essential capabilities. The Army will ensure that
industrial base reversibility cost and risk are carefully managed by:
(1) continuing ongoing efforts to determine the health of IB sectors
critical to support programs; (2) identifying and assessing current
status of organic and commercial critical manufacturing and maintenance
capabilities required to meet future contingency investment and
regeneration requirements; and (3) identifying supply chain issues in
design, manufacturing and sustainment that can present risk to critical
capabilities. Some of the mechanisms in place are:
1. The Industrial Base Baseline Assessments (IBBA), which aim to
assess the health of selected IB areas critical to the Army. IBBAs
include sector and subsector assessment of programs identified as
critical by Program Executive Offices (PEO) and Life Cycle Management
Commands, and determine the impact of reductions in funding to program
requirements.
2. The Sector-by-Sector/Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) IB analysis, which
establishes early warning indicators of risk, particularly at lower
tiers, to strengthen the supply chain and to mitigate potential points
of failure. The S2T2 analysis uses fragility and criticality criteria
to identify and assess vulnerable firms in the commercial IB supply
chain and to develop courses of action to mitigate risk.
In the near term, the Army is aggressively identifying mitigation
measures that may be needed to preserve critical manufacturing skills
and the supplier base. Specifically for the Abrams tank, we have
extended our fiscal year 2012 production of 67 M1A2SEP v2 tanks for 2
years through December 2014. With the fiscal year 2013 congressional
add of $181 million to the Abrams tank, the Army is considering a range
of options that could further extend production of the Abrams M1A2SEP
v2 tank for approximately 12-18 months or help provide significant work
for critical and fragile Tier II and III suppliers. With the fiscal
year 2013 congressional add of $140 million, the Army is considering a
range of options that could extend production of the M2A3 Operation
Iraqi Freedom variant via conversion from M3A3s for approximately 2
years and help provide significant work for critical and fragile
suppliers. We anticipate reporting our specific mitigation approaches
to Abrams and Bradley by the end of June 2013. The Army is conducting a
comprehensive study and analysis into the current state of
manufacturing within the overall combat vehicle industrial base
network. The analysis and planning for the future use of the JSMC in
Lima, OH, is being accomplished within the context of this complex
network. We anticipate providing our preliminary findings in a separate
report primarily focused on the Supplier Base and Critical
Manufacturing Skills portion of the IB study by the end of June 2013,
with the final report forthcoming in December 2013.
It is through these efforts that the Army is actively monitoring
the IB and addressing challenges of critical and fragile elements to
identify systemic and fundamental issues that will highlight
unacceptable risk areas that need immediate attention.
26. Senator Manchin. General Phillips, have you performed any
analysis of the potential readiness or operational impact of the loss
of industrial capacity or capability to support fielded and deployed
weapons systems? If not, why not, and if so, what are your findings?
General Phillips. Yes. To date we have had no issues that would
prevent us from sustaining either fleet. The Abrams tank remains the
best tank in the world as a result of significant improvements over the
past 2 decades while reducing the number of tank variants in the fleet
from six to two. The Army is currently funded to produce enough M1A2SEP
v2 tanks to fully meet its current force structure requirements, with
production ending in December 2014. At this point, the Abrams tank
fleet will only be 3- to 4-years-old on average. The Army's Two-Variant
Fleet Strategy for Abrams tanks (M1A2SEP v2 and M1A1 SA) is fully
interoperable. The Abrams tank fleet strategy has been carefully
synchronized with the ABCT force structure strategy and will be fully
implemented in fiscal year 2015. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle has
performed well in Iraq. From Operation Desert Storm to the present, as
the threat has adapted, the Army has upgraded the Bradley with improved
lethality, armor, fire controls, communications, and situational
awareness.
We are working mitigation efforts to minimize potential impacts in
the near-term. The ongoing PEO GCS Industrial Base study, with A.T.
Kearny assisting, will help us determine what our current and future
industrial base needs are and will also help us develop viable
strategic alternatives to sustain the GCVs base within a constrained
fiscal environment. We anticipate providing our preliminary findings in
a separate report primarily focused on the Supplier Base and Critical
Manufacturing Skills portion of the IB study by the end of June 2013,
with the final report forthcoming in December 2013.
27. Senator Manchin. General Phillips, how do you intend to manage
this risk?
General Phillips. For Abrams and Bradley, the Army supports
maintaining an industrial base and remains especially attuned to any
impacts on critical suppliers and needed expertise as the Army faces
reduced budgets.
Abrams Tank:
The current slow-down in U.S. Army Abrams tank production will
likely continue until the next major recapitalization of the Abrams
tank in 2019. The Army is continually assessing mitigation alternatives
to provide a sustaining workload at the JSMC in Lima, OH, for the
foreseeable future. In the meantime, the Army continues to aggressively
apply mitigation measures to preserve critical skills and supplier
base. Specifically, we have extended our fiscal year 2012 production of
67 M1A2SEP v2 tanks for 2 years through December 2014. With the fiscal
year 2013 congressional add of $181 million, the Army is considering a
range of options that could extend production of the Abrams M1A2SEP v2
tank for approximately 12-18 months and help provide significant work
for critical and fragile suppliers. We also recognize that FMS
inherently fluctuates and is influenced by the overall global economic
environment. However, currently there is every indication that both
``Firm'' and ``High Potential'' Abrams tank FMS production will
maintain a minimal level of sustaining work flow through fiscal year
2016. The Army is conducting a rigorous and detailed Industrial Base
Study that includes JSMC, which should help us identify other potential
mitigation courses of action. We anticipate providing our preliminary
findings in a separate report primarily focused on the Supplier Base
and Critical Manufacturing Skills portion of the industrial base study
by the end of June 2013, with the final report forthcoming in December
2013.
Bradley Fighting Vehicle:
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle has performed well in the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The high priority placed on the GCV, which is slated
to replace the Infantry Fighting Vehicle variant of the Bradley family
of vehicles, is a testament to the importance of the armored-troop-
carrying and direct engagement fighting vehicle with its multiple
functional configurations. From Operation Desert Storm to the present,
as the threat has adapted, the Army has upgraded the Bradley with
improved lethality, armor, fire controls, communications, and
situational awareness. With the fiscal year 2013 congressional add of
$140 million, the Army is considering a range of options that could
extend production of the M2A3 Operation Iraqi Freedom variant via
conversion from M3A3s for approximately 2 years and help provide
significant work for critical and fragile suppliers.
management of strategic risk in the industrial base
28. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, a major tenet of both the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
is protection of the Nation's defense industrial base. However, DOD
funding reductions in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 have
reduced the Army's modernization investment accounts and acquisition
strategy. How do you take into account industrial base issues in
programming for Army modernization?
General Barclay. The Army's assessment of essential capabilities
and capacities of its industrial base is a dynamic process. We
continuously re-examine skills and capabilities needed in the
industrial base to preserve the ability to ramp up to meet urgent needs
in the event of future contingency operations. These assessments are
dependent on which programs the Army will pursue based on risk,
affordability, cost effectiveness, and fiscal planning guidance.
The Army Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan is our primary
management framework of maintaining a viable and relevant industrial
base for organic assets and commercial industry. This plan identifies
several specific goals and objectives to support the Army's
modernization plan.
In addition, the Army continues to employ and improve criteria to
actively monitor the defense industrial base to assess any approach of
irreversible loss of capacity or capability. These efforts include: (1)
S2T2 analysis; (2) establishing metrics to feed consumption data to
display areas of risk; (3) a study of the combat vehicle industry; (4)
protecting critical portions of the industrial base; (5) conducting an
IBBA; and (6) holding Organic Industrial Base Corporate Boards to
provide strategic guidance and direction for the Army's Industrial Base
efforts as part of the U.S. Army Materiel Command's ``Materiel Core
Enterprise.''
The Army continues to develop and implement plans to modernize and
upgrade the industrial base, even as resources are declining. These
plans are in various stages of approval for Army ammunition plants,
depots, and arsenals.
29. Senator Manchin. General Phillips, what in your view, is the
risk that the loss of design and manufacturing capability and capacity
in the industrial base could undermine the concept of reversibility?
General Phillips. Loss of design and manufacturing capability and
capacity in the industrial base could present a serious challenge to
the Army's ability to quickly make a course change in response to
dynamic conditions. However, the Army is undertaking and participating
in initiatives to help ensure that design and manufacturing capability
and capacity in the industrial base remain strong.
The Army will ensure that the risk of loss of design and
manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base is
carefully managed by: (1) continuing ongoing efforts to determine the
health of industrial base sectors critical to support Army and Joint
Services programs; (2) identifying and assessing the current status of
organic and commercial critical manufacturing and maintenance
capabilities required to meet future Army contingency investment and
regeneration requirements; and (3) identifying supply chain issues in
design, manufacturing, and sustainment that can present risk to
critical Army capabilities.
As one of the key components of the Army Organic Industrial Base
Strategic Plan, capacity, infrastructure, and workforce are sized to
sustain joint core depot and critical manufacturing capabilities. These
capabilities include the essential facilities, equipment, and skilled
personnel necessary to ensure that the Army and other Service organic
depots are a ready and controlled source of technical competence and
have the resources necessary to meet the readiness and sustainment
requirements of weapon systems supporting mobilization, national
defense contingency operations, and other emergency requirements. Depot
and arsenal workforces and infrastructures will be sized and adjusted
accordingly over time to sustain core depot and critical manufacturing
capabilities to support warfighting equipment during current and future
contingency operations.
The Army is participating in a DOD-wide effort to assess the health
of and risk to the industrial base on a S2T2 basis. The Army is also
incorporating mitigative strategies involving the FMS program to
address identified risks. The FMS program allows Army vendors to
diversify and balance military with commercial business so they can
weather the lean years and be in position to compete when the Army
starts investing in the next generation of products or recapitalizes
current platforms. Sales under the FMS program also help to sustain
highly-skilled jobs in the Defense industrial base by maintaining and
extending production lines, thereby strengthening reversibility.
30. Senator Manchin. General Phillips, which areas of the
industrial base are the greatest areas of concern?
General Phillips. We are most concerned with the loss of critical
skills and manufacturing capabilities but the Army is taking several
actions to support a strong and viable commercial and organic
industrial base.
In the commercial industrial base, the Army is working with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army Materiel Command to
assess critical manufacturing capabilities and seeking innovation
within the supply chain sectors through responsible investment. The
Army is also analyzing the challenges of critical and fragile elements
of the commercial industrial base to identify systemic and fundamental
issues that can be resolved through engagement across the public and
private sectors. For example, the Army continues its engagement in the
S2T2 industrial base analysis that: (1) establishes early warning
indicators of risk, particularly at lower-tiers; (2) strengthens the
supply chain to mitigate potential points of failure; and (3) improves
coordination among Services to ensure a viable industrial base is
maintained.
The Army is conducting a comprehensive Combat Vehicle Portfolio
Industrial Base Study through A.T. Kearney, a global management
consulting firm. The 21-week study, with a final report to be submitted
to Congress later this year, is assessing the commercial and organic
combat vehicle industrial base, viable strategic alternatives, and
sustainment of the combat vehicle industrial base in a constrained
fiscal environment.
The Army is also engaged in IBBAs that aim to sustain those areas
critical in supporting Army and Joint Services programs by: (1)
conducting sector assessments of programs identified as critical by
PEOs and Life Cycle Management Commands; (2) determining the impact of
reductions in funding to program requirements; and (3) developing
recommendations which enable the industrial base to sustain current and
future warfighter requirements.
The Army's strategy for ensuring that its organic industrial base
remains viable and relevant includes: (1) establishing modern
facilities, equipment, and skill sets at the same rate that the Army
modernizes its weapon systems; (2) ensuring capabilities and capacities
are sustained to support current and future contingency operations; (3)
investing to ensure that facilities are capable of maintaining core
competencies and critical manufacturing capabilities; and (4)
prioritizing funding to achieve the desired end state of viable and
relevant organic industrial base facilities.
multi-component units
31. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, last March, Army leaders
indicated an interest in creating units that combine Active and Reserve
Forces. That would be, for example, an Active or Reserve component
brigade headquarters with perhaps two AC battalions and a National
Guard battalion assigned. What is the Army's current thinking on the
creation of multi-component (MC) formations?
General Barclay. A MC unit provides personnel and or equipment from
more than one Army component (AC, ARNG, USAR) into a cohesive fully
capable Army unit to the maximum extent possible within statutory and
regulatory constraints. A MC unit has unity of command and control
similar to that of single-component units and status does not change a
unit's doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment. There are
currently 37 MC units in the Army. The Army is examining the role of
the MC unit in the future operational environment with the intent of
expanding its use as a way to mitigate AC end strength reductions
without reducing capability or capacity.
32. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, have you done any cost
analysis to determine incremental increases or savings associated with
such a force structure? If so, what are your findings?
General Barclay. The Army is in the process of conducting the
analysis to determine what incremental funding changes are associated
with utilizing MC units. The Army will pursue a MC structure only if it
is operationally feasible and provides a means for cost savings.
33. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, I understand that during the
Cold War the Army used National Guard combat brigades to round-out to
complete the structure of a division, or round-up to reinforce or add a
brigade to the structure of a division. What is the Army's assessment,
positive and/or negative, of MC formations from past experience?
General Barclay. The Army assesses that the traditional Cold War
round-out MC unit design is best suited for total mobilization, when
100 percent mobilization of the Reserve component for the duration of
the emergency is authorized. During the Gulf War, the decision to
activate the round-out/up brigades was made long after the initial
force flow, which did not allow sufficient time for the activated
Reserve component brigades to train to the required standard and deploy
prior to the start of ground combat operations. Since then, demands of
the modern battlefield led the Army to use unit rotations, rather than
the individual replacement policy used in past conflicts. Over the last
decade, the Army has successfully formed and deployed MC organizations
on a rotational basis numerous times, but the differing requirements
for Active and Reserve components to remain at home station between
deployments did not allow for habitual command relationships within
these organizations. This nontraditional manner of forming MC units
allowed the Army to moderate the stress on high-demand AC capabilities.
The Army is studying ways to take advantage of the benefits of MC
capable units while avoiding the challenges that faced such units in
the past.
34. Senator Manchin. General Barclay, what is different now or
suggests that MC formations will work today if they did not work well
enough to continue in the past?
General Barclay. In the past, we designed MC units with a Cold War
mentality. We assumed that these units would mobilize, assemble, train,
and deploy for the duration of the conflict. This traditional MC design
is ill-suited to deploying forces on a rotational basis, as we have for
the past decade, since Reserve component units require a longer period
between deployments. Despite this initial challenge, the Army had
numerous positive experiences with MC designs performing well during a
decade of continuous warfare. The lessons learned from these
experiences have led the Army to explore an enhanced MC design which
will better allow for Active and Reserve component units to integrate
into a single unit and meet the demands of the modern battlefield. This
new design will focus on creating habitual relationships between AC
units and multiple Reserve component units such that there will always
be Reserve component units and personnel available to partner with
their AC counterpart while avoiding undue stress on the Reserve
component.
[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]