- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

[Senate Hearing 113-108, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 113-108, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1197

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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PART 1

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
MILITARY POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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MARCH 5, 7, 12, 19; APRIL 9, 17, 23, 25; MAY 7, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 1

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND b U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND b U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND b U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
b MILITARY POSTURE b DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY b DEPARTMENT OF THE
NAVY b DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

S. Hrg. 113-108, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1197

__________

PART 1

__________

MARCH 5, 7, 12, 19; APRIL 9, 17, 23, 25; MAY 7, 2013

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
85-626 WASHINGTON : 2014
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine

Peter K. Levine, Staff Director

John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command
march 5, 2013

Page

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 7
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 18

U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command
march 7, 2013

Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 103
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 114

U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command
march 12, 2013

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 182
Alexander, Gen. Keith B., USA, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command..... 194

U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command
march 19, 2013

Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command
and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe........................... 259
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 314
Kelly, Gen. John F., USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern Command...... 325

U.S. Pacific Command
april 9, 2013

Locklear, ADM Samuel J., III, USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command........................................................ 415

Military Posture
april 17, 2013

Hagel, Hon. Charles T., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
Robert Hale, Comptroller, Department of Defense................ 492
Dempsey, Gen Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 505

Department of the Army
april 23, 2013

McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army...................... 610
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 639

Department of the Navy
april 25, 2013

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 725
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 742
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 759

Department of the Air Force
may 7, 2013

Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force.............. 867
Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 872

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

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TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Wicker, Ayotte,
Fischer, Graham, Blunt, and Lee.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; and
Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A.
Kulenkampff, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs,
assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator
Gillibrand; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly;
Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington,
assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator
King; Christian Brose and Paul C. Hutton IV, assistants to
Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Brandon Bell, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; Craig
Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; Charles Prosch, assistant
to Senator Blunt; and Peter Blair, assistant to Senator Lee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning's
hearing is the first in our annual series of posture hearings
with the combatant commanders to receive testimony on the
military strategy and operational requirements in their areas
of responsibility (AOR). Our witnesses are two extraordinary
military leaders: General James N. Mattis, USMC, Commander,
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and Admiral William H. McRaven,
USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
On behalf of our members, please pass along to the men and
women serving in both CENTCOM and SOCOM for their dedication
and their sacrifices; and we also thank their families, whose
support is so essential to the well-being of their loved ones
and to the well-being of our Nation.
General Mattis, this is your third and your last posture
hearing before this committee. This committee has favorably
reported out your successor, General Lloyd J. Austin III, USA,
to the full Senate. General, we want to thank you for your more
than 40 years of military service and your distinguished
leadership of our Armed Forces.
This year's posture hearings with the combatant commanders
are being held under the specter of budget sequestration, which
threatens to impose arbitrary cuts on our military forces
unrelated to our national security requirements. Already,
sequestration is having an operational impact in the CENTCOM
area, with the Department of Defense's (DOD) postponement of
the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier to
the Persian Gulf. I hope that General Mattis and Admiral
McRaven will address the impacts and risks associated with
sequestration and with the expiration of the Continuing
Resolution (CR).
Our transition strategy in Afghanistan is entering a
critical phase in the coming months. Afghan forces will move
into the lead for security throughout Afghanistan beginning
this spring. This transition has been underway for some time
and Afghan forces are already in charge of security for more
than 85 percent of the Afghan people.
This shift to an Afghan security lead is exemplified by the
statistic that in 2012 Afghan forces for the first time
suffered more casualties than coalition forces. As Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) are stepping up, coalition
forces are shifting to a support role, deploying security force
assistance teams to advise and assist Afghan units throughout
the end of 2014, when the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission ends. ISAF casualties are down and during
a 1-month stretch from mid-January to mid-February of this year
ISAF forces suffered no fatalities.
But it seems the bad news out of Afghanistan is splashed
across the headlines, while good news barely makes a ripple.
The press gave wide coverage in December to the DOD report that
found only 1 of 23 Afghan brigades was rated as independent by
ISAF. Yet when Senator Reed and I visited Afghanistan in
January and talked to our regional commanders, we learned that
Afghan forces in the volatile and critical East Region have
been successfully conducting over 85 percent of the operations
unilaterally, without coalition forces even being present.
Afghans want their own forces providing for their security
and they have confidence in those forces. General Mattis, the
committee would be interested in your assessment of whether our
mission in Afghanistan is succeeding, whether our transition
plan is on track, and whether the Afghan forces will be ready
this spring to assume the lead for protecting the Afghan people
throughout the country.
Last month, President Obama announced plans for
withdrawing, by February of next year, 34,000 of the 66,000
U.S. troops in Afghanistan. As important as the size of the
cuts in U.S. troop levels over the coming year is, the pace of
those reductions is also important. The President has
previously stated that cuts in U.S. Forces would continue at a
steady pace after the recovery of the U.S. surge force at the
end of last summer. It's now being reported that the bulk of
the withdrawal of the 34,000 troops is likely to occur next
winter, after the 2013 fighting season. We need to understand
what the pace of U.S. troop withdrawal will look like and how
it fits with the overall transition strategy.
Looking ahead, significant challenges in Afghanistan
remain. Fundamental to the country's stability will be a
demonstrated commitment by the United States and the
international community to an enduring relationship with
Afghanistan. I am encouraged by reports that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) defense ministers recently
reconsidered plans to cut ANSF by a third after 2014 and are
now considering maintaining those forces at 352,000 at least
through 2018. That sends an important signal of commitment to
the Afghan people, to the Taliban, and to Afghanistan's
neighbors.
Pakistan needs to recognize that an unstable Afghanistan is
not in its interests, and Pakistan's continuing failure to
address the safe havens for insurgents conducting cross-border
attacks into Afghanistan will make it impossible for the United
States to have a normal relationship with Pakistan.
In addition, the Government of Afghanistan needs to address
its failure to deliver services and also the rampant corruption
that undermine the Afghan people's faith in their government's
institutions.
The CENTCOM AOR also presents other vexing challenges.
Iran's continued pursuit of its nuclear program is one of the
most significant national security issues of this day. I
believe most of the members of this committee share President
Obama's view that all options, including military options, need
to remain on the table and that preventing Iran from acquiring
a nuclear weapon is not only our policy, but that we are
determined to achieve that policy goal.
Iran is also actively expanding their threat network that
has promoted violence across the region in Yemen, Gaza, Sudan,
Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. Iran continues to provide financial
and material support through the Revolutionary Guard and
Lebanese Hezbollah to groups seeking to overthrow or undermine
governments or terrorize innocent civilians.
General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, you are the two
commanders most involved in confronting these current
challenges and planning for contingencies involving Iran. We
look forward to hearing your views on these matters.
In Syria, the death toll continues to rise daily. The mass
atrocities committed by the Assad regime over the past 2 years
have solidified the commitment of all but a few in the
international community that the required outcome in Syria is
that Assad must go. The United States is the largest
contributor of non-lethal and humanitarian aid to the
international response efforts, but these contributions have
not been enough. General Mattis, the committee looks forward to
hearing your views on the situation in Syria and to learn of
what our closest allies in the region say about the possibility
of extending additional aid to the opposition.
The committee is also interested in our commanders'
reactions to recent reports about U.S. counterterrorism
operations and whether more of these counterterrorism
operations should be conducted under title 10 authorities. For
example, Secretary Panetta said recently, ``The advantage to it
is that it becomes much more transparent in terms of what we're
doing.'' He's referring, of course, to more counterterrorism
operations being conducted under title 10 authorities rather
than title 50.
John Brennan in his recent confirmation hearing to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated that:
``The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities
and operations,'' and noted that ``On the counterterrorism
front, there are things the Agency has been involved in since
September 11 that, in fact, have been a bit of an aberration
from its traditional role.''
Beyond the current conflict in Afghanistan and the fight
against al Qaeda and its affiliates elsewhere, Admiral McRaven
has spent significant time developing his vision for the future
of Special Operations Forces (SOF). In light of the continuing
high demand for SOF throughout the world and the focus of last
year's Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) on ``innovative, low-
cost, and small-footprint approaches'' to achieve national
security objectives, Admiral McRaven has rightly focused on the
need to develop greater capabilities within our SOF to engage
with partner nation forces, with the goal of confronting mutual
security challenges before they become threats to the United
States or our interests overseas, what the Admiral calls
``enhancing the global special operations network.'' Admiral
McRaven, the committee looks forward to hearing more about any
changes to existing authorities that you believe would help you
be more effective in these areas.
Our special operations personnel and their families
continue to face the highest operational tempo in their
history. I understand SOCOM has documented the negative impact
of these repeated high-stress deployments, including an
increase in marital problems, substance abuse, and suicides,
and now has a standing task force dedicated to helping special
operators and their families deal with these issues.
Admiral, the committee would appreciate your assessment on
the state of your forces and the adequacy of the support
provided by the Military Services and SOCOM to address the
unique challenges in the special operations community.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
there are a lot of the things you've covered that I was going
to, so I'll just paraphrase some of the concerns.
First of all, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with
both of you, and I also appreciate your long years of service.
But I think you'd have to agree, as we discussed, that you
probably have not faced the situation that you're facing today.
With the cuts that we've already sustained and then with
sequestration coming up, with the CR problems that are there,
it is, in fact, unprecedented.
Anticipating that this might be a possibility, about 6
weeks ago we introduced legislation that would allow the
Service Chiefs to make determinations, as opposed to just the
straight cut that would come with sequestration. I called all
five Service Chiefs, including the Guard, and asked them, if we
were in a position where, taking the same top line, the cuts
that we are mandated for the military, if you could take that
and operate within that and make the determinations as to where
those cuts would be, would that be less devastating than if you
just went ahead and did it with the straight-line cuts? They
all said yes.
Then the second question I asked them was: Do you have time
to do that between now and the next 6 weeks, as we approach the
1st of March? They assured me that they did. So we're looking
at that right now. I'm hoping we'll be able to pass this and
give that added ability to make determinations within the same
amount of money, that would be less devastating.
General Mattis, I think as we look at CENTCOM one of the
biggest problems there, as we've talked about, is Iran. This
influence continues to spread across the Middle East, into
Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. They're developing more
complex anti-access and anti-denial weapons. We all know that
our unclassified intelligence said way back in 2007 that they
are gaining nuclear capability, and they should have it, that
along with a delivery system, by 2015. They're having a lot of
influence over the surrounding areas. Assad in Syria is getting
a lot of his stuff from Iran. The flow of Syrian refugees into
Jordan and Lebanon will probably exceed more than 1 million as
quickly as June of this year.
So all these problems that are out there, and we've talked
about these and we know how serious it is, it is unprecedented.
Admiral McRaven, as Commander of SOCOM you play an
instrumental role in shaping our global counterterrorism
campaign. Despite our successes in the battlefield, al Qaeda
and affiliated terrorist organizations remain resilient and
have developed sophisticated networks that transcend national
borders.
You both have your work cut out for you. I can't think of
two better people to take on this huge responsibility right now
than the two of you. I appreciate very much your service and
what you're going to be rendering that addresses our problems
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator James M. Inhofe

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Mattis and Admiral McRaven: Thank
you for your many years of faithful service to our Nation, and on
behalf of our entire committee, please convey to the brave men and
women you lead how grateful we are for their sacrifice, and that of
their families.
This hearing comes at a critical time for our Nation's security.
Our military has already endured significant budget cuts and now stands
to lose significantly more under sequestration. These cuts will
directly impact the readiness and capabilities of our force,
particularly at a time when they are confronted with a global security
environment that is as tumultuous and dangerous as any time in recent
history--a fact that is particularly true within the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).
The reality of these cuts and the pain of operating under
continuing resolutions mean that you will have declining resources and
reduced flexibility to address increasing threats. You will be forced
to accept greater strategic risk. As I have said many times before, due
to the nature of military operations: risk equals lives. As we accept
greater risk, like we did by under-resourcing U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) prior to the terrorist attacks in Benghazi, we must
understand that it will result in greater loss of life. That is why
last month Senator Toomey and I introduced a bill to give the
department the flexibility it needs to operate within these severe
budgetary constraints, and to mitigate risk. Although the amount of the
cuts to the top line would remain the same, the Department would have
maneuvering room to decide where to take them. I talked to all of the
Service Chiefs about this topic, and all of them agreed that this
flexibility would provide significant relief and help to reduce risk.
I look to our witnesses to provide the committee with their
assessment of how the ongoing budget crisis will impact their ability
to effectively address the challenges within their areas of
responsibility and whether the current strategies that they are
operating under are still executable given the budget realities.
General Mattis, in CENTCOM, the threats you deal with on a daily
basis are staggering. One of the most vexing challenges we face is
Iran. Their malign influence continues to spread across the Middle East
and into Africa, Europe and the Pacific through their proxy network of
terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah. Additionally, Iran is
developing more complex anti-access and area-denial weapons while
simultaneously pursuing ballistic missile and nuclear weapon
capabilities. I'm greatly concerned that our ongoing economic and
diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon have
been ineffective and we risk arriving at a similar outcome as we now
see in North Korea.
In Afghanistan, we are entering a new consequential chapter. The
President recently announced a reduction of 34,000 U.S. troops over the
next year and discussions are ongoing about what a post-2014 residual
presence should look like. We must ensure that decisions about the
future of our mission are based on sound strategy and the facts on the
ground rather than domestic political calculations. I worry that we
will repeat our mistakes in Iraq and draw down too many troops too
fast, resulting in a security vacuum that allows the resurgence of al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. We must listen to the
commanders on the ground, to you General Mattis and Admiral McRaven,
and your best professional military advice on what it will take to
preserve our hard fought security gains and prevent Afghanistan from
returning to a breeding ground for terrorists determined to strike at
the American homeland.
In Syria, the country's civil war has entered its second year and
has now claimed the lives of nearly 70,000. As the conflict drags on,
we see Syria increasingly becoming the front lines of a protracted
global struggle between Sunni and Shia terrorist groups that threatens
broader regional stability. Iran continues to support to the Assad
regime through their Hezbollah proxy and more directly through arms
shipments that overfly Iraq. Despite numerous requests from the United
States, Iraq continues to allow these flights which is damaging the
relationship between the United States and Iraq.
The flow of Syrian refugees into Jordan and Lebanon will likely
exceed more than 10 percent of their respective populations and top
over 1 million as quickly as June of this year. The overwhelming influx
of refugees could rapidly exceed the capacity of these small countries
to absorb massive humanitarian and economic burdens. If we are not
careful, these conditions will foster and fuel further instability,
which much like we've seen in North Africa, could serve as a breeding
ground for terrorism.
Admiral McRaven, as Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), you play an instrumental role in shaping our global
counterterrorism campaign. As we have seen in recent years, despite our
many successes on the battlefield, al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
organizations remain remarkably resilient. They have developed
sophisticated illicit and operational networks that transcend national
borders. I'm concerned that to date, though, our strategy has been ad-
hoc and focused primarily on a country-by-country approach. We must
confront this threat by developing a strategy that is truly global in
nature. I understand that you have taken steps to this end and I look
forward to you updating the committee on these efforts.
Admiral, I am also interested in your ongoing efforts to support
your most important asset-the men and women serving under your command.
Your predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, made headlines when he stated 2
years ago that after a decade of combat operations, the force was
beginning to ``fray around the edges.'' As a result, Admiral Olson
began a comprehensive assessment of the force and their families and
instituted a number of programs to address these stressors. I know you
have continued these vital efforts and I look forward to your update on
their status.
Thank you again for appearing before us today and I look forward to
your testimony.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
General Mattis, let's start with you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND

General Mattis. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Inhofe,
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
testify. I have submitted a written statement and request it be
accepted for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Mattis. It's my privilege to appear alongside
stalwart shipmate and friend, Admiral Bill McRaven. We have
worked together for many years and continue to do so.
In the Middle East, we confront what is a significant risk
to our interests in the region, specifically a perceived lack
of an enduring U.S. commitment. To counter this misperception,
we must clearly communicate our intent and demonstrate our
support through tangible actions.
In Afghanistan, we are conducting a steady and deliberate
transition. U.S. leadership among 50 nations fighting together
in the largest wartime coalition in modern history provide
continued support of the ANSF as they set conditions for their
long-term success.
Iran remains the single most significant regional threat to
stability and prosperity. Reckless behavior and bellicose
rhetoric characterize a leadership that cannot win the
affection of its own people or the respect of any responsible
nation in the region. Iran's continued support to the murderous
Assad regime in Syria, coupled with its malign activities in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Gaza, and
globally in Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Thailand, India,
Georgia, Bulgaria, Nigeria, and even here in Washington, DC, in
an attempt to kill the Saudi Ambassador, and elsewhere in the
world, as well as in the cyber domain, raise the risk of
Iranian miscalculation that could spark a disastrous conflict.
As we address the very real challenges we collectively
face, I am confident CENTCOM will continue working by, with,
and through our regional partners to ensure a measure of
stability in the region. Our military-to-military engagements,
security cooperation efforts, exercise programs, and
information operations will continue to need your support,
including innovative and flexible authorities and the necessary
funds, so we can continue doing what is required to protect
U.S. national security interests.
As our Nation confronts a period of fiscal austerity, our
ability to adapt our ways and means to continue to meet our
operational objectives is impacted by three key factors: first,
my need for budget certainty. Right now I do not have any
budget certainty. Second, my need for time to adapt to reduced
budgets and take the cuts smartly. Specifically, my third
request is for flexibility to determine where to shift
available funds in a manner that reduces risks and consistent
with the intent of Congress, and of course, much of that
flexibility must be granted to the Service Chiefs.
With your support and with the continued devotion to duty
of our troops and the commitment of our military families, we
will stand by our friends to maintain a measure of regional
stability in defense of our values and our interests.
I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC

INTRODUCTION

We are in the midst of a transition in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). With volatility a defining
feature of the region, CENTCOM remains a command postured to respond to
military crises while at the same time working in tandem with regional
partners and American diplomats to carry out U.S. strategy in the
region. In Afghanistan, U.S. Forces continue to support the largest
coalition campaign in modern history to ensure it will not again become
a haven from which violent extremist organizations can plan, rehearse
and execute terrorist attacks. We also work with international
partners, and across U.S. Government and combatant command lines, to
share information and posture our forces to inhibit the spread of these
radical and violent organizations and rapidly respond to protect U.S.
interests. CENTCOM works closely with our fellow combatant commands to
mitigate risk collaboratively across COCOM boundaries.
As we transition to Afghan-lead in accordance with NATO's Lisbon
and Chicago agreements, each of the other 19 countries that comprise
CENTCOM's AOR across the Middle East and Central Asian States present
both challenges and opportunities for our military-to-military
relationships. The ongoing events of the Arab Awakening, blatant
brutality by the Iranian-backed Syrian regime and the spillover effects
of refugees and violence into neighboring countries, coupled with
Iran's flagrant violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, bellicose rhetoric and pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability, and the persistent threat from both Shia (Iranian
supported) and Sunni (al Qaeda and its affiliates) violent extremists
demand international attention.
These factors, compounded by the lack of forward progress on Middle
East Peace and the movement toward a sustainable two-state solution and
the serious economic challenges many nations in the region confront,
require us to remain vigilant and be ready for turmoil in the months
ahead. In fact, we are now at a point where a re-energized Middle East
Peace effort could pay significant dividends in terms of regional
security since the status quo benefits no one and violent extremists
use the issue for their own purposes. It is essential that we maintain
the viability of the Palestinian Authority as a partner for peace and
security, and preserve the two-state solution.
As we look to the future direction of American foreign policy,
three enduring factors will keep U.S. attention anchored in this
region: the U.S. relationship with Israel and our other partner
nations; oil and energy resources that fuel the global economy; and the
persistent threat from violent extremist organizations. U.S. Central
Command's approach--working in tandem with the State Department and
other agencies through a whole-of-government approach--is to protect
our interests using fewer military resources in an era of fiscal
restraint and political change.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Significant factors are currently shaping and changing the region.
The Arab Awakening will bring years of political and social changes as
the demographic challenges of a burgeoning youth bulge collide with
struggling economies. There will be additional pressure on governments
to respond to popular interests. We recognize the Awakening is what it
is and not necessarily what we hope it will be: it is first a flight
from repression and may or may not result in an embrace of democratic
principles. The future is not foreseeable, but one thing is clear:
America must remain deeply engaged in the region and fully utilize all
tools of national power as a force for stability and prosperity.
Traditional regimes that held power for decades have been swept
aside or are under siege, adding to the region's uncertain future.
Modern communications and social media have the potential to both
empower and endanger people. While they can enable users to better
understand their social circumstances and provide ways to organize to
improve them, they can also make people more vulnerable to manipulation
by malevolent actors. The increasing role of our adversaries in
cyberspace necessitates additional emphasis and urgency on a targeted
expansion of our presence, influence, capabilities and the authorities
necessary to maintain an advantage in cyberspace. Threat networks
including those maintained by Iran are adjusting opportunistically, and
are emboldened by regional developments--to include the Arab Spring and
events such as those in Benghazi and Syria. These networks pursue a
range of destabilizing activities that include but are not limited to
the transfer of illicit arms, as well as the provision of financial,
lethal, and material aid support to a range of malign actors seeking to
undermine regional security. In our efforts to counter destabilizing
extremists, our international and regional partnerships remain one of
our greatest strengths, and most potent tools. Addressing these
activities will require our continued engagement, reassurance and
commitment to work with other nations against extremists' violent
activities.
U.S. Central Command's operating environment is also influenced by
the major and emerging powers bordering our region, by the increasing
Sunni-Shia polarization, and by Iran's malign influence. U.S.
Government efforts led by State Department to develop more militarily
capable and confident partners in the region are advancing, and
contributing significantly to enhancing our robust regional security
architecture. There is also widespread attention on how the United
States and NATO will remain involved in Afghanistan post-2014 to
prevent its regression, and whether the United States will continue to
remain resolute in the face of a growing Iranian threat. Finally, the
threat of weapons of mass destruction is prevalent in the region, with
both Syria and Iran possessing chemical weapons or the capability to
produce them and Iran advancing its nuclear program. Pakistan has a
fast growing nuclear arsenal and violent extremists continue to profess
a desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction. This danger has
our full attention.
Each country in my assigned region has its own unique history,
culture, religions and ethnicities and we treat each country on its own
merits. The value of American military-to-military relationships is
evident when you compare the transition in Egypt with events in Libya
and the ongoing brutality in Syria. Under immense pressure both
internally and externally, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in
Egypt oversaw the transition and transferred power to an elected
government. Egyptian military leaders did not attempt to protect the
old regime from its accountability to the people or seize power for
themselves. Moreover, they demonstrated restraint and steady
performance through difficult transition milestones including the
appointment of new military leadership and the political upheaval
following President Morsi's December constitutional decree. First and
foremost, the military sees itself as the upholder of Egypt's
sovereignty and national security. It has maintained its
professionalism and validated our longstanding investment in strong
military ties, sustaining the trust of the Egyptian people through a
most tumultuous period. As this critically important country
experiences significant political change and confronts a dire economic
situation, CENTCOM will remain actively engaged with Egypt's military
leadership.

STRATEGIC RISKS TO U.S. INTERESTS

The most serious strategic risks to U.S. national security
interests in the Central region are:
Malign Iranian influence
Despite significant economic sanctions and increased diplomatic
isolation within the global community, Iran continues to export
instability and violence across the region and beyond. There are five
main threats Iran continues to develop: the potential nuclear threat;
counter maritime threat; theater ballistic missile threat; the Iranian
Threat Network to include the Qods Force and its regional surrogates
and proxies; and cyber-attack capabilities.

Potential nuclear threat. Iran continues to expand its
nuclear enrichment capabilities, which enable Iran to quickly
produce weapons-grade nuclear material, should Tehran make that
decision.
Counter Maritime threat. Iran is improving its counter
maritime capabilities (mines, small boats, cruise missiles,
submarines) to threaten sea-lanes vital to the global economy.
The occasionally provocative behavior of the Revolutionary
Guard Navy is an issue with which we deal and we refine our
operational approaches in sustaining our stabilizing maritime
presence in the Persian Gulf.
Theater Ballistic Missiles. Iran has the largest and
most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East and
is increasing medium and short range ballistic missile
inventories and capability with ranges up to about 2,000
kilometers, sufficient to strike targets with increasing
precision throughout the region. While Iran has previously
exaggerated its capabilities, there is consensus that Tehran
has creatively adapted foreign technology to increase the
quality and quantity of its arsenal.
Iranian Threat Network. Malign influence and
activities (illicit weapons, financial aid, trained personnel
and training) in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Gaza, Lebanon
and Yemen along with the 2011 attempt here in Washington to
assassinate the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
indicate a long-term trend that has clear potential for
murderous miscalculation that could spark a disastrous regional
conflict. Iran continues to seek to establish nodes throughout
the region through which to advance its destabilizing agenda.
Cyber. Given Iran's growing capabilities in this
sensitive domain, the United States must recognize and adapt
now to defend against malicious cyber activity.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)
The focus of our military efforts over the past decade has largely
been on al Qaeda, its adherents and affiliates (AQAA), and we have
achieved measurable successes in combating them. The AQAA ``franchise''
remains a threat however. An equally concerning long-term threat
continues to emanate from the Iran-sponsored Shia brand of extremism
wielded by groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah. In addition to the threat
from these terrorists with which we are already familiar, a clash
brought on by these two brands of extremism could pour fuel on the
simmering Sunni-Shia tensions we observe from Baluchistan to Syria and
incite a worsening cycle of violence.

State Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
WMD proliferation and the potential loss of control of WMD by
regional governments, for example the potential loss of control of
Syrian chemical weapons, pose a significant risk to the region and our
most vital national security interests. The potential for WMD in the
hands of non-state actors and extremist organizations cannot be
addressed by traditional Cold War deterrence methods and presents a
clear threat to our regional partners, innocent populations, and our
forces and bases.

Afghanistan Stability and Security
While progress in Afghanistan is undeniable, progress and violence
coexist. In accordance with NATO/ISAF's campaign plan, our sustained
training, advising and assistance have led to a counterinsurgency-
focused Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) that has now achieved
full strength in numbers. Keeping our campaign on track requires close
collaboration and reassurance to our Allies and Afghan partners to
maintain the confidence of the largest wartime alliance in modern
history and the Afghan people. That message of commitment will also
reassure the Central Asian States, which are understandably sharply
focused on 2014 and beyond. The present drawdown rate leaves the
campaign on a sound footing for the Afghan forces to assume the lead
with our advisory support and training.

Regional Instability
As savagery increases in Syria's civil war, the number of refugees
fleeing the fighting continues to grow. The impacts on Turkey, Jordan
and Lebanon are severe, with media reports of over 4 million internally
displaced persons and the U.N. estimating over 900,000 refugees in
neighboring countries. Refugees into Jordan alone continue to increase
by more than 50,000 monthly since the New Year. The potential
destabilizing impact is clear and there is a growing likelihood of
unpredictable longer-term effects on regional stability. Refugee camps
are not a permanent solution, they have not proven to be economically
viable, nor do they give hope to younger generations.

Perceived Lack of U.S. Commitment
Perhaps the greatest risk to U.S. interests in the region is a
perceived lack of an enduring U.S. commitment to collective interests
and the security of our regional partners. This impression, if not
actively and often countered, and any lack of clarity regarding U.S.
intentions in the region, particularly with respect to Afghanistan's
future, Middle East Peace, and shaping an acceptable outcome in Syria,
could reduce our partners' commitment to stand with us and leave space
for other actors to assume less benign leadership roles. If we seek to
influence events, we must listen to partner concerns and continue to
demonstrate our support through tangible actions. Our regional partners
want to share the security burden with us, and we should actively
enable them to do so, especially as we face our own fiscal realities.

CENTCOM'S APPROACH

All of U.S. Central Command's military activities are firmly nested
in four main drivers of U.S. foreign policy. First is security, and in
particular, meeting the urgent challenges posed by Iran's reckless
behavior across a wide front and being prepared to respond to a range
of regional contingencies, as well as the related imperative of
accelerating a transition to the new leadership which the Syrian people
so deeply deserve. The second driver is our continued support for
political openness, democratic reforms and successful post-
revolutionary transitions. Third, no political transition or democratic
reform process can succeed without a sense of economic opportunity.
Fourth and finally, a re-energized effort is needed to resolve
persistent regional conflicts, and especially for renewing hope for a
two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. Within this
framework, CENTCOM stands firmly alongside our friends and supports
regional security, territorial integrity of sovereign nations, and the
free flow of commerce.
CENTCOM's approach to protect the Nation's interests in the Middle
East is to work BY, WITH, and THROUGH key regional partners to bolster
regional security and promote stability, while minimizing a permanent
U.S. military footprint. In so doing, we can build our partners'
capacity to enable them to share in the security costs for the region.
CENTCOM uses four principal levers as we engage in the region:

Military to Military Engagements: These lay the
foundation for and bolster our broader diplomatic
relationships. Much of this work is ongoing, but as resources
decrease and American forward presence in the region declines,
mil-to-mil engagements and working by, with, and through our
partners will become increasingly important. This type of
forward engagement is often the bedrock of our most important
relationships and builds the trust necessary to work closely
together.
Plans and Operations: CENTCOM develops and executes
plans and operations in close collaboration with our fellow
combatant commands, interagency organizations, and
international partners as necessary to address developing
contingencies and crises. While providing military options for
the Commander in Chief, these plans are designed from the
outset to be inclusive of regional and traditional partners.
Security Cooperation Programs: Building partner
capacity is the responsible way to reduce U.S. military
presence and maintain the health of our force by partnering
with regional nations to distribute more of the security
burden. In order to build partner effectiveness, we must be
more responsive to their capability needs while strategically
aligning acquisition and training plans with regional
collective security requirements. Combined training,
multilateral exercises (resourced by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Combatant Commanders' Exercise
Engagement and Training Transformation program), defense
reviews and expanded professional military education exchanges
are cost-effective means to enhance trust and interoperability
while encouraging progress on rule of law and human rights
issues. Once fully implemented, the Global Security Contingency
Fund will offer us opportunities to respond to emerging
security cooperation, assistance and requirements.
Posture and Presence: A tailored, lighter footprint
supported by access to infrastructure that enables rapid
reinforcement is the foundational concept for future military
posture in the region. The CENTCOM military presence will
continue to become more maritime in character, supported by
expeditionary land forces and have strong air enablers. I
anticipate the need to sustain maritime defense, anti-fast
attack craft capabilities, amphibious ships and mine-
countermeasure capability and Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance capabilities. I see the need for growth in our
Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capacities
across the region. In summary, we will need strong strategic
relationships with our partners to enable the presence required
to deter adversaries and reassure our friends.

AROUND THE REGION

The Department of Defense carefully shapes military presence
(United States and partners) in the Middle East to protect the global
free flow of critical natural resources and to provide a counterbalance
to Iran--a balanced force presence ready to respond to a variety of
contingencies, and to deter Iranian aggression. To maintain a right-
sized American security footprint in the Gulf, the United States
promotes close teamwork with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
By deepening strategic ties with the Gulf and improving the capability
of the GCC states through multilateral exercises, security assistance
and training, regional stability is appropriately shown to be an
international responsibility. The United States will continue to
promote the capabilities of GCC partners in such missions as missile
defense, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection and
development of a common operating picture that allows us to work
smoothly together when necessary.
During the past year, we have seen significant progress in our
military relationship with countries of the GCC. In support of the
efforts of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and the
U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, we have worked to enhance and
deepen Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation in response to the
proliferation of these weapons. We continue to emphasize U.S.-GCC
multilateral exercises, such as our successful International Mine
Countermeasure Exercise, which included participants from over 30
countries from 5 continents in 2012, and our Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) exercise Leading Edge 2013 ably hosted by UAE. The
Gulf States have demonstrated the willingness to work with one another
and with international partners to counter malign influence in the
region and ensure freedom of commerce--a critical international issue
in terms of the global economy. Interoperability in this framework
improves U.S. defense-in-depth and our own capabilities become more
robust by supporting partner capacity and working by, with and through
the GCC.
For decades, security cooperation has been a cornerstone of our
relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As we face ever more
sophisticated regional challenges in the Middle East, helping to enable
the upgrade of Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities sustains our strong
military-to-military relations, improves operational interoperability,
helps the Kingdom prepare to meet regional threats and safeguards the
world's largest oil reserves. In difficult times, the Kingdom has
demonstrated its willingness and capability to use its military forces
to fight as part of a coalition against regional threats. Sustaining
the Saudi military capability deters hostile actors, increases U.S.-
Saudi military interoperability and positively impacts the stability of
the global economy. Working with Department of State, CENTCOM helped
establish the first interagency security assistance program to build
the capabilities of the Ministry of Interior Security Forces that
protect Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure. This is a long-term $1
billion FMS Interagency Technical Cooperation Agreement, which has
shown remarkable progress.
A long-term and strong ally in the region, Kuwait continues to
build upon a long bi-lateral military relationship with its critical
support for U.S. troops and equipment. Kuwait remains a valued partner
and is steadily reconciling its long-standing issues with Iraq and
supporting the region's stability. We enjoy excellent relations with
the Kuwaiti military built on many years of trust between us since the
liberation in 1991.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been a valued partner through
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia,
Afghanistan and Libya. The Emirates participated in Operation Unified
Protector in Libya, flying as part of NATO's effort and the Emiratis
have increased the number of their troops and aircraft deployed to
Afghanistan even as other nations are drawing down. The UAE is also a
leader in the Gulf for air and missile defense capabilities. Their
Foreign Military Sales purchases total $18.1 billion and include the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, valued at
approximately $3.5 billion, a highly capable and wholly defensive
system that will contribute to regional stability and our
interoperability. The UAE was the first foreign government to purchase
this system. Their many contributions to collective defense and their
close military ties over decades mark UAE as one of our strongest
friends within the region, deserving of our continued close engagement
and tangible FMS support.
Qatar is taking an increasingly active role within the region,
supporting operations in Libya with both military and humanitarian aid.
Qatar continues to demonstrate leadership in its foreign policy,
including spearheading an Arab League resolution suspending Syria's
membership. Qatar has placed wide-ranging sanctions on Syria in
response to the Assad regime's violence against its own citizens and
has played a leading role in helping the Syrian opposition to improve
its organization and capabilities. We enjoy excellent military
relations with this country that has generously hosted several of our
forward headquarters and facilities.
Home to our sole main naval operating base in the Middle East,
Bahrain has been an important friend and partner for many decades, and
provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. Navy's Fifth
Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. Forces engaged in
regional security. The strong U.S.-Bahrain relationship is particularly
critical in the face of the threat Iran poses to regional stability.
Over the past several years, Bahrain has faced internal challenges.
CENTCOM works closely with others in the U.S. Government to advance a
message of support for dialogue and reform in Bahrain, which will be
key to ensuring the country's stability and security. The United States
supports Bahrain's National Dialogue and the government's ongoing
efforts to implement recommendations from the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry report. We will continue to be a strong partner
of Bahrain and the Bahraini people in the years ahead.
Oman is strategically located along the Strait of Hormuz and the
Indian Ocean and has played a steadying role and been a voice of
moderation in the region for many years. We have a shared appreciation
of the situation in the Gulf and Oman provides valued perspective for
maintaining regional stability. We enjoy trusted military relations
with the professional Omani Armed Forces and we are enhancing
interoperability through exercises and Foreign Military Sales.
In the face of intense regional pressure and internal economic
crisis, Jordan endures as one of our most dependable allies in the
region. Political reform is clearly occurring even as the spillover of
Syrian refugees severely impacts a challenging economic situation.
Always a leader in the region, King Abdullah II continues to press
forward with many political changes to strengthen Jordan's democratic
processes. On the international front, he advocates for re-energizing
the Middle East Peace. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) continue to
provide strong leadership and perform admirably and professionally
while stretched thin, and while continuing to deploy troops in support
of ISAF in Afghanistan. The JAF provides protection and humanitarian
relief to the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees who have fled to
Jordan over the last 2 years. Our continued support for Jordan,
including building the capacity of the JAF, has never been more
critical. A stable and secure Jordan is a needed bulwark now more than
ever.
Iraq remains at the geo-strategic center of the Middle East. Iraq
is also the fourth largest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) partner in the
region, and ninth in the world. As we work to develop a new strategic
relationship with the Iraqi government, our desired end state is a
sustained U.S.-Iraqi partnership in which Iraq becomes a proactive
security partner with their neighbors in the region. A shared border
with Iran is a reality as is the spillover of Syria's civil war that
can reignite sectarian violence in Iraq. Our military-to-military
relationship forged in recent years is the foundation for developing
the desired strategic partnership. U.S. security assistance and FMS are
key tools for building and shaping Iraq's defense capabilities and
integrating Iraqi security forces into the region, anchored by U.S.
materiel and training. Recently convened Defense and Security Joint
Coordination Committees have helped in this regard and CENTCOM
continues expanding security cooperation activities that deepen our
military-to-military ties with Iraq, to include opening doors for
Iraqis to participate in our regional exercises. Internally today, the
security environment in Iraq continues to present significant
challenges, and the United States is supporting the Government of
Iraq's efforts to confront these threats. The imperfect political
processes still keep most of the tensions from creating havoc. However,
persistent Arab-Kurd tensions and increasing Sunni discontent--
exacerbated by events in Syria and a sustained violent AQI threat--
diminish their regional leadership potential as well as their internal
stability. Now the world's third largest producer of oil and desirous
of the needed stability for exporting its oil, Iraq's long term
interests align more closely with its Arab neighbors in the GCC than
with Iran. With our persistent efforts over time, Iraq could become a
partner that is both a consumer and provider of security in the region.
Egypt remains one of the most important partners in the pursuit of
regional peace and stability in CENTCOM's theater of operations. They
continue to support our over-flight permissions and Suez Canal transit
courtesies and maintain a field hospital in Afghanistan in support of
the NATO campaign. The Egyptian military is also deploying peacekeeping
troops in Darfur, Sudan. The ceasefire agreement with Israel is holding
and Israeli military leaders have noted that Gaza is quieter today than
it has been in years. In the Sinai, the Egyptians are taking steps to
improve security by relocating border detection equipment to counter
smuggling activities and establishing a National Agency for Development
and Reconstruction. Further, their military has created quick response
forces to improve security for the Multinational Force and Observers
Force stationed in the Sinai, which includes around 600 U.S. troops.
The political situation remains fluid thus heightening the potential
for further changes, and this dynamic could place strains on the
network of relations between Egypt and its neighbors that have
historically been critical to the anticipation and mitigation of
emergent crises. Additionally, the dire state of the Egyptian economy
remains a cause of concern and a driver of internal dissent. Our
relationship with the Egyptian senior military leadership remains on a
firm footing characterized by candid and professional discussions. Our
military assistance plays a major role in protecting our interests and
is crucial to the modernization and interoperability of the Egyptian
Armed Forces and CENTCOM endorses its continued support without
conditionality.
As the sole multi-confessional security institution in Lebanon, the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a unifying force and the principal
governmental organization viewed positively by the Lebanese from all
sectarian groups. In light of the ongoing situation in Syria, our
various forms of aid to the LAF are vital to maintaining Lebanon's
internal stability and helping to guard against the spillover violence
from across the Syrian border. Our program providing military training
and material support to the LAF has enabled them to be a more effective
counter-balance to violent extremists within Lebanon. Our shared goal
is to support the Lebanese Government to be responsive to the peoples'
needs while allowing the LAF to build into the principal security force
in a country long abused by extremists and externally supported
militias.
In Yemen, President Hadi has made important progress implementing
the GCC-sponsored political transition agreement. He continues to
exhibit sound leadership and a strong commitment to reform. To support
the Yemeni Government's implementation of the agreement, we are working
closely with the Ministry of Defense to restructure and professionalize
the military and security apparatus to effectively deal with critical
national security threats. The economic situation, already degraded by
a long period of unrest, remains vulnerable and poses a significant
threat to stability. The security situation remains fragile due to the
threats posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Iran's
destabilizing activities. We continue our support to the national unity
government to reduce the opportunity for violent extremists to hold
terrain, challenge the elected government, or conduct operations
against U.S. interests in the region or the homeland.
As the crisis in Syria enters its third year, there is little
evidence to suggest the conflict's end is imminent. Russia and China's
regrettable vetoes in the U.N. and Iran and Hezbollah's full support
have helped the Asad regime to remain defiant in the face of
international condemnation. The regime has shown a growing willingness
to escalate violence in pursuit of its goal to retain power at all
costs. The regime's use of ballistic missiles since December 2012
perhaps best illustrates this point: Over 80 of these largely
inaccurate but highly destructive weapons have been launched thus far,
with little regard for collateral civilian population casualties. The
regime has used almost every conventional weapon in its arsenal and we
maintain a constant watch for any employment of its chemical and
biological weapons (CBW). As the conflict spreads, potentially
threatening the security of the regime's CBW stockpile, it will be
increasingly difficult to track the vulnerability and status of these
weapons.
The conflict has already resulted in an unprecedented level of
violence, with the United Nations assessing more than 70,000 dead and
nearly 1 million refugees fleeing the bloodshed (as of mid-Feb 2013).
Despite tangible gains by the opposition, the Syrian military maintains
its core capabilities--including ground forces, special operations
forces, air forces, integrated air defense systems (IADS), and theater
ballistic missiles (TBMs). Moreover, while the opposition has inflicted
significant losses on Syria's military and eroded Asad's control over
many parts of the country, the regime has responded with paramilitary
operations assisted by sustained Iranian financial and lethal support.
Hezbollah is now heavily committed as a critical partner of the Syrian
regime, providing training and oversight to the Shabiha militia in
conjunction with Iranian support. This cooperation between Syria, Iran
and Hezbollah stands in contrast to the relative disunity of the Syrian
Opposition - which is further encumbered by the malign influence of Al
Nusrah/AQ-related groups.
In Pakistan we face a confluence of issues that challenge the
Pakistan government and our ability to provide assistance. The
political and security environment in Pakistan is impacted by terrorist
attacks and ethno-sectarianism and a civilian government with tenuous
control in parts of the country, radicalization of segments of the
population, overstretched military, strained relationships with
neighbors, and dealing with frequent natural disasters. The United
States has a vested interest in Pakistan's sustainability as a nation
and despite challenges in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, they are an
important regional partner that has sacrificed greatly in the war on
terror. They must play a constructive role if Afghanistan is to achieve
long-term stability.
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship in 2012 began at a low point as
Pakistan maintained the closure of the U.S./ISAF ground lines of
communication (GLOC) to Afghanistan in response to the tragic November
2011 incident at Salala. The relationship has steadily improved since
the GLOC reopened in July 2012 when we resumed security cooperation
with Pakistan's Army and concluded an agreement that permits two-way
flow on the GLOC. We also concluded a tripartite U.S.-Pakistan-
Afghanistan agreement to facilitate better coordination and
complementary operations on both sides of the border that disrupt the
enemies' freedom of movement and help prevent another fratricide
incident. In December, we held our first high-level bilateral Defense
Consultative Group in more than 18 months. We resumed strategic-level
talks and committed to implement a framework for defense cooperation
that promotes peace and stability within the region, based on areas of
converging interests and principles of mutual respect and transparency.
Subsequently, we have held operational level talks, including through
the recent Defense Resourcing Conference and Military Consultative
Committee, which focused on synchronization of our efforts to build
Pakistan's capabilities to achieve our common objectives. Continued
support for Foreign Military Financing, International Military
Education and Training, and the Coalition Support Fund will provide the
necessary tools to keep our military-to-military relationship on a
solid footing.
In Afghanistan, ISAF operations and an increasingly capable ANSF
have degraded the enemy's capability. The counterinsurgency campaign
has made gains and created space for the Afghan government to continue
to make progress toward long-term stability after 30-plus years of war.
Transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANSF
continues. Tranche 4 has been announced and will soon move into the
Transition Phase, after which 87 percent of the population will be in
areas secured by the ANSF. To that end, ANSF units are demonstrating
increasing confidence and capability. As the ANSF assumes full security
lead, the Coalition will continue its transition to a security force
assistance (SFA) role. These SFA Teams (SFATs) will focus not only on
the Afghan National Army (ANA) maneuver units and the Afghan Uniformed
Police (AUP), but will also work to develop a greater level of autonomy
for key higher headquarters, district and provincial level components
within the ANSF. With sustained U.S. and international support, in
accordance with NATO's Lisbon and Chicago decisions, the ANSF will have
the capability to prevent the return of terrorist safe havens and
prevent a Taliban re-emergence as a dominant force.
However, our mission is not yet complete and our hard-fought gains
must be strengthened. As the final tranches of security transition are
implemented, Afghanistan will undergo three critical transitions: the
assumption of full security lead by the ANSF, elections in the spring
of 2014 with the transfer of authority to a new Afghan administration,
and the redeployment of the majority of ISAF forces. The success of
these transitions relies on continued financial support from the
international community, particularly for training, advising and
equipping the ANSF. In the current context of global fiscal austerity,
demonstrated U.S. leadership through continued support of Afghanistan
will be critical to maintaining Coalition cohesion. I greatly
appreciate your support for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, which will
continue to be a necessity through 2018. Not supporting the ANSF will
greatly limit our ability to prevent the return of terrorist safe
havens and a Taliban resurgence that threatens the Afghan Government.
Our enemies are hedging and contemplating whether the opportunity will
arise for them to pursue their agendas. Specific tools such as the
Commander's Emergency Response Program, Lift and Sustain, Coalition
Support Funds, Coalition Readiness Support Program and the Afghanistan
Infrastructure Fund need your support if we are to achieve a successful
transition.
The Central Asian States remain key supporting partners for our
Afghanistan Strategic Partnership and are concerned about U.S. long-
term engagement with the region. They share our priority to maintain
security in the region after the transition in Afghanistan. As we
transition, maintaining access to the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN) for logistical resupply of the Afghan campaign and retrograde
operations is of particular importance as we seek to promote stability
and assure our partners of our continued commitment to the region. The
development of the NDN has been a critical investment to that end and
cooperation with our Central Asian partners will continue post-2014.
Solidifying international support for the New Silk Road initiative, now
and after the drawdown in Afghanistan, will increase economic
development, contribute to stability across Central Asia, and may help
mitigate the impact of a potential economic vacuum that illicit
industries might otherwise fill. Coupled with our NDN efforts, CENTCOM
will continue to provide military assistance focused on building
partner capacity and capabilities to combat terrorists and counter
illegal trafficking in all its forms. In addition, we will work closely
with several of our willing partners who are committed to developing
deployable peacekeeping units. Programs and authorities such as Section
1206 (Global Train and Equip Fund) and the new Global Security
Contingency Fund, together with the National Guard's State Partnership
Program (SPP) represent cost-effective means for the United States to
respond to emerging opportunities for building partner capacity.
Our relationship with Kazakhstan continues to mature from one of
security assistance to a security partnership. In November 2012, we
signed a Five-Year Military Cooperation Plan (2013-2017) and a Three-
Year Plan of Cooperation in support of Kazakhstan's Partnership for
Peace Training Center. Both agreements will assist Kazakhstan in
realizing its objective to deploy a company-sized unit in support of a
United Nations peacekeeping operation by 2015. Towards this end,
Kazakhstan will undergo a NATO peacekeeping evaluation and
certification process at Steppe Eagle, a peacekeeping exercise co-
sponsored by Kazakhstan and the U.S. scheduled for August 2013.
Kazakhstan remains a force for stability within the region and supports
our efforts in Afghanistan through facilitation of the NDN.
Kyrgyzstan continues to be a key partner for U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan and the region. Our military relationship continues to
improve, particularly in the areas of regional security and military
security cooperation. Kyrgyzstan aims to deploy a U.S.-trained
peacekeeping mission within the next 2 years. The Kyrgyz provision of
general access and over flight and use of the Manas Transit Center
remain key factors for successful operations in Afghanistan.
For Tajikistan, building and maintaining counterterrorism, border
security and counter-narcotics capability to protect our mutual
interests from the threat of VEOs are important for regional stability.
In concert with our counterterrorism efforts, we are working with
Tajikistan to improve disaster response capabilities. Tajikistan is
committed to deploying their U.S.-trained peacekeeping battalion on a
United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2014. We continue to use the
transit routes along the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan (KKT)
route of the NDN and explore options to facilitate the transit of goods
and access in the event of a crisis.
Turkmenistan's policy of positive neutrality governs the shape and
pace of our security assistance relationship. This is illustrated in
their preference for non-military, non-alliance exchanges, such as
those hosted by the George C. Marshall Center and Near East Asia Center
for Strategic Studies on broad, multilateral topics. Our bilateral
security assistance relationship has seen modest growth focused on
building their Caspian Sea and border security capacity.
Our relationship with Uzbekistan continues to improve in a
deliberate, balanced way driven by our common regional security
concerns and expansion of the NDN. Security cooperation provides
increased opportunity for engagement. The bilateral agreements signed
in 2012 are now being implemented and are beginning to produce
important capabilities that support our campaign in Afghanistan. In
November 2012, we conducted our first Bilateral Defense Consultations,
serving to focus and strengthen our military cooperation toward
security threats of mutual concern. We expect cooperation with
Uzbekistan to continue to progress.

REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

America faces hard fiscal realities and the Defense Department is
undergoing a period of transition adapting to decreased budgets. U.S.
Central Command, along with the rest of DOD and the interagency, will
do less with less, but we will not do it less well. CENTCOM will remain
tenacious stewards of taxpayer resources as we seek to develop and
employ innovative ways and means to achieve our ends.
It is vitally important to invest in relationship development and
expand the capacity and capability of our regional partners. To
accomplish this, we must adapt CENTCOM's presence and Regional Security
Cooperation through strategic reposturing of our forces and by
providing these forces with the necessary support. We also work to
maintain access and presence that provide both crisis response and
prepositioning of critical combat assets and equipment should the need
for reinforcements arise. Finally, we need to maintain robust
international training opportunities in U.S. schools for their officers
as well as multinational exercises as we work to promote regional
security and stability by, with and through our partners.
As the war in Afghanistan draws down and our presence reduces, it
becomes increasingly important to cultivate strategic partnerships that
enable sustained stability. We will need to continue to leverage
combined training with our partners and build coalition integration for
long-term security in the region. CENTCOM's exercise and engagement
program will enable critical mission rehearsals with partners across
the entire military spectrum of operations--reducing the risk of denied
access while enhancing interoperability with our partners and creating
mutual awareness. This approach will build confidence and enable lower
cost mil-to-mil engagement and training activities.
Reposturing for the future, our enduring locations and projects
support both a steady state and surge basing capacity, air-refueling,
air operations, command and control, and special operations missions to
preserve freedom of movement and strategic reach. Our presence also
serves to demonstrate U.S. commitment to our allies, partners and foes.
Our partners, in turn, provide locations that support critical access
for current and future contingency operations while improving their
forces and building interoperability with CENTCOM.
The Iranian Threat Network and Ballistic Missile capability
continue to pose a great threat in the region. These threats are
expanding in quantity and quality and our focus on the nuclear threat
will not divert our attention from the larger issues related to Iran's
malign influence, as demonstrated through Lebanese Hezbollah and others
of their ilk who are working with Iran's support to destabilize the
region. Given Iran's intent to drive us out of the region, to undercut
our partners, and its stated threats to disrupt international oil
trade, our commitment and reassurance to our regional partners and
allies have become the lynchpins to regional security and stability.
Our efforts to advance regional integrated air and missile defense help
foster U.S. and GCC coordination and advances GCC capabilities in this
area. This also reduces risk to U.S. and partner deterrence and
response capabilities and preserves freedom of movement. Iran's
bombastic threats against the Strait of Hormuz, support for violent
proxies and demonstrated military capabilities make the goal of
enhancing GCC-wide missile defense capabilities and strengthening
collaboration with our forces all the more important.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the most
persistent and lethal weapon confronting our forces, those of our
partner nations, and local populaces throughout the area of
responsibility with an average of 172 incidents per month over the past
2 years, principally but not solely in Afghanistan. We continue to
execute a comprehensive program with the keenly focused Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to deter and defeat the
IED threat in the region and we appreciate Congress' counter-homemade
explosives legislation provision.
Our strategic communications and information operations programs
provide non-lethal tools to disrupt terrorist recruitment and
propaganda within the region. In terms of both outcomes and cost, these
programs are highly-effective complementary activities vital to our
strategy in the region: they allow us to exert presence, even while our
combat forces in the region are reducing. They provide the human socio-
cultural data, media analysis, internet video products, and multi-media
campaign that include attributable social media and the Regional Web
Interaction program to counter current and future threats. They also
enable the dissemination of regionally focused information that
counters violent extremist ideology and propaganda, amplifies moderate
voices within the region, and degrades adversary dominance of the
information domain.
These relatively inexpensive activities support interagency efforts
to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of
violence that al Qaeda and other terrorists exploit. To make this
supportable across the Defense enterprise requires an enduring funding
mechanism that DOD and our partners can rely on. Episodic engagement is
inefficient and has the potential to create animosity due to unmet
expectations by the governments and populations we are trying to
support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic
risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive
responses to terrorist attacks. We seek your support to sustain and
expand these efforts.
As I travel throughout the AOR and see the promise of new
initiatives and the risk posed by numerous challenges, I receive
requests from military leaders across the region to increase
intelligence sharing between our militaries. Many show determination to
make tough decisions and prioritize limited resources to oppose
antagonists seeking to destabilize their countries or use them to plan
and stage attacks against the U.S. Homeland. With this in mind, and in
order to demonstrate our commitment, I requested the Intelligence
Community to begin drafting releasable products for our most trusted
partners in the Levant, on the Arabian Peninsula, in the Central Asian
States, and in South Asia as a standard practice rather than the
exception.
I am encouraged by the personal attention the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence is giving these matters. Director
Clapper's strong emphasis and encouragement for the Intelligence
Community to produce intelligence in a manner that eases our ability to
responsibly share information with our military counterparts creates a
stronger, more focused front against our common enemies and builds our
partner nations' confidence. We are grateful for the nimble manner in
which our Intelligence Community has strengthened our efforts to
checkmate more of our enemy's designs.

CONCLUSION

Thank you for your continued support to U.S. Central Command and to
our troops engaged across the region. I recognize the difficult choices
you must make as we confront fiscal realities. We continue to
prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we
rebalance our approach to work by, with and through our partners while
continuing to build partner capacity and reduce our expenditures.
As a geographic combatant commander, the negative impact of a year-
long continuing resolution and/or sequestration would severely undercut
the coherence of our efforts. As conveyed in recent testimony by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Carter before this committee, ``The consequences
of sequestration and lowering of discretionary caps are serious and
far-reaching. In the near-term, reductions would create [are creating]
an immediate crisis in military readiness, especially if coupled with
an extension of the Continuing Resolution under which we currently
operate. In the long-term, failure to replace large arbitrary budget
cuts with sensible and balanced deficit reduction require this nation
to change its defense strategy.'' The Department continues to protect
operations and priority activities in high threat areas, which will
result in less initial impact on my current operations. However,
impacts on readiness, investments and the civilian workforce are
certain as well as other areas that are necessary to support our
national security strategy and maintain options for the President.
CENTCOM will weather the challenges we face in the short term. We
absorbed reductions in fiscal year 2012 and will do our part to reduce
spending this year as well. We prioritize our needs based on our most
critical requirements as we balance our approach to work by, with and
through our partners. Looking ahead, CENTCOM will do its best to do
what is required to protect U.S. national security interests in a
region undergoing social and political change and in the face of
declining resources for our own defense.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral McRaven.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral McRaven. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee: I also
appreciate the opportunity to address the committee today and
talk about the magnificent work being accomplished around the
globe by the men and women of the SOCOM. Sir, I have also
submitted a statement for the record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, before I begin, however, I would like
to recognize my colleague, my mentor, and my friend, General
Jim Mattis. In the coming months, sir, General Mattis will be
completing a 41-year career in the service of our country.
During that time he has fought in every major conflict in his
era. He has led soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with a
degree of caring, passion, and professionalism that would make
every American proud.
General Mattis has always been known for two things, his
incredible operational acumen and his candor. I know of no
other general who is as well-versed in the art of war and no
other man who speaks his mind the way Jim Mattis does. Every
warrior who has ever served by his side feels honored and
privileged to have done so. I count myself in that group.
Jim, you have been particularly supportive of the men and
women of SOCOM and on behalf of all those great warriors and
Americans everywhere, I salute you for your service and your
sacrifice to this Nation. It has been my distinct honor to have
served with you.
Mr. Chairman, this is my second opportunity to address this
committee since I took command in the summer of 2011. Since
that time, I'm proud to say we have continued the great work
initiated by my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, and at the
same time we have adapted to the changing strategic and fiscal
environment to keep SOF relevant now and in the future.
In Afghanistan, we helped establish a new SOF command
structure which brought the various NATO and U.S. SOF elements
into alignment under a two-star headquarters. This has allowed
the SOF to have a common view of the enemy and synchronize our
SOF to achieve a common end-state. It has made SOF even more
effective than ever before.
Partnered with our Afghan SOF, we have continued to attrite
the enemy leadership, while at the same time building and
training ANSF so they can stand on their own against this
determined threat.
In addition to Afghanistan, SOF are in 78 countries around
the world. At the request of those nations, we are helping to
build their SOF capacity and strengthen our partnership and
allied networks to deal with the unpredictable and complex
threat we face today.
In the 2012 DSG, former Secretary of Defense Panetta wrote:
``We are shaping a joint force for the future that will be
smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and
technologically advanced. It will have cutting edge
capabilities, exploiting our technology, joint and networked
advantage. It will be led by the highest quality, battle-tested
professionals. It will have a global presence, strengthening
alliances and partnerships across all regions.''
I believe the Secretary's words speak to the core
capabilities of SOF and therefore SOCOM is working with the
Joint Chiefs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
to ensure we are postured now and into the future to meet the
objectives of the strategy.
Finally, I have made the caring for our force and their
families my top priority. In the past year, my command sergeant
major and I have met with the soldiers and their families from
around the SOCOM enterprise. We have listened to their concerns
and, with the support of the Services, we are aggressively
implementing programs and plans to help with the physical,
mental, and spiritual well-being of the force. We have a
professional and moral obligation to take care of our warriors
and their families, and we greatly appreciate the support of
this committee and other Members on the Hill in our efforts to
take care of these men and women.
Thank you again for your commitment to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of DOD, and
specifically those great warriors who make up SOCOM. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM William H. McRaven, USN

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to address this committee, the second in my tenure
as the 9th commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
SOCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, yet it is distinct
in that it exercises numerous Service, military department, and defense
agency-like responsibilities. Under title 10, U.S.C., sections 164 and
167, it is my legal responsibility to organize, train and equip my
force; to build a strategy that supports the goals and objectives of
the Defense Strategic Guidance; and to provide combat ready forces to
the President and the Secretary of Defense to meet the challenges of
today's security environment.

SOCOM STRATEGY-SOF 2020

In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued his Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Chairman followed with his Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The DSG describes the Joint Force
of the future as ``agile, flexible, ready'' and possessing global
reach, thereby directing ``the joint force to capitalize on networks
and interdependency to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and
evolving war.'' Building on this imperative, the CCJO envisions a
``globally postured Joint Force . . . that quickly combine[s]
capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons,
geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.'' Special
Operations Forces are uniquely suited to implement the guidance
outlined in these documents. Specifically, SOF are ``rapidly deployable
. . . have operational reach . . . [are] persistent . . . and do not
constitute an irreversible policy commitment.'' General Dempsey
concluded his Capstone Document with the statement that military
success in today's environment is ``about building a stronger network
to defeat the networks that confront us.''
We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly
networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around
the world. These networks are diversifying their activities, resulting
in the convergence of threats that were once linear. In today's
environment, this convergence can have explosive and destabilizing
effects--there is no such thing as a local problem. In the words of
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ``Extremist networks
squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a
cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu
virus in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and
globalization have made our countries and our communities
interdependent and interconnected. Today's threats have become so
complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever
hope to solve them alone.''
To address these problems, we must adopt a global perspective. With
SOF deployed in over 75 countries on a daily basis, I can provide a
global view of the problem and help link and synchronize global effects
across geographic boundaries. However, as the SOCOM Commander, with
some unique exceptions, I do not command and control any forces in
combat or crisis. I am a ``supporting commander'' to the geographic
combatant commanders and the Chiefs of Mission (COMs). It is my job to
provide them the best Special Operations Force in the world. It is
their job, to employ those forces in support of U.S. policy. Special
Operations Forces do nothing, absolutely nothing, without the approval
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the geographic combatant
commanders and the Chiefs of Mission--nothing. To best serve the
interest of the GCCs and the Chiefs of Mission, SOCOM is developing a
plan to enhance its already global force by networking with our U.S.
interagency counterparts, and our foreign allies and partners around
the globe. We aim to provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with improved
special operations capacity and are aligning structures, processes, and
authorities that enable the network.

THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK

Given strategic guidance, increasing fiscal constraints, and the
networked and dispersed nature of conflict, SOF will play an
increasingly critical role in the Joint Force of the future. Although
SOF usually only garner attention for high-stakes raids and rescues,
direct action missions are only a small part of what we do, albeit a
very important part. SOCOM will continue to ensure our Nation has the
best precision strike force in the world. We will not let up on that
front. However, I'd like to emphasize that, in fact, on any given day
SOF are working with our allies around the world, helping build
indigenous special operations capacity so that our partners can
effectively deal with the threat of violent extremist groups,
insurgents, and narco-terrorists--themselves. Indeed, SOF focuses
intently on building partner capacity and security force assistance so
that local and regional threats do not become global and thus more
costly--both in blood and treasure.
Accordingly, with the support of the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission,
SOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our interagency
and international partners in order to gain expanded situational
awareness of emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables
small, persistent presence in critical locations, and facilitates
engagement where necessary or appropriate--all under the authority of
the GCC and COM.
Through civil-military support elements and support to public
diplomacy, SOF directly support interagency efforts to counter violent
extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al Qaeda
and other terrorists exploit. These efforts to prevent terrorist
radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are critical to defeating
this dangerous ideology in the future; neither we nor our partners can
kill our way to victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity
and perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the
potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the
governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the long-
run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American
lives, and reduce the need for expensive response to terrorist attacks.
To this end, using already programmed force structure, SOCOM is
methodically enhancing the capabilities of the Theater Special
Operations Commands (TSOCs) based on a multi-year deliberate process
supported by detailed analysis and war gaming. The goal is to increase
the capacity and capabilities of the TSOC and their assigned forces to
the GCCs to conduct full spectrum special operations--ranging from
building partner capacity (particularly in austere, high-risk or
sensitive environments) to irregular warfare and counterterrorism.
In partnership with the GCCs, COM, TSOCs, other U.S. Government
agencies and partner nations, SOCOM is working to develop opportunities
to improve our partnership with regional Special Operations Forces.
This approach was very successful in NATO, with the establishment of
the NATO SOF Headquarters which allowed U.S. and partner nations to
share information, improve interoperability and, when necessary, work
together abroad. While the NATO construct is unique in the world, we
believe there are other low-key opportunities that may present
themselves in other regions of the world.
In addition to the SOF capacity inherent in all GCCs through the
TSOCs, SOCOM also employs Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs)
in key U.S. embassies around the world. SOLOs are in-country SOF
advisors to the U.S. Country Team. They advise and assist partner
nation SOF and help to synchronize activities with the host nation.
Currently, there are SOLOs in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom,
Jordan, Poland, Colombia, France, Turkey, Kenya, and Italy.
Similarly, as part of the global SOF network here at home, one-to-
three person Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) work with our
interagency partners in the National Capital Region (NCR). They
comprise the SOF liaison network that assists in synchronizing DOD
planning for training, exercises and operations. Currently, we have
SOSTs working within 19 U.S. Government departments and agencies.
Given the importance of interagency collaboration, SOCOM is placing
greater emphasis on its presence in the National Capital Region (NCR)
to better support coordination and decision making with interagency
partners. Thus, SOCOM began to consolidate its presence in the NCR in
early 2012. This is not a duplication of effort. We are focused instead
on consolidating SOCOM elements in the Washington, DC, region under the
leadership of the SOCOM Vice Commander--who resides in Washington.
Specifically, SOCOM-NCR ensures that the perspectives and capabilities
of interagency and international mission partners are incorporated into
all phases of SOF planning efforts. The SOCOM NCR also conducts
outreach to academia, nongovernmental organizations, industry and other
private sector organizations to get their perspective on complex issues
affecting SOF.
At the SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, the staff will serve as the
focal point for coordinating information that supports SOCOM
warfighters. It is here that SOCOM will maintain the global perspective
on all SOF activities in support of the GCCs and U.S. Chiefs of
Mission. As such, SOCOM will support operations, intelligence,
logistics, planning, communications, and provide critical information
to enable forward deployed SOF to meet mission requirements. SOCOM will
monitor SOF supporting campaigns, ensure that the Command is satisfying
GCC theater requirements, maintain the global common operating picture
for the SOF network, and monitor the readiness and availability of all
U.S. SOF capabilities. The entire network will be enabled by the
existing communications infrastructure. However, communication and
information sharing must facilitate interconnectedness beyond the U.S.-
only realm, and improve partner-nation capacity, interagency
coordination, and stakeholder situational awareness by providing
information technology infrastructure and communications services to
unite U.S. and partner-nation SOF, plus other mission partners. This
communications infrastructure will leverage existing networks and
systems to avoid duplication of effort.
As a whole, the SOF network represents a way to improve the support
to the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission and to empower a global effort with
capable allies and partners. Recognizing that we have much to learn
from each other, working with partner SOF will build mutual trust,
foster enduring relationships, and provide new opportunities to affect
shared challenges.
To this end, the Secretary of Defense's authority to support
foreign forces, irregular forces, and groups or individuals who support
or facilitate ongoing military operations to combat terrorism--namely
section 1208 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005--remains critical to
Special Operations. The drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will not
diminish the need for 1208 authority. In fact, GCCs' demand for 1208
authority has increased, and the authority's utility is recognized as
mission essential in winning their current fight.

PRESERVE THE FORCE AND FAMILIES

A SOF Universal Truth is that ``people are more important than
hardware.'' We recognize that none of the efforts described in
preceding paragraphs are possible without having the dedicated,
professional SOF warriors to bring them to fruition. Hence, it is
imperative that we do all that we can to preserve the force and care
for their families. Therefore, to lessen the strain, we are seeking
improvements in the predictability of SOF schedules--training,
education, deployment, and rest.
SOCOM must ensure our SOF warriors and their families are properly
cared for and that we work to help them reduce the stress they face
related to high operational tempos. Difficulty also occurs as forces
reconnect and reintegrate into garrison and family activities. DOD
provides preventive and responsive counseling, medical, psychological,
and rehabilitative care to institutionalize the resiliency of our SOF
warriors and their families.
Everyone in the fight has been significantly changed by their
experiences. Providing the treatment our troops need and reducing the
stigma associated with asking for help is a top priority for all SOCOM
leaders. For our servicemembers and their families, we are implementing
programs identified as best practices and aggressively
institutionalizing education for our Chaplains and Mental Health
professionals to emphasize prevention-oriented care. Through human
performance improvement, readiness, and spiritual growth, we hope to
preserve our forces for the duration of their careers. Recognizing that
the readiness of many of our servicemembers is inextricably tied to the
well-being and happiness of their families, we have sought to bolster
the care afforded to them. Additionally, to increase the predictability
of servicemembers' time, SOCOM will redouble our efforts to reach out
to families by opening up communication channels at all levels of the
command through innovative use of varied media. We are committed to
sustaining our force and families and will not break faith with our SOF
family.
Maximizing SOF readiness also requires an enhanced capacity to
anticipate and proactively preserve and manage the future force. I am
implementing an enterprise-wide PERSTEMPO capability that will provide
commanders increased visibility, fidelity, and ability to manage SOF
readiness down to the individual servicemember level. Once fully
implemented throughout the command by fiscal year 2014, SOF commanders
from the O-5 level and above will have a near real-time common
operating picture of SOF readiness. This new capability further
enhances commanders' force management decision making, improves the
quality of life for the SOF force, and offers promise for maximizing
force readiness through improved recruitment, retention, and protection
of investments in SOF personnel and the resources that enable them.

ACQUISITION EXCELLENCE

Mobility, lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and survivability remain critical SOF enablers for the full spectrum of
SOF operations. SOCOM's unique acquisition authorities remain critical
to meeting the rapid, information sensitive and operationally peculiar
demands of Special Operations. Specifically, SOCOM employs rapid and
tailored acquisition strategies to modify Service-common equipment,
enhance commercial items, or--when required--develop, procure and field
SOF-peculiar equipment and services to respond to global requirements.
SOCOM will continue its emphasis on equipping SOF operators as a
system. Development, procurement and fielding of the SOF individual
equipment system (i.e. individual protection, visual augmentation
systems, weapons and sights) needs to suit the wide variety of SOF
tasks and environments. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care system and
use of Freeze Dried Plasma will combine to help care for wounded
operators in remote and challenging environments, often at great
distance from primary care facilities.
To meet the wide range of SOF missions, SOCOM employs platforms
that are both versatile and agile. For example, current acquisition
efforts focus on equipping both manned and unmanned fixed wing assets
with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
suitable for diverse global requirements. The Non-Standard Aviation
fleet of aircraft supports SOF intra-theater mobility, Aviation Foreign
Internal Defense, and manned ISR. The SOF fleet of Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA)--ranging from the manportable RQ-20A Puma to the medium
altitude MQ-9 Reaper--provides essential ISR capabilities and cutting
edge sensor and communication technologies. SOCOM's ability to
efficiently modify service common ISR assets with capabilities such as
high definition (HD) full motion video provides game-changing,
operational effects at relatively small investment.
SOCOM is continuing to execute programs to modernize its rotary
wing and maritime mobility fleets, replacing legacy equipment such as
the MH-60 K/L, Mark V Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable boat
(RHIB), and SEAL Delivery Vehicle in the coming years. On the ground,
SOCOM will maintain a family of special operations tactical combat
vehicles with customizable, mission-specific payloads. A Non-Standard
Commercial Vehicle (NSCV) capability enables SOF operators to maintain
a low profile among indigenous populations while providing necessary
mobility and protection.
Global SOF rely on the SOF Information Environment (SIE) to achieve
full operational potential. Within the SIE, SOCOM will continue to
incorporate a SOF Deployable Node (SDN), a family of Wide Band SATCOM
systems, and increased access to SIE voice, data and video services to
deployed headquarters and operational elements. Simultaneously, SOCOM
will continue its efforts to downsize system profiles and footprint
through engineering efficiencies of common and scalable components
amongst SDN variants, provide SIE access to tactical wireless users
through SDN, and focus current efforts on providing SIE access to
maritime and ground mobility platforms.
SOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate continues to
pursue technology innovation, and utilizes a Special Operations
Advanced Technology collaborative process for SOF-centric, S&T
development. This process allows better synchronization of SOF-related
technology initiatives with the Department of Defense and other
government agencies to leverage external capital opportunities that
address SOF capability gaps. S&T's near-term technology development
efforts are focused on providing SOF operators with all-digital, multi-
spectral visual augmentation systems and advanced novel materials to
improve protection and survivability for personnel and platforms.

RESPONSIBLE RESOURCING AND SERVICE SUPPORT

Despite an increase in operational commitments over the last
decade, we have been able to sustain our obligation to appropriately
organize, train, and equip the warriors from whom we ask so much. We
are aware of current budget uncertainties, and are therefore committed
to only prudent use of resources provided to us by the taxpayers. I am
committed to exercising common-sense steps to cost-cutting and cost-
avoidance. The Command has begun to restructure and realign resources
to support the SOF 2020 vision which reflects the Nation's strategic
priorities. Currently, we are able to execute the vision I have
outlined in this document without any increase in either civilian or
military manpower outside of current programmed growth or additional
funding. I will continue to manage cost-growth in acquisition programs,
and implement requirements of the combatant commanders, Executive order
mandates, and DOD auditability guidance.
SOCOM has successfully used the Rapid Acquisition Authority to
source a validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities. SOCOM will
rely more heavily on this authority within the future fiscal
environment.
The Command's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its materiel
and service programs is essential to deliver and field critical
requirements and new technologies. SOCOM's capacity to maintain a
competitive advantage on the battlefield depends on out-thinking and
outpacing the enemy in speed, technology, equipment, and
maneuverability. SOF capabilities are directly related to investments
we make through our procurement budget.
SOCOM, like the Services, has seen an extraordinary increase in
operational tempo. Through advanced technologies, the battlefield has
become smaller, highlighting a need for continued interoperability
among the Services and SOF. SOF's reliance on the Services for
institutional training, installation services and support--particularly
in forward deployed locations where SOF can only sustain itself for
short periods of time--remains critical. The Services' support for
SOF's global persistent presence and annual deployments to over 100
countries is both vital and very much appreciated.

CONCLUSION

Budget uncertainties which face the Department of Defense and SOCOM
are of great concern in fiscal year 2013. The SOF network, as a vital
tool to support the President and Secretary of Defense's national
defense strategy, seeks a strong and flexible global network of SOF,
U.S. Government partners, and partner nations. We are working
tirelessly to provide SOF capabilities and capacity to GCCs and Chiefs
of Mission; capabilities and capacities that are supported by the
required structures, processes, and authorities necessary for success.
In the immediate future, and as stated by Chairman Dempsey, the ``Joint
Force 2020 must protect . . . against threats that routinely span
regional boundaries.'' Notably, as presented by former Secretary
Clinton at the International Special Operations Forces Week in May of
last year, ``Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic of smart
power--fast and flexible, constantly adapting, learning new languages
and cultures, dedicated to forming partnerships where we can work
together.'' Your support will ensure SOCOM's continued ability to
successfully address the most challenging security demands of our
Nation.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
We're going to have a 7-minute first round.
Admiral, let me start with you. Relative to Afghanistan, we
read frequently that only 1 of 23 Afghan brigades was rated by
ISAF as being at the highest capability level, and that's
independent with advisers. Now, at the same time we also know
and have read--Senator Reed and I went to Afghanistan, so we
know firsthand--that 70 to 80 percent of the operations that
take place in many regions, including the toughest regions of
Afghanistan, are taking place with not just the leadership, but
with totally Afghan involvement.
Now, those reports seem to be inconsistent. Can you tell us
in your judgment whether or not, is our mission succeeding in
Afghanistan? But second, can you tell us about the capabilities
of the ANSF and whether they are on track for where we expected
them to be at this point in the campaign plan, with a little
over 20 months to go before the end of the ISAF mission?
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll defer to
General Mattis----
Chairman Levin. I thought I would start with General Mattis
on this.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Did I say you, Admiral? I'm sorry.
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, our mission is succeeding.
The Afghan campaign is on track. It is obviously a combination
of progress and violence, but I would say when it comes down to
the ANSF, they are proving themselves capable. Obviously, when
we were looking at the drawdown numbers there was a certain
amount of forecasting that the Afghan forces would be capable.
Let me just give you some statistics that take this beyond
simply my evaluation. Since the 1st of January, we have lost
four U.S. troops, four of our wonderful troops killed in
action. In the same period, the ANSF have lost 198 killed.
There can be no longer any doubt. It's not opinion; it's now a
fact: The Afghans are doing the bulk of the fighting, and they
are doing it with our support.
As a result, I need to go back and look at these statistics
and how we're evaluating forces that are proving themselves in
combat, when on the other hand we're saying only one is capable
of independent operations with our advisers. I think we may
have to relook at how we're measuring them, since obviously in
the field they're measuring themselves against the enemy and
they are proving themselves there.
As far as the ANSF itself, we are continuing to see them
mature and, with our advisers, many of them from the Special
Forces, but also from our conventional forces, as confidence
builders, as bringing American air power to bear, that enabling
function, we are seeing that these lads are willing to take it
to the enemy, and I think the Taliban has very little reason
for comfort right now.
Chairman Levin. General, do you support the decision of the
President relative to the reduction plan that he's announced in
our troops, as well as the pace of those reductions? Do you
support that decision?
General Mattis. The second part of your question makes it--
--
Chairman Levin. The numbers and pace.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. The pace is what makes it
possible for me to support it fully. The pace, by not bringing
the American forces down until after this year's fighting
season, and with what we're seeing of the ANSF, gives me a lot
of confidence we're on track. I support the pace and I support
the number.
Chairman Levin. When you say what we're seeing of the
Afghan forces, you're talking about a positive trend in the
capability of those forces as well as the size?
General Mattis. Absolutely. They are getting better each
day, and with 87 percent of the country now under their lead
and them proving themselves in combat, yes, sir, I support it.
Chairman Levin. There's been a decision made to reconsider
any reduction in the size of the Afghan troops. There was a
NATO decision some months ago that the goal was to reduce them
by 2015, I believe, by about a third, and now that's going to
be reconsidered. Do you agree that we should keep them at their
current level, which is much higher than 250,000? It's about
350,000, I believe.
General Mattis. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it's 352,000, and I
completely support that. That's the way to do it as we draw our
forces down, to make certain the enemy does not see an
opportunity there.
Chairman Levin. Now, relative to Iran, I think most of us
agree with the position of the President, as I said, that
military options need to be kept on the table, if necessary, to
prevent Iran from moving to nuclear weapons. Are those military
option plans being developed? Are they developed now?
General Mattis. Those plans are fully developed, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
This question relates to arming the opposition in Syria.
Should we now provide lethal assistance to the Syrian
opposition, and--well, let me start with that. Should we now
move to providing lethal assistance?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, the situation is so complex
that I have to get some degree of confidence that the weapons
that we would be arming them with are not going to people who
are our enemies. That would be the one caveat that I would put
on any military advice to go forward along those lines. We
don't want to inadvertently, with the best of intentions, arm
people who are basically sworn enemies.
Chairman Levin. You say you would have to get some degree
of confidence in order to make that recommendation. As of this
time, do you have that level of confidence yet?
General Mattis. I do not, Mr. Chairman. But I have not been
tasked with this mission, I have not looked deeply into this
yet, either.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, there's a real threat of violence to the Christian
communities in Iraq. My question to you is whether or not in
your judgment the Iraqi security forces are taking the threat
of violence against those Christian communities seriously and
whether, if not--and I believe that they are not--what can we
do to make sure that they do it?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, Iraq itself is in a post-
combat but prereconciliation situation, I believe. They are
still working out how they settle their differences
politically. So far they are imperfectly working without
resorting to violence. Al Qaeda is conducting most of the
violence.
So long as they continue to try to work these issues out
politically, I believe that in the long run it's the rule of
law and the political resolution of challenges that provide for
all minorities in Iraq the best opportunity to live safely. The
military itself, when I see them in action trying to work it
out the Kurdish situation to the north, appear to be willing to
negotiate, to talk, not to go to arms. I see them doing the
same thing pretty much with the Sunni troubles they're having
out west. That's the role I think of a military, to try and
buttress law and the rule of law and not to try to provide
security as the sole solution to that problem.
Chairman Levin. I do hope that you and your successor will
look for ways that we can press the Iraqis to do what they
committed to do, which is to protect minorities inside of Iraq.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my opening statement I talked about what we did in--
right now it's Senator Toomey and I headed up the effort to
allow more flexibility if the chiefs--and I mentioned to you
that I talked to the chiefs about this and they responded
pretty strongly that, yes, in the same top line, operating with
the same amount of money, would we be--to reduce the
devastation, I guess is the best way to put it.
Would each one of you agree with the chiefs' comments? Any
comments you'd like to make about what type of thing we could
do under that arrangement that we couldn't do with the straight
cuts?
General Mattis. Senator, I believe that if we got some
degree of budget certainty through an appropriations bill that
provides us as much as the CR does now, so we know for certain
what we're dealing with, then, like any household or business
in America, we can make some wise choices. The flexibility
you're talking about for the Service Chiefs would be critical
to those choices, obviously consistent with the congressional
intent. But yes, sir, we need that.
Senator Inhofe. I would say this. Written into the draft is
the assurance that we're going to follow the legislative intent
of this committee. So it has that level of discipline. It also
has the level of discipline that they're going to be able to
have some type of a congressional oversight or veto power over
decisions that might be made if they were to be influenced in
the wrong way.
Do you have any comments about that, Admiral McRaven?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I absolutely concur with the Service
Chiefs. We at SOCOM have obviously the same dilemma. I have a
budget--I have Service-like responsibilities as well as
combatant commander responsibilities. Under that, my ability to
manage the cuts, the way they are aligned now, is difficult.
It's an across-the-board cut, as you mentioned.
So any flexibility in dealing with those cuts would be
tremendously helpful to me and my staff.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much.
Chairman Levin mentioned, I guess to both of you about
supporting arming the opposition in Syria. Of course, you gave
your answer, but I would like to ask you, closely connected to
that, what is your assessment of how long the Assad regime can
hold onto the power in at least the sub-region, a sub-region of
Syria?
It's my understanding along the coast and then perhaps the
hockey stick going up to Damascus might be the area where he
would have most control. But the other area, what's your
assessment as to how long he'd be able to hold onto power in
that area?
General Mattis. We're dealing with a fundamentally
unpredictable situation. However, his power base is eroding.
The geographic area he controls is eroding daily. You see him
using ballistic missiles in order to try to impact those areas
he's lost control of. Notice how the increased use of those
missiles over the last month or 2 has been evident.
So he is losing ground. I really don't have the ability to
forecast this well, Senator. I'd hate to give you some kind of
certainty that I don't sense right now.
Senator Inhofe. He's losing ground, but at the same time
there's more stuff that's coming out of Iran to fortify him.
It's a tough area over there, more so than it's ever been
before.
Admiral McRaven, as we discussed during our meeting last
week, we're seeing that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are
developing operational networks that are increasingly complex.
I think you are the one who had stated that we can no longer go
after terrorist groups in an ad hoc, country-by-country basis
if we hope to be successful. Yet, I'm very concerned that's
exactly what we've been doing.
Do you believe that our current counterterrorism strategy
has kept pace with the increasing globalization in the nature
of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist networks?
Admiral McRaven. Senator, I certainly think we understand
the complexity of the al Qaeda network. If you look in Africa
as an example, you have al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
and we know that they are partnered or linked with Boko Haram
out of Nigeria. So you certainly cannot isolate a single
organization, whether it's AQIM or Boko Haram, and expect to be
able to solve the problem either locally by going after that
problem in a particular country or by individual entity. If you
deal with AQIM, you probably have to deal with Boko Haram.
Senator Inhofe. You mentioned Africa. Most people think the
problem is just North Africa or up around the Horn of Africa,
when, in fact, there's now evidence throughout Africa. I know
if you talk to General Ham, he'll tell you the evidence that he
has now of the presence of these terrorist groups in other
parts of Africa. So I think it is widespread.
Last question I have. In your professional opinion, are the
current diplomatic and economic efforts to stop Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons capability, are they working?
General Mattis. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Let's assume that they obtain nuclear
weapons and that capability, which our intelligence says
they're going to obtain. How do you think their behavior would
change after that?
General Mattis. Senator, you know what our policy is, but I
believe the reason for that policy is they would be more
emboldened to act more like a revolutionary cause vice a
responsible country.
Senator Inhofe. I think so, too. I think it's important
that we understand that this thing that we've talked about
since 2007, with their emerging capabilities, nuclear
capabilities, delivery systems, it's getting worse all the
time. I just think we need to keep talking about that. Do you
agree with that, Admiral McRaven?
Admiral McRaven. I do, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my commendations, General Mattis, along with
your colleague and my colleagues for your extraordinary service
to the Nation and to your marines. Thank you, sir, very much.
Let me begin by asking a specific question about
Afghanistan to both of you. Recently, President Karzai declared
that SOF couldn't operate in a certain province south of Kabul.
Does that affect the short- or long-run plans to deploy SOF as
part of our withdrawal? Is it something that you can cope with
in one instance, but if it develops to a wider scale it would
interfere dramatically with your operations and our withdrawal?
General Mattis. I just spoke with General Dunford a short
time ago. That issue is being worked right now. It is not
operant right now, that decision that you've heard about. So
we're working this out as we speak.
Obviously, we'd be reluctant to see our forces unable to
operate there. But at the same time, I think this is being
worked at the appropriate level with the responsible people
working with the President.
Senator Reed. So you at this juncture feel you can reverse
what appeared to be a final decision. Going forward, though, I
presume from your answer is that the need to operate rather
freely throughout Afghanistan by SOF is essential to the
withdrawal plans?
General Mattis. Senator Reed, I think the decision was not
taken, it's not just reversing it; it's crafting how best we
operate in Wardak Province, which is a key route into Kabul. So
I think it's still in place, sir. I can get back to you once
the decision's made.
Senator Reed. The larger issue here is, to the extent--
implicit in your plans for a phasedown of American forces, I
always assumed was a robust special operations capacity that
could operate throughout the country. Is that still central to
your plan? Is that something that's still viable?
General Mattis. It is, sir. Two purposes. One is
counterterrorism; the other is advise, train, and assist the
Afghans in their counterterrorism effort. So it's a twofold
effort.
Senator Reed. Admiral McRaven, do you have any comments?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, the SOF that we have in Afghanistan
are partnered with our Afghan SOF. So as you look at SOF,
nowadays you can't look independently at U.S. or NATO forces
alone. We have Commando Kandaks that we have built. We have
Afghan SOF that are out there. So there is a network of SOF
that is being applied across the area of operations that deal
with the threat.
Senator Reed. Let me ask another question about going
forward. There's an issue of size of the force. There's also an
issue of the pace of the force. But there's an issue also of
the role of the force. There's been some discussion, and I
don't know how far along, that these residual forces could be
institutional-based trainers only, not embedded with Afghan
forces, ANSF.
Is your vision that you will have embedded forces with them
or is it simply going to be institutional trainers in bases?
General Mattis. Senator, we're going to have to watch how
the Afghan forces mature. I anticipate there will be some
embedding going on, whether it be with their special forces or
their conventional forces. But at the current rate of
maturation, they are actually becoming quite impressive in
their ability to operate against this enemy.
So we have some time yet, a year and a half to go, as we
get them up on the step for when we will draw down to the
enduring force. During this period we'll figure out what level
of embedding has to be there and what level NATO forces are
willing to commit to.
Senator Reed. A final question on this area, Admiral
McRaven. You still retain the capability of striking anywhere
in that region if there is a high-value target as you go
forward in terms of whether or not there's access to certain
bases in Afghanistan or other parts of the world. You can do
that from aerial platforms, from sea-based platforms, or from
alternate land-based platforms. That capacity or capability
exists?
Admiral McRaven. It does, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me turn quickly to the issue of Syria. As many people
assume, the Assad regime is deteriorating rapidly. So let's
just assume at some point it fails. What planning is going on,
General Mattis, for any type of stability operations
internationally to prevent a descent into anarchy there that
would be disruptive for the whole region?
General Mattis. Senator, we have some quiet planning going
on with regional partners and with other partners, to see what
level of ambition and what regional leadership could take on
this mission. Clearly, it would be something best accomplished
with a regional leader, regional organization. After the
Russians' regrettable veto in the United Nations (U.N.), we
probably have fewer options in terms of a U.N.-led effort or
U.N.-sanctioned effort. But at the same time, there are
regional organizations--the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation
Council--that may be able to take this on.
We are doing some planning with the regional militaries and
getting basically a framework for what this would look like,
sir.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a follow-on question. What do you
think the reactions of the Iranians would be to a collapse of
the Assad government?
General Mattis. The collapse of the Assad regime, sir,
would be the biggest strategic setback for Iran in 25 years. I
believe they will arm militias inside the country to try to
create a Lebanese Hezbollah-type effect, and they would
redouble their efforts vis a vis Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, and
elsewhere. I think that's on a strategic plane what we would
see as far as their shift.
Senator Reed. Part of our reaction would be to plan for
that contingency explicitly?
General Mattis. We are, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, I appreciate your service and good luck in
your retirement.
I notice the map that you passed around about the AOR for
the Commander of CENTCOM. It ranges all the way from Kazakhstan
to the north, down to Yemen in the south, and over to Egypt.
About half the Arab world, half the population of the Arab
world, lives in Egypt, is that correct, General Mattis?
[The information referred to follows:]

General Mattis. I think it's well over a third anyway, yes,
sir.
Senator Wicker. A good portion.
We just had an amendment a few weeks ago offered to a storm
relief bill on the floor of the Senate. It would have
prohibited our sale of F-16 aircraft from the United States to
the Egyptian military. Did you follow that issue, General
Mattis?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Wicker. As a matter of fact, Senator McCain took
the point on that on the Senate floor and made an impassioned
plea for us not to abandon the chance of improved relationships
with the Egyptian military. I just wonder, was Senator McCain
correct? I voted with him on that, to not abandon our sale of
F-16s to Egypt.
What advice would you give us going forward, because we may
have to take further votes on that? What advice would you give?
What effect would the termination of that sale be on our
relationship and our chances of having any kind of meaningful
relationship with the Egyptian military?
General Mattis. Sir, I strongly endorse the
administration's position and Senator McCain's position. I will
tell you that I was just in Cairo a short time ago and our
Ambassador, one of the best ambassadors we have in the Foreign
Service, Ambassador Anne Patterson, also endorsed it.
The bottom line is, Senator, that the Egyptian military
through a very difficult period has maintained and even built
trust with the Egyptian people. They have made clear their
expectation that Egypt will maintain its international
treaties. That includes the one with peace with Israel. They
are the people that provide extra security when my ships go
through the Suez Canal. The Gaza area has probably not been
this quiet in 10 years, and in no small part the Egyptian
military is doing quiet operations in the Sinai to help keep it
that way.
I think anything right now that we do that would undercut
the trust between the U.S. military and the Egyptian military
would be extremely unhelpful.
Senator Wicker. Now, what do you think the advice of the
Israeli Government would be to policymakers such as us with
regard to that F-16 sale? Because I'll tell you, I've gotten a
lot of mail and a lot of emails from people in Mississippi very
supportive of the Nation of Israel, and they say, ``how could
you agree to the sale of these F-16s to Egypt when that could
be so harmful to Israel?'' What would your answer be to that?
General Mattis. Sir, I won't speak for what Israel thinks
about this. I can't do that. But I would tell you that the
Chief of Defense of Israel was in my office a week ago and this
issue did not come up.
Second, as far as how to respond to your constituents, it
is the Egyptian military right now, sir, that is the bulwark in
the Sinai against the threats, the extremist threats against
Israel, against Egypt, against all of us. So the Egyptian
military is the organization committed, alongside as part of
their government, but certainly have been very outspoken about
maintaining the peace treaty, the international treaty. So it
should not be seen as an enemy. It should be seen as a
stabilizing force in the region, unlike, I might add, the
military in Libya that fought alongside Qadafi or directed by
Qadafi, unlike the military in Syria. We have a military that
did not act that way when Egypt went through its transition.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
General Mattis. So it's a stabilizing force.
Senator Wicker. That's very helpful information.
Let me just switch to something. I had to step out of the
room to go meet with a very distinguished group of four retired
admirals and generals representing the U.S. Global Leadership
Coalition. Are you at all familiar with this coalition, General
Mattis?
General Mattis. Only very little. I've heard about them.
Senator Wicker. Let me tell you. They are a group of more
than 120 retired three- and four-star generals and admirals,
and they are coming to the Hill today to meet with Members of
Congress, not about the military budget, but about the
international affairs budget, in other words, what we call in
shorthand, foreign aid. Their message to me was what to some
people might be a surprising message: We need to be very
careful about cuts in foreign aid. They view it, General, as
working hand-in-glove with our security operations that you two
gentlemen are involved in.
So, I just wondered if you would comment on that. Have you
observed that the international development budget is helpful
to us in providing national defense for our country?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I would start with the Department
of State budget. Frankly, they need to be as fully funded as
Congress believes appropriate, because if you don't fund the
State Department fully then I need to buy more ammunition
ultimately. So I think it's a cost-benefit ratio. The more that
we put into the State Department's diplomacy, hopefully the
less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the
outcome of an apparent American withdrawal from the
international scene.
Senator Wicker. I see. To both of you: As I say, I had to
step out and I understand a question was asked with regard to
sequestration and the CR and the advice, I think, that you have
for us is we at least need to go ahead with the full
appropriations bill for the entire fiscal year.
But let me just make sure I get this answer. Would
flexibility help you two gentlemen in getting through the
sequestration issue? In other words, if Congress gave you, not
the meat axe across-the-board arbitrary cuts, but the ability
to pick and choose; would you be better off in performing your
missions?
General Mattis. From CENTCOM's point of view, sir, I'd just
tell you that the full appropriations bill would give us the
predictability, the flexibility you refer to. It would be
critical to the Service Chiefs to carry out their
responsibilities and lower the risk of less money available to
us.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think the flexibility would
certainly allow us to manage our money towards those areas that
are at most high-risk right now. So certainly having the
ability to manage our own budget, recognizing the cuts that are
coming, would be very beneficial to us.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Thank you both for
your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
Recently the Navy announced that it was going to delay the
deployment of an aircraft carrier over into the CENTCOM AOR
because of the sequestration threat. Can you speak to that?
General Mattis. Sir, ships are expensive articles to
operate. We all know that. She will be maintained at an
enhanced readiness level. I was on board USS Harry S. Truman
and spoke with Admiral Kevin Sweeney about 2 weeks ago, and he
assures me his air wing and his ship will be ready to deploy on
short notice.
I still have one carrier out there, and I would just
caution any enemy that might look at it as an opportunity to
take advantage of this situation that that would be very ill-
advised. If the President orders us into action, I have what it
takes to make it the enemy's longest day and their worst day,
and we'll get the other carrier out there quickly to reinforce.
Senator Nelson. If the President decided that the second
carrier needed to be out there, what is the transit time from
the time that he would give the order?
General Mattis. Sir, the carrier, just knowing the U.S.
Navy, would deploy faster than it's required to. Right now it's
on 21-day ready-to-deploy orders. I believe they would be out
of port faster than that, and would take probably about 14 days
to get her into theater.
Senator Nelson. So even if you cut the 21 days in half, say
down to 10 days, plus 14, you're talking a total of 24 days
before it could be on station?
General Mattis. That's correct, Senator. I can buy the
time.
Senator Nelson. When was the Harry S. Truman scheduled to
depart?
General Mattis. It was about 2 weeks ago, Senator. I don't
have the specific date.
Senator Nelson. I ask the questions for the obvious
reasons, that here is a good example of what you had planned in
the way of readiness, because of some ridiculous budgetary
ultimate decision is causing you not to have that second
carrier out there on station.
Would that carrier have the opportunity to be diverted into
the Mediterranean instead of going to the Persian Gulf region?
General Mattis. Sir, that would, of course, be up to the
Secretary of Defense, which combatant commander gets her. But
I've always thought most combatant commanders end up just
forwarding personnel and ships for my use, so I'm pretty sure I
could get her.
Senator Nelson. Coming back to Syria, which is in your AOR,
and that's why I ask about sending it to the Mediterranean as
opposed to the Persian Gulf. It seems that on the one hand, we
have Assad, and on the other hand, we have a group that's
fighting Assad that increasingly--al Nasra, which is in bed
with al Qaeda--is trying to take over. That doesn't give us
much of a choice between those two.
Do you have any reason for optimism that the anti-Assad
forces are going to win out that are more amenable to us than
al Nasra?
General Mattis. Senator, the al Nasra, they have a good
propaganda campaign. They're using humanitarian aid, they're
using their weaponry and their skilled foreign fighters to dig
their roots into this. But at the same time, they have a
philosophy that is not admired by a lot of the people who are
fighting Assad. So there's nothing certain about them coming
out on top in this, but it could be very messy.
The regional powers that are supporting the anti-Assad
forces obviously have no trust with al Nasra and I think that
you'll see more support continued for non-al Nasra elements.
But it is the intertwining that concerns me.
Senator Nelson. Admiral, you want to characterize for the
committee any effects of sequestration on your ability to
deploy SOF troops anywhere where there might be a flare-up?
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, we have the
perfect storm here, with the CR and sequestration. Right now,
the CR actually hurts us more than sequestration does at this
point. The CR for me is about $1.5 billion, but, getting back
to Senator Wicker's point, I'm unable to manage some of the
issues in terms of the military construction and new starts and
some of the adjustments that need to be made.
So the CR not only precludes me from spending at the fiscal
year 2013 level, as you know, pushing me back to fiscal year
2012, but it also limits what I can do there. Then you add on
top of that sequestration for me, which is about $900 million,
and again unable to manage that money. It's about a 23 percent
cut in SOCOM's available resources.
So what does that equate to? For me it is a function of
readiness, but not necessarily readiness forward deployed. We
are managing the forward-deployed readiness, but frankly that's
coming at the expense of our training base back in the
continental United States (CONUS). So my concern, sir, is not
for the immediate future.
I think I can manage that with the resources we have. But
we are beginning to create a readiness problem if we don't
resolve the CR and/or have an opportunity to manage the
sequestration money, because I'm already cutting 60 percent of
my flying hours back in CONUS. I'm reducing also some of my
deployments, about 20 percent of my deployments, going forward.
So again, a perfect storm of fiscal problems for us, sir.
Senator Nelson. I want to ask you something down in the
weeds. Last year the DOD transitioned the Defense Human
Intelligence Service to the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS).
How do you anticipate that this is going to affect SOCOM's
operations?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we've been working with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Intelligence Community to
help support the movement forward of the DCS. I'd prefer to
talk in closed session on some of the details of that, but in
total, we think it's a very good plan. We like the direction
and the initiative of the DCS. It puts SOCOM in a position to
have more collectors supporting the DIA. So I'm very much
behind it, sir.
Senator Nelson. In the past, specifically you and the CIA
have gotten along so well, and yet there is some concern about
the two stepping on each other as you're moving forward with
this DCS.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. We're working very closely with
the CIA on this and I think we each understand our lanes in the
road. The DCS is really about military intelligence and
obviously CIA has a different mandate in that term. So I'm
pretty comfortable and I think the senior leadership of the
agency would tell you that they're pretty comfortable with the
direction we're heading on DCS.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of our witnesses for their
distinguished service to our country. General Mattis, we will
certainly miss you, and thank you for everything that you've
done for our country.
I wanted to follow up. Senator Inhofe had asked you,
General Mattis, about your professional opinion on whether
current diplomatic and economic efforts will stop Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons capability, and I believe you said
no. So if that is the case, right now as I understand it the
economic sanctions that we have imposed on Iran are having a
very significant negative impact on their economy and their
currency, correct?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am, they are.
Senator Ayotte. So if current diplomatic and economic
sanctions will not stop them, in your opinion, from obtaining
nuclear weapons capability, what do you think that they are
doing now with negotiations? Are they trying to delay us again
and continuing to enrich?
General Mattis. Ma'am, just to be clear, I fully support
the economic sanctions. I fully support the diplomatic
isolation and accruing the international community's support to
try to stop this. I believe they are trying to buy time with
the negotiations, but that should not be in any way construed
as we should not try to negotiate. I still support the
direction we're taking. I'm paid to take a rather dim view of
the Iranians, frankly.
Senator Ayotte. It's understandable why you would be taking
a dim view, how you describe their activities around the world
in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen. I
dare say that we can't think of another country that is doing
more damage in terms of terrorism around the world and hurting
our interests and those of our allies. Would you agree?
General Mattis. I would agree strongly with what you just
said, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. What is their history, by the way, in terms
of using negotiations to delay and continuing to enrich? Do
they have a history of doing that?
General Mattis. They have a history of denial and deceit,
ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. So in the recent P5 Plus 1 negotiations we
offered, the group offered, basically that we would back off on
some of the sanctions if they agreed to keep enrichment levels
at 20 percent. Iran as I understand it--we were not able to
come to an agreement there. Is that right, General Mattis?
General Mattis. I believe they agreed to meet again,
Senator. But again, I think this was negotiations. There's
nothing final about it. This is a give and take.
Senator Ayotte. Here's our problem. If they have a history
of using negotiations as a dilatory tactic while they're
continuing to enrich and march toward nuclear weapons and we
know how dangerous that they are, how do we stop this pattern
to make sure that they know that we are serious that we will
not accept them having a nuclear weapon?
General Mattis. Senator, I think that the more that we can
accommodate a larger coalition against them--I believe that in
some ways we have to recognize Iran's legitimate security
interests so they are not put in a position to use illegitimate
means such as we're observing to address their legitimate
security interests. I think that we continue everything we're
doing right now, but, as the President has said, he's taken no
option off the table and my role is to provide him military
options.
Senator Ayotte. How important is it that we stop Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon?
General Mattis. I would just echo the President's words.
The Commander in Chief has said it's unacceptable, and I
believe it's absolutely important.
Senator Ayotte. In your view, based on your position, on a
scale of 1 to 10 in terms of danger to the world and to our
country, where would you put them obtaining a nuclear weapon,
10 being the highest danger?
General Mattis. Ma'am, it would be dangerous because it
would enable Iran to continue to act like a revolutionary cause
vice a responsible country, and they would sense fewer
limitations and more invulnerability to conducting the kind of
attacks to kill Israeli tourists in Bulgaria, provide Man-
Portable Air Defense Systems to Yemen, which they were just
caught at. I believe we would see more of this irresponsible,
reckless behavior.
Senator Ayotte. Given the fact that they use negotiations
to delay and continuing to enrich, why wouldn't we consider
just cutting off negotiations and saying: ``here's the bottom
line, Iran, otherwise, we're going to act,'' because I fear
that if they continue to use negotiations to delay that we will
be at a point where they have nuclear weapons capability and
then it's too late, is it not, sir?
General Mattis. It would certainly be too late for our
stated policy that they are not to achieve a nuclear weapons
capability. But I believe negotiations are critical as we build
an international consensus against them and sustain that. I
think that at some point they are going to have to confront the
unproductive aspects of what they're doing for their own
interests.
Senator Ayotte. But one thing I just can't get my hands
around here. We have pressed their economy. We have pressed
them dramatically. We have negotiated with them in good faith.
They have continued to enrich. They have used negotiations as a
delay tactic. At some point you have to get to a position where
you say insanity is the definition of doing the same thing over
and over again and expecting a different result, from a regime
that obviously continues to flout us and our allies and also to
be a danger to the world in terms of their terrorism
activities.
So that's the thing I worry about, General Mattis. So how
do we address that?
General Mattis. Ma'am, what I do, I provide the Commander
in Chief military options, working with some very strong
friends, partners in the region. They are creating in their
minds as a revolutionary cause a resistance economy. They are
trying to raise a sense of martyrdom as a nation. That's a very
dangerous type of self-view if they were to get a nuclear
weapon.
But I don't believe that we should stop negotiations,
because they do not prevent us from doing other things at the
same time. For example, while negotiating I have requested and
received additional forces in the Gulf by the decision of the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that we are ready to reassure
our friends that we mean business and temper the Iranians'
designs.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you very much, General Mattis. I
think we all share the concern, and particularly the Senate. We
voted on a resolution saying that containment is not the policy
of the United States of America. This is an overwhelming
bipartisan issue and Iran needs to understand that we will not
accept them having a nuclear weapon. But I worry that they are
using negotiations to delay and I hope the administration will
make sure that they are not able to use those negotiations to
further their aims at getting nuclear weapons capability.
I thank you so much for what you're doing. I want to ask
you a brief question on another topic on no contracting with
the enemy, that was incorporated in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, section 841, on work
that Senator Scott Brown and I did together. Senator Richard
Blumenthal and I recently visited, along with Senators McCain
and Graham, Afghanistan in January, talked to Major General
Longo about the impact of those provisions. He indicated that
it would be helpful--the provisions have been very helpful in
cutting off funds to those, our enemy, when contractors are
contracting to those that we don't want taxpayers' dollars to
go to.
Senator Blumenthal and I are working on an effort to extend
those provisions beyond Afghanistan to other combatant commands
and also to think about extending it to other agencies,
including the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). I wanted to get your opinion
on that, General Mattis.
General Mattis. Very quickly, Senator, I fully support both
the letter and the spirit of what was in there. We did have to
look more deeply at the subcontractors. That's where we found
the problem. It was not with the contractors. But then we
followed the money down and we found some things that were
disappointing. I can just tell you from CENTCOM's point of view
it's been very helpful to focus us in that area.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here today. Following up on my
colleague's question, I know that I have some specific
questions I probably won't have time for today about the
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund and the notion that it's very
hard to build infrastructure inside of a contingency by our
military without some money getting to the enemy, because of
the huge costs of security. One of the reasons the enemy got
money is because we were trying to pay off the enemy to not
kill our contractors.
So the problem here is not just contracting with the enemy.
As the war contracting provisions that we have now passed into
law embrace, it is also about whether or not the
counterinsurgency strategy should, in fact, include
infrastructure. Should it include major projects? I'm going to
have some specific questions about metrics being produced
around the counterinsurgency strategy to support the notion
that it is an effective part of counterinsurgency efforts.
I want to take advantage of your years of service, General
Mattis, and ask you something that is not directly related to
CENTCOM. My background includes handling dozens and dozens of
jury trials as a prosecutor of very difficult sexual assault
and rape cases. I think I have taken an acute interest, along
with many of my colleagues, on the pervasive problem of
prosecuting sexual assault in the military.
I feel a sense of urgency today because of what happened
last week. A colonel, James Wilkerson, was convicted by a
military jury of sexual assault that occurred at Aviano, Italy.
He was sentenced to dismissal, forfeiture of pay, and 1 year in
jail. With a stroke of a pen last week, a general dismissed
those charges against him, a general with no legal training, a
general that had not sat in the courtroom. This general did it
against the advice of his legal counsel.
Now, my heart is beating fast right now, I am so upset
about this. As we are trying to send a signal to women--now,
the victim in this case wasn't a member of our military. I
question now whether that unit that that man returns to,
whether there's any chance a woman who is sexually assaulted in
that unit would ever say a word, because what that general just
said is that jury's decision didn't matter.
The rules actually say that the convening authority not
only has complete discretion as to whether or not a case is
brought, without any legal training required; the convening
authority, also has the right to either reduce punishment or
dismiss the cases for ``any reason or no reason at all.''
Now, I ask you, General Mattis, isn't it time, as we
understand that the majority of homeless women in this country
are veterans and that the majority of them had some form of
sexual assault, that we look at the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and decide that we need to have something other
than the arbitrary decision of one general, without any other
supervising authority, any other procedure that is necessary,
to actually overturn the very difficult decision that the jury
came to?
General Mattis. Senator, I do not know the specifics of
this case and I've always been reluctant to comment on
something where I don't know it. Some of you are aware of the
high-visibility court cases I've superintended. I've read as
many as 9,500 pages of investigations before I made certain
decisions.
But let me assure you, Senator, that the Supreme Court has
upheld what Congress has passed for the UCMJ, recognizing the
unique aspects of the military. In this case, there are more
rights provided to defendants in the military, because no court
system is more subject to being characterized as a kangaroo
court than one where military officers who are in command also
initiate it.
In this case, I cannot speak to the specifics, but I can
assure you that justice is overwhelmingly served by the
currently constituted UCMJ. I say that because as a commander I
was not just responsible for prosecution, I was also
responsible for defense, and commanders must balance both of
those if we're to have a fair system.
I don't know the specifics of this case, so I do not want
that to be drawn in as support for something that I really
can't address. I'm sorry.
Senator McCaskill. Let's just set aside the specifics of
this case.
General Mattis. Okay.
Senator McCaskill. Do you really think that after a jury
has found someone guilty and dismissed someone from the
military for sexual assault, that one person, over the advice
of their legal counselor, should be able to say, never mind?
Don't you think that someone up the chain should have an
opportunity to look at that if they're going to dismiss it, a
jury conviction?
I understand that the military is not the civilian system.
But I'm trying to envision here the ability of a prosecutor or
a defense lawyer or the person who they both work for--and
that's a weird concept for me to get my arms around, the notion
that they could unilaterally, without having to have any
justification, for no reason at all, just say, never mind.
I think that is something that most--especially when you
realize how serious this problem is. I may not be able to talk
you out of the position that you just stated, but I think that
the military needs to understand that this could be a tipping
point, I think, for the American people to rise up,
particularly the women, and say: ``I don't think one general
should be able to overturn a jury.''
General Mattis. Senator, the commanders, including women
commanders, have this authority for a reason, for a vested
reason. I would just tell you that I would look beyond one
case.
Senator McCaskill. Unfortunately, General, I think I could
bring you a lot of cases. I think I could bring you a lot where
cases were not brought, where victims were not taken seriously.
I think there's a culture issue that's going to have to be
addressed here, and what this decision did was underline and
put an exclamation point behind the notion that if you are
sexually assaulted in the military, good luck.
General Mattis. Ma'am, I would just tell you that my troops
generally know what I stand for, but they also have no doubt
what I won't tolerate. I would just tell you that I'm not
unique in this. You show us someone who conducts themself in a
criminal manner along these lines and I am dry-eyed when I put
my beloved troops in jail the rest of their life for all I
care.
Senator McCaskill. Believe me, in some ways I am sad that
this occurred right before this hearing and that my time with
you today is covering this subject matter, because I have great
respect for the leadership of the military and particularly for
your service, General Mattis. So please don't misinterpret this
as anything other than a high degree of frustration as to a
system that appears unaccountable to the thousands of victims
who are struggling for a piece of justice under these
circumstances.
Thank you very much, General.
General Mattis. I respect that, Senator, and I just assure
you there is accountability for every general under my command.
Senator McCaskill. General Welsh is going to be hearing
from me about this particular general. I think it's also
interesting that both of these people are fighter pilots, they
both have served together, and that adds more appearance of
impropriety to this particular decision. I'm going to ask
General Welsh some very difficult questions.
Thank you very much, General Mattis.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill.
There's going to be a sexual assault hearing that Senator
Gillibrand is chairing----
Senator McCaskill. March 13.
Chairman Levin.--as the chair of our Personnel
Subcommittee. I would think that, even though the issue you
raise is broader than sexual assaults--it has to do with the
power of the convening authority, period, sexual assault cases
and any case--nonetheless, that may be an appropriate time to
raise it.
We will ask the General Counsel for DOD, Bob Taylor, who's
Acting General Counsel, to address this issue, if this is okay
and consistent with what you have in mind, Senator McCaskill. I
think it's important that we start getting the General Counsel
of DOD aware of the issue of the ``no reason at all'' language
which apparently is in the UCMJ, and to give this committee for
starters an opinion as to the source of that language and to
whether or not it is credible to maintain that kind of
authority, that ``no reason at all'' language in the UCMJ.
So I don't want to in any way move in a different direction
than you want to go, but I think that would be helpful, to ask
the Acting General Counsel that question, and we will do that.
Thanks to Senator Fischer, Senator McCain is next.
Senator McCain. I thank Senator Fischer for her indulgence,
unlike our colleague from New Hampshire. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, let's be clear about this cut and the,
``flexibility.'' We're still looking at $43 billion in cuts, is
that right?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Still, no matter whether you have the
flexibility or not, isn't this, in the words of Secretary
Panetta, ``we're shooting ourselves in the foot,'' in the head
and not in the foot?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. We're going to have to change our
strategy. We cannot maintain the same end state.
Senator McCain. The $43 billion is still a devastating blow
whether you have the flexibility or not; is that correct?
General Mattis. It is, Senator, but I don't want the enemy
to feel brave right now. I can still deal with them in my
region.
Senator McCain. But to somehow say that this problem goes
away because you are given flexibility is not accurate, is that
true?
General Mattis. That's correct, sir.
Senator McCain. First of all, I want to say, thank you.
Thank you for your service. Thank you for the inspiration
you've provided to the men and women who serve under you. I
have met so many of them who have the highest admiration for
you. Thank you for your service to the country, and you speak
truth to power. I wish more of your colleagues did that as
well.
On the issue of Syria, we're now over a million refugees.
We're now at 70,000 people at least who have been massacred.
The risk of spillover into Lebanon and Jordan is obvious. The
events of yesterday, 42 Syrian soldiers being murdered or
killed in Iraq. Everything that we worried about if we
intervened has taken place because we didn't intervene. Would
you buy that argument?
General Mattis. Senator McCain, I'm not certain even by
intervening into this, this cauldron, we could have prevented
all of it.
Senator McCain. Have we seen a worst-case scenario?
General Mattis. Not yet.
Senator McCain. Not yet, because that's chemical weapons,
right?
General Mattis. It's also the further fragmentation of the
country into ethnic and sectarian militias.
Senator McCain. I say with respect, that's already
happened.
You're saying you want to make sure that we get the weapons
to the right people if you were to support such a move, is that
correct, your previous answer?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So isn't the best way to do that to give
them a sanctuary area, a no-fly zone, and let them establish
themselves as the Libyans did in Benghazi, so that we can make
sure the weapons do get to the right people?
General Mattis. If I was given that mission, yes, sir, that
would be a way to do it.
Senator McCain. Without that, it's pretty obvious that the
flow of jihadists into the country continues unabated?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is on the
ground.
General Mattis. They are both on the ground and bringing in
other foreign fighters.
Senator McCain. The Russians continue to supply weapons to
Bashar Assad and veto resolutions in the Security Council.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Wouldn't you call that an unfair fight?
General Mattis. I've never been in a fair fight. Always one
side has the advantage, and right now Assad has----
Senator McCain. Yes, but the other side has the advantage
because we refuse to do something which would make it a fair
fight.
General Mattis. There are regional partners that we have
that are taking action.
Senator McCain. Many of those weapons are going to the
wrong people, as we know, some of our partners that are giving
the weapons to the wrong people.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Let me switch very quickly to Afghanistan,
if I could. What was your recommendation as to the troop levels
that should remain behind in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Sir, we did not use numbers. We said we
wanted to know what missions are we expected to do. Based on
that, we got to the 34,000, which I support, the reduction by
34,000, so long as the pace left them there through this
fighting season as the ANSF proved themselves.
Senator McCain. Did that happen?
General Mattis. It did.
Senator McCain. What about the residual force?
General Mattis. The post-2014 force, Senator, that decision
I know has not been made yet. It's still under consideration. I
have made my recommendation.
Senator McCain. Which is?
General Mattis. That recommendation is for 13,600 U.S.
Forces, sir.
Senator McCain. How many NATO?
General Mattis. Not something I control, but----
Senator McCain. Right.
General Mattis. --I assume it would probably be around 50
percent of what we provide.
Senator McCain. Back to Iraq for a moment, aren't you
concerned about the unraveling of Iraq, with the schisms
between the Kurds, Barzani, and Maliki, the continued terrorist
attacks that take place, and the increasing polarization of the
Sunni-Shia situation, particularly in places like Mosul, where
you have Kurds, Shia, you have everybody, Turkoman, you have
everybody there? In retrospect, do you think that the situation
would have been better if we had left a residual force there?
General Mattis. Hard to say if it would have been better,
Senator McCain. I share the concerns about the Kurdish schism
with the country, with the Sunni-Shia situation. Al Qaeda is
continuing its campaign. I would add one more point: The
Iranian-backed militia shelling the capital city, the MEK camp,
shows that the Iranians are not even now above going back and
to work their own way.
However, Senator, imperfectly as it is, they are still--the
various parts of the body politic there in Iraq are talking
with each other. So it still probably has a level of violence,
Senator, that is slightly below what it was when we were there
overall. Not a good answer.
Senator McCain. Let me just say with respect, Barzani told
me he had not spoken to Maliki in over a year, and to my
knowledge they're still not. But that's beside the point.
Back to Syria a second. We could take out the air assets of
Bashar Assad with cruise missiles, take them out on the ground?
General Mattis. Not all of them, Senator, because they have
a number of mobile systems. I'd have to do a pretty----
Senator McCain. We can take out a fair amount?
General Mattis. --we could take out a fair amount, yes,
sir.
Senator McCain. The Patriots could defend a no-fly zone?
General Mattis. They could--they're a point defense weapon.
They could certainly help put together a no-fly zone.
Senator McCain. You would agree that in a topography and a
situation like that, air power is a really decisive and
important factor in Bashar Assad's being able to hang on?
Finally, I'm concerned about this withdrawal to the coast,
the Alawite enclave. I wonder what you think of the likelihood
of that might be?
General Mattis. Sir, it is an economically unsustainable
enclave if they go there. So it's not going to be a long-term
thing. But it could certainly create a longevity for the regime
if they were to lose Damascus, that right now, I think, is
something we have to consider. In other words, you'll see a
two-step. As Damascus starts to fall, they'll try to get over.
I believe the Iranians are helping them to get established
there.
Senator McCain. Again, General Mattis, I've had the great
honor of being associated with some outstanding military
leaders and I know you will continue to contribute to our
Nation's security. I thank you.
General Mattis. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Here's the order of battle for us now. On the Democratic
side it's Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal. On the
Republican side it's Lee, Fischer, Blunt, Graham.
Senator McCaskill. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Yes?
Senator McCaskill. I notice that our colleagues, Senator
Kaine and Senator Donnelly, while they are new here, they're
upset that they were not mentioned. They're afraid that you've
forgotten they're there.
Chairman Levin. I have not. I should have said the next
four.
Senator McCaskill. Oh, okay. All right. They looked
panicked for a minute. I used to sit way down there at the end,
so I'm feeling for them.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Number five and six and seven and eight on the Democratic
side are Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. I should have said
the next four.
Since Senator Hagan is not here, it is Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, thank you for being
here. Congratulations on your retirement. I'm sure you're going
to enjoy it.
With that being said, General Mattis, I know there's been a
lot going back and forth--if you'd have had the flexibility,
knowing from the get-go that you'd have had flexibility, but
had to do the cuts, the $42.5 billion cut, would you have been
able to deploy the Harry S. Truman on time?
General Mattis. Sir, I'd have to know better what the Navy
confronts, but I suspect that we could have, yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. So much said about the amount of money
that we spend in DOD versus other countries. Do you have,
either one of you, just a quick scenario, an oversight, on the
difference of our cost versus--they tell me the next 10 or 15
developing nations of the world combined doesn't spend as much
as we do. What is the high cost of ours so much differently?
General Mattis. Senator, I think part of it is we're the
gold standard. We set the standard, from weaponry and
technology to the training and certainly to the coherence of
our force, the cohesion of our force, that also believes that
they're the best in the world because of the support of the
Hill.
We also have global responsibilities, and those--I was born
into this time. Others made those decisions. But I am often
impressed when I walk into offices where even at this rank
overseas I say ``Sir'' or ``Your Highness'' or ``Mr.
President'' or ``Mr. Prime Minister'' or ``Sultan,'' at just
how much other nations look to us to reassure them that they
can follow their better instincts and not have to accommodate
some pretty ugly situations in their region.
Senator Manchin. Admiral McRaven, I find it troubling that
the military is losing many of its talented people to private
contractors. I talk to an awful lot of the SOF, and they're
being lured away by the higher salaries. Is that not troubling
to you, sir?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, statistically, that was true back at
the beginning of the war, I think, when we saw, certainly
around 2001 as the wars began to ramp up and the contract base
began to build, we were losing a number of our senior
noncommissioned officers (NCO). Sir, that has tapered off
considerably and right now, frankly, our accessions rate into
our training pipelines are as good or better than they've ever
been and our retention is equally high.
Senator Manchin. Are we reducing our amount of dependency
on contractors then? Is that what you're saying?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we are, yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Either one of you could speak to
this one, if you compare Pakistan's actions by them having the
nuclear weapon and how we are working with them as supposedly
an ally--I can only imagine what your thoughts may be if Iran
is able to achieve the same status of nuclear weapons. I'm sure
if you had it to do over again, we'd probably look at that
differently with Pakistan. But your greatest fear is Iran, I
would assume, having this nuclear arsenal, right?
General Mattis. I think that would be the most
destabilizing event that we could imagine for the Middle East,
sir.
Senator Manchin. Another question I have is one that--I
came out of the Vietnam era, so I remember that war came to a
close much quicker than this war. Here we are in 2013. In 2001
if anyone would have, I think, anticipated that we'd still be
going at this 13 years, the amount of money and time--so I
think it brings up the question just for discussion: Have you
thought about, with all the budget cuts and different things
that we can do and staffing and all that, of the draft, a
combined hybrid of the draft with the professional services
that we have now? I know for a fact that we would not be in a
war 13 years if moms and dads had the input that they had back
then.
General Mattis. Senator, I won't take issue with what you
just said. We in the military are concerned that the All-
Volunteer Force has drawn us a little apart from our body
politic. But, that said, this threat is real. I've dealt with
it since 1979. The Shia side declared war on us in the 1980s,
blew up our peacekeeper barracks in Beirut. They continue with
Lebanese Hezbollah today. The Sunni side of the extremists--al
Qaeda is how you know them--they tried to take down the Trade
Towers once in the 1990s. They took it down the second time.
It's a real threat. One thing about America: It's been
willing to meet real threats when the political leadership
explains it to the American people. I think we would still be
here, sir, because I think the enemy would force the issue.
Senator Manchin. I agree that we're going to have to be
fighting the war on terror for many generations to come. I
think that most Americans accept that. But when you look at how
we got into Afghanistan and then we moved to Iraq and now we're
back in nation-building, I think there's an awful lot--I'd
rather us get out quicker and come home and rebuild America.
When you look at the Kajaki Dam that we built in the 1950s,
and now in disrepair. We went back and rebuilt it again, and
we've spent, I think, $70 million to finish the project. The
Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction doubts
that they have the capability of doing that if we gave them the
$70 million. That's what I think we as Americans are upset
about, the money we're putting into an infrastructure which
they are incapable of maintaining.
Are we moving away from that strategy? Admiral, would you
say we are?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I'll allow General Mattis to address
the Kajaki Dam issue, but I think in general as we in the
special operations community work with our partners abroad--as
I mentioned in my opening statement, we're partnered with about
78 nations on any day in the calendar. In a lot of those cases,
we are doing minor construction, so obviously nothing like
Kajaki Dam, but being able to build schools and boreholes and
wells and help with small infrastructure projects that
absolutely, I think, are critical to building our credibility
with the host nation, both with the military and the civilian
sectors.
Senator Manchin. Sir, I'm understanding in that situation
there we're not even allowed to brand it as made by the United
States because of the blowback. So we're not even getting
credit for that as we do that infrastructure repair and
building.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, you're referring to the Kajaki Dam,
sir?
Senator Manchin. I'm saying all the other things, whether
it be schools or whether it be the water supplies and things of
that sort, when I was there that we were afraid or they were
afraid to put our name on and give us credit, the U.S.
Government, for doing it.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would tell you, I think it's on a
case-by-case basis. We work with USAID. They're one of my
closest partners, and in fact, I have a great relationship with
USAID. Every time we go downrange we work with the U.S. Embassy
team. We take our lead from the U.S. Ambassador there. We get
together with their foreign assistance folks and we
collectively build a plan that makes sense.
Where it is important for us to articulate that the United
States has built this particular piece of infrastructure, we
absolutely do that. Where, frankly, we think it's more
culturally sensitive to allow the locals to receive credit,
then there's an appropriate way to do that as well. But
certainly it's not one size fits all, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
Senator Lee is next under our order that we operate here.
Again, I want to thank Senator Fischer. She may not have known
what she got into, but her generosity is noted. We appreciate
it. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for joining us today. Thank you
especially for all you do and have done throughout your
distinguished careers to keep us safe.
General Mattis, I wanted to start by talking to you about
Syria. Your written testimony mentions the dire situation in
Syria and it also refers to the fact that there is a certain
amount of disunity among the opposition groups and there may be
some influence from al Qaeda-related groups. I'd like to get
your assessment on Syria and your answers to a couple of
questions.
First, what can you tell us about the composition and the
objectives of the opposition forces in Syria? In particular,
what can you tell me about the extent to which they have a
vision for a future of a post-Assad Syria?
General Mattis. Senator, the opposition is not completely
unified. It's becoming more unified day-by-day. The one thing I
think all of them agree on is Assad has to go, on the
opposition side. But after that it breaks out pretty broadly,
to include some what I would call populist extremist views, as
well as the ones that we would find more along the lines of how
we would like to see Syria come out of this civil war.
The vision that some of them have is clearly inconsistent
with what we would like to see. These are the jihadist elements
that are there, the extremist elements, the foreign fighters
who've come in, who simply want to create another chaotic
background where they can put in their roots and have a new
place to operate from.
Senator Lee. What's your sense as to where the center of
gravity is? Obviously there are some that are like those that
you've just described, jihadist elements, as you put it. Is
that where the center of gravity is? Is that where the
heartland of the opposition forces are?
General Mattis. Sir, I think when you look at the Syrian
National Coalition or what you read as the SNC--and I have to
refer to my notes here in order to keep accurate--and then you
have the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), those are one and the
same thing. So where you see them gaining traction and
coherence, that's carrying a message to the Assad regime that
there is an opposition that's increasingly unified against
them.
At the same time, there's a military council below that and
that military council is what actually carries out the
operations there inside the country.
Senator Lee. But you can't give me a thumbnail sketch of
whether this is a minority faction within, whether it's a
fringe faction, a minority faction, a solid plurality, or a
majority faction that takes a jihadist approach?
General Mattis. I would say that that is a significant
minority that takes a jihadist, extremist approach, with the
idea of, for example, the al Nasra front gaining traction,
those kinds of organizations.
Senator Lee. It's those organizations that are a
significant minority, not amounting to a majority, but a
significant minority, that have either links to al Qaeda or to
some other terrorist group or some other group that might be
related to or similar to al Qaeda?
General Mattis. I believe that's correct, sir. They do have
a powerful propaganda arm. They do use humanitarian efforts in
addition to their well-armed, well-trained fighters to try to
build a broader reach among the opposition.
Senator Lee. Okay. Then I assume that their respective
visions for a post-Assad Syria would break down according to
what's motivating them now; would that be correct?
General Mattis. I believe so, yes, sir.
Senator Lee. In the time I have remaining, I'd like to talk
to you just a little bit about the threats that we face
elsewhere in the region. I certainly agree with our President,
who said in his State of the Union Address a couple of weeks
ago: ``We will do what's necessary to prevent Iran from getting
a nuclear weapon.'' I strongly support that and I suspect
nearly all my colleagues do as well.
But the decision to decrease the size of our carrier
presence in the Persian Gulf worries me because it seems that
it could be sending a different message. The budget uncertainty
surrounding sequestration is forcing DOD to take a number of
difficult steps. But I remain concerned about where the
administration's priorities are when we weaken our presence in
a region of such huge strategic importance to our national
security.
So let me ask you, will our removal of an aircraft carrier
from the Persian Gulf affect our ability to deter Iranian
action in the Gulf or elsewhere in the region?
General Mattis. Obviously, it is more difficult for me to
reassure our friends and to deter Iran, but I believe that a
strong statement of political will and the forces I have there
right now would cause Iran to take pause before they decide to
try to take advantage of what is not really an opportunity. I
can buy the time to get the second carrier out there with the
combat power I have right now in the Gulf.
Senator Lee. You think we'll be okay with the time you can
buy in order to get that out there?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lee.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, thank you both for your
service and thank you for being here this morning. General
Mattis, as all of my colleagues have said, we will certainly
miss you and very much appreciate your years of service to this
country.
I want to start by following up on some of the Syrian
issues that Senator Lee was raising. When you were here for
your posture hearing last year, General Mattis, one of the
things that we discussed was the chemical weapons in Syria.
Secretary Panetta was quoted as saying that the situation in
Syria is 100 times worse than what we saw in Libya with the
proliferation of weapons. It's been described as a nightmare
scenario by a number of officials.
I assume that it's safe to say that your concerns since
that hearing last year have not diminished and you continue to
be very concerned about the presence of the stockpiles of
chemical weapons in Syria?
General Mattis. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. There's been discussion about the red line
that has been drawn should Syria attempt to use those chemical
weapons either on their own people or on others in the region,
and a suggestion that the international community is also
equally concerned about that. But what happens should they try
to transfer those weapons to Hezbollah and they then get
transferred throughout the region? Has there been planning for
how to address that and how to prevent that from happening?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am. That would be a policy decision
by the President. I have military options if he wants to
disrupt that. It would be very difficult to prevent it at the
beginning, either use or transfer. But as fast as we picked it
up, we could disrupt it and we may be able to prevent further
transfer or use.
Senator Shaheen. Has NATO and other countries that are
concerned about what's happening in the region, have they also
been involved in those contingency plans?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Is there any reason that we should have
less concern about what's happening there, rather than more
concern? How can we affect what happens with those chemical
weapons? What can you share with us about the contingency
planning that should either make us be more concerned or less
about what's happening there?
General Mattis. Senator, in the chaos of what Assad has
created with his handling of his people's dissatisfaction and
the civil war that's grown out of it, I believe we have
increasingly vulnerable chemical sites there as this fighting
swings back and forth, as weapons get transferred from one
vulnerable site to one they believe is more secure, as
certainly the mercurial aspects of their leadership could cause
them to do things that cause us to keep a very close eye on
them.
Our planning is taking this into account to the degree that
it can. I'll just tell you that we have options prepared.
Senator Shaheen. Have any of the opposition groups that
we're talking to been involved in any of those discussions or
any of those plans?
General Mattis. No, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Mattis. I should say not by CENTCOM. We have not
engaged with the opposition groups on this.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I want to switch from Syria to Pakistan because obviously
that's one of the other parts of CENTCOM where there are
serious concerns about the impact on our actions in
Afghanistan. I wonder if you could talk about what the current
status is of our relationship with the military in Pakistan and
how the trilateral engagement on the border there between
Afghanistan, between ISAF, and Pakistan is working or is not
working today?
General Mattis. Senator, I don't want to overstate it, but
our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan has been
improving, and this is not recent. This goes back over the last
year, even in the aftermath of the Salala incident where we
accidentally killed 24 of their Frontier Corps troops.
The border itself, the collaboration along the border, the
trilateral cooperation, is actually much improved over a year
ago or 2 years ago. It's not everything we need it to be, but
it is improving, and we have other efforts going on, including
track two efforts under former Secretary of Defense Dr. Perry
and former Secretary of State Schultz out of Palo Alto. That
will shift to Islamabad coming up here in May, where we have
retired officers working to find ways to continue this improved
collaboration and help set the conditions for longer-term
prosperity and peace in that region.
Senator Shaheen. So how will that work once ISAF pulls out
with the Afghan and Pakistani forces there along the border? Do
you expect that collaboration to continue? Senator Levin and I
had the opportunity 2 years ago this summer to see firsthand
the attempted collaboration at a time when it had really broken
down. They were talking about the potential effectiveness of
that. Obviously, that's going to be critical as we withdraw in
terms of maintaining some stability in the region.
So what kinds of plans are in place to help address that
once ISAF withdraws?
General Mattis. It's a great question, Senator, because we
actually identified this as a key part of our transition a year
ago. Since then we no longer meet as NATO-ISAF with the
Pakistan military. It's always NATO-ISAF and the ANSF, the
Afghan security forces, and we meet in these trilaterals, as
you referenced them. We are going to have to continue to mature
it.
But right now, Senator, it's at least going in the right
direction, and day-by-day we build a little bit more trust, a
little more cooperation, a little more collaboration along that
contentious border.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General and Admiral, for your service and for
the service of those that you represent as well.
Admiral, earlier I believe you stated that with the
sequester and the CR we were looking at creating a readiness
problem. What are you doing now that is absolutely essential
and that we need to keep on doing with special operations?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, thank you. Our first and
foremost mission is to take care of the warfighting
requirements downrange. So my support to General Mattis and to
the other combatant commanders to me is my number one
warfighting priority, operational priority.
The problem with the CR and sequestration is it is
beginning to affect my readiness back at the CONUS-based
forces. So as I have to prioritize the training, I'm
prioritizing it forward, but that will come at the expense of
the next generation of forces that begins to deploy downrange.
Now, my ability to manage that budget and continue to provide
the very best SOF forward is exactly what I intend to do.
Having said that, if you take a look at our flying hours,
as an example, as I said, we have about 60 percent of our
CONUS-based training flying hours. Now, that bathtub, if you
will, will continue from this fiscal year to the next fiscal
year. It will get smaller, but it will continue. It just takes
time to catch up once you stand down training.
So when you take a look at the flying hours, and then I am
cutting some of my recruiting base, I'm cutting some of my
other training, that bathtub, as we refer to it, will move
throughout until we eventually, hopefully, catch back up
several years from now to stem the lack of readiness. But we
take care of our operational priorities first, but we are
mortgaging a little bit of our readiness and the future.
Senator Fischer. The troops that you represent, do you
believe that you're putting them at risk, where they're going
to have to be in rotation longer since the readiness is not
there, the training's not there, so that they can benefit from
some rest when they're off duty? Do you see that as a major
risk? If so, I'd like to hear why. If not, what do you see as
the major risks that you are facing due to these cuts that
we're looking at?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. We've worked very hard with--I
have subordinate Service components that work for me, and one
of my biggest concerns has been the pressure on the force and
making sure that the personnel tempo and the operational tempo
of the force is appropriate to meet the demands of the
combatant commanders.
We've taken a number of pretty dramatic and important steps
to ensure that those forces have the rest they need when they
are back in the continental United States before we cycle them
forward again. But I don't want to mislead you. There are
certain high-demand, low-density military operational specialty
codes, some of the intelligence requirements we have, some of
the information officers; those sorts of high demand, but are
in low density, require them to rotate a little bit more
quickly forward.
So again, I'm working hard as they come back to the
continental United States not to impress upon them additional
training and give them a little bit more time in the rear.
Senator Fischer. Under the current command structures that
you face, do you see any limitations being imposed on our SOF?
Admiral McRaven. No, ma'am. I'm very pleased with the kind
of command relationships I have and the command authorities
that I have. So right now I am a support team commander to the
combatant commanders like General Mattis and General Ham and
others, and that is a great relationship. I provide them the
forces; they, if you will, fight the forces or have the
operational command and control; and I'm perfectly comfortable
with that.
Senator Fischer. You don't think any changes need to be
made with regards to that?
Admiral McRaven. Not in regards to the command
relationships with the combatant commanders in terms of the
forces that are under their operational control, no, ma'am, I
do not.
Senator Fischer. Do you think there needs to be any
additional legal authority for soldiers in order for them to
train with our partners?
Admiral McRaven. That's certainly an area that we're taking
a look at. Right now one of the amendments that presents some
problems for us is the Leahy Amendment, we have to vet not only
the individual now but the units to make sure that there are no
human rights violations. We are absolutely in favor and we
understand the value and the importance of making sure we have
good clean human rights. Unfortunately, at a time sometimes
when those units need to have our partnership and our
relationship so they understand what right looks like, that's a
time in which we find ourselves more constrained than ever. If
there is a human rights violation, frankly, I would offer that
then more than ever we need to get engaged and make sure that
they do what is right.
So that's an area that we're exploring both with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the OSD and with
the Hill.
Senator Fischer. You've discussed that with the regional
commanders, I would assume?
Admiral McRaven. I have, yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. And their reactions?
Admiral McRaven. I think they all have similar issues. The
SOF that I provide them find themselves constrained in certain
circumstances, not in all circumstances, but in certain
circumstances in the units that we're dealing with. So, yes,
ma'am, it's a concern. Again, I think we're working through the
appropriate processes now.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. General, do you think that it's working
well together? Do you have any concerns on decisions being
made?
General Mattis. Ma'am, we have the best working
relationship between conventional and SOF that I have enjoyed
in 40 years of service. There are no longer any lines between
us. The collaboration is intense. It's been learned the hard
way, frankly, in the toughest school we could have had, and
right now the degree of confidence in each other and the use of
each other's capabilities, I think, is really at the top of its
game. But we're not complacent. We don't want to lose this as
the war's drawing down. So we're going to have to work hard to
maintain it.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, and thank you for your
many years of service. You have a sterling reputation. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to echo everybody's thoughts to both of you,
you've given so many years of service to our country and we
admire, we respect, and we really do appreciate all of your
commitment to our military and to the national security of our
country. So, thank you very much.
Admiral McRaven, I wanted to ask a question on the women in
combat now that former Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey
announced the end of the direct ground combat exclusion rule
for female servicemembers. I know that you've publicly
highlighted the contributions that women have made to our
special operations missions, including the cultural support
teams, the military information support teams, the civil-
military support elements, and other roles.
I understand, obviously, DOD's recent decision for women.
This is going to open up thousands of new positions for women,
and including many in special operations, too.
I wanted just to get your overall thoughts on how this is
going to be carried out under SOCOM. How have women contributed
to our special operations missions in recent years and then
what additional contributions do you see that will be possible
given this policy change, and how is SOCOM going to respond to
this, and how will you address the need to maintain strict
standards for assessment and selection for the male and female
special operators, and will there be exceptions or waivers to
keep any of the units all male? Just a series of thoughts.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. First, as you
mentioned, the women that have served in special operations
have done an absolutely magnificent and heroic job. We have
them with our cultural support teams and for the broader forum
here, they are partnered with our Rangers and our SEALs and our
Special Forces elements downrange. They go on target in very
hostile environments and they have proven themselves again and
again and again. Those are in small numbers, but have been very
valuable.
The policy right now from the Secretary of Defense, we are
required to provide him a brief on May 15 that will tell how we
are going to implement the new policy. What it will require me
to do is over the course of--well, I'm going to build the plan
before May 15 to brief the Secretary on exactly how we're going
to get there.
It will take us some time to do the assessments to
determine whether or not we need to adjust the standards,
whether we're going to do that, how they will fit into the
training pipelines, the critical mass of female trainees and
students we might need in order to create the appropriate
pipelines with the various military operational specialties.
So we will go through all of that analyses here in the next
year or so. Then if we find that there are areas where we just
cannot meet the requirements without lowering the standards,
without unduly affecting the cohesion of the small units, then
we will come forward to the Secretary for an exception to
policy.
Having said that, my going-in position is we are going to
find a way to make this work. So my staff and I are working
very closely with the Services. The Services all have equities
in this in terms of the Special Operations Military
Occupational Specialties (MOS) that we have. But I have an
agreement with the Service Chiefs. I will be looking at those
special operations-unique MOSs, so the Special Forces, the 18
series, the Green Berets, if you will, the Navy SEALs, the
Rangers, et cetera. I'm going to have an opportunity to provide
my input directly to the Service Chiefs.
Senator Hagan. I think one of the key points was not to
lower the standards. So when you said assess the standards, I
don't think anybody's saying lower the standards.
Admiral McRaven. No, ma'am, absolutely not. In fact, I was
asked at a press conference a couple of weeks back about the
concept of the gender-neutral standards and I said, ``we've
never had gender standards because we haven't had to have other
genders, so we have a standard. That is the standard.'' It's
been a standard that we have had around for a very long time.
It's an important standard. That doesn't mean we don't need to
assess that standard to make sure that it is, in fact,
appropriate.
But there is absolutely positively no intent to lower the
standard. We want to provide the Nation the very finest SOF we
can irrespective of gender.
Senator Hagan. I think that's good, and I also think that
so many of the women that I have talked to, they have been
attached to a number of units, but they haven't been assigned,
so they didn't get the credit for their career ladder. That
certainly has harmed many individuals, women, and I think many
of them saw the writing on the wall and then decided not to
make this a continued career.
So I think this is really, it's a good step, and I think
it's a very beneficial step for our military, too.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. General Mattis, I know that Senator
McCaskill asked questions on sexual assault, but I wanted to
follow up on one area, too. I know that some research that I
have seen says that, from the Department of Veterans Affairs,
suggests that about half of the women who deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan reported being sexually harassed and almost 25
percent say they were sexually assaulted.
I've been to Afghanistan three times, Iraq, Pakistan,
traveled, and women do tend to talk to other women. I was
really shocked at one of the forward operating bases (FOB) and
some of the other bases where--in an instance where individuals
shared with me that they literally were concerned, not then but
earlier, about the amount of fluid that they would drink in the
afternoon because they found it dangerous to go to the latrine
at night. When I think about an issue, how that would impact
somebody who's fighting for our country, to be concerned about
their safety, it makes you wonder. We have to take this
seriously and do something about it.
So my question is, what's the current state of this problem
within the CENTCOM AOR, what's specifically being done to
address the issue of sexual assault while on deployment, and
will the drawdown in Afghanistan present any unique challenges?
General Mattis. Senator, I don't believe the drawdown will
present unique challenges. The environment in the unit is the
environment, whether they're in buildup, drawdown, combat, FOB.
It really comes down to the alertness of the chain of command.
It comes down to the command climate. It comes down to the
commander's intent and his or her ability to articulate clearly
what is acceptable behavior. The authority of commanders to
deal with unacceptable behavior, thanks to the UCMJ that is
given them by the U.S. Congress, is more than sufficient to
maintain the discipline.
But I can assure you that we take this seriously. We took
it seriously a long time ago. It's not new. I'm keenly aware of
the disappointing statistics and some of the anecdotal word
that we get, and we take that for action, is what I will tell
you. Again, we have the authority to deal with people who think
that it's an option. It's not an option to act like a jerk or
in a criminal manner.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Once again, thanks to both of you for what you do for our
country.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both.
General, what are you going to do when you retire?
General Mattis. I have no idea right now, Senator, but it's
going to be a lot of fun. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. I would hire you, but we don't have any
money up here. Sorry about that. [Laughter.]
Regarding Syria. Do both of you agree or disagree with the
statement that we should be arming at least a portion of the
rebels in Syria to bring this thing to an end sooner rather
than later?
General Mattis. Senator, we as the military, I do not
believe that I have the situational awareness to do it. If
given the mission, could I do it? Absolutely.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we could absolutely do it. But again,
I think it's, as General Mattis has mentioned a couple of
times, a very confusing situation and I'm not sure we're in a
position to do that right now.
Senator Graham. So are you against arming the rebels or you
just don't have enough information?
General Mattis. In my case, Senator, they are being armed
right now by----
Senator Graham. But not by us.
General Mattis. That's correct, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you have enough information to give us
advice as to whether or not we should as Americans arm a
portion of the rebels?
General Mattis. It's a policy decision, sir. I think that
if we know who the weapons are going to it's certainly an
option that would complicate Assad's stay in power.
Senator Graham. Okay. Iran. Do you believe that 2013 is a
year of reckoning when it comes to Iran?
General Mattis. Senator, every year I seem to have a year
of reckoning. Again, I'm paid to be a sentinel for this
country, so I consider 2013 a year of reckoning.
Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to Iran you said that
the sanctions you believe were not working in their ultimate
goal of deterring them from acquiring a new capability. Is that
correct?
General Mattis. That's correct, sir. Their nuclear industry
continues.
Senator Graham. Now, what is the likelihood that they would
work in the future, in your view?
General Mattis. I believe this regime, knowing it can't win
the affections of its own people, I think they are very
concerned that the economic sanctions could turn the people
against them, in which case I think they'd cost-benefit. They
could be willing to give up even the nuclear effort to stay in
power.
Senator Graham. Do you think that's the most likely
scenario if we continue sanctions?
General Mattis. I think we have to continue sanctions, but
have other options ready.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that the Israelis would
attack Iran if they believed they had reached a critical point
in terms of nuclear capability?
General Mattis. The Israelis have said so, Senator. I take
them at their word.
Senator Graham. If they did attack Iran, would they need
our help militarily?
General Mattis. They could conduct a strike without our
help.
Senator Graham. Would it be in our interest to help them,
in your view?
General Mattis. That would depend on what the objective of
the strike is. Is it to stop them? Is it to delay them? How
long do you want to delay them? Is there a broader effort?
Senator Graham. If we had to use military force against the
Iranian nuclear program, would you recommend a limited strike
or should we go after their navy, their air force, and the
Revolutionary Guard?
General Mattis. Senator, I think that is advice that I owe
confidentiality to the President on. But I could meet you
separately and answer that question fully.
Senator Graham. If the Iranians develop a nuclear
capability, how certain are you that other nations in the
region would acquire an equal capability?
General Mattis. At least one other nation has told me they
would do that. At a leadership level, they have assured me they
would not stay without a nuclear weapon if Iran----
Senator Graham. Was that a Sunni Arab state?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So the likelihood of Sunni Arab states
acquiring nuclear capability to counter the Shia Persians is
great; would you not agree with that?
General Mattis. I agree, and also other, non-Sunni Arab
states in the general region.
Senator Graham. Okay. Let's talk about the budget. Admiral
McRaven, you say that your budget is being reduced by 23
percent when you look at the CR as well as sequestration. Over
a 10-year window, if sequestration is fully implemented, what
does it do to your command?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, over a 10-year window it'll cut it by
about $10 billion. Sequestration alone is $900 million, or
thereabouts over a 10-year period.
Senator Graham. What does that mean to your ability to help
defend this Nation?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, sequestration alone there is about a
10 percent cut to my budget. So I could get into eaches, but
essentially you think about a 10 percent reduction in readiness
and in capability.
Senator Graham. Would we have a hollow force if we
implemented sequestration?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think I can manage--I'm confident I
can manage the special operations community so that we would
not have a hollow SOF as a result of sequestration alone.
Senator Graham. Okay. What about you, General Mattis? What
about the Marine Corps?
General Mattis. I can't speak for the Marine Corps. I'm a
little outside it right now, sir, since I run CENTCOM. I will
tell you with sequestration, bottom line, we will do less with
the military in the future. Our goal is to not do it less well,
in other words keep the sense of purpose, keep them at the top
of their game with training and good equipment. It would be a
smaller force. We would do less with it.
Senator Graham. When people like myself go around the
country and say that if you implement sequestration the way
it's designed, where two-thirds of the budget's not affected,
only one-third, and 50 percent of that, of what's left, comes
out of DOD on top of what we've done, and personnel is exempt,
that we would be doing great damage to our national security.
Am I overstating that?
Admiral McRaven. No, sir, you are not overstating that. I
would, if I can, continue on with the SOF side of this, because
what is unappreciated sometimes is, while I will take about
$900 million a year in cuts, I get a lot of my support from the
Services. So for the Services the cuts that they take compound
the problem of special operations support.
To clarify my earlier comments, I can manage the SOF, those
that are badged special operations officers and NCOs. But I get
a tremendous amount of my support from the various Services and
that will absolutely affect the special operations capability
of this Nation.
Senator Graham. Am I correct in my statements to my
constituents back home and my colleagues, that sequestration
would do a lot of damage to our military, General Mattis?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, it would.
Senator Graham. Maybe we'll have a second round. Very
quickly, at the end of the 2-year sequestration we'll be at
2.41 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in terms of
military spending. In 1940, we were at 1.6 percent of GDP. On
September 11, we were at 3 percent of GDP. I just want the
committee to understand we'll be at an incredibly low number.
In 1962, 49 percent of spending was on the military, 30 percent
on entitlements. Today, 61.9 percent of the Federal budget is
spent on entitlements, 18.7 on the military. If we don't deal
with entitlements, we're just going to become Greece. I think
that's the challenge of Congress.
I have a couple of other questions, but I'll wait for a
second round, if that's possible.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service to our Nation. We thank
every member of the armed services who comes before us and many
who do not when we encounter them. But you both really
exemplify the strength and courage that we see from our
military and your records of service, I think, are simply
extraordinary. So a special thanks to each of you and to your
staffs for the great work that you have done for our country.
I want to follow some of the questions that Senator Graham
has been asking because I think the American people should be
really deeply troubled that our SOF are going to be cut, not
increased. After all, the President's strategy, his vision for
the future of our military readiness, is for special operations
to play a greater role and to be supported more, not less, in
resources and budget. I personally feel that approach is
critical to our Nation's security.
So my question, Admiral McRaven, is how do you make these
kinds of cuts consistent with that approach that emphasizes
special operations as the centerpiece, as the tip of the spear
of our Nation's readiness going forward? I don't know how I can
go back to the people of Connecticut and say everything's fine,
but we're cutting special operations by 10 percent. So I put
that question to you. I think it's a difficult question for us
as elected officials and I'm hoping that now, and going into
the future, you will have an answer.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, make no mistake about it, the
sequestration, and then on top of that the CR will have a
dramatic impact on special operations now and into the future.
The President and the Secretary of Defense charged me to manage
the best force I can to provide combat-capable SOF forward to
the combatant commanders. I will do absolutely the best I can
to ensure that I am providing those forces forward.
However, having said that, as I said, we tend to have to
mortgage a little bit of the future. So it will not be
apparent, I don't think, to the combatant commanders or to the
American people the effect that these cuts are having on
special operations for several years as we begin to cut back on
our flying programs, as we begin to cut back on our recruiting
base, as we begin to cut back on some of the modifications
we're going to do on our helicopters, as we begin to cut back
on the deployments. Before long, there is an effect, a global
effect, frankly, with the reduction in capability of the SOF.
Now, I can't tell you when that line is going to come, when
we're going to hit that mark where now the forces I'm deploying
are not the quality forces that I think the American people
expect. But make no mistake about it, as we move forward with
these sequestration cuts and if the CR stays in effect, we will
hit that line sooner than later.
Senator Blumenthal. So we have some time--and I'm not going
to ask you how much--but the sooner the better that we reverse
these cuts so as to avoid the lasting damage to our national
security.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, the problems are current, so I don't
want to lead you to believe that the cuts that were incurred
now, or that we're accepting now, are not affecting the force
now. They are. I've cut some of my deployments by about 20
percent in some cases, in some cases 60 percent of my
deployments for some of my less forward units.
So it is having an effect now, but that effect will be
magnified as we go forward into the future.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Do either of you differ with the statement, which I happen
to think is true, that Iran continues to be determined to
develop a nuclear capability?
General Mattis. Senator, they are enriching uranium beyond
any plausible peaceful purpose.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you also share that view, Admiral
McRaven?
Admiral McRaven. I do, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. So whether there has been a slowdown, a
pause, however the Intelligence Community may refer to it, that
basic ambition is still there; you would agree with that?
General Mattis. I would, sir. By their own public
announcements, they've brought advanced centrifuges on line.
They are refusing the International Atomic Energy Agency access
to the Parchin site. They are continuing their program.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I'm going to jump to another topic. I apologize that there
seems to be little continuity between the subjects, but that's
the nature of this questioning process, as I'm sure you know.
On sexual assault, an area that has concerned me, as a
prosecutor for a good part of my professional career, as well
as now a member of this committee, one of the current
weaknesses in our system of deterring as well as punishing
sexual assault in the military seems to me the nature of the
reporting of complaints, but also the prosecutorial decisions
as to whether someone is held criminally responsible. In other
words, the decision within the command structure is, in fact,
within that command made by generally someone to whom both the
complainant and the potential defendant report. That system is
somewhat unique because of the nature of the military. There
has to be a command structure.
I am posing to you the question whether if that
decisionmaking function, whether to prosecute, whether to hold
a predator criminally responsible, were taken away from the
commander, whether that would severely undermine the capability
of that commander to effectively command, whether it's at the
regiment or whatever level the decision is made?
General Mattis. It would severely undermine his command
authority. Any time a commander is no longer responsible for
some aspect of good order and discipline, you have set the
ground work, perhaps for the best of reasons or best of
intentions, to leave the commander in a more circumscribed
situation, and that is not something that's good and something
a force that's put together for the use of violent action. He
must be seen, she must be seen, as the ultimate arbiter of good
order and discipline in that unit, or you're solving--perhaps
addressing one issue and creating a Pandora's Box of other
issues that history will tell you will not work out well.
Would you agree, Admiral McRaven?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would. Also, while I don't want to
get too far astray from my expertise here, I will tell you that
in cases where there are felony charges against an individual,
those felony charges are generally resolved by a courts
martial, as opposed to an individual commander. They're taken
out of the commander's hands if there are felony charges in
some cases, and in some cases, they're actually prosecuted in a
civilian court.
So the characterization that a commanding officer at a
battalion level can come to his own decision on a felony charge
of rape, I think, is a mischaracterization of the UCMJ. Again,
I will defer to the military lawyers who have that expertise,
but in my many years of exercising the UCMJ I've found none. As
General Mattis said, it is absolutely positively critical to
maintaining good order and discipline in a unit.
Those cases that are beyond the commander's purview by law
are referred to a professional lawyer, a judge, a military
judge, and a courts martial, much like we have in the civilian
system. So the earlier characterization of the UCMJ as an
arbitrary decision by a commander to take care of one of his
buddies, I think, is a mischaracterization of the UCMJ.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired. I really want to thank you for your
very helpful and forthright responses and again for your
service. Thank you very much.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, thank you for your
service to the Nation. To General Mattis, thank you so much for
an extraordinary career devoted to the men and women of our
Services and to our country. Thank you so very much.
General Mattis, in regards to Pakistan, what would you say
is the state of where our relationship is right now compared to
some of the peaks and valleys that we have had in the past and
where we are at the present time, as you see it?
General Mattis. Senator, we're on an improving trajectory.
It's been improving for probably the last year, maybe 8 months,
and we have some valid reasons, I think, to see it continue to
improve into the near future as we try to get our two countries
to find common ground wherever possible.
Senator Donnelly. As we come home from Afghanistan, how do
you see Pakistan's reaction in relationship to Afghanistan
regarding that?
General Mattis. In Pakistan, as well as Central Asia,
Senator, there's a lot of concern about what's going to be
there after the NATO forces come out. I think that the ANSF,
which are performing better, will give a certain amount of
credence to the idea that the success we've achieved to date is
not transient. In fact, it can be sustained, and I think the
more we can get the current trilateral effort of NATO,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan to work together, the more we'll
build confidence for the Afghans and Pakistanis to take control
of that border region at a higher level than they've enjoyed
before.
Senator Donnelly. As a big part of this also as we move
forward is the Afghan-Pakistan relationship. What is your best
estimate of that relationship right now and where that seems to
be heading?
General Mattis. Sir, Pakistan has lost more troops in this
fight than NATO combined. As they go through this fight in an
area of their country where they have never had a lot of
control, they're going to have to exercise a degree of control
they have not exercised, been able to exercise always in the
past. There are a number of areas where they're actually
improving their control right now, but it is militarily the
most difficult terrain I've ever operated in along that border
region.
So this is not easy. The enemy is well dug in. They're hard
to get at. But the Pakistan military is moving against them,
and we'll just have to try and keep the collaboration along the
border continuing on the trajectory it's on now if we're going
to have success.
Senator Donnelly. Are the Afghans and Pakistanis, are they
cooperating more, or is it still a trust-but-verify type of
relationship? Or both?
General Mattis. Right. There's dissatisfaction that has
been articulated by the Afghans about the havens on the
Pakistan side of the border. Of course, there are some of these
terrorists who use the Afghan side of the border to attack
Pakistan. So they both recognize they have to work together.
It's imperfect right now. There are concerns that I don't want
to wish away or dismiss. But at least it's going in the right
direction, and I think NATO is a big facilitator to why it's
going in the right direction right now, getting Pakistan and
Afghanistan officers to talk together, to work together.
Senator Donnelly. There's a report this morning, and I know
it is not in your particular area, but in some ways it may come
back to that, that North Korea is again ratcheting up and has
said that on March 11 they are looking at possible surgical
strike actions. What do you see as the relationship between
Iran and North Korea, and how much of the technology that Iran
is developing is coming from that direction? Is that going to
be a substantial force for Iran's information in further
developing what they have? That would be for either of you.
General Mattis. It's a great question, Senator. I would
like to get back to you with a more complete answer, but your
instincts, your thoughts, are on target. There is a connection
and the degree to which that connection provides real progress
for Iran I cannot say in open session, but I will get back to
you, Senator, with an unclassified response for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

We have limited knowledge of North Korean assistance to Iran's
nuclear efforts and remain concerned that Iran may leverage the
relationship to further its program. Pyongyang has supplied weapons to
Iran since the 1980s and is a source of missile technology and
components. Reports that Iranian personnel attended the February 2013
nuclear test in North Korea and that North Korea and Iran agreed to an
``exchange of science, technology, and education'' at the September
2012 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Tehran are troubling. Details of
this agreement are unclear, but Iranian state media cited the
establishment of joint laboratories, exchanges of Iranian and North
Korean scientists, and technology transfers in the areas of energy and
information technology. We remain closely linked with the Intelligence
Community on the trajectory of Iran's nuclear endeavors and acknowledge
that many details of this program are still unclear as the IAEA presses
Tehran for answers and transparency. North Korea has already developed
and tested nuclear weapons. As such, the country would be in a position
to provide significant technological assistance to Iran, especially in
the areas of weapons design and fabrication. A nuclear relationship
between the countries would give Iran insight into nuclear weapons
testing and may provide an external venue to test an Iranian weapon.

Senator Donnelly. Thank you, General.
Admiral, one of the strongest parts of my State of
Indiana's assistance to the U.S. Armed Forces is the Naval
Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, located in Crane, IN. I
know one of the areas they work on--and this is without getting
into too much technical detail--is developing technology for
SOF. I want you to know we consider that a privilege.
But then also, in terms of our SOF, is there going to be a
continuing emphasis on the technical improvements as we move
forward?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, there absolutely will, and Crane,
Indiana, is one of our key depots for supporting special
operations, sir. I've visited Crane a number of times--
magnificent DOD civilians there and contractors and military
officers and enlisted people that are supporting our efforts.
Sir, that will continue.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
General, one of the areas in regards to the Syrian conflict
that we hear is, what will happen if the rebels are successful
to non-Muslim faith communities? Will there be a cleansing?
Will there be a purging? I was just wondering if there have
been any discussions in regards to those forces as to their
intentions in that area?
General Mattis. Sir, the kind of extremists we're most
concerned about there are not the opposition, not the people
that are trying to unseat Assad, and we understand where
they're coming from and where they want to take their country,
but these extremists who are taking advantage of the current
situation and the Iranian-inspired and supported what I would
call militias that they're going to have ready in the event
Assad falls so they've still got some influence.
They have a pretty medieval philosophy and I would
anticipate the worst from them. But they don't represent the
opposition either.
Senator Donnelly. Do you know if there are any plans being
made by either ourselves or the rebels, who in some cases you
see the rebels that these extremist groups are working right
next door to them? Are the rebels aware of the potential of
this danger?
General Mattis. I believe in many cases they are and
they're uncomfortable with those folks working next door to
them. At the same time, they're locked in a pretty rough fight.
I think they're willing to let bygones be bygones at this time
in order to try to win this fight, and then deal with that
issue once they've gotten rid of Assad. But of course, that
always brings its own danger, Senator.
Senator Donnelly. General Mattis, thank you again for
everything you've done. Admiral McRaven, thank you again for
your continued service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join my colleagues in thanking General
Mattis and Admiral McRaven for your service to our country, and
also thank the men and women in your respective commands for
the hard work that they do on behalf of all of us. Of course,
General Mattis, with 41 years of service, my congratulations to
you upon your retirement. My very best wishes go with you.
I know that some of my colleagues have focused on sexual
assault prevention in the military, I share their concerns and
I am looking forward to the Personnel Subcommittee's hearing
that will focus on these issues. I won't go into that, but I
just want to let you know that I share those concerns.
General Mattis, in your testimony you talked about the most
serious strategic risk to the U.S. national security in the
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. One of these areas
was, and you said, ``Perhaps the greatest risk to U.S.
interests in this area is the perceived lack of U.S.
commitment, particularly with regard to what happens in
Afghanistan, Middle East peace, Syria.'' Then you note that,
``If we seek to influence events, we must listen to partner
concerns and continue to demonstrate our support through
tangible actions.''
Can you give me examples of what you would define as
``tangible actions'' to make sure that people in this region
understand we have a continuing commitment?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am. On the military side, I provide
options to the President, and that manifests itself as U.S.
Forces that work within the framework of U.S. foreign policy to
reassure our friends and make certain our enemies know that
we're there, we're going to stand by our friends and work with
them. It involves bringing officers from various militaries
overseas to our schools here in the United States so that we
create relationships with them and create a degree of
interoperability. It means that we have our special operations
and conventional forces training alongside their forces.
Nothing builds those personal relationships faster than
probably the education and training effort.
It also means that we're going to be selling equipment,
high technology American equipment, to countries that share our
security interests as we make certain that we can operate
alongside them and they'll be equipped with some of the best
equipment in the world should we have to fight together. Taken
together, that serves as a deterrent, so hopefully we never
have to go into that fight.
But those would be some of the tangible things that we can
do, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Obviously, we need to continue those
efforts. It's a long-term kind of a relationship-building that
we're going to need to engage in in this highly volatile,
unstable area of the world.
General Mattis. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Hirono. When Senator Hagel's confirmation hearing
occurred, and now he is the Secretary of Defense, I asked him
some questions about the rebalance to the Pacific. So that is
not your command, but I'm just wondering, do you support the
rebalance to the Pacific in light of the realities that we are
facing in that area of the world?
General Mattis. Senator Hirono, I completely support it. We
do have three anchors in the Middle East. One of them is our
friends and partners there that must not face the future alone
without the reassurance that we're with them. Second is, of
course, oil that fuels the global economy, a global economy
that we're intimately connected to with the American economy.
The third are the violent extremists that come out of this
region threatening civilization everywhere, whether it be India
or Indonesia, United Kingdom or North Africa. This is a problem
that we all have to work with.
So we have three anchors that will keep us firmly committed
in the Middle East. But I completely support the President's
declared shift to the Pacific.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven, following our move out of Iraq and leaving
Afghanistan also on the horizon, as you look forward, do you
see the roles of our special operators changing or moving to a
different primary mission, and what would be the factors that
you would consider in making any kind of a change for our
special operations program?
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Senator. As we draw down in
Afghanistan, that will certainly provide me more capacity and
SOF that I can then provide to the combatant commanders. You
talk about the rebalancing to the Pacific. I was out with
Admiral Locklear a little over a month ago. I had an
opportunity to spend a fair amount of time in the Pacific. In
my Navy SEAL career, I grew up in the Pacific, if you will.
Ma'am, we have had, we the special operations community, have
had wonderful relationships in the Pacific for many decades,
from Korea down to Australia and every country in between.
So we very much value our relationship in the Pacific. I
will tell you that I think as we look at special operations
moving forward, we always need to maintain our ability to
rescue Americans and to capture or eliminate the terrorist
threats. So that kinetic, that direct action approach, is an
important part of what we do in special operations.
But I would tell you, the current and future aspect of
special operations that I think is equally, if not more,
important is how we go about building our partners' capacity,
how we allow them to deal with their own security problems. So
part of the strategy of SOCOM, building off the DSG put in
place in 2012 by Secretary Panetta, is the work with the
combatant commanders, work with the Chiefs of Missions, work
with the host nations, and figure out where can we apply our
special operations resources to best help the nations that are
inclined to help themselves and deal with these problems.
Senator Hirono. I don't know if this is a setting in which
you can mention some of those countries in which you are
working very closely to enable them to enhance their own
capacity to engage in special operations?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. One of the great success
stories we've had is working with our Filipino partners. Of
course, special operations and I can tell you in my time as a
SEAL, we have been in the Philippines, as I said, for decades
and had a great relationship with the Philippine Armed Forces.
But really since September 11, as the Filipino Government
aggressively went after the Abu Sayyaf and the Jemaah Islamiyah
down in Basilan and Mindanao, they requested and we supported
them in building their special operations capability and
capacity.
I had an opportunity again in my trip out to U.S. Pacific
Command a little over a month ago to visit Mindanao and
Basilan, and I will tell you the success is remarkable, the
degree of stability. The people see the Filipino Army as a
credible, reliable, important partner. The Abu Sayyaf is maybe
not completely gone, but they are on the ropes, and I give
tremendous credit to the Government of the Philippines and our
support to the Government of the Philippines in dealing with
that problem.
But the Philippines is one example. We have been partnered
with our South Korean brothers for a long time. I can go from
South Korea to Singapore to Australia----
Senator Hirono. Any country in the Middle East?
Admiral McRaven. Just about every country in the Pacific,
yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Any country in the CENTCOM?
Admiral McRaven. Oh, yes, ma'am. We are partnered with
General Mattis and most of our allies in CENTCOM as well.
Senator Hirono. So, General Mattis, what he's doing very
much is in line with our showing the continuing commitment that
we have; that addresses your perception issue that you talked
about?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am. As we draw down in Afghanistan,
as we draw down on some of our forces--you saw that the Harry
S. Truman battle group will not deploy right now--we just have
to make certain that's not misinterpreted as a pullback, that
we stay fully engaged. There's a number of ways to do so, not
just military. That's the area that I am concerned with and
Admiral McRaven's concerned with, but there's a number of ways
to do it. Not all of them cost a lot of money, but it's
critical that we do it.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Thank you for the testimony today and for your service, to
each of you.
I had intended to make my questions heavily focused on
budget, but I think you've done a very good job of covering
sequestration and the CR effects. I went to the Pentagon
yesterday on my way into town, to stop and visit with Secretary
Hagel, Deputy Secretary Carter, and General Odierno. Then I
went to the lunch room and talked to Active, Guard, Reserve,
veterans, and DOD civilians and contractors who were there.
The message I came away with loud and clear is certainly
something that you've underlined today, the need for us to
provide some certainty so that you can do the best with the
resources you have. I think the optimal situation would be for
our national security strategy to drive our budget. A distant
second would be for our budget strategy to drive our national
security. But we're in the far distant third, which is
budgetary indecision driving national security decisions, and
that's very dangerous. I think your testimony encourages us to
try to do some of our best work.
You are risk tolerators. You run the risk. The risk that
you shouldn't have to tolerate is a wavering political
commitment or political indecision in terms of providing you
the backup that you need.
Let me just talk for a second about Iran. Good discussion
today. One of the questions that I have is, as we are
evaluating what are the right options for our country to make
sure that Iran does not obtain nuclear capacity or nuclear
weapons, one of the keys to that is the confidence level that
we have about our own intelligence regarding Iranian activity.
That intelligence is both our own, but also credible
intelligence that we're able to receive from allies.
Without going into classified material, I'd be curious as
to each of your confidence level in our intelligence
surrounding the current status of Iranian activities regarding
their nuclear plans.
General Mattis. Senator, I'll just tell you that in 40-odd
years in the U.S. military, I have never enjoyed the level of
intelligence and the anticipation I'm able to achieve as I do
today in this job. It is phenomenal and it allows me insights
that I know that nobody else has in terms of outside the U.S.
Government.
Senator Kaine. General, is that both the intelligence that
we generate, but also the credible intelligence that we are
able to share appropriately with allies?
General Mattis. Absolutely, sir, and that they share with
us, I might add, which is invaluable.
But I would also tell you that this program inside a closed
country that's virtually a police state, its ability to conduct
denial and deception operations means that I stay in a very
watchful mode, as does our Intelligence Community. I think we
have to assume that in some cases we would not know something,
a decision made in a very small cohort of people, and perhaps
other hidden sites like the one revealed by our President a
couple years ago, Ford. I have to assume they have other hidden
sites where certain activities could be going on.
So the decision itself and what's going on at those hidden
sites, Senator Kaine, it could take a while for us to find
something like that. It's just the normal give and take of the
intelligence world.
Senator Kaine. Admiral McRaven, any additional comments on
that?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, nothing, but to add to what General
Mattis said, as the SOCOM Commander, I see virtually everything
General Mattis sees in terms of the intelligence products and I
would echo his sentiments that the Intelligence Community both
within the United States and the external communities that
provide us that insight is truly incredible.
Senator Kaine. Admiral McRaven, we have such a SOF
footprint in the Commonwealth. In Senator Levin's opening
comments he referred to the work that you've done in stress on
force studies and then recommendations to follow. I would just
like you to talk a bit about that. What are some of the things
that you're doing within SOF to deal with this uptempo
operation, the effect upon our warriors and their families?
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
question. My predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, did a wonderful
job of identifying the problem early on, and he put together a
``Pressure On The Force'' Task Force. We called it the POTF at
the time. They went out and interviewed about 7,000
servicemembers, and about 1,000 spouses. They had 440 different
meetings. It was about a 10-month assessment to determine the
pressure on SOF.
About the time that I took command back in the summer of
2011, that report, just a couple of days after I took command,
landed on my desk. It was very apparent that, as Admiral Olson
had said, the force was frayed at the time. Candidly, in the
last 18 months the force has continued to fray, and I'm
committed to making sure that the force that I leave my
successor and his successor is healthy and capable of doing the
mission the Nation expects us to do.
As a result of that, I took the POTF and we've changed the
name a little bit and the focus, and it is now the
``Preservation of the Force and the Families'' (POTFF) Task
Force. We have spent time working with Capitol Hill, working
with the Services who provide us a lot of our support, to make
sure we have the right programs in place for not only our
members, which we do pretty well, but also for their families.
I have made a point of stating that the readiness of the member
is directly related to the readiness of the family.
So there are a lot of programs out there that allow us to
take good care of our members, but not such good care of our
families in some areas. So we're working, again, with Capitol
Hill and with OSD and others to figure out how can we find the
appropriate programs where we can take care of our families so
that, frankly, the servicemembers will be ready to do their
job. Frankly, it is absolutely the right thing to do, to take
care of those families that have been supporting this Nation
along with their servicemembers for so very long.
I'm pleased we have a full-time task force that does
nothing but work with my component commanders and their Service
components to make sure that we're taking care of the tactical
and the headquarters elements as well. It's pretty aggressive,
but, as I said, I want to make sure the force is healthy for
years to come, sir.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate hearing
that status report.
One last question for you General Mattis, a big picture
question to take advantage of your lengthy experience. When I
was elected Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, we had a Virginia
Guard, as all States did, that was a Reserve Force. Twelve
years later, as I am now a junior Senator, we have a Virginia
Guard that has had significant operational experience, scar
tissue, training, wisdom, lives lost, folks injured in battle.
But it's a very different kind of a Guard force than it was 10
or 11 years ago.
I'd like for you just to talk about in your experience
since 2001 the changing nature of the Guard and how critical
the Guard and Reserve have been to your activities in CENTCOM
or, more broadly, other activities during the war on terror.
General Mattis. Thanks, Senator Kaine. I appreciate the
opportunity to recognize that here in a public hearing. They
have been magnificent in serving as an operational and even
strategic shock absorber for us so that we could conduct this
war and not lose the All-Volunteer Force, which I think would
have been the cost had we not had the ability to bring these
ready forces full of patriots who look past any hot political
rhetoric swirling around this war and answer their country's
call, come in, and deploy, not once, not twice, but in many
cases, multiple times.
I bring this up because we did have a contract with the
Guard and Reserve that said you would come in to take some
pressure off the others. They've become more of an operational
force now, and we have to make sure we don't break that
fundamental contract that allows them to be citizen-soldiers,
in other words, continue with their civilian career and still
give us the Reserve, the shock absorber we need. There comes a
point where they're Reserve only in name; they are, in fact,
becoming regulars.
I think we have to look at the kind of force we compose at
this point and make sure we keep faith with the Reserves and
the Guard, but at the same time not dismiss the very real
capability they give this country when the call comes.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General.
We'll have a second round of questions for 3 minutes. I'll
go to Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you both.
Afghanistan, General Mattis. The last card to play really
is the residual force in 2014; do you agree with that?
General Mattis. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. We could have a very good outcome in
Afghanistan if we play that card well. Do you agree with that?
General Mattis. It will be critical to the good outcome.
Senator Graham. Okay. 13,600 was the recommendation in
terms of U.S. Force presence, 352,000 in terms of ANSF, and
some NATO. That's the configuration, right?
General Mattis. 13,600 was my personal recommendation, yes,
sir.
Senator Graham. The President, he's the Commander in
Chief--we all respect that. My concern is that at the end here
we're going to drop the ball and I don't want to do that. Let's
say you announce 10,000 U.S. Forces, not 13,600, and you said
publicly we will reduce that force 2,000 a year until we get
down to 2,000 4 years later. What kind of effect would a
statement like that have on our success or potential success in
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Senator Graham, I think we have to send a
message of commitment. We work with a lot of unpredictability,
Senator, and if the ANSF continue to mature the way they have
been and we hold them at that full strength into 2018, there
may be more reductions we can take.
Senator Graham. But you wouldn't announce on day 1 we're
going to withdraw 2,000 a year no matter what?
General Mattis. I think a military perspective, Senator,
because of the unpredictable nature of war, we'd never reveal--
--
Senator Graham. The enemy would look at the last number,
not the first number.
General Mattis. They will, yes, sir, that's fair.
Senator Graham. Okay. One last thing, about Iran. We have
two choices here: bring them to their senses, which is to stop
developing a nuclear weapon capability; or bring them to their
knees, so they can't develop a nuclear weapon capability.
Aren't those our two options?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. As to the second option, do we have the
capability to bring them to their knees?
General Mattis. Absolutely, Senator. I would still say, on
``bring them to their senses,'' between economic sanctions,
diplomatic isolation, and encouragement of behavior, that does
not cost them such a degree of political support that they end
up losing power, there may yet be a way to bring them to their
senses on a purely cost-benefit ratio.
Senator Graham. I hope you're right. But if that doesn't
work, the only option left is to bring them to their knees. Do
you agree?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. There are a number of means to do
that, perhaps even short of open conflict. But certainly that's
one of the options that I have to have prepared for the
President.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Graham.
General Mattis, one more follow-up on this Guard and
Reserve question. If they were a traditional Reserve and then
we built the Guard and Reserve up to have this operational
capacity and strategic shock absorber, as you indicate, and now
we're wrestling with not wanting them to be frayed, you don't
recommend that we take them back to the old Reserve model?
There's training and expertise that we ought to now be taking
advantage of, so some scale-back to not wear them out and
maintain them is appropriate, but wouldn't you suggest that a
future role for the Guard and Reserve going forward should try
to take advantage of this operational and strategic shock
absorber capacity that they've developed over the last 10
years?
General Mattis. I believe it would be wise to, Senator
Kaine. Also, I think that we have to in light of the situation
we face fiscally in DOD right now.
Senator Kaine. Let me thank each of you very much. As
you've noticed, people have been departing because there's a
vote on right now. I'm going to depart stage right very
promptly.
Thank you so much for your service and your testimony
today. This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

RETROGRADE OF EQUIPMENT OUT OF AFGHANISTAN

1. Senator Levin. General Mattis, withdrawing millions of pieces of
equipment from Afghanistan as our forces draw down will depend on our
ability to ship equipment through the ground lines in Pakistan and
along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Central Asia. Do
you see strategic advantages for regional stability in improving and
expanding the transportation network between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
General Mattis. Improvements and expansion of the existing
transportation network between Afghanistan and Pakistan may yield
greater regional stability. Expansion of the transportation network
could facilitate greater capacity and efficiency of regional cross-
border legal commerce, enable customs and cross-border processes and
cooperation, and encourage expanded bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements, resulting in increased economic cooperation. All of these
factors could increase employment opportunities, reduce bureaucratic
and political barriers, and lead to economic stability, a prerequisite
for overall regional stability.

2. Senator Levin. General Mattis, do you see strategic advantages
for regional stability in connecting historical transit routes in
Central Asia with the growing economies of South Asia, along the same
routes we would use for the withdrawal of U.S. equipment from
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Yes. Connecting the transportation network between
the Central Asian states and South Asia encourages multi-lateral trade
and economic development. The enhanced transportation infrastructure
links local vendors and manufacturers with expanded regional and global
markets. Increased regional trade will cultivate economic and political
partnerships and result in economic growth and stability. Flow of U.S.
materiel along the NDN fosters greater cooperation between the Central
and South Asian states and serves as a catalyst to improve overall
cross-border commerce, customs processes, and cooperation.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

3. Senator Reed. General Mattis, from my understanding of your
testimony, there is an ongoing process to define the appropriate
operational procedures for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in
Wardak Province, Afghanistan. As such, once those operational
procedures have been developed and implemented, U.S. SOF will continue
to operate in Wardak Province and throughout Afghanistan. As was also
indicated in your testimony, you will inform the committee when this
situation is adequately clarified. To be sure that I am absolutely
clear with respect to this issue, SOF will be allowed to operate
throughout the entire country of Afghanistan, including Wardak
Province, particularly post-2014. The only item under consideration is
the operational techniques those forces can use, ensuring they have the
suitable operational flexibility to accomplish our mission, while
respecting the sovereignty of Afghanistan and minimizing civilian
casualties. Please inform me if this is incorrect?
General Mattis. Decisions have not yet been made about a post-2014
U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. The President continues to
consider a range of options for the size and structure of our post-2014
force. During post-2014 operations, we anticipate working by, with, and
through our Afghan partners. The lead for security in Wardak Province
is transitioning to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The combat
leadership shift from the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) to the ANSF demonstrates that capability and resolve of the ANSF
to secure their people and their nation.

4. Senator Reed. General Mattis, do you anticipate any other areas,
either now or in the future, that will become off-limits for our SOF?
General Mattis. The transition to a Government of Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and ANSF lead is progressing and is on track for
completion by the end of 2014. As GIRoA increasingly exerts
sovereignty, I anticipate there may be additional areas that limit or
constrain our forces. However, I have total confidence that General
Dunford and his team will work with the GIRoA security ministries to
execute the transition without degrading the security environment.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE AVAILABILITY

5. Senator Nelson. General Mattis, we continue to hear Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is doing very well
supporting the troops in Southwest Asia. The platform is also in high
demand by other combatant commands and is a proven performer in combat.
As you assess your intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
requirements and the various systems available to you for fulfilling
these requirements, how critical is JSTARS? Specifically, could you
perform the wide area surveillance mission without it?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

6. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, we have been told that
building infrastructure has been important to our counterinsurgency
(COIN) strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, no one from the
Department of Defense (DOD) has been able to show me data supporting
the argument that these multi-million dollars projects are having any
positive impact on our COIN efforts. Some projects funded by the
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) are unlikely to be finished prior
to the end of 2014, which means we will still be building
infrastructure in Afghanistan after most of our forces have come home.
Furthermore, a report last year from the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised the concern that some AIF
projects might be counterproductive to our COIN objectives. It appears
to me that COIN has been used to justify billions of dollars in
infrastructure spending in Iraq and Afghanistan without any hard-nosed
assessment as to whether or not it was doing any good. What metrics do
you use to determine that the money we have spent on large-scale
infrastructure projects in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to our
COIN objectives in those countries?
General Mattis. Each infrastructure project is specifically
designed to contribute to a system of interdependent, internationally-
funded projects which, as a whole, will raise the ability of all levels
of the GIRoA to promote stability by providing essential services and
increasing economic development efforts critical to our COIN strategy.
Sustainable power, safe and passable roads, reliable irrigation
systems, well-equipped schools, as well as modern medical facilities,
all contribute to stability and provide the Afghan people with a
hopeful alternative to an insurgency marked by violence and oppression.
More than 100 new businesses have been created in Kandahar since the
inception of the Kandahar Bridging Solution, and improved roads in
Helmand enable farmers to get agricultural products to market before
they spoil.
Each of the ongoing projects supports objectives of the GIRoA and
directly contributes to campaign objectives. Until completed and
functioning, metrics relating to ongoing projects to COIN objectives
often remain abstract. Once completed, objective metric data measuring
service delivery rates and outcomes will better articulate whether or
not a project has achieved its full COIN objective.
Current ongoing projects will provide for reliable electrical power
distribution to major population centers and improved water management
to primary agricultural production areas. Enabling the GIRoA to improve
such services is key to breaking the cycle of insurgency and bringing
immediate COIN benefits. The COIN effects of AIF projects--which were
not intended to be linked to U.S. Force levels--will continue well
beyond 2014. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), our executing
agent for large-scale infrastructure projects, has developed an
oversight and management plan, based on successes in other countries,
to ensure the completion of these strategic initiatives.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

7. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, the Navy is currently
projecting a strike fighter shortfall due to continued delays in the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Navy is attempting to mitigate
this shortfall by extending the life of older aircraft. However, we
don't yet know whether this effort will be successful. Currently, the
Navy has no plans to procure the F/A-18 Super Hornet beyond fiscal year
2014, which could result in the shut-down of the Super Hornet line
before the JSF is ready to fly actual combat missions. As a combatant
commander, you depend on the Services to fulfill your mission
requirement needs, and I imagine carrier-launched strike fighter
aircraft play an important role in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Area of Responsibility (AOR). So, the Navy's strike fighter shortfall
becomes your strike fighter shortfall. As a commander, can you discuss
how this shortfall and lack of reliability will affect CENTCOM's
ability to conducts operations?
General Mattis. Strike fighter aircraft play an important role in
CENTCOM's ability to respond to emerging crises, provide for the
defense of the Arabian Gulf, and to successfully accomplish a variety
of contingency operations within the CENTCOM AOR. Our joint aviation
posture includes a mix of shore-based and carrier-based fighter
aircraft. The continued presence of strike fighter capability in the
Gulf region is essential to support the articulated requirements of the
combatant commander, as validated by the Joint Staff and approved by
the Secretary of Defense. I remain confident the Services will continue
to meet my operational requirements.

8. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, have you raised this as a
point of concern with the Navy?
General Mattis. I maintain personal and professional relationships
with all of the Service Chiefs, including Admiral Greenert in his
capacity as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). He and I candidly
discuss a range of service-specific issues to ensure his decisions are
informed by the needs of the warfighters downrange in the CENTCOM AOR.
I have not voiced any concerns specific to strike fighter procurement
strategies with the Navy.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin

AUTOMATED BIOMETRICS IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

9. Senator Manchin. Admiral McRaven, the DOD repository for
biometrics information is housed at the Automated Biometrics
Identification System (ABIS) in Clarksburg, WV. This facility allows
SOFs to access biometric information on terrorists and enemy
combatants, particularly when no other means of identification is
possible. I am a strong supporter of the work done at this facility.
More than 6,000 terrorists have been captured or killed as a direct
result of the real-time information provided by ABIS to SOFs working in
harm's way. However, the funding for this work will run out on April 4,
2013. If the funding is allowed to expire, what would your assessment
be on how SOFs will be impacted when this facility can no longer
operate?
Admiral McRaven. Failure by the DOD Executive Agent for Biometrics
to adequately sustain ABIS will shut down SOF identity intelligence
operations, eliminating a proven enabler of SOF core missions and
negatively impacting force protection. U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), along with multiple inter-agency and partner nation SOF users,
depend on the DOD ABIS to search, match, and store biometric
submissions (fingerprints, facial photos, iris scans) of non-U.S.
persons of interest (POI). ABIS contains nearly 9 million biometric
files that SOF query on a daily basis to positively identity POI.
Additionally, ABIS is the DOD access point to query the FBI and the
Department of Homeland Security biometric files, adding the power of
another 225 million biometrics files to query. Connectivity to ABIS via
the SOF web-based exploitation architecture enables positive
identification of POI on tactical objectives during field operations
within 15 minutes. Since September 1, 2006, SOCOM has processed over
330,000 biometric files through ABIS resulting in over 131,000 positive
identifications, of which more than 24,000 were watch-listed or
improvised explosive device (IED)-associated individuals. Each of these
24,000 POI represents a neutralized threat.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ``TRUTHS''

10. Senator Manchin. Admiral McRaven, SOCOM places a significant
focus on human capital in the SOF ``Truths.'' From my own experience as
Governor of West Virginia, with a responsibility for National Guard SOF
units, I witnessed firsthand the significance of these ``Truths'' for
both overseas and domestic missions. What can we provide SOCOM to
enhance and maintain capabilities, in both the Active and Reserve
components, so to provide the global SOF capability needed to execute
the National Strategy and secure the Homeland?
Admiral McRaven. Senator Manchin, thank you for your interest in
assisting SOCOM. The continued migration of Overseas Contingency
Operations to base funding is critical for SOF's continued engagement
across the globe in support of the National Strategy and to secure our
Homeland. Additionally, the continued authorization of funding
flexibilities such as section 1208 and the Rapid Acquisition Authority
will ensure critical resourcing support in short order to support
current operations. I anticipate an increasing need for funding
execution flexibility in the current global environment and SOF's
continued efforts to build partnership capacity and conduct
counterterrorism operations. SOF is asked to respond quickly to a broad
spectrum of operations which require certainty of available resources
for continued success.

AFGHANISTAN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

11. Senator Manchin. General Mattis, I want to highlight the
fundamental problems we face when entering into large-scale nation-
building projects, particularly in Afghanistan. A telling example is
the Kajaki Dam project, in Helmand Province. The United States built
the dam in the 1950s and later paid to install electrical generation
units in the 1970s, only for it to fall into extreme disrepair. Since
returning to Afghanistan, the United States has allocated $266 million
to repair the Kajaki Dam, and more than 50 U.S. servicemembers have
been killed in the effort to secure the site. However, the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) has decided to cede control of
the installation of a large hydropower turbine, and $70 million to
complete the project, to the Afghani National Electric-Power Company
(DABS)--all of this after USAID had already paid two private
contracting firms, one of them Chinese, to complete the job. So, this
project, and many more like it, has come full-circle, with little gains
to the Afghans and too much blood and money spent by the United States.
I worry that the country is setting a dangerous precedent by entering
into these sorts of projects, where the recipient nation does not have
the resources to maintain the project--dooming it to ultimate failure
until the United States intervenes again with aid money and support. In
light of this, and as the United States begins its withdrawal from
Afghanistan, how many reconstruction projects are still planned for
this year, and for the following year?
General Mattis. The AIF supports requirements that enable a
successful handover of the projects intended to provide Afghanistan
with sufficient power, water, and transportation infrastructure. For
fiscal year 2013, we are executing three AIF projects, which focus on
sustaining power, expanding power distribution, and improving water
storage capacity. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the Department
of State (DOS) reviewed the planned project list for fiscal year 2014
on April 24, 2013. There are currently seven potential AIF projects
under consideration which focus on completion of critical transmission
lines and substations, dam control systems, and transitional
sustainment of infrastructure.

12. Senator Manchin. General Mattis, are there projections of what
these costs will be and how will the United States be involved?
General Mattis. For fiscal year 2013, Congress authorized and
appropriated $325 million to execute three AIF projects. For fiscal
year 2014, the total number of projects is still under review so a
total for the request is not available yet, but it will be less than it
was in fiscal year 2013. This funding will enable handover of AIF
projects constructed during previous years.

13. Senator Manchin. General Mattis, what assurances does the
United States have that these projects will be maintained?
General Mattis. We work jointly with GIRoA and USAID to develop
comprehensive sustainment plans associated with each of the
infrastructure projects. Sustainment costs are developed based on DOD
facilities pricing guidelines, including regional adjustment factors
based on location. The sustainment information for each project is
forwarded to the appropriate GIRoA ministry that will be responsible
for the project once constructed, which they include in their annual
budget submission. Multiple capacity building efforts are ongoing to
ensure that GIRoA is capable of assuming responsibility for these
projects. These efforts also include working with the Ministry of
Finance to ensure operational and maintenance costs are accurately
captured, as well as developing resourcing strategies consistent with
GIRoA's budgeting process.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

SUBMARINES

14. Senator Shaheen. Admiral McRaven, what capabilities will be
lost from a SOF perspective when the Ohio-class SSGNs retire?
Admiral McRaven. The SSGN provides a unique capability for SOF
undersea clandestine insertion (UCI) in terms of its ability to host
larger numbers of SOF operators for longer time periods, as well as its
ability to have dual submersible launch and recovery capability. We are
currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to determine the
most cost-effective means to replace this capability when the SSGNs
retire in the 2020s. Among the alternatives being examined are the
conversions of existing SSBNs if the future nuclear posture supports as
well the development of SOF capability in the proposed Block V of the
Virginia-class of submarines (Virginia Payload Module-VPM). In the
meantime, we will operate from four fully capable Virginia-class
submarines, designed to operate in the littoral regions and able to
conduct the UCI mission.

15. Senator Shaheen. Admiral McRaven, how many of those would be
addressed through the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) or other
enhancements to the Virginia-class submarines?
Admiral McRaven. The AoA study that we are presently conducting is
designed to answer this question in a methodical way. However, we are
very confident that the current state of UCI is very healthy. The four
Virginia-class submarines designated for Naval Special Warfare are
extraordinarily capable platforms with a superior ability to penetrate
littoral regions compared to the SSGN. Whether the VPM adds sufficient
capacity and endurance to the current Virginia-class, as well as dual
submersible launch capability, will be evaluated by the AoA.
Recommendations will be completed as part of the AoA later this year.
The timing of the AoA study is just right to ensure a healthy UCI
capability when the SSGNs retire in the 2020s.

16. Senator Shaheen. Admiral McRaven, are there any capabilities
that would not be addressed?
Admiral McRaven. No. The AoA will address all capabilities and the
study will make a consolidated recommendation to exclude a particular
capability.

17. Senator Shaheen. Admiral McRaven, you have mentioned previously
that Navy consideration of an investment in the next generation Dry
Deck Shelters (DDS) should be seriously considered in fiscal year 2013
to ensure seamless transition of this important platform. Can you
update me on the status of that effort?
Admiral McRaven. The next generation DDS is also being studied in
the same AoA that is looking at the SSGN retirement. The AoA is
scheduled for completion later this year. However, the Naval Sea
Systems Command has recently completed a service life study of the DDS
and determined that they can be kept in service an additional 20 years.
Therefore, they will not go out of service until the 2040s. However,
they are limited in their capacity, and we are also examining a
modernization program that will allow the present DDS to deploy a Dry
Combat Submersible (DCS).

CENTRAL COMMAND REQUIREMENTS

18. Senator Shaheen. General Mattis, what is your assessment of the
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS)
system?
General Mattis. Persistent ISR systems such as JLENS, specifically
designed for missile detection and tracking, would help to counter
threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the Gulf. However, JLENS
is not currently a program of record and is still in testing. If this
system does become available for worldwide operational use, JLENS will
offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities optimized for point area
defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will prove a limitation
requiring substantial planning and deconfliction to overcome the impact
to air navigation, especially in nations who only grant the United
States limited use of their airspace.

19. Senator Shaheen. General Mattis, does a requirement for
persistent surveillance and integrated fire control still persist in
the CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will
have only minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian
Gulf. Rapid identification, verification, geolocation, and kinetic
targeting of such threats are a must (find-fix-finish).

20. Senator Shaheen. General Mattis, does a requirement for
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire control and precision
track information to the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
persist in the CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

STRATEGIC RISK IN DEFENSE STRATEGY

21. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, DOD Guidance issued in January
2012 stated: ``Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at
countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as
upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Of particular
concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). To support these objectives, the United States will
continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in--
and in support of--partner nations in and around this region.'' How
would you assess the current status of these goals and where do you
have concerns?
General Mattis. Given the resources, and the constant pressure
being brought to bear against these threats, we are making progress on
our goals. We are working closely with our regional partners to develop
their anti-ballistic missile capabilities, and we work to ensure we
prevent the proliferation of WMD. By working by, with, and through our
partners, we realize greater progress than by going it alone, and more
importantly, we demonstrate our enduring commitment to regional
stability.

22. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, given the reduction of defense
resources, how would you characterize the trends in risk to your
missions in the region and in what specific areas are you assuming the
most risk?
General Mattis. I, and other senior defense leaders, have been
clear and consistent in saying that resource reductions will have a
significant impact on operations. We have also been clear in stating
that supporting the ongoing operations in Afghanistan remains a high
priority. But this focus on Afghanistan comes at a cost to readiness
and our ability to respond to emerging contingencies. As resources
continue to decline we will assume a greater risk in our ability to
respond decisively to CENTCOM regional challenges such as Iranian
aggression, instability in the Levant region, or a resurgent violent
extremist organization's presence.

23. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, aside from contingency
operations, do you believe the number of U.S. Forces permanently
stationed in CENTCOM is sufficient to meet U.S. national security
objectives?
General Mattis. CENTCOM has very few assigned permanent forces. We
depend on the use of rotational allocated forces to meet operational
demands and anticipate continuing this approach in the future.
To date, we are accepting increasingly greater risk to execute our
assigned missions, and remain concerned about further reductions and
the potential impacts they could have on key capabilities such as
maritime force presence, ISR capabilities, Ballistic Missile Defense
capabilities, and SOF in theater.

IRAN

24. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, in your testimony you indicated
that in your professional opinion, the current diplomatic and economic
efforts to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability were not
working. If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, do you think that Syria would
obtain that capability from Iran?
General Mattis. No, I do not believe Iran would share a nuclear
weapon capability with Syria. The financial and political cost of
Iran's nuclear pursuit has been extreme, making it unlikely Iran would
share a nuclear weapon with another state or sub-national group. This
is especially true given the current chaotic situation unfolding in
Syria. However, should this situation stabilize, with the Iran-friendly
Assad regime (or similar) intact, Iran might eventually share dual-use
nuclear fuel cycle technologies with Syrian counterparts.

25. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, do you think countries like
Saudi Arabia and Turkey would try to develop nuclear capabilities of
their own?
General Mattis. I believe other regional nations will pursue
nuclear capabilities if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon; they have
told us as much. This is part of why the international community's
efforts to deter Iran's nuclear progress are so critical.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, are there any other countries
you would expect to try to obtain nuclear capabilities?
General Mattis. Yes, nearly every regional state would feel
threatened by Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon, and desire
capabilities to deter this new Iranian threat. Some states are not
financially capable of embarking on a nuclear effort, but perhaps might
consider alliances to share this cost.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, it is well known that Iran
continues to provide the Assad regime with weapons and other tactical
support, including the presence of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
personnel on the ground in Syria. What is your assessment of current
Iranian support to the Assad regime and is it growing?
General Mattis. Iran is focused on keeping the Assad regime in
power in order to maintain the critical gateway to its regional
surrogates and proxies. Politically, Iran has attempted to bolster
Assad's hold on power through economic aid, by hosting conferences, and
by calling for Muslim unity against Western aggression in Syria. Since
the unrest began in early 2011, Iran has provided the Syrian regime
with weapons, military counsel, and technical assistance. Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force and likely the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security are the primary agencies facilitating the
Iranian aid flow into Syria. Iran's Qods Force appears to head up
Iran's support efforts, as evidenced by the multiple trips to Syria by
Qods Force commander, Ghassem Soleimani, likely to provide advice and
discuss aid to the Syrian regime. Iran has recently been training and
equipping a Syrian militia called Jaysh al Sha'bi, which Iran could use
as a lever of influence in a post-Assad regime scenario. More recently,
Iran likely has been directly involved in operations against opposition
forces.

28. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, is Iraqi airspace still being
used to transport weapons and other aid to Syria?
General Mattis. Yes.

29. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, are you aware of any systematic
effort by the Iraqis to halt these shipments through their airspace?
General Mattis. No.

30. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, do you believe that Iraq
tacitly allowing these shipments to transit their airspace should make
the United States rethink our planned security assistance programs with
Iraq and do you recommend altering that security assistance in any way?
General Mattis. I believe this is a litmus test to gauge the
competing influences between the United States and Iran on the
Government of Iraq. We must consider the Iraqi domestic situation
aggravated by the Syrian crisis, which has stressed the already tense
Sunni-Shia rift among Iraqis. The Shia-majority central government
moves closer to Iran because they fear a Sunni backlash that is
emboldened by the anti-Assad militias. Our security cooperation
activities provide us with leverage, but we must remain cognizant of
our strategic aims in the region when considering any alteration. We
must focus our leverage to reduce Iraqi internal fissures by pushing
Prime Minister Maliki to the middle. A strategic pursuit of Iraq, as a
strong U.S. regional ally, will counter Iranian influence in the region
and must be considered when contending with the tactical problem of
Iranian overflights.

31. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what is your biggest concern in
addressing the Iranian conventional threat in the Gulf?
General Mattis. Iran's military is capable of inflicting regional
and global economic damage by impacting access to the Straight of
Hormuz (SOH) and attacking neighboring energy infrastructure; one-fifth
of the world's oil, 17.4 million barrels per day, transits the SOH
daily. A well-armed Iran is capable of projecting power regionally,
threatening its neighbors, and undermining U.S. influence in the
region. Tehran's emboldened posture, likely driven by a perception of a
hostile international economic environment and a belief U.S. power is
declining in the region, has increased the risk to naval forces and
maritime traffic throughout the Arabian Gulf and possibly the Gulf of
Oman.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, it is well known that the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is aggressively attempting to disrupt
stability in the region through support of terrorist proxies such as
Hezbollah. What is your strategy to counteract this threat and what are
your key priorities to address the spread of Iranian malign influence
in CENTCOM's AOR?
General Mattis. We have seen a qualitative and quantitative
increase in Iranian malign influence activities within our AOR and
globally. Within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force
(IRGC-QF) branch is Iran's primary foreign policy tool for exerting
clandestine military, political, and economic power throughout the
world. IRGC-QF conducts operations in support of Iranian foreign policy
objectives which have two principal aims: limit U.S. influence within
the region; and reduce U.S. military forward presence.
CENTCOM, in cooperation with the entire Intelligence Community, has
greatly expanded efforts to both map and understand the IRGC-QF and its
nefarious networks throughout the region in the past 2 years. With this
increased understanding, we are now postured to better work alongside
our regional partners to counter the IRGC-QF and its networks. In
addition, we are working very closely with all of the combatant
commands in order to eliminate any gaps, both intellectually and
geographically, with respect to a coordinated deterrence effort against
IRGC-QF.
CENTCOM is acting to reduce Iranian support to surrogates, proxies,
and insurgents across the region. In order to accomplish this, we must
make the region inhospitable to IRGC-QF illicit operations and
activities through diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with
our friends and partners across the region. We must also reduce IRGC-QF
freedom of movement outside Iran, which includes Department of Treasury
designations, DOS demarches, partnering with other nations, interagency
and intergovernmental coordination, and maritime interdiction
operations, as appropriate.

33. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, how will the reduction of
funding impact your ability to execute your strategy?
General Mattis. Sound strategy requires a balance of ends, ways and
means. Without an approved budget, I cannot accurately forecast the
means available to support CENTCOM planning, although it is safe to
assume I will have less than I had a year ago. A reduction in means
will require an honest evaluation of our ability to meet prescribed
National Strategy (ends) and will likely require a modification to how
we execute our plans (ways). As I have stated in the past, we will
fight with what means we have available, but realize that achieving our
ends with less means execution will take longer and will be
accomplished at greater risk.

GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral McRaven, we are seeing that al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups are developing operational networks that are
increasingly complex and global in nature and we can no longer go after
terrorist groups in an ad-hoc, country-by-country basis if we hope to
be successful. Do you believe that our current counterterrorism
strategy has kept pace with the increasingly globalized nature of al
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist networks?
Admiral McRaven. In short, yes--from a DOD perspective, we have
been able to keep pace with an evolving enemy, which requires
adaptation and innovation on our part. DOD's current geographic
combatant command construct of specific AORs presents several
challenges when dealing with a globally-networked enemy. Gaps and seams
are discovered that a savvy adversary can exploit, and our current
counterterrorism strategy has morphed to mitigate those
vulnerabilities. Part of the problem is that al Qaeda, its affiliates,
and its adherents (AQAA) is more network than army, more a community of
interest than a corporate structure. Our principal terrorist
adversaries have regional affiliates--such as al Qaeda in the land of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA), and al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)--who collectively seek to further
al Qaeda's goals and objectives, to include attacking the U.S.
Homeland. Therefore, the United States and its partners must continue
to develop and improve a network to defeat a network. This network must
include a whole-of-government approach, with close interagency
cooperation and partner nation assistance to ensure success. The
battlefield is also no longer confined to geographic terrain. AQAA and
other terrorist organizations effectively use tactical and strategic
communications to push information and propaganda via social media. We
must keep pace by making honest and accurate assessments of both
ourselves and our adversaries to ensure that our strategies and tactics
are having the desired effects, and make adjustments as required.

35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral McRaven, how are we measuring our
effectiveness?
Admiral McRaven.

Effectiveness of Global Campaign Plan for Counterterrorism:
SOCOM's Global Campaign Assessment for Counterterrorism (GCA-CT)
measures progress toward achieving the end states contained in
Department-level guidance. GCA-CT provides recommendations to improve
strategy and execution in order to adapt to the changing
counterterrorism environment. GCA-CT reports, issued quarterly, focus
on U.S. and partner nation impacts on violent extremist organizations
and the environments where those adversaries are present.
The GCA-CT is conducted through a provisional collaborative process
that incorporates geographic combatant commands' regional assessments
into SOCOM's global perspective assessment. In addition, the GCA-CT
examines broader strategic issues derived from the National Strategy
for Counterterrorism (NSCT) released in June 2011. GCA-CT output is the
result of an objectives-based method which evaluates information
derived from both quantitative and qualitative analysis of collated
data. In detail, collected data of operational environmental conditions
is analyzed to derive factual information about threat, friendly, and
environmental (to include population) activities in the geographic
combatant commands' AOR. The information is evaluated against criteria
derived from the planning objectives and from NSCT overarching goals
and focus areas counterterrorism objectives.

Effectiveness of SOF in Joint Operations, Interdependent with Other
Forces, and the Interagency:
The Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) furnishes a
detailed appraisal of SOCOM's integrated strategic assessment and our
current and future mitigation efforts. SOCOM's response to the annual
CJA provides a common informational baseline and strategic picture of
SOCOM's ability to meet Title 10 and Unified Command Plan (UCP)
responsibilities and support the National Military Strategy (NMS).
Correspondingly, in 2012, SOCOM staff conducted a net assessment of how
SOF is organized, trained, equipped, and postured to address future
security challenges described by the DSG, in close collaboration with
the geographic combatant commands. Throughout this assessment process,
senior leadership focused on identifying areas of risk to mission, risk
to force, and risk to force structure. That risk construct informed
realistic force composition and posture recommendations that directly
support geographic combatant command requirements and shape inputs to
the CJA.

36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral McRaven, what must be done to develop a
comprehensive, long-term counterterrorism strategy that spans regional
boundaries?
Admiral McRaven. The NSCT outlines the framework to address this
challenge. It provides eight clearly stated goals, which, if achieved,
can be viewed as a checklist for success when executing our
counterterrorism strategy:

Protect the American People, Homeland, and American
Interests
Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al Qaeda and
its Affiliates and Adherents
Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of
WMD
Eliminate Safe Havens
Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and
Capabilities
Degrade Links between al Qaeda and its Affiliates and
Adherents
Counter al Qaeda Ideology and its Resonance and
Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al Qaeda
Exploits
Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means

These objectives are as relevant and crucial to success today as
they were in June 2011 when the NSCT was published. As mentioned
previously, DOD's current geographic combatant command construct
presents opportunities for an adversary to exploit gaps and seams
between geographic regions. Terrorist organizations such as AQAA,
Hezbollah, and Lashkar-e Tayyiba do not limit their activities to
defined AOR. Furthermore, they have extensive facilitation networks and
diaspora around the world to help them achieve their objectives.
AQAA (as our principal and most dangerous terrorist adversary)
includes regional affiliates such as AQIM, AQEA, and AQAP. These groups
conspire to further al Qaeda's goals and objectives, to include its
goal of attacking the U.S. Homeland. In order to counter their lack of
boundaries and the global nature of this network, our long-term
strategy must minimize the gaps and seams our adversaries seek to
exploit. This will require not only a whole-of-government approach, but
also a multinational effort. For example, as the United States and its
partners put pressure on AQIM in West Africa, it must also have
synchronous pressure against the financial networks and safe havens in
Europe and the Arabian Peninsula, pressure against drug financiers from
Central and South America who support terrorist actions, and degrade or
deny cyber communications that support global messaging. Our strategy
must go beyond the traditional diplomatic, intelligence, military, and
law enforcement templates we've applied in the past. Our strategy
requires a purpose-built network, and an integrated coalition of the
willing and able to dismantle and defeat the adversary's network.
The strategy must effectively and persistently engage the more
cerebral spectrums of cyber and human terrain. The adversary is a
thinking, evolving, globally-networked entity, plugged into both the
digital domain and the populace. AQAA and other terrorist organizations
are very active in pushing their narratives and strategic
communications in these arenas; we must be more skilled than our
adversaries in doing so.
Perhaps most importantly, the strategy must be actively coordinated
across all organizations engaged in the fight. We must guard against
using a stove-piped approach across numerous departments and agencies
and with our partners. We need to achieve buy-in and unity of effort
from all U.S. Government organizations involved, as well as our partner
nations, in order to present a unified and coordinated front to our
adversaries.

SYRIA

37. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, the ongoing decimation of Syria
as a result of the Assad regime has the potential to destabilize the
region. By June, Jordan is expected to have absorbed 600,000 refugees
from Syria, which would be approximately 10 percent of its population.
The Jordanian Government is already under severe economic stress with
the threat of energy shortages this summer. Simultaneously it is at a
fragile political situation as it attempts to form a government after
parliamentary elections. The Jordanian Government has done a great job
thus far responsibly caring for the influx of Syrian refugees while
holding back the influence of Islamic extremists. What is CENTCOM doing
to help support the Jordanian Government's efforts to protect its
borders while caring for large numbers of Syrian refugees?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

38. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what can the United States do
to increase that support and avert a crisis this summer that could
threaten the stability of the Jordanian Government and its ability to
hold back the spread of Islamist extremism?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

39. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, do you support a negotiated
settlement that would leave Assad in control of some portion of Syrian
territory?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

40. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, Syria has one of the largest
stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world. Does CENTCOM have a plan
or is developing a plan to address the security of chemical weapons in
Syria in a scenario in which Assad falls and the regime loses control
of Syrian chemical weapons?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

41. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what role do you see for the
international community in the effort to secure chemical weapons in
such a case?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

42. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, do you anticipate that CENTCOM
will have adequate resources to address that situation should it arise?
General Mattis. We have been very careful to articulate force and
resource requirements for the various planning scenarios envisioned by
our national leaders to date. I am confident that we would not commit
military forces towards a situation unless we are properly resourced in
terms of authorities, equipment, or manpower required for the mission.

43. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what Federal and DOD agencies
do you see as critical to formulating and executing a whole-of-
government effort in this scenario?
General Mattis. Under current authorities, the DOS would be the
lead Federal agency and would coordinate with the United Nations for a
mandate for U.S. military operations in Syria to secure designated
chemical and biological weapons facilities and stockpiles.
Additionally, the DOS will coordinate with adjacent countries to inform
them of our activities and, if desired, to garner their support and
potential participation. Diplomatic action will also be important to
secure any over-flight rights required for possible requests to
transport these materials safely through or over another country's
territory for proper disposal. If an evacuation is required due to
civilian proximity to storage and disposal sites, the USAID might be
requested to provide humanitarian assistance for displaced personnel.
Within DOD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency would lead in the
inspection, transportation and disposal of these materials. Additional
defense assets would be required to provide security at storage
facilities, along routes of transport and at disposal facilities.

44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral McRaven, what role do you foresee for
SOCOM in planning, preparing for, and executing a plan to secure
chemical weapons in Syria?
Admiral McRaven.

Planning:

SOCOM is a supporting command to CENTCOM for
SOF-related planning with respect to the situation in
Syria

As a supporting command, SOCOM
provides SOF-unique planning assistance
primarily through Special Operations Command
Central, which is under the operational control
of CENTCOM

Preparing to execute a plan:

In its role as a SOF joint force provider,
SOCOM trains, equips, and deploys SOF in support of
requesting geographic combatant commands for employment
Commander of SOCOM accomplishes these tasks
primarily through its assigned Service components and
subordinate unified commands
As CENTCOM's planning continues to mature,
SOCOM tactical units may receive planning tasks.
Designated units would then refine training/preparation
to address potential contingency mission requirements

Execution:

Were an Execute order to be issued, Commander
of SOCOM would deploy forces in accordance with that
order in support of Commander of CENTCOM's operations

AFGHANISTAN

45. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, a primary
concern is to not repeat the mistakes of Iraq and draw down too many
forces too quickly and create a security vacuum in Afghanistan that
will be exploited by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Developing
and properly resourcing a strategy for U.S. support post-2014 is vital
to ensuring Afghanistan does not revert to a breeding ground for
terrorists determined to attack the American Homeland. In your
professional military judgment, what should be the primary objectives
of our strategy in Afghanistan post-2014 to accomplish our national
security objectives?
General Mattis. The purpose of our engagement in Afghanistan since
2001 has been to eliminate the safe haven from which al Qaeda planned
and directed the September 11 attacks, and to prevent future safe
havens in Afghanistan from which terrorists could once again threaten
the U.S. Homeland. We have made significant progress disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda. Securing our hard-fought gains
over the long-term requires a sustained commitment beyond 2014. We,
along with our NATO partners, are planning for a small enduring
presence post-2014 to train, advise, and assist the ANSF. Our military
mission will be limited to: (1) training, assisting, and advising
Afghan forces so that they can maintain their own security; and (2)
making sure we can continue to go after the remnants of al Qaeda or
other affiliates that might threaten our Homeland. Ultimate success in
Afghanistan will require a whole-of-government effort which supports
economic and governance development.
Admiral McRaven. We have two objectives of our strategy in
Afghanistan: (1) denying al Qaeda and associated insurgent movements
the opportunity to utilize Afghanistan to support terrorist activities
that threaten the United States and our partners; and (2) preventing
the Taliban from overthrowing the Afghan Government. I believe the
United States should closely cooperate with the Afghan Government to
achieve these objectives. In my mind, a crucial supporting pillar of
that strategy should be to continue to build on the excellent work ISAF
and our U.S. Forces have done in building the ANSF. As outlined in the
Strategic Partnership Agreement, DOD will continue to work with our
Afghan partners to achieve a complete transition of security
responsibility to the ANSF. 2014 will mark the completion of that
transition but not the end to our commitment. We will continue to
train, advice, and assist the ANSF and provide financial support to
them in the post-2014 environment so that we not only maintain but
build on the security and stability gains earned over the past 12
years.

46. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, do you
believe that there is a point at which we draw down U.S. Forces so low
that whatever force remains is unable to accomplish a viable strategy
to prevent safe havens for terrorists and prevent a resurgence of the
Taliban, while maintaining adequate force protection?
General Mattis. There may be such a point. In conjunction with
General Dunford, CENTCOM will constantly monitor our draw down to
ensure that strategic momentum is not lost. As conditions on the ground
warrant, we will adjust the force flow to provide the greatest chance
of success. If significant changes are required, the CENTCOM commander
will make that recommendation to the Chairman, the Secretary of
Defense, and the President.
Admiral McRaven. The Afghan security conditions and the willingness
of the Afghan Government to achieve a stable and prosperous country
will be the indicator of opportunities for the United States to draw
additional forces from ISAF over time. The capability, proficiency, and
leadership of the ANSF will enable the United States to conduct a safe
retrograde, continue to pressure the al Qaeda networks, and enable the
GIRoA to improve services to its people. The more capable the Afghan
forces and its leadership prove over the course of time the quicker our
forces can prudently depart the theater of war. The ISAF commander is
in the best position to advise on what U.S. force management level is
best for achieving a viable strategy to prevent safe havens for
terrorists. SOCOM is prepared to support the level necessary to achieve
those national objectives.

47. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, what will
be the consequences, including your assessment of the resulting
security situation, if we are unable to negotiate a Bilateral Security
Agreement with Afghanistan that ensures our troops have immunity post-
2014?
General Mattis. The Bilateral Security Agreement is a prerequisite
for our continued presence in Afghanistan as it provides the legal
framework for our forces to conduct their mission. Without the
assurances afforded in the agreement, we cannot remain in country and
perform our security force assistance mission. Without such assistance,
it is not clear whether the ANSF will reach their full potential.
Admiral McRaven. In my opinion, exclusive U.S. jurisdiction over
our forces and DOD civilian personnel, sometimes also referred to as
immunity from host country jurisdiction, is an essential element of a
Bilateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan. The President made this
point clear in his press conference with President Karzai on January
11, and I wholly concur with the President's view.
If a Bilateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan cannot be
concluded, then theoretically a presence of U.S. Forces might continue
under our current Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan from
2003, which does not expire. However, it is also possible that either
or both countries would consider that approach unacceptable, which
would likely necessitate a complete withdrawal of U.S. Forces
coincident with the end of the ISAF mandate on December 31, 2014.
Similarly, if a Bilateral Security Agreement cannot be concluded, it is
highly likely that NATO would not be able to conclude an agreement to
support continuation of its presence and that of other coalition
members in Afghanistan after 2014.
Such a complete withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces on
Afghanistan's security situation would be profound. The ANSF would no
longer receive training, advice, or assistance from U.S. and coalition
forces, which would have significant implications for sustaining the
tactical and operational advantages of the ANSF over their enemies, for
their leadership development, and perhaps even for their cohesion. The
absence of coalition forces could cause deterioration in the sense of
confidence Afghan citizens have about their country's security and its
future. Others in the region could have similar doubts about
Afghanistan's future.
Additionally, without a Bilateral Security Agreement, the United
States would not be able to continue to conduct counterterrorism
operations from within Afghanistan against targets al Qaeda and its
affiliates, which are a threat to both Afghanistan and the United
States. We would have to rely on other means to address this threat to
ourselves, but our ability to mitigate the threat to Afghanistan would
be greatly diminished.

48. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, you have said that not
supporting the ANSF will greatly limit our ability to prevent the
return of terrorist safe havens and a Taliban resurgence that threatens
the Afghan Government. If we drop down to only 5,000 to 6,000 troops,
with 2,500 to 3,000 additional international troops in the post-2014
environment, do you have adequate force structure to both prevent
terrorist safe havens and prevent a Taliban resurgence?
General Mattis. In conjunction with General Dunford, CENTCOM will
constantly monitor our draw down to ensure that strategic momentum is
not lost. As conditions on the ground warrant, we will adjust the force
flow to provide the greatest chance of success. If significant changes
are required, the CENTCOM commander will make that recommendation to
the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

49. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, although you have recommended
13,600 U.S. troops, what is the minimum number you would need to
prevent both terrorist safe havens and a Taliban resurgence if you have
a coalition presence about half as big as what the United States
provides?
General Mattis. 13,600 U.S. troops is what the Commander, USFOR-A
recommended to me to accomplish the post-2014 Afghanistan mission, as
directed by the President, and I support that number. The coalition
presence is half as big as what the United States provides, and this is
what the 13,600 level assumes.

50. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, with the transition to Afghan
security leadership continuing, we need to have an effective process
for managing detainee affairs. What specific provisions are being made
regarding detainees; and during and after the transition, who is
responsible for combatants detained by U.S. Forces on the battlefield?
General Mattis. We have worked hand-in-hand with our Afghan
counterparts to build a competent and sustainable Afghan detention
regime. In March 2013, we completed the turnover and transfer ceremony
of the Afghan National Detention Facility in Parwan with the GIRoA. The
United States has retained control of selected facilities (such as the
Theater Intelligence Group, Joint Legal Center, Special Housing Unit,
Combined Joint Operations Center, COIN Office, Medical Services Center,
Repair and Utility Center, and Classified Information Systems).
Detainees captured on the battlefield are screened for intelligence
value, given suitable medical care, and are transferred to GIRoA
custody within 96 hours for prosecution or rehabilitation. We respect
the sovereignty of GIRoA to successfully manage Afghan nationals
captured on the battlefield in accordance with Afghan law.

51. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what safeguards will be in
place to ensure these combatants are treated in accordance with U.S.
and international law?
General Mattis. The United States has received high marks from
several international humanitarian rights organizations for its
treatment of detainees. This same belief system and legacy of personal
accountability has been ingrained in the Afghan National Army (ANA)
guard forces that we have trained. While U.S. Forces remain in
Afghanistan, we will do our best to maintain some form of oversight on
the treatment of former U.S.-held Law-of-Armed-Conflict detainees.

52. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, how will U.S. interests be
protected in the process?
General Mattis. The United States remains engaged with the GIRoA at
all levels to make sure that our interests are protected. This is
highlighted by the transfer of the Afghan National Detention Facility
in Parwan and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
acknowledging both the sovereignty of the Afghan Government over its
citizens while recognizing the United States' responsibility to ensure
safe and humane treatment of its former detainees. Additionally, the
United States will continue to advise and assist the Afghans as they
conduct their detention operations and as they continue to build and
operate a humane, competent, and sustainable Afghan detention regime.

53. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, Vali Nasr worked for Ambassador
Holbrooke at the DOS and has characterized U.S. strategy for engaging
the Taliban as transitioning from ``fight and talk'' to ``talk while
leaving''. Furthermore, he said that: ``The precepts were how to make
the conduct of this war politically safe for the administration rather
than to solve the problem in a way that would protect America's long-
run national security interests.'' How would you characterize the
formulation of U.S. policy for Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Like all policy, the U.S. policy for Afghanistan
was developed through extensive consultation across the whole-of-
government. I provided my best military advice and I concur with our
strategic objectives.

54. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, news reports indicate that it
may cost as much as $5 billion to retrograde all of the approximately
750,000 pieces of equipment we currently have in Afghanistan. Are you
considering the option of transferring it to another U.S. agency or
another country?
General Mattis. Yes. My staff has processed Letters of Request
(LOR) for Excess Defense Articles (EDA) located in Afghanistan from 18
nations. The EDA process automatically includes offering equipment to
other U.S. agencies, and involves the DOS, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD). To date, the Services have not declared any EDA. Currently,
DSCA, DOS, and OSD are reviewing all EDA LOR.

55. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, are you considering destroying
the equipment in place to avoid the movement cost and to prevent it
from falling into the wrong hands?
General Mattis. The individual Services (Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps) must make this determination; even though located in
Afghanistan, the equipment is owned and maintained by the Services. As
equipment is no longer required in the AOR, the Services make the
decisions to retrograde, redeploy, transfer, or sell to eligible
nations in accordance with the law. There are processes in place to
ensure material is properly screened and vetted for retention or
disposal. As a last resort during instances when the return
transportation and refurbishment combined costs outweigh the value of
the equipment, the Services turn over the materiel to the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) Disposition Services in Afghanistan to de-
militarize the equipment and sell the resultant scrap.

56. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what will be the key strategic
pieces needed to attract international partners to participate in the
efforts to ensure Afghanistan security in the post-2014 environment?
General Mattis. The key strategic pieces are the GIRoA's ability to
demonstrate its legitimacy to the Afghan people. Primarily through its
actions, namely, transparency of governance, lack of corruption,
provision of governmental services, free and fair elections--
specifically the presidential elections in 2014--and the peaceful
transfer of power after elections.

BAHRAIN

57. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, Bahrain as an important ally in
the Gulf region has been affected in the past 3 years by DOS decisions
to leverage Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for political reform in the
Kingdom. In our cooperation with Bahrain, are we proceeding with the
construction of ammunition bunkers in order to mitigate operational
risk in the Gulf?
General Mattis. Yes, construction of the ammunition bunkers is
still a valid requirement and long-term solution for U.S. Navy, Army,
and Marine Corps ammunition and Navy vertical launch system storage in
the CENTCOM AOR. We are currently seeking host nation approval to
authorize construction at Isa Air Base.

58. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, are you concerned about our
continued naval presence at Manama?
General Mattis. The short answer is no. Bahrain is a strong partner
in the Gulf, and our naval presence there accomplishes bilateral
security objectives in addition to facilitating security goals with our
other regional partners. Additionally, our naval presence in this part
of the world provides stability and leadership in the protection of
Gulf region shipping. Having been forced to reduce our presence already
by one aircraft carrier, our ability to offer the security and
protections that we provided over the last 11 plus years has already
been impacted. Currently, we are working with our coalition partners to
overcome this setback.

59. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, do we have agreements in place
for the use of Isa Air Base?
General Mattis. Yes and no. There is currently a working Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between our two countries that was signed
in 1991 for our military forces to coordinate operations in Bahrain,
including at Isa Air Base. However, the U.S. Navy Central Command,
based in Manama, is in the process of negotiating a non-binding
arrangement for specific aspects of the DCA related to the use of Isa
Air Base. The completion of this arrangement is being negatively
impacted by the hold placed on delivery of certain FMS cases.

KUWAIT

60. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, the removal of U.S. combat
forces from Iraq has altered our posture in the region significantly.
How important is it to you to maintain U.S. ground forces in Kuwait?
General Mattis. Kuwait remains a steadfast partner of the United
States in the CENTCOM AOR and it is critical to maintain sufficient
force posture in Kuwait to position us for success in the future.
Centrally located in a strategically vital position among Iraq, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait is distinguished by well-developed air, sea,
and ground lines of communication and would serve as an ideal platform
to project power in support of contingency operations.

61. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, what numbers and kinds of U.S.
Forces do we need in Kuwait over the long-term?
General Mattis. We have reached agreement with the Government of
Kuwait to transition to a steady-state force presence in support of
common regional security interests and have continued to coordinate
with the Government of Kuwait to set this steady-state force presence
at five designated bases. U.S. force provides an immediately responsive
joint capability for crisis in the region; assures Kuwait of a
continued U.S. commitment to a strong bilateral security relationship,
supports regional deterrence efforts, and will focus on strengthening
bilateral and multilateral training efforts to improve interoperability
and partner security force training. The steady-state force presence is
capped at 13,500 U.S. military personnel but adjusts to specific
operational requirements, as needed. There is recognition that further
adjustments will be required to adapt to a changing regional
environment and missions, U.S. and Kuwait economic and policy
decisions, and global demand for U.S. Forces. The steady-state force
recently coordinated with the Government of Kuwait is about 12,231.
Continual adjustments will be required but this is the approximate
force required to support regional missions.

62. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, do you anticipate a need to
invest in new facilities for U.S. Forces in Kuwait, and if so, where?
General Mattis. Kuwait continues to remain a close and supportive
regional partner of the United States. Following the drawdown of U.S.
Forces in Iraq, we have coordinated an enduring U.S. force presence
located at five different locations in Kuwait to support response to
emergent regional crises and the defense of Kuwait. We are currently
discussing with the Kuwaitis' refinement of basing concepts to support
both U.S. and Kuwait force presence and missions. We have select
projects planned to upgrade and/or maintain our current capabilities
and infrastructure at Camp Buehring, Camp Arifjan, and Ali Al Salem Air
Base in support of bilateral efforts to develop a footprint to
facilitate this presence.

CENTRAL COMMAND POSTURE

63. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, you have said that CENTCOM
military presence will continue to become ``more maritime in
character.'' What do you mean by ``becoming more maritime in
character''?
General Mattis. Well before the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq,
CENTCOM maintained a robust maritime presence in the CENTCOM AOR to
promote freedom of navigation and free flow of commerce in and through
the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea,
including three of the world's most critical choke points. These
maritime deployments are a visible sign of the United States'
commitment to overall regional security, and they will continue in the
aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom. As forces draw down in
Afghanistan and are redeployed to the continental United States
(CONUS), there will be fewer air and ground forces available to exert
U.S. power and influence. Fiscal constraints and agreements with our
Gulf Cooperation Council partners may also place limits on the number
of land and air forces we can base in the region, causing us to rely
more and more on maritime forces which can project power throughout the
region without violating a nation's territorial sovereignty.

64. Senator Inhofe. General Mattis, with sequestration already
impacting carrier strike group presence, what risks do you assume if a
large number of naval assets are only able to be on call from CONUS
ports?
General Mattis. Placing a large number of naval assets on prepare
to deploy orders would limit our ability to respond to an emerging
crisis, provide for the defense of the Arabian Gulf, or successfully
accomplish other contingency operations. Extended response times
required when staging from CONUS ports would also increase risk to our
coalition partnerships and diplomatic missions. The continued presence
of U.S. naval assets in the Gulf region is essential to support the
articulated requirements of the combatant commander, as validated by
the Joint Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

GREEN ON BLUE ATTACKS

65. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, over the span of the Afghan
conflict, there have been many instances of attacks by Afghan forces on
U.S. and coalition personnel. As noted in a January 2013 Foreign Policy
article, 52 coalition soldiers died as a result of 37 green on blue
attacks in 2012. The same article goes on to note that, despite
improvements, green on blue attacks continue to escalate, making
CENTCOM's assessment that ``continued shortfalls . . . will allow some
insider attacks to continue to occur'' all the more ominous. Is the
screening program for prospective Afghan military and police forces
sufficient?
General Mattis. I believe the screening program for prospective
Afghan military and police forces is sufficient. During the last 6
months of 2012, the screening program biometrically enrolled more than
160,000 ANA personnel and conducted more than 44,000 background checks
of Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel, resulting in the dismissal
of 570 individuals due to insurgent ties. Additionally, ISAF boosted
its counterintelligence capability in 2012 to respond to the insider
threat. counterintelligence teams detected and neutralized 171
nefarious individuals, 7 of which were confirmed as insurgents. The
teams have also conducted 5 significant operations in eastern and
southern Afghanistan, identifying 36 persons of interest for further
investigation. Finally, both the Afghan Ministers of Interior and
Defense have acknowledged shortfalls in past vetting of ANSF recruits
and are committed to work with ISAF to vet, deter, and hold Afghan
commanders responsible for insider attacks.

66. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, are there additional
capabilities that need to be made available to change the trend with
regards to green on blue attacks?
General Mattis. We continue to pursue the introduction of new
capabilities to assist in countering the green on blue attack trend.
For instance, the implementation of near real-time biometrics (NRTB)
will enable the identification of potential persons of interest upon
initial contact. NRTB will allow vetting stations to receive immediate
feedback if the individual undergoing screening is a person of
interest. NRTB will match individuals against more than 200,000
unresolved latent fingerprints collected from various crime scenes and
IED incidents throughout Afghanistan. Matching enrollees to latent
prints identifies individuals to known criminal acts, allowing
immediate action rather than releasing the individuals before they
return for a second interview. While there is no set deadline to
implement NRTB, a pilot program has enabled three battalions in
Regional Command-South with NRTB capabilities.

67. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, OSD's December 2012 ``Report on
Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan'' notes some
very positive accomplishments by the ANA in assuming the lead in COIN
operations. However, a quote from the same report also says:

``The capacity of the Afghan Government and the extension of
effective governance and rule of law have been limited by
multiple factors, including widespread corruption, limited
human capacity, lack of access to rural areas due to a lack of
security, a lack of coordination between the central government
and the Afghan provinces and districts, and an uneven
distribution of power among the judicial, legislative, and
executive branches. Security, governance, and sustainable
economic development are all necessary for a viable and stable
Afghanistan.''

Do you believe that improvements noted in the capabilities of the
ANA are sustainable given the broader governmental issues noted in the
December 2012 report?
General Mattis. The improvements are sustainable, provided the
GIRoA makes the changes the international community expects it to make.
These changes are needed in order for the international community to
continue to support GIRoA in the decade of transformation, because
outside support is critical to sustainability. Those changes include
transparency of governance, lack of corruption, provision of
governmental services, free and fair elections--specifically the
presidential elections in 2014--and the peaceful transfer of power
after elections.

68. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, do you believe that the Afghan
military is capable of maintaining stability and security long enough
for local and national government entities to build the capacity to
govern effectively?
General Mattis. The ANSF is developing at a pace which will allow
them to take the lead for security across Afghanistan by the first half
of 2013, and have responsibility for all security by the end of
December 2014, per the Lisbon Agreement. How long it will take for
local and national government entities to build the capacity to govern
effectively is really a function of Afghan leadership. However, the
international support pledged at Chicago in 2012 provides Afghanistan
years of time and space to demonstrate progress.

AFGHAN ARMORED VEHICLES

69. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, it has come to my attention
that the Army plans to sign a sole-source contract for 135 additional
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) for the ANSF. The cost per vehicle
under this contract is estimated to be between $1 to $1.5 million for
each vehicle. In our current fiscal situation, the sole-source
procurement of new vehicles appears to be less cost-effective than the
upgrade and transfer of hundreds of existing Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles already in Afghanistan. Has CENTCOM or ISAF
considered the upgrade and transfer of the in-country MRAP vehicles to
the Afghans?
General Mattis. The Army has already procured 488 MSFV for the ANA.
This is a second order. For the initial procurement, the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Security Assistance
Office conducted the market research. Based on their findings, CSTC-A
determined that the MRAP variants did not meet mission requirements
relating to an enclosed turret with day/night sights per CSTC-A's
original requirement. Since this requirement was an immediate
discriminator, an additional, detailed cost analysis to upgrade MRAP
vehicles was not conducted due to the urgency of the requirement.
In addition to the fully enclosed turret, the MSFV is distinguished
from MRAP vehicles by armored protection around both the occupants and
the major automotive components. Per CSTC-A's mission requirements
analysis, the MSFV's level of protection provides true ``combat vehicle
survivability for both the occupants and automotive platform'' versus
the occupant-centric protection provided to MRAP vehicles where the
engine and transmission are more vulnerable to damage. MSFV also have
far greater mobility and terrain accessibility and have been proven to
outperform MRAP vehicles off road.

70. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, please have CENTCOM provide a
written justification for this sole-source contract for MSFV.
General Mattis. CENTCOM, as a geographic combatant command, does
not have procurement authority; this rests with the Services. The U.S.
Army exercised their procurement authority in 2011 to award the sole-
source contract for the MSFV to Textron Marine and Land Systems. Any
justifications for the contract would need to come from the U.S. Army.

71. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, as the ranking member of the
Airland Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am a
strong supporter of SOCOM's Non-Standard Commercial Vehicle Program and
your efforts to acquire the Special Operations Tactical Vehicle. Please
provide this committee and my office with briefings on SOCOM's
acquisition strategy for these two programs.
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM possesses a Family of Special Operations
Vehicles (FOSOV) that consists of Light, Medium, and Heavy tactical
vehicles; a variant of each is currently employed in Afghanistan. In
acquiring these platforms, SOF-peculiar modifications are applied to
Service common or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) vehicles and in those
cases where Service common and COTS vehicles are not available,
purpose-built military COTS products are procured. Specific details on
the Ground Mobility Vehicle 1.1. is limited, as it is currently in
source selection.
The Special Operations Legislative Affairs Office will follow up to
provide the requested briefings.

SYRIA

72. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, last week, Secretary of State
Kerry announced that the United States would supply $60 million in non-
lethal aid to the Syrian opposition. As Secretary Kerry said, this
money would primarily go to ``strengthen the organizational capability
of the Syrian Opposition Coalition.'' I understand that this is the
first time the United States has given direct assistance to the Syrian
opposition. This is an important first step, but it seems to me that it
really won't have a decisive effect on the success or failure of the
revolution. Given your understanding of the organization, capability,
and sophistication of the Syrian opposition, do you believe that there
would be value in providing assistance beyond the non-lethal aid
announced last week?
General Mattis. I continue to recommend special caution regarding
provision of lethal aid to the very disparate and divisive Syrian
opposition. Simply supporting rebel groups with materiel and training
is fraught with risk, and harkens 1980s Afghanistan. As the regime
cedes territory, myriad opposition groups will jockey and fight for
control, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus. I could not guarantee
these groups will avoid the same sort of atrocities the Assad regime
has undertaken . . . opposition atrocities have already been alleged.
Ethnic cleansing against minority groups will grow more likely once the
regime retracts further. I strongly recommend a very clear vision for
Syria and the desired end state there, for both us and our partners.

SEQUESTRATION AND THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION

73. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, we've had the opportunity to
discuss the impacts of the Continuing Resolution (CR) and sequestration
with then Secretary of Defense Panetta and the Joint Chiefs. I am
concerned about the significant impacts to readiness they detailed
during our hearing 2 weeks ago, given the vital role that SOCOM and SOF
have played during the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. What
are your most significant concerns regarding the CR and sequestration
with regards to SOCOM?
Admiral McRaven. Sequestration and a year-long CR create a perfect
storm for SOCOM. I would like to thank the committee for its efforts in
mitigating the devastating effects of the latter. Sequestration alone,
however, still creates current budget uncertainty. SOCOM has already
reduced all non-essential travel and training, curtailed replenishment
of non-mission critical supplies, implemented a hiring freeze for non-
critical billets, and released non-critical temporary and term
civilians. Sequestration results in a 7.8 percent reduction to the
SOCOM fiscal year 2013 budget request, absorbed almost entirely during
the last half of this fiscal year, currently estimated $750 million.
Lastly, but just as important, SOCOM receives critical support from
the Services and we are already feeling the impact of sequestration
with the reduction in flying hours, ISR, and CJCS exercises. This will
negatively impact global operations and SOF efforts to build
partnership capacity and current counterterrorism operations.

74. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, the Joint Chiefs expressed
their concerns about the cutbacks required to meet the CR and
sequestration leading to the hollowing out of our operational forces.
As a primary end user of deployed forces, I'm sure this must be of
great concern to you as well. I am concerned that the way things are
going with regards to DOD budgeting, we will be forced to pick and
choose which capabilities are most important to us right now and set
them aside for funding while others are sacrificed. It seems to me that
one of the capabilities we overlook until we need it is our ability to
conduct forced-entry operations from the sea. To maintain this ability
we need a robust Marine Corps and combat-survivable amphibious lift to
get them to the fight and to sustain them once ashore. I am very
concerned that one of the results of the CR and sequestration will be
significant and irreversible damage to our ability to build survivable
amphibious shipping. Do you agree with me on the importance of ensuring
that the Navy and Marine Corps continue to be capable of conducting
forced-entry operations?
General Mattis. Our embarked troops and aviation assets provide me
with the most flexible force in our inventory to pursue a variety of
missions and respond to various likely contingencies within the CENTCOM
AOR. These forces give me options across the range of military
operations from building partner capacity, to humanitarian assistance
operations, to non-combatant evacuations, to rescues, to counter-
piracy, to combat operations. A steady-state Amphibious Ready Group
presence is at the top of my list of capabilities to be preserved
during the impending period of resource constraints. Using the sea as
maneuver space, these forces enable me to move our assets to a crisis
or exercise area with minimal exposure to risk and without placing a
large, visible footprint ashore in a sensitive region. It is imperative
not only that we maintain the currently planned bare minimum amphibious
ships in the Navy shipbuilding plan, but also that we maintain these
high-value assets in a high state of readiness.

VETERANS BENEFITS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

75. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, Esquire Magazine recently ran
an article detailing the difficulties that the Navy SEAL who shot Osama
bin Laden is having after leaving Active Duty service. I believe this
story, which is tragic in its own right, and is indicative of a greater
problem with the system we have in place to take care of special
operators when it is time for them to leave the military. It seems to
me that, while we as a Nation owe a debt to all of our veterans, we
have a unique obligation to our SOF. What are your thoughts on the
specific case of the SEAL who shot Osama bin Laden?
Admiral McRaven. All Active Duty members are volunteers who sign a
contract with their respective military departments that addresses
benefits and eligibility requirements for retirement. The SEAL cited in
Esquire Magazine left the Navy before he was eligible for retirement
benefits. Months ahead of his separation he was counseled on his status
and provided with several options to continue his career to reach
retirement eligibility. SOCOM, Naval Special Warfare Command, and the
Navy were prepared to help this SEAL address both health and transition
issues, as we would with other former members.

76. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, what can be done to better his
situation?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM is working on a number of initiatives that
ensure our SOF remain the best trained, the best educated, and the most
resilient force in the world. Highlighted below are two of these
initiatives that would improve the situation of individuals who are
faced with similar circumstances encountered by the SEAL from Esquire
Magazine.
First, SOCOM is coordinating to expand educational opportunities
for both officer and enlisted SOF members. This program will provide
additional opportunities for SOF to attain advanced civilian degrees
and to attend academic fellowships. Although this program was
established to fulfill an operational requirement, the benefits for SOF
operators will extend beyond their time in uniform.
Second, SOCOM has also established the Preservation of the Force
and Families Task Force (POTFF) to improve the short- and long-term
well-being of our SOF operators and their families. They are
implementing comprehensive, multidisciplinary programs to enhance the
physical, social, and psychological performance of all SOF personnel.
These efforts will provide special operations personnel the skills to
both perform their duties while in uniform and to be productive and
healthy long after their service ends.

77. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, what are your thoughts on how
DOD and SOCOM can more properly reward our SOF for their service?
Admiral McRaven. Currently, SOF operators are compensated through a
variety of Special Duty Assignment Pays, Qualification Pays, Hazardous
Duty Incentive Pays, Foreign Language Proficiency Bonuses, and
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses. Many of these incentive pays and
bonuses are unique to the SOF community. Additionally, SOF operators
are eligible for Hostile Fire Pay, Imminent Danger Pay, and Combat Zone
Tax Exclusion when serving in designated areas of operation.
SOCOM has also established the POTFF to improve the short- and
long-term well-being of our SOF operators and their families. They are
implementing comprehensive, multidisciplinary programs to enhance the
physical, social, and psychological performance of all SOF personnel.
The POTFF identifies and implements innovative solutions across five
lines of effort to meet the SOF-peculiar needs of our forces: (1) human
performance; (2) behavior health; (3) spiritual enhancement; (4) family
programs; and (5) personnel operational tempo predictability.

78. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, how can we as a Nation better
prepare these men and women to enjoy the rewarding post-military lives
they so richly deserve?
Admiral McRaven. The Service Departments provide official
transition assistance for SOF; however, SOCOM provides additional
augmentation. For example, SOCOM supplements Service Department
transition programs through seminars that cover topics such as job
search skills, interviewing techniques, salary negotiation, State
employment, and personal financial seminars.

BASIC UNDERWATER DEMOLITION/SEAL TRAINING

79. Senator Wicker. Admiral McRaven, Basic Underwater Demolition/
SEAL (BUD/S) training is considered by many to be the most difficult
military training in the world. Hell Week, from what I understand, is
an incredibly grueling and injury-prone portion of BUD/S. What are the
injury rates for BUD/S classes? Please break down the data by injuries
that occur during Hell Week and those that occur during other phases of
BUD/S training. Within the categories of injuries sustained during Hell
Week and those sustained during other phases of BUD/S, please further
break down the data by permanent injury (those that force the trainee
to leave BUD/S or the Navy) and non-permanent injury (those that allow
the trainee to remain in BUD/S).
Admiral McRaven. The table below summarizes the answers; specific
answers follow:

79a. Senator Wicker. What are the injury rates for BUD/S classes?
Admiral McRaven. During the most recent nine BUD/S classes, 22
percent of the candidates incurred injuries.
79b. Senator Wicker. Please break down the data by injuries that
occur during Hell Week and those that occur during other phases of BUD/
S training.
Admiral McRaven. Of all the candidates that incurred injuries, 26
percent of those injuries occurred during Hell Week while the remaining
74 percent occurred during other phases of BUD/S training.
79c. Senator Wicker. Within the categories of injuries sustained
during Hell Week and those sustained during other phases of BUD/S,
please further break down the data by permanent injury (those that
force the trainee to leave BUD/S or the Navy) and non-permanent
injury (those that allow the trainee to remain in BUD/S).
Admiral McRaven. Of the candidates injured during Hell Week, 5
percent where unable to continue BUD/S training due to the injury, the
remaining 95 percent were able to continue training. Of the
candidates injured during other phases of BUD/S training, 18
percent where unable to continue BUD/S training due to the injury, the
remaining 82 percent were able to continue training.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

SYRIA

80. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what is CENTCOM doing to help
support the Jordanian Government's efforts to protect its borders while
caring for large numbers of Syrian refugees?
General Mattis. CENTCOM is currently supporting the Government of
Jordan and the Jordanian armed forces in a variety of ways to counter
the growing crisis along their border and the continued influx of
refugees from Syria. Since 2009, we have supported the Jordan Border
Security Program, an initiative to secure the Jordan border with Syria
and Iraq, which includes both active measures (i.e. cameras, motion
sensors) and passive measures (i.e. roads, berms, towers). Our support
for this effort has included both design expertise and supplemental
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. We have also supplied
critically needed body armor for the Jordanian border guards who are
deployed along many parts of the border with Syria that experience
inadvertent fire from Syria as well as clashes with militants
attempting to enter Syria from Jordan. Additionally, CENTCOM counter
WMD experts have supplied technical assistance and materiel to the
Jordanian armed forces so they can respond to any WMD incidents and/or
smuggling along the border.
Regarding refugee assistance in Jordan, CENTCOM is not the lead
Federal agency to provide response so our authorities are somewhat
limited compared to our support to the border security projects.
However, we have been able to provide targeted and expeditious
assistance through our Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
authority. These projects have directly impacted the lives of Syrian
refugees arriving in Jordan at the border crossings (i.e. water tanks,
latrines, winter shelters) and improved conditions at the refugee camps
(i.e. medical equipment, tents, pre-fab shelters, gravel, generators).

81. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what can the United States do
to increase that support and avert a crisis this summer that could
threaten the stability of the Jordanian Government and its ability to
hold back the spread of Islamist extremism?
General Mattis. Jordan is one of our best allies in the region and
their continued stability and capacity to counter Islamic extremism is
critical to both the region and to our national security interests.
Jordan has upheld their international and moral obligations by
providing refuge to well over 350,000 displaced Syrians fleeing the
humanitarian crisis in Syria. In addition to the focused support we
have provided to the refugee situation so far, we are also standing by
should the Ambassador and/or DOS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration determine a more robust CENTCOM response is appropriate.
Should DOS make this determination and submit an Executive Secretary
Memorandum to DOD, we will immediately respond, as requested. The
Executive Secretary Memorandum will enable certain response authorities
CENTCOM currently does not have, significantly improving our capacity
to provide care and comfort to the refugee crisis and help to alleviate
some of the immense pressure currently burdening the Government of
Jordan. Additionally, our planners are working hand-in-hand with the
Jordanian armed forces planners to ensure that our humanitarian
response options to the crisis are completely in sync and complementary
to Jordanian humanitarian plans in development.

82. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what is your biggest concern in
addressing the Iranian conventional threat in the Gulf?
General Mattis. Iran's military is capable of inflicting regional
and global economic damage by impacting access to the SOH and attacking
neighboring energy infrastructure (one-fifth of the world's oil, 17.4
million barrels per day, transits the SOH daily). A well-armed Iran is
capable of projecting power regionally, threatening its neighbors and
undermining U.S. influence in the region. Tehran's emboldened posture,
likely driven by a perception of a hostile international economic
environment and a belief U.S. power is declining in the region, has
increased the risk to naval forces and maritime traffic throughout the
Arabian Gulf and possibly the Gulf of Oman.

83. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, could you please provide an
update of Iran's capabilities as they apply to Iranian threats to close
the SOH?
General Mattis. Iran has a variety of weapons, including large
inventories of cruise missiles, modern mines, small fast attack craft
equipped with torpedoes and/or cruise missiles, and an expanding
submarine fleet, all of which are capable of threatening naval assets,
merchant vessels, and energy infrastructure. Iran's ballistic missile
inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes
increasingly accurate anti-ship ballistic missiles that could threaten
U.S. aircraft carrier operations in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
Iran could, with little warning, effectively and quickly mine the SOH.
Iran's other options, short of closing the SOH, are similar to those
used in the 1980s Tanker War, including mining key port facilities of
Gulf Cooperation Council countries and inserting special forces via
sea, air, or land to attack those facilities.

84. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what is your assessment of
current Iranian support to the Assad regime and is it growing?
General Mattis. Iran is focused on keeping the Assad regime in
power in order to maintain the critical gateway to its regional
surrogates and proxies. Politically, Iran has attempted to bolster
Assad's hold on power through economic aid, by hosting conferences, and
by calling for Muslim unity against Western aggression in Syria. Since
the unrest began in early 2011, Iran has provided the Syrian regime
with weapons, military counsel, and technical assistance. Iran's IRGC-
QF and likely the Ministry of Intelligence and Security are the primary
agencies facilitating the Iranian aid flow into Syria. Iran's Qods
Force appears to head up Iran's support efforts, as evidenced by the
multiple trips to Syria by Qods Force Commander, Ghassem Soleimani,
likely to provide advice and discuss aid to the Syrian regime. Iran has
recently been training and equipping a Syrian militia called Jaysh al
Sha'bi, which Iran could use as a lever of influence in a post-Assad
regime scenario. More recently, Iran likely has been directly involved
in operations against opposition forces.

85. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, is Iraqi airspace still being
used to transport weapons and other aid to Syria?
General Mattis. Yes. Influence over Iraqi officials allows Iran to
extend hard and soft power influence in key areas of Iraq. Iraqi
airspace has been used to ferry lethal aid to Syria, uninhibited by
perfunctory Iraqi inspections of aircraft.

86. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, are you aware of any effort by
the Iraqis to halt these shipments through their airspace?
General Mattis. No.

87. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, do you agree with General
Austin that Al-Nusrah ``is increasing in capability and influence'' in
Syria, and if so, why?
General Mattis. I completely agree with General Austin. The al
Qaeda in Iraq Syrian front organization, al-Nusrah Front, has achieved
its current level of capability and influence because of two key
variables. Nusrah has focused on outreach to the Syrian populace,
tempering its vision of an Islamic state, and building an outreach
program that includes basic humanitarian assistance. This has some
Syrians looking to Nusrah as a viable alternative to the current Assad
regime. This outreach is powerful when combined with the second key to
Nusrah's success, the experience its fighters bring to the fight in
Syria. This experience, gained largely in Iraq, includes not only
tactics and strategies, but also logistics, organizational skills, and
a discriminating use of violence. al-Nusrah Front strives to minimize
civilian casualties and applies savvy propaganda when unwanted deaths
occur, typically shifting the blame to regime forces or other Syrian
opposition groups. For these reasons, I believe the al-Nusrah Front
will remain capable and influential in Syria for the near-term.

AFGHANISTAN

88. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what will happen in Afghanistan
if the United States withdraws too quickly or leaves too few troops in
Afghanistan after 2014?
General Mattis. A hasty, premature withdrawal would make it more
difficult to complete our task of getting the ANSF to a position where
the Afghans could provide security with minimal international
intervention and support. CENTCOM's task, in conjunction with ISAF's
along with our international partners, is to ensure we maintain forward
progress as we reduce our presence.

EGYPT

89. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, is it your understanding that
the Morsi Government in Egypt has not yet sent their ambassador back to
Israel since the Gaza conflict in November?
General Mattis. Yes.

90. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, do you believe that it is
important for the Egyptian Ambassador to return to Israel for the sake
of regional peace and sustaining the peace between Egypt and Israel?
General Mattis. While I believe the return of the Egyptian
Ambassador to Israel would definitely contribute to sustaining the
peace between Egypt and Israel, I don't think it is a necessity.
Nonetheless, it is essential that we encourage President Morsi to send
the Ambassador back to Israel to ensure a direct line for dialogue
exists between the two countries.
However, the fact that President Morsi pursued a ceasefire rather
than intensifying the conflict in Gaza is a sign of enduring interests
with regard to sustaining the peace. Additionally, President Morsi has
repeatedly said he would continue to honor the 1979 Peace Treaty with
Israel and uphold all of its other international agreements, despite
opposition from his Muslim Brotherhood backers.
Additionally, there appears to be an understanding that the peace
process is one of the pillars of the stability of Egypt, Israel, and
the region. Finally, the partnership between the Egyptian and Israeli
military and foreign ministries, over border issues, terrorism,
smuggling, and economic issues, shows a continuing commitment towards
sustaining the peace between Egypt and Israel.

91. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, how does our foreign aid to
Egypt protect our interests?
General Mattis. Egypt has been a key regional partner for the
United States since the signing of the 1979 Camp David Accords. They
supported all subsequent U.S. military initiatives in the region and
have been a critical mediator in Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli
matters. They control the Suez Canal and have provided unprecedented
access to their airspace for overflight and landing.
Our military-to-military relationship with Egyptian Armed Forces
(EAF) is the foundation of our bilateral relationship and has been the
continuity in a changing relationship. The EAF is the most respected
institution in the country and has been a stabilizing force in an
uncertain environment. The EAF played a positive role, bridging the gap
when there was no government in charge after the revolution and ceding
power once there was a democratically-elected government. The EAF has
helped balance the decisions made by their new, inexperienced civilian
leaders and have remained a neutral actor. The EAF is not the Muslim
Brotherhood but supports the legitimately elected Muslim Brotherhood
Government, staying on the sidelines and asserting they are the neutral
protector of the nation and its vital infrastructure.
Our security assistance provides access to and influence with the
EAF leadership which is critical to maintaining our state-to-state
relationship in this turbulent time. The annual $1.3 billion in FMF we
provide has enabled the EAF to modernize around Western, primarily U.S.
weapons systems, such as the F-16 and M1 tanks. In addition, many
analysts believe the reluctance of the EAF to brutally suppress
demonstrations during the January 25, 2011, revolution was a direct
result of the large number of mid-grade and senior Egyptian military
officers trained at U.S. military facilities. So it is in our best
interest to maintain a good relationship with Egypt and our best
opportunity is through our historically strong military-to-military
relationship. Decreasing or restricting their security assistance risks
undermining the only stable institution in the country and could send
the message of a loss in confidence with the EAF, which could have
severe repercussions.

92. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, why should the United States
sell F-16s to Egypt?
General Mattis. Egypt is critical to the stability of CENTCOM's AOR
and our continued support of the military, including sales of F-16
aircraft, is crucial to maintaining U.S. relevance within the country.
The excellent military relationship we have with Egypt plays a central
role in protecting our interests, to include ready access to Egyptian
airspace and the Suez Canal, which are must-have requirements for
operations in the central region. U.S. assistance to Egypt is crucial
to military modernization and development of advanced capabilities
which promotes the high level of trust that the military experiences
within the country. As Egypt goes through the challenges of building a
new democracy, their military will play a vital role in the success or
failure of that endeavor. We must maintain our support and I fully
endorse the continuation of our FMS and International Military
Education and Training programs without condition. The Egyptian
military has made it clear they value this bilateral relationship and
we want to encourage their continued regard for the United States and
their emulation of U.S. goals and values. To build influence and
preserve U.S. credibility in this region, we have to deliver on the
promises of American assistance for Egypt's ongoing transition.
Delaying or canceling the delivery of these aircraft risks sending a
message of a loss in confidence with the Egyptian military, which could
have severe repercussions.

INVESTMENTS IN TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES

93. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, I'm concerned that the budget
environment will constrain SOCOM's ability to continue to invest in and
develop technological advances for the future. Do you share this
concern, and how do you see the role of private capital and COTS
systems in helping you to continue to make progress in fulfilling your
critical missions?
Admiral McRaven. Fiscal constraints in the current budget
environment do create concerns that must be met by focusing SOCOM
investments that optimize SOF's agility, relevance, and responsiveness.
SOCOM's research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E) budget
is absolutely critical for providing SOF with cutting-edge systems and
capabilities. SOCOM continues to anticipate and proactively manage and
develop both near-term and mid- to far-term future force revolutionary,
game-changing capabilities that allow SOF to maintain their comparative
advantage for executing critical mission sets. SOCOM continues to
leverage external capital opportunities with government, private
industry, and academia through focused engagements on SOF specific
priorities. When feasible, COTS systems are modified to meet SOF
requirements. For example, commercial vehicles are bought and modified
as part of SOCOM's Special Operations Research and Development
Acquisition Center (SORDAC) Program Executive Office-SOF Warrior's
FOSOV program. When it makes economic sense, SORDAC PEOs will continue
to utilize COTS systems as a means to provide increased capabilities
into Programs of Record.

94. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, when evaluating the relative
affordability of various platforms, does SOCOM take into account the
effects of repetitive, high-impact shock on SEALS, for example, and the
associated costs of shorter careers and increased health expenses?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM is very concerned with the effects of shock
on the warfighter and has undergone several initiatives to account for
the effects of repetitive, high-impact shock on both Special Warfare
Combatant-Craft Crewman and SEALS.
Efforts are currently underway to capture the effects of shock on
the operator which include the Combatant-Craft Crewmen Rapid Enhancing,
Sustaining, and Tracking (CREST) project. CREST is a synergistic
clinical and translational study investigating the impact of peak
health and performance on the readiness of Navy Special Warfare (NSW)
Combatant-Craft Crewmen high-speed boat operators. We have evaluated an
Aft Lifting Body (ALB) which incorporated shock mitigation technologies
on rigid inflatable boats to decrease shock on the operator. The CREST
program and the ALB technology remain in development.
While studying and mitigating the effects of shock on the operator
are important, we must also ensure we are investing in the physical
capability of the individual operator to withstand the rigors of their
trade. The NSW Tactical Athlete Program is a physical resiliency
program that maximizes physical performance by providing the highest
levels of musculoskeletal care and physical training. This properly
prepares our operators for the crucibles that they operate within, as
well as reduce injuries and subsequent recovery times.
Additionally, as SOCOM develops the technical specification for new
combatant craft systems, we are including specific requirements that
address reduced shock on the operator and incorporate lessons learned.
SOCOM is committed to understanding the impact of shock on the
operator and recognizes shock mitigation as a critical enduring
requirement consistent with preservation of the force.

95. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, are you aware of the small
company, Juliet Marine, that has made some dramatic advances in small
high-speed/stable boat design and propulsion? Juliet Marine's GHOST
craft is a small waterplane area twin hull design that incorporates
high performance gas turbine engines and a propulsion and control
system that operates at very high speeds (50+ knots), long ranges (900+
nautical miles), and with great stability. It is an existing capability
that might be very useful to SOCOM.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, I am aware of the company from New Hampshire.
SOCOM remains in contact with the Office of Naval Research and the
Navy, who are more directly involved with the progress of this vessel.
SOCOM continues to stay engaged with industry and the other Services as
technology matures through multiple forums. SOCOM will always have the
need for innovative ideas to meet current and future maritime mobility
missions.

ACQUISITION

96. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, how would you rate the ability
of U.S. Forces to address the anti-access/area denial threats in your
AOR?
General Mattis. The anti-access/area denial threats in the CENTCOM
AOR are real and numerous. Mines, coastal defense cruise missiles,
small boats armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles, and submarines
are among the more prevalent threats that can be unleashed in the midst
of conflict. U.S. contingency plans take these threats into account and
our military forces stand ready to detect and immediately respond to
actions that threaten the free flow of commerce through strategic
chokepoints throughout the region. This is not a Navy-only challenge,
and requires a joint and combined solution.

97. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what do you see as the most
significant deficiencies?
General Mattis. The most significant deficiency for dealing with
regional anti-access and area denial threats lies with our maritime
mine clearance capacity and capability. Finding, fixing, and
neutralizing maritime mines is a long process which can only begin once
local air and maritime superiority have been attained. Additional mine
counter-measure ships, technological innovation, and coalition partners
can all contribute to the mitigation of this threat, but it will still
be a long operation that is likely to disrupt commerce and transport
through the region for some time.

98. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, how important do you think it
is to get cutting edge capabilities into the hands of operators so that
they can help to inform future development, come up with new ways of
operating, and stay ahead of the enemy?
General Mattis. The operational requirement is central to
understanding our technical capability gaps which underpin much of what
we do in the headquarters. What we learn is used as feedback to inform
the RDT&E community to improve our capability. Our understanding only
goes so far however, and early experience with a new capability has
shown to be a better driver of making capability improvements. Our goal
has always been to get technology into the hands of the warfighter as
early as possible so they may experiment and adapt new and novel
technologies to suit their specific operational needs. To that end, I
minimalized barriers so as to enable operational experimentation with
no potential loss of life, no mission failure, and no operational
distraction.

99. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, does DOD have the right
mechanisms in place to be able to facilitate this kind of interaction?
General Mattis. Yes. DOD adapted peacetime acquisition and fielding
processes to quick-turn promising technologies; enabling rapid
development, fielding, and continued sustainment. The Services, in
general, developed in-theater monitoring and mechanisms to absorb new
capability, quickly integrate it into operations, and enhance feedback
between warfighters and developers. However, these processes were
rapidly established and in some cases, ad hoc in nature. We should take
the lessons learned from over a decade of facing an adaptive and
thinking adversary, to institutionalize those processes which will
enable us to maintain technical battlespace superiority.

100. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, what can the Services learn
from SOCOM in terms of improving acquisition processes?
Admiral McRaven. The fifth SOF Truth--``Most SOF operations require
Services' support''--is as true in acquisition as it is in operations.
The Services provide direct support for the acquisition of many of our
platforms, including the AC/MC-130J, MH-60M, et cetera. The Services
also provide the fully-trained acquisition/contracting/finance/
logistics personnel that perform these activities for SOCOM.
SOCOM also benefits from having all title 10 authorities--funding,
the requirements process, and acquisition--aligned under a single four-
star commander. SOCOM acquisition processes follow all of the same
laws, policies, and procedures as the rest of DOD. The size of our
portfolio, which is less than 2 percent of the DOD budget and
consisting of only one ACAT II and three ACAT III programs, allows us
to streamline decision and reporting chains. In addition, SOCOM
operators are highly trained and adaptable; this mature user may be
able to take an 80 percent solution and make it 90 to 100 percent
effective. The ability to tailor our requirements and acquisition
processes, coupled with a mature user, enables our staff to make
requirements and programmatic changes in a rapid manner, working hand-
in-hand with all of the stakeholders.
These unique attributes of SOCOM acquisition mean that not all of
our approaches are scalable to the Services. OSD and the Services have
adopted SOCOM processes, where applicable. Specifically, the Joint
Rapid Acquisition Cell acquisition model was based on the SOCOM Combat
Mission Needs Statement and Urgent Deployment Activity processes.

101. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, does CENTCOM still have a
requirement for THAAD fire control and precision track information to
the BMDS?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

102. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, does a requirement for
persistent surveillance and integrated fire control still persist in
the CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will
have only minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian
Gulf. Rapid identification, verification, geolocation, and kinetic
targeting of such threats are a must (find-fix-finish).

103. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what would the addition of a
JLENS orbit add to CENTCOM's ability to address cruise missile and
surface moving threats to the Fifth Fleet and missile defense assets in
the region?
General Mattis. Persistent ISR systems such as JLENS, specifically
designed for missile detection and tracking, would help to counter
threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the Gulf. However, JLENS
is not currently a program of record and is still in testing. If this
system does become available for worldwide operational use, JLENS will
offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities optimized for point area
defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will prove a limitation
requiring substantial planning and de-confliction to overcome the
impact to air navigation, especially in nations who only grant the
United States limited use of their airspace.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

CENTRAL COMMAND REQUIREMENTS

104. Senator Vitter. General Mattis, does a requirement for
persistent surveillance and integrated fire control still persist in
the CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will
have only minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian
Gulf. Rapid identification, verification, geolocation, and kinetic
targeting of such threats are a must (find-fix-finish).

105. Senator Vitter. General Mattis, what would the addition of a
JLENS orbit add to CENTCOM's ability to address cruise missile and
surface moving threats to the Fifth Fleet and missile defense assets in
the region?
General Mattis. Persistent ISR systems such as JLENS, specifically
designed for missile detection and tracking, would help to counter
threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the Gulf. However, JLENS
is not currently a program of record and is still in testing. If this
system does become available for worldwide operational use, JLENS will
offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities optimized for point area
defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will prove a limitation
requiring substantial planning and de-confliction to overcome the
impact to air navigation, especially in nations who only grant the
United States limited use of their airspace.

106. Senator Vitter. General Mattis, does a requirement for THAAD
fire control and precision track information to the BMDS persist in the
CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

u.s. counterterrorism and intelligence strategy and capabilities
107. Senator Vitter. Admiral McRaven, in the months leading up to
the September 11, 2012, attacks on the U.S. compound in Benghazi, there
were 13 viable threats and 2 bombings on that very compound, and
increasing threats to and attacks on Libyan nationals hired to work
security at American diplomatic posts in Tripoli and Benghazi, causing
the consulate to request more security. Given the long list of non-
classified warning signs leading up to September 11, 2012, what was the
special operations/Intelligence Community focusing on if not emerging
trends?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM intelligence monitors global emerging
trends, developing crises, and opportunities for operational solutions
for assigned missions. The preponderance of SOCOM headquarters
analytical efforts are focused on support to special operations plans
and future operations with special emphasis on Phase Zero
Unconventional and Irregular Warfare analysis and/or assessments.
Tactical intelligence that is of immediate concern to the operator is
generally the purview of the geographic combatant commander and their
joint intelligence centers.

108. Senator Vitter. Admiral McRaven, in Libya, U.S. Government
reports indicate that there was a large failure on the part of the
guards hired to protect the U.S. embassy. To your knowledge, what
actions are being taken within DOD and the Intelligence Community to
ensure that the U.S. Government is effectively transferring and
disseminating critical information, and to ensure those hired have
adequate training that can be relied upon?
Admiral McRaven. The Intelligence Community has an extensive
network of secure and unsecure communication methods by which we share
real-time data and assessments with U.S. and partner-nation analysts
and decisionmakers. We remain confident in the ability to rapidly
disseminate and share critical information such as threats to force
protection.
Questions regarding standards and training for hired guards
assigned to U.S. diplomatic facilities should be directed to the DOS.

109. Senator Vitter. Admiral McRaven, how reliable is the
information we have on what is happening on the ground in the SOCOM
AOR?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM's AOR is global in that we synchronize DOD
planning for global operations against terrorist networks. Our average
persistent presence includes personnel in approximately 78 countries at
any given time.
The reliability of our information on any particular topic is
dependent on myriad factors including, but not limited to, the quality
and nature of the source (e.g. Signals Intelligence, Human
Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, et cetera), and whether there is
corroborating data. We also consider contradictory reporting, the
timeliness of the information, whether or not critical gaps in
collection exist, and other factors such as regional stability and
access to the area of interest.

110. Senator Vitter. Admiral McRaven, were there indicators to
which SOCOM was aware which had they been given greater weight would
have shown that the Libyan Government's response would be profoundly
lacking prior to the night of September 11, 2012?
Admiral McRaven. No. We are unaware of any pre-September 11, 2012,
assessments or indicators concerning the Libyan Government's potential
response in the event of an attack on our Benghazi facility.

111. Senator Vitter. Admiral McRaven, in Libya, large quantities of
weapons have recently entered into free circulation where there is
little or no government control over them. Is it within SOCOM's AOR to
take actions or look into ways to mitigate Libya from once again
becoming the arsenal of terrorism that it once was during the 1970s and
1980s?
Admiral McRaven. If directed by the President of the United States
or the Secretary of Defense, SOCOM can conduct counterterrorism
missions worldwide. However, because Libya is in U.S. African Command's
(AFRICOM) AOR, AFRICOM has primary responsibility to plan and conduct
missions to mitigate any threats emanating from Libya. SOCOM's Theater
Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command-Africa, is under
operational control of AFRICOM, and directly supports AFRICOM directed
missions. SOCOM has responsibility to synchronize counterterrorism
planning and activities worldwide, which would include synchronization
of planning by AFRICOM to mitigate terrorist threats in Libya. However,
AFRICOM would retain mission control of any forces operating in its
AOR.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt

BAHRAIN

112. Senator Blunt. General Mattis, on March 6, 2012, you testified
before this committee on the CENTCOM posture. You said, ``The deep
U.S.-Bahrain security relationship is the cornerstone for our
collective security in the Gulf region,'' adding that ``Bahrain
provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. Navy's 5th
Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. Forces engaged in
regional security.'' Can you please describe 1 year after your
testimony how U.S.-Bahrain military cooperation continues to evolve and
how the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014 will ensure
that security relations with Bahrain remain strong?
General Mattis. The Kingdom of Bahrain has a long history of
cooperation with the United States and hosts the U.S. 5th Fleet and
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, CENTCOM's only permanent forward-
based component. We have a significant strategic interest in Bahrain
and have worked diligently with the DOS to influence political reform
in Bahrain while maintaining a strong military-to-military
relationship. Bahrain remains a staunch ally in the fight against
terrorism and contributes significantly to the security of the region.
Additionally, the Bahraini Ministry of Interior's Special Security
Forces Company recently concluded their sixth and last deployment to
Afghanistan, plus Bahrain hosted and participated in the International
Mine Counter Mine Exercise in September.
The U.S.-Bahrain military-to-military relationship remains strong.
Unfortunately, there are indications the 10 FMS items on policy hold
will strain this relationship in the near future, especially since
Bahrain already paid for several of the items with their own national
funds. The Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014 for
Bahrain is in line with our common interests to maintain access,
increase interoperability, and develop an integrated defense from Iran.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Manchin,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, King, Inhofe, McCain, Ayotte, Fischer,
Graham, and Blunt.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member; and Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A.
Kulenkampff, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain;
Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Peter Schirtzinger, assistant
to Senator Fischer; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham;
Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Blunt.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome
our witnesses, General William M. Fraser III, USAF, Commander
of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and General
Carter F. Ham, USA, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM),
to testify this morning on the programs and the budget that's
needed to meet the current and the future requirements within
their respective commands. Please extend on behalf of our
committee our gratitude to the men and women of your commands
and their families for the many sacrifices that they've made on
behalf of our Nation. Thanks to both of you for your long
careers of leadership and service.
General Ham, this is likely to be your final posture
hearing. So on behalf of the committee, let me say that we've
enjoyed working with you in various positions. We wish you and
your family all the best as you embark upon another adventure
in your life. Your job as Commander of AFRICOM has been truly
challenging, coordinating and conducting a major multinational
effort, and in building relationships throughout the continent
of Africa. You and your staff at AFRICOM are to be commended
for your performance in this effort. We thank you, sir.
The multitude of security and military-related challenges
across your area of responsibility (AOR) have been well-known
to the committee since the inception of AFRICOM. The issues
associated with postwar Libya, ongoing conflict in Somalia,
evolving threats in Northwest Africa, Sudan's support to Iran
and its proxies, and enduring regional conflicts in Central
Africa continue and in some cases have gained momentum since
the command was stood up.
Given the Department of Defense's (DOD) economy of force
effort in the AFRICOM AOR, this committee has sought to provide
AFRICOM greater flexibility and broader authorities to respond
to the unique threats faced by your command, General Ham. We
look forward to learning more about the challenges that you
face today and how we could enhance your command's ability to
conduct operations.
There are three areas I want to call out for special
attention. First, the attack in Benghazi last September was a
poignant and powerful reminder of our need and the public's
expectation for a capability to respond in real time to crises
around the world. This committee recently heard from the
Secretary of Defense and from General Dempsey on the
Department's response to the Benghazi attack. It is clear that
AFRICOM continues to struggle to secure basing rights and
access which would allow for such a response or allowing us to
conduct day-to-day certain military operations with partners in
the region. Moreover, AFRICOM has received less in the way of
resources and support than other geographic commands, and this
problem indeed may grow in a resource-constrained environment.
So we look forward to learning of the action that the
Department has taken to ensure AFRICOM is equipped in the
future to respond to or, more importantly, secure the
intelligence to warn of such an impending attack.
Second, AFRICOM's efforts to combat the threat posed by
al Qaeda, its associated forces, and other violent extremists
have seen some success, but new challenges to sustaining
progress seem to emerge daily. In Somalia, AFRICOM's
investments are showing promise as the African Union forces
continue to expand their territorial control and the nascent
Somalia Government is provided additional time and space to
build its capacity and its capabilities. The committee looks
forward to learning of Africa's plan to consider building a
more traditional military-to-military relationship with the
Somali military.
The military operations led by General Ham which helped
bring about the fall of the Qadafi regime and the resulting
outflow of small arms and other advanced munitions has
drastically changed the security dynamics in North Africa. Over
the past few months, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) has used its kidnapping ransoms to destabilize
the nation of Mali and to threaten nations across the region.
While successful French military action enabled by
intelligence and aerial refueling support from AFRICOM has
forced AQIM out of the population centers in northern Mali, the
threat of terrorism emanating from Northwest Africa remains
potent and the region is likely to be a source of instability
for years to come. That instability is complicated further by
key smuggling routes that move drugs, weapons, terrorists, and
money which finance terrorist and other transnational criminal
activity around the world. This committee looks forward to
hearing your views, General Ham, on this dynamic situation as
well.
Lastly, Operation Observant Compass, AFRICOM's named
operation to assist the multinational military effort to remove
Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield,
remains of great interest to this committee. This is something
where Senator Inhofe has been particularly involved and taken a
leadership role. This committee has sought to ensure that this
mission is adequately resourced, with additional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as well as
flexible logistics authorities to better support the
nontraditional composure of this operation.
General Ham, we look forward again to your assessment of
those operations and a report of hopefully any progress that's
been made during the last year.
General Fraser, we know that things have been busy for you
as well ever since you assumed your command at TRANSCOM.
TRANSCOM has played a critical role in supporting our war
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. TRANSCOM now faces the
daunting task of returning thousands upon thousands of items of
equipment and containers of material as we withdraw our forces
from Afghanistan.
Less well known, but no less important, has been TRANSCOM's
role in supporting various humanitarian and relief efforts
around the world. We applaud those efforts as well.
TRANSCOM is also facing threats to its infrastructure on a
day-to-day basis. At TRANSCOM you communicate over the
unclassified Internet with many private sector entities that
are central to DOD's ability to support deployment operations
in the transportation and the shipping industries, in
particular. Much of the other critical communications and
operations of DOD can be conducted over the classified DOD
Internet service, which is not connected to the public Internet
and therefore is much more protected against eavesdropping and
disruption by computer network attacks.
You've been quoted in the press, General, as stating that
TRANSCOM is the most attacked command in DOD, and we'd like to
hear today about what those challenges are and any progress
that you've made in dealing with the problems.
TRANSCOM is facing many other challenges. The Ready Reserve
Force, a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime
Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with
newer ships over the next 10 years. Sealift support is critical
to our capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more
than 90 percent of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Another challenging area is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) program. I'm going to put my remarks about that program
in the record.
Finally, this committee has sought to ensure that combatant
commanders have what they need to succeed in their missions and
we will continue to support the requirements of our warfighters
in these conflicts. However, this year's posture hearings with
our combatant commanders are being held under the specter of
budget sequestration, which threatens to impose arbitrary cuts
on our military forces unrelated to our national security
requirements. As the committee heard last Tuesday,
sequestration is already having an operational impact in the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area, for instance.
So, General Ham and General Fraser, please address the
impacts and the risks associated with sequestration and the
expiration of the Continuing Resolution (CR), which is also
looming, as it applies to your commands.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

I want to welcome our witnesses, General William Frazer, Commander
of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and General Carter Ham,
Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to testify this morning on
the programs and budget needed to meet the current and future
requirements within their respective commands.
Please extend, on behalf of the committee, our gratitude to the men
and women of your commands and their families for the many sacrifices
that they have made on behalf of our Nation. And thanks to both of you
for your long careers of leadership and service.
General Ham--this is likely to be your final posture hearing. On
behalf of the committee, let me say that we have enjoyed working with
you in various positions, and we wish you and your family all the best
as you embark upon another adventure in your life. Your job as
Commander of AFRICOM has been truly challenging in conducting and
coordinating a major multinational efforts and in building
relationships throughout the continent. You and your staff at AFRICOM
are to be commended for your performance in this effort.
The multitude of security and military-related challenges across
your area of responsibility (AOR) have been well known to this
committee since your command's inception. The issues associated with
post-war Libya, ongoing conflict in Somalia, evolving threats in
northwest Africa, Sudan's support to Iran and its proxies, and enduring
regional conflicts in central Africa continue, and--in some cases--have
gained momentum since that time. Given the Department of Defense's
(DOD) economy of force effort in the AFRICOM AOR, this committee has
sought to provide the AFRICOM greater flexibility and broader
authorities to respond to the unique threats faced by your command.
General Ham, we look forward to learning more about your challenges
today and are prepared to further enhance your command's ability to
conduct operations.
There are three areas I want to call out for special attention.
First, the attack in Benghazi last September was a poignant and
powerful reminder of our need--and the public's expectation--for a
capability to respond in real-time to crises around the world. This
committee recently heard from the Secretary of Defense and General
Dempsey on the Department's response to that attack. It is clear that
AFRICOM continues to struggle to secure basing rights and access
allowing for such a response, or allowing us to conduct day-to-day
certain military operations with partners in the region. Moreover,
AFRICOM has received less in the way of resources and support than
other geographic commands, and this problem indeed may grow in a
resource-constrained environment. We look forward to learning of the
action the Department has taken to ensure AFRICOM is equipped in the
future to respond or--more importantly--to secure the intelligence to
warn of such an impending attack.
Second, AFRICOM's efforts to combat the threat posed by al Qaeda,
its associated forces, and other violent extremists have seen some
success, but new challenges to sustained progress emerge daily. In
Somalia, AFRICOM's investments are showing promise as the African Union
forces continue to expand its territorial control and the nascent
Somali Government is provided additional time and space to build its
capacity and capabilities. The committee looks forward to learning of
AFRICOM's plan to consider building a more traditional military-to-
military relationship with Somali military.
The military operations led by General Ham, which helped bring
about the fall of the Qadhafi regime and the resulting outflow of small
arms and other advanced munitions, has drastically changed the security
dynamics in North Africa. Over the past few months, al Qaeda in the
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has used its kidnapping ransoms to
destabilize the Nation of Mali and to threaten nations across the
region. While successful French military action--enabled by
intelligence and aerial refueling support from AFRICOM--has forced AQIM
out of the population centers in northern Mali, the threat of terrorism
emanating from Northwest Africa remains potent and the region is likely
to be a source of instability for years to come. That instability is
complicated further by key smuggling routes that move drugs, weapons,
terrorists, and money, which finance terrorist and other transnational
criminal activity around the world. General Ham, this committee looks
forward to hearing your views on this dynamic situation.
Lastly, Operation Observant Compass--AFRICOM's named operation to
assist the multinational military effort to remove Joseph Kony and his
top lieutenants from the battlefield remains of great interest to the
committee. This committee has sought to ensure this mission is
adequately resourced with additional intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities, as well as flexible logistics authorities
to better support the nontraditional composure of this operation.
General Ham, we look forward to your assessment of these operations and
a report on any progress during the past year.
General Fraser, we know that things have been busy for you as well
ever since you assumed your job at TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM has played a
critical role in supporting our war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
TRANSCOM now faces the daunting task of returning thousands upon
thousands of items of equipment and containers of materiel as we
withdraw our forces from Afghanistan. Less well known, but no less
important, has been TRANSCOM's role in supporting various humanitarian
and relief efforts around the world. We applaud those efforts as well.
TRANSCOM is also facing threats to its infrastructure on a day-to-
day basis. At TRANSCOM, you communicate over the unclassified Internet
with many private-sector entities that are central to DOD's ability to
support deployment operations--in the transportation and shipping
industries in particular. Much of the other critical communications and
operations of the Defense Department can be conducted over the
classified DOD internet service, which is not connected to the public
Internet and is therefore much more protected against eavesdropping and
disruption by computer network attacks. You have been quoted in the
press as stating that TRANSCOM is the most attacked command in the
Department. We would like to hear today about any progress you have
made in dealing with these problems.
TRANSCOM is facing many other challenges. The Ready Reserve Force
(RRF), a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime
Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with newer
ships over the next 10 years. Sealift support is critical to our
capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent
of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan, which is similar to previous
contingencies.
Another challenging area is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
program. DOD relies heavily on the CRAF program to provide wartime
capability, depending upon CRAF to provide as much as 40 percent of
wartime needs. TRANSCOM and DOD need to ensure that the CRAF
participants can continue to provide that surge capacity in the future.
This committee has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders
have what they need to succeed in their missions and will continue to
support the requirements of our warfighters in these conflicts.
However, this year's posture hearings with the combatant commanders
are being held under the specter of budget sequestration, which
threatens to impose arbitrary cuts on our military forces unrelated to
our national security requirements. As the committee heard on Tuesday,
sequestration is having an operational impact in the CENTCOM area.
General Ham and General Fraser, please address the impacts and risks
associated with sequestration and the expiration of the Continuing
Resolution as it applies to your commands.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think your
opening comments covered pretty much all of it and I do agree
with your concerns.
I know, General Ham, it's hard for me to believe that it's
been 2 years now that you've been at that helm. We talked about
some of the problems that were coming up when you came on the
job and some of those problems are still there. We'll have a
chance to talk about that and I appreciate it.
General Fraser, thanks to both of you for your service.
Six weeks ago, back when we were talking about the
sequestration, I made the comment that if it becomes
inevitable, which I didn't think was the case at the time,
several of us had legislation that would have changed that,
including some individuals at this table. However, I said, in
the event that it becomes a reality, and we have to live with
the top line that has been dictated, wouldn't it be better if
the decisions that were made to reach that were made by the
Service Chiefs?
I spoke to all Service Chiefs and they all agreed. Number
one, that that would be less devastating; and number two, that
it would be something that they would have time to do and put
it together. I think that's happened. We know that the House
has a program that's primarily the CR. It doesn't really
address sequestration quite as much.
I would like to get a response from you, if you think
that's a good idea. Hopefully, that still might be a
possibility, that we can get the expertise of the Service
Chiefs making these decisions as opposed to the President with
his formula of across-the-board.
The AFRICOM AOR has 54 countries and 12 million square
miles. I felt pleased when we were able to establish AFRICOM as
a separate command. However, I still believe it's under-
resourced, and I've talked to you about that in the past. As
the squeeze takes place in the Middle East, we have terrorism
going down through Djibouti and the Horn of Africa. We know
what's happening down there. It's not just in North Africa,
it's spreading.
The chairman spoke about Joseph Kony, I know that's a tough
thing to deal with. But this isn't just one madman who's
mutilating kids. This is a part of a terrorist organization and
it has to be treated that way. It's been tough, heavy lifting
for you. So I know you've done a great job and I look forward
to asking more specific questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
General Ham.

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND

General Ham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Inhofe, and members of the committee. Thank you especially for
this opportunity to discuss the contributions of the women and
men of AFRICOM. I'm honored to be here today with my friend and
colleague, General Will Fraser, whose support has been so
essential to our activities in Africa.
This year marks the fifth anniversary of the formation of
AFRICOM. We've evolved considerably since 2008, driven in part
by events on the ground and in part by our own rethinking about
the mission. Our operational capabilities and capacities have
markedly increased and our security cooperation engagements
have matured both in focus and effectiveness.
Our approach seeks to address the near-term threats to our
national security while simultaneously building partnerships
and fostering regional cooperation which contribute to
achieving longer-term U.S. objectives in Africa.
This past year has seen significant positive developments
in Africa as well as some sobering reminders of the threats
inherent in the continent's security challenges. Mr. Chairman,
as you mentioned, in East Africa, Al-Shabaab has been weakened
by the sustained operations of African forces with the support
and enabling assistance from the United States and others.
Somalia still faces significant political, economic, and
security challenges, but the Somali people now have something
they haven't had for a very long time: hope for a better
future. I'm proud that we've played a role in that.
In Central Africa, African troops, advised and assisted by
U.S. Special Forces, have achieved some significant tactical
gains against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader,
Joseph Kony. Today, we are seeing increased levels of LRA
defections, fewer LRA attacks, and enhanced cooperation between
the military forces in the region.
In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime forces of the many nations
in the region are increasingly cooperating to counter piracy,
oil bunkering, and illicit trafficking. Most notably, two of
the African Union's regional economic communities, the Economic
Communities of West African States and Central Africa States,
have for the very first time crafted rules and procedures that
facilitate maritime security cooperation. I'm very proud that
AFRICOM has helped bring these nations and these regional
organizations together.
I highlight these three, Somalia, counter-LRA, and Gulf of
Guinea security, because they, at least to me, offer great
examples of what can be achieved through an African-led
endeavor to which we provide support and enabling capabilities.
The next area where such an approach may be useful is Mali.
We've supported France's request for assistance and are
actively supporting African nations deploying to operate in
Mali.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, while the increasing
willingness of many African partners to actively address shared
threats is encouraging, other trends in the region are deeply
concerning. Terrorist organizations in West and North Africa
are increasing their connectivity. The loss of four Americans
in Libya and three more in Algeria underscores the threat
presented by this growing network. Although each terrorist
organization individually poses a threat to regional stability,
the increasing collaboration amongst these organizations
increases the danger that they collectively present. I'm
convinced that if left unchecked, this network will develop
into one that poses a greater and more imminent threat to U.S.
interests.
Countering the spread of violent extremist organizations
has been our top priority. At the same time, we're tasked to
focus on prevention through a very active partnership strategy.
It remains clear that Africans must solve Africa's problems.
The fiscal challenges that you mention now place AFRICOM's
strategy to strengthen the capabilities of our partners at
increased risk. I'm concerned about the impacts resulting from
the combined effects of sequestration and the CR. We've already
had to make difficult decisions based on the availability of
funds, such as reducing reconnaissance flights. The budget
reductions we face will cut theater security cooperation
engagements and will reduce important joint and combined
exercises. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General
Dempsey, has made clear, we will, in fact, be doing less with
less.
We at AFRICOM, with the engaged support of the Service
Chiefs, though, are not idly sitting on our hands. We're
looking for new and innovative ways to address the many
challenges in Africa. The Army's regionally aligned force,
Navy's Africa Partnership Station, and the Air Force
counterpart, Africa Partnership Flight, are programs the
Services have purposely designed to help us achieve our
objectives. We look forward to the capabilities of the Marine
Corps' new Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, which
will bring improvements in our crisis response capabilities.
Let me conclude by simply stating that it's been my great
honor to serve with the dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen, civilians, and colleagues from across
the U.S. Government who serve so unselfishly every day to
advance our Nation's interests in Africa. I depart in about a
month, knowing that AFRICOM is in the best of hands. General
Dave Rodriguez is an exemplary leader and an old friend. It'll
be my privilege to see him lead the women and men of AFRICOM
well into the future.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members, I thank this
committee for its unfailing support of our troops, their
families, and of AFRICOM. I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Ham follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Carter F. Ham, USA

MISSION STATEMENT

U.S. Africa Command protects and defends the national security
interests of the United States by strengthening the defense
capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when
directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat
transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive
to good governance and development.

INTRODUCTION

This year marks the fifth anniversary of the formation of the
command. Since our standup in 2008, our operational capabilities and
capacities have markedly increased. In parallel, our relationships with
African partners and our security cooperation engagements have matured
in both focus and effectiveness. Our integrated approach seeks to
address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while
simultaneously building long-term partnerships and fostering regional
cooperation.
The past year has witnessed both positive developments and sobering
reminders of the threats in the U.S. Africa Command Area of
Responsibility. Many African partners are more capable of addressing
national and regional security challenges today than they were a year
ago, and we have strengthened both new and enduring partnerships. In
Somalia, sustained operations by African forces, with enabling
assistance from the United States and the international community,
significantly weakened al-Shabaab, providing space for Somalia's
transition to a constitutionally-based government. We are deepening our
relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose
capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security
issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region.
Senegal and Ghana, anchors of regional stability in West Africa, held
peaceful, democratic elections last year and remain important U.S.
partners in efforts to counter transnational threats. Similarly, in
Botswana, a highly capable partner and positive influence throughout
southern Africa, we are strengthening an enduring partnership grounded
in shared commitments to democracy and the rule of law. Liberia is
progressing toward the establishment of a professional, capable
military that is a force for good, as demonstrated by its border
deployment in response to Cote d' Ivoirian rebel activities last fall.
In Libya, a nation that witnessed its first election of the General
National Congress since the overthrow of Qadhafi, we are developing a
strong partnership with the new military.
Despite these positive trends, the regional security environment
continues to challenge U.S. interests and increase the operational
demands on U.S. Africa Command. In the past year, the United States
lost four Americans in deadly attacks in Benghazi and three more in the
terrorist attack on a British Petroleum facility in Algeria; al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged stronger and better armed
following the coup d'etat in Mali; and Boko Haram continued its
campaign of violence in Nigeria.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Emerging Terrorist Networks
As al Qaeda has syndicated its ideology and violence, its
affiliates and adherents in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have
become increasingly networked and adaptable in their recruiting,
training, financing, and operations. Violent extremist organizations,
insurgents, and criminal organizations are exploiting weak governance
and under-governed spaces, and remain determined to harm the United
States, our partners and Allies, and innocent civilians. The need to
put pressure on al Qaeda affiliates and adherents in East, North, and
West Africa has never been greater. The September 2012 attack on the
U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex in Benghazi and the January
2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria illustrate
the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in Africa
to U.S. citizens and interests. This network of al Qaeda affiliates has
already developed into a threat to U.S. regional interests and if left
unchecked, could pose a threat to Europe and the U.S. Homeland.
Coordinated approaches that integrate diplomatic, development, and
military efforts are needed to achieve both short- and long-term
counterterrorism objectives, including the disruption of terrorist
financing and undermining of recruitment efforts by violent extremist
organizations.

Arab Awakening
The Arab Awakening redefined the North African political landscape
and continues to impact countries across the region. Two years ago, the
actions of a single Tunisian citizen catalyzed a wave of change that
continues to reverberate throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
The post-revolutionary transitions currently underway in Tunisia and
Libya are extraordinarily important to the future of these countries
and to the region and have had significant consequences for regional
security. The flow of fighters and weapons from Libya to violent
extremist organizations in northern Mali serves as one example of how
political instability in one nation can have a profound effect across a
broad region. The United States has a stake in the success of these
transitions, not least of all for their potential to serve as a
powerful repudiation of al Qaeda's false narrative that only violent
extremism can drive change. U.S. Africa Command's relationships with
the Tunisian and Libyan militaries have important roles in supporting
these transitions as new governments in Tunisia and Libya work to
develop accountable and effective institutions, strengthen civil
society, and improve security.

Increased Regional and International Integration
The rising political and economic influence of emerging powers is
transforming the international system, and this change is evident in
Africa. Asian economic expansion is inflating global commodities
prices, a major driver of strong economic growth in some African
nations. Increased Chinese engagement in pursuit of economic
development is deepening China's political and economic influence and
increasing its access in the region. Other rapidly growing economies,
including Brazil and India, are similarly increasing their engagement
and investment in Africa. As Africa becomes more fully integrated into
the global economy, African maritime security is growing in importance
to the free flow of global commerce. In parallel with Africa's
continuing integration into global political and economic systems,
African nations are strengthening their regional economic and political
integration. African nations and regional organizations are
increasingly taking a lead role in multilateral responses to regional
security threats, both within and outside the structure of the African
Union and the regional standby forces that comprise its continental
security architecture.

COMMAND APPROACH

U.S. Africa Command's approach reflects strategic guidance provided
in the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the
National Military Strategy, the Presidential Policy Directive for
Political and Economic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (PPD
13) and the United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on
this strategic guidance, U.S. Africa Command protects and advances
vital U.S. national security interests in Africa, including protecting
the security of the global economic system, preventing catastrophic
attacks on the homeland, developing secure and reliable partners,
protecting American citizens abroad, and protecting and advancing
universal values. These universal values include the respect for and
protection of human rights, the prevention of mass atrocities, and the
provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In Africa,
military-to-military engagement plays a limited but important role in
sustaining progress in countries undergoing democratic transitions, as
well as those emerging from conflict.
In support of advancing regional peace and security, U.S. Africa
Command focuses on priority countries, regional organizations, and
programs and initiatives that build defense institutional and
operational capabilities and strengthen strategic partnerships.
Cooperative security arrangements are key to addressing transnational
threats, and U.S. Africa Command utilizes operations, exercises, and
security cooperation engagements to foster multilateral cooperation and
build the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations. U.S.
assistance, including focused military support, has contributed to
significant progress by African forces in the past year in both
peacekeeping and combat operations.
U.S. Africa Command's strategic approach addresses both threats and
opportunities. We simultaneously address the greatest near-term threats
to our national security while building long-term partnerships that
support and enable the objectives outlined in the U.S. Strategy Toward
Sub-Saharan Africa: strengthening democratic institutions; spurring
economic growth, advancing trade and investment; advancing peace and
security; and promoting opportunity and development. Countering
terrorism is the Department of Defense's (DOD) highest priority mission
in Africa and will remain so for the foreseeable future. While
prioritizing addressing emerging security challenges through both
direct and indirect responses, U.S. Africa Command views these
challenges also as opportunities to deepen enduring relationships,
strengthen partner capabilities, and foster regional cooperation.
Our theater strategy and four subordinate regional campaign plans
guide our operations, exercises and engagements, which focus on five
functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations;
strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking;
strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and
preparing for and responding to crises. These activities are primarily
executed by U.S. Africa Command's components: Army Forces Africa, Air
Forces Africa, Naval Forces Africa, Marine Forces Africa, Special
Operations Command Africa, and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa. Our headquarters interagency representatives from nine Federal
agencies and liaison officers from eight countries are integral to the
success of U.S. Africa Command's efforts.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PRIORITIES

Countering Violent Extremist Organizations
The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and
Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum
oil facility in Algeria are evidence of the growing threat posed to
Americans and U.S. interests by African violent extremist organizations
(VEO) and the global VEO network. In the past year, U.S. Africa Command
worked closely with regional and interagency partners to strengthen
counterterrorism partnerships grounded in shared security interests,
assisted partner military forces and U.S. interagency partners in
discrediting and defeating the appeal of violent extremism, and
strengthened partner capabilities to provide security as an element of
responsive governance.
Three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in
Africa: al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in
northern and western Africa; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in
Somalia. Although each organization individually poses a threat to U.S.
interests and regional stability, the growing collaboration of these
organizations heightens the danger they collectively represent. Of the
three organizations, AQIM, which exploited the instability that
followed the coup d'etat in Mali and seeks to establish an Islamic
state in northern Mali, is currently the most likely to directly
threaten U.S. national security interests in the near-term.

To counter AQIM and support the restoration of governance in Mali,
U.S. Africa Command is providing support to French and African military
operations in northern Mali, which are achieving gains against AQIM and
other terrorist organizations. We are supporting French efforts with
information, airlift, and refueling, and are working with the
Department of State (DoS) to support the deployment of west African
forces to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali
(AFISMA). Recently, we began unarmed, remotely piloted aircraft
operations from Niger in support of intelligence gathering efforts in
the region. Although French, Malian, and AFISMA forces are achieving
success in removing AQIM fighters from population centers, eliminating
the long-term threat posed by AQIM will require the restoration of
Malian governance and territorial integrity, political reconciliation
with northern indigenous groups, the establishment of security, and the
sustained engagement of the international community.

While international focus is currently on Mali, AQIM is not solely
a Malian challenge. The organization is spread across the Sahel region
and requires a regional approach to effectively address the threat.
U.S. Africa Command continues to work closely with the Department of
State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
to support regional counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). A partnership
between 10 northern and western African nations and the United States,
TSCTP is designed to support the development of partner nation military
counterterrorism skills and capabilities and foster regional
cooperation among participating nations to address the evolving threat
of AQIM and related extremist groups. One aspect of TSCTP's impact can
be seen in the troop contributions of five participating countries
(Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) to AFISMA. Although
Mali has historically been a TSCTP partner, U.S. Africa Command is not
currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali,
consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security
assistance to any military force that has been involved in a military
overthrow of a democratically-elected government.

In Nigeria, where Boko Haram is conducting a destabilizing campaign
of violent attacks focused on the northern part of the country, U.S.
Africa Command engages with the Nigerian Armed Forces to improve their
military capabilities. We seek to support the development of a
professional military that will support a coordinated Nigerian
Government effort to address Boko Haram and provide the citizens of
Nigeria with responsive governance and improved economic opportunity.
Boko Haram is in contact with al Qaeda and recently kidnapped a French
family in retaliation for French actions against AQIM in Mali. If
pressure on Boko Haram decreases, they could expand their capabilities
and reach to pose a more significant threat to U.S. interests.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by the operations
of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian, and Somali
forces. While al-Shabaab is less effective, the group is still
dangerous and capable of conducting unconventional attacks to disrupt
AMISOM operations and the newly formed Somali Government.
The significant gains achieved by AMISOM forces over the past year
were critical in providing space for the political process that
resulted in Somalia's transition to a government now formally
recognized by the United States. While Somalia faces many challenges
ahead, it is on a positive path. As military-to-military relations are
normalized with Somalia, U.S. Africa Command will work with the DoS to
develop security cooperation activities to assist with the development
of a unified Somali security force. For the foreseeable future, focus
must be maintained on Somalia to sustain security progress made to
date.
Overall, we believe that our efforts to counter violent extremist
organizations are having a positive impact. Our African partners are
demonstrating strengthened capabilities and are increasingly
cooperating with other nations to address shared security challenges,
including supporting African Union and United Nations operations and
programs. The leadership of the African Union and the Economic
Community of West African States in addressing the security challenges
in Mali is indicative of the growing willingness and capability of
Africans to address African security challenges.

Maritime Security and Counter Illicit Trafficking
Multilateral cooperation in addressing regional maritime security
challenges continued to improve over the past year. Maritime security
is not only vital to countering terrorism and illicit trafficking, but
is also a critical enabler of trade and economic development. Coastal
nations contend with a range of challenges off their coasts including
trafficking in narcotics and arms, human trafficking; piracy and armed
robbery at sea; oil bunkering; and illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (IUU). Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western Indian
Ocean and Gulf of Guinea elevated insurance rates and shipping costs,
resulting in increased costs to consumers. IUU fishing devastates
African fisheries, which play a vital role in African economic growth
and food security. Criminal organizations leverage ungoverned maritime
space that could also be exploited by violent extremist organizations.
African partners are making progress in addressing challenges in
the maritime domain through cooperative regional approaches supported
by the international community. U.S. Africa Command and our Naval and
Marine components work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard in the
execution of our two primary maritime security programs, the African
Partnership Station program (APS) and the African Maritime Law
Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), which are contributing to
strengthening regional maritime capabilities and interoperability.
African maritime forces used skills gained through participation in
AMLEP and APS to conduct operations that resulted in the seizure of
over $100 million worth of cocaine and the levying of over $3 million
in fines. Benin and Nigeria now conduct joint maritime patrols while
South Africa, Tanzania, and Mozambique signed a counter-piracy
agreement codifying their efforts and reflective of the trend of
increasing regional cooperation in addressing maritime security
challenges.
Countering illicit trafficking is linked to the challenge of
increasing African maritime security. Illicit trafficking in the
maritime, air, and land domains provides income to international
criminal networks, has a destabilizing influence on governance, and is
increasingly exploited by violent extremist organizations as a source
of financing. U.S. Africa Command coordinates closely with U.S.
Government agencies and embassy law enforcement teams to conduct
programs to counter illicit trafficking. Our efforts focus on
increasing partner nation capacities to detect and interdict illicit
trafficking throughout the African continent. Counter-trafficking
skills are applicable to combating a wide range of criminal activity,
including poaching.
As part of our enduring partnership with Liberia, we are supporting
the development of the Liberian Coast Guard and recently renovated the
coast guard's pier to enable operations. U.S. Africa Command
constructed a new Senegalese maritime operation center with follow on
training and assistance to the new center's staff and advanced training
to the Cape Verde Counter Narcotics and Maritime Operations Center. The
U.S. Africa Command also assisted Cape Verde and Senegal in developing
maritime operations centers that have facilitated the interdiction of
suspect vessels.

Strengthening Defense Capabilities
Strengthening partner defense capabilities enables African nations
to provide for their own security and helps U.S. Africa Command to
develop enduring relationships that support freedom of movement and
assured access for U.S. forces. We assist African nations in developing
capable, accountable, self-sustaining military forces and defense
institutions. Our capacity-building activities complement DoS programs
and are planned in close coordination with embassy country teams and
partner nations. Our engagements, which span the range of essential
military capabilities, include combined humanitarian and medical
assistance programs conducted in coordination with the USAID.
The success of AMISOM forces against al-Shabaab illustrates the
positive impact of U.S. defense capacity-building efforts in the
region. AMISOM forces receive pre-deployment training through the DoS
Global Peace Operations Initiative's Africa Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. U.S. forces support and
complement ACOTA activities with specialized training in skills that
have played a critical role in enhancing the operational success of
AMISOM forces, including intelligence analysis and countering
improvised explosive devices. To date, the forces of five AMISOM troop
contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and
Uganda) were trained through the ACOTA program.

Advice and assistance from U.S. forces enhanced the capabilities
and cooperation of military forces of Uganda, South Sudan, Central
African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo currently
engaged in operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
Operational gains made by regional forces over the past year, combined
with civilian efforts, resulted in increased LRA defections, the
capture of key LRA leaders, and decreased LRA attacks on civilian
populations. The formation of an African Union Regional Task Force will
facilitate further cooperation among counter-LRA forces.
U.S. Africa Command is broadly supporting U.S. commitments to
countries undergoing democratic transitions by assisting in the
development of professional militaries that respect civilian authority,
are respectful of the rule of law, and are increasingly capable of
securing their borders and combating mutual threats, including
transnational terrorism. We continue to develop our and strengthen
partnerships with the armed forces of Libya and South Sudan. In South
Sudan we have developed a comprehensive program that supports the
ongoing DoS security assistance program. Our current focus is on
education of key institutional-level personnel and small-scale civil
action projects with the South Sudanese military. Our engagement with
the Libyan Armed Forces similarly focuses on education and also
emphasizes the strengthening of Libyan counterterrorism capabilities.
As these relationships continue to develop, we look forward to
deepening our partnership with both militaries.
U.S. Africa Command's engagements with African land forces will be
enhanced as the command becomes the first combatant command to be
supported by a brigade through the Army's Regionally Aligned Force
(RAF) concept. Beginning in March 2013, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry
Division will support U.S. Africa Command in developing enduring
relationships and cooperation with partner nation land forces. RAF
engagements will likely range from small travelling contact teams to
support to major exercises. Initial planning for the RAF includes
support to State Department-led ACOTA training for African forces
deploying in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping
operations.
An area of emerging focus is strengthening partner defense
capabilities in air security and safety. Last year, our dual-hatted Air
Force component, USAFE-AFAFRICA, launched the African Partnership
Flight (APF) program, which promotes regional cooperation and
strengthens the capabilities of partner nation air forces to provide
airlift support to United Nations and African Union peacekeeping
operations. 150 airmen from five African nations participated in APF's
initial event last year, which addressed air mobility and logistics for
peacekeeping operations, priority areas in which African air forces
have very limited capabilities. APF will expand this year to include
175 students from eight nations.
The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides unique capabilities
that augment our ability to build enduring relationships with strategic
partners in the region. SPP engagements build mutual U.S. and partner
nation capacity to address shared security challenges. SPP activities
currently contribute to our security cooperation with eight partner
nations; Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, and Tunisia. SPP engagements account for over 40 percent of
military-to-military engagements each year. Expansion of the State
Partnership Program, particularly in East and North Africa, would
assist in developing stable and enduring relationships with additional
strategic partners, providing a foundation for capacity-building
efforts by rotational forces.
Over the past year, U.S. Africa Command increased activities in
support of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,
including integrating gender training, which is tailored to partner
nation socio-cultural dynamics, into our security sector reform
activities. Liberia has established a goal of 20 percent female
representation in its armed forces, a development that reflects the
increasing regional interest in expanding opportunities for women in
the armed forces. We are also working with the Botswana Defence Forces
to assist in its efforts to expand the integration of women into their
forces.

Preparing and Responding to Crisis
U.S. Africa Command stands ready to respond to crises across the
continent. Several incidents in the last year caused the Command to act
to ensure the safety and security of American citizens including the
January 2012 rescue of American citizen Jessica Buchanan and Danish
citizen Poul Thisted from captors in Somalia. In November 2012, when
rebel activities in the Central African Republic required the
suspension of U.S. Embassy operations, we assisted the DoS in
evacuating U.S. Embassy personnel and American citizens.
The dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening
have increased requirements for crisis response capabilities. U.S.
Africa Command capabilities to respond to crisis have matured over the
past year, including the establishment of a headquarters Command Center
and the allocation of a Commander's In-extremis Force in October 2012.
The Commander's in-Extremis Force is currently based in Colorado, with
a rotational element forward in Europe. Forward basing in Europe would
increase the capability of the command to rapidly respond to incidents
on the continent. Our Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force,
which previously focused on supporting security cooperation activities,
will be expanded to allow support to crisis response, further
increasing our capabilities in this regard.

HOW CONGRESS CAN HELP

Sequestration and potentially, a year-long extension of the current
Continuing Resolution, will have a negative impact on the command. The
combined effects may force significant reductions in theater security
cooperation activities and joint and combined exercises, potentially
endangering progress in strengthening partner defense capabilities,
gaining access to strategic locations, and supporting U.S. bilateral
policy objectives. Meeting Africa's many challenges requires the
collaboration and support of all agencies of the U.S. Government and
the support of Congress. Enactment of full year appropriations for
defense, military construction, DoS, and USAID programs is critical to
effective program planning and mission execution. Because U.S.
Government efforts are interconnected and often mutually dependent,
fully resourcing one of these pillars without the others compounds the
difficulties of planning and execution, and hinders mission completion.
Many of our programs use a mix of DoS and DOD authorities and
funding. For example, DoS peacekeeping operation authority provides for
training our African partner nation forces, while DOD section 1206
authority provides for equipping those forces. The use of dual
authorities requires close coordination between departments, and full
funding of the DoS's security assistance programs is critical to
success. We work with our interagency partners to ensure the resources
provided by Congress are appropriately tied to our defense and foreign
policy priorities.
We are keenly aware of the current fiscal environment and support
all ongoing DOD efforts to decrease spending and ensure funds are
wisely utilized. Our efforts under the Campaign to Cut Waste resulted
in budget plans which reflect a savings of $1 million in both monetary
and process efficiencies. We have also taken a hard look at our
staffing levels, contracts, and conferences to determine where savings
can be realized. We applied a self-imposed 5 percent personnel
reduction for both fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 and are on a
path to all but eliminate temporary hires and overhires. But
sequestration and a possible year-long extension of the current
Continuing Resolution will have serious negative consequences for our
efforts.
I thank this committee and Congress for its support of our team and
our mission. You have provided key authorities at appropriate times, as
in extending through fiscal year 2014 the temporary authority to build
the counter-terrorism capacities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and
countries engaged in AMISOM. Pursuant to this authority, we have worked
with the DoS to plan and execute our support to counter-terrorism
capacity-building at a critical time. We are currently providing
logistical equipment to Djiboutian and Kenyan forces participating in
AMISOM. We appreciate this authority and believe it will enable AMISOM
forces to continue their progress against al-Shabaab.
We also appreciate the enhanced train and equip authority under
section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended in the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2013, to permit small scale military construction among
the authorized elements.
Your annual reauthorization of the temporary, limited authority to
use operation and maintenance funding for military construction in
support of contingency operations in our area of responsibility has
permitted us to meet critical operational support needs in a timely
fashion, and we appreciate your recognition of its importance.
The recent volatility in North and West Africa demonstrates the
importance of sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) assets to cover multiple crises simultaneously. ISR capabilities
are required to protect American interests and to assist our close
allies and partners. We appreciate the authorization in the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2013 of an additional $50 million for ISR in support of our
counter-LRA efforts.
We appreciate your continued support for the Combatant Commander
Exercise and Engagement Program. This program is the foundation of our
exercises in Africa and funds strategic lift requirements as well as
providing Service Incremental Funds to our components, ensuring we can
provide the forces to work and exercise alongside our African partners.
Finally, we welcome visits by congressional members and their
staffs. The members and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in
Africa gain a deeper appreciation for the challenges and the many
opportunities that are presented in this large and diverse continent.

CONCLUSION

The African continent will continue to present a complex and fluid
set of challenges and opportunities. African nations, the African
Union, and regional economic communities are increasingly demonstrating
their willingness to address African security challenges. At U.S.
Africa Command, we will continue to engage with our African partner
militaries to strengthen their skills and capabilities, so they are
better able to address shared security concerns and are able to
contribute to regional stability and security. We also look forward to
strengthening our existing partnerships and developing new
partnerships, such as we have with the Libyan military.
Our contributions to protecting and advancing our national
interests would not be possible without our interagency partners across
the government, including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development, the incredibly dedicated women and men of
the U.S. intelligence community and others. Our team of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen--and our DOD and
interagency civilian teammates--is dedicated to our mission and their
achievements would not be possible without the strong support of their
families.
Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in uniform
and for your interest in this increasingly important region of the
world.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Ham.
General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General Fraser. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee: It's an honor and a
privilege to be with you here today representing the men and
women of TRANSCOM. Our total force team of over 150,000 men and
women, military and civilian, is dedicated to providing
reliable and seamless logistical support to our warfighters and
their families around the globe.
It's also an honor to be here today appearing before you
with my good friend and colleague, General Carter Ham. Over the
past 2 years I've had the opportunity to work with General Ham
as he and his team made significant progress on the African
continent and continued to meet the challenges of that
expansive, diverse AOR.
Carter and I go way back. We go much further back than just
the last couple years of his service in AFRICOM. I've always
admired his commitment to his people, his dedication to solving
the toughest problems, and his selfless service. Carter, on
behalf of all the men and women of TRANSCOM, we wish you and
your family all the best in retirement. God bless.
Distinguished members of this committee: Our Active Duty
members, National Guard, Reserve, civil servants, merchant
mariners, and commercial partners must meet the challenges of
the future. They met the challenges of the past while
maintaining a high operations tempo of combat operations which
they are supporting through sustainment efforts, humanitarian
relief, and crisis action responses. These efforts, from
support following Super Storm Sandy to developing innovative
ways to maximize the throughput into and out of Afghanistan to
meet the directed 68,000 troop reduction level by September 30,
2012, were made possible by the TRANSCOM team of dedicated
professionals committed to ensuring our joint force maintains
global logistics superiority.
Our component and subordinate command team, comprised of
the Air Mobility Command led by General Paul Selva, Military
Sealift Command led by Rear Admiral Mark Busby, Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command led by Major General Tom
Richardson, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command led by Rear
Admiral Scott Stearney, and the Joint Transportation Reserve
Unit led by Major General Dave Post, continue their flawless
execution of our command's mission.
I have had the opportunity to observe firsthand during my
travels in Europe, Central Asia, the Pacific, and all around
the globe the support these world-class professionals provide.
I can tell you they are doing the Nation's business
magnificently, without fanfare and often in stressful
conditions. I could not be prouder of this total force team.
As we continue to sustain our forces abroad, we're also
working towards our goal of becoming the government's
transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. To
meet that goal, we embarked on a comprehensive and
collaborative 5-year strategic plan, which will tackle the
challenges and take advantage of the opportunities for
continuing to project national power and influence. This
strategic plan positions us to respond effectively and
efficiently to our rapidly changing operating environment,
while accounting for the dynamic fiscal landscape that we now
face.
We continue to work with our customers and our lift
providers to pursue smart transportation solutions to reduce
the cost of operations. Strategic guidance requires a military
that is smaller and leaner, while at the same time, more agile,
flexible, and ready. As the global distribution synchronizer
and distribution process owner, TRANSCOM is committed to
working with the Military Services, the other combatant
commands, government agencies, our allies, and commercial
partners to synchronize distribution planning and synergize our
distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure
that we deliver a scaleable and resilient global distribution
network from point of origin to point of employment, meeting
needs in all operating environments.
As we look towards the future, we're also assessing the
mission impact of funding reductions for this year and
potentially beyond. Since TRANSCOM requirements are driven by
our customer workload and readiness needs, as their demand
signals decline, our workload will be reduced. While the
impacts of these reductions will not occur immediately, the
long-term results will likely affect the business base of our
commercial partners and our ability to support other combatant
commands in the same manner as we do today. In the coming
months, we'll continue to work closely with the Military
Services and our commercial partners to mitigate the second-
and third-order effects of these reductions on our airlift,
sealift, and surface capabilities. We'll keep you informed of
our progress.
Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining
our capability to project power and provide support to our
joint forces around the world.
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of this
committee, I want to thank you for your continued support of
TRANSCOM, of all of our men and women both military and
civilian. I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before
you today. I ask that my written statement be submitted for the
record and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Your statement, of course, will be made
part of the record, and we thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF

INTRODUCING THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
MISSION/ORGANIZATION

It is an honor to represent the men and women of the U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Our Total Force team of Active Duty,
Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial partners, and contractors leads a
world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE)
providing reliable and seamless logistical support to our warfighters
and their families around the globe. Our service component commands the
Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the
Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility
Command (AMC); our functional component command the Joint
Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU); and our subordinate command the
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provide tremendous
capabilities that we merge into transportation solutions to deliver
effective support to the combatant commanders at the best value to the
Nation. Together, we deliver global transportation services and
enabling capabilities to our warfighters that no other nation can
match.
Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining the
Nation's capability to project power and influence anywhere, anytime.
As the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), TRANSCOM focuses on end-to-end
performance and on providing the most value by targeting process
improvements and enterprise performance measurements. Our mission as
Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) complements the DPO role by
integrating transportation solutions into theater posture plans in the
earliest planning phase possible. We are working with all combatant
commands (COCOMs), interagency, nongovernmental organizations,
supporting nations, and industry partners to develop regional
distribution campaign plans, with an eye toward process, global touch-
points, and measureable delivery. Additionally, we are hard at work on
a series of measures to reduce the cost of operations and maintain
effectiveness to those who depend on us--while encouraging continued
and expanded use of the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

Our goal is to be the U.S. Government's transportation and enabling
capabilities provider of choice. To meet the numerous challenges and
take advantage of the enormous opportunities for continuing to rapidly
project national power and influence well into the future, TRANSCOM has
proactively embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year
strategic plan. This strategic plan is positioning us to effectively
and efficiently respond to our rapidly changing operating environment
while accounting for the dynamic fiscal landscape we now face.
First, we will preserve enterprise readiness by ensuring unfettered
access to organic and commercial transportation resources. Our
Readiness Roadmap will better leverage our organic assets, as well as
the unique strengths and contributions of our commercial partners, and
identifies the steps we must take to wisely transition from a decade of
conflict to become a leaner, more efficient and more collaborative
manager of the defense transportation enterprise.
Second, we will achieve excellence in information technology (IT)
management, by promoting increased knowledge-sharing and transparency
across the enterprise. In our unique roles as Distribution Process
Owner and Global Distribution Synchronizer, we recognize we must
develop and sustain a secure information environment that ensures
effective knowledge-sharing and decisionmaking even while operating in
a contested cyber domain. We have already begun building a
functionally-managed IT framework to identify and align resources to
our most critical needs.
Third, we are rebaselining our internal roles, functions and
responsibilities in order to match human and capital resources for
projected future mission activities. This realignment enhances
collaboration, matches skills to processes and creates a more
disciplined, transparent resourcing process in order to achieve sound
resource stewardship while remaining responsive to those who depend on
us to effectively execute in an increasingly dynamic operational
environment.
Finally, but most importantly, we are better equipping our people
with the knowledge, skills, and training to maintain our world-class,
customer-focused professionals. The enhancements we are achieving in
our diverse workforce of Active, Guard, and Reserve military
components, civilian employees, and contractors will further enhance
support for global mobility across the transportation enterprise.

SUPPORTING GLOBAL OPERATIONS

Current fiscal realities have resulted in funding reductions for
all Services. TRANSCOM requirements are driven by our customer workload
and readiness requirements. If COCOM demands are reduced, our workload
will also be reduced. While these impacts will not occur immediately,
the long-term results may directly impact our ability to execute
critical missions of our supported COCOMs.
The capacity to project national power, presence, and influence
worldwide is unique to the United States. To support this vital
national capability, we lead a team of dedicated professionals in
providing global mobility and strategic enablers. TRANSCOM provides the
ideal blend of operational expertise and distribution know-how to move
and sustain the force worldwide. Together, we deliver unparalleled
service to multiple COCOMs in support of their theater campaign plans
and contingency operations. Our team has an unrelenting passion to meet
a vision of coordinated, synchronized, and responsive end-to-end
logistics which ensures that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
coastguardsmen, and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) civilians always
have the support they require.
TRANSCOM oversees the global mobility enterprise; our component
commands execute the mission. In 2012, AMC and its Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard partners maintained a high operations tempo
supporting requirements around the world. AMC deployed, to multiple
locations, a rotational force of over 30 C-130 Hercules tactical
airlift aircraft and 60 KC-135 Stratotanker and KC-10 Extender aerial
refueling aircraft. The strategic airlift fleet flew over 1,400 C-5
missions and 13,000 C-17 missions supporting the full range of national
interests. In total, AMC moved 584,000 tons of cargo, offloaded 194
million gallons of fuel, and moved 1.7 million passengers while flying
127,000 sorties. On the surface, MSC and SDDC transported over 7.4
million tons of cargo worldwide. In addition, MSC's point-to-point
tankers delivered 1.4 billion gallons of fuel in support of global DOD
requirements.
During 2012, more than 900 JECC personnel performed 27 operational
deployments and participated in 39 joint exercises in support of COCOM
requirements. JECC's highly skilled Active and Reserve component
personnel rapidly deployed as mission-tailored planning teams to assist
combatant commanders in establishing, organizing, and operating joint
force headquarters during numerous operations, and provided unmatched
deployable joint communications and public affairs expertise, whenever
and wherever needed.
Our functional command, the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit,
provided necessary augmenting capability to a wide array of functions
across the command. This augmentation has been particularly important
during numerous surge and contingency operations when our most critical
operational and planning functions required the highest level of
activity.

SUPPORT TO GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS (GCCS)

The President directed the reduction of Afghanistan's Force
Management Level to 68,000 troops by 30 September 2012. Achieving this
force reduction on schedule was possible through close coordination
between headquarters, TRANSCOM, our component commands, and our
commercial partners. Innovative ways to maximize throughput included
expanding options for transiting forces into and out of the CENTCOM
Theater. Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield, Romania, provided an additional
transit location for deploying and redeploying forces in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom, resulting in the movement of approximately
10,000 troops during the height of the surge recovery of forces from
Afghanistan.
Working with our regional and commercial partners, we executed
multiple proofs of principle to validate processes and capabilities. As
we develop more efficient transportation routes around the globe, we
continue witnessing the great effects of maturing routes. We continue
to seek new air, ground, and multi-modal routes, adding flexibility and
responsiveness to the DTS.
In addition to validating two-way passenger flow through Romania,
we are reaping the benefits of last year's initiative to flow air-
direct traffic over an Arctic route. This Arctic routing, allowing both
commercial and military aircraft to support Afghanistan from the west
coast, resulted in 2 million gallons of jet fuel saved last year. This
is a savings of $26 million.
Our ground lines of communication continue to mature as well. The
success of the distribution network's flexibility was demonstrated by
the lack of operational impact resulting from the closure of the
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). The Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) absorbed a 46 percent increase in
containers, moving over 30,000 containers in total. That capability,
coupled with our multi-modal capacity, allowed us to continue
uninterrupted support to our warfighters. Additionally, we have
successfully reversed our Kazakhstan--Kyrgyzstan--Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan routes, allowing the movement of retrograde cargo over the
NDN. We are also executing a reverse Trans-Siberia route, which
establishes another option for the movement of retrograde cargo.
Despite the enterprise's ability to weather the unexpected, the
PAKGLOC, when fully operational, remains the quickest and most cost-
effective route for supporting operations in theater.
Multi-modal operations continue to provide a middle-ground option
between the speed of air direct and the lower cost of surface movement.
TRANSCOM, working with industry and partner nations, continues to
expand the capabilities of existing locations and add new sites where
necessary. For example, following the recent success of air direct
shipments through Baku, Azerbaijan, we developed processes and
procedures for multi-modal operations. This effort is expected to
increase volume while reducing transit time and costs. Hybrid multi-
modal operations, leverage a blend of military and commercial airlift,
and provide another opportunity to reduce cost without sacrificing
effectiveness.
In the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of operations (AOR),
TRANSCOM continued its support of the National Science Foundation's
(NSF's) mission. As part of Operation Deep Freeze, we coordinated for
the delivery of over 4,000 passengers and 2,150 short tons (STONs) of
cargo via C-17 and more than 6 million gallons of fuel and 3,400 STONs
of cargo via sealift to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. In February 2012,
the NSF discovered the ice pier used in previous years to offload cargo
was not capable of supporting ship off-loading operations. TRANSCOM
rapidly coordinated the delivery and setup of an Army modular causeway
system, which permitted the off-load of nearly 7 million pounds of
cargo in 322 containers and the backload of more than 8.7 million
pounds of retrograde cargo in 391 containers. This off-load operation,
the first of its kind in this environment, spanned 8 days, during
subfreezing temperatures and sustained Antarctic winds.
In addition to ODF, TRANSCOM supported numerous operations that
enhanced the security and preparedness of U.S. and allied forces in the
PACOM AOR. TRANSCOM supported multiple deployments and redeployments in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Phillipines (OEF-P). We also
provided strategic airlift and sealift to military Security Forces and
Special Warfare Units to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Guam in
support of PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation program engagement
strategies and objectives. TRANSCOM supported U.S. Special Operations
Forces Joint Command Exercise Training (JCET) throughout the Asia-
Pacific region at the invitation of regional governments, with
strategic airlift and sealift of PACOM assets. Support for PACOM's JCS
Exercises Terminal Fury in Hawaii, Cobra Gold in the Kingdom of
Thailand, Commando Sling in the Republic of Singapore, Balikatan in the
Republic of the Philippines, and Key Resolve, and Ulchi Freedom
Guardian in the Republic of Korea entailed the movement of 10,452
passengers, 1,298 STONS moved by strategic airlift, and 406,270 square
feet (or 22,114 STONS) via sealift.
Additionally, TRANSCOM moved 1,574 STONS of food, water,
construction materials, and vehicles to support the PACOM Joint POW/MIA
Accounting Command (JPAC) team from Pusan, Republic of Korea, to Nampo,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
In the U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM continued
to support the secure transport of personnel for detainee movement
operations. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, Joint Staff, and
supported COCOMs, we successfully completed 100 percent of these
sensitive missions without incident.
In the U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and
redeployed more than 2,233 troops and 1,169 STONs of cargo in support
of the Kosovo Balkan force. During December 2012, we conducted the
movement planning for 326 personnel and 1,022 STONS of cargo in support
of the Patriot Missile Battery deployment into Turkey in support of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense. Support to EUCOM
also included numerous strategic lift missions in support of exercises
in several countries to include: Estonia, Georgia, Israel, Latvia,
Norway, and Poland. These exercises entailed moving more than 2,732
personnel and over 8,000 STONs of cargo for training events aimed at
exercising the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain forces in
response to a crisis affecting the EUCOM AOR.
In the U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and
redeployed 3,187 troops and 1,297 STONs of cargo in support of Combined
Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. We also coordinated and tracked 40
airlift missions moving nearly 300 personnel and over 490 STONs of
cargo while supporting contingency operations in northern Africa.
Finally, in the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) AOR, the Modular
Airborne Fire Fighting System equipped C-130 aircraft, provided by our
component, AMC, flew 922 sorties and released more than 22.2 million
pounds of fire-retardant, combating wildfires in direct support of U.S.
Forestry Service operations. The WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew
over 120 sorties into 32 storms collecting valuable hurricane data for
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In support of
relief efforts in the wake of Super Storm Sandy, TRANSCOM coordinated
for nearly 100 C-17 and C-5 missions moving 749 passengers and 3,762
STONs of cargo. Critical supplies delivered included electric utility
restoration vehicles, medical personnel, search and rescue teams,
blankets, dewatering pumps, and support equipment. Support to NORTHCOM
also included lift for training exercises providing realistic homeland
defense and defense support to civil authorities training for joint and
interagency partners. This entailed moving more than 3,700 personnel
and over 1,363 STONs of cargo in support of Exercise Vibrant Response
13, a training event exercising the ability to deploy, employ, and
sustain specialized military response forces upon the request of
civilian authorities following a catastrophic incident.

SUPPORT FOR THE WARFIGHTER

Global patient movement remains one of our most demanding missions
requiring 100-percent accuracy. Last year, in partnership with the
medics of AMC, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard,
we efficiently and effectively provided en route medical care to more
than 14,000 patients. Patients requiring critical care support were
moved by Critical Care Air Transport Teams, including six patients who
were moved by the new Acute Lung Rescue Teams, one from PACOM and five
from CENTCOM.
Our partnership with the Military Health System is vital to the
success of patient movement. In particular, Landstuhl Regional Medical
Center is vital to the support of four COCOMs: EUCOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM,
and U.S. Special Operations Command. The planned Military Construction
(MILCON) replacement of this outstanding hospital will further aid the
en route medical care needs of ill and injured servicemembers and their
families.
We are working to improve the quality of life for servicemembers
and their families by providing convenient and user-friendly online
services for scheduling the shipment of household goods. Last year, the
Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) through the Defense Personal
Property System (DPS) managed approximately 600,000 DOD household goods
shipments. DP3 provides the procedures necessary to build the many
online resources provided by DPS. These services include Web-enabled
counseling, the ability for a DOD customer to score their
Transportation Service Provider (TSP) via the customer satisfaction
survey, as well as the ability to file an online claim while in direct
communication with the TSP.
Finally, the ability to support the warfighter in Afghanistan's
mountainous terrain requires reliance on vertical resupply via airdrop
operations. Although airdrop cargo amounts decreased from 2011 to 2012,
AMC airdropped over 40 million pounds of fuel and combat supplies,
significantly reducing exposure to troops on surface roads. With the
High Speed Container Delivery System, we are able to support forward
deployed warfighters, increasing delivery tonnage to point of need and
providing enhanced threat avoidance and tactical maneuverability to
airlift aircraft and crews. Civilian causality concerns led to the
development of new capabilities such as an extracted container delivery
system to improve aerial delivery accuracy. Additionally, enhancements
in existing capabilities, such as the low-cost, low-altitude airdrop
system and Joint Precision Airdrop System, enhance our delivery
capability to warfighters operating at ever increasing, smaller and
more austere locations or in proximity to civilian populations.

INTERAGENCY AND OTHER SUPPORT

Cyber threats posed to TRANSCOM, our components, commercial
partners, national critical infrastructure, and key resources are a
direct challenge to DOD global operations. Among TRANSCOM's top
priorities is ensuring freedom of action and protection of mission data
throughout the cyberspace domain to plan and execute our global
mission. To that end, we continue to strengthen our partnerships with
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) as well as the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) and other interagency and industry partners. It
is critical that we protect our essential command and control systems
and information from cyber attack or exploitation. TRANSCOM continues
efforts to improve readiness and strengthen ties with both our
commercial and U.S. Government partners through improved information
sharing.
Our role as GDS facilitates enhanced opportunities to support the
COCOMs and the Department of State by means of engagement events
focused on distribution, transportation, and logistics. Fostering
critical relationship-building opportunities based on universal
logistics interests is our unique and innovative approach to
traditional security cooperation activities. Our GDS responsibilities
provide the basis and means for successful strategic engagements as we
continue to expand our reach and become more agile. The NDN is a prime
example of coordinated and synchronized activities that have maximized
strategic distribution flexibility and reduced operational risk. The
NDN has minimized reliance on any one nation by offering fair and open
competition that facilitates economic development and diplomatic
engagement. The strategic impact has improved international relations
and expanded commodity resourcing through the development of an
integrated and synchronized distribution enterprise.

MOBILITY CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT-18 (MCA-18)

MCA-18 is an assessment being conducted by TRANSCOM in conjunction
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. We are
assessing DOD's capability to project and sustain forces in support of
the defense strategy, through 2018, by examining a range of strategic
and operational mobility challenges that include current operations
plans, defense scenarios, seminars presented in Chairman Joint Chief of
Staff senior leader seminars, and historical operations. MCA-18 will
identify and evaluate our capabilities, the constraints associated with
projecting and sustaining forces in support of the strategy, and
options to mitigate system constraints. We will leverage this
assessment as we move forward to complete the congressionally-mandated
Mobility Requirements Capabilities Study 2018.

AIR MOBILITY READINESS

With the delivery of the last U.S. Air Force C-17, we will have the
planned air mobility force structure to meet the strategic airlift
requirements for a single large-scale operation, while maintaining the
flexibility and adaptability to support the Joint Force in another
region.
Our other strategic airlifter, the C-5, is critical to our
oversized and outsized air cargo capability. Management of this fleet
focuses on retirement of the C-5A, the oldest and least reliable
aircraft while improving reliability for the remaining C-5s. The
Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) increases the C-
5 fleet mission capable rate from 55 to 75 percent while vastly
increasing aircraft performance, range, and fuel efficiency.
Together our C-17 and C-5 fleets continue to improve availability
through the replacement of aging components, obsolete components and
the Air Force's new programmed phase inspection maintenance process.
This change from a ``failure of major components'' process to a
preventive replacement process, along with the retirement of
maintenance intensive jets and RERP modifications, will significantly
improve strategic airlift aircraft availability, velocity, and capacity
to the warfighters.
The KC-46A is critical to the entire Joint and coalition team's
ability to project combat power around the world, and provides America
and our allies with unparalleled rapid response to combat and
humanitarian relief operations alike. The KC-46A offers more refueling
capacity and increased capacity for cargo and aero-medical evacuation.
The KC-46A will provide outstanding aircraft availability, highly
adaptable technology, flexible employment options, and superb overall
capability.
The legacy air-refueling fleet includes the KC-10 and KC-135
aircraft providing the backbone for Air Mobility support to our
warfighters. The KC-10 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS)/
Air Traffic Management (ATM) Program addresses airspace access and
near-term critical obsolescence issues for the 59 KC-10 aircraft fleet.
CNS/ATM capabilities are necessary to ensure worldwide flight
operations in civil and military air space and meet current Federal
Aviation Administration and International Civil Aviation Organization
standards.
C-130s continue to be the intra-theater workhorse for airlift
operations around the globe, providing critical lift and airdrop
capability wherever needed. This versatile aircraft will continue to
play an integral role for airlift long into the future.
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a voluntary commercial
segment of our mobility force, providing additional capability to
rapidly deploy forces and equipment globally. Over the past few years,
TRANSCOM has encouraged program improvements by way of contracting day-
to-day business with preference to those commercial carriers who have
modernized their fleet. This approach has provided increased
reliability and greater fuel efficiency, through economy of scale and
continues to be of value as we adjust to changes in global economic
situation and anticipated changes in our future force deployments. We
continue to examine the CRAF program for viability and cost
effectiveness for future mission needs.

SEALIFT READINESS

During large-scale operations, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels are
the prime movers of unit equipment for Army and Marine Corps forces. We
rely primarily on commercial industry for sealift and complement it
with our U.S. Government-owned vessels from the MSC's surge fleet and
Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) when
necessary. Our partnership with commercial industry is formalized
through agreements such as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
(VISA). This agreement and others ensure the availability of a viable
U.S. flag maritime industry and the required U.S. citizen mariner pool
needed in times of national emergency. We also leverage significant
capacity through the Maritime Security Program (MSP). MSP has been an
extremely successful program since its inception in the mid 1990's;
over 70 percent of the VISA capacity needed for a national emergency
would come from our partners in MSP. Additionally, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 has ensured the continued
presence of the U.S. flag fleet in international commerce while
providing DOD critical continued access to militarily useful RO/RO and
other cargo vessels. Preserving these programs preserves the U.S.
merchant mariner base, a vital national asset that provides the
manpower needed for surge operations.
The National Defense Sealift Fund provides funding for 9 Large
Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off vessels, 5 Roll-On/Roll-Off-Container
vessels, and the 46 RRF vessels of our U.S. Government-owned surge
fleets. All vessels are critical for the DOD's ability to surge to meet
future global requirements. TRANSCOM is working with our commercial and
U.S. Government sealift partners to find the most cost effective means
to fund these fleets and the critical capacity they provide. Finally,
with the average age of the RRF exceeding 36 years, and nearly 1.6
million square feet of RO/RO capacity retiring over the next 10 years,
it is important to begin the process of recapitalizing our organic
fleets.

SURFACE READINESS

Successful execution of our mission and the daily support we
provide to the warfighter rely on a complex global enterprise of
interdependent critical infrastructure. Our Critical Infrastructure
Program aligns resources in managing both a COCOM program and a Defense
Infrastructure Transportation Sector program, the latter focusing on
building relationships and trust among non-DOD critical infrastructure
stakeholders, sharing information and collaborating where appropriate.
Our critical infrastructure stakeholders range from other Federal
agencies to State and local entities, foreign countries, and the
private sector.
We continuously monitor the infrastructure network based on
threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. We augment teams who assess
risks to infrastructure, advocate initiatives to economically reduce
risk, and help develop solutions to preserve our readiness. These
efforts are aimed at ensuring that infrastructure is available when
required. Through coordination and cooperation with the commercial
sector, the National Port Readiness Network delivers an important link
between commercial port operations and military readiness at 17
strategic ports. These ports provide the critical services and
intermodal links needed to ensure rapid, secure, and effective military
mobilization. Improving the resiliency and modernizing our seaports,
air nodes, and critical rail and road networks is a TRANSCOM focus area
that ensures our ability to support all geographic combatant commanders
and respond to emergencies within the homeland, now and far into the
future.
Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean
Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to TRANSCOM's
support of PACOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in
the Pacific Theater. Due to the nature and size of this military
mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We
continue to work within DOD to find resources to reduce or eliminate
any capability gaps and risk at MOTCO to alleviate throughput issues to
the Pacific Theater. DOD's current efforts are centered on preserving
existing throughput capability at MOTCO's only operational pier
configured for movement of containerized ammunition through
comprehensive structural engineering assessments. Although the
requisite resourcing processes have not yet run their full course, we
are working with the U.S. Army to address the deteriorating
infrastructure at MOTCO to allow for sufficient and uninterrupted
delivery of supplies to the Pacific Theater.
Recently completed and ongoing infrastructure improvement projects
at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), in Sunny
Point, NC, are essential to TRANSCOM's support of CENTCOM's operational
plans and DOD's military capability in multiple theaters. Specifically,
MOTSU's Center Wharf was recently upgraded to support the installation
of two new container gantry cranes, which became operational in 2012.
These improvements enhance MOTSU's ability to conduct missions and
allow the terminal to meet documented throughput requirements,
contributing to a resilient capability.
In addition to improving critical infrastructure, DOD must maintain
railcar capacity to meet military transportation requirements. TRANSCOM
through our Army component, SDDC, is executing an Army program
established to preserve and assure access to commercial railcars needed
to augment U.S. Government-owned capabilities and meet contingency
deployment requirements.

JOINT ENABLING CAPABILITIES

TRANSCOM ensures the readiness and timely deployment of mission-
tailored joint capability packages to assist all COCOMs across seven
unique functional areas-joint planning, operations, logistics,
knowledge management, intelligence support, communications, and public
affairs--within hours of notification. JECC forces provide these
enabling capabilities and are designated as part of the Secretary of
Defense's Global Response Force. As a result of a changing, complex
operational environment, the geographic combatant commanders have
relied on and will increasingly depend upon TRANSCOM's low density-high
demand JECC forces to accelerate the formation and the effectiveness of
joint force headquarters and assist joint force commanders in the
planning and execution of joint operations. We recognize that JECC's
ability to effectively assist COCOMs on short notice depends on the
development and maintenance of strong, close relationships with our
mission partners and stakeholders.

ENHANCEMENTS TO TRANSCOM READINESS AND DOD SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

As the GDS and DPO, TRANSCOM is committed to working with the
military Services, COCOMs, governmental agencies, allied, and
commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning and synergize
distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we
deliver a scalable and resilient Global Distribution Network from point
of origin to point of employment, meeting needs dictated by the
operating environment.
A robust global infrastructure network is essential to our Nation's
ability to project and sustain its power and influence; therefore, a
commitment to obtain the access and agreements necessary to maintain
this capability and adequately resource it is imperative. Using
strategic-level analysis and subsequent modeling, we have identified
requirements in the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) as both
current and anticipated capability gaps and requirements. We will
continue to utilize the ERIMP process to identify access requirements
and construction projects that will improve our ability to support
COCOM global routes.
At TRANSCOM we are constantly focused on reducing costs within the
DOD supply chain while simultaneously sustaining or improving service
levels to the warfighter. Last year, in collaboration with mission
partners from Defense Logistics Agency, General Services
Administration, COCOMs, and the Services, we achieved over $500 million
in cumulative cost avoidance due to better surface container
utilization and better pallet and planeload utilization. This simply
better optimized business practices. We have set another target this
year to continue finding savings opportunities and will seek to
identify an additional $500 million in cost avoidance by the end of
fiscal year 2015; to date, we have reached $721 million in cumulative
cost avoidance. Our collective efforts earned the prestigious Defense
Logistics 2012 Cost Savings and Performance Improvement Award.
To enhance readiness we are identifying new ways to leverage the
existing DTS infrastructure and industry resources in support of our
global demands, as well as formulating better solutions to improve DTS
capabilities. This will not only benefit military aircrew proficiency
but will contribute to our organic and commercial viability. In order
to accomplish these objectives, the command stood up the Enterprise
Readiness Center (ERC) to help capitalize on opportunities to increase
DTS volume. The ERC will also seek to improve transportation services
to existing customers and drive responsiveness to improved levels by
applying enterprise-proven methods. We understand multiple
transportation providers exist in today's global distribution network.
To that point and with the ERC in place, TRANSCOM will endeavor to
become the transportation provider of choice.
We continue to partner with CYBERCOM, DISA, industry, and academia
to improve and harden our information technology resources, strengthen
cyber defense, and improve our capability to operate effectively in
cyberspace. Because of our strong reliance on commercial partners, over
90 percent of DOD deployment and distribution information transactions
are handled on unclassified systems, leaving us vulnerable to possible
cyber attacks. We are defining standards for processing and handling
data that will improve the security of our information through our
continued collaboration forums, including our cyber summit, industry
day, and an exercise involving the Department of Homeland Security that
improved our information sharing processes and relationships.
In order to fully support the needs of the warfighter, we are
working with our joint enterprise partners to measure distribution
performance. Our focus is to measure the right events at a sufficient
level of detail to pursue supply chain optimization opportunities. For
example, we are leveraging technology such as electronic data
transmitted from commercial partners and system of record database
incorporation to capture appropriate time-stamps. This data facilitates
performance measurements and root-cause analysis as requisitions flow
from suppliers to the warfighter. Through continual collaboration
across the DOD, we are developing common and meaningful performance
metrics that incorporate best-practices from the commercial and U.S.
Government sectors.

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION--EFFICIENCIES

We continue seeking methods to achieve cost avoidance and improve
processes for container management. We have implemented several
initiatives to include container detention fee reductions through
increased use of U.S. Government-owned containers where cost effective,
improving contract provisions with carriers through the recently
awarded Universal Services Contract (USC)-7 and accomplishing container
buyouts earlier when carrier owned containers are required to meet
mission objectives. USC-7 is also enabling us to transform other
business areas. This multiple award program, with 22 contracted ocean
carriers, supports our worldwide surface shipments. Some changes of
significance from USC-6 to USC-7 include measuring carrier performance
regionally by COCOM versus global basis; this allows for more relevant
``best-value'' booking decisions and provides leadership visibility on
carriers' performance in each COCOM. We added four electronic data
interchange codes, assisting in more accurate measurement of carriers'
performance, ensures carriers are appropriately compensated for
validated and compensable delays by providing more detailed visibility
into the status of shipments.
Our operations focus foremost on effective support to the
warfighter; we constantly search for the best, most efficient methods
to provide seamless and responsive support. Many times, these
transparent efficiencies also result in increased effectiveness.
Deployment and Distribution Cost Based Decision Support (D2 CBDS)
practice ensures TRANSCOM and COCOM operational decisionmaking
incorporates cost consciousness with mission effectiveness through
vetted, standardized, and codified operational cost methodologies. D2
CBDS methodologies encompass end-to-end nodes and transportation legs.
To ensure second- and third-order effects are adequately considered,
all required stakeholders are engaged throughout the D2 CBDS process.
D2 CBDS has already produced significant cost avoidance, included under
our DPO Strategic Opportunities umbrella, through a number of emerging
efforts, including the Tankering Decision Matrix, monitored by the AMC
Fuel Efficiency Office, that informs the Tanker Airlift Control Center
when it is cost effective to carry fuel to downrange locations due to
the prohibitively high costs to deliver fuel in theater.
Going forward, the D2 CBDS Working Group composed of TRANSCOM
directorates, COCOMs, and network partners will provide rapid response
and subject matter expertise for emerging complex operational costing
opportunities.

TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND EXERCISES

TRANSCOM's participation in the Combatant Commanders Exercise
Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program directly
supports U.S. national security interests by ensuring joint force
readiness, increasing military capabilities, strengthening alliances
and partnerships, and retaining strategic access around the globe.
Maintaining freedom of action and global access is as much a
requirement for the functioning of our JDDE as it is for the conduct of
military operations and requires continuous engagement worldwide. CE2T2
enables this critical engagement; contributes to strategic and
logistical access for the U.S. Government; increases readiness across
combatant commands; and sustains partnerships with commercial industry
and our global core partners in order to provide reliable and seamless
logistical support at time of need. As we move forward with a refocus
on the Pacific and our forces become more contiguous United States-
based, we will see an even greater reliance on the CE2T2 program to
maintain our freedom of action and the readiness to project that force
to meet national security objectives. Maintaining the CE2T2 Program is
critical to TRANSCOM's readiness.

PLATFORM ENHANCEMENTS

Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) provides the capability to
load and discharge vessels in austere environments into Army and Navy
watercraft or lighterage, where ports are damaged, unavailable, or
inadequate or access is denied. Among the improvements JLOTS provides
is a telescopic crane system that has stabilization technology to
permit the selective retrieval of containers to be transferred between
vessels or lighterage even under heavy sea states. The second is an
interface module that will enhance Army Modular Causeway and the Navy
Improved Lighterage Systems, which have differing freeboards.
JLOTS operations are extremely complex and require a detailed
working knowledge of requirements, capabilities, and limitations among
the Services to successfully plan and execute. As part of our oversight
authority for JLOTS, this year we established the JLOTS Working Group
with the primary mission to facilitate and streamline the coordination
between Services and COCOMs and within the JLOTS community of interest.
This group will lead the review of JLOTS initiatives, doctrine, and
training as well as advocate for sustained JLOTS capabilities in
support of COCOM requirements. JLOTS and Service Logistics Over the
Shore capabilities continue to provide a necessary capability to
support combatant commanders.
Hybrid airships represent a transformational capability, bridging
the longstanding gap between high-speed, lower-capacity airlift, and
low-speed, higher-capacity sealift. Across the range of military
operations, this capability can be leveraged from strategic to tactical
distances. From swift crisis action support to enduring logistical
sustainment operations, hybrid airship technology has the potential to
fulfill ``factory to foxhole'' cargo delivery. We encourage development
of commercial technologies that may lead to enhanced mobility
capabilities in the future.

FINAL THOUGHTS

We are entrusted with the authority to lead and transform the Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise and the incredible
responsibility of serving the geographic combatant commanders as they
execute our Nation's most demanding military missions. To ensure that
we can repeat our successes of the past as we move into a dynamic,
resource-constrained future, we must transform the way that we manage
the enterprise and make significant cultural changes in the way that we
think, train, and execute our missions. Our strategic plan is guiding
us in this transformation so that we are postured to support our forces
worldwide with all available resources within the U.S. Government and
offered by our commercial partners. We will continue to challenge
ourselves to be ready for any contingency, peacetime or during
conflict, and to meet the needs of our warfighters across the globe. I
am extremely proud of the TRANSCOM team and our enterprise partners and
the fantastic work they do to support our national security objectives.
They know, better than anyone, that ``Together, we deliver!''

Chairman Levin. We'll start with an 8-minute first round.
General Ham, you made reference to a reduction in flight
hours, I believe, that have already been reduced as a result of
sequestration. Can you expand a bit on that?
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, most of our operations are
funded by the Services through the Service components, Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations, for
AFRICOM. In two of those components, Navy and Air Force, we
have had to constrain our flight operations because of the
Service component's funding challenges. Two specific examples:
I have asked my Air Force commander to maintain a heightened
alert posture with transport aircraft to be postured to move
crisis response forces more readily. That requires him to
sustain flight crews on a short leash, if you will, heightened
alert posture. That eats into their normal training and
sustainment flights and that's where the Air Force component is
having difficulty having sufficient money to do both of those
requirements.
On the Navy side, it's similar. I'd prefer, Mr. Chairman,
to give you the operational details in a classified setting.
But suffice to say that I've had to decrease the frequency of
some operational reconnaissance flights, again because of the
inability to fund the normal flight operations.
Chairman Levin. That's already taken place?
General Ham. It has, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Ham, there's been some adjustments to the AFRICOM
Commander's In-Extremis Force (CIF) and other contingency
response forces which hopefully will put you in a stronger
position to respond to a contingency. Have those changes
already been made and can you tell us what improvements might
be the result?
General Ham. The most notable change, Mr. Chairman, was on
the 1st of October a dedicated CIF was established for AFRICOM.
This was long in the planning, supported by Admiral McRaven and
those in U.S. Special Operations Command. The unit actually is
based in Colorado as part of the Tenth Special Forces Group.
They always have an element, the immediate response element,
forward deployed in Europe and have since October 1, where we
have stationed that force in a number of different places in
Europe.
There is still some work to be done. That force does not
yet have all of its enablers in terms of intelligence, aviation
support, and some other capabilities that we would like that
force to have. But it is a significant improvement from where
we were prior to the 1st of October, where the arrangement was
that I shared the CIF with Admiral Stavridis and U.S. European
Command (EUCOM).
The other Services have made similar improvements. The
Army's regionally aligned force, should there be an operational
requirement, I can go to the Secretary of Defense and ask to
use that force operationally, should that be necessary. General
Amos and the Marine Corps have proposed a new Marine Corps
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force specifically
tailored for crisis response in Africa, not yet formally
approved, but we think that that will be available in the
relatively near future. I'm most appreciative to General Amos
for making that force available.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, the forward element that you've made reference to
which is deployed in Europe, in your judgment is it able to get
to Africa more quickly actually from where it's deployed in
Europe than it would be if it were somehow deployed in Africa?
I know it sounds a little bit counterintuitive, but is it
actually not the case that you can actually get from,
particularly if it's in Italy or Southern Europe, to Africa
more quickly because of the capabilities and the infrastructure
than would be the case if you could find a location in Africa?
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, what we're seeking to do is use
the CIF along with two other forces to build a theater response
capability, with one element based in Djibouti where we do have
an enduring presence--that force is now stood up--one in
Southern Europe that could respond across Northern Africa, and
another in a site to be determined, but that would be
principally focused on response in West Africa. I think that
would give us a significantly improved posture from what we
have today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
On the cybersecurity issue, General Fraser, have you
experienced cyber attacks to the degree that I indicated in my
opening remarks? If so, with what effect? What are your plans
to address this threat?
General Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you've stated
in your remarks, we are--and as best as I can tell--continue to
be, the most attacked command. In fact, as I testified last
year, in 2011 we had nearly 45,000 attacks. This last year, in
2012, it actually had quadrupled. It is an area that we have
significant concerns about, but we have taken a lot of actions,
and it is not in one area. We're taking a holistic approach as
we work this specific issue.
If I might highlight just a couple of things.
Chairman Levin. Please.
General Fraser. First off is we had within the command a
number of what I would call touch points, by which industry and
others can come into the command and they could connect with
us. Our objective was to develop more of what we term a secure
enclave and collapsing that network so that there were fewer
touch points in order to get into the command. This would
enhance our abilities to have a defensive posture, so that if
people were trying to get into our network we would be able to
see it, and we could defend it. We have been successful in
that, as we have collapsed this to fewer touch points and have
not had any significant intrusions into our network.
Another area that we're working on very closely is with our
commercial partners. We have moved out in a very deliberate
manner with commercial partners and have actually held three
forums this last year where we brought in other agencies, to
include law enforcement and others, with Chief Executive
Officers and Chief Information Officers who actually came to
TRANSCOM, and we focused on this cyberthreat that is there.
These forums were very well-attended, upwards of nearly 100
each time that we held these conferences.
We were able to brief them in, to give them some
information that they did not have before, and allowed them to
further go back and take a look at their networks and how they
are working with us.
From that came an agreement, in working with our partners,
that we began to write into our contracts the need for more
cyber awareness/cybersecurity. So what we started doing was,
last year in the spring time, writing into our contracts the
need for us to have an understanding of what their information
assurance plan is. We were not directive in this but we wanted
to know, ``what are you doing to protect your network?''
Also in that contract, we stated that we wanted to have an
agreement as a part of a collaborative nature to know when
their networks were--in which they had activity that got into
their network--either having data that was exfilled from their
network or if they had someone in that was playing with their
data. So we made sure that we had in the contracts that we
would have this reporting that would come back to us.
When we get those types of reports, then we have a process
and procedure by which we would ensure that law enforcement is
advised, that we would offer any assistance that we have, and
then we would stand up a team to determine what impact this
might have had to our operations.
The other things that we have continued to do is to reach
out to other agencies to ensure that we're not missing anything
in the defense of our network. So it's a collaborative nature
in working with all of our partners, collapsing the network to
a secure enclave, and then writing it into our contracts to
better understand what the threat may be.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. If you could
furnish to the committee some examples of that contract
language, not necessarily with the names of the contractors,
just the actual kind of language which you're incorporating
relative to cyber attacks in your contracts, we would
appreciate it if you would do that.
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish
procedures requiring cleared defense contractors to report to DOD when
a covered network of a contractor is successfully penetrated. The
implicit objective of this section is to provide DOD with greater
visibility into adversary cyber activity on cleared defense
contractors' networks and information systems. Since U.S.
Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) cyber contract initiative only
provides visibility into contractors doing direct business with
TRANSCOM, the section 941 initiative may provide the command with
additional information in which to understand the adversary's
intentions, objectives, and capabilities. The command is awaiting DOD
implementation of section 941. At this time, TRANSCOM does not require
any additional cyber assistance from the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
We have separate cybersecurity language for transportation
contracts and nontransportation contracts. The same language goes in
all transportation contracts. [See ``Transportation Contract Cyber
Language'' document.]
There are three levels of cybersecurity language for
nontransportation contracts: Basic Language, Standard Language, and
Advanced Language. TRANSCOM, in conjunction with our customers,
determines which level of language is necessary for a particular
contract. [See ``Non-transportation Contract Cyber Language''
document.]
TRANSCOM includes the cyber language in newly issued contracts and
notifies the offerors during solicitation. [See ``Transportation
Solicitations Instructions to Offerors Cyber Language'' document.]

Chairman Levin. Also, you are aware, I believe, that we
included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013--it was section 941, which requires
certain contractors to report to DOD about penetrations of
covered networks and information systems. If you could, after
using that or reviewing that language, if you would let us know
if there's anything else that we need to do to be helpful to
you in your efforts, please let us know.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir. We will, and we look
forward to the Secretary's guidance in accordance with the
language as written.
Chairman Levin. Very good. Thank you so much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start off with something a little unpleasant, but it
deserves to be brought up, I think, over and over again, even
though the media doesn't care about it, the whole Benghazi
thing. It's incontrovertible right now that the second attack,
the one on the annex, was one that was premeditated, it's one
that was a terrorist-coordinated attack. We knew that the day
after. At the very latest it would have been on the 12th
(September 2012) that we knew that. Everybody knew that.
They've even testified before this committee that they knew.
Yet, this administration sent out Ambassador Susan Rice to
lie to the American people and say that this is something that
was a response to a video. All that's behind us now. I think
it's going to go down in history as one of the really great
cover-ups. That's beyond us, and again, the press doesn't care.
It's really disturbing to me.
But this thing just doesn't go away. Yesterday, CBS came up
with some documents and I'll read just two sentences from this
release: ``The documents viewed by Intelligence Committee
members indicated numerous other changes were made to the
talking points, including the removal of certain references on
the attacks.''
Now, what they're talking about here and why this is
different, all this stuff happened before the attack, saying it
was going to happen.
``The source who reviewed the documents also flagged
several emails prior to Benghazi attacks from the officials in
Libya to Washington that supposedly specifically warned of an
imminent attack within days before this attack.''
I only bring this up to ask you the question--I don't
believe them, but I do believe you, General Ham. I've gotten to
know you very well. We've worked closer together probably than
you have with any other member on your AOR. Let's assume this
is right. Did anyone tell you prior to this, as the AFRICOM
Commander, that they were predicting this was going to happen?
General Ham. Sir, I've looked at the intelligence over and
over and, while clearly the situation in Benghazi was worrying,
I do not find intelligence that----
Senator Inhofe. They didn't tell you----
General Ham. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--what I'm reading right now? They didn't
tell you?
General Ham. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I believe you. I believe you.
All right. I'd like to ask both of you this question. In my
opening statement I talked about sequestration, and how
critical this is because it's on the heels of an expanded
budget that would take us down by $487 billion and so we're all
concerned about it. So 6 weeks ago, I talked to the commands,
all six of them, and asked them the question that in the event
it becomes inevitable--and I didn't think it would; at that
time we had, in fact, Senator McCain and I and several other of
the Senators here, said that we thought there was a way to do
this where it could have been less of a threat.
But I said at that time, in the event we're wrong and that
they end up having to do this, wouldn't it be better to take
that same top line and work within that so that the commanders
would be in a position to make those adjustments, as opposed to
just a formula that cuts across. They all said yes, it would.
Do you two agree with them?
General Ham. I do, Senator.
General Fraser. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General Fraser, I don't quite understand how this works.
There's not going to be time for you to explain it, but
TRANSCOM and its components are paid for their Services by
their customers, the Service components and other agencies. Are
they finding themselves strapped to the point where you're not
getting the adequate funding through this very unique mechanism
that you would really need to do the job to your expectations?
General Fraser. Senator, as of right now, we are a Working
Capital Fund, the Transportation Working Capital Fund.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, Working Capital Fund.
General Fraser. We generate revenue. They have the
resources and then we accomplish the mission that they task us
to do. Then they pay for that service that is provided.
Senator Inhofe. Does that put you in a position where
you're not really in the same strapped situation that many of
the other Services are?
General Fraser. Sir, I am in a strapped situation because
over time the Working Capital Fund has been drawn down. I am
directed to have 7 to 10 days of Working Capital Fund available
to me in order to be able to respond in a timely manner and,
having those resources with all the authorities and
responsibilities that I do, I can execute operations and then I
go back later and get paid. What has been happening though is
coupled with the closure of the Pakistan border and actually
having to execute different routes that have been more
expensive, those bills have been higher and we've been relying
on the Working Capital Fund. This is one example that's been
drawing down the fund.
The Services also have other problems in paying their
Service-level bills and things of that nature, therefore
drawing down the Working Capital Fund. So we are seeing some
issues there.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Ham, you and I have talked about this before. We
did something pretty smart on this committee way back on
September 11 or shortly after that when we recognized, with the
squeeze that's going on in the Middle East and a lot of the
terrorist activity going down through Djibouti and the Horn of
Africa, to assist the Africans, not to do something for them,
but to assist them in building their five African brigades.
It started off, as was anticipated--at least in my mind it
was--and then it seems to have slowed down. I know you have the
same commitment to complete those standby brigades, but are you
getting there as fast as we ought to get there?
General Ham. We are not, Senator. Each of the five regional
economic communities of the African Union has a plan to
establish a regional standby force. Those plans have not
progressed in some cases in any material way, and today, none
of the five regions has, in my military view, the capability
that they ought have to be able to respond in short order to
regional crises.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's right. I know that the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was among
the first ones, and a lot of that was under the leadership of
President John Kufuor, former President of the Fourth Republic
of Ghana. They were a little bit ahead. But it hasn't reach
that, and I regret that you're going to be stepping down in
April and will be replaced by General Rodriguez, and we're
going to be trying to give new attention to that.
The LRA, any update you'd like to give us on that? I'd like
to mention--I think I did in my opening statement--that a lot
of people think this is just one guy that's mutilating kids and
that was true the first time that I saw the product of his
labor, where they would cut the ears and the noses off those
little kids and force them to kill their parents and all that.
That has expanded into a major terrorist group. So I think it's
one that has gotten little pockets of followers around now
where it's not quite one general unit.
Are you satisfied that we're doing what we should be doing?
I think your answer is going to be yes because I know you're
working very hard on it. Any comments on that?
General Ham. Senator, the work does continue. Again, as I
mentioned in my opening comments, I think it is a pretty good
model of a way in which we can provide, for lack of a better
term, unique U.S. military capabilities to enable an African
force. We do a lot of intelligence. We help them with funding
for rotary and fixed wing aircraft, mobility, information-
sharing, communications leaflets that have elicited numerous
defections and the like.
Just in terms of money, sir, over the last year we've spent
$138 million on counter-LRA, expected to be about $157 million
this year. It's not an inexpensive proposition, but in terms of
achieving the desired state of minimizing the effectiveness of
the LRA, bringing Kony to justice, and simultaneously building
the capacity of the African forces, I think we're doing okay.
Senator Inhofe. I do, too. I think you're doing a great job
there. While you say it's not cheap, it is pretty cheap when
you consider the other operations that are going on. You might
occasionally have a helicopter or something like that, but it's
primarily intelligence, communications, and coordination. I
think you're doing a great job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me thank and commend General Ham for his
extraordinary service to the Nation and the Army. You've done a
remarkable job, sir, and we thank you. I know foremost in your
thoughts has always been the men and women you lead, and it's
been evident in your contribution to the Nation. Thank you,
sir.
Let me ask a question. First, with the collapse of the
Qadafi regime in Libya and turmoil in the Maghreb, there has
been the fear that weapons, particularly the Manportable Air-
Defense Systems (MANPADS), are filtering through and
proliferating. Can you give us a sense in open session of your
take on that particular issue?
General Ham. I would, Senator. The details probably ought
to be in a separate session, but it's very clear that in the
collapse of the Qadafi regime, weapons, MANPADS, crew-served
weapons, individual weapons, explosives, have gone really in
two directions. We thought initially that most would transit
into northern Mali and we certainly have seen significant
evidence that that has been the case. AQIM, other
organizations, are significantly better armed now than they
were before.
What we didn't see quite so quickly, but now believe
certainly to be the case, is movement of weapons in the other
direction, some of which we believe have ended up in Syria.
General Mattis is more qualified to speak on that than I am,
but certainly that proliferation of weapons, I think, poses a
continuing destabilizing effect across the region.
Senator Reed. Not just the United States, but the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and all of our allies have a
proactive program to interdict these systems and to, obviously,
prevent their dispersal?
General Ham. Senator, there is a multifaceted approach for
the U.S. Government, principally led by the State Department in
terms of strengthening border security and helping the host
nations deal with this. There's a small component that is a
weapons buyback program. We have a small role along with others
in the U.S. Government to facilitate that program. I would
characterize it as having, frankly, modest success. Still, many
thousands, particularly of the MANPADS that we believe existed
in Libya prior to the revolution, remain unaccounted for.
Senator Reed. This leads to another issue, too, is that in
your mission in Africa a great deal depends on local
governance, policing borders, interdicting weapons. That role
is a shared role, not only with you, with the Department of
State, with nongovernmental organizations in certain cases. We
frequently talk about the impact of sequester and other budget
restrictions on DOD operations. Are you seeing significant
impacts on your State Department and those non-DOD assets that
you depend upon?
General Ham. Not yet, Senator. We haven't seen it manifest
itself. But clearly if sequester continues for the balance of
this year, I believe that there will be some very real
consequences in what our brethren at State are able to deliver.
Senator Reed. That will have an impact on issues like we
just talked about?
General Ham. Yes, sir, certainly.
Senator Reed. Let me ask just another final question with
respect to Mali. We engaged over the course of several years in
trying to develop a professional military force in Mali. We did
tactical training, we had Special Operations Forces troops
there, et cetera. Then there was a coup. We talked with General
Rodriguez about this. As we go forward, we're going to have to
continue to partner with indigenous forces, but we also have to
emphasize the proper role of the military.
Can you comment upon that, since you observed some of the
effects of our training and our lack of training when it came
to the roles of government?
General Ham. Yes, sir, certainly. In Mali both good and
bad, I suspect. The unit with which we were primarily engaged
was not a unit that participated in the coup. It was the
parachute regiment, which was actually repressed by those who
did lead the coup. But we did have interaction with others in
the Malian Government, in the Malian military.
My greatest disappointment is the senior leaders in the
former Malian military with whom we interacted, while they
didn't support the military coup, they took no action to resist
it. I think there are some lessons learned in that for us, that
in our training, as you mentioned, Senator, we have to focus
not only on technical and tactical training, but more on values
and the professionalism that is required of a military in a
democratic society. We can improve and need to improve in our
engagement in that area.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Fraser, Senator Levin and I were in Afghanistan and
Pakistan about 6 weeks ago and I got the impression that the
retrograde operations are picking up momentum significantly.
The Pakistan ground lines of communication (PAKGLOC) was
opening up in Pakistan. Can you comment on where we are in
terms of that retrograde operation?
General Fraser. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. It is
continuing to accelerate. We have multiple lanes that we're
able to use out of Afghanistan now because of the agreements
that have been struck with a number of different nations. The
proofs of principle that we have executed are showing us that
we have the right process, we have the right procedures in
place. Do we have the level of velocity that we want to have?
Not yet. It will continue to improve as time goes on.
I was in Pakistan last month and had very good discussions
with them. Shortly after that, with all the agreements in
place, and all the processes for getting the right permits, it
was not long after that, that we executed our first proof of
principle of exporting items from Afghanistan. It was
containers initially. The process went very smoothly. The
containers arrived down in Karachi. The next level that we're
going to work is some wheeled armored vehicles.
So that is continuing to move in the right direction. I am
encouraged by what I am seeing. I am also encouraged by what's
going in. When the border closed, the Karachi port was full of
over 7,000 pieces of equipment, containers, things of this
nature. We are at less than 2,000 now. We have been moving that
into Afghanistan since last year and it continues to get
better.
We also did a new import process by which we moved some
containers that were shipped in the local area into Karachi.
This is going to open up the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
equipment that has been held in a couple of locations, and just
last week we sent a booking notice to our commercial partners
that we're going to start booking more cargo for the FMS
equipment.
Additionally, in the agreement we agreed that we will not
take a pause at the border crossings; we'll continue to ramp
up, and we've continued to increase the number of bookings that
will come as far as exports go. I'm encouraged by what I'm
seeing, especially on this last visit out there, that the
capacity is built. We need to now continue to accelerate the
velocity.
Senator Reed. Thank you much, sir, and thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses. General Ham,
I'd like to echo the views of my colleagues and the American
people in thanking you for your outstanding service to the
country. I'm sure you feel some sense of relief from not having
to appear before this committee again.
General Ham and General Fraser, very briefly, we talk about
the sequestration effects on our ability and our readiness and
our capabilities. What is the effect the you're seeing and
foresee that we will see on the morale and eventually retention
of the men and women who are serving today of this profound
uncertainty that affects their lives?
General Ham. Senator, you captured exactly the right word.
It is uncertainty in both the military ranks and in our
civilian workforce. They're not sure what to expect of their
government. The looming threat of furlough for our civilian
employees; for our military members and for their families, the
programs that this committee and this Congress have supported,
will those be sustained.
I don't think we yet understand what effect this
uncertainty may have in the recruiting and retention of our
civilian workforce and perhaps even more importantly, on the
recruiting and retention of what, I think, is the crown jewel
in all of this, and that's the sustainment of the incredibly
talented All-Volunteer Force we have. I think there are a lot
more unknowns right now, sir, than knowns.
Senator McCain. But there could be some--all of that could
be in some jeopardy?
General Ham. I believe it is, sir.
Senator McCain. General Fraser?
General Fraser. I would agree with General Ham. We hear
this from our workforce, both the military and the civilians.
Most certainly I would highlight our civilian workforce and the
significant concerns that they have at this time of a potential
furlough.
The loss of potentially 20 percent of their income between
April and the end of September is undue burden and undue stress
upon them and their family members. It also goes into other
areas about security from a perspective of their job. The
reason I highlight this is because the workforce has begun
talking to us that if they have issues with financial
obligations and we understand the fact that they have security
clearances and financial responsibility is a piece of that.
This could be an unintended consequence of that.
Now, there are ways to adjudicate that, but I think it
shows this uncertainty, the concern and the stress that's upon
our family members and the other things that General Ham----
Senator McCain. So over time both you and General Ham agree
this could affect morale and retention and over time,
recruitment?
General Fraser. Yes, sir, I agree.
General Ham. I do, sir.
Senator McCain. General Ham, prior to the attack in Libya
were you aware of the multiple attacks against western
interests in Benghazi, including the British ambassador, the
Red Cross, the U.S. consulate, and the British pulled their
mission out of Benghazi and the Red Cross suspended operations?
Were you aware of all of that?
General Ham. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So what was your assessment of the threat?
General Ham. That the threat in Benghazi and more broadly--
--
Senator McCain. In Benghazi?
General Ham.--in eastern Libya it was growing, that there
was a renewed presence of extremist organizations that posed a
threat, not only to western interests, as exhibited by these
attacks, but also to the fledgling Libyan Government.
Senator McCain. Did you recommend any changes in force
posture or alert status based on this threat picture,
particularly on the date of September 11?
General Ham. Sir, as 11 September approached and there were
the obvious concerns of the anniversary event, we did posture
Marine Corps forces afloat in West Africa, Fleet Antiterrorism
Support Teams in Southern Europe, the personnel recovery team
with aviation at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and we ensured
that we had access to the shared EUCOM-AFRICOM CIF, which was
at that point based in Europe.
Senator McCain. But, General Ham, 7\1/2\ hours went by and
we were unable to get any forces there. As you are well aware,
two of the Americans were killed in the last hour. That doesn't
seem to me that you had forces there capable of responding.
Certainly they didn't respond.
General Ham. Sir, they didn't. As I replayed the events of
that evening over and over in my mind, when the first attack
commenced and then essentially ended shortly, about an hour or
so after it began, I didn't know at that point that there was
going to be a second attack. If I could turn the clock back I'd
do it differently.
Senator McCain. I say with respect that if an attack had
taken place, that already we didn't know the whereabouts of the
Ambassador at that time, it seems to me that would bring some
urgency to getting some forces there.
Did you discuss this with Secretary Panetta or General
Dempsey or the President during these attacks?
General Ham. We did, sir. I happened to be in Washington
that day and did meet personally with General Dempsey and with
then-Secretary Panetta shortly after the first attack began.
Senator McCain. Were any of your recommendations, were you
told not to execute?
General Ham. No, sir. I requested forces be placed on alert
both overseas and in the contiguous United States. The Chairman
and the Secretary approved that.
Senator McCain. Did you believe at the time that, given the
nature of the weapons used in this attack, that it was a
coordinated terrorist attack?
General Ham. In the first attack, I will admit during, as
the events were unfolding, it was unclear to me. But it became
clear within a matter of a few hours that this was a terrorist
attack, at least in my opinion.
Senator McCain. See, this is the conundrum we face here, is
that you and General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta all
testified that they knew right away that it was a terrorist
attack. Yet the American people literally for weeks, at least 2
weeks, were told we don't know. This disconnect between the
assessment that you, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
then-Secretary of Defense all immediately concluded, as those
of us who are not nearly as knowledgeable as you are, because
we don't believe that people bring rocket-propelled grenades
and mortars to spontaneous demonstrations--for 2 weeks in the
height of a presidential campaign, the American people were
told by the President of the United States, ``We don't know.''
Of course we did know. Of course we did know. That's why
some people are a little bit offended that some of us continue
to pursue this issue. Four people died and four people's
families deserve to know exactly what happened and what
transpired. Particularly again two of those brave Americans
died in the last hour of a 7\1/2\ hour attack.
So it seems to me that, given September 11th, given the
warnings, given the entire situation, why we were unable with
all the forces--you just enumerated so many of them--that we
have in the region, we were unable to get forces there in order
to save especially the last two individuals' lives, is
something that I think the American people deserve to know.
I thank you both.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ham, would you want to respond to that? I'd be glad
to hear that.
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, if it's okay.
Yes, sir, as I began to say, Senator McCain, that that
night stays with me, as I know it does with you and with
others. As I said, we didn't know that there was going to be a
second attack and we thought, frankly, that after what we felt
was the culmination of the attack at the Special Mission
Facility, that frankly the effort now shifted to recovery of
Ambassador Stevens, who was then the lone unaccounted for
American.
Again, in the context of then, not now, with the dispatch
of the small team from Tripoli to Benghazi, we thought
assurances from the Libyans, which obviously proved to not be
fulfilled, that that recovery mission was going to proceed in
good order. It did not.
Sir, if I could turn the clock back, I would make different
decisions based on what I know now as opposed to what I knew
then.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General, for that very candid
response. Again, I thank you for your service and we're very
grateful for it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To General Ham and General Fraser, thank you for your
service. General Ham, thank you so much for everything you've
done for our country in your career.
General Ham, has the AFRICOM region become as central a
center for terrorist activities as the CENTCOM region has been?
General Ham. Sir, I don't think it quite yet rises to that
level, but it certainly is trending in that direction.
Senator Donnelly. As you look at it, do you see it as an
increasingly, as you said, growing area, that we may look at
this in a few years and see this as equal to or more even than
the CENTCOM region at this time?
General Ham. It's hard to predict in the future,
Senator. Remember that it is in the CENTCOM region
that is the home of al Qaeda. I don't see any indication
that al Qaeda main, if you will, or al Qaeda's senior
leadership seeks to reposition to Africa. But certainly their
associates and affiliates and an increasing number of people
who adopt that al Qaeda ideology are present in Africa.
Senator Donnelly. Now, as we look at lessons learned from
Afghanistan and Iraq, is our plan in AFRICOM--you talked about
the five regional forces that are developing over there between
the countries on the military side--is our plan to have them
stand up and be the main force, with us guiding behind the
scenes, in the AFRICOM region?
General Ham. Sir, countering the effects of these violent
extremist organizations, terrorist organizations, has to be a
very broad approach. There is a military component and that's
what I am principally engaged with. But I recognize that the
military component will not be decisive. There is a military
component that has to contribute to security and stability, but
it really is the U.S. Government's interaction with African
nations and regional organizations to address the underlying
causes. Good governance, economic development, health care,
education, all of those programs, I think, will have a longer
and more lasting effect. But the military component helps set
the conditions under which those longer-term operations and
activities can take place.
Senator Donnelly. As we look at this, I know the French
have a presence in Mali. Are we primarily on our own other than
that, or are other nations in there with us?
General Ham. Senator, there are a number of nations, both
African and from outside the region, who are contributing in
meaningful ways to the operations in Mali. A number of European
countries have pledged training through the European Union and
also bilateral relationships. Many of them are already on the
ground in Mali and in other West African countries.
I think in principle there is broad agreement that, while
the initial reaction and operation by France was necessary,
this must transition to an African-led activity as quickly as
the conditions allow. I think that's the next transition point.
Senator Donnelly. Are we the point of the spear in
coordinating all the other nations on these efforts?
General Ham. No, sir, we're not. The ECOWAS is the
principal coordinating organization. We and many other nations
are supporting ECOWAS in their efforts.
Senator Donnelly. How do we increase as we look at this the
chance for success of those regional armies? You had talked
about they are not where we had hoped they would be and we look
toward a path forward. How do they stand up quicker, better,
more successfully?
General Ham. I think it requires a multi-pronged approach.
Part of it is our bilateral efforts and the bilateral efforts
of other contributing nations, many of which are in Europe, but
increasingly Brazil and India and others, to build the
capabilities of individual African states. But there has to be,
in my view, a more focused and coordinated effort from the
African Union directing the regional economic communities and
establishing standards and expectations for the regional
standby forces. I think that principally is a diplomatic effort
in engaging the African Union.
But I am encouraged because there is for the first time a
Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the
U.S. Government that formalizes our relationship. So I'm
hopeful that we can make some progress in the near-term.
Senator Donnelly. Do we have metrics as we look forward?
There's no guarantee you can hit numbers or plans or whatever,
but here's where we hope to be next year in Africa, here's
where we hope to be the following year, here's where we hope
this to have expanded in 5 years, so that we can start to turn
the tide back on this.
General Ham. Sir, we at AFRICOM have developed each year
and refine each year, in concert with the U.S. ambassadors,
what we call a country plan that does, in fact, establish
specific programs with measurables, that says where do we want
to go. We don't yet have that same kind of arrangement with the
regional organizations and I think that's a next step for us.
Senator Donnelly. General Fraser, you had talked about
cybersecurity before in regards to TRANSCOM. Do you know the
source of the cyber attacks that are taking place?
General Fraser. Sir, a number of them are scanning the
network, they're just hackers trying to come in. So we see a
myriad of attacks. There is also some advanced persistent
attacks out there that we continue to defend against.
Senator Donnelly. Are any of these of country of origin
elsewhere that you know of?
General Fraser. Sir, we continue to do the analysis on the
various threats that we have out there and some of these are
passed over actually to another agency to delve deeper into
that because of the sophistication that is used.
Senator Donnelly. In working with our contractors and
suppliers, is there or have you detected any effort that these
cyber attacks using the contractors and suppliers to be a back
door into your systems?
General Fraser. Sir, I've had one report where we are
working with a company, but that was principally a download of
data and activity that occurred on their network. It was not a
back door attack into us.
Senator Donnelly. General Ham, in regards to Benghazi, one
of the great concerns of everyone, including you and everyone
else, has been the time it took for response. So as we look
forward, are there plans being made with State, with the
consuls, with the embassies, to see how we can reduce that time
level before you are there?
General Ham. Those discussions are underway, Senator, in a
number of different ways. One, is should there be an increased
presence of Marine Corps security guards at diplomatic
facilities in Africa and other places around the globe. That
discussion continues.
But I think the fundamental discussion that's occurring
between Department of State and DOD and, in fact, more broadly
across the government is the fundamental nature of DOD's
security role with regard to diplomatic presence. The primary
responsibility has been with the host nation, and if we're
going to alter that that has some consequences. If we're going
to posture forces that can respond in crisis on very short
timelines in a geographic area as large as Africa, then that
also has some consequences.
We've taken some initial steps in that, as I outlined, in
terms of having an east, west, and north response force. But
even that, the distances involved, and the times involved,
preclude response within an hour or so. This will take us, I
think, some further study and some hard choices, some hard
resourcing choices, about how quickly must DOD be postured to
respond in response to a State requirement.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you both very much. General Ham,
again, thank you for all the years of service to our men and
women.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today.
General Ham, I'm concerned about the threats in Africa as
we see them growing and they continue to grow. With the
reductions in funding that we've talked about here, do you
believe that we're going to have to start to rethink our
strategy and maybe look for more direct involvement by the
United States in that area?
General Ham. Senator, I think with sequestration I do
believe we will have to revisit the Defense Strategic Guidance
of January 2012. I don't know that that will necessarily shift
us to a strategy that gives primacy to U.S. intervention as
opposed to building partner capacity and reliance upon other
nations. That'll be a difficult choice to make. It's perhaps
faster for us to respond, but in the longer-term, I think that
increases the demands on U.S. military forces, rather than what
we seek to do through building partner capacity is to
eventually reduce the demand, the global demand for U.S.
forces, by increasing the capabilities of others.
Senator Fischer. What areas do you think that we need to
start to focus on? If we are looking at cuts then, besides the
partnerships, what areas? I believe that General Rodriguez
testified before the committee that he felt we needed to see
increases in surveillance, aircraft, satellite imagery. Do you
agree with that assessment or where would you look to change
the focus then?
General Ham. Senator, I would agree. The most significant
shortfall I have at present and projected into the future is
ISR, the ability to see, know, and understand the operating
environment. So I think that shortfall will continue to have
the greatest impact on the command.
Senator Fischer. Do you see other areas where we need to
focus on as well?
General Ham. I think one of the programs I like a lot that
this committee and Congress have supported are the so-called
dual key authorities that DOD and Department of State, that
those two Secretaries can control together in an effort to help
build partner capacity in nations. I think that's an area where
we can probably operate more efficiently and with greater
prioritization.
I think in general, Senator, that's what the budget
constraints are going to cause us to do, is to take a much
sharper prioritization to our military-to-military engagements
in Africa. There are some exercises and other training
opportunities that we have been doing in past years that,
frankly, will probably fall by the wayside.
Second, I think it will drive us to an increased
multinational approach to building partner capacity, as opposed
to our exclusively, almost exclusively, bilateral building
partner capacity activities, to date.
Senator Fischer. Senator Inhofe and Senator Donnelly both
alluded to this, and you answered in response to their
questions about your timing, being able to respond to crisis
within your command. As we see terrorist networks overlapping
across commands, how do you think the coordination works
between the regional commands that we currently have today, and
is that going to help us at all in responding quicker to
crises?
General Ham. We have some good examples recently in our
collaboration with both CENTCOM and EUCOM. The Secretary of
Defense has given us in Djibouti and Yemen some authorities to
do very rapid sharing of forces between the two combatant
commands, though the geographic boundary exists right there.
That allows General Mattis and I to very quickly transition a
capability, a military capability that was dedicated to me, to
operate in support of him in Yemen or someplace else, or vice
versa.
I think we will need more of that kind of flexibility
because the threats that we face, of course, don't respect our
boundaries. They work transnationally and regionally. We have
to be increasingly flexible in applying our authorities and our
capabilities across those boundaries.
But I'm encouraged, Senator, by the direction in which
we're moving.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
General Fraser, thank you for coming to my office to visit
with me. I appreciated the information that you provided.
You said that the number of attacks has increased fourfold
in the last year, is that correct?
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am, that's correct.
Senator Fischer. You talked about the collaborative nature
that you have with regards to those cyber attacks with private
sector partners, correct?
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. This interaction with your private sector
partners, do you believe that's the most effective way to share
information, and is it a good approach to take?
General Fraser. Ma'am, that's not the only thing that we're
doing. As I mentioned earlier, in coordination with the newly
stood-up cyber center that we have on our operations floor in
what we call the fusion center, this neighborhood watch
capability that we have, where everyone is working together in
a collaborative nature, is actually enhancing us all, from our
commercial partners as well as us just in TRANSCOM, in our
ability to maintain the connectivity that we need to accomplish
our job.
So it's all of that working together that is making us as
effective as we are. Why we're able to get together and work
this in a collaborative nature is because everybody understands
the importance of it. So I am encouraged by what we're doing.
We continue to move forward in a partnership with them and
sharing this information.
Senator Fischer. Why are you such a prime target?
General Fraser. I believe it's because 90 percent of what
we do is on the unclassified network. We do have a number of
things that we can do from sensitive operations or movement of
sensitive or classified cargo. We do that on the SIPRNET, on
the high side, and through other means. But because of how much
business that we do with industry and with our commercial
partners, that's done on the unclassified side. So, therefore,
I also think that's one reason.
Another reason is, too, because there's no other nation
that can do what we do and do it the way we do it in order to
deploy, sustain, and then redeploy our troops and respond in a
timely manner for support of a humanitarian crisis to save
lives, decrease human suffering, or respond to a crisis in
another region where we've supported other combatant commands.
So I believe there's a learning that others want to know.
As I visit other countries and I talk to them about it,
they don't have a transportation command. They don't have the
collaborative nature that we have here as we reach across and
we are actually developing a global campaign plan for
distribution which synchronizes across all the combatant
commands, to be able to be agile, flexible, and responsive with
our forces. So I think there's a learning that's also going on
to get an understanding as well as they try to collect the
data.
Senator Fischer. Just briefly now, without the investment
of TRANSCOM, are your private sector partners viable? If not,
what happens?
General Fraser. There's significant concern in the industry
right now and we are working through both the land, air, and
maritime executive working groups to understand what the
future's going to look like. Because of the budget uncertainty
that we have with a CR, we see that we are not doing the level
of work that we had anticipated, programmed, and forecast for
the future. So when the 2013 budget was built, rates were
built, they expected a certain amount of business, both
organically and with respect to all the Services, but they're
under pressure, and so the inability to do things such as
exercises that have been changed, revamped, and consolidated.
There's also a further reduction that's going to be taken
with sequestration. So this lack of predictability, the lack of
flexibility that's there, they are feeling the pinch. They have
come to me and they've talked to me, which is why we're
bringing this into the executive working groups to make sure
that we're all on the same sheet of music and have the same
understanding of what the business is going to look like for
the future.
That lack of predictability and stability right now creates
great uncertainty. We have already had, as a result of the
change in operations in Iraq, all very positive, but because
the capacity that had been built on the air side of the
business, we have had several companies that have actually had
to go into bankruptcy and into restructure. There is one that
has had to shut their doors. They are no longer in the
business.
There is also concern in the maritime industry now as the
amount of cargo that we're moving starts to come down. So
they're looking to shift their business into different lanes
and going into different areas.
The other impact as a second-, third-order effect is
potentially, because of the high cost of crews, there has been
some discussion about reflagging some of the ships from U.S.
flags, and this could result in a change-out of the crews as
well. So, there is concern across all the industries.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Thanks to Senator King for his courtesies.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. I want, ought to thank Senator King, too.
We have a markup in Judiciary about the assault weapons ban,
which is obviously an important topic to everyone in the
country. I'm going to try to get to that. But Senator King,
thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to
go out of order here.
General Ham, thank you for your service to our country. I
want to get right into some questions I think are important, at
least in my mind.
Do you know a Lieutenant Colonel Wood?
General Ham. Sir, I've met him briefly, and yes, I do know
who he is.
Senator Graham. He was assigned to the site security team
in Benghazi, Libya. Is that correct General?
General Ham. In Tripoli, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. In Tripoli, a 16-person team providing
additional security to our Ambassador and our State Department
officials in Libya. Is that correct?
General Ham. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Graham. He says that he reported to you three times
a week or someone in your command through video
teleconferencing about the situation in Libya. Is that an
accurate statement?
General Ham. Partially, sir. The special security team, a
DOD entity, operated exclusively under what we call Chief of
Mission authority, meaning, they took all of their direction
from the Chief of Mission.
Senator Graham. Right. They were under their operational
control. But he told you or your command what was going on in
Libya; is that correct?
General Ham. Yes, sir. There was frequent communication.
Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, I want to compliment
your organization for informing the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. My point is that through
Lieutenant Colonel Wood's interaction with your command, he was
able to know of the August 16 cable from Ambassador Stevens
telling the State Department: ``We cannot defend the consulate
if attacked in a coordinated way.'' Secretary Panetta and
General Dempsey said that they knew of all the communications
coming out of Libya to the State Department regarding the
threat environment in Benghazi and Libya, in general. I think
that has a lot to do with your command, I want to compliment
you on that.
Do you have any idea how the Secretary of Defense could
have known of the reporting from the State Department about the
threat condition in Benghazi and the Secretary of State be
unaware?
General Ham. Sir, I don't have any insight into that.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Just for the record, Lieutenant Colonel Wood requested an
extension to go past August 2012 to help the Ambassador. The
Ambassador wanted his team to stay there. Would you have
approved that request if it had come before you?
General Ham. Sir, it would not have been mine to approve,
but----
Senator Graham. Would you have supported the request?
General Ham. I would and I did, and I explained that to
Ambassador Stevens, that if there were a request to extend the
team, we at AFRICOM were prepared to do so.
Senator Graham. He was sent home in August, at the same
time these cables were coming from our Ambassador, that we
cannot defend the consulate from a coordinated attack.
Lieutenant Colonel Wood said on October 12 to Congress it
was only a matter of time until we were attacked. We were the
last flag flying. So hats off to Lieutenant Colonel Wood.
Do you know a Representative Jason Chaffetz?
General Ham. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. He visited you on October 5 at your
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Do you recall that visit?
General Ham. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. You went together on October 6 to Tripoli
to visit the Embassy Country Team. Do you recall that visit?
General Ham. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you recall him asking you what military
assets you ordered deployed to Libya once you learned that the
Embassy's Special Mission Compound in Benghazi was under
attack? According to Representative Chaffetz, you responded
that you could have deployed assets; however, it was not
requested. Do you recall saying that?
General Ham. Not in those specific terms, Senator. I recall
having a discussion about the forces that were available, the
forces I requested of Secretary of Defense be placed on
heightened alert, in some cases----
Senator Graham. Did you ever recommend to Secretary
Panetta, General Dempsey, the President, or anyone in authority
to move assets into Libya?
General Ham. Yes, sir, and they approved that and the teams
did move.
Senator Graham. So what was the closest team?
General Ham. The team that was best postured to move was
the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team in Rota.
Senator Graham. So when did they begin to move?
General Ham. I don't know precisely when they began to
move. They arrived in Tripoli about 24 hours after the attack.
Senator Graham. I guess my point--were fighter aircraft
available in Aviano that could have gotten into Libya within 24
hours?
General Ham. They could have been, sir. I did not so
request----
Senator Graham. Did you ever suggest that we deploy any
military asset quicker than 24 hours?
General Ham. I did not. I considered, but did not request
the deployment of fighter aircraft.
Senator Graham. Did anybody ever ask you, General Ham, what
do we have to get to the aid of these folks quickly? Did anyone
ever suggest that we use an F-15 or F-16 to buzz the compound
once the Ambassador was found missing?
General Ham. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Graham. Were you ever told to stand down in any of
your efforts to move people into Libya because we were
concerned about violating Libyan air space?
General Ham. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Were you ever tapped on the shoulder by
anyone and told, ``you're going ahead of yourself here?'' No
one ever suggested to you to stop what you were doing?
General Ham. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Did you know when the attack was going to
be over when it started?
General Ham. Certainly not.
Senator Graham. What kind of reaction was there in the
system when the Ambassador was found missing?
General Ham. Shock, to be sure; an all-out effort to find
him and hence the diversion of the unmanned system to get that
overhead as quickly as possible.
Senator Graham. An all-out effort. Did we have air assets
within 2 to 3 hours of Libya? Were there any 130s available to
go in? Were there any AC-130 gunships?
General Ham. I know for a fact there were no AC-130s in the
theater. I would have to check if there were any C-130s.
Senator Graham. Could you do this? Could you give this
committee in writing a detailed analysis of the military assets
available that could have gotten into the Benghazi area within
12 hours?
General Ham. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Please tell us what you recommended, who
you recommended it to, and what to do with those assets.
General Ham. I will, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Graham. Did you ever talk to the President of the
United States?
General Ham. Not on this matter, no, sir.
Senator Graham. When the Secretary of Defense turned to you
and said, ``there's really nothing we can do within 24 hours to
help these people,'' what was his reaction?
General Ham. Sir, it wasn't that kind of a conversation.
The initial discussion was about the initial reports of an
attack, trying to gather information, what's happening, what
forces are available to respond. That's what precipitated the
alert to the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team, and to the CIF.
Senator Graham. Just finally, did it become apparent to
everybody in the room, there's nobody can get there within 24
hours?
General Ham. Pretty quickly. Not necessarily the 24 hours,
because the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team and the CIF could
have arrived earlier. But then, again, knowing what we knew
then, different than what we know now, the attack culminated
and seemed----
Senator Graham. Did you stop their deployment?
General Ham. We did not. We timed the deployment, then, in
concert with the embassy to say, ``when do you want this, when
do you need this team to arrive?''
Senator Graham. Thank you. My time has run out.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator King.
Senator King. General Ham, just for the record, you used a
term that gave me a start. You said ``Al Qaeda-Main.'' Can we
make it clear that there's no ``e'' on the word ``main'' in
that phrase? [Laughter.]
General Ham. Certainly, Senator, yes. ``Al Qaeda senior
leaders.''
Senator King. I appreciate that.
The question's been asked and I think Senator Graham's
questions were around this. I'm less interested in the details
of what happened and more interested in what do we learn from
it. I think the question's been asked several different ways. I
don't want to prolong it, but it seems to me the strategic
challenge--and it's fortuitous that you two fellows are here at
the same time--is how do we decrease response time while still
maintaining a relatively small footprint? That really, it seems
to me, is the ongoing strategic issue. I know you've talked
about it. I don't expect a lengthy answer, but I think it has
to do with transportation, because we don't want a big base in
Africa, I don't think. But on the other hand, as we learned in
Benghazi, we want to be able to get people--and not necessarily
in the context--the Benghazi case was a State Department
emergency. There may be other emergencies where American
interests are threatened on a short-term basis.
I just suggest to you, I hope that's something that's in
the planning and discussion stages, because I think that's the
strategic challenge that we face. Do either one of you want to
address that?
General Ham. I'll start, Senator, if that's okay. I do
agree with you. The challenge for us, I think, begins--first of
all, we're much better at prevention than we are at response.
Prevention is a lot cheaper, but that necessitates better
understanding of the operating environment, and hence my
concern for increased ISR, so that we have that better
understanding and we can perhaps, as we have done in some
places, a preventive deployment, if you will, a reinforcement
to prevent an activity from occurring, rather than responding
to crisis.
General Fraser. Sir, if I might add on TRANSCOM's part, one
of the things that I find that is good about the command is the
flexibility and the agility that we have, so that we have a
rather robust intelligence shop. We maintain constant contact
with all of our combatant commands, so that when there is an
event, whether it's an attack, whether it is a natural
disaster, an earthquake, a tsunami, whatever it may be, one of
the things that we initially do as part of our process is to
start looking at what is in the system and what I have
available.
As soon as we know that, then we're able to take action
and, dependent upon what it is that we may be responding to, we
have authorities, for instance, to start putting aircraft on
alert, to put crews into crew rest so that they'll be
immediately able to respond. We have different levels of alert
postures. Those are some of the things that we start doing
right away.
Numerous times they're never called upon. But immediately
within the system, the global nature of the mission and the
fact that we're around the globe somewhere, we're able to put
our hands on assets dependent upon the combatant commander's
needs. So there's a lot of flexibility and agility in the
system.
If I might add, I do have a concern as we move to the
future. Because of the cuts that are occurring, there's going
to be an impact, I think, long-term second- and third-order
effects of this readiness and this posture level. So will we
have that flexibility and agility in the system if the
readiness levels begin to lower to lower levels, and what risk
will that present to the system and the rapid response that is
required in the future? So it is something we're going to have
to keep an eye on. It's something that we'll make sure that we
continue to work with our combatant commands and our commercial
partners.
Senator King. I appreciate it. I think to me, the Benghazi
situation gives us an opportunity to learn. One of my
principles in a situation like this is after-action assessment
and what could we have done differently. I'm sure you've done
that. But to me, the fundamental question is how do we get
assets where they're needed in a fairly short time, whether
it's 2 hours, 4 hours, 6 hours? It depends on the
circumstances. But I'm sure you're working on that, your
command is working on that.
General Ham, I certainly appreciate your service to the
country and wish you the best of luck. I'll join Senator
McCain. I'm sure that one thing you won't miss is appearing
before this committee. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of our witnesses that are here today
for their distinguished service. I very much want to thank you,
General Ham, with your impending retirement, for everything
that you've done in AFRICOM.
I want to reiterate what you also heard from some of my
colleagues. I was deeply impressed when General Dempsey
testified before the committee, certainly the level of
briefings that you had provided up the chain of command with
regard to the deteriorating security situation in eastern
Libya. So I very much appreciate that.
I have a follow-up question to what Senator Graham was
asking you about with regard to what happened in Benghazi. When
General Dempsey testified before this committee along with
Secretary Panetta, he said that essentially you had recommended
the extension of the site security team in Libya, in other
words, the 16-person team that Senator Graham was asking you
about, the security team that was present, that was not
extended. It went there until August 5.
When General Dempsey testified before this committee, he
said that you personally had recommended the extension of the
special security team, you were aware and briefed on the August
cable that the Ambassador had indicated that the consulate
could not withstand a coordinated attack. According to General
Dempsey's testimony, you were told no, that there wouldn't be
an extension.
So how did that come about? Who told you no? Who made the
call that the site security team should not be extended?
General Ham. Senator, to the best of my knowledge, there
was no request from the Department of State to DOD to extend
the team. That's how the process began, was a request from
State to Defense for this augmentation, Senator, twice
extended. But I'm unaware--I do not believe there was a request
for a third extension.
My support for the extension was, first, we were postured
to do so, that if State so requested we had the people ready--
some of them were those who were already deployed that would be
extended. Some would be replacement persons. So we were ready
to respond to an extension should one be directed.
But there was also, I will admit to a selfish motivation.
Though the team operated exclusively under the Ambassador's
authority, it was good for us to have military people in Libya
who were establishing contacts, building rapport, building
relationships, building their understanding of Libya, that we
knew would pay off for us in establishing a military-to-
military relationship with the Libyans. So I had a selfish
motivation in the DOD presence.
Senator Ayotte. So as General Dempsey told us, he said that
you actually called the embassy to ask whether they wanted an
extension of it. Do you recall doing that?
General Ham. I do, Senator. I had numerous conversations by
phone or by secure video teleconference with Ambassador Cretz
and with Ambassador Stevens, and Ambassador Stevens visited the
AFRICOM headquarters on August 20 and we had face-to-face
discussions then as well.
Senator Ayotte. So when you had these conversations, what
were you told in terms of why they were not asking to keep the
security team there?
General Ham. I did not have that discussion with Ambassador
Stevens. It was simply my point to him to say: ``You know, if
State asks and the Secretary of Defense, obviously my boss,
approved it, we were postured to support the team.''
Senator Ayotte. Did you think it was a good idea that the
team remain longer?
General Ham. In my personal view, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Did you express that to the State
Department?
General Ham. Only to Ambassador Stevens, and previously to
Ambassador Cretz, and certainly to General Dempsey.
Senator Ayotte. Just so we understand, when the British
Ambassador's convoy was attacked, this team actually helped
recover and helped them when they were attacked, as I
understand it. So it had provided substantial assistance when
there had been other attacks in the area, particularly on our
allies.
General Ham. Senator, some members of the team did
occasionally travel into Benghazi at the request and direction
of the Ambassador and, as you might expect, from U.S. military
personnel, if there was a mission to be accomplished they were
going to find a way to try to do it.
Senator Ayotte. Just trying to understand what occurred and
also what lessons we can take from this. As I understand it,
you have at AFRICOM headquarters, interagency representatives,
where you have from nine different Federal agencies that meet
together to talk about and coordinate AFRICOM's activities.
Could you explain what that is and how does that working group
work together, and thinking about it in light of a situation
like this, where what we don't want is DOD thinking this is
what we should be doing to protect the consulate and this is
the best course of action, but Department of State not taking
that information in.
Could you tell me, did that working group take up the
security? Does it take up security issues? Did it in this
instance?
General Ham. Senator, one of the directions given to
AFRICOM is a mission set very similar to other geographic
combatant commands. But there's a special direction that says
that in Africa we will give particular attention to a whole-of-
government or interagency approach to achieving the U.S.
interests in Africa. That's resulted in a presence within the
command, as you mentioned, for multiple different U.S.
Government agencies. They don't sit as one body, but rather
they are interspersed throughout the command.
What those non-DOD personnel bring to us for the most part
is African expertise and experience and the particular
experience and expertise of their home organizations, be it the
Departments of Homeland Security or Agriculture or Treasury;
certainly State and the Foreign Service and the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and many other organizations.
They're coordinated by a very senior Foreign Service
officer who serves as my deputy commander for civil-military
activities, a very senior Foreign Service officer, a three-time
ambassador. He coordinates the interagency role in the
government.
So what that says is that we have an opportunity because of
the presence of those interagency personnel in the command to
have a very strong connective relationship with the U.S.
country teams, who are also multiagency, but also back to the
agency headquarters in Washington. That gives us some great
benefits.
Senator Ayotte. It sounds like a very good working group.
In the context of what happened in Benghazi and thinking about
the protection of the consulate, the prior course of attacks
that, of course, you reported up the chain of command, was that
ever discussed in that interagency working group in terms of
the deteriorating security situation and what actions we should
be taking to ensure protection of personnel and to deal with
the situation there?
General Ham. Yes, ma'am. It was a serious point of
discussion for a number of months--growing concern over the
increasing presence of individual extremists, some of them with
strong al Qaeda links, growing concern over an expanding
network, particularly in eastern Libya, and this caused us to
concentrate our intelligence collection efforts, which were
few, frankly, but those that we did have, to coordinate our
collection efforts in eastern Libya to better understand the
emerging situation.
Senator Ayotte. I know that my time is up. One of the
things that I'm struggling with--I think about that group and I
know that, as I understand it, your deputy in that group is a
pretty senior ranking official in the State Department--why we
wouldn't have thought about having the communication of
extending the site security team, in light of all these
discussions and the situation as it was unfolding in Benghazi.
Was that just not an issue taken up by that group?
General Ham. Ma'am, we did have that discussion. As
mentioned, Senator, we were prepared to extend the team. I do
not know the decisionmaking process within State that led to an
extension not being requested.
Senator Ayotte. So this was discussed with this team. There
was--as I understand it, Chris Dell is your deputy on that
team, who is a pretty high-ranking official in the State
Department. But when you had these discussions you don't know
why they didn't go up and the decision in the State Department
wasn't made to extend the team?
General Ham. I do not, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Now we have finished our first round. Is there anyone who
wishes to ask any additional questions at this time? [No
response.]
If not, we thank you both. A special thanks again to those
who work with you, and a special good luck to you, General Ham.
We'll stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN

1. Senator Nelson. General Fraser, the U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) is the Department of Defense (DOD) lead for in-transit
visibility (ITV) throughout the supply chain. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reports that although DOD has taken steps to improve in-
transit tracking, no one organization is aware of all such efforts
across DOD. GAO further states that there are at least 34 such
individual efforts across DOD, with only informal coordination amongst
them. As DOD is projected to spend $455 million on these efforts from
2012 to 2015, are you going to take an active role in these individual
efforts?
General Fraser. DOD efforts and projected expenses cited are those
of the four Services and defense agencies like the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA). TRANSCOM's responsibility as DOD lead proponent for ITV
is to collaborate with the Services/agencies to eliminate overlaps and
to ensure synergy among their programs.
Yes, TRANSCOM has been actively involved in this mission and will
continue to be so. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Supply Chain
Integration, is currently drafting DOD Strategy for Improving Asset
Visibility (Tracking) and ITV with input from TRANSCOM, the Services,
and DLA. Our understanding is this document will further define the
centralized roles of TRANSCOM in coordinating the DOD ITV efforts.

JACKSONVILLE PORT AUTHORITY

2. Senator Nelson. General Fraser, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Secretary of
Defense to develop and implement a plan to optimize the use of
strategic ports. Despite a 2008 study which ranked Jacksonville as the
number one east coast strategic port, Jacksonville Port Authority
(JAXPORT) saw a decrease in volume of military cargo. We corresponded a
year ago on this particular topic, specifically regarding the overall
selection process and movement of cargo through strategic seaports, as
well as best-value practices and processes for planning, routing, and
booking cargo. At the time, the audit of the Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command to determine cost effectiveness of cargo movement
procedures was ongoing, but the results were not expected in the near-
term. Will you provide an update regarding the status of your review?
General Fraser. The GAO audit referred to in our March 2012
correspondence is complete. The review of DOD preparations for the
Afghanistan drawdown (GAO-13-185R) was completed December 2012. This
audit, however, does not address your concerns regarding the cost
effectiveness of cargo movements and the relative impact to seaports
such as the JAXPORT.
DOD has 22 designated Strategic Seaports and 17 of them are
commercial. Such designation does not guarantee throughput of military
cargo or DOD business. However, JAXPORT has been, and remains, one of
our busiest seaports. Many factors are considered when selecting
seaports for inbound and outbound military cargo. For most missions,
port selection is initially recommended by the combatant command at
Force Flow conferences and is documented in the Joint Operations
Planning and Execution System. The type of cargo and the overland cost
to transport the cargo is also considered. Additionally, a significant
portion of the surface cargo is often booked with a commercial carrier
using the door-to-door method. In such cases, the carrier decides which
seaports to use based upon a business analysis taking advantage of
their network and infrastructure. This is often the best-value option
for the government.
Since March 2012, we have processed 1,928 pieces of redeployment/
retrograde cargo through JAXPORT in support of drawdown efforts in Iraq
(Kuwait) and Afghanistan. During the same time frame, JAXPORT processed
1,269 pieces of cargo in support of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
missions. The 101st Combat Aviation Brigade from Fort Campbell, KY,
deployed through JAXPORT recently, and we forecast increased traffic
via Jacksonville for 2,723 pieces of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) bound
for Afghanistan. Finally, we are conducting a feasibility analysis
using JAXPORT for expanded agricultural inspections of cargo returning
from Afghanistan.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

BUILDING SECURITY CAPACITY

3. Senator McCaskill. General Ham, one of AFRICOM's central
missions is to strengthen the defense capabilities of African states.
In January 2013, an International Security Advisory Board report on
``Security Capacity Building'' found that the United States annually
spends more than $25 billion on what is broadly classified as security
capacity of the recipient states. The report found that we have a
multiplicity of programs spread across different departments and
agencies where there may or may not be coordination in resourcing and
execution. A lack of coordination could easily lead to duplication of
effort and waste of resources that would be better spent elsewhere. As
the combatant commander, what policies are in place to ensure efforts
are coordinated with our diplomatic missions and other Federal agencies
to ensure duplication is not occurring?
General Ham. AFRICOM coordinates directly with the Department of
State (DOS) and U.S. Embassy country teams as we plan our programs. We
encourage a transparent approach to capability development to include
inviting members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
DOS to the initial stages of proposal development. Our excellent
working relationship with DOS and OSD and the growing number of Offices
of Security Cooperation in African nations facilitate this dialogue and
help ensure that the U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission has all the required
information to provide final approval to our programs--a key method for
ensuring that all agencies are involved.

4. Senator McCaskill. General Ham, while many at the DOS and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) welcome the ability
of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there
also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as
well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are not a core
part of its mandate. The highly unequal allocation of resources between
the DOD, USAID, and DOS could hinder their ability to act as equal
partners and could lead to the militarization of development and
diplomacy. How are you balancing our military presence in Africa with
our diplomatic responsibilities?
General Ham. The U.S. Ambassadors are the lead for U.S. diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic development in each African
nation. AFRICOM fully supports them and DOS to ensure a balanced and
synchronized effort between diplomatic, development, and military
presence in African nations. Traditional U.S. military engagement
strategy has been grounded in threat-based analysis. To meet our
growing responsibilities in Africa, the command will complement this
traditional framework with a partnership-based analytical approach to
planning. We will develop strategies to use our military capabilities
in a supporting role with our interagency team in an effort to assist
our partners in building resilient, democratic security institutions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III

EQUIPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

5. Senator Manchin. General Fraser, Foreign Policy Magazine's
Situation Report reported on Tuesday, March 5 that the Army is planning
on leaving about $6 billion worth of equipment in Afghanistan post-
2014, after moving about $21 billion of equipment out of the country. I
do not want a single soldier to die trying to move equipment out of
Afghanistan, but--at the same time--this seems like a tremendous waste
of resources at a time of fiscal crisis in this country. What was
TRANSCOM's role in determining what equipment was worth returning to
DOD's inventories outside of Afghanistan?
General Fraser. The individual Services make the determination of
what equipment will be returned to DOD's inventories. TRANSCOM's role
is to provide the transportation of equipment back to the United States
or other locations via military or commercial means.

6. Senator Manchin. General Fraser, how does the Afghanistan
retrograde situation compare with that of Iraq?
General Fraser. The retrograde of materiel out of Iraq was
significant and challenging. The reduction of troops and equipment out
of Afghanistan is much more challenging and is being conducted with
deliberate and careful planning. Additionally, Afghanistan's road
system is not as developed and there is no neighboring country like
Kuwait which allows U.S. Forces to stage vehicles and equipment for
processing and onward movement to the United States. Also, Afghanistan,
unlike Iraq and Kuwait, does not have access to a seaport.
To mitigate any challenges, TRANSCOM has focused on increasing our
strategic flexibility. The past year has seen the successful reversal
of the flow on multiple ground routes to include: the Afghanistan to
Europe Route, the Trans-Siberian Route, the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan route, as well as reestablishing bi-directional flow on the
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). Additionally, we are
expanding our multi-modal options to include retrograde operations
through Baku, Azerbaijan.

7. Senator Manchin. General Fraser, what was the value of equipment
left in Iraq?
General Fraser. The Services are in the best position to provide an
overall cost analysis of equipment in theater. TRANSCOM assists the
Services with calculating the transportation cost and readily supports
equipment movement once the Services make a determination of what is to
be returned to the United States.

8. Senator Manchin. General Ham, I recently received an interesting
briefing from the Henry Jackson Society on those convicted of planning
or perpetrating al Qaeda related terrorist offenses in the United
States. Of the 171 individuals convicted of al Qaeda-related offenses
studied by the researchers, about half had received terrorist training
of some kind. Of these, nearly 70 percent trained in Afghanistan, but 5
percent trained in Somalia. What is the current status of terrorist
training in the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), particularly in
Somalia?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

9. Senator Manchin. General Ham, what is AFRICOM doing to manage
this challenge?
General Ham. We believe that African nations are best suited to
address security challenges in Africa. AFRICOM will continue to work as
one element of a total U.S. Government approach to enable our African
partners to address security challenges. Our efforts focus on
intelligence-sharing and capacity-building so that Africa nations are
better able to prevent or defeat terrorist training activities within
their borders.

10. Senator Manchin. General Ham, under your leadership, the United
States has expanded its presence in Africa, including through the
establishment of new bases in Niger and Burkina Faso primarily tasked
with counterterrorism and surveillance missions. Will these bases
continue to serve primarily as platforms for surveillance, or will we
begin to see a larger U.S. troop presence and expansion of the mission
at these bases?
General Ham. Our presence in Niger and Burkina Faso is served by
operating locations rather than by long-term enduring bases. We do not
intend to increase U.S. troop presence or expand the mission in Niger
or Burkina Faso beyond what is necessary to support our ongoing
operations. We maintain a low profile presence while bringing to bear
unique U.S. capabilities in accomplishing our mission.

11. Senator Manchin. General Ham, over the next year, do you
anticipate that the United States will conclude additional status of
forces agreements with African nations, as we did with Burkina Faso on
February 28?
General Ham. The United States most recently concluded a Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Niger on January 28, 2013. The United
States currently has status protection agreements with 32 of 54 nations
in the AFRICOM AOR. Of those, six are global SOFAs which contain all of
the immunity privilege provisions the United States normally seeks to
ensure mission accomplishment and status protections for U.S. uniformed
and civilian members of DOD.
The United States is currently in the process of negotiating a SOFA
(renewal and update of existing agreement) with Morocco, as well as
concluding SOFAs with Cape Verde (new) and Uganda (renewal and update).
In addition, DOD has coordinated with DOS to deliver our global SOFA
text to 10 other nations in the AOR in the past year. We are hopeful
that we will be able to successfully negotiate and conclude these
agreements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

BENGHAZI

12. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, terrorist attacks in Benghazi on
September 11, 2012, that left four Americans dead--Ambassador Chris
Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. Deaths that I
believe could have been prevented. What has become clear is that the
United States was woefully unprepared for what occurred in Benghazi.
Warning signs went unheeded--when tragedy struck, forces weren't ready
to respond. What is also clear is that following the attack, the
administration provided the American people inaccurate information
about the true nature of the catastrophic events in Benghazi. Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey admitted before this committee last month
what most of us knew all along: it was immediately apparent to the
Obama administration that the deadly assault on our Benghazi annex was
unequivocally a coordinated terrorist attack. What was your assessment
of the threat in Libya prior to the attack?
General Ham. Due to the presence and activities of al Qaeda
operatives and other extremist networks in the region, there was a
general agreement in the Intelligence Community that Benghazi and
northeastern Libya were high-threat areas. However, there was no
specific, credible intelligence that an attack against the U.S. Special
Mission Facility or annex was being prepared.

13. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, were you aware of the multiple
attacks against Western interests in Benghazi in the months before the
events of September 11, 2012, including against the British Ambassador,
the Red Cross, and the U.S. Consulate?
General Ham. Yes.

14. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, were you aware that the British
pulled their mission out of Benghazi and the Red Cross suspended
operations?
General Ham. Yes.

15. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, did you make or recommend any
changes in AFRICOM force posture or alert status in the region based on
the threat picture? If not, why not?
General Ham. Yes, DOD posture across the world on September 11,
2012, was commensurate with the anticipated threat and force protection
conditions across individual regions. Our forces maintained heightened
awareness, however; we were not aware of specific threats to U.S.
personnel in Libya. We were also unaware of Ambassador Stevens' travel
to Benghazi as it is not customary for U.S. Embassies to advise DOD of
ambassadors' travel.

16. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, did you talk with Secretary
Panetta, General Dempsey, and/or the President during the attacks, and
if so, what was discussed?
General Ham. Yes. I spoke with Secretary Panetta and General
Dempsey. Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and I discussed the
situation, threats, and forces available.

17. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, when and how did you find out
about the attack in Benghazi?
General Ham. I was in Washington, DC, when I received the
notification call from my AFRICOM operations center at approximately
1620 EDT.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, what options did you recommend to
the President, Secretary of Defense, and/or the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

19. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, what forces were available forces
and what direction did you give your forces?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

20. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, were you told not to execute any
of your recommendations?
General Ham. No.

21. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, do you believe the attack was a
coordinated terrorist attack?
General Ham. Yes. It was clear to me soon after the first attack
that this was more than a demonstration.

22. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, did the State Department ask for
assistance in securing the attack sites after the Americans had been
evacuated to facilitate the investigation?
General Ham. No.

23. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, knowing what you know now, would
you make any different immediate recommendations or take different
actions?
General Ham. Had we known then what we know now, I suspect
Ambassador Stevens would not have travelled to Benghazi and the DOS
would have sought DOD assistance in evacuating all Americans from
Libya.

24. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, does the growing terrorist threat,
and lack of warning of this attack, indicate we are under-resourcing
our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel?
General Ham. AFRICOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) requirements continue to increase based on the
growing terrorist threat in our AOR. ISR assets are low-density/high-
demand assets that are in demand across the globe.
We recognize that we are one part of an overall U.S.
counterterrorism strategy. We will continue to work with the DOS to
enable partners to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities.

AFGHANISTAN REDEPLOYMENT

25. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan
presents a much more significant logistical challenge for the movement
of people and equipment into and out of the theater. Until last fall,
the military used a mix of commercial and military surface
transportation along five major ground routes through Pakistan to
deliver approximately 40 percent of total cargo into Afghanistan.
TRANSCOM also used a series of three northern routes though Central
Asian countries called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to
deliver another 40 percent, and Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft to
move the remaining 20 percent. However, TRANSCOM will remain challenged
to move the sheer volume required to meet the President's December 2014
deadline for the withdrawal of the majority of combat forces from
Afghanistan. What difficulties do you foresee with getting DOD
equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan?
General Fraser. None at the present time; however, floods, renewed
strikes/disputes, sectarian violence, and upcoming elections could
disrupt future cargo along the PAKGLOC. Afghanistan is a logistically
challenging area of operations. Limited surface routes and geopolitical
sensitivities have the potential of negatively affecting our ability to
support retrograde operations out of Afghanistan. To mitigate these
challenges, TRANSCOM has established multiple transportation routes,
including airlift between the continental United States and
Afghanistan, as well as commercial surface and multi-modal
transportation routes. TRANSCOM is providing the strategic flexibility
needed to meet U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) redeployment timeline
and is ensuring that there are no single points of failure in the
transportation enterprise.
The past year has seen the successful reversal of the flow on
multiple ground routes to include the Afghanistan to Europe Route, the
Trans-Siberian Route, the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan route;
as well as reestablishing bi-directional flow on the PAKGLOC.
Additionally, we are expanding our multi-modal routing options to
include retrograde operations through Baku, Azerbaijan.
In order to increase operational flexibility, decrease
transportation costs, and provide additional geopolitical theater
engagement opportunities, we are partnered with DOS, CENTCOM, and U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) to open new ground and multi-modal routes
while continuing to synchronize our efforts with CENTCOM. One example
of increasing flexibility is the passenger (PAX) transit option at
Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK), Romania. Our efforts to open an additional
transit location for PAX movements culminated in the successful bi-
directional movement last September and this past February. Nearly
12,600 passengers have transited MK.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, does DOD have sufficient
capacity to meet the drawdown timeline through 2014?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM currently has enough capacity to meet the
2014 drawdown timeline. We are in the process of increasing capacity by
opening new routes and new modes through several proofs of principle.
Once fully realized, these routes will provide additional operational
flexibility to the CENTCOM Commander during the Afghanistan drawdown.
These efforts will increase cost-effectiveness and provide additional
geopolitical engagement opportunities.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, has DOD determined what
equipment you will be returning to the United States?
General Fraser. The Services have made decisions on some equipment
that will be returning to the United States. TRANSCOM has been
transporting this equipment back to the United States for over a year.
The Services are still deciding on other equipment that may be declared
excess and offered to other countries as Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

28. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, do you have the authorities you
need to return all required equipment?
General Fraser. Yes, we have the authorities to return all required
equipment to the United States or other U.S. locations.

29. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, why has it taken so long to
finally open and use the PAKGLOC?
General Fraser. After the November 26, 2011, friendly fire incident
in Pakistan, the initial talks between the United States and the
Government of Pakistan to reopen the PAKGLOC began on April 27, 2012.
Those talks resulted in a decision to establish a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on principles and procedures for cargo movement
through Pakistan. On May 15, 2012, Pakistan's Defense Committee of the
Cabinet authorized the Ministries/Departments to conclude the ongoing
negotiations and shift the bilateral discussions to a more formal
negotiation.
On July 11, 2012, 1 week after Pakistan formally reopened the
PAKGLOC, Pakistan indicated that the cargo backlogged in Karachi would
move under existing, pre-November 2011 arrangements. The U.S. Embassy
and Pakistan counterparts then agreed that no new transit fees would be
charged on cargo transiting Pakistan.
Negotiations for the Terms of Reference (ToR) took place from
August to November 2012 with formal signing on November 1, 2012. On
November 7, the Exchange of Letters between Pakistan and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed, which brought all of our
International Security Assistance Force partners under both the MOU and
the ToR.
U.S. Forces Afghanistan developed Proof of Principles (PoPs) to
incrementally test the new agreements, processes, and the newly
established Universal Service Contract-7. Our PoPs are complete and
customers are now starting to shift sustainment and retrograde cargo to
the PAKGLOC.

30. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, what difficulties are you
encountering with this route?
General Fraser. None at the present time; however, floods, renewed
strikes/disputes, sectarian violence, and upcoming elections could
disrupt future cargo along the PAKGLOC. TRANSCOM, while balancing
requirements and capacity, will continue to ship cargo along other
transit routes, as a hedging strategy to ensure flexibility and
minimize the effects of any disruption along the PAKGLOC.

31. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, is Pakistan cooperating with
us?
General Fraser. Pakistan is cooperating in restoring the flow of
the PAKGLOC. We have communicated our expectations and they understand
that if the PAKGLOC is not meeting our requirements we will use our
other available routes, which would divert business from Pakistan. It
is in both our interests to maximize the cargo flow along the PAKGLOC.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, why does TRANSCOM continue to
move most of DOD supplies through the NDN when Pakistan is open and
less expensive to use?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM supports warfighter and Service priorities
by providing a transportation network that maximizes strategic
flexibility and reduces operational risk across a variety of routes and
modes, both into and out of Afghanistan. Additionally, we are actively
engaged with Pakistan to fully realize the potential velocity and cost
savings associated with transiting the PAKGLOC; while at the same time,
balancing the operational requirement for multiple transportation
options.
The PAKGLOC is through the PoP process that was aimed at ensuring
the viability of the route under the newly negotiated Terms of
Reference. We are now increasing our bookings of new cargo to this
route.

33. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, what difficulties are you
encountering with the NDN route?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM continues to optimize the use of the NDN
route. This is not one singular route, but a network of roads and rail
lines throughout Europe, Russia, the Central Asian States, and the
Caucasus. Each month thousands of containers of cargo destined for
Afghanistan flow across the NDN with few issues or interruptions. We
continue to work with the NDN nations to improve the processes and
strengthen our relations with these partnering countries. As for
retrograde, countries directly adjacent to Afghanistan require new
processes and procedures for export of cargo out of Afghanistan. We
continue to work closely with these nations to meet these specific
export requirements, and in some cases, improve velocity by replacing
manual processes with technology.

34. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, if operations in the CENTCOM
and AFRICOM AOR do not substantially subside to support the rebalance
to the Asia-Pacific region, which is a major premise of the new Defense
Strategic Guidance, what increased risks do you assess will occur for
TRANSCOM as it relates to operational tempo and meeting global airlift
requirements?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM supports warfighter and Service
priorities, as directed by the Joint Chiefs, by providing a
transportation network that maximizes strategic flexibility and reduces
operational risk across a variety of routes and modes. TRANSCOM
continues to execute movements as prioritized by the National Command
Authority to ensure the right level of effort is provided to support
the national strategy.

35. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, what difficulties do you
foresee with getting DOD equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan
with a year-long Continuing Resolution (CR) and sequestration?
General Fraser. As a service provider, TRANSCOM operations are
funded through a Working Capital Fund. When transportation services are
requested, the supported command and Services provide the funding
required. Therefore, the availability of funds for TRANSCOM contingency
operations will be dependent upon the availability of funds to the
combatant commands and the Services to conduct operations. The
redeployment of troops and equipment out of Afghanistan is no different
from any other TRANSCOM supported movement and is dependent upon
availability of the Services' funds to reimburse our Working Capital
Fund for transportation services provided. Today, the Afghanistan
redeployment is funded through supplemental Overseas Contingency
Operation (OCO) funds provided to the Services. Therefore, the lack of
adequate OCO funds and affects of sequestration on these funds have a
more significant impact on accomplishing the redeployment mission than
a year-long CR.

AFRICOM FORCE REDUCTIONS

36. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, AFRICOM is an economy of force
effort--an effort I support but one that raises concerns about adequacy
of resources. Its forces are completely shared with EUCOM. Admiral
Stavridis said the drawdown of 11,500 troops, most coming from the loss
of two Army brigades, will be mitigated by rotating troops through
EUCOM from a ``dedicated brigade in the United States.'' With
decreasing military resources and increasing threats in Africa, what is
the impact on AFRICOM operations given that AFRICOM was created as an
economy of force command?
General Ham. We are allocated forces through the Joint Staff
process from a variety of sources, including the National Guard and
units stationed in the United States and Europe. In a crisis, forces in
Europe are often the closest forces and may be the quickest to respond
to incidents on the continent. Therefore, I'm concerned about the
impact of a drawdown in Europe on the command's ability to respond to
developing crises.

37. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, having flown all over Africa, it
would take aircraft departing from Germany approximately 8 hours to fly
to central Africa with limited to no airfields and installations for
use by our military. What is the impact of having a majority of AFRICOM
forces in Europe?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

38. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, how can AFRICOM rapidly respond to
crisis in central or southern Africa?
General Ham. Based on time/distance factors, AFRICOM's ability to
respond rapidly to crises in central and southern Africa is limited. In
order to better respond, we require increased intelligence emphasis and
resources to gain a better understanding of the environment to posture
forces in a location to more quickly respond to a developing crisis.

39. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, what is the status of ISR assets
in AFRICOM today and in the future?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

40. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, how will the lack of a 2.0 carrier
presence in the Gulf impact AFRICOM?
General Ham. Given current and projected operations, I see no
significant impact to AFRICOM.

41. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, the headquarters for AFRICOM is in
Stuttgart, Germany. A recent DOD report supports keeping the
headquarters at Stuttgart. Do you agree with the report?
General Ham. Yes.

42. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, what are your thoughts of same day
moving AFRICOM somewhere on the continent of Africa?
General Ham. Due to the expense of moving the headquarters and
potential resistance from some African nations, I believe this is not
feasible in the foreseeable future.

43. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, what other basing is AFRICOM
currently looking at near- and far-term on the continent of Africa and
how will that impact AFRICOM's operations?
General Ham. AFRICOM is not looking for additional basing on the
African continent. We continue to maintain a low-cost, small-footprint
approach to achieving our security objectives, and have significantly
reduced the number of enduring locations on the African continent in
favor of non-enduring expeditionary operating locations.

MALI

44. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, the United States has been
supporting French military in Mali by providing refueling, airlift, and
intelligence support. Last week, the President informed Congress that
he was deploying another 40 U.S. military personnel to Niger to help
conduct surveillance operations in Africa, particularly in Mali and
Algeria. The purpose of the deployment is to provide support for
intelligence collection and facilitate intelligence sharing with French
forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the
region. What support is the United States providing the French, Mali,
and surrounding African countries?
General Ham. We are currently supporting French forces and those of
the African-Led International Support Mission to Mali with intelligence
sharing, ISR, and refueling. We provided airlift support to France and
Chad to move forces and equipment.
AFRICOM is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the
armed forces of Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the
provision of security assistance to any military force that has been
involved in a military overthrow of a democratically-elected
government.

45. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, under what legal authority is the
United States assisting the French and Mali forces?
General Ham. AFRICOM is executing operations in support of France
as directed in the Secretary of Defense-issued execution orders. We are
not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of
Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of
security assistance to any military force that has been involved in a
military overthrow of a democratically-elected government.

46. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, what is the U.S. strategic goal in
supporting French operations in Mali?
General Ham. Our mission in Mali is to provide support to French
military operations to stabilize the situation and allow for follow-on
deployment of designated Economic Community of West African States and
other forces forming the African-Led International Support Mission in
Mali.

47. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, who defines and what is the end
state for U.S. support for French operations in Mali?
General Ham. The end state for DOD support to French operations is
established by the Secretary of Defense. The end state is the French
military support requirements are met, and the French military can
support its own operations in Mali.

48. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, do you foresee U.S. operations
expanding in Mali?
General Ham. AFRICOM is not currently engaged in capacity-building
with the armed forces of Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions
on the provision of security assistance to any military force that has
been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically-elected
government. In the future, we look forward to establishing a normal
military-to-military relationship with Mali.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

49. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, you have been strong supporters of
our security assistance and engagement programs, whether it is foreign
military financing (FMF), FMS, international military education and
training (IMET), or our train-and-equip programs. Have these programs
been successful in AFRICOM? If so, do you have any examples?
General Ham. All of the security cooperation programs that you
mentioned have been very successful. We greatly appreciate the
opportunity that the authorized train-and-equip programs provide and
have seen successes. The Raven Program for Ugandan African Union
Mission in Somalia operations provided valuable intelligence leading to
increased tactical success on the ground. Counterterrorism unit train-
and-equip programs with Chad allowed them to act as an important
partner to France in the mountains of Northern Mali and assistance to
the Kenyan Ranger Strike Force led to the capture of Kismayo in
Somalia. Small boat programs in Kenya and Djibouti have made
infiltration into those countries more difficult and forced al Qaeda to
invest in slower and less secure means of conducting asymmetrical
warfare. The consistent annual appropriation for train-and-equip
programs, particularly 1206, is leading to a steady increase in
capability of key nations in Africa.
In Morocco, we concluded a $2.4 billion FMS case for 24 F-16
aircraft and are negotiating a case for sale of 108 M1A1 main battle
tanks. These assets will ensure interoperability with the United States
and assist Morocco with countering transnational threats in a volatile
region in our AOR. FMF is supporting vital programs such as Defense
Institution Building in Africa's newest country, South Sudan. FMF also
supports Africa Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations
through maintaining South Africa and Botswana's C-130 transport
aircraft, and provides Cameroon with surveillance radar to monitor
trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea.
The IMET program provides valuable training and builds enduring
relationships with key partners. For example, we currently have a
senior officer from Libya attending Naval War College in Newport, RI,
and a colonel from the South African Air Force attending Air War
College at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. We also utilize IMET to
reinforce the warrant officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps
of our partners' military forces through attendance at our Services'
warrant officer and NCO academies. IMET, at all levels, builds enduring
relationships and helps shape participants' views toward the United
States.

CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

50. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our
only enduring base on the African continent. The airfield, which we
share with our host government, serves as a critical hub of operations
for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and as logistics support
for humanitarian and other theater cooperation missions with our
allies. Recently, the Government of Djibouti has expressed concern
about the impact of our operations at their international airport. In
addition, as our interests grow on the continent, the need for more
resources may drive a request for additional areas at their airport at
the same time we are investing hundreds of millions of dollars in new
facilities for our forces at Camp Lemonnier. Are you aware of any
operational constraints at Camp Lemonnier that have you concerned over
the long-term?
General Ham. Yes. We are working with the host nation to mitigate
operational and safety concerns about remotely piloted aircraft
operating out of Djibouti's international commercial airport by
developing an alternate location for such operations.

51. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, should we continue to grow our
presence and invest in new facilities at Camp Lemonnier or should we
look for new locations to place forces around the continent?
General Ham. Camp Lemonnier (CLDJ) is strategically important to
U.S. interests and provides support for four separate combatant
commands, each having a vested interest in its development. CLDJ is our
only forward operating site on the African continent and is a critical
platform in the fight against violent extremist organizations.
We appreciate your support for our four highest military
construction projects at Camp Lemonnier. Many CLDJ facilities are
inadequate to support the amount of personnel currently operating from
CLDJ. A conservative, time-phased investment in CLDJ's infrastructure
and facilities will enhance strategic and operational readiness and
effectiveness, improve force protection, and the quality of life for
each of these organizations.

COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN AFRICA

52. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, we are seeing that Al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups are developing operational networks that are
increasingly complex and global in nature. Over the past decade, we
have successfully directed our military and intelligence capabilities
at fighting terrorism. Yet, it appears the United States is putting
relatively little effort into a long-range or comprehensive plan, but
we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists.
Do you believe the United States has adequately focused its
intelligence collection capabilities on Africa?
General Ham. Intelligence requirements in Africa continue to
increase based on the growing terrorism threat. Over the last year, we
have seen an increase in intelligence prioritization for AFRICOM.
Despite this, significant shortfalls remain, therefore, AFRICOM
requires increased national intelligence emphasis and resources.

53. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, do you believe AFRICOM has enough
of the right assets in the right places to execute an effective
counterterrorism strategy in the whole of Africa?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

54. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, are you concerned about the
potential influence of terrorist groups on large numbers of Western
Sahara refugees living in camps in southern Algeria?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

55. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, do you believe that our current
counterterrorism strategy has kept pace with the increasingly
globalized nature of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist networks?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

56. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, how are you measuring your
effectiveness in AFRICOM?
General Ham. AFRICOM measures effectiveness in its theater campaign
plans by assessing progress in the military objectives and effects.
AFRICOM's military objectives are specific, measureable, and
achievable within 5 years. They are assessed no less than semi-annually
using a comprehensive and integrated process of objective, subjective,
and perceptive indicators. The assessment encompasses all theater
intelligence, operations, exercises, and security cooperation
activities.

C-5/C-17 OVERFLY HOURS

57. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, for the past 2 years, DOD said
it had too much strategic airlift, so Congress reduced the strategic
airlift requirement from 313 to 301 and now down to 275. Will you have
to increase your reliance on commercial carriers as the organic fleet
reduces to 275?
General Fraser. No, the change in numbers will not require an
increased reliance upon Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) commercial
carriers. We have conducted a comparison of the current strategic
guidance to those requirements outlined in Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016. The comparison validated 275 aircraft (223 C-
17s and 52 C-5Ms) and our CRAF partners' ability to support a large
scale operation in one region, with a capability to deny the objectives
of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region, while defending the
Homeland and providing support to civil authorities.

58. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, what risks do you see at the
275 level to accomplishing your mission?
General Fraser. The TRANSCOM mission is to support the President's
strategic guidance. Recent assessments indicated that a fleet with 30.4
million ton miles per day (MTM/D) capacity will support that strategy.
A fleet of 223 C-17s and 52 C-5Ms provides at least 30.4 MTM/D capacity
and therefore supports the strategic guidance with moderate risk.

59. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, will overflying C-5s and C-17s
impact long-term readiness of both fleets?
General Fraser. Yes, overflying the C-5 and the C-17 past their
planned service life impacts the programs, but it is possible with
Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) and additional spare parts.
Based on engineering analysis, it is estimated the C-5 can fly 33
percent over the current usage rates without impacting scheduled
inspection intervals such as programmed depot maintenance. If the
aircraft operates beyond its planned life, the Air Force will start
reducing the inspection intervals proportionally to compensate for
increased stresses. Based on projected usage rates, the C-5 will have
approximately 15,000 flying hours of structural service life remaining
at its currently planned 2040 retirement date.
Flying past the planned service life will impact aircraft spares.
If the flying hours are increased or extended, then spare parts demands
increase commensurately. This will result in an increase in not mission
capable for supply rates in later years of the program if spare parts
are not funded and procured.
Each C-17 is programmed to fly 30 years at 1,000 hours per aircraft
per year. At current usage rates, the first aircraft will reach its
life expectancy in 2022. Over the past 12 years the fleet has flown an
average of 1,093 hours/tail/year. Flying beyond 2022 will require more
frequent structural inspections. The C-17 enterprise is evaluating a
plan to extend the service life of the aircraft from 30,000 to 60,000
flying hours provided funding is available to support a SLEP.
In summary, flying past programmed service life is possible, but
requires additional funding to assess structural integrity of the
aircraft and modernization of both the airframe and spare parts pools.

REGIONALLY-ALIGNED BRIGADES

60. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, the Army has aligned the 2nd
Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, with your command as a test bed for the
Army's regionally-aligned brigade concept. Do you believe one brigade
is sufficient to support your area of operations?
General Ham. Yes. One brigade is sufficient for our planned
engagements when coupled with the forces of the other Service
components allocated to the command.

61. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, do you have the resources to
support the test bed?
General Ham. Yes. We appreciate the U.S. Army selecting AFRICOM as
the first combatant command with a regionally-aligned brigade.

62. Senator Inhofe. General Ham, does AFRICOM have the
infrastructure to support the 2nd Brigade Combat Team should the entire
brigade be deployed to your area of operations?
General Ham. AFRICOM does not intend to employ the entire brigade
at one place or all at the same time. The intention is for the brigade
to employ tailored elements to support short duration security
cooperation activities which strengthen the defense capabilities of
African partners and regional organizations.

63. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, what risks do you see with
TRANSCOM's ability to support the Army's regionally-aligned brigade
concept?
General Fraser. I am aware the Army is working on the regionally-
aligned brigade concept. The concept creates a relationship between a
combatant command and an Army Brigade Combat Team that the combatant
command commander can use for theater campaign plan engagements and
exercises. I have seen a draft execution order that implements a
rotational brigade for EUCOM in fiscal year 2014. The rotational force
is limited to a battalion with some brigade level enablers and brigade
level command and control. In the case of EUCOM, the Army is creating a
prepositioned set of equipment for the rotational force to use. At this
point, I do not envision any problems supporting the Army concept. We
will continue to assess it for any mobility implications as Army
implementation progresses.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

LIBYAN BORDER SECURITY

64. Senator Wicker. General Ham, one area of concern I have
regarding the security situation in Libya is the inability of Libyan
forces to control border crossings. Without the ability to establish
effective control over its borders, it is unlikely the Libyan
Government will be able to manage the flow of terrorists and smugglers
into and out of the country, threatening Libya's long-term stability
and viability. Has the Libyan Government asked for U.S. assistance to
enhance their border control capabilities?
General Ham. Yes. In September 2012, representatives from the
Libyan Ministry of Defense and Customs Agency visited the U.S./Mexico
border in Arizona to observe how the U.S. secures its borders. As a
result of that trip, the Government of Libya submitted a FMS request
for equipment in support of their Border Security Forces. However, when
the new Defense Minister was confirmed in December 2012, the request
was cancelled. Our Office of Security Cooperation is currently working
with the leadership of the Libyan Border Security Force to coordinate
for a new equipment request.
AFRICOM has submitted a proposal to assist Libya with their Border
Security via a $7 million Global Security Contingency Fund (1207a)
proposal to create, train, and equip two quick-reaction Border Security
Companies--one for the east and one for the west. When executed, Marine
Corps Forces Africa will train the companies at a location to be
determined, but likely at a base in Europe (due to security concerns in
Libya).

65. Senator Wicker. General Ham, how would you envision assisting
the Libyan Government in establishing control, especially with regards
to the sparsely populated regions that compose Libya's inland regions?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

66. Senator Wicker. General Ham, what types of vehicles and
equipment would be most useful, given the difficulties inherent to the
geography and climate?
General Ham. I believe a holistic approach to Border Security in
Libya is the key to future success. Important initiatives would be the
construction of a series of national command and control centers, a
comprehensive communications system to support all levels in the system
from the individual guards on the borders up to the commander, and a
national-level ISR system. The sale or provision of vehicles, weapons,
and personal gear, such as body armor, night vision goggles, and
uniforms, would also be a part of this effort.
Appropriate vehicles would reflect a mixture of civilian trucks and
sport utility vehicles, with some tactical vehicles in support of
specialized missions. The Libyan Special Operations Forces and the
quick-reaction Border Security Forces should use heavier tactical
vehicles for use in engagements with violent extremist organizations;
and with some lighter and more mobile vehicles (such as the tactical
dune buggies used by U.S. Special Operations Forces) when conducting
ground-borne ISR.
Appropriate ISR systems would include ground surveillance radars,
tower-mounted cameras, and unarmed, unmanned aerial vehicles, although
manned aircraft would also be appropriate.
The Border Security Forces also require a networked command and
control system that provides the Libyan Border Security Forces with a
common operating picture, which would be generated by their ISR assets
and daily communications with their border guards.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

BENGHAZI ATTACK AND DOD RESPONSE

67. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, was AFRICOM on a heightened state
of alert on September 11, 2012, and if so, what actions did AFRICOM
take based on this heightened state of alert?
General Ham. Yes, DOD posture across the world on September 11,
2012, was commensurate with the anticipated threat and force protection
conditions across individual regions. Our forces maintained heightened
awareness, however, we were not aware of specific threats to U.S.
personnel in Libya. We were also unaware of Ambassador Stevens' travel
to Benghazi as it is not customary for U.S. Embassies to advise DOD of
ambassadors' travel.

68. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, based on the previous attacks in
Benghazi and the known deteriorating security situation in eastern
Libya, why weren't our forces in Europe and Djibouti better postured to
respond?
General Ham. DOD posture across the world on September 11, 2012,
was commensurate with the anticipated threat and force protection
conditions across individual regions. Our forces maintained heightened
awareness, however, we were not aware of specific threats to U.S.
personnel in Libya. We were also unaware of Ambassador Stevens' travel
to Benghazi as it is not customary for U.S. Embassies to advise DOD of
ambassadors' travel.

AFRICOM RESOURCES

69. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, based on the previous attacks on
U.S. and other western targets in Benghazi in the months preceding the
September 11, 2012, attack that left four Americans dead, do you
believe more than 7 percent of AFRICOM's ISR requirements should have
been met?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

70. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, in the months preceding the
September 11, 2012, attack in Benghazi, did you request additional ISR
assets for AFRICOM?
General Ham. Yes. The command was allocated additional ISR assets
in response to the increased terrorism threat across Africa.

71. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, who did you make those requests to
and what was their response?
General Ham. AFRICOM submits annual ISR requirements to the Joint
Staff. ISR is allocated through a formal Global Management Process and
reviewed/adjusted bimonthly through a process managed by the Joint
Staff.

72. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, last month, General Rodriguez said
that the current ISR allocation ``does not provide sufficient quantity
or sensor mix to achieve the objectives which the Joint Staff directed
to AFRICOM.'' Is that accurate?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

73. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, has Boko Haram conducted terrorist
attacks?
General Ham. Yes. Boko Haram conducts terrorist attacks against the
Christian populace, Muslim communities, the Nigerian Government,
Nigerian infrastructure, and Western interests.
Recent prominent Boko Haram attacks, which I believe are best
understood as terrorist acts, include the March 18, 2013, bus bombing
targeting the Christian community in Kano. The most notable anti-
Western Boko Haram attack was the August 2011 car bomb detonated
against the United Nations' Headquarters building in Abuja.
In 2012, Boko Haram and its faction Ansaru, were responsible for up
to 170 armed attacks, 46 bombings, and 21 suicide car bomb operations.

74. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, do you believe Boko Haram is a
terrorist organization?
General Ham. Yes, my personal opinion is they are a terrorist
organization. However, I understand the challenges involved with the
policy decisions to formally designate them as a terrorist organization
and the different perspectives other policymakers have regarding the
nature of Boko Haram.

75. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, how can we increase pressure on
Boko Haram?
General Ham. We will continue to work with the Nigerian Government
through the U.S. Embassy in Abuja. This ongoing dialogue will focus
increasing pressure on Boko Haram and support the Nigerian military as
they increase their counterterrorism capabilities to address the threat
posed by Boko Haram.

76. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, would it be helpful to U.S.
interests or to AFRICOM if we designated Boko Haram as a foreign
terrorist organization?
General Ham. Yes, my personal opinion is that designating Boko
Haram as a terrorist organization will provide additional authorities
to act against this organization. I recognize there are challenges
involved with the policy decisions to formally designate them as a
terrorist organization.

77. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, do you believe the United States
should designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization?
General Ham. Yes, my personal opinion is they are a terrorist
organization and should be so designated.

MARINE CORPS SECURITY GUARD DETACHMENTS

78. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, are there U.S. diplomatic
facilities in Africa today that do not have a Marine Corps Security
Guard Detachment?
General Ham. Yes.

79. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, how many Marine Security Guard
Detachments are there?
General Ham. There are 34 Marine Corps Security Guard Detachments
supporting U.S. diplomatic facilities in Africa.

80. Senator Ayotte. General Ham, what is DOD doing to address this
and how can Congress help?
General Ham. DOD is supporting DOS's efforts to look at reassessing
diplomatic security. As part of this review, DOD considered how the
role, mission, and resourcing of the Marine Corps Security Guards could
be adapted to respond to this new threat environment. In the near-term,
DOD has agreed with DOS to add 35 Marine Corps Security Guard
detachments globally over the next 2 to 3 years. DOD is working with
DOS now to identify specific locations for the new detachments.
DOD has also initiated coordination with the DOS to expand the
Marine Corps' role beyond their primary mission to protect classified
information. This could include expanded use of non-lethal weapons, and
additional training and equipment, to support the embassy Regional
Security Officer's response options when host nations' security force
capabilities are at risk of being overwhelmed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham

LIBYA

81. Senator Graham. General Ham, please provide a detailed analysis
of the military assets that could have arrived in Benghazi within 12
hours, and the approximate arrival time for each asset.
General Ham. [Deleted.]

82. Senator Graham. General Ham, what assets did you ask for or
recommend deploy to Libya on September 11 and 12, 2012?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

83. Senator Graham. General Ham, who did you speak to when you
requested the above assets? Please provide the approximate time of the
request.
General Ham. [Deleted.]

84. Senator Graham. General Ham, what military assets did
eventually deploy to Libya? Please provide the arrival time and date
for each asset's arrival in Libya.
General Ham. On September 11, 2012, the diverted surveillance
aircraft arrived on station over the Benghazi facility approximately
2300 (EET) hours after directed to move from its previous position. It
was replaced by another asset to maintain continual coverage.
On September 12, 2012, at approximately 0130 EET, a small U.S.
element from Tripoli landed in Benghazi.
On September 12, 2012, at approximately 2100 EET, the Fleet Anti-
Terrorism Security Team platoon and associated equipment arrived in
Tripoli and at approximately 2130 EET, the Special Operations Forces
deployed from the United States, and associated equipment, arrived at
an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.

[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Udall, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe,
McCain, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Blunt, and
Lee.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; and Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Steven M. Barney, minority
counsel; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Daniel A.
Lerner, professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Bradley
S. Watson, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King;
Christian Brose, Paul C. Hutton IV, and Elizabeth Lopez,
assistants to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Brandon Bell, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant
to Senator Ayotte; Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator
Fischer; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; Charles
Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt; and Robert Moore, assistant
to Senator Lee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today's hearing
continues a series of posture hearings that the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) is conducting on our combatant
commands. Today we receive testimony from the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), a
sub-unified command of STRATCOM.
Let us welcome General C. Robert Kehler, USAF, the
Commander of STRATCOM; and General Keith A. Alexander, USAF,
the Commander of CYBERCOM. I thank them both. We thank you for
your great work. We thank you. If you would pass along our
thanks to those who work with you for their service, we would
greatly appreciate it.
This hearing comes at a time when the Department of Defense
(DOD) and other Federal agencies face the twin threat of
sequestration and an expiring Continuing Resolution (CR) and we
will want to hear from our witnesses what impact budget
restrictions and uncertainty are likely to have on their
programs and their operations over the coming months.
General Kehler, here are five of the issues that I hope
you'll address this morning: First, are you satisfied with the
status of our nuclear deterrence?
Second, are you satisfied with the National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) ability to maintain our
nuclear stockpile so we can ensure without testing that the
stockpile remains safe and meets military requirements?
Third, do you believe we have the ability to protect our
space assets and to reconstitute them, if necessary, given the
growing congested and contested nature of space?
Fourth, DOD has allocated a block of the electromagnetic
spectrum that connects our space, cyber, and electronic warfare
assets to our forces. STRATCOM is the lead combatant command
for synchronizing spectrum operations. How concerned are you
about preserving DOD's access to this block of spectrum, given
the competing pressure to allocate more spectrum towards
commercial use?
Fifth and finally, what is your view on the links between
the space and cyber domains and the potential for integration
of capabilities and operations in both domains?
Now, relative to CYBERCOM, for years, and especially since
DOD proposed to establish a CYBERCOM, the SASC has emphasized
the lack of an effective, mature policy, strategy, rules of
engagement, doctrine, roles and missions, and command and
control arrangements that are so critical to managing this
vital but complex new domain. Progress in this area has been
slower than we desired, but appears to be picking up some
steam.
After Congress failed to pass comprehensive cyber security
legislation, the President developed and issued an Executive
order aimed at improving the security of critical
infrastructure and to better share cyber threat information.
The President has also recently issued a classified
Presidential Policy Directive governing cyber operations. DOD,
working through the interagency planning process, has developed
a set of emergency action procedures for cyber crisis
situations similar to the processes in place and regularly
exercised for nuclear and ballistic missile defense operations.
The Joint Staff is ready to issue its first-ever document
covering cyber doctrine. Finally, we understand that the Joint
Staff states that it will soon issue rules of engagement for
military commanders.
The fact that these foundational policy frameworks and
planning actions are now just taking shape serves as a stark
illustration of how immature and complex this warfare domain
remains.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2013 included a sense of Congress provision that raised
serious concerns about the complications that could be caused
by making CYBERCOM a full unified command. The NDAA also
included a provision that requires the Secretary of Defense to
create a process for designated defense contractors to report
to DOD when networks containing DOD information are
successfully penetrated, and we'd be interested in hearing the
views of our witnesses on our recent important addition to the
law in that regard.
Meanwhile, China's massive campaign to steal technology,
business practices, intellectual property, and business
strategies through cyberspace continues, and it continues
relentlessly. Last year's report by the National
Counterintelligence Executive, plus the recent report by the
Mandiant Corporation and the very recent Cyber National
Intelligence Estimate, all leave little doubt that China's
actions are a serious threat to our Nation's economic well-
being and to our security.
It's long past time when the United States and our allies,
who are also being attacked in this way, should be imposing
costs and penalties on China for their behavior. The Defense
Science Board (DSB) released a study in January that provides a
grim assessment of the ability of DOD and the owners of
critical infrastructure to defend vital systems and networks
against capable adversaries. In light of vulnerabilities
highlighted in that report, the DSB suggests building
resilience into our forces and infrastructure in addition to
trying to improve defenses.
We look forward to hearing from General Alexander on the
extent to which CYBERCOM is capable of preventing adversaries
from seriously damaging our critical infrastructure.
We have a long way to go to protect our vital
infrastructure and services from damaging cyber attacks. That's
why I supported the Lieberman-Collins bill that the Senate
failed to act on last year. That's the reason why the President
issued his recent Executive order. That's the reason why all of
us are deeply concerned about this issue and look to working
together to try to address the threat that exists particularly
from China in that area.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with all
of your statements and I am very concerned. I think it's a very
significant hearing with both Generals Kehler and Alexander. I
want to thank both of you for the time that you've given me
personally to help me along, particularly you, General
Alexander, because it's a tough issue that not many of us
understand, certainly not as well as you do.
The importance of our nuclear forces for the security of
the Nation and that of our allies was made clear by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Carter before this committee just last
month. Even in the face of the drastic budget cuts and all of
this brought about by sequestration, he said: ``We in the
Department of Defense will try to protect our nuclear
capabilities to the maximum extent possible,'' and that ``the
nuclear deterrence is the last thing that you want to do
serious damage to.'' While we all agree with that in this room,
there are a lot of people out there who really don't, because
it's not as well-understood as the conventional threats that
face us.
It's troubling, General Kehler, the statement that you made
to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) last week. As
sequestration impacts continued to grow, you said: ``Reduced
readiness and curtailed modernization will damage the perceived
credibility of our capabilities, increasing the risk to achieve
our primary deterrence and assurance objectives.'' You're
exactly right and I'm glad you made that very bold statement.
In other words, if we don't consistently demonstrate a
commitment to modernizing our nuclear deterrent both in words
and in funding, our allies might lose confidence in the U.S.
nuclear umbrella, while potential adversaries could be led to
believe that they hold a nuclear advantage over the United
States, which I think that gap is closing. It disturbs me.
While the President has been absent on the issue, I was
pleased to hear him acknowledge in his State of the Union
message the need to strengthen our own missile defense
capabilities.
Now, on the cyber end of it, I do agree--and I'm skipping a
lot of my opening statement because some of the contents made
references to China, because that is a fact and it would be
redundant. But this administration has thus far failed to
implement an effective cyber deterrence strategy that dissuades
those seeking to hold our economic and national security
interests at risk in cyberspace. Not a day goes by where it is
not reported that our national security is being exploited in
the cyber domain. Nation states such as Iran and China have
been exposed publicly for attempting to gain access to national
secrets and undermine our defense and economic interests.
Criminal and terrorist organizations continue to actively
pursue and exploit malicious capabilities, with little
resistance or consequences.
Despite my concern on White House policy, progress is being
made within DOD. Organizations and structures are maturing, and
DOD is beginning to rise above the interagency gridlock that's
sought to undermine DOD's reach.
I'm happy to welcome General Alexander and applaud him and
his team for the progress that they have made in just the last
year in developing the foundations necessary to start
developing an offensive cyber capability. I will confess to
them the conversation that you and I had. My concern over your
future is to make sure you're there long enough until we can
find somebody who understands this very complicated issue and
can deal with it as effectively as you have.
Certainly more must be done and the resources must be
allocated. However, progress is being made and I'm pleased to
see DOD is moving past the defense-only mind set. I think we
need to get beyond that so that we can understand that there's
an offensive angle to this that's going to have to be pursued.
So under sequester, every DOD account will be subject to
the highest level of scrutiny. The threats we face, however,
are blind to our fiscal woes and are emboldened by our
dysfunction. Every dollar we spend has to be maximized, and
those going toward nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and
cyber should be placed at a premium. That's nuclear deterrence,
missile defense, and cyber; that's what is the most significant
part, I believe, of the hearing that we're having today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator James M. Inhofe

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank General Kehler and General
Alexander for their many years of service to our Nation and acknowledge
the dedication of the brave men and women under their command, whose
main mission is to protect this nation against strategic attack.
The importance of our nuclear forces for the security of our Nation
and that of our allies was made clear by Deputy Secretary of Defense
Carter, when he told this committee last month that, even in the face
of the drastic budget cuts brought about by the sequester, ``we in the
Department of Defense will try to protect our nuclear capabilities to
the maximum extent possible, ``and that nuclear deterrence ``is the
last thing that you want to do serious damage to.''
Yet, his comments seem to foretell that despite the Department of
Defense's best efforts, we can expect shortfalls in funding for the
nuclear modernization commitments that were the basis for the
President's policy to reduce U.S. nuclear forces, as well as the
Senate's support for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
treaty.
It is important to recall the linkage between nuclear force
reductions and the need to modernize our nuclear infrastructure and
weapons. Indeed, the President's own 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
stated, ``these investments are essential to facilitating reductions
while sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond,''
It was terribly troubling to hear General Kehler tell the HASC last
week that, as the sequester impacts continue to grow, ``reduced
readiness and curtailed modernization damage the perceived credibility
of our capabilities, increasing the risk to achieving our primary
deterrence and assurance objectives.'' In other words, if we do not
consistently demonstrate--both through words and funding--a commitment
to modernize our nuclear deterrent, our allies might lose confidence in
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while potential adversaries could be led to
believe they might hold a nuclear advantage over the United States.
Another important rationale for the President's decision to reduce
both the role and numbers of nuclear weapons is what the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review refers to as ``the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional
military capabilities.'' Yet, we have heard from the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries that the sequester
and future years funding reductions will have real, negative
consequences for our ability to deal with crises around the world.
I would like to hear from General Kehler what these trends portend
for the role of U.S. nuclear forces in our military strategy,
especially in light of the fact that virtually all the other nuclear
powers are modernizing their nuclear forces and placing more reliance
on nuclear weapons in their national security strategy. Under these
circumstances, further reductions in our nuclear arsenal would be ill
advised.
I was pleased to hear the President finally acknowledge, in his
recent State of the Union address, the need to ``strengthen our own
missile defense capabilities.'' I hope the use of the phrase, ``our
own,'' was a specific reference to our ground-based midcourse defense
system, which I believe has suffered from neglect over the past 4 years
and now must be expanded and modernized to stay ahead of the ballistic
missile threat to the Homeland.
Unfortunately this administration has thus far failed to implement
an effective cyber deterrence strategy that dissuades those seeking to
hold our economic and national security interests at risk in
cyberspace. Not a day goes by where it is not reported that are
national security is being exploited in the cyber domain. Nation states
such as China and Iran have been exposed publicly for attempting to
gain access to national secrets and undermine our defense and economic
interests. Criminal and terrorist organizations continue to actively
pursue and exploit malicious capabilities with little resistance or
consequences. This must change. More must be done to make it clear that
there will be consequences for anyone who seeks to undermine our
national security through cyberspace. While the White House has been
quick to blame Congress on the need for cyber legislation, it has been
slow in developing and implementing the far more important strategy for
exposing, countering, and deterring our adversaries.
Despite my concerns on White House policy, progress is being made
within the Department of Defense. The organizations and structures are
maturing and the department is beginning to rise above the interagency
gridlock which has sought to undermine the Pentagon's reach. I am happy
to welcome General Alexander and applaud him and his team for the
progress they have made in just the last year in developing the
foundations necessary to start developing the offensive cyber
capabilities and personnel necessary to defend the Nation and project
power in the cyber domain.
Certainly, more must be done and resources must be allocated;
however, progress is being made and I am pleased to see for the
Department is moving past its defense only mindset. The full spectrum
of cyber defense--from our mainframe computers to our network switches
to our endpoints--must not be overlooked and the asymmetric and
relatively low cost potential of offensive cyber must be a priority.
Under sequester every Department of Defense account will be subject
to the highest level of scrutiny. The threats we face however are blind
to our fiscal woes and are emboldened by our dysfunction. Every dollar
we spend must be maximized and those going towards nuclear deterrence,
missile defense and cyber should be placed at a premium. The full
spectrum of strategic capabilities must not be overlooked, as they are
the Nation's ultimate insurance policy.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
General Kehler.

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND

General Kehler. Good morning, sir. With your permission,
I'd like to make my full statement a part of the record,
please.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Kehler. Good morning, sir, and Senator Inhofe,
distinguished members of the committee: I am honored to join
you today. It's a privilege to begin my third year leading the
outstanding men and women of STRATCOM.
I'm also pleased to be here with General Keith Alexander,
whose responsibilities as the Commander of CYBERCOM and
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) cover some of
the most critically important national security subjects.
General Alexander and I and our staffs are in constant contact,
I greatly value his leadership, his vision, and his counsel.
Uncertainty and complexity continue to dominate the
national security landscape, even as the United States
transitions from a decade of active conflict in Southwest Asia.
Uncertainty and complexity make this transition unlike any we
have experienced in the past. Many regions of the world remain
volatile and increasing economic and infrastructure connections
mean regional issues can quickly have global consequences.
Events over the past year validate this perspective.
Since my last appearance before the committee, we have seen
violent extremists continue to act against or threaten U.S.
interests, citizens, allies, partners, and our Homeland. Cyber
activities increased in both quantity and intensity, with the
potential for greater exploitation of U.S. intellectual
property, institutions, and critical infrastructure.
Iran's nuclear ambitions remain concerning. North Korea
conducted a missile launch in violation of its obligations
under multiple United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
resolutions and announced last month it conducted another
nuclear test. Civil war continues in Syria. Russia and China
continue to improve and demonstrate their strategic
capabilities.
Fiscal uncertainty is adding unique challenges. Not only
are the additional sequestration reductions steep, but the law
allows little flexibility in how to apply them, and we're
working from a CR while the Services are transitioning
contingency needs to the base budget--all of this during a time
when continued readiness is essential, modernization is
overdue, violent extremists remain active, threats in space and
cyberspace are increasing, and the possibility of nuclear and
ballistic missile proliferation persists.
As we confront these challenges, our enemies and potential
enemies are watching. In this uncertain and complex world,
STRATCOM remains focused on conducting the missions that are
most critical to protect our core national security interests,
and my priorities support this focus. Our fundamental purpose
remains constant: With the other combatant commands, we must
deter, detect, and prevent attacks against the United States,
assure our friends and allies of our security commitments to
them, and, if directed, employ appropriate force to achieve
national objectives should deterrence fail.
To do this, our men and women wield a range of
complementary capabilities to create the tailored effects the
Nation needs. Our primary objective is to prevent conflict by
influencing in advance the perceptions, assessments, and
decisions of those who would consider threatening our vital
national interests. Ultimately this requires the continuing
credibility of America's military capabilities, brought to bear
in concert with other elements of national power.
While our heritage in STRATCOM is nuclear and our nuclear
vigilance will never waver as long as those weapons exist,
today's STRATCOM is far more diverse and versatile than ever
before. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that STRATCOM is
capable of executing its assigned missions today. However,
given the potential impact fiscal uncertainty and declining
resources could have on STRATCOM, I am concerned that I may not
be able to say the same in 6 months or a year.
I'm most concerned with the impact financial uncertainty is
having on our people. Uniformed and nonuniformed members alike
have managed the effects of sustained high-stress combat
deployment and operational tempos. They willingly take personal
risks for their country, but they are fearful of taking
financial risks for their families. Hiring restrictions, salary
freezes, and the likelihood of unpaid furloughs are especially
troubling to our civilians. By the way, civilians comprise
about 60 percent of the STRATCOM headquarters staff. They hold
key leadership positions. They represent critical expertise and
they make up much of the essential workforce which provides
crucial functions like intelligence, maintenance, and
sustainment.
Because they are such dedicated patriots, I believe our
military and civilian members will cope with the effects of
financial uncertainty in the near term. But I worry that over
time our most experienced professionals will retire early and
our best young people will leave to pursue more stable
opportunities elsewhere. We are detecting hints of that now.
Beyond the human dimension, sequestration will eventually
impact the command's readiness and curtail growth in new areas
like cyber and cyber defense.
Now, even though the Services are trying to give STRATCOM's
missions as much priority treatment as possible within the
law--and you heard that from Deputy Secretary Carter last
month--we could not remain immune. So while the immediate
impact will vary by command, overall in STRATCOM the effect is
a bit like an avalanche. Seemingly small initial impacts are
going to grow. As time passes, we will see greater impacts and
potential impacts to things as Senator Inhofe mentioned, like
the nuclear deterrent, to global strike, to missile warning and
missile defense, the situational awareness in both space and
cyberspace, and to our support to warfighters around the globe.
In the longer term, continuing in this financial path will
affect STRATCOM's modernization and long-term sustainment
needs, potentially eliminating or jeopardizing a number of
important recapitalization efforts. Of course, ultimately such
reductions could impact our ability to deter and assure.
Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM's responsibilities have not changed,
but the strategic and fiscal environment in which we must carry
them out is much different than a year ago. I remain enormously
proud of the superb men and women I am privileged to lead and
potential adversaries must know that we can meet our mission
responsibilities today. But the pathway we're on is creating
growing risk to our defense strategy and our ability to execute
it.
I look forward to working with this committee and Congress
on these difficult and complex challenges. I will certainly
carry back your message of appreciation for the men and women
who we are privileged to be associated with. I look forward to
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. C.R. Kehler, USAF

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to join you today. It is my privilege to lead U.S Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), and on behalf of our 54,500 outstanding military
and civilian men and women I am pleased to report STRATCOM remains
capable and ready to meet our assigned missions. I thank Congress and
this committee for your support and I look forward to continuing to
work together to ensure our national security today and tomorrow.

STRATCOM TODAY

Uncertainty and complexity continue to dominate the national
security landscape. Today's operating environment is increasingly
characterized by the potential for persistent conflict across all
domains--air, sea, land, space and cyberspace--where state and non-
state actors alike can employ highly adaptive combinations of
strategies, tactics and capabilities to simultaneously and quickly
exploit and transit political, geographic and domain boundaries. These
hybrid threats are challenging earlier assumptions; stressing our
plans, practices, and organization; compelling unity of effort; and
demanding flexible and innovative approaches to create effects tailored
to the unique actors, circumstances and scenarios we face. In short,
yesterday's battlefield is rapidly becoming tomorrow's global
battlespace.
Events continue to validate this perspective. Even as the United
States continues to transition from today's conflicts, the reality of
preparing for tomorrow's challenges has emerged. Violent extremists
continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the
Homeland. Their acts remind us that we must remain both vigilant and
engaged with our combatant command (CCMD) partners to prevent a
terrible connection between such extremists and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). In December 2012, North Korea conducted a missile
launch in violation of its obligations under multiple United Nations
Security Council resolutions and announced last month it conducted
another nuclear test. Iran continues to pursue its ballistic missile
program and its nuclear ambitions. The Arab Spring continues to unfold
and the outcome remains unresolved. Syria, a state with significant
stocks of chemical weapons, continues to be gripped by civil war.
We continue to see improvements in more traditional militaries
whose capabilities can range from low-end conventional, to
sophisticated, all-domain regional and global (including WMD). China
conducted a successful anti-ballistic missile test and continues to
modernize its nuclear forces. South and East China Sea tensions rose
between China and the Philippines (Scarborough Shoals) and Japan
(Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands) respectively. Russia continues to modernize
its nuclear forces and increase its level of strategic military
activity.
Hostile cyber activities have increased in both quantity and
intensity, and the potential exists for even greater activity against
U.S. intellectual property, institutions, and critical infrastructure.
U.S. national power relies heavily on cyberspace and the capabilities
it enables; therefore, we must continue to improve the protection and
resilience of our networks as we work to increase cyber capacity and
capability.
Fiscal uncertainty presents our people with an unprecedented
combination of professional and personal concerns as well. The all-
volunteer military and civilian team has performed beyond our greatest
expectations and is the envy of the world; but some of the best young
uniformed and non-uniformed people assigned to STRATCOM are questioning
their future. The uncertainty surrounding civilian hiring restrictions,
salary freezes, and the possibility of unpaid furloughs is especially
troubling since 60 percent of the STRATCOM headquarters staff and much
of the essential workforce which supports our missions and sustains our
mission critical platforms and systems are civilians. Preserving this
combat-experienced military-civilian team in the face of further force
reductions, a potential decline in readiness and unpaid furloughs is
one of my greatest concerns.
The possibility of dramatic budget reductions creates additional
problems. The inflexible nature of cuts associated with sequestration
and the associated out year budget cuts of over $50 billion per year
across the Department of Defense, will likely cause dramatic decreases
in force readiness that will eventually impact our ability to deter
aggression and assure allies and partners. The impact of across-the-
board reductions and out year budget cuts to readiness accounts will
cascade as time passes; recovery from such cuts will take longer and be
more difficult to achieve. Similarly, cuts to investment accounts will
delay often deferred and much needed modernization to the nuclear
enterprise, curtail the expansion of cyber capabilities needed to meet
the growing threat, and will delay other key capabilities. In all cases
risk will increase.
The challenges inherent in these examples remind us that as we
plan, prepare and apply current capabilities to existing problems, we
must also remain aware of and prepared for the unexpected. Within the
new defense strategy we must maintain the organizational, programmatic,
and intellectual flexibility to deal with surprise and meet the
uncertainties of tomorrow's unforeseen problems.
STRATCOM remains focused on conducting the missions most critical
to protect the core national security interests described in the 2012
defense strategic guidance: defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates and
succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by
adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection;
countering WMD; effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and across
all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and
protecting the Homeland.
While our heritage is nuclear and our nuclear vigilance will never
waver as long as nuclear weapons exist, today's command is far more
diverse and versatile. The missions and forces assigned to this command
allow us to gain a global perspective and to create synergy from a
range of strategic capabilities--those that can impact many people or
systems, affect large physical areas, act across great distances,
persist over long periods of time, change the status quo in a
fundamental way, and provide the President ready military options in
extreme circumstances--that is unique among the CCMDs. STRATCOM's
nuclear and conventional strike, space, cyber, and other capabilities
remain foundational to confronting the challenges of the future. The
United States can neither deter adversaries and assure allies nor
prevail in war without them--simply put, STRATCOM's responsibilities
and capabilities underwrite freedom of action for our Nation and
generate viable options for our national leaders. Our seemingly diverse
missions share commonalities: they are strategic in nature, global in
scope, and they are interdependent with the responsibilities and
capabilities of the other CCMDs, the whole of the U.S. Government, and
key allies.

21ST CENTURY DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE

Future conflict will:

Encompass all domains (air, sea, land, space, and
cyberspace, all tied together through the electromagnetic
spectrum)
Cross traditional geographic and manmade boundaries
Involve a wider range of actors with access to
advanced, low-cost capabilities
Likely involve the U.S. homeland and multiple
combatant commands
Demand that the United States continue to evolve
toward an interdependent joint force that is integrated in
every aspect

STRATCOM's primary mission objective is to deter strategic attack
on the United States, our allies and partners by making anyone who
might contemplate such an attack recognize that they will not achieve
their goals and will pay an extraordinary price if they try. We employ
many means to influence the perceptions and assessments of others; but
the continuing credibility of America's capabilities is the most
effective deterrent against a strategic attack on the United States.
Deterrence and assurance have been part of the national lexicon for
well over half a century and, for many of those decades, strategic
deterrence was synonymous with nuclear deterrence (i.e., using nuclear
weapons to deter a massive nuclear or conventional attack on the United
States or our allies). Today we believe deterrence and assurance
concepts address a broader array of strategic attacks from individual
actors who will have widely different capabilities and motivations.
While nuclear attack will always remain unique in its potential for
impact and devastation, today's strategic attacks are potentially
broader and defined by their effect versus a specific weapon or means
of delivery. Therefore, it is increasingly clear that the capabilities
we need, to deter or defeat attacks, are those that can meet multiple
scenarios and take full account of the interdependencies and
interactions among CCMDs and across the air, sea, land, space, and
cyberspace domains--all tied together through the electromagnetic
spectrum.
It is also increasingly clear that we must carefully shape our
deterrence planning to specific actors and situations. To do this will
require a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of our potential
adversaries and their decisionmaking processes, a robust understanding
of the threats they pose, and more flexibility and speed in our
strategy development and planning processes. In practice, 21st century
deterrence encompasses a wider range of complementary tools, including
both nuclear and strong conventional forces, perhaps non-kinetic
capabilities, limited missile defenses, unfettered access and use of
space and cyberspace, and modern capabilities that are both resilient
and sustained.

STRATCOM Missions
Strategic Deterrence
Space Operations
Cyberspace Operations
Joint Electronic Warfare
Global Strike
Missile Defense
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Analysis and Targeting

Future conflicts will likely involve multiple CCMDs from the
outset, and so we must improve how we integrate our efforts across
CCMDs and with the whole of the U.S. Government and allies. We need the
resources, the situational awareness, the organizations, and the
decisionmaking capabilities with the responsiveness and flexibility to
provide the tailored effects the President might need before, during,
or after armed conflict.
Assuring U.S. allies and partners also contributes to deterrence by
demonstrating to our adversaries that our alliances and coalitions are
resilient and enduring. Our assurance efforts must leverage the
strengths of the individual CCMDs, Services, and agencies, and
complement other efforts already in place or in planning. Assurance is
not necessarily a byproduct of deterrence; it is a deliberate effort in
itself and one that often requires additional resources beyond those
needed for deterrence.
STRATCOM is helping to shape the DOD's approach to deterrence and
assurance. I'm pleased to report we have made significant progress in
this regard through our Deterrence and Assurance Campaign. This
campaign arranges STRATCOM's actions, operations, and messages in time,
space, and purpose to achieve our deterrence objectives, ensure combat
readiness, and generate unity of effort. The campaign is oriented
toward four strategic military objectives.

Enhancing strategic military deterrence. Adversaries
who contemplate strategic attack on the United States and our
allies must perceive unacceptable costs and an inability to
obtain desired outcomes.
Maintaining our readiness and capability to employ
force to prevent and defeat all strategic attacks, not just
nuclear.
Strengthening efforts to prevent proliferation and
use of WMD and mitigate effects if such weapons are used. This
includes accelerating the speed with which we develop and field
capabilities like standoff detection, better nuclear forensics
and improved global situational awareness.
Increasing the combat capability of the Joint Force
by continuing to integrate and exercise STRATCOM capabilities
and support plans across mission areas and with other CCMDs and
allies.
The end result of the campaign planning and
organizational effort is a STRATCOM that is more effective and
soundly positioned to meet today's challenges, deter tomorrow's
threats, and assure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to
them.

COMMAND PRIORITIES

CDR STRATCOM Priorities
Deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent force
Partner with the other combatant commands to win
today
Respond to the new challenges in space
Build cyberspace capability and capacity
Prepare for uncertainty

The new U.S. defense strategy is based on a future Joint Force that
will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and
technologically advanced. The strategy also incorporates the concepts
of networked warfare (recognizing the interdependence of both the
forces and the CCMDs) and unity of action (integrated military action
as part of a comprehensive whole of government and, when needed, multi-
national approach). Within this new strategy and in support of
STRATCOM's assigned missions, I have identified five priorities:
As long as nuclear weapons exist, STRATCOM's top priority must be
to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic
nuclear deterrent force. STRATCOM plans, operates and, if directed by
the President, employs the strategic nuclear deterrent force as needed
to achieve national objectives. To meet national deterrence objectives,
we continue to maintain a Triad of ballistic missile submarines,
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear capable heavy
bombers and associated aerial tankers, and an assured warning and
command and control system. To provide the President with maximum
flexibility, we maintain a portion of the missile submarine and ICBM
forces in a ready-to-use posture that is governed by strict nuclear
surety procedures and is constantly under the direct positive control
of the President. I can assure you that today's nuclear weapons and
Triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure, and effective.
My second priority is to bring STRATCOM's tremendous military
capabilities to bear in support of our CCMD partners as needed to
address today's conflicts. Over the last year we have worked hard with
the other CCMDs, departments and agencies to institutionalize and
enhance the integrated and synchronized joint force capability that was
the by-product of the last decade of conflict. To that end we are
actively exploring and creating new processes and relationships to
wield all of the Nation's capabilities in responding to future threats.
My third priority is to ensure that space capabilities will be
available whenever and wherever they are needed. Space capabilities are
integral to the American way of warfare and today's space environment
is characterized by more participants, more activity, and the
proliferation of a variety of capabilities that can threaten our access
to and freedom of action in space. In order to preserve the national
security, humanitarian, scientific, and commercial advantages we gain
from operating in space, STRATCOM has spent much of the last year
improving our contingency plans and working with our Service components
to enhance the resilience of our space capabilities.
My fourth priority is to continue building the cyberspace
capability and capacity. Cyberspace is central to civil, commercial,
humanitarian and national security endeavors as well and, like space,
we need to protect our access to and freedom of action in cyberspace.
We are also working with others in the U.S. Government to help protect
the Nation's intellectual property and critical infrastructure. We are
actively collaborating with partners in industry, academia, and the
Intelligence Community to achieve those goals. At the same time we are
working hard with U.S. Cyber Command to shape our future cyber force
and advocate for the resources to meet the increased demands of this
new domain.
Finally, we expend considerable effort trying to understand the
emerging strategic environment to avoid or limit the impact of surprise
which military history makes clear is a deadly enemy. We explore ways
to limit the impact of surprise by integrating our plans and operations
with other CCMDs, agencies, and partners through realistic and
challenging exercises, and by exploring alternative scenarios and
futures through aggressive tabletop exercises. We are also creating
opportunities for Joint Forces to exercise in an environment in which
space and cyberspace capabilities are degraded.

ENDURING ADVANTAGES

Given the uncertainty in the global environment abroad and the
fiscal environment at home, the Nation must rely ever more heavily on
the enduring advantages represented by our people and the ability of
our interdependent Joint Force to maintain global awareness and project
power. STRATCOM contributes and advocates for major capabilities that
enable these enduring advantages.

Our People
People are our greatest and most enduring strength. The men and
women of STRATCOM remain fully engaged with our many mission partners
every day--both at home and abroad--despite uncertainty and a high
mission pace multiplied by the inherent stresses of conflict and
combat. As a result of DOD-wide suicide statistics and other human
factors indicators, we have renewed our efforts to ensure our workforce
remains viable, strong, capable, and resilient. We have taken specific
steps to strengthen our workforce and enhance the working environment--
addressing the wholly unacceptable nature of sexual assault within our
ranks, respecting and including servicemembers of all sexual
orientations, understanding and treating combat-induced stress, and
confronting and preventing the tragedy of suicide. These efforts are a
good start toward protecting our most valuable asset, but we must do
more. Leaders at all levels of STRATCOM are emphasizing the critical
issues of personal health and well-being that are confronting our
military and civilian members and their families.
I fully support the efforts of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and Congress to recruit,
retain, and support our Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, and
civilian personnel. Our strategy demands that we also support
educational efforts (including lifelong science, technology,
engineering and math skills development) that will enable us to sustain
the unique and highly technical nuclear, global strike, space and cyber
workforce skills we need. However, I am extremely concerned about the
impacts of actual and potential budget reductions on our people. While
I believe these amazing professionals will continue to cope with
uncertainty in the near-term, I cannot say the same over time if the
financial risks to the individuals and their families persist.

Global Awareness
Our future success also depends on enhancing our enduring advantage
in global awareness. Over the past decade, U.S. air, sea, and space-
based capabilities have provided unfettered global access for the
surveillance and reconnaissance information needed to detect and
characterize trends and events. Most often, these platforms operated in
uncontested environments. As we go forward, STRATCOM and its mission
partners need to work to ensure the United States sustains this
advantage in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), cyberspace, space, and
other contested operating environments.
Space situational awareness (SSA) is foundational to unfettered
freedom of action in all domains. SSA involves not only characterizing
the dynamic physical arrangement of the space domain, but also the EMS
through which we transmit and receive spacecraft commands and mission
data. Protecting our assets from unwanted electromagnetic interference
is one of our highest priorities, and we are in the process of
streamlining procedures to detect, identify, characterize, geolocate,
and resolve such problems.
Many nations share the space domain and it is in our best interest
to create an environment where the sharing of SSA data facilitates
transparency. We provide conjunction analysis and collision warning for
space operators around the world, intent on reducing the risk of
collision that would create dangerous space debris. STRATCOM has
entered into 35 signed commercial SSA sharing agreements. In 2012, we
provided orbital data to 90 commercial and foreign, and 180 U.S.
entities. We received and reviewed nearly 500,000 satellite
observations and screened over 1,000 active satellites on a daily
basis. From those screenings we provided over 10,000 conjunction
warnings, supported 75 conjunction avoidance maneuvers, and fulfilled
over 300 orbital data requests for more than 85 separate entities.
Those numbers will grow every year, lending urgency to SSA improvements
and establishment of appropriate ``rules of the road'' that will govern
orbital behavior and allow us to more easily detect problems as they
occur.
We are also working to share the awareness advantages of space with
some of our closest allies and partners. The Combined Space Operations
concept is built upon the current Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)
at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, with virtual connections between it
and other nations' space operations centers around the world. This new
paradigm enables partnering nations to work together to maintain the
strategic advantage of access to space capabilities through
synchronized activities and sustainable, combined military space
operations.
Another component of global awareness, cyberspace, has become a key
element for operations in all other domains, and cyber capabilities
have enabled military forces to function with greater efficiency,
precision and lethality. Adversaries also recognize the contribution of
cyberspace to their overall warfighting capabilities and continue to
pursue the advantages that effective use of cyberspace can provide. The
result is a competitive and continuous life cycle of modification,
enhancement and replacement of information technology systems that
friends and foes alike can use to gain military, economic, or social
advantages. We believe that military functions and battlefield
operating systems will increasingly depend upon agile use of cyberspace
to gain advantages in combat.
Other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities also strengthen global awareness; the space capabilities
described just above provide some of these, but a large number of other
systems--manned and unmanned aircraft, ships, submarines, cyber,
human--make critical contributions as well. In crisis or contingency,
``ISR'' is one of the first capabilities commanders request and expect
for the duration of the mission. From determining the status of Syrian
chemical weapons, to identifying violent extremist organizations' safe
havens in North Africa, to monitoring tensions in the South and East
China Seas, to assessing Iran's progress with nuclear weapons, to
tracking the development and deployment of adversary ballistic
missiles--ISR has gone from an enabler to an essential component of all
military operations.
A fourth component of global awareness is control of usable
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Almost every modern
technological device is reliant on the EMS. The commercial sector is
now the primary driver of spectrum technology development which has led
to an exponential increase in the availability of EMS-dependent devices
and a global proliferation of emerging commercial off-the-shelf and
dual-use technologies. This proliferation creates competition with the
military's required access to the EMS and potentially pits economics
against national security needs. STRATCOM is working with the Services,
Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to engage
the whole of government to develop a cooperative way ahead to secure
spectrum access.
STRATCOM employs capabilities in the air, space, cyberspace, and at
sea in order to ensure the Nation maintains global awareness as the
foundation for deterrence and, ultimately, to project power when and
where needed.

Power Projection
The United States has long held a decisive military advantage
through our ability to project power to any corner of the globe. U.S.
conventional forces are second to none and our forward presence around
the world ensures we can rapidly respond to crisis in any theater of
operations. Adversaries and potential adversaries have taken note of
this and are working to deny us this advantage through A2/AD
strategies, improvements to their own capabilities, and the acquisition
of WMD to discourage or limit U.S. action. As described in the 2012 DOD
strategic guidance, ``In order to credibly deter potential adversaries
and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States
must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access
and freedom to operate are challenged.''
The ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), ICBMs, heavy bombers, and
cruise missiles assigned to STRATCOM remain the core of our nuclear
deterrent. These highly reliable platforms are credible because we
continue to invest the resources required to properly evaluate their
performance and upgrade their capabilities on a recurring basis. Each
time we test a ballistic missile or forward-deploy a heavy bomber, our
allies and potential adversaries take note; our ability to
transparently demonstrate the continued effectiveness of these tools
creates a lasting impression which enhances our deterrent.
As effective as the U.S. deterrent force is today, we must plan for
the likely circumstance that while we are projecting power abroad in a
future crisis or conflict, we will also be defending the homeland in
cyberspace and against missile or terrorist attack, perhaps at the
outset of--or even before--a regional conflict goes ``hot''. This is an
operational challenge that has strategic implications for warning,
thresholds, plans, and responses. Therefore, U.S. plans and operations
across multiple CCMDs must be so well integrated and synchronized that
when executed, they function as a single, coherent American campaign.
Over the past year, STRATCOM has begun a complete reassessment of our
operational plans to ensure we are well-integrated with our mission
partners in the other CCMDs. We continue to exercise and seek robust
training opportunities with these partners (including opportunities
that highlight operations in contested environments) to ensure we are
ready to achieve the objectives directed by the country's senior
leaders.

KEY INVESTMENTS

Deciding what capabilities are needed to meet these goals--
hardware, people, organizations and procedures--is more difficult.
Success in this context will be increasingly problematic as resources
decline, but we can compensate by complementing planned investments
with new operational concepts, more comprehensive and collaborative
plans, and more effective use of the capabilities we have.

Key Investment: Nuclear Deterrent Forces
Over the past 2 decades, the United States has responded to
changing geopolitical conditions by making appropriate reductions in
the total number of nuclear delivery platforms we operate and the
number of weapons in our nuclear stockpile. These reductions were
determined based on a careful assessment of the capabilities required
to provide the options and effects a President might need to achieve
national security objectives. These capabilities include the nuclear
weapons, the strategic delivery platforms, surveillance and
reconnaissance systems, supporting intelligence, and the systems by
which we command and control these unique forces. We must continue to
invest in each of these areas even as we reduce to force levels
specified by New START.
Many of our current nuclear command and control (NC3) systems were
designed for the Cold War and require modernization in order to
effectively meet the challenges presented in the evolving security
environment. Using new and emerging technologies, we have set a course
to transform the Nation's NC3 architecture to achieve robust and
resilient 21st century capabilities. As part of modernizing nuclear
command and control, last year we broke ground on the new STRATCOM
Command and Control (C2) Facility. Our current headquarters was built
in 1957 to support a single mission, nuclear deterrence and operations,
with the corresponding C2 technology of the time (the land line
telephone). Our greatly expanded mission set, combined with the vastly
more complex supporting technology placed increasing demands on the
legacy electrical and air handling systems to the point where we suffer
numerous electrical, cooling, water, fire detection/suppression, and
other basic service interruptions. Your continued support for the new
facility is greatly appreciated and will ultimately provide better
command and control for all of our strategic forces.
The Triad of SSBNs, ICBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, all
with their associated support elements--offers a mutually reinforcing
strategic package that provides a credible deterrent to our
adversaries, assurance to our allies and partners, and flexibility for
the President.

Because of the extended service life of the current
SSBN fleet, it is essential to provide sufficient resources to
replace our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Last
year's decision to delay the Ohio-class Replacement Program by
2 years is all the risk I would recommend in this critical
program.
The Minuteman III force is sustainable through 2030
and potentially beyond with additional modernization
investment. The ongoing Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
Analysis of Alternatives is studying the full range of concepts
to sustain this Triad leg beyond 2030.
Planned sustainment and modernization activities will
ensure a credible heavy nuclear and conventional bomber
capability through 2040 for the B-52 and 2050 for the B-2.
Looking forward, a new, long-range nuclear-capable penetrating
bomber is required. STRATCOM is working with the Air Force to
develop requirements for the next nuclear and conventional
capable long-range strike platform and long-range stand-off
missile. Additionally, the Air Force is replacing the aging KC-
135 tanker fleet with the KC-46A, ensuring an enduring air
refueling capability essential to long-range bomber operations.

Regarding the nuclear weapons themselves, modernization has in
practice meant sustainment of the nuclear warheads manufactured 20-plus
years ago. At the same time, the United States has maintained a
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for over two decades. Thus,
the nuclear weapons enterprise faces the complex challenges of
certifying the effectiveness and reliability of nuclear weapons without
actually testing them with nuclear explosions. Considerable progress
has been made toward managing these challenges with aggressive science
and surveillance programs, but our future confidence in the stockpile
will depend centrally on our continuing ability to attract outstanding
people with scientific, engineering and technological talent to this
work.

Key Investment: Global Strike
Today, the only prompt global strike capability to engage
potentially time-sensitive, fleeting targets continues to be ballistic
missile systems armed with nuclear weapons. We continue to require a
deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the President
a range of flexible military options to address a small number of
highest-value targets, including in an anti-access and area denial
environment.

Key Investment: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
STRATCOM continues to make progress in our global CWMD efforts by
synchronizing planning efforts across the combatant commands through
cooperation on regional CWMD campaigns, alignment with Theater Campaign
Plans and incorporation of CWMD objectives and concepts in deliberate
and crisis action planning efforts with combatant commands.
Identifying and countering WMD requires extensive technical
knowledge, capabilities, and timely and relevant intelligence. In
support of DOD objectives, STRATCOM continues to pursue capabilities
necessary to detect, interdict, and contain WMD. One of my highest
priorities in addition to securing and reducing dangerous materials is
acquiring the capabilities to monitor and track lethal agents and their
means of delivery, and defeating or responding to the use of these
weapons. Just this year, we established and sponsored a new University
Affiliated Research Center (UARC). The center will advance cutting-edge
defense research in support of STRATCOM--as well as the rest of the
U.S. Government--in the mission areas of global deterrence and
combating weapons of mass destruction, along with international space
and cyber law. The UARC will help address these challenges by providing
unique access to academic perspectives and research methods not
currently found anywhere in the DOD, and will help ensure critical
skill sets are nurtured, developed and available for DOD to engage
current and future CWMD challenges. We are truly excited about this new
partnership.
A key element of our CWMD efforts is the continuing maturation of
STRATCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E).
The SJFHQ-E achieved initial operational capability in September 2012
and is successfully supporting the other combatant commands with WMD
elimination expertise and planning. When fully operational, SJFHQ-E
will be able to quickly integrate into an operational headquarters,
conduct both deliberate and crisis planning, and maintain awareness of
the WMD environment.

Key Investment: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
The ISR community is increasingly being challenged to operate
effectively in anti-access/area-denial environments. Additionally, our
ability to process and analyze data from increasingly capable ISR
platforms is a growing challenge. Analysts are dealing with more data
on an increased operations tempo that imposes ever-greater demands on
analysis and reporting timeliness. Greater efficiencies are clearly
needed, and we are seeking them through improved data management,
increased computing power and capability to help the analysts, and more
effective management of ISR processing, exploitation and dissemination.
Our intent is to manage resources globally while maintaining regional
and local focus, thus ensuring we can more quickly reprioritize during
and between emerging crises and contingencies, guaranteeing knowledge
dominance for our commanders. Additionally, we are looking at ways we
can reduce these gaps through globally connected, focused integration
and by managing the exploitation and analytic resources in a more
unified structure.

Key Investment: Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
In August 2012, STRATCOM established a federated Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) Office, staffed by subject
matter experts from across the headquarters and our components. This
new organization supports all CCMDs with spectrum advocacy, operations,
test and evaluation, and contingency planning. The JEMSO Office, in
collaboration with the Joint Staff, is driving the development of a
holistic JEMSO policy and doctrine that consolidates the activities of
electronic warfare and spectrum management in order to significantly
improve spectrum-related mission cohesion, agility, and responsiveness.
We have created a mission partnership with OSD and the Joint Staff to
chart a path forward regarding strategy, doctrine, and best practices
to ensure that all facets of the process are built in a cogent and
logical manner. Engagement beyond DOD will be vital for success in
management of this mission area. The JEMSO Office will support the
combatant commands through contingency planning, training, and advocacy
for EMS capabilities to enhance combat effectiveness across all
warfighting domains. To address the rapid technological advances and
significant proliferation of EMS-dependent systems, STRATCOM's Joint
Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) is leading a comprehensive, globally
oriented, cross-domain, JEMSO assessment. This assessment will continue
STRATCOM's effort to inform EMS-dependent capability acquisitions,
ensuring our warfighters are armed with the best possible training and
equipment to effectively operate in this dynamic environment.

Key Investment: Missile Defense
Ballistic missiles continue to become more accurate, lethal, and
capable--remaining a significant threat to the U.S. Homeland and a
growing threat to our allies and our forces deployed abroad. In
response, U.S. and allied capabilities to deter, detect, and defeat
these weapons are also growing, with decades of research and
development continuing to pay dividends in terms of capability and
credibility. Missile defense capabilities address limited threats to
the homeland and our regional partners and allies. Ballistic missile
threats are likely to grow at least as rapidly as our defensive assets,
giving us little margin for error in acquisition and force management
decisions. Sustained missile defense investments support deterrence and
assurance goals by significantly improving the protection of our
Homeland, our forward-based forces, and our allies and partners.
STRATCOM is committed to future capability development efforts that
leverage past successes, address the most pressing and most likely
threats, and produce field-tested, reliable assets in a cost-effective
manner.
Over the past year, these efforts substantially improved our
overall missile defenses. We deployed and integrated radars in Europe
and the Middle East, improving threat coverage and available battle
space. We concluded a review board and plan to test a revised design of
the Capability Enhanced (CE II) interceptor to return it to full
mission capability. We increased the number of Aegis BMD-equipped
ships. We conducted testing and development of future elements of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), an effort that improves
missile defenses through the acquisition and integration of more
advanced capabilities and the expansion of key partnerships.
STRATCOM coordinates the integrated air and missile defense
Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) across other CCMDs to improve
Service and Missile Defense Agency understanding of prioritized joint
warfighter capability needs. To this end the PCL advocates for
continued support to regional and homeland missile defense needs. This
includes the upgrade of early warning radars and their integration with
existing fire control systems for enhanced early warning and
engagement. More broadly speaking we must avoid delays in development
and fielding of needed missile program upgrades. We must also continue
testing individual components in an operationally realistic end-to-end
manner, and preserve integrated multinational exercises which
contribute to enhanced operational cooperation and increased confidence
in our capability and that of our allies. This enhances efforts to
provide persistent detection; expand data sharing among the United
States, allies, and partners; field effective defensive systems; and
provide appropriately robust joint training. As the Joint Functional
Manager for missile defense capabilities, STRATCOM recommends the
global allocation of low-density, high-demand assets, including force
rotations, and force sufficiency--thus making the best use of limited
resources.

Key Investment: Space
Space is no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers--the number
of countries that share the domain continues to grow as barriers to
entry continue to decline. Space is foundational to the global economy,
international strategic stability, and our national security. However,
the strategic advantages space provides are in danger of diminishing.
America must continue its leadership role to ensure space is
accessible, usable, and responsibly preserved for all users. As the
CCMD responsible for military space operations, support, and capability
advocacy, we remain focused on ensuring intergovernmental
collaboration, international cooperation, and access to and shared use
of space.
Access to orbit remains vital to national security and the key to
achieving it is an industrial base that is capable, responsive and
affordable. Diversity in the launch marketplace could prove a positive
development, and accordingly STRATCOM supports the Air Force's efforts
to expand the available industrial base of certified and proven launch
providers. The success of companies like Space-X is an encouraging step
in the right direction but we must continue to invest in capabilities
that assure our access to space.
We must retain a robust and enduring capability to detect, track
and analyze each of the more than over 20,000 objects on orbit today.
Clearly, there is an international demand for continued and ever-
improving SSA, but challenges remain in the form of critical SSA
architecture legacy elements that are well past their design life.
Addressing these challenges remains a high priority but fluctuating
funding profiles and constrained budgets make maintenance of existing
forces and infrastructure and timely acquisition of new capabilities
more difficult. The JSpOC is enabled by the JSpOC Mission System (JMS)
which is being developed to provide key SSA, command and control, data
processing, integration, and exploitation capabilities. Continued JMS
progress is vital to streamlined data processing integration,
information sharing with partners and allies, and understanding of
adversary intent in space.
Our assessment of existing on-orbit and ground-based communication,
intelligence, surveillance, geolocation, and environmental monitoring
assets is acceptable yet fragile. To preclude any gaps in our ability
to provide support for the warfighter, we must program and procure
replacements to our aging systems in a timely manner.

Key Investment: Cyberspace
The great power of technology--and our reliance on it--means that
cyber threats represent one of the most serious national security,
public safety, and economic challenges facing the Nation. The ongoing
theft of the Nation's critical commercial, civil and unclassified
military data by foreign intelligence and security services continues
to erode U.S. economic and national security and reduce the competitive
edge of the U.S. businesses. U.S. Government departments, the private
sector, allies and international partners must become more actively
involved in securing our collective networks and to preventing our
adversaries from inadvertently gaining generational increases in
technology through inadequate cyber security practices.
Improving the DOD's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace
requires investment in five major areas: defensible architecture (the
Joint Information Environment), trained and ready forces, effective
command and control, global situational awareness, and policies and
rules of engagement to defend the Nation in cyberspace. Of these, the
most urgent investment is increasing the numbers, training and
readiness of our cyber forces. We are recruiting, training, and
retaining the best and brightest our Nation has to offer, but the
operational demands of cyberspace exceed our capacity to conduct
sustained operations. We must continue to grow and align our cyber
forces to enable operations and support CCDRs and their components.
It is also essential that we prepare our forces to operate in a
cyberspace environment in which expected network resources and data are
degraded or unavailable, or whose confidentiality and integrity cannot
be confirmed. Toward this end we have made progress in developing joint
cyberspace training and certification standards that will serve as the
common foundation for training all DOD cyber operators.
Sharing of cyber threat indicators and countermeasures must occur
in near real-time to enable prevention as well as response. We are
fostering close information sharing relationships with the Department
of Homeland Security, law enforcement agencies and private sector
companies in the Defense Industrial Base, but we need to make it easier
for the government to share threat information more broadly. At the
same time we must also establish and develop baseline standards for our
critical private-sector infrastructure to help companies take proactive
measures to secure their networks.

CONCLUSION

The Nation and our military are confronted with an unprecedented
confluence of geopolitical, technological, and fiscal challenges that
have the potential to threaten the readiness of our military, the
execution of our National Security Strategy and the security of our
Nation. These challenges may be daunting but they are not paralyzing.
We are building our future on a strong and successful past, and your
support, together with the hard work of the outstanding men and women
of the U.S. Strategic Command, will ensure that we remain ready, agile,
and effective in deterring strategic attack, assuring our allies, and
defeating current and future threats.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Kehler.
General Alexander.

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CYBER COMMAND

General Alexander. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking
Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. It's
an honor to lead the men and women of CYBERCOM. It's also a
tremendous honor to work with and for General Bob Kehler. He
has been truly supportive of everything that we're trying to do
in CYBERCOM, and he's the only one that's nice to me, and as an
intelligence officer, that's unique. [Laughter.]
It does give me great pleasure to come here today and talk
to you about the great things that we're doing at CYBERCOM, but
also to address some of the questions that you've put on the
table and I think some of the questions that have troubled the
committee in the past. I will try to answer some of those. I
cannot answer all of those today.
First, the role of DOD. It takes a team to operate in
cyberspace and we've talked about this team approach. But at
times I think in talking about the team approach we're not
clear on who's in charge when. For defending the Nation in
cyberspace or in any way when the Nation is under attack,
that's a DOD mission and that falls to STRATCOM and CYBERCOM in
cyberspace. We are also responsible for supporting the
combatant commands in their cyberspace operations and for
defending the DOD networks, as well as supporting the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and defending critical
infrastructure. We must also gather important threat
information to protect, prevent, and mitigate and recover from
cyber incidents in support of DHS and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
As I said, no single public or private entity has all the
required authorities, resources, or capabilities to respond to
or prevent a serious cyber attack. I work closely with
Secretary Napolitano and Deputy Secretary Lew at DHS and with
Director Bob Mueller at FBI. We all see eye-to-eye on the
importance of cyber, of supporting each other in these cyber
missions. FBI's role in domestic cyberspace is absolutely
critical to disrupting cyber criminals and stopping cyber
attacks and leading investigation in those areas. DHS' work to
defend the Government and to strengthen the security posture of
critical infrastructure is essential. They are the lead for
domestic cyber security and help protect Federal networks and
critical infrastructure.
To act quickly, we must have clear lanes of responsibility
and rules of engagement. We all recognize that the private
sector plays a key role in this area, and having the ability to
work with the private sector is important to us and one of the
key reasons we need cyber legislation. The Executive order
issued last month, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, is a step in the
right direction, but it does not take away the need for cyber
legislation.
I'd like to point out before I go forward that civil
liberties, oversight, and compliance are key for both CYBERCOM
and NSA in operating in this space, and we take that
requirement sincerely and to heart and ensure that we do every
part of this properly. I would also point out that we can do
both. You can protect civil liberties and privacy and protect
our Nation in cyberspace. I think that's one of the things that
we need to educate the American people on, how do we do that,
how do we work with industry to do this.
If you look at the strategic landscape--you've hit on much
of that, Mr. Chairman. When you look at the strategic landscape
from our perspective, it's getting worse. Cyber effects are
growing. We've seen the attacks on Wall Street over the last 6
months grow significantly, over 140 of those attacks over the
last 6 months. Last summer in August we saw a destructive
attack on Saudi Aramco where the data on over 30,000 systems
were destroyed. If you look at industry, especially the
antivirus community and others, they believe it's going to grow
more in 2013, and there's a lot that we need to do to prepare
for this.
Let me just talk a little bit about what we're doing to
prepare for it from our perspective. As many of you know, we
are already developing the teams that we need, the tactics,
techniques, procedures, and the doctrine for how these teams
would be employed, with a focus on defending the Nation in
cyberspace.
I would like to be clear that this team, this Defend-the-
Nation team, is not a defensive team; this is an offensive team
that the DOD would use to defend the Nation if it were attacked
in cyberspace. Thirteen of the teams that we are creating are
for that mission set alone. We're also creating 27 teams that
would support combatant commands and their planning process for
offensive cyber capabilities. Then we have a series of teams
that would defend our networks in cyberspace. Those three sets
of teams are the core construct for what we're working with and
the Services to develop our cyber cadre.
As you noted, the key here is training our folks to the
highest standard possible. I think that's the most important
thing that we are on the road to and it's the most important
partnership that we have with NSA and others, is ensuring that
the training standards that we have for our folks is at the
highest level.
I'd just like to hit on a few key points that we're doing
to develop this cyber strategy. You mentioned command and
control. General Kehler, the combatant commands, the Service
Chiefs, and I are all looking at the command and control, how
we work this with the other combatant commands. That's a key
issue. We have done a lot of work on that and we've ironed out
how the joint cyber centers at each combatant command would
work with CYBERCOM, how we push information back and forth, and
how we'd have operational control and direct support of teams
operating in their area. There will be more to do in this as
the teams come on line.
One of the key things that we have to address is
situational awareness, how do you see an attack in cyberspace.
Today seeing that attack is almost impossible for the DOD.
Specifically, an attack on Wall Street would probably not be
seen by us. It's going to be seen by the private sector first,
and that's a key need for information-sharing. It has to be
real-time to DOD, DHS, and FBI, all at the same time, one
government team. If we're going to respond in time to make a
difference, we have to see that in real time. Those companies
that are sharing that information with us have to have
liability protection.
We're also building the operational picture that we would
share, CYBERCOM would share, with the other combatant commands,
with DHS, with FBI, and with other national leaders.
We need a defensible architecture, and you've heard about
the joint information environment, our cloud security. Not only
is that more defensible, it was created by some of our folks to
come up with the most defensible architecture we could make;
it's also more secure. It's not perfect. No architecture is
perfect in security, but it is better than where we are and
it's cheaper, and it's something that we should push for.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned authorities, policies, and
standing rules of engagement. We're working that hard, but, as
you've already stated, this is a new area for many of our
folks, especially within the administration, within Congress,
and the American people. Setting those right, we're being
cautious in ensuring that we're doing that exactly right and
sharing the information we have with Congress.
So in conclusion, from my perspective no one actor is to
blame for our current level of preparedness in cyberspace. Many
don't understand how serious the threat is, so we need to
educate people on this threat. We must address this as a team,
sharing unique insights across government and with the private
sector. We must leverage the Nation's ingenuity through an
exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.
The U.S. Government has made significant strides in defining
cyber doctrine, organizing cyber capabilities, and building
cyber capacity. We must do much more to sustain our momentum in
an environment where adversary capabilities continue to evolve
as fast or faster than our own.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.
[The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Keith B. Alexander, USA

Thank you very much, Chairman Levin and Ranking Member Inhofe, for
inviting me to speak to you and your colleagues today on behalf of the
men and women of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). I have the honor of
leading them on a daily basis, and let me assure you there is not a
finer and more dedicated team of servicemembers and civilian personnel
anywhere. It gives me great pleasure to appear before you to talk about
their accomplishments, and to describe some of the challenges they face
in performing their difficult but vital mission of keeping U.S.
military networks secure, helping to protect our Nation's critical
infrastructure from national-level cyber attacks, assisting our
combatant commanders around the world, and working with other U.S.
Government agencies tasked with defending our Nation's interests in
cyberspace.
CYBERCOM is a subunified command of U.S. Strategic Command in
Omaha, though we are based at Fort Meade, MD. We have approximately 834
active-duty military and civilians assigned from an authorized end
strength of 917 (plus contractors), and a budget of approximately $191
million for fiscal year 2013. CYBERCOM has strong, evolving, and
growing cyber components representing each of the Services: Fleet Cyber
Command/Tenth Fleet, Army Cyber Command/Second Army, Air Force Cyber
Command/24th Air Force, and Marine Forces Cyber Command. Each of our
Service Cyber Components also has representation at our headquarters.
Combined we and they have more than 11,000 people in our force mix.
CYBERCOM shares its headquarters with key mission partners in the
National Security Agency (NSA), which I also lead. CYBERCOM's
colocation with NSA promotes intense and mutually beneficial
collaboration. The Department of Defense (DOD) established CYBERCOM in
2010 to leverage NSA's capabilities. This partnership is key to what we
are doing now, and provides the essential context for all the
activities I shall describe below. The people under my command and
direction at CYBERCOM and NSA are collectively responsible for
operating the Department's information networks, detecting threats in
foreign cyberspace, attributing threats, securing national security and
military information systems, and helping to ensure freedom of action
for the U.S. military and its allies in cyberspace--and, when directed,
defending the Nation against a cyber attack. Also nearby at Fort Meade
is another key mission partner, the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA). The constellation of agencies and capabilities in the
Washington, DC, region makes for a unique synergy of people and ideas--
a nexus for military and national cybersecurity innovation.
CYBERCOM has deployed representatives and mission support elements
worldwide. We have an expeditionary cyber support unit forward in
Afghanistan. We also have liaison officers at each Combatant Command
(serving as that Command's CSE lead) and in several other key offices
and agencies in the Washington area. The flow of information and advice
across CYBERCOM and its Service components and the commands, agencies,
and foreign mission partners here and overseas is improving slowly but
steadily.
Since I last spoke with you in March 2012, our progress has
accelerated. In December we moved ahead with building a balanced and
highly capable military cyber force designed to meet our joint
warfighting requirements. We have laid out and codified team
composition, training, and certification standards to field a world-
class force in support of the Combatant Commands (CCMD). Although we
have much work to do, we are focused on doing it right and meeting the
CCMDs' and the Nation's most pressing cyber defense requirements. In
short, we have moved ahead to normalize cyber operations within the
U.S. military, and to turn that capability into a reliable option for
decisionmakers to employ in defending our Nation. This progress will
not only make our military more capable but our networks and
information more secure. We have serious threats facing us, as I shall
explain. Our progress, however, can only continue if we are able to
fulfill our urgent requirement for sufficient trained, certified, and
ready forces to defend U.S. national interests in cyberspace.

THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

U.S. Cyber Command operates in a dynamic and contested environment
that literally changes its characteristics each time someone powers on
a networked device. Geographic boundaries are perhaps less evident in
cyberspace, but every server, fiber-optic line, cell tower, thumb
drive, router, and laptop is owned by someone and resides in some
physical locale. In this way cyberspace resembles the land domain--it
is all owned, and it can be reshaped. Most networked devices, for
example, are in private hands, and their owners can deny or facilitate
others' cyber operations by how they manage and maintain their networks
and devices. Cyberspace as an operating environment also has aspects
unique to it. Events in cyberspace can seem to happen instantaneously.
Data can appear to reside in multiple locations. There is a great deal
of anonymity, and strongly encrypted data are virtually unreadable. In
cyberspace, moreover, sweeping effects can be precipitated by states,
enterprises, and individuals, with the added nuance that such cyber
actors can be very difficult to identify. The cyber landscape also
changes rapidly with the connection of new devices and bandwidth, and
with the spread of strong encryption and mobile devices. Despite the
unique characteristics of cyberspace, states still matter because they
can affect much of the physical infrastructure within their borders.
Convergence is our watchword; our communications, computers, and
networks are merging into one digital environment as our political,
economic, and social realms are being reshaped by the rush of
innovation.
In this environment that is both orderly and chaotic, beneficial
and perilous, we at CYBERCOM have to focus on actors who possess the
capability--and possibly the intent--to harm our Nation's interests in
cyberspace or to use cyber means to inflict harm on us in other ways.
Unfortunately, the roster of actors of concern to us is growing longer
and growing also in terms of the variety and sophistication of the ways
they can affect our operations and security.
State actors continue to top our list of concerns. We feel
confident that foreign leaders believe that a devastating attack on the
critical infrastructure and population of the United States by cyber
means would be correctly traced back to its source and elicit a prompt
and proportionate response. Nonetheless, it is possible that some
future regime or cyber actor could misjudge the impact and the
certainty of our resolve.
We have some confidence in our ability to deter major state-on-
state attacks in cyberspace but we are not deterring the seemingly low-
level harassment of private and public sites, property, and data. As
former Secretary of Defense Panetta explained to an audience in New
York last October, states and extremist groups are behaving recklessly
and aggressively in the cyber environment. Such attacks have been
destructive to both data and property. The Secretary mentioned, for
example, the remote assaults last summer on Saudi Aramco and RasGas,
which together rendered inoperable--and effectively destroyed the data
on--more than 30,000 computers. We have also seen repressive regimes,
desperate to hold on to power in the face of popular resistance, resort
to all manner of cyber harassment on both their opponents and their own
citizens caught in the crossfire. Offensive cyber programs and
capabilities are growing, evolving, and spreading before our eyes; we
believe it is only a matter of time before the sort of sophisticated
tools developed by well-funded state actors find their way to non-state
groups or even individuals. The United States has already become a
target. Networks and websites owned by Americans and located here have
endured intentional, state-sponsored attacks, and some have incurred
damage and disruption because they happened to be along the route to
another state's overseas targets.
Let me draw your attention to another very serious threat to U.S.
interests. The systematic cyber exploitation of American companies,
enterprises, and their intellectual property continued unabated over
the last year. Many incidents were perpetrated by organized
cybercriminals. Identity and data theft are now big business, netting
their practitioners large profits and giving rise to an on-line sub-
culture of markets for stolen data and cyber tools for stealing more.
Much cyber exploitation activity, however, is state-sponsored. Foreign
government-directed cyber collection personnel, tools, and
organizations are targeting the data of American and western
businesses, institutions, and citizens. They are particularly targeting
our telecommunications, information technology, financial, security,
and energy sectors. They are exploiting these targets on a scale
amounting to the greatest unwilling transfer of wealth in history.
States and cybercriminals do not leave empty bank vaults and file
drawers behind after they break-in--they usually copy what they find
and leave the original data intact--but the damage they are doing to
America's economic competitiveness and innovation edge is profound,
translating into missed opportunities for U.S. companies and the
potential for lost American jobs. Cyber-enabled theft jeopardizes our
economic growth. We at CYBERCOM work closely with our interagency
partners to address these threats.
We must also watch potential threats from terrorists and
hacktivists in cyberspace. The Intelligence Community and others have
long warned that worldwide terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and
its affiliates have the intent to harm the United States via cyber
means. We agree with this judgment, while noting that, so far, their
capability to do so has not matched their intent. This is not to
downplay the problem of terrorist use of the Internet. Al Qaeda and
other violent extremist groups are on the Web proselytizing,
fundraising, and inspiring imitators. We should not ignore the
effectiveness with which groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates
radicalize ever larger numbers of people each year--on more continents.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies cite instances
in which would-be terrorists found motivation and moral support for
suicide attacks at jihadist websites and chat rooms. This is an
especially serious and growing problem in areas of hostilities where
our troops and personnel are deployed. Another threat that is not
growing as fast as we might have feared, on the other hand, is that of
hacktivists with a cause or a grievance that leads them to target U.S.
Government and military networks. Our vulnerabilities to this sort of
disruption remain, but 2012 saw fewer such incidents than 2011.

LOOKING AHEAD: THE COMMAND'S PRIORITIES

I have established several priorities for U.S. Cyber Command in
dealing with these risks and threats. We are actively working to guard
DOD's networks and information and helping to defend the Nation. Key to
countering these threats is learning how to grow our capabilities in
this challenging domain. We have no alternative but to do so because
every world event, crisis, and trend now has a cyber-aspect to it, and
decisions we make in cyberspace will routinely affect our physical or
conventional activities and capabilities as well. CYBERCOM is building
cyber capabilities into our planning, doctrine, and thinking now--while
we as a nation have time to do so in a deliberate manner. We do not
want to wait for a crisis and then have to respond with hasty and ad
hoc solutions that could do more harm than good.
When I say we are normalizing cyber operations, I mean we are
making them a more reliable and predictable capability to be employed
by our senior decisionmakers and Combatant Commanders. Normalizing
cyber requires improving our tactics, techniques, and procedures, as
well as our policies and organizations. It also means building cyber
capabilities into doctrine, plans, and training--and building that
system in such a way that our combatant commanders can think, plan, and
integrate cyber capabilities as they would capabilities in the air,
land and sea domains.
In keeping with DOD's Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, U.S.
Cyber Command and NSA are together assisting the Department in
building: (1) a defensible architecture; (2) global situational
awareness and a common operating picture; (3) a concept for operating
in cyberspace; (4) trained and ready cyber forces; and (5) capacity to
take action when authorized. Indeed, we are finding that our progress
in each of these five areas benefits our efforts in the rest. We are
also finding the converse--that inertia in one area can result in
slower progress in others. I shall discuss each of these priorities in
turn.

Defensible Architecture:
DOD owns 7 million networked devices and thousands of enclaves.
Cyber Command works around the clock with its Service cyber components,
with NSA, and with DISA to monitor the functioning of DOD networks,
including the physical infrastructure, the configurations and protocols
of the components linked by that infrastructure, and the volume and
characteristics of the data flow. This is a dynamic defense, and it
consistently provides better security than the former patch-and-
firewall paradigm. Patches and firewalls are still necessary--I wish
everyone kept theirs up-to-date--but they are an insufficient defense
for DOD networks. Dynamic defenses have brought about noticeable
improvements in the overall security of DOD information environment. We
know for a fact that our adversaries have to work harder to find ways
into our sensitive but unclassified networks. Unfortunately,
adversaries are willing to expend that effort, and DOD's architecture
in its present state is not defensible over the long run. We in the
Department and the Command are crafting a solution. The Department's
bridge to the future is called the DOD Joint Information Environment
(JIE), comprising a shared infrastructure, enterprise services, and a
single security architecture to improve mission effectiveness, increase
security, and realize information technology (IT) efficiencies. The JIE
will be the base from which we can operate in the knowledge that our
data are safe from adversaries. Senior officers from CYBERCOM and NSA
sit on JIE councils and working groups, playing a leading role with the
office of the DOD's Chief Information Officer, Joint Staff J6, and
other agencies in guiding the Department's implementation of the JIE.
NSA, as the Security Adviser to the JIE, is defining the security
dimension of that architecture, and has shown how we can pool big data
and still preserve strong security. We have even shared the source code
publicly so public and private architectures can benefit from it. DOD
is benefitting from that knowledge and from our growing understanding
of the totality of measures, procedures, and tools required to assure
the health and security of even the biggest networks and databases.

Increased Operational Awareness:
Enhanced intelligence and situational awareness in our networks
will help us know what is happening in the cyberspace domain. This
effort can be likened to a cyber version of the tactical air picture of
friendly, neutral, and aggressor aircraft that a Combined Air
Operations Center in a Combatant Command typically maintains. We are
now issuing a weekly Cyber Operating Directive across the DOD cyber
enterprise for just this purpose, so that all .friendlies. understand
what is happening in cyberspace. Our improving knowledge of what is
normal in cyberspace is crucial to grasping what is not normal. We at
CYBERCOM are also helping DOD increase our global situational awareness
through our growing collaboration with Federal Government mission
partners like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FBI, and
other departments and agencies, as well as with private industry and
with other countries. That collaboration in turn allows us to better
understand what is happening across the cyber domain, which enhances
our situational awareness, not only for the activities of organizations
based at Fort Meade but also across the U.S. Government. I am happy to
report that at least one of our foreign partners has volunteered to
invest in this and enter its own network traffic data to contribute to
a common picture.

Operating Concepts:
Our operating concept calls for us to utilize our situational
awareness to recognize when an adversary is attacking, to block
malicious traffic that threatens our networks and data, and then to
maneuver in cyberspace to block and deter new threats. I am pleased to
report that in December, the Department endorsed the force presentation
model we need to implement this new operating concept. We are
establishing cyber mission teams in line with the principles of task
organizing for the joint force. The Services are building these teams
to present to U.S. Cyber Command or to support Service and other
combatant command missions. The teams are analogous to battalions in
the Army and Marine Corps--or squadrons in the Navy and Air Force. In
short, they will soon be capable of operating on their own, with a
range of operational and intelligence skill sets, as well as a mix of
military and civilian personnel. They will also have appropriate
authorities under order from the Secretary of Defense and from my
capacity as the Director of NSA. Teams are now being constructed to
perform all three of the missions given to U.S. Cyber Command. We will
have: (1) a Cyber National Mission Force and teams to help defend the
Nation against national-level threats; (2) a Cyber Combat Mission Force
with teams that will be assigned to the operational control of
individual Combatant Commanders to support their objectives (pending
resolution of the cyber command and control model by the Joint Staff);
and (3) a Cyber Protection Force and teams to help operate and defend
DOD information environment.

Trained and Ready Forces:
Each of these cyber mission teams is being trained to common and
strict operating standards so that they can be on-line without putting
at risk our own military, diplomatic, or intelligence interests. Doing
this will give not only U.S. Cyber Command's planners, but more
significantly our national leaders and combatant commanders, a certain
predictability in cyber capabilities and capacity. Key to building out
the Cyber Mission Force articulated in our Force Planning Model is
having the training system in place to train each of the cyber warriors
we need, in the skill sets we require and at the quality mandated by
the cyber mission. We have that training system in place for the
operators, and now we need to build the accompanying command and staff
academic support packages and programs to ensure our officers and
planners know how to effectively plan for and employ cyber capabilities
for our Nation. As a result of this operator and staff training system,
decisionmakers who require increments of cyber skills to include in
their plans will know how to ask for forces to fill this requirement,
and planners will know how to work cyber effects into their
organizations' plans. To build the skills of the force--as well as to
test the ways in which its teams can be employed--U.S. Cyber Command
has sponsored not only an expanding range of training courses but also
two important exercises, Cyber Flag and Cyber Guard. The latter
assembled 500 participants last summer including 100 from the National
Guards of 12 States. They exercised State and national-level responses
in a virtual environment, learning each other's comparative strengths
and concerns should an adversary attack our critical infrastructure in
cyberspace. Cyber Flag is our annual exercise at Nellis Air Force Base
in Nevada and we conduct it with our interagency and international
partners. Our most recent running of Cyber Flag introduced new
capabilities to enable dynamic and interactive force-on-force maneuvers
at net-speed, while incorporating actions by conventional forces as
well at Nellis' nearby training area.

Capacity to Take Action:
Successful operations in cyberspace depend on collaboration between
defenders and operators. Those who secure and defend must synchronize
with those who operate, and their collaboration must be informed by up-
to-date intelligence. I see greater understanding of the importance of
this synergy across the Department and the Government. The President
recently clarified the responsibilities for various organizations and
capabilities operating in cyberspace, revising the procedures we employ
for ensuring that we act in a coordinated and mutually-supporting
manner. As part of this progress, DOD and U.S. Cyber Command are being
integrated in the machinery for National Event responses so that a
cyber incident of national significance can elicit a fast and effective
response to include pre-designated authorities and self-defense actions
where necessary and appropriate. CYBERCOM is also working with the
Joint Staff and the combatant commands to capture their cyber
requirements and to implement and refine interim guidance on the
command and control of cyber forces in-theater, ensuring our cyber
forces provide direct and effective support to commanders' missions
while also helping U.S. Cyber Command in its national-level missions.
In addition, we are integrating our efforts and plans with combatant
command operational plans and we want to ensure that this collaboration
continues at all the commands. Finally, most cyber operations are
coalition and interagency efforts, almost by definition. We gain
valuable insight from the great work of other partners like the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, such as in their work
against distributed denial of service attacks against American
companies, which in turn helps DOD fine-tune defenses for the DOD
information environment. We also benefit from sharing with the Services
and agencies of key partners and allies. We welcome the interagency
collaboration and evolving frameworks under which these efforts are
proceeding, especially such revisions that would make it easier for the
U.S. Government and the private sector to share threat data, as the
administration previously emphasized. In addition, new standing rules
of engagement for cyber currently under development will comply with
and support recently issued policy directives on U.S. cyber operations.

BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE

We have made strides in all of our focus areas, though what
gratifies me the most is seeing that we are learning how they all fit
together. We are building quickly and building well, but we are still
concerned that the cyber threats to our Nation are growing even faster.
From the technological, legal, and operational standpoints we are
learning not only what is possible to accomplish but also what is wise
to attempt. Our plans for U.S. Cyber Command over the foreseeable
future--which admittedly is not a very distant horizon--should be
understood in this context.
In a speech last fall, then-Secretary Panetta emphasized the
Department's need to adjust our forces as we transition away from a
decade of war. He explained that a wise adjustment makes cuts without
hollowing out the force, while also investing in ways that prepare us
to meet future needs. We will do that, he said, by increasing our
investments in areas including space and cyber. It is fair to ask how
we plan to use such new resources while others are trimming back. Our
new operating concept to normalize cyber capabilities is just the sort
of overarching theme to unite the whole institutional push. We need to
foster a common approach to force development and force presentation--
up to and including the Service component and joint headquarters--given
the intrinsically joint nature of this domain.
Let me emphasize that this is not a matter of resources alone--it
is a matter of earning trust. We will continue to do our work in full
support and defense of the civil liberties and privacy rights enshrined
in the U.S. Constitution. We do not see a tradeoff between security and
liberty. We can and must promote both simultaneously because each
enhances the other. U.S. Cyber Command takes this responsibility very
seriously. Indeed, we see this commitment in our day-by-day successes.
We in DOD and DHS, with the Department of Justice and industry, for
instance, have shown that together we can share threat information, to
include malware signatures, while still providing robust protection for
privacy and civil liberties.
Building the Department's defensible cyber architecture will let us
guard our weapons systems and military command and control as well as
our intelligence networks. We hope to take the savings in personnel and
resources gained by moving to the JIE and have the Services repurpose
at least some of them to hunt for adversaries in our DOD networks and
even to perform full-spectrum operations. Although doing so will
require a large investment of people, resources, and time, in the long
run it will be cheaper to train Service personnel than to hire
contractors. Moving to the JIE will make sharing and analytics easier
while also boosting security. I know this sounds paradoxical but it is
nonetheless true, as NSA has demonstrated in its Cloud capability. If
we know what is happening on our networks, and who is working in them
and what they are doing, then we can more quickly and efficiently see
and stop unauthorized activities. We can also limit the harm from them
and more rapidly remedy problems, whether in recovering from an
incident or in preventing one in the first place. This is our ultimate
objective for operations on our DOD information architecture.
As we grow capacity, we are building cyber mission teams now , with
the majority supporting the combatant commands and the remainder going
to CYBERCOM to support national missions. When we have built this high-
quality, certified, and standardized force, we will be able to present
cyber forces with known capability sets to our combatant commanders--
forces they can train with, plan for, plan on, and employ like forces
and units any other military domain. This gets at the essence of
normalizing cyber capabilities for DOD. Furthermore, we want to
increase the education of our future leaders by fully integrating cyber
in our existing war college curricula. This will further the
assimilation of cyber into the operational arena for every domain.
Ultimately we could see a war college for cyber to further the
professional military education of future leaders in this domain.

CONCLUSION

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
inviting me to speak to you today. I hope you will agree with me that
U.S. Cyber Command has made progress across the board in the last year,
thanks to the support of Congress and our interagency and international
partners, as well as the hard work of its many dedicated men and women.
The novelist and visionary William Gibson once noted .The future is
already here, it's just not evenly distributed.. We are seeing that
future at U.S. Cyber Command. Cyber capabilities are already enhancing
operations in all domains. We are working to contain the
vulnerabilities inherent in any networked environment or activity while
ensuring that the benefits that we gain and the effects we can create
are significant, predictable, and decisive. If I could leave you with
one thought about the course of events, it is that we have no choice
but to normalize cyberspace operations within the U.S. military and
make them part of the capability set of our senior policymakers and
commanders. I am ready to take your questions and to clarify our
command's achievements and challenges, and to discuss any concerns that
you might wish to share.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Alexander.
We'll have an 8-minute first round.
General Kehler, let me start with you. The DSB released a
report in January that has a number of noteworthy assertions
and I'd like you to start with this assertion and comment on
it. The report says that: ``Our nuclear deterrent is regularly
evaluated for reliability and readiness.'' But then it says:
``However, most of the systems have not been assessed against a
sophisticated cyber attack to understand possible weak spots.''
Can you comment on that? Then, General Alexander, I'm going
to ask you to comment on that as well.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, in general terms I agree with
the thrust of the DSB report. I think that they've pointed out
a number of places that we need to do better. Let me hone in
specifically on the nuclear command and control system for just
a second. Much of the nuclear command and control system today
is the legacy system that we've had. In some ways that helps us
in terms of the cyber threat. In some cases it's point-to-
point, hard-wired, which makes it very difficult for an
external cyber threat to emerge.
However, we are very concerned with the potential of a
cyber-related attack on our nuclear command and control and on
the weapons systems themselves. We do evaluate that. I think,
as the DSB pointed out, in terms of an end-to-end comprehensive
review, I think that's homework for us to go and accomplish.
In what we have done to date and the pieces that we have
looked at to date, which has been going on for quite some time,
I am confident today that the nuclear command and control
system and the nuclear weapons platforms themselves do not have
a significant vulnerability that would cause me to be
concerned. We don't know what we don't know, and I think what
the DSB pointed out is that we need a more comprehensive
recurring way to evaluate such a threat. On that, I am in
agreement with them.
But I don't want to leave you with the perception that I
believe that there is some critical vulnerability today that
would stop us from being able to perform our mission or, most
importantly, would disconnect the President from the forces. I
believe we have looked at that. I receive those reports. We've
done a lot more over the last 1 to 2 years. But I think in
general terms the DSB is right. We need to do better at
exercising such threats and we need to do better working with
Keith and his team to detect such threats, red teaming, as the
DSB suggested. I think we have a ways to go here until we put a
punctuation mark at the end of the sentence.
Chairman Levin. Is that underway? Are those kinds of
continuous reviews underway?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, they are. In fact, the pace of
those things has increased. We completed, for example, a review
of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
system not so very long ago. We have a little bit of different
problem, of course, with aircraft that are in flight and
submarines that are under way. We're confident in the
connectivity to those.
But I think that this is something we're going to need to
increase the volume of the gain here on this whole issue.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Alexander, do you want to add anything to that?
General Alexander. Mr. Chairman, I would just add three key
points. First, General Kehler has led a series of meetings on
the nuclear command and control, working with both the NSA side
and the CYBERCOM side, to look at vulnerabilities and address
those. I would tell you I think they've done a great job over
the last 6 months in doing that and I think that's moved in the
right direction and leads to the conclusion that General Kehler
just gave.
I would also add that our infrastructure that we ride on,
the power and the communications grid, are one of the things
that is a source of concern, how you maintain that. Now, we can
go to backup generators and we can have independent routes, but
it complicates significantly our mission set. It gets back to,
in the cyber realm, how the government and industry work
together to ensure the viability of those key portions of our
critical infrastructure.
Chairman Levin. General Alexander, there's a real theft
going on of our technology and our business strategies, our
intellectual property, by China particularly, but not
exclusively by China. The question is, of course, what is it
going to take to stop that practice? I will reserve that
question for later if there's time.
But I guess the real question I want to focus on right now
is whether the Intelligence Community can determine not only
which Chinese Government organizations are stealing our
intellectual property, but also what Chinese companies may be
receiving that intellectual property and using it to compete
against U.S. firms?
General Alexander. Walking a fine line, Mr. Chairman, I
would say that the Intelligence Community has increased its
capabilities in this area significantly over the last 7 years.
I can give you specific examples in a classified setting.
Chairman Levin. Because it's really important that we act.
I think there's a consensus here in Congress that this has to
stop and that we have to find ways of preventing it, stopping
it, responding to it in every way we can. This is a threat
which is at the moment probably an economic threat, but some
day could be a physical and a military threat as well. So we
will take that in a classified setting.
General Alexander, you mentioned three teams that you're
creating, I believe. Is there a timetable for those three
teams?
General Alexander. Mr. Chairman, we're working with the
Services on that. The intent is to roughly stand up one-third
of those, the first third, by the end of September of this
year, the next third by September of the next year, 2014, and
the final third by September 2015. The Services are on track.
In fact, I would tell you great kudos to the Service Chiefs
because they are pushing that faster. The key part of that is
training. I am extremely proud of the rate that they're pushing
that on.
Chairman Levin. General Alexander, you mentioned the
Executive order. You've indicated that information-sharing is
needed in real time. Give us your personal view as to why
Congress needs to pass cyber legislation and what needs to be
in there? What is missing now that needs to be in legislation
which Congress hopefully will pass?
General Alexander. There are three key elements that I
believe personally that need to be in cyber legislation: first,
the ability for industry to tell us in real time--and this is
specifically the Internet service providers--when they see in
their networks an attack starting. They can do that in real
time. They have the technical capability, but they don't have
the authority to share that information with us at network
speed. They need liability protection when we share information
back and forth and they take actions.
The third part is more difficult and the Executive order in
part addresses that. That's how do we get the networks to a
more defensible state. It's like your own personal computers;
how do we set the standards without being overly bureaucratic,
but how do we set the standards so that the power grid, our
communications infrastructure, banks and the government can
withstand cyber exploits and attack? That resiliency needs to
be built in.
I think what the Executive order offers us is a way of
discussing that with industry, led by Dr. Pat Gallagher at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), would
allow us to sit down with different sectors of industry and get
their insights on the most efficient way of doing that and,
coming back then from Congress, how do we incentivize them for
moving forward and in some cases, for example the power
companies, how do we help move them through regulatory
processes.
Chairman Levin. Just to complete that point, you talk about
the ability to communicate. You talk about the authority to
share. Do we need legislation to authorize the sharing? That's
the privacy piece of it?
General Alexander. Mr. Chairman, it is the authority for
them to share back information on the networks to the
government. That's the part that needs to be in there.
Chairman Levin. All right. But that's essentially a privacy
or a commercial protection of secrets, of proprietary
information, issue?
General Alexander. In combination, and I think it goes to
some of the previous acts that have been there on computer and
protection that's out there. I think what we have to do is tell
them it's okay to share this level of information with the
government. Specifically from our perspective, that information
that we need to share is the fact of an exploit or an attack
that's coming in.
We need to have it in real time. The complication, to
really get to the point of your question here, is when the
government shares back signatures it becomes more complicated
because some of our capabilities are classified. So we have to
have a way of giving them classified information that they
would have to protect, and then if they see that classified
information, think of this as going up to New York City on the
New Jersey Turnpike. The EasyPass would see a car going by.
What we're telling the Internet service provider is if you see
a red car tell us that you saw the red car, where you saw it,
and where it's going.
In cyberspace it would be they saw this significant event
going from this Internet address to this target address, and
they could tell us that at network speed and they could stop
that traffic. It is important to recognize the role of industry
because government could not easily scale to what the Internet
service providers could do. It would be very costly, very
inefficient. So we're asking industry to do that.
Mr. Chairman, that does not get into the content of those
communications. I think it's absolutely important for people to
understand we're not asking for content. We're asking for
information about threats. Think of that as metadata.
Chairman Levin. You're aware of the fact that in the last
defense authorization bill we put in a requirement that
industry that has clearance for classified information is
required to report threats to the government, and the
regulations and rules for that are currently being written and
I presume you're having an input in that; is that correct?
General Alexander. That's correct. We're working with them.
The issue would be with the defense industrial base, they don't
see all the threats coming in all the time. Oftentimes the
threats that we see have gotten in long before. So I think we
need a total approach. I think that's a good step in the right
direction.
Chairman Levin. What, the law that we wrote?
General Alexander. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Thanks. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to ask for some brief answers to a couple of
questions here. General Kehler, there seems to be unanimity in
drawing the relationship between the nuclear reductions and
nuclear modernization. It's been stated several times, and I
will quote Secretary Gates, who said: ``When we have more
confidence in the long-term viability of our weapons system,
then our ability to reduce the number of weapons that we must
keep in the stockpile is enhanced.'' Do you agree with that and
with the linkage in general that I'm referring to?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. Would you take that last statement, that
says ``When we have more confidence in the long-term viability
of our weapons system,'' is there reason to believe that we do
now have more confidence? Have we done what's necessary to have
that, to earn that confidence in the existing system?
General Kehler. Sir, I'm confident in the deployed weapons
today. I am confident in the stockpile that provides the
sustainment spares and the hedge against any technical failure
that we might experience. I'm confident in that stockpile
today. Every year my predecessors, the Commanders of STRATCOM
prior to me, and I are responsible to provide our assessment of
the stockpile, and through this year I can certify.
Senator Inhofe. Do you feel you've had the resources
necessary to do that to your expectations and to ours?
General Kehler. Yes. Although the resources have increased
over the last couple of years and that has helped us, I think
that the resources were dwindling to an unacceptable point.
Senator Inhofe. Let me get into the Homeland missile
defense. We've said for quite some time that there's less
concentration on the Homeland part of the missile defense. I'm
referring to, of course, the number of ground-based
interceptors (GBI) going down under this administration from 44
to 30, but it's really more than that because there were 10 of
them that would have been part of the Poland GBI, which would
have been more for protection of the eastern part of the United
States.
It was interesting because I had Vaclav Klaus in my office
yesterday and we were talking about a conversation we had not
too many years ago, where he made the statement to me, he said:
``Are you sure now, if we put our radar system in the Czech
Republic and agree and do what's necessary in Poland for a GBI
for the Western Europe and Eastern United States, that you
won't pull the rug out from under us?'' Of course, I said
``yes.'' But we did anyway.
Now we're looking at where we are today and I would ask
you, General Kehler, are you satisfied with the numbers that
we've gone down to in terms of our GBIs and do you think that
we should be--there are a lot of options I'll ask you about in
a minute. Are you satisfied with the number of GBIs we have
right now at 30?
General Kehler. I am satisfied that we can defend against a
limited attack from North Korea today with 30.
Senator Inhofe. What about Iran?
General Kehler. I am confident that we can defend against a
limited attack from Iran, although we are not in the most
optimum posture to do that today.
Senator Inhofe. I think you're being a little too
cautious--not cautious enough here when you say a ``limited
attack,'' when our intelligence has shown us that Iran is going
to have the capability and a delivery system by 2015. We're
looking at what we have today with some options there. They're
talking about possibly an option on the east coast, an option
on additional GBIs--I think you'd probably say it's not
necessary--at Fort Greely to enhance our capability.
I'm concerned, as I always have been going all the way back
to the Poland operation that was pulled out, with what was
going to happen as far as the east coast of the United States.
I know you're somewhat cautiously confident. How would you
characterize your level of confidence in the protection of the
eastern part of this country with the capability that we have
today?
General Kehler. Again, cautious. It doesn't provide total
defense today.
Senator Inhofe. What about the idea of a third site in the
United States?
General Kehler. It is under consideration along with, as
importantly, the sensors that will be important for the threat
from Iran.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I'm concerned when you talk about SM-
3 Block 2A missiles. The date of that I believe currently that
we could expect that would be 2018, is that correct?
General Kehler. Around 2018, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. The capability that I've been concerned
about with Iran is 2015. I would share with you and I'd like to
have you send to me your level of confidence about what's going
to happen, what our capability is in that 3-year interim time.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. That can be for the record, if you would do
that for me.
[The information referred to follows:]

Given that we can defend against a limited attack from Iran today,
I remain guardedly optimistic regarding the potential Iranian ballistic
missile threat between 2015 and 2018. On 15 March 2013, the Secretary
of Defense announced the plan to increase the number of emplaced
ground-based interceptors from 30 to 44, add a second AN/TPY-2 radar in
Japan, initiate environmental studies of potential east coast
interceptor sites, and restructure the SM3-IIB program to develop
common-kill vehicle technology. By funding additional GBIs and
investing in common-kill vehicle technology in addition to already
planned improvements to sensors and command and control systems, we add
protection against threats from Iran sooner while providing additional
defense against a North Korean threat. We are actively engaging with
other combatant commands and the Missile Defense Agency to understand
which concepts and technologies best address this 3-year window and
show the most promise over the longer term.

Senator Inhofe. Let's see. Let's go to, if we could,
General Alexander. First of all, you've been very helpful to me
in bringing to my attention some of the things that I--some of
my shortfalls in knowledge, as I've confessed to you, on this
whole issue. Yet I consider it to be so incredibly important.
Right now, as you're well aware, the mainframe computers, while
could be considered a relic of the 1980s and the 1990s, of the
past, they are still integral to our core infrastructure and
have unique security vulnerabilities that are not as well
appreciated at this endpoint in security.
Do you agree that layered defenses are essential and that
the efforts must be made to ensure our mainframes receive
comparable attention on the vulnerability protection? It seems
to me that most of the focus is on where all of the data is
stored and all the new stuff that's coming on, and are we
adequately protecting the mainframe components of our systems?
General Alexander. Senator, as we've discussed, I believe
there's more work that needs to be done in protecting the
mainframe computers and that portion of the total information
infrastructure. It's not the only vulnerability and probably
not the most frequent one that we see, but it's an important
one to address because it is at the heart of many of our
systems. As you've stated, it is one of the ones that we don't
normally look at. But it is one that our information assurance
folks are addressing and it's one, as you stated, that's key to
a layered defense.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's important, because what you
hear is the new systems coming on more than the mainframe. I'm
glad to know that you'll be paying adequate attention to that
relative to some of the new innovations that we see.
There was an article in the Wall Street Journal, I think it
was yesterday, that talked a little bit about how the banks are
seeking help on Iran cyber attacks. It says: ``Financial firms
have spent millions of dollars responding to the attacks,
according to bank officials, who add that they can't be
expected to fend off attacks from a foreign government.''
Then further down in the article it says: ``U.S. officials
have been weighing options, including whether to retaliate
against Iran. Officials say the topic was discussed at high-
level White House meetings a few weeks ago, a U.S. official
said, adding, `All options are on the table.' ''
Could you address this for me?
General Alexander. Senator, what I can do is hit more
theoretical and then in a closed session address that more
specifically, that question. But I think this gets to the heart
of it. How do we defend the country and when does DOD step in
to defend the country, and what are the actions that the
Internet service providers can do, and what's the most logical
approach to this? Why I say logical is that distributed denial
of service attacks, those are what mainly today are hitting
Wall Street. Those types of attacks are probably best today, if
they're at the nuisance level, mitigated by the Internet
service providers.
The issue that we're weighing is when does a nuisance
become a real problem and when are you prepared to step in for
that. That's the work that I think the administration is going
through right now in highlighting that. In order to do that, it
gets back to the question the chairman had asked about
information sharing. For us to stop this at network speed, we
have to see it at network speed, and that's going to be key to
helping the banks and others.
I do see this as a growing problem and I believe this is
one of the problems that the antivirus community and others
have brought forward to say, here's what you're going to see in
2013. What we're seeing with the banks today, I am concerned is
going to grow significantly throughout the year. We have to
address it.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
Then lastly, just for the record, General Kehler, I have
been concerned about our allies losing confidence in the
strength of our umbrella that's out there, and I'd like to have
you--we all remember during the New START treaty, which I
opposed, the President was very specific on the things that he
was going to do. I look at these things and I see that they
haven't, with specific reference to the B61 bomb, the warheads
of 78 and 88 and the air-launched cruise missiles, and the Los
Alamos processing facility. These are all behind the schedule
that was put out back during the New START treaty.
So for the record, I'd like to have you evaluate what we
have done, that we should have done, and were told was going to
be done if that treaty would pass, if you would do that for the
record.
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

Sustainment and modernization of the nuclear enterprise is a
complex process dependent on the execution of long-term planning that
is informed by accurate cost, schedule, performance, and capacity
projections. Even minor perturbations in any of these areas can result
in significant long-term impacts.
For example, the 2011 Budget Control Act fundamentally changed the
funding outlook for the National Nuclear Security Agency and caused the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to make modernization program adjustments
to meet budget constraints. These choices represent a balance between
the condition of the stockpile, modernization needs of the
infrastructure, and the current fiscal environment.
The NWC understands the out-years of the fiscal year 2013 budget
submission have additional risk. In response, the NWC recently approved
a long-range stockpile strategy and an implementation plan to
restructure modernization efforts for the fiscal year 2014 budget
submission. This strategy and plan address the critical weapon life
extension and stockpile management issues discussed during
consideration of New START. Even with a new strategy and implementation
plan, the full impacts of additional sequestration reductions remain
unknown, and thus I remain concerned about the long-term effects of
fiscal uncertainty on our plans and programs to maintain the stockpile,
sustain the infrastructure, and retain a technically proficient
workforce.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
General Kehler, in your discussions with Senator Inhofe you
talked about the capacity to withstand, I believe, a limited
attack from a country like North Korea or Iran. I think it's
important to determine what that means. Their existing
capabilities would allow them only to mount a limited attack or
they could mount a limited attack, and something more than
that? I.e., are we capable of defending today against what they
have, and at what point do you feel that they could go beyond a
limited attack?
General Kehler. Senator, let me split that into two
different questions. There's a question for the theater and the
theater-class ballistic missiles, where the numbers are large
and we continue to try to deploy capabilities to be able to
blunt such a large ballistic missile attack in theater.
Senator Reed. Which would not be against the United States.
It would be against regional powers.
General Kehler. Regional powers, our allies, or forward
forces, et cetera, and perhaps in some cases Guam and other
U.S. territory.
Senator Reed. But not the continental United States.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Then the second question is about a limited threat to the
United States, and the current ballistic missile defense system
is limited in two important ways: number one, in terms of the
size of raid, if you will, that it could deal with; and number
two, in terms of the technological capability of it. So our
system is limited. It is limited in terms of the size--and sir,
before I say it's X number of ballistic missiles, what I can
say is we are confident we could defeat a threat from North
Korea today. But, given the potential progress we are seeing
from them, we are considering right now whether we need to take
additional steps.
Senator Reed. That's a fair response. But today you feel
confident you could protect the continent of the United States
from an attack. Then the question is their technology, how fast
it evolves.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. You're considering that, as you must.
General Kehler. Numbers and whether they evolve in terms of
an intercontinental threat. We're working with the Intelligence
Community on that to see if we can't scope that. But that has
our attention. Their activities have our attention and it has
our concern.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me shift gears slightly. The architecture of our
nuclear deterrence has been the triad; sea, air, and land. One
aspect is the replacement of the Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine. That's slipped a bit. Can you give your assessment
of whether we can allow additional slippage or is that
something we have to get on with?
General Kehler. I think we have to get on with the
replacement for the Ohio-class submarine. I support the triad.
I continue to support the triad. I think that what it brings to
us still are the three big attributes: survivability,
flexibility, and responsiveness. That confounds an attacker.
I think that continues to serve us well, and of course the
most survivable of the legs is the Ohio replacement. As far as
we can see into the future, I think we're going to require a
replacement for the Ohio class. Here's the interesting part.
They will reach a date certain that they are no longer capable
of going to sea and being used the way they're used today. The
Navy is working very hard to make sure we understand that time
with clarity. We intend to keep those submarines longer than
any other submarines we've ever had before. So I think we will
reach a point that we must have a replacement and I believe we
understand where that point is, and the current program puts us
right about there.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me ask a question to both of you which involves the
triad. You made the point that the most invulnerable leg of the
triad is the submarine. There's been lots of discussion of the
potential for disruption of the electric grid as one of the
major ways to inflict damage on the United States. To what
extent, General Kehler, are your land-based assets, the missile
silos and the airfields, dependent critically on the local grid
that could be taken down and therefore, either wittingly or
incidentally, two legs of the triad could be knocked out
without an explicit kinetic blow?
General Kehler. Sir, the nuclear deterrent force was
designed to operate through the most extreme circumstances we
could possibly imagine. So I am not concerned that a disruption
in the power grid, for example, would disrupt our ability to
continue to use that force if the President ever chose to do
that or needed to do that.
I am concerned, though, about some other facets of this.
One, of course there's a continuing need to make sure that we
are protected against electromagnetic pulse and any kind of
electromagnetic interference. Sometimes we have debates over
whether that's a Cold War relic and I would argue it is not. We
need to be mindful of potential disruptions to that force. But
I am not concerned about disruptions to the power grid, for
example, or other critical infrastructure pieces impacting that
force.
Senator Reed. General Alexander, your comments about this,
the potential threat?
General Alexander. Sir, I agree with what General Kehler
said with nuclear command and control and the way that we do
that specifically. I think what it really impacts is, as you
look at commands like U.S. Transportation Command and others,
our ability to communicate would be significantly reduced and
it would complicate our governance, if you will, and our
ability for the government to act.
I think what General Kehler has would be intact. So the
consequence of that is, it's the cascading effect into
operating in that kind of environment that concerns us,
concerns me mostly.
Senator Reed. General Alexander, let me raise an issue
that, as Senator Levin indicated the Collins-Lieberman
legislation was not successful. I share his view it's very
important because right now we have essentially a voluntary
scheme. One of the arguments that's raised by the opponents is
that it would impose too much cost on the business community,
et cetera.
With your knowledge of the potential state and non-state
ability to disrupt the economy of the United States, not our
STRATCOM but ATM machines, et cetera, have you done a
calculation of the potential cost to the economy if someone
decided to conduct, not an intermittent attack on a banking
system, but a concentrated attack?
General Alexander. Senator, an attack on a bank would be
significant. It would have significant impacts. If people can't
get to their money the impact of that is huge, and you've seen
that and we've discussed that impact.
What I'm concerned about is a distributed denial of service
attack could accomplish that. A significant distributed denial
of service attack could make it very difficult for our people
to do online banking, online trading, and others. So there's
the cost of losing that. If you think about Amazon, 1 hour of
Amazon costs $7 million in profit to them if they were offline.
There's also a cost that complicates legislation in that
each of our critical infrastructure portions of our industry
have different levels of cyber readiness, if you will. So the
banks and the Internet service providers are generally pretty
good, the power companies not so good, and the government
somewhere in between. So the cost for repairing, for fixing
that, is significant.
I think the issue that I get talking to industry is their
concern on creating an overbureaucratic regulatory process. So
I do think that what the administration has put forward is,
let's sit down and talk to them on the way to address this, is
a great step forward. It really does allow us now to sit down
with industry and say, so here's what we think needs to be
done.
In my discussions with the power company specifically,
their comment is: Look, we'd like to do that, but that's going
to cost more; how do we do that?
Senator Reed. But the point, my final point, is from your
perspective right now if an attack, which is conceivable, took
place, the cost to that company would be many times the cost of
preemptive action today. Yet they still object to that cost.
Now, the probability of attack has to be weighed. If that
probability today is 1 percent, that cost, that might be a
reasonable judgment. But I think the impression I get from your
testimony and consistently is that percentage or probability
goes up and up and up each day, until we reach the point where,
do the math and if they're not investing in protecting
themselves, those financial institutions, then the cost they're
likely, probably to shoulder, will be catastrophic. They don't
seem to get that point, though.
General Alexander. I think that's accurate. Just as you've
said, it increases every day. That's the concern and I think
you've seen that from industry stating the same thing. So I do
think we have to have this public debate on that and get it
right.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of our witnesses for your leadership
and for your service to our country.
I wanted to follow up, General Kehler, on the issue of the
ICBM threat to the country that Senator Inhofe and Senator Reed
asked you about. You used the term ``not optimum'' in terms of
some of the challenges we may face there. Just so it's clear to
people, if now, an ICBM were headed to the west coast we would
get a shoot-look-shoot at it, correct, because of our missile
defense system? But we don't have an east coast missile defense
system, so if Iran develops ballistic missile capability we
don't have the same capacity, do we, on the east coast of the
country?
General Kehler. While I hate to say it, the answer is it
depends. It depends on what a country like Iran would do, where
they would launch from, what the azimuths are, et cetera. The
intent is that as time passes and additional features are added
to the ballistic missile defense system that our capability to
defend improves.
Senator Ayotte. But just so we're clear, as of today am I
not correct in saying that west coast, North Korea, we get
shoot-look-shoot? We don't get the same capacity on the east
coast of Iran--some analysts believe that they could develop
this ICBM capability as soon as 2015. That may or may not be
correct. But at this point our missile defense is--the capacity
is different on the east coast of the country versus the west
coast, isn't that true?
General Kehler. I would tentatively say yes and provide you
a better answer for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Ballistic Missile Defense System is capable of defending the
east coast against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile threat
from Iran today. It's capacity to do so differs from its capacity to
defend the west coast from North Korea due to a number of technical,
operational, logistical, and geographical factors. On 15 March 2013,
the Secretary of Defense announced the plan to increase the number of
emplaced ground-based interceptors (GBI) from 30 to 44, add a second
AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan, initiate environmental studies of potential
east coast interceptor sites, and restructure the SM3-IIB program to
develop common-kill vehicle technology. By funding additional GBIs and
investing in common-kill vehicle technology in addition to already
planned improvements to sensors and command and control systems, we add
protection against threats from Iran sooner while providing additional
defense against a North Korean threat.

Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it, because the National
Research Council actually this year recommended an additional
ballistic missile site on the east coast; isn't that right?
General Kehler. Yes. They are one of the organizations that
has looked at this, yes.
Senator Ayotte. I certainly would like to hear your view
more specifically as to why an east coast missile defense site
would or would not enhance our capability to address an ICBM
coming from Iran, particularly protecting the population base
in the east coast of the country.
General Kehler. I'd be happy to provide that for the
record.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
I also wanted to follow up. As I understand it, last week
you testified in the HASC that any potential future nuclear
arms reductions with the Russians should be bilateral in
nature; is that fair?
General Kehler. That's fair.
Senator Ayotte. So my follow-up question to that is, should
they not be bilateral and verifiable? Is verifiable important
if we were going to take arms reductions based on what we were
going to count on a bilateral understanding with the Russians?
General Kehler. I believe verifiable is important.
Senator Ayotte. Why is verifiable critical or important
when we think about entering these types of understandings with
the Russians, or any other country for that matter, with regard
to nuclear arms?
General Kehler. Senator, from a military perspective, I
believe we have been on a successful and deliberate pathway
with the Russians that has allowed us to reduce the threat to
the American people and to our allies while at the same time
being able to achieve our national security objectives, and
we've done so in a way that's verifiable. I think that's a
winning combination of things. Verification has proven to be
important for us, I believe, from an assurance standpoint, and
I think it's important. It has also provided second and third
order benefits in terms of transparency and engagement with
Russia which I think has been very valuable.
Senator Ayotte. General, are the Russians in full
compliance with all existing arms control agreements with the
United States right now?
General Kehler. The United States' view is that they are
not in compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty.
Senator Ayotte. Are there any other treaty obligations
they're not in compliance with?
General Kehler. As I recall, and I'll provide the official
answer for the record, there are a couple of other treaties
where we have questions about the way they are going about it.
I think the only one that we have said that we do not believe
officially that they are complying with is Conventional Forces
in Europe.
I can tell you that so far under New START all of the
indications I have is that they are, in fact, complying.
Senator Ayotte. I would actually like a follow-up for the
record, just with the question of whether they are in full
compliance with all existing arms control agreements with the
United States.
General Kehler. I'll provide that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of State (DOS) publishes detailed assessments of
U.S. and foreign nation compliance with obligations in all arms
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, or commitments
to which the United States is a participating state. The August 2012
DOS report titled, ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,'' stated
that the Russian Federation ``failed to comply'' with provisions of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In addition, the report
expresses ``concerns'' regarding the Russian Federation's adherence to
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I would defer to the DOS for
further details.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
I also wanted to ask you--you and I talked about this when
you came to see me in my office yesterday, which I appreciated,
to talk about these issues--about an article that appeared in
the Sunday New York Times titled: ``Cuts Give Obama Path to
Leaner Military.'' In that article it essentially said that the
sequestration cuts would allow the administration to call for
deep reductions in programs long in President Obama's sights,
and among those programs were an additional reduction in
deployed nuclear weapons and stockpiles and a restructuring.
There's some other restructuring, but the issue I want to
ask you about is an additional reduction in deployed nuclear
weapons. Can you tell me right now--in the article it said that
the Joint Chiefs had agreed that we could trim the number of
active nuclear weapons in America's arsenal by nearly a third
and make big cuts in the stockpile of backup weapons. Is there
any intention by the administration right now that you're aware
of or any recommendation pending to significantly reduce our
active nuclear weapon arsenal by a third or make big cuts in
the stockpile of our backup weapons, as outlined in this
article?
General Kehler. Senator, I can't comment on the article.
What I can say is that from the Nuclear Posture Review forward
certainly the administration has undertaken a study to look at
what alternatives may exist beyond New START, for reductions
beyond New START. We participated in that conversation and in
parts of the study. In fact, we did parts of the study at
STRATCOM. We were fully involved, and to my knowledge no
decisions have been made.
Senator Ayotte. Let me just say that, obviously, I think
that preserving our nuclear deterrent is very important. I
think that making significant reductions right now, at a time
with what's happening in North Korea, with the threat we face
from Iran, and also from the situation where we find ourselves,
I think, in the world, that obviously I hope that if there are
any reductions that are made, for example, with the Russians,
that will be done through the treaty process. The New START was
done through the treaty process.
One of the things this article also says is that there
could be reductions made with the Russians without a treaty. So
I don't know whether you would weigh in on whether we should go
through the treaty process, but in my view I think that
Congress should have an ability to weigh in on these issues.
As a follow-up, I wanted to ask you, General Alexander,
about the role of the Guard in cyber issues. Where do you see
the Guard in general, not just the Air National Guard, but all
of the Guard, playing what role they would play with regard to
how we meet the challenges facing us with cyber attacks, and
what role could the Guard play on a State basis working with,
obviously, you, General Kehler and General Alexander, and how
can the Guard help in this?
General Alexander. Thank you, Senator. I've sat down with
the Guard leadership, all the adjutant generals from all the
Guard, and talked about the role and responsibility of the
Guard in cyberspace. I think there are two key things that they
can do: First by setting up protection platoons and teams and
training them to the same standard as the Active Force, it
gives us additional capacity that we may need in a cyber
conflict.
The second part is it also provides us an ability to work
with the States, with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and cyber
forces that FBI has, and with DHS to provide additional
technical capacity for resilience and recovery. I think those
two areas the Guard can play a huge role in.
The key is training them to the same standards. We talked
about that with all the Guard chiefs. They agree with that and
we are working towards that objective.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you both. I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler, you spoke very crisply about us having the
ability in our command and control to control our nuclear
response. I appreciate that, and that is assuring, even though
we might have a cyber attack that would take out electric grids
and so forth and so on.
What about the Russians and the Chinese? Do they have the
ability to stop some cyber attack from launching one of their
nuclear ICBMs?
General Kehler. Senator, I don't know. I do not know.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I think that's a question
that we ought to see to what degree we could answer. That
reminds me, in the disintegration of the Soviet Union it was
the United States that took the initiative through Nunn-Lugar
to go in and try to secure those nuclear weapons. That turned
out to be a very successful program.
In this new world of cyber threats, we, of course, have to
be responsible for ours, but we have to worry about those
others on the planet that have a nuclear strike capability
protecting theirs against some outside player coming in and
suddenly taking over their command and control.
General Alexander, do you have any comment on that?
Chairman Levin. I wonder if you would yield before his
answer.
Senator Nelson. Certainly.
Chairman Levin. That is, it's a very important question. I
wonder for starters--and I didn't mean to, I shouldn't
interrupt the answer--is to whether for starters, Senator
Nelson, we should ask the Intelligence Community writ large as
to what we know about that.
Senator Nelson. Okay. If you want to save that----
Chairman Levin. No, no. We will do that. It's a great idea.
It's an important point and we will take that on. We will ask.
But let me not interrupt further the answer.
Senator Nelson. Okay. I know General Alexander is going to
be constrained as to what he can say in this setting. So let me
just defer that then for a classified setting.
Chairman Levin. Not just classified, but also a broader
Intelligence Community assessment as well, if we could do that,
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. General Alexander knows everything about
everything.
General Kehler. Senator, if I could add just one additional
point, though. I would say that we know--I think because we've
worked with the Russians over the years and we've had fairly
decent transparency with the Russians over the years, I think
we understand they are very careful about their nuclear command
and control. They are very careful about the way they provide
what we would call nuclear surety as well.
This is also one of the reasons for why we would like to
see additional transparency with China, because we would like
to be able to have these dialogues with them in a military-to-
military kind of context. It's something that we have been
trying to push now for quite some time.
Senator Nelson. Exactly. As we go into the session that the
chairman has recommended, let's just don't stop with China.
What about the Brits? What about the French? Do they have the
capabilities of stopping a rogue cyber attack from coming in
and suddenly messing up their command and control?
Okay. General Alexander, you must be one of the most
frustrated people on the planet, because you know the threat in
cyber and here Congress can't get anything done because certain
players won't allow the passage of the legislation. So let me
ask you, what is it about liability protection that the private
sector would feel comfortable about in order so that real-time,
as you said, we have to have the private sector respond to an
attack with the information in real time in order to be able to
meet this present and increasingly dangerous threat?
General Alexander. Senator, I'll give you my answer here
and I'd ask to just take that for the record to get you a
really accurate and detailed answer on it, because I do think
this is important to lay this out.
The issues as I see it for liability protection are in two
parts. When the Internet service providers and companies are
acting as an agent of the government and make a mistake and are
subject to lawsuits, the issue becomes they get sued so many
times by so many different actors that they spend a lot of
money and time and effort responding to those lawsuits when
we've asked them to do something to defend the Nation. So there
is that one set.
The other is, let's say theoretically that we send a
signature that says stop this piece of traffic because it is
that Wiper virus that hit Saudi Aramco, but we the Government
mischaracterize it and when they stop it that stops some
traffic that they didn't intend to nor did we. We make a
mistake. Mistakes are going to happen because when you have
real-time concerns, emergency concerns, some traffic may be
impacted.
That traffic that is impacted, the Internet service
providers would quickly fix by altering that signature to get
it right. But some traffic has been delayed or disrupted by
their actions because we've asked them to, which could make
them also subject to lawsuits.
So I think it's in that venue that we have to give them
immunity from those kinds of actions. I'm not talking about
giving them broad general immunity and I don't think anyone is.
It is when they're dealing with the Government in good faith in
these areas we should protect them for what we're asking them
to do. I think that's in the venue.
I'll get you a more specific answer from our legal folks on
the technical side.
[The information referred to follows:]

There are three main areas where concerns about liability may be
inhibiting private sector action from either sharing cyber threat
information with the Government or taking action to stop cyber attacks
and intrusions. Some protections in these areas should be considered:

First is that several current statutes effectively
limit or prohibit the Internet service providers and others
from sharing cyber threat information with the Government.
Those legal constraints should be appropriately modified so
that companies can share cyber threat information, subject to
appropriate privacy protections.
Second is a broader risk that companies will be
subject to private lawsuits sharing cybersecurity information
with the Government. Again, there also needs to be liability
protection in this area, subject to appropriate privacy
protections and limits on what may be shared.
Finally, if they act to stop cyber attacks or
intrusions, obviously companies should be held accountable if
they cause damage by acting irresponsibly. However, in some
cases the companies may be taking action on cyber threat
information provided to them by the Government, or using
techniques shared with them by the Government. We should
consider liability protection for the company when it is really
the Government that may be at fault, not the company itself.

Senator Nelson. This should not be that hard, because we've
been through this before with the metadata on the question a
few years ago of being able to intercept traffic in order to
identify the terrorist wherever the terrorist was. Clearly,
we've dealt with it before and liability protections, so we
ought to be able to get this one.
General Alexander. Senator, if I may, I think there's broad
consensus on information sharing and liability protection.
Where it really gets uncomfortable, if you will, is
regulations, standards, what the Government does there. That's
the really hard part, in part because all the industry sectors
are so different.
I think that's one of the things that the administration
has done that really puts the step forward, is the Executive
order now gives us an avenue to start discussing that. I think
that's very useful. I think any legislation should point to
that and look at incentives to get industry and others to
having a more resilient infrastructure.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Now it is Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, on the staffing of CYBERCOM, it's been
reported that you need to expand in a significant way. Do you
want to talk a little about what you see as your staffing needs
and also how you'd meet those staffing needs? How do you
compete for the kind of people you need that are in the private
sector now?
General Alexander. Senator, thank you. There are two issues
here and let me just pull them apart to accurately answer your
question. We're not talking about significantly increasing the
CYBERCOM staff per se. We're actually asking the Service
components of CYBERCOM to field teams that could do three
missions: defend the Nation from an attack, support our
combatant commanders, and defend our networks with cyber
protection platoons.
Those sets of teams are what is the big growth that we're
talking about and that the Services are looking at. We are
working closely with each of the Services in setting standards,
training standards for those.
The good news: So far the Services have stood up and met
every goal that we've put for them here. I just give my hats-
off to the Service Chiefs and our components in doing that. So
we are right now in line, on track for one-third of that force
being completed by September and about one-third the next
September 2014, and the last third by 2015, that target range.
The good news is we are taking the most serious threats and
addressing those first with the teams that have already stood
up. They're already on line and actively working in this field.
So we already have teams up and running, thanks to the Army,
Air Force, and Navy for setting those teams up.
So what we're talking about is bringing those folks in.
Now, doing that, there's two parts to it. One is training, so
we can take kids, young adults, with great aptitude. They don't
have to be cyber experts. We can help them get there. I will
tell you, my experience is people who want to work in this area
and have the desire--we have a machinist's mate from the Navy,
a machinist's mate--I talked to him and I said, ``well, how'd
you get here?'' He goes: ``I really wanted to do it.'' He is
one of our best. So we've asked the Navy to give us all their
machinist's mates. No, just kidding. [Laughter.]
So when you look at it, there is great talent out there.
The real key part is how do we keep them, how do we incentivize
them, and what are the programs that we're doing? We're working
on a program with the Services to do that, and setting up their
career fields for the Services to have this common among the
Services.
Senator Blunt. A concept I'd like you to talk about if you
want to and think about if you haven't thought about it.
Senator Vitter, Senator Gillibrand from this committee, and I,
along with Senator Coons and others, are looking at some
legislation that would create more cyber warrior opportunities
in the National Guard. Missouri's done some of this already, as
I think you know. These are people who are actively in this
work every day anyway, who would then be available to react or
be available to train.
Do you have a sense of how that might be part of what
you're looking at in the future?
General Alexander. Senator, we have National Guard folks on
our staff. We are actively working that with the Guard. A few
weeks ago I sat down with all the adjutant generals from all
the States and walked through how we could do this, how we
train everybody to the same standard, Active and Guard. Their
roles, twofold. Just to quickly summarize, one would be how
they work with the States, DHS, FBI, in resiliency and recovery
and helping the investigative portion, and how they work with
us in a cyber conflict to complement what we're trying to do.
We will not have enough force on our side, so we'll depend on
Reserve and National Guard just like the rest of our force
structure.
Senator Blunt. I think in this area that gives--for
instance, your machinist's mate, if he decides, he or she
decides, for some reason that they don't want to be in the
full-time force, but they have this great skill level that
they've acquired, to take that to the Guard.
General?
General Kehler. Senator, if I just might pile into the
conversation for a moment. I think it's just as important for
us to remind ourselves that, whether it's growth in cyber,
whether it's investment in replacement for the Ohio-class
submarine, no matter which piece of the future that we are
looking at here, all of this is sensitive to the budget
decisions.
Sequestration, for example, and those budget totals will,
in fact, impact all of this. While General Alexander is right,
there is some growth that is underway--and I think the Services
have been very generous in that regard--there will be impacts
across the board here. We just can't predict what those will
look like today until the actual budgets are redone.
Senator Blunt. General Kehler, have you talked about the
sequestration and the CR component of that? We had people in
here in the last few days that have talked about how important
it is we update your spending request, and hopefully we're in
the process of doing that. But would you visit with me a little
bit about that?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. I think we would be in favor of
as much certainty as we can put back into the process. That is
a way to help with certainty, and that will be very beneficial.
I think, as I said earlier, the most immediate impact for us
and the most concerning and troubling impact in STRATCOM is the
impact that we will see on our civilians. That is not
insignificant, and I think we have to be very mindful of the
potential damage that those impacts will have.
Beyond that, then there are the impacts on the readiness
accounts that we will see. That's like a slow-motion movie. In
STRATCOM this will be like watching something in slow motion.
It will occur. It is happening now. It's just we do not see the
effect yet. We will see that effect as the months progress.
Senator Blunt. I think these two things come together here,
where the failure to update the priorities by refusing to
appropriate and debate those bills on the floor has come
together with then cutting those old priorities on a line-by-
line basis, and it's challenging.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. General Alexander?
General Alexander. Senator, I was just going to add that it
impacts CYBERCOM in a similar way, two parts. The CR holds us
to the fiscal year 2012 budget, but, as you now know, we're
standing up all these teams in fiscal year 2013 and the funding
for that was in the fiscal year 2013 budget. So about 25
percent of our budget right now is held up. That's significant.
One-third of our workforce are Air Force civilians and they
are going to be impacted by this furlough. When you think about
it, here are the folks that we're asking to do this tremendous
job and we're now going to furlough many of them. That's a
wrong message to send people we want to stay in the military
acting in these career fields.
Senator Blunt. What's the impact of dividing your workforce
between the uniformed personnel and the civilian personnel?
What's the internal management challenge of that, General
Alexander?
General Alexander. Actually, it works well together.
Senator Blunt. I know it works well, but when the civilian
force takes a furlough----
General Alexander. Right. It has a significant impact
because they look at it and they say, why are we being targeted
for this? It is a smaller group, and when you look at it, both
sides agree that this is the wrong way to handle it.
I think I would add to what General Kehler said, is we need
to give the Service Chiefs and the military the ability, the
flexibility to look at where we take these cuts and do it in a
smart way. Right now, just doing it by activity doesn't make
sense. We would not do it if we ran this as an industry.
Senator Blunt. I couldn't agree more.
General Kehler, when I was at Whiteman Air Force Base the
other day the commanding general there on this topic said: The
civilian force is an integral part of what we do and we don't
need to send a message to them that somehow they're not as
integral to what happens every day as the uniformed force is.
He showed real, I thought, very good management concern about
how you keep your team together when the law is dividing your
team and part of your team's taking the hit that the other
part's not taking.
Not suggesting, by the way, that we do anything to the
uniformed force, but I think this is maybe one of those, the
law of unintended consequences. You think you're protecting the
uniformed force and in writing the law that way then all the
personnel obligation goes onto the other side.
Do you have anything you want to say about that?
General Kehler. Sir, I couldn't agree more. The role of our
civilians has changed dramatically over the years that I've
served. Today they are integral to everything we do. They are
leaders in our organizations. They occupy senior leadership
positions. In many cases, they represent the expertise and the
experience that we do not have in the uniformed force.
So in a place like STRATCOM, in a place like CYBERCOM, in a
place like the nuclear enterprise, where our senior civilians
really represent most of the experience that's left in these
types of highly technical, highly complicated places--certainly
in the space part of our business, we have some senior
civilians who are in very important parts of the DOD space
organizations.
So I think that my concern with the sequestration begins
with the intentional and then the unintentional intangible
impacts that we might see on our workforce. It is the
uncertainty that goes with that that concerns me the most.
If I could just add one more thing, we have had a very
successful intern program to try to entice young college
graduates to enter civil service so that they can have
government careers. It's been very successful. So in Omaha we
find that a number of these youngsters who are just beginning
their careers in civil service with college degrees are looking
around today and wondering if this is their future.
Senator Blunt. Exactly.
Thank you, Generals.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To General Kehler, General Alexander, thank you so much for
your service.
General Alexander, does the private sector have the same
skills that your team does in reacting to cyber security and to
cyber attacks, and being able to protect themselves?
General Alexander. The private sector has some tremendous
talent in this area, which we need to leverage and partner
with. So I want to be clear. There are two parts to answering
this question accurately, I think. When you look back 70 years
ago to Enigma and you look at the making and breaking of codes
and doing some of the special work that the predecessors to NSA
did, we have special capabilities both in CYBERCOM and NSA.
Hence that partnership. That gives us unique insights to
vulnerabilities and other things that we can share back and
forth.
It is that area that is perhaps most important in
identifying those vulnerabilities and sharing it with industry,
those things that could impact our industry. But industry has
like skills and sees different things. So the antivirus
community is very good in this area, and I don't want to
underestimate them. What you're actually doing is saying, let's
put the best of those two teams for our Nation together to
defending us. I think that's, in legislation, one of the key
things that we need to do.
Senator Donnelly. When we look at what's going on, a huge
amount of this is efforts to try to steal America's
intellectual property, from defense contractors, from private
businesses, and from our military. If you are a business and
you're developing products and you're going to patent it, you
may be concerned about your ability to protect against a cyber
attack. You know how to develop a great product that may help
cars run faster, on less fuel, et cetera, but cyber attacks are
not your thing.
If you were that company, what would you recommend to them
in terms of protecting themselves?
General Alexander. I would recommend that they first talk
to companies like McAfee, Symantec, Mandiant, and others that
have great experience in this and that can give them great
advice. The defense industrial base also has companies that can
do that. That takes them one step.
I think Senator Inhofe brought up a good point that needs
to be brought in here and that is it needs to be a layered
defense. So there are things that they can do to have a more
resilient and more protected architecture, and those things
they should do. It's like having Norton Antivirus in your home
computer.
Senator Donnelly. Sure.
General Alexander. Those are the key things and we can help
them with that. There's another part. We know things about the
network that now we'll call classified information, that would
be useful for us to share to protect those. But what we can't
do is share those so widely that the adversary knows that we
know them, or we lose that capability.
So that part of sharing has to be done properly, in a
classified forum, that those Internet service providers and
other companies can use to protect the networks. That's why I
say it's almost two layers to this.
Senator Donnelly. You had mentioned before, you talked
about being on offense as well. Are there communications made
to those countries, to those organizations, that have done
cyber attacks against us that there are consequences in regards
to what we can do as well?
General Alexander. The President did make that statement
publicly in 2011, that we'd respond to cyber attacks with all
the broad range of options that he has before them. I think
some companies have been talked to privately. I can't go into
that here. I think that's the first logical step that we should
take, is say if you do A it will really upset us. That's why
they don't have me do it. They have people who can really put
this in the right words. But I think we ought to have those
demarches and other things with other countries, and I know the
interagency process does work that closely.
Senator Donnelly. General Kehler, in regards to North Korea
and what we have seen in the past few weeks, at this point what
adjustments to our posture are needed, if any, to make sure
that not only our friends in South Korea, but our own Nation
and our other allies are protected?
General Kehler. Senator, we're looking across our entire
range of activities to see if any adjustments need to be made.
What I would say is that deterring North Korea from acting
irrationally is our number one priority, and that deterrence
begins on the peninsula with our alliance with the Republic of
Korea. It extends to our conventional forces that are forward
on the peninsula. It extends to other forces that are available
in the theater to Admiral Locklear and General Thurman. It
extends ultimately all the way back to our nuclear deterrent.
Today my assessment of certainly STRATCOM's role in this is
that we are capable of offering to the President the full range
of options. Whatever he chooses to use in response to a North
Korean act, I believe we can make available to him, and I'm
confident in that today.
We are looking, though, at the pace of the North Korea
threat to see whether or not the limited missile defense that
we have in place, both in the theater and for the United
States, is on the right pathway to deal with the threat. We're
working that with the Intelligence Community to see if there's
a more complete assessment that we need to put in place today
and whether that will cause us to make any adjustments.
Senator Donnelly. With some areas, some countries, you can
in a way determine here's what we expect them to do next. Has
North Korea--you talked about rational actors. Is it difficult
at times to determine what they are going to do next and what
steps they will take?
General Kehler. I believe it's difficult. I believe that we
all think that's difficult, especially with a new leader that,
frankly, I think, we're still getting to know. So I think that
there are great debates about rational, irrational, et cetera.
I think for us anyway it is a question about readiness for us,
and us being ready to respond in any way that might become
appropriate. I am confident today that we can respond in
appropriate ways.
We participate in exercises, of course, with U.S. Pacific
Command and with our command on the peninsula, as they are
participating with the Republic of Korea in their exercise
series. So I believe that we are demonstrating the credibility
of our capabilities and that's important.
Senator Donnelly. Do you see coordination between North
Korea and Iran in Iran's efforts to develop further nuclear
technologies and in Korea's efforts?
General Kehler. Sir, I would prefer to have that
conversation in a different setting.
Senator Donnelly. That's fine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Fischer is next.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. General Kehler,
it is a pleasure to see you again.
Earlier you said that we can protect the continental United
States with the resources that we currently have. Is that
correct?
General Kehler. Against a limited threat, yes.
Senator Fischer. Against a limited threat. Would you agree
that that equation would rapidly change if others would be able
to develop technology to detect our submarines, if governments
would become more hostile to us, and if we don't maintain the
systems that we have?
General Kehler. Senator, I think that any time the threat
changes that that certainly causes us to review and could cause
us to make adjustments in all kinds of places, yes.
Senator Fischer. Are we addressing those concerns now?
General Kehler. Yes, we are.
Senator Fischer. Are we maintaining our nuclear arsenal to
the standards you would like to see?
General Kehler. We are today and--however, with a caveat.
The caveat is that all along over the last 2 years that I've
been in command we have made a point of agreeing forcefully
with the need to both modernize the deterrent and make sure
that the enterprise is capable of sustaining it. So with those
caveats, then yes, I am comfortable that we are capable of
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
Senator Fischer. With those caveats, you can perform the
mission that you are asked to do right now?
General Kehler. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Do you agree with the statement: the more
useable weapons are, the more deterrent value they have and the
less likely they will be used?
General Kehler. I would generally agree with that. I
typically say the more credible the deterrent is, and that, of
course, includes that we are able to employ it if we were ever
in the situation where the President asked for us to employ it.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that our conventional
forces today would be able to execute a deterrence mission
that's currently performed by our nuclear weapons?
General Kehler. I think in some cases conventional forces
are capable of executing--of producing a military result that
would be similar to what a nuclear weapon could do. The
question about deterrent effect, I think, is an interesting
one, and in some cases yes, I believe that strong conventional
forces clearly improve and increase our overall deterrent, just
like a number of other factors do.
But I believe that nuclear weapons continue to occupy a
unique place in our defense strategy, in our national security,
and in global perceptions; I think they continue to occupy a
unique place.
Senator Fischer. From your response, I would assume that
you would agree that we need to maintain the balance that we
currently have, then, with our nuclear deterrent in balance
with our conventional forces. Is that a good balance right now?
Are we at a good point?
General Kehler. I think an interesting thing has happened.
I believe that we are. I think that they are complementary, I
would say. What has happened, I believe, since the Cold War is
that our increases in our conventional capabilities and in the
overwhelming conventional power projection that we can bring to
bear around the world has made a difference in the role of our
nuclear deterrent. I think that we've been able to narrow the
role of that nuclear deterrent accordingly.
But I think as we go forward that will be an interesting
question to watch, whether our conventional forces remain
strong.
Senator Fischer. But at current levels you believe that it
is a good balance? If those levels would drop with conventional
forces or with nuclear, but focusing on the conventional, if we
see the nuclear side drop, if we don't maintain the arsenal
that we have now or if we continue to limit it, can the
conventional forces pick up the slack?
General Kehler. I think in some cases the answer is yes. I
don't think they can across the board. I don't think that they
substitute for the effect of the nuclear deterrent. However, I
do think that conventional forces do, in fact, make a
difference in terms that we are no longer in a position where
we have to threaten nuclear use in order to overcome a
conventional deficiency. So that's made a difference.
I also think that we need--saying that they are in some
kind of balance today doesn't mean in my view that there isn't
some opportunity to perhaps go below New START levels.
Senator Fischer. Would you like to elaborate on that?
General Kehler. I think there are still--as I said earlier,
from my military perspective, I think that we have in the
deliberate pathway we have been on with the Russians over the
years in reducing the number of weapons that can potentially
threaten the United States or our allies, and we've done that
in a way that's maintained stability and we've done that in a
way that's been verifiable, I think that has provided benefit
to us from a military perspective. I think that if there are
additional opportunities in the future we ought to explore
those.
Senator Fischer. Would you recommend going below the New
START levels unilaterally?
General Kehler. I would not. I think that again the formula
for success has been that we have done this with the Russians
and I think that's the formula for continued success. I believe
that certainly Secretary Panetta was very public about that.
I've seen some correspondence from Secretary Hagel where he has
agreed with that. The President mentioned in his State of the
Union address that he wanted to work with the Russians. I think
that's a consistent theme that we have seen across the board.
Senator Fischer. It's been suggested by opponents to our
nuclear program that the program's on a hair trigger. Do you
believe that there is any risk that's caused by our readiness
posture right now?
General Kehler. We go to extraordinary lengths to make sure
that our nuclear deterrent force is both safe and secure, and I
believe that it is safe and I believe that it is secure. It is
also under the positive control of the President of the United
States.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that it makes our country
safer?
General Kehler. I believe that in today's global
environment that having a portion of our force in a ready to
use posture for the President meets our needs today. But we are
always reviewing that to see whether that's the appropriate
balance for tomorrow or the day after. I think that will vary
as the world situation changes.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Alexander, if I could just ask you a brief
question. The defense authorization bill said that Congress
should be consulted about any changes to the Unified Command
Plan as it relates to CYBERCOM. Would you commit to providing
this committee, this panel, with justification for elevating to
a CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. Absolutely. I think right now the
Secretary and others are looking at that and I know that the
intent is to share everything with this committee before they
take any action and make sure the committee is comfortable with
any actions. Right now it's just in the discussion phases. The
new Secretary has to look at it and I think that will take some
time, and they will bring it back.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Fisher.
Senator Blumenthal is next.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service, your extraordinary
contribution to our defense readiness and our Nation.
Perhaps I could begin, General Alexander, by asking you a
general question which perplexes me. We agree, I think all of
us on this committee, with you that the threat of cyber attacks
and cyber interference with key parts of our Nation's
infrastructure, our private companies that are so vital to our
national defense, is a clear and present danger to our Nation.
Yet the Nation as a whole seems unaware, certainly unalarmed,
by this threat.
I know that you've thought a lot about these issues, have
spoken to us about them privately as well as publicly. I wonder
if you have some suggestions for us as to how we or you or the
President can make the Nation more aware about them. Obviously,
the President has spoken about them, but I wonder whether you
have some thoughts for us.
I know it may seem as though it's in the political realm,
but really in the educational task that I think we face
together to make the country aware of the real threat
physically and otherwise of cyber attack.
General Alexander. Senator, thank you. What you bring out
is the key, I think, to really moving the legislation and other
things forward, and that's educating people on the threat,
accurately educating them on the technical side--what does this
mean, what's a cyber attack, and what are the effects, what's
going on, what are we losing, and what should we do.
There are many reasons that industry and other players are
concerned about legislation and other things. Part of it is the
cost, the bureaucracy that comes in. Part of it is addressing a
very complex issue that at times it's easier to ignore, and
that's theft of intellectual property. The fact that they lose
it is an issue, but for the country, for the Nation as a whole,
this is our future. That intellectual property from an economic
perspective represents future wealth and we're losing some of
that.
Senator Blumenthal. You've referred to it, I think, as the
greatest single illegal transfer of wealth in the history of
the world.
General Alexander. Illegal, yes, exactly. I'm concerned
that if we don't stop it, it will hurt our Nation
significantly. There's two parts to stopping it. One is fixing
our infrastructure, working together with industry and
government to stop these attacks. Then the second, as was
brought out by Mr. Donnelly, perhaps our administration and
others reaching out to those countries and stopping them.
I think the second part is ongoing right now. We have to
step back to the first part and look at how we educate. I do
believe that we have to be more public in some of this and we
have to defuse the alarming stuff that comes out on civil
liberties and privacy and have a candid set of discussions on
what it means to protect in cyberspace. I think that's often
lost. Often it is just thrown out there as a way of stopping
progress when what will happen, what I'm really concerned
about, is a significant event happens and then we rush to
legislation.
We have the time now to think our way through and get this
right. We should educate people and do that. We are pushing the
same thing, and we'll help in any way we can, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General Kehler, if I may ask you. You have stated that ``It
is essential to provide sufficient resources to replace our
Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines.'' As you're aware, the
fiscal year 2013 budget deferred procurement of the first Ohio
replacement boat by 2 years. I'd like you to share with the
committee, to the extent that you can, whether 12 submarines
are still required--I assume that they are--and how in general
terms a requirement like this is established, and what we're
going to do to achieve that goal?
General Kehler. Senator, we established the requirement by
looking into the future and making a number of judgments about
the future, which is what we do with every weapons system that
we put on the books. In this case, though, I think we've
started to report the assessment that the value of a submarine-
based deterrent, as we go to the future, will remain as high as
it is today. Then the question doesn't become if you need to do
it; in my mind it becomes when do you need to do it.
So we've worked this very carefully with the Navy, and it
is ultimately the Navy's assessment of the current performance
of the existing submarines and their longevity that's driving
the answer to this question. Much like any other military
platform, the amount of use that gets put on it determines its
lifetime. In the case of submarines, which I don't know much
about, but a number of submariners who work for me remind me
constantly that it's the cycles on a submarine. It's a harsh
environment, first of all, and then you get the pressure, no
pressure, pressure, reduced pressure, et cetera.
So that does things to metallurgy and it does things to
fittings and it does things to the internal workings of a
submarine that ultimately cause them to question the continued
safety of being able to cycle down and up. The Navy tells us
that we're going to reach that. It's not going to be a bright
line in the sand that on today they're all okay and tomorrow
they're not. There's a zone that they're going to enter and
sliding these an additional 2 years to the right puts them in
the zone.
My view would be it's not prudent for us to slide them
further, unless of course the Navy steps forward and says, no,
we can go another couple of years. I don't know that they're
going to say that. I don't expect that they will. But I think
again it's not a bright line in the sand. I think the issue for
us will be 12 looks like the right number as we go to the
future. That can always be adjusted as we go to the future. It
seems to be the right balance between capability and cost, and
that's going to be important as we go to the future, no
question about that.
So on balance my view is that we do need to go forward with
that. We need to go forward with long-range strike aircraft as
well, and we need to complete the analysis of alternatives on
the future of the ICBMs beyond 2030. That's not a decision we
have to make today, but it is an analysis of alternatives that
needs to go forward.
Senator Blumenthal. But there's no question right now that
12 is the right number?
General Kehler. I don't have a question that that's--I
would say that that's a minimum number that we sit there
looking at today. I don't know if the number gets larger than
that, and that will depend, I believe, on a number of factors
as we go forward.
Senator Blumenthal. When you say that sliding to 2 years
puts us in the zone, could you explain what you mean?
General Kehler. The first of the Ohio-class submarines will
begin to reach the end of their service lives at just about the
time the first of the replacements comes on line. It's a dance
that we're working. By the way, we're working this with the
United Kingdom as well because they are looking to piggyback,
if you will, on this program for their own replacement. So this
is a very delicate programmatic dance that the Navy is doing
with the U.K. as well as with the needs that STRATCOM has put
on them.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired. Perhaps I can follow up with some
questions and also to General Alexander, if we can explore
perhaps further the education of the public, which is so vital
to the work really that you're doing and that we're seeking to
assist you to do.
Thank you very much. Thank you both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for your leadership in the important
commands that you have, both of which are extremely important
to America.
DOD acknowledges, General Kehler, that Russia is increasing
its reliance on nuclear weapons and that the pace and scope of
China's nuclear programs, as well as the strategy behind their
plans, raises questions about their future intentions and the
number of weapons they intend to have. Likewise, India and
Pakistan are modernizing their nuclear forces and the French
President recently commented that nuclear weapons are essential
for France. Of course, North Korea continues to expand its
capabilities, while Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear
weapons.
So I'm not aware of any country reducing their nuclear
stockpiles, except perhaps us as we continue to look at that.
But let me ask you, what are the strategic implications of
these trends of enhanced nuclear weapons around the world?
General Kehler. Senator, they do have implications for us.
I think first of all, when we look at assessing other nuclear
arsenals around the world what we do is we look at intent and
capability. I think none of us believe that the Russians intend
to attack the United States. I think we don't believe the
Chinese intend to attack the United States, et cetera. However,
they have the capability to do so, and as long as they do then
we have an obligation to deter against such an attack. That
means we have to be mindful of the capabilities that they are
bringing to bear.
We note their modernization and we certainly note their
numbers. I think, at least again from my military perspective,
arms control and arms reductions have helped us in terms of
limiting or reducing in some cases the threat that we face.
We get to a point here, though, where as we work toward a
goal, if the eventual goal is zero, you get to a point where
other arsenals I think begin to bear on this equation.
Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more about that. I think
it's unimaginable that if we go to zero that every other
country in the world would go to zero, and that would place us
at a strategic disadvantage of great magnitude and cannot be
allowed to happen.
Could the disparity in public vision of countries and their
nuclear weapons, some or most of these I've mentioned more
robust than the United States, could that make our allies
nervous? I'm concerned about these discussions that we're
having about further reducing our nuclear weapons to a level I
think is dangerous, about what discussions--what impact they
might be having on our allies around the world, like Japan and
South Korea, that have relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for
the past 7 decades.
If our arsenal and therefore the nuclear umbrella we
provide continue to shrink, I'm concerned that our partners
will look to create their own, and this is the very definition
of proliferation, it seems to me.
As you may have seen, the Sunday New York Times reported
that following North Korea's third nuclear test some
influential South Koreans are now beginning to openly call for
the South to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
Is this a factor that we should consider as we evaluate the
level of nuclear weapons that we want to maintain?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I believe it is a factor you have
to consider.
Senator Sessions. In a message to the U.S. Senate in
February 2011, President Obama said: ``I intend to modernize or
replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems of
heavy bomber, air-launched cruise missile, and ICBM, and
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and SLBMs, and
maintain the United States' rocket motor industrial base.''
Additionally, 2 days before the vote on the New START
treaty in a letter to Senators Inouye, Feinstein, Cochran, and
Alexander, President Obama reaffirmed this commitment to
nuclear modernization, stating: ``I recognize that nuclear
modernization requires investment for the long-term. That is my
commitment to Congress, that my administration will pursue
these programs and capabilities for as long as I am
President.''
Can you tell us where we are on the efforts to modernize
our triad and our nuclear infrastructure, and are we on pace to
comply with the President's commitment?
General Kehler. Sir, I can tell you that through the
submission of the 2013 President's budget, with some exceptions
that we talked about last year--there were still issues in the
nuclear enterprise, the weapons part of the business. The
program didn't close, if you recall that from last year. But
the 2013 budget continued the modernization efforts across the
board. Some were later than others, but it continued the
modernization efforts.
The 2013 budget turned into a CR. I don't know what the
remainder of the year is going to bring to us in terms of the
2013 piece of this.
The 2014 piece--we've worked pretty hard over the last year
to try to structure the 2014 piece so that it would also
continue all of the things that you've mentioned here. I don't
know what's going to happen to the 2014 piece, given the
additional investment reductions that will have to come with
sequestration. So, I can't tell you today what it looks like,
sir. I can't tell you it's not going to happen. I just can't
tell you what's going to happen yet, because we don't have a
budget on the Hill yet that describes our position.
Senator Sessions. Do you believe financially we should
follow through with the commitments that the President had and
this is a reasonable defense posture and expenditure for the
United States?
General Kehler. I believe, as the advocate for the
strategic force, that this continues to be a wise investment on
our behalf, I do.
Senator Sessions. In the last NDAA, we articulated certain
expectations of the NNSA, which manages our nuclear weapons
production, and the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), of which
you're a member, with regard to the shaping and reviewing of
NNSA's budget. You review the budget and through the Council
have input into that. Specifically, our report said: ``The
conferees expect that the NWC not only certify, as required by
law, that the NNSA budget as it is submitted to Congress, but
that the NWC also take an active role in shaping and reviewing
the NNSA budget as it is prepared for submission to Congress
and negotiated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
during the budget review process.''
Is the NWC, which you and others sit on, taking an active
role in shaping and reviewing NNSA's budget proposal? I ask
that because it's really clear to me, colleagues, that the NNSA
and the Department of Energy (DOE), their role is much like a
defense contractor, a Boeing or a Lockheed. They're producing a
weapons system that you have to have and utilize, and you
should be involved in how they manage that and the amount of
money that's spent on it, I believe. At least I think that's
healthy for America.
So do you feel good about where NWC is and are we on track
here to raise it up as we intended to, to give it more power?
General Kehler. Senator, I do feel good about where we are
today in terms of insight and influence. It isn't perfect, but
I think that over the last year in particular there has been a
dramatic change in the working relationship between DOD and DOE
and NNSA in particular over visibility into the budget and over
influence in shaping that budget.
So again, it's not perfect. I think we're learning a lot
about how we can get better at this as we go forward. I think
there's more to do. But I have seen a tremendous change in the
way we go about working together through the NWC and I think
it's a tremendous positive change.
Senator Sessions. Great.
Mr. Chairman, I would note that my understanding is that
DOD has not yet certified the budget. They must have some
concerns about it. But it is at the OMB level already and going
forward. I do think it's healthy that DOD has real input into
the production of the budget for nuclear weapons.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Kehler and General Alexander, for your
service.
General Kehler, the men and women who are assigned to the
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Hawaii are some of the
best around. The capabilities provided at this facility are
exceptional and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) uses it to
test the systems that will protect our country and allies from
missile attacks.
Currently under construction there is the Aegis Ashore
Facility, I'm sure you're familiar, which will enhance the
capabilities available for MDA and the Navy. So if you have not
visited PMRF recently, I certainly encourage you to go out
there, and I would certainly want to join you in that visit so
that you can chat with the great team that we have out there
and also the contractor personnel that keeps the whole place
going.
I would welcome your thoughts on the facility as we go
forward in these economically constrained times.
General Kehler. Senator, I'll do that. I could hear my
staff back here volunteering to get on the airplane and go
visit out there. [Laughter.]
I can tell you that the entire Pacific Range complex, that
really starts on the west coast of the United States, goes to
PMRF in Hawaii--there are other range assets in Hawaii
elsewhere as well, as I know you know--and then it extends all
the way out toward Kwajalein--is very important to the United
States.
Senator Hirono. So, I can expect your continuing support
for the new construction that's happening for the Aegis Ashore?
General Kehler. Yes, you can.
Senator Hirono. Again, I note in your testimony the
challenge that you're facing--I think you might have talked
about this a little bit--to process and analyze all the data
that our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
platforms are providing. So it's one thing to collect all the
data and we want to be sure that that data is accurate. It's
another as to how you're going to use that data, all this
tremendous amount of raw information that you're getting.
Given the challenging budget situation that we face and the
limits on the number of analysts that you have, the costs of
data storage, and the limits on the amount of intelligence
products your consumers can effectively use, how do you solve
this problem and find the balance while ensuring that we don't
miss something big?
General Kehler. Senator, let me start and then I'm going to
defer to my Intelligence Community colleague sitting on my
left, because over the last 10 years, I think, we've learned
something in combat in Southwest Asia, and that is, that it
isn't about the collectors as much as it is about collecting
and processing. So the more processing power we've been able to
throw at the collection to have the machines make sense out of
what is being collected, the better we have gotten. It has
provided great insight for forward forces to be able to carry
out their missions and act in ways I think that the adversaries
did not think we could act.
The question now and the trick is to extend that globally
for all of our combatant commands as we look to the future.
That's something that we are looking at as we speak. So that's
going to be really important, and I'll defer to Keith because
his organization has really been in the forefront of how do you
use computing power to help us in this collection business.
General Alexander. Senator, I think one of the things--and
I'll just go back to Iraq--was putting together a real-time
regional gateway capability--think of this as the processing
power that General Kehler talks about--and putting it forward
with our combat troops so that they had the information they
needed.
I think there's a few things that you have to put on the
table: first, understanding the needs of the tactical
commander, what do they need to do their job. So from the
Intelligence Community perspective that means our folks going
down and being in their environment, living in their
environment, and understanding what their needs are, and then
having access to all the data that the collectors do.
I think this committee and others and some of your staff
have worked hard to ensure that the sensors that we have push
their information into data stores that everybody could use.
This is key, key to leveraging the power of our collectors,
national, theater, and tactical, to impact the tactical
commander's requirements. We've made great strides in that.
I know you've been up to NSA Hawaii, a wonderful facility,
and I think some of the capabilities exist there, and our folks
would love to walk you through those.
Senator Hirono. So, I take it that the research and
development component of what you do is very critical and that
we need to continue to provide resources for that in order to
enable you to do what you need to do with all this massive data
that you are needing to analyze.
I note, General Alexander, that you had talked a little bit
about how important recruiting and retaining your key personnel
would be. I note in your testimony that you wanted to increase
the education of our future leaders by fully integrating cyber
into our existing War College curricula. You noted that this
will further the assimilation of cyber into the operational
arena for every domain.
So I know that what you're working in is an area that needs
to become fully integrated and assimilated. What are your
thoughts on how long this is going to take to make sure that
the curricula incorporates cyber and that cyber is at the
forefront of what all of our generals should be thinking about?
General Alexander. It should be absolutely the first thing
they learn and the most important. That's my view, of course.
Senator Hirono. I tend to share that view. This is a new
area and I think that we are very vulnerable on the cyber
front.
General Alexander. So I speak at the war colleges. We have
people at the war colleges on the NSA side that carry that
message forward, and we are adding it into the curriculum and
these courses are growing.
We are also working with the Defense Intelligence Agency on
setting up a cyber, if you will, mid-grade course for field
grade officers, the young O-3s, O-4s that we have. We have a
series of courses that we have for our folks and for staffs,
for the combatant command staffs, not just ours but all of
them, to understand cyber.
The interesting part here is we'll get that set up, but
it's key to note that every day this area changes. So keeping
on top of it and keeping those changes is what we really need
to do, and keeping people aware of those changes and the impact
those changes have. That's the key part.
One of the great parts about having CYBERCOM at NSA is that
we can leverage the academic capabilities of NSA with the
military working together to ensure we have these courses that
both our civilian and military people go through. We've made
great strides in that and we have a whole series of courses
that we can show you that we're giving to our folks.
Then when I talk publicly, I also give people insights to
books that they should read. When I was a younger officer, I
know I did not read all those books that people recommended,
but there are some great books out there on cyberspace that we
recommend that they read.
Senator Hirono. So are you satisfied that this assimilation
is going on fast enough and that it will continue? As you note,
changes occur very rapidly in this area.
General Alexander. It's growing. It's not fast enough.
There's a lot that we have to do. But changing some of these
courses takes time. We are pushing this very hard, with a focus
on those folks that first have to operate in this area. I think
that part is going well. We do have the staff-level courses
out, and we have opened it up for all the combatant commands,
and we're hitting those key parts.
Finally, I'll tell you that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and others have worked with the combatant
commands and had these discussions with all of us sitting
around the table to talk about cyber in a classified
environment, so everybody understands the threat of that. I'll
tell you, the senior officers in our military do understand
that.
Senator Hirono. You noted just now that this is an area
that changes very rapidly and you have to stay on top of these
changes. So can you talk a little bit about how you would
measure effectiveness in your cyber security efforts and what
kind of metrics would you use to determine whether we're on the
right track?
General Alexander. There's two parts to measuring that. One
is certifying individuals, so we are developing a certification
program--think about getting a flying license--that our cyber
operators would have to be certified to operate in cyberspace
for different functionalities. That's one part.
The other is in our defense, looking at what we see in
going through our cyber readiness inspections to see where each
of our commands in the military are in defending their
networks. What we've seen is a constant improvement in the
cyber readiness of those networks. It's not perfect, but it's
growing and getting better.
Senator Hirono. That's reassuring.
I recall that you testified about how important
collaboration is with the private sector. Can you talk a little
bit about what you see as the kind of collaboration? Are we
talking about collaborating on information with the private
sector, collaborating on technology? Then you also said that in
order for all of this to happen that the private sector would
need insulation from liability. So can you talk a little bit
more specifically about what you mean and why the private
sector needs liability protection?
General Alexander. Senator, the key things that they need,
that we need in sharing information, is the ability for those
to understand the threats as we see them, perhaps in a
classified environment, and what they're seeing in threats in
their networks. They're going to be looking at different
portions of our networks than the government looks at. So
together we see more if we put those two facts together, and we
can come up with a more defensible architecture.
So there's that sharing of information on the threats that
we both see. Those threats could be just routine malicious
software that's out there to nation-state capabilities. That's
one set of threats, and sharing it.
The second part is, so what do you do to fix the networks
and make them more defensible? Here industry and government
have some great ideas, and implementing those, for example the
joint information environment, is just such a path forward that
gives us a more defensible architecture because it allows us to
patch at a more rapid rate and see threats better than we've
ever been able to in the past. So it's those kinds of things
that we're working on to move forward.
The reason we need liability protection is when we share
some of this information with industry or they share it back,
the liability that they incur because they are acting perhaps
as an agent of the government in letting us know a threat is
significant. Allowing them to be sued in some of these areas,
from my perspective, when we're asking them to do something and
then they bear the brunt of that lawsuit, is not right, and we
ought to fix that and address that. We ought to give them the
authority to share their information with the government, which
they don't have today.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
I apologize for going over my time. I didn't see the little
blue note. But thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono, and we will put
these blue notes a little bit closer to the eye contact in the
future. But you've always maintained your courtesy, so I'm sure
our colleagues understand.
Senator Lee is next.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Kehler and General Alexander, for
joining us today and for your service to our country. Both of
those things are deeply appreciated.
General Kehler, in June 2010 as the Senate was considering
the New START treaty, your predecessor, General Chilton,
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
the force level under that Treaty, meaning 1,550 warheads on
700 delivery vehicles, was ``exactly what is needed today to
provide the deterrent.''
Did I understand your answer to Senator Fischer's question
as being inconsistent with that? I think I did. I thought I
heard you say we could go lower than that. If that's exactly
what we needed in 2010, what has changed between now and then?
General Kehler. Senator, I think I'm not inconsistent with
that, so let me explain. The way we determine the size of the
force, we don't start with a number. What we start with is a
set of national security objectives. Those objectives
eventually wind up being military tasks. Those tasks require a
certain number of weapons to achieve.
When General Chilton was asked that question, he took a
look at the national objectives that he had at the time, the
tasks that he was asked to perform, and he looked at the number
of weapons that were going to be permissible under the New
START treaty, and he said all of those matched.
My point is that we may have opportunities to go below
that, but it doesn't start with a number; it has to start with
national objectives and military tasks that would be associated
with it.
Senator Lee. Okay. So you're not saying as of right now
you're certain or you're confident that we could go below that.
You're saying it is possible, based on further assessments at
some point in the future?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I think that's right. I think
it's possible, based upon assessments, based upon national
objectives, based upon the military tasks we would be asked to
achieve. I think it depends on the nature of any threat that's
out there. So I think many factors go into the number.
My contention is, though, like the Nuclear Posture Review
said, I support this. I think we should explore whether further
reductions are possible.
Senator Lee. One of the reasons why I think I was a little
bit surprised to hear you say that, though, was in light of the
ambitious ongoing modernization programs that we have going on
in Russia and in China, and in light of the fact that we have
other countries like North Korea and Iran with aggressive
nuclear ambitions. I would think that our risk and our threat
would be on the increase and our need for those weapons would
not necessarily be diminishing. Am I mistaken in that regard?
General Kehler. I think all of those factors need to be
considered. Primarily, though, yet today the arsenal that we
have, that was built during the Cold War, and the arsenal that
the Russians have represent the vast majority of the weapons
that exist.
Senator Lee. Sure, I understand that. But you know, there
are a lot of countries, in addition to the United States, that
rely on our nuclear arsenal.
General Kehler. Most definitely.
Senator Lee. So that umbrella, if you will, extends over a
number of our allies, some of which lie in close proximity to
countries like Iran and countries like North Korea. What
consequence do you think it might have if we diminish our
nuclear forces even further, either through reductions or
because of a failure to modernize adequately? What impact might
that have on some of our allies who rely on our own nuclear
capabilities to protect them? Couldn't that bring about
additional nuclear proliferation?
General Kehler. I think that's always a possibility. I
think we would have to be mindful of that as we go forward and
that needs to be one of the factors considered.
Senator Lee. Now, do you think that countries like Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, or maybe other nations in the Middle East might
feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons in the relatively
near-term future if, for example, Iran is able to achieve
status as a nuclear power?
General Kehler. There have been some reports that some of
those countries would consider it. I don't have a good feeling
from my position about what our official view is of that, but I
think that again any time that we are talking about extending
our nuclear guarantee, which is what we have done for many,
many, many years, that our allies, what they've told us when
they come and visit my headquarters is that it concerns them as
we consider making changes. So, I think we need to be mindful
of those concerns and address them accordingly.
Senator Lee. Right, right. That probably means that we
ought to be cautious before reducing our nuclear arsenal, and
we also ought to be very concerned about our failure to
modernize adequately those weapons systems, wouldn't it?
Because again, it seems logical to me that, especially as we
have states like Iran and North Korea moving in that direction,
that inevitably will have a huge impact on what other countries
do. What other countries do will in turn most likely put more
of a burden on us and further strain our ability to provide
that assurance that we've provided in the past, would it not?
General Kehler. I think, Senator, as we have always
thought, ultimately our ability to deter, our ability to extend
that deterrence and assure our allies with that is based on the
credibility of our nuclear deterrent and our nuclear deterrent
force. Increasingly, certainly over the last decade now, the
presence and capability of our conventional capabilities has
made a difference, and I think in some cases has set a
different context for the way we view our nuclear forces. But
they still remain critical, I believe, and complementary.
Senator Lee. Okay. In the minute and a half or so that I
have left, I'd like to talk to you a little bit about China.
What can you tell me about the Chinese nuclear arsenal, and in
particular whether you believe that China will continue to
increase the number of weapons in its arsenal, and whether it's
going to try to seek a level of equivalency with the United
States and Russia in terms of nuclear weapons?
General Kehler. Senator, I think we need to have a more
full conversation in a different setting than this. But just in
this setting, what I would say is we watch China continuing to
modernize portions of their nuclear force. In terms of numbers,
I believe the number ranges that our Intelligence Community has
assessed with that--I don't think I can state that here, but I
tend to believe that they're in about the range that we are
talking about.
I do not see, nor has the Intelligence Community reported
to me, that they are seeking to have some kind of numeric
parity with the United States or with Russia. But I would
quickly say I think this is why we want more transparency with
China. We'd like to know what their intentions are going
forward and we'd like to be able to expand our dialogue with
them so that we can prevent any misunderstandings.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lee.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to associate myself with the line of
questioning of Senator Lee. I think he's right on point. We
have to look at the world we live in when we make these
decisions about numbers and capabilities.
General Kehler, am I pronouncing your name right?
General Kehler. Yes.
Senator Graham. Close enough?
Senator Fischer. Yes, you and I are right.
Chairman Levin. We've been batting about 500 on the
committee today. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. Well, I'm a colonel. I don't want to get
court-martialed. [Laughter.]
Are we spending enough money to modernize our nuclear
weapons force?
General Kehler. I think we are coming out of a period where
the answer was no.
Senator Graham. How does sequestration affect?
General Kehler. It affects it. I can tell you it affects it
in the near-term in terms of the potential impact on readiness,
as I mentioned earlier, which will come about over a period of
months. I described this earlier as a slow-motion impact in
STRATCOM, because the Services are trying to protect----
Senator Graham. As part of the START Treaty negotiations
was, those who voted for the Treaty--I did not--there was a
promise given we'd modernize our nuclear force.
General Kehler. Part two of sequestration, of course, is
the overall budget totals which are coming down.
Senator Graham. So basically my view is we never honored
the modernization commitment in terms of funding, and along
comes sequestration. So you've been hit twice. We never made
the commitment that was promised in terms of modernization
funds, even though it was more than in the past. Now you have
sequestration. It's a double whammy. Would you agree?
General Kehler. I don't know yet, sir, what the
sequestration investment impact is going to be on us. I don't
know. The budget details have yet to be worked out.
Senator Graham. If it's across-the-board your account will
be hit, right?
General Kehler. Certainly if the rules stay the way they
are, across-the-board.
Senator Graham. Let's just assume that. Get back to me or
the committee in writing: Assuming an across-the-board
continuation over a 10-year period, what it would do to our
nuclear modernization efforts. Could you do that?
General Kehler. Yes, I can.
[The information referred to follows:]

We can meet our strategic mission responsibilities today. We expect
continued budget reductions to impact future Department of Defense
(DOD) platform acquisition programs and National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) stockpile maintenance and infrastructure
sustainment activities. We will continue to develop sustainment and
modernization plans within budget constraints to meet our strategic
mission requirements. DOD and NNSA are jointly preparing an updated
Section 1043 Report (Public Law 112-81) that describes our plans for
maintaining strategic deterrence capabilities for the next 10 years.
The update will include consideration of the budget reduction impacts
on program scope and schedule, and estimated funding requirements for
maintaining nuclear weapons delivery platforms and modernizing the
nuclear weapons complex.

Senator Graham. General Alexander, why isn't an attack on
critical infrastructure in this nation, a cyber attack by a
government like China or Russia, why is that not considered an
act of war?
General Alexander. That's a great question and I think one
that needs to be ironed out: What constitutes an act of war in
cyberspace? So let me give you my thoughts on that versus
trying to bat this around.
Senator Graham. There is no clear answer, I agree with you.
General Alexander. Right. I think first I would look at the
laws of armed conflict, the intent of the nation, and what
they're doing. I would say what we're seeing today from those
countries, essentially espionage and theft of intellectual
property, is not an act of war.
Senator Graham. What about military modernization plans,
stealing--a lot of their fighters tend to look like our
fighters.
General Alexander. That's right, and a lot, a lot across
the board. So I think that's espionage. I think that's theft of
intellectual property. I would say that the intent is to steal
secrets and you're into the espionage, criminal.
If the intent is to disrupt or destroy our infrastructure,
I think you've crossed a line. So somewhere in that zone----
Senator Graham. Have you seen an intent, a planning process
in place where enemies of the nation would attack us through
cyberspace? Is that something we should be worried about?
General Alexander. Yes, that's something we should be
worried about, and I can give you more details in a closed
setting.
Senator Graham. All right. Now let's talk about outside
DOD. You can defend the defense infrastructures, but you're so
connected to the private sector one cannot be disconnected from
the other; is that correct?
General Alexander. That's correct.
Senator Graham. We don't have a little bubble that you can
protect. If systems go down, if power systems go down, it
affects you. If financial services are disrupted, it would
affect you. You can just go on and on with how an attack on
critical infrastructure could affect our national security.
Have you talked to Senator Whitehouse about his proposed
solution of dealing with critical infrastructure?
General Alexander. I have not, not the latest one. I have
talked to Senator Whitehouse in the past and found that he and
I are essentially in sync on those discussions. But I haven't
seen his latest.
Senator Graham. I am with him. The concept is that we would
identify critical infrastructure in the private sector, like
power supply, financial services, things that every American
depends on, and if they went down would hurt us as a Nation,
hurt our economy, and could do harm to our citizens. I think
his concept is that, let's identify our critical infrastructure
and allow the industries in question, like the utilities, to
come up with best business practices within their industry and
submit their proposal to a collaborative body of government
agencies, with DHS certainly a key component of it.
If these best business practices are in the minds of the
government meaningful, we would grant liability protection to
those who met those standards. It would be voluntary.
Does that sound like a reasonable way to proceed?
General Alexander. Senator, I think in part that's
reasonable. The issue that it leaves not addressed is the
information-sharing part.
Senator Graham. Right. That has to be done. That's a
critical part of it.
Let's assume that we get the information-sharing right. We
have two ways to do this, through a regulatory regime--my
belief is that regulations would be expensive and the threats
move too fast for it to work. Do you agree with that?
General Alexander. I do. In fact, I would say so if you
separate the two and you have liability and information-sharing
on one side and then you have liability and standards and
regulation on the other side that work together, in essence
that's essentially where the Executive order is trying to go as
well.
Senator Graham. Right. So I would just want to encourage
you. We'll meet with Senator Whitehouse and others and see if
we can find a pathway forward that would allow the private
sector to set the standards in the critical infrastructure
area, and the payoff would be liability protection, because
this is an ever-changing threat.
Finally, what kind of damage could be done through a cyber
attack? Start with nation states, then criminal organizations.
What kind of threat are we facing?
Finally, in South Carolina our database at the Department
of Revenue was hacked into and every citizen's Social Security
number and a lot of business information was stolen, causing
the State of South Carolina a lot of chaos in trying to provide
identity theft protection to our citizens. This was a massive
intrusion into a State system where over 3 million Social
Security numbers were seized.
Can you just quickly tell the committee the kind of threats
we face, and if Congress doesn't get involved, I think we will
regret the day.
General Alexander. Generally speaking, all our systems
today, our power systems, our water systems, our governments,
our industry, depend on computers, depend on computerized
switches, depend on these networks, all are at risk. If an
adversary were to get in, they could essentially destroy those
components, make it so that you either had to replace them or
get somebody to come in and replace each part of that.
In the power grid as an example----
Senator Graham. They could do as much or more damage than
the attacks of September 11?
General Alexander. That's correct, I think it would. If you
look at what happened in 2003 in the northeast power
disruption, that was caused by a software failure. That was not
somebody attacking us. That was a software failure.
But now think about somebody imposing a software failure,
not just in the northeast, but across all of those and
cascading that across the United States, and breaking some of
the transformers, which would be very difficult to replace. We
would have significant power outages for extended periods
throughout the country.
Think about Wall Street if we were to go in and--I know
Senator Blumenthal was asking questions on this earlier, about
what happens if you attack Wall Street and you destroyed the
data that they need at the end of the day to ensure all the
books are right. If you can't close those books, which are done
today by computers, you have a significant problem in our
banking infrastructure, not just ours but global.
Senator Graham. Since our time is up, if you could submit
to the committee a worst-case scenario from a cyber attack, a
September 11 scenario.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

I'd like to walk you through an intellectual thought exercise that
we, at U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), use to illustrate a potential
significant cyber event.
This event is totally fictitious. It is plausible, credible, and we
have observed full scope adversaries having developed or currently
developing these capabilities. However, we have no indications that
anyone is actively attempting to conduct this scale of operation in the
near-term against U.S. systems.
From a planning perspective, we envision any global cyber campaign
to consist of three components; regional, U.S. domestic, and global,
all three occurring simultaneously. While envisioned to be masked, the
intention of the adversary would be to effectively paralyze the ability
of the United States to project power globally and to marshal forces
regionally.
Minute 1 would consist of attacking initial military response in
the affected region combined with an anti-access strategy against U.S.
regional logistics, i.e. U.S. Pacific Command. As a domestic diversion,
U.S. financial institutions may be significantly affected.
Minute 2 would consist of developing a regional internal disruption
focused on civilian infrastructure and causing internal regional panic.
This may be combined with affecting U.S. Transportation Command's
ability to resupply the affected region and/or geographic combatant
commander and other U.S. Government networks, i.e. intelligence
agencies, commercial network venders, et cetera.
Minute 3 would consist of disrupting primary power generation,
which would force the three components to rely on back-up and/or
emergency power. Since back-up power generation is far less than
primary grids, significant systems in communication, visibility, C2,
and coordination would be stressed and potentially fail.
Minute 4 would be focused at command and control in the affected
region and the Gulf Cooperation Council. As a potential icing on the
cake, U.S. Air Traffic Control may be affected to cause domestic U.S.
panic.
Although depicted as a 4 minute scenario, I submit that we've
slowed the scenario down. This is really a 4 second scenario.
The implication is this: within seconds, not only could the real
ability for the United States to globally project power be put at risk,
the confidence of allies to rely on the credible ability for the United
States to globally project power be put at risk, which is just as
significant.

Senator Graham. Finally, the Executive order, I think, is a
result of Congress' inaction and I don't blame the President at
all. Do you believe it would be prudent for Congress to enhance
the Executive order, that we need legislation in this area
beyond the Executive order to make the Nation safe?
General Alexander. I do.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. We're expecting Senator Kaine back at any
minute. Senator Inhofe has a question and then I'll have a
question, and then we'll turn it over to Senator Kaine.
Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, in response to the question
that was given to you by Senator Graham--he was talking about
what's going to happen to you under sequestration, and then you
qualified it and said, well, that is assuming it's going to be
cut straight across-the-board. Of course, that would be
damaging, because that's done, in my opinion, without thought.
It's just a cut across-the-board.
Now, I introduced legislation 6 weeks ago anticipating that
maybe sequestration would happen. I didn't think it would, but
I thought in case it does, to take the same top line as to how
it's going to affect a whole division of bureaucracies and then
say, in the case of you and of anything having to do with
defense, take that and adhere to that top line, but allow the
Service Chiefs underneath that to make those decisions, and
would that be better?
All the Service Chiefs, all five including the Guard
Chief--I contacted them, too--said yes, that would make a world
of difference. The devastation is still there, but not as
devastating.
Would you agree with that?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I would.
Senator Inhofe. Would you, General Alexander, too?
General Alexander. I would, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals Kehler and Alexander.
General Kehler, I just want to focus a little bit on some
of your testimony that grabbed my attention. The opening
comment that you made and that you repeated verbally today is
uncertainty and complexity continue to dominate the national
security landscape. I agree with that and I want to wrestle
with questions that many of my colleagues here have asked about
fiscal uncertainty.
We can't necessarily reduce the uncertainty in the broader
world, but it is in our power as Congress to try to reduce some
of the fiscal uncertainty that you're dealing with. One week
ago yesterday, so the first weekday after the sequester cuts
went into effect, I visited DOD and spoke with Secretary Hagel
and General Odierno, Deputy Secretary Carter. I spoke with
General Welsh on that same day here in my office.
Then I went downstairs and didn't talk to the brass, but I
went to the cafeteria and just went table to table. In three
tables, just in the random three tables I went to, I have
Active Duty assigned to the Pentagon, veterans who were there
having lunch with friends, DOD contractors, DOD civilians, and
some Guard representatives who were there for a planning
meeting.
They were all sharing their concerns about sequester, CR,
and the overall climate of uncertainty as it affects them and
as it sends a message about our commitment to the mission, to
the DOD mission. One affect of the uncertainty that I think
just has really dawned on me and increasingly in your testimony
is the effect on personnel.
So a couple of the comments in your testimony. On page 2:
``Fiscal uncertainty presents our people with an unprecedented
combination of professional and personal concerns as well. The
all-volunteer military and civilian team has performed beyond
our greatest expectations and is the envy of the world. But
some of the best young uniformed and non-uniformed people
assigned to STRATCOM are questioning their future. The
uncertainty surrounding civilian hiring restrictions, salary
freezes, and the possibility of unpaid furloughs is especially
troubling since,'' as you testified earlier, ``60 percent of
STRATCOM headquarters staff and much of the essential workforce
which supports our missions and sustains our mission-critical
platforms and systems are civilians.''
Then with a specific reference to cyber, at the end of your
testimony--and this is General Kehler's testimony, but I'm sure
it's something that General Alexander resonates with as well:
``Improving the DOD's ability to operate effectively in
cyberspace requires investment in five major areas.'' Then you
go over the areas. ``But of these, the most urgent intelligence
is increasing the numbers, training, and readiness of our cyber
forces.''
Again, it's about personnel and the choices that people are
making about their own future. It strikes me, and I just would
like to hear you talk about this a bit more--I know that
Senator Blunt raised it--it strikes me that you have two issues
of significant concern as you're trying to grow a cyber talent
pool within DOD.
The first is the competition from the outside world, which
from a salary and benefits standpoint I would imagine for these
professionals can be pretty intense. The second is a fiscal
uncertainty that people would have if they chose the path of
public service. What would they face in terms of furloughs or
pay cuts or pay freezes? What is the commitment that we have?
I would like to hear each of you just talk about how you
deal with the recruiting and retention in this environment when
you not only have a global uncertainty, but tough economic
competitors in the private sector and fiscal uncertainty as
well.
General Kehler. Senator, I would only add a couple of
remarks. Number one, we have the most magnificent people
anywhere. They're the envy of every other military in the
world. They're like that for a reason. They're extraordinarily
talented and they are very patriotic.
So normally I don't worry much about them other than to
make sure that as a leader I'm doing everything that I can to
take care of them and make sure that they're going to be there
and that we're taking care of them and their families. That's
been an interesting challenge, of course, over the last 10 or
12 years, with wounded and other things.
But I think as we look to the future here what I'm hearing
from some of our folks is particularly troubling, and it gets
back to uncertainty. As we all--of course, we all want the
economy to get better and we'd like it to be better soon, as
fast as it can possibly happen. But when that happens and as
that happens, I guess is a better way to say it, as that
happens, then this competition for our best and brightest
talent is going to go up. In that environment, I'm concerned
that as they are weighing, not the personal threats to
themselves, which they are willing to take, but when they are
weighing the financial certainty for their families, that
they'll come down on a different side than government service.
So I think that's an important question for us. We have an
all-volunteer military. It's been stressed in a lot of
different ways. This is another stressor on it. So I think we
need to be mindful of this because we are competing for the
best and brightest talent. We've been getting it. I believe
again they are magnificent people that raise their right hand,
whether that's a civilian or uniformed or whether they serve as
a contractor. It doesn't seem to much matter; they're all
working hard to do the right things.
It's preserving that, and there is an impact here with what
is going on. There is an impact on them. It is coming to our
level. They are telling us that there's an impact on them, and
we need to be mindful of it.
Senator Kaine. General Alexander, could you comment
additionally?
General Alexander. Senator, two broad areas. First, I agree
with everything that you read there. I think it's 100 percent
on track.
We're impacted in CYBERCOM in two areas. The CR impacts our
ability to train more and we need to do that to get this force
stood up. I think by singling out the civilian workforce for
furloughs we've done a grave injustice. We're trying to get
people to come in and support us in this technical area. People
are leaving industry to come in and work with us. Now that they
get there, they're saying: Did I make the wrong decision?
You're going to furlough me now X percent of the time. I
already took a salary reduction to come to work for you. I
think it's a great thing for our Nation. But if this is the way
it's going to be, I can't afford to do this to my family.
That's a big impact across our workforce and we shouldn't
do that.
Senator Kaine. Let me stay on cyber and just move to a
related area that raised some questions earlier as well. That
is trying to pass the right kind of balanced cyber legislation.
A lot of it is a dialogue between policymakers and the private
sector and they have legitimate concerns. Thus far in your own
experience, has the private sector expressed those concerns in
the right way? Namely, has it been a series of, don't do this
to us, don't do that to us, don't do this to us, or have they
been offering ways that we can accomplish the goal in a
productive and constructive way? Because if the answer to that
is no, that might be something that we could help with, to try
to smoke out the positives, the positive and constructive
advice about how to balance some of these important
considerations.
General Alexander. Senator, I think the big problem is
every sector approaches it slightly different. So what you get
is 18, 20 different views, groups of views, on cyber and cyber
legislation, what we need and how we need to do it. I think the
Executive order, that which Senator Graham and Senator
Whitehouse are referring to, are in the right way: Get industry
to sit down with the government officials, put the Director of
NIST in charge, bring all our technical talent there, and start
talking with industry on the best way sector-by-sector, and
then bring that back up to the administration, to you, and say:
Here's what we think is the way to work with industry to help
make their networks more resilient.
What you'll find is each part of our industry sectors are
at different states of cyber readiness, if you will, and that's
the real problem that we face. I've talked to lots of Chief
Executive Officers out there on this topic area and you get
from one side to the other. When you do that, when you really
start drilling down, you see that some of them really need
help, want help, are concerned about regulation and how we do
it. Some of them don't need help and are concerned about the
``help'' we're going to give them.
So I think what we have to do is address each of those
concerns and do it in a fair and equitable way. I think that
Executive order reach-out is a great step in the right
direction.
Senator Kaine. Thank you both very much.
Mr. Chairman, thanks.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Inhofe, you all set?
If there are no other questions, we just want to thank you
both for your great service to our country, your great
testimony this morning, thoughtful, considered, and we are very
appreciative of it. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

IRAN

1. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, a recent Wall Street Journal
article titled ``Banks seek U.S. Help on Iran Cybersecurity'' states
that ``major U.S. banks are pressing for government action to block or
squelch what Washington officials say is an intensifying Iranian
campaign of cyber attacks against American financial institutions.''
The article asserts that some of the financial institutions are
concerned by the lack of U.S. Government response arguing that the
banks ``can't be expected to fend off attacks from a foreign
government.'' According to the article, ``U.S. officials have been
weighing options, including whether to retaliate against Iran.'' While
the Iranian attacks referenced in this article appear to be fairly low
level nuisance efforts, as attacks grow more sophisticated, or are
attempted by more sophisticated nations, the role the Department of
Defense (DOD) will play in protecting the United States becomes
increasingly more important. What role do you believe DOD should play
in events such as the recent Iranian attacks on the financial sector
and do you believe there is an offensive role DOD should be able to
utilize via cyberspace?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

2. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, is there a threshold that a
country must cross before we consider it an attack?
General Alexander. The President, in consultation with both
civilian and military advisors, would determine a threshold and decide
on an appropriate response to any form of attack.

CYBER DETERRENCE

3. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, in a letter from the
committee last year you were asked if you believed we are deterring or
dissuading our adversaries in cyberspace. You responded ``no, while
work is ongoing in each area, much remains to be done across both the
public and private sectors.'' What more must be done and what can be
accomplished within DOD to shift the mindset of those looking to hold
our economic and national security interests at risk in the cyber
domain?
General Alexander. There is much to be done as a nation to deter
and dissuade adversaries in cyberspace from the perspective of both
policy and developing viable options. DOD is constantly improving cyber
defenses to deny benefits and increase costs to any adversary. We are
close to implementing a new Standing Rules of Engagement but do not yet
have an Executive order that would allow us to defend the Nation's
critical cyberspace resources.
A whole-of-nation approach to cyber deterrence is needed. The
military deterrence initiatives under development will be most
effective if our efforts are coordinated with other agencies of the
U.S. Government. The private sector is also part of this equation since
most U.S. infrastructure is privately owned. Finally, the United States
must project a unified approach to deterrence that clearly demonstrates
to allies and adversaries alike our commitment to defend and maintain
the availability of cyberspace.

4. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, what role could the
development of offensive cyber capabilities play in cyber deterrence
and do you view this as a matter of urgency?
General Alexander. The development of offensive cyber capabilities
will play a critical role in cyber deterrence, but capabilities alone
are not the answer. It is of utmost urgency that we develop these
capabilities, appropriate polices, and delegated authorities to act as
soon as possible. These capabilities will take time, will, and
resources. We are at risk now. Overt development of such capabilities--
and the authority to employ them--sends a clear, unambiguous message
that DOD can respond to cyber threats, intrusions, and attacks if the
President and DOD leadership so chooses. A robust, comprehensive set of
cyberspace capabilities provide a range of options to our
decisionmakers. For this reason, the force generation priority for DOD
Cyber Mission Forces remains the Cyber National Mission Teams, which
possess offensive cyber capabilities. Since the end of World War II, a
major role of the DOD has been to assess emerging military threats from
overseas and develop technologies and military constructs to counter
such threats. Threats in cyberspace must be treated the same way. If
the DOD does not develop effective offensive capabilities in cyberspace
and clear rules of engagement for using them, adversaries will have
little to fear of a U.S. response, and therefore, have little
motivation for restraint.

CHINA

5. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, recent estimates suggest that
China has some 564 million internet users, almost doubling the number
of internet users in the United States. Taking into account China's
desire to compensate for military shortfalls with cyber capabilities as
well as recent public reports describing well-coordinated campaigns by
the People's Liberation Army against the United States, how at risk or
vulnerable are we in the cyber domain if China sought to engage us in
an armed conflict?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

6. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, what in your opinion will be
necessary to deter China from making such unwise decisions?
General Alexander. Three things are necessary. First, working with
other agencies of the U.S. Government, and in close cooperation with
allies and partners we need to clearly define acceptable and
unacceptable behavior in cyberspace. Second, we must have a defensible
architecture, arrayed in depth so anomalous activity is easily
detectable and defensive actions may be efficiently synchronized.
Finally, the United States must have a credible, demonstrated offensive
cyber capability the employment of which can be justifiably warranted.

7. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, how capable are the Chinese?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

8. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, do you agree that Chinese
cyber capabilities pose an existential threat to the United States?
General Alexander. No.

defense science board report on nuclear vulnerabilities through cyber
9. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler and General Alexander, in a
January 2013 report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) on advanced
cyber threats and the implications for military systems, the DSB's top
recommendation was to ``Protect the nuclear strike as a deterrent'' and
to take ``immediate action to assess and assure national leadership
that the current U.S. nuclear deterrent is also survivable against the
full-spectrum cyber Tier V-VI threat.'' Do you agree with the DSB's
recommendations?
General Kehler. I support the DSB recommendation. Deterring nuclear
attack with a safe, secure, effective nuclear deterrent force remains
my #1 priority. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is working closely
with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), and others to evaluate our nuclear command and control
systems against a range of threats including cyber, and will advocate
for updates as appropriate. Cyber threats, whether from nation states
or individuals, are being closely monitored today and as we develop the
next generation of nuclear command and control.
General Alexander. CYBERCOM and the National Security Agency (NSA)
absolutely support activities to preserve the integrity of our Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) enterprise. In 2011, the
collective General Officer Staffs of CYBERCOM and STRATCOM convened a
conference where the primary focus was ``mission assurance.''
Acknowledging the varying threat vectors from all domains, we work
together, along with the DOD CIO and DISA, to ensure survivable,
reliable, and assured NC3 platforms.

10. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler and General Alexander, do you
agree that a successful DOD cyber strategy must include a deterrence
component?
General Kehler. Yes, a successful DOD cyber strategy necessarily
includes elements of deterrence. In broader terms, I would suggest that
cyber is only one of many capabilities that form the overall DOD
deterrence strategy. We enhance our overall deterrence posture by
convincing adversaries they cannot achieve their objectives through
cyberspace or any other domain; and that they will run the risk of
unacceptable U.S. response at the time, place, and via the domain of
our choosing. Such a deterrence posture includes all elements of
national power.
General Alexander. Absolutely. Under the National Military Strategy
for Cyberspace Operations and the current Defense Strategy for
Operating in Cyberspace, my team at Fort Meade has been working with
the Joint Staff and OSD on building a framework for a cyberspace
deterrence strategy.

11. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler and General Alexander, do you
believe that the United States should preserve the right to retaliate
against a full-scale cyber-attack using nuclear weapons?
General Kehler. The United States retains the right to respond to a
full-scale cyber attack in a manner and at the time and place of the
President's choice. That being said, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) stated that, ``The United States would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the United States or its allies and partners.'' Further, the NPR
issued a ``negative security guarantee'' regarding nuclear response
which stated ``the United States will not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to
the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations.'' I also note that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons
are reserved exclusively for the President of the United States.
General Alexander. The President has stated that all options are to
be considered in the defense of the Nation. We must therefore, consider
including a nuclear response in the most extreme circumstance. As
stated in the International Strategy for Cyberspace, ``we reserve the
right to use all available means--diplomatic, information, military,
and economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable
international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our
partners, and our interests.''

12. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler and General Alexander, what
could a cyber-vulnerability in our nuclear command and control mean for
deterrence and national security?
General Kehler. [Deleted].
General Alexander. A cyber vulnerability in our Nuclear Command and
Control (NC2) or Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3)
system could undermine our deterrent strategy. The DOD CIO established
the NC3 Cyber Risk Assessment Tiger Team in May 2012 to perform a 5-
phase study to examine the cyber vulnerabilities in the NC3 system. One
of the study phases will focus specifically on cyber vulnerabilities
associated with Nuclear Force Direction, and will include corrective
actions and a timeline for mitigation.

CYBER COMMAND AS A UNIFIED COMMAND

13. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler and General Alexander, I
understand that a decision has been made by the Joint Chiefs to
recommend that the Secretary of Defense elevate CYBERCOM from its
current position under STRATCOM to become its own Unified Command. Is
this true? If so, do you agree with the decision and why do you believe
the existing command relationship is no longer sufficient?
General Kehler. A Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation on the
status of CYBERCOM is under consideration by the Secretary of Defense,
and to date no decision has been reached. As military cyber operations
to protect DOD networks and defend the Nation grow in complexity and
importance, it is prudent to align our command and control arrangements
for maximum effectiveness. While the current arrangement is not causing
undue operational impediments, elevating CYBERCOM to a Unified Command
would shorten and clarify the chain of command between its Commander
and the Secretary of Defense and President. Regardless of if or when
that decision is made, it is essential that the Commander of CYBERCOM
remains dual-hatted as the Director of the NSA.
General Alexander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense regarding the status
of CYBERCOM, but a decision has yet to be made. Considerations are
being made with regard to the complexity of the environment, and the
need for rapid decisionmaking. Elevating CYBERCOM to a Unified Command
would increase decision speed between the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and Commander CYBERCOM. In addition, it would elevate and
align advocacy for prioritization and allocation of resources under one
commander focused exclusively on cyber. Regardless of the Secretary's
decision going forward, it is imperative that Commander CYBERCOM remain
dual-hatted as Director of the NSA.

14. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler and General Alexander, just over
2 years ago we were told that the command structure had become
bureaucratic when then Secretary Gates recommended the closure of Joint
Forces Command. With an annual cost of $240 million to operate, it was
determined that the proliferation of combatant commands in some cases
had become costly and burdensome. Will there be a cost associated with
making CYBERCOM a unified command?
General Kehler. If the decision is made to elevate CYBERCOM to a
Unified Command, there will likely be some costs associated with the
combatant command headquarters portion of that decision. Those costs as
well as the costs associated with all the combatant command
headquarters are currently under review as part of the Secretary of
Defense's strategic management review. We are working with the Joint
Staff and OSD to accurately address these costs. In the meantime we
continue to plan and advocate for the increased cyber operational
capacity and capabilities needed to meet national and combatant command
requirements. The Joint Staff is currently analyzing the financial
impact.
General Alexander. Yes, there will likely be a cost associated with
elevating CYBERCOM to a unified command if that decision is made, but
we are working closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to review all
programs as part of Secretary Hagel's efforts to ensure optimal defense
posture for the decade ahead.

CYBER HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DUPLICATION

15. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, I understand there is some
confusion over the role the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would
play in an attack on the Homeland in cyberspace. Do you believe that
DHS should have anything more than a supporting role to DOD in a cyber-
attack against the Homeland?
General Alexander. The Nation's cyber security is a shared
responsibility. I work closely with Secretary Napolitano at DHS, as
well as with Director Mueller at the FBI to coordinate and synchronize
our roles and responsibilities in cyberspace. DHS is the lead Federal
department responsible for coordinating national protection against,
mitigation of, and recovery from domestic cyber security incidents,
protecting critical infrastructure, and securing the Federal civilian
systems (''.gov''). In essence, DHS works to prevent attacks by raising
network security standards, sharing information, and developing a more
resilient infrastructure. The FBI is the lead for investigating and
mitigating adversary cyber activity in U.S. domestic space. This
includes nation state actors using U.S. infrastructure.
When defending the Nation from a nation state attack, or actors
that present nation state like capabilities, DOD is in charge. DOD's
cryptologic platform allows the DOD to see activity in foreign
cyberspace, analogous to radar's role in air defense. With this
information, NSA is able to provide intelligence on adversary
capabilities and intentions as well as indications and warnings of
cyber attacks on U.S. infrastructure. CYBERCOM leverages NSA's
technical capabilities and insights to develop and employ response
options.

16. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, I assume that you agree that
the Secretary of Defense as directed by the President is the individual
responsible for defending the United States against a cyber attack from
outside our borders. Capabilities-wise, do you agree that DOD and the
NSA have the most comprehensive set of resources to defend the Nation
from a foreign cyber attack?
General Alexander. Yes.

17. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, do you agree that
establishing bureaucracies and duplicative efforts at DHS would be
unwise?
General Alexander. Yes. We've worked hard at the leadership level
of NSA/CYBERCOM, DHS, and FBI to define and articulate our roles and
responsibilities to minimize duplication and close gaps in the cyber
mission area. Ensuring the Nation's cybersecurity is a shared
responsibility, with Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI, DHS, and DOD,
each carrying out important roles and responsibilities as part of the
broader U.S. Federal Cybersecurity Operations Team.

MILITARIZATION OF THE INTERNET

18. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, a recent statement by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues that locating a
government-wide information sharing program ``in a military agency like
the NSA would create significant new threats to Americans' privacy, and
must be avoided.'' Do you agree with the ACLU's statement?
General Alexander. I strongly disagree with that statement. The men
and women of the NSA and CYBERCOM are deeply committed to compliance
with the law and the protection of privacy rights. This commitment is
reinforced by a rigorous compliance program, extensive training and
education, and multi-layered oversight by the DOJ, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the OSD, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, and multiple committees of Congress, as well as the
NSA's own Inspector General. I am totally confident that any private
sector cyber threat information received by NSA will be handled in a
way that fully assures U.S. personal privacy and civil liberties.

OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS

19. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, in the DSB's recent report
on cyber, the DSB suggests that the United States should build and
maintain world-class offensive cyber capabilities. However, they state
that ``preparing for full-scale force-on-force cyber battle is not
well-understood.'' The report goes on to say that DOD needs to
significantly increase the number of qualified cyber warriors and
enlarge the offensive cyber infrastructure commensurate with the size
of the threat.'' Do you agree with their assessment?
General Alexander. I agree. The focus of their assessment is that
we don't have the workforce in place to accomplish the tasks. In
coordination with our Service cyber components, CYBERCOM is forming,
training, certifying, and fielding a world class cyber force--
approximately 6,000 strong. We recently identified 42 specific work
roles required to plan and execute cyberspace operations. We have
developed the standards and skills required to operate with those
proficiencies in work roles. We are identifying existing training and
in many cases developing training that will satisfy the knowledge,
skills, and ability requirements. Another challenge, correctly
identified by the DSB, is building world-class capabilities. We must
prepare not only for the offensive engagement, but must maintain
defensive capabilities; both forces and architecture. Over time we will
develop the people and force structure to integrate both world-class
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities through our Cyber National
Mission Teams, Cyber Combat Mission Teams, and Cyber Protection Forces.
The development of the Nation's Cyber Mission Force will culminate
in fiscal year 2016 with 133 total teams: 21 teams for a Cyber National
Mission Force (CNMF), 44 teams for a Cyber Combat Mission Force (CCMF),
and 68 teams for a Cyber Protection Force (CPF). The presentation of
these forces will be as follows:

CNMF

13 Cyber National Mission Teams (CNMT) of 64
personnel each.
8 Direct Support Teams (DST) of 39 personnel
each (supporting the 13 CNMTs).

CCMF

27 Cyber Combat Mission Teams (CCMT) of 64
personnel each.
17 Direct Support Teams (DST) of 39 personnel
each (supporting the 27 CCMTs).

CPF

48 Cyber Protection Platoons (CPP) of 39
personnel each (supporting the lines of effort for
``Defend the Nation'', ``DODIN'', and ``Military
Services'').
20 CPPs of 39 personnel each (supporting
Combatant Commands).

20. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, do you agree that we should
also be preparing and build our forces to support preemptive cyber
operations?
General Alexander. Yes.

21. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, is the number of cyber
warriors you have today commensurate with the threat we face? If not,
what is that number?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

22. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, is the size and capability
of the offensive cyber infrastructure commensurate with the size of the
threat? If not, why not?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

OVER-CLASSIFICATION OF CYBER-RELATED INFORMATION

23. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, one of your predecessors,
General Michael Hayden, has argued that the Government classifies too
much information on cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Do you agree with
General Hayden's assessment that this stuff is overprotected, and if
so, why do you suspect General Hayden feels this way?
General Alexander. General Hayden's statements are consistent with
the findings of the 9/11 Commission and the Reducing Over-
Classification Act of 2010 in acknowledging the challenges of over-
classification of national security information. In accordance with
Executive Order 13526, the Secretary of Defense delegated Original
Classification Authority to me as the CYBERCOM Commander. I am aware of
the dangers of over-classification and my obligation to classify
national security information at the lowest appropriate level.

24. Senator Inhofe. General Alexander, do you believe that the
declassification of threat signatures could help facilitate increased
information sharing between the public and private sector?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

LINKAGE BETWEEN NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

25. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, the 2010 NPR made clear the
linkage between investments in nuclear modernization and the ability to
make reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal: ``by modernizing our aging
nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can substantially
reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise.'' Please explain the linkage
between nuclear modernization and nuclear reductions inherent in the
2010 NPR and in the New START Resolution of Ratification--and how that
linkage guides your assessment of our nuclear force posture.
General Kehler. The United States retains a nondeployed stockpile
of weapons to compensate for the limitations of our aging production
facilities--especially our uranium and plutonium processing
capabilities--as well as to mitigate technical risk in our deployed
weapons and hedge against geopolitical uncertainty. We need to complete
the design and construction of the Uranium Capabilities Replacement
Facility at Y-12, and invest in an interim plutonium production
capability to meet the stockpile's near-term maintenance, surveillance,
and life extension requirements. Over the long-term, sustained
investment (to include a permanent, modern plutonium facility) is
needed to develop a modern, responsive nuclear enterprise that will
allow the United States to reduce its reliance on the nondeployed
weapon stockpile.

POTENTIAL CHANGES IN U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS GUIDANCE

26. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, why is the administration
contemplating changes to well-established nuclear deterrence
requirements and targeting requirements--requirements that informed
your command's support for the New START treaty?
General Kehler. Due to many factors, to include the pending
expiration of the START I treaty, sufficient time was not available to
conduct a nuclear employment policy and guidance review prior to New
START treaty negotiations. The NPR report discusses the need for an
updated assessment of deterrence requirements which aligns with my
belief that a periodic review of policy and guidance makes sense.
STRATCOM has participated in a study which examined possible changes to
nuclear employment policy and guidance to align them with the
principles contained in the NPR. Results of that study and review are
pending.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, what is wrong with the current
guidance?
General Kehler. Periodic policy and guidance reviews are prudent
and appropriate, and do not by themselves indicate that anything is
``wrong'' with the policy. Historically, most Presidents have reviewed
nuclear policy and guidance and adjusted these when needed to meet U.S.
national security needs.

28. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, has there been a change in
global security conditions that warrants a guidance change, and has
STRATCOM been involved?
General Kehler. Yes, there have been numerous changes in the
international security environment since presidential guidance was last
updated--one of several reasons to conduct such a review. STRATCOM has
been involved and I was given every opportunity to provide my best
military judgment on the issues.

FLEXIBILITY IN NUCLEAR TARGETING

29. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, do you agree we need a spectrum
of nuclear employment options and flexibility in targeting? Or, is it
sufficient merely to be able to attack a certain number of Russian
cities?
General Kehler. As the combatant commander tasked with strategic
deterrence, it is my responsibility to develop nuclear force employment
plans as directed by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The nature and extent of the options and
flexibility required is a function of that guidance.

VERIFICATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF CHEATING

30. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, what might be the military
significance of cheating with tactical nuclear weapons, which are not
covered by New START and where the Russians enjoy a significant
superiority over the United States?
General Kehler. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty
is the only treaty that limits non-strategic nuclear forces. Both the
United States and Russia have met all their obligations under the INF
treaty. I'm hesitant to speculate on the military significance of
``cheating'' without understanding which provisions of the agreement
are being violated and the nature of the violation.

31. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, has the United States ever set
up a verification regime for tactical nuclear weapons?
General Kehler. Although there have been unilateral/reciprocal
measures to reduce non-strategic weapons (e.g. Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives), verification measures have not been applied to these
agreements.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, do you think the U.S.
Government knows how to verify compliance with reductions in non-
strategic nuclear weapons, which can be as small as an artillery shell?
General Kehler. The physical characteristics of non-strategic
nuclear weapons would require different verification measures than are
currently in place for New START. Absent the details of a reduction
agreement and associated verification regime, I cannot comment on the
effectiveness of such a program to verify compliance.

COST OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT

33. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, at the House Energy and Water
Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on the fiscal year 2014 budget,
Chairman Frelinghuysen asked Don Cook, the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, if further reductions in the U.S. stockpile would
save money in the annual budget. Dr. Cook's response was, ``I'd answer
the question directly by saying not much . . . So not much savings will
be achieved.'' Do you agree with Dr. Cook that there are not large
savings associated with reducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile?
General Kehler. I agree with Dr. Cook's assessment. There are
significant fixed infrastructure costs required to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent regardless of the size of the
underlying stockpile. Therefore, we would not immediately expect large
cost savings associated with reducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

34. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, according to section 1043,
``Estimate of Budget Requirements over the 10-year period,'' submitted
to Congress by DOD last year, the 10-year cost to modernize and sustain
nuclear delivery systems is estimated at $119 billion, which doesn't
include the cost of the follow-on ICBM and full costs for the new
bomber. Also included is another $36 billion over 10 years for nuclear
command and control, for a total of $155 billion over 10 years, or
$15.5 billion per year, which amounts to approximately 2.3 percent of a
$600 billion defense budget. Is this an accurate assessment of DOD
costs to sustain and modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
General Kehler. Yes, it is. In the May 2012 report pursuant to
section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, DOD provided a 10-year cost estimate to sustain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent. Some costs, such as a potential
Minuteman ICBM replacement or the full cost of a new bomber, were not
included in this estimate as these efforts were not yet official
programs of record or their costs extended beyond the report's 10-year
period.

HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE

35. Senator Inhofe. General Kehler, what are the potential benefits
for the defense of the Homeland of deploying: additional ground-based
interceptors (GBI) at Fort Greely, AK; additional GBIs at a site on the
east coast of the United States; an X-band radar on the east coast of
the United States; and SM-3 block IIA missiles on the east coast of the
United States or on ships deployed near the east coast?
General Kehler. Secretary Hagel's 15 March 2013 announcement to
deploy additional GBIs to Fort Greely will enhance our capacity to
address a limited ballistic missile threat to the United States from
North Korea or Iran. Additional GBI sites would add more capacity to
defend the United States and a variety of options to include an east
coast missile site are being studied. We are working with the Missile
Defense Agency to explore potential benefits and locations of
additional sensors, but it appears installation of an X-band radar on
the east coast may not track a ballistic missile threat early enough in
its flight to employ an interceptor. Stationing SM-3 IIA missiles on or
near the east coast would likely be of limited use because they are
designed to defeat intermediate-range rather than intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

CHINA'S CYBER THREAT

36. Senator McCain. General Alexander, on Monday, March 11, 2013,
the National Security Adviser said, ``specifically with respect to the
issue of cyber-enabled theft, we seek three things from the Chinese
side. First, we need a recognition of the urgency and scope of this
problem and the risk it poses--to international trade, to the
reputation of Chinese industry, and to our overall relations. Second,
Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a stop to
these activities. Finally, we need China to engage with us in a
constructive direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of behavior
in cyberspace.'' Would you agree with recent reports that suggest that
the Chinese Government, and in particular the Chinese military, is
responsible for the repeated acts of cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks
on our government and industry?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

37. Senator McCain. General Alexander, would you agree that, absent
some kind of consequences, China will continue doing exactly what it
has been doing for years now?
General Alexander. Yes. The United States is working with allies
and partners in the region and internationally to make clear to China
that its behavior is not acceptable to the majority of international
actors.

38. Senator McCain. General Alexander, from your perspective what
is our government doing to raise the consequences on China for its role
in the blatant theft of billions and billions of dollars of our
intellectual property?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

CYBER DEFENSE

39. Senator McCain. General Alexander, cyber networks within our
country, both public and private, have been facing a growing cyber
threat originating from places like China and Iran. Who is responsible
for defending the United States from an attack originating outside of
our borders?
General Alexander. In the event of a foreign cyber attack on the
United States with the potential for significant national security or
economic consequences, the DOD, through CYBERCOM and with the support
of NSA/CSS, would conduct foreign operations to neutralize the threat
and/or deny the adversary the capability. The DOJ/FBI would lead
domestic national security operations. DHS would secure Federal
civilian government networks (``.gov''), and coordinate the protection
of the critical infrastructure. Post attack, DHS would lead any
necessary national recovery and reconstitution efforts.

40. Senator McCain. General Alexander, according to numerous
reports, economic espionage and intellectual property theft are costing
our country billions of dollars annually. Given this reality, what is
the administration doing to curtail economic espionage and intellectual
property theft?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

41. Senator McCain. General Alexander, what role does CYBERCOM have
in this respect?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

42. Senator McCain. General Alexander, what is CYBERCOM's role in
safeguarding intellectual property and national security information
held by defense contractors who support DOD programs?
General Alexander. The DOD's Cleared Defense Contractors (CDC), not
CYBERCOM, are responsible for protecting the intellectual property and
national security information they hold. In accordance with guidance
from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, all DOD components, including
CYBERCOM, are responsible for encouraging eligible CDCs to consider
participating in the voluntary Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber
Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program and its optional DIB
Enhanced Cyber Security Services (DECS) component. Additionally,
section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 mandates cyber intrusion reporting by CDCs. This should improve
our shared understanding of cyber threat activity and our ability to
respond to potential damage to critical programs if national security
information and intellectual property are compromised.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt

NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN CYBER INITIATIVE

43. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, what is the cyber expert
shortfall in CYBERCOM? It has been reported that CYBERCOM wants to
expand its cyber workforce from 900 personnel to 4,900 troops and
civilians.
General Alexander. It is true that CYBERCOM has developed a manning
construct that, when fully manned, will be approximately 6,000
personnel. However, those numbers are not increases to CYBERCOM
headquarters staff. The teams are divided among our Service components,
in support of three mission areas: defending the Nation from attack,
support to combatant commanders, and defense of DOD's networks using
cyber protection platoons. The Service components are much better
equipped to accurately describe any shortfalls in expertise or gaps in
force numbers.
CYBERCOM realizes that the National Guard and Reserves will play a
critical role in our mission to defend the Nation within the cyber
domain. The National Guard and Title 10 Reserve Forces represent a
significant part of the potential capability and capacity of CYBERCOM
to conduct effective cyberspace operations in both Federal and domestic
operations. To that end, the CYBERCOM Guard and Reserve Directorate in
coordination with NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau Joint Staff
will develop a National Guard and Title 10 Reserve Forces Integration
Framework that builds on using the unique talents and title 32
authorities of the National Guard and private sector skills within
Title 10 Reserve Forces into the Cyber Mission Force construct.
Together we are working in concert with the Service components to bring
a Total Force approach to this effort.

44. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, how do you plan to locate,
hire, and train enough skilled people to provide for the increase in
demand?
General Alexander. The Services are currently applying existing
personnel resources to the Cyber National Mission Teams and will
continue to do so over the next 2\1/2\ years. Each Service has
``revamped'' their career fields that feed the cyber workforce to
maximize utilization of personnel resources to accomplish their
Service-specific missions as well as needs of joint commanders.
Additionally, the Services have reprioritized student through-put in
their technical training schoolhouses and accelerated training
schedules to fill the teams along the timetable we've established. Even
with these efforts to reorganize and reprioritize, we know that a
significant gap in the teams' manning will remain. Included in this
approach is the pursuit of select National Guard and Reserve Forces who
have been vetted through the security clearance process and bring
specialized civilian cyber skill sets, usually along with previous
Active-Duty military experience, to the fight.
To attract and retain highly-qualified civilian employees, we have
at our disposal numerous incentive programs and tools to include:
Schedule-A hiring authority, superior qualification step increases,
leave accrual, relocation bonuses, and tuition repayment bonuses. We
are also partnering with academic institutions where cyber skills are
being developed and offering opportunities including scholarships and
internships. Internally, we identify talent in our existing workforce
by selecting junior employees from other closely-related fields for
career broadening and developmental opportunities.

45. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, how can the National Guard
and Reserve--in partnership with combatant commanders, the FBI, and
DHS--complement the work being done here in the Homeland?
General Alexander. Our National Guard and Reserves play a critical
role in defending the Nation in the air, land, and sea domains. It will
be no different in the cyber domain. In fact, their title 32
authorities could enhance DOD's role in responding to local cyber
attacks and computer security emergencies. I have sat down with the
Guard leadership, all the adjutant generals from all the Guard, and
talked about the role and responsibility of the Guard in cyber space. I
think there are two key things that they can do. Setting up protection
teams and training them to the same standard as the Active Force, gives
us additional capacity that we may need in a cyber conflict. It also
provides us an ability to work with the States, with the Joint
Terrorism Task Force and cyber forces the FBI has, and with DHS to
provide additional technical capacity for resilience and recovery.

BOMBER PROGRAM AMID FISCAL UNCERTAINTY

46. Senator Blunt. General Kehler, how will the readiness of our
bomber fleet be affected by sequester budget cuts, assuming you have
the flexibility to prioritize and target the cuts? For example, I
assume a number of bomber pilots' certification will be affected by a
reduction in their training resources and flying hours.
General Kehler. The U.S. nuclear deterrent force remains capable of
responding with overwhelming force to any attack on our country or our
allies. The Air Force has established a plan to keep sufficient
aircrews from each nuclear capable bomber platform proficient and
prepared to meet all of STRATCOM's missions. To bridge the gap until
more flying hours become available, remaining aircrews will maintain a
reduced level of mission readiness through ground training and
simulators. I am concerned that continued reductions to bomber flying
hours will eventually impact crew proficiency across all mission areas.

47. Senator Blunt. General Kehler, how do you prioritize decisions
like these? I have to think that keeping our bomber pilots certified to
respond to unforeseen global contingencies is pretty important, right?
General Kehler. Ensuring bomber pilots are certified to respond to
unforeseen global contingencies is an important part of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. STRATCOM emphasizes this priority through
coordination and planning with the Air Force to keep sufficient
aircrews from each nuclear capable bomber platform proficient and
prepared to meet all of STRATCOM's missions. To bridge the gap until
more flying hours become available, remaining aircrews will maintain a
reduced level of mission readiness through ground training and
simulators. I am concerned that continued reductions to bomber flying
hours will eventually impact crew proficiency across all mission areas.

FOREIGN CYBER ATTACKS

48. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, I just read an article in the
Times that said China reportedly is calling for international ``rules
and cooperation'' on internet espionage issues. At the same time, they
continue to insist the accusations that the Chinese Government is
involved in hacking attacks amounts to a false smear campaign. Can you
comment on that, and also tell us what we can do to deter China from
making unwise decisions in the realm of cyber?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

49. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, how capable do you believe
they are?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

50. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, have we established clear
rules of engagement under which CYBERCOM will operate?
General Alexander. Not yet, but we are making progress. Cyberspace
is a new area of conflict in which many norms that exist in other
domains have not yet been established. As a result, we are still
developing cyberspace specific rules of engagement that have the level
of fidelity found in rules of engagement for land warfare or other more
established military activities. The first version of cyberspace
Standing Rules of Engagement developed to be consistent with the new
Presidential Policy Directive 20, has been developed and forwarded to
the Secretary of Defense for approval and is expected to be signed in
the near-term.

51. Senator Blunt. General Alexander, which segments of the private
sector should fall under DOD's responsibility? In other words, which
elements of the private sector--if attacked--would be considered an
``extension'' of U.S. Government facilities?
General Alexander. DOD is responsible for defending the Nation from
foreign cyber attack, wherever that foreign cyber attack may be
directed. In the event of a foreign cyber attack on the United States
with the potential for significant national security or economic
consequences, the DOD would defend the Nation from this attack by
conducting foreign cyberspace operations. In a whole-of-government
effort, the DOJ and FBI would also conduct operations to disrupt the
threat domestically. The DHS would secure Federal civilian government
networks (``.gov'') as well as coordinate protection of the critical
infrastructure. Post attack, DHS would lead any national recovery and
reconstitution efforts, if necessary.
The DOD depends on the private sector to sustain its operations--in
both the short- or long-term--without the goods and services provided
by a wide range of other elements of the Nation's critical
infrastructure and beyond. While some such as Energy, Transportation
Systems, Communications, and Information Technology are obvious, others
such as Financial Services, Healthcare, and Food and Agriculture are
also critically important. In the increasingly interconnected and
interdependent global environment in which the DOD operates, the DOD's
dependencies on these infrastructures extend beyond the critical
infrastructure of our Nation to those of our allies and partners where
we are located.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss,
Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, and Cruz.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Ozge
Guzelsu, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A.
Kulenkampff, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator
Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington
and Mary Naylor, assistants to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith,
assistant to Senator King; Christian Brose, assistant to
Senator McCain; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad
Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Peter Schirtzinger,
assistant to Senator Fischer; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator
Graham; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt; and Brooke
Bacak, assistant to Senator Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
This morning the committee continues its review of the
missions and operational requirements of our combatant
commanders in preparation for consideration of the fiscal year
2014 national defense budget request. We welcome Admiral James
R. Stavridis, USN, Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General Charles H. Jacoby,
Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD);
and General John F. Kelly, USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM). We thank you all for your service, your
leadership, and please pass along our gratitude to the men and
women who serve in your commands for their dedication to the
Nation and for their sacrifices, as well as for the sacrifices
of their families whose support is so essential to the success
of our military and of our Nation.
Admiral Stavridis, at last year's EUCOM posture hearing I
said that it was likely your last appearance before this
committee, and I'm glad I included the word ``likely.'' So now
we can thank you again for your nearly 4 years now as EUCOM
Commander and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, which I believe
makes you one of the longest serving EUCOM commanders in recent
history. You've been a steady hand on the tiller during some
very turbulent times and we all wish you the best in your
retirement from military service.
The witnesses before us represent the United States'
commitment to defend the Homeland, to help our neighbors, and
to come to the collective defense of our close allies in
Europe. Yet our ability to meet these commitments has been put
at risk by the arbitrary budget cuts called sequestration,
resulting from the budget impasse here in Washington.
This committee is interested in hearing from each of you on
how the Continuing Resolution and sequestration are affecting
military operations and readiness in your areas of
responsibility (AOR) and what would be the effect if
sequestration continues.
Last Friday Secretary of Defense Hagel announced changes to
our Homeland missile defense posture and plans, including plans
to deploy an additional 14 ground-based interceptors (GBI) in
Alaska in order to stay ahead of the evolving North Korean
missile threat. Two previous intercept flight tests of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system using the latest
model of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), so-called CE-2,
resulted in failures. Secretary Hagel made clear that we would
not deploy the new missiles until we have confidence from
testing that they will work as intended.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is taking steps to ensure
that the CE-2 kill vehicle will work reliably and effectively
before we produce or deploy more. They have already conducted a
successful non-intercept test in January and an intercept test
is planned for late this year. MDA is also planning an
intercept test of the earlier interceptor with the CE-1 kill
vehicle this summer to demonstrate that the system works as
intended.
It is important that we take the time needed to make sure
that we conduct adequate and operationally realistic testing so
that we have confidence in the system, i.e., that we fly before
we buy.
Friday's announcement also included a plan to increase our
defenses of the United States against Iranian long-range
missiles, with more interceptors deployed in the United States
rather than in Europe. Secretary Hagel also emphasized that the
U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) missile defense remains ironclad. He said that: ``The
missile deployments the United States is making in phases one
through three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach,
including sites in Poland and Romania, will be able to provide
coverage of all European NATO territory as planned by 2018.''
We would be interested to hear from General Jacoby and
Admiral Stavridis about the proposed changes in our missile
defense plans and posture.
Our trans-Atlantic relationship with our European allies
remains fundamental to our national security interests. Nowhere
is our mutual commitment more fully demonstrated than in the
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, where countries from the EUCOM region contribute
90 percent of the non-U.S. forces in our international
coalition.
Despite some public weariness with the Afghan conflict and
despite problems created for our troops and for our continued
presence by the rhetoric of President Karzai, the coalition has
demonstrated its cohesion, adapting an ``in together, out
together'' approach through the 2014 end date for the ISAF
combat mission in Afghanistan.
At the recent NATO defense ministerial, NATO members
reconsidered an earlier proposal to reduce the size of the
Afghan forces by one third after 2014. That was followed last
month with the good news that alliance defense ministers agreed
to change course and approved maintaining the Afghan security
forces at their current level of 352,000 through at least 2018.
This will send an important message of reassurance to the
Afghans as we draw down U.S. and coalition forces. I understand
at the NATO meeting several defense ministers also expressed a
willingness to participate in a possible post-2014 NATO
training mission in Afghanistan.
Another issue discussed at the recent ministerial was the
appropriate role of NATO with regard to Syria. While Syria is
not in EUCOM's area, its impact is being felt by key allies in
the region, including Israel and Turkey. As the civil war in
Syria continues to rage on, President Assad and his associates
are resorting increasingly to the use of Scud missiles and
other indiscriminate capabilities that terrorize innocent
Syrians and increase further the flow of refugees out of Syria.
Former Secretary Panetta has discussed the possibility of
more robust options for military support of the opposition last
year and he agreed to bring this matter to his counterparts in
Brussels. The recent decisions by the French and the British to
provide lethal assistance directly to the Syrian opposition
suggests that the position at NATO is by no means unified.
Admiral Stavridis, I hope that you'll provide the committee
with some context of our current thinking compared to that of
our European partners as it relates to Syria and possible
additional roles for the alliance beyond the deployment of
Patriot batteries.
EUCOM's responsibilities include managing our military-to-
military engagement and cooperation with Russia, including
through the NATO-Russia Council. This includes Russia's
cooperation with the movement of coalition equipment out of
Afghanistan along the Northern Distribution Network through
Russia and over 110 military-to-military activities between our
2 militaries last year.
I hope, Admiral, that you'll provide us with your views of
the value of and the prospects for further engagement with
Russia.
NORTHCOM, which was established after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, is responsible for the defense of the homeland
and for providing defense support to civil authorities in
response to domestic natural or manmade disasters, including
those that could result from cyber events or attacks. We'd be
interested in hearing how NORTHCOM and NORAD will contribute to
the emerging domain of cyber security in the homeland and how
they will work together with other elements of the U.S.
Government in response to cyber threats.
My additional comments on NORTHCOM and on SOUTHCOM will be
made part of the record, and again we thank you all for your
attendance and for your great work on behalf of our country.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, General Kelly, and General Jacoby, I
appreciate the time that you've given me and the rest of the
members of this committee to fill us in on what is really going
on. I guess this time, Admiral, this is going to be your final.
I don't know whether you're going to go into perhaps education
in some of these areas, but someone's going to benefit from all
the great experience that you've had and the contributions that
you've made.
Now more than ever before, the threats in the AOR and
around the globe are interconnected. What happens in Europe,
Latin America, and the Middle East, the Asia Pacific, and
Africa has the potential of directly impacting our security
here at home, our Homeland security that we talk about. This is
particularly true with regards to Iran and North Korea. The new
leadership in North Korea has escalated tensions in that region
through provocative statements, military exercises, nuclear
tests, and the development of a road-mobile missile delivery
system.
But my major concern has been down in Iran. Our
intelligence has told us since 2007 that they're going to have
the weapon and a delivery system by 2015. It just seems like we
ignore that. Now, while I'm encouraged that the President has
reversed his earlier decision from 2009 to reduce the number of
GBIs by 14, I'm glad that it's going back up by the same 14,
however that doesn't resolve the problem of the east coast.
We've talked about this several times, about a third missile
site on the east coast. The threat is very real and needs to be
corrected--needs to be addressed.
Closer to home, violence continues to escalate throughout
Central and South America and in Mexico as a result of
increasingly capable transnational criminal organizations.
Their multi-billion networks deal in drugs, weapons, bulk cash,
and now span through West Africa, Europe, and even right here
in the Homeland of the United States. Combatting them requires
whole-of-government solutions and robust cooperation with
international partners.
There has not been a time in my life when things are--the
world has been as dangerous as it is today and the threats more
diverse. Yet, due to the planned budget cuts and sequestration,
we are poised to cut our defense budget by a trillion dollars
over the next 10 years. We're talking about what's already come
out of the budget, that $487 billion. Another half trillion
dollars would come through sequestration. It's kind of
interesting. That is the only area where this administration
has been actively cutting government.
This reality underscores the glaring need for a national
military strategy that accurately reflects the global security
environment we face. I am greatly concerned that, given the
declining resources available to our military and the growing
budget uncertainty, the current strategy is untenable. Starting
with the strategic guidance issued in January 2012, it seems
that we're falling into a trap of creating strategies based
almost entirely on how quickly we can cut the defense budget,
rather than as a result of an honest assessment of the threats
we face and the resources required to address these threats.
So I'm very much concerned. Maybe I'm a minority nowadays,
but I always thought that the major mission of the Federal
Government is to protect the Homeland. We have to get back to
that mentality and recognize the threat is greater than any
threat that we have ever faced before. You guys are in the
right position to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

Admiral Stavridis. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of
the committee:
Thank you very much for taking time to hear from myself,
General Jacoby, and General Kelly. I always say I feel very
safe when I'm with a big Marine General and a big Army General.
It's probably the safest team I could be up here with. So thank
you for having us and putting us together for this panel.
As the chairman mentioned, I'm rounding out 4 years in my
current position. Before that I was lucky enough to be down at
SOUTHCOM in General Kelly's position. So this is my seventh
appearance in this run in front of the committee. I've always
enjoyed the dialogue, the give-and-take, and the chance to
express what our commands are doing.
I think that as I look at the challenges for EUCOM where I
am focused at the moment is first and foremost our work in and
around Europe, which includes a number of things mentioned by
the chairman and the ranking member, including the missile
defense system, NATO system which is coming on line. I'm very
focused on Afghanistan, which is the key operational mission
for NATO at the moment, and I'll be glad to talk about that in
some depth.
We are, of course, monitoring the situation in the Levant
extremely closely. It's very close at hand to Europe and part
of EUCOM's responsibility includes military-to-military
relations with Israel. So we watch that area very closely.
We don't talk as much about areas like the Balkans, the
Caucasus, the Baltics. All of those remain extremely important
as well. As the ranking member mentioned a moment ago, there
are a wide variety of other issues, from Special Operations to
humanitarian disasters, countering terrorism, organized crime,
cyber. So it's a very rich agenda.
If I had one overriding message for the committee today,
I'd like to answer the question, why Europe? Why should we
continue to be engaged in Europe? What's important about this
part of the mission for the Department of Defense (DOD)? I
would say very quickly that, first and foremost, it's the
values that we share with this pool of partners in Europe, the
democracies who stand with us on freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom of the press.
Second, it's the economic bonds that bind us together. The
United States represents about a fourth of the world's gross
domestic product (GDP). The nations of Europe represent another
fourth. NATO in total is about 50 percent of the world's GDP
and it's $4 trillion a year that crosses that Atlantic. So I
think that trans-Atlantic connection has an important economic
component as well.
Third, geography matters. Sometimes people say to me, why
do we need those bases in Europe? They're just--they're the
bastions of the Cold War. I would counter by saying that
they're not. They're forward operating bases in the 21st
century and they allow us to extend support to EUCOM--from
EUCOM to U.S. Africa Command, to U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), and the Levant area as well.
Fourth, I'd say NATO itself is important, the alliance. We
serve together around the world in a wide variety of missions
that we can talk about this morning.
Then fifth and finally, nowhere else in the world will we
find such a complete and capable group of allies who have the
technology, the training, the force levels to help us. We need
to encourage our European partners to spend more on defense. I
do that consistently and I'm glad to talk about that today. But
I do believe these connections are important for us and will be
so going forward into the future.
So, members of the committee, I'll conclude by saying again
thank you on behalf of EUCOM. Thank you for the support of this
committee. I'll pass your thanks on to them as well, and I look
forward to answering your questions this morning.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the
committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear again before you
today. For nearly 4 years now, I have commanded the exceptional men and
women of the United States European Command and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Command Operations. It has been the
privilege of a lifetime, for a mission I deeply believe in: one that
directly links U.S. national security and the American way of life with
our most steadfast allies and partners in vital strategic partnerships
that produce global security and stability. I can report to you today
that we continue to make strong progress--in military operations,
theater security cooperation, strategic rebalancing efforts, and
important initiatives with our international, interagency, and public-
private partners--to protect America's vital national security
interests and provide stability across Europe and Eurasia. In meeting
this enduring mission, most recently endorsed and mandated in the
Department's 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, these exceptional men
and women continue to provide for the forward defense of the United
States and ensure the collective security and continued viability of
the NATO Alliance.
Today, thanks to decades of sustained leadership, tireless
devotion, and ironclad commitment on both sides of the Atlantic, the
United States and our historic allies enjoy an unprecedented degree of
freedom, interconnectedness, economic opportunity and prosperity, and
interdependence toward achieving these common goals of global security
and stability. Indeed, as former Secretary of State Clinton remarked in
assessing the legacy of the last century and its impact on the current
one: ``Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining
achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to the world
we hope to build together in the century ahead.''

This partnership and investment, made in the 20th century,
continues to pay us considerable dividends in the 21st. For even as the
global economy fights through its current perturbations, the fact
remains that the transatlantic partnership--rooted in the stability
that flows from security--constitutes nearly half the world's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and a third of global trade. The transatlantic
economy is valued at nearly $31 trillion,\1\ generates approximately $4
trillion in annual trade revenue, and supports 15 million jobs.\2\
Acting together, the United States and Europe still command the heights
of the global economy, and maintain the advantage that position offers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html.
\2\ European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, ``Report on
European trade with the United States,'' http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In support of that position, our European partners continue to make
important financial and military contributions to our shared security.
For, in spite of recent and oft-repeated criticisms focused exclusively
on single national contributions, the fact is that, collectively, our
European allies and partners are annually investing nearly $300 billion
on defense, second only to the United States ($600 billion) and well
ahead of available figures on annual defense expenditures by China
($140 billion) and Russia ($70 billion).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Guardian, ``Military Spending: How Much Does the Military
Cost at Each Country, Listed,'' http: www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/
2012/apr/17/military-spending-countries-list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also a fundamental reality of the modern security
environment--one recognized in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance--
that these defense contributions and NATO's continued evolution have
transformed Europe, in the span of a single generation, from a security
consumer to one of the world's most important security producers.
Today, NATO militaries include 750 ships, 24,000 aircraft, and over 3
million active duty personnel. Over the past decade, as these assets
were vigorously put to use, our European allies and partners made
conscious national decisions to set aside the security paradigms of the
previous century and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States,
making unprecedented deployments on out-of-area expeditionary
operations to confront 21st century threats. It remains one of
history's more ironic twists that NATO's only Article 5 declaration was
made by our NATO allies in the defense of the United States after the
events of September 11, 2001.
In the decade of war and military operations that followed,
European military personnel comprised 80 percent of non-U.S. forces in
Iraq and 90 percent of non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan--essentially a
third of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In
addition, our European partners provided substantial military support--
in command and control, basing, air sorties, and maritime
interdiction--to execute Operation Unified Protector in Libya
successfully in 2011. They also sustain 90 percent of the mission in
Kosovo, provide 6,000 troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations across
the world, and continue providing important support to current missile
defense and counter-piracy operations. These are extraordinarily
valuable contributions, both diplomatically and in terms of their
relief on U.S. force generation requirements. They represent burden-
sharing unparalleled in any other region of the world, showcasing the
vital importance of our European allies and partners to U.S. national
security interests and the viability of coalition warfare as we
continue moving into the 21st century.
Yet, even as we acknowledge these extraordinary contributions and
commitments, the fiscal realities and current inflection point that
follow a decade of war have prompted necessary national deliberation to
reconsider the U.S. defense strategy and rebalance global U.S. posture.
Indeed, the Cold War and its strategic imperatives are long over. As
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance makes clear, after 10 years of
combat operations ``our Nation is at a moment of transition'' requiring
us to put ``our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-
term economic strength.'' These considerations have increased scrutiny
of U.S. posture in Europe. Yet, the reality is that U.S. posture in
Europe has been steadily declining for more than 2 decades.
At the height of the Cold War, more than 450,000 U.S. forces were
stationed across 1,200 sites on the European continent. Today, U.S.
forces on the continent have been reduced by more than 85 percent and
basing sites reduced by 75 percent. Indeed, shortly after release of
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, European Command announced further
significant force structure cuts, phasing out the Army's V Corps
Headquarters, the 170th and 172nd Brigade Combat Teams, three forward-
stationed Air Force squadrons, and a host of Army and Air Force
enablers in concert with the Department's strategic rebalancing effort.
Additionally, over the past 6 years, the U.S. Army has dramatically
consolidated its theater footprint, closing six garrisons and over 100
sites across Europe to consolidate and align its much smaller presence
with enduring 21st century missions.
In light of these reductions, European Command is today comprised
of approximately 64,000 joint forces--representing less than 5 percent
of the military--strategically located across 21 main operating bases
and smaller supporting sites. The command is sharply focused on the
goals outlined by the Secretary of Defense in his own preface to the
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. That guidance seeks to ensure that
`Joint Force 2020' is capable of: ``maintaining our defense commitments
to Europe; strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions;
deterring and defeating aggression by our adversaries, including those
seeking to deny our power projection; countering weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and
across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent;
and protecting the homeland.'' For European Command, these remain our
existing and most critical missions, performed from forward-stationed
locations that protect the United States through strategic depth and
distance, while providing our Nation the strategic agility and
responsiveness to deal rapidly with 21st century crises and complex
contingencies in an environment of unforgiving speed.
Despite these realities, there persists in some quarters a notion
that the strategic rebalance represents a zero-sum game for U.S. global
posture, recalling debates from the last century pitting advocates of
`Europe first' or `Asia first' against each other. Yet, what that
century taught us, and what the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance makes
clear, is that the United States must retain its global reach, access,
and prerogatives to maintain its status and influence as a global
superpower, particularly in regions vital to U.S. economic well-being
such as Europe and the Middle East. Power, like nature, abhors a
vacuum. A zero-sum withdrawal or substantial diminishment of U.S.
presence, influence, and supporting infrastructure across these vital
regions provides opportunity for other rising powers to displace the
United States, and gain the geostrategic benefits from that
substitution.
The new strategic guidance is also clear in identifying the
Nation's evolving strategic challenges, as well as its enduring
strategic partnerships. While the guidance directs that the U.S.
military will ``of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region,'' it also articulates that, in addition to working with
America's allies in the Pacific, Europe remains ``our principal partner
in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the
foreseeable future.'' Chairman Dempsey echoed this point at the
strategy's roll-out: ``Our strategic challenges are shifting, and we
have to pay attention to those shifts. But what we do will always be
built on the strong foundation of our traditional strategic
partnerships, and NATO is chief among them.'' Thus, NATO remains an
essential vehicle, given its more than 60 years of security experience,
strong and progressive direction from the Lisbon and Chicago summits,
and a decade of sustained investment and gains in expeditionary out-of-
area operations, capabilities, and interoperability. Within this
construct, European Command remains the essential catalyst, driving and
strengthening that principal partnership through vital theater security
cooperation and multilateral training events, particularly at places
like U.S. Army Europe's full-spectrum Joint Multinational Training
Command, centrally located and accessible in southern Germany.
Geographically, Europe provides the critical access and
infrastructure to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance's priorities and
expand U.S. global reach across half the world, to Europe and on to
Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East. America's enduring presence and
leadership in Europe provides our Nation with an indispensable
geostrategic platform--a metaphorical forward-deployed ``unsinkable
aircraft carrier''--to facilitate and conduct global operations in
direct support of NATO, six U.S. Combatant Commands (European Command,
Central Command, Africa Command, Transportation Command, Special
Operations Command, and Strategic Command), a wide host of U.S.
Government interagency organizations, and 51 U.S. Embassies. In
accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, our evolved but
enduring presence will continue to support these missions, assure our
allies, deter potential adversaries, promote enhanced capabilities and
interoperability for future coalition operations, support and provide
leadership for NATO's continued progressive evolution, and provide
critical forward defense against the rising threats of the 21st
century.
The timing of the U.S. strategic rebalance--coming simultaneously
with a number of other rapidly unfolding events in and around our
theater, in places like Israel, Turkey, Syria, North Africa, the wider
Middle East, and Afghanistan--has also provided the command with a
strategic inflection point of our own to consider and to focus on as we
move into the future.
European Command has aggressively leveraged this opportunity to
undertake a significant strategic review last fall, guiding our
implementation of the Defense Strategic Guidance and ensuring the
responsible utilization and maximum efficiency of increasingly precious
defense resources. That strategy acknowledges the environment we are
witnessing: one characterized by decreasing resources and increasing
instability; one that endorses the Department's emphasis to work with
America's ``most stalwart allies and partners'' to maintain our
commitments to allied security; one that promotes enhanced allied
capacity and interoperability, ensuring that a decade of sustained
investment and combat experience with these partners is not lost; and
one that leverages resource pooling and sharing opportunities--such as
NATO's `Smart Defense' program--to economize our efforts as we meet the
challenges of the 21st century.
In light of this environment and the path forward, European
Command's new strategy tightly aligns our enduring posture with the
command's most pressing 21st century missions and priorities. Those
priorities include: the command's readiness to execute NATO Article 5
missions and other priority U.S. contingency plans; preservation of our
strategic theater partnerships, both to enable a successful ISAF
transition and to preserve the return on past U.S. investment in
partner capability and interoperability; and European Command's charge
to defend the Homeland forward against rising threats from ballistic
missiles, international terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational
illicit trafficking, piracy, and malevolence in cyberspace. European
Command's new strategy will serve to ensure that our resources are
harmonized effectively and efficiently across the command, that we are
prepared to address conflict across the spectrum of operations with a
focus on the most likely scenarios, and that we are meeting the growing
need, based on fiscal realities, to align high-end training
opportunities, capability development, and sustained outreach with our
allies and partners on future coalition operations and military burden-
sharing.
The transatlantic alliance is and will remain an essential
foundation for sustained global security, stability, and freedom. It is
a precious and profound generational inheritance from those who
preceded us; a tool forged in the fire of the last century to provide
us the edge we need in this one. In candid remarks on his departure,
outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned against the growing
devaluation among American leadership of this inheritance: ``The
policymakers who will follow us will not have the same historical,
personal, and, indeed, emotional ties to Europe and may not consider
the return on America's investment in Europe's defense worth the cost .
. . and that will be a tragedy.'' Former Secretary Panetta has also
stated it clearly: ``We live in a world of growing danger and
uncertainty where we face threats from violent extremism, nuclear
proliferation, rising powers, and cyber attack. We cannot predict where
the next crisis will occur. But we know we are stronger when we
confront these threats together. It is precisely because of these
growing security challenges and growing fiscal constraints that we need
to work more closely than ever as partners.''
To summarize, there are five key responses to the question: ``Why
is Europe of such importance to the United States?'' First, Europe is
home to most of the world's progressive democracies; nations with which
we share the fundamental values that are a critical element in building
effective coalitions. Second, with a GDP of $19 trillion--a quarter of
the world's economy--and approximately $4 trillion in annual trade with
the United States, Europe's importance to the U.S. and global economies
cannot be overstated. Third, the European theater remains critical
geostrategic terrain, providing the United States with the global
access it needs to conduct worldwide operations and crisis response.
Fourth, Europe is the backdrop for NATO, history's most successful and
effective alliance, and a vital partner for dealing with the challenges
of the 21st century. Fifth, Europe is today a security exporter,
possessing among the most highly trained and technologically advanced
militaries in the world. No other region possesses such a comparable
pool of capable and willing partners able to conduct global operations
with the United States.
Therefore, our Nation must take care--even as we grapple with
significant economic challenges and chart the necessary strategic
reorientations--to protect, preserve, and continue evolving this
extraordinary partnership. We must keep the transatlantic light burning
brightly. It will help guide us as we continue navigating the shadows,
complexity, and continuous evolution of the 21st century security
environment. It will prove, as we persevere and rise to meet today's
economic and security challenges, that we are still, and will remain,
STRONGER TOGETHER.

``Over a decade of war, from the mountains of Afghanistan to
the shores of Tripoli, this alliance has proven its relevance
in the security challenges of the 21st century. We have moved
closer to realizing a vision for the Atlantic community
articulated by President John F. Kennedy 50 years ago,
envisioning that one day the United States would partner with a
revitalized Europe `in all the great and burdensome tasks of
building and defending a community of free nations.' ''--Former
U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

MISSION, VISION, PRIORITIES

Mission
The mission of the U.S. European Command is to conduct military
operations, international military engagement, and interagency
partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United
States forward.
Vision
We serve the Nation as an agile security organization executing
full-spectrum activities in a whole-of-government framework to deliver
solutions that contribute to enduring security and stability across the
world.

2013 Theater Priortites:
1. Ensure readiness to execute European Command's NATO Article 5
commitment and other contingency plans.
2. Preserve our strategic partnerships.

Sustain relationship with our allies to ensure a
strong NATO Alliance;
Preserve recently developed allied and partner
capability and interoperability;
Maintain regional stability and security.

3. Enable ISAF's transition to Afghan security lead.
4. Counter transnational threats, focusing on: missile defense;
weapons of mass destruction; counterterrorism; illicit trafficking;
counterpiracy; and cyberspace.
5. Maintain U.S. strategic access across Europe in support of
global operations.
6. Maintain particular focus on four key countries: Israel,
Poland, Russia, and Turkey.

SUCCESS AND PROGRESS

Meeting the Chairman's Strategic Priorities

Aligned and Supporting Joint Force 2020

The Defense Strategic Guidance provides a blueprint for optimizing
the U.S. Joint Force by the year 2020. This blueprint provides a 21st
century fighting force that sustains U.S. global leadership, is
postured to protect America's vital national security interests, stands
ready to confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world, and
maintains the missions, capabilities, and capacity to prevail in the
complex security environment of the 21st century. As part of that
blueprint, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has outlined 10
critical mission areas for Joint Force 2020:

1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
3. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
4. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
7. Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence
9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

U.S. European Command is closely aligned with, and executing, all
ten of these mission areas. Every day, through a wide array of
operations, exercises, and supporting initiatives, conducted in
conjunction with our allies and partners, European Command is providing
the forward defense of the United States and preserving America's vital
national security interests across multiple continents in each of these
priority areas. Over the past year, we have achieved significant
progress in line with the Chairman's strategic priorities. Highlights
include:

1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Afghanistan
European Command continues a wide range of activities to enable a
successful transition to Afghan security lead at the end of 2014. Our
European allies and partners, who constitute a third of ISAF, have made
an ``in together, out together'' commitment, with some countries,
including Georgia, Hungary, and Romania, having recently increased
their ISAF contributions to address critical shortfalls. Allied and
partner special operations forces, working in concert with Special
Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) under the Partnership Development
Program, have demonstrated a particularly noteworthy level of
commitment, indicating their willingness to continue contributing to
Afghan stabilization efforts beyond 2014 should this requirement exist.
European Command leverages a number of essential programs and
authorities, including Section 1206 (global train & equip), the
Coalition Support Fund, the Coalition Readiness Support Program, and
the SOCEUR Partnership Development Program to assist our allies and
partners with necessary pre-deployment training and equipment needs.
Through these vital programs, we have provided training in critical
combat skills and specialized equipment to enhance our partners'
downrange interoperability and operational effectiveness. The continued
availability of these programs is essential to support the transition
and post-2014 missions in Afghanistan.

In quarterly training rotations this year through U.S. Army
Europe's Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany,
European Command has also prepared a total of 72 Security Force
Assistance Teams from 16 countries for ISAF deployment. Additionally,
we provided life-saving Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training to
2,481 personnel from 22 countries. To date, the command's Expeditionary
Intelligence Training Program has developed counterinsurgency
intelligence, analysis, and operational skill sets for over 1,000
personnel from 26 countries. European Command has expanded our `Georgia
Deployment Program' to support the simultaneous deployment of two
Georgian battalions every 6 months to ISAF's Regional Command
Southwest, where they operate in conjunction with the U.S. marines
without caveats. U.S. Air Force Europe's Warrior Preparation Center has
also contributed to the ISAF mission by training 60 Joint Tactical Air
Controllers from 19 partner nations. Finally, in 2012, European Command
obtained and delivered critical lifesaving equipment for deploying
partners from 10 Central and Eastern European countries.
Theater Counterterrorism
Exercise Jackal Stone is U.S. European Command's premier Special
Operations Force (SOF) training event. In 2012, this theater-wide SOF
exercise was conducted in Croatia involving over 1,700 personnel
representing 15 countries: Canada; the Czech Republic; Denmark;
Estonia; Finland; France; Hungary; Italy; Lithuania; Latvia; Norway;
Poland; Romania; Slovakia; and the United Kingdom. Exercise Jackal
Stone honed theater SOF capabilities in all mission sets from
counterterrorism to high-intensity conflict. The exercise validated
Special Operations Task Force-Europe's ability to conduct special
operations, and enhanced SOF relationships with these key partners who
continue deploying to ISAF and fully support our strategy of active
security.

2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
Austere Challenge
In its 8th year as European Command's premier joint force
headquarters exercise, Austere Challenge 12--the largest and most
significant exercise ever to take place in U.S. European Command since
the end of the Cold War--continued to provide world-class training
opportunities for U.S. European Command Headquarters, our Service
component commands, and the Israel Defense Forces. An extensive, multi-
phased event, Austere Challenge 12 exercised existing U.S. European
Command plans and capabilities in the Levant, focused on combined
missile defense training and interoperability with a critical partner
in a challenging strategic environment. The exercise involved 3,500
U.S. personnel from all 4 Military Services, integrating U.S. Army
Patriot batteries, Air Operations Center command and control
capabilities, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships, and other
air defense systems to sharpen combined defensive capabilities against
a variety of threats. As part of the broader Austere Challenge event,
European Command also conducted the largest of our combined exercises
and engagements with Israel, Exercises Juniper Cobra and Juniper
Falcon. These exercises also sustain the U.S.-Israeli political-
military relationship, exercise important theater capabilities, and
provide further demonstration of the United States' strong commitment
to the security of Israel.

The Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement Fund continues to be
a linchpin for theater-wide Joint and Coalition training. In 2012, the
fund supported 31 joint and coalition exercises, training European
Command Headquarters staff and more than 25,000 U.S. military personnel
across a full spectrum of critical missions from integrated air and
missile defense to counterterrorism. This funding enables European
Command and NATO to be a net exporter of security, from ISAF operations
to the defense of Israel, and was instrumental in ensuring the success
of Exercise Austere Challenge 12, demonstrating a fully-rehearsed,
seamlessly integrated missile defense capability and clear U.S.
commitment to a key ally during a critical period.

3. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
Theater Nuclear Forces
U.S. European Command maintains a safe, secure, and effective
theater nuclear deterrent in support of the NATO Alliance and enduring
U.S. security commitments. Through rigorous and effective training,
exercises, evaluation, inspection, operations, and sustainment,
European Command ensures U.S. nuclear weapons, dual-capable aircraft,
nuclear command centers, materials, procedures, and personnel are fully
ready to support national strategic nuclear directives. Our annual
program includes command-only exercises, such as Fig Leaf and Clover
Leaf, as well as participation in the NATO Steadfast exercise series,
and multiple Joint Staff, NATO, and U.S. European Command assessments
and inspections.

4. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
Collective Security Defends the U.S. Homeland
In 2012, U.S. European Command continued its mission to defend the
Homeland forward by expanding our planning efforts with, and in support
of, NATO. Through America's fulfillment of its Article 5 commitments,
and a strong and enduring NATO Alliance, we support our national and
collective security, manifested so clearly in NATO's historic and only
Article 5 declaration, made in the wake of September 11, 2001.
Supporting the Fight against Transnational Organized Crime
Additionally, through the work of European Command's Joint
Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC), we continue to provide
strong support to the President's Transnational Organized Crime
Strategy, the U.S. Government interagency, and numerous U.S. Country
Teams working to counter global transnational illicit trafficking and
terrorism. With profits from illicit enterprises estimated in the
trillions, these efforts focus on disrupting versatile illicit networks
who traffic in a wide host of destabilizing influences, including
narcotics, terrorism, weapons (from small arms to WMD), human
trafficking, and illicit finance. These networks pose a growing threat
to the U.S. Homeland, as well as the security of our allied and partner
nations. Through these efforts, we are contributing to U.S. interagency
efforts to disrupt and dismantle these networks, and assisting our
partner nations develop and refine the counter-trafficking and
counterterrorism skills and capacity needed to keep these threats as
far as possible from American shores.

5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges

Ballistic Missile Defense
Throughout 2012, European Command continued to improve its
ballistic missile defense (BMD) readiness for the defense of Israel and
Europe. In particular, 2012 saw the AN/TPY-2 radar--on-line at Kurecik,
Turkey, since 2011--transition to NATO control as part of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. Additionally,
important EPAA Phase Two progress was made last year, as we
successfully completed all international negotiations to forward-
station four U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships in Spain,and continued to
prepare the Aegis Ashore site in Romania.
European Command has also taken a number of proactive steps to set
the theater and increase our readiness in response to heightened
instability in the Levant. Increased Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) operations enable the command to maintain a close
watch on that region. As the situation in the Levant became
increasingly serious last year, we significantly increased our
coordination and collaborative planning with our counterparts in the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). European Command also took steps to
increase our force posture and readiness during this time frame, in
order to be prepared to rapidly execute operations in the Levant should
it become necessary.

6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
European Counter-Proliferation Stakeholders
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the hands of a rogue state or
non-state actors continue to represent a grave threat to the United
States, our allies, and partners. In confronting this high-stakes
challenge, one that possesses far-reaching and highly destabilizing
consequences, several factors intersect across European Command's
theater: the bulk of the world's WMD resides here; European population
centers and U.S. military installations present numerous targets for
terrorist organizations; and European ports and terminals are the last
line of defense for much of the commercial traffic that enters the U.S.
port system.
Our allies and partners share these concerns, and we continue to
leverage their capabilities as we pursue efforts, both bilaterally and
regionally, to reduce the potential for successful WMD trafficking. We
have increased our preparedness through several military-to-military
and military-to-civilian engagements, joint training events, NATO's
annual consequence management exercise (conducted in conjunction with
over 30 European nations), U.S. interagency cooperation, defensive
consequence management planning with Israel, the work of the Joint
Interagency Counter Trafficking Center, and other partnering to bolster
our collective capabilities in this critical mission area.

7. Operate Effectively in Space and Cyberspace
Cyberspace Operations
European Command is pursuing a cyber posture that ensures mission
assurance by protecting the command's critical data, information
systems, and networks against an expanding number of increasingly
sophisticated cyber threats. Over the past year, European Command has
refined the organization and functionality of its Joint Cyber Center
(JCC), which serves as the focal point for coordinating, integrating,
and synchronizing the theater's cyber activities. It is an integral
part of the command's contingency planning efforts and operations,
working closely with U.S. Cyber Command and Service cyber components to
ensure responsiveness to priority mission requirements in the cyber
domain.
In an effort to enhance the security of its networks and enhance
their operational effectiveness, European Command is also working with
U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Army to implement the initial
increment of the Joint Information Environment. This is a multi-phased
effort supporting the Department's migration from Service-centric
networks to a single information technology infrastructure and common
network architecture. This undertaking will allow analysts at each
combatant command to assess potential cyber threats on a near-real time
basis and react to potential adversary activity in a more cohesive and
effective manner.
Cyber Defenses
European Command's cyber posture also includes military engagement
to strengthen coalition networks and the cyber defense capabilities of
our NATO Allies and Partnership for Peace nations. Thirty-seven
European Command country cooperation plans include activities that help
partners strengthen their cyber defense programs and exchange
information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Successful again
last year, European Command conducted Exercise Combined Endeavor 12,
the largest communications and information systems interoperability
exercise in the world. The event drew delegates from 40 nations (26
NATO and 14 Partnership for Peace countries) focused on partnership
capabilities, operational preparation of deployable command, control,
communications, and computer forces, cyber training and professional
development, and the development of interoperability standards for
cyberspace.
European Command also hosted Exercise Cyber Endeavor, which
promotes a common standard for network defense processes and
procedures. The exercise involved 175 participants from 32 countries,
including NATO members and Warsaw Initiative Fund-resourced Partnership
for Peace nations. It focused on malware analysis and reverse
engineering, cyber incident response, and network and computer
forensics. Through this capstone event with NATO, partner nations,
academia, and industry, European Command is enhancing theater-wide
cyber capabilities, and building strong defense partnerships to ensure
that the United States and NATO are prepared to prevail in this
critical domain.

8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence
Israel and the Levant
European Command's sustained engagement with Israel, through our
theater security cooperation program and numerous annual military-to-
military engagement activities, continues to strengthen our Nations'
enduring ties and military capabilities. European Command chairs four
bilateral, semiannual conferences with Israel addressing planning,
logistics, exercises, and interoperability. Additionally, the U.S.-
Israeli exercise portfolio includes eight major recurring exercises.
Through these engagements, our leaders and staff maintain uniquely
strong, recurring, personal, and direct relationships with their IDF
counterparts.
U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority
European Command's comprehensive engagement strategy with Israel
complements other U.S. Government security cooperation initiatives,
including the important work of the U.S. Security Coordinator for
Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC). USSC's mission is to help
Israel and the Palestinian Authority meet security conditions to
support a two-state solution; to transform and professionalize the
Palestinian Authority's security sector; and to support U.S. and
international whole-of-government engagement, with both the Israelis
and the Palestinians through security initiatives designed to build
mutual trust and confidence. Continued U.S. support for this engagement
and the progressive capacity and capabilities of the Palestinian
Authority Security Forces remain in the interest of overall Israeli-
Palestinian regional security.
Kosovo
In advance of the Serbian elections last year, for which there were
indications Serbia would attempt to organize illegally in the territory
of Kosovo, European Command worked closely with Senior Department of
Defense officials to identify Kosovo Force (KFOR) capacities,
capabilities, and risks to mitigate against a deterioration in security
resulting from such an effort. We prepared ground forces, forward-
stationed in Germany, to deploy rapidly to reinforce KFOR if required.
Though this augmentation was ultimately not needed as a diplomatic
solution was found to allow the OSCE to administer polling sites where
dual national Kosovo Serbs could vote, the proximity and presence
demonstrated important U.S. resolve to continued stability in the
Balkans.
Caucasus
With U.S. assistance, Georgia conducted cross-border Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Response training with Armenia in 2012, and
also continued to develop their biohazard threat analysis capabilities
to enhance regional stability. Further south, European Command
facilitated Armenia's participation in Exercise Combined Endeavor and
the U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force, efforts focused on
regional security, while also providing non-commissioned officer
training to the Armenian military. In Azerbaijan, European Command also
involved Azerbaijan forces in the Black Sea Rotational Force,
coordinated training events at the Joint Multinational Training Center
in Germany, and provided section 1206-funded explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) training to Naval Special Operations Forces.

9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
Baltic States
In support of this priority, focused on stability and expanding
military-to-military cooperation to strengthen partner capabilities and
reduce reliance on U.S. forces, European Command sponsored the 42nd
annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) engagement, a maritime exercise
which has grown to become the largest military-to-military event in the
region. BALTOPS 2012 continued America's highly visible outreach and
engagement in the Baltic region, supporting development of Latvian,
Lithuanian, and Estonian maritime capabilities, enhancing regional and
NATO Alliance unity of effort, and exercising a host of key military
competencies focused on joint and combined air, land, and sea training.
The exercise brought together 12 European nations--including Russia--27
ships, 33 aircraft, and 1 submarine to conduct tactical unit actions,
in-port and at-sea events, and a culminating exercise employing multi-
national sea and air forces. The exercise was important in promoting
assurance and stability in this key maritime region, and expanding our
engagement with Russia, one of European Command's leading priorities.
State Partnership Program
The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) remains one of
European Command's most effective and efficient programs to enhance
theater stability and influence the development of partner nation
military capabilities. Launched in 1993 to reach out to former Warsaw
Pact and Eastern European countries after the Cold War, the program
accounts for 25 percent of European Command's theater security
cooperation and military-to-military engagement programs with these
nations. In the European Command Theater, SPP partners U.S. National
Guard forces from 21 participating States with 22 allied and partner
nations. SPP in the theater leverages other programs and authorities,
such as National Guard annual training and Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster and Civic Aid program activities to conduct military training
and education, pursue key theater security cooperation objectives, and
foster positive relationships among junior and mid-grade military
professionals. These relationships pay dividends as these professionals
progress to ever higher positions of responsibility in their
militaries. The program has also delivered a significant operational
return on investment, with 19 participating nations contributing forces
to ISAF, and 9 of these nations training, deploying, and serving side-
by-side with participating U.S. National Guard units in Security Force
Assistance Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams across
Afghanistan.

10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
Disaster Relief
In 2010, in coordination with the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), European Command provided critical firefighting
support to control wildfires raging across Russia and Israel. A year
later, in August 2011, the Command provided significant disaster relief
to Turkey in the wake of a devastating earthquake. Last year, in
response to a particularly harsh winter, European Command provided
rapid disaster response across the Balkans. In February 2012, blizzard
conditions caused widespread power outages across Bosnia and
Herzegovina, prompting officials to request emergency assistance from
the international community. On short notice, European Command
delivered badly needed parts and supplies to repair degraded military
helicopters so that Bosnians could respond to isolated mountain
communities. A short time later, Montenegro declared a similar state of
emergency. European Command again answered the call, providing intra-
theater lift to transport required material, personnel, and equipment
to Montenegro, and dispatched two U.S. Army UH-60 helicopters to assist
the government with emergency resupply and medical evacuation
operations.
Humanitarian Assistance
European Command also supports civil-military engagement programs
that focus humanitarian assistance and disaster response along four key
lines of operation: disaster preparedness; education; health; and water
and sanitation. These programs provide training and construction
support to develop disaster preparedness in poorer regions of
southeastern Europe and Eurasia. This program, also coordinated with
USAID, generates significant `soft power' for the United States, as
efforts to renovate clinics, schools, orphanages, and water lines build
tremendous goodwill and leave a lasting positive American legacy for a
relatively modest investment. In 2012, the program obligated $9 million
across 17 countries in the region to help build and reinforce
stability.
To summarize, through the execution of the command's combined
operations, theater exercises, interagency outreach, and security
cooperation across each of these ten national mission areas, European
Command is protecting and preserving every one of America's vital
national security interests. These interest, defined by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs are:

Survival of the Nation (deterrence of nuclear attack);
Survival of the global economic system (enabling
physical and virtual flow of global commerce);
Prevention of catastrophic attacks on the Nation (from
ballistic missiles, WMD, or terrorists);
Freedom of action for the United States (facilitate
the exercise of American power);
Secure, confident, and reliable allies and partners
(fulfilling obligations to our partner states);
Protection of American citizens abroad (defending
diplomatic facilities and conducting hostage rescue,
counterterrorism, and evacuation operations);
Preserving and, where possible, extending universal
values (human rights, democracy, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief).

Supporting each of these vital national security interests,
European Command is making a difference, keeping America safe, and
ensuring the Nation's defenses are Stronger Together with our European
allies and partners.
challenges, opportunities, and initiatives
``European security remains an anchor of U.S. foreign and
security policy. A strong Europe is critical to our security
and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally
depends on working together with Europe.''--Former U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

The most important challenge facing U.S. European Command is
maintaining our readiness to conduct unilateral operations, as well as
combined operations with our European allies and partners, to support
our collective NATO Article 5 responsibilities, out-of-area operations,
and other contingency missions. Today, rising tensions--stemming from
declining resources, long-simmering ethnic strife, regional hegemonic
desires impacting U.S. European Command area of responsibility
partners' security, and a host of demographic, social, political, and
economic forces--pose challenges and risk to security and stability in
and around our theater. Enduring U.S. presence and engagement remains
critical to preventing destabilizing influences or simmering
resentments from erupting into violence or escalating into open
conflict. While these challenges are real, European Command remains
vigilant, proactive, and engaged to seek out opportunities in each of
these challenges and leverage our presence, leadership, and
capabilities to continue to protect U.S. vital national security
interests and meet our collective security commitments.

Afghanistan
We have entered the critical transition period in Afghanistan. Over
the next 20 months, ISAF must continue to fully recruit and field the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), both army and police, in order
to shift the main security effort to the Afghans later this year. We
must also prepare to support the Afghan presidential election and the
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), while planning to redeploy
thousands of ISAF forces and restructure our basing readiness to ensure
that European Command is postured to support this redeployment and the
post-2014 mission.

European Command is involved in a wide range of supporting
activities to enable a successful transition in Afghanistan in
accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and NATO's Chicago
Summit Declaration. As mentioned, European Command continues to
leverage Section 1206, Coalition Support Fund, Coalition Readiness
Support Program, and a host of other security assistance programs to
provide the critical training and equipment that enable our European
allies and partners--particularly Central and Eastern Europeans who are
punching far above their weight in ISAF--to continue contributing to
security and stability in Afghanistan. The continued availability of
these authorities, particularly Section 1206, is essential to helping
us meet the transition timeline and our post-2014 responsibilities.
European Command is also providing critical logistical support to the
mission in Afghanistan. We are working closely with U.S. Transportation
Command to ensure the existing capacity, versatility, and
responsiveness of redeployment mechanisms, routes, and infrastructure
can cover the size and scope of the Afghanistan redeployment mission.
To that end, European Command's recently established multi-modal
logistical hub at U.S. Forward Operating Site Mihail Kogalniceanu
Airfield in Romania represents an extremely valuable addition to this
logistical capacity, helping to mitigate risk from existing logistical
ground and sea lines of communication in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

NATO Evolution
While progress continues, in step with the Lisbon and Chicago
summit declarations, budget pressures and the transition in Afghanistan
will continue to affect NATO's ongoing evolution. This challenge is
characterized by several elements. First, NATO will discover new force
capacity when troops, both U.S. and European, return home from
Afghanistan as we move closer to 2014. This will facilitate support to
the NATO Response Force (NRF), which provides the alliance with Article
5 and other crisis response capabilities. Second, the allies will
naturally refocus on training, exercising, and initiatives inside
alliance borders, even as they seek to retain hard-earned
counterinsurgency and expeditionary capabilities. The Department's
decision to reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NRF offers a
significant opportunity to ensure America's allies and partners sustain
their expeditionary capabilities and maintain their interoperability
with U.S. forces. European Command is working to implement this
decision, through support to rotational U.S. battalion task forces
participating in NRF exercises and important training events with our
European allies and partners. Third, the importance of
counterinsurgency skill sets will give way to other priorities,
including missile defense, cyberspace, and regional stability. Fourth,
NATO will continue to adjust to its recently reduced command structure.
Fifth, the alliance will seek to integrate increasingly capable allies,
such as Turkey and Poland, into high-end planning, command structures,
and exercises. Lastly, the alliance will become more aware of, and
focused on, evolving transnational challenges, including illicit
trafficking, piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and energy security.
The challenge to NATO presented by the current evolution is to
develop a capable force structure to ensure enduring alliance
credibility. European Command continues to support NATO's ongoing
evolution through our bilateral and multilateral engagements,
exercises, training, theater security cooperation programs,
participation in the NATO Centers of Excellence, and a wide variety of
other initiatives. One of the most effective enablers in this effort
continues to be the U.S. International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. Through this invaluable program, the United States has
trained and educated a number of our partner nations' top performing
military personnel and future leaders, increasing international
understanding, cooperation, and interoperability. IMET beneficiaries
have risen to the highest echelons of their defense establishments,
which today include 3 Eastern European Chiefs of Defense, 11 partner
nation Service Chiefs, and 8 Sergeants Major of our partner nations'
militaries. The IMET program continues to build and expand on these
vital relationships, strongly supports NATO's continued evolution, and
provides the United States with considerable advantage in outreach and
connection as we maintain these relationships over the years. Through
these programs, European Command reinforces U.S. leadership in NATO and
reenergizes our enduring commitment to the alliance's collective
security. These efforts sustain confidence in NATO's aggregate
strength, shared democratic values, recognition of global
responsibilities, and continued adherence to operational competence.
By supporting NATO's continued viability and success, the United
States encourages European nations to approach global security issues
from within the alliance, ensuring that European and U.S. viewpoints
are shared, considered, and weighed together in the decisionmaking
process. Today, NATO stands at a second major crossroads, similar to
the decision point that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our
challenge is to work diligently to support the broader U.S. Government
effort to demonstrate tangible U.S. commitment to the alliance,
ensuring that the correct choices are made to maintain NATO's
capabilities, capacity, and credibility.

``NATO not only serves to protect our collective nations but
our Homeland as well.''--Congressman Michael Turner (R-OH),
House Armed Services Committee

Israel and the Levant
The `Arab Spring' movement is significantly reshaping leadership
across the Middle East and North Africa. New strategic challenges are
emerging. Several Arab countries are undergoing major internal changes
resulting in a more dynamic, less predictable region. For Israel, a
country inside European Command's area of responsibility, these
movements bring increased uncertainty for enduring stability in the
region. The Sinai's growing instability is of increasing concern to
Israel. Over the past 3 decades, Israel has made significant military
reductions along its southern border based on a stable Egyptian/Israeli
border. Internal developments in Egypt have now put the stability of
that border into question. Additionally, aggressive actions by elements
inside Gaza eventually compelled Israel to launch its 7-day `Pillar of
Defense' operation last November. To the north, events in Syria have
severely destabilized Israel's northern border. Israel must be prepared
to deal with the actions of the current Syrian regime as well as a
range of possible successors. In addition, Lebanese Hezbollah continues
to grow as a powerful actor on the Israel/Lebanon border, possessing
lethally accurate rockets and missiles with the potential to severely
damage Israeli infrastructure. To the east, Iran continues to increase
its ballistic missile stockpile and pursue a nuclear weapons program,
further narrowing Israel's strategic depth and decision space. Given
this situation, it is feasible that increasing violence or war could
erupt from multiple directions within the Levant with limited warning
and grave implications for regional stability, Israeli security, and
U.S. interests.
Accordingly, European Command continues to work with our IDF
partners to ensure strong U.S. support to the defense of Israel.
European Command works closely with U.S. Central Command to keep
abreast of all emerging threats and intelligence regarding Iran, Syria,
the Sinai, Hamas, and Hezbollah, ranging from missile threats to
terrorist activity. Lastly, European Command continues a robust program
of security cooperation and military-to-military activities with Israel
to demonstrate U.S. resolve and ensure a high degree of defense
synchronization between our two nations.

Russia
Though a significant actor who at times disagrees with U.S. and
NATO policies, Russia still presents potential for future engagement.
The military component of the relationship exists principally in the
annual bilateral U.S.-Russian Military Cooperation Work Plan. Since its
re-establishment in 2008, focused on `zones of cooperation' where our
interests overlap and that avoid enhancing Russian combat capabilities,
our bilateral activities have increased from 10 events in 2009 to 110
events and exercises in 2012, in areas of mutual interest including:
combating terrorism; counter-piracy; counter-trafficking; crisis
response; maritime capabilities; search and rescue; the Arctic; and
support to coalition stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Despite
recent disagreements over missile defense, we continue to seek out
additional areas for cooperation, such as security for the 2014 Sochi
Winter Olympics and Russia's recent request for assistance developing
its new Military Police organization, which the U.S. Army is working
diligently. The ability to effectively work together not only provides
important strategic access for ongoing NATO and coalition operations,
but continues to satisfy our mutual strategic goals.

Militarily, Russia seeks to enhance its regional influence and
leverage through participation with former Soviet states in the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (membership includes Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), as well as a
robust defense build-up through its `State Armament Plan.' That plan
calls for the construction and modernization of: naval surface
combatants and submarines; air defense brigades; attack helicopters;
developments in fifth generation fighters; and the continued
maintenance of its existing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. At
the same time, Russia faces many challenges, including declining
demographics, a high rate of drug and alcohol abuse, a relatively
narrow economic base stemming from oil and gas, and uneven
infrastructure. While appropriately anticipating these developments,
European Command will continue to seek and leverage existing and
emerging zones of cooperation as a priority and focus for our current
and future engagement with Russia.
Turkey
A NATO ally since 1952, Turkey continues to make important
contributions to vital U.S. national security interests, particularly
in its support for regional missile defense with the AN/TPY-2 radar
site located in eastern Turkey as well as ongoing counter-terrorism
operations. Turkey is an indispensable partner in addressing the
increasingly complex challenges in the Levant and across the broader
Middle East. Turkey's own challenges include a growing refugee crisis
on the Syrian border, threat of Syrian ballistic spillover (hence
NATO's Patriot deployment to southern Turkey), and increased terrorist
activity, specifically with the Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly the Kurdistan
Workers Party or PKK) along their border with Iraq.
We continue to support U.S. efforts with the Government of Turkey
to ensure optimum cooperation and outcomes given the Assad regime's
uncertain future in Syria. European Command and the Turkish General
Staff are engaged in a dialogue that will serve as the foundation for
deeper cooperation as the situation requires. Turkey's status as a
stable, democratic nation, its sizable security resources, and its
influence as a regional power broker combine to make this NATO ally a
critical component in achieving U.S. regional objectives. In return,
Turkey is raising its expectations for U.S. cooperation and
partnership, specifically with access to high-end Foreign Military
Sales (FMS), cooperation on counter-terrorism activity, and increased
leadership opportunities in NATO and coalition political/military
structures. That said, Turkey's eroding relationship with Israel bears
special emphasis. Resumption of good relations between these two U.S.
allies, and willingness to facilitate these relations on a military-to-
military level, remain a priority for European Command.

Poland
Poland remains a pivotal nation in our theater, and an emerging
leader in eastern Europe and the NATO Alliance. The strong cooperation
between the United States and Poland remains important to overall
regional security. European Command sees value in the increased
visibility and presence of U.S. forces in Poland, through military
engagements and regionally-hosted exercises, to assist Poland in
realizing its full potential as a capable and reliable security
partner, able to contribute forces that can operate side-by-side with
the United States in future NATO and coalition operations. U.S.
military engagement with Poland is multi-faceted. Recent cooperation
across a variety of initiatives, to include missile defense, Patriot
battery rotations, the establishment of the U.S. Air Force aviation
detachment, and multinational exercises, has allowed the United States
to maintain strong defense ties with this important regional power.

Balkans
In the Balkans, the overarching U.S. goal is to achieve stability
and advance Euro-Atlantic integration. However, strong enmity remains
between former warring factions, especially within Bosnia and
Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina
possesses a stagnant economy. Public sector spending accounts for an
unsustainable 40 percent of GDP. Efforts at post-conflict economic
revitalization have proven fitful at best. The complex governmental
structures created by the Dayton Peace Accords are inefficient and
prone to obstruction by political interference, and resistant to
reforms promoted by the international community. European Command
continues its outreach and engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina
through theater exercises, humanitarian assistance activities, disaster
readiness training, theater exercises, and the State Partnership
Program. We are also energizing defense reform efforts to address
chronic problems in logistics, procurement, and defense institution
building.
Serbia's efforts to realize its aspirations to join the European
Union, as well as advance military-to-military relations with the
United States, will be strained until and unless Belgrade makes real
progress to normalize relations with Kosovo and reach durable solutions
on northern Kosovo. European Command is looking to the EU-facilitated
Pristina-Belgrade dialogue to deliver progress in these areas, while
further engaging Serbia in regional exercises and engagement to
encourage a constructive relationship.
Serbia's refusal to date to normalize relations with Kosovo--as
well as actions by hardliners and criminal elements in northern
Kosovo--have hampered Pristina's ability to extend its authority to its
northern borders without significant international presence. Tensions
in northern Kosovo remained high in 2012, including at least one
serious violent incident that required the rapid deployment of KFOR
personnel to control the situation. Accordingly, despite earlier NATO
plans to continue drawing down alliance force levels in Kosovo, of
which U.S. troops comprise only 15 percent, KFOR should remain at
current levels until further progress is made. In addition to KFOR
support, European Command continues to facilitate State Partnership
Program engagement between Kosovo and the Iowa National Guard, as well
as traditional military-to-military efforts aimed at professionalizing
the Kosovo Security Force's training program and noncommissioned
officer corps. These efforts are designed to assist in the eventual
transition of international security responsibilities to Kosovo
institutions.

Overall in the Balkans, European Command continues its work to
encourage greater collaboration among partners in regional venues such
as the Adriatic Charter. The Adriatic Charter serves as the flagship
forum for regional cooperation, and builds on U.S.-provided support
toward the goals of eventual integration into NATO and other Euro-
Atlantic institutions. European Command's objectives remain focused on
facilitating regional solutions to challenges, promoting regional
stability, protecting and strengthening borders through counter-
trafficking and counter-proliferation initiatives, and promoting a safe
and secure environment in Southeast Europe's most fragile countries.

Caucasus
Similar to the Balkans, instability and fragility in the Caucasus
will continue. That instability is highlighted by Russia's continued
non-compliance with the August 2008 cease-fire agreement with Georgia,
as well as the ongoing political struggle between Georgia and Russia
over the occupied regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The North
Caucasus may very well experience more violence in the near term, as
persistent economic stagnation, lack of government investment (outside
of Sochi, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics), social instability,
and wholesale emigration by ethnic Slavs seeking safer territories all
take their toll, resulting in challenges to governance and
susceptibility to the increasing influence of radical Islamists. Though
not as volatile as the North Caucasus, the South Caucasus remains a
concern in the absence of an agreed political resolution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and continued
violent incidents on the Line of Contact separating the opposing
forces.
European Command continues vigorous engagement across the Caucasus,
given the region's strategic importance as a global energy corridor,
key node on the Northern Distribution Network, source of national
contributions to ISAF, potential for narcotics and illicit weapons
trafficking, interest area for both Russia and Iran, and location of
frozen conflicts that have potential to flash into wider and more
destabilizing wars. In 2012, Armenia deployed a platoon of peacekeepers
to serve alongside the United States in KFOR, and Georgia remains a key
partner in the region, one who continues to make extraordinary ISAF
contributions. European Command is involved in defense cooperation
assessments and efforts with Georgia as directed in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Additional security
cooperation program priorities in the South Caucasus are focused on
developing and sustaining relationships that: ensure U.S. access and
freedom of action (focused in the near term on Northern Distribution
Network areas); counter regional and transnational threats, especially
violent extremist organizations, counter-WMD proliferation, and illicit
trafficking; solidify defense institutional reforms; and sustain
partner capacity to enhance regional security while not hindering
diplomatic efforts to settle the region's frozen conflicts.

European Economic, Social, and Demographic Dynamics
Europe will continue to feel the cumulative effects of several
economic and associated socio-cultural stresses for the foreseeable
future. These stresses include: the lasting impact of the Euro zone
debt crisis; the aging and retirement of a large segment of the
population, with its attendant pressure on already stressed social
services; increased labor demand that exceeds worker supply, with a
resultant pressure to assimilate a growing immigrant work force; and
the draining of human resources and intellectual capital in countries
experiencing slow or no growth. These economic and demographic forces
pose a challenge to European economic and political clout in the near
term, stress transnational and national governance structures,
including the European Union and NATO, and increase the potential for
instability around the continent. The result of these forces is also
magnified on European militaries, as national GDPs have fallen and
governments reduce the GDP percentage dedicated to defense spending in
order to deal with increasing deficits and reduced revenue. European
Command's response is a campaign of active engagement with allied and
partner Ministries of Defense across the theater to keep national
defense funding at effective levels, encouraging wise investment of
available defense spending and supporting the broader U.S. interagency
effort to assist newly democratic nations develop well-crafted
government institutions and reduce the effects of corruption.

Pooling Resources, Sharing Capabilities
In response to this climate of fiscal austerity and corresponding
defense cuts, European Command is working with NATO to make the most of
available defense expenditures by pooling resources, sharing
capabilities, setting priorities, and enhancing coordination of
effort--in initiatives like the NATO Centers of Excellence--that
sustain the required military capabilities that underpin the alliance's
core tasks, evolving needs, and priorities set in Lisbon and Chicago.
Additionally, we must also continue to strongly encourage our allies to
meet the minimum NATO goal of spending at least 2 percent of their GDP
on defense.

Ballistic Missile Defense
Unfortunately, our adversaries continue efforts to procure,
develop, and proliferate advanced ballistic missile technologies,
posing a serious threat to U.S. forces and installations in the
theater, as well as to the territory, populations, and forces of our
European allies and partners.
Accordingly, European Command continues to make significant
progress in implementing the President's European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. EPAA Phase One is complete, with
the AN/TPY-2 land-based radar established and operating from eastern
Turkey, U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships on-station in the Mediterranean,
and NATO's declaration last May in Chicago of its interim ballistic
missile defense (BMD) capability. EPAA Phase Two is currently in
progress, with planning and construction efforts on track to homeport
four forward-deployed U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships at Naval Station
Rota, Spain, and with work progressing on the first of two Aegis Ashore
facilities, with the first site located in Romania. The BMD agreement
with Poland for the second Aegis Ashore site, as part of EPAA Phase
Three, is signed and in force.

The BMD mission also offers another excellent example of the
tangible benefits of cooperative resource pooling with our allies and
partners in a critical collective security mission. At last year's
European Command-sponsored BMD conference in Berlin, the United States
and our allies conferred on existing advanced maritime air defense
systems that could be upgraded to provide European-procured upper-tier
BMD surveillance or interceptor contributions to NATO's BMD mission,
augmenting the U.S. national contribution. The conference also explored
ways to burden-share through a multi-national interceptor pool. This is
an important dialogue that, adequately supported, can generate ideas
and realize initiatives to increase allied upper and lower-tier BMD
contributions complementary to, and interoperable with, existing high-
demand, low-density U.S. assets. European Command efforts in this area
are already achieving results, as we contributed to the recent Dutch
decision to procure upper-tier maritime surveillance BMD systems.

Terrorism and Violent Extremism
With more than 700 kinetic terror incidents occurring in the
theater over the past several years, ongoing instability and terrorism
(both international and indigenous) existing in, and transiting
through, our theater will continue to threaten Europe and the United
States. The diversification of the threat landscape in Europe combined
in some cases with the destabilizing social and economic factors
described earlier will increase the number of disaffected groups across
the political and cultural spectrum that may support extremist groups
or seek to express their growing frustrations through violence. The
concern is that, stretched increasingly thin by fiscal and policy
constraints, theater national governance mechanisms, including law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, may be hard-pressed to respond
to these trends. Meanwhile, Al-Qaida and other Islamist extremist
groups, with extensive ties to individuals and groups in Western
Europe, continue to pose a significant regional threat. These groups
regard Europe as an important venue for recruitment, logistical
support, financing, and the targeting of U.S. and Western interests.
Additionally, Iran's Qods Force continues to operate in Europe, and the
rising influence and actions of Lebanese Hezbollah in our theater also
operates against U.S. and partner interests.
In addition to designating Special Operations Command Europe
(SOCEUR) as the lead organization for theater counter-terrorism
efforts, and the associated creation of the SOCEUR CT-Core Cell
organization described in the SOCEUR appendix, European Command
continues to work closely with theater-based U.S. Intelligence
Community partners, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations
Command, and U.S. Northern Command to track terrorist threats across
Europe and the Levant which may pose a risk to the security of the
Homeland, forward-stationed or deployed U.S. forces, or our allies and
partners.
In fighting back against theater terrorism and extremism, influence
operations constitute a key element of the command's 21st century
strategy and military activities. In the literate and wired societies
of Europe, these operations provide us with the ability to communicate
and influence key target audiences using traditional print and
broadcast media, as well as increasingly pervasive 21st century tools,
including web sites, social media, and cell phones. Our ongoing
influence program, Operation Assured Voice, is a vital contributor to
the pursuit of our military objectives and theater campaign plan.
Through these increasingly necessary `soft power' activities, we seek
to counter violent extremist messaging and mitigate the potential loss
of influence given reduced force presence in Europe. We must be able to
compete effectively in the information environment, confront violent
extremist ideology and recruitment, and reach out to fence sitters
wherever ideas compete. Success on the front lines of the information
age is critical to preserving stability in our theater and shaping the
information environment should a crisis occur.

Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking
In addition to, and often in collusion with, terrorist and
extremist threats is another source of growing instability inside the
European Command theater: the expanding reach and influence of
transnational organized crime. Transnational organized crime networks
are using increasingly sophisticated business models, operations, and
networks to perpetrate global illicit activities. These networks are
highly adaptable, bold in technique, ruthless in execution, and are
expanding and diversifying their activities at an alarming rate. Some
estimates project their revenue at 8-15 percent of the $70 trillion in
global GDP.\4\ The result is a convergence of well-funded transnational
organized crime networks that can destabilize entire economies,
undermine good governance, and create national security threats to the
United States, our allies, and partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. National Defense University, ``Final Report of the Trans-
Atlantic Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines,'' June 25-26,
2012.
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There is also growing evidence of an evolving relationship among
terrorists, criminals, and financiers, as each group attempts to
exploit the seams that exist in national policies to further this
growing illicit global enterprise. Additionally, the pace and scope of
21st century global commercial activity is increasing smuggling venues
and innovation to facilitate the movement of a wide range of threats
from small arms to threat finance to human trafficking to, in a worst-
case scenario, WMD agents and delivery systems. Continued pressure on
European security budgets, along with Europe's open borders and eased
customs checkpoints, could increase the difficulty in combating these
threats. Yet, as the President's strategy makes clear, we must continue
our collective efforts to understand, disrupt, and dismantle these
growing threat networks. In an increasingly interconnected world, the
threat from transnational organized crime represents a 21st century
national and global security imperative.

Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center
In support of the President's National Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), European Command has stood up the
Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC). It is important
to note that JICTC is a facilitator in support of U.S. Country Teams,
and that JICTC is not a law enforcement organization and does not
conduct law enforcement activities. Created from existing European
Command personnel and infrastructure, JICTC uses existing legal
authorities to support U.S. security cooperation activities conducted
by U.S. Embassy personnel, operating in countries within the European
Command area of responsibility. All of the support and training
provided to any particular European nation is done at the request, and
through the auspices, of the U.S. Country Team in that nation. JICTC's
operations are focused security cooperation activities in the areas of
counter-narcotics and support to law enforcement. JICTC provides a
single point of contact for U.S. Country Teams to provide training to
host-nation partners in these areas. The emphasis on counter-narcotics
is consistent with NATO's priorities, and has been a European Command
mission for many years.

In support of these objectives, JICTC supports U.S. Country Team
and interagency efforts, and collaborates with similar European
organizations, to assist our partner nations build self-sufficient
counter-trafficking skills, competencies, and capacity to defend the
United States and Europe from rising TOC threats. Importantly, JICTC
does not seek a leadership role for combating organized crime; rather
it simply serves as an important forward, theater-based facilitation
platform for U.S. agencies and international partners to synchronize
counter-trafficking efforts in a collaborative, whole-of-government
approach. In a recent example of its contributions and effectiveness
last year, JICTC partnered with Southeastern Europe nations to
implement biometric screenings at border entry ports in order to
rapidly identify potential terrorists and TOC figures. In just the
first day in operation, these enhancements netted two arrests,
including a known terrorist.

Whole-of-Government Approach
Given the likelihood of reduced budgets for years to come, a
`whole-of-government' approach to finding and implementing solutions to
sources of instability and conflict is more important than ever.
Partnering unlocks efficiencies and avoids costly duplication of
effort. European Command's J-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, a
model that is also in use at numerous other U.S. combatant commands,
applies the multiple perspectives of U.S. Government interagency
partners to address complex 21st century problems that transcend
military-only solutions. For 3 years, European Command has diligently
worked to assemble a diverse team of representatives from eleven U.S.
Government agencies, including the Departments of State, Justice,
Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Their
expertise, skills, and direct linkage to their Washington DC-based
headquarters make these team members an invaluable resource in taking a
more probative look at sources of regional instability across our
theater, including terrorism and extremism, and applying the collective
wisdom and intellectual resources of the interagency community to form
more comprehensive long-term solutions.

Public-Private Partnering
`Whole-of-society' solutions are the next evolution to build upon
`whole-of-government' success. European Command continues to support
the Department of Defense initiative to integrate the capabilities and
expertise of the private and non-profit sectors, in coordination with
our interagency partners, to support theater objectives. Our long-term
strategic partnership with the Business Executives for National
Security (BENS) group continues to enhance our partner nations'
abilities to provide for their own security. This year, BENS sent a
delegation of volunteer business executives to the Azores in Portugal
to help identify economic development opportunities in anticipation of
projected force structure reductions at Lajes Airfield. BENS also
teamed with cyber experts to assist the Government of Iceland cope with
a host of cyber security challenges.
In direct support of the transition mission in Afghanistan,
European Command has developed strategic partnerships with the private
sector, non-profit organizations, and U.S. interagency partners to
improve access and economic opportunities for countries along the
Northern Distribution Network. Additionally, we are working with
partner nations in the South Caucasus to develop and improve treatment
capabilities for their wounded warriors who have suffered complex
amputations from combat in Afghanistan. Lastly, these public-private
efforts are focused on assisting partners improve their disaster
preparedness and response capabilities by working with private sector
and non-profit partners to enhance the ability of local commercial
sectors to assist national recovery efforts in vulnerable areas.

Cyberspace
Cyberspace remains largely indifferent to national borders and
traditional security arrangements. Continuous technology evolution and
the relative ease of employing disruptive effects in cyberspace have
elevated its strategic significance in the military arena. Challenges
in attribution and identity management in cyberspace make it difficult
to differentiate between state-sponsored and non-state threat actors,
while employment of non-state proxies in cyberspace allows states to
mask their involvement in malign activity. Traditional deterrence
strategies and defensive concepts still need to be adapted to the
unique character and functions of this increasingly vital operational
domain, without negatively impacting the vital global connectivity,
commerce, and free flow of information that cyberspace provides.
Apart from developing technologically superior defensive
countermeasures and seeking multinational commitment to ensuring
fundamental freedoms, privacy and the free flow of information in
cyberspace, European Command continues to work collaboratively with
regional allies and partners in a whole-of-government effort to build
strong and resilient collective cyber security. These efforts include
assisting our partners develop and sustain information assurance and
cyber defense programs, capable cyber defense workforces (including a
cyber incident response capacity), and promoting shared situational
awareness about existing threats and the best practices to mitigate
them. The command pursues these initiatives through our annual cyber
exercise program, Combined Endeavor, our ongoing coordination with U.S.
Cyber Command, and our participation in the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.

Energy
Reliable access to affordable energy remains a core issue for
countries across the European Command theater, whether they are energy
exporters, importers, or transit states. The reality is that dependence
on Russian natural gas will continue to drive energy security
considerations for many of our European partners. We continue to
support alternatives and monitor changes to the energy status quo in
Europe, including changes in global oil markets, the potential large-
scale development of unconventional gas resources, alternate
hydrocarbon supply lines (such as those from the Caspian Sea region),
and the increased supply of liquefied natural gas.
European Command's J-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate assists
our partners in this area by working with the U.S. Department of Energy
and other U.S. agencies to investigate and expand alternative
opportunities, primarily in support of partner nation military forces
and facilities. Advances in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction,
developments in current and next-generation renewable energy
technologies, and improvements in energy efficiency all combine to
provide European states a significant opportunity to reduce their
energy dependence. The J-9 Directorate continues to work closely with
these nations to explore these issues and identify energy solutions.
Last fall marked a milestone, as European Command's bilateral
engagement and 2011 Memorandum of Understanding with Lithuania's Energy
Security Center assisted in elevating the importance of that Center's
work; one which was recently certified by the North Atlantic Council to
become NATO's fully-accredited Energy Security Center of Excellence.
Closer to home, J-9 continues its work with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to implement the Department's Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan, focused on energy security and efficiency for U.S.
forces, defense installations, and critical infrastructure.

THEATER POSTURE

``For Europe, the U.S. defense strategy reaffirms the lasting
strategic importance of the transatlantic partnership with the
United States. Although it will evolve in light of strategic
guidance and the resulting budget decisions, our military
footprint in Europe will remain larger than in any other region
in the world. That's not only because the peace and prosperity
of Europe is critically important to the United States, but
because Europe remains our security partner of choice for
military operations and diplomacy around the world.''--Former
Secretary Panetta

Force Laydown
The United States will sustain a military presence in Europe that
meets our NATO Article 5 commitment, enables execution of our likely
European Command contingency plans, continues to support America's
leadership position in NATO, ensures a credible deterrent against
aggression, and is sufficiently robust to maintain and sustain the
strategic access, infrastructure, and lines of communication that
enable the United States to conduct global operations. Global access
through Europe remains a critical aspect of America's ability to
execute our existing contingency plans in and beyond Europe. This
strategic access is dependent upon continued success in sustaining the
long-term relationships we enjoy with our European allies and partners,
who remain our hosts. We recognize the challenges of the fiscal
environment and, in accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance,
continue to consolidate our installations and seek additional
efficiencies in U.S. overseas posture while maintaining the necessary
capacity to meet our mission requirements. We will continue to advocate
for a deliberate and balanced approach to posture in Europe to ensure
that future changes meet minimum requirements to conduct U.S.
contingency operations, support U.S. global strategic access, and meet
our NATO commitments.
U.S. posture in Europe provides unparalleled proximity and access
to three continents (Europe, Asia, Africa), stands ready to support
U.S. and NATO operations on extremely short notice, and is critical to
U.S. planning, logistics, and operations in support of U.S. European
Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.
Forward-stationed active duty servicemembers, forward-deployed
rotational units, and Reserve Forces remain the Nation's primary tool
to maintain influence across our theater and, when called upon, to
project power quickly within and beyond it. U.S. posture in Europe is
an incontestable manifestation of our commitment to the region,
preserving strategic relationships and trust, helping build
interoperability with our allies and partners, and facilitating
progressive transformation within European militaries. The U.S.
approach throughout the recent defense strategy review was guided by
our enduring need for, and commitment to, these objectives.
There are approximately 64,000 military personnel authorized for
the support of U.S. European Command and our Service component
commands. Additionally, there are approximately 10,000 additional U.S.
personnel supporting U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Command,
NATO, and other U.S. Government and Department of Defense activities in
Europe. Moving forward into the future, European Command's mission
focus for our enduring forces is as follows:

Ground Forces: U.S. Army Europe will retain a
deployable Contingency Command Post, two Brigade Combat Teams
(BCT), and theater enabling forces to include aviation, signal
corps, medical, engineers, air and missile defense, logistics
units, and the Joint Multinational Training Command. From a
pool of globally available forces, the U.S. Army will also
allocate a BCT, with rotational assignments described
previously, to be part of the NATO Response Force (NRF)
beginning this year.
Air Forces: U.S. Air Forces Europe will retain the
capability to conduct air superiority, theater nuclear support,
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and strike missions.
In addition, the Air Force will maintain its current capability
in terms of operational and tactical-level command and control,
theater airlift, air refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, special operations forces, and base operations
support.
Naval and Marine Forces: U.S. Naval Forces Europe will
retain the USS MOUNT WHITNEY and provide command and control of
rotational naval forces. Additionally, the U.S. Navy will begin
to base four Aegis destroyers at Naval Station Rota beginning
in fiscal year 2014. U.S. Marine Corps presence includes the
U.S. Marine Forces Europe Headquarters, the USMC Prepositioning
Program in Norway, and rotational forces, including those
assigned to the Black Sea Rotational Force.
Special Operations Forces: Special Operations Command
Europe will retain a headquarters element, along with an Army
Special Forces Battalion, an Air Force Special Operations
Group, and a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) unit.

Strategic Rebalance
In accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. European
Command continues to rebalance its force levels and base footprint in
order to help the Department of Defense divest itself of legacy forces,
reapportion forces toward regions of greater instability, and save
money. Several recent inactivation decisions will make significant
changes to our posture. The most notable change is the inactivation of
the U.S. Army's V Corps Headquarters (2013), 170th Brigade Combat Team
(2012), and 172nd Brigade Combat Team (2013). Additionally, as the U.S.
Army reduces force structure in the coming years, there will be an
additional reduction of approximately 2,500 enabling forces and their
equipment. Lastly, the Air Force de-activated an air support operations
squadron (2012), and plans to inactive an A-10 squadron and an air
control squadron.
Consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance and the new NATO
Strategic Concept, we will also continue to adapt and develop our
theater requirements by: (1) reinvigorating our contribution to the
NATO Response Force, allocating elements of a rotational BCT to train
in a multi-national European environment and leveraging the premier
U.S. Army training facilities located at the Joint Multinational
Training Center in Germany; (2) meeting the objectives of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach by supporting the AN/ TPY-2 radar in Turkey,
home-porting four Aegis BMD-capable ships in Spain, and establishing
land-based Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland; (3) enhancing
regional SOF responsiveness by stationing CV-22 aircraft in the United
Kingdom, and continuing our strong partnership with the NATO SOF
Headquarters in Belgium; and (4) continuing C-130 and F-16 aircraft
rotation to the newly established aviation detachment in Poland to
enhance Eastern European aviation training and interoperability.

Military Construction
Thanks to strong and continued congressional support, previous
annual military construction authorizations and appropriations have
enabled us to address a balanced mix of our most pressing requirements
to support the missions and priorities articulated above. The goal of
our fiscal year 2014 military construction program is to support our
posture initiatives, recapitalize key infrastructure, and consolidate
at enduring locations. Of particular importance in the coming year is
support for our EPAA missile defense projects and the Landstuhl
Regional Medical Center/Rhine Ordnance Barracks theater medical
consolidation and recapitalization project.
Congressional support for EPAA Phase One projects, including
approval to replace expeditionary facilities in Turkey with semi-
permanent facilities, was critical to achieving a high degree of
readiness at the AN/TPY-2 radar site. In fiscal year 2013, the command
will begin EPAA Phase Two projects, including an Aegis Ashore site in
Romania. Additionally, a request for an EPAA Phase Three Aegis Ashore
site in Poland is being developed in fiscal year 2015 as part of the
budget submission and will provide the U.S. and our allies improved
deterrence against rogue BMD activity.
The Landstuhl/Rhine Ordnance Barracks Medical Center replacement
project remains one of the command's highest military constructions
priorities. Fiscal year 2012 and 2013 funding support have greatly
facilitated the project's progress to date. The new facility
consolidates duplicative medical facilities in the Kaiserslautern
Military Community, and provides a vitally important replacement to
theater-based combat and contingency operation medical support from the
aged and failing infrastructure at the Landstuhl Regional Medical
Center. This recapitalization project will provide lifesaving
intervention, combat trauma, emergency care, and other medical support
to warfighters operating in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central
Command, and U.S. Africa Command theaters, as well as forward-stationed
U.S. forces in Europe and their families. Continued support and
progress with this critical project will ensure the continued
availability of the highest level trauma care to future U.S.
warfighters at this medically significant halfway point between the
United States and areas of persistent conflict in the Middle East,
Africa, and other regions across half the globe.

European Command continues to carefully assess our investments at
enduring locations. We have reduced our footprint dramatically over the
past 22 years, consolidating all operations to approximately 21 main
operating bases, with smaller supporting sites. As mentioned earlier,
this represents a 75 percent reduction in installation inventory since
the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the command is on a trajectory
to reduce our footprint further, to 17 main operating bases with the
closure of the U.S. Army communities at Heidelberg, Mannheim,
Darmstadt, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg. While further theater
consolidation at enduring locations remains a command priority, it is
important to note that continued reductions and consolidations to gain
greater efficiencies may require additional military construction.

OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE

``We will keep faith with our troops, military families, and
veterans who have borne the burden of a decade of war and who
make our military the best in the world. Though we must make
hard fiscal choices, we will continue to prioritize efforts
that focus on wounded warriors, mental health, and families. As
our newest veterans rejoin civilian life, we continue to have a
moral obligation--as a government and as a nation--to give our
veterans the care, benefits, and the job opportunities they
deserve.''--President Obama

Taking Care of our People and their Families
As the Department of Defense continues to deal with the effects of
more than a decade at war, we have a solemn obligation and
responsibility to continue successful programs and seek new and
innovative ways to support our forces and families. In that effort,
European Command's `Force and Family Readiness' priorities are closely
aligned with the administration's `Strengthening Our Military Families'
initiative.
While maintaining our focus on mission readiness, we continue to
seek avenues and resources to respond to the significant stress placed
on our forces and families due to protracted combat operations and
cyclical unit and personnel deployments. There remains a need for
sustained behavioral health services to support our warriors and their
families, particularly in an overseas environment with few private
sector options. It remains a command priority that the members of our
All-Volunteer Force and their families continue receiving the quality
care and responsive support they need in a stigma-free environment.
European Command also supports the efforts being led by the
Department of Defense Education Activity to transform and modernize our
1950s-era, aged and, in some cases, failing overseas school
infrastructure. European Command is fortunate to have some of the best
and most committed teachers at work in our theater. We are committed to
providing the resources these educators need to ensure the children of
our military and DOD civilian families receive a first-rate education.
Lastly, as total force levels continue to change, servicemembers
must transfer more often than originally expected, placing yet another
burden on the military family. The inability of the military spouse to
remain in his or her chosen career field is a part of that burden,
adding further economic strain in difficult times. Of the 26,000 Active
Duty and Reserve spouses who live in our theater, 25 percent possess a
college degree and 10 percent hold graduate degrees. Accordingly, in
order to support greater spouse employment, European Command launched
our first-ever `Spouses Virtual Job Fair' last year. Part of the wider
`Military Spouse Employment Partnership' program, this initiative
provided key assistance by linking military spouses with employers
seeking a highly qualified 21st century workforce.

NATO AND ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS (ACO)

NATO's Strategic Direction
The NATO Alliance remains the center of a transatlantic framework
focused on the strategic concept of `Active Engagement, Modern
Defense.' The core principles of collective defense, crisis management,
and cooperative security contribute to the peace and safeguarding of
the United States and our European allies and partners. The alliance
has evolved from a Cold War construct, consisting of a few nations, to
twenty-eight member nations today with a shared vision and growing
interoperability to provide expeditionary capabilities for out-of-area
operations. To safeguard the alliance against the evolving challenges
of 21st century security, including ballistic missile defense, cyber
attack, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism,
NATO is evolving through institutional reform, programs and
initiatives, and increased interoperability and partnerships.

NATO Command Structure Reform
The Lisbon Summit set the glide path for a new NATO command
structure that is leaner, more affordable, and more effective at
conducting operational and transformational tasks across the full range
of alliance missions. NATO Command Structure reform is on track to
reduce its staff manpower from 13,000 to 8,800 and cut major
headquarters from 11 to 6. Organized under two Strategic Commands
(Operations and Transformation), it will include two deployable joint
force headquarters (JFHQs), land, air, and maritime components, and the
NATO communications and information systems group. The NATO command
structure links the alliance's over 3 million active military
personnel, 24,000 aircraft, 750 ships, and 50 AWACS to operate stronger
together in the 21st century.
NATO Forces 2020. NATO's vision for future capability improvement
was unveiled at the Chicago Summit as a framework to build the concepts
of `Smart Defense' and the `Connected Forces' initiative. NATO's Smart
Defense initiative provides the path to develop the capabilities; the
Connected Forces initiative is how NATO will employ these capabilities.

Smart Defense
The Smart Defense initiative is a means to provide access to
crucial capabilities while collectively taking multinational and
innovative approaches to pooling resources. As mentioned, this
initiative creates opportunity for the alliance to work together,
wisely using individual defense budgets to make NATO greater than the
sum of its parts. In critical areas--such as sustainment, training,
engagement, ballistic missile defense, force protection, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance--Smart Defense gives
nations the ability to contribute to projects and acquire capabilities
that they may otherwise be unable to afford individually. To date, the
Europeans participate in every one of the 147 Smart Defense projects.
More importantly for the transatlantic partnership, they lead over two-
thirds of them. Smart Defense aims to assure continued capability
development commensurate with global security challenges in order to
meet NATO's Strategic Concept, even in the prevailing resource-
constrained global economy.

``We will ensure that our Alliance has the modern, deployable,
and connected forces that we need for the next decade and
beyond. We will do this through a renewed culture of
cooperation called `Smart Defense' . . . We call it `Smart
Defense' because it is about spending defense money in a
smarter way. The smarter way is to prioritize, to specialize,
to cooperate, to focus on not just what we cut, but on what we
keep. And to choose multi-national solutions instead of
unilateral solutions.''--NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen

Connected Forces Initiative
The Connected Forces initiative presents an opportunity to
contribute to the `NATO Forces 2020' vision and goal, by building on
alliance experience in recent operations, and maintaining and enhancing
NATO's combat effectiveness--hard earned over the past decade--through
expanded education and training events, increased exercises, and the
better use of technology.

Major Operations
Over the past year, NATO and Allied Command Operations have
executed multiple major operations, demonstrating the alliance's
impressive capabilities. Today, roughly 150,000 military personnel are
engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing
complex ground, air, and naval operations in every type of environment.
Every day, NATO forces are operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the
Mediterranean, with the African Union, in the skies over the Baltic and
North Seas, and in the waters off the Horn of Africa.

Afghanistan
NATO's operation in Afghanistan continues to remain the top
priority and operational commitment of the alliance and our partner
nations comprising ISAF. There are 106,000 troops from 50 troop-
contributing nations sharing the combined burdens and sacrifices of the
Afghanistan mission as we press forward with a balanced drawdown of
combat forces and provide sustainment post-2014. The sacrifices shared
by ISAF and our Afghan partners will ensure that Afghanistan will never
again become a safe-haven for terrorists. Since NATO's intervention,
the lives of Afghan men, women, and children have significantly
improved with respect to security, health care, education, and
opportunity. Today, over 80 percent of Afghans have access to health
care. Since 2002, school enrollment for children has increased from 2
million to 8 million with girls representing 38 percent of this
enrollment, up from a dismal low of 3 percent under the Taliban.
Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have decreased by over 34
percent since 2002, and adult life expectancy has gone from 42 to 62
years of age. NATO's goal remains to turn over full responsibility for
security to Afghanistan by December 31, 2014.
The strategy outlined at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, assured at the May
2012 Chicago Summit, and reinforced at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference
is on track to build the capacity, capability, and professionalism of
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Today, ANSF stand at a
force level of 335,000: 182,000 from the Afghan National Army; 6,000
from the Afghan Air Force; and 147,000 from the Afghan National Police.
In October 2012, ANSF reached their recruiting goal of 352,000. The
transition--which started in 2011, and is being sequentially expanded
through five tranches of selected districts and cities to encompass all
of Afghanistan by mid-2013--is underway in some part of all 34
provinces, all provincial capitals, and two-thirds of all districts.
The ANSF have assumed lead responsibility for areas that encompass 76
percent of the Afghan population, and conditions in these areas have
remained stable or improved. In fact, civilian casualties have fallen
for the first time in 6 years, down 12 percent, and ISAF casualties are
down 27 percent compared to last year. Last December, the `Tranche 4'
announcement transitioned security responsibility for the remaining
internal and border areas. Once the full transition is complete by the
end of 2014, the ISAF mission will end.
In support of post-2014 operations in Afghanistan, NATO will launch
the NATO Train, Advise, and Assist Mission, tentatively named `Resolute
Support' in Afghanistan. In October 2012, NATO Defense Ministers
approved the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Initiating Directive for
developing the concept of operations for the Resolute Support Mission
in Afghanistan. It is due this spring. This demonstrated resolve
ensures the gains made during the transition are irreversible.
Tangible signs of the gains in Afghanistan continue to be shown. In
findings recorded by the Asia Foundation in their 2012 Survey of the
Afghan People, 52 percent of Afghans polled conveyed their belief that
the country is ``headed in the right direction,'' up from 46 percent
last year.\5\ It is worth noting that this statistic is higher than the
percentage found in most Western countries. Moreover, the survey noted
a moderate decrease in the percentage of Afghans who fear for their
safety, while reflecting Afghans' continued confidence in the Afghan
National Army and National Police as the country's most trusted public
institutions. NATO will not leave a security vacuum in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Asia Foundation, ``Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the
Afghan People,'' http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1155.
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Kosovo
The international supervision of Kosovo has ended 4\1/2\ years
after it became independent. The situation remains outwardly calm, but
there remain underlying tensions and fragility while Serbia and Kosovo
proceed within the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue to resolve
their differences peacefully. To ensure this outcome, the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission maintains 5,600 troops from 30 contributing
countries in Kosovo. KFOR will be staying there for the time being,
along with the 1,250 international legal experts and police supporting
the EU's rule of law mission. While progress will require committed
political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, KFOR continues to
create positive conditions for this dialogue by helping to maintain a
safe and secure environment and facilitate freedom of movement.

Counter-Piracy and Operation Ocean Shield
Operation Ocean Shield is NATO's counter-piracy mission, consisting
of up to seven ships working alongside EU and U.S. task forces to
counter piracy in waters surrounding the Horn of Africa. These
relationships and the shipping companies' use of armed security teams
and industry best practices have notably reduced piracy. During the
first 6 months of 2012, there were 69 incidents involving Somali
pirates, down from 163 during the same period in 2011, a reduction of
over 40 percent. Today, 2 vessels and less than 100 hostages are being
held, compared with 30 ships and 682 mariners in 2011.

Operation Active Endeavor
As NATO's only current Article 5-based operation, Operation Active
Endeavor provides maritime situational awareness through operations in
the Mediterranean to demonstrate NATO's resolve to deter, defend,
disrupt, and protect against terrorism. Ongoing since 2001, Active
Endeavor is on a path to transform from a platform-based to a network-
based operation, based on an intelligence and information-sharing
network among the 63 nations and regional partners that contribute to
the Maritime Safety and Security Information System.

NATO Members Defense Commitments and Budgeting Outlook
The European financial crisis has had a security impact on NATO and
partner nations. Few allies currently meet the NATO goal that each ally
commits 2 percent of GDP to defense spending. The Smart Defense
Initiative, Connected Forces Initiative, and NATO Forces 2020 all
strive to fill capacity and capability gaps. However, at a time of
uncertain security challenges and severe fiscal austerity it remains
difficult, but still critical, to adequately fund defense spending.

Enduring 21st Century Impact & Relevance
The 2012 U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance addresses Europe and NATO
prominently, noting: ``Europe is home to some of America's most
stalwart allies and partners, many of whom have sacrificed alongside
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.'' One of NATO's most
important priorities is to maintain working relationships, at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels, with those allies who have
recently developed capabilities and interoperability with each other
and with U.S. Forces. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a key way to
meet this priority.

``Today, I can announce that the United States will make a new
commitment to the security of our NATO partners by
reinvigorating our contribution to the NATO Response Force that
we value so much. The NRF was designed to be an agile, rapidly
deployable, multinational force that can respond to crises when
and where necessary. The United States had endorsed the NRF but
has not made a tangible contribution due to the demands of the
wars--until now.''--Former Secretary Panetta, Munich Security
Conference, February 2012

As announced by the Secretary of Defense last year, our commitment
of U.S. forces to the NRF is a means to reinvigorating and bolstering
the NRF. By providing a rapid demonstration of force or an early
establishment of NATO military presence in support of Article V or
crisis response operations, NRF mitigates force structure reductions in
Europe by improving interoperability and capitalizing on flexibility.
Over the long term, NRF will be a vital asset for post-ISAF
interoperability ensuring adherence to, and constant improvement of,
Standing NATO Agreements (STANAGS). The NRF will also serve as both a
key training resource and valuable tool for evaluating the status of
European forces. As they remain our most likely companions in any
security effort--from humanitarian assistance to full-spectrum
conflict--the United States must have confidence in the
interoperability and readiness of European forces.

Ballistic Missile Defense
The protection of NATO European territory, populations, and forces
against ballistic missiles from increasing threats to the alliance is
vitally important. NATO declared an Interim Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) capability at the May 2012 Chicago Summit. As mentioned, the U.S.
AN/TPY-2 surveillance radar based in Turkey has been declared to NATO
as a part of EPAA's Phase One implementation. The initial operational
capability of NATO BMD is anticipated in 2016, with full operational
capability in 2020.

Moreover, NATO's recent decision to provide Patriot missiles to
defend Turkey against the threat of Syrian ballistic missiles is yet
another sign of the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness in this
area.

Cyber Defense
NATO's policy on cyber defense focuses on the protection of cyber
assets and sharing of cyber situational awareness among NATO nations.
The fielding of the NATO Computer Incident Response Center was a
significant milestone as we progress towards full operational
capability in 2013 to support alliance operations and missions.

NATO Special Operations Forces
U.S. leadership of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ)
remains instrumental in driving the rapid transformation of NATO
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and creating a NATO allied and partner
SOF collaborative network. A deployable core of the NATO Special
Operations Component Command Headquarters will achieve initial
operational capability in 2013, providing an assured, responsive, and
agile command and control entity for NATO SOF under the operational
command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This core will be
capable of coordinating NATO military operations within the complex and
asymmetric environments of the 21st century. Today, over 2,000 NATO
allied and partner SOF are conducting SOF missions in Afghanistan.
Additionally, NSHQ is moving forward with several initiatives to
develop interoperable SOF standards. NATO SOF brings unprecedented
opportunities to leverage partnerships, improve interoperability, and
deliver expanded capabilities for NATO to ensure peace and stability
for the alliance and our partner nations.

Keeping the Edge through Exercises
The planned reduction of NATO forces supporting ISAF, combined with
U.S. reinvigoration in the NRF, provides a unique opportunity for NATO
to modify and align exercise programs with U.S. combatant commands and
regional partners. After 10 years of combat deployments against an
asymmetric enemy, NATO will need to dedicate itself to flexible
training that emphasizes traditional skill sets, while incorporating
lessons learned from recent conflicts. Additionally, these exercises
provide the opportunity for newer members of the alliance, as well as
our other NATO partners, to pair with some of the highly-capable
founding members, continuing to burden-share collective defense while
raising the overall quality of NATO forces.

``The NATO Alliance continues to wield unprecedented influence
in our world, and remains a critical element of U.S. and
European security.''--Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Senate
Armed Services Committee

CONCLUSION

Every day, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen,
and civilians of U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command
Operations are making vital contributions to the forward defense of the
United States, the preservation of America's vital national security
interests, and the continued evolution and effectiveness of NATO. As
they continue their work, through the seamless execution of combined
military operations, interagency cooperation, and whole of society
activities, I ask that you keep faith with these extraordinary men and
women, and their families, to ensure they receive the care and benefits
they have earned and so rightly deserve.
I entered Annapolis and joined the Navy over 40 years ago. Among
the many things I have learned, one of the clearest lessons is that the
most reliable constant in this world is change. But in today's world of
accelerating change, connectivity, and complexity, another anchor has
also held remarkably constant, recognized by national leaders time and
again, for providing the essential foundation of continued security and
stability in the 21st century. That anchor is the transatlantic
alliance. It is simply a fact, one bridging two centuries and
continuing to evolve in a dynamic security environment, that Europeans
remain our most steadfast, reliable, battle-tested, and important
global partners as we confront the strategic risks and military
challenges of the 21st century. No other region so readily combines the
same commitment to shared values, high-end military capabilities and
capacity, and willingness to stand with America--as our European allies
and partners have demonstrated at great cost and sacrifice over the
past decade--in this century's fight for freedom and the pursuit of
global security and stability. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
states it clearly: ``Europe is our principal partner in seeking global
and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.''
The world is changing again. Yet, as we consider the contributions
and future of the transatlantic alliance, the numbers are worth
repeating, especially in an era of significant fiscal pressure and
austerity: Together, the United States and Europe generate half the
globe's GDP. Our European partners collectively spend $300 billion on
defense, second only to the United States and well ahead of China and
Russia. As essential contributors to an alliance comprised of 750
ships, 24,000 aircraft, and over 3 million Active-Duty Forces, and with
over 40,000 European forces currently devoted to NATO and U.N.
operations, our European allies and partners are significant and
necessary global security providers, fielding forces for combat and
stability operations that have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S.
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Kosovo, and other hot spots across the
world. Europeans have willingly shared the burden of war over the past
10 years, consistently comprising the bulk of non-U.S. coalition forces
for the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya.
Even as we acknowledge these facts, the convergence of several
factors last year--the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, rising tensions
in the Levant, North Africa, and the Balkans, and the global tightening
of defense resources--has provided an opportunity for European Command
to reconsider and rebalance our present priorities and enduring
capabilities to ensure that we are providing the most efficient and
effective support to the Nation and to NATO. This effort offered
several conclusions. First, European Command is actively contributing
to every one of the Defense Department's ten national missions for
Joint Force 2020, protecting America's vital national security
interests, and defending the Nation against the threats of the 21st
century: ballistic missiles; WMD proliferation; terrorism; piracy;
cyber attack; and transnational illicit trafficking. Second, U.S.
presence and infrastructure in Europe, which continues to be right-
sized for these enduring missions and the future security environment,
provide the United States with an indispensable strategic platform for
engagement across the globe, directly supporting the operations of 6
U.S. combatant commanders, numerous U.S. Government Interagency
functions, and 51 U.S. Country Teams. Third, U.S. leadership and
commitment to the NATO Alliance continues to support the evolution of
that institution into the world's premier security organization,
contributing highly capable and interoperable forces to Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, and Kosovo, and preparing them for future coalition
expeditionary operations. As such, the alliance has also become a hub
for continued cooperation and outreach with like-minded partners in the
Pacific, including Australia, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, and
Japan, essential in the years ahead. In this capacity, the
transatlantic partnership--one the President calls the ``cornerstone of
global security''--remains one of the Nation's most valuable and
enduring strategic investments. Properly sustained, it will continue
providing critical security dividends in the challenging decades ahead.
To safeguard that investment, European Command continues to
leverage the funding and authorities that Congress has provided to
preserve our strategic partnerships and maintain the essential
warfighting capabilities and interoperability that our allies and
partners have gained, with our help, over a decade of sustained
deployment and combat operations. In the near term, European Command is
working to enable a successful ISAF transition and preserve partner
capability and commitment to the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. To
that end, we request that Congress continue supporting Section 1206
(Global Train and Equip) and other ISAF coalition support programs, in
order to meet our goals to transition security responsibility in
Afghanistan over the coming year and, in concert with our allies and
partners, to continue training, advising, and assisting the ANSF after
they assume full security responsibility in 2014.
Over the longer term, we seek your assistance and support to
sustain the value of the transatlantic alliance and its continued
contributions to global security. The key to that future is ensuring
our European allies and partners can and will continue contributing
deployable, capable, and interoperable forces for future conflicts and
coalition military operations. Despite the economic constraints we all
face, this future is within reach if we sustain the necessary
investments to maintain critical gains in expeditionary capabilities
and interoperability that have been achieved in recent years, and
preserve the vital strategic relationships that have been painstakingly
built over the past 6 decades. The preservation and future employment
of these capabilities represent the impending return on our investment
when crises arrive on our doorstep at their unscheduled hour, seeking
urgent, multilateral, and coalition-based solutions.
Mitigating the risks posed by the fiscal environment to U.S.
influence in the region and NATO's enduring strength and cohesion also
requires a clear and unequivocal U.S. commitment to our theater and
Article V responsibilities. Those responsibilities require that we
maintain a balanced and enduring U.S. presence in Europe; reinvigorate
U.S. participation in the NATO Response Force; continue resourcing
important security assistance programs such as Foreign Military
Financing, International Military Education and Training, the Warsaw
Initiative Fund, and the Combatant Commanders' Exercise and Engagement
Fund; and support NATO's Smart Defense, Connected Forces, NATO 2020,
and related initiatives.
History may not repeat itself, but its patterns are clear. After a
decade of war, and facing significant fiscal challenges, we stand once
again at the crossroads: on one side, the military retrenchment and
risk that has traditionally accompanied the end of every period of
American war; on the other, a belt-tightening but balanced approach
that sustains U.S. leadership and engagement in the world, with a focus
on continued global security and prosperity. Each choice entails risks,
and the future is hard to see. But one thing history has also shown us,
time and again, is the enduring value of this remarkable transatlantic
alliance.
Though the strategic and fiscal challenges are very real on both
sides of the Atlantic, this historical moment offers us a critical
opportunity, one acknowledged by former Secretary Panetta: ``I believe
that today's strategic and fiscal realities offer NATO the opportunity
to build the alliance we need for the 21st century--an alliance that
serves as the core of an expanding network of partnerships around the
globe in support of common security objectives. But it is an alliance
that remains rooted in the strong bonds of transatlantic security
cooperation and collective defense.''
The men and women of U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command
Operations are building, strengthening, and preserving those vital
bonds to provide for the forward defense of the United States, our
collective security, and the viability of this critical partnership.
This is critical work, as the transatlantic partnership continues to
serve as the security foundation for the world's economic center of
gravity, America's secure Eastern flank, and the ``vital cornerstone of
global security and stability'' to deal with the challenges of a
rapidly changing century and security environment. Through this work,
European Command and NATO form that vital ``core'' of an ``expanding
network of partnerships''--through joint and coalition forces, civil-
military security partnerships, and international security structures--
that provide us with what I call the ``sum of all security.''
In his remarks at last year's NATO summit in Chicago, President
Obama reiterated and reinforced the importance of this security and an
enduring truth of the global security environment; one that bridges the
past and current centuries in order to guide us into the future. In
that statement, the President acknowledged: ``NATO has been the bedrock
of common security, freedom and prosperity for nearly 65 years. It
hasn't just endured--it has thrived--because our Nations are stronger
when we stand together.''
For nearly 4 years now, the motto of U.S. European Command has been
that we are, clearly and unequivocally, `Stronger Together.' For nearly
65 years, this has been NATO's historic organizing principle. It is
even truer today in light of the economic challenges and increasing
threats we face. We must continue to work together, trust each other,
and continue building and evolving this historic partnership to meet
the needs and challenges of the 21st century. In doing this, we will
not only endure; we will prevail, we will thrive, and we will continue
to grow and to be STRONGER TOGETHER.

``Our transatlantic partnership is the most successful
alliance and the greatest catalyst for global action. I am
determined to keep it that way.''--President Obama

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral Stavridis.
General Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND

General Jacoby. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe,
distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. It is a pleasure to be
here with my friends and fellow combatant commanders, Admiral
Jim Stavridis and General John Kelly. I'm not as big an Army
guy as John is a Marine, but we're here to protect you, Jim.
On behalf of the men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD, I
appreciate this committee's continuing support of our important
missions. In the case of NORTHCOM, our missions include
Homeland defense and that's my number one priority mission.
It's a mission in which we work very closely with Canada in our
integrated NORAD binational command.
Next, we remain active in conducting our core mission of
defense support of civil authorities, for which the highlight
last year was our participation in the interagency response to
Hurricane Sandy.
Finally, alongside cooperative defense activities with our
ally Canada, we continue to conduct security cooperation
efforts with our close partners in Mexico and The Bahamas.
Our NORAD missions specifically include aerospace warning
and control and maritime warning for the United States and
Canada. Our commands' motto is ``We Have the Watch!'' This
reflects the vigilance with which we approach our duties and
commitment to both the American and Canadian people. We execute
our NORAD missions principally through our well-honed and
uncompromising 24/7 defense of our skies, and that's Operation
Noble Eagle.
Our citizens have high expectations of our ability to
defend and support them here in the Homeland, and rightfully
so. In the event of a natural or manmade disaster, NORTHCOM
meets those expectations by leveraging the tremendous
capabilities and capacities of DOD to support a lead agency
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Hurricane Sandy offered us glimpse of what a complex
catastrophe which spans several States and regions could look
like. We'll continue to mature the successful dual-Status
Command construct, provided in the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) so that we will be ready to act
swiftly and with unity of effort when the unthinkable happens
and we are called.
We are facing an increasingly complex and dynamic security
environment. Threats are adapting and evolving. Technologies
advance and proliferate, creating greater vulnerability in the
homeland than ever before and complicating the accomplishment
of our mission sets, from cyber and ballistic missile defense
to the disruption and defeat of transnational criminal
organizations (TCO).
As such, critical command priority is to advocate and
develop capabilities in our core mission areas in order to
outpace these threats. Yet, while we are confronted with this
emerging threat landscape, the current fiscal environment adds
uncertainty to the availability and development of the
capabilities we will need to manage the risks these threats
will pose.
Readiness concerns are sure to grow, as clearly described
by recent Service Chief testimony. My most pressing of those
will include unforecasted cuts to training and exercise
programs, which are fundamental to building partnerships
essential for responding to events in the Homeland. Unexpected
loss of service capabilities and readiness could also, in the
future, erode our ability to conduct our critical Homeland
defense missions.
As we look forward, despite these challenges, our current
layered partnerships and history of training, education,
exercise programs, for now leave NORTHCOM and NORAD postured to
defend the Nation against a full spectrum of threats. But we
will have to work hard with the Services to sustain that
posture as we deal with program and budget uncertainty.
Today and in the future, we will remain committed to deter,
prevent, and defeat aggression aimed at the United States and
Canada as two commands oriented on a single vision: that, with
our trusted partners we will defend North America, outpace and
mitigate threats, maintain faith with our people, and support
them in their times of greatest need.
We will need this committee's continued support to meet
that vision.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Jacoby follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture of
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). As the combatant commander charged with defense of our
Homeland, it is a distinct privilege to represent the more than 2,000
men and women of the Commands who stand the watch around the clock on
behalf of our Nation. Strengthened by robust partnerships with
hemispheric neighbors and interagency communities, my commands execute
three primary missions: homeland defense, defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation.
NORTHCOM was established October 1, 2002 to provide command and
control of Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and to
command the Federal military response to requests for DSCA. The
imperative to protect and secure the homeland against all hazards is
even more important today. Over the last year, Hurricanes Isaac and
Sandy, record wildfires, severe drought, and violent tornado activity
tested the Nation. The continued opening of the Arctic precipitated
significant growth in human activity, potentially posing new domestic,
foreign consequence management, and homeland defense challenges and
opportunities. In addition to these natural events, internal and
external manmade threats continue to proliferate. Cognizant of these
challenges, we remain positioned to support our mission partners in
their response efforts to restore normalcy following any disaster,
while continually honing our capabilities to outpace and adapt to
shared security threats to the United States and Canada in accordance
with the NORAD agreement. Leveraging the vitally important Combatant
Commander Exercise and Engagement Program, we prepare for our missions
through training, education, and exercises, and take every opportunity
to learn from these events. With each real-world crisis, we apply a
candid, rigorous lessons learned process to replicate successes,
correct deficiencies, and ultimately strengthen our partnerships.
Defending the Nation requires a reliance on partners in three
distinct geographic locations: globally, in the approaches to the
Homeland, and within the Homeland. On the outer layer of this defense
in depth, my global partners include the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of
State, and associated functional and geographic combatant commands, to
name a few. In the approaches to the homeland are our partners in
Mexico, The Bahamas, and Canada. Within our homeland, my Federal
partners include the Military Departments and Services, National Guard
Bureau (NGB), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (specifically,
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
Transportation Security Administration, and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP)), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Finally and perhaps most critically, are my
subordinate headquarters strategically placed at key intersections
between the approaches and the homeland: Joint Task Force North (JTF-
North) on the Southwest border, Joint Task Force National Capital
Region, Joint Task Force Civil Support on the eastern seaboard, and
Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-Alaska) in America's high north.
Partnerships are equally important in my DSCA responsibilities. I
live daily with the knowledge that any moment can bring news of natural
and manmade disasters. To meet the deservedly high expectations of our
citizens, we work in support of primary agencies responding to natural
disasters as part of a team of Federal, state, and local entities.
Disaster response is largely a function of preparedness. As such, our
training and exercise program, collaboration, and communications with
our partners form the foundation of our ability to execute in times of
crisis. The trusted partnerships we have built with some 50 Federal
agencies are evident in the presence of more than 60 liaison officers
in our headquarters with whom we work side-by-side.
These well-established partnerships achieve two principal effects.
In pre-crisis, they enable safety and security activities that mitigate
the effects of natural disasters and deter threat activities. Upon
transition to crisis, unity of effort and the power of interagency
teamwork are a function of our robust, realistic, and comprehensive
training and exercise programs.
Today, our partners are pressured by budget constraints that can
erode the defense and security of the homeland unless we judiciously
build, balance, and protect homeland defense capabilities. We remain
mindful of our Nation's budgetary challenges and understand that fiscal
responsibility is itself a matter of national security. The nation
realizes meaningful security dividends through interagency partnering
and cooperative engagement with our Canadian, Mexican, and Bahamian
neighbors. As we confront shared challenges such as transnational
criminal organizations, terror and weapons proliferation, and other
threat networks, prudent investments made possible by Congress equate
to a significant down payment on our national security objectives. With
a relatively modest geographic combatant command budget, NORTHCOM and
NORAD carry out our country's foremost and uniquely solemn duties to
protect our citizens and support them in their times of greatest need.
We are working smarter in an era of significant budget constraints,
knowing threats to the homeland will likely not diminish. Keeping faith
with our fellow Americans is our greatest moral imperative,
understanding that the physical and moral consequences of a successful
attack in the homeland far outweigh those of a similar attack overseas.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Homeland defense is perhaps the best example of how we defend in
depth through our partners. Our Missile Defense, Aerospace Warning and
Control, Maritime Warning, Cyber Security, Infrastructure Resiliency,
and Antiterrorism/Force Protection mission sets require close
cooperation and communication with partners globally, in the
approaches, and in the Homeland.

Missile Defense
North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 launch in December 2012, followed by its
announcement of a third nuclear test in February 2013, are sobering
reminders that our Nation must remain vigilant against nation-states
that can threaten the homeland directly. North Korea continues to seek
international recognition as a nuclear-armed state and has unveiled a
road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with claims it
can strike targets in our homeland. Although Iran does not yet possess
a nuclear weapon, it is developing advanced missile capabilities faster
than previously assessed and is apparently positioning itself to
produce a nuclear warhead quickly should its leaders choose to do so.
I am confident in our ability to employ the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system to engage the current ballistic threats against
the United States. The fielded system was developed using a spiral
acquisition approach designed to counter a limited, unsophisticated
ballistic missile threat from a rogue nation. In light of the
challenging threats that loom on the horizon, Admiral Locklear
(Commander, U.S. Pacific Command), General Kehler (Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command), Vice Admiral Syring (Director, Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)), and I are working as a team with the intelligence
community to improve our capability to warn against and mitigate
emerging threats. We remain committed to improving current Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities to ensure we maintain our strategic
advantage and guarantee confidence in our ability to defeat evolving,
more complex threats in the future.
In view of the continued development of North Korean threat
capabilities, we are partnering with the MDA to improve GMD
reliability. To be sure, GMD is a system of systems. Only synergistic
and comprehensive improvements across the entirety of the kill chain--
intelligence, sensors, interceptors, and command and control--can
ensure system confidence and maximize performance. We are working
across the entire system to enhance system reliability. The complexity
of the GMD system dictates an intricate interplay between development
of new capability, operator tactics, component testing, and the
continuous calibration of threat profiles.
We have worked closely with the MDA to maintain the right balance
in developing and testing missile defense technologies, while
increasing our readiness to execute this critical mission set. This
requires that we achieve a cadence of at least one operational GMD
intercept flight test annually. I am pleased with the successful flight
test conducted in January 2013 and expect that future tests will serve
to increase confidence in the fielded system.
Our BMD responsibilities include all potential missile threats,
regardless of range or source. To evaluate our capability against a
regional ballistic missile threat, we have conducted a series of tests
and exercises using Joint, Deployable Integrated Air and Missile
Defense systems in the protection of designated critical assets (such
as population centers, major events, and critical infrastructure)
against a limited air, cruise, or ballistic missile attack. These
ongoing tests and exercises are oriented on the development of tactics,
techniques, and procedures that integrate existing Aegis BMD, Patriot,
and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems into a layered
defense. We will continue to pursue effective and efficient methods to
improve our ability to protect the Homeland. Our citizens expect our
vigilance and rigor to protect them from a missile attack on our soil.
We work diligently to maintain their trust.

Aerospace Warning and Control
A vital component of homeland defense is NORAD's Aerospace Warning
and Control missions. Through the execution of Operation Noble Eagle
(ONE), NORAD defends North American airspace from unwanted and
unauthorized aircraft on a 24/7 basis and accomplishes this critical
mission with a combination of armed fighters on alert, air patrols,
aerial refueling, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
surveillance platforms, the National Capital Region Integrated Air
Defense System, and our ground-based Air Defense Sector surveillance
detection capabilities. These assets allow NORAD to respond to both
strategic and asymmetric air threats to the Homeland.
Since September 11, more than 62,000 sorties have been flown in
support of ONE. Our continued requirements for air domain awareness and
intercept capabilities mean we must ensure that NORAD forces can
protect our most critical national infrastructure, and that we maintain
a basing architecture that defends key terrain and our most critical
national infrastructure.
This has been an extremely busy year for the men and women of
NORTHCOM and NORAD, as we have successfully supported the DHS and the
U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to plan and execute many National Special
Security Events (NSSEs). These include the G-8 Summit at Camp David,
MD; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago,
IL; the Republican National Convention in Tampa, FL; the Democratic
National Convention in Charlotte, NC; the Presidential Inauguration,
and the State of the Union Address in our Nation's capital. In addition
to NSSEs, the day-to-day operational planning and support generated by
the 2012 National Election involved the cooperation and coordination of
an array of interagency organizations. NORAD participated extensively
in these efforts with a full array of support, when required by lead
Federal agencies. We are proud of NORAD's successful planning and
execution for these critical national events.
NORAD continues to demonstrate the ability to respond quickly to
potential strategic threats through Northern Sovereignty Operations,
which involves the monitoring and detection of announced and
unannounced Russian Military Aviation flights entering the United
States and Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones. This year again,
Russian Long-Range Aviation (LRA) continues a deliberate modernization
plan with increasing operational capability. The successful detection
and intercept of such flights demonstrates NORAD's ability and
intention to defend not only the northern reaches of our sovereign
airspace, but all of NORAD's area of operations. Whether in the
continental United States or along the northern tier of Alaska and
Canada, NORAD continues to successfully provide Aerospace Warning and
Aerospace Control for North America.

Maritime Warning and Maritime Homeland Defense
NORAD's Maritime Warning Mission, which supplements the national
intelligence analysis and warning capabilities of the United States and
Canada, continues to mature, and we have achieved notable progress in
building and maintaining relationships with mission partners and
stakeholders in the maritime community of interest. My staff remains
engaged with our Canadian partners through the Permanent Joint Board on
Defense (PJBD) and the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) as we
continue to improve awareness and develop the NORAD Maritime Warning
Mission.
Beyond maritime warning, NORTHCOM supports the execution of the
National Maritime Security Strategy through preparations to lead or act
in a supporting role to ensure the security of the homeland in the face
of a maritime threat. With the recent assignment of Navy North
(NAVNORTH), I now have a service component commander and headquarters
responsible for maritime operations in my area of responsibility.
NAVNORTH will continue to build on the outstanding working
relationships with our interagency and Service partners, particularly
the USCG, to ensure future operations are coordinated and integrated to
the greatest extent possible.

Cyber Security
I share former Secretary Panetta's concern that the United States
may be in a ``pre-September 11 moment'' with regard to a major cyber
attack. Global dependencies on electronic information technology offer
adversaries attractive opportunities to wreak havoc in this domain.
Cyber operations are non-kinetic, asymmetric options that have the
added advantage of shrouded attribution. The potential effects of a
targeted attack could have severe consequences for U.S. infrastructure
and institutions, impede our homeland defense mission, degrade our
ability to support military activities overseas, and strain our ability
to provide relief to civil authorities. To address growing threats,
NORTHCOM and NORAD, in conjunction with U.S. Cyber Command, recently
established a Joint Cyber Center (JCC) to recognize and assess when a
cyberspace attack is being orchestrated against the homeland. Although
in its infancy, the JCC's goal is to provide timely and accurate
information associated with the cyber domain through focused
situational awareness and integrated operational cyberspace planning.
We have also incorporated more robust cyber play in our exercises to
refine our cyber-defense capability and enhance our effectiveness to
operate within the confines of a degraded environment.

Antiterrorism and Force Protection
Consistent with our Unified Command Plan authorities and guidance
from the Secretary of Defense ``to preserve the Nation's combat
power,'' NORTHCOM executes an antiterrorism and force protection
mission across our area of responsibility. This is achieved by
implementing force protection and security-related policy, ensuring
compliance with standards, developing new technologies, and engaging
with key mission partners. To preempt insider threats as occurred at
Fort Hood, NORTHCOM maintains a close, trusted partnership with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to share threat information
rapidly, and to synchronize the collective military response efforts of
the Department.
Protection of our installations, people, and Defense Critical
Infrastructure (DCI) is imperative to maintain mission assurance.
NORTHCOM advocates to ensure that sufficient resource requirements are
considered in Military Department budget deliberations to implement
Service component antiterrorism and force protection programs. In
addition, NORTHCOM continues aggressive planning and collaboration with
DOD components to ensure DCI most vital to mission owners is always
available and mission capable, consistent with DOD guidance.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

We assist our domestic mission partners across the spectrum of
activities in the homeland. Our civil support actions range from
support to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) on our borders, to
mitigating the effects of man-made incidents or natural disasters.
Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense,
our assistance in this role is always in support of the lead Federal
agency.
NORTHCOM, with its homeland in my area of responsibility, is
uniquely characterized by domestic laws, policy, culture, and
tradition. The nuances of the homeland, coupled with the evolutionary
nature of the threat, highlight the criticality of NORTHCOM's close
relationship with law enforcement partners. Our continued investment
and partnership with LEAs in the execution of their homeland security
activities prevents operational seams and is the cornerstone of our
ability to defend the Nation. Underpinning the large majority of our
relationship with LEAs is JTF-North, co-located with the El Paso
Intelligence Center on key terrain of the Southwest border.
During 2012, we responded to multiple requests for assistance in
support of CBP, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), USSS, FBI, and other agencies along the
Nation's Southwest border. Exchange of information and analysis allows
DOD and LEAs to be partners in the layered defense and security of the
homeland. Our partnerships with Federal, State, and local agencies have
never been stronger.
This last year speaks to the critical nature of our strong
interagency partnerships and the continued requirement to support our
partners. To complement the tremendous capacity of communities and
states to deal with crises, DOD has capabilities that can save and
sustain lives, reduce suffering, protect property, mitigate the damage
to critical infrastructure, and get citizens quickly and solidly onto
the path of resuming their daily lives. Our challenge in this
environment is not to be late to need. DOD capabilities are only useful
if they are accessible and responsive to relief requirements. To
improve the agility and effectiveness of our support, we conduct
detailed integrated regional planning to better understand concurrent
employment challenges of Federal military forces and National Guard,
and we employ Dual Status Commanders (DSCs), made possible by Congress,
to improve unity of effort.

Dual Status Commanders
A fundamental change in how we execute our civil support mission is
the use of DSCs--perhaps one of the most important initiatives taken in
the area of DSCA in a decade. The Secretary of Defense and state
governors authorize specially trained and certified senior military
officers to command Federal and State military forces employed by DOD
and a State, respectively, in support of Federal and State civil
authorities, thereby promoting unity of effort in military assistance
to the affected community. DSCs provide a link between the distinct and
separate Federal and state chains of command that is vital to
facilitating unity of effort between the operations of Federal and
large State military force packages supporting civil authorities. In
2012, the use of DSCs for the Waldo Canyon fire and Hurricane Sandy
provided opportunities, through unity of effort, to strengthen
NORTHCOM's close collaboration with the National Interagency Fire
Center (NIFC), FEMA, the NGB, and States' National Guard organizations.
Multiple states requested and received DSC designations in 2012,
including: California and Colorado (for wildland firefighting); and
Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
and Rhode Island (for hurricane response).

Wildland Firefighting
When the Waldo Canyon fire erupted less than 12 miles from my
headquarters last June, our DSCA role was brought into sharp focus. No
one could have predicted the June 26, 2012, firestorm that was fueled
by 65 mile per hour winds and rapidly consumed 346 Colorado Springs
homes, some of which belonged to members of my staff. In reaction to
this crisis, immediate response support from Fort Carson, Peterson Air
Force Base (AFB), Schriever AFB, and Buckley AFB was directed toward
the effort, and the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of Colorado
quickly authorized a DSC. At the request of NIFC, NORTHCOM coordinated
the deployment of Air National Guard C-130 aircraft, equipped with U.S.
Forest Service (USFS) Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) to
support the Federal wildland firefighting effort. Without hesitation,
the courageous Airmen operating these aircraft continually put their
lives at great risk to save and protect American lives and property
during these wildfires. I would be remiss if I did not honor the names
of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mikeal, Major Joseph McCormick, Major Ryan
David, and Senior Master Sergeant Robert Cannon from North Carolina Air
National Guard's 145th Airlift Wing, who selflessly made the ultimate
sacrifice fighting wildfires in South Dakota last July.
With senior leaders from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S.
Forest Service, Department of Interior, NIFC, and the NGB, we are
focused on getting ahead of the next fire season. Through routine
engagement, interagency teamwork, and a collaborative effort of working
groups, we have expanded our collective understanding of the
implications of and capabilities required to prepare for requests for
assistance from our interagency partners' wildland firefighting
operations. These include near-term proposals such as integrated
training, improved processes for requesting and implementing support,
and clarification of lines of authority, ensuring installation
preparedness and necessary agreements are in place, and identifying
technology transfers that can be accomplished before the next wildland
fire season.

Hurricane Sandy Response
Hurricane Sandy challenged the agility of the National Response
Framework while impacting key terrain in New York City and New Jersey.
Working with FEMA (the lead agency for the Federal response), the NGB,
and the individual States, we estimated required support and
prepositioned Title 10 resources in the region in order to respond as
soon as requested. Throughout the response to the storm, NORTHCOM was
able to support our Federal, State, and local partners by facilitating
the Department's efforts in power restoration, dewatering, fuel
distribution, transportation, and public health and safety. In
addition, along with the NGB, NORTHCOM supported the Secretary's
approval of Governors' requests for DSCs. As the hurricane made
landfall, DSCs received orders to facilitate military unity of effort
for the response and recovery efforts in New Jersey and New York. The
DSCs provided critical leadership to promoting greater unity of effort
between Federal and state military forces responding to the devastating
effects of this hurricane. As a result, NORTHCOM was able to support
our Federal, State, and local partners by facilitating power
restoration, dewatering, fuel distribution, transportation, and public
health and safety.
As part of the Hurricane Sandy response and recovery effort, and
with Military Department Secretary concurrence, we designated a number
of title 10 installations as Incident Support Bases and Federal Team
Staging Facilities (as requested by FEMA). Located throughout FEMA
Regions I and II, these installations provided a platform for FEMA to
stage commodities and equipment as well as response and recovery teams
(such as Urban Search and Rescue Teams). Additionally, we designated
four installations as Base Support Installations with the task to
support logistically the Title 10 response effort. Fort Hamilton and
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst simultaneously supported both FEMA and
DOD response efforts.
During the course of execution, we rapidly recognized the
incredible capacity and capability of U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA). The established authorities, interagency
agreements, funding mechanisms, and operational flexibility of these
organizations are critical to mitigating large-scale catastrophic
events in the future.
Leveraging our relationships with TRANSCOM and our interagency
partners, NORTHCOM executed the strategic air and ground movements of
DOD assets and private/commercial power utility company trucks and
personnel. Together, our teams completed 241 sorties, hauling 4,173
short tons and 1,225 passengers. These numbers included the movement of
262 power restoration vehicles and 429 support personnel from western
States to New York and New Jersey. Based on our past hurricane response
experience, we pre-identified title 10 electrical generator and water
pump availability as Hurricane Sandy approached the New Jersey and New
York coasts. One hundred DOD water pumps and almost 300 pump operators
were requested by FEMA and greatly contributed to the overall USACE
pumping effort, which removed more than 475 million gallons of water
from tunnels and other critical infrastructure.
NORTHCOM's success in civil support during Sandy was characterized
by anticipation and timely support of our partners' requests for
assistance during domestic crises. As a result, I am overwhelmingly
convinced that DSCs are the right answer to facilitating military unity
of effort before, during, and after a natural or manmade disaster. DSCs
are vital for a successful roadmap to readiness that links
organizational learning and adaptation to a continuous improvement of
interagency preparedness in disaster response.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response
We understand bad actors are committed to gaining access to
chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear and radiological
material, and employing these weapons against us. This truth demands
our preparedness and resiliency if a CBRN attack should occur in the
homeland.
NORTHCOM, in close collaboration with the NGB and our other
military and civilian partners, has made significant progress improving
our ability to respond in the aftermath of a CBRN incident by
increasing the overall readiness of the Nation's CBRN Response
Enterprise. Following a series of external evaluations and confirmatory
exercises, the Enterprise achieved full operational capability (FOC) on
October 1, 2012. Despite the FOC designation, important work remains to
be done to realize the full potential of the enterprise. Through our
robust exercise program and partnerships, we are using both title 10
exercises (e.g., Vibrant Response) and regional state exercises (e.g.,
Vigilant Guard) to maximize preparedness for the entire range of CBRN
threats and hazards.

SECURITY COOPERATION

Security Cooperation with Mexico and Countering Threat Networks
When it comes to the security of North America and the shared
pursuit of enduring stability and prosperity, we cannot afford to work
in isolation. The ties between the United States and Mexico are deep
and growing. The Department of Defense views Mexico as a strategic
partner in mutual regional and hemispheric security interests. At the
center of our shared security concerns is the proliferation and
influence of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and other
threat networks that greatly undermine citizen security in Mexico.
TCOs are sophisticated international enterprises representing a
national security threat based on their unique ability to move people,
drugs, money, and weapons across borders. According to the National
Drug Intelligence Center, the demand for illegal drugs in the United
States continues, fueling the nearly $40 billion drug trade occurring
in the region.\1\ Per the Trans-Border Institute, since 2006 there have
been more than 50,000 TCO-related homicides in Mexico,\2\ often the
result of conflicts over lucrative territory for drug trafficking and
other illicit activity, routes, and access points to the U.S. drug
market. Although narco-related homicides continued to occur at
disturbing levels in 2012, the number modestly declined for the first
time in 6 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland and Security Issues.
Testimony before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control. March 9, 2011.
\2\ Trans-Border Institute. Drug violence in Mexico, Data and
Analysis through 2011. March 2012.
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More broadly, we are deepening our defense and military partnership
with Mexico in a whole host of areas, including strengthening our
ability to work together in humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, cyber security, defense planning, training and education, air
and maritime defense, counter-terrorism, and defense acquisition and
maintenance.
In support of the President's July 2011 Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime, and his 2012 National Drug Control
Strategy, NORTHCOM works with mission partners throughout our region to
increase collaboration to confront TCOs. Our current priority of effort
resides with the Mexican military where, at their request, we work with
the Mexican Security Forces to build our shared capabilities and
capacities. With full respect for Mexico's sovereignty and with full
understanding that efforts to counter transnational organized crime
have a civilian law enforcement lead, over the past year we have worked
together in three key areas: increased capacity to conduct
intelligence-driven operations; improved awareness and practice in
protecting human rights; and increased capacity to work on a whole-of-
government basis to address the challenges posed by TCOs.
Mexico's southern border, an area of strategic importance in the
counter-TCO effort, also represents a border between the areas of
responsibility of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and NORTHCOM,
requiring close coordination between our commands to ensure mission
success. Illustrative of our partnership, our commands co-sponsor
Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize Border Region Workshops. These workshops
bring together national security forces to address communications,
border security, standard operating procedures, and air, land, and
maritime surveillance. Another example of our efforts is the
coordinated deployment of a ground-based radar and associated
information sharing protocols for Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize.
Mexico and the United States are critical, strategic partners in
the security sphere. My goal remains strengthening NORTHCOM's
relationship with the Mexican military. We look forward to working
closely with the leadership of the Mexican Army (SEDENA) and Navy
(SEMAR) as they implement the strategy of President Pena Nieto and
integrate their actions with those of Mexico's civilian agencies.
Through our positive partnership, both nations have improved their
capacity to respond to TCOs, to terrorist threats, and to natural
disasters. I consider my relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico of utmost importance in the execution of Department of Defense
goals and objectives throughout the region and hemisphere. Ambassador
Wayne is the U.S. Government lead for engagements with Mexico and, as
such, is a vital partner in all coordination and execution of DOD and
NORTHCOM's security cooperation mission. Confronting the security
challenges we face in the future will continue to require an
integrated, whole-of-government approach at home and close cooperation
with our partners abroad. Nothing is more important to our security and
prosperity in this region than strengthening those partnerships.

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)
Located at Fort Benning, GA, WHINSEC remains a key component of
DOD's security cooperation outreach in the Western Hemisphere. WHINSEC
is the only U.S. Army School that teaches in Spanish and informs the
thinking of future Latin American leaders about democracy, human
rights, and military topics. It is a strategic tool for international
engagement supporting principles set forth in the Organization of
American States (OAS) Charter. The training offered at WHINSEC impacts
approximately 800-1,000 Latin American leaders annually from military,
law enforcement, and civilian institutions and serves to increase
collaboration and improve foreign partner capacity in pursuit of
NORTHCOM's security cooperation objectives.

Security Cooperation with The Bahamas
The United States and The Bahamas share a strong bilateral
relationship founded upon common interests in security, trade, disaster
response, and the promotion of meaningful cultural exchange. These
shared interests, including a common belief in the rule of law and
democratic values, and The Bahamas' geographic proximity to the United
States have been integral in building this long-standing partnership.
The Bahamian Government is committed to close cooperation with the
United States on law enforcement and maritime security concerns, as
well as on counternarcotics efforts. This strong security cooperation
relationship is highlighted by Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, a
trilateral counternarcotics effort conducted by personnel of the Royal
Bahamas Police Force, Royal Bahamas Defence Force, and the Turks and
Caicos Islands police, with counterparts from the DEA, ICE, CBP, and
the USCG.
One of the key focus areas in The Bahamas is the Hawk's Nest
Forward Operating Base, a staging location for counternarcotics
operations. Hawk's Nest is a centrally located facility on Great Exuma,
used by Bahamian and interagency counternarcotics partners. We were
ardent supporters of U.S. Embassy-Nassau in its successful effort to
develop a cost-sharing agreement among the CBP, DEA, and FAA in an
effort to maintain Hawk's Nest in a state of minimal operational
capacity. The proximity of The Bahamas to the United States means that
relatively small sites (like Hawk's Nest) have strategic importance for
counter-illicit trafficking and Cooperative Defense mission areas.
Establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command, North (SOCNORTH).
On December 31, 2012, the Secretary of Defense approved the
establishment of SOCNORTH. This subordinate unified command is the
logical progression from our previous Special Operations Detachment
(SOD). Reorganizing my existing command structures will improve the
Department's ability to command, through a designated accountable
commander, special operations forces throughout my area of
responsibility under NORTHCOM's existing Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, security cooperation, and Homeland Defense
responsibilities. The establishment of SOCNORTH provides NORTHCOM with
a command and control structure that matches that of all other
geographic combatant commands, where a component commander is placed in
charge of things we are already doing with a staff element. SOCNORTH
will enhance NORTHCOM's ability to meet our current security
cooperation mission requirements, and improve our ability to support
our interagency and regional partners. This organizational change is
consistent with the new Defense Strategic Guidance that calls for low-
cost, small-footprint approaches to accomplish our national security
objectives.

PARTNERSHIP WITH CANADA

We continue to build unprecedented levels of cooperation across our
two nations, and Canadian and U.S. cooperation in defending our
homelands has been seamless. One of the most important enablers to
NORTHCOM and NORAD mission accomplishment remains our ability to
conduct sophisticated, multi-echeloned exercises with our mission
partners. This past December, the Commander of the Canadian Joint
Operations Command (CJOC) and I signed the Tri-Command Training and
Exercise Statement of Intent, which provides 2 years of training and
exercise planning among NORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC.
Beyond combining our exercises, the three commands have improved
cooperative efforts in the Arctic. Rapid reductions in the extent and
duration of summer ice cover in the Arctic region have led to increased
human activity, primarily in the forms of scientific research,
speculative shipping, and resource extraction. As counties and private
businesses vie for regional access and influence in pursuit of economic
interests, safety and security concerns will continue to rise. All
Arctic nations have publicly stated their emphasis on cooperative
approaches to peace and stability in the region.
The spike in regional activity may result in increased requests to
militaries to provide support to other agencies, given the austere
fiscal and operational environment. Other traditional military actors
are already setting priorities for the region. Russia is actively
recapitalizing its Arctic-focused fleet. Additionally, China, a nation
without Arctic territory, is acquiring a second icebreaker.
In December 2012, NORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC signed the Framework
for Arctic Cooperation, which acknowledges that Canadian and U.S.
forces will support other departments and agencies in response to
threats and hazards in the region when requested or directed. The
framework also strengthens an already mature partnership, ultimately
enhancing joint and combined readiness in support of safety, security,
and defense missions through information sharing, planning, and
capability development. In this document, CJOC Commander Lieutenant-
General Beare and I recognize that our near-term capability gaps in the
Arctic are communications, maritime domain awareness, presence, and
infrastructure. Along with the CJOC's JTF North, JTF-Alaska, which is
my operational lead in the Arctic, is focused on how we will most
effectively cooperate and partner to mitigate these capability gaps and
effect mission success in this expansive region. Our commands will
continue to seek opportunities to, in coordination with, and as part of
wider U.S. Government efforts, meet emerging needs associated with
increased activities throughout the Arctic, and realize the full
potential of our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational,
and private sector partnerships.

ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA

We also continue to pursue our engagement with the Russian
military, taking advantage of every opportunity to increase
cooperation, interaction, and military-to-military training events. I
believe these efforts are particularly important to foster shared
understanding, especially in light of expanded Russian modernization
and training efforts that extend the range of patrol activities by
their air forces. For example, NORAD and the Russian Federation Air
Force conducted our third annual Vigilant Eagle counter-hijacking
exercise in August 2012. By mutual agreement we conducted a non-flying,
command post exercise (with each nation) with NORAD and Russian forces
practicing procedures to track, intercept, and pass control for
monitoring and escorting a simulated hijacked aircraft into the other's
airspace. Like our 2011 event, the upcoming August 2013 exercise will
be a full-profile, live-fly event, involving a variety of NORAD and
Russian military aircraft exercising a counter hijacking scenario.
NORTHCOM and NORAD are in the early stages of planning a similar
cooperative counter-hijacking exercise with our Mexican partners. This
exercise, known as Amalgam Eagle, will provide an opportunity to
practice military and civilian roles in responding to a simulated
hijacking situation in our respective airspaces.
In addition to fostering mutual trust and increased transparency
with Russia, NORTHCOM and NORAD have proposed connecting the Alaskan
NORAD Region to the NATO/Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI),
currently operational in Europe. This proposal, called the Bering
Strait Initiative, would provide Russian and NORAD air traffic
controllers with information about tracks of mutual interest moving
across the Bering Sea, using a web-enabled digital linkage to allow
information exchange. Poland, Norway, and Turkey have already
established a CAI link with Russia, and the system was declared
operational in December 2011. We only await Russian concurrence to
begin operational testing and implementation of the data link. This
example of increased cooperation with Russia helps us to avoid
unintended consequences associated with heightened tensions or
misunderstandings.

CONCLUSION

We now face a security environment that is more violent, uncertain,
and complex than ever before. This environment is distinguished by
myriad global actors and destabilizing events including terrorism,
cyber attacks, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
turmoil in nations where WMD are stored, rogue threats, nations with
nuclear weapons and those processing nuclear material, and
transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere with a growing
concern of a crime-terror nexus. Bad actors seek either to attack the
homeland directly, or to diminish the Nation's ability to build strong
relationships that foster regional stability, security, peace, and
prosperity. In the midst of this environment are near-peer competitors
seeking geopolitical advantage over the United States while we are
engaged in countering global threats. Since the homeland is the likely
confluence of many of these threats, we face increased challenges as a
nation and acknowledge the low level of national willingness to assume
such risk. In the homeland, although the probability of existential and
catastrophic attacks remains low, the consequences are unacceptable--
driving us to seek preparedness and deterrence to reduce those
probabilities as low as possible, and keep them there.
Robust, layered partnerships and steady improvement through
rigorous training, education, and exercise programs have readied
NORTHCOM and NORAD to defend the Homeland against a full spectrum of
threats and support of civilian partners in providing life-saving and--
sustaining assistance to the American people. We are guided by the
belief that smart investment in relationship building with our partners
in safety and security endeavors can prevent crises from reaching the
Nation by deterring and dissuading adversaries, and arresting threat
streams. Should a transition to crisis occur, we are strengthened by
the unity of effort and synergy of capabilities made possible by the
depth of our partnerships. NORTHCOM and NORAD stand ready to deter,
prevent, and defeat any aggression aimed at the United States and
Canada as two commands oriented on a single vision: with our trusted
partners, we will defend North America by outpacing all threats,
maintaining faith with our people, and supporting them in their times
of greatest need.
I am grateful for the support this committee has provided my
commands and am truly honored to serve as the Commander of NORTHCOM and
NORAD. I look forward to your questions.

``WE HAVE THE WATCH''

Chairman Levin. General Kelly.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND

General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, distinguished
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear today and speak on behalf of not only the SOUTHCOM
personnel, full, civilian, and military, but also the region
known as Latin America.
I'm here today to talk primarily about the four primary
missions of SOUTHCOM: The first, countering transnational
organized crime. This effort consists of both title 10
responsibilities that I have and security cooperation
activities as well. Our support to law enforcement includes
very highly effective, efficient, and cost effective detention
and monitoring operations, also sharing information and
building the capacity of countries to combat drug trafficking
and dismantle very powerful criminal networks.
On our second mission, partner engagement, we focus on
building relationships with regional militaries to enhance the
defense of the United States and the security of the region.
Human rights play a very, very big role in everything we do,
everything I do, from my engagements with regional leaders to
our joint training teams that are working alongside partner
nation forces in Central America, South America, and in the
Caribbean, to the courses of instruction at Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at Fort Benning
and in the Inter-American Defense College here in Washington.
Militaries in the region have made enormous strides in
terms of professionalization and respect for civilian authority
and human rights, thanks to a large measure to the role of the
U.S. military over the years and our continued engagement.
The third mission, contingency response, involves planning
for a wide range of possible crises in the region, including
natural disasters, mass migrations, and the evacuation of U.S.
citizens.
Finally, our most critical no-fail mission today is
detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. I would just offer that
I am concerned at this point in time that the facilities down
there, the infrastructure down there, built to last 2 or 3 or 4
years, has now been in existence for 11 years. It's rapidly
deteriorating and in large measure has deteriorated, and we
have some initiatives that certainly in terms of infrastructure
need to be taken seriously this year.
Mr. Chairman, members, I look forward to discussion of any
of these issues. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Kelly follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. John F. Kelly, USMC

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of
the committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. As U.S. Southern Command enters its 50th anniversary year, we
continue to work diligently to build relationships that enhance the
defense of the United States and the security of the region, and I am
proud to now be part of this important mission. In my first months in
command, I am struck by the stark contrasts in our area of
responsibility. It is a region of enormous promise and exciting
opportunities, but it is also one of persistent challenges and complex
threats. It is a region of relative peace, low likelihood of interstate
conflicts, and overall economic growth, yet is also home to corrosive
criminal violence, permissive environments for illicit activities, and
episodic political and social protests. Given the global security
realities and the fiscal constraints facing the U.S. Government, some
might argue that we should disengage from the Americas, turn our
attention to other partners, other priorities. Mr. Chairman, members,
let me be frank: we must not take progress and overall stability for
granted; we must not disregard our geographic proximity and the
economic, cultural, and social interconnections of Latin America and
the Caribbean to the United States. I thank Congress for sharing this
sentiment, for its longstanding commitment to our security partners,
and for its continued support to U.S. Southern Command's mission.
However, our ability to fully execute this mission is at extreme risk
as we face present-day budget uncertainty and the potentially
devastating long-term impacts of sequestration and its associated out-
year budget reductions.

BUDGET UNCERTAINTY AND SEQUESTRATION CONCERNS

Reduced Spending Plan
Due to shortfalls associated with the allocation of funding in the
current Continuing Resolution and the cuts we face as a result of
sequestration, U.S. Southern Command is facing an immediate, combined
26 percent reduction to our already lean headquarters operating budget.
Although this reduction applies only to this fiscal year, we could
easily face another dire budget situation next year as well. We have
implemented a reduced spending plan to ensure continued operations this
year under the Continuing Resolution, and as a practical measure, we
have incorporated potential sequestration cuts into our planning
efforts. We have already undertaken painful cost-savings measures,
including a civilian hiring freeze, eliminating overtime costs, not
extending temporary and term hires, and reductions in travel and
administrative costs, as well as cutting back or cancelling numerous
exercises, training activities, and military-to-military engagements
for the remainder of the fiscal year. We are also preparing for
furloughs of our 851 dedicated and patriotic civilian employees,
beginning in April and lasting through September.\1\ I expect morale
and financial effects to be severe, especially for our civilian
professionals in the lower pay grades, who will face significant
financial hardships due to the resulting 20 percent reduction in take-
home pay for the last 6 months of the fiscal year. This reduction is
compounded by living and working in Miami, one of the most expensive
cities in the world.\2\ I have directed our manpower division to offer
all means of advice, support, and guidance to our people if furloughing
indeed occurs. Simply put, budget uncertainty in fiscal year 2013 is
already having very real, deleterious effects on our readiness,
effectiveness, and day-to-day operations in the region. Mandated
sequestration cuts only amplify these effects.
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\1\ This number includes: all Department of Army and Defense
Intelligence Agency employees at our headquarters, including term and
temporary hires, and civilian employees at Joint Interagency Task Force
(JIATF) South, U.S. Special Operations Command South, JTF-GTMO and
security cooperation offices.
\2\ UBS. Pricings and Earnings Report, Edition 2012. Geneva:
September 2012; Center for Housing Policy. Losing Ground: The Struggle
for Middle Income Households to Afford the Risings Costs of Housing and
Transportation. October 2012.
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Sequestration Impact--Assigned/Allocated Forces
Although I am able to accept risk associated with this year's
reduced spending plan, sequestration presents significant additional
strategic and operational risks. The severe cuts to U.S. Southern
Command, and the numerous second and third order effects from the
force-providing Service cuts, will adversely impact our training and
ability to respond to crises. U.S. Southern Command has traditionally
achieved valuable ends with limited means through a low-cost, small
footprint approach. This approach, while effective, does carry inherent
risk that increases exponentially under sequestration. Due to our
minimally assigned forces and diminishing availability of surface
assets, we are already challenged to respond to large-scale
contingencies such as mass migration, natural disasters, the evacuation
of American citizens, or ensuring the security of our embassies;
maintain comprehensive awareness in the southern approaches to the
United States; and support the National Drug Control Strategy's
interdiction objectives. Across-the-board spending cuts will only
exacerbate this situation, at a time in which several regional security
challenges require active engagement by the United States.

Sequestration Impact--Future Operations
Mr. Chairman, members, let me be blunt: sequestration in fiscal
year 2013 and its associated out-year budget cuts in future years will
severely degrade our ability to fulfill the Department of Defense's
title 10 statutory obligations and provide operational support to the
U.S. interagency and our partners in the region. Given the drastic
magnitude of cuts being contemplated by the Services, the day could
soon come when U.S. Southern Command has no assigned DOD surface assets
to conduct detection and monitoring operations.\3\ This would not only
impact our ability to detect and monitor the illicit transit of drugs
towards the United States, but we would also be unable to fully support
U.S. and partner nation law enforcement interdiction operations to
disrupt this drug flow. Under sequestration, the Coast Guard has
indicated that it too will curtail air and surface operations,
affecting several missions including drug interdiction and other law
enforcement operations. Taken together, these limitations would
undermine the significant gains we have made through the highly
successful and ongoing Operation Martillo; the 152 metric tons of
cocaine seized to date represents over $3 billion in revenue that will
not go to fund powerful criminal groups, violence in Mexico, and the
destabilization of our Central American partners. These 152 metric tons
will also not reach the streets of America nor fuel costly crime and
drug addiction. Due to sequestration, and its associated out-year
budget cuts of over $50 billion per year across the Department of
Defense, we may no longer be able to support future interagency
initiatives like the Department of State's Regional Aviation Program in
Central America. Additionally, we could be forced to suspend our
cooperation with U.S. Northern Command and Mexico on information
operations, which had been heralded as the model for cross-Combatant
Command collaboration. Finally, we will face challenges to resource and
sustain our emergent cyber defense capabilities, at a time when cyber
concerns are increasing in scope and magnitude.
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\3\ As one example, the Chief of Naval Operations indicated in a
memo dated January 25, 2013 (Ser N000/10005) that due to sequestration,
the Department of the Navy will be compelled to reduce OMN expenditures
through numerous actions, to include stopping all naval deployments to
the Caribbean and South America.
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Sequestration Impact--Operational Effectiveness
It is my position that scarce assets must be deployed where they
have the greatest impact, but sequestration will cripple our proven
operational effectiveness. As responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars,
we have long employed a ``defense forward'' approach to attack the drug
trafficking problem near its origin, before bulk shipments are broken
up for transit into the United States. Although the U.S. Southwest
border has received the greater share of public attention and
counternarcotics funding, Joint Interagency Task Force South is more
effective at the removal of large quantities of cocaine than U.S.
Southwest border operations, as bulk cocaine shipments are broken up
into numerous smaller quantities upon reaching the transit zone of
Central America. While this success is noteworthy, diminishing assets
already place significant limitations on JIATF South's ability to
target the majority of documented drug trafficking events and support
Coast Guard interdiction efforts. Sequestration cuts will only
intensify this challenge, potentially allowing hundreds of tons of
cocaine and other illicit products to flood into our cities. Likely
second and third order effects include an increase in supply and purity
and a decrease in cost of cocaine in the United States, undermining the
significant progress that has been made in U.S. demand reduction. En
route to our country, this largely unimpeded flow will chart a
corrosive pathway through Central America and Mexico, contributing to
instability, corruption, and violence and impacting efforts to improve
citizen safety.

Sequestration Impact--Security Cooperation and Partner Engagement
Building the capabilities of regional militaries is a cost-
effective strategy to help our partners confront internal challenges to
security, stability, and sovereignty; increase professionalism; and
strengthen defense and security institutions. Mr. Chairman, Members, I
am deeply concerned by the adverse impact sequestration will have on
these efforts, many of which have yielded significant and valuable
security dividends. Take, for example, how U.S. Southern Command has
provided persistent, focused training to the Naval Special Forces (FEN)
in Guatemala over the past 4 years. As a result, the FEN can now
effectively locate and interdict target vessels, seize drug shipments,
and cooperate as a cohesive unit. Severe budget cuts will likely reduce
this type of sustained relationship building and training, the
repercussions of which could be harmful to U.S. interests. Reduced
engagement by the United States could result in a partnership
``vacuum,'' which nations like China, Russia, or Iran may seek to fill.
In recent years, these countries have made in-roads, deepening
diplomatic, economic, and military ties with the region. Declining U.S.
influence will provide an opportunity to expand these relationships at
the expense of the United States.
From a strategic perspective, our government-to-government security
relationships are critical to the United States' ability to meet
complex global security challenges, facilitate U.S. military and
coalition operations, and ensure regional stability. With the
corresponding growth of globalization, economic integration, and a
changing geopolitical landscape, expanding and deepening these
bilateral relationships have become even more essential to U.S.
national security and foreign policy. Sequestration cuts lead to the
exact opposite outcome, forcing U.S. Southern Command to reduce support
to partner nations' efforts to respond to internal and external threats
and impeding our ability to provide defense support to U.S. foreign
policy objectives, and those outlined in the 2012 Western Hemisphere
Defense Policy Statement. Ultimately, sequestration undermines our
efforts to help build and maintain an international community of
nations that are stable and reliable partners, whose security forces
fill an appropriate role in a society that is characterized by
effective, accountable, democratic governance.
Mr. Chairman, members, this leads me to my final thought on the
impacts of sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts of
over $50 billion per year across the Department of Defense. I will
speak plainly: severe budget cuts will have long-term, detrimental
effects on U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. Significantly reduced
U.S. military engagement will make it difficult to counter those who
would seek to exploit perceptions that the United States is abandoning
our longstanding commitment to the region. Sequestration and its
associated out-year budget cuts will result in damage to the United
States' leadership, national security, readiness, and ability to deter
or respond to global crises and regional security challenges.

REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Unfortunately, the sequester, a full-year Continuing Resolution,
and associated out-year budget cuts due to sequestration are not
accompanied by a corresponding decline in security challenges within
our area of responsibility. These challenges are non-traditional in
nature, networked in design, and transnational in scope, requiring
constant vigilance, regional cooperation, and collective action. When
it comes to South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, I cannot
overstate the importance of awareness, access, and the enormous return
on investment from personal, on-the-ground security relationships. As
the United States turns its attention to the home front to address
domestic economic and budget issues, I firmly believe we must remain
engaged with the Nations in our shared home, the Western Hemisphere,
for one very simple reason: proximity. Left unaddressed, security
concerns in the region can quickly become security concerns in the
homeland.

Transnational Organized Crime
The prevalent problem in the region--particularly in Central
America--is the growing power and destabilizing activities of criminal
networks, whose illicit operations are funded in significant part by
U.S. and international drug consumption, as well as diverse illicit
funding streams like kidnapping and extortion. As recognized by the
President's 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,
transnational organized crime is a global issue with global
implications that directly impact the United States.\4\ In the U.S.
Southern Command area of responsibility, these powerful groups exploit
under-governed areas--where state capacity is weak and corruption and
impunity are rampant--to consolidate control over drug, money, weapons,
and human smuggling networks that span the hemisphere. This corrosive
expansion is taking place in the context of deteriorating citizen
security, especially in Honduras, where the number of people killed
rivals that of Iraq at the height of sectarian violence. Like many
Members of Congress, I am troubled by this rising violence and its
impact on regional stability.
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\4\ National Security Staff. Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security, 25
July, 2011.

2012 HOMICIDE RATES PER 100,000, SELECT CITIES \5\
San Pedro Sula, Honduras................................... 169
Caracas, Venezuela......................................... 118
Tegucigalpa, Honduras (Distrito Central)................... 101
New Orleans, LA............................................ 56
Detroit, MI................................................ 54
Baltimore, MD.............................................. 35
Washington, DC............................................. 17

The impact on our own country is also clear. Transnational criminal
organizations, which have expanded their presence throughout Central
America, were responsible for several high-profile murders of American
citizens across or on our border in recent years. Additionally, a 2007
report estimated that illicit drug use cost the United States an
estimated $193 billion in combined health and criminal justice
impacts.\6\ According to an analysis of arrestees carried out for the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, more than half of the adult
males arrested for crimes in 10 metropolitan areas tested positive for
at least one drug at the time of their arrest.\7\ A recent survey
estimated 6.5 million Americans 12 years and older are dependent on or
abuse an illicit drug,\8\ while in 2009, 39,147 people died from drug-
induced causes, more than double the amount that were murdered that
same year.\9\
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\5\ Security, Peace, and Justice (Seguridad, Paz y Justicia). 50
Most Violent Cities in the World, 2012 Rankings. (available online at:
http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx) Washington, DC figures are
from the Metropolitan Police Department's 2011 Annual Report (most
recent data available).
\6\ National Drug Intelligence Center (2011). The Economic Impact
of Illicit Drug Use on American Society. Department of Justice.
\7\ Office of National Drug Control Policy. (2012). Arrestee Drug
Abuse Monitoring Program: 2011 Annual Report. Executive Office of the
President: Washington, D.C.
\8\ 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health
\9\ Kenneth D. Kochanek, M.A.; Jiaquan Xu, M.D.; Sherry L. Murphy,
B.S.; Arialdi M. Minino, M.P.H.; and Hsiang-Ching Kung, Ph.D.,
``Deaths: Final Data for 2009.'' Division of Vital Statistics (Atlanta,
GA: Centers for Disease Control), Vol. 60, Number 3, Dec. 29, 2011, p.
11.
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Mr. Chairman, members, I'd like to sketch an image of illicit
trafficking operations in our hemisphere to illustrate the magnitude of
this problem. Picture an interconnected system of arteries that
traverse the entire Western Hemisphere, stretching across the Atlantic
and Pacific, through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and
Central America. Complex, sophisticated networks use this vast system
of illicit pathways to move tons of drugs, thousands of people, and
countless weapons into and out of the United States, Europe, and Africa
with an efficiency, payload, and gross profit any global transportation
company would envy. In return, billions of dollars flood back into the
hands of these criminal enterprises, enabling the purchase of military-
grade weapons, ammunition, and state-of-the-art technology to counter
law enforcement. This profit also allows these groups to buy the
support--or silence--of local communities through which these arteries
flourish, spreading corruption and fear and undermining support for
legitimate governments.

According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment,
Mexican-based transnational criminal organizations and their
associates operate in upwards of 1,200 U.S. cities, working
with domestic U.S. gangs to distribute and traffic illicit
drugs throughout the United States.
The FBI reports that MS-13 gang leaders in El Salvador
have initiated assassination plans against U.S. law enforcement
personnel and target American citizens.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures of these criminal networks
have advanced far beyond the typical activities of ``traditional''
organized crime. These are superbly financed, well-organized, and
ruthless adversaries for our partner nations, especially our Central
American ones. These networks conduct assassinations, executions, and
massacres, and with their enormous revenues and advanced weaponry, they
can outspend and outgun many governments. Some groups have similar--and
in some cases, superior--training to regional law enforcement units.
Through intimidation and sheer force, these criminal organizations
virtually control some areas. In my view, the proximity of the U.S.
Homeland to criminally-governed spaces is a vulnerability with direct
implications for U.S. national security. I am also troubled by the
significant criminal capabilities that are available to anyone--for a
price. Transnational criminal organizations have access to key
facilitators who specialize in document forgery, trade-based money
laundering, weapons procurement, and human smuggling, including the
smuggling of special interest aliens. This criminal expertise and the
ability to move people, products, and funds are skills that can be
exploited by a variety of malign actors, including terrorists.

Crime/Terror Nexus
Mr. Chairman, members, the presence of all these so-called ``bad
actors'' raises the question of possible nexus between international
terrorist organizations and criminal networks in the region. The answer
is complex. While regionally-based Shi'a who support Lebanese Hezbollah
are involved in drug and other illicit trafficking, we have only a
partial understanding of possible interconnections and overlap between
terrorist financing and illicit revenue streams, both within the
hemisphere and on a global scale. The 2011 Iranian plot to assassinate
the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. demonstrates Iran is willing to
leverage criminal groups to carry out its objectives in the U.S.
Homeland. This only underscores my concerns over the exploitation of
criminal capabilities. In my judgment, any group seeking to harm the
United States--including Iran--could view criminal middlemen,
facilitators, and support networks as potential operational enablers,
although not necessarily operational requirements. As distinguished
members of this committee have noted, an attack in or through the
region would have major consequences for the entire Western Hemisphere.
We remain vigilant against this possibility and its potential criminal
facilitation, but need the assets to remain so.

Iran in the Western Hemisphere
This brings me to the next issue I would like to discuss, which has
serious implications for U.S. national security. I share Congress'
concerns over Iran's attempts to increase its influence in the region.
The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain
influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small
set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States
are waning. In an attempt to evade international sanctions and
cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment, the Iranian regime has increased its
diplomatic and economic outreach across the region with nations like
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. This outreach has only been
marginally successful, however, and the region as a whole has not been
receptive to Iranian efforts.
Members and supporters of Iran's partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, have
an established presence in several countries in the region. The
Lebanese Shia diaspora in our area of responsibility may generate as
much as tens of millions of dollars for Hezbollah through both licit
and illicit means. There is also precedent for Iranian and Hezbollah
collusion to conduct attacks in the region, as evidenced in the 1992
and 1994 bombings in Argentina.\10\ In Venezuela, government officials
have been sanctioned for providing financial support to Hezbollah, and
for providing support to the FARC's narcotics and arms trafficking
activities in Colombia.\11\ We take Iranian activities very seriously
and, along with U.S. Government agencies and international partners, we
remain vigilant to the activities of Iran and affiliated extremist
groups and remain prepared to work with our partners to counter any
direct threat to U.S. national security. I would be remiss, however, if
I did not share with Congress my assessment that U.S. Southern
Command's limited intelligence capabilities may prevent our full
awareness of all Iranian and Hezbollah activities in the region.
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\10\ This refers to the 1992 and 1994 bombings of the Asociacion
Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) and Israeli Embassy by Hezbollah
operatives.
\11\ U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control. ``Press Release: Treasury Designates Four Venezuelan Officials
for Providing Arms and Security to the FARC.'' September 8, 2011; U.S.
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. ``Press
Release: Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela.'' September 19, 2008.
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Terrorist Presence in the Region
Additionally, both Sunni and Shia extremists are present in our
area of responsibility, and I am watchful for an evolution in
operational presence, capacity, or radicalization, particularly among
``homegrown'' extremist groups. Proselytizers with ties to global
Islamic extremism are attempting to radicalize and recruit among the
Muslim communities throughout the region. Outreach by external
extremist groups from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, such as
Jama'at al Tabligh, has increased. As many Members of Congress have
noted, the United States and our partners should be extremely concerned
whenever external extremist groups or state-sponsors of terrorism see
the Western Hemisphere as attractive--or even worse, vulnerable.

The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions
against seven current or former senior Venezuelan Government
and military officials, including the former Minister of
Defense, for providing direct support to the FARC's narcotics
trafficking activities.
In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed
sanctions on two Venezuelans--Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi
Kan'an--for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah.
Nasr al Din served as Charge d' Affaires at the Venezuelan
Embassy in Syria and the Director of Political Aspects at the
Venezuelan Embassy in Lebanon.

Terrorist groups represent a persistent challenge that has plagued
the region for decades. The FARC is the region's oldest, largest, most
capable, and best-equipped insurgency. The Government of Colombia is
currently in peace negotiations with the FARC, but the fight is far
from over and a successful peace accord is not guaranteed. Although
weakened, the FARC continues to confront the Colombian state by
employing improvised explosive devices and attacking energy
infrastructure and oil pipelines. In Peru, Sendero Luminoso (The
Shining Path), while smaller than the FARC, remains committed to
violence and overthrowing the government. Both the FARC and Sendero
Luminoso rely on drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion to fund
attacks on the Colombian and Peruvian Governments. The hundreds of
millions of dollars in revenue the FARC receives from cocaine
trafficking alone enable them to purchase surface-to-air missiles and
fund the construction of multi-million dollar ``narco subs.'' Utilized
by a variety of illicit trafficking groups in the region, fully
submersible vessels are capable of transporting up to 10 metric tons of
a variety of cargo and have a range capacity of 6,800 nautical miles, a
range that could reach Africa. In other words, these subs, which are
extraordinarily difficult to detect, can travel from the Caribbean
coast of Colombia to just about any major city in Florida, Texas, or
California in 10-12 days.^{12, 13}
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\12\ Depending on the type and dimensions of the cargo, up to 10
metric tons of a variety of products could be transported. Range
estimates based on Office of Naval Intelligence assessments of seized
fully submersible vessels.
\13\ Written Testimony of Read Admiral Charles Michel, Director,
Joint Interagency Task Force South. Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, House Committee on Homeland Security. June 19, 2012.

The U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility has the
highest improvised explosive devices (IED) activity in the
world outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, with Colombia accounting
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for over 90 percent of IEDs in the region.

External Actors
Finally, I view the expanding influence of countries ``external''
to the Western Hemisphere as having uncertain implications. As I stated
earlier, personal relationships are of enormous importance in this
region, a fact other nations recognize. China is increasing its
economic role in the region, and government-owned companies are funding
or acquiring strategic infrastructure to facilitate commercial
logistics. Chinese companies own and operate an interest in at least
five ports in the region, while telecommunications firms such as Huawei
Technologies and ZTE have a rapidly expanding presence in South
America. With an unprecedented three naval deployments to Latin America
since 2008, including a hospital ship visit in 2011, China is
attempting to directly compete with U.S. military activities in the
region. I believe it is important to note that sequestration will
likely result in the cancellation of this year's deployment of the USNS
Comfort to the region, an absence that would stand in stark contrast to
China's recent efforts. In my judgment, Chinese interest in cultivating
relationships with countries in the Western Hemisphere reaffirms the
importance of strengthening our own partnerships with the region.

2012 Regional Investments by China:

Two Chinese banks provided $8 billion in credit lines
for 60 projects in 12 countries in the region.
$2 billion loan to Argentina to finance railway
modernization through soy-producing regions.
$1.4 billion investment in copper mines in Ecuador.
Joint agreement with Venezuela to develop Las
Cristinas gold mine, one of the world's largest gold reserves.

STRATEGIC APPROACH

The transnational nature of many of these challenges I described
cannot be addressed by any one nation or agency alone. In my view, this
illustrates the efficiency of working with and through our partners in
the region and the U.S. Government. U.S. Southern Command's strong,
established relationships with regional militaries and security forces
can serve as a catalyst for encouraging greater unity of effort on
hemispheric security, from terrorism to illicit trafficking to the
security of the Panama Canal. Many of the issues we face in the region
transcend borders, requiring more than just a ``whole-of-government''
approach; they require a whole of community, a whole of society, a
whole of hemisphere approach. Time and again--whether during Plan
Colombia or Operation Unified Response in Haiti; whether in an
interdiction operation that denies drug traffickers billions of dollars
in revenue; or in multinational training exercises that improve the
capability of regional armies, air forces, marines, navies, and special
operations forces--our partnerships are the key enablers for ensuring
regional security. It is my position that strengthening these
partnerships is a cost-effective use of government resources. A layered
defense can help the U.S. detect and deter threats before they reach
the homeland, and help the hemisphere collectively respond to an
uncertain and complex security environment. I would like to provide
Congress with a brief overview of what, in my view, is the invaluable
return on investment from partnering and engaging with Central America,
South America, and the Caribbean. I am gravely concerned, however, that
sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defense budget
will imperil our ability to sustain these successful partnerships and
regional progress.

OPERATION MARTILLO 2012 RESULTS
Cocaine disrupted......................... 152,389 kgs
Marijuana disrupted....................... 21,488 kgs
Bulk cash disrupted....................... $7.2 million
Assets seized (total)..................... 101
Partner nation supported disruptions...... 67 percent
Revenue denied to TCOs.................... $3 billion

Operation Martillo
We are currently witnessing the security dividends from regional
cooperation as a result of Operation Martillo. In support of Department
of State's Central American Regional Security Initiative, U.S. Southern
Command launched a joint, interagency, and combined operation to
counter illicit trafficking along the Central American coastlines,
coordinating with Western Hemisphere and European partner nations to
maximize all possible means for support. In addition to the measurable
results of the operation, we have also seen greater unity of effort,
expanded information sharing, and enhanced interoperability among
partner nations and Federal departments like the Department of Justice
and the Department of Homeland Security. I am very proud to note that
67 percent of illicit trafficking disruptions in 2012 were supported by
partner nations, who have played an enormous role in the success of the
operation. This unprecedented level of cooperation could serve as a
model for future operations in Central America, although our ability to
continue Martillo, build on the nascent progress of our Central
American partners, or provide complementary support to the Department
of State's Regional Aviation Program will all be in serious jeopardy
due to sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defense
budget.

Cooperation on Counterterrorism
In the region, our engagement on counterterrorism issues centers on
promoting interoperability with key partner nations and maintaining a
persistent and episodic presence to counter the influence of Islamic
extremism, recruitment, and radicalization efforts. We are also
conducting contingency planning for a variety of scenarios, but the
most valuable deterrent to direct threats to the United States is
through presence and partnerships, by maintaining active awareness and
nurturing our relationships within the region. Continued budget
uncertainty is impacting our ability to ensure this presence, however,
as reduced resources have forced us to scale back deployments of Civil
Affairs and Special Operations Forces teams to the region.

Interagency and Private Sector Partnerships
Collaboration with our foreign and domestic partners also
underscores everything we do at U.S. Southern Command headquarters.
Thirty three interagency representatives and detailees, along with five
foreign liaison officers, are integrated throughout the command,
allowing our military personnel to capitalize on the unique
capabilities, authorities, and expertise of other government agencies
and partner nations. Likewise, our military planning capability and
capacity often can enhance synchronization of interagency efforts, even
when the Department of Defense is not the lead agency. Cooperation with
the private sector and non-governmental organizations also serves as
significant force and resource multipliers to our activities and those
of our interagency partners. In 2012, our collaboration with the
private sector leveraged gifts-in-kind and the participation of medical
personnel, emergency management practitioners, business leaders, and
academics in our humanitarian assistance activities throughout the
region. While we will seek to expand these no-cost partnerships with
the private sector, budget cuts have compelled us to reduce the
interagency presence in our headquarters, which undermines our
coordination within the U.S. Government.

NEW HORIZONS 2012: PERU
Total U.S. troops trained................. 435
Medical Readiness Training Exercises...... 8
Patients treated.......................... over 26,000
Animals treated........................... 313
Construction and renovation projects...... 6
NGO Contribution.......................... valued at over $200,000

Security Cooperation
Within the region, we build relationships with partner nation
militaries through a range of engagements, such as training exercises,
educational exchanges, and security cooperation activities. Every year,
U.S. Southern Command conducts multinational training exercises with
our partners, which focus primarily on maritime interdiction, the
defense of the Panama Canal, and training for peace support and
disaster response operations. These exercises are a unique opportunity
to promote regional cooperation, enhance readiness and interoperability
of our hemisphere's military forces, and encourage collective action to
address shared security challenges. To help mitigate costly disaster
relief operations and strengthen state presence in under-governed
areas, we conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs and
exercises that provide training to U.S. and partner nation personnel
and demonstrate U.S. values to the region. The shadow of sequestration
and its associated out-year budget cuts place the continuation of many
of these activities in doubt, however. Our security cooperation mission
has borne the brunt of our budget reductions this year, and reduced
engagements may have an ``eroding effect'' on our partnerships far into
the future.
In addition to training exercises, our Human Rights Initiative and
International Military Education and Training are essential to
developing professional armed forces throughout the Americas. The
regional trend of deploying militaries in non-traditional roles like
domestic security underscores the continued importance of our human
rights training, including our ongoing support for Colombian military
justice reform. Programs like the Inter-American Air Force Academy, the
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Inter-
American Defense College, and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship build
relationships among future senior military leaders in the region.
Additionally, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies helps strengthen regional defense institutions by promoting
security sector reform. These entities are all vital in assisting our
partner nations develop the accountable, professional, and transparent
defense institutions that are key to long-term hemispheric security.
Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts could impact
these valuable programs. Mr. Chairman, members, we want to avoid losing
an opportunity to build strong, enduring relationships with militaries
in our own hemisphere.

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS

International Military Education Training. Funded 2,034 students from
the region in 2012
Inter-American Air Force Academy.......... In its 69-year history,
44,000 graduates
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security In its 12 year history,
Cooperation. trained 15,859 students
from 34 nations, 2 of whom
went on to prominent
positions in their
respective governments
Inter-American Defense College............ More than 2,380 students
from 24 countries have
graduated from the IADC. 34
percent have gone on to
become partner nation
presidents, cabinet
ministers, ambassadors, or
general officers.

Through our engagement and training activities, U.S. Southern
Command seeks to build the capabilities of regional militaries to
confront internal challenges to stability, sovereignty, and security.
In addition to the rotational forces provided by our component
commands, we rely on the National Guard's State Partnership Program to
engage with 22 nations in the area of responsibility. The State
Partnership Program provides long-term mentorship to our partner
nations to advance democratic principles and values and to encourage
subordination of the military to civilian authority. Due to budget
reductions, however, we were forced to cancel more than 90 events aimed
at improving partner nation capacity in areas such as disaster
response, defense support to civil authorities, and countering
transnational organized crime. If triggered, sequestration and its
associated out-year cuts to the Department of Defense budget could
further limit the Services' ability to provide forces for future
security cooperation activities.

In 2012, U.S. National Guard units conducted 223 events, and
Colombia-South Carolina became the newest partnership under the
program.

In Central America, we are providing training and security
assistance to improve maritime, aerial, and land domain awareness
capabilities, focusing on the Northern Tier countries where the threat
posed by transnational criminal organizations is greatest. In the
Caribbean, we are supporting the development of a regional maritime
interdiction strategy, as well as providing equipment and training to
improve maritime and air domain awareness. Further south, Foreign
Military Financing for the Joint Rotary Wing/Riverine Program has
delivered critical mobility to Colombian counterinsurgency efforts,
while an expanded Military Justice Program has resulted in invaluable
training in the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law. In Peru, we
are supporting planning related to counterterrorism efforts against
Sendero Luminoso. Additionally, we have partnered with the Joint IED
Defeat Organization to help the Colombian Armed Forces build their
counter IED capabilities, and we are in discussions on offering similar
training to Peru. Our engagement with Brazil centers on space, cyber
defense, intelligence and information sharing, and counterterrorism
training for the upcoming World Cup and Summer Olympics. We are also
exploring possible collaboration with U.S. Health and Human Services on
consequence management. We fully support the proposal presented at the
October 2012 Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas to
advance a coordination mechanism for regional disaster response, and
have begun discussions with the Government of Peru, the next CDMA
Secretariat, on implementation. Although critical to ensuring the
forward defense of the United States, our training and engagement
programs have been seriously impacted by this year's budget reductions.
Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts will result in
further debilitating effects to these valuable programs.

In 2012, U.S. Southern Command's DOD Rewards Program
facilitated the capture of Florindo Eleuterio Flores-Hala (aka
``Artemio''), the organizational head of the Upper Huallaga
Valley (UHV) faction of Sendero Luminoso, landing a blow
against the UHV organization.

Partners as Security Exporters
As I travel throughout U.S. Southern Command's area of
responsibility, I am continuously impressed by the contributions of our
partners to regional and international security. A global leader,
Brazil heads the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,
provides security assistance to several African nations, participates
in maritime exercises with South Africa and India, and is conducting
border security operations with its neighbors. Chile has integrated a
Salvadoran infantry unit into a battalion in support of the U.N.
Mission in Haiti, and is exploring opportunities for further building
partner capacity initiatives in Central America. Colombia is perhaps
the best example of the inherent value of security assistance to the
region. Once on the brink of falling to a powerful insurgency, Colombia
is now a leader in counterinsurgency tactics and provides training to
West African and Central American counterparts. U.S. Southern Command
shares the commitment of these valued partners to ensuring a strong,
secure, integrated hemisphere and global system, but sequestration may
limit our ability to deepen our defense relationships with these
partners or enhance the collective security of the hemisphere.

Thirteen countries are providing forces to multinational
security operations and United Nations peacekeeping missions
throughout the world, and El Salvador recently deployed
personnel in support of the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

WAY AHEAD

Future Budget Reductions
While we have taken painful steps to reduce spending in 2013, we
recognize that sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the
defense budget will result in even more difficult decisions in the
future. This year, we were able to decrease spending by applying
equitable cuts across a range of programs, but future cuts may involve
wholesale program elimination. As I have told my workforce, spending
cuts will force us to ``do less, with less.'' There will be some
missions we will simply no longer be able to conduct, and our regional
relationships will likely suffer as a result.

Mitigating Asset Gaps in the Caribbean
Mr. Chairman, members, as I alluded to earlier: presence matters.
It is a documented deterrent. Given our likely continued asset
reductions, we will need to rely on our partners, wherever possible, to
help bridge some capability gaps in terms of assets, authorities, or
resources. I credit the support of our European and Canadian allies in
the Caribbean whose presence helps mitigate asset gaps, although I
remain concerned by the sub-region's vulnerability to a shift in
trafficking tactics. Although an estimated 92-94 percent of cocaine
destined for the U.S. still flows through Central America, known
cocaine movement towards Hispaniola--mainly the Dominican Republic--
appears to have increased by 3 percent to 32 metric tons in 2012.\14\
We have experienced the so-called ``balloon effect'' before, and
focusing limited assets on Central America creates a potential gap in
other areas, which could be exploited by traffickers seeking to escape
pressure from Operation Martillo. Last year, according to local media
reports, 885 pounds of marijuana washed ashore on Florida's beaches, a
vivid reminder of the heyday of drug smuggling in the Caribbean, an era
I know none of us wants to see repeated.\15\ This will be increasingly
difficult to prevent, however, given the impact sequestration will have
on future asset availability.
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\14\ Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). Cocaine
Movement Trends 3rd Quarter 2012.
\15\ ``Drugs found on South Florida beaches recalls smuggling
heyday.'' October 1, 2012. Sun Sentinel.
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Detainee Operations
U.S. Southern Command continues to conduct safe, humane, and
transparent detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-
GTMO). The pending installation of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
undersea fiber optic cable will save the United States millions of
dollars in the long-term by reducing costs associated with using
satellite communications. This cable will improve the reliability of
communications with Guantanamo Bay facilities and also thereby enhance
our ability to support military commissions, periodic review boards,
and detention operations.
Two of the major challenges we face at JTF-GTMO are a lack of long-
term resource planning, and complex issues related to future medical
care of detainees. Mr. Chairman, members, to paraphrase a former JTF-
GTMO commander, we haven't been at Guantanamo for 11 years; we've been
there for 1 year, 11 times. A temporary detainee operation has now
lasted over 11 years, and the expeditionary infrastructure at JTF-GTMO
is rapidly deteriorating, placing assigned personnel and operations at
increasing risk. Regardless of policy disputes, we must make pragmatic
decisions to protect our troops from unsafe and unsanitary living
conditions and to ensure the continued safe and humane care of the
detainee population. We have been relying on a patchwork of temporary
fixes, but there is an urgent need for immediate refurbishment of
degraded expeditionary infrastructure at JTF-GTMO. Using fiscal year
2009 Overseas Contingency Funding for military construction, we have
identified a series of projects aimed at increasing the security of the
detainees, facilitating our ability to support legal processes for
detainees, and most of all, meeting basic quality of life requirements
for our troops. I look forward to working with Congress as we address
this issue. Additionally, the medical issues of the aging detainee
population are increasing in scope and complexity. As is the case with
any older person, aging detainees could require specialized treatment
for issues such as heart attack, stroke, kidney failure, or even
cancer. The future emergency and critical medical care of detainees may
require specialists and equipment to enhance the current capabilities
at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.

Quality of Life
As a nontraditional installation, U.S. Southern Command faces
unique issues in supporting our assigned military personnel and their
families, as well as retirees, and veterans living in South Florida who
utilize the services available at our U.S. Army Garrison facility. In
my first few months at U.S. Southern Command, I have come to realize
that military families in South Florida are at a huge financial and
benefits disadvantage. Access to a commissary is an integral part of
the military benefits package for Active Duty personnel throughout
their compensated period of duty or service.\16\ Servicemembers
stationed at U.S. Southern Command do not have access to a nearby
commissary, yet live in one of the most expensive cities in the United
States. The continued lack of a commissary at our headquarters is not
only a disservice to our personnel, but to the entire South Florida
military community. In addition to the demonstrated economic returns
and benefits, the commissary system ensures our service men and women
and their families receive the full compensation they deserve by
law.\17\
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\16\ Department of Defense Instruction 1330.17. December 2008.
\17\ Resale and MWR Center for Research. Costs and Benefits of the
DOD Resale System. December 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whenever I visit one of our component commands or joint task
forces, I make a concerted effort to address quality of life issues
facing our troops, even seemingly minor ones like 24-hour gym access, a
small request when you are working long shifts far from your loved
ones. At our headquarters, I have spent a great deal of time talking to
the servicemembers assigned to U.S. Southern Command, and every single
junior enlisted person I meet has told me of the financial hardships
they face trying to make ends meet under the current Cost of Living
Allowance. For example, a typical E-3 assigned to U.S. Southern Command
receives $1,787 in monthly pay, $1,437 per month for housing, and a
mere $18 in Cost of Living Allowance,\18\ in a city with some of the
highest insurance rates and lack of affordable rental housing in the
country.\19\ I am actively engaging within the Department of Defense to
make them aware of my concerns, and we are working to find a solution.
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\18\ Based on calculations for duty location (33176) for an E3 with
2 years of service and no dependents. 2013 pay information from Defense
Finance and Accounting Services; BAH calculator may be found at:
www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/bahCalc.cfm. The CONUS COLA calculator
may be found at http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/conusCalc.cfm
\19\ According to apartment market research firm AXOIMetrics, the
average effective rent (which includes concessions) in Miami is $1,269
per month, compared to the United States as a whole at $964. According
to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, the
Miami rental market has the greatest share of severely cost-burdened
renters (i.e. renters who pay more than half their income to rent) in
the country.
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U.S. Southern Command's most important resource is its workforce,
and I am committed to enhancing quality of life at our headquarters. In
recognition of growing concerns for the health and wellbeing of U.S.
servicemembers, we conducted two suicide prevention events, and we are
developing a specialized council to address the emotional, mental, and
physical health of all our personnel. Although an Army program, our
Survivor Outreach Services office recently received approval to provide
long-term support to family members of all our South Florida fallen
heroes, regardless of service affiliation. As Congress is aware,
reports of sexual assault and harassment in the military have been at
an all-time high, and U.S. Southern Command is doing its part to
address this unacceptable issue. All incidents are handled using the
exact procedures outlined in Department of Defense directives and
policy, which promote sensitive care, confidential reporting for
victims of sexual assault, and 100 percent accountability for those who
commit these crimes. We also have a strong Sexual Harassment/Assault
Response and Prevention program in place that ensures victims receive
all the legal, medical, and psychological support they need. To support
the professional development of our workforce, we expanded training
opportunities last year, including language and cultural awareness
training to enhance our relations with partner nations. Possible
furloughs, however, will likely disrupt training and professional
development for our civilian employees, while sequestration will impact
our language programs, undercutting the readiness of our assigned
forces.

CONCLUSION

Finally, I would like to extend my personal gratitude to the
outstanding men and women under my command. Day-in and day-out, 1,482
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians work
to enhance the defense of the United States and build enduring
partnerships across Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.
Mr. Chairman, members, although I have spoken extensively about the
impact of drastic spending cuts to our missions and operations, there
is also a human impact. Our dedicated Department of Defense civilians
and servicemembers--our people--will disproportionally suffer the long-
term damages sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the
defense budget will inflict. U.S. Southern Command is committed to
ensuring the security and stability of the Western Hemisphere, and I
hope Congress will demonstrate its commitment to our great nation, its
people, and its military by resolving budget uncertainty and preventing
the devastating effects of sequestration. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
committee members, I stand ready for your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Kelly.
Let's try an 8-minute first round.
General Jacoby, let me start with you. Last week, Secretary
Hagel announced plans to deploy an additional 14 GBIs in Alaska
to help stay ahead of an evolving missile threat from North
Korea. He also indicated that we would not deploy these
interceptors unless we have confidence from flight testing that
they're going to work as intended.
Do you support the plan that Secretary Hagel announced last
week?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that before we deploy these
interceptors that it is essential to demonstrate the correction
of the CE-2 kill vehicle in an operationally realistic
intercept flight test so that we can have some confidence that
it will work as intended?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, as a warfighter I do.
Chairman Levin. Now, General Jacoby, last Friday Secretary
Hagel and the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Winnefeld, both said that the currently deployed GMD system,
with its 30 interceptors in Alaska and California, currently
defends all of the United States against long-range missile
threats from either North Korea or Iran.
Do you agree that the current system protects all of the
United States against those long-range missile threats from
nations such as North Korea and Iran, including the east coast
as of now?
General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, we have coverage against both
Iran and North Korea with the current system.
Chairman Levin. For the entire United States?
General Jacoby. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Including the east coast at the moment?
General Jacoby. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, I asked you last year about the idea
of an east coast missile defense site and you said at that time
we did not have a requirement for such a site and no plans to
deploy one. Since then we have in our defense authorization
bill required that there be an assessment, an environmental
assessment of various sites on the east coast. Of course,
there's been a modification of the Phased Adaptive plan so that
it's now Europe that is covered by that plan.
Is it possible in the future that we'll be able to defend
all of the United States from an Iranian long-range missile
threat without needing an east coast missile defense site?
General Jacoby. Senator, as I testified last year, the
condition is still the same. We currently can defend the entire
United States from an Iranian long-range missile threat. The
question is how do we stay ahead of an evolving Iranian threat
and how do we keep our options open for the continued evolution
of either Iranian or North Korean threats. The threat of
ballistic missiles is not going down.
Chairman Levin. So that we don't know yet whether it will
be possible in the future to have that kind of defense against
an Iranian threat without an east coast site? It may or may not
be, is that your testimony?
General Jacoby. My testimony is that as the Iranian threat
evolves, we need to be prepared to continue improving the
resiliency, the redundancy, and the agility which I provide to
defend the entire United States. That could include additional
missile sites.
Chairman Levin. It could, but we don't yet know; is that
correct? We just simply want to keep that option open, but as
of right now we have protection for the entire United States
and we may or may not be able to have that protection depending
on the evolvement of an Iranian missile threat without an east
coast site?
General Jacoby. That's correct, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Phases 1 through 3 of the Phased Adaptive
Approach is going to protect all of NATO Europe against Iranian
missile threats by 2018. Phase 1 was deployed at the end of
2011. Phase 2 is due to be deployed in 2015, including a so-
called Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Phase 3 is planned to be
deployed in 2018 with an Aegis Ashore site in Poland.
Will this plan and capability provide in fact better
coverage of Europe than the previous plan, General?
General Jacoby. Senator, I believe that as rolled out, I
think that we are making steady improvements in the plan.
Chairman Levin. Is this plan as far as you're concerned
going to protect all of NATO Europe against Iranian missile
threats you 2018?
General Jacoby. I would defer to the EUCOM commander.
Chairman Levin. I'm sorry. I really did intend this to go
to Admiral Stavridis. Forgive me.
Admiral Stavridis. That's fine. Yes is the answer.
Chairman Levin. These questions should have been addressed,
these last two questions, to you, Admiral. I'm sorry.
Is this Phase 1 through 3 approach that is now the approach
that has been adopted a solid approach and do you support it?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is it at least as good an approach as the
previous one and perhaps better?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it fulfills the capability and
the requirements, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. So would you say it's at least
as good an approach?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do the Europeans like this approach?
Admiral Stavridis. So far, so good. I will know more when I
get back to Europe and have a chance to talk to them later this
week.
Chairman Levin. Now, Admiral, let me ask you about
Afghanistan. Are the Africa security forces on track to assume
the security lead throughout Afghanistan later this spring?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, they are. They currently have
87 percent of the population under their remit and that will go
up to 100 percent this year.
Chairman Levin. Do you support the President's decision to
draw down 34,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by February 2014?
Admiral Stavridis. From where we sit today, I think that
looks like a good--looks militarily supportable.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, will NATO support--excuse me. Will
NATO negotiate a status of forces agreement with Afghanistan
applicable to any NATO forces participating in a post-2014
mission in the same way that we are negotiating a status of
forces agreement to protect U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan
after 2014?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, that is the intent.
Chairman Levin. Is this a parallel negotiation? Is it one
negotiation?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, it's going to be sequential.
We're going to conclude the U.S. Bilateral Security Agreement,
it's called, and then we will move forward with the NATO one
after that, using the United States one as a basis.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, relative to Syria: In your
prepared statement you outlined the impact of the civil war in
Syria on certain parts of your AOR. Can you give us some of the
NATO or European thinking as to whether or not the alliance
should increase its involvement in Syria through direct lethal
support to the opposition, possibly the creation of
humanitarian buffer zones, and possibly the destruction of
Syria's air defenses or part of Syria's air defenses?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, as we all know, the Syrian
situation continues to become worse and worse and worse--70,000
killed, a million refugees pushed out of the country, probably
2.5 internally displaced, no end in sight to a vicious civil
war. The alliance has taken a position that it will follow the
same sequence that was used in Libya, which is to say prior to
NATO involvement there would have to be a U.N. Security Council
resolution, regional agreement, and agreement among the 28
nations.
So within NATO channels what we are focused on is defending
that border with Syria and, as you alluded to, chairman, in
your statement, we've moved Patriot missiles down to do that.
In terms of what else is happening, on an individual nation
by nation basis there's a great deal of discussion of
everything you mentioned--lethal support, no-fly zones, arms
embargoes, et cetera. It is moving individually within the
Nations, but it has not yet come into NATO as an overall NATO
type approach. The NATO piece at the moment, again, is focused
defensively, planning, being prepared, but the movement at the
moment is in the individual national capitals.
Chairman Levin. Finally, does that movement include at
least some countries that are thinking about the possibility of
going after at least some of Syria's air defense?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Good. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I sure want to get some clarification out of you guys on
this thing, because I'm very disturbed over some of the answers
that you just gave. I know that, General Jacoby, perhaps that
would have been better asked of the Admiral. However, you're
responsible for the Homeland. When we talk about the capability
of Iran we're talking about both Western Europe and eastern
United States. You both agree with that.
If you're saying that the GBI in Poland along with the
radar that was in the Czech Republic was something that--I
think we all agreed at the time that was primarily for that
protection, the eastern United States. Yes, we have GBIs. We
all agree that we're glad we went back to 44 instead of 30. But
that's still primarily--and I'm comfortable with anything
coming from that direction.
We're talking about Iran now. Now, when you say that you're
comfortable--I ask probably you, Admiral--with what we have in
the place of what was taken down to accomplish that, is that
depending upon the SM-3 IIA in any way?
Admiral Stavridis. As I see the landscape for the European
defensive piece of this, Senator, from Phase 1, 2, and 3, I
think it will pace the Iranian threat through that period, and
it would include therefore the SM-3 IIA as the 2018 weapon that
would provide the coverage for Europe.
Senator Inhofe. Europe and eastern United States?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. I defer to Chuck on that, but
Phase 1, 2, and 3 is strictly for European defense. Over to
Chuck on how the Homeland----
Senator Inhofe. All right, General Jacoby. You and I have
talked about this before. Tell me, how do you assess the threat
to the eastern United States with our capability right now?
General Jacoby. We have a plan that's based on limited
defense of the entire United States and, given the threat that
is represented by Iran to the eastern United States today, we
can cover that threat. The question is making sure that we
outpace that threat as it evolves.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral, you say yes, you need the SM-3
IIA, and yet our intelligence, as you heard me say several
times and we talked about it in my office, would give us the
system by--Iran would have a weapon and a delivery system by
2015. That's been in our intelligence estimate since 2007. We
had General Kehler in here and he said, when I asked him that
question--this is a quote now. He said: ``I'm confident that we
can defend against a limited attack from Iran, although we are
not in the most optimum position''--``posture to do that
today.''
Do you agree with him?
Admiral Stavridis. I think today what we have is the Phase
1 system, which is the SM-3 IA, a radar in Turkey, Aegis ship
at sea. I would agree with him that we are not optimally
positioned, and the faster we can bring on the additional
phases the better, absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. Wouldn't we be better off if we had stayed
with a system that would give us that capability by 2015, which
was what they were anticipating at that time? Not that it makes
a lot of difference. That was done. It shouldn't have been
done, but it was done 4 years ago. But nonetheless I don't want
to put you in that position.
Admiral Stavridis, how will the budget cuts impact the
EUCOM missile defense program called the European Phased
Adaptive--now, I want to ask that question--you've partially
answered it--I'd like to get that for the record, because I
want all the detail in on this as I can get, because I've been
deeply disturbed since the President's first budget came out 4
years ago when we did away with that system.
[The information referred to follows:]

On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced U.S. policy changes
with regard to Ballistic Missile Defense, including Phase 4 of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA Phase 4 was cancelled
and the prime component of Phase 4--the SM-3 Block IIB--was put on
hold. EPAA Phases 1-3, including Polish and Romanian ``Aegis Ashore''
sites, will provide the ballistic missile defense resources to meet the
requirements to defend U.S. interests and support American commitments
to our allies. The loss of EPAA Phase 4 will have no effect on EUCOM's
regional ballistic missile defense requirements, but EUCOM will not
have the capability to engage in the active defense of the U.S.
Homeland.

Senator Inhofe. Now, by the way, it wasn't just that we did
away with the GBIs in Poland and the radar in the Czech
Republic. It was that we had told them that we were going to do
that. I always will remember when Vaclav Klaus--and I was with
him. This would have been back when they first agreed to do
this. He said: ``You know, we're taking a lot of risk here.
We're upsetting Russia. We want to make sure that you don't
pull the rug out from under us if we agree to this.'' I said:
``Absolutely, that won't happen.'' Of course that's what did
happen.
The situation that we have right now in Africa is very much
dependent upon the command that has all the assets there. In my
office, in talking about the SOUTHCOM, you talked about the
amount of drugs that are taking place right now and the
proliferation of drugs. I remember when you had that command,
Admiral, you said the same thing.
I'd like to have you share with us, with this panel, the
seriousness of that drug problem that is down there and how the
drug cartel--no one's paying that much attention to it now. But
is that producing a lot of assets that are eventually going up
into western, southern, and northern Africa? Right now they're
getting the money from someplace, and I think you would
probably share that that's one of the major areas of financing
that activity in Mali and other areas.
General Kelly. Yes, sir. There's two aspects in--let's talk
cocaine primarily here. There's cocaine that comes into the
United States in large amounts and has a very adverse effect,
obviously, and a very expensive effect on our country. Then
there's a great deal of cocaine produced--and all of that
cocaine that comes to the United States is primarily from
Colombia. I have to give them a shout-out. They have done a
tremendous job working shoulder-to-shoulder with us. They have
tremendous appreciation for what the U.S. Government and its
people have done for them over the years to defend against the
traffickers and the insurgents that they've dealt with.
They have fallen, if you will, to the number three
producers of cocaine in the world. Number one and number two
are Peru and Bolivia. The vast majority, in fact I would say
100 percent, of that cocaine goes into Brazil. Brazil is now
the number two consumer of cocaine and also is the traffic
path, if you will, to Africa and then further to Europe.
As I mentioned, Brazil is the number two consumer. When the
cocaine gets to the west coast of Africa by various means,
Africa is not a particularly big consumer of cocaine, but it's
a trafficking route up to northern--to the north and to Western
Europe, which is a very big consumer of cocaine. Everyone takes
a little bit. All the cartels, all the bad guys along the way,
take a little bit of a cut.
So an awful lot of what's going on in West Africa in
particular and then up through the Maghreb, there is a fair
amount of----
Senator Inhofe. So a lot of it is coming from there and is
being channeled up there, because somewhere a lot of money is
appearing on the scene in those areas around Mali and that
portion of Africa.
General Kelly. Exactly. Exactly right, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. One last thing. This morning I was on a
talk show with a rather liberal host, who was--we were arguing
this thing, which we had a modest disagreement and hopefully
it'll be cleared up by information on the record, about Iran.
The response was: They're not going to do anything because they
know they'd be blown off the map immediately.
He didn't use the term, but what he was talking about was
the old relic that used to work, mutual assured destruction.
Are the three of you as confident with the threat that would
come from a party such as Iran, that mutual assured destruction
has the deterrent value that it did back in the days of the
Cold War, just real quickly?
Admiral Stavridis. I think Iran is a very difficult nation
to assess, so I think it would be less certain as a
proposition.
Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby?
General Jacoby. I think they're very different, very
different strategic contexts, and I think we have to be wide-
eyed with how we approach Iran. As the commander responsible
for the defense of the Homeland, we are going to focus on the
defend piece of this. That's not part of mutually assured
destruction, and I think it's appropriate.
Senator Inhofe. That's a tool in the quiver, though.
General?
General Kelly. No.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I particularly want
to thank Admiral Stavridis for his extraordinary service in
many different capacities. As you leave your command, thank
you, sir, for your efforts.
Let me just begin with a question to Admiral Stavridis.
Part of our long-term strategy with respect to Afghanistan,
since it's a NATO operation as well as a United States
operation, is continued support for the Africa security forces.
Given the economic crises in Europe today, what's your
perspective about their long-term commitment to supporting
these international efforts?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think the Europeans will stay
with us in Afghanistan. Historically, they've provided about
one soldier for every two of ours, so about 33, 35 percent of
the total force. That holds true today. There's 68,000 U.S. and
about 35,000, 40,000 Europeans there.
I think they will key on the United States' commitment in
the post-2014 period. I think if the United States has 10,000
troops there, I think the Europeans would come in with 5,000 or
even 6,000 troops. My sense is they want to be with us in this
mission. They believe in it, and I think they, like us, are
cautiously optimistic that, despite all the challenges, if we
stay steady post-2014, we have a good follow-up mission there,
that this can succeed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Let me ask all you gentlemen the same question, but from
your perspectives as commanders in different areas of the
world. We had General Alexander here recently, who talked about
cyber. It's a new dimension of warfare. It's evolving very
quickly. From the perspective of EUCOM and from NORTHCOM and
from SOUTHCOM, can you just give quick impressions of what you
think the biggest challenges are, starting with Admiral
Stavridis?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think cyber is the area where we
have the biggest mismatch between our level of preparation,
which is relatively low, and the level of threat, which is
relatively high. In other words, we talk a lot and think about
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), specific enemies
around the world. We spend a lot of time preparing for those.
In cyber I don't think we've done that level of preparation as
yet, and you know that better than most from your conversations
here with General Alexander.
The good news is, from a European perspective, here is a
pool of partners who are quite advanced in this area. The
British, the French, the Germans are all quite capable. NATO as
a whole is seized with this. We've created a center for cyber
security in Tallinn, Estonia, a nation that suffered a cyber
attack.
So I think as we move forward with this, the ideas of
partnership and linkages in NATO and in Europe are going to be
a positive aspect of it, and I'm working with General Alexander
on that.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Jacoby, your perspective?
General Jacoby. Senator, from NORTHCOM's perspective, my
principal role will be to respond to a cyber event, just as I
do to any support to civil authorities. It's a very difficult
challenge for us because it's more like an earthquake than it
is a hurricane. It'll be in network speed, so it'll be probably
unannounced, and we'll have effects rapidly.
We're working closely with FEMA on modeling, along with
Cyber Command. What could the effects be across various systems
and critical infrastructure? Also, defending the Homeland, I
think there were important steps made with the Executive order
and the PPD that helps us start better defining roles and
responsibilities of agencies and organizations within the
Homeland.
There's a lot of work to be done on that, though. It's
complicated and we're going to have to continue exercising and
training against that threat.
Senator Reed. Your preliminary estimate is that for a
reasonable threat that exists today, the cost to the country
could be staggering in terms of a----
General Jacoby. I think that we had a glimpse of the kinds
of cascading effects that you can have from a cyber attack in
Hurricane Sandy, when you saw the amount of power outages and
the ripple effect that that had across not just the State; but
a region, across not just people, but the economy. I think that
was a glimpse of the kinds of effects that you could create
with a cyber attack. So that's why it has our attention.
Senator Reed. That's why in individual industries, given
the potential catastrophic costs, preventive, preemptive action
today would be more than cost justified in your----
General Jacoby. Senator, I think that the President's PPD
sets some standards and goals, and identifies the correct
relationships between commercial, private, and government. But
I think there's a lot of work that still needs to be done on
the gaps and seams that could exist between those.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Kelly, from your perspective in SOUTHCOM?
General Kelly. Senator, I'm not sure I could add that Jim
Stavridis and Chuck haven't already mentioned. I will say this,
though, to give some perspective. Throughout my AOR, it's
probably the one single threat that every nation down there,
whether they're particularly friendly to us or not, it's the
one single threat they talk to us a lot about and ask for our
help. We're trying to give them that, but don't have much in
the way of that capability at SOUTHCOM right now.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Kelly, too, one of your major efforts is
counternarcotics, interdiction, et cetera. I presume that
you're seeing huge pressures as naval forces are withdrawn
because of budget pressures. But also, can you comment on the
role of Coast Guard, because even though it's not the
jurisdiction of this committee, I presume that it plays a very
large role, too. If they're not able to deploy ships into your
AOR that could degrade your ability to respond to narcotics.
General Kelly. Yes, sir. Senator, first of all, the Coast
Guard plays a very big role in my life and I think I play a big
role in their life down in that part of the world. We are
partners joined at the hip and shoulder to shoulder. But as you
say, even without sequestration I occupy a seat that is very
definitely the economy of force seat of all of the combatant
commanders. So we didn't get much then and we get just about
zero now if sequestration stands.
What that translates to is last year roughly we got 150 to
200 tons of cocaine on the high seas, Coast Guard and U.S. Navy
shoulder to shoulder. Next year all of that will make its way
ashore and into the United States. So sequestration in
particular--didn't have much before and we'll have just about
nothing if sequestration stands.
Senator Reed. Let me tell you, not much has changed. In
1969 I was with the 4th of the Tenth Infantry at Fort Gulick,
the economy of force was quite obvious even then. So at least
that's consistent.
One area that's been mentioned before is the foreign
policy, if not the military role, of Iran and China in areas
like SOUTHCOM. Have you noticed a significant increase in
activity, not military activity, but diplomatic activity,
economic activity, by both these countries?
General Kelly. The short answer is absolutely. One of the
things I'm supposed to be doing down there is making sure the
United States remains the partner of choice in Latin America.
But a partnership is a two-way thing, I think you'd agree, and
it's very one-way now. They very much want the United States in
their lives, with the exception of the two or three of four of
them, very much want the United States in their lives.
So we don't bring much any more. We have great trading
relationships with them. We have great military-to-military
contact. But when you have an organization like the Chinese
come in there, just economically powerful, spending a lot of
money, whether they're increasing infrastructure at ports, the
Panama Canal, or just going in and buying everything that they
want in large quantities--so that partnership with China is
very strong.
They do the best they can to establish military-to-military
partnerships and they do pretty well in that. So that's China.
On the Iranian side, we've seen a fairly significant
increase in their desire to establish relationships. Obviously,
Venezuela to date has been kind of the central core of that.
But over the last several years they've done pretty well in
other locations. They don't really need, now that Chavez is
gone, regardless of what happens in Venezuela, they don't
really need that support any more. They have some positive
relationships.
Some of these things, who knows where they're going? It's
not a huge threat now. But I think anywhere they go,
particularly when they go to a region that is completely
different than they are culturally, religiously, and all the
rest, I think they bear watching.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses for being
here and their outstanding and dedicated work, especially you,
Admiral. This is probably your last appearance before this
committee and we thank you for your years of outstanding and
dedicated service to the country.
I'd like to ask each of you as succinctly as possible if
you could tell us the specific impact that it's having and will
have on the morale and readiness, and including retention, of
sequestration within your AORs. Maybe begin with you, Admiral.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. It is obviously significant
and negative in all elements that you mentioned. I want to
begin by saying the particular area that I'm concerned about in
morale and retention is in our civilian workforce, where we
have these marvelous civilians who do extraordinary work, stand
with us every single day, and yet they are facing the
possibility of furloughs, 20 percent pay cuts, and so forth.
My own headquarters is reduced by about 25 percent in terms
of our efficiency and our ability to support our missions. Our
actual operations in the Balkans, in the Levant, our ISR,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, are all reduced at
about that level. I'm cancelling about 140 security assistance
programs that help us build this base of support I was talking
to Senator Reed about in Afghanistan.
Indeed, even on the family side, the impact on our
children, who are going to be facing school day cuts and
furloughs of their teachers is significant and is part of this
whole challenge for us.
Then as we look forward and we look at the cuts in force
structure and platforms that are coming, overall it's a very
difficult and challenging picture, sir.
General Jacoby. Senator, many of the same comments as Jim
had. I would say that we're the command with the most civilian
personnel assigned to the command. They work across all of my
mission sets to defend the Homeland to support civil
authorities, and to work with our partners in the region. So
this is having a significant impact on them and their families
as they look forward to some real uncertainty in what's the
take-home benefit here.
I would also say from a soldier's point of view on this,
Senator, you know we have a generation and a force out there
that knows what right looks like, and they know it's not right
that they don't have the tools that they need to train and
maintain readiness. Through 2013 the Services are very
challenged to meet their readiness requirements and 2014 is
really unknown at this point.
I do not have a lot of assigned forces to defend the
Homeland. I count on trained, ready, and available forces from
the Services. So degradation in Service capabilities that
provide me the F-16s that I do Operation Noble Eagle with, to
the mobile training teams that form the basis of our
partnership with our Mexican partners--all of those things are
under stress right now and are part of the sequestration bill
on the force.
General Kelly. Senator, the immediate impact on SOUTHCOM is
our counterdrug interdiction, detention, and monitoring
operations will go to zero.
Senator McCain. You just said that you would not be able to
interdict the drugs next year that you were able to this year.
General Kelly. Exactly right.
On the engagement piece, I've had to cancel probably 50
percent of my engagements. These are small-term engagements.
These are training exercises that might involve 12 or 15
soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines or something like that.
There's a sense, however, as we go down this road--and I
certainly can talk to the Latin American countries. There's a
sense that they have that we are withdrawing. Partnership is
important, but it has to be a two-way street. They have to
believe we'll stay engaged. I don't think, increasingly I don't
think they believe that, which changes a large part of the
strategic equations, I think, for our country.
Then on the morale issue, Jim Stavridis talked about his
civilians. I would ditto that. Our civilians are great folks.
Senator McCain. What about the desire of the uniformed
military, the real good ones, to stay in?
General Kelly. I think the Senator knows----
Senator McCain. I notice that all three are----
General Kelly. I have time in the ranks. I was a former
enlisted marine. I admittedly look at a lot of these things
through a sergeant's eyes and I'm proud of that. They're
wondering what the heck's going on. Less than 6 or 8 months ago
they were ``Thank you for your service'' and ``You guys are the
greatest'' and ``You fought the wars.'' The families, the Gold
Star families, they're confused now because it's now dollars
and cents. I think there's a sense that we've begun to turn our
backs on them, is how I see it.
Senator McCain. So we are--I think from what the witnesses
said we're doing them a grave disservice. For the record, would
you speak----
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
General Jacoby. I concur, Senator.
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis, last year at this hearing I asked if the
North Atlantic Council had directed NATO to do any contingency
planning whatever for possible NATO involvement in Syria. Is
NATO doing any military planning now for any potential Syria
contingencies?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we are. We are looking at a wide
range of operations and we are prepared, if called upon, to be
engaged, as we were in Libya.
Senator McCain. NATO has deployed Patriot missile batteries
to southern Turkey to defend Turkey against contingencies in
Syria. Are those Patriot missiles capable of shooting down
aircraft?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, they are.
Senator McCain. Are they capable of shooting down Scud
missiles?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, they are.
Senator McCain. Are they effective in a 20-mile range?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Can they be positioned in southern Turkey
in such a way they could shoot down some of Assad's aircraft?
Admiral Stavridis. Depending on range and altitude, yes,
sir.
Senator McCain. Would you agree that shooting down a few
Syrian aircraft would serve as a powerful disincentive for
pilots to fly in that area?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that whenever aircraft are shot
down that is a powerful disincentive.
Senator McCain. Is it your opinion, Admiral, that it is
time that we help the Syrian opposition in ways that would
break what is a prolonged civil war?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that that option should be and
is being actively explored by all the Nations who are looking
at this.
Senator McCain. But could I ask your personal opinion?
Admiral Stavridis. You can. My personal opinion is that
would be helpful in breaking the deadlock and bringing down the
Assad regime.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
General Kelly and General Jacoby, we are engaged in
comprehensive immigration reform. Obviously, coming from a
southern, a southwestern State, the issue of border security is
very important. The focus is on immigration of illegal people
crossing our border illegally, but both of you have pointed out
that a primary reason for border security is the flow of drugs.
Isn't it true--I think, General, you told me that the
majority of drugs, cocaine, that comes into the United States
comes across our southern border? Maybe you could talk a little
bit about the challenges that we face in securing this Nation
from the flow of drugs, as well as that of people who come to
this country illegally?
General Jacoby. I'll start with that, Senator. NORTHCOM
supports civil authority on the southwest border, principally
law enforcement agencies and DHS, through Customs and Border
Patrol. We do that by fulfilling requests for support and
providing some unique military capabilities to do that. It's to
our mutual benefit to do that.
It's my opinion that borders should be the best part of the
relationship between two countries. We have a tremendous
trading relationship across that border, so there is a tension
between the security and the economic piece of this.
I think that, as well as we do in security across the
border, we will always be in a position of needing to improve
it, because we are dealing with an adaptive, ruthless,
relentless criminal organization. So in the end our experience
has been--or I'll speak for myself. My experience has been that
we're going to have to take on the network on both sides of the
border and in all of the areas of responsibility to really have
an effect on security.
Senator McCain. You would agree that technology is really
the answer? People are important, but the lessons and
technology we've developed in Iraq and Afghanistan in the form
of drones, in the form of sensors, they are really key
elements, I think. Is it your view--do you agree?
General Jacoby. I absolutely agree that all of our partners
should be leveraging every technical capability we can. We've
seen that be effective across a number of borders that we've
worked.
General Kelly. I'll comment on any you want, obviously,
Senator, but on the technology issue----
Senator McCain. Flow of drugs first. You mentioned to me--
--
General Kelly. Flow of drugs. In the so-called transit
zone, the drugs come up from South America in very large--
talking cocaine here--in very, very large, multiple ton
packages. Once it gets ashore in Honduras and starts to flow
through Guatemala--and by the way, the Hondurans, these are
great partners. They are really with us in this fight, to the
tune of tens--many thousands of deaths a year.
But once it gets ashore in Guatemala, in Honduras, and
starts to flow through Guatemala, gets up into Mexico, which is
again outside of my zone but a tremendous partner, it
essentially enters a distribution system that is at least as
effective as Federal Express. It is moved, broken down into
packages, and makes its way across our southern border.
As I mentioned yesterday in an office call with you,
virtually all of the heroin that comes into the United States
is produced in Mexico, makes its way across the border, and
that applies to methamphetamines as well. It's almost all
produced outside the country and makes its way across the
border.
On the technology issue, there's a time--and this wasn't
Kelly's idea. My predecessor put this together. Rather than
have U.S. Navy ships and Coast Guard cutters just meandering
their way across the ocean looking for people, they have it
down to such a science down there now, basically using ISR,
electronic intercepts, and a lot of other means, highly
technical means, essentially they can tell a U.S. Navy ship, we
can tell a U.S. Navy ship or cutter, to go to a certain
location on the ocean, kind of look off the starboard bow, and
you see that guy going 40 knots, stop him. He has 4\1/2\ tons,
and by the way, they can almost always give the name of the
driver.
So the technology piece is huge. In my AOR it resulted in
150, 200 tons that we know of of cocaine taken off the market.
Senator McCain. Could I just say, but the flow of cocaine
into the United States of America has not appreciably
decreased. Is that correct?
General Kelly. There is plenty of cocaine on the streets of
Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles. So we get a lot. The shout-
out again to Columbia; they get a lot on our behalf. Honduras,
Guatemala, they get a lot, El Salvador. But we could do a lot
more, but there's enough getting through, obviously, Senator,
yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just the follow that question, General Kelly, what more can
and should the United States do in your command and potentially
others?
General Kelly. If you're speaking, Senator, about drugs,
just more assets. As I say, we're very, very good at locating--
we understand the network certainly south of Mexico, and I can
only speak to that. We understand the network very, very, very
well. We can vector airborne ISR assets, all sorts of
airplanes, any airplane, to look for them. Once we identify
them, we can then tell surface ships to pick up, whether
they're go-fast boats or whatever.
A key point here, if I could. If we get the--if we get the
drivers of the boats, we can very quickly turn that, because
they enter our legal justice system. Honduras, Guatemala,
places like that are extremely helpful to us, but if they get
the drivers of the boats or the pilots of the airplanes, we
don't get the same turnaround in intelligence just because of
the nature of the network.
But they're with us. More assets equal more tonnage. Less
assets equal less tonnage.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me pursue the illegal drug
trafficking question with a question about human trafficking,
that is the flow of people, in effect, who are exploited either
with bad working conditions, substandard working conditions
there or in this country, sex exploitation and so forth. To
what extent has that been a concern and what measures can be
taken against it?
General Kelly. Let me----
Senator Blumenthal. I'll ask all three of you that
question, if I may?
General Kelly. We watch an awful lot of flow that come in
from the Middle East, come into the traffic pattern, if you
will, in Latin America, and then they disappear up into the
United States. So it's a network. It's highly efficient.
Anything that gets on that network, if you can pay for it, has
a pretty good chance of getting through.
So I look at high-value, high-interest people. You don't
pay a lot of money to come from, say, Pakistan, fly to Latin
America, and then get up into the United States. We're not
talking about the kind of people who are economic refugees.
They have other business, if you will.
I think Chuck Jacoby probably has an answer on the other
part of this.
Senator Blumenthal. General Jacoby.
General Jacoby. Senator, I think the thing that all of this
illicit activity has in common, whether it's people, drugs,
money, or weapons--is this complex criminal network that has
grown in size, capacity, ruthlessness, and the ability to find
the vulnerabilities across our broad frontier, within nations
that are good partners with us: Central and South America,
Europe, and Mexico.
So they are exploiting weak institutions or just
vulnerabilities that exist. So in my view, after looking at
this closely--and John and I talk about it a lot--more steps
that we take to put pressure to disrupt and defeat this network
is, I believe, the really high payoff activity in terms of all
of the illicit activity. Whether it's people, whether it's
drugs, whether it's money or weapons, it is a very powerful
organization that really hasn't been taken on in the way it
should.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Could I, two quick points on that. One
is, in addition to everything Chuck just reeled off that moves
on these networks, we need to remember the truly dark edge of
the spectrum is WMD. These routes, the ability to move ten tons
of cocaine in a mini-sub, well, if you can move 10 tons of
cocaine you can put a crude nuclear device in that and move it
into the homeland. So that's what I really worry about as the
SOUTHCOM commander, and I think it is also very pertinent today
when you look at proliferation.
The second point, to the drug question. We talked a lot
about cocaine. There's also a heroin issue. Heroin of course
comes from opium, from poppy, 80 percent of which is produced
in Afghanistan. So there's another narcotic flow, if you will,
that comes up through the Balkans, across Europe, and into the
United States, that is worth considering as we discuss this
trafficking point.
I completely agree with my fellow combatant commanders here
that these trafficking routes are crucial elements of 21st
century security that don't get enough attention.
Senator Blumenthal. Are these----
General Kelly. Senator, if I could just comment.
Senator Blumenthal. I'm sorry. Go ahead.
General Kelly. The fact that an awful lot gets onto this
traffic pattern and into the United States, I think we have to
acknowledge the fact that we have hundreds and even thousands
of very, very, very dedicated law enforcement personnel. I have
them. I think we probably all have them in our headquarters--
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Treasury, Border Patrol
agents.
These people are hugely dedicated people that are fighting
this fight shoulder to shoulder with us. So we have to
acknowledge, I think, the fact that we have--they're not in
uniform, or at least they don't wear military uniforms. We need
to give them the credit that they're due, a very, very tough
job. But they're overwhelmed by the, as Chuck points out, the
intricacy and the efficiency of this networking, the
ruthlessness of it. But we need to remember they're true heroes
in every sense of the word.
Senator Blumenthal. These networks really are not only
ruthless, they're also relentless, because the amounts of money
are so huge. I agree with you that our civilian law enforcement
authorities, which at a prior point in our history would have
been relied on completely to combat these networks, now has
been outgunned and outmanned and outresourced by those criminal
networks.
So we've relied increasingly on the great work that you and
the men and women under your command have done. I wonder
whether you feel that either more resources to them or more
coordination with you is perhaps an answer to dealing with
these networks?
General Kelly. If I understand the question, Senator, I'm a
believer in the away game. I go back to the efficiency of what
we do in SOUTHCOM with the U.S. Coast Guard and all the
interagency, whole-of-government partners that we have across
the U.S. Government, not to mention our partners. So when I
talk in terms of what we do in the south, I talk in terms of
multiple tons at a time, 10 to 20, in that range.
Once it gets ashore and gets into this landward trafficking
network, the efficiency of it is just unbelievable. These large
amounts are broken down into very small amounts and smuggled
across the border in thousands of trunks, floorboards,
containers. In my opinion the place to get it is before it ever
gets ashore.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you share that view, General Jacoby?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I do. The border itself is
not the optimum place to stop this, where it's in small loads,
it's in tunnels, it's in ultralights, it's in Panga boats that
are going around the coast. So the industrial work that can be
done, larger than that though, I believe are these global
networks that we need to treat as threat networks, that
threaten our security. We need to come up with the policies and
the partnerships to put pressure on this network and this
network of networks: the financiers, the leaders, the
logistics, the operators, all the folks that we've learned how
to go after in our threat network work that we've done in the
past.
Admiral Stavridis. Could I just add, one thing we've done,
speaking of the away game, in EUCOM is put together a joint
interagency counter-trafficking center, kind of modeled on
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, the one down in Key
West. Very low-cost, whole of government, bring in the partners
and try and find and get at these routes, land, sea, and air.
It's that whole-of-government interagency approach that will
succeed.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I want to thank you all for your very helpful testimony and
for your extraordinary service to our Nation. I think, General
Kelly, your testimony about morale and the need to make sure
that we maintain what attracts the best and brightest and
bravest to our military is very much on point at this time in
our history.
Thank you all for your service and your testimony today.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, to each of you, thanks for your service, thanks
for your leadership. To all the men and women that serve under
you, please convey to them our heartfelt thanks for their great
commitment to freedom.
Admiral, I'll echo what the chairman said to start with.
We're going to miss you. You've been such a great asset to our
country. You've also been a good friend. So we're sorry to see
you go, but we're very thankful for your service.
There's a press report today that there may have been the
use of chemical weapons in Syria. There are allegations being
thrown from both sides, the rebel side and the government side.
Any information you can tell us about that with respect to the
use of chemical weapons, particularly in the Aleppo area where
it's alleged?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think I'd best take that for the
record and provide that at a classified level.
[The information referred to follows:]

At this time we cannot confirm anything with respect to alleged
chemical weapons use in Aleppo. The international community had
proposed investigating chemical weapons use in Syria--which would
include Aleppo but I understand such an investigation is held up over
questions of scope and jurisdiction.

Senator Chambliss. Okay. With regard to Benghazi, Admiral,
I know you were put on high alert during the course of the
attack that took place at the mission and the annex. There were
lots of failures, it looks like, from an intel standpoint as
well as some issues of leadership regarding what should have
been done. Can you give us your look-back now from the
perspective that you had then with what you were being told and
give us a lessons learned on Benghazi?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think my job from EUCOM was to
serve, if you will, as the back office for Carter Ham. I know
Carter has been up and testified and I understand he's going to
provide a detailed classified for-the-record kind of timetable
of how this unfolded.
What we did and what I saw was immediately after the attack
we started chopping assets to General Ham, starting with ISR,
so we could get Predator coverage up overhead. We began moving,
at General Ham's request, the Commander's In Extremis Force,
which was under his and my joint operational control. He took
control of that, moved it from Croatia to Sigonella.
He requested and we moved two FAST teams, these Marine
Corps quick response teams, from Rota to Souda Bay in Crete. We
spun up all of our C-130s and C-17s. We tried to, from a EUCOM
perspective, to just push forces south and forward to General
Ham.
I think to the degree there are lessons learned here, you
alluded to the intelligence piece, which I think is really the
critical thing, because we have to defend hundreds of these
critical locations all around the world. We need to ensure that
as the intelligence breaks we are reacting as quickly as we
can. Time and distance are a tyranny of their own.
I think the bottom line from this particular incident from
a EUCOM perspective is the value of having these bases in
Europe so that we can move these forces forward, and even
within the European area we can move them from the north to the
south and get as close to the action as possible to support the
combatant commander who's in charge, in this case Carter Ham.
So that's a quick overview, sir. I can provide a little bit
more on the record from a classified perspective as well.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. We'll ask that you do that on both
of those questions, relative to Syria and any additional
classified info on this.
General Kelly, during the SOUTHCOM budget hearings for
fiscal year 2013 General Fraser commented on the capability of
the Joint STARS platform in the region that was successfully
being utilized to interdict drug trafficking and detection and
monitoring of wide-area surveillance. Currently the 116th from
Robins flies two Joint STARS missions per month in support of
your operation at SOUTHCOM from a counternarcotics standpoint.
Can you enlighten us as to the use of Joint STARS and what
future plans you have to leverage this asset, as well as other
ISR platforms in your region?
General Kelly. Senator, JSTARS is very important in what we
do in the counterdrug effort. We're probably going to lose our
JSTARS support because of sequestration, so that's essentially
off the table. But they're hugely effective in that wide-area
look as we begin the process of identifying the drug
traffickers as they come up out of the northern tier of--
primarily Colombia and Venezuela.
If we lose that, it makes it harder. But that's the
reality. All ISR--and we use anything--much of the ISR we use
is--an example, are ISR that are just out on training missions.
We have like bombers as an example, that are going to go up and
train anyways. U.S. Air Force will vector them down to the
Caribbean area. They get their training, they get their flight
time, and they help us out.
So a lot of it was whatever fell off the table or whatever
I or General Fraser, better than I am at it, what he could beg
out of the services. That basically is going away, so it'll
make it infinitely more difficult to identify the patterns in
the not-too-distant future.
Senator Chambliss. I hope with maybe some flexibility that
we're giving to all of your commands in the CR that hopefully
will get completed in the next couple of days, maybe we can
figure out a way to continue to utilize some of those
platforms.
General Kelly, again, with the demise of Hugo Chavez, what
can you tell us about the future leadership in Venezuela, plus
relationships with the United States? Is it going to improve,
is it going to denigrate? Which way is it going to go?
General Kelly. Senator, I think it's safe to say
essentially the rising stars now that Chavez is gone are from
the same point of view, same old crowd, if you will. The
expectation is that the vice president will win the election in
April.
But I think the Senator knows this. The economy there, the
oil production infrastructure, all of that is really on the
edge. It's a very, very violent country. So the vice president
when he wins that election or is likely to win that election is
going to inherit all of the problems that already existed
there, and they're pretty critical.
The one difference is he does not have the charisma that
Chavez had with at least 51 percent of the country. So he has
his hands full. But we don't anticipate--it's really a State
Department question, I think. But from my perspective, we don't
anticipate any real change between our country and the
Venezuelan Government, at least in the short term.
Senator Chambliss. Admiral Stavridis, I was not a proponent
of the START Treaty, primarily because it did not address
tactical nuclear weapons. Now, the Russians we know have
continued to, if not increase their arsenal, certainly
modernize their inventory of tactical weapons. What information
can you give us relative to the continued production of nuclear
weapons or the modernization issue relative to tactical versus
strategic by the Russians?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, at an unclassified level, you are
correct that the Russians continue to have a significant
inventory of tactical nuclear weapons. They are maintained,
they are upgraded. It's part of their planning and their
theory.
I would like to come back again with a classified answer
that would give you a little bit more detail. But it is a
concern and I watch it closely from a NATO perspective.
Senator Chambliss. Again, if you will follow up with us on
that in a classified setting.
Admiral Stavridis. Aye-aye, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your service. Admiral, thank
you so much. General, thank you. General Kelly, thank you so
much. Especially if you would pass that on to all the men and
women who are in harm's way every day, because they don't
always hear it, but they sure are the ones who protect our
freedom.
General Kelly, you had talked about the criminal networks,
all of you have, that we're facing. It is our law enforcement
combined with our military facing these criminal networks. Are
there nations who are working with the criminal networks on the
other side, who are partners with them in a number of these
efforts? What can be done in regards to that? General Kelly or
whoever wants to take the first crack at that?
General Kelly. With the exception of a couple possibilities
in SOUTHCOM, I'm confident that there are no governments--in
fact, I would say across SOUTHCOM there's no governments that
are supportive. But there are high officials within governments
that are supportive, many of them for just their own personal
corruption purposes, but I think many of them--a few of them to
make life a little bit more difficult for the United States.
I'll let it go at that. I wouldn't want to get into the detail
in an open hearing.
Senator Donnelly. Sure.
Admiral Stavridis. I think John is absolutely correct, and
this points to another real concern about these networks. It's
not just the impact on our populations, our youth that are
using the narcotics. The profits are used to corrupt officials,
exactly as John is saying, and that undermines these fragile
democracies.
I do agree with John, I'd be hard-pressed to name a state
that was an identified narco-state. But there are high
officials throughout the region and in certainly Afghanistan
that are involved in this. So it's extremely pernicious.
Senator Donnelly. Do countries like Iran or North Korea
ever work in coordination with them?
Admiral Stavridis. Not as--I'll speak to Iran. Not as--not
as a matter of state policy. In fact, Iran has a very strong
and reasonably effective counternarcotics effort. I know that
because it's on the border with Afghanistan and we have
opportunity to understand what's happening over there. I think
you'd find, if you asked the DEA, that Iran can be very
effective in counternarcotics.
On the other hand, in all of these states in the region I
think there are high officials that are not adverse to being
part of that process for financial gain.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral, in regards to Syria, is there a
fear or is there planning as to if and when Assad falls, fears
of ethnic cleansing, religious cleansing and the danger that
shows us?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, there is a great deal of danger in
the end game scenario in Syria. Of course, I'm not a Syria
expert. That's really General Mattis and CENTCOM. But I watch
it closely because of my NATO hat. The closest analogue I could
give you, sir, is think back to the Balkans in the 1990s, when
we had competing ethnic, demographic, religious groups that
really turned the Balkans into a nightmare for the better part
of 10 years.
We saw in the Balkans 100,000 killed, 1 million people, 2
million people pushed across borders, 2 significant wars, 1 in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1 in Serbia-Kosovo. I think, unfortunately,
that's probably the future in Syria. It's going to be--after
the Assad regime falls, I think there is every potential for a
great deal of revenge killing, inter-religious conflict between
various segments of the population. It's very difficult to see
the pieces of Syria going back together again very easily.
Senator Donnelly. General Kelly, this is a little bit of an
overall general question, which is: What do you see as, other
than the cyber discussions that we had, what do you see as the
greatest threat coming out of SOUTHCOM to our Nation?
General Kelly. Clearly, in my mind it's the network, the
trafficking network that drugs ride on, certainly people ride
on, and potentially WMD that could ride on. As I mentioned a
little earlier, the concern on the part of many of our Latin
American friends and partners is that we're withdrawing, that
there's a lack of interest on our part to continue doing what
we're doing. They want us in their lives for the most part.
Even the countries that are not so friendly to us get great
benefit just from what we're doing there, in not only the drug
trade, but in trade in general. So those are the kind of two
issues, I guess.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral, as we look forward in EUCOM, one
of the discussions on the budget end is, are all the facilities
in EUCOM necessary as we look at where danger is coming from in
years ahead? Do you believe our partnership-building efforts
will result in a smaller U.S. footprint, or is that something
where--would having the flexibility to make those decisions as
to where changes are made, would that be of assistance to you?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes and yes are the two quick answers. I
think, just to put perspective on it, if you recall, 20 or 30
years ago, Cold War, we had 450,000 troops in Europe, 1,200
bases. We've come down 85 percent since then. So we have taken
a great deal of infrastructure out of Europe. As we've talked
about at the hearing this morning, what remains are really
forward operating bases that we need for access into Africa,
the Levant, the near Middle East, and into Central Asia.
Having said all that, we should continue to look at the
basing structure. We have a study that's in progress by the
Department, which will report out at the end of this year. I
think we conceivably could over time draw down a bit further.
It'll depend, exactly as you said, Senator, on partnerships, on
our confidence in access, and how we move within the NATO
alliance.
So I think there is room for continuing analysis of it. I
feel we're positioned about right for the moment in time in
which we find ourselves. But I believe that that downward
trajectory over time will probably continue.
Senator Donnelly. General Jacoby, a little bit of the same
version of what I had asked General Kelly. What do you see as
the greatest threat in NORTHCOM as we look forward, other than
again the cyber piece that we deal with every day?
General Jacoby. I think today, as I said in my opening
statement, we have increased vulnerability in the Homeland, and
it's because I think there's a closer relationship between the
home game and the away game than there's ever been before. To
that end, I worry about my AOR, but I have interests in all of
the other COCOM's as well. For instance, WMD: a WMD getting
into the Homeland is any NORTHCOM commander's nightmare. So
where would that come from? What route would it ride? What
organizations would sponsor it? What threat would seek to
deliver a device like that?
That means I have to be closely connected with all the
other COCOMs and intelligence agencies. We cannot take our eye
off the ball on the terrorist threat and al Qaeda; I think they
still remain determined to attack the United States.
So the terrorist threat has changed over time. It's
manifested itself in different places and different ways. We've
had success against it, but I still believe that they're intent
on attacking the United States.
Finally, the no-notice catastrophic event in the Homeland
and making sure that DOD is not late to need is something that
increasingly occupies my attention. In just the year and a half
I've been the commander, we've had three major hurricanes and
two major wildfires, Hurricane Sandy being the worst of those.
Those really are times where the expectations of our people are
that DOD is going to provide assistance.
So that's kind of the panoply of things that keep me up at
night.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you all for your service and for
what you've done for our country.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, let me do a little follow-up. Senator
Donnelly just asked if and when Assad falls and you discussed
his question about ethnic cleansing. If and when Assad falls,
does EUCOM or NATO have contingency plans to deal with the
Syrian stockpile of chemical weapons?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM does not. That would fall under
General Mattis in CENTCOM.
Senator Wicker. Can you tell us anything about that?
Admiral Stavridis. Not at an unclassified level. But I'm
happy to take that for the record back to General Mattis.
Senator Wicker. Okay, thank you very much.
Now, then to follow up on Senator McCain. He had an
interesting line of questioning with regard to the placement of
Patriot batteries in Turkey. Who put those Patriot batteries
there, Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Those are on NATO mission. They were
assigned by the NATO alliance. There are three nations that
have contributed batteries. The United States is in a place
called Gaziantep. Germany is in a place called Kahramanmaras
and the Dutch are in a place called Adana. All of these are
located in southwestern Turkey along the border, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Was this a decision that was reached by the
NATO leadership or did we do that individually with those, with
those two allies of ours?
Admiral Stavridis. It was a NATO decision and this is a
NATO mission. In fact, although those are the three nations
that have contributed the actual batteries, the entire 28
member nations have people that are part of this mission. For
example, the command and control is made up of people from all
the different countries, connected back through the operational
chain and the headquarters. So it's very much a NATO mission.
Senator Wicker. What did it take within NATO to make that
decision?
Admiral Stavridis. We had to bring it into the NATO
Council, which is 28 nations. They're represented by
ambassadors in Belgium. It was discussed there. Then those
ambassadors went back to capitals, got approval for it, and
then the operational task began.
I would say that sounds like quite a process, but----
Senator Wicker. It does.
Admiral Stavridis. We did it in about a month. In other
words, from the time the Turkish nation asked for the Patriots
to be emplaced to the time the first Patriot batteries were in
place was just about a month.
Senator Wicker. What level of unanimity was required within
NATO to do that?
Admiral Stavridis. All 28 nations had to agree.
Senator Wicker. So do I take it then from the tone of your
answer that you're comfortable with our having to rely on that
level of required consensus in our past dealings with the
Libyan issue and currently with Syria? Or has that been
cumbersome and has it stood in the way of us making efficient
decisions?
Admiral Stavridis. As I look back on 4 years as the NATO
commander for operations, I look at all the things we've done--
Afghanistan, counter-piracy, the current Syria mission with the
Patriots, the Balkans. We've typically got 150,000 people out
doing five or six operations around the world at any given
moment. All of those decisions have been done by consensus.
There have been times when that has been frustrating and
there have been times when it takes consensus-building, just
like it does in any deliberative body. But as I look back on 4
years, I would say that it is reasonably effective at
delivering operational capability. Having said all that, there
are always going to be times when each nation must reserve to
itself the right to act immediately. The United States has done
that. I think we will continue to do that. We're not bound by
NATO, but when we want to bring NATO along we go into this
process. Again, looking back on 4 years, it's been reasonably
successful in delivering capability for operations.
Senator Wicker. The United States has not done that,
though, with regard to Syria policy.
Admiral Stavridis. It has not done that with regard to
Syria, that's correct. It did it with regard to Libya, for
example.
Senator Wicker. In what respect?
Admiral Stavridis. In the sense that the Libyan operation
began as a series of unilateral coalition of the willing
operations, initially the French and the British. The United
States jumped in, the Italians came in. At that point, after
about 10 days to 2 weeks of that coalition of the willing
operation, NATO stepped up and took over that operation and
then ran the Libyan operation for the next 9 months.
Senator Wicker. Now, with regard to Senator McCain's
specific question about those Patriot batteries being used to
knock down Syrian military aircraft, at this point our position
is that that would require this type of NATO consensus
decision?
Admiral Stavridis. That's correct. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. We're far from that at this point?
How is the Syrian issue impacting our relationship with
Ankara and what is your current assessment of our military
relationship with Turkey?
Admiral Stavridis. Our current U.S. to Turkey military-to-
military relationship is extremely strong. We operate with them
in a wide variety of missions and they are very capable
partners. Within a NATO context, they are equally strong.
Turkey, just for example, has a couple of thousand troops that
are the bulwark of Kabul's train, equip and organize mission.
Turkey's participated in every mission since I've been the
Supreme Allied Commander. They continue to be very strong.
Senator Wicker. How has the Syria issue affected our
relationship?
Admiral Stavridis. It has made it stronger.
Senator Wicker. Really?
Admiral Stavridis. It has, because Turkey correctly feels
as though there's a great deal of danger and difficulty in the
south and therefore they came to NATO and have come to the
United States. I think they're very positive about the response
both from NATO and the United States in both of those
scenarios.
Senator Wicker. I think your answer is with regard to our
military-to-military relationship.
Admiral Stavridis. Right.
Senator Wicker. Is there any difference between that and
our government-to-government relationship?
Admiral Stavridis. Obviously, State Department would be the
right people to ask. But I have a fair amount of contact with
the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Turkey. My impression is that we are in a strong position
government-to-government. But my area is military-to-military
and I can testify to that.
Senator Wicker. Let me quickly shift just a bit to the 2012
Secretary General's annual report with regard to NATO.
Secretary General Rasmussen makes clear his concerns with the
growing disparity not only between U.S. and European
contributions to defense, but also the growing disparity among
European nations to this contribution.
Let me quote the Secretary General's report: ``The effects
of the financial crisis and the declining share of resources
devoted to defense in many allied countries have resulted in an
overreliance on a few countries, especially the United
States''----
Admiral Stavridis. Correct.
Senator Wicker. We certainly know that.
``--and some significant deficiencies in key capabilities,
such as intelligence and reconnaissance.''
So what I'm concerned about is that there seems to be a
lack of emphasis by some of our NATO allies on defense, to the
point where they may actually be participants in name only.
Do you agree with Secretary General Rasmussen's assessment
and, if so, what needs to be done to correct the problem?
Admiral Stavridis. I do agree with his assessment, and the
quick fix is for the Nations of NATO to meet their self-
described 2 percent of GDP spending goal. Today only a handful
of nations, including of course the United States, spend more
than 2 percent. The majority do not and that's not right and
all of us should be continuing to talk to those nations who are
not meeting that goal so they can increase their spending.
Having said that, the good news is the Europeans
collectively spend about $300 billion a year on defense. That
number surprises people sometimes. It's a very significant
amount of spending. But it still does not rise to the goal that
they have set and therefore it's disproportionate for the
United States and that's not right and it should be addressed.
Senator Wicker. Other than talk about it, there is very
little else we can do; is that correct, Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. I think there are other pressure tools
that can be brought to bear. But I think principally----
Senator Wicker. What suggestions would you have?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that it would entail the United
States withholding some of its assets or deciding to take
positions in NATO that would effectively put pressure on
nations in operational kinds of ways. We hope not to get to
that point. We are continuing--and as we come out of this
financial crisis, especially in Europe, I'm hopeful that our
allies will step up and get us up into that 2 percent spending
range.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you all for your testimony today.
I'm going to hop-scotch around a little bit. I'd like to
start with General Kelly to follow up on a conversation we
started to have yesterday. You earlier talked a little about
the interdiction efforts that have been successful to a degree,
but there are likely challenges as a result of sequestration. I
just want to make sure I have this right.
So last year the interdiction efforts under SOUTHCOM were
responsible for taking, did you say, 150 to 200 tons of cocaine
out of circulation?
General Kelly. Yes, sir. The interdiction effort, it's a
whole-of-government interdiction. It's not just U.S. military.
So we're talking DOJ, Department of Treasury, DEA, FBI. It's
all of government, to include all of the police officers and
agents in the United States.
But in the neighborhood of 200, 150 to 200 tons either
taken, we actually have it in our hands, or it was thrown over
the side. Those are the estimates, yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Do you believe that that is about 20 percent
of the cocaine that would get into the United States from South
America?
General Kelly. By some numbers that's about 20 percent.
Senator Kaine. Right. We talked yesterday you thought to
really be disruptive in terms of the drug markets and the
dollars raised for it you'd have to take about--you'd really
want to interdict about 70 or 80 percent of the cocaine coming
in.
General Kelly. Our President's given us a goal, again the
entire government goal, of 40 percent. The thinking there is
that if you took that much cocaine out of the flow that the
network just wouldn't have the profits that it has enjoyed for
so many years and it would begin to come apart. The network
itself would suffer because of the profits.
Senator Kaine. It would also drive up prices----
General Kelly. It would drive up prices.
Senator Kaine.--such that a lot of people couldn't afford
it.
General Kelly. I believe we could do much--given the ISR
assets and the surface assets, more takes more off the market.
Less takes less off the market. But yes, sir, I think we could
take much more than even the 40 percent that the President has
tasked us to take off by 2015.
Senator Kaine. A key component of this interdiction is the
use of ships, I guess primarily on the Caribbean side, maybe a
little bit on the Pacific side. You have about six ships that
you currently use that would be part of your normal
interdiction force?
General Kelly. Surface vessels. The Coast Guard plays big
into this, both in the Pacific and on the Caribbean side. The
way we see it, about 14 ships a day would go a long way to
crippling this effort in that initial part of the transit zone.
On average we get five or six. We still get tremendous amounts
of tonnage off the market. But again, SOUTHCOM being very much
the economy of force area of operations, for many years now
we've only gotten a relatively small number of Coast Guard
cutters and U.S. Navy ships of all types.
Senator Kaine. The five or six now is significantly
jeopardized by sequester. It would drop it down to zero or one
potentially?
General Kelly. Yes, sir, zero or one.
Senator Kaine. While drugs are interdicted other than by
the surface ships, the surface ships are really the key
component to the interdiction effort?
General Kelly. Overwhelmingly. The example I would give you
is the product that's flown out of primarily Venezuela by small
aircraft carry--typically go into the ungoverned spaces, the
wide-open spaces of Honduras. It might carry a ton, sometimes
less than that, but roughly a ton. Again, the profits are so
lucrative they land and then they take the drug off the
airplane, they just burn the airplane. So it's not even worth
making the return trip to them, the profits are so high.
The Hondurans and the Guatemalans tremendously, and the
Belizeans and the El Salvadorans, tremendously helpful in this
effort. But the vast majority of the tonnage is taken off the
high seas.
I have to point out, with again partnerships--the French
are involved in this, the Brits are involved in this, small
numbers, but they are involved. I cannot say enough about the
Colombians and what they do.
Senator Kaine. That has dramatically improved, obviously,
with the current government, ongoing negotiations to
potentially resolve the civil war with the FARC. Colombia is
getting to be a stronger and stronger partner every day.
General Kelly. They are that, yes, Senator.
Senator Kaine. One of the things you mentioned, and I put
quotes around it is, a concern by some in the hemisphere as
they see an upscale of activity from China, maybe somewhat of
an upscale from Russia, an upscale of activity from Iran, a
sense that we are pulling back.
We talked yesterday about just a small example of it, the
Inter-American Defense College here in Washington that for 50
years has trained military officers from the hemisphere, who
have often gone back and assumed key positions militarily or
even in civilian political leadership. That is a very small
line item, but it's something that's definitely jeopardized by
our current budget woes?
General Kelly. Yes, Senator. I think in the last 50 years
the Inter-American Defense College, which is here in
Washington, doesn't work for me, but they've graduated
something on the neighborhood of 2,500 graduates. Many of them
have become general officers, admirals, down south. Many of
them have become presidents, ministers of defense. It's a very
effective program.
It's all about civilian control of the military. It's all
about the right relationship between the military and the
people of their countries. It's all about human rights. Very
effective.
They may go under if we don't find them $800,000, which I
don't have, but that's not----
Senator Kaine. $800,000.
The Chinese are starting to bring the military leadership
from the hemisphere to China for military training now,
correct?
General Kelly. They do. They have kind of a wide-open
program, much as we have, but for the Chinese it's much easier.
If you want to go, you can go. As I mentioned yesterday, a lot
of the officers from Latin America go. They don't get much out
of it, but it's a year abroad and it's very easy, where we have
similar programs in the United States and they're very popular
down south.
The example I would give you, today the president of Peru
is a former graduate as a military officer from the old School
of the Americas. That's gone now and we now have the WHINSEC
program down in Fort Benning. But he found it to be so useful
to him, the old program, that he is buying up every seat he can
get in the Western Hemisphere course of instruction down in
Fort Benning. The dividends are immense, but there are a few
hurdles, money being one of them, in order to get students up
into our programs.
This includes attendance at schools that the Marines run at
Quantico, the Army at Leavenworth, the Air Force at Maxwell Air
Force Base. So it's just not those schools. It's all of the
schools in the United States. The relationships are key.
Senator Kaine. I just don't believe we can afford to send
the message that we're pulling back, and that's important
testimony.
General Jacoby, just real quick, staying in the same part
of the world. Talk a little bit about the military-to-military
relationship with Mexico?
General Jacoby. Senator, I'm happy to report we have a
strong military-to-military relationship with Mexico. It's a
relatively recent phenomenon. I've been involved with Mexico
over the last decade or so, and it's really in the last 3 to 4
years that our military-to-military engagement has become a
rich exchange between equals. We're developing a great
partnership.
We changed administrations in Mexico and I know the two
gentlemen that became the head of Sedena and the head of Semar,
tremendous professional officers, very eager to sustain and
grow the military-to-military relationship. So it's very
beneficial to both countries to do that and I'm proud of what
we've accomplished.
Senator Kaine. Great.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I thank you for
your service and I hope you will extend my appreciation to the
men and women that you represent as well.
General Jacoby, according to certain reports Iran could
have a ballistic missile capable of striking the United States
in 2015. Earlier this morning Senator Levin had a conversation
with you about the threat to the east coast and you discussed
that. You also said later on in some testimony that the closer
relationship between home game and the away game--or we have a
closer relationship between the home game and the away game
than ever before.
How long would it take to construct a missile defense site
on the east coast?
General Jacoby. It's a pretty complicated proposition, from
the studies required, the environmental impact statements, and
then, depending on the site, this could be an issue of years to
get another missile site done, whether it's on the east coast
or wherever it might be. So it's quite a proposition, and to
that end we are happy to be conducting the study that was
directed in the NDAA to provide decision points along the way
to make sure that we're outpacing the threat.
Senator Fischer. I know in my home State in highway
construction an environmental impact statement can take 5 to 7
years sometimes. Would that apply to a missile site as well?
General Jacoby. I think these things--and I do have
experience with them, can take years to get an environmental
impact statement, and of course that could be affected by the
urgency of an increased threat. I think it's safe to say that
this is a question of years and getting the study started is a
good and important step.
Senator Fischer. But if the Iranians are able to have a
system that can reach this country, reach the east coast, by
2015, are we already behind?
General Jacoby. Currently, as I testified, we're able to
provide defense of the entire United States from an Iranian
threat.We don't think that threat has resolved itself yet, but
I would say that it's my belief that Iran is actively pursuing
an ICBM capability and I think it's prudent to be taking steps
to hedge against the evolution of that threat.
Senator Fischer. Will the SM-3 Block IIA missile be
deployed by 2015?
General Jacoby. I'll defer to--that won't be part of the
Homeland defense, the Block IIA.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, it will be. That is the current
plan, and it'll be deployed in Europe.
Senator Fischer. Correct. Would that help with defense of
the Homeland?
Admiral Stavridis. No. No, Senator, it would not. It's
strictly for defending our allies in Europe.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Admiral, also on Friday we learned that DOD has made a
decision to eliminate the deployment of those interceptors in
Europe. Is that correct?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, Senator, that was announced on
Friday.
Senator Fischer. So how does that affect Europe and how
would that affect the United States as well? Does it make the
east coast more vulnerable? You said it doesn't apply to the
United States, but would it make the east coast more
vulnerable?
Admiral Stavridis. The theory of the Phase 4, which is what
we're talking about, was that it would defend, help defend, the
United States. What has happened, as General Jacoby knows
better than I, they have--the OSD, the Secretary of Defense,
has moved this capability to the GBI site that you were just
discussing with him. It will not affect Europe. Phases 1, 2,
and 3 are the phases that are to defend Europe, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Kelly, in your opening statement you said that
China is attempting to compete with U.S. military activities in
the region. Senator Reed asked you about the Chinese influence
and you mentioned the economic influence. Can you elaborate on
that?
General Kelly. Yes, Senator. The Chinese first and foremost
are very, very active in Latin America commercially. When they
want to buy something, they buy it in very, very large numbers,
whether it's soybeans in the far south of the Southern Cone,
oil from Venezuela. They're in there in a big way buying up
commodities primarily.
They also are very good at building things like ports and
running things like ports, so they're very involved in the
running of the Panama Canal, as an example, as a commercial
interest. I don't personally see a threat there. So they're
doing that commercially and economically.
They deployed--on the military-to-military context, they
deployed a hospital ship to the region, much like our own
hospital ship, and it saw tremendous goodwill, visited large
numbers of ports, did thousands of medical procedures on people
that have never seen a doctor, again much as we do in that part
of the world every other year or so with our own hospital ship.
Obviously, they want to sell their military hardware to any
nation that will buy it. It's much easier. You know the
frustration that our friends and partners around the world have
with our military sales. It's very complicated, takes a long
time. I would offer that many of these countries certainly that
I deal with just get tired of waiting. They'd rather buy
American stuff because it's better. It's better maintained. It
comes with better support packages. But they get tired of
waiting for it, so they go elsewhere, either to the Russians or
to--the other big players to the Russians are the Chinese.
So they're down there trying to sell their equipment. We
already mentioned the training. They have training programs
where they'll pay for officers particularly to go to China and
do a year in their staff colleges.
So they're trying in a big way. What's the ultimate goal? I
think the ultimate goal certainly commercially is just they're
huge, powerful, and they're going to penetrate any market they
can penetrate. That's not a bad thing necessarily. It's a good
thing for most of the Nations that I'm talking about.
They're also looking to the U.N. and inflencing the U.N.
They have certain agenda items that if they could get more
votes in the U.N. they might be--they might get those agenda
items. So that's where they are on this.
I don't see it as a huge threat, but as we back away or
it's harder and harder for people to buy or military equipment,
they go to other, easier to deal with countries, and China is
certainly one of them.
Senator Fischer. Specifically which countries are being
most affected by the Chinese influence in this way?
General Kelly. Economically, any country down there.
They're all now big trading partners. Again, it's primarily
commodities, farm products, things like that. I don't think
there's a soybean safe in Latin America that isn't going to be
scooped up and sent to China. Oil, as I say, from Venezuela and
some of those countries.
But they're all, I think, good trading partners with a
country that is willing to trade and undercut things and make
it happen. Again, not a threat in that regard, but certainly if
we want to remain the partner of choice, we the United States
of America, we're certainly doing that at the military-to-
military level for the most part. We're doing that in the law
enforcement level, as we help them, many countries, deal with
their drug problems and their money-laundering problems. But
there are other aspects of military or national instruments of
power that other countries have replaced us or certainly are
enjoying success in replacing us.
Senator Fischer. If I could just ask, are our private
businesses, private industry, picking up the, I guess the slack
there in maintaining the influence and being good trading
partners with those countries? So would that diminish the
threat of the Chinese then?
General Kelly. Our private business partners are very
active. We have tremendous trade relationships. In fact, we
are, the United States, the biggest trader. But there are still
restrictions on what U.S. private businesses can do, hula-hoops
they have to get through, hurdles they have to jump. It's much
easier when you deal with a country that has absolutely no
restriction and will do business with anyone for any reason.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome. Admiral, I'm sorry that you're leaving
as I'm coming in and we don't get a chance to work together.
One thing, General Kelly, you just mentioned that sort of
perked my ears up. What's the Chinese involvement in the
management of the Panama Canal?
General Kelly. They have commercial managers, companies,
that work either end, particularly either end, the port
facilities on either end of the Panama Canal.
Senator King. So they in effect, Chinese personnel are in
effect managing it? Are there Chinese personnel there?
General Kelly. They have managers and personnel. There are
many Panamanians that are involved in the process as well, but
they do have contractual arrangements with the ports on either
end of the canal.
Senator King. Thank you.
The second question. Admiral, on the question of sequester,
there has been a lot of discussion around here, as you can
imagine, about it. One of the potential cures, if you will, or
at least ameliorations, is greater flexibility to DOD in terms
of how it's going to be achieved, not reducing the overall
amount, but how it's going to be achieved.
To all three of you, would that help or are the amounts so
significant that that would not be a great boon to your ability
to respond to this issue?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that would be very helpful. I'm
not the right person to declame on that and neither are my
fellows here. That really is a question for our budgeteers in
the Department. But speaking as an operator, I can see where it
would be very helpful and it would allow the movement of funds
across various accounts so we could better prioritize, which I
think is what you would want us to be able to do.
Senator King. You gentlemen would agree?
A different question. Again Admiral Stavridis: Benghazi and
forces in Europe in a time of fiscal austerity, reducing
footprints. Is there a middle ground that would allow the
positioning of smaller strike forces, if you will, to respond
to a situation like Benghazi, as opposed to maintaining a large
footprint generally? Do you see what I'm getting at?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I do. Life is not an on-and-
off switch. It's not we have to have a huge infrastructure or
nothing. Certainly life is a rheostat and you kind of dial it
in.
As I testified earlier, I'm generally satisfied with the
current level of infrastructure that we have in Europe, which
has come down 85 percent since the height of the Cold War. But
there are studies in progress this year and I think by the end
of this year you'll see reported to the committee and to
Congress ideas for how we can get the best balance on that
rheostat.
Senator King. One of the issues that we discussed in
Benghazi is response time. If you move everybody to Fort
Benning, it's going to be hard to get them there.
Admiral Stavridis. Exactly. I would certainly not recommend
coming out at that level. We need these forward operating bases
in this 21st century because of all the things we've talked
about today.
Senator King. Part of what I'm suggesting is not a full-
blown base, but a much smaller, as I say, a kind of strike
force in the neighborhood. Is that a feasible option?
Admiral Stavridis. I think all of those ideas could be
explored. It would of course depend on our partners. If we
don't have the infrastructure that we do now, we would then
rely even more on the Italians, on the Greeks, on the Spanish,
and so forth. Personally, I'm comfortable at the moment with
the arrangements we have. But it is certainly worth considering
all options as we look forward to get the best balance, the
best position on that rheostat for taxpayers as well as for
security.
Senator King. Again changing the subject, trying to hit a
lot of areas, several of you--you all have mentioned the
criminal network. I was interested. How organized and unified
is it? Is it a criminal network? This is reminding me of the
old James Bond movie, books in the 1970s, where there was this
criminal network that was organized, that had a boss and a set
of underlings and a structure. Is that what we're dealing with,
or are we dealing with a whole bunch of random bad guys?
Admiral Stavridis. It's somewhere in the middle. There are
large cartels that operate in a variety of different ways
around these criminal networks. This is, Senator, if you will,
this is the dark side of globalization. If we're in a world in
which there's much more connection and much more ability to
move information and people quickly, that's generally a good
thing, but there are going to be entities, both individuals,
mid-sized groups, and big cartels, that take advantage of this.
Some of the estimates, if you think of the global economy
as being about $70 trillion, some estimates are that about $6
trillion, about 10 percent of the global economy, is invested,
if you will, in narcotics, human smuggling, cyber crime being
the largest of all these areas, as well as the other things
we've talked about, arms, cash, et cetera.
Senator King. I know you've mentioned cyber crime and we
don't have time to get into it in detail, but I view that as
the next Pearl Harbor risk. You'd share that concern?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I would. Former Secretary
Panetta spoke about it in just those terms--tremendous
opportunities in the network, but there's also vulnerabilities
that could have catastrophic consequences for us.
Senator King. One further question about the criminal
cartels. One of the things that scared me about your testimony
is the idea of one of our state enemies, if you will--perhaps I
shouldn't use that term--people who don't wish us well, working
with the criminal cartel as a conveyor, for example, of a WMD.
That to me means that the work you're doing, General Kelly, in
the SOUTHCOM on the high seas is not only a drug issue or a
criminal issue, but it's a very serious national security
issue.
General Kelly. You won't get an argument from me, Senator.
I think you're exactly spot on.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, and thanks again for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
We're going to have a brief second round. I think one of
our colleagues is on her way here also, so she can have her
first round, of course, when she gets here.
Admiral, let me ask you some questions about Syria. I think
the administration has shown some caution, real caution, about
getting more deeply involved militarily in terms of supplying
arms particularly to the opposition in Syria. I think the fear
has been that we want to make sure who those arms are getting
to, first of all, and second that when Assad falls--I won't say
if and when because it's when as far as I'm concerned Assad
falls--there needs to be in place or ready to be put in place
by the Syrians some kind of an interim government, which would
avoid chaos and anarchy in Syria so that it doesn't fall apart,
it doesn't disintegrate, and that progress needs to be made in
that direction prior to the provision of more lethal arms.
That seems to have been the feeling of the administration.
I understand that caution and basically share it, with a couple
caveats. One is that if Turkey were willing to provide a safe
zone or to assure a safe zone, with NATO support, along the
border with Syria, but inside Syria, if Turkey were willing to
do that, that I think that we ought to support that.
Second, I favored at least consideration of going after
some of Syria's air defenses and possibly some of their air
capability itself.
We heard an interesting idea today, probably not from his
mind for the first time. I think Senator McCain is probably
further along in this line than perhaps most of our colleagues.
I thought it was a very intriguing set of questions of his when
he asked about the capability of the Patriot missiles, as to
whether or not they essentially could defend a zone along that
border perhaps 20 miles wide from Syrian aircraft, from Turkish
territory with the Patriot missiles.
Your answers were very, it seems to me, illuminating, that
yes, there could be that kind of protection of a, I think you
indicated or he indicated, a 20-mile wide zone. I think that
really is subject to some very serious consideration myself,
because I think we have to step up the military--our military
effort against Assad in some ways, whether it's some kind of a
safe zone that we help protect along the border inside of
Syria, whether it's going after their air defenses, or whether
it's going after some of their air force.
Would Turkey, do you believe, support the use of the
Patriot missiles in that manner, to help protect a safe zone in
Turkey--I'm sorry, in Syria, along that border?
Admiral Stavridis. Again, I'm not the expert on Syria. From
the perspective of our Turkish colleagues, whenever they have
talked to us about the use of the Patriots they have been very
emphatic that they would be defensive. That's the role they
have continued to say is paramount in their view, because I
think they are loathe to be dragged into the Syrian conflict by
an inadvertent incident of some kind.
Having said that, as I told Senator McCain, the capability
is there. It would have to be first and foremost a Turkish
decision since it's their sovereign soil. If it were to be a
NATO mission, it would then need to come into NATO for dialogue
and so forth. As I was discussing with Senator Wicker, that
will require 28-nation consensus. So it would be a complicated
process.
But I think this range of options are certainly under
discussion in a lot of the capitals.
Chairman Levin. Would you take back that option, if it
isn't already under consideration, to our NATO allies, starting
with Turkey? Turkey has suggested, I believe, that she would be
willing to help create and then protect a zone, a narrow band
inside of Syria along the Turkish border, where Syrians could
go for safety, instead of all flowing across the border. So it
would be I think an interesting, obviously important and
essential, but interesting to find what Turkey's response would
be to such a proposal.
If there is a positive response there or a willingness to
even consider it, can you take that up with other NATO
countries, the possible use of those Patriots?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Because I think it's kind of a real
possibility that we ought to explore.
Are you familar with the man who was chosen in the last few
days to head up the exile opposition coalition, a man named
Ghassan Hitto?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, I'm not.
Chairman Levin. All right. He's apparently a Syrian-
American who's lived in Texas that the Syrian opposition
coalition has voted to lead that coalition politically, to help
form an interim government. It's an interesting article in
today's Times about him. It was a close vote and there's
obviously some skepticism as to whether he's the right person.
That's always the case in close votes. In fact, sometimes it's
even the case in unanimous votes, sometimes unexpressed concern
about who got the nod.
But nonetheless, anything that you learn about him, if you
could provide for the record----
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin.--we'd appreciate it.
I will stop right there. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since I was disappointed in your responses to my line of
questioning, let me just get a couple of things in here just
for clarification. When we put in the Poland site, GBI, when we
were planning to do that, that was for protection of both
eastern United States and also Western Europe; is that correct?
General Jacoby. Senator, I believe that was the idea.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I think that was the idea. I believe
you said that in terms of the eastern United States, the SM-3
IIA is not something that would work, not fast enough and so
forth. However, that would have application in Europe. Is that
correct?
Admiral Stavridis. Exactly, exactly.
Senator Inhofe. All right, it would have application in
Europe. I know that something less desirable, less effective,
would be the SM-3 IB, which is ready now or pretty close to it,
is that correct?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. But the IB does not have the protection
that the IIA has, is that correct?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I guess what I was trying to get to is, the
IIA--right now we're still looking, we're looking at 2018. Our
intelligence still says that they're going to have, Iran would
have that capability by 2015. Now, it's that time frame in
there in terms of Europe that I am concerned about. So I ask
the same question in terms of what is your concern over that 3-
year period between 2015 and 2018 in Europe, not in the United
States?
Admiral Stavridis. We are concerned about it. We'll need to
continue to analyze the Iranian movement, and if it continues
to move we'll need to go back and see if we can accelerate our
own capability. It is of concern and we'll track it very
closely, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Now, in terms of the United States, the
east coast site, we've all talked about it. Everyone talks
about how expensive it is. Are you--I read the comment that was
made, the statement that was made by General Kehler, he said:
``I am confident that we can defend against a limited attack
from Iran, although we are not in the most optimum posture to
do that today.''
I think I asked you if you are in agreement with his
statement.
General Jacoby. Senator, I am in agreement that we have the
capability, a limited defense right now. I think that it's not
optimum, that we've made some important steps forward in what
was rolled out, and that we need to continue to assess the
threat to make sure that we stay ahead of it and not fall
behind it. So I think that that is a process that we are
committed to. In terms of Iran, I remain concerned about Iran.
Senator Inhofe. I hope you remain concerned about Iran. I
don't want to put you in a position of comparing what we would
have had as opposed to what we could have right now in terms of
the United States.
We're talking about the Homeland missile defense site,
which would include both radars and interceptors on the east
coast. I think we all agree that that would improve the posture
that we're in, in response to the question I just now asked you
from General Kehler; is that correct?
General Jacoby. Certainly exploring a third site is an
important next step. What a third site gives me, whether it's
on the east coast or an alternate location, would be increased
battle space. That means increased opportunity for me to engage
threats from either Iran or North Korea.
Senator Inhofe. So the people who were saying that from the
West Coast site, a threat coming from Iran or a missile coming
from Iran to the east coast, it would take away--now, several
have testified to this--your capability of shoot, look, and
shoot, and leave a capability of shoot. Do you agree with that?
General Jacoby. I think that right now we are making it a
priority to see how we can improve our tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Shoot-look-shoot is something that I'm very
interested in continuing to evolve. So there are a number of
things that would contribute to shoot-look-shoot: GBI
reliability, EKV upgrades, battle space, and increased number
of missiles.
So all of those things are at play for shoot-look-shoot and
I think it's a very important tactic for us to continue to
pursue.
Senator Inhofe. So I think then that all of you pretty much
would agree with General Kehler, his responses?
General Jacoby. Specifically that we're not optimum, yes,
that's correct.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of our panelists for being here and for
your service to the country. I'm sorry I missed your testimony
earlier.
Admiral Stavridis, I want to start with you because I had
the pleasure of chairing the European Affairs Subcommittee over
the last 4 years in the Foreign Relations Committee and have
very much appreciated your openness and willingness to work
with us, and we will miss you.
I wonder if you could give me an update on how the new
strategic concept for NATO is working. I had a chance to attend
the summit last year and follow the adoption of the new
strategic concept and am very interested, given the changing
role of NATO, how you think that's going and any concerns or
any areas where you feel good about what's happening?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Senator. Thank you also for
your work on the NATO parliamentary committee in Europe as
well. You're one of the experts in this field in this Congress
and we appreciate all you do.
Let me start with a concern and it's one we discussed and
we talked about it this morning with several of your
colleagues. It's the failure of NATO, almost all of the
nations, to meet the 2 percent spending. This creates a
disproportionality between U.S. defense contribution and the
rest of NATO.
That concerns me over the long-term in NATO because I think
it will create a sense here in the United States that our
European colleagues are not pulling their weight. So I think we
need to continue to put a lot of pressure, particularly as
Europe comes out of the current crisis, that they raise their
defense spending to the 2 percent level. That's extremely
important even as we are reducing defense spending here in the
United States, so we get the resources back in balance between
both sides of the Atlantic.
Now, that's the challenge. On the positive side, in terms
of the strategic concept, it's now been in place for almost 3
years. I think NATO is living up to the strategic concept,
which is to say we are doing crisis management operations in
places like Afghanistan, where we still have 100,000 troops, on
piracy off the Horn of Africa, where we typically have 4 to 6
ships operating, and we've seen piracy go down by 70 percent,
the Balkans, where we have 6,000 troops, 90 percent of them
Europeans, our operations in Libya a year ago.
I think NATO has answered the call when requested to go
forth and be part of creating security outside of the borders
of Europe.
The second pillar of the strategic concept, of course, is
collective defense. Here I think as well our capabilities, our
integration, our Baltic air policing--Balkan air policing, our
series of exercises, one of which, we'll conduct a big one in
Poland this year, all of that is very contributory to
collective defense.
As far as tackling the new challenges, I think we've made
some progress in cyber. We've stood up a special operations
center. We're working very hard on unmanned aircraft, the air
surveillance ground system that you're familiar with.
So I think overall we're making a lot of progress in
fulfilling that strategic concept. My one worry going forward
is disproportionality in spending and there our European allies
need to step up to the plate.
Senator Shaheen. I think we all appreciate the financial
situation that Europe has been in over the last 4 years. How
much of your concern is related to a commitment to the burden-
sharing and how much of it is concern that once they come out
of the financial situation that that commitment may not be
there?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, my own sense--and this is
simply a personal intuition--is that as they come out of the
financial crisis they will in fact increase their defense
spending. I base that on conversations I have with my
interlocutors, ministers of defense, chiefs of defense, heads
of state and government. There is a commitment to this
alliance.
I think as we look at the long throw of the European
economy, it's going to be strong. Let's face it, Europe is one-
fourth of the world's GDP, $15 trillion, comparable to the
United States in every sense. They spend $300 billion a year
now on defense. That's a significant amount, but it doesn't
quite rise to the level that it should.
My sense in my conversations, what I can read and see and
feel after 4 years in Europe, is that the commitment to the
alliance remains strong.
Senator Shaheen. Good.
You mentioned the Balkans. I think we've seen some real
progress between Serbia and Kosovo on addressing some of their
tensions. However, there are still issues that remain. So I
wonder if you could give us an update on the situation there,
and also what you see in the future for the KFOR force?
Admiral Stavridis. I can. I'd actually start by looking
back for a moment. If we look back, 10 to 15 years ago we saw a
disaster in the Balkans comparable to what we see in Syria
today. In that period of time we saw 8,000 men and boys killed
in Srebrenica in a matter of days. We saw genocide. We saw
100,000 people killed, millions pushed across borders, two
major wars.
Flash forward to today. Instead of reaching for a gun to
resolve a dispute in the Balkans today, the Nations are
reaching for the telephone. They are, under the auspices of the
European Union, as you allude to Senator, we see Kosovo and
Serbia at the table, their prime ministers at the table, their
presidents at the table, led by Baroness Catherine Ashton, the
European Union's head of foreign affairs, if you will.
I think we're very close to a real settlement between
Kosovo and Serbia. That will allow us to draw down our forces
in KFOR, Kosovo. Today we have about 6,000 there. When I came
into the job 4 years ago we had 15,000. That's in and of itself
a sign of real progress. If the talks bear fruit, I think we'll
be able to drive that force down as early as late this year. So
stay tuned. I think there's more progress ahead in the Balkans.
Senator Shaheen. That's very encouraging. It's also
encouraging to think that hopefully, if we're 15 years out from
the current crisis in Syria, that we might see some similar
progress.
Admiral Stavridis. Hopefully faster, but yes, I agree.
Senator Shaheen. That would be great.
I'm not sure who would like to answer this next question,
but I think, Admiral Stavridis, you talked about how critical
our relationship with Poland is. I wonder if you could
elaborate a little bit on that, given our military
relationship?
Admiral Stavridis. I'd be glad to, Senator. Poland is one
of the absolute pillars in the alliance. They're the most
capable military in Eastern Europe. They are full participants
in all of the NATO missions. Their troops fight very bravely
and take significant casualties in Ghazni Province, where they
maintain a full brigade, the White Eagle Brigade that both of
these two gentlemen know quite well. They are continuing to
improve their military and they're one of the few nations that
is actually increasing defense spending. They have a strong
economy, and the soldiers and sailors and airmen that they send
around the alliance are leading elements of the intellectual
capital of the alliance as well.
They will be the host for the European missile defense
system that we've talked about. I think in every context
they're a very strong ally and someone that we the United
States should maintain a very strong bilateral focus on.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you very much.
My time is up, but I just want to close, General Jacoby, by
talking about, very briefly, about the positive partnership
that the New Hampshire National Guard has with El Salvador.
It's been very positive both for our National Guard and for El
Salvador, and I just wanted to commend that to you because I
know it's one of the areas that you are looking at.
General Jacoby. On behalf of General Kelly, I'll say
thanks.
Senator Shaheen. Oh, I'm sorry. General Kelly. That wasn't
aimed for you. I just misread my comments.
General Kelly. I'll say thanks then.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on
the state partnership program?
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Admiral Stavridis. Because I was both SOUTHCOM and EUCOM,
I've had over the years 60 of these state partnership programs
and they are all extraordinary bang for the buck for the
Department of Defense. For very low dollars, they go into a
wide variety of countries and help in very fundamental ways to
build partnership. I think that exists today in SOUTHCOM and I
assure you it does in EUCOM.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, General Kelly.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Kaine for your second round.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis, I just have one topic that I wanted to
raise with you and didn't get to you in the first round, and
that is there's been a lot of testimony today in response to
many questions about the importance of Turkey, whether it's
with Patriots, whether it's their role in NATO, support for our
NATO operations, support for the U.S. efforts to hopefully
counter the Iranian nuclear threat.
This is a very important partnership and all the testimony
I would have a strong accord with. But there is this concern
that you raised in your written testimony, that I know concerns
many of us, and that's the eroding relationship between Turkey
and Israel. What is your command doing or what can the EUCOM do
to begin to try to make that better, at least on the military
to military level?
Admiral Stavridis. You're absolutely right to be concerned
about it. We are very concerned about it, both from an Israeli
friend perspective and a Turkish friend perspective. This was a
very strong relationship 3 years ago before this tragic
incident that caused the two of them to split apart.
What we're doing to try and bring them together has both a
NATO component--we're encouraging Israel to be part of the
Mediterranean Dialogue, which is a program in NATO that could
potentially allow some interactions military to military--and
then in a bilateral context, whenever I, for example, go to
Israel or go to Turkey, I work very hard to try and at least
create some connectivity between the senior militaries, so that
if, God forbid, there's another incident at sea, for example,
people can be reaching for their cell phones and not spinning
up their defensive nets.
So I think the relationship, Senator, is very slightly,
marginally better than it was a year or so ago, but it's an
area where we, both NATO and the United States, would like to
see an improved set of relationships. We'll continue to work
those. I'm traveling to both Turkey and Israel in the next 45
days and that will be on my agenda.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I just have--you haven't had a second
round, so, Senator Shaheen, you could have a couple minutes
before I ask a third-round question, if you like.
Senator Shaheen. Okay. I just have two follow-up questions.
One is on Georgia. Admiral Stavridis, there's been a lot of
discussion with Georgia about potential future NATO membership,
and I just wondered where you think they are in terms of the
prospects. I know many of us have watched their election with
some concern in the post-election period and we're looking to
see that they continue the democratic reforms that have been
started there.
But I wonder if you could give us an update?
Admiral Stavridis. I can. Georgia is a terrific partner for
NATO. Today Georgia is the highest per capita contributor in
Afghanistan. They are pushing up toward 2,000 troops. They have
more troops there than any other non-NATO nation. So they are
absolutely with us in combat. I frequently go over here to
Bethesda Hospital to visit with Georgians who are amputees,
veterans. They stand with treasure and blood with the NATO
alliance.
Their membership program, if you will, is moving along. We
continue to interact with them in a wide variety of NATO
contexts. Of course, the United States is very involved. Our
Marine Corps has taken on working with the Georgian military,
to wonderful effect, and has very much improved the Georgian
capabilities from a technical and a tactical kind of
standpoint.
You're correct to focus on the political element of this.
That will be very important to NATO moving forward. I'm headed
over to Georgia in about 2 weeks and I'll have a chance to meet
the new leadership team over there, as well as the continued
president.
So I think overall they are moving in the right direction
and that they are certainly very strong NATO contributors and
that is well regarded and well known within the Nations.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I'm glad to hear that
assessment. Hopefully, you will convey to the new leadership
there, as well as to President Sakashvili, our continued
interest and scrutiny of what's happening there.
General Jacoby, you mentioned in your testimony the key
role the National Guard has played in the success of NORTHCOM
missions. I wonder if you could talk a little bit more about
how important that relationship is and that the Guard is to our
success in those missions?
General Jacoby. Thank you. The National Guard is a great
partner across all of my mission sets. So from homeland
defense, where principally Guard units fly the Operation Noble
Eagle mission in defense of our skies 24/7, our missile
defense, where the 100th Brigade mans the command and control
facilities for our missile launch capabilities, and then of
course in defense support of civil authorities, where every day
the Guard not only meets the needs of the citizens in the
States, but is also available to support regionally through
their emergency management capabilities.
So we're a great consumer of Guard capability. I rely on
the total force to meet the needs of the Nation, but on an
everyday basis the National Guard steps up and meets a
tremendous number of my mission requirements.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. We're very proud of our
National Guard, General Kelly, not just in terms of their
partnership with El Salvador, but all of the other great work
that they do. So thank you all very much.
General Kelly. Senator, if I could, since we're talking
about the Guard, I do want to mention that we lost some
guardsmen this year fighting fires, brave men and women of the
North Carolina Air National Guard, 145th Airlift Wing. It just
reminds us that even supporting our citizens in the Homeland
can be a dangerous activity----
Senator Shaheen. Absolutely.
General Kelly.--and we really appreciate the sacrifices
that those airmen and their families made on that behalf.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for pointing that out.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
I just have one additional question. Admiral, I asked
General Jacoby about whether he supports the new missile
defense approach which was recently announced and he said he
did. Do you support it?
Admiral Stavridis. I do.
Chairman Levin. Any additional questions, colleagues? [No
response.]
If not, we thank you all for your service. We appreciate
your testimony, very forthcoming, very helpful, and do thank
everybody that you work with and their families for us if you
would.
Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

HEALTH ISSUES AT GUANTANAMO DETENTION FACILITY

1. Senator Levin. General Kelly, as the detainee population at the
Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detention facility ages, concerns have arisen
over how well that facility is equipped to address age-related health
issues. What medical issues or challenges do you anticipate in the
coming years at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), in particular
with respect to age-related health issues?
General Kelly. In the coming years, detainees are likely to require
more health care due to a number of factors. First, as mentioned, the
population is aging and like any other aging population we expect them
to have more health problems and require health care that outpaces
current capability on island. This would likely include heart and
circulatory problems like hypertension, liver and kidney disease,
diabetes, stroke, or cancer. This problem becomes more complex when the
health care issues require specialized treatment for emergencies,
chronic medical issues, or mental health issues. Second, many detainees
came to GTMO with health issues that had been unrecognized or untreated
in their countries of origin, resulting in accelerated progression of
disease. Finally, many of the detainees do not consent to health care
treatment and/or medication that is prescribed by the military health
care professionals caring for them. This circumstance often prevents
healing, or exacerbates an existing condition.

2. Senator Levin. General Kelly, what is the legal obligation of
the United States to provide for the medical treatment of detainees,
including in particular with regard to providing lifesaving or
emergency procedures that are readily available in the contiguous
United States (CONUS) but not at the GTMO detention facility?
General Kelly. The legal obligation of the United States for the
medical treatment of detainees is rooted in international law, Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005. These principles of law are reflected in Department of Defense
Instruction, ``Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations,'' which
provides that ``to the extent practicable, treatment of detainees
should be guided by professional judgments and standards similar to
those applied to personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces.''
Detainee health care is provided by the JTF-GTMO Joint Medical
Group (JMG), a group of more than 100 uniformed military health care
professionals, and supported by the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Hospital.
These doctors, nurses, and support personnel provide detainees the same
level of general health care given to U.S. Armed Forces, applying
identical professional judgments and standards in caring for the
detainee population. This health care includes providing lifesaving and
emergency services to the extent they are available at Guantanamo
through the JMG detainee health clinic and the Naval Hospital.
Sustained medical care for more complex and enduring illnesses may
exceed the capabilities of Guantanamo Bay, and are case dependent.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

601ST AIR OPERATIONS CENTER AT TYNDALL AIR FORCE BASE

3. Senator Nelson. General Jacoby, the 601st at Tyndall Air Force
Base (AFB) supports 1st Air Force (AFNORTH), the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM). The Air and Space Operations Center (AOC), which operates
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, provides aerospace
warning and control for NORAD defensive counter-air activities, and
directs joint air, sea and land forces in support of NORTHCOM homeland
security and civil support missions. Given the vital nature of its
mission, will the 601st AOC receive adequate funding under the
sequester to provide for the proper air defense of North America?
General Jacoby. The 601st AOC's NORAD mission to provide Aerospace
Warning and Aerospace Control is an important part of the entire
Homeland Defense mission. We continue to work with our force providers
and interagency partners to ensure infrastructure and personnel are
resourced appropriately in order to provide a robust and sustainable
aerospace defense network. In fiscal year 2013, adequate funding for
the 601st AOC was provided through the recently passed fiscal year 2013
DOD Appropriations Bill. At this time, it is too early to make a
determination on fiscal year 2014 funding levels; however, I will
continue to work with our force providers to ensure this mission is
resourced at appropriate levels.

FLORIDA AIR NATIONAL GUARD

4. Senator Nelson. General Jacoby, Florida Air National Guard F-15s
of the 125th Fighter Wing, located in Jacksonville and forward deployed
to Homestead, provide air sovereignty for the Southeastern United
States. The sequester has cut their flying hours by 57 percent. How
will you ensure that the National Guard Pilots are ready to fly when
they have to scramble to intercept an enemy aircraft?
General Jacoby. The Air National Guard (ANG) as a whole began
cutting their flying hour budget by 57 percent in February 2013 in
anticipation of sequestration and the Continuing Resolution not being
passed. In the weeks since those initial cuts, the fiscal year 2013 DOD
Appropriations Bill passed, which restored original Air National Guard
flying hours. ANG Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) units will have
adequate flying hours to maintain required Combat Mission Ready (CMR)/
Basic Mission Capable (BMC) levels to conduct the ACA mission
throughout fiscal year 2013. It is unknown if sequestration will impact
ACA for fiscal year 2014.
NORAD maintains a regular dialogue with our force providers to
ensure that, as a team, we get the missions right. Throughout the
course of sequestration, our staff (and in the case of air defense
missions, our air component, Continental NORAD Region) has expended a
great deal of effort to monitor and coordinate with our force providers
to ensure that DOD's primary mission for defense of the homeland
remains capable and robust.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

5. Senator Manchin. Admiral Stavridis, the United States does not
have a greater ally in the Middle East than Israel. In your posture
statement, you discussed several aspects of our military partnership
with Israel. With the continued development of Iran's nuclear program
and the transitions underway throughout the Arab world, Israel is
entering a period of increasing uncertainty and needs our strong
support more than ever. How will U.S. European Command (EUCOM) continue
to prioritize its high level of support for the defense of Israel
despite the fiscal challenges we currently face?
Admiral Stavridis. Israel remains my first priority country as
Commander of EUCOM. We enjoy the strongest military-to-military
relationship I've ever seen, and I expect that will continue.
Nonetheless, the recent fiscal restraints in DOD creates new challenges
for EUCOM in sustaining our military-to-military relationship with
Israel, and sequestration requires creative solutions. For example,
Israel has the greatest number of key leader engagements compared with
our other partners. We will continue these engagements, but, where
appropriate, reduce the size of the accompanying support staff.
Additionally, we will use to a greater extent the video tele-
conferencing capability developed over the last several years. I can
assure the committee, however, that we will continue to maintain our
established relationships at all levels with the Israel Defense Forces
and to press forward with critical planning events. Sequestration will
not immediately affect U.S. or Israeli Defense Forces readiness or
capabilities to meet the challenges of the potential threats in the
Middle East.

NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

6. Senator Manchin. General Kelly, I am proud that West Virginia
was one of the first States to implement the National Guard's State
Partnership Program (SPP) by forming a partnership with the Peruvian
Government in 1996. This program was created to strengthen the
relationship between the military and civilians, and I know we've had
rural health experts accompany our National Guard to Peru. I read in
your posture statement that you have been forced to cancel more than 90
events within this program. What specific impacts will sequestration
have on the National Guard Partnership Program?
General Kelly. The fiscal year 2013 sequestration has forced me to
make tough decisions about SPP activities in the SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility. For example, in Peru, sequestration has a relatively
minor impact on the program. Budget cuts to Traditional Commander
Activities (TCA) funding resulted in the cancellation of three SPP
engagement events in Peru. On the opposite side of the spectrum,
sequestration has a major impact on the program in Nicaragua, where TCA
funding cuts resulted in a loss of 11 military-to-military engagements
in that country, 7 of which were under the SPP. fiscal year 2013
sequestration has disrupted the Security Cooperation Organization's
ability to pursue short-term objectives identified within individual
Country Cooperation Plans and the SPP's ability to leverage the
additional funding from TCA, due to large cuts that also occurred in
that program.
While no irreparable damage was done in the fiscal year 2013 cuts,
in my assessment, a multi-year sequestration would critically damage
long term enduring relationships between the United States and partner
nations. Sequestration over a longer period will degrade partner nation
security forces capability, decrease partner nation confidence in U.S.
commitment to security in the region and further degrade our ability to
access partner nation senior leadership for key leader engagement,
crisis response planning, or other Defense Department issues.

NORTHCOM-SOUTHCOM COOPERATION ON COUNTERNARCOTICS

7. Senator Manchin. General Jacoby and General Kelly, your
geographic areas of responsibility touch (AOR) each other, meeting at
the southern border of Mexico with Central America. It is clear that
you both share the mission of countering the drug trade and the
insecurity that it brings with it. How are your two commands working
together to stem the flow of narcotics into the United States from
Latin America?
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are working with the Mexican
and Central American authorities to enhance their capability and
capacity to counter illicit narcotics trafficking activity throughout
the region through staff talks, regional syndicates, and mutual
attendance at Theater Security Cooperation engagements. This approach
includes an emphasis on the Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize border region
where the goals for reducing regional insecurity include improving
border security, enhancing partner country interdiction capabilities,
improving domain awareness, fostering regional cooperation (including
interoperability), and building the security foundation for whole-of-
government approaches to extending the effective authority of the state
in vulnerable regions.
NORTHCOM co-hosted a Mexico/Guatemala/Belize Working Group Meeting
with SOUTHCOM to discuss the Mexican Southern Border. This resulted in
NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and our regional partners agreeing to conduct a
series of workshops emphasizing the improvement of communications,
surveillance, and border security. We focus on enhancing the
partnerships between U.S. law enforcement agencies and respective
partner nation law enforcement agencies to build capacity along the
Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize border. This parallels the efforts of
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM with the Mexican, Guatemalan, and Belizean
militaries.
General Kelly. SOUTHCOM works with NORTHCOM on several initiatives
to disrupt the flow of narcotics into the United States. First, the two
combatant commands partner with the governments of Mexico, Belize, and
Guatemala to host regular conferences and operational workshops
addressing the shared security challenges that transnational organized
crime exacerbates. Second, SOUTHCOM assists NORTHCOM by disrupting
illegal products and criminal networks along the southern approaches to
the United States. Toward this end, SOUTHCOM supports Department of
State and partner nation eradication efforts in the source zones
located in South America. We also fulfill our statutory responsibility
for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of
illegal drugs into the United States, primarily through Joint
Interagency Task Force-South.
Further, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM consistently share information and
intelligence on people, products, networks, tactics, and operations
that facilitate transnational criminal networks. Other information
sharing mechanisms include joint discussions on partner nation
engagement, strategic communication, and the evolution of our command
arrangement agreement to harmonize counter-narcotic efforts. These
interactions focus primarily on an integrated, hemispheric approach to
combating transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere,
especially along the border shared among Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize.

8. Senator Manchin. General Jacoby and General Kelly, how are you
each encouraging your partner nations to work together and share
intelligence to combat the drug trade?
General Jacoby. Our commands sponsor the Mexican/Guatemalan/
Belizean Border Security Workshop series, which emphasizes
communications, surveillance, and shared border security interests. The
workshops focus on enhancing partnerships between U.S. law enforcement
agencies and respective partner nation law enforcement agencies to
build capacity along the Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize border. This
parallels the efforts of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM with the Mexican,
Guatemalan, and Belizean militaries.
(U) Operation Martillo is another salient example of regional
partners working together and sharing information. Operation Martillo
is a counter illicit trafficking operation, led and implemented by the
Department of Defense under the auspices of Joint Interagency Task
Force-South, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM. The operation includes
participation from Central American partner nations, Mexico, Colombia,
Canada, and several European countries. Operation Martillo has proven
to be a critical component of the U.S. Government's coordinated
interagency regional security strategy in support of the Central
America Regional Security Initiative and the President's Strategy to
Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
General Kelly. The expanded awareness of illicit activities as a
hemispheric problem has resulted in the expansion of traditional
partnerships to include extra-regional countries like Mexico and
Canada, bringing an added dimension to international collaboration. We
have been able to leverage strategic partners, like Colombia and
Brazil, to take on leadership roles and export knowledge and lessons
learned throughout the region.
SOUTHCOM also provides the technology employed by most partner
nations to share intelligence and information with their counterparts
with intelligence networks that span the entire AOR.
SOUTHCOM promotes regional cooperation and intelligence sharing
among partner nations by underscoring that transnational organized
crime (TOC) as a hemispheric problem requiring regional collaboration
to counter it successfully. Through conferences, workshops, bilateral
and multilateral events, we have been able to expose partner nations to
a new analytical tool that has changed the way intelligence and
information is shared with and among our partner nations. The Whole-of-
Society Information Sharing for Regional Display (WISRD), enables each
country to share their respective intelligence in the form of layers
(time, event, survey, gangs, cartels, etc), which result in a three
dimensional regional common operating picture (COP) of the TOC
environment. The COP provides a comprehensive common characterization
that helps identify intelligence gaps so nations can work together to
satisfy these intelligence gaps. Several Central/South American
countries are currently using WISRD successfully.
Operation Martillo, a joint and combined operation against illicit
trafficking, is a great example of how successful we have been in
reaching our partners with our TOC message. Its success is attributed
to the increased cooperation among all the participating nations as
they fight against national, regional, and international security TOC
challenges. All the Central American nations, the United States,
European allies, Canadians, et cetera, are collaborating more than ever
before as a direct result of Operation Martillo.

DUAL-STATUS COMMANDER

9. Senator Manchin. General Jacoby, I have long said that the
National Guard presents the best value for the taxpayer's dollar. I
would like your views on the dual-status commander concept that aligns
both National Guard and Federal forces under a single leader. While
first responders and local volunteers might suffice in routine
emergencies, complex disaster responses like Hurricane Sandy often span
multiple States and municipalities. The dual-status commander was
designed to bring a unity of effort to the Department of Defense (DOD)
disaster response. What lessons did you learn from Hurricane Sandy
about the relatively new dual-status commander concept?
General Jacoby. DSCA is a core DOD task for which the total force
is committed. A fundamental change in how we execute our civil support
mission is the use of Dual Status Commanders (DSC)-perhaps one of the
most important initiatives taken in the area of DSCA in a decade. The
Secretary of Defense and State Governors certify senior military
officers to simultaneously command Federal and State military forces
employed in support of civil authorities, unifying DOD assistance to
the affected community. DSCs provide effective organizational structure
and leadership that are vital to the successful management and
operations of Federal and large State military force packages
supporting State and local authorities.
Hurricane Sandy offered us a glimpse of what a complex catastrophe
spanning several States and regions could look like, when flooding and
winds knocked out power, disrupted fuel and food distribution and
pushed the limits of what local responders could handle themselves. But
Sandy helped us to mature the new Dual Status Commander concept that
allows a single officer to oversee both State National Guard and
Federal military response, enabling us to be even better prepared and
ready to act swiftly and with unity of effort if the unthinkable
happens in our Homeland.
Three key lessons we learned from Hurricane Sandy include: (1)
continue to mature the process for establishing DSCs during limited/no
notice events like hurricanes--we are working with OSD to codify this
process in a new Department of Defense Instruction to make sure we all
understand and follow this process; (2) establish clear reporting
chains for our DSCs so there is no confusion on what the T10 reporting
chain will be--we are working internally as well as socializing with
National Guard Bureau and States to ensure we have appropriate options
for the proper command and control of our DSCs for future events; and
(3) continue to analyze how multiple DSCs will be resourced for
catastrophic events where we will have many demands for limited DOD
resources--we are continuing to work with OSD on catastrophic event
response to include the employment of DSCs in multiple adjacent states.
I am convinced that DSCs are the right answer to manage a total
force response--to include DOD Active Duty, State National Guard, and
Reserve Forces--to both facilitate unity of effort and leverage
NORTHCOM's supporting role to primary agencies before, during, and
after a natural or manmade disaster.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

HEZBOLLAH'S ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

10. Senator Hagan. Admiral Stavridis, last month, the Bulgarian
Government implicated Lebanese as a Hezbollah proxy of Iran in the
fatal bomb attack on Israeli vacationers in Sofia last summer. What is
your assessment of this announcement on other European Governments and
militaries?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

11. Senator Hagan. Admiral Stavridis, in your view, are military
leaders in other European capitals fully aware of Hezbollah activities
across Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

12. Senator Hagan. Admiral Stavridis, will Hezbollah's involvement
in this bombing change the posture of governments in Europe on
Hezbollah and its motives?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE

13. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, you stated during your
testimony that you agreed with a recent statement by General Kehler,
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, in which he said ``I'm confident
that we can defend against a limited attack from Iran, although we are
not in the most optimum posture to do that today.'' You went on to say
that you ``remain concerned about Iran'' and ``exploring a third site
is an important next step. What a third site gives me, whether it's on
the East Coast or an alternate location, would be increased battle
space. That means, increased opportunity for me to engage threats from
either Iran or North Korea.'' In what ways will the ``increased battle
space'' provided by a third site on the East Coast help mitigate risk
in defending the United States against an evolving ballistic missile
threat from Iran?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

14. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, will you please provide
unclassified and classified details as to the benefit for the Ground-
Based Midcourse Defense System (GBMD) of deploying the GBR-P (X-Band)
Radar to a location on the east coast of the United States?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

15. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, after Exercise Austere
Challenge last fall practiced our air and missile defense coordination
with Israel, what areas do you assess that we need to work on to
improve our capability to defend Israel?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

16. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what is your assessment of
our current missile defense cooperation with Israel?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

17. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, does cancellation of the SM-
3 IIB system leave any part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) territory in Europe unprotected from a missile attack from Iran?
Admiral Stavridis. No. Analysis of the defensive capability of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phases 1-3 is based on
intelligence of threat capabilities, as well as initial, low fidelity
modeling of planned capabilities--including the Polish and Romanian
Aegis Ashore sites. This analysis confirms that EUCOM will have the
ballistic missile defense resources to meet U.S. requirements to defend
U.S. interests and support American commitments to our allies in the
2018 timeframe. The loss of EPAA Phase 4 will have no effect on EUCOM's
regional ballistic missile defense requirements.

18. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, how have our allies reacted
to the cancellation of the SM-3 IIB?
Admiral Stavridis. I think the overall reaction is neutral, but may
be trending slightly negative. We received very subdued responses since
the announcement. I would highlight the reaction of two allies, the
Czech Republic and Poland. The Czechs were not surprised, which I
attribute to their understanding of U.S.-European politics and being
able to see the larger picture. Similarly, the Poles have indicated
they were satisfied with how they were notified on the cancellation of
Phase IV. I think the U.S. message is solid and reinforces progress
through Phase III, but all maintain a watchful eye for further cuts and
their potential impacts.

19. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, assuming Iran acquires the
ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 2015,
3 years before the integration of the SM-3 IIA, will you please provide
one or more graphic depictions of the territory that can be protected
by the SM-3 IB assuming you are limited to the Romanian land-based
interceptor site and have access to only two Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD)-capable ships that are tethered to a specified limited
operating area?
Admiral Stavridis. As the SM-3 IB is still in development, and
since EUCOM does not possess the modeling software for such an
analysis, I respectfully request this question be referred to the
Missile Defense Agency.

COUNTERNARCOTICS/ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

20. Senator Inhofe. General Kelly, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
has historically been under-resourced. Now under sequestration, your
efforts stand to be significantly impacted. The Navy has already cut
short or cancelled the deployment of several ships to your AOR in 2013,
including 3 frigates and the hospital ship USNS Comfort. You note in
your opening statement that sequestration will ``cripple your
operational effectiveness''. What priorities within your AOR will
suffer the most under sequestration?
General Kelly. The primary Intermediate Military Objective (IMO #1)
in SOUTHCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) is Countering Transnational
Organized Crime. Under sequestration, the loss or curtailment of
maritime, aviation, personnel, and funding assets across the services
and organizations that provide this command with resources to
accomplish this objective will have significant detrimental effects to
our ability to effectively execute our assigned mission. Specifically,
the loss or curtailment of scheduled deployments of ships and aircraft
means that the persistent U.S. presence required to ensure the success
of Operation Martillo will be substantially degraded. Operation
Martillo is the multinational, effects-based operation originally
designed to deny use of the littoral trafficking routes of Central
America. It is the first truly whole of region response to
transnational organized crime. The loss of a persistent U.S. presence
in the Operation Martillo focus areas sends an ambiguous message to our
regional partners about our willingness to counter a regional threat
and to conduct sustained detection and monitoring (D&M) against the
flow of cocaine towards the United States.

21. Senator Inhofe. General Kelly, where do you stand to accept the
greatest risk?
General Kelly. The greatest risk and the one that presents us the
greatest challenge is the impact of sequestration on our ability to
effectively execute SOUTHCOM's statutory detection and monitoring (D&M)
mission under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124. The loss of air and maritime assets
and associated systems will result in a commensurate loss of capability
to effectively execute this mission. The extensive size of the SOUTHCOM
AOR imposes a significant challenge with respect to domain awareness,
and although we will still be able to execute detection and monitoring
operations in areas where an asset is available and assigned, the
expected loss of air and maritime assets will mean vast areas of the
AOR will simply go unmonitored.
Additionally, the loss of these mission-critical assets will
significantly degrade our ability to contribute to the Office of
National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) goal of 40 percent interdiction
of cocaine by 2015.

22. Senator Inhofe. General Kelly, one of the most effective tools
you have to support the interdiction of drugs and illicit materials
before they enter the United States is through the Joint Interagency
Task Force-South (JIATF-South). You note in your prepared remarks that
in 2012 alone, JIATF-South was directly responsible for the
interdiction of 152 tons of drugs worth an estimated $3 billion. How
would you assess the importance of JIATF-South to your operations and
priorities within the SOUTHCOM AOR?
General Kelly. JIATF-South operations are critical to SOUTHCOM's
mission and to the operations of four other Combatant Commands (COCOM).
JIATF-South Joint Operations Area extends across all COCOMs with the
exception of United States Central Command, and their detection and
monitoring mission supports the statutory efforts of all of these
commands. JIATF-South serves as the primary executor of daily statutory
10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 detection and monitoring operations and provides
command and control for interdiction operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
JIATF-South also acts as the primary conduit for intelligence flow
throughout the AOR, and is the central hub for the interagency fusion,
collaboration, and exploitation of available information. In 2012,
working with an operating budget around $50 million, JIATF-South
contributed to the removal of over 152 metric tons of cocaine worth
over $3 billion by focusing their efforts near the Source Zone. This is
61 percent of all the cocaine removed from the Western Hemisphere
Transit Zone. To provide the value in perspective, of the $25.2 billion
ONDCP's U.S. Counterdrug Budget, $9.4 billion was spent by U.S.
domestic law enforcement which interdicted or disrupted 26 metric tons
of cocaine at all the land, air and sea ports of entry in the United
States, and 35 metric tons taken internal to the country by domestic
Law Enforcement. Each year, JIATF-South demonstrates its value as a
center of excellence for intelligence fusion and interagency
coordination. Despite the relative lack of operational assets in this
AOR, these other activities have dramatically enhanced SOUTHCOM's
operational effectiveness. Without the necessary aircraft and ships to
support the mission, reliance upon intelligence and our work within the
interagency and with Partner Nations take on a greater role. Fused-
Intelligence Driven operations conducted in support of, and coordinated
with, Interagency priorities will enhance the precision and
effectiveness with which JIATF-South executes their D&M mission. The
role has not changed from how we do business now, but even greater
emphasis will need to be placed on fewer resources to perform the same
mission.

23. Senator Inhofe. General Kelly, what do you assess the impact of
sequestration will be to the effectiveness of JIATF-South operations?
General Kelly. My assessment is that JIATF-South's ability to
perform their statutory 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 detection and monitoring
(D&M) mission will be degraded. Their operational effectiveness will be
reduced by an estimated 37 percent when compared to fiscal year 2012.
Additionally, their ability to contribute to ONDCP's 40 percent cocaine
interdiction goal by 2015 will be similarly affected. Simply put, more
cocaine will reach American shores due to this degradation.

24. Senator Inhofe. General Kelly, what, if any, ongoing or planned
programs within JIATF-South will be cancelled as a result of the cuts
associated with sequestration?
General Kelly. No specific programs will be cancelled as JIATF-
South operates under three funding programs that remain intact; however
JIATF-South planned operations have been severely impacted. For
example, Operation Atlantic Watch, a combined operation with the United
Kingdom, France, Brazil, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has been
cancelled as a direct result of sequestration impacts on available U.S.
resources. Without U.S. air and maritime assets to support this
operation, the British, French, and Brazilian Governments were
unwilling to commit their valuable resources towards this operation.
Atlantic Watch focused on the Atlantic area of operations and typically
provided enhanced awareness of the illicit trafficking departing South
America for Europe and Africa, a critical concern for our allies.
Additionally, Operation Martillo has also been negatively impacted
by sequestration-related cuts. Specifically, a 30 percent reduction in
maritime assets to conduct this joint, interagency, international
counter illicit trafficking operation has adversely affected mission
execution. While JIATF-South continues to execute their statutory
detection and monitoring mission with limited aviation assets, the
handoff to law enforcement for interdiction and apprehension of illicit
traffickers is dramatically constrained as a direct result of this
reduction in maritime assets. These mission critical assets provide the
platform for law enforcement based interdictions in the form of USCG
Law Enforcement Detachments and boarding teams. The interdiction and
apprehension of illicit traffickers is critical to acquiring the
witnesses and evidence necessary to continue effective operations
against Transnational Criminal Organizations, and to demonstrate the
United States commitment to our allies and partners in the region.

STRATEGY-RESOURCE DISCONNECT

25. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, Deputy Secretary Carter
said, ``One of the ways our strategy would need to change is we
couldn't do . . . what we want to do in the rebalance in the Asia-
Pacific theater.'' If we cut $500 billion above the $487 billion
already cut from defense, can we execute the President's military
strategy that requires rebalancing as laid out in the January 2012
Strategic Defense Guidance?
Admiral Stavridis. The Secretary has directed a Strategic Choices
and Management Review to address this question. The review, led by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, will be complete by 31 May 2013. EUCOM, along with the other
Combatant Commands, is participating in the review. The review will
examine ends, ways, and means in light of potential further budget
reductions and consider significant choices necessary to better align
the Department to execute the President's strategy.

26. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what are the strategic risks
over the next 5 years in your AOR if the current sequestration and
continuing resolution (CR) budget cuts remain in place?
Admiral Stavridis. Additional budget cuts could pose strategic
risks in several areas, depending upon the measures the Department must
take to fund these reductions. For example, steps to reduce personnel
and infrastructure costs could increase the risk to our most important
resource: our civilian and military personnel. Additional cuts in force
structure, the delay and/or cancellation of modernization programs, and
reduced readiness will all negatively impact our ability to respond to
crises and execute contingency plans. There will be greater risk to our
leadership of NATO, the credibility of our commitment to the alliance,
and interoperability with allies and partners if forces and funding for
combined exercises, security cooperation programs, and other steady
state activities are significantly reduced.

27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, you have said the drawdown
of 11,500 troops, most coming from the loss of two Army brigades, will
be mitigated by rotating a brigade through EUCOM from the United
States. What size of an Army force will be rotated through the EUCOM
AOR on an annual basis and how long will they stay in theater for
exercises and training?
Admiral Stavridis. Under the current plan, the U.S. Army will
source elements from a Brigade Combat Team to rotate to EUCOM twice a
year for up to 60 days each. These elements include the Brigade
Headquarters and one Battalion Headquarters in October-November 2013,
and also a Brigade Headquarters and maneuver Battalion (HQ and maneuver
companies) in May to June 2014.
These forces have a two-fold purpose. First, as the U.S. ground
contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF), they will participate in
NRF exercises in order to enhance interoperability with our allies.
Second, they will participate in bilateral training with partners, and
will also gain familiarity with EUCOM plans and operations.

28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, how important is the
rotation of a force of this size to your theater cooperation plan?
Admiral Stavridis. The rotation of a force of this size is critical
to my Theater Campaign Plan. The regular deployment of forces based in
the United States to Europe provides a powerful, tangible demonstration
of the continued U.S. commitment to NATO. The rotation of elements of a
Brigade Combat Team to Europe creates opportunities to maintain
interoperability across the alliance, especially at higher echelons of
command. Finally, the participation of the rotational force in NRF
exercises and in other training events with the NRF forces of allies
and partners enhance NRF training and readiness in support of NATO's
Connected Forces Initiative.

29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, will Army budget cuts
prevent them from rotating a brigade to Europe for annual exercises?
Admiral Stavridis. As far as we understand, the Army intends to
rotate a Brigade Headquarters and a Battalion Headquarters to Europe
for participation in Exercise Steadfast Jazz 13 in October-November
2013. In May to June 2014, the Army will rotate a Brigade Headquarters
and a maneuver battalion, including a Headquarters and maneuver
companies for training in Exercise Rochambeau 14.

30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what will be the impact to
U.S. capability, NATO capability, and interoperability if the
rotational concept is not executed and how do you think our allies and
partners will react?
Admiral Stavridis. In terms of U.S. capability, Army forces based
in the United States will lose a significant opportunity to exercise
deployment procedures and to train with European allies and partners.
Such opportunities will be especially important for U.S. forces to
maintain readiness and interoperability once regular rotations to
Afghanistan come to an end after 2014. A critical opportunity to
enhance NATO capability--specifically the training and readiness of the
NRF--will also be lost if the rotational concept is not executed.
Finally, the United States has publicly committed, most recently at the
February 2013 NATO Defense Ministerial, to reinvigorating its
participation in the NRF and to rotating battalion task forces to
Europe to train with allies and partners. Failure to fulfill this
pledge will likely raise questions among allies and partners about our
commitment to NATO and our strategic partnership with Europe.

EUCOM SUPPORT OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, EUCOM provides forces for
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and strategic access to Africa and the
Middle East while sharing Air Force and Navy component commanders. Will
you be able to adequately support AFRICOM operations given the cuts in
EUCOM personnel coupled with additional cuts in the defense budget?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what are the additional
risks in supporting AFRICOM as your resources are reduced?
Admiral Stavridis. As resources are reduced, EUCOM will experience
a corresponding reduction in strategic flexibility. Please refer to
further classified discussion relating to AFRICOM in my response to
question 31.

33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, can EUCOM respond quickly to
a rapidly emerging crisis in central or southern Africa?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM maintains scalable, rapidly deployable
forces to protect and preserve U.S. lives and facilities in the event
of regional unrest in the EUCOM and AFRICOM areas of responsibility
(AOR). These response forces provide a variety of pre- and post-crisis
response options. However, based on the significant distances involved,
it would be challenging for EUCOM response forces to reach central or
southern Africa rapidly without positioning forces in advance of a
crisis in the AFRICOM AOR.
EUCOM and AFRICOM staffs collaborate weekly to review threats,
intelligence products, and other indications/warnings that would
potentially require crisis response forces. EUCOM is prepared to
provide assigned forces to AFRICOM with sufficient depth and
flexibility to respond to crisis. Upon providing forces, AFRICOM would
then be responsible to position them appropriately across their
expansive AOR to support an emerging crisis.

34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, the budget is decreasing
while threats are increasing in Africa and the Middle East. How will
the President's strategy shift to Asia impact EUCOM's support to
AFRICOM operations?
Admiral Stavridis. Currently the convergence of the Asia pivot with
the budget impact has a limited impact on EUCOM's ability to support
AFRICOM. Over time, the reduction in the number of forward-deployed
forces, and the readiness of those forces, will reduce EUCOM's ability
to provide forces to AFRICOM.

AFGHANISTAN AND NATO TRANSFORMATION

35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) has been in Afghanistan now for a decade. Can
you describe some of the successes of the NATO partnership with the
United States in Afghanistan?
Admiral Stavridis. Since Afghanistan is in the area of
responsibility of the U.S. Central Command, I respectfully request this
question be referred to that command.

36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, General Mattis has
recommended 13,600 U.S. troops and about half as many international
troops in post-2014 Afghanistan. In your professional opinion, what are
the missions and force size we need in post-2014 Afghanistan to
preserve our investment in blood and treasure over the past decade?
Admiral Stavridis. Ultimately, Afghans must be able to secure and
stabilise their country themselves. Our objective is to develop the
capability for Afghans to assume these tasks.
Achieving this objective requires a comprehensive program which
trains, mentors, and advises the Afghan National Security Forces
through army and police advisory teams and within the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A brings together both NATO and
national training efforts to develop professional, capable and self-
sustaining Afghan National Security Forces.
In parallel with the training and mentoring efforts, ISAF troops
are implementing a phased process to facilitate the transfer of full
security responsibility to Afghan security forces as their capabilities
improve, in keeping with the end of 2014 transition timeline.
The training, advising and assisting of the Afghan National
Security Forces will continue after transition is complete at the end
of 2014, when the ISAF mission will end.
NATO has agreed to lead a post-2014 mission focused on continued
support the development of ANSF capacity. Allies and my NATO military
staffs are currently going through an in-depth review to determine what
assets and capabilities will be required post-2014 to maintain the
momentum of ANSF development and sustain the progress we have already
made. We have not yet reached the point of defining a formal
recommendation as to what the number of forces and required
capabilities will be.

37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, NATO has been transformed by
the expeditionary requirements of operations in Afghanistan. After
2014, what do you perceive to be the primary means to maintain those
hard-earned skills and further evolve NATO to be able to meet 21st
century threats?
Admiral Stavridis. The primary means will be a reinvigorated NRF
and a robust NATO exercise program, which will maintain the links and
interoperability between allies and, importantly, non-NATO partners
across the globe.

38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, as the percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) that NATO nations are spending on defense drops
from the goal of 2 percent towards an inadequate 1 percent, how do we
ensure that Europe will continue to shoulder its share of the global
security burden?
Admiral Stavridis. We need to continue to encourage allies to meet
the agreed commitment of a minimum of 2 percent of GDP spending on
defense. Defense budgets in most countries have declined at a time when
the alliance has undertaken its most demanding and significant mission
ever in Afghanistan, and when the need for investment in future
capabilities is essential. However European NATO nations do recognize
the global security challenges--we have seen this recently with the
French led intervention into Mali as one example. NATO allies have
taken steps to address the issues related to falling defense budgets,
with the announcement at the Chicago Summit in 2012 of a Defence
Package and key initiatives such as Smart Defence and the Connected
Forces Initiative. Alongside the 2 percent guideline, allies have
agreed that at least 20 percent of defense expenditures should be
devoted to major equipment spending. While only four other allies have
met this goal, investment in major equipment by the non-U.S. allies has
held steady at about $50 billion per year for the last decade.

39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what areas of defense
cooperation with our NATO allies do you think have the most potential
to yield productive relationships?
Admiral Stavridis. There are four areas that are extremely
productive:
Operations. NATO allies have provided the core of global missions
from Kosovo to Libya to Afghanistan, to European Air Policing and
maritime operations (counter-piracy) in the Mediterranean and in the
Indian Ocean.
Increased interoperability, which is enabled and maintained by
exercising together, will increase as our forces drawdown in
Afghanistan.
The successful SPP strengthens links between the United States and
a number of allies, at a small cost. This in turns enables increased
participation in operations and exercises.
Foreign Military Sales equip a number of allies with common
equipment.

COUNTER PIRACY

40. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, NATO has had success in
anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. With expanding oil
discoveries in the Atlantic Ocean off of the coast of western Africa,
and drug trafficking that runs from South America through that same
area to Europe, do you see the need for an anti-piracy mission off of
the west coast of Africa?
Admiral Stavridis. Each region is faced with its own unique root
causes of crime and piracy; each will require unique solutions.
The strategic environment and imperatives which led to NATO's
involvement in the current counter-piracy mission are quite different
from that off the coast of West Africa. NATO's mission to counter
maritime piracy began in 2008 with the request from the United Nations
to provide escorts to U.N. World Food Program vessels transiting
through dangerous waters to deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia.
In addition to the threat piracy posed to humanitarian efforts in
Africa, there was a broad international recognition of a threat to the
safety of vital sea lines of communication and economic interests off
the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. This included risks to the
safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the
world--the gateway to and from the Suez Canal.
What we have found during NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, is that
countering piracy requires a mix of maritime security capabilities, use
of best practices by the commercial shipping industry, with stability
and rule of law ashore. NATO's contribution to international counter-
piracy efforts mission continues to this day, in full accordance with
the relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions relating to Somali-based
piracy, and with the consent of Somali authorities.
An increase in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is
indeed of growing concern to the maritime community, but represents a
different challenge. Whereas the counter-piracy mission off the coast
of Somalia, a failed state, has taken place in international waters of
a vital sea line of communication and required an international
response, the Gulf of Guinea is lined with sovereign, functioning
nations and much of the criminal activity takes place within
territorial waters. The United Nations and other relevant actors have
called for nations of West Africa to develop a comprehensive and
integrated regional anti-piracy strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.
The Gulf of Guinea is neither in EUCOM nor NATO's area of
responsibility. I understand that AFRICOM is successfully working with
West African nations to assist in the development of their maritime
capabilities in order to improve safety and security in the Gulf of
Guinea.

41. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what support is Brazil
providing to support the anti-piracy mission? Should the United States,
through increased security assistance resources, support Brazil's anti-
piracy efforts?
Admiral Stavridis. Since Brazil is in the area of responsibility of
the SOUTHCOM, I respectfully request this question be referred to that
command.

42. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, do you envision this as a
U.S. force, a NATO force, or some combination?
Admiral Stavridis. Since Brazil is in the area of responsibility of
SOUTHCOM, I respectfully request this question be referred to that
command.

ISRAEL-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP AND REGIONAL STABILITY

43. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, given the standoff over the
Mavi Marmara incident between Israel and Turkey, are Israel and Turkey
reconcilable?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, Israel and Turkey are reconcilable;
however, the relationship is first and foremost between those two
countries. EUCOM supports a closer relationship between these two key
allies of the United States. We have seen recent moves to better the
relationship by the governments of both countries. Of note, Prime
Minister Netanyahu's recent apology for the Mavi Marmara incident of
May 30, 2010 is a positive first step in this incremental process.
Although many variables and challenges remain that the governments of
both countries must address together, they both have demonstrated they
are capable of a dialogue to proactively attempt to resolve disputes.

44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what is your assessment of
Prime Minister Erdogan's regional ambitions?
Admiral Stavridis. Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan is committed to
establishing optimum security within his own borders in a conflict with
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a conflict which has spanned three
decades and cost over 40,000 lives. PM Erdogan is sensitive to regional
perceptions of Turkey acting unilaterally within the region and
generally takes the position that Turkey should act as a part of a
coalition in any action. PM Erdogan appreciates that, comparatively,
Turkish power within the region is on the rise. However, we have no
indications that he generally advocates greater unilateral Turkish
regional activity.

45. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, do you think Turkey's
cooperation with EUCOM and with NATO on Syria is adequate?
Admiral Stavridis. Turkey's cooperation with EUCOM and NATO on
Syria has definitely been adequate. As Syria's northern neighbor,
Turkey understands the threat, takes it seriously, and is engaged with
the international community for support. Turkey is a strong and
reliable partner for EUCOM and NATO in an unstable region. In response
to the Syrian threat, Turkey has requested and welcomed cooperation in
a number of areas. In January, EUCOM rapidly deployed two Patriot
batteries to Turkey's southern border in support of NATO. Over the past
year EUCOM has worked with Turkey to support and enhance its
capabilities to respond to various Syrian threats. Several of these
efforts have been in support of broader Department of Defense and
Department of State initiatives, such as counter- and non-
proliferation. It is important to note that Turkey is currently home to
over 250,000 Syrian refugees; has lost two Air Force pilots to Syrian
air defenses; and has sustained multiple cross-border indirect fire
incidents due to the Syrian crisis.

46. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, does EUCOM and/or NATO have
a plan to support efforts to secure chemical weapons in Syria if the
Assad regime falls given the threat to Israel and Turkey of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from Syria?
Admiral Stavridis. Since Syria is in the area of responsibility of
the U.S. Central Command, I respectfully request this question be
referred to that command.

47. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Stavridis, what are the major
challenges you see as a military commander to addressing this situation
and what are potential roles do you see for international partners?
Admiral Stavridis. Since Syria is in the area of responsibility of
the U.S. Central Command, I respectfully request this question be
referred to that command.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

U.S. AND RUSSIA RELATIONS

48. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis and General Jacoby, last
month, it was reported that two Russian bombers, both of which were
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, circled Guam and caused the U.S.
Air Force to scramble jets to intercept. It appears that the incident
occurred at about the same time that President Obama was giving his
State of the Union Address. General Jacoby, you note in your testimony
that NORAD's increased ability to detect and respond to Russian
Military Aviation flights entering U.S. and Canadian Air Defense
Identification Zones. You also state that Russia is in the process of
modernizing and enhancing the capability of its long range aviation.
The fact that you mention these two issues in your testimony indicates
to me, at the very least, a passing concern with Russia's intentions
towards the United States and our allies. At a period in time when
Russia appears to be modernizing its military and flying long range
bomber missions near U.S. territory, how would each of you characterize
the nature of U.S.-Russia relations?
Admiral Stavridis. As Russia continues to modernize its strategic
forces, it has increased its long-range aviation (LRA) training flights
to previous levels and areas of activity to test its own capabilities
and readiness. Additionally, Defense Minister Shoygu and other senior
military leaders recently conducted ``no notice'' evaluations of
ground, naval and air forces in Southern, Central and Eastern military
districts to gauge current and emerging capabilities in these regions.
We do not assess that the capability to conduct these activities
presents an imminent threat to U.S. territory or U.S. forces. These
activities have strained, but not significantly altered, our bilateral
working relationship. Along with our allies, we should continue to
track Russian activities near NATO territory in order to maintain a
persistent deterrent to assure allies and partners of our commitments
to supporting their security. We must do this while attempting to build
mutual transparency and trust with Russia to avoid misunderstandings
and miscalculations over its training activities.
General Jacoby. Senator, while we have seen a definite increase in
past years in the number of long range training flights in proximity to
U.S. air space, I would defer to EUCOM--which is the designated
combatant command for coordinating U.S.-Russia Military cooperation
efforts--for a broad brush, big picture, overview of the wider
military-to-military relationship.
From a NORAD perspective, we have not seen any significant change
in our military-to-military relationship with the Russian Federation.
We continue to use the U.S./Russian Military Work Plan to schedule
items of mutual interest and benefit. These cooperative efforts
culminate in the annual Exercise Vigilant Eagle, a very successful
counter-air terrorism event conducted in the Bering Sea area between
NORAD and Russian Eastern Military District. I am encouraged that we
have seen no indications that the Russians intend to curtail or
eliminate this yearly event. However, while NORAD would like to expand
the scope and complexity of Vigilant Eagle, the Russian military is
clearly more comfortable with the existing state of cooperative efforts
at this time.

49. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis and General Jacoby, have you
seen anything to indicate that the administration's Russia reset has or
has not had the intended effect?
Admiral Stavridis. The answer is somewhere in the middle between
success and failure. I think that the level of military cooperation
with Russia has increased in areas of mutual interest and benefit,
especially if one looks at where the relationship was in the fall of
2008. We still have many differences with Russia such as missile
defense, its support for the Assad regime in Syria, and its desire for
a ``sphere of influence'' in its periphery. Also, while Russia wants us
involved in Central and South Asia to stabilize Afghanistan, it works
at every turn to have us ejected from the Manas Transit Center in
Manas, Kyrgyzstan. We must however continue to work to develop a
constructive partnership despite our significant political
disagreements. No one wants to stumble backwards toward the Cold War,
so the best course for the future is open discussion, frank airing of
disagreements, and, hopefully, seeking to build a wider strategic
partnership.
General Jacoby. NORAD pursues all appropriate avenues for
cooperation with the Russian military. We continue to work through
issues of mutual concern through NORAD specific items in the U.S.-
Russia Military Work Plan. This coordination is highlighted through the
annual anti-terrorism Exercise Vigilant Eagle. It's clear to me that in
spite of the ebb and flow of the ongoing political discourse between
the Nations, we can continue to build cooperation on areas of mutual
interest with the Russian military.
That said, whatever the status of reset, the Command's mission
calls for demonstrating the capability and intentions to defend North
American from threats, to include those that might be presented by
Russia.

50. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, RT reported on March 18,
2013 that Russia is going to establish a permanent naval task force,
composed of five or six combatant ships, in the Mediterranean Sea. The
article further reports that ``Russia is prepared to send combat ships
to the Pacific and Indian Ocean.'' How would you characterize the
nature of this announcement?
Admiral Stavridis. In strategic terms, Russia's establishment of a
rotational naval task force in the Mediterranean with plans to follow
up in the Indian and Pacific oceans is an attempt to regain some
measure of its former maritime presence, and a continuation of
evaluations and exercises across the Armed Forces under new Defense
Minister Shoygu. Given the current instability in the Levant,
especially in Syria, Russia is making moves to protect its interests in
the region while appealing to an internal audience nostalgic for its
former global reach. Syria contains Tartus, Russia's only base outside
of the territory of the former Soviet Union, and can provide logistical
and materiel support for some of its smaller warships, alleviating the
need to navigate the Turkish-controlled Dardanelle and Bosphorus
Straits into the Black Sea.
The composition and size of the 5-ship fleet (three combatants and
two support ships) indicate that it is not capable and likely not
intended to challenge NATO for dominance in the Mediterranean, where
the U.S. Sixth Fleet is permanently stationed.

51. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, do you believe that the
Russian task force will be a help or a hindrance to U.S. and NATO
efforts to promote maritime security in the Mediterranean?
Admiral Stavridis. I think we can look at the example of the
Russian counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa.
The Russian Navy has been extremely useful to the overall counter
piracy efforts in the region even though it has not integrated into
Combined Task Force efforts. Nevertheless, they have been able to
relieve some of the burden on the Combined Task Force by providing
extra escort and protection services for ships/convoys. We will likely
see the Russian Navy also be of assistance in promoting security in the
Mediterranean Sea, with the possible exception of Syria. The Russian
Navy has actively participated in Operation Active Endeavor and
frequently joins Partnership for Peace exercises in the Mediterranean.
The goals of Operation Active Endeavour and the Partnership for Peace
exercises are promotion of interoperability, search and rescue, counter
smuggling, and maritime interdiction operations. The addition of a
Russian Task Force will possibly enhance these two programs.

52. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, in your prepared testimony,
you acknowledge that U.S. force posture in Europe has been declining
for decades, and you state, quite rightly I believe, that ``Power, like
nature, abhors a vacuum.'' I also believe you are correct in asserting
that the diminishing U.S. presence in Europe provides an opportunity
for our adversaries. It seems to me that the timing of this
announcement is not a coincidence. It is no secret that the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) recently announced that significant impacts that
sequestration will have on our naval readiness and ability to meet
planned deployment schedules. Do you believe the establishment of the
Russian task force is, at least in part, in response to the diminished
U.S. military presence in the AOR?
Admiral Stavridis. I do not think there is a direct correlation
with the diminishing U.S. military presence in the AOR, though the
Russians will definitely take advantage of the situation. Since 2007,
the Russian Navy has been declaring a desire to return to the world's
oceans and the new Mediterranean Task Group will be a natural follow on
to these plans. This commitment to a worldwide presence has been
reflected by KUZNETSOV Task Group deployments to the Mediterranean in
2007, 2008, and 2011; near continuous counter-piracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa since 2009; and multiple deployments by
Kirov-class battle cruisers to the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas,
and the Indian and Pacific Oceans since 2008. Accordingly, the
establishment of a Task Group would seem to be a continuation of plans
likely put into place several years ago.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

SYRIA AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

53. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, from open source news
outlets, Syria's Government and rebels accused each other of launching
a deadly chemical attack near the northern city of Aleppo on March 19,
2013 in what would, if confirmed, be the first use of such weapons in
the 2-year-old conflict. What can you confirm about the possible use of
chemical weapons in Aleppo and what contingency plans does EUCOM have
in place in the event of continued use of chemical weapons?
Admiral Stavridis. At this time we cannot confirm anything with
respect to alleged chemical weapons use in Aleppo. The international
community had proposed investigating chemical weapons use in Syria-
which would include Aleppo--but I understand such an investigation is
held up over questions of scope and jurisdiction.
EUCOM does not currently have in place any contingency plans
related to the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria which, as you
know, is within the area of responsibility of the U.S. Central Command.
My team is working with counterparts in CENTCOM to ensure we support
their contingency plans relative to Syria.

EUCOM RESPONSE TO BENGHAZI

54. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, you gave a brief overview of
EUCOM's actions during the response to the Benghazi attacks of
September 11, 2012 during the posture hearing. Please discuss in detail
the actions that EUCOM conducted during the attack to include but not
limited to: the requests that were submitted for support from AFRICOM;
contingency plans to include units that were slated to respond to a
Benghazi like attack to AFRICOM; and their actions during the attack?
Admiral Stavridis. Immediately upon notification of the attacks in
Benghazi, EUCOM went into action, initiating coordination and support
for AFRICOM and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). AFRICOM
requested, and EUCOM provided, the following operations, intelligence,
logistical, and communications support:
Operations Support:

Postured EUCOM Commander's In-Extremis Force (CIF) to
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, to respond to AFRICOM
requirements.
Deployed one Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST)
Platoon to U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya.
Postured one FAST Platoon at Naval Station Souda Bay,
Greece to respond to AFRICOM requirements.
Provided multiple U.S. Navy surface combatants and
aviation platforms for intelligence collection and forward
presence, to include the IWO JIMA/24 Marine Expeditionary Unit
Strike Group and E/F-18G electronic warfare support.
Provided Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) support to AFRICOM throughout the
operation.
Working closely with U.S. Embassy Country Teams,
coordinated basing, access, throughput, and overflight
permissions with Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany, and other
European nations for responding U.S. forces.

Intelligence Support:

Provided intelligence support to AFRICOM from the
EUCOM Intelligence Directorate and EUCOM's National
Intelligence Agency Representatives.
Supported personnel recovery efforts by coordinating
strategic debriefing of U.S. State Department members evacuated
to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and Ramstein Air Base.
Coordinated with AFRICOM Intelligence Watch, Theater
Cryptologic Operations Center, and National Military Operations
Center to gain and maintain situational awareness.
Supported AFRICOM with geospatial information and
services support.

Logistical Support:

The EUCOM Logistics Directorate established and
executed a daily Basing Support Working Group that deconflicted
movements, intra-theater lift, basing activities, and
logistical support requirements between EUCOM, AFRICOM, SOCOM,
and various subordinate commands.
Due to a staffing shortage at AFRICOM, EUCOM Mortuary
Affairs supported AFRICOM by providing the safe and expeditious
repatriation of the four Americans killed in the attack.
Supporting response airlift operations, EUCOM
synchronized the execution of 55 airlift missions at 12
different bases delivering over 1,000 personnel and 700 short
tons of cargo.

Communications Support:

U.S. Air Forces Europe deployed communications
personnel and equipment to Trapani Air Base, Italy, in order to
provide secure and non-secure voice and data communications
support to U.S. personnel recovery assets stationed there.
The EUCOM Communications Directorate processed and
managed 10 high-priority, ad-hoc satellite communications
(SATCOM) requests, meeting AFRICOM's planning and operational
requirements.

tactical nuclear weapons in russia
55. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, we suspect that the Russian
Government continues to increase or modernize their tactical nuclear
weapons inventory. What information can you provide relative to the
continued production and/or modernization of Russian tactical weapons
versus Russian strategic nuclear weapons especially from a NATO
perspective?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

56. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, what is your assessment of the
SPP?
General Kelly. The SPP is an important instrument for advancing
international cooperation to effect key defense and security issues in
the SOUTHCOM area of operation. SOUTHCOM leverages the close ties that
exist between National Guard units, their communities and States to
develop holistic government and society solutions.
The SPP improves my ability to provide a persistent United States
presence and enhances the Command's ability to counteract the
increasingly negative influences in the region while promoting United
States National Security Goals.
Since 1996, the SPP in the SOUTHCOM theater has grown from 4 to 22
partnerships, with the latest, Colombia, being partnered with South
Carolina in 2012. Through the efforts of Congress and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the program's oversight and executions have been
formalized. Now, SPP activities and events are planned, coordinated,
and executed to achieve my theater security cooperation program
objectives, the objectives of the Chief of Mission, as well as the
national security objectives of the partner nation.

57. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, what role does the SPP play in
helping SOUTHCOM accomplish its mission?
General Kelly. The SPP provides approximately 10 percent of the
total annual theater engagement in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.
It builds enduring civil-military relationships that improve long-term
international security while building partner nation capacity across
all levels of society with partner nations of strategic importance to
the United States.
All National Guard SPP activities and events are planned,
coordinated, and executed to achieve objectives of the Combatant
Commander and the Chief of Mission in each partner nation.

58. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, what is your assessment of the
New Hampshire National Guard's SPP in El Salvador?
General Kelly. I am proud of the work all the National Guard does
in support of SOUTHCOM through the SPP. New Hampshire's State
Partnership is a model program, and its mature partnership with El
Salvador has a solid mix of military-to-military, military-to-civilian
and Civil Security Cooperation events. New Hampshire's National Guard
has executed nearly 85 events over the past 12 years under the SPP, and
all of their efforts have been well harmonized with the Intermediate
Military Objectives within SOUTHCOM's Theater Campaign Plan.
In particular, New Hampshire has done an excellent job in focusing
their engagement efforts on Defense Support to Civilian Authorities. El
Salvador's defense capabilities are evidenced by its ability to export
its security capability during 11 deployments to Operation Iraqi
Freedom and two deployments to Operation Enduring Freedom.

SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS

59. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Stavridis, General Jacoby, and General
Kelly, how will sequestration impact each of your combatant commands?
Admiral Stavridis. Sequestration will have several near-term
effects over the remainder of fiscal year 2013. The lack of sufficient
funds for training hours, steaming hours, flying hours, and sustainment
will reduce the readiness, maintenance, and availability of assigned
and rotational forces required to execute ongoing operations, steady
state activities, and crisis response. Sequestration will also entail
cuts to Defense and State Department programs that support EUCOM steady
state activities to preserve our strategic partnerships in Europe,
ensure strategic access, and promote regional stability. In addition,
the ability of EUCOM and our Service component headquarters to plan,
direct, and execute military operations and steady state activities
will be degraded due to reductions in headquarters funding, the
furlough of civilian personnel, and cuts to facilities maintenance.
Finally, sequestration will adversely affect the services that support
our military and civilian personnel and their families, such as schools
and health services.
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM has very few assigned forces. I rely on
trained, available, and equipped forces from the Services. Thus, if
sequestration causes the Services to mortgage their readiness, it will
put at risk my ability to defend in depth and potentially erode my
ability to conduct critical homeland defense missions. Service
readiness will also directly impact the exercises and training NORTHCOM
conducts and executes alongside our mission partners, through reduced
Service or partner participation and fewer engagements or touch points.
Building partnerships is essential to responding to events in the
homeland; a reduced capacity to build those partnerships adds to the
existing challenge of protecting the homeland. Each of my mission sets
will be further impacted by furloughs, as my civilian workforce is
associated with all aspects of homeland defense and support of civil
authorities. In summary, NORTHCOM and NORAD are postured to defend the
Nation against a full spectrum of threats, but we will have to work
hard with the Services to sustain that posture as we deal with
sequestration, and the program and budget uncertainty that comes with
it.
General Kelly. Sequestration cuts have forced the military services
to cut personnel, ships, and aircraft deployments to the region,
affecting several missions including support to drug interdiction and
other law enforcement operations. Out-year cuts associated with
sequestration will degrade SOUTHCOM's ability to fulfill its title 10
statutory obligations to conduct detection and monitoring (D&M) and
limits its ability to provide operational support to U.S. interagency
and partner nation interdiction operations. Execution of SOUTHCOM's
Partnership of the Americas strategy that includes deployment of the
medical ship USNS Comfort, whose regional stops included Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Honduras, has also been canceled for fiscal year 2013.
The deployment of the USNS Comfort has historically been an enormously
successful and positive event in the region.
Security Cooperation Activities have been reduced by approximately
25 percent ($15 million) in fiscal year 2013, forcing the cancellation
of three major exercises (Peace Keeping Operations Americas, Fuerzas
Comando, and Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias); the descoping of the
exercise Panamax and exercise Unitas; and the elimination of
approximately 200 engagement activities. These activities range from
medical readiness training exercises to small group training activities
and infrastructure development projects. Decreased out-year funding
associated with sequestration, in addition to potential furloughs to my
civilian workforce, will further impact SOUTHCOM's ability to improve
the security and defense capabilities of partner nation forces in the
region. Nonetheless, we remain committed to supporting regional
security and to strengthening our valued defense partnerships in South
and Central America, and the Caribbean.

IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT AND U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE

60. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, in your prepared statement, you
conclude that Iran ``is developing advanced missile capabilities faster
than previously assessed and is apparently positioning itself to
produce a nuclear warhead quickly should its leaders choose to do so.''
Does the United States currently have a shoot-look-shoot capability
against an ICBM launched from Iran that is heading toward Boston, New
York, or Washington, DC? In other words, would the United States
currently have one chance or two chances to shoot down an Iranian ICBM
headed toward the east coast?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

61. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, would an east coast missile
defense site provide additional missile defense protection against a
prospective Iranian ballistic missile threat against the east coast of
the United States?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

62. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, from start to finish, what is
your understanding as to how long it would take to build an east coast
missile defense site?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

GUANTANAMO BAY

63. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, how would you characterize
detention operations at GTMO?
General Kelly. Detention operations in Guantanamo are executed in
accordance with humanitarian principles, applicable domestic and
international law, and Department of Defense policies, regulations, and
directives.
JTF-GTMO normally houses detainees under two different detention
models. The majority of detainees are held in single-cell detention,
which means that a detainee has his own cell, usually in close
proximity to other detainees in adjacent cells, whereby he is able to
participate in no less than 2 hours of open-air recreation per day and
to worship in accordance with his religious beliefs. A smaller number
of detainees are held in a communal setting, where detainees are not
locked in their cells during the day, but they are permitted to leave
their cells and move freely within shared common spaces within their
detention camp, including outside areas for open-air recreation.
Whether a detainee is held in single-cell detention or communal
detention depends upon his behavior and compliance with camp rules:
only ``compliant'' detainees are afforded the increased freedom of
socialization and movement granted by communal detention. Whether
housed in single cell, or communally, all detainees are treated
humanely as required by international law and U.S. policy.
Regardless of the detention model, all detainees with pending legal
processes, including military commissions, habeas corpus litigation, or
periodic review boards, are permitted access to their attorneys through
personal visits, mail, and in many cases, telephone calls.
Additionally, in coordination with the International Committee of the
Red Cross, JTF-GTMO facilitates quarterly hour-long telephone or video
teleconference calls between detainees and their families, regardless
of whether the detainee is held in single-cell or communal detention.

64. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, what are the challenges you face
with respect to the infrastructure at GTMO?
General Kelly. Most of the current facilities are aging,
dilapidated temporary structures well beyond their expected life
expectancy and present risk to JTF-GTMO and their mission. The
environment at Guantanamo Bay is not suitable for the long term use of
temporary facilities. Year-to-year funding hampers any real master
planning efforts and execution. Legal and policy issues are intertwined
in the infrastructure decisions relative to their repair and
replacement.

65. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, you say that you ``have
identified a series of projects aimed at increasing the security of the
detainees, facilitating our ability to support legal processes for
detainees, and most of all, meeting basic quality of life requirements
for our troops''. Did you recommend that these projects be included in
the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request?
General Kelly. No; the projects identified by JTF-GTMO that I
endorsed were submitted to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Energy, and Environment (ASA/IE&E) by our Army
component (U.S. Army South) for Army Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) Military Construction (MILCON) funding consideration. The ASA/
IE&E identified uncommitted MILCON for possible use to satisfy JTF-GTMO
requirements; final resolution of funding availability is pending
approval of the Secretary of Defense.

66. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, would our servicemembers
stationed at GTMO be well-served by ensuring that facility sustainment,
restoration, and modernization (FSRM) funding for GTMO is incorporated
into the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
General Kelly. SOUTHCOM submitted a Program Budget Review (PBR)
Issue Nomination in fiscal year 2012 to include all JTF-GTMO funding
into the base budget (FYDP) for the specific purpose of increasing
fiscal discipline and to enable planning for facility sustainment and
restoration.

67. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, how often do representatives of
the International Red Cross visit GTMO?
General Kelly. In 2012, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) began visiting JTF-GTMO six times per year on a bimonthly
schedule. Representatives of the ICRC now annually carry out four 1-
week visits and two 2-week visits, for a total of 8 weeks per year,
inspecting facilities, delivering Red Cross Messages, and conducting
private interviews with detainees from all of JTF-GTMO's detention
camps.

68. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, how often do the media and
Congressional delegations visit GTMO?
General Kelly. There is a steady flow of media into JTF-GTMO, both
to visit the detention facility itself and to report on commissions.
Since opening the facility in 2002, more than 2,300 media members have
visited. In 2012, JTF-GTMO hosted 164 media representatives from 60
U.S. and international news organizations.
Since 2003 there have been 75 congressional delegation trips to
JTF-GTMO, with anywhere from 1 to 7 people on each visit.

69. Senator Ayotte. General Kelly, is it fair to say that GTMO is
one of the most well-supervised and professional detention facilities
in the world?
General Kelly. Yes. JTF-GTMO is unique. JTF-GTMO is staffed by a
well-trained, professional guard force consisting predominantly of Army
military policemen. Through the dedicated efforts of dozens of
committed commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers,
and sailors, the JTF-GTMO Commander, Rear Admiral John Smith, enforces
the highest standards despite a very challenging detention environment.

COORDINATION BETWEEN NORTHCOM AND SOUTHCOM

70. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby and General Kelly, what are your
assessments of the illegal activities in this border area between the
United States and Mexico?
General Jacoby. As well as we do on securing the border, we will
always be in a position of needing to improve. The security environment
constantly changes as criminal enterprises become more sophisticated
and aim to exploit vulnerabilities in terrain and institutions.
NORTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement partners (principally CBP, CBP-
Office of Air and Marine, ICE-Homeland Security Investigations, and
U.S. Border Patrol) with unique military capabilities to directly
pressure criminal networks on both sides of the border. With
persistent, agile application of capability to support our partners,
the command gains strategic depth in our homeland defense mission.
(U) NORTHCOM is taking a broader approach to looking at the U.S./
Mexico border area. We view criminal networks operating across the
border as a part of a sophisticated, integrated, global network that
poses a national security threat to the United States. To address this
elaborate network of networks that traverses through physical and cyber
space, we advocate working across governments and using interagency
approaches to understand and attack the network. Through a coalition of
partners, we can put pressure on the financiers, leaders, logisticians,
and operators that enable illicit activity.
General Kelly. NORTHCOM, based on its assigned responsibilities in
the Unified Command Plan, is best suited to characterize the illicit
activities along the U.S./Mexico border. SOUTHCOM assists NORTHCOM by
disrupting illegal products and criminal networks along the southern
approaches to the United States. Specifically, SOUTHCOM supports
Department of State and partner nation eradication efforts in the
source zones located in South America. Additionally, SOUTHCOM fulfills
its statutory responsibility for the detection and monitoring of aerial
and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States primarily
through Joint Interagency Task Force-South. Further, SOUTHCOM and
NORTHCOM consistently share information and intelligence on people,
products, networks, tactics, and operations that facilitate
transnational criminal networks.

71. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby and General Kelly, what are each
of you doing to ensure optimal coordination between your two commands?
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM, in collaboration with SOUTHCOM, is
focused on enhancing the partnerships between U.S. Law Enforcement
Agencies with our respective counterparts and Mexican, Guatemalan, and
Belizean militaries to build capability and capacity. Currently, the
commands are working together to update our Command Arrangement
Agreement, which establishes coordination procedures and delineates
responsibilities between our two geographic combatant commands.
General Kelly. SOUTHCOM coordinates with NORTHCOM at all levels,
including participation in mutually-relevant conferences, exercises,
and planning events. My staff coordinates with NORTHCOM on strategy,
engagement, and strategic communication efforts in the Western
Hemisphere, focusing primarily on an integrated, hemispheric approach
to combating transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere,
especially along the border shared among Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize.
A NORTHCOM-SOUTHCOM Command Arrangement Agreement describes and directs
formal inter-combatant command relationships essential for operational
planning and execution in the vicinity of our shared area of
responsibility boundary and on topics of common interest.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Inhofe, McCain, Wicker, Ayotte, and Graham.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Ozge
Guzelsu, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, Minority
Staff Director; Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member;
and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Mariah K. McNamara, John L.
Principato, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; David LaPorte, assistant to Senator Manchin; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King;
Christian Brose and Brian Rogers, assistants to Senator McCain;
Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; and Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We hope our
speakers work here. This microphone I don't think is working.
We're going to start without the mic. Okay, I have to get
closer.
We're receiving testimony today on the posture of U.S.
forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and on behalf of the
committee first let me welcome Admiral Samuel Locklear, the
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Admiral, the
committee appreciates your long years of faithful service and
the many sacrifices that you and your family have made for our
Nation, and we would also greatly appreciate it if you would
pass along to the men and women with whom you work our
admiration for their service as well. We know this is a
particularly busy time for you, Admiral, and for your staff. We
appreciate your joining us today.
General Thurman, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, was
originally scheduled to testify today as well, but the decision
was made to keep him on the Korean Peninsula at this time and
we understand and appreciate the reasons for that decision. We
wish General Thurman well in his ongoing activities.
Today's hearing is a particularly timely one because of the
events on the Korean Peninsula, which have intensified as the
North Korean regime, which is a longstanding international
pariah, has elevated its reckless rhetoric and its provocative
behavior. Any guarded optimism about North Korea that may have
accompanied the December 2011 death of long-time dictator Kim
Jong Il has faded as the new regime has adopted many of the
same destructive policies as its predecessors, stubbornly
pursuing its nuclear weapons and its ballistic missile programs
with callous disregard for the well-being of its own people and
the region.
Earlier this month, the North Korean regime announced its
intention to restart plutonium production at Yongbyon. In
February, it tested a nuclear device that appears to have a
yield greater than that shown in previous North Korean tests.
In December of last year, the regime put a satellite in orbit
using technologies associated with long-range ballistic
missiles. Last April, it displayed a road-mobile missile
launcher which may or may not be operational.
The North Korean regime's rhetorical threats appear to
exceed its capabilities and its use of what capabilities it has
against the United States or our allies seems highly unlikely
and would be completely contrary to the regime's primary goal
of survival. Nonetheless, its words and actions are not without
consequences. Even China, despite its longstanding relationship
with North Korea, has joined in United Nations condemnation of
the North Korean regime's dangerous behavior and has supported
new sanctions, including tighter financial restrictions and
bans on luxury goods.
A few weeks ago, Secretary Hagel announced a plan to
enhance our ground-based interceptor (GBI) capability in
Alaska, and just last week the Department of Defense (DOD)
announced the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to Guam as a
further precautionary measure.
The administration has responded to North Korea's bluster,
not with hot rhetoric of our own, but with firm and confident
resolve with our partners and countries in the region who want
stability and calm, always looking forward to the time when the
oppressive North Korean regime will come to an end.
I am puzzled by the delay of the long-scheduled
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operational test
following the North Korean rhetorical threats. Why was this
delayed? Why was our test delayed? I would appreciate knowing,
Admiral, if you agree with the decision which was made to delay
that test.
The Republic of Korea remains one of the United States'
most steadfast and reliable allies and we are working in close
coordination to address the North Korean challenge. We look
forward to hearing Admiral Locklear's views on recent
developments on the Korean Peninsula and additional steps that
can be taken.
We face many other challenges and opportunities in the
Asia-Pacific region as well. China's continued rise in regional
and global influence, coupled with its military modernization
and growth, has drawn justifiable attention from DOD. China's
pursuit of capabilities that extend the reach of its military
raises concerns about Chinese intentions, particularly in the
context of that country's increasing willingness to assert its
controversial claims of sovereignty in areas of the South China
Sea and the East China Sea.
In addition, China's lack of regard for the intellectual
property rights of the United States and other nations remains
a huge problem for the global community. China remains the
leading source of counterfeit parts both in military systems
and in the commercial sector. In addition, China appears to
have engaged in a massive campaign to steal technology and
other vital business information from American industry and our
government. China's apparent willingness to exploit cyberspace
to conduct corporate espionage and to steal trade and
proprietary information from U.S. companies should drive our
government and our businesses to come together to advance our
own cyber security.
There are a number of other PACOM missions that warrant our
attention as well, such as ensuring freedom of navigation and
protecting the free flow of commerce through critical sea lanes
of communication, strengthening alliances, and building on
partnerships, providing expertise and support to countries
committed to fighting transnational violent extremism, working
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), and preparing for and assisting with humanitarian and
disaster relief efforts.
To better meet these challenges, the administration
continues to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. DOD has been
working through substantial realignments of U.S. military
forces in countries like South Korea and Japan and is also
engaged in initiatives to position forces further to the south
in countries such as Australia, Singapore, and, possibly, the
Philippines. As we rebalance and realign our presence in the
Asia-Pacific area, it is important that we get it right in
terms of strategy, but also in terms of resourcing and
sustainability.
This committee will continue to exercise its oversight
responsibilities, to ensure that our forward presence in the
Asia-Pacific and elsewhere in the world is affordable,
sustainable, and operationally supportable. In this regard, the
committee has recently approved the report of its inquiry into
U.S. costs and allied contributions associated with U.S.
military presence overseas and we anticipate releasing this
report in the next few days.
With respect to the planned realignment of U.S. marines
currently on Okinawa, Senator McCain, former Senator Webb, and
I advocated changes for the 2006 U.S.-Japan realignment road
map plan to better support U.S. strategic goals in the region
while also accounting for the fiscal, political, and diplomatic
realities associated with long-term sustainability. The April
2012 joint U.S.-Japan announcement of changes to the 2006 plan
reflected an appreciation by both governments of the need to
make adjustments in order to support the goal of achieving a
more viable and sustainable U.S. Marine Corps presence in
Japan, on Guam, and elsewhere in the region.
DOD is currently working to develop the details of this new
plan and the final construction schedule and total costs are
not yet known. After we receive that plan, we will be in a
position to judge it. But until that plan is forthcoming, the
committee has deferred action on associated requirements until
previously-adopted conditions are met. So while I support the
concept of restationing marines from Okinawa to Guam, it must
be done in a fiscally and operationally sound manner.
Of course, we must consider all these challenges and
initiatives in the Asia-Pacific against the backdrop of the
budget constraints of sequestration, and, Admiral, we'd be
interested in your assessment as to the effects of
sequestration on your ability to meet mission requirements in
your area of responsibility (AOR).
Again, we very much appreciate all the work that you do for
this Nation. We appreciate your joining us this morning. We
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Locklear, you're on your own today, but I think
that General Thurman made the right decision staying where he
is. So I'm sure you can handle all of this today.
North Korea's recent actions highlight the historic
disparity between the Obama administration's triumphant
declaration that the tide of the war is receding and the
reality. Old threats are being replaced by new, more dangerous
ones, just like Kim Jong Il was replaced by Kim Jong Un. North
Korea's new leader, Kim Jong Un, brutally represses his people
and is engaged in provocative statements, military exercises,
and nuclear tests that have pushed the region onto the brink of
conflict. I just got back from there and I got the clear
impression that he was doing that intentionally just to
intimidate and to provoke people.
Both General Thurman and Admiral Locklear are implementing
prudent steps that include continuing to train our South Korean
partners in exercises like Foal Eagle, practicing strike
missions with the F-22, the B-2, and the B-52 aircraft, moving
Aegis cruisers closer to the Korean Peninsula, and installing
the THAAD capability in Guam. Our increased military
capabilities in the region are designed to deter North Korean
aggression. Should deterrence fail, they also stand ready to
punish aggression, to protect vital United States interests.
Though I'm encouraged by the President's reversal of his
previous decision by acquiring the 14 additional GBIs, which is
right after he got rid of the 14 GBIs, I think the decision to
reverse that first decision was the right one. I think that
doesn't address the problem, though, that we would have, which
is not really in your area, but the third site that we've been
talking about, the regretful thing that we did in getting rid
of the GBI capability in Poland 4 years ago.
China's growing defensive capabilities and aggression
demand that we understand our capability to defend Taiwan and
how PACOM intends to tailor--I took all of the stuff I had on
China out of my opening statement because I agree with the
statement that the chairman made and I think he covered it very
well. We have to have a clear long-term strategy that details
adjustments to our force posture, including a plan for Marine
Corps presence in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, and Australia. It's
been over a year since the administration announced the
rebalance to Asia and I look to Admiral Locklear as the
commander on the ground to provide the committee with a
detailed description of what the rebalance means in military
terms.
I also look forward to his frank assessment as to how the
ongoing budget crisis will impact his plans and operations in
the Pacific. I have some questions about that and I'm sure that
you'll give us very straightforward answers.
I'm deeply concerned about the growing divide between what
we expect our military to accomplish and the resources that
we're providing them. I've often said, Admiral, that you do a
great job with the hand you're being dealt; we need to deal you
a better hand.
I can't recall a time in my life when the world has been
more dangerous and, while the President naively sees the tide
of war receding, I see the continued need for a strong, able,
and well-resourced force that remains engaged in the Asia-
Pacific and beyond. This insistence by this President to
drastically slash the defense budget puts the future of such a
force at risk. The Obama administration's plan to have DOD,
which makes up only 18 percent of the budget, be accountable
for 50 percent of the reduction is not responsible.
Shortsighted cuts to defense capabilities will result in a
weakened U.S. military and would embolden adversaries like
North Korea.
The reckless course of action pursued by the regime in
Pyongyang underscores the importance of our forward military
posture in the Asia-Pacific. Our presence helps to shape events
and underpin stability, in this case very concretely, through
deterrence. But should deterrence fail, make no mistake, our
military forces stand by, ready to defend the Nation.
Thank you very much, Admiral, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Locklear. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify today and provide you with my
perspectives on the posture of PACOM. I request that my written
testimony be included in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Admiral Locklear. For the past 13 months or so, I've had
the great honor to lead the 328,000 servicemembers and about
38,000 civilian employees and their families in the PACOM area.
Our AOR is diverse and complex. It encompasses about 52 percent
of the world's surface and over half the world's population.
It's culturally, socially, economically, and geo-politically
diverse. The nations are what I refer to as the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, because that's the framework I see it in, includes 5
of our Nation's 7 treaty allies, 3 of the largest and 7 of the
10 smallest economies, the most populated nations in the world,
including the largest Muslim-majority nation, the largest
democracy in the world, and of course the world's smallest
republic as well.
The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the engine that drives the global
economy. The open and accessible sea lanes throughout the Indo-
Asia-Pacific annually enjoy about $8 trillion in bilateral
trade, with one-third of the world's bulk cargo and two-thirds
of the world's oil shipments sailing to and from the 9 of the
world's 10 largest economic ports which are in the Asia-
Pacific.
So by any meaningful measure, the Indo-Asia-Pacific is also
the world's most militarized region, with 7 of the 10 largest
standing militaries, the world's largest and most sophisticated
navies, 5 of the world's declared nuclear-armed nations. So
when taken altogether, these aspects, they present a region
with a unique strategic complexity and a wide, diverse group of
challenges that can significantly stress the security
environment.
Now, effectively engaging in the Indo-Asia-Pacific requires
a committed and sustained effort, and PACOM as a military
component of this commitment, is clearly focused in our efforts
to deter aggression, to assure our allies and our partners, and
to prevent conflict should our national interests be
threatened.
While the Indo-Asia-Pacific is relatively peaceful over
time, I'm concerned by a number of security challenges similar
to those that you've outlined, Mr. Chairman, that have the
possibility to impact the stability of today's security
environment. I'm sure we'll talk later about the Korean
Peninsula, but it appears it will persist and an impetuous
young leader continues to focus on provocation rather than on
his own people.
The rise of China and India as global economic powers and
their emergence as regional military powers will continue, and,
with China specifically, we will focus our efforts on building
relationships with them and doing all we can to assist them as
they emerge into a security environment as hopefully productive
contributors to global peace and prosperity.
We expect that the growing populations of the world will
continue to be challenged by inevitable earthquakes and
tsunamis and typhoons and flooding, as well as continued
transnational threats like pandemics, pirates, terrorists,
criminal organizations, human trafficking, and proliferation of
WMD.
We will also, no doubt, see historic and emerging border
and territorial disputes continue as the competition for water,
food, and energy grow, and we expect that access and freedom of
action in the shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyber will
become increasingly challenged.
Finally, there's no single organization, mechanism, in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific to manage the relationships when it's needed
or to provide a framework for conflict resolution. So we have
to rely on our allies and our growing partner relationships,
including those that we're growing with multilateral
organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), to ensure that we can maintain the peace.
The U.S. joint force has been heavily tasked in other AORs
over the past decade and as a consequence in my AOR, in PACOM,
in many key areas we have been resource-challenged and have
assumed additional risk. Our rebalance to the Pacific strategy
has given us a new opportunity to begin to solve these
challenges and to reemphasize to our allies and our partners
that we are committed to the Pacific, that we are a committed
Pacific nation. It also reflects the recognition that the
future prosperity will be defined largely by events and
developments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Over the past year, the rebalance has helped focus our
planning and our resourcing decisions as we work closer with
our allies and partners to ensure a security environment
favorable to U.S. interests. However, the impacts of
sequestration have created budget uncertainties, limited our
flexibility to manage risk, and have the potential to undermine
our long-term strategic rebalance momentum.
Nonetheless, PACOM will work with the Services to preserve,
to the extent possible, our essential Homeland defense and
crisis response capabilities, capabilities resident in our
forward-deployed forces.
The Pacific Ocean does not separate the United States from
Asia; it connects us. We are connected by our economies, our
cultures, our shared interests, and our security challenges.
We've been resource-challenged and we've been accepting risk in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region for some time. But our rebalance
strategy is in place and we're making good progress.
Let me assure you that PACOM will continue to demonstrate
to our allies, our partners, and others the U.S. resolve and
commitment to peace and security in this important part of the
world.
On behalf of our superb military and civilian members and
their families, all of whom sacrifice every day to ensure that
our country is well defended, I'd like to thank each member of
this committee for your support. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM Samuel J. Locklear, USN

INTRODUCTION: WHY IS THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC IMPORTANT?

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to present an update on U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM). For the past 12 months I have had the honor to
lead over 328,000 servicemembers and 38,000 civilian employees as the
PACOM Commander, and I look forward to sharing my thoughts with you on
the strategic environment of this diverse and complex theater.
In 2011 the President directed his national security team to make
America's ``presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top priority.''
This testimony discusses the foundations of our strategy and how we
plan to accomplish the President's directive by providing a candid
assessment of the opportunities and challenges PACOM faces in this
critical half of the world.
The Indo-Asia-Pacific stretches from California to India. It
encompasses over half of the Earth's surface and well over half of its
population. The Pacific Ocean is the largest physical feature on the
planet. If all the world's landmasses were placed in the Pacific, there
would still be room left over for additional North American and African
continents. To give you an even better idea of its size, a Carrier
Strike Group takes 3 weeks to transit from the U.S. west coast to the
Philippines; 15 hours to get there in a C-17; and from Fort Lewis, WA,
to the Maldives is 9,000 miles.
This region is culturally, socially, economically, and geo-
politically diverse. The nations of the Indo-Asia-Pacific include five
of our Nation's seven treaty allies,\1\ three of the largest economies
in the world,\2\ and seven of the 10 smallest;\3\ the most populous
nations in the world,\4\ the largest democracy;\5\ the largest Muslim-
majority nation;\6\ and the world's smallest republic.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Australia, Japan, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand
\2\ United States, China, and Japan
\3\ Tokelau, Niue, Tuvalu, Futuna, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Palau
\4\ China, India, Indonesia
\5\ India
\6\ Indonesia
\7\ Nauru
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Indian Ocean is surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific as the
world's busiest and most strategically significant trade corridor. One-
third of the world's bulk cargo and two-thirds of its oil shipments now
pass through the Indian Ocean. Nine of the world's 10 largest ports are
here,\8\ and the Indo-Asia-Pacific is the engine that drives the global
economy. China, Japan, and India are three of the world's largest
economies. Last year alone, there was over $8 trillion of two-way
trade. Regional cooperation to ensure the safety and security of these
vital trade routes will become increasingly important over coming
decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Shanghai, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Singapore, Tianjin, Guangzhou,
Qingdao, Quinghuangdao, Hong Kong, Busan
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By any meaningful measure, the Indo-Asia-Pacific is also the
world's most militarized region, with 7 of the 10 largest standing
militaries,\9\ the world's largest and most sophisticated navies,\10\
and 5 of the world's declared nuclear armed nations.\11\ All these
aspects, when you take them together, result in a unique strategic
complexity. This complexity is magnified by a wide, diverse group of
challenges that can significantly stress the security environment. To
be successful, we must draw on the strengths of the entire U.S.
Government, the U.S. economy, and the American people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ China, India, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russia,
Republic of Korea, Vietnam, United States
\10\ China, India, Russia, United States
\11\ Russia, China, India, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
United States
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a time when the region is experiencing such significant change,
we must clearly communicate to our allies and partners our commitment
by maintaining a credible, forward deployed, sustainable force.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Indo-Asia-Pacific has a myriad of security challenges,
including rapidly growing military capabilities, nuclear developments,
unresolved territorial and resource disputes, violent extremism,
natural disasters, proliferation, illicit trafficking and more. This
complex security environment continues to evolve with both positive and
negative trends.
Overall, the region enjoys considerable political stability. In the
past year, we have seen a series of peaceful leadership transitions,
most notably in China, the ROK and Japan, which have reinforced
existing succession processes. With the obvious exception of China,
these changes have also advanced democracy and democratic principles.
We've noted the positive changes occurring in Burma's Government and
look forward to its continued progress. The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues efforts to provide leadership on
regional security issues and to effectively address transnational
challenges such as natural disaster, terrorism, transnational crime,
climate change, while simultaneously working towards its goal of
becoming a single economic community by 2015. We expect ASEAN to
continue to grow in this role under Brunei's chairmanship in 2013. We
have also seen encouraging examples of states using international
bodies to address disputes peacefully, such as Bangladesh and Burma
using the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to resolve
their disputed maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal and Thailand and
Cambodia are awaiting a ruling later this year from the International
Court of Justice on their long-disputed border region. We encourage all
claimant states to seek peaceful means to resolve their disputes.
However, not all developments have been positive or stabilizing.
North Korea's repeated violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions
that forbid building and testing of nuclear weapons and long-range
ballistic missile technologies, represent a clear and direct threat to
U.S. national security and regional peace and stability. China's rapid
development of advanced military capabilities, combined with its
unclear intentions, certainly raises strategic and security concerns
for the United States and the region. Continuing plans by violent
extremist organizations (VEOs) to attack host nation and U.S. targets
is another example of the issues in this vast region that are of
concern not just to PACOM, but too many Indo-Asia-Pacific nations.
North Korea:
Kim Jong Un used 2012 to consolidate his power. Kim is the youngest
head of state in the world and holds the leadership position in all
significant North Korean institutions of national power--military,
state, and party. We were cautiously encouraged in February 2012 when
North Korea agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile
launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon. However,
Pyongyang almost immediately broke its promise by attempting to place a
satellite into orbit using proscribed ballistic missile technology and
parading an alleged road mobile intercontinental range ballistic
missile system. Pyongyang responded to the unanimous U.N. condemnation
of its December launch with renewed rhetoric, threats and bluster. Just
a few weeks ago, again in clear violation of U.N. resolutions, North
Korea announced it had conducted its third nuclear test, which it
claimed--without any evidence--was a ``smaller, more powerful weapon.''
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, its
illicit sales of conventional arms, and its ongoing proliferation
activities remain a threat to regional stability and underscore the
requirement for effective missile defense.
North Korea maintains a significant percentage of its combat forces
forward deployed along the demilitarized zone with the ROK. From these
locations, they could threaten U.S. and ROK civilian and military
personnel, as they showed in 2010 with the surprise attack on the ROK
ship Cheonan and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong-Do Island. The
continued advancement of the north's nuclear and missile programs, its
conventional force posture, and its willingness to resort to asymmetric
actions as a tool of coercive diplomacy creates an environment marked
by the potential for miscalculation that and controlled escalation
could result from another North Korean provocative action.
Kim Jong Un's stated emphasis on economic development and promises
of economic growth have so far yielded little, and are undermined by
North Korean missile launches and nuclear tests that lead to further
sanctions and international isolation. We remain concerned about the
potential for peninsular and regional instability while North Korea
continues to prioritize military objectives above economic recovery and
reform, and thus remains unable to sufficiently provide for its own
population, a concern shared by our allies and partners.
Proliferation:
We remain concerned by North Korea's illicit proliferation
activities and attempts to evade U.N. sanctions. North Korea's acts
defy the will of the international community and represent a clear
danger to the peace, prosperity and stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
PACOM's Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) program is a
complementary multinational activity intended to support counter-
proliferation interdiction operations. PACOM welcomes Thailand as a
recent endorsee of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and
looks forward to the new opportunities their active participation will
bring. CWMD provides a voluntary framework through which PSI partner
nations can improve operational capabilities and domestic legal
authorities in order to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials. Participation in PSI is vital, as part of an
interagency approach, to the reduction of WMD trafficking. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
PACOM continue to synchronize a wide range of CWMD-related activities
such as international counter proliferation with our allies and
partners, and foreign and homeland consequence management.
Additionally, PACOM is coordinating with the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) to establish Centers of Excellence with both China and India to
promote effective nuclear security and safeguards.
China:
China's military has benefited from many years of double-digit
economic growth, which has helped fund a comprehensive military
modernization effort. China's military is an increasingly trained and
capable fighting force focused, in part, on denying U.S. access to the
Western Pacific during a time of crisis or conflict. There are a number
of notable examples of China's improving military capabilities,
including five new stealth and conventional aircraft programs and the
initial deployment of a new anti-ship ballistic missile that we believe
is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers. China is producing great
quantities of advanced aircraft, missiles, electronic warfare systems
and other specialized military equipment, while its shipyards are
currently building six classes of modern diesel-electric submarines,
destroyers and frigates. These new systems augment or replace older
platforms and are rapidly transforming the People's Liberation Army
(PLA). China commissioned its first aircraft carrier a few months ago
and is continuing efforts to integrate aircraft with the ship to
achieve a nascent regional power projection capability within the next
few years.
Chinese military operations are also expanding in size, complexity
and geographic location. Last summer, the PLA-Navy conducted its
largest ever exercise outside the first island chain and into the
Western Pacific, demonstrating increasing proficiency and sending a
clear message to the region. Chinese maritime intelligence collection
operations increased in 2012 as well; with historic first such missions
into the Indian Ocean and within the U.S. exclusive economic zones off
of Guam and Hawaii.
Overall, China's intensive efforts to build, test, and field new
aircraft, ships, weapons and supporting systems are of increasing
concern to the region. Many Asian nations worry about Chinese current
and future intentions, with many of them asking, ``As China's military
capabilities improve, will China's intentions change?''
Chinese naval and maritime law enforcement vessels have been active
in recent years in trying to advance China's territorial and maritime
claims in the South China and East China Seas. China's strong rhetoric
about the indisputable nature of its claims, combined with active
patrolling by civil and military ships and aircraft in the air and
waters surrounding Scarborough Reef and the Senkakus Islands, has
raised tensions with the Republic of the Philippines and Japan
respectively. China has also used other economic and diplomatic tools
to pressure those countries to accede to Chinese claims. These actions
have resulted in U.S. partners and allies in East Asia seeking
additional support and reassurance. I am particularly concerned that
the activities around the Senkakus islands could lead to an accident
and miscalculation and escalation between China and Japan. The close
proximity of ships and aircraft from all sides of these disputes raises
the risks of escalation. Elsewhere, in the South China Sea, periodic
confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese ships and Chinese efforts
to pressure international companies to not explore for oil and gas
raise tensions. China has consistently opposed using collaborative
diplomatic processes--such as negotiations of a Code of Conduct or
international arbitration--to address disputes in the South China Sea,
instead insisting on bilateral negotiations.
China's relationship with Taiwan remains stable following the
reelection of President Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan. Cross-Strait tensions
are at historic lows because Taiwan and mainland China have
consistently pursued increased economic integration and people-to-
people exchanges. However, the PLA continues to maintain a robust
military buildup opposite Taiwan that contradicts Beijing's stated
pursuit of a ``peaceful development'' of cross-Strait relations. Many
of China's military developments appear specifically intended for use
in a possible future conflict with Taiwan. Included in this growing
arsenal are hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles and land-attack
cruise missiles, high-speed patrol boats equipped with advanced anti-
ship cruise missiles, naval mines suitable for blockading Taiwan's
ports, and various types of electronic warfare and cyber attack
systems. Cyber activity presents a significant and growing threat to
PACOM.
China is rapidly improving its space and counterspace capabilities
to advance its own interests, and presumably to challenge the United
States' or other actor's use of space-based systems. China is expanding
its satellite navigation, reconnaissance and communications
capabilities through routine space launches. At the same time, we are
concerned over extensive writings about--and apparent continued testing
of--anti-satellite systems, including a purpose-built missile system,
lasers and jammers.
One military development worth specifically highlighting is the
advances being made across the Indo-Asia-Pacific to enhance or expand
submarine forces, including in several smaller navies as a potential
counter to stronger neighbors. From the northernmost part of our area
of responsibility where Russia maintains attack and strategic
capabilities in its Pacific Fleet, to the westernmost boundary where
India is growing its submarine force, we see an emphasis on submarines
throughout the region. The largest and most capable non-U.S. submarine
force in the region is clearly China's, which continues to expand and
modernize to complement China's increasingly capable surface fleet.
Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the ROK are
nations that have recently launched--or soon will launch--new, modern
submarines. Both Russia and China are expected to soon field new
ballistic missile submarines capable of ranging the U.S. Homeland.
Violent Extremism:
Violence perpetrated by extremists, separatists, nationalists, and
others of varied motivations remains a concern for PACOM and our
partners. Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the asymmetric weapon
of choice for many of these groups. We average over 100 IED incidents
per month in South and Southeast Asia, the highest rate outside Central
Command's area of responsibility. The overwhelming majority of these
incidents are not linked to global transnational violent extremism, but
some are. We continue to see periodic eruptions of sectarian/religious
violence in a variety of places, to include Burma, India, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. There is also a strong correlation
between criminal activities and violent extremism, which often
manifests through extortion, kidnapping and other violent crime.
Several countries, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, are
traditional focal points for extremist recruiting, fundraising,
movement and other facilitation efforts. Extremists affiliated with
Iran are active in PACOM's area of responsibility as well. Iranians
with links to Hezbollah conducted both successful and disrupted attacks
in India and Thailand in February 2012.
PACOM has made significant progress in countering terror through
building partner capabilities and through counter radicalization
programs implemented by Civil Military Support Elements and Military
Information Support Teams in support of U.S. Embassies. We are
encouraged by the persistent pressure that our partners and allies have
applied against VEOs over the last 10 years and the marked success they
have achieved in countering extremist ideology and terror plots.
Continued success requires a consistent long-term effort to diminish
the drivers of violence that al Qaeda and other terrorists exploit.
These efforts to prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and
mobilization are critical to defeating this dangerous ideology and
reducing strategic risk; neither we nor our partners can capture/kill
our way to victory in this fight. Continued modest preventive efforts
today will make expensive reactionary efforts far less likely in the
future.
Our partners in Southeast Asia have made impressive strides in
reducing the danger posed by violent extremists, but disrupted attack
planning in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand last year is
testament to the remaining threat. Smaller, more fragmented groups
continue to pursue their disparate agendas through violence and
intimidation. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P)
continued to advise and assist Philippine Security Forces as they
improved counterterrorism capabilities in combating the Abu Sayyaf
Group and Jemaah Islamiyah in the southern Philippines. The improving
security situation has supported the implementation of an initial peace
framework agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front. This agreement serves as a vehicle for
ongoing negotiations to build lasting peace and improve security and
stability in the Southern Philippines. Counterterrorism efforts, which
have included improved information sharing and increased cooperation,
have also had positive impacts on the related issues of piracy and
crime. Piracy and robbery-at-sea in the Malacca and Singapore Straits
remain low.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) remains one, if not the most operationally
capable terrorist groups through all of South Asia. LeT was responsible
for the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India that killed over 160
people, including 6 Americans, and has supported or executed a number
of other attacks in South Asia in recent years. Beyond the direct
impact of these attacks, there is a significant danger another major
terrorist attack could destabilize the fragile peace between India and
Pakistan. Should the perpetrators of such an attack be linked back to
Pakistan--as was the case in the 2008 attack--the Indian Government may
face domestic pressure to respond and the resulting spiral of
escalation could be rapid. For those reasons, and more importantly to
protect innocent lives, we and our partners in the U.S. Government
engage regularly with the Indians and Pakistanis to avert such a
crisis.
India's relationship with Pakistan has gradually improved in recent
years, thanks to a series of confidence building measures, growing
economic ties and the absence of large-scale destabilizing incidents.
However, we remain concerned the progress could be quickly undone by a
major terrorist attack. Both sides maintain modern, trained militaries
underpinned by demonstrated nuclear capabilities. A major war on the
subcontinent is not likely, but could be catastrophic to both sides, as
well as the region. In addition, while India has seen its bilateral
economic ties with China expand in recent years, its unresolved border
disputes with China have remained a source of friction. We do not think
war between India and China is inevitable or likely, but unresolved
territorial issues and regional competition could fuel incidents.
Elsewhere, South Asia is mostly free from direct conflict, but
various, mostly internal, challenges remain. Despite Nepal's inability
to resolve its many political issues, reintegration of former Maoist
combatants into the army is now complete and the process has remained
peaceful, with all parties and entities working within the framework of
peace and stability. Bangladesh may struggle to contain political
violence and turmoil as they face national elections early next year.
Sri Lanka needs to work to move past its recent history and reconcile a
nation divided by many years of civil war.
Indo-Asia-Pacific nations continue cooperative efforts to reduce
illegal trafficking in drugs, persons and commercial products, an
endeavor significantly challenged by the enormous distances and varied
geography of the region. Through Joint Interagency Task Force West,
PACOM partners with international and other U.S. Government agencies in
this effort.
Typhoons, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, and cyclones are all too
common in Indo-Asia-Pacific. Increasingly severe weather patterns and
rising sea levels threaten lives and property, and could even threaten
the loss of entire low-lying nations. In 2012, almost 100 natural
disasters struck Asia, causing nearly 4,000 deaths and affecting over
65 million people. Amazingly, this was actually below the 10-year
average of over 6,600 people killed annually by natural calamities.
The illegal trafficking of people, animals and products poses a
transnational threat. Counterfeit or substandard antibiotics can
promote the introduction and spread of antibiotic resistant strains of
diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis. Water sanitation and global
food security issues can to divert resources and halt the flow of goods
and services in the event of global pandemics. Illegal trafficking in
animals and plants has the potential to spread organisms that destroy
crops or food chain ecosystems. As we engage with the Indo-Asia-Pacific
nations through Cooperative Health Engagement (CHE), we will enhance
the region's ability to deal with these and other public health risks.
Based on PACOM's past humanitarian assistance/disaster response
(HA/DR) experience, we have initiated changes to the planning and
execution of health engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The focus has
shifted from one-time provision of health care to an underserved
population to CHEs which build sustainable, multilateral, capability,
capacity and medical interoperability in support of the PACOM Theater
Campaign Plan. CHEs tie directly to health security, homeland defense,
and transnational threats. Some of our more successful efforts include
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos Blood Product Safety projects. These
interagency collaborations have built national civilian and military
blood product capacity resulting in a national self-sustaining blood
supply. Through the DOD HIV/AIDS prevention program (DHAPP), militaries
of 10 Indo-Asia-Pacific countries are implementing HIV prevention
programs to reduce the incidence of disease among uniformed
international partners, and by extension, in the civilian communities
in which they live. DOD overseas medical research laboratories have
made great strides in developing countermeasures to many emerging
diseases. The Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences in
Bangkok, Thailand, has made important breakthroughs on the Hepatitis A
vaccine, the Japanese Encephalitis vaccine, and the first HIV vaccine
to show efficacy in human trials. All of these engagements serve to
build health security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and contribute to
a more stable global health environment.
Resource Competition:
Demand for water, food, and energy will only grow. Friction caused
by water availability and use is evident between India and Pakistan,
between India and Bangladesh, between countries in the Lower Mekong
regions of Southeast Asia, between China and Southeast Asia, and even
internally in China between the northern and southern regions of the
industrialized east. Much of the Indo-Asia-Pacific is unable to
adequately provide for their own food requirements, highlighting the
need for stable, plentiful supplies available through international
commerce. The same is true for energy supplies. Disruption to these
supplies or unexpected price increases will quickly strain many
governments' ability to ensure their population's needs are met.
Intelligence Support to Operations:
The challenges I've addressed all place a significant strain on our
theater and national intelligence organizations. Still, these
challenges, which necessitated our national strategy to rebalance to
the Indo-Asia-Pacific, must be met head on by our military leadership
and the Intelligence Community (IC). There are several key enablers
that I believe will assist in this task. Key among these is the
continuing requirement for making ``all sensed data'' available to our
analysts so that it can be quickly absorbed into our decision cycle and
visualized in a way that assists our understanding of complex issues.
As we reset the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
force in the drawdown from Afghanistan and reprioritize our overhead
sensors, we must ensure that those ISR sensors and accompanying
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) architectures and
personnel that help us understand our unique operating environment are
optimally positioned and outfitted to achieve this mission. Most
importantly, I need to have effective command and control over ISR
architecture in real-time through all phases of operations. We are
making steady progress in all of these areas. Improving processes to
rapidly share information with allies and partners creates a common
understanding within the region and results in more effective and
robust relationships. Maturing concepts for cloud architectures and
initiatives to enhance access to those clouds have great promise to
unleash knowledge from derived data in ways that we have not yet
experienced. Significant advances in intelligence mission management
are helping address my need for effective command and control,
optimization and visualization of ISR. Still, we have much work to do
to fully realize the potential advantage of a penetrating understanding
of our key threats.

THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC REBALANCE

The Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Strategy reflects the recognition
that the future prosperity of the United States will be defined largely
by events and developments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
While the Indo-Asia-Pacific region today is at relative peace, we
remain concerned as we see stress points in territorial disputes and
the threat that North Korea presents to the peace and security of the
region. However, the credible and persistent commitment of the United
States to the region through robust presence and partnerships has, and
will continue to provide, an enduring, prosperous, and stable security
environment for the region.
Fundamental to the rebalance is that PACOM actions align and
synchronize with the diplomacy, policy, and economic confidence
building measures of our U.S. Government partners. These coordinated
efforts demonstrate an enduring resolve to show commitment to the Indo-
Asia-Pacific across all facets of engagement. PACOM remains focused as
the military component of this commitment, and we will continue to plan
and conduct operations, actions, and activities that support this
holistic governmental approach in building upon the peace and
prosperity of the region.
The posturing and forward presence of our military forces is key to
PACOM's ability to rapidly respond to any crisis or disaster. Due to
the vast distances involved in our area of responsibility, it is
imperative we continue to receive the support provided by our partners
in the Services and through Congress to maintain the readiness of our
forward deployed forces. PACOM manages the rebalance along four lines
of operations that form the bedrock of our strategy. Those four lines
of operations are: (1) strengthening alliances and partnerships; (2)
improving posture and presence; (3) developing capabilities and
concepts; and (4) planning for operations and contingencies.
Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships:
At the core of the rebalance, is an effort to renew, modernize and
strengthen our alliances and partnerships in support of shared security
interests. We are ensuring our alliances are adaptive so they can meet
the challenges of the current security environment while capitalizing
on emerging opportunities. Similarly, we are exploring innovative ways
to expand cooperation through more effective strategic partnerships in
order to address the complex problems presented by nontraditional
security challenges. PACOM is working closely with the five U.S. treaty
allies in our AOR, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and
Thailand, as well as key partners, including India, Indonesia and
Singapore.
Australia:
The U.S.-Australian alliance is an anchor of peace and stability in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and promotes economic development and
integration, good governance, and the rule of law. PACOM coordinates
closely with our Australian partners to promote security in the region.
This past fall in Sydney, we co-hosted PACOM's Pacific Chiefs of
Defense annual conference, where 22 of 26 Chiefs of Defense attended.
We engaged in a weeklong series of briefings and discussions on
security cooperation. In addition, the Australian Chief of Defense and
I attended the Australia-U.S. Ministerial (AUSMIN) Consultations in
Perth in November where we jointly briefed on our robust military-to-
military engagements.
We are continuing to implement the force posture initiatives
announced by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard in November
2011, which include U.S. marines who will rotate through Darwin to
participate in bilateral training. In addition, access by U.S. aircraft
to airfields in Northern Australia, which will provide significant
training opportunities. The first rotational deployment of
approximately 250 U.S. marines in Darwin was successful, and planning
continues for the second rotation scheduled to begin in April 2013. We
are working together to increase the USMC rotational presence in Darwin
to approximately 1,100. This increase will require infrastructure
improvements and we are currently in the process of identifying the
details of those requirements. We are also working through the
protocols and lift required to deploy these personnel in the event of a
natural disaster as we did during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. I am
confident that our efforts will bear fruit, and we will continue to
posture in a manner that supports our strategic objectives.
We also continue to seek better opportunities to advance bilateral
and multilateral operations. For example, our biennial Exercise
Talisman Saber 2013 is a combined U.S.-Australian exercise designed to
train our respective military forces in planning and conducting
Combined Task Force operations. We are further analyzing the benefits
of expanding Talisman Saber to include other security partners.
We are also realizing increased value in the expansion of regional
trilateral security cooperation engagements. The close relationship
between Australia and the United States facilitates the inclusion of
other countries to our combined security cooperation efforts, such as
with Japan. This allows us to move forward together and support
multilateral security exercises and activities with multiple nations
focusing on Proliferation Security Initiative exercises, HA/DR
operations, information sharing, intelligence, surveillance, and cyber
security cooperation.
Japan:
The U.S.-Japan Alliance, supported by a robust U.S. military
presence in Japan, continues to provide the deterrence and capabilities
necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of peace,
security, and economic prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Over the
last year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and PACOM have worked
with our Japanese counterparts to realize adjustments in the U.S. force
posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Significant achievements with
realignment initiatives include: progress in the environmental impact
assessment process for the Futenma Replacement Facility; the expansion
of aviation training relocation programs to Guam; the relocation of the
Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) Air Defense Command to Yokota Air
Base; and progress in the relocation of the Japan Ground Self Defense
Force (JGSDF) Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Camp Zama.
These movements do not alter the fundamental goals of the
Realignment Roadmap, which are to maintain deterrence and mitigate the
impact of U.S. forces on local communities. In fact, the adjustments
improve interoperability between U.S. forces and the Japan Self Defense
Forces (JSDF) thereby strengthening the overall deterrent capability of
the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Bilateral exercises, such as Keen Edge 2012
and Keen Sword 2013, do the same and continue to expand earlier set
precedents for expanded U.S.-Japan operations. Likewise, the deployment
of Marine Corps MV-22s to Okinawa replaces outdated equipment and
brings enhanced capabilities to our forward deployed Marine forces.
In concert with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, we have begun to evaluate alliance roles, missions, and
capabilities in order to fortify the alliance for the evolving
challenges of the regional and global security environment. The United
States and Japan continue to share common security interests such as
containing the threats presented by the North Korea, providing
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and supporting
freedom of action in shared domains. In addition, we are cooperating to
help allies and partners in the region build security capacity through
training and exercises. These efforts will contribute to continued
peace and stability in the region.
Philippines:
Our 62-year-old alliance with the Philippines remains key to our
efforts to ensure the stability and prosperity of the Western Pacific,
and we are modernizing the relationship to meet the challenges of the
21st century. High-level engagements including Secretary Clinton's
visit to Manila in November 2011, when she signed the ``Manila
Declaration,'' the first ``Two-Plus-Two'' Ministerial Consultations
hosted by Secretaries Clinton and Panetta in April 2012, and President
Aquino's official visit in June 2012, have reinvigorated the U.S.-
Philippines relationship. We are seeing a renewed interest to redefine
our relationship with capability and capacity building beyond the CT
effort; increased rotational access; and more sharing of situational
awareness in the maritime domain.
We remain committed to our alliance with the Philippines as defined
in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. This past December, we co-chaired
the annual Mutual Defense Board/Security Engagement Board in Manila,
which remains the focal point of our expanding military relationship.
As the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continue to transition
from internal security operations to territorial defense, we will make
adjustments to the military-to-military relationship in order to
effectively mitigate perceived threats. We are currently discussing
opportunities to increase rotational presence of U.S. forces in jointly
identified priority areas to allow new training for Philippine and U.S.
forces.
We use training opportunities to address short-term AFP capability
gaps while helping them build long-term capability and capacity.
Additionally, our security assistance is primarily focused on
supporting the AFP maritime domain awareness and maritime security
capabilities, but also includes information technology and cyber
security. This past May, we transferred a second Hamilton-Class Coast
Guard Cutter (Ramon Alcaraz) to the Philippines, and we continue to
partner with the AFP to affect the necessary maintenance and training.
Operationally, PACOM engages the Philippines through the Joint
Staff-sponsored exercise Balikatan and periodic Pacific Partnership
missions that focus on humanitarian/civic assistance and civil military
engagement as well as numerous Service component-led exercises. In
addition, for the past decade, JSOTF-P has operated in a non-combat
advisory and assist role in support of the AFP to combat and contain
violent extremist organizations. We are currently assessing JSOTF-P's
enduring requirements to align with the current security situation. A
strong U.S.-Philippines alliance greatly enhances regional stability
and helps the United States guarantee an environment that will help
prevent miscalculation, promote regional cooperation, and protect vital
Sea Lanes of Communication for all parties.
Republic of Korea (ROK):
2013 marks the 60th year of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which remains
strong and essential to the success of our strategy. For over 6
decades, the United States and the ROK have collectively worked to
provide peace and stability in Northeast Asia by deterring a North
Korean regime committed to periodic provocations and overt threats to
peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. A major
conflict in Korea could have unpredictable, long term, and far reaching
impacts due to the central location of the Korean peninsula in
Northeast Asia and the vital importance of Northeast Asian trade to the
global economy. We have limited understanding of North Korean
leadership intent, which remains a concern to long-term stability.
General Thurman and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is
necessary for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes
transformation, a change that will ultimately assist the ROK to better
meet security challenges both on and off the peninsula. Part of that
transformation is the transition of operational control to the ROK
military, which will allow it to take the lead role in the combined
defense of Korea. Transition of operational control in 2015 is
conditions-based and certification of key capabilities must be
accomplished. The U.S.-ROK exercise program--which includes Key Resolve
and Ulchi Freedom Guardian--is a key mechanism to certify that critical
capabilities, such as C4I and command and control of combined and joint
forces, are achieved. As we proceed through the transition process,
USFK will seamlessly transform into U.S. Korea Command and will remain
capable of executing future plans.
To address the growing threat posed by North Korean missile
capabilities, the United States and ROK have been conducting close
consultations through the Alliance Counter-Missile Capabilities
Committee. Last fall, these discussions resulted in the adoption of a
comprehensive Alliance counter missile strategy. ROK capability
improvements under this strategy include the development of new ROK
ballistic missiles that increase ranges from 300 kilometers (km) up to
800 km, strengthened missile defenses, improvements to command, control
and communications, as well as enhanced ISR capabilities. All of this
is to better achieve a fully-integrated and operational missile defense
umbrella. As part of enabling these improvements, the Missile
Guidelines governing ROK missile and unmanned aerial vehicle ranges and
payloads were revised. These improvements in ROK capabilities are a
smart and proportionate response to the growing North Korean missile
threat.
Trilateral security cooperation between the United States, the ROK,
and Japan has been evolving, although political and historical context
moderates the pace at which it develops. The shared values, financial
resources, logistical capability, and planning capacity to address
complex contingencies make this trilateral partnership a relationship
worth pursuing. PACOM and our counterparts within Japanese and the ROK
military staffs will continue to find ways to enhance trilateral
cooperation with diplomatic assistance. During the April 2012 and
December 2012 DPRK missile tests, PACOM coordinated closely with both
our ROK and Japanese counterparts throughout the launches. We conducted
a trilateral naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in June 2012 improving
our naval forces' tactical interoperability in ballistic missile
defense. U.S., ROK, and Japan officials issued a trilateral statement
at the Defense Trilateral Talks in early 2013 stressing that we will
closely coordinate to monitor a potential North Korean nuclear test and
to respond to ballistic missile threats.
Thailand:
As the treaty relationship between the United States and Thailand
enters its 180th year, our relations remain strong, vibrant, and
essential. Thailand has demonstrated a willingness and capability to
act as a regional leader in a number of areas, including HA/DR efforts.
Thailand has also been a partner supporting reform in Burma, and
invited representatives from Burma, as observers, to exercise Cobra
Gold 13, which is the United States' largest co-hosted multilateral
exercise in the world. Thailand is a demonstrated partner in
counterterrorism and is the United States' oldest partner in the
region.
Thailand will be increasingly important in collective security,
peace, and prosperity in the region. PACOM remains committed to helping
the Thai military further develop its already impressive capabilities
so that it can assume even greater security responsibilities in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific, particularly in counter-piracy and maritime
security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping
operations.
India:
The U.S.-India relationship is the strongest it has been since
India gained its independence in 1947. A strengthened U.S.-India
strategic partnership is imperative to achieve U.S. national interests
including ensuring regional security, strengthening the international
trading system, protecting shared domains, countering terrorism, and
bolstering international nonproliferation. We remain India's most
frequent partner for security engagements. Our defense relationship is
built around a robust program of dialogues and engagements, military
exercises, personnel exchanges, and defense trade, which has grown from
$0 to $9 billion in less than a decade. The Indians now operate a fleet
of 6 C-130J cargo aircraft; they have taken delivery of their first of
8 P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and their first of 10 C-17
Strategic Airlifters.
Our relationship with India has room to grow, and we are optimistic
and enthusiastic about its potential. India's legacy of non-alignment
and commitment to a policy of ``strategic autonomy'' is often viewed as
limiting the relationship. However, our shared values and commitment to
democratic principles inevitably place us on parallel, if independent
paths. Several of these parallel interests include cooperating in
multilateral forums which address counterterrorism and maritime
security, including anti-piracy and HA/DR issues. We support India's
increased desire for regional leadership.
While U.S.-Indian relations remain on an upward trajectory, we
recognize there are impediments that must be overcome in the
relationship. Process issues in the Indian bureaucracy and Indian
concerns about U.S.-Pakistan relations are examples of challenges to
achieving the strategic partnership we seek. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Carter's India Defense Trade Initiative, however, has great
potential to overcome much of the inertia and institutional red tape
that has hampered our ability to expand cooperation. Even though
progress is incremental, PACOM continues to reinforce our desire for,
and commitment to an expanded relationship that promotes a secure and
stable South Asia.
Indonesia:
Since President Yudhoyono signed a comprehensive partnership
between Indonesia and the United States in 2010, progress has been made
in military relations. Following a decade of political, economic, and
military reform, Indonesia has surfaced as a vibrant democracy, with an
emerging economy and a strengthened PACOM--Armed Forces of Indonesia
(TNI) relationship. We are working extensively with Indonesia in areas
such as resilience and disaster risk reduction, counter terrorism, and,
most recently, Indonesia and the United States were designated co-
chairs of the Asia Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference. As co-chairs
with Indonesia since 2011, we are now preparing to conduct the
inaugural Counterterrorism Exercise (CTX) of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
Plus) Experts Working Group (EWG) on Counterterrorism in 2013.
Following a 12-year hiatus, PACOM has reestablished security
cooperation activities with the Indonesian KOPASSUS (Army Special
Forces). The measured pace of this engagement includes key leader
dialogue and small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such
as military decisionmaking, medical planning and law of war/human
rights. More activities of this type are planned for 2013 and will
gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress
in the TNI's transparency and institutional reform. Broadly speaking,
we cannot afford to disengage just as we establish key partnerships in
the Pacific.
Defense trade is also increasing as Indonesia grows its military
budget. The United States is providing Foreign Military Financing and
is in conversation with Indonesia on purchases of military equipment
such as attack helicopters, fighters, and radar systems. The
comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the United States is
strengthening ties between the two countries as well as bolstering our
engagement with Southeast Asia and the region as a whole. The progress
in this security relationship is very promising for both countries.
Singapore:
Our bilateral relationship with Singapore is extensive and
continues to strengthen and broaden. Singapore armed forces comprise a
small, but capable military, and the access to port and airfield
facilities they grant the United States is key to our posture in the
Asia Pacific. Their main focus continues to be security within the
Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait and they cooperate with
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in conducting security patrols within
the Straits against piracy and other illicit activities.
Singapore's armed forces are also conducting counter-piracy
missions in the Gulf of Aden. Both of our militaries are seeking to
increase engagement across all PACOM Service components. Singapore's
offer to host U.S. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at Changi Naval Station,
the first scheduled to arrive in April 2013, will also significantly
enhance PACOM's posture.
Engaging with Other Partners:
New Zealand:
In addition, PACOM has been working hard to promote our security
relationships with our partners in the region. For example, U.S.-New
Zealand bilateral ties are stronger than it has been in 3 decades. We
have made historic improvements in our relationship as we advance
diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation. The growth between our
countries is exemplified by regularized strategic and defense
consultations, joint efforts to protect Antarctica's maritime
ecosystem, and strategic dialogues on the Pacific Islands. The
Washington Declaration, signed by Secretary Panetta and Defense
Minister Coleman in June 2012, has allowed for greater flexibility in
terms of joint exercises, military liaisons, and military educational
exchanges. In 2012, Secretary Panetta announced a significant policy
change, modifying restrictions on U.S. military relations with New
Zealand by allowing the Secretary of Defense to waive, on a case-by-
case basis, the restriction on access by Royal New Zealand Naval
vessels to U.S. military and Coast Guard facilities.
China:
The U.S.-China relationship has elements of cooperation and
competition. The overall U.S. policy goal is to expand the areas of
practical cooperation in addressing shared economic and security
challenges, while preventing unhealthy and disruptive competition from
undermining the relationship. In January 2011, President Obama and
Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to ``build a cooperative
partnership'' that included a commitment to develop ``continuous,
stable, and reliable military-to-military relations.'' More recently,
in 2012, President Obama and President Hu Jintao agreed to explore
``building a new model of major power relations'' in recognition of the
fact that rivalry and conflict does not need to be inevitable between a
rising power and an established power. Both Washington and Beijing are
working towards these goals, as evidenced by the more than 60 formal
dialogues a year including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which
PACOM attended at the invitation of Secretary Clinton last year. Both
nations recognize the importance of our bilateral relationship not only
to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, but also to the world, which explains
in part why, in spite of many disagreements, the United States and
China stress the importance of stability in the overall bilateral
relationship.
For the first time in 4 years, the Commander of PACOM participated
in a military-to-military engagement with China in country. To mature
the partnership, I visited China twice in my first 6 months as a
commander and hosted reciprocal visits at my headquarters.
The importance of stability presents opportunities in our bilateral
military-to-military relationship. China's participation in regional
multilateral and bilateral security dialogues, consultations and
mechanisms has grown commensurate with its rising economic and military
clout, and has provided greater potential for cooperative engagement
with the United States and the region. Through those multilateral and
bilateral activities, the United States is working with the Chinese to
build a relationship that seeks to address regional security issues
based on enhanced trust and convergent interests. Nontraditional
missions such as HA/DR, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and military
medicine offer potential for growth. The Chinese received our
invitation to attend the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise in 2014
very positively, and it appears both sides view U.S. outreach and
Chinese attendance as an important step in fostering greater trust and
openness in the bilateral military-to-military relationship.
The seventh U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks in October
2012 featured substantive discussions on U.S.-China relations including
maritime security and safety, as well as regional and global security
issues. In early December, PACOM hosted a delegation of PLAN officers
led by VADM Zhang Yongyi, Vice Chief of the PLAN. Discussions during
the roundtable focused on PACOM's mission in the region and PACOM's
thoughts on the U.S. Government's perspective on recent territorial and
maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. During the
13th U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks in early December, both
delegations reaffirmed the importance of a healthy, stable and reliable
military-to-military relationship. We achieved a broad consensus on a
number of areas of common concern and candidly discussed areas of
disagreement. The U.S.-PRC 2013 Military-to-Military Planning
Conference in Beijing expanded on these talks. Both sides agreed to a
bilateral plan consisting of over 40 events, the largest number since
China suspended military-to-military engagements in 2010.
Our bilateral military dialogues with China provide us with
important opportunities to discuss our respective concerns as well as
to explore areas of future cooperation. The Chinese characterize our
rebalance as militarily heavy, aimed at containing them, and that it
has ``emboldened'' regional actors such as the Philippines and Japan
against them, generating regional instability. However, Beijing also
questions the sustainability of the rebalance, pointing to
sequestration and other looming fiscal issues.
A continuing point of friction between the United States and China
and a key part of bilateral discussions involves Chinese efforts to
impede our lawful military activities in international air and maritime
areas. While we do not believe China seeks a repeat of the 2001 EP-3
incident, we still see instances where Chinese forces conduct unsafe or
unprofessional maneuvers in proximity to legally operating U.S. forces.
Despite our many differences with the Chinese, we have areas of
common interest, and both sides agree that 2012 was an especially
positive and productive year for military-to-military relations. We
furthered the relationship in line with DOD's long-term objectives of
increasing cooperative capacity, fostering institutional knowledge and
building a common picture of the security environment. The PLA became
more amenable to conducting more complex engagements, and committed to
events beyond the normal 1-year timeframe. PACOM will continue to
develop this relationship focusing on our converging interests in
counter-piracy, counterterrorism, protecting sea lanes, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Multilateral Relationships and Institutions:
While the United States is committed to strengthening bilateral
alliances and partnerships, we also recognize the critical role
multilateral relationships and institutions will play in enhancing
regional security. Common challenges like natural disasters that strike
with little warning require unified efforts to respond rapidly and
effectively. Institutions such as ASEAN can serve as an organizing
force to harness such efforts but can likewise serve as a unifying body
in establishing principles that support responsible behavior by
regional actors.
PACOM, working with the State Department and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, has supported U.S. engagement with ASEAN. I
recently met with the newly-inaugurated ASEAN Secretary General and was
encouraged by his desire to continue the progress made by his
predecessor in addressing security-related matters in Southeast Asia.
We are also participating in two major ASEAN Humanitarian and Disaster
Response field training exercises in May and June 2013 reinforcing
multilateral civ-mil and mil-mil cooperation as the ASEAN Humanitarian
Assistance (AHA) Center comes online.
Engagement Tools:
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military
Education and Training (IMET) are two of the top security cooperation
engagement tools available to PACOM. With minimal continued increases
to meet our requirements, we can truly address a broad range of
challenges from border security issues, HA/DR, counterterrorism, and
military-to-military engagement. PACOM countries receive between 0.1
percent-0.15 percent of the worldwide FMF. Specific PACOM
considerations in making FMF budget recommendations include: Commander
and Theater Campaign Plan priorities, coalition partner contributions
or country priorities, and U.S. access objectives. The Philippines and
Indonesia were the top beneficiaries of PACOM FMF aid in fiscal year
2012. IMET is a low cost, high impact program that has a longstanding
track record of establishing valuable relationships with senior
officers and leaders from critical partner nations.
Programs such as these contribute resources which PACOM can
synchronize with other efforts to build right-sized capacity at the
right time, ultimately strengthening our relationships, building
interoperability, and maintaining our leadership role in the region.
The sustained engagements these programs provide also help regional
nations appreciate the value of maintaining an active U.S. presence.
Improving Posture and Presence:
The United States requires a more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture that allows
persistent presence and, if needed, power projection. As many of you
who have frequently visited Asia know, the tyranny of distance imposed
by the size of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans and intervening
landmasses requires the United States to operate forward in order to
achieve rapid response. This rapid response hinges on flexibility and
forward positioning of both permanent and rotational military forces
and is essential in enabling us to influence the onset and unfolding of
crises, prevail in conflict, and provide aid in the aftermath of
disasters.
Some of the most visible results of the rebalance can be seen in
the ground forces now returning to theater. After a dozen years
supporting wars in the Middle East, PACOM's permanently-assigned forces
are resetting to focus on the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Recently, the Army
removed I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division from worldwide service
rotation, permanently assigning them to PACOM and, at my request,
subsequently elevated Commander, U.S. Army Pacific to a four star
position. Likewise, the Marine Corps removed the III Marine
Expeditionary Force from its worldwide service rotations, allowing them
to once again concentrate on Pacific theater missions.
A large component of PACOM's permanent posture adjustment is the
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which is a product of an
extensive force posture and footprint review conducted by PACOM and
approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State in 2005. DPRI also
remains a key transformational goal of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and we
are supportive of its implementation. A major element of DPRI is the
significant reduction of Marine forces on Okinawa and relocation of
approximately 8,000 marines to Guam and Hawaii. The resulting end state
is a transition from a heavily-concentrated Marine force in Northeast
Asia region to four Marine Air Ground Task Forces geographically
distributed across the Pacific providing a more flexible and balanced
capability throughout the entire Western Pacific. The implementation is
in progress with the Environmental Impact Statement under development
in Guam and land-use alternatives being studied to support a future
Environmental Impact Statement in Hawaii. While we intend to leverage
the use of existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible,
resource investments will be needed to support this realignment. Those
investment decisions, as well as the timeline for making personnel
movement decisions, will be informed by the impact studies that are
underway now. It should be noted that the Government of Japan has also
committed to providing $3.1 billion to support the strategic
realignment. It is recommended that a focused approach be adopted for
the identification of required resources so that the strategic benefits
of a balanced forward force presence across the entire Western Pacific
can be realized as soon as is feasible.
Additional DPRI initiatives include the relocation of part of the
Navy's air wing in Japan from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to Marine Corps
Air Station Iwakuni as a result of encroachment issues. In large
measure, DPRI remains on track due to the contributions provided by the
Government of Japan (GOJ). In December 2012, the GOJ submitted the
environmental impact statement for the Henoko-based Futenma Replacement
Facility to the Okinawa Prefectural Government, moving the process one
step closer towards completion. Meanwhile, U.S. forces will continue to
operate from the existing facility at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
As previously mentioned, changes in rotational forces are already
underway. These include the rotational presence of marines in Darwin,
Australia, and the upcoming rotational presence of Littoral Combat
Ships at Changi, Singapore. Further, PACOM is able to enhance the
persistence of our rotational and forward deployed force presence
through various operations such as those conducted in support of
freedom of navigation, humanitarian missions, and civic assistance, to
name a few. Pacific Air Force's Operation Pacific Angel and Pacific
Fleet's Pacific Partnership are two examples that bring joint, combined
and nongovernmental organizations together to deliver cooperative
health engagements, engineering civic action programs and subject
matter expert exchanges to many nations, specifically in areas like
Oceania, Sri Lanka, and Laos--opening doors that would otherwise be
closed to a U.S. military presence.
In addition to operations, exercises serve as a valuable means of
augmenting presence in and around the region while simultaneously
providing opportunities for robust and meaningful engagement. The PACOM
exercise program is key to maintaining a credible defense posture,
strengthening relationships with our allies, expanding our partner
networks, and preparing to accomplish the full range of military
contingencies. Congressional support for the Combatant Command Exercise
Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program, therefore, is
critical. CE2T2 directly impacts our ability to conduct joint training
exercises and theater security engagement events in the Pacific region.
PACOM's portion of this essential program is comprised of 18 major
exercises and involves joint military forces, interagency activities,
and 30 of our 36 partner nations. In support of the rebalance, the
number of major exercises conducted will expand to include events with
Malaysia, regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) partners,
and ASEAN.
The exercise program also provides important venues for joint
experimentation to accelerate the development and fielding of new and
maturing concepts, technologies, and procedures ahead of potential
adversaries. This is essential to the development and application of
innovative capabilities and concepts that comprise the third component
of PACOM's rebalance efforts.
Developing Capabilities and Concepts:
Today's regional threats and potential contingencies necessitate
PACOM be equipped with America's most advanced ships, aircraft,
intelligence collection, logistics, and missile defense capabilities,
thereby placing our finest forces forward. In order to outpace the
rapidly evolving challenges of tomorrow, however, PACOM requires
further investments in hardware, systems, and innovation. For example,
the Indo-Asia-Pacific's unique challenges in terms of distance and
threat require development of capabilities related to lift; long-range
strike; ISR; sub-surface capabilities; and missile defense. We are also
working with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Deputy's Management
Action Group (DMAG Asia Pacific) to determine the optimal mix of
capabilities, given competing requirements.
PACOM is further working to improve cyber capability, capacity, and
security through our recently activated Joint Cyber Center-Pacific. We
believe the Joint Cyber Center is critical for synchronizing cyber
operations with the other operational domains. In order to improve
cyber operations with allies and partners, PACOM continues to advocate
for implementation of a Joint Information Environment (JIE) that
addresses coalition networks as an organic element of the design. As a
result of our cyber planning, exercise, and engagement efforts, the
United States has emerged as the partner of choice in the Pacific for
collaboration in the cyber domain.
We must continue to progress in strengthening the collective cyber
security capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners.
Our bilateral and multilateral communications interoperability programs
have improved the management of electromagnetic spectrum, tactical data
link capabilities, communications security, and satellite management in
the multilateral environment. We are working to meet increasing demand
for cyber and information assurance partnerships, including requests
from all nations with whom we have bilateral communications agreements
as well as those from emerging partner nations.
Resilient cyber and space capabilities are critical to PACOM's
ability to maintain communications, situational awareness, and command
and control of forward deployed forces and coalition partners. PACOM is
working with allies and partners to strengthen collective cyber
security and those efforts have the collateral benefit of strengthening
relationships as they build capacity. Still, a more defensible and
secure cyber architecture specifically designed for joint and coalition
mission partners as well as cyber defensibility is necessary to ensure
our ability to communicate securely, share information, and conduct
operations. Space assets also remain vulnerable to terrestrial and on-
orbit threats. For example, China possesses a mature anti-satellite
(ASAT) research and development program. Expanding PACOM's organic
satellite communications capacity will help mitigate this threat.
Because PACOM recognizes the resource constraints the United States
faces, we also endorse and participate in the development of concepts
that augment the efficacy of our capabilities. These include
warfighting approaches such as the Joint Operational Access Concept,
Air-Sea Battle, and efforts to deepen ally and partner capacity to
prevent, respond to, and rebound from crisis.
PACOM further supports concepts that allow for creative and
innovative funding mechanisms in order to accomplish our mission. The
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is one such tool. Its broad-
based authority has the potential to allow improved interagency
security cooperation in support of U.S. Government strategic
objectives.
Moving forward, to better deter and defeat aggression, PACOM is
taking steps to improve in-theater critical munitions stockpiles. In
the past year, U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Forces Korea have seen
tangible benefits from the rebalance, improving their ability to meet
future requirements through enhanced prepositioned stocks. PACOM is
working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff
through the Munitions Requirement Process to ensure adequate resourcing
of munitions, as well as other logistics enablers, such as the pier
facilities at Military Ocean Terminal Concord, a next generation
Offshore Petroleum Discharge System, our inland petroleum discharge
system capability, and completion of required MILCON projects in
support of our theater petroleum plan.
Planning for Operations and Contingencies:
The final aspect to PACOM's rebalance efforts is the planning we
conduct for operations and contingencies. Just as innovative concepts
allow us to maximize our resources, so too, does creative planning. An
example of this is our approach to the PACOM Theater Campaign Plan
(TCP). The TCP operationalizes our theater strategy and puts words into
execution. Although the TCP has traditionally been used to generally
guide command efforts for a 5-year period, planning has begun too late
for our Service components to execute with anything but resources on
hand. PACOM has now extended the TCP's time horizon by producing a
Theater Campaign Order that defines component taskings for the current
fiscal year. Planning for the next fiscal year occurs in conjunction
with TCP planning for the next 5 year period, far enough out to allow
our Service components time to influence their parent Service budgets.
Another example of a new approach to planning is our Theater
Security Cooperation Plan. Developing mutually supported objectives and
goals with our allies and partners is critical, and aligning a
solidified U.S. position is crucial to building capability in the
region. To support this effort we have developed Country Security
Cooperation Plans to support the Theater Campaign Plan. These lay the
foundation for our bilateral and multilateral engagements and allow us
to be smarter in the application of our resources.
Additionally we have reassessed the efficacy of our theater-wide
command and control efforts and have made the adjustments necessary to
better respond to the dynamic security environment we find ourselves
in.

REPERCUSSIONS OF SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION

During the past decade the U.S. joint force has been heavily tasked
in other AORs. As a consequence, the PACOM AOR, in many areas has
assumed additional risk. Examples of areas of particular concern are
ISR assets, regional and homeland ballistic missile defense
capabilities, carrier strike group availability, undersea warfare
capabilities, munitions availability and theater lift. The rebalance
has given us a new opportunity to begin to solve this and to re-
emphasize to our allies and partners that we are a committed Pacific
nation. However, the impact of sequestration and shortfalls in
operating accounts under the continuing appropriations resolution may
begin to undermine our strategic rebalance initiatives, exasperate
existing resource challenges, and result in increased risk.
Due to Service funding reductions, PACOM component training tempo
will be drastically reduced; rotational forces in theater will be
reduced, all leading to decreased ability to accomplish assigned
missions, respond to crises, and support theater engagement objectives.
These funding cuts will challenge our ability to execute both discreet
operations and the broader Indo-Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy.
The net effect of sequestration will be a negative impact in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific at a critical time as we look to stabilize our
forward presence and increase engagement with our treaty allies and
partners. Given the size of the PACOM AOR, Service contributions,
especially lift capabilities that the Air Force and Navy provide, are
crucial to engagement with Indo-Asia-Pacific countries.
Facilities maintenance is critical to sustaining essential
infrastructure. In order to provide immediate savings, Services will be
forced to forgo facilities sustainment. Due to lack of maintenance,
issues that would have been inexpensive minor problems will turn into
expensive projects in future years. The inability to conduct preventive
maintenance will affect the lives of our servicemembers and will cause
a bow wave of maintenance and infrastructure requirements in the out
years. Degraded facilities put missions at risk and delayed MILCON
projects endanger the implementation of international agreements.
Civilian furloughs and restrictions on hiring are of special
interest. Civil servants represent a noteworthy portion of our
capability and capacity. If furloughs occur, every aspect of PACOM's
warfighting readiness will be adversely affected. Overseas schools,
hospitals, and warfighting staffs will be impacted. Of particular
concern, more than half of those who support our ISR architecture are
civilians. The current budget restrictions and hiring freeze also puts
at high risk the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command's (JPAC) ability to
meet the NDAA 2010 required 200 identifications per year by fiscal year
2015.
The impact to each of these civilians will be significant--22
unpaid days equates to 20 percent less pay for nearly half the year. On
a personal level, it breaks faith with a skilled workforce. Much of
what they do simply cannot be picked up by others in their absence.
As we work through the near-term resource implications of funding
reductions and assess the increasing risk, I will continue to work with
the Services to preserve, to the extent possible, our essential
homeland defense and crisis response capabilities . . . capabilities
resident in our PACOM forward deployed forces. We will also continue to
demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to peace and security in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific.

CONCLUSION

The Pacific Ocean does not separate the United States from Asia; it
connects us. We are connected by our economies, by our cultures, by our
shared interests, and our security challenges. We have been accepting
additional risk in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region for some time. Our
rebalance strategy is in place, and we are making progress.
Implementing and sustaining the strategic rebalance will require long-
term, sustained commitment and resources.
On behalf of our military members and civilian employees that work
every day to ensure that our country is successful in this effort, I
would like to thank the committee for their support, and I look forward
to answering your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. Thank you very much,
Admiral.
We're going to try to use the technology we've been
provided with here today. Senator Inhofe said the other day:
How come we don't use timers like every other committee? My
answer was: I don't have the vaguest idea why we don't use
timers. So we're going to find out whether they actually have
an impact on us. Instead of a card being handed in front of us,
now you have to keep your eyes on the timer. So let's see if it
works.
We're going to start with 8 minutes.
Senator McCain. A quantum leap.
Chairman Levin. A quantum leap, right. A small step for the
committee, major step for mankind.
So, Admiral, let me start. Over the weekend, DOD announced
that they were delaying a routine reliability test of a
Minuteman III ICBM that would have been from Vandenberg Air
Force Base to an impact site in the Marshall Islands 4,300
miles away. The test was apparently delayed so it would not be
misconstrued by North Korea.
Now, I know you're not in the chain of command here, but
basically do you agree with that decision and do you know what
the basis for it was?
Admiral Locklear. I do agree with the decision. I assume
that the basis of the decision was to look at the strategic
communications, at all the events surrounding this particularly
tenuous time with North Korea, and the impacts of the totality
of those. So it is my sense that through this period of the
last few weeks that we have demonstrated to the people of the
region, we've demonstrated hopefully to the leadership of North
Korea, and we've demonstrated to our own population back here,
our ability and our willingness to defend our Nation, to defend
our people, to defend our allies, and defend our forward-
deployed forces.
So I did agree with the decision.
Chairman Levin. What are some of the things that we've done
in response to the bellicose rhetoric of North Korea?
Admiral Locklear. We do a series of exercises each year
with all of our allies. In particular with North Korea, about
this time of year we do an exercise called Key Resolve.
Chairman Levin. With South Korea?
Admiral Locklear. With South Korea, we do Key Resolve and
Foal Eagle. Those exercises are to build our alliance
capabilities together, our defensive capabilities together.
Many of the activities that you've seen play out over the last
month are a result of an exercise that we would do annually
anyway.
So normally at this time of year you will also see in North
Korea that they will go into their winter training cycle and
they will conclude that winter training cycle about the time
that Foal Eagle finishes. So we have those two events happening
at the same time.
So when you lay on top of that the bellicose rhetoric that
has come out of North Korea and the follow-up from the nuclear
test and now the poor decisions that it appears that he's
making, each of these events that were rolled out at Foal Eagle
start to take on a more significant strategic context. But they
all, I think, demonstrate the strength of the alliance,
demonstrate the defensive capabilities we build in the
alliance, and demonstrate the deterrence capability of the
forces that we bring together.
In addition, we pursued a long-range B-2 demonstration as
part of Foal Eagle that came from the United States here. It
was a good opportunity for my forces in PACOM to coordinate
with the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and for us to be
able to demonstrate that capability. I believe the fact that it
was visibly demonstrated was done at the right time to indicate
the capabilities that the United States has to ensure the
defense of our allies and of our Homeland.
Chairman Levin. I believe we also moved a missile defense
system, is that correct?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. To Guam, I believe.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, we did. At my request, I asked
the joint force to be able to produce for the defense of Guam
the THAAD asset and that request was supported and we're doing
that to ensure that we can adequately defend our U.S.
territories as well.
Chairman Levin. I understand that President Obama talked to
Chinese President Xi recently regarding the actions that we
have taken following this North Korean spate of rhetoric. Have
you had any conversations with your military counterparts in
China in the last couple of weeks?
Admiral Locklear. I have not.
Chairman Levin. A widespread attack by North Korea,
conventional or otherwise, seems highly unlikely, but
nonetheless there is a prospect, based on history, for a
limited military action of some type from North Korea. If there
were such an event, that would, I presume, draw a military
response from South Korea.
The United States and South Korea have reportedly finalized
something called a Combined Counter-Provocation Plan in an
effort to get in place the terms and type of any such response
to a limited military action from North Korea. Can you describe
for us in general terms what the parts of that agreement are
and are you satisfied that the plan that we have entered into
with South Korea strikes the right balance between enabling
South Korea to respond and to defend itself, at the same time
ensuring that the United States is involved in any decisions
that might widen a military action to include U.S. forces?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. You know we've been planning
with our ally, joint planning together, for many, many years.
We have plans that we've worked together and we continually
revise them. This particular plan that has been talked about is
basically what I would call a branch from our normal day-to-day
planning we have there to take a look at how things have
changed. This is a recognition of a better understanding of the
cycle of provocation that we see from not only this leader, but
his father as well, and how best to deal with it.
I won't go into the details of the plan here because I
don't think that's appropriate. But I do think that it is a
good planning effort. I think that it has provided us, General
Thurman, and his counterparts there the opportunity to ensure
that the right command and control and the right coordination
is in place, to ensure that as we were to approach future
provocations that we do so in a predictable way that allows us
to be able to manage those provocations without, hopefully
without, the unnecessary escalation that none of us want.
So I am supportive of the plan, I think it's a good one,
and we will continue to revise it as time goes on.
Chairman Levin. Are you satisfied that we would be ready if
there were such a limited military action from North Korea?
Admiral Locklear. I am satisfied that we're ready today,
yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Can you give us briefly the impact of sequestration on the
PACOM?
Admiral Locklear. There's no doubt that sequestration is
having an impact on near-term operational readiness. By nature
of the way that sequestration is put into the budget,
particularly in this year, in the execution year of 2013,
there's only so many places that we can pay that size of a
bill, and most of the places that the Services have to go to
are in readiness and operational accounts.
So I would say that for us to be able to deal with what we
have done, what the Services have done, is that we've
prioritized our assets globally as well as inside the Asia-
Pacific to be able to ensure that our most pressing problems
are properly addressed with the right force levels and the
right levels of readiness. So today I think we have managed
that inside the PACOM AOR.
Now, where I have concerns is in the mid-term, as our
overall readiness of our force starts to decline because of the
impacts of the way that sequestration has been implemented. So
you're seeing things like cancelling large-scale exercises that
we've done to ensure the future readiness of our force, because
we don't have the flying hours, or the transportation, or the
fuel supplies to do that, or the fuel money to do that. So
we're having to prioritize those things towards those things in
PACOM's theater which are most pressing, and today that most
pressing situation is what's happening on the peninsula in
Korea.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, as you and I have talked about before, I'd like to
get clarification on one statement that was, I think,
misrepresented. It was in the Boston Globe, reported that you
indicated--and I'm quoting now from the Boston Globe--``The
biggest long-term security threat in the Pacific region is
climate change.''
Now, I'd like to have you clarify what you meant by that
because I want to follow up with a couple of things here.
Admiral Locklear. Thanks for asking that question. I'm
happy to have the opportunity to clarify.
Senator Inhofe. I say that because a lot of the people who
are trying to use that and use your statement are the very
people who think we're spending too much money on defense and
that that money should be spent in other areas. Some of the
environmental extremists don't really believe we need to have
that strong of a military, as strong as we have right now, in
spite of the hit that we've taken militarily.
But go ahead.
Admiral Locklear. As you might expect, I gave 100 or so
interviews over the last year. During those interviews, I can
assure the committee that I always start by talking about the
most pressing military threats that we have--North Korea, the
rise of powers in the region, transnational threats, all the
things that Chairman Levin laid out in his opening remarks
quite well.
In this particular case, I did the same. Then we started to
talk about the long-term, the long-long-term, and what are the
implications of it. I would clarify my perspective this way. In
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, projections are we're going to go
from about 7 billion people in the world to about 9 or 10 by
the century, and about 70 percent of them are going to live in
this part of the world.
About 80 percent of them today live within about 200 miles
of the coast, and that trend is increasing as people move
towards the economic centers which are near the ports and
facilities that support globalization. So we're seeing that
trend of people moving into littoral areas.
We are also seeing--if you go to the U.S. Agency for
International Development and you ask the numbers for my PACOM
AOR how many people died due to natural disasters from 2008 to
2012, it was about 280,000 people. Now, they weren't all
climate change or weather-related, but a lot of them were due
to that. About 800,000 people were displaced and there was
about $500 billion of lost productivity.
So when I look and I think about our planning and I think
about what I have to do with allies and partners and I look
long-term, it's important that the countries in this region
build the capabilities into their infrastructure to be able to
deal with the types of things that----
Senator Inhofe. I'm sorry to interrupt you here, because
you've now used up half my time and we didn't get around to it.
Is it safe to say that in the event--that the climate is
changing, which so many scientists disagree with--in fact, when
the Boston Globe, coming out of Massachusetts, made that
statement, perhaps arguably one of the top scientists in the
country, Richard Lindzen, also from Massachusetts, MIT, said
that was laughable?
Let me just put it this way: CRS has told us that we could
be totally independent from all other countries in terms of
providing our own energy if we just develop our own resources.
I believe that to be true. Wouldn't it be a more secure world
and, specifically in your area, if we not only were totally
independent, but were able to supply our allies in your
jurisdiction with their energy so they don't have to depend on
other sources?
Admiral Locklear. Absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Let me say something about China.
China, I understand right now--this is fairly new stuff--that
they're talking about increasing their defense budget by 10.7
percent in 2013. I remember back in the 1990s when they
increased their defense spending during that decade by 300
percent at the same time that we reduced ours by about 30
percent. This is not a partisan thing. This was after the Cold
War. A lot of people felt that we could afford to reduce and we
did.
We went down 30 percent in that decade. They went up 300
percent. Now, we're facing the same thing. My concern is could
it be that we will cease to become the partner of choice to our
allies if this trend continues? Does this concern you with the
amount of increase that China is making and how it's affecting
your region?
We see this in Africa. It's our experience in Africa that
every time we have any type of a void that takes place in
Africa, China moves in, and they seem to have the resources to
do that. I just want to know how that might affect our
relationship with our allies in your jurisdiction?
Admiral Locklear. It is concerning, and I think one of the
aspects of the rebalance is to ensure that we have the right
force posture, the right force mixture for the future in the
Asia-Pacific so that we can reassure our allies, that we can
reassure our partners, we can reassure the American people that
our interests are protected over there. I think we do have to
watch very carefully how China's military rises, what they do
with that military, and how that military is integrated into
the security environment.
Senator Inhofe. In our trip over to Guam, we were looking
at that controversial hangar and the fact that you'd made a
statement that maybe that should be hardened. There's a big
expense to that. That's a controversial thing over there. I
would agree with your statement. However, with the resources
that we have, I would think that others would say, these need
to be hardened also.
Would you address that issue in terms of the scarce
resources and the advantages of hardening those facilities?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. First, we're acutely aware of
the significance of the resources that we'd be asking for. It
really boils down to resiliency. It's not just about hardening.
It's resiliency of forward bases as you look to the future,
where in this case you are looking at Guam. It is a significant
strategic hub for us in any scenario I think that I would see
in the Asia-Pacific for the next number of decades as far as I
can see forward.
So when you look at resiliency, there's really a number of
components. There's offensive counter-air and how you use that.
There's offensive methods to protect it. There's defensive
measures to protect it. Then there are things that you might do
to harden, and then there's command and control over it. We're
looking across all of those.
So when you look at the things we're talking about
hardening, I think, those are things that would allow you to be
able to quickly, as quickly as possible, recover Guam if it
ever were to be attacked by someone. It's not hardening
everything, but it's hardening those things that would allow
you to have that resiliency with some expectation you could
return it to service quickly.
Senator Inhofe. I think it would be a good idea, just for
the record, to elaborate on that, in what areas that should
take place, give us some ideas of some priorities. I know it's
not of a lot of interest to this committee right now, but it
was during our trip over there.
It might also be true on this. Taking the 9,000 marines
from Okinawa going to Guam, and I think some of them to
Australia and some to Hawaii, there is some issue there in
terms of the real estate that that would free up for the
Japanese. Is there any brief comment you can make about that
move of those marines?
Then I'd like to have for the record some of the detail in
terms of where the remaining, I guess about 10,000 marines,
would be, where they'd be moved to, how that affects the value
of the real estate there, and how we might be addressing that.
Admiral Locklear. Let me begin with the question of
resiliency in Guam and you said some more detail on that. I
think generally I would say when you look at fuel supplies and
how you would regenerate fuel supplies and whether those
fuelheads would need to be hardened or not, is one we look at;
whether you have the right runway recovery equipment if the
runways were ever damaged by someone who decided to attack Guam
and how fast you could recover them. So those are a couple of
things we're looking at.
We're also looking at how you would command and control the
dispersal of assets so those assets might go to different
places in times of crisis and conflict. So we're looking at a
broad spectrum and these are just things that fit together in
that patchwork.
Senator Inhofe. Because of the timing, if you can just go
ahead and answer the other one for the record, that would be
fine, Admiral.
[The information referred to follows:]

In April of this year, the Secretary of Defense released the
Okinawa Consolidation Plan which established three categories of
return: immediate facilities and areas upon completion of necessary
procedures; additional areas following construction of replacement
facilities; and remaining areas after marines relocate to Guam and
Hawaii. Under the plan, the remaining 10,000 marines will be
consolidated in order to reduce impacts on some of the most populated
parts of Okinawa. Potential effects on the value of real estate will be
addressed through Environmental Impact Assessments, part of the
`necessary procedures' specified in each return category. When
complete, approximately 1,000 hectares will have been returned to the
people of Okinawa.

Admiral Locklear. Aye, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thanks so much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your service. I was struck in your
testimony at page 9 where you describe the growing number of
nations adopting the submarine as an enhanced weapon system.
You point out the Russians in the north have both attack and
ballistic missiles, indeed that India is growing its submarine
force, the Chinese seem to be the ones who are expanding the
most. Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and
the Republic of Korea have launched new submarines.
This seems to be the class of weapon systems or ships that
they are actively trying to compete with the United States; is
that a fair judgment?
Admiral Locklear. I don't know that I would say they were
actively competing with the United States. I think globally you
have well over 300 submarines and that number's growing. People
recognize that they have a significant anti-access, denial, or
anti-access capability, that there remains an asymmetric
ability in undersea warfare in the ability to remain covert, in
stealth; and that technology is allowing very quiet submarines
to be built that can be sustained at sea for longer and longer
periods of time.
So I don't know that they're necessarily competing with the
United States because 300 submarines is a lot, but they
certainly are, I think, re-emerging into the security
environment in a way that we should be very thoughtful about.
Senator Reed. But in terms of our fleet, which is clearly
because of technology and also the skill of the men and women
who operate these vessels, is far superior, but no longer do we
have in one sense an open field. We are now beginning, and
you're beginning, to note an increase in submarines that are
being developed and deployed by Asian powers. That's the sum of
your testimony?
Admiral Locklear. First of all, let me say that we have the
very best submarines in the world, so I'm not concerned about
the capabilities of our submarines or the crews that operate
them. I am concerned about--numbers matter, and where you have
them matters, and the types of missions. Our submarines do a
variety of missions across the broad spectrum of things, and
there are places in the world where an asymmetric advantage
from undersea warfare is important.
Senator Reed. It seems to be important, on the basis of
your comment, in the context of the anti-access doctrine. Is
that what you're perceiving to be the major emphasis now in
Asia, particularly the major powers like China and others being
in line, to be able to deny access to our fleet?
Admiral Locklear. I would say the general trend around the
globe is that people want to be able to control what happens in
their economic zones and in their territorial seas. Then there
are those powers that like to project power even beyond those
areas, and submarines provide them viable alternatives for
doing that in a way that's sometimes asymmetric.
Senator Reed. One other, shifting gears slightly, is that
the Littoral Combat Ship, the Freedom, I believe, has been
deployed to Singapore, which is in your AOR. We're going to
have issues with respect to budgets and the capability of
different ships. How do you--do you intend to monitor the
operation of the Freedom, or how are you going to employ it,
since it's in your AOR?
Admiral Locklear. First, the Freedom is the first of the
class of the Littoral Combat Ship. It's a concept ship,
something that started out to build it and then to grow the
research and development in it as you build it. The Chief of
Naval Operations, I think, has wisely decided to push it to
PACOM and to rotationally deploy it out of Singapore.
It is a ship that was designed for littoral operations
because of its speed, its shallow draft. It has the ability to
be, over time, reconfigured. It has mission module packages
that you are all aware of. What it does for me out there,
number one, it provides a visible presence of the United States
in the littorals. It allows us to cooperate and participate
with a key strategic partner out there, our partners in
Singapore. It provides my Seventh Fleet commander and my
Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Haney, another tool in the
toolkit to be able to deal with peacetime events as well as
those in crisis. So I'm anxious to get it out to the theater
and to see what it can actually do.
Senator Reed. In that context, do you have a conscious plan
to evaluate its capabilities, to make recommendations with
respect to both its design, its function, and its operational
capacities?
Admiral Locklear. We do. The Freedom will be there for
about 10 months in this first rotation to the area. During that
time, my understanding is that we will concentrate on how we
move the mission module packages around, how do we employ them
in the littorals, how do we integrate them into the operational
fleet, the Seventh Fleet.
So it's a good thing because it gets it into the real
world. It gets it to having to see what it can do and how it
can best perform and how it can best be used.
Senator Reed. Just a final question. When you're doing your
planning for a range of operations from noncombatant
evacuations all the way up to a main fight or a forced landing,
will you think in terms of where the Littoral Combat Ship fits
in those missions and what missions it may or may not be
adequate for?
Admiral Locklear. Absolutely. I think they are, from my
other components, all looking very carefully at what they can
use, how they can use the Littoral Combat Ship, because of its
reconfigurable capability, because of the amount of cargo and
types of things it can carry, the flexibility that it has with
airframes. So we'll be looking at that.
We'll also be looking carefully at its mine countermeasure
mission, which is an integral part of, I believe, the Navy
strategy for next generation mine countermeasures, and we're
going to ensure that those technologies are looked at as
carefully as we can.
Senator Reed. Finally, with the remaining minute or so, can
you comment about the amphibious capability that you have in
the Pacific now? Because of the Marine Corps' deployment in
Afghanistan and their service there, the frequency of
amphibious operations from ship to shore have been curtailed
over time. Have they been reinvigorated? Are you conducting
them on a regular basis, and what are the problems you see?
Admiral Locklear. They have been reinvigorated. I think one
of the initial impacts of the rebalance was to see the Marine
Corps forces, that many of them had been deployed into
Afghanistan and the Middle East over the last decade, returned
to the Pacific. So General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and I have had extensive conversations about how do we
bring back the marines, reintegrate them back on the amphibious
ships that we have there, what are the types of missions that
we need to pursue, what is the level of training, what are the
exercises we need to be incorporating.
So we have a good plan. I've asked the Navy to look at
increasing the amount of amphibious lift that's in the AOR
because of the geographically distributed operations that
marines have to do. I think there's a need for more lift in the
PACOM area and that has been, I believe, positively received
and we'll look at options on how best to do that.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you, Admiral, for being here. You mentioned the
effect on sequestration and you were making certain adjustments
to it. Are you going to be able to, in your view, adjust
adequately to carry out your assigned missions in the medium-
and long-term if sequestration continues on the path that it's
on?
Admiral Locklear. I would say that we'll have to closely
assess globally the types of things that our military's being
asked to do, and then we'll have to decide----
Senator McCain. I'm asking for PACOM.
Admiral Locklear. I think it would depend on how, over
time, if the resources were reprioritized to the rebalance. I
think at the end of the sequestration we'll still have the most
powerful military in the world, I expect. So it will depend on
how we're going to reprioritize that and whether that comes
back to the Pacific. But it will be a challenge.
Senator McCain. My question is not whether we will still
have the most powerful military in the world. My question is,
will you be able to carry out the assigned missions that the
PACOM has now in a sufficient manner to ensure our national
security if sequestration continues on the path that it's on.
Admiral Locklear. I hate to give you this, but I think it
depends on----
Senator McCain. You know what the numbers are, Admiral.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. You know what the numbers are and you know
then that those numbers in some way or another are going to
have to be put into effect. My question again is: Will you be
able to ensure the American people that you will carry out your
assigned security requirements to defend this Nation if
sequestration continues the path that it's on?
Admiral Locklear. I'd have to give you the answer. It
depends on how the resources globally are prioritized and if
they're prioritized to the Pacific.
Senator McCain. So I guess the answer is that sequestration
is okay as long as we prioritize in the proper fashion. Is that
the answer you're giving this committee?
Admiral Locklear. No, sir. I've been consistent in saying
that sequestration would have a catastrophic effect on our
ability to do the type of global operations we're doing today.
To tell you that sequestration is something that I would be
supportive of in general, I would say no, I have not said that.
But now that sequestration appears to be heading in that
direction, at least in the near term, then there will be
decisions that DOD will be forced to make.
I believe Secretary Hagel and Secretary Carter are moving
in that direction to start to look at what are those strategic
choices that have to be made. If the strategic choice is that
we cannot--that we're not going to be able to provide the force
levels that we have today in the PACOM, then the answer to your
question is I can't do it. The answer is if they're going to
reprioritize to the Asia-Pacific, then I'll have to see, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much. Thank you.
I was thinking this morning, I don't know of a time of
greater tension since the end of the Korean War that exists
today between North Korea, South Korea, and us. Would you agree
with that?
Admiral Locklear. I would agree that in my recollection I
don't know a greater time.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that we have the ability to
intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch a missile, as
it is widely reported they would do in coming days?
Admiral Locklear. I believe we have a credible ability to
defend the Homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to
defend our forward-deployed forces, and to defend our allies.
Senator McCain. Do we have the capability to intercept a
missile if the North Koreans launch within the next several
days?
Admiral Locklear. We do.
Senator McCain. Would you recommend such action?
Admiral Locklear. If the missile was in defense of the
Homeland, I would certainly recommend that action. If it was
defense of our allies, I would recommend that action.
Senator McCain. My question is would you recommend that we
intercept a missile if it is launched by North Korea, no matter
where the intended target is?
Admiral Locklear. I would not recommend that.
Senator McCain. Until you were sure what the target is?
Admiral Locklear. I think if you look at the architectures
that we have, we will be able to sense and be able to
understand pretty quickly where any launch from anywhere in the
world, but in this case, from this particular site, where it
would probably--where it would be going and what we would need
to do about it. So I am confident that we would be able to make
that decision for the defense of our allies and our Homeland.
Senator McCain. So in the event of a missile launch, you
would wait until you could determine where the missile was
aimed?
Admiral Locklear. We should hopefully have--if we have any
predetermined indications and warning (I&W), we'll have a
good--we should have a sense of where it's going to be aimed.
If we don't, it doesn't take long for us to determine where
it's going and where it's going to land.
Senator McCain. We see that China made some rather
cautionary remarks about North Korea. We identified a building
in Beijing from which cyber attacks emanate. We also see
continued confrontational behavior on the part of China as far
as its assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea. Would
you agree with me that the only really restraining force on
North Korea would be at this time the Chinese?
Admiral Locklear. I would say that they would play--will
play a key part in any restraint. I don't know the only one,
but I would say they are a significant factor.
Senator McCain. Do you think they have played a sufficient
role of restraint of North Korea yet?
Admiral Locklear. I think that they could do more.
Senator McCain. So are you concerned about this combination
of factors about Chinese behavior, that they certainly are not
behaving in many respects as a world power should behave,
especially again in light of the military buildup that Senator
Inhofe has already described?
Admiral Locklear. I do have some concerns.
Senator McCain. How serious are those concerns?
Admiral Locklear. I think that as the Chinese military
evolves, which I think it will evolve, it doesn't surprise me
that they're investing in their military. They're getting
global aspirations because of their economic growth. The
question is, for me, about transparency and what they're going
to do with that military and how they integrate that military
into the rest of the security environment.
So it does concern me. They know my concerns. I voice them
when we meet together, and we continue to have dialogue on
those concerns.
Senator McCain. Do you have adequate missile defense
resources to defend the Homeland, including Guam, Hawaii, and
Alaska?
Admiral Locklear. The Secretary of Defense has announced
some additional missile buys for the GBIs. But today we have
the capacity, the capability, and a limited capacity to be able
to defend against the type of threat that we're seeing from
North Korea.
Senator McCain. Isn't it true that this concern about North
Korea is exacerbated by the fact that artillery at the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) could strike Seoul and cause
horrendous casualties?
Admiral Locklear. It is very much exacerbated by that
because of the legacy of the DMZ and how that has progressed
for the last 50 or 60 years. That amount of artillery, through
a miscalculation or a provocation from the north, would put
Seoul at risk and it is a primary concern of U.S. Forces Korea
and mine.
Senator McCain. This committee noted with interest the
announcement that the Governments of Japan and the United
States announced for Okinawa movements, that has already been
mentioned by the chairman and Senator Inhofe. We are awaiting a
master plan for the movement and what's required and the costs
required, including environmental impact assessments. When do
you think the committee and Congress would receive this master
plan?
Admiral Locklear. I don't have a date to give you for when
OSD would present that to you. I've been providing the
information to them, as required, from my perspective and I
think I've responded to the committee on a number of issues
that you've asked me about, including the lift requirements
necessary to move marines around, and I submitted that to the
committee within the last 2 weeks.
Senator McCain. Thank you. I thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your service, your extraordinary
service over many, many years and for being here today and for
your excellent testimony.
I am concerned as much about the threat that North Korea
poses in terms of nuclear proliferation over the long-term as
the immediate tension and potential threat in the short-term.
You have briefly discussed it in your testimony. We have
discussed it barely at all here today. So I wonder if you could
elaborate on your testimony to describe what you see as the
extent of the ongoing, and I underscore the word ``ongoing'',
aid that North Korea is providing to other nuclear-arming
countries, such as Iran, around the world? Then I'm going to
ask how we can stop it more effectively, as you've described,
through the counter-WMD program and what can we do to bolster
it?
Admiral Locklear. North Korea's proliferation of weapons
systems, including potentially missile technologies or nuclear
technologies, very much concern me. We know that, over a period
of time, North Korea goes through cycles of provocation. One of
the things they rely on to fund their ability to do what they
do is through proliferation and movement of arms sales around
the world.
I don't have any direct knowledge that there's been, in
this near-term case, that there's been collusion between Iran
and North Korea, but it doesn't mean it hasn't happened.
Senator Blumenthal. Isn't it a fact that Iran would be
greatly disadvantaged if North Korea were not helping it?
Admiral Locklear. I think that Iran would be greatly
advantaged if North Korea helps them.
Senator Blumenthal. Is that help ongoing?
Admiral Locklear. I can't give you a verification of that
in this forum, but I'd be happy to----
Senator Blumenthal. Perhaps in another forum or for the
record?
Admiral Locklear. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Blumenthal. What can we do to help stop that kind
of proliferation even more effectively than we are right now
through the counter-WMD program?
Admiral Locklear. I think first the international community
has to bring pressure, continued pressure, to bear on North
Korea. We have to tighten our ability to sense and see what is
being proliferated and where it's going, and then we have to be
able to ensure that we have the ability to interdict it before
it is proliferated.
Senator Blumenthal. I will just say, Admiral--and I know
you are focused on this problem, as evidenced by your testimony
here--but for me some of the most chilling testimony this year
before our committee came from Admiral Stavridis, who told us,
and I'm quoting: ``Remember, the truly dark edge of the
spectrum is WMD and the proliferation of these weapons.'' Then
he said that ``the ability to move 10 tons of cocaine in a
mini-sub, if you have that ability you can also move a nuclear
device.''
So the seas are a ready means of proliferating nuclear arms
that can do destruction beyond what we have seen so far through
weapons of terrorism, isn't that correct?
Admiral Locklear. Certainly the seas, and particularly in
my AOR, are the highways for a lot of these types of
activities. Some don't recognize just the size of the Pacific
Ocean. If you took all the land masses in the world and put
them together, they'd all fit in the Pacific Ocean.
Senator Blumenthal. You stated that well in your testimony,
the sheer physical extent of your challenge. With that in mind,
and I didn't mean to cut you off, but I do hope that we can be
rebriefed, perhaps with your guidance as well as others, on the
threat of proliferation particularly as it concerns Iran going
forward.
Let me just shift to a subject that Senator Reed raised,
submarines. This goes really to the end of your last question.
There are 300 submarines out there now and they can't compare
to the United States in terms of their technological capability
or the ability of the personnel who man them, I agree with you
totally.
But don't we need to continue our sub-building program at
the rate we are now of two-a-year to keep pace with what's
happening in the rest of the world?
Admiral Locklear. That's been my recommendation.
Senator Blumenthal. Nothing has happened to change that
recommendation, has it?
Admiral Locklear. Nothing's happened to change that
recommendation.
Senator Blumenthal. In fact, arguably, the urgency of that
recommendation is all the more prescient now in the world with
the increased building of those submarines by other countries
around the world.
Admiral Locklear. I would--it's not only about the
submarines. Our submarine force does a lot of other things,
from intelligence and reconnaissance to special operations
support. So it's a wide array of things that need to be
addressed in the security environment that can be addressed
very well by a competent submarine force that has the
capability and the capacity to be able to address the growing
challenges we see in the world today.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Finally, you mentioned in your testimony, just very
briefly, the challenges posed by human trafficking in the
region under your command. I wonder if you could elaborate a
little bit on that, particularly focusing on whether it's
increasing or not, human trafficking, sex exploitation,
particularly affecting children, young women, the range and
increasing extent of it.
Admiral Locklear. I have a slide that somebody gave me the
other day. I don't know if it's accurate or not, but it said
that the slave trade in the world today, that it's about $30
billion a year. So in my particular AOR, my guess is that
there's a fair amount of that trafficking coming from that part
of the world.
So we do look at this. We try to work with our partners,
our allies, to look at where the sources of this type of
trafficking might be coming from, what are the security
mechanisms they may have in place to be able to help deal with
it. But it is a problem and I think a much larger problem than
we often want to think about.
Senator Blumenthal. Isn't the Republic of North Korea a
primary contributor to this problem?
Admiral Locklear. I don't have the knowledge of that.
Senator Blumenthal. My information is that, in fact, they
are a primary contributor to human trafficking of women and
girls, both within that country and the industry, particularly
through Mexico and Canada. Are you aware of information that
would corroborate that?
Admiral Locklear. I'm not aware of it, but I'll certainly
look into your numbers. But I wouldn't be surprised.
Senator Blumenthal. I apologize, I don't have numbers. But
if you have some, I certainly welcome any additional
information that you might be able to provide.
My time has expired, but I really want to thank you for
your very informative and helpful testimony here today. Thank
you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your leadership and for all that
serve underneath you. I wanted to ask you, what is the
relationship between China and North Korea, and how does North
Korea depend upon China?
Admiral Locklear. China is, I think de facto, the only
real, so to speak, ally that North Korea would have. They are
on their border. They share a common border. I believe that
China economically supports North Korea through food and fuel
and water. I think that there are diplomatic ties between North
Korea, unlike--they are much more robust than what we may have
ever experienced with North Korea. So I think their influence
in North Korea is and can be significant.
Senator Ayotte. Wouldn't it be--as I understand it, in
fact, China is North Korea's biggest trading partner, their
main source of food, arms to some extent, and fuel. So it seems
to me that North Korea would have a difficult time continuing
economically, even at their lower economic development pace as
they are now, given the starving that many of the North Koreans
experience, if they didn't have China's support. Would you
agree with me with that?
Admiral Locklear. I would have to agree with that. The
North Korean economy is about 2 percent of the South Korean
economy.
Senator Ayotte. So one thing that--when you look at what's
happened in the last couple of weeks with the new leader of
North Korea and his bellicose actions, which seem to go beyond
their typical cycle of provocation that we've seen in the past
with his father, couldn't China play a key role in getting
North Korea to stop their actions?
Admiral Locklear. I would think that China could play a key
role in influencing the bellicose rhetoric and restoring some
more sense of calm to the peninsula. Of course, I believe
sometimes the Chinese, in the way they approach it, are more
nuanced than we are. I believe there's been some reporting and
some indication that the leadership in China has made some
statements about the issue. I can't tell you what's going on
behind the scenes between Beijing and----
Senator Ayotte. One thing that troubled me is that when you
were asked by Chairman Levin about your conversations with your
Chinese counterpart in the military you said during these past
2 very dangerous weeks that we've had with North Korea that you
have not had contacts with your military counterpart. It seems
to me that we need to be, I would think, clearer with China as
to what our expectations are because this is a danger to them,
and also, if there is a provocation between North and South
Korea and we are required to engage, or North Korea engages us,
that is to the detriment of China's security as well.
So I'm wondering why you haven't had those conversations.
Admiral Locklear. I believe our Secretary of Defense has
had those conversations. The nature of our military-to-military
with China is growing and is progressing and I believe that
over time we will progress to a state where the PACOM commander
can talk to the chief of defense or the Chairman can talk there
in real time. We're not there yet. We'd like to get there with
them.
But I can't tell you--I'd have to refer you to the
Department of State. I know that there's a different flow of
information at the diplomatic level than at the military level
because of the way the PLA is structured.
Senator Ayotte. I'm sorry to interrupt, but do you know
what conversations that Secretary Hagel has had with his
counterpart in China to get them to stop this? It seems to me
that the Chinese could get North Korea to back off tomorrow.
Admiral Locklear. I don't know the specifics of it, but I
believe that there has been outreach at that level. I believe
there has.
Senator Ayotte. I think that's particularly important,
given that North Korea relies on China essentially for its
economic existence almost.
I wanted to ask you, with the thought of stopping the
proposed Minuteman, which is a preplanned ICBM test that we
had, you had said you agreed with that decision. Was there any
thought to the fact that if we stopped a proposed test that we
were planning on doing anyway that North Korea might interpret
that as their actions having an impact on us backing off,
meaning that his bellicose actions were actually getting us to
stop actions with our own ICBM testing? What was the thought
process there about the other side of stopping?
Admiral Locklear. I'm sure that entered into the
discussions about when the decision was made. I would just say
that we have many tools available that demonstrate U.S. power
and resolve and that we use those selectively, particularly as
we're trying to make sure that we don't end up with a situation
that spirals out of control on the Korean Peninsula.
So I think there's no question that we have the capability
to demonstrate at will, when we want to, the ability to defend
our own people, defend the peninsula. So I was supportive of
the decision at the time it was made.
Senator Ayotte. At some point we're going to have to go
forward with our regular testing, though, because this isn't
something that we just planned for this. It's something that we
do regularly, isn't that right?
Admiral Locklear. Absolutely.
Senator Ayotte. Can I ask you about the 14 GBIs that are
now being placed, replaced. The prior administration had
planned to put those interceptors in place in Alaska to make
sure that we had the missile defense capability that was
needed. How long will it take for that to be put in place?
Admiral Locklear. I don't have an answer for you. I can
refer to STRATCOM and get you one, though.
[The information referred to follows:]

We defer to Missile Defense Agency for response as this is still in
the planning phase and not in contract.

Senator Ayotte. Is that a matter of years, though, to build
those, to get those in place?
Admiral Locklear. I would assume that it's longer than
days.
Senator Ayotte. Right. So obviously, not having gone
forward, this administration, with what the prior
administration had planned, in 2009 has delayed some capacity
that we now believe we need; is that right?
Admiral Locklear. I don't really have a comment on that.
Senator Ayotte. Okay, thank you.
I wanted to also ask you about, in particular, the
importance of the Virginia-class submarine. I know that Senator
Blumenthal had asked you about the need to continue the current
build, payload schedule. Is that payload schedule under threat
with sequestration?
Admiral Locklear. I think that as we look at sequestration
that they're going to look at--as the Secretary of Defense has
said, we have to look at all options and all things that are
out there, and to see what's affordable and within the context
of what the American people want to provide us for defense. So
I think it will get looked at and it will stand on its own
merits as far as what we expect our submarine force to do in a
sequestered budget.
Senator Ayotte. Is there any doubt, though, that we need
that Virginia-class attack submarine capability in light of,
obviously, what's happening in the Asia-Pacific region and in
other regions around the world, including obviously what is
happening in the Middle East?
Admiral Locklear. In my mind there's no doubt that we need
the Virginia-class submarine and we need it to be able to
employ a wide range of capabilities. They are all important. In
my particular AOR I have to look at what are the capabilities
that are most important, and we'll be doing that.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Admiral, for your testimony and I appreciate
your being here today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for your service. The North Korean
missile that's been moved to their east coast, what is the
capability of that? What parts of American territory are under
threat from that, if any, and what countries are under threat
from that?
Admiral Locklear. We believe, as has been widely reported,
that there's been a Musudan movement to the east coast. A
Musudan has a range of roughly 3,000 miles, 3,500 miles, has a
minimum range of about 400 or so miles, is what we think. So
you can just extrapolate that out. It doesn't put the Homeland,
the mainland of the United States, at risk. It doesn't put
Hawaii at risk. It could put, I assume, if it was pointed in
that direction, Guam at risk.
But let me reiterate again, we have the capability in place
to be able to monitor and be able to protect the Homeland,
protect Guam, and protect our forces that are fielded there, as
well as our allies.
Senator Donnelly. How quickly are you aware if a launch
occurs?
Admiral Locklear. This is complicated, the scenario, over
time. In the past we had significant I&W to be able to
understand the direction of the launch, where it was at. So the
introduction of road-mobile systems creates a problem for our
intelligence, and the world knows this. This is not just a
North Korea problem. This is a global issue with road-mobile
systems.
So it puts pressure on our ability, a premium on our
ability to sense and understand what's going on and to see it
and to be able to respond to it. We would like from a military
perspective to be able to sense it and be able to, if we have
to, deal with it before it ever launched. But in this case, in
the scenario we're in, we're probably looking at being able to
see it being in the general location and then to sense a launch
and then to do what's necessary to defend if that was required.
Senator Donnelly. At what point do you have to launch to
protect our allies and our own territories?
Admiral Locklear. That would be speculation, Senator. It
would depend on the location of the launch. It would depend on
the geometry of where it was going. It would depend on where
the assets were located. So we will position our forces to
optimize our capabilities in that area.
Senator Donnelly. Do you feel confident we'll be able to
protect all of our territories and our friends.
Admiral Locklear. I feel confident, I do.
Senator Donnelly. In regards to the decisionmaking in North
Korea with their new leader, what is--what differences do you
see from his father to him?
Admiral Locklear. I think first the similarities. I think
he's taken the playbook probably from his ``Military First.''
It's a government that's organized around the military, and
he's played that hard to the people of North Korea. He has
indicated that he was going to do economic reform, which we
haven't seen anything of.
He has brought from that playbook from his father a
recognition of a cycle of provocation, where they go through--
they do an event, there's bellicose rhetoric, it builds and it
builds until the international community says, ``I've had
enough,'' and they go into some dialogue, he asks for
concessions, the concessions are either given or not, and then
it kind of hangs out there for a while, and then starts back up
again.
Over time, I believe that that cycle of provocation has
been a fairly successful strategy for them. They're still in
power.
Now, where they differ is that I think our observation is
that he's unpredictable, more unpredictable. His father and his
grandfather as far as I can see always figured into their
provocation cycle an off-ramp of how to get out of it, and it's
not clear to me that he has thought through how to get out of
it. So that's what makes this scenario I think particularly
challenging.
Senator Donnelly. Is there a tipping point for the Chinese
with the North Koreans? What I mean by that, is there a point
where they will look or speak to the generals of North Korea
and say: Look, this is a point we don't want you to go past. Do
they have that kind of influence?
Admiral Locklear. I think that they have that kind of
influence, and I think there will be a point, would be a point
in time where you would see more of that probably visible than
you might have seen to this point in time. But we share with
the Chinese similar interests. We don't want--we want peace and
security on the peninsula. There's no benefit to the Chinese of
having this type of activity occurring on their borders.
There's no possible benefit that I can see from this.
So they will, I believe, in time, work this problem to
their national interest, just like we do and the South Koreans
do.
Senator Donnelly. Do they have the ability--obviously, they
have the physical ability to do it, but do they have the will
or desire, do you think, if the North Koreans go past a point
we would have expected them to go past in this, do the Chinese
have the ability to force a change in North Korea in the
leadership there?
Admiral Locklear. I don't know that they have--that they
would say they have the ability to force a change. My sense is
that they will look after their national interest and that they
would at some point in time, if North Korea is not in the best
interest--activity is not in the best interest of their
national interest, they will act to preserve their national
interest, as we would.
Senator Donnelly. Outside of the Korean Peninsula, what do
you see as the biggest challenge in your region? What is the
situation that concerns you the most outside of the Korean
Peninsula?
Admiral Locklear. Certainly as we look at the rise of
regional powers, the rise of China--and I've said this before
in testimony in other forums--it's looking to a future where
the U.S. interests are protected, that our allies are protected
in the Asia-Pacific. But we have to also expect that China will
integrate into that security environment. They have to. There's
really not another good option.
So how we do that and how we are able to assist where we
can--``assist'' is a pretty soft word--how we can help China
assume the regional role, a regional role in the security
environment, which I think they will at some point in time,
that is consistent with U.S. interests there and the interests
of our allies is a concern to me of how we get there and the
road we're on to that.
Senator Donnelly. Do you see the contesting of islands, of
territories, not only with Japan but with other countries as
well in regards to China, do you see that as getting worse or
is that situation getting worked out better? How do you see
that moving forward?
Admiral Locklear. You know in the South China Sea the
Philippine Government filed an international tribunal under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which I
thought was--I was supportive of that when they did that. I
believe that, first, we don't take sides. That's our U.S.
policy on territorial disputes. But we do have an opinion and
the opinion is that they should be resolved using normal
standards of international rule, that they should be done
peacefully, without coercion, and that in the end it should be
in the best interests of all the partners in that region.
So in the South China Sea I think we have--we are at a, I
would say, kind of a low boil, is probably the best way I'd put
it, is that we're watching carefully what happens as each of
these peripheral countries look at how they're going to secure
their interests.
In the East China Sea with the Senkakus, we're clear as
well there. We don't take sides on territorial disputes. But we
do recognize that the Senkakus fall in the administrative
boundary of Japan and that falls under our alliance and our
treaty responsibilities with them. So we are hoping again that
over time this scenario can play out to the benefit of both
Japan and China, to the degree they can ever get there, because
they do have many, many interests together that I think over
time may eclipse this event, but they have to get through it.
Hopefully that's done peacefully.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral, thank you for your service and
for your testimony today.
Senator Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, sir.
Admiral, again, thank you for your service.
If you looked out over a 10-year window and sequestration
was fully implemented, we would have 232 ships left in the Navy
a decade from now. Is that a wise thing?
Admiral Locklear. Not a wise thing.
Senator Graham. Would it severely restrict our ability to
deal with the threat that you face today in your backyard; do
you agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. Unless you put them all in my AOR. I'd
probably be okay if you put them all there.
Senator Graham. But somebody else wouldn't be.
Admiral Locklear. But somebody else wouldn't be.
Senator Graham. Fair enough.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Now, what percentage of North Korea's GDP
is dependent on their relationship with China?
Admiral Locklear. I don't have that at my fingertips, but I
imagine a fair percentage, and I can give you a number.
[The information referred to follows:]

Over 15 percent of North Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) is
dependent on its relationship with China. The vast majority of this
contribution is from direct trade. A smaller portion, likely less than
1 percent of total GDP, comes from other Chinese-related sources such
as private entrepreneurial investments and remittances from North
Koreans working in China. China also indirectly supports the 2 percent
of North Korean GDP coming from other trade partners, via air/ground
transport links, telecommunication links, and banking support. Further,
North Korea relies heavily on China for petroleum, machinery, and
textiles, all critical for domestic and export production.

Senator Graham. Okay, I'd appreciate that. The point I'm
trying to make is that basically North Korea's a client state
of China and they could stop this if they chose to in my view.
We're ready for the fight with North Korea if that day ever
comes?
Admiral Locklear. We're ready.
Senator Graham. South Korea and Japan, do they believe we
have their back?
Admiral Locklear. In my sessions with my counterparts, the
answer to that is yes.
Senator Graham. The politics in South Korea has changed,
would you agree, where the tolerance by the South Korean
Government and people to accept any more attacks against South
Korean interests is much lower than it was 2 years ago, do you
agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. I would agree that their toleration of a
significant provocation towards the South is much lower than it
has been in the past.
Senator Graham. If there were an incident where a South
Korean naval vessel was sunk by North Korea, a South Korean
island was shelled where South Korean citizens were killed, or
a South Korean plane was shot down by the North Koreans, it
would be almost impossible for the South Koreans not to respond
in some fashion; do you agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. You'd have to ask, to get a real answer,
the South Koreans. But my sense is, and I think General Thurman
would probably agree, is that there is a growing sense in South
Korea that future provocations of the level you just described
would require them to respond in some way.
Senator Graham. From our own national security interests, a
nuclear-armed North Korea sharing technology with terrorist
groups is a real concern; do you agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. One of the greatest concerns.
Senator Graham. We should be concerned about a missile
attack coming from North Korea and I applaud the administration
for showing resolve. I think all the things you have done under
Secretary Hagel's direction have been good, the right signal to
send.
But it is more than just getting hit by a North Korean
missile that I'm concerned about. A North Korea with an
advanced nuclear weapons program is probably a nightmare for
this country, because they have shown a propensity to share the
technology with terrorist groups. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral Locklear. A fair statement.
Senator Graham. Do the North Koreans have a rational bone
in their body?
Admiral Locklear. I would say that over time that you
could, if you look at--the armistice was in place the year
before I was born, so over time they're still in power. So
there must have been some rationality from their perspective of
what they're doing.
Senator Graham. I think from their perspective this is
rational if you live like kings and most people are starving to
death. When you get to the bottom of a North Korean problem you
have to go back to China in my view, because this North Korean
regime could not last 6 months under the current construct
without support from China. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. I believe that North Korea is highly
dependent on China for a lot of its resources. I don't know how
long they would survive.
Senator Graham. Not long.
Do you agree that China must have a plan for propping up
this crazy regime?
Admiral Locklear. I don't know that----
Senator Graham. They're not doing it by accident. They know
who they're giving the money to, right?
Admiral Locklear. They do, they do. It's a long----
Senator Graham. What is their plan? Tell me the best you
can. You're one of our eyes and ears in that part of the world.
As briefly as possible, tell me, why does China continue to do
this? How does this fit into their plan for the planet?
Admiral Locklear. I would say that, speculating on China,
my perspective of China's position on it is that over the
last----
Senator Graham. Have you ever asked them?
Admiral Locklear. We've talked about the situation on the
peninsula----
Senator Graham. Have you ever asked them, why do you
support this crazy guy? Why do you do this? What's in it for
you?
Admiral Locklear. My sense is that over time that they've
developed this relationship with North Korea as a buffer to
U.S. presence in South Korea on the peninsula.
Senator Graham. Don't you think it's a little deeper than
that, that they worry about a unified Korea, another democracy
in their backyard?
Admiral Locklear. I don't know that I would agree that they
are--you'd have to ask them. I don't know that I'd agree that
they're worried about a democracy. They have a pretty vibrant
relationship with South Korea, actually a strategic
relationship economically.
Senator Graham. So you think North Korea is a buffer?
Admiral Locklear. My sense is that they, again, that they
may----
Senator Graham. Okay. Why do they engage in cyber attacks
against American business interests?
Admiral Locklear. They do that so that they can get the
technological advantage.
Senator Graham. Why do they object to efforts to control
the slaughter in Syria?
Admiral Locklear. I don't have a comment on that.
Senator Graham. Why do they not support us more in terms of
controlling the ayatollahs in Iran?
Admiral Locklear. I couldn't comment.
Senator Graham. I'll give you a comment. I think this is a
communist dictatorship that fears individual expression. They
fear freedom of thought. They fear freedom of religion. They
fear anything not controlled by the state. It is now time to
deal with these people more directly.
Do you consider China a friend or a foe?
Admiral Locklear. I consider them at this point in time, in
the terms of those two terms, neither.
Senator Graham. With friends like this, do you agree we
don't need many enemies?
Admiral Locklear. I consider them at this point in time
someone we have to develop a strategic partnership with to
manage competition between two world powers.
Senator Graham. I'll be a little more direct. I know you're
a military officer and I appreciate your service. Their
behavior is not only provocative, it's obscene. They're
stealing American intellectual property. They're attacking us
every day through cyber space. They're propping up one of the
most dangerous regimes in the world that directly threatens our
interests. They're one of the groups having Assad's back, one
of the last real vicious people on the planet--not one of the
last, but certainly one of the major.
So you live in a tough neighborhood and I just wish you
would share with the Chinese that there's a growing frustration
here in Congress with the way they behave and we would like to
have a more mature China as part of the international
community, a China that would bring out the best in the world,
not reinforce what's dangerous about it. I think I'm speaking
for a lot of Republicans and Democrats.
Thank you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to join my colleagues in welcoming you, Admiral
Locklear, for the very important hearing today. Thank you for
your leadership, and of course I want to thank the men and
women who serve with you at PACOM. I visited with many of our
leaders this past week and so I know how hard they work. The
fact that they are very much a part of the community through
volunteering and particularly with our schools.
I have a question regarding Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.
With the new strategy to rebalance our forces with a focus on
the Asia-Pacific, the need for a strategically located
maintenance facility such as the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
appears even more critical to the readiness of our fleet. When
I visited Pearl Harbor, one of our attack submarines was in a
drydock and I saw the huge effort and the hundreds of people
who have to work to maintain our submarines.
Do you foresee any adjustment to the role that you see
Pearl Harbor Shipyard playing with this rebalancing, as well as
the importance of continuing the modernization efforts at the
shipyard, because I know that we need to modernize that
shipyard in order for them to work on these very highly
sophisticated submarines in order to support the fleet in the
future? Can you share your thoughts with us on that?
Admiral Locklear. Yes. I know of no plans to change the
strategic direction we're headed with Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard. In this AOR we have to have geographically
distributed capabilities. They have to be operationally--you've
heard this term--operationally resilient, and they have to be
able to respond in crisis. But they also have to be affordable.
So I assume that the changes we're going to make in the
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard will continue to make it
competitive in nature. But certainly what they produce for us
from a military perspective, from the PACOM perspective, is
important and will continue to be important.
Senator Hirono. I hope that means that you will continue to
support the efforts to modernize that shipyard so that they can
conduct the kind of highly technical work that they do there.
Admiral Locklear. For them to remain operationally
resilient, they have to be able to do the type of work that I
would need them do. If that requires them to modernize, then
we'll need to do that.
Senator Hirono. They do need to modernize. Some of the
equipment seems to be under tents.
When we talk about the importance of the Asia-Pacific area
and the rebalancing to that area--I just participated in a tea
ceremony with Dr. Sen of the Urasenke tea group and their focus
is peace through the way of the tea. So our relationship with
Japan is very important. Can you talk about the current status
of our alliance with Japan, which is a critical alliance in
light of everything that is happening in the Asia-Pacific area?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, it is a cornerstone alliance, at
least from the security perspective. Our relationship with
Japan is equally as important today as it ever has been in the
past and maybe more important. The strength of our military-to-
military relationships and the strength of our military
alliance and training together is as strong as it's ever been
and it's getting better.
Their capabilities both from a joint command and control
perspective, their capabilities to participate in high-end
things like ballistic missile defense of their own territories,
is growing. I see a continued good way ahead with our military-
to-military relationship with Japan.
Senator Hirono. Would you say that one of the areas that we
need to continue to focus on is the Futenma situation in
Okinawa?
Admiral Locklear. Yes. We've had recent good news where the
Government of Japan provided to the governor of Okinawa the
landfill permit and they're having that under consideration. So
that's the next step to go forward to be able to realize the
Futenma replacement.
Senator Hirono. I know that this committee has had numerous
hearings on how we can facilitate and ensure that movement of
marines happens in a way that is of benefit to both of our
countries, not to mention what we need to do regarding Guam.
One of the areas that I've focused my questioning with
other leaders from the military is your need to reduce your
energy consumption, which DOD is the largest user of energy of
all of our departments. So regarding your implementation of the
DOD's operational energy strategy, I'm curious to know how this
is progressing and what have been some of the successes of your
implementation efforts? What have been the biggest challenges
in your operational energy strategy efforts, and any lessons
learned from the implementation of the strategy being
integrated into PACOM's decisionmaking?
Admiral Locklear. I'd like to give you a more complete
answer if I can later on in writing.
Senator Hirono. I welcome that.
[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is aggressively pursuing operational
energy and energy security goals. Given PACOM's extensive area of
operations, it is imperative to ensure energy limitations do not become
an Achilles' heel.
First, we created a Joint Energy Security Working Group which
includes representatives from each of the command directorates. This
Working Group integrates energy considerations into all command
functions: plans, engagement strategies, innovation efforts, exercises,
intelligence, and operations.
Second, we are completing a Pacific Command Energy Security
Strategy. The strategy's main themes are: decreasing energy consumption
through waste elimination and efficient technology; pursuing
distributed generation; hardening our electrical grids; and engaging
with our allies and partners to share energy technology, enhance
interoperability, and more efficiently share the energy burden. As
always, we will not sacrifice operational capability for energy
efficiency.
Third, as we update our family of plans, we consider operational
energy at every step, thus creating a lasting legacy in our capstone
planning documents.
Finally, we are collaborating with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs to ensure
energy readiness is regularly reported in our logistics system. By
capturing this data, we can identify our largest energy-consuming
activities, eliminate waste, target areas for material and non-material
improvements, and better understand the costs associated with our
operational tempo.

Admiral Locklear. But to the larger perspective, inside of
DOD, PACOM is the largest user of energy resources. The
vastness of the AOR requires me to continuously think about
where the energy resources are and where they're going to come
from. I have to think about how they're going to get refined,
the quality that I need to put into the airplanes and the
ships. I think about, have to think about how I'm going to move
it around or get it moved around in this vast AOR. I have to
look to ensuring that the energy is going to be reliable when I
get there, when I need it.
I also have to consider that I have locations throughout
this vast area, that many of them are remote, and more remote
locations that might be available to look at alternative energy
supplies. So it remains a critical aspect of the way we think
through the strategy and we are following OSD's lead on looking
at renewable energy sources, and you're familiar with many of
them, and I think there has been some success in that area.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I think that's a very important
strategy--for us to pursue energy, lessening the energy usage
in DOD.
Very briefly, I know that Senator Graham asked you some
questions about China vis-a-vis North Korea. There's some
indication that perhaps China is not too happy, perhaps
displeased, with North Korea's rhetoric and actions. Do you
foresee some action on the part of the Chinese either publicly
or behind the scenes to stop or at least reduce the level of
provocations from North Korea?
Admiral Locklear. I think there've been statements by both
Xi Jinping and by their minister, I believe of foreign affairs,
in the last day or 2 that would indicate that they have some
concerns about any disruption, continued provocations or
disruptions in this part of the world or anything that would
put a potential negative situation on their border.
So I think these are maybe not as direct as what we like to
see here, but I believe that there are indications that the
Chinese Government is engaging. I think I'd have to refer you
to the State Department to get more specifics on what the
diplomatic channels are. But my sense is that they will
consider their national interest, just like we do, and they
will move to protect those national interests when the time
comes.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Locklear, welcome. I'm going to pick up on a theme.
There's been a lot of questions about the relationship between
China and North Korea and I just would like to associate myself
with comments made by others. I wouldn't have wanted to answer
that question that you were posed by Senator Graham, is China a
friend or a foe. It reminded me, I was once in Israel and asked
the foreign minister of Israel the same question about the
relationship between Israel and Russia. He groaned and he said:
``It's a friendship, but it needs an awful lot of work.''
We have extensive ties with China commercially and in many
multilateral venues, obviously, and the relationship is
probably just about the most important relationship between two
nations in the world. But when you list those items of
controversy that Senator Graham mentioned--the Chinese position
vis-a-vis Syria, the completely flagrant cyber-security attacks
that can be testified to by any governmental agency, financial
institution, or technology firm in this country will tell you
about it occurring day after day after day, along with Chinese
Government denials of the obvious reality, and then the
situation in North Korea, it is clear that, while we have a
friendship and an alliance and it's a very strategic one and
it's important for the world, it needs a lot of work right now.
I just would like to associate myself with the comments of
the Senators who have said, I think the North Korean nuclear
program would come to a grinding halt as soon as China demands
that it happen. They have the capacity to. They have the
ability to. They have the leverage to. I think you're right
that the Chinese interest is in seeing North Korea as a buffer,
but an unsafe, unstable buffer isn't much of a buffer.
At some point, other nations in the Pacific region--South
Korea, Japan, and others--will start to, because of the logical
illogic of nuclear proliferation, will say: We don't want
nuclear weapons, but if an unstable neighbor has them then I
guess we're going to need to get them, too. It would be the
worst thing for China to face the prospect of additional
nations in the area with nuclear weapons. Ultimately, that is
going to be what other nations will be compelled to do unless
the North Korean program is stopped.
So this is a comment, but it's to give you a sense of what
we are thinking here as you deal with your counterparts in
PACOM, Chinese counterparts, and others. We feel like China can
bring it to a stop. We feel like they have not chosen to do so.
The day is coming where they will need to do that or they will
face other nations with weapons that they'll not be happy to
have near their borders if they do not act in the role that
they should.
I just, having heard similar rounds of questioning in
hearings before this one from Senator McCain and Senator
Ayotte, Senator Graham, others who've asked these questions,
this is the emerging consensus, I believe, of this body, this
committee, many members of the committee, about China's
responsibilities and where we will likely go. So I hope you
would just take that in the ``for what it's worth'' category.
A question, you've been asked a couple of things about
sequester. I visited Joint Base Langley-Eustis last week in
Virginia and that is the home of the Air Force's Air Combat
Command. I talked to the men and women who maintain F-22s on
the very day the United States had deployed F-22s to Osan Air
Force Base in South Korea as part of these joint military
exercises.
We've had a remarkable show of force of both F-22s and B-2s
to demonstrate that we're serious about the North Korean
threat. But, as we were doing that, I was also being told, and
I'm concerned about, Air Force plans to cut flying hours by 18
percent as a result of the sequester. Air Combat Command
informed us that as of this week it will enter what they called
a tiered readiness status. One-third of its flying units will
cease flying or stand down for the remainder of fiscal year
2013.
How will that stand down or cessation or that tiered
readiness of flying units affect your important and critical
missions in PACOM?
Admiral Locklear. As I indicated earlier, the fact of
sequestration at PACOM in the near mid-term will be the
degradation, potential degradation of readiness of our forces
that would have to follow on. So what we've done in the near
term is to ensure that we're able to manage the scenarios that
are most important to us, in my case North Korea, manage that,
to manage our homeland defense.
But as the sequestration starts to move downstream we start
to see more and more negative impacts on the readiness of our
force. So what it means to Air Combat Command is that the
forces that are back here, that are going to be training to get
ready to come and relieve the ones that are on station, will
not have adequate flying hours, will not have adequate
training, potentially not have it. That's the world that we're
in right now.
Senator Kaine. I think it is important. Many of us were
very pleased when we did the defense appropriations bill to
carry forward through year end to replace the CR. But even with
that, the notion that a third of our air combat units are
standing down from now to year end is something that should
cause us some significant anxiety. I know it worries me.
You talked a little bit and there was also some information
in your testimony about the combined counter-provocation plan,
which is a South Korea-led, U.S.-supported contingency plan for
challenges in the region. I know that was just signed within
the last couple weeks, I think March 22. Could you share a
little bit more about that contingency plan and what are some
of the strategies for dealing with contingencies, including
miscalculations or threats over skirmishes or threats that
escalate in ways that we obviously wish they wouldn't?
Admiral Locklear. In all of our bilateral planning with our
allies there, which we've been doing for years with them, and
we continually evolve it based on the scenarios that we see in
North Korea--this particular plan that you've heard about is
just a follow-on iteration of our robust planning that we have.
It's a look at the recognition that North Korea has established
a cycle of provocation and then, following the Cheonan and the
Yeonpyeong Island shelling a number of years ago, is that how
do we best ensure that, as this cycle of provocation were to
occur, how do we together as allies communicate, how do we
understand the situation, how do we share intelligence, how do
we posture ourselves to be able to ensure that we can manage
those scenarios?
I can't go into the details of it, but it's a good--from
our perspective, it's a very good effort. It's an indication of
a maturing of the alliance and I'm very supportive of the
efforts that General Thurman and his counterpart in Korea have
undertaken.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Admiral.
Finally, your testimony discusses the continued challenge
faced by the region because of typhoons, earthquakes, floods,
tsunamis. What is PACOM doing to plan humanitarian assistance
and disaster response with other nations and also with
multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations?
Admiral Locklear. Certainly the military aspects of
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)--that's not
why you have militaries. You have them to do other things. But
they certainly can provide assistance in these areas,
particularly early on in those type of events. So, as we saw in
Tomodachi in Japan, we saw where the readiness of military
assets to kind of step in at the early stages of a huge crisis,
a huge natural disaster, and to kind of get in front of the
problem and get command and control set up and to give the
people on the ground the will and the help they need to kind of
get them jump-started to go solve it. Because, in the end,
Tomodachi was not solved by the U.S. military or any other
allies. It was predominantly solved by the people of Japan. But
it needed to get them started.
There's other areas that we can support. We have
technologies and we have know-how that are in developed
countries that we can share with developing countries. So in
PACOM, I'm able to bring together many interagencies from our
U.S. Government and we can transport some of that knowledge
into these growing HADR scenarios that we do and exercises that
we do with other countries.
So for instance, in Bangladesh, over time, they have been
able to develop warning systems and places where people go
during large storms that have significantly decreased the
damage and cost in human life. So we can do some of those
things in our multilateral planning together. Plus the whole
idea of HADR is--many times in this large area we have to look
for places where our interests converge to be able to
participate with each other. In this case everybody can
converge on HADR--the Chinese, the United States, everyone can.
So you will see exercises where we're operating with the
Chinese, we're operating with others, the Indians, other people
in the area, because we're going after a common cause. These
things build trust and over time I think make us a stronger
region.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you for your thoughtful answers today.
Are there treaty obligations between China and North Korea that
we know of, a kind of mutual non-aggression or something like
that?
Admiral Locklear. I understand that there is an alliance of
some mechanism there. I don't know the specifics of how it
would be implemented, but I believe there is, that it's been
widely speculated that North Korea is an ally and vice versa of
China.
Senator King. Here's the scenario that keeps me up at
night. The North Koreans torpedo a ship, a South Korean ship.
The South Koreans, as you've testified, seem to have a higher
level of intolerance for this kind of activity than they have
in the past, so there's a response from the South Koreans, some
kind of strike in North Korea. There's then a response from
North Korea of more severity in the South.
What happens next? What's worrying me here is the ``Guns of
August'' phenomenon, Barbara Tuchman's famous study of the
beginning of World War I, where we stumbled into a world war
because of a series of alliances based upon what could be
considered insignificant incidents.
What is next in that scenario? Let's posit an attack on
Seoul or some large population area in South Korea. What
happens next?
Admiral Locklear. First, I share your concern about the
seriousness of a provocation that would lead to a
miscalculation or an escalation that would go kind of up and
out pretty quickly. The timeline from when you would go to
where you would see a miscalculation that went kinetic, let's
say, to the time that you could see significant combat activity
from the North is a very short timeline, primarily due to the
proximity of Seoul and the South Korean rising economic state,
a great ally there.
So, it's hard for me to speculate exactly how those
scenarios would play out. But what we have in place is the
ability for the alliance to have--we've planned and thought
through some of these events, in fact a lot of the events, and
we have the ability to quickly consult with each other and to
quickly bring the forces that would be necessary to hopefully--
the idea would be to get it under control and to de-escalate it
as fast as possible, so that in the end, the best thing we as
militaries can do is to preserve the peace, to get it back to
peace so that diplomacy can work. We would hope that that could
be done in North Korea.
But it is a very dangerous situation. I'm not going to go
where Mrs. Tuchman went on the scenario and extrapolate that
because I don't think it has to go there. But it is something
we have to watch and it could be quite volatile.
Senator King. It seems to me that the key to the situation
is our relationship with China, which has come out over and
over, in terms of their ability to be a partner here in
restoring peace, as opposed to an enemy.
Let me ask a general question about China. Why are they
arming? Why are they building their military? Why are they
diverting more resources? We've been attacked. We know that
there are people around the world plotting against this
country. Do they have any serious fear of someone attacking
their homeland? What's driving them to militarize?
Admiral Locklear. First, they have a large standing army
for internal security and border security issues that have
worried them over time, is my guess. Then, over the last number
of decades, as they have become a more economically powerful
nation and they have money and resources to do it, they have
increased their emphasis in cyber, increased their emphasis in
space, increased their emphasis in maritime capabilities, which
I think, if you pragmatically look at it, we shouldn't be
surprised by that.
They have growing global economic and national interests
that are concerning them, and any nation-state that has those
needs to be able to ensure the security of them. In many ways,
you do that with navies and things that can deploy. So,
building an aircraft carrier, does that concern me? To the
degree that--first of all, aircraft carriers are hard and
expensive to operate. But to the degree that they get one, it
would seem kind of a natural progression to me for a power that
was rising.
The real key is that they need to be--and we've talked
about this--there's a need for transparency. There's a need for
them to build trust between their neighbors, which happen to be
our allies. As they evolve this military capability, what are
they going to do with it? Is it there to pursue their own
interests at the expense of others in this kind of tightly-
controlled, tightly--small sea space part of the world? Or is
it to be a contributor to a security environment where the
global economy and all the peace and prosperity can continue?
So that's what we have to contemplate.
Senator King. Using the word ``transparency'' in connection
with China strikes me as something of an oxymoron.
I also would like, Mr. Chairman, to associate myself with
the comments, particularly at the end, of Senator Graham's
remarks about on the one hand we have this commercial
relationship with China, on the other hand they have some
opportunities to really assist in peace around the world and
aren't doing so. I think Senator Graham put it quite well.
To change the subject entirely, General Kelly from Southern
Command, when he was here last month, talked about non-state
actors, transnational criminal organizations, pirates, if you
will, smugglers, human smugglers, drugs, weapons. Is that a
serious issue in your command and are we equipped to deal with
it effectively, particularly given the size of your
jurisdiction?
Admiral Locklear. It is a concern and it's a growing
concern. I think that transnational organizations will, in the
current security environment we're in, continue to proliferate.
We've done some--I think the joint U.S. forces and the United
States of America have done some really magnificent work over
the last decade or so to help curtail, particularly, al Qaeda
activity globally.
But where you have disaffected populations and you have all
these things that enter into frustrations of peoples, there's a
potential for that. We don't see a significant terrorist threat
today. There's pockets of it that we deal with. We work
carefully with our Filipino partners in the Philippines in some
operations that we help train and assist in there. Of course,
in India there is always the concern about the transition of
terrorists basically from the West into India that we discuss
and talk about.
But what we're doing mostly in PACOM to try to stay ahead
of this is we're working to ensure our information-sharing, so
that as these networks develop either internal to countries or
transnationally across countries, that we're able to sense and
understand with each other what they're doing, how they're
doing it, and being able to interdict them before this becomes
a larger problem.
Senator King. I know my time has expired. One very quick
question. In the Cold War there was the famous hot line between
Moscow and Washington. Is there a similar kind of direct
communication link between Washington and Beijing to your
knowledge?
Admiral Locklear. There is, and there's also--if necessary
there would be one between me and Beijing as well. We exercise
that on occasion. But as I've said to my Chinese counterparts,
we need to get better at this, because I don't have the same
relationship I have with maybe the chief of defense of Japan or
of Korea or of the Philippines, where we understand each other,
we meet routinely, we talk through security issues. We need to
move that forward with our relationship with China, because we
have many things that are friction points and we also have
many, many things that we have in common with each other, and
we need to understand those better.
Senator King. It's nice to have a relationship before the
crisis.
Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Admiral, good morning.
Admiral, going back to sequestration, in a big AOR such as
yours, to be ready you have to do a lot of exercises. Is there
any capability of using our increasingly enhanced ability in
simulation to keep your troops ready as a substitute for actual
exercises?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, I think you'll find that we
have--that we have spent an awful lot of money and time on
developing simulations that help us. So I see simulations that
help us across all of the joint force today that are critical.
Many of what we used to fly in airplanes are now done in
simulators and so there's a huge, huge cost savings there. Our
highest-end ships today do most of their training via
simulators because the cost to actually fire the weapons and
very expensive missiles and things are prohibitively expensive.
Even at the joint force command level, we do synthetic training
where we bring in synthetic exercises to pulse the force and
make it work.
Should there be more of this? Absolutely. The down side to
it is that it is expensive to get into it. There's a cost to
have to get into it. So we have to weigh that, that cost of
asking the Services to buy it, versus whether or not it can be
realized.
Senator Nelson. Let me ask you about, going back, to the
North Korean nuclear program. Recently they said they were
going to reopen their mothballed Yongbyon reactor, weapons-
grade plutonium. They had shut it down, as far as we know, in
2007 and people have testified that it would take at least 6
months to get the reactor up and running.
Do you agree with this kind of assessment? Let me just stop
there.
Admiral Locklear. First, I think it's a bad decision by
North Korean leadership to do it. It's in direct contradiction
of the U.N. Security Council resolutions and the agreements
that have been made in the past. It's certainly provocative in
nature.
The timeline that you discuss is what I have seen roughly
approximates that. But it's just an approximation at this point
in time.
Senator Nelson. Okay, so that's 6 months. Now, it's another
thing taking a nuclear weapon and then integrating it on a
delivery system. Presumably, they have the ability to integrate
it on short-range delivery systems. What about the long range?
We've heard testimony from senior officials that they have not
produced the ability of mounting nuclear weapons on long-range.
Can you share your thoughts in this open forum or does that
need to go into closed forum?
Admiral Locklear. I would say that to get into the
specifics of it, we'd probably need to go into a more closed
forum. However, as a general rule, I would say that we have not
seen them demonstrate that capability yet. Now, they have
indicated to us that they have it, which makes us--we're going
to take it seriously when someone indicates it, and I think
we've done prudent due diligence steps to ensure the defense of
the homeland and our allies and our forces forward. But we
haven't seen them demonstrate that capability.
Senator Nelson. For the American people to understand our
capability with this bellicose nature of this new young leader
in North Korea, can you state for the record here that between
the United States' ground-to-air, sea-to-air capability of
knocking down one of his threatening missiles from North Korea,
that we have that capability?
Admiral Locklear. I can confirm we have that capability.
Senator Nelson. Yes, sir, that we do.
Now, what about the F-22s? They were at Kadena going to be
sent back to the United States and that was a plan that was in
process until all of this bellicosity started by the Korean
young leader. So then we sent our F-22s in some kind of
exercise with South Korea. Do you think we ought to continue on
that long-planned process of sending those F-22s out of Japan
back to the United States?
Admiral Locklear. We rotate--we have two types of forces in
my theater, one that are forward-deployed all the time, which
is forward naval deployed forces and the air components that
are there in both Japan and Korea; and then we have rotational
forces. So I use a blend of those to maintain the capacity of
the theater to deal with what we have to.
Some of those are perfectly useful being deployed from the
States here. So, over time we've used force packages, F-22s are
one, where we rotate them in and out. It lets them go back and
get the high-end training they need and those types of things.
The decisions we made recently, I won't talk about
specifically why we made those. But I think it was a prudent
decision that we made, on General Thurman's behalf, to maintain
stability of the force that we saw in Korea just in case we saw
a contingency that we hadn't anticipated.
What I have more concern about is not so much our ability
to rotate them, but our ACC's capability to sustain them
through sequestration in a readiness status that allows them to
get to me in time to be trained and ready.
Senator Nelson. Finally, Admiral, you have a lot of
terrorist activity going on in your AOR and you've had some
stunning successes over the years--catching the Bali bomber,
the success that we've had in the southern Philippines,
Zamboanga. But terrorism continues throughout the AOR,
including Mumbai, et cetera.
If you would provide, in a classified setting for the
committee, what you are doing with regard to an attack not only
of the terrorism, but all of the other illicit activities that
go along with terrorism, such as transfer of drugs, money
laundering, and other terrorism-related activities, I would
appreciate that for this committee in a classified process.
Admiral Locklear. All right, sir. I will take that and
provide it.
Senator Nelson. Have that, of course, sent to the chairman,
but make sure that part of it is directed to me.
Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman Levin. We will ask staff when this is received in
a classified form to notify the members of the committee that
it's available for members. Thank you for raising that, Senator
Nelson.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Locklear, thank you very much for being here and
for your stamina in responding to our questions.
I want to--forgive me if I re-cover some ground that you've
already responded to. Assuming that we continue to operate on
heightened alert with respect to North Korea, is there any
indication that sequestration has limited your ability to
respond to a crisis there?
Admiral Locklear. It has not limited my ability to date.
Senator Shaheen. That's really the question that I have,
because you have indicated that sequestration will have an
impact over time in the operational capability of PACOM and,
obviously, other parts of our military. So at what point are we
going to get to that tipping point where it is going to have an
impact on our ability to respond, and how do we know that, and
how can you convey to members of this committee and to Congress
when we've reached that tipping point?
Admiral Locklear. We're continually looking at our
readiness capabilities in the AOR, in my area, particularly of
the forward-deployed forces. So I have certain priorities that
I maintain as we go through any kind of budget decision
process. One is, I have to be able to sense what's going on in
my AOR. So there's a continuing high demand for intelligence
and reconnaissance type of activity so we know what's going on.
It gives me the ability to understand what's happening. It
gives me the ability to coordinate with our allies. So we do
that.
The second thing is I need to make sure that, at least in
the near term right now, in fact in the long term too, that the
forces on the Korean Peninsula, that they're ready to do what
we call a ``fight tonight,'' if something happens there that
we're able to respond in ability to protect the interests of
the alliance and the interests of the United States, as well as
the soldiers, sailors, and airmen that are on the peninsula. So
keeping those forces attuned and ready to be able to respond is
something we're doing and that I've done now.
Then, finally, my concern is as those forces need to be
replaced over time, are those forces that need to replace them,
are they agile, are they trained, are they able to get there?
Is there the money to do the training to keep those skill sets
up? This is where I think the impacts of sequestration start to
make the choices very difficult for the Services. The Services
do have some leeway in where they make their decisions, but not
a lot, particularly in the near term.
Now, as you go further down into the planning cycle into
the out years, you might be able to start looking at different
ways of doing it. But, in the near-term and the mid-term, it's
going to have an impact on us.
Senator Shaheen. So, I missed the part where you said there
was a mechanism to notify Congress when you get to that point.
Admiral Locklear. I didn't mean to skip over that part. We
keep a very formatted reporting system that's monitored by the
joint force. The Chairman then takes from me, about once a
quarter, my assessment of the risk that we're assuming in the
theater, and that risk then gets reported to the Secretary of
Defense. My guess is that through the dialogue at that level
that our readiness levels are well-reflected.
There's no secret here. We won't hide readiness that we
don't have. We're very upfront about it. It's a matter of kind
of a--I put it, like a math equation. What you put in is what
you get out. When we can't meet those readiness requirements,
then that becomes risk and that's risk that I have to manage as
a combatant commander. When my risks get too high, where they
go from risks to being potentially worse than risk, then my
responsibility is to tell my leadership and you that those
risks are too high.
Senator Shaheen. As chair of the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee, I hope you feel like you have a direct
line in to me when you get to that point. I certainly hope that
we will have addressed sequestration before we get to that
point. I think it's critical to our national security.
Let me follow up on a line of questioning that Senator
Kaine was going after, relative to the potential for what's
happening in North Korea to set off a nuclear arms race across
Asia. I understand that India continues to develop nuclear-
capable ballistic missile submarines, that Pakistan has
indicated an interest in doing that because of India's
capability. So, how do we combat the risk that, whether it's
those nuclear ballistic missile technologies, whether it's the
technology that North Korea now has and we know already has
shared with other non-state actors in a way that is dangerous,
how do we keep that from proliferating?
Can you also talk, if you would, the extent to which the
effort to address arms control has an impact on the thinking of
actors about this question?
Admiral Locklear. First, let me give you my position from
the PACOM commander. First, I support the nuclear triad from
where I sit.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Admiral Locklear. I support, as long as there are nuclear
weapons in the world, that we have a safe, reliable, and secure
nuclear deterrent. But also the father in me says that I'd like
to see a world that didn't have nuclear weapons, because--will
we ever realize that? I don't know, but it would be nice some
day if the world could see themselves to that. But I'm not
predicting that that's going to happen any time soon.
So to the question of the proliferation among what I would
call state actors that are building a nuclear deterrent, that's
really not something--that has to be dealt with above my level.
But when you talk about a North Korea that is potentially going
to proliferate nuclear technology to irresponsible actors, and
particularly maybe to transnational threats or to actors which
you could extrapolate that to, this becomes a very real concern
for me.
Now, so it gets to the issue of how do you monitor it, how
do you interdict it, how does the international community
enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions that forbid all
this, so it all fits together, my part of that is on kind of
the monitoring and interdiction side of it.
Now, so the question then of how does the nuclear
proliferation or a discussion of nuclear weapons in the
theater, which I think is what you're kind of getting at, we
have an extended deterrence policy for our allies in this part
of the world, and it works. There are occasionally discussions
about, well, would our actions here in this, what we're doing
here, would it create a desire by our allies or other partner
nations to want to proliferate their own nuclear systems?
First of all, it would not be beneficial. It's unnecessary.
I'm confident that the U.S. extended deterrence policies are
adequate and substantial enough to do what's necessary. But
deterrence isn't just about nuclear weapons. It's also about
conventional capabilities and how those conventional
capabilities are applied and how they're viewed.
So this is what makes it important for our forward
presence, our exercises that were talked about here, that build
that confidence in the alliances that we've had over the years,
that make it--in any scenario, you want to handle a contingency
through conventional means. You just don't want to go the other
direction. So ensuring that the conventional side of our
deterrent is strong deserves equally as much discussion as the
other side of it, in my view.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I just have one additional question. Then I'll call on
others to see if they might for a second round just have an
additional question or two.
Admiral, I think you've heard from this committee, to a
person, some very strong feelings that China could, if it
chose, put an end to the provocative, blustering kind of
comments that are coming from North Korea and thereby help to
avoid a miscalculation and a possible spinning out of control
of military actions on the peninsula. We all, I think, have
very strong feelings that China creates all kinds of problems
for us in terms of what they do in cyber, in what they do in
other areas. I mentioned some of those in my opening statement
and others have mentioned them very powerfully as well.
But, in this interest, our interests are the same. It's
clear to me that China, at least in their vote at the U.N., is
indicating some willingness now to take some action to try to
prevent the kind of spinning out of control that could lead to
serious military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.
I asked you whether or not we are ready to respond
appropriately and proportionately should North Korea take some
action against our ally South Korea or against us, and you
indicated that we are ready. You also indicated that there is a
hotline between you and your counterpart in China that you
could use and that you at least are able to communicate with
them should you choose.
I guess my question and my request would be the following:
that the military-to-military contact sometimes is the best way
to show a seriousness of purpose on our part with China, and
their military has a major influence, obviously, in their
government. Would you explore the possibility, after talking to
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
the, perhaps, Secretary of State--the Secretary of Defense
could do that--would you explore the possibility as to whether
it might be useful for you to contact your equivalent person in
the Chinese defense establishment, your counterpart, and
express to them, your counterpart, the great desirability of
China weighing in with North Korea before this--these incidents
grow in seriousness, and make it clear to the Chinese that we
and the South Koreans want them to act to put an end to the
North Korean provocations, and that we and our South Korean
allies are prepared to respond in an appropriate way should
North Korea take any action against the South or against us.
Would you explore the possibility of that, whether you
should, at this point, make that military-to-military
connection with your counterpart in China, with your superiors
at the civilian, at the Secretary of Defense level, and also
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Could you explore that?
Admiral Locklear. Absolutely, Senator, I will explore it.
We'll look at it in the context of the benefit, which I think
there are--obviously, I have advocated for this with my
counterparts in China. There is benefit to establishing those
types of links. In this particular scenario, I think because of
where we are it will have to be tied in with the other
communications that are happening through other forms of our
government, which I'm sure there are those that are going on
with their Chinese counterparts as well.
Chairman Levin. I agree that all ought to be coordinated
and linked. But it could add a very important element if this
military-to-military communication occurred with your Chinese
counterpart.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So that's something you could take on?
Admiral Locklear. I will explore it, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That's what I mean. Thank you.
Any other question? I don't need to call in order. I'll
just see if anyone raises their hands at this point. Senator
Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. I just had one follow-up to the question
about should we need to respond to North Korea. What would
China--can you suggest what you think China's reaction might be
should the United States respond to an act of aggression by
North Korea?
Admiral Locklear. Again I'd be making hypotheticals, but I
would again go back to what are their enduring interests there.
One is their own border security. I think they would be
concerned about refugee flow, uncontrolled refugee flow.
There's 25 million people there that will be affected by
something like that, and how would that be controlled.
I think they will have a similar concern as we have about
WMD, not only particularly fissile material but all other WMD
that we know that he has the capability and the capacity to
have in the country, and how that would be managed at the time.
We're contemplating all that and are thinking through how that
would be done with our allies in the South as well.
So I think--how would they respond beyond that and how they
would do it, I can't speculate on that. But I think again they
would move to secure their national interests, just like we
would--will.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
If there's no other questions, then we thank you very much,
Admiral. As always, you've been very direct and very helpful,
and we greatly appreciate your presence here this morning and
all the great work you and those who work with you are doing in
PACOM.
Thanks again and we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

JAPAN

1. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, we have seen an enormous
increase in our costs while host nations are paying less in spite of
the agreements we have with them. For example, in Japan, U.S.
nonpersonnel costs have doubled since 2008 while the Japanese have
contributed less every year since 2000. Last week it was announced that
the United States and Japan agreed on a new timetable for the return of
Futenma and other military bases on Okinawa. In your prepared testimony
you state that the Government of Japan (GoJ) has committed to providing
$3.1 billion to support the strategic realignment. What measures are in
place to ensure that the Japanese Government fulfills its share of this
$3.1 billion commitment and what is being done to change the course of
our increasing costs while theirs are decreasing?
Admiral Locklear. In support of the Defense Policy Review
Initiative, the GoJ agreed to provide funding for the reposturing of
U.S. forces throughout Japan, particularly the relocation of 8,000
marines from Okinawa to Guam. Under the original terms of the
agreement, the GoJ committed $3.1 billion to this effort.
Unfortunately, continued congressional funding restrictions undermine
the realignment of forces in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR).
This situation prevents the Department of Defense (DOD) from spending
the nearly $1 billion in GoJ funding that has been transferred to the
U.S. Government and hinders the further funding of projects by the GoJ.
Any concerns regarding the equity of cost sharing will be addressed
during the next round of Department of State (DOS)-led Special Measures
Agreement negotiations that will take place in 3 years.

2. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, in Europe we have seen
numerous issues with in-kind payments being accepted instead of
pursuing cash settlements associated with consolidation and relocation.
As we conduct the Pacific Pivot, will all payments be in the form of
cash settlements?
Admiral Locklear. No. The Status of Forces Agreements in Japan and
Korea do not provide for the host nation to make residual value
payments when we return facilities or areas. In turn, the United States
is not responsible to cover the costs of the restoration for returned
facilities.

3. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, will Congress receive
advance notice and justification of any intent to accept in-kind
payments?
Admiral Locklear. No. Since the host nation does not have an
obligation to make residual value payments for the returned facilities
or areas, we will not be in a position to accept either cash payments
or in-kind payments for such returns.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

4. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, the Navy is currently
projecting a strike fighter shortfall due to continued delays in the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Navy is attempting to mitigate
this shortfall by extending the life of older aircraft. However, we
don't yet know whether this effort will be successful. Currently, the
Navy has no plans to procure the F/A-18 Super Hornet beyond fiscal year
2014. As a combatant commander, you depend on the Services to fulfill
your mission requirement needs, and I imagine carrier-launched strike
fighter aircraft play an important role in the Pacific Command (PACOM)
AOR. So, the Navy's strike fighter shortfall becomes your strike
fighter shortfall. As a commander, how does this shortfall and lack of
reliability affect PACOM's ability to conduct operations?
Admiral Locklear. My expectation is that we will continue to
maintain Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) and deployed carrier
strike group strike/fighter squadrons at fully-equipped levels, thus
supporting our operational requirements. However, continued operations
in overseas contingencies has resulted in the Navy's F/A-18 Super
Hornet fleet flying at a higher operational tempo than planned, aging
the fleet faster than anticipated when the timeline for introduction of
the follow-on F-35 JSF was established. In addition, as the total force
Super Hornet numbers come down, operational tempo of individual units
will increase, further exasperating the shortfall in the strike fighter
community. While this will not directly affect my ability to operate on
a day-to-day basis, it will impact nondeployed squadrons will likely
reduce our surge capacity in the event of contingency operations.

NORTH KOREA

5. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, last month DOD publicly
announced the participation of two B-2 stealth bombers in a practice
bombing run over South Korea. While Secretary Hagel stated publicly
that the use of the B-2s was not intended to provoke North Korea, this
appears to be the first time B-2s have been used in this way on the
Korean peninsula. Why was the decision made to publicly disclose the
use of the nuclear-capable B-2 bomber at time when tensions with North
Korea are so high?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

6. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, was the use of the B-2 in a
practice bombing run requested by allies in the region, and did we
inform our allies that the B-2s would be used in this way?
Admiral Locklear. The B-2 training sortie was not requested by our
allies. However, the B-2 training sorties were routine in nature and
coordinated with the host nation and appropriate regional allies and
partners in a timely manner.

7. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, were our ambassadors in our
allied nations in the region given notice that the B-2s would be used
and publicly disclosed?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, the ambassadors in the region were notified
of the participation of B-2s in Exercise Foal Eagle. Their
participation was acknowledged in response to questions from the media
after the B-2s had achieved their training objectives.

8. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, was the decision to use the
B-2s in this manner coordinated with U.S. diplomatic efforts being led
by DOS?
Admiral Locklear. Yes. The Office of the Secretary of Defense led
the coordination between the DOS and the DOD.

9. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, how did our allies in the
region react to the use of the B-2s?
Admiral Locklear. The response from our allies was generally very
positive. These flights, along with our force posturing, reassured our
allies and demonstrated our commitment to the defense of the Republic
of Korea and Japan and to regional peace and stability. They also
demonstrated our commitment to the nuclear deterrence umbrella.

10. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, I am aware that North
Korea often acts aggressively when recognizing significant events, such
as commemorating the assent to power of past leaders. Does PACOM have
lessons-learned from past bellicosity of North Korean leaders during
events like we are currently experiencing and, if so, how is it
applying them?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, PACOM has lessons-learned from the past
bellicosity of North Korean leaders during events like the tensions we
are currently experiencing and is applying them. For example, prior
provocation cycles have informed the timelines we use to deploy
ballistic missile defense assets to the theater. We are currently
monitoring Kim Jong Un's actions to evaluate whether he will continue
the patterns of his father and grandfather or whether he will establish
his own approach to confrontations with the United States and Republic
of Korea.

11. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, you stated that our
missile defenses have the ability, ``to defend the Homeland, to defend
Hawaii, defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces, and defend
our allies.'' I'm concerned about U.S. forces and their dependents
living in South Korea and Japan. North Korea is reported to have more
than 1,000 missiles. Do we have adequate early warning capabilities and
missile defenses in the region to protect them?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

12. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, are there emergency action
plans in place to safeguard and evacuate U.S. dependents located in the
region?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

13. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Locklear, should we consider moving
dependents from the region now?
Admiral Locklear. No. PACOM continuously consults with the DOS,
U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan regarding force protection
posture. After weighing historical trends and current intelligence, I
do not assess that we should remove dependents from the region.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

CLIMATE CHANGE

14. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, following up on your response
regarding your analysis of the long-term threats facing your region,
you cite numbers from the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) on the impact of natural disasters on civilian populations,
most of whom will live within 200 miles of a coast and the impact of
climate change. Yes or no, do you believe climate change is the most
urgent long-term threat facing your command?
Admiral Locklear. No, not the most urgent.

15. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, can you characterize which
natural disasters you reviewed since 2008 were, in your opinion, the
result of climate change?
Admiral Locklear. PACOM does not analyze or categorize the root
cause of natural disasters. However, since 2008 humanitarian assistance
and disaster response (HADR) events have increasingly consumed PACOM
resources in terms of planning and operations.

16. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, is it your position that
humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations should be the
primary PACOM mission for long-term planning?
Admiral Locklear. The frequency and magnitude of extreme weather
events and natural disasters around the world will continue to be a
concern. Responding to these events is not a primary PACOM mission;
however, when directed, and in coordination with U.S. lead agencies,
PACOM has responsibility to support foreign government authorities when
they request military support through the U.S. Ambassador.
Additionally, PACOM plays an important role in assisting partner
nations to build their capacity to respond.
Natural disasters also have second and third order impacts on
security. These impacts include adversaries exploiting the instability
created by a natural disaster, and internal unrest caused by food
shortages and other domestic pressures. PACOM seeks to consistently
shape the Asia-Pacific Theater and foster regional security
cooperation. Therefore, we must continue to work closely with partner
nation militaries and governments, U.N. agencies, and international
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to prepare for and respond to
humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations.

17. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how much of the PACOM budget
is set aside for humanitarian assistance and disaster response
operations?
Admiral Locklear. Humanitarian Assistance funding for PACOM is
provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as part of
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Program.
OHDACA is 2-year funding and PACOM received $18.8 million in fiscal
year 2012/fiscal year 2013 and $6.0 million in fiscal year 2013/fiscal
year 2014.
Disaster-response funding is also provided by DSCA as needed for
Office of Secretary of the Defense-approved relief operations in the
PACOM AOR. PACOM received $10.0 million for disaster relief operations
in Thailand in fiscal year 2012 and $5.0 million for disaster response
operations in the Philippines in fiscal year 2013.

18. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, which U.S. agency do you
consider to be the lead for humanitarian assistance and disaster
response operations overseas?
Admiral Locklear. The USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (USAID/OFDA) is the lead agency for humanitarian and
disaster response operations overseas.

19. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, are you developing any plans
to address climate change? If so, can you describe those plans?
Admiral Locklear. PACOM does not have any plans that specifically
address climate change, but we do recognize the threats of extreme
weather events, natural disasters, erosion of littoral areas, and other
global effects associated with climate change as security challenges
within the region. PACOM plays an important role in assisting allies
and partners' capacity and capability to assess and address these
threats and respond to HADR events. Building relationships with allies
and partners through HADR capacity building efforts is an integral part
of PACOM Theater Strategy. Additionally, PACOM has and will continue to
work by, through, and with interagency (e.g., DOS and USAID)
international, and nongovernmental organization partners to improve
regional resiliency, stability and security in confronting climate
change challenges.

20. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, in your testimony you said ``
. . . it is important that the countries in this region build the
capabilities into their infrastructure to be able to deal with the
[natural disaster] types of things . . . '' Is it PACOM's primary
responsibility to ensure that partner nations build the proper
infrastructure to deal with climate change?
Admiral Locklear. No, it is not PACOM's primary responsibility to
ensure that partner nations build the proper infrastructure to deal
with climate change. However, in the interest of underpinning regional
stability, it is important for PACOM to engage in ways that build
partner capacity (BPC), promote resiliency and set the theater for
operations across the spectrum of military operations. Humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief is one area where broad consensus drives
increased cooperation. The second order effect of BPC, which is a
powerful yet inexpensive engagement tool, is increased access and
forward presence for U.S. forces. BPC across a variety of areas, from
terrorism to human trafficking, maritime security to disaster response,
is a key enabler of our forward military posture strategy in the
theater.

RESOURCES FOR ASIA REBALANCING

21. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, in recent press coverage of a
speech by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, reaffirmed that ``the U.S.
rebalance towards Asia is durable and will persist and grow regardless
of automatic, widespread budget cuts this fiscal year and lower overall
spending levels in future years.'' I know DOD is currently in the
process of undergoing a Strategic Choices and Management Review to
assess the impact of reduced budgets on the Defense Strategic Guidance
issued in January 2012. In your testimony, you expressed concern about
the impact of budget cuts on the Asia rebalancing. From your
perspective, what items contained in the budget request for fiscal year
2014 are critical for you to carry out the rebalancing?
Admiral Locklear. All of them are critical at some level. Over the
past decade, the United States has been focused on conflicts and
challenges in the U.S. Central Command AOR. As the United States begins
to transition out of Afghanistan, it is imperative that we follow
through with the President's commitment to re-engage in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific.
In order to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression, we must
have the capability and capacity to decisively defeat any opponent.
This requires the correct mix of systems to counter both large-scale
and high-end offensives. Additionally, we need to have the ability to
move personnel and equipment, and protect them, across vast stretches
of ocean.
All of the weapons systems, personnel, and transportation will mean
nothing if we cannot maintain a high standard of training. Readiness is
the glue that holds our forces together. An inadequately trained force
is a liability, not an asset.
To single out a specific item in the budget as critical to carrying
out the rebalance would be difficult as they are all linked together in
support of our strategy.

22. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what specific U.S. force
posture changes, other than increased exercises, removing I Corps, the
25th Infantry Division, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force from the
worldwide service rotation, elevating the Commander of U.S. Army
Pacific to a four-star position, relocating 8,000 marines to Guam and
Hawaii, and rotating marines through Australia and Littoral Combat
Ships through Singapore are part of your rebalance plan over the next 5
years?
Admiral Locklear. PACOM's force posture efforts over the next 5
years aim to address rapidly-evolving threats to forces in the theater
while encouraging partner nation contributions to their own defense and
pursuing assured access to rotational and small footprint locations for
engagement and crisis response.
We will continue to advocate for more investments in resiliency,
including protecting critical defense infrastructure in Hawaii and
forward operating locations. We will also seek to field new systems and
capabilities, such as the F-35 JSF, to maintain a credible regional
deterrence.
Additionally, we envision a significantly Increased Rotational
Presence (IRP) in the Philippines. Increased access to Philippine
ports, airfields, and training areas will be foundational to our
rebalance to Asia. We intend to accomplish this IRP by partnering with
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to determine host nation locations
which are currently capable of supporting U.S. forces or require
minimal infrastructure development.
Special Operations Command Pacific, in order to fill longstanding
and critical capability gaps, anticipates gaining additional theater-
assigned forces and continental U.S.-based rotational forces. These
additional forces may include fixed wing, CV-22 tilt-rotor, rotary-wing
aviation, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets, SEAL
Platoon and boat detachment, military information support teams, civil-
military support elements, and Marine Special Operations teams. Forces
will utilize intra-theater lift platforms to move to specific operating
locations to conduct activities.
We will also seek to increase amphibious lift capabilities and make
infrastructure improvements in Japan, Guam, and Australia (pending
access agreements) in support of the relocation of marines to Guam and
Hawaii. Providing these supporting lift capabilities and infrastructure
improvements is essential to ensure PACOM maximizes opportunities to
exercise, train, and operate with partner nation militaries, while
maintaining quality of life standards for our forward-deployed forces.

23. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, have you identified
requirements for fiscal year 2014 that are not currently included in
the budget request?
Admiral Locklear. No. The President's budget has supported efforts
to begin a rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Our immediate concern is
the potential for further cuts due to sequestration which could
negatively impact the rebalance. Continued sequestration, as well as
yearly continuing resolutions, imposes significant uncertainty on our
planning ability.

24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what is the impact of
sequestration and budget cuts on your plan to increase exercises in the
Pacific as part of the rebalance?
Admiral Locklear. The direct impact of sequestration on the PACOM
fiscal year 2013 Joint Exercise Program (JEP) is a decrement of $13
million (approximately 20 percent) to joint exercises conducted through
the remainder of fiscal year 2013. The realization of this fiscal
decrement will be taken from a combination of the Joint Exercise
Transportation Program used to provide Strategic Lift to components for
unit participation in exercises as well in the Service Incremental
Funds used to offset Service component costs for participation in Joint
Exercises. The attached table outlines current impacts to the JEP. Two
of three planned iterations of Commando Sling have been cancelled due
to Service component cost mitigation measures and reduced flying hours.
Northern Edge 13 was cancelled due to priorities of participating units
and flying hours. Talisman Saber 13 and Ssang Yong 13 were rescoped to
meet both JEP decrements as well as Service sequestration guidance.
Terminal Fury 13 was rescoped partially due to internal reorganization
and in part to sequestration cuts.
Our exercises are increasingly focused on strengthening our
alliances and partnerships, enhancing our presence, building regional
relationships, while simultaneously achieving the highest level of
readiness for our forces. Training underpins and strengthens PACOM's
military preeminence; it achieves and sustains force readiness,
develops capabilities and confidence, fosters cooperation, both within
PACOM forces and interoperability and capacity building with allies and
partner nations. Exercises demonstrate PACOM's clear sustained
commitment to a secure and peaceful Asia-Pacific region.
PACOM continues to adjust to the effects of sequestration on our
JEP. In support of PACOM priorities, preliminary adjustments have been
made to the JEP to enable us to execute our program in the AOR.
Projected participation reductions are not expected to significantly
impact the readiness of our forces or our obligations to our allies and
partners. Our long-term effort will be adjusted based on funding
availability and prioritized in accordance with readiness and rebalance
goals. As part of our strategy, we recently introduced two new JEP
exercises for fiscal year 2014: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting/ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief
Exercise, and Proliferation Security Initiative. These events are not
as large as some of our other exercises. However, their introduction
highlights our expanded approach to promoting cooperation and
understanding.
The strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has not changed, but
what is affected in the near term is the tempo. The levying of both the
sequestration and Continuing Resolution bills so late in the fiscal
year impacted the Services' ability to provide the assets and forces
necessary to fully leverage in the rebalance strategy. For example,
fiscal year 2013 exercise support, partnership activities, and
engagements are reduced due to Service component cost mitigation
measures. Limited flying hours, ship steaming days, and travel funding
have reduced some of our engagement activities.

25. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, you mentioned the lift
requirements necessary to move the marines around your theater in
testimony to Senator McCain and in what you have submitted within the
last 2 weeks to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Can you identify
which of these lift requirements are included in the budget request for
fiscal year 2014? Given the possibility of defense budget cuts, are you
concerned about having the strategic air and sealift to support the
annual deployments?
Admiral Locklear. Yes. The presidential budget for fiscal year 2014
requests $24 million to continue the lease of High Speed Vessel, MV
Westpac Express. Additionally, $3.5 million is requested for Joint High
Speed Vessel steaming days in support of the Marine Rotational Force-
Darwin. However, I am concerned that the net effect of sequestration
will negatively impact the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Specifically, given the
size of the PACOM AOR, the lift capabilities provided by the Air Force
and Navy, which are critical to our engagement with our allies and
partners, our presence and our ability to execute our plans must be
preserved.

26. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, when do you expect to have
submitted all of the necessary information to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for a master plan for the movement of marines from
Okinawa?
Admiral Locklear. DOD is conducting a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Study (SEIS) for the new Marine Corps main cantonment area and
live-fire training area complex on Guam. We anticipate the draft SEIS
being available in 2014, with a final record of decision in February
2015. This study will inform the master plan which we project will be
submitted to DOD in 2015.

AUSTRALIA

27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, in your written statement
regarding Marine Corps deployments to Australia, you noted that: ``We
are working together to increase the Marine Corps rotational presence
in Darwin to approximately 1,100. This increase will require
infrastructure improvements and we are currently in the process of
identifying the details of those requirements.'' What is the status of
progress on the agreement with the Australian Government?
Admiral Locklear. We expect the Australian Government decision on
approval of 1,100 USMC personnel sometime this summer. Once approved,
we will commence negotiations on required arrangements, including
infrastructure improvements, after we have secured Circular 175
authority through the DOS.

28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what is the total number of
marines planned for annual deployments to Australia?
Admiral Locklear. We currently have about 200 Marine Corps
personnel in Darwin from April to September 2013. We plan to increase
to 1,100 in 2014, contingent on Australian Government approval that we
expect this summer. Our overall goal is a fully-manned Marine Air
Ground Task Force of 2,500 personnel by 2017-2018 timeframe, contingent
on Australian Government approval.

29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, when will the details of the
infrastructure improvements required in Australia to support Marine
Corps deployments be available for congressional review?
Admiral Locklear. Upon completion of negotiations with the
Government of Australia projected to begin this summer, details of
infrastructure improvements required will be available for
congressional review.

30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, from your interactions with
counterparts and defense leaders of allies and partners in the region,
what is their perception of the rebalance and if budget cuts prevent
you from executing the strategy, what do we risk in terms of our
relationships with them?
Admiral Locklear. Asia is a complex region that exhibits a wide
range of opinions; nevertheless several themes have recurred during our
engagements in the region.
The rebalance has generally been welcomed by ASEAN countries.
Southeast Asian nations appreciate our enhanced regional focus and
generally understand our rationale for the rebalance. Additionally,
they are highly appreciative of increased U.S. support bilaterally and
to the ASEAN organizations (e.g. ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus;
ASEAN Regional Forum.)
Regional nations seek a more detailed understanding of what the
rebalance means for them and how the United States will execute it.
Some believe the rebalance has not been effectively communicated in
regard to its specific purpose, strategy, and details. Most see the
rebalance as focused on Northeast and Southeast Asia, and do not
appreciate the South Asia and Oceania dimensions. Some believe there
has been too much emphasis on the military dimension of the strategy.
We must work across the U.S. Government to better communicate the
rebalance strategy, particularly the nondefense aspects. This will help
counter China's narrative that the rebalance is a military effort to
contain their rise.
The rebalance is seen, at least partly, as a response to China's
rapid rise in regional affairs. This is generally regarded as
appropriate, though with significant reservations. Some leaders have
opined the rebalance is an effort to contain China and express concern
it could increase tension with China or place them uncomfortably in the
middle of the United States and China. Continued messaging is necessary
to emphasize that the rebalance is not containment, that we welcome
China's rise, and that the region can enjoy good relations with both
the United States and China simultaneously.
Countries are watching the U.S. budget process closely. ASEAN
nations will weigh their relationships carefully in light of China's
ascendance and questions regarding U.S. commitment. Allies and partners
desire reassurance that the rebalance is sustainable. They insist the
rebalance will be validated by actions, not narrative.

CHINA

31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how have your Chinese
counterparts reacted to the concept of rebalance?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, you have said we are going to
``pursue a lasting relationship'' with China. What are the primary
components of that pursuit and is this similar to the Russia reset?
Admiral Locklear. A ``lasting relationship with China'' is one in
which the security component of our bilateral relationship grows into
one that is healthy, stable, reliable, and mature enough to withstand
the friction generated by policy disagreements that exist between our
two countries. This relationship would exist in the context of our
existing alliances and partnerships--not at their expense--and be based
upon pragmatic cooperation in areas of shared interest, such as
disaster response, counter-piracy, countering proliferation,
peacekeeping, and military medicine. Our military relations with China
develop from different pressures, motives, and imperatives than our
relations with Russia. PACOM does not seek to ``reset'' relations with
China, but rather seeks to mature the security component of an already
robust, and largely cooperative, bilateral relationship. Therefore, I
would not characterize it as similar to the Russia reset.

33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, you have indicated we will
invite the Chinese to our Rim of the Pacific exercise. Are you also
going to invite the Taiwanese to participate? Why or why not?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what effects are China's
significant increases in defense spending, foreign military sales, and
soft power having in the PACOM region?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, if we don't deliver on the
rebalance due to budget constraints on the military, how much will that
erode our influence in the region?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, given the expected growth in
Chinese missile capabilities over the next 10 years, how do you
envision the evolution of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense in the Pacific?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

NORTH KOREA

37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, do you think our current
strategy of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions will stop Kim
Jong Un from acquiring nuclear weapons capability?
Admiral Locklear. No. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has
already demonstrated the ability to construct and detonate crude
nuclear devices. However, PACOM is confident that our defense posture,
military capabilities, deterrence, and counter-proliferation strategies
can protect the U.S. Homeland, forward-deployed U.S. forces, and our
regional allies and partners.

38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, we know that missile defense
is an important but expensive capability. What allies and partners are
helping us with regional missile defense efforts and what capabilities
are they developing?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

OPERATIONAL RESILIENCY

39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, you mention in your written
statement regarding Pacific military forces that ``the United States
requires a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
and politically sustainable posture that allows persistent presence
and, if needed, power projection.'' Can you explain the concept of
operational resiliency and your plans to improve it?
Admiral Locklear. Operational resiliency refers to a force posture
that has active and passive defenses as well as the offensive capacity
and capability to meet war-fighting requirements. A resilient posture
assures access for U.S. forces in a contested environment. In short, an
operationally resilient posture is the foundation of our ability to
respond rapidly and prevail in crisis.
With regards to missile defense, the concept of resiliency includes
dispersal, active missile defense capabilities, operational deception,
and, when appropriate, hardening. This concept is a key tenant to
safeguarding U.S. assets and critical defense infrastructure in the
PACOM theater. The resiliency efforts already underway or planned for
Guam (missile defense and hardening of critical infrastructure) remain
a top priority.
Additionally, PACOM continues investments in dispersal initiatives
to ensure we have a range of options for rapidly responding to crises
across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Areas where PACOM is looking to increase
our presence include Northeast Asia, Australia, the Philippines,
Southeast Asia, Micronesia, and the Marianas. In this way,
operationally resilient posture underpins our persistent presence and
power projection, essential tenets of the rebalance.

40. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, given the strategic
importance of the military resources stationed in your command,
including the aircraft carrier USS George Washington in Japan, what are
your priorities to improve operational resiliency? Are the Marine
Corps, Navy, and Army going to harden their facilities as well, in
other words, will this resiliency concept be applied across PACOM?
Admiral Locklear. Operational resiliency goes beyond the hardening
of critical defense infrastructure. It denotes a force posture that has
the flexibility and depth to respond to a broad spectrum of crises,
whether tsunamis, earthquakes, humanitarian crises, or major
contingency operations. To this end, we seek a diverse mix of
capabilities across the theater.
With regards to missile defense, the resiliency concept of
hardening, dispersal, active defense capabilities, and deception is a
key tenant to safeguarding U.S. assets and critical infrastructure
throughout the PACOM theater. The resiliency efforts already underway
or planned for Guam are a top priority.
As forward deployable forces, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Army have
different and unique resiliency requirements, of which hardening is
just one aspect. As the threat evolves we will continue to study and
apply the appropriate resiliency pillar for specific facilities and
services across PACOM.

41. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, given the recent provocations
of North Korea, have you identified significant risk or vulnerabilities
for our forces stationed in Korea and Japan? If so, can you describe
them and what measures you are undertaking to mitigate those risks?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

42. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, last year you wrote a
classified letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee advocating for
the funding of a hardened aircraft fuel cell maintenance hangar on Guam
and noting that ``to reduce the operational vulnerabilities of our
forces, we should selectively invest in force protection enhancement
now.'' In an era of declining defense spending, is the construction of
hardened facilities on Guam to protect certain assets during a
contingency your highest priority for the operational resiliency of
forces in your AOR? If not, what higher priorities do you have?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

43. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, do you support the hardening
of facilities on Guam to preserve a second strike capability and
increase the targeting complexity for adversaries?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, given the large numbers of
Chinese missiles projected in 2020, what makes you believe that you can
protect enough infrastructure to be able to launch a second strike?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

45. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, hardening approximately
doubles the cost of a facility--can we afford that cost in this budget
environment?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

ARTICLE 60 MODIFICATIONS

46. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, commanders in the military
are given great responsibility, literally over life and death.
Decisions they make send men and women into battle where they may die
or be severely wounded. This special trust and confidence is given to
no other position in our government. In line with this responsibility,
commanders are given the autonomy to discipline, train, and reward
their units so that they can establish a cohesive, mission-ready unit
capable of fighting and winning the Nation's wars. While we trust you
with our sons' and daughters' lives, the proposed modifications to
Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) seem to
suggest that we do not trust your discretion when it comes to UCMJ
offenses. Do you, as a commander, consider the UCMJ as it is currently
structured, to be a viable tool to help you maintain and enhance the
cohesiveness and fighting capabilities of your combat units?
Admiral Locklear. Yes.

47. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, have you seen any evidence
that commanders are abusing their discretion as the convening authority
to adjust sentencing?
Admiral Locklear. No.

48. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, the Secretary of Defense has
announced that he intends to recommend changes to the UCMJ. How would
the proposed changes to the UCMJ impact your effectiveness as a
commander?
Admiral Locklear. I support the Secretary Defense's recommended
changes to the UCMJ.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

MISSILE DEFENSE

49. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, from your perspective as the
Commander of PACOM, what is the requirement for effective missile
defense in your AOR?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

50. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what is the difference
between our current missile defense posture in PACOM and the missile
defense posture required to protect our interests in the region?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

51. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, is China developing a fifth
generation fighter?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

52. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how would these Chinese fifth
generation fighters match up against our current fourth generation
fighters?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

53. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, in order to maintain U.S. air
dominance, deter potential adversaries, and assure our allies, how
important is it that the United States finalizes development of the JSF
and begin to dramatically ramp up procurement of the F-35?
Admiral Locklear. In order to maintain air dominance, deter
potential adversaries, and assure our allies, it is extremely important
to procure the F-35. To this end, the President's fiscal year 2014
budget specifically requests $8.4 billion for the continued development
of the JSF.

VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINES

54. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what capabilities and what
strategic value does the Virginia-class submarine provide you as the
PACOM Commander?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

55. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, from your perspective, how is
the Virginia-class submarine performing?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

56. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what percentage of your
combatant commander requirements for attack submarines were met in
fiscal year 2012?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

57. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, as Los Angeles-class
submarines retire in the coming years and we fail to replace them
quickly enough with Virginia-class submarines, our number of attack
submarines will drop from 54 today to 43 in 2030. As a result, our
undersea strike volume will decline. In order to at least partially
address this decline in undersea strike volume, how important is it
that we go forward with the Virginia payload module?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

58. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, can you give an update on the
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command's (JPAC) operations?
Admiral Locklear. Thus far in fiscal year 2013, JPAC has identified
38 individuals: 4 from the Vietnam War, 27 from the Korean War, and 7
from World War II.
JPAC's plan to increase capacity and capability to fulfill the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2010 mandate continues to
progress in some areas, but is hindered in others. We expect Full
Operational Capability (FOC) of the JPAC Continental U.S. Annex (JCA)
at Offutt Air Force Base, NE, in June 2013. Physically, this annex will
significantly improve laboratory capacity to enable additional
identification capabilities. However, the current civilian hiring
freeze is preventing the proper scientific staffing of the JCA beyond
the one anthropologist who relocated from Headquarters, JPAC.
Construction of the JPAC Headquarters Building at Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam has experienced a delay, but is projected to be
construction-complete in spring 2014. However, the continued lack of
funding for the communications and computer infrastructure will delay
occupancy of the building to spring 2015. JPAC will be requesting
reprogramming of available excess MILCON funding to fund this facility
requirement.
Within the past year, additional challenges have manifested in
JPAC's ability to contract and pay for services in austere locations
which can negatively impact mission success. While a Joint Field
Activities (JFA) in Cambodia had to be deferred and others adjusted, a
country-by-country comprehensive review has ensured the proper fiscal
authorities and contracting mechanisms are in place for JPAC teams to
operate in these countries.

59. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how can Congress help support
JPAC's mission?
Admiral Locklear. The recently-introduced POW/MIA Accounting and
Recovery Support Act of 2013 (H.R. 1520), if passed, would help reduce
disruptions to JPAC field operations, if civilian furloughs were to go
into effect. It would allow JPAC's deployed civilian scientists a
temporary exemption from the requirement to take 1 furlough day off
each week. The bill would permit them to support the 4 to 6 week
mission, otherwise lacking an anthropologist to deploy, the recovery
missions would have to be cancelled. The deploying civilians would make
up the accumulated furlough days upon their return to JPAC
Headquarters.
JPAC would greatly benefit by having a dedicated, ``fenced''
funding line separate from PACOM. Currently JPAC's budget is embedded
with PACOM's budget which means that every time the combatant commands
(COCOM) are hit with a budget cut, JPAC assumes a large portion of the
PACOM share since they have the largest budget that is not in direct
support of our warfighting mission. With a ``fenced'' line item in the
budget, JPAC would better weather the budget challenges and
uncertainties we face, and in doing so build and sustain the capacity
and capabilities to meet Congress' mandate in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2010.

60. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, can you provide more detail
on the impact of sequestration and furloughs on the ability of JPAC to
perform its important mission?
Admiral Locklear. The extended Continuing Resolution Authority
(CRA) reduced JPAC's programmed budget by $21 million, thus lowering
JPAC's fiscal year 2013 planned Joint Field Activities (JFAs) from 30
to 19. Sequestration forced PACOM to levy an additional $15 million
mark against JPAC's already-diminished CRA budget line which further
reduced JPAC's operational capacity from 19 to 14 JFAs, 6 of which were
also reduced in scope. Total net loss to JPAC budget due to CRA and
sequestration is $36 million. Total net loss in operational capacity
was 16 JFAs. With the allocation of the fiscal year 2013
appropriations, JPAC hopes to buy back some cancelled JFAs (difficult
this late in the fiscal year) or enhance some of the remaining
scheduled JFAs.
CRA and sequestration also combined to result in a civilian hiring
freeze. fiscal year 2013 was JPAC's high watermark in the Fiscal Year
Defense Plan for programmed growth to increase capacity and capability
to meet the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 mandate. However, the hiring
freeze left JPAC unable to bring aboard 86 civilian hires, a large
percentage of which had already been selected for the new positions.
This impedes JPAC's requirement to add key anthropologists, historians,
and other key personnel to its ranks.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AND PROLIFERATION

61. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, as North Korea has developed
its nuclear weapons program, what are you and General Thurman hearing
from our allies in Japan and South Korea?
Admiral Locklear. North Korea's rhetoric, recent nuclear tests, and
missile launches have only strengthened our alliances with Japan and
South Korea. We continue to conduct annually scheduled combined joint
military exercises with South Korean Armed Forces and the Japanese Self
Defense Force. Kim Jong Un's continued threats and provocations
encourage more trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea,
particularly with regards to regional Ballistic Missile Defense.

62. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, do you believe North Korea's
nuclear program could encourage some of our allies to move closer to a
nuclear weapons capability?
Admiral Locklear. No. While elements in Japan and the Republic of
Korea periodically advocate for independent nuclear weapon programs,
both governments have a mature understanding of the diplomatic,
political, and economic costs of developing nuclear weapons.
Specifically, they recognize that the U.S. extended deterrence
commitment comes with the understanding that they will forego their own
nuclear weapons development and remain within the Nonproliferation
Treaty. As long as our allies see our extended deterrence commitment as
credible, PACOM is confident they will not pursue nuclear weapons.

63. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what role does a reliable and
credible U.S. nuclear triad play in not only deterring North Korean
aggression, but in also discouraging the proliferation of nuclear
weapons programs among our allies?
Admiral Locklear. A reliable and credible U.S. nuclear triad
assures a second strike capability and guarantees the capability for an
overwhelming response in retaliation to any employment of nuclear
weapons by North Korea. While Kim Jong Un may be young and bellicose,
PACOM assesses that he is a rational actor and can be deterred.
The existence of a reliable U.S. nuclear triad is essential to
maintaining the credibility of the United States' extended deterrence
commitments. Extended deterrence is a key consideration for our allies,
providing a credible defense without them having to develop their own
nuclear programs.

SEA LEG OF OUR NUCLEAR TRIAD

64. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how important is the sea leg
of our nuclear triad?
Admiral Locklear. The sea leg is the most survivable part of the
U.S. Nuclear Triad and is thus an essential component of our strategic
nuclear deterrence.

65. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what unique role do our Ohio-
class submarines play in our Nation's nuclear deterrent?
Admiral Locklear. The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
comprise the most survivable leg of the U.S. Nuclear Triad. Our ability
to have a reliable, survivable second strike capability is crucial to
our nuclear deterrence strategy because it interrupts the adversary
decision cycle by the positive knowledge that any initial strike, no
matter how massive, will result in an overwhelming second strike.

66. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, do you believe any additional
delay to the Ohio-class replacement program would undermine U.S.
national security and our Nation's nuclear deterrent?
Admiral Locklear. A delay in the Ohio-class replacement program
would complicate the Navy's ability to meet its nuclear deterrence
patrol and presence requirements.

COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF BOATS

67. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, given the number of nations
with whom you would like to engage, as well as the long distances
between them, how useful would long-range, high-speed, commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) boats be in helping you to bridge that gap?
Admiral Locklear. Current versions of COTS vessels do not
adequately meet our engagement needs to move equipment, supplies, and
personnel over the vast distances of the Indo-Asia-Pacific. These
vessels lack the following necessary capabilities: helicopter landing
deck capacity, onboard cranes, and adequate life support (berthing,
feeding, showers, etc.) for personnel who use the ship as
transportation or for in-port billeting. The military is currently
contracting the Joint High Speed Vessel that meets all of the above
requirements.

68. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, do you believe that the
export capability of COTS boats would help enhance partnership-building
and interoperability?
Admiral Locklear. Potentially. Depending on the specific
requirements of our allies and partners, exporting COTS boats could
enhance partnership and increase their capability to quickly transport
equipment.

69. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, there is a growing need for
low-cost, multi-role, and flexible platforms. What attributes of naval
platforms are most critical to you in your AOR, either individually or
as part of a broader force package?
Admiral Locklear. In the PACOM AOR, there is a need for a balanced
portfolio of platforms that can deal with both high- and low-intensity
conflicts, conduct humanitarian assistance and presence operations, as
well as provide a sufficient, credible force to deter aggression.
With the rapidly increasing cost of fossil fuel, fuel-efficient
ships that provide greater endurance and lower steaming costs are
critical given the vast distances necessary to transit in the PACOM
AOR.
Finally, ships must also possess a high degree of independent
operational and maintenance capability, thus allowing them to operate
forward for extended periods.

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions,
Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter, Blunt, Lee, and Cruz.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; Travis E. Smith, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Gabriella E. Fahrer,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member;
Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Anthony J.
Lazarski, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Mariah
K. McNamara, and John L. Principato.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey
Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Mara Boggs, assistant to
Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King; Paul C.
Hutton IV, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator
Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Peter
Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; Craig Abele,
assistant to Senator Graham; Joshua Hodges, assistant to
Senator Vitter; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt;
Robert Moore, assistant to Senator Lee; and Jeremy Hayes,
assistant to Senator Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today the
committee gives a warm welcome to Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel; General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; accompanied by the Department of Defense's (DOD)
Comptroller, Under Secretary Robert Hale, for our hearing on
the DOD's fiscal year 2014 budget request and the posture of
the U.S. Armed Forces.
We welcome Secretary Hagel on his first appearance as
Secretary of Defense before this committee. We thank all of our
witnesses for their service to our Nation and to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way. We can
never say that enough.
Your testimony today is a key component of the committee's
review of the fiscal year 2014 budget request for DOD. This
year's request includes $526.6 billion for the base budget and
$88.5 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO),
although as your testimony notes, the OCO number is simply a
placeholder figure pending final force level and deployment
decisions.
The future of the defense budget is in flux due to
Congress' failure to enact legislation reducing the deficit by
$1.2 trillion as required by the Budget Control Act (BCA). As a
result of that, the DOD funding for fiscal year 2013 was
reduced by sequestration in the amount of $41 billion, and
unless Congress acts, the fiscal year 2014 DOD budget will be
cut by an additional $52 billion below the funding level which
is in the President's budget for fiscal year 2014 and also in
the budgets passed by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
Congress can fix the budget problems by enacting
legislation that reduces the deficit by $1.2 trillion over 10
years. That would take a grand bargain, including both spending
cuts and additional revenues, that would turn off the automatic
spending cuts of sequestration for those 10 years. I remain
hopeful we can develop such a bipartisan plan. But absent a so-
called ``grand bargain'', surely we can devise a balanced
deficit reduction package for 1 year that avoids sequestration
in fiscal year 2014. We simply cannot continue to ignore the
effects of sequestration.
Sequestration will have a major impact on military
personnel. Though the pay of military personnel has been
exempted, the sequester will reduce military readiness and
needed services for our troops, including schools for military
children, family support programs, and transition assistance
programs and mental health and other counseling programs.
The President's budget request continues the measured
drawdown of Active Duty and Reserve end strength. We have, in
recent years, given DOD numerous force-shaping authorities to
allow it to reduce its end strength in a responsible way,
ensuring that the Services maintain the proper force mix and
avoiding grade and occupational disparities, all of which have
long-term effects. If sequestration continues, the result would
be more precipitous reductions, leaving us with a force
structure that is out of sync with the requirements of our
defense strategy.
Sequestration has already affected military readiness. We
have heard testimony that as a result of cuts to flying hours,
steaming hours, and other training activities, that readiness
will fall below acceptable levels for all three military
Services by the end of this summer. The Army, for example, has
informed us that by the end of September, only one-third of its
Active Duty units will have acceptable readiness ratings far
below the two-thirds level that the Army needs to achieve to
meet national security requirements. These cuts are having an
operational impact as well. For example, four of six fighter
squadrons in Europe have been grounded and the deployment of
the Truman carrier group to the Persian Gulf has been postponed
indefinitely. It will cost us billions of dollars and months of
effort to make up for these shortfalls in training and
maintenance, and it will be nearly impossible for us to do so
if we have a second round of sequestration in fiscal year 2014.
Our men and women in the military and their families should not
have to face both the pressure of military service and the
uncertainty about future financial support from their
Government.
DOD faces these budget shortfalls at a time when 68,000
U.S. troops remain in harm's way in Afghanistan. We must, above
all, ensure that our troops in Afghanistan have what they need
to carry out their mission. The campaign in Afghanistan is now
on track to reach a major milestone later this spring, when the
lead for security throughout Afghanistan will transition fully
to Afghan security forces. As our commander in Afghanistan told
us yesterday, there are clear signs that the Afghan security
forces are capable of taking the fight to the Taliban and are
doing so effectively. Operations by Afghan security forces are
increasingly conducted by Afghan units on their own, that is,
without international forces present. There are fewer Afghan
civilian casualties in recent months and fewer U.S. and
coalition casualties, including a 4-week stretch earlier this
year with no U.S. or coalition fatalities.
DOD's budget challenges, which are the subject of today's
hearing, are occurring in a world full of threats to U.S.
security, including North Korea's reckless rhetoric and
provocative behavior, and perhaps the greatest world threat,
Iran's nuclear program and its support for international
terrorism.
In the interest of time, I am going to submit the remainder
of my statement relative to those and other matters for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:)

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

Good morning. Today, the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel and General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by the Department's Comptroller, Under
Secretary Robert Hale, for our hearing on the Department of Defense's
(DOD) fiscal year 2014 budget request and the posture of the U.S. Armed
Forces.
This morning's hearing is Secretary Hagel's first appearance before
this committee as Secretary of Defense and we welcome you back. We
thank all of you for your service to the Nation and to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way. They and their
families deserve our utmost support and appreciation for their
willingness to serve our Nation.

BUDGET

Your testimony today is a key component of the committee's review
of the fiscal year 2014 budget request for DOD. This year's request
includes $526.6 billion for the base budget and $88.5 billion for
overseas contingency operations (OCO) although, as your testimony
notes, the OCO number is a placeholder figure pending final force level
and deployment decisions.
The Defense Department's fiscal year 2013 budget and the budget
request for fiscal year 2014 are both in flux due to Congress' failure
to enact legislation reducing the deficit by $1.2 trillion as required
by the Budget Control Act. As a result of this failure, DOD funding for
fiscal year 2013 was reduced by sequestration in the amount of $41
billion and, unless Congress acts, the fiscal year 2014 DOD budget will
be cut by an additional $52 billion below the funding level which is in
the President's budget and also in the budgets passed by the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
Congress can fix the budget problems by enacting legislation that
reduces the deficit by $1.2 trillion over 10 years. That would take a
``grand bargain''--including both spending cuts and additional
revenues--that would turn off the automatic spending cuts of
sequestration for those 10 years. I remain hopeful that we can develop
such a bipartisan plan. But absent a so-called grand bargain, surely we
can devise a balanced deficit reduction package for one year that
avoids sequestration in fiscal year 2014. We simply cannot continue to
ignore the effects of sequestration.
Personnel, both military and civilian, remain our top priority.
Sequestration will have a major impact on military personnel. Though
the pay of military personnel has been exempted, the sequester will
reduce needed services for our troops, including schools for military
children, family support programs, and transition assistance programs,
and possibly mental health and other counseling programs, all of which
are staffed significantly by civilian employees or contractors. The
Department has also informed us that htere is a risk that it will be
unable to pay its TRICARE bills before the end of the year, resulting
in a reduction in the avilability of medical services.
The President's budget request continues the measured drawdown of
active duty and Reserve end strength. We have in recent years given the
Department numerous force shaping authorities to allow it to reduce its
end strength in a responsible way, while ensuring that the Services
maintain the proper force mix, and avoid grade and occupational
disparities, which have long-term effects. I have been supportive of
the Department's efforts, but I remain concerned that continued
sequestration could require more precipitous reductions without
adequate planning, leaving us with a force structure that does not
match the requirements of our defense strategy.
The President's budget also contains numerous proposals affecting
the pay and benefits of our servicemembers, retirees, and their
families, including a 1 percent across-the-board pay raise for fiscal
year 2014, for both military and civilian personnel. While the budget's
pay raise is below the expected increase in the Employment Cost Index
of 1.8 percent, I support modest but equal pay raises for our military
and civilian personnel. The Department also proposes, as it has for a
number of years, to establish or raise certain fees relating to health
care coverage for military dependents and retirees. Congress has not
fully supported these proposals in past years, but given the impact of
sequestration and the continued pressure the personnel and health care
accounts are exerting on other areas of the budget, these proposals may
be considered in a different light this year.
For civilian personnel, the situation is even worse. As a result of
sequestration, the Department plans to furlough most of its 800,000
civilian employees for up to 14 days beginning in June--a pay cut of 20
percent for the rest of the year. As a number of our combatant
commanders have testified, the Department's civilian workforce is an
important component of the total force. DOD civilian employees play a
vital role in acquiring, sustaining, and repairing weapon systems,
providing logistics support to our troops in the field, providing
medical care for military members and their families, developing the
next generation technologies we need to keep our military edge in the
future, and maintaining the infrastructure of the Department of
Defense. I am concerned that if we continue to target our civilian
workforce for cuts, young people may no longer see public service as a
viable career--a devastating result.
Another place where sequestration will have a deep impact is on
military readiness. Sequestration will cut the Department's operation
and maintenance accounts by several billion dollars in fiscal year
2013, requiring deep reductions in spending for training and
maintenance. We have heard testimony that as a result of cuts to flying
hours, steaming hours, and other training activities, readiness will
fall below acceptable levels for all three military Services by the end
of this summer. These cuts are having an operational impact as well.
For example: four of six fighter squadrons in Europe have been
grounded, the deployment of the Truman carrier group to the Persian
Gulf has been postponed indefinitely, and we are unable to deploy ships
that would otherwise be expected to interdict 200 tons of cocaine per
year in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. It will cost
us billions of dollars and months of effort to make up for these
shortfalls in training and maintenance and it will be nearly impossible
for us to do so if we have a second round of sequestration in fiscal
year 2014.
I do not believe that Members of Congress have any interest in the
new round of base closures proposed as a part of this budget--but if we
are unable to address the sequestration problem, we may have no choice
but to reconsider. It is difficult to see how the Department could cut
another $500 billion from its budget over the next decade and still
retain the same infrastructure.

SECURITY CHALLENGES

The Department faces these budget shortfalls at a time when 68,000
U.S. troops remain in harm's way in Afghanistan, and the Department
must be prepared to address a myriad of other challenges on a moment's
notice. This is not, in my view, a time when we can afford to be
shortchanging the Department of Defense, or our men and women in
uniform.
First and foremost, we must ensure that our troops in Afghanistan
have what they need to carry out their mission. The campaign in
Afghanistan is now on track to reach a major milestone later this
spring, when the lead for security throughout Afghanistan will
transition fully to the Afghan security forces. There are clear signs
that the Afghan security forces are capable of taking the fight to the
Taliban, and are doing so effectively. Operations by Afghan security
forces are increasingly conducted unilaterally, that is, without
international forces present. This has translated into fewer Afghans
civilian casualties in 2012, and fewer U.S. and coalition casualties,
including a 4-week stretch earlier this year with no U.S. or coalition
fatalities.
Nonetheless, significant challenges remain in Afghanistan. Not
least is the continuing presence of safe havens for the Afghan Taliban
and associated extremist groups in Pakistan. Pakistan must do more to
disrupt and degrade these deadly sanctuaries. The Government of
Afghanistan needs to demonstrate its seriousness about improving
governance and fighting corruption. And our bilateral relations are
harmed by President Karzai's inflammatory remarks, which offend
Americans and weaken U.S. support for Afghanistan. I remain hopeful
that the campaign remains on the right track, but continued robust OCO
funding will be necessary to ensure that we don't undermine our
decades-long work as we transfer responsibility to the Afghans.
I've just outlined a daunting list of challenges for the
department. It is a sign of the times that this lengthy list does not
include major additional challenges: North Korea's continued
belligerence; Iran's nuclear program and its support of international
terrorism; or the ongoing bloodshed in Syria, about which we will hear
more later today. In the interests of time I will submit the remainder
of my statement for the record, but rest assured the committee remains
concerned about each of those issues and more.
Before I turn to Senator Inhofe, I should also mention that this
morning the committee released a report of our year-long review of
Department of Defense spending overseas. The review focused on spending
in Japan, South Korea and Germany, three critical allies. In order to
better sustain our presence in these countries, we need to understand
and manage our costs. Our review found construction projects lacking
congressional or Pentagon oversight and allied contributions failing to
keep up with rapidly rising U.S. costs. Every dollar spent on
unnecessary or unsustainable projects is a dollar unavailable to care
for our troops and their families, to maintain and modernize equipment,
and to pay for necessary investments in base infrastructure. Our
findings suggest that changes to how we manage spending are necessary
and that closer scrutiny is warranted to avoid future commitments that
may be inefficient or unaffordable.

NORTH KOREA

Over the last several months, the North Korean regime has elevated
its reckless rhetoric and provocative behavior. Earlier this month, the
North Korean regime announced its intention to re-start plutonium
production at Yongbyon. In February, it tested a nuclear device that
appears to have a yield greater than that shown in previous North
Korean tests. In December of last year, the regime put a satellite in
orbit using technologies associated with long-range ballistic missiles.
And last April, it displayed a road-mobile missile launcher, which may
or may not be operational.
A series of United Nations Security Council resolutions--joined by
China, despite its longstanding relationship with North Korea have
condemned the regime's dangerous behavior and imposed new sanctions,
including tighter financial restrictions and bans on luxury goods. A
few weeks ago, Secretary Hagel announced a plan to enhance our ground-
based interceptor capability in Alaska. And just last week, the
Department announced the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to Guam as a
precautionary measure. I support the measured steps taken by the
administration to date, but the situation in Korea remains volatile.

IRAN

Iran's continued pursuit of its nuclear program is one of the most
significant challenges confronting our Nation today. There is unanimous
agreement that our preferred outcome to this problem is a diplomatic
arrangement that welcomes Iran back into the global community. However,
I also believe most of the members of this committee share President
Obama's view that all options--including additional sanctions and
military options--need to remain on the table, and that preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon is our policy.
Further, Iran's ongoing expansion of its support to international
terrorism and its capability to promote violence and instability in
Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, Sudan, Iraq, and elsewhere is also a
source of great concern. It is critical that DOD map this network and
build the capacity of our partners to counter it. In the case of Syria,
Iran's support of President Assad's campaign to conquer his fellow
Syrians is considered by many, including General Mattis--the former
Commander of U.S. Central Command to be a key reason the Assad regime
continues to operate.

COUNTERTERRORISM

The declaration of allegiance of the al Nusrah Front in Syria to al
Qaeda's senior leadership recently was a keen reminder that despite the
successful operations against many of al Qaeda's senior leaders, the
United States must continue to pursue al Qaeda and its affiliates. Al
Qaeda's ability to mutate and identify emerging safe havens, such as
North Africa, and its ongoing activities in the Horn of Africa and
Yemen demonstrate its willingness to continue the fight. These threats
remain a source of great concern, and we must ensure that DOD can
continue to conduct operations that increase pressure on al Qaeda and
its affiliates.
Both former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and new Director of
Central Intelligence John Brennan have expressed support for a shift of
counterterrorism operations from title 50 authorities to title 10
authorities. I will be interested to hear the views of our witnesses on
this issue as well.

MISSILE DEFENSE

The decision announced by Secretary Hagel on March 15 to increase
the number of ground-based missile defense interceptors by nearly 50
percent in Alaska--after they have demonstrated success in realistic
flight testing--is a prudent step that has several benefits. It will
enhance future protection of the entire homeland to help stay ahead of
the evolving North Korean and Iranian missile threats. It will also
allow us to maintain our missile defense commitment to our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies while avoiding the cost of
the expensive and delayed Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach to
missile defense in Europe. And if an East Coast missile defense site
proves unnecessary in the future- as our U.S. Northern Command
Commander, General Jacoby, acknowledged may be the case the Secretary's
decision will allow us to enhance our Homeland missile defense against
future threats from North Korea and Iran while avoiding the multi-
billion dollar expense of developing and deploying such a site.
At our hearing on March 19, General Jacoby testified that all of
the United States, including the east coast, is currently defended from
missile threats from both North Korea and Iran. He also reiterated his
strong support for continuing our ``fly before you buy'' approach to
making sure our missile defense interceptors are realistically tested
and demonstrated to work as intended before being deployed. Admiral
Stavridis, our European Command and NATO Commander, told the committee
that Phases 1-3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense remain on track to protect all of NATO Europe, including force
protection of our forward deployed forces, against Iran's current and
emerging regional missiles by 2018, including interceptor sites in
Romania and Poland.
In addition to the steps announced on March 15, the Department has
since taken additional prudent steps to enhance our missile defense
capabilities in response to North Korea's bellicose threats to launch
missiles at the United States and our allies in the region. These
include deployment of a THAAD battery to Guam, deployment of additional
Aegis missile defense-capable destroyers in the waters off the Korean
Peninsula, and deployment of the Sea-Based X-band radar to the Pacific.
Last week, Admiral Locklear, our Pacific Commander, told the committee
that the United States is capable of shooting down any North Korean
missile, and can defend the areas threatened by North Korea, namely the
United States, Hawaii, Guam, South Korea, and Japan.

ASIA-PACIFIC

Recent events on the Korean Peninsula remind us that the relative
stability and prosperity that we have enjoyed in the Asia-Pacific
region must not be taken for granted. The rogue North Korean regime's
relentless pursuit of dangerous nuclear and missile capabilities and
its callous oppression of its own people demand the continued attention
of the international community, and the United States, our allies, and
partners must remain vigilant and steadfast in the face of North
Korea's continuous cycle of provocations and bluster.
Other challenges in the region, such as the emergence of new and
ambiguous military capabilities, the uncertainties surrounding
simmering territorial disputes, and the continuing threat of
transnational violent extremism, underscore the need for the United
States to stay actively engaged and present in this important part of
the world.

CYBERSECURITY

The cybersecurity threat continues to grow and diversify. It is
essential to sustain the recent momentum towards maturing Cyber Command
and the broad policy framework necessary to guide its operations. This
includes finalizing standing rules of engagement, operational doctrine,
emergency action procedures, command relationships, and plans to
establish the first genuine operational military cyber units with the
mission to actively defend DOD networks, to support the war plans of
the combatant commands, and to defend the Nation against a major attack
in cyberspace.
There is a proposal before the Secretary of Defense to elevate
Cyber Command from a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command
to a full-fledged unified command. The Senate and House Armed Services
Committees, through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013, expressed concern and raised questions about this proposal,
given the immaturity of the command and the cyber policy framework, as
well as concerns about sustaining the dual-hatting of the Commander of
Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency.
It bears emphasizing that even when Cyber Command stands up its
national cyber defense units, critical infrastructure is going to
remain vulnerable to cyber attack, requiring owners and operators to
work with the government pursuant to the President's recent Executive
order to improve defenses, increase resiliency and redundancy, and
share threat information.
With regard to China's unrelenting campaign to steal American
intellectual property, I believe the time has come to act to impose
costs on China for this serious threat to economic well-being and
national security. It is also time to consider measures to start
controlling the proliferation and trafficking of cyber tools that can
be used as weapons, just as we have done for all other dangerous
weapons.
Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, and Under Secretary Hale we look
forward to your testimony.
Senator Inhofe.

Chairman Levin. As each of us were notified, we will have a
separate hearing on the growing bloodshed in Syria after the
conclusion of this morning's session. We will take a half-hour
break and then we will return to hear from our witnesses about
the situation in Syria.
Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, Under Secretary Hale, we
look forward to your testimony. I now call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to join you in welcoming our guests and
especially my friend, former Senator Hagel. We worked together
for a long period of time, had some differences of opinion. We
will always remain good friends.
The request comes at a time when our military is facing
unprecedented challenges categorized by escalating threats
abroad and a growing budget crisis here at home. Unfortunately,
the budget before us today is symbolic for its lack of
presidential leadership necessary to overcome the unprecedented
challenges facing our military. Most troubling, the budget does
not even acknowledge the mandatory cuts associated with
sequestration in fiscal year 2014, much less propose a plan to
replace the cuts that can actually pass Congress.
This is not a new phenomenon. The defense budget cuts and
fiscal uncertainty have become a hallmark of this
administration. If you want to get into a lot more detail, I
have an op-ed piece in this morning's The Hill that gets into a
lot more detail.
Since entering office over 4 years ago, the President has
already cut over $600 billion from our military at a time--and
this is significant--non-security-related domestic spending has
increased by nearly 30 percent.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently
testified that after absorbing over $400 billion in cuts, the
military cannot afford to give another dollar if they are to
maintain current capabilities.
Our military leaders are warning that we are on the brink
of creating a hollow force, unprepared to respond to
contingencies around the world. Yet, according to the fiscal
year 2014 budget request, the White House now feels that we can
slice another $120 billion out of DOD.
We are at the point in our Nation's history where our
National Military Strategy is no longer guided by the threats
we face or an honest assessment of the resources needed to
protect our critical interests. Instead, the discussion in
Washington has centered around how deeply we can cut defense.
Our forces are now being asked to do more with less training,
less equipment, less capability; no one's assessing the
increased risk on the battlefield and increased risk of our
service men and women ultimately making the sacrifice. This is
unacceptable and the fiscal year 2014 budget does little to
reverse this.
I think that Chairman Levin said it very well in talking
about the dilemma that we are facing in our Services, the
flying hours, the steaming hours. At a time our intelligence
experts tell us that we face the most diverse, complex, and
damaging threats to our national security in recent history, we
are poised to slash defense budgets by over $1 trillion over
that period of time.
We have made this mistake before in the military drawdowns
in the 1970s and 1990s which left this country with a military
too small to meet the instability and the rising threats of a
changing world. We need to stop this stupid argument that
runaway defense spending is what is driving our country's
unsustainable debt. It is disingenuous and, more important, it
is just wrong.
Defense spending accounts for approximately 18 percent of
Federal spending annually while non-security mandatory spending
accounts for 60 percent. We are on a path where an insatiable
appetite to protect domestic spending and mandatory programs is
consuming our defense budget and will soon result in a hollow
military.
The Commander in Chief must take a lead in restoring
certainty to our budgeting process and ensure that our military
leaders have appropriate resources to develop and execute plans
and manage DOD efficiently. I have repeated the warnings of
Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
many times over the last 3 months, and this quote is an
accurate quote which he has reaffirmed. ``I know of no other
time in history when we have come potentially down this far,
this fast in the defense budget. There could be, for the first
time in my career, instances where we may be asked to respond
to a crisis and we will have to say we cannot do it.''
We have to correct this, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Hagel, welcome.
Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to Ranking
Member Inhofe and to all members of the committee, thank you
for an opportunity to appear before you this morning.
Chairman Levin. I am going to interrupt you before you get
started because we have a quorum. That means that we can now
consider a list of pending military nominations. I know you
would want us to do that.
So I will now ask our committee to consider 549 pending
military nominations. Included in the list is the nomination of
General Breedlove to be Commander, U.S. European Command and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Now, of these nominations,
311 are 1 day short of the committee's requirement that
nominations be in the committee for 7 days before we report
them out. No objection has been raised to these nominations. I
recommend that we waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the
confirmation of the nominations of these 311 officers, as well
as the others.
Is there a motion to report?
Voice. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Inhofe. I second the motion.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay? [No response.]
The ayes carry.
Thank you very much.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 17, 2013.
1. LTG John W. Hesterman III, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Central Command, Air Combat Command
(Reference No. 54).
2. Col. Richard M. Murphy, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 56).
3. In the Marine Corps, there are 98 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Christopher C. Abrams) (Reference No. 112).
4. Col. Dorothy A. Hogg, USAF, to be major general (Reference No.
139).
5. MG James M. Holmes, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Vice
Commander, Air Education and Training Command (Reference No. 140).
6. MG Michelle D. Johnson, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy (Reference No. 180).
7. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are 57 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Timothy L. Adams) (Reference No.
187).
8. LTG Susan J. Helms, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Vice
Commander, Air Force Space Command (Reference No. 207).
9. Col. Erik C. Peterson, USA, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 209).
10. Col. Brently F. White, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 210).
11. Col. Christie L. Nixon, USAR, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 211).
12. In the Army, there are 24 appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Jeffrey L. Bannister) (Reference No. 212).
13. LTG John E. Wissler, USMC, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine
Forces Japan (Reference No. 214).
14. MG Ronald L. Bailey, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps (Reference No. 215).
15. LTG Steven A. Hummer, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command (Reference No. 216).
16. LTG Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr., USMC, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration; Commanding
General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Commander, U.S.
Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command; Commanding General, Marine Corps
National Capital Region Command; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Cyber Command (Reference No. 217).
17. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jonathan F. Potter) (Reference No. 220).
18. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Hilario A. Pascua) (Reference No. 221).
19. In the Army Reserve there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with James D. Peake) (Reference No. 222).
20. In the Army, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel
and below (list begins with John D. Pitcher) (Reference No. 223).
21. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Mark L. Allison) (Reference No. 224).
22. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Phillip E. Appleton) (Reference No. 225).
23. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(Joseph R. Primeaux, Jr.) (Reference No. 229).
24. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Gary S. Phillips) (Reference No. 232).
25. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Genevieve Buenaflor) (Reference No. 233).
26. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Freddie R. Harmon) (Reference No. 234).
27. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Catherine W. Boehme) (Reference No. 235).
28. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Todd W. Mills) (Reference No.
236).
29. Capt. Bret J. Muilenburg, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 249).
30. Capt. Adrian J. Jansen, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 254).
31. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, to be general and Commander,
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Reference
No. 263).
32. MG Mark O. Schissler, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chairman, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee
(Reference No. 267).
33. MG Robert P. Otto, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,
Headquarters, Air Force (Reference No. 268).
34. BG Scott W. Jansson, USAF, to be major general (Reference No.
269).
35. LTG Daniel B. Allyn, USA, to be general and Commanding General,
U.S. Army Forces Command (Reference No. 270).
36. LTG James L. Terry, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Central Command/Third U.S. Army
(Reference No. 271).
37. MG Perry L. Wiggins, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army North/Fifth U.S. Army (Reference No.
272).
38. LTG Richard P. Mills, USMC, to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve and Commander, Marine Forces North
(Reference No. 276).
39. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Lou Rose Malamug) (Reference No. 279).
40. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Kelly A. Halligan) (Reference No. 280).
41. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Andrew W. Beach) (Reference No. 281).
42. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Donald V. Wood) (Reference No. 282).
43. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Richard J. Witt) (Reference No. 285).
44. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Christopher E. Curtis) (Reference No. 300).
45. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Timothy A. Butler) (Reference No. 301).
46. In the Air Force, there are nine appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with John T. Grivakis) (Reference No.
302).
47. In the Air Force, there are 11 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Danny L. Blake) (Reference No. 303).
48. In the Air Force, there are 14 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Richard G. Anderson) (Reference
No. 304).
49. In the Air Force, there are 17 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jeffrey R. Alder) (Reference No. 305).
50. In the Air Force, there are 20 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Ronnelle Armstrong) (Reference No. 306).
51. In the Air Force, there are 51 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Maiya D. Anderson) (Reference No.
307).
52. In the Air Force, there are 126 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Matthew G. Adkins) (Reference No. 308).
53. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel
(Suzanne C. Nielsen) (Reference No. 310).
54. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Ann M. Rudick) (Reference No. 311).
55. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Matthew P. Weberg) (Reference No. 312).
56. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Grady L. Gentry) (Reference No. 313).
57. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Oleh Haluszka) (Reference No. 316).
58. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Stephen S. Cho) (Reference No.
317).
59. In the Navy, there are 48 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Timothy R. Anderson) (Reference
No. 318).
Total: 549.

Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Hagel. Is the hearing over?
Chairman Levin. It is. [Laughter.]
At least for the 549 nominees, it is over. [Laughter.]
Secretary Hagel. It is a damn efficient committee.
[Laughter.]
Thank you. I know General Dempsey and all of us are very
pleased with that action, as will be other members of our team.
So we appreciate your deliberation and your action.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin my formal presentation, which
you have noted, I have a longer version that has been
distributed, I believe, last night to the committee and
committee members on the fiscal year 2014 budget.
Let me say on behalf of the men and women that represent
our Armed Forces both in uniform and civilians that our prayers
and hearts go out to the people in Boston, the families who
lost loved ones, those who were injured, wounded by this
despicable act. We are very proud of how our leaders and those
responsible for assisting and dealing with the tragedy in
Boston, how they have responded. We are particularly proud of
our National Guard who are still working with local officials.
I wanted to put that on the record, Mr. Chairman, and make that
of considerable note. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. We thank you very much for that. Our
sympathies were reflected yesterday at a hearing that we had
here, and we surely join you in your sentiments.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT HALE, COMPTROLLER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
Allow me first to express my appreciation and that of DOD
to this committee and each of its members for its continued
support of our men and women in uniform and our civilian
workforce. They are doing tremendous work, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Inhofe, as you have both noted, and they are making
great sacrifices, along with their families, as they have for
more than 11 years of our Nation being at war. Their dedication
and professionalism are the foundation of our military
strength. As we discuss numbers, budgets, and strategic
priorities this morning, we will not lose sight of those men
and women serving across the globe. As you all know, their
well-being depends on the decisions we make here in Washington.
Today, DOD faces the significant challenge of conducting
long-term planning and budgeting at a time of considerable
uncertainty, both in terms of the security challenges we face
around the globe and the levels of defense spending we can
expect here at home.
Even as the military emerges and recovers from more than a
decade of sustained conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, it
confronts an array of complex threats of varying vintage and
degree of risk to the United States, to include: the
persistence of violent extremism throughout weak states and
ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and North Africa; the
proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials; the rise of
new powers competing for influence; the risk of regional
conflicts which could draw in the United States; faceless,
nameless, silent, and destructive cyber attacks; the
debilitating dangerous curse of human despair and poverty; and
the uncertain implications of environmental degradation.
Meanwhile, the frenetic pace of technological change and
the spread of advanced military technology to state and non-
state actors pose an increasing challenge to America's
military.
This is the strategic environment facing DOD as it enters a
third year of flat or declining budgets. The onset of these
resource constraints has already led to significant and ongoing
belt-tightening in military modernization, force structure,
personnel costs, and overhead expenditures. You have noted some
of those, Mr. Chairman. It has also given us an opportunity to
reshape the military and reform defense institutions to better
reflect 21st century realities, flexibility, and agility.
The process began under the leadership of Secretary Gates
who canceled or curtailed more than 30 modernization programs
and trimmed overhead costs within the military Services and
across the defense enterprise.
The realignment continued under Secretary Panetta who
worked closely with the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to craft new defense strategic guidance and a fiscal year 2013
defense budget plan which reduced DOD's top line by $487
billion over the course of a decade.
The President's request of $526.6 billion for DOD's base
budget for fiscal year 2014 continues to implement the
President's defense strategic guidance and enhances DOD's
efforts at institutional reform. Most critically, it sustains
the quality of the All-Volunteer Force and the care we provide
our servicemembers and their families, which underpins
everything we do as an organization.
Before discussing the particulars of this budget request,
however, allow me to address the profound budget problems
facing DOD in fiscal year 2013 and beyond as a result of
sequester. Congress and DOD have a responsibility to find
answers to these problems together because we have a shared
responsibility. We have a shared responsibility to protect our
national security. DOD is going to need the help of this
committee. We are going to need the help of Congress to manage
through this uncertainty.
The fiscal year 2013 DOD appropriations bill enacted by
Congress last month addressed many urgent problems by
allocating DOD funding more closely in line with the
President's budget request, giving DOD authorities to start new
programs and allowing us to proceed with important military
construction (MILCON) projects. Nonetheless, the bill still
left in place the deep and abrupt cuts associated with
sequester, as much as $41 billion in spending reductions over
the next 6 months. Military pay and benefits are exempt, as you
have noted, Mr. Chairman, they are exempt from the sequester.
We made a decision to shift the impact of sequester from those
serving in harm's way.
Furthermore, the military is experiencing higher operating
tempos and higher transportation costs than expected when the
budget request was formulated more than a year ago. As a result
of all these factors, DOD is now facing a shortfall in our
operation and maintenance accounts for fiscal year 2013 of at
least $22 billion in our base budget for Active Forces.
In response, DOD has reduced official travel, cut back
sharply on facilities maintenance, imposed hiring freezes, and
halted many other important but lower priority activities.
However, we will have to do more. We will have to do much more.
We will soon send to Congress a large reprogramming request
designed to offset some of our shortfalls, especially
shortfalls in wartime funding, and we ask your help with its
speedy review and approval. This reprogramming will be limited
by ceilings on transfer authority and so can only solve some of
our problem.
We will have to continue to consider furloughing civilian
personnel in the months ahead. There will also be significant
cuts in maintenance and training, which further erodes the
readiness of the force and will be costly to regain in the
future. As the Service Chiefs have said, we are consuming our
readiness. Meanwhile, our investment accounts and the defense
industrial base are not spared damage as we also take
indiscriminate cuts across these areas of the budget. We will
continue to need the strong partnership of this committee to
help us address these shortfalls.
If the sequester-related provisions of the BCA of 2011 are
not changed, fiscal year 2014 funding for national defense
programs will be subject to a steeply reduced cap, which would
further cut DOD funding by roughly $52 billion. If there is no
action by Congress and the President, roughly $500 billion in
reductions to defense spending would be required over the next
9 years.
As an alternative, the President's budget proposes some
$150 billion in additional defense savings over the next
decade. These cuts are part of a balanced package of deficit
reduction. Unlike sequester, these cuts are largely back-
loaded, occurring mainly in the years beyond fiscal year 2018.
That gives DOD time to implement these reductions wisely,
carefully, responsibly, and anchored by the President's defense
strategic guidance.
Now, let me turn to the details of the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2014.
The $526.6 billion fiscal year 2014 budget request
continues to balance the compelling demands of supporting our
troops still at war in Afghanistan, protecting readiness,
modernizing the military's aging weapons inventory in keeping
with the President's strategic guidance, and sustaining the
quality of the All-Volunteer Force.
Today's budget request also contains a placeholder request,
which you have noted, Mr. Chairman, for OCO at the fiscal year
2013 level, $88.5 billion. The submission does not include a
formal OCO request because Afghanistan force level and
deployment decisions for this year were delayed in order to
provide commanders enough time to fully assess responsibilities
and requirements. We will soon be submitting an OCO budget
amendment with a revised spending level and account-level
detail.
The base budget being presented today continues DOD's
approach of the last several years to first target growing
costs in the areas of support, acquisition, and pay and
benefits before cutting military capabilities and force
structure. This budget identifies new savings of about $34
billion in fiscal year 2014 through 2018, including $5.5
billion in fiscal year 2014 from these areas.
In order to maintain balance and readiness, DOD must be
able to eliminate excess infrastructure as it reduces force
structure. DOD has been shedding infrastructure in Europe. We
have been shedding infrastructure in Europe for several years
and consolidating that infrastructure and are undertaking a
review of our European footprint this year. But we also need to
look at our domestic footprint. Therefore, the President's
fiscal year 2014 budget request authorizes one round of base
realignment and closure (BRAC) in 2015.
BRAC is a comprehensive and fair tool that allows
communities to have a role in the reuse decisions for their
property and provides development assistance. BRAC, as we all
know, is imperfect and there are upfront costs for BRAC. The
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adds $2.4 billion to pay
for those costs, but in the long term there are significant
savings. The previous five rounds of BRAC are saving $12
billion annually, and those savings will continue.
DOD continues to streamline its acquisition programs and
processes and, over the past 4 years, we have realized
significant cost savings as a result of reforms implemented by
the Weapons System and Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,
sponsored by Chairman Levin and Senator McCain. In this budget,
DOD has also achieved $8.2 billion in savings from weapons
program terminations and restructuring.
For example, by revising the acquisition strategy for the
Army's ground combat vehicle, DOD will save over $2 billion in
development costs. In other cases, DOD used evolutionary
approaches to develop new capabilities instead of relying on
leap-ahead gains in technology.
The cost of military pay and benefits are another
significant driver of spending growth that must be addressed in
the current fiscal environment. In this budget, DOD is
substituting a new package of military compensation proposals
that take into consideration congressional concerns associated
with those from fiscal year 2013. These changes save about $1.4
billion in fiscal year 2014 and a total of $12.8 billion in
fiscal years 2014 through 2018.
This package includes a modest slowing of the growth of
military pay by implementing a 1 percent pay raise for
servicemembers in 2014. DOD is also seeking additional changes
to the TRICARE program in the fiscal year 2014 budget to bring
the beneficiaries' costs closer to levels envisioned when the
program was implemented, particularly for working-age retirees.
Survivors of military members who died on Active Duty or
medically retired members would be excluded from all TRICARE
increases. Even after the proposed changes in fees, TRICARE
will still remain a very substantial benefit.
These adjustments to pay and benefits were among the most
carefully considered and most difficult choices in the budget.
They were made with strong support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the senior enlisted leadership in recognition that in order
to sustain these benefits over the long term, without
dramatically reducing the size or readiness of the force, these
rising costs will need to be brought under control.
Nevertheless, spending reductions on the scale of the
current drawdown cannot be implemented through improving
efficiency and reducing overhead alone. Cuts and changes to
capabilities, force structure, and modernization programs will
all be required. The strategic guidance issued in January 2012
set the priorities and the parameters and informed those
choices, and the fiscal year 2014 budget submission further
implements and deepens program alignment to this strategic
guidance.
The new strategy calls for a smaller, leaner, more agile,
more flexible force. Last year, we proposed reductions of about
100,000 in military end strength between 2012 and 2017. Most of
those reductions occur in the ground forces and are consistent
with the decision not to size U.S. ground forces to accomplish
prolonged stability operations, while maintaining adequate
capability should such activities again be required. By the end
of 2014, we will have completed almost two-thirds of the
drawdown of our ground forces, and the drawdown should be fully
complete by fiscal year 2017.
Increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East
represents another key tenet of the new defense strategic
guidance. This budget continues to put a premium on rapidly
deployable, self-sustaining forces such as submarines, long-
range bombers, and carrier strike groups. They all can project
force over great distance and carry out a variety of
complicated missions.
This new strategy leverages new concepts of operation
enabled by advances in space, cyberspace, special operations,
global mobility, precision-strike, missile defense, and other
capabilities. By making difficult tradeoffs in lower priority
areas, the fiscal year 2014 budget protects or increases key
investments in these critical capabilities.
Another area of focus in this budget request is sustaining
the readiness and quality of the All-Volunteer Force. The high
quality of our All-Volunteer Force continues to be the
foundation of our military strength. The fiscal year 2014
budget request includes $137.1 billion for military personnel,
as well as $49.4 billion for military medical care. Together,
these make up roughly one-third of our base budget. This budget
seeks to ensure that our troops receive the training and the
equipment they need for military readiness and the world-class
support programs they and their families have earned and
deserve.
DOD continues to support key provisions and programs in
fiscal year 2014 that support servicemembers and their
families, spending $8.5 billion on initiatives that include
transition assistance and veterans employment assurance,
behavioral health, family readiness, suicide prevention, and
sexual assault prevention and response. The fiscal year 2014
budget is a reflection of DOD's best efforts to match ends,
ways, and means during a period of intense fiscal uncertainty.
It is obvious that significant changes, Mr. Chairman, to
DOD's top-line spending would require changes to this budget
plan. DOD must plan for any additional reductions to the
defense budget that might result in Congress and the
administration agreeing on a deficit reduction plan. It must be
prepared in the event that sequester-level cuts persist for
another year or over the long term.
Consequently, I directed a Strategic Choices and Management
Review in order to assess the potential impact of further
reductions up to the level of full sequester. The purpose of
this review is to reassess the basic assumptions that drive
DOD's investment and force structure decisions.
The review will identify strategic choices and further
institutional reforms that may be required, including those
reforms which should be pursued regardless of fiscal pressures.
It is designed to help understand the challenges, articulate
the risks, and look for opportunities for reform and
efficiencies presented by resource constraints. Everything will
be on the table during this review: roles and missions,
planning, business practices, force structure, personnel,
compensation, acquisition and modernization investments, how we
operate, and how we measure and maintain readiness.
This review is being conducted by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Carter working with General Dempsey. The Service
Secretaries, Service Chiefs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
principals, and combatant commanders will serve as essential
participants. Our aim is to include this review which is now
underway by May 31. The results will inform our fiscal year
2015 budget request and will be the foundation for the
Quadrennial Defense Review due in Congress in February of next
year.
It is already clear to me, Mr. Chairman, that achieving
significant additional budget savings without unacceptable risk
to national security will require not just tweaking or chipping
away at existing structures and practices but, if necessary,
fashioning entirely new ones that better reflect 21st century
realities. That will require the partnership of Congress.
The fiscal year 2014 budget and the ones before it have
made hard choices. In many cases, modest reforms to personnel
and benefits, along with efforts to reduce infrastructure and
restructure acquisition programs, met fierce political
resistance and were not implemented.
We are now in a completely different fiscal environment
dealing with new realities that will force us to more fully
confront these tough and painful choices and to make the
reforms we need to put DOD on a path to sustain or maintain our
military strength for the 21st century. But in order to do
that, we will need flexibility, time, and some budget
certainty.
We will also need to fund the military capabilities that
are necessary for the complex security threats of the 21st
century. I believe the President's budget does that. With the
partnership of Congress, DOD can continue to find new ways to
operate more affordably, efficiently, and effectively. However,
multiple reviews and analyses show that additional major cuts,
especially those on the scale and timelines of sequestration,
would require dramatic reductions in core military capabilities
or the scope of our activities around the world.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my formal remarks. As I said,
I have a more detailed report that I have submitted for the
record. I appreciate the time of the committee and look forward
to your questions.
Now I know you would like to hear from Chairman Dempsey.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Charles T. Hagel
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year 2014 budget
request for the Department of Defense (DOD).
Allow me to express my appreciation to this committee for its
continued support of our men and women in uniform and our civilian
workforce. They are doing tremendous work and making great sacrifices,
along with their families, as they have for the more than 11 years our
Nation has been at war. Whether fighting in Afghanistan, patrolling the
world's sea lanes, standing vigilant on the Korean Peninsula, supplying
our troops around the world, or supporting civil authorities when
natural disasters strike, they are advancing America's interests at
home and abroad. Their dedication and professionalism are the
foundation of our military strength.
As we discuss numbers, budgets, and strategic priorities, we will
not lose sight of these men and women serving across the globe. As you
all know, their well-being depends on the decisions we make here in
Washington.
fiscal and strategic context
Today, DOD faces the significant challenge of conducting long-term
planning and budgeting at a time of considerable uncertainty--both in
terms of the security challenges we face around the world and the
levels of defense spending we can expect here at home.
Even as the military emerges--and recovers--from more than a decade
of sustained conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, it confronts an array of
complex threats of varying vintage and degrees of risk to the United
States, to include:

the persistence of violent extremism throughout weak
states and ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and North
Africa;
the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials;
the rise of new powers competing for influence;
the risk of regional conflicts which could draw in the
United States;
faceless, nameless, silent and destructive
cyberattacks;
the debilitating and dangerous curse of human despair
and poverty, as well as the uncertain implications of
environmental degradation.

Meanwhile, the frenetic pace of technological change and the spread
of advanced military technology to state and non-state actors pose an
increasing challenge to America's military.
This is the strategic environment facing DOD as it enters a third
year of flat or declining budgets. The onset of these resource
constraints has already led to significant and ongoing belt-tightening
in military modernization, force structure, personnel costs, and
overhead expenditures. It has also given us an opportunity to reshape
the military and reform defense institutions to better reflect 21st
century realities.
The process began under the leadership of Secretary Gates, who
canceled or curtailed more than 30 modernization programs and trimmed
overhead costs within the military services and across the defense
enterprise. These efforts reduced the Department's topline by $78
billion over a 5-year period, as detailed in the Department's fiscal
year 2012 budget plan.
The realignment continued under Secretary Panetta, who worked
closely with the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to craft new
defense strategic guidance and a fiscal year 2013 defense budget plan
which reduced the Department's topline by $487 billion over the course
of a decade. Even while restructuring the force to become smaller and
leaner and once again targeting overhead savings, this budget made
important investments in the new strategy--including rebalancing to
Asia and increasing funding for critical capabilities such as cyber,
special operations, global mobility, and unmanned systems.
The President's request of $526.6 billion for DOD's base budget for
fiscal year 2014 continues to implement the President's defense
strategic guidance and enhances the Department's efforts at
institutional reform. Most critically, it sustains the quality of the
All-Volunteer Force and the care we provide our servicemembers and
their families, which underpins everything we do as an organization.

CHALLENGES IN FISCAL YEAR 2013

Before discussing the particulars of this budget request, however,
allow me to address the profound budget problems facing the Department
in fiscal year 2013 and beyond as a result of sequester--because they
have significantly disrupted operations for the current fiscal year and
greatly complicated efforts to plan for the future. Congress and DOD
have a responsibility to find answers to these problems together--
because we have a shared responsibility to protect our national
security. DOD is going to need the help of Congress to manage through
this uncertainty.
The fiscal year 2013 DOD Appropriations bill enacted by Congress
last month addressed many urgent problems by allocating DOD funding
more closely in line with the President's budget request than a
continuing resolution would have, giving the Department authorities to
start new programs, and allowing us to proceed with important military
construction projects. Nonetheless, the bill still left in place the
deep and abrupt cuts associated with sequester--as much as $41 billion
in spending reductions over the next 6 months. With military pay and
benefits exempt from the sequester, and our internal decision to shift
the impact of sequestration away from those serving in harm's way and
spread them to the rest of the force where possible, the cuts fall
heavily on DOD's operations, maintenance, and modernization accounts
that we use to train and equip those who will deploy in the future.
Furthermore, the military is experiencing higher operating tempos
and higher transportation costs than expected when the budget request
was formulated more than a year ago. As a result of all these factors,
the Department is now facing a shortfall in our operation and
maintenance (O&M) accounts for fiscal year 2013 of at least $22 billion
in our base budget for Active Forces.
In response, the Department has reduced official travel, cut back
sharply on facilities maintenance, imposed hiring freezes, and halted
many other important but lower-priority activities. However, we will
have to do more. We will soon send to Congress a large reprogramming
request designed to offset some of our shortfalls, especially
shortfalls in wartime funding, and we ask your help with its speedy
review and approval. This reprogramming will be limited by ceilings on
transfer authority and so can only solve part of our problem.
We will have to continue to consider furloughing civilian personnel
in the months ahead. There will also be significant cuts in maintenance
and training, which further erodes the readiness of the force and will
be costly to regain in the future. As the Service Chiefs have said, we
are consuming our readiness. Meanwhile, our investment accounts and the
defense industrial base are not spared damage as we also take
indiscriminate cuts across these areas of the budget. We will continue
to need the strong partnership of this committee to help us address
these shortfalls.
If the sequester-related provisions of the Budget Control Act of
2011 are not changed, fiscal year 2014 funding for national defense
programs will be subject to a steeply reduced cap, which would cut DOD
funding by roughly $52 billion further. If there is no action by
Congress, roughly $500 billion in reductions to defense spending would
be required over the next 9 years.
As an alternative, the President's budget proposes some $150
billion in additional defense savings (measured in terms of budget
authority) over the next decade when compared with the budget plan
submitted last year. These cuts are part of a balanced package of
deficit reduction. Unlike sequester, these cuts are largely back-
loaded--occurring mainly in the years beyond fiscal year 2018--which
gives the Department time to plan and implement the reductions wisely,
and responsibly, anchored by the President's defense strategic
guidance.

FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET REQUEST

The President's fiscal year 2014 request continues to balance the
compelling demands of supporting troops still very much at war in
Afghanistan, protecting readiness, modernizing the military's aging
weapons inventory in keeping with the president's strategic guidance,
and sustaining the quality of the All-Volunteer Force.
The top-line budget request of $526.6 billion for fiscal year 2014
is essentially flat compared to the President's request for fiscal year
2013, and roughly in line with what both the House and Senate have
passed in their fiscal year 2014 budget resolutions.
Today's budget request also contains a placeholder request for
overseas contingency operations (OCO) at the fiscal year 2013 level
($88.5 billion). The submission does not include a formal OCO request
because Afghanistan force level and deployment decisions for this year
were delayed in order to provide commanders enough time to fully assess
requirements. We will soon be submitting an OCO budget amendment with a
revised level and account-level detail.
The following are the major components of the $526.6 billion fiscal
year 2014 base budget request:

Military pay and benefits (including TRICARE and
retirement costs)--$170.2 billion (32 percent of the total base
budget);
Operating costs (including $77.3 billion for civilian
pay)--$180.1 billion (34 percent);
Acquisitions and other investments (procurement,
research, development, test and evaluation, and new facilities
construction)--$176.3 billion (33 percent)

The budget presented today, at its most basic level, consists of a
series of choices that reinforce each of the following complementary
goals:

making more disciplined use of defense resources;
implementing the President's defense strategic
guidance;
seeking to sustain the readiness and quality of the
All-Volunteer Force;
supporting troops deployed and fighting in
Afghanistan.

Many of the reductions we are being forced to make in fiscal year
2013 as a result of sequester run counter to these goals.

1. Making more disciplined use of defense resources

In developing the fiscal year 2014 budget, the Department
identified about $34 billion in savings over the current Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP), which covers fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year
2018. These savings were used to help pay the costs of implementing the
new defense strategy and to accommodate budget reductions.
These efforts continue the Department's approach of the last
several years to first target growing costs in areas of support,
acquisition, and pay and benefits, before cutting military capabilities
and force structure.
Reducing Support Costs
In order to maintain balance and readiness, DOD must be able to
eliminate excess infrastructure as it reduces force structure. DOD has
been shedding infrastructure in Europe for several years and we are
undertaking a review of our European footprint this year, but we also
need to look at our domestic footprint. Therefore, the President's
fiscal year 2014 budget requests authorization for one round of Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) in 2015. While the commission would meet
in 2015, the actual closing of any bases would involve a multiyear
process that would not begin until 2016.
BRAC is a comprehensive and fair tool that allows communities a
role in reuse decisions for the property and provides redevelopment
assistance. There are upfront costs for BRAC, and this FYDP adds $2.4
billion to pay them, but in the long term, there are significant
savings. The previous five rounds of BRAC are now saving a total of $12
billion annually.
We are also taking other important steps to cut back on support
costs. We will institute a study of our Military Treatment Facilities,
including many hospitals and clinics that are currently underutilized.
By the end of this year we will have a plan in place that suggests how
to reduce that underutilization while still providing high-quality
medical care. This restructuring, coupled with a BRAC round and other
changes, would permits us to plan on a cut in our civilian workforce
that will comply with congressional direction.
We are also continuing our successful efforts to hold down military
health system costs. With the Department's proposed TRICARE benefit
changes, our projected costs for fiscal year 2014 are about 4 percent
lower than those costs in fiscal year 2012, a significant turnaround
compared to health care trends over the past decade. We continue
efforts to slow the growth of medical care costs through actions such
as rephasing military construction, making full use of past changes in
provider costs, and taking advantage of the slowing of growth in
medical costs in the private sector.
Another important initiative is our effort to improve the
Department's financial management and achieve auditable financial
statements. We need auditable statements, both to improve the quality
of our financial information and to reassure the public, and Congress,
that we are good stewards of public funds. We have a focused plan and
are making progress. Our next goal is audit-ready budget statements by
the end of 2014. We are working hard to achieve this goal, though the
current budget turmoil is hampering our efforts. I strongly support
this initiative and will do everything I can to fulfill this
commitment.
These and many other changes led to total savings of about $34
billion in fiscal year 2014-2018, including $5.5 billion in fiscal year
2014. However, we are concerned that these savings from more
disciplined use of resources could be eroded by sequester, as we are
forced to make inefficient choices that drive up costs. Today, for
example, we are being forced to engage in shorter and less efficient
contracts and sharp cuts in unit buy sizes that will increase the unit
costs of weapons.

Restructuring and Terminations of Weapons Programs
The Department continues to streamline its acquisition programs and
processes, and over the past 4 years we have realized significant cost
savings as a result of reforms implemented by the Weapon Systems and
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 sponsored by Senators Levin and McCain.
In this budget, the Department has shifted priorities within its
modernization portfolios and achieved $8.2 billion in savings from
weapons program terminations and restructuring.
For example, by revising the acquisition strategy for the Army's
Ground Combat Vehicle program, the Department will save over $2 billion
in development costs.
In other cases the Department used evolutionary approaches to
develop new capabilities instead of relying on leap-ahead gains in
technology.
For example, the Department:

Realigned investment funding and restructured the SM-3
IIB interceptor--a high-risk, high-cost system--to improve the
capabilities of existing missile defense systems, resulting in
savings of about $2.1 billion during the Future Year Defense
Program (FYDP);
Cancelled the Precision Tracking Space Satellite
system--another high-risk project--saving $1.9 billion during
the FYDP; the Department invested a portion of these savings in
technology upgrades to existing ground-based radars and
sensors.

To lessen the potential impact on local communities from the
reductions in defense procurement, the Department is requesting an
additional $36 million in support of the Defense Industry Adjustment
program.
The Department is continuing to take steps to tighten the contract
terms and reduce risk in our largest acquisition program, the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. The fiscal year 2014 budget request includes $8.4
billion for the Joint Strike Fighter.

Military Pay and Benefits
The costs of military pay and benefits are another significant
driver of spending growth that must be addressed in the current fiscal
environment. In this budget, the Department is submitting a new package
of military compensation proposals that take into consideration
congressional concerns associated with those from fiscal year 2013.
These changes save about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2014 and a total
of $12.8 billion in fiscal year 2014-2018.
This package includes a modest slowing of the growth of military
pay by implementing a 1 percent pay raise for servicemembers in 2014.
The Department is also seeking additional changes to the TRICARE
program in the fiscal year 2014 budget to bring the beneficiary's cost
share closer to the levels envisioned when the program was
implemented--particularly for working-age retirees. Today military
retirees contribute less than 11 percent of their total health care
costs, compared to an average of 27 percent when TRICARE was first
fully implemented in 1996.
The proposed TRICARE changes include:

For retirees, modest increases in TRICARE Prime
enrollment fees, instituting an enrollment fee for TRICARE
Standard/Extra, and increasing Standard/Extra deductibles;
Implementation of an enrollment fee for new TRICARE-
for-Life beneficiaries, while grandfathering in those already
Medicare-eligible at enactment;
Increases in pharmacy co-pays and, where appropriate,
mandatory use of mail order delivery of pharmaceuticals; and
Indexing of fees, deductibles, co-pays, and the
catastrophic cap to the growth in annual retiree cost-of-living
adjustment.

Survivors of military members who died on active duty or medically
retired members would be excluded from all TRICARE increases. Even
after the proposed changes in fees, TRICARE will remain a substantial
benefit.
These adjustments to pay and benefits were among the most carefully
considered and difficult choices in the budget. They were made with the
strong support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Senior Enlisted
Leadership, in recognition that in order to sustain these benefits over
the long term without dramatically reducing the size or readiness of
the force, these rising costs need to be brought under control.

2. Implementing and deepening our commitment to the President's
defense strategic guidance

Spending reductions on the scale of the current drawdown cannot be
implemented through improving efficiency and reducing overhead alone.
Cuts and changes to capabilities--force structure and modernization
programs--will also be required. The strategic guidance issued in
January 2012 set the priorities and parameters that informed those
choices, and the fiscal year 2014 budget submission further implements
and deepens program alignment to this strategic guidance.
The new strategy calls for a smaller and leaner force. Last year we
proposed reductions of about 100,000 in military end strength between
fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2017. Most of those reductions occur
in the ground forces and are consistent with a decision not to size
U.S. ground forces to accomplish prolonged stability operations, while
maintaining adequate capability should such activities again be
required. By the end of fiscal year 2014 we will have completed almost
two thirds of the drawdown of our ground forces, and the drawdown
should be fully complete by fiscal year 2017.
Last year DOD submitted proposals for changes in Air Force and Navy
force structure; some were rejected by Congress. We continue to
believe, however, that these reductions are consistent with our defense
strategy and the need to hold down costs. Therefore, DOD is
resubmitting several proposals from its fiscal year 2013 budget
submission that were not supported by Congress, including the
retirement of seven Aegis cruisers and two amphibious ships at the
beginning of fiscal year 2015. Despite the growing importance of the
Asia-Pacific--a mostly maritime theater--the high costs of maintaining
these older ships relative to their capabilities argues strongly for
their retirement.
The fiscal year 2014 budget continues implementation of the Air
Force total force proposal included in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. In response to state and
congressional concerns about proposed reductions to the Air National
Guard that DOD made in the original fiscal year 2013 budget, the
Department added back 44 aircraft to the Guard, 30 aircraft to the Air
Force Reserve, and is taking away 31 aircraft from the Active Air
Force.
These shifts were forced primarily by political realities, not
strategy or analysis. While this Active-Reserve compromise allows the
Air Force to move forward with prior year retirements and transfers,
and approved mission changes for many Reserve units, it does requires
the Department to retain excess aircraft capacity. The Department's
position continues to be that retaining excess air capacity in the
Reserve component is an unnecessary expenditure of government funds
that detracts from more pressing military priorities outlined in the
defense strategic guidance.
Increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East represents
another key tenet of the new defense strategic guidance. This budget
continues to put a premium on rapidly deployable, self-sustaining
forces--such as submarines, long-range bombers, and carrier strike
groups--that can project power over great distance and carry out a
variety of missions.
As part of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the Department is
expanding the Marine Corps presence in the region, including rotational
deployments of Marine units to Australia. We continue to develop Guam
as a strategic hub where we maintain a rotational bomber presence among
other capabilities. The Department will stage its most capable forces
in the region, including an F-22 squadron at Kadena Air Force Base in
Japan. The Navy has deployed a Littoral Combat Ship to Singapore and is
increasing and more widely distributing port visits in the Western
Pacific.
Additional enhancements and key capabilities supporting the Asia-
Pacific rebalance in the fiscal year 2014 budget include:

Protecting investments for new ship construction,
enabling the Navy to procure eight new ships in fiscal year
2014--including two Virginia-class submarines ($10.9 billion);
Continuing investments to develop a new penetrating
bomber ($379 million);
Investing in new maritime patrol aircraft ($3.8
billion);
Continuing investments to maintain and expand undersea
dominance, including increasing the cruise missile capacity of
the future Virginia-class subs and developing new unmanned
undersea vehicles ($223.9 million);
Continuing to fund development of an unmanned carrier
launched UAV ($427 million);
Adding electronic attack EA-18Gs to offset the loss of
retired Marine Corps EA-6B (Prowler) squadrons ($2.0 billion);
Investing in a new suite of anti-surface warfare
weapons ($160 million);
Increasing the number of attack submarines forward
deployed to Guam to four ($78 million);
Funding airfield resiliency measures such as
dispersal, rapid runway repair, and hardening in the Western
Pacific ($440 million);
The Army is investing in upgraded missile defense
capabilities in the region ($40 million);
Increasing funding for joint exercises in the PACOM
region ($14 million).

Another tenet of the strategy is to support efforts to build
partner capacity through innovative mechanisms based on lessons learned
over the past decade of war. To that end, the fiscal year 2014 request
builds on our section 1206 program by including $75 million in
dedicated funding for the new Global Security Contingency Fund, a
pooled resource between DOD and Department of State that supports
common efforts to boost the security capacity of partners in regions
like Africa. This represents the first time dedicated funds have been
requested for this new authority.
This new strategy not only recognizes the changing character of the
conflicts in which the United States must prevail, but also leverages
new concepts of operation enabled by advances in space, cyberspace,
special operations, global mobility, precision-strike, missile defense,
and other capabilities. By making difficult trade-offs in lower
priority areas, the fiscal year 2014 budget protects or increases key
investments in these critical capabilities, including:

Cyberspace operations, including the recruitment and
retention of world-class cyber personnel ($4.7 billion for
fiscal year 2014, an increase of $800 million over fiscal year
2013 enacted levels).
Space operations--to maintain our superiority in
space, the Air Force continues to modernize the GPS program and
is investing in improved space surveillance capabilities and a
new generation of communications satellites ($10.1 billion).
Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR)--the Department is investing in both sea-
based and extended range, land-based ISR platforms ($2.5
billion).
Rapid Global Mobility--to maintain our ability to
rapidly deliver and sustain our forces around the globe, the
Air Force is upgrading its C-5, C-17, and C-130 transport
aircraft--replacing the oldest aircraft and modernizing the
fleet--and building the new KC-46 aerial refueling tanker ($5.0
billion);
Missile Defense--to protect against ballistic missile
threats from Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, the Department
is increasing its fleet of Ground Based Interceptors (GBI),
continuing the conversion of Aegis ships to provide ballistic
missile defense capability, and procuring additional Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors and Patriot
PAC-3 missiles ($9.2 billion);
Special Operations/counterterrorism--to ensure our
Special Operations Forces maintain the highest levels of
readiness and to expand the global Special Operations Force
network ($7.7 billion).

3. Seeking to sustain the readiness and quality of the All-
Volunteer Force

The high-quality of our All-Volunteer Force continues to be the
foundation of our military strength. This budget seeks to ensure that
our troops receive the training and equipment they need for military
readiness, and the world-class support programs they and their families
have earned. However, as in other areas of the budget, the steep and
abrupt cuts of sequester would harm these programs. The remainder of
this discussion outlines the goals of the fiscal year 2014 budget, but
they would be significantly impacted by the persistence of sequester-
level cuts.

Readiness Investments
Even with flat and declining defense budgets, this budget seeks to
press ahead with the transition from a counterinsurgency-focused force
to a force ready and capable of operating across a full range of
operations across the globe. The service budgets all fund initiatives
that seek to return to full-spectrum training and preparation for
missions beyond current operations in Afghanistan:

The Army would prepare for a rotational presence in
multiple regions and has begun training in ``decisive action''
scenarios and is transitioning to training in combined arms
conventional warfare;
The Marine Corps would return to a sea-going posture,
its traditional role in between major conflicts;
The Navy would invest in ship maintenance and measures
to alleviate the stress on personnel from prolonged and
extended deployments required by current operations;
The Air Force would re-focus on high-end capabilities
required to confront the advanced air forces and air defense
systems of other nations.

The Department continues its work to understand and quantify
readiness activities as we seek to maximize our preparedness for real-
world missions. We do not yet know the costs of fixing the readiness of
the force following the 6 months of sequester cuts to training in this
fiscal year. Therefore these costs are not included in the fiscal year
2014 budget. However, the President's budget includes balanced deficit
reduction proposals that are more than sufficient to allow Congress to
replace and repeal the sequester-related reductions required by the
Budget Control Act.

Family Support Programs
The Department's budget submission makes clear that people are
central to everything we do. While sequester cuts would unfortunately
counter many of these initiatives, especially for our civilian
workforce, the initiatives remain important statements of the intent in
this budget.
The Department continues to support key programs in fiscal year
2014 that support servicemembers and their families, spending $8.5
billion on initiatives that include:

Transition Assistance and Veteran's Employment
Assurance--the Department continues to support the Transition
Assistance Program to ensure every servicemember receives
training, education, and credentials needed to successfully
transition to the civilian workforce.
Family Readiness--the Department continues to ensure
that family support is a high priority by redesigning and
boosting family support in a number of ways.

The Department is also providing support to our people with a
number of other important initiatives, including:

Behavioral Health--the Department maintains funding
for psychological health programs and expands those programs
that are most effective, such as Embedded Behavioral Health, to
provide improved access to care, improved continuity of care,
and enhanced behavioral health provider communication.
Suicide Prevention--the Department continues to
implement recommendations from the Suicide Prevention Task
Force and act on other findings from think tanks, the National
Action Alliance's National Suicide Prevention Strategy, and DOD
and Department of Veteran's Affairs Integrated Mental Health
Strategy.

Another area of focus has been Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response. The Department has implemented a number of initiatives to
change the way it prevents and responds to the crime of sexual assault,
along five lines of effort:

Prevention--the military services have launched a wide
range of enhanced training programs, which are now being taught
in multiple professional military education and training
courses, to include DOD-wide precommand and senior
noncommissioned officer training courses.
Investigation--Consistent with the National Defense
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 2012 and Fiscal Year 2013,
DOD has established new policies to retain investigative
documentation for 50 years for unrestricted reports, and is
developing policy for Special Victim Capability.
Advocacy--DOD has implemented a Safe helpline to give
victims 24/7 global access to crisis support staff, implemented
an expedited transfer policy for victims requesting transfer to
a new unit, and expanded emergency care and services to DOD
civilians stationed abroad.
Assessment--DOD has added sexual assault questions to
DOD Command Climate Surveys and implemented policy to conduct
assessments within 120 days for new commanders and annually
thereafter, consistent with the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
Accountability--on April 8, I directed DOD's Acting
General Counsel to propose to Congress changes to Article 60 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that would
eliminate the ability of a convening authority to change
findings in courts-martial, except for certain minor offenses.
These changes would also require the convening authority to
explain in writing any changes made to court-martial sentences,
as well as any changes to findings involving minor offenses.
These changes, if enacted, would help ensure that our military
justice system works fairly, ensures due process, and is
accountable.

I am currently reviewing other options and actions to strengthen
the Department's prevention and response efforts, and will announce
those decisions and actions soon. Consistent with the 2013 National
Defense Authorization Act, I will soon be naming individuals to sit on
independent panels to review and assess the systems used to
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes involving sexual assault,
and judicial proceedings of sexual assault cases. I will closely review
their recommendations when complete.

4. Supporting troops deployed and fighting overseas

As I said earlier, this budget request includes a placeholder
request for OCO funding at the fiscal year 2013 level ($88.5 billion)--
we expect to submit an OCO budget amendment with a revised level and
account-level detail later this spring. I would note that OCO funding
is essential in fiscal year 2014 to support troops deployed and
fighting in, and coming home from, Afghanistan, and the cost of
transporting and resetting equipment returning from theater. OCO costs
should decrease as our military presence in Afghanistan decreases, but
even after the conclusion of combat operations we will face war-related
costs that must be addressed.
the way ahead: strategic choices and management review
The fiscal year 2014 budget is a reflection of DOD's best efforts
to match ends, ways, and means during a period of intense fiscal
uncertainty. It is a balanced plan that would address some of the
Department's structural costs and internal budget imbalances while
implementing the President's defense strategic guidance and keeping
faith with our men and women in uniform and their families.
It is obvious that significant changes to the Department's top-line
spending would require changes to this budget plan. The Department must
plan for any additional reductions to the defense budget that might
result from Congress and the administration agreeing on a deficit
reduction plan, and it must be prepared in the event that sequester-
level cuts persist for another year or over the long term.
Consequently, I directed a Strategic Choices and Management Review
in order to assess the potential impact of further reductions up to the
level of full sequester. The purpose of this Strategic Choices and
Management Review is to reassess the basic assumptions that drive the
Department's investment and force structure decisions.
The review will identify the strategic choices and further
institutional reforms that may be required--including those reforms
which should be pursued regardless of fiscal pressures. It is designed
to help understand the challenges, articulate the risks, and look for
opportunities for reform and efficiencies presented by resource
constraints. Everything will be on the table during this review--roles
and missions, planning, business practices, force structure, personnel
and compensation, acquisition and modernization investments, how we
operate, and how we measure and maintain readiness.
This review is being conducted by Deputy Secretary Carter working
with General Dempsey. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs,
Office of the Secretary of Defense Principals, and combatant commanders
will serve as essential participants. Our aim is to conclude this
review by May 31, 2013. The results will inform our fiscal year 2015
budget request and will be the foundation for the Quadrennial Defense
Review due to Congress in February 2014.
It is already clear to me that achieving significant additional
budget savings without unacceptable risk to national security will
require not just tweaking or chipping away at existing structures and
practices but, if necessary, fashioning entirely new ones that better
reflect 21st century realities. That will require the partnership of
Congress.
The fiscal year 2014 budget and the ones before it have made hard
choices. In many cases, modest reforms to personnel and benefits, along
with efforts to reduce infrastructure and restructure acquisition
programs, met fierce political resistance and were not implemented.
We are now in a different fiscal environment dealing with new
realities that will force us to more fully confront these tough and
painful choices, and to make the reforms we need to put this Department
on a path to sustain our military strength for the 21st century. But in
order to do that we will need flexibility, time, and some budget
certainty.
We will also need to fund the military capabilities that are
necessary for the complex security threats of the 21st century. I
believe the President's budget does that. With the partnership of
Congress, the Defense Department can continue to find new ways to
operate more affordably, efficiently, and effectively. However,
multiple reviews and analyses show that additional major cuts--
especially those on the scale and timeline of sequestration--would
require dramatic reductions in core military capabilities or the scope
of our activities around the world.
As the executive and legislative branches of government, we have a
shared responsibility to ensure that we protect national security and
America's strategic interests. Doing so requires that we make every
decision on the basis of enduring national interests and make sure
every policy is worthy of the service and sacrifice of our
servicemembers and their families.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Hagel. Your
full statement will, of course, be made part of the record.
General Dempsey.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe.
I would like to add my thoughts and prayers, as the
Secretary mentioned, to those affected by the terror attack in
Boston and also tell you how proud we are of our guardsmen who
were among the first responders. Of course, we will stand
ready, all of us, to provide whatever support they need as this
issue evolves.
I welcome this opportunity to update you on the U.S. Armed
Forces and to comment on the budget proposal for fiscal year
2014.
This hearing comes at a time of extraordinary uncertainty.
As resources are declining, the risks to our national security
are rising. It is in this context that I offer my perspective
on how we can work together to sustain a balanced and a
peerless joint force.
One thing you should be certain of is that our men and
women are steadfast in their courage and in their devotion to
duty. I saw it recently in their eyes as I had the honor of
reenlisting some of them at Bagram Airfield. In Afghanistan,
our forces are simultaneously fighting, transitioning, and
redeploying. The Afghan military, as the Secretary said, will
soon take operational lead for security across the country. As
they gain confidence, so too do the Afghan people.
The coalition will remain in support as we transition to a
sustainable presence beyond 2014, and at every point along the
way we must make sure that our force levels match the mission
that we ask of our men and women in uniform.
Our joint force has been vigilant elsewhere as well. We are
deterring aggression and assuring our allies in the face of
provocation by North Korea and by Iran. We are working with our
interagency partners to defend against cyber attack. We are
acting directly and with partners to defeat al Qaeda. We are
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and adapting our force
posture to a new normal of combustible violence in North Africa
and the Middle East. As we will discuss more later today, we
are also working with others to keep Syria's complex conflict
from destabilizing the region. We are prepared with options if
military force is called for and if it can be used effectively
to secure our interests without making the situation worse.
We must also be ready with options for an uncertain and
dangerous future, and this budget was purpose-built to keep our
Nation immune from coercion. It aims to restore versatility to
a more affordable joint force in support of our defense
strategy.
But let me also be clear about what this budget does not
do. This budget does not reflect the full sequestration amount.
It does impose less reduction and give us more time.
However, uncertainty does persist about what the top line
will be for this or for any other budget. Nor does this budget
include funds to restore lost readiness. We do not yet know the
full impact or the cost to recover from the readiness
shortfalls we are experiencing this year.
As expected, we have already curtailed or canceled training
for many units across all forces, those not preparing to
deploy. We all know it is more expensive to get ready than it
is to stay ready. Recovery costs, therefore, will compete with
the costs of us building the joint force towards 2020.
This budget does, however, invest in our priorities. It
keeps the force in balance. It supports our forward-deployed
operations. It upholds funding for emerging capabilities,
notably cyber. It funds those conventional and nuclear
capabilities that have proven so essential to our defense. It
also lowers manpower costs, reduces excess infrastructure, and
makes health care more sustainable. Most importantly, it
protects our investment in our real decisive edge, which is our
people. It treats being the best-led, the best-trained, and the
best-equipped military as non-negotiable and as an imperative.
Never has our Nation sustained such a lengthy war solely
through the service of an All-Volunteer Force. We must honor
our commitments to them and to their families. For many
veterans, returning home is a new front line in the struggle
with wounds seen and unseen. We must continue to invest in
world-class treatment for mental health issues, traumatic brain
injury, and combat stress. We also have a shared responsibility
to address the urgent issue of suicide with the same devotion
we have shown to protecting the lives of those in combat.
The risks inherent to military service must never include
the risk of sexual assault. Sexual assault betrays the trust on
which our profession is founded. We will pursue every option to
drive this crime from our ranks.
This is a defining moment for our military. Our warriors'
will to win is undaunted, but the means to prepare to win are
becoming uncertain. We, therefore, have an opportunity and an
obligation with this and any future budget to restore
confidence. We have it within us to stay strong as a global
leader and as a reliable partner. The joint force is looking to
us to lead through this period of historic fiscal correction,
but we cannot do it alone.
As I have said before, we need budget certainty, we need
time, and we need flexibility. That means a predictable funding
stream. It means the time to deliberately evaluate tradeoffs in
force structure, modernization, compensation, and readiness. It
means the full flexibility to keep the force in balance.
Thank you for all you have done to support our men and
women in uniform. I only ask that you continue to support a
responsible investment in our Nation's defense.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN. Martin E. Dempsey, USA

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished committee members, it
is my privilege to update you on the state of the U.S. Armed Forces and
to comment on the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2014.
This year's posture testimony comes in the context of extraordinary
uncertainty. Our Nation is going through an historic fiscal correction
to restore the economic foundation of our power. As resources decline,
risks to our national security interests rise. A more competitive
security environment compounds these risks, increasing the probability
and consequences of aggression.
This context calls out for our leadership. We can and must find it
within ourselves to stay strong as a global leader and reliable
partner. We must restore lost readiness and continue to make
responsible investments in our Nation's defense.

II. STRATEGIC DIRECTION TO THE JOINT FORCE

A year ago, I established four priorities to help guide our Joint
Force through this period of uncertainty. Our way forward must be
rooted in a renewed commitment to the Profession of Arms. This means
preserving an uncommon profession that is without equal in both its
competence and its character. Along the way, we must keep faith with
our military family. This means honoring the commitments we have made
to our servicemembers and their families. They deserve the future they
sacrificed so much to secure.
These two priorities serve as a source of strength for the Joint
Force as it achieves our national objectives in current conflicts. This
means achieving our campaign objectives in Afghanistan while
confronting aggression toward America and its allies in all its forms
wherever and whenever it arises. It also means helping to secure the
flow of commerce in the global commons, building the capacity of our
partners, providing humanitarian assistance, and maintaining a credible
nuclear deterrent.
These three priorities enable us to understand and develop the
Joint Force of 2020. Our ability to build the force we will need
tomorrow depends on the decisions we make today. This is a defining
moment in a defining year. Ensuring our future military is unrivaled
and sustainable requires the right mix between current capacity and new
capabilities. We must recapitalize current equipment where possible and
modernize capabilities that preserve our decisive advantages.

III. JOINT FORCE OPERATIONS

One thing has been certain over the last year--the Joint Force
stood strong and responded to the Nation's call. After more than a
decade of continual deployments and tough fighting, I remain humbled by
the resilience and determination of our warriors.
In the past year, our service men and women have simultaneously
fought, transitioned, and redeployed from Afghanistan. Never before
have we retrograded so much combat power and equipment while continuing
combat operations. Our forces performed superbly, transitioning to
Afghan security lead in areas comprising over 85 percent of the
population. In the process, we redeployed over 30,000 U.S. troops,
closed over 600 bases, and preserved coalition cohesion. We were
challenged by ``insider attacks,'' but responded the way professional
militaries do. We assessed and adapted. We reaffirmed our partnerships
and moved forward jointly with more stringent force protection and
vetting procedures.
Transition continues. In the weeks ahead, the Afghanistan National
Security Forces will assume operational lead across all of Afghanistan.
This milestone represents an important achievement on the Lisbon
roadmap, reaffirmed at the Chicago Summit in 2012. At the same time,
the International Security Assistance Force will transition primarily
to training and advising. We are also working with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the Afghan Government on options for an
enduring presence beyond 2014 to reinforce Afghan security and maintain
pressure on transnational terrorists.
When I testified last year, the effects of the November 2011 border
incident with Pakistan were still fresh, and tensions were as high as
any time since the Osama bin Laden raid. Measured, but steady civilian-
military engagement with Pakistani leadership led to the reopening of
the Ground Lines of Communication in July 2012. We are gradually
rebuilding our relationship with Pakistan as reflected in the recent
signing of a tripartite border document to standardize complementary
cross-border operations.
The Joint Force has been vigilant well beyond South Asia and around
the world. We continue to help deter aggression and counter the
increasingly bold provocations from North Korea and Iran. We are
supporting Syria's neighbors in their efforts to contain spillover
violence while providing assistance to help with refugees. We are
postured to support additional options for dealing with any threats to
our national interests that may emerge from the Syrian conflict.
Along with our interagency partners, we are also postured to
detect, deter, and defeat cyber-attacks against government and critical
infrastructure targets. We are part of interagency and multinational
efforts to counter transnational crime. We remain relentless in our
pursuit of al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations, directly
and through our partners. This includes al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula in Yemen and, working with French and African partners, al
Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb.
Finally, in the context of a ``new normal''--where the diffusion of
power fuels insecurity and unrest--we continue to support reform across
the Middle East and North Africa through military-to-military
exercises, exchanges, and security assistance. We are also adjusting
global force posture to reflect these risks in the context of our
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

IV. OUR JOINT FORCE TODAY

We have an experienced, combat-tested force. Never has our Nation
sustained such a lengthy period of war solely through the service of an
All-Volunteer military. Our warriors' will to win is undaunted, but the
means to prepare to win are becoming uncertain. Military readiness is
at risk due to the convergence of several budget factors. These same
factors compound risk to the wellness of the Joint Force and our
military family. We need the help of our elected leaders to gain budget
certainty, time, and flexibility.
Few have borne more of war's burden than our military family. For
12 relentless years, our service men and women have answered our
Nation's call with unsurpassed courage and skill. Many have fallen or
been grievously wounded in the service of our country. We honor them
most by caring for their families and for those who have come home with
wounds seen and unseen.
We are unfailing in our praise for the sacrifices of our warriors
in battle. But for so many of our veterans, returning home is a new
type of frontline in their struggle. We cannot cut corners on their
healthcare. We must continue to invest in world-class treatments for
mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. Stigma
and barriers to seeking mental health services must be reduced.
Suicide is a tragic consequence for far too many. As a Nation, we
have a shared responsibility to address this urgent issue with the same
devotion we have shown to protecting the lives of our forces while in
combat. The Department is working closely with our interagency partners
and the White House to increase our understanding of the factors
leading to suicide and how to best leverage care networks to keep our
veterans alive.
The risks inherent to military service must not include the risk of
sexual assault. We cannot shrink from our obligations to treat each
other with dignity. We cannot allow sexual assault to undermine the
cohesion, discipline, and respect that gives us strength. Therefore, we
are examining the best ways to leverage additional education, training,
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. We are exploring every
option, and we are open to every idea, that could help eliminate this
crime from our ranks.
Future success relies on opening our ranks to all of America's
talent. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs and I have supported the
expansion of service opportunities for women. This decision better
aligns our policies with our experience in war, and it serves to
strengthen the Joint Force. Consistent with the law, we also extended
some benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of servicemembers. We
are implementing both initiatives deliberately across all Services to
ensure we uphold essential standards and avoid creating new inequities
for other members of the Joint Force.
Keeping faith with our military family will take a mutual
commitment from fellow veterans and a grateful Nation. The next few
years will define how we, as a Nation, view the September 11 generation
of veterans. America's future All-Volunteer Force is watching.
They are also watching as we inflict risk on ourselves. With $487
billion in planned reductions already reflected in the Department's
fiscal year 2013 budget, sequestration's additional cuts jeopardize
readiness not only this year, but also for many years to come. We
cannot fail to resource the war we are still fighting. At the same
time, we cannot compromise on readiness in the face of an uncertain and
dangerous future. Our Joint Force must begin to reconnect with family
while resetting and refitting war-torn equipment. It must retrain on
the full-spectrum skills that have atrophied while developing new
skills required for emerging threats. There are no shortcuts to a
strong national defense.
When budget uncertainty is combined with the mechanism and
magnitude of sequestration, the consequences could lead to a security
gap--vulnerability against future threats to our national security
interests. Our military power could become less credible because it is
less sustainable. We could break commitments to our partners and
allies, our defense industrial base, and our men and women in uniform
and their families.
This outcome is not inevitable. We can maintain the readiness and
health of the force at an affordable cost. But, we need help from our
elected leaders to keep the force in balance and avert the strategic
errors of past drawdowns. To this end, the Joint Chiefs and I have
requested your support for certainty, time, and flexibility.
Most importantly, we need long-term budget certainty--a steady,
predictable funding stream. While the passage of the fiscal year 2013
Appropriations Act provided relief from the Continuing Resolution,
uncertainty over the fiscal year 2014 topline budget and the full
effects of fiscal year 2013 sequestration remains.
Second, we need the time to deliberately evaluate trade-offs in
force structure, modernization, compensation, and readiness. Finally,
we need the full flexibility to keep the force in balance. Budget
reductions of this magnitude require more than just transfer authority
and follow-on reprogramming authority. Everything must be on the
table--military and civilian force reductions; basing and facilities;
pay and compensation; and the mix among Active, Reserve, and National
Guard units.
The fiscal year 2014 budget proposal helps us rebalance and
strengthen readiness through hard choices. It enables us to lower
manpower costs, reduce unneeded infrastructure, and shed ineffective
acquisition programs while maintaining support for the responsible
drawdown of our military presence in Afghanistan. It provides a 2014
military pay raise of 1 percent while protecting important education,
counseling, and wounded warrior programs. Proposed infrastructure
reductions include a request for BRAC authorization in fiscal year
2015, although any closures would take multiple years and not begin
until 2016. We simply cannot afford to keep infrastructure and weapons
we do not need without getting the reforms we do need.

V. A JOINT FORCE FOR 2020

The budget decisions we are making now will indicate whether we
view our future Joint Force as an investment or an expense.
America is unmatched in its ability to employ power in defense of
national interests, but we have little margin for error. We are able to
deter threats, assure partners, and defeat adversaries because we act
from a position of strength.
We are strong--and our Nation is secure--because we treat being the
best led, trained, and equipped force as a non-negotiable imperative.
The secret to sustaining our strength with this or any future budget is
simple--preserve investment in readiness, prioritize investment in
people, and protect investment in decisive capabilities.
It is our people that make us the most capable military in the
world. They are our best hedge against threats to our homeland and
interests abroad. By 2020, we will require even greater technical
talent in our ranks. But, developing technological skill must occur in
concert with leader and character development. We must resist the
temptation to scale back on education, including languages and cultural
knowledge. Military service must continue to be our Nation's preeminent
leadership experience. It is more important than ever to get the most
from the potential and performance of every servicemember.
Investing in people is not just about their development and
readiness. It is also about the commitment we make to their families.
Unsustainable costs and smaller budgets mean we must examine every
warrior and family support program to make sure we are getting the best
return on our investment.
We need to reform pay and compensation to reduce costs while making
sure we recruit and retain the best America has to offer. We must also
balance our commitment to provide quality, accessible health care with
better management and essential reform to get escalating costs under
control. The fiscal year 2014 budget would help control rising health
care costs by initiating a restructuring of medical facilities to make
them more efficient, without sacrificing quality or continuity of care,
and by proposing fee adjustments that exempt disabled retirees,
survivors of servicemembers who died on active duty, and their family
members. The Department of Defense is also working with Veterans
Affairs to find efficiencies across health care systems.
As we work to get the people right, we must also sustain our
investment in decisive capabilities. The fiscal year 2014 budget
continues to fund long-term capabilities that sustain our edge against
resourceful and innovative enemies, while maintaining critical
investments in science and technology, and research and development
programs.
Emerging capabilities, once on the margins, must move to the
forefront and be fully integrated with our general purpose forces.
Special Operations Forces, for example, have played an increasingly
consequential role over the past 10 years. We have expanded their ranks
considerably during this timeframe, and now we must continue to improve
the quality of their personnel and capabilities.
Closely linked are our intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities--from sensors to analysts. We will continue
to rely on proven systems designed for the low threat environments of
Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, we must also develop and field
sensors designed to penetrate and survive in high-threat areas. They
will expand our ability to access and assess hard-to-reach targets.
This budget also sustains our investment in cyber, in part by
expanding the cyber forces led by the U.S. Cyber Command. Despite
significant investment and progress in the past year, the threat
continues to outpace us, placing the Nation at risk. The fiscal year
2014 budget increases funding for cyber security information sharing,
but we need legislation to allow the private sector and U.S.
interagency to share real-time cyber threat information--within a
framework of privacy and civil liberty safeguards. In parallel, we must
establish and adopt standards for protecting critical infrastructure.
The development and integration of these emerging capabilities will
by no means amount to all that is new in Joint Force 2020. They must be
integrated with our foundational and impressive conventional force
capabilities. The fiscal year 2014 budget protects several areas where
reinvestment in existing systems--such as the C-130, F-16, and the
Army's Stryker combat vehicle--sustains our competitive advantage. All
are backed by our asymmetric advantages in long-range strike, global
mobility, logistics, space, and undersea warfare. They must be
connected with a secure, mobile, and collaborative command and control
network.
This combination of increasingly powerful network capabilities and
agile units at the tactical edge is a powerful complement to leadership
at every echelon. It provides the basis to project both discrete and
overwhelming power across multiple domains. It gives policymakers and
commanders alike a greater degree of flexibility in how they pursue
objectives.
As we set priorities and implement reductions, we need to pay
attention to the important relationship among defense, development, and
diplomacy. Fewer defense dollars means we must rely more on--and invest
more in--our other instruments of power to help underwrite global
security. Our international partners will have to work with us on
accepting a greater share of the risk. Some are more ready and willing
to do that than others.

VI. CONCLUSION

Although I am confident the Joint Force today can marshal resources
for any specific contingency, our goal is to be able to offer military
options that put U.S. national security on a sustainable path to 2020
and beyond. To do this, we must recruit and retain the most talented
people. We must invest in their competence and character so they can
leverage emerging and existing capabilities in our defense. It is an
investment our predecessors made in decades past. We must do the same.
Our consistent first line of defense has been and always will be
our people. They are our greatest strength. We will rely on our war-
tested leaders to think and innovate as we navigate the challenges and
opportunities that lie ahead. We need to seize the moment to think
differently and to be different. But, we cannot do it alone. We need
the help of our elected officials to give us the certainty, time, and
flexibility to make change.
We can and must stay strong in the face of declining budgets and
rising risk. We must have the courage to make the difficult choices
about our investments, about our people, and about our way of war. The
Secretary's Strategic Choices and Management Review will us help us
identify options and opportunities.
We have been down this road before. We can lead through this
uncertainty and manage the transition to a more secure and prosperous
future. I know your Nation's military leaders are ready--as is every
single soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coastguardsman--to give
their last breath to defend America and her allies.
Please accept my thanks to this committee and Congress for all you
have done to support our men and women in uniform. Together, we serve
our Nation.

Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
We are going to have a 7-minute first round, and that may
likely be the only round here, given the large number of
Senators that are here today.
Let me start first with you, General Dempsey. Do you
personally support the request for the DOD budget for fiscal
year 2014?
General Dempsey. I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you know whether the Chiefs share in
your view?
General Dempsey. They do.
Chairman Levin. We heard yesterday, General, quite an
optimistic assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan,
more optimistic than in previous years, and we heard that from
our commander there, General Dunford. I am wondering whether
you share the generally optimistic assessment that we heard.
General Dempsey. Yes. I was with General Dunford and his
subordinate commanders about 2 weeks ago. I will say that my
impression after visiting some of the operational coordination
centers, where for the first time I have seen the Afghan
Government actually applying some of their instruments and some
governance and economic factors into security, does lead me to
be more optimistic than I have been in the past where I felt
like we have been doing a good job but not necessarily that
they have been shouldering as much of the burden as I think
they need to shoulder.
Chairman Levin. Have you reached a conclusion as to the
troop level which you are going to recommend to the President
for the post-2014 period?
General Dempsey. No, we have not, Senator. I have said at a
previous hearing that the target that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has established for the range, let us call
it, that NATO has established, 8,000 to 12,000, seems to me to
be a reasonable target. But we have not selected a specific
number.
Chairman Levin. Is that a target for U.S. Forces?
General Dempsey. No. That would be the International
Security Assistance Force and it would be that part of the
mission related to training, advising, and assisting.
Chairman Levin. So the President has not made a decision
yet on that either then. Is that correct?
General Dempsey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. In terms of the reduction between now and
2014, the President announced plans to draw down 34,000 of the
66,000 troops in Afghanistan by February 2014. Is it true that
the pace of that drawdown will affect the OCO funds that are
needed and when they are needed?
General Dempsey. I am sure it will, and that is the reason,
I think, Mr. Hale would agree that the OCO budget has not been
submitted yet. What we have done is given the commander in the
field the flexibility to plan that reduction which, by the way,
I think is very important to allow him to plan the pace and
manage the equilibrium between fighting, transitioning, and
redeploying. But I think that is why the OCO budget is delayed.
Chairman Levin. If the commander has that flexibility, then
as soon as we presumably learn from the commander how they are
going to exercise that flexibility, then we are going to
determine the OCO?
General Dempsey. That would be my understanding of the
sequence.
Chairman Levin. For the record, Secretary Hale--not now
because of my time limit--would you tell us how the pace, as it
is determined by the commander, if the commander has that
flexibility, will affect the OCO needs, for the record?
[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Hale. We are making assumptions, though, because we
have to go ahead.
Chairman Levin. All right.
We, in this budget, Mr. Secretary, have certain amounts
that are going to be utilized for our missile defense. There
has been an announcement--I believe that you were the one who
made it--that we are going to deploy 14 additional ground-based
interceptors (GBI) in Alaska. We have made a decision relative
to the final phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), which
has been adopted for NATO. I am wondering, let me ask you,
General, do you personally support the missile defense approach
that has been decided upon by the administration?
General Dempsey. I do. It is in response to what we
perceive to be an increasing threat, in particular from North
Korea.
Chairman Levin. That includes both parts of the missile
defense approach that I have just identified. One is the
modification to the PAA in Europe but also the additional GBIs
in Alaska. Both pieces? Do you approve of both parts?
General Dempsey. I do.
Chairman Levin. On the BRAC issue, as I understand your
testimony and your budget, Mr. Secretary, there is a short-term
cost if there were an additional BRAC approved, but that cost
is not in the 2014 budget request. You put it in the 2015
budget request. Is that correct?
Mr. Hale. The money is actually in 2016 through 2018. It is
$2.4 billion of additional funds.
Chairman Levin. Okay, but the additional upfront funding,
the cost of the BRAC is not provided for in the 2014 budget
request. You made a provision or you say you are going to make
a provision in 2015. Is that correct?
Mr. Hale. 2016, 2017, and 2018.
Secretary Hagel. We are not requesting it until 2015. So we
put the money in the out-years.
Chairman Levin. So there is no money impact for this year.
Now, when we met at the Pentagon a few days ago, and there
were a number of us that were there, we discussed the point
that you made about alleged savings from the last BRAC round.
You today indicated that previous rounds or perhaps the
previous round, you testified, saved $12 billion annually. Was
that the savings that you say exists, created from the last
round or from all of the previous rounds?
Secretary Hagel. From all the rounds.
Chairman Levin. All the rounds.
Secretary Hagel. If you would like more detail, maybe Mr.
Hale could break that out. But it would be for all the rounds.
Chairman Levin. Can you give us that for the record? I
think that is the detail that we would need for the record,
round by round.
[The information referred to follows:]

Please refer to my letter to you, signed on May 1, 2013. [Inserted
previously]

Chairman Levin. I think that is my time. So we will call on
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since you are on the subject of BRAC, I think you might
remember, Secretary Hagel, that you were in the Senate at the
time in 2005. You might remember that I led the opposition to
that BRAC round unsuccessfully, I might say. The irony of that
was that my senior Senator Don Nickles was on the other side,
and we lost by two votes. So it is contentious.
Secretary Hagel. You are not going to hold that against me,
are you?
Senator Inhofe. No. I do not even remember how you voted on
that, but I will not get into that.
Secretary Hagel. I support BRAC.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Yes, I came in with the first BRAC round of the five BRAC
rounds. I supported some of them in the past. I opposed the one
in 2005 for two reasons. One is that it was bringing down our
infrastructure to an artificially low size to meet what I
thought was an unacceptable force size. Now, that was just one
reason at that time. I think that reason is good today.
But the other reason is what the chairman touched on here,
and that is that there is a cost to BRAC. It is in two
different areas. One is in the initial cost and the other is
the recurring cost.
Now, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a
report last year. That is 7 years after the 2005 BRAC round,
noting that the one-time implementation cost of 2005 grew from
$21 billion to $35 billion, an increase of $14 billion, or 67
percent.
As a result of the 20-year value--now we will get into the
recurring costs--DOD expected to achieve from the 2005 round,
it decreased by 72 percent. In addition, GAO determined that 75
out of the 182 recommendations, about 41 percent, are now
expected to result in a negative 20-year value. That means they
will cost more to implement than any projected savings over a
20-year period. Now, that is pretty bad. I have seen this.
I know there are different ways of projecting figures.
Those are the figures, and this came from GAO just last year, 7
years after this. So keep that in mind, recognizing, as you
pointed out, you may not feel this until 2015. I have no reason
to believe we are going to be in a lot better shape in 2015
than we are today.
Have you considered that in your support of this BRAC
round?
Secretary Hagel. I have not seen the actual figures or the
study you referred to, Senator. I do not know if it was the
same GAO report or another one that noted on that 2005 BRAC
round, it clearly reflected--I think the number was almost a 25
percent over-capacity in infrastructure at the time in our
facilities.
Now, I am going to ask Mr. Hale to respond here very
quickly.
But to answer your question, we have looked at all the
factors, upfront costs, continuing costs, do we need it.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We do not need to hear from Mr. Hale
now.
I know you have read the report I referred to, and I would
ask that you share that with Secretary Hagel, which I am sure
he will want to look at. I would only ask that you consider
that because I think those reasons for my opposition 7 years
ago--8 years ago now, are probably more true today.
When the chairman talked about the missile defense thing, I
was very pleased when you made the decision to increase, back
up to 44, the number of GBI sites on the west coast. I think
that was good.
Where I do not agree, as has been pointed out, that is
probably a good thing to do in light of all the things that are
happening in North Korea. I was over there recently. In fact, I
talked to you from over there, and I realize that this is
something that we need to protect against.
I am satisfied. I may not be in the majority up here, but I
am satisfied that anything coming from North Korea or coming
from that way we have the capability to shoot, look, and shoot.
I feel comfortable we could knock down anything coming.
Where I probably disagree, General Dempsey, with you is on
our capacity to knock one down coming from the other side, from
the east. That is the reason, of course, that we were initially
building the GBI in Poland.
Now we are talking about a third site, and I could quote
several generals here. General Jacoby, for example, had said we
are not in the most optimum posture to defend against an
Iranian threat, in spite of the fact that our intelligence has
told us since 2007 that Iran is going to have the capability of
a weapon and a delivery system by 2015.
Secretary Hagel, do you disagree with my concern over the
threat that would come from the east as opposed to the west?
Secretary Hagel. No, I do not disagree. It is something
that DOD and all those responsible for our missile defense
capabilities and our strategies and the tactics to match those
and the weapons to match those strategies are concerned with as
well. So it is a very real issue. It is one that we are dealing
with. We are going to have to continue to deal with it. So it
is like all of these issues. How do you deal with it? What
should we be doing? What are we doing?
Senator Inhofe. One way to deal with it is on the third
site everyone is talking about. I do not know whether you have
taken a position on that or not. But if you have, would you let
us know what that is?
Secretary Hagel. We were instructed through the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to conduct environmental
impact statements (EIS) looking at the possibility of putting a
site on the east coast. That investigation, that study, is
underway. We should have it complete by the end of this year.
We will obviously share that with Congress.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
The last question I would have, Mr. Secretary, is having to
do with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a
commitment that was made by the President in order to get the
votes necessary for that. Those commitments have not been met.
What I would like to get from you for the record, since there
would not be time now, is will you support the products that
the President talked about in order to get the votes that he
got for the New START treaty, in other words, noting our
nuclear capability.
Secretary Hagel. Whatever commitment the President made, I,
of course, would support and carry forward my responsibilities
in order to comply with those commitments and the Treaty.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Hale, on that GAO report, would you give us any
differences that you have--not now but for the record--with
that GAO report, in addition to the request of Senator Inhofe?
Mr. Hale. I will. May I just say quickly we do not intend
to repeat the 2005 round? It was very different than we would
do in 2015.
Chairman Levin. You can just give us your criticisms or
disagreements with that report.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, Secretary Hale, the
Secretary mentioned in his comments that we are facing a lot of
short-run constraints, sequestration, other issues, but longer-
term there are financial issues that have to be dealt with
regardless of the present dilemma with sequestration and the
BCA. One of those is growing personnel costs and particularly
health care costs. I know you have made some proposals in the
budget in that regard, and I just want to direct the question
to General Dempsey and ask the Secretary if he wants to comment
also.
But it would seem to me that in order to effectively carry
out any reforms, there has to be an ongoing dialogue with both
uniformed Active Duty personnel and Reserve personnel. That
dialogue is probably best conducted by the uniformed military
because you have shared the service and the sacrifice of these
individuals more so than anyone else. Is that dialogue going
on? Are there constructive ways organizationally to begin to
save costs? Is there any sort of path forward that could be
agreed upon and then giving us more of an opportunity to deal
with a solution that has buy-in on all sides?
General Dempsey. There has to be, Senator. We have to find
a way forward. The manpower costs are truly unsustainable when
we project them out to 2020, which is where I am trying to
look.
We have reached out. We have actually had several sessions
now with veteran support organizations on this budget
submission and more broadly on the issue of, let us call it,
compensation reform. I would not suggest that we have made much
progress, but I assure you we are working toward that.
Senator Reed. I think it is something that you constantly
have to do, and also, obviously, it is a two-way process,
listening as well as explaining.
I think the other issue too that must concern you is that
at some point you crowd out operations training, maintenance,
procurement. For the Active Force, training, good equipment,
well-motivated, well-schooled leaders are more of a factor than
other benefits.
General Dempsey. Yes. If I could just reinforce that point.
What gets crowded out, by the way, is training and
readiness. There are plenty of constituents for infrastructure,
for compensation, and for weapons systems, but there are not so
many constituents for readiness. So when I talk to the force
about this, I explain to them that you do not want to be the
best compensated force on the planet, but sitting at Fort Hood,
TX, or Beaufort or Langley Air Force Base. We have to keep this
thing in balance.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that very much.
Last year, we were able to work through a process where we
were able to reduce co-pays on pharmaceuticals by adopting a
new technique of mail order, and that was a more efficient
approach. I think those are the types of smart adjustments that
might be more palatable and more acceptable and more
achievable, frankly.
Mr. Secretary, just quickly changing, you initiated, as you
indicated, a strategic review indicating that Secretary Carter
and the Chairman should look at it. Can you update us on any
insights you have at this point? Also, it obviously begs the
obvious question: Is that strategy going to drive the budget or
is the budget going to drive the strategy?
Secretary Hagel. As I noted in my statement, the budget,
obviously, is affecting all of this, not just fiscal year 2013,
which we are living through, which you all understand what we
are going through. I noted this and the Chairman did. But as we
look out into the future, where are we going? How are we going
to get there? What are our strategic priorities? How do we
defend the interests of our country? When you look through
that, obviously resources are critical to that.
When I initiated the Strategic Choices and Management
Review, it was, yes, influenced by the budget, the uncertainty
of that budget. But also more than that, the world is a
different kind of world today, as everyone on this committee
knows. You all travel. You go everywhere. We have new threats.
We have some of the same old threats. There is an alignment
going on in global affairs that we have not seen certainly
since World War II and maybe never quite seen it the way it is.
So the question I have to ask as Secretary of Defense is:
are we prepared, not just today, but are we going to be
prepared within the constraints of budget realities, but bigger
than that? How are we using our assets? Are they smart? Are we
doing wise things, capable things? You mentioned personnel
costs, TRICARE. That has to be examined within and is being
examined within the framework of our examination of everything.
You asked for a status. It is ongoing. As I noted in my
remarks, we brought everybody into this not just to have a
committee, but we have to hear from the combatant commanders.
We have to hear from the senior enlisted. We have to hear from
the men and women who actually have the responsibility of
implementing whatever policies we decide. They are part of
that. We should have it, at least initial report on this, by
the end of May.
I get reports on this weekly. Ash Carter and I talk about
it the end of every week. We will talk about it on Friday. It
is a result of his collaboration with General Dempsey and what
has been done that week and how it is all factoring in.
That is a general, broad brush of it. If you want to go
deeper, I will be glad to.
Senator Reed. No, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.
I just have a few seconds left which I would cede back to
the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
We are going to talk about Syria after this hearing, but I
just have one question initially about it.
Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, and your predecessor,
Secretary Panetta, and Secretary of State Clinton and General
Clapper, all have openly stated they favor providing weapons to
the resistance in Syria. Have you reached an opinion on that
issue?
Secretary Hagel. I have not made a recommendation to the
President that we should militarily intervene.
Senator McCain. No. I am asking about providing weapons to
the resistance.
Secretary Hagel. We are constantly reviewing every policy,
every option.
Senator McCain. Have you reached a conclusion yet?
Secretary Hagel. No.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
General Dempsey, there are persistent rumors the North
Koreans are going to launch a missile sometime in the next days
or weeks to coincide with certain events. Do we have the
capability to intercept a launch?
General Dempsey. We do.
Senator McCain. Would you recommend if that missile left
North Korean airspace, that we intercept it?
General Dempsey. If it threatened any of our facilities or
any of our personnel.
Senator McCain. So the criteria would not be whether it
left North Korean airspace. It would be whether we viewed it as
a threat.
General Dempsey. That would be my advice at this point.
Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Is there any doubt in your mind that over
time, the North Koreans are on the path to having a combination
of a missile and a weapon on it?
General Dempsey. No doubt at all.
Senator McCain. In the case of the Iranians, the latest
round of talks have, obviously, been unsuccessful. We hear
reports about increased capabilities that the Iranians have
even announced. How serious do you think this is getting?
General Dempsey. I have said before, Senator, I think the
Iranian threat is not limited to its nuclear aspirations. I
think they are proliferating weapons of all kinds. They have
surrogates and proxies all over the globe, and I think they
aspire to control the Gulf.
Senator McCain. Secretary Hagel, the defense budget for the
2014 request is $52 billion over the spending cap imposed by
the BCA. Have you made any plans? Are you going to share with
Congress the plans that you will have to make if the BCA and
sequestration is not repealed?
Secretary Hagel. We are underway with those options right
now, Senator. One of the parts of the Strategic Choices and
Management Review is part of that. Every day that is what we
are about, that reality.
Senator McCain. Would it be appropriate to share with
Congress, since it can only be Congress that repeals, and a
signature from the President that repeals, the BCA? Would it
not be appropriate for us to know what measures have to be
taken in case existing law continues to prevail?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, it is and we do. For example, I noted
in my testimony that we will be coming up to Congress with a
significant package of reprogramming requests, which we have
been working with Congress on.
Senator McCain. It is one thing to have reprogramming
requests. It is another thing to submit an overall budget that
reflects the realities of the law as it is today rather than
sending us a budget that has restoration of cuts. So far, there
has been no movement or action to repeal. I am saying that
because I think we need to know what happens if we do not
repeal. It is in your interests, in my view, to give us that
information as to what would happen if we just simply complied
with existing law.
Secretary Hagel. I want to address both points.
One is we are continuing to do that, Senator, as part of
Marty's testimony, part of my testimony on what we are doing,
and explaining and working with the committees here in the
House and the Senate if we do not make these changes, what is
going to be requested. For example, is a supplemental
appropriation within the realm of what is going to be required?
We do not know. We are trying to internally adjust now.
The second part of that is I would just add on the budget--
and I noted one of the points made here this morning on this--
the Senate and the House budget resolutions for defense for
2014 essentially were the same, basically the same numbers as
our budget for defense.
The other part of this is, not at all dismissing your
questions that are real and legitimate on the reality of this,
but as well as anyone, this is a $600 billion enterprise. This
budget was put together over a year. To try to readjust that
and come back with new numbers in a budget was difficult as
well.
But make no mistake, Senator, we are dealing with the
realities of everything that you just talked about.
Senator McCain. But you need to share those with Congress,
Mr. Secretary. I appreciate the fact that you put together a
budget that ignores the realities of the law today. It would be
very helpful in adjusting for those realities if you would
share with Congress what the budget would be if the existing
law is implemented.
Secretary Hagel. We will.
Senator McCain. When?
Secretary Hagel. We are doing that now. As I said----
Senator McCain. You will submit it to Congress.
Secretary Hagel. I am sorry?
Senator McCain. You will submit to Congress----
Secretary Hagel. We have been informing Congress, working
with Congress.
Senator McCain.--a budget that reflects the $52 billion
less than the budget that has been submitted by the President?
Secretary Hagel. As I said in my statement, if there is no
balanced budget agreement, then that is the law, as you have
noted, as I noted in my statement, that we are going to be
facing the reality of a $51 billion to $52 billion cut. We are
preparing for that reality.
Senator McCain. I am just saying you need to inform
Congress and work with Congress so that we can also explain to
our constituents the realities of what would happen if the BCA
were fully implemented. I do not think that is too----
Secretary Hagel. No. I agree.
Senator McCain. General Dempsey, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps says the sequester's impact on marines constitutes
excessive risk. Do you agree? Does that apply to all our
Services?
General Dempsey. It does apply to all our Services. Full
sequestration, particularly in the mechanism, would destroy
readiness in a way that I think none of us would be very
pleased with.
Senator McCain. I thank you. My time has expired. I thank
the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Hagel, let me just agree with
what Senator McCain was driving at. If you will let us know
when you know what the impact would be of a $52 billion
reduction in the budget you have submitted, it will help us, I
believe, avoid that outcome. I think that is what Senator
McCain was pointing to, and I would just agree with that.
Secretary Hagel. I agree with it. We will.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you very much.
Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first want to thank Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey
for responding to concerns that we have expressed. Senator
Gillibrand had a hearing on this and many of us have been
working on this issue for a number of years, and that is making
sure that the military is doing everything it can to catch the
perpetrators of sexual assault and make sure that the system is
respecting the victims and is not arbitrary or capricious. I
know that it is unusual for the Joint Chiefs to come together
with a recommendation to change the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and for the Secretary of Defense to endorse that
and embrace it in such a quick fashion as this occurred, and I
just want you to know how grateful all of us are that are
working on this issue. We will continue to work with you as we
codify some of these changes hopefully in the NDAA this year. I
appreciate your mentioning it in your statement and look
forward to working with both of you to make sure that we are
doing everything we can to focus the system on the act that
occurred and the facts surrounding that act and take the focus
off the victim and what she did or did not do or what he did or
did not do and get us into this century as it relates to the
way this crime is being handled within the UCMJ.
It will not surprise you I want to talk about contracting.
I noticed that U.S. Transportation Command recently put out a
solicitation for airevac, medevac, airlift in Africa. So my
question to you is, was there an analysis done as to why our
current capability on medevac and all of the different commands
that deal with--I think you all just canceled--the Air Force
just decided to cancel the C-27J, which is hard for me to
figure if we are going to turn around and contract with
Blackwater, which it appears from the solicitation that you are
looking for CASA C-212 as the only aircraft that would qualify
under the solicitation. Of course, that is the aircraft that is
used by Academia, the new name for Blackwater.
I am not against contracting logistical support, but I need
to know what the analysis was as to why we cannot do this and
why this is cheaper.
Secretary Hagel. I do not know. Marty, do you?
General Dempsey. No. I know that our lift is stretched. It
is a stretched resource, and in particular, most of what is
coming out of Afghanistan these days comes out by lift.
Second, the threat environment in Africa is different than
it is in other parts of the world, and I am sure that was a
factor. Some of the aircraft you are referring to are
actually--we do not want them in the inventory because of their
sustainability and their capability.
So I know the analysis was done and I am sure that it
followed the rules of competition by the Federal acquisition
regulations. But we owe you an answer. I do not know the
specifics.
Senator McCaskill. I think the answer I am looking for here
is before we do contracting as a default position on
logistics--what I worry about in this shrinking budget
environment, that there is going to be even more of a tendency
to just assume that we should contract it out because it is
cheaper. If Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us anything is
that that is not always true. If you do not have adequate
contracting oversight, it is not, and especially when it is
inherently a governmental function. We could spend a whole
hearing and we have many on that. But I just want to make sure
that it is a new day, and as we begin to do new solicitations
for new logistics support contracts in any threat environment,
there has to be a really detailed analysis done as to why this
is going to save you money and why we cannot do this within the
existing command.
So I will be anxious to see that analysis that was done,
and as you are probably aware, I will spend some time on it.
Secretary Hagel. Senator, we will provide that for you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary Hagel. But let me address just very briefly your
general question and concern. You are right. That is part of
what we are doing in the review. You have been, as much as
anyone, engaged in this overall procurement/acquisition issue
and been very helpful. That is an area that we need to do more,
obviously.
There have been some successes. A recent GAO report that
came out reflected rather positively on what we have been
doing. We will continue to stay at it for the reasons you
mentioned and work with you on it.
Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
As we are drawing out of Afghanistan, I think it is really
time to measure the effects of large-scale infrastructure
spending as being part of the counter-insurgency. I continue to
harp on this, and I am going to keep harping on it until you
all do the work. I need some kind of analysis as to how large-
scale infrastructure spending contributed to a successful fight
in the area of counterinsurgency. You have the ability because
you have done small-scale projects and you have done large-
scale projects. So I am confident that you can do the analysis
as to the impact of what the Commander's Emergency Response
Program was originally intended for versus water systems,
electrical grid, highway systems, all of that that we have
spent billions and billions and billions of Americans' dollars
on.
If we do not do it now, there will be a tendency in the
next conflict to say, okay, let us start building big stuff. I
especially want the analysis to do the overlay of the security
environment and whether or not the small-scale makes sense
because you have to pay off less to security people and
therefore risk getting the money into the wrong hands versus
the large-scale payments we have had to make many times to the
bad guys. So if you would get back to me on that analysis and
when it is planned or how it is planned, that would be very
helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]

Please refer to my letter to you, signed on April 29, 2013.
[Inserted previously]

Secretary Hagel. We will, and just one brief comment.
I believe about five of six of those large-scale
infrastructure projects are directly related to energy or in
some way the lifestyle and the well-being of the people of
Afghanistan, which is obviously important for us and the
importance of the government in bringing together some
nationalism to promote a cohesiveness of society that actually
makes their life better. We want to do that.
But your points about accountability, the whole question of
can they maintain it, is this a wise investment, should we be
doing smaller projects, all appropriate. They are being
analyzed. They are being questioned, and we have spent a lot of
money. Inspector General reports come out almost monthly on
every one of these. We are looking very carefully at every one
of them, and you are exactly right. So we will continue to work
with you on it and get you the analysis your requested.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Secretary Hagel. In
isolation, the theory sounds absolutely sound, but now we have
the data and we can figure out if it actually works or not.
Secretary Hagel. We have made mistakes.
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Congratulations, Secretary Hagel. I look forward to working
with you. I know you love the country and know a lot about the
military. So we have some real opportunities, I think, in the
years to come and some real challenges.
One thing that you need to fully understand--it happened
before you came--was in August 2011 that this Nation reached
the debt ceiling, and there was a national discussion about
that. An agreement was reached and passed in the law. It was
signed by the President of the United States. It said we will
reduce the growth in spending by the amount we raise the debt
ceiling, $2.1 trillion. $1.1 trillion of that was a sequester
if an agreement was not reached by this committee, and the
committee did not reach an agreement.
There was no provision in the BCA agreement to raise taxes.
The President did succeed in January of this year raising taxes
$600 billion, but there was never an agreement as part of the
sequester or the BCA to raise taxes. So that is where we have
loggerheads. This is the problem.
So at the end of debate, I remember sitting bolt up when
the President guaranteed the American people that sequester
would not happen. But it is happening. It is happening right
now. It is in the law.
Now, the House has proposed a budget that eliminates the
cuts on DOD but finds other cuts in the government to replace
them with. The President is saying he wants to eliminate the
sequester, or he apparently indicates he does, but he wants to
do it raising taxes. That is a non-starter.
Under our current debt path, we are increasing spending
every year. The difficulty, as I pointed out before our
committee so many times, is half of the reductions in spending
in the sequester fall on DOD, which only makes up one-sixth of
the entire spending in our government. So that is a
disproportionate cut.
So as you talk to Congress about the difficulties, I
suggest that you go to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and talk to the
President, the Commander in Chief, because I am very worried. I
am very worried because Congress is not going to raise taxes to
eliminate the sequester.
It has been deeply disappointing, DOD has delayed telling
us what those cuts might be. Senator McCain raised it a long
time ago. I have talked about it. We passed legislation, as I
recall, requiring you to lay out a spending plan if the
sequester was not fixed. It is a big deal. I just want to tell
you that you are in a tough spot. But I really do believe that
the way to handle this is to look for other reductions in
spending. Big agencies like Medicaid or food stamps and other
programs got no reductions in spending at all. Zero. So there
is an opportunity to spread some of these reductions around and
not have this burden fall on DOD.
So as the ranking guy on the Senate Budget Committee, I
have been wrestling with these issues. I am worried. I do not
see an easy solution right now. Hopefully, something will
happen, but you need to be prepared for the worst.
I am the ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subommittee
that has nuclear and missile defense forces. I just want to
share some concerns with you, really, about the commitment we
have as a Nation--and this administration does--to the nuclear
arsenal, our nuclear infrastructure, our nuclear modernization
that we have said we are committed to and its understanding for
our nuclear forces as they serve as the ultimate guarantor of
the security of our country and the assurance it provides to
our allies and our partners. These are big issues right now.
President Obama identified nuclear proliferation as a key
danger to the United States and its allies, and it is a danger.
Yet, the response we have seen from this threat of
proliferation has been self-defeating, I am afraid. The
President had hoped to set a disarmament example for others to
follow by emphasizing nuclear arms reductions with Russia over
nuclear deterrence, striking that balance. But the disarmament
provision and the President's policies are undermined by our
inability--the international community's inability--to keep
regimes such as North Korea and Iran from developing nuclear
weapons and long-range missiles. So this will cause
proliferation not only in those rogue nations but people who
feel threatened by them may well feel compelled to develop
nuclear weapons.
I am sure you know, Defense Secretary Ash Carter, in an
attempt to reassure our Asian allies in the face of North
Korean missile threats, said on April 8, ``we will continue to
provide the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear
umbrella.''
But the President in March in South Korea--March 2012,
March last year--said as President, ``I changed our nuclear
posture to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our
national security strategy. I made it clear the United States
will not develop new nuclear warheads and we will not pursue
new military missions for nuclear weapons. We have narrowed the
range of contingencies under which we would ever use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons.''
So there is no wonder, I think, our allies are getting
nervous here, and it has the danger of proliferation and danger
of instability, I am afraid, in the world. We do not like to
talk about nuclear weapons. This is a grim subject, indeed, but
I want to raise these issues with you.
It looks like in November 2010, the White House issued the
statement noting the administration had added $4.1 billion to
the 5-year plan for weapons, but according to my accounting,
over the years 2012, 2013, and proposed 2014, assuming the
sequester were to occur, we would have $1.4 billion, 34 percent
short of what the promised increases were.
We were informed last year that the replacement for the
Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine and the air-launched
cruise missile were both 2 years behind schedule. It has yet to
be made clear about the follow-on for the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program. The Life Extension Program
(LEP) for the B-61 bomb was 2 years behind schedule, as was the
planned LEP for the W-78 and W-88 nuclear warheads.
So, I think this is a dangerous trend that we have to
reverse and stop.
I think what we need to hear from you, and the world needs
to hear from you, is a commitment to maintain the strategic
triad and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and the nuclear
weapons complex, as I understand, the President has agreed to.
I understand you support the agreement.
But just would you repeat that here today? I think it would
be important for the world, our allies, and our adversaries.
General Dempsey, you have your commitment that you will
preserve our nuclear arsenal and pursue the nuclear
modernization efforts that President Obama, our Commander in
Chief, has committed to. Specifically, will you commit to
increases in the fiscal year 2015 budget and FYDP to help get
these capabilities on track or to, at least, prevent further
delays?
General Dempsey. Senator, I am committed. My advice has
been and will continue to be to maintain the triad to include
extended deterrence in our capability and to maintain a safe
and secure and reliable stockpile.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Hagel, you had a comment.
Secretary Hagel. I have said that in my confirmation
hearing, would say it again, and am absolutely committed to it.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you.
There is talk around as a result of us passing the defense
appropriations for the rest of the fiscal year. There is now
talk around that you can reduce the furlough days for defense
civilians from 14 to 7. Is that true?
Secretary Hagel. Senator, we sent out notification to
Congress, to comply with the law, that we were considering
furloughing. Our initial take--and I will let our Comptroller
respond more fully to this, but our initial take on it was
maybe as much as 21 days were going to be required. We now have
that down to 14. We are still reviewing, Senator, what actions
we may have to take. I think we are probably a couple of weeks
away from coming to a determination on what that furlough would
be. Congress, of course, will be fully informed, kept informed
on any decisions we think we need to make to comply with our
budget restraints.
With that, let me ask the Comptroller if he has anything
further.
Mr. Hale. I think you said it well, Mr. Secretary. We have
not made a decision beyond the 14 days--beyond saying up to 14
days.
Senator Nelson. If it stays at 14, that would start to go
into effect at what time? Either 14 or 7--when would it go into
effect?
Mr. Hale. We also have not made specific timing decisions,
but it would probably be in late June, perhaps at the 14-day
level. I want to preserve the Secretary's options for looking
at this.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, President Karzai has said
that we are in cahoots with the Taliban. Why would he say such
a thing?
Secretary Hagel. I was welcomed with that comment as I was
arriving in Afghanistan. We had an opportunity to expand on
that privately, and he has since, I think, readjusted his
thinking on what he said publicly. Secretary Kerry was there
soon after my visit. I did not go into any great depth as to
what led him to that conclusion, but I think he said something
to the effect that he was misinterpreted or there was some
confusion in what he said.
I spoke to President Karzai 2 days ago. I called him and I
think it is important that we stay in touch with leaders. We
had a conversation, in particular, about a bilateral security
agreement, and I wanted to also get his sense of the handover
at the detention center, which I know General Dunford was here
yesterday and addressed that.
You know that that is an area of the world and its leaders
are under a lot of pressure all the time. I think we need to
stay engaged wisely and carefully and reach out, make it very
clear what our guidelines are. We have a big challenge ahead of
us, which has already been noted here this morning. We will
probably get into a little more detail this afternoon on post-
2014 activities and how many troops. What will be our mission?
Why should we stay there? Should we stay there? So the only way
we can, I think, responsibly transition out is to continue to
work with the leaders.
But I guess only President Karzai would be able to answer
that question.
Senator Nelson. Are the leaders over there beginning to
accept the fact that we are not going to remain as an occupying
force?
Secretary Hagel. I think so, Senator. I think it is pretty
clear, as we are consolidating our bases and handing over
responsibilities. General Dempsey noted in some of his
testimony this morning what the Afghan army has taken
responsibility for, what their police force has. There is some
good news. It is imperfect. It is, in places, raggedy, but that
is reality. I think we have to recognize that this is the first
time that we have ever seen any kind of a national government
with a national unity of a national force and all that goes
with it. We need to continue to assist where we can, but not
occupy. But I do think, to answer your question, it is clear to
the leadership in Afghanistan and the people that we are not
there to occupy.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions on
Syria. Do you want me to wait until the afternoon session?
Chairman Levin. That is the plan, but you have a minute and
35 seconds left and I am not about to tell you how to answer.
But we will have a----
Senator Nelson. I can yield back the same amount of time
that Senator Sessions went over, and then we would be even.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I think I am going to stay out of this
conversation. You are free to ask a question.
Senator Nelson. I would just like to get it on the table,
and if you want to discuss it later this afternoon, that will
be fine.
If we are faced with having to go in and secure the
chemical weapons in Syria, it has been bandied about that that
would take 75,000 troops, boots-on-the-ground, American troops
in Syria. Is that an accurate assessment?
Secretary Hagel. I am going to defer that question to
General Dempsey because we are looking at all options for all
contingencies. But let me ask General Dempsey if he would take
it.
General Dempsey. In the time remaining--and we can follow
up this afternoon. We have looked at alternative futures. The
answer to your question would be whether we are entering a
hostile environment, a non-permissive environment, a permissive
environment, or an environment of collaboration. We know how
that number changes based on the environment. But it is a
resource-intensive task to be sure.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
First, Mr. Secretary, welcome back from your travels.
Let me quote from the Stars and Stripes dated April 16
regarding the sharing of medical records. It starts off,
``Faced with tough questions from legislators, Defense
Secretary Chuck Hagel on Tuesday said he would decide on a plan
within 30 days to work through the tangled process to
seamlessly share medical records between DOD and the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA).''
Mr. Secretary, it goes on to say you are doing this at the
urging of members of the Veterans Affairs Committee. They have
asked you to institute electronic transfer capabilities by
December 31.
It mentions that Secretary Panetta, your predecessor, had
instead taken another approach of filesharing rather than
building a single, integrated system from scratch. He said he
could not defend DOD's past performance on record sharing. In
recent days he said he stopped further spending on the process
and has restructured the program oversight.
I was in the U.S. House of Representatives before I came
over here. I have been here 5 years, and I was on the
appropriations subcommittee dealing with veterans for some time
over there, Mr. Secretary.
We did not even have iPads 4 years ago, and this whole
technology has been developed in 4 short years. It just seems
to me that the fact that we have been talking in 2013 about
filesharing only and not thinking big about a new system that
our most talented people in America could certainly do, to just
start over and have a system that starts within DOD and moves
seamlessly with you when leave and need the system is something
we ought to go to.
So tell us what we can expect from you in 30 days and
elaborate, if you will, on your plans there.
Secretary Hagel. I think, Senator, you have said it. Why
can we not expect exactly what you just said? We should expect
it. We owe that to our veterans.
I also said in my response yesterday that there have been a
lot of positive things done too. There has been a lot of good
things, and there has been a lot of progress. But we are still
not where we need to be, where the President committed us to be
in 2009, and Members of Congress expected us to be.
Now, with that said, there is no point in going back and
blaming anybody for anything. We are where we are. Now, how do
we fix it? That is the only thing that matters.
When I came in--and I am not an expert on any of this, but
I have some background on this, Senator. 30 years ago, I was
Ronald Reagan's Deputy Administrator of the VA, 1981 and 1982,
and I had some ability at the time to start to actually
computerize systems. Now, I do not take credit for that
happening, but I pushed that pretty hard.
In some ways, we are still in a state of limbo in
accomplishing what needs to be done. You used the iPad example
as why can we not do this. We will do it. We will get to it.
But I always start with who is in charge, who is accountable,
how does it happen, theory, policy, strategy. You need it, but
how does it get implemented. What I have done is I have asked
to stop everything as far as request for proposals going out
until I can understand what it is that our objective is. How
are we spending our money? Why? What is it that we can do that
is most helpful to the VA? What is our obligation to our
people? We invent the veteran. The person starts with us. The
seamless network, the interoperability that you refer to is
where we need to be in everything. So we are going to continue
to do it.
Senator Wicker. Have you had a chance to sit down with VA
Secretary Shinseki about this?
Secretary Hagel. I sat down with Secretary Shinseki in the
second week I was on the job. We have talked a number of times
on the phone. We talk once a week. We are very closely
connected. It is a tough assignment that he has. But I am
absolutely committed, as my predecessors have been--you noted
Secretary Panetta's involvement--to make this work and to have
these two agencies cooperate and work together.
Senator Wicker. What can we expect to receive from you?
What can we on the committee expect to receive from you after
the 30-day period you alluded to?
Secretary Hagel. What I said is that I am assessing it all
now, and what we will do is we will restructure the
accountability chain as to how we are going to go forward, who
is going to be in charge, and who will have that
responsibility, what kind of resources we will have.
Senator Wicker. Is there something you can get back to us
with, say, by the end of May?
Secretary Hagel. Once I make a decision, we will, of
course, share it with the committee.
Senator Wicker. Do you think that might be by the end of
May?
Secretary Hagel. As I said, my goal is to try to have
something together structurally within 30 days.
Senator Wicker. Okay, thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]

Please find my memorandum dated May 21, 2013, to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness attached.

Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, I was visiting with some
DOD people earlier this week. A 9 percent sequestration cut,
when you cram it into half a year, turns out to be 18 percent.
The number of training sorties that we are able to have in the
Air Force, for example, 18 percent of those cannot be done. I
understand a lot of that is fuel, some other costs there.
The statement was also made to a small group of us that if
only we had more time, we could absorb the sequestration cuts
in a more logical way. It just makes me wonder. Did we take the
wrong approach in assuring the public and assuring ourselves
that sequestration really was not going to happen? This is just
unimaginable.
It seems to me in retrospect--and I am speaking about
myself also--that we should have known at the collapse of the
Supercommittee, that sequestration was the law and also that it
was likely to happen. If we had, since 2011, the realization
that this was a fact and was going to happen in 2013, we would
be in a better position, would we not, General?
General Dempsey. If you are asking me did we take the wrong
approach, yes. I do think that this Strategic Choices and
Management Review allows us to understand the impact and to be
able to articulate to Congress what the effect of full
sequestration would be.
But please remember too we are still trying to figure out
how to absorb the $487 billion of the BCA. So this is not the
deepest budget cut in our history. It is the steepest by far.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
In terms of Senator Wicker's request that we hear from you
by the end of May, can you give us a status report by the end
of May even if you have not made that decision, letting us know
where you are? Would you include in that report the response of
DOD to the Wounded Warriors legislation that we passed here
that required that there be interoperability, not a single
record, but interoperability by, I believe, the end of 2012?
Let us know just what became of that and how interoperable the
two systems are as part of your response to Senator Wicker's
request, and give us again that status report even if you have
not completed your decision.
Secretary Hagel. I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Great to have you here. Mr.
Secretary, I particularly want to extend a special welcome to
you in your first appearance as the Secretary of Defense before
the committee.
General Dempsey, let me start on cyber, if I might. I was
pleased to see the increased funding in the budget, especially
given the threats and the capabilities that we have seen
developing over these last few years, and what you are
proposing will hopefully allow us to stay ahead of all of this.
Can you give the committee a sense of what the $800 million
in the budget will buy us? What enhancements will be a result
of that investment that we did not have before? On that same
subject, given the current level of maturity, is it now the
appropriate time to elevate U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to
the level of a separate unified command?
General Dempsey. What we are doing with the $800 million;
we are organizing ourselves. Currently, we have capabilities at
the national level. I know you know this, Senator, but our
portfolio for cyber is very narrowly defined as defending the
dot-mil domain. So we are protecting ourselves, though we have
said frequently that we have capabilities that could be
extended to the Nation, should that become necessary, in the
defense against an attack, for example. So we have the teams
formed at the national level.
We are also trying to export the capability, if you will,
to the combatant commanders, forming fusion centers, operations
centers, if you will, so that they have the capability to
conduct reconnaissance of threat networks external to the
United States, of course, and then defensive teams that if the
dot-mil domain is under attack can block and, if necessary,
have the capability to perform offensive cyber as well.
So what we are doing is protecting ourselves. But you are
interested, of course, as well as the Nation, and I think that
the next step in that journey will require some legislation to
augment and supplement what the President provided in his
Executive order.
Senator Udall. Thoughts on a unified CYBERCOM? Do you want
to take that under advisement?
General Dempsey. Yes, sure. We have not pushed it because
we want to make sure that the timing is right. You know that I
advocate that CYBERCOM and the National Security Agency be
dual-hatted. I am not sure we have been persuasive in that
regard, and so until I am persuasive, we want to leave well
enough alone because I think we are adequately organized right
now. But I think that if we are having this conversation in
2020, people will say, of course, it should have been a unified
command, but we are just not there yet.
Senator Udall. Mr. Secretary, you know well the important
role research and development (R&D) has played, not just in DOD
but the work that has been done has been translated and
transferred over to the civilian sector dating way back.
I want to focus on energy R&D. Many experts have been
saying that we should do so in DOD. I understand in that vein
that the price of fuel that the Services will pay--and this is
conventional fuel--is going to rise to over $4.70 per gallon on
May 1, which is an increase of about 21 percent over current
prices. The bottom line is oil prices keep going up and the
volatility of those prices makes budgeting impossible.
With that in mind, what kind of investments will DOD need
to make to prevent our fuel bill from cutting further into our
critical programs?
Secretary Hagel. You know the numbers on this, Senator, as
to how much money we spend annually and one of the largest,
maybe the largest, consumer of fuels in the world is DOD. So it
is an issue. It is not just a budget issue, but it is a
security issue, the reliability of our sources as we have the
fleet all over the world, and planes.
We have an office in DOD that focuses on this. We have
programs within that office. We continue to look at different
options and programs. We fund those offices. It is a priority,
has to be a priority, within the balance of all the things that
we are doing.
The R&D wing of defense has been a remarkably productive
element for defense and the country. So, yes, it is a priority,
will continue to be a priority.
Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you in that
regard. I want to, again, pay tribute to the Navy, in
particular. It has really been on the cutting edge of this
effort, Secretary Mabus specifically.
If I might, let me reference General Dunford's comments
yesterday that he is worried about the effect that cuts will
have on the training and readiness of troops rotating into
Afghanistan. General Odierno told us last month that reduced
training dollars could force the Army--extending tour lengths
in order to prevent units that are not fully prepared from
going into harm's way.
Do you have the same concerns? If I could be more blunt, is
Congress' inability to compromise putting our troops' safety at
risk? I direct that to both you and General Dempsey.
Secretary Hagel. I will respond briefly and then General
Dempsey will want to respond.
First, as General Dempsey has said, as I noted in my
statement, readiness has to be our number one priority. I
cannot certify, nor can the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or
any of our chiefs, to have our young men and women go to war if
they are unprepared, if they are not ready. I will not do that.
I know Chairman Dempsey will not do that. Any of our leaders
will not do it, so it has to remain a priority.
Are we concerned with the cuts and what is happening? Yes,
we are. As you heard this morning and will continue to hear, we
are working around that in every way we can to affect that. But
at some point here, we are going to see that start to cut
pretty deeply, I think, as the Chairman has noted and General
Dunford noted, the chiefs have noted.
With that, let me ask General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. Yes, I am deeply concerned. Right now,
Senator, we are consuming readiness. We are using it. We are
not producing it. We are stuck in that position because we have
to find $23 billion in readiness funding for the rest of the
year. So we are consuming it. We are not producing it. That is
a dangerous path.
Senator Udall. I would note we have another opportunity as
a Congress in the early/middle part of the summer to deal with
this. It is my desire that we do so, and I am going to be
focused on this in every way I possibly can. I know Sergeant
Hagel would not send our troops into combat without being
properly prepared.
Thank you again, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer my
questioning to Ms. Fischer and go after her. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today. General
Dempsey, Mr. Hale, I appreciate it very much.
I would like to follow up a little bit on Senator Sessions'
question about the commitment to the triad. You all agreed that
you have a firm commitment to the triad. Is that correct?
Secretary Hagel. Yes.
Senator Fischer. General Dempsey, you as well?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Do either of you see any reason to abandon
that commitment in the foreseeable future?
Secretary Hagel. No, I do not see a reason to abandon it.
General Dempsey. Nor do I.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
I ask this because, Secretary Hagel, last week you were
speaking and testifying before the House Armed Services
Committee, and you discussed your office's request for funds to
perform an EIS related to the ICBM missile wings. What is the
EIS examining?
Secretary Hagel. Senator, in the NDAA, we were instructed
to examine possible ground-based locations on the east coast to
supplement the two that we have on the west coast, Fort Greeley
and Vandenberg. We are conducting EISs to examine those at the
direction of the NDAA.
Senator Fischer. Are you looking at any partial shutdowns
at all?
Mr. Hale, did you have a comment you would like to put in?
Mr. Hale. I think you are referring to the EIS at the three
missile wings. Is that correct?
Senator Fischer. Yes.
Mr. Hale. There, I think, we are looking at ways to
accommodate the New START treaty's drawdown and looking at all
options. But as the Secretary just said, no decisions have been
made.
Senator Fischer. It is my understanding that leadership in
the military consistently says that we need to make sure that
we have a strong triad and that we need our ICBMs. So why would
we be conducting any kind of study looking at possible
shutdowns?
General Dempsey. As Mr. Hale said, Senator, we have to get
to New START levels. So we have to look at the triad. The two
places that are likely to be adjusted are either submarine-
launched ballistic missiles or ICBMs. So the EIS is looking at
the impact of that.
But we are already on a path where we have to achieve New
START levels by, I think, 2017.
Senator Fischer. Would that include keeping some of the
silos warm?
General Dempsey. It could, Senator. That is partly the
purpose of the EIS, as well as the Nuclear Posture Review that
we have been conducting for some time.
Senator Fischer. Are you looking at any other missions with
regard to EIS, besides the ICBMs?
General Dempsey. Meaning some other use for those silos?
Yes. We are looking at the entire spectrum of possibilities.
The problem with keeping a silo warm is that it causes
concerns in our compliance with New START. So we have to work
through all that, but we are looking at the entire spectrum of
possibilities.
Senator Fischer. Does that include shutting down any of the
missile wings completely?
General Dempsey. Decision to be determined, but generally
speaking at this time, we do not believe so.
Senator Fischer. What is the cost of the evaluation? Do you
have any idea on that?
General Dempsey. I do not, Senator.
Mr. Hale. I am going to have to give you that for the
record. I am sorry. I do not have it in my head.
Senator Fischer. Okay, that would be good.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Fischer. Senator Hagel, in your prepared statement,
you speak about the curse of human despair and poverty, along
with environmental degradation, as key threats confronting our
military. I guess I was not aware that our military was ever
formed to look at those items. Why did you put that in your
statement, especially in light of the budgetary concerns that
we now have?
Secretary Hagel. That was included in the list of issues
that our military does have to face around the world as we go
into other countries to protect our interests. What produces
terrorists? What produces instability? What produces
uncertainty around the world? That rolls right back on
responsibility and obligation of DOD to protect our interests
around the world. When you have unstable areas that, partly,
are as a result of poverty, degradation in any way, it adds to
the complication of the environment of terrorism challenge
problems. So it was not just one issue. I listed an entire
inventory.
Senator Fischer. How would you try to balance that, though,
with the needs of our men and women who are in the Service and
their need for training, for resources, to make sure that we do
not send out a hollow force, and that they have all the
resources that they require to accomplish their mission?
Secretary Hagel. Senator, that inventory of issues was, as
you note from my testimony, an inventory of issues of the
global environment that we face today. I mentioned global
terrorism, technology, and so on. It had nothing to do with
directly making a choice. But my point was when you look at all
those challenges that we need to prepare our military--for
example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, young Army and Marine Corps
captains were doing many things on the ground. They were
leading their men and women into combat. They were dealing with
tribal leaders. They were dealing with different systems within
the village. They were dealing with social issues. So it all
does have an intersection and a confluence as to how we train
and prepare all of our people.
Senator Fischer. With the sequester and the limits that we
are going to have on DOD's budget, are we going to be able to
continue to train our military so that they can address that
very wide range of issues that you listed?
Secretary Hagel. We are going to have to continue to train
our military to be prepared to deal with every eventuality,
every contingency, every option. That is how we prepare our
military. It is how we prepare any institution's leaders.
Senator Fischer. So as you look ahead to that $52 billion
in cuts that are not a part of the budget that you presented
but yet are required under the sequester, do you have any idea
at this point, at this hearing, on what you would suggest that
we are able to cut and still maintain a fighting force that is
well-prepared?
Secretary Hagel. I would refer you back to the comment I
made in my statement, and General Dempsey has noted, and my
response to Senator McCain on this question. That is one
reason--not the only, but it was certainly an important
reason--why I directed the Strategic Choices and Management
Review to prepare all of us, DOD, all our forces, to deal with
that $52 billion that may well be coming. That, as you note, is
reality. That is law, and it may get worse. It may be another
$500 billion over 9 years. So within that review, Senator, then
we will have to come up with ways to deal with this reality
with this current law.
Senator Fischer. Within your review, would you also list
what you deem as priorities that cannot be reduced?
Secretary Hagel. That is the whole point of it because it
is a matter of, as I have noted here, others here, a
prioritization of our resources, but mainly it has to begin
with what is our main responsibility. The main responsibility
we have--I have as Secretary--is the security of this country.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey and Secretary Hale, thank you, obviously,
for your service. Secretary Hagel, welcome back to this
committee.
Secretary Hagel, I wanted to ask you some questions about
the furloughs. The Navy is reporting that with the recent
passage of a defense appropriations bill, that it does have the
financial resources to avoid furloughing the 200,000 Navy and
Marine Corps civilians, including thousands from my home State
of North Carolina. However, recently a DOD spokesman stated
that the current plan is to implement civilian furloughs with
rough consistency across DOD.
So I remain committed to replacing sequestration with a
balanced, long-term approach that can give certainty not only
to DOD, but to the Departments, to businesses, and obviously,
the men and women serving our Nation. Until this problem is
fixed, I am concerned about any unnecessary furloughs.
While there would be some short-term savings by furloughing
civilian employees, those savings would be outweighed by the
longer-term drop in readiness. For example, delaying
maintenance like that performed at FRC East at Cherry Point
would likely result in additional cost when the backlog would
be eventually addressed.
So, Secretary Hagel, do you plan on furloughing civilian
workers even if it is not financially necessary? How does DOD
plan on approaching furloughs?
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
First, you know that when we notified Congress, appropriate
to the law, that we are considering furloughs, which we have
done, at that time we were looking at the possibility of a 21-
day furlough. We have since announced, as we have tried to
bring this down and manage it, that we think we are at 14 days.
We have also said if we have to do this, it could be less.
But that said, to answer your question, we are examining
all of this very carefully for the reasons you mentioned. That
would be one of the last options that we would want to take for
the reasons you mentioned and more.
We believe within 2 to 3 weeks, we will have an answer to
this. There could be some better news; there could not be some
better news. But we are dealing with a balancing here of where
do you get the cuts in order to, as you have said--we discussed
this morning--maintain readiness and do the things that we have
the highest responsibility for, what are our highest
priorities? Now, that is not to say our civilian workforce is
not a high priority, not at all. I think General Dempsey talked
about the costs of getting back, and you just mentioned some of
the maintenance issues. We are well aware of that. There are no
good choices here, Senator, at all.
So we will not take any action on furloughs unless in our
collective judgment there is no other way to get around this in
order to comply with the law and with our budget.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. But I would like you to be sure
and look at what the Navy has said in response, that it does
have the financial resources to avoid those furloughs.
Secretary Hagel. I am not unaware of that, but let me
respond this way. We have tried to come at this in a fair way
across the board. Some Services are in better shape than
others. I do not think that is necessarily--and I will ask the
Chairman to respond to this--meaning one Service is better
managed than the other. The Army has taken the brunt in
Afghanistan. They had to chew up so much of their budget. That
is the way it is. I do believe--and I said this when I first
went over there 6 weeks ago--on this issue and everything, we
are going into this together. We are going to come out of it
together. I think that is the wise, smart, and fair way to do
this. Some Services are on some higher ground with their budget
than others. So that is recognizing what you have just said.
Let me ask General Dempsey on the Service----
Senator Hagan. I would also add the Marines are taking that
brunt too.
Secretary Hagel. That is true.
General Dempsey. I cannot improve upon that, Mr. Secretary.
That is right. This is an issue of dealing with this as a
Department, not as individual Services.
Senator Hagan. General Dempsey, let me move to the cyber
threat issue. I know we were just talking about that too. We
all know that China, on a huge scale, is routinely hacking into
U.S. Government information networks collecting intelligence
and stealing technology. The same is true for our U.S.
businesses and academia.
There have been numerous press reports of Chinese cyber-
operators breaking into industrial control systems. Specific
stories indicate that Chinese actors penetrated the control
systems of a string of gas pipeline companies to such an extent
that they could have freely manipulated them.
So I am interested to know the extent of China's cyber
capabilities that could have a more direct impact on our
security if we were to find ourselves in a crisis in the
future. Although conflicts between the United States and China
is a very remote proposal, can you address China's cyber
capability, if it would allow it to effectively attack our
critical infrastructure through cyberspace if it felt compelled
to do so, and likewise, your comments on whether you think
China would be able to impair our ability to mobilize, deploy,
and sustain military forces in the Pacific from a cyberattack
on infrastructure that DOD, obviously, depends on to move and
supply our troops?
General Dempsey. In the time available, let me, if I could,
Senator, suggest that we have a longer conversation about this.
But I am concerned about the state and non-state actors and
individuals operating in cyber. It is ungoverned space and
there are plenty of actors taking advantage of it. We are
vulnerable to it. We will continue to be vulnerable to it until
we reach agreements both internal to our country and also
internationally.
I am going to China, in particular, in the next week or so.
You may have seen that Secretary Kerry, when he was there,
gained agreement with them to have a cyber working group, and I
think that will be a very positive step forward.
But I am concerned about the vulnerabilities in cyber in
general, not necessarily pended to any particular country or
group.
Senator Hagan. Whenever I talk about cyber, I always want
to talk about the fact that we need to really concentrate on
science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education in
our K through 12 and in our university system. I think we need
to have a much larger focus and investments in STEM because not
only does our military need individuals well-trained in that
field, we are competing with industry right now and so many
other factors. These are the jobs that are going to continue
propelling the United States as a global super power. So I just
want to reiterate the intense need and desire for investments
in STEM education.
General Dempsey. I think Duke University would be
particularly well-placed to lead that effort.
Chairman Levin. A very wise answer. [Laughter.]
Senator Hagan. Many of our North Carolina institutions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, because of scheduling
concerns, I am going to defer to Senator Ayotte, and then if I
could be the next Republican? Thank you.
Chairman Levin. If you are here at that moment, you will be
the next Republican and then Senator Lee would be after you,
and now Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank Senator
Vitter for yielding to me. I really appreciate it.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Let me echo what Senator Hagan just touched upon with
regard to the furloughs because I had an opportunity to meet
with Admiral Ferguson yesterday and he is going to be
testifying before the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee on the Navy readiness posture. He also informed me
that the Navy, in looking at their resources and budget, have
come up with a proposal that could end all the furloughs for
the Navy and the Marine Corps, including--of course, you think
about our shipyards and the important maintenance work done
there, particularly at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. One of
the reasons he gave me was--it made a lot of sense to me,
having been to the shipyard and talked to certainly the
commander there and the workers--that once we get behind on a
maintenance schedule, then the entire maintenance of our naval
fleet and our submarine fleet gets behind. So what I was told
by Admiral Ferguson is this proposal to end the furloughs he
believes would also be cost efficient because of the
maintenance schedule issue that will get us behind if we have
to furlough the workers at the shipyard in Portsmouth and the
other public shipyards in the country.
So I wanted to follow up just to add to what Senator Hagan
said, and it is my hope that given that the Navy has said that
they are able to do this, that we will follow through because I
understand the difficulties and appreciate--and I thank you for
serving in challenging times in sequestration. But if we can,
obviously, in areas that are very important, such as the
maintenance of our submarines and ships, not get behind
schedule and also keep those workers working, I think that is
very important.
So I do not know if you have a further comment on that, but
I am really hoping that given that they have come up with this
proposal, that you will decide to implement it.
General Dempsey. Senator, as the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, it will not surprise you to know that my
recommendation--and that is what it is--to the Secretary is
that we deal with this problem as a Department, not as
individual Services. I know, for example, that the Army has
some real problems at Anniston Army Depot in trying to reset
equipment that has been beaten to death in Afghanistan. So
every Service has their own particular challenge, but my
recommendation is that we have to deal with it as a Department.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. Also, I would hope that
as you look at it, you think about, to the extent we can
mitigate additional costs we are going to see in the long term
like, for example, in a maintenance schedule or even with the
reset of equipment, certainly I know that you will look at
those issues. I know that you are in a tough position. But I
was encouraged to hear that by Admiral Ferguson the other day
and appreciate the decision that you will make. Thank you for
taking those priorities into consideration.
Secretary Hagel. Just to reassure you on it, Senator, as I
had noted to Senator Hagan, Mr. Hale spends a good part of
every day of his life and his staff dealing with this. This is
as difficult a part of this as we have to deal with. I noted
that in my testimony. You are right on every count on
maintenance and costs and longer-term costs. All those factors
are part of it. We will only take action if really we feel--the
chiefs and everybody--there is no other way to get around this.
I would also say, without getting too deep into this, that
if we would have to move in that direction of furloughs, there
are exceptions as well to those who would be exempt with
certain jobs. Then we would have to factor some of what your
conversation is about into that as well.
Senator Ayotte. Good, good. That makes sense so that you
can try to prioritize given the challenges. I appreciate that,
Mr. Secretary.
I also wanted to ask you if--you said in your prepared
statement that our next goal is audit-ready budget statements
by the end of 2014. Secretary Hale will appreciate this because
I have asked him about this on many instances. But what I
really want to ask you is will you meet the law and produce the
budgetary statement of audit-ready budget statements by the end
of 2014 because it is the law?
Secretary Hagel. I know it is the law. We are all aware
that it is the law. We are committed to do that and to comply
with the law. We need to do it whether there was a law or not.
Senator Ayotte. Good. Thank you. I appreciate that very
much.
I wanted to ask about the North Korea situation, and in
particular, if you have had any interactions with your
counterpart from China, Mr. Secretary.
One of the concerns I have had and I know that the
administration shares is that North Korea is very dependent
upon China for their economic viability, including food, fuel,
trading. In my view, China could end some of the deeply
troubling and bellicose behavior that we are seeing from the
leader of North Korea. I know we put additional defense assets
in the area because we are concerned about the North Koreans.
So if I could get a comment from either Secretary Hagel or
General Dempsey about the Chinese, what interactions we have
had with them, and how we could encourage them to tell North
Korea to knock it off.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you. I will begin and then I know
General Dempsey will want to say something because, as he has
noted and he will talk about, he is leaving for China here in a
couple of days.
Yes, I have spoken to my Chinese counterpart about this. We
spent some time on this issue. He is well aware of the
seriousness for them too, the common interests.
Secretary Kerry was just recently there. I talked to
Secretary Kerry Sunday night. He was in Tokyo. He called me and
we had a long conversation about it. I will see him today. We
will have further conversation about it. Both of us focused on
the same issue. We need more help from China here for the
reasons you mentioned. So let me leave it there before I ask
General Dempsey to respond.
You are right. We are doing everything we can within our
frameworks here to encourage the Chinese to do more. I think
that we are seeing some response to that. This issue is not
over. We know that. But I think it is moving in the right
direction with the Chinese.
General Dempsey. I will just add, Senator, you can be sure
that is going to be on the top of the agenda when I am in
China. I will be happy to give you a call when I get back.
Senator Ayotte. I am sure you will come up with a more
polite way to say, can you tell them to, ``knock it off,'' but
that is what we need.
General Dempsey. I wrote that down. I will see if I can fit
it in. [Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it.
I thank you all for being here and for your leadership.
Chairman Levin. General, I think it might be very helpful
if you get a Chinese translation of ``knock it off'' because
that kind of directness, I think, reflects the feeling of every
member of this committee, probably every Member of the Senate,
that they have an ability--they being China--capability and,
indeed, a responsibility to the region and the world to take
the action that they are able to take to tell North Korea that
their continuing economic support of North Korea is dependent
upon North Korea ``knocking it off,'' however that is
translated into Chinese, Mandarin, or otherwise.
General Dempsey. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think there is an
opportunity to have this conversation in a new way. Secretary
Kerry and their leadership agreed on the discussion of a new
great power relationship. Great powers have great
responsibilities, and I think on that basis, we will have a
good conversation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte, for your plain
English. We appreciate that.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you
for your service. I am extremely grateful.
I would like to just continue the line on North Korea just
for a moment. Obviously, they have extraordinary
unpredictability and highly threatening behavior, and we need
China to step up to play a leadership role, to apply the kind
of serious pressure that it will take to have North Korea
refrain from the language and threats that they are making. How
confident are you that we will be able to convince China to
play this role? If they choose not to, what recommendations
will you make?
Secretary Hagel. As I said in my parting comments regarding
this issue, I think we are seeing some movement in the right
direction with our relationship with China on North Korea. I
start with the fact that this is a problem for them. Every
nation responds in its own self-interest, which is predictable.
But we clearly have a common interest here. I agree with the
chairman's comment that he just made that we may have some
opportunities here, and the way we are approaching it, I think,
is the right way to approach it. As to what happens if things
do not turn out right, I think we will have to deal with that
at an appropriate time.
But I have some confidence that this is moving in the right
direction. It is always a balance of projecting force, which we
have done, I think, wisely and carefully. Diplomacy and
economics are involved in this. I think also we realize that
they have a new set of leaders in China. So they are going to
carefully navigate this, as they should, and I think we are
seeing that kind of careful and responsible leadership through
this. We need to do more. I believe China needs to do more. But
we will keep working at it.
Senator Gillibrand. My concern is that we have a lot of
assets now moved to the region in response to the threats in
order to be prudent, but part of our military exercises in the
region may well exacerbate the type of response that we have
gotten from North Korea. Do you imagine that if we can engage
China appropriately--and obviously, China has every interest in
the world to engage on this appropriately--do you think it
would change our long-term strategy for how we respond in the
region?
Secretary Hagel. We have interests and we will continue to
have interests in the Asia-Pacific, and that is, obviously,
part of what was behind the President's decision to rebalance
in our defense strategic guidance. I agree with that, and I
think that was an appropriate rebalancing.
Our allies in that area are critically important. Allies
are always important, but I think as we sail into an even more
complicated 21st century where military action alone is not
going to make the decisive moves that will bring about the
conclusions and accomplish objectives that we want, we are
going to have to work with allies. We are going to have to
continue to prepare and build up our allies.
Obviously, China is a hugely important country. It will
continue to be. We have a relationship with it that is one of
competition, one of cooperation, and in some cases, one of
collaboration where we find common interests.
So, yes, it has a lot to do with the future and our role.
But I do not think there is any mistake that anyone should
make that the United States is not going to be in the Pacific
and Asia for a long time. Our interests are clearly there. We
have strong alliances there and friends there.
Senator Gillibrand. Along the lines of long-term strategic
planning, as we consider these kinds of threats, we also have
to consider nonstatic nuclear-equipped states that have
capacity to launch threats from other locations. Have you
thought about whether we need an east coast missile defense
system and site? What role do you see EADS playing in ensuring
domestic security against a nonstatic nuclear-equipped state?
Secretary Hagel. We discussed this a bit in the latest
exchange with Senator Fischer, and others have asked this
before.
We are involved now in a study directed by the NDAA which
we are undertaking now. We have not come to any conclusions.
That, of course, as we know, is a part of a review and a study.
We will present those reviews and conclusions.
So I could not give you an answer now, Senator, on whether
I think we need an east coast site or not.
Senator Gillibrand. We can continue that dialogue.
Secretary Hagel. We will.
Senator Gillibrand. For the last minute, I would like to
turn to cyber. I know, General Dempsey, you have testified
already today that it is very important for the defense budget
to expand our cyber capabilities. I believe that an attack on
our infrastructure is a threat that we cannot take lightly, and
I appreciate that you believe you do need some legislative
support to amplify the President's Executive order.
One piece of legislation I have been working on with
Senator Vitter is to create and leverage a cyber guard.
Basically it would allow the capacity of the National Guard and
Reserve to have expertise outside of the military to leverage
that expertise to the benefit of our national security. Is that
something you have thought about? Is it something that you
would be willing to work on with me?
I have talked to some of the Service Chiefs already and I
have gotten a positive letter back from General Alexander on
the topic. But I would love your thoughts.
General Dempsey. The short answer is yes. I think we need
to take a total force approach, which means we need both Active
and Guard involved. I am familiar with the direction you are
moving. Anything that Keith Alexander tells me I generally
agree with.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you again for your
service, each of you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for your service.
With regard to the budget, the big threshold frustration a
lot of us have is that it is 2 months late largely, we were
told, because of dealing with sequestration and planning about
sequestration. Then we get it 2 months late and it ignores
sequestration. Do you think that is a responsible or a helpful
approach to ignore what is clearly part of the law and give no
guidance about how you would deal with sequestration even in
fiscal year 2014?
Secretary Hagel. Senator, thank you.
My answer would be this. As I noted earlier this morning, a
$600 billion enterprise just does not slam together a budget.
It is a year-long process. Before I got to DOD, it was pulling
together that budget and it was predicated on what the
President's numbers were, numbers that we were given from the
Office of Management and Budget.
Second, I noted this morning--and this is in no way a
defense of us being late, but the House and Senate resolutions
for the DOD budget were essentially the same as the budget we
are presenting.
I recognize--we do recognize--that sequestration is the law
of the land, the reality, and that is why I have asked
essentially for the review to prepare this institution to have
to deal with the law of the land as it currently is, as you
have noted, sequestration and beyond.
Senator Vitter. I appreciate that.
Let me just point out that, obviously, sequestration
started recently, but it was enacted--that possibility was
enacted in mid-2011, and then mid-2012. Congress affirmatively
said start planning for it, show us that outline. So it is not
as if it was a complete surprise a few months ago.
But given that planning, when we will see your budget, if
you will, taking account of sequestration, at least for fiscal
year 2014?
Secretary Hagel. As I said to Senator McCain, we are
working on it now. We have had to adjust. We are adjusting to
2013. At the same time, we are also looking at the reality of
taking another $52 billion cut for 2014.
Again, I go back to why I asked the institution for the
review, due the end of May, so we can understand better what
our choices are, first what our priorities are, what are the
obligations and responsibilities of DOD first. Then we look at
that reality of what we are going to be dealing with. From
that, then comes the numbers and how we prepare to make that
cut.
Senator Vitter. Will that yield and outline a budget given
to us, given to Congress that takes into account that number at
least for fiscal year 2014?
Secretary Hagel. I do not think we are talking about
sending up a new budget, but we are certainly working with
Congress and the appropriate committees on how we intend to go
forward.
Let me ask the Comptroller if he wants to add anything to
this.
Mr. Hale. Nor would I expect we would send up another
budget and provide information--
Senator Vitter. I do not want to get bogged down in
semantics, but the point is, when will we see your
recommendations about how you would deal with those numbers
starting in fiscal year 2014?
Mr. Hale. I think it would be sometime after May 31, but we
need to give the Secretary time to review it.
Senator Vitter. But we will see that sort of proposal,
whether you want to call it a new budget or whatever you want
to call it. It does not matter.
Mr. Hale. I assume at some point, if the Secretary agrees,
that we would share it with Congress.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Secretary, would you share it with
Congress?
Secretary Hagel. We will have to share it with Congress
because, as I said in my opening statement, Congress is a
partner here, and we have to let Congress know and work with
Congress on how we intend to do this, to accomplish it.
Senator Vitter. I think all of us feel like the sooner, the
better and the more specific, the better, because you all are
the experts about these things far more than we are. So we
would like that leadership and that guidance to continue that
discussion in a productive way.
The second point. Even ignoring sequestration, the
President's New START funding commitment is not kept in fiscal
year 2014, $300 million short. Now, these were very specific
commitments related to the passage of that treaty, the
ratification of that treaty. There were a lot of discussions in
the Senate about that, very specific discussions, and it is
underfunded a couple years later, a year and a half later.
How is this going to be corrected? If it is not, what are
we to take away from that experience? Very specific commitments
are made in the discussion about ratification, and a very short
time later, they are not kept. That does not even account for
sequestration.
Secretary Hagel. I am going to ask the Comptroller to talk
specifically about the numbers.
But let me address it this way. The President is committed
to carrying out the law. I am committed to carrying out the law
and the commitments that the President made with the new
treaty, as I noted here in an earlier conversation. The safety,
security, reliability of our stockpile, the funds required to
do that, the commitment to triad, some of the discussion we
have had this morning are all part of that. We will do that and
we will continue to do that.
Now, your question about the $300 million. Let me ask the
Comptroller to address it because there are some savings that
we realized in some other areas as well.
Mr. Hale. I am going to need to get with your staff and get
more information on the $300 million.
Senator Vitter. We can follow up with that.
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Senator Vitter. But my concern is a pretty simple one.
Again, a lot of discussions about this related to the
ratification of the treaty. Then the treaty gets ratified. Then
the funding commitments are not kept a very short time later.
It has nothing to do with sequestration because the budget does
not account for sequestration. So the lesson I would draw from
it is do not believe anything you hear when an administration,
maybe any administration, wants a confirmation because it
evaporates 3 months after the ratification happens.
Mr. Secretary, you have suggested a new BRAC, and I think
you have suggested an upfront cost of $2.4 billion. I would
suggest that Congress broadly does not have a big appetite for
anything with a significant MILCON upfront cost. But I am also
concerned that that $2.4 billion just seems on a different
planet from the last BRAC where GAO has said the first 5-year
cost was $35 billion. So how do you jibe all that?
Secretary Hagel. There will be no BRAC without the
authorization of Congress, as we know.
I am going to ask the Comptroller to deal with the specific
number because we talked about it earlier this morning.
But I will respond this way, as I have already done. When
you look at the infrastructure required, as we are bringing
down our troops, reducing 100,000, we are unwinding from two
wars, reducing responsibilities, commitments around the world,
a different kind of a structure that we are dealing with now,
funding now, preparing our forces for, that is also going to
require less inventory and infrastructure. We are doing that in
Europe now. We are going to continue to do that in Europe and
around the world.
It is my thought, and I think the President's thought, that
we need to look at our infrastructure here. Do we have excess
capacity? The GAO report and the 2005 study showed that we did
have about 25 percent excess capacity.
Now, as I said in my statement, it is going to come at some
upfront costs, of course. But let me stop there because the
2005 BRAC versus what we are talking about in 2015 is different
in certain ways which do account, I think, for the numbers that
you asked about.
Chairman Levin. I wonder, Senator Vitter, because we have
asked for that detail for the record, whether that might be
satisfactory in terms of the time.
Senator Vitter. Okay, that is fine. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Would that be all right? Thank you, Senator
Vitter.
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Mr. Hale. Mr. Chairman, may I at least just reiterate we
are not going to do 2015 the way we did 2005. It will be much
more focused on closing and therefore the costs will be lower
and the savings quicker. We are getting $12 billion a year from
BRAC. We cannot afford, in my view, not to do this because at
some point 4 or 5 years from now, we will be having this same
conversation and we need those savings.
Chairman Levin. Senator Vitter, they have committed to
provide for us for the record that $12 billion figure, what the
basis of it is. Earlier they said it was from all the BRAC
rounds not just from the last one. But we still are demanding
that we see the data that supports that allegation.
Senator Vitter. It seems to me upfront MILCON costs are not
adequately weighted into that the way I think they should be,
given the fiscal situation and Congress' lack of appetite for
upfront MILCON costs.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Let me just comment. You were not here when
I asked my questions, and that was my concern too. Of course,
we will look and see. We have not seen a product yet, so we do
not know what we are talking about. I suspect, though, it is
going to be very similar to what we faced in 2005, and I know
that they all said at that time, no, this is not going to
happen this time. But it did and the costs were far greater
than they anticipated prior to the 2005 round.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
Before I ask you a question, I just want to mention that in
half an hour at Arlington National Cemetery, Lieutenant Colonel
Don Faith is going to be interred. He was killed in Korea in
1950. He finally came home after 50-plus years in Korea from
Washington, Indiana. He served under General Matt Ridgway, was
at the Chosin Reservoir when they were overwhelmed by Chinese
forces. His superior was killed, and he personally led the
breakout of the troops. He was killed there, never came home.
Over 50-plus years later, he finally came home. They did DNA
testing. They finally figured out who the lieutenant colonel
was. In half an hour, his daughter and the men he served with--
he is at Arlington right now, a Congressional Medal of Honor
winner. I just wanted to mention his name and keep him in your
prayers and thoughts. He is an American hero.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for mentioning that, Senator.
Senator Donnelly. This would be to Secretary Hagel. The
Indiana National Guard--we were just off-ramped--a number of
them. It affected over 1,000 of our National Guard members. We
had 570 members who were going to the Horn of Africa this
month, and 446 members were going to Egypt in June. They are
the only ones this has happened to. These two units, less than
6 weeks from being deployed, were off-ramped and they were off-
ramped and replaced by Active component forces.
We are willing to take our share of the hit as we move
forward on sequestration and on all of these issues. But over
1,000 of these families will lose TRICARE in 4 days. 142
soldiers that reenlisted for these deployments and they were
given a reenlistment bonus, are being terminated and then being
asked to reenlist without any bonus. 60 of these soldiers left
their civilian employment and have lost their jobs. Others have
had their employers already hire somebody else. They have gone
back and their employer said we want to take care of our
soldiers, but what do we do.
This has been extraordinarily damaging to the families and
to our soldiers. So, as I said, we are willing to step up and
take our hit. We always have been. But there are only two
minimal requests that the Indiana National Guard has made to
me, and that is just that the units have 180 days of TRICARE.
Number two is that the people who were promised a bonus get
their bonus. The cost of that is less $1 million. This is
simply a matter of keeping our word. Our people, as we have
always said, are central to everything we do. They were
prepared for the mission, ready to go on the mission, got
bumped on the mission for Active-Duty Forces. All we are
asking--many of them have lost their jobs. Many of them are
losing their health care, and so all we are asking is those
minimal things, that we be able to do that.
Secretary Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Let me ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to respond to
the entire framework of issues that you noted, the off-ramping
of the Guard. I am generally aware of all those activities, but
specifically about your request.
Senator Donnelly. In particular, these folks were 6 weeks
out and had, in effect, basically done the packing, getting
ready, canceling leases, getting the family squared away. These
are just two minimal things that they had asked me to talk to
you--that the soldiers had asked me to talk to you about and to
the General.
Secretary Hagel. I do not know what our policies and
procedures are about these specific issues. I will find out.
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Secretary Hagel. Let me ask the Chairman to respond here
quickly to your bigger point. But I will look at your last
request, and if the Comptroller wants to add anything to this,
we would welcome him. But we will look at it and we will be
back to you on it.
General Dempsey. As you say, Senator, these off-ramp
decisions are really challenging, Active and Guard, and of
course, the Truman. Some people suggested that we off-ramped
the Truman to make a political statement. I assure you I would
not do that to 5,000 sailors who had the same issues. Families
have gone home to live with their parents, terminated leases,
sold cars, stopped education courses, and of course, this issue
on the off-ramping of the Indiana Guard.
So you have our commitment that when we off-ramp either
because of sequestration--the other reason we are beginning to
off-ramp some units is, of course, the glide slope in
Afghanistan. We will always have the human dimension of this
first and foremost.
We will go back and work on trying to meet your specific
request.
Senator Donnelly. Because I think after these decisions
were made, they then said, ``we are not going to do it to any
groups less than 120 days before.'' These folks, in effect,
were the ones who were caught in the middle, that were 6 weeks
out. So if you could take a look at that, we would be
extraordinarily appreciative of it.
General Dempsey, in Afghanistan, as we draw down, I am sure
you have plans and metrics in place as we are going through
this year as well. I wanted to see how we are doing on that, if
we are on target, on schedule, and if the transition is moving
the way that has been planned.
General Dempsey. It is, and we have what we are calling
Milestone 2013 coming up later in the spring/early summer where
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be in the lead
across the country. What that gives us, Senator, is two
fighting seasons now to allow them to demonstrate their
capabilities while in the lead and us in support. So we will
continue to know more and more. We are accelerating enablers.
We are talking about how long should we keep the ANSF at
352,000. All of those are factoring into what we will recommend
for our enduring presence. The enduring presence number is not
in isolation. It is glide slope. It is ANSF capability, how
long we keep them at 352,000, how successful are we at
providing enablers and these two fighting seasons of
experience. So I think we are in a pretty good place right now.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to each of you for your service to our country, for
all you do to keep us safe. It is deeply appreciated by me, my
colleagues, and my constituents back at home.
My first question goes both to Secretary Hagel and to
General Dempsey. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mullen, made a statement in 2011 that people on
both sides of the aisle and across America have quoted many
times since then, and I would like to repeat it because it is
something that I think needs to be repeated often. He said, ``I
have said many times that I believe the single biggest threat
to our national security is our debt. So I also believe we have
every responsibility to help eliminate that threat.''
Do you both agree with that statement today when our
national debt is significantly larger than it was in 2007
through 2011?
Secretary Hagel. I agree with it, yes.
Senator Lee. You do.
Secretary Hagel. I do, yes.
General Dempsey. Yes, I have always pointed out--by the
way, I cannot tell you how many times that quote has been read
to me. So thanks for reminding me again.
But, look, economics, our fiscal situation, the deficit,
the budget are all threats to our security. There are a lot of
physical, seen and unseen, threats out there that perhaps are
different even from when Admiral Mullen made that comment. So I
do align myself with the economic piece of it. But there are
just groups out there that also threaten us.
Senator Lee. So you would not necessarily say it is the
single biggest threat.
General Dempsey. No.
Senator Lee. Okay, thank you.
It is important for us, I think, to remember the
President's budget, despite proposing pretty significant tax
increases, would still contemplate adding about $2.5 trillion
to the total debt held by the public by the time he leaves
office in 2017. Then by 2021, our payments, just our interest
payments, on our debt will be larger than our defense outlays.
So it is for this reason that several weeks ago during the
Senate budget debates, I put forward an amendment that would
prohibit us from getting into a position where we are spending,
or contemplating spending, more money on interest on our debt
than we are on defense. I was happy that we got bipartisan
support for that, at least narrow bipartisan support. I think
we had all Republicans voting for it and one Democrat.
But the budget that is in the best interest of our national
security is one that balances, one that gets to a balance and
is able to turn off the sequester by focusing not just on
cutting disproportionately out of our defense spending, but on
spending as a whole.
To that end and consistent with following up on something
Senator Vitter was asking, if the sequester is not turned off--
the sequester or some would say that there are spending caps
moving forward in the future years covered by the BCA--will we
continue to see budgets that ignore these provisions, that
ignore the sequestration provisions? Can we expect budgets like
that to continue to be sent to Congress that do not reflect the
law, that is, the BCA of 2011? Secretary Hagel?
Secretary Hagel. The fiscal year 2015 budget that we will
present early next year will reflect the reality of whatever
the situation is. I do not know if between now and next
February if Congress and the President are able to come
together with some deficit reduction plan--I know Congress has
worked very hard on it, both parties. The President has. I know
everyone was hopeful. But as you suggest, the law of the land
is the law of the land, and that is reality. So that will be
the budget that is presented.
Senator Lee. Okay, that is great. That is why we were
surprised when it did not reflect it this time around, but I am
happy to hear that it will reflect the law of the land next
time around.
Mr. Secretary, you announced last month that 15 additional
GBIs will be deployed to Alaska as a reaction to the
provocations that we have had from North Korea. This brings the
numbers of GBIs in Alaska to the number that was originally
planned during the Bush administration, I believe, was later
reduced by President Obama. I have a question for you about
this.
Was the Russian Government consulted or informed that the
United States was considering this decision before that
decision was made, and if so, when did that occur?
Secretary Hagel. The answer is, not to my knowledge. The
Russian Government was not consulted in any way, and that
decision, that policy, was not decided based on any
consideration of the Russian Government.
Incidentally, I would just add that those GBIs also not
only are in Fort Greeley, AK, but some are in Vandenberg, CA.
Senator Lee. Okay. But to your knowledge, they were not
consulted. If DOD were to decide that additional missile
defense systems were needed to be deployed for the protection
of the United States, whether domestically or abroad, would the
Russian Government be consulted or informed before that
decision was made?
Secretary Hagel. First, I cannot answer for the President.
That would be a decision for the President to make. It would, I
suspect, have to revolve around treaty obligations we have with
the Russians and other issues like that.
Senator Lee. In March, the Russian Government requested
that some meetings take place regularly to discuss plans with
the European missile shield. Are there any plans for those
talks to take place, and if there are plans for such talks,
will these include any of our NATO allies as part of those
discussions?
Secretary Hagel. Again, Senator, I do not know about those
talks. That would be in the purview of the Secretary of State
and the White House. I have not been consulted on any talks or
the possibility of what you are talking about.
Senator Lee. Okay. You are not certain of whether there
have been those talks, but to your knowledge, there have not.
Secretary Hagel. To answer your question, I do not know of
any conversations about what you suggested about resuming talks
on the basis that you laid out.
Senator Lee. Okay. I see my time is expired. Thank you very
much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey and Secretary Hale. Thank
you for your service, and of course, we thank the men and women
of the armed services and their families for their service and
sacrifice.
I would like to commend you and acknowledge the work that
you are doing to stop sexual assault in our Services because it
has been the subject of a separate hearing of a subcommittee of
this committee. Secretary Hagel, thank you for your quick
action in changing the UCMJ regarding the convening authority's
right to overturn decisions--overturn verdicts, and I expect to
continue to work with you and General Dempsey on these issues.
I also would like to thank you, Secretary Hagel, for your
commitment to a continuing collaboration with the VA and
Secretary Shinseki to create a seamless transition for the men
and women who are transitioning from Active Duty to civilian
life. There are major issues regarding all of that.
My colleague, Senator Mark Udall, asked you some questions,
Secretary Hagel, about the energy use of DOD. Of course, given
the unstable fuel costs and the rising fuel costs and the
impact of fuel costs on budget estimates, as well as the
overall fiscal environment, I believe that controlling energy
costs across the board, now and in the future, is an important
goal for DOD.
The operational energy implementation plan identified
incorporating energy security concerns into the requirements
and acquisitions process as one of the targets for DOD to
implement. I wanted to get your views on the importance of
those goals and how we are doing in making sure that energy use
criteria and factors are considered in acquisition planning
processes.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
As I noted in my response to Senator Udall, for me, for our
leadership at DOD, our energy use, our energy sources, our cost
of energy are and must be a high priority. That is R&D. It is
not just the budget, but it is the security and reliability of
our sources of energy. So we continue to put a high priority on
those programs. We continue to invest in those programs. As you
noted--it has been much of the conversation this morning--we
have less money and it appears we are going to have even less
money. So we have to balance the resources we have with the
responsibilities we have.
But that all said, we are committed--I am committed to
continue to follow through on the energy programs that we have
in existence that continue to find more reliable, cheaper forms
of energy.
Senator Hirono. I think that to reiterate, those kinds of
energy security concerns should be very much part and parcel of
how you analyze various priorities, going to equipment needs,
all of those concerns. It should be an across-the-board part of
our consideration as we meet our fiscal challenges.
Secretary Hagel. Yes.
Senator Hirono. I wanted to turn to, General Dempsey, the
military-to-military relationships that we have, and we have
been working to engage China in these exchanges, and you are
going to China soon. Would you expect that the issue of our
rebalance to the Pacific to be a matter of some concern to the
Chinese? Do you expect this to become part of the conversation
that you have when you are in China?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator. I have had some telephonic
contact with my new Chinese counterpart, and he has indicated
that he is eager to get my views and understand better our
intentions, and I am prepared to have that conversation.
Senator Hirono. At the same time, to make sure that one of
our intentions is to strengthen our communication and
relationships with them, because as some of my colleagues have
said, China is a very big part of the activities and actions of
North Korea, and any stronger relationship we can have with the
Chinese would be, I think, a goal to be sought.
General Dempsey. Yes. I am committed to that. I am
committed to strengthening our relationship with China.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Regarding recruiting, I know that we are drawing down our
numbers in our Service. But at the same time, with all the news
about the challenges facing our military, DOD, the cuts, the
furloughs, all of that, Secretary Hagel and also General
Dempsey, have you already seen an impact of all of this kind of
news on recruitment now and in the future?
Secretary Hagel. I am going to ask the Chairman to respond
to that. But as far as I can see and know, I do not think it
has yet impacted that recruitment, but the Chairman is closer
to it than I am.
General Dempsey. The answer is that we are having no
difficulties right now, either recruiting or retaining high-
quality, very high-quality individuals.
But here is a prediction, Senator. If sequestration affects
readiness and young men who come in to be pilots are sitting
not flying or they come in to be seamen, sailors, and they are
sitting at dockside and not steaming and they come into the
training on tanks and they are parked in the motor pool, then
we will have a retention problem. I actually have that T-shirt.
We have done this before, and we did not do it correctly and
shame on us if we do it again.
Mr. Hale. I would just add. I worry about our civilian
workforce. I do not know--three pay freezes, furlough
potential--I am not sure why anybody would want to work for us
right now, frankly. We need to do better. I think there are no
problems I know of with 7.8 percent unemployment. But as the
economy recovers, I think we have every reason to worry about
the ability to recruit good civilians.
Senator Hirono. Thank you for raising that point because,
of course, we have some 18,000 civilians in Hawaii who are
working for DOD and very concerned about potential furloughs
and other changes.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, Under Secretary Hale, I
want to thank you for being here. Thank you for your testimony
this morning. I want to thank all three of you for your service
to this Nation.
As recent events have powerfully underscored, these are
perilous times, whether we are speaking of the horrific terror
attack in Boston this week or the escalating situation in North
Korea. Your service is greatly appreciated, and I thank all
three of you for serving on the front lines and protecting
America.
The questions I would like to ask focus on two areas:
number one, financial planning going forward at DOD; and number
two, missile defense and our ability to defend the Homeland.
I want to start with there has been much discussion today
about sequestration--that the current budget does not reflect
the cuts in sequestration, but I understand that DOD will,
hopefully in the month of May, submit a plan to comply with
those cuts. That presents both short-term challenges and long-
term challenges.
In addition, the budget contemplates a renewed BRAC
commission process going forward.
I would suggest in the process both of assessing
sequestration in the short-term and long-term and in the BRAC
process that a significant component of DOD's assessment should
include consideration of the degree to which we can reduce our
footprint overseas, reduce our bases overseas, reduce our
manpower overseas, consistent with the central imperative of
protecting our national security.
So the first question I wanted to ask Secretary Hagel is:
to what extent is DOD currently assessing, in complying with
these financial pressures, our ability to draw down our
overseas footprint, reduce bases? I would suggest it is
preferable to reduce bases overseas than here at home, if it
can be done consistent with national security. To what extent
is DOD engaged right now in that assessment and analysis?
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
Let me also clarify a point you made so there is no
misunderstanding. I do not want an expectation that may be
inaccurate. I did not say we are going to present a plan by the
end of May to the committee on how we are going to deal with
sequestration. What I said was the Strategic Choices and
Management Review that I asked for was going to come back to me
by the end of May, which then we will start making some
assessments and decisions based on that, which obviously will
affect complying with the law of the land, if we have to. I
just want to make sure----
Senator Cruz. If I may follow up then. Do you have right
now an intention for a timetable of when DOD would get back to
the committee on its intention and plan for complying with----
Secretary Hagel. This is evolving, and I have to look at
the review that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are leading, and then we will
proceed on that basis. But I do not want an expectation here
that is not correct.
As to your questions about overseas and overhead and
manpower and the other observations you made about how we are
assessing what we have to do to comply with these new
realities, yes is the first. We have been consolidating and
closing facilities overseas for the last few years. We will
have a study complete by the end of this year specifically on
additional recommendations on closing facilities and
consolidating overseas. So, yes, that has been ongoing.
At the same time, I think, the President thinks, and the
leadership of DOD, that we need to also take a look at our
infrastructure in this country as well.
Mr. Hale. Can I just add a couple facts that might be
helpful?
We have transferred more than 100 sites back to our allies
since 2003. There are about 30 more scheduled over the next
several years, in addition to any identified by this
consolidation. So we have been aggressively looking at overseas
infrastructure.
Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
General Dempsey, I would like to get your thoughts, in
particular, about North Korea, both about how grave a threat
the current North Korean situation poses and what is our
capacity right now with missile defense to intercept and defend
against a hostile launch from North Korea?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. There has been some
discussion in the Intelligence Community about whether they
have been able to weaponize, but as you might expect, as the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we will react to what we think
could be the worst case scenario. So we have postured ourselves
to be capable of intercepting and destroying any ballistic
missile that would be launched at our facilities or our
personnel, and we are postured to do that.
Senator Cruz. I would note that the President's budget,
while not accounting for sequestration, nonetheless cuts $500
million from missile defense. In my judgment, particularly
given the threats we are seeing from North Korea, the potential
threat we have from the Nation of Iran, reducing our commitment
to missile defense at this point seems ill-advised. Indeed, our
current posture on missile defense is at a minimum of 2 months
in that we are right now deploying a Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense system to Guam and at the same time reinstating
GBIs that have been canceled in Alaska, both of which, I think,
are reasonable and positive responses to the threat we are
seeing. Yet, that seems inconsistent with reducing funding for
missile defense, and it seems in many ways driven by our
enemies rather than a comprehensive, strategic plan for missile
defense. I would welcome the thoughts of either Secretary Hagel
or General Dempsey on that issue.
Secretary Hagel. I think the budget reflects the priorities
of our missile defense programs and plans. Missile defense is
an essential component of securing this country, the interests
of this country. I certainly would never sign off on any budget
that would lessen that ability to fulfill that commitment to
this country. I think I can speak for the Chairman and every
leader inside the Pentagon. So it is my sense that it does
comply with our requirements.
I will ask the Chairman if he would like to add anything.
General Dempsey. I think in the interest of time, Senator,
I would be happy to have someone give you a lay-down of the way
ahead, what we have done this year, why, and where we think
this is all going.
I would also say, ballistic missile defense is an important
investment. It can get to be extraordinarily expensive. So one
of the things we have to do is balance defense and offense. I
often use the phrase that at some point you have to stop
worrying about the arrow and start worrying about the archer. I
would suggest to our potential adversaries that we have not
forgotten that we also have capabilities to deal with the
archer.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, General. I look forward to that
ongoing discussion. I thank all three of you for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Just relative to the facilities overseas that are being
closed, we do have rules as to the reimbursement to us for the
improvements which we have made in overseas facilities. We just
issued a report yesterday, a committee report, which we hope
you will take up, showing the failure of DOD to achieve that
reimbursement in the way in which it is supposed to be made. It
has been going on too long. Part of it is a failure of
oversight, but mainly it is a failure of DOD to enforce our
rules relative to reimbursement by our allies for the
improvements which we have made in those facilities which we
are turning back to them. So that was a report which was
released yesterday. It is, I know, on your desks, and we would
look forward to your response.
Senator Inhofe. Just one comment about the overseas
facilities. All of us know, in western Europe we had quite a
few of them there. One of the problems that came up is because
of some of their environmental controls over there, they are
restricting in Germany, for example, our ability to use a live
range to so many hours a day and so many days a week. Finally,
we had to go in and say if we cannot train, we are going to
leave, and that got their attention. So I think that we need to
use the tools that we have to most efficiently train our people
as we are supposed to be doing over there.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Welcome to all of you. Thank you for the
testimony this morning.
I am just going to jump right to it. I would like to say a
word about sequester, a word about BRAC, and then a comment
about Syria.
A lot of discussion about sequester. I agree with what
Senator Sessions said earlier. It was a horrible idea. I do
have the alibi of not having been around when it was put in
place. So that makes me very free to criticize, and we never
should have allowed it to happen. To make a sixth of the
budget, defense, take 50 percent of the cuts, that was foolish.
To make one-eighth of the budget non-defense discretionary take
50 percent of the cuts, that was foolish.
It is important to acknowledge there was an alternative. We
had an alternative in this body that had 53 votes. That is the
majority of the body that wanted to turn off sequester and do
it a different way. That is sufficient votes to pass unless
filibuster is invoked by the minority. In this instance, in
late February filibuster was invoked by the minority and we
needed more than 50 votes. But that is not an automatic. There
was a sufficient vote in this body to turn off the sequester
that is having, in my view, a very significant and negative
effect.
Especially, Secretary Hagel, I do think Senator McCain's
suggestion was an extremely helpful one. If there is to be any
chance of this Congress, this Senate considering an alternative
to sequester--and the sooner, the better--the more people have
an understanding about the good faith, most considered judgment
of DOD about what is going to be cut if we have to knock that
extra $52 billion off, the more specifics we have about that,
the more we look and say, boy, we do not want that to happen.
We better come up with an alternative. In the absence of an
alternative that is so specific and granular and clear, it does
not put any pressure on us at this point really to come up with
an alternative. So I would just say that I viewed Senator
McCain's suggestion as actually a helpful one.
On BRAC, I worry about the sturm und drang of BRAC. So when
the testimony this morning said we have done five BRAC rounds
and we have saved $12.5 billion annually--and I look forward to
the accounting of that. When BRAC is announced, what happens is
that every community that has military assets, whether they are
ultimately going to be on the chopping block or not--they
lawyer up. They accountant up. They public relations up. There
is an economic effect in the community of anxiety and
uncertainty that can have its own economic effects. If we are
going to do all that to produce--if it has been $12.5 billion
for five BRAC rounds, if we are going to do all that to produce
$2.5 billion of savings, I really wonder if it is worth the
trouble. It is important to lay out potential cuts to deal with
these budgetary realities, and so just two examples.
As Governor, I had an $80 billion budget and in 4 years--
you just get one term in Virginia--I cut $5 billion out of the
budget. I did not convene a commission to do it. I sat with a
bunch of budget folks and I made very specific reduction
proposals, and I gave them to my legislature. They all,
Democratic and Republican, as soon as they saw every one--and
this was successive rounds--they said I was a heartless dope
for everything I proposed. Then after they spent a bunch of
time going through everything I proposed, they ended up
approving 90 percent of what I proposed. That was a regular
order process. By doing it that way, I did not make every last
person or every last community in Virginia by announcing the
BRAC round or something like that think uh-oh, we have to
lawyer up and lobby.
So the one thing I would just encourage to you and
encourage to my committee members--and I know Senator Inhofe
had some concerns about the 2005 BRAC--is whether that is--we
are dealing with the need to make some challenges. But whether
a BRAC round really is the best way to reduce costs, when you
add in the anxiety it creates, and you add in the economic
effect of that and all the external transaction costs that it
generates, is a BRAC approach the best way to reduce costs?
After the last BRAC round, your predecessor--one of your
predecessors, Secretary Hagel, Secretary Gates, reached a
conclusion that a particular mission in Virginia, Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) was probably not the best expenditure of money.
That was, as I understand it, a joint effort that might have
been inspired by an earlier Secretary of Defense. I think
Secretary Gates said, hey, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
offices near each other inside the Pentagon anyway, why do we
need a separate JFCOM in Norfolk. He did not do a BRAC. He just
said, I am not sure we need this, and he put on the table, let
us get rid of JFCOM.
The local community and the congressional delegation came
forward and said we think this is a bad idea, and they laid out
a case. They reached an accommodation where essentially the
JFCOM structure was removed, but some of the military missions
that were being provided in Hampton Roads continued to be
provided and there was compromise. That was done not in a BRAC
process but with DOD laying down, we think we should get rid of
this, and then Members of Congress saying we think you are
wrong, and then a compromise being reached.
I would just recommend that as a potential way of thinking
about it as an alternative to BRAC because BRAC will produce a
whole lot of sturm und drang, and if it is going to do that and
it is going to produce a $2.5 billion savings which, by my
quick math, is--$2.5 billion out of $585 billion is about 0.6
of 1 percent of a savings, and that is what it is going to
produce. I am not sure that the BRAC process and all the drama
associated with it is worthwhile. So I would just commend you
to ponder that.
The last thing. I just want to say a word, Mr. Chairman,
with your permission, about Syria. There will be additional
discussion of Syria this afternoon. But there is a competing
Senate Armed Service Committee hearing on the personnel aspects
of the NDAA proposal, and I am on the Personnel Subcommittee
and I think I am going to do that.
I am also on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We are
spending a lot of time talking about Syria. I have some
sympathy with Senator McCain and others who said we need to
explore the recommendation potentially to go from non-lethal to
lethal assistance and what would be the conditions. My concern
about Syria right now is this, that it looks more and more
sectarian, that Assad is an Alawite and with a military that
is--about 70 percent of the military leadership is Alawite. It
is becoming a death struggle for the Alawite community which is
about a sixth of the population. If they believe that the only
outcome of this is likely going to be whether they survive or
whether they are purged as that community, then this will be a
fight to death whether we offer lethal aid or not.
I know one of the factors that must weigh in very heavily
on any decision about whether to provide aid is what is the
character of the opposition. Can we trust them? Will the
weapons end up in the wrong place? If the opposition can do
things that will bring Alawites into the opposition and
convince the Alawite minority that there is not going to be a
purge against that ethnic group, that would also have the
effect of diluting the jihadist elements of the opposition and
would probably give us an opposition that we could have more
trust in.
In your tiering, General Dempsey, of non-permissive,
permissive, or collaborative--and there is another tier in
there--hostile, non-permissive, permissive, collaborative.
Efforts that we would undertake to assure that the character of
the opposition included members of the Alawite minority so that
Alawites would not fear an ethnic purge in the aftermath of a
conflict, that would make our decision easier. That would make
the cost less. That would make the consequences less severe.
I would just put that on the table as part of the
discussion of Syria. I am sure I have not said a single thing
that you all have not thought five steps down the chessboard
on, but for purposes of my committee members and others, I just
wanted to state that.
General Dempsey. Thanks, Senator. We would be happy to have
you put a chair right here and testify with us this afternoon.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Hagel. Senator, thank you.
I listened very carefully to all three of your main points,
and you make a lot of sense. So we will take all of your points
under advisement.
Mr. Hale. Can I briefly add on BRAC? There are specific
laws that stop us from closing bases above a certain level.
JFCOM fell just under those or through exceptions. I am not
sure it would work, $2 billion a year for 10 years is $20
billion. It sounds interesting to me. I think we have to think
about it.
Senator Kaine. I am not against the $2 billion. I am just
suggesting you might be able to find a way that will create
less drama.
Chairman Levin. One of the things that Senator Kaine
referred to has to do with the lawyering up and getting other
kinds of consultants just by the mention of the possibility of
BRAC, and I would urge our constituents not to start lawyering
up and hiring consultants because it has a long way to go
before Congress approves another BRAC round. I think the
implied suggestion of Senator Kaine is wise.
Second, I hope you did not suggest, Mr. Secretary, that
Congress, both the Senate and the House, and the President did
not comply with the law in your budget request. The BCA made
certain requirements in order to avoid sequestration. The
President did it in his budget. He avoided it in a way which is
very different from what the House did. The House avoided it in
a very different way from what the Senate did. Hopefully now
the House and the Senate will get together and adopt a joint
budget.
But in any event, I hope that you did not mean to imply in
any way that the three budgets that are now out there are not
in compliance with the BCA and I hope you did not mean to imply
that your budget--these 2013 budgets are not in compliance.
They do it in different ways. One has greater focus on cuts.
One has greater balance of cuts and revenues. One has a greater
balance yet on additional revenues. But they are in compliance,
are they not, all three of them?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, and I did not mean to imply that. My
point in bringing that up was in reference to somehow--at least
I interpreted some implication that the President's budget was
somehow out here in the ether. In fact, all three budgets were
pretty closely aligned but not at all to imply that they were
not complying with the law.
Chairman Levin. As I said before when Senator McCain made
his comments, I agree with what Senator McCain said and what
Senator Kaine just said. I said it before: it will be helpful
to us to avoid sequestration if you can get to us as quickly as
you can the details, some of what the specific impacts would be
if we do not avoid sequestration.
Secretary Hagel. We intend to do that, as I said. But at
the same time, we wanted to make sure whatever we come up here
with we can defend and make sense. That is why I referenced the
review, and until we get that review--and then go forward. I
agree with that. I got it.
Chairman Levin. Senator Graham has shown up just in time--
--
Senator Graham. I will be last and certainly least.
Secretary Hagel, I want to congratulate you and the
administration for, I think, a responsible handling of North
Korea.
Very quickly--you have probably beat this to death, but I
think 2013 is going to be a major year for national security
issues. General Dempsey, do you believe if we do not deal with
the Iranian nuclear program between now and the end of the
year, we are probably in trouble one way or the other?
General Dempsey. I have been disappointed about the
progress, and I think that the urgency will only increase.
Senator Graham. As I understand it, as we have been
negotiating the P5+1, our intelligence tells us that the level
of enriched uranium has gone up during the negotiations, not
down. Do you agree with that?
General Dempsey. There has been a pattern of it going up
and then transitioned into oxide to stay below what they think
would be the threshold.
Senator Graham. But the information I have received is that
the amount of enriched uranium has actually increased over the
last 6 months. I very much support sanctions and a diplomatic
resolution to the Iranian problem.
Secretary Hagel, when it comes to Afghanistan, I think you
are still making an evaluation. Is that correct?
Secretary Hagel. When you say ``evaluation''----
Senator Graham. Post-2014.
Secretary Hagel. That is right.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the Iranians are
probably watching us on multiple fronts in terms of our
resolve?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, I do and I have said that publicly,
not specifically about the Iranians, but we have a global
audience.
Senator Graham. That is why I am just so upset, for lack of
a better word, that we would pick now of all times to basically
gut our military.
Do you agree, General Dempsey, this is a time of great
national security risk, that we live in pretty dangerous times?
General Dempsey. I do.
Senator Graham. From a GDP point of view, we are on the low
end of defense spending in time of conflict. Is that correct,
Secretary Hagel?
Secretary Hagel. We are, and General Dempsey and I were
talking about this the other day, the ups and downs. But you
are right.
Senator Graham. It is not that we cannot reform DOD and
reduce spending. We have $489 billion and maybe there is some
more to do. But $600 billion, I will agree with both of you,
will make us a hollow force at the time we need it the most.
So I would just urge you, as you meet with the President--
there is a lot of bipartisan support for the idea that it is
unacceptable for the Iranians to get a nuclear capability.
There is no good ending to a nuclear-armed Iran. Our friends in
Israel, our Sunni Arab allies--it would just take the whole
region and throw it into chaos. Do you agree with that
assessment, General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. I do.
Senator Graham. So we are at a critical time.
How would you evaluate the security situation in Iraq,
Secretary Hagel, at this point?
Secretary Hagel. In Iraq?
Senator Graham. Yes, sir.
Secretary Hagel. Obviously, that is a country still dealing
with internal issues, and I think they are, unfortunately,
playing out in some sectarian ways, al Qaeda. They still have
difficult challenges.
Senator Graham. It seems to me that al Qaeda in Iraq is on
the rise and their political process is frozen.
When it comes back to Afghanistan, I know it is a
frustrating country. I think the detainee agreement you have
negotiated is a good one. I think it really resolves the issues
in a good way for us.
So my question really is, is now the time, given all the
things going on in the world, to really be engaged in
sequestration?
Secretary Hagel. Senator, I wish we were not. I am right
with you on this. But as I have been constantly reminded all
morning, it is the law of the land. So we have a responsibility
to deal with that law and that reality.
Senator Graham. The people who made this law, as Secretary
Panetta said, a dumb law--I think we have the ability, if we
choose, to replace it. It is not that I do not want to put us
on a sound financial footing. I just do not want to destroy the
military in the process.
So between now and the end of this year, we have to deal
with Syria. We are going to talk about that in more detail. We
have to deal with how we end the war in Afghanistan.
General Dempsey, what would winning look like in
Afghanistan? Do you agree with General Dunford--his definition
of winning?
General Dempsey. Yes, I do, Senator.
By the way, let me thank you personally for your help on
the detention issue.
Senator Graham. You all found a good resolution to a hard
problem.
What would losing look like in your opinion in Afghanistan?
General Dempsey. I think that the inability of the central
government to control its urban areas and arteries, as well, I
think it would be a loss if we did not have a long-term
relationship with them.
Senator Graham. Is morale being affected by this
uncertainty we have created in the budget process?
General Dempsey. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has just told this committee--all of us care about the
military--that we are hurting morale by not having a better
budget solution. I hope we will take that to heart. Thank you
for your honesty.
Secretary Hagel, what would you like to see Congress do
this year, if you had a two- or three-item wish list, to help
you confront the threats that we all face?
Secretary Hagel. I would start with some certainty on
dealing with sequestration on a budget. If we could get that,
as we have said this morning and I think particularly the
Chairman's comments--I noted it to some extent--it would give
us, Senator, the time, the flexibility, to do what we need to
do to adjust to the realities that we are adjusting to as we
unwind from two wars and all the consequences that come with
that. That would be my main priority.
Senator Graham. I would end with this thought. There is an
al Qaeda element on the Pakistan side of the border that we
have been dealing with. Is that correct?
Secretary Hagel. Yes.
Senator Graham. The drone program has been pretty
successful.
Secretary Hagel. It has been, yes.
Senator Graham. The infrastructure that we have in place to
identify al Qaeda movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to
neutralize their ability to hit us--I hope we do not dismantle
that. As we wind down the war in Afghanistan, I hope we realize
that this is the place we were attacked from, that al Qaeda
still exists in that region, and that a stable, secure
Afghanistan would be a tremendous win for us and our war on
terror. I look forward to talking to both of you about troop
levels, keeping the Afghan army at 352,000. I think this will
be one of the most important decisions the President makes in
his second term.
Thank you all for your service.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here and thank you for your service to
our country.
I want to begin by following up one of the questions that
was asked earlier concerning sexual assault. I understand that
a report was under preparation, expected to be delivered at the
end of March, regarding potential changes and recommendations.
I know that you have answered a number of inquiries regarding
sexual assault at this forum. But I wonder if you could tell us
whether that report has been received and whether you can
commit to providing it to us.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
That request of the Office of General Counsel, as well as
the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, was given to me.
One of the requests was to give me their thoughts on
recommendations on how they believe Article 60 of the UCMJ
should be amended. They did. I accepted those recommendations.
We are now moving forward on working with our counsel to draft
legislation that we would ask Congress to look at and propose
changes to Article 60. We announced this about a week ago.
Senator Blumenthal. Is that report available?
Secretary Hagel. It is not exactly a report. They are
recommendations, which I will go back to the General Counsel's
Office and ask them.
Senator Blumenthal. If you could provide them to us, I
would appreciate it, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense submitted to Congress a legislative
proposal to amend Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice by
limiting the authority of commanders to take action under Article 60 on
the findings of courts-martial on May 7, 2013. The legislative proposal
reflects the advice provided by the Secretary of the Air Force, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Acting General Counsel of the Department
of Defense (DOD). DOD looks forward to working with Congress as it
considers this issue.

Senator Blumenthal. I want to turn now to an area that I
think is very important to our national security: our submarine
building program. You and I have talked about it at various
points, and I believe that the President's budget envisions
continuing to build two submarines a year, both in this fiscal
year and going forward in the next. I assume that you share his
apparent view that submarines are more important than ever to
our strategic security.
Secretary Hagel. Yes, I do.
Senator Blumenthal. On another issue that has not really
been covered, is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), I wonder if
you could bring us up to date as to your views regarding what I
view as an essential platform for our air superiority.
Secretary Hagel. You know the background and the problems
and the issues. So I will not traverse that territory.
I met with the director of the F-35 program 2 weeks ago and
asked for a report. He spent a couple of hours with me.
It is my assessment that we are making progress. We are
getting to where we need to be; we are not there yet. Our
partners, our other allies, who went in with us on joining us
in procurement of copies of the F-35, are essentially hanging
with us on this. They have delayed--most of the countries--on
their orders. But the program is moving forward. I think it
should. We put a lot of money in it. It is the largest
acquisition program we have ever had, but I do think overall it
is the answer for our Services.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate that.
General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. If I could just add, Senator. First of
all, on submarines, they are truly our asymmetric advantage
globally. No one--no one--comes anywhere near our capability
beneath the sea, and I think we have to keep those asymmetric
advantages prominent.
On the JSF, I happened to meet the Marine Corps lieutenant
colonel who is running the operational squadron of the B
variant down in Eglin. I was open-minded to hear whether he
thought it was good or bad. I am a ground-pounder. So I did not
have any predisposed notions. But I am telling you he convinced
me.
I will say this: we have not been attacked from the air
since April 15, 1953. I am not going to be the Chairman on
whose watch that is reversed. So I am an advocate.
Senator Blumenthal. I deeply appreciate both of your views
on both submarines and the JSF because I strongly share the
commitment to those programs not only because they are
stealthy, strong, and asymmetric, but also extraordinarily
versatile, speaking about the submarines, and of course, the
JSF is, in my view, the linchpin to our air superiority in
defending against the kind of aggression that you have just
alluded to many years ago. So I thank you both for those
answers.
Mr. Secretary, one of the reasons that I was so proud to
support you and so grateful that you have been confirmed is
your commitment to the well-being of our troops. On health
issues and health care, on their well-being while they are in
service, but also I think you share my view that more needs to
be done to enable and prepare them for lives after their
service, particularly concerning employment and skill training.
I know that the minute-plus that I have left here will be
absolutely inadequate for an answer on this score from you and
General Dempsey, but perhaps you can just give us your view as
to how we are doing and where we should go in terms of
preparing the men and women, particularly many of them who are
going to leave the Services in the very near future for
civilian life.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you. I will ask General Dempsey for
his comments as well.
First, I share absolutely your comments for the reasons you
noted. These are young men and women who come forward and serve
our country unselfishly with tremendous sacrifices that, in
most cases, they make with their families.
We do have some responsibility here. We have programs now
underway that we continue to fund to assist that transition.
Can we do more? Yes. Can we coordinate that better? Yes. All
the Services are in complete agreement on this. No one is more
committed than the Joint Chiefs and the senior enlisted and
General Dempsey, as I am. So you have my continued commitment
on this issue.
Let me ask General Dempsey for his thoughts.
General Dempsey. Transition assistance programs are going
well. They can continue to be improved upon. They are resourced
in our budget submissions. We are working on credentialing
across States. There are initiatives to allow welders in the
Army and the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to be welders
elsewhere. Working on the spouses' side as well, working with,
for example, career trackers so that right from the time a
young man or woman comes in, they begin thinking about
transitioning instead of waiting until the last 6 weeks. So I
think we get it.
We also know that as we down-size the force, we are going
to make the challenge a little more challenging. But we are
ready for it.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you all for your
testimony here today, and thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator King.
Senator King. Secretary Hagel, welcome. Nice to see you.
One of the advantages of going last is that most of the
other questions have already been asked, but I do have one. It
is more in the nature of a request.
Yesterday in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
we had a briefing by Jim Clapper on the intelligence budget
going forward, and he produced a chart which basically showed--
it started with fiscal year 2012 and then showed the effects of
the first sequester and then the ongoing sequester, the
President's budget, and other things that have affected that
budget. It was a very powerful chart. I would ask if you could
check with him perhaps--it is chart number 11 in his
presentation--and give us a similar visual breakdown of what
your budget looks like, including as we now know, the sequester
on an ongoing basis. If we do not do anything about it, what
does it do?
I found this information yesterday to be very important
because what it shows is real cuts, not cuts to growth, but
real diminutions of the amount of funds available. I think it
would be helpful to the committee to be able to see that data
as it looks over the next 10 years, building in different
slices. You look at the director's chart and you will see what
I am saying.
[The information referred to follows:]

Please refer to my letter to you, signed on April 29, 2013.
[Inserted previously]

Secretary Hagel. We will, Senator. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you.
Just one other quick comment on this whole sequester and
budget issue. I am sure you know this as well as I do. One of
the first things you have to do in a situation like this is
defer maintenance, but deferring maintenance is not saving. It
is just a cost that somebody is going to have to pay in the
future. I am sure you agree.
Secretary Hagel. We do agree.
General Dempsey. You actually end up paying more. As I said
earlier, even in things like training, it costs less to sustain
training than it does to restart it. The same thing with
maintenance.
Senator King. I do not know if you have had this question.
I apologize for not being here the entire hearing. But my sense
is that this budgetary uncertainty is hurting morale and
retention and those kinds of intangible assets that are such an
important part of our force structure and our troop readiness.
Is that an accurate statement?
General Dempsey. It is absolutely true, Senator. I have a
little formula that I carry around in my head that says today's
readiness challenges are tomorrow's retention problems. That
always proves true. If you allow readiness to erode, the young
men and women who come in to serve and to be trained and ready
will not stick around very long.
Senator King. That is the essence of the deal is the
personnel.
Final question. General Dempsey, you have been involved
with two drawdowns; at the end of Vietnam and at the end of the
Cold War. There was a significant drawdown. Share some lessons
from those experiences that you think might be beneficial to us
in this situation.
General Dempsey. Yes, thanks for asking, Senator, although
I am not happy you reminded me about how long I have been
serving. [Laughter.]
A couple of things. One is the drawdown produced hollowness
in different ways each time. The first time, it was manpower
hollowness. The second time, it was equipment hollowness. What
we are seeing in this one is a readiness hollowing of the
force. So although we have learned lessons each time, it has
been a little different challenge each time.
I think we have to be alert for what we are doing this time
to readiness. We have incredible young men and women in
uniform. So the personnel side of it is good. Our equipment has
been recapitalized and reset over time. So equipment is
adequate, although it is aging and we do not want to stop
modernizing. But where we are really suffering now is in
readiness. We are not training to the level we should be
training because of sequestration and its mechanism.
The other factor, in terms of the three different
drawdowns, is each time you start from a much lower start
point. So I will take the Army as an example. A million men in
uniform in Vietnam, down to 781,000 by the end of the 1970s.
You start at 781,000 and you draw down in the 1990s to roughly
500,000. Today, we are starting at 490,000. We will be at
490,000 in the Army Active as a result of the BCA, 487,000.
That is where you start from to absorb sequestration. So each
time you start at a lower level. I think we have to remember
that.
Senator King. Thank you very much, General, and thank you
all for your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Just one quick reference on Senator Blumenthal's reference
to Article 60. I believe that it is understood that what you
are considering are generic changes in terms of the convening
authority's power, not just relating to sexual assault. It is a
generic change for all----
Secretary Hagel. Major offenses.
Chairman Levin. For major offenses.
Secretary Hagel. That is right.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I think that is what we
understood.
I think Senator Inhofe has a quick last comment.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Senator Lee came out and expressed a
concern. I do not think you had time to fully develop it. That
is, to what degree are we going to be influenced by Russia in
our missile defense decisions that we make?
It goes back to the decision that this President made the
first year that he was President to pull the rug out from under
both Poland and the Czech Republic on the GBI. I can remember
talking to Vaclav Klaus at that time, and he said, now we are
going to go ahead and do this. It is going to really anger
Russia, but can we be sure that you are not going to pull the
rug out from under us. That is what I referred to, and he did
in the first year. I will always think it was a result of his
effort to get along with Russia.
Now, you answered his questions about not having that
influence. I would call your attention to the--and I am sure,
Mr. Secretary, that you have had communication with the defense
minister, whose name I can never pronounce right, from Russia
who said that he wanted to carry on conversations with you as
national missile defense developed. So it implies that Senator
Lee is pretty accurate in his concern over how much influence
that will be over us.
Do you have any thoughts? Do you think you would be willing
to talk about it now?
Secretary Hagel. Yes. Thank you, Senator. A couple of
thoughts in response.
First, on Poland and the announcement that we had made
regarding the PAA. The Polish and Romanian Governments were
very supportive of that announcement and what we are doing. I
spoke, incidentally, to both the Polish Defense Minister and
the Romanian Defense Minister about this.
Senator Inhofe. No, this all happened before you were on
board, though.
Secretary Hagel. No, I am talking about the latest
announcement that we made during the ground-based----
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I was talking about 4 years ago, that
decision that was made.
Secretary Hagel. There is nothing I can say about that, but
I can say again when Senator Lee asked me the question about
this latest decision, which I announced that decision, the
conversation I had with the Russian Defense Minister was after
that decision was made, after that decision was announced. One
of the things we did talk about was further missile defense
issues, but we talked about a number of things. That was not
the intent of the call. But it was after the announcement was
made.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Chairman Levin. I am glad we are not afraid to talk to
people and on a positive note.
We will reconvene in 30 minutes for the second session,
which will resume at 2 p.m. Thank you.
This first session is now adjourned. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

DRUG INTERDICTION

1. Senator Nelson. General Dempsey, due to the sequester, Navy ship
deployments to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) have been cancelled.
Additionally, the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request saw a
drastic 38 percent reduction from his fiscal year 2013 request for drug
interdiction efforts. Historically, SOUTHCOM drug interdiction results
in the annual removal of 200 tons of cocaine from the U.S. supply--10
times the amount of what is removed by all domestic U.S. law
enforcement. Can you share the short- and long-term effects of the
sequester and the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request on the
drug interdiction mission in the Caribbean?
General Dempsey. The U.S. Government has two primary
counternarcotics missions in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific
narcotics transit zone, which lies between the Andean region source
zone and the domestic arrival zones. These missions are the: (1)
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal
drugs into the United States; and (2) interdiction and apprehension. 10
U.S.C., section 124, designates the Department of Defense (DOD) as the
lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit
of illegal drugs into the United States in support of the counterdrug
activities of Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement
agencies. The U.S. Coast Guard under 14 U.S.C., section 89, has the
lead for interdiction and apprehension. DOD assets have supported the
U.S. Coast Guard in their mission.
Sequestration and budget reductions are coming at a time when a
major Navy surface asset recapitalization effort is occurring. These
events, coupled with other global activities requiring increased
demands for support from DOD, are compounding the impacts on our
ability to fully support these two counternarcotics missions. Though
DOD will continue to execute its detection and monitoring mission, the
overall support to the U.S. Coast Guard for interdiction efforts over
the short- and mid-term (1 to 5 years) time horizon will be
significantly curtailed, and could potentially undergo further
reductions.

MAYPORT AND STRATEGIC DISPERSAL

2. Senator Nelson. Secretary Hagel, dispersing our capital ships is
in our best national security interest and specifically, dispersing the
east coast carrier fleet is a national security priority. The 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) clearly states, ``to mitigate the risk
of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy
will homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport, FL.'' The Navy has
stated military construction (MILCON) costs to prepare Mayport to
homeport a carrier would be approximately $500 million, while the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates the number to be $250
to $300 million. However, the Navy recently completed a Controlled
Industrial Area at the Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, VA, for $33
million. Can you discuss how the Navy can provide such a drastically
different quote for a similar facility?
Secretary Hagel. When comparing facilities, it is important to note
the one-time costs associated with the creation of a second CVN
homeport at Mayport, FL, which was estimated at $588 million,
consisting of $489 million of MILCON projects and $99 million of other
one-time costs including Initial Outfitting and Permanent Change of
Station orders for rotating personnel. The $489 includes $46 million
for dredging (contract awarded in fiscal year 2010); $15 million for
Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements (contract awarded in fiscal year
2012); $30.9 million for Parking; $42 million for Wharf F Improvements;
$150.4 million for a Controlled Industrial Facility; $174.4 million for
a Ship Maintenance Facility/Maintenance Support Facility, and $30 for
Planning and Design.
The cost estimates for the Mayport unprogrammed projects were
developed for initial planning purposes. They were based on highly
preliminary design information and included conservative assumptions to
account for projected local and national market conditions, force
protection standards, sustainable design requirements, and unique
construction features, such as hurricane/storm-surge design
considerations. Planning assumptions are reviewed multiple times as
part of the MILCON programming process. Based on current market
conditions, the Navy anticipates the cost will decrease during routine
planning and design.

3. Senator Nelson. Secretary Hagel, will you ensure strategic
dispersal is again added as an objective in the 2014 QDR?
Secretary Hagel. The nature of the future strategic environment
requires U.S. forces project power with global flexibility and agility
to accomplish the Nation's security objectives. A U.S. military force
that is properly postured provides the credible combat power needed to
protect the American interests, assure friends and allies, and deter
potential adversaries.
The strategic dispersal of U.S. forces must also be fiscally
informed and appropriately planned within a framework that considers
risk, responsiveness, and Joint Force capability tradeoffs. To that
end, I expect the degree to which U.S. forces are dispersed, both at
home and abroad, will be reviewed during the upcoming QDR.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

SEXUAL ASSAULT

4. Senator Hagan. Secretary Hagel, since being confirmed, you have
made the recommendation of eliminating the discretion for a convening
authority to change the findings of a court-martial, except for certain
minor offenses. While I'm glad you are looking into the problem of
sexual assault in the military--as you indicated you would during your
confirmation process--I'd like to hear what you are doing on the front
end of these attacks. In 2011, less than 8 percent of reported cases
even went to trial. Considering that roughly 85 percent of sexual
assaults go unreported, in order to make a dent in this problem, you
have to address what occurs shortly after an attack. What are you doing
to foster an environment where victims are comfortable reporting their
assault and are confident in their leadership to adjudicate the matter
fully?
Secretary Hagel. I am committed to achieving an enduring culture
change and hold leadership accountable to create an institution that
makes victims feel safe and confident the DOD's ability to properly
adjudicate reporting of assaults. DOD has taken many steps to improve
victim confidence, recognizing that increased victim confidence and
reporting is a bridge to greater victim care and offender
accountability. Our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
program has a focus on the victim as its foundation. We have created,
resourced, and trained the entire force on the variety of reporting
options that provide avenues for victims to seek support services that
range from anonymous crisis intervention with the DOD Safe Helpline to
Restricted Reporting that provides case management and medical care to
full Unrestricted Reporting, investigation, and support services. A
victim can report an assault confidentially through a Restricted Report
to a healthcare provider, Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) or
victim advocate and receive services and healthcare without law
enforcement or commander notification. A victim can also choose to
report her/his offense to law enforcement through an Unrestricted
Report. These recipients of reports provide the independent care and
professional first responder treatment that can contribute to victim
confidence in reporting and adjudication.
Other victim care initiatives have been completed and are available
to victims to instill confidence.

The DOD Safe Helpline provides victims 24/7 global
access to crisis support staff and we have developed and
fielded a Safe Helpline Mobile Application to advance victim
support services.
Victims may now request an expedited transfer.
We have expanded SAPR Restricted Reporting support
services to adult military dependents.
We offer expanded SAPR services during emergency care
for DOD civilians stationed abroad and DOD U.S. citizen
contractors in combat areas.
A victim-victim advocate privilege creating a new
category of protected communications was enacted.
As part of the revised DOD SAPR policy, we implemented
new standards for medical care providers to support victim care
and enhance investigations.
Finally, DOD is sponsoring a legal assistance pilot
program in the Air Force with 60 specially trained attorneys
who are providing legal representation to victims of sexual
assault. Under this program, legal assistance attorneys
represent victims in a confidential, attorney-client
relationship, throughout the investigation and prosecution
processes. Initial reports are positive in the number of
victims staying in the system and converting Restricted Reports
to Unrestricted.

In addition, I recently directed the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to assess, monitor, and develop methods to improve victim
treatment by their peers, co-workers, and chains of command, and to
report their methods to me by November 1, 2013.

5. Senator Hagan. Secretary Hagel, how are you ensuring
accountability at every level of command not only for preventing sexual
assault, but also for properly handling sexual assault cases when they
are brought forward?
Secretary Hagel. I am committed to achieving an enduring culture
change and hold leadership accountable to create an institution that
not only works to prevent sexual assaults, but to make victims feel
safe and confident the DOD's ability to properly adjudicate assaults
when they occur. DOD currently has multiple tools in place to better
ensure accountability.
First, DOD Inspector General (IG) reviews are a primary tool DOD
uses to ensure accountability, integrity, and efficiency. To date, the
DOD IG has conducted three separate reviews to assess different aspects
of how the overall system responds to and handles sexual assault cases.
In 2011, the DOD IG formed a new Violent Crime Division focused on
evaluating and improving the quality of DOD's violent crime
investigations, including sexual assault. They also review
investigative training programs that form the foundation for sound
investigative products. Through this unit, the DOD IG reviewed closed
cases to ensure investigators performed thorough investigations and
followed the best practice protocols.
Second, accountability is a point of emphasis within the SAPR
Program, operating on several levels simultaneously. First, our leaders
within the Military Services are responsible for program compliance and
success. In September 2012, the Secretary of Defense directed the
development of standardized core competencies, learning objectives, and
training assessment methods for this training. The Services implemented
these tools for all pre-command and senior enlisted training starting
in April 2013.
To further enhance command accountability, the Service Chiefs,
through the Secretaries of their respective Military Departments, are
developing methods to assess the performance of military commanders in
establishing command climates of dignity and respect, and incorporating
SAPR prevention and victim care principles in their commands. These
methods will be reported back to the Secretary by November 1, 2013.
Finally, the Department ensures accountability through the military
justice process. In June 2012, the Secretary of Defense elevated
initial disposition decisions to senior commanders (colonels or Navy
captains) for cases of rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy, and
attempts to commit these crimes. This action allows a more experienced
commander to make disposition decisions in these very serious and often
complicated cases.

6. Senator Hagan. Secretary Hagel, is the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), in its present form, capable of dealing with the
problem of sexual assault, or do we need to consider a more significant
overhaul of the system?
Secretary Hagel. There is no silver bullet to eliminate sexual
assault. Congress and I recently appointed the members of the Response
Systems Panel established pursuant to section 576 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013. I welcome the
Panel's review and scrutiny of the military justice system, and I am
open to all improvements that may enhance reporting, investigating, and
prosecuting sexual crimes and the military justice system as a whole. I
support limiting a commander's authority to reverse findings of guilt
from a court-martial. However, I urge against further piecemeal changes
of the military justice system to avoid unintended consequences for the
victim, the accused, and the integrity of the military justice system
as a whole.
The military justice system was established as a separate system
because of the worldwide deployment of military personnel, the need for
a system that can be responsive to the unique nature of military life
and the combat environment, and the need to maintain discipline in the
force. The deployability of the administration of military justice
system is paramount to ensuring a ready fighting force throughout the
world.
Our commanders are trained in their responsibilities under the UCMJ
from the day that they are commissioned and throughout their careers.
Commanders have at their disposal Judge Advocates to provide advice and
counsel. Judge Advocates are an integral part of the military justice
system; they serve as command legal advisors, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and military judges. Judge advocates are trained to analyze
evidence to determine if there are sufficient facts to support
allegations, and to make recommendations to commanders on disposition.
A variety of procedural safeguards ensure commanders make evidence-
based disposition decisions, particularly in regard to sexual assault
allegations.

SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

7. Senator Hagan. General Dempsey, Syria has the largest stockpile
of chemical weapons in the Middle East. During his trip to Israel in
March, President Obama reiterated the U.S. position that the use of
chemical weapons by the Assad regime would constitute a red line,
presumably meaning the United States would intervene militarily, if
necessary. Earlier this year, however, you stated that preventing Syria
from using chemical weapons would be almost ``unachievable.'' What is
the United States doing to ensure that Syria's chemical weapons do not
fall into the wrong hands and how quickly is the United States capable
of responding once intelligence is received that a transfer is taking
place?
General Dempsey. Given the complexity of the issue regarding the
proliferation of Syria's chemical weapons, DOD is working closely with
the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, other U.S.
Government departments, and key international partners. As an example,
through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, DOD personnel
and our interagency partners are working with Syria's neighbors to help
build their capabilities to counter the threat of proliferation from
Syria's chemical weapons. With regard to our ability to respond,
options are ready to respond to a broad spectrum of scenarios and if
ordered to do so by the President we will act. Chemical weapons remain
a very difficult target set because the Syrian regime moves them and
because even their destruction carries risk.

8. Senator Hagan. General Dempsey, President Obama said that the
Assad regime ``will be held accountable'' for transferring chemical
weapons to terrorists. Can you elaborate on what this means?
General Dempsey. Militarily this means we will provide the
President with a full range of options for any contingency. DOD has
plans in place and continues to engage in planning to respond to a
broad spectrum of scenarios.

9. Senator Hagan. General Dempsey, will the United States act to
prevent other strategic weapons from being transferred from Syria to
Hezbollah, including advanced missiles and anti-aircraft systems?
General Dempsey. We are concerned about the danger of sophisticated
conventional weapons falling into the hands of extremist groups. The
Department is continually reviewing our planning to make sure that we
have appropriate options to respond to a variety of scenarios. We also
work very closely with allies and partners in the region to prevent
proliferation of these types of weapons.

BIOFUELS

10. Senator Hagan. Secretary Hagel, last year, DOD released a
funding opportunity announcement for the Defense Production Act Title
III Advanced Drop-In Biofuel Production Project. In that announcement,
DOD expected to award a Technology Investment Agreement (TIA) by March
1, 2013. What is the status of that TIA award and if it has not been
awarded, when do you expect that decision?
Secretary Hagel. I have authorized awards to three companies in
California, Nebraska, and Illinois, totaling $16 million in funding for
the first phase of the interagency Advanced Drop-In Biofuels Production
Project. The Government investment will be matched by $17.4 million in
private sector funding.
Phase I of the project involves validation of production
technology, verification of technical maturity, site selection, plant
design, permitting, and detailed cost estimation, all of which will
require 12 to 15 months to complete. Following Phase I, interagency
technical experts will evaluate the projects to determine which, if
any, will move on to Phase II, which is for bio-refinery construction.
If all Phase I projects successfully complete the second phase of this
project, awardees project that this would represent more than 150
million gallons per year of drop-in, military-compatible fuels with
initial production capacity by 2016 at an average cost of less than $4
per gallon. Government funding up to $130 million is currently
programmed for Phase II coupled with matching private sector funding.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin

ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIERS BUYING FIREARMS IN THEIR HOME STATES

11. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, my good
friend Senator Pat Toomey and I have been working hard on this
background check bill. We want to make sure that criminals and the
dangerously mentally ill can't get a firearm. When we crafted this
bill, we did everything we could to protect the dignity of our
veterans, and gave them some much-needed protections in the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) process. When we did our research, and when we
talked to the National Rifle Association, we also found out that Active
Duty troops cannot buy guns in their home State. They move around so
much--they might not even have a chance to establish residency where
they are based. So, we included that provision in our bill. Our bill
allows Active Duty troops, and their spouses, to purchase firearms in
their home State, as well as where they are based. This is just the
right thing to do. What do you think about that provision in our bill?
For reference, this bill is Amendment 725 to S. 649, Safe Communities,
Safe Schools Act of 2013.
Secretary Hagel. I support the administration's approach to
comprehensive gun control and believe this issue should be addressed in
the broader negotiations on gun control.
General Dempsey. I prefer not to make public comment on an
important domestic political debate such as firearms legislation. I
always appreciate any provision that would recognize the special
circumstances of our servicemembers and their spouses, and would always
ask that provisions be made in support of them. I thank you very much
for both the consideration and support you have provided in this
circumstance.

THE DRAFT IN CONTEXT

12. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel, when you and I were young,
this country had a draft. There was something about a shared sacrifice
that gave everybody a stake in our country's wars. Today, less than 1
percent of America serves in the military. I've had many West
Virginians ask me if we should go back to the draft. I'm very
interested in your perspective on that. If we don't go back to a draft,
what can we do so that everyone shares in the sacrifices that go along
with war?
Secretary Hagel. There is no military necessity for a draft at this
time. The 1 percent of American youth who volunteer meet the
Department's needs for the foreseeable future, given our reduced force
size.
Today's All-Volunteer Force reaches out to every person in every
corner of the country. The military is more representative of society
now than it was at any other time in history of the All-Volunteer
Force. This goal was achieved by ensuring geographic diversity was a
focus of recruiting strategies. To this point, there are over 6,500
recruiting-related facilities throughout all 50 States and the U.S.
Territories seeking diverse, qualified talent that is necessary to meet
the challenges of the 21st century. The Department benefits immensely
from the different perspectives and linguistic and cultural skills of
all Americans.
The last time the United States had to draft young Americans into
Service, the military was nearly twice the size of the force today. A
draft, given the current requirement for just over a quarter of a
million new accessions each year, would be possibly forcing some young
people into doing something they do not want to do and, at the same
time, denying others who want to join the opportunity to serve. Even if
a mass mobilization were required, the recall of active and inactive
reservists would suffice for all but the most extraordinary of
circumstances.
Since the creation of the All-Volunteer Force in 1974, the U.S.
military has maintained the smartest, strongest, and most technically
lethal military in the world. As tested by dual conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the volunteers of America's Armed Forces
sustained operations for over 12 years, keeping the Services at high
readiness throughout this unprecedented period of military operations.

EXCESSIVE CONTRACTOR SALARIES

13. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel, U.S. taxpayers pay
contractors as much as $700,000 per year. Many times these contractors
do the same jobs that our troops do, and as the Secretary of Defense,
you make about $200,000 a year. That's a lot less than $700,000. I'm
not spilling any secrets here--all this information is public. I truly
believe that you are serious about reforming the DOD budget. Can you
tell me--where is the common sense when contractors make so much more
than our very own Secretary of Defense?
Secretary Hagel. You are correct, Senator; I am committed to budget
reform. By law, allowable contractor executive compensation costs are
limited to a benchmark compensation amount determined annually by the
Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). While
the contractor personnel can be paid more than that amount by their
employers, the costs cannot be passed on to the taxpayers through
Government contracts. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 extended the
compensation cap on executive salaries to all contractor employees,
with limited exceptions; this broader limitation is being incorporated
into the Federal Acquisition Regulation through the rulemaking process.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 directed the GAO to study the impact of
tying the cap to either the President's or the Vice President's salary,
rather than the OFPP benchmark. I understand that the GAO study is
almost complete and that should inform the discussion on compensation.
In addition to the statutory cap on compensation, there are
longstanding limitations on the allowability of compensation costs.
Employee compensation costs will not be reimbursed by the Government
unless the costs are determined to be reasonable in amount, are
otherwise allowable, and are properly allocable to a Government
contract. Reasonableness is determined by comparing a contractor's
employee compensation data to that paid on a comparable industry-wide
basis. Excessive compensation is disallowed as unreasonable.

VETERANS UNEMPLOYMENT

14. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, as we've
discussed before, my good friend Senator Mark Kirk and I formed the
bipartisan Congressional Veterans Jobs Caucus to address veterans'
unemployment. The veterans' unemployment epidemic is affecting the
defense budget too. I find it troubling that DOD will spend nearly $1
billion this year in unemployment compensation. This figure has
increased by over 300 percent since 2003, when DOD spent about $300
million on unemployment benefits. Our younger veterans are increasingly
at risk. The 18- to 24-year-old veterans' unemployment rate is at 33
percent. What are you doing to help our troops find a job, before they
need a job--before they leave the Service?
Secretary Hagel. The Department's efforts are not merely about
finding jobs for our future and current veteran population, but also
include empowering them with the skills-development training,
information, awareness, and confidence to be ``career ready'' and
highly competitive in today's very challenging labor market. As you may
already be aware, the Department recently revamped its Transition
Assistance Program (TAP) into a cohesive, modular, outcome-based
program. TAP is an outcome-based curriculum known as Transition GPS
(Goals, Plans, Success), which provides practical skills, development
training, and tools to veterans. These resources include financial
planning seminars, VA workshops on available benefits, and Department
of Labor Employment Workshop. DOD is also aggressively pursuing
licensing and credentialing programs with many State agencies and trade
associations allowing members to translate their military training into
professional licenses and related items.
General Dempsey. I would say the biggest challenge is making sure
we prepare them properly for transition. We want to make sure that
these young men and women who have served so honorably and so well and
have the skills and attributes, can translate their service in the
military into employment in the civilian sector. We need to begin
preparing them for transition at the beginning of their careers and not
wait and cram it into the last 6 weeks before they separate from
Service.
That said, the recent changes to the TAP are the most prominent
efforts within DOD to improve employment outcomes for our transitioning
servicemembers. Working with the VA and the Department of Labor we've
redesigned the TAP into a comprehensive, mandatory program that
includes pre-separation counseling, a military-to-civilian skills
review, VA benefits briefings, financial planning support, a job search
skills building workshop and individual transition plan preparation.
We've expanded the timeline and created multiple tracks, to include
technical training for those pursuing a technical career as well as an
entrepreneurial track to prepare servicemembers wishing to start a
business or be self-employed.

OVERSPENDING IN AFGHANISTAN

15. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, the
President accelerated the draw down of forces this year. But, war
spending is higher than expected and one of the cited reasons for the
current budget shortfall. Why are we spending more in Afghanistan than
projected?
Secretary Hagel. I expect the drawdown of 34,000 troops in
Afghanistan, as announced by the President, will eventually lead to
lower overseas contingency operations (OCO) budgets. The drawdown will
occur mostly in fiscal year 2014.
However, for fiscal year 2013, the Department is experiencing
higher-than-budgeted costs in war spending because operating tempo in
Afghanistan and transportation/retrograde costs are higher than
anticipated. Efforts to responsibly draw down troop strength in
Afghanistan require oversight, logistics support, base closure
activities, and environmental remediation, a lot of which was not
anticipated when formulating the fiscal year 2013 OCO budget.
As we move toward a responsible drawdown in fiscal year 2014, the
budget is not projected to decrease proportionately to the forces in
Afghanistan, because the cost reduction associated with fewer troops
will be substantially offset by increasing costs such as:

Preparing facilities for closure/environmental
remediation;
Bringing equipment home (transportation and retrograde
costs);
Costs for contractor personnel, which tend to lag
reductions in troop costs because contractors are heavily
involved in closure activities;
Fixing or replacing equipment and replenishment of
munitions (reset costs), which will remain high for several
years after combat activities end; and
Costs for sustaining in-theater forces--that is, units
and forces operating outside Afghanistan but supporting our
troops in Afghanistan and other activities in the U.S. Central
Command region--largely continue at a steady pace of
operations.

General Dempsey. The Department's operating tempo and
transportation costs in Afghanistan are higher than we anticipated when
we developed the fiscal year 2013 OCO submission. Our efforts to
responsibly drawdown troop strength in Afghanistan require oversight,
logistics support, base closure expertise, and environmental
inspectors/controls, most of which were not included in the fiscal year
2013 OCO request. Finally, we could not predict the higher retrograde
costs due to the slow reopening of the Pakistan ground routes.
The Department has submited a reprogramming action to Congress to
largely offset war-related costs and avoid adverse effects on our
wartime operations. The $7.5 billion in transfer authority provided in
fiscal year 2013 will provide some relief from this shortfall.

16. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, in some
cases, are we spending more money to retrograde equipment than the
actual equipment is worth?
Secretary Hagel. In most cases, if the cost to retrograde an item
exceeds its acquisition value, the Military Services will not
retrograde the item. Instead, the Military Service will dispose of the
item in accordance with existing authorities and guidance for
reutilization, transfer, donation, demilitarization and destruction. In
a limited number of cases, an item whose retrograde cost exceeds its
acquisition value may be retrograded if it retains significant military
utility and cannot be easily or quickly replaced.
General Dempsey.

In many cases, such as for tactical vehicles, the
equipment is being sent back with several upgrades and better
capabilities than when it arrived in Afghanistan. These
battlefield improvements represent lessons learned during
combat, and it is essential we bring this knowledge home to
benefit America's future national defense.
The focus for us is not the cost but the requirement
to bring home needed military capability, to ensure U.S. Armed
Forces maintain proper future readiness. That being said, it
will likely cost several billion dollars total, which is a good
investment since the equipment in question would cost many
times that amount to replace.
In cases where the materiel is excess to the needs of
the DOD and/or the transportation cost exceeds the fair market
value, the materiel will be donated or disposed of. The
disposition of U.S. equipment and supplies is an area of
interest to Congress. Congress will be notified of the intent
to donate or sell military equipment.

TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN

17. Senator Manchin. General Dempsey, after 2014, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is planning for somewhere between
8,000 to 12,000 troops in Afghanistan. You said, ``I find that to be a
reasonable target.'' If we leave this many troops in country, I fear
the war in Afghanistan may never conclude. In Iraq, we currently have
less than 300 troops there. Why do you feel 8,000 to 12,000 troops are
needed in Afghanistan after 2014?
General Dempsey. In my military judgment, a NATO force of 8,000 to
12,000 is necessary to secure our national objectives as I currently
understand them in a post-2014 environment. NATO's proposed force
structure range preserves flexibility, limits unnecessary risk to force
and mission, and supports the objectives of the Afghanistan campaign.
We will continue to refine our analysis and coordinate with NATO as
conditions change over time.

ACTIVE COMPONENT TO RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE MIX

18. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel, since September 11, the Army
National Guard has deployed over 500,000 soldiers to Iraq or
Afghanistan. This includes 5,700 West Virginia guardsmen. Our Guard is
really indistinguishable from the Active Force. Long gone are the days
when our Guard didn't have a seat at the table. But, I'm not sure we've
learned as much from this experience as we should have, and are yet to
truly unleash the full potential of an operational reserve. I'm sure
you are well aware that even after the Army completes its projected
downsizing to 490,000 soldiers, it will actually be slightly larger
than it was on September 11. Do you feel we have the right mixture of
Active component and Reserve component forces?
Secretary Hagel. At present, the Active component and Reserve
component mix is about right. The National Guard and Reserves clearly
proved their ability to accomplish assigned missions both overseas and
at home. They will continue to play a vital role as the Department
moves beyond the past decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, shaping
the force in accordance with a defense strategy addressing the
challenges of a new era. The high state of readiness of the Reserve
Forces has been, and will continue to be, a strength for the
Department. DOD is looking for opportunities to continue to use the
National Guard and Reserves as part of the operational force.

19. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel, can we push more of our
Active Force to the Guard to save money and retain our trained forces?
Secretary Hagel. The Active component/Reserve component is at
appropriate levels. Over the last decade, the Department has learned a
significant amount about using Reserve Forces in many different mission
sets. Reserve Forces provide unique opportunity to preserve operational
capability and mitigate risk at reduced costs. The upcoming QDR will
lay the ground work for assigning mission sets to all forces. Each
component brings different capabilities to the fight. I will be looking
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working closely with the
Services and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to recommend the
most effective mix and makeup of Active, Reserve, and Guard personnel
to support the Defense Strategy. We need to capitalize on each of the
Reserve component capabilities. We need to take advantage of Reserve
and Guard cost efficiencies where mission and acceptable risk permits.
Determining the best mix is important to our national security, the
efficient operation of the Department, and the overall cost
effectiveness for U.S. taxpayers.

PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST

20. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, this
budget largely ignores the caps that are in place under current law.
While we all want a more balanced approach, the Budget Control Act
(BCA) is the law of the land. If no deal is reached, at some point,
between now and October, DOD will have to adjust to the sequester
levels. In your estimation, at what point in the year would DOD need to
move forward at the sequester levels and reduce this budget by $52
billion?
Secretary Hagel. The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request
conforms to the discretionary spending limits in the BCA, as amended,
as well as being within the targets established by both the Senate and
House Budget Committees. The BCA does contain a provision for reducing
these limits by over $50 billion for the defense function; however,
this provision is intended as a forcing function as all of the parties
to this agreement agreed that these steep reductions were not intended
to take effect. The President's budget contains sufficient deficit
reduction to meet the threshold of the BCA, which, if enacted, would
avoid sequestration.
General Dempsey. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget, in total,
exceeds the deficit reduction targets in the BCA, meeting the intent of
the law. This budget also proposes a level of defense funding that we
believe is appropriate to defend the Nation. Secretary Hagel initiated
a Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) to examine options in
the event sequestration cannot be mitigated.

21. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, do you
plan on further end strength cuts if the sequester levels remain in
place?
Secretary Hagel. The fiscal year 2014 budget builds on the choices
from the previous budget cycle and further implements the strategy
articulated in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. In
developing the fiscal year 2014 budget and planning for future years,
the Department will adjust the size of the Total Force commensurate
with requirements for future missions, while at the same time ensuring
full support for the All-Volunteer Force.
If sequester levels remain in place, DOD will ask for flexibility
to apply the reductions in a more strategic manner than the current
across-the-board sequestration rules permit. I have initiated the SCMR
to focus on the choices the Department faces in fiscal year 2014 and
beyond, informed by the strategy that was put forth by the President a
year ago. DOD must consider all options, including further force
adjustments, to absorb a $52 billion reduction.
General Dempsey. The new strategy calls for a smaller and leaner
force. Last year we proposed reductions of about 100,000 in military
end strength between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2017. Most of
those reductions occur in the ground forces and are consistent with the
decision not to size U.S. ground forces for prolonged stability
operations.
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget proposes no additional end
strength reductions, but the Secretary's SCMR is assessing the
potential impact of further funding reductions. The SCMR will reassess
the basic assumptions that drive the Department's investment and force
structure decisions. As Secretary Hagel has said, everything will be on
the table, including force structure, personnel and compensation,
acquisition and modernization, how we operate, and how we measure and
maintain readiness. The review will identify the strategic choices and
further institutional reforms that still may be required, including
those reforms which should be pursued regardless of fiscal pressure.

BUDGET FLEXIBILITY AND REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY

22. Senator Manchin. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, although
we hope for a budget solution that is more balanced, the sequester and
its caps are the law of the land. In the meantime, I am concerned that
amount of flexibility Congress gave you to enact the cuts was
insufficient. For instance, I was informed that the Army National Guard
needs approximately $123 million in reprogramming authority to pay
certain guardsmen during this summer's annual training. What do you
feel would be an optimal amount of additional flexibility during this
year if the sequester cuts remain?
Secretary Hagel. If the President's fiscal year 2014 budget for DOD
were enacted by Congress as submitted, no other action was taken to
avoid sequestration, and the President chose to exempt military
personnel from sequestration, the Department would face a $20 billion
shortfall in our O&M accounts. Thus, the Department sees a requirement
for $20 billion in general transfer authority as a minimum to support
the warfighters in the field and restore and maintain military
readiness. It would, of course, be difficult to find the sources for
these potential transfers without doing irreparable harm to our
investment portfolio.
General Dempsey. We are now in a different fiscal environment. In
order to put the Department on a path to sustain our military strength
for the 21st century, we will need time, flexibility, and budget
certainty. This means time to deliberately evaluate the tradeoffs in
force structure, modernization, compensation, and readiness, the full
flexibility to keep the force in balance, and a predictable funding
stream.
We only have a few months left to absorb up to $41 billion in
reductions in fiscal year 2013. The Department is complying with the
law and accommodating these reductions by cutting back sharply on
everything from training to maintenance. If sequestration continues
through the end of fiscal year 2013, we will be forced to impose far-
reaching changes that will seriously damage military readiness.
Unfortunately, at this point in the fiscal year, additional flexibility
does not help very much.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

FURLOUGHS

23. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, one of the big concerns I
have at this time is the effect furloughs might have on our readiness.
DOD is currently considering furloughs of up to 14 days for our
civilian workforce. In many cases, furloughs could wind up costing us
more in the long run. For instance, the Navy has indicated that
furloughs of our shipyard workforce could result in delayed maintenance
of around 85 days. I understand the Navy has submitted proposals to
find savings elsewhere and eliminate the necessity of furloughs
altogether. I understand that DOD is currently considering plans for
furloughing the civilian workforce. As you make a decision, can we have
your commitment to take into account the long-term costs associated
with furloughing our critical civilian workforce, particularly the
long-term costs of delayed maintenance, possible overtime pay, and a
growing backlog of ship and aircraft availabilities?
Secretary Hagel. Major budgetary shortfalls drove the basic
furlough decision. Before making a decision, I sought advice from
senior leaders in the military departments and agencies as well as
advice from my senior civilian and military staff. I asked them to keep
in mind our fundamental criterion to minimize adverse mission effects
and, subject to that criterion, to ensure reasonable consistency and
fairness across DOD for any furloughs that we impose.
Based on all these inputs, I decided to direct furloughs of up to
11 days for most of the Department's civilian personnel. This halving
of previous furlough plans reflects vigorous efforts to meet budgetary
shortfalls through actions other than furloughs.
Furloughs will be imposed in every military department as well as
almost every agency and in our working capital funds. All of our
civilian employees are important, and I would prefer not to furlough
any of them. However, there will only be limited exceptions driven by
law and by the need to minimize harm to mission execution.
I understand that the decision to impose furloughs will impose
financial burdens on our valued employees, harm overall morale, and
corrode the long-term ability of DOD to carry out the national defense
mission. I deeply regret these aforementioned effects of my decision.
Nevertheless, I continue to urge our Nation's leaders to reach an
agreement to reduce the deficit and detrigger sequestration.

24. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, will you do what you can to
find alternative ways to eliminate the need for civilian furloughs
altogether?
Secretary Hagel. Major budgetary shortfalls drove the basic
furlough decision. Before making a decision, I sought advice from
senior leaders in the military departments and agencies as well as
advice from my senior civilian and military staff. I asked them to keep
in mind our fundamental criterion to minimize adverse mission effects
and, subject to that criterion, to ensure reasonable consistency and
fairness across DOD for any furloughs that we impose.
Based on all these inputs, I decided to direct furloughs of up to
11 days for most of DOD's civilian personnel. This halving of previous
furlough plans reflects vigorous efforts to meet budgetary shortfalls
through actions other than furloughs.
Furloughs will be imposed in every military department as well as
almost every agency and in our working capital funds. All of our
civilian employees are important, and I would prefer not to furlough
any of them. However, there will only be limited exceptions driven by
law and by the need to minimize harm to mission execution.
I understand that the decision to impose furloughs imposes
financial burdens on our valued employees, harms overall morale, and
corrodes the long-term ability of DOD to carry out the national defense
mission. I deeply regret these aforementioned effects of my decision.
Nevertheless, I continue to urge our Nation's leaders to reach an
agreement to reduce the deficit and detrigger sequestration.

PUBLIC SHIPYARDS

25. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, our four public shipyards--in
Washington State, Hawaii, Virginia, and Maine--are the backbone of our
naval power. We are pleased that the Navy has agreed to accelerate a
critical military construction project into this budget. In addition,
we are pleased at the fact that the Navy may actually hit its 6 percent
capital investment requirement for its installation sustainment account
in the fiscal year 2014 budget. We look forward to supporting that
commitment. These are good first steps, but more will need to be done
in the years ahead to ensure that all of our public shipyards are
modernized to meet their responsibilities. We are eagerly awaiting the
shipyard modernization plan that this committee required from the Navy
in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. I understand it is on its way to us
soon. Will you commit to pressing the Navy to fully fund the
investments needed to implement this important modernization plan to
the extent practicable?
Secretary Hagel. The report to Congress on the Navy's Investment
Plan for the Modernization of Naval Shipyards was delivered today. It
outlines Navy's overall investment strategy to ensure the long-term
continued mission effectiveness of naval shipyards.
Given the critical nature of naval shipyard facilities and
requirements for uninterrupted service for aircraft carrier and
submarine depot maintenance, the Navy recognizes the importance of
infrastructure investments to improve mission-essential facilities as
quickly as possible.
I will commit to pressing the Navy to fund shipyard investments,
which is challenged by the current lack of predictability of future DOD
budgets and competing requirements. Within the unpredictable
environment, the Navy will address the investments on a year-to-year
basis, balancing shipyard investments with those of the operating
fleets.

GAY AND LESBIAN SERVICEMEMBERS

26. Senator Shaheen. General Dempsey, is there any reason to
believe that gay and lesbian servicemembers are in any less danger than
their straight counterparts during their time in uniform or their
deployments overseas?
General Dempsey. No. There is no reason to believe that gay and
lesbian servicemembers are in any less danger than their straight
counterparts during their time in uniform or their deployments
overseas.
All servicemembers, regardless of sexual orientation, face similar
challenges and threats during their time in uniform or when deployed
overseas. With our All-Volunteer Force, all servicemembers will
continue to be eligible for worldwide assignment without consideration
of sexual orientation.

27. Senator Shaheen. General Dempsey, do you see any military
reason that the families and spouses of gay and lesbian servicemembers
should not have access to compensation or benefits should their loved
ones be injured or killed?
General Dempsey. No, I do not. Currently there are 20 member-
designated benefits that can be extended to same-sex domestic partners;
12 of these benefits are survivor and death benefits available to the
same-sex domestic partner of the military member if he/she designates
the same-sex domestic partner as a beneficiary. On February 11, 2013,
the Secretary of Defense announced the extension of 22 additional
benefits for same-sex domestic partners of military members, and, where
applicable, the children of the same-sex domestic partner. However, if
the law governing the benefit defines the term ``dependent'' to be a
spouse, then the Defense of Marriage Act prohibits us from extending
the benefit to a same-sex domestic partner. DOD is committed to
extending benefits to same-sex domestic partners to the maximum extent
allowable under current law.

28. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, can you think of any other
segment of individuals serving in our military that are entitled to
fewer benefits than their peers based on their lifestyle?
Secretary Hagel. Other than single individuals not being entitled
to the same benefits as individuals with family members, no I cannot.
For example, married servicemembers qualify for a higher basic
allowance for housing rate than unmarried members without dependents.
In this regard, under the law some benefits require gay and lesbian
servicemembers to be treated the same as single servicemembers, despite
being in committed relationships. If the law governing the benefit
defines the term ``dependent'' to be a spouse, then the Defense of
Marriage Act prohibits us from extending the benefit to a same-sex
domestic partner.
To address this inequity, on February 11, 2013, then-Secretary
Panetta announced the extension of additional benefits for same-sex
domestic partners of military members, and where applicable, the
children of the same-sex domestic partner, where the Department could
extend benefits by policy. In advancing this policy change, then-
Secretary Panetta committed DOD to extending benefits to same-sex
domestic partners to the maximum extent allowable under current law.

29. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, do you foresee any managerial
problems in providing benefits to the families of gay and lesbian
servicemembers?
Secretary Hagel. No, I do not. Implementation of the benefits
announced on February 11, 2013, requires substantial policy revision,
training, and, in the case of identification cards, changes to computer
applications. DOD and the Military Services are currently working on
these revisions and developing mechanisms to ensure the force is
informed of the pending changes. It is my expectation that DOD and the
Military Services will make every effort to ensure specified benefits
will be available for same-sex domestic partners of military members,
and, where applicable, the children of same-sex domestic partners.

VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINES

30. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, DOD's submarine capability
will be a critical asset in the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
especially in light of nations in that region (China, North Korea,
India, and Pakistan) placing an increased emphasis on developing their
undersea programs. I am pleased to see that DOD was able to protect its
investments in ship construction despite the difficult challenges
imposed by sequestration. The procurement of two Virginia-class
submarines in fiscal year 2014 with a plan to procure a total of 10
over the next 5 years signals your commitment to maintaining a
preeminent submarine force. What effect will sequestration have on
DOD's ability to meet its shipbuilding goals?
Secretary Hagel. DOD is currently assessing the impact of
sequestration on its shipbuilding goals as part of a review of the
Defense Strategy. Upon completion of the review, DOD will balance the
level of risk across warfighting and support capabilities for the full
range of potential military operations and prioritize procurements to
meet those requirements. Changes to ship force structure numbers and
types of ships will be evaluated based upon the results of this review.

31. Senator Shaheen. General Dempsey, I mentioned the undersea
developments within the Asia-Pacific region. Do you feel confident that
the Virginia-class submarine procurement plan and proposed enhancements
are adequate to meet 21st century demands of our submarine force?
General Dempsey. Yes. The current Virginia-class submarine
procurement plan supports a post-2020 SSN force of sufficient size to
meet the 21st century demands of our submarine force. We plan to
procure 30 Virginia-class submarines to maintain a post-2020 force of
48 attack submarines.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

32. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, you recently announced that
the administration is utilizing DOD's CTR authorities to work with
Jordan to help them counter the threat from Syria's chemical weapons. I
believe that the Middle East and North Africa region represent a
growing proliferation challenge when it comes to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)-related materials. I believe we should be supporting
more CTR and nonproliferation programs in this region. Do you believe
the United States is doing enough to work with our partners in the
region to build their capacity to prevent, detect, or interdict WMD-
related materials--particularly with respect to Syria's chemical
weapons stockpile?
Secretary Hagel. The U.S. Government is undertaking a significant
effort to enhance the capacity of partners to mitigate the threat from
Syria's chemical weapons stockpile. DOD's CTR program plays a key role
in these efforts. In October 2012, then-Secretary Panetta, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, exercised the authority to
initiate CTR programs outside the area of the former Soviet Union, and
specifically in the Middle East region to enable activities intended to
mitigate threats from Syria's chemical weapons program. The CTR
program's new work builds on an existing DOD CTR program to enhance
Iraq's biosecurity capacity. DOD intends to use the CTR program's full
suite of capabilities to enhance partner capacity through both training
and equipment. DOD will continue to coordinate closely with the
Department of State and Department of Energy, both of which are also
undertaking important nonproliferation efforts in the region. Although
WMD development and proliferation remain persistent threats in the
Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere, DOD seeks to advance its
highest CTR priorities and is continuously evaluating how to apply
available resources to address the most immediate threats most
effectively.

33. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, given the threat posed by
Syria's chemical weapons and other proliferation challenges in the
region, can we anticipate additional CTR programming requests in the
Middle East and North Africa?
Secretary Hagel. The fiscal year 2014 budget submitted by the
President requested $528.5 million for the CTR program, which includes
current requirements in the Middle East and North Africa. However, if
the situation in Syria changes dramatically, such that the U.S.
Government had a Syrian partner with which it could undertake efforts
to secure and destroy Syria's chemical weapons stockpile, then the CTR
program might face additional requirements. In that circumstance, DOD
would seek to fund new requirements using available resources first,
but would engage Congress if additional appropriations became
necessary.

34. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Hagel, does DOD have all the
authorities it needs to ramp up CTR efforts in the Middle East and
North Africa?
Secretary Hagel. Yes. The Middle East determination that Secretary
Panetta signed in October 2012, with the concurrence of Secretary
Clinton and Secretary Chu, enables DOD to help regional partners
mitigate the threat from Syria's chemical weapons through the full
suite of CTR program tools. DOD's CTR program also provides the ability
to help Libya secure and destroy its chemical weapons stockpile, and to
enhance Iraq's biosecurity capabilities. The applicable determinations
reflect the DOD CTR program's current priorities and validated
opportunities. If the Department identifies additional priorities in
the region not already covered by my Department of State and Department
of Energy counterparts, and if such potential opportunities for
cooperation were validated, DOD could address these opportunities by
proposing additional determinations to expand the CTR program
accordingly.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King

REVERSIBILITY

35. Senator King. Secretary Hagel, last year's Defense Strategic
Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense,'' discussed the need to build the concept of
reversibility into defense investment decisions we make in case our
current assumptions about the future security environment are not
valid. It specifically said we need to apply this concept to decisions
we make concerning the industrial base, our people, our Active-Reserve
component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis. How do
you define reversibility, and how does the fiscal year 2014 budget
request and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) embody this concept?
Secretary Hagel. Reversibility applies to DOD's ability to make
course corrections in response to strategic, economic, or technological
change. It is very hard to predict the future in this current
environment. It takes years to recover a particular skill set when
lost, if ever. That fact has been factored into DOD's program and
budget decisions. So even though a particular program may have been
weak, or something we thought about doing away with, if in doing away
with it we would completely lose a capability or the ability to have
that capability in the future on a timely or responsive basis, we have
input of what to do in that case. The guiding principle of
reversibility has spurred DOD to try to maintain investments in science
and technology as well as research and development.

DEFINITION OF KEEPING THE FAITH

36. Senator King. General Dempsey, what are your thoughts about
what it means to you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep faith with
our men and women in uniform, their families, and veterans?
Specifically, please discuss the concept of keeping faith in the
context of military pay, benefits, and health care so that this
committee can understand your views as we consider proposals related to
military compensation, TRICARE, and other personnel issues.
General Dempsey. Yes, ``Keeping Faith with Our Military Family'' is
one of the four priorities I established upon taking office. The most
important way we keep faith is by making sure our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen are the best trained, led, and
equipped when we send them into harm's way.
We should also honor our commitments to just and sustainable pay
and compensation. I think we can reform both in a way that: (1) ensures
long-term viability of an All-Volunteer Force; (2) fosters successful
recruiting, retention, and military careers; (3) ensures quality of
life for members, retirees, and families; and (4) achieves fiscal
sustainability. We should pursue such reform comprehensively and at
once if possible to remove prolonged uncertainty.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

HEALTH OF THE FORCE

37. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, you recently indicated to
Congress that in your assessment of the military readiness, there are
several worrisome health of the force indicators, but you did not
elaborate further. Can you provide a detailed description of the
indicators that are causing you concern and their anticipated trends
over the next 5 years and for each one, can you suggest remedies to
alleviate your concerns?
General Dempsey. Yes, there are a number of health of force
indicators that make me concerned. Among them are suicide rates, sexual
assault, behavioral/mental health issues, divorce rates, and retention
rates. The Joint Staff continues to work with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Services, and Congress to implement holistic
solutions to address each of these problem areas. We will continue to
monitor these indicators and seek every opportunity to adopt/evolve our
policies and practices. Senior leaders across all of the Services are
unified in this effort.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION

38. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, in
January, Admiral Winnefeld, in his role as head of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), authored a memorandum which
stated: ``the JROC encourages Program Managers, Program Executive
Officers (PEO), and Component Acquisition Executives, in coordination
with the requirements sponsor, to officially request requirements
relief, through the appropriate requirements validation authority,
where Key Performance Parameters (KPP) appear out of line with
appropriate cost-benefit analysis.'' Obviously, this reform was
designed to overcome situations such as when we spend 15 percent of a
program's budget to get the last 3 percent of KPP. Though this reform
is new, does DOD have any preliminary examples of how this reform has
positively affected the acquisition process?
Secretary Hagel. Since the Vice Chairman, in his role as head of
the JROC, promulgated the KPP relief memorandum in January 2013, the
Air Force was granted KPP relief for the required number of concurrent
Joint Space Operations Center Mission System operators, which helped
the program to stay on schedule; and the Army's Apache Block III
program ground proximity hover characteristics were reset to a level
more in line with observed mission profiles. Admiral Winnefeld and Mr.
Kendall are also working closely together to set KPPs at levels to
provide effective and affordable capability to the warfighter in
programs such as the Navy's Air and Missile Defense Radar program, and
the Air Force Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar program.
General Dempsey. Shortly after the release of this particular JROC
memorandum, the Air Force requested KPP relief for the minimum number
of users supported by the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System.
The JROC reduced the threshold value for the number of concurrent users
and consequently enabled the Air Force to meet the timeline for
increment 1 Milestone C.
Additionally, in February the Army brought its Apache Block III
program back to the JROC for relief of its hover-out-of-ground-effect
capability. The JROC approved the proposed change which allows for a
slight decrease in the required performance to account for expected
engine wear over the life of the program.

39. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, what are
your thoughts on the potential of this reform?
Secretary Hagel. Seeking KPP relief is not a new option. For
instance, in 2009 the Navy sought and was granted acoustics related KPP
relief for the Virginia-class submarine to bring those parameters more
in line with mission requirements. However, the Vice Chairman's
memorandum, as well as other directive and process revisions, have
served to strengthen the coordination and synchronization of our
activities to control cost and/or schedule.
General Dempsey. This initiative and similar efforts, like the
pending update to the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02
and the revision of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System (JCIDS) guidance documents, strive to improve the coordination
between the requirements and acquisition processes. By building a more
synchronous, dynamic, and flexible relationship between military
requirements, acquisition, and budgetary efforts, DOD is better
positioned to realize timely delivery of warfighter capability at a
reasonable cost.

40. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, how can
DOD's leadership encourage such reforms in the future?
Secretary Hagel. DOD's Better Buying Power 2.0 initiative provides
a framework and specific tasks to continuously examine our
sequestration processes to drive efficiency and effectiveness, measure
progress, and capture lessons learned. To ensure leadership engagement,
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation; and Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will hold Quarterly Leadership
Forums to ensure leadership visibility and engagement in process
improvement. The Better Buying Power 2.0 initiative encourages the
Services to emulate these cross-authority discussions within their
Departments.
General Dempsey. We believe that maintaining focus on the changes
put in place recently and continuing to improve the requirements
process and its interaction with acquisition and resourcing will be key
to future successes. The review and revision of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01 (JROC Charter), CJCSI
3170.01 (JCIDS Instruction), and the JCIDS Manual is ongoing. They will
continue to emphasize flexibility and speed in requirements review and
validation, and when necessary, reassessment and adjustments to
previously validated documents when overreaching or poorly crafted
requirements inhibit acquisition program success.

41. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, are there
any incentives for program managers and PEOs to request relief?
Secretary Hagel. Better Buying Power 1.0 put affordability
constraints on programs over 2 years ago. The DODI 5000.02, currently
in coordination, stipulates affordability goals, treated as KPPs, at
Materiel Development Decision and Milestone A, and places affordability
caps at Pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development and Milestone B
reviews. These affordability constraints force prioritization of
requirements, drive performance and cost trades, and ensure that
unaffordable programs do not enter the acquisition process. If poorly
designed KPPs are driving unacceptable cost growth, the PEO has a very
strong incentive to seek relief or face potential program cancellation.
General Dempsey. The incentive for the program manager and PEO is
to develop a capability that meets the warfighters' needs on time and
within budget. By focusing program resources on the achievement of a
single performance parameter, the ability to enhance the overall system
capability is diminished. Therefore, in order to provide the best
technically feasible solution to the warfighter while remaining within
budget, it is in the PEO's best interest to request requirements relief
when appropriate.
The Marine Corps' request for KPP relief with the Joint Air Ground
Missile (JAGM) offers an exemplar of a program manager willing to seek
requirements relief. The JROC-approved KPP relief for JAGM range was
based on an updated acquisition strategy employing incremental
thresholds for range values. The new range values still satisfied the
primary need to provide better than current Hellfire capabilities and
allowed the program to remain affordable without driving delivery
delay.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION

42. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, in June
2011, GAO authored a report titled, ``DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-
off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews.'' In this report, GAO
recommended that the JROC establish a mechanism to review analysis of
alternatives (AOA) results earlier in the acquisition process. The JROC
has adopted this recommendation. What are the advantages of this
change?
Secretary Hagel. Previously, there was an extended gap between JROC
reviews during which capability requirements were developed, refined,
and endorsed. The formal review of AOA results brings all stakeholders
together including Joint Staff, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
AT&L, and the Services, to assess the requirements analysis and
proposed alternatives, especially regarding cost and technology risk,
before performance parameters are finalized in the and Capability
Development Document (CDD). This provides a great advantage to
acquisition activities that follow, especially conveying vetted and
executable program requirements to industry in the Requests for
Proposals.
General Dempsey. An upfront review of the AOA provides the JROC an
opportunity to review the relative cost, capability, and strategic risk
associated with each alternative evaluated and the preferred solution
proposed out of these studies. This is a key enabler for the JROC to
execute its statutory responsibilities under 10 U.S.C., section 181.
Additionally, senior decisionmakers have the opportunity to assess non-
materiel approaches as alternatives or in conjunction with materiel
solutions. A recent example was the review of the Unmanned Carrier
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD) and AOA which resulted in reducing several capability
requirement values to deliver proposed solutions to the warfighter
quicker and at lower costs. The entire effort is to ensure DOD delivers
the required capabilities to our warfighters at the right time, in the
right quantity, for the best price.

43. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, is DOD
better able to explore non-materiel solutions to military requirements?
Secretary Hagel. The iterative nature of the JCIDS process provides
avenues for sponsors to identify and employ non-materiel solutions to
satisfy validated capability gaps. When prudent, the JROC will also
assess non-materiel options before validating a requirement for a
materiel solution. For example, this was the case when the JROC
reviewed DOD nuclear sampling requirements. After approving the Mobile
Nuclear Air Sampling Initial Capabilities Document, the JROC
recommended pursuit of non-materiel solutions in lieu of additional
aircraft procurement.
General Dempsey. The iterative nature of the JCIDS process provides
avenues for sponsors to identify and employ non-materiel solutions to
satisfy validated capability gaps. When prudent, the JROC will also
assess non-materiel options before validating a requirement for a
materiel solution. Such was the case when the JROC reviewed DOD nuclear
sampling requirements. After approving the Mobile Nuclear Air Sampling
ICD, the JROC recommended pursuit of non-materiel solutions in lieu of
additional aircraft procurement.

44. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, is DOD
better able to determine a materiel solution which provides the best
equipment to warfighters, while also providing the best value to
taxpayers?
Secretary Hagel. Refinements in both requirements and acquisition
processes, and components' active engagement in seeking Joint
solutions, have made DOD more effective in looking across capability
portfolios to procure effective weapon systems at lower cost.
Spearheaded by better buying power initiatives, our performance in
acquisition is improving, and mechanisms are in place to sustain
improvement in the severe budget-constrained environment.
General Dempsey. The JROC is looking at capabilities in portfolios
more than ever, which is driving DOD away from each problem having a
distinct solution. For example, the JROC reviewed potential overlapping
requirements for Service specific surveillance radar capabilities.
After providing some requirements relief, the JROC determined that the
requirements for Air Forces' three-dimensional long-range radar and the
Marine Corps' Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar provided similar
capabilities to the joint force. The JROC continues to identify ways to
develop cost savings from these redundancies as the programs continue
through acquisition development.
Additionally, the JROC directed an assessment of Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV) and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) commonalities. After
a comprehensive review, the JROC determined a common platform for both
Services was not achievable due to the differences in mission. However,
the JROC identified common technical areas and subsystems which could
provide cost savings. By employing a portfolio perspective when
validating requirements, the JROC is better able to define requirements
which address the warfighters' needs more efficiently and effectively.

45. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, are there
examples where as a result of early consideration of the AOA, DOD
changed its approach?
Secretary Hagel. The AOA reviews have served to increase Joint
scrutiny for all programs as they progress through the requirements and
acquisition processes. In the case of the Army's GCV, the set of
preferred performance parameters which were identified in AOA review
were carried forward as the program moved into the acquisition process.
This early extensive analysis enables opportunities for expanded
performance trade-space, technology risk reduction, and cost control.
General Dempsey. The Navy's UCLASS was on a track to provide one
orbit's worth of high end capability at a premium cost. After JROC
review, UCLASS is now well-placed within the broader portfolio of
unmanned ISR aircraft with respect to performance, capability, and
basing. As a result, the program is now positioned to provide a larger
number of lower end, long-range platforms carrying a variety of agile
payloads that are common to other platforms and which support a variety
of missions.

46. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, what other
reforms in this area is DOD considering so that decisions such as these
are considered earlier in the acquisition process?
Secretary Hagel. Admiral Winnefeld and Mr. Kendall lead a dynamic
collaboration between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to foster analytic rigor and informed decisions earlier.
This helps to ensure that acquisition programs start on a solid footing
with executable and affordable requirements. The JCIDS and Better
Buying Power-driven Defense Acquisition revisions provide the framework
for implementing that shift to earlier in the acquisition process.
General Dempsey. DOD is striving to push capability gap information
out to industry earlier in the acquisition process and provide them
insight into what DOD is considering for future capabilities. By
partnering early with industry, DOD is better able to leverage industry
S&T efforts and, informed by early S&T development, provide feasible
and affordable options for acquisition decisions. A recent example of
this new approach is the Army's Future of Vertical (FVL) Initial
Capabilities Document which defined capability gaps in the 2030 and
beyond joint operational environment. Combatant command identified
capability gaps will be shared with industry early in the assessment
process providing a starting point for requirements, determination, and
cost-informed trades.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION

47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 made important and beneficial
changes to the acquisition process. This includes statutory changes to
the mission of the JROC. One such change was to remove the phrase the
JROC should ``ensur[e] the consideration of trade-offs among cost,
schedule, and performance objectives for joint military requirements''
and insert ``in ensuring that appropriate trade-offs are made among
life-cycle cost, schedule, and performance objectives, and procurement
quantity objectives, in the establishment and approval of military
requirements.'' What has been the effect of this statutory change? Most
importantly, does the change enable DOD to better strike a balance
between providing the best equipment to the warfighter while ensuring,
if a materiel solution is chosen, that it is affordable and sustainable
over the long-term?
Secretary Hagel. The JROC is increasingly focused on program
affordability over the lifecycle when assessing and endorsing joint
military requirements. This serves to move consideration of trade-offs
among cost, schedule, performance, and quantity further to the left in
the acquisition process. Collaboratively setting parameters correctly
early in program development is a key objective of both requirements
and acquisition authorities and processes.
General Dempsey. In short, the answer is yes. We are focused on
life cycle costs, especially operations and support where most costs
are incurred. Affordability is becoming more important and we expect to
provide more guidance in this area in the upcoming DODI 5000.02
revision.

48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, what
additional changes should this committee consider to the statute to
better achieve that goal?
Secretary Hagel. The Department has submitted a legislative
proposal that would amend section 2366b(a) of title 10 U.S.C which
would allow for a more effective sequence of acquisition events and
improve the operation of the DOD acquisition system. This sequence
would have the formal Milestone B occurring when the Milestone Decision
Authority approves the program plan and authorizes the release of the
solicitation to industry and the Preliminary Design Review would be
required prior to contract award.
General Dempsey. We believe that the 2013 NDAA changes provide the
statutory guidance needed to move forward and improve upon the way we
do business. We are already updating our guidance documents to ensure
this is a focus in future requirements, acquisition, and resourcing
decisions.

49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, the JROC
has adopted new management procedures where the number of individuals
who are invited to participate in JROC meetings has been significantly
reduced. Has this increased the effectiveness and timeliness of the
requirement determination process, and if so, how?
Secretary Hagel. Admiral Winnefeld instituted the smaller forum to
enable frank and open discussion among top leadership addressing
shaping of the future force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
advisors to the JROC, particularly USD(AT&L), Director, CAPE, and
USD(C) play a key role in those forums to produce informed,
coordinated, and timely decisions on the Nation's defense capabilities.
As a result, the JROC has become more agile and responsive, limiting
its agenda and participation to top level leadership decision-making,
and increasingly driving issues analysis and coordination to lower
level preparatory forums.
General Dempsey. We believe this change is extremely positive and
has resulted in more frank, open, and joint force-focused discussions
by the JROC. Senior leadership is having a dramatic impact on shaping
the joint force of the future. Critical issues are address for more
timely and informed decisions as programs move through the resourcing
and acquisition processes. Additionally, regular attendance of the
statutory advisors, in particular USD(AT&L), D/CAPE, and USD(C), at the
JROC forums has made coordination between requirements, acquisition,
and resourcing processes more effective.

AUDITABILITY

50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, DOD is
required to achieve audit readiness for its Statement of Business
Resources (SBR) by September 30, 2014. In addition, by September 30,
2017, DOD is required to achieve audit readiness for its full financial
statement. In order to assist in achieving these legal requirements,
DOD has published a Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR)
Guidance. This FIAR Guidance outlines a process of four waves for
achieving DOD's legal requirements. Each wave has objectives which must
be achieved before progressing to the next wave. For example, upon
successful completion of Wave 2, DOD's SBR must be able to be audited.
In addition, at the conclusion of Wave 4, DOD's full financial
statement will be audited. What is less certain is the specific
timeline for accomplishing the objectives of Waves 1 and 3. What are
the specific timelines for achieving the requirements of Waves 1 and 3,
and is DOD on schedule?
Secretary Hagel. The Department's incremental strategy for
achieving audit readiness and the roadmap to auditable financial
statements are contained in the DOD FIAR Guidance, which is being
followed by all DOD Components and is detailed in their financial
improvement plans. The FIAR Strategy is comprised of four waves.
Completion of Wave 2 is dependent on the successful completion of Wave
1, and the completion of Wave 4 is dependent on the successful
completion of Waves 2 and 3.
Specific information relating to the four waves and DOD's status on
each wave follows:

Wave 1 - Appropriations Received Audit has been completed by
all DOD Components and validated as audit ready. The completion
of this milestone was important, demonstrating that the funds
appropriated to the Department are properly recorded and can be
presented in the manner required by a financial audit. As such,
Wave 1 was an important first step to enable completion of Wave
2.
Wave 2 - Statement of Budgetary Resources Audit builds on and
expands the FIAR activity of Wave 1 by focusing testing and
corrective activity on the business and financial processes
that impact the SBR, which is also necessary to successfully
complete Wave 4. All DOD Components are currently working on
Wave 2 and are on track to achieve audit readiness of these
processes by September 30, 2014, as required by the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012. Audits are scheduled to begin in fiscal year
2015.
Wave 3 - Mission Critical Asset Existence and Completeness
Audit requires DOD Components to improve practices, processes,
controls, and systems to ensure mission critical assets are
ready for existence and completeness audits. Since the
existence and completeness of mission critical assets was
established as a FIAR priority in August 2009, work is well
underway and 53 percent of the assets are either under audit,
validated as audit ready, or asserted as audit ready.
Completing Wave 3 prior to completing Wave 4 is an important,
incremental step and essential to achieving full audit
readiness. All DOD Components with mission critical assets are
currently working Wave 3. Plans indicate incremental completion
with sufficient time to support Wave 4, and in all cases prior
to September 30, 2017.
Wave 4 - Full Audit Except for Existing Asset Valuation, all
work to improve processes, controls, and systems for Waves 1-3
also impact achieving the objectives of Wave 4. The Department
is presently updating the DOD FIAR Guidance to document the
specific steps needed to complete Wave 4 and achieve full audit
readiness.

The Department's updated plans and timelines for completing Waves
2, 3, and 4 are contained in the May 2013 FIAR Plan Status Report that
was delivered to Congress on May 15, 2013.
General Dempsey. I fully support the intent of full auditability of
the Joint Force to include achieving audit readiness for both the Joint
Staff Statement of Budgetary Resources as well as the Joint Staff's
full financial statement. The Joint Staff is closely following DOD's
FIAR Guidance and the schedule prescribed by DOD. We are currently on
schedule to meet the timeline and objectives of Waves 1 and 2.

RISK MITIGATION PLANS IN RESPONSE TO THE CHAIRMAN'S RISK ASSESSMENT

51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, Congress requires the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs to prepare an annual Chairman's Risk Assessment
(CRA) and requires you to accompany the assessment with a plan to
mitigate significant risks or deficiencies identified in the
assessment. Both documents are required pursuant to section 153 of
title 10, U.S.C., to be submitted by February 15 of each year. We
received the CRA this year on April 10, 2013. In your mitigation plan,
you note that while sequestration has occurred, your plan does not
account for the severe fiscal effects imposed on DOD. As we review the
budget request for fiscal year 2014 for DOD and the potential
devastating impact of the budget caps imposed by the BCA, it is
imperative that we receive a risk mitigation plan that takes into
account current laws regarding future defense spending. Therefore, in
addition to the information requested by other members of this
committee regarding the impact on national security of sequestration in
fiscal year 2014, can you please provide a revised risk mitigation plan
assuming the budget caps imposed by current law on security accounts
are maintained?
Secretary Hagel. The Department is currently in the process of
conducting a SCMR, which will examine the choices that underlie the
defense strategy, posture, and investments, identify the opportunities
to more efficiently and effectively structure the Department, and
develop options to deal with the wide range of future budgetary
circumstances. It will be informed by the strategy that was put forth
by the President a year ago, and DOD will keep strategy in mind during
every step of this review. Results of the review are expected to
provide DOD with a holistic set of strategic choices to preserve and
adapt the defense strategy--to include possible adjustments to military
personnel levels--if sequestration is not de-triggered. The results of
the SCMR will help define the risk associated with living within the
budget caps imposed by the BCA and allow DOD to make informed decisions
about how best to mitigate that risk, if possible.

NAVAL STATION GUANTANAMO BAY CUBA

52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, we recently received a
notification from DOD of the intent to spend over $200 million for the
construction of new detainee facilities and support facilities for the
Joint Task Force at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (JTF-GTMO). As
of now, these projects are not authorized by Congress and I would
strongly recommend that Congress be allowed to review the policy
implications of these initiatives prior to the expense of taxpayers'
funds. Is your plan to request a formal authorization from Congress
before carrying out the award of any construction projects?
Secretary Hagel. DOD is currently in the process of assessing
whether to repair or to replace certain facilities that have exceeded
their anticipated service life (in some cases by many years). DOD will
abide by its obligations to keep Congress informed, consistent with
current military construction authorities. The projects being
considered would replace deteriorating structures, consolidate
facilities, gain efficiencies by reducing detainee movements, and
provide quality of life improvements for servicemembers supporting the
Joint Task Force mission.

53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, what status of detainees will
the new facility house?
Secretary Hagel. All detainees at Guantanamo are held as
unprivileged enemy belligerents under the authority provided by the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, as informed by the laws
of war. The new detainee facility under consideration would house High-
Value Detainees currently held in Camp 7 by JTF-GTMO.

54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, for how long will these
projects be built to last?
Secretary Hagel. These facilities will be built to Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 1-201-01 (Non-Permanent in support of
Military Operations) standards. Therefore, I expect these facilities to
last 7 to 10 years.

55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, what is the current
administration policy about housing detainees at GTMO in the future?
Secretary Hagel. The President and the administration are committed
to closing the DOD Detention Facilities at JTF-GTMO. Until such a time,
DOD will continue to hold detainees in a manner that reflects the best
practices for detention in non-international armed conflict and
complies both with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
applicable U.S. law and policy. As a function of this continuing
requirement, DOD is assessing whether to repair or replace certain
facilities built for temporary use and far exceed their anticipated
service life.

56. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, what is the administration
policy about where to detain al Qaeda and its affiliates?
Secretary Hagel. Throughout its history, the United States held
detainees captured during armed conflict in various overseas theaters,
as well as on U.S. soil. Historically, the particular circumstances of
each conflict determined the appropriate detention location. In similar
fashion, decisions regarding where to detain members of al Qaeda and
associated forces are made on a case-by-case basis, in consultation
with the Department's interagency partners.

57. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, what is the proper venue for
trial, if appropriate?
Secretary Hagel. A decision regarding the appropriateness of a
venue in which to prosecute an alleged terrorist should be made based
on the unique facts and circumstances of that particular case.
Speaking generally, with regard to the prosecution of alleged
terrorists, it is essential that the government has the ability to use
both military commissions and Federal courts as tools to keep this
country safe. Both Federal courts and the reformed military commissions
can and must be available to disrupt terrorist plots and activities, to
gather intelligence, and to incapacitate terrorists through prosecution
and conviction. When determining which system to use to prosecute a
particular detainee, the Department remains relentlessly practical,
focusing exclusively on which option will produce a result that best
serves national security interests in the unique facts and
circumstances of that case.

TRICARE FEE INCREASE PROPOSALS

58. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, in the fiscal year 2014 budget
request, DOD's TRICARE Prime and TRICARE for Life enrollment fee
proposals provide for fee increases based on each beneficiary's gross
military retired pay. Why did you choose this method to calculate those
specific fee increases?
Secretary Hagel. DOD's benefit reform proposals are based on one's
ability to pay, as calculated by gross retirement pay. The higher the
gross retirement pay, the higher the enrollment fees, but only to a
point. DOD instituted both a floor and ceiling to help ensure that no
one pays too much or too little. An additional feature of this method
is that it provides for a gradual increase rather than a cost cliff
that can occur with a tier-based system. When fully implemented, the
annual calculation is a simple 4 percent of gross retired pay. Even
after benefit reform, TRICARE will still be an incredible value. Out-
of-pocket costs remain far below the percentage of cost-sharing
experienced in 1995, even with proposed changes. Moreover, DOD will
protect the most vulnerable beneficiaries from proposed changes in
cost-shares.

59. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, how much will it cost DOD to
implement all of the new TRICARE fee increases that you propose?
Secretary Hagel. DOD anticipates $27 million in one-time,
additional administrative costs. This includes change orders for the
TRICARE contractors, system changes, and other transition costs needed
to effect the changes. The savings estimates for the proposals were
reduced by this amount.

60. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, did DOD consider the
additional administrative costs (systems changes, contract
modifications, et cetera) required to implement new TRICARE fee
increases and how do those costs affect your estimated savings from fee
increases in fiscal year 2014 and the out-years?
Secretary Hagel. The savings estimates for the proposals were
reduced by $27 million in anticipation of one-time additional
administrative costs. This includes change orders for the TRICARE
contractors, system changes, and other transition costs needed to
effect the changes.

61. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, were health program and policy
experts within DOD given an opportunity to consult on the fee increase
proposals or were DOD's proposals simply the result of a budget-driven
exercise by the administration?
Secretary Hagel. Health benefit reform within DOD was shaped over
the last 8 years by many program and policy experts, Members of
Congress, constituencies, and subject matter experts from both within
and outside of the Department. Far from being simply a budget-driven
exercise, these proposals are based on sound principles. Beneficiaries,
both Active and retired, deserve a generous health benefit. The
military health benefit is one of the best in the country, and it
remains that way. Out-of-pocket costs are far below the percentage of
cost-sharing beneficiaries experienced in 1995, even with proposed
changes. In addition, DOD will protect the most vulnerable
beneficiaries from proposed changes in cost-shares.

62. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, if Congress prohibits DOD's
new TRICARE fee proposals, what is your back-up plan to make up the
large deficit in the Defense Health Program accounts?
Secretary Hagel. If Congress prohibits the proposed TRICARE fee
changes and does not restore the budgeted savings in fiscal year 2014,
the Department will likely be forced to make additional reductions to
readiness and modernization accounts. The TRICARE fee proposals are an
important piece of the Department's approach to balanced drawdown in
defense spending. The fee changes are necessary to help put the
military health benefit on a path to long-term fiscal sustainability,
to lessen the impact on readiness and modernization efforts, and to
avoid a hollowing of the force in the near-term until savings from
longer-term structural changes are realized.

CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS

63. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, the Navy and Marine Corps have
announced that funds are available to avoid furloughs of their civilian
employees and to meet readiness requirements, but the Office of the
Secretary of Defense will not give the Navy that flexibility. You
testified that DOD favors a unified approach to furloughs, recognizing
that some Services--like the Army--may not be in the same position with
respect to funds available to avoid furloughs. If DOD cannot avoid
furloughs completely, would you require the Navy and Marine Corps to
furlough civilian employees, with resulting hardship to those civilian
employees and their families, when the Navy and Marine Corps have found
a way to avoid furloughs?
Secretary Hagel. Major budgetary shortfalls drove the basic
furlough decision. Before making a decision, I sought advice from
senior leaders in the military departments and agencies as well as
advice from my senior civilian and military staff. I asked them to keep
in mind our fundamental criterion to minimize adverse mission effects
and, subject to that criterion, to ensure reasonable consistency and
fairness across DOD for any furloughs that we impose.
Based on all these inputs, I decided to direct furloughs of up to
11 days for most of DOD's civilian personnel. This halving of previous
furlough plans reflects vigorous efforts to meet our budgetary
shortfalls through actions other than furloughs.
Furloughs will be imposed in every military department as well as
almost every agency and in our working capital funds. All of our
civilian employees are important, and I would prefer not to furlough
any of them. However, there will only be limited exceptions driven by
law and by the need to minimize harm to mission execution.
I understand that the decision to impose furloughs imposes
financial burdens on our valued employees, harms overall morale, and
corrodes the long-term ability of DOD to carry out the national defense
mission. I deeply regret this decision. I continue to urge our Nation's
leaders to reach an agreement to reduce the deficit and de-trigger
sequestration.

RECRUIT PROCESSING IMPACTS FROM SEQUESTRATION

64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, if civilian furloughs in
response to sequestration impact the mission of the Military Entrance
Processing Stations (MEPS), then what options does DOD have to provide
additional resources to ensure recruit processing is not degraded?
Secretary Hagel. The Department is carefully considering the impact
that furloughs will have across the MEPS. It is expected that Military
Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) will focus furlough days on
Fridays, which is the lowest volume day of the week for processing
recruits, to allow the maximum use of civilian resources to support
recruit processing as much as possible. Additionally, MEPCOM will
continue to work with the Service recruiting commands to optimize
recruit scheduling, which will make the most of available processing
time. The reduction in processing capability will still exist, but
these mitigation efforts will lessen the overall shortfall in recruit
processing.

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, DOD and the VA have been
working on integrated electronic health records (iEHR) for several
years with very little progress being made towards a truly seamless
transition of health information between the two of them. In January
2013, the VA decided to use VistA, its legacy system, as its core
health record despite the findings of a recent study commissioned by
the VA that identified many VistA deficiencies. We've been told that
DOD has been evaluating existing solutions to determine the appropriate
core health record to use. When will DOD announce its decision on a way
forward?
Secretary Hagel. Following a 30-day internal review, I issued a
memorandum directing the Department to conduct a competitive
acquisition process to achieve DOD's electronic healthcare system
modernization. In the near-term, DOD will continue to work with the VA
to provide seamless, integrated sharing of electronic health data this
year. The completion modernization effort will build on this near-term
work.

66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, how much will it cost for both
DOD and the VA to develop and field a new, interoperable iEHR?
Secretary Hagel. Updated cost estimates for the development,
deployment, and sustainment of a modernized DOD electronic health
record system will not be known until the program is realigned with the
direction I provided in my memorandum for the Department's electronic
health care record modernization way ahead.

67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, why should Congress believe
that DOD and VA can develop and implement an interoperable iEHR since
they have shown little competence and cooperation doing this work in
the past?
Secretary Hagel. Secretary Shinseki and I are both committed to the
goal of providing seamlessly integrated healthcare data interchange
between the DOD and the VA this year. DOD and VA intend to make
standardized, integrated clinical record data broadly available to
clinicians across the DOD and VA later in calendar year 2014. On a
parallel path, the DOD needs to modernize its clinical software, and
the VA continues to evolve its legacy system. My memorandum providing
direction the Department's healthcare modernization effort is intended
to refocus efforts on achieving near-term data-interoperability while
also pursuing a competitive acquisition process to satisfy DOD mid-term
electronic healthcare management software modernization needs.

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, Office of the Secretary of
Defense/Legislative Affairs recently informed this committee that the
iEHR effort has been transferred from the Office of the Under Secretary
of Personnel and Readiness to the Office of the Under Secretary for
Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics. What caused this abrupt change
in oversight?
Secretary Hagel. Both my Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (A/USD(P&R)) and the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) remain engaged in
the Department's iEHR efforts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs will continue to serve as the functional sponsor for
this capability. Because choosing EHRs is an acquisition decision, I
directed USD(AT&L), who is an expert in procurement, to assume
responsibility for DOD healthcare records interoperability, software
modernization, and lead for DOD coordination with VA on the technical
and acquisition aspects of iEHR.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

69. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, our force
is exceptionally well-trained on suicide awareness and prevention, and
yet we still experience the tragedy of suicide at an unacceptably high
rate. What is your assessment on whether the current level of training
and leadership engagement is sufficient or whether it has inadvertently
created a climate in which some vulnerable individuals may have
contemplated suicide because we talk about it so much?
Secretary Hagel. Research has shown that increased awareness of the
issue of suicide, so long as it is not glamorized or normalized, does
not increase the risk of suicide. Most suicide awareness trainings
include messages about how treatment works and that seeking help is a
sign of strength. Leaders reinforce these messages outside of the
awareness trainings. DOD is shifting towards a resilience emphasis,
which will reinforce messages of hope, recovery, and strength to
further reduce suicidal thoughts among servicemembers.
General Dempsey. Currently, DOD widely disseminates suicide
prevention trainings that focus on recognized best practices in raising
awareness about the warning signs and risk factors of suicide, and the
crisis resources available to servicemembers and their families.
Leaders in DOD encourage servicemembers to seek help for their
behavioral health issues, and understand the potential negative
consequences if leadership is not actively involved in the issue of
suicide. These negative consequences may reflect in suicide contagion,
resulting from inappropriate communications, such as glamorizing or
sensationalizing suicide. However, research has shown that increased
awareness of the issue of suicide, when conveyed according to
nationally-accepted best practices, does not increase the risk of
suicide. DOD has strong guidelines that encourage the safe reporting of
suicide, which are in line with the prevention guidance of health
bodies such as the World Health Organization and the Suicide Prevention
Resource Center. This guidance, which is provided in trainings, aims to
reduce suicide contagion, helps reduce the stigma that prevents some
servicemembers from seeking help, and promotes awareness of the
Military Crisis Line, which provides 24/7 crisis support to
servicemembers and their families. These efforts target the saving of
lives, rather than increasing the possibility of suicide. In addition,
DOD is shifting towards a stronger emphasis on resilience to improve
servicemembers' protective factors against suicide.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

70. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, what is your assessment
concerning whether DOD has experienced any difficulties in implementing
NDAA requirements to reduce the occurrence of sexual assault?
Secretary Hagel. There are several areas we have experienced
difficulty in resolving.
Section 586 of the NDAA for 2012 requires DOD to develop a
comprehensive policy on retention and access to records. Because
section 586 required preservation of all physical and forensic evidence
rather than just the SAFE Kit and related documentation, section 586
had the unintended consequence of preventing victims from recovering
their personal property after the legal proceedings are finalized.
This requirement brings unnecessary anguish to victims and places
law enforcement in a difficult and uncomfortable position of denying
victims access to property, which they rightfully own. Personal
property seized could include articles of clothing, jewelry, bedding,
shoes, cell phones, computers or other electronic devices, or anything
the victim submitted for evidence. These items could have significant
sentimental value (e.g., necklace given by a parent) or considerable
monetary value, as with an electronic device.
Before section 586 was enacted, these items were routinely returned
to victims at the end of legal proceedings. The return of a victim's
personal property assists in giving victims closure and helping in
their recovery. Consequently, DOD seeks to alter the requirements of
section 586 to ensure that personal property can be returned to the
victim in a manner that does not interfere with any potential legal
proceedings.
Also, section 575 of the NDAA for 2013 requires DOD to gather
additional detail/data for inclusion in the annual report. This new
requirement included an analysis and assessment of trends and
incidence, disposition, and prosecution of sexual assault by units,
commands, and installations.
While important for assessing the effectiveness of DOD's SAPR
program, this new level of detail stands to potentially eliminate a
victim's right to privacy and his/her desire for confidentiality
because it could have the unintended consequence of identifying
victims. Our concern is that victims will not view reporting as a
reasonable option and, as a result, may not access the care they need.

71. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, has DOD had an adequate time
and opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of those requirements?
Secretary Hagel. In the past two NDAA legislative cycles, fiscal
year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, we have been responsible for
implementing more than 25 provisions of law related to sexual assault.
Most of these provisions were passed on January 2, 2013. As we are
still actively developing and implementing in policy many of these
provisions of law, it is too early to assess their effectiveness. We
need to allow time to ensure these policies take effect and then to
assess their overall impact on our ability to reduce and eliminate
sexual assault in the armed forces.

72. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, what additional tools does DOD
need in order to continue to reduce--with the goal of eliminating--
sexual assault?
Secretary Hagel. In the last year alone, my predecessor and I
announced numerous initiatives to prevent and respond to the crime of
sexual assault. These initiatives, as well as our new DOD Strategic
Plan, the UCMJ review panels, the Air Force Pilot Program on legal
assistance, the DOD-wide stand-down, and visual inspection of DOD
facilities have the potential to make a dramatic impact on victims
desire to remain in the system and to instill confidence across the
board. Because of the range and scope of these many new efforts, we
need time to put them in place, prepare and implement needed training,
and then assess what additional steps need to be taken.

ASSESSING COMMANDERS' PERFORMANCE

73. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, some have suggested that it
would be appropriate to incorporate standardized assessments of
commanders' performance in prevention, investigation, accountability,
advocacy, and assessment of sexual assault response and prevention
lines of effort. What are your views of the potential benefit and
feasibility of requiring assessment of commanders' performance on SAPR
in Service-specific performance appraisal systems?
General Dempsey. It is important that we hold commanders
accountable for the organizational climate in their organizations.
Secretary Hagel recently directed the Service Chiefs to develop methods
to assess the performance of military commanders in establishing
command climates of dignity and respect, and incorporate sexual assault
prevention and victim care principles in their commands. The use of
Service-specific performance appraisal systems will be assessed.

SAME SEX PARTNER BENEFITS

74. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel, recently former Secretary of
Defense Panetta announced that DOD will expand benefits to unmarried
same-sex domestic partners who declare a committed relationship, but
will not extend those same benefits to unmarried heterosexual domestic
partners. Do you agree with Secretary Panetta, that when it comes to
benefits paid for by hard-working American taxpayers, that DOD should
favor same-sex domestic partners over heterosexual partners?
Secretary Hagel. I value the service of all members of DOD equally.
I am humbled by their dedication to their nation and the tremendous
sacrifices they make on a daily basis. That being said, I am bound by
the laws passed by Congress. I recognize, as did Secretary Panetta,
that good order and discipline are enhanced by the equitable treatment
of all individuals in DOD, to the extent permissible under law.
Heterosexual couples, if they so choose, have the opportunity to get
married in every State, and their marriages are recognized by Federal
law. Same-sex couples do not have this opportunity and as a result,
several benefits, such as medical care, may not be legally extended.
The extension of benefits identified by my predecessor earlier this
year is a significant effort to close the gap in equity for benefits,
consistent with current law, and sends a clear signal to all
servicemembers that the United States highly values their service.

RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD FORCE MIX

75. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your testimony you stated
that DOD needs flexibility to keep the force in balance, and that
everything must be on the table including the mix among Active,
Reserve, and National Guard units. In view of the heavy wartime demand
on the forces including the Reserve and Guard, what do you envision as
a viable option to change that force mix?
General Dempsey. Specific force mixes are dependent on the ongoing
strategic review, still uncertain budget, and future threats. What is
certain is the requirement to refine the integrated, Total Force
approach that served us so well the past decade during counter-
insurgency operations. In reshaping for our joint future, we require
the flexibility to organize complementary capabilities to cost-
effectively meet a changing and dynamic national security environment.
We will need a total force mix that is responsive enough to deter and
defeat adversaries forward and appropriately sized to defend the
Homeland within its borders or surge for unforeseen threats. At the
same time, we need to be able to sustain the All-Volunteer Force over
the long-term. Meeting these requirements requires us to periodically
and carefully rebalance Active and Reserve component forces. While
minimizing cost is an important consideration and always one of our
goals, maintaining an effective and responsive force is the imperative.

MILITARY COMPENSATION FOR THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

76. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, our
Nation's historical experience of pursuing cost savings by cutting
military compensation has demonstrated that periods of designed
reduction in overall compensation levels resulted in retention
problems. Those retention problems, especially in the context of
generally improving civilian employment opportunities, meant Congress
was required to come back and authorize catch-up increases to help us
keep the highly trained talents and skills that we need. What is your
assessment of the impact of the President's proposed slowdown in
military compensation on retention and recruiting?
Secretary Hagel. My assessment, informed by recommendations of the
Department's senior leadership, is that curbing the growth in
compensation is prudent and does not increase risk to recruiting and
retention programs. The costs of military pay and benefits are a
significant driver of spending growth that must be addressed in today's
constrained fiscal environment. Therefore, the President's budget
package includes a modest slowing of military pay growth by
implementing a 1 percent pay raise for servicemembers in 2014.
In June 2012, the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
reported that on average, enlisted members are paid at approximately
the 90th percentile, and officers are paid at the 83rd percentile
relative to American workers with similar education and experience.
Capping the pay raise in 2014 at 1 percent, while the Department
continues to assess the economy and prepares for reduced operations
abroad, will provide the flexibility to inject limited resources into
those areas critical to maintaining the future force. This will also
continue to fulfill the United States' responsibility to provide
military members a standard of living above a majority of their
civilian counterparts.
This adjustment to pay was among the most carefully considered and
difficult choices in the budget. The decision was made with the strong
support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior enlisted
leadership, in recognition that limiting personnel costs was necessary
to sustain military compensation over the long-term without reducing
the size or readiness of the force.
General Dempsey. My assessment, informed by the Service Chiefs'
recommendations, is that curbing the growth in compensation is prudent
and does not increase risk to the Department's recruiting and retention
programs. The cost of military pay and benefits are a significant
driver of spending growth that must be addressed in today's constrained
fiscal environment. Therefore, the President's budget package includes
a modest slowing of the growth of military pay by implementing a 1
percent pay raise for servicemembers in 2014.
Capping the pay raise in 2014 at 1 percent, while we continue to
assess the economy and prepare for reduced operations abroad, will
afford the Department the flexibility to target limited resources at
those areas critical to maintaining the force we need in the future.
This adjustment to pay was among the most carefully considered and
difficult choices in the budget. This decision was made with the strong
support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior enlisted leadership
in recognition that limiting personnel costs was necessary to sustain
military compensation over the long-term without reducing the size or
readiness of the force.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

77. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, you testified that
unsustainable cost and smaller budgets require DOD to examine every
warrior and family support program to make sure we are getting the best
return on our investment. How do you assess the investments our Nation
has already made in family support programs, and suicide prevention, in
particular, in moving the needle with demonstrable positive return on
investment?
General Dempsey. The Nation's investment has been continuous and
favorable. As our budget decreases, we're continuing to explore public-
private partnerships. As you're well aware, America cares about and
values our men and women in uniform and their families--and is
assisting them in communities across our Nation.

TUITION ASSISTANCE

78. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, I am pleased to learn that DOD
has now reinstated the Tuition Assistance program, previously cancelled
by the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force in response to the
administration's failure to plan for sequestration. How does tuition
assistance enable the Active-Duty Forces to meet the professional
development requirements you described in your testimony to establish
the Profession of Arms as the foundation for the Joint Force?
General Dempsey. Renewing our commitment to the Profession of Arms
has been one of my priorities. In order to be a professional, we must
develop servicemembers of character and competence. Education is
essential to how we do this as an institution.
We recruit and seek to retain high quality individuals who are
committed to continuous learning. The Tuition Assistance program helps
us to satisfy their interests and invest in the future of the Joint
Force. The courses our members take using the Tuition Assistance
program balance the pursuit of education with other professional
priorities, such as mastery of rating skills, warfare qualification,
and leadership skills.
As we work to restore and maintain readiness in light of budget
reductions, we must carefully balance our investments. To minimize the
impact to programs like this, the Joint Chiefs and I are seeking
congressional support for greater time and flexibility to implement
reductions.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE TRAINING

79. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, having military members with
language and culture training are essential to a U.S. global force. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 authorized the Secretary of Defense to
transform the National Language Service Corps from a pilot to a
permanent program, and also to enhance the ability of our Federal
agencies to hire people with strategic foreign language skills and as
National Security Education Program awardees. What are DOD's goals with
respect to the capabilities represented by the National Language
Service Corps?
General Dempsey. The National Language Service Corps is an
invaluable asset that maintains a readily available group of language
volunteers who provide supplemental language resources to U.S. Federal
agencies when a U.S. Government requirement arises. In order to respond
to increasing demands for foreign language skills, DOD plans to
increase membership in the National Language Service Corps from the
current 4,200 to at least 5,500 and expand the number of languages/
dialects represented from 283 at present to at least 350, by fiscal
year 2015. This increase will provide greater opportunities for the
Corps to respond to requests in areas such as strategic language
support operations (interpretation, translation, and analysis),
training (instruction), logistics activities, emergency relief
activities, and administrative language support services to Federal
Government domestic and international activities. Once DOD internal
procedures are established, the National Language Service Corps will
more actively expand its membership recruitment efforts to reach out to
groups in which the government has already invested (such as veterans
and other members departing the Services who have foreign language
skills).

WOMEN IN COMBAT

80. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, on January
24th, former Secretary of Defense Panetta rescinded the 1994 Direct
Ground Combat Definition and Assignment rule that excluded women from
assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is to engage
indirect combat on the ground. How will military readiness be improved
by opening combat arms units and positions to women?
Secretary Hagel. Opening positions to women maximizes military
capabilities, provides a greater pool of qualified members from which
to draw, and reduces operational tempo. The Department's goal is to
ensure that the mission is met with the best-qualified and most capable
people, regardless of gender. This effort will ensure that the
Department continues to maintain a high state of readiness and preserve
the quality of our All-Volunteer Force.
General Dempsey. The elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule provided greater flexibility assigning
the best qualified individuals where they are needed most. Greater
flexibility and wider pool of skilled personnel creates a more agile
and responsive force generation model for greater readiness.

81. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, how will
you integrate sexual assault prevention consideration into decisions on
whether units should be opened to women?
Secretary Hagel. I have made it abundantly clear that there is no
place in DOD for sexual assault and made it a top priority to do
everything possible to reduce and prevent sexual assault, to make
victims of sexual assault feel secure enough to report this crime
without fear of retribution or harm to their career, and to hold
perpetrators appropriately accountable.
The key to successful integration will be our commanders, who are
expected to follow DOD policies on standards of conduct, ensure strict
compliance with those standards, and build the appropriate command
climate. No one should be at risk--male or female.
General Dempsey. Sexual assault and sexual harassment are
unacceptable and eradication of both is a top priority throughout the
Department. Our men and women need to feel safe and secure no matter
where they serve. To that end, we have a plan that ensures a sufficient
cadre of mid-grade/senior enlisted and officers are assigned to
previously closed units to ensure successful assimilation of women for
the long run. Having these women in leadership positions helps create a
command climate where more junior women will have senior female mentors
who are already established in the unit.

82. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, how will
integration of women into these units and positions further efforts to
combat sexual harassment and assault in the Armed Forces?
Secretary Hagel. Commanders are key for successful integration.
General Dempsey and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a way forward
that ensures a sufficient cadre of women who are mid-grade/senior
enlisted and officers are assigned to commands at the point of
introduction to ensure success in the long run. As women are assigned
to previously closed positions, the Services will solicit feedback from
these women and assess how future assignments may be enhanced.
General Dempsey. Sexual assault and sexual harassment are
unacceptable and eradication of both is a top priority throughout the
Department. Our men and women need to feel safe no matter where they
serve and feel secure enough to report this crime without fear of
retribution or harm to their career. To that end, we have worked
extensively on a plan to ensure a sufficient cadre of women who are
mid-grade/senior enlisted and officers are assigned to these previously
closed units to become established members of the command to act as
mentors to younger women as they assimilate into the unit. Having these
women mentors firmly established within the command will have a
positive influence toward establishing a command climate of trust and
support for young women once they arrive.

83. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, do you
agree that if physical requirements are based on bona fide military
requirements, some male servicemembers may be unable to meet gender-
neutral standards?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, I agree. Recent experience at over a decade
of war indicates that a review of standards is necessary to ensure both
men and women are physically able to perform the tasks required of them
without sustaining an injury.
The Services are working to ensure the standards used to classify
and train male and female servicemembers are validated by science and
related directly to the tasks required by their occupations. Applying
these task-oriented occupational screening tests, without regard to
gender, provides the greatest opportunity for maintaining the readiness
of the force.
This effort complies with the requirements of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160), section 543, which requires the Department
shall ensure that occupations are evaluated on the basis of common,
relevant performance standards, without differential standards of
evaluation on the basis of gender. If the physical requirements of an
occupational specialty are newly established or revised, a member
serving in that occupational specialty shall be provided a reasonable
period to meet the new standard.
General Dempsey. Relevant performance standards exist to ensure
individuals can accomplish the associated tasks required of the
mission. This includes screening males at certain military occupational
training schools to ensure they meet requisite standards.

CHANGES TO ARTICLE 60

84. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, Secretary
Hagel recently directed the DOD General Counsel to draft a change to
Article 60 of the UCMJ that would limit existing authority of
commanders to take post-trial action for military courts-martial,
including cases involving sexual harassment and sexual assault, which
can have a negative impact on unit readiness, cohesiveness, and combat
effectiveness. In light of the recent testimony by the Service Judge
Advocates General that it is exceedingly rare for convening authorities
to exercise their lawful authority to set aside court-martial
convictions, explain why you can trust your commanders to make
decisions to send servicemembers into combat, but you cannot trust
their authority to make decisions concerning military justice?
Secretary Hagel. The military justice system must serve two
critical purposes: (1) to provide justice for all participants in the
system, including victims, and (2) to support good order and discipline
throughout the ranks. Proposed changes to the military justice system
must be carefully evaluated against those two goals. After consulting
with the Joint Chiefs, and with the Department's military justice
experts, I concluded that limiting the commander's authority to reject
findings would increase the confidence of the men and women of our
military in the military justice system, and thereby contribute to good
order and discipline, and it would increase the confidence of victims
of crimes that they would receive justice.
General Dempsey. I do trust commanders to make decisions within
their authority in times of combat and peace, on the battlefield, and
within garrison. This includes trusting those commanders vested with
the responsibility of serving as a convening authority.
That being said, military justice has significantly evolved since
the UCMJ was originally enacted. Sixty years ago, military judges had
no role in courts-martial, and neither the accused nor the government
was represented by an attorney. The convening authority, with the
assistance and advice of a staff judge advocate, was required to review
the record of trial for both factual and legal errors. Today, the
accused has the right to be represented by an attorney, trial counsel
are also licensed attorneys, and professional military judges preside
over general and special courts-martial. A robust appellate process has
also developed over time, providing an added layer of judicial review
to ensure an accused's legal rights were protected. These positive
developments in the professional nature of court-martial practice have
significantly diminished the need for convening authorities to modify
the findings adjudged at a court-martial, except in limited
circumstances in the best interest of justice.
Secretary Hagel's proposed amendment to Article 60, on which I and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided recommendations, does not undercut
the authority of convening authorities and commanders. Under the
proposed amendment, the convening authority retains the responsibility
for approving and enforcing the punishment for an individual convicted
of a crime at court-martial. The proposed amendment also provides the
convening authority the ability to modify findings for certain minor
offenses when doing so is in the best interests of justice. Also, the
requirement for a convening authority to explain his or her decision to
modify an accused's sentence or to disapprove a finding of guilt for
certain minor offenses promotes transparency and public trust in the
military justice system. These changes should not be perceived as the
result of a loss of faith in commanders but rather as positive
developments that can be made due to the advanced professionalism of
our system of military justice.

85. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, despite
Secretary Hagel's recent announcement that he has directed the DOD
General Counsel to draft a change to Article 60 of the UCMJ that would
limit existing authority of commanders to take post-trial action for
military courts-martial, some Members of Congress believe you have not
gone far enough and suggest that the public trust and confidence in the
military justice system cannot be preserved unless military commanders
are deprived of the discretion to dispose of offenses under the UCMJ,
and to shift that responsibility to judge advocates. Do you agree that
removing that authority from military commanders would be a fundamental
change to the UCMJ and that it would undermine the ability of
commanders at every level of the chain of command to maintain and
sustain unit readiness, cohesiveness, and combat effectiveness?
Secretary Hagel. Removing the authority of commanders to make
disposition decisions regarding allegations of misconduct by members of
their commands would be a fundamental change to military justice. Given
the depth of the concerns about sexual assault, however, I believe that
DOD must be open to considering all options to improve public trust and
confidence in the military justice system. The panel required by
section 576 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239) is tasked
to examine proposals to modify the role of commanders in the military
justice system, and I look forward to the panel's assessment and
recommendations.
General Dempsey. The Article 60 revision proposed by Secretary
Hagel does not undercut the authority of a convening authority and
serves as a well-crafted and refined proposal that will simply prohibit
a convening authority from setting aside the findings of a court-
martial except for a narrow group of qualified offenses. It also
preserves the ability of the convening authority to enter into pretrial
agreements, when appropriate, which provides a limitation on an
accused's sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.
However, I do not support any revisions to the UCMJ that would
remove the commander from the military justice system, or that would
eliminate a commander's authority to take action on a court-martial
sentence. The ability to punish is the bedrock of discipline, and the
commander must have the authority to dispense punishment quickly,
visibly, and under any conditions. It would send the wrong message to
everyone in the military that there is a lack of faith in those
officers selected to command. The commander is responsible and
accountable for all that goes on in a formation, including health,
welfare, safety, morale, discipline, and readiness to execute the
mission.
I remain committed to working with Congress, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Services to make further necessary amendments and
revisions to the UCMJ. Any changes to the UCMJ must be carefully
considered, as even minor changes could have unintended consequences
that could negatively impact our system of justice.

ARTICLE 60 MODIFICATIONS

86. Senator Inhofe. Chairman Dempsey, we trust you to make
decisions that may result in the loss of life in order to protect the
Nation and accomplish the mission. Every day commanders must make
decisions to correct underperformers with training or education, and,
when necessary, to discipline troops or possibly relieve commanders.
Ultimately, our Nation charges them, and you, with the responsibility
to establish cohesive, mission-ready combat units. While we trust you
with our sons' and daughters' lives, the proposed modifications to
Article 60 of the UCMJ seem to suggest that we do not trust your
discretion when it comes to UCMJ offenses. Do you, as a commander,
consider the UCMJ as it is currently structured, to be a viable tool to
help you maintain and enhance the cohesiveness and fighting
capabilities of your combat units?
General Dempsey. Yes. I believe the UCMJ as currently structured to
be an effective means to maintain and enhance the cohesiveness of
military units, provide due process under the law, and preserve good
order and discipline. It provides accountability at all times and
places, in peace and in combat.
However, the UCMJ, while effective, is not perfect. We should
always be searching for ways to improve our system of military justice.
Reasonable changes to military justice system, such as the Article 60
revision proposed by Secretary Hagel, keep the UCMJ vibrant and fair to
victims and to the accused. The proposed revision does not limit the
current role of appellate courts, access to defense counsel, and
significant post-trial involvement by convening authorities.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires a Response Systems Panel to
conduct an independent review and assessment of the systems used to
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes involving sexual assault
and related offenses. I welcome the Panel's review of the effectiveness
of the UCMJ and its strengths and weaknesses in dealing with sexual
assault. I also welcome the opportunity to provide input regarding the
important role commanders serve in the military justice system.

87. Senator Inhofe. Chairman Dempsey, have you seen any evidence
that commanders are abusing their discretion as the convening authority
to adjust sentencing?
General Dempsey. No. I have not seen any evidence that commanders
are abusing their discretion as convening authorities to adjust
sentencing.
It is critical that the convening authority retain the authority to
reduce or suspend an adjudged sentence. This authority is essential for
purposes of giving effect to plea bargains. Within the military justice
system, a plea bargain is accomplished when an accused agrees to plead
guilty in exchange for a cap on the maximum sentence the convening
authority can approve. Removing the convening authority's ability to
modify an adjudged sentence would eliminate that option and the
efficiencies it affords. This authority is also critical to the
commander's ability to act in the best interests of good order and
discipline to prevent undue hardship or for reasons of military
necessity.

88. Senator Inhofe. Chairman Dempsey, how would the proposed
changes to the UCMJ impact your effectiveness as a commander?
General Dempsey. The Article 60 revision proposed by Secretary
Hagel does not undercut the authority of a convening authority and
serves as a well-crafted and refined proposal that will simply prohibit
a convening authority from setting aside the findings of a court-
martial except for a narrow group of qualified offenses. It also
preserves the ability of the convening authority to enter into pretrial
agreements, when appropriate, which provides a limitation on an
accused's sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.
However, I oppose any revisions to the UCMJ that would remove the
commander from the military justice system, or that would eliminate a
commander's authority to take action on a court-martial sentence. The
ability to punish is the bedrock of discipline, and the commander must
have the authority to dispense punishment quickly, visibly, and under
any conditions. It would send the wrong message to everyone in the
military that there is a lack of faith in those officers selected to
command. The commander is responsible and accountable for all that goes
on in a formation, including health, welfare, safety, morale,
discipline, and readiness to execute the mission.
I remain committed to working with Congress, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Services to make further necessary amendments and
revisions to the UCMJ. Any changes to the UCMJ must be carefully
considered, as even minor changes could have unintended, negative
second- and third-order effects. Secretary Hagel's proposed revision to
Article 60 received thorough review, and I am satisfied that it will
not have unintended consequences that could negatively impact our
system of military justice.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

TOWER CLOSURES

89. Senator Vitter. Secretary Hagel, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) recently made the decision to close 149 Federal
contact towers around the country beginning on April 7 as part of their
plan to meet their obligations under sequestration. A few of these
towers are situated near Air Force bases, such as the tower at the
Shreveport Downtown Airport, which is located near the Barksdale Air
Force Base. Did the FAA contact DOD when considering which towers to
close or to coordinate their closing?
Secretary Hagel. On February 26, 2013, the FAA requested that each
Military Service determine the mission impacts of potential contractor-
staffed tower closures. In response, each Service assessed towers
within its purview. On March 19, 2013, the Deputy Secretary of
Transportation contacted the Department and requested that DOD
consolidate and validate each of the Services' lists and return a
comprehensive DOD list to the Department of Transportation by March 21,
2013. The Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment--working with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Readiness and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic and Tactical Systems--combined Service and departmental
inputs into a list with tiered categories (based on the Transportation
Department's standard approach) for approval by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The approved list
was transmitted to the Transportation Department on March 21, 2013.
DOD's response identified 38 towers, the closure of which would result
in a severe impact to operations.

90. Senator Vitter. Secretary Hagel, since many of these areas
share the air space between the area airport and the adjacent Air Force
bases, are there any safety concerns?
Secretary Hagel. Although the Department does not anticipate that
tower closures will significantly impact safety or increase the risk of
collision, it will be important for all aviators operating in the
affected areas to have an awareness of the changes that will occur
subsequent to the closures. Specifically, operations at these airfields
will migrate from positive control to uncontrolled operations once the
towers close. In order to accommodate the introduction of uncontrolled
operations, changes will likely be put in place to procedurally
deconflict aircraft and mitigate risk. Additionally, a high emphasis
will have to be placed on local aviation safety education programs, a
robust mid-air collision avoidance program, and at other recurring
safety awareness forums.

91. Senator Vitter. Secretary Hagel, is there an increased risk of
collision or will there be any impact on mission readiness or training
activities?
Secretary Hagel. Although DOD does not anticipate the tower
closures will significantly impact safety or increase the risk of a
collision, it will be important for all aviators operating in the
affected areas to have an awareness of the changes that will occur
subsequent to the closures. Specifically, operations at these airfields
will migrate from positive control to uncontrolled operations once the
towers close. In order to accommodate the introduction of uncontrolled
operations, changes will likely be put in place to procedurally
deconflict aircraft and mitigate risk. Additionally, a high emphasis
will have to be placed on local aviation safety education programs, a
robust mid-air collision avoidance program, and at other recurring
safety awareness forums.
In terms of Air Force readiness and training, the Air Force only
anticipates possible impacts to Air Education and Training Command
(AETC), the command whose mission it is to train pilots. AETC uses the
airfields on the closure list for off-station pattern work because of
on-station traffic congestion. According to AETC, the closure of these
locations will drive increased risk due to uncontrolled airfield
operations and could result in ceasing operations at these airfields,
potentially affecting pilot production. These tower closures could be
further complicated by the furlough of Air Force civilian air traffic
controllers who make up approximately 45 percent of the AETC controller
workforce. This will potentially drive decreased hours of operations or
reduced services, i.e., combined air traffic control positions, et
cetera, at our AETC bases. AETC continues to assess the changing
complexion of the FAA landscape for impact and explore mitigations
where possible.

92. Senator Vitter. Secretary Hagel, due to the suggested changes,
is there potential negative impact on costs to the military and if so,
is DOD taking any actions to remedy these concerns?
Secretary Hagel. The military does not anticipate any increased
monetary cost subsequent to the Federal contract tower closures.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee

MISSILE DEFENSE

93. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, you announced last month that 14
additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) will be deployed to the west
coast as a reaction to North Korean provocations. This brings the
numbers of GBIs to the number originally planned by the Bush
administration and reduced by President Obama. Was the Russian
Government consulted or informed by DOD or any other agency or
representative of the U.S. Government that the United States was
considering this before the decision was made?
Secretary Hagel. Russia was not consulted or informed prior to this
decision. The decision was made to strengthen protection of the United
States from the growing North Korean threats.

94. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, when was the Russian Government
notified of this decision to deploy the additional GBIs?
Secretary Hagel. Russia was notified through my press conference
announcement on March 15, 2013, following notifications to key allies.
U.S. and Russian officials met the following week to discuss the
announcement.

95. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, if DOD decided that additional
missile defense systems needed to be deployed for the protection of the
United States, domestically or around the world, would the Russian
Government be consulted before the decision was made?
Secretary Hagel. The United States will continue to discuss missile
defense with Russia and explore opportunities for cooperation, but
Russia will not be allowed to have a veto on U.S. missile defense
plans, programs, or decisions. The President has made clear on numerous
occasions that cooperation with Russia will not in any way limit U.S.
or NATO missile defenses. The United States is committed to continue to
develop and deploy missile defenses that are affordable and effective
against projected threats.

96. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, Russian Defense Minister Sergey
Shoygu stated in March that he expressed his desire to you to reconvene
missile defense discussions with the United States. Are there any plans
for these talks to take place and if so, will these talks include our
NATO allies?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, the United States plans to continue a long-
running series of talks with Russia on potential missile defense
cooperation. We are pursuing a bilateral U.S.-Russia dialogue, but U.S.
officials regularly provide readout briefings to NATO allies on the
substance of the discussions. The United States is committed to keeping
allies informed at every step of the way. At the same time, we are also
continuing to explore opportunities for missile defense cooperation in
a multilateral setting via the NATO-Russia Council. In neither track
will we accept limitations on U.S. missile defenses.

NORTH KOREA

97. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, the
President, Secretary Kerry, and Secretary Hagel, throughout the crisis
on the Korean Peninsula, have been united in stating that North Korea
will not be accepted as a nuclear power. However, North Korea conducted
its third nuclear test in February and is vigorously working to create
a launching vehicle and suitable warhead. Do you believe current U.S.
and United Nations sanctions will keep North Korea from developing a
reliable nuclear weapon and delivery platform?
Secretary Hagel. North Korea's continued attempts to advance its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs constitute a threat to U.S.
national security, to the security of U.S. allies in the region, and to
international peace and security. Based upon its actions, North Korea
will never be accepted as a nuclear power by the international
community. The United States will continue to take steps to impede the
growth of these programs, as well as to defend itself and its allies
from the threat posed by North Korea, including through the U.S.
extended deterrence commitments in the region.
General Dempsey. Changing North Korea's behavior will continue to
require international cooperation and pressure. U.S. and U.N. sanctions
remain essential components to a more comprehensive strategy to impact
Pyongyang's calculus. The sanctions regime slows down and increases the
development costs of a nuclear weapon and delivery systems. This is of
particular consequence because North Korea obtains technology and
material to develop their capability through illicit transactions. We
need and expect our partners to fulfill their obligations to robustly
implement the current U.N. sanctions regime.

98. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, what can the
United States do to further deter North Korea from development of these
weapons when they have progressed this far already?
Secretary Hagel. The United States and the Republic of Korea deter
North Korean aggression every day and will continue to be prepared to
defend against threats on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. The
United States will strengthen its ongoing close coordination with
allies and work with our Six-Party partners, the U.N. Security Council,
and other U.N. member states to pursue firm action against North
Korea's nuclear weapons program. We are also engaged in proliferation
prevention activities across the globe, which seek to identify various
networks used by North Korea to proliferate WMD and related
capabilities. By disrupting these networks, we raise barriers to North
Korea's acquisition efforts.
Although North Korea has demonstrated that it could pose a threat
to regional stability and U.S. national security, the United States is
fully prepared and capable of defending itself and its allies and
partners with the full range of capabilities available, including the
deterrence provided by both U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.
General Dempsey. The United States and the Republic of Korea deter
North Korea from aggression every day and will continue to prepare to
defend against threats on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. While
North Korea has demonstrated that it is a threat to regional stability
as well as U.S. national security, the United States is fully prepared
and capable of defending itself and its allies with the full range of
capabilities available, including the deterrence provided by both our
conventional and nuclear forces.

99. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, in spite of
multiple warnings and sanctions from the United States and the world
community over 2 decades, North Korea has successfully tested nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. What message does this telegraph to
Iran and other countries that seek their own nuclear weapons?
Secretary Hagel. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear and ballistic
missile programs do not make it secure. Far from achieving its stated
goal of becoming a strong and prosperous nation, North Korea has
instead become increasingly isolated, impoverishing its people through
its ill-advised pursuit of WMD and their means of delivery. Other
countries, like Iran, seeking nuclear weapons should take note of North
Korea's experience.
General Dempsey. North Korea's actions risk creating a perception
in Iran that possession of nuclear weapons may somehow guarantee regime
survival. The history preceding North Korea's initial nuclear test
highlights the importance of strengthening diplomacy with credible
threats of military force. However, the scenarios differ within the
frameworks of regional partnerships and international resolve, as well
as regime behavior, where Iran's sponsorship of global terrorism and
regional malign activities compound the international threat we are
working to prevent.

AFGHANISTAN BUDGET

100. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, at last
Wednesday's news briefing on the defense budget, Under Secretary Robert
Hale stated an answer to a question that the costs in Afghanistan were
$7 to $10 billion higher this year than what we anticipated. This is
very troubling in any environment, but especially under the constraints
that DOD is currently under. Can you verify if this is correct, and
account for such a massive underestimation?
Secretary Hagel. DOD is experiencing higher-than-expected costs in
war spending, because operating tempo in Afghanistan and transportation
costs are higher than anticipated 2 years ago. The DOD's OCO request is
a bottom-up budget preparation each year, and it is configured to
support current military strategy and the commander's assessment of
needs on the ground. However, the budget is prepared about 2 years in
advance of when the funds are needed and sometimes fact-of-life
adjustments (e.g., fuel price increases) and changes in strategy (e.g.,
retrograde of equipment due to adjustments in redeployment schedule)
drive budget shortfalls.
The O&M portion of DOD's fiscal year 2013 OCO request is
understated based on emerging requirements identified above. DOD has
submitted a reprogramming action that, if approved, should mitigate
these shortfalls.
General Dempsey. DOD's operating tempo and transportation costs in
Afghanistan are higher than we anticipated when we developed the fiscal
year 2013 OCO submission. Our efforts to responsibly drawdown troop
strength in Afghanistan require oversight, logistics support, base
closure expertise, and environmental inspections/controls, most of
which were not included in the fiscal year 2013 OCO request. Finally,
we could not predict the higher retrograde costs due to the slow
reopening of the Pakistan ground routes.
DOD will submit a reprogramming action to Congress to largely
offset war-related costs and avoid adverse effects on our wartime
operations. The $7.5 billion in transfer authority provided in fiscal
year 2013 will allow us to request some relief for the situation in
which we find ourselves this year.

101. Senator Lee. As the United States and Afghanistan negotiate
for a troops presence in that country, can we continue to expect
miscalculations similar to those referenced to in the previous question
in the future?
Secretary Hagel. I hope not, but, the DOD OCO request is a bottom-
up budget preparation each year, and it is configured to support
current military strategy and the commander's assessment of needs on
the ground. However, the budget is prepared about 2 years in advance of
when the funds are needed and sometimes fact-of-life adjustments (e.g.,
fuel price increases) and changes in strategy (e.g., retrograde of
equipment due to adjustments in redeployment schedule) drive budget
shortfalls.
The O&M portion of DOD's fiscal year 2013 OCO request is
understated based on emerging requirements identified above. DOD
submitted a reprogramming action that, if approved, should mitigate
these shortfalls.
General Dempsey. DOD uses the best assumptions possible to budget
for OCO requirements, but the situation in the field continues to
evolve. Higher than anticipated execution costs for fiscal year 2013
are associated with operational tempo and transportation costs.
As we move toward a responsible drawdown, the budget will not come
down proportionately to the forces in U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility because our in-theater strength continues to support
operations such as intelligence collection, which does not decrease
proportionately to troop levels. DOD's reset costs will also continue
beyond the drawdown timeframe. DOD strives to project these costs
appropriately, but year of execution adjustments will always be
necessary.

[Whereupon, at 1:27 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, King,
Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss, Ayotte, and Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel;
William K. Sutey, professional staff member; and Bradley S.
Watson, special assistant for investigations.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; Allen M.
Edwards, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: John L. Principato.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator
Udall; Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara
Boggs and David LaPorte, assistants to Senator Manchin; Brooke
Jamison and Kathryn Parker, assistants to Senator Gillibrand;
Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Karen
Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant
to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to Senator
McCain; T. Finch Fulton and Lenwood Landrum, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Brandon Bell, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant
to Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham;
Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Blunt.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today, and we welcome Secretary of the Army, John McHugh,
and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno, to our
hearing on the Army's fiscal year 2014 budget request and
current posture.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, thank you for your
continued outstanding service to the Army and to our Nation.
Over the last decade, the men and women of the Army have
learned and adapted to the hard lessons of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, showing that they have what it takes to be ready,
to be successful, and to be resilient through repeated combat
deployments. I hope that you'll convey this committee's
appreciation with all whom you serve, both military and
civilian, and for all that they do.
Even as the Army's combat commitments wind down in
Afghanistan, the Nation is asking it to deal with serious
resources challenges. The sequestration required by the Budget
Control Act (BCA) in fiscal year 2013, along with a higher-
than-expected operating tempo in Afghanistan, has led to a $12
billion shortfall in Army operation and maintenance (O&M)
accounts, leading to the cancellation of major training
exercises and the deferral of required equipment maintenance
and repair. By the end of September, only one-third of the
Army's Active Duty units are expected to have acceptable
readiness ratings.
We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on how
the fiscal situation facing the Army is likely to impact
military and civilian personnel, families, readiness,
modernization, and, as well, on the operations on Afghanistan.
The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) announced by President
Obama in January 2012 de-emphasizes ground forces for large-
scale stability operations, and increases emphasis on air and
sea forces for global power projection. Under the DSG, the
Active Army will cut its end strength by approximately 52,000
soldiers, ending with a force of 490,000 by the end of fiscal
year 2017, and will still be approximately 10,000 soldiers
above its pre-Iraq war size. The added stress of troop
reductions on an Army still at war will be significant, and we
know the Army will strive to manage this risk very carefully.
We recently learned that, due to increasing success in
transitioning wounded soldiers through the Integrated
Disability Evaluation System (IDES) and back into civilian
society, the Army expects to end fiscal year 2013 with 530,000
soldiers, which is 22,000 below its authorized strength for the
year. We'd be interested to hear from our witnesses whether the
Army's success in moving wounded warriors through the IDES will
have a similar impact on Active Duty end strength in fiscal
year 2014.
The 2012 DSG also reduces the Army's force structure by
eight combat brigades, with two of these brigades in Germany
being inactivated. We're interested to hear from our witnesses
on how the Army will reorganize to meet the rest of this
brigade reduction and whether additional savings might be
realized by moving foreign-based units that are not
inactivating back to the United States.
If end strength and force structure reductions in readiness
were not well-managed, the Army increases the risk of allowing
the nondeployed force to become hollow. That is, too many
units, with too few soldiers, to fill them or with training
levels below that necessary to accomplish the units' missions.
This risk will be compounded if we allow Army readiness to
further erode, which would be the result if sequestration takes
place again in fiscal year 2014 and beyond.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, we look forward to
your views on steps that are necessary to avoid a hollow Army
that would be unable to meet its mission requirements for
current contingency plans and in various future scenarios.
The Army works with great determination to deal effectively
with the human cost to soldiers and their families after 11
years of war. The Army has initiated creative programs and
budgeted billions of dollars to improve the care of our wounded
soldiers and to support families before, during, and after the
deployment of their loved one. There's more work ahead for the
Army--indeed, all the Services--dealing with the prevention and
treatment of the heartbreaking incidence of suicides and sexual
assault. The committee is interested to hear updates from
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno on their assessments of
the steps the Army has already taken to address these problems
and the steps that lie ahead.
The committee has noted over the years how the Army's
equipment modernization efforts have struggled. As the Decker-
Wagner report found, several years ago, many Army acquisition
programs have been canceled without delivering the capabilities
expected and needed. Please describe your efforts to develop an
achievable and affordable new equipment strategy that will
enable us to avoid a repetition of that experience.
In this year's request, the Army has tried to meet tight
budget requirements by restructuring, slowing, or cutting, but
not canceling, nearly all of its ground vehicle and aviation
programs. This means the Army will get what it plans for, but
it will be later and likely cost more in the long-run. Our
witnesses will, hopefully, tell the committee how slower
procurement and maintenance might impact the health of the
military vehicle industrial base. More generally, we're
interested to hear from our witnesses their assessment of and
their plans to manage risks in the industrial base.
Again, to our witnesses, our country is appreciative of
your leadership of the Army in meeting these complex
challenges.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General Odierno, I've enjoyed our getting to
know each other well, both in the field and in the office.
It's hard for me to believe, Secretary McHugh, that you and
I have been friends since we sat next to each other on the
House Armed Services Committee. I won't even mention how long
ago that was.
But, anyway, we hear all the time--and, of course, it's
true--that our Army is the best-tested and so forth, but there
are really some serious problems that are out there. I think
the chairman has articulated, and very well, that this budget
is emblematic of the growing mismatch between the missions and
the capabilities that we expect our Armed Forces to maintain in
the budget resources provided to them.
Last week, Director of the National Intelligence, James
Clapper, stated, ``In my almost 50 years in intelligence, I do
not recall a period in which we confronted a more diverse array
of threats, crises, and challenges around the world.'' I agree
with him. Yet, despite that reality, we're poised to cut over
$1 trillion from our military. These cuts are having a
significant impact on the Army. Even without sequestration,
these budget cuts are causing a significant decline in the
readiness of our Army and its ability to train for the next
contingency.
General Campbell, the Vice Chief of the Army, recently
stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee's Readiness
and Management Support Subcommittee, ``To meet the sequestered
targets to protect our warfighter, warfighter funding in fiscal
year 2013, we've currently curtained training for 80 percent of
our ground forces for the next fiscal year. We've canceled six
combat maneuver training exercises at the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).''
These cuts in training come at great cost to the readiness
of the Army. I've often said, and everyone agrees, that
readiness equals lives and risk. It means that our soldiers
will be less capable and less prepared to deal with the growing
threats abroad. The longer these cuts continue, the closer we
get to a hollow force.
Readiness is not the only area that I'm concerned about.
The Army has rightfully prioritized funding to support deployed
and next-to-deploy forces, but we are learning that the Army's
modernization accounts, its future readiness, are at
significant risk. These negative effects on modernization are
only compounded by sequestration. Last week, General Campbell
stated, ``Sequestration will also result in delays to every 1
of our 10 major modernization programs, including the ground
combat vehicle (GCV), the network, and the joint light tactical
vehicle (JLTV). It will increase costs. It will create an
inability to reset our equipment after 12 years of war.''
These cuts will also have an impact on civilian workforce.
The civilians play an important role in the Service, especially
in maintenance and logistics area. I'm greatly concerned on how
these furloughs will impact the support they provide the Army.
The Service Chiefs continue to tell us that what they need
the most is certainty, flexibility, and time. The Army's budget
request does little to help the Army address these three
concerns. Last week, in our Department of Defense (DOD) posture
hearing, General Dempsey testified. He said, ``When budget
uncertainty is combined with the mechanism and magnitude of
sequestration, the consequences could lead to a security-gap
vulnerability against future threats to our national security
interests.'' That's exactly what we are beginning to see.
I believe General Dempsey said it best in a letter signed
by the Joint Chiefs to the congressional defense committees:
``The readiness of our Armed Forces is at a tipping point.''
So, we hear it from everyone, about what is happening,
about the immorality--I call it--of the action that is being
taken that's forcing you to do a better job. I've said, General
Odierno, several times in the past that you do a great job, you
guys, with the hand that's dealt. We have to deal you a better
hand. I think that's what this is all about, and I look forward
to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator James M. Inhofe

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh
and General Odierno and thank them for their many years of dedicated
service to our Nation.
The purpose of our hearing today is to discuss the fiscal year 2014
budget request for the Department of the Army. Our Army continues to
perform with remarkable courage, professionalism, and effectiveness
around the world. They are battletested after a decade of sustained
combat operations and demonstrate every day that they are the best led,
trained, and equipped land force in the world. It is our responsibility
to ensure that this continues to be the case. Unfortunately, the budget
request before us today falls short of this necessary goal.
This budget is emblematic of the growing mismatch between the
missions and capabilities we expect our Armed Forces to maintain and
the budget resources provided to them. Last week, Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper stated: ``in my almost 50 years in
intelligence, I do not recall a period in which we confronted a more
diverse array of threats, crises, and challenges around the world.'' I
agree with him. Yet, despite this reality, we're poised to cut over a
trillion dollars from our military. These cuts are having a significant
impact on the Army. In August 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control
Act (BCA) of 2011, which reduced planned defense spending by $487
billion over 10 years. The Army's share of the phase 1 cuts associated
with the BCA are forcing the Army to reduce its end strength by 80,000
Active-Duty Forces by 2017 and to cut the number of brigade combat
teams from 44 to 36.
Additionally, these budget cuts when coupled with the impacts of
sequestration are causing a significant decline in the readiness of our
Army and its ability to train for the next contingency. General
Campbell, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, recently stated before
the Senate Armed Services Committee's Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee: ``To meet the sequestered targets to protect war fighter
funding in fiscal year 2013, [we're] currently curtailing training for
80 percent of our ground forces for the next fiscal year. We've
cancelled six combat maneuver training exercises at [the] National
Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center.'' These cuts
in training come at great cost to the readiness of our Army. It means
that our soldiers will be less capable and less prepared to deal with
growing threats abroad. And, the longer these cuts continue, the closer
we get to a hollow force.
Readiness is not the only area that I'm concerned about. The Army
has rightfully prioritized funding to support deployed and next-to-
deploy forces, but we are learning that the Army's modernization
accounts--its future readiness--are at significant risk. Overall, the
Army's base budget request for its modernization accounts is $1.7
billion less than last year's request, driven primarily by reductions
in aviation and ammunition procurement and Ground Combat Vehicle
research and development. These reductions do not reflect cuts
associated with sequestration nor do they reflect the likely reduction
to the modernization accounts this year as the Army attempts to solve
its fiscal year 2013 readiness shortfalls. These negative effects on
modernization are only compounded by sequestration. Last week, General
Campbell stated: ``Sequestration will also result in delays to every 1
of our 10 major modernization programs, including the ground-combat
vehicle, the network, and the joint light tactical vehicle. In most
cases, this will increase our cost. It will create an inability to
reset our equipment after 12 years of war.''
The civilian workforce is an important component of the Army. They
provide a variety of services especially in the maintenance and
logistics arena. Prior to passing a defense appropriations act, the
Army, along with the rest of the Department was directed to furlough
its entire civilian workforce for up to 22 days. However, as a result
of H.R. 933 which provided budgetary relief for fiscal year 2013, the
Department adjusted the furlough period from 22 to 14 days. I'm greatly
concerned with the impact of these furloughs and look to our witnesses
to provide more information on how these cuts are affecting our
civilians.
The Service Chiefs continue to tell us that what they need the most
is certainty, flexibility, and time. The Army's budget request does
little to help the Army address these concerns. Ongoing budget
uncertainty has degraded the readiness of our Army and I'm concerned
with the long term impacts if we don't address these shortfalls now.
Last week in our Defense Department Posture Hearing, General Dempsey
testified, ``When budget uncertainty is combined with the mechanism and
magnitude of sequestration, the consequences could lead to a security
gap-vulnerability against future threats to our national security
interests.'' That is exactly what we are beginning to see.
I believe General Dempsey said it best in a letter, signed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Congressional Defense Committees: ``The
readiness of our Armed Forces is at a tipping point.'' I couldn't agree
with him more. We're going down a path where readiness and capability
are being cut at such a rate that, as General Dempsey has stated
previously, it would be ``immoral'' to use this force. We need for our
witnesses to tell us not only what it will cost to prevent a further
decline in the readiness of our Army, but also what it will take to
rebuild the readiness that's been lost already this year.
It is our job today to make sure we understand the impacts and
ramifications of reducing the Army budget to levels from which we may
never recover if we ``go over the tipping point.'' Such an outcome
would have dire implications for our Army. We cannot allow that happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary McHugh.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH,
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for the opportunity, once again this year, to appear before
you to discuss what I know you will agree is the extraordinary
work of America's Army this past year, its current state, and,
of course, the vital requirements that are necessary to sustain
our combat power for today, tomorrow, and beyond.
I want to assure all the members of this committee, in
response to the chairman's opening comments, this Army--and I
think I can speak for all the Services--deeply, deeply
appreciates the leadership, the guidance, and sometimes the
shelter that you, the members of this great committee, provide.
We not just look forward to, we very much need to continue to
work with you in the days ahead.
I wish I had better news to share, frankly, but today we
find our Army at what can be described as a dangerous
crossroads, one which if we, as a Nation, choose the wrong
path, may severely damage our force, further reduce our
readiness, and hamper our national security for years to come.
Over the last 12 years, this Nation has built the most
combat-ready, capable, and lethal fighting force the world has
ever known. From Iraq and Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa and
Korea, we have fought America's enemies, protected our national
interests, deterred would-be aggressors, and supported our
allies with unprecedented skill, determination, and, quite
frankly, results. Over the last year alone, we've seen great
success in operations ranging from counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency to homeland security and disaster response.
Soldiers and civilians from all components--Active, Guard, and
Reserve--have repeatedly risked their lives to defend our
freedom, to save the lives of others, and to support our
citizens in recovering from hurricanes, wildfires, and even
droughts. There has been no foreign enemy, natural disaster, or
threat to our Homeland that your Army has not been prepared to
decisively engage.
Unfortunately, today we face an unparalleled threat to our
readiness, capabilities, and soldier and family programs. That
danger comes from the uncertainty caused by continued
sequestration, funding through repeated Continuing Resolutions
(CR), and significant shortfalls in overseas contingency
accounts.
In fiscal year 2013, the blunt ax, known as sequestration,
which struck in the last half of the year, on top of the $487
billion in Department-wide cuts already imposed by the BCA,
forced us to take a extraordinary measures just to ensure that
our warfighters have the support needed for the current fight.
We made those hard decisions, but at a heavy price to our
civilian employees, training needs, maintenance requirements,
readiness levels, and to a myriad of other vital programs
necessary to sustain our force and to develop it for the
future.
For the Army, sequestration created an estimated shortfall
of $7.6 billion for the remaining 6 months of fiscal year 2013.
This includes nearly $5.5 billion in O&M accounts alone, as the
chairman referenced. The impact of this drastic decline over
such a short period will directly and significantly impact the
readiness of our total force. We've reduced flying hours,
frozen hiring, and released hundreds of temporary and term
workers. We were forced to cancel initial entry training for
more than 2,300 military intelligence soldiers, reduce training
to the described level for our nondeploying units, and had to
cancel again, as the chairman and ranking member noted, all but
two of the remaining brigade decisive-action rotations at our
NTC. This is on top of the drastic impacts to our depot,
vehicle, and facility maintenance programs. Unavoidably, these
negative effects will cascade well into the next fiscal year,
and often beyond.
Simply put, to continue sequestration into fiscal year 2014
and beyond would not only be irresponsible but devastating to
the force, but it would also directly hamper our ability to
provide sufficiently trained and ready forces to protect our
national interests.
Moreover, full implementation through fiscal year 2021 will
require even greater force reductions that will dramatically
increase strategic risk. For example, just to maintain balance,
we may have to reduce over 100,000 additional personnel across
all three components. When coupled with the cuts driven by the
BCA already, your Army could lose up to 200,000 over the next
10 years.
Consequently, to mitigate against the continued impacts of
such indiscriminate reductions, our fiscal year budget request
for 2014, as in the House and as in the Senate resolutions,
does not reflect further sequestration cuts. Rather, we attempt
to protect some of our most vital capabilities, which were
developed over nearly a dozen years of war in a hedge against
even further reductions in readiness. We hope that, if
additional funding reductions are required, they are properly
backloaded into later fiscal years and that we're provided the
time and flexibility to better implement them, and do as
responsibly as possible.
For all of its challenges, continued sequestration is only
part of the danger we face. Since fiscal year 2010, the Army
has experienced funding through some 15 different CRs. This has
caused repeated disruptions in our modernization efforts,
uncertainty in our contracts, and unpredictability for our
industrial base. Each CR prevents new starts for needed
programs and creates inefficiencies that often result in
wasteful spending for things we no longer need or can no longer
afford. This year it was 6 months into the fiscal year before
we had an appropriation, and there's more.
While we remain at war with a determined enemy in
Afghanistan while simultaneously conducting retrograde
operations, we must remember that Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding is essential. Unfortunately, your Army
currently faces up to a $7.8 billion deficit in overseas
contingency funding. Although, as noted earlier, we will not
allow our warfighters to suffer, OCO shortfalls disrupt our
ability to repair and reset equipment, and directly impact our
organic and commercial industrial bases.
Continued budgetary uncertainty jeopardizes our ability to
have the right forces with the right training and the right
equipment in the right place to defend our Nation. Our
readiness has suffered, our equipment has suffered, and, if
we're not careful, our people may suffer, as well.
As such, more than ever before, we need you, our strategic
partners, to help ensure that America's Army has the resources,
tools, and force structure necessary to meet our requirements
both at home and abroad. The Army's fiscal year 2014 budget
request is designed to meet those objectives. As you'll see,
the fiscal year 2014 submission meets our current operational
requirements while allowing us to build an Army to meet future
challenges through prudently managing and aligning force
structure, readiness, and modernization against strategic risk.
First, it helps us balance readiness across the total
force--Active, National Guard, and Reserve. It allows us to
refocus training toward core competencies, and supports a
steady and sensible transition to a smaller force.
Second, it reinforces the Army's central role in the
defense strategy by allowing us to strengthen our global
engagements with regionally aligned forces, and ensures that we
remain a lynchpin of the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
theater.
Third, it provides for vital reset and replacement of
battle-damaged equipment, helps to support our industrial base,
and funds key modernization priorities focused on soldier-squad
systems, the network, and enhanced mobility.
Most importantly, it sustains our commitment to soldiers,
civilians, and their family members, many of whom continue to
deal with the wounds, illnesses, and stresses of war. From
suicide prevention and Wounded Warrior programs to resiliency
training and sexual assault prevention and prosecution, this
budget is designed to strengthen, protect, and preserve our
Army family that uses those programs, and uses them in ways
that are efficient, effective, and comprehensive. We have a
sacred covenant with all those who serve and with all those who
support them, and we must not break it.
Nevertheless, we recognize our Nation's fiscal reality.
Accordingly, our budget proposal will further these vital goals
with a 4 percent reduction from fiscal year 2013's budget base,
achieved through prudent, well-planned reductions, not
indiscriminate slashing.
In conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of the Army,
let me thank you again for your thoughtful oversight, your
unwavering commitment, and your proud partnership with this
Army. With your support, the Army has become the finest land
force in history. Now we need to work together to help protect
the hard-fought capabilities developed over years of war and to
ensure we have the resources necessary to meet the unforeseen
challenges that may lie ahead.
Our soldiers, civilians, and family members are second to
none, as I know everyone on this committee knows and agrees.
They are patriots, working tirelessly every day to support and
to defend freedom. America's Army has succeeded in Iraq and is
making progress in Afghanistan, and, at this moment, and as
this budget demonstrates, is focused on completing the current
fight as we transform into a leaner, more adaptable force. To
do so, as I said earlier, we need flexibility, predictability,
and the funding necessary to ensure we have highly trained and
ready forces to meet the mission. As we face this crossroads
together, it's critical that we choose the right path for our
soldiers, our Army, and our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared joint statement of Mr. McHugh and General
Odierno follows:]

Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. John M. McHugh and
GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA

INTRODUCTION

The Army has been in a state of continuous war for the past 12
years, the longest in our Nation's history. More than 168,000 soldiers
are deployed or forward stationed in nearly 150 countries worldwide.
The global security environment points to further instability, and the
Army remains a key guardian of our national security.
The Army's ability to perform this vital role, and field a ready
and capable force that meets mission requirements, has been placed at
risk by fiscal challenges in fiscal year 2013. The combined effects of
funding reductions due to sequestration, the fiscal uncertainty of
Continuing Resolutions and emerging shortfalls in Overseas Contingency
Operations funding has significantly and rapidly degraded Army
readiness, which will translate directly into fiscal year 2014 and
beyond. This lack of predictability makes it difficult to address the
posture of the Army in fiscal year 2014 with certainty and specificity.
However, this document will address some of the potential long-term
effects that fiscal uncertainty will have on the Army.
Landpower for the Nation
America's Army is the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led
fighting force in the world, providing a credible and capable
instrument of national power. Army forces play a fundamental role in
all but one of the missions specified by the defense strategic
guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense. The Army's ability to provide strategic landpower for
the Nation makes it uniquely suited to meet these requirements. Army
forces are tailorable and scalable to meet mission requirements. The
Army's ability to rapidly deploy task organized forces, from company to
corps level over extended distances, sustain them and deliver precise,
discriminate results is unmatched. Highly ready, responsive and capable
ground forces prevent conflict through deterrence, by shaping combatant
commanders' operational environment and, when necessary, winning the
Nation's wars.

Fiscal Challenges
The Budget Control Act of 2011 imposed caps on discretionary
spending that required a $487 billion reduction in planned defense
spending over 10 years. As a result of these spending cuts and in line
with the defense strategic guidance announced in January 2012, we are
reducing Active Army end strength from a wartime high of about 570,000
to 490,000, the Army National Guard from 358,200 to 350,000, the Army
Reserve from 206,000 to 205,000 and the civilian workforce from 272,000
to 255,000 all by the end of fiscal year 2017. These reductions, which
began in fiscal year 2012, represent a net loss of 106,000 soldier and
civilian positions.
The implementation of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 created a
significant shortfall in Army funding, estimated at $7.6 billion for
the remaining months of the fiscal year, which includes nearly $5.5
billion in the Operation and Maintenance account for Active and Reserve
component forces. We also face up to a $7.8 billion shortfall in
Overseas Contingency Operations funding due to increasing costs related
to the war in Afghanistan. The sharp decline over a short period of
time significantly impacts readiness which will cascade into the next
fiscal year and beyond.
The President's budget includes balanced deficit reduction
proposals that allow Congress to replace and repeal the sequester-
related reductions required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 through
fiscal year 2021. In the absence of such an agreement, the Army may not
be able to execute the current defense strategic guidance as planned.
This may compel actions that break faith with our soldiers, civilians,
and families. Full implementation of sequestration and its associated
outyear budget cuts will require further force structure reductions
that will greatly increase strategic risk. To maintain balance between
force structure, readiness and modernization, the Army may have to
reduce at least 100,000 additional personnel across the Total Force--
the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. When
coupled with previously planned cuts to end strength, the Army could
lose up to 200,000 soldiers over the next 10 years. If steep cuts are
required in fiscal year 2014 and beyond, this will create imbalance and
significantly compound risk. It will cause a disproportionate
investment across manpower, operations and maintenance, modernization
and procurement, challenging our ability to sustain appropriate
readiness in the near term in support of our current defense strategy.
To some extent, the impact of spending reductions can be mitigated
if funding is timely and predictable, and cuts are backloaded, enabling
the Army to plan, resource and manage the programs that yield a highly
trained and ready force. Continued fiscal uncertainty, on the other
hand, poses considerable risk to our ability to maintain a ready force.
Each Continuing Resolution prevents new starts for needed programs,
limits reprogramming actions, creates inefficiency and often results in
wasteful funding for accounts that we no longer want or need. Resource
predictability affords the Army the opportunity to plan and shape the
Army's force for the future within identified budgetary constraints.
The fiscal year 2014 budget is designed to meet current operational
requirements and allows us to build an Army to meet our future needs by
balancing force structure, readiness and modernization. It fully
supports the Army's central role in the defense strategic guidance. The
budget request funds balanced readiness across the Total Force while
retaining agility and capacity. It supports reset and replacement of
battle-damaged equipment, as well as modernization priorities. A 4-
percent reduction from the fiscal year 2013 base budget request
reflects the Army's acceptance of measured risk, accommodating a
tightening fiscal environment.

AMERICA'S ARMY TODAY

Beyond combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army conducts many
missions worldwide in support of national security objectives, as well
as within the United States in support of civil authorities. The Total
Force provides the foundation for Joint operations. Demand for Army
forces in Afghanistan will continue to decrease. However, the
requirement for strategic landpower capable of worldwide deployment
will endure.

Operations Around the World
The Army has nearly 80,000 soldiers currently committed to
operations around the world--in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Philippines,
Horn of Africa, Turkey, Sinai Peninsula and throughout the Middle East.
Forward-stationed Army forces, in the Republic of Korea, Japan, Europe
and elsewhere, provide Geographic Combatant Commands with an
unparalleled capability to prevent conflict, shape the environment and,
if necessary, win decisively. About 77,000 soldiers are postured to
support operations and engagements in the Asia-Pacific region. During
2012, these soldiers participated in security cooperation engagements
in 23 countries across the Pacific. Reductions to our force posture in
Europe are underway, but a significant Army presence and commitment
remains. Army forces in Europe remain a critical source of timely
operational and logistical support for operations in other theaters,
such as Southwest Asia and Africa. The long-term impacts of
sequestration and the associated outyear reductions, particularly to
force structure and readiness, threaten the Army's ability to provide
trained and ready forces to perform these enduring and vital missions.

Operations in Afghanistan
The approximately 60,000 soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, in both
conventional and special operations units, remain our top priority. The
Army provides the corps-level headquarters that form the basic
structures for conventional forces in the theater, and provides two
division-level headquarters that control the majority of operational
activities in the country. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Force is built on a foundation of an Army Special Forces Group. The
majority of combat units in theater are U.S. Army, and some of the most
critical enablers such as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and route
clearance units are almost exclusively U.S. Army. The critical
transition to Afghan leadership in security is being enabled by
thousands of Army noncomissioned officers (NCO), officers, and soldiers
who have been remissioned to advise and assist the increasingly capable
Afghan National Security Forces. The Army also provides essential
logistics capabilities that sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In
fact, only the Army can provide the theater logistics, transportation,
medical and communications infrastructure necessary to support
operations of this size, complexity, and duration. The Army has also
begun the challenging task of equipment and materiel retrograde and
refit from Afghanistan. It is a daunting task by virtue of the sheer
volume of the equipment that must be brought home as well; this
challenge is compounded by harsh geography, adverse weather and ongoing
combat operations. Funding shortfalls threaten to further extend the
timeline and increase overall costs.

Missions as a Member of the Joint Force
The Army provides a wide range of capabilities as an indispensable
member of the Joint Force. Every day, the Army maintains deployable
contingency forces, employs forward-based capabilities, delivers
humanitarian assistance and conducts multilateral exercises with
partners and allies. The Army maintains a Global Response Force at
constant high readiness providing the Nation its only rapid response,
inland forcible entry capability for unforeseen contingencies. Army
forces set theaters for the combatant commanders maintaining constantly
the critical logistical, communications, intelligence, medical and
inland ground transportation infrastructure to support all plans and
contingencies. We maintain partner relationships that ensure access to
critical regions around the world. Army commanders and headquarters
lead Joint Task Forces, plan operations and exercise mission command of
units across the full range of military operations. Army units provide
space, air and missile defense capabilities for the Joint Force. We
build and operate the space and terrestrial communication networks that
connect our own units, the Joint community, and interagency and
multinational partners. Soldiers provide essential logistics
infrastructure, delivering food, fuel, ammunition, materiel and medical
support that sustain Joint operations ranging from combat to
humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Army collects and analyzes
the intelligence that informs our actions and measures our progress,
and provides the majority of the forces in U.S. Special Operations
Command.

Missions at Home and Support of Civil Authorities
The Total Force is prepared to defend the Homeland and routinely
conducts critical Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. As
this past year demonstrated through wildland fires, two major
Hurricanes (Isaac and Sandy), floods in the heartland and multiple
winter storm emergencies, the Army is always ready to respond to the
call of its citizens. The Army does so by performing a wide range of
complex tasks in support of civil authorities during natural and
manmade disasters, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or
Nuclear incidents, and for counterdrug operations within each State, as
well as along the approaches to the United States. After Hurricane
Sandy struck the eastern United States, more than 22,000 Active and
Reserve component soldiers, which included over 10,000 Army National
Guard soldiers from 19 States, provided immediate and sustained relief.
Army Corps of Engineers soldiers and civilians pumped more than 475
million gallons of water from the New York City subway system and all
tunnels connecting Manhattan.

THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE

The Army for the future will feature regionally aligned and
mission-tailored forces designed to respond to combatant commander
requirements to prevent conflict, shape the strategic environment and,
when necessary, win decisively. Maintaining credible strategic
landpower requires the Army to continually assess and refine how we
operate, manage our human capital and increase our capabilities, all
while mitigating the effects of significant reductions in funding. We
must exploit our advantages in some key areas such as leader
development; strategic, operational and tactical mobility; command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and
logistics. As we transition over the next 5 to 10 years, this effort
will be underpinned by a strong institutional Army. This institutional
Army mans, trains, equips, deploys and ensures the readiness of all
Army forces. It generates the concepts and doctrine that guides the way
we operate. It runs the professional military education system, that
provides our country unparalleled thinkers and leaders at the tactical
operational and strategic levels. It recruits our soldiers and prepares
them for military services. It is the foundation upon which readiness
is built, enabling the operational Army to provide landpower capability
to the combatant commander. The institutional Army takes a deep look at
the future strategic environment to formulate concepts and plans for
the best mix of capabilities to meet the Nation's land warfare
challenge--the right skills, right doctrine, right equipment and the
right qualities in our adaptive leaders.
The Army must strike a balance between force structure, readiness
and modernization, in a manner that is mindful of fiscal realities yet
also provides the Nation with optimized but capable landpower. The
decisions we have made in response to fiscal year 2013 budget
reductions will have far reaching impacts on the Army. Clear priorities
guided these decisions. All soldiers meeting operational requirements--
such as those deployed to Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Horn of Africa or
forward stationed in the Republic of Korea--will be prepared and ready.
We will fund programs related to Wounded Warrior care. Finally, we will
determine whether we have sufficient funds to continue training the
units that meet our Global Response Force requirements. The rest of the
Army, however, will experience significant training and sustainment
shortfalls that will impact readiness this year and will be felt for
years to come. The Army's ability to perform its missions, as directed
in the defense strategic guidance, will inevitably be degraded.

Globally Responsive, Regionally Engaged Strategic Land Forces
Regional alignment will provide Geographic Combatant Commands with
mission-trained and regionally focused forces that are responsive to
all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and
multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation
activities. Regionally aligned forces are drawn from the Total Force,
which includes Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve
capabilities. Aligned Corps and Divisions will provide Joint Task Force
capability to every geographic combatant command. Through regional
alignment, the Army will maintain its warfighting skills and complement
these skills with language, regional expertise and cultural training.
For example, 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, stationed at
Fort Riley, KS, is aligned with U.S. Africa Command for fiscal year
2013. In support of U.S. Africa Command objectives, the brigade will
conduct engagement activities in 34 African nations over the coming
year.
Regionally aligned, mission tailored forces play an essential role
in the defense strategic guidance, which rebalances to the Asia-Pacific
region while maintaining our commitment to partners in and around the
Middle East. Lessening demand for forces in Afghanistan allows our
aligned units in the Asia-Pacific theater to refocus on supporting U.S.
Pacific Command's objectives. In addition, U.S. Army Pacific will be
elevated to a four-star headquarters in 2013. I Corps, stationed at
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, is developing Joint Task Force command
capability, which will provide a deployable headquarters that can meet
contingencies across the full range of military operations. These
initiatives will enhance the capability and responsiveness of our
forces. However, the training shortfalls and readiness impacts of
sequestration places the Army's ability to provide these critical
capabilities at risk.

Training for Operational Adaptability
In recent years the Army has deliberately focused training on
counterinsurgency and stability operations to support requirements in
Iraq and Afghanistan. We will build upon that expertise while
transitioning to a more versatile Army, with operationally adaptable
land forces that will take on a broader range of missions in support of
the national defense strategy. Innovative training methods produce
ready and responsive forces while optimizing our resources. Army units
train at Combat Training Centers, while deployed and at home station.
Live, virtual, and constructive training enables Army commanders to
conduct multi-echelon events in a complex environment at home station.
The Army's Decisive Action Training Environment, which has been
incorporated by each of our three maneuver Combat Training Centers,
creates a realistic training environment that includes Joint,
Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational partners against a
wide range of opportunistic threats.
Sequestration has had an immediate impact on the Army's ability to
train at every level--individual soldier, Brigade Combat Team, and
deployable headquarters. We were forced to cancel fiscal year 2013
Initial Entry Training (IET) for more than 2,300 Military Intelligence
soldiers, and we may have to cancel up to 10 Field Artillery IET
classes, which would affect over 200 soldiers. We may also be forced to
cancel all but two of the remaining fiscal year 2013 brigade-level
Decisive Action rotations at our Maneuver Combat Training Centers
unless additional funds become available. Training in fiscal year 2014
and beyond remains at risk as well. With sequestration, the Army will
not be able to fully train our soldiers, whether through professional
military education or collective unit training, in a way that enables
them to operate successfully in a complex environment across the full
range of military operations. The long-term readiness impacts of the
resulting deficit in trained forces will jeopardize the Army's ability
to meet war plan requirements.

People
The soldiers of our All-Volunteer Force are the Army's greatest
strategic asset. These professional men and women provide depth and
versatility throughout the Total Force--the Active Army, the Army
National Guard, and the Army Reserve. As the Army gets smaller, it
becomes even more important that we retain and recruit only the highest
quality soldiers. With the support of Congress, we will maintain a
military pay and benefits package--to include affordable, high-quality
health care--that acknowledges the burdens and sacrifice of service
while understanding our future fiscal environment. During 2012, 96
percent of the Army's recruits were high school graduates, exceeding
the goal of 90 percent. The fiscal year 2012 Active component
recruiting effort produced the highest quality enlisted recruits in our
history, based on test scores and waivers issued. We are also on track
to sustain the high retention rate of the past 3 years. While the Army
draws down, it is important that we do so at a pace that will allow us
to continue to recruit and retain these high-quality soldiers. A
precipitous drawdown, which may be necessary if sequestration and
associated reductions in budgetary caps are fully implemented over the
coming years, will have lasting impacts on the quality of the force.
The Army is committed to ensuring that female soldiers are provided
career opportunities that enable them to reach their highest potential
while enhancing overall Army readiness. Over the last year, the Army
opened more than 13,000 positions to women. In January 2013, the
Department of Defense rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and
Assignment Rule, thus enabling the elimination of unnecessary gender-
based restrictions for assignment. The Army is currently developing,
reviewing and validating occupational standards, with the aim of fully
integrating women into occupational fields to the maximum extent
possible. We are proceeding in a deliberate, measured and responsible
way that preserves unit readiness, cohesion and morale.
Ready and Resilient
Caring for the Army means doing our best to prepare soldiers,
civilians, and families for the rigors of Army life. The Army remains
committed to providing soldiers and families with a quality of life
commensurate with their service. We continue to review our investments
and eliminate redundant and poor performing programs. The Army will
make every effort to protect essential Army Family Programs, but they
will be unavoidably affected by workforce reductions, cuts to base
sustainment funding and the elimination of contracts.
The Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign enhances readiness for the
Total Force by tailoring prevention and response measures to promote
physical and mental fitness, emotional stability, personal growth and
dignity and respect for all. An integral part of this campaign is the
Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Program, which strengthens
soldiers, family members, and Army civilians by addressing physical,
emotional, family, spiritual, and social fitness collectively. Healthy
soldiers, families, and civilians perform better, are more resilient,
and improve unit readiness.
The challenges associated with suicide directly affect the force.
It is a complex phenomenon that reflects broader societal problems and
defies easy solutions. To better understand psychological health
issues, the Army has partnered with a number of agencies to assess
mental health risk and help commanders effectively address this
persistent problem. In collaboration with the National Institute of
Mental Health, the Army is examining risk and resilience factors among
soldiers in the largest behavioral health study of its kind ever
undertaken. The study will develop data-driven methods to reduce or
prevent suicide behaviors and improve soldiers' overall mental health.
The objective is to identify the most important risk and protective
factors, and then act on them. Programs that improve soldier and family
access to care, while reducing stigma, are essential to our efforts.
The Embedded Behavioral Health program, which is being established for
all operational units in the Active Army, is a leading example of how
we are redesigning behavioral health services to improve the care that
our soldiers receive.
The Army is committed to providing quality care for our wounded,
ill, and injured soldiers and their families. During 2012, six new
warrior transition complexes were completed, which consist of barracks,
administrative facilities and a Soldier and Family Assistance Center.
Medical innovation and groundbreaking research in areas such as
traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder are helping
us improve the care we provide our wounded soldiers. Our command
climate must foster an environment in which soldiers can seek
assistance without stigma.

Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program
The Army continues to employ the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response
and Prevention Program (SHARP) to eliminate sexual assault and
harassment within our ranks. Active and engaged leadership is central
to helping the Army community understand that a climate that respects
and grants dignity to every member of the Army family increases our
combat readiness. The Army will reinforce a culture in our basic
training units, our officer training courses and our operational units
in which sexual harassment, sexual assault and hazing are not
tolerated, and if they occur are dealt with rapidly and justly. We are
adding 829 full-time military and civilian sexual assault response
coordinators and victim advocates at the brigade level as well as 73
trainers, certifying those personnel, and executing more frequent
command climate surveys in units. We have begun the hiring process for
the 446 civilian positions.
The Army has increased emphasis on investigations, prosecutions and
laboratory resources needed to effectively build cases in order to
ensure each alleged incident is adequately investigated, and if found
credible, prosecuted to the full extent of the law. All unrestricted
sexual assault allegations are referred to the Criminal Investigation
Division, where we have added four highly qualified expert criminal
investigators and 6 expert military attorneys and 20 specially trained
agents who pursue their investigations independent of the command. We
have also hired 30 additional Lab Examiners. Our 20 Special Victim
Prosecutors educate and support the victim and provide advice and
counsel to the criminal investigators as well as commanders.
Sequestration and associated civilian furloughs are likely to degrade
aspects of our SHARP efforts, from slowing hiring actions, to delaying
lab results which hinders our ability to provide resolution for
victims.
Develop Adaptive Leaders
One of our greatest advantages is our officers and noncommissioned
officers, and the Army's ability to provide strategic landpower depends
on the quality of these leaders. While we can recruit and train
soldiers in relatively short order, the Army cannot build leaders in a
similar timeframe. Army leaders must be innovative, possess a
willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar, highly complex and
dangerous environments and display an ability to adjust based on
continuous assessment. As we face an uncertain future with an uncertain
level of resources, we must prudently commit to the one certain, high-
payoff investment--our leaders. Training, education and experience are
the pillars of our leader development strategy, and we have many
initiatives underway to ensure we cultivate, manage and optimize the
talent of our leaders. We are instituting a program to match personal
history and informal skills to duty assignments. We are implementing
and improving our 360-degree assessment programs for officers and are
making 360-degree assessments prerequisites to assume command at the
lieutenant colonel and colonel levels. We are dramatically increasing
the opportunity for and emphasis on broadening experiences and have
increased the number of fellowships for our officers in government,
industry and academia. Cuts to institutional and unit training, due to
sequestration, OCO budget shortfalls in fiscal year 2013 and continuing
fiscal uncertainty, will degrade our ability to develop leaders and
will have long-term impacts on the readiness of the force.

Equipment Modernization and Reset
As we prepare for the future, we will need to invest considerable
time and resources to restore equipment used in combat operations to an
acceptable level of readiness through reset operations, a combination
of repair, replacement, recapitalization and transition. At the same
time, other pressing modernization needs require attention and
investment. The long-term nature of sequestration-related budget
reductions puts each of the Army's investment priorities at risk. All
acquisition priorities and many equipment modernization programs may
face unanticipated schedule or cost impacts in the out years.
The Army will require Overseas Contingency Operations funding for
equipment reset for 3 years after the last piece of equipment has been
retrograded from Afghanistan. This funding will support the substantial
workload required for equipment retrograde, induction and repair, a
process that can take up to 3 years for some items such as crash and
battle damaged aircraft. Fiscal year 2013 budget reductions have
already placed the Army at a disadvantage, forcing the cancellation of
depot maintenance that will delay required repairs and upgrades.
Organic and Commercial Industrial Base
The Army will deliberately draw down force and production levels to
fulfill the strategic guidance we have received. Aware that the future
may bring unexpected crises, we must retain the ability to regenerate
capabilities quickly in response to unforeseen emergencies. It is
critical that we find the right balance between our organic and the
commercial industrial bases. The ability to reduce the industrial base
in times of peace but surge as required remains essential to equipping
the Army, the Joint Force, and, in many cases, our allies and coalition
partners. The current fiscal environment threatens the retention of
critical skill sets in our depots, arsenals and ammunition plants.
Fiscal uncertainty in fiscal year 2013 led to delays in awarding many
new contracts. Industry also began laying off workers and postponed
hiring actions due to the slowdown in funding.
Acquisition Reform
The Army continues to reform the way it develops and acquires
services and materiel through a capability portfolio review process.
This approach exposes redundancies and ensures that funds are properly
programmed in accordance with combatant commanders' requests, wartime
lessons learned, progressive readiness and affordability. The Army
develops capabilities through Army research and development processes,
collaborating with other Services, industry, academia and international
partners to identify and harvest technologies suitable for transition
to the force.

Modernization Strategy
The Army must maintain the technological edge over potential
adversaries, enabling the force to prevail in all domains. The Army for
the future requires capabilities that are versatile and tailorable, yet
affordable and cost effective. The Army modernization effort goes
beyond materiel and equipment solutions. It is a comprehensive strategy
that includes doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel
and facilities. The heart of the strategy is the use of mature
technologies and incremental upgrades of existing equipment, while
balancing research investments between evolutionary and disruptive
technologies. The modernization strategy is also supported by a risk-
based assessment to identify candidate capabilities for complete
divestiture. Divestiture decisions will reduce total costs and preserve
our ability to sustain the force.
Soldier Systems
The centerpiece of the Army Modernization Strategy is the soldier
and the squad. The soldier portfolio focuses on equipment vital for
squad success and empowers and enables squads with improved lethality,
protection and situational awareness. It also includes resources to
develop leaders and train soldiers to take advantage of new or improved
capabilities. Planned improvements for dismounted soldiers include a
mission command system that allows soldiers to see each other's
positions, mark hazards collaboratively and access on-the-move
broadband voice, data and video capabilities. This unprecedented
situational awareness, coupled with the continued fielding of advanced
sensors and lightweight small arms systems, will ensure that our
soldiers and squads remain the best in the world.
The Network and Investment in Cyber Capabilities
The Network, also known as LandWarNet, is critical to empowering
our soldiers. Our senior leaders and soldiers must have the right
information at the right time to make the decisions essential to
mission success. Consequently, the Army is building a single, secure,
standards-based, versatile network that connects soldiers and their
equipment to vital information and our joint, interagency,
intergovernmental and multinational partners. It is critical that
network modernization and sustainment efforts meet the ever-growing
demand for tactical and business-related information and enterprise
services in a timely manner and at an affordable cost.
Ensuring freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and protecting our
information and the Network is a continuing Army priority. The Army
must strengthen its cyber security and network defense by building
secure and resilient network environments, providing greater
situational awareness, expanding programs for ensuring compliance with
information assurance policies and best practices, and increasing
training for all technical and non-technical personnel. To ensure the
Army can defeat adversaries in both land and cyber domains, a full
range of cyberspace capabilities must be available in support of the
combatant commander, including well-trained cyber warriors, cyberspace
operational freedom and assured mission command. This will require
investment not only in technology, but also in people and process
improvement.
Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
The Army's top two vehicle modernization programs are the Ground
Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. As a replacement for
the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Ground Combat Vehicle will
accommodate a full nine-man infantry squad in a vehicle that features
increased underbelly and ballistic protection with scalable armor that
provides maximum mission flexibility. The Ground Combat Vehicle will
also provide sufficient space and power to host the Army's advanced
network, increasing the effectiveness of the vehicle in any threat
environment. The Army is developing the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to
fill capability gaps in the light wheeled vehicle fleet, carefully
balancing payload, performance and protection. The Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle combines an increased level of protection with improved
mobility and transportability. It is also the Army's first network-
ready vehicle. Together, this integrated team of vehicles will be
capable of dominating across the range of military operations and allow
for incremental improvements.

CLOSING

The American people have learned time and again that they can trust
their Army to protect our national interests at home and abroad. Over
the past 12 years of conflict, our Army has proven itself in arguably
the most difficult environment we have ever faced. Our leaders at every
level have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, flexibility and
adaptability. Our soldiers have displayed mental and physical toughness
and courage under fire. They have transformed the Army into the most
versatile, agile, rapidly deployable and sustainable strategic land
force in the world.
We live in an uncertain world, which often requires a military
response to protect our national security interests. When that time
comes, the Army must be ready to answer the Nation's call. We cannot
take the readiness of the force for granted. Sequestration budget cuts,
and continuing fiscal uncertainty, have placed us on the outer edge of
acceptable risk for our future force. The Army must be capable of
providing strategic landpower that can prevent conflict, shape the
environment and win the Nation's wars. Preventing conflict demands
presence, shaping the environment demands presence, restoring the peace
demands presence, and more often than not, that presence proudly wears
the uniform of an American soldier.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General Odierno.

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and other distinguished members of the committee.
First, I want to thank you for your continued commitment to
our soldiers and families, especially over the past 12 years as
we've been in combat. This partnership has done a great job in
supporting them, ensuring they have what they need, and it
helped us to ensure we have success on the battlefield.
Second, I want to thank Congress for its hard work in
passing the fiscal year 2013 Consolidated Appropriations and
Further Continued Appropriations Act. We very much appreciate
your help, which has alleviated nearly $6 billion of the $18
billion shortfall to the Army's O&M accounts in fiscal year
2013.
I'm humbled to be here representing the 1.1 million
soldiers, 318,000 Department of the Army civilians, and 1.4
million family members of the U.S. Army. I'm extremely proud of
their competence, character, and commitment of our soldiers and
civilians, their sacrifice and their incredible
accomplishments.
I remind everyone as we sit here today, the U.S. Army has
nearly 80,000 soldiers deployed and more than 91,000 forward-
stationed in 150 countries, including almost 60,000 in
Afghanistan and thousands of others in Korea, and new
deployments with command-and-control capability to Jordan,
patriots to Turkey, and Terminal High Aptitude Area Defense
batteries to Guam and elsewhere around the world.
Our forces in Afghanistan continue to conduct the
successful transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF), who increasingly demonstrate
the self-reliance, confidence, and capability to protect their
population and secure a more stable political future.
Today, the Army's primary purpose remains steadfast: to
fight and win the Nation's wars. We will continue to be ready
to do that, even as we do our part to help the country solve
our fiscal problems. But the timing, magnitude, and method of
implementing budget reductions will be critical.
In fiscal year 2013, the Army still faces a more than $13
billion O&M shortfall, which includes a $5.5 million reduction
to the Army's base budget and a $7.8 billion shortfall to OCO.
As a result, we have taken drastic actions to curb spending. In
the final 6 months of the year, we have curtailed training for
80 percent of the force, canceled 6 brigade maneuver combat
training center rotations, and cut 37,000 flying hours,
initiated termination of 3,100 temporary employees, canceled
third- and fourth-quarter depot maintenance, and are planning
to furlough our valued civilian workforce for 14 days in fiscal
year 2013.
The cost of these actions is clear. We are sacrificing
readiness to achieve reductions inside the short period of the
fiscal year, and readiness cannot be bought back, not quickly
and not cheaply. So, I am concerned that the problems created
by the over $13 billion shortfall will push into fiscal year
2014 and beyond.
The Army's fiscal year 2014 base budget submission of
$129.7 billion enables us to support the 2012 DSG, but it does
not account for the decaying readiness that is being caused by
our shortfall in fiscal year 2013, and this will impact the
Army as we enter fiscal year 2014.
In addition to this base budget, the Army will continue to
require OCO funding for operations in Afghanistan and our
ability to continue to reset our force. The Army has submitted
a separate request for a fiscal year 2014 OCO. It is critical
that this request be fully funded.
I would implore all of us to work together so that we
receive the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2014
and fiscal year 2014 budget on time. This will allow us to
properly plan for and mitigate the risks associated with a
declining defense budget.
It is imperative that we gain predictability in our budget
process. If we don't, we'll be unable to efficiently and
effectively manage our resources, and it will be impossible to
make informed decisions about the future of the Army.
I also think that it is in the best interests of our Army,
DOD, and our national security to avert sequestration. The size
and the steepness of cuts required by sequestration make it
impossible to downsize the force in a deliberate, logical
manner that allows us to sustain appropriate balance of
readiness, modernization, and end strength. The cuts are simply
too steep. We just cannot move enough people out of the Army
quickly enough to produce the level of savings needed to comply
with sequester. Therefore, we will need to take
disproportionate cuts in modernization and readiness. Let me
explain.
Under sequestration, the Army would need to again absorb
immediate cuts in fiscal year 2014. This would likely force us
to cut personnel accounts, reductions that could equate to tens
of thousands of soldiers. By the time we paid separation
benefits for these soldiers, the cost to separate them would
exceed the savings garnered. The maximum we can reduce the
force by without breaking readiness and including excessive
separations costs is somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000
soldiers per year, but this would only save $2 billion a year.
So, right now, almost the full weight of sequester will again
fall on the modernization and readiness accounts, where such
drastic cuts will take years to overcome. The net result will
be units that are overmanned, unready, and unmodernized. The
steepness of the cuts in sequestration forces us to be hollow.
Even though I think the level of sequestration cuts are too
large, if we backload them into the later years of the
sequester period, at least that would allow us the opportunity
to properly plan and to sustain the balance we need in these
uncertain times.
As we look to fiscal year 2014 and beyond, our foremost
priority is to ensure that our soldiers deployed on operational
commitments are trained, ready, and able to execute their
missions. Simultaneously, we'll continue to draw down the
force. We are on schedule to remove 89,000 soldiers from the
Army by fiscal year 2017, due to the budget reductions levied
by the 2011 BCA. So far, most of these cuts have come from our
overseas formations; specifically, in Europe. In fiscal year
2014, future force reduction will affect almost every Army and
joint installation across the United States. We will release
our plans for these reductions in June. The key to the current
drawdown is to maintain that the balance between end strength,
readiness, and modernization so that we are properly sized and
ready for whatever the country needs us to do. Such an
evenhanded approach is the only acceptable one while the world
remains such an unstable place, the most unstable I have seen
in my nearly 37 years of service.
Full sequestration will dangerously steepen that drawdown
ramp. It will require us to reduce, at a minimum, another
100,000 soldiers from the total Army. That will be on top of
the 89,000 already being reduced. This will result in a 14
percent reduction of the Army's end strength and an almost 40
percent reduction in our Brigade Combat Teams (BCT).
In addition, these reductions will degrade support to
combatant commanders in critical areas, such as missile
defense, special operations, cyber, logistics, intelligence,
and communications. Cuts of this magnitude will leave us with
excess infrastructure, making a future round of base
realignment and closure (BRAC) essential.
Sequestration will degrade our ability to take care of our
soldiers and families who have fought so hard and sacrificed so
much over the last 12 years, both those who are leaving the
Army and those who are staying in the Army. Sequestration will
make it impossible to execute a responsible drawdown and will
challenge our ability to support the 2012 DSG.
Looking into the future, we are reposturing our force to be
globally responsive and regionally engaged. We are aligning our
forces with the geographical combatant commanders to provide
mission-tailored, -sized, and -scaled organizations for
operational missions, exercises, and theater security
cooperation activities.
For times of crisis, we'll maintain a global response force
capable of conducting force entry on short notice. We will
reinvest in our expeditionary capabilities to deploy forces
quickly and efficiently anywhere in the world. We are refining
the integration of our conventional special operations and
cyber capabilities to ensure we can handle a broad range of
emerging threats. In this uncertain world, we need an Army that
conducts many missions, at many speeds, at many sizes, under
many conditions.
Going forward, the Army will evolve into a force that can
deploy and sustain capabilities across the range of military
operations anywhere in the world on short notice. It will have
increased flexibility and agility in both its formations and
its acquisition systems.
A modernization strategy will center on the Army's
strength--the soldier--making him the most discriminately
lethal weapon in the U.S. military. We will provide our
soldiers with the network connections to give them unparalleled
access to information and intelligence so they can make timely
decisions. We will provide our soldiers with the tactical
mobility, survivability, and lethality to take decisive action.
As we prepare to operate in an increasingly complex and
uncertain environment, our number-one priority is to invest in
our leaders. This spring, we will roll out a brand new leader
development strategy, which will invest in our soldiers'
training, education, and development. It will fundamentally
change the way we train, educate, assign, assess, and promote
our leaders. It will be the foundation of our future Army.
We will continue our efforts to take care of our soldiers.
Twelve years of war has taught us the importance of building
and sustaining the resiliency of our soldiers, civilians, and
their families. Just this year, we rolled out the Army Ready
and Resilient Campaign. This holistic effort to build the
emotional, physical, and spiritual health of our soldiers will
pay dividends in all three components.
Caring for wounded warriors and keeping faith with veterans
is essential to honoring their service. Our Soldier-for-Life
Campaign will ensure that our soldiers transition successfully
into civilian life and enrich American society with their Army
experience.
With the support of Congress, we'll maintain a military pay
and benefits package, including affordable, high-quality
healthcare that acknowledges the burdens and sacrifice of
service while remaining responsive to the fiscal environment.
Soldier personnel costs have doubled over the last 10 years
and now make up 44 percent of the Army's fiscal year 2014
budget. If we do not slow the rate of growth of manpower costs,
we will not be able to afford to keep our Army trained and
ready.
We are at a strategic point in the future of the U.S. Army
and our military. We must strike the right balance of
capabilities both within the Army and across the joint force.
Our history tells us that if we get out of balance, our enemies
will seek to take advantage.
Our soldiers are the finest men and women our country has
to offer. Since 2001, more than 1.5 million soldiers have
deployed, and more than a half a million have deployed two,
three, or four more times. More than 35,000 soldiers have been
wounded, and over 4,800 soldiers have made the ultimate
sacrifice to defend this great Nation. It is our responsibility
to ensure that we never again send soldiers into harm's way
that are not trained, equipped, well-led, and ready for any
contingency, to include war. It is our responsibility to honor
the service and sacrifices of our veterans, whether they remain
in uniform or transition back to civilian life.
The strength of our Nation is our Army. The strength of our
Army is our soldiers. The strength of our soldiers is our
families, and that's what makes us Army Strong.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the committee for
allowing me to testify today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
We'll have an 8-minute round for the first round.
Let me start with this question. We were notified recently
that the Army's Active Duty end strength at the end of fiscal
year 2013 would be approximately 530,000. Now, that's below
their authorized strength. It's 22,000 below the authorized
strength for the Army, and it's 12,000 below the floor
established in law. The President is given the power to waive
end strength laws in time of war in order to avoid violating
the law. But, nonetheless, those seem to be the statistics.
Now, the Army Times had an article recently in which they
said the following, that 11,000 Active Duty soldiers backlogged
in the IDES are going to be separated this year, and as many as
15,000 soldiers, according to this article, will be separated
this year, ``for misconduct or for not meeting the required
standards, such as physical fitness and weight control.''
So, my question, starting with you, Mr. Secretary--this is
a rapid reduction, more than expected, in the Army's fiscal
year 2013 end strength. Is that due to the expedited processing
in the IDES, or are we removing soldiers who no longer meet the
requirements for detention, or both, and to what degree is each
involved?
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The answer is both.
The article that you cited is pretty correct. The estimates
that we have now through the rest of this year will be about
11,000 more soldiers out-processed, and, frankly, as a result
of a good-news effort to try to reduce the backlog and the
Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) and the Physical Evaluation
Board (PEB) process going into IDES. That's a good readiness
story, as well. Those soldiers count against end strength, and,
obviously, because of their conditions, are not really assigned
in any Active Duty details that allow them to deploy. So, we
view that as a positive step.
Also, the new era that we're entering does allow us to get
back to basics, and that includes our standards for discipline,
height, and weight. Commanders across the force have been
paying, I think, rightfully, more attention to that; and the
result, in large measure, is an expected 15,000-soldier
reduction who have been out-processed either for misconduct or
other failures to meet up to standard. So, that has brought us
down to the numbers that you cite. The end-strength objective
for the Army at the end of 2014 will be 520,000, but again,
we'll have to measure that against these kinds of factors going
forward.
Chairman Levin. That 520,000 may be high if these patterns
continue, is that right?
Mr. McHugh. That's my reference to ``we have to continue to
monitor.'' From my perspective, the more we can reduce the
backlog to IDES and MEB and PEB, and I'm sure you all agree, is
a good thing.
Chairman Levin. Right.
Mr. McHugh. We want to maintain standards. So, if those
trends continue, the 520 may be subject to some amendment, as
well.
Chairman Levin. Okay. The administration is requesting a 1
percent pay raise for military personnel. They're also
proposing to increase fees for military retirees who enroll in
the TRICARE Prime healthcare program, instituting enrollment
fees for participation in the TRICARE Standard, Extra, and
TRICARE for Life programs. They're proposing to increase
pharmacy copayments and to increase deductibles and the
catastrophic cap. As a result of the 1 percent pay raise for
personnel and the--well, let me just focus on those fee
increases.
DOD has assumed budget savings of about a billion dollars
for the fee increases, and I'd like to ask you about both the
pay raise and the TRICARE fee increases, and ask you both
whether you support both the amount of the pay raise, at 1
percent, which is a little bit below the expected 1.8 percent,
but also whether or not you support those increased TRICARE
fees.
So, Mr. Secretary, do you support those items in the
budget?
Mr. McHugh. I do, Senator.
Starting with the pay increase. Thanks to the great work of
Congress and this committee, there have been significant gains
against the private-sector equivalents in pay. We think we're
now at a fairly good place. The President very much wanted to
reflect some increase, based on the continued sacrifice of our
soldiers, and 1 percent seems to fit well both within that
recognition band but also recognizing the challenges that we
have in this budget in the ways going forward.
Our first responsibility to our soldiers is making sure
they have the equipment they need, making sure, particularly
while deploying, they have all the resources they need. So,
that was both our, and I think it would be their, first desire,
as well.
As to the TRICARE fees, as we discussed last year, we all
wish that things could remain status quo, but, as is happening
in the civilian sector, although numbers have come down, to
some extent, the increases to the Defense Health Plan and
Program have skyrocketed, particularly over the last 10 years.
These are matters of ensuring we have the resources necessary
to support a very robust and, in the military, a very favorable
program, when compared to the private sector, but also
recognizing we have to do some things to get those increases
and those costs under control.
I think--and the Chief can certainly speak for himself--
those proposals were the product of a lot of work from both the
civilian and the uniformed leadership, including the
noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership of the Army.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Odierno, do you support both that 1 percent pay
raise plus the TRICARE fee increases that I outlined?
General Odierno. I do, Senator. As I mentioned in my
opening statement, we have to reduce the rate of growth of the
cost of our soldiers that has doubled since 2001. If we don't,
that will require further significant reductions in end
strengths across all the Services, but specifically the Army.
So, I think there's a way for us to balance. I think this
proposal balances proper compensation with what we need in
order to sustain the right level of end strength for our Army
as we move forward.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Then, my final question has to do with the management of
risk in the industrial base. There are proposals here to reduce
the quantities, and also to delay the development, procurement,
and maintenance programs for equipment. The question is what
actions you're taking to--or, let me put it this way: What
criteria or indications in the industrial base are you going to
monitor to alert you to the potential or to the imminent loss
of capability or capacity to meet the Army's needs into the
future? In other words, what's going to indicate some evidence
of an unacceptable increase in that risk, or an imminent loss
of capacity or capability in the future?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, this is an area that troubles us deeply,
and it really is a confluence of two factors. You noted
correctly, Mr. Chairman, that the sequestration threat, the
budget and fiscal realities, going forward will require some
changes in how we've done business, but also, the reality of
coming out of two theaters of war; it's just natural to assume
we'll have less need to buy things.
So, what we have attempted to do is really a two-path
track. The first is to work with DOD, through their sector-by-
sector, tier-by-tier analysis. That's an across-the-board look
at all military suppliers to do what you queried; that is,
identify the metrics necessary to measure and eventually assess
risk. The first year of that has been completed. It was begun
in 2012. The Department is now trying to set up those metrics
so we can feed consumption data into it and come up with those
kinds of red flags, and it'll provide us at least the
opportunity to try to do something about it.
From the Army perspective, the second path, we've started
an industrial-base program to do a similar analysis within the
Army and also have hired A.T. Kearney, an industrial analyst
firm, to study particularly our combat vehicle fleet to make
sure that we understand where the threats lie to our industrial
base, particularly where we have single point of failures. We
will receive that report hopefully in June, which, of course,
we'll share with the committee. The first step is knowing where
the problems lie. The second is trying to use diminishing
resources to protect it. That's why it's important we work on a
Department-wide basis.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, to both of you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, we talked about this in my office. There
are proposed changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) that have, up until now, been the responsibility of
commanders. Now, to date, we've only had Judge Advocate
Generals (JAG) testify up here before the subcommittee and give
their opinions, so I would like to get a commander's
perspective. As a commander, we trust you to make decisions
that may result in the loss of life in order to protect the
Nation and accomplish the mission. We trust you with our sons'
and daughters' lives, but we don't trust you, or your
discretion, when it comes to UCMJ offenses. This seems a little
bit hard for normal people to believe that you would have that
responsibility, but not have that responsibility, in terms of
what they are doing.
I'd ask first, do you as a commander consider the UCMJ as
it is currently structured to be a viable tool to help you
maintain enhanced cohesiveness and fighting capabilities of
your units?
General Odierno. First, the commander's role in the
military justice is simply essential. It's critical to our
system. It's essential to the commander's authority. The
commander is responsible for good order, discipline, health,
and morale and welfare of the force. The commander needs the
ability to punish quickly, locally, and visibly, which impacts
the overall discipline of the force.
So, as we look at changes to Article 60, it's important
that we do it deliberately to make sure that it does not take
away the commander's authority and ability to maintain standard
order and discipline. It's essential to us as we move forward.
Senator Inhofe. General, that's a great answer. I
appreciate that very much. I had the staff look up a couple of
things for me, and I just got it this morning. In the Marine
Corps, only 7 out of 1,768 has the convening authority actually
changed a guilty decision. In the Air Force, it's 1.1 percent.
The Navy has had 16,056 general court-martials, and in only 2
known cases have they reduced them. Now, in the Army, it's very
similar; since 2008, the Army convening authority has
disapproved the findings and sentence of a soldier convicted of
a sexual assault and returning the soldier to Active Duty. So,
they didn't have any of those.
So, I'm going to put this into the record, but it sounds to
me like there is not a serious problem here.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Inhofe. Secretary Hagel came out and said that he
would take away that jurisdiction from the post sentencing,
which I thought was going quite a ways. Now, I've talked to
several members who agree with me. Do you think that that's a
reasonable compromise?
General Odierno. I think they still--the important--what
UCMJ gives you is flexibility. So, you have a variety of
actions that you can take along the spectrum that allows you to
punish appropriately for the offense that's conducted.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Odierno. So, that's the important part that the
UCMJ--that is not anywhere else in a public judicial system,
and that's what allows us to--so, we have to be careful that we
don't ever walk away from that ability.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Odierno. So, I think, in the proposal, they
maintain that for the minor offenses. For the more difficult
offenses, they--for the more Federal-conviction-like offenses,
then it would be brought forward----
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, no, and I appreciate that. Let
me ask both of you--because there is an independent panel that
is investigating this. They're going to convene in the summer.
I don't know exactly when they're going to have the report.
But, it would seem to me that, if we're going to take something
that is as far-reaching as this, that we should at least wait
until we get an independent panel, get the results, and
consider their recommendations. Would both of you comment on
that or agree with that?
Mr. McHugh. The concern I have, Senator, is that, based on
over 20 years in a legislative body, myself, in an effort to do
understandably good things, we tend to go too far in the first
bite. So, what I would simply say--and I'd--obviously, we defer
to the judgment of Congress, here--is that we take this in a
very measured way and, as the Chief said, recognizing what I
think most people who have had the opportunity to look at the
UCMJ and the commander's role in it understand, is a positive
role. Secretary Hagel, as you noted, Senator Inhofe, has
proposed some changes and is pursuing some changes for one
aspect, in the commander's right to overturn, in felony cases,
in certain circumstances. I personally support that, but any
steps beyond that, I think should be done----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's----
Mr. McHugh.--very carefully.
Senator Inhofe.--a fair answer. But, you say ``a measured
approach.'' Wouldn't a measured approach be to take the results
of an independent commission that is conducting an
investigation as early as this summer, before making a
decision? Wouldn't that be valuable?
Mr. McHugh. It depends what the commission says. I never
like to commit to an outcome before I know what that outcome
is.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Okay, but, at least we'd have the
input. Not saying that we're going to do what the commission or
the committee says, but we'd have the information from their
independent study. Is there any problem with that?
Mr. McHugh. I can't, again, judge outcome.
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Mr. McHugh. I would simply say this. To change the UCMJ
would, rightfully, take an act of Congress, and we'll defer to
Congress as to how to go forward.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's fair. I have a couple of other
questions. I may have to take some of these for the record.
But, you've heard several of us up here talking about the cost
of energy. I know when you're cutting defense there are cuts,
there are delays. A lot of times, I think the delays, like the
2-year delay on the 179 F-35s, that could end up being a cut.
But, the thing that people are not as aware of is putting the
agenda, as this President has done, into the defense budget.
For example, why should DOD be paying for biorefineries and
solar panels and these things? It's my understanding that right
now--the Army budgeted $562 million and approximately $4.2
billion in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for
operational energy initiative. Now, down here in the last--it
says, ``In addition, the Army announced, late last year, an
initiative to award $7 billion a contract''--over a period of
time, I'm sure--``to procure renewable and alternative
energy.''
As I look at that and I see the things, General Odierno,
that you stated about the crises that we're facing, I would
like to have--I'll just wait and get this for the record,
because I don't think there's time to give you adequate time to
answer that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Multiple Award Task Order Contract (MATOC) is an Indefinite
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle that establishes a
pool of qualified firms/contractors for four renewable energy
technologies (i.e., solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal) to compete
for individual task order contracts. These contracts will be for
renewable energy projects located on or adjacent to U.S. military
installations. The objective of this acquisition is to procure
reliable, locally-generated renewable and alternative energy utilizing
Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) or other contractual equivalents. There
is no capital or military construction appropriation connected with a
PPA. PPAs are third-party funded acquisitions where the Army only buys
the power and does not own, operate, or maintain the generating assets
that are built on federal land. The intent is to award contracts to all
qualified and responsible competing firms, both large and small
businesses, whose offers receive the required minimum acceptable
evaluation ratings and whose price is reasonable and realistic.
The MATOC's total estimated value of $7 billion refers to the total
dollar value of energy available for purchase under all PPA task orders
for their entire term (up to 30 years). The authority to entered into
such contracts has been provided by Congress to all military
departments for renewable energy projects located on land under the
Secretary's jurisdiction or privately held.

Senator Inhofe. But, $7 billion in this, to me, is just
outrageous. I was around when they established the Department
of Energy. That's what those guys, in my opinion, are supposed
to be doing.
So, I'd like to have your response to that for the record,
since there would not be time to do it now.
Mr. McHugh. Senator, can I provide one point?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, of course.
Mr. McHugh. The multiple award task order contract (MATOC),
the multiple year--30-year contract you've mentioned, that
really is private-sector investment money. What it does is
allow us, as the Army, to purchase power that is produced
through the investments. Those programs, by our analysis, for
every dollar of government taxpayer money invested, we get $7
of private investment and a dollar on--in return. So it's just
energy independence, it's not a biofuel.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that. But, when the Navy is
forced to pay $27 a gallon for 420,000 gallons of gas, a fuel
that you can get for $3, that doesn't apply there.
Mr. McHugh. I won't speak for the Navy. We don't have that
program.
Senator Inhofe. Well, all right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed was sitting right here, and he asked me if he
could switch positions with Senator King, and I told him he
could do that.
So, Senator King, you would take his place, and I assured
him he could leave 10 seconds early and do that so that, then,
Senator Reed would take your position, which is near the end of
the queue. So, that's very gracious of him to do that.
I hope I didn't in any way mislead you, Senator Donnelly,
on this.
Senator Donnelly. No, and if Senator Reed would like to
take my position, so----[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Now you're really confusing things here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly. I'm fine with having Senator Reed go
before me.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, we've been talking a lot about sequestation
and budgets. We know that the Senate--the budget, that was
passed by the Senate several weeks ago, essentially unwinds the
sequester in fiscal year 2014, and thereafter, through a
different series of cuts and revenues. Have you analyzed the
House budget that's been passed and what it does? I've tried to
research this, and I'm a little confused. Does the House budget
maintain the sequester on into the indefinite future?
Mr. McHugh. My understanding--and we do get into a level of
semantics, here, that are always troubling--but, both houses,
the Senate and the House, do not assume the sequester numbers.
However, the two houses accommodate those sequester numbers in
very different ways. I would really prefer to defer to the
House to analyze their own budget. But, that's why we come here
in support of the President's 2014 budget. We think that has a
reasonable approach to the issue.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
General, you were testifying about training. To put it most
bluntly, when we cut training, are we putting lives at risk?
General Odierno. Ultimately, if we have to deploy soldiers
on a no-notice contingency, they will go at a lower training
rate, which usually equates to putting their lives at risk,
because they will not be able to accomplish their missions
effectively or efficiently as we'd like them to be, and they
will not have the experience of training, working together. The
Army is, probably more than any other Service--maybe the Marine
Corps, as well--we have to focus so much on the team, and
integrating the team in very complex environments. If you don't
have the ability to train on that, that could cost lives, if we
had to deploy them without that appropriate training.
Senator King. Thank you.
On the issue of maintenance, you have mentioned--both of
you, I think, mentioned that maintenance is going to have to be
cut. In my view, cutting maintenance isn't a savings. It may be
a savings this year, but it's ultimately something that's going
to have to happen, and it may be more expensive in the future.
Mr. Secretary, do you have a thought on that?
Mr. McHugh. I think that's absolutely correct. The other
thing it does, particularly when you talk about reset
maintenance, bringing products out of theater, and platforms
out of theater, ultimately that's where our equipment-on-hand
ratings come from. That's how troops, both in the Active and
the Guard and Reserve, get their training--or, get their
equipment, after we've had a chance to provide the maintenance,
and, in the case of coming out of the theater, the reset. So,
that degrades their equipment on hand, which degrades their
readiness, as well.
So, all of these things are fiscally necessary to keep us
on track, but I don't think many people would argue they're
fiscally prudent or economically wise.
Senator King. Thank you.
We had a hearing last week of the Senate Armed Services
Committee Personnel Subcommittee with representatives of the
veterans organizations. You used terms today like ``keep the
faith,'' ``breaking faith with our troops,'' particularly in
terms of TRICARE. What does that term mean? The implication
from our hearing last week was that the veterans assume a
lifetime of health benefits at a much reduced rate as part of
their employment package, if you will. Is that the way the Army
sees it? What are people told when they enlist?
General Odierno. I would just say, when you enlist, you
understand you have a series of benefits that are available to
you. I think when you enlist, people probably aren't thinking
about retirement, but we learn that, over time, what your
retirement benefits are and what you expect when you retire.
I think what we're talking about here though is, we're not
eliminating benefits, but we're realizing that we have not
increased the cost of contributing to TRICARE from when we
originally started this program. We started a little bit last
year. So the benefit has actually gotten so much better because
as inflation has gone up, the TRICARE contributions have not
kept up with it. So in reality, the benefit has gotten much
better than when they first came in because pay's gone up,
inflation's gone up, retired pay continues to go up, and yet
the TRICARE contribution did not go up at the same rate. So,
what we're trying to do is make it a bit more even now. Because
if we don't--and ultimately it's going to--what will cost us
not to bring in less soldiers into the Army, Navy, Air Force,
et cetera, because the cost of a soldier will be so much to us.
So we're trying to get that balance. So we think that's a good
way to get after this.
Senator King. I was struck by your comment--I believe it
was yours--that 44 percent of your total costs now are
personnel. I presume that includes these health benefits.
General Odierno. It does. In fact, it was and it will go
up, frankly. It's going to go up, it's not going to come down,
if we continue along the path----
Senator King. Of that 44 percent, do you have, offhand, a
figure of what percentage of that is the long-term health cost?
General Odierno. I don't, but I can get it for you, sir.
Senator King. I'd appreciate that.
General Odierno. Yes.
[The information referred to follows:]

The fiscal year 2014 Army budget includes 44 percent of the base
request in the Military Personnel Appropriations (MPA). Of this, the
projected percentage of the total cost associated with long-term health
care in fiscal year 2014 is 2.31 percent. This information is reflected
as the fiscal year 2014 contribution to the Medicare-Eligible Retiree
Health Care Fund (MERHCF) in the budget estimates dated April 2013 for
the MPA, NGPA, and RPA appropriations. These documents display a total
fiscal year 2014 personnel request of $56.6 billion. This includes
MERHCF contributions of $3.0 billion. The MERHCF is for retiree health
care for those over 60 years of age. Most health care costs can be
found in the Department of Defense health programs budget submission.

Senator King. Finally, I'm still concerned about the high
rate of unemployment among veterans. You're talking about a
drawdown, a mustering out of 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers. Are you
satisfied with the steps the Army is taking to help those
people transition? I raised with Secretary Hagel the idea that
you have recruiters. How about having outplacement people at
the other end in order to assist with that transition? Because
it's just tragic to have these unemployed veterans.
General Odierno. I agree with you, Senator. We have two
things that we're doing. One, we have the Soldier-for-Life
program that we've established. We have a Soldier-for-Life
office that is helping to place veterans as they come out. They
are organized regionally. They deal with many corporations
regionally to help the transition of our veterans. But also the
execution of the Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) Act that
was passed last year which significantly increases the assets
we have available to us in order to help soldiers transition,
is allowing us to develop programs that are important.
But, we have two--the Army, having the biggest Reserve
component, has two issues. First is Active-component soldiers.
The second is the Reserve. Frankly, because of the amount of
deployments that the Reserve component has had, their
unemployment rate is very high, because we--that's what I worry
about as we go to the future. We have to get their deployments
down because they are citizen soldiers. Because they've been
deployed so much, some of them have lost jobs or have had to
quit jobs. That's not what we want our Reserve component to do.
We want to have that right balance so they are able to maintain
their job and not--and we think we have about a 24 percent
unemployment rate with our Reserve component. Now those numbers
are a little bit fuzzy, but they're high. So we have to really
focus on that.
So part of it is not deploying them so much and making life
more predictable for our Reserve component and then having
capability to place them as we work through the VOW Act and
putting into place at all our installations and offices around
the country to help them get jobs.
We have some good initiatives going on. We just had one, we
did a joint initiative with a welder's union, it was a pilot
program out of Fort Lewis, WA, and they ended up placing about
200 soldiers right into jobs, and we allowed them to train
their last 2 weeks of Active Duty or Reserve duty, after they
retired, they got immediately to a job. Those are the kind of
programs we're trying to work so we can place our soldiers as
soon as possible.
Senator King. Good. We can't do anything about it here,
because it's a matter of States' law. But one of the things--if
you can do an analysis of State laws about certification so
that people can get full credit--it's ridiculous to have
somebody that's trained as an electrician in the Army have to
go through a year-long something or other in a State in order
to be licensed. I hope that could be part of your initiative.
General Odierno. The one thing we're doing is, we're
looking at where we can change our programs in the Army that at
least get them closer to a standard that we think is close to a
standard or close in the States. We're doing that for things
like medics, truck drivers--as you said, electricians--and
other capabilities. We're learning more and more about this. I
think we are making progress but we still have a ways to go in
this area.
Senator King. Appreciate it. Thank you.
General, Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Mr. McHugh. Thanks.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses for their important
testimony.
General Odierno, I understand that you were commissioned in
1976. So as a junior officer, you were aware of the condition
the Army was in at that time. I'm sure you recall when the
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Meyer, came before
this committee and said we had a hollow Army. Can you compare
that situation with the situation we're in today, as regards to
the impact of sequester? I'm sure you were much smarter in 1976
than you are now.
General Odierno. When I first came in the Army there were
several things. It's pretty similar, actually. We were just
coming--we were out of Vietnam, we were recovering from
Vietnam, but our ability to train, our ability to sustain our
equipment, was limited. We had discipline issues within the
force that were really causing us to have significant problems
in allowing us to assure we were able to deploy and meet our
future requirements. So, General Meyer was very clear, and he
was focused on moving us away from that. So, for the next 15
years, we focused on improving our readiness, improving our
modernization, and improving our training programs. We've
revolutionized how the Army did the business. I was fortunate
enough to grow up in that environment.
What we can't have happen today--we don't have--we can't
allow this to get away from us, where it's going to take us 5
or 10 years to recover. That's what I'm worried about. I made a
comment early in my testimony, that I came into a hollow Army;
I don't want to leave a hollow Army when I leave the Army. I'm
focused on that.
So, what I worry about, the steepness of cuts of
sequestration could lead us back to where we were in the late
1970s.
Senator McCain. Inevitably? If something doesn't change?
General Odierno. If something does not change.
Senator McCain. It's inevitable we would return to the era
of a hollow Army.
General Odierno. That's right, the steepness of the cuts
will not allow us to maintain that right balance between end
strength, modernization, and readiness, training, and
educational readiness.
Senator McCain. You've stated that possibly or the
Secretary stated, you may have to eliminate another 100,000
Active and Reserve soldiers, so we could be near the pre-World
War II low of 400,000 members of the Army.
General Odierno. We will be headed in that direction,
Senator. In fact, I would say 100,000 is the minimum. If we go
to full sequestration, it will probably be more than that.
Senator McCain. Does it intrigue you, as it does me, that
there doesn't seem to be the concern in Congress that there was
back in 1976?
General Odierno. I think, what I worry about is our
military over the last 20 years has been able to respond to any
contingency that we've had. We've been able to do it very well.
I worry that we are getting somewhat used to that.
Senator McCain. Arguably, the world is in many ways more
dangerous than we have ever seen it. Certainly more complex and
dangerous. Would you agree with that?
General Odierno. I absolutely agree with that.
Senator McCain. So here we are, on a steep decline as you
mentioned, with a world that is fundamentally in turmoil from
Pacific to Middle East. It's intriguing.
Also, one of the great intangibles of the military is we
find, particularly when we get to know other countries'
military, the morale and the willingness of very bright people
to remain in the military. Are you sensing amongst the very
best, particularly those who are making decisions as to whether
to make the Army a career or not, a certain questioning as to
whether they should remain in this organization, and perhaps
even a sense of frustration that they feel about their ability
to train, to operate, to maintain, to lead?
General Odierno. I think--I agree with you--right now we're
in a position of strength, because of the incredible combat
experience that we have and our leaders, both our NCOs and
officers. One of the focuses needs to be is keeping these
leaders in the Army as we move to our future. We want that
experience.
What we have to be careful of is, we are not seeing it yet
because we're still involved with some heavy issues with
Afghanistan, and the full impact of not having enough money to
train has not fully hit yet. It's just beginning to hit. But,
if it continues over a 2- to 3-year period, I believe we'll
have some real challenges on our hands in terms of people
saying, ``I want to stay in an organization that's the best
organization in the world,'' they might start questioning that.
So, I think we still have time to ensure that we can keep
the best in our Army. We have to act now and make sure we are
doing the right thing--get predictable budgets that allow us to
prove to them that we're going to have an Army that is right-
sized, trained, and ready when they're asked to deploy anywhere
around the world.
Senator McCain. On the subject of predictability, Secretary
McHugh, you and the DOD; I asked Secretary Hagel about this--
are planning on a budget that does not include the effects of
sequestration. Is that correct?
Mr. McHugh. That is correct. We've----
Senator McCain. So----
Mr. McHugh. Sorry, sir. Go ahead.
Senator McCain. So, we're in an Orwellian situation here.
All of us decry the effects of sequestration, and there's
graphic testimony, such has just been presented, and yet
there's no request on the part of the President of the United
States or the Secretary of Defense that we repeal sequester. I
don't ask you to respond to that, but it's a weird experience
to hear our military leaders in uniform decry the effects of
the sequestration on the military, yet I don't hear the
President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, saying:
``This is destroying our military--has the potential to destroy
our military, and we want Congress to repeal it.''
So I hope that you will continue to--not only to Members of
Congress, but to the members of the administration--convey the
urgency of this situation, because I don't hear anything from
the administration saying we want it repealed, and yet we
continue to have testimony as to the draconian effects.
General Odierno, in the unlikely circumstance that there is
a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, are we prepared to respond?
General Odierno. The units in Korea are obviously at a high
state of readiness. We continue to ensure they are. Right now,
we have about--I would say, about 40 percent of the forces that
would be required, that I would consider to be ready to go
there now. The cancellation of the Combat Training Center
rotations, the six of them that we've canceled, is having an
impact on our ability to potentially respond to the Korean
Peninsula, because those decisive-action rotations would have
helped them to prepare for this eventuality.
Senator McCain. So, obviously you didn't agree with that.
General Odierno. No.
Senator McCain. Finally, in the event of hostilities on the
Korean Peninsula, we all know the North Koreans would lose,
they could inflict incredible damage on Seoul because of their
capability at the demilitarization zone. Is that correct?
General Odierno. Their ability to provide indirect fires
and other things would have a potentially devastating effect on
Seoul.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Good morning, gentlemen.
I would note as a preface to the questions I'm going to ask
on the heels of what Senator McCain is discussing in regards to
sequestration, that when we look at another budgetary
crossroads early in the middle of this summer this committee
could lead the way in crafting a budget deal that sets aside
sequestration with this--with a goal of some of the cuts, more
broadly, but giving you all the kinds of flexibility that we
hear you need and you should have.
Secretary McHugh, great to see you. You and I served in the
House for a number of years, and again, I want to just thank
you for your service across the river.
Could you, focusing on the BCT reductions, talk a little
bit about your process? Specifically, is the analysis that
you're using include fiscal savings to the Army and strategic
impacts? Have you also thought about the economic losses that
would be felt by local communities?
Mr. McHugh. Senator, we are, as you noted, in the process
of determining where our restationing will actually occur.
There seems to be some thought, amongst some, that this is an
action resulting out of sequestration. I think it's important
to note that this really comes as a result of the 490,000 end
strength through the end of fiscal year 2017 that was put into
place in the beginnings of the BCA.
As the Chief mentioned in his opening comments, we have
already reduced 6 of the necessary 8 brigades to meet that
490,000, those 2 both coming out of Europe, 2 heavy BCTs, that
needs 6 to be assessed across our remaining structure.
Part of the law by which we pursue this is called an
environmental assessment--programmatic environmental
assessment. We went to 21 installations where we would
potentially inflict larger numbers of either increases or
decreases. That process has been completed. That from our
perspective completes our requirements under the Network
Environmental Policy Act and other environmental regulations
and laws that essentially found that, in considering the
economic impact, that clearly those bases that might lose
structure or might lose soldiers would suffer some economic
impact. That's just a natural. It was not of the level that
would require a full economic impact statement.
We are now in the process of holding public listening
sessions in over 30 locations throughout the Army to receive
input from the communities that surround places like Fort
Carson and others, to make sure that we have the fullest record
possible to make those very important decisions.
As to the decisions, we have a listing of criteria that do,
indeed, include the cost savings or loss to the Army,
geographic distribution, and other kinds of measures that we
would be happy to share with you, and I believe we already have
shared with the committee staff professional staff.
Senator Udall. When do you expect that announcement to be
made?
Mr. McHugh. We hope to get through the hearing process,
analyze it, and then come to a decision, probably by June.
Senator Udall. All right.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just add one thing to
this.
One of the things we're trying to make sure everybody
understands is, you shouldn't focus so much on flags, but focus
on the numbers of people, because we are also looking at
reorganizing our BCTs. We have not made any decisions yet, but
we might make them larger. So, we might eliminate flags, but it
wouldn't be a total loss of a BCT, because we would add a third
maneuver battalion to the BCT.
So, one of the things we're trying to tell people is, don't
focus on the flags, focus on the number which will be more
important in the end, depending on what decisions we make as we
go forward.
Senator Udall. General, you anticipated one of my other
questions. I'm not sure I'm going to get to it, but will submit
it for the record. That applies to how you're going to align
the BCTs, the combat commands, and are you going to come up
with a different structure so those realigned teams will have a
different look, or will they simply be in those habitual
relationships with the----
General Odierno. They will rotate through habitual
relationships with the combatant commanders. The concept of
reorganizing these brigades, we've done an extensive analysis
that tries to tell us what is the most capable organization to
operate across the spectrum of conflict that we can expect? The
results are, it looks like we probably should reorganize. But,
the Secretary and I have not made that final decision yet, but
that would be part of this process as we announce in June.
Senator Udall. Yes, again, I'm going off on a tangent and
will ask this for the record because I want to turn back to
Afghanistan.
But does the division structure become almost obsolete,
given the ways in which the division structure will still have
application. If you'd respond to that in more detail for the
record that would be terrific.
General Odierno. Sure.
Okay, let me turn to Afghanistan. We all know that one of
your key priorities is modernizing and restoring equipment to
an acceptable level of readiness. Are we going to see real
savings as the war in Afghanistan scales back or is the cost of
repairing, replacing, and modernizing equipment--is that going
to overwhelm any savings we might have?
General Odierno. Senator, so we have about--there's just
about $21 billion worth of equipment that we have in
Afghanistan today that we want to bring back. If we had to
repurchase that equipment, it would cost us significantly more
than it does--cost us to reset and then redistribute to the
Army. This will help us increase our equipment on hand in our
Active, Army Reserve, and National Guard units. It's essential
for us to make sure this redistribution happens as we come out.
So that's why that is so important.
Senator Udall. Okay.
Mr. McHugh. Could I add a comment?
Senator Udall. Sure. Mr. Secretary, please go ahead.
Mr. McHugh. Your question goes to our interest in assuring
we have 3 years of OCO funding after the end of hostilities. As
we bring back that $22 billion of equipment that the Chief
noted, it's essential we have the funds necessary to recoup it,
to rehab it, and to get it back to the units. OCO's a critical
part of meeting that need.
Senator Udall. Let me stay on the subject of Afghanistan.
General, you mentioned last month that sequestration could
affect the Army to the extent that we'd have to extend tour
lengths in Afghanistan. Do you still have the same concerns?
Have you proposed any changes to the deployment patch chart at
this point?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator, for asking that
question.
Senator Udall. Yes.
General Odierno. We have reworked, I did talk about that.
That was one of the decisions that we'd have to make. That's
one of the reasons why we have to continue, unfortunately, with
14 days' worth of furloughs, because that's allowing us to have
enough money to invest in the training of the units that would
replace those in Afghanistan so we will not have to increase
tour lengths. We've had to make some very difficult decisions
here in 2013 in order to ensure that we do not extend those
tour lengths. They were tough, difficult decisions, but we
believe right now that tour lengths will remain the same and we
will be able to train the forces that follow up those units.
Senator Udall. My time's about to expire, so let me ask a
question for the record, and you might be able to give a
general answer.
If you look at what you all had to say in your opening
statements, 200,000 soldiers lost in the next 10 years, with
cuts of that size, can you explain what an Army that size can
and cannot do?
General Odierno. We certainly, we just barely, with
490,000, would have enough capability to do one major
contingency, maybe something a bit smaller. If we cut another
80,000 and 100,000 out, we now put into question our ability to
respond to large-scale major contingencies, and we certainly
will not be able to do anything above that. So, it really puts
into question the capabilities that we have to deter potential
future conflict.
Senator Udall. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both, again, for your service.
I wanted to go back to the ongoing assessment of the
restructuring of Active BCTs. I was happy and honored to
participate in one of those listening sessions at Fort Polk by
Skype very recently. I'll just quickly mention some of the
significant factors there in Fort Polk's favor.
The Army's own analysis indicates there wouldn't be any
need for military construction to not only retain its BCT, but
could accommodate 1,000 more soldiers. It's one of the few Army
installations with an active land acquisition program which is
ongoing. There's a very unique JRTC there, capable of training
forces for exactly the sorts of conflicts we're facing today.
Mr. Secretary, with all that in mind, can you reaffirm to
the committee that this process is going to be fully open and
transparent using objective criteria, and that you'll release
that grading, if you will, based on those criteria?
Mr. McHugh. The means by which we arrive at these decisions
will be released. I want to assure, not just the good people of
Fort Polk, but all across this great country, that we're doing
this in the most deliberative, the most objective way possible.
I would note as well the reports I received on the public
listening opportunity outside Fort Polk was extraordinarily
well-attended, so we appreciate that kind of interest.
Senator Vitter. Yes, great.
Can you also confirm that the process will certainly
consider the factors I mentioned, including that Fort Polk has
a land acquisition program, is growing for mission expansion,
and would not need any additional military construction?
Mr. McHugh. Yes. All of those factors are critical to
establishing military value, are critical to judging the kinds
of investments that may be needed in the future. So, anything
that a post, camp, or station is in a posture to do, like
adding land, is certainly something we have to judge.
Senator Vitter. Right.
I can't speak for anyone else here, but I think it's going
to be a very widespread concern if there's a big military
construction bill to shrink the Army in the context of the
fiscal situation we've been discussing today.
Finally, on this point will you be releasing the grading,
if you will, of facilities according to these objective
criteria and the weighting guidance about these different
criteria?
Mr. McHugh. The commitment we have made to the committees
is to ensure both the inputs--in other words, the various
criteria--and also to share with the professional staff members
the weighting that attends those. Those have not been decided,
as yet. Those are still something that the Chief and I need to
take a look at and make final determinations. But, based on my
experience in past force-changing initiatives, it does not
inure to the Army's interests to try to be secretive. We want
to be as open as possible, but also as fair as possible, to
everyone as we go forward.
Senator Vitter. Okay, great.
General, on the same topic, I know one factor listed is
proximity, which appears to mean the Army's desire to have the
BCTs close to division headquarters. Why is that important,
particularly these days, with all sorts of distance
communications available?
General Odierno. First, one of the lessons we've learned
out of the last 5 or 6 years when we went to full modularity of
brigades, is that the oversight--the training and oversight
necessary that a division headquarters gives, both from a
training perspective, a discipline perspective, a standards
perspective--we saw some degradation in that. So we're trying
to make some subtle adjustments to get the divisions once again
more involved with having training oversight with the BCTs to
ensure standards are being sustained, proper training
requirements are being met. The development of officers and
NCOs becomes a very important criteria as we move forward. So,
those are the kinds of things.
That said, it doesn't mean they necessarily have to be
colocated to do that, but it is something we want is to have
the divisions more involved with the BCTs.
Senator Vitter. Okay. So just to be clear, it doesn't
absolutely require close physical proximity.
General Odierno. It does not.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, I want to thank you
for your service and for being here today to testify.
Also, I think you know in the State of West Virginia we
have the utmost respect for all of our servicemembers and all
of the veterans. We have a high percentage of veterans in a
little State of West Virginia. We're proud of what we've done.
We recently saw the National Guard people--it was just so
moving to see in Boston [Boston Marathon bombings on April 15,
2013], as horrible and horrific as that was, to see all men and
women in uniform, and National Guard especially, running
towards the area of danger. That just speaks volumes of how
they're trained and the people that you're attracting to there.
Secretary McHugh, I would like to say that I know DOD was
instructed in 2012 really not to plan for the sequester. No one
thought it would come to fruition. I know that the Army has
always been good at planning for every type of situation.
Hindsight being 20/20, do you think that maybe that could have
been handled a little differently?
Mr. McHugh. I don't think our real problem is that we
didn't plan. Our real problem is the depth and the breadth of
these cuts. As the Chief noted, and as I've commented as well,
it really didn't come just from sequester. We have a $7.6 or
$7.8 billion hole in our overseas contingency accounts, which
is really unrelated to sequester, per se. The fact that we've
had CR after CR that has caused us to do what, in the longer-
term, were inefficient things. So, we can do the math of
sequester. The problem is, the math is so hard and it's so
devastating----
Senator Manchin. Let me ask both of you, and maybe,
General, you might want to chime in on this one, but right now
you have $42.5 billion of cuts that have to come under
sequestering between now and September 30, right? October 1? If
we in Congress were able to give you the flexibility to make
those adjustments--and I have every confidence that you'll make
the $42.5 billion--would it be a lot different than what we're
seeing today if you had the ability to recommend to us what
you'd want to change and cut?
General Odierno. Yes, I would say for 2013, there's nothing
we can do. Because there's flexibility--there is no
flexibility----
Senator Manchin. If we could give you, if we came right
back now and gave you the flexibility----
General Odierno. 2013?
Senator Manchin. Right now, for the rest of 2013, and say:
``General, tell us how you could do it.''
General Odierno. Yes. So, it would help us if we could move
more money between accounts, because if we would do that, we
would be able to probably invest a bit more in our O&M
accounts. That would allow us to mitigate much of this.
Senator Manchin. By Congress not giving you the
flexibility, we're basically just shooting ourself in the foot,
if--literally.
General Odierno. It's making it more difficult.
Senator Manchin. More difficult.
General Odierno. Now, what I want is in the out-years--
that's why we talk about backloading. If you backload it, it
then gives us the ability to plan and do this right. Because
you can't take the amount of people out you have to in an
efficient way, the way it's set right now. It costs too much to
take the people out, because you have to pay benefits.
Senator Manchin. Right.
General Odierno. So, you lose the ability to do the right
balance of modernization, readiness, and end strength.
Senator Manchin. With that being said, let me ask you--I
know you're going to--you're thinking about a 100,000 troop-
level cut, in that neighborhood, correct? Why wouldn't you move
those to the National Guard?
General Odierno. I'm not going to move all of it to the
National Guard. There'll be more out of the Active component.
But, there has to be a balance that we have to maintain. We
have a total Army--and I think we've proven the value of the
total Army over the last 10 or 12 years--we need an Active
component that can respond to crises, are at a higher readiness
level. We need our National Guard and our Army Reserve to
provide us depth and capabilities to give us operational depth,
to conduct operations as well as they need capabilities to
respond to the Governors. So, it has to be a combination of
that. We've already taken 80,000 out of the Active component.
We've already said that. If we have to take 100,000 more, at
least 50,000 of that's going to come out of the Active
component.
So as I look at the formula and the capabilities that I
need across the total Army, we're going to have to take a
little bit out of the National Guard and Army Reserve in order
to continue that right balance.
It is about sustaining the balance of the different
qualities and capabilities we have in each one of the forces.
They are all valuable. They are all valuable and we have to
keep that right balance.
Senator Manchin. From the business standpoint, I'm just
looking at it--if I had--and I know it's not a business model,
but a business model would be, if you had this type of
expertise that's been well-trained, and you can bring them up
when you need them, and basically keep them in a readiness
state, that----
General Odierno. No, because in order to do that, the cost
goes up. If you want to keep them at the same readiness level
as an Active component, you have to spend more and more money.
So, it doesn't work that way.
What we're investing in our National Guard is an ability to
expand over a period of time. Thirty-nine days a year, they
train. Active component trains over 250 days a year. There's a
huge difference in readiness levels.
So if you decide to go that way, you're taking significant
risk in being able to respond to unknown contingencies with
predictability.
Senator Manchin. But, they've been able to just about meet
every----
General Odierno. Two years notice for deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Two years. If we have to respond to Korea, I
can't give them 2 years notice and slowly build up readiness. I
need both.
Senator Manchin. I see.
General Odierno. I'm not telling you I don't need the
National Guard or the U.S. Army. I need both.
Senator Manchin. If there's an opportunity, I'd love to
come and sit down and make sure I understand it better.
General Odierno. Sure.
Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, if I may ask you--I
asked this question, I believe, about the expense of the
private contractors that we have with all different branches.
You told me one of the major initiatives we have is to diminish
significantly the number of contractors that we employ. So my
question would be pretty straightforward. How many contractors
did the Army have last year, and how many do they have this
year?
Mr. McHugh. I'd have to get you the actual numbers for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

In compliance with statutory requirements in 10 U.S.C. 2330a, the
Army does not generate contractor inventory data until the end of the
fiscal year in order to minimize reporting requirements on contractors
in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Army's contractor
inventory is captured in the Contractor Manpower Reporting Application
(CMRA) Report. For its Fiscal Year 2012 CMRA Report, the Army reported
approximately 150,535 contractor full-time equivalents for the
generating force and 90,319 contractor full-time equivalents in the
operating force (which includes Overseas Contingency Operations).

Mr. McHugh. I can tell you, it depends how you define
``contractor.'' But one of our major initiatives, in part to
respond to the current challenges we're facing, was to go
through all of our hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of
contractors and to change up the requirements. We've actually
reduced our contracting cost by double-digits.
Senator Manchin. I basically look at contractors--those
jobs that the military men and women can do, and have done, in
some period of our past that have been taken over by
contractors. If you look at the graph, it basically starts our
post-war era, whether it be Korea to Vietnam to the Cold War to
today. It's just exponentially what are increased amounts of
people and costs in contractors versus what military used to
do. Some of that could have been because of the draft. You had
more people you were using differently.
Mr. McHugh. I think probably it had more to do with the
war. Over the last 10 years, we've needed every man and woman,
or certainly every possible man and woman in uniform, to go do
things that contractors can't do.
Senator Manchin. Contractors are doing the same job as some
of our military, side by side.
Mr. McHugh. In some places, that may be true, but if you're
saying they're fighting the war, I wouldn't agree with that.
Senator Manchin. You don't agree that we have contractors
that we're paying to do the same exact job as a person in
uniform?
Mr. McHugh. It depends what job you're talking about.
Senator Manchin. I'm talking about fighting forward
operating base (FOB).
Mr. McHugh. Carrying a rifle out----
That's why we were----
Senator Manchin. Security?
Mr. McHugh. That's why we rely upon contractors. I'd also
note that we're using----
Senator Manchin. How can a contractor carry a rifle better
than a military person trained to do it? I'm just saying----
General Odierno. Excuse me----
Senator Manchin. Why would we have anybody in contracting
doing what the military----
Mr. McHugh. Because if you don't use contractors, you have
to use military, and that takes away from the warfight.
General Odierno. Yes. The missions that they do are
missions that are nowhere near what we ask our military to do,
carrying a weapon. But, I would say this. If you don't want
contractors to do that, you have to significantly increase the
size of the Army. So the reason we've gone into this strategy
is, we can't afford an increased size in the Active and
National Guard and Army. You'd have to increase it 200,000 to
300,000 in order to be able to meet these commitments, if we
had to go to war.
Senator Manchin. But we have as many contractors or more
contractors now than ever. You're paying high prices. It would
be cheaper to increase the end strength size.
General Odierno. No, it's not. The analysis has been done
that says in order to sustain 300,000 for a lifetime--it's
about benefits, it's about retirements, it's about--it's
significantly more than hiring contractors for short periods of
time. I would love to be able to use soldiers for this. I would
much rather have soldiers doing all of those jobs. But I don't
think we can afford it. I don't think we can--hell, we're
cutting 100,000 more right now. This sequester, I'm going to
cut 200,000 soldiers out of the Army.
Senator Manchin. How many contractors? No one can ever
get--every time I ask the question, I never get an answer. I
get--this is not disrespectful--I never have gotten an answer--
--
General Odierno. It's because when we contract out, you
contract for a capability. The number of people that do that
capability changes from month to month, based on what's needed.
That's why it's difficult to give an exact number of
contractors, because it's based on the dollar figure of the
contract.
But the point is, when we go to war, we get OCO funding, we
get operational funding that allows us to do this. We do not
have the base budget to sustain the Army at the size necessary
for us to fill all the needs we have. So unless we're willing
to increase the base budget of the Army significantly, we're
going to have to live with this--contractors on the
battlefield. As a commander, I'd much rather have military. I'm
with you, Senator. I really am, I'm with you. But, we can't do
it in our base budget.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
My time is up. I'd like to continue this later.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Secretary McHugh, will you get these numbers to Senator
Manchin, at least as of one particular point in time, how many
contractors we have? Because that is a knowable number. So, if
you would.
Mr. McHugh. That absolutely is. I just wasn't prepared to
answer it exactly 1 year to the next.
Chairman Levin. All right. That's fine.
That's fine, but I think that--anyway.
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Blunt.
No, wait, excuse me. No, I think Senator Ayotte came back
here in time, beat you out.
My note says ``Blunt,'' but my other note says ``Ayotte.''
So, Ayotte is next.
Senator Blunt. Go with your heart. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Senator Ayotte.
I was half-tempted to say that, but I avoided it.
Politically incorrect. [Laughter.]
But, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Blunt.
I certainly appreciate, General Odierno, Secretary McHugh,
your service during challenging times.
In your prepared statement, you discuss the serious problem
of suicide in the Army. As I understand it, in 2012 there were
182 potential Active Duty suicides--some have been confirmed,
some are under investigation--and 143 potential suicides in the
Guard and Reserve.
You've mentioned that the Army's partnering with a number
of agencies to identify the most important risk and protective
factors, and then act on them for best practices. Obviously, we
want to do everything we can to prevent suicides and to give
people the support that they need in difficult circumstances.
We have a program in New Hampshire that has received
national recognition. It's achieved tangible results. We've
prevented at least one suicide directly, but we've also
assisted many servicemembers and their families with mental
healthcare, employment, and homelessness, many factors that can
contribute to someone feeling that they have to take their own
life.
It's called the Deployment Cycle Support Care Program. It's
a unique program. In 2012, actually, we intervened successfully
in 29 suicide-risk situations in the State of New Hampshire
alone. I recognize this is a difficult problem, so I would ask
that--I believe, if--are you both aware of the program in New
Hampshire?
General Odierno. I am, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. To what extent are you looking at best
practices around the Nation, both within the Army, Active Duty,
and then obviously, with the Guard and Reserve, we have
different challenges because they're going back in their
communities. One of the things I'm very proud of in New
Hampshire is that we be able to bring the private sector in
this to leverage resources. What are your thoughts on this
issue? What more can we do?
Mr. McHugh. We absolutely are looking at best practices.
You mentioned the Guard and Reserve, very correctly. The way by
which they redeploy and disperse makes reaching out to them and
making sure that we're detecting any emerging problems as
quickly as possible is particularly challenging.
The Guard has done a good job, nationally, through a
variety of programs, particularly what's called the Resilience,
Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention program, that
establishes councils in every State and territory to help
coordinate and, in places like New Hampshire, take advantage of
things that are working particularly well. As part of that,
they have appointed 54 suicide prevention program managers and
78 directors of psychological health to ensure that a soldier
knows where he or she can call or go and get the kind of
referral that's necessary.
But one of the things that we're working on--and it isn't
just for the Guard and Reserve, but I think it's particularly
well-suited to them--are telebehavioral health programs. We
have increased those programs. I believe the contacts have gone
up by over 900 percent--about 10 percent of those are Guard and
Reserve, the increase--that allows people in remote locations
to get somebody and actually do a face-to-face discussion, and
to get a referral, if absolutely essential.
Of course, while the Guard and Reserve are deployed and
coming back for redeployment, we put them through the same
behavioral health screenings that we do every deploying
soldier. There are five touch points: predeployment; about 90
days before the sector redeploy and three times after coming
back.
We're trying to make sure that we have both the behavioral
health specialists necessary--for the first time in my nearly 4
years as Secretary, we're actually exceeding the requirement
for those behavioral health specialists--and trying to
destigmatize the continuing challenge of helping soldiers
realize it's okay to ask for help, that it doesn't make you any
less of a soldier, and that it won't ruin your career.
I think we're making inroads. But as you noted, Senator,
this is something that plagues, yes, the military, but as a
member of the National Alliance on Suicide Prevention that I
am, as appointed by Secretary Gates, I can tell you it's
something that plagues the civilian sector as well, as you, of
course, understand very clearly.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just add--
unfortunately, in 2013, we're seeing a rise in suicides,
specifically in the National Guard and Army Reserve, so it's
very concerning to us. They have the most difficult problem; I
don't have to tell you this. But because the commanders don't
have control of their soldiers all the time, because of their
civilian jobs, although they're doing a great job of trying to
outreach and stay in contact. So this private governmental
relationship is critical for us to help our National Guard,
U.S. Army Reserve. So we have to figure out ways how we can get
this work with the States in order for them to adopt this
program, because it's critical to what we want to do as we move
forward.
Some other things that we've done is, we've also improved
our ability to share information. We're working very hard and
getting to better share information with people who have some
discipline issues with their health issues, with other issues
that all contribute to potential suicide. Our ability to share
this information and bring that together is helping to identify
those who are at risk.
Then, as the Secretary mentioned, in my mind the most
important thing is the intervention or what I call bystander
mentality, those who are willing to not only come forward
themselves, but those people who are closest to them who start
to see the signs, to come forward. We're starting to gain some
traction. We're not where we need to be yet, but we're starting
to gain traction.
But I'm worried because we're doing a lot and we're putting
in a lot of assets, but we are not seeing any substantial
improvement yet in the lowering of suicides. I think this has
become a societal issue that--and we're trying to--we have a
bit more controlled environment to try to deal with it, but we
are not yet seeing the success that we need to see in this. So,
there's lots of work that needs to be done yet.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General. I do hope--obviously, I
know you're familiar with our program, but I think it is a very
important model. Not every State has had everyone coming
together around this issue like New Hampshire. We hope that we
can, obviously, continue to improve our program--it's a
terrific program--but also to bring it to the rest of the
Nation, because this is a huge issue and something we have to
address, not only in the general population, but, in
particular, for our military, with this rise that we're seeing.
So, I appreciate very much how concerned you are about this.
I also wanted to follow up on. There's something that, as
serving on the Senate Armed Services Committee Readiness and
Management Support Subcommittee, that I think it's important
for everyone here to understand. I serve on the Senate Budget
Committee, other committees, and everyone around this place
seems to have their eyes on OCO funding for some other purpose.
Go into any other committee in this body, and you'll find
somebody else with their eyes on OCO.
So, let me be clear. General, the Army needs 3 years of OCO
funding for reset after the last piece of equipment returns
from Afghanistan. Why is that? I think it's very important that
people understand that if we don't do that, we will have a
hollow Army, and we will not be able to reset, because--people
need to understand that, so that this money isn't grabbed
elsewhere.
General Odierno. What this does is, as the equipment comes
out, it immediately goes to a depot or some other commercial
entity that allows us then to upgrade it or because of years
and years of use in a combat environment. It then goes back to
the units, in the National Guard, Reserve, and Active
component, to ensure they have the equipment on hand so they're
ready to use it, wherever it might be, for whatever mission we
give them.
The reason it takes 3 years is because of the load that we
have in our organic industrial base. It takes a period of time
to get the equipment through there. If it does not get funded,
that means it has to come out of our base budget, which has not
been budgeted for, and it'll take money away from the daily
readiness that we need in order to be prepared to meet any
operational missions that we have.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh, it's wonderful to see you again. It was
an honor to serve with you in the House together.
General Odierno, thank you for your leadership. Thank you
for your service. We're greatly appreciative of it.
This is a little bit of a follow-up in regards to the Guard
that we were talking about. We had two groups from Indiana
ready to go, and they were off-ramped less than 6 weeks before.
So, they're now dealing, right now, with loss of TRICARE,
trying to figure out where they're going to go to work, because
in many cases, their jobs, they went back and somebody had
already gotten in that position and the employer is wondering
what the heck to do. I'm just following--and we're willing to
take our cuts. We understand that. We're willing to take our
chunk and then some extra. All we're trying to do right now,
April 21 was the day that their TRICARE ended. All they ask for
is, ``Can we extend it for 180 days?'' In regards to--they
reenlisted to go to the Horn of Africa, to go to Egypt. A lot
of them had to reenlist. They got a bonus with that. All the
Guard is asking for is, ``Can we keep our bonus? Can we have
180 days of TRICARE?'' Because they're trying to figure out a
whole lot more than that right now.
I wanted to ask both of you. I had talked to Secretary
Hagel about this, and he said, ``You know, we're going to look
into this.'' We were told yesterday it's in the front office. I
don't know who the front office is, but you look like the
general manager to me, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. McHugh. First, let me say that these kinds of off-
ramps--and the Indiana Guard and the people of Indiana should
be aware of how forward-leaning you have been in trying to
present their interests--is not something we--as I said, that
we do lightly or do easily. This was something in light of the
current fiscal circumstances that we felt we had to do to save
some $85 million in the process. I would say, just generically,
in light of where we find ourselves financially, it's likely
that we'll have to take similar actions into the future.
I would defer to the Chief as to the actual discussions
that occurred, leading up to this, with Guard officials.
Senator Donnelly. Great.
Mr. McHugh. I assure you, we will do everything we can to
maximize every benefit that is available to them.
My understanding--and I would ask for a little time to
check this more fully.
Senator Donnelly. Sure.
Mr. McHugh. My understanding is, the availability of
TRICARE for 180 days pre and 180 days post, it would not be
available to these soldiers, given the conditions of their off-
ramping. I do believe, however, that they are eligible, and I
would certainly encourage them to pursue TRICARE Reserve
Select, which is paid for, about 74 percent of that is paid for
by the Federal Government.
Senator Donnelly. I wanted to ask you another Indiana-
specific question. That is in regards to the Humvees. There's
$100 million that's been appropriated as part of fiscal year
2013 to be spent to purchase, it was allocated to be spent to
purchase new Humvees. The adjutant generals have asked that it
be spent for new Humvees. It is the Army's decision. It is
being talked about that it will possibly be used for
recapitalization instead. The adjutant generals have asked for
new ones. So, I just wanted to put that on your radar.
Mr. McHugh. Yes. We need to get into that as well. My
understanding previously was that the Guard Bureau and the U.S.
Army were in agreement on the recap proposal, but we'll check
that out.
Senator Donnelly. Maybe we can talk a little bit more about
that.
Mr. McHugh. Yes.
Senator Donnelly. Then, General, what is your biggest fear
over the next 6 months in Afghanistan?
General Odierno. I think, in Afghanistan--not fear, but I
think what we have to watch----
Senator Donnelly. Biggest challenge, then.
General Odierno. The biggest--what we have to watch is the
confidence of the ANSF as we go through this fighting season.
We think they're ready. They're in the lead in about 73 percent
or 75 percent of the country. It is about helping them to
ensure they're able to themselves to get through the fighting
season, protect their citizens in a way where they continue to
have the confidence, so when we leave in 2014, they are
prepared to do this on their own. So for me, that's the most
important thing.
So far, we're pretty confident.
Senator Donnelly. Are we on target right now? In the
planning we have, as to the end of 2014, are we where you
expected to be?
General Odierno. I think, actually--I was over there a
couple of months, and, frankly, a little ahead of where I
thought we were, to be honest with you. I think the ANSF has
had an exponential improvement, because of the teams that we've
put with them, and how we've readjusted, it has increased their
capability quite significantly. I think they are prepared to
take this over.
The thing that we have to do now is make sure they have the
right enablers as we leave, because we now still provide them
of some enablers, whether it be improvised explosive device
(IED) protection, whether it be some aircraft capability,
whether it be logistics capability. We now have to make sure
that they have the right enabler. I guess that that would be my
biggest concern, that they would build the enablers necessary
for them to be successful once we leave.
Senator Donnelly. Okay. In regards to North Korea--and this
is to you, General, or to you, Mr. Secretary--have you seen any
change in the last week or 2? Is there any walking back on
their part or is it right where it was or getting worse at this
point?
General Odierno. I try to defer all of these to General
Thurman, but from what I've read, I think things are calming a
bit, but I think we have to watch it very carefully. I know
that we're doing that.
Senator Donnelly. Have you seen any indication that Kim
Jong has even thought about a potential off-ramp for himself or
for the country in this process?
General Odierno. I think it's hard for all of us to predict
what Kim Jong-un is doing, or will do, and that's what makes
this such a tense situation in my mind because we simply don't
know what he's thinking. I think that's what makes it even more
problematic for us.
Senator Donnelly. I know I have less than a minute left,
and it is certainly not a fair amount of time for you to answer
this question, but, in regards to Syria, what do you see as the
best path forward for the United States at this point?
General Odierno. I would just say I think we have to
continue to watch and leave options open, because Syria is
dynamic. I think deploying the command-and-control headquarters
into Jordan is a good capability that allows us to do planning
and allows us to develop several different options. They've
been working very closely with the Jordanians and others. I
think things like that help us, whether it's dealing with--if
we have to--so it then provides the President options. That's
what we owe him. We owe him a range of options that allow him
to choose from what happens based on this year, because it's
still not quite predictable enough to really figure out what's
going to happen in Syria. We're all obviously watching very
closely about the use of chemical and biological weapons, which
is something that we think is quite significant. We'll continue
to watch that very carefully. It's also important for us to
ensure that we take care--we help and assist and take care of
some of the citizens, which we've been doing.
It's a combination of all these factors, but it's about
working with our friends and allies in the region to come up
with a solution that we do together in order to solve this
problem. I think that's what we're trying to work towards.
Senator Donnelly. General, thank you and your family for
all your dedication to the country, and, Mr. Secretary, for all
your service.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
To both of you, you're not only my personal friends, but
you're heroes, and I'd just thank you for your service to our
country.
With respect to what's going on in the Army now--and the
same is true for the other branches--there seems to be a lot of
uncertainty. First, we have sequestration staring us in the
face, and you guys are struggling with that, just as we are, to
try to make life easier for you there. Second, that you're
going to be downsizing your force structure.
How is this affecting those individuals who have been a
part of this great Army that we have developed over a couple of
hundred years into the finest Army in the world? How are those
men and women who are coming back from 10 years of experience
in combat dealing with these issues? What are you doing about
the potential for combat brain-drain loss, with that
uncertainty steering a lot of your NCOs and particularly a lot
of your younger officers?
General Odierno. Senator, if I could, what we're seeing so
far is the trends are good. In fact, our attrition rates right
now of NCOs and officers is the lowest it's been for some time.
That said, I have the same concerns you do. We are working
this very carefully and making sure that they understand about
the path ahead for the Army, because we need them to help us to
bring the Army forward, where we want to be 5 years from now,
10 years from now. We need their leadership. We're looking at
our new leader development program to help adjust them and help
them stay interested in order for them to help us to develop
what we're going to look like.
I think it's exciting for them to look at how we will
develop our Army in the future. But the one thing that would
help us tremendously in doing this is predictability. As I said
earlier, it's predictability in our budget so we can clearly
outline where we are headed as an Army. If we don't get this
predictability, it's going to cause all kinds of problems. It's
going to cause potential hollowness in the Army. It's going to
cause potential loss of leadership that we developed over a
long period of time.
So for me, if we can just get some predictability that
allows us to put a solid plan together, that Congress and us
have worked together on for our Army, that will, frankly,
reduce a lot of angst that's out--in both the civilian and
military workforce.
They still want to serve. That's not the issue. But if we
continue along this unpredictability, it's going to start to
whittle away at our leaders, and I think it becomes a real
problem if we don't solve this predictability issue.
Mr. McHugh. Could I add just a couple of words?
Senator Chambliss. Sure.
Mr. McHugh. The Chief's absolutely right. I think so far
the folks in uniform are willing to see if we can get this
right, even though they are concerned.
Senator Chambliss, I know you've been to Iraq and, of
course, Afghanistan, and you've seen as I have these captains
and lieutenants, young men and women, out there making
decisions that usually had to have an O6 full-bird colonel
insignia to make. They want to come back into this Army and
stay challenged. One of the biggest problems we have as we
attempt to deal with sequestration is funding the training
opportunities, the schoolhouses, the kinds of things that we're
going to need to make as robust as possible and as available as
possible to these young leaders so that they stay challenged
and they stay excited about being in the Army. So that's why
predictability is so critical for us.
The other side the Chief mentioned is civilian workers. I'm
deeply worried about the morale of the civilian workers. As
this committee knows, we're discussing in the Department 14
days of furloughs or some variant thereof. That comes on top of
3 years of pay freezes for the civilian employees. They feel a
part of this Army as well and we believe they should; they've
been critical to the fight. Their morale is, I think, on the
downswing.
Then there are 50,000 U.S. Army civilians who today could
walk out the front door with full retirement benefits, and
another 25,000 who are eligible to go and receive early
retirement benefits. I'm concerned again if we don't get this
straightened out so we can at least see a straight path
forward, whatever that is, those civilians are going to start
to walk on us as well. In their own way, they're absolutely as
important to this fight as every soldier is as well.
General Odierno. As an anecdotal example, I was down at the
San Antonio Military Medical Center (SAMMC), as we now call it.
They are starting to be concerned because of the furloughs and
the unpredictability of future budgets. They're starting to see
some of their--as they get offered jobs, they're starting to
walk away. They're walking away to the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), they're walking away to other facilities, because
there's more predictability in their future.
So we're starting to lose some people because of this
unpredictability. That's an anecdotal example, but that's the
kind of thing that we'll continue to face unless we can tell
them, ``This is what our future is going to be.''
Senator Chambliss. Yes.
As you look at downsizing and make your plans for the next
couple of years, what are you doing with respect to flag
officers? Are we going to be downsizing there also?
General Odierno. We are in the process of downsizing. I
would just say the Army has the lowest ratio of general
officers to soldiers than any other Service. I think we're 1 to
1,700 or 1,800. So we have been very cognizant of doing this.
We have met, or are going to meet, the initial reductions that
we put in for ourselves by the end of next year. We'll continue
to review this as we downsize the Army.
Now, I will say that a lot of our general officers are now
in the joint and combatant command world, and so we have to
work with the joint and combatant commands to work some of
these positions. But within the Army itself, we have downsized,
we have reduced ranks, and we have the lowest general officer
to soldier ratio of any Service, to include the Marine Corps.
Senator Chambliss. General, as we come out of Afghanistan--
I heard what you just said in response to Senator Donnelly. I
look at what's going on in Iraq now. The violence appears to be
on the rise. We have no idea, obviously, what difference it
would have made had we left a residual force in Iraq. But I
know that's under consideration right now as to what we're
going to do, what size of a residual force needs to be there.
What's your thought with respect to how we're going to ensure,
number one, that the violence in Afghanistan does not start on
the upswing like we're seeing in Iraq? Then, number two, what
size residual force do we need to have to make sure that the
Afghans are able to do what we expect them to do?
General Odierno. There's a couple of things. I would just
make a quick comment about Iraq.
I don't think that's a sense, that's not a mark against the
capability of the security forces. I think those are political
issues that are driving that violence. There's been some
political divide within the country that's causing, I think,
some violence. I think it can be fixed by some political
agreements and other things between the parties there.
In Afghanistan, it's important that we sustain a long-term
commitment from not only the military but a government-wide
commitment to them. If we do that, continuing to help fund for
a period of time their security forces to continue to help them
develop in several different areas, I believe that will help us
significantly in tamping down the violence. Because the
security forces, I believe, will have the capability based on
the trajectory we were on in Afghanistan. It's now solving some
of the other issues that are necessary to go along with the
security capability that will be key to ensuring violence
remains low once we leave, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. The size of the force?
General Odierno. I think they're looking at anywhere from 0
to 12,000 to 13,000. I think it depends on the type of missions
you want them to do. I think we want to do training and
advising at higher levels. I think we want to be able to have
some special operations capability on the ground. My opinion is
somewhere around 9,000, 8,000 is probably about the right
number. We're continuing to work that, and I'd leave that up to
the commander on the ground, General Dunford.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thanks, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and
General Odierno, for not only your testimony but for your
service. A lot of the questions that have been raised today go
to the reduction-in-force of the Army. Let me ask a question
and either the Secretary or the Chief can take it.
In terms of force structure, where is the excess personnel?
At what ranks?
General Odierno. In reality, as we've gone through natural
attrition, where we'll see some access right now is at the O6
level, the O5 level, and then, for some year groups, O3s, and
then senior NCOs, sergeant first class, master sergeant,
sergeant major. Because we've been able to do everything else
by attrition, we'll have to see where we'll have some actions
where we will have to make some selections, and it's going to
be by year group, because it's about balancing it across the
years as we go forward. We'll have to make some of those
decisions pretty shortly.
Senator Reed. You, in fact, are contemplating a selective
early retirement board?
General Odierno. We are. I think we've already announced
it, Senator, for August.
Senator Reed. Which is, in the old terminology, a
reduction-in-force.
General Odierno. Except that they get to retire.
Senator Reed. Okay.
General Odierno. Yes, so this will be for lieutenant
colonels and colonels.
Senator Reed. Who have been vested, then will retire, but
they will----
General Odierno. But, they--right.
Senator Reed.--they'll be--or get to retire. No? So you
don't contemplate the need, given the force structure, to go
in, having involuntary separations?
General Odierno. We don't yet, but, I think, before we get
done with this process, we're going to have to have involuntary
separations.
Senator Reed. Okay.
One of the consequences, not just the budget, but the
completion of operations in Iraq and soon, Afghanistan, is a
shift from almost an exclusive focus on counterinsurgency, in
terms of training, in terms of equipping, in terms of
everything else, to what I think you described as a more full-
spectrum approach. Can you give us an indication of that? Just
as a footnote is that one of the most labor-intensive and one
of the most difficult challenges is Phase 4 in
counterinsurgency. So as you shift away from that and shift to
more conventional forces, what does that do to your flexibility
and to force structure and to the need for resources?
General Odierno. Sir, we are not shifting away in our
training base from counterinsurgency. However, what we are
doing is, as we do our decisive-action rotations, which are
being developed at NTC/JTRC, that's a combination of stability,
counterinsurgency, and combined arms operations, all going on
at one time, because that's what we believe we will see in the
future. It will be a combination of all of those, because our
enemies learn from what they've seen, and we'll have to conduct
that simultaneously. So we're training our units to do that,
both in our leader development programs, as well as our
training centers, both for divisions and corps as well as
brigades and below.
I think we're integrating what we've learned over the last
10 years into this, and we're developing scenarios that are
very complex and very difficult. But that's what we think our
leaders will face in the future.
In terms of force structure, there have been some decisions
in the 2012 guidance that we were given that we would not be
sized to conduct large-scale stability operations. So although
we will still be able to do them, we would not be able to do
them at the size we have done over the last--and duration--of
what we've done over the last 10 or 12 years.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a related question. A lot of the
equipment that we required was very specialized for both
Afghanistan and Iraq--the mine-resistant ambush-protected
(MRAP) vehicles, the type of suspension systems, everything was
necessarily thrown in to protect our men and women in these
situations. Do you find yourself now with equipment that you
don't need because of this shift from the full-scale operations
together with a deliberate decision to conduct much smaller-
scale counterinsurgency operations?
General Odierno. I think, for example, the problem we have
now is we're out of balance. We have to always balance
mobility, survivability, and lethality in all our equipment.
Right now, we're out of balance towards survivability. We've
limited our mobility and given up some lethality because of the
counterinsurgency. As we develop our new systems, it's
important that we integrate them where they have all three of
those at the right balance.
In terms of MRAP vehicles and things like that, we will
have to divest ourselves of MRAP vehicles. We have a strategy
to keep a portion of the MRAP vehicles that we'll lead, and
we'll invest in the force, and we'll also keep a portion of
them where we put in storage, so if we need them for other
small-scale contingencies, that they would be available.
We will divest probably of about 60 percent or so, a bit
higher, the number of MRAP vehicles now. We'll keep about--and
we'll do it in such a way where it's efficient and effective
for us to----
Senator Reed. That will allow some limited cost savings,
nothing spectacular, but some limited cost savings.
General Odierno. That's right.
Senator Reed. There's another aspect of this too,
particularly as sequestration rolls forward. That is, some
functions that have routinely been done for the last 20 years
by contractors, like mess halls, like cutting grass, et cetera,
in fact, I think there's a whole generation of soldiers that
post support is something that their fathers spoke about. Do
you anticipate that you're going to have to make adjustments
along those lines, too? Which has a definite tradeoff with
training and readiness?
General Odierno. We've already done that, Senator. Guarding
gates is another one.
Senator Reed. I remember.
General Odierno. Roger. So dining facility, guarding gates,
maintenance of facilities--there'll be some more troop labor
used to do that. I think it's okay. We can work our way through
that. All of those things require leadership and organization,
so there's always some training value in it. I believe that
we'll do that.
We do have to be careful that we don't trade off so much
that it does impact our training. That's that balance that we
have to meet. But we've already started to do that, and I see
that continuing beyond this fiscal year into next, and the
close coming up.
Senator Reed. I remember the training time being a mess
officer. [Laughter.]
Mr. McHugh. For whatever it's worth----
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I'd like you to just finish up
my time by making any comments you have on the range of
questions I posed.
Mr. McHugh. I appreciate it very much. I just wanted to
piggyback onto the Chief's comments about what we're calling,
in the near-term, borrowed military manpower, that trading for
contractors, the military. We had planned about 8,000 of those
switches this year. We're actually running a little bit lower
than that. But I think that'll still come to be pretty close to
the number. As the Chief said in a very careful way, we need to
ensure that we continue along that path, but don't do it in a
way that excessively erodes the readiness levels that are
already, as we've discussed here today, a challenge.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
service.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The advantage of
waiting is you get to hear lots of good questions. I was glad
to get to hear my colleagues' questions.
It's good to see both of you here today, particularly
Secretary McHugh, who we worked so closely together for so
long.
Secretary McHugh, you mentioned the problem of CR after CR.
How much of that was taken care of in what was done last month?
What are your priorities moving forward in terms of structuring
for the next spending year what you'd hope would be there?
Mr. McHugh. Public Law 113-6, I believe was the number,
gave us what the Chief and I have been talking about. That is,
predictability and stability. It was an important step with
respect to being able to redirect funds. We were initially
estimating that a year-long CR would cost us about $6 billion.
So by interrupting that progression, it saved us some money,
but most importantly, allowed us to take funds and do what we
consider our prime objective for the moment and that is to
continue to provide for the warfighters.
As to the way ahead, I think it's important for everyone to
understand that the things that we're going to have to do, the
things we've already done here in 2013, will, in some
instances, take a year, multiple years, to fix, regardless of
what we may do in 2014 in adopting either the Senate
resolution, the President's proposed budget, or the House
resolution, because we're just creating holes that don't get
fixed overnight.
For example, at the Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort
Rucker, sequestration will probably require the reduction of
more than 500 training seats. Those just don't get recreated in
a year's time. The Chief mentioned about how we'll only be able
to do two BCT rotations at our NTC. All of those other
rotations will be put back into the queue. It's not like
they'll make up that readiness in a 6-month period.
So those are holes that are, even under the best
circumstances as we can see it, that we're going to be dealing
with for some time. But at least with predictability and an on-
time budget and, if not the elimination, certainly the control
of CRs, we're going to be significantly challenged in the way
ahead.
Senator Blunt. That'd be great if we could eliminate CRs.
It's our job, and we ought to do our best to do that.
You mentioned the OCO accounts. I want to be sure I
understood what your concern was there.
Mr. McHugh. Well, money.
Senator Blunt. That there's too much money in contingencies
you no longer need?
Mr. McHugh. No.
Senator Blunt. Or there's not enough money in
contingencies?
Mr. McHugh. There's not enough money. In the current OCO
account, our estimation is that we're about $7.8 billion short
of what the Army needs to fund the warfighters through the end
of this year. That's why we're having to make all of these cuts
that degrade readiness, that go into our base budgets, because
we're moving money out of our base into what should be the
funded OCO accounts, in our view, to support that warfighter.
Our prime goal is not to send anyone into harm's way or into
Korea or as part of the global response force that has without
what they absolutely need. That's the commitment we make. But,
right now, we're hard-pressed to do that.
Senator Blunt. Okay. Thank you.
General, following up on your conversation with Senator
Reed, how has the recruitment strategy been impacted by the
reduction strategy?
General Odierno. Sir, the one thing that we have to be able
to do is sustain the balance of people coming in the Army as
they leave. So, for example, because we had a larger number of
people leave the Army this year than anticipated, we increased
our recruiting level by about 5,000 this year and in the Active
component, we're meeting that.
We have to always sustain the balance between recruiting
and as soldiers leave, because if you don't do it by year
group, and you get out of balance, you create holes in your
force over time. So as we've increased the amount of soldiers
leaving, we've had a small increase in those we're recruiting.
The quality of recruits that we're bringing in this year
are the highest they've been, and over the last 3 years, we've
had the least amount of waivers, the highest level of education
that the Army has seen since we've been keeping track of
records.
So for now, we're doing okay. But we are worried, 2014,
2015, 2016, as the economy continues to get better and,
frankly, this unpredictability that we have, how will that
contribute to people wanting to come into the Army? We're
concerned about the out-years because even though we're
reducing, you have to keep those fresh people coming in every
single year.
Senator Blunt. Some of the reductions would actually not
impact in a negative way your intake numbers. Your intake
numbers are still going to be pretty high. Is that what I
understand?
General Odierno. It is. When we were growing the Army, they
were much higher, but they're about 65,000 this year, is how
many we're bringing in to the Active component, and we're
bringing in more to the National Guard and Army Reserve. So
that number continues. We have to stay consistent with that
number.
As the overall end strength of the Army goes down, that
will reduce. It'll probably get down sometime in 2 or 3 years
from now, to about 55,000 a year. But we have to continue to
bring people in every single year.
Senator Blunt. Right. To repeat some of what's been said--
as you look at the BCT restructuring the facility I'd be most
familiar with would be Fort Leonard Wood, the two things that
occur to me there are the proximity to the schools, to the
training and doctrine schools, and then the location of that
and other bases if, at some point, you need to support civil
authorities because of incidents that happen here. I would hope
those would be two of the things you'd put into the matrix of
trying to make that decision.
Mr. Secretary, do you want to respond to that?
Mr. McHugh. I would tell you, one of the newer criteria or
factors is that geographical balance. That's something we're
going to look at very carefully. That, frankly, responds to the
issue you said, so that we are located to work and support our
civil authorities where and when as necessary, but it also
helps with keeping the Army relevant to the American population
as a whole. I worry about us becoming isolated unto ourselves.
The more places we can maintain presence and American
communities can look across a patch of land or a piece of water
and see, in this case, an Army base, a camp, post, or station,
I think is a good day.
Geographic dispersal in equity is part of our
consideration.
Senator Blunt. Okay.
General Odierno, we had General Alexander, from U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM), in the other day, and when you were talking
earlier, I think with Senator Manchin, about Guard versus the
readiness of the full-time force actually, in talking to him
and some things we're looking at, I think CYBERCOM could be a
place where guardsmen and reservists are likely to be doing
every day in the private sector the same kind of skill set that
we are going to need in CYBERCOM. Would you like to respond to
that?
General Odierno. Yes. As we look at cyber warfare as we go
forward, there are several things. One is national cyber
capability, and then we have both operational/tactical cyber
capability that we have to sustain in the Army as we go
forward. So what we have to do is, we're building structure in
the Active, and we have to have mirrored structure in the
National Guard and Reserve, because as you say, we think that's
a good place for us to have some of this key capability that we
would need to do operational, tactical, national-level cyber
capability. So, as we are looking, as we're waiting for
CYBERCOM to develop its requirements, and then we will develop
to meet the requirements they have for each one of the
Services, and then we have to develop our own requirements for
operational and tactical cyber.
What we want the National Guard and Reserves to do is
mirror our structure, because we're going to need them as we
move forward. Then, of course, what comes along with that is
training and everything else. So we'll make sure that they get
the matched training, because that's something, I think, would
be an important mission.
What we have to balance, though, is the requirements of the
State with the requirements that we have federally. That's what
we have to think our way through.
Senator Blunt. That's true. At one time, when I was
Secretary of State of Missouri, the securities responsibilities
of investment were in my office, and the securities
commissioner worked for me and others. My view was that every
time we brought in somebody from the private sector, they
actually had some strengths that diminished as they got away
from that daily contact with the bigger of the private sector.
I think in cyber you're going to see some of that same
thing, so people who are out there trying to protect their own
networks, trying to do the things that are going to be critical
in that responsibility. I think this is a place where the Guard
and Reserve component is more likely, frankly, particularly if
they're well-placed in their civilian role, more likely to be
kept up-to-date than they might be in some of the other areas
you were visited about earlier. I just would hope we'd all keep
that in mind as we look at the potential of some of these cyber
units in the Guard.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service to our Nation. Thank you
for being here today and for your leadership in difficult
times.
If I may begin, General, by focusing on part of your
testimony dealing with the service of women in new career
opportunities, particularly in combat positions. I note that
the Army has opened 13,000 more positions to women and is in
the process of developing occupational and validating
standards, as you say in your testimony.
Could you give me some idea of how soon women will be
integrated into infantry officer positions in the Army?
General Odierno. Senator, we don't know exactly yet. What
we're trying to do now is, we're doing the studies of standards
in order for us to make sure we integrate them properly. We're
looking at probably in the next 2 to 3 years we'd be able to do
that.
We actually are doing a pilot right now with field
artillery officers. Women were always able to serve in field
artillery, but they were limited in the units they could go to.
We are now doing a pilot that will put them in the positions
for them to do this. So we're doing that first, and then we'll
move--and as we get the standards developed and what we need
them to do--and they would be standards that are the same for
everybody--and once we establish those and everybody
understands what those are, we will start to attempt to begin
to run pilots with the women. I see that about 2 years down the
road from now. We're going to slowly move our way towards that.
What we don't want to do is rush to failure. In other
words, I want to set our females up for success. So when we
give them the opportunity, they have the opportunity to succeed
in what we're asking them to do. I'm afraid if we rush too
quickly they might not succeed, which would cause problems for
them to integrate fully when we really need them to.
I'm a believer it's about talent management. I have to make
the most of the talent that's available to us, and we have to
take advantage of the talent that our females bring to us. I
want to make sure we set them up to be successful when we make
this decision and to move forward.
Senator Blumenthal. So 2 years would probably be the
timeline for----
General Odierno. It might be sooner, but within the next 2
years, when we first begin to integrate officers, it'll be done
after we do some assessments and what's the best way for us to
do that, assess them and set them up to be successful as we go
forward.
Senator Blumenthal. Enlisted would probably follow that?
General Odierno. That's right, NCOs. Because the issue is,
you want to develop a cadre of officers and NCOs. Since you
can't grow them, we're going to have to move them from other
positions and train them, and we have to figure out how we do
that to make them successful. Then the soldiers would follow.
That's the model that we think is the most successful model.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me shift if I may to a subject that
I don't think has been covered. You and I have discussed it in
the past and that is the continued threat of IEDs in
Afghanistan. I know you've been very active, concerned, and
devoted to the well-being of our troops, in protecting them
from these devices. Am I right in assuming, as I've been told
within at least the past couple of months, that IEDs continue
to cause more than half of all the casualties in Afghanistan to
our troops?
General Odierno. That's correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you note any progress in either
protecting troops on the ground or stopping the Pakistani
sources of the fertilizer and other components of the bombs?
General Odierno. First, the number of casualties, although
it's still greater than 50 percent, is way down. So that shows
some of the progress that we've made in protecting our
soldiers. So we are continuing to make progress.
This is a very dynamic piece. We adjust, they adjust; we
adjust, they adjust; and we have to constantly figure this out.
I think there's been some things put into place that have
enabled us to slow the movement of capability from Pakistan
into Afghanistan. They just did some work with the Pakistani
army. I think we have put some procedures in place with the
Afghan army and ourselves to prevent that. We certainly have
not stopped it, but there's some progress being made in the
interdiction of this.
IEDs are still being used. We continue to try to come up
with capabilities that allow us to detect at the point of
attack but we're still really focused on how do we get there to
the left? That's where we made our most progress, in trying to
develop and understand the networks and get involved with the
networks, identify the things necessary that are made to use
and build IEDs. We've made some good progress there.
But we still have an issue with IEDs.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think the threat from IEDs will
grow or diminish as we draw down?
General Odierno. I think it is a weapon that the enemy will
continue to use. It's cheap, it's inexpensive, and it gets them
the effect that they want.
I also believe that IEDs will be used by many people into
the future. It is a weapon system now that will be used quite
regularly. Frankly, that's what we saw in Boston this week, it
was an IED. That's what people, when they try to make a
statement or they try to conduct operations against a military
that they know they're overmatched against, they will continue
to find irregular ways to attack them. We're going to have to
be prepared to deal with this for a very long time, in my
opinion.
Mr. McHugh. Could I add a comment?
Senator Blumenthal. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. McHugh. If I could just add on, because it really goes
back to an earlier discussion we had about what we're doing to
get ourselves more modernized for the future. One of the things
we're keying upon as we look at such future platforms is the
GCV, the JLTV, and others, is to be able to operate with
mobility as the Chief mentioned earlier, but also in an IED
environment. Because we have no reason to suspect we will see
anything but more of those into the future.
Senator Blumenthal. Yes, you and I, and the General and I,
have discussed this issue over the years. I think the
investments we've made in Afghanistan in combating IEDs will
pay off in the future, because it is the asymmetrical weapons
platform for terrorism in the future. Unfortunately, it also,
obviously, is the type of device that was used recently in
Boston, tragically and horrifically there. That was one of my
first thoughts when I saw and heard more detail about the
explosion, that it fit all the criteria for an IED that you've
been seeing in Afghanistan over many years.
Let me just finish talking about Afghanistan. Is there an
estimate as to the total amount--the value of equipment and
hardware, so to speak, that we have on the ground in
Afghanistan?
General Odierno. Senator, there's $28 billion worth of
equipment on the ground now, is our estimate. That's all
equipment. There's about $21 billion of that that we think
we'll bring back in order to reset and redistribute to the
force.
Senator Blumenthal. What's the estimate--and I apologize if
I'm asking you to repeat testimony you've already given--on the
cost of how much will be necessary to bring the $21 billion
back?
General Odierno. I will get back to you with that number; I
have not said that.
[The information referred to follows:]

As of February 13, the Army had $28 billion worth of Army equipment
in Afghanistan with the requirement to retrograde and reset $21 billion
to meet Army requirements. The estimated cost to do so is between $1.8
billion and $3.2 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funding.
This range of costs is based on numerous variable conditions such as
the viability of the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication, the
availability of overflight/landing rights at multi-modal sites, the
condition of combat operations on the battlefield, and political/
election unknowns. A worst-case scenario, in which all equipment must
be flown from Afghanistan directly to the United States by military
aircraft, could cost as much as $6 billion.

General Odierno. It's a combination of transportation costs
and others. But I will tell you we've done the analysis and the
cost of the transportation and the cost to reset is much
cheaper than the cost to have to repurchase new equipment.
Senator Blumenthal. Despite what you very aptly describe in
your testimony as the harsh weather conditions, the adverse
geography, and the need for sufficient funding to do it,
because I think, to state the obvious, although it may not be
obvious to most Americans, the difficulty of withdrawing that
equipment from Afghanistan is far, far greater than it was in
Iraq.
General Odierno. It is, yes.
The specific numbers, the calculations, there's quite a
difference in the cost if we had to repurchase this equipment
new, and we think we can reset it, as I've walked through our
depots and everything else, when we reset equipment, it is like
new. Our ability to do that and bring it back, we'll do it much
cheaper than if we had to buy it new.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I look forward to that
additional information. Thank you so much for being here today.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, I'm always honored to
have you before our committee, and I thank you both for your
service and your commitment to our country. So, thank you. It's
a pleasure to see you.
The Army's fiscal year 2014 military construction request
is over 35 percent less than last year's. The Army has stated
that this request reflects a return to a more historical level
of funding, following the completion of the Grow the Army and
the 2005 BRAC changes and investments. One of the concerns that
I have with this is that there are no transportation projects
at Fort Bragg in fiscal year 2014, and there's also nothing
planned for the FYDP either. Roads and these other projects
have not kept up with the facilities projects in the growth of
that base. It's created a serious safety problem at one of, I
believe, the Army's most elite bases, including an increase in
over 400 percent of traffic accidents since 2005. With an
increase of over 200 percent in injuries also during the same
period, it appears to me that investing in transportation
infrastructure there would be a smart and critical safety
investment. In our current fiscal environment, this seems like
low hanging fruit in terms of payback to the Army.
So my question is, could you give me your thoughts on my
concern on the lack of transportation projects at Fort Bragg.
Mr. McHugh. Senator, I have no doubt that there are
projects such as that spread across the Army that, had we the
money, we could expand upon. What this budget, as I mentioned
in my opening comments, attempts to do is balance the wide
range of needs against the available funding. The statements,
you are absolutely correct, and the posture that notes this is
historically a number that reflects our past military
construction numbers, that doesn't necessarily reflect the
statement that we're meeting every one of our needs in this
budget.
We try to do the best job we can, taking the military
construction appropriation availability and dispersing it
across the projects, as necessary. That doesn't mean we get it
perfectly correct every time. We're certainly happy to sit down
and take a look at whatever description and materials you might
want to make available to us. We begin a next budget cycle as
soon as we've completed the last. I don't want to make any
promises, but I'm sure we can do better.
But, we do feel, as was noted in the posture statement, the
very significant expenditures on new construction embedded in
the 2005 BRAC that met so many of our needs, and the high level
of military construction investments that have been occurring
over the last 10 years, that this budget account is reflective
of our affordability.
General Odierno. Yes, I would just say, Senator, certainly
we will take a look at it. I think we do have some money in
Fort Polk which I think is important. That's something that has
to be taken care of. So we put that probably at a higher
priority, based on the military construction dollars that we
were able to allocate, and we believe that's in very much need
of help down in Fort Bragg.
As I go down there, first, I'm very pleased with the work
that the State is doing outside, increasing the road network
coming into Fort Bragg, which I think will help a lot coming
off of I-95, there.
Senator Hagan. It will.
General Odierno. I hope that that will help us. So as that
project gets developed, we'll probably have to review how does
that impact the rest of the transportation network around Fort
Bragg? Is there some things that we have to do as we do that?
That'll be something that we'll ask our commanders down there
to take a look at and get back with us.
Senator Hagan. Okay. I appreciate that. I am concerned
about the traffic issues, the accidents, and obviously the
injuries associated with that.
I want to ask a couple of questions on sexual assault.
Recent research by the VA suggests that about half of the women
who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan report being sexually
harassed and almost 25 percent say they were sexually
assaulted. I've spoken personally with a number of the female
servicemembers and veterans that when they were deployed they
actually stated that when they were at a forward operating
base, they had to decrease their water intake so they wouldn't
have to use the latrines at night. I know there's been
significant changes with lighting and safety conditions and
things like that, but it is an issue that you're thinking,
``Oh, my goodness. You know, why in the world, when we have our
women serving us overseas, fighting for our country, do they
have to think about an issue like that, how much water they
take, much less the threat of a sexual harassment or sexual
assault?''
What's the current state of the problem with our deployed
Army units? What's specifically being done to address the issue
of sexual assault while on deployment?
General Odierno. First of all, having just been over there,
and actually, I had a discussion about this with all of the
commanders on the ground about this specific issue, not only
while deployed but also when they come back. First, I know
people are tired of hearing me say this but we have to change
the culture. It's about commanders setting the environment that
becomes nontolerant of any of this activity. We have to start
from the time there are cadets at West Point, ROTC cadets,
basic training, and we're really starting to make a difference
and try to emphasize this.
But that said, let's put that aside, because that's a long-
term solution. It is about commanders' awareness of being able
to see themselves. I asked them, we have to increase the
assessment tools that you have in theater that allows you to
assess where are the problem areas and what are you doing to
reduce the risk to our female soldiers that are forward
deployed? They are increasing the amount of sensing sessions,
they're increasing surveys, they're increasing other techniques
that they use in order to understand that environment so they
can make the corrections.
Then we emphasize, obviously, that it's about maintaining
discipline and standards and taking swift action when something
is found, so that people realize that this kind of behavior
simply will not be tolerated.
It's a combination of those kinds of things that we have to
do, and then the constant awareness training and lecturing and
everything else you need to do to make soldiers aware that this
is not acceptable.
It is just about constantly talking about this problem, and
constantly ensuring that people understand we are going to take
this seriously. It's as frustrating to all of us, I know, as it
is to you, Senator.
Senator Hagan. General Odierno?
General Odierno. I wish I had a better answer for you,
frankly.
Senator Hagan. Of all these commanders that you're talking
to, how many are women?
General Odierno. Probably about 20 percent--15 to 20
percent.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Let me ask about reporting the sexual assault. Part of the
challenge faced by soldiers in deployed units relates to the
geographical dispersion and remoteness of many of these units,
which obviously necessitates creative and adaptive measures to
ensure that the reporting resources are readily available and
that the victim's privacy is protected. I know you're talking
about the extra training, sensing sessions, but what are you
doing to ensure that the deployed units are prepared to process
reports of sexual assault and that the deployed victims are
also cared for equally with those in the garrison? If you could
just emphasize a little bit about the predeployment training
that's required to ensure that our deployed servicemembers
actually know what the Services are available to them while
deployed, if, hopefully, not needed.
Mr. McHugh. If I could just start and then defer to the
Chief.
As to predeployment, it goes to the part of the comments
that the Chief made about making sure that our lessons on
sexual harassment, sexual assault, are not just confined to a
single touch-point during initial entry training. We have
embedded this into virtually every aspect of our training,
through all ranks and through all processes that we offer to
our soldiers, and not just for 1 day, not just 1 time, but
repeatedly. That includes part of their predeployment
counseling.
The way in which we're attempting in part to deal with the
problems in theater are as directed by this Congress to ensure
that every brigade has a sexual advocate, an assault advocate,
and a sexual assault response coordinator there so that
soldiers feel confident they can go to someone whose
responsibility is to be caring about these, to know kinds of
things, to know about the process and to protect their
interests so they don't feel like they'll be victimized again.
The deployed environment is a very challenging one, but if you
look across the Army--and I haven't seen the breakout of the
data specifically for in-theater, but our propensity to report
has gone up significantly. It was about 28 percent just a few
years ago. Our latest statistic is at 42 percent.
Now that's not perfect, and it's a long way from where we
need to be. But, I do think it shows that female soldiers are
no longer willing to just sit back, that they're going to take
action. The data seems to confirm that.
This is something that has to be imbued at virtually every
level of our Army. I was out just a few weeks ago at Charm
School, as they smilingly call it, for our new brigadier
generals, and I told them very frankly: ``You can succeed, from
this day forward, in virtually every aspect of your military
career, but if you fail at this''--and that is leading on the
issue of sexual assault--``you've failed the Army,'' because
there's nothing more important to the very bedrock upon which
this Army is built. Clearly, a long way to go but I can only
tell you, Senator, we're dedicated to doing everything we
possibly can to help fix it.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just add a couple of
things.
One is, we've also increased the number, we've trained
criminal investigation command-qualified experts, we have also
trained prosecutors, and we've increased those numbers in
Afghanistan, so they are available to conduct investigations
and make sure that we have the expertise over there as we move
forward. So as we have increased them around the Army, we also
have that increased expertise there as well.
So anyhow, we're doing what we can. But as I said, this is
about commanders and this is about them setting the right tone
at all levels. I have a lot of confidence in our brigade and
battalion commanders, but it's how that translates down into
our company commanders, our platoon leaders, our platoon
sergeants, and our squad leaders, because they're the ones who
actually lead, they are the first ones to touch these women in
many cases and we have to make sure they understand, and they
understand the requirements that we extended.
Senator Hagan. I know my time is running out but Secretary
McHugh, you said that 42 percent of the sexual-assaults
reporting has increased, but are you seeing an increase in the
number of sexual-assaults percent or a decrease?
Mr. McHugh. The actual number reported went down by, I
believe, about 16 percent with the propensity to report going
up.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
We're in a second round. I have a few questions to submit
for the record which I would ask you to reply to.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was out of time when you corrected my assumption
concerning some of the commitments that we're making in terms
of energy policy. I wanted to ask the question about that
because there was an Army plan that was announced that said
that $7 billion--that's where the number came from.
Mr. McHugh. That's correct.
Senator Inhofe. The $7 billion would be over a period of
time. There's going to be contracts that over a period of time,
maybe 10, 20, 30 years, in terms of the amount or the
percentage that would go to renewable sources. I guess the
multiple award task order contract would use the power purchase
agreements by the Army for a long-term contract. Is that
correct?
Mr. McHugh. That is correct, yes.
Senator Inhofe. Which would be 10 to 30 years?
Mr. McHugh. Probably 30 years, I believe, is the multiple
award task order contract length, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Those contracts would commit the Army to a
specific price for the purchase of renewable energy I assume.
Is that correct?
Mr. McHugh. It would commit us to purchasing energy from a
private developer at a set price, that the objective is to
reach a price that is at least at parity, if not lower, than
what we would pay otherwise.
Senator Inhofe. That may be the objective but you're
projecting out a number of years and decades in this case, and
how in the world could we accurately do that? I just wonder at
the wisdom of why we would want to lock in a price and not
allow the Army at some future date to take advantage of the
many changes that are taking place out there, whether that's a
wise thing to do.
Mr. McHugh. A couple of things. One, the creation, the
generation of energy, Senator, is an incredibly expensive
undertaking, one that frankly we don't think the taxpayers,
insofar as the Army base budget is concerned, can afford to
bear. Where we can encourage private investment to come in and
to make those kinds of commitments, as we did with the
Residential Communities Initiative and privatized housing, can
be a good value for the Army. It also helps us posture
ourselves to bring energy independence, of a kind, to our
individual bases, which we consider to be a very critical
strategic move.
Senator Inhofe. Is the request for proposal already out or
is it planning to be out?
Mr. McHugh. On the multiple award task order contract, it
has been released, yes.
Senator Inhofe. Oh, it has been released.
Mr. McHugh. That is my understanding. I'll check that
though.
[The information referred to follows:]

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Center issued the
solicitation notice for the Multiple Award Task Order Contract in
August 2012. Proposals for prequalification were due to the Government
in September 2012. Individual Multiple Award Task Order Contract awards
are being staggered by technology and are anticipated for release
through the remainder of calendar year 2013. The intent is to award
contracts to all qualified and responsible offerors, both large and
small businesses, whose offers receive the required minimum acceptable
evaluation ratings and whose price is reasonable and realistic.
Individual project task orders will be competed amongst those qualified
offerors on a project-by-project basis.

Senator Inhofe. Okay. What I'd like to get, and I think
it's a reasonable request, is a copy of it. I'd like to see how
the wording is stated and to be able to look at it.
Mr. McHugh. Of course, absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. If the concern, of course, is in the future
to be able to take advantage of our independence, there's a lot
easier way of doing it than exploring new technologies in the
future. I think, going back to what I stated a little bit
earlier, that's what the Department of Energy was supposed to
be doing initially.
Mr. McHugh. We'll be happy to come and provide you all the
materials that are available, and certainly to talk and try to
answer any questions you may have.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, because we have enough problems, as
pointed out by both you and General Odierno, with the current
problems that are there, and then relating that, as General
Odierno did, to other times in our history when we've had a
hollow force and all things like that that are coming out
there. I just would like to see how it's worded, then be able
to sit down with you and discuss where to go, we go from here.
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. Also, how I might be able to impact that.
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you very much. I
appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I think, actually, all of us would be interested in seeing
that request for proposal, if you could submit that to the
committee.
Mr. McHugh. Sure.
Chairman Levin. Actually, one of my four questions that I'm
going to ask you to answer for the record does relate to the
renewable energy technologies and how they actually, in some
cases, can enhance combat capability. We'll save that for the
record.
We thank you both very much, again, for your service, for
your testimony. Thank you for joining us this morning,
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

MANAGEMENT OF RISK IN THE COMBAT AND TACTICAL VEHICLE INDUSTRIAL BASE

1. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, given the fiscal year 2013 and
now fiscal year 2014 and beyond reductions in the Army's ground combat
and tactical vehicle investment accounts, what, in your view, are the
risks, if any, to the combat and tactical vehicle industrial base and
what actions, if any, is the Army taking to mitigate these risks?
Mr. McHugh. In the overall combat and tactical vehicle industrial
base, single point failures and the loss of critical component
suppliers are a concern. These disruptions would negatively affect
overhaul and rebuild operations. The Army is taking action to keep
production lines open to minimize these risks. Using the Abrams tank as
an example, the Army has extended production of 67 M1A2SEP v2 tanks for
2 years through December 2014. In addition, there is every indication
that both ``Firm'' and ``High Potential'' foreign military sales (FMS)
production will maintain a minimal level of sustaining work flow
through fiscal year 2016.
The Army is also conducting a comprehensive Combat Vehicle
Portfolio Industrial Base Study through A.T. Kearney, a global
management consulting firm. The 21-week study is assessing the
Commercial and Organic Combat Vehicle Industrial Base, viable strategic
alternatives, and sustainment of the Combat Vehicle Industrial Base in
a constrained fiscal environment. A final report will be submitted to
Congress later this year.

USE OF SOLAR ENERGY IN OPERATIONS

2. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in
Afghanistan, the smart use of alternative energy directly translates
into an enhanced combat capability that enables soldiers to accomplish
their missions, save lives, and increase efficiency. How do these
renewable energy technologies enhance the combat capability of our
soldiers deployed around the globe?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is fielding renewable
energy technologies in both its soldier power systems and on its
contingency bases. The Army has been fielding the Rucksack Enhanced
Portable Power System, which combines lightweight solar panels,
connectors, and adapters that can charge most common military batteries
in 5 or 6 hours, and can also be daisy-chained together for more power.
This system reduces battery requirements enabling greater mobility and
extended resupply intervals.
On its contingency bases the Army is installing hybrid power
systems that help to reduce fuel consumption and improve the
reliability of electrical supply for critical systems. These fuel
savings lead to enhanced mission effectiveness by returning combat
power to commanders through reduction in resupply missions, which
reduces the risk to the warfighter.
We have a dedicated effort underway, lead by the Army G-4 and the
Army's Training and Development Command to incorporate operational
energy lessons learned in Afghanistan into our doctrine and into our
training centers in order to ensure they are part of all future, global
operations.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, how do
these technologies affect soldiers' fuel consumption demand and
logistical resupply efforts?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Renewable energy technologies,
along with other operational energy efforts in theater, such as
improved generators and minigrids, significantly reduce fuel
consumption on Army outposts and contingency bases. These investments
are improving performance of critical equipment, reducing the logistic
footprint, increasing efficiency, creating energy alternatives, and
assuring availability of supply. The combined effect of these efforts
is a reduction in resupply missions to our outposts and contingency
bases, which in turn allows the return of combat power to commanders.

ARMY ROLE IN STRATEGIC SHIFT TO ASIA-PACIFIC

4. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what, in your view, is the
impact on the Army of the new Asia-Pacific-oriented strategy?
General Odierno. The Army's contribution to the region will only
increase as the Department of Defense (DOD) rebalances toward the Asia-
Pacific region, pending fiscal decisions. The Army already maintains a
robust presence through forces assigned to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
and the placement of Army pre-positioned equipment sets in Korea, Guam,
Japan, and Diego Garcia. Three of the Army's four forward-stationed
Patriot battalions are located in the region. In recognition of the
importance of the region, the Army has upgraded U.S. Army Pacific
Command to a four-star headquarters. At a time of fiscal difficulties
and downsizing, we are preserving the readiness of forces stationed in
Korea at the expense of other forces. The Army recently deployed one of
its two Theater High Altitude Air Defense systems to Guam in support of
regional objectives. Beginning next year, the Army will rotate an
additional Combined Arms Battalion and Attack Reconnaissance Squadron
to Korea. Another important focus for the region is building
partnership capacity. Acknowledging the region includes a number of
U.S. treaty allies and 7 of the world's 10 largest armies, we will
strengthen relationships with our key partners while cultivating
relationships with nations that share our common values.

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

5. Senator Levin. General Odierno, with respect to increasing the
size and capability of armored and infantry brigades by adding a third
maneuver battalion, will the Army need to further reduce the number of
combat brigades to find the troops necessary to implement this change,
and if so, by how many more and over what period of time?
General Odierno. The Army announced its force structure decision on
June 25, 2013. The reorganized Brigade Combat Team (BCT) provides a
third maneuver battalion, a brigade engineer battalion, improved fires
and other capabilities and directly addresses capability gaps
identified by extensive modeling and by tactical commanders based on
their experiences with the modular BCTs. As announced, this conversion
required a further reduction of BCTs beyond the eight previously
announced resulting in fewer, more capable BCTs. This will allow us to
reduce some overhead and maintain more combat capability. We have
performed significant analysis in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) using a series of 34 vignettes and conducting
extensive interactive interviews and modeling with both the Army's
Division commanders and with current or recent combat veteran BCT
commanders (23) across the range of military operations, and in every
case the three-maneuver battalion brigade outperformed the two-maneuver
battalion brigade. The Army National Guard's (ARNG) BCTs would also be
reorganized to the same design. The reorganization will begin in fiscal
year 2014 and continue through fiscal year 2017. This does not take
into account sequestration. If sequestration is allowed to continue,
the Army will have to further reduce end strength and adjust force
structure across all three components.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM REORGANIZATION

6. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno,
following the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Army
made a conscious effort to co-locate Army schools with related
operational units because doing so enhances Army readiness and welfare.
Does the Army continue to see value co-locating U.S. Army Forces
Command and TRADOC units?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The 2005 BRAC round did recommend
co-locating a number of operational units on TRADOC installations,
though the analysis underpinning the BRAC did not treat any benefit
deriving from co-location as a singular factor. Rather, TRADOC
installations offered other benefits such as available training land
and ranges. The same considerations would apply as part of the
programmed 80,000 reduction in Active component Army end strength.

7. Senator McCaskill. General Odierno, you have testified that you
believe it is important to reconfigure BCTs by adding a third maneuver
battalion, and have stated that you do not believe there are enough
engineers within the brigades. What analysis has been done to justify
this conclusion?
General Odierno. In the overall combat and tactical vehicle
industrial base, single point failures and the loss of critical
component suppliers are a concern. These disruptions would negatively
affect overhaul and rebuild operations. The Army is taking action to
keep production lines open to minimize these risks. Using the Abrams
tank as an example, the Army has extended production of 67 M1A2SEP v2
tanks for 2 years through December 2014. In addition, there is every
indication that both ``Firm'' and ``High Potential'' FMS production
will maintain a minimal level of sustaining work flow through fiscal
year 2016.
The Army is also conducting a comprehensive Combat Vehicle
Portfolio Industrial Base Study through A.T. Kearney, a global
management consulting firm. The 21-week study is assessing the
Commercial and Organic Combat Vehicle Industrial Base, viable strategic
alternatives, and sustainment of the Combat Vehicle Industrial Base in
a constrained fiscal environment. A final report will be submitted to
Congress later this year.

8. Senator McCaskill. General Odierno, was this analysis based on
the Army's experiences over the last 10 years of war, or was it based
on likely scenarios that would stem from the Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG) announcement by DOD in January 2012?
General Odierno. The decision to reorganize the BCTs was based on
both lessons learned in our recent wars and on our perception of the
needs of the Army as we move forward into a different security
environment--which was in turn informed by scenario guidance stemming
from the January 2012 DSG. Working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and the Army Staff to develop a range of possible visions
of the future demands for the Army and for BCTs, TRADOC then conducted
extensive analysis.
TRADOC's analysis can be broken into three primary areas. First,
using a series of 34 vignettes and conducting extensive interactive
interviews and modeling with both the Army's division commanders and
with 23 current or recent combat veteran BCT commanders, TRADOC
established how the force would use the different BCT designs
differently in order to accomplish the full range of missions--from
Homeland Defense/Security missions, to full-scale combat missions, to a
wide variety of stabilization and other missions. Understanding
commander's preferences and concerns about the different BCT designs
and mixes (Stryker, Infantry, and Armored) and how they would be
employed, TRADOC then did force-on-force modeling to understand the
differences in outcomes from over 6,500 hours of simulated combat
examining four organizational options across three vignettes (ranging
from 7 to 72 hours of operations) and measuring success and speed in
winning battles/engagements, casualties (friendly and enemy), other
combat losses (equipment), and ability of the unit to continue on to a
subsequent mission or the amount of time it might need to reconstitute
prior to performing a subsequent mission. At the strategic level,
TRADOC's analysis looked at multiple different mixes of future demand
using campaign level criteria such as how long it took to deploy and
how well the Army could sustain supplying BCTs over time to a wide
range of different mission demands at acceptable levels of stress on
the force.
Across all of the different levels of analysis the new BCT design,
with its third Maneuver Battalion and other combat support enablers,
represented the clear best choice for the Army. From a Headquarters,
Department of the Army perspective, the new design also allowed us to
reduce some overhead and maintain more combat capacity than would have
been possible if we stayed with the older design.

9. Senator McCaskill. General Odierno, in April at a speech at the
National Defense University, Secretary Hagel announced that he had
tasked Deputy Defense Secretary Carter and General Dempsey to lead a
Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR). How will the findings
of this review inform the Army's ultimate decision on any
reorganization of its BCTs?
General Odierno. The Army has been an active participant in the
SCMR. We anticipate that the output from this review will be used to
frame fiscal guidance for 2015. At this point we don't expect the
results of the SCMR to affect the Army's decision on whether to
reorganize the BCTs. As you know, we have completed a very lengthy and
complex analysis to inform our decisions on the organizational design
of the Army's BCTs. The SCMR results will provide fiscal guidance to
help inform the size of the operating force that will remain in the
Army.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE

10. Senator McCaskill. General Odierno, last month General Charles
H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, testified that, ``U.S. Northern Command, in close
collaboration with the National Guard Bureau and our other military and
civilian partners, has made significant progress improving our ability
to respond in the aftermath of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and environmental (CBRNE) hazards incident by increasing the
overall readiness of the Nation's CBRNE Response Enterprise. Following
a series of external evaluations and confirmatory exercises, the
Enterprise achieved full operational capability (FOC) on October 1,
2012. Despite the FOC designation, important work remains to be done to
realize the full potential of the enterprise.''
In September 2012, Mr. John W. Newman, Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(M&RA), visited Fort Leonard Wood, the Maneuver Support Center of
Excellence (MSCoE), to discuss the need for an Emergency Management
(EM) training program to ensure that the Active and Reserve component
personnel supporting future Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
missions are fully prepared and/or can train others in DSCA operations.
Fort Leonard Wood already has a training program for CBRNE training
that qualifies DOD and interagency personnel; however the program is
not accredited for offering civilian educational credit. The Missouri
National Guard has offered the MSCoE the use of its Regional Training
Institute for a proposed EM training program that could be combined
with an existing University of Central Missouri bachelors and master
degree program that could be merged with existing CBRNE training to
offer MSCoE an accredited degree program for EM. The Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs directed a
review of EM and DSCA with a projected completion by March 1, 2013.
What are the findings of this review?
General Odierno. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) directed TRADOC to study a range of issues related to
EM and DSCA. TRADOC is in the early stage of its analysis, and is not
anticipated to report its finding to Headquarters, Department of the
Army until late in fiscal year 2013.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III

UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE ARMY

11. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, the Army has spent more than
$3 billion dollars on unemployment compensation over the last 10 years.
Last year, you said that the Army was working on a single portal than
links up soldiers and jobs. Can you update me on the progress of this
single portal concept?
General Odierno. Yes. The Army uses Hero2Hired (H2H) as a single
portal for both soldiers who will transition from Active Duty and
employers who want an expedited way to connect soldiers to their
various employment opportunities. The H2H portal makes it easy for
soldiers to connect to employers and find jobs, explore careers,
translate military skills to civilian careers, find hiring events, and
post resumes. Employers get free, direct access to qualified soldiers,
who in many cases already have background checks and security
clearances.

C-23 DIVESTURE

12. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, language in this year's
appropriation bill states that no funds shall be used to retire C-23
Sherpa aircraft. What is the Army going to do with C-23s that were
scheduled to be divested?
General Odierno. In order to comply with Public Law 113-6, which
prohibits the expenditure of funds to retire C-23 aircraft in fiscal
year 2013, Headquarters, Department of the Army is implementing a semi-
flyable storage plan for its C-23 fleet for fiscal year 2013. No fiscal
year 2013 appropriated funds will be used to retire C-23 aircraft. This
semi-flyable storage plan will result in approximately $30 million in
savings and allows for eight C-23 aircraft to remain assigned to the
Army National Guard. The intent will be to use these savings for higher
priority mission requirements.

13. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, will the C-23s prohibited
from divesture continue to be used in support of the National Guard's
domestic mission?
General Odierno. The Army no longer has a Fixed Wing Cargo mission.
The September 2009 Resource Management Decision 802 transferred all
direct support (cargo) missions and program requirements to the U.S.
Air Force. In October 2009, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed
between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force to implement this direct
support mission. Eight C-23 aircraft assigned to the Army National
Guard will likely continue flight operations until placed in storage at
the end of fiscal year 2013.

ARMY END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

14. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, the 2014
defense budget does not conform to the caps set under sequestration.
While we all want a more balanced approach, the Budget Control Act
(BCA) is the law of the land. If no deal is reached, at some point,
between now and October, DOD will have to adjust to the sequester
levels. If the sequester remains in place, what type of end strength
cuts, by Army component, do you project for the Army in fiscal year
2014?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is already reducing 80,000
out of the Active Army, 8,000 out of the Army National Guard, and 1,000
out of the U.S. Army Reserve based on the initial $487 billion
reduction in the BCA of 2011. If full sequestration is implemented, the
Army may have to reduce up to an additional 100,000 soldiers across the
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve and further
reduce the civilian workforce in future program submissions. In doing
so, the Army would strive to maintain a balance between end strength,
readiness, and modernization. The Army is assessing the distribution of
such reductions across the Army components to strike the best possible
balance for the future, but our assessment is that the Army that
results in the near years will be forced to accept hollowness in our
modernization and readiness accounts.

15. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in your
estimation, when would that decision need to be made?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has been an active
participant in the SCMR. We anticipate that the output from this review
will be redefined DSG which will be used to frame fiscal guidance for
2015. That fiscal guidance combined with direction from the OSD will be
the basis for any further reductions in Army end strength. Once the
Army is provided with guidance from the OSD to execute plans to
accommodate long-term sequestration of our budgets, the Army would
initiate the actions to draw-down the force over time. The sooner those
decisions and actions are taken, the sooner savings from personnel
draw-down could materialize. The Army is beyond the window for any
decisions that would generate large changes to strength in fiscal year
2014 that would save fiscal year 2014 resources. We are fast
approaching the decision window for actions that would adjust fiscal
year 2015 strength. If sequestration remains unaltered through 2023,
the Army will be forced to initiate further reductions in order to
properly balance end strength, readiness, and modernization, and ensure
our formations are prepared for any contingency.

TRAINING DAYS FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

16. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, in the hearing, you gave the
following statement regarding training days in the National Guard:
``What we're investing in our National Guard is an ability to expand
over a period of time--39 days a year they train.'' It is my
understanding that 39 days is the statutory minimum for a member to
perform in the selected Reserve and that most soldiers in the National
Guard train in excess of 39 days. Is this a correct assessment?
General Odierno. According to 32 U.S.C. Section 502, the Army
Reserve/National Guard units are required to assemble for at least 48
drills (24-hour drills=1 Inactive Duty Training (IDT) day) and
15 days of annual training each year. As a result, a unit must conduct
a minimum of 39 days of training annually. However, individual soldiers
may be excused from this training for a variety of reasons--for
example, attendance at military school, Special Training, mobilization,
etc.--resulting in some soldiers training at less than the unit
minimum. In fact, a majority of National Guard soldiers train 39 days
or less, though soldiers can add to their total number of training days
by conducting military duty in other statuses, such as Active Duty for
training or operational support.

17. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, what is the average annual
number of training days for a soldier in the Army National Guard?
General Odierno. The average annual number of training days
executed in fiscal year 2012 (the most recent fiscal year with complete
data) per drilling soldier was 18 days of IDT (36 drill periods) and 12
days of annual training, for a total of 30 training days. Of the total
average drilling strength, a portion do not participate in all Annual
Training/IDT for various reasons (e.g. military school attendance,
Special Training, mobilization, etc.). Thus, the average annual number
of training days is fewer than 39 days. If the non-participating
population is removed from the data, the average annual number of
training days per soldier increases to 42 days--26 days of IDT (52
drill periods) and 16 days of annual training.

ARMY CONTRACTORS

18. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, what is the approximate
number of contractors the Army presently has in its inventory?
Mr. McHugh. The Army's contractor inventory is captured in the
Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) Report that is
generated at the end of the fiscal year. For the fiscal year 2012 CMRA
Report, the Army reported approximately 150,535 contractor full-time
equivalents for the generating force and 90,319 contractor full-time
equivalents in the operating force (which includes Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO)).

19. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, has this figure gone up or
down since last year?
Mr. McHugh. In compliance with statutory requirements in 10 U.S.C.
2330a, the Army does not generate contractor inventory data until the
end of the fiscal year in order to minimize reporting requirements on
contractors in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Army's
contractor inventory is captured in the CMRA Report. For purposes of
comparison, between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012, contractors
in the generating force increased by 15,870 contract full-time
equivalents and contractors in the OCO part of the contractor inventory
decreased by 21,940 contractor full-time equivalents.

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY SPOUSES

20. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, in many cases, servicemembers
convicted of Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) violations lose
their retirement pension and benefits. When this happens, innocent
family members also suffer. Can you tell me about the Victims'
Transitional Compensation Benefit Program?
General Odierno. As currently structured, the Transitional
Compensation program helps ease the unexpected transition from military
to civilian life for eligible family members who have experienced a
dependent-abuse offense. The program was established by Congress as an
entitlement for abused dependents of military personnel in the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160).
The Act authorizes temporary payments for families in which the Active
Duty soldier has been court-martialed with a qualifying sentence or is
being administratively separated from the military as a result of a
dependent-abuse offense. Crimes that may qualify as dependent-abuse
offenses include, but are not limited to, sexual assault, rape, sodomy,
assault, battery, murder, and manslaughter. Under current law, crimes
such as larceny of military property, desertion, and those not related
to directly abusing dependents do not qualify for Transitional
Compensation. There are still some dependents who are not adequately
covered. I encourage Congress to review the legislation further.
The Army provides benefits and entitlements for 36 months to
eligible family members. Eligible family members receive monthly
payments based on the current monthly dependency and indemnity
compensation rate. During the entitlement period, beneficiaries are
also entitled to commissary and exchange privileges. They are also
eligible to receive medical care, including behavioral health services,
as TRICARE beneficiaries. Dental care services may be provided in
dental facilities of the Uniformed Services on a space available basis.

21. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, could this program be
expanded to protect families in other cases?
General Odierno. Broadly speaking, the Transitional Compensation
program could be expanded to protect families in other cases, but such
an expansion would require congressional action.
As the DOD is the proponent to implement the policy, assign
responsibilities, and prescribe procedures under 10 U.S.C. section
1059, they would have the lead in providing views on any changes to
existing law. The Army stands ready to partner with DOD and Congress to
consider shortfalls in the existing program and ensure any change to
the law is affordable, supportable, and inclusive of all Services.

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

ARMY SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT BACKLOG

22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McHugh, on March 27, 2013, I joined
a bipartisan group of Senators in a letter to you and General Odierno
expressing our continued concern and deep frustration over the Army's
apparent lack of progress to date to thoroughly process the 43
debarment referrals involving individuals and companies with links to
terrorist groups, including the Haqqani Network and al Qaeda, as
identified by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander under the
Section 841 designation and the Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Industry and Security, Entity List. Given the serious nature of these
cases, we strongly believe that special and immediate consideration
from the Army is required. In our letter, we requested the Army
Suspension and Debarment Official commit to thoroughly reviewing these
43 cases and to make a determination on each within 30 days, and to
notify us of the final decisions of each case. How soon can we expect
to receive a response to our March 27 letter?
Mr. McHugh. As discussed in my April 15, 2013 response to your
March 27 letter, the Army's Procurement Fraud Branch (PFB) initially
received the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's
(SIGAR) recommendation concerning these 43 cases (9 based upon section
841 designations and 34 based upon Department of Commerce (DoC)
decisions to place individuals and entities on the Entity List) on
September 4, 2012. Initially, the 43 recommendations did not include
any supporting evidence, but merely cited the fact that these
individuals or entities were so designated. After a number of requests
from PFB, on November 13, 2012, SIGAR provided the classified
documentation on which SIGAR relied to support the nine Section 841
designations, which consisted of classified intelligence summaries
derived from unidentified sources of ``unknown'' or ``varying
credibility/reliability.'' The summary reports are unattributed and
include neither indicia of reliability nor evidence of corroboration,
and amount to mere suspicion. While such reports may be adequate under
Section 841 and for the DoC Entity List decisions (both of which have
severely limited due process and reduced burdens of proof), they are
not an adequate basis to propose debarment. SIGAR did not provide
supporting documentation on the 34 Entity List recommendations. On
December 18, 2012, PFB returned the 43 recommendations to SIGAR with a
detailed explanation of the basis for their return, and requested
supporting evidence underlying the summary reports and Entity List
decisions.

23. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McHugh, where is the Army in the
review process and on making final determinations for these 43 cases?
Mr. McHugh. On December 18, 2012, Army PFB returned the 43
recommendations to the SIGAR with a detailed explanation of the reason
for their return, and requested supporting evidence underlying the
summary reports and Entity List decisions. On March 14, 2013, SIGAR and
the DoC made a number of classified documents available for PFB review
concerning the one company on SIGAR's referral of DoC Entity List
companies that appeared to do business with the Army. These documents
consisted of summaries from un-named sources of varying credibility/
reliability which were legally insufficient to support the initiation
of debarment action. Subsequently, on April 4, 2013, PFB requested that
SIGAR and DoC provide all available supporting documentation to enable
PFB to conduct a thorough review of all 34 individuals/entities on the
DoC Entity List. SIGAR notified PFB that it is coordinating with DoC
and the Defense Intelligence Agency to make additional documents
related to the 34 Entity List recommendations available for PFB to
review. PFB continues to work with SIGAR and DoC, but PFB has not yet
received any additional supporting evidence upon which to conduct a
review.

24. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McHugh, will you commit to ensuring
these 43 cases are thoroughly reviewed and processed in order to make
sure that these individuals and companies are not funneling U.S.
taxpayers' dollars to our enemies?
Mr. McHugh. Once the SIGAR and the DoC make additional evidence
available for review, the Army PFB will promptly review the material
for legal sufficiency in accordance with the requirements of Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.406.

25. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McHugh, is the Army committed to
preventing U.S. taxpayers' dollars from flowing to insurgent and
terrorist groups?
Mr. McHugh. Yes. The Army fully supports the comprehensive exercise
of both authorities under Section 841 (to include the authority to
restrict the award of future contracts to designated 841 entities) and
Suspension and Debarment action under FAR 9.406 when such action is
warranted and supported by sufficient credible evidence. Army PFB
attorneys will continue to work with the SIGAR staff to develop
supporting evidence to proceed with recommendations from SIGAR. In
fact, just since October 1, 2012, the Army Suspension and Debarment
Official has taken 156 suspension and debarment actions on cases from
the Afghanistan theater of operations, 127 of which were forwarded to
PFB by SIGAR.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand

PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

26. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary McHugh, I want to ask you about a
place you know well--Fort Drum and the 10th Mountain Division. Over the
last decade, the 10th Mountain Division has been one of the most
deployed divisions, demonstrating its importance to the Army and the
Nation. I am very proud of the work these soldiers have done and am
honored to represent them. As we begin to transition away from combat
operations in Afghanistan, I want to make sure the 10th Mountain
Division is still seen as a vital division for the Army. As you analyze
the findings from the Programmatic Environmental Assessment, what
metrics will you use to make force reduction decisions?
Mr. McHugh. The Army realignment and stationing decisions are based
on quantitative and qualitative factors that ensure that the Army is
properly stationed at installations where we can best train and deploy
to meet the Army's worldwide mission.
To begin its analysis, the Army uses the Military Value Analysis
(MVA) model to evaluate five broad operational categories critical to
BCTs including: (1) training; (2) power projection; (3) well-being; (4)
mission expansion; and (5) geographic distribution. Within each
category, the Army weighs a number of attributes. For example, in
analyzing an installation's ability to support training, the Army
considers available maneuver land, range sustainability, training
facilities, indirect fire capabilities, and available airspace. Power
projection evaluations look at an installation's deployment
infrastructure, aerial port of embarkation and sea port of embarkation
proximity. Factors that impact soldier well-being include access to
medical care, family housing availability, the general quality of life
of an installation (e.g., access to Army Community Services, child care
development centers, fitness centers, chapels, and youth centers), and
the quality and quantity of brigade facilities and barracks. Mission
expansion considerations include buildable acres, urban sprawl, and
telecommunications infrastructure. Finally, we will evaluate geographic
distribution by examining the dispersion of the Army's BCTs in order to
support civil authorities for disaster response, minimize vulnerability
to a catastrophic attack or natural disaster, and keep our All-
Volunteer Force connected to the American people.
Using the MVA model scores as a baseline, the Army applies
qualitative factors, including environmental and socioeconomic impacts,
military construction (MILCON) costs, readiness, command and control
proximity, and support to National Defense Strategy to evaluate various
courses of action in order to reach an optimal stationing solution that
is both feasible and acceptable.

27. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary McHugh, will you make these
metrics available to our military communities so that they can
understand your decisions?
Mr. McHugh. Yes. The Army recently completed Community Listening
Sessions at 30 installations in order to explain the process that the
Army is using to make these difficult decisions and to receive
community input before any final decisions are made. The Army's brief
detailed the operational categories contained in the MVA model--
training, power projection, well-being, mission expansion, and
geographic distribution, as well as the qualitative factors outside the
MVA model that the Army is using, to include strategic considerations,
command and control proximity, MILCON costs, readiness impacts,
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, and community input.

CYBER CAPABILITIES

28. Senator Gillibrand. General Odierno, the fiscal year 2014
budget indicates a large investment in our military's cyber
capabilities. DOD approved a major expansion of the U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM), to include growing its ranks from around 900 to 4,900
personnel or cyber warriors which I understand will: (1) fortify DOD's
own networks; (2) help plan and execute offensive attacks; and (3)
protect critical infrastructure like power grids and power plants. What
is the Army doing to recruit the best and brightest cyber talent?
General Odierno. The Army, as part of a Joint Service research
team, is making strides in efforts to screen new recruits to assess
their ability to perform cyber-related functions. The Information and
Communication Technology Literacy Test (ICTL), an Air Force sponsored
test, is designed to measure aptitude for cyber security specialties.
The Army Research Institute (ARI), through the testing of tens of
thousands of applicants at U.S. Military Entrance Processing Stations,
is gathering data to validate the ICTL instrument to determine its
viability for Army use. The Army's signal proponent is conducting a
pilot study of ICTL for use in selecting soldiers for cyber-related
occupations. The ICTL also appears to have potential for use in the
selection process for military intelligence cyber occupations. ARI
researchers believe the instrument will prove to be a credible
screening tool. The Army has also greatly expanded its targeting of
applicants with Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM) degrees to improve production of officers with these skills. The
Army in the last 2 years has increased by nearly one third the number
of accessions with these degrees into our technical branches and is on
a path to have nearly half of new officer accessions in these branches
hold these degrees.

29. Senator Gillibrand. General Odierno, what mechanisms do we have
in place to encourage cyber studies at West Point and in Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs across the country?
General Odierno. On October 19, 2012, the Secretary of the Army
established the Army Cyber Center at West Point to serve as the Army's
premier resource for strategic insight, advice, and exceptional subject
matter expertise on cyberspace-related issues affecting Army
operations, organizations, and institutions. With a view towards
building the Army's cadre of cyber-qualified leaders, the Army Cyber
Center will develop the educational and training programs to foster the
rigorous study of the intellectual underpinnings of cyberspace
operations to enhance the competencies of Army personnel in the cyber
domain.
All cadets attending the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) complete an
information technology course that provides cyber-related topics, a
technology tour, and hands-on cyber security demonstration to encourage
cyber-related studies as part of their West Point curriculum. A
majority of juniors take another course that focuses on cyber security
and cyber operations overall. A new five-course cyber minor allows
cadets to take focused coursework in cyber studies and the minor will
be annotated on the cadets' transcripts. Additionally, a new three-
course engineering sequence focusing on cyber, one of seven such
sequences at USMA will also be available and is required for non-
engineer cadets.
The USMA has several other cyber-related programs that encourage
participation in cyber studies. Some of the activities include a cyber
warfare club that offers a robust guest-speaker program, cadet-
organized lessons on cyber topics, and hands-on learning opportunities;
the club boasts over 250 cadet members. Another program is the Cyber
Defense Exercise, an intensive competition between all the Service
Academies.
A program that covers both USMA and ROTC cadets is the cyber
internship program for cadets from all academic disciplines. In 2013,
there are 86 cadets from USMA and U.S. Army Cadet Command participating
in internships at the National Security Agency, CYBERCOM, Army Cyber
Command, and other government and industry organizations. Participating
cadets receive a TS-SCI clearance.
U.S. Army Cadet Command has set conditions for meeting cyber
challenges by using scholarships to increase production of STEM
graduates in general, and cyber studies in particular. Currently, there
are 3,334 (30 percent) ROTC scholarship cadets studying in STEM fields.
We currently have 535 cadets studying in the cyber field. Other large
concentrations of academic STEM studies that would facilitate future
cyber support are Computer Science (225), Information Systems (147). We
also have cadets studying Software Engineering, Computer Science, and
Computer Engineering/Artificial Intelligence. We reward cadets by using
extra points for degrees in engineering, hard sciences, math, and
computer science in our Order of Merit System that determines
branching. The points awarded improve cadet standing for those with
STEM qualifications. Additionally, cadets with cyber compatible majors
who have a 2.75 or higher GPA may be preferentially branched to our
Signal Corps where a majority of cyber skill requirements reside.

30. Senator Gillibrand. General Odierno, is the Army considering an
incentive pay system that helps in the retention of military members
with high level cyber skill sets?
General Odierno. Yes. We have four tools available to recruit,
retain, and stabilize this critical population. We have the Current
Station Stabilization Reenlistment Option, the Conversion Bonus, the
Selective Reenlistment Bonus, and the Critical Skills Retention Bonus
to target recruitment and retention of soldiers with high level cyber
skills. The Army will monitor retention trends to maximize use of these
incentives as the career field matures.

31. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary McHugh, leveraging citizen
soldiers who work in the cyber industry every day and also serve their
country in uniform through the National Guard and Reserve is
imperative. Senator Vitter and I have introduced a bill to create and
leverage a Cyber Guard. I received a positive letter from General
Alexander and the National Guard Governors Association about the idea.
At the DOD posture hearing, I asked General Dempsey about the bill and
he was also supportive. I'd like to work with you to ensure that we
implement every available tool to recruit and retain a capable cyber
force. Does this sound like legislation the Army will support?
Mr. McHugh. The Army does not support the legislation as written,
but like you, we are committed to a cyber strategy that leverages the
cyber civilian skills existing in our Guard and Reserve Forces. Our
concern is that this legislation would likely compete directly with
Joint Staff's efforts to build Reserve Component Cyber Protection Force
units inside the CYBERCOM Force Build. The Army is collaboratively
working with the Army National Guard and the Office of the Chief, Army
Reserve on an Army Reserve Component Cyber Integration Strategy to
identify specific contributions the Reserve component could make toward
the CYBERCOM Force Build. The optimal solution is one in which the
Active and Reserve component cyber force structure complements each
other to establish a total Army solution to providing cyber forces for
defense of the Nation.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

32. Senator Gillibrand. General Odierno, I have enormous respect
for the men and women who serve in the military. That is why I am
committed to ending the violent crime of sexual assault among those in
uniform. The new DOD Health Related Behaviors Survey of Active Duty
Military Personnel was released this week, and I am very disturbed that
it indicates more than 1 in 5 women in the Active Duty Armed Forces
reported experiencing unwanted sexual contact by a fellow
servicemember. That is unacceptable. The men and women who serve in our
Armed Forces are the military's most precious resource, and clearly the
system is failing to protect them from the worst kind of violence. As
you may know, I am drafting legislation that will remove the initial
disposition authority from commanding officers and put it in the hands
of experienced military prosecutors. Over the past few months, we have
been examining this change and one of the concerns that has been voiced
is that it will disrupt the good order and discipline of the unit. In
your opinion, what precisely about this change would disrupt good order
and discipline?
General Odierno. Command authority under the UCMJ and the
maintenance of good order and discipline are inextricably linked. The
only way that a commander can be effective in enforcing good order and
discipline is by having the authority to dispose of criminal offenses--
quickly, visibly, and locally.
Put another way, commanders are individually responsible and
accountable for everything that goes on in his or her command,
including good order and discipline. Soldiers understand that, and they
look to the commander, no one else, for enforcement of all standards.
Command authority, particularly in the context of military justice, is
and will remain the most critical mechanism for ensuring discipline,
accountability, cohesion, and integrity of the force. A commander's
ability to execute the responsibilities of command will be severely
disrupted if that command authority is diminished in any way.

33. Senator Gillibrand. General Odierno, what other recommendations
do you have for dealing with this crisis and actually getting results?
General Odierno. On May 28, 2013, the Secretary of the Army
directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) to establish a department-wide working group ``to explore
other options for ensuring the qualifications and suitability of, and
incentivizing service as, a SARC or Sexual Assault Victim Advocates to
ensure that the best-qualified and most suitable individuals seek out
and are selected for service in these positions.'' The group's
recommendations will be provided to the Secretary of the Army not later
than October 31, 2013.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS

34. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, I am concerned about the
potential impact of civilian furloughs on the Army's critically
important family support programs. If furloughs take place, do you
expect any cutbacks in your operating hours at commissaries, exchanges,
and child development centers or curtailment of Morale, Welfare, and
Recreation (MWR), Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA),
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) or military spouse employment
programs?
Mr. McHugh. As a result of funding reductions/furlough guidance,
each commissary will close 1 day per week. Operations at 7-day stores
will reduce to 6-day operations; 6 days to 5; and 5 days to 4. At
overseas locations, stores will be closed 1 additional day a week
unless adequate local nationals are available to keep them open. HQ/
Areas Operations will be closed to coincide with store closures. There
will be no impact on operating hours at the Exchange.
As far as DODEA, furloughs will not affect the end of the 2012-2013
school year. Though furloughs will be in place at the start of the
2013-2014 school year, the number of days has not been confirmed.
Regardless, DODEA will ensure that all students have a robust academic
year. School staff will ensure students receive a full year of academic
study even within a slightly shortened academic year due to the
furloughs.
Transition counseling services are contracted by a fully-funded
contract through September 30, 2013. There will not be a decrease/delay
in providing transition services to soldiers and their families.
However, the program is overseen at most installations by Transition
Services Managers (TSM), who are civilian employees. Garrisons will
have a civilian employee or military personnel available to oversee
contract operations during the time the TSM is furloughed. At smaller
installations, transitioning soldiers will utilize virtual counseling
services to meet Veterans Opportunity to Work Act requirements.
Family, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (FMWR) programs and
services are currently frozen at fiscal year 2012 levels.
Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) employees are currently exempt from
furlough, which includes 2,637 full-time Child Development Center (CDC)
and School Age Center (SAC) employees. These individuals will continue
to maintain 5-day coverage of centers to accommodate the needs of
soldiers and families.
Although NAF employees are the primary service providers for most
FMWR programs and services, appropriated fund (APF) employees are
utilized within Army Community Service (ACS) Centers and, in some
cases, Community Recreation programs. These employees are subject to
furlough and some services will be impacted. Installation Senior
Commanders and Garrison Commanders will determine the optimum method of
furlough implementation with the goal of minimizing disruption to
critical soldier and family programs. Some of these key programs
include spouse employment, victim advocacy for sexual assault and
domestic violence, Army emergency relief, support to exceptional family
members, child abuse prevention and intervention support, support to
wounded warriors and their families, and support to survivors. In most
cases, our ACS Centers plan to close 1 day per week during the furlough
period. In order to mitigate the effect of furlough, ACS Centers will
develop strategies to ensure 24/7/365 coverage for key services such as
victim advocacy and child abuse/domestic violence response. We
encourage our Centers to rely on electronic resources such as Army
OneSource and Military OneSource to provide information and link up
service providers to our soldiers and families.

35. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, if civilian furloughs, in
response to sequestration, impact the mission of the Military Entrance
Processing Stations, then what options does the Army have to ensure
your recruit accessions are not disrupted?
Mr. McHugh. By shifting funding, the Army addressed the risk of
accession mission failure in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 due
to sequestration. Civilian furloughs will not affect the ability of
Army accessioning agencies to achieve fiscal year 2013 accession
missions. However, if the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command
curtails operations in fiscal year 2013 due to civilian furloughs, some
delays in contracting new soldiers for entry into the Army in fiscal
year 2014 may occur. For example, the Military Entrance Processing
Stations will be shut down for 1 day per week. This will significantly
increase applicant travel costs and adversely affect the streamlined
process of new recruits. The Army plans to mitigate these delays by
processing these soldiers after the beginning of the new fiscal year.

INTEGRATED DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEM

36. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, it is unconscionable that
servicemembers must wait many months to receive a disability
determination from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). While DOD
and VA have made some progress in decreasing the amount of time it
takes to get disability claims completed in the Integrated Disability
Evaluation System (IDES), more work must be done. What is the Army
doing to help DOD and VA to expedite claims through the system?
Mr. McHugh. To assist the VA in managing this additional workload,
the Army is providing personnel to perform administrative procedures so
that VA adjudicators can focus on rating activities. The Army is also
making additional entries into the Veterans Tracking Application to
allow VA to better manage cases in the benefits delivery phase of IDES.
VA estimates this assistance will lead to a 10 to 15 percent increase
in the number of Ready for Decision cases over the 90-day period. We
continue to explore and implement other solutions to provide the
information that VA needs to finalize their rating decisions in a more
timely manner.

37. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, do you believe the VA is
doing all that it can do to decrease the amount of time for disability
case reviews and claims adjudication?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, I believe our partners in the VA are doing
everything they can to decrease the amount of time for disability case
reviews and claims adjudication.

38. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, does the VA need additional
resources to hire more claims adjudicators?
Mr. McHugh. The Army does not know if VA requires additional
resources to hire more claims adjudicators.

PROTECTING PROSPECTIVE RECRUITS

39. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, a recent tragic case in
Maryland appears to have been a murder/suicide incident involving a
prospective recruit and her recruiter. What guidance has the Army
provided to ensure that prospective recruits and their parents or
guardians are fully aware of the limits for relationships with
recruiters?
Mr. McHugh. Army recruiter contact with newly contracted soldiers,
prospects, and applicants is highly restricted by Army policy.
Recruiters who violate the regulations governing this contact are
subject to disciplinary action, relief, or separation. Cards describing
sexual harassment prohibitions and what the prohibited activities are
for recruiters and applicants are given to all applicants upon first
contact, as well as to their parents. These cards are used by the U.S.
Army Recruiting Command in its recruitment of Regular Army and Army
Reserve applicants. The Army National Guard has similar cards in
development. In addition, all recruits in all the Army's components
sign contracts that include descriptions of sexual harassment
prohibitions and what the prohibited activities are for recruiters and
members of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP).

40. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, what information does the
Army require to be provided to prospective recruits to ensure that they
have immediate access to assistance and intervention, if necessary, if
they believe a recruiter is intending to take improper advantage of
them?
Mr. McHugh. Army recruiter contact with newly contracted soldiers,
prospects, and applicants is highly restricted. Cards describing sexual
harassment prohibitions and what the prohibited activities are for
recruiters and applicants are given to all applicants upon first
contact, as well as to their parents. These cards are used by the U.S.
Army Recruiting Command in its recruitment of Regular Army and Army
Reserve applicants. The Army National Guard has similar cards in
development. Applicants and recruiters are offered a Hot Line phone
number on the card to report any improper actions. In addition, all
recruits in all the Army's components sign contracts that include
descriptions of sexual harassment prohibitions and what the prohibited
activities are for recruiters and members of the DEP. The contract also
provides the applicant a recruiting agency senior leader's telephone
number for reporting sexual harassment or prohibited activity
violations.

DEFENSE SEXUAL ASSAULT INCIDENT DATABASE

41. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, DOD has told us they have
achieved full-deployment of the congressionally-mandated Defense Sexual
Assault Incident Database (DSAID). Is the Army providing data to
populate the database, and if so, what information, specifically, is
this database providing Army leadership concerning sexual assault
incidents?
Mr. McHugh. The Army has a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DOD
that allows us to continue to use our Sexual Assault Data Management
System (SADMS), which has been operational since 2005. Under that MOA,
the Army ``pushes'' the required sexual assault data to DSAID from
SADMS on a monthly basis. Accordingly, the sexual assault information
provided to Army leadership comes from SADMS through our Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program Office. This
information includes the type of reports (Restricted or Unrestricted),
type of assault (rape, forcible sodomy, aggravated sexual contact, et
cetera), gender, rank, location (on/off post), investigation status,
disposition status (court-martial, non-judicial punishment, adverse
administrative action, et cetera) and victim services (counseling,
healthcare, advocacy, legal, et cetera).

SEXUAL ASSAULT

42. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, before
this committee, DOD witnesses described the recently revised DOD-wide
policy on Sexual Assault Program to standardize prevention, health
care, victim safety, training and response efforts, and to clearly
convey the role of servicemembers and employees in sexual assault
prevention and recovery. This committee is concerned that medical care
providers were not fully aware of their obligations concerning
restricted reports, including the obligation to withhold disclosure to
the chain of command. What actions have been taken to ensure
standardization with response to protecting the sanctity of Restricted
Reports?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army follows DOD policy and
requires our healthcare providers to notify a Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (SARC) when a sexual assault victim seeks care at a
Military Treatment Facility (MTF). The SARC (if not present with the
victim) will then respond to the victim as quickly as possible.
Health care providers are trained to safeguard the confidentiality
of medical information and maintain it in accordance with current
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) guidelines
regardless of whether the soldier elects restricted or unrestricted
reporting. Improper disclosure of covered communications and improper
release of medical information are prohibited and may result in
disciplinary actions under the UCMJ, loss of credentials, or other
adverse personnel or administrative actions.
Additionally, each Army MTF has a Sexual Assault Care Coordinator,
Sexual Assault Clinical Provider, and a SARC who train other health
care providers and health care personnel on their requirements
regarding the preservation of restricted reports, including withholding
protected information from the chain of command.

43. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what
additional challenges do you see in attaining the required level of
standardization?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. I do not see any challenges with
respect to protecting sanctity of restricted reports in standardization
that the Services and DOD, working together, have not already
addressed. Two examples include the decisions by DOD to standardize
SARC and Victim Advocate credentialing requirements and train sexual
assault investigators from all Services at the U.S. Army Military
Police School.

44. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what
additional tools does the Army need in order to continue to reduce--
with the goal of eliminating--sexual assault?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army possesses the tools needed
to achieve the goal of resolving the problem of sexual assault in the
military, but additional refinement is needed. We look forward to the
results of the Response Systems Panel, which will highlight components
of the UCMJ that may need to be changed, while at the same time
thoroughly exploring the second and third order effects of those
refinements. However, we know it is our responsibility to establish the
positive organizational climate and culture needed to protect victims,
and appropriately prevent and respond to sexual assault.

45. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, some have suggested that it
would be appropriate to incorporate standardized assessments of
commanders' performance in prevention, investigation, accountability,
advocacy, and assessment of sexual assault response and prevention
lines of effort. What is your assessment of the feasibility of
implementing commanders' performance in Service-specific performance
appraisals?
General Odierno. It is feasible and very appropriate to assess all
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) on their enforcement of
sexual assault prevention and response principles, including their
establishment or support of a positive command climate. The current
officer and NCO evaluation reports allow for comments regarding support
of Equal Opportunity (EO) and Sexual Harassment. AR 600-20, Army
Command Policy, also encourages comments for this topic. The future
officer and NCO evaluations will continue to stress this topic and the
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership under
the Leader Competency of Trust reinforces this in leader development.
We are exploring methods to reinforce the SHARP effort by including
SHARP and EO topics as part of the performance evaluation and including
a directed comment in both the officer and NCO evaluations reports,
both of which are currently under revision.

46. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, the annual report on sexual
assault at the Service Academies revealed that many people who enter
the armed services have experienced and report sexual assault or
unwanted sexual contact that occurred before they entered the Service
Academies or the armed services. What could the Army be doing to
improve support to men and women in the accession process, to identify
whether individuals have experienced sexual assault?
Mr. McHugh. The USMA does not screen applicants for a history of
sexual assault but does provide all new cadets information about the
Army's SHARP Program.
When a new cadet self-identifies during cadet basic training, or
subsequently over the course of their career as a cadet, the cadet is
referred to a SARC or Victim Advocate who provides essential support
and care to the victim.
This support includes, but is not limited to, providing information
on available reporting options (restricted and unrestricted), available
resources to assist the victim in the healing process (e.g., on- and
off-post counseling, chaplaincy, DOD SafeHelpline), and due process and
investigation procedures (legal assistance and/or law enforcement to
include Criminal Investigation Division--even if serving in a liaison
role between civilian law enforcement and the military for off-post
incidents).
The Victim Advocate provides continual support until the victim
states that s/he no longer requires assistance or until departure from
the Academy, at which point s/he receives information about resources
available after departure.

COMMAND CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS

47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what
percent of your commands conduct command climate assessments?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Per Army regulations, all Active
component company commanders (or equivalents) must administer a command
climate survey within 30 days of assuming command, then again at 6
months, and annually thereafter. Reserve component company commanders
receive 120 days to complete command climate surveys upon assuming
command. I have also directed command climate surveys at all levels of
command through Division level. Revised policy will require command
climate assessments to be conducted at all command and major
organization levels and for results to be reviewed with the next higher
level commander or leader.
Unfortunately, the Army is unable to respond to the specific
question of the percent of commands which have completed fiscal year
2013 company-level assessments. The Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute provides automated organizational climate survey
services, and this service was shut down for several months during this
last year. While this service was down, the Army conducted its
assessments manually (paper and pencil surveys). A way ahead is being
planned for Army automated survey administration, tracking, and
accountability mechanisms.

48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what is
the Army doing to improve the regularity of command climate
assessments?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We updated Army Regulation 600-20
in September 2012 to read ``Company level commander (or their
equivalents) will conduct a unit command climate survey within 30 days
of assuming command (120 days for ARNG and USAR), again at 6 months,
and annually thereafter. Assessments must include a facilitated small
group discussion of topics. Company level commanders (or equivalents)
may supplement any survey efforts with individual and group interviews,
the analysis of unit records, and statistical information (awards,
promotions, reenlistments, incidents of misconduct resulting in UCMJ,
and EO complaint reports).'' We report and track the compliance rates
for command climate surveys. I have also directed command climate
surveys at all levels of command through Division level.

49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what is
the Army doing to evaluate the results of the command climate
assessments to ensure necessary follow-up action?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Current Army policy requires
company level commanders to administer command climate surveys within
30 days of assuming command (120 days for Army National Guard and Army
Reserve), again at 6 months and annually thereafter. I have also
directed command climate surveys at all levels of command through
division level. Revised policy will require command climate assessments
to be conducted at all command and major organization levels and for
results to be reviewed with the next higher level commander or leader.
Additionally, revised evaluations policy will include mandatory
comments on unit climate. Results of an ongoing 360 Assessment Pilot
will provide information for a decision to expand this assessment to
all brigade and battalion commanders. Completion of command climate
assessment survey requirements will be tracked and reported to Army
Senior Leaders as a part of the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign.

FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, what is your assessment of
the performance of the Army's Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)?
Mr. McHugh. In my view, the Army has a very robust voting
assistance program. We have a large network of Installation Voting
Assistance (IVA) offices and Unit Voting Assistance Officers (UVAO),
who are providing voting assistance on a year-round basis. In 2012, the
Army voting assistance program had over 7,800 appointed and trained
Active Duty UVAOs who provided information to eligible voters within
their organizations. The Army also created Public Service Announcements
(PSA) that were seen overseas and State-side and participated in
Absentee Voters Week and Armed Forces Voters Week to encourage eligible
voters to register and vote. The Army voting assistance program has
also successfully leveraged social media by using Facebook and Twitter,
and established and maintain a vigorous communications strategy. We
empower individual voters and continue to provide voting assistance and
guidance to soldiers, civilians, and their dependents.

51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, what Army-specific
initiatives have you implemented to improve compliance with FVAP and to
maximize the opportunity for servicemembers to exercise their right to
vote?
Mr. McHugh. The Army welcomes the responsibility for providing
voting assistance to our servicemembers, their family members, and our
civilian employees. Before the 2012 elections, we made weekly phone
calls and/or e-mail communications to IVA offices to ensure proper
manning and updated any changes to office contact information. The Army
continues to complete monthly phone and/or e-mail communications to the
IVA offices. To maximize voter participation, over 7,800 Active Duty
UVAOs provided voting assistance at the unit level. They presented
registration and voting information during meetings, training sessions,
and formations. The UVAOs provided assistance and encouraged
servicemembers to access the FVAP website for fast and efficient voter
registration and assistance. Some of the Army voting activities for
2012 included participation in Armed Forces Voters Week and Absentee
Voters Week with IVA offices setting up voting information tables in
high traffic areas. To increase voter awareness and participation, the
Army Voting Assistance Program uses Facebook, Twitter, PSAs, print
media, and mass e-mail distribution. The Army continues to use
collaborative tools and information sharing with FVAP to push current
and relevant voting information to our voting assistance personnel and
eligible voters.

OPERATIONAL TEMPO OVERSIGHT

52. Secretary McHugh, what is your assessment of the Army's
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) reporting and how well are we meeting our
OPTEMPO requirements to reduce stress on our servicemembers and their
families?
Mr. McHugh. Overall, the Army is meeting its OPTEMPO, with the
exception of the Army Reserve. The Active component goal is a ratio of
1:2 (time deployed vs. time home). The Active component is exceeding
this goal with a ratio of 1:2.46. The Army National Guard is achieving
the goal of 1:4 (time deployed vs. time home). The Army Reserve is
continuing to improve; however its current ratio of 1:3.5 is below the
goal of 1:4. A number of high demand military occupational specialties
such as interpreters, aviation maintainers, and engineer specialties
fall below the goals, with ratios ranging from 1:1.5 to 1:2. However,
given the expected reduction in demand for ground forces in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), we expect ratios to improve.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE TRAINING

53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, military members with
language and culture training are essential to a U.S. global force. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 authorized the Secretary of Defense to
transform the National Language Service Corps (NLSC) from a pilot to a
permanent program, and also to enhance the ability of our Federal
agencies to hire people with strategic foreign language skills and as
National Security Education Program awardees. What are the Army's goals
with respect to the capabilities represented by the NLSCs?
Mr. McHugh. The Army continues to support and leverage the
capabilities provided by the NLSC under the NDAA. Currently, the Army
works with NLSC's recruiters to hire language proficient soldiers
departing the Army to work at NLSC. We display NLSC advertisements on
various portals targeting language qualified soldiers and civilians.
Additionally, the NLSC provides an overview of their organizational
opportunities to our 09L soldiers (native speakers of foreign languages
who serve as interpreters) planning to depart military service. The
Army is very active in supporting this program's growth. In addition,
the Army leverages NLSC capabilities to fill short-term foreign
language requirements that cannot be met from within. Some of these
categories include: role players, interpretation, translation and
analysis, training (instruction), and administrative language support
services.
To respond to increasing demands for foreign language skills, the
NLSC plans to increase membership from the current 4,200 to at least
5,500 personnel. The number of languages/dialects represented is
expected to increase from 283 to at least 350 by fiscal year 2015. The
Army continues to work with the Secretary of Defense to actively expand
the NLSC membership, reaching out to groups in which the government has
already invested while seeking to leverage the capabilities of this
organization.

MARKETING AND ADVERTISING

54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, one effect of sequestration
was that the Services quickly moved to end service advertising,
marketing, and outreach programs that have been used to aid in
recruiting. What is your assessment of the value of funding these
programs, and the projected impact to recruiting if these programs are
not funded?
Mr. McHugh. It is essential that the Army conduct a vigorous and
sustained marketing and advertising program in order to recruit a
quality force capable of handling 21st century mission challenges.

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, DOD and VA have been working
on an integrated electronic health record (IEHR) for a number of years
with very little progress being made towards a truly seamless
transition of health information between the two departments. In
January 2013, VA decided to use VistA, its legacy system, as its core
health record despite the findings of a recent study commissioned by
the VA that identified many VistA deficiencies. We've been told that
DOD has been evaluating existing solutions to determine the appropriate
core health record to use. Has DOD coordinated its proposed EHR program
with the Army?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, the Army has coordinated with the Navy and Air
Force in the review of the request for information submissions. This
information was released to the public on February 8, 2013. Results and
recommendations were briefed to DOD leadership and the three Service
Deputy Surgeon Generals. The Army actively contributed to defining EHR
core capabilities.

56. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, how much will it cost for the
Army to field a new IEHR?
Mr. McHugh. The estimated costs as determined by the DOD Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office are acquisition
sensitive and not available for public release at this time.

57. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, what impact do you anticipate
for the Army's medical readiness?
Mr. McHugh. The IEHR provides a lifetime EHR from the time a
solider enters the Army; it is a key enabler for a soldier's seamless
transition to the VA. The IEHR will make it easier to extract medical
records as a soldier goes through the IDES process, which will improve
readiness capabilities, for example, by making it easier to track
immunizations. Current systems require duplicate efforts that cause
errors and gaps, so it is important that the IEHR have full
compatibility with readiness data systems for all Services to enable
crucial bidirectional data exchange.

58. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, do you believe the EHR must
be deployable?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, it is essential that the IEHR be deployable to
support soldiers in theaters of operation or doing contingency
operations. A deployable IEHR will allow data input and visibility
throughout the continuum of care from point of injury to DOD medical
treatment facilities to VA treatment facilities. Documenting care in
the deployed environment will enhance the accuracy of a soldier's
medical history, which could affect future disability assessments and
benefits determination.
Documenting pre-hospitalization care and assessment provides
valuable retrospective data to conduct research to improve patient care
to address preventable causes of battlefield death. Finally, a
deployable IEHR also enables deployed providers to access the medical
history of the injured soldiers, thereby improving the quality of care.

59. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, what input has the Army had
on the EHR program?
Mr. McHugh. Army medicine has been involved in the IEHR program
from the beginning. Army's contributions to the IEHR program include:
requirements generation and support with Clinical Informatics,
Capability Management, and Enterprise Architecture assets. The Army
Surgeon General is a non-voting member of the Interagency Program
Office Advisory Board, which is responsible for IEHR governance.

BENEFITS FOR SAME-SEX PARTNERS

60. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, recently, former Secretary of
Defense Panetta announced that DOD will expand benefits to unmarried
same-sex domestic partners who declare a committed relationship, but
will not extend those same benefits to unmarried heterosexual domestic
partners. Do you agree with former Secretary Panetta, that when it
comes to benefits paid for by hard-working American taxpayers, that DOD
should favor same-sex domestic partners over heterosexual partners, and
was the Army consulted to determine the cost impact of extending these
benefits to same-sex partners?
Mr. McHugh. We support former Secretary Panetta's decision.
Heterosexual couples, if they so choose, have the opportunity in every
State to get married; currently, same-sex couples do not have this
opportunity. The steps that have been announced are an effort to close
the equity gap for benefits, consistent with current law. Once
implemented, same-sex domestic partners will be required to sign DD
Form 683, (Declaration of Partnership) attesting to the committed
relationship. Similarly, a DD Form 684, (Dissolution of Partnership)
will be required if the relationship ends. Soldiers must notify their
personnel official within 30 days of the dissolution and will be
required to wait 6 months before attesting to another relationship.

TOTAL FORCE MIX

61. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, General Dempsey said in his
testimony last week that DOD needs flexibility to keep the force in
balance and, that everything must be on the table including the mix
among Active, Reserve, and National Guard units. In view of the heavy
wartime demand on the forces including the Reserve and Guard, what do
you envision as a viable option to change that force mix for the Army?
General Odierno. The Army must maintain a balance between military
and civilian end strength, readiness, and modernization as it considers
future strategic implications. As for force mix, I do not envision
significant migration of force structure between the Active and Reserve
components. As we draw down and rebalance, I would continue to see the
Active component as that portion of the force best suited for
unpredictable and frequent employment, for dealing with complex
operational environments, and for dealing with unexpected
contingencies. I would see the Reserve components best suited for
predictable and infrequent deployments, for providing title 32 support
to State and local authorities, and for providing operational and
strategic depth.

MILITARY COMPENSATION

62. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, our Nation's historical
experience of pursuing cost savings by cutting military compensation
has demonstrated that periods of designed reduction in overall
compensation levels resulted in retention problems. Those retention
problems, especially in the context of generally improving civilian
employment opportunities, meant Congress was required to come back and
authorize catch-up increases to help us keep the highly-trained talents
and skills that we need. What is your assessment of the impact of the
President's proposed slowdown in military compensation on retention and
recruiting in your Service?
Mr. McHugh. The Army believes that a slowdown in the increase in
military compensation can be accomplished without sacrificing recruit
quality or member retention. Conditions appear favorable for slowing
the increase in military pay. Recruiting quantity is being met and
recruit quality is high; retention goals are typically being exceeded.
Any unanticipated changes in circumstances, such as a significant
improvement in civilian employment opportunities, could negatively
affect Army retention and recruiting. However, at present and in the
anticipated future environment, the Army does not believe that a
slowdown in the increase in military compensation will adversely affect
its ability to recruit and retain an adequate number of high-quality
personnel.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

63. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, General Dempsey testified
last week that unsustainable costs and smaller budgets require DOD to
examine every warrior and family support program to make sure we are
getting the best return on our investment. How do you assess the
investments our Nation has already made in family support programs, and
suicide prevention in particular, in moving the needle with
demonstrable positive return on investment?
Mr. McHugh. In late 2011, the Army adopted a portfolio approach for
managing warrior and family support programs. This portfolio approach
shifts the governance focus from individual program proponents to the
entire group of related programs, such as suicide prevention. In 2012,
the Army piloted its first enterprise evaluation to assess how programs
within the Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Portfolio contribute to
specific strategic outcomes (Help-Seeking, Risk Reduction, Transition,
and Resilience and Coping). The findings of this and future evaluations
will focus on how programs could increase their ability to achieve the
Army's strategic outcomes and improve our return on investment.

TUITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, I am pleased to learn that
DOD has now reinstated the Tuition Assistance Program (TAP), previously
cancelled by the Army, Marines Corps, and Air Force in response to the
administration's failure to plan for sequestration. How does TAP enable
your Active Duty Forces to meet the professional development
requirements described by General Dempsey to establish the Profession
of Arms as the foundation for the Joint Force?
Mr. McHugh. Tuition assistance supports soldiers in completion of
classes leading to Associate's, Bachelor's and Master's degrees as well
as certificate programs. This off-duty voluntary education program
develops critical and adaptive thinking skills soldiers and leaders
need to make informed decisions. These skill-sets allow our soldiers
and the Army to learn faster and adapt more quickly than our
adversaries, all of which are necessary skills to meet the challenges
of today's operational environment.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, our force
is exceptionally well-trained on suicide awareness and prevention, and
yet we still experience the tragedy of suicide at an unacceptably high
rate. What is your assessment on whether the current level of training
and leadership engagement is sufficient or whether it has inadvertently
created a climate in which some vulnerable individuals may have
contemplated suicide because we talk about it so much?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We continually assess our training
for effectiveness. The Ready and Resilience Campaign requires an
assessment of programs that support the campaign. The Army has not,
however, completed an assessment on the correlation of suicide
prevention training and the incidences of suicides overall. What we do
know is that suicide is a complex issue with a multitude of variables
influencing each one. The Army focus on identifying the early signs of
suicidal behaviors and intervention skills remains the best option in
attempting to reduce the number of suicides. That said, we are not
aware of any direct correlation that the increase in suicide prevention
training has created a higher propensity of soldiers to consider
suicide.

SEQUESTER

66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in your
prepared testimony, you say, ``The combined effects of funding
reductions due to sequestration, the fiscal uncertainty of Continuing
Resolutions and emerging shortfalls in OCOs funding has significantly
and rapidly degraded Army readiness, which will translate directly into
fiscal year 2014 and beyond. This lack of predictability makes it
difficult to address the posture of the Army in fiscal year 2014 with
certainty and specificity.'' Failing to budget for or at a minimum
identify where DOD would cut in fiscal year 2014 in response to
sequester is a failure in leadership by the President. Aside from
wanting to shift the responsibility of making cuts to Congress, why
doesn't your testimony address the Army's share of the $52 billion that
will have to be cut if a sequester replacement agreement cannot be
reached?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We built and submitted the Army's
portion of the fiscal year 2014 President's budget request within the
top-line provided by the DOD Comptroller. As of the date of our
submission and testimony we do not know the magnitude of any potential
sequestration reduction that would be applied to Army accounts. If
sequestration is directed in fiscal year 2014, the Army will have to
take a significant reduction in modernization and readiness accounts,
severely impacting future readiness levels.

67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, do you
believe Congress is best informed to make such cuts?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army and its commanders provide
their best military information and assessments to the President and to
Congress. We will continue to perform our advisory duties on military
issues, but do not believe we are in position to identify who is best
qualified to propose reductions to the defense budget. It is through
Service posture, budget, and other hearings where military officials
provide their best military advice that Congress obtains the best
information available to make the hard choices necessary to address the
growing budget deficits. Each year, the President submits the budget
request to Congress, and the Army presents and defends its portion of
the budget in congressional hearings to the authorization and
appropriations committees. Under expressed constitutional powers,
Congress strictly controls the obligation and expenditure of public
funds by the executive branch, regulating virtually all executive
branch programs and activities through the appropriations process.

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, do you
believe Congress is best informed to make decisions on where to take
risk in the defense strategy?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Without question, we must work
together to ensure the right decisions are made for our national
security, especially in light of the harsh consequences of
sequestration. Congress plays an important and positive role in
exercising oversight over the execution of the national security
strategy and helping the executive branch assess risks and align
resources. We are committed to providing Congress the information
necessary to effectively exercise these oversight responsibilities.

BACK LOADING DEFICIT REDUCTION

69. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in your
prepared testimony, you say, ``The President's budget includes balanced
deficit reduction proposals that allow Congress to replace and repeal
the sequester-related reductions required by the BCA of 2011 through
fiscal year 2021,'' followed later by the comment, ``To some extent,
the impact of spending reductions can be mitigated if funding is timely
and predictable, and cuts are back-loaded, enabling the Army to plan,
resource, and manage the programs that yield a highly trained and ready
force.'' General Dempsey has stated in other venues that sequestration,
even if it does not last the full 10 years, will cost more than it will
save. How can you argue that the impact of an additional $120 billion
cut in the out-years will not have a significant effect if the near-
term budgets continue to consume readiness in the manor this budget
will for the Army?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Timely and predictable funding
allows for effective and efficient execution of resources against a
long-term plan (or ends). Given the opportunity to deliberately plan
for reductions and establish a set of objectives to achieve readiness
(or ways), the Army can assess the impact of constrained budgets on the
strategy and make the necessary adjustments to implement with the
allocated resources (or means). While there is no guarantee that these
plans will avoid costs, predictable funding enables the Army to
establish the long-term requirements necessary to man, train, equip,
and sustain a highly-trained and ready-force and set the conditions
necessary to maintain balance in force structure, readiness, and
modernization efforts.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

70. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, the
President's defense budget request includes a request for authorization
to conduct a round of BRAC in 2015. How many of the Army's BRAC
decisions in the 2005 round end up costing the Army more than they will
save over 20 years?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Unlike previous BRAC rounds that
focused primarily on creating savings, BRAC 2005's goal was military
transformation. The process provided an opportunity to maximize the
Army's warfighting capability by reshaping and transforming force
structure, infrastructure, and vital industrial, training, and
operational capabilities and functions. The BRAC 2005 vastly improved
the quality of the Army's infrastructure portfolio, facilitated the
return of thousands of soldiers from overseas, and enhanced mission
capabilities. BRAC 2005 generates a $1 billion annual net recurring
savings, which the Army has been realizing since 2011.
A total of $17.9 billion was invested to implement the Army's BRAC
2005 recommendations and total net savings will exceed total net costs
for an overall break-even point of just over 12.5 years. The BRAC 2005
Commission Report identified 56 specific Army recommendations (Appendix
Q): 46 recommendations will achieve the break-even point within the 20-
year window; 6 recommendations will exceed the 20-year window; and 4
recommendations have transformation goals that do not produce savings
with implementation costs that will never be paid back.

71. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, does the
Army really need a BRAC round?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Yes. The current budget situation
and declining forces make it important to reduce overhead. Parametric
techniques used to analyze aggregate assessment of excess capacity in
2004 indicated that DOD had 24 percent excess capacity overall relative
to force structure plans developed by the Joint Staff. Because BRAC
2005 eliminated only a modest portion of the DOD excess capacity, we
believe we have still significant excess today. The excess capacity in
our infrastructure will only get larger as force structure is reduced.
Financially, the Army is reaping over $1 billion a year in net
savings from the BRAC 2005 round, and another $1 billion a year in net
savings from prior rounds of BRAC. Comparatively, the cumulative
savings to the Army from previous BRAC efforts exceeds our entire
fiscal year 2014 MILCON program.

72. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in
addition, the Army is also conducting an assessment of the number of
U.S. Army personnel and units stationed overseas. Can you provide the
results for the review of the stationing of U.S. Army personnel
overseas?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army, with DOD, is conducting a
reassessment of our global posture in light of the emerging defense
strategy. This effort remains a work in progress, and there are no
results to report at this time. Overseas basing enables the United
States to maintain its strong leadership role throughout the world and
secures our vital national interests overseas. This sends a clear and
visible sign of commitment to global security/peace to our allies and
potential adversaries. The Army will maintain a flexible ground force
in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility to meet Article 5
and other NATO commitments. The U.S. pledge to the NATO Response Force
is essential to reassuring European allies that the United States
remains invested in the trans-atlantic alliance. Army forces in South
Korea are well-positioned and play a strategic role throughout the
region.

73. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, are there
any overseas basing issues for the Army remaining to be resolved?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Other overseas basing issues will
be informed by a potentially redefined DSG that will frame Fiscal
Guidance for fiscal year 2015 and beyond.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM RESTRUCTURE

74. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, the Army
is currently in the middle of an assessment to restructure its Active
BCTs by eliminating six Active U.S.-based BCTs and realigning brigades
to man BCTs with additional maneuver battalions. When can we expect a
decision?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army announced its brigade
restructuring and elimination decision on June 25, 2013.

75. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, can you
assure me that you have an open, transparent process with objective
criteria to assess both the military value and external considerations
for each installation?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Yes. The Army recently completed
Community Listening Sessions at 30 installations in order to explain
the process that the Army is using to make these difficult decisions
and to receive community input before any final decisions are made. The
Army's brief detailed the operational categories contained in the MVA
model--training, power projection, well-being, mission expansion, and
geographic distribution, as well as an overview of the qualitative
factors outside the MVA model that the Army is using, to include
strategic considerations, command and control proximity, military
constructions costs, readiness impacts, environmental and socioeconomic
impacts, and community input.

76. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, will the
Army publicly release the weighting guidance for each attribute of the
qualitative assessment prior to your final decisions?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has briefed the committee
professional staff members on the process that the Army is using to
make these difficult decisions. The Army's brief detailed the
operational categories contained in the MVA model--training, power
projection, well-being, mission expansion, and geographic distribution,
as well as the qualitative factors outside the MVA model that the Army
is using, to include strategic considerations, command and control
proximity, MILCON costs, readiness impacts, environmental and
socioeconomic impacts, and community input. Now that the weighting for
the attributes in the MVA model has been approved, we are prepared to
share that information with the committee professional staff members.

77. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in your
testimony, you assert that without a solution to sequestration, you may
have to eliminate another 100,000 Active and Reserve component
soldiers. How many BCTs does this represent?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We have yet to quantify the force
structure impacts associated with such a significant reduction. I would
anticipate additional BCTs beyond those identified would have to be
reduced and that they would have to come from both the Active component
and from the Army National Guard. It would impact all Combat Support
and Combat Service Support structure as well.

FUNDS FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

78. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, for the
first time in 5 years, we cannot review the administration's request
for emergency supplemental funds for OCO at the same time we are
reviewing the President's base defense budget. In addition, I am also
aware that $88.5 billion requested by the administration for OCO for
fiscal year 2013 is not sufficient to meet current warfighter
requirements. I am concerned that this administration is losing the
ability to accurately budget for OCO at the same time many core
readiness needs for the Services are being migrated to the OCO from the
base budget. What is the Army's share of the $88 billion wedge for OCO?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Because final decisions about the
pace and structure of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan were
not available before the preparation of the budget, the fiscal year
2014 budget included a placeholder value of $88.5 billion for DOD OCO
funding. In May 2013, the President submitted budget amendments that
revised the fiscal year 2014 DOD OCO funding request to $79.4 billion
of which Army's request is $47.6 billion.

79. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, will the OCO request for 2014
include funds to address the fiscal year 2013 problems in both the OCO
and base budget for readiness shortfalls?
General Odierno. The Army developed the fiscal year 2014 budget
request without full knowledge of the negative impacts to the fiscal
year 2013 budget driven by the Continuing Resolution, the impact of
sequestration, and the OCO Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Army (OMA)
budget shortfalls. Therefore, the fiscal year 2014 OCO budget request
does not contain additional funds to address the fiscal year 2013
problems in either the OCO or base budget for readiness shortfalls.

MILITARY READINESS

80. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, the Army has adapted a policy
that rightfully prioritizes funding to deployed and next-to-deploy
forces. At the same time, units not in those categories are being
starved of the necessary funding to maintain readiness. For example,
the Army has cancelled seven readiness exercises because of a lack of
funding in fiscal year 2013. These units have lost valuable training
time that cannot be addressed in your fiscal year 2014 budget
submission. The fiscal year 2014 funding O&M funding request
exacerbates existing fiscal year 2013 readiness challenges from which
it will take years to recover from these impacts. How will you know
that the forces are not ready?
General Odierno. The Army's critical funding priorities for
readiness are unit training, maintenance and sustainment of equipment,
and leader development. We will begin to see changes in readiness
ratings for the next to deploy units as well as those units not
scheduled to deploy immediately. The present budgetary situation forces
the Army to focus training resources on next to deploy units, but only
to conduct training and advisory missions. Therefore, we accept
significant risk in the training of nondeploying units causing a
significant degradation in readiness for fiscal year 2014 and beyond.
Even though units with scheduled deployments are the priority, it will
take these units much longer to meet the required training proficiency
due to constrained and limited resources, which in turn affects the
assessment of the ability of the deploying units to execute their
assigned missions and nondeploying units to meet contingency missions.
The effects of degraded readiness will manifest themselves in lower C-
Levels, Training Levels, Mission Essential Tasks Assessments, and
ultimately in the Army's Readiness Assessment levels.
The lack of training resources limits home station and combat
training center opportunities, and stalls the development of all other
units not scheduled to deploy. Another mitigating action shifts
personnel from nondeployed to deploying forces in order to meet
operational demands. This would exacerbate personnel shortfalls
geometrically each month and put successful execution of combatant
commander operational plans at greater risk. Equipment would be
migrated from nondeployed to deploying forces in order to fill
shortages due to incomplete reset and redistribution, or shortages
arising from the lack of equipment retrograded from theater. To
mitigate the impacts upon readiness, the Army limited reset and depot
repair of equipment to those items required for deploying units. Again,
this would jeopardize combatant commander operational plans in an ever-
increasing manner each succeeding month.
The cumulative effect of reduced training, equipment readiness and
availability, and leader development increases the overall risk to
unacceptable. If current budgetary conditions persist, the level of
risk increases if required to deploy these forces. The lack of adequate
funding and the flexibility to manage the funds available, forces the
Army to make resourcing decisions that have the potential to increase
the level of risk with respect to other OPLANS. It is highly probable
that a long-term continuance of the current fiscal limitations will
degrade the overall readiness of the Army.

81. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, what will be the triggering
event that tells you we have reached a readiness crisis?
General Odierno. There will not be one signature event to indicate
a readiness crisis. Rather, the long-term impacts of reduced fiscal
resources and the associated out-year reductions, particularly to force
structure and readiness, threaten the Army's ability to provide trained
and ready forces to the combatant commanders and to perform enduring
and vital missions. If steep cuts are required in fiscal year 2014 and
beyond, this will create imbalance and significantly compound risk. It
will cause a disproportionate investment across manpower, O&M,
modernization, and procurement, challenging our ability to sustain
appropriate readiness in the near-term in support of our current
National Defense Strategy. Initially, we will see the effects of
degraded readiness reflected in lower c-levels, training levels,
mission essential task assignments, and ultimately the Army's readiness
assessment levels.

82. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, what is the plan to address
these impacts and when will Congress be notified of mitigation
measures?
General Odierno. Right now with sequestration as the law, the Army
will not be able to meet readiness goals for the next 3 years,
incurring significant risk to our soldiers if asked to deploy on
contingency operations. The steepness of sequestration does not allow
us to balance end strength, modernization, and readiness.

83. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, we are interested in knowing
about readiness reporting requirements through the quarterly readiness
reports. Are the reports useful to you in planning, and if not, why?
General Odierno. Yes they are. The Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress describes the operational overview of the Army's deployed and
forward stationed soldiers, the Army's top readiness concerns, and
supports the Joint Staff's effort to report DOD's current readiness
posture.
However, readiness of units deploying for specific missions does
not necessarily make them ready for full-scale contingency operations.
This is especially true for units deploying to Afghanistan, since they
are conducting advisory and assistance operations in a complex
environment.

84. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, what systems do you use
internally to track readiness trends?
General Odierno. Unit commanders measure their unit readiness using
the four functional areas of Manning, Equipping, Equipment Readiness,
and Training. The unit overall readiness levels are reported using Core
Mission (C levels) and Assigned Mission (A levels). The C level
assessment indicates the ability of the unit to accomplish its core
mission while the A level assessment indicates the unit's ability to
accomplish its directed, currently assigned mission. Headquarters,
Department of the Army uses many systems to measure readiness in
addition to the Commanders Unit Status Report, and the Strategic
Readiness Update (SRU). Presently, the Army is developing AR 525-XX-B,
Army Strategic Readiness. This regulation will define Army Strategic
Readiness and develop the concept for developing the Army Strategic
Readiness Assessment. The Army will track leading indicators across the
six strategic readiness tenets of manning, equipping, sustaining,
training, installations, and capacity and capability, in order to
provide a holistic view of Army readiness. Upon analyzing the leading
indicators and associated trends, the Army Staff will be able to make
readiness projections and recommend courses of actions to senior Army
leaders to mitigate negative impacts upon Army readiness at the
strategic level.

85. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, do you have suggestions for
alternative reporting mechanisms?
General Odierno. The Army currently has multiple readiness
reporting mechanisms across the various tenets of Army readiness. The
unit status report is the most recognized of these systems--it provides
unit commanders with a mechanism to provide their own assessment of
unit capabilities directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army.
Other reporting mechanisms or databases currently exist across the
readiness tenets of manning, equipping, sustaining, training, and
installations that provide insight into Army capabilities. Currently,
the Army is developing strategic readiness policy and procedures that
will identify leading indicators of readiness deficiencies. Analysis of
both deficiencies and indicators will provide the Army an assessment of
current strategic readiness and an ability to project future
capabilities.

86. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, prior to the Continuing
Resolution, you said the Army would have a $17 billion to $19 billion
shortfall in Army O&M accounts. The recently passed Continuing
Resolution fixed $6 billion, leaving the Army an O&M shortfall in the
range of $113.3 billion entering into fiscal year 2014. Will the fiscal
year 2014 budget request combined with the fiscal year 2013 O&M
shortfall create a hollow Army, and if not, why?
General Odierno. As you stated, the Army faces a more than $13
billion O&M shortfall in fiscal year 2013 which includes a $5.5 billion
reduction to the Army's base budget and a $7.8 billion shortfall to
OCO. (Operational decisions in Afghanistan led to adjustment to the OCO
shortfall, which stands at $6.7 billion today, July 17, 2013.)
The Army's fiscal year 2014 Base Budget Submission of $129.7
billion enables us to support the 2012 Defense Strategy in fiscal year
2013 but does not account for the decaying readiness that will impact
the Army as we enter fiscal year 2014. In addition to this base budget,
the Army will continue to require OCO funding for operations in
Afghanistan and to continue the reset of our force. The Army submitted
a separate request for fiscal year 2014 OCO; it is critical that this
request be fully funded.
It is in the best interest of our Army, DOD, and our national
security to avert sequestration. The size and steepness of cuts
required by sequestration make it impossible to downsize the force in a
deliberate, logical manner that allows us to sustain an appropriate
balance of readiness, modernization, and end strength. The cuts are
simply too steep; we just cannot move enough people out of the Army
quickly enough to produce the level of savings needed to comply with
sequester, and therefore we will need to take disproportionate cuts in
modernization and readiness. The net result will be units that are
overmanned, unready, and unmodernized. Even though I think the level of
sequestration cuts are too large, if we back load them into the later
years of the sequester period, at least that would allow us the
opportunity to properly plan and to sustain the balance we need in
these uncertain times.

87. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, what will be the trigger that
signals the Army is going hollow?
General Odierno. We are today out of balance and this will continue
into fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016. This imbalance puts at risk our
ability to provide properly trained and ready forces for unknown
contingencies over the next few years.

88. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, will the Army submit a
supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2013 if the Army cannot
solve its O&M shortfalls?
General Odierno. The Army may need a fiscal year 2013 supplemental
funding request to ensure adequate resources are available to support
ongoing contingency operations. DOD recently submitted two
reprogramming actions for fiscal year 2013 that use all the OCO special
transfer authority and all but $200 million of general transfer
authority for fiscal year 2013. Congressional approval of the
reprogramming actions as submitted will help reduce the Army's current
OCO shortfall from $8.3 billion to $3.3 billion. The Army is continuing
to work with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and all other OCO stakeholders to
reduce the remaining $3.3 billion shortfall (which has been reduced to
$3.1 billion as of June 6, 2013). If unsuccessful, the Army may have to
submit a request for supplemental funding later in fiscal year 2013.

89. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, in your written testimony, you
note that the Army may not be able to execute the current DSG, as
planned. In your opinion, are U.S. combat forces ready today to defend
South Korea and Japan from an unprovoked attack by North Korea?
General Odierno. The Army forces stationed on the Korean peninsula
and in Japan can defend against North Korean attacks, but training
readiness degradation in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 put our
ability to provide forces to meet combatant commanders' requirements at
significant risk.

90. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, in what Army capabilities are
you concerned about risk?
General Odierno. Today, our readiness level will make it difficult
to respond with ready forces to one major event.

91. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, if the Army is fully funded to
its request in fiscal year 2014, how long will it take you to restore
readiness of the nondeployed forces?
General Odierno. The Army's fiscal year 2014 President's budget
does not include all the resources needed to recover from lost
readiness in fiscal year 2013. The impact of sequestration reductions
is an atrophy of readiness due to cancelled training, deferred
equipment maintenance, and delayed procurements. Any new unfunded
directed missions will also negatively impact our OPTEMPO accounts and
our ability to build readiness for all except the top priority units of
those next to deploy, rotating to Korea, or a part of the Global
Response Force.
The Army has significant unfunded OMA requirements to recover lost
training and rebuild lost readiness. Adding funds to those OMA and
procurement accounts would be a positive step toward rebuilding
readiness in fiscal year 2014. This would not, however, address the
need to restore the Army's base funding for OCO-funded training,
sustainment, and procurement that supported the Army at war for nearly
12 years. As more soldiers return to home station, restoring base
funding is among the biggest challenges in an environment of continued
fiscal uncertainty.
As soon as we can provide forces with the resources they need to
execute their full training strategies, they will be able to
progressively build readiness for a broader range of missions. It takes
an Army BCT approximately a full year to reset from a deployment and
train-up for another mission. Even with full funding, a unit's training
progression is generally linear, which limits acceleration. Units must
go through the steps of building proficiency from smaller units to
larger formations, from easy conditions to ambiguous or varied
conditions, from basic tasks to synchronization of more complex
operations. A BCT is not considered fully ready for decisive action
until it has completed a training rotation at a maneuver combat
training center (CTC). The Army will manage limited training assets
(like CTC rotations) as best we can to support the training progression
of priority units. Even with additional funding for CTC rotations,
units at squad-level proficiency at the end of fiscal year 2013 would
not have time to adequately prepare and benefit from a CTC rotation
early in fiscal year 2014.

92. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, due to funding shortfalls, the
Army has cancelled third and fourth quarters depot maintenance. If the
Army completes the rest of the fiscal year without conducting depot
maintenance, what impacts on the materiel readiness of the Army will be
felt in fiscal year 2014 and beyond?
General Odierno. Initially the Army believed it would have to
cancel $2.43 billion in depot orders, essentially cancelling all depot
maintenance for the third and fourth quarters. However, funding
provided by H.R. 933 combined with internal reprioritization has
allowed the Army to restore $1.07 billion in funding for depot
maintenance. Although this additional funding mitigates about 50
percent of the original sequestration impact, it will still create a
maintenance backlog that will extend post-combat equipment repair in
Active and Reserve units by 2 to 3 years following redeployment. If
sequestration cuts are continued, there will be a backlog even further
into the future.
The Army will begin addressing the deferred workload in fiscal year
2014 if it has sufficient funding to meet both the fiscal year 2014
maintenance requirements and the deferred fiscal year 2013 workload. As
we meet these challenges, the Army will always focus available
resources on priority units and equipment--those deployed, next to
deploy, or equipment needed to fill validated shortages.

93. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, how long, once fully funded,
will it take the Army to return to a proper level of maintenance?
General Odierno. The Army continues to defer maintenance daily at
the field and depot level due to funding constraints. The Army will
begin addressing the deferred workload in fiscal year 2014 given
sufficient resources are provided to meet both the fiscal year 2014
maintenance requirements and to meet the deferred fiscal year 2013
workload. Future OPTEMPO and available capacity will dictate the length
of time it will take the Army to bring all equipment back to Technical
Manual (TM) 10/20 Maintenance Standard. Current estimates range from 2
to 3 years to restore all ground equipment to the Army's standard TM
10/20.

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

94. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was
established 7 years ago and is a pass-through account for the Army.
Consistent with DOD's inability to audit its finances, GAO has
identified a lack of comprehensive visibility over all of DOD's
counter-IED efforts external to JIEDDO. We have authorized billions of
dollars to JIEDDO to address the counter-IED problem but it is time to
assess the organization. How do you see JIEDDO's mission and
organization in the future?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. What we know is that the nature of
warfare is such that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) will continue
to be a threat around the world. The IED will remain the weapon of
choice for terrorists, not only in Afghanistan, but also wherever the
United States and our allies have national security interests. As such,
JIEDDO's mission will not end with the drawdown of forces in
Afghanistan; the IED threat will continue to drive combatant commander
and Service requirements for counter-IED capabilities and training. We
agree that current fiscal constraints drive a need for shared
responsibilities and resources with other Federal agencies. JIEDDO
remains the DOD lead for a whole-of-government approach to IED threats,
which highlights that there are many stakeholders with an interest in
counter-IED capabilities. We understand that JIEDDO's rapid acquisition
authority has provided a vital ability to meet validated battlefield
requirements much faster than the Services' regular acquisition
process. In the end, the enemy always gets a vote, so JIEDDO's
continuous and focused action, reaction, and counter-action as the
enemy adapts is crucial to saving lives.

95. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, is it
time to integrate JIEDDO into other existing organizations and
processes?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The reasons for transforming the
Army IED task force into a joint IED organization are as valid today as
they were when the IED task force was first established in 2003. As a
joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD, under the authority,
direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO is
able to leverage the experience of warfighters across the Services to
defeat IEDs. Because IEDs will remain the weapon of choice of
terrorists and continue to grow in sophistication and frequency
wherever we deploy forces in support of our national security
interests, the counter-IED mission to attack the network, defeat the
device, and train the force remains an important one.
The Army currently serves as Executive Agent by providing
administrative support to JIEDDO in accordance with DOD Directive
2000.19E, enclosure 3.
The Army will fully support any review of JIEDDO organization,
mission, and resourcing.

96. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, how do we
gain more visibility into what DOD is doing in all aspects of counter-
IED?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We are available to brief you about
Army activities in the area of counter-IED, both as Executive Agent for
JIEDDO under DOD Directive 2000.19E and any complementary work that is
being done at our centers and schools.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

97. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in your
written testimony you state, ``It is critical that we find the right
balance between our organic and the commercial industrial bases. The
ability to reduce the industrial base in times of peace but surge as
required remains essential to equipping the Army, the Joint Force, and,
in many cases, our allies and coalition partners.'' I am concerned that
the Army is cancelling contracts simply to bring more work into the
depots or engineering centers at a time where the breakdown between
depot and commercial work within the Army is 61 percent to 39 percent
in favor of the Army. Is this the right balance between organic and
commercial industrial base?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is not canceling contracts
to bring more work to its depots or engineering centers. The Army seeks
to maintain complementary capability between the organic and commercial
industrial base sectors to ensure the viable health of both, and the
Army promotes public-private partnerships to maintain this delicate
balance. The Army's organic percentage of work increased during
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) to
support wartime surge requirements, but as overall requirements decline
to pre-OIF/OEF levels, the Army envisions that its organic percentage
will also decrease, which will generate a closer balance between
organic and contract depot maintenance workloads.

98. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what
actions are you taking to support a strong and viable organic and
commercial industrial base?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is taking several actions
to support a strong and viable commercial and organic industrial base.
In the commercial industrial base, the Army is working with the OSD
and the Army Materiel Command to assess critical manufacturing
capabilities and seek innovation within the supply chain sectors
through responsible investment. The Army is also analyzing the
challenges of critical and fragile elements of the commercial
industrial base to identify systemic and fundamental issues that can be
resolved through engagement across the public and private sectors. For
example, the Army continues its engagement in the sector-by-sector,
tier-by-tier industrial base analysis that: (1) establishes early
warning indicators of risk, particularly at lower-tiers; (2)
strengthens the supply chain to mitigate potential points of failure;
and (3) improves coordination among Services to ensure a viable
industrial base is maintained.
The Army is conducting a comprehensive Combat Vehicle Portfolio
Industrial Base Study through A.T. Kearney, a global management
consulting firm. The 21-week study is assessing the Commercial and
Organic Combat Vehicle Industrial Base, viable strategic alternatives,
and sustainment of the Combat Vehicle Industrial Base in a constrained
fiscal environment. A final report will be delivered to Congress later
this year.
The Army is also engaged in Industrial Base Baseline Assessments
that aim to sustain those areas critical in supporting Army and Joint
Services programs by: (1) conducting sector assessments of programs
identified as critical by Program Executive Offices and Life Cycle
Management Commands; (2) determining the impact of reductions in
funding to program requirements; and (3) developing recommendations
that enable the industrial base to sustain current and future
warfighter requirements.
The Army's strategy for ensuring that its Organic Industrial Base
remains viable and relevant includes: (1) establishing modern
facilities, equipment, and skill sets at the same rate that the Army
modernizes its weapon systems; (2) ensuring capabilities and capacities
are sustained to support current and future contingency operations; (3)
investing to ensure that facilities are capable of maintaining core
competencies and critical manufacturing capabilities; and (4)
prioritizing funding to achieve the desired end state of viable and
relevant organic industrial base facilities.

CONTINGENCY RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS

99. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, what impact have
sequestration-driven cuts had on the Army's ability to respond to
contingencies worldwide?
General Odierno. Sequestration-driven budget cuts have led to
reduced readiness of Army units intended to support contingency
requirements. The Army's short-term mitigation strategy for
sequestration and shortfalls in OCO funds is to protect the readiness
of deployed forces, those stationed in Korea, and the Global Response
Force. The Army will only resource remaining forces (those that would
support contingency requirements) to achieve squad level proficiency.

100. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, are we appropriately ready
for the most probable and dangerous contingencies, and what would
happen if we had to deploy to the contingencies on very short notice?
General Odierno. The Army may no longer be able to provide a
sufficient number of units in accordance with the timelines required by
combatant commanders for our most likely or demanding contingencies. As
a result of the current fiscal situation and budget cuts, the Army
units available to deploy to contingencies will train less often and to
a lower level of proficiency. The Army will prioritize resources to
maintain readiness for units deploying to OEF, homeland defense units,
units forward deployed in Korea, and global and regional response
forces.

DEFENSE STRATEGY AND FORCE SIZING

101. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, what do you perceive the risk
to be of not sizing the Army to conduct large-scale sustained ground
combat operations?
General Odierno. It would be dangerous to assume we will not have
to engage in a large-scale ground war. I see nothing on the horizon
that tells me we no longer need ground forces for such a mission. Not
sizing the Army to conduct large-scale sustained ground combat
operations denies the Nation a credible force-in-being to serve as a
deterrent to a would-be adversary that might seek to take advantage of
such a miscalculation.

102. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno, does this limit our Nation's
ability to deter aggressors and bring our conflicts to a satisfactory
conclusion?
General Odierno. Maintaining an Army sufficiently large to generate
a credible capability of defeating any threat--state or non-state--
through sustained combat operations is critical for our Nation to
effectively deter agressors. I believe that the 490,000 Active
component force will serve as an effective deterrent, but any further
reductions could challenge the Army's deterrent capability. Another
element of deterrence is willingness to support partners, and an
appropriately sized Army can improve our allies' and partners'
abilities to secure themselves and manange regional security
challenges.

RADIOS

103. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, how many proprietary, sole-
source radios has the Army procured over the last 4 years? Please
provide a breakdown by year, the number of radios, and the funding
associated with these radios.
Mr. McHugh. Within the last 4 years, the Army procured 739 Rockwell
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System, 5,124 Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) Harris Corporation AN/PRC-117G radios, and 1,144 COTS
Harris Corporation AN/PRC-152A radios.

The Harris Corporation AN/PRC-117G radios were procured using a
blanket purchase agreement through the General Services Administration
schedule. Harris Corporation was the only company that responded to a
market survey for potential vendors.

The Harris Corporation AN/PRC-152 radios were procured off the
competitively awarded Consolidated Interim Single Channel Handheld
Radio contract. An engineer change proposal to modify the Harris AN/
PRC-152 to the NSA certified Type 1 AN/PRC-152A models was approved due
to a lack of responses from a market research conducted requesting the
availability of NSA Type 1 certified handheld radios.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY SPOUSES

104. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, I understand that DOD
provides transitional compensation for spouses of servicemembers and
their family members who are victims of domestic violence at the hands
of a servicemember. Yet, this benefit does not exist for other cases in
which a servicemember has violated the UCMJ. Do you believe this
program has potential value in protecting other military families
which, due to no fault of their own, stand to lose all benefits because
of UCMJ violations by the servicemember?
General Odierno. The transitional compensation program does have
potential to protect families in non-domestic abuse cases, but such an
expansion would require congressional action.
As DOD is the proponent to implement the policy, assign
responsibilities, and prescribe procedures under 10 U.S.C. section
1059, they would have the lead in providing views on any changes to
existing law. The Army stands ready to partner with DOD and Congress to
consider shortfalls in the existing program and ensure any change to
the law is affordable, supportable, and inclusive of all Services.

105. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, do you believe the Victims'
Transitional Compensation Benefit Program could be broadened to protect
families, especially cases where retirement benefits are involved?
General Odierno. The transitional compensation program does have
the potential to be broadened to protect families where retirement
benefits are involved, but such an expansion would require
congressional action.
As DOD is the proponent to implement the policy, assign
responsibilities, and prescribe procedures under 10 U.S.C. section
1059, they would have the lead in providing views on any changes to
existing law. The Army stands ready to partner with DOD and Congress to
consider shortfalls in the existing program and ensure any change to
the law is affordable, supportable, and inclusive of all Services.

INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS

106. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, to what extent has the Army
already utilized involuntary separations to achieve end strength
reduction goals?
General Odierno. To date, the Army has not used any programs
specifically to generate involuntary separations to achieve end
strength goals. However, in order to attain a 490,000 force by fiscal
year 2017, Army planning foresees the requirement to use programs that
will identify officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers for involuntary
separation. We have begun identifying NCOs (SSG and above) for denial
of continued service through the use of the Qualitative Service
Program. At this time, based on current planning, it is anticipated
that a majority of these soldiers would qualify for some form of
retirement.

107. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, do you anticipate that the
Army will have to use involuntary separations to achieve the existing
end strength reductions?
General Odierno. Yes. Analysis shows we cannot achieve a 490,000
force by the end of fiscal year 2017 through natural attrition alone.

108. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, if the administration and
Congress fail to identify alternative spending reductions and defense
sequestration goes forward and the Army must cut another 100,000
soldiers, would this force the Army to implement large-scale
involuntary separations?
General Odierno. If sequestration remains in place, the Army would
have to implement additional involuntary separation measures based on
the required end strength reductions. Since the Army has not completed
its analysis of the necessary force reductions, we cannot provide exact
figures. However, we learned from the 1990's drawdown that in order to
generate accelerated voluntary losses, substantial incentives are
required. These incentives are not in the current budget.

109. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, can you provide an estimate
as to how many involuntary separations might be required?
General Odierno. The Army anticipates we will require involuntary
separations of approximately 6,500 officers and close to 6,000 enlisted
through fiscal year 2017 to achieve an end strength of 490,000. If
sequestration remains in place, those numbers would have to be
increased based on any additional end strength reductions required and
the timeline that those reductions must be completed within.

110. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what impact could involuntary
separations have on unit morale and readiness?
General Odierno. The Army has carefully considered the possible
impacts on morale from involuntary separations and has designed
programs to minimize unwanted outcomes. The Secretary and I have
provided direction to the Army staff on how to make these difficult
decisions in a way that ensures a quality Army remains at the end of
the drawdown. The plan is to use programs that are seen as fair and
equitable (e.g., promotion, continuation, and selective early
retirement boards). This should minimize the perception of favoritism
and capriciousness by incorporating field commander input with the
impartiality of centrally-managed selection processes.

111. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, do I have your continued
commitment that you will avoid involuntary separations as much as
possible and that you will keep Congress fully informed when you are
forced to utilize involuntary separations, as required by Section 525
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013?
General Odierno. It is the Army's intent to avoid involuntary
separations whenever possible, and the Army will certainly keep
Congress fully informed as we make these difficult decisions.

REBALANCE TO ASIA-PACIFIC

112. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, as DOD rebalances toward the
Asia-Pacific, why do you believe our Nation continues to require an
Army of sufficient size and top quality?
General Odierno. Only with a credible and capable U.S. land power
will the nations of this critical region choose us as their partner of
first choice for security and stability. The Army must maintain its
strong regional and global role in maintaining and developing the
relationships that preserve U.S. access and influence through our
consistent engagement and interface focused on building our partners'
capabilities. We have an expansive program in the Pacific to include 24
large-scale exercises in fiscal year 2014 involving 14 nations in the
region.
Additionally, there are contingency plans and operational plans
that require large amounts of ground forces. We use our plans to size,
train, and modernize the Army.

HOLLOW ARMY

113. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what does a hollow Army look
like?
General Odierno. It would look like a force that lacks the right
balance between end strength, modernization, readiness training, and
educational readiness. The Army is showing these characteristics. Our
ability to train and sustain our equipment is becoming limited. This
denies the Army the ability to ensure that it is able to deploy and
meet future requirements and puts our soldiers at higher risk to
execute their mission with the training and capability we would expect,
ultimately increasing casualties and the time to accomplish the
mission.

114. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what was the hollow Army like
after the Vietnam War?
General Odierno. When I entered the Army in 1976, our country had
recently completed a long and divisive war in Vietnam, the aftermath
resulted in the collapse of retention rates among first-term soldiers,
career NCOs, and junior officers. Our Nation was struggling with
inflation and unemployment, and military priorities were less important
in a time of economic difficulties, when many people predicted that
never again would our country enter into a sustained conflict like
Vietnam that would cost so much in terms of lives and resources.
Without adequate funding for its assigned missions and with the end of
Selective Service, the Army was unable to recruit and retain enough
high-quality personnel, requiring years to rebuild a capable NCO Corps.
The degradation of readiness caused by this personnel shortfall was
compounded by insufficient funds both for the training of soldiers and
for the maintenance of equipment. Modernization, for the most part
deferred during the Vietnam war, was impeded. Under these conditions,
low morale and indiscipline became serious problems for the Army during
the 1970s.
In the end, the after effects of the war, difficulties in
transitioning from a draftee to an All-Volunteer Force, force structure
decisions, the lengthy process of improving professionalism in the
officer and NCO ranks, and inadequate budgets created a hollow Army
throughout the 1970s.
I worry that if we continue having to deal with our current budget
issues, we are heading down the same road and we simply cannot do that
again. It would not be acceptable to the American people or to me. The
American people expect us to be ready to respond when needed, but our
ability to do so will be put at risk over the next several years as
sequestration takes its toll.

115. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what are the warning signs
that the Army is becoming hollow?
General Odierno. A hollow Army may simply be defined as existing
force structure that lacks the necessary combination of ready equipment
and trained personnel to accomplish the mission for which it was
designed. The warning signs are likewise a combined effect of
insufficient investment in the building blocks that comprise a properly
trained and well-equipped Army unit. A warning sign that the Army is
becoming hollow is the prolonged disparity between training for
counterinsurgency (COIN) and the reinvestment in training for the full
range of military operations. The highest order of which is decisive
action. Deferred maintenance compounded by the reduced standard of
maintenance of equipment is a leading indicator of a future down-turn
in readiness. These indicators of hollowness are closely monitored at
every level of command to safeguard against the inevitable risk they
present to the successful employment of soldiers in future conflicts.

116. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, is the Army becoming hollow?
General Odierno. Presently, the Army no longer has the right
balance among end strength, modernization, readiness training, and
educational readiness to prevent the force from becoming hollow. If the
Army cannot manage end strength/force reduction, force structure
reductions and readiness, the Army increases the risk of allowing the
nondeployed force to become hollow. This results in units that are
overmanned, unready, and unmodernized. Further erosion of the Army's
readiness compounds this risk. Sequestration occurring in fiscal year
2014 and beyond will result in the reduction of readiness across the
Army and puts our soldiers at higher risk to execute their mission with
the training and capability we would expect, ultimately increasing
casualties and the time to accomplish the mission.

117. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, if sequestration goes forward
this year and next year, will the Army become hollow?
General Odierno. The resourcing decisions and adjustments that the
Army made because of sequestration have the potential to create a
hollow Army over time. These decisions will accelerate and compound the
inequalities and risks to the force caused by sequestration. Since
March 2013, the Army has already experienced a 20 percent decline in
the readiness of non-allocated BCTs. Seven Combat Training Center (CTC)
rotations that were planned to train Army BCTs to their full designed
capability were cancelled because of the fiscal austerity resulting
from the Continuing Resolution and sequestration. The Army is losing
opportunities to develop its current and future leaders through
Professional Military Education (PME) because of sequestration. The
loss of training opportunities affects unit readiness and leadership
development at unit levels. The lost opportunities caused by
sequestration will become more difficult to recover. Restoring
readiness lost to sequestration will require extended timelines and
significant investment of resources. Under sequestration, the Army
needs to absorb immediate cuts in fiscal year 2014. This will force
cuts to personnel accounts--reductions that could potentially equate to
tens of thousands of soldiers, and by the time we paid separation
benefits, the cost to separate them would exceed the savings garnered.
We cannot move enough people out of the Army quickly enough to produce
the level of savings needed to comply with sequester, and therefore we
will need to take disproportionate cuts in modernization and readiness.
The reductions in readiness across the force jeopardize the ability of
the Army to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. This
will continue to be compounded in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 until we
can reduce enough end strength.

118. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what impact does a hollow
Army have on our soldiers, families, and military readiness?
General Odierno. The Army I entered in 1976 was hollow in that it
was not well-trained and did not have the resources necessary to
sustain readiness while supporting soldiers and their families. I am
absolutely focused on making sure I do not leave this Army hollow in
that way. Ultimately, maintaining the Army with fewer resources
requires balancing the overall size of the force, its equipment, and
its training and readiness. Each of these must be sufficiently robust
to field an army with the capability and capacity to perform its
assigned missions.
The steepness of sequestration forces us into a hollow force from
fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017 because we are forced to reduce
resources for modernization and readiness faster than we have reduced
end strength. When you have structure that cannot be properly trained
or equipped, it is the start of a hollow force. A hollow Army loses
military readiness over time. A hollow Army is challenged to maintain
high levels of professionalism.
A hollow Army affects soldiers. Lost training opportunities for
soldiers will impact on our units' basic warfighting skills. We will
have a cohort of leaders who will have lost out on the opportunity to
conduct a wide array of leader development and training, for example
valuable CTC rotations.
We have mitigated impacts on families in fiscal year 2013, but in
fiscal year 2014 we are very concerned and we are evaluating the full
impacts on families and support programs. At a minimum we will have to
consolidate some family programs.
We are sacrificing readiness to achieve reductions inside the short
period of the fiscal year. There is a time component to readiness.
Trained forces require time to practice the employment of teams, manned
with the right skills, equipped with modern systems, and exposed to the
complex conditions they likely will face on contemporary battlefields.
We are now going to go through a period during which we need to buy
back as much readiness as possible, or we're going to have a severe
problem over the next 2 or 3 years. Time required by nondeploying
forces to restore readiness in fiscal year 2014 will depend largely on
how far their readiness slips in fiscal year 2013.
The cost of a hollow force and the risk posed will equate to a loss
of soldiers' lives. We can't continue to do more with less or else
we're going to put soldiers' lives at risk.

119. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what must Congress do to
avoid a hollow Army?
General Odierno. A hollow Army is one in which there is prolonged
and disproportionate investment across manpower, O&M, modernization,
and procurement without corresponding adjustments to strategy. The
fiscal uncertainty caused by repeated Continuing Resolutions, delayed
appropriations, and the implementation of sequestration is not in the
best interest of our country, our soldiers, or our national security.
Just this year, the late appropriation and sequestration led to the
cancellation of training and the release of 3,100 valuable temporary
and term civilian employees.
In fiscal year 2013, the Army faces the combined effects of a
sequestered budget and an increase in theater demand. These two events
have put a $13 billion pressure on the Army's O&M accounts. This
includes the $4.6 billion OMA reduction due to sequestration and an
$8.3 billion theater activities level higher than the fiscal year 2013
President's OCO budget request. The emergency reprogramming action
being considered by Congress would restore $5 billion of the $8.3
billion OCO OMA shortfall. I do want to highlight that our sister
Services are helping us fund some of the $5 billion, however, the
Committees have denied or deferred portions of our sources, causing us
to seek replacement sources. I ask that you act quickly on our proposed
replacement sources. Additionally, that reprogramming action will still
leave us with a shortfall, which the Army is working with OSD toward
resolving with a joint solution that will likely require another
reprogramming. With your continued support, I am confident that our
enterprise solution will meet the immediate needs of the warfighter in
theater.
Congress can further help the Army by carefully considering the
fiscal year 2014 O&M budget submission. Reductions to the fiscal year
2014 O&M accounts further continue the decline in readiness and our
ability to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders.
The Army continues to outline the buyback of readiness in the Notice to
Congress on Unfunded Priorities (section 1003 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2013).
I must stress, however, that fiscal flexibility, while essential,
is not sufficient to avert the problems we face. Even if we get relief
from current restrictions, the budget reductions in fiscal year 2014
and beyond as a result of sequestration will pose a significant risk to
readiness and will force us to reconsider the Army's ability to execute
its obligations under the DSG.

SEQUESTRATION END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS AND IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL GUARD

120. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, if sequestration and its
associated out-year budget reductions go forward and the Army must cut
approximately 100,000 additional personnel, roughly speaking, how much
of a reduction would this be from the National Guard?
General Odierno. The Army is on schedule to remove 89,000 soldiers
from the Army by fiscal year 2017, due to the budget reductions
contained in the 2011 BCA. Our analysis suggests that full
sequestration may require the Army to potentially reduce another
100,000 soldiers from the total Army, on top of the 89,000 already
being reduced.
There is a balance that the Army must maintain between the Active
component and Reserve component end strengths. This additional 100,000
reduction in end strength would have to be appropriately spread across
all components of the Army. The Army is currently looking into various
options to keep the Army in balance and at this time specific
reductions to the Army National Guard have not been determined.

COUNTERINSURGENCY SKILLS

121. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, as the Army attempts to
regain full spectrum readiness--including readiness for high intensity
combat--how will the Army codify and institutionalize the
counterinsurgency skills and lessons learned over the last decade so
that these hard-won skills and lessons are not lost?
General Odierno. Beginning in 2011, the Army began revising all
doctrinal publications describing the Army concept of decisive action
through the simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and
stability operations and defense support of civil authorities, all in
support of unified land operations. COIN skills are inherent to
decisive action. The Army published the COIN Operations Doctrine (Field
Manual 3-07.22) in 2004 and Tactics for COIN Operations (Field Manual
3-24) in 2009, and has maximized opportunities to codify lessons
learned in handbook publications and on-line reference sites from the
Center for Army Lessons Learned, as well as institutionalizing the
cross-service exchange of information and lessons learned as a result
of the Joint/Army Lessons Learned Forums. We have defined the future
environment as one which entails a hybrid threat. Therefore, combat
training centers encompass decisive action, unless otherwise directed.
This training will develop the skills for not only offense and defense,
but also stability operations (including COIN).

122. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, how will the Army ensure the
current force retains and passes on to future Army leaders their COIN
know-how?
General Odierno. The Army published COIN Operations Doctrine (Field
Manual 3-07.22) in 2004 and Tactics for COIN Operations (Field Manual
3-24) in 2009, and has maximized opportunities to codify lessons
learned in handbook publications and on-line reference sites from the
Center for Army Lessons Learned, as well as institutionalizing the
cross-service exchange of information and lessons learned as a result
of the Joint/Army Lessons Learned Forums. The Army will continue to
benefit from the experiences of our soldiers and leaders as they
embrace increasing responsibilities over the next few years as small-
unit leaders, doctrine writers, and institutional trainers. We have
defined the future environment as one which entails a hybrid threat.
Therefore, combat training centers encompass decisive action, unless
otherwise directed. This training will develop the skills for not only
offense and defense, but also stability operations (including COIN).

123. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, based on your experience in
Iraq, what are the most important lessons you learned about COIN
operations?
General Odierno. My experiences in Iraq have taught me that war is
a human endeavor, and that the human dimension of conflict is as
important, if not more important, than other considerations. Our
soldiers must understand culture, religion, history, political and
social dynamics, and economics in order to prevail.
Second, we must deal with the challenge of hybrid warfare. In the
future, the Army will operate in environments with regular military,
irregular paramilitary or civilian adversaries, with the potential for
terrorism, criminality, and other complications. Our leaders and
soldiers must understand and adapt to a complex future in which the
ability to distinguish between friend and foe will be increasingly
difficult and experience and judgment will be more important than
simply technical solutions. The Army will retain and integrate into its
training what we have learned over the last decade about the changing
nature of conflict.
Third, we will not fight alone. As a rule, we will fight in
coalitions, and these coalitions will include civil agencies and
nongovernmental organizations as key components or partners. We must
continue to build on the interagency and multinational experiences we
have gained in the last decade.
Fourth, an important lesson is that the American soldier remains
the most discriminately lethal force on the battlefield. Any activity a
soldier undertakes can rapidly evolve into a combination of combat,
governance, and civil support missions. Any individual, military or
civilian, can alter the trajectory of an operation with the push of a
button on a cell phone. Not only do our own actions receive immediate
international coverage, but technology allows our adversaries to shape
the narrative to their advantage, often with little regard for the
truth. Our soldiers must remain able to operate comfortably within this
exceptionally complex arena.
As our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrate, it
is difficult to imagine any future situation in which a relationship
exists solely between two states, whether an alliance or a conflict.
Other regional actors can and will seek to advance their own interests
in every situation and have more tools at their disposal to do so.
Sometimes they will work in concert with our objectives, but at other
times we may be in opposition. Regardless of the path they choose, our
actions must be informed by an awareness of these dynamics. The
evolving complexities of the environment require us to adapt.

SEQUESTRATION'S IMPACT ON TRAINING AND WAR PLANS

124. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, what training events have
already been canceled?
General Odierno. For all but our deploying and higher-priority
contingency forces, training events and activities above squad-level
were curtailed in the latter half of fiscal year 2013. Cancelled
training included seven maneuver CTC rotations, which train BCTs to
maneuver and synchronize live fire; eight Mission Command Training
Program Warfighter Exercises, which train staffs of BCTs to command and
control the brigade; and support for a Warfighter Exercise for one Army
Service Component Command Headquarters. We still have a $3.1 billion
shortfall which will cause us to cancel institutional training if
additional resources are not found.

125. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, if sequestration continues
into next year, will more training events have to be canceled?
General Odierno. Yes. Continued cancellation of training events can
be expected until appropriations better align with programming and
budget requirements. It will take some time for the Army to rebalance
readiness components: manning, equipping, training, facilities,
services, force structure, and current and future readiness. In fiscal
year 2014, the Army will continue to do its best to ensure deploying
and high-priority contingency forces are prepared, but training events
for other forces will be significantly curtailed since the lack of
training in fiscal year 2013 will be compounded by another degradation
in readiness in fiscal year 2014. We are working within appropriation
guidelines and Army readiness priorities to find support for these
training events.

126. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, would you agree that not
providing our soldiers the very best training represents a breach of
faith with our soldiers, their families, and the American people?
General Odierno. It is our solemn responsibility to ensure that
American soldiers are prepared, trained, ready, and well-led whenever
our Nation might call on them. We remain committed to the current fight
and dedicated to ensuring our forces receive the best training,
equipment, and support possible. In 1976, I entered a hollowed Army
that was not well-trained and did not have the resources necessary to
buy equipment. I am absolutely focused on making sure I do not leave
this Army in the same way that I came into it. We must ensure that we
resource our soldiers much with the proper resources to conduct the
missions we have asked them to do.
We're making sure that those who are deploying are fully trained.
Those who will next deploy will be trained, but that's at the expense
of not training of the rest of the Army. We're no longer able to build
readiness up under current budget constraints. The unfortunate reality
is that we now lack the resources to train simultaneously for future
contingencies. We are accepting risk when we only have enough resources
to train for the current demands for forces. This leaves us unprepared
for unforeseen contingencies. We are sacrificing readiness to achieve
reductions inside the short period of the fiscal year; unfortunately,
readiness can't ever be brought back, because there is a time component
to readiness. So we are now going to go through a period where we have
to make sure that we're able to buy back as much readiness as possible,
or we're going to have a severe problem over the next 2 or 3 years,
especially if the sequestration cuts are not addressed.

ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE

127. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, do you believe it is in
America's interests to maintain a significant U.S. Army presence in
Europe? If so, why?
General Odierno. Yes. First, with a GDP of $19 trillion--a quarter
of the world economy--and approximately $4 trillion in annual trade
with the United States, Europe's importance to the U.S. and global
economies cannot be overstated. Second, the European theater remains
critical geostrategic terrain, providing the United States with the
global access it needs to conduct worldwide operations and crisis
response. Third, Europe is home to most of the world's liberal
democracies; nations with whom we share the fundamental values that are
critical elements in building effective coalitions. Fourth, Europe is
the backdrop for NATO, history's most successful and effective
alliance, and a vital partner for dealing with the challenges of the
21st century. Fifth, Europe is a security exporter, possessing among
the most highly trained and technologically advanced militaries in the
world.

128. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, how does a U.S. Army presence
in Europe benefit U.S. national security?
General Odierno. Europe provides the critical access and
infrastructure to meet the DSG's priorities and expand U.S. global
reach across half the world, to Europe and on to Eurasia, Africa, and
the Middle East.

BREAKING FAITH

129. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, in your prepared statement,
you state that sequester may ``compel actions that break faith with our
soldiers, civilians, and families.'' What specific kinds of actions
would the Army be forced to take that would ``break faith''?
General Odierno. In the near-term, the upcoming furloughs for our
civilian employees, while temporary, will disrupt lives, impact Army
operations, and may cause financial burdens on our civilians and their
families. In addition, the ripple effect of further force reductions
beyond the current program of 490,000 by fiscal year 2017 will create a
situation forcing the Army to separate fully qualified soldiers.
Reductions in overstrength skills and grades will also force out some
of our best qualified personnel. While the Army will provide a robust
package of benefits including transition assistance, involuntary
separation pay, and early retirement for eligible soldiers who are
selected for involuntary separation, the inevitable result will be that
good soldiers will be denied continued service. Such difficult
decisions will undoubtedly disrupt the lives of certain soldiers, some
with deployment experience, who had every intention of continuing their
military careers. Since compensation is such a large portion of the
budget, it will be very hard to exempt it from reductions needed to
meet sequestration. As a result, soldiers who remain in the Army could
well face lower compensation and health benefits packages.

SIZE OF THE ARMY

130. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, based on your professional
military judgment, the threats to our country, current war plans, and
the DSG, what do you believe should be the floor for U.S. Army end
strength?
General Odierno. The BCA of 2011 imposed caps on discretionary
spending that required a $487 billion reduction in planned defense
spending over 10 years. As a result of these spending cuts and in line
with the DSG announced in January 2012, we are reducing Active Army end
strength from a wartime high of about 570,000 to 490,000, the Army
National Guard from 358,200 to 350,000, the Army Reserve from 206,000
to 205,000 and the civilian workforce from 272,000 to 255,000. Army
analysis indicates that at 490,000, we will maintain sufficient
capability for the Active component to meet the anticipated range of
potential future missions envisioned in the new defense strategy.
Anything below 490,000 would threaten our ability to meet the National
Strategic Guidance.

[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:32 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, Sessions, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
general counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member;
and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; Allen M. Edwards,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and John L.
Principato.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs,
assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
Senator Shaheen; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator
Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen
Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant
to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to Senator
McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd
Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Brad Bowman, assistant
to Senator Ayotte; and Craig Abele, assistant to Senator
Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, General Amos to our
committee to testify on the plans and programs of the
Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year 2014
annual budget request. We very much appreciate your willingness
to accommodate this early starting time for our hearing. It's
my goal to conclude the hearing in time for members to attend
an all-Senators briefing at 10:30 a.m. this morning, and in
order to do that we're going to have to have a shorter first
round when we come to that of either 6 or 7 minutes to give
everybody a chance, depending on when that first round begins.
We're grateful to each of you for your service to the
Nation and for the truly professional service of the men and
women that you work with. We're very grateful to their
families, all of your families, knowing as you do the vital
role that families play in the success of the men and women of
our Armed Forces.
This year the defense budget situation is particularly
challenging. The sequestration required by the Budget Control
Act (BCA) for fiscal year 2013 is already having an adverse
impact on the Navy and the Marine Corps in the form of deferred
maintenance, reduced steaming, and flying hours. The problem
will get dramatically worse in fiscal years 2014 and beyond,
and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on how
this fiscal situation is likely to affect personnel, readiness,
modernization, and our operations overseas.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) most recent strategic
guidance, issued in January 2012, refocuses the U.S. military
on the Asia-Pacific region. Consistent with that strategy, DOD
has been working to realign U.S. military forces in South Korea
and Japan and plans to position Navy and Marine Corps forces
further to the south in Australia, Singapore, and possibly
elsewhere.
The Department has also begun implementing a plan to deploy
forward more ships, as shown by the beginning of the Navy's
first rotational deployment of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
the USS Freedom, to Singapore in the past few weeks.
As we rebalance and realign our presence in the Asia-
Pacific region, it is important that we not only get the
strategy right, but that we also ensure that it is sustainable.
With respect to the planned realignment of U.S. marines
currently on Okinawa, Senator McCain, former Senator Webb, and
I advocated changes to the 2006 U.S.-Japan realignment roadmap
plan to better support U.S. strategic goals in the region while
also accounting for the fiscal, political, and diplomatic
realities associated with long-term sustainability.
The April 2012 joint U.S.-Japan announcement of changes to
the 2006 plan reflected an appreciation by both governments of
the need to make adjustments in order to support the goal of
achieving a more viable and sustainable U.S. Marine Corps
presence in Japan, Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. The Department
is currently working to develop the details of this new plan,
so the final construction schedule and total cost are not yet
known. After we receive that plan, we will be in a position to
judge it. But until that plan is forthcoming, the committee has
deferred action on associated requirements until the conditions
that we set are met.
Even in the absence of sequestration, the DOD authorization
request raises significant issues. For example, should we
increase the cost cap for the aircraft carrier CVN-78? Should
we approve the multi-year procurement authority for the E-2D
surveillance aircraft? Should we authorize advance
appropriations for the SSN-774 Virginia-class submarine?
For many years the committee has expressed concern about
Navy ship force levels which have consistently fallen short of
the projected needs. At the same time, Navy and Marine Corps
aviation force levels are also under pressure. The budget
provides for a service life extension program on some 150 F-18
aircraft already in the inventory and for the purchase of
additional E/A-18G electronic warfare aircraft to support land-
based electronic warfare squadrons, but would end the
acquisition and production of new F-18 aircraft. The budget
also sustains planned purchases of the Marine Corps and Navy
versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft and,
while it is encouraging that the Navy is now predicting a
strike fighter shortfall of only 18 aircraft compared to
earlier projections as high as 250 aircraft, I suspect that
estimate will be significantly impacted by sequestration.
The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009
requires that the DOD make significant changes to avoid the
kind of costly delays and overruns that have plagued our
acquisition system in the past. While this legislation should
help correct past problems, I know that we will succeed only
through concerted efforts within the executive branch to
implement that legislation, and we look forward to hearing from
our witnesses as to how the Department of the Navy is
implementing the provisions of the WSARA of 2009.
Finally, I want to commend you, Secretary Mabus, for your
efforts to lead on energy efficiency and energy self-reliance.
You have placed a strong emphasis on an area where, as strong
as our military forces may be, we remain subject to the tyranny
of energy supplies. You have put deeds behind the commitment to
a more sustainable Navy and the Nation is stronger for it.
Our witnesses this morning face huge challenges as they
strive to balance modernization needs against the costs of
supporting ongoing operations and sustaining readiness in the
face of across-the-board cuts from sequestration. Those
challenges are made all the more important by the fact that we
continue to have roughly 7,000 marines in Helmand Province in
Afghanistan and thousands more Navy and Marine Corps personnel
deployed elsewhere around the world.
We appreciate everything that you do and the men and women
of the Navy and the Marine Corps do every day what they do to
meet the challenges that this Nation faces.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me thank all three witnesses for sharing
your valuable time with me personally. It was actually helpful
to me, Secretary Mabus, with some of the areas where I thought
I would have more disagreement with you, and that's changed.
You'll have a chance to cover those things.
I think, Mr. Chairman, you've covered the budget comments
that I would have made adequately. Our ability to meet our 30-
year shipbuilding goal and recapitalize our sea-based nuclear
deterrent will greatly depend upon budget certainty. It's the
certainty that's important, I believe.
The Navy needs a sustained level of investment topping $20
billion by 2021 and maintaining that level for the following 10
years. More importantly, this assumes that DOD can finally
control the runaway cost overruns in ship construction. We are
not on the right track to accomplish that at this time.
The Navy's largest research and development (R&D) program
in fiscal year 2014 is the Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine replacement program. A failure to recapitalize our
at-sea deterrent on time would have devastating impacts. I
encourage the Navy to aggressively continue to reduce risk and
emphasize affordability of this program.
The Navy also needs a sustained level of funding for
readiness, training, and shipyard maintenance to keep a
majority of the fleet fully mission capable. Sequestration in
2013 has resulted in a $4 billion operation and maintenance
(O&M) shortfall and a $6 billion investment shortfall. In
addition, the Navy has not budgeted for over the $700 million
in unscheduled ship repairs resulting from a series of sea
accidents, sabotage, and major equipment failures. I think you
have to budget for these things because these are going to
happen.
The Navy just released a report stating that shipyards are
in such poor shape that at the current funding rate it would
take 17 years just to clear the backlog of critical facility
repairs that have been identified to date. Further, the Navy
announced in January 2013 yet another reduction in its
requirement for Navy combatant vessels, from 313 to 306. Then
the budget request for fiscal year 2014 goes even further and
accelerates the retirement of 16 ships, reducing the combatant
force structure to an all-time low of 273, down from 289. I
suspect that we'll hear some comments about that in opening
remarks. If not, there'll be some questions.
In addition, while DOD has identified a requirement for 33
amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, the Navy only had
22 of those ships actually available and fully mission capable
and ready to go last year.
Marine Corps readiness continues to be a significant
concern. Similar to other Services, the Marine Corps has
rightfully prioritized deployment and next-to-deploy marines in
the O&M accounts. This is at the expense of non-deployed units
and has already resulted in a degradation of the Marine Corps
readiness.
By the beginning of calendar year 2014, approximately 50
percent of Marine Corps ground and aviation units will be below
acceptable mission readiness levels. Of course, readiness,
risk, and lives are all tied together.
This all comes down to risk. As the world is becoming more
dangerous, our Navy and Marine Corps are becoming less capable
and less prepared. We're going down a path where readiness and
capability are being cut at such a rate, as General Dempsey has
said, will soon be at a point where it would be immoral to use
this force.
So we have problems and I'm looking forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Mabus, welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR.,
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking Member Inhofe,
and distinguished members of this committee. I first want to
thank you for your support for the Department of the Navy, for
our sailors, our marines, our civilians, and our families.
General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and
Admiral Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, and I could
not be prouder to represent those steadfast and courageous
sailors, marines, and civilians. No matter what missions are
given to them, no matter what hardships are asked of them,
these men and women serve the Nation around the world with
skill and dedication.
In the past year the Navy and Marine Corps team has
continued to conduct a full range of military operations, from
combat in Afghanistan to security cooperation missions in the
Pacific to disaster recovery operations on the streets of
Staten Island. In each one of these, sailors and marines have
gotten the job done.
As the United States transitions from two land wars in
Central Asia to the maritime-centric defense strategy that was
referenced by the chairman and which was announced 15 months
ago, our naval forces will be absolutely critical in the years
ahead. This strategy, which focuses on the Western Pacific, the
Arabian Gulf, and continuing to build partnerships around the
world, requires a forward-deployed, flexible, multi-mission
force that is the Navy and Marine Corps, America's away team.
Within this strategy we have to balance our missions with
our resources. We're working under Secretary Hagel's leadership
on a strategic choices and management review to assess how we
deal with budget uncertainty facing the Department as we go
forward. He has directed us to review the basic assumptions
that drive the Department's investment in force structure, to
identify institutional reforms that may be required, including,
as we always should, those reforms that should be pursued
regardless of fiscal pressures. As he said during recent
testimony, everything will be on the table during this review.
2013 has been hard because we began the fiscal year
operating under a Continuing Resolution that gave us little
room to be strategic and to prioritize, limiting our ability to
manage the Navy and Marine Corps through this new fiscal
reality.
Thanks to the efforts of this committee and to your
congressional colleagues, we have an appropriations bill for
this fiscal year. However, sequestration is still forcing us,
as also mentioned by the chairman and the ranking member, to
make across-the-board cuts totaling more than $4 billion from
our O&M accounts and about $6 billion from our investment
accounts.
These cuts will have some real impacts. We've prioritized
combat operations in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
deployments to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). However, we've had
to cancel a number of deployments into U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM). In order to maintain our priority deployments in
2013 and 2014 and to meet our global force management
allocation plan, funding shortfalls will cause our units back
home to cut back on training and maintenance. Pilots will get
less flight time, ships will have less time at sea, and marines
will have less time in the field. It will take longer for
repair parts to arrive when needed. Our facilities ashore will
be maintained at a far lower level.
The Department's 2014 budget request is a return to a
measured budget approach, one based on strategy that protects
the warfighters by advancing the priorities I've referred to as
four Ps: people, platforms, power, and partnerships.
We're working to make sure our people are resilient and
strong after more than a decade of a very high operations
tempo. We're doing this with programs like 21st Century Sailor
and Marine Initiative. With this program we aim to bring all
the efforts on protection and readiness, on fitness and
inclusion, and the continuum of service, together as one
coherent whole. This encompasses a wide range of issues from
preventing sexual assault and suicide to fostering a culture of
fitness to strengthening the force through diversity to
ensuring a successful transition following 4 years of service
or 40.
In the Marine Corps, we continue decreasing manpower to
meet our new end strength of just over 182,000 marines by
fiscal year 2016. But we're doing this in a way to keep faith
with the marines and to help retain the right level of
noncommissioned officers (NCO) and field grade officers and
their experience.
We're working to make sure that our sailors and marines
have the tools and the platforms they need to do the missions
they are given. One of the most important of these is our
fleet. On September 11, 2001, the U.S. Navy had 316 ships. By
2008, after one of the largest buildups in our Nation's
military history, that number was down to 278 ships. In 2008
the Navy put only three ships under contract, far too few to
maintain the size of the fleet or our industrial base, and many
of our shipbuilding programs were over budget, behind schedule,
or both.
One of my main priorities as Secretary has been to reverse
those trends. Today, the fleet is stabilized and the problems
in most of our shipbuilding programs have been corrected or
arrested. We have 47 ships under contract today, 43 of which
were contracted since I took office, and our current
shipbuilding plan puts us on track for 300 ships in the fleet
by 2019.
The way we power our ships and our installations has always
been a core and vital issue for the Department of the Navy. We
continue to lead in energy as we have throughout our history.
From sail to coal to oil to nuclear, the Navy has led in moving
to new sources of power, and every time it has made us a better
warfighting force.
Today, from marines making power in the field to
alternatives on land, on and under the sea, and in the air, the
Navy and Marine Corps are powering innovations that will
maintain our operational edge.
Building partnerships, interoperabiity, capacity, and
capability is a crucial component of this defense strategy. The
strategy directs that these partnerships be pursued in a low-
cost, small-footprint, innovative way. This is exactly what the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps do. The process we use to craft the
Department of the Navy's budget was determined, deliberate, and
dedicated to our responsibility to you and to the taxpayers.
Like the budget resolutions of both the Senate and the House,
we do not assume in this budget that sequestration will
continue in fiscal year 2014.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the budget we
are submitting supports the defense strategy. It preserves the
readiness of our people and it builds on the success we've
achieved in shipbuilding. For 237 years our maritime warriors
have established a proven record as an agile and adaptable
force. Forward deployed, we remain the most responsive option
to defend the American people and our interests.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Ray Mabus

Chairman Levin and Ranking Senator Inhofe, and members of the
committee, today I have the privilege of appearing on behalf of the
sailors, marines, and civilians who make up the Department of the Navy.
This is the fifth time that I have been honored to report on the
readiness, posture, progress, and budgetary requests of the Department.
With my shipmates--Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos,
and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert--I take
great pride in the opportunity to both lead and serve the dedicated men
and women of the Department. This statement, together with the posture
statements provided by CNO Greenert and Commandant Amos, present a
comprehensive overview of the state of the Department of the Navy.
For 237 years the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have been deployed
around the globe, conducting missions across the full spectrum of
military operations. Whether ashore, in the air, on or under the
world's oceans, or in the vast cyberspace, The Navy-Marine Corps team
operates forward, as America's ``Away Team,'' to protect our national
interests, respond to crises, deter conflict, prevent war or, when
necessary, fight and win. The past year has been no different. Among
myriad missions, our sailors and marines have continued to conduct
combat operations in Afghanistan; maritime stability and security
operations around Africa; ballistic missile defense with our allies in
Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific; and humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief missions from the archipelagos of Southeast Asia to
the streets of Staten Island.
Today, we continue to transition from a decade of war and
counterinsurgency ashore to a time of increased global uncertainty.
Eighty percent of the world's population live a short distance from the
sea and 90 percent of global trade moves by sea, so our naval forces
play a vital role in delivering the security needed to help address
today's global challenges. The Nation's Defense Strategic Guidance, as
announced by President Obama, directs focus toward the maritime-centric
regions of Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf and uses innovative, low-
cost, light footprint engagements in other regions. These are tasks
tailor made for the Navy-Marine Corps Team. The Commandant, CNO, and I
are confident that with proper resourcing, the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps will meet today's and tomorrow's missions.
Almost a century ago the United States began a fruitful period of
profound military development between the First and Second World Wars.
Vice Admiral William Sims, commander of our naval forces in England
during World War I, wrote that ``we must be on our guard against the
dangers of a lack of vision.'' As then, strategic thinking and
innovative development of our operating concepts will be central to our
success now and in the future. The ability to think and adapt to
changes in the fiscal and operational environment has been and will be
the key to the success of American naval forces.
The Department of the Navy has a proven track record of effective
and efficient management of our Nation's most important maritime
resources: people, platforms, power, and partnerships. The most
resilient and capable force in our history protects the Nation. In the
past 4 years, we have stabilized the size of the Fleet, and we are
building more capable ships with greater accountability and at a better
value to the taxpayer and we are on a trajectory to restore the Fleet
to 300 ships by 2019. The Navy and Marine Corps are seeking ways to
lessen dependence on fossil fuel and volatile oil prices, some of our
greatest military vulnerabilities, by using more efficient and varied
forms of power. We are building and maintaining the global partnerships
that are so critical to the Navy and Marine Corps' ability to project
power throughout the world through forward deployment. As we sail into
a new maritime century, the Navy and Marine Corps team is the most
formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 2012

Operational tempo in 2012 was high. On a daily basis, almost half
the fleet was at sea and more than 70,000 sailors and marines were
deployed; our Reserve components mobilized over 3,700 sailors and 5,000
marines to support operations. Our forces conducted combat and maritime
security operations, bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises with our
international partners, and humanitarian assistance missions.
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
The Asia-Pacific is fundamentally a maritime region, and over 50
percent of the world's population and the world's five largest Armed
Forces lie within the operating area of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
Emphasizing our existing alliances while also expanding our networks of
cooperation with emerging partners is central to the defense strategy
articulated by the President in January 2012. Our mission is to provide
security with combat ready units, demonstrated by the forward basing in
Japan of USS George Washington and her strike group as well as the USS
Bonhomme Richard amphibious ready group and 31st Marine Expeditionary
Unit. Destroyer Squadron 15 continues to conduct Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) patrols that contribute significantly to this mission.
When North Korea conducted launches using ballistic missile technology
in both April 2012 and December 2012, our ships were on scene to
monitor the situation and defend our forces and allies if needed.
The first Marine rotational force arrived in Darwin, Australia
early last year. The marines, part of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) soon after embarked USS Germantown and began operations in
the region. Working with naval assets like the destroyer USS Lassen and
the submarine USS Buffalo the marines participated in the longstanding
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises with a
number of our allies and partners including Thailand, Singapore and
Bangladesh. Marines from 3rd MEF also participated in Mongolia's Khaan
Quest 2013 exercise as part of a joint force that included the U.S.
Army. The multinational exercise started 10 years ago as a bi-lateral
training opportunity between U.S. Marines and Mongolian forces and has
grown to include participants from 10 countries.
Exercise Malabar, an annual bi-lateral exercise between U.S. and
Indian Forces, continued to expand in 2012 and comprised training in
numerous mission areas including maritime security operations and
strike missions. U.S. units, including the USS Carl Vinson strike
group, conducted operations both at sea and ashore with our partners
from the Indian Navy. In cooperation with the armed forces of the
Philippines in 2012 we expanded our annual Balikatan exercise to
include 20 participating partners from the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN). This year's exercise focused on Humanitarian
Assistance, Search and Rescue, and helped develop interoperability with
the participating forces.
In 2012 our west coast hospital ship, USNS Mercy executed a 5-month
Pacific Partnership humanitarian assistance deployment, conducting
medical and civic assistance missions in Indonesia, Vietnam, the
Republic of the Philippines, and Cambodia. Pacific Partnership began as
a humanitarian response to one of the world's most catastrophic natural
disasters, the 2004 tsunami that devastated parts of Southeast Asia.
The Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group and marines from the 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted Exercise Crocodilo with the Defense
Forces of Timor-Leste, demonstrating the importance of working with all
partner nations, no matter the size of their naval forces, which share
our commitment to peace and security.
Our largest operation in the Pacific this year was the biennial Rim
of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). The largest maritime exercise in the
world, RIMPAC in 2012 had participants from 22 nations, including for
the first time the Russian Navy. RIMPAC provides a unique training
opportunity that helps foster and sustain the cooperative relationships
that are critical to maritime safety and security not only in the
Pacific, but across the globe. This year's exercise also displayed the
Navy's commitment to energy security with the Great Green Fleet
demonstration. USNS Henry J. Kaiser conducted an underway replenishment
with USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, and USS Chung-Hoon,
refueling all the ships and types of aircraft in the Nimitz Strike
Group with a 50/50 blend of advanced biofuels and petroleum-based
fossil fuels. Every type of aircraft that flew from the strike group
flew on this blend and all the surface ships sailed on this blend. No
engines were changed in any way. This demonstrated the effectiveness
and seamlessness of the use of advanced biofuels during operations at
sea.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Marines and sailors, Active and Reserve, remain engaged in
operations in Afghanistan. They have denied the Taliban safe haven and
substantially calmed the violent Helmand Province. Along with Coalition
partners from eight nations and the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), Marines have succeeded in pushing enemy initiated attacks
outside populated areas, diminishing the enemy's ability to disrupt
governance efforts by Afghans and bringing increased security to
population centers.
As 9,000 marines have been drawn down in Helmand over the course of
the year, our forces there helped to standup the 215th Corps of the
Afghan National Army as well as units of the Afghan National Police and
Afghan Local Police. Through these efforts, ANSF has increasingly taken
responsibility for securing this area. ANSF units currently conduct 80
percent of operations on their own while leading 85 percent of all
operations in Helmand Province.
Aircraft from Carrier Strike Groups in the Indian Ocean conducted
thousands of sorties supporting combat operations in Afghanistan with
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and close air
support. With two Carrier Strike Groups in the region for much of the
year, regular flight operations were also conducted in the Arabian
Gulf. USS Ponce also deployed to the region to demonstrate and employ
the capabilities of our future Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB).
Off the Horn of Africa, we continue to work with partners in
Combined Task Force 151 and other counter-piracy missions. Primarily as
a result of these efforts, there was a dramatic drop in the number of
pirate attacks during 2012. While the primary purpose and goal of
counter-piracy operations is to enhance maritime security in the
region, an additional benefit is the development of operational
relationships with a wide range of partners. For example, in September
USS Winston S. Churchill conducted exercises to expand counter-piracy
expertise and promote interoperability with the Chinese frigate Yi
Yang, the first bilateral exercise of its kind between the navies of
the United States and the People's Republic of China.

European Command/Africa Command/Southern Command (EUCOM/AFRICOM/
SOUTHCOM)
U.S. Navy ships teamed with 11 European and African partners for
Phoenix Express 2012, a maritime security exercise in the
Mediterranean. AEGIS ships in EUCOM continued their BMD patrols for the
European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense and planning
continues to forward base four guided missile destroyers in Rota,
Spain. The High Speed Vessel (HSV) Swift circumnavigated Africa for
African Partnership Station, making 20 port calls to conduct security
cooperation missions and humanitarian assistance. Marines from Special
Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Africa trained
counterterrorism forces and provided support to forces across the
Maghreb region of North Africa.
In the Caribbean, western Atlantic, and eastern Pacific work
continued with our regional partners to counter transnational organized
crime. Aircraft from Helicopter Anti-Submarine (Light) and Carrier
Airborne Early Warning squadrons flew detection and monitoring missions
while our ships, working with the U.S. Coast Guard, helped confiscate
millions of dollars of illegal drugs and illicit cargo.
Southern Partnership Station provided both military to military
training opportunities and humanitarian assistance missions to
countries in Central and South America. The Navy also supported the
annual Unitas exercises, multinational naval exercises designed to
enhance security cooperation and improve coalition operations. Unitas
exercises are typically conducted annually in Atlantic and Pacific
waters around South America, and in 2012 U.S. Southern Command
conducted bilateral training opportunities with nations including
Guatemala, Honduras, and Belize. Panamax, the annual U.S. Southern
Command-sponsored multinational exercise series, focused in 2012 on
ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal. Personnel from 17 nations,
including the United States, participated in simulated training
scenarios from various U.S. locations.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
When Hurricane Sandy came ashore in October, the Navy and Marine
Corps immediately gathered resources to support the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal agencies in the response to
this disaster. USS Wasp, USS San Antionio, USS Carter Hall, and USNS
Kanawha steamed to the coast of New York and New Jersey and became
logistics bases for relief efforts following the storm, working in
concert with units deployed to Lakehurst Naval Air Station in central
New Jersey. Marines from 26th MEU went ashore from Wasp at Staten
Island to clear debris and reopen streets, while Seabees ran supply
convoys into hard hit areas and set up generators, removed beach sand
from city streets, pumped over a million gallons of water from homes
and removed tons of debris. Sailors from Mobile Diving and Salvage
Units worked with FEMA and State officials in dewatering the World
Trade Center site and the New York subway system, while members of the
Coastal Riverine force cooperated with FEMA at the Hoboken Ferry
Terminal to restore service.
Our sea-based strategic deterrent force of ballistic missile
submarines continues to provide the most survivable leg of the Nation's
strategic deterrent triad. For 50 years, and for more than 4,000
strategic patrols, our Navy's submarine force has patrolled,
undetected, below the sea. Our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
promote global stability and provide credible and reliable deterrence.
There are countless other examples of Navy and Marine Corps units
on, above and under the seas, on land both in the United States and in
every corner of the globe, standing watch protecting this Nation.

DEVELOPING CAPABILITIES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

The 21st century presents us with new challenges or threats to both
our national security and to global stability. The Navy and Marine
Corps are working to develop new concepts and capabilities that will
help address sophisticated anti access/area denial (A2/AD) networks,
irregular and cyber threats, and the proliferation of precision guided
munitions. The Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army are working
together to implement the Air-Sea Battle concept, which seeks to
improve integration of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace
forces. The Navy and Marine Corps are also developing the concept of an
integrated battle force, taking many of the lessons we have learned
about joint and combined operations, combining them with the results of
exercises like Bold Alligator 2012, the largest amphibious exercise in
over a decade which was conducted on the coast of North Carolina in
early 2012, and developing new frameworks for naval warfare and
expeditionary operations.

Air-Sea Battle
In order to ensure that U.S. forces remain able to project power on
behalf of American interests, the Departments of the Navy, Air Force,
and Army continue to develop the Air-Sea Battle concept and its
capabilities. The Air-Sea Battle Office, jointly manned by all four
Services, is working on a series of initiatives to achieve the
capabilities and integration required in future joint forces so that
combatant commanders have the tools they need, delivered with the most
efficient use of resources. Air-Sea Battle is building on the lessons
learned by the joint force over the past three decades to enhance
efficiency while confronting the challenge of A2/AD systems in all
theaters of operations.
The Navy continues to work on the integration of advanced air and
cruise missile defense capabilities, the development of BMD
enhancements, and ``soft-kill'' capability. A new generation of Anti-
Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) remains a priority, which will increase the
range and speed at which we can engage enemy surface combatants, the
most capable of which are armed with advanced ASCMs. We are also
developing the Virginia Payload Module for the Virginia-class
submarines, to mitigate the loss of the undersea strike capacity of our
guided missile submarines when they retire in the mid-2020s.

DEFENDING FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

By custom, experience and treaty the traditional concept of freedom
of the seas for all nations has developed over centuries. This vital
part of the global order has been codified within the Law of the Sea
Convention (LOS Convention). The DOD and the Navy continue to strongly
support this important treaty. The LOS Convention guarantees rights
such as innocent passage through territorial seas; transit passage
through, under and over international straits; and the laying and
maintaining of submarine cables. Nearly every maritime power and all
the permanent members of the UN Security Council except the United
States have ratified the convention. Our absence as a Party weakens our
position and impacts our military, diplomatic, and economic efforts
worldwide. Remaining outside the LOS Convention also undercuts our
ability to challenge expansive jurisdictional claims that, if
unchallenged, could undermine our ability to exercise our navigational
rights and freedoms, conduct routine naval operations in international
waters, and provide support to our allies. Additionally, only as a
Party to the Convention can the United States fully secure its
sovereign rights to the vast resources of our continental shelf beyond
200 miles from shore. The uniformed and civilian leaders of the
Department strongly support accession to the LOS Convention.

DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITIES

Maintaining the world's most capable expeditionary fighting force
means developing our Navy and Marine Corps as a strategic asset that
provides our Commander in Chief with the broadest range of options in a
dynamic and complex global security environment. As Secretary, I
continue to charge the Department to focus on four key priorities:
people, platforms, power, and partnerships, by ensuring we do the
following:

Support our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families;
Strengthen shipbuilding and the industrial base; Promote
acquisition excellence and integrity; Continue development and
deployment of unmanned systems;
Recognize energy as a strategic national security issue; and
Build partner capacity to help distribute the burden of
securing the global maritime domain based on alliances, shared
values, and mutual trust.

From training our newest midshipmen and recruits, to supporting
ongoing operations in Central Asia and the Pacific, to preparing for
the future force, these principles will guide the Department in all of
its many tasks.
Supporting our sailors, marines, and their families
Operational tempo is high and getting higher. The Bataan Amphibious
Ready Group and 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit's spent almost 11 months
at sea, the longest amphibious deployment since World War II. Personnel
with John Stennis Carrier Strike Group spent only 5 months at home
between her two most recent 7-month deployments. Sailors, marines,
civilians, and their families are being asked to do more with less, and
it is the job of the Department's civilian and military leaders to
provide them with the resources to maintain readiness, both physically
and mentally, and to support families while loved ones are forward
deployed.
The naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan once wrote
that being ready for naval operations ``consists not so much in the
building of ships and guns as it does in the possession of trained
men.'' The Department is committed to our most important asset and the
most critical combat payload for our ships, aircraft, and units
ashore--our people. Over the last 4 years, I have visited with sailors
and marines deployed in 96 countries across the globe. When our U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps team is on the job, they are far from home and
from the people they serve. One of my core missions is to remind them
we are grateful for their service, and humbled by their sacrifice.
Pay and benefits are the most tangible example of our commitment to
our sailors and marines, and an important focus for the Department. The
President's budget includes a 1 percent pay raise for sailors and
marines. The amount of this raise reflects the commitment to our
sailors and marines, while adhering to the current budget constraints
faced by DOD. We support the modest TRICARE fee increase in the fiscal
year 2014 budget, which Congress has allowed the Department of Defense
to link to CPI to help ensure an efficient and fair benefit cost, as
well as efforts to introduce efficiency and cost savings into military
pharmacies. These are important steps that help us introduce reform to
the Department's personnel costs. The promise of a military retirement
is one of the solemn pledges we make to compensate our servicemembers
when they volunteer for a full career. However, it is time for a review
of this system. We fully support Congress' establishment of the
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission to
conduct a comprehensive review of military compensation and retirement
systems. The commission must maintain a focus on ensuring any suggested
changes support the required force profiles of the services. Keeping
faith with those currently serving is a high priority, and the
Commission and Congress should ensure that any resulting reforms
protect our current servicemembers through grandfathering those who
prefer the current retirement structure.
We must manage resources to ensure support for the most combat
effective and the most resilient force in history. The standards are
high, and we owe sailors, marines, and civilians the services they need
to meet those standards. I am very proud of the dedicated service
provided by our civilian workforce, who despite economic sacrifices,
continue to deliver outstanding products and services in support of the
Navy mission. The continued development of the 21st Century Sailor and
Marine Initiative will help ensure that sailors and marines maximize
their professional and personal readiness with initiatives that cut
across previously stove-piped programs. In March 2012, aboard USS
Bataan, I outlined the five ``pillars'' of the 21st century sailor and
marine which are: readiness and protection, safety, physical fitness,
inclusion, and the continuum of service.
Readiness and protection will ensure sailors, marines, and their
families are prepared to handle the mental and emotional rigors of
Military Service. Ensuring the readiness of the force includes
continuing campaigns by both Services to deglamorize, treat, and track
alcohol abuse.
It also means maintaining the standard of zero tolerance for sexual
assault. The Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO)
is responsible for keeping the health and safety of our sailors and
marines at the forefront. SAPRO has developed training initiatives,
opened new lines of communication, and worked to ensure that offenders
are held accountable while reducing the number of attacks. In the last
year, SAPRO conducted dozens of site visits to Navy and Marine Corps
installations worldwide. Their sexual assault prevention programs for
leadership reached over 5,000 Navy and Marine officers and senior
enlisted personnel at eight operational concentration sites.
Simultaneously, live-acted and vignette-based programs, emphasizing the
importance of bystander intervention in preventing sexual assault, were
presented to packed theaters totaling roughly 15,000 sailors and
marines. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has personally championed a
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Campaign Plan that
engages his senior leadership in top-down, Corps-wide training
initiatives anchored on the core values of Honor, Courage, and
Commitment. He and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps have been
tireless in conveying their expectations in special forums and personal
visits to virtually every Marine Corps installation. Across both
Services, literally every sailor and marine is receiving special SAPR
training that emphasizes the concept of Bystander Intervention to
prevent sexual assaults, and additional training tools are in
development.
To enhance capabilities in the area of sexual assault prevention
and prosecution, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) created an
advanced adult sexual assault training course. They have also launched
a multidisciplinary Adult Sexual Assault Program, which synchronizes
the efforts of investigators, prosecutors, and victim advocates. NCIS
has continued its campaign to train the Department's leaders,
conducting 389 briefings worldwide to over 48,000 servicemembers. Last
year they also introduced a 24-hour text-tip capability to enhance
responsiveness to criminal allegations including sexual assault,
receiving 1,300 web based referrals.
A ready force is also a force that understands how to respond to
our shipmates in need in order to help stem the tide of military
suicides. The Department will continue to work to improve suicide
prevention programs to eliminate suicide from the ranks. This will not
be easy. The complexities surrounding suicide requires an ``all-hands''
effort and comprehensive approach. New training programs, like the
Marine Corps' R.A.C.E. (Recognize suicide warning signs, Ask one
another about suicide, Care for one another through listening and
support, and escort fellow marines to help), are just the start. Navy
and Marine Corps commanders are fully engaged in promoting the
psychological health of our marines, sailors, and family members and
are receiving training on how best to provide solutions in their units.
The message to all Navy and Marine Corps leaders is to look out for
each other and to ask for help.
The fiscal uncertainty we live with today not only affects
operational readiness; the impact may also manifest itself in safety
performance. More than ever, we must emphasize safety and risk
management, both on- and off-duty as operational tempo increases and
our sailors and marines are asked to do more with resources that are
being stretched. Efforts to ensure the safest and most secure force in
the Department's history include more targeted oversight of our high
risk evolutions and training. To improve risk assessment, the
Department is analyzing safety and safety-related data from a variety
of sources and in 2012 committed to establishing a secure funding
stream for the Risk Management Information System. The Department is
also employing System Safety Engineers in the hazard and mishap
investigation process.
Physical fitness is central to the ability of our sailors and
marines to complete their missions. More than just another program, it
is a way of life and supporting it resonates throughout the 21st
Century Sailor and Marine Initiative. Throughout the force personal
fitness standards will be emphasized and reinforced. That commitment
extends to improving nutrition standards at Navy dining facilities with
the ``Fueled to Fight'' program, developed and used by the marines.
Fueled to Fight emphasizes the importance of nutrition and healthy food
items, and ensures their availability.
A cornerstone of the Department's commitments to individual sailors
and marines is to ensure the Navy is inclusive and, consistent with
military effectiveness, recruits, retains, and promotes a force that
reflects the Nation it defends. The aim to increase the diversity of
ideas, experiences, expertise, and backgrounds to ensure the right mix
of people to perform the variety of missions required of the services.
With military requirements as a guiding tenet, the Department will
reduce restrictions to military assignments for personnel to the
greatest extent possible.
An officer corps must be representative of the enlisted force it
leads. The U.S. Naval Academy, our Reserve Officer Training Corps
programs, and Officer Candidate School have all continued to achieve
high ethnic diversity rates as minority applications remain at historic
levels. In recent years NROTC units have reopened at some Ivy League
schools, and new units have opened at State Universities with large
minority populations, including Arizona State University and Rutgers
University. The first group of women assigned to the submarine force
have deployed aboard their boats. Three of these trailblazing officers
already earned their qualifications in Submarine Warfare and were
presented their ``Dolphins'' in a ceremony last fall. With success
aboard Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and guided
missile submarines (SSGNs) women will now be assigned to the attack
submarine fleet and enlisted women will soon be included in the
submarine force.
The final pillar, continuum of service, will provide the strongest
transition support in the Department's history. The Navy and Marine
Corps develop future leaders of our Nation, in and out of uniform. For
that reason, and for their service, individuals separating or retiring
from the Naval Service should be provided the best assistance programs
and benefits available to get a positive start in civilian life. The
Department's education benefits, transition assistance, career
management training, life-work balance programs, and morale, welfare,
and recreation programs are keys to their future and have been
recognized by human resource experts as some of the best personnel
support mechanisms in the Nation. Our transition efforts also bolster
our ability to maintain a highly-skilled Reserve Force, ensuring those
highly-trained servicemembers who want to continue to serve in a
Reserve capacity are smoothly and appropriately aligned within the
Reserve component.
Both the Navy and Marine Corps reached our recruiting goals again
in the past year. The Navy is on track to meet its active duty-manning
ceiling of 322,700 sailors by the end of this fiscal year. The Marine
Corps continues to draw down from 202,001 to the goal of 182,100 by
fiscal year 2016 and stood at about 198,000 at the end of 2012. The
quality of our recruits continues to rise, with high levels of physical
fitness and increasing numbers of recruits with a high school diploma
rather than a GED. With high quality recruits the attrition numbers in
Boot Camp have dropped, and more sailors and marines are successfully
completing their follow-on schools, where they learn the basics of
their military specialty.
In order to address many of the asymmetric military scenarios we
face, the Department has initiated programs in our Special Operations
and Cyber Forces to ensure we have the right personnel for the mission.
For instance, the Department conducted a Cyber Zero-Based Review and
developed a Cyberspace Manpower Strategy. Operating in and
strategically leveraging cyberspace requires a sophisticated and
technically savvy force and we must invest in their training and
development. We also need an equally sophisticated officer corps to
lead this force and therefore, I will make the construction of a
cybersecurity studies facility at the U.S. Naval Academy a top priority
in developing the fiscal year 2015-2019 military construction program,
looking for opportunities to accelerate this vital project. With
respect to Special Forces, the Department continues to work closely
with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) on their manpower
priorities, including emphasis on targeted recruiting of personnel with
language capability and ethnic diversity, compensation issues, and
ensuring the proper balance of SOF manning during times of fiscal
austerity.
The Department constantly evaluates its success at reintegrating
the combat-wounded sailor or marine into civilian life. The Navy and
Marine Corps have pressed forward in their efforts to support our
wounded, ill, and injured (WII) sailors and marines. The Marine Corps'
Wounded Warrior Regiment, based at Quantico, provides and facilitates
non-medical assistance throughout all phases of recovery. With
Battalions located on both coasts and detachments around the world, it
has the global reach needed to support our men and women. The Navy has
established the Safe Harbor Program to coordinate the non-medical care
of WII sailors, coast guardsmen, and their families. The program
provides a lifetime of individually tailored assistance designed to
optimize the success of our shipmates' recovery, rehabilitation, and
reintegration activities and has representatives at military treatment
facilities all over the world, including partnering with some Veteran's
Affairs facilities.
A key to successful integration is meaningful employment and the
Department continues to lead by example in providing employment
opportunities for Wounded Warriors and veterans. Civilian careers
within the Navy offer a wealth of opportunities that allow Wounded
Warriors to apply the wide array of skills and experience gained from
their military service. Last year, veterans represented more than 50
percent of new hires, with nearly one in ten having a 30 percent or
more compensable service-connected disability. Additionally, nearly 60
percent of the Department's civilian workforce has prior military
experience. The Department also continues to share best practices
across the Federal and private sector, and annually hosts the Wounded
Warrior Hiring and Support Conference.
In addition to the successful efforts to help employ transitioning
sailors and marines, the Department has also made tremendous strides to
improve overall career readiness through the implementation of the
newly designed Transition Assistance Program. Both the Navy and Marine
Corps have reported compliance with the mandatory components of the
transition program required by the Veterans Opportunity to Work to Hire
Heroes Act (VOW Act) and implemented new and revised curriculum to
facilitate pursuit of post-military goals. By the end of this year,
program enhancements will also include the program's three
individualized tracks for education, technical training, and
entrepreneurship.

Strengthening Shipbuilding and the Industrial Base
Much has been said and written about the size of our Fleet. A few
facts are in order. On September 11, 2001, the Navy's battle force
stood at 316 ships. By 2008, after one of the great military buildups
in American history, our battle force had shrunk to 278 ships. In 2008,
the Navy built only three ships, and many of our shipbuilding programs
were over budget or over schedule or both. Over the past 4 years, the
Fleet has stabilized and many problems in our shipbuilding programs
have been corrected or arrested. There are now 47 ships under contract,
many under fixed-price contracts that ensure the Department receives
the best value for our shipbuilding programs.
Maintaining and increasing current Fleet numbers is a challenge in
the current fiscal environment. However, it is important that we
succeed in this effort as our defense strategy calls upon us to focus
on the maritime-centric theaters of Pacific and Central Command, while
still remaining engaged globally. This is why building up the number of
ships in our Fleet has been my priority from day one. With your support
it will continue to be a priority as we allocate our resources moving
forward.
The fiscal year 2013 shipbuilding plan projected that, by the end
of the 5 years of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the Fleet,
because of a large number of retirements, would have 285 ships, about
the same number as exist today. Beyond the FYDP, the Fleet would again
experience growth reaching 300 ships before the end of the decade. The
plan maintains a flexible, balanced battle force that will prevail in
combat situations, including in the most stressing A2/AD environments,
while living within the reduced means allocated.
Furthermore, our shipbuilding plan aims to build a Fleet designed
to support the new defense strategy and the joint force for 2020 and
beyond. A force structure assessment was recently completed and it
found, due to the new defense strategy, forward basing and other
variables that about 300 ships will be needed to meet the Navy's future
responsibilities.
Regardless of the final battle force number, the Fleet's ship count
will begin to rise as major surface combatant and submarine building
profiles are sustained and as the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) built during the next 5 years begin to enter
fleet service.
A healthy industrial base is necessary to support the Department's
priorities going forward. Our Nation faces tough economic times, so our
plan, as we noted earlier, to grow the Fleet to 300 ships by 2019 means
we have to work closely with the shipbuilding industry to ensure we
maintain their skill and capability while growing a fleet affordable to
the American people. The industrial base also includes our aircraft
manufacturers, and the industry teams that develop the payloads aboard
our ships. We will work to ensure diversity in supply as we move ahead,
and we will look for opportunities to compete.

Promoting Acquisition Excellence and Integrity
One of the most important obligations of public service is a
responsibility to be good stewards of the American people's money; it
is particularly important given today's fiscal realities. Rebuilding
the fleet with the right platforms continues to be a top priority, and
requires efficient and smart spending based on a realistic vision of
the future force. At the heart of the Department's improved stewardship
and leadership is the acquisition excellence initiative in force since
2009.
The central role Navy and Marine Corps play in the Nation's defense
strategy drives the acquisition programs currently underway and those
planned in the future. Contract requirements, aggressive oversight, and
competition drive affordability. At every appropriate opportunity the
Department pursues fixed-price contracts like those in use for the LCS
program, or multi-year procurements like those used to purchase the
Virginia-class submarines, MV-22 Ospreys, and MH-60 helicopters. The
Department continues to look for other innovative funding strategies
that help ensure a consistent workload for the industrial base, as well
as focus on increasing productivity and fostering innovation both in
industry and government. Total ownership costs, eliminating unnecessary
bureaucracy, and unproductive processes are always considered as
programs are developed. Using these methods to inject affordability and
refine requirements in the LCS and DDG-51 programs, the Department cut
over $4.4 billion from the projected cost of the ships, and over $4.9
billion in projected life-cycle costs.
To be responsible with the taxpayer's money also means we must take
action against fraudulent contractors and shoddy work. The Navy has
greatly strengthened our suspension and debarment system, and enhanced
its ability to protect the Department from unscrupulous and
irresponsible contractors. NCIS has made significant investments in our
major procurement fraud program and has realized a 300 percent return
on investment through fines and recoveries associated with criminal
prosecutions this year. During fiscal year 2012, the Navy Suspending
and Debarring Official suspended or debarred 344 contractors, a 75
percent increase from the previous year. Most of this increase was the
result of aggressive pursuit of ``fact-based'' debarments of
contractors who had been terminated for default or poor performance
under a Navy contract or who had mischarged costs against Navy
contracts, but also includes conviction-based debarments taken against
contractors for fraud associated with Government contracts. The
Government Accountability Office has recognized the Navy for its very
active procurement fraud program, which actively pursues leads of
contractor misconduct from numerous sources, and effectively carries
out its suspension and debarment responsibilities under the Federal
Acquisition Regulations.
To protect the Department's research, development and acquisition
(RDA) process from a counterintelligence (CI) perspective, NCIS has
partnered with intelligence community members at locations of special
interest. For example, integration of NCIS resources at University
Applied Research Centers (UARC) and the Applied Research Laboratories
has allowed NCIS CI agents and analysts to intensify their operational
efforts and investigations that protect these prioritized programs and
technologies. Operation ``Bigger Game'', an integrated RDA CI effort,
resulted in the arrest of seven individuals affiliated with a UARC for
illegally exporting high-tech microelectronics from the United States
to Russian military and intelligence agencies.
Over the past decade and a half the acquisition workforce was
downsized. As a result, our expertise and experience was stretched too
thin. With your support the Department has been slowly increasing the
number of acquisition professionals, restoring the core competencies
inherent in their profession and to our responsibilities in the
Department to organize, train and equip the Navy and Marine Corps.
Since starting the effort 3 years ago, the Department has grown the
acquisition work force by 4,700 personnel, which has been key to
increasing the necessary technical authority and business skill sets,
and improving the probability of program success.
Additionally the Department is keeping program managers in place
longer to build up their expertise in and oversight of individual
programs, which also contributes to program stability and success. The
Department also invests in education for our program managers, who are
sent to an intensive short course at the graduate business school at
the University of North Carolina specifically targeting a better
understanding of defense contractors. A pilot for mid-level managers
began last year for a similar graduate level course at the University
of Virginia Darden Business School. The Department is also changing the
way program leaders are evaluated and now incentivizes them to work
with their industry counterparts to manage costs. Finally, acquisition
workforce professionalization is receiving the attention it deserves,
and more resources are targeted to individual training, education and
experience for individuals in key leadership positions.

Developing and Deploying Unmanned Systems
Unmanned systems will continue to be key military platforms, both
in the maritime domain and ashore. Successful integration of the
unmanned systems begins with the sailors and marines who support the
effort. In October 2012, we established Unmanned Helicopter
Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (HUQ-1), the first dedicated rotary-wing UAV
squadron in the Navy, to train sailors on the aircraft as well as
provide deployable detachments. Across the entire spectrum of military
operations, an integrated and hybrid force of manned and unmanned
platforms is the way of the future. In the past year the Department has
made significant movement forward in the development of unmanned
systems.
In 2012 USS Klakring deployed with 4 MQ-8B Fire Scouts operated by
Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron (Light) 42 to conduct operations in
the Fifth and Sixth Fleets. The ship and squadron, which deployed with
a Fire Scout detachment in 2011 in support of counter-piracy operations
and operations off of Libya, continued to develop the tactics,
techniques and procedures to integrate the Fire Scout helicopters into
fleet operations. Another detachment of 3 Fire Scouts flew over 3,000
hours of ISR missions for marines engaged in combat operations in
Afghanistan. The next generation Fire Scout, the MQ-8C, made its first
flight in 2010 and began production in 2012. It has greater range and
payload capacity and it will fly its first missions to serve with Naval
Special Warfare.
In unmanned rotary-wing aviation, the marines have continued
experimenting with the Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System, using
unmanned K-MAX helicopters for resupply in Afghanistan. These UAVs
carry cargo to patrol bases and forward operating bases, eliminating
the need for dangerous convoys. The contract was extended for another
6-month deployment in Afghanistan, in order to build on the system's
success.
A good example of integrating manned and unmanned systems is the
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Module in LCS. This module includes
the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), which will tow the AN/AQS-20A
mine hunting sonar to find mines, paired with a manned MH-60S
helicopter with the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) system
to neutralize them. The development team is working with unmanned
surface craft for autonomous mine sweeping and shallow water mine
interdiction, as well as vertical take-off UAVs for detection and
neutralization. USS Independence (LCS-2) has already conducted
developmental testing of the RMMV and continues to develop operating
concepts and procedures.
This spring will bring the first flight of the MQ-4C Triton, the
unmanned element of Navy's maritime patrol system of systems. Based on
the proven Global Hawk, the Triton will play a central role in building
maritime domain awareness and prosecuting surface targets. Further
testing and evaluation will occur in 2013. Its experimental
predecessor, the BAMS-D demonstrator aircraft, continues to provide
maritime surveillance in Fifth Fleet and to develop operating concepts
for the aircraft.
The Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike
system (UCLASS) is changing the way reconnaissance and strike
capabilities are delivered from our aircraft carriers. Designed to
operate alone in permissive environments or as part of the air wing in
contested environments, UCLASS will conduct ISR&T and/or strike
missions over extended periods of time and at extreme ranges. Unlike
manned carrier aircraft, UCLASS will not require flights solely to
maintain pilot proficiency. The UCLASS airframe will be employed only
for operational missions and operators will maintain proficiency in the
simulator, extending its useful life expectancy considerably. Its
airborne mission time will not be limited by human physiology but
rather will be determined by tanker availability, ordnance expenditure,
or the need to conduct maintenance. At NAS Lakehurst, the X-47 Unmanned
Combat Air System, Aircraft Carrier Demonstrator conducted its first
launch via catapult. In December, the X-47 went to sea for the first
time aboard USS Harry S. Truman and conducted integration testing and
evaluation with the flight deck crews for taxi checks and flight deck
operability. Increased autonomy will continue to evolve and will
continue to expand the possibilities of what can be done with unmanned
systems flying from a carrier. Integrated manned and unmanned systems
will provide a more effective fighting force while helping to reduce
risk to our sailors and marines.

Recognizing Energy as a Strategic National Security Issue
How the Navy and Marine Corps use, produce, and procure energy is a
critical operational element. From the adoption of steam power over
sail, the development of oil burning power plants, or the move to
nuclear power more than half a century ago, the Navy has a history of
leading in energy innovation. In this fiscally constrained environment
we must use energy more efficiently and effectively. This fiscal
environment also means that the Department must continue to lead on and
invest in alternative energy. Failure to do so will leave a critical
military vulnerability unaddressed and will expose the Department to
price shocks inherent in a global commodity like oil.
The Department's energy initiatives are about combat and
operational effectiveness. In wartime, energy is a tactical and
operational vulnerability. Because of the massive amount of fuel that
the Department uses, price shocks in the global market have a
significant impact on budget resources. Every time the cost of a barrel
of oil goes up a dollar, it effectively costs the Department an
additional $30 million in fuel costs. These price spikes are mostly
paid out of operational funds, which mean less steaming time, less
flight time, less training time for our sailors and marines and lack of
facilities sustainment. To help address these operational
vulnerabilities and threats to our combat effectiveness, in 2009 I
established energy goals for the Department. These goals drive the Navy
and Marine Corps to strengthen our combat capability by using energy
more efficiently and by diversifying our sources of power.
Efficiency and innovation are key starting points to changing the
way we use energy. USS Makin Island, the fleet's newest amphibious
assault ship, is a great example. Designed with energy efficiency in
mind, it has a unique hybrid electric power plant instead of the steam
plant powering the rest of the Wasp class. The ship returned from its
maiden deployment last year and, between the highly efficient systems
and the energy awareness of the crew, saved the Navy $15 million in
fuel costs out of a budgeted $33 million over the 7-month deployment.
Plans for the two following ships, USS America and USS Tripoli, include
hybrid electric systems like Makin Island and we are working on a
similar system to back-fit it onto Flight IIA Burke-class DDGs.
The Marine Corps has proven and is proving that energy efficient
and renewable energy equipment increases combat effectiveness.
Recognizing a combat multiplier, the Marines Corps came up with an
innovative process to shorten the timeline from concept to combat. In
just a year, using the Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB)
process, the Marine Corps equipped marines with new capabilities that
reduce the burden of fuel and batteries. Since Third Battalion, Fifth
Marines deployed to Helmand Province in fall of 2010 with solutions
identified through ExFOB, this equipment has become a standard part of
the Marine Corps kit. Marine Battalions in Afghanistan are equipped
with these energy technologies so we now have sniper teams, Special
Operations teams, Communication units, Infantry and Artillery Units,
and teams training our Afghan partners employing ExFOB-proven gear,
from solar blankets to power radios, LED lights to illuminate tents,
and solar generators to provide power at forward operating bases and
combat outposts. These capabilities have made a real impact: enabling a
foot patrol to operate for 3 weeks without battery resupply, reducing
the backpack load on marines, and increasing self-sufficiency at
operations centers. Continuing to aggressively pursue solutions, ExFOB
deployed hybrid power solutions to Patrol Base Boldak in Afghanistan.
With the lessons learned at Boldak, the Marine Corps is now writing
requirements to redefine how they power the Force--with hybrid power
systems and fewer generators that are right-sized for the mission.
Capabilities that increase combat power through greater energy
performance have become fundamental to Marine Corps modernization.
The Department continues to develop the drop-in, advanced biofuel
initiative for our ships, aircraft, and shore facilities. Under the
Defense Production Act, the Department of the Navy has teamed with the
Departments of Agriculture and Energy to fund the Advanced Drop-in
Biofuel Initiative to help the development of multiple, geographically
dispersed biorefineries. Last fall, DOD issued a multi-stage
solicitation under Title III of the Defense Production Act (DPA) that
sought to construct or retrofit through public-private partnerships
multiple, commercial-scale next generation bio-refineries
geographically located and capable of producing cost-competitive, ready
drop-in biofuels that meet or exceed military specifications. Soon, DOD
will finalize negotiations with several companies that have met the
criteria, including demonstrating the ability to domestically produce
alternative fuels by 2016-2017 that are very cost-competitive with
petroleum.
This past year the Navy purchased a B20 blend (80 percent
conventional/20 percent biodiesel) for the steam plant at the St.
Julien's Creek Annex, near Norfolk, VA. The cost of the B20 is 13 cents
per gallon less expensive than conventional fuel, and is projected to
save the facility approximately $30,000 over the 2012-2013 heating
season.
Drop-in fuels are necessary so that no changes to our engines,
aircraft, ships, or facilities are needed to burn the fuel and so we
retain operational flexibility to use whatever fuel is available. After
testing individual platforms in 2011, in 2012 the Department took an
important leap forward toward the goal of globally deploying ships and
aircraft in maritime operations on competitively priced biofuels by
2016. At RIMPAC, the entire Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, from the
surface escorts to the helicopters flying patrol and logistics
missions, conducted operations on a 50/50 conventional and biofuel
blend. The ships of the strike group also demonstrated energy efficient
technologies to reduce the overall energy use, including solid-state
lighting, on-line gas turbine waterwash, and shipboard energy
dashboards.
This year I issued the Department's ``Strategy for Renewable
Energy'' to outline our path to procuring one gigawatt (GW) of
renewable energy for our shore facilities by 2020. For reference, one
GW can power a city the size of Orlando. This strategy will help us
achieve the goal of obtaining 50 percent of our power ashore from
alternative energy sources, at no additional cost to the taxpayer. The
Department chartered a 1GW Task Force to create an implementation plan,
calling on each region of our shore establishment to develop their own
energy plans to help achieve these goals. In fiscal year 2012 we
initiated four power purchase agreements for large scale renewable
energy including three photovoltaic projects, each of which will
provide electricity cheaper than conventional sources and will save a
total of $20 million over the lives of the agreements, and a waste-to-
energy facility at MCAS Miramar that is cost neutral when compared to
conventional power. All four of these projects have been developed with
third party financing.
Continued leadership in this field is vital to the Nation's future.
Our allies and friends around the world are actively exploring the
potential of efficiency and alternative energy to increase combat
effectiveness and strategic flexibility. The Australian Navy is
drafting an alternative fuels policy, and the Department is working
closely with them to ensure interoperability so that our forces can use
alternative fuels together. The British Army, partnered with marines in
Afghanistan, has begun to use alternative energy equipment developed by
the marines in their ExFOB program at the bases they operate in
theater. These partnerships are emblematic of the types of engagements
with our allies around the world on important topics such alternative
fuels, energy efficiency and renewable energy that we must continue to
lead to provide secure alternatives, improve reliability of fuel
supplies, and enhance combat and operational effectiveness.
Energy, fuel, and how we power our ships have always been a vital
issue for the United States Navy. Those who question why the Navy
should be leading in the field forget the Navy's leadership in energy
throughout history. From John Paul Jones rebuilding the sailing rig of
USS Ranger in France in order to make the ship faster and more
efficient before raiding the British seacoast, to the deployment of our
first nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, which was just
decommissioned, the energy and fuel to propel the Fleet has been a key
element of the U.S. Navy's success.

Maritime Partnerships and Forward Presence
For almost 7 decades, U.S. Naval forces have maintained the
stability and security of the global maritime domain, upholding the two
key economic principles of free trade and freedom of navigation, which
have underwritten unprecedented economic growth for the global economy.
As 90 percent of worldwide trade and over half of global oil production
are moved at sea, this system, and the sophisticated set of
international rules and treaties upon which it is based, has become
central to the economic success of the global marketplace. However its
efficiencies, and the demanding timelines of a ``just in time''
economy, place it at risk from the destabilizing influences of rogue
nations and non-state actors. While our engagement with and assurance
of this global system are not without cost, the risk of instability,
stagnant global economic growth and a decline in national prosperity
could be dramatic.
Providing security across the global maritime domain requires more
capacity and capability than any single nation is able to muster
especially within the current fiscal constraints. Building partner
capacity helps distribute the burden of securing the global maritime
domain based on alliances, shared values and mutual trust. The Navy and
Marine Corps are naturally suited to develop these relationships. Trust
and partnerships across the globe cannot be surged when conflict looms
if they have not been established in times of peace.
Forward presence is the key element of seapower, which can help
deter or dissuade adversaries from destabilizing the system or starting
a military conflict. U.S. naval forces operating around the world
underwrite the credibility of our global leadership, and give meaning
to our security guarantees. They demonstrate shared commitments and
concerns, and reinforce regional security without a large and expensive
footprint ashore. Forward deployed naval forces allow us to provide a
full range of options to the President and the combatant commanders;
from a single patrol craft to a carrier strike group; from a platoon of
SEALs to a Marine air-ground task force; that ensure our leaders have
the adaptable and flexible forces needed to respond to any challenge
and retain an element of control in the escalation of conflict. The
ability to concentrate forces for military operations in times of
crisis, or distribute them to engage allies, partners, and friends in
times of relative peace, depends on maintaining naval forces forward.
As does our ability to be present during a crisis and avoid the
appearance of escalation.
In addition to the exercises and operations previously described,
senior leader engagement and training opportunities for our allies,
partners, and friends are important components of building
international relationships and trust. As Secretary, I have had the
opportunity to meet with 35 Heads of State and Government, over 60
Ministers of Defense, over 80 Chiefs of Navy, as well as additional
military leaders and many foreign military personnel. The U.S. Naval
Academy, the U.S. Naval War College, Marine Corps University, and the
Naval Post Graduate School host international students who return home
with not only a first-rate education, but with friendships and new
perspectives on the United States and its people that can have a
significant impact on future military-to-military relationships.

FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET SUBMISSION

Every strategy is a balance of responsibilities and resources. The
Department's ability to meet the demands of today's operations, in
support of our Defense Strategic Guidance, depends on anticipating and
preparing for the changing geopolitical landscape and having the proper
resources ready to deploy. The Department will continue to maintain the
capabilities required to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps is the
finest expeditionary force in the world, however proper resourcing is
needed to maintain our capacity for global operations.
With the resources as laid out in the fiscal year 2014 budget
request, the battle force of 2019 will include the following platforms.
Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carriers and Air Wings.
With the 2016 delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford, the first of a new
class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the number of carriers in
commission returns to 11. The Department will sustain that number at a
minimum through the middle of this century. The Ford class of carrier
is a completely new ship within a rearranged Nimitz hull. The Ford
class contains new shipboard systems like an electromagnetic launch
system and advanced arresting gear, and with advanced combat
capabilities resident in the F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter,
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, E-2D
Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, the MH-60 Sierra and
Romeo tactical helicopters, and new unmanned aerial systems.
Nuclear-powered Attack Submarines.
There are nine Virginia-class submarines already in commission and
seven more at various stages of construction. The planned fiscal year
2014-2018 multi-year procurement (MYP) of nine submarines remains
intact, andwith the 2013 congressional action, advanced procurement has
been authorized and appropriated for a 10th boat to be ordered in 2014.
I would like to thank Congress for their support of our submarine
programs. Your continued support is needed for the advance
appropriation required to complete the procurement of the 10th
Virginia-class boat. This means that these flexible, versatile
platforms will be built at the rate of two per year during the FYDP
with the cost-saving benefits afforded by the multi-year procurement
contract.
With four guided missile submarines (SSGNs) decommissioning in
2026-2028, the Department will continue to invest in research and
development for the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). VPM could provide
future Virginia-class SSNs with four additional large diameter payload
tubes, increasing her Tomahawk cruise missile capability from 12 to 40
and adding other payload options.

Guided Missile Cruisers and Destroyers.
Modular construction of the DDG 1000 class destroyers is proceeding
apace, with commissioning of all three ships of this class planned
between 2015 and 2019. The Arleigh Burke-class DDGs (DDG-51s) remain in
serial production, with plans in place for a multi-year purchase of up
to 10 ships through fiscal year 2017. As part of that multi-year
purchase, the Navy intends to seek congressional approval for
introducing the DDG-51 Flight III aboard the second fiscal year 2016
ship based on the achievement of a sufficient level of technical
maturity of the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) development
effort. The Flight III Destroyer will include the more powerful AMDR
providing enhanced Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Air Defense
capability. The modernization program for in-service Ticonderoga-class
CGs and Arleigh Burke-class DDGs is progressing satisfactorily, with
hull, machinery, and electrical system maintenance and repairs;
installation of advanced open architecture combat systems, and upgrades
to weapons/sensors suites that will extend the service life and
maintain the combat effectiveness of these fleet assets.

Littoral Combat Ships
With their flexible payload bays, open combat systems, advanced
unmanned systems, and superb aviation and boat handling capabilities,
LCSs will be an important part of our future Fleet. This spring we
forward deployed the first LCS, USS Freedom, to Singapore and will
forward deploy four by CY16. Crew rotation plans will allow for
substantially more LCS forward presence than the frigates, Mine
Counter-Measures ships, and coastal patrol craft they will replace, and
will free our multi-mission capable destroyers for more complex
missions. The Department remains fully committed to our plan of
purchasing 52 Littoral Combat Ships.

Amphibious Ships
Thirty amphibious landing ships can support a two-Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) forcible entry operation, with some risk.
To generate 30 operationally available ships, the strategic review
envisions an amphibious force consisting of 33 ships total. The
objective fleet will consist of 11 big deck Amphibious ships (LHA/LHD),
11 Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD), and 10 Landing Ship Dock (LSD). To
support routine forward deployments of Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEUs), the amphibious force will be organized into nine, three-ship
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and one four-ship ARG forward based in
Japan, plus an additional big-deck Amphibious ship available to support
contingency operations worldwide.

Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSBs)
The Navy is proposing to procure a fourth Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) in fiscal year 2014, configured to serve as an Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB). This AFSB will fulfill an urgent combatant
commander requirement for sea-based support for mine warfare, Special
Operations Forces (SOF), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR), and other operations. The work demonstrated by the interim AFSB,
USS Ponce, has been very encouraging. To speed this capability into the
fleet, and to ultimately provide for continuous AFSB support anywhere
in the world, we are designing and building the fiscal year 2012 MLP 3
to the AFSB configuration, resulting in a final force of two MLPs and
two AFSBs. This mix will alleviate the demands on an already stressed
surface combatant and amphibious fleet while reducing our reliance on
shore-based infrastructure and preserving an important part of our
shipbuilding industrial base.

Naval Aviation
The Department continues to evaluate the needs of naval aviation to
ensure the most efficient and capable force in line with the Defense
Strategic Guidance. The Navy procured the final F/A-18 Super Hornet in
fiscal year 2013 for delivery in fiscal year 2015 for a total of 552
aircraft. EA-18 Growler will complete program of record procurement
with 21 EA-18G in fiscal year 2014 for delivery in fiscal year 2016 for
a total of 135 aircraft. The Department's review of aviation
requirements has validated the decision to purchase 680 Navy and Marine
Corps F-35s. The F-35 procurement remains steady, with four F-35C and
six F-35B. The Marine Corps stood up the first F-35 operational
squadron, VMFA-121, in November 2012. The Fleet Replacement Squadron,
VFA-101, is expected to receive its first F-35C in April 2013.
The Department of the Navy continues to monitor strike fighter
capacity. Changes in the Marine Corps force structure, accelerated
transition from the legacy Hornet aircraft to the Super Hornets, high
flight hour extensions for legacy hornets and lowered utilization rates
resulted in an appropriately sized strike fighter aircraft inventory.
Based on current assumptions and plans, strike fighter aircraft
shortfall is predicted to remain below a manageable 29 aircraft through
2023, with some risk.
In the long term, the Navy will need to replace its F/A-18E/F
Fleet. Pre-Milestone A activities are underway to define the follow-on
F/A-XX aircraft. Navy continues to develop the first-generation
Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System
(UCLASS), which will provide long-range, persistent ISR&T with
precision strike capability, enhancing the carrier's future ability to
provide support across the range of military operations in 2020 and
beyond. UCLASS will utilize the flexibility and access inherent in
carrier operations to provide the Joint Force and combatant commanders
with on demand intelligence and strike capability against time-
sensitive targets while on station.
In fiscal year 2014, the Navy is seeking approval for a MYP of 32
E-2D aircraft over a longer term than originally proposed. Over the
FYDP, purchases of P-8s have been reduced by eight aircraft, which
reflects the Department's intent to procure all the aircraft originally
planned, but at a slower rate in order to distribute the costs more
evenly.

MARINE CORPS

As the Nation's ready response force, the Marine Corps, by
definition, remains at a high state of readiness. The demands of a
ready force require careful balance across these accounts to avoid a
hollowing of the force. The Department is executing an approved multi-
year plan to draw down the Corps from an end strength of 202,100 in
early 2012 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016. The drawdown is
on pace at approximately 5,000 marines per year and anticipates that
voluntary separations will be adequate to meet this planned rate. The
marines will resort to involuntary separations only if absolutely
necessary. But, no matter how a marine leaves, we remain committed to
providing effective transition assistance and family support.
The Joint Strike Fighter continues as the Marine Corps number one
aviation program. The F-35 will replace the Marine Corps' aging legacy
tactical fleet; the F/A-18A-D Hornet, the AV-8B Harrier and the EA-6B
Prowler, bringing the force to one common tactical fixed-wing aircraft.
The integration of F-35B will provide the dominant, multi-role, fifth-
generation capabilities needed across the full spectrum of combat
operations, particularly to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
and the Joint Force. Having successfully completed initial ship trials,
dropping a variety of ordnance and completing hundreds of successful
test flights, the F-35B continues to make significant progress,
culminating with the standup this past November of the first
operational JSF squadron, VMFA-121, in Yuma, AZ.
The Marine Corps' ground vehicle programs are also a critical
element of revitalizing the force after age and operational tempo have
taken their toll on the equipment. Two key programs for the Ground
Combat Elements are the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). The JLTV will provide the Marine Corps
tactical mobility with a modern expeditionary light utility vehicle.
The initial planned purchase of 5,500 vehicles has been reduced based
on our constrained fiscal environment, and the Marine Corps will need
to refurbish the remaining High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) fleet in order to fill out less dangerous missions. The ACV is
central to the Marine Corps role as an amphibious force providing
forcible entry and crisis response. The ACV program will develop the
next generation amphibious, armored personnel carrier that will help
ensure the Marine Corps can continue to bridge the sea and land
domains. The Marines' Light Armor Vehicle (LAV) Mobility and
Obsolescence program is on track to extend the service life of the LAV
by replacing or upgrading several components including the suspension
and drive systems. The Marine Corps' ability to exploit an obsolete but
already produced suspension system from the Army's Stryker vehicles has
saved at least $162 million taxpayer dollars.
Of particular concern is the fact that the Marine Corps
modernization accounts represent only 14 percent of the Marines' total
obligation authority. Because of this level of modernization funding,
even proportional cuts have disproportionate impact on the many small
programs essential to modernization of the Corps. Combining this with
efforts to reconstitute the force as it returns from Afghanistan, our
reset strategy, which focuses on the most economical way to restore
equipment readiness, is vital to the Marine Corps' future.
Keeping faith with our marines as we reduce the force, maintaining
our plans for the modernization of the force, and resetting our
equipment after a decade in combat depend on appropriate funding.

CONCLUSION

The Founding Fathers, in their wisdom, placed in the Constitution
the requirement that Congress ``provide for and maintain a Navy.'' In
the 21st century, that force is as vital, or more so, to our national
security as it has been throughout our Nation's history. As we
commemorate the bicentennial of the Battle of Lake Erie, we continue to
recognize our Navy's history in the War of 1812. Captain Oliver Hazard
Perry led his men through a bloody battle, in the end reporting that
``we have met the enemy, and they are ours.'' It was the first time
that an entire squadron of the Royal Navy surrendered to an enemy
force. The battle was a critical naval victory and represents more than
just the skill and daring of our Navy in the Age of Sail. The joint
operations that followed, with Perry's naval forces conducting an
amphibious landing and providing naval gunfire support for an Army
invasion of Canada, were early examples of joint power projection. It
serves as a reminder that the Navy and Marine-Corps Team has a vital
role to play in the defense of our Nation, but is a teammate with our
joint partners who all contribute to success and victory.
The goals and programs we have discussed today will determine our
future as a global force. We have worked to streamline our processes
and increase efficiency, to work toward innovative new solutions to our
21st century problems, and to eliminate programs that no longer apply
in the current strategic environment. We have done this to ensure that
we retain the ability to deter regional conflict and respond rapidly
and decisively to emerging crises.
Our specific requests are reflected in the President's fiscal year
2014 budget submission. Today's economic environment and our Nation's
fiscal constraints demand strict stewardship and leadership. The
process by which we arrived at the Department's budget requests was
determined, deliberate, and dedicated to our responsibility to you and
the taxpayer. I can assure you that the Department has thoroughly
considered the risks and applied our available resources efficiently
and carefully to align our request with the President's Defense
Strategic Guidance.
Today, your Navy and Marine Corps are deployed across the spectrum
of military engagement around the world, from direct combat operations
to providing security in the maritime domain to humanitarian
assistance. Our sailors and marines often seem to be everywhere except
at home. Their hard work and success are based on the unparalleled
professionalism, skill, and dedication that ensure their dominance in
every clime and place. The Commandant, CNO, and I look forward to
answering your questions. This committee's continued and enduring
support for our policies, payloads, platforms, and people enables us to
fulfill the historic charge of the Founders to sail as the Shield of
the Republic.
Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Mabus.
Admiral Greenert.

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN,
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator
Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee: It's my
pleasure to appear before you today to testify on the Navy's
fiscal year 2014 budget and our posture. I am honored to
represent 613,000 Active and Reserve sailors, Navy civilians,
and the families who support them, all who are serving today.
This morning I will address three points in my oral testimony:
our enduring tenets for decisionmaking, our budget strategy for
2013 and the subsequent carryover that we will incur, and our
intended course for 2014.
Two important characteristics of our naval forces describe
our mandate, that we will operate forward where it matters and
that we will be ready when it matters. Our fundamental approach
to meeting this responsibility remains unchanged. We organize,
man, train, and equip the Navy by viewing our decisions through
three lens, or I call them tenets. They are that warfighting is
first, we have to operate forward, and we need to be ready.
Regardless of the size of our budget or our fleet, these three
tenets are the lens through which we evaluate all our
decisions.
If you refer to the chartlet I've provided in front of you,
you will see that on any given day we have about 50,000 sailors
in 100 ships deployed overseas. They are providing forward
presence. The orange bow ties, if you will, on the chart
represent what I call the maritime crossroads, where shipping
lanes and our security concerns intersect. A unique strength of
your fleet is that it operates forward from U.S. bases,
represented by circles on the chartlet, and from places
provided by partner nations, represented by squares on the
chartlet.
[The chart referred to follows:]

Admiral Greenert. These places are critical to your Navy
being where it matters because they enable us to respond
rapidly to crises and enable us to sustain forward presence
with fewer ships by reducing the number of ships on rotational
deployments.
The reverse side of the chartlet will describe the plan for
our deployments shown in the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
while sustaining our Mideast posture.
[The chart referred to follows:]

Admiral Greenert. In February we faced a shortfall of about
$8.6 billion in our 2013 O&M account. Since then we received a
2013 appropriation in March, and I thank this committee for
their work in that regard. In accordance with our priorities
and tenets, we plan to invest our remaining 2013 O&M funds to
fund our must-pay items such as contracts, leases, and
utilities, to reconcile our 2013 presence with our combatant
commanders, and to conduct the training and maintenance for
forces next to deploy, and to prepare to meet our 2014 global
force management allocation plan responsibilities. Also, we'll
restore critical base operations and renovation projects.
Although we intend to meet our most critical operational
commitments to the combatant commanders, sequestration still
leaves us with a $4.1 billion O&M shortfall and a $6 billion
investment shortfall. This will result in our surge capacity of
fully mission-capable carrier strike groups and amphibious
ready groups being reduced by two-thirds through 2014. Further,
we will have deferred about $1.2 billion in facilities
maintenance, as well as depot-level maintenance for 84 aircraft
and 184 engines.
Combined, our O&M and investment shortfalls leave us $9
billion worth of carryover challenge for 2014. A continuation
of sequestration in 2014 will compound this carryover challenge
from $9 billion to $23 billion. Further, accounts and
activities we were able to protect in 2013, such as manpower
and nuclear maintenance and critical fleet operations, will be
liable to a reduction in 2014.
Our people have remained resilient in the face of this
uncertainty and I have been amazed throughout this process with
their patience and their dedication, that of our sailors and
our civilians.
Our 2014 budget submission supports the Defense Strategic
Guidance (DSG) and enables us to maintain our commitments in
the Middle East and to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. We
prepared this budget with the following priorities: One, to
deliver overseas presence in accordance with our Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP); and two, to continue our
near-term investments and address challenges in the Middle East
and the Asia-Pacific region; three, we want to develop long-
term capabilities with the appropriate capacity to address
warfighting challenges in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific
region.
Our budget submission continues to invest in future fleet.
We've requested $44 billion in ships, submarines, manned and
unmanned aircraft, weapons, cyber, and other procurement
programs such as the JSF, LCS, unmanned aerial vehicles, the
DDG-1000, and the P-8A Poseidon, just to name a few.
These investments will deliver a fleet of 300 ships by 2019
with greater interoperability and greater flexibility when
compared to today's fleet.
We also continue to fund important high-technology and
asymmetric capabilities such as the Laser Weapon System for
small boat and drone defense, which will deploy aboard the ship
Ponce in spring 2014. Also in 2014, we will deploy on the
carrier George Herbert Walker Bush a successfully tested
prototype system to detect and defeat advanced wake-homing
torpedoes.
We continue to grow manpower by about 4,600 sailors in this
submission compared to last year's budget, and these new
sailors will reduce our manning gaps at sea, will enhance our
cyber capabilities, and will improve our waterfront training.
We will continue to address our critical readiness and safety
degraders, such as sexual assault, suicide, increased
operational tempo, and our at-sea manning.
Mr. Chairman, this budget places our Navy on a good course
which enables us to meet the requirements of the DSG today
while building a relevant future force and sustaining our
manpower for tomorrow. We appreciate everything you and the
committee have done for the sailors and civilians of our Navy
as well as the families, and we again ask for your support in
removing the burden of sequestration so that we can better
train, better equip, and deploy properly these brave men and
women in defense of our Nation.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM Jonathan Greenert, USN

Chairman Levin, Ranking Senator Inhofe, distinguished members of
the committee; it is my pleasure to appear before you today to testify
on the Navy's fiscal year 2014 budget and posture. I am honored to
represent the approximately 613,000 Active and Reserve sailors and Navy
civilians serving today, as well as their families.

ESTABLISHING THE BASELINE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014

Before discussing our fiscal year 2014 budget submission, we have
to clarify our current situation in fiscal year 2013. This will form
the baseline for our fiscal year 2014 program. In February, Navy faced
a shortfall of about $8.6 billion in our fiscal year 2013 operations
and maintenance (O&M) account due to a combination of requirements
growth, the Continuing Resolution and sequestration. Since then, thanks
to Congress' efforts, we received an fiscal year 2013 appropriation in
March as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act of 2013. This appropriation restored about $4.5 billion toward our
total need in operations and maintenance. As a result, we have a fiscal
year 2013 shortfall in operations and maintenance of about $4.1
billion, approximately 10 percent of the planned amount for this fiscal
year.
In accordance with our priorities and strategy, we are applying our
remaining O&M funds to the following:

Pay ``must pay bills'': Ensure we have funding for
bills such as utilities, contracts and reimbursables.
Reconcile fiscal year 2013 readiness: Sustain
operations and maintenance for the priority forces in
accordance with the defense strategy that will deploy to meet
the current approved fiscal year 2013 Global Force Management
Allocation Plan (GFMAP), which describes the forces required to
be provided by the Services to the combatant commanders (CCDR)
as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Our remaining spending
plan for fiscal year 2013 will address furloughs of civilians
and sustain nondeployed ship and aircraft operations so
appropriate forces prepare to deploy, and other forces operate
enough to be able to safely respond if needed to support
homeland defense.
Prepare to meet fiscal year 2014 GFMAP: Conduct
training and maintenance for forces that will deploy as part of
the fiscal year 2014 GFMAP, including guided missile destroyers
(DDG) transferring to Rota, Spain as part of the Forward
Deployed Naval Force (FDNF).
Restore critical base operations and renovation:
Sustain base infrastructure and port and airfield operations to
support training and deployments needed for the fiscal year
2013 and fiscal year 2014 GFMAP. We will also conduct health
and safety-related facility repairs and continue high-return
energy efficiency projects.

However, sequestration will result in a fleet and bases less ready
than planned. For example, at sea we were compelled to recommend the
fiscal year 2013 GFMAP be changed to cancel one ship deployment to the
Pacific, two ship deployments to Europe and cancel all but one fiscal
year 2013 ship deployment to U.S. Southern Command. We continue to
evaluate opportunities to add deployments to these regions as our
fiscal position becomes clearer. In addition to reducing overseas
deployments, we will also reduce the amount of operations and training
our ships and aircraft will conduct when not deployed.
We reduced maintenance, including deferral of depot maintenance on
84 aircraft and 184 engines, and reducing the scope of 2 ship
maintenance availabilities. We plan to recover this backlog during
fiscal year 2014. With Congress' approval of our proposed fiscal year
2013 reprogramming, we will restore all of our planned ship maintenance
availabilities remaining in fiscal year 2013.
The impact of reduced fleet operations and maintenance will be less
surge capacity, but we will retain the ability to support the fiscal
year 2014 GFMAP. All our forces deploying in fiscal year 2013 and
fiscal year 2014, including two carrier strike groups (CSG) and two
amphibious ready groups (ARG) (one each in the Middle East and the
Asia-Pacific), will be fully mission-capable and certified for Major
Combat Operations. All our forces supporting operations in Afghanistan,
where Navy aircraft fly about one-third of all tactical sorties, will
also be fully mission-capable and certified. For surge, we will retain
one additional CSG and ARG in the United States that are fully mission-
capable, certified for Major Combat Operations and available to deploy
within 1-2 weeks. This is about one-third of our normal surge capacity.
Overall, due to reduced training and maintenance, about two-thirds of
the fleet will be less than fully mission capable and not certified for
Major Combat Operations. Historically, about half of our fleet is in
this status, since ships and squadrons are in training or maintenance
preparing for their next deployment. While these forces will not be
ready or certified to deploy overseas, they will remain able to
respond, if needed, to support homeland defense missions.
Ashore, we deferred about 16 percent of our planned fiscal year
2013 shore facility sustainment and upgrades, about $1.2 billion worth
of work. Recovering these projects could take 5 years or more, and in
the meantime, our shore facility condition will degrade. We were able
to sustain our Sailor and Family Readiness programs through fiscal year
2013, including Child Development Centers, Fleet and Family Support
Centers, and Sexual Assault and Prevention programs. We also fully
funded a judicious Tuition Assistance program for our sailors. Despite
these efforts to reduce the impact of sequestration on our people,
however, we must still consider furloughs for our Navy civilians.
Sequestration reduced the fiscal year 2013 funding for each of our
investment programs by about 8 percent, or about $6.1 billion total. We
are still reconciling the impact of this reduction, but due to the
mechanics of sequestration and limited reprogramming authorized by the
fiscal year 2013 Defense Appropriations Act, it is likely we will be
compelled to reduce the number of weapons we purchase and the number of
aircraft we buy in some of our aviation programs due to the reduction--
including one E-2D Hawkeye, one F-35C Lightning II, one P-8A Poseidon
and two MQ-8C Firescout. Our ship construction programs will need to
restructure schedules and shift some outfitting costs to future years
to address the nearly 8 percent sequestration reduction in fiscal year
2013. This will pass on ``costs to complete'' that will need to be
reconciled in future years. These costs will not be an insignificant
challenge as they may compel Navy to cancel the procurement of future
ships to complete outfitting ships that are nearing delivery.

THE IMPACT OF CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY

Over the past 4 months we slowed our spending, stopped new program
starts, and proceeded very deliberately in choosing our operations,
deployments and investments. We brought ``all hands on deck'' to work
on revised plans for everything from how we provide presence to what we
buy in fiscal year 2013. In the Fleet, this is standard procedure for
proceeding through a fog bank--slow, deliberate and with limited
visibility ahead; effectively, most other operations and planning stop
because of the dangerous near-term situation. With a fiscal year 2013
appropriation, we are now coming out of this ``fog,'' increasing speed,
heading toward a national future, and reestablishing momentum behind
our top priorities.
This momentum, however, may be short-lived. While the fiscal year
2014 budget submission includes deficit reduction proposals beyond that
called for by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), it requires the
BCA's lower discretionary budget caps are replaced in fiscal year 2014
and beyond. If the discretionary caps are not revised, our fiscal year
2014 obligation authority could be reduced $10-$14 billion. This would
compel Navy to again dramatically reduce operations, maintenance and
procurement in fiscal year 2014, preventing us from meeting the fiscal
year 2014 GFMAP and negatively impacting the industrial base. While
military personnel compensation was exempted in sequestration during
fiscal year 2013, if the lower discretionary budget caps of the BCA are
retained, we will evaluate options to reduce personnel and personnel
costs, including compensation and entitlements.
The uncertainty inherent in our fiscal outlook prevents effective
long-term planning and will begin to affect the ``Health of the
Force.'' We can ill-afford the distraction of planning for multiple
budget contingencies, stopping and restarting maintenance, changing
operational schedules and restructuring investment programs. This
constant change negatively impacts our sailors and civilians and their
Families here at headquarters and in the Fleet. It also precludes us
from looking long-term at how we should build, train, develop and
posture the future force as we end two land wars in Middle East and
rebalance our effort toward the Asia-Pacific.
To begin planning for the long-term and ensure we are realistically
confronting our strategic and fiscal challenges, the Secretary of
Defense ordered a Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR). The
review does not assume or accept that deep reductions to defense
spending, such as those from sequestration, will endure or that they
could be accommodated without a significant reduction in military
capabilities. The review does reflect the Secretary's view that the
Department of Defense must constantly examine the choices that underlie
our defense strategy, posture, and investments, including all past
assumptions.
The SCMR will consider the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) as
the point of departure. It will define the major strategic choices and
institutional challenges affecting the defense posture in the decade
ahead that must be made to preserve and adapt defense strategy and
management under a wide range of future circumstances. The results of
this review will frame the Secretary's guidance for the fiscal year
2015 budget and will ultimately be the foundation for the Quadrennial
Defense Review due to Congress in February 2014.

OUR STRATEGIC APPROACH

Our first responsibility is to ensure Navy is able to deliver the
overseas presence and capabilities required by our DSG Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, as manifested
in the GFMAP.
Our mandate per the DSG is to be present overseas where it matters,
and to be ready when it matters. A central element of the DSG to Navy
is to field a ready force, with the right capabilities, postured in
each region. The DSG concludes that a prompt, credible response by
forward U.S. forces can demonstrate American resolve and can blunt the
initial actions of an aggressor. This can in turn deter, assure, and--
if necessary--control escalation, contain the conflict and prevent it
from growing into a larger war.
Our fundamental approach to making decisions and implementing the
DSG is unchanged since I assumed the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. We organize, man, train and equip the Navy by viewing our
decisions through three lenses, or tenets. They are: Warfighting First,
Operate Forward, and Be Ready. Regardless of the size of our budget or
our fleet, these tenets are the key considerations we apply to each
decision.

Warfighting First
Warfighting First is a first principle. It is our fundamental
responsibility; each decision inherent in our fiscal year 2014 program
was viewed in terms of its impact on warfighting. Our forces must have
relevant warfighting capability today to be credible--not at some point
in the future. If the credibility of our forces is lost (or perceived
lost) they cannot rebuild it easily or quickly. In developing our
fiscal year 2014 budget submission we did not ``let perfect be the
enemy of good--or good enough.'' For example, if a new system or
capability would provide a probability of successfully defeating a
threat 60 percent of the time, we will deploy it, particularly if
today's probability of success is 0 percent.
To develop future capability, Warfighting First compels us to look
for the most effective way to defeat a threat or deliver an effect that
can be realistically fielded, efficiently. The logic we use to identify
our most effective capabilities is to analyze the adversary's ``kill
chain'' or ``effects chain'' and pursue an asymmetric means to ``break
the chain.'' For example, to execute a successful attack, an adversary
has to:

Find the target
Determine the target's location, course, and speed (or
relative motion)
Communicate that information coherently to a platform
or unit that can launch an attack
Execute an attack using anything from a kinetic weapon
to electromagnetic systems to cyber

Each (or any) of these ``links'' in the chain can be broken to
defeat the threat. But some are more vulnerable than others and kinetic
effects are not always the best way to break the chain. So instead of
overinvesting and trying to break every part of the effects chain, we
focus on those where the adversary has a vulnerability we can exploit
or where we can leverage one of our own advantages asymmetrically.
Similarly, we analyze our own effects chains for strengths and
weaknesses; our fiscal year 2014 budget submission emphasizes proven
technologies that limit the adversary's ability to defeat our ability
to project power.
We addressed challenges in the Arabian Gulf throughout 2012 and
into this year by emphasizing Warfighting First. For example, in
response to a Central Command urgent request and with the help of
Congress, we rapidly outfitted the amphibious ship USS Ponce,
previously an amphibious ship slated for decommissioning, to be an
Afloat Forward Staging Base-Interim (AFSB-I) in support of mine warfare
and Special Operations Forces in the Arabian Gulf. To improve our mine
warfare capabilities we rapidly deployed Mark 18 mine-hunting unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUV) and SEAFOX mine neutralization systems to
Ponce and our minesweepers (MCM). These systems became force
multipliers and enable our forces to find and/or clear mines twice as
quickly as the forces we deployed to the Arabian Gulf in 2012--taking
1-2 weeks instead of 1-2 months depending on the size (and our
knowledge) of the minefield. We tested these new capabilities and
improved our ability to operate with a coalition by organizing and
conducting an International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX) with
34 other navies in the Arabian Gulf last September. We will hold
another IMCMEX next month.
In addition to improving our mine warfare capability in the Arabian
Gulf, we increased our surveillance capability and our ability to
counter fast attack craft and submarines in the region. Through rapid
fielding efforts supported by the Secretary of Defense and Congress, we
added new electro-optical and infrared sensors to our nuclear aircraft
carriers (CVN), upgraded the guns on our Patrol Coastal (PC) ships
based in Bahrain, fielded upgraded torpedoes for our helicopters
deployed in the Arabian Gulf and deployed additional anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) sensors in the region. Each of these initiatives and our
mine warfare improvements continue into fiscal year 2014 as part of our
budget submission.
We also continued implementing the Air-Sea Battle concept as part
of Warfighting First. We practiced and refined the concept in wargames
and real-world exercises including Valiant Shield and Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) last summer. RIMPAC brought together 40 ships and
submarines, more than 200 aircraft and over 25,000 personnel from 22
nations, including Russia and India for the first time. RIMPAC enabled
forces to practice high-end ballistic missile defense, surface warfare
and anti-submarine warfare in simulations and more than 70 live-fire
missile and torpedo events. RIMPAC 14, supported by our fiscal year
2014 budget submission, will include as many or more live-fire events
and nations, including China for the first time.
We reinvigorated our efforts to conduct integrated operations with
the Marine Corps as the war in Afghanistan draws down and demands for
naval crisis response grow in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The
Navy-Marine Corps team conducted Bold Alligator in 2012; our largest
amphibious exercise in more than a decade, yielding dozens of lessons
learned which we are incorporating into our capability development
efforts. Some of these changes, particularly in command control
organizations and communications systems, are reflected in our fiscal
year 2014 program. Bold Alligator 14, supported by our fiscal year 2014
budget submission, will build on the results of last year's exercise
and will explore the concepts and capabilities needed for a range of
amphibious operations from single ARG up to large-scale amphibious
assaults.

Operate Forward
The Navy and Marine Corps are our Nation's ``away team'' and first
responders to crisis. History has demonstrated that the Navy is at its
best when we are forward and ready to respond where it matters, when it
matters. To operate forward we focus our deployed presence at strategic
maritime crossroads such as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz or the
Suez and Panama Canals. It is in these areas and others where sea
lanes, resources and vital U.S. interests intersect that influence
matters most.
On any given day, about 50,000 of our sailors are underway on 145
ships and submarines, 100 of them deployed overseas as depicted in
Figure 1. They are joined by about 125 land-based patrol aircraft and
helicopters, 1,000 information dominance personnel, 1,000 Naval Special
Warfare operators, and 4,000 Naval Combat Expeditionary Command sailors
on the ground and in inland waters.

The tenet Operate Forward compels us to look for new ways to
increase the amount of presence we can deliver at the right places--and
to do so more efficiently. Each of these ways places ships overseas
where they deliver continuous (``non-rotational'') presence, instead of
having to deploy from the continental United States (CONUS) to provide
``rotational'' presence. One ship operating from an overseas port in
this manner provides the same presence as about four ships operating
from homeports in the United States.
There are two basic ways in which we can sustain ships overseas.:

Ships can be homeported overseas as part of the
Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) with their sailors and
their families as we do in Japan and will soon do in Rota,
Spain. This provides continuous presence, immediate response to
crisis, and the means to build a strong relationship with the
host nation.
Ships can also Forward Station overseas and be manned
by civilian or military crews that rotate out to the ship.
Rotating civilian crews man our Mobile Landing Platform (MLP),
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Afloat Forward Staging Base
(AFSB) and Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships. Rotating
military crews man our Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and nuclear
guided missile submarines (SSGN).

Both of these ways of operating forward rely on ``places'' overseas
where our partners and allies allow us to use their facilities to rest,
repair, resupply and refuel. Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission
continues to sustain development of these facilities. Military
construction (MILCON) for these facilities comprises only 27 percent of
our fiscal year 2014 MILCON program funding, a slightly smaller
percentage than in fiscal year 2013. These eight projects will provide
essential support facilities at ``bases'' and ``places'' around the
world such as Guam and Japan. Without this investment our forces will
be less able to operate forward and more dependent on support from
CONUS.
Our posture in the Arabian Gulf will improve this year with the
addition of three PCs in Bahrain for a total of eight. Further, our
fiscal year 2014 program supports the homeporting of 2 more PCs there
for a total of 10 by the end of fiscal year 2014. During fiscal year
2013 we will permanently homeport all our PCs and our four MCMs in
Bahrain, instead of manning them with crews rotating from the United
States. This will increase the crews' proficiency and continue to build
our relationship with partners throughout the Arabian Gulf.
In Europe, we continued preparations for the planned move of four
destroyers to Rota, Spain, which highlights the benefit of FDNF ships.
Conducting the European ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission today
takes 10 ships deploying from CONUS. This same mission can be done with
four destroyers based forward, freeing up six rotationally-deployed
destroyers to deploy to other regions such as the Asia-Pacific.
In the Pacific, we deployed our first LCS, USS Freedom, to
Singapore where it will remain for two crew rotations (8 months) to
evaluate LCS operational concepts. Our posture in the Asia-Pacific will
increase as part of the Department's overall rebalance to the region.
Our fiscal year 2014 program supports the basing of another nuclear
attack submarine (SSN) in Guam (for a total of four) and the increase
in the number of LCS operating from Singapore to four by fiscal year
2017. In addition to the increase in rotational forces made available
by FDNF DDG in Rota and the introduction of new ships such as JHSV in
Africa and South America, our efforts to shift 60 percent of our fleet
to Pacific homeports will increase our day-to-day presence there by 15-
20 percent.
Fundamentally, operate forward is about making the most effective
and efficient use of what we own. Each of these initiatives reflects
that idea.

BE READY

Our fleet must be ready to meet today's challenges, today. This
means more than ensuring maintenance is done and parts and fuel are on
hand. Those elements are essential to readiness, but our tenet to Be
Ready requires that our sailors be confident in their abilities and
equipment and proficient in their operations. Be Ready compels us in
our decision making to always consider what our sailors need to be
confident and proficient. We will buy proven technology that our
sailors can use and depend on instead of new, unproven equipment. We
will use empirical data, such as Board of Inspection and Survey
reports, as much as possible in our decision making. This is what our
sailors experience and we must work to make them as confident as
possible in the warfighting capability of themselves and their gear.
Applying our tenet to Be Ready requires that we consider all the
factors that will detract from our sailors' ability to effectively
fight when the time comes.
In the past year we increased the proficiency of our sailors by
conducting more live-fire and practical training events. In addition to
exercises such as RIMPAC and Bold Alligator, we increased live-fire air
defense and surface warfare and practical ASW training in our
preparations for deployment and purchased additional training missiles,
sonobuoys, ammunition and targets. To enhance the proficiency of our
operators more efficiently, we funded completion and installation of
trainers for new systems such as the P-8A Poseidon, E/A-18G Growler and
LCS.

Current concerns
We are encountering four major factors now that detract from our
sailors' readiness and hinder our ability to make progress in line
toward the vision described in Sailing Directions. They are: Sexual
assault, suicide, at-sea manning shortfalls, and high operational
tempo.
Sexual assault
Sexual assault is a crime that happens to about two sailors every
day. Sexual assault creates an unsafe workplace and degrades the
readiness of our ships and squadrons. Last year we began a concentrated
effort to change our culture and get after sexual assault in our Navy.
We implemented a series of measures, including:

Completed training for all Navy military personnel,
conducted by mobile training teams of experts in sexual assault
prevention and response. We have received superb feedback on
this training.
Refined our reporting criteria for sexual assault to
help understand victim and offender demographics, find out
where these attacks happen and focus our efforts accordingly.
We also required that all sexual assault incidents be briefed
by unit commanders to the first flag officer in the chain of
command.
Established programs in Fleet Concentration Areas such
as our Great Lakes training facility and San Diego which
reduced the number of reported sexual assaults--by 60 percent
in the 20-month program at Great Lakes. We established a
similar program in San Diego in December 2012 and will
implement programs in Europe and Japan this summer. Our San
Diego program provided insights that enabled us to address
contributors to sexual assault there, and we are seeing a near-
term downward trend in the number of San Diego-area Navy sexual
assault reports--we'll watch this closely.
Continued quarterly meetings with all Navy four-star
commanders to review the data from our ``first flag officer''
reports, refine our plan and adjust our approaches as needed.

We are seeing some clear trends regarding sexual assault in the
Navy. There appears to be less stigma associated with reporting sexual
assault, as indicated by an increased number of sexual assault
reports--in particular delayed reports of sexual assaults that occurred
weeks or months earlier. Most sexual assaults are sailors assaulting
other sailors; most victims and offenders are junior sailors; more than
half of incidents occur on base or on ship; and alcohol is a factor in
the majority of sexual assaults. We are applying these findings to
develop our efforts to prevent sexual assault. I see a great
opportunity for future success in three main areas:

Disrupting the ``Continuum of Harm''--or the chain of
events and contributors that tend to be associated with sexual
assault. We continue to focus, in particular, on alcohol as a
factor in sexual assault. This year we fielded Alcohol
Detection Devices to the fleet to help educate sailors on their
alcohol use.
Prosecuting the offenders using specially trained
investigators, victim advocates, prosecutors, and paralegals.
As part of this effort we established dedicated Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) agent-teams in Norfolk, San Diego,
Bangor, and Okinawa that exclusively handle adult sexual
assault investigations. In Norfolk, these teams reduced the
average sexual assault investigation timeline from 324 days to
80 days. NCIS is expanding this model during fiscal year 2013
to Yokosuka, Japan, Hawaii, and Mayport, FL.
Support for victims. We prioritized prompt and
effective care for victims of sexual assault that maximizes the
ability to apprehend offenders. We continue to train and
qualify our military and civilian medical care workers to
conduct Sexual Assault Forensic Exam (SAFE); all our Military
Treatment Facilities and operational settings will be able to
perform SAFE exams by the end of this fiscal year. To support
victims through the investigation and judicial process we will
complete professionalizing our Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (SARC) and Victim Advocate (VA) cadre by hiring 10
additional SARCs and 66 full-time VAs in fiscal year 2013.
Suicide
Suicide is a growing problem in our Nation, our military and our
Navy. The number of suicides per 100,000 sailors per year has risen
steadily from 13, 2 years ago to 16 in the last 12 months. To help
address this trend, Navy stood up a task force to examine Navy suicide
prevention and resilience-building programs as well as evaluate DOD,
other service, and non-DOD approaches and programs. The task force
completed their assessment this month and is providing a comprehensive
set of actions for implementation. Their findings showed that while no
program to date has stopped suicides in the military, there are some
key factors contributing to suicide that we can address. Their
recommendations are being incorporated into our existing efforts to
prevent suicide, focused on education and awareness; intervention;
sailor care; and continued assessment of our progress.
In particular, the task force will revise our current collection of
123 programs designed to improve resiliency or prevent suicide and
focus them on the factors they found to be most effective at preventing
suicide. We will implement many of these recommendations in fiscal year
2013 and into fiscal year 2014. The Navy also works with DOD's Defense
Suicide Prevention Office to promote awareness of the Military Crisis
Line, a service that provides 24/7 confidential crisis support to those
in the military and their families. This line provides immediate access
to care for those who may be at risk for suicide, along with additional
follow-up and connection with metal health services.
At-sea manning shortfalls
Our goal for at-sea manning is 95 percent of billets filled and 90
percent ``fitted'' with a sailor having the right specialty and
seniority. At the start of fiscal year 2013, we were at about 90
percent fill and 85 percent fit--5 percent short of our goal in each
measure and about 7,000 short of our goal in at-sea manning. We put in
place a number of initiatives to shift more sailors to sea including
Sea Duty Incentive Pay, changes to Sea-Shore rotation and shifts of
Reserve component sailors to Active Duty. We are on track to reach our
fit and fill goals by the end of fiscal year 2013. An enduring factor
behind at-sea manning shortfalls is the fact we are about 4,000 sailors
below our planned and budgeted end strength. To permanently address our
end strength shortfall we increased accessions by 6,000 per year and
broadened and increased reenlistment bonuses for undermanned ratings,
adding bonuses for 18 specialties and increasing them for 42 more. We
expect to reach our end strength goal by the end of fiscal year 2013.
High Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO)
Over the last decade, our fleet shrank by about 10 percent while
our deployed presence remained about the same. As a result, each ship
and aviation squadron spends on average about 15 percent more days away
from home per year now than it did 10 years ago. This is an average,
however. Our increased OPTEMPO is not evenly distributed. Our CSGs and
ARGs will deploy on average 7-8 months in fiscal year 2013, but some
will deploy for 9 months or more due to emergent maintenance or the
effects of sequestration on operational schedules. Our BMD ships are
similarly deploying for about 9 months at a time. To better understand
how unit OPTEMPO affects individual sailors, this year we began
monitoring the time each sailor is away from home (ITEMPO) and will use
this information to guide our future decisions. For the long term,
however, we have to adopt a more sustainable process to provide ready
forces. For that reason, we are shifting to a ``supply-based'' model to
prepare forces for deployment starting in fiscal year 2014. As part of
this we will revise our Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) to make it
more predictable and provide more presence from the same size fleet.
When sailors are gone up to 9 months at a time, family readiness is
vitally important. Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission sustains
family support programs that provide counseling, education, child care
and financial advice. We also continue developing our sailors'
readiness and protection, safety, physical fitness, inclusion and
continuum of service as part of our 21st Century Sailor and Marine
initiative. The actions described above to address sexual assault and
suicides are part of this initiative. To improve our resourcing,
management and oversight of the programs that support our sailors and
their families, I am reorganizing my personnel headquarters to bring
all these aspects of a sailors' total health and personal readiness
under a 21st century sailor office led by a two-star admiral.
Our responsibility of support to our sailors and their families is
most important when they are wounded, ill, or injured. Navy's ``Safe
Harbor'' program helps about 1,200 sailors and coast guardsmen and
their families through their recovery with travel orders for treatment,
lodging, child and respite care, employment and education assistance,
mental health assistance and career counseling. We implemented a
campaign over the past year that increased enrollment in Safe Harbor 30
percent by reaching out to servicemembers who were eligible but had not
signed up. Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission sustains Safe Harbor
and improves the program's level of service.

OUR COURSE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014

Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission implements the DSG and
continues our current efforts by making decisions based on our three
tenets. Our approach to building our fiscal year 2014 program focused
on three main areas, in order:

First, we ensured sufficient forces and readiness to
provide the presence required to meet the current and projected
future GFMAP.
Second, we sustained our fiscal year 2013 investments
required to support our critical near-term capability to
perform DSG missions.
Third, we addressed our most relevant future
capability requirements to support the DSG missions.

The resulting fiscal year 2014 program and associated plans
implement DSG direction to rebalance our effort toward the Asia-Pacific
region, support our partners in the Middle East, sustain our alliance
commitments in Europe and employ low-cost, small footprint approaches
to security on other regions.

1. Delivering presence: Our fiscal year 2014 submission includes
the investments in force structure needed to meet the presence
requirements of the fiscal year 2014 GFMAP. Our investments in ships
and aircraft are complemented with the funding for training,
maintenance and operations necessary for readiness today and to ensure
they can continue to provide presence over their expected service life.
Figure 2 depicts the presence levels generated by our planned
investments in the fiscal year 2014 Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). Figure 2 also includes the number of ``non-rotational'' ships
that are either homeported in the region or are Forward Stationed in
the region and manned by rotational crews from CONUS.

Shipbuilding
We determined the number and type of ships required over the long-
term through a comprehensive, analytically-driven Force Structure
Assessment (FSA). The FSA determined the day-to-day presence required
to execute the DSG, informed by today's GFMAP and the introduction of
new ships, systems or payloads, and concepts that deliver presence more
efficiently or that better match capabilities to their theater. The FSA
resulted in a required number of each type of ship to meet the
projected presence requirements. Although presence is the governing
factor for Navy force structure requirements, the FSA also ensured
Navy's force structure would be sufficient to meet the surge
requirements of CCDR operational plans and DOD Defense Planning
Scenarios, informed by the DSG direction to reevaluate those plans in
view of our resource limitations.
The FSA analysis resulted in a battle force requirement of 306
ships. This requirement is different from our previous 313-ship
requirement because of: (1) reduced presence requirements resulting
from the DSG's priorities; (2) increased forward basing of ships; (3)
introduction of new payload capacity for SSNs (replacing the SSGNs)
and; (4) the increased use of ships manned with rotating civilian and
military crews which provide more presence per ship.
Our fiscal year 2014 long-term shipbuilding plan is designed and
planned to deliver the fleet, by ship type, required per our FSA over
the long term. Over the fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2018 FYDP our
program will fund construction of 41 ships. Our investments are not
programmed to reach the precise number and mix of ships within this
FYDP, but do deliver a fleet of 300 ships by 2019 with increased
capability and flexibility compared to the fleet of today. To meet the
required force mix and number, however, Navy will need the means to
resource, in particular, construction of the next generation nuclear
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter
acknowledged this resourcing challenge in his memo of March 2012 that
forwarded the Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan to Congress.
Our fiscal year 2014 program continues the construction of ships
that employ rotational military or civilian crews to improve their
ability to operate and stay forward. Our fiscal year 2014 budget
submission funds the final MLP, which will be configured as an AFSB and
manned by rotating civilian crews with military detachments, and four
LCS that will employ rotational military crews. During fiscal year 2014
we will deploy the first JHSV, USNS Spearhead, and continue the first
deployment of USS Freedom. We will use these deployments to integrate
these new, highly adaptable platforms into the fleet and evaluate the
ways we can employ their combination of persistent forward presence and
flexible payload capacity.
During fiscal year 2014, seven ships will enter the fleet,
including two new classes of ships. The first Zumwalt-class DDG will
deliver next year, bringing with it an all-electric integrated
propulsion system and the Advanced Gun System, able to reach targets
with precision up to 60 miles away. The amphibious assault ship USS
America will join the fleet in fiscal year 2014 and empower new
concepts for amphibious operations that take advantage of its expanded
aviation capacity. Over the next 5 years, we will deliver 47 ships,
including the Gerald R. Ford, the first of a new class of CVN that will
provide much higher sortie generation with about 500 fewer sailors.
Aviation
Our aviation requirements are tied to requirements for the ships
from which they operate, and on our required forward presence of land-
based aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon. Our fiscal year 2014 program
invests in aircraft to meet those requirements. To support our carrier
air wings and independent deploying ships, our fiscal year 2014 budget
submission continues construction of the proven and adaptable MH-60R/S
Seahawk and E-2D Hawkeye. We also continue investment in development
and low-rate production of the F-35C Lightning II to replace our older
F/A-18 Hornet models (A-D).
Readiness
Our funded operations and maintenance in fiscal year 2013 will
complete the manning, training, maintenance and other preparations
necessary to enable Navy to meet the fiscal year 2014 GFMAP. Our fiscal
year 2014 budget submission, combined with anticipated Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, fully funds our planned ship and
aircraft maintenance and the ship and aircraft operations needed to
execute the fiscal year 2014 GFMAP.
Our overall fiscal year 2014 readiness is dependent on OCO funding.
OCO funding subsidizes about 20 percent of our ship and aircraft
maintenance costs in fiscal year 2014, including depot maintenance, as
our fleet supports operations in Afghanistan. We are requesting OCO
funding for about 20 percent of our planned ship operations to support
training and certification for deployment and deployed operations. Our
dependence on OCO funding for baseline operations has decreased from
$3.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $2.3 billion fiscal year 2013 as we
``migrate OCO to base'' funding. A more enduring funding strategy will
eventually be required for Navy to maintain its current readiness and
level of overseas presence into the future.
The Navy also continues to develop more efficient ways to generate
presence. Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission requests investments
needed to modify the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP), which is the
means Navy uses to train and maintain ships and aircraft in our CSGs
and ARGs in preparation for deployment. This change, called ``Enhanced
CSG Presence,'' will enable increased overseas presence of
rotationally-deployed CSGs by: lengthening the overall FRTP cycle;
adding time for maintenance and training; and increasing the total
deployed time of each CSG per operating cycle. This transition will
take about 2 years to complete, but when completed we will have
established a more sustainable process for training and maintaining our
rotationally deploying ships, aircraft and crews.
Enhanced CSG Presence addresses increased use and increased
overseas presence of CSGs over the last decade, since the current FRP
was first developed. The current FRTP organizes the training and
maintenance of ships and aircraft in the CSG to conduct one deployment
(nominally 7 months) per 32-month cycle; the CSG is then available to
deploy for contingencies for another 12 months. In the last several
years, Requests For Forces (RFF) added to the GFMAP compelled Navy to
routinely deploy CSGs twice in each operating cycle. This caused
personnel to exceed DOD personnel tempo limits and expended the CVNs
nuclear fuel at a higher rate than planned--causing some CVN to be
constrained in the amount of operations they can do before they are
refueled. Enhanced CSG Presence is designed to deploy CSGs twice each
operating cycle while providing the time at home needed to stay within
PERSTEMPO limits and maintain ships and aircraft. This model is more
efficient because it trains and maintains the CSG once for up to two
deployments. It is also a ``supply-based'' model because it delivers a
set amount of overseas CSG presence and does not include ``on demand''
surge capacity except in most extreme contingencies. Our fiscal year
2014 program includes the near-term investment in personnel and
shipyard capacity needed to implement Enhanced CSG Presence, but future
investment in CVN and aircraft recapitalization may be needed to
address increased usage over time.
Our shore establishment is a key contributor to our operational
readiness. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 reduced by more than half
our planned facilities sustainment, renovation and modernization (FSRM)
projects. This $1.2 billion reduction in shore investment will be
``carried over'' into fiscal year 2014 and beyond and will degrade our
shore readiness over time. Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission funds
FSRM at acceptable levels of risk overall, but this ``carryover'' will
have to be addressed.
One particular area of emphasis in our facilities investment
remains unaccompanied sailor housing. In 2001, 21,000 of our junior
sailors had to live on their ship even when the ship was in port
because there were no quarters ashore for them. Our military
construction in fiscal year 2013 will complete our effort to provide
every sailor a room ashore by 2016, while our FSRM investments going
forward will improve the quality of our sailor's quarters. These
efforts are important to our sailors' quality of life and personal
readiness, but also will improve the safety and security of our on-base
housing.
Arctic
Emerging projections assess that the Arctic will become passable
for shipping several months out of the year within the next decade--
about 10 years earlier than predicted in 2009 when we first published
our Arctic Roadmap. This will place new demands on our fleet for
presence in the Arctic and capabilities to operate in the Arctic
environment. Between now and the start of fiscal year 2014 we will
update our Arctic Roadmap, and accelerate many of the actions Navy will
take in preparation for a more accessible Arctic. During fiscal year
2014 we will implement this revised roadmap, including developing with
the U.S. Coast Guard plans for maintaining presence and search and
rescue capability in the Arctic and pursuing exchanges with other
Arctic countries to familiarize our sailors with Arctic operations.

2. Fielding near-term capabilities: Mine warfare continues to be a
significant emphasis in the near-term. Our fiscal year 2014 program
increases investment in the new AQS-20 towed mine hunting sonar and the
new unmanned surface vehicle that will tow it, freeing up manned
helicopters and ships and further expanding our mine hunting capacity.
Our budget submission funds upgrades for our existing helicopter-towed
mine hunting sonar and MCM hull-mounted sonar and accelerates fielding
of the Mk-18 UUV and Sea Fox mine neutralization system. To support our
MCMs and PCs in Bahrain, Navy's fiscal year 2014 program sustains USS
Ponce as an AFSB-I in the Arabian Gulf and funds the outfitting of its
replacement--the first MLP modified to be an AFSB.

To address the near-term threat from submarines, our fiscal year
2014 program sustains accelerated procurement of Mk-54 torpedoes,
improves sustainment and replacement of today's fixed and mobile
undersea sensors and improves our current periscope detection radars on
surface ships and aircraft. To counter wake-homing torpedoes we
installed a prototype surface ship torpedo defense (SSTD) system on USS
George H.W. Bush this year and it is being tested. The SSTD system will
deploy with Bush during fiscal year 2014.
Small boats with explosives or anti-ship missiles remain a
potential threat to our forces in the constrained waters of the Arabian
Gulf. Our fiscal year 2014 program funds integration of the Advanced
Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) onto our MH-60R helicopters to
counter this threat. We also will test the new Laser Weapons System
(LaWS) during fiscal year 2014 in the Arabian Gulf aboard USS Ponce.
LaWS brings capabilities to defeat small boats and unmanned air
vehicles (UAV) for about $1 a shot compared to thousands or millions of
dollars per artillery round or missile. To improve our ability to
defeat larger surface combatants, our fiscal year 2014 program invests
in development and testing of near-term modifications to existing
weapons that would enable them to be used for surface warfare.

3. Developing future capabilities: Our development of future
capability is bench-marked to support our rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific and is guided in large part by the Air-Sea Battle concept,
which implements the Joint Operational Access Concept. Both these
concepts are designed to assure U.S. forces freedom of action and
access to support deterrence, assurance of our allies and partners, and
the ability to respond to crises. Our investments focus on assuring
access in each domain, often by exploiting the asymmetric capability
advantages of U.S. forces across domains
Undersea
Navy's dominance of the undersea domain provides U.S. forces their
most significant asymmetric advantage. Our fiscal year 2014 program
continues improving our capability to deny the undersea to adversaries,
while exploiting it for our own operations. Our ASW concepts combine
U.S. air, space, cyber, surface and subsurface capabilities to prevent
adversaries from effectively using the undersea domain. Navy's fiscal
year 2014 budget submission sustains and plans production of proven ASW
platforms including MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, P-8A Poseidon maritime
patrol aircraft, Arleigh Burke class destroyers and Virginia class
nuclear submarines (SSN)--including a second SSN in fiscal year 2014
thanks to congressional support in fiscal year 2013. Our budget
submission also funds Advanced Airborne Sensors for the P-8A Poseidon,
accelerates torpedo defense systems for our aircraft carriers,
transitions the PLUS system to an acquisition program and improves
Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. To tie these manned and
unmanned air, surface and undersea systems together in a networked, our
fiscal year 2014 budget submission continues development of the
Undersea Warfare Decision Support System.
Our submarines and undersea vehicles can exploit their ability to
circumvent anti-access challenges to conduct missions such as
surveillance, strike, and ASUW into the air and surface domains with
near-impunity. In addition to building two Virginia class SSNs in
fiscal year 2014 our budget submission continues development of the
Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle and additional payloads
for our existing submarines.
Air
Our fiscal year 2014 program continues to improve the capability of
our CSGs to project power despite threats to access. In fiscal year
2014 our budget submission funds two squadrons E/A-18G Growler
electronic warfare aircraft and the Next Generation Jammer. E/A-18G
provides key and critical capabilities to our CVW and expeditionary
forces by jamming or deceiving adversary electromagnetic sensors while
providing improved capability for sensing of adversary electromagnetic
emissions. Our fiscal year 2014 budget submission also continues to
invest in the development and low-rate production of the new F-35C
Lightning II. We will continue to evaluate how to best integrate F-35C
into our CVW from a training, logistics and operational perspective. In
particular, we are concerned about the sustainment model and costs for
F-35C and how to manage them. While we expect the F-35C to be able to
do all the missions of today's F/A-18 E/F, it will also bring improved
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities that will make possible a
number of new operational concepts.
Our fiscal year 2014 program funds the fielding of new ``kill
chains'' that are better able to defeat adversary jamming. One chain
uses infrared sensors and weapons to provide air-to-air capability that
operates outside the radiofrequency (RF) band and is therefore not
susceptible to traditional RF jamming. The other kill chain uses
networked sensors and weapons in the Navy Integrated Fire Control-
Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system. NIFC-CA uses the Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) datalink between Aegis ships and E-2D aircraft and
Link-16 between E-2D and F/A-18 aircraft to seamlessly share threat
information between Navy ships and aircraft. NIFC-CA enables each
platform to engage targets on another platform's data, even if the
shooting platform does not even see the target on its own radar due to
jamming or extreme range. Since NIFC-CA incorporates Link-16, other
Link-16-equipped sensors such as the Army's Joint Land Attack Cruise
Missile Elevated Netted Sensor and Airborne Warning and Control System
could also participate in the network. We will field the first NIFC-CA
equipped CSG in 2015 and will pursue greater Joint and coalition
employment of NIFC-CA as part of the Air-Sea Battle Concept.
Enhancements to our manned aircraft are still limited by the range
and persistence of manned platforms. Our fiscal year 2014 program
continues testing and development of the X-47 Unmanned Combat Air
System Demonstrator (UCAS-D) UAV, which completed flight deck trials at
sea aboard USS Harry S Truman, its first land-based catapult launches,
and is slated for its first at-sea catapult launch and recovery in late
May. This spring we will finalize the requirements for the follow-on
Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Strike and Surveillance (UCLASS)
system, followed by an initial request for proposals from industry. By
fiscal year 2020, UCLASS will enhance the reach and persistence of our
CSGs by conducting surveillance and strike missions several hundreds of
miles from the carrier and with two to three times the endurance of a
manned aircraft. The UCLASS can also be equipped to take on missions
such as tanking that today take several F/A-18 E/F out of the tactical
missions for which they were designed.
Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and cyber
Future conflicts will be fought and won in the electromagnetic
spectrum and cyberspace, which are converging to become one continuous
environment. This environment is increasingly important to defeating
threats to access, since through it we can disrupt adversary sensors,
command and control and weapons homing. Our fiscal year 2014 budget
submission aggressively supports Navy's efforts to exploit the EMS and
cyberspace. In addition to E/A-18G aircraft and Next Generation Jammer,
our fiscal year 2014 budget submission funds seven SLQ-32 Surface
Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 1 upgrades and
fields new deployable decoys to defeat anti-ship missiles. The fiscal
year 2014 program also accelerates research and development on SEWIP
Block 3, which expands the frequency range of the SLQ-32 electronic
warfare system to address emerging missile threats and provides
enhanced electronic attack capabilities. To disrupt adversary
surveillance and communications, our fiscal year 2014 budget submission
continues procurement of improvements to Navy's Ships Signal
Exploitation Equipment, which will host a growing number of electronic
surveillance and attack payloads.
Improving the defense of our computer networks depends on reducing
our ``footprint'' or the number of different networks; reducing the
number of different applications on our networks; improving our day-to-
day cyber ``hygiene''; and developing an effective cyber workforce. Our
fiscal year 2014 program continues fielding the Consolidated Afloat
Network and Enterprise Services (CANES) on ships and the Next
Generation Network ashore to reduce the number of Navy networks and
applications while we continue to expand the inspection of our cyber
``hygiene'' with improving results. To expand our cyber warfare
capabilities, our fiscal year 2014 program funds the manpower and
training to man and train a cyber force increase of about 1,000
personnel by fiscal year 2016 in addition to the 800 billets realigned
in fiscal year 2013 from other specialties. These cyber specialists
will help form 40 computer defense, attack and exploitation teams at
U.S. Cyber Command. Navy studied the challenges associated with the EMS
and cyber domains in 2012. We are now building on these initial
capabilities with a comprehensive plan to improve our ability to
exploit the EMS and cyberspace.
Amphibious warfare
Not all threats to access are from enemy missiles or torpedoes.
Adversaries will exploit geography and coerce neighbors to not allow
our forces to use their facilities. Naval forces also need the
flexibility to come ashore in unexpected areas or from less predictable
directions to catch the adversary off guard. Amphibious warfare
exploits the inherent maneuverability of naval forces to provide an
asymmetric advantage against adversary anti-access efforts. Our fiscal
year 2014 budget submission funds construction of an 11th ``big deck''
amphibious assault ship (LHA), LHA-8, which will bring enhanced
aviation capacity and a traditional well deck to expand its ability to
support the full range of amphibious operations. Our fiscal year 2014
program also extends the life of USS Peleliu through fiscal year 2015
and sustains our ship to shore connector capacity through life
extensions and recapitalization. We are complementing this investment
with revised concepts for marines to operate at sea on a larger number
of ships to conduct missions from peacetime security cooperation to
wartime amphibious assault.
While developing new Navy-Marine Corps operating concepts, we will
address in the near-term the need for improved communications systems
on our amphibious ships. Our fiscal year 2014 program continues to
install the CANES on San Antonio-class Amphibious Transport Dock ships
(LPD) and on LHAs and LHDs. This only addresses a part of our
shortfall. We are analyzing the need for upgraded communications on our
older amphibious ships and will correct those shortfalls in the near-
term. We are also developing changes to our command and control
organizations to enable our amphibious forces to scale their operations
from disaggregated Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) up to large scale
operations involving multiple ARGs and CSGs.
Asia-Pacific Rebalance
Our fiscal year 2014 program continues rebalancing our efforts
toward the Asia-Pacific region in four main ways:

Increased presence: As indicated in Figures 1 and 2,
our fiscal year 2014 budget submission enables Navy presence in
the Asia-Pacific to increase by almost 20 percent between now
and 2020. This is in large part a result of more ships
operating from forward locations, including an additional SSN
homeported in Guam, LCS operating from Singapore and JHSV, MLP
and AFSB operating from ports throughout the region. It also
reflects additional DDG and amphibious ships rotationally
deployed to the Asia-Pacific after being made available by
forward homeporting of DDG in Rota, Spain or because they were
replaced by JHSV and LCS in Africa and South America.
Homeporting: We implemented a plan in fiscal year 2013
to shift 60 percent of our fleet to be homeported on the
Pacific by 2020. Our fiscal year 2014 program continues this
plan.
Capabilities: Our capability investments for the Asia-
Pacific are guided by the Air-Sea Battle concept and the future
capabilities described above will be deployed preferentially
and first to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, the P-8A
will conduct its first deployment to the Asia-Pacific in 2014,
followed by the MQ-4C and F-35 later this decade. Our improved
aviation kill chain capabilities will go first to the CVW in
Japan and NIFC-CA will be first fielded to the Pacific Fleet
once it completes its operational testing.
Intellectual Capital: Our investments in education,
exercises, interoperability and engagement continue to focus on
the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to conduct more than 150
exercises annually in the Asia-Pacific and our plan for RIMPAC
14 is to continue growing in sophistication and participation,
including China for the first time. We established a permanent
squadron staff to support LCS in Singapore and manage Navy
security cooperation activities in the South China Sea.
conclusion
Budget uncertainties or reductions may slow progress toward our
goals, but the tenets which guide our decisions will remain firm. Along
with our primary joint partner the U.S. Marine Corps we will remain
America's ``force in readiness,'' prepared to promptly respond to
crises overseas. On behalf of the approximately 613,000 Navy sailors
and civilians, I appreciate the support that Congress has given us to
remain the world's preeminent maritime force. I can assure Congress and
the American people that we will be focused on warfighting first,
operating forward and being ready.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
General Amos.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC,
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

General Amos. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
members of the committee: I'm pleased to appear before you
today to outline the 2013 posture of your U.S. Marine Corps.
I'm equally pleased to be sitting alongside my Service
Secretary, the Honorable Ray Mabus, and my good friend and
fellow shipmate, Admiral John Greenert, the Chief of Naval
Operations.
For more than 237 years, the Marine Corps has been a
people-intense force. We have always known our greatest asset
is the single individual marine. That has borne true yet again
during 12 years of hard combat. Our unique role as America's
principal crisis response force is grounded in the legendary
character and warfighting ethos of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Today's marines are ethical warriors, forged by challenging
training and made wise through decades of combat. You can take
great pride in knowing that as we gather here this morning in
this hearing, some 30,000 marines are forward deployed around
the world, promoting peace, protecting our Nation's interests,
and securing its defense.
Sergeant Major Michael Barrett, Sergeant Major of the
Marine Corps, and I recently returned from Afghanistan and can
attest to the progress there. Marines have given the Afghan
people a vision of success and the possibility of a secure and
prosperous society. I'm bullish about the positive assistance
we are providing the people of the Helmand Province and I
remain optimistic about their future. Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) have the lead now in almost every single
operation. Our commanders and their marines assess the ANSF as
overmatching the Taliban in every way and in every single
engagement.
Speaking today as both a Service Chief and as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the foundation of our Nation's
defense and the security of the global economic environment
depends upon regional stability and international order.
Failing to provide leadership in the collective security of the
global order will have significant consequences for the
American people. Worse, a lapse in American leadership and
forward engagement will create a void in which lasting security
threats will be left unaddressed and new security challenges
will find room to grow.
The reality of today's security environment reveals the
true value of forward-deployed naval presence. Sea-based naval
forces support a proactive security strategy, all while
treading lightly on our allies' and our partners' sovereign
territory. Amphibious forces are a sensible and unmistakable
solution in preserving our national security. Naval forces, and
the Marine Corps in particular, are our Nation's insurance
policy. We are a hedge against an uncertain and unpredictable
world. A balanced air-ground logistics team, we respond in
hours and days to America's needs, not in weeks and months.
This is our raison d'etre. It has always been that way.
This year's baseline budget submission of $24.2 billion was
framed by our following service-level priorities:
First, we will continue to provide the best-trained and
equipped Marine Corps units to Afghanistan;
Second, we will protect the readiness of our forward-
deployed and rotational forces;
Third, we will reset and reconstitute our operating forces
as our marines and our equipment return from nearly 12 years of
combat;
Fourth, as much as is humanly possible we will modernize
our force through investing in the individual Marine first by
replacing aging combat systems second; and
Fifth and last, we will keep faith with our marines, our
sailors, and our families.
We have remained committed to these priorities in fiscal
year 2013 despite the loss of $775 million in O&M funding as a
result of sequestration. To guarantee near-term readiness, we
have traded long-term infrastructure and nondeployed unit
training to bolster the readiness of our next-to-deploy forces.
By doing so we are capable of meeting all current GFMAP
requirement for the remainder of this fiscal year.
However, we cannot continue to sustain this level of
reduction in fiscal year 2014 without impact to our deployed
and next-to-deploy forces. Sequestration in 2014 will mean that
more than half of our non-forward-deployed ground and aviation
units will have readiness ratings of C3 or below.
Ladies and gentlemen, your Marine Corps is well aware of
the fiscal realities confronting our Nation. During these times
of constrained resources, the Marine Corps remains committed to
being responsible stewards of scarce public funds.
In closing, the success of your marines and your Marine
Corps is directly linked to the unwavering support of Congress
and the American people. You have my promise that during our
economic challenges, the Marine Corps will only ask for what it
needs, not for what it wants. We will continue to prioritize
and make the hard decisions before we ever come before
Congress. We will continue to offer a strategically mobile
force, optimized for forward presence and rapid response. Your
Marine Corps stands ready to respond whenever the Nation calls
and whenever the President may direct.
Once again, I thank this committee for your strong support
over the last many years and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC

I. MARINES AND THE NATION'S DEFENSE

Our Nation has long recognized the need for a ready expeditionary
force, one able to deter those who would do us harm, swiftly intervene
when they act to do so, and fight to win where the security interests
of our Nation are threatened. I am pleased to report that your marines
remain that ready force. Because of the faithfulness and trust of the
American people, marines are forward deployed today; on ships at sea,
at our diplomatic posts, in key security locations, and alongside our
allies. They are poised to respond wherever crisis looms. Thousands of
your 21st century marines and sailors remain deployed to Afghanistan
where they are putting relentless pressure on a disrupted enemy, while
setting the conditions for a transition of security responsibilities to
the Afghans themselves. Marines here at home are in the field, training
at their bases and stations. Wherever they serve, whatever their
mission, your marines are ready, motivated, and eager. Their
professionalism and patriotism are undimmed by over a decade of combat.
They carry the timeless ethos and deep pride marines have built over
237 years of service to this Nation. You can be proud of their service.
The need for this highly capable and ready force is more pressing
now than ever. Today, we see a world marked by conflict, instability
and humanitarian disaster. We see the disruptive changes that accompany
a rapidly modernizing world; a world in which tyranny is challenged,
power is diffused and extremism finds fertile ground in the
disenfranchised. While America's continued prosperity and security are
found in a stable global order; instability, extremism and conflict
create disorder instead. In what has been described as a `new normal,'
extremism, economic disruption, identity politics and social change
generate new potential security threats at an accelerating pace. While
we desire peace as a nation, threats to our citizens, allies, and
national interests compel our response when crisis occurs.
The unpredictable and chaotic security environment in which we find
ourselves presents security challenges that are aligned exactly with
the core competencies of the Marine Corps. While marines have acquitted
themselves well during two long campaigns ashore, our fundamental ethos
and character remains that of the Nation's Expeditionary Force in
Readiness. The Marine Corps is purpose-built for the very world we see
emerging around us . . . purpose-built to intervene in crisis, purpose-
built to forge partnerships in collective security, purpose-built to
defend our Nation from the wide range of security threats it faces
today.
This unique role is grounded in the special nature of the
individual marine. America's marines hold to a professional ethos
anchored in honor, discipline, fidelity, and sacrifice. Today's marines
are ethical warriors, forged in hard training and made wise through
years of experience in combat. Courageous in battle and always
faithful, marines stand as pillars of just action, compassion, and
moral courage. This ethos defines our warfighting philosophy and is the
timeless scale upon which we continually measure ourselves . . . it has
always been this way.
The Marine Corps remains first and foremost a naval service,
operating in close partnership with the U.S. Navy. We share with them a
storied heritage that predates the signing of our Constitution.
Together, the two naval Services leverage the seas, not only to protect
the vast global commons, but also to project our national power and
influence ashore where that is required. The world's coastal regions
are the home to an increasing majority of the human population, and are
thus the scene of frequent conflict and natural disaster. These
littoral regions comprise the connective tissues that connect oceanic
trade routes with the activities of populations ashore. In an era of
heightened sensitivities over sovereignty, and where large foreign
military footprints are unwelcome, the seas provide maritime forces
with a means of less obtrusive access. Maritime expeditionary forces
can be located close enough to act when crisis threatens and hours
matter, without imposing a burden on host nations. Expeditionary
maritime forces can operate in the air, at sea, and on land, without
the necessity of infrastructure ashore. They can loiter unseen over the
horizon, and can move swiftly from one crisis region to another.
Importantly, maritime forces also have the ability to rapidly return to
the sea when their mission is complete.
This flexibility and strategic agility make Marine forces a key
tool for the Joint force in major contingencies. Operating in
partnership with the Navy, the Marine air-ground-logistics task force
creates the strategic asymmetries that make the joint force so
effective on the modern battlefield. Amphibious and expeditionary
capabilities contribute to each of the ten mission areas of the joint
force, and are directly responsive to the security demands articulated
in the President's Defense Strategic Guidance for the 21st Century. By
design, marines smoothly integrate with the other elements of the joint
force, enable our interagency partners in response to disaster or
humanitarian crises, and provide a naturally complementary team when
working with Special Operations Forces.
As the Nation prepares for an uncertain future, its expeditionary
Marine forces provide a highly-utilitarian capability, effective in a
wide range of scenarios. Marines remain a cost-effective hedge against
the unexpected, providing a national ``insurance policy'' against
strategic surprise. Thanks to the support of American people, the
Marine Corps remains responsive to its congressional mandate to be the
``most ready when the Nation is least ready.''
2012 Operational Highlights
This past year, marines have been actively engaged in every corner
of the global security environment. The Marine Corps continued to meet
operational commitments in Afghanistan, while simultaneously working
with more than 90 allies and partners to train, to learn, and to build
effective security institutions. In addition to forces committed to
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), our Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEUs), in partnership with Navy Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs),
continued to patrol regions of likely crisis. Other task-organized
Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), operating from expeditionary
locations, supported U.S. national security objectives through forward
presence, deterrence, multinational theater security cooperation
exercises, and building partner capacity. Marines have been active in
every geographical combatant command, serving as a key component of the
joint force. Even under fiscal restraint, we will continue to support
these strategically important activities to the greatest extent
possible.

Afghanistan
Our number one priority remains providing the best-trained and
best-equipped Marine units to Afghanistan. As long as we are engaged
there, this will not change. Active and Reserve marines continue
operations in Helmand Province, comprising approximately 7,000 of the
16,000 Coalition personnel in Regional Command Southwest (RC-SW). By
the end of this year, we expect our contribution will be closer to half
its current size. Through distributed combat operations conducted with
their Afghan counterparts, marines have continued to deny the Taliban
safe haven. Your marines, with coalition partners from nine nations and
the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), have restored stability in
one of the most critical regions of Afghanistan, creating breathing
space for the establishment of effective tools of governance. These
combat operations have been marked by the continued bravery and
sacrifice of American, coalition, and Afghan servicemembers.
One measure of our battlefield success is the continued progress in
implementing the mechanisms of effective governance in Helmand
Province. In 2012, citizens of Helmand conducted three successful
elections for district community councils, with more than 5,000
participants vying for approximately 45 council seats. There are new
district governors in 12 of 14 districts, and new provincial
authorities in the capital of Lashkar Gah. Within the provincial
judicial system, the numbers of judges, prosecutors and defense
counselors are steadily growing.
Provincial social conditions also show marked improvement. Marines
have helped open 86 schools, providing a new normal of daily classroom
participation by over 121,000 children. This total includes more than
28,000 female students, a 432 percent increase since 2005.
Healthcare is another area of vast improvement. In 2006, only six
health clinics served the needs of the population of Helmand province,
an area nearly twice the size of Maryland. Six years later, 57 health
care facilities provide basic health services to more than half of the
population. Infrastructure improvements currently underway include a
$130 million major electrical power system project and additional major
road construction projects.
Transitioning from counter-insurgency operations to security force
assistance in Afghanistan, we are adjusting our force posture into an
advisory role in support of the ANSF. U.S.-led missions have given way
to U.S.-Afghan partnered missions; and now are transitioning once again
to missions conducted entirely by Afghan forces with only advisory
support from U.S. forces. As nearly all Districts in RC-SW have entered
the transition process, the next year remains a delicate and extremely
important time. Afghan local authorities, supported by the ANSF and
their citizens, have welcomed their responsibility to lead and are
taking it upon themselves to contribute to the transition process.
I recently returned from visiting your marines in Helmand province,
and I can attest to the progress there. Marines have given the people
of Helmand a vision for a secure and prosperous society, and the
responsibilities that come with that freedom. The marines are proud of
what they and their predecessors have accomplished, and want to see
this mission through to completion.
That mission is not complete until the massive project of
retrograding our equipment from our dispersed operating locations
across southern Afghanistan is completed. I am happy to report to you
the tremendous progress our marines have made in recovering and
redeploying our equipment. Our logisticians have spearheaded a recovery
effort that has been proactive, cost-effective, and in keeping with the
high stewardship of taxpayer resources for which the Corps is known.
Much of our equipment, unneeded in Afghanistan but required for home-
station training, has been successfully returned to the United States,
where it can be refurbished and reissued. We are proud to preserve our
reputation as the frugal force.

Global Crisis Response
Concomitant with our Afghan commitments, marines have been vigilant
around the globe, responding to crises ranging from civil conflict to
natural disasters. Crisis response is a core competency of your
expeditionary force in readiness. The Marine Corps provides six MEUs
operating from the continental United States, and one operating from
its bases in Japan. Teamed with Navy ARGs, these expeditionary forces
provide a rotational forward presence around the globe. Special-purpose
MAGTFs, capable of rapidly responding when conditions deteriorate,
augment the MEUs from forward security locations in key regions. The
recent deployment of our 24th MEU and the Iwo Jima ARG is instructive.
As this Navy-Marine expeditionary team transited the Mediterranean Sea
and operated off the horn of Africa, they participated in their normal
syllabus of exercises and operations to include African Lion with the
Moroccan military, Eager Lion with the Jordanian Navy and the
International Mine Countermeasures Exercise that included more than 30
international partners. While forward deployed participating in these
partnership initiatives, however, they also provided an essential
response capability for our national leadership when U.S. interests or
citizens were threatened due to violence in Syria, Gaza, Sudan, Libya,
Egypt, and Yemen. These forces planned against a variety of scenarios
and were poised to swiftly intervene from the sea in each of these
cases. Although past the end of their scheduled deployment, this Navy-
Marine team was extended on-station, and maneuvered throughout the
region in order to ensure our Nation could respond if crisis
necessitated intervention to protect our citizens. If even one of these
smoldering situations had ignited into the flames of crisis, our
marines would have been quickly on the scene, protecting human life,
preserving our interests, and evacuating our citizens. For our
diplomats and citizens in these troubled parts of the world, there is
no substitute for the capabilities brought by forward deployed marines
and their Navy partners. Their ability to quickly respond to a variety
of missions gave decisionmakers at all levels time to develop their
plans, created options for execution, and provided assurance that there
was a force ready to be called-on if needed. This utility, flexibility
and forward presence is an essential feature of our Nation's ability to
respond to crisis at a moment's notice.
In 2012, our diplomatic posts and embassies remained highly visible
symbols of US presence and commitment. In the threat environment posed
by the new normal, the protection offered by host states is often
threatened by groups and organizations that do not respect the
conventions of the state system. Marines are a key component in
ensuring the security of these most vulnerable nodes of U.S. presence.
Marine Security Guards are currently deployed to 152 embassies and
consulates around the world. With congressional guidance, we are
seeking to increase this number in close coordination with the State
Department. Marine Embassy Security detachments and Fleet Anti-
terrorism Security Teams (FAST), alongside their State Department
colleagues, also protect our diplomatic missions against a range of
threats. During 2012, specialized FAST marines deployed to reinforce
U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, providing physical security and force
protection. Last year we provided each Geographic Combatant Commander
with FAST support to aid in protecting U.S. interests worldwide. These
teams provided immediate relief in Libya following the deadly terrorist
attack on the consulate that claimed the lives of the Ambassador and
three other Americans. As demonstrations spread across the Middle East
and North Africa, marines from an additional FAST platoon deployed to
Yemen when violent protests threatened American diplomatic personnel.
These specially trained marines remain forward deployed at naval
commands around the globe, poised to respond on short notice when our
citizens and diplomats are threatened.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Over the past decade, in the Asia-Pacific Area alone, major natural
disasters have claimed the lives of an average of 70,000 people each
year. American leadership in response to global natural disaster is a
clear and unambiguous demonstration of our strength, our values, and
our good intentions. This demonstration gives credibility to our
security promises, strengthens the value of our deterrence, and creates
goodwill among our potential partners. Although built for war and
maintained forward to protect our security interests, the utility of
expeditionary Marine forces makes them a natural response option when
disaster strikes. Forward deployed marines responded to numerous
natural disasters over the past year, smoothly integrating as a
contributor to multiagency and multinational relief efforts. As an
example, just this last December, marines from the III Marine
Expeditionary Force supported a USAID-led response by providing
disaster relief in the aftermath of super typhoon Pablo in the
Philippines. When hours mattered and the survival of large populations
was at stake, marines from their forward bases in Japan quickly
organized and executed their participation in the U.S. relief effort.
KC-130J Hercules transport planes delivered critical food packages and
other supplies to Manila for distribution by the Philippine military.
This is but one example of a regular feature of the global security
environment, and the utility of your forward-postured marines.

Defense Support to Civil Authorities
In a similar vein, when Hurricane Sandy struck our own nation in
October 2012, more than 300 marines and sailors from the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit provided critical recovery and relief operations in
support of Americans in need in New York City and Long Island. Marines
were one part of a multiagency response that included ships of the USS
Wasp ARG and other military assets. Marine aviation conducted disaster
relief assessments and provided the necessary airlift for marines to
deploy into the hardest-hit areas. On the ground, marines successfully
coordinated with local leaders and residents for priority relief
requirements, providing critical supplies and assisting with clearing
debris and helping restore normalcy to people's lives. The swiftness of
the Marine response, and their ability to conduct relief efforts from
the sea made them an important contributor, without imposing additional
strain on the roads, airfields and infrastructure supporting the
broader relief effort.

Security Cooperation
In 2012, marines participated in more than 200 security cooperation
engagements, including multilateral and bilateral exercises, training,
and military-to-military engagements. Forward-deployed MEUs
participated in joint and coalition exercises around the globe from
Morocco to the Philippines, strengthening our partnerships with allies
such as Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan.
In Europe, marine trainers deployed to support battalions of the
Georgian Army, strengthening a decade-long partnership with that
nation. Because of this small investment of marines, Georgian
battalions have been effectively fighting alongside U.S. marines in
Afghanistan since 2008. Marines continue to provide forces and
leadership to activities such as the Black Sea Rotational Force, an
annual U.S. European Command initiative with the Romanians, Bulgarians,
and other Black Sea regional allies.
In Africa, a Special Purpose MAGTF, tailored to conduct theater
security cooperation in support of OEF-Trans Sahara, trained
counterterrorism forces and supported coalition forces combating al
Qaeda affiliates across the Maghreb region. This MAGTF also trained
with forces from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
providing well-trained African peacekeeping forces that are currently
countering the Al Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia.
In Australia, our new rotational units continued to expand the
training and partnership opportunities offered by one of our strongest
and oldest allies in the Pacific. This past year, Marine Rotational
Force Darwin conducted bilateral training with their hosts on the
superb training ranges available in Northern Australia. The partnership
of our Australian allies is a cornerstone of our Pacific rebalance.
Marines are natural partners for an Australian military that continues
to expand its expeditionary capabilities. As the Australians take
delivery of their new big-deck amphibious ships, U.S. marines look
forward to more combined training opportunities and reinforced crisis
response capabilities. From Darwin, marines embarked aboard USS
Germantown to participate in the annual Landing Force Cooperation and
Readiness Afloat Training (LF CARAT) amphibious patrol of the Southeast
Asian neighborhood. Through LF CARAT, marines conducted training
exercises with our partners in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Maintaining a sound international economic system and a just
international order are the foundations of our Nation's Defense
Strategic Guidance. Your marines remain forward deployed around the
world, projecting U.S. influence, responding to contingencies, and
building strong international relationships. By doing so, we
significantly enhanced the security and stability of the global commons
and contributed to the mechanisms of collective security that underpin
the global economy and our own return to prosperity.
ii. fiscal year 2014 budget submission highlights
As we move into fiscal year 2014 and beyond, our budget submission
balances our force structure, our readiness and our capability to meet
national security commitments. A critical measure of the effectiveness
of our Marine Corps is its readiness. Our readiness is preserved
through a careful balance of high quality people, well-trained units,
modernized equipment, well-maintained installations and a force level
sufficient to accomplish our many missions. Failure in any one of these
pillars of readiness begins to set the conditions for an eventual
hollowing of the force. We will do everything within our power to avoid
this outcome, and request your continued support. The linkage between
resources and readiness is immediate and visible, and our fiscal
restraint has caused us to pay keen attention to our priorities. To
guide us as we optimize investments and readiness in our force, our
priorities are as follows:

We will continue to provide the best trained and
equipped marine units to Afghanistan
We will continue to protect the readiness of our
forward deployed rotational forces within the means available
We will reset and reconstitute our operating forces as
our marines and equipment return from more than a decade of
combat
We will modernize our force through investments in
human capital and by replacing aging combat systems
We will keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and
our families

This year we are seeking $24.2 billion to fund our baseline
operations. This funding allows the Marine Corps to continue to provide
forward deployed and engaged forces, rapid crisis response
capabilities, and the necessary training to ensure readiness for our
forces to fulfill strategic demands. In addition, this funding provides
adequate resources for us to reset our combat-worn equipment, rebalance
to the Asia-Pacific region, and keep faith with our marines, sailors,
and their families.
Two years ago, the Marine Corps initiated a Force Structure Review
(FSR) whose mission was to reshape the Marine Corps for a Post-OEF
environment. This FSR sought to find ways to meet our national security
responsibilities in the most resource-efficient manner possible. Our
goal was to provide the most ready, capable, and cost-effective Marine
Corps our Nation could afford. Last year, we reported on our approved
multi-year plan to draw down the Corps from the end strength of 202,100
in fiscal year 2012 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016. I am
pleased to report that these reductions are being made in a measured
and responsible way, maintaining our commitment to provide adequate
transition time, effective transition assistance, and family support
for our marines who have given so much to our Nation . . . we remain
committed to doing so.
We will continue to reshape the force, ever mindful of our
operational requirements and our responsibility to keep faith with the
marines that fulfill them. As the Nation's principal crisis response
force, we must maintain a continuous high state of readiness in both
our forward deployed and ready forces at home station. Maintaining an
expeditionary force in a high state of readiness creates a hedge
against the unexpected, giving the Nation the ability to swiftly
contain crisis, respond to disaster, and buy time for strategic
decision-makers. For us, a hollow force is not an option. This not only
enables joint success, but also allows selected follow-on capabilities
of the joint force to be maintained at more cost-effective readiness
levels. Marines are poised to swiftly fill the temporal gap between
crisis initiation and when the joint force is fully prepared to conduct
operations; buying time for the deployment of the larger joint force in
major contingencies. Readiness is a key to making this possible.
This high state of readiness is necessary for security of our
global interests, but financing near-term readiness has caused us to
continually decrement our modernization and infrastructure accounts. To
meet strategic guidance during the current period of fiscal austerity,
the Marine Corps has funded near-term manpower and readiness accounts
at the cost of significantly increased risk in longer-term equipment
modernization. Over the long-term, resourcing short-term readiness by
borrowing-forward from long-term investment resources is unsustainable,
and will eventually degrade unit readiness to an unacceptable level.
Full implementation of sequestration and the associated cap reductions
in the coming years will require a top to bottom re-examination of
priorities, missions and what it will take to continue to be the
Nation's Expeditionary Force in Readiness.
The current period of fiscal austerity significantly pressurizes
each of our appropriation accounts, especially operations and
maintenance, equipment modernization, and military personnel. Our
challenge in balancing modernization and end-strength costs is
especially acute, as we invest nearly 60 cents of every appropriated
dollar on our most vital assets, our personnel. Our ground materiel
modernization investment accounts comprise a mere 10 percent of our
baseline budget. Because of this significant variance between personnel
and ground modernization funding, even proportional cuts across the
Services have disproportionate impacts on our already pressurized small
investment programs. In the Marine Corps' ground investment portfolio,
the top 25 programs consume 60 percent of the available budget, while
the remaining 40 percent supports 171 small programs. These small
programs are essential to equipping individual marines and providing
their qualitative edge. These programs, and the small businesses they
support, have limited flexibility to respond to reduced funding, and
are increasingly vulnerable as resource shortfalls become more acute.
Sustained combat operations in the harsh environments of Iraq and
Afghanistan have also significantly degraded the readiness of our
existing ground equipment. Our combat equipment has aged far faster
than it would have given normal peacetime utilization rates.
Accordingly, we are requesting funding to support the reset and
restoration of our equipment to ensure we provide marines the most
combat ready equipment needed to respond to future crisis and
contingencies around the world.
We are proud of our reputation for frugality, and will always
remain good stewards of every defense dollar we are entrusted with. In
a period of budget austerity, we offer a strategically mobile force
optimized for forward presence and rapid crisis response for a notably
small portion of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget. The Marine
Corps will remain ready to fulfill its role as the crisis response
force of choice for our Nation's leaders.

III. SHARED NAVAL INVESTMENTS

The Department of the Navy's (Navy) investment in amphibious
warships, maritime prepositioning ships, ship-to-shore connectors, mine
countermeasures, and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
represent critical Navy investments that also support the Marine Corps.
Due to current fiscal challenges, we have agreed to take risk in the
number of amphibious ships to a fiscally constrained fleet of 33
amphibious warships, producing 30 operationally available ships if
readiness levels are significantly improved. Thirty operationally
available amphibious warships allow for the employment of two Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), the minimum capability and capacity
necessary to fulfill our combatant commander commitments for sea-based
forcible entry. This represents a minimal capacity for a maritime
nation with global interests and key dependencies on the stability of
the global system. By way of comparison, a two brigade force was
necessary to wrest control of the mid-size city of Fallujah from
insurgents in 2004. Two brigades of forcible entry capacity are
required to create access for the rest of the joint force should
defense of our interests make it necessary. There are no acceptable
substitutes for this capability within our national defense inventory.
This fiscal year, the total amphibious warship inventory will rise to
31 ships with the delivery of LPD-25. Within the next 2 years, the
inventory will decline before rising to an average of 33 amphibious
warships across the 30 year shipbuilding plan.
The Navy's programs and plans to sustain fleet quantities of
landing craft include the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) Service
Life Extension (SLEP), LCAC Fleet Maintenance Program (FMP), and the
Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) program which will produce the
replacement LCAC-100 class craft to maintain the non-displacement ship-
to-shore capability of the fleet. The LCU Sustainment Program is the
single program to maintain the displacement component of the connector
fleet. The Surface Connector (X) is Navy's planned program to replace
and recapitalize the aging LCU. These Navy programs are important to
marines, and are essential for our Nation's ability to project its
influence from the sea. Additionally, we support the Navy's idea to
extend the life of select LCAC SLEP craft for 10 years to reduce
inventory shortfalls in the 2020s. The Marine Corps actively supports
and depends upon these programs.
To complement our amphibious capabilities, the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) program is designed to rapidly deploy the
combat equipment and logistics required to support Marine Air Ground
Task Forces from the sea. The MPF provides the capability to rapidly
equip MAGTF personnel, who fly in to marry up with their gear. Although
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron One (MPS Squadron One)--
homeported in Rota, Spain--was eliminated in 2012, efforts are
currently underway to enhance MPS Squadron Two (Diego Garcia) and MPS
Squadron Three (Guam) to ensure the two remaining squadrons are
optimized for employment across the full range of military operations.
The current 12-ship inventory has been re-organized into two Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Squadrons that possess new sea basing-enabling
capabilities, including at-sea selective offload of equipment and
supplies, thereby providing combatant commanders a greater range and
depth of sea-based capabilities. An additional two ships will be added
during fiscal year 2015, for a total of 14 ships, 7 in each MPS
Squadron. Additionally, the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in
Norway (MCPP-N) is being reorganized to provide combatant commanders
with balanced MAGTF equipment set for training and operations. This
combination of prepositioned equipment locations, afloat and ashore,
greatly enhances our ability to swiftly establish critical combat
capabilities in times of major crisis.

IV. INVESTING IN OUR MARINES

The core of our overall readiness and combat effectiveness resides
in the individual marine. Recruiting and retaining high quality people
is essential to attaining a dedicated and professional Marine Corps.
Recruiting provides the lifeblood of our Corps; the foundational step
in making marines. To maintain a force comprised of the best and
brightest of America's youth, the Marine Corps uses a variety of
officer and enlisted recruiting processes that stress high mental,
moral, and physical standards. We retain the most qualified marines
through a competitive career designation process for officers, and a
thorough evaluation process for enlisted marines. Both processes
measure, analyze, and evaluate our marines performance and
accomplishments for competitive retention.
Our ability to attract young men and women is tied directly to our
ability to establish and foster a dialogue with the American people. We
do this through an aggressive outreach and advertising campaign that
seeks to reach all sectors of American society. We continue to seek
qualified young men and women of any race, religion, or cultural
background who are willing to commit to our demanding standards.
Marine Reserve Forces continue to serve as a strong force
multiplier of the total force, and are a high-payoff investment in
capability. Since September 11, 2001, more than 60,000 Marine
reservists, from all across the United States, have participated in
over 80,000 activations or mobilizations. Our Reserve marines are
uniquely well-positioned to seamlessly integrate with the Active
component, to reinforce our service priorities, and to provide a
reservoir of capacity for future national emergencies. Our Reserve
marines are well-equipped and highly-trained professionals, providing
an essential shock absorber for the Active component in the uncertain
global environment.
Professional Military Education (PME) is designed to produce
leaders who are proficient in the thinking skills necessary to face the
complexity of conflict we expect in the future. As such, PME represents
a key, cost-effective investment in our most valued resource--our
marines. Marine Corps University (MCU), a part of Training and
Education Command (TECOM), is a regionally accredited, degree-granting
institution committed to providing world-class educational
opportunities through both resident and distance/outreach programs.
Marine Corps University is a globally recognized, world-class PME
institution that is designed to advance the study and application of
the operational art. Our commitment to improve the quality of our PME
programs and advance the PME opportunities for our marines is
unwavering. Beginning in fiscal year 2011, military construction
projects totaling $180 million have helped dramatically improve MCU's
educational facilities, to include staff noncommissioned officer
academies across our installations as well as an expansion of our
primary campus in Quantico. In addition, we will continue to improve
the quality and quantity of our active duty and civilian faculty.

V. INVESTING IN READY UNITS

The Marine Corps will continue to meet the requirements of
strategic guidance while resetting and reconstituting the force in-
stride. Our reconstitution efforts will restore our core combat
capabilities and will ensure units are ready for operations across the
spectrum of conflict. Sustaining combat operations for more than a
decade has required the use of a large share of the available assets
from our home bases and stations. This has produced ready forces where
they have mattered most, but has taken a toll on nondeployed Marine
units. Currently, 65 percent of non-deployed units are experiencing
degraded readiness due to portions of their equipment being
redistributed to support units deploying forward. While necessary in
times of crisis, this commitment of our `seed corn' to current
contingencies degrades our ability to train and constitute ready units
for their full range of missions over time. Unbalanced readiness across
the force increases risk to timely response to unexpected crises or
large-scale contingencies. We will continue to emphasize our reset and
reconstitution efforts that cost-effectively restore combat equipment
and return it to units for training.
Vital to maintaining readiness is the operations and maintenance
(O&M) funding to train in our core missions and maintain our equipment.
MAGTF readiness continues to improve with larger scale naval exercises
that are maximized to enhance our ability to operate from the sea. Over
the next 2 years, we anticipate incremental increases in the core
training readiness of units as marines return home from Afghanistan and
have time to train to their full range of capabilities. The peacetime
availability and readiness of amphibious warships and maritime
prepositioning ships are critical dependencies for training readiness,
and for supporting expeditionary, amphibious operations around the
globe.
The geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) continue to register an
increased demand for crisis response and amphibious forces in order to
meet requirements across the range of military operations. Forward
deployments provide deterrence, reassure our allies, posture our forces
for crisis response, and enable rapid contingency response to major
conflict. GCCs recognize and appreciate the agility and operational
reach of ready expeditionary capabilities. As we construct the forces
for the next decade, we will continue to seek cost-effective ways of
saying `yes' to joint commanders on the leading edge of our national
security effort, while preserving skills and training necessary for
larger contingencies. The multi-purpose nature of Marine forces makes
them a cost-effective investment for a wide range of application.
In addition to our traditional crisis response and expeditionary
capabilities, the Marine Corps has reinforced its contributions to our
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and Marine Forces Cyber
Command. The demand for our expeditionary MARSOC forces remains high as
these marines provide critically needed capability and capacity to
theater special operations commands supporting both Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and the GCC operational requirements. Marines have
excelled as special operators, combining the Marine ethos with the
training and skills of the special operations community. Additionally,
the Marine Corps continues to expand its capability and capacity for
cyberspace operations; including offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities. The Marine Corps Information Operations Command (MCIOC)
supports deployed MAGTFs, integrating information operations in support
of forward deployed forces and joint commanders.

VI. INVESTING IN MODERNIZATION

Across the spectrum of conflict, our adversaries have adapted their
tactics to counter our significant technological advantage. Even many
`low-end' threats are now equipped with modern technologies and
weapons. Our adversaries oppose us with tools of the information age,
including modern communications, intelligence and cyber capabilities.
While state-sponsored opponents continue their development of advanced
technologies, non-state threats have likewise become increasingly
sophisticated and lethal. An increasing number of threats now possess
intelligence capabilities, precision munitions, and unmanned systems.
This `rise of the rest' erodes the technological advantage we have
enjoyed for decades, making the qualitative advantages of the modern
Joint force even more important. This situation creates an imperative
for maintaining our investments in new equipment, better technology,
research, and development.
Our desire for our marines to maintain a qualitative edge over
their opponents applies equally to both our large-scale weapons
programs, and the numerous small programs that equip our individual
marines with modern capabilities. This modernization mandate is a
fundamental pillar of a ready force, shared by all of the Services.
With the smallest modernization budget in the Department of Defense,
the Marine Corps continually seeks to leverage the investments of other
Services, carefully meting-out our modernization resources to those
investment areas which are the most fiscally prudent and those which
promise the most operationally effective payoffs.
Innovative warfighting approaches and can-do leadership are
hallmarks of the Corps, but these cannot overcome the vulnerabilities
created by our rapidly aging fleet of vehicles, systems and aircraft.
Long-term shortfalls in modernization will have an immediate impact on
readiness and will ultimately cost lives on the battlefield. At some
point, sustaining fleets of severely worn vehicles becomes inefficient
and no longer cost-effective. This inefficiency reduces available
modernization resources from an already small account, degrading our
ability to effectively operate in today's complex security environment.
Our modernization investment requires a balanced approach across the
Air-Ground-Logistics Team.

Aviation Combat Element Modernization
On average, more than 40 percent of our aviation force is deployed
at any time, with an additional 25 percent preparing to deploy. All
told, this means two-thirds of Marine Aviation forces are currently
deployed or preparing to deploy. This creates an increasing cost burden
as we work to sustain our heavily used and rapidly aging fleet of
aircraft.
Accordingly, even as we invest in new aircraft as a part of our
aviation modernization, we must take every opportunity to drive down
operations and sustainment (O&S) costs while ensuring the continued
safety, reliability, and operational relevance of our ``legacy'' and
recently fielded platforms. The F/A-18A-D, originally designed for a
6,000-hour service life, has reached an average usage of 6,800 hours.
Ongoing upgrades and analysis have extended service life to 8,000
hours, but this buys only limited time. A service life extension
program to increase service life to 10,000 hours would rely heavily on
depot capacity, rapid engineering assessment, and adequate funding. Our
aging AV-8B fleet depends on careful stewardship of its supply chain
and targeted capability enhancements to keep it relevant through the
mid twenties. Similar oversight and investment in the CH-53E, UH-1N,
and AH-1W will keep our helicopter fleet operating while the next
generation is fielded. On a positive note, the MV-22 program has
continued to excel in combat and crisis environments, even as it has
reduced flight hour costs by 18 percent over the past 2 years. We
intend to find similar savings throughout Marine aviation.
To do so, we will use our Aviation Plan--a phased, multi-year
approach to modernization that encompasses aircraft transitions,
readiness, aircraft inventory shortfalls, manpower challenges, safety
and fiscal requirements. The following programs form the backbone of
our aviation modernization effort:
F-35B:
As we modernize Marine fixed-wing aviation assets for the future,
the continued development and fielding of the short take-off and
vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint Strike Fighter remains the
centerpiece of our effort. The capability inherent in a STOVL jet
allows the Marine Corps to operate in harsh conditions and from remote
locations where few airfields are available for conventional aircraft.
It is also specifically designed to operate from amphibious ships--a
capability that no other tactical fifth-generation aircraft possesses.
The ability to employ a fifth-generation aircraft from 11 big-deck
amphibious ships doubles the number of ``aircraft carriers'' from which
the United States can employ this game-changing capability. The
expanded flexibility of STOVL capabilities operating both at-sea and
from austere land bases is essential, especially in the Pacific. Once
fully fielded, the F-35B will replace three legacy aircraft--F/A-18,
EA-6B, and AV-8B. Training continues for our F-35B pilots. In 2012, we
flew more than 500 hours and trained 15 pilots. Just recently, in
November 2012, we established our first operational squadron, VMFA-121,
at MCAS Yuma. Continued funding and support from Congress for this
program is of utmost importance for the Marine Corps as we continue
with a plan to ``sundown'' three different legacy platforms.
MV-22B:
The MV-22B Osprey has performed exceedingly well for the Corps and
the Joint Force. This revolutionary tiltrotor aircraft has changed the
way marines operate on the battlefield, giving American and coalition
forces a maneuver advantage and an operational reach unmatched by any
other tactical aircraft. The MV-22B has successfully conducted multiple
combat deployments to Iraq, six deployments with MEUs at sea, and is
currently on its seventh deployment to Afghanistan. In the Pacific, we
have fielded our first permanent forward-deployed Osprey squadron, VMM-
265, in Okinawa. Our squadron fielding plan continues apace as we
replace the last of our Vietnam-era CH-46 helicopters. The MV-22B's
proven combat capability reinforces the necessity that we continue to
procure the full program of record quantities. The record of
performance and safety this aircraft brings in support of marines and
the joint force on today's battlefields has more than proven its value
to the Nation.
CH-53K:
The CH-53K is a new-build heavy lift helicopter that improves on
the legacy CH-53E design to increase operational capability,
reliability, maintainability, and survivability; while reducing cost.
The CH-53K will transport 27,000 pounds of external cargo under high
altitude/hot conditions out to 110 nautical miles, nearly three times
the lift capacity of the legacy CH-53E. It is the only naval rotorcraft
able to lift all Marine Corps air-transportable equipment from
amphibious warships and the Maritime Prepositioned Force. Our Force
Structure Review has validated the need for a CH-53K program of record
of eight CH-53K squadrons.
UH-1/AH-1:
The H-1 program, composed of the UH-1Y utility and the AH-1Z attack
helicopters, is a single acquisition program that leverages 85 percent
commonality of major components between the two platforms. This
commonality enhances deployability and maintainability while reducing
training requirements and logistical footprints. Both aircraft are in
full rate production. The H-1 procurement objective is 160 UH-1Ys and
189 AH-1Zs for a total of 349 aircraft. Currently, 181 H-1 aircraft are
on contract, with 72 UH-1Ys and 30 AH-1Zs delivered to date. The UH-1Y
has supported sustained combat operations in OEF since November 2009.
The AH-1Z completed its first deployment alongside the UH-1Y in June
2012 as part of the 11th MEU. The AH-1Z performed extremely well on its
initial MEU deployment. These aircraft had high mission capable (MC)
readiness rates while deployed (89.9 percent MC for AH-1Z, 94.4 percent
MC for UH-1Y). All subsequent West Coast MEUs are sourced with UH-1Y
and AH-1Z aircraft. The continued procurement and rapid transition to
these two platforms from legacy UH-1N and AH-1W assets in our rotary-
wing squadrons remains a priority.
KC-130J:
The new KC-130J Hercules has been fielded throughout our Active
component, bringing increased capability, performance and survivability
with lower operating and sustainment costs to the Marine Air Ground
Task Force. Using the Harvest HAWK weapon mission kit, the KC-130J is
providing extended endurance Close Air Support to our marines in harm's
way. Currently, we have procured 48 KC-130Js of the stated program of
record requirement totaling 79 aircraft. Continued procurement of the
program of record will allow us to fully integrate our active and
Reserve Force with this unique, multi-mission assault support platform.
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS):
Marine Corps operations rely heavily on a layer of small UAS
systems that complement the larger systems provided by the joint force.
These smaller systems provide direct support for forces operating from
sea-based platforms, and enable critical low-altitude and immediate
responsiveness that enable small units on the ground. The RQ-7B Shadow
unmanned aircraft system has provided excellent intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and battlefield management capabilities
in Afghanistan. The RQ-21A Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System is
uniquely capable of operating from ship or shore, is transportable by
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), and will be an
integral part of the future MAGTF. We remain committed to these two
critical programs.
Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR):
The TPS-80 G/ATOR system is the three dimensional short/medium
range radar designed to detect low observable/low radar cross section
targets such as cruise missiles, UAS, aircraft, rockets, mortars, and
artillery shells. G/ATOR replaces five legacy radar systems and
supports air surveillance, fire finding, and air traffic control
missions. G/ATOR provides fire quality data that supports the
integrated fire control concept and the extension of defensive and
strike capabilities from the sea to landward in the littorals.

Ground Combat Element Modernization
Age and operational tempo have taken a toll on our Ground Combat
Element's (GCE) equipment, creating a requirement to recapitalize and
modernize key components. Essential to modernizing the GCE is a
comprehensive technologically advanced vehicle portfolio. Two key
initiatives to modernize the GCE are the Amphibious Combat Vehicle
(ACV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). These systems,
coupled with the recapitalization of our family of Light Armored
Vehicles (LAV), a refurbishment of a portion of our legacy HMMWV fleet,
and improvements in advanced simulations systems, are critical to
sustaining individual and unit combat readiness while ensuring core
capabilities of the GCE.
Amphibious operations are a core mission of the Marine Corps.
Amphibious operations is a category which includes a broad range of
missions including reinforcing diplomatic facilities from sea-based
platforms, conducting strikes and raids against terrorism targets,
delivering aid in the case of humanitarian disaster, and conducting
forcible entry where our forces are not invited. The future security
environment dictates that we maintain a robust capability to operate
from the sea, placing special demands on our equipment. When operating
in a maritime environment, Marine systems are exposed to the effects of
salt water and extreme weather. Our operational concepts depend on
rapid maneuver in littoral waters by which we avoid threat strengths
and exploit weaknesses. Thus, our combat systems must bridge the gap
between sea and land. Our tactics exploit swift action by marines
ashore, mandating a seamless transition from maneuver at sea to
maneuver on land. In every operating environment we must provide a
modicum of protection for our marines while preserving all-terrain
mobility and minimizing weight. The specialized craft utilized by
marines support the unique missions of the sea-based crisis response
force, and are essential for swift maneuver and forcible entry across a
range of environments.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle:
Many of our systems show the signs of age, but none more than the
current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) which has been in Service
since 1972. The legacy AAV has served the Corps well for over 40 years,
but faces multiple component obsolescence issues that affect readiness,
sustainment costs, safety, and our ability to respond from the sea. The
ACV is needed to replace this aging fleet. To meet the demands of both
amphibious crisis response and forcible entry, the ACV program will
develop and field an advanced generation, fully amphibious, armored
personnel carrier to Marine Corps expeditionary forces. The ACV will
provide the ability to maneuver from the sea and to conduct amphibious
operations and combat operations ashore by providing the capability to
self-deploy from amphibious ships and to seamlessly transition between
sea and land domains. The ACV will enable the efficient, tactical
mobility of infantry combat forces from ships to inland objectives
across beach landing zones under uncertain, non-permissive, or hostile
conditions in order to facilitate the rapid buildup of combat power
ashore. Bridging this sea-land gap with surface vehicles is a necessary
complement to the maneuver capabilities brought by our MV-22 aircraft.
Our objective in the ACV acquisition program is to provide a sufficient
quantity of vehicles to ensure we can meet the requirement of the
surface assault force for forcible entry and sustain MAGTF operations.
During the interval in which we design, build and field the ACV, we
must ensure the continued safety, reliability, and operational
capability of our ``legacy'' AAV. The current AAV platform faces
significant maintenance challenges and obsolescence issues.
Accordingly, AAV sustainment efforts, to include the AAV Upgrade
program, remain a top Marine Corps recapitalization effort priority
until fielding of the ACV.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle:
The JLTV will provide the Marine Corps with modern expeditionary
light combat and tactical mobility while increasing the protection
afforded our marines in the light utility vehicle fleet. Working
closely with the Army as the lead Service, the Marine Corps is a
partner in developing this key system for the tactical-wheeled vehicle
fleet of the Joint Force. A relatively light system is necessary to
retain our expeditionary capabilities aboard amphibious warships, and
to support transport by rotary wing aircraft. The program also seeks to
provide a level of protection that is an improvement over the HMMWV. As
a reflection of a constrained fiscal environment, our initial planned
purchase is 5,500 vehicles, only enough to meet critical needs in the
most dangerous combat mission profiles of the light vehicle fleet. The
JLTV development will benefit from early user and life cycle cost
analysis to ensure its long-term cost-effectiveness. The Marine Corps
also seeks funding to refurbish the balance of the HMMWV fleet that
will be retained. This is a cost-effective strategy to use these older
vehicles in mission profiles where a lack of the advanced capabilities
of the JLTV can be mitigated.
Light Armored Vehicle:
The family of LAVs enables combined arms reconnaissance and
security missions in support of the GCE. This family of vehicles has
proven itself over more than 2 decades of combat, and is an essential
element of the combat power of the MAGTF. Heavily utilized in crisis
response, conventional combat, irregular environments, and stability
operations, this fleet now requires robust recapitalization and
modernization in order to sustain its capabilities. Additionally,
obsolescence issues with several critical components threaten the
sustainability of the LAVs through the expected end of service. Funding
is requested to maintain the operational availability of these
platforms and provide upgrades to adapt to the current and anticipated
operating environments.
Ground Training Simulation Systems:
Modernization efforts in ground training simulation systems have
capitalized on advancements in technology developed over a decade of
preparing marines for combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Leveraging our success with these programs, we will further enhance
combat training to maintain our readiness for the current and future
security environments. These critical simulation systems develop combat
unit proficiency in core skills such as command and control, leadership
decisionmaking, and combined arms coordination. They develop
proficiency in individual skills through combat convoy vehicle operator
training, advanced gunnery training, and individual marksmanship. These
systems complement necessary live ammunition and range training, but
allow the fundamentals of these capabilities to be practiced in a much
more cost-effective manner. Training simulation systems conserve
training and maintenance funds, reduce ammunition expenditures, and
mitigate limited availability of training ranges.
Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program:
As DOD's Executive Agent for the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program,
the Marine Corps also continues its efforts, in concert with the other
Services, to advance nonlethal technologies, and to provide
capabilities in support of operational commanders and our allies to
minimize collateral damage and unnecessary loss of life. These
capabilities are becoming increasingly relevant in the security
environment of the new normal of instability, non-state actors, and a
desire to minimize collateral damage.

Logistics Combat Element Modernization
Our logistics modernization efforts include the Global Combat
Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) as the Information Technology
enabler for logistics supply chain management throughout the Marine
Corps. When fully developed, GCSS-MC will provide an unprecedented
capability for inventory accountability, providing accurate logistics
data to commanders and logisticians in near real-time at any location
in the world.
The past decade's operational tempo and the continuing evolution of
warfare have also emphasized the importance of engineer equipment
modernization. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability has become
increasingly important with the rise of the improvised explosive device
as the enemy's weapon of choice. Development of the Advanced EOD
Robotics System and Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Sets have proven
themselves in combat, saving lives and preempting casualties.

Energy Modernization
Expeditionary Energy is a multi-year initiative integrated with our
approach to amphibious and expeditionary operations. Over the last
decade of combat, marines have increased their lethality and
situational awareness, but at the expense of increased requirements for
fuel and batteries. These dependencies increase the logistics footprint
and combat weight of our force, impairing our expeditionary
responsiveness. The Marine Corps takes seriously the necessity to
increase energy efficiency, deploy renewable energy technology where it
makes sense, and train marines to employ resources more efficiently. We
have made tremendous strides in weaning ourselves from external energy
dependencies, and we remain committed to continue our investments in
expeditionary energy. For expeditionary marines operating in austere
environments, these energy efficiency measures represent a significant
increase in combat effectiveness.

VII. INVESTING IN INSTALLATIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure Sustainment
Marine Corps Installations are a foundational support element to
our Air-Ground-Logistics teams. Our bases and stations serve as launch
platforms for our combat deployments, and are host to the realistic
training and facilities that make our marines successful on the
battlefield. Our installations also provide for the safety and support
of our military families, our combat equipment, and our civilian
workforce. The quality of life for our marines, sailors, and families
is measurably impacted by the condition of our facilities. Our
installation commanders are required to be good stewards of their
properties, to respect natural and cultural resources and to operate in
a manner that sustains the environment and their mission. We will
continue to ensure that Marine Corps facilities are well planned,
built, and maintained, and that they cost-effectively support Marine
Corps readiness. To maintain our physical infrastructure and the
complementary ability to train and deploy highly ready forces, we must
adequately resource the sustainment and readiness of our bases and
stations.
In fiscal year 2014, the Marine Corps Facilities Investment
strategy ensures that our infrastructure can adequately support Marine
Corps' needs. The proposed fiscal year 2014 budget provides $653
million for facilities sustainment of Marine Corps facilities and
infrastructure, maintaining funding at 90 percent of the sustainment
model requirement. Our budget request adequately supports environmental
compliance, family housing improvements and the replacement of
inadequate and obsolete facilities across our installations. The fiscal
year 2014 budget request provides proper stewardship of Marine Corps
infrastructure. Sequestration necessitates significant cuts in
facilities investments and subsequent degradation in infrastructure
conditions and readiness.
With over $800 million requested in fiscal year 2014 for required
Military Construction projects, we are prioritizing funding to support
new mission and new platform requirements, force structure
repositioning, replacement of aging infrastructure, and support to
enduring missions. Our efforts to improve force protection, safety, and
physical security requirements are continuous.
The fiscal year 2014 budget provides $69 million for military
construction and $31 million for operations and maintenance funding to
continue improvements in our installations energy posture. This funding
will target energy efficiency goals established by the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 aimed at reducing consumption by
30 percent from a 2003 baseline. Additional efficiencies will be gained
by decentralizing older, inefficient steam heating plants and by
improving our energy management and control systems. Overall, our
planned investments are intended to increase energy security on our
installations while reducing the cost of purchased utilities. Lean and
efficient basing infrastructure allows us to put every precious dollar
to use making marines and deploying them where they are needed most.
To enable essential changes in training requirements as well as new
weapon systems, we are seeking Congressional support to expand the
Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, CA, extend the existing withdrawal
of land for the Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, CA, as well as
purchase private property to expand the Townsend Bombing Range in
Georgia. At Twentynine Palms, we are requesting the withdrawal of
approximately 150,000 acres from the public domain as well as the
purchase of approximately 2,500 acres of California State Land and
10,000 acres of privately held land enabling it to support training and
exercises for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade size force. The Marine
Corps is also requesting to extend the existing withdrawal of land for
the Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range in southern California. The
current withdrawal expires in 2014 and requires renewal by Congress so
that this vital range can continue its use for air and ground training.
Finally, the current 5,000 acre Townsend Bombing Range, adjacent to
Savannah, is not large enough to meet the required safety or space
requirements for use of precision guided munitions. We are seeking to
purchase privately held land to increase this facility as well,
allowing us to drop a wider range of ordnance in training. This is a
critically important Marine Corps aviation training requirement that
would be safely supported with the proposed expansion by approximately
28,000 acres. For decades, Townsend Range has been used by the joint
aviation community as a centrally located and preferred Air-to-Ground
training facility on the east coast; the fielding of the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter to all three Services makes the expansion of Townsend
Range even more critical.

VIII. ORIENTING TO THE FUTURE

Rebalancing Toward the Pacific
As the world's leading democracy and largest economy, the United
States is a global nation with economic and security interests
inextricably linked to the Asia-Pacific. The arc extending from the
chain of our own Alaskan islands down the Asian continent follows a
vast littoral and archipelagic swath that is home to close allies,
emerging partners and potential threats. It contains vast resources,
vibrant populations, and great cities. It continues through the narrow
straits of Southeast Asia and extends all the way into the Indian
Ocean. Our return to prosperity as a nation (and thus achieve our
lasting security) depends on the restoration of global growth. No
engine of growth is more powerful than the Asia-Pacific. Rebalancing to
the Pacific theater is a central element of strategy. Geographically,
culturally, economically, even by name, the ``Pacific'' is a maritime
theater. The vast stretches of ocean, the thousands of small islands
that dot its map, and the vast inland waterways that shape its
demography are all artifacts of this maritime character, and have
implications for the types of forces required to achieve our security
there. The tyranny of distance underscores the value of forward
deployed maritime forces in the Pacific region. The Navy-Marine Corps
team is uniquely suited to operate in this vast blue water and littoral
environment. Marines have a long legacy of serving in the Pacific; it
is where the Marine Corps 'came of age.' We are proud of our heritage
in that theater through a world war and the many smaller conflicts,
crises and contingencies that have followed. Strategic imperatives
demand that our Nation continues to build on the presence of sailors
and marines who operate daily throughout this region.
As we draw down our presence in Afghanistan we will reset in
stride, resuming our Unit Deployment Program in Okinawa and re-
establishing our force posture in the Pacific. The Marine Corps has
developed a comprehensive campaign for a future force lay down in the
Pacific that retains the ability to contribute a stabilizing presence,
continues to contribute to deterrence and regional stability in
Northeast Asia, revitalizes our traditional partnerships while
developing new ones, and postures forces to take advantage of key
partnership opportunities in Southeast Asia. Our desired end state
through this rebalance is four geographically distributed and
operationally resilient Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) trained
and prepared to conduct combined arms and amphibious operations in
support of the global requirements of the joint force.
In the Pacific, forward presence is a key necessity for timely
response to crisis. Where hours matter, a response measured in weeks or
months wanes in relevance. Expeditionary Marine forces operating in the
Western Pacific can trim 2 weeks off the response time of units coming
from the continental United States. Forward naval presence and training
with our Pacific allies demonstrates our commitment to the region, and
builds trust that cannot be surged during times of crisis.

Innovation and Experimentation
The Marine Corps has remained at the forefront of innovation,
especially during the last decade. Through experimentation and
realistic training, the Marine Corps has adapted to the challenges of
the modern operating environment, and has developed new concepts,
tactics, techniques and procedures to ensure marines are prepared to
meet the challenges of the future. Two key components of our training
innovation are our Marine Corps' Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG)
and our Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group (MCLOG). These
organizations represent the collective wisdom of years of combat
operations rapidly turned directly into our training curricula.
Combined with the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One
(MAWTS-1), we are implementing a professionalization syllabus and
certification process for our mid-level combat leaders.
Through a rigorous process of wargaming, technological assessment,
and experimentation, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL),
works closely with the Office of Naval Research and other partners to
produce material and non-material solutions for our operating forces.
This mix of combat veterans, technical experts and forward thinkers
conducts timely innovation to meet current needs and emerging threats.
We intend to build on this ability to adapt and innovate through MCWL
and the Marine Corps University. Leveraging the human capital
represented in a combat-proven generation of marines is essential for
our future force.

LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

Nations around the world, many of whom are our allies, are
purchasing and constructing amphibious capabilities at an increasing
rate. Even as total fleet numbers decline, the number and tonnage of
amphibious fleets is on the rise, and the growth of expeditionary
maritime capabilities is similarly resurgent. Our allies and partners,
especially in the Pacific, continue to improve amphibious arsenals and
realize the importance for this capability, as do our competitors and
potential adversaries. The forward deployed Navy-Marine Corps
amphibious team continues to be a significant power projection
capability and a compelling model for other countries to emulate. Our
ability to train with and mentor this global force development is
essential.
In 2012, the Navy-Marine team conducted a number of large-scale
amphibious exercises to revitalize, refine, and strengthen our core
amphibious competencies. Exercises such as Bold Alligator on the U.S.
East Coast, Cobra Gold in Thailand, and Ssang Yong in South Korea each
draw significant international participation. Our allies have seen the
broad utility of expeditionary forces in achieving national security
objectives, and are investing to achieve these capabilities themselves.
These large exercise series, and others like them, leverage the
explosive growth of amphibious capabilities among our allies and
partners. They contribute not only to the training readiness of our own
forces, but also achieve combined training objectives with our allies.
They demonstrate our collective ability to provide the mechanisms of
collective security in the global commons. The investment of operating
funds to conduct these large-scale exercises not only trains forces,
but also builds strong security relationships.

IX. KEEPING FAITH WITH OUR MARINES, SAILORS, AND FAMILIES

Family Readiness
The Marine Corps remains acutely aware of the critical relationship
between quality of life and Marine Corps combat readiness. The strong
support of Congress in providing quality of life funding continues to
yield needed enhancements in family support programs. Our Marine Corps
Family Team Building (MCFTB) trainers and Family Readiness Officers
support the Unit, Personal and Family Readiness Program to ensure
marines and their families maintain a high level of family readiness.
Over the last year, we have made significant strides in making our
entire syllabus of MCFTB training available online via computer based
training modules. As of 1 March, families are now able to register for
an account and utilize computer based training on our Marine-Net
training website. With over 227,000 subscribers and growing, our online
family readiness website, e-Marine, continues to be a valuable and
innovative tool to securely and safely share family readiness
information while improving lines of communication within individual
commands. Marines, family members, and unit commanders can access
documents, view photos and videos, participate in forums, and receive
important information about their marine's unit from anywhere in the
world.

Wounded Warriors
The Marine Corps' Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR) is a fundamental
component of the Marine Corps' pledge to ``keep faith'' with those who
have served. The WWR supports marines wounded in combat, those who fall
severely ill, and those injured in the line of duty. The WWR
administers the Marine Corps' Recovery Care Coordination Program that
ensures medical and non-medical needs fully integrate with programs
such as the Warrior Athlete Reconditioning Program. Facilities such as
our new Warrior Hope and Care Centers provide necessary specialized
facilities that allow us to support our wounded warriors and their
families.
Key to this care is ensuring marines execute recovery plans that
enable their successful return to duty or reintegration to their
civilian communities. Around the country, we have established District
Injured Support Cell Coordinators who assist marines transitioning from
active duty to veteran status. Our WWR Medical Staff provides medical
subject matter expertise, advocacy, and liaison to the medical
community. The Sergeant Merlin German Wounded Warrior Call Center
conducts an average of 7,000 outreach calls per month and receives
calls for assistance 24 hours a day from both active duty and veteran
marines. Our contact centers conduct outreach to marines who remain
with their parent command ensuring their needs are met. Depending upon
the individual marine's requirements, these programs and services are
coordinated for optimal care delivery, proving that Wounded Warrior
care is not a process, but a persistent relationship between the Marine
Corps and our marines.
One of my greatest concerns is the long-term care and support for
our wounded veterans. Many of our young men and women have sustained
injuries that will necessitate support for the remainder of their
lives. Given the youthfulness of this wounded population, this
represents a debt to our Nation's warriors that will have to be paid
for several decades. Our Wounded Warrior capabilities are an enduring
measure of our commitment to keep faith with our young men and women,
and we expect this capability will continue well beyond our return from
Afghanistan.

Resiliency
We continue to invest, treat and care for our marines with Post-
Traumatic Stress (PTS) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). We are working
to ensure that marines understand that, ``it's OK to not be OK.'' Our
efforts will continue to ensure that marines seek help and are provided
effective care when they need it. We stress that all marines and
lsailors have a responsibility to look out for one another and to
assist anyone who might be struggling.
PTS and TBI are invisible enemies we cannot ignore. We are
thoroughly screening all marines and sailors prior to deployment,
enhancing the delivery of care in theater and identifying and testing
all at-risk personnel as they return from deployment. Enhanced
resilience, achieved through training and improved physical, spiritual
and psychological fitness, can decrease post-traumatic stress, decrease
incidents of undesirable and destructive behaviors, and lead to greater
likelihood for future good health. Most servicemembers who seek and
receive psychological health support improve, and are eligible to
remain on active duty.
Since January 2010, we have been building Operational Stress
Control and Readiness (OSCAR) teams at the unit level. These teams
consist of selected unit marines, leaders, medical and religious
personnel, and mental health professionals who work together to provide
a network of support. This model empowers marines with leadership
skills to break stigma and act as sensors for the commander by noticing
small changes in behavior and taking action early. OSCAR teams
strengthen marines, mitigate stress, identify those at risk and treat
those who need support, with the goal of swiftly re-integrating marines
back into the force. This investment comes at a cost, and places
increased demand on an already stressed Navy medical capacity.
In fiscal year 2013, we will continue to advance our Marine Total
Fitness concept to develop marines of exemplary physical,
psychological, spiritual, and social character. Marine Total Fitness
infuses fitness-based information and concepts into all aspects of a
marine's training and readiness and prepares marines to successfully
operate in and respond to the rigors, demands, and stressors of both
combat and garrison.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Sexual assault is a crime. Like other serious crimes, it is
incompatible with our core values, negatively impacts individual
marines, and directly undermines readiness, unit cohesion, and morale.
Protecting our marines and eradicating sexual assault from our ranks
are top priorities for me and our Corps. I believe we are making real
and tangible progress. Over the last year, we have taken deliberate and
substantive steps toward dramatic changes in our sexual assault
prevention and response capabilities. The focus of effort has been on
changing our culture--specifically, changing the behavior of those who
might commit sexual assault and the actions of those who respond to it.
We believe that all marines are part of the solution, from small unit
leaders to peer and bystander intervention, to legal professionals, to
unit commanders. In April 2012, I handpicked a two-star general to lead
an Operational Planning Team (OPT) comprised of our Corps' most
credible officers and senior enlisted marines. They were tasked with
defining the sexual assault problem in our Corps and providing me
recommendations on how we could eliminate it from within our ranks.
This study led to our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
Campaign Plan. While recognizing that there is no single solution to
preventing and responding to sexual assault, this plan makes every
marine accountable in our fight against it. We reconfigured the entire
SAPR program at the Headquarters level, assigning oversight to a
General Officer and a newly established team of experts. In an
unprecedented move, we pulled one of our very best colonels from his
operational command to implement the initiatives outlined in the
Campaign Plan. We brought back all of our general officers to Quantico
in July for 2 days of training and cross-leveling of their
responsibilities in turning this crime around. On the heels of that
effort, the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps brought all of his top
senior enlisted leaders back to DC in August to deliver the same
message.
The campaign's first phase consisted of 42 tasks, including new
large-scale training initiatives at all levels. It was comprised of
Command Team Training for senior leaders, bystander intervention
training for noncommissioned officers, and all hands training for every
single marine. In these training sessions, we employed ethical decision
games and interactive discussions to engage all marines in this
difficult topic. To achieve long-term cultural change, this training
will be sustained through enhancing the training curricula in all of
our professional schools, customizing the training based on the rank
and experience of the individual marine.
Protection of the victims of sexual assault, even while cases make
their way through the legal system, is an immediate and enduring
requirement which we take very seriously. Regarding response to sexual
assault, we professionalized our victim advocate community by revising
our advocacy training and implementing credentialing requirements for
SAPR personnel. Additionally, we have added 47 full-time Sexual Assault
Response Coordinator and Victim Advocate billets for fiscal year 2013.
We have completely reorganized our legal community to improve our
ability to successfully prosecute these complex cases after they have
been investigated. The centerpiece of this new model is the Regional
Complex Trial Team, which ensures we have the right prosecutor on the
right case. Our complex trial teams are staffed with experienced
military prosecutors and augmented by civilian--Highly Qualified
Experts--giving us a wealth of experience to prosecute complex sexual
assault cases. These teams will not only be able to prosecute ``special
victims'' type cases, but all types of complex cases.
This effort complements our Campaign Plan's central Phase II
initiative: the establishment of Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTs).
SARTs will be established regionally to prevent a fragmented approach
to victim care. This requires continued collaboration with various
entities, such as the US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), adding to the enhanced training
and surge capability that NCIS has already implemented to expedite
assault investigations.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, one potential manifestation of our
intensified institutional response will likely be an increase in
unrestricted reported cases. If this represents an increase in the
bonds of trust between our junior marines and their chain of command, I
will consider that a successful step on the path to eliminating this
issue in the Marine Corps. Eliminating sexual assault in our ranks is
our ultimate goal, and I will stay personally and actively engaged in
leading this campaign.

Suicide Prevention
During 2012, the Marine Corps experienced a rise in suicides and
suicide attempts after 2 encouraging years of declining numbers. During
calendar year 2010 and 2011, 37 and 32 marines, respectively, died by
suicide. For calendar year 2012, the number of suicides increased to
48. We remain committed to preventing this great tragedy. Suicide is an
issue that belies simple or quick solutions; it is an important issue
that demands our continual attention. We have learned that the most
effective methodology for us to prevent suicides is vigilant and
persistently engaged leadership at every level. Proactive leaders are
alert to those at risk for suicide and take action to help marines
optimize their physical, psychological, social and spiritual aspects of
their lives. To counter suicide, affirming and restoring the
indomitable spirit of marines is an enduring mission.
Our primary challenge remains teaching marines to engage our many
services early, before problems worsen to the point where they
contemplate or attempt suicide. Last year we signed the first formal
policy and procedural guidance for the Marine Corps Suicide Prevention
Program. Never Leave a Marine Behind suicide prevention training
focuses on how marines can help one another, and how they can seek help
early before a situation becomes a crisis. In 2012, we also expanded
our successful--DSTRESS--Line worldwide, which provides anonymous 24/7
counseling services to any marine, sailor, or family member.
Additionally, we have trained and implemented Suicide Prevention
Program Officers for every battalion and squadron. We will continue
focusing our efforts on preserving the health of our greatest and most
cherished resource, our marines, sailors, and their families.

Civilian Marine Workforce
Civilian marines exemplify our core values. They embrace esprit de
corps, teamwork, and pride in belonging to our Nation's Corps of
Marines. The 95 percent of our civilian workforce that is employed
outside the Headquarters element in the Pentagon, are located at our
installations, bases, and stations; they are the Guards at our gates,
the clerks who pay our bills, the therapists who treat our wounded, the
experts who repair our equipment, our information technology support,
and the teachers who instruct our children. Sixty-eight percent of our
civilian marines are veterans who have chosen to continue to serve our
Nation. Of those, a full 13 percent have a certified disability. Still,
our civilian workforce is very small in comparison with similar
organizations. The Marine Corps maintains a very frugal ratio of one
civilian to every 10 Active Duty marines. Our civilian non-appropriated
funded workforce continues to steadfastly provide vital support to our
marines, Reserve marines, their families, and our wounded, ill, and
injured. Since 2009, the Marine Corps has taken proactive measures to
prioritize civilian requirements and realign resources to retain an
affordable and efficient workforce directly linked to our mission. In
our effort to restrain growth, we implemented a hiring freeze from
December 2010 through December 2011 to achieve our appropriated funded
civilian end strength commensurate with a goal of 17,501. We started
into this era of budgetary uncertainty not fully recovered from the
hiring freeze and we have no chance of recovering in fiscal year 2013.
In pursuit of the leanest possible institution, the Marine Corps' 2013
budget restrains growth in our civilian marine workforce; our 2014 and
beyond budget plans are based on a stabilized workforce. Further
civilian reductions will severely jeopardize our ability to meet
mission requirements.

Women in Service Restriction Review
The Marine Corps continues its efforts to review the laws,
policies, and regulations that restrict the service of female marines.
As our policies evolve, we must ensure the effectiveness of our combat
units, the long-term physical well-being of all of our marines, and the
broadest possible career opportunities for all. To that end, I
initiated a measured, deliberate, and responsible research effort to
provide the meaningful data necessary to make fact-based
recommendations to the senior leadership of the Department of Defense
and Congress. Our research efforts will continue as we implement the 24
January 2013 Secretary of Defense decision to rescind the 1994 Direct
Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. Additionally, in order
for us to collect performance data in our most demanding and rigorous
ground combat skills training environment, female graduates of our
Basic Officer Course at The Basic School are afforded the opportunity
to volunteer to attend our Infantry Officers Course. That effort is
ongoing and will continue into 2016 as we collect the necessary data.
During this past year, we requested and received approval for an
exception to the 1994 Ground Combat Exclusion Rule. Under this
Exception to Policy (ETP), the Marine Corps opened 371 Marine and 60
Navy positions in combat arms units previously closed to females. These
19 previously closed operational units include artillery, tanks,
assault amphibians, combat engineers, and low altitude air defense
communities. The assessments and feedback from these units to date has
been encouraging.
Following the Secretary of Defense's required notification to
Congress later this spring, we intend to further expand the ETP beyond
these original 19 battalions to include opening Military Occupational
Specialties (MOSs) within Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company units and
the 0203 Ground Intelligence Officer MOS. During 2013, ETP participants
and Commanders will continue to provide assessments which will afford
our leadership the opportunity to address issues such as optimum cohort
size, mentorship and career development. Currently, 90 percent of our
military occupational specialties are open to females.
Additionally this year, the Marine Corps will continue our
measured, deliberate and responsible research effort by completing our
review and validation of standards for those MOSs with the greatest
physical demands. Once complete, our goal is to correlate and norm
these proposed physical standards with our already established Physical
Fitness Test (PFT)/Combat Fitness Test (CFT). The goal is to develop a
safe, predictive mechanism to use during the MOS assignment process for
all marines, both male and female, to ensure they are assigned where
they have the greatest likelihood to excel to their fullest potential.

Returning Quality Citizens
It is vital that we meet the needs of our marines who transition
from service. In March 2012, we implemented the new Transition
Readiness Seminar (TRS) to maximize the transition-readiness of all
servicemembers. In accordance with the Veterans Opportunity to Work
(VOW) to Hire Heroes Act, TRS revolutionized our approach to meet the
individual goals of each marine as he or she transitions to the next
phase in their life. The seminar is a week long program which includes
a mandatory standardized core curriculum and also provides four well
defined military-civilian pathways: (1) College/Education/University;
(2) Career/Technical Training; (3) Employment; or (4) Entrepreneurial.
Each pathway has associated resources and additional tools to better
prepare our veteran marines. An essential feature of the TRS is that it
allows marines to choose and receive transition information and
education in line with each marine's future goals and objectives.

X. SUMMARY

Even in challenging times, our great Nation remains the world's
largest economy and an indispensable leader in the global community of
nations. Our interests span the globe, and our prosperity and security
are to be found in the protection of a just international order. That
order is threatened daily by the instabilities of a modernizing world,
putting our citizens, our interests, and our allies at risk. While we
seek peace as a nation, the headlines remind us that those who would do
us harm continue to bring conflict to our doorstep. The Marine Corps
remains the Nation's ready hedge against unpredictable crises, an
insurance policy that buys time when hours matter. In special
partnership with the Navy, and on the ready leading edge of the larger
Joint Force, your marines provide the capability to respond to today's
crisis, with today's force . . . TODAY. The American people can rest
assured that their marines are poised around the globe, ready to
respond swiftly when danger, difficulty or disaster strikes.
I pledge that your Marine Corps will continue to work with Congress
and the Department to provide the Nation's ready expeditionary force
with economy, frugality and good stewardship. Through Congress, the
American people entrust us with their most-precious capital: their
sons, their daughters, and their hard-earned resources. With your
continued support, we will carefully invest this capital to provide
young marines with the ethos, training, and equipment that have made
them successful for over 2 centuries. We will uphold high standards of
training, leadership and discipline. We will keep faith with our
Wounded Warriors. We will care for our families. Most importantly, we
will ensure that your marines are ready when the Nation needs us the
most. We will do this all with dignity, humility, and a keen
sensitivity to the sacred trust the American people have placed in us.
Thank you for your continued faith in us. We remain . . . Semper
Fidelis.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Amos.
Let's have a 6-minute round. We hope to get everybody in in
time. If there's a few minutes left, then we can see if there's
additional questions.
Mr. Secretary, General Amos just talked about what the
effect of continuing sequestration would be if the assumption
which is made in the budgets that we have adopted, both the
President's budget and the House and Senate budgets, prove not
to be true, if, as you point out, the assumption that
sequestration will not continue in 2014 proves to be a false
assumption. Can you tell us what the effect would be if
sequestration occurs in the next fiscal year, the one that
we're considering right now?
Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, the effect would be wide-reaching,
deep, and incredibly damaging. For the Navy, we have met all
our deployments for this year following the passage of the
appropriations bill. We are training to meet all our
deployments for next year. However, the risk that we are taking
is that we are maintaining ships and aircraft in lesser
amounts. We are maintaining our bases at very low levels.
Except for emergency repairs, we're essentially not doing
repairs on those bases.
In terms of investments for ships, there is a term ``cost
to complete'' and it's things like documentation, all the
government-furnished equipment being put on the ships, things
like that. We have moved those further out so that they're not
required to be paid for today. But that bill will come due and
it will be very difficult for us to complete ships or to get to
the level of shipbuilding that we need to.
For the Marine Corps, as the Commandant said, they have put
their money into readiness today because they have to be our
first-to-deploy, always ready force. They have to be ready
every day. If sequestration continues, the degradation to
training would not only occur in units at home, it would begin
to occur in the units next to deploy.
The harm of sequestration is number one in its amount, but
number two is in the fact that it allows us no planning time,
no ramp time to get ready; and number three, that it does not
allow money to be matched against strategy. It's a fairly
mindless way of cutting funds.
So while the effects are very real in 2013, the effects
will be far more damaging and far-reaching should it continue
into 2014.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Do you know how much the Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) funding is going to be, the request for OCO for fiscal
year 2014 yet? Has that number been established?
Mr. Mabus. No.
Chairman Levin. In the past, witnesses have told our
committee that the Navy and the Marine Corps will require at
least 2 to 3 years of additional OCO funding after the end of
combat operations just to bring equipment and personnel back to
an acceptable state of readiness. Is that your position as
well?
Mr. Mabus. That is, and I'd like for both Admiral Greenert
and General Amos to answer this, but the Department of the Navy
has been moving funds previously expended under OCO back into
our base budget very aggressively. But we have OCO-related
expenses for both the Navy and Marine Corps, particularly in
terms of reset for the Marine Corps, but also in terms of
maintenance for our ships, which is the Navy's version of
reset.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. As the Secretary said, reset is the key
term to cover 3 years following the completion of operations in
the Middle East. For us it's the depot work that didn't get
done while we spent the extra time supporting operations in the
Middle East. We've captured that amount and quantified it. It's
relatively modest compared to the Marine Corps's numbers, which
I'll turn over to the Commandant.
But as the Secretary said, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, we
need a strategy in order to move ahead. Supplementals have been
around for years and years. Decades we've had supplementals for
various and sundry reasons, and I believe it would be a good
idea if we could work through a strategy as we move from this
OCO to determine what's an appropriate way to deal with
emergent costs for emergent operations.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, 2 to 3 years is a good marker
on the table. It's a function of physically being able to get
all the equipment, the remaining equipment, out of Afghanistan
and actually getting it through the depots and back reset to
the fleet. If sequestration continues--and we're planning on
it--that's going to be in the long run a 75 percent reduction
in our depot capacity because it's going to reduce civilian
manpower, contractors, and everything else reduce. So it's
going to have an impact. That 2 to 3 years could go to the
right.
But for us it's 2 to 3 years, about $3.2 billion, to reset
the Marine Corps and get all our equipment out.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have two areas that I want to address in this brief
period of time. One is, a couple of days ago, during one of our
hearings, I cited, having to do with the Article 60 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) the incidents where a
convening authority overturned a particular conviction and I
covered all four Services, and mistakenly there was an article
saying I didn't think that sexual assaults were a reality. That
was wrong. That was corrected after that.
However, as far as the Marine Corps and the Navy are
concerned, from 2010 to 2012 in the Marine Corps, as you and I
talked about, General Amos, there were 1,768 courts-martial
resulting in findings of guilty. In seven out of those--that's
0.4 percent--they were overturned by the convening authority.
In the Navy, it's a little bit more--a little stronger case in
terms of how things are working. Over a decade, 2002 to 2012--
16,056 special and general court-martial cases resulting in
findings of guilty. There are only two in the Navy. I state
that because I think we need to put it into perspective.
So I am sending each of you a letter and a letter actually
to the Chiefs, and Mr. Chairman, I want to have this made part
of the record at this point.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Inhofe. Then I think we can come down to a couple
of ideas or conclusions that I feel strongly about. First of
all, Secretary Hagel came out with a solution--it was a
suggestion, I guess it was, and I thought it was very generous.
He was wanting to change the convening authority's jurisdiction
on post-conviction trials, and I thought that that was giving
up more than I thought should be given up, when you consider
these commanders have the responsibility of sending our kids in
where their lives could be lost and certainly that's something
that is very significant. That's an authority that they have
and they should keep.
So I would like to ask each one of you in terms of the
suggestion that Secretary Hagel had on just addressing the
post-sentencing authority.
Then also, there's a review that's going on, that's going
to be convening this summer. Wouldn't it be better to address
this after we get the results of this hearing and the study
that's taking place this summer? Those are the two questions I
would ask each one, starting with you, Secretary Mabus.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. The legislative proposal
that's being done under the direction of Secretary Hagel is to
take away the power of a convening authority to change the
findings of a court-martial, which is a very narrow exception.
I support this, as do all the Judge Advocates General of all
the Services. I think it's representative of how our military
justice system has matured over the past 50 or 60 years. You
now have professional prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges,
and a very strong appeals process.
I know that General Amos and Admiral Greenert are concerned
about this and will talk more specifically about it, what it
does not do is take away any authority in terms of convening,
in terms of post-trial sentence relief or clemency. It seems to
be a very directed and very fair and prudent change to make.
Finally, in regard to the panel that was set up by the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), while it's true that
it will begin meeting this summer, I believe the results will
not be out for about 18 months, and this seems to be an area,
because of the attention that it's gotten, that needs to be
acted on sooner than that. But it will be a congressional
decision and not a DOD decision.
Senator Inhofe. I would say, you generally agree with
Secretary Mabus? I'm almost out of time here.
Admiral Greenert. I do agree.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Amos. Sir, I'm probably just a little bit out of
sync here, because I think we need to proceed cautiously. I
support Secretary Hagel's panel that he's setting up. I think
that's exactly the right way to go. I just think we need to be
cautious of what it is we're trying to fix, what the problem is
we're trying to fix.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that and I do, I'm in more
agreement with you on this.
Secretary Mabus, I've been critical for quite some time
about the over 400,000 gallons of fuel and all this stuff in
terms of how much money it costs. This comes out of the budget,
the warfighting budget. The Department of Energy, which was
started in 1977, was set up for this very reason, and I'm going
to put into the record the mission statement of that today,
which shows that, in my opinion as I look at it, they are the
ones who need to be making these determinations.
[The information referred to follows:]

The mission of the Energy Department is to ensure America's
security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and
nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology
solutions.

Senator Inhofe. If our concern is to do away with our
reliance upon foreign countries, we can do that quite easily
just by developing the resources that we have right now. You've
heard me say this. I'm sure you're tired of hearing it. But the
one thing that I had learned during our conversation, Mr.
Secretary, was that DOD will not make bulk purchases--I'm
reading now--``of alternative drop-in replacement fuels unless
they are cost-competitive with petroleum products.''
Is that the commitment that you would make at this time?
Mr. Mabus. It's a commitment I have made. I made it to this
committee last year at this very hearing. But, Senator, in
terms of needing alternative sources, I applaud the fact that
our resources are going up in terms of fossil fuels and we
should certainly continue that. However, oil is the ultimate
global commodity and the prices are not set here. They are set
around the world.
In the last 3 years, the Department of the Navy has been
hit with additional fuel bills over and above what we had
budgeted for of $1.5 billion to pay for unexpected oil price
shocks. That amount of money comes directly from our operations
accounts, maintenance accounts, and if the bill gets too big it
will come from platforms. I simply think that that is
unacceptable and I think it's irresponsible for us not to
address this sort of military vulnerability.
I am confident, I am absolutely positively confident, that
by the time we begin buying bulk amounts of biofuels, which is
one important but fairly small part of this whole effort, is
that it will be competitive with petroleum products.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but we have the language in there to
be sure that that will be the case. I'm old-fashioned enough to
still believe in supply and demand, and once we open up our
resources here, I think that's going to positively affect the
costs that we have to bear. Thank you.
Mr. Mabus. You and I, Senator, agree very enthusiastically
on the free market, and I simply think that relying on one type
of fuel which is a monopoly today is not a prudent thing to do.
Senator Inhofe. I think the safeguard you have is
satisfactory. Thank you.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
By the way, on the 18-month provision that you referred to
for the first report on the powers of the convening authority,
it says no more than 18 months. I hope it won't take anywhere
near that amount.
Second, in terms of proposed changes in the legislation
that follow that, there's another panel that we've created I
hope will review that. It's much too long a process, I think
unnecessary, because there's a growing, I think, if not a
consensus, there's a growing understanding that we have to do
something at the end of the process relative to reversing the
findings. They've been rare, as I think Senator Inhofe has
pointed out, and that means this would not be disruptive, to
just focus on that one narrow part of the process. I hope we'll
do that in this year's defense authorization bill.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and of course General
Amos, I thank you all for your service and also for the quality
of men and women that serve in the Navy and in the Marine
Corps.
I know a lot of people wouldn't know it, but in West
Virginia geography-wise, we're not maybe at the largest body of
water, but we do have a real close tie to the Navy and we
cherish that. Sugar Grove Naval Base in Pendleton County is a
strategic position and it's been a strategic asset for a long
time for the Navy, and we know that might be changing and we
look forward to working with you as the changes come about to
make sure that we're able to serve this country in a continued
future.
We also have the Navy Rocket Center at the Allegheny
Ballistics Laboratory, which I think you just designated as the
Navy Enterprise Data Center, which is extremely important. We
appreciate that and we're proud of that designation and when it
continues that partnering with you.
Let me ask this to Secretary Mabus, if I may. I know we
talked about sequester and sequestering is now starting to hit
and we're seeing the effects of it. I think it was very
draconian how it's been implemented across-the-board. None of
us run our lives that way. So we've talked about flexibility. I
know there's an awful lot of politics in this whole
flexibility.
But I think when you look at the security of our Nation--
are we too far down the road with sequestration, since there's
a $42.5 billion cut between now and September 30 or October 1,
and in between that time we have to come up with a budget or we
continue, the way the legislation is written?
If we were able to vote as a body to give you the
flexibility, to DOD, to pick and choose where the $42.5 billion
in cuts would come from, are you too far down the road to make
a difference, or could you change quickly enough to stop some
of the draconian things that are happening?
Mr. Mabus. I think the short answer is no, we're not too
far down the road. The flexibility in terms of whether it's
under the traditional reprogramming or something else would
certainly be welcome. What I don't want to imply is that that
would solve anything for 2014.
Senator Manchin. Sure, we know that. I'm just trying to get
you through this fiscal year to October 1.
Mr. Mabus. I appreciate that.
Senator Manchin. To me it just makes sense, sir, as a
former governor--and we have a few former governors on this
committee. We understand that it's tough sometimes, but
sometimes you can work through these things, and we're just
hoping that you're still in that position, if we can make
something happen for you.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you.
Senator Manchin. The other thing I would ask is on Sugar
Grove Naval Base, which we just talked about. I think we've
been asking you for your assistance on that--anyone can comment
on that--to try to help us. Maybe, Admiral, you might have more
input on that.
Admiral Greenert. I'll give you a better written answer,
but my fleet cyber command commander, Admiral Rogers, and I are
talking about that, how do we make that adjustment, directed by
Cyber Command, that makes sense so we use the civilian cyber
warriors we have properly and make the best of an activity
which has been around for quite some time supporting us. I'll
give you a better written answer.
[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Fleet Cyber Command has examined all aspects of potential
reuse of the Sugar Grove facility including potential use by civilian
cyber warriors. Based on the anticipated small number of civilian cyber
warriors and the specialized mission needs for these people to be co-
located with other cyber personnel and cyber mission functions, Fleet
Cyber Command has concluded they have no requirement for use of the
Sugar Grove facility beyond 2015.
Navy officials have visited the site, in conjunction with other
Service and National Guard representatives, to meet with local
Pendleton County community leaders. Despite our efforts to identify
potential reuse alternatives within the Department of the Navy, no
requirement for the site has been identified to date.
In compliance with 10 U.S.C. 2696, the Navy will continue to work
with appropriate organizations to identify potential use of the
property elsewhere within the Department of Defense (DOD). If no DOD
use is identified, we will work with the General Services
Administration to transfer the property to another Federal Government
agency, local government, or to the public. The Department of the Navy
will continue to provide monthly updates to you, Senator Manchin, and
to Senator Rockefeller, throughout this process.

Senator Manchin. If you could do that. Also, if I could
ask--and I know with your schedules--but if there's a time that
we could meet there, myself and Senator Rockefeller would love
to meet with you there. If you haven't had a chance to visit
there, the assets that the Navy has there is unbelievable and
we'd like to be able to work with you.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. Maybe we'll schedule that with your staff.
Mr. Secretary, I think this might come back to you and
really to General Amos and to the Admiral also. I know, General
Amos, the Marine Corps is reducing by 20,000 marines and there
are civilian furloughs that have been looming and hiring
freezes in place for many of the DOD civilian positions. Sir, I
think you know my position on contracting. It's not real
favorable.
Do you know how many contractors we will still have and are
we downsizing our contracting fleet in proportion to our
military fleet?
Mr. Mabus. You ask a question that I asked exactly: How
many do we have? The best answer that I have is for the
Department of the Navy we have a little over 170,000
contractors or contracts out there. We are moving----
Senator Manchin. That's just the Navy, right?
Mr. Mabus. That's the Department of the Navy.
Senator Manchin. Department of the Navy, I have it, yes,
sir.
Mr. Mabus. We're moving pretty aggressively to go into
these things, and we've set up something called contract
courts. It has a more formal name, but that's what we call it.
It makes every contracting officer come in every year and say:
Here are the contracts I have, here's why I need them, here's
the best price I can get, this sort of thing. We're moving
toward becoming more aggressive on that, which is, instead of
saying here are the contracts I have, tell the contracting
authorities to come in at zero and say, here's what I need,
because I think that there are still some areas that we can
make a difference here. It's too opaque right now. It's too
hard to get into.
Senator Manchin. Let me ask just real quickly. My time is
running out. But on auditing, you know that myself and Senator
Coburn have put in legislation to have DOD audited. Does that
cause a problem with Navy, to meet this auditing that we've
been talking about?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I started my elective career as State
Auditor of Mississippi.
Senator Manchin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mabus. I'm a big fan of auditing. I'm going to brag on
the Navy and Marine Corps right now. The Marine Corps audit is
under way right now and we're expecting an opinion soon.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, General.
Mr. Mabus. The Navy's audit will be ready to go, we think
by the end of this year.
Senator Manchin. So that doesn't create--the audit does not
create a hardship for you? The Navy can meet that auditing
requirement?
Mr. Mabus. We are meeting it. I don't know about adding
layer on there, but we're meeting it on current things.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses. Admiral Greenert, due to sequester
the Navy is faced with the prospect that two-thirds of the
fleet will not be fully mission-capable by the end of the year;
is that correct?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, those that are not on
deployment. So if you're not on deployment or just ready to go,
two-thirds will be what we call C3, and that's a capability
rating or less.
Senator McCain. So they will not be ready to replace those
rotating back out?
Admiral Greenert. Typically, we have about half the fleet
at C3 or C4. They're in the progress of getting ready to
deploy. That will increase to two-thirds from one-half.
Senator McCain. General Amos, you said recently: ``By the
end of this year more than 50 percent of my combat units will
be below minimal acceptable level of readiness for deployment
to combat.'' Is that still the case?
General Amos. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator McCain. If the sequester is not fixed, Admiral
Greenert, are you ready to identify where you would have to cut
your budget?
Admiral Greenert. I can't give you specific program and
budget lines now, but we are working on that right now. We're
working within the Department and we're working with DOD staff.
It's called a strategic concepts management review.
Senator McCain. But you are working on the eventuality of
actions that need to be taken, budgetary actions that need to
be taken in case sequester is not repealed?
Admiral Greenert. We are working that within the
Department, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. General?
General Amos. Senator, we absolutely are. We're under the
assumption that sequester will stand. It's law. The pain of
that will be a Marine Corps that's going to be below 182,000.
So the immediate impacts will be a drastic reduction, probably
reductions-in-force in the Marine Corps, to some number below
that once the strategic forces has leveled out and gives us the
amount of money we have. But it'll be civilians, it'll be
military, it'll be programmatic, and the cuts will be severe.
Senator McCain. One of our problems is that the budget that
has been submitted to Congress does not take into account the
effects of sequestration, assuming that sequester will be
repealed. So I'm glad to hear that, at least at your level, you
are planning on actions that need to be taken if sequester is
not repealed.
General Amos, earlier this week General Odierno testified
that sequester will produce a hollow Army. Will it have the
same effect on the Marine Corps?
General Amos. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator McCain. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, from
talking to a lot of young officers, this is having a
significant effect on the morale and willingness to retain
high-quality NCOs as well as commissioned officers; is that
correct? Is that a correct impression that I have from
conversations with our senior NCOs and captains and majors and
lieutenant commanders and lieutenants?
General Amos. Senator, we're not seeing that right now. In
fact, the retention both of our enlisted ranks and our officer
corps is very high. But I will say that with an air of caution,
because as we go through sequestration, the full impacts take
place, and we come back from 12 years of combat, there's going
to be a sea change in the Marine Corps and it wouldn't surprise
me at all to find that the retention will become challenging.
Admiral Greenert. It's the word, the simple word,
``predictability.'' They ask us, ``so what's the
predictability? How can I plan my future?'' That's the case,
Senator. My retention right now is good, but there are some
signs here and there. I attribute it to increased operations
right now based on the skill set, the Navy enlisted
classification code, pilots, nukes, that nature, right now. But
it's about predictability, Senator.
Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the repositioning or,
unfortunate word, pivot that was used to Asia-Pacific, how much
credibility do we have when we consider, when we continue to
have our Navy shipbuilding plan continue to decline now to 270
ships in fiscal year 2015?
Mr. Mabus. Actually, Senator, I think that our credibility
remains high. If you look at our shipbuilding plan, it takes
the fleet up to 300 ships by the end of 2019, and the fact that
we are forward deploying four LCS in Singapore--the first one
is there on its maiden deployment today--the fact that we are
putting our new builds, our most capable ships, into the
Pacific, and the fact that 60 percent of our fleet will be in
the Pacific by the end of the decade.
Senator McCain. So you are planning on by what year?
Mr. Mabus. To have 300 ships in the fleet.
Senator McCain. We will remember those, that testimony,
Secretary Mabus, because it isn't going to happen.
Admiral Greenert, the 30-year shipbuilding plan reflects
the reduction of the fleet to 270 ships in 2015. How many ships
with the right capabilities do you think the Navy needs?
Admiral Greenert. I need 306 ships with the right
capabilities to do the jobs assigned to me in accordance with
the DSG we have today.
Senator McCain. You need 306 and we're going to be down to
270 by 2015, and you believe that we're going to add 30 more
ships plus those that need to be replaced by 2019?
Admiral Greenert. Based on the ships we have under
construction today, yes, sir. We have 47 ships under contract
or in construction today.
Senator McCain. I'd like to see those numbers for the
record, please.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy will have 300 ships in 2019. Between 2013 and 2019, 66
ships will be delivered and 56 ships will be decommissioned. Of the 66
ships to be delivered, 47 (listed in the table below) were under
contract on April 25, 2013. As of June 3, 2013, 55 were under contract.
The list below does not include AGOR-27, AGOR-28, and T-AGS-66
which are also under construction, but are not included in the Navy
battle force count.

Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses. It's interesting
that we are now in a panic mode because the Federal Aviation
Administration is delaying flights. We don't seem to be
concerned about the testimony that you and other uniformed
leaders have given to Congress about the devastating effect on
our national security of sequestration. It's one of the more
embarrassing moments for me in the many years that I have had
the honor of serving here in this body.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all, gentlemen, for being here this morning and
for your service.
Admiral, I'd like to begin by a comment about the Navy. My
home town is Brunswick, ME, and for about 60 years, we were the
home of the Brunswick Naval Air Station. Losing that station
was a tremendous blow to our community, but it was a blow in a
way--it was certainly economic with business and the economic
effect.
But as a resident of that community with kids in the
schools, the loss of the Navy personnel was a tremendous loss
for us because of what they contributed to the community,
teaching in Sunday school, coaching in the Little League, kids
in the schools. The Navy added so much to our community, and
this is just a way of complimenting you on the quality of
people that you have because they were our friends and
neighbors for so many years.
The economic loss we can calculate, but the loss to the
community of the Navy personnel, was incalculable. I just want
to convey that to you. We regret that decision.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral, talk to me about how you
envision the future of the Navy's destroyer force. We continue
to retire frigates. The decision several years ago not to
procure the next generation cruiser--it seems like destroyers
will fill multiple roles in the Navy. Can you give me, Admiral,
an idea of how you see the destroyer, the future of the
destroyer fleet?
Admiral Greenert. We need 88--we call them large surface
combatants and that's cruisers and destroyers. So as we phase
out the cruisers that we have, destroyers will, if you will,
replace them.
The destroyer of today, the ones built, for example, in
Bath, ME, is very high-end ship, in fact, much higher end, if
you will, capability-wise, it has more capability than a
cruiser. It's multi-mission. It's a fantastic vessel right now.
So the future is we need 88. We have 84. We're growing and
will continue to grow through this decade, and we need to
sustain that. To do that into the 2020s, we need to build about
2\1/2\-a-year on average of these destroyers or a ship like
them.
Now, I'd add to this. In 2016 we will add a capability, the
Advanced Missile Defense Radar, which will make the current
Arleigh Burke even more capable, missile defense-capable, in
addition to anti-air capable. We call it integrated air missile
defense.
Senator King. How do you intend to leverage the technology
that's been developed for the DDG-1000? That's an amazing ship
as well.
Admiral Greenert. We get a lot of engineering technology
from that ship, its fuel efficiency as well as the reduced
manning. So we'll take that capability as well as the
stealthiness that the ship provides. There's a good element of
anti-submarine warfare, the hull-mounted sonar and the towed
array sonar, that we would want to backfit as much as feasible
into destroyers.
Mr. Mabus. We are putting the dual-band radar that came out
of the DDG-1000 on our aircraft carriers now.
Senator King. So that technology is being used in other
areas?
Mr. Mabus. Yes.
Senator King. I think it was the Admiral who used a phrase
that I never want to hear these three words in the same
sentence, ``Reducing nuclear maintenance.'' Talk to me about
the impact on maintenance from the sequester, which we've
talked about today? To me, not doing maintenance isn't a
savings. It's simply deferring the cost to a later date and it
will probably be more expensive at that point. Your thoughts?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, if you're talking those numbers,
which the one I was referring to was $23 billion, it's a
balance of sustaining the force of today, and that would be the
maintenance and the readiness of it, the force structure today,
the number of ships and aircraft, and building the future
fleet. So we need to do this in a balanced manner.
If we ensure we do all the nuclear maintenance that needs
to get done, we bring all of the non-nuclear maintenance to
kind of parade rest, to very little. I can't do that. We have
to have a balance towards that. Those numbers at that level
make it difficult for me to see how we would preclude needing
to reduce the number of shipyard workers we have, that
capacity, and therefore the amount of ship maintenance that
would go on.
Senator King. Gentlemen, I've been going to these hearings
now for a couple of months and every single uniformed and
civilian official in Defense and also--I'm on the Intelligence
Committee--the Intelligence Community has told me that they
have never seen a more dangerous, volatile, and complex period
of threats to the United States. Yet at the same time, we are
going through the sequester and hollowing out our Services,
which has been testified.
What are we doing to ourselves? I just don't understand it.
I think Senator McCain made the point that everybody knows
about the delays at the airports. What's happening to you?
We're putting not only our soldiers and sailors at risk, but
our people at risk. Am I overstating this problem?
General Amos. Senator, I don't think you are at all. I had
a little bit of an advantage a couple of years ago. I spent
almost a year with a very elite team working on trying to
determine what the future security environment would look like.
It was an international team, to include corporate America. I
think your sense for the world we're in is accurate. I see no
indication that the world is getting any nicer. I think all you
have to do is look at the Washington Post on Sunday and you can
start from the front and go all the way to the back and you can
see that.
So from my perspective, it is every bit as dangerous and
perhaps because it will be spread out, it could be considerably
more dangerous in the future. From my perspective as a service
chief, I think that dictates--it's a predicate for us to remain
engaged in the world. We're the only global superpower on this
planet. We have people that count on us for leadership. They
expect us to be leaders.
So that's part of why I said what I said in my opening
statement. We are global leaders. We have a responsibility
globally, international and quite honestly, very selfishly and
myopically. That's really what the Navy and Marine Corps team
is able to do, is be out there engaging and representing the
interests of the United States of America.
Senator King. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you. General,
thank you.
Our State of Indiana is proud to be a key center for naval
operations at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane.
The dedicated people there work night and day to keep our
servicemembers safe, and we want you to know we are proud to be
your inland Navy.
In regards to China, Admiral, when you look at the threats
that are out there, can you give us an update on their
development of anti-ship ballistic missiles and what the
intention of that program is? Do you consider that a game
changer in regards to our aircraft carrier reliance?
Admiral Greenert. My assessment would be China wants to be
able to influence what we call within the first island chain,
roughly 1,000 miles and in, the first island being--if you're
familiar with that, the Philippine Islands.
Senator Donnelly. Yes.
Admiral Greenert. They want to be able to influence that
area to a great degree. It's a defensive measure for the
mainland. They look to that area as, they call it their ``Near
Sea.'' They want to have the ability to defend it, if you will,
as they need to.
Is it a game changer? It certainly could be. It depends.
But in a perhaps more classified setting I could describe to
you, we haven't been standing around wringing our hands. There
is a series of events that has to take place for something like
that. You have to have the right detection, you have to
classify it, you have to be able to target, you have to know
when to launch it, you have to have confidence in that launch.
It has to go through its launch sequence. Then do you shoot it
down? Do you deceive it, do you jam it? Then lastly, do you
shoot a bullet with a bullet?
All of these things go through what we call the kill chain,
and we study that very closely.
Senator Donnelly. That was going to be my next question,
was the current capability in regards to countering that. But
as you said, perhaps a more classified setting would be more
appropriate for that.
In regards to the balance of power in submarines, you hear
of the Chinese bringing a submarine on and the discussion of
other nations seeing how important this is. In regards to where
we are today in helping to control the seas and the strength of
our submarine program, has our premier position changed at all
in the last year? If so, how? What do you see 5 years from now?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, simplistically, I say we own the
undersea domain, and we still do and I have empirical data that
convinces me of that, and I watch it very closely. It is our
job to keep that asymmetric advantage in the future. I believe
it is our asymmetric advantage, one of our asymmetric
advantages, and it's our job, my job, to come to you and show
you how we can sustain that.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
General, your marines have done an extraordinary job in
Afghanistan. As we look toward the next year or 2 ahead, for
instance Helmand Province, do we have the confidence of the
people in Helmand Province as we move forward in this process
that they have some confidence level that they'll be able to be
protected, that they'll be able to have a life that they can
protect their children and have a decent life?
General Amos. Senator, they do. The chemistry has changed
dramatically over the last 4\1/2\ years. It's leadership. It's
leadership by the provincial governor, Governor Naim, the
district governors, mayors, and the ANSF.
The Taliban have--I'm not saying they're not there. They're
there, but they have been marginalized to the point where the
ANSF have become strong enough where they can handle this
themselves. So we are today turning over--I've already said
major operations belong to the ANSF. We don't write operation
plans any more. We just write supporting plans. So we're there
as a backup.
But the actual kind of control of the districts, the
Afghans have it. So in Helmand the answer is yes. The key will
be the continued stable support of the central government, the
ability for the central government to continue to put resources
down in these various provinces, to include the Helmand
Province. If that stays, the confidence of the people will
remain. If that goes, then it will evaporate quickly.
Senator Donnelly. Do you think that the continued presence
of--we don't know the exact number, but 8,000 to 10,000 or
whatever that number is at the end of 2014, the continued
presence of those marines, soldiers, sailors, or airmen, do you
think that the Afghan people--that the presence of those
military people makes them sleep better at night?
General Amos. Senator, without a doubt. You talk to them
personally face-to-face, whether it be in Kabul or whether it
be in Helmand or anyplace else, and they are very worried. The
normal Afghan civilian is extremely nervous that we will just
completely come out, as we did in Iraq.
Senator Donnelly. Are our servicemembers viewed by the
Afghan people as we move forward in those much smaller numbers,
as the glue that will help hold things together?
General Amos. Sir, I think so. At the very senior levels of
government and the military and whatever, we will help be that
connecting tissue with thought and resources that perhaps they
wouldn't otherwise have.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much. To all of you, thank
you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for your service and your testimony
today.
Secretary Mabus, your written testimony really talked about
something I'm very focused on, which is that the challenges of
the future require flexible force more than a fixed force, and
the combined operations that you represent here in this hearing
give the Nation a great flexible force capacity to deal with
challenges whenever and wherever they arise. That's why this is
such an important hearing.
I stepped out for a few minutes to attend a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee meeting on embassy security. So I think I
may just start, General Amos, with you on that topic. I visited
the Marine Security Guard Program at Quantico, VA, within the
last month or so and was very impressed. But certainly there's
a significant need in the aftermath of Baghdad. One of the
recommendations from the review board was upgrading Marine
Security Guard and the foreign affairs security training, and
it looks like you have a pretty significant both capital
expansion at Quantico as well as an upgrading of about an
additional thousand Marine Security Guards to help our missions
around the world.
I'd love to just know how the current budgetary challenges
or sequester if it continues will affect our ability to beef up
the needed Marine Security Guard presence and training.
General Amos. Senator, none of that is funded. It was all
done in good faith, for all the right reasons, 6, 8 months ago.
The original intent, my understanding is, is that once the NDAA
authorized the 1,000-marine plus-up to the already, I think our
number is at 1,449 marines we currently have in that field, so
it will be another thousand on top of that to perform the
missions that you talked about, that the funding of that would
follow basically on top of whatever funding I would normally
get.
We're on our way down to 182,100, as Secretary Mabus said.
So to add another 1,000-marine requirement on top of that pulls
those combat forces out of the 182,000 and makes me a 181,000-
size force. So I'm still hoping that we're able to sort through
the funding of that. But right now it's not funded.
We are pressing ahead, just so that you know. We're not
sitting back. In agreement with the State Department, we will
stand up three new Marine Security Guard Detachments between
now and June. We'll stand up another 7 by the end of this year,
and then over the next several years we'll stand up another 26.
So we're proceeding as if we're going to have the money,
because the need is there. So our intent is honest. We just
would appreciate the funding.
Senator Kaine. I think we have to be consistent in our
message. I'm on the Budget Committee, too, and we end up
hearing a lot about the need to cut, cut, cut, and then at the
other side, on the foreign relations side, we're telling you
that we need a dramatic expansion of security presence at our
embassies, and the Marine Corps' own part of that space. So we
have to be consistent in the message we deliver.
You have a sizable price tag for the retrograding of
equipment back from Afghanistan. I think the testimony I heard
earlier, not today but earlier, was about $3 billion or so just
to retrograde equipment back for the marines. Then that
equipment has to be retrofitted and improved, et cetera, before
it's ready for additional use. So the budgetary environment and
sequester affects both the retrograding and the upfitting of
that equipment to make it available for its next use in the
field.
General Amos. Senator, you're 100 percent correct. In fact,
within our Corps as a result of the sequester we've gone back
and said, okay, what's good enough? What is it we currently
own? What is it we've been driving and using for the last 5, 10
years? Whereas otherwise we might have moved on to something
new, we're actually taking that back through the depots right
now.
We have 60 percent of the equipment that we had on the
ground in Afghanistan out as of today. I'm pretty pleased about
that. 38,000 principal end items are working their way through
the depots, all really important to reset the Marine Corps, and
the bill is about $3.2 billion to complete the mission and
reset it.
Just to give you a sense for how we've done, though, it
wasn't but about 4 or 5 years ago the bill was about $15
billion. So Congress has been very good, helped us out. We've
been faithful stewards to get our equipment through, and now
we're in the final stages of that to get the equipment out once
we finish the mission and to reset the Corps.
Senator Kaine. Excellent.
For Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, one of the things
I noticed in the 2014 submission was that you're funding 80
percent of ship depot maintenance, but I believe it looks like
it's 100 percent funding on both carrier and submarines. So
this is surface ships, I gather. Is there an intent to put in
an additional budgetary request through OCO for the remaining
ship maintenance? Or how will you manage lesser maintenance on
the surface ships?
Mr. Mabus. That's correct. We would get from 80 percent to
close to 100 percent based on our OCO submission. That's based
on the fact that, unlike the Marine Corps, who pull equipment
out, send it through a depot and reset, the Navy tends to reset
every day through maintenance, through maintaining our ships.
So that OCO request--and as I said earlier, we are aggressively
moving OCO into base. But this is--that 20 percent of
maintenance is still very much related to the operations tempo
in CENTCOM right now.
Senator Kaine. How about just generally the sequester
environment and future shipbuilding costs and scheduling? If we
don't find that solution that is assumed in the budget that the
President has submitted, that you're testifying to today, what
will be the long-term effect on the costs and scheduling on the
shipbuilding side?
Mr. Mabus. One of the things that we have done based on the
bill passed here in 2009 on acquisition reform, WSARA of 2009
is we've pushed things like multi-year contracts, which save a
great deal of money. We've pushed things like competition.
Sequester would have a bad effect on all those things. Again,
as the CNO said, we're working through exactly what that effect
would be.
We have, for example, the Virginia-class submarine program
now under multi-year, the DDG-51 under a multi-year, the Marine
Corps MV-22 aircraft under a multi-year, the Hawkeye electronic
surveillance aircraft for the Navy under a multi-year.
If we cannot continue those multi-years or if we can't
execute them as multi-years, the cost goes dramatically higher
for fewer ships and aircraft.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here this
morning and for your service.
I want to begin by saying I share Senator McCain's
frustration and outrage that this Congress hasn't yet addressed
sequestration and very much appreciate the challenges that we
have given to all of you as you try and deal with a budget that
has so much uncertainty.
One of the things that I do every week is to host a coffee
for my constituents from New Hampshire who are here. Several
weeks ago I had a woman at the coffee who approached me close
to tears because her husband works at the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard and she said: We don't know what we're going to do
about our personal budget because of the furloughs that he is
expecting.
I know the Navy has been working on this issue, trying to
address the furlough question. Clearly it's one of the things
that has an impact on morale, which all of you have mentioned
this morning. So I wonder if you can give us any insights into
whether you are going to be able to address the furlough and
how you might do that?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. That decision has not been
made yet. It's being made at a DOD-wide level and they're
looking at the health of the whole force. But as you point out,
we have civilian workers--shipyard workers is a great example--
that have a direct operational impact on the Navy. The CNO and
I have both talked about this publicly, about how that will
impact the ships that go through these depots, how it will
impact the sailing schedules, the steaming schedules, and our
operational schedules.
That's part of the input that we've been given. As
Secretary Hagel said, if we can do better we will do better. I
think everybody recognizes just how crucial these civilians
are. General Amos says that he considers them civilian marines.
We consider them civilian sailors. They are absolutely crucial
to the fleet and to the Marine Corps.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I know
that the shipyard workers at Portsmouth and throughout the
country appreciate the efforts that are being made to try and
address their situation.
I want to switch to energy, because one of the best things
I've done since I've been in the Senate was to join with you in
the hearing on the USS Kearsarge about the efforts that are
being made by the Navy to address energy use. I certainly agree
that we have to reduce our what has been almost a total
dependence on oil in recent years.
I know that biofuels is something that you've been working
very hard on and I very much appreciate that. But I wonder if
you could also address some of the other efficiencies that
you're trying to achieve in order to address energy usage
throughout the Navy and the Marine Corps?
Mr. Mabus. I appreciate the opportunity to talk about it.
You're right, we're proceeding down two tracks. One is to
change the type of energy we use, but the other is to do the
same amount with less energy. In the Navy we're doing things
like different hull coatings, stern flaps, different kinds of
lighting on ships, voyage planning tools, this sort of thing,
to use less energy.
All these things have a tremendous impact on the amount
that we use. We have the USS Macon Island, the first hybrid
ship, that has an electric drive for under 12 knots. They made
a deployment to CENTCOM and to PACOM. We sent them out with a
$33 million fuel budget and they brought $15 million back that
they did not use, which is able to put back into operations.
The Marines, through their Experimental Forward Operating
Base that they have twice a year, once at Quantico, once at
Twentynine Palms, and get whatever industry is doing. So
marines are lightening their loads by using fewer batteries and
by charging their radios and global positioning systems with
solar power. They're doing insulation. They're using wind
power, they're using hybrid generators at their bases.
So we are bringing down the amount of energy that we use
and not cutting our operations at all. In fact, we're
increasing the amount we can do on the same amount of energy. I
think we have to keep proceeding down these two tracks because,
as I said in answer to a previous question, in the last 3 years
just from the spike in oil prices the Department of the Navy
has had to pay an additional $1.5 billion in fuel bills that we
didn't have budgeted. That money could have gone to operations
or to platforms.
Senator Shaheen. Particularly in these challenging economic
times, I think it's prudent for you to continue proceeding down
this path, and hope that we can provide you as much support in
the Senate as possible.
General Amos, I'm almost out of time, but I wanted to go
back to your comments about sexual assault and about the
convening authority, because I certainly appreciate your
concern about proceeding with caution in this area, but the
fact is that there are over 3,000 reported sexual assaults in
the military. The estimate is that it's more than 19,000.
You've indicated that you're going to lead a cultural
change within the Marine Corps regarding sexual assault. How do
you do that? Do we not have to look at how the system addresses
sexual assault in order to make that cultural change?
General Amos. Senator, I don't want to confuse you here.
I'm working my way through the convening authority Article 60
mentally as it relates to sexual assault, because I don't want
anybody to think for a second that this isn't important to me.
If that's what it takes, if that becomes part of the solution
set, then I fully support it. So I just want you to know that.
To your question, though, about our institution, the U.S.
Marine Corps, this has to be a culture change. We began last,
probably around the May timeframe, began with a general officer
symposium. I brought every general in the Marine Corps back to
Quantico for 2 straight days and talked nothing but where we
were. It was a cold dose of reality, where we are in the Marine
Corps, because quite frankly--and it's like the Gregg Zoroya
article that popped in USA Today 2 days ago. The numbers are
shameful. It's more than being embarrassed. I'm ashamed of this
thing.
But that's not where we're headed and that's not where we
are right now. We have the entire senior leadership of the
Marine Corps after this--I'm talking about officers and staff
NCOs. We've just really been after it since probably about the
mid-summer. We started in the spring, but all the campaign
plan, three phases of it--and there's a host of things we've
done.
I know we're out of time. I'd be honored to come by and
talk to you about it. But I don't want anybody to think for a
minute that this culture change is going to be easy. But we are
dedicated, my generals are and my sergeant majors are, and
we're going to succeed. It's going to be hard, but we are going
to succeed at this, because it's the right thing to do.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. I
have other questions, but I'm sure my colleagues on the
committee will follow up.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Just a quick follow-up question because both Admiral
Greenert and General Amos indicated that they are looking at
units that will be C3 towards the end of the year. As I
understand it, that has several different components in terms
of the rating, personnel, the equipment, et cetera.
Can you go just one step down? What's the problem? Is it
personnel readiness, availability of sailors? Is it equipment?
Just to give us some texture for the rating.
Admiral Greenert. The fact that a unit is C3, Senator, unto
itself shouldn't be that alarming. It is not unusual. In other
words, we have units that just before they're ready to deploy
they are fully manned, trained, equipped. They need to get
their ammo on board. They pick it up and they go. So for the
record, they remain C3 until that point.
The point is it's a trend and it's a quantification of how
those that are ready to deploy, they are C1 and C2, those that
are in the surge are drifting further from that C1-C2. It's
like a Slinky dog that goes further behind. It takes that much
more to get it ready to deploy.
So what is the issue? It tends to be training. They don't
have as many skill sets as they need to have when they're ready
to deploy. If they're called to surge, we have to have a longer
conversation to say, okay, here's what your unit will have. It
could be an air wing, it could be a destroyer, but we have to
have a more in-depth conversation, whereas if they're where we
want them to be and where they are typical in our fleet
response plan, then that is automatic, that is the covenant
that we already have.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Amos, your comments about the Marine Corps?
General Amos. Senator, the reality is it's equipment
available--we talk what C3 is. The exact definition of C3 is
units trained to undertake many but not all wartime missions.
We don't typically deploy units that are C3. We deploy them C1
and C2, and that's what the combatant commanders, that's what
they expect.
Would we deploy a C3 unit? Absolutely, yes. If war broke
out, I'd deploy a C4 or a C5 unit. So I want to be clear about
that.
But what's happening is the equipment readiness as a result
of things going through depot--I've said, when sequestration
fully hits in 2014 and 2015, 75 percent of our depot capacity
is going to be affected in one way or the other. That's going
to have an effect on the equipment availability. It's training
ranges, it's O&M, it's fuel, it's ammunition. It's the ability
to be able to take a unit and fly it out to or move it out to
Twentynine Palms to do its final integrated training exercise.
It's all of that.
Finally, the last I guess kind of litmus test is, because
the depot maintenance and aviation has had an impact as a
result of O&M, we're going to have--and I'll give you the exact
numbers. Today I have 102 of 257 F-18s that are out of
reporting status, which means they're not flyable. They need
depot maintenance of some kind. 23 F-18s are not going to be
inducted in the third and fourth quarter of this year.
So the net result will be this, I'll have 125 out of 257
Marine Corps F-18s out of reporting status. If you take all the
squadrons that I have forward deployed, which will have the
full complement of airplanes, the ones on carriers, the ones
that I have in the Persian Gulf, they're my first priority. The
remaining squadrons back home by January 2014 will have 6 of 12
F-18s sitting on the flight line.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Let me do one follow-up question, too, because this was
brought up previously. As you retrograde equipment out of
Afghanistan, some of that equipment I presume, because it was
specifically, particularly some of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-
Protected (MRAP) vehicles and some of the vehicles, were
designed for the conflict in Afghanistan--do you have the
flexibility to bring them out, but then deferring maintenance,
as a way to husband resources without affecting the ability of
a MEU to operate and conduct?
General Amos. We do, Senator. For instance, we have well
over 2,500 MRAP vehicles right now. Our long-term plan is to
keep roughly about 1,200 of them. We're going to bring them all
back.
Senator Reed. Right.
General Amos. We'll start parsing out those that need it
and those that don't, to be able to husband resources.
Senator Reed. Understand.
Admiral Greenert, I was particularly impressed with the
brilliance of Senator Donnelly's questioning about submarines,
and also the threat to surface ships. I think it raises an
interesting question. As you know and Admiral Locklear
testified, there are a number of countries, particularly in
Asia--China, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Vietnam, the Republic of Korea--who are developing new
submarines, much more capable submarines. Indeed, I'm also
indicated that Russia and China are expected to soon field new
ballistic missile submarines, which adds another dimension.
Then you can join that with the surface-to-surface
precision long-range weapons, particularly with the Chinese,
which threaten the surface fleet, which raises I think not only
the necessity, but the criticality of the submarine fleet. Is
that a view that you support or take?
Admiral Greenert. I absolutely support that. As I testified
last year, that 2014 submarine was our number one priority.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you all, gentlemen, for your service and your
thoughtful testimony today.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here very much.
General Amos, I know that you had expressed to my colleague
that you want to get at this culture change and it's very
important to you as to sexual assault. But let me just say the
quickest way to change the culture is to put these cowards in
prison. The people who commit these crimes are sullying your
ranks and they are diminishing what you are as a powerful force
in this country.
I think the challenge around that is getting the victims to
come forward. This has to be one of the problems that is
foremost in your mind: How do we create an environment of
professionalism and justice that gives victims the confidence
that they can help you weed out these cowards and get them out
of our wonderful military that I know you are so proud and it
is your life, and you want nothing more than the Marine Corps
to be seen for the wonderful men and women they are.
So when you have a convening authority that picks five
colonels and lieutenant colonels to sit on a jury and they do
the thing that you always do in these cases, and it is one
thing you do as a jury, you decide who's telling the truth,
because all this case was about was who was telling the truth--
was it the fighter pilot and his wife or was it the victim?
These five colonels and lieutenant colonels decided the victim
was telling the truth, and with one stroke of a pen that
convening authority said to every victim out there that he's
confident if they come forward they're either not going to be
believed or they're not going to be supported or nothing is
going to happen to the guy.
You know what he did when he did that? He told all of them
they were exactly right to hide in the shadows. That is more
damaging to our military in the area of sexual assault than
anything that could happen. All the training in the world will
not fix this problem if you don't give these victims
confidence.
Frankly, when he wrote the letter explaining how he did it
and the first point in his letter is that she hadn't taken a
ride home from the party? Are you kidding me? You know what
every victim said? Oh my gosh, no matter what happens at the
trial, no matter if they believe me, some general is going to
decide that I'm a slut because I didn't take a ride home.
That is the problem. Until you guys at the top levels of
the military get that, we're not going to fix it. I firmly
believe that. I'm so proud that the Joint Chiefs made the
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to change Article 60
of the UCMJ.
I'm going to work as hard as I can to change Article 60. I
don't want to throw it all out. I get that the convening
authority has a role in terms of the good of the order. I get
that. But the idea that they can overturn a factual
determination by a jury they hand-picked, that's ridiculous.
So I feel better.
Now, on to F/A-18s. I think it's really an issue here that
we're taking a real risk with our strike fighter inventory when
it comes to JSF. I know that we now have a problem with them
landing on the carriers, with the tailhooks, that they're all
going to have to be modified. This is a huge issue. We now know
another $8.5 billion just to fix the tailhook problem.
The F/A-18 line is going to end domestic production after
the final procurement this year. Doesn't the F/A-18 line
mitigate the risk of this shortfall going forward? We're now
not to full production until 2019 on the JSF. I would like
Admiral or Secretary Mabus or any of you to speak to this
issue.
We can talk about how expensive it is. We can talk about
how it's not doing what it should have done. We can talk about
the capability being diminished. But at the end of the day,
what about the inventory?
Mr. Mabus. On the F/A-18 line, in our budget we're
requesting 21 more Growlers, F/A-18Gs, be built in fiscal year
2014, which would keep the line going through 2016. We do think
that it's important to have that capability there.
I'll let Admiral Greenert talk about the issues with the F-
35 and the tailhook and the inventory.
Admiral Greenert. Simply, Senator, I need a tailhook, a
helmet, and I need a program that will deliver weapons
equivalent to a Super Hornet, so that the F-35 comes into the
air wing. The air wing can't turn around the F-35. I've been
pretty clear on that. My air wing of the future has to be
Hornets, Growlers, and a fifth generation. So I do need the
capability, and in my view unmanned; there's an unmanned
element to that.
Does it mitigate? Yes, it definitely would mitigate the
need for the capability. So it all fits together into an air
wing of the future that has to be able to deliver ordnance as
well as jam and handle the electromagnetic spectrum, which is
huge, in the future.
Senator McCaskill. In terms of extending the flight hours,
I know that the report came back from GAO saying that maybe we
need an independent assessment about what the cost is going to
be on extending the flight hours on existing Super Hornets. Can
you speak to that? Based on experience, we've not always gotten
the right number when it's been an interior assessment as
opposed to an independent assessment.
Admiral Greenert. Let me get you a written answer, but
here's what my Naval Air systems commander is telling me, that
the extension on the Super Hornet looks very good, that the
Super Hornet's performing very well and its fatigue factors and
those areas look well. So that he was confident that we could
get an extension.
I'll just give you something in writing that is deliberate.
[The information referred to follows:]

The cost and schedule to extend the service life of the Super
Hornet is not fully known at this time. A Service Life Assessment
Program (SLAP) is in progress to provide detailed analysis of fleet
usage compared to structural test data. At this time, indications are
that life extension will be achievable through modifications and
inspections similar to the ongoing F/A-18C Hornet Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP). Compared to the previous F/A-18A-D SLAP, the
Super Hornet SLAP has the advantage of having three lifetime test
cycles completed on certain test articles, which provides additional
data and insight into fatigue issues that will need to be addressed if
extending service life beyond 6,000 flight hours is required. As the
Super Hornet SLAP results are delivered, we will be able to develop
SLEP cost estimates, plans, and milestones.

Senator McCaskill. That would be great.
Thank you all very much. General Amos, I know your heart
wants to get this fixed, and we'll work together and get it
done. I know all of the military wants to do this. As you can
tell, this one hits close to home for me because of the years I
spent doing this.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Greenert and Secretary Mabus, I was here yesterday
at the Defense Appropriations Committee hearing. I didn't get a
chance to ask the questions I wanted to ask then. I think maybe
my colleague Senator McCaskill has opened that door and asked
some of them already.
Admiral, you're the last in line of the Services to get the
F-35s, is that right?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, that's right.
Senator Blunt. The same things you mentioned today I heard
you mention yesterday, that you have to have some things happen
before those are really useable planes.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned you've ordered the Growlers.
You've asked for them in the budget, rather. You haven't
ordered them; you've asked for them in the budget. I guess one
of my questions is, I know your tactical aircraft, you're 29 or
30 short of what you think you need and what's the risk of not
moving forward, asking for more of the Super Hornets at the
same time? Or is there just not a shortage in the Super Hornet
part of the tactical aircraft (TACAIR) mix?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, the TACAIR shortfall which the chairman
mentioned in his opening statement has gotten significantly
better. It's down to less than 20 aircraft in about 2,023 now.
This is a result of a lot of things. Part of it is what Admiral
Greenert said. As we're doing the high flight hour inspections
of the Hornets and Super Hornets, these inspections are turning
out better than we had anticipated. The wear is less, the
repairs will be less. We are currently planning to do the
service life extension on 150 aircraft to get us there.
The other thing is we're transitioning quicker to the Super
Hornets from the legacy Hornets, which are giving us more
capability and more flight hours.
So I think that, just in terms of numbers of TACAIR risk,
the risk is relatively low as we're going forward. We're buying
the extra F/A-18Gs or requesting that we buy 21 additional Gs
because of the electronic attack mission. The Marine Corps is
retiring their EA-6s and this would be required to make sure
that we maintain that important capability of electronic attack
in an expeditionary way, so that we can have enough
expeditionary squadrons to support electronic attack, not just
for the Navy and Marine Corps, but across the joint force.
Senator Blunt. I'm hearing right that you think that your
shortfall is now less than the Navy might have thought it was
going to be a couple of years ago, because these planes are
more serviceable and lasting better than anticipated?
Mr. Mabus. Yes.
Senator Blunt. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. There's also, when we did the numbers
that you referred to, the higher numbers as to what the
shortfall might be, a big factor was the use, how many cycles
are the aircraft being used. That number has come down as we've
operated in the Gulf. So 2 years ago the use of the Super
Hornet and the legacy Hornets, if you will, was much higher
than it is now.
So as we do the measurements we're finding, hey, they're
not as fatigued as we originally thought. The assumptions have
changed in the analysis.
Senator Blunt. I think there was a fairly significant
request for maintenance and parts, maybe beyond what I would
have thought. But General Amos, do you have anything to say on
this topic of your transition on planes?
General Amos. No, sir. I'm in complete agreement with my
Secretary and the CNO on this. The management of the shortfall
has been mitigated by a large degree as a result of actually
managing each bureau number aircraft. Every single airplane,
the number of carrier landings, the number of arrested
landings, catapults, Gs on the airplane. So the naval aviation
enterprise is actually managing each one of those aircraft by
bureau number to mitigate the long-term effects of a lot of
flying hours.
So we're actually managing the fleet and that's what's
helping us out.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blunt.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service. Thank you
for being here. Thank you for what you do for our country.
Before I get into my questions, I did want to make one
comment and it's echoing Senator Shaheen and Senator McCaskill.
It's about sexual assault. General Amos, I really appreciate
what you're doing, but you made a comment saying that it is not
going to be easy to change this culture. I think if you look at
the training, you look at the convictions, you look at the
punishments, we shouldn't be saying it's not going to be easy.
This is something that has, as you said, has the attention.
You brought the generals together. You've discussed this.
I guess one question is, how many of those generals are
women percent-wise?
General Amos. I can't tell you percent-wise, but we have a
slice of our general officers, 80-plus general officers, that
are females.
Senator Hagan. I just think it is imperative that we
understand that sexual assault, sexual harassment, has
absolutely no place in our military, and that it is something
that is really affecting the culture, especially of our women
who are in Service. I just echo the other comments, how
important this is. I appreciate what you're doing.
General Amos, I did also appreciate the time that you've
taken to discuss with me a lot recently on the issue of
notifying those affected by water contamination at Camp
Lejeune. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry's
(ATSDR) recently released water model did find that the levels
for some contaminants were as high a 150 times now what is
considered safe. So it's very important to me that the marines,
the civilians, and family members who were exposed to these
contaminants are kept informed as key information is released.
I appreciate our discussion and our commitment to do so.
Can you update the committee on what the Marine Corps has
done since we talked to notify those affected by this tragedy
of recent and future findings?
General Amos. Senator, I can. I'll be happy to. Thank you
for the opportunity.
As you said, the ATSDR released what they call a chapter 8
water model and it became public, and that was an official
report. That's one of five phases of reports, and it talks
about the contamination started as early possibly as 1953
instead of 1957. So as a result of that, we've advertised in
USA Today, national publications, full-page ads talking about
the report, and with a link on there that you can link to get
the report.
We've notified 104,000 email addressees that we currently
have in our registry. We've sent them emails. We also mailed
out 188,000 letters here just this month. All this has been
done this month, to notify everybody that we are in contact
with that have come forward, that are part of the registry,
about the results of the report.
I'll also say, Senator, we intend to do exactly that same
type of mass notification and awareness for all the other
reports as they come out in the future over the next year or 2.
So we're dedicated to this. We want to do it right--we are
going to do it the right way.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I appreciate us working together
on that, I really do.
The Department of the Navy's investment in amphibious
warships represents a critical investment that also supports a
key Marine Corps mission. Citing fiscal constraints, you've
decided to reduce the number of amphibious ships to a fleet of
33, with only 30 available at any given time due to maintenance
requirements. My understanding is that 30 ships is the bare
minimum required for sea-based forcible entry.
Secretary Mabus, do you consider it an acceptable risk to
rely on the exact minimum number of ships needed to execute
such a mission should the need arise? Then what is plan B if
there are not enough ships operationally available?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, in the shipbuilding plan that we've
sent the tables to Congress we're building toward that 33
level. The Commandant has said repeatedly that if he could have
50 he would. So would I. But given the fiscal constraints, I
think 33 is a reasonable number with a reasonable amount of
risk.
The other thing that is in there is that in terms of
operations concepts there perhaps are other ways we can
transport things beside just amphibious ships. The afloat
forward staging bases that we're building two of today and two
more to be configured as--the last two will be afloat forward
staging bases. The first two are mobile landing platforms that
can transport huge amounts of equipment into an amphibious
assault area. The Joint High Speed Vessel that can move people
and equipment around very quickly.
So the Marines I know are looking at the concept of
operations, but also we find that these amphibious ships, the
three-ship amphibious ready groups with the big-deck amphib,
the landing platform dock, and the landing ship dock, are some
of our most flexible and important forces, and we think that
these, the Gator Navy, the amphibs, are some of the most
important things that we have.
Finally, we're exercising that as well, the exercise Bold
Alligator that happened off the coast of North Carolina last
year and will be repeated next year, to make sure that the
Marines have gone back to the amphibious roots and have the
training and the doctrine to be able to perform the way that we
know Marines do perform.
Senator Hagan. We definitely know that.
Thank you all for being here today and your testimony.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for their service during
challenging times and for all of those that serve underneath
you, we're grateful.
I wanted to ask Admiral Greenert and certainly Secretary
Mabus about the fleet size. I know that you've testified about
the fleet size and I believe you began with that if you look
back to September 11 our fleet size was 316 and now we're at
283. We know from your recent reporting to us that what you
believe you need is 306 to meet all of our needs.
As I look at the schedule, the schedule that you have put
forward that would put us dropping down to a fleet of 270 in
2015, did I understand that correctly? Is that a schedule that
is based upon the President's proposed budget? In other words,
this 270 by 2015 does not account for sequestration, does it?
Mr. Mabus. That's correct. The reason that you have the dip
is that there were a lot of smaller surface combatants,
particularly frigates, built in the 1980s during the big Cold
War buildup and they are reaching the end of their service
life. Now, they're being replaced, as you can see from those
charts, and we're going to go back to 300 ships by the end of
this decade, by far more capable, far more flexible ships in
the fleet.
One of the things--and I was the one that said, that gave
the numbers--is that we today have 47 ships under contract and
43 of those ships have been put under contract since I got
here.
Senator Ayotte. But just to understand, we don't meet 306,
which is what we've said we'd need, until 2037, is that right?
That is with what we believe to be more robust, appropriate
levels of funding.
Mr. Mabus. I believe that is correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. So that's according to the P-14 Battle
Force Inventory. That's where I got that number.
So as I look where we are, we have pretty great challenges
of getting to where we need to be for our naval fleet now, even
if we keep funding where you've proposed it to be without
sequestration. So what happens to us if we go forward with
sequestration in terms of fleet number and capacity?
Mr. Mabus. I'd like Admiral Greenert to also comment on
this. But sequestration looms over everything and it will have
impacts on things like multi-year programs that we're building
submarines and destroyers under. It will have obviously an
impact on the number of ships we can build.
But the President's budget, the Senate budget resolution,
the House budget resolution, all went forward saying that
sequestration was not a good idea----
Senator Ayotte. Mr. Secretary, I'm looking around here and
I don't see, unfortunately, people doing what needs to be done
to resolve sequestration. So I want to make sure that everyone
here understands if we go forward with sequestration for our
military, for our Navy, what size does our fleet end up being?
Because we right now are at 283. We know we need 306. As far as
I can see--and I'm sure you would agree with me--the world's
not getting any safer with Iran marching toward a nuclear
weapon, with what's happening in the Persian Gulf, with our
shift to the Asia-Pacific region, all of which needs naval
capacity. Numbers obviously matter in terms of what we can
cover around the world.
So, Admiral Greenert, I don't know if you can share with
me, what happens to our fleet?
Admiral Greenert. If we just apply sequestration, the
number is $50 billion a year through there, and they are pro-
rated, you pro-rate it to the shipbuilding plan, and then I
have to reduce force structure, again it's a straight linear
extrapolation: 30 less ships, roughly, by 2020. So you're
looking at, instead of 295, somewhere around 265. You keep
taking that out to a 2-year posture, we could be down as low as
235 ships.
Senator Ayotte. 235 ships. Would you agree with me that
that would take on tremendous risk, given the challenges we
face around the world? What would that do to our shift to the
Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Greenert. Number one, yes, I agree with you it
would be tremendous risk. The shift to the Asia-Pacific, it
would slow it down, truncate it by a lot.
A point I'd like to make: Ships are definitely important.
Ships forward are most important. So we have to sustain our
forward-deployed naval force, the Singapore Initiative, making
sure we take care of lift for the Marines to Darwin. That is
something I think would be most important to work out, so that
we do the best we can to be forward.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it.
I wanted to ask--I know it was touched upon before,
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, on the Navy's proposed--
as I understand it, you submitted a proposal to OSD that would
allow you to forego furloughs for 2013. Do you know when that
decision will be made from OSD as to whether we can forego
civilian furloughs? Because obviously one of the concerns that
I have heard that seems to me to be a sensible concern is that
we will get behind on the maintenance schedule, which will
further exacerbate the difficulties and the strain put on our
fleet.
Mr. Mabus. Secretary Hagel said, I believe last week, that
the decision had not been made, would not be made for a few
weeks. One of the things that both the Commandant, the CNO, and
I have said during these discussions is that, exactly as you
pointed out, some of these civilian workers that we have, like
our shipyard workers, have a direct operational impact in terms
of maintenance and in terms of getting ships back out to sea.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I appreciate all of you being here. I know that it's a
challenging time to serve. Sequestration is something that I
think is particularly foolish with regard to our national
security, and I think it's been clear from your testimony and
the other Service Chiefs that if we continue with this we're
going to really diminish the strongest military in the world.
So I thank you all for being here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. If we get out of our ideological stances
here on both sides of Capitol Hill, we can get rid of the
sequestration going forward. But it's baked into the cake
between now and October 1st.
Admiral and General, since you're not going to have as many
flying hours, can you use simulators to try to keep your crews
tuned up?
Admiral Greenert. We can, and in fact during this phase we
went through with the Continuing Resolution and the
sequestration we turned to simulators to help keep our folks as
current as feasible. There are some skill sets that you can't
replicate in a simulator.
Some are getting better. The P-8 you're well aware of down
there in Jacksonville. That's an excellent simulator and does
magnificent things. But you can do some, but it's very limited.
General Amos. Senator, exactly. We revamped the training
and readiness manual for our aviation squadrons some time ago
to incorporate more simulation as pressurization on flight
hours increased. So we are and we obviously are going to have
to continue to do even more.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your
service. It has been extraordinary.
As evidenced by the female Senators that have spoken so
emotionally, I want to point out that 6 and 7 years ago in
another committee I chaired hearings about the rapes that were
occurring in Iraq among contractors. I did that through the
means of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. What we had
was the dramatic testimony of a number of female contractors,
and they came to the committee and told about how everything
was swept under the rug, that in some cases--now, this is only
6 or 7 years ago--that they could not get medical attention,
and of course they had to rely, not just on the contractor
medical attention, but they were in the war zone, the U.S.
military--and in addition, that once they got home they
couldn't get the U.S. attorneys to prosecute because all of the
evidence had been swept under the rug. It was so bad that they
could not get rape kits.
Can you bring me up-to-date on what is the standard
procedure not only of this raw issue that has been brought out
here with regard to Active Duty military, but with regard to
the contractors as well under the supervision of the military?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, just as an overall thing I want to say
that--and this is the way I put it--that, asked if I'm
concerned about sexual assault in the military, I've said--and
I know I speak for General Amos and Admiral Greenert here--
we're angry. It's an attack. It's a crime. It's not anything
else. If somebody was walking around and taking shots at random
at our Service, we would fix it, and this is the same thing.
This is an attack. This is an attack from the inside.
We have made a lot of progress, I think. We're beginning to
learn what works.
In answer to your specific question, we now have trained
sexual assault responders, victim advocates. We've trained our
medical personnel in sexual assault and rape. There is a
requirement to keep evidence for very long periods of time and
not discard it after a certain amount of time.
We have other things to encourage people to come forward,
that if they feel in danger we will transfer someone
immediately to get them out of even that feeling of danger.
We are finding that we're beginning to figure out what
works in a lot of these cases. I think we're doing a good job
in terms of just training like NCIS investigators in this
specific thing, training prosecutors in this specific thing,
training defense attorneys in this specific thing.
There's a lot more that can be done, but I do think that we
have to make it clear from the seaman recruit to the four-star
that we won't put up with this, this is unacceptable.
Senator Nelson. Is this being applied now to the contractor
personnel as well as the military?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, as far as I know, in terms of the
contractor personnel that the military supports in medical care
and things like that, it is. On the broader question, I simply
will have to get back to you.
Senator Nelson. Okay. That was the situation that we
examined in the committee years ago. In some cases some of the
rapes were perpetrated by contractor personnel on contractor
personnel, in some cases Active Duty military on contractor
personnel.
Admiral Greenert. Excuse me, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Yes, Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. If I may, just a tidbit.
Senator Nelson. Please.
Admiral Greenert. Contractors, we can't compel them and
order them to come to training. We're doing training. But the
feedback is they are attending the training and they're quite
interested in what we're doing. They're embedded in our people
and those that are embedded are coming to the training and
interfacing. Just thought you'd want to know that.
Senator Nelson. I appreciate that, and I'm sure they are,
because it all affects morale and so forth.
But in your execution of a contract with them, I wish you
would look into the fact that your contract could compel
contractor training.
Don't forget those women.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, will you get back to us about that
last point of Senator Nelson, about whether contracts can be
amended to require the training which you've referred to?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

Navy will pursue the establishment of a requirement that
contractors attend sexual assault training into our contracts. I will
work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) on this issue.
A requirement for Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
training does not typically fall within the specifications or statement
of work (SOW) section of Navy contracts. To mandate that SAPR training
be included in contracts, Navy would have to establish a policy
requiring contracting officers to do so. Pursuant to the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 201.304(1)(i),
``Approval of the USD(AT&L) is required before including in a
department/agency or component supplement, or any other contracting
regulation document such as a policy letter or clause book, any policy,
procedure, clause, or form that: (A) Has a significant effect beyond
the internal operating procedures of the agency; or (B) Has a
significant cost or administrative impact on contractors or offerors''.
This type of contractor training has been held by USD(AT&L) to fall
within both categories (A) and (B) above; therefore we must seek
USD(AT&L)'s approval before implementing such a requirement.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Thanks, Senator Nelson.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank each of you for your service and most especially the
service of the extraordinary men and women under your command.
I'm grateful to you for being here today and proud of your
service to our Nation.
Let me begin, Admiral Greenert, you were very kind to come
to visit the sub base in New London. Mr. Secretary, you've been
there as well. I assume that you continue to be of the view
that that submarine base is important, indeed essential, to our
national security?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, I do, both the piers and the
support to the submarines, as well as the submarine training--
actually, the Submarine Learning Center, excuse me.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied, Admiral, that the
President's budget has sufficient funding to continue the
submarine building program, Virginia-class program, at the
present pace of two submarines a year for 2014 and beyond?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, it does. We have a submittal and a
funding mechanism in place that we proposed to Congress. With
that, I'm comfortable.
Senator Blumenthal. I've noticed that mechanism, which I
fully support because I think the submarine program, as you and
the Secretary observed, is absolutely essential to our
continued undersea superiority, which in turn is vital to our
national security.
Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, that there's enough
funding for the Ohio-class program?
Mr. Mabus. I am, Senator. At the place we're in, which is
early design, continuing to do some R&D, we have the funding in
place and we are on track to not only begin construction on the
timeline that we have laid out, but also working with our
British partners on the common missile compartment, we're on
schedule for their successor class as well.
The one caveat that I would put in there is sequestration
has the potential to change that answer considerably.
Senator Blumenthal. My hope is that sequestration has no
effect on the submarine program, because I think it ought to be
clearly excepted from any of those cuts that could be
contemplated in light of all the considerations that you and
others have stated so powerfully and eloquently. So I'm hopeful
that we can avoid those effects.
Also, with all due respect, I know that you may not be able
to comment on this point in detail, but the proposal for
another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) I think is probably
destined to be doomed or, as it's been put, dead on arrival
here in Congress. But I would certainly believe there are
better ways to save money. Indeed, the BRAC process has shown
itself to be cost-ineffective rather than a means of saving
money. So I'm hopeful that we can avoid that mistake as well.
I know that you may not be in a position to comment on it,
but I just want to state for the record that I'm hoping that
the President will reconsider that point of view.
Let me say to you that I take with complete trust and
confidence the position that you have stated, all three of you,
with great passion and commitment to eliminating sexual
assault. I think that one of the aspects of this that deserves
greater scrutiny is the reporting, which has to be encouraged.
I noted that the report released on Monday--I believe it was on
Monday--the 2011 health survey, stated that the percentage of
reporting or responding to that survey in the Marine Corps was
only about 22 percent, or in other words 78 percent of troops
declined to participate.
Now, that was before the legal reorganization, I suppose.
So perhaps the reporting rates would be higher now.
General Amos, I wonder if you could comment on what more
can be done to encourage reporting?
General Amos. Senator, I want to make sure I'm clear here.
When I think of reporting, it's not so much a survey as it is
the actual victims coming forward and saying something bad
happened. It could be male or female.
With the advent of this surge effort, this more than surge,
this sustained long-term effort that the Marine Corps has taken
on since the mid-summer of last year, we've said all along that
we expect the numbers of restricted and unrestricted reports to
go up. That would be an indication to me that my marines
actually have confidence in the battalion commanders, the
squadron commanders, the senior enlisted leadership, that they
will not be revictimized, that they will not be humiliated,
that they will be treated with dignity and respect and they'll
be protected.
That's what's happening. Our reports are going up. So
there's a side of me that you go: Oh, I hate to see that. But
that's the reality. As I travel around, as my Sergeant Major
travels around, the feedback we get, the anecdotal feedback we
get from predominantly our females is that: Okay, we're more
comfortable; we have more confidence in the leadership now.
A large percentage of the reports in this--and I can't tell
you how many, sir, because the information is convoluted--are
reports from 2 years ago. In other words, my marines have come
forward and they've said: Okay, this happened to me 2 years
ago. That's an indication that there is more confidence in the
leadership's ability to be able to take this seriously.
So that's the reporting I'm looking at, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Your point is very well taken that
there are two kinds of reporting and the reporting of actual
crimes is what really probably is most important. I would just
suggest in closing, because my time has expired, that the way
to get more reporting, the way to make this system more
effective, the way to give confidence to the men and women
under your command, is to increase the conviction rates. I say
that with all due respect as a prosecutor and not as a career
military person as you are. But the best deterrence is--and I
would just second Senator McCaskill--putting people away,
putting them in prison, giving harsh, significant, but fair
punishment. I know that you're committed to that policy.
General Amos. Senator, if I could, I realize time is of the
essence. That's a very good point. As a result of NCIS's help
and the result of reorganization of what we pull together are
complex trial teams, where we actually have the pros from Dover
doing this now, from 2011 to 2012 we more than doubled the
amount of prosecutions and we've more than doubled the amount
of convictions.
So we're headed in the right direction.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
I'm going to leave. I think that Senator Inhofe will be
leaving. We have that meeting of all Senators.
Before I call on Senator Hirono, I would ask that when
she's completed, if she's the last Senator here, which I think
she will be, if she could then adjourn the hearing.
Thank you very much for your testimony, gentlemen, and I
call on Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
I echo the sentiments of a number of my colleagues on this
committee to focus on the need to do everything you can to end
sexual assault in your Service and of course all the other
Services.
Admiral Greenert, you gave a response to Senator Ayotte
regarding the number of ships, and I believe that you said that
the reduction in the number of ships will slow our rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific. This is not a question. It's simply to say
that I share those concerns with you and this is yet--your
response is yet another reason that we need to end
sequestration and focus on going forward come October 1.
Secretary Mabus, I want to thank you for your noting that
you are doing everything you can to use some other method than
furloughing the thousands and thousands of civilian employees
at our various shipyards and other places in order to meet your
budget cuts. So the thousands of our civilian employees at
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and I commend you for those efforts
and please continue them.
Yesterday the National Security Adviser, Tom Donilon, spoke
of the critical link between energy security and national
security. He stated, ``Energy matters profoundly to U.S.
national security and foreign policy.'' I could not agree more.
I know that this is something that you, Mr. Secretary, have
long recognized. I want to commend your work as Secretary in
aggressively pursuing a strategy of diversifying the Navy's
fuel sources and using energy more efficiently so that we would
be saving significant amounts of money that can go for other
defense priorities.
So as you note in your testimony, the Navy has historically
been a leader in energy innovation. Given the successes you are
seeing within the Navy and Marine Corps, what in your estimate
would be the impact on the Navy's long-term capabilities if we
were to reduce our investments and initiatives in energy
security?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, this is a military vulnerability, the
amount of fuel we use, the types of fuel we use, the
vulnerability we have not only to supply shocks, but also to
price shocks. I think that if we were to lessen that commitment
to diversifying our sources, to becoming more efficient, that
we would simply be making a military vulnerability worse; and
that one of the things that leaders of military Services are
required to do and certainly should do is identify, you have a
series of adversaries' or potential adversaries'
vulnerabilities, but also your own, and to work to lessen
those. That's what we've been trying to do, and we very much
appreciate the support of you and of your colleagues toward
this goal.
It's a wide range of things. It's the efficiencies that we
talked about, but it's also putting some competition in trying
to develop sources of energy that are not influenced by world
events, by somebody threatening to close a strait here or there
and making the price of oil spike.
For every dollar that oil increases per barrel, it costs
the Department of the Navy $30 million in additional fuel
costs. So for fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2012, and then the
proposed increase for fiscal year 2013, that's $1.5 billion to
the Navy. Those sorts of impacts have impacts on our
operations, they have impacts on our people, they have impacts
on our ability to do what our missions are.
So I would be very happy to--because I literally could go
on about this all day, but to get you some of the figures that
we have worked through in terms of the benefits of this, in
terms of where this will take us, and, as you point out, the
fact that the Navy in particular, but also the military in
general, has led in this and other technology changes.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Secretary, I could not agree with you
more that we need to continue to make the investments in energy
security, and you correctly identify this as a security
vulnerability if we don't do that.
General Amos, it's good to see you again. The Marine Corps
obviously plays a major role in the Pacific and are a
significant part of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific area. Can
you talk a little bit about the latest with regards to
relocating Marine Corps forces throughout the Pacific?
General Amos. Senator, thank you. Yes, I can. We actually
began this about a year and a half ago. If you take a look at
the amount of monies over the Future Years Defense Program,
there's about $3.5 billion all totaled money being focused on
the reorientation of the marines in the Pacific. So that just
gives you a sense for how committed we are.
We deployed our first rotating battalion back onto the
island of Okinawa last year. One of the companies of that
battalion went down to Darwin, Australia, and began the Darwin
detachment down there, which has just been reconstituted again
this month.
So that's going to begin an effort between our Nation and
Australia, gradually eventually growing to about 2,500 marines
there.
We started again this year with another installment of
another Marine battalion from Hawaii to Okinawa. So today we
not only have the kind of typical battalion that's affiliated
with Okinawa; we now have two rotating battalions on the ground
on Okinawa in support of the rotational forces.
This fall we're going to do that again. We'll triple down
on that, so we'll have three rotating battalions plus one on
the ground. We'll move more aviation assets into the Western
Pacific.
So we're committed on that. There's already this footprint
increasing in the Western Pacific for the shift to the Pacific.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much for that explanation.
As I am the last remaining person on the committee here, I
want to once again, on behalf of our committee, thank you all
for your service and for being here with your testimony.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

MAYPORT AND STRATEGIC DISPERSAL

1. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, dispersing
our capital ships is in our best national security interest and
specifically, dispersing the east coast carrier fleet is a national
security priority. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) clearly
states, ``To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or
natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will homeport an east coast carrier in
Mayport, FL.'' The Navy has stated military construction costs to
prepare Mayport to homeport a carrier would be approximately $500
million, while the Government Accountability Office (GAO), estimates
the number to be $250 to $300 million. However, the Navy recently
completed a Controlled Industrial Area (CIA) at the Naval Shipyard in
Portsmouth, VA, for $33 million. Can you discuss how the Navy can
provide such a drastically different quote for a similar facility?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Several factors contribute to the
disparity in cost between the Norfolk Naval Shipyard Controlled (NNSY)
Controlled Industrial Facility (CIF) and Mayport: project scope,
timing, and location. First, a direct one-for-one comparison of the
NNSY CIF to Mayport cannot be made as several structures critical to
operating a CIF already exist in Norfolk, whereas they would have to be
included in constructing a similar facility in Mayport.
Second, the downturn in the economy after 2008 has led to a more
favorable bidding climate nationwide. The award amount of $26.3 million
for the NNSY CIF reflects a winning bid in the current economic
climate. In contrast, cost estimates for Mayport were prepared to
inform the selection of a Preferred Alternative from among many
different ship homeporting options as part of the 2008 Environmental
Impact Statement. Estimates for all the Mayport options were very
conservative, as they were based on preliminary data and took into
consideration the post-Katrina cost escalations prevalent in Florida
and the other Gulf Coast States at the time.
Third, the Mayport CIF design is more robust to accommodate the
increased potential for higher storm surges due to its location
adjacent to the coast of Florida.
In closing, should the CIF be programmed in a future year, the
estimate would be refined to reflect current economic conditions and
lessons learned from constructing the CIF in Norfolk.

2. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, will you
ensure strategic dispersal is again added as an objective in the 2014
QDR?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy is committed to strategic
dispersal of its forces. Strategic dispersal ensures that ships and
aircraft, their crews, supporting maintenance, and training-critical
infrastructure are located in more than one facility or region whenever
possible. To that end, strategic dispersal of our assets will have
great emphasis in the development of the 2014 QDR.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III

CONTRACTORS

3. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, what is the approximate number
of contractors the Navy presently has in its inventory and whether this
figure has gone up or down since last year?
Mr. Mabus. For fiscal year 2011, the Department of the Navy
Inventory of Contracts for Services (ICS) reported 182,126 Contractor
Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) based on Navy contracted actions with
$33.1 billion obligated. For fiscal year 2012 the Navy ICS reported
178,679 contractor FTEs based on Navy contracted actions with $28.5
billion obligated. Using this common reporting baseline, the Navy ICS
figures have gone down.
Additionally, for fiscal year 2012 an improved model for gathering
ICS data was implemented to include additional separate categories for
actions contracted by defense agencies (not Navy) and by non-defense
agencies using Navy funds. The table below includes the baseline Navy
contracted figures for fiscal years 2011 and 2012; and, includes the
fiscal year 2012 Navy ICS reported data for these two additional
categories.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of the Navy fiscal
year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 Full-Time
Inventory of Contracts for Obligated Dollars Equivalent Count
Services (ICS) Report
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From fiscal year 2011 ICS
Navy Contracted.............. $33,120,323,148 182,126
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From fiscal year 2012 ICS
Navy Contracted.............. 28,478,906,028 178,679
Defense Agency Contracted 1,765,038,233 9,844
(Not Navy)..................
Non-Defense Contracted....... 496,141,609 3,812
----------------------------------------
Total...................... $30,740,085,870 192,335
------------------------------------------------------------------------

FURLOUGHS

4. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, I'm told the Navy proposed an
alternative to the 14-day furlough for its 201,000 civilian workers.
According to Foreign Policy's Situation Report Newsletter, Navy leaders
believe the ultimate cost of disrupting operations via a Department-
wide furlough would negate the $300 million in projected savings.
However, this request was disapproved by the Department of Defense
(DOD). Would you implement an alternative to the civilian furlough if
you were given the discretion to do so?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy provided input to the Secretary of Defense
regarding possible ways to deal with the current budget crisis caused
by sequestration. After consideration of the Navy's and the other
Services' proposed options and alternatives, the Secretary of Defense
on May 14, 2013, announced the decision to furlough DOD civilian
employees, with a limited number of approved exemptions, as part of the
solution to solve the budgetary shortfall across the DOD for fiscal
year 2013. The Navy is implementing that decision. We continue to work
with the Secretary of Defense to find ways to mitigate against the
negative implications of sequestration on the Navy's mission.

5. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, is the furlough going to
create more bills than it will pay?
Mr. Mabus. Sequestration reduced the DOD's budget by $37 billion in
fiscal year 2013, and of that amount, the Department of Navy was
reduced by nearly $11 billion across various appropriations. It was
these budget reductions that resulted in the Secretary of Defense's
decision to furlough civilian personnel (with some exceptions).
Current estimates of projected savings for the 11-day furlough
announced by the Secretary of Defense on May 14, 2013, are
approximately $130 million in the Operation and Maintenance, Navy
Appropriation and $2 million in the Operation and Maintenance, Navy
Reserve appropriation. For those personnel funded by the Navy Working
Capital Fund (NWCF), while the personnel will be paid less, the
furlough will slow completion of orders and result in the lost recovery
of overhead, which may actually increase costs in future years.

TUITION ASSISTANCE

6. Senator Manchin. Admiral Greenert, the Navy is the only Service
to provide uninterrupted tuition assistance to its servicemembers. I
find this to be a remarkable commitment to both the personal and
professional growth of Navy servicemembers. Can you discuss why you
feel tuition assistance is so vital to the Navy?
Admiral Greenert. In addition to the readiness advantages offered
by education, there is an implied commitment between sailors and the
Navy they serve. One way that Navy honors this commitment is by
preserving a Tuition Assistance program that assists sailors in
achieving their education goals. This enables sailors to develop
themselves both personally and professionally into leaders who can
think critically, translate their thoughts into actions, and make
effective, educated decisions. This is important both in the Navy, and
if sailors choose to return to civilian life.

MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH

7. Senator Manchin. General Amos, you are in the midst of reducing
the size of the Marine Corps from roughly 200,000 to 182,000 by 2017.
Recently, the Army alluded to cutting an additional 100,000 soldiers if
the sequestration's caps remain in place. If sequestration remains in
place, would the Marine Corps have to make additional end strength
cuts?
General Amos. We will not have a definitive answer to this question
until DOD completes its Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR)
of our current National Defense Strategy and analysis of a range of
potential budget cuts. Depending upon where the Department weights its
effort, 182,100 may or may not be sustainable. We continue to believe
that the Nation needs a ready crises response force that is forward
deployed and forward engaged. The President's current National Defense
Strategy which rebalances our forces towards the Asia-Pacific theater
is suited to the capabilities and strengths of your Marine Corps. If
the Marine Corps' budget is further reduced below current Budget
Control Act levels, we will have to look at reducing forces below
182,100. Determining how much below 182,100 will again depend on how
much the Marine Corps is required to reduce their budget based on
decisions that result from the SCMR.

NAVY CREW SWAPS

8. Senator Manchin. Admiral Greenert, the respected defense expert,
Michael O'Hanlon, suggested that the Navy could save about $2 billion
per year by employing crew swaps. He stated, ``by keeping a given ship
abroad for roughly 2 years and having two or three crews share that
vessel overseas, the Navy can do more with less. In fact, it can
accomplish with about 3.5 ships, on average, what previously might have
required 5.'' What do you think about using crew rotation as a means to
do more with less?
Admiral Greenert. I agree that using crew rotation can help us
achieve more forward presence more efficiently. The Navy and Marine
Corps are our Nation's ``away team'' and history demonstrates the Navy
is at its best when we are forward and ready to respond where it
matters, when it matters.
In order to maximize forward presence within resource constraints,
we have explored the use of different manning (rotational crews and
active duty/civilian mariner mixed crews) and basing (Forward Deployed
and Forward Stationed Naval Forces) models.
When part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF), ships,
aircraft, crews, and their families all reside in the host nation, such
as Japan, South Korea, Spain, or Italy. As your question referenced, it
typically requires at least four ships from the continental United
States (CONUS) to keep one forward: one ship is deployed, one is
returning, one is on its way forward and one is in deep maintenance.
For example, today we designate about 10 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers
deploying from Norfolk and Mayport to provide two in the Eastern
Mediterranean for missile defense to our European allies. In a few
years, we will cover the same mission with four destroyers based in
Rota, Spain, and, therefore, free up six destroyers to deploy to other
regions of the world. This is much more efficient than rotationally
deploying ships and aircraft from the CONUS. Similarly, we will soon
homeport another submarine Guam, providing the same presence as four
deploying from the West Coast. In addition, we will also transition
Minecounter Measure (MCM) and Patrol Coastal (PC) ships to the FDNF in
Bahrain.
Forward stationing and rotational crewing together provide more
than twice the forward presence as traditional models. We also deploy
Forward Operating Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships such as Mobile
Landing Platforms, Joint High Speed Vessels, Combat Logistics Forces
and Afloat Forward Staging Bases. These Forward Operating ships remain
forward overseas almost continuously and employ rotating crews of
civilian mariners augmented by rotating military detachments.
Each of these models that keep ships and aircraft forward enable
Navy to maximize the presence delivered by the fleet. Each ship kept
forward using one of these models provides the same presence of about
four ships rotationally deploying from CONUS. These models all depend
on U.S. bases overseas (such as in Hawaii and Guam) as well as places
overseas, which are allied and partner nation facilities such as
Singapore, Japan, and Rota, Spain, that are available for the use of
our deployed forces. Bases and places enable our deployed forces to
rest, repair, resupply, and refuel overseas and reduce the need for
rotational deployments from CONUS.

ALLEGANY BALLISTICS LABORATORY

9. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, I want to commend the Navy for
being responsive to my colleague, Senator Rockefeller, and myself last
year, when you examined the data center and information technology
capabilities at the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) in Rocket
Center, WV. In particular, I note that you wrote to Senator Rockefeller
on May 21, 2012, that ABL was being seriously considered for the
designation as a Naval Enterprise Data Center. I also understand that
recently ABL has been slated to be a research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) hub for Navy information technology. Can you give me
an update on that?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy is planning to include ABL as a part of our
long-term Data Center Hosting options for the RDT&E environment. Our
ongoing focus in Data Center Consolidation has been to close and
consolidate multiple domestic computing environments in accordance with
the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (OMB). The Navy is
considering using a portion of ABL as an RDT&E hub for the east coast.
We will also designate a facility to be our RDT&E hub for the west
coast. Plans for establishing these Navy hubs are currently in
development.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS

10. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, I am concerned about the
potential impact of civilian furloughs on the Navy's critically
important family support programs. If furloughs take place, do you
expect any cutbacks in your operating hours at commissaries, exchanges,
and child development centers or curtailment of morale, welfare, and
recreation, Department of Defense Education Agency programs, transition
assistants programs, or military spouse employment programs?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy provided input to the Secretary of Defense
regarding possible ways to deal with the current budget crisis caused
by sequestration. After consideration of the Navy's and the other
Services' proposed options and alternatives, the Secretary of Defense
announced the decision to furlough DOD civilian employees with a
limited number of approved exemptions. The Navy is implementing that
decision and continues to work with the Secretary of Defense to find
ways to mitigate against the negative implications of sequestration on
family support programs.
As a result of sequestration, most Commissary stores will close on
Mondays. Overseas commissaries staffed primarily with foreign nationals
will remain open. The Defense Commissary Agency Headquarters also plans
to close every Monday.
Furlough will have minimal impact on Spouse Employment and
Transition Assistance Programs (TAP). Furlough days for employees at
delivery points will be rotated to ensure support is provided to Navy
families.
The civilian furlough will not impact Navy child care programs. The
majority of Navy child care workers are non-appropriated funded (NAF)
personnel and therefore not subject to furlough. Additionally,
appropriated funded personnel who provide direct caregiving have been
exempted from furlough.
The majority of morale, welfare, and recreation employees are NAF
personnel; accordingly reductions or curtailment of programs and
services due to the civilian furlough are not anticipated. Morale,
welfare, and recreation programs and services have already been reduced
at most Navy installations due to sequestration and further reductions
are not anticipated due to the furlough.
Navy exchanges employ non-appropriated fund personnel, therefore
the civilian furlough will not impact operating hours. There are no
plans to change operating hours at any Navy Exchange or Navy Lodge.

11. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, if civilian furloughs, in
response to sequestration, impact the mission of the military entrance
processing stations, then what options does the Navy have to ensure
your recruit accessions are not disrupted?
Mr. Mabus. Marine Corps - All Service recruiting will be impacted
by civilian furloughs at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS);
because 80 percent of MEPS personnel are civilians. The possible
civilian furlough reduces their available processing capacity.
Implementation of a 4-day processing week would likely degrade our
accession efforts.
Navy - Navy ships its recruits from Monday through Thursday. We
anticipate the furlough would shut down MEPS processing on Friday only.
Therefore, Navy recruiting accession mission may not be impacted as a
result of planned MEPS furloughs in fiscal year 2013. However, with the
planned 11-day MEPCOM furlough, Navy recruiting would experience a new
contract mission shortfall of approximately 2,900 total new contracts
for both Active component (AC) and Non-Prior Service Reserve component
(RC). This shortfall represents approximately 15 percent of the
remaining fiscal year 2013 new contract mission of 19,675 (AC/RC). This
shortfall would result in a 5 percent decrease in the Delayed Entry
Program (DEP) posture for the beginning of fiscal year 2014. The
reduction of the DEP posture from a target of 50 percent will increase
our new contract mission for fiscal year 2014. However, we anticipate
meeting our accession mission in fiscal year 2014. If MEPCOM furloughs
continue into fiscal year 2014, MEPS capacity to process new contracts
will be restricted and Navy's accession mission could be at moderate
risk.

NAVY'S LONG-TERM SHIPBUILDING PLAN

12. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, last year, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) issued a review of the Navy's 30-Year Shipbuilding
Plan. That review questioned the Navy's estimates that the cost for
new-ship construction under its plan would be $505 billion over 30
years, or an average of $16.8 billion per year. In contrast, CBO
estimated that the Navy's intended new-ship construction would cost
$599 billion over 30 years, or an average of $20.0 billion per year.
Even with these estimates, CBO concluded that the Navy's 2013 plan
would fall short of meeting the Service's inventory goals for
destroyers, attack submarines, and ballistic missile submarines. In
addition, CBO's estimate of $20.0 billion per year for new-ship
construction in the Navy's 2013 shipbuilding plan is about 40 percent
above the historical average funding of $14.3 billion. As of this
hearing, we have not received an updated 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan this
year that was supposed to accompany the President's budget. Will the
Navy's updated plan for a 306-ship Navy reconcile differences in cost
estimates with CBO?
Mr. Mabus. Yes. The differences between the Navy and CBO estimates
is caused by different cost estimating methods, assumptions about
design and capabilities of future ships, and inflation indices.
The cost estimates in the Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan are
consistent with the estimates in previous plans. Cost estimates in
Navy's shipbuilding reports are inflation-adjusted to constant-year
dollars using the ship composite inflation rate which captures the
historical increases in shipbuilding costs. This rate is typically 1.5
to 1.8 percent higher than the general inflation rate of the U.S.
economy as a whole. CBO's estimates use this rate, but also inflate
costs by market inflation rates, which Navy considers double-counting
the effect of inflation.

13. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what is the Navy's plan to
address CBO's concerns for goals related to destroyers and attack
submarines?
Mr. Mabus. The need to recapitalize our Fleet Ballistic Missile
Submarine force will cause significant and noteworthy risks to the
Navy's overall shipbuilding plan. The Navy will try to maintain
destroyer and submarine requirement goals through calculated
procurements, cost reductions in the Ohio replacement SSBN and other
ship programs, ship retention for the expected service life, and
targeted service life extensions.
The Navy plans to procure 33 Virginia-class SSNs from fiscal year
2014 to fiscal year 2033. This will result in attack submarines falling
to a low of 42 ships in fiscal year 2029--6 boats below the current
planning requirement--before rising to 48 in fiscal year 2035 and
remaining at or above the requirement for the rest of the 30-year
period.
A particular planning concern is the Large Surface Combatant (LSC)
force and the impact Ohio replacement SSBN funding will have on it. The
Navy's Shipbuilding plan procures 66 LSCs which will reduce the effect
of the retiring CG-47-class cruisers in the mid-2020s and the large
number of retiring legacy DDGs in the late 2020s and early 2030s.
Additionally, the Navy has extended the service lives of all Flight IIA
DDG-51s to 40 years to reduce the impact on LSC force structure. Even
with this measure, the LSC inventory will fall to a low of 80 ships in
fiscal year 2034--8 below the current planning requirement--before
rising to 88 LSCs in fiscal year 2038.
An important point is ``not all ship types are equal in
importance''; we will build and integrate ship types based on the
capability each provides, the evolving global situation, payload
integration, and other key factors. For example, the plan attempts to
balance shortfalls in large surface combatants, amphibious warfare
ships, and attack submarines until the Force Structure Assessment (FSA)
(by ship type) requirement is reached. It is a complex balance of
platforms, payloads, capacity, and capability.
All of these measures will help maintain the size of the battle
force inventory at about 300 ships during the procurement of the Ohio
replacement SSBN and the heavy ship retirement period expected in the
2020s and 2030s. However, even after all of these measures are taken,
executing the build plan with expected future resources will present a
planning and resource challenge.

14. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, how will the full funding of a
replacement ballistic missile defense submarine affect the Navy's
shipbuilding plan?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy will encounter several challenges in executing
this shipbuilding plan; perhaps the most important is funding and
delivering the Ohio replacement program SSBN. The Ohio replacement SSBN
is projected to cost about $6 billion (fiscal year 2013 constant
dollars) each. Therefore, during the procurement and construction of
Ohio replacement SSBN between fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2035, an
average of $19.2 billion per year is projected to be required for
shipbuilding, which will be a key resourcing challenge for the
Department.
If Navy funds the Ohio replacement SSBN from within its own
resources, Ohio replacement SSBN construction will take away from
construction of other ships in the battle force such as attack
submarines, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and amphibious warfare
ships. The resulting battle force will not meet the requirements of the
Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and will therefore not be sufficient
to implement the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). In addition, there
will be significant impact to the shipbuilding industrial base.

15. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, how will the sequestration of
funds in fiscal year 2014 affect the Navy's shipbuilding plan?
Mr. Mabus. I am committed to the successful execution of the Navy's
shipbuilding plan, and I'm doing my best to ensure that we continue to
build the fleet. We have 53 ships under contract today, 47 of which
were contracted since I took office, and our current shipbuilding plan
puts us on track for 300 ships in the fleet by 2019. However, the Navy
shipbuilding plan is underpinned by the assumptions, that funding: will
be sustained at the fiscal year 2014 President's budget level through
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), will be increased during
recapitalization of the Ohio-class submarines, and will be sustained at
the appropriate levels (likely higher than current historical average)
for the remainder of a 30-year period.
The Navy is concerned that sequestration poses significant risks
upon these underlying assumptions and therefore upon the size of our
fleet. This was highlighted by the Navy's determination to balance
fleet wholeness with the constraints of the budget. The Department is
currently assessing the impact of sequestration on its shipbuilding
goals as part of the SCMR, which is designed to factor in defense-wide
budget cuts and its impact on the DSG. Upon completion of the review,
we will balance the level of risk across warfighting and support
capabilities for the full range of potential military operations and
prioritize procurements to meet the capabilities and capacities to
achieve this balance.
Ultimately, in the event of full sequestration, the Navy's fiscal
year 2014 shipbuilding plan will need to be reexamined. Under such
circumstances, and in keeping with our shared responsibility for a Navy
which provides for the Nation's security, the Department will work
closely with Congress in determining the naval force the Nation can
best afford.

16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, how would you assess the
current readiness of the amphibious fleet to meet Marine Corps
deployment requirements?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy remains committed to providing sufficient
amphibious warships for day-to-day presence as well as large-scale
expeditionary operations. The Navy stands aligned with the Marine Corps
on the fiscally-constrained requirement for 33 amphibious warships.
This provides 30 operationally-available amphibious ships to meet Naval
and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) amphibious embarkation demand
requirements. Although our current amphibious inventory stands at 30
ships, the Navy continues to meet Navy and MAGTF deployment schedules
with a higher than normal OPTEMPO. Going forward, the shipbuilding
program described in the fiscal year 2014 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
builds and maintains a battle force of at least 31 amphibious ships by
fiscal year 2018 and achieves 33 amphibious ships in the required 11/
11/11 mix no later than fiscal year 2025.

COSTS FOR CVN-78 AIRCRAFT CARRIER

17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2014 includes a legislative proposal to amend the cost
cap for the first Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN-78), currently under
construction from $11.8 billion to $12.9 billion. As you know, the CVN-
78 is the first of three ships in the Navy's new USS Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78)-class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The next carrier,
CVN-79, is now estimated to cost the Navy $11.3 billion. Are the costs
and schedule for the CVN-78 under control?
Mr. Mabus. The cost for CVN-78 has stabilized at $12.887 billion.
Similarly, schedule performance has also stabilized, holding a constant
4-month variance to launch for the past few years. This delay in the
launch date will allow increased outfitting of the ship while still on
land, which is a key aspect in controlling the cost. CVN-78 is now
scheduled to launch in November of this year and deliver no later than
second quarter of fiscal year 2016. A detailed summary of the cost
control measures for CVN-78 and CVN-79 is attached in the Report to
Congress I provided in May of this year.

18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what challenges remain to
deliver the CVN-78 to the fleet?
Mr. Mabus. The biggest challenge to delivery of CVN-78 to the fleet
is completion of the test program for new development items aboard the
ship. The primary developmental systems include Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System (EMAL), Dual Band Radar (DBR), and Advanced
Arresting Gear (AAG). As these are new technologies employed on the
Ford, the first of the CVN-78 class, there are system integration risks
with initial operation of these systems. To mitigate these first time
integration risks, the Navy conducts land-based testing of these
systems at Wallops Island (DBR) and Lakehurst (EMALS and AAG) prior to
shipboard installation; however, there likely will still be interface
issues that need to be addressed after full integration with other
ship's systems during testing prior to ship delivery.

19. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, how will sequestration in
fiscal year 2013 affect the delivery schedule?
Mr. Mabus. Fiscal year 2013 sequestration had no impact on the CVN-
78 delivery schedule.

20. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, how would the sequestration of
defense funds in fiscal year 2014 affect the Ford-class acquisition
program?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy is examining the impacts of sequestration in
fiscal year 2014, in conjunction with the Department's broader SCMR
effort. The impacts to specific programs have not yet been determined.

21. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, given the current budget
reality, how realistic is it that we be able to build and maintain 11
carriers?
Admiral Greenert. Navy remains committed to maintaining a force
structure of 11 aircraft carriers, as reflected in the fiscal year 2014
Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels submitted to Congress
in May 2013. The 11-carrier force structure represents a balanced
approach to best support a forward naval posture capable of meeting
warfighting and peacetime requirements. Delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) in fiscal year 2016 returns the carrier fleet to 11 aircraft
carriers as statutorily established in 10 U.S.C. 5062(b). A combination
of new carrier construction and the recapitalization of Nimitz-class
carriers through the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) program will
maintain the carrier force structure at 11 ships through 2039.
Continuing sequestration will remain the biggest challenge to
executing this plan in the near term. Navy is aggressively pursuing
cost-cutting initiatives to reduce the cost of subsequent Ford-class
carriers. Initiatives include:

Applying lessons learned from the construction of the
first-of-class CVN-78; and
Building follow-ships at regular intervals for a
stable industrial base.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS

22. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, the Concept of Operations for
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) called for one ship with multiple
mission modules to replace 30 FFG-7 frigates, 14 Avenger-class MCM
vessels, and 12 MHC coastal mine hunters, for a total of 56 vessels.
The current plan calls for the purchase of 52 LCSs, which will
eventually comprise one-third of the entire Navy's surface combatant
fleet. While the price per ship has increased by over 60 percent since
inception, recent concerns have been raised within the Navy about the
LCS's capabilities as compared to legacy systems as well as concerns
about survivability, adequate manning, endurance, and the ship's
ability to meet warfighter requirements. In how many core missions of
the sea service's Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is the
LCS likely to succeed?
Admiral Greenert. LCS, as seen in her initial operations, is
performing as expected, and is likely to succeed in all of the core
missions outlined in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. In terms of price, the LCS and its mission modules are about
the same (in inflation-adjusted terms) as when originally proposed.
While the seaframes are more expensive than planned, the mission
modules are less costly than expected.

Forward Presence:
LCS has already deployed and commenced forward operations out of
Singapore. USS Freedom (LCS-1) deployed from San Diego on March 1,
2013, and will conduct multi-lateral exercises, port visits,
humanitarian assistance, and counter-piracy operations with partner
nations in Southeast Asia over the next several months. LCS deployments
will alleviate the operational burden on our forward deployed surface
forces based in Japan. When the LCS program reaches maturity, much of
the class will operate forward from places such as Singapore, Bahrain,
and Sasebo, as well as throughout the U.S. European Command, U.S.
Africa Command, and U.S. Southern Command Areas of Responsibility
(AORs).

Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, and Maritime Security:
LCS, by virtue of its flexible capabilities and sheer numbers, is
ideal for deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime
security operations. The modular design allows operational commanders
to tailor LCS to execute Surface Warfare (SUW), MCM, and Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) missions. LCS' high speed will allow it to quickly arrive
on station, in numbers, to project power and serve as a credible
deterrent.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response:
LCS's speed and agility provide limited noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO) capability, and the shallow draft allows these ships
to enter austere ports that larger vessels could not safely navigate.
LCS can be customized to rapidly support Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Response missions. The large mission bays which normally
support SUW, MCM, and ASW mission packages can be used to transport
disaster relief supplies and can support evacuees for short durations.

23. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, is the Navy trying to find a
mission for the LCS rather than working to meet the original concept of
operations?
Admiral Greenert. No. Since the LCS program was announced on
November 1, 2001, LCS has continued to meet and expand on the original
concept of operations. LCS was conceived as an integral part of a new
battle force architecture based on an essential need for a new
generation of ``focused mission'' multi-role surface combatants
optimized for operations near land. This capability is precisely what
the Department of the Navy has received with LCS.
LCS's concept of operations calls for LCS to operate in contested
littorals to address three major anti-access threats which are
documented joint capability gaps: swarming fast attack craft/fast
inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC), diesel submarines, and maritime mines.
LCS's high speed, maneuverability, shallow draft, networked sensors,
and readily exchangeable mission packages are specifically intended to
allow LCS to counter these threats and assure access to the littorals.

24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, in your professional
assessment, does the LCS offer combatant commanders increased combat
capabilities for the three missions assigned (SUW, MCM, and ASW) as
compared to the legacy systems it is replacing?
Admiral Greenert. The LCS and Mission Packages (MP) will provide
greater combat capabilities compared to the legacy systems in today's
Navy. LCS will assure access for joint operations through SUW, MCM, and
ASW.
LCS embarked with the MCM MP will provide greater mine hunting
capability per ship than current platforms. The MCM MP will provide
capabilities to counter deep, shallow, floating, tethered, bottom, and
buried mines. Using systems deployed from off-board manned and unmanned
vehicles. The MCM MP also represents a significant tactical change by
emphasizing the use of off-board assets, ensuring LCS and the crew will
operate outside of mine danger areas.
LCS embarked with the SUW MP will have greater capability against
highly maneuverable small surface craft than any of the ships they are
replacing. Compared to a Frigate or Patrol Craft, LCS with a SUW MP
embarked will have more guns (one 57mm + two 30mm) as well as a surface
to surface missile capability and an embarked armed helicopter. These
combined systems will provide the required volume and depth of fire
required to defeat swarms of small littoral surface threats. Combined
with maneuvering speeds in excess of 40 knots, LCS is a very adept SUW
ship for the missions it was designed to execute.
LCS with the ASW MP will feature proven and effective anti-
submarine technologies. LCS will provide greater detection capability
than legacy systems.

25. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, how would you assess the
LCS's core defensive capabilities, especially against air threats, when
employed in the littorals during elevated threat environments?
Admiral Greenert. I am very confident the LCS can defend herself.
Even without the mission modules on board, the ship still has core
capabilities for self defense, air defense, surveillance, search and
rescue, and boarding capabilities.
LCS can operate independently in low- to medium-threat
environments. LCS will use its speed, organic weapons (57mm gun and RAM
missile system), and sensors to counter surface and air threats in the
littorals. LCS has equal or greater self defense capability compared to
frigates, patrol craft, and MCM ships.
In situations where the threat of anti-ship missiles is high, LCS
will operate with a Strike Group or Air Defense ships. As a small
surface combatant, LCS is not designed to operate independently in a
high air threat environment without being networked into a larger
force.

26. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, how would you assess the
lethality of the LCS's SUW module as compared to other small surface
combatants that are predicted to be encountered in combat operations?
Admiral Greenert. During combat operations, the LCS is likely to
encounter large groups of small FIAC or larger FAC. The typical FIAC is
a militarized commercial boat less than 50 feet long with limited open
water capability, with armament that typically consists of small
caliber machine guns, rocket launchers, man-portable air-defense
systems (MANPAD) and rocket propelled grenades (RPG). The typical FAC
is a designed military or militarized vessel greater than 50 feet long.
Armament can include anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), torpedoes, small
to medium caliber machine guns and MANPADs.
LCS, with the SUW MP embarked, is significantly more lethal than
both enemy FAC and FIAC. The 57 mm and 30 mm guns provide greater
engagement range and lethality than enemy counterparts, while the .50
cal machine guns provide close-in engagement capability. The Rolling
Airframe Missile (RAM) provides an anti-ship missile defense capability
far superior to that of enemy FAC/FIAC. LCS's embarked MH-60R provides
an armed helicopter capability which can engage FAC/FIAC while LCS
remains outside of enemy weapons engagement range. The Surface-to-
Surface Missile Module (SSMM) will initially provide a short range
counter-swarm capability, which will later be upgraded to an extended
range, more advanced missile capability. Further, LCS's speed in excess
of 40 knots, substantially greater than all other surface combatants,
allows LCS to quickly maneuver to engage or evade, as necessary, both
FAC and FIAC.
Additional information can be provided at the SECRET level.

27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, when fully employed, will the
LCS drive greater demands on crews, shore maintenance, and logistical
support than the legacy systems it is replacing, and if so, are the
greater demands sustainable?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is taking steps to ensure the demands LCS
places on crews, shore maintenance, and logistical support are
sustainable.
Although LCS operates with a core crew one-fourth to one-fifth the
size of other Navy ships, it must execute similar administrative,
operational, and sustainment processes. The LCS Squadron (LCSRON) and
other organizations serve as extensions of the crew ashore, enabled by
distance support methods and techniques. LCSRON ONE has been
established in San Diego, CA, to provide this required support to the
first ships that will homeport on the west coast. LCSRON TWO will be
established in Mayport, FL, to support future LCS operations on the
east coast. The LCSRON provides administrative and personnel support
far beyond other surface ship Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC)
staffs.
Distance support is provided by U.S. based military, government
civilian, and contractor personnel who monitor equipment logs, conduct
trend analysis, and provide recommendations for shipboard and fly away
maintenance. A small operational staff in Singapore serves as a
Maritime Staff Element (MSE) and maintains operational oversight of
Freedom while deployed. This staff is unique to Singapore, and will
eventually oversee all four ships that will operate from that forward
operating station.

28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, given the difference in hull
designs and ship systems, will the LCS require ship crews to become
increasingly reliant on Navy shore facilities and private contractors
to help them cope with a variety of non-standard systems?
Admiral Greenert. While there are two distinctive LCS hull designs,
the systems aboard the ship are not non-standard systems. LCS sailors
are trained extensively on their respective variant of ship and are
intimately familiar with the systems they will operate and maintain.
While a significant portion of planned maintenance will be
conducted by off-ship personnel due to the relatively small size of LCS
crews, each ship's core crew conducts maintenance on ship systems
similar to what is done on other Navy ships. Core crews typically are
assigned planned maintenance with a monthly or less periodicity
requirement and also all situational maintenance required to conduct
safe operations (e.g. operational tests or configuration of critical
equipment prior to use). Condition-based maintenance (CBM) will also
reduce the planned maintenance required on ship systems by determining
when maintenance is actually required based on data points collected
within the system vice being based on a pre-determined periodicity.

29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, are you concerned about the
ship's endurance at sea in terms of maintenance, fuel usage, and
sustainment of crew and mission modules?
Admiral Greenert. I am not concerned about LCS's endurance at sea.
In fact, combatant commanders will enjoy greater operational
availability from LCS due to its ability to consistently remain in
theatre. A single LCS will remain forward deployed for long periods of
time without executing lengthy transits from homeport and its range and
endurance support the full scope of operations which are being
performed by legacy platforms. The ships will deploy from homeport for
16 months and crews will be swapped during the deployment at 4 month
intervals. The ships will return to homeport every 16 months for a
depot maintenance period, during which the ship be unavailable for
tasking. While deployed, LCS will be able to execute 25 day patrols,
followed by 5 day inport maintenance periods, as well as a quarterly
maintenance period during which the ship remains available for surge
operations.

30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, are you comfortable with the
Navy eventually relying on the LCS for a third of its surface combatant
fleet?
Admiral Greenert. I am comfortable with relying on the LCS as a
third of our surface combatant fleet. The Fleet's capability is a
function of platforms, payloads, and networks. It is not a linear
extrapolation of individual ships' capabilities. Numbers matter;
however it is the capability defined by the systems' synergy that
matters most. LCS makes a significant contribution to this synergy with
its ability to employ payloads that can rapidly evolve in capability.
LCS represents an innovative approach that does not entirely lend
itself to comparisons with traditional shipbuilding programs. LCS will
initially provide essential combat capability in three mission areas--
SUW, MCM, and ASW. These payloads will deliver improvements over the
capability resident in the platforms LCS is replacing in the Fleet, and
they will continue to evolve going forward. Payloads for other mission
areas may also be deployed in the future.

NAVY MISHAPS

31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, there seems to have been a
proliferation of Class A mishaps in the Navy since 2011, each of which
has caused more than $2 million in damage to the vessel. In January
2013, Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command,
reported an $850 million unforecasted maintenance bill, which just
compounds the budget woes for the Navy. I am most concerned about the
complete loss and decommissioning of a critical asset for the Navy, the
USS Guardian, (one of our Avenger-class MCM ships). Do you see any
trends developing in the results of the mishap investigations?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is assessing whether there are common
readiness trends that could be corrected to prevent future incidents.
In the past 2 years, the primary causes for ship groundings and
collisions have been:

1. Failure to follow procedures,
2. Lack of knowledge or understanding, and
3. Poor communication.

The USS Guardian mishap included all of these causal factors and is
part of the analysis Navy is conducting.

32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, I have heard about faulty
charts, but that's what seamanship is supposed to counter. What caused
the loss of the USS Guardian?
Admiral Greenert. This mishap was preventable and was the product
of poor voyage planning and poor execution by Guardian leadership. The
investigation uncovered no single point of failure; instead, there were
numerous links in the error chain leading up to the grounding. Had any
one of these been appropriately addressed, the grounding would have
been prevented. Guardian leadership and watch teams failed to adhere to
prudent, safe, and sound navigation principles which would have alerted
them to approaching dangers with sufficient time to take mitigating
action.

33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, are we starting to see the
signs of a strained force in the Navy?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is currently meeting adjudicated Global
Force Management (GFM) commitments to the maximum extent possible,
despite budgetary impacts to operations, maintenance, and training.
Maintenance and training are the foundation of Navy's Fleet
Response Plan. Navy is deferring and curtailing both maintenance and
training to meet Secretary of Defense adjudicated presence requirements
under the current budgetary shortfalls.
The impact of reduced fleet training and maintenance will be less
surge capacity, but we will retain the ability to support the fiscal
year 2014 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). All our
forces deploying in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, including
two carrier strike groups (CSG) and two amphibious ready groups (ARG)
(one each in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific), will be fully
mission-capable and certified for Major Combat Operations. For surge,
we will retain one additional CSG and ARG in the United States that are
fully mission-capable, certified for Major Combat Operations and
available to deploy within 1 to 2 weeks. This is about one-third of our
normal surge capacity. Overall, due to reduced training and
maintenance, about two-third of the fleet will be less than fully
mission capable and not certified for Major Combat Operations.
Historically, about half of our fleet is in this status, since ships
and squadrons are in training or maintenance preparing for their next
deployment.

34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, is there a problem with the
maintenance and operating condition of ship systems?
Admiral Greenert. No. While Navy has made several unbudgeted and
unscheduled ship repairs in recent years stemming from unexpected at-
sea accidents, none of them were caused by problems with ship
maintenance or the operating condition of ship systems.

DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS

35. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, it is unconscionable that
servicemembers must wait many months to receive a disability
determination from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). While DOD
and VA have made some progress in decreasing the amount of time it
takes to get disability claims completed in the Integrated Disability
Evaluation System (IDES), more work must be done. Do you believe the VA
is doing all that it can do to decrease the amount of time for
disability case reviews and claims adjudication?
Mr. Mabus. The delays in case review and adjudication are
unacceptably long. At the same time, VA is coping with an enormous
increase in claims being filed. We are very supportive of our VA
partners in helping to decrease their disability case review and
adjudication backlog. The Department of the Navy is moving ahead to
support the VA's request to certify the Service Treatment Record
completeness when forwarding for disability claim reviews. This will
enhance the VA's ability for claim adjudication. Innovative solutions
are always possible and we stand ready to assist the VA as they explore
solutions for improvements.

36. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, does the VA need additional
resources to hire more claims adjudicators?
Mr. Mabus. The VA continues to balance their work force. We are
confident the VA presented their defensible resource requirements in
the President's budget.

PROTECTING PROSPECTIVE RECRUITS

37. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, a recent tragic case in
Maryland appears to have been a murder/suicide incident involving a
prospective recruit and recruiter. What guidance has the Navy provided
to ensure that prospective recruits and their parents or guardians are
fully aware of the limits for relationships with recruiters?
Mr. Mabus. Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) provides applicants
information on the first day of their enlistment into the Delayed Entry
Program (DEP) at MEPS. Additionally, recruiters and their supervisor
also provide the same information to the future sailor and their
parents or guardians during the 72-hour indoctrination. This policy is
included in the Enlisted and Officer Recruiting Manuals. NRC also has a
Fraternization Policy Acknowledgement that details the proper behaviors
of future sailors and recruiters, which all future sailors must read
and sign.
At the time of DEP enlistment, NRC provides all future sailors a
Standards, Transitions, Acknowledgements, Requirements, and Training
(START) Guide. Recruiters and immediate supervisors are required to
review the contents with each future sailor during the 72-hour
indoctrination. The START Guide contains information regarding Sexual
Harassment and Fraternization. Additionally, the START Guide lists
``Recruiter Prohibited Practices,'' which includes a prohibition on any
relationship other than a formal, professional relationship. Every Navy
recruiter business card contains the following personal pledge from
Commander, NRC: ``We at Navy Recruiting Command are committed to
professional, honest, and respectful treatment of every prospect and
applicant.'' Also included is the NRC headquarters number, which is
answered by Admiral Gay's personal staff.
Finally, NRC is completing an intensive, updated Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Delayed Entry Program (SAPR-D) video
presentation, which will be shown to every future sailor. It provides
training on the Navy's SAPR Program, fraternization and sexual
harassment policies. The video clearly articulates and emphasizes the
prospective sailor's rights and responses if they feel they have been
violated or mistreated.

38. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what information does the Navy
require to be provided to prospective recruits to ensure that they have
immediate access to assistance and intervention, if necessary, if they
believe a recruiter is intending to take improper advantage of them?
Mr. Mabus. Each Navy Recruiting Station has posters with Navy
Recruiting District points of contact if applicants or future sailors
have any issues during the recruiting process for which they desire
assistance from someone other than their recruiter. Posters include the
DOD Safe Helpline phone number and NRC Inspector General hotline
number. Every applicant receives a business card from their recruiter
that contains the recruiter's information on the front of the card and
the following personal pledge from Commander, Navy Recruiting Command
(CNRC) on the back: ``We at Navy Recruiting Command are committed to
professional, honest, and respectful treatment of every prospect and
applicant.'' Also included is CNRC phone number, which is answered by
Admiral Gay's personal staff. We provide additional information at the
time of Delayed Enlistment Program enrollment while at Military
Entrance Processing Station, and again during the 72-hour
indoctrination. Command Hotline and NRC Headquarters phone numbers are
provided.

SEXUAL ASSAULTS

39. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, DOD has told us they have
achieved full-deployment of the congressionally-mandated Defense Sexual
Assault Incident Database (DSAID). Is the Navy providing data to
populate the database?
Mr. Mabus. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps use DSAID as a
centralized, case-level, database for the collection and maintenance of
information regarding sexual assaults. All Navy and Marine Corps Sexual
Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) receive extensive DSAID training
and use DSAID as a case management system, entering information within
48 hours of a report of sexual assault (96 hours in deployed locations
presenting internet connectivity issues). DSAID includes available
information about the nature of assaults, demographic information,
services offered and disposition of reports. The Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) uploads final case disposition weekly into
DSAID.

40. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what information,
specifically, is this database providing Navy leadership concerning
sexual assault incidents?
Mr. Mabus. The DSAID is a centralized, case-level, database for the
collection and maintenance of information regarding sexual assaults,
which the Department of the Navy has been using since October 2012.
DSAID includes information about the nature of assaults, the victim,
services offered to the victim, the offender, and the disposition of
reports associated with the assault. Over time, as DSAID becomes
populated with more case data, it will increasingly provide the ability
to identify and manage trends, analyze risk factors or problematic
circumstances, and assist with actions and plans to mitigate risks.

41. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, when appearing before this committee, DOD witnesses described the
recently revised DOD-wide policy on the Sexual Assault Program to
standardize prevention, health care, victim safety, training and
response efforts, and to clearly convey the role of servicemembers and
employees in sexual assault prevention and recovery. I am concerned
that medical care providers were not fully aware of their obligations
concerning restricted reports, including the obligation to withhold
disclosure to the chain of command. What actions have been taken to
ensure standardization with respect to protecting the sanctity of
restricted reports?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
(BUMED) Instruction 6310.11A (Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Medical-Forensic Program) has been recently revised and signed on May
2, 2013. This policy establishes the training requirements for all
health care providers who will complete medical-forensic examinations.
A subset of the multi-disciplinary policy revision working group
has been convened to oversee and support implementation of policy
guidance. The training is 14 hours in length and in a standardized
format that supports health care providers in completing a Sexual
Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE), reviews the SAFE kit and contents,
chain of custody, preparing to be a factual witness and Navy specific
policy guidance and reporting options. Restricted reporting is
thoroughly covered in this training as well as the current medical
response training required of all Navy Medical Department personnel.
Documentation of completion is required and metrics have been
established to support tracking of training implementation.
General Amos. There are several directives that outline the
obligations regarding restricted reporting requirements for medical
care providers:

Marine Corps Order 1752.5B states: ``In cases where a
victim elects restricted reporting, the healthcare personnel
may not disclose confidential communication or SAFE Kit
information to law enforcement or command authorities.''
The Navy BUMED Instruction 6310.11 also defines the
elements of restricted reporting. It specifically states that,
under the circumstances of a restricted report, any details
provided to health care personnel will not be reported to law
enforcement to initiate the official investigative process
unless the victim consents.
BUMED Instruction 6310.11 also mandates that general
health care personnel receive initial and annual refresher
training on sexual assault response policies, including
confidentiality policy rules and limitations. It also specifies
that all health care personnel understand the difference
between restricted and unrestricted reporting.
BUMED Instruction 6310.11 contains a procedures
checklist for SAFEs to be used by health care personnel. The
checklist is used to verify that in the event a victim chooses
the restricted reporting option that neither the military
criminal investigation organization nor the victim's chain of
command has been notified.
States vary in their medical personnel reporting
requirements. California, for example mandates that medical
personnel report incidents of sexual assault to local
authorities. As a result of this requirement, victims are
informed of those limitations by their Victim Advocate.

All SAPR personnel throughout the Marine Corps must complete 40
hours of standardized advocacy training to be credentialed and must
complete 16 hours of continued education on an annual basis to maintain
their credentials. Marine Corps health care personnel must likewise
complete initial and annual refresher training specific to sexual
assault victim response. All training for SAPR and healthcare personnel
provides restricted reporting protocol, highlighting the applicable
directives to ensure that such cases are handled appropriately.

42. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what additional challenges do you see in attaining the required
level of standardization?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Each Military Service has a unique
culture and operating environment. Beyond that, sexual assault
prevention, sexual assault victim support, and sexual assault criminal
investigations and prosecutions are overlapping but separate areas of
activity.
First, we need to better distinguish between specific activities
that should be performed in just about the same way everywhere, and
those where tailored approaches may be more effective. Sexual assault
victim support is a good example of the former--victims should expect
the same services everywhere. Sexual assault prevention is a good
example of the latter--the Services need flexibility to implement
strategies that work for them.
Second, we need to evolve beyond standardizing exactly how to do
things, and instead explore performance-based standards for key aspects
of our processes that are most important to those affected. That will
be hard work, and it will require genuine collaboration. For example,
we want to know what aspects of our victim support processes are most
important to victims themselves, so we can focus on making them more
personal and effective.
General Amos. There are always additional challenges with ensuring
that SAPR training is ongoing and up-to-date so that all personnel are
briefed on the latest and current policies and procedures. The Marine
Corps is continually assessing and updating its training and
outreaching to its commanders and SAPR leaders with the goal of making
sure our SAPR efforts are standardized.
The restricted reporting option is a standardized procedure known
by all SAPR and health care personnel throughout the Marine Corps. It
is a key concept of our 40 hours of standardized SARC and Victim
Advocates training. Restricted reporting is also integral to our Fleet
SAPR training. SARCs, Victim Advocates, and Uniformed Victim Advocates
inform all victims of the restricted reporting option, clearly
indicating that medical and counseling services are available to them
without requiring disclosure to their chain of command or law
enforcement.

43. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what additional tools does the Navy/Marine Corps need in order to
continue to reduce--with the goal of eliminating--sexual assault?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We need more expert resources for
the investigations of alleged sexual assault crimes. NCIS has come a
long way in the past several years. They have implemented impressive
special training, and they have hired criminal investigators with
civilian expertise, but the workload impact of new requirements to
investigate all alleged sexual assaults, regardless of severity, is
daunting.
We also need to establish new tailored programs for sailors and
marines who have been victims of sexual assault. We are in the early
stages of developing such programs. Sexual assault victims have an
especially high risk of re-victimization, and we must break that cycle
by providing peer support and personal tools to help them succeed and
fulfill their personal and professional goals without unduly labeling
them or undermining their performance of primary duties.
We are in the process of expanding across the entire Navy
Department best practices from local pilot projects involving focused,
synchronous, SAPR efforts. We must maintain visible and consistent
senior leadership engagement working across organizational boundaries
to change our culture and reshape the attitudes and behaviors of our
sailors and marines. It will require dogged commitment and perseverance
over a prolonged effort. Key to our success will be our ability to
partner across the Department of the Navy uniformed and civilian
leadership to identify common goals and standards while implementing
effective solutions that work in various settings and operating
environments.
General Amos. Eliminating sexual assault begins and ends with
engaged leadership. The main duties of a commander regarding sexual
assault are: preventing the crime by fostering a culture of dignity and
respect, remaining responsive to victims in need, and holding offenders
accountable. Aligned with the Joint Chiefs of Staff's five lines of
effort to combat sexual assault--prevention, victim advocacy,
investigation, accountability, and assessment--the Marine Corps' 2012
SAPR Campaign Plan emphasizes leadership engagement. Commanders must
remain engaged, as they serve as our greatest tool to reduce sexual
assault. To alter or remove the commander's role goes against our
mission to influence Marine Corps culture from the top down and to
establish an environment of respect and trust.
To further support efforts to influence cultural change, I have
directed a new command climate survey to be administered within 30 days
of a new commander taking command and again a year after taking
command. Designed to measure the health of a particular command, the
survey will cover a spectrum of issues, including sexual assault, and
will be integrated with our ongoing efforts to stop all behavior-
related offenses, including sexual harassment, hazing, and alcohol
misuse. Giving commanders this tool and holding them accountable for
the overall health and well-being of their command will help us
mitigate the high-risk behaviors that tear at the fabric of the Corps.

44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, some have
suggested that it would be appropriate to incorporate standardized
assessments of commanders' performance in prevention, investigation,
accountability, advocacy, and assessment of sexual assault response and
prevention lines of effort. What is your assessment of the feasibility
of implementing commanders' performance in Service-specific performance
appraisals?
Admiral Greenert. We evaluate our commanders (and all officers) in
their regular fitness reports (performance evaluations used for
determination of advancement) in three areas: Command Climate/Equal
Opportunity, Leadership and in written summary, where documentation of
poor command climates would be listed. We hold our commanders
responsible and accountable when they do not meet acceptable standards.
We believe the current system adequately addresses the issue; however,
we routinely review the Navy fitness report system to ensure it
provides a comprehensive officer assessment consistent with the
prevailing needs of the Navy.
General Amos. The Marine Corps Fitness Report system provides the
official evaluation and record of an officer's performance and contains
a section entirely dedicated to leadership. This section evaluates the
commander's ability to set the example, communicate effectively,
provide direction, and motivate, which includes his or her ability to
develop, lead, and ensure the well-being of subordinates. Ensuring the
well-being of subordinates necessitates that officers demonstrate a
genuine concern for their safety--a characteristic rooted in the
defining Marine Corps values of honor, courage, and commitment. The
commander's efforts must enhance the concentration and focus of the
subordinate on unit mission accomplishment, which includes setting an
environment free of any criminal behaviors, such as sexual assault.
In line with the Secretary of Defense memorandum dated 6 May 2013,
the Marine Corps is exploring methods to assess the performance of our
commanders in establishing command climates that foster dignity and
respect. To this end, I directed the development of a new command
climate survey, administered within 30 days of a new commander taking
command and annually thereafter. Designed to measure the health of a
particular command, the survey covers a spectrum of issues and will be
integrated with the ongoing efforts to stop all behavior-related
offenses, including sexual harassment, assault, hazing and alcohol
misuse. Survey results must be provided for review to the next level up
in the chain of command.

45. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, the Annual Report on Sexual
Assault at the Service Academies revealed that many people who enter
the armed services have experienced and reported sexual assault or
unwanted sexual contact that occurred before they entered the Service
Academies or the armed services. What could the Navy be doing to
improve support to men and women in the accession process, to identify
whether individuals have experienced sexual assault?
Mr. Mabus. Navy has a thorough application process, which includes
detailed medical screening of applicants at MEPS. Although not asked
explicitly, applicants are questioned by MEPS Chief Medical Officers
using a Supplemental Health Screening Questionnaire to determine if
they have experienced any significant abusive events in their life. To
improve support for men and women during the accession process, NRC has
developed training focused specifically to indoctrinate them on
military SAPR policies, to help prevent sexual harassment and assault,
and to provide them with guidance and procedures in the event of an
incident. In addition to this mandatory training, there is a wide
variety of products and resources (e.g., videos, posters, and
brochures) recruiters use for local training programs and to increase
awareness with the future sailors in the Delayed Entry Program.
The U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) also has a thorough application
process, which includes medical screening of applicants. USNA ensures
that each entering Midshipman is made aware of the Academy's SAPR
Office services, including medical, counseling and advocacy, and legal
assistance. All incoming plebes receive a SAPR indoctrination brief
within 14 days of arrival. This session includes an in-depth overview
of the USNA SAPR Program; a discussion on sexual assault, consent,
types of reports, and services available; and emphasizes that these
services are available regardless of when they experienced the sexual
assault. Academy SAPR staff follow up with plebes, conduct refresher
training, answer questions, and again stress the availability of
services.
As a result of findings in the most recent Service Academy Gender
Relations survey, the USNA has implemented additional process changes
for the entering Class of 2017 that will arrive this June.
Specifically, during the Indoctrination-Day check-in, each Midshipman
4th Class (MIDN 4/C) will be asked in a confidential setting if they
have experienced sexual assault prior to entering the Academy.
Regardless of response, each MIDN 4/C will receive a data sheet
identifying available services and points of contact, should they
desire to use them. This information will provide the SAPR Office and
chain-of-command with real-time data on MIDN 4/C who admit experiencing
pre-service incidents, as well as provide the Class of 2017 information
they can use to access services discreetly.
Navy is sensitive to the fact that asking explicit questions
regarding sexual assault could lead to re-victimization of an
applicant, which is something that should be carefully avoided. DOD is
currently conducting a review of the applicant accessions process as
one aspect of the 2013 DOD SAPR Strategic Plan released by the
Secretary of Defense on May 6, 2013.

COMMAND CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS

46. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what percent of your commands conduct command climate
assessments?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Navy: All Commanders are required
to conduct a Command Climate Assessment within 90 days of taking
command and yearly thereafter. In fiscal year 2012, 90 percent of Navy
commands participated in the Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute Organizational Climate Survey, before the reporting system
failed on September 19, 2012. Following the system failure, surveys and
reporting continued throughout the year providing complete and accurate
assessments to higher headquarters. This online assessment system was
restored in January 2013. The DEOCS is just one portion of a Command
Climate Assessment (CCA). Echelon II commands are charged with tracking
their subordinate command's completion of the CCA. We entrust
Commanders to hold their Commanding Officers accountable for 100
percent completion of the CCA.
Marine Corps: 100 percent. All commands are required to conduct
climate assessments in accordance with current DOD, Navy, and Marine
Corps directives. A new command climate survey will be administered at
the battalion/squadron and regimental/group level in the first 30 days
of a new commander's tenure and annually thereafter. It is known that
at least two other surveys, Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute, Defense Equal Organizational Climate Survey, and the Ground
Climate Assessment Survey, are required in the first 90 days of a new
commander's tenure.
General Amos. 100 percent. All commands are required to conduct
climate assessments in accordance with current DOD, Navy, and Marine
Corps directives. A new command climate survey will be administered at
every battalion/squadron and regimental/group level in the first 30
days of a new commander's tenure and annually thereafter. It is known
that at least two other surveys, the Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute's Defense Equal Organizational Climate Survey and
the Ground Climate Assessment Survey, are required in the first 90 days
of a new commander's tenure.

47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what are the Navy/Marine Corps doing to improve the regularity of
command climate assessments?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Navy: Every commanding officer is
required to conduct a command climate assessment within 90 days of
taking command and annually thereafter. The Navy will continue to track
the completion of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
Organizational Climate Survey, by Echelon II command, on a quarterly
basis.
Marine Corps: Current changes in the command climate survey
requirements will result in commanders surveying their commands within
30 days via the Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey, and annually
thereafter. Results of the completed surveys will be provided to the
next higher level command.
General Amos. I have instituted a new command climate survey that
will be administered at every battalion/squadron and regimental/group
level in the first 30 days of a new commander's tenure and annually
thereafter. Additionally, two other surveys, the Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute, Defense Equal Organizational Climate
Survey and the Ground Climate Assessment Survey, are required in the
first 90 days of a new commander's tenure.

48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what are you doing to evaluate the results of the command climate
assessments to ensure necessary follow-up action?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Navy: Each ISIC ensures subordinate
commanders assess their command climate within 90 days of assuming
command with annual follow-up assessments during their command tenure.
Every commanding officer is required to provide an executive summary of
survey results and any intended actions within 60 days of completing a
command climate assessment. The ISIC also ensures necessary follow-up
action on the results of command climate assessments. Additionally, we
are constantly evaluating what we can do to increase the effectiveness
of our leaders in command. A working group has been assigned to
evaluate and make recommendations on expanding and reinforcing
supervisory command relationships. By identifying potential or ongoing
issues early, timely correction is likely to set conditions for a
successful command environment.
Marine Corps: The Commandant of the Marine Corps has directed new
command climate survey or assessment requirements to be administered
within 30 days of a new commander taking command and annually
thereafter, in order to continue fostering a positive climate within
each Marine Corps unit. The survey covers a spectrum of personnel
issues and will be closely integrated with ongoing efforts focused on
reducing all behavior-related offenses. The results of the surveys will
be measured in order to obtain accurate knowledge on the health of each
command. To assure accountability, the results of the surveys will be
briefed to the next higher headquarters. The Commandant's intent is to
provide commanding officers with the necessary tools to identify high-
risk behaviors and positively act on behalf of the health of their
commands.
General Amos. I directed our new command climate surveys to be
administered within 30 days of a new commander taking command and
annually thereafter, in order to continue fostering a positive climate
within each Marine Corps unit. The survey covers a spectrum of
personnel issues and will be closely integrated with ongoing efforts
focused on reducing all behavior-related offenses. The results of the
surveys will be measured in order to obtain accurate knowledge on the
health of each command. To assure accountability, the results of the
surveys will be briefed to the next higher headquarters. My intent is
to provide commanding officers with the necessary tools to identify
high-risk behaviors and positively act on behalf of the health of their
commands.

FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what is your assessment of the
performance of the Navy's Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy's Voting Assistance Program (VAP) has performed
above-and-beyond expectations; the program has met and surpassed
requirements and complies with the full intent of the law. The program
rapidly established all of the Installation Voter Assistance Offices
required by law in the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE)
Act, maintains a worldwide network of over 1,200 Voting Assistance
Officers, and provides innovative support and outreach to voters.
I concur with the assessment of both the Navy Inspector General and
the DOD Inspector General in their 2012 assessment of VAPs that the
Navy VAP is both compliant and effective. This assessment is also
supported by the FVAP's annual report to Congress that was written
after a DMDC survey of a wide range of stakeholders--including
servicemembers, their dependents, and Voting Assistance Officers.

50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what Navy-specific initiatives
have you implemented to improve compliance with FVAP and to maximize
the opportunity for servicemembers to exercise their right to vote?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy VAP engaged in a number of initiatives to
ensure that it was fully compliant with the FVAP and provide better-
than-ever service to absentee voters. Efforts included:

The full implementation of the MOVE Act by
establishing an Installation Voting Assistance (IVA) Office at
every Navy Installation. IVA Offices submit quarterly reports
detailing their assistance to voters. They also conducted a
wide range of awareness and outreach activities leading up to
the 2012 election on key emphasis dates coordinated by FVAP.
The engagement of senior leadership through three
NAVADMINs, Flag and SES Rhumb Lines, and MCPON newsletters.
Strengthening of command level VAPs through publishing
of the 2012 Navy Voting Action Plan and Voting Assistance
Toolkit that allowed Voting Assistance Officers every resource
needed.
Innovative marketing and awareness initiatives to
include the distribution of over 25,000 brochures and pocket
reference cards, 5,000 posters, base newspaper articles, voter
registration drives, public service announcements played at
base movie theaters, and Facebook marketing.
Voter and Voting Officer training including a
redesigned training curriculum for recruits at boot camp, the
roll-out of interactive Navy Knowledge Online courses for
Voting Officers, and numerous workshops and assist visits to
Installation Voter Assistance Offices.

The Navy took a holistic approach to ensure that voters were aware
of elections and their rights and afforded every opportunity to
register and vote absentee.

OPERATIONAL TEMPO

51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what is your assessment of the
Navy's operational tempo (OPTEMPO) reporting and how well are we
meeting our operational tempo requirements to reduce stress on our
servicemembers and their families?
Mr. Mabus. Navy has a good, robust mechanism in place to ensure
accurate reporting of its units' OPTEMPO and is in the process of
revising the instruction by which it governs the reporting of OPTEMPO
to increase reporting efficiency. In addition, every effort is made to
limit OPTEMPO violations to only emergent requirements.
Through the second quarter of fiscal year 2013, OPTEMPO violations
are down 31 percent from fiscal year 2012. This decrease shows a marked
improvement over the previous year, even as sequestration limits Navy's
capacity to meet all combatant commander demands.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE TRAINING

52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, military members with language
and culture training are essential to a U.S. global force. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 authorized the Secretary
of Defense to transform the National Language Service Corps (NLSC) from
a pilot program to a permanent program, and also to enhance the ability
of our Federal agencies to hire people with strategic foreign language
skills and as National Security Education Program awardees. What are
the Navy's goals with respect to the capabilities represented by the
NLSCs?
Mr. Mabus. Marine Corps - The Marine Corps recognizes the valuable
service provided by the NLSC. In fact, Marine Corps units have employed
NLSC services on several occasions for operational and exercise support
and foreign language instruction. As a matter of practice, however, the
Marine Corps will seek assistance from the NLSC only after all internal
Marine Corps options to satisfy language requirements could not be met
through organic Service capabilities. For this reason, the Marine Corps
has not set any specific parameters or goals for the employment of NLSC
services. Rather, the Marine Corps requests NLSC assistance on an ad
hoc basis similar to other language resources, including the National
Virtual Translation Center. The Marine Corps has implemented several
programs to increase foreign language capacity and capability within
its uniformed and civilian workforce, to include the Regional, Culture
and Language Familiarization program for Career Marines; expanding the
Foreign Area Officer program; and the creation of a Foreign Area
Specialist program for senior enlisted Marines.
Navy - Navy recognizes the broad range of language and culture
capabilities provided by the NLSC, and finds particular value in their
ability to satisfy short notice requirements. Navy has utilized NLSC
resources for both standard fleet operations and humanitarian missions.
NLSC personnel have served as interpreters/translators for
multinational maritime exercises when service personnel either were not
available or non-existent for the task.
In the future, Navy plans to formalize its process for filling ad
hoc requests for language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC)
support. To that end, and similar to Navy's employment of the National
Virtual Translation Center, the NLSC will be included as an option when
organic assets are unavailable or nonexistent. Therefore, the intent is
not to establish explicit, quantifiable goals for usage. Navy will
continue to train its own assets based on identified, validated, and
documented requirements. For ad hoc LREC support requests, Navy will
try to use sailors first and will consider other government options
afterwards. Navy is pursuing several initiatives to enhance LREC
capability within its force, but it is neither reasonable nor fiscally
sound to invest in LREC training and sustainment to meet all
contingency needs. Navy plans to coordinate as necessary with the
Defense Language and National Security Education Office on any
policies, procedures, or business practices to improve or better
utilize the NLSC.

MARKETING AND ADVERTISING

53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, one effect of sequestration
was that DOD quickly moved to end the Services' advertising, marketing,
and outreach programs that have been used to aid in recruiting. What is
your assessment of the value of funding these programs, and the
projected impact to recruiting, if these programs are not funded?
Mr. Mabus. Navy currently has an annual accession mission of over
45,000 officer and enlisted sailors with potential recruits dispersed
throughout the country. Recruiting quality individuals is the first
step in ensuring that we have intelligent, capable, high-quality people
in the future force. Paid advertising, marketing, and outreach are
critical components in our efforts to attain the proper recruiting mix.
Working together to inform the American public of opportunities
available in the Navy, they collectively communicate efficient and
effective messages that favorably impact recruiting mission and
contribute to end strength attainment in support of national security
objectives. Further reduction in marketing, advertising, and outreach
efforts and resourcing would clearly present challenges to future
accession goal attainment.
Specific impacts to recruiting are measured through leads and
contracts with direct linkage to advertising efforts. In fiscal year
2008, 44.7 percent of Navy accessions (20,218 contracts) originated
from advertising efforts. The national unemployment rate at that time
was 5.2 percent. As the unemployment rate declines, recruiters will
need more assistance from advertising-generated leads to meet accession
goals. With current levels of unemployment, 22.64 percent of contracts
(9,810) come from advertising. These are direct effects and do not
account for the indirect effects that advertising has on influencing
and reinforcing the joining behavior of our market.
Outreach programs, including Navy Weeks and Blue Angel appearances,
allow the American public to directly interact with Navy
representatives and afford them opportunities to observe examples of
the technology and equipment sailors use in the daily performance of
their duties around the world. These interactions prompt them to
consider military service.
The value in funding paid advertising and participating in outreach
events is derived from end strength requirements. Joint Advertising and
Marketing Research Studies (JAMRS) indicate that 53 percent of armed
forces accessions come from youth who, when asked if they would
consider joining the military, had previously indicated ``definitely
not'' or ``probably not''. Additionally, approximately 74 percent of
high quality applicants indicated they initiated first contact with a
recruiter. Advertising, marketing, and outreach events serve to drive
these initial interactions by creating awareness and a positive image
of the Navy and its career opportunities.
Marine Corps: In fiscal year 2012, 99.9 percent of Marine Corps
recruits were high school graduates and 74.8 percent scored in the
upper half of the written military entrance exam. The quality of our
applicants is higher than ever before. A critical requirement to
continued success is our recruit advertising program. Our advertising
program is used both strategically and tactically to deliver branded
communications to support Marines on recruiting duty, generate leads,
and create positive awareness that engages our prospect and influencer
audiences. In total, recruiting a quality and representative force
costs less than 1 percent of the Marine Corps' overall budget.
Recruiter success is inextricably linked to operational and advertising
support. Advertising creates awareness and drives consideration to
serve in the military--it produces leads. Advertising leads enable
recruiters to efficiently focus their prospecting activities.
Advertising dollars currently generate approximately 25 percent of all
new contracts (enlisted) through numerous avenues, such as television
commercials, enhanced area canvassing activities, and social media
outlets. A further loss of funding to advertising will ultimately lead
to increased stress and reduced quality-of-life for Marine Corps
Recruiters, most of whom currently work in excess of 60 hours per week.
If advertising spending is cut back too much when recruiting is strong,
potential long-term gain in awareness and propensity may be lost. The
dramatic advertising cutbacks between 1986 and 1993 coincided with a
considerable erosion of public awareness regarding military service.

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, DOD and VA have been working
on an integrated electronic health record (EHR) for a number of years
with very little progress being made towards a truly seamless
transition of health information between the two Departments. In
January 2013, VA decided to use VistA, its legacy system, as its core
health record, despite the findings of a recent study commissioned by
the VA that identified many VistA deficiencies. We've been told that
DOD has been evaluating existing solutions to determine the appropriate
core health record to use. Has DOD coordinated its proposed EHR program
with the Navy?
Mr. Mabus. Yes. DOD has coordinated with the Navy while analyzing
and determining requirements for a proposed EHR program. Our work with
DOD continues and we have participated in the review of the Request for
Information submissions which were publicly released on February 8,
2013.
I fully support the Secretary of Defense's strategy to acquire best
value and sustainable health information technology while ensuring
interoperability with the VA.

55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, how much will it cost for the
Navy to field a new EHR?
Mr. Mabus. The Services do not provide funding to this effort as
all funding is centrally managed through the DOD/VA Interagency Program
Office (IPO), the organization responsible for oversight and
coordination of DOD/VA information-sharing initiatives. In conjunction
with DOD, we remain focused on tri-service planning for the joint
deployment of an integrated EHR which achieves maximum economies of
scale, standardization of the business process of healthcare among the
Services, and interoperability with the VA.

56. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what impact do you anticipate
for the Navy's medical readiness?
Mr. Mabus. A new integrated EHR should enhance our ability to
assess medical readiness for our sailors and marines. While information
can currently be viewed via the Bidirectional Health Information
Exchange, a single integrated EHR will afford expanded access to the
source of that health information; permitting quicker assessment and
care coordination among healthcare providers. This capability will
improve the continuity of care and further support our priority of
promoting and protecting the health of our sailors and marines--
anywhere, anytime.

57. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, do you believe the EHR must be
deployable?
Mr. Mabus. It is critical that the integrated EHR be deployable to
support the Navy-Marine Corps operational mission. Our force is forward
deployed and spends significant portions of their careers deployed and
underway. A key feature of the integrated EHR is the ability to
continue to document medical care in times of low or no network
connectivity, and then synchronize data once a connection is restored
so it is available for future use. To that end, the integrated EHR will
provide one system permitting both the inputting of data and the
visibility of that data throughout the continuum of care--from the
initial point of injury, through care at a military treatment facility,
and onto the VA treatment facility.
Documenting healthcare in the deployed environment will enhance the
accuracy of the medical history for our sailors and marines, which is
important to ensuring they receive the right healthcare at the right
time. Well-documented healthcare is also critical for use in
determining future disability assessments and benefits determination.

58. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, what input has the Navy had on
the EHR program?
Mr. Mabus. Navy Medicine is working closely with DOD, the other
Services, and the Veterans Health Administration. Our subject matter
experts work on the Capability Integrated Project Teams, Clinical
Informatics Teams, and Enterprise Architecture Teams, as well as assist
with the requirements generation process. In addition, the Navy Surgeon
General is a non-voting member of the DOD Integrated Program Office
Advisory Board which is responsible for integrated EHR governance.
We recognize the challenges associated with this ambitious project
and fully support the Secretary of Defense's strategy to acquire best
value and sustainable health information technology while ensuring
interoperability with the VA.

BENEFITS FOR SAME-SEX PARTNERS

59. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, recently, former Secretary of
Defense Panetta announced that DOD will expand benefits to unmarried
same-sex domestic partners who declare a committed relationship, but
will not extend those same benefits to unmarried heterosexual domestic
partners. Do you agree with former Secretary Panetta, that when it
comes to benefits paid for by hard-working American taxpayers, that DOD
should favor same-sex domestic partners over heterosexual partners?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy is committed to supporting the requirements and
priorities as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Heterosexual
couples, if they so choose, have the opportunity in every State to get
married, and their marriage is recognized by Federal law. The Navy is
committed to working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
best ensure that all who volunteer to serve our Nation in uniform are
treated with dignity, respect, and fairness regardless of their sexual
orientation, and to taking care of all of our servicemembers and their
families, to the extent allowable under law.

60. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, was the Navy consulted to
determine the cost impact of extending these benefits to same-sex
partners?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, the Navy was included among the representatives in
the DOD working group established by the Secretary of Defense which,
among other things, was to determine the cost impact of extending
certain benefits to same-sex domestic partners of servicemembers and
their children. Following the Supreme Court decision that found
unconstitutional the section of the Defense of Marriage Act that, for
Federal purposes, defines ``marriage'' as a legal union between one man
and one woman, DOD is reviewing the process to make benefits available
to all military spouses regardless of sexual orientation. The
Department of the Navy is committed to ensuring all servicemembers and
their families are treated with equality and respect under current law
and regulation.

TOTAL FORCE MIX

61. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, General
Dempsey said in his testimony last week that DOD needs flexibility to
keep the force in balance and that everything must be on the table,
including the mix among Active, Reserve, and National Guard units. In
view of the heavy wartime demand on the forces, including the Reserve
and the National Guard, what do you envision as a viable option to
change that force mix for the Navy/Marine Corps?
Admiral Greenert. Navy's fiscal year 2014 budget request, based on
a comprehensive review of applicable strategies and guidance, provides
Navy with the optimal Active and Reserve component mix to meet current
operational demands and respond to future contingencies. This mix is
predicated on the assumption that Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
demand for Individual Augmentation by Navy personnel will continue to
decline, and that the Reserve component will retain the capacity to
source requirements and provide strategic depth in several capability
areas. This approach enables the Active component to man our ships,
submarines, squadrons, and other operational units and meet the demands
for naval presence as outlined in the Global Force Management
Allocation Plan.
General Amos. The Marine Corps needs to remain at its current
Active component to Reserve component proportionality, which is an
Active component of 182,000 and a Reserve component of 39,600. We have
analyzed this force mix over the course of two dedicated working
groups, Force Structure Review Group 2010 and Force Optimization Review
Group 2012. From those reviews we determined that this force mix is
required to meet service level Title 10 responsibilities as a forward
deployed force in readiness and the operational requirements levied on
the Marine Corps by the combatant commands.

MILITARY COMPENSATION

62. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, our Nation's historical
experience of pursuing cost savings by cutting military compensation
has demonstrated that periods of designed reduction in overall
compensation levels resulted in retention problems. Those retention
problems, especially in the context of generally improving civilian
employment opportunities, meant that Congress was required to come back
and authorize catch-up increases to help us keep the highly trained
talents and skills that we need. What is your assessment of the impact
of the President's proposed slowdown in military compensation on
retention and recruiting in your Service?
Mr. Mabus. Military compensation is highly competitive today, and
the President's proposed slowdown in base pay growth is not likely to
cause recruiting or retention problems in the near term, provided
recruiting bonuses and retention pays are preserved. The most recent
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation reported enlisted members
were paid at the 90th percentile and officers were paid at the 83rd
percentile relative to private sector counterparts with comparable
education and experience. Just 13 years ago, both officer and enlisted
personnel in some pay grades were below the 70th percentile benchmark,
and DOD made deliberate investments in military pay to meet that
threshold. With the modest increases in the pay table as proposed in
the President's budget, servicemembers will still realize sizable pay
increases through promotions and longevity. Even without any increases
in the pay table, a typical new enlisted servicemember would realize
approximately an 80 percent increase in base pay over 5 years. In the
current fiscal environment, there is room to slow down base pay growth,
thereby helping to mitigate further cuts to force structure, readiness,
and modernization.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

63. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, General Dempsey testified last
week that unsustainable costs and smaller budgets require DOD to
examine every warrior and family support program to make sure we are
getting the best return on our investment. How do you assess the
investments our Nation has already made in family support programs, and
suicide prevention in particular, in moving the needle with
demonstrable positive return on investment?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy and Marine Corps continually evaluate the
effectiveness of their programs to ensure the needs of our sailors,
marines, and their families are being met. Assessment and research
efforts help identify program deficiencies, program best practices, and
satisfaction. This insight enables the Navy to adjust internal
programming and accurately direct external support to best serve
sailors, marines, and their families.
The Navy actively participates in the Defense Suicide Prevention
Office's (DSPO) program evaluation initiative. DSPO is conducting an
analysis of the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Suicide Prevention programs in order to align and integrate
programs, resources, policy, and strategy. The analytical method being
utilized has the following three components:

(1) Strategic Coverage: Navy is supporting efforts to align and
analyze suicide prevention programs to assess whether there are gaps in
addressing the overall OSD suicide prevention strategic objectives.
(2) Resource Allocation & Analysis: OSD and the Services are
conducting a review of suicide prevention programs to determine full
costing of requirements/level of effort, funding amounts, and potential
shortfalls. This review includes examining program duplication and
analysis of alternatives in an effort to reduce costs without
significant negative impact.
(3) Program/Portfolio Effectiveness: The DSPO recently completed
an effort to establish a common framework and understanding of measures
of effectiveness (MOEs), and ground rules, for suicide prevention
programs. The Services and OSD are examining MOEs and performance
measures. This analysis will be used to realign existing program
resources and ensure that highly-ranked suicide prevention programs are
implemented across all of the Military Services.

TUITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, I am pleased to learn that DOD
has now reinstated the Tuition Assistance Program, previously cancelled
by the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force in response to the
administration's failure to plan for sequestration. How does the
Tuition Assistance Program enable your Active-Duty Forces to meet the
professional development requirements described by General Dempsey to
establish the Profession of Arms as the foundation for the joint force?
Mr. Mabus. The requirements described by General Dempsey relate to
incorporating lessons learned from our 21st century wars into the
development of our future leaders. While such requirements are
foundational to our service academies and military graduate
institutions, they are not necessarily a systematic element of Tuition
Assistance (TA), an entirely voluntary off-duty program.
Despite these differences, the Department of the Navy considers
many aspects of voluntary education to be fully as supportive of
General Dempsey's professional development aims as our formal
institutions. For example, the critical thinking, problem solving in
complex environments, and communications skills obtained through
voluntary education can be as effective as those learned at a Service
Academy. The Department of the Navy believes that TA can contribute to
morale, retention, and innovation.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, our force is exceptionally well-trained on suicide awareness and
prevention, and yet we still experience the tragedy of suicide at an
unacceptably high rate. What is your assessment on whether the current
level of training and leadership engagement is sufficient or whether it
has inadvertently created a climate in which some vulnerable
individuals may have contemplated suicide because we talk about it so
much?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The American Society of Suicidology
emphasizes that discussing suicide does not cause someone to become
suicidal. In fact, experts are in near universal agreement that open
discussion is an important factor in suicide prevention. Additionally,
the U.S. Surgeon General's 2012 National Strategy for Suicide
Prevention recommends emphasis on resiliency in training, messaging,
and communications, as well as clinical practice guidelines. Within the
Navy, operational stress control training teaches skills that build
resilience, navigate stress and identify resources that reduce risk of
crises. By helping our servicemembers develop life skills and promote
comprehensive wellness--physical health, nutrition, fitness, proper
rest, sound financial decisions, strong relationships, and
spirituality--suicide risk factors are reduced without explicitly
discussing the subject. Navy's training is designed to foster
meaningful discussion of stress and proactive ways to mitigate it and
instill awareness of stress injury warning signs for those having
trouble navigating through challenges.
Our strategic and tactical communications products provide best
practices on how to discuss stress injuries to help servicemembers
avoid risk of suicide. Adapted from the national suicide prevention
resource center's recommendations, these Navy branded products are not
only useful to guide training, but encourage leaders to engage in
meaningful dialogue with their servicemembers, reinforcing the message
that, ``It's okay to speak up when you're down.'' Finally, unit
leadership engagement is critical to enable servicemembers to move
beyond decades of negative psychological health perceptions and
barriers, and to seek the help needed to remain resilient and
operationally ready. The Navy is confident that both the training
strategy and leadership commitment to engage all aspects of suicide
prevention will provide servicemembers and their families with the
necessary tools to choose life.
General Amos. The Marine Corps continually evaluates the
effectiveness of its suicide prevention training and makes periodic
updates to incorporate the latest evidence-based practices. Our
evaluation includes partnering with Federal agencies, academia, and
private industry in cooperation with Defense Centers of Excellence for
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury to study the
effectiveness of our suicide prevention training.
To ensure that we do not inadvertently create a climate that
promulgates suicide, the Marine Corps adheres to the latest
recommendations for suicide reporting and prevention, which includes
offering hope and avoids talks about the act. We do not discuss suicide
methods and avoid portraying dramatic images. Discussing suicide
carefully can correct myths and encourage those who are vulnerable or
at risk to seek help.

COMPENSATION AND ENTITLEMENTS

66. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, in your written testimony,
you stated that ``if the lower discretionary budget caps of the Budget
Control Act (BCA) are retained, we will evaluate options to reduce
personnel and personnel costs, including compensation and
entitlements.'' What compensation and entitlements will the Navy reduce
if you are not given relief from the BCA caps?
Admiral Greenert. Options to reduce personnel costs are still being
evaluated through multiple venues including the OSD-led Strategic
Choices and Management Review, the Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Commission, and the fiscal year 2015 budget process.
The most significant aspects of military compensation and
entitlements such as basic pay, housing allowances, subsistence
allowances, and medical and retirement benefits are non-discretionary
at the Service level. Elements of personnel costs that are
discretionary at the Service level include some special and incentive
pays, permanent change of station moves, the rate at which we promote
or advance personnel, and the total number of personnel in the Navy.

SAFE EXAMS

67. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, in your written testimony,
you stated that ``all our Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) and
operational settings will be able to perform SAFEs by the end of this
fiscal year.'' It is disturbing to learn that there may be some MTFs in
the Navy's inventory that still cannot perform SAFE. Can you explain
why some MTFs cannot currently perform SAFE?
Admiral Greenert. Previously, both DOD and Navy BUMED policy
indicated that SAFEs could be provided at MTFs or at local civilian
facilities via local Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). While the DOD
instruction continues to offer the alternative of MOUs with local
civilian facilities, BUMED Instruction 6310.11A (SAPR Medical-Forensic
Program) has been revised and directs the establishment of MTF
capability to provide SAFEs. BUMED is monitoring implementation and
this requirement will be met by September 30, 2013. All Navy MTFs
outside of the CONUS currently offer examinations on-site.

FUNDS FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, will the OCO request for 2014 include funds to address the fiscal
year 2013 problems in both the OCO and the base budget for readiness
shortfalls?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2014 OCO
President's budget amendment does not address any fiscal year 2013 OCO
or base budget readiness shortfalls for the Navy. The Navy fiscal year
2014 President's budget amendment includes incremental costs to sustain
operations, manpower, equipment, and infrastructure repair, as well as
equipment replacement due to wartime operations. The request supports
the responsible drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, including costs to
retrograde equipment, repair, and replacement of equipment to reset the
Navy, and combat support costs. The fiscal year 2014 OCO President's
budget request is $11.2 billion, a reduction of $3.0 billion from the
fiscal year 2013 OCO President's budget request.
General Amos. The Marine Corps' fiscal year 2014 OCO request does
not include funds to address readiness shortfalls from fiscal year
2013. The passing of H.R. 933 enabled the Marine Corps to meet near-
term readiness commitments for deployed and next-to-deploy forces and
continue to rebalance to the Pacific including the Marine Rotational
Force Darwin and our Unit Deployment Program. While we are capable of
meeting near-term readiness commitments in fiscal year 2013, we have
taken risk in our long-term infrastructure sustainment and the unit
readiness of our home station units as a result of sequestration. We
cannot continue to sustain these levels of reductions in fiscal year
2014 without impacting our non-deployed operational forces stationed at
home. As such, the Marine Corps requests congressional support for the
fiscal year 2014 President's budget request.

MILITARY READINESS

69. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, I am
interested in knowing about readiness reporting requirements through
the quarterly readiness reports. Are the reports useful to you in
planning? If not, why not?
Admiral Greenert. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)
helps inform our fundamental analysis of current readiness and
readiness trends and is useful to Navy's planning process. The QRRC
information is also evaluated in concert with the real time readiness
reporting by individual units and group commanders, the narrative
reporting by our Fleet and Naval Component Commanders, and in support
of assessments of the Joint force readiness. The resulting
comprehensive readiness analysis is used to inform our decision-making
processes across the full range of Navy man, train, and equip
responsibilities.
General Amos. The information contained in the DOD QRRC is
principally constructed to report military readiness to Congress per
section 482, title 10, U.S.C. Some of the information in the QRRC,
particularly that pertaining to the Chairman's Joint Force Readiness
Review and Joint Combat Capability Assessment, reflect the Marine
Corps' inputs for Joint planning, readiness reporting, and risk
assessments. Those inputs are useful both for Service planning and
Joint Force planning.

70. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, what systems
do you use internally to track readiness trends?
Admiral Greenert. Navy uses a variety of databases and a business
intelligence tool to mine readiness trends. The Navy Readiness
Reporting Enterprise (NRRE) database is the primary system through
which Navy manages a series of subsystems that collect readiness
information. The most significant of these subsystems is the Defense
Readiness Reporting System-Navy. To increase the breadth of information
available for readiness analysis, data is also collected from other
systems outside the NRRE. One example is the Maintenance Figure of
Merit database, which provides access to the material condition
readiness of ships.
To ensure Navy headquarters is aware of and able to address Fleet
readiness concerns, U.S. Fleet Forces Command publishes a quarterly
Integrated Fleet Readiness Report (IFRR). The IFRR integrates Fleet
platform operational availability and readiness production metrics from
a wide range of sources to identify emerging problems, track leading
indicators, and allocate resources most effectively.
General Amos. The system used by the Marine Corps to track
readiness trends is the program of record Defense Readiness Reporting
System-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC). Commanders' assessments are inherently
part of the DRRS-MC reporting system and provide operational
perspective in terms of unit design, mission capability, and readiness.

71. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, do you have
suggestions for alternative reporting mechanisms?
Admiral Greenert. Navy would not recommend establishing alternative
reporting mechanisms, although we will support adjustments to current
reporting that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress
determine should be made.
General Amos. The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
enterprise is the readiness reporting system for DOD. The system used
by the Marine Corps to track readiness trends is the program of record
DRRS-MC. With this readiness reporting system, Commanders' assessments
are an inherent part of the reporting process and they provide an
operational perspective in terms of a unit's designed mission
capability and its readiness to execute those missions. I am satisfied
with DRRS-MC's ability to provide an accurate readiness picture and do
not have any alternate recommendations.

72. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, will DOD submit a supplemental
funding request for fiscal year 2013 if the Marine Corps cannot solve
its O&M shortfalls?
General Amos. The Marine Corps does not intend to submit a
supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2013. The passing of H.R.
933 enabled the Marine Corps to meet near-term readiness commitments
for deployed and next-to-deploy forces and continue to rebalance to the
Pacific including the Marine Rotational Force Darwin and our Unit
Deployment Program. While the Marine Corps is capable of meeting near-
term readiness commitments in fiscal year 2013, we have taken risk in
our long-term infrastructure sustainment and the unit readiness of our
home station units as a result of sequestration. We cannot continue to
sustain these levels of reductions in fiscal year 2014 without impact
to our nondeployed operational units. As such, we request congressional
support for the fiscal year 2014 President's budget request.

73. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, if the Marine Corps is fully
funded to its request in fiscal year 2014, how long will it take you to
restore readiness of the non-deployed forces?
General Amos. The fiscal year 2014 budget helps put the Marine
Corps on a trajectory to fully reconstitute its full spectrum combat
capability by fiscal year 2017. If this funding is sequestered,
reconstitution of the force will be impacted, delaying indefinitely the
complete restoration of our nondeployed operational forces.
The fiscal year 2014 budget continues the transition to a post-
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Marine Corps that complies with
strategic guidance and fully capable to operate across the range of
military operations. This budget invests more in full-spectrum
training, which will lead to greater proficiency in amphibious
operations and combined arms operations. Moreover, it enables the
Marine Corps to maintain its high standards of training, education,
leadership, and discipline, while contributing vital capabilities to
the joint force in meeting the strategic aims of our Nation.
Sequestration would have a direct and negative impact on the
achievement of these transitions. Additionally, current readiness
remains heavily dependent on OCO funding. While the fiscal year 2014
budget submission explicitly protects the Corps' ability to support
current and near-term readiness, the impact of sequestration would
exacerbate today's imbalance between current and long-term readiness.

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

74. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) was established 7 years ago. Consistent with DOD's inability
to audit its finances, GAO has identified a lack of comprehensive
visibility over all of DOD's counter-IED efforts external to JIEDDO. We
have authorized billions of dollars to JIEDDO to address the counter-
IED problem, but it is time to assess the organization. How do you see
JIEDDO's mission and organization in the future?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. IEDs remain the largest cause of
casualties among U.S. and coalition forces within the CENTCOM AOR. Easy
access to commercially available initiating systems and precursor
chemicals will continue to make them a weapon of choice among potential
adversaries, especially non-state actors. Knowledge of IED materials,
tactics, and techniques is easily shared globally among our
adversaries, and we must maintain diligence and persistence in our
efforts to counter this threat in all of its forms.
JIEDDO was established in February 2006, with the Mission to
``Focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DOD actions in support of
combatant commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts
to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.'' This mission was
enabled by generous support of Congress in appropriating substantial
funds to this mission and providing the authorities and flexibility to
apply those funds to counter a very agile threat. JIEDDO has largely
succeeded in focusing the Department on this threat and many of
JIEDDO's initiatives have already transitioned to the Military Services
for further development and sustainment. Additionally, for some
capability areas, such as Joint Service Explosive Ordinance Disposal,
we have had joint coordination and cooperative development structures
in place for several decades. The Military Services already execute
most of the initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO and as we transition from
OEF we are reviewing the proper role of the Services to prepare our
forces in this important capability area.
The Department has learned many lessons from the wars of the past
decade to include the need for focused leadership and agile responses
to emerging threats. As we strive to build and sustain capability to
mitigate the threat of IEDs, while also improving efficiency in light
of fiscal constraints, alternative solutions managing this threat, to
include counter-IED leadership, advocacy, and coordination role
currently provided by JIEDDO, will be considered by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
General Amos. The fiscal year 2014 budget helps put the Marine
Corps on a trajectory to fully reconstitute its full spectrum combat
capability by fiscal year 2017. If this funding is sequestered,
reconstitution of the force will be impacted, delaying indefinitely the
complete restoration of our non-deployed operational forces.
The fiscal year 2014 budget continues the transition to a post-OEF
Marine Corps that complies with strategic guidance and fully capable to
operate across the range of military operations. This budget invests
more in full-spectrum training, which will lead to greater proficiency
in amphibious operations and combined arms operations. Moreover, it
enables the Marine Corps to maintain its high standards of training,
education, leadership, and discipline, while contributing vital
capabilities to the joint force in meeting the strategic aims of our
Nation. Sequestration would have a direct and negative impact on the
achievement of these transitions. Additionally, current readiness
remains heavily dependent on OCO funding. While the fiscal year 2014
budget submission explicitly protects the Corps' ability to support
current and near-term readiness, the impact of sequestration would
exacerbate today's imbalance between current and long-term readiness.

75. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, is it time to integrate JIEDDO into other existing organizations
and processes?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Yes, it is an appropriate time to
consider integrating the roles and responsibilities performed by JIEDDO
into existing organizations and processes empowered with the requisite
authority. Since its inception, JIEDDO has focused on three lines of
effort: defeating the device through rapid and agile acquisition
efforts; training the joint force; and attacking the IED networks
through the integration of operations research and intelligence
analysis. Two of these lines of effort clearly fall within the
responsibilities of the Military Services to man, train, and equip
forces for combatant commander employment, while attacking the network
is a shared responsibility among all DOD components and our interagency
and coalition partners.
JIEDDO's substantial investments in research, development,
acquisition of equipment, and operations analysis and integration have
been successful. There is no doubt that the substantial and flexible
Joint IED Defeat Fund that Congress provided to help us mitigate this
threat has saved many lives as well as catalyzed awareness of, and
focus on, this threat throughout the Department. We are now better
equipped to understand the IED threat and the strategies to mitigate it
than we were at the beginning of these wars. As the resources that
enabled JIEDDO's reach are no longer fiscally tenable, however, the
Military Services must effectively execute our Title 10
responsibilities within available funding.
We have experience in successfully executing joint programs through
common management structures such as the Navy's role as Executive Agent
and Single Manager for Counter Radio-Controlled IED (RCIED) Electronic
Warfare (CREW) under DOD Directive 5101.14 (CREW Executive Agent and
Single Manager will transfer to the Army by 2014), and the Navy's role
as the Single Manager for DOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Technology and Training under DOD Directive 5160.62. Such experience
will inform how the Department chooses to manage this joint capability
area while balancing resources to maintain the freedom of maneuver
necessary to support our National Security Strategy.
Obviously, no Service has budgeted to assume all of the
responsibilities currently executed with OCO funding by JIEDDO.
Continuation of these efforts will require supplemental funding, or
will require offsets from other budgeted priorities. Risks associated
with any disestablishment of JIEDDO will be most tangible in the
operations integration efforts to include the sharing of IED forensics,
biometrics, targeting, and exploited intelligence on adversary tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) and IED devices' flow of precursor
materials and countering the acquisition, manufacture, and use of
commercial, military, or homemade explosives. Additionally, JIEDDO's
coordinating role with the interagency and coalition partners would
have to be assumed by another DOD component with the requisite
authority to execute this task. The transition of these functions and
its timing must be carefully planned, coordinated, and funded to
preserve our knowledge and to sustain our momentum against the IED
threat.
General Amos. The Marine Corps recommends that JIEDDO remain as the
joint organization responsible for synergizing and integrating counter-
IED capabilities for DOD.
There are significant risks in eliminating JIEDDO and requiring
other existing DOD organizations or individual Services to assume
counter-IED responsibilities. Without a single responsible
organization, DOD would experience a reduced ability to coordinate
multi-Service responses to joint urgent and emergent requirements as
well as reduced visibility on whether joint requirements are fulfilled.
Additionally, requiring individual Services to pursue separate counter-
IED efforts allows the potential for fragmentation, duplication, and
overlap. Ultimately, without a single coordinating organization, DOD's
capability to anticipate and develop responses to new threats would be
significantly reduced.

76. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, how do we gain more visibility into what DOD is doing in all
aspects of counter-IED?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Counter-IED is a very broad area
that spans multiple communities and components. It is possible to share
information and collaborate on initiatives through appropriate joint
structures. For example, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal technology
and training and ground-based CREW technology have been delegated to
the Navy and through management structures established by DOD
directives 5101.14 and 5160.62. The Navy communicates and coordinates
with JIEDDO and other DOD components to ensure visibility across all
stakeholders. The CREW Executive Agent and Single Manager will transfer
from the Navy to the Army by 2014.
In the case of counter-IED, JIEDDO's responsibilities and
organization are defined in DOD Directive 2000.19E. JIEDDO's mission
states ``JIEDDO shall focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DOD
actions in support of the combatant commanders' and their respective
Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic
influence.''
JIEDDO, by direction of the Secretary of Defense, remains the Joint
authority for DOD counter-IED efforts and is the appropriate source for
insight and information for DOD counter-IED efforts.
General Amos. The most effective way to provide better visibility
on all aspects of counter-IED is to ensure a single DOD organization
responsible for synchronizing and integrating counter-IED capabilities,
requirements, and responses continue to robustly support combatant
commanders and the Services. A streamlined, efficient JIEDDO,
responsible for the standardization, rapid resourcing, and integration
of joint counter-IED efforts would be appropriately poised to respond
to all inquiries with answers informed by regular interaction with the
Services.

77. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what actions are you taking to support a strong and viable
organic and commercial industrial base?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We continue to support many
counter-IED science and technology initiatives through the Office of
Naval Research, Naval Research Laboratories, federally Funded Research
and Development Centers, University Affiliated Research Centers, and
Navy systems commands and their many geographically dispersed warfare
centers. We are also teamed with many industry partners involved in the
development, manufacture, fielding, and sustainment of counter-IED
technology. Today, most of our acquisition programs employ open
architecture designs, facilitate regular communication with industry on
challenges and opportunities, and negotiate for appropriate government
data rights. These practices allow greater alignment with the
industrial base, afford opportunities for small business involvement,
and reduce system costs through increased competition.
General Amos. The Marine Corps fully supports Secretary Mabus and
the five acquisition principles he outlined in 2010 for the Department
of the Navy: Clearly identify requirements; Raise the bar on
performance; Rebuild the acquisition workforce; Make every dollar
count; and Support the industrial base. The Marine Corps supports a
strong and viable organic and industrial base via open competition,
early communication, and targeted efforts.
The Marine Corps acquisition commands procure material solutions
based on validated requirements from Marine Corps and DOD leadership.
To support a strong industrial base, the Marine Corps regularly
communicates future requirements with industry via Advanced Planning
Briefs to Industry, Requests for Information, Sources Sought
Announcements, and Requests for Quotes and Proposals through the
various government points of entry. These include FEDBIZOPPS, SeaPort-
e, GSA Schedule, Small Business Innovation Research, and Small Business
Technology Transfer solicitations. These communications provide
industry with permissible information to support their internal
planning and focused research so they can position themselves to
efficiently and effectively support future government acquisitions.
As acquisition programs mature, the Marine Corps continues to
actively engage and communicate its programmatic intentions, technical
priorities, and future plans in a number of forums. The Marine Corps
participates in a wide range of events, such as the annual Modern Day
Marine Exposition that included the Small Business Pavilion which
highlights the capabilities and technology solutions of the small
business contractor community. Another event that offers engagement
with industry is the biennial Advanced Planning Briefing to Industry.
The Marine Corps engages in these Industry Days, where many individual
Marine Corps ground programs offices meet with industry throughout the
year, giving them an opportunity to meet with our acquisition
professionals on potential solutions. In addition, the Marine Corps
recognizes the potential capabilities, innovations, and technology
solutions that small businesses can offer. The Marine Corps has an
Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) that is involved in small
business and industry outreach events on a weekly basis. The OSBP
participates in local and national small business outreach events,
performing business matchmaking at many of those events, to match the
capabilities of small businesses with Marine Corps requirements. Such
events provide great venues for industry to stay abreast of
opportunities with the Marine Corps acquisition community and for the
Marine Corps to learn from industry about potential solutions.

RADIOS

78. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, how many proprietary, sole
source radios has the Marine Corps and Navy procured over the last 4
years? Please provide a breakdown by year, the number of radios, and
the funding associated with these radios.
Admiral Greenert. The following is a breakdown of single-source
digital modular radio (DMR) and portable radio program (PRP) by year:

The Marine Corps has not purchased any radios via sole source
contracting action in the timeframe requested.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

OHIO-CLASS SUBMARINE REPLACEMENT PROGRAM COMMITMENT

79. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, during
a February 28, 2013, hearing concerning the nomination of Mr. Alan
Estevez to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I asked Mr. Estevez if DOD is
dedicated to recapitalizing the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)
force so it continues to be the Nation's most survivable nuclear
deterrence capability, which he replied with concurrence. Mr. Estevez
assured that DOD would fund a SSBN force of 12 to meet U.S. Strategic
Command's (STRATCOM) strategic deterrence requirements. With fiscal
uncertainty and the administration not taking sequestration into
account for budgeting, I am wary that this program will not be
delivered on time, resulting in a lapse of coverage in our nuclear
triad. The President's budget has caused a 2-year shift to construction
and delivery of the replacements. Mr. Estevez committed that the Navy
would be monitoring closely. Are you committed to ensuring that the
Navy commits its resources to seeing the timely fruition of the new
Ohio-class submarine replacement?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Strategic deterrence remains a
national imperative. The SSBN force is the most reliable and survivable
leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The Ohio Replacement SSBN is one of the
Navy's top three acquisition priorities. Under the current fiscal year
2014 budget submission, research and development for the Ohio
Replacement SSBN is fully funded and on schedule. However, continuing
sequestration or a Continuing Resolution presents the greatest risk to
program execution and affordability.
To cover both the SSBN(X) program as well as other shipbuilding
programs, yearly shipbuilding expenditures during the mid-term (2024-
2033) planning period will need to average about $19.3 billion per
year. This is nearly $3 billion more per year than in the near-term
planning period (2014-2023), and nearly $6 billion more per year than
past steady-state funding levels.
The shipbuilding plan assumes the average recurring affordability
target for the 2nd through 12th SSBN(X)s will be $5.9 billion per
submarine in fiscal year 2013 dollars. The SSBN(X) Milestone A
Acquisition Decision Memorandum established an even lower affordability
target of $4.9 billion per ship in fiscal year 2010 dollars. The Navy
is working to reduce the cost of the submarines and conducts
affordability reviews to monitor program efforts in achieving
affordability targets.

80. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Greenert, please explain your plan
to integrate the replacement of SSBN(X) into the fleet while removing
the old Ohio-class submarine while ensuring there are at least two
SSBNs at sea for nuclear deterrence.
Admiral Greenert. The Ohio-class SSBNs will begin to decommission
at a rate of one per year in 2027 after a proposed and planned life
extension from 30 to 42 years. Consistent with the DSG, in our fiscal
year 2013 budget submission we proposed delaying the Ohio replacement
program by 2 years. This delay will result in an SSBN force of 10 ships
in the 2030s adequate to meet the requirement, but will require a high
state of readiness to meet the Nation's strategic deterrence needs. The
key to ensuring we maintain the required number of SSBNs at sea to meet
strategic requirements is for construction of the lead Ohio replacement
SSBN to commence on time in fiscal year 2021 and complete per plan.
This ensures that Ohio replacement SSBNs will enter fleet service
starting in fiscal year 2031 at the rate of one per year to replace the
retiring Ohio-class.

81. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus, will your current fiscal
year 2014 budget request for the SSBN(X) replacement program be
sufficient to keep the program on schedule?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, the fiscal year 2014 President's budget request is
sufficient to keep the Ohio replacement program on schedule. The Ohio
replacement SSBN is one of the Navy's top three acquisition priorities.
However, continuing sequestration or a Continuing Resolution presents
the greatest risk to program execution and affordability.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

82. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus, the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) is an imperative part of continuing our air superiority in these
dangerous and uncertain times. As former Secretary of Defense Panetta
commented on the F-35, ``this 5th generation fighter . . . is
absolutely vital to maintaining our air superiority. And it will enable
the kind of vital operations we need in anti-access environments.'' He
went onto to say that DOD is committed to the development of the F-35.
The Navy's aircraft procurement reflects multiple purchases of the F-35
in the upcoming years. Are you committed to ensuring that the F-35
remains an integral part of the warfighting capabilities of the Navy?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy remains committed to the F-35C and will
leverage its 5th generation capabilities to ensure mission
effectiveness in anti-access/area-denied environments. The F-35C will
provide a significant additive value when brought to bear as a fully
integrated asset in the future Navy carrier air wing.

83. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus, will the current fiscal
year 2014 and other projected fiscal years of JSF procurement be
sufficient to incorporate the fifth generation fighter to replace the
aging F-18s that are currently in the Navy fleet?
Mr. Mabus. The fiscal year 2014 F-35C procurement profile is
sufficient to replace the aging F/A-18s that are currently in the Navy
fleet. The current transition plan calls for a one-for-one replacement
of an F/A-18C/D squadron by an F-35 squadron. Under the current program
of record, the first F-35C squadron is scheduled to replace the first
F/A-18C/D squadron starting in 2016. At projected procurement rates,
the entire F/A-18C/D fleet will be replaced by 2026.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

84. Senator Wicker. General Amos, in your written testimony you
express concern that the number of amphibious ships currently available
represents the minimal number you feel is acceptable. You note that
current numbers allow the Marine Corps to meet combatant commander's
requirements, but with significant risk. Would the addition of a 12th
San Antonio-class Landing Platform Dock to the fleet be of use to the
Marine Corps?
General Amos. Yes. The San Antonio-class LPD is extremely versatile
and serves as the replacement for four classes of older ships: LKA,
LST, LSD-36, and LPD-4. Nine of the 11 authorized and approved ships of
this class have been delivered to the Navy. The utility of this class
was best demonstrated by USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19) as she recently
returned after 19 months of deployed operation over a 25 month period.
Based on the expeditionary requirements of a 2.0 MEB assault
echelon force, as long as 30 operationally available ships are
maintained, the Navy can meet assault echelon requirements with some
risk. The current planned mix of amphibious ships is 11 LHA/LHDs, 11
LPDs, and 11 LSDs. It is important to note that each additional LPD-17
that is procured today could reduce the total number of ships required
to replace the aging LSD-41/49 class. LX(R) is the planned LSD
replacement program and is currently undergoing an Analysis of
Alternatives.
Today, the Amphibious Force Structure stands at 30 ships, which
includes 9 LHD/LHAs, 9 LPDs, and 12 LSDs.

85. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, I am
concerned with the recent trends towards the acquisition of non-
military shipping as a substitute for combat-ready amphibious warships.
Commercial-grade ships have the potential to save costs when used as
intra-theater lift in a benign environment. However, the robust anti-
access/area-denial capabilities being developed by regional threats,
such as Iran and North Korea, indicate that commercial-grade ships
would not survive in the event of conflict. To this end, I believe that
the Navy must continue to procure combat-survivable amphibious
shipping. While cost savings should be sought in the adoption of
commercial-grade standards where doing so will not negatively affect
the safety of the ship and crew, the emphasis must remain on ensuring
our amphibious ships are built to fight and survive. Do you agree
regarding the need to continue to build amphibious ships that are meant
to operate and survive in a multi-threat combat environment?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy is committed to building amphibious
ships that mitigate the capability gaps that are created when ships in
the inventory reach their expected service lives. The starting point
for a new warship design is based on capability gaps and the associated
requirements. Proven hull forms are evaluated along with other ship
alternatives in an Analysis of Alternatives in accordance with DOD
Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. In
executing a thorough Analysis of Alternatives, commercial, military,
and tailored specification design concepts are studied. Each option is
analyzed on the basis of capability, suitability, survivability, and
cost.
General Amos. It is critically important for our Nation to maintain
a robust amphibious warship capability that enables the Nation to gain
access regardless of the threat environment. Amphibious warships
operate forward to support allies, respond to crises, deter potential
adversaries, and provide the Nation's best means of projecting
sustainable power ashore. They also provide the best means for
providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Expeditionary
forces comprised of sailors, marines, and amphibious warships provide
the ability to rapidly and decisively respond to global crises without
a permanent footprint ashore that would place unnecessary political or
logistic burdens upon our allies or potential partners. There are two
main drivers of the amphibious warship requirement: maintaining
persistent forward presence, which enables both engagement and crisis
response, and delivering the assault echelons of up to two Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) for joint forcible entry operations.
Marines will continue to enhance our ability to operate from any
available platform, but we believe combat missions require combat
capable warships with its supporting echlon/sustainment platforms.

86. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, would you agree that the
starting point for new warship design should be on a proven, combat-
capable hull form that can be modified according to need and cost-
constraints?
Admiral Greenert. The starting point for a new warship design is
based on capability gaps and the associated requirements. Proven hull
forms are evaluated along with other ship alternatives in an Analysis
of Alternatives in accordance with DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation
of the Defense Acquisition System. In executing a thorough Analysis of
Alternatives, commercial, military, and tailored specification design
concepts are studied. Each option is analyzed on the basis of
capability, suitability, survivability, and cost.

STABILIZING THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

87. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, in your written testimony, you
discuss at length the need to maintain a robust and healthy
shipbuilding industrial base. In my discussions with industry leaders,
they expressed to me their concerns with the unsteady nature of the
contract work they perform for the Navy and the difficulties that stem
from the shipbuilding acquisition program. Because of the feast or
famine nature of the Navy's shipbuilding process, companies are
challenged to find steady work for their highly-skilled employees to
ensure they do not lose them to other industries. Once these employees
leave an industry or region, they are unlikely to return. Such losses
have the potential to cripple or bankrupt a major shipbuilding company.
Additionally, the lack of consistency that characterizes the
acquisition and contracting system currently in place has a ripple
effect on 2nd- and 3rd-tier producers. While the major companies can
generally survive short periods in which they are not building a ship,
smaller companies that produce components or provide materials are
often forced out of business. This uncertainty increases costs to the
Navy and the taxpayers in the near-term, and contributes to the gradual
erosion of the industrial base in the long-term. Do you agree that it
is in the best interest of the Navy and the shipbuilding industry to
establish a more consistent, predictable method of contracting and
paying for ship construction?
Mr. Mabus. The Navy agrees that stability and affordability are key
to obtaining the objectives of the shipbuilding plan and improving the
health of the industrial base. Over the past several years, the Navy
has placed a priority on increasing shipbuilding rates and providing
stability for the shipbuilding industrial base. On September 11, 2001,
the U.S. Navy had 316 ships. By 2008, after one of the largest military
buildups in our Nations' history, that number was 278. In 2008, the
Navy put only three ships under contract, far too few to maintain the
size of the fleet or our industrial base, and many of our shipbuilding
programs were over budget, behind schedule, or both. One of my main
priorities as Secretary has been to reverse those trends. Today, the
Fleet has stabilized and problems in most of our shipbuilding programs
have been corrected or arrested. We have 53 ships under contract today,
47 of which were contracted since I took office, and our current
shipbuilding plan puts us on track for 300 ships in the fleet by 2019.
Stability translates into retention of skilled labor, improved material
purchasing and workforce and financial planning, strong learning curve
performance, and the ability for industry to invest in facility
improvements; all resulting in more efficient ship construction and a
more affordable shipbuilding program. The past Virginia-class and DDG-
51-class Multi-Year Procurements (MYPs), the DDG-1000 Swap/DDG-51
Restart Agreement, the LCS dual block buy, the MLP procurement, the
continuation of CVN-78-class procurements on constant 5-year centers,
and the heel-to-toe CVN RCOH induction-to-delivery cycle have provided
critical stable workload for our shipyards and their respective vendor
bases. The approved upcoming Virginia-class MYP and just awarded DDG-
51-class MYP will help to further stabilize the submarine and surface
combatant industrial base through this decade. Likewise, the funding
requested to procure a fourth MLP, and to configure MLP-3 and MLP-4 as
AFSBs will also provide for much-needed workload within the auxiliary
shipbuilding sector.
The strategy going forward continues to center upon improving
affordability. To this end, in addition to the emphasis on stability
discussed above, the Navy has established affordability requirements
and invested in Design for Affordability for future ship programs;
mandating use of open systems design; leveraging competition at every
opportunity in shipbuilding and weapons systems production; employing
fixed-price contracts to control cost for ships and weapon systems in
production; imposing strict criteria limiting disruptive change to
contracts; investing in industry-wide manufacturing process
improvements through the National Shipbuilding Research Program; and
incentivizing capital investment in facilities where warranted.
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request for fiscal years
201 to 2018 requests 41 ships. Of these 41 ships, 25 ships are part of
stable DDG-51 or SSN-774 MYPs or the LCS block buy contracts, and 11
ships are part of ongoing shipbuilding construction programs.
The Navy believes continued use of multi-year and block buy
procurements provide the best means of ensuring stability and
predictability within the industry with respect to workload and
financial planning. The greatest risk to the industrial base is
associated with budget uncertainty, particularly the disruption and
inefficiency caused by sequestration, delayed authorization and
appropriations, and the looming budgetary challenges. The Navy will
continue to aggressively pursue the mutual objectives of improving the
affordability of our shipbuilding program and increasing the strength
of our shipbuilding industrial base, and is committed to working
closely with Congress on these efforts.

88. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, would you agree to funding
contracts on a multi-year basis, rather than a year-per-year basis?
Mr. Mabus. New ship construction is typically procured using
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation funding which
provides multiple year budget authority that is available for
obligation for 5 years. With few exceptions, the Navy typically
requests to fully fund an entire ship in the year of authorization/
appropriation. In cases where there is a requirement for advance
procurement (AP) funds, which typically is associated with the need to
order long lead time material or to achieve economic order quantity
discounts, the Navy will request AP funds in the year(s) preceding a
ship's full funding request. With respect to aircraft carriers, large
deck amphibious ships, and submarines, in addition to AP funds, the
Navy will request to incrementally or split fund the balance of the
ship, in order to avoid large spikes in the budget request for the
years that these capital ships are authorized and appropriated.
In instances where the ship class design is mature and production
is proven and stable, the Navy believes continued use of multiyear and
block buy procurements provide the best means of ensuring stability and
predictability within the industry with respect to workload and
financial planning. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request for
fiscal years 2014 to 2018 requests 41 ships. Of these 41 ships, 25
ships are part of stable DDG-51 or SSN 774 multi-year procurements or
the LCS block buy contracts. The greatest risk to the industrial base
is associated with budget uncertainty, particularly the disruption and
inefficiency caused by sequestration, delayed authorization and
appropriations, and the looming budgetary challenges. The Navy will
continue to aggressively pursue the mutual objectives of improving the
affordability of our shipbuilding program and increasing the strength
of our shipbuilding industrial base, and is committed to working
closely with Congress on these efforts.

TRANSITION FOR VETERANS TO CIVILIAN LIFE

89. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, in your written testimonies, each of you discuss the importance
of readying our sailors and marines for their eventual transitions to
civilian life. I am very concerned about the current unemployment rate
for veterans. I applaud the steps you are taking to improve the TAP,
especially the development of a more tailored and targeted curriculum
for individuals. Even with these improvements, I remain concerned that
we are sending our youngest sailors and marines, those in the 18- to
24-year-old demographic, into the world unprepared to face a struggling
economy and a job market into which their skills do not readily
translate. Of special concern to me are those sailors and marines whose
military occupations and skills do not translate well to well-paying
civilian occupations. Do you share my concerns with regards to the high
rate of unemployment among our youngest veterans?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Department of the Navy shares
your concerns regarding the unemployment rate of young veterans, and we
continually monitor the factors that may contribute to their
unemployment. What is unknown is the duration of their unemployed
status. In many cases, this may be attributed to a short-term
transition phase as veterans enter the job market for the civilian
workforce. Since this is an unavoidable circumstance, our goal is that
transition programs positively improve the career readiness of
separating servicemembers, and limit the amount of time they are
unemployed.
While the unemployment rate of veterans, particularly young
veterans, remains unacceptably high, the notion that new veterans have
a more difficult time finding employment than similar civilians who
have recently left their jobs is not supported by employment data. The
Department of the Navy has just begun to analyze unemployment
compensation data to understand the duration of veteran unemployment
and any patterns across military occupations. In many cases, young
veterans are sought after as highly skilled and disciplined employees.
Therefore, the TAP program has implemented the Military Occupational
Code (MOC) Crosswalk which facilitates sailors and marines translating
their military skills, training, and experience into credentialing
appropriate for civilian jobs. Upon completing this module,
servicemembers will have a file documenting their military career
experience and skills; translation of their military occupation
experience to civilian sector skills; and identification of gaps in
their training and/or experience that need to be filled to meet their
personal career goals. Further, this documentation will be a mandatory
Career Readiness Standard that must be reviewed and verified prior to
separation.
General Amos. The Marine Corps shares your concerns about veteran
unemployment. It is vital that we meet the needs of our marines who
transition from service. In March 2012, we implemented the new
Transition Readiness Seminar (TRS) to maximize the transition-readiness
of all servicemembers. In accordance with the Veterans Opportunity to
Work (VOW) to Hire Heroes Act, TRS revolutionized our approach to meet
the individual goals of each marine as he or she transitions to the
next phase in their life. The seminar is a week-long program which
includes a mandatory standardized core curriculum and also provides
four well-defined military-civilian pathways: (1) College/Education/
University, (2) Career/Technical Training, (3) Employment, or (4)
Entrepreneurial. Each pathway has associated resources and additional
tools to better prepare our veteran marines. An essential feature of
the TRS is that it allows marines to choose and receive transition
information and education in line with each marine's future goals and
objectives.

90. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, how is the Navy tracking the post-military employment of this
demographic?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Once the DD214 is issued, the
Department of the Navy no longer has the ability or statutory authority
to track post-military employment of separated servicemembers. The
Department has, however, begun an effort to analyze unemployment
compensation payments to our recent veterans. When completed, this may
give us insight into both the duration of veteran unemployment and any
differences across demographic groups or military occupations.
General Amos. The Marine Corps does not have metrics to track post-
military employment, however we remain concerned with the overall
veteran employment picture. As marines separate, we provide them with
contact information for the VA and the Department of Labor (DOL)
service locations closest to their post-military homes. These executive
branch agencies have the mission of providing veteran and employment
services.

91. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what additional opportunities do you see for improving the
employment rates for these individuals?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Although there are many factors
that impact the employment status of a veteran, the Navy and Marine
Corps are fully committed to improving the career preparedness and
employability of sailors and marines. To that end, the Navy and Marine
Corps are planning to implement the ``Military Life Cycle'' transition
model. This proactive approach makes meeting future career goals a
priority at the start and throughout a servicemember's military career.
This process aligns military career development with the
servicemember's personal post separation goals resulting in better
preparation for civilian career opportunities.
General Amos. Returning quality citizens from military service
remains a key responsibility that I take very seriously. Our TRS
maximizes the transition-readiness of all of our marines who are
preparing to leave Active Duty. As such, we encourage our marines to
explore the four well-defined military-civilian pathways: (1) College/
Education/University, (2) Career/Technical Training, (3) Employment, or
(4) Entrepreneurial. Each pathway has associated resources and
additional tools to better prepare our veteran marines.
In addition, the DOL and the VA both have a myriad of programs to
assist veterans with employment. Together, we encourage employers to
hire our marines leaving Active Duty service.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly A. Ayotte

OHIO-CLASS SUBMARINE PROGRAM

92. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in your written testimony,
you state that: ``the Navy will need the means to resource . . . the
next generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine.'' Why do you
believe the Navy needs to build the next generation ballistic missile
submarine?
Admiral Greenert. Our SSBNs are stealthy, reliable, flexible, and
persistent, and provide the Nation with an assured second strike
capability. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the enduring
requirements to maintain a secure and survivable sea-based deterrent.
Further, under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START),
SSBNs will be responsible for approximately 70 percent of our Nation's
deployed nuclear warheads.
With the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines approaching the
end of their unprecedented 42-year service life, it is now necessary
for the Navy to recapitalize this vitally important leg of the triad.
The next generation ballistic missile submarine will leverage the Ohio-
class and Virginia-class designs, components, and construction best
practices. The new SSBN is being designed to employ the highly
successful TRIDENT II D-5 life extension missile and associated
strategic weapon systems negating the need to simultaneously develop a
new missile system. By reducing midlife maintenance, including the
development of a life-of-ship reactor core, a class of 12 submarines
will be available to perform the same mission as today's 14 Ohio-class
submarines. In addition, this new ballistic missile submarine will
incorporate the enhancements in stealth necessary to ensure that it is
able to deliver the required survivability against threats expected to
emerge well into the 21st century.

93. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, why do we need the sea leg of
our nuclear triad?
Admiral Greenert. U.S. strategic deterrence promotes global
stability. Deterrence relies on the credible and survivable threat to
impose unacceptable consequences to an adversary should he consider an
attack against our Homeland. A survivable deterrent retains the ability
to conduct an assured retaliatory response even after being attacked.
For more than 50 years, the Navy's ballistic missile submarine force
has provided the most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic nuclear
deterrent triad. Our SSBNs are reliable, flexible, and persistent, and
provide the Nation with an assured second strike capability. The 2010
Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the enduring requirements to maintain
a secure and survivable sea-based deterrent. Further, under the New
START, SSBNs will be responsible for approximately 70 percent of our
Nation's deployed nuclear warheads.

94. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, why is 12 Ohio-class
replacement submarines the right number?
Admiral Greenert. Long term, the Navy needs a minimum of 12 SSBNs
to provide a survivable force and meet Commander, STRATCOM,
requirements. A force structure of 12 SSBNs provides 10 operational
SSBNs during the mid-life refueling overhauls required for each SSBN.
Ten operational SSBNs are needed to deploy SSBNs in two oceans, provide
continuous presence, and meet targeting and policy constraints. Force
structure requirements are not tied to the number of warheads carried
by each submarine.

95. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, do you oppose any further
delay to the Ohio-class replacement program? If not, why not?
Admiral Greenert. I am opposed to any further delay to the Ohio
replacement program because, based on current plans and programs, it
would reduce the total SSBN force structure below the absolute minimum
required to provide 10 operational SSBNs during the transition period
from the Ohio-class to the Ohio replacement. This would prevent us from
meeting Commander, STRATCOM, at-sea requirements.
Consistent with the DSC, in our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
we delayed the Ohio replacement program by 2 years. This delay will
result in an SSBN force of 10 ships in the 2030s and will require a
high state of readiness to meet the Nation's strategic deterrence
needs.

SIZE OF FLEET AND SEQUESTRATION

96. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in the past you have
testified that the Navy's fleet size would drop as low as 230 ships--
well below the established fleet size requirement of 306 ships--if
sequestration and the associated budget reductions go forward for the
entire period--fiscal year 2013 to fiscal 2021. What would be the
operational and national security implications of having so few ships
and submarines?
Admiral Greenert. Should the BCA of 2011 discretionary caps remain
in place through fiscal year 2021, we will take a deliberate and
comprehensive approach to the reduction, based on a reevaluation of the
DSG. In doing so, I will endeavor to: (1) ensure our people are
properly resourced; (2) protect sufficient current readiness and
warfighting capability; (3) sustain some ability to operate forward by
continuing to forward base forces in Japan, Spain, Singapore, and
Bahrain, and by using rotational crews; and (4) maintain appropriate
research and development.
Inevitably, these changes will severely damage our industrial base.
Some shipyards will not be able to sustain steady construction or
maintenance operations and may close or be inactivated. Aviation depots
will reduce their operations or become idle. Aircraft and weapons
manufacturers will slow or stop their work entirely. In particular, the
small firms that are often the sole source for particular ship and
aircraft components will quickly be forced to shut down. Once these
companies and their engineers and craftspeople move on to other work,
they are hard to reconstitute, sometimes impossible, at a later date
when our national security demands it.
The GFMAP represents our covenant with the geographic combatant
commanders on how we will match resources to their demand signal. The
GFMAP is a primary basis for our Force Structure Assessment and its
fleet size requirement of 306 ships.

97. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, if we allow sequestration to
continue and the Navy is forced to cut our fleet that much, what
message would that send to our potential adversaries, as well as to our
allies?
Admiral Greenert. Should the BCA of 2011 discretionary caps remain
in place through fiscal year 2021, we will take a deliberate and
comprehensive approach to the reduction, based on a reevaluation of the
DSG. In doing so, I will endeavor to: (1) ensure our people are
properly resourced; (2) protect sufficient current readiness and
warfighting capability; (3) sustain some ability to operate forward by
continuing to forward base forces in Japan, Spain, Singapore, and
Bahrain, and by using rotational crews; and (4) maintain appropriate
research and development.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

98. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus, why is the F-35 the Marine
Corps' number one aviation program?
Mr. Mabus. The Marine Corps will leverage the F-35B's capabilities
to ensure our tactical aircraft is able to provide fifth-generation
benefits to our ground warriors. The concept is one aircraft, capable
of multiple missions, providing the MAGTF with flexible expeditionary
basing and superior technology to dominate the fight. The F-35B is the
tactical aircraft we need to support our MAGTF from now until the
middle of this century. Our requirement for expeditionary tactical
aircraft has been demonstrated repeatedly since the inception of Marine
Corps aviation for over 100 years. From the expeditionary airfields and
agile jeep carriers, to close air support, to forward basing on
cratered runways and taxiways throughout Iraq, and strikes from the sea
in Libya to today's fight in Afghanistan, our ability to tactically
base fixed wing aircraft has been instrumental to our success on the
battlefield. Given the threats we will face in the future, the F-35B is
clearly the aircraft of choice to meet our expeditionary operating
requirements at sea and ashore. It is the interoperability catalyst
that optimizes our tactical aircraft effectiveness and will generate
unprecedented strategic and operational agility within our MAGTFs to
counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios
that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft.

99. Senator Ayotte. General Amos, why does the Marine Corps need
the F-35B?
General Amos. Given the threats we will face in the future, the F-
35 is the only aircraft capable of meeting our expeditionary operating
requirements at sea and ashore. It will generate unprecedented
strategic and operational agility within our MAGTF to counter a broad
spectrum of threats and capable of dominating in operational scenarios
that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft. The F-35B is the
tactical aircraft required to support our MAGTF for the next 50 years.
Our requirement for expeditionary tactical aircraft has been
demonstrated repeatedly since the inception of Marine Corps aviation.
From the expeditionary airfields and agile jeep carriers of World War
II, to close air support in proximity to troops in Korea and Vietnam,
to forward basing on cratered runways and taxiways throughout Iraq,
strikes from the sea in Libya through to today's fight in Afghanistan,
our ability to tactically base fixed wing aircraft in close proximity
of our ground forces has been instrumental to our success on the
battlefield.

JOINT LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE ELEVATED NETTED SENSOR SYSTEM

100. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, working with the Navy's
integrated fire control system, how would the Joint Land Attack Cruise
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) System help increase the
Navy's ability to engage targets despite jamming and long ranges?
Admiral Greenert. The JLENS system could be networked with Navy
surface-based anti-air weapons systems (e.g. AEGIS destroyers or
cruisers) to provide an additional, elevated radar that increases
surveillance range over the horizon and enables earlier detection and
engagement of missiles. This capability was demonstrated at a live-fire
event with the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air System in
September 2012 at White Sands Missile Range.

VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINE

101. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, how is the Virginia-class
submarine program performing?
Admiral Greenert. The Virginia-class continues to be a highly
successful acquisition program with ships consistently delivering early
and within budget. Nine ships have delivered, the last being USS
Mississippi (SSN-782), delivered 1 year ahead of schedule with a Navy
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) rating of green in all 22
areas. The program increased production to two ships per year in fiscal
year 2011, starting with the construction of USS Washington (SSN-787)
in September 2011, with a follow-on multi-year procurement contract for
10 ships in fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018.
Delivered ships are exceeding expectations for operational
performance, with five ships already completing successful full length,
worldwide deployments: USS Virginia (SSN-774), USS Texas (SSN-775), USS
Hawaii (SSN-776), USS North Carolina (SSN-777) and USS New Hampshire
(SSN-778). Virginia-class ships are preferentially assigned our most
challenging missions and have performed superbly. Specific mission
highlights are available at the appropriate classification level.

102. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, what is the Navy's
requirement for attack submarines?
Admiral Greenert. Per our 2012 Force Structure Assessment, the
Navy's requirement for SSNs is 48.

103. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, how will a shortfall in
attack submarines impact our undersea strike volume?
Admiral Greenert. Undersea strike volume will decrease by
approximately 63 percent, from today's force, in the 2030 timeframe due
to two factors: SSN force structure reductions and SSGN retirement.
The Navy is examining an option to increase strike volume via a
payload module inserted into 20 future Virginia-class. The Virginia
Payload Module (VPM) could more than triple the vertical launch
capacity in current Virginia-class ships, replacing the undersea strike
capacity gap created by the retirement of the SSGNs. VPM payload tubes
can also be used for other payloads such as Special Operations Forces
or unmanned vehicles. The current advanced engineering design work on
VPM will enable the Department of the Navy to incorporate VPM in the
fiscal year 2019 Block V Virginia-class buy.

104. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, based on the anticipated
shortfall in the number of attack submarines, as well as undersea
strike volume, how important is it that Congress provides the resources
for the Navy to build two Virginia-class submarines each year going
forward and that we move forward with the Virginia-class payload
module?
Admiral Greenert. Attack submarines provide a unique combination of
stealth, persistence, and firepower that complement and enable other
joint forces. Continuing to build two Virginia-class SSNs per year will
minimize the length of time that our SSN force structure is below the
validated requirement of 48, and maximize our ability to respond to
critical peacetime and wartime tasking.
Undersea strike is an asymmetric capability that assures joint
access with capabilities providing additional attack capacity in our
submarine force. The VPM could more than triple the vertical launch
capacity in current Virginia-class ships, replacing the undersea strike
capacity gap created by the retirement of the SSGNs. VPM payload tubes
can also be used for other payloads such as Special Operations Forces
or unmanned vehicles. The current advanced engineering design work on
VPM will enable the Department of the Navy to incorporate VPM in the
fiscal year 2019 Block V Virginia class buy.
While VPM represents a significant improvement in strike capacity,
it comes at a cost. Given the increased costs VPM would introduce in
the Virginia-class concurrent with our efforts to field the SSBN(X)
replacement, it may render VPM unaffordable as we assess the future
fiscal impact of sequestration.

NAVY HIRING FREEZE

105. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
impact is the across-the-board civilian hiring freeze having on the
Navy, and how will this impact worsen over time?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The hiring freeze has had a
significant negative impact on the Navy and the morale of its
employees. Since initiating the hiring freeze, the Navy's ability to
hire veterans and wounded warriors has been drastically cut. Veterans
account for approximately 57 percent of the Navy's civilian workforce.
Since the freeze, the numbers of wounded warriors and disabled veterans
brought onboard have dropped. Additionally, the Navy's efforts to build
a diverse workforce have been brought to a near standstill.
Prior to the hiring freeze, the Navy led the other Services and
exceeded both DOD and OPM targets for hiring reform metrics. These
metrics measure time to fill vacancies from beginning to end. Those
metrics now are held in abeyance until the Navy can once again
aggressively recruit and hire new talent. Hiring reform efforts are
part of the Navy's strategy to attract and retain a highly qualified
workforce as well as being an employer of choice.
Sustained execution of a hiring freeze will severely hamper the
Navy's ability to recruit a skilled and talented workforce capable of
executing the Navy's mission. Navy civilians play a critical role in
keeping the Navy and Marine Corps team operating forward--the Navy
workforce is among the most technical worldwide. More than half of the
civilian workforce are engineers, logisticians, mathematicians,
scientists, information technology, and acquisition specialists--many
with critical certifications and advanced degrees.
The hiring freeze creates critical gaps in the Navy's current
readiness as well as into the future. Recently Thomson-Reuters
recognized the Navy (along with our sister Service, the Army) as one of
the Top 100 Global Innovators--standing alongside such companies as
Apple, Google, Yahoo, and Xerox. We will not be able to maintain this
level of innovation if the hiring freeze continues.

SEQUESTRATION AND REBALANCE TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

106. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, if sequestration continues into fiscal year 2014, how will it
impact the Navy and Marine Corps rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2014 President's
budget submission is currently being assessed for impacts due to fiscal
year 2014 sequestration. Navy is working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense in the SCMR to inform the major decisions that
must be made in the decade ahead to preserve and adapt our defense
strategy, our force, and our institutions under a range of future
budgetary scenarios. In the event sequestration is allowed to occur in
2014, this will compel Navy to again dramatically reduce operations,
maintenance, and procurement in fiscal year 2014, preventing us from
meeting the fiscal year 2014 GFMAP. The uncertainty makes it difficult
to look long-term at how we should build, train, develop, and posture
the future force as we rebalance our effort toward the Asia-Pacific.
General Amos. We are concerned that sequestration will impose
significant impacts to our operational readiness as the effects are
occurring in the midst of our planned redistribution of forces in the
Pacific. Furthermore, sequestration will negatively reduce our
responsiveness and hinder our ability to maintain project power and
respond to crises in accordance with combatant commander requirements
and timelines. Our rebalance to the Pacific faced a significant
challenge with the planned downsizing of the Marine Corps to 182,100.
We mitigated this by pacing the reconstitution of the III MEF Unit
Deployment Program (UDP) commensurate with our force requirements in
the CENTCOM AOR and by accepting the impacts of the downsizing in other
commands in favor of sustaining, and in some cases increasing, our III
MEF force levels under the distributed laydown. Sequestration will
reduce the operational readiness of those Pacific-based forces to
conduct their assigned missions. Sequestration will also incur a
proportional delay in executing the facilities and force posture
restructuring necessary to achieve the distributed laydown plan,
inducing further risk for Marine Corps forces in the Pacific. Extending
the already protracted timeline for the distributed laydown increases
risk for III MEF due to disruption of operational capabilities during
the transition and relocation process.
In addition, sequestration will likely affect Marine Corps
participation in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events across the
Pacific, to include Phase II of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
(MRF-D), and the III MEF UDP. Phase II incorporates the growth in
Australia from a company to battalion sized SPMAGTF. Initial fiscal
year 2013/2014 costs related to site preparation for the larger unit,
and the costs associated with moving the equipment, agricultural
inspections, unit movement, as well as regional TSC strategic-lift
expenses are at risk. III MEF UDP is the Marine Corps method to project
Marine Corps forces forward in the PACOM AOR and may be affected by
sequestration, if funding is unavailable for deployment.
The significant impact to Marine Corps equity in the Pacific due to
sequestration is the effect on strategic mobility. Intra-theater lift
is a requirement due to the distances in the PACOM AOR. Marine Corps
ability to participate in TSC events could be impacted if Navy ships
are less available due to maintenance and other forms of intra-theater
lift are too expensive. While the Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV) is not
currently available, sustained sequestration may impact Marine Corps
capacity to fund JHSV use when the asset becomes available.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE FOR TACTICAL AVIATION

107. Senator Blunt. Admiral Greenert, last week you testified at a
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing expressing your concerns
about the strength and capacity of the defense industrial base in its
support of the Navy. However, you did not address the defense
industrial base for tactical aviation. It has been demonstrated that
having competition lowers cost and risk involved in production and
operations. In the past, this committee has expressed concern with the
Navy's tactical aviation shortfall, with its associated life cycle
costs and the risk brought to the carrier aviation forces. During the
past several years the Navy has reduced its shortfall figure, in part
through managing its carrier fleet tactical inventory, service life
extension programs (SLEP) of its legacy aircraft, and procuring new F/
A-18E/F Super Hornets. The fiscal year 2014 budget shows that the Navy
has not addressed this committee's concerns about cost and risk. The
budget shows the F/A-18 line will end domestic production after a final
procurement of EA-18G Growler aircraft this year. However, the F-35C
variant--the last of the three versions of the JSF aircraft--won't
reach operational status until at least 2017 or beyond. One of the ways
to mitigate against the risk in that program and the challenges
associated with SLEP is to keep the F/A-18 line open for domestic
production. As a way to mitigate risk in your tactical aviation
inventory, can you discuss the importance of having the F/A-18 line
available to support the tactical aviation needs of the Navy?
Admiral Greenert. The current plan for F/A-18 procurement is for a
total of 563 aircraft, with the final procurement in 2013 for delivery
in 2015. However, the production line will remain open with the
procurement of 21 E/A-18G in fiscal year 2014 with a delivery in 2016.
The production line will shut down after this procurement, unless we
receive international orders as a result of pending Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) offers. We have one partner nation that recently agreed to
buy 12 EA-18Gs for delivery in the 2017 timeframe, and are awaiting
decisions on two dozen additional aircraft from other nations. These
FMS procurements could extend the F/A-18 production line.
We continue to evaluate options to meet our strike fighter
requirements, to include possible procurement of additional Super
Hornets. The F-35C is a necessary part of our future air wing to enable
it to remain relevant against improving anti-access threats. The F-35C
will bring C4ISR capabilities and stealth that will complement the
capabilities of our F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler.

PRODUCTION GAP

108. Senator Blunt. Admiral Greenert, during these challenging
budget times and out heightened national security, are you concerned
about a production gap when the Navy can't procure operational tactical
aircraft for the carriers?
Admiral Greenert. Currently, we have both the Boeing line of F/A-
18E/Fs and Lockheed Martin F-35C line producing tactical aircraft for
our carriers.
Based on the potential for a production gap, Navy is closely
monitoring the production lines and continues to evaluate options to
meet our strike fighter requirements, to include possible procurement
of additional Super Hornets. The current plan for F/A-18E/F procurement
is for a total of 563 aircraft, with the final procurement in 2013.
However, the production line will remain open with the procurement of
21 EA-18G in fiscal year 2014 for delivery in 2016. The production line
will shut down after this procurement, with parts of the production
line for the manufacture of long lead items starting to shut down in
fiscal year 2014.
The F-35C is a necessary part of our future air wing to enable it
to remain relevant against improving anti-access threats. The F-35C
will bring C4ISR capabilities and stealth that will complement the
capabilities of our F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler.

109. Senator Blunt. Admiral Greenert, you wrote in proceedings
earlier this year that weapons payload and standoff ability will be
vital to tactical naval aviation in the shift to the Pacific theater.
Given this conclusion, the ability to carry different and diverse
weapons payloads should be critical in current and future combat
aircraft. Last week, the JSF program official testified before this
committee that there remains risk in the program's technical and
software development that could affect weapons payload. Specifically
with respect to the F-35C Navy variant, when will the aircraft reach
its Block III F full combat operational capability?
Admiral Greenert. Navy F-35C IOC shall be declared when the first
operational squadron is equipped with 10 aircraft, and Navy personnel
are trained, manned, and equipped to conduct assigned missions. Based
on the current F-35 JPO schedule, the F-35C will reach the IOC
milestone between August 2018 (Objective) and February 2019
(Threshold). Should capability delivery experience changes or delays,
this estimate will be revised appropriately.

110. Senator Blunt. Admiral Greenert, at that point, what weapons
payload will it be able to carry in order to meet the goals you
described?
Admiral Greenert. Block 3F for the F-35C will include the following
internal and external weapons capability:
Internally there are four weapon stations, two Air-to-Air stations
and two mixed usage Air-to-Air/Air-to-Ground stations. The Air-to-Air
stations will be capable of carriage and employment of AIM-120 Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air (AMRAAM) missiles. The mixed usage Air-to-Air/
Air-to-Ground stations are also capable of carriage and employment of
AIM-120 AMRAAM, as well as GBU-32 and GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM), the Joint Standoff Weapon System (JSOW), and GBU-12
laser guided bombs (LGB).
Externally there are seven weapon stations capable of carriage and
employment of up to four GBU-12 LGB, two AIM-9X Air-to-Air missiles,
and one 25mm gun pod.

111. Senator Blunt. Admiral Greenert, how does that Block III F
weapons payload compare with the current weapons payload profile of the
F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet?
Admiral Greenert. F/A-18E/F achieved IOC in 2001 and has expanded
its weapons portfolio as the program matured. Today a Block II Super
Hornet can deliver a variety of air-to-surface weapons including global
positioning system guided bombs such as the JDAM and JSOW, LGBs, and
missiles such as the High Speed Anti-radiation Missile (HARM) and
Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER). Super Hornet
Air-to-Air missiles include the infra-red homing AIM-9X, the semi-
active AIM-7 Sparrow, and the active AIM-120B/C Advanced Medium-Range
Air-to-Air Missile.
F-35C with Block 3F software and weapons will be able to engage
ground targets with the JSOW, JDAM, LGBs, and airborne threats with
AIM-9X and AIM-120C. The Department of the Navy will continue to expand
the arsenal of F-35C as the program evolves much like the Super Hornet
added weapons to its portfolio.
Both F-35C and F/A-18E/F will develop additional payload
capabilities to pace threat development. These payloads will include
networked, survivable, smart, precision munitions that will be
delivered by carrier-launched Super Hornets and JSF, leveraging
networked integrated fire control and advanced strike-fighter tactics.

SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

112. Senator Blunt. General Amos, this committee has been concerned
with the strength of the the Navy's tactical aviation fleet.
Specifically, we have questioned the inventory size and how the Navy
planned to mitigate a strike fighter shortfall in the near- and long-
term. Last year, the Marine Corps emphasized a SLEP for 150 F/A-18A-D
aircraft, which would help bridge to the F-35B. This year, briefings
indicate a new inspection regime for aging legacy aircraft. However,
you testified before the HASC that government depot-level inspections
for tactical aviation are taking far longer than anticipated. You
stated that your out-of-reporting aircraft is above 40 percent. I
understand that inspections are estimated to be taking at least twice
as long as anticipated. The Navy released a Request for Information to
the industry on capabilities available to support these depot
inspections, in part because there is a backlog of aircraft awaiting
inspection. Can you discuss the new inspection and SLEP plan for legacy
aircraft and has there been an analysis on the costs and schedule of
this new process?
General Amos. In order to meet our operational commitments through
2030, the Navy plans to extend the life on 150 F/A-18A-D aircraft to
10,000 flight hours by way of the SLEP. All other F/A-18A-D aircraft
will complete a high flight hour (HFH) inspection at the depot prior to
reaching the current service life limit of 8,000 hours. Once complete,
the aircraft will be granted an extension authorization to 9,000 hours
with recurring operational level inspections at 200-hour intervals. If
completed without additional work requirements, such as regularly
scheduled Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) 1 or 2, Center Barrel
Replacement (CBR), or other avionics modifications, then we only
require a Stand Alone inspection. Thus far, Navy has completed 102 HFH
inspections. In addition to the HFH inspection, each of these aircraft
required engineering analysis and follow-on repairs or parts
replacements in order to return it to an operational status.
The HFH Stand Alone turn-around time is averaging approximately 1
year. The average cost of this inspection is currently $447,186, due to
the complexity and thoroughness of the inspection. Many of the aircraft
inducted into the depot have required extensive repair and there has
not been a case where an aircraft only required an inspection which has
added to the challenges of attaining the 180-day turn-around goal. The
main contributors are material and engineering dispositions, both of
which are being closely monitored and standardized to improve
throughput. As the nonrecurring engineering (NRE) process continues to
develop Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) and associated kits, they
will be incorporated into aircraft inducted. This will alleviate long
lead material issues and reduce turnaround times at depot.
There has been analysis on the costs and schedule of HFH
inspections. 102 HFH inspections have been completed at the Fleet
Readiness Centers since 2008 and every year the Naval Air Systems
Command 4.2. Cost Team evaluates the cost and schedule based on updated
information. The results are then compared to the existing FYDP and
adjusted requirements are forwarded up through the budgeting process.

113. Senator Blunt. General Amos, what percentage of your fleet is
out-of-reporting?
General Amos. The percentage of Marine Corps F/A-18A-D aircraft
that are in out-of-reporting status is 45 percent. As of the latest
Naval Air Systems Command Flight Hour and Inventory Report (May 2013),
115 of 258 Marine Corps F/A-18A-D aircraft are out-of-reporting for
various depot level maintenance events. This constitutes approximately
45 percent (44.57 percent) of the Marine Corps F/A-18 fleet. There is
an increasing trend in out-of-reporting over the past year: May 2012
(88 of 245, 36 percent), September 2012 (102 of 249, 41 percent).

114. Senator Blunt. General Amos, what is the average time an
aircraft is out-of-reporting to undergo this inspection process?
General Amos. The HFH Stand Alone inspection (not combined with any
other recurring inspection) is averaging approximately 1 year to
complete.

115. Senator Blunt. General Amos, what is the cost of this new
inspection and SLEP plan across the FYDP?
General Amos. The average cost of the HFH Stand Alone inspection is
currently $447,186 with turnaround times averaging 328 to 403 days
depending on the depot site.
Fiscal year 2013 HFH inspections and SLEP plan are fully funded.
The FYDP costs are shown below.

[Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MAY 7, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Nelson,
McCaskill, Udall, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, and Lee.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel; and John H.
Quirk V, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; Allen M.
Edwards, professional staff member; Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional
staff member; and Natalie M. Nicolas, minority staff assistant.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and John
Principato.
Committee members' assistants present: Jason Rauch,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jess
Fassler and Brooke Jamison, assistants to Senator Gillibrand;
Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Marta McLellan
Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to
Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine;
Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King; Jacob Heisten,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to
Senator McCain; T. Finch Fulton and Lenwood Landrum, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad
Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to
Senator Graham; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt; and
Peter Blair, assistant to Senator Lee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to discuss the plans and
programs of the U.S. Air Force in our review of the fiscal year
2014 annual budget and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
I want to welcome Secretary Donley and General Welsh to the
committee this morning. This will be General Welsh's first
posture hearing as Air Force Chief of Staff and it is likely to
be Secretary Donley's final posture hearing, not certainly, but
probably, as Secretary. We thank you both for your long careers
of leadership and your service to the Department of Defense
(DOD) and to our Nation. A special thanks as we also appreciate
your flexibility on scheduling. This hearing has been scheduled
and rescheduled a number of times because of complications from
the late budget submission.
We are presented this morning with dramatic evidence of the
need for DOD to act swiftly and decisively to address the
plague of sexual assaults in the military. A DOD report,
scheduled to be issued later today, reportedly estimates that
on the average there are more than 70 sexual assaults involving
military personnel every day.
Just this past weekend, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jeff
Krusinski, the branch chief of the Air Force's Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Program, was arrested in Arlington
County, VA, and charged with sexual battery. While under our
legal system, everyone is innocent until proven guilty, this
arrest speaks volumes about the status and effectiveness of
DOD's efforts to address the plague of sexual assaults in the
military. We will ask our witnesses to explain in their opening
statements today what actions the Air Force has taken, plans to
take to address this plague.
The issue of possible changes in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) relative to the power of the convening
authority will be addressed at our markup of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) next month.
Over the past 12 years, Air Force personnel and equipment
have played a key role in support of our national security
goals in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world.
Over this time period, we have relied heavily on Air Force
strike aircraft to take on important ground targets, Air Force
manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles to provide
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support,
and Air Force tankers to support coalition air operations. I
hope that you two will extend on behalf of our committee our
gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force and their
families for the many sacrifices that they have made on our
behalf.
The Air Force faces a number of difficult challenges in
fiscal year 2014 and the following years.
First, the Air Force faces the ongoing challenge of
ensuring that it will have the right size and mix of assets and
capabilities to meet our strategic needs in a manner consistent
with a tight budget environment. The Air Force budget this year
calls for a pause in the major restructuring of Air Force
structure proposed last year, pending the results of the
National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. We will
look forward to receiving the Commission's report next spring.
Second, the Air Force is expected to play a key role in
implementing recent defense strategic guidance calling for a
shift to refocus emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region. I hope
our witnesses today will help us understand how this strategic
shift is reflected in the Air Force budget and in the Service's
future plans.
Third, the Air Force faces a continuing challenge in
managing its acquisition programs, including the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), which now stands as the most expensive
acquisition program in history. This challenge is exacerbated
when rising costs and tight funding lead the Air Force to
stretch out production lines, which delays modernization
programs and further increases unit costs. The Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that DOD make
significant changes to avoid the kind of costly delays and
overruns that have hit our acquisition system in the past.
While this legislation should help correct past problems, it
will succeed only through concerted efforts within the
executive branch to implement it.
These problems are greatly exacerbated also by the
implementation of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 and the
specter of further sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and
beyond. Sequestration, which is already required, is having an
adverse impact on the Air Force. General Larry Spencer, the Air
Force Vice Chief of Staff, testified last month that ``lost
flight hours will cause unit stand-downs which will result in
severe, rapid, and long-term unit combat readiness degradation.
We have already ceased operations for one-third of our fighter
and bomber force. Within 60 days of a stand-down, the affected
units will be unable to meet emergent or operations plans
requirements.''
Last week, Senator Inhofe and I sent a letter to the
Secretary of Defense in which we asked the Secretary to provide
us with a package of reductions to the fiscal year 2014 budget
that would meet the $52 billion savings requirement established
by the Budget Control Act (BCA). Now, that requirement in the
BCA will, hopefully, be met by Congress without a sequester.
All three budgets on table--the President's budget, the House
budget resolution, and the Senate budget resolution--would
avoid a sequester, but none of those are likely to be adopted
as proposed. As we explained in our letter to the Secretary, we
believe that the identification of specific reductions should
help prepare DOD for the possibility that we will be unable to
avoid another round of sequestration. But at the same time, it
should help Congress avoid sequestration because sequestration
is so irrational and draconian, and if the public knows how
unpalatable that outcome would be, it will hopefully help us
avoid the outcome. We cannot afford as a Nation to let
sequestration continue for another year.
So we look forward to exploring these and other issues with
our witnesses this morning.
I now call upon Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses and the tribute you made to Secretary
Donley. I believe this probably will be your last appearance as
a witness. You are a very good friend to all of us up here and
we appreciate your service. I am sure you will continue to
contribute to our country and to the men and women in uniform.
Today's hearing comes at not just a pivotal time, but at a
tragic time for our Air Force, and declining defense budgets
and ongoing effects of sequestration are having a significant
impact on the capabilities and readiness of our airmen.
I look to our witnesses to provide the committee with their
candid assessment of what this new budget reality means to the
Air Force and the risks that they are being forced to accept,
as well as what is being done to manage those risks.
General Welsh, you recently stated--and I am quoting, ``the
need for modernization is pervasive across our Air Force.'' I
could not agree with you more. I just wish that were the only
problem that we are facing right now.
America's combat air assets are worn out and spread too
thin after 2 decades of modernization programs being deferred
and canceled. The Air Force has to replace its aging aircraft
inventory, field new tankers and fifth generation fighters, and
build a new bomber and increase our long-range strike
capability. We have to maintain our space-based capabilities,
enhance our ability to operate in the cyber domain, and ensure
that our airmen are trained and ready to execute combat
operations across the spectrum of conflict.
Sadly, these efforts are being undermined by a broken
acquisition process. The way we develop and buy new weapons
systems is an arcane and cumbersome process that continues to
saddle the taxpayers with billions of dollars in cost overruns
while delaying the delivery of much needed technology to our
warfighters. Congress, DOD, and the defense industry have to
come together to reform and streamline this process.
The greatest near-term threat to the readiness and
capabilities of our Air Force is sequestration, as the chairman
stated. In order to meet the budget caps associated with
sequestration, the Air Force is raiding its readiness and
modernization accounts.
We learned last month that flight hours have been cut by
94,000. Seventeen combat squadrons, nearly a third of the
Active Duty combat fleet, have been grounded. The Air Force
estimates that it will take between 6 and 12 months at a
minimum to return these squadrons to mission-ready status. This
is unconscionable at a time when we are facing a global
security environment that is as dangerous and complex as any
time that I can remember.
Finally, it is critical that we take care of the most
important component of our Air Force. That is our airmen. We
must ensure that they are properly trained for the full
spectrum of operations, that they and their families receive
the medical care that they are entitled to, and that their
rights are protected.
Your written statement details several actions the Air
Force has taken to combat sexual assault. I agree that
providing a safe, respectful, and productive work environment
is the responsibility of every airmen at every level. But let
me be clear: I am not satisfied with the progress to date. More
must be done to eliminate this scourge and do everything
possible. Sexual assault undermines morale, hurts readiness,
and breaks the trust of those who have volunteered to serve our
Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Donley, we call on you, as Senator Inhofe said,
as kind of an old friend of many of ours. I may be the only one
on the committee--although I look around, there may be one
other one--who was here when you were on the committee staff.
You were a great staffer then and you have been a very fine
Secretary of the Air Force. We welcome you and we call upon you
now for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. Donley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here
representing our Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian
airmen.
I am also honored to be here this morning with my teammate,
our 20th Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Mark Welsh, a
great partner and a great Air Force leader.
For fiscal year 2014, the Air Force requests $114.1 billion
in our baseline budget. As with all budgets, our fiscal year
2014 request represents a snapshot in time, our best analysis
of Air Force needs, based on available information. Especially
given the budget turmoil over the past year, this morning's
discussion on the fiscal year 2014 budget needs to begin with
where we stand this year in fiscal year 2013.
First, I would like to highlight that throughout the
current budget turmoil, our Air Force priorities remain aligned
with the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. This includes
supporting combatant commanders in the current fight in
Afghanistan, maintaining a strong and stable presence in the
Pacific and Korea, supporting nuclear and regional deterrence,
counter-terror, and other operations.
There is demand for airpower, and your airmen are busy
around the world. Today more than 35,000 airmen are deployed.
More than 57,000 airmen are stationed overseas, and more than
132,000 are providing support to combatant commanders every
day.
As the fiscal constraints get tighter, we must tighten our
alignment with this new strategy and strengthen our commitment
to joint interdependent solutions to the Nation's military
challenges.
You have heard many times that the implications of the
sequestration reductions are dire. They are. That is why the
President has put forward a balanced deficit reduction proposal
that would allow Congress to repeal sequestration in fiscal
year 2013 and beyond. While DOD is working full out to adapt to
new fiscal realities, it was not possible, given the necessary
timelines, to turn around a new fiscal year 2014 budget based
upon new assumptions derived from the March 1 sequestration and
from the final Defense Appropriation Act, also approved in
March, nearly 6 months into the fiscal year.
We need to stipulate upfront that the fiscal year 2014
budget does not provide funding to recover from the damage done
by even a partial year of fiscal year 2013 sequestration, much
less the full impacts that would hit the Air Force if the
President's budget proposal to replace sequestration for fiscal
year 2013 and beyond is not enacted.
This morning I will summarize the state of our Air Force in
three broad areas: force structure, that is, the size and
composition of the Air Force; readiness, the training and
preparedness of our airmen and their equipment; and third,
modernization, the replacement of aging aircraft and
infrastructure and our investment in future capabilities.
Last year, in our efforts to meet the requirements of the
first half of the BCA, which included reductions of $487
billion over 10 years, the Air Force's fiscal year 2013 budget
proposed a number of force structure changes, including
aircraft transfers, retirements, and changes in unit missions,
that were the subject of much controversy in our Reserve
components, with the State Adjutants General, and congressional
delegations. Thanks to the work of this committee and others,
we were able to fashion a compromise which you approved in the
NDAA.
This year, I can report that the fiscal year 2014 budget
proposes no major changes in force structure. As compared to
the levels enacted in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, the fiscal
year 2014 proposal would reduce our Active Duty end strength by
1,860 airmen, reduce Air Force Reserve end strength by 480, and
reduce Air National Guard end strength by 300. We retain C-130
and Global Hawk Block 30 force structure as directed through
the end of fiscal year 2014. Our nuclear forces remain at
current levels, pending future decisions on implementation of
the New START agreement, and we are on track to achieve 65
medium-altitude combat air patrols with our remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) fleet. We will focus in fiscal year 2014 on
implementing the retirements, transfers, and mission changes
outlined in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. We have provided two
reports to Congress outlining implementation plans for each
affected unit and location.
Looking ahead, it has never been more important for the Air
Force to maximize the strength of the total force. Our Active,
Reserve, and Guard components are increasingly integrated,
training, deploying, and conducting the full range of missions
together as a total force. We must continue to ensure that our
Active and Reserve component mix correctly balances the
strengths of each component and meets our strategic
requirements and fiscal demands.
We have made progress over the last year in our
intergovernmental relationships, working with DOD and the
Council of Governors to formalize the consultative process
between DOD and the States to provide more transparency in
planning and programming. Within the Air Force, working with
our Guard and Reserve leaders, General Welsh and I have
established a Total Force Task Force to provide strategic
options on the appropriate mix of total force capabilities and
to inform our strategic planning for fiscal year 2015 and
beyond. This task force will also serve as a resource to the
congressionally-directed National Commission on the Structure
of the Air Force, which held its first meeting on April 30.
In summary, our proposed force structure is relatively
stable for now, but beyond fiscal year 2014, it is dependent on
decisions yet to be made and especially on achieving a balanced
approach to deficit reduction to avoid further sequestration.
Turning to readiness, while the Air Force has met the
demands of a high operational tempo in support of today's
fight, this has taken a toll on our weapon systems and our
people. Unit readiness declined significantly from 2003 onward,
and despite significant investments in the past few years, only
half of our combat air forces have met acceptable readiness
standards.
With the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and our continued
presence in the Middle East and Africa, we expect the demand
for Air Force capabilities will remain constant and perhaps
even rise over the next decade. We must improve readiness to
prevent a hollow force.
With respect to fiscal year 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Air Force leaders have already recounted the readiness
impacts we anticipated this year as a result of sequestration.
Passage of the final fiscal year 2013 Continuing Resolution
(CR), which included defense appropriations, was helpful to DOD
overall but did not improve the active Air Force's operation
and maintenance (O&M) budget. It left shortages in the Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) accounts and did not mitigate the
impacts of sequestration which required approximately $10
billion in reductions to be taken in the last 7 months of
fiscal year 2013.
Anticipating this challenge, at the beginning of January,
we took steps to cut back normal operations, including a
civilian hiring freeze for permanent, temporary, and term
vacancies, canceling non-mission critical official travel and
conferences, reducing major command and combatant command O&M
budgets by about 10 percent, and deferring non-emergency
facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization
projects. However, these steps alone are not sufficient to
absorb the full impacts of sequestration without affecting
readiness.
Collectively, these sequestration reductions and readiness
impacts are now being felt across the Air Force. Currently,
nine combat-coded fighter units and three combat-coded bomber
units are stood down and have ceased flying operations. Seven
combat-coded units are flying at basic mission capable levels
and will only return to combat mission ready status if funding
becomes available. Flying hour reductions will halt training
for the rest of the year in many units and will take up to 6
months to restore pilot proficiency.
Other impacts include reductions in weapon systems
sustainment that will delay necessary maintenance, increase
costs, and take perhaps 2 to 3 years to recover from repair
backlogs. The potential furlough of our valued civilian
workforce is significantly reducing civilian pay and
devastating morale and slowing productivity.
Our main objective in the fiscal year 2014 budget mirrors
our objective for 3 years running: to slow and reverse the
erosion of Air Force readiness. To that end, the fiscal year
2014 budget request is aimed at setting the Air Force back on
the course toward full spectrum readiness. The fiscal year 2014
request prioritizes funding for 1.2 million flying hours, an
increase of 40,000 hours over fiscal year 2013 to ensure pilot
proficiency and continue new pilot production. It funds
training ranges to enhance flying training effectiveness and to
restore deteriorating infrastructure. It also adds $1.5 billion
across the FYDP to weapon systems sustainment to keep our
aircraft and space systems ready.
Unfortunately, fiscal year 2013 sequestration now
jeopardizes the gains we had hoped to achieve next year. Even
assuming this budget is approved as proposed, and even if
Congress acted sometime this summer to repeal and replace
sequestration for fiscal year 2013, we would almost certainly
begin fiscal year 2014 carrying forward a significantly
degraded readiness posture from this year.
The Air Force is working with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) on a fiscal year 2013 reprogramming request to
cover OCO shortfalls and to address some of the worst effects
of sequestration. However, the budgetary transfer authority
available to DOD is not sufficient to address all our known
shortfalls. Even if such transfer authority were available, we
do not have sufficient internal resources to pay for these
shortfalls without digging far too deeply into modernization
programs, and there may not be sufficient time left in fiscal
year 2013 to repair the damage now immediately ahead.
To sum up the readiness situation, we have been consuming
Air Force readiness for several years and will continue to
focus resources available to meet combatant commander
requirements. But with the steep and late fiscal year 2013
budget reductions brought on by sequestration, the readiness
hole that we have been trying to climb out of just got deeper.
The full readiness and budgetary implications of this situation
could not be accounted for in the fiscal year 2014 Air Force
budget request and they are still under review. We will
continue to work with our DOD leadership and Congress to
fashion a practical way forward.
With respect to modernization, as I have previously
testified, this challenge facing the Air Force is pervasive and
will, if it is unaddressed, seriously undermine our ability to
accomplish the missions the Nation asks us to undertake. The
average age of our fighter aircraft is now 23 years; rescue
helicopters, 22 years; training aircraft, 25; bombers, 36
years; and tankers, nearly 50 years. Satellites for missile
warning, navigation, secure communications, and other needs are
also aging, and replacements must be built and launched on a
schedule consistent with the life expectancy of current
constellations.
Our most significant Air Force priorities remain on track
in fiscal year 2014: the fifth generation F-35, JSF; the KC-46
tanker; the long-range strike bomber (LRS-B). The continued
modernization of existing fleets like the B-2, the F-22, the F-
15, the F-16, and the C-17 to keep them operationally effective
and to extend their service lives is also key.
We request funding for preferred munitions, as well as
critical space satellite assets such as the global positioning
system (GPS); and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellite; and the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). We
intend to maintain science and technology funding in order to
stay on the cutting edge of technological innovation and
sustain our airpower advantage.
While we often face challenges with major acquisition
programs, we have recently achieved some notable success using
block buys and efficient procurement strategies to drive down
the costs of our three largest space programs--the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle, AEHF, and SBIRS--by over $2.5
billion. The fiscal year 2014 request includes the first year
of a multiyear procurement for the C-130J, which is expected to
save over $500 million over the next 5 years. We will need more
successes like these in the future because there is still
significant pressure on our modernization programs.
Last year, in programming the Air Force share of $487
billion in defense reductions over 10 years, the cancelation or
delay of modernization programs accounted for 65 percent of
total Air Force reductions across the FYDP. This year, each
program was reduced by more than 7 percent in sequestration. In
the immediate years ahead, major programs such as the F-35, the
KC-46, and the bomber are scheduled to grow as the overall DOD
budget declines, and some longstanding needs such as a new
trainer and a replacement for the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) are unfunded.
Looking ahead, if there continues to be resistance to force
structure changes, to base closures, and constraining growth
and compensation, and given our current focus on improving
readiness, it is very likely that out-year budget reductions
through the BCA will require further disproportionate cuts to
our modernization programs. As advanced technologies continue
to proliferate around the globe, these cutbacks in
modernization would put at risk the Air Force capabilities this
Nation will need in the next decade.
The decisions ahead of us are extraordinarily difficult,
but Congress has the power to help the Air Force and DOD
maneuver through these unparalleled budget challenges. In
recent years, Congress has placed limits on the Air Force's
efforts to take tough but urgently needed actions to balance
our readiness, modernization, and force structure and rejected
some of DOD's proposals to help slow the growth in military
compensation. As our DOD leaders have testified, these
congressional actions, if sustained, will add billions to our
costs over the next 5 years. We hope that in the view of the
serious economic problems facing our Nation that Congress will
allow us to implement these and other important changes.
It is now all the more critical that we get your support on
reductions in base infrastructure. The Air Force executed Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 on time and under budget,
and those adjustments are today generating savings estimated at
$1 billion per year. We are looking at European basing
requirements with our DOD partners, and we are ready to begin
next steps in the continental United States (CONUS). We
estimate that more than 20 percent of our basing infrastructure
is excess to need. BRAC authority is a tool that we urgently
need to allow DOD to divest excess infrastructure and refocus
resources to meet other critical needs, including readiness,
modernization, and taking care of our people.
In the area of military compensation, we are committed, as
you are, to taking care of our airmen, but the impact of
increasing personnel costs continues to be a serious concern
and can no longer be ignored. Therefore, we support DOD's
efforts to slow the growth of personnel costs. We support the
modest 1 percent pay raise and the TRICARE fee and pharmacy co-
pay changes included in the President's fiscal year 2014
budget.
While these are some of the broad outlines of our fiscal
year 2004 budget request, there is clearly more work to do as
we assess the rolling implications of sequestration in fiscal
year 2013 and beyond. We will need your help to make necessary
adjustments in our force structure, to keep us ready and to
avoid a hollow force, and to equip this Air Force with the
modern capabilities it needs for the future.
But perhaps one of the most helpful things Congress can do
is to return to regular order and to approve the annual defense
authorization and appropriations measures in a timely way.
Throughout our history, this Nation has effectively dealt with
strategic challenges and fiscal constraints, but our recent
track record of repeated delay and uncertainty, CRs that
disrupt programs and budget planning, and mid-year cuts that
impair readiness and threaten civilian furloughs must not
become the new normal. We sincerely appreciate the ongoing
commitment of this committee and its professional staff to
return to regular order.
Today's world is a dangerous place and it is
counterproductive to generate problems of our own making when
so many other serious threats beyond our control demand
attention. Together we must do better for our men and women in
uniform and their families, our civilian workforce, and our
national security.
Mr. Chairman, the American people have the world's best
airmen and the world's finest Air Force. Your Air Force
leadership team remains committed to getting the most
capability possible from whatever level of resources you
provide. We remain grateful for the support this committee
unfailingly provides to the Air Force and to the men and women
of our Armed Forces. The Air Force stands ready to assist in
any way we can, and we look forward to discussing our proposed
budget.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Secretary Donley, for a
very clear and a very forceful statement.
General Welsh.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE

General Welsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and members of the committee. It is always really a
privilege to appear before you.
It is a special privilege for me today because I get to sit
next to Secretary Donley on what is likely his last visit to
this committee. For the last 5 years, he has led our Air Force
with dignity and treating every airman with respect, and we
have been absolutely privileged to follow him. I would just
like to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, with your
forbearance to thank him publicly. Boss, thank you for being a
remarkable leader for our Air Force.
Ladies and gentlemen, despite the budgetary turbulence in
what I hope will be an atypical year, I believe that we will
see a continuing demand for American airpower in the future.
Because of that, while our fiscal year 2014 budget request does
not fully account for the necessary recovery actions from
sequestration, what it does do is prioritize our effort to
reverse our declining readiness trend, recognizing that low
states of readiness negate many of the strategic advantages of
that airpower.
Flying hours are allocated to maintain and in some cases to
incrementally improve readiness across the total force. In the
past, we relied on OCO funding to partially fund those flying
hour programs, and that cannot continue. So we will continue to
reduce our reliance on OCO funding for our flying hour program
through 2015, at which point we should meet as much as 90
percent of our peacetime flying requirement within our base
budget, a level we have not reached in quite some time.
We have also restored emphasis on our training ranges and
are funding about 75 percent in the 2014 budget request, up
from a low of about 25 percent only a couple of years ago.
As a side note, we also hope to realize cost savings from
the findings of our Total Force Task Force. This group was
formed to examine the operational impacts and cost factors
associated with various approaches to Total Force integration.
By identifying and implementing the optimum mix of our Active,
Reserve, and Guard components, we should be able to maximize
operational effectiveness, better provide stability over time
to our Reserve component missions and organizations, and better
support the States as well as provide for the national defense.
You can expect to see the results of this work presented in our
fiscal year 2015 budget submission.
Our fiscal year 2014 budget request also strives to protect
the modernization that will make our Air Force viable in the
future. The KC-46, the F-35, and the LRS-B remain our top three
investment priorities. We need the F-35. It remains the best
platform available to address the proliferation of highly
capable, integrated air defenses and new air-to-air threats.
The LRS-B will give our Nation a flexible, credible capability
to strike globally with precision on limited notice should the
national interest require. The KC-46 is our highest
modernization priority and will ultimately replace a third of
our current tanker fleet. That tanker fleet is what puts the
``global'' in global vigilance, global reach, and global power.
It provides strategic options for the Nation and we must
modernize it.
Four of the Air Force's 10 largest modernization programs
are space-based platforms. We plan to extend our streak of 58
consecutive successful launches and expand and modernize our
constellations like the GPS, the defense meteorological
satellite program, and others upon which our Nation and many of
our allies and partners depend.
We will also continue to invest in our most important
resources, our airmen. We will provide the training, education,
and professional development opportunities they need to be the
best in the world at what they do. That is all they ask of us.
On a decidedly negative note, both Secretary Donley and I
were appalled at the deeply troubling sexual battery
allegations against the chief of our Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Branch on the air staff just this weekend. As we
have both said over and over and over again, sexual assault
prevention and response efforts are critically important to us.
It is unacceptable that this occurs anywhere at any time in our
Air Force and we will not quit working this problem.
So you know, this case is being adjudicated by the
Arlington County prosecutor. We have requested jurisdiction,
which is standard practice in cases like these. The individual
will be arraigned this Thursday on a single count of sexual
battery, and the sexual assault prosecutor in Arlington County
will make the decision on jurisdiction and we will go from
there. That is as much as I know about this case.
We remain committed to supporting victims of this crime
and, consistent with the requirements of due process, to
holding those who commit this crime accountable for their
actions. We will continue to foster work environments that are
safe and respectful. We will develop leaders of character who
demonstrate operational effectiveness, innovation, and the
selfless caring approach required to lead America's sons and
daughters. We will continue to do everything in our power to
care for airmen and their families, while balancing the
resources required to do that, with the understanding that our
primary job is to fight and win the Nation's wars.
My job is to help Secretary Donley field the most capable,
credible Air Force possible. I believe our fiscal year 2014
budget request moves us in that direction. It postures the Air
Force to improve readiness, to limit force structure costs, and
to protect vital modernization. Secretary Donley and I stand
ready to answer your questions about it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared joint statement of Mr. Donley and General
Welsh follows:]

Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. Michael B. Donley and
Gen. Mark A. Welsh III, USAF

INTRODUCTION

Today's airmen play a pivotal role in the constant pursuit of
better ways to defend the Nation. Since the airplane was employed over
the battlefields of World War I, airmen have stood for and pioneered
new and innovative ways to shape the fight and reinvent the battle
itself. While pre-Kitty Hawk warriors relied on breaking through
fortified lines on the ground, airmen have always sought to go over,
not through, those fortifications to achieve victory. This spirit of
innovation, seeing problems from an alternative, multi-dimensional
perspective, is in our Service history, in our culture, and in every
airmen--Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian--regardless of his or her
specialty or role. We call this perspective ``airmindedness.'' Airmen
characteristically view security challenges differently--globally,
without boundaries.
As a direct result of our status as the world's preeminent
aerospace nation, airpower--the ability to project military power or
influence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and
cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives--
allows America to control the ultimate high ground that is essential to
winning our Nation's wars. The air arms of the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps are supremely capable at what they do--facilitating their parent
Service's respective mastery of operations on the ground, at sea, and
in a littoral environment. However, America has only one Air Force
specifically designed and precisely employed to exploit the singular
global advantages of military operations in air, space, and cyberspace.
Airmen provide global vigilance, global reach, and global power for
America through the enduring Air Force core missions of air and space
superiority, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
rapid global mobility, global strike, and command and control. By
integrating capabilities across these core missions, we bring a unique
set of options to deter war, deliver rapid, life-saving responses to
threatened areas anywhere on the planet, and strike hard and precisely
wherever and whenever the national interest demands.
Recruiting and developing high-quality, innovative airmen who
leverage technology to rethink military operations to achieve strategic
objectives will remain a fundamental tenet of the U.S. Air Force. Only
through the efforts of airmen who have led the way in integrating
military capabilities across air, space, and cyberspace--even as their
numbers have become significantly smaller--has our Nation maintained
its airpower advantage. In an uncertain world, the Nation will depend
even more on ready airmen to deliver global reach, global vigilance,
and global power.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued new defense
strategic guidance (DSG)--Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense--which serves as a foundational document in
establishing national security interests, the threats to these
interests, and the fiscal realities that guide our military posture.
The DSG directed a rebalance of forces, with a renewed focus on the
Asia-Pacific region, as well as continued emphasis on the Middle East.
Using the DSG as a point of departure, the Secretary of Defense
recently directed a strategic choices and management review in light of
budget realities--such as sequestration--and strategic uncertainty.
This review will continue to help the Air Force to identify the major
strategic choices that we must make to properly and realistically plan
for the future.
Although the future is uncertain, we know that the capability to
sustain national priorities hinges upon a strong and capable Air Force.
Over the last 12 years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required Air
Force capabilities to help force rogue regimes from power and then to
provide critical support to land forces engaged in counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism operations, and the Air Force currently plans to
maintain these capabilities. In addition, the expected military
challenges of the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, and Africa
suggest an increasing reliance on airpower, not only by America and her
allies, but also by her adversaries. The defining characteristics of
American airpower--range, speed, flexibility, precision, persistence,
and lethality--have played a crucial role in cultivating stability in
these regions, a trend that will only increase in the future. The sheer
geographic size and extended lines of communication of the Asia-Pacific
region, along with the developing military expansion of potential
regional adversaries, demand an air force that is postured to ensure
stability and preserve U.S. interests. The Air Force is committed,
along with our joint partners and allies and through cooperative
military relationships, to ensuring global and regional stability and
mutual freedom of access to the global commons to secure our common
interests around the world.
The Air Force's technological advantage is threatened by the
worldwide proliferation of advanced technologies, including integrated
air defenses, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles with precision-
capable warheads, and advanced air combat capabilities. Advances in
adversarial capabilities in space control and cyber warfare may also
limit U.S. freedom of action. Some of these technologies are attained
with relatively minimal cost, greatly reducing the barriers to entry
that have historically limited the reach and power of non-state actors,
organized militias, and radical extremists. We live in an age of
surprise, where individual acts can be powerful and the effects can be
global. Today's strategic environment presents a broad range of threats
and an unpredictable set of challenges, ranging from non-state actors
to nuclear armed nations. We must continue to invest in our science and
technology base to ensure that the future balance of power remains in
our favor. This requires flexibility, versatility, and a shift to
inherently agile, deployable, and networked systems from those designed
for fixed purposes or limited missions.
One initiative that we continue to pursue as we consider the
strategic environment is the Air-Sea Battle concept. Air-Sea Battle is
an operational concept focused on the ways and means that are necessary
to overcome current and anticipated anti-access and area denial
threats. By focusing on increased integration and interoperability
between all Services, the concept ensures that joint forces maintain
the ability to project power and protect national interests despite the
proliferation of anti-access/area denial threats worldwide. The concept
is not a strategy, nor does it target a specific adversary, but instead
focuses on acquiring pre-integrated, joint capabilities. Beyond
conflict, the Air-Sea Battle concept can enhance response to
humanitarian missions where weather or geography may deny access.
Even as we rebalance our forces, we are aware that the time, place,
and nature of the next contingency can never be predicted with
certainty. When contingencies arise, we must maintain the ability to
respond immediately and effectively if called to action. To align with
the DSG, the Air Force has traded size for quality. We aim to be a
smaller, but superb, force that maintains the agility, flexibility, and
readiness to engage a full range of contingencies and threats.

FISCAL ENVIRONMENT

We recognize that because our Nation is striving to reduce spending
and our military is transitioning operations from the U.S. Central
Command area of responsibility and rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific
region, the Air Force must adapt to a relatively static or reduced
budget. However, reliance by the joint team and the Nation on our
unique ability to provide global vigilance, global reach, and global
power constrains Air Force options in reducing or terminating
capabilities or missions. Therefore, we are working hard and making
real progress in eliminating unnecessary expenses and ensuring more
disciplined use of resources. Nonetheless, the fiscal environment
requires us to make trades between force structure, readiness, and
modernization among the core missions to ensure the highest quality and
ready Air Force possible.

Fiscal Year 2013 Sequestration Effects
As a result of the triggering of the 2011 Budget Control Act's
sequestration provision, the Air Force is implementing significant
reductions to our fiscal year 2013 operations. If the post-sequester
Budget Control Act funding caps remain in effect, the Air Force will be
unable to achieve our agenda of reinvigorating readiness and aligning
to the DSG. In both the short- and long-term, sequestration will have
devastating impacts to readiness, will significantly affect our
modernization programs, and may cause further force structure
reductions.
Sequestration will force the Air Force to reduce expenditures by
around $10 billion in fiscal year 2013. These actions include a planned
furlough of more than 170,000 civil service employees, an 18 percent
reduction in flying training and aircraft maintenance, and deferment of
critical facility requirements (including runway and taxiway repairs).
Many of these actions severely degrade Air Force readiness. Lost
flight hours will cause unit stand downs which will result in severe,
rapid, and long-term unit combat readiness degradation. We have already
ceased operations for one-third of our fighter and bomber force. Within
60 days of a stand down, the affected units will be unable to meet
emergent or operations plans requirements. Lost currency training
requires 6 months to a year to return to current suboptimal levels,
with desired flying proficiency for crewmembers requiring even longer.
Sequestration impacts are already occurring, and the fiscal year 2014
President's budget (PB) does not assume the costs of recovering the
readiness impacts from even a partial year of sequestration.
Depot delays will also result in the grounding of some affected
aircraft. The deferments mean idled production shops, a degradation of
workforce proficiency and productivity, and corresponding future
volatility and operational costs. It can take 2 to 3 years to recover
full restoration of depot workforce productivity and proficiency. In
our space portfolio, sequestration will force the elimination of some
system redundancies, as well as other preventative maintenance actions
designed to minimize risk. All of these sequestration impacts
negatively affect Air Force full-spectrum readiness at a time when we
have been striving to reverse a declining trend in this critical area.
As a result of the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, the Air Force has been able to make limited
funding transfers and reprogramming actions that will help alleviate
the most problematic and immediate fiscal year 2013 funding shortfalls.
However, the decisions that we have been forced to make in short-term
spending may increase total costs over the long run. For example,
sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will impact every one of
our investment programs. These program disruptions will, over time,
cost more taxpayer dollars to rectify contract restructures and program
inefficiencies, raise unit costs, and delay delivery of validated
capabilities to warfighters in the field. The drastic reduction to
modernization programs reduces our Air Force's competitive advantage
and decreases the probability of mission success in the Asia-Pacific
region.

Sequestration Effects in Fiscal Year 2014 and Beyond
The President's budget includes balanced deficit reduction
proposals that would allow Congress to replace and repeal sequestration
in fiscal year 2013 and the associated cap reductions in fiscal year
2014-2021. If sequestration is not replaced, however, the Air Force
will have to rebuild degraded unit readiness, accept further delays to
modernization, absorb the backlog in depot maintenance inductions, and
invest additional funding to restore infrastructure. While the Air
Force has made every effort to minimize impacts to readiness and
people, the bow-wave of reductions, deferments, and cancellations
associated with sequestration will challenge the strategic choices made
in the fiscal year 2014 budget submission.
The exact impacts of sequestration on Air Force resources in fiscal
year 2014 and beyond depend on congressional action. We do know,
however, that the national fiscal situation will require some
reductions that may increase risk to our readiness, force structure,
and our ability to modernize an aging aircraft inventory. In addition,
the outcome of the strategic choices and management review may drive
further changes.
As we navigate the uncertain way ahead, in order to mitigate risk
in critical areas like readiness, force structure, and modernization,
and to avoid a hollow force, we will continue to work with Congress to
develop force shaping options, urgently seek another base realignment
and closure (BRAC) round, and ask for relief from legislative
restrictions on the reduction of excess force structure and from
mandatory expenditures on programs that we have proposed to retire or
terminate. To slow the growth in military compensation while also fully
supporting the All-Volunteer Force, we also request congressional
support on limiting the basic military pay raise to 1 percent and
allowing sensible TRICARE fee and pharmacy co-pay changes.
In spite of these fiscal challenges, the Air Force will continue to
strive to balance reductions across the force to maintain the
capabilities of the remaining forces and keep the Air Force strong.

AIR FORCE CORE MISSIONS

The Air Force will only remain a superb fighting force in fiscal
year 2014 and beyond by investing in the capabilities that enable us to
bring our five core missions to the joint team. President Truman
assigned several roles and missions to the Air Force at its
establishment in 1947. Today, the Air Force brings essentially the same
interdependent, integrated, and enduring contributions to the joint
fight:

Air and space superiority;
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
Rapid global mobility;
Global strike; and
Command and control.

Through these core missions, our airmen provide global vigilance,
global reach, and global power for America. While the means through
which we provide these core missions will change and evolve--for
example, the addition of space and cyberspace--the core missions
themselves will endure. None of these core missions function
independently. Their interdependency and synchronization provide an
unparalleled array of options, giving America the ability to respond
quickly in the face of unexpected challenges.
The five core missions shape where we invest the resources we are
given. However, the significant reductions that the Air Force has faced
in the last few years have required us to make difficult choices. We
have become a markedly smaller Service--the smallest in Air Force
history.
Despite this decline in size, our airmen have stepped up to the
challenge and delivered incredible airpower for the Nation, 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. They always respond when needed--
from combat rescue airmen who exfiltrate the wounded from battlefields,
to joint terminal attack controllers who direct the actions of combat
aircraft engaged in close air support, to mobility airmen who quickly
airlift personnel, vehicles, and equipment in both combat and relief
operations, to the missile combat crews who sit nuclear alert to deter
our enemies. These brave and innovative men and women must be properly
trained and equipped to defend the Nation. Experience has taught us
that during periods of fiscal austerity, tough decisions are necessary
to avoid a hollow force--one that looks good on paper, but has more
units, equipment, and installations than it can support, lacks the
resources to adequately man, train, and maintain them, and are not
provided with enough capable equipment and weapons to perform their
missions.
In each core mission described below, we highlight what each core
mission means, why it is important, our airmen's recent accomplishments
in that area, and what we are focusing on for the future with respect
to force structure and modernization.
Air and Space Superiority . . . Freedom From Attack, Freedom to Attack
Air Superiority
Air superiority is foundational to the application of joint
military power, and it ensures that the advantages of the other Air
Force core missions, as well as the contributions of our sister
Services, are broadly available to combatant commanders. It includes
the ability to control the air so that our military forces do not have
to worry about being attacked from the air, and it ensures that joint
forces have the freedom to attack in the air, on the ground, and at
sea. Air superiority has been and remains an essential precondition for
conducting successful military operations. Air superiority has provided
our Nation with a decades-long asymmetric advantage. Joint force and
coalition commanders have come to expect mission-essential air
superiority provided by America's airmen. The Air Force has given them
ample reason--not since April 15, 1953, has an enemy combat aircraft
killed a servicemember in the American ground forces.
In the six major U.S. combat operations of the last two decades,
the Air Force's ability to provide air superiority has played an
indispensable role in determining the outcome of each conflict.
Recently, in Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, our airmen
patrolled the skies of Libya providing 50 percent of allied airborne
reconnaissance and 40 percent of allied strike missions, equating to
over 1,800 total strikes in support of the United Nations-sanctioned
no-fly zone. In addition, the Air Force provides nearly 100 percent of
the Nation's homeland air defense.
Although air superiority underwrites the freedom of action required
for all joint military operations, there is no guarantee of it in the
future. Substantial near peer investment and proliferation of advanced
technologies threatens this freedom of action. Our legacy, or fourth-
generation, fighter fleet has secured more than 20 years of an air
superiority advantage, but may lose its ability operate as effectively
in contested environments. Large-scale use of legacy aircraft in these
environments could be inhibited by the increased survivability of
highly lethal, advanced integrated air defenses that will likely
persist for the duration of future conflicts. Our air superiority
future depends on modern technology and fifth-generation fighter
capability. Weapon systems like the F-22, with contributions from the
F-35, are what will carry America's Air Force forward to continue to
provide that capability. Fifth-generation aircraft possess the
survivability to operate despite these threats, and the Nation will
need them in quantity.
In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force will focus on maintaining air
superiority by investing $1.3 billion to modernize the F-22 and F-15
fleets. The last F-22A was delivered in May 2012. The current F-22
upgrade programs include hardware and software enhancements to improve
electronic protection, weapons capabilities, and service life. The F-15
is undergoing full scale fatigue testing to determine remaining service
lifespan. In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force is requesting $308 million
for F-15 fleet radar and electronic warfare upgrades that will permit
it to operate in conjunction with fifth-generation aircraft in the
future threat environment.
Space Superiority
Along with air superiority, space superiority is integral to our
forces' ability to remain free from attack and have the freedom to
attack in the air, on land, and at sea. Joint, interagency, and
coalition forces depend on Air Force space operations to perform their
missions every day. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS)
enables precision guided munitions employment by all Services, in all
weather conditions, minimizing collateral damage and providing the
nanosecond-level timing needed by today's interconnected and highly-
networked communications systems. Beyond defense uses, annual GPS
benefits to the economy are in the tens of billions of dollars. Air
Force military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems, including
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Wideband Global SATCOM
(WGS) satellites, provide wideband and protected communications to
deployed forces around the globe. This enables the command and control
needed by our joint force commanders and allows deployed warfighters to
receive intelligence, logistical, and other support from those serving
at their home stations.
In calendar year 2012, the Air Force launched nine National
Security Space (NSS) satellites to bolster our GPS, MILSATCOM, and
situational awareness, and this year, we have successfully launched an
additional satellite to enhance our missile warning capability. These
launches include putting the fourth WGS, the second AEHF satellite, and
the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) GEO-2 satellite into orbit. The
Air Force also delivered to orbit a new communications satellite for
the Navy, a third GPS II-F satellite, and four National Reconnaissance
Office satellites, as well as handled the third successful launch of an
orbital test vehicle (OTV), including the first reuse of OTV-1. These
launches make 58 consecutive successful Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) launches to date and 90 consecutive successful NSS
missions.
To continue to advance our space superiority mission, the Air Force
will continue to launch satellites to enhance the GPS, AEHF, WGS,
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), and SBIRS
constellations. In calendar year 2013, in addition to the SBIRS GEO-2
launched in March, the Air Force has five more launches planned--two
GPS, one AEHF, and two WGS. In calendar year 2014, the Air Force plans
five launches--three GPS, one DMSP, and one additional EELV launch.
Each of these launches will continue the necessary modernization of
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing, protected
communications, weather monitoring, and missile warning.
Despite our success in space, we cannot take our space
technological capabilities and advantages for granted. The barriers to
space access have dropped; nine nations have cleared the engineering
and technical challenges required to reach space independently, and at
least 40 other nations have a space presence. As a result, the current
space environment is more congested, contested, and competitive than
ever, and we will see this trend continue for the foreseeable future.
To ensure that America remains a nation with unfettered access to space
and superior space capabilities, the Air Force is pursuing ways to
maintain a resilient \1\ and affordable system architecture. Building
and launching satellites is expensive, and we are exploring ways to
reduce costs, increase competition, and improve resiliency without
introducing unacceptable risk.
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\1\ Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the
functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or
adverse conditions. An architecture is ``more resilient'' if it can
provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of
reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions,
and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative
government, commercial, or international capabilities.
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Our space programs demand significant modernization investment, and
the pace of modernization for those programs often is based on the life
expectancy of on-orbit capabilities. The Air Force's 10 largest
programs include four space systems upon which the joint team and the
American public depend. We must sustain these critical space
capabilities with a focus on warfighting and mission assurance
priorities, while accepting risk to meet fiscal goals.
To get our satellites safely into orbit, the Air Force has
implemented a new EELV acquisition strategy to efficiently purchase up
to 36 EELV common core boosters at a savings of more than $1 billion.
This strategy also introduces a competitive environment for up to 14
additional common core boosters for which new launch provider entrants
can compete, starting as early as fiscal year 2015, giving new entrants
a clear path to compete for future NSS missions. For fiscal year 2014,
we are investing $2 billion in EELV.
Our Efficient Space Procurement (ESP) strategy \2\ is driving down
satellite costs, resulting in savings across the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) of more than $1 billion for AEHF satellites, and
modernizing MILSATCOM systems to provide greater capacity, force reach
back, and access in benign, contested, and nuclear environments. To
improve our ability to provide global, persistent, and infrared
surveillance capabilities, the Air Force is requesting $1.2 billion in
fiscal year 2014 for sustained funding of the Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS). We have already achieved over $500 million in savings
due to our ``block buy'' approach and have the potential for additional
future savings in the SBIRS program due to the ESP strategy.
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\2\ ESP is an acquisition strategy that builds on the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation-developed
concept known as Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE).
EASE sought to lower the cost of acquiring space systems by using block
buys and reinvesting the savings into the Space Modernization
Initiative. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition took the EASE concept as a building block and added
``should cost/will cost'' methodology and fixed price incentive fee
contracting.
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In addition to replenishing and modernizing aging satellite
constellations in critical space mission areas, the Air Force must
improve space surveillance and the resilience of space-based
capabilities. Therefore, in fiscal year 2014, we are requesting $1.2
billion to modernize the GPS space, control, and user segments,
including the addition of new signals and enhanced anti-jam
capabilities. To ensure precision navigation and timing capabilities in
the future, we are also developing technologies, including chip scale
atomic clocks, cold atoms, and vision-based navigation to reduce
dependency on GPS. Space situational awareness (SSA) is truly
foundational for ensuring our ability to operate safely and effectively
in space. To improve our ability to discover, search, and monitor near
earth objects, we are requesting $403.7 million to fund the Space
Fence, a new system that will provide increased capacity to observe
objects in space and, therefore, improve our ability to safely operate
our critical space systems.
International Space Partnerships
The Air Force remains fully committed to the long-term goal of
fostering international relationships and supporting ongoing security
efforts with partner nations around the globe. Teaming with allies and
partners not only helps cost-sharing, but it also increases their
capability and their capacity to support contingency operations. Space
is an area in which we have made significant progress in building
partnerships. For example, in May 2012, the Air Force concluded a
United States-Canada SSA partnership memorandum of understanding (MOU)
regarding the Canadian Sapphire satellite system, and we successfully
concluded a United States-Australia MOU in November 2012 to begin an 8-
year, bilateral effort to provide dedicated space surveillance coverage
in the southern hemisphere. International partners are also supporting
our SATCOM efforts. In January 2012, the Air Force signed the WGS MOU
with Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand to
enable expansion of the WGS program to a ninth satellite, thus
increasing interoperability and partner access to the system. We are
also acquiring and fielding the AEHF constellation in cooperation with
our international partners from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
and Canada. In addition, the Air Force has also established nine bi- or
multi-lateral international agreements to advance the benefits of the
GPS system.
In coming years, our Nation's ability to gain and maintain
superiority in air and space will become progressively more contested
as sophisticated technologies continue to proliferate. Beyond
modernizing our systems, the key to maintaining air and space
superiority is ready and trained airmen who are properly equipped for
their mission. When called upon, these airmen must command a well-honed
combat edge so that they are ready to prevail even against the most
advanced opponents.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance . . . Eyes and Ears on
Adversaries
Since the beginning of armed conflict, superior knowledge of
adversary intentions, capabilities, and actions has been a critical
enabler to victory. The evolution of globally integrated ISR has
fundamentally changed how our military fights wars. The tremendous
demand for Air Force ISR during recent conflicts and crises highlights
their combat advantage. ISR capabilities are among the first requested
and deployed, and they are increasingly essential to all facets of Air
Force and joint operations. Airmen deliver integrated, cross-domain ISR
capabilities that allow the Air Force to provide our Nation's decision-
makers, commanders, and warfighters with a continual information
advantage over our adversaries.
The Air Force ISR force is networked to provide both foundational
intelligence and immediate warfighter support. Sensors operating in
air, space, and cyberspace, global communication architectures, and a
network of regionally aligned centers enable our forces to conduct
exploitation and analytical efforts in support of combatant commander
requirements. The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) is
a critical capability within this global network, providing decision
advantage across the spectrum of conflict, in all theaters, and in
support of all operations.
Last year, our ISR airmen conducted intelligence preparation of the
operational environment, shaped combat plans for 33 named operations,
enabled the removal of 700 enemy combatants from the fight, and
provided critical adversary awareness and targeting intelligence to
U.S. and coalition forces in over 250 ``troops-in-contact''
engagements. ISR airmen enhanced battlespace awareness through 540,000
hours of sustained overwatch of tactical maneuver forces and lines of
communication and identified over 100 weapons caches and explosive
devices that would have otherwise targeted American and partner forces.
ISR Force Structure and Modernization
In fiscal year 2014, our ISR budget request maintains investments
in the DCGS, the MQ-1 Predator, the RC-135 Rivet Joint, the RQ-4 Global
Hawk Block 40, and U-2 programs, and makes internal adjustments in MQ-9
Reaper program funding so that the program was able to meet a key
acquisition milestone.
The Air Force remains on track to field 65 MQ-1B Predator and MQ-9A
Reaper combat air patrols by May 2014. To maintain our ability to
conduct counterterrorism operations, we are standing-up five new
medium-altitude remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) combat air patrols in
calendar year 2013 and continuing our transition to an all-MQ-9 fleet.
We have built a highly effective permissive ISR capability--a growth of
4,300 percent since 2000--but the survivability in contested
environments of some RPA is questionable. Therefore, in a post-
Afghanistan security environment and as we rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific, we are reviewing the need to adjust the RPA mix toward more
survivable systems.
The enduring and universal requirement for ISR capabilities,
coupled with a complex and dangerous future security environment, drive
the need to modernize our ISR forces. This modernization will include
improved automated tools for the Air Force DCGS, a system that allows
the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of an enormous amount
of information every day, as well as integrated networks that are
secure and reliable. The regionally aligned distributed ground sites
will be the centerpiece of our cross-domain, global ISR enterprise and
will allow airmen to exploit real-time data from sensors and platforms,
even in contested environments. To modernize to an easily upgradable
and interoperable architecture, we must overcome policy and technical
impediments to allow for seamless intelligence sharing and integration
with intelligence community agencies, other Services, and coalition
partners. The fiscal year 2014 PB requests $62 million for military
construction investments for a new DCGS building to support more than
200 operators, maintainers, support personnel, and mission systems at
Beale AFB, CA.
Significant reductions in Air Force-provided ISR capabilities would
be inconsistent with the current needs of our joint forces. Although
ISR forces will continue to engage in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations, they must also evolve to address the
challenges of the more contested environment of the Asia-Pacific
region, including increased emphasis on air and naval forces, as well
as greater cooperation and partnership with allies and regional
partners. For example, we are currently exploring potential ISR
efficiencies that can be gained by collaborating with the Navy, and we
continue to grow and mature our intelligence partnerships with
strategic allies across the Pacific. One ISR airmen will also continue
their partnerships within the intelligence community to leverage
national capabilities for the air component commander and better
position combat support agencies to support air, space, and cyber
operations.
To enhance our ability to conduct ISR across the range of military
operations, we must shift our efforts to solutions that enable robust
and reliable communication architectures, all-domain data processing
and exploitation, advanced analytical tools, and cross-domain
targeting. We are dedicated to improving the automation and machine-to-
machine capabilities of intelligence analysis systems in order to
deliver greater operational advantage to combatant commanders.
Therefore, in the fiscal year 2014 PB, we are requesting an increase of
88 personnel at the Air Force Targeting Center to support deliberate
planning requirements, and we are investing $20 million for network
centric collaboration targeting capabilities, which includes developing
targeting automation tools, machine-to-machine interfaces, and auto-
populate capabilities across ISR intelligence and command and control
systems. We also plan to add Air National Guard targeting units at two
locations to solidify our commitment to reinvigorating the Air Force
targeting enterprise.
The strength of our Air Force ISR enterprise continues to be our
professional, well trained, and dedicated airmen, officer, enlisted,
and civilian, who take all this technology and data and transform it
into a decision advantage for our Air Force, our joint teammates, and
our Nation. Air Force ISR allows our forces to own the night in
Afghanistan, connect with partners across Europe and Africa, and
provide warning on the Korean peninsula. The integration of air, space,
and cyber ISR is a powerful capability--one in which we must continue
to invest our talent and resources.
Rapid Global Mobility . . . Delivery on Demand
The Air Force's rapid global mobility core mission projects
American influence quickly and precisely to anywhere on the face of the
earth. Air mobility forces provide swift deployment and sustainment
capability by delivering essential equipment and personnel for missions
ranging from major combat to humanitarian relief operations around the
world and at home. On any given day, the Air Force's mobility aircraft
deliver critical personnel and cargo and provide airdrop of time-
sensitive supplies, food, and ammunition on a global scale. America's
mobility fleet averages one take-off or landing every 2 minutes, every
day of the year.
Airlift
The Air Force provides unprecedented airlift responses through our
strategic and tactical airlift fleets. Here at home, a 12-base effort
was initiated within 72 hours of Superstorm Sandy's landfall in October
2012. Active and Reserve airlift crews from Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base (AFB), McChord AFB, and Travis AFB converged on March Air Reserve
Base and worked together to move 356 utility workers from across
California and 134 utility vehicles with their associated equipment--
totaling 2.4 million pounds of cargo--in less than 96 hours to places
like Stewart Air National Guard Base and John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York. This Total Force effort helped quickly bring
utility trucks and workers to where they were needed on the east coast
to help restore power to affected Americans 4 days sooner than if the
vehicles and equipment would have been driven across the country.
In calendar year 2012, airmen flew 38,000 airlift missions, and
over the course of 1,300 airdrops, the Air Force dropped 40 million
pounds of life-saving sustainment to coalition forces on the ground in
Afghanistan--86 percent more than the entire Korean War. The capability
to airdrop personnel, equipment, and humanitarian relief, especially in
contested environments, remains critical to our Nation's defense.
For the inter-theater airlift fleet, C-17 procurement will complete
this year, but essential modernization programs to standardize the
configuration of the entire 223 aircraft fleet continue. Our fiscal
year 2014 budget request includes $1.1 billion to continue the
conversion of 52 C-5B aircraft to C-5M Super Galaxy aircraft, with
expected completion in fiscal year 2017.
In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force will also continue its efforts
to modernize its intra-theater airlift and special operations C-130-
type aircraft. In 2014, the Air Force seeks congressional support to
embark upon a C-130J multi-year procurement contract that will extend
through fiscal year 2018. Over the course of this contract, we will
procure 72 C-130J-type aircraft to further recapitalize our airlift,
special operations, and personnel recovery platforms. The contract is
expected to provide approximately $574.3 million worth of savings to
the Air Force over the life of the procurement program and deliver
aircraft earlier than annual contracts would.
Supported by the C-130 multi-year contract, the Air Force has
programmed $963.5 billion dollars to continue procurement of AC/MC-
130Js to recapitalize Air Force Special Operation Command's MC-130E/P
and AC-130H aircraft. The AC-130H recapitalization effort concludes in
fiscal year 2014, as does the CV-22 procurement, with the purchase of
the last three airframes.
Air Refueling
Mobility forces also provide in-flight refueling--the linchpin to
power projection at intercontinental distances. Over the past 50 years,
the Air Force has provided unparalleled air refueling capability to
support the interests of our Nation and her allies. The Air Force flew
16,000 tanker missions last year, and since September 11, 2001,
America's tanker fleet has offloaded over 2.36 billion gallons to joint
and coalition air forces. The new KC-46 tanker will help maintain this
capability--the backbone of America's military reach--while also
extending the range and persistence of joint and coalition aircraft.
As the Air Force considers where to invest in this core mission
area, we are seeking the most effective and efficient way to move
people and equipment. We also anticipate a future that will call for us
to provide rapid global mobility to remote, austere locations in
contested environments. This will first require a very capable tanker
fleet. Replacing one-third of the 50-year-old KC-135 aerial refueling
tanker fleet with the KC-46A is our top Air Force acquisition priority.
The KC-46A program will ensure that our Nation retains a tanker fleet
able to provide crucial air refueling capacity worldwide for decades to
come. In fiscal year 2014, we programmed $1.6 billion dollars for the
manufacture of four developmental aircraft. The initial flights of the
KC-46A test aircraft are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2014. The
program is currently executing as planned, and we are on track to
receive 18 operational aircraft by late fiscal year 2017. Until the KC-
46A reaches full operational capability, we are resourcing critical
modernization of the KC-10 and KC-135 tanker fleets.
Combat Rescue/Aeromedical Evacuation
Combat rescue and aeromedical evacuation forces are other key parts
of the rapid global mobility force. The Air Force is the only Service
with a dedicated force organized, trained, and equipped to execute
personnel recovery. These highly-trained airmen support Air Force,
joint, and coalition forces in a wide variety of mission areas. With a
unique combination of armed, highly advanced HH-60G Pave Hawk
helicopters and specially trained airmen, we provide a unique
capability to recover wounded soldiers and civilians in environments
considered too hostile for standard medical evacuation units. In
addition to overseas contingency deployments, these airmen also serve
as first responders during disaster relief and humanitarian assistance
operations, making pararescue one of the most highly stressed career
fields in the U.S. military. Since 2001, our combat rescue forces have
saved over 7,000 lives, and in 2012 alone, they flew 4,500 missions
that saved 1,128 coalition, joint and partner nation lives in some of
the harshest environments in the world.
Aeromedical evacuation also continues to play a vital role in
providing responsive, world-class medical support to wounded soldiers
and injured civilians around the globe. In calendar year 2012, the Air
Force airlifted 12,000 patients; since 2003, we have transported a
staggering 195,000 patients. To enhance our response to battlefield
evacuation support, we developed and deployed tactical critical care
evacuation teams to provide triage care on rotary wing aircraft closer
to the point of injury. Our health response teams include rapidly
deployable, modular, and scalable field hospitals. They provide
immediate care within minutes of arrival, surgery and intensive care
units within 6 hours, and full capability within 12 hours of
deployment. These advances have elevated battlefield survival rates to
unprecedented levels, with a nearly 30 percent improvement since
Operation Desert Storm (Iraq) in the early 1990s.
With the recapitalization of the HC-130N/P with the HC-130J through
the C-130 multi-year program, the Air Force continues its effort to
modernize its personnel recovery programs. The Combat Rescue Helicopter
Program will replace the aging HH-60G fleet, and the Operational Loss
Replacement Program will replace HH-60G aircraft lost during operations
over the past decade, returning the HH-60G inventory to 112 aircraft.
This year, we budgeted $393.6 million to finalize the modification
process and begin testing the first two aircraft. The ability of Air
Force helicopters to fight their way in and out of medical evacuation
and recovery operations is unique to the joint team and has proven its
value over the past 10 years. Currently, the combat rescue fleet is
sized appropriately to meet our global strategy.
Mobility Force Structure
Air Force mobility forces, including long-range strategic
airlifters, tankers, and tactical airlifters are sized to move and
sustain joint forces over long distances. Congress manages the long-
range fleet to a specific floor, currently 301 aircraft. However, after
submission to Congress of a report required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, we anticipate that this floor
will be lowered to 275. The tanker fleet is largely right-sized to
support the joint force. However, the tactical airlift fleet is sized
somewhat larger than the defense strategy requires.
Rapid global mobility will continue to be a critical core mission
for the Air Force. Whether it is sustaining the warfighter in any
environment or delivering hope with humanitarian assistance, airmen
will ensure that the whole of government and international partners are
strengthened with this unique capability to get assets to the fight
quickly, remain in the fight, and return home safely.
Global Strike . . . Any Target, Any Time
As a significant portion of America's deterrent capability, Air
Force global strike provides the Nation the ability to project military
power more rapidly, more flexibly, and with a lighter footprint than
other military options. The Air Force's nuclear deterrent and
conventional precision strike forces can credibly deny adversary
objectives or impose unacceptable costs by effectively holding any
target on the planet at risk and, if necessary, disabling or destroying
targets promptly, even from bases in the continental United States.
Global strike may entail close support to troops at risk, interdicting
enemy fielded forces, or striking an adversary's vital centers from
great distances. Credible long-range strike capabilities are
indispensable for deterrence and provide fundamental military
capabilities to underpin U.S. military power. Air Force global strike
capability relies on a wide-range of systems including bombers,
missiles, tankers, special operations platforms, fighters, and other
Air Force systems.
Nuclear Deterrent Forces
The unique attributes of the Air Force's nuclear deterrent forces--
the stabilizing characteristics of the intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) and the flexibility of the bomber--underwrite the
Nation's ability to achieve stability amidst the likely crises and
challenges of the coming decades. Air Force B-2 and B-52 bombers and
ICBM crews--who continually stand watch all day, every day--provide two
legs of the Nation's nuclear triad, while our nuclear command, control,
and communications systems provide the National Command Authority the
necessary tools to employ all strategic forces. Together, our bombers,
tankers, ICBMs, and dual-capable fighters provide this ``no fail''
capability as the backbone of America's deterrence.
Against a backdrop of increasingly contested air, space, and cyber
environments, the Air Force must maintain its ability to hold any
target at risk and provide the Nation a credible strategic deterrent
force. This capability, unmatched by any other nation's air force, will
only grow in importance as America rebalances its force structure and
faces potential adversaries that are modernizing their militaries to
deny access to our forces. Therefore, the Air Force will modernize
global strike capabilities to ensure that American forces are free to
act when, where, and how they are needed.
Consistent with the DSG, in fiscal year 2014, the Air Force is
investing in the development of the long range strike family of
systems. The Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B)--another of the Air
Force's three top acquisition programs--is a key piece of that effort,
and we are requesting $379.4 million for LRS-B in fiscal year 2014. The
Air Force is committed to leveraging mature technologies and
streamlined acquisition processes to deliver an affordable new bomber
with conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. Therefore, the Air
Force will certify the LRS-B for nuclear weapons employment within 2
years after initial operating capability to simplify the development
and fielding of the aircraft, as well as have the benefit of conducting
its nuclear certification on a mature system.
While the LRS-B is in development, sustaining and modernizing B-52
and B-2 bombers is critical to ensure that these aging aircraft remain
viable. Upgrades to the B-2's Defensive Management System,
communications improvements on the B-52 via the Combat Network
Communications Technology (CONECT) program, and aircraft sustainment
efforts, such as the anti-skid system replacement on the B-52, are just
a few examples of steps being taken to ensure the effectiveness of our
bomber fleet for years to come. Independent of specific platforms, we
budgeted $122.8 million to continue the adaptive engine technology
development effort to mature advanced propulsion technology to decrease
fuel consumption and increase range and loiter time.
Nuclear weapons improvements include the B61-12 tail kit assembly
program, which is undergoing its preliminary design review. We are also
modernizing ICBM fuzes for Mk21 and Mk12A re-entry vehicles, leveraging
common technologies and components with the ongoing Navy fuze program.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, the Air Force is committed to
meeting the President's direction to maintain safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrence capabilities. The quantity of nuclear-
capable bombers and ICBMs comprising the bulk of the Nation's deterrent
force may be reduced as we continue to implement the New START treaty.
However, the treaty allows both sides to determine their own force
structures, which gives us flexibility to deploy and maintain our
strategic nuclear forces in a way that is best calculated to serve our
national security interests. But deeper reductions must consider multi-
dimensional challenges from the world's emerging nuclear powers in a
more complex security environment. The Nation's nuclear expertise must
not be allowed to atrophy, and focused attention is necessary no matter
the size of the nuclear force.
Precision Strike Forces
In addition to nuclear deterrent forces, our conventional precision
strike forces hold any target at risk across the air, land, and sea
domains. Currently, precision strike forces and armed ISR support joint
and coalition ground forces in Afghanistan and Africa. In 2012, the Air
Force flew and supported over 28,000 close air support sorties in
Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). However, as our forces
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and as anti-access/area-denial
capabilities proliferate, the ability of our fourth-generation fighters
and legacy bombers to penetrate contested airspace will be increasingly
challenged.
Success in counterterrorism and irregular warfare missions requires
the continued ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive environments, using other than conventional
forces. Air Commandos provide specialized expertise for infiltration,
exfiltration, precision strike, battlefield air operations, ISR, and
aviation foreign internal defense that are essential to joint special
operations capabilities. In 2012, Air Force special operations
personnel executed 1,642 strike missions and 7,713 specialized mobility
missions. Persistent special operations presence in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, increasing requirements in the Pacific, and enduring global
commitments will continue to stress our Air Force special operations
airmen and aircraft.
In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force is concentrating on funding the
F-35 program--one of our top three acquisition programs. While also
complementing the F-22's world class air superiority capabilities, the
F-35A is designed to penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of
precision munitions. This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the
added benefit of increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing
between Services and partner nations. In fiscal year 2014, we are
investing $4.2 billion in the continued development of the F-35 weapon
system and the procurement of 19 low rate initial production Lot 8
aircraft. The Air Force is focused on completion of the system design
and development of the F-35 by fiscal year 2017 and requests $782.3
million in fiscal year 2014 for this purpose.
During F-35 development, it is imperative that we maintain our
fourth-generation fighter fleet. The F-16 is undergoing full-scale
durability testing to inform structural modification efforts to extend
its service life. At least 300 F-16s will undergo a service life
extension program and a capability enhancement called Combat Avionics
Programmed Extension Suite, which permits them to remain relevant in
the near-term threat environment until the F-35 is available in
sufficient numbers. We are requesting $52.3 million in fiscal year 2014
for these enhancements.
Modernizing our munitions to align with the DSG is also an urgent
requirement that is fundamental to managing the risk associated with
combat force reductions. In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force is
investing $1.1 billion in preferred conventional munitions, such as the
AIM-120D, AIM-9X, AGM-158, and GBU-53, and is developing new munitions
to address future needs. We are also continuing our efforts to ensure
the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal.
The Air Force must maintain its ability to neutralize any target at
any time with global strike forces so that America's military
credibility will remain uncontested, allies will not worry, and
potential adversaries will not be emboldened to challenge the pursuit
of our national objectives.
Command and Control . . . Total Flexibility
Airmen employ the Air Force's other four interdependent and
enduring core missions through robust, adaptable, and survivable
command and control systems. The Air Force provides access to reliable
communications and information networks so that the joint team can
operate globally at a high tempo and level of intensity. Air Force
command and control systems give commanders the ability to conduct
highly coordinated joint operations on an unequaled scale using
centralized control and decentralized execution.
The Theater Air Control System (TACS) is the Air Force's primary
system to enable planning, control, and execution of joint or combined
air operations. The senior element of the TACS is the air operations
center (AOC). The inherently flexible capabilities of the AOC and its
crews allow for deliberately planned responses to anticipated
challenges and dynamically planned responses to contingencies. The Air
Force's primary TACS weapons systems, such as the Control and Reporting
Center (CRC), the E-3 B/C/G Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), and the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS), provide the AOC with the critical battle management, sensors,
and communications that are required to get the right information to
the right person in a timely manner.
In Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya) in 2011, TACS airmen enabled more
than 2,000 sorties to enforce the United Nations' no-fly zone. In 2012,
Air Force command and control operations included: planning, executing,
and controlling over 60,000 combat sorties in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan); over 12,000 sorties in support of
Operation Noble Eagle (U.S. air defense); over 1,700 sorties supporting
35 defense support to civil authorities events; over 9,000 global
aeromedical evacuation missions; noncombatant evacuation operations as
a result of the terrorist attack on the American embassy in Libya; and
over 1,500 ISR missions supporting U.S. Southern Command and Northern
Command. Our command and control systems enabled us to conduct many of
these operations simultaneously.
It is essential that we continue to modernize, upgrade, and refit
our operational and tactical level command and control systems and
sensors to maintain the Nation's advantage in command and control. Our
systems are under constant attack, as illustrated by the new and more
capable threats emerging daily in the areas of cyber weapons, anti-
satellite systems, advanced fighter/attack aircraft, and
electromagnetic jamming. Our potential adversaries are also making
advances by electronically linking their own combat capabilities,
creating new military challenges that our forces must be prepared to
address.
To respond to these challenges, the Air Force will field advanced
command and control systems that are more reliable, resilient, and
interoperable. More importantly, we will recruit and train innovative
airmen to build, manage, and advance our complex and diverse command
and control systems while enabling their ready use by our own and
allied forces. Modernization of existing systems, such as the CRC and
E-3G Block 40/45, and AOC 10.2 will serve as the backbone of this
effort. In fiscal year 2014, we are investing $396.8 million in E-3G
Block 40/45, $58.1 million in AOC 10.2, and $26.4 million in CRC. We
are also funding critical investments in future capabilities, such as
the Joint Aerial Layer Network. The Air Force has also initiated
modernization of crucial national command, control, and communications
systems and is investing $52.3 million in fiscal year 2014 to fund data
linkages between fifth-generation aircraft and legacy fleets. Finally,
the Air Force continues to examine alternatives for the future of the
JSTARS mission area.
Cyber Capabilities
The capability to deliver airpower is intimately dependent on the
ability to operate effectively in cyberspace, which is critical to all
of our core missions and many of our command and control systems.
Operations in cyberspace can magnify military effects by increasing the
efficiency and effectiveness of air and space operations and by helping
to integrate capabilities across all domains. Pervasive and highly
interconnected, cyberspace operations will remain extremely contested.
The United States faces cyber-attacks on key infrastructures. The cost
of entry is low, anonymity is high, and attribution is difficult. The
Air Force recognizes the severity of these threats, as well as the
speed and interconnected nature of cyberspace, and is dedicated to
ensuring the access and freedom of maneuver that are essential for
effective cyber operations.
Cyber roles and responsibilities are certainly not exclusive to the
Air Force; however, the integration of cyber capabilities with each of
our core missions is an essential component of how we bring innovative,
globally focused ``airmindedness'' to ensure our warfighting advantage.
In fiscal year 2013, the Secretary of Defense decided on a new force
model for Department of Defense (DOD) cyber operations. This model will
increase the Air Force cyber force structure and manning. The
additional manpower will provide the Air Force capability for national,
combatant command, and Air Force cyber missions. For example, the Air
Force has increased funding to $3.6 million in fiscal year 2014 to
cyber hunter teams who provide precision capability to identify,
pursue, and mitigate cyberspace threats affecting critical links and
nodes within the Air Force network.
The Air Force will continue to synchronize forces across air,
space, and cyberspace to achieve mission success in dynamic
battlespaces and support integrated and interoperable joint command and
control capabilities that are agile, responsive, and survivable, even
in contested environments.

AIRMEN READINESS AND DEVELOPMENT

While it is common to define the Air Force by its core missions or
by our aircraft, missiles, and satellites, the reality is that our
Service's unmatched capabilities exist only because of the imagination
and knowledge of our outstanding airmen. Accordingly, we believe in
taking care of our people first, while always remaining focused on the
mission. To ensure that our airmen can continue to power the enduring
core missions for the Nation, we must invest in their readiness and
development.
Readiness
Underpinning our airmen's ability to provide global vigilance,
global reach, and global power to the Nation and contribute our core
missions to the joint team is their readiness. ``Readiness'' is the
ability of a unit to provide its designed operational capabilities
within the required timeline. It is comprised of personnel
requirements, training (to include flying hours), weapon system
sustainment, facilities, and installations. A good readiness posture
depends on health in all of these key areas. While protecting future
readiness includes modernizing the weapons systems and equipment,
creating combat readiness in the near-term is a complex task involving
the intersection of personnel, materiel, and training. It includes
balancing time between operational and training commitments, funding
from multiple sources, informed levels of risk, and effectively
managing resources to achieve the desired state of readiness.
Mitigating the risk associated with a smaller military requires a
fully ready force. A smaller force with less capacity requires greater
attention to ensuring adequate personnel levels, aircraft availability,
weapons, and sufficient training to support the full range of mission
requirements at the desired level of competency. If we attempt to
sustain current force levels while personnel and operational costs
rise, there will be progressively fewer resources available to support
our current number of installations, maintain existing aircraft
inventories, vital equipment, and weapons, and invest in future
capabilities. These factors become more critical as shortages in
aircraft availability, weapons, and key personnel grow and exert a
larger negative effect on the overall readiness of the force.
While the Air Force has met the demands of a high operational tempo
in support of today's fight, this has inevitably taken a toll on our
weapons systems and people, putting a strain on the overall readiness
of the force. As reflected by Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)-
mandated Status of Requirements and Training System (SORTS) metrics, we
have seen a steady decline in unit readiness since 2003; our readiness
must improve. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and our continued
presence in the Middle East and Africa indicate that the demand for Air
Force capabilities will remain constant, or perhaps even rise, over the
next decade.
Currently, the bulk of the funding for maintaining numerous
missions initially fielded with overseas contingency operations (OCO)
funding (e.g., MQ-1/9, MC-12, and the E-11A with its battlefield
airborne communications node capability) remains in the upcoming fiscal
year 2014 budget request. If the Air Force is to retain those
capabilities for the long-term, funding for the aircraft and the
capabilities and the infrastructure that supports them must migrate
from OCO funding to an adjusted base budget. If the base budget is not
adjusted, these capabilities will either have to be retired or be
retained at the expense of other full spectrum forces and capabilities,
which would increase risks.
The Air Force supports combatant command missions that require 24/7
availability and attention. Space operations, command and control,
cyber defense, ISR, special operations, personnel recovery, and nuclear
deterrence are all high priority missions that cannot be done
adequately, and in some cases cannot be done safely, at low readiness
levels. In support of U.S. defense strategy, air forces are inherently
capable of responding quickly and can be shifted on relatively short
notice between critical theaters of operation. Allowing the Air Force
to slip to a lower state of readiness that requires a subsequent long
buildup to full combat effectiveness will negate the essential
strategic advantages of airpower and put joint forces at increased
risk.
Therefore, the Air Force's portion of the fiscal year 2014 PB
aligns resources in an effort to slow the readiness decline and sets
the stage for restoring full-spectrum readiness. However, as noted
previously, the effects of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 will
hamper our readiness efforts in fiscal year 2014 and beyond. The
pillars of our full-spectrum readiness effort include: a consistent,
equitable, and attainable flying hour program; prioritized full-
spectrum training venues; focused weapons systems sustainment funding;
appropriate reallocation of manpower to our highest priority missions;
sustainment of our power projection platforms (Air Force
installations); and developing and caring for airmen and their
families.
Through planned funding of weapons system sustainment, the flying
hours program, training ranges, facilities and installations, and
modernization programs, the Air Force could maintain its legacy of
``spring-loaded'' readiness. In the past 35 years, the Air Force has
been called upon nearly 150 times to conduct combat or humanitarian
operations in more than 45 countries, and combat sorties in the U.S.
Central Command area of responsibility have continued uninterrupted
since 1991. The completion of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
are important milestones that should provide an opportunity to reset
the force, but other international security challenges remain and, in
some cases, are growing. America will continue to need a ready Air
Force.
Weapons System Sustainment (WSS)
WSS is a key component of full-spectrum readiness. Years of combat
demands have taken a toll across many weapons systems, and we continue
to see an increase in the costs of WSS requirements, which are driven
by sustainment strategy, complexity of new weapons systems, operations
tempo, force structure changes, and growth in depot work packages for
aging, legacy aircraft. With recent force structure reductions, we must
carefully manage how we allocate WSS in order to avoid availability
shortfalls.
The fiscal year 2014 budget submission adds $1.5 billion to the WSS
portfolio across the FYDP. Although the fiscal year 2014 PB adds
baseline funds for WSS, we continue to rely on OCO funding for global
contingency operations.
WSS funding requirements for combat-ready air, space, and cyber
forces have consistently increased at a rate double that of DOD
inflation planning factors. Although service life extension programs
and periodic modifications have allowed our inventory to support 20
years of unabated operations, the cost of maintenance and sustainment
continues to rise. As a result, we want to improve the link between
resources and readiness for Air Force weapons systems by reducing
costs, improving risk-based decision making, and balancing costs with
performance. To address the trend of higher costs, we are reviewing and
streamlining organizations and processes to reduce maintenance and
material costs, develop depot efficiencies, and manage weapons systems
requirements growth. We are taking actions to reduce requirements by
examining the potential for restructuring or modifying new and existing
contractor logistics support contracts to optimize tradeoffs, provide
visibility, and improve flexibility between costs and outcomes. We will
also leverage risk-based strategies and evaluate maintenance schedules
to maximize aircraft availability and apply performance-based logistics
solutions to balance total sustainment costs with performance.
Despite our efforts, WSS costs are still expected to grow, and new,
more capable aircraft are often more expensive to maintain than those
they replace. In the current fiscal environment, our efforts to restore
weapons system availability to required levels will be a serious
challenge.
Flying Hour Program (FHP)
The emphasis on readiness in the DSG reinforced the need to
implement a FHP that achieves full-spectrum readiness. The Air Force
balanced the allocation of flying hours across the Total Force to
incrementally improve readiness levels. The flying hour program will
continue to rely on OCO funding to support Operation Enduring Freedom
and the redeployment of combat forces from Afghanistan. With the
expectation of decreasing OCO flying hours, we have programmed
increasing O&M-funded flying hours in fiscal year 2015 and throughout
the FYDP. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, the program is approximately
90 percent of the peacetime training requirement to attain full-
spectrum readiness across the Total Force, reflecting our assessment of
the full executable program.
We are also committed to a long-term effort to increase our live,
virtual, and constructive operational training (LVC-OT) capability and
capacity by funding improvements in LVC-OT devices (e.g., simulators
and virtual trainers) and networks. Adjustments to the flying hour
programs will continue to evolve as the fidelity of simulators and LVC-
OT capabilities improve. Increasing our virtual capabilities will
minimize fuel consumption and aircraft maintenance costs while ensuring
high quality training for our aircrews. In fiscal year 2014, we are
investing $3.3 million for LVC-OT purposes.
Training Ranges
Full-spectrum training requires the availability of air-to-air and
air-to-ground training ranges. Many of our ranges are venues for large-
scale joint and coalition training events and are critical enablers for
concepts like Air-Sea Battle. In fiscal year 2014, we are requesting
range O&M funding of $75.8 million to sustain these crucial national
assets to elevate flying training effectiveness for the joint team,
which in turn improves individual and unit readiness levels.
Unfortunately, previous years' baseline range funding was at levels as
low as 25 percent of requirements, resulting in a corresponding
corrosive effect as range infrastructure deteriorated and aircrews only
maintained readiness in skill sets oriented toward current combat
operations. This year, we are reversing this trend by raising baseline
range funding to 74 percent of requirements to begin a return to full-
spectrum readiness. As we continue to realign to the DSG, additional
range investment and sustainment funding will be necessary to ensure
that our combat forces are prepared for the full range of potential
threats and environments.
In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force is poised to work with the joint
community to enhance cyber ranges to enable realistic testing and
evaluation of new cyber concepts, policies, and technologies. These
ranges will provide a venue for evaluating network services,
information assurance, and offensive and defensive cyber capabilities
in a closed and secure environment. Coupled with the Air Force's
program for simulator-based cyber education, training, crew
certification, and exercises, these cyber ranges will provide trained
and tested cyber operators able to strike targets anywhere on the
globe, as well as defend against foreign and domestic attacks.
Facilities, Installations, and Energy
From cyber to long-range strike, installation readiness buttresses
the Air Force's core mission. Therefore, the Air Force's fiscal year
2014 budget request employs a balanced approach to our installation
investment strategy. Our installations are power projection platforms
comprised of both built and natural infrastructure that: (1)
effectively enable Air Force core operational capabilities--we deliver
air, space and cyber capabilities from our installations; (2) send a
strategic message of commitment to allies and intent to adversaries;
(3) foster partnership-building by stationing our airmen side-by-side
with our coalition partners; and (4) enable worldwide accessibility in
times of peace or conflict. Therefore, we must maintain sustainable
installations to enable Air Force support to the vectors outlined in
the DSG.
In the fiscal year 2014 PB, the Air Force returned military
construction (MILCON) investment levels to near historic norms
following the deliberate pause of fiscal year 2013. This year, the $1.2
billion investment focuses on supporting beddown requirements for the
F-35 and KC-46, combatant commanders' top priorities in cyber and
nuclear deterrence, and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific theater.
Recognizing the links between MILCON and facilities sustainment,
restoration, and modernization (FSRM), we are funding facilities
sustainment at 80 percent of the OSD facilities sustainment model
requirement, and we added over $400 million for restoration and
modernization across the FYDP to enable consolidation efforts and
improve the quality of our most mission-enabling facilities.
Foundational to all of our efforts, energy enables the force and
sustains our national security posture. Energy, which comprises about 8
percent of the Air Force budget, enables Air Force core missions, and
fuels our operational capabilities. The Air Force recognizes the
vulnerability and volatility created by our dependence on finite, non-
renewable energy supplies. Therefore, we are committed to increasing
energy security and becoming ever more energy efficient. We have
already made great strides in reducing consumption and improving
efficiency. Since 2006, the Air Force has reduced its fuel consumption
by 12 percent, exceeding a 10 percent reduction goal 3 years ahead of
schedule.
Overall, our focus is to reduce our energy footprint across all
operations. Investments we made in fiscal year 2012 to improve our
facility energy efficiency and reduce our energy requirement are
expected to start generating savings in fiscal year 2014. The Air Force
is also looking to improve its energy security and diversify its energy
supply through increased use of renewable energy. We also plan to
improve our energy security by making the most of private sector
knowledge, technology, and financing to capitalize on underutilized
land on our installations.
The Need for Base Realignment and Closure
As we make efforts to improve and sustain our installations, we
also recognize that we are carrying infrastructure that is excess to
our needs. A capacity analysis conducted prior to the 2005 BRAC
suggested that the Air Force had 24 percent capacity that was excess to
our mission needs. However, the 2005 BRAC did not make major reductions
to Air Force facilities, and since that time, we have reduced our force
structure by more than 500 aircraft and reduced our active duty
military end-strength by 7 percent. The Air Force currently has
significant excess infrastructure that is very expensive to maintain in
terms of both financial and human resources. In the current and
projected fiscal environment, we simply cannot afford it. The Air Force
has limited authority under current public law to effectively
consolidate military units or functions and divest excess real
property. The money that we are spending on maintaining excess
infrastructure is more urgently needed to recapitalize and sustain our
weapon systems, improve readiness, and invest in the quality of life
needs of airmen.
Readiness and Modernization
The decline in future budgets does not allow us to improve
readiness while also maintaining force structure and continuing all
planned investment programs. To prioritize readiness, we have made a
conscious choice to take some risk by making sacrifices in
modernization programs. Although we have been more effective in our use
of operating resources and garnered savings from better business
practices,\3\ the Air Force has been forced to terminate or restructure
several programs. Program restructures and terminations include
terminating the Space Based Surveillance Block 10 follow-on, freezing
Gorgon Stare at Increment II, terminating Air Force participation in
the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System land-based segment, and
divesting the UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) Battlelab in fiscal year
2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ There are $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2014 funding reduction
adjustments and $7.9 billion across the future years the Air Force has
categorized as being reflective of a more disciplined use of resources.
Program terminations and restructures are $2.4 billion of this total.
Savings from better business practices and more effective use of
operating resources total $3.2 billion across the future years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Air Force also terminated acquisition of the underperforming
Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS). ECSS was initiated in 2005
in an effort to provide end-to-end visibility of the Air Force's supply
chain and enable better logistics decisionmaking. As planned, ECSS
would have transformed the logistics enterprise, making all aspects
interoperable and synchronized with the financial and accounting
systems to enhance business and mission operations and realize
efficiencies. Unfortunately, after several years of schedule delays,
poor contractor performance, and cost increases, we determined that the
program could not meet the fiscal year 2017 financial improvement and
audit readiness statutory requirement and was not likely to achieve
other promised capabilities at an affordable cost. Instead of
continuing to spend money on an underperforming program, the Air Force
determined that the prudent course of action was to pursue other ways
to transform our logistics business processes.
The fiscal year 2013 sequestration cuts took away all program
flexibility, deferred some buys, added risk to many programs while at
the same time forced us to reallocate investment funds to more critical
O&M needs. Budget projections for fiscal year 2014 and beyond, along
with the fiscal year 2013 cuts, may force us to halt or slow pending
development or productions milestones on 11 acquisition category (ACAT)
1 programs. Small scale program terminations began in fiscal year 2013,
and we will have to consider expanding terminations in fiscal year
2014. Similarly, several key modernization priorities remain unfunded
given the current fiscal environment, including a replacement for the
aging T-38 trainer and the JSTARS surveillance aircraft.
America's Air Force remains the most capable in the world, but we
cannot allow readiness levels to decline further and modernization
cannot wait for the next cycle of increased defense spending. We have
important production lines under way and development programs that are,
or will soon be, mature enough for production. Cancelling programs in
anticipation of a future generation of technology would be wasteful
and, in some cases, risk the loss of critical engineering talent and
technological advantage. New threats and corresponding investment needs
are not theoretical possibilities for the future. They are here, now.
The future success of the Nation's military and the joint team depends
on modernizing our Air Force and keeping it ready to fight.
Airmen Development
The Air Force's strategic advantage begins with its ability to
attract, recruit, develop, and retain innovative warriors with a
commitment to high standards and our core values of Integrity First,
Service Before Self, and Excellence In All We Do. To accommodate an
uncertain and fiscally challenging future, we must continue to invest
in our airmen through education, professional development, and support
programs for airmen and their families, coupled with other programs to
maintain a safe, respectful, and positive work environment. We are
focusing on the recruitment, development, retention, and overall
effectiveness of each individual airman. Through this investment, we
will not only improve the capability of today's force, but also
illustrate our commitment to future generations of airmen to ensure a
diverse and inclusive rich pool of the highest quality recruits well
into the future.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Providing a safe, respectful, and productive work environment is
the responsibility of every airman at every level, and we are working
hard to achieve this. We do not tolerate sexual assault. In the last
year, the Air Force redoubled its efforts to eradicate sexual assault
within our ranks, and we have invested in several programmatic,
educational, and resourcing efforts aimed at reinforcing a zero
tolerance environment. When sexual assaults are alleged, we are
providing improved support to victims. In coordination with OSD, the
Air Force created a special victims capability comprised of specially
trained investigators, prosecutors, paralegals, and victim and witness
assistance personnel. A cadre of 24 special investigators has received
special victim training, along with 16 senior trial counsel, 9 of whom
specialize in the prosecution of particularly difficult cases,
including sexual assault cases. In addition, 60 Air Force attorneys
have been identified and trained to serve as ``special victims'
counsel'' to provide comprehensive and compassionate representational
legal assistance to victims. Special victims' counselors currently
represent over 200 sexual assault victims. The Air Force has also
approved all 46 expedited transfer requests for Air Force victims over
the past year, to include both permanent change-of-station and local
installation reassignments, and we continue to employ over 3,100
volunteer victim advocates. In accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, each of these volunteer
victim advocates will receive full certifications to provide
confidential victim support beyond the training they already receive,
and the Air Force is on track to place a full-time victim advocate at
every installation by October 1, 2013.
Innovative, Global Airmen
Globalization and the pace of technology advances are accelerating.
Airmen work with advanced technology every day, and developing
innovative and technically-savvy airmen to continue to operate on the
cutting edge is the lifeblood of our Service. The Air Force's ability
to leverage and field crucial technologies is dependent on America's
aerospace research and development infrastructure--a national asset
that must be protected to ensure future U.S. advantages in technology,
commercial aviation, and space. Accordingly, we are protecting science
and technology funding as a share of our total resources. To ensure
that airmen increase their technical acumen, we are strategically
managing our science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)
workforce and conducting outreach activities to recruit and train an
adequate and diverse STEM talent pool to develop, operate, and maintain
our technical advantage. While airmen must remain technically
proficient, we are most interested in whole person development--
creating leaders of character who demonstrate creativity and empathy in
addition to technical competency.
Globalization also makes the development of a global community of
airmen a more achievable goal. Efforts to enhance the language and
cultural skills of the force continue to lay the groundwork for access
and coalition building activities that enable future cooperative
efforts with friends and allies. Likewise, outreach through foreign
professional military education programs where members of other nations
attend Air Force programs, as well as personnel exchange programs,
significantly increases the likelihood of current and future
cooperative relationships. The combined effects of these personnel
programs and relationship-building efforts help ensure that future
leaders of friendly foreign air forces will continue to regard the U.S.
Air Force as one of the finest air forces in the world.
Airmen and Family Support
The quality of airmen and family support programs remains a
critical element of the Air Force resilience program. Using a strength-
based approach to the resilience program builds an improved ability to
cope with stress and forms the basis for an approach for suicide
prevention. Regardless of the fiscal environment, the Air Force must
continue to address the Service's evolving demographics and maintain
balanced, healthy, and resilient airmen and families. We will adjust,
consolidate, or eliminate services where required to meet changing
demands, capitalize upon community resources, and gain efficiencies
where possible.
To better support our airmen and families, we continue to move
forward with our ``3 to 1 Total Force Personnel Management''
initiative. This effort integrates personnel management policies,
processes, and procedures across the Total Force to create a more
efficient and effective Air Force. To the greatest extent possible, ``3
to 1'' will yield uniformity, enhance coordination across components,
optimize warfighter support, and improve service levels for our airmen.
This effort will also eliminate cumbersome paper-based personnel
workflows, standardize human resource management under common
directives, and provide ``one-stop shopping'' for personnel support
from anywhere, at any time. Finally, we expect this effort to ease
airmen transitions on and off active duty and across the three
components, all of which are vital to our Air Force mission.
Our airmen continue to contribute significant capabilities in the
joint arena and do so with the integrity and excellence expected of
them. They remain committed to the Air Force mission and our core
values. It is imperative for us to apply sufficient resources coupled
with well-informed personnel policies to support and maintain our high
quality, All-Volunteer Force, retain their trust and confidence, and
empower them to fly, fight, and win.

ACTIVE/RESERVE COMPONENT BALANCE

Today's Total Force consists of about 329,500 Regular Air Force (or
Active) airmen, 105,700 Air National guardsmen, and 70,900 Air Force
Reserve airmen actively serving in the Selected Reserve, as authorized
by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. For fiscal year 2014, the total
number of airmen will decrease slightly to 327,600 Active airmen,
105,400 guardsmen, and 70,400 reservists. In addition to these numbers,
the Air Force Reserve maintains a strategic depth of more than 790,000
stand-by or non-participating reservists and retirees who can be called
up for national emergencies. We are one Air Force--Regular Air Force,
Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve airmen--working together as a
Total Force team every day around the world.
There is great interdependence between Active, Guard, and Reserve
Forces. We must ensure the right balance between them because too much
force structure in the active component does not capitalize on
potential lower operational costs of personnel and installations in the
Reserve component. Too little force structure in the active component
requires guardsmen and reservists to deploy more often--even in
peacetime--which breaks the model of a part-time force, threatens the
sustainability of the Total Force, and increases costs significantly.
The analytical foundation used to develop Active and Reserve
component force balance starts with the National Defense Strategy. The
strategy is based on scenarios and associated concepts of operation and
forces developed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. These scenarios form the common
starting point for all DOD force structure assessments and include
major contingency demand (i.e., surge) as well as pre- and post-
contingency rotational demand (non-surge and post-surge, respectively).
Force demands, both surge and post-surge rotational, are compared to
projected inventories to determine how much and what type of force
structure is required. Capabilities and risk are balanced across the
Air Force's core missions to field the most capable and sustainable
force within available resources. Analysis of Active and Reserve
component force levels provides insights into the balance within this
force that can most effectively and efficiently meet demand within DOD
deployment goals.
Maintaining the appropriate Active and Reserve component force mix
is critical to the ability of the Air Force to meet forward presence
requirements, maintain rapid response, and meet high-rate rotational
demands within a smaller force. Additionally, appropriate force mix is
critical to the sustainment, readiness, and health of the Total Force
components. Force mix decisions cannot be made based solely on cost. We
must consider the symbiotic relationship of the active and Reserve
components and treat the three components as a complete system,
evaluating the effects of change on all components to better understand
unintended consequences to the whole. For example, Reserve Forces
depend on healthy Active component forces from which trained and
experienced airmen transition to part-time status. If the active
component force becomes too small, the flow of personnel into the
Reserve component will slow, driving the Reserve components to increase
direct-entry recruitment, causing experience levels to fall and costs
to rise. Our analysis also will consider how the Reserve component
leverages important civilian skills and experience, such as in cyber,
for the needs of the Nation. Air Force leaders must have the
flexibility to reorganize force structure within the Active and Reserve
components to maintain the health of the Total Force and its ability to
ultimately execute the National Military Strategy.
Total Force Initiatives
To get a better understanding of our Total Force mixture, we
launched the Total Force Task Force, a team led by three two-star
general officers from the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard,
and the Air Force Reserve. The Total Force Task Force is leading a
reassessment of the Air Force's efforts to develop the appropriate
Active and Reserve component balance through processes that enable the
Department of the Air Force to leverage the inherent strengths, unique
aspects, and characteristics of each component. The Total Force Task
Force is conducting a comprehensive review of Total Force requirements
and will develop strategic options to ensure that the Air Force
balances the strengths of each component while sustaining necessary
capabilities in the years ahead. The team is scheduled to present their
findings by October 1, 2013. We expect the task force to serve as a
focal point for the National Commission on the Force Structure for the
Air Force that was directed by Congress and is scheduled to provide a
report to the President by February 1, 2014.
Total Force Integration (TFI) works to shape the most capable force
possible under fiscal and operational constraints for our current and
future force. TFI associations are a cost-efficient value to the
taxpayer as the active and Reserve components share equipment and
facilities. We are increasing the number of units that partner Active,
Guard, or Reserve airmen at a single location. We currently have 121
such unit associations and plan to add additional associations;
however, implementation of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 may affect the
number of associations. Already a success story for mobility forces, we
are planning for every U.S.-based Reserve fighter unit to become an
association with the Regular Air Force within the FYDP, as will the
continental United States locations for the KC-46 tanker. We will
continue to refine this combination of Active and Reserve Forces across
all appropriate areas of the Total Force.
Force structure changes require continual dialogue between the
Active component, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and
the respective Governors. Over the past year, we have worked with OSD,
the National Guard Bureau, and the Council of Governors to formalize a
consultative process to exchange views, information, and advice,
consistent with the applicable guidelines on programming and budgetary
priorities and requirements on matters specified in Executive Order
13528. Recently, DOD and the Council of Governors agreed to the
``State-Federal Consultative Process for Programming and Budgetary
Proposals Affecting the National Guard.'' This process will, among
other things, increase National Guard involvement in DOD's planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution processes and improve the
dialogue between the Council of Governors and the DOD before resource
decisions affecting the National Guard are made. It is essential that
we manage the health of the Total Force holistically, and we are
committed, now more than ever, to strengthen our integration of effort.

CONCLUSION

From airpower's earliest days, airmen have exploited technology to
provide essential knowledge and information on when and where to act,
to move people and materials when and where needed, to control the
ultimate high ground, and to strike when and where directed.
We are confident in our airmen. They are the best in the world, and
we can rely on them to meet any challenge, overcome any obstacle, and
defeat any enemy--as long as they are given adequate resources and the
freedom to innovate. As they have time and again, our innovative airmen
will find new and better ways to approach future military challenges
across the spectrum of conflict, throughout every domain, and against
nascent and unpredicted threats.
The Air Force's core missions will continue to serve America's
long-term security interests by giving our Nation and its leadership
unmatched options against the challenges of an unpredictable future. In
the last several decades, Air Force airpower has been an indispensable
element of deterrence, controlled escalation, and, when so tasked by
the Nation's leadership, been an instrument of destruction against an
adversary's military capability--all accomplished with minimal
casualties to U.S. service men and women and civilians. However,
investments in Air Force capabilities and readiness remain essential to
ensuring that the Nation will maintain an agile, flexible, and ready
force. This force must be deliberately planned and consistently funded,
as reconstitution of a highly sophisticated and capable Air Force
cannot occur quickly if allowed to atrophy.
Today's Air Force provides America an indispensable hedge against
the challenges of a dangerous and uncertain future. Regardless of the
future security environment, the Air Force must retain and maintain its
unique ability to provide America with Global Vigilance, Global Reach,
and Global Power.
We are committed to excellence and we will deliver with your help.
We ask that you support the Air Force budget request of $114.1 billion
for fiscal year 2014.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
We will have an 8-minute first round.
First, on the question of sequestration, Mr. Secretary, you
gave us some specifics in your oral testimony about the impacts
on unit readiness. Can you go into that in a little bit more
detail? We did not have that in your written statement. So it
is very important that we flesh it out here in your oral
statement. Number of units that have been reduced in readiness
and so forth.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir. I will ask the chief to chime in.
We have 12 units that have been stood down completely. That
means that there is no flying going on. I think I referred to
an additional seven units that are being held at a reduced
readiness status, that is, basic mission capable. If the
resources are made available, we might be able to move some of
those from basic mission capable up to combat mission ready,
but those funds are not yet available. We are still working on
assessing whether or not that would be feasible. That may
depend on the reprogramming to which I referred.
We are concerned that, as the chief outlined--taking units
to a stand-down position where they are not flying at all
negates the advantages that airpower brings to the joint team.
So we are very concerned that this situation be only temporary
and that we get back to restoring combat capability as quickly
as possible.
Chairman Levin. How many units are there all together? That
is 12 of how many, 7 of how many?
Mr. Donley. This is of, I think, 31 active squadrons.
Chief?
General Welsh. We have 54 fighter squadrons in the Air
Force, sir. Right now, those 17 are about a third of that.
There are additional squadrons the Secretary did not mention
because they are not part of our combat air forces. We have
also shut down the Thunderbirds. We have shut down our weapons
school squadrons. We have closed down a couple of our
additional training units that we use, our aggressor squadrons
who helped train in Red Flag both in Nevada and Alaska. We have
taken those flying hours and we prioritized it toward units
scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan or to the Pacific.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I think, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned OCO shortfalls. That
was, I assume, for 2013 because the OCO request for 2014 has
not yet been coming. What is the OCO shortfall for 2013 and
what is the reason for it?
Mr. Donley. It is at least about $1.8 billion.
Chairman Levin. This is for the Air Force.
Mr. Donley. This is for the Air Force. I believe you will
see us attempting to get funding for that in the upcoming
reprogramming. We simply did not get support for all of the OCO
costs in the original OCO request.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, relative to BRAC, let me just
make a request of you rather than a question. We have made this
request before. You have indicated a savings from the last BRAC
round of about $1 billion. If you could furnish for the record
the detail that goes into those savings, we would appreciate
it.
Mr. Donley. I am happy to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) savings are substantial and
allow the Air Force to apply scarce resources to emerging and/or higher
priority missions. The Air Force continues to realize approximately
$1.0 billion in annual net savings from commission recommendations
implemented during BRAC 2005.
BRAC savings begin to be realized during the first year of
implementation, growing through the 6-year implementation period, and
maximizing the first year of post-implementation. For BRAC 2005, post-
implementation net annual savings are approximately: civilian salaries
($183 million), military entitlements ($555 million), base operating
support ($68 million), sustainment ($28 million), recapitalization ($32
million), mission ($66 million) and procurement ($24 million).
Specific amounts for each category in BRAC 2005 during the
implementation period can be seen in Exhibit BC-02, Implementation
Period Financial Summary, page 6, contained in the Department of
Defense Base Closure Account--Air Force Fiscal Year 2014 Budget
Estimate Justification Data submitted to Congress in April 2013.

Chairman Levin. In terms of the role of the chain of
command in addressing sexual assaults and other crimes in the
military, some propose removing the chain of command from the
decisionmaking process for prosecuting assaults and other
crimes in the military both before and after trial. We are
going to be taking up this issue, as I indicated, in markup.
Can you very briefly, both of you, tell us what your
position is relative to whether or not the chain of command
should be making the decision relative to prosecution? If so,
why? Whether or not the chain of command should have the power
to reverse a finding of fact after a finding of fact of guilt
where that is the case, and whether or not the chain of command
should retain the power relative to modifying the sentence
where there is a finding of guilt. On those three areas, very
briefly, if you could. Mr. Secretary, we will start with you.
Mr. Donley. Sir, I think maintaining good order and
discipline is a commander's responsibility. So I think it is
very important that the administration of the UCMJ occur within
the military chain of command.
With respect to the role of the convening authority, which
reviews evidence and determines whether or not court martials
ought to occur, I think that should stay in place.
There is the issue of Article 60, which provides for the
opportunity for the convening authority to review the results
of courts martial after they are completed and to make any
change the convening authority deems appropriate.
When that Article 60 was built, the U.S. military had a
much less robust appeal process for court martial cases. Now
that that appeal process is in place, we strongly support the
Secretary's proposal for Article 60 that the convening
authority no longer be given carte blanche to review the
results of court martial and that be cut be back and limited
quite a bit.
Chairman Levin. General, do you have a view on that?
General Welsh. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
On the convening authority's ability to refer cases to
court, I feel very strongly that that is in the commander's
purview for a reason.
Number one, if over time you take the UCMJ, particularly if
you move the whole caseload, not just sexual assault cases,
away from the commander's discretion, commanders eventually
will lose touch with the UCMJ, and that would be a terrible
occurrence I think over time.
Second, I do not think there is an issue with commanders
not agreeing with their lawyers on what cases ought to go to
court. In the Air Force, we have looked back the last 3 years,
and we have taken a look at over 2,500 cases. We have reviewed
them manually. In 0.5 percent of those cases, the commander
made a decision to prefer charges or not counter to the
recommendation of their judge advocate general (JAG). So this
is not a common thing that occurs. I do not know what we would
be fixing by doing that.
For the commander's ability to review and make changes to
findings of a court, my personal opinion is there is no need
for that. We have a court. We have a military judge in the
courtroom. We have an appeal process.
I do believe the commander has a role in reviewing the
sentencing of a court, and I believe that we should talk very
carefully about the commander's involvement in that because
there are reasons to keep the commander involved in that
discussion.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
The administration is proposing to substantially increase
enrollment fees for military retirees who enroll in the TRICARE
Prime health care program to institute enrollment fees for
participation in TRICARE Standard Extra and TRICARE For Life
and to increase pharmacy copayments, to increase deductibles
and the catastrophic cap. DOD has assumed budget savings of
nearly $1 billion for all of these changes.
Let me ask the General first. Did you personally support
these proposals?
General Welsh. I did, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Do you?
General Welsh. I do.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, I assume--let me ask you, I
will not assume anything. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Donley. I do support the President's proposals.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Welsh, the chairman had asked you to give us an
analysis of the $1 billion on the BRAC savings over that period
of time. He is referring, I am sure, to the 2005 BRAC round. I
would like to have that report include the amount of loss that
came from that in the first, let us say, 3\1/2\ years. Would
you mind doing that?
General Welsh. No, sir. We will do it.
[The information referred to follows:]

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) does not drive ``losses;''
rather there is an upfront investment required to implement the
commission recommendations. These upfront implementation costs are
offset by savings garnered during the implementation period.
BRAC one-time implementation costs occur primarily in the following
categories: military construction, to include planning and design;
operations and maintenance; military personnel, other procurement, and
environmental cleanup. The invested total one-time implementation cost
in the first 4 years of implementing BRAC 2005 was $3.2 billion.
Also during implementation, BRAC savings are generated primarily in
the following categories: civilian salaries, military entitlements,
base operating support, sustainment, recapitalization, mission and
procurement. The net savings generated during the first 4 years of
implementing BRAC 2005 was $1.4 billion (grand total savings minus
total recurring costs (non-add) in the first 4 years).
Bottom line, the net implementation cost during the first 4 years
of BRAC 2005 was $1.8 billion (grand total one-time implementation and
total recurring costs (non-add) minus grand total savings in the first
4 years).
Specific amounts for each category in BRAC 2005 can be seen in
Exhibit BC-02, Implementation Period Financial Summary, contained in
the Department of Defense Base Closure Account--Air Force Fiscal Year
2014 Budget Estimate Justification Data submitted to Congress in April
2013.

Senator Inhofe. All right.
General, you and I talked in my office about the reduction
of the 94,000 flying hours and the grounding of about one-third
of the squadrons. Now, it is my understanding that once the
units have stood down for about 60 days, they are no longer
able to meet the operational requirements. Is that correct?
General Welsh. Yes, Senator, or accept great risk in doing
so.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, which we do not want to do.
It is my understanding that the Air Force estimates it will
take--and I think the Secretary mentioned this in his opening
remarks--between 6 and 12 months to return these to mission
ready status.
General Welsh. Senator, that would be true, assuming you
have the additional flying hour money required to requalify----
Senator Inhofe. That is my next question. Do you see that
in the request of the 2014 budget?
General Welsh. No, sir. It is not there.
Senator Inhofe. That is serious, don't you think?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. We would require additional funds.
Senator Inhofe. A very similar thing is true in depot
maintenance and in the modernization program. We have deferred
a lot of things. We have the best depot maintenance system, I
think, that anyone would expect us to have. However, the
maintenance has been kicked down the road, probably deferring
some 60 aircraft and 35 engines from depot maintenance. So I
would ask the same question. By delaying these things, we are
going to have to be requiring something in the 2014 budget to
make up for that. Do you see that in the 2014 budget?
General Welsh. No, sir, nor is there the capacity to surge
to catch up with that bow wave within a year.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
When General Odierno was here, we talked a little bit about
the hollow force. Nobody likes to talk about that, and I think
that, Mr. Secretary, you did mention that we are going in that
direction right now. I am going to read to you the quote that
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) used back a short
while ago. It was actually just last year. They said, talking
about the hollow force, that although the size and composition
of the force appeared adequate on paper--this is talking about
in the 1970s and the 1990s--shortcomings identified when these
forces were subjected to further scrutiny raised questions if
these forces would be able to accomplish their assigned wartime
missions.
Some feel that we are already approaching the hollow force.
We heard General Odierno talk about the hollow force insofar as
the Army is concerned. We know that we have smallest size of
the Air Force that we have had in history, and we are flying
the oldest aircrafts. So where do you think we are, each one of
you, in terms of approaching a hollow force similar to that
which we experienced in the 1970s and 1990s?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I have been very concerned about the
decline in readiness since about the 2003 timeframe and our
inability to get the resources necessary to keep up with the
weapon systems sustainment costs, in particular, that have come
with some of the new platforms that require lots of contractor
logistics support to support the ongoing efforts in
Afghanistan, et cetera. So I have been concerned about this.
Sequestration makes the problem worse, quite simply. Standing
down units again with no flying hours at all and deferring
aircraft and engines, as you mentioned--and I think the numbers
you quoted are correct, about 60 airframes and about 35
engines--will create a backlog that needs to be addressed down
the line, and we will not be able to recover as quickly as we
should. So we are right now making the problem worse, not
better.
Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with the comments or the
answers that General Welsh stated in terms of the fact that it
is not currently in the 2014 budget to get this done?
Mr. Donley. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. It is a very serious thing.
The F-35. You commented on the significance of that,
General Welsh. A lot of times, people are challenging that. I
know that there have been cost overruns, have been problems,
and all that. Is there anything further you want to state in
terms of the significance of the JSF to our fleet for the
future?
General Welsh. Senator, as I mentioned, we need the
airplane. We have committed to it. It brings a capability that
nothing else in our fleet has, and we will be able to bring it
to the battle space in 2030. It is beyond our ability to
upgrade legacy platforms to produce the kind of capability this
aircraft will bring to the battlefield. It is just the way it
is.
The program for the last 2 years has been making steady
progress and has stayed on track in my view since about 2011.
The major issues that remain are cost-related. I believe the
company now knows how much it costs to build an airplane. I
think they have demonstrated stability in that cost in the
production line for the last two lots. I think we have to make
very clear we understand the long-term operating costs of the
airplane. We are working very hard at doing that in conjunction
with the company to make sure that we see the same picture.
It is important that we keep our partners involved in the
program because they also affect the long-term investment that
the United States makes in this program. It becomes much
cheaper for us if we have partners in investing in future
builds, et cetera, not just in the production value.
So we are committed to the F-35. I am pretty happy with
where it is right now. We need to keep moving toward as high a
production rate as we can get. Sequestration has impacted that.
We have had to back off our production rates for the next
couple of years, although we will still hope to hit 60 per year
starting in 2018.
Senator Inhofe. Is the figure that they used initially
still a reality figure?
General Welsh. Sir, 1,763 remains the number in the
President's budget.
Senator Inhofe. Now, you say that there were 179 that were
delayed for 2 years. I have had occasions to go down to Fort
Worth and talk about the significance of delays, and you talk
about the out-of-country purchases that are out there. As the
price does go up--and it does go up every time there is even a
delay, not just a cancelation--that does drive some people out
of the market. That is something that I am concerned about
because that makes it more expensive for us at the same time.
Let me ask you one last question on the C-130. It is the
work horse. Now, we are completely out of the E models now. Is
that correct?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. The intent is to go to all C-130H
and J models.
Senator Inhofe. But the H1 series--as we get new J models
on, are we taking out of service then the H1 or the earlier H
models?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. The intent is to attrit the older
models as we get new J models.
Senator Inhofe. Is that not one program that has not slid
on the J models?
General Welsh. The J model program is doing very well.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join my colleagues, Secretary Donley, in thanking
you for your excellent service to our Nation and wishing you
well in the future if this is, indeed, your last appearance
before our committee.
General Welsh, welcome and thank you for your extraordinary
service over many years and the men and women under your
command.
I want to begin, if I may, with a question about the combat
search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter, the CSAR HH-60, which I
understand is scheduled to be replaced with a new aircraft
which is necessary to perform the very challenging rescue and
recovery missions that the Air Force undertakes so frequently.
If I may, let me ask--first of all, to commend the Air Force on
a very well-structured request for proposal (RFP) that
emphasized the best capability and the lowest operating cost
for the taxpayers. Could you provide me with an update as to
the status of this program and an idea as to when the decision
will be reached?
Mr. Donley. It is funded in the President's budget, but it
is currently under source selection. So we do not have much to
say about the particulars of that. It is scheduled for a
decision later this year.
Senator Blumenthal. Will the RFP, as it was issued, be
implemented?
Mr. Donley. Again, I expect that the RFP would be addressed
in the source selection process and that is the process that is
underway today. Again, we are looking to make a decision later
this year.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you have a more precise idea as to
when later this year it would be made?
Mr. Donley. I do not at this point.
I will just offer transparently that we are also looking at
the affordability of all our modernization programs going
forward. This is a very important one, but as we look at the
potential for sequestration over a 10-year period, if that
sight picture does not change, as I suggest in my testimony, it
is going to change a lot of acquisition programs. So we are
taking a broad look at all of our modernization programs to
make sure they will be affordable for the future.
Senator Blumenthal. I understand. If you could keep us
informed about the status of that program, I would appreciate
it.
General Welsh, first of all, let me commend you for being
so forthcoming to many of us in your efforts to combat sexual
assault in the Air Force and in particular the special victims
counsel (SVC) program that you have implemented since January
28, 2013. I understand that the SVC program has already
represented 224 sexual assault victims. I have joined two of my
colleagues, Senators Boxer and Gillibrand, in urging that funds
be made available to every Service to follow the model that the
Air Force is setting in this regard.
I wonder if you could give us an update on this program and
the efforts that are being made because the kind of
representation of victims or survivors is so critically
important to enabling and encouraging them to come forward and
report these predatory crimes. They are predatory, violent
crimes for the most part. They should be treated as such. In
the civilian world, as I know from my experience, providing aid
to victims is critically important in encouraging more
reporting of a crime that in the military is so drastically
under-reported. Could you give us an update, please?
General Welsh. Yes, sir, I can.
We now have 265 victims assigned to SVCs. Our SVCs are busy
enough that we have taken them off of all other duties. They
are now completely dedicated to this particular task. We left
them regionally distributed around the country as opposed to
centralizing them, which was one of the debates we had, because
we think it allows victims better access to them.
We have seen two significant statistics.
One is that in the past we had about a 30 percent rate of
unrestricted report victims who would decide not to continue
with prosecution after they began the process of
investigations, interrogations, questioning, et cetera. So far,
of the 268 represented by SVCs, we have 2, which is a huge
improvement, which allows us to prosecute more cases over time
which is key to moving forward in this area in my view.
The second thing I would mention to you is that our change
of restricted reports to unrestricted reports in the past was
about 17 percent on average. Of the victims who have SVC, that
number is about 55 percent. So more victims are willing to
change to an unrestricted report and allow us to investigate
because they are more comfortable having a legal advisor who is
with them throughout the entire process.
Just those two statistics make me feel very comfortable
this program is moving in the right direction, and there is a
lot of other anecdotal evidence, including victim testimony, et
cetera.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you. You may have read,
General Welsh, the Washington Post story this morning about
Lieutenant General Susan Helms reversing a conviction similar
to the one that General Franklin did that has aroused a great
deal of interest and more than a little controversy.
I wonder if you could enlighten us as to whether that story
was accurate and what action you would contemplate under these
circumstances.
General Welsh. Senator, I would be happy to.
First of all, by way of context, because I think this is
such an emotional topic from every angle that context is
important. In the U.S. military, in DOD over the last 5 years,
there have been five sexual assault cases where a convening
authority has reversed the decision. In three of those cases,
the actual allegation of sexual assault--the subject was found
not guilty at a trial but was found guilty of lesser offenses,
not sexual assault charges. In those three cases, the convening
authority set the court aside and punished the subject under
nonjudicial punishment for the three lesser offenses.
In the two cases where a sexual assault allegation was
found to be guilty in court and then set aside by the convening
authority, in one of those, the case you refer to, General
Helms' case, there were actually two sexual assault charges.
The court found the subject innocent of one and guilty of the
second. General Helms has the convening authority and,
following due process of the law as written, reviewed the case,
determined that in her view the evidence presented did not meet
a burden of reasonable doubt. She reversed the guilty decision
on the second count of sexual assault. She then took the other
three charges, the minor charges that had also been found
guilty in court, and she punished the subject under nonjudicial
punishment for those offenses. She also punished the sexual
assault charge under nonjudicial punishment.
The last case, and the only one where a court has been
completely set aside that we can find in DOD in the last 5
years, was the Aviano case that has also gotten a lot of
publicity.
So we have had two cases over the last 5 years where this
has occurred. It does not happen routinely. I think clearly it
makes us question two things. Number one, we have to do a
review of the convening authority's actions. In the Aviano
case, Secretary Donley did a very thorough review of that and
determined that our convening authority followed the law as
written, made a decision that we expect our convening
authorities to make, not right or wrong in our judgment, but
just made a decision. That is their job.
Now we think the issue is whether the law is written
correctly. Should Article 60, which gives the convening
authority that responsibility and designs the process--should
it be reviewed and adjusted? The Secretary and I both very
clearly believe it is time to do that.
Senator Blumenthal. I think it also undermines the
credibility of the convening authority to make prosecutorial
decisions in the first place. You have defended that authority
here and I understand and respect your views. But I would just
respectfully suggest that it also indicates a need to review
the entire convening authority's actions and powers and
credibility in light of these decisions.
General Welsh. Senator, if I might. It is clearly an issue
that we need to debate openly and honestly and look at all the
second- and third-order effects.
One practical example of why removing a convening
authority's disposition authority is that it would create a
huge problem for commanders in the field. Article 15, which is
one of the tools commanders use routinely, is a baseline
building block for enforcing military justice and discipline in
their units. It almost requires the ability to compel someone
to accept it. If you do not have the ability to refer that
individual to court, you have no way to compel them to accept
the Article 15. So from a very practical perspective, we just
need to think through that implication because it is
significant.
Senator Blumenthal. I thank you very much. My time has
expired, but I look forward to exploring these questions with
you further. Thank you personally for your actions, as well as
Secretary Donley. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, thank you for your great
service in many capacities to this country, and we thank you
for that. I think I share the view of all of us in thanking you
for your outstanding service.
I do not usually speak about parochial matters, but if I
could just for a minute. The forest fire season is coming
earlier than ever. In our defense bill that we passed, we
authorized the transfer of aircraft of the C-27J to replace the
very rapidly aging, very old fire fighting aircraft that we
have.
Can you give us an update on that particular evolution and
how soon we could expect those very aging fire fighting tankers
to be replaced?
Mr. Donley. Yes, Senator. We are implementing the planned
retirement of the C-27s using the language that the NDAA passed
last year. We have had letters of interest from U.S. Special
Operations Command, from the Coast Guard, from the U.S. Forest
Service. It is our intent to have those aircraft off the books
by the end of the fiscal year. So we will go through a process
this summer of evaluating those letters of interest and
negotiating out which agencies might receive the C-27s that DOD
plans to divest.
Senator McCain. I hope you will view it with some urgency
because I am told that we may have a shortfall in our ability
to combat these fires. Obviously, it is not a question of
whether there are going to be forest fires in the entire West,
but when. So I hope you will give it some priority and make
sure that we are on track to replace those aircraft that we
have to retire.
Now, back again on sequestration, does your budget planning
for fiscal year 2014 consider--does it assume that
sequestration will be repealed?
Mr. Donley. No.
Senator McCain. It does not.
Mr. Donley. Let me think this through. The President's
budget does propose the repeal of sequestration. So if all the
budget assumptions that go with the President's budget were
passed, there would be no need for sequestration in fiscal year
2014. Therefore, the fiscal year 2014 budget, as proposed, does
not anticipate sequestration. If those budget assumptions do
not come to pass and sequestration occurs, it will occur from
whatever level, as I understand it, Congress has enacted for
fiscal year 2014.
Senator McCain. But right now, you are not budgeting for
sequestration remaining in effect.
Mr. Donley. Correct.
Senator McCain. General Welsh, are you concerned about
morale and retention of pilots in the U.S. Air Force as a
result of the reduced flying hours and actual stand-down in
some of the most important training components like the Fighter
Weapons School at Nellis and others?
General Welsh. Senator, if this continues for any period of
time, I am absolutely concerned about it. They did not join to
sit. You know that as well as anyone. They will get frustrated
and they have other options.
Senator McCain. I am told that there will be a very large
exodus of airline pilots who have joined in a block period and
that will create a demand for pilots in the airlines that we
have not seen in a long time. Are you aware of that?
General Welsh. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator McCain. So you are having to, as you listed, stand
down some of the most vital training regimens that we have in
the U.S. Air Force.
General Welsh. Senator, we have stopped Fighter Weapons
School classes. We have stopped Red Flag training, and we
canceled the last Red Flag at least. We are looking at them one
at a time as they come up on the schedule to see how much money
we have to execute them. We have stopped instructor pilot
upgrade programs that are dedicated to that function. These are
bills that we will continue to pay for 20 years. We will never
recover this training capacity. The longer we shut down, the
more traumatic it is. This is a big deal to our Air Force.
Senator McCain. General Odierno testified that it could
take 10 to 15 years to restore the operational capability of
the U.S. Army if we continue with sequestration throughout the
next year. Do you agree with that assessment?
General Welsh. If we continued for another year, I am not
sure it would take us 10 years to restore the operational
capability. It would take us much longer than that to fill the
personnel and the requirements bathtubs that we have generated
in year groups now. If we do not do Weapons School instructor
training for another year, our ability to create the top tier
leaders of our Air Force will be affected for 20 years until
those people retire.
Senator McCain. The ability of your pilots to perform at
the highest level in combat will be degraded because of the
lack of training.
General Welsh. Yes, absolutely, Senator. That training is
what makes all our Services the best in the world.
Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, in that context, in your
retirement--and you have been around longer than most--I think
one of the reasons that members of both parties are willing to
allow this sequestration to proceed is a widespread belief that
a profligate DOD is unwilling to rein in runaway costs on
under-performing programs. The most recent example is the
Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS), $1 billion, JSF
cost overruns, the F-22 cost overruns, the criminal Boeing
tanker case. It is damaging DOD's fiscal credibility which in
turn permits elected officials to believe that haphazard cuts,
which damage our readiness, are the right thing to do. As you
testified, grounding of 17 squadrons, critical operations,
maintenance. What do you say to this, Secretary Donley?
Mr. Donley. I think our acquisition process just takes way
too long and costs way too much. We have become, in many ways,
risk averse, I think, in acquisition programs because we have
seen so many different ways over the years that programs can
get off track, and each time a program gets off track, we try
to correct it by putting in a new law, a new regulation, a new
layer of oversight to try to prevent that from happening again.
After 20 or 30 years of that, we are pretty thick on
regulations and oversight in our acquisition system.
So I think there is a lot of streamlining that needs to be
looked at going forward and especially as the resources come
down after the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan and looking at
the budget totals contemplated in the BCA, sequestration or no,
whatever would take the BCA's place, we need to put more
pressure on streamlining our acquisition process and getting
some of the people and the processes out and get focused on
more rapid introduction of technology.
I support the spiral approach where we are introducing
technology more rapidly and planning for changes later, not
trying to build the perfect airplane right off the bat, but
spiraling that capability in 5- or 10-year increments to
improve it over time.
Senator McCain. If you think that Congress needs to act in
any way, I promise you we are more than eager to accept your
recommendations as to what actions need to be taken to do
exactly as you said. I am sure you understand the frustration.
We share the frustration of a lot of American taxpayers. We
need to fix it, and any recommendations that you can provide to
us with the benefit of your experience we would certainly be
pleased to have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Donley, General Welsh, welcome today.
Last week, we were in a recess and as I often do in recess,
I travel around Virginia and go to parts of our State that
touch upon our armed services mission, Department of Veterans
Affairs' hospitals, bases, military contractors, Reserve
Officer Training Corps programs. I was at an interesting one
last week. Mary Baldwin College is a women's college in
Staunton, VA, that has a 100-member Virginia Women Institute of
Leadership in this small, private college, and they have a
commissioning percentage among these 100 women that is higher
than most of the 6 senior military colleges designated in title
10.
One of the young ladies was asking me a question and said
do you think the military's decision to remove barriers to
combat service might have a broader effect on women's
opportunities in the civilian world. That led to an interesting
discussion about what happens in the military and its effect on
the civilian world and the important leadership role that the
military takes.
It is in that spirit--I am just very sorry that the
rescheduling has you here today, in the same week when this
incident in Arlington is in the news, and yet it is. I just
worry about the effect of this. There are all kinds of today
effects that this kind of event suggests when somebody charged
particularly with overseeing a program to deal with victims of
sexual assault is in fact charged. The chairman said that we
have to presume innocence until proven guilty.
But I worry as much about the tomorrow effects. I worry
about the tomorrow effects of women who are thinking about
making military careers and for the young woman who asked me
the question about what happens in the military has a civilian
effect. I also worry about those women in the program who do
not commission but go into a civilian world but maybe go in
with a little more of a concern that if this happens at the top
echelon in military leadership, then it could happen in the
civilian world as well.
The stakes on this one are enormously high. They are
enormously high. Senator McCain asked about morale questions
with respect to sequester, and I am going to get to that in a
minute. But we need to worry about the morale of tomorrow's
military leaders, and in that context I was quite concerned.
General Welsh, you mentioned that you have sought
jurisdiction in this case, which is a standard matter, and if
you could just educate me for a second about the procedure.
There is an arraignment that is scheduled through the
Commonwealth's Attorney in Arlington County, and that is
scheduled later in the week. It would be military standard to
seek jurisdiction of the matter. I gather that the prosecutor
has discretion as to whether to continue with the criminal case
in the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia or to put it in
abeyance in some way and transfer it over to military
jurisdiction. Is that correct?
General Welsh. Senator, that is exactly right. The sexual
assault prosecutor in Arlington County will make that decision.
Our 11th wing assigned at Bolling Air Force Base here in
Washington, DC--their JAG office is actually the one that is
the interface with Arlington County. They have submitted the
request for jurisdiction and we will let the process play out.
Senator Kaine. You have educated me on the process, so I
clearly do not know. But I imagine that one of the things the
prosecutor's office weighs in wrestling with a request such as
that is their degree of confidence about whether a trial or
proceeding, if transferred over to military jurisdiction, would
in fact be a fair one.
General Welsh. Senator, I would assume that would be part
of this.
Senator Kaine. Just that the stakes are very high. The
stakes are very high on this one.
Talking about morale in a different way and now moving to
sequester, I visited Langley about a month ago. I met with
wonderful Air Force personnel there, both pilots but also
wonderful mechanics who maintain F-22s, not just those in
Virginia, but from all around the country. I talked to General
Hostage about this one-third of the Air Combat Command (ACC)
units standing down. My assumption is that in the dangerous
circumstances we find ourselves in in the world, there is an
awful lot of contingency planning going on about use of ACC
assets in Syria possibly, with respect to North Korea, other
places in the world.
If you could, just talk about what it means to stand down
one-third of the ACC units and how that impacts the kinds of
planning and then, God forbid, the need to actually go forward
on executing any of those contingency plans in a status where
we have curbed our training and our missions in that way.
General Welsh. Senator, what we have prioritized to keep
units flying is the units that are either already in
Afghanistan or preparing to deploy to Afghanistan or units on
the Korean Peninsula or those doing the nuclear mission--
everything else was affected by this, either drawdown to
minimal flying or standing down completely. So any new
contingency activity that requires the rest of that force
structure will be impacted.
As one example of the type of disconnect you can get,
because we are meeting a known tasking from a combatant
commander for a type of capability, an F-15C let us say, which
is an air-to-air airplane--we have other units that do
suppression of enemy air defenses that are not flying right now
because they are not required in the current deployment cycle.
In an example like a new contingency where you need to go
suppress enemy air defenses, they would be the first things you
need and they will not be fully ready. So we are trying to
manage them day-to-day as the world's situations change.
Senator, if I could go back to your last comment just one
time on the fair trial or not. One of the issues that seems to
come up routinely is this belief that the military does not
prosecute as much as a local jurisdiction might. We actually
took the Air Force statistics that are in a little bit of a
convoluted equation that comes out of DOD because of the way we
track these things. We took them to the Rape, Abuse, and Incest
National Network (RAINN) folks. We sat down side-by-side with
them, and we said use your model and put our data into it and
tell us what our prosecution and conviction rates are. For
2012, our prosecution rate was 1 percent below the national
average. Our conviction rate was 3 percent above. So the idea
that we do not prosecute should not be a concern of the special
prosecutor. The idea that we cannot convict relative to the
local jurisdiction should not be a concern of his if we can
ensure they have all the facts.
Senator Kaine. That is certainly my hope. I am not
suggesting otherwise. Yet, just the controversy over the Aviano
situation, the article about the second case this morning, the
fact that the individual who is charged with leading an
important leadership position to deal with sexual assault cases
has, in fact, himself been charged, those are the kinds of
things that just, again, as a prosecutor is making up a mind
about where a case can be prosecuted in a way that will
certainly protect victims and it will also protect the
accused--Arlington is a pro-military community. So it is not
going to be a hostile environment. These are the kinds of
things that prosecutors wrestle with, and that goes back to my
comment about the stakes being pretty high in this situation.
I wanted to follow up on Senator McCain's question because
I think you each knew something that I do not know and maybe
others do not. This issue about is there a cohort of civilian
aviation pilots that is expected to retire or depart that would
create a significant present competition that might pull out
military pilots if they feel like Congress, through budgetary
or other actions, is demonstrating that we are not committed to
certainty in their future work and path.
General Welsh. Senator, we have been hearing for about a
year now that the airline industry expects to increase their
hiring rates dramatically over the next 1 to 3 years. So we do
anticipate there will be opportunities and a draw, and
historically we lose a much higher percentage of air crew
members from all the Services when the airlines hire.
Senator Kaine. Let me just say in conclusion that there
were 53 votes, I think, in this body at the end of February in
the Senate to not allow the sequester to go into effect. There
were 50 votes to pass the Senate budget that did pass on March
23 that would have dramatically changed the sequester and made
the cuts targeted rather than across-the-board, back-end rather
than spread evenly across 10 years, and cut in half. It is my
deep hope, based on your testimony and the testimony of others
who have been before us that this committee can play a lead
role in trying to find a solution that does not continue to
jeopardize the missions that you are promoting.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses, both of you, for being here
and for your distinguished service to our country and all that
serve underneath you.
Secretary Donley and General Welsh, in your prepared
statement, you talked about the KC-46 as one of the top Air
Force acquisition priorities, particularly given that obviously
our tankers go back to the Eisenhower era of making sure that
we update our tankers. The importance of the in-flight
refueling missions is certainly the linchpin for our being able
to carry out almost any mission in the world, as well as
supporting our allies.
I understand, General Welsh, from the discussion you and I
certainly had this morning in my office that you are in the
process, the Air Force is in the process, of making the
decision on the basing of this particularly for the Air
National Guard and that will be upcoming. I just want to
applaud you for the transparent and objective process you have
applied thus far. I think it will not come as a surprise to
both of you that both Senator Shaheen and I feel very strongly
about the performance of our 157th air refueling unit at Pease
and we welcome the objective nature of this process because
certainly Pease has a strategic location, only 12 minutes from
very important refueling tracks, and also an already existing
Active Duty association that we are very proud of. Of course,
for us just what our unit has already done in every conflict in
terms of their utilization and the excellent work they have
done to support essentially almost every mission that the Air
Force has been involved in most recently. So I am very proud of
Pease. I know that Senator Shaheen is as well. I want to
commend both of you just for the way you have conducted the
process thus far.
Do we expect this process to go forward in May when you
will be making final decisions?
Mr. Donley. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Okay, good. So one of the questions I would
have to you going forward, as we look at the impact of
sequestration, what type of impact could that have on, for
example, our acquisition of the KC-46A in terms of purchasing
the numbers that we need to meet our capacity going forward?
Mr. Donley. As I suggested, Senator, the acquisition plan
for the KC-46 remains intact. It is 179 aircraft, I think 8
aircraft by fiscal year 2017, the first development aircraft by
fiscal year 2015. So the program is on track today. It is a
contract which is, we think, in the best interests of the
warfighter and the taxpayer, limiting the Government's exposure
at about $4.9 billion. We need to make sure that those contract
requirements stay funded over the next several years. So we
will do our best to keep that on track and make sure that the
KC-46 remains a high priority and a funded program.
Senator Ayotte. Of course, we also need to make sure that
our pilots get the appropriate training and flying hours not
just in our refuelers, but obviously our fighters as well. That
remains a significant challenge going forward with
sequestration, does it not, General?
General Welsh. Senator, clearly it does. In fact, just as a
side note, if you will permit me, we have a KC-135 crew we lost
in Kyrgyzstan just this past week, and this morning, we were
still searching for the remains of one of those crew members.
Senator Ayotte. Our thoughts and prayers are with their
families and their loss for their sacrifice for our country.
Thank you.
I wanted to discuss with you, General Welsh. Earlier you
told Senator Blumenthal that the Air Force was seeing positive
results by providing victims of sexual assault a SVC. I
understand that that is a pilot program within the Air Force
that you think is effective.
Today, Senator Murray and I are introducing a bill which,
in part, will provide a SVC to all sexual assault victims
within all branches of the military. This is something modeled
after, obviously, what is happening now in the Air Force pilot
program. So I wanted to get your view on this and how important
you thought having that counsel was helping the process of
making sure victims have the support that they need to navigate
through the system, the judicial system.
General Welsh. Senator, I believe to date the evidence in
my mind is clear that it has been immensely helpful
particularly to the victims, and that is who we are most
interested in helping. Our intent in this program is to
complete the pilot with a report that I will work with the Air
Force JAG, and I will forward that to the Secretary with my
recommendations on whether the Air Force continues and
recommendations on what he should forward to the Secretary of
Defense for recommendations across DOD. Then the Secretary will
make a decision from there.
Senator Ayotte. I believe that this is not something that
when you are within the Air Force and a victim that you should
receive, but I believe that victims across the branches should
be receiving this type of support. Obviously, as you can hear
from the questions today from many of us, this is a very
important issue that we are concerned about in terms of the
readiness of our forces and also making sure that those who are
victims receive the support that they need and a proper legal
process to see that justice is done going forward. So I think
this is an issue that we will work on on a bipartisan basis,
and it is an important issue for our country.
I wanted to finally follow up on the issue of audits, which
is when I look at the cancelation late last year of the ECSS,
that raised a flag for me, and I wanted to hear from both of
you. Is the Air Force on track to meet the 2014 and 2017 audit
deadlines?
Mr. Donley. The short answer is yes, but there is risk in
this work and the cancelation of ECSS puts a little bit more
emphasis on the need to go forward with existing systems and to
modify existing systems, it is clear that our enterprise
resource programs are not going to all be in place to support
this work. So there is going to be a lot of manual work and a
lot of work with existing systems to do that. We have had some
success in getting a clean opinion on about 46 percent of Air
Force inventory, on missile motors, other parts of our Air
Force inventory. So we continue to work toward the fiscal year
2014 and fiscal year 2017 goals.
Senator Ayotte. Mr. Secretary, do you think that you will
today, as we sit in this hearing, meet those goals?
Mr. Donley. We are working very hard to get there. There is
risk but we are working very hard to get there. We have been
trying to use outside auditors and experts to do pre-audit work
with us. Some of that work was intended to be contracted out.
The contract is under protest. So that did set us back. We are
looking for opportunities to regain some lost time there, but
we are working very hard to get there.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you. This is, obviously, a very
important issue just for us to meet those audit deadlines
finally and to be able to have the right type of financial
information and accountability, particularly with the fiscal
challenges that we face.
So I thank you both for being here today and for your
leadership.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know you had a bad weekend, General Welsh, and I
understand that this is painful for you. But I need to ask a
couple of questions.
What background did Lieutenant Colonel Krusinski have that
qualified him for this job?
General Welsh. He is a personnel officer by training. He
has spent the last 2\1/2\ years working on the air staff in the
personnel policy arena. He was a Force Support Squadron
commander before coming to the Pentagon. The Force Support
Squadron is the squadron in which things like sexual assault
coordination counselors, et cetera work in our active Air Force
units. He has been around the business his entire career as a
personnel officer.
Senator McCaskill. Have you looked at his file?
General Welsh. Yes, Senator, I have. His record is very
good.
Senator McCaskill. Did you look at his file for any kind of
problems related? I mean, clearly the accusation is that he was
drunk and sexually attacked a complete stranger in a parking
lot. It is hard for me to believe that someone would be accused
of that behavior by a complete stranger and not have anything
in their file that would indicate a problem in that regard.
Have you looked at his file and determined that his file was
absolutely pristine?
General Welsh. Senator, I looked at his officer record of
performance, which is all I could access last night. I talked
to his current supervisor. I have not talked to people who knew
him or supervised him in the past. There is no indication in
his professional record of performance or in his current
workplace that there is any type of a problem like this.
Senator McCaskill. Who selected him?
General Welsh. He was selected by Brigadier General Eden
Murrie who is the director of our services part in our
personnel area, the office above the Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Office, and Lieutenant General Darrell Jones who
runs our directorate of personnel manpower.
Senator McCaskill. Will those two people be responsible for
selecting his replacement?
General Welsh. Yes, ma'am, they probably will be.
Senator McCaskill. I hope that you will evaluate the
qualifications. I have spent hours with JAG prosecutors, not
just General Harding and his colleagues at the top of the
military justice food chain, but with courtroom prosecutors.
You have a wealth of people in the Air Force that understand
what this job has to be. If this allegation is proved true,
this was not someone who understood what this job was about. I
will be watching very carefully who is selected to replace
Lieutenant Colonel Krusinski because I think it is one of those
times you are going to be able to send a message, and I think
it is important you do.
These cases turn on who is believable. In the Aviano case
and in the case that General Helms overturned, in both
instances you had the victim testifying to one set of facts and
the accused testifying to another. In both instances, juries
selected by those generals said they believed the victim. In
both of those instances, the generals said, no, no, we believe
the member of the military. That is the crux of the problem
here because if a victim does not believe that the system is
capable of believing her, there is no point in risking your
entire career. Or as the victim in the Helms case said, how
difficult it was for her to encounter the accused who had been
convicted by a jury and have to salute him. Now, I cannot
imagine what that would feel like to have to salute the man who
had been convicted by his peers of assaulting her in the way
that he did.
So I agree with you that we have to be very careful about
removing the convening authority entirely, but I will look
forward to visiting with General Helms about her decision.
The other point I want to make about her decision, General,
is that these generals have the ability to consider anything
when they make this decision. Anything and everything. She did
it without meeting with the victim. She did get some email from
the prosecutor about the victim's point of view. But should the
victim be required to have something in the file before
clemency is determined even if we decide to remove the
convening authority from the ability to overturn? Should the
victim's statement not be part of any clemency proceeding?
General Welsh. Senator, I would assume that every victim
would want their statement to be part of a clemency proceeding.
I know in the cases you have referenced, the victim was
requested to provide matters for clemency.
Senator McCaskill. So would you have any problem with us
requiring that?
General Welsh. Senator, I personally would not have any
problem with that. I have no idea if there is a legal
implication of that, but from a common sense perspective, it
makes eminent sense.
Senator McCaskill. Yes. They are all getting stacks of
letters about what a great guy this is. In this instance, they
got an email from the prosecutor characterizing what the victim
had said. It seems to me that is a little weighted.
When she made this decision, we had changed Article 120,
and I do not know how familiar you are with 120. But 120 has
been a difficult part of the UCMJ dating back to 2007. We
wanted to change it, to update it, and then mistakes were made
in the way it was drafted. We changed it again. We had changed
120 at the time Helms made her decision. It had been signed
into law. It just had not gone into effect yet. But yet, she
reached back and used the old 120 instead of looking at the new
120 as she was evaluating what standard of consent was
available. I will be anxious to visit with her about that
decision, if she got any legal advice about how that law had
been changed.
Senator Ayotte covered also ECSS. For both of you, I share
her concerns about auditability on ECSS. But the main question
I would like for both of you--and I know, Secretary Donley, you
have served well and long, and I too salute your service in
leading one of the most important parts of our great military
in this country. What I really want to focus on--and we would
like some follow-up answers to this--is what did we learn about
when to cancel a system. We spent a billion with a ``B'' on
ECSS before it was canceled.
At what point in time should we have canceled it, and why
was it not canceled earlier? Why did we get to $1 billion
before we realized this was unworkable? If we do not do this
analysis, I know this is going to happen again. I just know it.
So what steps do you think we need to memorialize here that
would be instructive to the future ECSSs that we could avoid
wasting $1 billion of taxpayers' money?
Mr. Donley. Senator, this is a very good question. There
are two reviews underway, one in OSD, one inside the Air Force,
to get formally the lessons learned out of this experience. In
the case of the Air Force, we are treating it in terms of
developing for the acquisition this process, the same kind of
rigor and discipline that we put to an accident investigation
process, why and how did this happen, in great detail.
I will tell you that ECSS got lots of oversight and that
the program was restructured at least twice over a 4- or 5-year
period. That the program manager was held accountable, that the
program was rescoped down to try to make it more implementable,
and it got oversight not just from the Air Force but from three
other offices in OSD.
So deciding when we have gone far enough--we have
restructured it once. We have restructured it a second time,
and in this case the third review determined this is
unrecoverable.
So I am very interested in getting the results of these two
reviews to see if it can help us decide earlier when we should
cancel programs such as this. But we certainly went through
restructurings and it certainly had lots of oversight.
Senator McCaskill. Now with the fiscal restraints we have,
it is going to be very important that we absolutely have a very
clear document showing when mistakes were made and how they
could have been avoided. We have good news and bad news about
our military, and that is, our military is so good we think we
can do anything. The bad news sometimes is our military is so
good we think we can do anything. In this instance and many
other instances I can cite, a failure to give up ends up being
very costly for the bottom line, and that is just something we
cannot afford going forward.
So I will look forward to those reports. I will continue to
follow up on this subject until I feel like we have real clear
guidance as to where mistakes were made and how we can avoid
them in the future.
I will continue to want to work closely with you, General
Welsh, in a way that is responsible on the UCMJ on these cases,
and I will look forward to any kind of information I can get
about the replacement for the lieutenant colonel who was
arrested over the weekend. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony.
I am going to try to squeeze three issues in to my 8
minutes. So I think on the first one, let me just make a
statement for the record, and perhaps we can talk about that
later.
I want to reiterate my concerns regarding the concept of
the Air Force Total Force Plan (TFP) and its implementation. I
remain deeply concerned about the fiscal year 2013 defense
authorization conference decision made without consultation of
all conferees, which enabled the Air Force to begin
implementation of the TFP without hearings or adequate
deliberation by the full Senate Armed Services Committee. I am
convinced that some elements of the TFP were short-sighted and
may adversely impact our intra-theater airlift capability at a
time when our Services are evolving toward a more rotational
deployment model.
I say to my chairman and to my ranking member, I look
forward to working with them as well and with the Airland
Subcommittee chairman, Senator Manchin, on markup initiatives
to help ensure the Air Force makes its force structure
decisions based on the best possible understanding of long-term
global force requirements. These decisions should not be based
solely on artificial or self-imposed resource constraints.
Now, having made that statement, let me move to another
issue. I think what I will ask you to do is just take this
series of questions for the record, but I want to get it out in
public. It is concerning the Air Force's rotorcraft acquisition
strategy.
I understand you are considering a common support
helicopter to recap your UH-1N fleet of aircraft. I believe
there are existing and affordable replacement systems available
to meet global strike command's nuclear missile security
mission during the decades to come. So I would appreciate it if
both of you could provide this committee with written answers
concerning the following.
Number one, current requirements for all UH-1N missions.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Air Force's UH-1N is flown by five major commands, which
include multiple mission sets: Air Force Global Strike Command's
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) helicopter security support,
the Air Force District of Washington's National Capital Region Mass
Passenger Transport, Pacific Air Forces' Operational Support Airlift,
Air Education and Training Command's Air Force Survival School, and Air
Force Materiel Command's flight test support.
The current requirements for the various missions of the UH-1N are
documented in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's approved
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) capability development
document. Although these requirements are no longer tied to a specific
acquisition program (i.e., the CVLSP), the requirements for the UH-1N
mission set remain valid.

Senator Wicker. Number two, whether the Air Force
requirements have been reviewed and validated since those
missions were separated from the combat rescue helicopter
program.
[The information referred to follows:]

The current requirements for the various missions of the UH-1N are
documented in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's approved
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) capability development
document. Although these requirements are no longer tied to a specific
acquisition program (i.e., the CVLSP), the requirements for the UH-1N
mission set remain valid.
Air Force Global Strike Command will continue to sustain the
existing UH-1N fleet for the foreseeable future, and look for
opportunities to acquire excess aircraft from other Department of
Defense organizations at low or no cost to the Air Force.

Senator Wicker. Number three, the findings and
recommendations of the Air Force's request for information on
the UH-1N modernization with regard to the costs of the program
modification versus a replacement cost.
[The information referred to follows:]

In the case of the UH-1N, as stated in the original request for
information (RFI), ``in terms of mission capability rates the UH-1
remains one of the most reliable platforms within the USAF inventory.''
The purpose of the Air Force's RFI on UH-1N Modernization was to
determine the feasibility of sustaining and making modest modernization
enhancements to the platform via low cost options. The Industry Day
presentations reaffirmed that the robust helicopter industry and the
large number of UH-1's operating globally will enable the Air Force to
effectively sustain the UH-1N until such a time that it can be replaced
with an aircraft that provides all required capabilities.
Air Force Global Strike Command has determined that the most cost
effective way ahead includes safety and simulator modifications
totaling just over $500,000 per aircraft in the near-term. Follow-on
improvements to the forward looking infrared radar and secure
communications at $100,000 to $200,000 per aircraft yield a total cost
of less than $1 million per aircraft over a 10-year period. Compared to
the previously assessed cost of the Common Vertical Lift Support
Platform program, or any other new helicopter acquisition, this
approach is far more cost effective for the Air Force.

Senator Wicker. Number four, the current operational
availability of the UH-1N fleet and the Air Force's assessment
of any risk regarding the maintenance and adequate availability
levels.
[The information referred to follows:]

The current UH-1N average aircraft availability for fiscal year
2013 is 73.7 percent, meeting the Air Force Global Strike Command-
established standard of 73.7 percent. The future aircraft availability
rate is projected to continue to meet or exceed the 73.7 percent
requirement. We expect to maintain adequate readiness levels for the
foreseeable future.

Senator Wicker. Number five, whether the Air Force has
evaluated potential replacement aircraft for any of the
missions performed by the UH-1N.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform was cancelled due to cost
considerations in this constrained economic environment after
determination that the Air Force could assume manageable risk in this
area. Air Force Global Strike Command is no longer pursuing a Combat
Rescue Helicopter option to replace the UH-1N fleet for similar
reasons. Instead, Air Force Global Strike Command will continue to
sustain the existing UH-1N fleet for the foreseeable future, and look
for opportunities to acquire excess aircraft from other Department of
Defense organizations at low/no cost to the Air Force.

Senator Wicker. So having asked for that on the record, I
will now see if I can let you gentlemen actually speak on an
issue, and that is concerning the safety of our U.S. Air Force
data security.
There have been numerous media articles referring to an
egregious breach of U.S. computer networks when the Chinese
gained access to some data from the JSF program back in 2009.
The incident was part of a wave of data thefts that year,
during which Beijing stole proprietary and in some cases
classified information from the U.S. defense contractors.
I asked General Bogdan, the program executive officer for
the JSF program, at a subcommittee hearing 2 weeks ago about
these data intrusions. General Bogdan's testimony was this: DOD
and our allies have a robust system in place to prevent cyber
theft, but the general went on to say, ``I would tell you that
I am not confident outside the Department.'' Then he went on to
say that he is ``less confident about industry partners.''
So let me ask you each about that, and I will start with
you, Mr. Secretary. How confident are you about the Air Force's
ability to secure classified and sensitive data within DOD data
networks and how confident are you about the ability of our
industry partners to secure this very important classified and
sensitive data?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I do believe we have the appropriate
security protocols in place to protect key classified
information in DOD. We have protected networks to do that on,
and we work very hard to maintain appropriate security levels
on each of our classified and unclassified networks.
I will say that in the last 5 or 6 years, 7 years--since I
have come back to DOD, really 8 years now, I have seen more and
more attention to this issue progressively each year. We have
learned from weaknesses or errors seen and experienced from the
past. We developed strong partnerships with industry partners
who are what I would call our prime contractors who deal with
the JSF, for example, Lockheed Martin, Northrop, Boeing, other
large contractors with whom we do lots of defense business.
So we have a stronger network of collaboration among key
industry partners today than we had, say, 5 or 6 years ago. But
it is continuing work, and there is always a concern that we
are covering all that needs to be covered.
Senator Wicker. General Welsh?
General Welsh. Senator, I would tell you that internal to
DOD, the one thing that we have worked very hard on over the
last year and will continue to work on and refine is the way we
support U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) which, I believe, will be
the orchestrator and the architect of the proper defense of the
DOD information network. The Air Force has to be hand-in-glove
with General Alexander and his people moving forward on this,
and we are trying to identify clearly how we do that, what kind
of training our people need to support him. They have been
tremendously helpful in this regard, and the entire joint world
is trying to move in that direction.
Senator Wicker. Are you as confident about our industry
partners as you are about security within DOD itself? Or do you
agree with General Bogdan that you are less confident about our
industry partners?
General Welsh. Senator, first of all, I am not a technical
expert on what industry is doing in every case. I believe we
have some partners who are very reliable in this area, and
there are probably some who are not as reliable. I would leave
this up to the experts at CYBERCOM to offer a better assessment
than I can give you.
Senator Wicker. Are either of you aware of any further
intrusions like the one I mentioned in 2009 into the Air Force
research and development (R&D) and acquisition programs since
that time? Either one of you?
Mr. Donley. I think I would like to provide you an answer
for the record on that. This is ongoing work.
Senator Wicker. You could do that in a non-classified
answer for the record.
Mr. Donley. We will do our best to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer recently
released the latest National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section
935 2012 Report to Congress, which contains an unclassified summary of
cyber intrusions.
To summarize that report, in fiscal year 2012, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) investigated 86 cyber intrusions reported by
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) participants. Fifty-four of the 86 were
reported prior to fiscal year 2012 and 32 additional cases were
reported during fiscal year 2012. Of the 86 cases, OSD cyber intrusion
damage assessment entities concluded the analysis for all or part of 35
cases. Twelve other cases were closed in fiscal year 2012 when the DIB
cyber security and information assurance participant certified that no
DOD information was involved. Most cases involve multiple DOD
acquisition equities (e.g., programs, systems, or technologies).
DOD is concerned with the vulnerabilities throughout the
information and communications technology supply chain. As part of its
ongoing efforts to institutionalize the Trusted Defense Systems/Supply
Chain Risk Management (SCRM) strategies, DOD continued to develop
policies and legislative input to formalize SCRM.
Supply chain risks pose a complex and evolving threat to defense
systems. In the January 2010 NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 Section 254
Report on Trusted Defense Systems, DOD described supply chain risks and
DOD's strategies for countering those risks. During fiscal year 2012,
DOD continued efforts to implement those strategies, policies, and risk
management activities with the goal of developing a fully operational
SCRM capability by fiscal year 2016.
The Air Force can provide more details via a classified venue if
requested by the committee.

Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator King.
Senator King. General, do you fellows have data on the
frequency of occurrence of sexual assault in the military or in
the Air Force in particular versus the general society?
General Welsh. Sir, anecdotally we do. One of the things
that we have also learned in our discussions with RAINN is that
that data is not easily available anywhere else. It is much
better tracked inside DOD than it is in most places.
I have talked to a number of university deans of student
affairs, the vice president for student affairs. There are some
who estimate that as many as 50 percent or more of their
students experience some type of sexual harassment or unwanted
sexual contact or sexual assault during their time at their
university. I hate to try and characterize this as better or
worse anywhere. It is a big problem for our Nation. It may be
as big or bigger elsewhere.
My view is that we can lead the pack in this. We have the
ability. We have the organizational structure, the leadership,
the training, the education, and a disciplinary system and a
judicial process that allows us to attack every aspect of this
problem. We should be the best in the world at it.
Senator King. I am delighted to hear you say that. In
dealing with these kinds of problems, often it is a cultural
issue. You can do all the law enforcement and all of those
things, but the culture is what you have to deal with. You and
I grew up at a time when drinking and driving was more or less
tolerated in this country. The culture changed and that has had
a really profound impact. So I hope that--and I am sure this is
the case--that within the Air Force, it has to become
unacceptable culturally in the pub after work that this is just
not something that we do.
General Welsh. Senator, that is clearly what it has to be.
Roughly 20 percent of our young women who come into DOD and the
Air Force report that they were sexually assaulted in some way
before they came into the military. So they come in from a
society where this occurs. Some of it is the hook-up mentality
of junior high even and high school students now, which my
children can tell you about from watching their friends and
being frustrated by it. The same demographic group moves into
the military. We have to change the culture once they arrive.
The way they behave, the way they treat each other cannot be
outside the bounds of what we consider inclusive and
respectful.
Senator King. Thank you, General. I appreciate your
attention to this.
Secretary Donley, sequester. It keeps coming up. We talk
about it at all of our hearings. There is a discussion around
here that the real problem is flexibility and that you can take
the cuts if you are given the flexibility. Now, you said
something like transfer authority will not help. Can you focus
this discussion for us? Because this is going to come up over
the next year as we wrestle with this issue. If we gave you
additional flexibility, would that substantially alleviate the
impact of the sequester on the hollowing out of the force?
Mr. Donley. Flexibility comes in a variety of flavors and
colors. So, first of all, with respect to fiscal year 2013 and
the way it has to be implemented this year and what we
experienced, it came almost 6 months into the fiscal year. So
it forced a very mechanical spread of dollars across all the
accounts, but it forced that to happen in essentially the last
6 or 7 months of the fiscal year. So it has had devastating
impacts really on our ability to execute the budget that you
all approved.
Looking forward, there is no question in our minds that
more flexibility is better, that being allowed to make choices
about where to put emphasis in our defense planning and
programming, to favor certain programs, to promote the
strategic interests of the United States even as defense
resources go down is an important goal. It is an important
flexibility to have.
But I would also offer that in doing this work, we need
time. We need time to do this right. As you give us the
flexibility, we also need to have the collaboration and the
cooperation of Congress so that you understand the choices that
we will be making and you will be comfortable with those as you
approve our defense plans and budgets. It will not help if we
make tough choices internal to DOD which Congress does not
agree with or is not ready to make and you reverse or block
those changes. So it is very important that we collaborate in
this work going forward regardless of what the level is. But we
need time to do it right.
Senator King. But are you suggesting then that we can go
ahead with the 10-year sequester and you can manage okay if you
are given--I was under the understanding that you said transfer
authority will not really help. Was that only for this year or
in the future? This is an important question.
Mr. Donley. Just to be clear, transfer authority for fiscal
year 2013 will not help us out in this sense. What you are
giving us when you give us transfer authority is the ability to
move dollars from one account to another account inside the
fixed constraints of sequestration. So in order to meet all our
O&M requirements, for example, to fix all the OCO shortfalls
and O&M shortfalls, we have to cut into modernization programs
that right now we are not quite prepared to cut into yet. So we
would have to start breaking contracts and doing other
significant damage to modernization programs to pay operational
bills for this year. That is not a good trade for fiscal year
2013. We could set up those decisions for 2014 and 2015 if we
were given the time to do that.
Senator King. But are you saying that the figures you would
get in 2014 and 2015 under sequestration are adequate if you
have the flexibility to plan and move the funds around?
Mr. Donley. No. My view is that the dollars implicit in the
BCA, which involve a trillion dollars in cuts over 10 years,
will have a devastating impact on our security policy and
programs going forward.
Senator King. Regardless of flexibility and transfer
authority.
Mr. Donley. You cannot take a trillion dollars out of the
defense program and not have an impact.
Senator King. The impact you just characterized as----
Mr. Donley. Devastating. It will be force structure. It
will be readiness. It will be modernization. To get a trillion
dollars out will do significant damage to our military in my
opinion.
Senator King. The phrase you used earlier was,
``significantly degraded readiness posture.'' Is that the
characterization?
Mr. Donley. That is how we are going to start fiscal year
2014 most likely.
Senator King. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
submit some questions for the record on the long-term plans for
the KC-46 and refueling, where that is going to go.
I appreciate your testimony. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say to Secretary Donley, this being your last
hearing, again as I alluded earlier to you privately that we
thank you for your service and I particularly do. I have a
major Air Force presence in my State. You have been very open
to dialogue with respect to all the issues that we have had
with regard to not just the facilities but with weapons systems
and a broader range of issues that we have had to engage on.
Your service is very much appreciated and I also appreciate the
friendship that we have shared during your tenure. So we are
going to miss you, but we certainly wish you the best.
Gentlemen, I want to talk for a minute about JSTARS. I am
very concerned with what I see the direction in which this
weapon system is going. The E-8C aircraft is the military's
premier and wide-area ISR aircraft with ground targeting
capability. Secretary Donley, you and I have talked about this
any number of times over and, General Welsh, you and I have had
this conversation too, that every time I go into theater, which
is often, and I mention to our combat commanders on the ground
the word ``Joint STARS,'' their eyes light up because of what
this weapon system has done from the standpoint of being able
to address the enemy in whatever part of the theater they
exist.
The President's budget request cuts $10.7 million in R&D
funding from the program and recommends the test aircraft, the
T-3, be put into what I understand as preservation storage
because the developmental program has concluded. However, there
are multiple upgrade programs such as the National Guard's
multi-agency upgrade that will require flight testing, and the
Air Force is proposing in your budget request to place JSTARS
test aircraft into preservation storage, again due to the
conclusion of the development programs. But the Air National
Guard continues their development programs and modernization
efforts, funded and planned, which will require flight testing.
How will the Guard complete flight test requirements for
these programs without the T-3?
Both the Air Force and the Guard have future plans for
additional modernization programs for JSTARS. How will these
programs complete flight test requirements without the T-3?
Lastly, what are the costs associated with placing T-3 in
preservation storage?
Mr. Donley. Senator, I would like to get back to you on the
record with a comparison of what is funded in the Active Air
Force versus what is planned on the Guard side going forward
for the E-8.
[The information referred to follows:]

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System operational jets will
be used to support test requirements when not providing their primary
function of supporting combatant commanders and training forces for
initial qualification and combat readiness. The cost of placing T-3 in
storage is $57,000 for induction and $52,000 for re-preservation every
4 years.

Senator Chambliss. Okay.
Any comments, General Welsh?
General Welsh. No, Senator. I do not know the details of
the Guard program. I agree with the Secretary. We need to get
you the right answer.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. I really am concerned that this
program may be headed towards whatever preservation storage may
be, and I am truly concerned about it.
Mr. Donley. Sir, if I might, I would just offer too that
this is a concern for us in the sense that we have done an
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) that suggests for this set of
missions, the ground moving target indicator mission, going
forward among varying levels of options and capabilities, the
best solution is probably a business jet type aircraft with a
new radar. That was the result of the AOA a couple of years
ago.
The issue for us is it is not funded. We simply do not have
the resources. It is one of several programs where we know
pretty much what we want to do. We pretty much understand the
requirements, but the dollars are not there to fund those
programs going forward. There is even more pressure on the
modernization programs ahead, as I indicated.
Senator Chambliss. In your response to Senator King, you
talk about readiness being impacted in a big way, and this is
another one of those areas where we are not going to be ready
if we do not have the resources under sequestration.
Let me move to another issue, G-222. There is a lot of
conversation around the Hill these days that the Air Force has
a $600 million program of airplanes that we purchased for use
in Afghanistan and that those airplanes are sitting on the
ground in Afghanistan not being used now and that they are
going to be chopped up and thrown away versus some other more
useful disposition being made. My understanding is that that is
not really the case, but I want to give you an opportunity to
address that issue and let us set the record straight with
respect to, number one, what are the circumstances surrounding
the termination of that contract, and number two, what is the
Air Force's intentions relative to the disposition of those
aircraft that are on the ground in Afghanistan today.
Mr. Donley. Senator, as you suggest, the G-222 has been a
troubled program for the Air Force. This was an early version
of the C-27, procured on the used aircraft market to meet an
urgent need for the Afghan air force. As those aircraft were
delivered, they had sustainment problems from the very
beginning. First it was propellers. A year later, it was supply
chain issues. They faced a number of spare parts and
performance-related materiel crises over several years. Again,
after working with the contractor, we simply concluded that
this was not recoverable. We were not delivering--the
contractor was not delivering the ready aircraft required under
the contract.
So we have worked with the Afghans. They have identified a
C-130-like aircraft as the best option for them going forward.
The G-222 was actually always intended as a bridge to a future
capability, and the cancellation of the G-222 program will get
us to the C-130-like capability more rapidly.
So Secretary Carter and the rest of the defense leadership
has us focused on making this transition as quickly and as
effectively as we can. We have no plans for the disposition of
the G-222 at this point. So there is simply no good option in
front of us at this point.
Senator Chambliss. As you proceed down the decision-making
process route, I hope you will keep this committee informed of
what you do intend to do there because, obviously, that was a
lot of money to be spent. I understand the problems that
existed, but we just need to know what is going to happen with
the resources that were used there.
Mr. Donley. We will keep you posted.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here today.
I am a dad. I have a son and daughter, and moms and dads
all over the country put their most precious resource, their
most precious treasure in our hands. We have to get this right
in the area of sexual assaults and sexual harassment. We have
to have zero tolerance. I believe that you will work nonstop to
make sure we get this right and look forward to your efforts on
that. We will be watching closely to make sure that happens.
I was with a group of Senators and Representatives that
just returned from Afghanistan a few days ago. While we were
there, there was a discussion about the need for the Afghan
troops to continue to have air cover after we are gone. One of
the discussions that took place was that there is a contract
dispute right now over planes that are going to go to the
Afghan air force. This dispute continues. I am very concerned
about making sure that the Afghan army, the Afghan police have
the ability to have the same kind of quality air coverage that
we provide to our soldiers as we step back. I was wondering
what are the plans to solve these disputes and to get this in
place because the Afghan soldiers themselves said, look, we are
concerned about the Medevac piece. If we are out there
fighting, we need to get back. We need to have cover. So I am
interested in your response.
Mr. Donley. Just a couple of points, Senator. I will also
ask the chief to chime in.
This is the light attack support program, to which you
referred, which we had a misfire on in our acquisition process
over a year ago. We restarted that competition. We made a
contract award earlier this year. It was protested, and that is
currently being reviewed by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) currently. That usually takes about 100 days. The
100-day clock will run out in the mid-June timeframe, I think.
In the meantime, though, we have sustained the contract
award that we made earlier this year to get the program
started. This was an extraordinary action on our part. Normally
we would have suspended that while waiting for the GAO to rule
on this matter, but we decided to go ahead because of the
commitment we had made to the Afghan air force to get this
capability to them next summer. We are already behind in that
work, and we are dedicated to doing that.
They will not have the same kind of capability that we are
exercising over Afghanistan today. I do believe they are on
track to building a small but effective air force. One of their
backbones right now is the MI-17 helicopter, and they have been
doing casualty evacuation work in this regard and stepping up
into that mission.
Chief?
General Welsh. Yes, Senator. I would just add that nobody
anywhere has the kind of air support that we give our troops on
the ground and they never will.
The Afghans will get what they need from the A-29. It will
provide them the capability they need to be successful in the
battlefield, I believe, if we can deliver it on time. The plan
is still to deliver it by the end of calendar year 2014, and
that is what the Commander of International Security Assistance
Force, General Dunford, is expecting us to do.
Senator Donnelly. Great.
In Syria, in regards to a no-fly zone, whether it is--20
percent has been discussed. 100 percent of the entire country
has been discussed. How difficult is that to put in place? How
many airmen, soldiers, marines, Navy are required to do that?
General Welsh. Senator, I think the number is completely
dependent on the plan itself, and I am not privy to the
detailed planning that is going on for options in Syria.
I will tell you that the forces we have that are not flying
right now will be likely required to maintain a no-fly zone
over time. A lot depends on where you can actually base the
aircraft which are enforcing the no-fly zone. You cannot do it
all from carriers in the Levant. We do not have enough. You
will have to do land basing. If they can base in countries
nearby, you need less tanker support. If you have to move
farther away, you need more tanker support. There are a lot of
variables that will drive the size of this operation.
Senator Donnelly. When you look at that, does a no-fly zone
over 20 percent of the country--is that effective? Does that
change the game at all?
General Welsh. Senator, I think that is completely
dependent on the objectives you are trying to accomplish. As I
said, I am not in that discussion.
Senator Donnelly. In regards to unmanned air systems, can
you talk to us about the future of the unmanned air systems in
the Air Force? What role in the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) task of integrating the unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS)
by September 2015--what role is the Air Force going to play in
that, sir?
Mr. Donley. Sir, we are members of the NAS review process.
We have Air Force staffers, Air Force officers assisting FAA in
this work. Their choice about which locations to choose for
demonstrating, I think it was, six different locations across
the Nation--that is an FAA decision that we are not privy to.
But they did come to us and ask for advice on how to set up
that process.
RPAs have a future in our Air Force. There is no doubt
about that. We have new career fields and capabilities that we
did not have 10 years ago that we are going to maintain into
the future.
Senator Donnelly. One of the proposals out there is a joint
proposal between the States of Indiana and Ohio to be one of
those six UAS test sites.
As you look at the fiscal year 2014 budget, it requests
approximately $90 million for Air Force research, development,
test and evaluation, human effectiveness, applied research for
trusted autonomy. Do you think that that level of funding is
sufficient for the study of the UAS autonomous systems?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I am not familiar with the details of that
particular proposal, but I will get you an answer for the
record on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The total Air Force research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E) budget request for research in trusted autonomy is sufficient.
The $89.483 million request for Air Force RDT&E, Human Effectiveness
Applied Research (Program Element 0602202F), contains a broad portfolio
of human-centered research in the areas of airmen training, airmen
system interfaces, bioeffects, deployment and sustainment of airmen in
extreme environments, and understanding and shaping adversarial
behavior. Of this amount, $3.1 million is specifically targeted to work
in the area of trusted autonomy for unmanned aircraft systems. The Air
Force Research Laboratory has a well-coordinated investment in trusted
autonomy research as it relates to integration of remotely piloted
aircraft in the national airspace. The research investment in this area
is balanced across multiple technology areas and program elements to
develop and demonstrate technology options to our warfighters in the
timeframe they require. The Air Force is also leading a cross-Service
effort, called the Priority Steering Council for Autonomy. This group
has identified two technical challenge areas related to trusted
autonomy: (1) human/autonomous system interaction and collaboration;
and (2) test, evaluation, validation, and verification. There are many
shared goals in these technical challenge areas that have resulted in
ongoing, collaborative cross-Service research efforts focused on this
issue.

Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson [presiding]. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you both for your extraordinary
service and for the hard work you do every single day.
I want to continue the line of questioning that was started
by Senator Levin concerning sexual assaults in the military,
and I want to start with you, Secretary Donley.
You said that you believe the chain of command needs to
retain its authority to make determinations of whether or not a
sexual assault charge should go to trial because you believe
that that authority is necessary to maintain good order and
discipline within the ranks.
Now, fiscal year 2011 had 19,000 cases of sexual assault
and rape, 3,192 reported, 190 convictions. The fiscal year 2012
report has come up with higher numbers, 26,000 cases and barely
more reported, 3,374.
Obviously, this is not good order and discipline. So are
you saying that every commander in the chain of command is
failing in our military today?
Mr. Donley. No, I am not, and I would say that the changes
in the numbers that we are seeing are a matter of some debate
and we are not really sure whether the numbers of increasing
reporting reflect a higher incidence or they reflect more
confidence in the system so we are getting more reporting of
incidents that had already been taking place----
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Donley, take the lower
number. Let us not even take the supposed cases of 19,000. Let
us just stick with the 3,000 reported cases. If that is too
high for you, let us stick with 190 convictions from last year.
Mr. Donley. The numbers are too high. We agree with you on
that. The issue that you asked about is whether or not
commanders ought to be involved in this work, and I guess in my
judgment--and I will defer to the chief to chime in here--
commanders need to be part of the good order and discipline for
their units. If they are cut out in some specific way, it is
not good. It kind of separates them----
Senator Gillibrand. They are failing in this regard, sir.
This is a regard in which there is clearly insufficient
training, insufficient understanding. If the man in charge for
the Air Force in preventing sexual assault is being alleged to
have committed a sexual assault this weekend, obviously there
is a failing in training and understanding of what sexual
assault is and how corrosive and damaging it is to good order
and discipline and how it is undermining the credibility of the
greatest military force in the world. This is not good enough.
Now, General Welsh, in answer to the same question from
Senator Levin, you said you did not know what we would be
fixing by removing the authority from the chain of command. You
cite as proof for that that the chain of command does not
disregard the recommendations of the lawyer.
Do you have a sense as to why, if there are 19,000 or
26,000 or some unknown number of sexual assaults and rapes
within the military every year, such a fraction are reported?
Could you surmise that it may well be that a victim has no
faith in the chain of command on this issue, on sexual assault?
Because going back to the gentleman whose job it is to prevent
sexual assaults was just alleged to have committed sexual
assault. Do you think perhaps that a victim does not believe he
or she will receive justice because the chain of command is not
trained, does not have the understanding of what sexual assault
and rape actually is?
So I do not think you should pat yourself on the back that
your commanders have acknowledged and accepted the
recommendation of their lawyers in a good percentage of cases.
I am highly concerned that so few victims feel that they could
ever receive justice that they will not report. So what I would
like you to consider--and I would like thoughtful consideration
of this--if we remove it from the chain of command, perhaps
more people will report these cases because they are reporting
them to a trained prosecutor who understands the nature of
sexual assault and rape and will not discount their
allegations.
Already you are willing to agree that Article 60 is no
longer needed because we see time and time again that after a
jury's verdict, commanders are overturning that verdict.
Imagine you are the assaulted victim who has just gone through
a trial and because a commanding officer has said let us
overturn the jury's verdict, you then have to salute the person
who assaulted you. That seems to be a lack of justice.
So I would like you to think this through because I have
now heard from nearly everyone that somehow removing this one
judgment--this one judgment--would unwind the discipline and
order within the armed services. We are not taking away the
commander's authority over almost everything else. I think
there is a lack of understanding and training for this specific
type of crime that is continuing to rise. So do you understand,
General Welsh, that there is something that needs to be fixed?
General Welsh. Senator, you referred to several different
things. Let me try and break them apart just a bit because I
have given this a lot of thoughtful thought.
The number 800 is the one I focus on because I know there
are 800 victims last year in the U.S. Air Force--792 people
came forward and said they were victims, and we know an awful
lot about that set of victims.
I also know that in the last 3 years there has been one
sexual contact case, one case out of 2,511 court cases, where a
commander decided not to prefer it to court when a lawyer,
well-trained, educated in the law, said he should. One case. We
do not have commanders routinely overturning sexual assault
convictions. There are two in DOD in the last 5 years that we
can find. This does not happen all the time.
The facts are critical as we try and figure out how we move
forward to solve the problem because it is very easy to get
distracted and derailed and focus on things that will not make
this better.
My concern is ensuring, if that is ever humanly possible,
that no one else suffers from this crime. You know well,
because you work this very hard, that there are lots of pieces
to that. One is prosecution. I do not know if you were in the
room when we had this conversation earlier, but I sat down with
my JAG. We took our Air Force statistics because my concern is
if we are seen as not prosecuting, people will not report.
Senator Gillibrand. I heard your .05 percent. That is not
what I am worried about.
General Welsh. That is not the point I am making. RAINN
took our data, put it in their model, and for 2012, according
to their statisticians, we are 1-something percent below their
prosecution rate and 3 percent above their conviction rate. So
a fact on the table is that we do not have a very different
problem than district attorneys' offices around the country
have. It is a horrible problem, but it is the same problem. So
that is not the critical issue that makes the military
different.
Senator Gillibrand. If one in five women say they are
serving in the military and they are receiving unwanted sexual
contact, that is a huge problem regardless of what you are
looking at in the public sector.
General Welsh. I am not comparing us to anything, Senator.
I am trying to get at the problem that we have to fix. In the
civil sector, there are people who can help us look at this.
They have the same problem. We are reaching out to them. It is
the same problem in universities, on Capitol Hill, and
industry. It is the same problem. We should be working together
to identify those things that help us resolve the problem in a
meaningful way. That takes a very careful analysis of the data.
Senator Gillibrand. One of the reasons why I am concerned
that you are so focused on retaining this authority, if it is
used in so few instances, why do you need to retain it? Because
the reality is because it is in the chain of command, I
believe--and this is what victims have told us time and time
again--that it is why they do not report. So if you want to
increase the number of reported cases, as opposed to these
numbers that are unsure, vague, not sure if it is precise,
whether it is 19,000 or 26,000 a year but only 3,000
approximately are reporting, you have to remove it from the
chain of command. The commander is not using the authority to
overturn what the lawyers are recommending in hardly any cases.
You have just said so. It is only a handful of not taking the
recommendations to go to trial, and it is only a handful that
are overturning those cases.
But I think because it is in the chain of command, because
this is what our witnesses have told us, people are not
reporting. They do not feel that there is an atmosphere by
which they can report safely. They are afraid of retaliation.
They are afraid of being treated poorly by their commanders,
being treated poorly by their colleagues. There is not a
climate by which they can receive justice in the system. That
is why I want the decision not to be part of the chain of
command but be done entirely by trained professionals who may
not have a bias or may not have a lens that is untrained.
General Welsh. We did a survey recently in the third Air
Force in Europe. 79 percent of the respondents said that they
would report sexual assault if it occurred to them. That ends
up not being true once they become victims. We find that 16
percent of our victims report. So what changes when you become
a victim? I think we all know. The things that cause people to
not report primarily are really not chain of command. It is I
do not want my family to know. I do not want my spouse to know
or my boyfriend or girlfriend to know. I am embarrassed that I
am in this situation. It is the self-blame that comes with the
crime. That is overridingly on surveys over the years the
reasons that most victims do not report. I do not think it is
any different in the military.
Prosecution rates in the Air Force for this crime----
Senator Gillibrand. I think it is very different in the
military. I think you are precisely wrong about that.
Everything is about the chain of command. How you are seen by
your peers and your commanders is the essence of whether you
will have a successful career in the military.
General Welsh. Ma'am, I am just relating what we get on
surveys from our members. I cannot attest to the veracity with
which they take the survey. I will take the data at face value
until we have something better to work on.
Our prosecution rate for sexual assault in the first
quarter of this fiscal year--we have more cases referred to
court than were referred in the entire year of 2011. It is 50
percent higher than any quarter last year. We are working this
hard.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you for your efforts, and I do
appreciate what you are doing. I know every aspect in the
military is trying very hard to address this scourge, and I
appreciate your leadership on that.
My time has expired.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. I think what you are hearing here is this
is coming to the fore because a lot of people are beginning to
speak out. This Senator had hearings on this not among the
military but among the military contractors in Iraq, and I had
these hearings 6 years ago. We had women who had been raped
come forward and explain how everything was shuffled under and
swept under the rug, how rape kits were not available, how
there was always the pressure not to report. I think that what
has happened is that there has been sufficient agitation now as
being expressed by a number of the women Senators here on the
dais that it is finally coming out. Of course, things need to
change.
What I found was that we could not even--this is the
hearing 6 years ago--that we could not even get the U.S.
attorneys to prosecute because they could not get the evidence
because the evidence was never there when in fact we had a
number of testimonies that would just tear your heart out.
So thank you for what you are doing.
Mr. Secretary, I want to personally thank you. You have
served extraordinarily well. I remember when you were selected
by Secretary Gates to come in and clean up a problem in the Air
Force, and that was 5\1/2\ years ago and you have done that
exceptionally well. I want to thank you for your service.
Now, let me just ask a couple of quick questions. There is
talk about another round of BRAC, and of course, that makes
Senators nervous. But why is there not real concern about a
BRAC in Europe? Why do we need the forces there that, in large
part, were put there as a result of the Cold War? Why is that
not a logical place to look?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I would offer that the U.S. Air Force
footprint in Europe is much smaller than it was during the Cold
War. We can possibly make it a little bit smaller yet, and
those discussions are underway with our joint partners and with
OSD. But I will let General Welsh, who knows this theater like
the back of his hand, address this in more specifics.
But I will also offer that despite the range and speed of
airpower and the flexibility it provides from the CONUS to go
east or west in support of combatant commanders or worldwide
commitments, geography matters. Geography matters, and so the
collaboration that we have, the presence that we maintain in
Europe provides throughput to the Middle East and other
important areas and to North Africa as well.
But I would let the chief talk about his experience in
Europe.
Senator Nelson. General, can you speak outside the Air
Force as well?
General Welsh. Senator, I think so. The U.S. Army did a
very big reduction in Europe a couple of years ago. The Air
Force has actually come down about 75 percent of its force
structure in Europe over the last 20 years. There has been a
significant lowering in force structure and size.
We believe we can still streamline the footprint. We
believe we can consolidate, we can realign some things and save
money and close some infrastructure in Europe. We are in the
process of putting that plan together. But as the Secretary
said, there are some things that the United States will always
want to have in Europe to support options for the Nation.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I just want to echo the
commentary from Senator Chambliss' concerns regarding the
grounding of the test aircraft in JSTARS, and he has already
made that statement. General, I would address that to you as
well.
Tell me. Replacing the A-10--would something like the A-29
help fill the gap in close air support?
Mr. Donley. Again, I would offer the chief the opportunity
to speak in more detail.
But the F-35 is our preferred air-to-ground capability
going forward. It is intended to replace the F-16. It is a
multi-role aircraft, likely to replace the F-16 in numbers. I
think it has the capability to replace the A-10 as well. But I
will let the chief talk to this more specifically.
One problem with the A-29 is its inability to operate in a
highly contested environment. But I will let the chief respond.
General Welsh. Senator, we have no requirement for the A-29
in the U.S. Air Force. The environments that we are training
for for the future--we need an airplane that can both operate
in a contested environment and then swing to an uncontested one
when able because we are, as Senator Inhofe mentioned earlier,
the smallest Air Force we have ever been, and I think that
downsizing will continue, which means we are having to make
decisions like single-capability, single-mission airplanes are
not as valuable to us as multi-mission airplanes.
The F-35 can do the close air support mission. I think we
will have to look at optimizing weapons for it for that mission
in the future potentially, but the weapons that are currently
in its projected inventory will allow it to do the job very
well.
Senator Nelson. I did not have the opportunity to hear
Senator McCaskill's comments. She has put a hold on a promotion
of an Air Force general, and as reported in the Washington
Post, this was a general that overturned a conviction of a
military court. Is that what it is? Can you cite something
about the history of whether or not this is something that is
done frequently?
Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt your answer on this. I am
going to run over and vote and come back. Senator Shaheen is
over voting and is going to come back. There is a vote on, I
should have started by saying. So when you are done, Senator
Nelson, if you would recess this until either Senator Shaheen
or I or other members come back.
You folks may have a 5- or 10-minute break, in which case
it is purely by chance, not by design. So do not thank me for
it. We are punishing you here a little bit this morning.
Anyway so, Senator Nelson, excuse the interruption.
Senator Nelson [presiding]. Thank you.
General Welsh. Senator, this was a case, one of only two in
DOD in the last 5 years, where a convening authority has
reversed the finding of guilt on a sexual assault charge. This
was a case where there were actually two allegations of sexual
assault against an individual and then some other lesser
charges. On the principal charge of sexual assault, the subject
was found not guilty. Or the second charge, he was found
guilty, and he was found guilty of the lesser offenses that
were not directly related.
So the convening authority, reviewing the case in
accordance with the UCMJ and our rules of court martial, made
the judgment call that the evidence presented--after she
considered the record of trial, the evidence presented and
matters presented for clemency, which included other things,
that the evidence presented had not met the burden of proof in
her view. So she set aside the court conviction on the second
charge of sexual assault and set aside the court on the other
lesser charges and took those four charges and handled them all
under nonjudicial punishment through Article 15 action. So she
did not set aside with no punishment, but she set aside the
court finding on that case. That is the case.
It has only happened twice, that and a recent case at
Aviano. That is it in all the Services in the last 5 years.
Senator Nelson. Can you describe the facts in the Aviano
case?
General Welsh. In that particular case, sir, there was an
allegation of sexual assault by a military member on an Air
Force civilian. The convening authority convened the court. The
court found the subject guilty of sexual assault, and sentenced
him to prison. In the review process, the standard review
process, again according to the UCMJ and the rules of court
martial, the convening authority again reviewed all the
evidence presented at trial and some additional information
presented in the clemency package that was not available to the
jury at trial. The convening authority decided again that they
had not met the burden of proof in trial in his view, and he
set aside the court martial findings.
Senator Nelson. In this instant, the case that Senator
McCaskill was involved in, was there any additional evidence
that came in such as in the Aviano case?
General Welsh. There was input from the victim through the
victim's counsel included in the matter of clemency, and then I
do not know exactly what was in the entire clemency package. I
know roughly what it was. I have scanned through it all. But I
do not remember how many letters of support, et cetera, were
presented. I did not review all of the evidence presented in
trial on this case. It happened a couple of years ago, and so I
do not know if there was other evidence that the judge in that
trial had not allowed in court that was presented to the
convening authority. I do not know the answer. We can find that
out for you, sir.
Senator Nelson. I think this ought to be handled, but you
have a Senator, Senator McCaskill, who is concerned about the
convening authority and the convening authority's ability to
proceed with a promotion. I would assume that that might be
something that the Chief of Staff would want to review with
regard to any additional evidence presented, as opposed to
letters of support. As you just stated, in the Aviano case,
there was additional evidence that had not been brought out at
the trial. That would seem to me to be something that the Air
Force at the highest counsel would want to know.
General Welsh. Senator, we are in very close contact with
Senator McCaskill. She has the complete record of trial. She
has the justification from the convening authority. She has
everything we have on this case. My JAG has spoken with her
staff multiple times. I believe she has all the information she
needs from us on this case.
By the way, just to clarify, this is not a promotion. It is
a lateral move that we have requested for this particular
officer.
Senator Nelson. If it is not a promotion, why does it have
to come through the Senate Armed Services Committee?
General Welsh. It is another three-star position, sir. She
is in a three-star position currently and moving to another
one.
Senator Nelson. I see. Okay. Thank you.
The committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of
the chair. [Recess.]
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, everyone, for
coming back in.
To Secretary Donley and General Welsh, thank you both for
your stamina this morning, for coming back so I can ask my
questions as well, and especially thank you for your service to
the country. Secretary Donley, I very much appreciate all of
the time, energy, and expertise you have provided in your role
as Secretary of the Air Force. I know that the country will
miss you.
Gentlemen, I am going to change the subject for a minute. I
know my colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Ayotte, has
raised this issue, and I would be remiss if I did not begin
with asking you about the KC-46A basing decision. Now, I will
spare you my talking points about Pease's great location in the
northeast Atlantic and the success we have had integrating our
Active Duty and our National Guard and the competence of
everyone who is stationed there. But I do want to ask you if
the decision about the basing of the new tankers is still on
track and when you expect that to be announced.
Mr. Donley. It is on track, ma'am. We do expect it later
this month.
Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you.
I know there have been some questions about the contract
for the new tankers, but can you explain what the impact of
continued sequestration might be, if there is any, and we have
to renegotiate the contract for the KC-46A?
Mr. Donley. We think that the current program is on track,
179 aircraft, first developmental aircraft by fiscal year 2015,
and I believe it is 8 aircraft by fiscal year 2017. We think
the contractor is a good one both for the taxpayers and for the
warfighter.
One of my favorite reports to sign to Congress, which I do
on a quarterly basis I believe, is that there have been no
engineering changes to the KC-46 contract and there have not
been since that contract was awarded. It caps the Government's
role in this development contract at $4.9 billion. There is
some cost and schedule--cost risk, I would say, not schedule
risk that we know of, but cost risk to the contractor at this
point. There is a minor impact from sequestration as we have to
move dollars around to make sure that the KC-46 contract can be
and is funded. We will continue to do that going forward.
Senator Shaheen. So what would the impact be should we not
address sequestration in the next fiscal year or the following
fiscal year? Will we still be able to go forward with the
contract?
Mr. Donley. It would make it more difficult to do so.
Depending on the flexibility provided by Congress to move
dollars around various appropriations, that could impact our
ability to meet contract obligations. But we are doing our
utmost not to reopen this contract.
Senator Shaheen. That is very good to hear. I certainly
hope that we will do our utmost in Congress to address those
automatic cuts from sequestration and to come up with a long-
term plan that means that not only will the military but no one
within Government will have to have the impact of those cuts.
But while we are talking about contracts, can we also talk
about what impact that sequestration and furloughs might have
on the JSF?
Mr. Donley. Again, the JSF remains a very important
priority for us. It has taken its share of reductions in
sequestration. We have been able to accommodate those to some
extent, but we are losing probably 3 to 5 tails out of our
planned procurement for the Air Force of 19 aircraft in fiscal
year 2013. Some of that will go to pay for continued
development of the program which we are prioritizing. So the
focus is on making sure the F-35 development program closes out
before fiscal year 2018, and that is a firm commitment that the
Joint Program Office is holding to, that the Services are
holding to. There is no more money being provided to this
program. So tradeoffs between procurement and development are
an annual process, and sequestration forces us to take a couple
of more tails in 2019 to support development.
Senator Shaheen. Will that affect the long-term cost of the
F-35?
Mr. Donley. It will. We have made adjustments to the
program in the last several years where we have pushed
airplanes outside of the FYDP, and those would need to be made
up at the end of the program. That does increase unit cost a
little bit, extends the program out. So these are deliberate
choices we are making. They do extend the life of the program a
little bit longer and add cost.
Senator Shaheen. So that even though we may see some short-
term savings, we are going to see some long-term increased
cost.
Mr. Donley. Yes, but hopefully marginally. As long as we
stick to our current procurement plans and we maintain strong
partnerships with the international partners that are part of
this program and we do not take any action to substantially
reduce the size of the program, then the cost per aircraft
increase from these delays will be smaller than if we take
these other actions.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
Finally, gentlemen, I do want to raise my concerns, even
though I know they have been raised by many of my colleagues
here, about sexual assault in the military. We heard in my
office last week not from a woman who had been sexually
assaulted but from a man who had been sexually assaulted and
not only once but over a period of time.
So, General Welsh, you talked about the comparison between
what is happening in the military and what is happening in the
civilian world. As you pointed out, this is unacceptable
regardless of where sexual assault happens. But can you talk
about how you are making use of what has been learned on the
civilian side about how to address sexual assault?
This is an issue that I have worked on for probably 30-plus
years in various capacities, and the things that I have learned
from my experience that have worked have been opportunities to
support victims of sexual assault, to make sure that they can
be removed from the perpetrator, to ensure that there is a
swift response on the part of law enforcement and that people
understand what the punishment is going to be and that that is
clear and swift and an awareness about why this is unacceptable
among the general public.
So can you talk about how you are making use of some of the
lessons in the civilian world as you try and address this
issue?
General Welsh. Yes, Senator, I can. We have worked very
hard to review both literature and to invite experts in,
experts in the fields of prosecution, experts in the field of
victim care, experts in the field of psychology, experts in the
field of developing cultures and environments. We have been
doing this for several years in the Air Force now and in DOD.
We have made many changes.
We do not know what effect they are having, but they are
not having enough of an effect is the big point I would raise.
We have to keep working this and we have to find a different
set of things that may be game changers in battling this
problem. That is why I stressed that we have to unemotionally
assess this to the extent possible so that we can work together
on the things that can be game changers, not the things that
are not really at the source of the problem.
For example, I have a dinner at my home later this week
with a group, an industry group, that actually does work on
building cultures and climates. The intent is to ask them if
there is a way to put together something that we integrate into
our training programs across the Air Force that helps develop
focus on diversity, inclusion, and respect. We will not call it
sexual assault training because that might not get us the
result we want. We just change the way people think from the
day they walk in the door. How do we take that wide spectrum of
behavior and thought in society and bring it down into what we
think is an acceptable spectrum of behavior when you are
serving in this business. If we can start to make progress in
that area, we can extend it throughout the course of a career.
Now, we are trying to do all those things, find the areas
where we gain traction, and then exploit those. The SVC, in my
mind, is the one that has done that. Some of the things we have
done differently are investigative processes. We have a new
Office of Special Investigations special investigator course
that we have now run three classes through, designed curriculum
approved by initial attendees from outside the Air Force who
are special victims prosecutors in the civilian world. So we
have counselors, psychiatrists, special victims' prosecutors
from the past who are helping us, and we are going to continue
to do everything we can.
Senator Shaheen. Did Lieutenant Colonel Krusinski have the
benefit of some of those education programs before he was
assigned to his role?
General Welsh. Let me speak generally because I have not
seen specifics of training completions that he has done. As I
said, I just have not had time to look at that since we heard
of this yesterday.
He has completed all the standard Air Force training. We
have annual training. We have recurring training. He has been a
squadron commander in our Air Force. There is training that is
required in squadron commander training before you take that
role where this is included. He was a Force Support Squadron
commander, and sexual assault response coordinators, et cetera,
work under the Force Support Squadrons in our Air Force. So he
is clearly familiar with the program. I do not know how far
back his training record goes. Obviously, he had just completed
his sexual assault response coordinator training and victim
advocate training for this job last week.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Shaheen.
Just one quick question. You have given us some indication
of the very few number of cases where fact findings by courts
martial panels have been overturned by the convening authority.
Could you, for the record, tell us--those related just to
sexual assault case. So if you could tell us for the record
whether there are any other cases and if so, what cases in the
last same number of years--I think you were going back 5
years--there were set-asides of findings.
General Welsh. It is about 1 percent, just so you know. We
will get you the details.
Chairman Levin. If you could get us the actual numbers,
that would be helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]

From 1 March 2008 to 28 February 2013, convening authorities
disapproved findings in a total of 40 cases, 35 of which were not
sexual assault. During that same timeframe, 3,713 cases were tried in
the Air Force.

Chairman Levin. There will be many questions that will be
sent to you about either proposed legislation or legislation
that has already been introduced asking for your opinion. There
has been some legislation already introduced, which I
understand has already been sent to the general counsel. There
have been letters that have been sent to our chiefs, but there
will be some additional letters that will be sent by me, other
members of the committee. What we would ask you for is--we know
we are going to get thoughtful responses, but we also need
prompt responses because it is my plan and expectation that
there will be legislation that will be taken up as part of the
defense authorization bill's markup, which begins in June. So
you could be getting letters regularly between now and then,
but we would very much appreciate prompt responses to those
letters.
Nothing that was said here today by any of us was intended
to affect or influence any judicial proceeding. Nothing that
was said by any of us here today was intended to have any
effect on any either pending or future judicial proceeding. I
think we were careful to make that clear. But in any event,
that is the position of this committee and our members to a
person that we do not intend to influence any judicial
proceeding by any comment that we make here because you have a
responsibility in the military to dispense justice. We count on
you to dispense justice for victims, but also for people who
are accused of crime.
We are going to do the very best that we can to see if we
cannot bring our UCMJ up to date because there are some things
that have happened since those provisions on the power of the
convening authority were written, particularly in the area of
appellate rights for defendants. So, we will be working hard on
that and we will need your cooperation.
We are very, very grateful to both of you for your
testimony here today. It is very important to us that we have
your views on not just the issues of sexual assault but also on
the problems that you face in the Air Force, which are there in
large numbers. So we are grateful for your service.
Particularly, I say to you again, Mr. Secretary, you will be
missed. You have been a really true friend, not just of the Air
Force, but of our Nation, and we are grateful for that. We will
see much more of you, General Welsh.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

F-35: REPLACING THE A-10

1. Senator Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) program is designed to replace the F-16 and A-10
in the Air Force inventory. As you know better than anyone, the A-10 is
designed to be low and slow in order to provide close air support (CAS)
to ground forces, and it is heavily armored to protect the pilot and
vital systems. How confident are you that the will the F-35 will be
able to replace the core mission of the A-10?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force is very confident in
the F-35s' capabilities as an A-10 replacement.
The F-35A in the CAS role provides increased survivability and
lethality, and while stealth may not necessarily be required to conduct
CAS in low intensity conflicts, F-35's fused sensors, precision
weaponry, large payload, and data-link capability will offer distinct
advantages.
Selecting the appropriate CAS asset must take into account the
threat, ground situation, target effects required, and a host of other
dynamic factors. As the threat of advanced, mobile, surface-to-air
missiles proliferates, the F-35's unique survivability may make it the
best available fighter to conduct CAS in certain high-threat
situations.

2. Senator Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, would
something like A-29 help fill the gap left in CAS?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. In the near- to mid-term, the Air
Force believes it will be able to fulfill COCOM CAS requirements with
acceptable, but increased risk. With declining budgets, the Air Force
is emphasizing aircraft capable of performing multiple missions, rather
than those uniquely optimized for CAS. Aircraft like the A-29 are
optimized for precisely the kind of low-intensity, large-scale,
sustained operations that the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance de-
emphasized, saying ``U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct
large-scale, prolonged stability operations.'' While the DSG does
emphasize irregular warfare, presence missions and counterinsurgency
operations, the Air Force believes that multi-role systems can
successfully perform these missions at acceptable cost for short
durations.
As long as the President expects the Air Force to be able to
deliver global reach, power and vigilance anywhere in the world at the
moment of our Nation's choosing, airmen must be equipped and ready for
that call. We remain committed to bringing decisive airpower to
combined arms warfare campaigns, but budgetary realities mean we cannot
afford platforms efficient at one end of the spectrum of conflict and
unusable at the other. Fiscal pressure is forcing the Air Force to make
difficult choices, such as not pursuing as much CAS capacity as we may
like--and that the A-29 may deliver--in order to ensure we can deliver
the forces needed to prevail in most consequential scenarios with a
near-pear aggressor.
The Air Force will continue to support the A-29 filling a building
partnership mission. Should the demand signal for CAS, sustained
stability and engagement operations, building partnership, or
Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance change, we will continue
to seek optimal weapons systems to fulfill our warfighting mission.

JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

3. Senator Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft have
proven themselves in all recent conflicts, including Libya. The
decision has been made to terminate the re-engining program and the Air
Force has indicated a need to upgrade the avionics sensors, as well as
other systems to keep the aircraft viable. In light of the current
budget environment and the need to recapitalize the fighter, bomber,
and tanker fleet concurrently, do you believe it makes sense to
modernize the JSTARS platform or to replace and invest in upgrading the
platform?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force considers the JSTARS
mission areas of battle management and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, critical for combatant commanders' operations
worldwide. In the fiscal year 2014 President's budget, the Air Force
continues to fund modernization of JSTARS computer and radar processing
equipment. Further, emerging requirements in command and control and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance make a compelling case
for JSTARS recapitalization, even within today's challenging budget
environment. To meet these emerging requirements, the Air Force is
evaluating several options, including JSTARS recapitalization, in
accordance with the recently completed analysis of alternatives (AOA),
modernizing the existing E-8C fleet, or maintaining the status quo.

4. Senator Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, why is the
Air Force preparing to ground the test aircraft for a year?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Due to the conclusion of
developmental programs and no significant testing currently planned,
the JSTARS T-3 test aircraft will be put into preservation storage. In
fiscal year 2014, the National Guard Bureau's Multi-Agency
Communications Capability integration will only require two test
sorties on an operational aircraft.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

HIGH SPEED WEAPONS

5. Senator Hagan. General Welsh, given the pivot to the Asia-
Pacific region, one of the unique challenges the military must face is
the long distances involved between our bases and potential areas of
action. In order to cover long distances in a relatively short amount
of time requires higher speeds for both aircraft and weapons. DOD is
focusing on high speed kinetic strike weapons and pursuing programs
like the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program and the Air Force
has the High Speed Strike Weapon program. What specific investments is
the Air Force making in its research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure and workforce to be able to
effectively and affordably develop, test, and field these high speed
weapons?
General Welsh. The Air Force has made RDT&E investments for
ballistic missile defense and hypersonic research (such as the X-51)
that to a great extent can be translated to support programs such as
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and the Air Force's High Speed Strike
Weapon. Currently funded Air Force upgrades to our related
infrastructure are being completed and we continually evaluate the
operational and technological requirements of this emerging high speed
kinetic strike technology against the RDT&E needs. The Air Force also
makes it a point to promote partnerships with other government agencies
such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Langley Research Center to
maximize our opportunity for any future investments in this field.
The Air Force RDT&E community is engaged across the relevant
technical areas to effectively utilize personnel with experience in the
high speed tactical concepts (supersonics, hypersonics) and ensure the
next generation of workforce carries forward this expertise. The Air
Force has previously developed a Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) Workforce Strategic Roadmap, called Bright Horizons,
which we've been implementing over the past 2 years to assist in our
RDT&E workforce planning. We are confident our current workforce
approach will make certain we have the right skill sets in place as
this technology matures into the operational realm.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE AIR FORCE

6. Senator Manchin. General Welsh, the arrest of Lt. Col. Jeff
Krusinski was an embarrassment to the Air Force. With the gravity of
the Air Force's sexual assault problems, it is perplexing to understand
how--with over 200 general officers--the Air Force would appoint a
Lieutenant Colonel as the face of the program. The Air Force's decision
to assign a field grade officer to manage its sexual assault prevention
program suggests the program was not a high priority. Given the
importance of this issue, why did the Air Force not assign a general
officer to lead its sexual assault program?
General Welsh. The Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
(SAPR) program was under the Air Force Services Directorate led by a
Brigadier General at the time of Lieutenant Colonel Krusinski's arrest.
The lieutenant colonel branch chief was responsible for SAPR policies
and procedures. Following the events that have transpired over the last
year to include the arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Krusinski, the Air
Force has worked on creating a new directorate that reports directly to
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In June, this directorate was
officially stood up under the direction of Major General Maggie
Woodward. The new structure is significantly different than our
previous structure as it will consist of over 30 functional experts
across the SAPR spectrum to include medical, legal, personnel, law
enforcement, public affairs, and research. This new headquarters SAPR
structure will have a much greater capability to comprehensively
address the crisis facing the Air Force. Four and three star
commanders, wing, group, and squadron commanders, command chiefs, and
supervisors are all charged with executing and enforcing our Air Force
SAPR program. I have overall responsibility for the Air Force SAPR
program and Air Force leaders at all levels.

7. Senator Manchin. Secretary Donley, how are you addressing sexual
assault involving servicemembers in the Air National Guard that are in
a Title 32 status?
Mr. Donley. Any servicemember who is sexually assaulted while in
Title 32 status is encouraged to report the assault to the Sexual
Assault Response Coordinator (SARC). The member will be assigned a
Victim Advocate. Because Air Guard facilities and services are limited,
we ensure these victims are provided information on civilian services.
A line of duty determination may be accomplished to establish whether
the assault occurred while the member was on active duty. All members
assaulted while on duty will have access to medical care and spiritual
counseling. They are also eligible for expedited transfer to a new unit
if desired. If local law enforcement or the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations declines investigating the title 32 sexual assault on/
off orders, the member's Adjutant General is able to contact the Office
of Complex Administrative Investigations to request an investigation in
accordance with Chief National Guard Bureau Manual 0400.01.

8. Senator Manchin. Secretary Donley, are you comfortable that
sexual assault is being adequately addressed in all three Air Force
components?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force recognizes we will not win our war on
sexual assault until we have everyone on board to fight; Guard,
Reserve, Active Duty, and our civilian workforce. We have taken great
strides in the last year in working with the Total Force (Guard,
Reserve, and Active Duty) to address sexual assault in the Air Force
over a wide front of prevention, investigation and response. One
example of this close teamwork was our Guard and Reserve components
training alongside Active Duty members for Bystander Intervention
Training. Additionally, our Total Force airmen now benefit from the
many enhancements we have made in care and training for SARCs and
Victim Advocates (VAs) who help AF members regardless of their title.
Further, our Special Victims Counsel program is a pilot which
empowers all Total Force airmen to come forward and ensures the legal
process is better understood and not so daunting. We completed a Total
Force Health and Wellness Inspection of over 200 installations and over
700,000 AF military/civilian personnel ensuring that no materials were
in the workplace which could be perceived as contributing to an
unprofessional environment that tolerates sexual harassment or assault.
Recently, we created a new AF SAPR directorate which is aligned
directly under the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and is led by a
Major General. This new structure is significantly different than our
previous structure as it will consist of over 30 functional experts
across the SAPR spectrum to include medical, legal, personnel, law
enforcement, public affairs, and research. This new headquarters SAPR
structure will have a much greater capability to comprehensively
address the crisis facing our Total Force and will work closely with
Guard and Reserve leadership as we map out SAPR policies and
procedures.
However, there is a need for improvement as we identify our Total
Force manning requirements and shortfalls. Currently, our Air National
Guard bases do not have ``dedicated'' full-time SARC positions. These
duties fall under the Air National Guard Wing commander executive
officer. We are working with our Air National Guard leadership to
address this problem. Lastly, we are able to offer only limited support
beyond SARC/VA services to Res/ANG airmen who were assaulted outside of
a duty status.

CONTRACTORS

9. Senator Manchin. Secretary Donley, please provide the
approximate number of contractors the Air Force presently has in its
inventory. Has this figure gone up or down since last year?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force reported approximately $26.5 billion in
obligations which equated to 141,300 contractor full-time equivalents
(CFTEs) to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Personnel and
Readiness (P&R) and OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for
inclusion in the DOD's fiscal year 2012 Inventory of Contracts for
Services (ICS) pursuant to section 2330a of Title 10, U.S.C. (fiscal
year 2012 data is the most recent and is due to Congress by 30 Jun 13).
This is a gross reduction of 25,200 CFTEs from our fiscal year 2011 ICS
that identified approximately $33.6 billion in obligations which
equated to 166,500 CFTEs performing these same type services.
Note: Approximately 21,400 CFTEs of this reduction is directly
attributable to a change in methodology when the data is normalized
between the last 2 years. This change captured service obligations
embedded in supply and equipment contract actions (18,300 CFTEs) and
excluded supply and equipment obligations embedded in service contract
actions (39,700 CFTEs) based on the object class definition of the
funding source identified in the initial stages of our ICS review
process.

impact of the sequester on air force end-strength
10. Senator Manchin. General Welsh, if the current budget control
caps remain in place, will you propose reductions to the Air Force's
authorized end strength? If so, what are those reductions by component?
General Welsh. The Air Force will program military, civilian, and
contract support end strength to perform required capabilities
consistent with the National Military Strategy and fiscal constraints.
If Sequester remains in place for the next 9\1/2\ years the Air
Force will look different. If the gross effect is to take 10 percent
off everything then that would translate to about 33,000 Active Duty
airmen separated and about 700 aircraft taken out of service. Similar
reductions in the Guard and Reserves would equate to a loss of 10,000
and 7,000 positions, respectively.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand

INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT

11. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 provided the Air Force
with the authority to decide the type of intra-theater airlift aircraft
to retain. The Air Force made the strategic choice to divest the C-27J
and maintain the C-130 as the single airframe in the intra-theater
airlift inventory. I fully support your decision; however, I am
concerned that you provided C-130 aircraft back to units as
predominantly back-up aircraft. These aircraft did not come with
personnel or flying hour allocations. While I understand your rationale
to maintain force structure at a reduced cost, how will units maintain
the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on these airplanes without
the personnel allocations to do so?
General Welsh. Back-up aircraft are typically assigned to units
over and above primary inventory to allow for scheduled and unscheduled
depot level maintenance, modifications, inspections and repairs. The
2013 NDAA placed aircraft into units that previously did not have back-
up inventory and only placed one aircraft per unit. Although the
additional total inventory comes with an incremental cost increase in
Weapons System Sustainment, the additional aircraft should benefit the
gaining units with additional operational and scheduling flexibility.

12. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, do you believe this lack of
resources will hurt unit morale?
General Welsh. The addition of one back-up aircraft to selected C-
130 units should not adversely affect morale. The intent of back-up
aircraft is to offset depot level maintenance, modifications,
inspections and repairs. Although every back-up aircraft placed into
service comes with incremental increased costs at the enterprise level,
a single back-up aircraft can actually be a benefit to units by
providing greater flying and maintenance scheduling flexibility and
increased ground training opportunities.

CYBERSECURITY/NATIONAL GUARD

13. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, the fiscal year 2014 budget
indicates a large investment in our military's cyber capabilities. DOD
approved a major expansion of the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to
include growing its ranks from around 900 to 4,900 personnel, or cyber
warriors, which I understand will fortify DOD's own networks, help plan
and execute offensive attacks, and protect critical infrastructure like
power grids and power plants. The fiscal year 2014 budget asks for a
large increase in offensive and defensive appropriations for Air Force
cyber projects. Is this investment mostly for technology development,
or does it include personnel training and recruitment as well?
General Welsh. This investment is for both technology development
and personnel. About $74.7 million of CYBERCOM's funding increase went
toward research and development and another $74 million went toward
personnel-related activities. This includes plus-ups in Air Force
civilian and contractor pay, information technology costs, supplies,
travel, and security clearances. Additionally, the Air Force increased
funding to its cyber hunter teams that provide security for Department
of DOD networks by $3.6 million in fiscal year 2014. Lastly, the Air
Force sourced its initial military manpower requirement for CYBERCOM's
Cyber Mission Forces, a total of 39 officers and 130 enlisted.

14. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, what is the Air Force doing
to recruit the best and brightest cyber talent?
General Welsh. The Air Force targets potential airmen with cyber
skills through national advertising campaigns highlighting STEM
requirements as opposed to targeting cyber specifically. The Air Force
also advocates and supports cyberspace and computer training and
education programs nationwide to encourage high school and college
students towards technical career fields. For example, we support
national competitions such as the Air Force Association's CyberPatriot
competition for high school students. Additionally, the Air Force
Institute of Technology's Center for Cyberspace Research hosts the
Advanced Cyber Education (ACE) summer program for Reserve Officer
Training Corps cadets from all Services who are studying computer
science or computer/electrical engineering. Unfortunately, ACE has been
canceled for 2013 due to funding constraints as a result of
sequestration but we hope to be able to hold ACE again in future years.

15. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, what mechanisms do we have
in place to encourage cyber studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy
(USAFA) and in Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs across
the country?
General Welsh. All USAFA cadets learn about cyber fundamentals and
Air Force cyber operations during their first year in the core
Introduction to Computing course. The cyber operations content of this
course was recently increased from 5 to 16 of the 40 lessons and now
includes many offensive and defensive cyber operations exercises
conducted on USAFA's virtual Cyber Training Range. In the summer,
between their first and second years, USAFA cadets have the opportunity
to take the week-long basic cyber operations training course. This
training is taught by upper-class cadets who have excelled in cyber and
many who compete on USAFA's world-class Cyber Competition Team.
Approximately 200 cadets per class attend this training and earn the
cadet Basic Cyber Badge which they may wear on their uniforms. This
exposure to cyber takes place before most cadets select their academic
major in their second year.
USAFA cadets who decide to pursue cyber studies in depth typically
major in computer science-cyber warfare or computer engineering. In
addition to earning an Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology (ABET)-accredited degree, these cadets have opportunities to
expand their knowledge in cyber. Each year about a dozen of the
sharpest students in these majors get a top secret security clearance
and spend 6 weeks working at the National Security Agency or the
National Reconnaissance Office. Cadets also have the opportunity to
conduct state-of-the-art cyber research in the Intel Corporation's
anti-malware lab located at USAFA. Cadets who demonstrate exceptional
cyber skills can earn a position on USAFA's 12-person Cyber Competition
Team and compete against the best cyber teams around the world. The
record-high enrollments in USAFA's computer science and computer
engineering majors, over 200 cadets this academic year, are a good
indication that cadets are encouraged and motivated to study cyber at
USAFA.
Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps (AFROTC) enrolls cadets
to meet Air Force cyberspace operations career field requirements which
include a degree in Computer Science or 24 hours in 200 level or above
STEM courses. AFROTC produces computer science, computer engineering
and other engineering degrees that exceed accession targets. ROTC
accomplishes this primarily through the scholarship program. There are
currently 197 computer science and 173 computer engineer majors on
scholarship and 293 more non-scholarship cadets in our program.
Additionally, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) hosts
the Advanced Cyber Education (ACE) program to encourage ROTC cadet
cyber studies. ACE is a summer program for ROTC cadets studying
computer science, computer engineering and electrical engineering. The
program consists of an instructional component and cyber war games,
hands-on internships and cyber officer development days that focus on
the study of cyber as a revolution in military affairs. Unfortunately
ACE has been canceled for 2013 due to funding constraints as a result
of sequestration but we hope to be able to hold ACE again in future
years.

16. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, is the Air Force considering
an incentive pay system that helps in the retention of military members
with high-level cyber skill sets?
General Welsh. Of the eight enlisted cyber Air Force Specialty
Codes (AFSC), seven are currently receiving Selective Reenlistment
Bonuses (SRB) in at least 1 year group. The SRB program is updated
biennially, at the start of the fiscal year and mid-way through. As
additional manpower authorizations are identified, we will be able to
increase and adjust the bonuses as needed to mitigate low retention.

17. Senator Gillibrand. General Welsh, leveraging citizen soldiers
who work in the cyber industry every day and also serve their country
in uniform through the National Guard and Reserve is imperative.
Senator Vitter and I have introduced a bill to create and leverage a
Cyber Guard. I received a positive letter from General Alexander and
the National Governors Association about the idea. At the DOD posture
hearing, I asked General Dempsey about the bill and he was also
supportive. I'd like to work with you to ensure that we implement every
available tool to recruit and retain a capable cyber force. Does this
sound like legislation the Air Force will support?
General Welsh. The Air Force recognizes the urgent requirement for
high-end expertise as we build our cyber forces to meet future
missions. To meet this need, the Air Force is actively participating in
DOD CIO, OSD(P), OSD(P&R), and CYBERCOM working groups to address
broadening the recruitment pool for all services. Currently the Air
Force screens members based on test scores and educational
achievements. Future plans include targeted recruiting and testing for
cyber aptitude. In addition, the Air Force provides full-spectrum cyber
training for the Total Air Force encompassing net ops, cyber offense/
defense, and exploitation for officers, enlisted and civilians alike.
We have some concerns that, if enacted, the Cyber Warrior Act of 2013
would actually hinder the efforts of DOD to build and strengthen cyber
forces for two primary reasons.
First, establishing 54 National Guard Cyber and Computer Network
Incident Response Teams would limit the available recruiting pool. We
recognize that the National Guard provides a great opportunity to
recruit personnel willing to serve their country while retaining their
civilian careers and service in National Guard cyber forces, combined
with equivalent civilian experience, presents a great value for the
Nation. Accordingly, we expect the Air Force Reserve to leverage the
same advantage to develop cyber forces for the Total Air Force.
Second, this bill would divert DOD resources that should be
invested in creating skilled DOD cyber forces--from all Reserve
components--to perform national defense missions and support Federal
partners. Distributing cyber forces across 54 Cyber Teams could provide
flexibility in response, and equip the Guard to respond in the wake of
a cyber attack just as they do for natural disasters. Yet the inherent
fluidity and flexibility of cyber technology permits cyber forces to
use remote access to achieve their objectives. It is this flexibility
that will allow the Air Force to partner with other Services and
Federal agencies to build the world-leading cyber force by
consolidating resources where possible, recruiting among all Reserve
components, and distributing forces in appropriate locations, to serve
all 54 States and territories.

UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT

18. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Donley, the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012 included a provision which amended the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994 to include
full-time National Guard members who are serving under Title 32 status
for more than 5 years. This new provision ensures servicemembers who
exceed the 5-year statute of limitations receive the same protections
under the law as servicemembers serving on title 10 orders. Thus far,
DOD has failed to issue any guidance for implementation of this new
law. What is the status of the provisions implementation and why has it
taken DOD so long to ensure our National Guard members are protected
under this law?
Mr. Donley. Section 575 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 amended
section 4312(c)(4) of title 38 to add a new subparagraph (F) that
exempts full-time National Guard duty (other than for training) under
section 502(f)(2)(A) of title 32 when authorized by the President or
the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of responding to a national
emergency as declared by the President and supported by Federal funds,
as determined by the Secretary concerned. In accordance with the law,
when an operation is authorized by Secretary of Defense under section
502(f)(2)(A) of Title 32, the Air Force will ensure that airmen receive
a statement on their orders citing the authority under Title 38
exempting the period of service from the USERRA 5-year limit.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal

AIR FORCE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

19. Senator Blumenthal. General Welsh, in order to bed down C-130
aircraft at the Bradley Air National Guard Base, the aligning and
training of personnel for the new mission along with the movement of
the new aircraft must be considered. Given all these moving pieces, and
as you have visibility through coming fiscal years, what are the
necessary infrastructure projects--like hangar space and fuel cell
size--that will facilitate a seamless changeover in aircraft type and
maintain mission tempo?
General Welsh. The National Guard Bureau conducted a Site
Activation Visit (SATAF) at Bradley Air National Guard Base on 18-21
Jun 13. The Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the base are
integrating existing base assets; user facility needs; perceived
facility modifications required, and environmental considerations to
develop both their project list and the Description of Purposed
Alternative Actions (DOPAA) for the Environmental Impact Analysis
Process (EIAP) required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). To expedite our efforts, the contracts needed to complete the
EIAP actions have already been awarded. As briefed to base leadership,
the Air Force and the ANG plan to include the alternative project lists
and the proposed timing of those projects developed as a result of the
SATAF in the formal public release of the DOPAA, so we may comply with
NEPA. There are several critical considerations that must be assessed
and adjudicated including ramp configuration, hangar capacities, fuel
cell requirements and other facility considerations. If existing
situation cannot meet the requirements for the new mission, the ANG
will propose facility projects to address the new weapon system
requirements. Projected resource constraints will make it difficult to
achieve current conversion timelines.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

20. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, does
the Air Force Inspector General treat the SAPR program as an item of
special interest when conducting inspections of organizations and
activities with responsibilities regarding the prevention and response
to sexual assault as explained in Section 1611 of Public Law 111-383?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Yes, the Air Force Inspection System
has included the SAPR program as a mandatory inspection requirement
within the inspection system since 1998. The new Air Force Instruction
(AFI) 90-201, The Air Force Inspection System, continues to designate
SAPR as a mandatory inspection item by Major Command IGs. The Air Force
is implementing a new inspection system that increases compliance
reporting and external oversight. In an early test of the new system in
2013, Air Force wing commanders inspected and reported over 99 percent
compliance with Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR)
requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.

AERIAL REFUELING MODERNIZATION

21. Senator King. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what is the
long-term plan of the Air Force to sustain its aerial refueling
capabilities, to include the fielding plan for the KC-46 and
modernization plans for the KC-135 fleet until they can all be
replaced?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Replacement of the legacy KC-135
fleet is planned to take place in three stages, KC-46, KC-Y, and the
KC-Z. The initial increment fields 179 KC-46s by 2028, replacing
roughly a third of the current capability. The Air Force will continue
to evaluate the health of the current tanker fleet and invest, as
required, to meet objectives outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance
and keep the legacy aircraft viable to the projected service life of
2040.

22. Senator King. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what is the
plan for the second and third--KC-Y and KC-Z--phases of the tanker
replacement plan, and is that on schedule?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force intends to begin the
Next Generation Tanker (KC-Y) procurement in the mid/late 2020s as the
current planned KC-46 procurement concludes. We are in the early stages
of developing an initial capabilities document for KC-Y and plan to
undertake an AOA by 2017. This AOA will explore several options
including a continuation of the current KC-46 production line, a
different commercial derivative effort, or a new development effort.
KC-Y and KC-Z will conceptually explore a smaller, tactical complement
to the KC-46 combining the capabilities of a penetrator (range, speed,
signature technology, advanced avionics, defensive systems, and
automated air refueling) with smaller size and lower infrastructure
requirements to support advanced strike, special operations forces and
combat search and rescue missions. KC-46A is on schedule and
development of the KC-Y is awaiting approval for the Advanced Air
Refueling Capability Concepts Developmental Planning effort.

23. Senator King. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, how many
refueling aircraft does the Air Force have in its inventory today, and
how many does it anticipate having in the inventory after the KC-135
and KC-10 fleets are replaced?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Based on approved retirements in the
fiscal year 2013 President's budget, the Air Force will have 456
refueling aircraft in the inventory (397 KC-135s and 59 KC-10s) at the
end of this fiscal year. The future refueling force structure will be
based on current fiscal constraints and the Defense Strategic Guidance.

24. Senator King. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, will KC-46,
KC-Y, and KC-Z aircraft replace the KC-135/KC-10 fleet one-for-one, or
will the capabilities of the new aircraft allow the Air Force to meet
its refueling demands with less total aircraft?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. KC-46 is the first of a three step
recapitalization strategy for air refueling. Its capabilities allow for
a one-for-one replacement with the KC-135 tanker. Air refueling
capability requirements involve not only ``fuel offload,'' but ``booms
in the air'' as well. KC-46A will only replace approximately one third
of our Nation's air refueling fleet, leaving approximately 220
``Eisenhower-era'' KC-135s still in the inventory. KC-Y and KC-Z, steps
two and three of the recapitalization process, are planned to replace
the remaining KC-135s and KC-10s. However, an analysis of air refueling
requirements must be accomplished prior to beginning each
recapitalization step. For example, to determine capabilities required
for a follow-on to the KC-46A (KC-X), Air Mobility Command, in
collaboration with Air Force Material Command, are initiating a
developmental planning effort in fiscal year 2014 to examine advanced
air refueling capability concepts. Given the size of our legacy tanker
fleet and the length of the current DOD acquisition and procurement
processes, the Air Force must begin to examine future air refueling
capability concepts now to ensure uninterrupted recapitalization of the
tanker fleet.

25. Senator King. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, do you
foresee the need for any further consolidation of air refueling units
or aircraft?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. As the fiscal and strategic
environments evolve, the Air Force will continue to evaluate its air
refueling enterprise and field the most operationally effective,
fiscally-informed force structure ready for the Nation today and
modernized to the support the Nation in the future.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

READINESS AND FLYING HOUR CUTS

26. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the Air Force had to cut
approximately $10 billion over the next 6 months of fiscal year 2013
due to sequestration. This includes a reduction of 94,000 flying hours,
resulting in the grounding of combat coded squadrons that started on
April 9. Please provide a complete list of Air Force flying squadrons/
units that have been, and those who have had, their readiness status
reduced. Please include numbers of aircraft and personnel impacted by
each squadron/unit grounding or reduced readiness status.
General Welsh. Sequestration forced the Air Force to implement
actions to flying units which forced some Regular Air Force units to
cease flying operations while other units flew at reduced rates. The
Air Force is continually adjusting unit flying rates to meet global
operational commitments and deployment timelines within fiscal
constraints. Due to the fluidity of these adjustments, the status of
certain units may differ from what is listed in the chart below.
The Air Force can also provide a detailed assessment of unit
readiness status in a classified forum as needed.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, are these grounded squadrons
tasked to fill combatant commander (COCOM) operations plans?
General Welsh. Almost all of our mission-ready units are already
tasked to Secretary of Defense-ordered missions or forward-based, so
the ability of the Air Force to provide requisite numbers of ready
forces for emergent requirements is severely limited and will continue
to become more difficult the longer we operate under these conditions.
The flying hour reductions due to sequestration have caused the Air
Force to continually adjust unit flying rates to meet deployment
timelines and ensure global operational commitments are filled within
fiscal constraints.
Detailed descriptions of taskings and ability to meet operations
plans are classified, but the Air Force can provide more details in a
classified forum as needed.

28. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is the impact of our
ability to fill all COCOM operational requirements, and what is the
impact on conducting additional combat operations?
General Welsh. Almost all of our mission-ready units are already
tasked to Secretary of Defense-ordered missions or forward-based, so
the ability of the Air Force to provide requisite numbers of ready
forces for emergent requirements is severely limited and will continue
to become more difficult the longer we operate under these conditions.
The flying hour reductions due to sequestration have caused the Air
Force to continually adjust unit flying rates to meet deployment
timelines and ensure global operational commitments are filled within
fiscal constraints.
If non-mission ready forces are sourced for combat ops, the risk of
higher casualties and collateral damage increases. The lack of ready
forces limits strategic choices and increases risk.
Detailed descriptions of taskings and ability to meet operations
plans are classified, but the Air Force can provide more details in a
classified forum as needed.

29. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how many additional hours will
have to be dedicated to bring all these units and their aircrews back
up to mission ready status, and how much will that cost?
General Welsh. In order to bring units back to pre-sequestration,
sub-optimal readiness levels, it is anticipated the stood down units
would need an additional 10 percent over the requested fiscal year 2014
budget for flying hours and would require 3-6 months.
Bringing the Air Force back to full, mission readiness goals
requires one full training cycle (approximately 2 years) and an
additional $3.2 billion increase above the fiscal year 2014 budget
request for both fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, as well as a
reduction in the number of current deployments.

30. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, is that cost factored into the
fiscal year 2014 budget?
General Welsh. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget submission
does not factor in the cost of restoring the readiness of flying
squadrons that have stood down due to sequestration. The Air Force is
working to mitigate readiness impacts in fiscal year 2013. Through
prioritization, efficiency efforts to make every dollar count and
congressional reprograming actions, the Air Force is working to
increase funding to the flying hour program. As our opportunity to buy
back additional flying hours comes closer to an end, a more accurate
picture of 2014 impacts will be possible.

31. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, as the Air Force focuses its
flying hours on getting the grounded aircrews mission-ready again, what
is the impact on the rest of the force?
General Welsh. Since flying hours are contained within our
operations and maintenance budget, additional flying hour funding will
reduce critical base operating support or facility maintenance.
Overall, the Air Force does not have sufficient operations and
maintenance funding in fiscal year 2013 and will not in fiscal year
2014 if the 2014 budget request is sequestered.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how will the student pilot
pipeline be impacted?
General Welsh. Under our current plan, we have allocated sufficient
flying hours to enable our basic student pilot pipeline production to
continue. However, we expect impacts if there is a civilian furlough
because Air Education and Training Command maintenance and simulators
are largely run by government civilians.

33. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what are the safety risks
associated with reduced flying hours?
General Welsh. The Air Force designs our flying hour program model
to provide requisite hours for aircrew to accomplish each unit's
mission in a proficient manner. Diminished flying hours put these
pilots at higher risk if they are called upon to execute operational
taskings in a diminished readiness state.

34. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how will the groundings impact
the readiness of other mission-essential personnel, such as munitions,
maintenance, and life support?
General Welsh. The skill sets and training opportunities of our
munitions handlers, maintenance, and life support personnel will erode
in units where flying is curtailed. This will slow progression in skill
level training for our maintenance personnel and contribute to
challenges in readiness recovery.

READINESS AND DEPOT MAINTENANCE CUTS/DEFERMENTS

35. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, constant deployments over the
past 20 years have taken a toll on all Air Force aircraft. Fortunately,
we have the best depot maintenance in the world, but it comes at a
cost. Sequestration will result in deferring 60 aircraft and 35 engines
into depot maintenance which will result in the grounding of some
aircraft, further reducing the overall combat readiness of the Air
Force. How will civilian furloughs affect depot maintenance, and what
are the possible long-term consequences on the depots and the fleet?
General Welsh. The overall depot maintenance requirement from
fiscal year 2013 moving into fiscal year 2014 currently stands at 24
aircraft and 84 engines. Internal mitigation and requested
reprogramming efforts would decrease impacts; however a bow wave into
fiscal year 2014 remains. In the near term, civilian furloughs are
expected to reduce depot maintenance productivity by 25 percent for
each week of furlough. This loss of productivity will increase flow
days and depot possessed time impacting availability and readiness.
With adequate sustainment funding, the Air Force anticipates a 2- to 3-
year recovery for the impacted fleets.

36. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what are the safety risks
associated with reducing depot maintenance?
General Welsh. There are no safety risks with reducing depot
maintenance. The depot maintenance reductions are a result of fewer
depot inductions, but do not affect the quality of maintenance. The
aircraft and engines that are not inducted will be grounded (not flown)
until the required depot maintenance can be performed.

37. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, like flying hours, the Air Force
starts fiscal year 2014 with a bow wave, or backlog, of depot and
maintenance requirements, but the fiscal year 2014 budget does not
include extra funding nor does it factor in sequestration. How much of
the force can the Air Force return back to mission-ready status in
fiscal year 2014, given these budget impacts?
General Welsh. Internal mitigation and proposed reprogramming would
reduce aircraft availability impacts in fiscal year 2013; however a bow
wave of requirements into fiscal year 2014 remains. The Air Force will
seek to minimize fiscal year 2014 near-term risks to readiness by
making tradeoffs within weapon system sustainment to minimize the
impact to those requirements that most directly impact readiness,
including aircraft and engine overhauls. The Air Force will make
adjustments throughout fiscal year 2014 to optimize funding to ensure
aircraft are available to meet mission requirements.

38. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how does that impact long-term
time and cost to recover the fleet back to required mission-ready
status?
General Welsh. With adequate sustainment funding, the Air Force
anticipates a 2- to 3-year recovery for the impacted fleets. The Air
Force will continue to minimize risk by making tradeoffs within weapon
system sustainment. However, the trade space for these tradeoffs will
decrease as workload accumulates resulting in impacts to aircraft
availability. Targeted force structure adjustments may decrease the
recover costs and the length of the recovery period.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

39. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, while the overall press on the
F-35 continues to be negative, positive changes have been made in the
program to include decreasing cost of each lot buy for the aircraft,
lower than project concurrency costs, timeline milestones being met,
flight tests surpassing goals, and a recent assessment by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) that is the most positive I have
seen in the entire history of this program. The first operational
squadron stood up at Yuma, AZ, in November 2012, and the first delivery
of aircraft to Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) occurred at the end of
February 2013. How many F-35s have been delivered to the Air Force and
are they all currently flying?
General Welsh. To date, 22 production F-35A aircraft have been
delivered to the Air Force. An additional four F-35A aircraft were
procured using system development and demonstration funds and are being
used exclusively to support developmental testing at Edwards AFB. All
26 F-35As are currently accruing flight hours.
Of the 22 F-35As delivered to the Air Force, 12 are stationed at
Eglin AFB, 4 are located at Nellis AFB, and 6 are located at Edwards
AFB. To date, production F-35As have flown over 700 sorties and
accumulated over 950 flight hours. In addition, the F-35A has flown
over 1400 flight test sorties and accumulated 2,733 total flight test
hours. The Air Force gains increased confidence in, and knowledge of,
the F-35 weapon system with each sortie.

40. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the Marine Corps is planning to
achieve initial operational capability (IOC) of the F-35B next year.
When is the Air Force planning to achieve IOC with the F-35A?
General Welsh. The Air Force has recently established its IOC
criteria for our F-35As, and based on the current program schedule, we
have set an Objective date for achieving IOC of August 2016 and a
Threshold date of December 2016. This IOC criteria is capability-based
and is defined as 12-24 F-35As, with airmen trained, manned, and
equipped to conduct CAS, interdiction, and limited suppression and
destruction of enemy air defenses in a contested environment. Logistics
and operational elements should also be in place, and the air system
and personnel should be capable of deploying and performing the
assigned missions. Should capability delivery experience additional
delays, we will need to revise our timeline estimate.
This criteria provides sufficient initial capability for the threat
postulated in 2016. However, to meet the full spectrum of Joint
warfighter requirements in future years, the Air Force requires the
Block 3F capabilities delivered at the completion of the program's
system development and demonstration (SDD).

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

41. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the Air Force is responsible for
two legs of the strategic nuclear triad: bombers and intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM); and tactical nuclear weapons delivered by
fighter aircraft. Development of a replacement for the 31-year-old
nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is 2 years behind schedule,
no decision has been made for a follow-on to the Minuteman ICBM which
we hope can be maintained until 2030, and a life extension program
(LEP) for the B-61 bomb, an average age of 27 years--the principal
nuclear weapon on the B-52, B-2, and fighter aircraft--has been delayed
by 2 years from 2017 to 2019. Does the Air Force continue to support
development of the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), a nuclear long-
range stand-off weapon, a new ICBM, and future tactical fighters
capable of carrying the B-61 nuclear bomb?
General Welsh. Long-Range Strategic Bomber (LRS-B): The Air Force
continues to support development of the LRS-B. The ``Strategic Guidance
for a 21st Century Defense'' reaffirmed the requriement for a new,
survivable bomber by highlighting its critical role in projecting power
and deterring adversaries. LRS-B will be built with features and
components necessary for the nuclear mission, ensuring nuclear
certification within 2 years of conventional IOC. The President
requested $8.8 billion in fiscal years 2014 to 2018 for the development
of the bomber. Further programmatic, technical, and operational details
are subject to enhanced security measures to protect critical
technologies and capabilities.

- Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO): The Air Force continues to
support development of the LRSO program. The 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review directed the Air Force to conduct a study to
inform decisions about replacing the current air-to-ground
(AGM)-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The Air Force
conducted an AOA between August 2011 and December 2012, and its
conclusions were validated in May 2013. The LRSO program was
fully funded in the fiscal year 2014 President's budget. It
will be compatible with B-2, B-52, and LRS-B.
- Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD): The Air Force
continues to support the GBSD program. The Air Force will
sustain the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030. The Air Force
programmed $21.1 million during fiscal years 2013-2014 for a
materiel solution analysis phase (including an AOA) to identify
potential follow-on ICBM solutions. The GBSD AOA will be
complete in late fiscal year 2014, in time to inform the
President's budget, facilitating replacement of the Minuteman
III ICBM in the 2025-2030 timeframe.
- Future tactical fighters capable of carrying the B-61 nuclear
weapon: The Air Force continues to support carrying the B-61 on
the tactical fighters. The Air Force is pursuing two new lines
of effort to incorporate the B-61 into the F-35, while
remaining committed to ensuring legacy aircraft are modernized
and sustained to carry the B-61 for decades to come. The fiscal
year 2014 President's budget funded R&D efforts specific to
preparing the F-35 to integrate B-61s, and the Air Force
supports the Joint Program Office (JPO) timeline to deliver
nuclear delivery capability as part of the F-35's Block 4B
configuration.

42. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what are the military risks for
the Air Force nuclear deterrence mission should the B-61 LEP encounter
further delays?
General Welsh. The Air Force plans Life Extension programs with
some margin to enable success through the transition. Delays that
decrease that margin are cause for concern and require careful
attention and planning to ensure requirements are met. The B-61
supports the strategic nuclear mission performed by the heavy bomber
force and also supports the United States national commitment to the
extended deterrence mission performed by our European-based dual
capable fighter force. Additional delays in the fielding of the B-61
Mod 12 would increase the risk of aging issues in the weapons that
currently support STRATCOM requirements and would undermine both the
strategic and the extended deterrence mission, which is a central
element of the U.S./NATO alliance.

43. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, why is the B-61 bomb an
important capability? Why not arm our bombers only with nuclear cruise
missiles?
General Welsh. To hold all targets at risk, the Air Force requires
both nuclear gravity weapons and stand-off cruise missiles. These
capabilities are complementary, not redundant. As the primary nuclear
gravity weapon employed by United States. long-range bombers and dual-
capable aircraft, the B-61 plays a central role in meeting STRATCOM
requirements and providing extended deterrence and assurance to our
allies. The B-61 is the only U.S. nuclear weapon capable of employment
from U.S. Dual-capable aircraft (F-16/F-15E), bombers and NATO dual
capable aircraft. Limiting the inventory to just nuclear cruise
missiles will minimize our military capability to cover a wide variety
of targets. Also, the B-2 will not be able to employ a nuclear cruise
missile until the long-range stand-off missile is operational.

44. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, why hasn't the administration
made a decision about a follow-on to the Minuteman ICBM?
General Welsh. The Air Force is continuing to modernize the
Minuteman III ICBM to sustain the weapon system through 2030. We are
currently pursuing an AOA for the GBSD. The study is expected to begin
August 13 and will define options for a Minuteman III follow-on
providing capability well beyond 2030. The final AOA report is expected
late fiscal year 2014 with a Milestone A decision expected in fiscal
year 2015. The GBSD AOA will examine the following system approaches:
(1) Baseline: sustain current capabilities, (2) Current Fixed: improved
baseline to address capability gaps, (3) New fixed: a new, hardened
silo-based system, (4) Mobile: ability to disperse upon warning and
launch from various locations. Also considered will be a hybrid
concept, a mixture of fixed silos and mobile based systems.

45. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, it can take up to 15 years to
develop a new ICBM. If the Minuteman III comes out of the force in
2030, we need to begin a new development next year. What options are
being examined?
General Welsh. The Air Force is continuing to modernize the
Minuteman III ICBM to sustain the weapon system through 2030. We are
currently pursuing an AOA for the GBSD. The study is expected to begin
August 13 and will define options for a Minuteman III follow-on
providing capability well beyond 2030. The final AOA report is expected
late fiscal year 2014 with a Milestone A decision expected in fiscal
year 2015. The GBSD AOA will examine the following system approaches:
(1) Baseline: sustain current capabilities, (2) Current Fixed: improved
baseline to address capability gaps, (3) New fixed: a new, hardened
silo-based system, (4) Mobile: ability to disperse upon warning and
launch from various locations. Also considered will be a hybrid
concept, a mixture of fixed silos and mobile based systems.

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING

46. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, I am concerned that this
administration is losing the ability to accurately budget for overseas
contingency operations (OCO). Each of the Services has been required to
expend base budget money to fund OCO requirements. Is there an OCO
funding shortfall for fiscal year 2013? If yes, what is it?
General Welsh. The Air Force has an $1.8 billion fiscal year 2013
OCO shortfall in the Operation and Maintenance appropriations.

47. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, will DOD's upcoming
reprogramming budget request eliminate the OCO funding shortfall?
General Welsh. Yes, if fully supported by Congress, the upcoming
reprogramming request eliminates the Air Force's fiscal year 2013 OCO
funding shortfall.

48. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, will the Air Force fiscal year
2014 OCO request include funds to address the fiscal year 2013 problems
in both the OCO and the base budget for readiness shortfalls?
General Welsh. The fiscal year 2014 OCO request does not include
funds to cover fiscal year 2013 OCO or base readiness shortfalls
resulting from sequestration. The fiscal year 2014 OCO request was
formulated with input from CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, and OSD and is
based on the best available estimate of operational requirements for
fiscal year 2014.

49. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, did the Air Force get fully
funded for its fiscal year 2013 OCO expenses? If not, what was the
shortfall?
General Welsh. The fiscal year 2013 OCO submission was based on
budgetary assumptions made at the time of the submission. Congress made
a variety of reductions to the request which, combined with operational
reality has resulted in $1.8 billion shortfall in the Operation and
Maintenance appropriations.

50. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is your fiscal year 2014
OCO request?
General Welsh. The fiscal year 2014 OCO request for the Total Force
is $13.9 billion.

51. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, do you expect to be fully
funded? If not, what would be the impact to readiness?
General Welsh. Yes, the fiscal year 2014 flying hour program was
built upon a fully funded fiscal year 2014 OCO request. If the OCO
request is not fully funded, additional units will be required to
reduce and/or cease flying to ensure continued OCO operations. This
will have a detrimental and long-term readiness impact.

SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITY

52. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the Air Force fiscal year 2014
budget seems to indicate it will save the Air Force $1 billion over the
fiscal years 2014 to 2018 budget from doing a block buy of rockets from
the incumbent Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) provider. Is
that correct? Please explain your answer.
General Welsh. Yes. As a result of the new acquisition strategy,
which was validated by the OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
independent cost estimate, the program has achieved $1.1 billion in
savings over fiscal years 2014 to 2018. The new acquisition strategy
incentivizes the incumbent to order material from vendors in quantity
sets allowing for maximum economies of scale savings.

53. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, does the Air Force current
launch capability meet the full spectrum of launch requirements by the
Air Force and its users?
General Welsh. Yes, the EELV can launch the entire National
Security Space manifest to all required orbits.

54. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, does demand exceed current
launch capabilities?
General Welsh. No, the United Launch Alliance is capable of meeting
the National Security Space launch capabilities.

FORWARD PRESENCE

55. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how critical is a forward-
deployed presence in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM)?
General Welsh. Our forward-deployed presence in EUCOM and PACOM
supports our national interests and is an essential element of our
alliances in both theatres. Although the formal makeup of the alliances
differ, the presence of United States capabilities in theatre
demonstrates our commitment, provides opportunities to develop alliance
interoperability, and keeps our forces trained for employment anywhere
in the world. Our combat-ready forces are a deterrent to potential
adversaries, enhancing regional stability. In the event of a
humanitarian or contingency operation overseas, our forward stationed
forces are capable of responding with minimal support from our limited
and aging fleet of refueling aircraft. We have programmed to
recapitalize our tanker fleet, but even with the complete package of
new tankers, in some scenarios an overseas force gives us options and
responsiveness not possible from CONUS. That said, our stewardship of
national resources demands a continuous review of our posture. We are
engaged with OSD and our Sister Services in a comprehensive review of
U.S. facilities in Europe to identify efficiencies. We fully expect
this European Infrastructure Consolidation will enable us to return
some assets to our host nations and consolidate certain operations with
a foot print that supports an essential level of forward presence while
eliminating that which is not additive to the national defense.

56. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, current Air Force force
structure is reportedly the minimum required to rapidly respond to
crises in the European and African areas of responsibility (AOR) and
dictate a permanent forward presence. Missions include contingency,
presidential support, aero-medical evacuation, airdrop, and training
missions, as well as significant Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed
and COCOM-requested exercises. Current events in Northern Africa and
the Middle East exemplify the need to permanently forward-base forces
to execute phase zero operations and preserve strategic flexibility in
times of crises. What is the requirement for C-130s in EUCOM, and what
missions do they support?
General Welsh. There are 14 C-130Js assigned to EUCOM. They support
operational missions for EUCOM and U.S. Africa Command as well as
Theater Security Cooperation (partner capacity building) missions with
partner nations. In addition to COCOM operational missions, these
aircraft use training sorties to support U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and
U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR) airborne qualified units (approximately 20
percent of all training sorties). USAREUR and NAVEUR do not possess
organic capability to maintain their required airborne currency.
A portion of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe-based C-130 force
remains on heightened alert status to support U.S. Government and
partner nations' interests throughout both theaters. Removal of
forward-based C-130 support puts these interests at risk.

57. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, have timelines for requests for
forces been met in the past?
General Welsh. Although every effort is made to deliver forces on
the timeline requested by combatant commanders, there are occasions
when delays are inevitable. In most cases, the delay can be attributed
to shortages in the requested forces or individual circumstances (e.g.,
insufficient dwell, personal hardships and other situations). In every
case we work with the requesting combatant commander to establish an
acceptable delivery date.

58. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how would NATO be impacted by
cuts to force structure?
General Welsh. Cuts in the U.S. Air Force force structure could
call into question NATO's ability to achieve the Level of Ambition
agreed by the heads of state of the member nations. It would require
the North Atlantic Council to reevaluate its strategic goals and would
most likely reduce its ability to influence destabilizing activities
both inside and outside its traditional borders.
Much of the planned force structure supporting the NATO Strategic
Concept comes from the U.S. Air Force: high demand, low density forces
such as air-to-air refueling and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance platforms are just two examples of critical resources we
provide. The United States provides more than half of the NATO
requirement for these capabilities. For ballistic missile defense of
NATO member nations, we provide an even higher percentage.
We have always stated that, in principal, the United States may
make the political decision to provide all our resources for defense of
the NATO Alliance, to the degree that is consistent with our worldwide
commitments. Given current and potential operations and standing treaty
obligations, further cuts in our force structure would severely
constrain the resources that could be available to NATO under any
scenario.

MUNITIONS

59. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, are you experiencing any
shortfalls in ammunition for training, base, and operational
requirements?
General Welsh. The current Air Force ground munitions stockpile is
adequate to support all current Air Force training, base and
operational requirements for fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.

60. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, do you have any inventory
shortfalls in air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, such as advanced
medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), joint direct attack
munitions (JDAM), and high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM)? If so,
how do you plan to address such shortfalls?
General Welsh. Yes, AMRAAM and JDAM inventories are short of their
objectives. The Air Force will address these weapons shortfalls by
competing these requirements against all other high priority
procurements within the Air Force and make the tough trade-offs on what
we can afford to buy. The Air Force plans to continue procurement of
both AMRAAM and JDAM at a rate determined by the results of the trade-
off with the intent to meet combatant commander objectives. HARM
inventory currently meets its objective. High-speed anti-radiation
missiles modernization efforts are currently underway to increase the
lethality of the weapon system against emerging advanced surface-to-air
missile systems.

CYBER SECURITY

61. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the Air Force is uniquely
situated to support cyber-related missions. This capability is critical
to ensuring national security interests. What is the Air Force doing to
recruit and train airmen with cyber skills?
General Welsh. The Air Force targets potential airmen with cyber
skills through national advertising campaigns highlighting STEM
requirements as opposed to targeting cyber specifically. The Air Force
also advocates and supports cyberspace and computer training and
education programs nationwide to encourage high school and college
students towards technical career fields. For example, we support
national competitions such as the Air Force Association's CyberPatriot
competition for high school students. Additionally, the Air Force
Institute of Technology's Center for Cyberspace Research hosts the
Advanced Cyber Education summer program for Reserve Officer Training
Corps cadets from all Services who are studying computer science or
computer/electrical engineering. Unfortunately, ACE has been canceled
for 2013 due to funding constraints as a result of sequestration but we
hope to be able to hold ACE again in future years.
Air Force cyberspace training programs develop Total Force
cyberspace professionals from numerous career fields. Core training
includes Undergraduate Cyberspace Training and Cyberspace Defense
Operations at Keesler AFB, MS, and Intermediate Network Warfare
Training at Hurlburt AFB, FL. We have also developed an Intelligence
Cyber Analyst course at Goodfellow AFB, TX, to train our digital
network analysts. This analyst training is complemented with a 6-month
follow on Joint Cyber Analysis Course at Pensacola Naval Air Station,
FL. Cyber personnel attend further joint cyberspace and related courses
based upon positional requirements and work roles. In addition, the Air
Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, conducts
graduate-level cyber curricula and professional continuing education as
well. Growth and change is constant in the cyberspace domain and these
schools adjust as technology and tactics evolve.

62. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what type of training do these
airmen receive?
General Welsh. Air Force cyberspace training programs develop Total
Force cyberspace professionals from numerous career fields. Core
training includes undergraduate cyberspace training and cyberspace
defense operations at Keesler AFB, MS, and intermediate network warfare
training at Hurlburt AFB, FL. We have also developed an Intelligence
Cyber Analyst course at Goodfellow AFB, TX, to train our digital
network analysts. This analyst training is complemented with a 6-month
follow on Joint Cyber Analysis Course at Pensacola Naval Air Station,
FL. Cyber personnel attend further Joint cyberspace and related courses
based upon positional requirements and work roles. In addition, the Air
Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, conducts
graduate-level cyber curricula and professional continuing education as
well. Growth and change is constant in the cyberspace domain, and these
schools adjust as technology and tactics evolve.

63. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how are you retaining these
airmen after such training?
General Welsh. To retain our cyber airmen, seven of the eight
enlisted cyber Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) are currently receiving
a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) in at least 1 year group. Also,
all eight AFSCs are currently identified on the Chronic Critical Skills
for Promotion List that increases the number of promotions given to a
career field to support noncommissioned officer (NCO) and senior NCO
manning. Finally, cyber AFSCs were shielded from some of the force
management programs such as voluntary separation programs and accession
cuts.

64. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how are you ensuring that these
airmen will get opportunities to advance in their career progression?
General Welsh. Cyberspace airmen have multiple opportunities to
advance in their careers. They are deliberately force managed to
acquire breadth in their career fields and depth in the cyberspace
field. For example, certain specialties will serve consecutive
operations tours in cyberspace positions at different locations to
build depth as they progress through their career. This experience is
coupled with continuing professional cyberspace education to build
cyberspace experts.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

65. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, GAO released a report last year
noting that one-time implementation costs for the 2005 Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) round grew from $21 billion to $35 billion, an
increase of $14 billion, or 67 percent. As a result, the 20-year value
DOD expected to achieve from the 2005 round decreased by 72 percent and
the annual recurring savings has decreased by 10 percent. In addition,
GAO determined that 75 out of the 182 recommendations, about 41
percent, are now expected to result in a negative 20-year value. Has
the Air Force actually conducted any analyses to quantify the extent of
its excess infrastructure? If not, how can the Air Force predict with
any confidence how much will be saved by a BRAC round?
General Welsh. The Air Force has not conducted an updated capacity
analysis. Our current estimates of excess infrastructure are based on
the 2004 OSD report to Congress, required under BRAC 2005 legislation,
which stated the DOD had approximately 24 percent excess infrastructure
at that time. BRAC 2005 eliminated very little Air Force infrastructure
in BRAC 2005 and since then, the Air Force retired approximately 500
aircraft and reduced its total active duty manpower by approximately 8
percent without reducing infrastructure accordingly. If legislation is
enacted authorizing another round of BRAC for U.S. installations, the
Air Force will base its analysis on an approved force structure plan
and will evaluate all bases equally to determine what bases may be
candidates for closure or realignment.
The Air Force knows from past BRAC rounds that savings from BRAC
are real; 40 installations have closed saving $2.9 billion per year.
However, it is premature for the Air Force to predict the amount of
savings that can be garnered prior to completing the BRAC analysis.
The Air Force effectively controlled BRAC 2005 costs through a
disciplined military construction and training approval process with
senior leader oversight. The Headquarters Air Force staff screened and
budgeted for major command requests within the first year.
Subsequently, all major command projects were reviewed biannually,
tracking both status and cost management. Requirements that arose from
site surveys were justified and well supported.

TRICARE

66. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, in the President's budget
request, DOD proposes to increase TRICARE Prime enrollment fees and
pharmacy co-pays yet again, institute new enrollment fees for TRICARE
Standard and TRICARE for Life beneficiaries, and increase Standard
deductibles, among other things. Within the last 2 years, Congress
authorized DOD to increase enrollment fees and pharmacy co-pays each
year by the amount of the annual retired-pay cost-of-living adjustment.
Hasn't that helped you control healthcare costs? Why do we need to go
down this road again?
General Welsh. Congress' recent support for increases in the
TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working age retirees and adjustments
to retail and mail order pharmacy co-pays are an important step to
managing costs, but they are not enough to sustain the benefit in the
long term. Managing health care costs is a shared responsibility among
the government, providers and the beneficiaries. In addition to seeking
reasonable beneficiary cost share reforms, the Military Health System
is undergoing comprehensive change to be a progressive health system
for the beneficiaries into the future while aggressively gleaning
efficiencies to control cost.
By following a holistic approach to addressing the rising costs of
health care, the military health benefit will continue to be a rich
reward for those who have served our country. Without beneficiary cost
share reforms, sustaining the health benefit will require diversion of
funds from other critical accounts to make up the shortfall.

67. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, if Congress doesn't agree with
your TRICARE fee proposals, what is your back-up plan to make up the
large deficit in your health account?
General Welsh. If Congress prohibits the proposed TRICARE fee
changes and does not restore the budgeted savings in fiscal year 2014,
the Department will likely be forced to make additional reductions to
readiness and modernization accounts. The TRICARE fee proposals are an
important piece of the Department's approach to balanced drawdown in
defense spending. The fee changes in conjunction with the governance
changes in progress for the Military Health System are necessary to put
the military health benefit on a path to long-term fiscal
sustainability as well as to lessen the impact on readiness and
modernization.

HARDENING FACILITIES

68. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, Admiral Locklear testified to
this committee that; ``the United States requires a more
geographically-distributed, operationally-resilient, and politically-
sustainable posture that allows persistent presence and, if needed,
power projection.'' The Air Force has proposed construction of hardened
facilities on Guam to protect certain assets to provide operational
resilience. Do you support the hardening of facilities on Guam to
preserve a second strike capability?
General Welsh. Yes, the Air Force supports the ``selective
hardening'' of facilities on Guam for a number of critical reasons,
both unclassified and classified. Selective hardening increases our
warfighting capability and demonstrates our commitment to operational
resiliency to our partners and allies as well as our potential
adversaries. This effort stems from the requirement to be resilient
against enemy attack, ensures the availability of airpower to the Joint
Force Commander, and enables the ability to generate airpower in the
face of multiple attacks. The Air Force is currently working on a
Pacific Airpower Resiliency study built on the premise of previous
analyses that recommends the construction of two large hardened hangars
to protect national assets deployed to Guam. Since the submission of
the fiscal year 2012 President's budget, all major stakeholders have
determined and agreed on the importance of these two structures. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 provided funding for one unhardened hangar,
and the Air Force requested funding in the fiscal year 2014 President's
budget to harden the first hangar and construct a second hardened
hangar. The Air Force will continue to pursue selective hardening,
increased airfield damage repair capabilities, and a number of other
efforts in concert with the other Services, including development of a
new plan beyond the two proposed hangars.

69. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, given the large numbers of
Chinese missiles projected in 2020, what makes you believe that you can
protect enough infrastructure to be able to launch a second strike?
General Welsh. This question cannot be adequately answered at the
unclassified level. However, there are combinations of approaches that
work in concert to help mitigate the threat represented by a large
missile inventory. These include, but are not limited to, dispersal,
selective hardening, rapid repair and other passive and active defense
measures. All efforts stem from the requirement to be operationally
resilient against enemy attack, guaranteeing the availability of
airpower in support of the Joint Force Commander. It is not about
simply preserving a second strike, rather it is about ensuring a
continuous ability to generate airpower in a contested environment.

70. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, hardening a facility
approximately doubles the cost of a facility--can we afford that cost
in this budget environment?
General Welsh. Yes, we have determined we can afford hardening of
selective critical infrastructure on Guam and have included these
requirements in our fiscal year 2014 budget request. We are only
requesting to selectively harden facilities and infrastructure that are
critical to ensure we can accomplish our missions in all threat
scenarios. The United States has done virtually no hardening for some
30 years, and there are no hardened facilities currently on Guam.
Selective hardening is one of four distinct methods of mitigating
risk in PACOM's resiliency strategy, which also includes redundancy,
rapid repair, and dispersal. In many cases, hybrid solutions will be
used that incorporate two or more of the mitigation measures. Without
the selective hardening of key infrastructure, our commitment to
overall Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific theater could be called
into question by our partners and allies as well as our potential
adversaries.

C-130 AMP

71. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, at last year's Air Force posture
hearing, General Schwartz said that: ``the Air Force C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) provides military capability equal or
greater than alternative programs and at less cost than those
programs.'' The U.S. Government performed four independent studies on
the C-130 AMP solution between 1998 and 2008 and found it was the most
cost-effective solution to modernize the C-130 fleet, and at the same
time, consolidate the multiple configurations and increase equipment
reliability and availability. It appears from the fiscal year 2014
President's proposed budget that a new start effort, the Minimize CNS/
ATM option, has been identified. Could you explain the Minimize CNS/ATM
option?
General Welsh. The Minimize Communications, Navigation,
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program is a less-costly,
smaller-scope program, compared to AMP. The Minimize CNS/ATM program
primarily upgrades communication and navigation equipment enabling the
C-130H to meet navigation mandates into the 2020s.

72. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is the cost of the new
approach and what will it truly save after considering the termination
liability, and after other life-cycle cost savings are removed from the
solution?
General Welsh. The fiscal year 2014 Presidents' budget requests
$476 million for the Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM program for 184 aircraft.
The Air Force expects the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study
directed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 to provide life cycle cost
comparisons for C-130 AMP, the fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM
program, and the fiscal year 2013 Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM
program. Planned delivery date of the IDA study to Congress is October
2013.

73. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what requirements or missions
changed that would allow for a change of direction of this magnitude,
specifically cancelling the program of record, AMP, and executing a new
start, Minimize CNS/ATM?
General Welsh. Significant fiscal reductions to Air Force funding
drove difficult strategic choices. One of these difficult choices was
C-130 modernization. We were compelled to pursue a less-costly,
smaller-scope modernization program that meets mission requirements and
ensures the C-130H fleet remains viable into the 2020s.

74. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, less than 2 years ago, the C-130
AMP was the best solution and at a lower cost than all other capable
alternatives. How can AMP now be too expensive?
General Welsh. The constrained fiscal environment forced us to make
difficult strategic choices. The decision to terminate the C-130 AMP
was driven by the first phase of the 2011 Budget Control Act. Full
implementation of the Budget Control Act--or sequestration--eliminated
budget resources that might have been available to fund the C-130 AMP
program. Acquiring the capability afforded by the C-130 AMP became
untenable under these fiscal constraints, especially when compared to
other more compelling investment opportunities.

75. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, why is the Air Force choosing to
end a program that is over 99 percent complete with development
activities and with very little risk going forward?
General Welsh. The constrained fiscal environment forced the Air
Force to make difficult strategic choices. The decision to terminate
the C-130 AMP was driven by the first phase of the 2011 Budget Control
Act. Full implementation of the Budget Control Act--or sequestration--
eliminated budget resources that might have been available to fund the
C-130 AMP program. Acquiring the capability afforded by the C-130 AMP
became untenable under these fiscal constraints, especially when
compared to other more compelling investment opportunities.

76. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, as directed by the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2013, have you begun the IDA study for a cost benefit
analysis, and what is the current status and projected completion date
to report back to the committee?
General Welsh. DOD placed the IDA study on contract on March 1,
2013. The IDA study is currently progressing according to schedule, and
IDA plans to deliver initial study results to the Air Force in August
2013. The Air Force plans to deliver the study to Congress in October
2013.

77. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, has there been any analysis of
long-term cost savings the current C-130 AMP provides versus the
proposed fiscal year 2014 Minimize CNS/ATM capability?
General Welsh. The Air Force has not completed an official life-
cycle cost analysis for the proposed fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM) program. The Air Force expects the IDA study directed in the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2013 to provide life cycle cost comparisons for C-130
AMP, the fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM program, and the
fiscal year 2013 Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM program.

78. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the fiscal year 2013
appropriations reduced the C-130 AMP program of record in fiscal year
2012 by $118 million, leaving $90 million and identified $20 million
for fiscal year 2013. What is the expenditure plan for fiscal year 2013
appropriations identified for the C-130 AMP?
General Welsh. The Air Force has not expended any of the fiscal
year 2013 C-130 AMP funds, or any of the fiscal year 2012 production
funds. We are continuing to conduct fiscally responsible and prudent
program actions while the IDA completes the cost-benefit analysis on C-
130 AMP directed by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. Based on the outcome
of the IDA study, the Air Force will provide a spend plan as
appropriate.

79. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, can the current C-130 AMP be
scaled down and still retain its certification? If so, have you thought
about doing that instead of starting over?
General Welsh. No, significantly scaling down C-130 AMP would drive
a program redesign and retest.

80. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, with a reasonable learning
curve, what is the current cost of a fully installed C-130 AMP system
and what would the estimated cost be for the alternative system?
General Welsh. The C-130 AMP Office currently estimates the C-130
AMP per aircraft cost to be $15.4 million. The Air Force expects the
IDA study directed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 to provide life
cycle cost comparisons for C-130 AMP, the fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-
130 CNS/ATM program, and the fiscal year 2013 Optimize Legacy C-130
CNS/ATM program. Planned delivery date of the IDA study to Congress is
October 2013.

81. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the current C-130 AMP eliminated
the navigator position, which essentially paid for the upgrade through
personnel savings. Will the Minimize CNS/ATM require a navigator, and
if so, what is the impact on availability, training, and life-cycle
costs?
General Welsh. The Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM program requires a
navigator. While the navigator savings of approximately $500 million
(then-year dollars over a 15-year life cycle) offsets the Operations
and Support costs of C-130 AMP, it was never intended to recover the
full cost of the AMP modification.
The Air Force expects the IDA study on C-130 AMP to analyze the
impact of availability, training, and life-cycle costs of the three C-
130H combat delivery fleet modification alternatives: C-130 AMP, the
fiscal year 2013 Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM program, and the fiscal
year 2014 Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM program.

82. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, will the Minimize CNS/ATM new
start provide more or less capability than the current program of
record, the C-130 AMP?
General Welsh. The Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM new start is a less
robust avionics and sustainment solution than the C-130 AMP. The legacy
C-130H combat delivery fleet will continue to maintain global access
and global engagement to support the Joint Warfighter regardless of
which AMP is adopted.

83. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what other upgrades/capabilities
previously included in the C-130 AMP will not be done and which of
these will be addressed at some future time?
General Welsh. The C-130 AMP modernizes C-130Hs across three
variants (H2, H2.5, H3) with a common avionics suite and standardized
cockpit configuration. AMP provides substantial system integration to
reduce crew workload, thus eliminating the navigator. AMP also
addresses future issues with obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing
sources.
The fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM is an airspace
compliance only program to meet the Federal Aviation Administration's
January 2020 CNS/ATM airspace mandate for an Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast system. Therefore, the Air Force will continue
to analyze the Legacy C-130H fleet's avionics systems' reliability,
maintainability, and sustainability issues, and would pursue options to
address any shortfalls.

84. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, is the current IDA study
evaluating the C-130 AMP against the Minimize CNS/ATM identified in the
fiscal year 2014 President's budget document?
General Welsh. Yes, the Air Force tasked the IDA to evaluate all
three C-130H combat delivery fleet modification alternatives: C-130
AMP, the fiscal year 2013 Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM program, and
the fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM program.

85. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, has an acquisition strategy been
developed for the fiscal year 2014 Minimize CNS/ATM new start option?
General Welsh. The Air Force, in compliance with section 143 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, has taken no action to develop an official
acquisition strategy on the fiscal year 2014 Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM
program.

86. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, is there an intention to have
some level of commonality between the large platform CNS/ATM solutions
for the Air Force?
General Welsh. Yes, it is our intention to maximize commonality in
the CNS/ATM equipment used in the large platforms. However, every
aircraft is different, which limits the extent of commonality. Since
cost savings is a concern, we plan to take advantage of proven and
available commercial off-the-shelf options for CNS/ATM compliance
equipment when these solutions lower our cost to equip or sustain.

C-130 RE-ENGINING

87. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, I understand that there is an
upgrade for the T56 engine, the engine enhancement package (EEP), that
would improve fuel efficiency of the current engines. What is the
status of the modification?
General Welsh. Rolls Royce Corporation, the T56 engine
manufacturer, developed a more fuel efficient upgrade to the current C-
130H aircraft engines using internal company resources. This upgrade is
known as the T56 Series 3.5 engine configuration.
Although the T-56 Series 3.5 engine modification is expected to
provide improved fuel efficiency and reduced maintenance costs, the Air
Force has not funded a program of record due to higher Air Force
funding priorities in the current fiscal environment.

88. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, has the EEP been tested, and if
so, what were the results?
General Welsh. The T56 Series 3.5 has successfully passed engine
qualification testing. Additionally, the prototype engine was flight
tested on a C-130H at Edwards AFB, CA with all operational requirements
being met during that effort.

89. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is the estimated cost of
the modification, and for how many aircraft?
General Welsh. A June 2011 Air Mobility Command Business Case
Analysis (BCA) forecasted a requirement for 200 C-130H aircraft (184
Mobility Air Force and 16 Air Combat Command), which will require 941
engines including required spares. The study estimates the modification
would require a total investment of $969 million (calculated in 2011
constant year dollars) from fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2024, and $414
million would be required from fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2018. This
funding is based on a modification profile of 20 engines in fiscal year
2014, and 100 engines in each of the remaining years until fiscal year
2024 when the remaining 21 engines would be modified.

90. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how long will it take to modify
the fleet?
General Welsh. For the Air Mobility Command BCA forecasted
requirement of 941 engines, if the modification begins with a profile
of 20 engines in the first year, and 100 engines in each of the
remaining out-years, it will take 11 years to modify the fleet.

91. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is the expected fuel
savings from making the modification?
General Welsh. The Air Mobility Command BCA expects $240 million in
fuel savings (7.9 percent) over 25 years of operations.

92. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, has the Air Force independently
verified those savings estimates?
General Welsh. The predicted $240 million (7.9 percent) fuel
consumption improvement, at the current equivalent engine power
setting, was validated through Air Force ground and flight testing.

KC-46A

93. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, February was the 2-year
anniversary of the KC-X contract. Since that time, both the Air Force
and Boeing have delivered on their commitments by meeting all contract
milestones on or ahead of schedule. At this point in the program, to
what do you attribute the success of the Air Force?
General Welsh. The keys to the program's success have been
requirements and funding stability, backed by the diligent efforts of
our professional acquisition workforce. The Department led a contract
with well-defined requirements and both parties have held each other
accountable to the agreement. Additionally, the Department has not
subjected the program to budget-driven changes in schedule and content.
This creates an environment where our engineers and program managers,
government and contractor, can focus on executing the program on time
and on schedule.

94. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how do you see leveraging the
lessons learned in the tanker acquisition to other Air Force
acquisitions?
General Welsh. The lessons learned from the tanker acquisition are
being implemented in policy and in practice. Multiple components of the
Air Force's Acquisition Improvement Plan and DOD's Better Buying Power
(BBP) initiatives and policies have roots in the successes and failures
of the broader tanker acquisition program. In practice, the source
selection lessons learned are being propagated through the leadership
and working levels of the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
(AFLCMC) and Space and Missile Systems Center through policy,
procedures, training, directed communications, and the Air Force's
Lessons Learned Program. As the Air Force approaches new acquisitions,
the policies and processes that have grown out of the tanker
acquisition will be implemented as appropriate with the nature, scope,
and risks inherent in each new program.

LONG-RANGE STRIKE BOMBER

95. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, DOD is pivoting to a strategy
that focuses on the Western Pacific. To accomplish this, the strategy
says we must maintain the ability to operate in Anti Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD) environments and that the development of a new stealth bomber
is, therefore, needed. How does the development and fielding of a new
LRS-B help satisfy the requirement to operate at great distances in an
A2/AD environment?
General Welsh. Current bombers are increasingly at risk to modern
air defenses; the LRS-B will be able to penetrate modern air defenses
to accomplish combatant commander objectives despite adversary A2/AD
measures. The LRS-B will be usable across the spectrum of conflict,
from raid to campaign levels and will provide broad geographic coverage
(ability to operate deep and from long range). Additionally, it will
carry a wide variety of stand-off and direct-attack munitions for
increased flexibility. Once fielded, the LRS-B's long range, payload,
and survivability will provide the President with the option to hold
targets at risk at anywhere on the globe, as well as provide
operational flexibility for Joint commanders.

96. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, in light of the extremely high
total cost of ownership numbers that have been identified with the JSF
program, what steps is DOD taking to incentivizing bidding contractors
to design for control of those costs?
General Welsh. With regards to the LRS-B program, the Air Force is
considering an array of options for incentivizing the contractors to
design the weapon system in manner that reduces total ownership costs.

97. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, would it make sense to increase
the emphasis on procurement and sustainment costs in the evaluation of
competing offers?
General Welsh. Yes. The LRS-B program is considering an array of
options to place an appropriate amount of emphasis on the evaluation of
the projected procurement and sustainment costs of competing offers.

C-17

98. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the ability of the U.S.
industrial base to support the production of large military aircraft is
a growing concern. The U.S. educational system is producing fewer
people with the requisite technical skills to build highly integrated
and sophisticated weapon systems. More and more U.S. manufacturing
facilities are shutting down, and U.S. corporations are depending on
overseas companies to provide major assemblies and parts for U.S.
products. What are you doing to maintain the U.S. industrial base and
to ensure it retains its technology and capability edge in supporting
and winning future wars?
General Welsh. The national budget turbulence has caused not just
the Air Force, but also each organization in DOD, to carefully consider
priorities and make adjustments in plans and budgets. While sustaining
a robust national technology and industrial base is a concern, it is
one of many subject to the realities imposed by the current fiscal
situation.
Our top three modernization programs, the KC-46, the F-35, and the
LRS-B, highlight the Air Force's current investments in the industrial
base. Other modernization efforts such as our space programs also
support the Nation's industrial base. However, the Air Force does not
have resources to sustain industrial capability or capacity beyond that
required for funded programs. In a key area, such as turbine engine
development, the Air Force collaborates with industry on a shared-cost
basis to advance the state of the art and maintain a cadre of
engineering and design expertise.
The Air Force is working with the other Services and OSD to develop
a deeper understanding of our mutual dependencies on the complex web of
suppliers that produce and sustain our air, space, and cyber
capabilities.

99. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is the Air Force doing to
ensure that mobility--and particularly airlift--are part of that
enduring industrial base?
General Welsh. In the current fiscal environment, the Air Force has
few choices beyond those to support our airmen, maintain readiness of
key units, and continue our top modernizations efforts. I fully
appreciate that the Air Force's air, space, and cyber capabilities are
sustained by the products and services purchased from the national
technology and industrial base. Without the support of both the organic
and the commercial components of the industrial base, the Air Force
would not be ready to respond to the needs of the Nation. The result of
the difficult choices imposed by the current budget situation is that
the Air Force has reduced our demands on the industrial base.
As far as the current state of industrial base supporting airlift,
the C-17 along with the C-130J, remain in production and are still some
of the youngest fleets in our inventory. The Air Force also benefits
from the very healthy commercial aerospace sector of the economy. For
example, the KC-46 is a derivative of a commercial aircraft.

100. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what alternatives do you see
for future airlift production if the C-17 line shuts down?
General Welsh. No alternative is needed at this time since the Air
Force's current airlift requirements will be met upon delivery of the
final C-17 and completion of C-5 RERP modification. After the delivery
of the final U.S. Air Force C-17 (third quarter of calendar year 2013),
the future of the C-17 line is fully dependent on Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and/or direct commercial sales orders. As of now, the
remaining firm C-17 FMS orders will keep the production line going
until the fourth quarter of calendar year 2014. We remain committed to
our allies and partners to help them through new FMS orders should they
require additional airlift capability and capacity.

JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS

101. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, in fiscal year 2012, Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) constituted over 98 percent of all air-
to-ground gravity bombs employed in combat (85 percent if Hellfire is
included) according to U.S. Air Force Central (AFCENT) data. The JDAM
weapon system on an annual basis drops approximately 7,000 units a year
in the support of training, test, tactics development, and combat
operations. What is the impact on the strategic weapons stockpile/war
reserves, when training, testing, and combat operations are consuming
more than the annual planned procurement?
General Welsh. The strategic weapons stockpile/war reserves
inventory levels decrease when training, testing, and combat operations
expenditures outpace annual procurement. Since Joint Direct Attack
Munitions inventories are already short of inventory objectives,
continuing to expend more weapons than we procure increases risk over
time. This shortage will drive the use of secondary weapons that
decrease warfighter effectiveness and result in increased time
accomplishing the combatant commander's objectives.

102. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, has DOD conducted an analysis
for what levels should be maintained and the assumptions that have
pushed JDAM procurements to such low rates?
General Welsh. The Air Force conducts an annual analysis to
determine the required inventory levels to accomplish the combatant
commanders' objectives. Annual procurement is then set in an attempt to
meet those inventory objectives, but balanced against Air Force budget
constraints to meet the highest priorities of the Air Force.

103. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, there was a tremendous surge in
JDAM production after September 11. As production rates drop
dramatically, what are you doing to sustain the U.S. industrial base
and to ensure it retains the capacity to surge again, when required?
General Welsh. This is an important issue that applies not just to
the Air Force and not just to the Joint Direct Attack Munitions. The
demands on that sector of the national technology and industrial base
producing and sustaining munitions are very closely tied to the tempo
of our combat operations. For that industrial sector, there isn't much
of a middle ground. When the Nation's forces are not engaged in combat,
the only demands are for training, maintaining operator proficiency,
sustaining war reserves, or sales to our allies. When the Nation
decides to send forces into combat, demand can rise rapidly with the
potential for production surges.
The Air Force works closely with the other Services and OSD on a
variety of issues concerning the munitions industrial base. For
example, we have participated in reviews to help identify requirements
for and development of critical energetic materials, to support
development of fuzes and monitor the health of that subsector. We have
looked across the industry to identify critical suppliers and
capabilities. The Air Force is also looking beyond the current systems
with research programs to develop technologies for future munitions.

104. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, the Libyan conflict
demonstrated that NATO inventories of JDAM are not sufficient to
conduct even a small operation effectively. What is the United States
doing to encourage our NATO allies to increase their JDAM inventories
significantly?
General Welsh. The Air Force is working with the Offices of Defense
Cooperation to stress to NATO allies the importance of keeping
sufficient weapons inventories. The Air Force is also working with DOD
to investigate options, such as expedited acquisition and multi-
national munitions pooling.

T-X PROGRAM

105. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, given the impacts of
sequestration, what priority is the Air Force acquisition plans for the
T-X program, and will the Air Force continue with recapitalization
plans for the T-38 Talon, which has been in service for over 50 years?
General Welsh. Current weapon-system recapitalization efforts and
operations took precedence over the T-X program in the fiscal year 2014
budget. However, the Air Force does intend to recapitalize the T-38
fleet. At this time, the objective IOC date is undefined.

106. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, is the T-X program still
planning to keep this a bundled effort, to include jet, simulator, and
courseware, all tied to the Family of Systems (FoS) to save the
warfighters and taxpayers by reducing the cost of flight training?
General Welsh. Yes, the Air Force still plans to acquire the T-X as
a single Family of Systems rather than as separate acquisitions for the
aircraft, ground training devices, and courseware. We believe this to
be the most efficient course of action to provide a robust training
capability at the most effective cost.

107. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, has the Service defined T-X
requirements in a manner that mandates that the T-38 replacement
aircraft must accommodate the full spectrum of male and female pilot
candidates (JPATS 1-7), just as you did in the T-6 Texan and other new
platforms?
General Welsh. The T-X is still in an early stage of requirements
development, but as the requirements are developed, the Air Force will
try to ensure that they accommodate the full spectrum of male and
female pilot candidates.

CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS

108. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, I am concerned about the
potential impact of civilian furloughs on critically important Air
Force family support programs. If furloughs do take place, do you
expect any cutbacks in your operating hours at commissaries, exchanges,
and child development centers, or curtailment of: morale, welfare, and
recreation (MWR) programs; Department of Defense Education Activity
(DODEA) programs; Transition Assistance Programs (TAP); or military
spouse employment programs?
Mr. Donley. Civilian furloughs will have a negative impact on our
ability to provide, and maintain, a variety of services to our airmen
and their families. Specifically, Commissaries will close one
additional day per week and MWR programs are projected to experience
reduced hours of operation and/or closed facilities. Additionally,
budget reductions will have a negative impact on our ability to timely
transform our activities to make our services more efficient.
Utilizing the 1,645 direct child care employees that have been
excepted from the furlough, we will continue to provide child care
operations and minimize the impact to airmen and their families.
Additionally, we do not anticipate Army and Air Force Exchange Service
(AAFES), TAP or Military Spouse Employment to be affected by furloughs.

109. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, in response to
sequestration, if civilian furloughs impact the mission of the Military
Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), what options does the Air Force
have to ensure your recruit accessions are not disrupted?
Mr. Donley. Approximately 80 percent of Military Entrance
Processing Command (MEPCOM) employees are civilian. The 11-day furlough
(as announced on May 14, 2013) will have a significant impact on
MEPCOM's ability to process recruits and manage military accessions
testing programs. MEPCOM will reduce applicant processing from 5 days
down to 4 days to accommodate the civilian furloughs.
There are no options to overcome recruit processing disruptions as
a result of the MEPCOM furlough. No alternatives exist for MEPCOM
processing to qualify youth for military service. MEPCOM is the sole
entity for enlisted accessions. The Air Force will adjust to the
reduced processing capacity by tightly managing the available
processing slots. Slots will first be used to send fiscal year 2013
recruits to Basic Military Training, and then whatever slots remain
will be prioritized to best meet fiscal year 2014 needs. These
restrictions will force the Air Force to delay processing motivated
applicants until slots become available at a later date.

INTEGRATED DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEM

110. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, it is unconscionable that
servicemembers must wait many months to receive a disability
determination from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). While DOD
and VA have made some progress in decreasing the amount of time it
takes to get disability claims completed in the Integrated Disability
Evaluation System (IDES), more work must be done. Do you believe the VA
is doing all that it can do to decrease the amount of time for
disability case reviews and claims adjudication?
Mr. Donley. DOD and VA have implemented several improvement
strategies to improve the IDES Physical Evaluation Board (PEB)
timeliness.

1. VA has added 109 personnel to reach 264 full-time equivalents
for claims adjudication, and consolidated Army claims at Seattle
Disability Rating Activity Site to reduce processing times.
2. VA has proactively engaged DOD to expedite adoption of
Disability Benefits Questionnaires (DBQs) within the IDES Program.
3. To better support DOD and members of the Reserve components
(RC), VA implemented a process to perform IDES Compensation and Pension
examinations closer to the residence of RC servicemembers.
4. VA's Chief of Staff conducts bi-monthly internal Video
Teleconferences (VTC) with Central Office and Field Executive staff to
review IDES performance metric and discuss process improvement
measures. VA also has joint monthly VTCs with both Army and Navy/Marine
Corps to discuss site performance and general collaboration
opportunities.
5. VA's IDES leadership conducts weekly meetings with IDES
leadership from OSD, Warrior Care Policy, and the Military Services.
These meetings have been occurring since July 2011.
6. VA Central Office personnel conduct periodic site visits to
identify best practices and provide assistance.
7. VA and DOD routinely collaborate to improve and refine policies
and procedures.

The Air Force continues to collaborate with DOD and VA to improve
the overall disability evaluation process. Despite improvements,
challenges still remain and all of the DOD is committed to working
diligently with VA to continue streamlining and improving the overall
disability process.

111. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, does the VA need additional
resources to hire more claims adjudicators?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force cannot address the resource requirements
of the VA. However, our Service continues to collaborate with VA to
improve the overall disability evaluation process. Despite
improvements, challenges still remain, DOD and the Air Force are
committed to working diligently with VA to continue streamlining and
improving the overall disability process.

PROTECTING PROSPECTIVE RECRUITS

112. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, a recent tragic case in
Maryland appears to have been a murder/suicide involving a prospective
recruit and recruiter. What guidance has the Air Force provided to
ensure that prospective recruits and their parents or guardians are
fully aware of the limits for relationships with recruiters?
Mr. Donley. Air Force Recruiting has instituted an aggressive and
comprehensive program to inform and educate recruits and their parents
on the subject of inappropriate behaviors, to include unprofessional
relationships throughout the recruiting process. This program employs
video, talking points, ``Applicant Rights/Responsibilities Cards'', and
signed statements. The program clearly defines what constitutes an
unprofessional relationship vs. professional relationship between
recruits and their recruiters, and advises the recruits of their right
and obligation to report suspected or actual cases. The program also
outlines sources of assistance and steps to be taken to address
concerns.

113. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, what information does the
Air Force require to be provided to prospective recruits to ensure that
they have immediate access to assistance and intervention, if
necessary, if they believe a recruiter is intending to take improper
advantage of them?
Mr. Donley. Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) personnel are
required to provide all applicants with an ``Air Force Applicant
Rights/Responsibilities Card'' as early as practical in the application
process before Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM)
processing. This card clearly defines professional relationships to
potential applicants and provides guidance on how to report any
violations. Recruiters are directed to discuss and train Delayed Entry
Program (DEP) recruits on expectations.
In addition, each applicant views a video discussing professional
relationships--what is professional and unprofessional, as well as
expectations of recruits as Air Force members and what they can expect
from their recruiter and the recruiting process. By defining what is
and is not acceptable, the applicant knows what is expected and what is
expected of the recruiter. This enhances the Rights/Responsibilities
card--if the recruit notices unacceptable behavior, he/she can then act
on it by contacting local Air Force leadership or the contacts listed
on the card.
Each recruit has the opportunity to discuss potential misconduct
when they visit the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for the
first time. Here, away from his/her recruiter, our MEPS liaison
completes a survey with each recruit and asks if there were any
instances of misconduct or action/words that made the recruit
uncomfortable. If so, leadership addresses the concerns with the
recruit and investigates allegations further to determine if additional
action is necessary.
Applicants will also receive periodic briefings from supervisors
and squadron leadership during their time in the DEP. These briefings
will further emphasize rights, roles, and responsibilities of all
members as well as ways to report suspected or actual cases.
The survey process completed with the MEPS liaison in the
recruiting process is repeated both in basic military training (BMT)
and technical training. Essentially the survey becomes a cradle to
grave document within the accessions and training continuum.

DEFENSE SEXUAL ASSAULT INCIDENT DATABASE

114. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, DOD has told us they have
achieved full-deployment of the congressionally-mandated Defense Sexual
Assault Incident Database (DSAID). Is the Air Force providing data to
populate the database?
Mr. Donley. Yes, the Air Force was the first Service to implement
the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID) to streamline data
collection efforts and reporting.

115. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, specifically, what
information is this database providing Air Force leadership concerning
sexual assault incidents?
Mr. Donley. Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID) is a
centralized, case-level database for the uniform collection of DOD
Military Service data regarding incidents of sexual assaults involving
persons covered by Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6495.02.
DSAID includes information when not limited by Restricted Reporting, or
otherwise prohibited by law, about the nature of the assault, the
victim, the offender, and the disposition of reports associated with
the assault. DSAID is available to the Sexual Assault and Response
Office and the DOD to develop and implement congressional reporting
requirements. Unless authorized by law, or needed for internal DOD
review or analysis, disclosure of data stored in DSAID is only granted
when disclosure is ordered by a military, Federal, or State judge or
other officials or entities as required by a law or applicable U.S.
international agreement. DSAID is a valuable tool that Air Force
leaders can utilize to identify the extent and trends of reported cases
either at their location or the Air Force as a whole. It helps leaders
to plan strategies for combatting sexual assault.
DSAID includes the capability for entering records and interfacing
data; generating predefined and ad hoc reports; and conducting case and
business management. Specifically, the system is a warehouse of sexual
assault case information; has the ability to run queries and reports;
provides the SARC with the capability to interface and manage case-
level data; includes victim, subject, and case outcomes in connection
with the assault; and allows for SAPR Program Administration and
Management.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

116. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, before
this committee, DOD witnesses described the recently revised DOD-wide
policy on Sexual Assault Program to standardize prevention, health
care, victim safety, training, and response efforts, and to clearly
convey the role of servicemembers and employees in sexual assault
prevention and recovery. This committee is concerned that medical care
providers were not fully aware of their obligations concerning
restricted reports, including the obligation to withhold disclosure to
the chain of command. What actions have been taken to ensure
standardization with response to protecting the sanctity of restricted
reports?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. DOD and the Air Force have
established policy concerning restricted reporting cases as detailed in
DODI 6495.02 and AFI 36-6001. Sexual assault policy pertaining to
medical care is listed in AFI 44-102. If a victim first reports to a
medical provider without having consulted with a SARC, the victim is
referred to the SARC, after completion of immediate medical care, to
ensure the victim is advised of all reporting options. Sometimes, the
SARC is able to report to the medical facility to advise the victim of
reporting options. If the victim elects restricted reporting then Air
Force medical personnel do not report the assault to command
authorities and documentation of the medical assessment is flagged to
prevent unauthorized release. Although some local jurisdictions require
medical personnel to report certain crimes to local law enforcement,
the Air Force respects the choices of our victims and does not pursue a
military criminal investigation for those victims who elected
restricting reporting. If the victim elects to file an unrestricted
report, then the SARC, victim, and medical providers as a team ensure
that the victim reports to the Office of Special Investigations and/or
his/her chain of command.

117. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what
additional challenges do you see in attaining the required level of
standardization?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. To attain a level of standardization
we first need to clearly identify the root causes of sexual assault and
ensure our airmen understand what behavior is acceptable and what is
not. Once we have a firm grasp on those two issues we must establish a
standardized SAPR training and education program throughout the Air
Force. This is necessary to affect the positive cultural change we are
striving to achieve. This training and education program should be
firmly ingrained throughout the life cycle of our airmen, starting at
basic military training and officer accession training programs through
technical training and senior officer and NCO schools. A key element
throughout the life cycle of training is combining the understanding of
what is acceptable and what is not with the need to internalize and
live by our Air Force core values. Our new SAPR office under the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force and led by Major General Maggie
Woodward provides us the means to attain the proper level of
standardization. The new SAPR office includes functional experts across
the SAPR spectrum. Their expertise and the assistance we are receiving
from subject matter experts from the civilian sector will help us take
our Air Force SAPR program to the next level.

118. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what
additional tools does the Air Force need in order to continue to
reduce--with the goal of eliminating--sexual assault?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. We appreciate your continued support
for our ongoing efforts, with the understanding that results will not
be immediately apparent. Over the past year, we have taken great
strides to improve our prevention and response program through the
development of numerous initiatives and tools. We enhanced our
education and training programs, implemented a Special Victims Council
(SVC) pilot program to assist victims, brought on additional SARCs to
assist victims and developed a specialized Judge Advocate/Office of
Special Investigations training course designed to train Special
Victims investigators and prosecutors for sexual assault offenses.
Additionally, we expanded the Leaders Toolkit on the Air Force
Personnel Center SAPR website and created a new Chief of Staff of the
Air Force and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force video for our
airmen.
Furthermore, we recently stood up the Air Force's new SAPR
directorate aligned directly under the Vice Chief of the Air Force and
led by a Major General. This new SAPR office will grow the old four
person office to over 30 functional experts across the SAPR spectrum.
This office's mandate is to develop a comprehensive multi-pronged
campaign plan to combat sexual assault and harassment in our force.
Once this office has progressed in its analysis of root causes, trends,
and prevention strategies the Air Force will engage with your office
and other key members of Congress on our planned way ahead and
additional tools we may need.

119. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, some have suggested that it
would be appropriate to incorporate standardized assessments of
commanders' performance in prevention, investigation, accountability,
advocacy, and assessment of sexual assault response and prevention
lines of effort. What is your assessment of the feasibility of
implementing commanders' performance in service-specific performance
appraisals?
General Welsh. DOD is currently evaluating the methods used to
assess the performance of military commanders for establishing command
climates of dignity and respect and incorporating SAPR into their
commands to ensure standardization across the Services.

120. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, the annual report on sexual
assault at the Service Academies revealed that many people who enter
the armed services have experienced and reported sexual assault or
unwanted sexual contact that occurred before they entered the Service
Academies or the armed services. What could the Air Force be doing to
improve support to men and women in the accession process, to identify
whether individuals have experienced sexual assault?
Mr. Donley. In both officer and enlisted accession processes we
identify our definition of sexual assault, provide a description of our
prevention and response program, and allow the recruits to speak with
SARCs should they have any concerns or questions. We have hired
additional SARCs/Victim Advocates at some bases due to increased
workload driven by training requirements and caseload due to more
reporting. Additionally, we are creating a voluntary course focused on
prevention for those with prior victimization that includes coping
methods and skills.

COMMAND CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS

121. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what
percentage of your commands conduct command climate assessments?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. All Air Force units have the
opportunity and are encouraged to conduct climate assessments by the
Equal Opportunity (EO) Office. EO Offices, on behalf of the commander,
administer Unit Climate Assessments (UCA) on organizations that have 50
or more personnel (both military and civilian combined). For those
organizations with less than 50 members, commanders are not afforded
the Unit Climate Assessment; however, they are able to utilize other
forms of EO climate assessment such as out and abouts, focus groups,
and interviews. In addition, the Defense Equal Opportunity Climate
Survey (DEOCS) is available through the Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute (DEOMI) to gauge the climate of the organization.
The difference between the UCA and the DEOCS is that contractors are
permitted to be survey participants in the DEOCS.
The UCA is required every 2 years or upon commander's request. With
the passage of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, the new requirements
necessitate annual climate assessments and they must be completed
within 120 days upon assumption of command. The Air Force is currently
revising Air Force regulations to reflect the new requirements.

122. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what is
the Air Force doing to improve the regularity of command climate
assessments?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The overall Air Force climate
assessment is conducted annually. Current regulatory guidelines require
units to conduct climate assessments in units once every 2 years and
upon request by a commander. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 has a
requirement to conduct a climate assessment annually and within 120
days upon assumption of command by a new commander.
The Air Force is considering several courses of action on how to
increase the regularity of command climate assessments with existing
resources, including increasing the use of focus group interviews and
various other survey assessments.

123. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, what are
you doing to evaluate the results of the command climate assessments to
ensure necessary follow-up action?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force Climate Survey is
conducted biennially and the results are out-briefed to the Secretary
of the Air Force and released to the units. Commanders with ten or more
respondents are provided survey results along with a guide developed by
behavioral scientists from the Air Force Personnel Center, Directorate
of Manpower containing specific recommendations and lists of resources
to improve their unit climate. Leaders that use previous survey results
to make improvements with the organization have yielded higher levels
of agreement in all areas.
In addition to the Air Force Climate Survey, the Air Force has
Equal Opportunity (EO) subject matter experts that conduct Unit Climate
Assessments (UCA), analyze the results, and provide an out-brief to
unit commanders. During the out-brief, EO professionals discuss
recommendations and strategies for problem resolution and offer follow-
up services to help resolve EO or managerial related problems. With the
passage of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, UCAs will be conducted
annually, rather than biennially, and within 120 days upon assumption
of command.

FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

124. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, what is your assessment of
the performance of the Air Force Federal Voting Assistance Program
(FVAP)?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force FVAP is a successful program within the
department at all levels of command. In 2012, the Air Force Major
Command (MAJCOM) inspection teams reviewed 134 Voting Assistance
Programs at squadron, group, wing and command levels with just 12
discrepancies reported. All discrepancies were classified as ``minor
deficiencies'' by the SAF/IG. As a result, the Air Force is confident
we have an effective FVAP in place and military members have the
resources to exercise their right to vote.

125. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, what Air Force-specific
initiatives have you implemented to improve compliance with FVAP and to
maximize the opportunity for servicemembers to exercise their right to
vote?
Mr. Donley. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Voting Assistance Program
initiated several initiatives to improve compliance with FVAP and Title
42, U.S.C.

1. The USAF made a change to Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD)
36-31 which effects the requirement for an Installation Voting
Assistance Office (IVAO) in the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment
(MOVE) Act, establishing the office as a voter registration agency
within the installation headquarters organization reporting directly to
the installation commander
2. USAF moved ahead quickly with changes to the AF Voting Action
Plan in December of 2009, implementing various requirements of the MOVE
Act prior to OSD and FVAP releasing any guidance (i.e., service
requirements for moving members and deployers immediately implemented).
3. USAF implemented the ``Core Unit Voting Assistance Officer
(UVAO)'' position which is authorized by the installation commander's
appointment letter for the IVAO. IVAO are given the authority to
appoint up to four Core UVAOs to assist in the manning and workload of
the IVAO, which remains an unfunded mandate to date. Special training
is required for IVAO and Core UVAO positions.
4. USAF produced an ``IVAO Handbook'' supplement to the ``FVAP
IVAO Handbook'' on 30 Aug 2010. To date, seven versions have been
published. In May 2013, the Handbook contents are being incorporated
into the AF Voting Action Plan so that IVAOs and other IVA Office
workers have a single document for the execution of the AF Voting
Assistance Program.
5. USAF established an effective communication dissemination
system from Service Voting Action Officer (SVAO) to IVAO to UVAO to all
Squadron members and their voting age family members. Any voting news
items generated by FVAP were immediately passed on to voters through
this streamlined network.
6. USAF IVAOs are required to be clearly marked and advertised on
base, giving voters a visible office; and UVAOs were not forgotten. 85
percent of voting assistance during the past quarter was done at the
unit level by UVAOs.
7. USAF SVAO scripted a Public Service Announcement which the
USAF Chief of Staff released in January 2012, encouraging military
members, DOD civilians and their families to vote.
8. USAF SVAO implemented a new Staff Assistance Visit
(inspection) requirement for IVAOs to perform on all assigned UVAOs
between Feb and March of every even-numbered year.
9. IVAOs are instructed to partner with military and civilian
personnel offices to have the IVAO included on in/out-processing
checklists for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and deployment
processing as well as for address changes.
10. USAF maintains an online website that allows IVAOs and UVAOs
to access all current documents and guidance; search for and submit
``best practice'' documents; and communicate via the forum.
11. USAF IVAOs are encouraged to work with local election
officials (LEOs) during biannual Armed Forces Voters Week and Absentee
Voters Week events to invite the LEOs on base to assist in the booth
for local voters.
12. USAF IVAOs are provided an intuitive, stand-alone, forms-based
``IVAO's Database'' for easy management of UVAO manning and training
requirements as well as documenting UVAO ``due-outs'' (tasks), voters
week plans and after action reports. Reports are generated at the push
of a single button.
13. The USAF Voting Action Plan provides IVAOs and UVAOs multiple
tools to use in the execution of their voting assistance duties. These
include instructions for ordering forms, posters, and banners online at
no cost to their units; template voting assistance information forms;
and a biannual chronological sequence of events.
14. Various other measures were taken following the passing of the
MOVE Act: (a) IVAO voicemail and email is answered within 48 hours (24
hours if within 60 days of a Federal election); and (b) USAF SVAO
hosted a webinar to train IVAOs on establishing and running IVA Offices
(three webinars done to ensure time zones around the world were
supported).

OPERATIONAL TEMPO OVERSIGHT

126. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, what is your assessment of
the Air Force's operational tempo (OPTEMPO) reporting, and how well are
we meeting our OPTEMPO requirements to reduce stress on our
servicemembers and their families?
Mr. Donley. OPTEMPO for an individual away from home on an
operational deployment is managed by unit commanders and tracked
through the individual's electronic personnel records. In turn, this
information is transferred to the Defense Manpower Data Center in
accordance with DODI 1336.07, Reporting of Personnel tempo events. We
believe this process provides an accurate record for reporting.
Due to the number of operations and locations the Air Force is
currently supporting, we have not seen a significant reduction in
requirements. We are, however, working closely with Air Force component
staffs to reduce deployed footprint and leverage reach back capability.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE TRAINING

127. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, military members with
language and culture training are essential to a U.S. global force. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 authorized the Secretary of Defense to
transform the National Language Service Corps (NLSC) from a pilot
program to a permanent program, and also to enhance the ability of our
Federal agencies to hire people with strategic foreign language skills
and as National Security Education Program (NSEP) awardees. What are
the goals of the Air Force with respect to the capabilities represented
by the NLSC?
Mr. Donley. The purpose of the NLSC is to have a pool of language-
capable individuals available to support sudden and short-term
requirements. The NLSC construct is not currently used to support the
type of exercises and operations conducted by the Air Force. Rather,
the Air Force meets its language needs by deliberately developing
individuals to meet its requirements. The Air Force intends to
encourage separating and retiring airmen who have existing language
skills to join the NLSC.

MARKETING AND ADVERTISING

128. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, one effect of sequestration
was that the Services quickly moved to end advertising, marketing, and
outreach programs that have been used to aid in recruiting. What is
your assessment of the value of funding these programs, and the
projected impact to recruiting if these programs are not funded?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force advertising, marketing and outreach
programs are a critical component to our mission--to attract the best
and brightest youth of America. Reduced funding for these programs will
jeopardize the Air Force's ability to meet career field and DOD quality
requirements. Even though the Air Force has greatly benefited from
historic highs in the quality of accessions in recent years, initial
indicators are signaling a potential shrinking market for high quality
recruits per Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies ``State of
the Recruiting Market,'' briefing April 2013. That same study indicates
that 47 percent of new recruits were undecided about a career path and
were influenced within a year of joining the Service. The Air Force
must continue to strategically advertise, market, and maintain outreach
programs to target the highest quality recruits and to convert
applicants that are less likely to serve.

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

129. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, DOD and VA have been working
on an integrated electronic health record (EHR) for a number of years
with very little progress being made towards a truly seamless
transition of health information between the two Departments. In
January 2013, VA decided to use VistA, its legacy system, as its core
health record despite the findings of a recent study commissioned by
the VA that identified many VistA deficiencies. We've been told that
DOD has been evaluating existing solutions to determine the appropriate
core health record to use. Has DOD coordinated its proposed EHR program
with the Air Force?
Mr. Donley. We fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to
proceed with a Request for Proposals for a core Electronic Health
Record for DOD that will enable full interoperability between DOD and
VA health care. The Air Force Surgeon General's Chief Medical
Information Officer has been involved in the AOA between VistA and
other commercial electronic health records. Additionally, the Air Force
Deputy Surgeon General has been a regular participant in DOD and
Veterans' Affairs meetings regarding validation of requirements and
evaluation of solutions. The Surgeon General has kept me appropriately
updated.

130. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, how much will it cost for
the Air Force to field a new EHR?
Mr. Donley. DOD's electronic health record cost estimates must be
redetermined under the acquisition strategy directed by the Secretary
of Defense. Prior cost estimates were based on a previous DOD and
Veteran' Affairs' strategy that was determined by both Departments to
be infeasible.

131. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, what impact do you
anticipate for Air Force medical readiness?
Mr. Donley. With a new electronic health record, data and
documentation pertaining to individual medical readiness will be better
integrated into clinical processes, enhancing our ability to provide
timely health measures to sustain readiness, forecast deterioration in
health status earlier, and proactively restore the health of the
servicemembers under our care.

132. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, do you believe the EHR must
be deployable?
Mr. Donley. In the initial capability document approved by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the electronic health record
should be deployable in Theater and support the mobility requirements
for enroute care. The solution would eliminate the need for three
separate theater electronic health record solutions and enhance
continuity of care, even in ``low-communication/no-communication''
environments.

133. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, what input has the Air Force
had on the EHR program?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force Surgeon General's Chief Medical
Information Officer has been involved in the AOA between VistA and
other commercial electronic health records. Additionally, the Air Force
Deputy Surgeon General has been a regular participant in DOD and
Veterans' Affairs meetings regarding validation of requirements and
evaluation of solutions. The Air Force Medical Service and Air Force
Communications communities have provided more than 100 clinical subject
matter experts for the functional and technical requirements process.

BENEFITS FOR SAME-SEX PARTNERS

134. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, recently, former Secretary
of Defense Panetta announced that DOD will expand benefits to unmarried
same-sex domestic partners who declare a committed relationship, but
will not extend those same benefits to unmarried heterosexual domestic
partners. Do you agree with former Secretary Panetta that when it comes
to benefits paid for by hard-working American taxpayers, that DOD
should favor same-sex domestic partners over heterosexual partners?
Mr. Donley. As a result of the June 26, 2013 Supreme Court ruling
on the Defense of Marriage Act, the Air Force is working with OSD to
extend health care and other benefits to same-sex spouses of military
members as quickly as possible.

135. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, was the Air Force consulted
to determine the cost impact of extending these benefits to same sex
partners?
Mr. Donley. Benefit subject-matter experts were consulted during
the OSD-led Joint Benefits Review working group. The Air Force provided
input via this working group and various other senior leader briefings
and discussions leading up to the announcement of benefits extension.
From a fiscal perspective, the benefits that are being extended are of
negligible cost. Some are cost neutral and self-sustaining such as
Morale, Welfare and Recreation Programs, and commissary and exchange
privileges.

TOTAL FORCE MIX

136. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, in his hearing testimony,
General Dempsey said that DOD needs flexibility to keep the force in
balance and, that everything must be on the table, including the mix
among Active, Reserve, and National Guard units. In view of the heavy
wartime demand on the forces, including the Reserve and Guard, what do
you envision as a viable option to change that force mix for the Air
Force?
General Welsh. For the Total Force Air Force, numerous options are
on the table. To preserve the capability and capacity to win our
Nation's wars, enhance readiness, and modernize our warfighting
capability, the Air Force must have the flexibility to balance between
all three components--Active, Guard, and Reserve. In today's fiscal
environment, this is a daunting challenge, and the leaders of all three
components are fully engaged to meet this challenge.
All three components are working diligently to appropriately size
the Total Force Air Force mix to meet the demands of the Defense
Strategic Guidance, geopolitical environment, and combatant commander
requirements. The Air Force uses Force Composition Analysis (FCA) to
provide senior leaders a range of force mix options, providing insight
into the optimum active component/reserve component (AC/RC) mixes for
various scenarios. FCAs are an enterprise-level analysis of a given
weapon system or career field. These FCAs examine mission feasibility
across a range of force mix options, based upon the associated outputs,
costs, benefits and risks. The force mix in a specific mission area
normally favors the AC when: (1) deployment must occur rapidly, or in a
very short period of time, (2) steady-state demand requires rotational
forces exceeding current policy, or (3) permanent (non-rotational)
overseas presence is high. On the other hand, the force mix in a
specific mission area normally favors the RC when: (1) deployments
occur at a pace that allows the RC time to mobilize the force (normally
72 hours after notification), (2) anticipated steady-state and/or
forward presence requirements do not exceed deploy-to-dwell policy, or
(3) cost savings and retaining capability/capacity are sought by moving
force structure to the RC.

MILITARY COMPENSATION

137. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, our Nation's historical
experience of pursuing cost savings by cutting military compensation
has demonstrated that periods of designed reduction in overall
compensation levels resulted in retention problems. Those retention
problems, especially in the context of generally improving civilian
employment opportunities, meant Congress was required to come back and
authorize catch-up increases to help us keep the highly trained talents
and skills that we need. What is your assessment of the impact of the
President's proposed slowdown in military compensation on retention and
recruiting in your Service?
Mr. Donley. At this time, the Air Force does not foresee
significant challenges to our recruiting and retention efforts as a
result of the proposed slowdown in military compensation. Our Force
Management program is a tailored multi-year strategy focused on sizing
and shaping the total force with the right balance of skills to meet
current and emerging joint mission demands. The Air Force's strategy
over the past few years has been aggressive, allowing us to meet
congressionally mandated end strength requirements and maintain a high
quality force by leveraging voluntary programs first, offering
incentive programs where needed, and implementing involuntary actions
when required. Due to the expected improvements in the economy and the
importance our airmen place on overall compensation, our recruiting and
retention will be increasingly challenged, particularly as the Air
Force addresses the need for its highly technically-skilled force.
These compensation challenges may require increased recruiting and
retention incentives for our future force.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

138. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, General Dempsey testified
that unsustainable costs and smaller budgets require DOD to examine
every warrior and family support program to make sure we are getting
the best return on our investment. How do you assess the investments
our Nation has already made in family support programs, and suicide
prevention in particular, in moving the needle with demonstrable
positive return on investment?
Mr. Donley. We have multiple forums that enable us to monitor the
delivery of family support programs. Within our Airman and Family
Readiness Centers, we have a very robust computer management system
that provides us with real time data for our supported populations-
service codes are used to record the type of support sought (e.g.,
financial management) and the system allows the provider to make
notations of the visits. Additionally, the Air Force conducts biennial
Community Assessments, through the Air Force Surgeon General, that
provide valuable data on our ability to meet individual needs, and also
collects information regarding behaviors that may place an individual
at risk. Further, the Air Force Community Action Information Board
(CAIB), convened at the installations, major commands, and Headquarters
Air Force, identifies community issues to emphasize the importance of
taking care of airmen and their families. Since 1996, the CAIB process
has focused extensively on monitoring, managing, and implementing
suicide prevention best practices for use by commanders. Additionally,
the CAIB provides detailed actions and discussions on sexual assault
prevention, child and family maltreatment issues, and resilience. A
significant outcome from the CAIB process has been the development and
implementation of the Comprehensive Airman Fitness concept that
concentrates exclusively on developing our airmen and families to
become more resilient and better prepared to meet the unique challenges
of military service.

TUITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

139. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley, I am pleased to learn that
DOD has now reinstated the TAP, previously cancelled by the Army,
Marine Corps, and Air Force, in response to the administration's
failure to plan for sequestration. How does TAP enable your Active Duty
Forces to meet the professional development requirements described by
General Dempsey to establish the Profession of Arms as the foundation
for the Joint Force?
Mr. Donley. Military tuition assistance provides the financial
means for our airmen to pursue higher education. In turn, higher
education provides the educational background crucial in developing the
critical thinking skills needed for practitioners of the profession of
arms. This means our airmen are more able to work in the dynamic
climate of today's conflicts. Additionally, higher education allows
airmen to develop the critical ability to make connections between
seemingly unrelated events or information and develop holistic
solutions quickly and accurately. Military tuition assistance will
continue to be integral to the recruiting, retention and readiness of
our airmen. However, competing funding requirements will necessitate
changes in fiscal year 2014 and beyond to ensure the financial health
of the program.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

140. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, our force
is exceptionally well-trained on suicide awareness and prevention, and
yet we still experience the tragedy of suicide at an unacceptably high
rate. What is your assessment on whether the current level of training
and leadership engagement is sufficient or whether it has inadvertently
created a climate in which some vulnerable individuals may have
contemplated suicide because we talk about it so much?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The current level of training on
suicide prevention and leadership engagement in the Air Force is
appropriate and the Air Force has been proactive in managing its
messages regarding suicide.
The Air Force has maintained emphasis in training and messaging on
elements of resilience and the importance of seeking help early. Our
leadership training cautions against dramatizing suicide. The AF
Suicide Prevention program (AFSPP) is an effective evidenced-based,
leader-led, community program that relies on 11 overlapping elements.
The core of these elements is leadership involvement.
Enhancements were made to the AFSPP as part of the Air Force
response to the 2010 Suicide Task Force and the RAND reports. One of
the most critical enhancements was the development of a strategic
communication plan to promote responsible reporting of deaths by
suicide, encouraging help-seeking behaviors among all airmen, and
removing barriers to seeking care. This was done to ensure that in our
efforts to prevent suicide, the Air Force was not inadvertently
promoting suicide. The culmination of these efforts was the development
of the Air Force Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Suicide Prevention
that is consistent with the World Health Organization media guidelines
and the OSD Public Affairs media guidance. The Air Force also supports
the joint VA/DOD Military Crisis line campaign.
In addition, the Air Force has ensured that this message
emphasizing the importance of seeking help early is reflected in
suicide prevention training courses and has worked hard to balance the
amount of suicide prevention training. Current training includes annual
suicide prevention training for all airmen, focusing on identifying
risk factors and warning signs how to intervene using the Ask, Care,
Escort (ACE) model. Supervisors of personnel in at-risk career fields
receive a one-time 4-hour training session to supplement their
supervisory skills with knowledge of resources and referral procedures.
Leaders receive training within professional military education courses
with suicide prevention messaging and information appropriate to their
level of responsibility. As a result, we have achieved a balance that
ensures leadership is engaged and all airmen understand their
responsibility to look out for one another, identify warning signs, and
seek help.

C-27 TRANSFER

141. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, what is the status of the
transfer of 25 C-27 aircraft currently possessed by the Air Force?
General Welsh. The Air Force has purchased 21 C-27J aircraft, of
which we currently possess 16. The remaining five aircraft are in
various stages of production, all anticipated to be delivered to the
Air Force by the end of calendar year 2013.
Currently, DOD is determining: (1) the number of C-27Js that are
excess to DOD needs, and (2) the appropriate transfer priorities, in
light of existing DOD policy regarding the disposition of excess
defense materiel and the fiscal year 2013 Appropriations and
Authorization Act requirements. Interested agencies will be notified
this summer regarding allocation plans. In the end, the Air Force
intends to transfer these aircraft to a new owner(s), or induct them
into long-term storage at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration
Group G) by the end of this fiscal year.

142. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, is the Air Force factoring in
the gaining agency's ability to operate and sustain the aircraft as
part of its transfer decision criteria?
General Welsh. No, the excess aircraft disposition procedures
outlined in the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual (DOD 4160.21M
Chapter 4) do not contain such criteria. Transfer is based on the
priority for allocation of the requesting agency. The Air Force has
shared with the agencies who have expressed interest in receiving C-27J
aircraft our historical operations and sustainment costs in order to
help them build their transitions plans to accept aircraft. The Air
Force will coordinate the transfer of C-27J aircraft with each gaining
organization, but the ability to operate and sustain the aircraft,
post-transfer, is the concern of the gaining organizations.

143. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, is the Air Force considering
transferring all 25 C-27s to one agency to minimize cost of operating
and maintaining these aircraft?
General Welsh. The Air Force has purchased 21 C-27J aircraft, not
25. Excess aircraft disposition procedures outlined in the Defense
Materiel Disposition Manual (DOD 4160.21M Chapter 4) do not contain
such criteria. Transfer is based solely on the priority for allocation
of the requesting agency. Aircraft may be transferred to other agencies
after the Secretary of Defense declares them excess to DOD needs.
Section 1091 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 outlines the parameters
for these transfers to include the number of aircraft a non-DOD
organization (in this case, U.S. Forest Service and U.S. Coast Guard,
with first priority given to the Forest Service) can receive.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

C-27J

144. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, as the Air Force implements
the C-27J divestiture, what is the current status of the screening
procedure outlined in DOD 4160.21-M, Defense Material Disposition
Manual, as amended by section 1091 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013?
Mr. Donley. Currently DOD is determining the number of aircraft
that are excess to its needs and the appropriate transfer priorities in
light of existing DOD policy regarding the disposition of excess
defense materiel and the fiscal year 2013 Appropriations and
Authorization Acts. Interested agencies will be notified this summer
regarding allocation plans.

145. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, have any C-27J been
identified for allocation to: (1) another military Service; (2) another
DOD agency; (3) the Forest Service; (4) the U.S. Coast Guard; (5)
Federal/State law enforcement (per the NDAA for fiscal year 1997,
section 1033); (6) security assistance needs; or (7) other Federal
civil agencies through the General Services Administration?
Mr. Donley. No, not yet. Currently DOD is determining the number of
aircraft that are excess to its needs and the appropriate transfer
priorities in light of existing DOD policy regarding the disposition of
excess defense materiel and the fiscal year 2013 Appropriations and
Authorization Acts. Interested agencies will be notified this summer
regarding allocation plans.

146. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, what number of aircraft has
been requested by the Forest Service or the Coast Guard at this time?
Mr. Donley. The Secretary of Agriculture has requested seven
aircraft for the U.S. Forest Service. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has requested 21 aircraft for the Coast Guard, but will accept
no fewer than 14 aircraft. The Coast Guard has stated that their
analysis shows that they need a minimum of 14 aircraft to make a C-27J
program cost-effective.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

GLOBAL HAWK SYSTEM

147. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, how much money has been
invested in sustaining and modernizing the U-2 fleet over the past 5
years? Please include all sources of funding, including appropriations
and reprogramming, both above and below threshold.
General Welsh. The investment in sustaining and modernizing the U-2
fleet over the last 5 years is in the table below:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 5 Years
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Costs (No Mods) BY..................................... $513,546,387 $543,238,188 $513,804,668 $534,965,623 $555,256,038 $2,660,810,904
Mod Cost......................................................... 31,192,000 61,360,000 34,452,000 138,340,000 61,257,801 326,601,801
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational cost w/ Mods......................................... $544,738,387 $604,598,188 $548,256,668 $673,305,623 $616,513,839 $2,987,412,705
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

$57.4 million in fiscal year 2011 procurement was invested for
capability enhancements supporting combatant commander urgent
operational needs, not modernization costs incurred fixing aging
equipment, or solving diminishing manufacturing sources and vanishing
vendor item issues.

148. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, how much funding is needed to
support the U-2 until 2040? Please include all anticipated sustainment
and modernization costs. Please include all costs, including pilot
training, special pilot food, special food development, chase cars,
aircraft upgrades, infrastructure improvements, etc.
General Welsh. Total U-2 funding for the next 27 years (2040) is
approximately $16 billion, or about $600 million per year in today's
dollars.

149. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, if the Global Hawk could carry
every sensor carried by the U-2, would there be a need to retain the U-
2?
General Welsh. Yes. The Air Force's assessment of U-2 sensor
superiority is based on a number of factors. The U-2 aircraft maintains
a substantial advantage in size, weight, and power, allowing for
heavier payloads and more electrical power to enable a wider range of
mission systems. Additionally, the U-2's operational altitude extends
the maximum range of its imagery and signals intelligence sensors
beyond the Global Hawk, enabling the U-2 to operate at increased
standoff range. Finally, the U-2's highly capable defensive system and
anti-jam data links permit the U-2 to operate more effectively in
contested environments, which are increasingly prevalent in potential
combat theaters.
A review of current Global Hawk Block 30 performance highlights the
impact of previously assessed limitations. The Global Hawk does not
have an effective capability to operate in areas of known or forecast
thunderstorms or icing conditions, resulting in significant mission
impact. Further, the lack of an effective capability to sense and avoid
air traffic continues to drive a requirement to mitigate risk by
employing other airborne assets in an overwatch role in selected AORs.
The Air Force's decision to retain the U-2 also considers future
applications consistent with Defense Strategic Guidance. Operations in
contested environments require ISR weapon systems able to stand off at
greater distances from contested boundaries and yet still collect
against targets well inside the adversary's border. This mission
demands ISR platforms with defensive systems to maintain an effective
presence as tensions rise and then protect the aircraft from attempts
to disrupt or defeat navigation systems and data links. In our
assessment, a technical solution allowing U-2 sensors to be carried by
Global Hawk still does not resolve the capability gap between platforms
and thus the Air Force's intent is to retain the U-2.

150. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, how much funding could be saved
over the next 20 years by retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2014?
General Welsh. Air Force long-range plans provide approximately $13
billion funding for U-2 sustainment and operations over the next 20
years. However, divesting the U-2 in 2014 would create a significant
operational and sensor capability gap. Transitioning those capabilities
to another platform would require significant additional investment and
time. In fact, no other current platform can match the altitude and
weather capabilities of the U-2. In the current resource environment,
continued investment in RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 operations is
unaffordable given the lower total cost and proven sensor capabilities
of the U-2 fleet. The most economical choice is represented in the
President's fiscal year 2014 budget.

151. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, please provide the average age
and remaining service life of the Global Hawk fleet and the U-2 fleet.
General Welsh. The average age of the Global Hawk fleet is 2.7
years. The best means to measure service life is in flight hours. The
flight hour average of the Global Hawk fleet is 1,193 hours. The
certified service life for Global Hawk is 40,000 flight hours. The
fleet average of 1,193 represents 3 percent of certified service life.
The average age of the U-2 fleet is 31 years. The flight hour
average of the U-2 fleet is 12,677 hours. The certified service life
for the U-2 is 75,000 flight hours. The fleet average of 12,677 hours
represents 16.9 percent of certified service life.

152. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, please provide the: (1) total
number of U-2 aircraft; (2) number of deployable U-2 aircraft; (3)
number of currently deployed U-2 aircraft; (4) number of U-2 aircraft
dedicated solely for training; and (5) type and number of all U-2
sensors and their current locations.
General Welsh. (1) There are a total of 32 U-2 aircraft; (2) number
of deployable aircraft is 27 U-2 model aircraft with three U-2s in
depot at any given point in time; (3) there are 12 U-2 model aircraft
currently deployed; (4) we have five two-seat TU-2 trainers dedicated
solely for training; and (5) the types and numbers of U-2 sensors are
classified and will be provided under separate cover (and will include
locations).

153. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, please provide the cost of an
hour on station (over target, collecting data, not training or
transiting) for both the Global Hawk and the U-2 aircraft. Please
consider all costs for both systems.
General Welsh. The fiscal year 2012 (last full year) cost per hour
on-station (over target, collecting data, not training) or transiting
for Global Hawk is $68,234. The on-station cost for U-2 is $73,206.
Because the two systems have been operated in different ways, these
comparisons depend on multiple complex assumptions and will vary from
year to year.

154. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, please provide a thorough
accounting of all missions flown by the Global Hawk fleet over the past
24 months, including hours flown, types of missions, quantification of
data collected (type and quantity of intelligence data), and locations
of operations. Please provide similar data for the U-2 fleet. A
classified response is acceptable, but please provide an unclassified
overview as well.
General Welsh. Due to the sensitive nature of the missions and
complexity of the data requested we would be unable to provide an
unclassified overview. We will provide information that addresses the
request within 60 days.

155. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, how much has been invested in
the Global Hawk enterprise to date? How much specifically for the
Blocks 20, 30, and 40 aircraft?
General Welsh. The total baseline funding for the Global Hawk
program through fiscal year 2013 is $10,733.5 million. The $10,733.5
million is broken down as: Research Development Test & Evaluation:
$3,257.1 million; Procurement, $5,116.4 million; Military Personnel,
$482.8 million; Military Construction, $122.9 million; and Operations
and Maintenance: $1,754.2 million. Funding cannot be broken out by
specific Blocks. Funding is based on the December 31, 2012 RQ-4, Global
Hawk Selected Acquisition Report. The funding for RDT&E does not
include MP-RTIP and Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) costs, nor does it
include fiscal year 2013 President's budget congressional adds,
rescissions, and sequestration reductions.

156. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, the Air Force Global Hawk is
planned to be based jointly with the Navy Triton program. Presumably
basing costs will be shared between both systems. Please provide an
accounting for how basing costs are distributed between these systems
and what costs would be shifted to the Navy program if the Air Force
program were to go away.
General Welsh. The Navy elected to base the MQ-4C Triton at Point
Mugu Naval Air Station, California. The change in strategy was based on
the fiscal year 2013 President's budget proposal to divest the Global
Hawk (GH) Block 30 fleet. Consequently, basing costs are not shared
between the two programs. However, the Navy continues to leverage
lessons learned from the GH program to incorporate system improvements
and establish a system support infrastructure. The Air Force and the
Navy will continue to develop joint synergy opportunities that will
lead to reduced operations costs over the life cycle of the GH and
Triton programs.

157. Senator Wicker. General Welsh, I understand the Global Hawk
Block 40 system will be deployed to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in
May to provide ground-moving target-indicator support to deployed
forces. I applaud the decision to deploy the Block 40 system to support
the troops and hope the deployment will demonstrate the value of this
uniquely capable system. I hope the Air Force is doing everything
necessary to ensure the deployment is well supported and postured for
success. Please provide a list of key deployment milestones and a
detailed assessment of the resources necessary to facilitate a
successful deployment.
General Welsh. The Air Force is postured to respond quickly to a
decision to deploy the Block 40 capability. Once a fielding
recommendation has been made, there are a number of factors that
CENTCOM will consider before a deployment decision is finalized. Key
pre-deployment milestones include:

Mid-July: AFOTEC delivers final operational utility
evaluation report describing the effectiveness, suitability,
and mission capability of the system to the Commander, Air
Combat Command (ACC) who will determine the final fielding
recommendation
End of July: CENTCOM provides ACC deployment decision
for Global Hawk Blk 40
Subject to Commander ACC recommendation and CENTCOM
approval, a deployment is possible within weeks

GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

158. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, I
understand you are considering a Common Support Helicopter to recap
your UH-1N fleet of aircraft. I believe there are existing and
affordable replacement systems available to meet Global Strike
Command's nuclear missile security mission during the decades to come.
Please provide the current requirements for all current UH-1N missions.
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force's UH-1N is flown by
five major commands, which include multiple mission sets: Air Force
Global Strike Command's ICBM helicopter security support, the Air Force
District of Washington's National Capital Region Mass Passenger
Transport, Pacific Air Forces' Operational Support Airlift, Air
Education and Training Command's Air Force Survival School, and Air
Force Materiel Command's flight test support.
The current requirements for the various missions of the UH-1N are
documented in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's approved
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) Capability Development
Document. Although these requirements are no longer tied to a specific
acquisition program (i.e., the CVLSP), the requirements for the UH-1N
mission set remain valid.

159. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, could you
tell me whether the Air Force requirements have been reviewed and
validated since these missions were separated from the Combat Rescue
Helicopter program?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The current requirements for the
various missions of the UH-1N are documented in the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council's approved CVLSP capability development document.
Although these requirements are no longer tied to a specific
acquisition program (i.e., the CVLSP), the requirements for the UH-1N
mission set remain valid.
Air Force Global Strike Command will continue to sustain the
existing UH-1N fleet for the foreseeable future, and look for
opportunities to acquire excess aircraft from other DOD organizations
at low or no cost to the Air Force.

160. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, please
provide the findings and recommendations of the Air Force's Request for
Information (RFI) on UH-1N modernization with regard to the costs of
UH-1N modification versus replacement cost.
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. In the case of the UH-1N, as stated
in the original Request for Information, ``in terms of mission
capability rates the UH-1 remains one of the most reliable platforms
within the U.S. Air Force inventory.'' The purpose of the Air Force's
RFI on UH-1N Modernization was to determine the feasibility of
sustaining and making modest modernization enhancements to the platform
via low cost options. The Industry Day presentations reaffirmed that
the robust helicopter industry and the large number of UH-1's operating
globally will enable the Air Force to effectively sustain the UH-1N
until such a time that it can be replaced with an aircraft that
provides all required capabilities.

161. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, please
provide the current operational availability of the UH-1N fleet and the
Air Force assessment of any risk regarding the maintenance and adequate
availability levels.
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The current UH-1N average aircraft
availability for fiscal year 2013 is 73.7 percent, meeting the Air
Force Global Strike Command-established standard of 73.7 percent. The
future aircraft availability rate is projected to continue to meet or
exceed the 73.7 percent requirement. We expect to maintain adequate
readiness levels for the foreseeable future.

162. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, please
tell me whether the Air Force has evaluated potential replacement
aircraft for any of the missions performed by the UH-1N.
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The CVLSP was cancelled due to cost
considerations in this constrained economic environment after
determination that the Air Force could assume manageable risk in this
area. Air Force Global Strike Command is no longer pursuing a Combat
Rescue Helicopter option to replace the UH-1N fleet for similar
reasons. Instead, Air Force Global Strike Command will continue to
sustain the existing UH-1N fleet for the foreseeable future, and look
for opportunities to acquire excess aircraft from other DOD
organizations at low/no cost to the Air Force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

163. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, why is the F-35 one of your top
acquisition programs?
General Welsh. It is a fundamental truth of the modern battlefield
that to win the fight, you must ``own the skies.'' This means
protecting your own forces, while also holding the adversaries dearest
targets at risk. This is a hard lesson learned during World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam, and used to our advantage in Operations Desert
Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Without it,
our troops in combat, whether in the air, on the ground, or on the
seas, are put at undue risk, and our chances of ultimately achieving
victory are diminished. ``Owning the skies'' is difficult to achieve,
and requires vigilance in maintaining this advantage through continued
investment and development in more capable aircraft, weapons and
mission systems. This is more than something simply tasked as
requirement within the Defense Planning Guidance, it is something our
joint warfighter expects from their Air Force.
Our potential adversaries know this truth as well, and continue to
seek ways to prevent us from achieving it. Applying lessons from our
previous conflicts, they are investing in advanced technology for their
planes, weapons, and air defense systems that rival our own
capabilities and in some cases surpass them. We are also faced with
operating a fighter fleet that is smaller and older than in any time in
our Services' entire history. With the threat getting more capable, and
our own fleet at its oldest and smallest, the challenges to our ability
to control the skies in any future conflict continue to grow.
This is why the F-35 is one of our top acquisition programs. We are
investing in a fifth generation fighter that ensures we field a fleet
that supports the mission essential requirement to ``own the skies.''
Fifth generation fighters like the F-35 have the capabilities needed to
achieve unmatched levels of survivability and lethality required to
maintain our air advantage against the most challenging threats. These
capabilities include improved stealth, high maneuverability, advanced
electronic attack and protection, fused sensors for enhanced
situational awareness, advanced precision weapons, and multi-role
capability. Together, they provide our airmen the best tools available
to ensure they never have to face a ``fair fight in the sky'' against
any future adversary, and will continue to own the skies in the mission
to support and protect the joint warfighter.

164. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what advantages does a fifth
generation fighter like the F-35 provide over a fourth generation
aircraft?
General Welsh. Our potential adversaries are continuing to develop
and field systems to challenge our ability to ``control the skies''. We
are seeing planes being developed and fielded that are as good as, or
better than, our legacy fleet, with improved speed and agility,
equipped with the latest and most advanced radars, avionics, and
electronic jamming, employing highly advanced and lethal air-to-air
weapons, and levels of signature reduction never seen before anywhere
outside the United States. We are seeing the proliferation worldwide of
air defense systems with advanced early warning and target tracking
radars that are digital and agile, with better protection against
jamming. These advanced air defense systems are integrated into robust
and networked command and control centers that can target and engage
unprecedented numbers of targets at greater ranges. We are also seeing
strategic and tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with increased
range, maneuverability, target tracking capability and lethality.
Ultimately, we are seeing these types of systems evolve in both
complexity and capability, being sold worldwide, and being used
together to form integrated air defense systems that challenge our air
advantage.
While our legacy fleet, such as our F-16s, secured a generation of
air advantage in previous conflicts, they now offer little margin in
capability against the current high end threat, and will be severely
challenged in future scenarios against these evolving threats. We are
at the point where our conventional legacy aircraft risk both the
forces they protect and our ability to secure victory. Our legacy fleet
is also rapidly approaching the point where adding new capabilities
will no longer guarantee success. These advanced threat environments
require signature reduction (stealth) through proper design and
materials to achieve required levels of survivability, which simply
can't be ``added on'' but must be inherently designed into the aircraft
from the beginning.
While our legacy fourth generation fleet is unable to operate and
survive in these high threat environments, they will remain a critical
part of our inventory for many years, complementing our fifth
generation fleet in reduced threat scenarios. Even these ``reduced
threat scenarios'' need to honor advanced fourth generation threats
currently being proliferated, thus requiring targeted investments to
increase their lethality and survivability. This also means the Air
Force is carefully choosing modernization efforts that maximize our
cooperative capabilities between our fourth and fifth generation fleets
in order to increase our ability to accomplish the mission.

165. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in your prepared statement, you
say that the ``Nation will need them [F-35s] in quantity.'' What is the
current Air Force requirement for the F-35?
General Welsh. The Air Force is planning to purchase 1,763 F-35As
to meet our Defense Planning Guidance directed requirements for Air
Superiority and Global Precision Attack.

166. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what influence will an
increased ramp rate in the coming years have on unit cost?
General Welsh. In general, increased production rate will lower the
unit cost of the F-35A. For the contract awarded in fiscal year 2011,
the Air Force is buying 22 F-35A aircraft at an average unit recurring
flyaway (URF) cost of $120 million. For the contract scheduled to be
awarded in fiscal year 2018, we plan to buy 60 F-35A aircraft at an
average URF cost of $85 million.

IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION/BUDGET CUTS ON AIR FORCE READINESS

167. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what are your leading readiness
concerns?
General Welsh. The Air Force is the smallest it has been since its
inception in 1947. A smaller force with less capacity requires greater
attention to ensuring fully adequate personnel levels, availability of
aircraft, and training to support the full range of mission
requirements. These factors become more critical because shortages in
aircraft availability or key personnel will have a larger effect on the
overall readiness of the force. With a smaller force, including all
Active, Guard, and Reserve elements, there is less marginal capacity to
meet operational needs. The total force must be more ready to meet
near-term contingencies, including those that may involve contested
operational environments.
Over the past decade the ability of combat air forces to accomplish
full-spectrum training has been hampered by operational commitments
focused on very specific counter-insurgency missions and air-to-ground
support. Training to establish and sustain air superiority and suppress
air defenses has understandably received less emphasis. As we rebuild
full-spectrum readiness, adding resources for more flying hours to
support training must be matched with the resources for maintenance to
ensure aircraft availability, and ranges to provide appropriate
training venues. Additionally, the Air Force's operations tempo must be
reduced to enable units sufficient time at home station to accomplish
all required training.
Critical operations and maintenance activities currently being paid
with OCO funding are especially problematic. Several funding lines for
remotely piloted aircraft and other platforms should be retained as
part of our future force, but are not yet part of our base budget.
These activities must eventually migrate from OCO funding to an
adjusted base budget. If the base budget is not adjusted, these
capabilities will need to be retired or, alternatively, if incorporated
without increasing the total budget, they will squeeze out other forces
and capabilities.
Other threats to readiness include personnel and operational costs
rising faster than the budget; savings from defense cuts not being
adequately reapplied into readiness-related activities; and the
inability to make or implement strategic choices, like reducing force
structure or installations, that would help to consolidate resources
and protect a quality force.
The Air Force must not be forced to resource some units for higher
levels of readiness than others. Air Force skepticism of this approach
is grounded in two strategic realities. First, we support several
combatant command missions that require 24/7 support, including nuclear
deterrence, various space operations such as missile warning, command,
control and communications, and global positioning system operations.
Cyber defense and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are
also 24/7 missions that provide indications and warning of critical
events and threats for our national leadership. Operational readiness
for these units is a continuous requirement.
Second, the range, speed, and striking power of air forces make
them among the most flexible, agile, and globally responsive elements
of the joint force. In support of U.S. defense strategy, air forces are
inherently capable of responding quickly and can be shifted on
relatively short notice between critical theaters of operation.
Intentionally posturing the Air Force for lower readiness and a long
build-up to full combat effectiveness would negate an essential
strategic advantage of airpower.
The Air Force must modernize its weapon systems. The average age of
our fighter aircraft is now 23 years, rescue helicopters 22 years,
training aircraft 25 years, bombers 37 years and tankers nearly 50
years. Satellites for missile warning, navigation, secure
communications and other needs are also aging and replacements must be
built and launched on a schedule consistent with the life expectancy of
current constellations.
America's Air Force is the most capable in the world, but
modernization can't wait. We have important production lines underway
and development programs now maturing that are, or will soon be, ready
for production. Cancelling programs to wait for a future generation of
technology would be wasteful and, in many cases, would risk the loss of
critical engineering talent.
America's Air Force must remain the most capable in the world; yet
it is older than it should be and the need for modernization is growing
while overall defense resources are diminishing.

168. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what does the Air Force need
most from Congress?
General Welsh. One of the most helpful things Congress can do is to
return to regular order and to approve annual defense authorization and
appropriations measures in a timely way. Throughout our history, this
Nation has effectively dealt with strategic challenges and fiscal
constraints, but our recent track record of repeated delay and
uncertainty, Continuing Resolutions that disrupt programs and budget
planning, and midyear cuts that impair readiness and threaten civilian
furloughs must not become the new normal. We sincerely appreciate the
ongoing commitment of this committee and its professional staff to
return to regular order.

169. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what have been the impacts of
sequestration and budget uncertainty on readiness and training, so far?
General Welsh. Sequestration has forced the Air Force to make
drastic reductions in readiness accounts. Flying hour reductions have
forced some combat squadrons to cease flying operations while
significantly reduced flying operations in other squadrons. The
reductions in flying operations have further eroded already
unacceptably low readiness levels.
Almost all of our mission-ready units are already tasked to
Secretary of Defense-ordered missions or forward-based, so the ability
of the Air Force to provide requisite numbers of ready forces for
emergent requirements is severely limited and will continue to become
more difficult the longer we operate under the conditions created by
sequestration. The flying hour reductions due to sequestration have
caused the Air Force to adjust unit flying rates to meet deployment
timelines and ensure global operational commitments are filled within
fiscal constraints. Additionally, flying units which provide advanced
tactical training, including all of the Air Force's Aggressor squadrons
have stood down. The Thunderbirds demonstration team was also forced to
cancel all of its shows after March 1, 2013.
The reductions in weapons system sustainment funding due to
sequestration, while not immediately felt by operational units, will
impact units potentially for years to come as aircraft are unable to
receive required depot maintenance in a timely manner, which will
negatively impact unit readiness.
If the Air Force does not receive sufficient funding in fiscal year
2014, we may have to rotationally stand down units, or fly them at a
reduced rate, similar to the actions we've taken in fiscal year 2013.
This sequester-induced readiness posture will impact our ability to
fill OPLAN and Secretary of Defense-ordered missions, as well as
significantly erode our training and force development efforts,
creating long-term readiness shortfalls.
Fixing Air Force readiness requires additional resourcing and
reduced operations tempo to recover Air Force readiness levels. Along
with additional funding, full depot workload recovery is expected to
take 2 to 3 years. Increased funding would be required to recover
deferred maintenance backlog as depot overhaul timelines would extend
to accommodate additional aircraft inductions
The Air Force can also provide a detailed assessment of unit
readiness status in a classified forum as needed.

LONG-RANGE STRIKE BOMBER

170. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in your posture statement, you
stated that the LRS-B is one of the ``Air Force's three top acquisition
programs.'' Why is the LRS-B so important to the Air Force?
General Welsh. The LRS-B is crucial to the Air Force and joint
forces because it will play a critical role in projecting power and
deterring adversaries. The LRS-B's long range, payload, and
survivability will provide the President with the option to hold
targets at risk at any point on the globe, as well as provide
operational flexibility for joint commanders.
Current bombers are increasingly at risk to modern air defenses,
while the LRS-B will be able to penetrate modern air defenses to
accomplish objectives despite adversary anti-access and area denial
(A2/AD) measures. The LRS-B will provide broad geographic coverage
(ability to operate deep and from long range) and will carry a wide mix
of stand-off and direct-attack munitions for increased flexibility.
Additionally, the LRS-B will be built with features and components
necessary for the nuclear mission to ensure the nuclear certification
effort completes within 2 years after IOC. The current bomber fleet
will continue to provide a robust nuclear deterrent until LRS-B is
fielded and certified.
The need for the LRS-B was reaffirmed in the Strategic Guidance for
a 21st Century Defense as well as directed by the Secretary of Defense
in January 2012 when he stated, ``Accordingly, the U.S. military will
invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in
anti-access and area denial environments. This will include developing
a new stealth bomber.''

171. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in terms of our Nation's
nuclear deterrent, what value does the bomber leg of the triad provide?
General Welsh. As recently demonstrated by the B-52 and B-2 flights
to the Korean peninsula, bombers provide great flexibility in force
posturing, signaling intentions and recall-ability. Additionally, these
assets provide the President with the ability to hold at risk virtually
any target on the globe. On a daily basis, this highly valuable, Air
Force-unique capability, forces adversaries who consider threatening
our national interests and those of our allies to confront the
potential costs of losing what they hold most dear. Combined with the
other two legs of the Triad, they comprise a robust deterrent
capability that complicates a potential adversary's offensive and
defensive planning and are a synergistic force that provides protection
against the failure of any single leg of the Triad.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer

DE-ALERTING INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

172. Senator Fischer. General Welsh, some observers have suggested
the Air Force de-alert its fleet of Minuteman III ICBMs and remove the
warheads from the missiles. Does the Air Force have the capacity to
store hundreds of warheads at its ICBM bases, or would such a policy
require significant infrastructure changes?
General Welsh. No, the Air Force does not have the capacity to
store hundreds of warheads at its ICBM bases without significant
infrastructure changes. Due to limited storage facilities at the wing
level, the warheads would have to be disassembled and transported to
another storage facility located elsewhere for long-term storage.

173. Senator Fischer. General Welsh, I understand that it requires
a substantial amount of time to install a warhead on top of an ICBM and
that, due to safety and security requirements, as well as limited
maintenance crew availability, returning a de-alerted missile wing to
alert status could take as long as 18 months. Is that correct?
General Welsh. Due to multiple operational variables involved, re-
turning a de-alerted missile wing to alert status could take up to 36
months.

174. Senator Fischer. General Welsh, separating warheads from
missiles would appear to undermine the principle attribute provided by
the ICBMs--their ability to instantly launch on the President's
command. Do you agree?
General Welsh. Yes, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that
the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces--heavy bombers off
full-time alert, ICBMs on alert with ``open-ocean targeting'' and a
significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time should be
maintained. As the most responsive leg of the Triad, ICBM alert forces
underpin day-to-day stability and support America's leadership role in
the international security environment. Nuclear alert forces also
provide a highly visible commitment of assurance to support U.S.
extended deterrence for our allies.

175. Senator Fischer. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, do you
believe it is important that the President still have this responsive
option?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Yes, nuclear alert forces underpin
day-to-day stability and support America's leadership role in the
international security environment. These forces are key elements of
our national security policies of assurance, deterrence and dissuasion.
They demonstrate visible U.S. commitments to maintaining strategic
equivalency, deterring coercion and maintaining world order and their
presence removes incentives for a first-strike by a potential aggressor
while imposing a difficult and costly decision calculus on potential
enemy planners.

CURRENT ARMS REDUCTIONS

176. Senator Fischer. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, as you
note in your prepared statement, the United States will have to reduce
its nuclear forces to comply with the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START). Do you believe it is important that the United States
retain the ability to reconstitute its nuclear forces in the event of
technological surprise or significant geopolitical change?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Yes, any course of action should
preserve the capability to reconstitute nuclear forces, as a hedge
against unexpected threats and geopolitical changes in our strategic
security situation over the next 10-20 years.

177. Senator Fischer. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, would
distributing any reductions in ICBM forces across the missile wings and
keeping empty missile silos in warm status help preserve the ability of
the ICBM force to resume its strength, if necessary?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Yes, keeping the silos warm would
allow us to increase the number of deployed ICBMs if there was a need
to do. Eliminating silos that are currently operational to achieve New
START treaty limits would eliminate this option. The cost of
eliminating a silo is more than keeping the silo ``warm'' but empty
over time. Silo destruction carries a significant cost and is
permanent.

178. Senator Fischer. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, are there
are other benefits, such as in the maintenance of silos, which would be
achieved by keeping empty Minuteman III silos in warm status?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Yes, keeping Minuteman III silos in
warm status does have additional benefits. The Air Force plans on using
any warm, nondeployed launchers to support ongoing test, evaluation,
and sustainment operations. Additionally, the Air Force will allocate
the nondeployed ``warm'' silos as necessary to support major
maintenance at each unit creating an added benefit of spreading the
workload on our maintenance forces.

READINESS OF NUCLEAR FORCES

179. Senator Fischer. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, your
prepared statement reads: ``The Nation's nuclear expertise must not be
allowed to atrophy.'' I understand that the readiness of our nuclear-
capable bombers and ICBM forces have been largely preserved. How long
can the Air Force protect our nuclear forces from the same readiness
crisis building across its fleet?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. In the near-term, the Air Force has
been successful at managing the impact of sequestration on nuclear
deterrence operations--ensuring that our strategic forces remain safe,
secure, and effective day-to-day. While challenging, we are confident
in our ability to mitigate the remainder of the required reductions in
fiscal year 2013 with negligible mission impacts. However,
sequestration will put Minuteman III readiness in direct competition
with modernization required to keep the capability viable beyond 2030.
Beyond fiscal year 2013, the unknown effects of sequestration to the
enterprise are cause for concern. Significant investment will be
required within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for propulsion,
guidance, reentry vehicles and ground systems to continue providing a
ground based leg of the triad. Over the FYDP, continued effects of
sequestration will impact replacement of aging equipment used to
maintain Minuteman III reentry vehicles and warheads, equipment used to
periodically launch and test the Minuteman III weapon system to collect
critical reliability and accuracy data, and equipment used to transport
and protect reentry vehicles, warheads, guidance and booster stages.
Since the risks of underinvestment are cumulative and have a
compounding adverse effect on readiness over time, the magnitude of the
impact will ultimately depend on the duration of the sequester.
Under sequestration, Air Force Global Strike Command has incurred a
10 percent reduction across its operations and maintenance accounts.
While Air Force guidance implementing the reductions expressly
prioritized flying hours directly supporting nuclear operations, the
cuts are having tangible impacts elsewhere. Of particular note, the
deferment of non-emergency facility, sustainment, maintenance,
restoration, and modernization (FSRM) projects at missile alert/launch
facilities, weapons storage areas, and aircraft hangars is exacerbating
the existing backlog of critical capital improvements, raising safety
and security risks that over time, may erode the ability of these
facilities to meet mission requirements. Also, cancellation of most
temporary duty assignments is limiting professional development within
the nuclear career field. Additionally, the furlough of civilian
employees is negatively impacting productivity and mission continuity.
Should these and other sequestration-related impacts persist into
future years, their combined effect will eventually lead to the
deterioration of core readiness within our nuclear forces.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
F-35 PROGRAM

180. Senator Lee. General Welsh, as we recently discussed, the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Record of Decision (ROD) for
candidate bases to host the first operational wings of the Air Force F-
35 was delayed again until this fall. The Air Force has stated, and you
have assured me, that this delay will not have an effect on the
scheduled delivery of these aircraft in 2015. I hope that this will be
the last delay in the delivery of this decision, as we are shrinking
the schedule margin for construction of facilities to house these
aircraft when they are delivered to the wings. I believe the F-35 is of
great importance to our national security; however, delays and cost-
overruns continue to be a problem. A GAO report in March stated that
the current outlook for the F-35 is improving, but long-term
affordability remains a major concern. Have you identified places where
the Air Force can improve efficiency and cut costs to increase the
long-term affordability of this program?
General Welsh. The Air Force is proactively engaging with the JPO,
OSD, and the Department of the Navy on multiple initiatives to improve
efficiency and cut costs to increase the long-term affordability of the
F-35 program.
Over the last couple years, the Air Force has supported the JPO on
several affordability initiatives that have the potential to reduce
program costs by a program office estimated $2.3 billion (CY12$). The
Air Force will continue to partner with the JPO on these types of
initiatives, to help make the aircraft more affordable.
The Air Force is also participating in the JPO-led BCA which is
examining key sustainment functions such as supply chain management
(SCM), sustaining engineering, fleet management, and field ops support
to optimize contractor and organic mix. Analysis so far has found
significant opportunities to reduce costs, while maintaining
performance and mitigating risks. The final report is expected March
2014. Out of this study, the Air Force and Department of Navy have
formed a Joint Organic SCM Team to develop potential options and an
implementation proposal should the BCA recommend a full or partial
organic solution.
The Air Force is also working with the Department of Navy on a
Level of Repair Analysis. The purpose of this effort is to maximize
cost effectiveness and fully exploit existing maintenance
infrastructure by exploring potential to expand current F-35 program of
record (2-level maintenance concept (operational/depot)) to include
intermediate level.
Finally, the Air Force is participating in the development of the
OSD McKinsey report. The goal of this project is to identify potential
opportunities to reduce total F-35 operational and sustainment cost.
Everything is on the table that contributes to generating F-35 sorties.
The final report is expected September 2013.

181. Senator Lee. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, are there any
reasons for you to believe at this time that the arrival date for the
first operational wings of F-35s will be delayed beyond 2015?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force is moderately
confident, based on the F-35 JPO schedule, that F-35 aircraft will be
delivered to the first operational wings on schedule.
Based on the current production profile, the forecasted delivery
date of F-35A aircraft to the first operational site starts in 2015.
These aircraft will be from low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 7.
The baseline delivery dates will not be finalized until the LRIP 7
production contract is definitized. We expect that contract to be
signed this summer.

PRESIDENT'S BUDGET AND READINESS

182. Senator Lee. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, I am very
worried about the Air Force's state of readiness under sequestration.
Unfortunately, the President's proposed budget for the Air Force and
DOD does not take sequestration into account for 2014, despite the fact
that it is current law. Can you comment on how the Air Force is
preparing for the real possibility of sequestration in fiscal year 2014
and beyond?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. Sequestration not only presents
additional undue risk in our readiness posture, it also creates an
unprecedented disruption to our planning process. While we remain
hopeful that impacts of sequestration will be mitigated by legislative
actions, we are engaged in planning efforts to best balance our ends,
ways and means during this period of very intense fiscal uncertainty.
The Air Force is employing a deliberative process to prioritize our
ongoing and future initiatives and ensure a best effort at achieving
full-spectrum readiness in a post-sequestration environment. We look
forward to working with members of Congress to address any questions
necessary to lead to a budget deal that eliminates sequestration and
its damaging impacts. A return to regular order and timely enactment of
appropriations and authorization bills will also help the Air Force to
plan for whatever levels of resources are provided.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE AIR FORCE

183. Senator Lee. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, recent
reports appeared in the media last week regarding religious freedom in
the Air Force and DOD. I appreciate statements from DOD and Air Force
representatives last week attempting to clarify these reports and
stating that servicemembers can share their faith, or evangelize, but
cannot proselytize, or force unwanted, intrusive attempts to convert
others of faith or no faith to one's beliefs. My concern, however, is
how the military is defining and drawing the line between evangelizing
and proselytizing, and communicating this to servicemembers. The First
Amendment guarantees freedom of religion and freedom of speech. For
many of our men and women in uniform, their faith is what sustains them
through the enormous pressures and stresses of the battlefield, the
months away from loved ones with little communication, the life-
changing injuries, and the loss of close friends. If an environment is
created where those servicemembers feel that expressing their religion,
sharing their faith, or showing outward representation of their beliefs
could be found in violation of military policy and grounds for
reprimand, it will have an unsettlingly negative effect on military
morale and undermine recruitment, retention, and cohesiveness efforts.
Can you both describe how the Air Force defines the difference between
evangelizing and proselytizing, and how these standards are
communicated and explained to airmen?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force does not have a formal
definition for ``evangelizing'' or ``proselytizing.''
Standards regarding Government neutrality towards religion, free
exercise of religion and religious accommodation are set out in AFI 1-
1, Air Force Standards. AFI 1-1 was published on 7 August 2012. While
the majority of AFIs are only available electronically on the Air Force
e-Publishing website, CSAF directed that AFI 1-1 be made available both
on-line and in a hardcopy booklet format. The booklet is referred to as
``The Little Blue Book,'' and is being distributed throughout the Air
Force. A booklet is being provided to every uniformed airman, who can
reference the booklet any time they have a question or concern.
Collectively, commanders, first sergeants and judge advocates
communicate the standards set out in AFI 1-1 to airmen assigned to
their organization.
With regards to Government neutrality towards religion, AFI 1-1
states:

``Leaders at all levels must balance constitutional
protections for an individual's free exercise of religion or
other personal beliefs and the constitutional prohibition
against governmental establishment of religion. For example,
they must avoid the actual or apparent use of their position to
promote their personal religious beliefs to their subordinates
or to extend preferential treatment for any religion.
Commanders or supervisors who engage in such behavior may cause
members to doubt their impartiality and objectivity. The
potential result is a degradation of the unit's morale, good
order, and discipline. Airmen, especially commanders and
supervisors, must ensure that in exercising their right of
religious free expression, they do not degrade morale, good
order, and discipline in the Air Force or degrade the trust and
confidence that the public has in the U.S. Air Force.''

With regards to free exercise of religion and religious
accommodation AFI 1-1 states:

``Supporting the right of free exercise of religion relates
directly to the Air Force core values and the ability to
maintain an effective team. All airmen are able to choose to
practice their particular religion, or subscribe to no
religious belief at all. You should confidently practice your
own beliefs while respecting others whose viewpoints differ
from your own. Your right to practice your religious beliefs
does not excuse you from complying with directives,
instructions, and lawful orders; however, you may request
religious accommodation. Requests can be denied based on
military necessity. Commanders and supervisors at all levels
are expected to ensure that requests for religious
accommodation are dealt with fairly.''

184. Senator Lee. Secretary Donley and General Welsh, how is the
Air Force working to comply with section 533 of the NDAA of 2013
(Public Law 112-239)?
Mr. Donley and General Welsh. The Air Force is complying through
the adherence of Air Force Instruction 1-1, Line 2.12, ``Supporting the
right of free exercise of religion'' Additionally, the Air Force is
updating the Free Exercise of Religion Course (ZZ133109) in Advanced
Distributed Learning Service.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]