[Senate Hearing 113-762]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. Durbin (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Durbin, Reed, Shelby, and Murkowski.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING, DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES NAVY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN
Senator Durbin. The subcommittee meets this morning to
receive testimony in the fiscal 2015 budget request for the
Missile Defense Agency.
I'm pleased to welcome the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), Vice Admiral James Syring. Thank you for
appearing before the committee today.
For fiscal year 2015, the President's budget requests $7.5
billion for the Missile Defense Agency, and you're planning on
receiving $30.1 billion from fiscal year 2016 through 2019.
As we all know, the Department's budget plan for fiscal
years 2016 through 2019 exceeds the spending caps put in place
by the Budget Control Act by over $115 billion. I hope to hear
from you today on how you would meet sequestration levels in
future years and what this would mean for MDA's ability to
perform its mission of keeping America safe.
We've discussed in the past the threats the United States
faces around the world in the area of missile proliferation and
programs in Iran and North Korea, to name a few. As we attempt
to address these problems with a prudent combination of
political, economic and military tools, we rely heavily on
MDA's capabilities for regional and homeland defense.
Given the threats we face, it's important to get missile
defense right. This budget request includes a number of
proposals to mitigate problems with our fielded systems; most
notably the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI). These are design,
engineering and reliability problems that were largely caused
by the rush to field this system without proper testing. We are
now paying dearly for some of those decisions.
As we move forward with new major acquisition programs, we
need to ensure that we don't let arbitrary schedules trump
sound, fiscally responsibly acquisition practices. ``Fly before
you buy'' makes a lot of sense to me. We simply can't afford to
divert resources from critical new investments in science and
technology or proven successful production programs to pay for
things that should have been done right in the first place.
One example, I'm concerned by the proposal to reduce
procurement quantities of the Standard Missile interceptor.
This missile works, it's in high demand by our Combatant
Commanders around the world, and it's a critical element of
regional missile defense in Europe, which the administration
and this committee are committed to. Yet, your budget request
reduces production by over 40 percent.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We look forward to hearing your thoughts on these issues.
We want to ensure that our fiscal year 2015 appropriation bill
enables the Missile Defense Agency to defend and support our
Nation and interests around the world in a successful, fiscally
responsible manner.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin
The subcommittee meets this morning to receive testimony on the
fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency.
I am pleased to welcome the Director of the Missile Defense Agency,
Vice Admiral Jim Syring. Thank you for appearing before the committee
today.
For fiscal year 2015, the President's budget requests $7.5 billion
for the Missile Defense Agency, and you are planning on receiving $30.1
billion from fiscal year 2016 through 2019. As we all know, the
Department's budget plan for fiscal years 2016 through 2019 exceeds the
spending caps put in place by the Budget Control Act by over $115
billion. I hope to hear more from you today on how you would meet
sequestration levels in future years, and what this would mean for
MDA's ability to perform its mission of keeping America safe.
We have discussed in the past the threats the United States faces
around the world in the area of missile proliferation, and programs in
Iran and North Korea, to name a few. As we attempt to address these
problems with a prudent combination of political, economic and military
tools, we rely heavily on MDA's capabilities for regional and homeland
defense.
Given the threats we face, it is important that we get missile
defense right. This budget request includes a number of proposals to
mitigate problems with our fielded systems, most notably the Ground
Based Interceptor. These are design, engineering and reliability
problems that were largely caused by the rush to field this system
without properly testing it first. We are now paying dearly for that
decision.
As we move forward with new major acquisition programs, we need to
ensure that we don't let arbitrary schedules trump sound and fiscally
responsible acquisition practices. ``Fly before you buy'' makes a lot
of sense to me. We simply cannot afford to divert resources from
critical new investments in science and technology or proven,
successful production programs to pay for things that should have been
done right in the first place.
To give you one example, I am concerned by your proposal to reduce
procurement quantities of the Standard Missile interceptor. This
missile works, it is in high demand by our Combatant Commanders around
the world, and it is a critical element of regional missile defense in
Europe, which the administration and this committee are committed to.
And yet your budget request reduces production by over 40 percent.
We look forward to hearing your thoughts on these issues. We want
to ensure that our fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill enables the
Missile Defense Agency to defend and support our Nation and interests
around the world in a successful and fiscally responsible manner.
Thank you for your testimony this morning. Your full statement will
be included in the record.
Senator Durbin. I will have your testimony after
acknowledging the presence of the Ranking Member of the full
committee, Senator Richard Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Admiral, welcome. I had a nice talk with you yesterday.
Thanks for giving me that opportunity.
I join in welcoming you here today, along with Senator
Durbin. I'm very appreciative of the important work that the
Missile Defense Agency performs. It's a tremendous asset to our
nation.
I believe, and I think this committee will agree, that the
Missile Defense Agency's work to invest in game changing
technology programs is essential to defending the United
States, our deployed troops, allies, and friends against
adversary ballistic missiles.
As you stated in your testimony, Admiral Syring, funding
for MDA is essential to works, and these are your words, ``work
with the warfighter to develop, test and field a network global
ballistic missile defense that is flexible, survivable and
affordable.''
I look forward to working with you and this committee and
the Chairman to ensure that we provide adequate funding so that
our Nation is equipped to counter present and future ballistic
missile defense.
I agree with a lot of people; we live in a troubled and an
unsettled world whether we realize it or not.
Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Senator Shelby.
Admiral, please proceed.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING
Admiral Syring. I want to thank you, Chairman Durbin and
distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity
to testify today.
Out of our total request of $7.46 billion for the fiscal
year 2015 missile defense program, we are requesting
approximately $1.3 billion for homeland defense as we prepare
to expand our GBI fleet to 44 by 2017. My highest priority
remains a successful intercept flight test of the CE-II
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV).
In January 2013, we conducted a highly successful non-
intercept flight test and confirmed we are on the right path to
return GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) to sustain flight
testing.
I am confident we have fixed the problem we encountered in
the December 2010 test and I look forward to conducting the
intercept test FTG-06b later this month. I'm also optimistic
we've identified the root cause, sir, of the intercept failure
involving our first generation EKV last July when the CE-I Kill
Vehicle failed to separate from the booster's third stage.
We've accounted for this issue in the upcoming flight test and
we are working towards a correction to the entire fleet before
the end of the year.
Instead of continuing to make year-to-year reliability
improvements in our GBIs, in fiscal year 2015 we are requesting
to begin the redesign and improvement of the GBI EKV. The new
EKVs will be more producible, testable, reliable and cost
effective and eventually replace the Kill Vehicle used in our
current GBI inventory.
We also begin development of a long ranged discrimination
radar with deployment plan in 2010. The new midcourse tracking
radar will provide persisting coverage and improved
discrimination capabilities against threats to the homeland
from the specific theatre.
We will continue to improve the performance of the Aegis
weapons system and are requesting to procure 30 Standard
Missile Block 1B guided missiles in fiscal year 2015. We will
request 4 year multiyear procurement authority for the 1B
starting in fiscal year 2016.
In addition, in fiscal year 2015 we will procure 31
interceptors for the THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense) system and fund additional AN/TPY-2 radar spares and
an additional THAAD battery for the Army.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I want to be very clear. We remain on schedule to meet the
presidential mandate for the deployments of Phase 2 and 3 of
the European Phase Adaptive Approach. I was just in Romania
last week.
With 15 flight tests planned in fiscal year 2015, we will
continue to test elements of the system, sir, to demonstrate
that they work before we commit to fielding.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring
Good morning, Chairman Durbin, Vice Chairman Cochran, distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify
before you today. Our current budget request of $7.459 billion for
fiscal year 2015 will continue the development of defenses for our
Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international partners against
increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The fiscal year 2015 missile
defense program will support the warfighter and needs of the Combatant
Commanders (COCOMs) with the development and deployment of
interceptors, sensors, and the command, control, battle management and
communications (C2BMC) system that make up the integrated Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS). Our President's 2015 budget request
supports needed improvements in homeland defense and continues strong
support of regional defense initiatives. Our fiscal year 2015 program
plans include continued investments in advanced technologies and future
capabilities to keep pace with the increasingly complex threat.
ballistic missile threat
The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries are
acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their
range and making them more complex, survivable, reliable, and accurate.
The missile defense mission is becoming more challenging as potential
adversaries incorporate BMD countermeasures. Space-launch activities in
Iran and North Korea involve multistage systems that serve to further
the development of ballistic missile technology for longer-range
systems, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-applicable
technologies and systems. As the Director for National Intelligence
testified last year, ``Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small
satellites, and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical
steps . . . provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop
larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an
ICBM.'' Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the
United States by 2015. In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 space launch
vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has paraded the KN08 road-
mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable
of reaching Guam and the Aleutian Islands. Iran also has steadily
increased its ballistic missile force, deploying next generation short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing
accuracy and new submunition payloads. Iran has publicly demonstrated
the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple rockets and
missiles. Demonstrating that it is capable of modifying currently
deployed ballistic missile systems, Iran has flight-tested a Fateh-110
ballistic missile called the Khalij Fars by adding a seeker to improve
the missile's accuracy against sea-based targets. This ballistic
missile has a range of 300 km, which means it is capable of threatening
maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.
support for the warfighter
Our overriding goal is to provide support to the warfighter. With
this budget we will maintain our commitment to build out homeland
defenses to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs), pending a successful
return to intercept this summer, and focus on Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system reliability and GBI performance. We will also
maintain our commitment to deploy Phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). We are continuing efforts to improve the
performance of the Aegis Weapons System and deliver Standard Missile
(SM-3) Block IB guided missiles. We will also deploy a second forward-
based X-band AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan, improving homeland and regional
defense capabilities and increasing our global operational AN/TPY-2
radar posture, and build and improve the C2BMC infrastructure at
fielded sites. We plan to procure interceptors for Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and, pursuant to our agreement with the
Army, fund additional AN/TPY-2 spares and an additional THAAD Battery.
Last year we conducted or participated in over 17 multi-event
exercises and wargames, which are critically important to the
warfighter and the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency. MDA
also worked collaboratively with Combatant Commanders, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services to complete a strategy and
roadmap providing a series of near-, mid-, and far-term architecture
options for the BMDS that are the basis for program planning for the
rest of this decade. In response to the continued fielding by U.S.
adversaries of air, missile, and rocket capabilities, in May 2013 MDA
assumed the responsibility of Technical Authority for Integrated Air
and Missile Defense (IAMD), and as such will lead the Department's
joint IAMD engineering and integration efforts, including interface
definition and control as well as technical requirements allocation.
Finally, we continue to work closely with the Director, Operational
Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) and with independent testers and the
Services. From October 2012 to the present, we have executed 10 high
profile flight tests, 14 if you include our involvement with and
contributions to Israeli flight tests. The highlight was Flight Test
Operational-01 (FTO-01), the historic and unparalleled operational test
of our regional layered ballistic missile defenses this past September,
which involved THAAD and Aegis BMD, ground- and sea-based forward
deployed sensors, and C2BMC. The two targets were launched on
operationally realistic trajectories towards a defended area near the
Reagan Test Site in the Pacific Ocean. This was a highly successful
operational test involving MDA, the Operational Test Agency, Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and U.S.
Pacific Command, as well as U.S. Army Soldiers from the Alpha Battery,
2nd Air Defense Artillery THAAD, U.S. Navy Sailors aboard the USS
Decatur and British sailors aboard the HMS Daring, and Airmen from the
613th Air and Operations Center. Similar to the Flight Test Integrated-
01 test conducted in October 2012, FTO-01 provided the warfighters
confidence in the execution of their integrated air and missile defense
plans and the opportunity to refine operational doctrine and tactics,
techniques and procedures.
In fiscal year 2015 we have 15 flight tests in the Integrated
Master Test Plan. As the BMDS matures, we are continuing to increase
the complexity in our flight test program by: conducting more system-
level operational tests; increasing the number of BMDS assets in those
tests; increasing the numbers, types and ranges of the threat
representative targets we use; conducting more simultaneous launches;
and replicating potential wartime scenarios to realistically exercise
warfighting chain of command to evaluate command and control concepts
of operation and tactics, techniques and procedures. We also have
system-level ground tests that combine the warfighter chain of command
with the developmental system and test under varying conditions to
improve confidence in the system being deployed to Combatant Commands.
We are entering a period of unprecedented complexity and increased
testing tempo based on that complexity. Our flight tests will also
involve an increasingly stressful set of threat representative targets
as well as longer range interceptors for our regional capabilities.
Over the coming years, U.S. Government stakeholders--to include
Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen--and allies will have a larger
role and impact in our test program than ever before.
homeland defense
MDA's highest near-term priority remains the successful GMD
intercept flight test of the newest GBI Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV)--the Capability Enhancement (CE)-II EKV. Based on our analysis of
the data from the successful January 2013 non-intercept controlled
flight test of the CE-II GBI (CTV-01), we plan to conduct FTG-06b, an
intercept flight test, this summer. CTV-01 demonstrated the successful
dampening of the vibration environments that affected the navigation
system and resulted in the failure of the FTG-06a mission conducted in
December 2010. FTG-06b will demonstrate the ability of the CE-II EKV to
discriminate and intercept a lethal object from a representative ICBM
target scene. An increase in the number of GBIs in the fleet assumes a
successful return to intercept of the CE-II EKV.
Last July, with FTG-07, we conducted an intercept flight test of
the upgraded CE-I, or first generation, EKV. We made numerous
improvements to the CE-I fleet through upgrades since the last
successful CE-I flight test in 2008. In FTG-07 the EKV did not
intercept the target because the kill vehicle on the GBI did not
separate from the booster's third stage. The failure investigation is
progressing toward a root cause. Once the investigation is concluded,
we will take steps to make any fixes to the fleet that need to be made
for both the CE-I and CE-II EKVs.
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
limited ICBM attack from current regional threats, such as North Korea
and Iran. Last year we began refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort
Greely, Alaska (FGA) to develop silo capacity to support delivery of an
additional 14 GBIs, continued emplacing GBIs in Missile Field 2 (MF 2),
and continued conducting GBI component testing and refurbishing
currently deployed GBIs to test and improve their reliability. We are
requesting approximately $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2015 for homeland
defenses. We remain committed to a ``fly before you buy'' acquisition
approach. Pending a successful outcome of the GMD intercept flight test
this summer, we will resume taking delivery of GBIs and emplace them in
MF 2 and MF 1 as we progress towards 44 by the end of fiscal year 2017.
Beginning in fiscal year 2016, we will acquire replacement GBIs to
support GMD operations, testing, and spares, pending the outcome of
flight testing.
Construction of the GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System
(IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum, New York is proceeding on
schedule. Once it is operational in late-2015, the east coast IDT will
enable communication with GBIs launched from Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California over longer distances and
improve defenses for the eastern United States by increasing system
performance in specific engagement scenarios.
We currently operate a forward-based X-band radar, the AN/TPY-2
radar, in Shariki, Japan, which is in the northern part of that
country. In September 2012 the Secretary of Defense directed the
deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 X-band radar in Japan to provide
improved tracking coverage for launches out of North Korea. Working
with our Japanese partners, we expect to complete the deployment of the
second AN/TPY-2 radar in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan by the end of
this calendar year. We will also deploy a new C2BMC capability which
will enhance the overall performance of the radars when operating in a
mutually supporting dual radar mode.
We will take additional steps to keep pace with the threats to the
U.S. homeland. We have requested $99.5 million in fiscal year 2015 to
redesign and improve the GBI EKV. The redesigned EKV will be built with
a modular, open architecture and designed with common interfaces and
standards, making upgrades easier and broadening our vendor and
supplier base. The new EKVs will improve reliability and be more
producible, testable, reliable, and cost-effective and eventually will
replace the kill vehicle on our current GBI fleet. We are currently
assessing concepts, acquisition options, and timelines to test and
field the redesigned EKV. Our goal is to begin flight testing the
redesigned EKV in fiscal year 2018. We also request $79.5 million,
which includes $29 million in MILCON funding for planning and design,
to begin development of a Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), with
deployment planned in 2020. The new long-range, mid-course tracking
radar will provide persistent coverage and improve discrimination
capabilities against threats to the homeland from the Pacific theater.
This new radar also will give more geographic flexibility to deploy the
Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar for contingency and test use.
MDA requests $122 million in fiscal year 2015 to support the
Discrimination Improvements for Homeland Defense (DIHD) efforts. The
goal of this effort is to develop and field an integrated set of
capabilities to improve BMDS reliability, lethality, and
discrimination. The end result will be a deployed future BMDS
architecture more capable of discriminating and destroying a reentry
vehicle. Our plans in this area will support a near-term DIHD
capability (2016) and a DIHD capability fielding in 2020.
We are requesting $64 million in fiscal year 2015 for continued
Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar operations. In collaboration with the
Services, Joint Staff, STRATCOM and the COCOMs, we maintained the SBX
radar in Limited Test Support Status, where the radar continues to
support the BMDS test program and remains available for contingency
deployment under the operational command of PACOM. In 2013 SBX
supported real world operations, with 49 days at-sea, and the FTG-07
GMD test with a total of 110 days at-sea and demonstrated an autonomous
acquisition capability.
We are also examining locations for a possible additional CONUS
interceptor site. The current GBI sites at Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg AFB, California provide capability necessary to protect the
homeland. While there has been no decision by the Department to move
forward with an additional CONUS interceptor site, such a site would
add battle space and interceptor capacity should it be deemed necessary
to proceed with deployment. Our CONUS Interceptor Site study determined
the following sites are viable candidates and they are to be included
in the Environmental Impact Statement: Fort Drum, New York; Naval Air
Station Portsmouth SERE Training Area, Rangley, Maine; Ravenna Training
and Logistics Site, Ohio; and Fort Custer Combined Training Center,
Michigan. The Environmental Impact Statement, which will take
approximately 24 months to complete, will assess environmental impacts
at each of the sites, to include potential impacts to land use, water
resources, air quality, transportation, socioeconomics and other
factors established by the National Environmental Policy Act.
For fiscal year 2015 we are requesting approximately $38.6 million
for our network of strategic radars. We will continue missile defense
upgrades of the Early Warning Radars in Clear, Alaska and Cape Cod,
Massachusetts. We expect to complete the Clear radar upgrade in 2017
and the Cape Cod upgrade in 2018. Last year MDA worked with the Air
Force to begin upgrading the Early Warning Radar (EWR) at Clear, Alaska
to give it a missile defense capability, providing improved ballistic
missile defense sensor coverage over the continental United States and
reducing sustainment and operating costs. We also transferred
sustainment responsibility for the Beale (California), Fylingdales
(United Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland) Upgraded Early Warning Radars
back to the United States Air Force.
regional defenses
Deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces,
allies and international partners remains one of our top priorities.
Our fiscal year 2015 budget request funds the continued development and
deployment of defenses against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support of
Combatant Commanders' near-term and future priorities. MDA will
continue to focus on threats from the Asia-Pacific and Middle East
regions as we continue to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach
to protect our deployed forces and our allies.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
In fiscal year 2013 MDA delivered 37 THAAD Interceptors and
expended two in flight tests, for a total of 84 delivered to Army war
stock. We also delivered hardware for fielding of the third THAAD
battery: 2 Tactical Station Groups, 6 Launchers, and a set of Peculiar
Support Equipment. Training of the soldiers who will operate the third
THAAD battery has begun and we expect it to be completed in fiscal year
2015. This year we expect to deliver the fourth THAAD battery. In
collaboration with the Services, Joint Staff, STRATCOM and the COCOMs,
we achieved first operational deployment of the THAAD capability for
the defense of Guam. In recent tests we demonstrated THAAD's ability to
intercept an MRBM as part of an integrated operational test with Aegis
BMD (FTO-01), the second intercept of this class of target since FTI-
01. THAAD has put together a remarkable record of success, successfully
intercepting 11 out of 11 targets with the operationally configured
interceptor.
For fiscal year 2015, MDA is requesting $464 million for THAAD
procurement, which includes the purchase of 31 THAAD interceptors. We
also are requesting $300 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2015
and $76 million for THAAD operations and maintenance. We will continue
to enhance THAAD's ability to operate through post-intercept debris,
enable launch of THAAD's interceptors using sensor data provided by
other BMDS sensors, and maintain capability against current and
evolving threats. THAAD will conduct two flight tests in fiscal year
2015. In FTT-18 THAAD will demonstrate an intercept of a separating
IRBM target using the THAAD radar, launcher, fire control and
communication, interceptor closed loop operations, and engagement
functions. In FTO-02 THAAD will engage a SRBM with associated objects
and demonstrate advanced radar algorithms.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Last year MDA completed six BMD Weapons System installations on
Aegis ships: two Aegis BMD 3.6; three Aegis BMD 4.0; and one Aegis BMD
5.0 (USS John Paul Jones) in conjunction with the Navy's Aegis Baseline
9 installation. The USS John Paul Jones will replace the USS Lake Erie
as the BMD deployable test ship to support MDA and Navy testing of
Integrated Air and Missile Defense capabilities. We now have a total of
30 BMD capable Aegis ships in the Fleet. In 2013 we delivered 10 SM-3
Block IAs and 16 SM-3 Block IBs. By the end of 2015, over 65 SM-3 Block
IBs will be delivered.
We are requesting $929 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2015
to continue development, testing, and installation of Aegis BMD
capabilities to defeat longer range and more sophisticated ballistic
missiles launched in larger raid sizes. We request $435 million in
fiscal year 2015 for Aegis BMD procurement, which includes $348 million
for 30 SM-3 Block IB guided missiles and $12 million for operations and
maintenance of SM-3 Block IAs. In response to the Combatant Commanders'
demand for more BMD ships with the latest tested capability, Navy and
MDA have incorporated Aegis BMD into the Navy's Aegis DDG Modernization
Program and new construction DDGs. We will continue upgrading the
capability of existing BMD ships and integrating new and modernized
ships to the BMD fleet, with a planned operational availability of 43
Aegis BMD ships in fiscal year 2019. MDA coordinates BMD upgrades and
installs with the Navy, and this plan will adjust if needed based on
the Navy's new construction, Aegis modernization, and availability
schedules. The homeport transfer of four Aegis BMD ships to Rota, Spain
began this past February with the USS Donald Cook. Another Aegis BMD
ship, USS Ross is scheduled to transfer later this year, and the
remaining two Aegis BMD ships will transfer in 2015.
With the Japan Ministry of Defense, we completed multiple SM-3
Block IIA component Cooperative Development Project Critical Design
Reviews, including: Staging Assembly, Steering Control Section,
Guidance System, Third Stage Rocket Motor, Sensors, Kinetic Warhead
Guidance Electronics Unit Assembly, Divert and Attitude Control System,
and Kinetic Warhead, culminating with an overall missile system
Critical Design Review, in October 2013. Also in October, the SM-3
Block IIA completed Propulsion Test Vehicle-01 in which the missile and
new composite canister both demonstrated successful and safe ignition
and egress from the vertical launching system.
Last year was a significant year for Aegis BMD testing, with five
for five successful intercept tests and successful transmission of Long
Range Surveillance and Track data through C2BMC to the GMD system in
FTG-07. FTM-20 (February 2013) demonstrated the ability of the Aegis
BMD 4.0 Weapon System to Launch on Remote using data from the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstrator satellites. FTM-20
employed an SM-3 Block IA against a unitary medium-range target. High
quality infrared fire control data from STSS was provided through
C2BMC. C2BMC generated very high quality fire control quality data and
passed the track data over operational communications links to the
firing Aegis ship to conduct a launch on remote engagement. This
complex test proved the value of an integrated C2 and sensor network
and the use of space-based sensors to expand the BMD battle space. FTM-
19 (May 2013) supported the development and assessment of the Aegis BMD
4.0 Weapon System and the SM-3 Block IB prior to an fiscal year 2014
full-rate production decision. A second Aegis BMD ship successfully
acquired the target and conducted a simulated engagement using space-
based sensor data.
In a span of 23 days, Aegis BMD was a principal player in three
major operational flight tests: FTO-01, FTM-21 and FTM-22, which all
achieved successful intercepts. FTM-21 (September 2013) and FTM-22
(October 2013) fired SM-3 Block IBs to validate operational
effectiveness and suitability of the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and
the SM-3 Block IB. FTM-22 was our fifth consecutive successful
intercept mission using the 4.0 Weapons System and SM-3 Block IB and an
important milestone for Phase 2 of the EPAA. FTM-21 and FTM-22 also
completed Director Operational Test and Evaluation Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation flight testing requirements for the 4.0 Weapons
System and the SM-3 Block IB.
To complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation requirements
for the 4.0 weapons system, we also conducted a tracking exercise, FTX-
18, over the Atlantic Ocean in January 2014, which confirmed the
capability of the 4.0 weapons system to track and engage a raid of
three ballistic missile targets with simulated SM-3 Block IBs. In this
event, multiple Aegis BMD baselines participated, yielding comparative
raid performance data, including the Aegis Ashore Romania deckhouse at
Lockheed Martin in Moorestown, New Jersey. The Aegis Ashore system will
be deployed to Romania later this year.
We also continue development of a Sea Based Terminal capability to
provide protection of maritime forces against advanced anti-ship
ballistic missiles and increased layered defense for forces ashore.
Using an incremental development approach, we are incorporating BMD
capability into the Navy's Baseline 9 architecture, to include terminal
defense with the SM-6 guided missile and the BMD 5.0 weapon system. In
2013, we completed the initial design phase and initiated software
development for missile and weapon system modifications. We plan to
test and certify the first increment of Sea Based Terminal capability
in 2015. We also finalized the requirements for the second increment of
Sea Based Terminal capability, scheduled to certify in 2018.
The fiscal year 2015 Aegis BMD flight test program will include
almost all of the Standard Missile variants, with firings of SM-3 Block
IBs from ships as well as the PMRF Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test
Center, execution of raid scenarios with engagements in both Anti-Air
Warfare and BMD warfare areas, Launch on Remote for long-range
engagements, developmental Controlled Test Vehicle firings of the SM-3
Block IIA missile, and tracking exercises for the Sea Based Terminal
weapon system configuration.
European Phased Adaptive Approach
We will continue to support the EPAA to provide coverage of
European NATO territory from Iranian ballistic missile threats by
investing resources for EPAA development, testing and deployment. Phase
1, which provides coverage of NATO territory in Europe with the
deployment of Aegis BMD 3.6 ships with SM-3 IAs and a SPY-1 radar in
the Mediterranean, the AN/TPY-2 radar (Forward Based Mode) to U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) in Turkey, and the C2BMC Spiral 6.4 system at
Ramstein AFB in Germany, has been operational since the end of 2011.
Our goal in EPAA Phase 2 is to provide robust capability against
SRBMs and MRBMs. The architecture includes the deployment of the Aegis
BMD 4.0 and 5.0 weapon systems with SM-3 Block IBs at an Aegis Ashore
site in Romania and at sea. A formal ground-breaking ceremony for the
Aegis Ashore site took place in Deveselu, Romania in October 2013. The
start of construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania
this year involves the delivery of the deckhouse from Moorestown, New
Jersey to Romania. The site will be integrated into the EUCOM command
and control network, tested and operational by December 2015. MDA
requests $123 million in fiscal year 2015 to continue development of
the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. We also request $226
million in fiscal year 2015 for the continued procurement of equipment
for Aegis Ashore in Poland.
Four months after disassembly and transport of the Aegis Ashore
equipment to the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) began, an Aegis
Light Off ceremony was held on 6 December, 2013 to commemorate the
first time the Aegis Combat System was powered on, with Sailors manning
the consoles and the system brought on-line at the PMRF deck house
facility. Last month we conducted the first test, a controlled test
vehicle test, from Aegis Ashore test facility at PMRF, successfully
firing the SM-3 IB against a simulated target. We plan to conduct
additional flight tests at this facility in 2015.
Deployment of Phase 3 will enhance and expand protection for
European NATO countries and U.S. forces through the region from MRBMs
and IRBMs from the Middle East. In support of EPAA Phase 3, the SM-3
Block IIA, which we are co-developing with the Japanese government, and
an upgraded version of the Aegis Weapons System are on schedule to be
available for deployment in 2018 at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and
Poland, and at sea. MDA requests $264 million in RDT&E funding in
fiscal year 2015 to continue the bilateral, cooperative effort. The
upgraded Aegis Weapons System and C2BMC system with engage on remote
AN/TPY-2 radar (forward based mode) capability combined with the
faster, longer reaching SM-3 IIA will expand Aegis BMD battle space to
counter more sophisticated threats and will extend coverage to NATO
allies in Europe threatened by longer range ballistic missiles.
Working closely with Navy, we will deliver the upgraded 5.1 Aegis
BMD Weapons System as a part of the Navy's Baseline 9 architecture on
ships for deployment worldwide in 2018 to support Combatant Commanders
requirements to counter an expanded threat set. This past year we
continued development of the Aegis BMD 5.1 fire control system.
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and Sensors
In 2013 we continued to support warfighter operations of the EUCOM
BMDS capability for regional defense. In partnership with the Combatant
Commands, we maintain the capability to engage multiple simultaneous
threat attacks in the region. As the foundation of BMDS, the MDA C2BMC
team supported the warfighter in real world operations across multiple
Areas of Responsibility, which included deployments to the Middle East,
Turkey, and Kwajalein. Last year we fielded software upgrades to U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) and installed
Spiral 6.4 MR-2 at PACOM, NORTHCOM, and STRATCOM. This year we
completed software upgrades to CENTCOM and EUCOM. We also delivered the
Distributed Training System to CENTCOM for Air and Missile Defense
Exercise 13-2.
For the first time, in 2013, we conducted a flight test with
successful debris mitigation (FTO-01) and also generated fire control
quality track data from space sensors for a live fire Launch-on-Remote
Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapons system and SM-3 Block IA engagement (FTM-20). In
addition to continuing the enhancement of global BMD survivable
communications and support for operations and sustainment of C2BMC at
fielded sites, in fiscal year 2015 we will integrate Space Based
Infrared System Increment 2 capabilities into C2BMC to support cueing
of BMD sensors worldwide. We will also improve sensor data integration
and battle management in C2BMC to support Aegis BMD cueing and launch-
on and engage-on remote capability.
In support of homeland and regional defense, we continued to
sustain AN/TPY-2 operations and supported the deployment of additional
AN/TPY-2 radars and the C2BMC infrastructure. For the second AN/TPY-2
radar deployment to Japan, we identified candidate sites, conducted
site surveys, selected sites, obtained agreements with the host nation,
and initiated site design efforts. We deployed the AN/TPY-2 (Terminal
Mode) as part of a THAAD battery in the PACOM Area of Responsibility.
Last year we relocated the AN/TPY-2 radar in CENTCOM to a permanent
location. Additionally, we accepted the AN/TPY-2 radar Number 8 and
provided it to the 3rd THAAD Battery; awarded a production contract for
AN/TPY-2 Number 12; awarded a production contract for an additional
Prime Power Unit; and awarded a contract for AN/TPY-2 spares.
We request $393 million in fiscal year 2015 to develop and deploy
BMDS sensors (includes Long Range Discrimination Radar), and $183
million to operate and sustain the nine AN/TPY-2 radars and support the
UEWRs and Cobra Dane radar. We request $444 million in fiscal year 2015
to operate and sustain C2BMC at fielded sites and continue C2BMC
program spiral development of software and engineering to incorporate
enhanced C2BMC capability into the battle management architecture and
promote further interoperability among the BMDS elements, incorporate
boost phase tracking, and improve system-level correlation and
tracking. We will also continue communications support for the AN/TPY-2
radars and C2BMC upgrades. We request $31 million for continued
operation of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System and Near-Field
InfraRed (NFIRE) satellite system in fiscal year 2015. We continue to
operate the two STSS-D satellites to conduct cooperative tests with
other BMDS elements and demonstrate the capability of the satellites to
cue and track against targets of opportunity to provide high precision,
real-time tracking of missiles and midcourse objects that enable
closing the fire control loops with BMDS interceptors. We also continue
to operate the NFIRE satellite, which has the capability to collect
near-field phenomenology data for use in developing plume to hard-body
handover algorithms for boost phase interceptor programs.
developing new capabilities
We are developing fiscally sustainable advanced technology that can
be integrated into the BMDS to adapt to threat changes. Our investments
are focused on technology that brings upgradeable capability to the
warfighter. Our advanced technology investments are determined by
systems engineering, which permits us to evaluate and determine which
emerging technical solutions will best address gaps in the BMDS and
enhance its overall capability and performance. The goal of our
technology investment strategy is to deploy a future BMDS architecture
more capable of discriminating and killing reentry vehicles with a high
degree of confidence, allowing the warfighter to dramatically improve
shot doctrine. One of our greatest challenges is the ability to bring
multiple sensor phenomenology (i.e., reflective and thermal properties
of the missile) into the missile defense architecture. Relying purely
on terrestrial radar for precision tracking and discrimination of the
threat is a potential weakness our enemy could exploit in the future.
Adding persistent electro-optical sensors to our architecture is a high
payoff solution for this gap.
MDA requests $45 million in fiscal year 2015 for Discrimination
Sensor Technology. We will integrate advanced sensors on existing
unmanned aerial vehicles and demonstrate their ability to create a
precision track that shooters can use to target their interceptors
quickly and accurately. We will test the first precision track sensors
at PMRF this fall. In parallel, we will begin integration and ground
test of an advanced sensor upgrade to these precision track sensors
with follow-on flight testing in fiscal year 2016. MDA's Discrimination
Sensor Technology development and test plan is a cost-effective,
stepping stone to MDA's long-term goal of persistent discrimination
coverage from a space platform.
Additionally, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and MDA are
collaborating on future space sensor architecture studies and sensor
performance assessments across a broad set of joint mission areas and
on Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) studies with threat definition,
technical evaluations, and cost analysis support. MDA is supporting
AFSPC in its review of concepts that will inform an AoA for the future
of protected military satellite communications and overhead persistent
infrared systems. As an example, MDA is exploring the potential of
BMDS-focused space sensors that also provide data contributing to Air
Force missions such as Space Situational Awareness.
MDA requests $14 million in Weapons Technology in fiscal year 2015
to combine the knowledge gained from our Discrimination Sensor
Technology effort with our high-power directed energy program to build
the foundation for the next-generation laser system capable of
addressing advanced threats and raids at a much lower cost than
existing missile interceptors. We are pursuing a unique set of laser
technology to execute missile defense missions from high-altitude, low-
mach airborne platforms operating in the clear, low turbulence
stratosphere. We have been developing two promising solid-state lasers:
one at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the other at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory
collaboratively with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). Both lasers achieved record power levels within the last year.
MDA will continue high energy efficient laser technology development
with the goal of scaling to power levels required for a broad spectrum
of speed of light missile defense missions. This year, we are working
with several aircraft prime contractors defining concepts for
integrating a multi-kW class laser into a mid-altitude, unmanned aerial
vehicle. A laser test platform addresses a broad spectrum of mission
applications and we will continue our collaboration with our service
partners, the Air Force Research Laboratory, and DARPA for joint
development and test opportunities.
MDA requests $26 million in fiscal year 2015 for the Common Kill
Vehicle (CKV) Technology effort. MDA's strategy is to achieve as much
commonality among future GMD kill vehicles and other future kill
vehicles for Aegis BMD and THAAD. In fiscal year 2014 this CKV
technology effort will help establish the requirements foundation for
the redesigned GMD EKV, which we are now planning as the first phase
(Phase I) of our overall kill vehicle development strategy. Our fiscal
year 2014 joint government and industry concept definition effort will
also assess the ability of industry to meet those requirements. In
follow-on CKV efforts, or Phase II, we will make investments that
reduce the costs of production and weapon system operations through new
kill vehicle architectures and scalable technology that improves the
effectiveness and performance of our interceptor fleet against an
evolving threat. Our investments in large format focal plane arrays,
smaller inertial measurement units and high performance propulsion
components as well as new kill vehicle architectures are key enablers.
This technology development allows us to engage a more numerous and
increasingly more complex threat, eventually establishing the
technology foundation for killing multiple lethal objects from a single
SM-3 or GBI.
MDA requests $16 million in fiscal year 2015 for the Advanced
Research area which conducts leading-edge research and development with
small businesses, universities, and international partners to create
and advance future missile defense capability. This effort includes
managing the Small Business Innovation Research and Technology
Applications programs to help MDA-funded small businesses to transition
their technology to missile defense applications. MDA is also seeking
to leverage the creativity of our Nation's universities by sponsoring
academic research focused on developing breakthrough capabilities for
missile defense.
MDA requests $9 million in fiscal year 2015 for the Advanced
Concepts & Performance Assessment effort, which delivers independent
assessments of government, university, and industry technology concepts
that, along with systems engineering requirements, support acquisition
strategy decisions and define our technology focus areas. This effort
has greatly improved our assessment of advanced BMD technologies to
address evolving threats for the warfighter. We work directly with
universities, federally Funded Research and Development Centers,
University Affiliated Research Centers and innovative small businesses
to develop cutting edge data collection, modeling techniques, hardware-
in-the-loop, and high performance computing platforms to speed the
assessment of innovative technology concepts.
international cooperation
MDA is engaged with over twenty countries and international
organizations, such as NATO. Our major international efforts reflect
the Department's goals in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Europe:
building partner BMD capacity, supporting the strategic shift to Asia-
Pacific, and executing EPAA deployments.
Building Partner BMD Capability
Since I last testified before the committee, we had several
successes in our cooperative development programs with our Israeli
partners. Through our cooperative efforts, Israel is developing a
layered and robust BMD capability. In November 2013 the Israel Missile
Defense Organization (IMDO) and MDA achieved a second successful
intercept using the David's Sling Weapon System. This past January we
successfully conducted the second fly-out of the Arrow-3 upper tier
interceptor. These programmatic milestones provide confidence in future
Israeli capabilities to defeat the evolving ballistic missile threat in
the Middle East. Another recent and significant accomplishment for the
Department is the precedent-setting international agreement with Israel
regarding coproduction of the Iron Dome missile defense system that was
signed on March 5, 2014. The agreement supports increasing U.S.
industry co-production of Iron Dome components.
Our largest co-development effort is with Japan on the SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor. Japan has committed significant funding for their part
of this co-development project. Japanese and U.S. components will be
fully integrated and flight tested in the coming years. The Japanese
dedication to this program ensures we will remain on track to deliver
SM-3 Block IIA in support of the EPAA Phase 3 in the 2018 timeframe.
After spending a year establishing processes, procedures, and an
information technology infrastructure, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency designated MDA a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Implementing
Agency in February 2012 for the THAAD missile defense system and the
AN/TPY-2 radar. MDA is currently executing one FMS case with the United
Arab Emirates for two THAAD batteries and accompanying launchers,
radars, and interceptors. We are actively engaged with several nations,
particularly those in the Gulf region, to provide program information
and pricing and cost data that may inform future decisions to procure
THAAD as an upper tier missile defense capability.
Supporting the Strategic Shift to the Asia-Pacific
As I have already stated, along with the cooperative efforts on the
SM-3 Block IIA, the United States and Japan are working together to
support the deployment of the second U.S. forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar.
Our Japanese partners should be commended for their efforts in
supporting this deployment to the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF)
base in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan. This radar will enhance both
regional BMD capability and improve defense of the U.S. homeland.
MDA also supported the deployment of a THAAD missile defense system
to Guam for the defense of U.S. deployed forces in the region. This is
our first long-term deployment of a THAAD battery.
Executing EPAA Deployments
Last October MDA and other Department leaders participated in a
groundbreaking ceremony for the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Site
preparation work has started, and we are on schedule with military
construction activities demonstrating real steps to deliver EPAA Phase
2 in the 2015 timeframe.
In addition to programmatic planning and deployment activities, MDA
is also supporting EUCOM efforts to ensure the necessary Implementing
Arrangements are in place to support EPAA fielding timelines. In the
near-term, this means coordinating on and, where possible, streamlining
the construction, site activation, and equipment acceptance processes
in Romania. We are also laying the groundwork for these efforts in
Poland. Again, all activities are on track to support the stated EPAA
timelines.
We are also working through NATO to ensure U.S. C2BMC and NATO
command and control networks are fully interoperable. The United States
and NATO test existing and future ballistic missile defense
capabilities through a series of ongoing test campaigns in order to
evaluate current capabilities and reduce risk for future development.
MDA will continue to engage NATO and regional Allies in support of
U.S. national security strategy through international cooperation in
missile defense. For instance, the United States is working with NATO
on a study to identify cooperative opportunities for European nations
to develop and procure missile defense capabilities to complement the
U.S. EPAA contribution to NATO BMD.
MDA remains engaged and committed to expanding work with our
international partners, to include conducting joint analyses to support
partner missile defense acquisition requirements, cooperative research
and development projects, co-development, deployments, FMS, and co-
production. It is an honor to work with dedicated international
partners on activities that benefit both U.S. and international
contributions to missile defense architectures.
cybersecurity
MDA has been working diligently to enhance the cybersecurity
posture of missile defense networks and improve the protection of
ballistic missile defense information. MDA has developed new policies,
partnered extensively with industry and other Department of Defense
organizations, and has continuously increased investments in
cybersecurity to ensure our networks and information remain secure
against cyber attacks.
I have coordinated policy Memoranda with the DOD Chief Information
Officer's office and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics and signed MDA Policy Memoranda on ``Securing
Ballistic Missile Defense Information on Government and Non-Government
Networks and Systems.'' These require MDA program executives, program
managers, contracting officials, and contractors to follow existing
guidelines and implement new cybersecurity measures. We published MDA
Manual titled: ``Procedures for Protection of Critical Program
Information and Mission-Critical Functions and Components within the
Missile Defense Agency.'' We conducted a cybersecurity industry day
titled: ``The Emerging Role of Cybersecurity in Missile Defense Agency
Acquisitions.'' This served to inform MDA industry partners of new
cybersecurity requirements and threats and elicited feedback from
industry representatives on how they can meet the new cybersecurity
requirements. MDA also expanded a partnership with DOT&E to test and
experiment with cybersecurity on MDA systems. This partnership
leverages DOT&E resources and teams MDA with special cyber expertise
and extensive knowledge of current threats.
The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) performs continuous
monitoring of MDA government information systems to protect and defend
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of MDA networks and
data. MDA is enhancing the established integrated security
architecture, aligned to the Defense Enterprise Security Architecture
that constantly improves methods to protect, monitor, analyze, detect,
and respond to unauthorized activity within MDA information systems.
Cyber boundary protection measures include state-of-the-art firewalls,
intrusion detection and prevention systems, and email spam/virus
prevention capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency will continue to
work closely with Federal agencies, industry partners, and others to
identify and implement measures to further increase the security of
missile defense information while continuously seeking to improve
technologies and capabilities that protect MDA critical program
information.
I am proud to report we completed our first experiment with DOT&E
in February. In the first experiment, MDA successfully demonstrated
cybersecurity improvements that are in development. As a result of
extensive interactions with a live cyber Operational Force during the
first experiment, MDA will pursue new ways to strengthen cybersecurity
that will be demonstrated in future experiments.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, we have stayed focused on our core mission. We will
continue our work with the warfighter to develop, test, and field a
networked, global BMD system that is flexible, survivable, and
affordable and invest in promising and potentially game-changing
technology programs to ensure the BMDS will be capable of defeating the
complex threats we expect to face in the future. In order to ensure we
are using the taxpayer's dollars wisely and deploying effective missile
defense capabilities, we will continue to test elements of the system
to demonstrate that they work before we commit to their fielding. It is
vital that we provide the warfighters the cost-effective and reliable
weapon systems they need to do their job. I remain dedicated to
committing the manpower and resources to correcting the issues in our
GMD program, executing a successful intercept flight test this summer,
and keeping the focus on reliability in our operational homeland
defenses. We continue to make good progress in our work with our
international partners, and I want to increase my focus on those
important efforts.
I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TESTING
Senator Durbin. Admiral, later this month, as you
mentioned, you will attempt a GMD intercept flight test.
Essentially, it's a do-over of the two flight test failures of
the air 2010.
You stated repeatedly that a successful intercept is a
prerequisite before purchasing any additional Ground-Based
Interceptors. I'd like to ask you two questions.
The first question: You and I met yesterday and you noted
that the whole world will be watching this test not just
friends of the United States but even our enemies. First, how
realistic will this test be? What kind of circumstances have
been built into this to give an advantage to the interceptor?
How will this stack up against a real attack on the United
States; this particular test circumstance?
The second question: If, unfortunately, there is a bad test
result, what then will you have to say about the future of this
program?
Admiral Syring. Sir, the answer to the first question in
terms of operationally realistic scenario, it is very
operational and realistic in terms of a threat that we may face
from North Korea. Now, there are a range of limitations,
obviously, in terms of our ability to test across the entire
Pacific Ocean, but we are testing at thousands of kilometers at
very high intercept velocities. Very, very similar to what we
would experience with the threat ICBM (Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile) from North Korea. I think Dr. Gilmore would
validate that.
In addition, we do, as we have the last couple of tests,
plan countermeasure which would be part of an expected scene
from a threat from North Korea, as well. So we've seen good
performance in terms of what the system saw in the last test
with the same sort of countermeasure package and I'm confident
that this test will demonstrate the same. So I would say it is
very operationally realistic.
Now, as you and I have discussed, there are necessary
scripted parts of the scenario that we must conduct for safety
reasons and for range limitations that are part of not just
this test but every test that I do with Aegis and that as well.
The second part of your question, Mr. Chairman, is on what
happens if we fail. I believe it is, if I can paraphrase. And
the response would be we would, like every test, we would find
out, first, what failed. There's many parts of the system that
could fail that are part of a successful intercept test. It's
just not the GBI or the Kill Vehicle. So we would go through a
very rigorous, very thorough failure review board process.
If it turned out to be something very simple in terms of
maybe the wrong weapon task plan that was transmitted to the
interceptor from the radar or some issue that we haven't seen
before, we would quickly find out what happened, correct, and
try to get back to flight as soon as possible. If it was
another Kill Vehicle problem, which would now make us 0 for 3
on this design, I think you would see us take a step back and
assess taking delivery of the EKVs that we're planning to take
delivery upon a successful flight test.
Senator Durbin. Admiral, the GAO (Government Accountability
Office) tells us that the cost of demonstrating and fixing the
GBI is about $1.3 billion. This includes flight test costs,
failure review costs and retrofits. Have you been able to
recoup any of these additional costs from the contractors as a
consequence of performance? What actions are you planning on
incorporating in future GBI procurement to protect the
Government from having to cover unforeseen cost?
CONTRACTS
Admiral Syring. Sir, the failure really goes across two
contracts; an old contract and the new contract that was
awarded. And there have been fee decrements in terms of award
fee and incentive fee that the contractor has lost. Going
forward, now entirely under the new contract, if there is a
failure, say in the next test or the test after especially with
the next version which is the CE-II block one, there are
provisions in the contract for us to recoup paid fee; to go
back retroactively and pull fee back. So I'm confident that has
a good provision in it going forward.
Senator Durbin. When you described the problems with the
first two tests to me yesterday, they were a bit more technical
than I'm familiar with in my capacity. But there appears to be
a kind of breakdown in the actual mechanics. You talked about
the vibration of a certain engine and the failure of another
valve to close; if I remember correctly. Are those the types of
things that, if they occur in the future, you would say to the
contractor, ``You bear the responsibility for not producing
what you promised.''
Admiral Syring. Absolutely. Sir, yes, sir.
Senator Durbin. And that would carry with it a financial
burden on that contractor?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Durbin. In the past, it's been difficult to
distinguish the cost for acquiring the actual interceptor from
other GMD program cost since interceptors were incrementally
funded along with ongoing design and engineering. Can you tell
us how much the 14 additional interceptors you're planning to
procure in the future will cost?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we, right now in the budget, we have
roughly $75 million per interceptor starting in fiscal year
2016 at a procurement rate of two per year.
Senator Durbin. Can you assure the committee that before
production of these missiles we'll have full cost data for each
of these interceptors?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
AEGIS ASHORE
Senator Durbin. Admiral, construction of the Aegis Ashore
site in Romania concludes later this year and you're planning
to follow that with construction of an Aegis Ashore site in
Poland beginning in fiscal year 2016. Can you give us your
outlook on how this is progressing and do you have sufficient
military construction and procurement funding in your budget to
fully execute Aegis Ashore in Romania and Poland?
Admiral Syring. The answer to the second part of the
question is yes, sir, 100 percent funded, on track for
completion. The Poland request is for next year. The big
request for Poland and the MilCon and all of those pre-
agreements and negotiations with host country are going very,
very well. Romania is, as I said, is on track. I was there last
week. We are actively managing that between myself and the Army
corps of engineer head. I'm confident that that will deliver on
its stated milestones.
Senator Durbin. Admiral, the budget request includes $175
million for the procurement of Iron Dome batteries and
interceptors for Israel consistent with our Government's
commitment to fund a $680 million requirement for the state of
Israel by fiscal year 2015. The program has been very
successful against rockets launched from Gaza toward Israel and
was developed in field in record time. Can you give us an
update on the production timeline for additional batteries and
interceptors? And what role is there for U.S. industry to
contribute to this program?
ISRAELI CO-PRODUCTION
Admiral Syring. Sir, I'm very pleased, and I know you know
this, that we've signed a coproduction agreement with Israel
back in March which would give 30 percent of the stated Iron
Dome production in the first year to the United States and 55
percent in the second year. The request this year is for $175
million. So there will be a significant amount of U.S. work
share to help our Israeli partners produce and field the Iron
Dome interceptors.
I would defer on the number of batteries and the number of
interceptors to a classified forum as they protect that
information. But, with the coproduction agreement and with the
ongoing contract negotiations that are going on between the
U.S. company and the Israeli company, we will work through
those details together to come up with the right cost, model,
and the right overall price to the Government of Israel.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Admiral, on April 30, General Odierno testified before this
very committee affirming, again, the importance of funding U.S.
Missile Defense capabilities. This notwithstanding
sequestration. The General stated then, and I'll quote him:
``Our missile defense program and our ability to protect
ourselves, is becoming more and more important as the Army
continues to have over 50 percent of its ballistic missile
defense capability deployed around the world.''
Admiral, Senator Durbin rightfully questioned you just a
few minutes ago about the implications of failure. And you're
going to have failure from time-to-time in testing as you
develop this, and there's nothing better than success in our
performance. Let's assume that you're going to have a
successful--you don't know what you're going to test coming up,
but what are the implications of that and is there a ring to
that around the world?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
As you know, historically, sir, with the older Block of
interceptors, we've been successful. We've tested three times
successfully before the failure last July. The failure last
July, I won't go into details in this forum, but it was very
simple. And I'm confident that we've corrected that going back
and that it's been accounted for going forward underscoring the
need to test. And you know I testified last year saying that we
can't go 3, 4, or 5 years between tests because the importance
of what we learn is critical to the program and critical to the
confidence of the warfighter. Upon success--if I can, sir?
Senator Shelby. Go ahead.
Admiral Syring. Upon success later this month, we would
then take delivery on the next batch of interceptors that are
ready to go. As you know, we've been on a delay and a lot of
those have been put under contract but we, the Government, are
not accepting them until the successful flight test. And upon
that, we'll begin accepting those; we'll begin taking
interceptors out of the ground to, now, put those improvements
in the interceptors that are fielded; and then, the final step
will be to complete what we call the CE-II Block 1 program,
which is a rocket motor booster avionics upgrade that's
absolutely necessary for OBSA lessons and that will comprise
the next nine. So, by the end of 2017, we'll have a total of 47
which will be 44 in the ground plus 3 spares.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, the threat that North Korea poses
to the Asia Pacific region and to the world, I believe, is
real. In March, North Korea, you know this well but I'm just
doing this for the record, North Korea tested a midrange Rodong
missile, which has a range of over 600 miles. In light of this
and other developments, South Korea has discussed a possibility
of deploying a THAAD battery.
What kind of threat in your judgment does North Korea pose
in terms of mid and potential long range ballistic missile and
what are the possibilities of deploying a THAAD battery to
South Korea?
NORTH KOREA
Admiral Syring. As I discussed with you, sir, the threat
that North Korea poses to South Korea is very real. And they've
demonstrated, through flight testing, a capability that
threatens that country. And they paraded longer range missiles
around--North Korea has paraded longer range missiles around
their country on annual provocation cycles that are concerning,
to say the least, to myself and--Admiral Locklear.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, again, during your testimony
before the Senate Armed Services committee in April of this
year, you warned against the ballistic missile threat stating
then, these are your words: ``Our potential adversaries are
acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles. Increasing
their range and making them more complex, viable, reliable and
accurate.''
MISSILE AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER
And we're all troubled by the proliferation here. I'm
encouraged sometimes by the important work that the Missile and
Space Intelligence Center does to combat this threat. Could you
discuss here in this hearing or would it take a classified
hearing on MDA of the Missile and Space Intelligence Center's
work and what opportunities do you see for greater cooperation
in the future?
Admiral Syring. Sir, they're a key component and a key
partner in our development efforts. Everything that we develop
and improve is based on their intelligence assessments. And
we've also done a lot of work with them in other areas that are
classified that I look to continue in the future.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, the Missile Defense Agency and the
Navy, together, successfully completed their first flight test
of the Aegis Ashore system component less than a month ago, on
May 21. During the flight test, the Aegis weapons system
effectively targeted a simulated ballistic missile threat with
a Standard Missile SM-3 Block 1B (SM-3 1B) guided missile. What
do you see is the future role of the SM-3 Block 1B guided
missile? Can you talk about that here?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
That will be the--the SM-3 1B will be the workhorse for the
Aegis BMD fleet going forward. We'll go through the FYDP
(Fiscal Years Defense Plan) to procure over 300, close to 400,
of these missiles before fiscal year 2019. They'll be loaded
out on the, today, 30 BMD capable ships going to 43 by the end
of the FYDP. SM-3 1B will be the cornerstone and the
interceptor that we field in Romania in 2015. It is the
workhorse for the fleet around the world.
IRON DOME
Senator Shelby. Just for the record, Senator Durbin asked
you some questions about the cost and production, everything,
about the Iron Dome. Just for the record, tell us about the
Iron Dome and we know--a lot of us know about it. You know more
than anybody. How important is that in the future and should we
spend that money?
Admiral Syring. The----
Senator Shelby. In your judgment.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
I've been to Israel. I've seen the real threat that they
face. I've stood on the Hill. I've talked to the folks. I've
talked to kids in Israel who are concerned every day of the
threat they face; the schools and the shelters that they must
run to upon attack is nothing that we face in this country.
The Iron Dome system is incredibly effective. I won't say,
you know, there's different views on the, you know, the
percentage of intercepts. But that's based on what they
actually try to intercept versus what is not a threat to the
population. And when it needs to intercept, it does. And it's
proven very, very effective.
In terms of application for our use, I would defer that
question, sir, more to the Army and their development of a
requirement for it. They certainly are deploying and are all in
on PATRIOT and the PATRIOT upgrade and then the future of that,
as well.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, in your judgment, do you believe
that the Defense capability against missiles, defensive
posture, has grown in recent years faster than the offensive
missile capability, or is it a standoff?
Admiral Syring. I would answer that in two ways, sir.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE THREAT
Admiral Syring. We certainly are ahead of where the longer
range threat maturity is in terms of the field that GBI
interceptors. And we've worked to stay ahead of the threat with
Aegis and THAAD to make sure that not just in numbers but in
capability they're able to counter the ever increasing
complexity of the threat.
We'll never be able to field a system that's going to
intercept hundreds or thousands of ballistic missiles. Our
purpose is to provide a first line of defense around the world
and that's what we're designed to do.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to
consider a closed hearing with the Admiral because a lot of
things we can't get into it in open session here but I think
it's important----
Senator Durbin. Of course. Let's talk about it at a
mutually convenient time for that.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your service and your leadership.
STANDARD MISSILE-3
Senator Shelby made the point about the SM-3 and it's vital
but, as we're looking at comparing numbers, it looks like this
budget submission there's a reduction in the number of SM-3s
you're buying. Is that a budget pressure, or a more efficient
deployment, or what's the story?
Admiral Syring. Sir, two issues that force the reduction in
quantity. One, we were behind in terms of finishing the
required testing for operational fielding which we were very
successful with last year. There was an issue with one of the
interceptors that we had to flush out and then a retest. So we
were late in terms of the original plan.
So in terms of putting missiles under contract, in August
of last year we put 33 under contract and then I'm getting
ready to award, this month, another 52. And then, you know, as
you stated, 30 in next year. So really, in a period of about 18
months we'll have awarded 115 missiles. That's a lot of work.
And then I think you'll see us get back to 52 in the request
next year, hopefully, under a multiyear authority. So I think
we got it right.
Senator Reed. Good, good.
Let me ask a question with respect to Ground Missile
Defense. In order to provide guidance and telemetry to the
launch vehicle and the Kill Vehicle wraps, you need external
sources; radars and other satellite, et cetera. How vulnerable,
and you might want to take this for close session, are those
external sources to cyber-attack so that someone contemplating
a launch would first conduct a cyber-interruption of your
guidance systems?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we've looked at that and I'd like to
take that to a classified session.
Senator Reed. But it's a serious concern?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
AEGIS MODERNIZATION
Senator Reed. With respect to the Aegis program, it is one
of the most adaptable and critical to the defense not just of
the United States but our allies. The total number of ships
that you would like to see by fiscal year 2019 is 43 but the
Navy, in their budget this year, are restricting the operating
status was at least four of those Aegis ships. Are you
anticipating a problem with availability of Aegis platforms in
going forward?
Admiral Syring. Sir, it's a good question.
As you know, we're tied to the Navy and their modernization
plans but we're also working with the Navy in terms of the, and
not to get too technical here, but the 4.1 is the computer
program. And that gives, you know, current Aegis ships like the
Flight I's and II's significant BMD capability without going
through a full modernization.
So we're in support, we're driven in some cases by the
numbers, but I'm confident that the 43 is good through 2019. I
was just with the Navy last week.
Senator Reed. But, of those, at least four of those ships
will be, sort of, limited duty; if that's the right term. Even
with that status, you're confident that you can call upon them
when necessary?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. One of the issues here is that, and it's
becoming increasingly important, is our cooperation with
allies. And, you know, in the Pacific, the Japanese, they are
very serious about cooperating, et cetera. Can you talk about
the plans you have with respect to ballistic missile defense
not only operationally but also in terms of research,
development, coproduction, and that, you know, tough budget we
could ask--we could get assistance?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
STANDARD MISSILE-3 2A
The Japanese, our partners from Japan, have been very
helpful and are equal partners on the SM-3 2A development and
have stepped up to the plate in a big way in terms of carrying
a lot of that load. And they're not only just great financial
partners, they're great technical partners. I'm confident that
missile is in a good place because of their partnership; one
example.
Senator Reed. Let me go back to the Ground Missile Defense
program, and this is a question that's not rhetorical. Correct
me if I'm wrong but the test vehicle, is it launched from one
of the silo missiles that you have, the 44 missiles?
Admiral Syring. It's launched from a test silo at
Vandenberg.
Senator Reed. At Vandenberg.
So the actual force that's in the field now, we don't
launch from those physical facilities?
Admiral Syring. There's a silo at Vandenberg that's
dedicated to test.
Senator Reed. And do you have to compensate in terms of,
you know, are we at the phase--I guess the question would be
we've got 44 missiles in the ground, we never shot any of
those----
Admiral Syring. We'll have 44 in the ground by 2017.
Senator Reed. 2017.
Admiral Syring. Thirty, today.
Senator Reed. Yes.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TESTING
Admiral Syring. And, yes, we're limited to testing out of
Vandenberg. We would never, and can't, test out of Fort Greely.
Senator Reed. But there's got to be, at least, a small
translation problem between a test range at Vandenberg and the
actual--you're planning for that? Are you compensating for
that? Are you----
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
What happens is, and I've described the limitations of the
range, and it is shorter range, although it's still thousands
of kilometers. We take the results of that test and we feed it
back into our models and extrapolate for the entire range of
intercept.
Senator Reed. All right.
Admiral Syring. Which gives us confidence.
Senator Reed. You've made the point that, you know, even
the most sophisticated defense system can't stop a barrage of
hundreds of thousands of missiles but when will we get to the
point where we're engaging multiple missiles coming at us? How
many years away?
THREAT
Admiral Syring. I'll answer that in a classified session. I
could talk about numbers and current shot doctrine but the
request that we have in front of you is to greatly improve
where we are today in terms of the number of interceptors that
we fly at each threat.
And the way we do that is, one, reliable EKV and
interceptors, and two, the ability to discriminate at a very
complex decoy scene which we see as the future. So you need to
have high confidence in the reliability of the interceptor and
be able to inform the interceptor what the correct target is in
the debriefing. And both of those are critical too to
countering more threats to the future.
Senator Reed. And just to the question Senator Shelby
alluded to, and I'll conclude because we'll do it in close
session, is that there's a trajectory for offensive
capabilities and there's a trajectory for defense capabilities.
And one question is are we ahead or where do the lines cross?
And that would be a valuable but I suspect you want to say that
in close session.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. I would. And I would like to do
it with Admiral Winnefeld, as well, who thinks a lot about
this.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir.
Senator Durbin. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, welcome and thank you for your leadership.
I want to follow on the questions that my colleague and
friend from Rhode Island has been asking about this next
scheduled test for the GMD test scheduled for the 22nd of this
month. We have historically launched our target missiles from
the Kodiak launch complex. In fact, there were eight launches
between 2004 and 2010 and I'm told that the last successful
intercept that we had of the GMD system was when we used the
complex there at Kodiak.
So the question for you this morning is given that this
next test coming up in the end of June is going to be launched
out of Kwajalein, the last 4 years, the tests have all come out
of Kwajalein, what do you see as the future of the Kodiak
complex? Are there plans to return to the complex for any
launches? I would think and I guess, just looking at the map, I
would think there would be cost savings, actually, that come
from the Kodiak complex given that you're 2,000 miles past
Hawaii there. Can you just speak to the Kodiak complex and
where it fits in to the testing?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am.
The Kodiak complex was very useful to us in the past. And I
agree with your assessment. And it gets really back to the
Chairman's question in terms of operationally realistic
scenarios. In terms of a threat from North Korea coming to the
United States is, in layman's terms, is head on. And that sort
of geometry is very, very important to us. But geometry,
perpendicular, if you will, to the threat access was useful
early on. But the way we are progressing our tests is to be,
again, more operationally realistic and move consistently up to
higher intercept velocities and longer ranges; are the two
areas we're concerned with.
I'll be happy to come over and share with you our
assessment at a classified session in terms of the plan testing
and the limitations that Kodiak has with those tests.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I would appreciate that level of
discussion. Again, I think we recognize that we have had some
good results out of Kodiak. There is clearly value. So it would
be helpful for me to understand your perspective here.
What is the annual testing requirement for the existing
intercepts? And how do we maintain that the confidence in the
reliability for these systems while we're working towards the
redesign of the EKVs? How do you do this simultaneously?
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TESTING
Admiral Syring. The first part of your question: The annual
test cost for a GMD intercept is about $200 million. That
includes the cost of the interceptor, the cost of the target,
and all of the support that goes into it. It's a huge national,
sort of, level test.
The point on how do you ensure reliability in terms of
everything that's going on with the redesign and everything
that is happening in the current program or record actually is
confidence in reliability and component testing and modeling of
the components to ensure that we understand where the weak
links are in the design, and work to improve those, is one way.
And, as we return to 44, you'll see, I think, a renewed
emphasis and focus in the program on that very issue.
Senator Murkowski. The recommendation for the GMD testing
here, coming out of the various committees here in the Senate,
have recommended additional funding for maintenance and
reliability upgrades that are not included in your fiscal year
2015 budget request. It appears, looking at what the various
committees have advanced, that the amount needed to address the
maintenance and the reliability concerns is in the range of $30
million to $50 million. Based on your assessment of what needs
to happen with the maintenance and the reliability
requirements, how much additional funding do you actually think
you need in the fiscal year 2015 to make sure that we are to
that point; that we can ascertain that we have what we need for
the maintenance and the reliability?
Admiral Syring. I would answer it in two ways, ma'am.
Inwardly, within the agency, there's amounts that can be
made available through below-threshold reprogramming in fiscal
year 2014 and we're certainly actively pursuing that within my
authority. The other part would be to work through the
Department on a request above the budget request and to gain
acceptance and really concurrence on the needed and necessary
improvements in the program. And I'm working that today with
the Department.
Senator Murkowski. Okay.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I requested an additional $250 million
in the appropriations request that I had advanced for
additional GMD upgrades. You know, certainly that's higher than
we're talking about here. And I recognize, given the budget
environment, certainly willing to work to scale that back but I
do think that it is necessary to work to maintain the
reliability of this system. So, as we look to determine what
that right number is, I would hope that we would have good
discussion on that.
And then, last, Admiral, I want to ask you about the Long
Range Discrimination Radar. We follow pretty closely, in
Alaska, what is going on with missile defense and take the role
that we have as a state, where we are host to the GMD system
there at Greely, very seriously. I have been encouraged by what
we're seeing coming out of the development of the Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and the fielding schedule that
we're looking at and having it operational within Alaska,
within this next decade.
I was somewhat troubled to see that on the House side they
have struck out your fiscal year 2015 request for the LRDR
planning. So I would like for you to describe not only what the
capabilities that LRDR brings to the missile defense system but
also to the basing aspect of it. I think, or at least I've been
told pretty consistently, that this will be based in Alaska.
There's some discussion as to where it might be and how the
siting will impact the effectiveness of that. So if you can
speak to the LRDR system?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am, and I'll keep it short.
LONG RANGE DISCRIMINATION RADAR
But there are eight active trade studies that we're
conducting within MDA and with the warfighter to answer those
exact question in terms of where is the best placement of the
radar; what is the right frequency of the radar; what is the
right power of the radar to meet what we project to be the
threat in 2020.
The importance of the radar is that it provides us that
needed discrimination capability against the threat from North
Korea. As they continue to progress and add decoys and
countermeasures, and I'll stop there in terms of
classification, we must have a discrimination capability of a
radar to counter that to keep our shot doctrine manageable and
to defeat raid sizes of more than one. And I view it in
conjunction with the EKV redesign that I've asked for in this
budget, as well. That's the two most critical components, the
GMD program, going forward in addition to the needed
reliability improvements; absolutely vital.
Senator Murkowski. You mentioned that you are doing the
assessment, the analysis, there for this siting. Do you have
any idea as to when those decisions might be made and, more
importantly, made public?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am.
Over the course of the summer, I'm on a very aggressive
timeline to award this radar in fiscal year 2015 to meet the
fiscal year 2020 capability, which I view as critical. I would
take it for the record, but it'll be over the next several
months, ma'am, and we'll be sure to come over and see you.
[The information follows:]
The Missile Defense Agency is working with the Warfighters to
finalize the Long Range Discrimination Radar site selection. The
selection will be made public when the final request for proposal is
released this fall.
Senator Murkowski. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.
Admiral, thank you for your testimony today. We're looking
forward to the results of your test in just a few weeks.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel Coats
Question. The Canadian Senate is currently reviewing Canada's
missile defense policy and its lack of interest to participate in U.S.
homeland missile defense. While we understand that the decision is
ultimately Canada's, could you please explain potential benefits of
Canadian participation in U.S. missile defense efforts?
Answer. Until formal government-to-government discussions on
ballistic missile defense (BMD) participation between the U.S. and
Canada occur, and the Canadian Government makes a policy decision on
its intent to participate in BMD activities and the extent of that
participation, it is premature to discuss any capabilities or potential
benefits of Canadian participation in U.S. BMD efforts.
Question. Could you please describe the benefits that an East Coast
missile defense system would give you, both in terms of tracking and
capabilities, should a land based Aegis site be deployed?
Answer. [Deleted].
Question. Given Russia's recent aggressive actions in Ukraine,
could the U.S. speed up the construction of land-based missile defense
sites in Poland and Romania? What additional resources would be
required to do so?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is on schedule to deliver
Aegis Ashore (AA) to Romania in 2015 and Poland in 2018 to support
European Phased Adaptive Approach Phases II and III. It would be costly
if the Department of Defense (DOD) decides to accelerate deployment of
these systems. Acceleration would not include the more capable Standard
Missile (SM)-3 Block IIA guided missile, and there are other associated
risks.
With regard to Romania, construction began at the AA Romania site
in October 2013. No opportunities exist to accelerate the schedule on
the ongoing military construction (MILCON) project due to procurement
schedules of long-lead items.
By increasing shift work, we could accelerate Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) weapon system (AWS) installation, integration,
and testing by approximately 2 months with additional research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) funding. Any acceleration to
the Navy's integration, testing and manning schedule and plans must be
determined by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
With regard to Poland, there are two options to accelerate
deployment of AA Poland:
Option 1. Acceleration of AA Poland by 9 Months
Shorten MILCON contract acquisition time by awarding a negotiated
sole source contract:
--May result in a higher negotiated cost requiring more MILCON
funding.
--Coordination with United States (U.S.) Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) as the DOD construction agent is required to revise
acquisition strategy and obtain sole source approval.
--Current AA host nation-Poland (HN-PL) AWS equipment contract
delivery date supports this option.
Option 2. Acceleration of AA Poland by 18 Months
Requires MILCON authority and funding availability in the fiscal
year 2015 budget:
--May result in a higher negotiated bid requiring more MILCON
funding.
--Contracting acceleration; issue a sole source design-build
contract.
--Requires coordination with USACE as the DOD construction agent to
revise acquisition strategy and obtain sole source approval.
Requires more RDT&E funds due to an accelerated schedule requiring
complex premium shift work and additional equipment. Includes
specialized material handling equipment during site activation,
installation and checkout, and transition and transfer leading to
initial operational capability.
Requires AWS equipment swap with Navy, coordinated with Navy
Program Executive Officer, Integrated Weapon System (PEO IWS), and must
be authorized by Congress:
--Maintains current AA HN-PL AWS equipment contract delivery date.
--AWS ship set accelerated delivery does not require modification of
funding.
--Margin exists in AWS delivery where both options support
operational capability.
The accelerated AA system will be able to launch SM-3 Blocks IA and
IB guided missiles. The Aegis BMD 5.1 weapon system (required to launch
the IIA missile) and SM-3 Block IIA missile will not be available
earlier than 2018. However, compliance with section 223 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011 (Public Law 111-383)
requires us to not procure other than long-lead, or deploy operational
missiles on European land until operationally realistic testing of the
interceptor and system are certified to Congress.
The MDA can only address costs and programmatic impacts of MDA
responsible efforts. A more complete response requires coordination
with the Navy and other organizations to more fully reflect Department
costs, operational impacts, and national security policy implications.
Note: The MDA delivers all SM-3 missiles to U.S. Fleet Forces
Command (USFF) for allocation to combatant commanders. USFF determines
the mix of variants deployed to ships and ashore based on ballistic
missile defense requirements through the Global Force Management
process. Deploying SM-3 interceptors to Poland before delivery of the
SM-3 Block IIA in 2018 would reduce the availability of SM-3 Block IB
guided missiles.
Question. In what timeframe should we expect North Korea to develop
multiple warhead technology? If this is a conceivable threat, what
response is proposed by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency?
Answer. [Delete].
Question. The latest congressionally mandated Department of Defense
report on China's military modernization for the first time mentions
that China is developing a new ICBM called the DF-41 that may have
multiple warheads. What is your estimate for how many Brigades of the
DF-41 that China may eventually deploy and what new threat does this
missile pose to the security of the United States?
Answer. This question requires an intelligence assessment to
answer. The Missile Defense Agency respectfully defers to the DOD
intelligence community.
Question. Both Russia and China are now in the process of
developing and soon, perhaps deploying new multiple warhead-armed
ICBMs. Is it time for the Missile Defense Agency to revisit the
development of a missile defense interceptor that can defend against
multiple incoming warheads?
Answer. As specified in both the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
signed by the Secretary of Defense in 2010 as well as the Presidential
Policy Directive on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense signed by the
President in 2011, it is the policy of the United States that the U.S.
Ballistic Missile Defense System is not intended to threaten the
strategic balance with either the Russian Federation or the People's
Republic of China. As currently designed and deployed, the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system is directed toward the projected limited long-
range ballistic missile threats emanating from North Korea and Iran.
The Missile Defense Agency is continually assessing improvements in our
missile defense capabilities to address the evolving threat.
Question. According to reports citing U.S. Defense Department
sources, China earlier this year tested a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
(HGV) warhead. What new threat would a HGV pose to U.S. forces and does
the Missile Defense Agency have the means to protect U.S. forces from
HGVs? What new capabilities would be required to defend against HGVs?
Answer. [Delete].
Question. China is developing and may soon deploy a new class of
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), with one identified as
the ``DF-26.'' Does the Missile Defense Agency have the means to defend
U.S. forces from IRBMs?
Answer. [Delete].
Question. China is estimated to have amassed up to 1,400 ballistic
and cruise missiles against the Taiwan. Given the volume of this
threat, is it advisable for allies and friends facing this level of
threat to seek a more economical form of missile defense, such as the
Rail Gun? When could Rail Gun technology be developed in order to offer
allies and friends a defense against massive missile threats? Does the
Missile Defense Agency support any ongoing Rail Gun related programs
that could defend against massive short range ballistic missile
threats?
Answer. As specified in both the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
signed by the Secretary of Defense in 2010 and the Presidential Policy
Directive on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense signed by the President in
2011, it is the policy of the United States that the U.S. Ballistic
Missile Defense System is not intended to threaten the strategic
balance with either the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of
China. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working closely with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO)
and the Office of Naval Research to assess the feasibility of the rail
gun for ballistic missile defense.
Regarding the question, ``When could Rail Gun technology be
developed in order to offer allies and friends a defense against
massive missile threats?'' this question is better addressed by the
Office of Naval Research, since this a Navy program.
The MDA does support ongoing rail gun related programs that could
defend against massive short-range ballistic missile threats. We have
been working closely with the SCO and the Office of Naval Research, and
are supporting electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG) as follows:
--Identifying and assessing fire control sensor options and
continuing to participate in sensor trade studies.
--Helping to assess propagation effects, accuracy and guidance law
analysis.
--Assisting with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) target
identification and integrated testing expertise.
--Providing systems engineering expertise, threat and scenario
identification, and cost estimating support to evaluate the
utility of this weapon for BMD.
--Assessing Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) integration requirements.
--Assessing potential role for EMRG in BMDS and IAMD architectures.
A significant systems engineering effort would be the next step in
assessing the value of this technology for defense against ballistic
missile threats.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Durbin. I will tell the members of the subcommittee
that we're going to reconvene on Wednesday, June 18, at 10 a.m.
to receive testimony from the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At this time, the subcommittee is going to stand in recess.
Thanks, Admiral.
[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., Wednesday, June 11, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
June 18, 2014.]