    [Senate Hearing 113-217]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 113-217

    ARE WE PREPARED? MEASURING THE IMPACT OF PREPAREDNESS GRANTS SINCE 9/11

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                           SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
     MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                             HOMELAND SECURITY AND
                              GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 25, 2013

                                   __________

                       Available via http://www.fdsys.gov

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                            and Governmental Affairs

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

    82-572 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2014
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
    Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
    area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104  Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
    20402-0001

            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                      THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    JON TESTER, Montana                  RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota

                       Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
                   Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
                         Trina D. Shiffman, Chief Clerk
                        Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk

    SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND
                            THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                          MARK BEGICH, Alaska Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    JON TESTER, Montana                  MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
    HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
                         Pat McQuillan, Staff Director
                    Brandon Booker, Minority Staff Director
                           Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statement:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Begich...............................................     1
        Senator Chiesa...............................................     3
        Senator Paul.................................................    11

                                   WITNESSES
                             Tuesday, June 25, 2013

    Hon. Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and
      National Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
      U.S. Department of Homeland Security...........................     4
    Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General, Office of Audits,
      Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
      Security.......................................................     6
    David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team,
      U.S. Government Accountability Office..........................     7
    John W. Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security
      and Emergency Management Association, and Member, National
      Governors Association..........................................    23
    Hon. William Euille, Mayor, City of Alexandria, Virginia, and
      Member, U.S. Conference of Mayors..............................    25
    Josh D. Filler, Founder and President, Filler Security
      Strategies, Inc.,..............................................    27
    Matt A. Mayer, Visiting Fellow, Heritage Foundation..............    29

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Euille, Hon. William:
        Testimony....................................................    25
        Prepared statement...........................................    82
    Filler, Josh D.:
        Testimony....................................................    27
        Prepared statement with attachment...........................    88
    Madden, John W.:
        Testimony....................................................    23
        Prepared statement with attachment...........................    71
    Manning, Hon. Timothy:
        Testimony....................................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................    39
    Maurer, David C.:
        Testimony....................................................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................    56
    Mayer, Matt A.:
        Testimony....................................................    29
        Prepared statement...........................................    96
    Richards, Anne L.:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    48

                                    APPENDIX

    Additional statements for the Record:
        Richard W. Stanek, President Major County Sheriff's
          Association (MCSA).........................................   102
        The Jewish Federations of North America......................   110
        National Assocation of Counties (NACO).......................   125

                                ARE WE PREPARED?
             MEASURING THE IMPACT OF PREPAREDNESS GRANTS SINCE 9/11

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2013

                                   U.S. Senate,
                  Subcommittee on Emergency Management,
                             Intergovernmental Relations,
                              and the District of Columbia,
                        of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
    room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Begich,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Begich, Paul and Chiesa.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEGICH

        Senator Begich. Thank you very much for being here this
    morning. This meeting will come to order.
        Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on Emergency
    Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of
    Columbia (EMDC).
        I want to begin by thanking all our witnesses here today
    for their willingness to participate as we examine the impacts
    of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA's) grants on
    enhancing preparedness capabilities at the State and local
    level and the role of metrics to measure our progress as a
    Nation.
        Since September 11, 2001, almost $40 billion has been spent
    on equipment, training, and exercising for our emergency
    management and homeland security professionals and our first
    responders in an effort to enhance preparedness, response and
    recover from natural and manmade events. These grants support
    investments being made by cities and communities across the
    country, and the funding is leveraged in a variety of ways to
    encourage a whole-of-community response.
        While our response to disasters has evolved over the years,
    as lessons are learned and processes are streamlined, FEMA
    continues to struggle to quantify improvements and achievements
    that would inform future investments to address critical gaps
    in our capabilities.
        Congress has attempted to encourage the measurement of
    preparedness numerous times in the past. The Post-Katrina
    Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 directed FEMA to create
    the National Preparedness System and a National Preparedness
    Goal, which could be used to define the target level of
    preparedness and require the development of a National
    Preparedness Report (NPR).
        FEMA has made progress toward addressing these
    requirements, releasing the second National Preparedness Report
    earlier this month.
        Unfortunately, after significant delays, the report falls
    short of truly measuring progress toward achieved stated goals.
    As we will hear from the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO), FEMA has encountered challenges comparing current levels
    of preparedness to clear, objective, scalable and measurable
    baseline and standards.
        FEMA has tried to measure preparedness in a variety of
    ways, and reporting requirements have changed many times over
    the years. There have been many changes recently in the
    reporting and data requirements that the States and localities
    must provide.
        While FEMA's approach will naturally evolve as new
    priorities emerge and methodology develops, stakeholders need
    some sense of consistency in order to really make progress in
    measuring capabilities.
        In order to best leverage grant investments, States and
    locals must be able to prioritize funding they receive for
    their most pressing threats and hazards.
        Local officials are best positioned to understand the
    critical infrastructure that exists within their jurisdictions
    and are fully invested in identifying the best ways to prepare
    for emergency, emerging threats and consequences of disasters
    of all types.
        Our intention is not to increase the number of reports
    local, State and Federal officials submit or make preparedness
    assessments burdensome. We simply want to assure the reports
    that are required truly measure progress in achieving goals
    while leveraging metrics and standards that remain flexible and
    not overly prescriptive. A single one-size-fits-all reporting
    methodology may not be responsive to the unique threats,
    hazards and organizational structures and priorities evident
    across the Nation.
        In my home State of Alaska, we understand the importance of
    scaling generalized requirements and priorities. Our unique
    position as an Arctic State shapes how we address threats and
    hazards. Standards and metrics that are applicable in New York
    City may not translate to Anchorage, Fairbanks or a small
    village in our State. Flexibility is needed to allow States to
    be responsive to their biggest hazards and react effectively
    when new threats emerge.
        Alaska's remote location means we must assess not only the
    hazards we face internally, but we must also consider
    consequences of events happening in other time zones.
        Cascading effects from a disaster of the Port of Seattle or
    the Port of Los Angeles would cutoff shipping lanes that
    facilitate the movement of food to all of Alaska.
        Even though the highways that transport vital resources
    from the Midwest to the West Coast are thousands of miles away,
    a terror attack on a critical bridge could impact the supply
    chain and delay shipments of goods bound for Anchorage,
    Fairbanks and the rest of the State.
        Along the Yukon River in Alaska, spring breakup has
    resulted in devastating flooding in a number of communities,
    including Galena.
        These events test a resolve in affected citizens and can
    highlight investments made over years, utilizing Federal
    Homeland Security Grant dollars and State general funds.
        Since 2003, Galena has received over $190,000 to conduct
    exercises for local residents, purchase critical equipment and
    build interoperable communication capabilities. In addition,
    the State coordinated with the Tanana Chief Conference to
    facilitate a table-top exercise in March of this year, to
    further develop their working relationship on disaster response
    and recovery.
        They say you should not be meeting critical partners for
    the first time on the site of a disaster, and these exercises
    contribute to the swift response and smooth recovery. I believe
    these investments are worth making, and the Federal funds can
    support actions already taking place at the State and local
    level.
        In pursuit of the national preparedness, we are greater
    than the sum of the parts. State and local stakeholders have
    worked diligently to remain accountable to taxpayers, in an
    effort to use decreasing grants funds efficiently and
    effectively in accomplishing major goals.
        As the maxim goes, what gets measured gets done. We must
    assure that we work collaboratively to actively support
    investments that show clear progress. This is a national goal,
    and it must remain a national priority.
        I truly look forward to the testimony today.
        And, before that, I would like to introduce our new member,
    Senator Chiesa.
        Did I say that right?
        Senator Chiesa. Chiesa, yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Well, you are welcome. And, if you have a
    few comments before we start, I would be happy to have you say
    an opening comment.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHIESA

        Senator Chiesa. Thank you very much.
        Living in a State that has been so devastated over the past
    year, I appreciate everything FEMA is doing to bring our State
    back where it needs to be, and I look forward to our
    conversation on these really important issues today.
        So, thank you for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much and welcome to the
    Committee in total.
        We have the first panel here, and what I will do is
    introduce all three, and we will just start from this side.
        Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and
    National Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency--we
    welcome you here.
        Anne Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits,
    Office of Inspector General (OIG), again, U.S. Department of
    Homeland (DHS).
        And, David Maurer, Director of Homeland Security Department
    of Justice.
        Again, thank all three of you for being here.
        And we have a second panel which we will introduce after
    you all are done.
        When the Ranking Member arrives, if he is able to be here,
    we will have him do some opening comments. So I may have him
    interject in between your testimony.
        Let me first start with the Hon. Timothy Manning.

    TESTIMONY OF THE HON. TIMOTHY MANNING,\1\ DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
        PROTECTION AND NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
        MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Manning. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Begich,
    Members of the Committee.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Manning appears in the Appendix
    on page 39.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Good morning. I am Tim Manning, Deputy Administrator of
    FEMA for Protection and National Preparedness. On behalf of
    Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Craig Fugate, thank you
    for the opportunity to be here this morning.
        As you know, FEMA's preparedness grant programs have
    contributed significantly to the overall security and
    preparedness of the Nation. We are more secure and better
    prepared to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and
    recover from the full range of hazards and threats the Nation
    faces than we have been at any other time in our history.
        Much of this progress has come from the leadership at the
    State and local levels, fueled by FEMA's grant programs. Over
    the past 10 years, Congress, through the Department of Homeland
    Security, has provided State, territorial, local and tribal
    governments with more than $36 billion. We have built and
    enhanced capabilities by acquiring needed equipment, funding
    training opportunities, developing preparedness and response
    plans, exercising and building relationships across city,
    county and State lines.
        And, although Federal funds represent just a fraction of
    what has been spent on homeland security across the Nation
    overall, these funds have changed the face of preparedness in
    the United States. Response and recovery efforts from last
    year's Hurricane Sandy, the recent tragedy in Boston and the
    deadly tornadoes in Oklahoma bear witness to this.
        In March 2011, President Obama signed Presidential
    Directive 8 on National Preparedness, directing the
    implementation and the establishment of a National Preparedness
    Goal and a National Preparedness System to build, sustain and
    deliver the core capabilities needed to achieve that goal. This
    system allows grantees to use components to identify the
    threats and hazards with which we are faced; build, sustain and
    plan for the use of capabilities needed to face them; and
    constantly review our effectiveness.
        FEMA is tracking grantees' progress in implementing the
    components of the National Preparedness System and working
    toward closing the gaps. In 2012, FEMA released its
    Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard
    Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). The results
    highlight the gaps in capabilities which gives FEMA a basis to
    measure grantees' progress in closing those gaps against
    specific core capabilities over time.
        On December 31, 2012, States and territories submitted
    their first THIRAs and the State preparedness reports to FEMA.
    The summary of those results are published in the annual
    National Preparedness Report.
        The first NPR, released last year, included specific
    accomplishments in the context of the core capabilities
    identified in the goal. While this inaugural 2012 NPR
    highlighted preparedness accomplishments in the decade
    following September 11, 2001, the 2013 National Preparedness
    Report recently transmitted to Congress focuses primarily on
    accomplishments either achieved or reported during 2012.
        The strengths and areas for improvement in the NPR are used
    to inform planning efforts, focus priorities of Federal grants
    and enable informed collaboration amongst stakeholders, working
    together to improve the Nation's preparedness.
        Our investments have paid off before and after recent
    disasters and terrorist attacks. New York City's and New
    Jersey's success in responding to Hurricane Sandy stems in part
    from grant-fueled investments in personnel and supplies as well
    as community outreach and warning systems.
        New York City used the Urban Area Security Initiative
    (UASI) funds to develop and train the Fire Department New
    York's (FDNY's) Incident Management Team, which successfully
    managed operations in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island. It
    supported the City's Office of Management in evacuation and
    sheltering plans to move more than 3 million residents and
    sheltered up to 605,000 people.
        New Jersey used Public Safety Interoperable Communications
    Grants to fund the construction of a statewide 700 MHZ trunked
    radio system, which is one of the biggest public safety
    communications success stories in Hurricane Sandy.
        Federal grant programs also helped bolster State and local
    preparedness and response for the April 15 Boston Marathon
    bombing. The Massachusetts State Police used a Forward Looking
    Infrared (FLIR)--imaging unit purchased with DHS grants to
    search, locate and apprehend the surviving bomb suspect. Boston
    used funds to train the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
    teams to better integrate with bomb technicians into tactical
    operations--a crucial capability that was demonstrated to all
    in the aftermath of that bombing.
        And the Nation's ability to conduct collapse search and
    rescue, as we have seen demonstrated too many times in recent
    tornadoes, is significantly more advanced than it was 10 years
    ago. Ninety-seven percent of the U.S. population now lives
    within a 4-hour drive of a structural collapse team, up from 60
    percent a decade ago.
        In conclusion, we have demonstrated the efficacy of our
    grant programs through thoughtful analysis. The National
    Preparedness Goal provides us with a clearly defined target to
    work toward. And we have greatly improved our ability to assess
    the needs and track spending toward meeting those goals.
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss these important issues today. I am happy
    to be here and very happy to respond to any questions you may
    have.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Anne Richards.

    TESTIMONY OF ANNE L. RICHARDS,\1\ ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL,
    OFFICE OF AUDITS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT
                          OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Ms. Richards. Good morning, Chairman Begich, Members of the
    Committee. My testimony today will summarize the results of our
    audits of the Homeland Security Grant Program. I will present
    my testimony in two sections by first discussing the
    deficiencies or challenges we have identified and then
    highlighting some of the best practices being used by various
    States and urban areas.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Richards appears in the Appendix
    on page 48.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Homeland Security grants are awarded to States, territories
    and local and tribal governments to enhance their ability to
    prepare for, prevent, protect, respond to and recover from
    terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. The
    Homeland Security Grant Program includes the State Homeland
    Security Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative that
    fund a range of preparedness activities.
        Since 2007, we have audited States and urban areas to
    determine whether they have implemented their Homeland Security
    grants efficiently and effectively, achieved program goals and
    spent funds according to grant requirements. As of May 2013, we
    have completed audits of 36 States and 1 territory, some of
    which included urban areas. We have 17 ongoing audits.
        Through our audits, we determine that States generally
    complied with applicable laws and regulation in distributing
    and spending their grants. However, they face challenges in
    homeland security strategies, obligation of grant funds,
    reimbursement to subgrantees for expenditures, monitoring of
    subgrantees' performance and financial management, procurement
    and property management.
        Of the 22 States we audited in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal
    year 2013 to date, 17 had recommendations related to strategic
    planning and measurement. Although State homeland security
    strategies are to include specific, measurable, achievable,
    results-oriented and time-limited goals and objectives, many
    strategies, goals and objectives were too general to
    effectively measure the States' performance and progress toward
    improving capabilities. In addition, some States had outdated
    strategies that did not reflect the most current priorities,
    risks, needs and capabilities.
        States did not always obligate Homeland Security grants to
    subgrantees in a timely manner, which could have led to
    increased administrative costs and may have hindered the
    subgrantees' ability to complete projects and deliver needed
    equipment and training. For example, 6 of the States we have
    audited this fiscal year actually obligated the funds between
    138 days and 842 days after the funds were available.
        In our fiscal year 2013 audits, we have determined that 7
    States had limited oversight of subgrantees, did not ensure
    that subgrantees consistently tracked their accomplishments or
    did not ensure their compliance with Federal laws and
    regulations. Without adequate monitoring, States may have
    limited their ability to meet their goals, assess capabilities
    and gaps, take corrective actions and use funds to enhance
    capabilities.
        Some subgrantees did not fully comply with Federal and
    State procurement regulations by not obtaining an adequate
    number of bids, not properly justifying sole-source
    procurements or not conducting required cost analysis for
    noncompetitive procurements. As a result, subgrantees may not
    have made fully informed decisions on contracted awards or
    selected the best vendors.
        We also identified weaknesses in property management,
    including the subgrantees that did not regularly inventory
    grant-funded equipment, maintain adequate property records and
    inventory documentation, or properly mark grant-funded
    equipment. Without good property management, States and
    subgrantees may not be able to safeguard against equipment
    loss, damage and theft.
        Through our audits, we also identified several States and
    urban areas using innovative and promising practices. For
    example, the State of Texas created a registry for people with
    disabilities, medical conditions or other problems who may need
    assistance in case of a mandatory evacuation.
        The San Diego urban area created a technology clearinghouse
    to evaluate new technologies and independently assess equipment
    and systems being considered by first responders.
        Kentucky hosts grant workshops at various locations
    throughout the State to assist agencies interested in receiving
    grant funding.
        In closing, I would like to note FEMA's efforts to improve
    Homeland Security grants management and its plans to continue
    these efforts by updating program guidance and better
    monitoring grantees. FEMA has generally agreed to our
    recommended actions and is taking steps to implement those
    recommendations.
        For our part, by August 2014, we plan to complete audits of
    all States and territories receiving grants. Our overall
    objective in these audits remains essentially unchanged--to
    continue recommending actions that will make grant management
    more efficient and effective while strengthening the Nation's
    ability to prepare for and respond to natural and manmade
    disasters.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome
    any questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may
    have.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. David Maurer.

     TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. MAURER,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
        AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Begich, Ranking Member
    Paul and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here today
    to discuss FEMA's ongoing efforts to assess our national
    preparedness for natural and manmade disasters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer appears in the Appendix on
    page 56.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Over the past decade, Congress has appropriated $41 billion
    for a variety of grant programs designed to help the Nation be
    better prepared for terrorist attacks and disasters. During
    this time, GAO has been there, providing objective, nonpartisan
    oversight, and what we have found has often not been
    encouraging.
        DHS and, more specifically, FEMA have struggled to
    effectively manage and measure grant programs. It is difficult
    to say what we have really gotten for our investment because
    FEMA has been unable to measure how grant funding has enhanced
    our national ability to be prepared.
        Specifically, our work has found that FEMA lacks measures
    to assess how well its individual grant programs are working
    and whether, collectively, these programs have helped enhance
    national preparedness. For example, we found that while FEMA
    has performance measures for its largest grant programs, they
    typically provide information on whether tasks or activities
    have been completed. They do not generally provide an
    assessment of the effectiveness of individual activities or the
    overall grant program.
        To put it another way, FEMA has developed output measures
    for its individual programs but still generally lacks the
    ability to assess their outcomes. And when you cannot do that
    for individual programs, how do you assess the impact of all of
    FEMA's grant programs?
        That leads to an important national-level question: How
    much better prepared do all these programs make us?
        To answer that, it comes down to knowing how prepared we
    are and how prepared we should be.
        Over the past several years, we have found that FEMA has
    been unable to assess these vital questions. FEMA, therefore,
    lacks a clear view of where we have preparedness gaps. That
    makes it very difficult to direct grant money to address those
    gaps.
        Now I need to be clear. It is quite difficult to measure
    preparedness. FEMA has been working on this for years, and it
    is very important to give them credit for what they have been
    able to accomplish over the course of the last 2 years.
        FEMA now has the basic elements in place for assessing
    national preparedness capabilities. It has articulated a
    national goal, developed a plan for achieving that goal, issued
    two national reports on progress and enhanced the consideration
    of risk and funding decisions.
        For example, FEMA recently issued its second National
    Preparedness Report. The report summarizes, at a nationwide
    level, self-reported State and local progress in identifying
    and closing preparedness gaps. These steps are vital, and they
    make progress toward addressing GAO recommendations.
        However, FEMA continues to face important challenges. Most
    significantly, FEMA still lacks clear, objective and
    quantifiable measures of how prepared the Nation is and how
    prepared we should be. That means FEMA is not yet in a position
    to target grant funding toward the most critical gaps.
        FEMA's approach relies on States' individual, self-reported
    judgments on their capability requirements and levels of
    preparedness. In other words, funding decisions continue to be
    informed by what each State says it needs rather than applying
    a common, objective assessment across all of the States.
    Without such standards, it becomes very difficult to identify
    differences and compare capability levels between States.
        In conclusion, billions of taxpayer dollars are being
    invested in making the Nation better prepared for terrorist
    attack and natural disaster. Measuring how much better prepared
    this makes us is a very difficult task, but FEMA needs to do
    it. The law requires it. The President requires it. And stacks
    of GAO reports have recommended it.
        FEMA efforts on this front over the past couple of years
    are encouraging, but the bottom line remains--after years of
    effort, FEMA cannot clearly and objectively articulate what $41
    billion in grant funding has accomplished, what still needs to
    be done and the magnitude of the remaining gaps. This is vital
    for ensuring that in the future increasingly scarce grant
    funding is focused on areas of greatest need.
        Chairman Begich, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    this morning. I look forward to your questions.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        We will start with a 5-minute round, and let me first ask.
        David, I want to followup just on your last comments here.
        I know FEMA has recommended some consolidation of some of
    their programs. Let me first ask you; from your perspective, do
    you think that will have a positive impact in trying to
    streamline their process and also to analyze their outcome
    better?
        Or, give me a thought on their recommendation.
        Mr. Maurer. Sure. Absolutely. From GAO's perspective, we
    have not seen enough detail yet in FEMA's proposal for
    consolidating the different grant programs to make an
    independent assessment of whether it will help or whether it
    will not help.
        At the highest level, you could envision how it could make
    things easier for grant recipients to only have to provide
    information and respond to queries on one program. However,
    there is the potential for other downside risks as well.
        So the devil is in the details, and the details are not yet
    available.
        Senator Begich. Sure. As a former mayor, we operated an
    emergency management system and worked with FEMA and worked
    with a lot of different groups.
        How do you envision, or how does GAO envision, to measure
    the success of preparedness?
        In other words, we know investments. I will use Galena. We
    had an exercise with our State in March, and I am glad that
    happened. I mean, we had a lot of significant property damage
    but not life lost, so it helped me understand.
        How do you see that?
        Or, what is the tool to measure?
        I mean, I agree with you. There has to be a better
    understanding of how we measure these grants and success.
        Mr. Maurer. Absolutely. I think at the broadest level the
    conceptual framework that FEMA has laid out would enable us to
    get there eventually. I think the challenge that they are
    facing right now is fully implementing it.
        And probably the biggest challenge is the one that you have
    mentioned--that at the State and at the local level there are
    very specific requirements; there are very specific threats.
    Trying to roll all of that up from local to State to the
    national level and use that as a way to drive grant funding
    decisions is a difficult thing to do. But, in order to get
    there, you have to have clear, objective, quantifiable
    measures.
        And, like I said, I think the framework that FEMA has is a
    reasonable approach toward doing that. It is just not fully
    implemented yet from our perspective.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Manning, let me ask a couple questions.
        I know FEMA has had, over the last several years, different
    measurement levels of how you would measure success, and I know
    that has changed quite a bit.
        Help me create some assurance here that you are in the
    process now or have some ability to ensure; here is where you
    want to measure; here is how you want to measure; and 2 years
    from now, or a year from now, it will not change again--because
    I will tell you again as a person who managed an operation and
    that had to always fill out the papers, when the measurement
    changed every year or every 2 years, it was just more paper we
    churned in order to satisfy the needs of FEMA.
        What assurances can we have?
        And then also I would like for you to comment on the
    consolidation of FEMA programs--what does that mean, and when
    would that happen in your eyes, and what will it take to make
    it happen?
        Mr. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I guess I could start with saying that Administrator Fugate
    and I--and Secretary Napolitano--we were all, before we joined
    the Department of Homeland Security, State officials
    responsible for implementing these programs as well and were
    subject to the very frequent changing of requirements. So we
    are very cognizant of the detriments to the effectiveness of
    building a homeland security program in a State or local
    government by those constantly changing requirements.
        The President's Directive No. 8 (PPD8)--on national
    preparedness consolidated a number of different and divergent
    directives from over the past decade and brought them all in
    line with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and
    directed the executive branch to build this system to be
    implemented.
        One of the reasons, I believe, that we had a frequent swing
    in the requirements over the past was new directives and new
    requirements coming up and the recognition on the part of the
    department that a particular scheme was not maybe as effective
    as it needed to be. And, in order to address concerns raised by
    both the IG and the GAO and Congress and our stakeholders
    across the country, the department would come up with new
    ideas.
        You heard many times mentioned--and you yourself mentioned
    in your opening comments--about the concerns with a one-size-
    fits-all approach----
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Manning [continuing]. And the ability to assess the
    effectiveness of the programs from places as divergent as New
    York City to Alaska to Oklahoma City.
        So what we have tried to achieve in this National
    Preparedness System, the THIRA and the goal that I mentioned is
    the idea that working jointly between cities and towns and
    counties around the country, and their States and FEMA and
    through its regions in the department nationally, we assess and
    understand the threats and hazards unique to a particular
    community and the capabilities that community needs. So it is
    no longer entirely just self-directed and self-assessed but an
    actual objective analysis of those capability requirements.
        And then prioritizing the grants and the national systems
    to achieve those goals gives us the ability at FEMA, but more
    importantly, nationally--to understand whether we have been
    effective in closing those gaps.
        And, when I say capability, I do not simply mean material.
    I do not simply mean a truck or a bomb robot. I am talking
    about people with the training to use particular equipment in a
    timeframe to do a job, like we saw in Moore, Oklahoma, when the
    technical rescue teams that were built, using the National
    Incident Management System (NIMS) typing, using national
    doctrine in a way that can be shared nationally, were able to
    respond quickly to a disaster--those teams did not exist 10
    years ago--and save many lives.
        And, Mr. Chairman, our proposal on the National
    Preparedness Grant Program in the President's budget includes a
    consolidated proposal, or a proposal to consolidate all the
    various grant programs.
        The idea is exactly as you heard described--that if we can
    more effectively synthesize the activities within an area,
    within a State, recognizing the very important needs of the
    high-risk urban areas, ports and transit systems that we have
    worked with independently and separately over the years, if we
    can pull those together and have coordinated efforts toward
    filling the gaps, then there is less likelihood for duplication
    and waste of resources.
        Senator Begich. My time has expired. I am going to turn to
    Senator Paul here, but let me ask you a quick question on that.
        And that is, is it in your budget? Do you need legislative
    action to make that happen?
        Mr. Manning. Mr. Chairman, yes, the the grant proposal, as
    envisioned, works as an evolution toward the grant systems that
    were established in the Post-Katrina Act. We have been, and we
    are nearly at completion on, working with our partners through
    the executive branch on the legislative proposal we anticipate
    delivering to the Committee soon that would outline what we
    propose as changes to the authorization.
        Senator Begich. OK. Very good.
        Let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Paul, and then,
    Senator Chiesa, I will turn to you right after that.
        Senator Paul, I apologize. We started and I knew you were
    on your way, and I just wanted to keep the meeting going. I
    apologize that you were not here.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL

        Senator Paul. No, that is great. That is a first in Senate
    history to be on time.
        I want to thank the panel members for coming today.
        I was wondering, Mr. Manning; are FEMA preparedness grants
    being used to purchase drones?
        Mr. Manning. Senator, no drones. There have been some
    grantees that have purchased remote-controlled low-level
    aircraft--basically, RV, like what you would think of as hobby
    aircraft--that have cameras for monitoring.
        Senator Paul. Drones can be of different expenses. It
    sounds like a drone to me, just a cheaper one.
        And do you have a policy then for surveillance? If you are
    giving out money that is being used to be purchasing
    surveillance, do you have a policy in place for how the money
    is spent and how the surveillance is done?
        Mr. Manning. The department does have policies in place
    with our grantees and with the various fusion centers on
    protection of civil rights and civil liberties through our
    Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) in the
    Intelligence Analysis Directorate.
        Senator Paul. So what is the policy then for using drone
    surveillance?
        Mr. Manning. Senator, I would have to defer to my
    colleagues across the department for specifics on those
    answers, but I know that they work to ensure that they are
    compliant with all the Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations.
        Senator Paul. Does anybody on the panel know anything about
    the drone surveillance program or any of the money being used
    for drones?
        David, did you have a comment?
        Mr. Maurer. We have not done any work specifically looking
    at use of FEMA grants for purchasing of drones. We have done
    broader work on drones, but not specific to FEMA grants.
        Senator Paul. Right. So the problem is that your fusion
    centers have not always been the best at defending civil
    liberties.
        There have been instances where the fusion centers have
    targeted people for their political beliefs. We are in the
    midst of a huge crisis in the country with the Internal Revenue
    Service (IRS) apparently being used for political purposes, but
    a few years back the Missouri fusion center was targeting
    people for their political beliefs. Third-party candidates,
    pro-life people and people with different bumper stickers on
    their car were said to be targeted by the fusion centers.
        There is a big concern that allowing your money--our
    money--to be used to purchase drones without any rules in place
    or without an awareness of what the rules are is disconcerting.
        There are some who believe that once you get outside your
    house you have no privacy. I tend to disagree, and I think
    these are things we are going to have to revisit.
        But we now have the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    director saying that drones are being used. He was not aware or
    forthcoming with any specific policy on privacy.
        So these are not something of passing concern.
        I am also concerned about where these grants are going.
    Apparently, some grants are being used to pay office rent. Some
    grants are given to a fusion center that had zero percent
    progress toward its goals.
        David Maurer, would you have any comment on exactly how we
    would go about trying to have better oversight?
        Mr. Maurer. Absolutely. Last year, we issued a report
    looking at that aspect of FEMA grants programs. We looked at
    the four largest programs and identified the amount of
    visibility that FEMA had over the specific uses of the funds,
    and we found that for some of the largest programs FEMA may not
    know specifically how the funds are being used at the time they
    make decisions to provide the money. That creates a problem.
        It also, in our mind, raises the potential risk of
    unnecessary duplication. In other words, grantees could
    potentially receive funds from more than one program for the
    same or similar activities without the internal workings of
    FEMA being aware that that was happening.
        Now we looked into that. We looked at a thousand different
    grant awards. We did not find any examples of specific
    duplication, but there were a couple hundred cases where if you
    just looked at the data they had in their FEMA systems--it
    looked like on paper they were being funded for the same things
    from different programs.
        Senator Paul. Senator Begich, I think this is a good
    example of really where the bill that you and I have talked
    about--trying to pay people to save money, give people within
    the bureaucracy of government more pay to save money--would be
    a good example because, I mean, one, it is just so enormous and
    nobody has the proper incentives.
        If it were my money, I would be watching it. But since it
    is not my money, I do not really care. That seems to be the
    attitude of most people in government.
        We had the trailers that sat in Arkansas for years and
    years. We had the ice that was stored by the hundreds of
    thousands of pounds for Hurricane Katrina that never got there.
    We had the inmates in Baton Rouge who were receiving displaced
    money from FEMA. We had people staying in resorts.
        We had all kinds of things, but it is not really because
    there is one particularly bad person or one particularly bad
    policy. It is really because there is no incentive for anybody
    to protect the money because it is just not theirs.
        And I think the enormity of how much money will always lead
    to abuse.
        I think the distance from the problem, being in
    Washington--really, most of this stuff ought to be locally
    collected and locally handled. It is really why when certain
    States want $62 billion, they want it all at once. They cannot
    stand to get it a little bit at a time so there could be more
    surveillance or more oversight of whether the money is being
    spent properly. It is really why things ought to be done
    differently.
        And instead of giving $62 billion after Hurricane Sandy, in
    1 lump sum, I feel certain that we will be back here in 5 years
    talking about how that money was abused as well. Thanks.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        Let me go to Senator Chiesa, but let me also--Mr. Manning,
    if I could ask that you could ask the department to submit to
    the Committee whatever written policies or documentations on
    utilization of drones, or whatever the right term is, for
    protection of civil liberties and how that is done. If you
    could have that--whoever the right person is there to submit
    that--I think we would all be very interested in what written
    policies there are on that.
        Let me turn to Senator, again, Chiesa. Thank you very much.
        Welcome again, to the opportunity to be here at the
    Committee. Thank you.
        Senator Chiesa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for your testimony this morning.
        I understand that we want to be as careful as we can in
    closing the preparedness gaps, and so we are creating national
    standards to be sure that there is some way to measure what we
    are doing.
        And I also appreciate, as the former attorney general of my
    State, that it is not the easiest thing to measure because
    people want to feel safe all the time. And I think because of
    the tremendous work that gets done by law enforcement and our
    first responders, people do feel safe.
        What I would like to ask you, Mr. Maurer, is understanding
    the need for some type of objective national criteria, is there
    a recognition that--and we have three States here. We have
    Alaska, Kentucky and New Jersey--very different States, very
    different sorts of vulnerabilities in each of those States. How
    does that get calculated into the ability to create a national
    standard?
        How do you recognize each State's individuality as part of
    the balance in creating those national standards?
        Mr. Maurer. Well, I think as a general proposition the
    approach that FEMA is taking makes some level of sense.
        In other words, you start at the local level, you buildup
    to the State level, go to the regional level, and then build to
    the national level so that you are able to take advantage of
    the local-based knowledge and information.
        I mean, obviously, in New Jersey, the local officials in
    New Jersey are much better informed about the risks and the
    capabilities in New Jersey than folks here in Washington, DC.
        The difficult part is trying to roll it up in a way that
    allows comparisons and information, and fair comparisons,
    across States to help inform some of this decisionmaking.
        And I think having the core set of capabilities that FEMA
    has established at least is a start toward a framework. In
    other words, having 31 core capabilities that at a national
    level we want to see progress in achieving helps develop a
    common framework that everyone can work within.
        On the FEMA side, it is going to be increasingly important
    for the folks at FEMA regions to be watching this process very
    closely and provide effective oversight of the information that
    is coming up from the States and locals, to sort of take a look
    at it and make sure that it makes sense and it can be pulled
    together in a way that is consistent and comparable across
    States.
        Senator Chiesa. And I guess that dialogue continues with
    the States on an ongoing basis to make sure, as you said, that
    the information is coming from and within any State, even a
    State that is geographically relatively small, like New Jersey.
    Every community there has a different vulnerability and a
    different core set of issues that they need to be managing to
    keep their people and their community safe.
        Mr. Manning, could you tell me--we see that States--and I
    recall this in dealing with the grants that came into New
    Jersey, that some of these grants are not being obligated as
    quickly as they should be and there are timeframes. And your
    audits, that Ms. Richards talked about, see these things
    happening on a delayed basis.
        What steps are we taking--because States want the money,
    right? They want to keep their citizens safe. They want to use
    the money as effectively as they can. No one is trying to lose
    the ability to use this money.
        So what steps can we take to (a) better educate the States
    and (b) create a sensible protocol that allows the money to be
    obligated in a way that makes sense and is within the
    timeframes that are created by the source of the money?
        Mr. Manning. Senator, thank you.
        You, of course, hit the issue right on the head. There is a
    number of different complexities into the program that have led
    to some of that.
        There has been a requirement at the beginning of the grant
    program that it be obligated in a very short period of time,
    and that has always been defined. It could be defined as
    identified for a particular subgrantee against maybe not
    specific projects but allocations against the general areas,
    against the straight strategies.
        Those all--that does happen.
        The time lags tend to then build on a number of different
    factors. Some is compliance with NEPA; the environmental review
    process can take a deal of time, especially in port and transit
    programs where there is significant capital improvement
    happening. There is a coordination of the 80 percent pass-
    through of the grants to the local governments. There is a
    number of administrative procedures that all kind of compound.
        So I think the combination of a refocusing into using the
    National Preparedness System and the idea of using the grants
    to achieve specific capabilities that can be shared nationally,
    to build both local and State capabilities but our national
    disaster and terrorism preparedness, will help facilitate that
    because the projects will be identified ahead of time.
        An element to that program is that once you identify your
    threats and hazards you have to achieve them using specific,
    typed resources--what we call our National Incident Management
    System Typing--so that it is, as I mentioned before, people and
    equipment and training to do a task. Those are identified.
        So it is no longer a nebulous idea of wanting to buildup
    your rescue capability. You want to build to a Type III search
    and rescue team, which is a more easy thing to achieve
    administratively.
        And further, if I may mention, to another--there was an
    issue of draw-downs for many years, where the grant programs
    are multi-year appropriations. They have multiple years against
    that program, and this system has led to grantees having delays
    in the implementation of the expenditure of those funds.
        And we have worked very hard--all the grantees working in
    partnership with us--in changing some of our rules, changing
    some of the implementation rules, and have achieved some great
    progress. We had roughly $8 billion in unspent money as of last
    February. As of this month, it is down to $4 billion, and that
    burn rate is on track.
        So I think we have made great progress in what you have
    heard this morning.
        Senator Chiesa. Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time.
        I just ask that we continue to work with the States as
    carefully as we can because, as I said, they want to use this
    money. They are desperate to make sure that they are taking all
    the steps that they need to take. And we just need to create a
    conversation that makes sense so that people can do the things
    they need to do to get the resources where they should be.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        We will do another quick round, and then we will move to
    the next panel.
        I wanted to followup on some of the questions I know
    Senator Paul had. I guess, Mr. Manning, you could answer this,
    and then anyone else could add to it.
        I feel, Ms. Richard, you have not said anything. I do not
    want you to not have anything to say, but you are probably
    thinking please get done with this testimony so I can sit down.
    [Laughter.]
        But I understand your feeling there.
        We have these minimum grant levels that happen. I forget
    what Alaska is. I think it is 3.5 or somewhere right in that
    range, and there are several that are in that kind of level.
        But they are really spend plans. I mean you allocate the
    money, and then the States say here is what we are going to go
    spend it on versus here is what we need to do to fill our gaps;
    can we get this money? It is kind of a different twist.
        Do you see an opportunity or some way to improve that?
        And I guess because I look at this, and I am listening to
    all the testimony, and there is no--I do not want to offend
    anyone here, but I am listening carefully, and it sounds like a
    lot of mill-churning for what really people want is to have
    capability to respond to manmade or natural disasters.
        But as we and maybe Congress has done this. We have created
    so many layers that are required now that it is not as easy for
    the agencies to operate. I do not want to say that we are not
    to blame for some of this.
        But I am listening carefully, and I just am visualizing my
    days back as mayor and the mill that we had to create in order
    to satisfy the paper checks so all the boxes are checked.
        I could tell you that from a mayor's perspective we want to
    make the cities safe and able to respond, but we are not going
    to wait for a box to be checked to do that. We are going to go
    do it.
        So I am trying to understand. Is there a better way to
    approach this that maybe FEMA, where it is today, is evolving
    into something much different because we have such different
    local response?
        I mean local communities are always and will always be--I
    say local, and I look at my friend, John, there.
        Locals or States, depending on how the situation is laid
    out, always are going to be the first responders, period.
        I do not care what FEMA does. I do not care how much they
    plan, how much money they have. They cannot respond as well as
    a local responder can and should because they understand how
    the nuances of that community work.
        So are there any thoughts on that?
        I do not know if there was a question there that I gave.
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. Manning. I heard a question.
        Senator Begich. OK. Thank God because I am not sure I heard
    one, but go ahead.
        Mr. Manning. Well, you raise important points, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Our approach--the grant programs have always been about
    building a national capability to respond to what may strike
    the Nation and doing that and supporting State and local
    governments because they are the first responders.
        Frankly, often, the public is the real, true first
    responder. The official government agencies--come in, and the
    Federal Government is really one of backfill. We support the
    Governors and the mayors in their tasks.
        So the grant programs have always been about building
    capability, building capacity to protect against acts of
    terror, and build our ability to respond and protect for
    anything else.
        We take that approach with the recognition that risk is
    everywhere. We do--the grants are focused on the highest risk
    community, highest risk States and urban areas, and it
    includes----
        Senator Begich. Except, Mr. Manning, I would say that
    because you have the minimum amounts for each State, it does
    not really differentiate. I mean Louisiana and Alaska get the
    same amount of money.
        Mr. Manning. That is correct.
        Senator Begich. I am sure if Senator Landrieu was here she
    would want to add a zero to her number, but I am just saying
    that the population centers are different. We are more broad-
    range.
        So how does that work as a risk-analyzed approach?
        Mr. Manning. The distribution of grant funds follows a risk
    formula established in law in the Post-Katrina Act. It is a
    combination of State minimum amounts basically on population
    and then in addition based on a risk formula that is an
    analysis of the threat vulnerability and consequences, largely
    of an act of terror, on large urban areas around the country--
    an analysis of the top 100 and this year, in the appropriation,
    limited to an award of the top 25 riskiest places and the
    cities. So it is a combination of both.
        There is a minimum for the communities that do not have as
    high a risk and then are not awarded additional funds. For
    every State, there is a floor minimum, essentially, with the
    understanding that risk is everywhere and that there are
    requirements everywhere.
        Oklahoma is a very good example, and there are disasters in
    Alaska and Kentucky and many other minimum States.
        I come from New Mexico. It was a minimum State as well.
        Where responses are performed using capabilities developed
    under the grant but, more importantly, that grants fill a
    national purpose--we are building national preparedness, and
    the national--the ability of the United States to respond to a
    national crisis is an aggregate of the capabilities that exist
    in local governments.
        In Hurricane Katrina, there were 80,000 State and local
    responders that traveled from around the country. Hurricane
    Sandy was similar. When we have national-level crises, there is
    mutual aid from every small town in America, and that is a
    capability that is built for the Nation with a national-level
    grant program.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Ms. Richards, again, I did not want to leave you not having
    an opportunity to say something. I know there have been a lot
    of questions that have been laid on the table. And I will turn
    to Senator Paul here in just 2 seconds. But any comment on the
    general issues in regards to everything from the consolidation
    to the things we can be doing better to ensure that we are
    fairly managing these from a risk perspective?
        Is there data that we are not asking for?
        Give me your thoughts there.
        Ms. Richards. Thank you, sir. I do have a few comments.
        Two years ago, we published a report where we looked at the
    efficacy of a grant management program, and we had a number of
    recommendations that identified legislative barriers to the
    efficiency of the program, where the simple facts of different
    grant programs have different deadlines and the money is
    available at different times makes it more difficult for the
    applicants to----
        Senator Begich. That is legislatively?
        Ms. Richards. Yes.
        Senator Begich. And I am assuming--and I am just guessing
    here as a new member--Congress has done nothing with those?
        Ms. Richards. Well, we make recommendations to FEMA. FEMA
    is making applications----
        Senator Begich. The answer is yes. I hear you.
        Ms. Richards. Yes. I would say yes, sir. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. I am just guessing because we have all
    these reports we love to get, and then we go onto the next
    crisis.
        So, OK. Good. That is something for us to do.
        Ms. Richards. And also, it goes back to Senator Chiesa's
    question as well, on the difficulty to get the grant funds
    obligated in a timely manner. A lot of that is administrative
    because to complete the obligation there has to be a signature
    from the recipient at the subgrantee level.
        Because those recipients are oftentimes local or small
    organizations, they do not meet every day like a State
    administrative agency does. And so, because they cannot predict
    when the money is going to be available and when the paperwork
    is going to come down, they may not have a meeting scheduled.
    So the funding just sits until they are available to sign for
    it.
        So some greater regularity and some greater consolidation
    of when these timeframes would be helpful to both FEMA and the
    recipients.
        Senator Begich. Very good. Senator Paul.
        Senator Paul. I started, and we mentioned some of the
    abuses from past FEMA expenses, but I thought it would be good
    to go through a few more.
        Mr. Manning, have you read Senator Coburn's report?
        Mr. Manning. Yes, I have.
        Senator Paul. OK. Well, here is one. This is Montcalm
    County. This is not from his report.
        It says, the United States is fighting terrorism one snow
    cone at a time. The West Michigan Shoreline Regional
    Development Commission, with a grant from FEMA, bought 13 snow
    cone machines valued at $11,700.
        That would embarrass me if I were in charge of any of this
    money, and I would want to respond and do something about that.
        I think most people saw this when this was in the news--the
    Halo Counter-Terrorism Summit in 2012 in San Diego with the
    zombie apocalypse demonstration. Forty actors dressed as
    zombies did some kind of simulated terrorism thing. The cost, I
    think, was offset by grant money from FEMA.
        That, I think, would embarrass me also if I were in charge
    of any of this money, but I would want to know if something had
    been done about it.
        We are buying all these armored vehicles. And there
    probably is a need for an armored vehicle maybe in New York
    City or Washington, DC. or somewhere, but in Keene, New
    Hampshire, there have been two murders in the last 15 years. We
    bought a $285,000 armored vehicle.
        I am sure that even the people in Keene thought that was
    kind of ridiculous.
        Montgomery County, Texas got a $300,000 ShadowHawk drone
    with UASI dollars.
        I would be a little concerned about not only the expense of
    it but what are our rules with regard to how that drone is
    being used.
        See, some people have interpreted this open spaces doctrine
    to mean you can fly a drone anywhere. There are a lot of open
    spaces in Kentucky and Alaska, and I think you do deserve some
    privacy even when you are out hunting, sledding, whatever you
    are doing.
        I think really we should be going to a court and saying: We
    think this person is committing a crime. Will you give us a
    warrant to look at them?
        But we should not just be flying these. The whole
    government, from top to bottom, is buying these drones. I mean
    it is outrageous.
        EPA has them. They are flying them everywhere. But if you
    think someone is a polluter and they are a farmer, go after
    them, but let's get a warrant.
        We just cannot be funding this. Plus, it just gets so
    large, and this money is not accountable. It is just flowing
    everywhere, and nobody--snow cone machines, drones.
        Long-range acoustic devices--they bought one in Pittsburgh
    for $88,000. Apparently, it can cause permanent hearing loss,
    but it is this ear-splitting noise. And it is like we have got
    to have $90,000 for an ear-splitting noise device?
        See, I just wonder how the controls are, but some of it is
    just because nobody is paying attention to the dollars spent.
    We are a trillion dollars in debt every year, and we should do
    some things.
        I mean, we had 9/11. We had this terrible thing happen, but
    we have a terrorism center--I think an anti-terrorism center in
    Somerset, Kentucky. I figure if the terrorists get to Somerset,
    Kentucky, we are probably done for, if they get that far.
        But we do these things because they are work projects and
    communities like them because they bring money instead of
    saying, where do terrorists attack us?
        It is sort of like who attacked us on September 11, 2001.
    Sixteen of the 19 were here on student visas. So we had a
    special program looking at student visas for 10 years, and we
    just de-funded that.
        So we have money for ear-splitting devices and for snow
    cone machines, but we did not have enough money to look at
    people who are on student visas.
        We, apparently, do not have enough analysts to look and see
    when you are targeted, when a foreign government, like Russia
    reports you, like the Tsarnaev brothers, to know that you are
    flying back to a part of the world where you may become
    radicalized.
        So I think we empty our pockets spending money everywhere,
    but then the things we ought to be doing we are not doing, and
    the things we ought not to be doing we are doing. But I think
    it is really because of the overall philosophy of just throwing
    money at problems.
        And I would appreciate if there had been any reforms, Mr.
    Manning, done since the zombie apocalypse and maybe on the snow
    cone machines and anything else.
        Mr. Manning. Thank you, Senator.
        Yes, we have done, as you can imagine, a very close
    analysis of all of the examples raised in the report and many
    that we hear.
        Senator Paul. If you have a response--a formal response--I
    would not mind seeing that if you can send that to our office.
        Mr. Manning. Sure. We do, and we will be happy to provide
    it to your office as well.
        There are usually, as you would imagine, answers and
    reasons for those. The ice machines were, well, intended for
    exactly that. Anybody who has been hospitalized will probably
    recall that they are often given ice chips when they are
    recovering rather than water, and the idea was to provide
    shaved ice in large quantities for a heat response.
        But, nonetheless, we have processes in place to scrutinize
    the equipment that is being purchased. But, more importantly,
    what we have in place through the grant program now and what we
    propose going forward would eliminate those kinds of
    acquisitions because we are talking about defined
    capabilities--a particular number of individuals with training
    on certain equipment that is defined as a typed resource--to be
    able to achieve and much less of the kind of more vague ``This
    is something I think might be useful, so I am just going to go
    ahead and do it'' as we might have seen in the past.
        Senator Paul. But I am not sure why we send any money to
    these cities. Why do we send money for terrorism to little,
    tiny cities around the country?
        I come from a little town. I am all for little towns, but I
    am not for sending anti-terrorism grants to any little cities.
        I mean, New York is a problem. D.C. is a problem. L.A. is
    probably a problem. But by sending them to all these little
    cities, it sort of seems to me as if somehow politicians got
    involved.
        I think there was a report a few years ago that said--I
    think this was in Indiana. There were like 9,000 requests for
    preparedness grants--the pumpkin factory, the popcorn festival,
    all of these cute little things that my family goes to in a
    small town, but they do not need terrorism grants.
        Someone should just say no.
        Mr. Manning. Well, Senator, in the case of small
    communities it is often that capability is procured by the
    State through local governments, and the idea is that you build
    response capabilities. There are prevention and interdiction of
    an attack that may occur somewhere, but you build the response
    often in the outlying areas to come in as mutual aid.
        In the case of the snow cone machines, for example, if I
    recall correctly, that was in the Detroit area. And
    Abdulmutallab--had that device not failed, that aircraft would
    have blown up over Detroit and----
        Senator Paul. And the snow cone machine was going to save
    anybody?
        Mr. Manning. The snow cone machine, as I described,
    Senator, was to build capability for their mass casualty
    response, to be able to have shaved ice available. And, of
    course, as we all know and have seen reports, it was used for
    other purposes, and we have procedures in place to prohibit
    that from happening again.
        The BearCats are another good example--the armored
    vehicles. I think we all saw the utility in the Boston area.
        And, as I described, the idea is to build statewide
    capability on the part of the State that can come together as a
    statewide response to wherever a threat may occur.
        And we do know that Zazi, the Times Square bomber, was
    building his bombs and planning in kind of remote, ex-urban
    Denver and transited most of the United States in route to New
    York.
        So our grant program going forward has what we propose as
    more constraint on capabilities developed against specific
    identified threats and hazards that we have all worked jointly
    on identifying.
        Senator Begich. Mr. Manning.
        Mr. Manning. Yes.
        Senator Begich. Can I ask you a question? Would you mind
    submitting this--and then we will end this panel here.
        The point I think Senator Paul is making is: How are these
    expenditures managed? What are really the capabilities and
    needs?
        But you are also indicating that you have a newer approach
    to how you are dealing with the grants in the future. I would
    be interested if you could do this.
        I am very visual. One thing about the Senate--we love to
    create mills of paper with a lot of writing. Can you show how
    the grant program existed before and what it looks like in the
    future in just a very simple chart style?
        In other words, here is what it used to or could be used
    for, and these are some examples, and here is what now is
    happening that will preventing that or not, depending on what
    the subject matter.
        Is that something that you could do?
        It does not need to be complicated. When I say this--I
    always like to say this because I know Federal Agencies love to
    just inundate us with paper because they figure that is how we
    will get blurry-eyed and forget.
        But I just want something very simple that says: Here is
    our current program. Here is what we are moving to.
        And that, I think, would be a very interesting point to see
    because that would help us understand how you have kind of
    plugged these problem areas that have occurred.
        Would that be within reason?
        Mr. Manning. Most definitely.
        Senator Begich. Great.
        For the two others, if I can ask you to do one thing--and
    it just dawned on me as you were talking. We probably do not do
    enough of this, and it is something I am trying to do with this
    Committee and another committee that I chair, and that is
    better oversight not just when something bad happens but--you
    know.
        Can you submit not the ones that we have right now, but
    even you had mentioned you did a report a couple years ago with
    some legislation.
        Can you submit to the Committee: Here is what we
    recommended, maybe even the last two reports, and what we have
    done?
        Ms. Richards. Absolutely.
        Senator Begich. Again, I do not need a big fancy document.
    I just need: Here is the recommendation--completed, partially
    completed, not completed. What is your analysis of why--because
    one of the things we do not do here--it just dawned on me even
    more and more after 5 years now, sitting here.
        We have great professional staff from the IG and your
    group, GAO, doing all this work. And then 3 years later since I
    have been here, 60 percent of the Senate has changed.
        So, of course, we all come in with new ideas, and we say,
    why haven't you done this?
        And you actually politely say, as you did--and it was very
    good--well, 2 years ago, we did this.
        Then all of us say, well, we never saw it because, of
    course, we were new.
        This might give us a better understanding of what we should
    be doing or not doing and, when there are recommendations, what
    is our followup to make sure that is done because, otherwise,
    we spend lots of time in committee meetings having committee
    meetings about something we talked about a year and a half ago.
        And you all or the agency folks--I know what you will do.
    No disrespect; you will leave, and you will go, we told them
    this 2 years ago.
        Well, help us do a better job in oversight.
        So, if you would not mind doing that?
        Ms. Richards. Absolutely.
        Senator Begich. And you select. I mean I would say the last
    report or last 2, whatever you feel is more relevant because if
    it is 10 years old it may be times have changed quite a bit.
        But something that just says: Here is what we recommended.
    Here is what happened.
        And then even if you can show what agency or the elected
    body--was supposed to be doing something.
        Would that be OK?
        Mr. Maurer. Absolutely.
        Senator Begich. Great.
        Thank you all very much. I appreciate your time and thank
    you for being at the panel here.
        We do have another panel. If they are ready, we will do a
    little switch-out here. [Pause.]
        Thank you very much. Thank you all very much for being here
    for our next panel. Again, I will just mention who is here, and
    then I will start.
        And I will start with you, John, but let me first introduce
    everyone that is here.
        John Madden, Director of Alaska Division of Homeland
    Security and Emergency Services; William Euille, Mayor, city of
    Alexandria--thank you very much. We love mayors. As you know, I
    was in the mayors' conference just a couple days ago. So we are
    glad that you are here.
        Next is Josh Filler, President of Filler Security
    Strategies, and Matt Mayer, Visiting Fellow from the Heritage
    Foundation.
        Thank you all very much for being here.
        John, welcome. I know you are dealing with some significant
    tragedies and disasters in Alaska. I think we have one
    literally every 2 weeks, and I think there was an analysis done
    that we always have some sort of situation in Alaska. And I
    know you have done some incredible work. So let me turn to you,
    and then we will just kind of go down the row here.

     TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. MADDEN\1\, DIRECTOR, ALASKA DIVISION OF
      HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, AND PRESIDENT,
    NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AND MEMBER, NATIONAL
                         GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION

        Mr. Madden. Well, thank you, Senator Begich and Ranking
    Member Paul for the opportunity to speak today on an
    increasingly critical and often overlooked aspect----
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Madden appears in the Appendix on
    page 71.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Begich. John, can I interrupt you a second. I
    forgot to say one other thing.
        Mr. Madden. Yes.
        Senator Begich. You are also now the President of the
    National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), not just from
    Alaska, but you represent the whole group. I just want to give
    you that proper introduction. Sorry, John.
        Mr. Madden. Thank you, sir.
        Before I proceed, I do extend my thanks to you, Senator,
    and your staff and Senator Murkowski and Representative Young
    for your support during the recent historic floods on the
    Yukon, particularly in Galena. I was there just 4 days ago,
    working with the community.
        We learned just in this last month that our investments in
    building capabilities did save lives, did alleviate human
    suffering and did reduce property damages.
        And I do speak today for both the National Emergency
    Management Association, of which I am the President, and the
    Governors' Homeland Security Advisory Council in the National
    Governors Association (NGA), of which I am a member.
        The question, what is the return on our investment, is not
    new and neither are the considerations from the States and our
    local partners.
        The National Preparedness Task Force, comprised of leaders
    from State, local, tribal and territorial governments,
    addressed this in their report to Congress in September 2010.
    Many of the task force recommendations focused on building a
    problem-solving system based on investments in capabilities
    made through skilled analysis and continuous assessment of
    risk.
        In January 2012, the National Emergency Management
    Association presented to Congress a proposal for a
    comprehensive grant system based on flexibility but balanced
    with accountability, where States set priorities and make
    investments in capabilities in support of their local
    governments for their risks, and measure performance and
    effectiveness of those investments.
        In June of this year, the National Governors Association
    submitted its Governors' principles for Homeland Security grant
    reform including many of the measurement needs.
        The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment--
    must be at the center of this enterprise and be the basis for
    our priorities.
        But the initial THIRA in 2012 held on to some past
    assumptions--that complex risk can be simplified and quantified
    by classifications like red, green, yellow/low, medium, high.
    It also limited the range and the variability of hazards and
    fit everything into a snapshot on the day. It did not enable
    and encourage collaboration between States that share the same
    hazards or where one may be a resource provider for the other
    through mutual aid. Most importantly, it did not recognize that
    threats and hazards and the risks from them do not stop at the
    State line, the county line or the city limits.
        We must measure and manage risk. We must invest in
    capabilities based on risk. And we must measure the
    effectiveness of our investments in drawing down those risks.
    And with each investment and with each assessment of its
    effectiveness, we must feed this back in and adjust our
    priorities.
        An effective THIRA must follow the supply lines from
    production to consumption. It must follow the watersheds and
    rivers and not just the geopolitical boundaries on the map. The
    THIRA must consider the interdependence of our systems and the
    possibility that a single investment may reduce the risk from
    several hazards.
        But we must measure far more than we do now. We must
    measure the effectiveness of our decisions, of our assumptions
    and of our actions.
        I can measure the effectiveness with great precision of a
    three-legged sled dog, but perhaps I should question the
    effectiveness of my decision based upon the ability to win the
    race.
        Consider this statement developed and supported by the
    National Governors Association and the National Emergency
    Management Association in documents provided to the Congress:
    We must build and sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation
    that is well organized, rigorously trained, vigorously
    exercised, properly equipped, prepared for all hazards, focused
    on core capabilities and resourced for both the most serious
    and the most likely threats and hazards.
        There are 13 opportunities in this statement to measure
    performance, and we need those 13 and more.
        While not endorsing the National Preparedness Grant Program
    overall, both the National Governors Association and NEMA
    believe that any grant framework should have consistent methods
    to measure or assess progress in achieving those core
    capabilities. Only through the comprehensive grant reform can
    we ensure continuous assessment of risk across all levels of
    government, encourage strategic planning rather than spending
    planning and base funding on the priority needs of the
    communities and to measure progress to fill gaps in our
    capabilities.
        This Nation is not well served when the grant system or the
    measurement system is an impediment to our national ability to
    be agile and adaptive, to swiftly confront changing hazards,
    emerging threats and increasing risks.
        And I will stand ready for any questions at the end of the
    panel.
        Thank you.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        Mayor, thank you again. As I said in the opening, I am
    biased toward mayors. You know that.
        And at the end of the day--no disrespect to my friend,
    John, sitting to your right--mayors have to deliver the end
    product, and so I really appreciate that you are here and
    represent the conference. Please.

        TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM EUILLE,\1\ MAYOR, CITY OF
      ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, AND MEMBER, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

        Mr. Euille. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
    Member Paul.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Euille appears in the Appendix on
    page 82.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Certainly, your comments are very appropriate--that mayors
    are the closest to the people and we have to deal with these
    issues on a daily basis and be responsive.
        And I appreciate the opportunity, on behalf of the U.S.
    Conference of Mayors, to testify before you on the suite of
    Homeland Security Grant Programs and how they have helped not
    only my city and the region, but also cities across the
    country, to prevent, mitigate, prepare for and respond to both
    acts of terrorism and natural disasters.
        Senator Begich, we especially appreciate the way as you
    mentioned, you were with us this past week in Las Vegas for our
    annual convention. You have continued to reach out to mayors
    and represent our interests and those of our cities in many
    different areas since your office moved from city hall to the
    Nation's capital. We know that you have not forgotten where you
    came from, and we know that we have a real friend here in the
    Senate.
        My basic message today--again, your opening comments are a
    good segue in terms of why I am here representing the mayors.
    And my basic message today is that mayors and other local
    officials across the Nation strongly support the existing menu
    of Homeland Security programs.
        As I believe my testimony will show they are working. We
    recognize that they may not be perfect and some changes may be
    needed, but they are the product of years of work by Congress,
    the Administration, State and local governments, and first
    responders. The Federal grant funds, which the Department of
    Homeland Security and its Federal Emergency Management
    Administration have provided, clearly have improved the
    Nation's planning, mitigation, preparedness, prevention,
    response and recovery capabilities.
        The April 15 bombing at the Boston Marathon provides an
    excellent example of how DHS's investments provided through the
    Urban Area Security Initiative Program have paid off. There can
    be no doubt that they contributed significantly to the Boston
    area's quick and effective response to this horrific act of
    terrorism.
        Here is one specific example. UASI funds provided the
    salaries for nine intelligence and GIS analysts and high tech
    equipment at the Boston Regional Intelligence Center. These
    assets were critical in protecting and providing information to
    the first responders in the field. The analysis monitored,
    vetted and triaged information concerning over 280 suspicious
    or criminal acts within Boston following the bombing.
        The Tucson area has used Metropolitan Medical Response
    Systems (MMRS), funding to pay for planning, equipment and
    training to help first responders, public health, private
    health, law enforcement and emergency managers across Southern
    Arizona prepare for a mass casualty event. This capability
    played a major role in the effective interdisciplinary response
    to the January 8, 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle
    Giffords and 19 others.
        In Alexandria, and the National Capital Region we have used
    learned lessons from various incidents to guide investment
    decisions, to increase our capabilities, to protect against
    future occurrence. For example, after the anthrax attacks in
    2001, the NCR and UASI funds were used to enhance secure and
    interoperable communications, information sharing and the
    situational awareness in the region, and produce NCRnet, a
    secure fiber optic network connecting the NCR regions, Essence,
    a public health surveillance system, and the installation of
    chemical and biological sensors in the Metro system, where I am
    also a member of the board of directors.
        As we are all aware, the fiscal year 2013-2014 budget
    submitted by the Administration proposed a major reform and
    consolidation of FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Programs, which
    would replace the current programs with the new National
    Preparedness Grant Program.
        It is no secret that the U.S. Conference of Mayors and
    other organizations which represent local governments, first
    responders and emergency managers have registered serious
    concerns with regards to this proposals to convert the current
    suite of Homeland Security Grant Programs into State-
    administered block and competitive grant programs in which
    funding decisions are based on State and multi-state threat
    assessments. This proposal would no longer guarantee the
    retention of key programs, remove 25 percent set-aside for law
    enforcement terrorism prevention and expand the eligible
    applicants for the portion of the funds which must be passed
    through to local governments, and to include port and transit
    authorities and private organizations.
        We especially appreciate the fact that, thus far, Congress
    has rejected the Administration's proposed changes to the
    Homeland Security Grant Programs and agreed with us that
    changes must be considered by the authorizing committees.
        We know that you will carefully examine any proposals that
    they send to you. The U.S. Conference of Mayors and other
    organizations which represent local governments, first
    responders and emergency managers have urged FEMA and the
    Administration to work with us and Congress to develop programs
    reforms which incorporate the successful elements of past and
    current programs, that identify new approaches which can have
    broad-based support.
        Finally we suggest that any program improvements increase
    transparency, increase local involvement, provide flexibility
    with accountability, protect local funding, sustain terrorism
    prevention, provide incentives for metropolitan area
    regionalization.
        I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I stand
    ready for any questions you may have.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mayor.
        Let me go to Mr. Filler.

     TESTIMONY OF JOSH D. FILLER,\1\ FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, FILLER
                       SECURITY STRATEGIES, INC.

        Mr. Filler. Thank you.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Filler appears in the Appendix on
    page 88.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Good morning, Chairman Begich and Ranking Member Paul.
        I am Joshua Filler, President of Filler Security
    Strategies, a homeland security consulting firm in Washington,
    DC. It is my privilege today to discuss with you, issues
    surrounding our Nation's preparedness, how to evaluate it and
    what impacts Homeland Security grants have had on preparedness
    at the local, State and national levels.
        The purpose of Homeland Security grants, such as the Urban
    Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security
    Program, is to supplement local and State spending to allow
    urban areas and States to build capabilities that bridge
    traditional domestic public safety, largely handled by the
    States and localities, with national security imperatives
    traditionally managed by the Federal Government. Without such
    funding, States and urban areas would not have the resources to
    develop capability levels necessary to integrate those
    missions.
        Measuring the effectiveness of specific grant programs is
    different than measuring overall preparedness. Grant
    effectiveness is about how grants specifically impact
    capabilities. However, the overall level of preparedness in an
    urban area or State is influenced by numerous other factors--
    most importantly, State and local resources.
        While Homeland Security Grant Programs are critical to
    enabling urban areas and States to enhance preparedness, they
    represent a small fraction of the tens of billions of dollars
    spent by States and urban areas on public health and safety
    each year.
        To measure grant effectiveness and preparedness, States and
    urban areas must establish their own capability targets and
    performance measures and metrics based on their unique risk
    profile and planning assumptions. That risk profile should also
    determine which capabilities are a priority to address high
    risks, threats and hazards. We cannot measure everything, and
    no single part of the Nation needs to be fully prepared for
    every conceivable hazard.
        These locally developed targets, measures and metrics
    should all fit under a common framework, such as the Core
    Capabilities under the National Preparedness Goal. This will
    ensure a consistent, strategic approach while recognizing the
    differences across a country as large and diverse as the United
    States.
        With these targets, measures and metrics in hand, States
    and urban areas should engage in a regular assessment process,
    involving self-evaluations, quantitative modeling and
    performance evaluations, particularly involving exercises and
    especially real-world incidents--all in order to build a
    consistent picture of preparedness over time.
        In each case, the following steps should be addressed:
    First, identify the gaps in a State's or urban area's priority
    capabilities. Next, outline grant and other expenditures to
    close the identified capability gaps. And, based on the
    measures and metrics, identify the outcomes produced from grant
    and other expenditures in terms of closing capability gaps and
    attaining the capability target.
        Throughout such a process, the best way to determine grant
    effectiveness and overall preparedness is to review how
    capabilities performed in a real-world incident. Based on the
    need, what were the strengths; what were the gaps, when a
    jurisdiction or agency had to perform?
        In the end, we are making these investments in preparedness
    to more effectively operate when we have a threat or disaster.
    That is what matters most.
        To date, I have worked on five grant effectiveness studies
    and have developed tools to evaluate overall preparedness in
    numerous regions across the Nation. These include in the San
    Francisco Bay Area, San Diego, Hampton Roads, Riverside and
    Anaheim/Santa Ana.
        From that experience, I can say with certainty that there
    is no silver bullet or single answer to addressing the
    questions of grant effectiveness and overall preparedness.
        What I have learned is that grant effectiveness and
    preparedness cannot be measured by just looking at the United
    States as a single operating entity, which it is not. Rather,
    the United States is a vast network of independent actors--
    towns, villages, cities, counties, States, the private sector
    and Federal Departments and Agencies--that must unify to
    achieve homeland security priorities and perform critical
    operational tasks before, during and after an incident.
        When attempting to answer how effective a grant program is,
    or how prepared a region or the Nation as a whole may be, we
    must take a varied approach that addresses the question through
    multiple lenses. These lenses should include a look from the
    local perspective, the State perspective and the national
    perspective as well as others. Taken together, each lens will
    help provide a more complete understanding as to grant
    effectiveness and overall preparedness across the Nation.
        Thank you.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Mr. Mayer.

       TESTIMONY OF MATT A. MAYER,\1\ VISITING FELLOW, HERITAGE
                               FOUNDATION

        Mr. Mayer. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you for
    having me this morning.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mayer appears in the Appendix on
    page 96.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Now the question we are trying to address here is: Are we
    prepared?
        And we have to ask the followup question: Are we prepared
    for what?
        In over 10 years and $40 billion plus of spending, the fact
    that we do not know what we have, where we have it and at what
    level it exists is problematic.
        I do not envy Mr. Manning or any of the folks at FEMA.
    Having sat in those chairs, along with Mr. Filler, is not a
    place that you want to sit as you try to struggle through these
    very difficult issues after September 11, 2001. But we have to
    do so because we are entrusted with the public's money and we
    have an obligation to do so in the most effective and efficient
    manner we can.
        I will say congratulations to the department and FEMA for
    pushing for a reduction in the number of Urban Area Security
    Initiative cities. It had ballooned to over 60 cities--a
    ridiculous number--and now has come down to 31, to 25. That is
    a great investment so we do not squander resources trying to
    put a thin layer of peanut butter on a piece of bread that is
    very big.
        I also think the idea to consolidate the programs is a very
    good idea. It is not a new idea. We tried that during the Bush
    Administration several times, and special interests and other
    groups said no. But I think we have to be looking at
    consolidating so we can target funds where the risk is the
    greatest based upon that current risk model that the
    intelligence is driving there.
        One of the mistakes I think we make is we assume that the
    risk is everywhere, and if we do so, that means protecting
    America from that risk is incredibly hard.
        There is risk everywhere, but we do not live in a nanny
    State. We cannot make it a 100 percent safe place to live. If
    we do so, we sacrifice our civil rights and civil liberties in
    the process.
        So we have to be smarter about saying, where is the risk
    and where is a meaningful level of risk where finite funds,
    finite resources, finite time and people can be applied, so
    that we can raise our preparedness to the highest degree
    possible in order for us to prevent an attack and if we are hit
    to respond effectively.
        Boston is a great example. It shows over the years we have
    spent a whole lot of money on the response side and can respond
    fairly effectively, whether it is a tornado or it is the Boston
    attack.
        Our problem still remains in preventing those attacks. And
    Boston was a preventable attack that we missed on opportunities
    because we failed to learn some of the lessons over the last
    decade that we should have learned.
        And so, when we think about it, one of the things we do--
    and, Chairman, you noted this in the turnover in the Senate. I
    would say the turnover in the department is just as high or
    higher, and as a result, you see enormous amounts of churn on
    doctrine.
        This is not the first National Preparedness Goal. I think
    it might be the fourth iteration of it.
        It is not the first Core Capabilities. It may be the third
    or fourth iteration of those capabilities first announced in
    September 2004.
        So this process has been an ongoing process where enormous
    amounts of churn have resulted, federally, in a lot of inaction
    and ineffectiveness.
        But at the State and local levels, what that creates is an
    enormous problem. They do not have the resources to deal with
    this constant churn of policy, and all they do then is try to
    chase the next iteration. Do the mill burning, as you spoke of.
    And, as a result, we are just constantly shifting to kind of
    what is the next shiny object that we are trying to get money
    for.
        We need to settle one policy so that States and locals can
    start building toward this idea of capabilities--what are they?
    What do we need? How high do we need them? And let's then
    figure out what the gap is that remains to be funded, which we
    often do not do enough.
        Another problem that we have not addressed is the
    subjectivity of the measurement process, whether we measure
    effectiveness, which is an incredibly subjective measurement.
    You and I may see something completely different in terms of
    whether it is effective or not, and that subjectivity is a
    problem.
        So we need to put more rigor and objectivity into the
    evaluation process so that we know when you and I both say that
    capability is working, it has common language; it has common
    understanding.
        And, between jurisdictions, what I say is an effective
    urban search and rescue squad is what you say is so that when I
    call for yours under mutual aid it does not fail because it
    cannot do what I thought you said it could do.
        So we need to make sure that there is commonality across
    the spectrum in order for us to do that.
        Again, self-evaluations are problematic. I think you see in
    my testimony that I submitted for the hearing the 2012
    assessments and the 2013 assessments, and we have lost ground
    enormously somehow in a year even though we gave more money
    out.
        I know FEMA will say they are measuring different things,
    but that actually demonstrates the problem of how we measure
    things.
        So we need to move further down the line of being smarter
    about what we measure, how we measure it and where we put the
    money.
        I would suggest that the high risk urban areas are the
    place we need to focus our funding. After 10 years and more
    than $40 billion, if we have not secured Small Town, Ohio,
    which is where I am from, it is time to let Small Town, Ohio
    take care of itself. We need to focus our Federal funds in the
    big places where we know there is risk of a terrorist attack.
        With that, I will end my testimony and be happy to take any
    questions you might have.
        Thank you for having me today.
        Senator Begich. Thank you all very much for being here.
        And let me start, John, if I can, with you. It sounded from
    your testimony, as you look at the Federal land--and I think of
    the phrase of spending plan versus strategic plan. I think you
    said strategic--that is the better approach. I think everyone
    on the panel probably would agree with that.
        Do you think FEMA is moving in the direction that makes
    that really the focus? I will use what Mr. Mayer just said at
    the end.
        I agree. I just quickly looked at the 2012 versus 2013.
    When you look at the numbers, you get terrified that we have
    gone the wrong direction. But then you hear the arguments from
    FEMA that, well, we are measuring things differently, which
    then means mayors and State folks have to churn paper to
    respond to that.
        And, yet, what are measuring, are we doing it right, and
    what is the answer in this?
        I am going to ask the same question to you, Mayor.
        Are States trying to get FEMA to be on one set of
    parameters at some point, or is it just that FEMA is directing
    and you all are just trying to chase it and make sure that you
    fill the paperwork out so we get the resources that we think we
    need on the ground?
        Does that question make sense?
        Mr. Madden. Yes, sir, and it is constantly a chase between
    intent and execution.
        In the heyday of all the funding--and there used to be
    several--many times more of what it is now, annually. It was
    all about spending. If I give you this money, can you spend it?
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm----
        Mr. Madden [continuing]. Ask the question, how you can
    spend it?
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Madden. And the performance measurement was I said I
    need three things, and I bought three things; therefore, I am
    successful.
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Madden. There has been movement away from that, but we
    have not fully abandoned it.
        Senator Begich. Abandoned the spending concept.
        Mr. Madden. The spending concept.
        Senator Begich. Right. Is that because of just entrenched--
    I mean, these two were there many years ago. So, I mean, is it
    just that change is difficult to adapt to in the way this
    program should operate?
        Mr. Madden. We live in a time that cries out for
    innovation, but unfortunately, we have to create the innovation
    within a bureaucracy.
        Senator Begich. Bigger----
        Mr. Madden. And bureaucracies do not change rapidly. So
    they need to measure something, so they will measure the
    comfortable things before they will measure the difficult
    things.
        And the real challenge that comes in under the National
    Preparedness System is trying to integrate it across. If you
    are thoughtful in this and say that this element is very
    critical for a recovery of a community that would be hit by any
    disaster, are we taking that knowledge and priority and putting
    it over into then let's make that an emphasis for mitigation;
    let's make that an emphasis for protection?
        We do not have that cross. Therefore, we are still
    emphasizing on execution.
        And the strategic value of all these is to emphasize the
    thinking, the planning, the setting of priorities that then
    yield the spending.
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Madden. We need to start at the beginning of this
    thoughtful process rather than at the end.
        Senator Begich. Mayor, what is your thought on that?
        Then I am going to ask both of you if you agree with that
    kind of analysis. Mayor.
        Mr. Euille. Well, thank you, sir.
        While I am not directly involved on a daily basis in terms
    of overseeing emergency preparedness, we have professional paid
    staff that does that very well.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Euille. But I will certainly agree with John's
    comments.
        But I think really what we are looking for here is, first,
    a comfort level that works for all--the localities, the States
    and the Federal Government. We are also committing to making
    certain that we are effective and efficient in terms of what we
    do and how we do it.
        But, this talk about small towns versus large towns and not
    having the need to have the same type of equipment, or adequate
    equipment, and services that other cities and towns have--that
    makes sense in terms of----
        Senator Begich. Of risk analysis.
        Mr. Euille. Yes, risk analysis, in terms of concern.
        But the reality of it all is--take my city of Alexandria,
    Virginia. We are caught in the middle of being right next to
    the Nation's capital. We are the small pea in a pot, but yet,
    we have just as much of a major commitment to helping to secure
    and protect the region----
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Euille [continuing]. In terms of our mutual aid,
    whether it is equipment, manpower or what have you. So we need
    to also have the resources to be able to be responsive.
        Senator Begich. A good example might be--and I will use
    Alaska as an example, and then I am going to turn to Mr. Mayer
    and Mr. Filler for kind of additional comments.
        Galena is not a terrorist location, but there is a flood
    disaster. So you have different risk levels on different
    levels. We know a natural disaster could occur there much more
    rapidly than a terrorist activity.
        Then we go into Valdez, Alaska, where we have a small town,
    but we have the oil terminus for the pipeline. Higher risk but
    also on multiple fronts, wouldn't you say, John?
        I mean especially last week when it was 90 degrees there. I
    am sure they love it, but also the fire risk now has increased
    dramatically. But it also has oil terminals that have a huge
    risk factor.
        So it has kind of multi-layered tasks. Is that a fair
    statement, John?
        Mr. Madden. Yes, sir, it is, and that illustrates the need
    for that interdependence.
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Madden. Alaskan oil is an economic driver for the
    entire West Coast----
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Madden [continuing]. That enables them to have the
    economy to ship things back to Alaska.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Madden. The vulnerability for the State of Alaska
    exists outside of our State as much as it does inside.
        Senator Begich. The State, right.
        Mr. Madden. And that is the part where any assessment of
    risk has to recognize that the vulnerability for a city or a
    county or a State often resides outside of its borders and that
    every city, county and State protects things that are of value
    to others. We protect a strategic national oil supply. Others
    protect food supplies.
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Madden. There are pipelines that run from Louisiana to
    New England through many States.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Madden. And each State is viewed differently for how
    they are assigned a risk.
        Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Madden. And, to go on what you said earlier, there are
    34 States that have received the identical Homeland Security
    grant funds last year and this year, and that just cries out--
    --
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Madden [continuing]. For it is not based on risk if 34
    States get the identical amount.
        Senator Begich. And I think, Mayor, you would probably
    agree with that in a broad sense, not the specifics, but that
    last statement. I could sit here in my own limited knowledge
    and say certain States have a higher risk than other States,
    but 34 all the same seems odd.
        But maybe----
        Mr. Euille. Absolutely. I remember last year, maybe 2 years
    ago, when we got word in terms of the Washington Metropolitan
    Area about the grant funding that we were receiving, we all
    said, well, this is ridiculous.
        I mean, we should almost be equal to what New York City is
    receiving, but yet the Washington Metropolitan Area suffered a
    tremendous reduction.
        So I do not think that should be based on just allocations
    across the board. It should be, again, based on risk.
        Senator Begich. Risk.
        Either one of you want to respond on that analysis?
        And you have unique experiences, both of you, because you
    have worked inside this system--and I am correct on that,
    right--at different times. So you kind of saw the beginning of
    these grants as well as now you are on the outside, looking in.
        So I think it is a unique experience you bring here to the
    Committee.
        Either one? Mr. Filler or Mr. Mayer.
        OK.
        Mr. Filler. Yes, it has been a unique experience having to
    live with the consequences of some of your decisions from the
    outside. It definitely gives you a unique perspective.
        On the risk side, I think what has been happening here is
    that the risk analysis that is being used is pushing more and
    more of the funding to the top which, by default, leaves so
    little funding for what is left, that everybody gets the same
    amount.
        Senator Begich. So the bulk of the money goes here. There
    is a little bit left. So just spread it.
        Mr. Filler. Just spread it because the real risk analysis
    is taking place at the very top of the urban area list or the
    State list, depending on which list you are actually looking
    at.
        So, when you do that, you only have a certain amount of
    money left. If there are statutory minimums, you have to meet
    those statutory minimums, and that basically----
        Senator Begich. You have kind of got two pressures going
    on--the minimums and then the high risk--and then what is left
    is----
        Mr. Filler. Exactly.
        So, when those two forces come together, it produces the
    result where 30 or some odd States may get the same amount of
    money even though there is no way those States have the same
    amount of risk. There just is not enough money to differentiate
    those risk levels when you are putting so much money at the
    top. I think that is probably what is happening.
        Senator Begich. Mr. Mayer.
        Mr. Mayer. Yes, there are a couple responses to some of the
    issues that you raise.
        One of the challenges we have, right, is that we have a
    dual sovereignty system, that States are sovereign entities, as
    are local governments, and so this tension between the Federal
    Government telling States what they need to do or not do and
    States wanting to have some control over that. After all, it is
    the States' money that comes to Washington, coming back to
    them.
        So that tension is always there, and it is a challenge, I
    think, to try to navigate that for any issue, including
    homeland security.
        On the risk issue, it was interesting. When Mr. Filler and
    I were there, in preparing for the 2006 allocations, we thought
    we would try to get creative with the risk formula and add
    natural disaster risk to the formula to see how it would impact
    things as we were going through the analysis.
        And what we discovered is if you put natural disaster risk
    into the risk formula it overwhelmed terrorism risk because the
    risk of fires, floods, tornadoes----
        Senator Begich. Huge.
        Mr. Mayer. It is huge.
        Senator Begich. Huge and more frequent.
        Mr. Mayer. More frequent.
        So, again, that gets into that tension between what are we
    preparing for. Are we preparing for the natural disasters, or
    are we preparing for terrorism? And that, I think, helps us
    define and target where we need to go.
        And on that risk, I think it was the 2007 to 2008 year on
    the Urban Area Security Initiative program, where they added 4
    cities, and literally, every city got cut by 3 percent exactly,
    from top to bottom. It did not matter.
        And, again, that----
        Senator Begich. In order to take care of the four.
        Mr. Mayer. Yes. And that goes to the question of, how in
    the world, mathematically--and I am not that smart. So I cannot
    do this. But what is the algorithm that gets you the exact same
    outcome--a 3 percent cut for every city, from top to bottom?
        It was basically to try to feed more mouths, and so they
    had to essentially rob from Peter to pay Paul.
        Senator Begich. Right, with an amount that was shrinking
    overall.
        Mr. Mayer. Correct.
        Senator Begich. So it created even another problem.
        Mr. Mayer. That is exactly right.
        Senator Begich. Do you think--and let me ask again to
    whoever wants to answer this.
        We have these grants. It is about preparedness. We have two
    kind of major areas--terrorism and natural disasters. I think
    you defined it.
        I think that is a fair national security, and terrorism,
    kind of this category, and then natural disasters.
        I had a panel here about a month ago, and we had some
    folks--a gentleman from the insurance industry. And their risk
    analysis on natural disasters is being incorporated much
    greater than they have ever had to do--the size and the
    frequency.
        Do you think FEMA is understanding that there--or Homeland
    Security/FEMA is understanding--that there is an ever growing
    now on the natural disaster end, that is bigger?
        The price tags are bigger and the frequencies are more
    often than maybe what the model or the thought was back a
    decade ago, because terrorism was kind of the driver. We had
    some natural disasters, but they were--I do not want to say
    they were infrequent, but they were not like they are today, or
    what we classify as natural disasters.
        No one would have anticipated what happened in Hurricane
    Sandy, for example, 10 years ago. They would have never had
    that on kind of the risk analysis plan. Now they do, due to the
    frequency and intensity of some of these disasters.
        Do you think the model has to be updated because you made
    me think about it when you said the natural disaster issues
    overwhelm the system when you calculate that in, which is going
    to be even bigger in the future, it seems to me.
        Any thought on that?
        Mr. Mayer. Yes. I mean, I have written extensively at
    Heritage on this issue of kind of the growth of the
    declarations coming out of FEMA for natural disasters. And we
    have taken the position that the vast majority of those are not
    being issued because they are creating--they are greater
    catastrophic events. Hurricane Sandy, obviously, is an
    exception to that.
        But what you have is because we have not moved the number
    that gets you qualified for the declaration in a long time,
    average, routine fires, floods, tornadoes, severe storms are
    starting to qualify. And, as a result, lots of money is being
    poured into that.
        Our position is we actually need to decentralize that and
    get that back as the primary responsibility of mayors and
    Governors that they need to fund and prepare for rather than
    have Federal funds and FEMA's time, frankly, being used for
    that smaller-scale, routine issues just because, well, there
    are more people living in certain places and those places have
    routine issues, whether they be a tornado in the Oklahoma alley
    or a flood in the Toledo area----
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Mayer [continuing]. Or for you and the issues you deal
    with.
        Senator Begich. Like Alaska.
        Mr. Mayer. Exactly.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        John or Mayor, any----
        Mr. Madden. Well, sir, I am one of the 22 States--Alaska
    is--where the responsibility for homeland security and
    emergency management are combined into a single division.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Madden. So I get to look at this in a little different
    way.
        And that is why the integration of our efforts needs to be
    the objective.
        There are very similar consequences to terrorist acts as
    there are to natural disasters. There is disruption of central
    services and disruption to the population. There is suffering.
    There are injuries. And that is why if we build capabilities
    that well serve the Nation for natural disasters, for the
    consequences, it well serves the Nation against the terrorists,
    but we need to take different preventive and protective and
    mitigative measures in those.
        But we have some universal risks, almost transcendent
    risks, that we need to have at the foundation.
        Senator Begich. No matter what those subject matters----
        Mr. Madden. No matter what.
        Senator Begich [continuing]. We always have a base.
        Mr. Madden. Because cyber attack can happen anywhere. It
    can be Portland, Oregon or Portland, Maine.
        At any time. Any community. Any industry.
        Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive
    can happen at any place within the Nation.
        Mass casualty from many forms--it could be a terrorist
    attack, or it could be an airplane crash or a collapsed
    building.
        There are some of these capabilities that we can increase
    that well serve across a range of those hazards.
        The separation between terrorism and natural disasters--not
    only is it artificial when it comes to consequences. It
    actually invites the extreme measures, or--what Senator Paul
    brought out--it invites the spending of money to accomplish the
    spending of money.
        If we bring this back in and recognize that terrorism is
    not a logical, rational, predictable element, but it is a non-
    zero every place in the Nation--Oklahoma City in 1995 was not a
    rational terrorist attack. It was symbolic. And that can happen
    anywhere.
        But Oklahoma City also has tornadoes.
        The same skills they use for the one can be used for the
    other--command structure, communications, mass casualty.
        Senator Begich. Debris cleanup.
        Mr. Madden. Debris. All those things are capabilities that
    well serve the entire range of those hazards.
        And that is where the separation--not only is it
    artificial, but it is a detriment to the strategic thought of:
    How do we develop the capabilities, for what purpose, and how
    do we integrate that between cities, between States?
        Senator Begich. Mayor, do you have any comment?
        I mean, it is interesting.
        Mr. Euille. Just very briefly, and we had this discussion
    at the mayors' conference just recently in Las Vegas.
        In terms of, again, being responsive, it is all about
    flexibility and the fact that for most cities and towns and
    States across the Nation we do have all of this under one
    umbrella. You do not have a separate office on homeland
    security and a separate office on emergency management--it is
    one umbrella.
        Senator Begich. All one place.
        Mr. Euille. Yes. They work as a team together and
    everything else.
        And in terms of natural--at least in terms of homeland
    security, rather, the eye is always on the prize. We are always
    focused and looking and making certain that our communities and
    our cities and towns are safe from terrorism and everything
    else.
        But I just had on my monthly TV show a campaign--See
    Something, Say Something--not so much on--well, it focused on
    the terrorism elements of it, but in terms of natural disaster
    you cannot see something and say something relative to a
    natural disaster because you do not know when it is going to
    occur. And it will happen, and then you have to be ready to
    respond.
        So, for all the comments and the expressions by Mr. Madden
    here, I certainly support and believe that we need to keep the
    two intertwined, again, but I think it is flexibility that is
    the key here.
        Senator Begich. Is the key.
        Any last comments, and again, Mr. Filler, did you have any
    comment you want to make before I close out?
        Mr. Filler. I would just add that from the earliest days
    the department has embraced the concept of dual use, which is
    basically if you acquire a capability you can use it for either
    a natural hazard or a terrorist event.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Filler. Obviously, there is a difference in prevention.
        And I think States and urban areas around the country have
    embraced that--that this split between terrorism and natural
    hazards, when you get to the ground level, really does not
    exist.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Filler. Obviously, on the prevention side and the
    intelligence side, but for all other practical purposes it is
    really an academic issue and one that I think most of the
    community has worked through and understands.
        Now, if you change how you allocate funding based on
    terrorism risk or natural hazards risk, that will have a
    change. Obviously, New York is a greater terrorism risk than it
    is from an earthquake or even a hurricane despite Hurricane
    Sandy.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Filler. But, for purposes of once the money goes out
    and is used, dual use has been embraced for almost 10 years.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Let me say to all of you; thank you very much for being
    here. The first panel, second panel--you guys are kind of on
    the ground, dealing with it.
        Again, your two unique experiences have been in the system
    and now outside the system. Like you said, sometimes you
    wonder, do I really want that regulation, and now I have to
    deal with it?
        You get what you sow, right?
        But it is helpful. I mean, I think we have--it is clear to
    me more and more as we look at this issue of FEMA. How do we
    create some consistency?
        How we do not just do the churn and burn on the material or
    do as--the thing that bothered me the most was kind of the
    spending plan approach versus what is strategically necessary
    and where those gaps are, you fill them. I think a couple of
    you talked about that and how we do that.
        A piece of what the mayor brought up--and I think in
    Alaska--we are kind of unique because we have this unique
    relationship with our cities and our State. But I can tell you
    in other cities and other States it is not as clean-cut as it
    should be.
        John, you are an exception. I will tell you that, to be
    frank, with all the mayors that I know around the country.
        And we have to figure this out--how to make sure that
    cities who are always going to be, no matter how much you
    strategize, will be the first person on the ground.
        It may be a terrorist act as we saw in Boston or a natural
    disaster in Galena. It is the first. It is that body that is
    right there who may be a volunteer firefighter, a firefighter,
    police officer, EMT, or nurse, whoever it might be. And then
    right next door to them will be the State system and then the
    Federal system.
        And if we are going to be responsive, not only in a
    preventive--or in a response mode but also in the preventive
    mode, which is also the hardest to measure but probably one of
    the most important. We can do certain things, but there are
    these risk factors.
        It is going to be interesting to see over the next period
    of time as we see some recommendations on how we analyze this
    money and use it for risk factor strategic planning versus,
    well, we have a certain amount; spend it; we hope you do well
    with it because that is not the kind of money we have available
    anymore and we have to be much smarter about it.
        So your ideas and your testimony, as well as your written
    testimony--I want to say on behalf of the Committee, thank you
    very much for being here.
        Let me just check one thing. [Pause.]
        The record will be kept open for 15 days for additional
    questions or comments from Members of the Committee. We may
    submit some written questions for you. We would be anxious for
    your response.
        But, again, thank you all very much for being here.
        This Committee is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]