[Senate Hearing 113-762]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. Durbin (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Durbin, Leahy, Murray, Shelby, Collins,
and Murkowski.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN
Senator Durbin. The subcommittee meets this morning to
receive testimony on the fiscal year 2015 request for the
United States Army. I am pleased to welcome the Secretary of
the Army, John McHugh; the Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond
Odierno, thank you; the Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
General Frank Grass; the Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant
General Jeffrey Talley; and the Acting Director of the Army
National Guard, Major General Judd Lyons. Thanks for being
here.
The fiscal year 2015 President's budget request includes
$119 billion for the Army that falls under the Defense
Subcommittee's jurisdiction. The budget request does not
include funding for Overseas Contingency Operations, known as
OCO. That's a big concern. Until we receive the President's
plan for support in Afghanistan post-2014, it's really
difficult if not impossible to appropriate proper levels of
funding to support our warfighters.
To comply with the budget caps specified in the Budget
Control Act (BCA), the Army is facing an estimated $170 billion
in budget reductions over the next 10 years on top of
sequestration, which forced the Army to cut an additional $37
billion in fiscal year 2013.
How to achieve these savings is a familiar story. Each
military service is forced to find a balance between end
strength, readiness and modernization. The Army is reducing end
strength as rapidly as possible in order to rebuild readiness.
But to do this, you must accept greater risk in modernization
programs. Your fiscal year 2015 request establishes obvious
priorities. The purpose of this hearing is to investigate the
rationale behind those decisions and determine whether they are
the right ones.
Despite budget challenges we face, we cannot waver from
protecting our most precious asset. I say to you, gentlemen,
and I know that you know this far better than I do, not only do
you represent our men and women in uniform and their families
but you also represent a devoted and competent and professional
civilian workforce, a crucial part of the Army team. However,
there's a proposal recently surfacing in Congress to cut DOD
(Department of Defense) civilian workforce by 15 percent and to
somehow use the ``savings'' to invest in weapons systems and
other capabilities.
Our witnesses know the value of our civilian workforce. I
see it in my home State of Illinois at the Rock Island Arsenal.
When the private sector couldn't provide our troops with what
they needed to fight with in Iraq, the civilian workers at Rock
Island stepped up to answer the call. These men and women are a
national treasure wherever they serve our military.
Rock Island is also home to much of the Army's contract
oversight capability, which we've only recently rebuilt as a
Nation. I hope that many people still remember, in the 1990s,
large civilian layoffs forced the Pentagon to hire contractors
to oversee contractors. And the result was tens of billions of
dollars wasted in Lead System Integrator or TSPR (Total System
Performance Responsibility) contracts.
This outsourcing of weapons systems oversight cost
taxpayers and the Army dearly. The Future Combat Systems
program cost $20 billion before it was cancelled, and yielded
very few fielded capabilities. Another example, the Ground
Mobile Radio, which was 7 years behind schedule and 70 percent
over its development budget when it was finally terminated.
The drastic cuts in civilian oversight were a critical
failure in both of these programs. We cannot repeat this
mistake again.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I look forward to working with you, our distinguished
panel, throughout the year; so that our fiscal year 2015
appropriations bill can enable the United States Army to
successfully defend our national interests around the world.
We sincerely appreciate your service to America and the
dedication and sacrifice made daily by the men and women in our
Army.
Thank you, ahead of time, for your testimony. And your full
statements will of course be included in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin
The subcommittee meets this morning to receive testimony on the
fiscal year 2015 budget request for the United States Army.
I am pleased to welcome:
--The Secretary of the Army, John McHugh;
--The Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond T. Odierno;
--The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass;
--The Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Jeffrey W.
Talley;
--The Acting Director of the Army National Guard, Major General Judd
H. Lyons.
Thank you for being here with us today and providing your
testimony.
The fiscal year 2015 President's budget request includes $119
billion for the Army that falls under the Defense Subcommittee's
jurisdiction. The budget request does not include funding for Overseas
Contingency Operations, which is a major concern for the Committee.
Until we receive the President's plans for support in Afghanistan post-
2014, it is impossible to appropriate proper levels of funding to
support our warfighters serving in war zones.
To comply with the budget caps specified in the Budget Control Act,
the Army is facing an estimated $170 billion in budget reductions over
the next decade, on top of sequestration, which forced the Army to cut
an additional $37 billion in fiscal year 2013.
How to achieve these savings is a familiar story: Each military
service is forced to find a balance between end strength, readiness and
modernization. The Army is reducing end strength as rapidly as possible
in order to rebuild readiness. But to do this, you must accept greater
risk in modernization programs. Your fiscal year 2015 request
establishes obvious priorities. The purpose of this hearing is to
investigate the rationale behind those decisions and determine whether
they are the right ones.
Despite the budget challenges we are facing, we must not waver from
protecting our most precious asset--our people. Gentlemen, not only do
you represent our men and women in uniform and their families, you also
represent the civilian workforce, who are a crucial part of the Army
team. However, a proposal has recently surfaced in Congress to cut
DOD's civilian workforce by 15 percent, and use the savings to invest
in weapons systems and other capabilities.
Our witnesses know the value of this workforce. I see it every day
in Illinois at the Rock Island Arsenal. When the private sector
couldn't provide our troops with what they needed for the fight in
Iraq, the civilian workers at Rock Island stepped up to answer the
call. Those personnel are a national treasure.
Rock Island is also home to much of the Army's contract oversight
capabilities, which we've only recently rebuilt as a Nation. Some may
have forgotten, but in the 1990s, large civilian layoffs forced the
Pentagon to hire contractors to oversee other contractors--and the
result was tens of billions of dollars wasted in ``Lead System
Integrator'' or ``TSPR'' contracts.
This outsourcing of weapons system oversight cost the Army dearly.
The Future Combat Systems program cost $20 billion before it was
cancelled, and yielded very few fielded capabilities. Another example
is the Ground Mobile Radio, which was 7 years behind schedule and 70
percent over its development budget by the time it was terminated.
The drastic cuts in civilian oversight were a critical failure in
both of these programs, and it is a mistake that we cannot afford to
repeat again.
I look forward to working with you, our distinguished panel,
throughout the year; so that our fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill
can enable the United States Army to successfully defend our national
interests around the world.
We sincerely appreciate your service to our Nation and the
dedication and sacrifices made daily by the men and women in our Army.
Thank you for your testimony this morning, and your full statements
will be included in the record.
Now I will turn to the Vice Chairman, Senator Cochran, for his
opening remarks.
Senator Durbin. Senator Cochran is not here at this moment
but I will recognize him for opening remarks when he does
appear.
Senator Collins, is there anything you'd like to say at the
outset?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank you for holding this hearing to
review the Department of the Army's fiscal year 2015 budget
submission.
Last January, I joined a bipartisan group of 58 Senators in
sending a letter to Secretary Hagel supporting a strong Army
National Guard and urging him to carefully consider the
appropriate balance of Active and Reserve component personnel.
I was, therefore, disappointed when the President's budget
request calls for such drastic cuts to the Army Reserve and
National Guard end strengths.
As the military resizes, following more than a decade of
war, I believe that the Department of Defense should place
greater reliance on the more cost effective Reserve and
National Guard components; not less. Time and time again, the
Army National Guard has answered our Nation's call to duty,
whether here, at home, or halfway around the world. And we must
make certain that we retain the important capabilities that the
Guard represents.
So, for my part, I look forward to engaging the witnesses
today on that important issue. And I will continue to press for
maintaining a strong Army National Guard.
Let me just end by saying that I think it would be a
disaster if the sequestration, which has already harmed our
Government, comes back into play in the year 2016. And I hope
that we can ensure that doesn't happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Senator Collins.
I was given a note by the staff that Senator Cochran had to
return to Mississippi because of the tornado damage. He won't
be with us this morning, but I'd like to recognize Senator
Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I just want to welcome
Secretary and Chief of Staff and all of these other panelists
today. I look forward to hearing them.
Senator Durbin. Thanks a lot, Senator.
Secretary McHugh.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MC HUGH
Secretary McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Shelby, Senator Collins. Thank you for allowing us to
be here. This is my fifth appearance before this distinguished
subcommittee. And, as always, we deeply appreciate the
opportunity to discuss, what I know you'll agree, the really
incredible work of our soldiers, our civilians and our leaders
this past year to talk with you as well about the current state
of America's Army. And as I think you, perhaps better than many
on this Hill, understand the very perilous times that lie ahead
should the vital requirements in our budget request not be
approved.
I think it's important that I be clear up front and, simply
put, the time for action is now. And frankly, perhaps as much
as any time in our recent past, we need your support and your
leadership going forward. We believe, very strongly, we require
this budget to properly restructure, reduce, and to revamp our
force. And, quite frankly, we need it to protect your Army as
we march into a dangerous and very unpredictable future.
As you, the members of this subcommittee know, full well,
the cuts that Senator Collins mentioned, that we've endured
from the Budget Control Act and sequestration, have already
damaged our readiness, drastically reduced our modernization
programs, and demanded sharp cuts to our end strength. These,
coupled with significant shortfalls in 23 OCO funding, caused
your Army to enter this year with a $3.2 billion hole in
readiness alone. Moreover, and although the Bipartisan Budget
Agreement provides some temporary relief, we're still
implementing a $7.7 billion cut to our fiscal year budget
request for 2014, and, to meet our top line requirements, we've
had to cut another $12.7 billion from our 2015 submission.
In order to protect current operations, our combat power,
as well as our soldiers and their families, we've been forced
to make extremely hard choices in this budget. Choices that
impact virtually every component, will affect every post, camp
and station, and limit nearly every modernization and
investment program.
This is not what we want. It's not what I believe your Army
deserves, but it is what we have had to do to preserve
America's land power in such an austere fiscal environment as
constructed by the dictates approved in law. Nevertheless, in
spite of turbulent funding and tremendous change, this past
year has been one of great transition, transformation, and, I
might add, triumph for America's Army not just here at home but
across the globe as well. From intense combat to
counterterrorism retrograde to humanitarian relief, disaster
assistance, and regional engagement, your soldiers, civilians
from every component, Active, National Guard, and Reserve, have
seen unprecedented success, saved countless lives, and promoted
freedom and democracy in some 150 nations around the world.
In Afghanistan, as your Army continues to fight insurgents
and terrorists, we further transition into a training and
support role helping to set conditions for elections in April
and appropriate withdrawal in December. Simultaneously, we
continued one of the largest retrograde operations in history;
returning, removing or demilitarizing some 580,000 pieces of
equipment in the past 12 months alone. We plan to retrograde
over $10.2 billion of the Army's $15.5 billion in equipment
that remains there at this time.
As we continue to fight in one theater, we also expanded
our regional alignments conducting dozens of engagements with
partners around the world. From the rebalance to the Pacific to
exercises in the Middle East, Africa, South America, and
Europe, our soldiers demonstrated their global responsiveness,
reassured our allies, and deterred would-be aggressors.
As our forces performed these vital missions around the
world, the Army began a major transformation to reorganize our
brigade combat teams (BCTs), accelerate end-strike reductions,
and cut our headquarters staff; all designed to help protect
critical readiness and seek more balance under severe budgetary
constraints.
As we continue to retrograde, restructure, and reduce, we
also continue our transition to decisive action training
replacing our recent focus on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately,
due to the severe cuts in fiscal year 2013 we were forced to
cancel seven combat training rotations and significantly reduce
home station training. Although we ensured deploying units were
fully trained, sequestration cuts directly impacted the
training, readiness, and leader development of more than two
divisions' worth of soldiers. And although readiness levels
will increase through this year and into fiscal year 2015, as
Senator Collins did note, the pending return of sequestration
in fiscal year 2016 will quickly erode these gains.
Finally, I'd be remiss if I did not thank the Chairman,
particularly for his comments about our extraordinary civilian
employees. As the Chairman has said, they have borne a great
burden. They have faced, over the past year, pay freezes and
furloughs. And although our fiscal year 2014 appropriation
brought some much needed relief, I fear we have yet to see the
true impacts of these cuts as it will bear on their morale and,
sadly, their retention. We owe them so very, very much.
Our fiscal year 2015 budget reflects the challenging fiscal
times in which we live by making the hard strategic choices
now. No question we face difficult decisions to further reduce
end strength, realign our aviation assets, prioritize near-term
readiness, and protect soldier and family programs. We do much
of this by taking calculated risk in modernization and
facilities programs. This budget is lean, it is stark, but it
is critical to meet the needs of our Nation and its soldiers.
And our request will begin further reductions to our end
strength; reaching 450,000 Active, 335,000 Guard, and 195,000
Reserve soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2017.
It's important to note that we're also adjusting our force
mix in favor of the Reserve component. This is the maximum end
strength we can afford to protect readiness and the minimum we
need to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.
Nevertheless, this is not without risk.
Members, we believe very strongly we must restructure our
aviation portfolio. We know this is controversial, but we have
no choice. The money is gone and we must balance these vital
assets in a way that maximizes our readiness and minimizes
costs across all components. And make no mistake about it, if
our restructure proposals are delayed or rejected whether
through a commission or other actions, we will be forced to
take other immediate cuts to the Active Forces and those
programs that have already been heavily impacted; further
eroding our readiness and in impacting manning both civilian
and military at every post, camp and station in the United
States.
So, instead, we propose generating savings by reducing our
total number of rotary platforms from seven to four. We will
divest the older, less capable Kiowa Warrior and TH-67 trainers
in favor of the Apaches and the Lakotas. In support, the Guard
will transfer their low-density, high demand Apache attack
helicopters to the Active Army and, in return, receive over 100
of our most modern Blackhawks, which are ideal for the dual
combat and state support role.
This is the right thing to do. It allows us to better
sustain a modernized more capable fleet across all components
and significantly reduce sustainment cost. Once again, the vast
majority of cuts, a total of 86 percent, come from the Active
Army. Overall, the Guard's fleet will decline by just 8 percent
while the Active Force declines by some 23 percent.
At its core, our Army is people. Accordingly, we are
committed to protecting our soldiers, civilian, and family
programs and, where appropriate, adding resources. And, in
fact, we increased funding by nearly 46 percent across the
myriad of programs associated with our ready and resilient
campaign. In the prevention of sexual assault and harassment
and suicide to transition assistance and comprehensive soldier
and family fitness, we are determined to meet the needs of our
warriors, employees and their families. We believe we have a
sacred covenant with all who serve and all who support them and
we will not break it.
Regarding facilities, our budget is just 49 percent of our
fiscal year 2014 MILCON appropriation. And we are deferring
some 20 projects across all components with, again, the vast
majority coming from the Active component.
On a related note, let me take a moment to mention BRAC
(base realignment and closure). I know it's not popular. As a
member, I had a base in my district that closed due to BRAC. It
wasn't fun. It's hard and we understand that. But, it was
necessary then and, we believe, it's more necessary now. We
cannot afford to pay for the maintenance and upkeep of unused
or unnecessary facilities. It wastes money that we just don't
have.
Members, as I've noted, we didn't want to make these
decisions. We didn't want to limit our programs or cut the
Army's end strength, but we had little choice. Nevertheless, we
firmly believe we've developed a plan that balances the needs
of our Nation, our soldiers, and their family members against
the severe budget constraints and calculated risk. And now, we
need your help.
If our planned reductions and realignments are derailed or
delayed, we don't have the funding or time to adjust. Simply
put, we need protection. We need predictability. We don't need
politics.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of your Army,
let me thank you for your thoughtful oversights, steadfast
support and proud partnership. Now, as I said before, we need
your help. We need your leadership to safeguard the most
capable land force the world has ever known as we prepare to
meet the unforeseen challenges that lay ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John M. McHugh and
General Raymond T. Odierno
introduction
America's Army remains heavily committed in operations overseas as
well as at home in support of our Combatant Commanders. More than
66,000 U.S. Army Soldiers are deployed to contingency operations, with
nearly 32,000 Soldiers supporting operations in Afghanistan. In
addition, there are approximately 85,000 Soldiers forward stationed
across the globe in nearly 150 countries worldwide. Every day, the
Soldiers and Civilians of the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army
Reserve inspire us with their competence, character and commitment to
serving our Nation. A typical day for our Soldiers may include
patrolling alongside our Afghan National Army partners, standing watch
on the DMZ in Korea, manning missile batteries in Turkey and Guam,
delivering humanitarian relief to the Philippines, conducting logistics
training in Sierra Leone, securing facilities in South Sudan and
responding to floods, wildfires and tornados across the United States.
----------------------------------------------------------------
the army's strategic vision
The All-Volunteer Army will remain the most highly trained and
professional land force in the world. It is uniquely organized with the
capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive land power
to the Joint Force and ready to perform across the range of military
operations to Prevent, Shape and Win in support of Combatant Commanders
to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today
and against emerging threats.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout our Nation's history, the United States has drawn down
military forces at the close of every war. Today, however, we are in
the process of rapidly drawing down Army forces before the war is over.
At the same time, we continue to face an uncertain, complicated and
rapidly changing international security environment, as stated in the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. In light of domestic fiscal
challenges, the Army is committed to doing its part to restore fiscal
discipline and contribute to our Nation's economic strength. In a time
of budget stringency, the Army's greatest challenge is providing
steadfast support to worldwide operational commitments to include
Afghanistan while simultaneously drawing down, reorganizing and
preparing the force for a wider array of security missions and threats
in the future. We are committed to ensure the U.S. Army remains the
most highly trained and professional land force in the world.
Together, we must ensure our Army is trained and ready to prevent
conflict, shape and set theaters for our geographic Combatant
Commanders, deter aggression, and if necessary, win decisively in a
sustained major combat operation. However, over the last 2 years, the
impact of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 has resulted in
declining readiness throughout the Total Army (Active Army, Army
National Guard and Army Reserve).
budgetary reductions and strategic choices
Over the past 4 years, the Army has absorbed several budget
reductions in the midst of conducting operations overseas and
rebalancing the force to the wider array of missions required by 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance. To comply with the funding caps specified
in the BCA, the fiscal year 2013 budget proposed $487 billion in DOD
funding reductions over 10 years, of which the Army's share was an
estimated $170 billion. In addition, sequestration was triggered in
2013, forcing an additional $37 billion reduction in fiscal year 2013
and threatening a further total reduction in DOD funding of
approximately $375 billion through fiscal year 2021, with the Army's
portion estimated at $95 billion. In fiscal year 2013, a combination of
sequestration and overseas contingency operations funding shortfalls
degraded Army readiness levels. It caused the Army to carry over a
readiness shortfall of $3.2 billion to fiscal year 2014.
The Army continues to face an uncertain fiscal environment in the
years ahead. The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2013 provides the Army
modest, temporary relief from BCA defense spending caps in 2014. The
predictability afforded by known budget levels is appreciated, and the
BBA supports an fiscal year 2015 Army funding level of $120.5 billion.
However, the Army still faces budget cuts of $7.7 billion in fiscal
year 2014, and an additional $12.7 billion in fiscal year 2015, when
compared to the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request. While we
welcome the relief and predictability that the BBA provides, the Army
will be forced to cut $20.4 billion in planned funding, an abrupt
reduction over a short 2-year period of time. Beyond fiscal year 2015,
fiscal uncertainty remains, including the potential resumption of the
sequestration-level spending caps in fiscal year 2016.
During this period of uncertainty in the fiscal and strategic
environment, our goal has been to maintain the proper balance between
end strength, readiness and modernization across the Total Army. We are
reducing end strength as rapidly as possible, while still meeting our
operational commitments, in order to concentrate remaining funds on
rebuilding readiness. However, to do this we must accept greater risk
in our modernization programs. To rebuild and sustain a force capable
of conducting the full range of operations on land, to include prompt
and sustained land combat, it is essential that we take steps to
prevent hollowness within the force. Therefore, consistent with the
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, we are in the process of drawing down
Active Army end strength from a wartime high of 570,000 to 490,000--a
14 percent cut--by the end of fiscal year 2015. The Army National Guard
will reduce from 358,200 to 350,200 and the Army Reserve will remain
relatively constant, decreasing from 205,000 to 202,000 Soldiers. In
conjunction with these end strength reductions, the Army decided to
reorganize the current operational force of Active Army Infantry,
Armored and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from 38 to 32. This
force structure reorganization will allow us to eliminate excess
headquarters infrastructure while sustaining as much combat capability
as possible.
The fiscal year 2015 budget request provides a balanced and
responsible way forward in the midst of ongoing fiscal uncertainty. It
allows the Army to reduce and reorganize force structure, but incurs
some risk to equipment modernization programs and readiness. Under the
fiscal year 2015 budget request, the Army will decrease end strength
through fiscal year 2017 to a Total Army of 980,000 Soldiers--450,000
in the Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in
the Army Reserve. This reduction will also adjust the force mix ratio
between the active and reserve components. We will reverse the force
mix ratio, going from a 51 percent active component and 49 percent
reserve component mix in fiscal year 2012 to a 54 percent reserve
component and 46 percent active component mix in fiscal year 2017. The
Army will be able to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance at
this size and component mix, but it will be at significant risk.
But with sequestration-level caps in fiscal year 2016 and beyond
the Army will be required to further reduce Total Army end strength to
420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard and
185,000 in the Army Reserve by the end of fiscal year 2019. This would
end up being a total reduction of 213,000 Soldiers with 150,000 coming
from the Active Army, 43,000 coming from the Army National Guard and
20,000 from the Army Reserve. This includes a 46 percent reduction in
Active Army BCTs and a 21 percent reduction in Army National Guard
BCTs. Sequestration-level spending caps would also require a 25 percent
reduction to Army modernization accounts, with no program unaffected.
Major weapon programs will be delayed, severely impacting the
industrial base both in the near and long term. Most significantly,
these projected end strength levels would not enable the Army to
execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.
For the next 3 years, as we continue to draw down and restructure
into a smaller force, the Army will continue to have degraded readiness
and extensive modernization program reductions. Under the President's
budget, we will begin to regain balance between end strength,
modernization and readiness beyond fiscal year 2017. Our goal would be
to achieve balance by the end of fiscal year 2019 with 450,000 Soldiers
in the Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in
the Army Reserve.
Under sequestration-level spending caps, from fiscal year 2019 to
fiscal year 2023 the Army will begin to establish the appropriate
balance between readiness, modernization and end strength, albeit for a
much smaller Army at 420,000 Soldiers in the Active Army, 315,000 in
the Army National Guard and 185,000 in the Army Reserve. We will
stabilize our end strength and force structure. From fiscal year 2020
to fiscal year 2023 we would begin achieving our readiness goals and
reinvesting in modernization programs to upgrade our aging fleets. Our
goal is to achieve balance by fiscal year 2023. The reduction in our
institutional base will make reversibility significantly more
difficult. Finally, the size of our Army at this level of funding will
not allow us to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance and will put in
doubt our ability to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major
contingency operation.
leader development
Developing adaptive Army leaders who possess the individual
toughness, battlefield skill and fighting spirit that typify the
American Soldier is one of our highest priorities. The unpredictable
nature of human conflict requires leaders to not only lead in close
combat but understand the operational and strategic environment, to
include its socio-economic, cultural and religious underpinnings. Our
leaders must demonstrate the competence, proficiency and professional
values necessary to achieve operational and strategic mission success.
We must continue to educate and develop Soldiers and Civilians to grow
the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary
security environment to better lead Army, Joint, Interagency and
Multinational task forces and teams. Therefore, we will reinvest and
transform our institutional educational programs for officers and
noncommissioned officers in order to prepare for the complex future
security environment.
We will continue to build leaders who exhibit the character,
competence and commitment that are hallmarks of the Army Profession. We
are aggressively and comprehensively reinforcing our core values and
ethical leadership throughout all unit and institutional training,
leader development programs and professional military education. We
will also transition to a new officer evaluation system that
strengthens accountability and emphasizes the evaluation of character
attributes and competencies. We have completed a 360-degree assessment
pilot for all battalion and brigade commanders, which will be fully
institutionalized across the force in 2014. We will continue peer
assessments for all general officers and will institute 360-degree
assessments for all general officers upon promotion to each general
officer rank.
Today, our leaders are the most competent and operationally
experienced since World War II. We must build on this incredible
experience to develop leaders who can operate in an ever-changing,
complex strategic environment, understanding the implications of
critical thinking, rapid communications and cyber warfare as it relates
to combined arms maneuver, irregular warfare and counterinsurgency
operations.
the army: globally responsive, regionally engaged strategic land forces
There is no more unambiguous display of American resolve than the
deployment of the American Soldier. As part of the Joint Force, the
Army deters potential adversaries by presenting a credible element of
national power: Landpower that is decisively expeditionary and
strategically adaptive. The Army possesses a lethal combination of
capability and agility that strengthens U.S. diplomacy and represents
one of America's most credible deterrents against hostility. If
necessary, a ready Army can defeat or destroy enemy forces, control
land areas, protect critical assets and populations and prevent the
enemy from gaining a position of operational or strategic advantage.
Ultimately, potential adversaries must clearly perceive Army forces as
being capable of appropriate and rapid response anywhere in the world
and across the entire range of military operations, from stability
operations to general war.
A ready and capable Total Army provides Joint and Combined forces
with expeditionary and enduring landpower for the full range of
military operations. Regionally aligned Army forces provide direct
support to geographic and functional combatant commands. Army forces
are tailorable and scalable, prepared to respond rapidly to any global
contingency mission. The Army maintains a responsive force posture
through an effective mix of Total Army capabilities and network of
installations at home and abroad, to include Army prepositioned stocks.
The Army National Guard and Army Reserve provide predictable, recurring
and sustainable capabilities and strategic depth. Rapidly deployable
Army forces, to include airborne forces, are able to respond to
contingencies and conduct forcible entry operations anywhere in the
world on short notice. Army prepositioned equipment across the globe
also enables the rapid air deployment of Army combat and support
forces.
Missions as a Member of the Joint Force
As an interoperable member of the Joint Force, the Army sets the
theater for Combatant Commanders by providing unique capabilities en
route to, and operating within, austere environments to support all
plans and contingencies. These capabilities include special operations
and ground forces, operational leadership and mobility, and critical
enablers such as aviation, missile defense, intelligence, engineers,
logistics, inland ground transportation infrastructure, medical and
signal/communications.
The Army provides the Joint Force versatility across the full range
of military operations, underpinning operational and strategic reach
through the full length of a campaign, often in contested environments.
Effective joint operations require Army ground combat forces and Army
critical enablers. A significant portion of the Army's force structure
is devoted to enabling the Joint Force as well as our Multinational and
Interagency partners.
We provide a variety of Joint Task Force headquarters certified and
trained to lead Joint Forces, plan operations and exercise mission
command of units across the full range of military operations. We
provide strategic, operational and tactical logistics, worldwide
engineering support and intelligence capabilities, as well as space-
based and terrestrial command and control networks that connect our own
units, the Joint community, and Interagency and Multinational partners.
The Army is also investing in emerging and evolving missions such as
operations in cyberspace and countering weapons of mass destruction.
For example, we continue to develop and field cyber mission forces that
enable the success of our national mission force, combatant commands
and Army land forces.
Regionally Aligned Forces
The Army is regionally aligning forces in support of the geographic
and functional combatant commands. These forces provide deployable and
scalable regionally focused Army forces task organized for direct
support of geographic and functional combatant commands and Joint
requirements. Forward stationed Army forces in the Republic of Korea,
Japan and Europe, along with Army units based in the United States are
aligned with combatant commands. These forces shape and set theaters
for regional commanders employing unique Total Army characteristics and
capabilities to influence the security environment, build trust,
develop relationships and gain access through rotational forces,
multilateral exercises, military-to-military engagements, coalition
training and other opportunities.
Army forces strengthen alliances and ensure collective capability
while building capacity and serving common interests. In many regions
of the world, Army military-to-military relationships have enabled the
U.S. to remain a trusted and welcome partner over the years. The Army's
Special Forces Groups provide extraordinary regional expertise and
unique capabilities, as well as years of experience, to the combatant
commands. The Army National Guard, through the State Partnership
Program, maintains long-term partnerships worldwide.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We are expanding regional alignment of the Total Army as the
drawdown in Afghanistan continues and additional formations become
available. The Army's first regionally aligned BCT--the 2nd Brigade,
1st Infantry Division stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas--began actively
supporting U.S. Africa Command in March 2013 and has conducted over 70
missions, from crisis response to security cooperation, in more than 30
countries. 1st Infantry Division headquarters, building upon the
initial success of its 2nd Brigade and aligned with U.S. Africa
Command, is planning a Libyan General Purpose Force training mission.
The 48th Infantry BCT, Georgia Army National Guard, is aligned with
U.S. Southern Command and has deployed teams to several Central and
South American countries. The Fort Hood-based 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry
Division, aligned with U.S. European Command, participated in
multilateral exercises and training as the primary U.S. land force
contribution to the NATO Response Force.
About 80,000 active and reserve component Soldiers are postured to
support operations and engagements in the Asia-Pacific region. I Corps,
stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, and assigned to U.S.
Pacific Command, provides deployable mission command capability for
contingencies and enhances an already strong Army presence in the Asia-
Pacific region. The Army maintains a Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense battery deployed to Guam, defending our allies and supporting
the Pacific theater's ballistic missile defense posture. During fiscal
year 2013, U.S. Army Pacific conducted 28 large-scale exercises with 13
countries. Soldiers also conducted security cooperation engagements
with 34 countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
During fiscal year 2013, a total of more than 109,000 Soldiers
deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan. More than 4,300
Soldiers supported Operation Spartan Shield, our ongoing effort to
maintain stability in the region and reassure our allies and partners
in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. In addition, during
fiscal year 2013 more than 2,200 Soldiers participated in seven
exercises in the region. III Corps, stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, and
1st Armored Division headquarters, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, are
both aligned with U.S. Central Command. In June 2013 the 1st Armored
Division headquarters deployed to Jordan, providing mission command for
several regional exercises and conducting training with allied and
partner forces.
Missions at Home and Support of Civil Authorities
The Total Army defends the Homeland and supports civil authorities
for a variety of complex missions. Soldiers from the active and reserve
components are engaged in the Homeland on a daily basis, in capacities
ranging from personnel serving as defense coordinating officers in
support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to U.S. Army North
leading and coordinating Army missions in support of civil authorities.
The Army stands ready to conduct a no-notice response in support of
civil authorities, particularly for a complex catastrophe that may
require the employment of a significant Army force. The Total Army also
provides the preponderance of forces for the Department of Defense's
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Enterprise.
Army National Guard air and missile defense units protect our Nation's
Capital and provide manning for Ground-based Midcourse Defense systems
deployed in Alaska and Colorado that will deter and defeat missile
attacks on our Nation. Soldiers support Federal drug enforcement
efforts along our Nation's southern border every day.
Over the past year, the Army responded to natural disasters in the
United States with sustained, life-saving support. The Army National
Guard conducted firefighting operations in several Western States. In
September 2013, active and reserve component Soldiers provided rapid
assistance when severe storms caused devastating floods and landslides
in northern Colorado. A team of about 700 Soldiers from the Colorado
and Wyoming Army National Guard, as well as the Active Army's 4th
Infantry Division stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, evacuated more
than 3,000 displaced residents. Soldiers and Civilians from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers also supported operations in Colorado, and
continue to support ongoing national efforts to restore critical
infrastructure following Hurricane Sandy.
ensuring a ready army
A trained and ready Army must be able to rapidly deploy, fight,
sustain itself and win against complex state and non-state threats in
austere environments and rugged terrain. Readiness is measured at both
the service and unit levels. Service readiness incorporates
installations and the critical ability of the Army to provide the
required capacities (units) with the requisite capabilities (readiness)
to execute the roles and missions required by combatant commands. Unit
readiness is the combination of personnel, materiel and supplies,
equipment and training that, when properly balanced, enables immediate
and effective application of military power.
Training
Training across the Total Army serves two main purposes: Preparing
units to support combatant commands worldwide and developing leaders
who can adapt to the complex security environment. To meet demands
across the full range of military operations, the Army will shift the
focus of training on rebuilding war fighting core competencies. We are
reinvigorating our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), to challenge and
certify Army formations in a comprehensive and realistic decisive
action training environment that features regular, irregular and
insurgent enemy forces. Tough, realistic multi-echelon home station
training using a mix of live, virtual and constructive methods
efficiently and effectively builds Soldier, leader and unit competency
over time.
From 2004 to 2011, all CTC rotations were focused on building
readiness for assigned missions in a counterinsurgency environment.
This shift impacted 5,500 company commanders, 2,700 field grade
officers and 1,000 battalion commanders. Recognizing this atrophy in
readiness for the full range of military operations, the Army returned
to conducting decisive action CTC rotations in 2011, with a plan to
cycle nearly all Active Army BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2015 along
with the requisite amount of available Army National Guard BCTs.
However, due to sequestration, the Army canceled seven CTC rotations in
2013 and significantly reduced home station training, negatively
impacting the training, readiness and leader development of more than
two divisions' worth of Soldiers. Those lost opportunities only added
to the gap created from 2004 to 2011, creating a backlog of
professional development and experience.
The BBA allows us to remedy only a fraction of that lost
capability. Even with increased funding, in fiscal year 2014 the Army
will not be able to train a sufficient number of BCTs to meet our
strategic requirements. Seventeen BCTs were originally scheduled to
conduct a CTC rotation during fiscal year 2014. BBA-level funding
enables the addition of another two BCT rotations, for a total of 19
for the fiscal year. However, due to the timing of the additional
funding, some BCTs were still unable to conduct a full training
progression before executing a CTC rotation. Without the benefit of
sufficient home station training, BCTs begin the CTC rotation at a
lower level of proficiency. As a result, the CTC rotation does not
produce the maximum BCT capability, in terms of unit readiness. For
BCTs that do not conduct a CTC rotation, we are using available
resources to potentially train these formations up to only battalion-
level proficiency.
The Army can currently provide only a limited number of available
and ready BCTs trained for decisive action proficiency, which will
steadily increase through fiscal year 2014 and the beginning of fiscal
year 2015. But with potential sequestration in fiscal year 2016,
readiness will quickly erode across the force. We must have
predictable, long-term, sustained funding to ensure the necessary
readiness to execute our operational requirements and the Defense
Strategic Guidance.
Fiscal shortfalls have caused the Army to implement tiered
readiness as a bridging strategy until more resources become available.
Under this strategy, only 20 percent of operational forces will conduct
collective training to a level required to meet our strategic
requirements, with 80 percent of the force remaining at a lower
readiness level. Forward stationed forces in the Republic of Korea will
remain ready, as will those dedicated as part of the Global Response
Force. Forces deployed to Afghanistan are fully trained for their
security assistance mission but not for other contingencies. The Army
is also concentrating resources on a contingency force of select
Infantry, Armored and Stryker BCTs, an aviation task force and required
enabling forces to meet potential unforeseen small scale operational
requirements. Unless Army National Guard and Army Reserve units are
preparing for deployment, the Army will only fund these formations to
achieve readiness at the squad, team and crew level.
Force Structure
We have undertaken a comprehensive reorganization of Army units to
better align force structure with limited resources and increase unit
capability. Unit reorganizations are necessary to begin balancing force
structure, readiness and modernization. However, when combined with
reduced funding and operational demand, the pace of force structure
changes will reduce our ability to build readiness across the force
during fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015.
Reorganization of the current operational force of Active Army
Infantry, Armored and Stryker BCTs from 38 to 32 reduces tooth to tail
ratio and increases the operational capability of the remaining BCTs.
All Active Army and Army National Guard BCTs will gain additional
engineer and fires capability, capitalizing on the inherent strength in
combined arms formations. Initially, 47 BCTs (29 Active Army and 18
Army National Guard) will be organized with a third maneuver battalion.
The remaining 13 BCTs (3 Active Army and 10 Army National Guard) will
be reevaluated for possible resourcing of a third maneuver battalion in
the future.
Following a comprehensive review of our aviation strategy, the Army
has determined that it must restructure aviation formations to achieve
a leaner, more efficient and capable force that balances operational
capability and flexibility across the Total Army. We will eliminate
older, less capable aircraft, such as the OH-58 A/C Kiowa, the OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior and the entire fleet of TH-67 JetRangers, the current
trainer. The Army National Guard will transfer low-density, high-demand
AH-64 Apache helicopters to the Active Army, where they will be teamed
with unmanned systems for the armed reconnaissance role as well as
their traditional attack role. The Active Army in turn will transfer
over 100 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to the Army National Guard. These
aircraft will significantly improve capabilities to support combat
missions and increase support to civil authorities, such as disaster
response, while sustaining security and support capabilities to civil
authorities in the states and territories.
The Army will also transfer nearly all Active Army LUH-72 Lakota
helicopters to the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence at
Fort Rucker, Alabama, and procure an additional 100 LUH-72 Lakotas to
round out the training fleet. These airframes will replace the TH-67
JetRanger helicopter fleet as the next generation glass cockpit, dual
engine training helicopter. At current funding levels, this approach
will enable the Army National Guard to retain all of its LUH-72
aircraft for general support requirements as well as ongoing border
security operations. The Aviation Restructure Initiative allows us to
sustain a modernized fleet across all components and reduces
sustainment costs. Eighty-six percent of the total reduction of
aircraft (687 of 798) will come out of the active component. The Active
Army's overall helicopter fleet will decline by about 23 percent, and
the Army National Guard's fleet of helicopters will decline by
approximately 8 percent, or just over 100 airframes. The resulting
active and reserve component aviation force mix will result in better
and more capable formations which are able to respond to contingencies
at home and abroad.
soldiers, civilians and our families: the premier all-volunteer army
Trust is the foundation of military service. An individual's choice
to serve, whether enlisting or reenlisting, depends on a strong bond of
trust between the volunteer, the Army and the Nation. Soldiers need to
know that the Nation values their service and will provide them with
the training, equipment and leadership necessary to accomplish their
mission. They also want to know that their Families will enjoy a
quality of life that is commensurate with their service and sacrifice.
For that reason, one of our top priorities as we make the transition
from war and drawdown the Army--regardless of fiscal challenges--must
be the welfare, training and material resources we put toward
maintaining the trust of our Soldiers, Civilians and their Families.
Ready and Resilient Campaign
Perhaps nothing exemplifies the idea of trust more than President
Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address when he called upon the
Nation to care for those who have borne the burdens of battle and their
Families. The effects of deploying are sometimes severe and lifelong.
As a result, the continued care and treatment of Soldiers and their
Families is a lasting priority. Yet even as we work to recover and
rehabilitate those most severely affected by two wars, we know that an
ever increasing portion of our Army has not faced warfare.
Understandably, they have new and different challenges. In both cases,
Army readiness is directly linked to the ability of our force to deal
with personal, professional and unforeseen health concerns, such as
mental and physical challenges. We must also begin to view health as
more than simply healthcare, and transition the Army to an entire
system for health that emphasizes the performance triad--sleep,
activity and nutrition--as the foundation of a ready and resilient
force.
The Ready and Resilient Campaign, launched in March 2013, serves as
the focal point for all Soldier, Civilian, and Family programs and
promotes an enduring, holistic and healthy approach to improving
readiness and resilience in units and individuals. The campaign seeks
to influence a cultural change in the Army by directly linking personal
resilience to readiness and emphasizing the personal and collective
responsibility to build and maintain resilience at all levels. The
campaign leverages and expands existing programs, synchronizing efforts
to eliminate or reduce harmful and unhealthy behaviors such as suicide,
sexual harassment and assault, bullying and hazing, substance abuse and
domestic violence. Perhaps most importantly, the campaign promotes
positive, healthy behaviors while working to eliminate the stigma
associated with asking for help.
Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
The Army is an organization built on and bound by values. Sexual
harassment and assault in all its forms is abhorrent to every one of
those values. Simply put, sexual assault is a crime that will not be
tolerated. The overwhelming majority of Soldiers and Civilians serve
honorably and capably, but we must recognize that the ill-disciplined
few jeopardize the safety of all our people as well as the trust and
confidence the American people have in their Army.
Army actions to combat sexual assault and harassment are driven by
five imperatives. First, we must prevent offenders from committing
crimes, provide compassionate care for victims and protect the rights
and privacy of survivors. Second, we must ensure that every allegation
is reported, it is thoroughly and professionally investigated, and we
must take appropriate action based on the investigation. Third, we
shall create a positive climate and an environment of trust and respect
in which every person can thrive and achieve their full potential, and
continually assess the command climate. Fourth, we will hold every
individual, every unit and organization and every commander
appropriately accountable for their behavior, actions and inactions.
Finally, the chain of command must remain fully engaged--they are
centrally responsible and accountable for solving the problems of
sexual assault and sexual harassment within our ranks and for restoring
the trust of our Soldiers, Civilians and Families.
Our goal is to reduce and ultimately eliminate this crime from our
ranks. To underscore the importance of the chain of command's role in
preventing sexual assault, the Army now includes command climate and
SHARP goals and objectives in all officer and non-commissioned officer
evaluations and unit command climate surveys. Accountability is
reinforced by training and education on the appropriate behaviors,
actions and reporting methods. The Army has integrated SHARP training
into every professional development school, making sure it is tailored
to roles and responsibilities appropriate to each course's population.
We are making progress, particularly on reporting and investigating
these incidents. Over the past year the Army expanded the Special
Victim Capability Program to include 23 special victim prosecutors, 22
sexual assault investigators and 28 special victim paralegals at 19
installations worldwide. These professionals are trained in the unique
aspects of investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases. We have
also trained 81 active and 24 reserve component judge advocates through
our Special Victim Counsel Program, which was established in September
2013. As of December 2013, 241 victims had received over 1,443 hours of
legal services from these specially trained counsel, including
appearances at Article 32 hearings and courts-martial.
Army commanders, advised by judge advocates, continue to take the
most challenging cases to trial, including cases that civilian
authorities have declined to prosecute. For cases in which the Army had
jurisdiction over the offender and a final disposition was made,
commanders prosecuted rape and sexual assault at a rate more than
double the estimated average prosecution rates in civilian
jurisdictions. The Army also provides sexual assault patients with
expert, emergency treatment for their immediate and long-term needs.
Regardless of evidence of physical injury, all patients presenting to
an Army medical treatment facility with an allegation of sexual assault
receive comprehensive and compassionate medical and behavioral
healthcare.
Sexual assault is antithetical to competent command, and it is
important that commanders retain their authority over the disposition
of sexual assault cases. Removal of that authority would make it harder
to respond to the needs of Soldiers within the command, especially the
victims. Many of the Army's most difficult problems--such as
integration--were solved by making commanders more accountable, not
less. Therefore the Army opposes legislative efforts to remove
commanders from the disposition process.
Suicide Prevention
The Army Suicide Prevention Program, part of the Ready and
Resilient Campaign, has significantly enhanced our understanding of one
of our greatest challenges: the loss of Soldiers to suicide. The Army
has expanded and increased access to behavioral health services and
programs that develop positive life-coping skills. A comprehensive
education and training program is helping Soldiers, Civilians and
Family members improve their ability to cope with stress,
relationships, separations, deployments, financial pressures and work-
related issues. The goal is to increase resiliency and, just as
important, access to support. Our Suicide Reduction Working Group
provides a forum for stakeholders to collaborate on initiatives that
mitigate high-risk behaviors. The Army continues to revise and create
policy to promote and increase awareness of prevention and intervention
skills, services and resources. We have seen an aggregate drop in
suicides, and while not a declaration of success, it is a leading
indicator that our resiliency efforts are starting to take hold across
the force.
Role of Women in the Army
Women continue to play an important role in making our Army the
best in the world. We are validating occupational standards for
integrating women into all career fields. By reinforcing universal
standards for each Soldier--regardless of gender--in a deliberate,
measured and responsible manner we increase unit readiness, cohesion
and morale while allowing for qualification based on performance, not
gender, across our profession.
Army Training and Doctrine Command is leading our effort with the
Soldier 2020 initiative, which seeks to ensure we select the best
Soldiers for each military occupational specialty, regardless of
gender. It is a standards-based, holistic and deliberate approach that
uses scientific research to clearly define physical accessions
standards based on mission requirements for each Army occupation.
Simultaneously, we are conducting an extensive study to identify the
institutional and cultural factors affecting gender integration, to
develop strategies for the assimilation of women into previously
restricted units. An important part of that process will be to ensure
we have a qualified cadre of female leaders, both officers and
noncommissioned officers, in place prior to the introduction of junior
female Soldiers to serve as role models and provide mentorship during
this transition.
During the last year the Army opened approximately 6,000 positions
in 26 BCTs, select aviation specialties in special operations aviation
and approximately 3,600 field artillery officer positions. The Army
anticipates opening an additional 33,000 previously closed positions
during fiscal year 2014.
Recruitment and Retention
The Army is defined by the quality of the Soldiers it recruits and
retains. We are only as good as our people, and recruiting standards
and reenlistment thresholds remain high. During fiscal year 2013, 98
percent of the Army's recruits were high school graduates, exceeding
our goal of 90 percent. We are also on track to achieve retention rates
consistent with the past 3 years. The need to recruit and retain high-
quality Soldiers will only grow in importance as we continue to draw
down our forces.
Unfortunately, natural attrition alone will not achieve the Army's
reduced end strength requirements. Inevitably, the Army will not be
able to retain good Soldiers on active duty who have served their
Nation honorably. The Army must responsibly balance force shaping
across accessions, retention, and promotions, as well as voluntary and
involuntary separations. During fiscal year 2013, the Army reduced
accessions to the minimum level needed to sustain our force structure,
achieve end strength reductions and reestablish highly competitive but
predictable promotion opportunity rates. The Army also conducted
Selective Early Retirement Boards for lieutenant colonels and colonels
and, likewise, a Qualitative Service Program for staff sergeants
through command sergeants major, all aimed at achieving 490,000 Active
Army end strength by the end of fiscal year 2015. During fiscal year
2014 the Army will conduct Officer Separation Boards and Enhanced
Selective Early Retirement Boards for qualified majors and captains. We
remain committed to assisting Soldiers and their Families as they
depart Active Army formations and transition to civilian life, and we
encourage continued service in the Army National Guard or Army Reserve.
Role of the Army Civilian
As the Army evolves so too must its civilian workforce, which will
also draw down concurrent with reductions to military end strength.
Army Civilians will reduce from a wartime high of 285,000 to 263,000 by
the end of fiscal year 2015. As the civilian workforce is downsized, we
will do it smartly, focusing on preserving the most important
capabilities. This requires a broader strategy that links functions,
funding and manpower to produce the desired civilian workforce of the
future--one that fully supports the generation of trained and ready
combat units. The Army will manage the civilian workforce based on
workload and funding available. We will use all available workforce
shaping tools such as Voluntary Early Retirement Authority and
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay to reduce turbulence in our civilian
workforce. We will target the skills we need to retain, and voluntarily
separate those with skills no longer needed. If we cannot achieve our
Army Civilian reduction goals by voluntary means, we will use Reduction
in Force as a last resort.
The possibility of future reductions only adds to the burdens we've
placed on Army Civilians in recent years. Last year, the Army
furloughed more than 204,000 civilian employees, forcing them to take a
20 percent reduction in pay for 6 weeks during the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2013. Furloughs came on the heels of 3 years of frozen pay
and performance-based bonuses. The tremendous impact on the morale of
our civilian workforce cannot be understated, and some of our highest
quality civilian personnel have sought employment in the private
sector.
We rely heavily on our Army Civilians, and they have remained
dedicated and patient during the last few years of uncertainty and
hardship. Like their uniformed counterparts, Army Civilians are
required to demonstrate competence, technical proficiency and
professional values to achieve mission and individual success. Over the
past 3 years the Army has implemented a number of changes to improve
training, educational and experiential opportunities for the civilian
workforce. Focused leader development, improvements to the Civilian
Education System and continued maturity of the Senior Enterprise Talent
Management Program are all designed to build a more professional and
competency-based civilian workforce.
The Army is also streamlining its contractor workforce by reducing
contract spending at least to the same degree as, if not more than,
reductions to the civilian workforce; contractor reductions are
approximately $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2015. The use of contracted
services will continue to be reviewed to ensure the most appropriate,
cost effective and efficient support is aligned to the mission. As the
Army continues its workforce shaping efforts, contracted manpower will
be appropriately managed based on functional priorities and available
funding to ensure compliance with law.
Compensation Reform
We are extremely grateful for the high quality care and
compensation our Nation has provided to our Soldiers over the last
decade. Military manpower costs remain at historic highs. We must
develop adjustments to military compensation packages that reduce
future costs, recognize and reward our Soldiers and their Families for
their commitment and sacrifice, while ensuring our ability to recruit
and retain a high quality All-Volunteer Army. While we recognize the
growing costs of manpower, we must also approach reform from the
perspective that compensation is a significant factor in maintaining
the quality of the All-Volunteer Army, and always has been.
After 13 years of war, the manner in which we treat our Soldiers
and Families will set the conditions for our ability to recruit in the
future. That said, if we do not slow the rate of growth of Soldier
compensation, it will consume a higher, disproportionate percentage of
the Army's budget and without compensation reform we will be forced to
reduce investments in readiness and modernization. The Army supports a
holistic and comprehensive approach that reforms military compensation
in a fair, responsible and sustainable way. Changes to military
compensation included in the fiscal year 2015 budget request--which
include slowing the growth of housing allowances, reducing the annual
direct subsidy provided to military commissaries and simplifying and
modernizing our TRICARE health insurance program--are important first
steps that generate savings while retaining competitive benefits. These
savings will be invested in readiness and modernization.
equipment modernization, business process improvement and sustainment
The Army makes prudent choices to provide the best possible force
for the Nation with the resources available, prioritizing Soldier-
centered modernization and procurement of proven and select emerging
technologies. The institutional Army manages programs that sustain and
modernize Army equipment, enabling the operational Army to provide
responsive and ready land forces. We will continue to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of our business processes to provide
readiness at best value.
Focus Area Review
Army senior leaders conducted reviews to consolidate and reorganize
organizations, programs and functions across several focus areas--
readiness, institutional and operational headquarters reductions,
operational force structure, installations services and investments,
the acquisition workforce and Army cyber and command, control,
communications and intelligence. As a result of this effort, the Army
will achieve greater efficiency across our core institutional
processes, consolidate functions within the acquisition workforce and
reduce headquarters overhead by up to 25 percent.
Equipment Modernization
Modernization enables the Army to meet requirements with a smaller,
fully capable and versatile force that is equipped to defeat any enemy
and maintain dominance on land. BCA-driven budget reductions have
placed Army equipment modernization at risk through program
terminations, procurement delays and program restructures. Research,
development and acquisition funding has declined 39 percent since the
fiscal year 2012 budget planning cycle and the long-term effect will be
additional stress on current vehicle fleets, reduced replacement of
war-worn equipment, increased challenges sustaining the industrial base
and limited investment in the modernization of only the most critical
capabilities.
The Army's equipment modernization strategy focuses on effectively
using constrained resources for near-term requirements and tailoring
our long-term investments to provide the right capabilities for
Soldiers in the future. This approach calls for carefully planned
investment strategies across all Army equipment portfolios, which will
involve a mix of limiting the development of new capabilities,
incrementally upgrading existing platforms and investing in key
technologies to support future modernization efforts. The strategy
captures the Army's key operational priorities: enhancing the Soldier
for broad joint mission support by empowering and enabling squads with
improved lethality, protection and situational awareness; enabling
mission command by facilitating command and control, and
decisionmaking, with networked real-time data and connectivity with the
Joint Force; and remaining prepared for decisive action by increasing
lethality and mobility, while optimizing the survivability of our
vehicle fleets.
----------------------------------------------------------------
army equipping strategy
Investment focused on:
--Deploying and redeploying units,
--Managing equipment retrograde,
--Reorganizing BCTs,
--Supporting rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region,
--Resetting our equipment,
--Redistributing equipment to raise readiness across all Army
components,
--Repositioning forces,
--Aligning wartime equipment with the Army's current needs,
--Divesting equipment we no longer need, and
--Remaining prepared for homeland defense priorities.
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the short-term, the Army remains focused on several efforts. We
are reducing procurement to match force structure reductions. We will
continue to apply business efficiencies such as multiyear contracts,
planning for should-cost and implementation of Better Buying Power, to
facilitate smarter investing. We will tailor capabilities in
development to meet requirements under affordability constraints. We
will not transition four programs to the acquisition phase, to include
the Ground Combat Vehicle and the Armed Aerial Scout. Additionally, we
will end 4 programs, restructure 30 programs and delay 50 programs.
Lastly, the divestiture of materiel and equipment, where appropriate,
will reduce maintenance and sustainment costs and support the
maximization of resources. Over the long-term, investing in the right
science and technology and applying affordable upgrades to existing
systems will allow us to keep pace with technological change and
improve capabilities.
Ground Vehicles
A new Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) remains a key requirement for
the Army. However, due to significant fiscal constraints, the Army has
determined that the Ground Combat Vehicle program will conclude upon
completion of the Technology Development phase, expected in June 2014,
and will not continue further development. In the near-term, the Army
will focus on refining concepts, requirements and key technologies in
support of a future IFV modernization program. This will include
investment in vehicle components, sub-system prototypes and technology
demonstrators to inform IFV requirements and future strategies for
developing a Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle replacement. Over the
long-term, the Army anticipates initiating a new IFV modernization
program informed by these efforts as resources become available.
The Army is also committed to developing and fielding the Armored
Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace our obsolete M113 family of vehicles
and augmenting our wheeled vehicle fleet with the Joint Light Tactical
family of vehicles. In addition, the Army will continue to fund a third
brigade's set of Double V-Hull (DVH) Stryker vehicles, while supporting
an incremental upgrade to DVH Strykers for power and mobility
improvements.
Army Aviation
The Army will divest legacy systems and fund the modernization and
sustainment of our most capable and survivable combat-proven aircraft:
the AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Blackhawk and CH-47 Chinook helicopters. We
will divest almost 900 legacy helicopters including the entire single
engine OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and TH-67 helicopter training fleets. The
Army will also modernize our training fleet with LUH-72 Lakota
helicopters.
The Network
The equipment modernization strategy seeks to provide the Soldier
and squad with the best weapons, equipment, sustainment and protection
with the support of the network. LandWarNet is the Army's globally
interconnected network that is ``always on and always available,'' even
in the most remote areas of the globe. LandWarNet enables mission
command by carrying the data, voice and video every Soldier and leader
needs to act decisively and effectively. It supports all Army
operations, from administrative activities in garrison to operations
conducted by our forward stationed and deployed Soldiers. Additionally,
it forms the basis of our live, virtual and constructive training.
Equipment Reset and Retrograde
Retrograde is the return of equipment to facilities for reset and
to support future force structure and operations. By December 2014, the
Army plans to retrograde approximately $10.2 billion of the $15.5
billion worth of Army equipment currently in Afghanistan. The balance
of the equipment will be used by our forces, transferred to the Afghans
or to another troop contributing nation, or disposed of properly in
theater, which will provide a cost avoidance of more than $844 million
in transportation, storage and security costs. The total cost of moving
the equipment out of Afghanistan is estimated at roughly $1-3 billion.
The cost range is due to the unpredictable nature of our ground routes
through Pakistan and other Central Asian countries that may require a
shift to more expensive multimodal or direct air cargo movement.
Once the equipment returns to the United States, our reset program
restores it to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with a
unit's future mission. A fully funded Army reset program is critical to
ensuring that equipment worn and damaged by prolonged conflict in harsh
environments is recovered and restored for future Army requirements.
During fiscal year 2013, the Army reset approximately 87,000 pieces of
equipment at the depot level and about 300,000 pieces of equipment,
such as small arms; night vision devices; and nuclear, biological and
chemical equipment, at the unit level. As a result of sequestration, we
deferred approximately $729 million of equipment reset during fiscal
year 2013, postponing the repair of nearly 700 vehicles, 28 aircraft,
2,000 weapons and Army prepositioned stocks. The projected cost of the
reset program is $9.6 billion (not including transportation costs),
which extends for 3 years after the last piece of equipment has
returned. Resources available under planned spending caps are not
sufficient to fully reset returning equipment from Afghanistan in a
timely and efficient manner.
Organic and Commercial Industrial Base
The Army's industrial base consists of commercial and Government-
owned organic industrial capability and capacity that must be readily
available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and
national emergencies. The Army must maintain the critical maintenance
and manufacturing capacities needed to meet future war-time surge
requirements, as well as industrial skills that ensure ready, effective
and timely materiel repair. We are sizing the organic industrial
workforce to meet and sustain core depot maintenance requirements and
critical arsenal manufacturing competencies. We will also continue to
work with our industrial partners to address energy, water and resource
vulnerabilities within our supply chain.
----------------------------------------------------------------
organic industrial base
During Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the organic
industrial base surged capacity and in some cases tripled their prewar
output. The organic industrial base consists of:
--Five maintenance depots,
--Three manufacturing arsenals and
--Eleven ammunition plants.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Both the commercial and organic elements of the industrial base are
essential to the efficient development, deployment and sustainment of
Army equipment. Over the past decade, the Army relied on market forces
to create, shape and sustain the manufacturing and technological
capabilities of the commercial industrial base. However, reduced
funding levels due to sequestration accelerated the transition from
wartime production levels to those needed to support peacetime
operations and training. During fiscal year 2013, the Army lost more
than 4,000 employees from the organic industrial base and will continue
to lose highly skilled depot and arsenal workers to other industries
due to fiscal uncertainty. Hiring and overtime restrictions, in
addition to furloughs, affected productivity and increased depot
carryover, not to mention the detrimental effect on worker morale.
Installations
In fiscal year 2013, the Army deferred critical upkeep on thousands
of buildings across Army installations due to a reduction of $909
million in sustainment, restoration and maintenance funding. End
strength reductions have reduced some associated sustainment costs, but
key facility shortfalls remain that will continue to impact Army
readiness. Increased funding in fiscal year 2014 enables investment in
facility readiness for critical infrastructure repair as well as high
priority restoration and modernization projects. The fiscal year 2015
budget reflects our measured facility investment strategy that focuses
on restoration, modernization and limited new construction.
The capacity of our installations must also match the Army's
decreasing force structure. At an Active Army end strength of 490,000
Soldiers, which we will reach by the end of fiscal year 2015, we
estimate that the Army will have about 18 percent excess capacity. We
need the right tools to reduce excess installations capacity, or
millions of dollars will be wasted maintaining underutilized buildings
and infrastructure. Failure to reduce excess capacity is tantamount to
an ``empty space tax'' diverting hundreds of millions of dollars per
year away from critical training and readiness requirements. Trying to
spread a smaller budget over the same number of installations and
facilities will inevitably result in rapid decline in the condition of
Army facilities.
The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is a proven, fair
and cost-effective means to address excess capacity in the United
States. BRAC has produced net savings in every prior round. On a net
$13 billion investment, the 2005 BRAC round is producing a net stream
of savings of $1 billion a year. We look forward to working with
Congress to determine the criteria for a BRAC 2017 round.
Energy and Sustainability
We are establishing an energy informed culture as a key component
of Army readiness. Through a synchronized campaign of performance
initiatives, business process changes and education and training
opportunities, the Army seeks to achieve a lasting capability to use
energy to the greatest benefit. The campaign includes efforts focused
on both the energy required for military operations (operational
energy) and the energy required by our power-projection installations
around the world.
In a tighter budget environment, the Army must manage its
installations in a sustainable and cost-effective manner, preserving
resources for the operational Army to maintain readiness and capability
across the range of military operations. We will leverage institutional
energy savings to generate more resources that we can use to train,
move and sustain operational forces and enhance Army mobility and
freedom of action. To take advantage of private sector efficiencies,
Army installations are privatizing utilities and entering into public-
private energy-saving performance contracts. By partnering with
experienced local providers, the Army has privatized 144 utilities
systems, avoiding about $2 billion in future utility upgrade costs
while saving approximately 6.6 trillion British thermal units a year.
The Army is also exploring opportunities to expand public-public
partnerships.
Operational energy improvements to contingency bases, surface and
air platforms and Soldier systems will increase overall combat
effectiveness. Improved efficiencies in energy, water and waste at
contingency bases reduce the challenges, risks and costs associated
with the sustainment of dispersed bases. Next generation vehicle
propulsion, power generation and energy storage systems can increase
the performance and capability of surface and air platforms and help
the Army achieve its energy and mobility goals. Advances in lightweight
flexible solar panels and rechargeable batteries enhance combat
capabilities, lighten the Soldier's load and yield substantial cost
benefits over time. Emergent operational energy capabilities will
enable Army forces to meet future requirements and garner efficiencies
in a fiscally constrained environment.
Business Transformation
The Army continues to transform its business operations to be
smarter, faster and cheaper. We are working to reduce business
portfolio costs by almost 10 percent annually as we capitalize on the
progress made with our Enterprise Resource Planning systems. Our
business process reengineering and continuous process improvement
efforts continue to confer significant financial and operational
benefits. Through our focus area review we will reduce headquarters
overhead, consolidate and streamline contracting operations and improve
space allocation on Army installations. We are reengineering core
processes in acquisition, logistics, human resources, financial
management, training and installations to improve effectiveness and
reduce costs. Over the long-term, the Army will improve its strategic
planning, performance assessment and financial auditability so that
commanders can make better-informed decisions on the utilization of
resources to improve readiness.
closing
Throughout our history, we have drawn down our armed forces at the
close of every war. However, we are currently reducing Army end
strength from our wartime high before the longest war in our Nation's
history has ended, and in an uncertain international security
environment. Our challenge is to reshape into a smaller, yet capable,
force in the midst of sustained operational demand for Army forces and
reduced budgets. The resulting decline in readiness has placed at risk
our ability to fully meet combatant commander requirements. Our ability
to provide trained and ready Army forces will improve as we begin to
balance readiness, end strength and modernization. However, if
sequestration-level spending caps resume in fiscal year 2016, we will
be forced to reduce end strength to levels that will not enable the
Army to meet our Nation's strategic requirements.
We have learned from previous drawdowns that the cost of an
unprepared force will always fall on the shoulders of those who are
asked to deploy and respond to the next crisis. The Nation faces
uncertainty and, in the face of such uncertainty, needs a strong Army
that is trained, equipped and ready. No one can predict where the next
contingency will arise that calls for the use of Army forces. Despite
our best efforts, there remains a high likelihood that the United
States will once again find itself at war sometime during the next two
decades. It is our job to be prepared for it.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
General Odierno.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, ARMY CHIEF OF
STAFF
General Odierno. Chairman Durbin, Senator Shelby, Senator
Collins, thank you for being here today.
I'm truly humbled to lead the extraordinary men and women
of our Army who volunteered to raise their right hand and serve
our country. As a division, corps and theater commander for
nearly 5 years in combat, I've personally led and seen the
tremendous sacrifice the soldiers of the Active Army, the Army
National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve have made for our
Nation.
As the Chief of Staff, my focus is on ensuring all soldiers
from all components are properly trained, equipped, and ready.
Despite declining resources, the demands for the Army forces
continue. Today, as I sit here, we have nearly 70,000 soldiers
deployed today. Our contingency operations and another 85,000
soldiers are forward stationed in nearly 150 countries
including nearly 20,000 on the Korean peninsula. Our soldiers,
civilians, and family members continue to serve with the
competence, commitment, and character that our great Nation
deserves.
Your Army continues to respond whenever needed. Just this
week, we deployed soldiers to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to conduct joint training and to reassure our Eastern
European allies against Russian aggression. We have soldiers
training and supporting the Afghan security forces, standing
guard at the DMZ (demilitarized zone), conducting operations in
Kosovo, Jordan, and Kuwait. We continue to have more than 2,000
soldiers on the African continent building partner capacity to
include those providing security for the U.S. Embassy in South
Sudan.
As we continue the future roles and missions and funding
for our Army, it is imperative we consider the world as it
exists, not as one we wish it to be. It demands that we make
prudent decisions about the future capability and capacity that
we need within our Army. Therefore, we must ensure that our
Army has the ability to rapidly respond to conduct the entire
range of military operations from humanitarian assistance,
partnered activities, stability operations to general war.
We appreciate the short-term predictability in fiscal year
2014 and 2015 afforded by the budget levels in the Bipartisan
Budget Agreement. The Bipartisan Budget Agreement supports the
fiscal year 2015 Army funding level to $120 billion, but it's
still $12.7 billion short of our request. This has allowed us
to buy back some short-term readiness by funding additional
training and sustainment to include multi-echelon,
multicomponent training events at our combat training centers
(CTCs) which starts us on a path of increased readiness.
However, the continued accumulation of budget reductions
requires us to make difficult choices. Last year, I testified
that we can implement the defense guidance at moderate risk
with an end strength of 490,000 in the Active Army, 350,000 in
the Army National Guard, and 202,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve.
And I stand by that assessment. However, sequestration is the
law of the land and its full brunt will return in fiscal year
2016 without congressional action. Under sequestration for the
next 3 to 4 years, we will continue to reduce end strength as
quickly as possible while still meeting our operational
commitments.
As we continue to draw down and restructure into a smaller
force, the Army will continue to have degraded readiness and
extensive modernization shortfalls. At the end of fiscal year
2019, we will begin to establish the appropriate balance
between end strength, readiness, and modernization, but for an
Army that is much smaller than it is today.
From fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2023 we will begin to
achieve our readiness goals and reinvest in our modernization
programs. We will have no choice but to slash end strength
levels if sequestration continues in order to attain the proper
balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization. We
will be required to further reduce the Active component to
420,000; the Army National Guard to 315,000; and the U.S. Army
Reserve to 185,000. At these end strength funding levels, we
will not be able to execute the current defense strategy.
In my opinion, this will call into question our ability to
execute even one prolonged, multiphased, major contingency
operation. I also have deep concerns that our Army at these end
strength levels will not have sufficient capacity to meet
ongoing operational commitments while simultaneously training
to sustain appropriate readiness levels.
The President's budget submission supports end strength
levels at 440,000 to 450,000 in the Active Army, 335,000 in the
Army National Guard, and 190,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. I
believe this should be the absolute floor for Army end strength
numbers. To execute the defense strategy, it's important to
note that as we continue to lose end strength, our flexibility
deteriorates as does our ability to react to strategic
surprise.
My experience tells me that our assumptions about the
duration and size of future conflicts, allied contributions,
and the need to conduct post-conflicts stability operations are
optimistic. If these assumptions are proven wrong, our risk
will grow significantly.
In order to meet ongoing and future budget reductions, we
have developed a Total Force Policy in close collaboration with
Army and DOD leaders. The Secretary of Defense directed the
Army to not size for large, prolonged, stability operations.
Furthermore, we were not to retain force-structure at the
expense of readiness and to develop balanced budgets that
permitted the restoration of desired levels of readiness and
modernization by the end of the sequestration period.
The Secretary of the Army and I provided additional
guidance to fulfill the needs of our combatant commanders first
and then to disproportionately reduce our Active Forces while
implementing modest reductions in our Guard and Reserve. The
Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a
transparent, open, and highly collaborative budget formulation,
force-structure and aviation restructure decision process that
included representation from all components and analysis from
experts at every level. The result is a balanced approach that
gives us the best Army possible even if sequestration continues
in fiscal year 2016.
The plan calls for end strength reductions of a total of
213,000 soldiers with a disproportionate cut of 150,000 coming
from the Active Army; 43,000 from the Army National Guard; and
20,000 from the Army Reserve. These reductions to the Active
Army represent 70 percent of the total end strength reductions
compared with 20 percent from the National Guard and 10 percent
from the U.S. Army Reserve. This will cause us to reduce up to
46 percent of the brigade combat teams in the Active Army and
up to 22 percent of the brigade combat teams from the National
Guard. This will result in an Army going from a 51 percent
Active and 49 percent Reserve component to a 54 percent Reserve
component and 46 percent Active Army.
The Army will be the only service in which the Reserve
component outnumbers the Active component. And we believe that,
under these fiscal constraints, this is appropriate.
The aviation restructure initiative allows us to eliminate
obsolete airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, reduce
sustainment costs, and officially organize ourselves to meet
our operational commitments and imperatives. But even in
aviation restructure, disproportionate reductions come from the
Active component. We will inactivate and eliminate three
complete combat aviation brigades in the active component and
we will remove all LUH-72s from the Active component in order
to train our pilots of all components at Fort Rucker.
In the National Guard, we'll maintain all 10 current
aviation brigades. We will move Apaches to the Active component
while increasing the fleet of UH-60s by sending 111 of the most
modern Blackhawk helicopters to the National Guard. The
National Guard will also retain all of its LUH-72s and CH-47s.
In the end, the Active component will be reduced by 687
aircraft, which is 86 percent of the total reduction. The
National Guard will be reduced by 111 aircraft which is 14
percent of the total reduction. The Aviation Restructure
Initiative will result in better and more capable formations
which are able to respond to contingencies at home and abroad.
Let me be very clear: These are not cuts we want to take; these
are cuts we must take based on sequestration. I believe our
recommendation delivers the best total Army for the budget we
have been allocated.
The Secretary and I understand that the American people
hold us to a higher standard of character and behavior.
Combating sexual assault and harassment remains our top
priority. Over the past year, the Army has established more
stringent screening criteria and background checks for those
serving in positions of trust. Army containers--excuse me, Army
Commanders continue to prosecute the most serious sexual
assault offensives at a rate more than double that of civilian
jurisdictions, including many cases that civilian authority has
refused to pursue.
We appreciate the continued focus of Congress as we
implement legislative reforms to enhance the rights of
survivors and improve our military justice system. We continue
to take this issue very seriously, and also know much work
remains to be done in this area.
We're also aggressively and comprehensively tackling the
issue of ethical leadership individually, organizationally and
through systematic reviews. We initiated 360 degree assessments
on all officers, especially commanders and general officers. We
implemented a new officer evaluation report to strengthen
accountability for our general officers and all officers. We
also conduct peer surveys and develop the specific ethics focus
as part of our senior leader education programs throughout the
entire process.
We must keep in mind that it is not a matter of ``if'' but
``when'' we will deploy our Army to defend this great Nation.
We have done it in every decade since World War II. It is
incumbent on all of us to ensure that our soldiers are highly
trained, equipped, and organized. If we do not, they will bear
the heavy burden of our miscalculations.
I am proud to wear this uniform and represent all the
soldiers of the United States Army, Active, National Guard, and
U.S. Army Reserve. Their sacrifice has been unprecedented over
the last 13 years. We must provide them with the necessary
resources for success in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the entire
committee for the support that you have given us and for
allowing us to have this discussion today.
Thank you very much.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, General Odierno.
General Grass.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL FRANK J. GRASS, CHIEF, NATIONAL
GUARD BUREAU
General Grass. Chairman Durbin, Senator Shelby, Senator
Collins, and Senator Murray, good morning.
It's an honor to be here today to represent the 460,000
Army and Air National Guardsmen across the States, territories
in the District of Columbia.
As we move into an uncertain security and fiscal future,
our Nation is fortunate to have today's operational National
Guard. Your Guard is efficient, effective, and as fast to the
fight as needs to be at home and abroad. The Department of
Defense, though, and our Nation will face deep challenges in
the decades ahead. We need to maintain the gains achieved by
your National Guard over more than a decade of combat
experience. Put simply, the effective and affordable Guard you
have today arrives on the scene at the precise right time.
As Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey have consistently
observed, the fiscal challenges that lay ahead will
dramatically constrain decisionmaking. This will affect the
size, shape, and roles of our military including the National
Guard.
In the near-term, the looming cuts to the fiscal year 2015
budget of almost $1 billion on the Army National Guard will
challenge the Army Guard in several areas, and General Lyons
will address those in a moment. The risk we will assume will
certainly increase when the Budget Control Act resumes in
fiscal year 2016. The Governors and Adjutants General have
relayed to me that the unique efficiencies of the National
Guard should be part of the solution. I echo their sentiments.
Fiscal challenges may drive us to a greater programmed reliance
on Reserve components in the future.
I'd like to briefly share with you my observations on three
key points worthy of your consideration. First, I agree
completely with Secretary McHugh and General Odierno of the
risk our Nation faces in our Army. For the Guard to meet that
means the Guard that is properly resourced and programmed for
use.
The current generation of guardsmen expects to be deployed
both at home and abroad. The Guard we have today is equipped,
trained, and tested in the field of battle; 760,000 successful
global deployments over the last 12 years testifies to this. In
the homeland, when disaster strikes, our Governors know within
certainty that the Guard is always there. We saw this again,
this week, with the terrible storms across the Midwest and the
South. The Nation cannot afford to squander the gains in
readiness and leadership. Modest but necessary investments will
keep your Army Guard operational and ready for any contingency.
Second, the Guard is fully capable where it has mattered
the most: On the field of battle; that Army National Guard has
accomplished every wartime mission assigned to them since 9/11.
When our enemies look at America's military, they see the
best fighting force in history. They do not see different
components. This is how we have built the Total Force for the
past decade. Preserving the strengths of this Total Force is
our goal. The National Guard's proficiency in executing complex
missions allows us to handle the complex emergencies at home.
Third, the Army National Guard is an efficient hedge in an
uncertain security environment. It enables easy expansion of a
Total Force when required.
During peacetime, investing in a strong Guard frees up
resource for modernization to readiness across the Total Force.
Additionally, the stable unit structure of the Guard provides a
unique tool to build enduring security partnerships across the
globe. This matters a great deal in the world today as a threat
to one can quickly become a threat to all. Today, we have
enduring partnerships in 74 countries in our State partnership
program.
From my visits with the soldiers across America and around
the world, I can tell you that our successes are due to our
most important resource; our people. The wellbeing of our
soldiers, airmen, their families, and their employers remains a
top priority of every leader in the National Guard. We are
aggressively working to eliminate sexual assault, enhance
mental health programs, and reduce suicides across the force.
Congress's recent and continued assistance in resourcing the
programs that address these critical issues is greatly
appreciated.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Chairman, Senators, your National Guard is accessible by
law, as ready as resourced and capable because they are
experienced. In my professional opinion, the fiscal challenges
facing us now and in the future will require us to plan,
program, and use an operational National Guard. Today's
National Guard is fully prepared for that mission.
I'm honored to be representing the men and women of the
Army and Air National Guard and I thank this committee for the
opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Frank J. Grass
opening remarks
Chairman Durbin, Vice Chairman Cochran, distinguished members of
the subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you today representing
more than 460,000 Citizen-Soldiers and Airmen of the Army and Air
National Guard. The National Guard serves with distinction as the
Department of Defense's primary combat reserve to the Army and Air
Force and as the Governor's military force of first choice in times of
domestic crisis. Each day Citizen-Soldiers and Airmen serving
throughout the Nation help to achieve our Nation's overseas and
domestic security objectives by doing three things extraordinarily
well: Fighting America's wars, protecting the homeland, and building
global and domestic partnerships. These three overlapping operational
missions align within Chairman Dempsey's strategic direction to deter
threats, assure partners, and defeat adversaries while also providing
localized, reliable, on-demand security and support to Americans within
their own neighborhoods. The National Guard stands poised to build upon
its 377-year legacy as an operational force deeply engrained within the
foundation of American strength and values.
Today, thanks to the support of Congress and the American people,
after 12 years of war the operational National Guard is the best
manned, trained, equipped and led force in its history. We are able to
do all of this because of our great Citizen Soldiers and Airmen.
Today's Guard is accessible, ready, and capable; and I might add, it
provides a significant value to the American taxpayer.
Accessible
There is no limit to accessibility due to a full suite of
authorities available to access and employ the Guard. Since 9/11 our
leaders have mobilized our National Guard members more than 760,000
times for overseas operations in a variety of wide ranging roles at the
Brigade Combat Team level, to include full spectrum Counter Insurgency
Operations (COIN), Security Force Operations (SECFOR), and training and
mentoring the newly created Afghan National Army/Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) to establish and maintain law and order
throughout Afghanistan. We have filled every request for forces,
meeting or exceeding Army readiness standards, while also meeting every
request to support domestic response missions at home. At the same time
the National Guard is present in approximately 3,000 communities and
immediately accessible to their governors in the event of a domestic
incident or natural disaster. The National Guard is scalable and able
to provide forces for any contingency or emergency.
Ready
The National Guard is at its highest state of readiness as a result
of readiness funding and equipment modernization provided by the
Congress. I want to especially thank the Congress for funds provided in
the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account which have been
critical to our equipment and modernization upgrades. Your support
ensures that the men and women of the National Guard have the resources
they need when called upon by the Nation.
The Army National Guard adheres to the same individual readiness
requirements as the Active Army. It differs when it comes to collective
training. This difference is by design. All Army units, regardless of
component, follow the same training strategy. The Army strategy
reflects the characteristics of the components and maintains some parts
of the active Army at a higher state of readiness for nearly immediate
employment. Leveraging the inexpensive cost of dwell, Army Guard units
maintain sufficient collective proficiency to support leader
development and are ready to quickly surge to a higher level of
readiness. Our Brigade Combat Teams culminate their progressive force
generation cycle at Combat Training Center rotations like their active
duty counterparts. If mobilized, these units can achieve Brigade Combat
Team level proficiency after 50-80 days of post-mobilization training.
When deployed for operational missions Guard and Active Army units are
indistinguishable. Army Guard Brigade Combat Teams will not replace
early deploying Active Army Brigade Combat Teams in their overseas
``fight tonight'' missions. Army Guard Brigade Combat Teams are well
suited for surge and post surge mission sets.
The National Guard is the ``fight tonight'' force in the homeland;
ready to respond rapidly and decisively to the Governor's requirements.
Just as the active Army and Air Force are forward-deployed around the
world the National Guard is forward-deployed in communities across
America. The Guard's ability to provide the Essential 10 capabilities
that the Governors' rely on for domestic incidents and its forward
presence in the homeland saves lives.
Capable
The capability of the Army National Guard is exactly as it should
be today. Our units and Soldiers have accomplished every mission
assigned to them, including the broadest range of mission sets
possible: From Brigade Combat Teams conducting counterinsurgency
operations and Combat Aviation Brigade deployments, as well as non-
standard units such as Agribusiness Development Teams. In fact, since
2003, the Army National Guard has deployed 46 Brigade Combat Teams,
with 49 percent of those deployments being Security Force Operations,
36 percent Counter Insurgency operations, and 15 percent training and
mentoring the newly created Afghan National Army/Afghan National
Security Forces. With our attack-reconnaissance aviation units, 12
battalions and 5 companies have also deployed since 2003 to Bosnia,
Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We have done all of these missions side-
by-side with our Total Army partners.
The Army National Guard allows the Nation to rapidly expand the
Army though mobilization with trained and ready units. The only way you
can do this is if the Army Guard has sufficient capacity with the same
training, organization and equipment maintained at appropriate
readiness levels. Maintaining an Army Guard with similar force
structure to the Active Component is important to growing future combat
leaders and providing the necessary strategic depth we need in our land
forces.
Domestically, we have proven time and again our ability to meet the
needs of the governors and our citizens, regardless of the scope of the
crisis. Whether responding to a natural disaster such as Hurricane
Katrina or Sandy, Colorado flooding, California wildfires, or the
Boston Marathon Bombing, the National Guard is everywhere when it is
needed.
Value
As an adaptive force capable of rapidly generating as-needed
forces, today's National Guard offers significant fiscal value to the
Nation for tomorrow's turbulent security environment. The National
Guard's lower personnel costs and unique capacity-sustaining strengths
also provide efficiencies to free up critical resources for Total Force
modernization, recapitalization, and readiness. At one-third of the
cost of an active duty servicemember in peacetime the Guard provides a
hedge against uncertainty while allowing us to address our fiscal
situation. Furthermore, every dollar invested in the National Guard
allows for a dual use capacity that provides the Governors and the
President capabilities to meet the demands both within and beyond U.S.
borders.
Fiscal Challenges
This Army National Guard force I have outlined will be at risk if
the cap reductions required under the Budget Control Act are fully
implemented. Although Congress provided relief to the Department of
Defense with the Bipartisan Budget Act, the Army National Guard fiscal
year 2015 budget will nonetheless be cut $1 billion from fiscal year
2014 levels. This will require the Army Guard to accept risk in fiscal
year 2015 in several areas: Our Brigade Combat Teams will be limited to
achieving Individual, Crew and Squad-level proficiency in their
training; personnel will have fewer opportunities to attend schools and
special training; and our armories--which average 44 years in age--will
lack funding for repairs beyond those that will ensure health and
safety.
The Department of Defense faces tough decisions on how to balance
readiness while preserving force capacity as a strategic hedge in an
uncertain and complex world. Looking forward, if the cap reductions
required under the BCA are fully implemented in 2016, we will have to
make further difficult decisions. These decisions will continue to
atrophy Army National Guard readiness as a result of our inability to
sufficiently train our units and Soldiers, modernize our equipment and
maintain our facilities. We also face the prospect of a reduction in
Army National Guard End Strength to 315,000 by 2019. This significantly
increases the risk to our ability to conduct Defense Support to Civil
Authorities in the Homeland, and it places our ability to meet the
Defense Strategic Guidance at risk. Moreover, it further degrades our
capabilities in the National Guard's Essential 10--command and control,
logistics, aviation, security, engineering, transportation, medical,
CBRN, maintenance, and communications--all of which the Governors rely
upon to direct their States during times of disaster. These fiscal
challenges come at a time when we are faced with asymmetric and
conventional threats from State and non-State actors; to include the
physical environment. However, as we move forward in this difficult
financial environment, today's unprecedented National Guard readiness
posture offers options to preserve both capability and capacity rather
than choose between them.
Accountability
Ensuring the National Guard is an effective and accountable steward
of public resources begins with every Soldier and Airman. Innovations
that improve efficiency must continue to be encouraged and implemented.
Everyone in the National Guard--from general officers to privates and
airmen--must strive to ensure that the American people feel confident
that our actions, with regard to the use of resources, are above
reproach. We must audit activities, both inside and outside of the
National Guard Bureau, to bolster an environment of full accountability
if we hope to continue to earn the respect of the American public and
to recruit the best and brightest that America has to offer.
We are currently doubling our efforts to ensure that we remain good
stewards of the taxpayer's money. Despite having an already lean
headquarters we have followed the Secretary of Defense's directive to
decrease our headquarters staff by 20 percent. We are completing a
major overhaul of our contracting process through a number of steps, to
include a revamped organizational structure to provide greater senior
leadership oversight, improved formal training, an internal contract
inspection program, and a rewritten National Guard Acquisition Manual.
We will continue to actively advance our methods of increased
accountability as we hold ourselves to the highest standards of fiscal
integrity.
the future
Looking to the future, there are three things the National Guard
will continue to do extremely well for this Nation. First, we will
execute the warfight as the proven combat reserve for both the Army and
Air Force. Second, we will protect the homeland as the ``fight
tonight'' force in our local communities. Finally, the structure of our
force, the very nature of our force, is trained for the warfight and
ready to respond in the homeland, allowing us to continue to build
enduring partnerships both at home and abroad.
Fighting America's Wars
The Department of Defense continues to meet the challenges posed by
the persistent, evolving, and emerging threats and to engage around the
world. Crucial to meeting these challenges is sustaining the National
Guard as an operational force. Some 115,000 Guardsmen have two or more
deployments. Furthermore, as of today, there are over 11,700 National
Guard personnel deployed overseas, to include Afghanistan, the Horn of
Africa, and the Sinai. However, we expect these deployments to decrease
over time as the conflict in Afghanistan draws down.
There is no question that National Guard Citizen-Soldiers and
Airmen training, equipment, and capabilities closely mirror that of
their active component counterparts. We are an adaptive force that is
changing as the threats to the United States evolve. Modernization and
equipping of Army Guard units gives the Nation a rapidly scalable land
force to address threats to the United States and its allies.
Sustaining the advantages of today's National Guard requires
maintaining a high state of readiness through some level of operational
use, relevant training, and continued investment in modernization and
force structure.
A force of Citizen-Soldiers and Airmen that has met or exceeded
established readiness and proficiency standards, the National Guard is
a crucial operational asset for future contingencies. We will remain
adaptable as we plan and prepare to operate effectively in the joint
operational environment as part of the Army and Air Force and execute
emerging missions.
Protecting the Homeland
The National Guard provides the Governors with an organized,
trained, and disciplined military capability to rapidly expand the
capacity of civil authorities responding under emergency conditions.
Prepositioned for immediate response in nearly every community across
the country the National Guard can quickly provide lifesaving
capabilities to the States, territories, and the District of Columbia.
Whether it is the 3,100 National Guard members supporting recent winter
storms across 12 States, 7 Civil Support Teams supporting water
decontamination in West Virginia, or the Dual Status Command concept in
support of the Super Bowl, our Soldiers and Airmen are always ready.
Should the ``worst day in America'' occur, our fellow citizens and
State Commanders-in-Chief expect us to be there; ready to respond
quickly and effectively.
The National Guard also assists U.S. Northern Command, the North
American Aerospace Defense Command, and the military services in the
daily execution of Federal missions such as disaster response and
protecting the skies over America by standing alert with fighter and
missile defense units to protect our Nation's airspace and by providing
immediate response against weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the
National Guard comprises 63 percent of the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear enterprise. The National Guard supports the
Department of Homeland Security to assess the vulnerabilities of our
Nation's critical infrastructure, assists in interdicting transnational
criminals at our borders, conducts wildland firefighting, and augments
security during special events. The National Guard community-based
tradition spans 377 years of localized experience and national service
in times of need and is America's clear first choice for military
response in the homeland.
Building Global and Domestic Partnerships
Each day, the National Guard strengthens and sustains partnerships
around the world and within our communities. The National Guard's
innovative State Partnership Program pairs individual States with
partner nations to establish long-term cooperative security
relationships in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands. The
State Partnership Program is a joint security cooperation enterprise
highly regarded by U.S. ambassadors and Combatant Commanders around the
world that has evolved over 20 years and currently consists of 68
partnerships involving 74 countries. As a result of these strong
relationships, 15 partner nations have paired up with our States and
deployed 79 times together to Iraq and Afghanistan. National Guard
Airmen and Soldiers participated in 739 State Partnership Program
events across all combatant commands in fiscal year 2013 alone.
The three fundamental characteristics of the State Partnership
Program that help define its success are, first and foremost, the
enduring relationships fostered; the ability to share the National
Guard's highly relevant domestic operations expertise; and lastly, the
National Guard's interagency and inter-governmental role in response to
domestic crises and disasters. Additional benefits of the State
Partnership Program include economic co-development, educational
exchanges, agricultural growth to build food security, and support to
other Federal agencies such as the State Department. National Guard
civilian expertise in areas such as engineering, emergency management,
infrastructure development and reconstruction are in significant demand
within developing nations that are eager to partner with America, but
require sustained trust-building engagements before relationships can
realize their full potential. Some of today's State partnerships span
more than 20 years. During that time, the individual careers of
National Guard Soldiers and Airmen have matured alongside those of
their counterparts in partner countries thereby creating enduring
relationships. Overall, the complementary nature of the National
Guard's three core competencies provides a powerful security
cooperation enabler for Combatant Commanders to employ.
The National Guard's three core competencies are who we are and
what we do. But there is more to it than that; our core competencies
permeate throughout the more than 3,000 communities in which we reside.
These core competencies drive us to serve our individual States and the
Nation from within the same communities where we live and work. The
local relationships we forge with our public and private partners, from
first responders to school boards, provide daily benefits that
strengthen and unite through community-based activities and programs.
One such program is the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe--a successful
community-based program that leads, trains, and mentors 16-18 year old
high school dropouts. Over the past 21 years Youth ChalleNGe has
graduated 122,000 youth who have given back to their communities in the
form of 8.4 million hours of community service totaling $163 million.
More importantly, by graduating from this invaluable National Guard
program, these young Americans significantly increased their chance for
a successful future.
Our People
At the very heart of these core competencies is our most important
resource--our people. The well being of our Soldiers, Airmen, their
families and their employers remains a top priority for every leader
throughout the National Guard. We will continue to aggressively work to
eliminate sexual assault, reduce suicides across the force and maintain
faith with our people--the very same people who have put their faith in
us.
Prevent Sexual Assault and Harassment
Sexual assault is a crime, a persistent problem that violates
everything we stand for. All of us have a moral obligation to protect
our members from those who would attack their fellow servicemembers and
betray the bonds of trust that are the bedrock of our culture.
Eliminating sexual assault in the National Guard remains a moral
imperative, with leaders setting and enforcing standards of discipline,
creating a culture that instills confidence in the system, and a no
tolerance culture for inappropriate relationships or sexist behavior.
To assist us in preventing sexual assault and harassment, in August
2012 the National Guard Bureau established the Office of Complex
Investigations within the Bureau's Judge Advocate's Office to assist
the Adjutants General in responding to reports of sexual assault
arising in a non-Federal status. To date the Bureau has certified 92
specially trained investigators that are able to assist the States and
to respond to their needs when an incident of sexual assault or
harassment arises. The efforts of the Office of Complex Investigations
to work in close collaboration with the State military leadership has
been a tremendous success and invaluable enabler in assisting the 54
States, territories and the District of Columbia in addressing this
most serious problem.
Suicide Prevention
One of the strengths of the National Guard is that we are
representative of our great American society. Unfortunately, this also
means that the suicide trends our society struggles with are also
present in the National Guard. While suicides in the Air National Guard
are decreasing, the Army National Guard rates remain high. Although
there have been a below average number of Army National Guard suicides
year to date in 2014, there were 119 suicides in 2013, the highest per
year number over the past 6 years.
To better understand and address this serious issue we have taken a
number of actions. We have reached out to the State Mental Health
Directors and Commissioners for opportunities to partner with and
establish relationships, which will allow us to ensure that appropriate
State, local and community resources are available to our Citizen-
Soldiers and Airmen. Furthermore, each State, territory and Air
National Guard wing currently has a licensed behavioral health provider
that provides clinical mental health assessments, education,
information and referrals for our Soldiers and Airmen. These providers
also act as subject matter expert advisors to our senior leaders. We
are also working with the Air Force to learn from its superior suicide
prevention program. Fortunately, Congress allocated $10 million for
additional Army National Guard behavioral health counselors in the
fiscal year 2014 budget. The National Guard Bureau also has
representation in suicide prevention at the DOD level where we
participate on suicide prevention committees and councils, and to
ensure we are getting the best information and the latest research.
This is a complicated problem; however, I assure you that the National
Guard will engage all support programs in order to work collaboratively
to address this heartbreaking challenge.
National Guard Psychological Health Program
Our Psychological Health Program provides ready access to high
quality mental health services to our Airmen, Soldiers and their
families. We provide support to our member in several ways. Our State
Directors of Psychological Health (DPH) are very effective at directly
addressing help-seeking behaviors and reducing stigma by educating all
levels of leadership about psychological health as part of force
readiness. We work closely with the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to leverage services and support for our members by
increasing access to behavioral healthcare and offering mental health
vouchers through the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration Access to Recovery program. Through HHS, the Health
Resources and Service Administration identifies specific federally
funded health initiatives and programs to better support healthcare
needs for the National Guard population, especially in remote, rural
areas. Additionally, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, through our
close working relationship with HHS, has trained all National Guard
contracted counselors on the Affordable Care Act for Guardsmen who may
be uninsured or underinsured. Finally, we have a total of 174 Army and
Air National Guard mental health counselors throughout the 54 States,
territories and the District of Columbia that are available to our
Guardsmen who are in need of assistance.
National Guard Family Programs
As Overseas Contingency Operations wind down in 2014, funding is
also expected to decrease for our family readiness programs that are
tied to the challenges our Guardsmen face when dealing with a
deployment. Our lessons learned during the last 12 years have shown
that we cannot go back to pre-9/11 assumptions with little to no
support infrastructure for geographically dispersed servicemembers and
their families. Our family programs leverage a network of strategic
partnerships that enhance well-being through increased access to
outreach services. For instance, 454 Army National Guard Assistance
Center specialists and 91 Air National Guard Airman and Family
Readiness Program Managers are spread throughout the Nation and offer
immediate outreach and referral for servicemembers and families.
Moreover, each of the 101 National Guard State Child and Youth Program
Coordinators provide support to our servicemembers' children that in
2013 saw more than 50,000 National Guard children participate in events
such as youth camps and councils. Maintaining access to current
services and resources, particularly those that build strong family and
spouse relationships, and strengthen financial wellness and employment
will pay dividends in future years as it will directly contribute to
the readiness of our force.
closing remarks: always ready, always there
The National Guard is always there when the Nation calls. Whether
serving in uniform or in their capacity as civilians, National
Guardsmen are vested in a culture of readiness and volunteer service.
Time and time again, I see examples of where innovative civilian skills
complement military training in operations both overseas and at home.
Likewise, the military expertise garnered from the past 12 years of
consistent operational use has improved our ability to support the
homeland. Whether responding to a manmade or natural disaster or
planning for future emergencies with first responders, the unique
combination of civilian and military experience pays tremendous
dividends to the American taxpayer. At a fraction of the cost to
maintain during peacetime, the National Guard is a great value as a
hedge against unforeseen threats in a complex and ambiguous world.
Today's National Guard is flexible and scalable to America's changing
needs on any given day. The National Guard has been and will remain
``Always Ready, Always There'' for our Nation.
I want to thank you for your continued support of our Citizen-
Soldiers and Airmen. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, General Grass.
General Talley.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY W. TALLEY,
CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
General Talley. Chairman Durbin, Senator Shelby, Senator
Collins, Senator Murray: Thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear before you today. It's an honor to
represent America's Army Reserve. It's a lifesaving and life-
sustaining Federal force for the Nation. And I'd like to begin
by thanking the committee for your steadfast support that you
provided to all members of our Armed Forces and their families.
The Army Reserve is a community-based force of 205,000
soldiers, 12,900 civilians, living and operating in all 54
States and territories and in 30 countries. We provide about 20
percent of the total Army force structure for only about 5.8
percent of the budget. That's a great return on the investment
especially given the positive economic impact we make
everywhere we are. As the only component of the Army that is
also a single command, we're embedded in every Army service
component command and combatant command around the world.
When the Nation reaches out or our allies reach out and
call for help, the Army Reserve soldiers answer the call with
pride and professionalism. We respond at home, such as in
October 2012 when Superstorm Sandy struck the Northeastern
United States causing major flooding and widespread power
outage. We respond abroad, providing relief when our friends
are overcome by natural disaster, such as the 2013 typhoon in
the Republic of the Philippians. We support ongoing contingent
operations with almost 20,000 soldiers today serving around the
globe with over 6,000 still fighting in Afghanistan.
We provide, also I think uniquely compared to all the other
components and services, a direct linkage to industry private
sector as most of the troops in the Army Reserve are
traditional reservists who work in technical civilian careers
in the private sector that directly correlate with what they do
in the Army Reserve. In fact, most of the total Army's support
and sustainment capabilities, such as attorneys or legal
support, chaplain, civil affairs, military, history,
logisticians, information operations, postal, personnel,
medical doctors and nurses, chemical, transportation, public
affairs, full spectrum engineering--hopefully you're getting
the idea here--are in the Army Reserve; not in the regular Army
or one of our great Army National Guards.
Because the majority of these soldiers are traditional
Reserve soldiers, they keep their technical skills sharp at
little or no cost to the Department of Defense. In fact,
currently 74 percent of the doctorate degrees and half of all
the masters' degrees, in the total Army, are held by Army
Reserve soldiers.
Since September 11, 2011, more than 275,000 Army Reserve
soldiers have been mobilized. Like all Reserve components, we
have become de facto part of the operating force. And I'm sure
we all agree that we must preserve that capability. Essential
to that effort is the necessity to maintain our full-time
support which currently is authorized at 13 percent. That's
significantly lower than any other service or component. The
Department of Defense average for full-time support is 19.4
percent.
The Army Reserve is the largest three-star command in the
Department of Defense and the second largest command in the
total Army, yet is manned at 13 percent full-time manning
compared to the other Reserve components which averaged 19.4
percent. This is a challenge for the Army Reserve.
The funding reflected in our fiscal year 2015 budget, that
request that is currently before you, helps us to maximize our
end strength and maintain our ability to meet the steady demand
signal that we see from our combatant commands. As the
Department of Defense and Army leaders have testified in recent
weeks, the Army Reserve end strength should not be permitted to
drop below 195,000. However, return to the sequester level
funding in fiscal year 2016 would force us to go below that
number. This would seriously degrade our ability to meet the
demands of the National Defense Strategy as already testified
by Secretary McHugh and General Odierno.
I'd like to thank the committee for its support of the
current budget request. But I also wish to highlight the areas
which we were found to accept more risk and that is our
Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve account, which took
nearly a $500 million hit or reduction. This reduction forces
us to forego all but the most necessary facilities maintenance
and scale back training opportunities for our soldiers.
The Army reserve is posed to provide a soft landing for
quality mid-level soldiers who depart our regular Army and
Active component sooner than they had planned. However, if
we're unable to continue to offer relevant and engaging
training for this all volunteer force of our soldiers, we will
experience difficulty in recruiting and retaining the best
talent, especially those brave men and women from our Active
component who have served so well in combat all these many
years.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Finally, I want to emphasize that the Army Reserve is a
full partner with the total Army as we develop the budget.
Current times require us to make painful decisions, but the
budget before you reflects the most thoughtful vision for the
allocation of scarce resources and for the structure of our
Army. I am deeply concerned about the impact of any actions
that would shift the burden away from any one component,
therefore, forcing deeper cuts in others.
As you're aware, I provided the committee a statement that
outlines the challenges of the Army Reserve and some specific
ways the committee and the Congress can assist in keeping us
viable and strong to answer the call of duty. I ask for your
continued support for all of our services and components as we
keep America secure and prosperous. I look very much to your
questions. Twice the citizen and, absolutely, Army strong.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Talley
america's enduring operational force
The Army Reserve is America's dedicated operational Federal reserve
of the Army--a premier provider of trained, equipped, ready and
accessible Soldiers, leaders and units to the Total Army, the Joint
Force and civilian authorities nationwide.
Since September 11, 2001, more than 275,000 \1\ Army Reserve
Soldiers have been mobilized and seamlessly integrated into Active
Component and the Joint Force missions. Today, approximately 19,000
still serve in direct support of Army Service Component Commands and
Combatant Commands across the globe, including nearly 4,000 \2\
Soldiers in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 275,542 since September 11, 2001, as per G-3/5. Source: HQDA
system ``MDIS'' Mobilization deployment information System.
\2\ From G-3/5: as of March 11, 2014, 18,990 AR Soldiers were on
duty in support of ASCC/COCOMS, and 3,951 AR Soldiers were in
Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, while we are no longer in Iraq and will soon be out of
Afghanistan, we continue to face a dangerous world--one which Secretary
Hagel recently described as ``growing more volatile, more unpredictable
and in some instances more threatening to the United States.''
Continued regional instability, violent extremism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and any number of other factors, would
seem to predict that the future global security environment is likely
to be even more complex and potentially dangerous than it is today. And
so we must be prepared to meet the threats and challenges of the
future.
army reserve capabilities vital to america
Never before in the history of our Nation has the Army Reserve been
more indispensable to the Army and the Joint Force, and the reason is
the critical skills and capabilities they bring to the fight--skills
often acquired through their civilian careers and honed in service to
our Nation.
We not only provide the professional skills and capabilities vital
to the success of the Total Army and the Joint Force--but we also
provide capabilities not found anywhere else in the Active Army, the
Army National Guard, or our sister Services. Most, if not all, of those
capabilities are vital during major combat operations, but are also
valuable during times of local and national emergencies affecting the
homeland.
Those capabilities include theater-level transportation and
sustainment, pipeline and distribution management, railway and water
terminal operations as well as other high demand career fields such as
doctors and nurses, lawyers, engineers, and cyber warriors. Put simply,
the Army Reserve Citizen-Soldiers add the operational flexibility and
strategic depth so essential to the Army's ability to Prevent, Shape
and Win across the full range of military operations in which our
Nation is, and will continue to be, engaged.
A significant portion of the Army's enablers--including 90 percent
of civil affairs, 65 percent of logistical units; 60 percent of
doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals; 40 percent of
transportation units; 35 percent of engineers; 24 percent of military
police--are provided by the Army Reserve. We also provide 50 percent of
the Army's combat support and 25 percent of it's mobilization base
expansion capability.
As a dedicated reserve force under Federal control, the Army
Reserve is an indispensable Total Army partner that is ready and
accessible 24/7. It provides direct and immediate access to high-
quality, operational Soldiers, leaders and units for both planned and
emerging missions. Our focus to support the Army's Regionally Aligned
Forces ensures that Army Reserve Soldiers and leaders will be ready to
support the Department of Defense's global requirements.
We are a single command and a component within the Army with an
authorized end strength of 205,000 Soldiers and 12,600 civilians
arrayed under a variety of theater commands. Inherently flexible, the
Army Reserve can quickly task organize in to force packages ranging
from individuals to large units. These packages can be tailored to
support a full range of missions, including homeland response, theater
security cooperation, and overseas contingency operations.
Indeed, steady demand for Army Reserve capabilities has introduced
a new paradigm of reliance on the Army Reserve as an essential part of
our national security architecture.
resourcing
The Army Reserve is concerned that declining Defense budgets will
adversely affect our readiness and modernization for the next several
years. We are a full partner with the Army in striving to achieve the
proper balance between end-strength, readiness, modernization, and
budgets. In the fiscal year 2015 budget request, the Army Reserve's
end-strength was reduced from 205,000 to 202,000 Soldiers. As Secretary
Hagel and General Odierno have testified, Army Reserve end-strength
should be no lower than 195,000 Soldiers, which we will achieve by
fiscal year 2017. However, the currently scheduled sequestration-level
caps will drive the Army Reserve end-strength down to a critically low
level of 185,000 Soldiers, by fiscal year 2019, which is unacceptable
for the execution of the defense strategy.
Our near term resources no longer support unit level readiness and
put in jeopardy our experienced and operational Army Reserve. Our
Soldiers have served their Country proudly over the past decade and
have gained invaluable experience that needs to be maintained through
realistic and worthwhile training. Reductions in funding to our
institutional training programs will adversely impact Duty Military
Occupational Skill readiness, future Soldier promotion potential, as
well as recruiting and retention.
Army Reserve installation services have also taken a significant
cut. Funding reductions in our facilities sustainment programs will
accelerate the decay of our training facilities and force projection
platforms. Of particular concern, is the significant reduction in Base
Support funding which will require us to reduce critical Base
Operations Services in areas such as physical security, base
information management, environmental compliance and municipal
services.
As the active component draws down, we need a robust incentive/
bonus structure to attract those quality Soldiers into the Army Reserve
and retain them as Soldiers for Life. The investment to retain these
Soldiers in the Army Reserve is more than offset by the costs of
recruiting and training new Soldiers.
defense support of civil authorities
In 2012, Congress provided the Department of Defense with new
Reserve Component access authority in 10 U.S. Code Sec. 12304a. This
law clears the way for the Army Reserve to assist our fellow Americans
during domestic emergencies when Federal Assistance is requested by the
Governors through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The same
life-saving and life-sustaining capabilities so essential to missions
abroad make the Army Reserve an optimum force for preserving property,
mitigating damage and saving lives here at home.
In fact, key capabilities in high demand during a major disaster,
such as an earthquake or hurricane, are prominent in the Army Reserve
and nearly all Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) response
missions could benefit from the Army Reserve's unique capabilities and
core competencies. In addition to those already mentioned, Army Reserve
capabilities also include aviation lift, search and rescue or
extraction; quartermaster units (food, shelter, potable water, heated
tents, etc.); supply; civil affairs; public affairs; public and
civilian works; protection of key infrastructure; as well as a
significant portion of full spectrum engineer capability--with some
capabilities predominately within the Army Reserve.
Our Expeditionary Sustainment Commands go into places devoid of
infrastructure and quickly open seaports and airports, while our
logistics and supply chain personnel are experts at moving supplies
into affected areas.
Army Reserve aviation units possess robust capability. Medical
evacuation helicopters and fixed wing aircraft can provide quick
transportation in a disaster response area. Medium and heavy lift
helicopters can rapidly move relief supplies, equipment and
construction material into devastated areas.
Our Engineer units include search and rescue teams, debris removal
capabilities, horizontal and vertical construction and bridge
construction capabilities. We even have a prime power company,
headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia that provides commercial-level
electrical power to affected areas.
We also provide 100 percent of the Army's Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers (EPLOs) and 33 percent of the Department of Defense's
EPLOs, who maintain communications between the Department of Defense,
Federal, State and local governments, and nongovernmental organizations
to coordinate assistance between all parties during emergency response
events. They serve as subject matter experts on specific capabilities,
limitations and legal authorities and keep track of Army Reserve
capabilities in their states and regions.
Thus, the same trained and ready forces that provide indispensable
and immediately accessible capabilities for operations abroad, today
stand ready to support domestic emergency and disaster relief efforts
at home.
a good return on america's investment
The Army Reserve provides all of these capabilities, including
nearly 20 percent of the Army's trained Soldiers and units, for just 6
percent of the total Army budget.\3\ We are the most efficient and
cost-effective reserve component in the Army and operate with the
lowest ratio of full-time support to end strength in the entire
Department of Defense--about 13 percent. With our unique structure of
combat support and combat service support enablers, the majority of our
Soldiers are traditional Army Reserve Soldiers, with full-time jobs in
the public and private sectors, who keep their technical skills sharp
at little or no cost to the Department of Defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Does not include Army Procurement funding for Army Reserve
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With steep force reductions anticipated across the services, it is
imperative that our Nation remains committed to sustaining a strong and
ready operational Army Reserve. For many missions supporting a
Combatant Command's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy such as
Building Partner Capacity, it makes sense to leverage the capabilities
of the Army Reserve, especially since Congress increased direct access
to our capabilities with 10 U.S. Code Sec. 12304b. In this era of
constrained fiscal resources, using the Army Reserve is a particularly
cost-effective way to mitigate the risks while maintaining an
operational reserve. The use of the Army Reserve in support of the
Combatant Commands maintains the operational experience gained during
the last decade. This use of our capabilities also supports the Total
Force Policy for the Army by having all components working together for
the Combatant Commands while leveraging the Operational Reserve.
In addition to the return on investment the Army Reserve provides
to the Army and the Department of Defense, there is also a return in
the form of a positive economic impact to States and communities across
the United States.
Each year the Army Reserve invests billions in local communities in
a number of ways. These investments include payroll to local Soldiers
and Department of Defense employees, utilities and other services to
municipalities, civilian contractors and administrative support; as
well as professional, scientific and technical services in areas like
environmental clean-up and protection. This investment in turn
generates tens of thousands of new food industry, service-related, and
other non-DOD jobs, creating new income for families and a positive
economic climate for State and local communities.
a new generation of army reserve leaders
For these reasons, the Army Reserve that some people still recall
from the 1990s is long gone. As my predecessor testified 3 years ago to
the Senate Appropriations subcommittee, ``I have seen the Reserve of
the future and it is now.''
Our Citizen-Soldiers are highly educated and professionals in their
civilian careers. They are our doctors, lawyers, academics, scientists,
engineers and information technology specialists on the leading edge of
their fields--a new generation of Soldiers who grew up with technology
in their hands, practice it in their professions and leverage it while
in uniform. Today, 75 percent of the doctorate degrees in the Total
Army and half its master's degrees are found in the Army Reserve. This
education and their skills are invaluable to the civilian career fields
in which they work, but they are also invaluable to the Army.
Physically and mentally fit, and fundamentally resilient, Army
Reserve Soldiers are America's steady state, operational reserve force.
In times of crisis or national emergency, the Army Reserve can respond
quickly to our Nation's call. A ready Army Reserve not only offers the
Nation an insurance policy, but it can provide an opportunity for
Soldiers leaving active service due to end-strength reductions a chance
to continue serving. As we downsize the Active Component, transitioning
Soldiers to the Army Reserve helps the Army keep faith with them and
their families who demonstrate a propensity to serve their country.
This preserves the taxpayer's investment in training these Soldiers,
and can offer new military career tracks that may bridge the transition
for Soldiers and their families.
Offering a continuum of service option supports, the Chief of Staff
of the Army's recent guidance to leverage the unique attributes and
responsibilities of each Component and preserves the operational
experience gained from more than 12 years of war while continuing to
prepare Soldiers and units for future challenges.
national guard and reserve equipment appropriation and modernization
challenges
The Army Reserve appreciates the steadfast support the Committee
has provided for more than a decade and particularly the National Guard
and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding that has improved
our equipment acquisition and modernization levels. The Army Reserve is
at an all-time high for equipment modernization and equipment on hand,
and was a full partner in developing and submitting the fiscal year
2015 President's budget for equipment procurement and modernization.
However, we still suffer from significant equipment shortfalls and are
the least equipped and modernized Army component.
In the 2014 National Guard & Reserve Equipment Report, dated March
2013, the Army Reserve's modernization rate was 66 percent. As of
December 2013, the rate increased to 76 percent. While the Army
Reserve's equipping posture has improved during the past 10 years,
critical equipping and modernization shortages remain one of the Army
Reserve's greatest challenges. Program procurement delays and the
restructuring of requirements as a result of budget reductions, will
further widen modernization gaps and impede our interoperability with
the Joint Force.
Since 2011, the Army Reserve's base budget for equipment
procurement had seen an overall decrease of 45 percent. The Army
Reserve, in coordination with the Army, continues to develop mitigation
strategies aimed at improving equipment modernization. Congressional
support through NGREA is essential to successfully execute mitigation
strategies and improving Army Reserve equipment modernization levels.
Even in these times of constrained fiscal resources, we cannot afford
to let this challenge go unaddressed as it directly impacts our ability
to train and sustain an operational force that is properly equipped to
meet National Security responsibilities while enhancing Federal
response to Homeland Defense and DSCA.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Challenges
A challenge for the Army Reserve is modernization of the legacy
Light Tactical Vehicle fleet. The Army Reserve is scheduled to replace
one-third of the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
fleet with Joint Light Tactical Vehicle beginning in 2022. As a result,
we must maintain two-thirds of the legacy fleet for 31 additional
years, through 2045, without any scheduled modernization, leaving the
Army Reserve, and especially our medical units, with an unfunded
modernization requirement.
Today, 48 percent of the Total Army's ground ambulance companies
reside in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve has on hand only 64
percent of its required Light Ground Ambulances. This more than 20-
year-old legacy Ambulance fleet was not included in previous
modernization efforts and is short 36 percent of the HMMWV Ambulances
required to support contingency operations and potential mass casualty
events in the homeland.
Clearance and Bridging Capabilities
Similarly, 35 percent of the Army's total engineering capacity--
which includes 80 percent of its Area Clearance capabilities and 36
percent of its Multi-Role Bridging capabilities--are provided by the
Army Reserve. In just 6 years, by 2020, only 20 percent of the Common
Bridge Transport System, and none of the Joint Assault Bridge system
will be modernized.
Logistical Capabilities
Lastly, the Army Reserve provides 65 percent of the Army's total
logistics capabilities, of which the majority is Critical Dual Use
equipment for enabling support to Homeland Defense and DSCA.
Significant shortfalls in this area include water and fuel storage and
distributions systems and material handling equipment. Only 43 percent
of the Fuel Distribution System, and 20 percent of the Army's Light
Capability Rough Terrain Forklift for moving material, will be
modernized by the end of 2020.
While the Army Reserve's equipping posture has improved during the
past 10 years, critical equipping and modernization shortages remain
one of the Army Reserve's greatest challenges. Even in these times of
constrained fiscal resources, we cannot afford to let this challenge go
unaddressed as it directly impacts our ability to train and sustain an
operational force that is properly equipped to meet National Security
responsibilities while enhancing Federal response to Homeland Defense
and DSCA.
Full Time Support
Ensuring our operational Army Reserve will continue to meet global
mission requirements with trained and ready forces requires resourcing
adequate full time support. Our full time Active Guard and Reserve
(AGR) Soldiers and Civilians ensure the precious time of our
traditional Reservists is focused on training and readiness rather than
the abundant administrative and preparatory tasks. At the Budget
Control Act and even the Bipartisan Budget Act level of funding, the
Army Reserve was forced to reduce Full Time Support. Military
technicians (MILTECHs) will be reduced by 500 in fiscal year 2015, with
an additional 500 programmed in fiscal year 2016 for a total of a 1000
MILTECH reduction across the Army Reserve.
Army Reserve full time support is currently authorized at 13
percent of end-strength, while the Department of Defense average for
all Reserve Components is 19.4 percent. Increasing Army Reserve full
time support will improve Army Reserve unit readiness by moving non-
readiness producing administrative tasks from the part time Soldier to
the full time support staff. In addition, we urge congressional support
of two important legislative proposals submitted to the committees on
modifying the military technician program. These legislative proposals
allow for greater flexibility and upward mobility for our members both
as Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians.
america's army reserve: a life-saving, life-sustaining force for the
nation
Whether it is providing trained and ready forces for combat
missions and contingency operations abroad, or saving lives and
protecting property at home, today's Army Reserve is America's life-
saving, life-sustaining force for the Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and for the
steadfast support Congress has always provided to the men and women who
have served our country so selflessly over the past 106 years, and
continue to do so every day.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, General Talley.
General Lyons.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JUDD H. LYONS, ACTING
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General Lyons. Good morning, Chairman Durbin, Senator
Shelby, Senator Collins, Senator Murray. I'm honored to appear
before you today, representing more than 355,000 soldiers in
the Army National Guard.
At home, our Guard's men and women continue to answer the
call. Today, they are assisting in the aftermath of deadly
tornados in Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee; as
well as flooding in Florida and North Carolina. Army National
Guard soldiers are always ready to respond to natural disasters
anywhere in the country.
Thanks to the firm and committed support of Congress and
the Army over the past 13 years, the Army Guard has transformed
from a strategic Reserve into an operational force. Since
September 11, 2001, we've mobilized soldiers, more than 525,000
times.
As part of our total Army, Guard units have performed every
assigned mission from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan to maintaining the peace in Kosovo and the Sinai.
Your Army Guard is actively adapting to a new global
environment as part of the total Army. As the Army transforms
its training from counterinsurgency focus to decisive action,
Vermont's 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team will be the first
Army Guard BCT in a decade to conduct a decisive action
rotation at the joint readiness training center in Fort Polk,
Louisiana this summer.
The fiscal year 2015 budget submission required hard
choices and has significant impact in our National Guard
personnel and operations and maintenance funding. The based
budget request for these two accounts is nearly $1 billion
below what was appropriated in fiscal year 2014. This will
require the Army Guard to accept risk in fiscal year 2015.
Our brigade combat teams lack NGPA (National Guard
Personnel, Army) and OMNG (Operations and Maintenance, National
Guard) for CTC rotations and will be limited to achieving
individual, crew and squad level proficiency in their training.
Personnel will have fewer opportunities to attend schools and
special training and our depple level overhaul of our trucks
will be deferred. Our armories, which average 44 years of age,
will lack funding for repairs beyond those that will ensure
health and safety.
Yet, these reductions pale in comparison to what will be
required under Budget Control Act levels. Under BCA, Army
National Guard end strength is reduced to 315,000. Our
reduction of 35,000 Guard soldiers means the elimination of
many critical command and control headquarters, the loss of
experienced leaders and fewer opportunities for Active-Duty
soldiers to transition into the Guard. We will be in fewer
communities and face closing armories.
Ultimately, this combination of these impacts equals
increased response time for domestic emergencies and fewer
forces available for Title 10 missions in case of a national
emergency.
Because people are our number one resource, we are
committed to eliminating sexual assault and to enhancing our
behavioral health programs. We're working diligently to deal
with these challenges and to provide resiliency building tools
to our soldiers and their families. These are top priorities
for all Army Guard leaders.
PREPARED STATEMENT
With committed Citizen Soldiers in our formations, the Army
Guard presents tremendous value to the Nation and to the
communities where we live, work, and serve. The last decade-
plus of war has demonstrated our strength as a combat-ready,
operational force or role that, with your support, we will
probably continue to perform for the Army and for our Nation.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Judd H. Lyons
opening remarks
Chairman Durbin, Vice Chairman Cochran, members of the
subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you today, representing
more than 354,000 Soldiers in the Army National Guard. For 377 years
our Citizen Soldiers have been central to how the Nation defends itself
at home and abroad. Through resolve and readiness, Army National Guard
Soldiers deliver essential value to our Nation and our communities.
The men and women of the Army National Guard continue that history
and contribute immeasurably to America's security. They have been an
integral part of the Army, supporting the National Military Strategy
and Army commitments worldwide. In more than a decade of fighting two
wars, the Army National Guard has successfully expanded the capacity
and capabilities of our Army, conducting every mission assigned.
Since September 11, 2001, Guard Soldiers have completed more than
525,000 mobilizations in support of Federal missions. The Army National
Guard mobilized more than 17,300 Soldiers for service around the world
during fiscal year 2013, a number substantially lower than our peak
years of 2003 and 2004, when we mobilized more than 80,000 per year.
Currently, we have nearly 15,000 mobilized, of which 6,500 are deployed
to multiple locations in the U.S. and around the world defending our
national interests.
There is a direct and powerful connection that begins with the Army
National Guard's organization, equipment and training for overseas
missions and leads to our unequaled capacity to complete domestic
missions. On the home front, the Army National Guard continues to
fulfill its centuries-old obligations to the communities in which we
live and work. Guard Soldiers live in each congressional district,
playing a vital role as the military's first domestic responders and
linking national efforts to local communities. In fiscal year 2013 Army
Guard Soldiers served nearly 388,000 duty days under the command of the
Nation's governors assisting our fellow citizens during domestic
emergencies. Yet, despite a large call up for Hurricane Sandy, fiscal
year 2013 was historically a slow year. The current fiscal year has
already seen State activations for ice storms in the south, unusually
high levels of snow throughout the country, floods in several States,
and a major water contamination disaster in West Virginia. Whether at
home or abroad, the National Guard lives up to its motto--Always Ready,
Always There.
The Army National Guard of 2014 remains at peak efficiency in
manpower, training, equipping, leadership and experience. We haven't
arrived at this level by accident. This is a direct result of the
resourcing and legal authorities that Congress has dedicated to this
purpose over the past decade-plus of conflict, and a tremendous effort
by the Total Army to reach this level of operational capability. I can
assure you that this effort has not only been worthwhile, but that the
results have brought an excellent return on the taxpayers' investment.
The National Guard delivers proven, affordable security and we do it on
an as-needed basis.
The Army National Guard, the active Army and the Army Reserve,
ensure the Total Force remains capable of providing trained and ready
forces for prompt and sustained combat, in support of the Nation's
security strategy.
The transition from a strategic reserve to an operational force
means the Army Guard is resourced, trained, ready, and used on a
continual basis. When properly resourced we can conduct the full
spectrum of military operations in all environments as a part of the
Total Force.
The fiscal constraints imposed by sequester level reductions under
the Budget Control Act, though temporarily eased by the Bipartisan
Budget Agreement, will lead to inevitable reductions in funding in
years ahead. The Army Guard will share in these cuts; however, it is in
these challenging times that the inherent value of the ARNG to the
American taxpayer comes most clearly into focus. As numerous studies
both internal and external to the Department of Defense have
demonstrated, a reserve component service member costs a third of his
or her active component counterpart when considering the fully burdened
cost over the lifetime of the individual. Because Congress has already
invested in the training and equipping of the Army National Guard over
the past 13 years of war, it now takes only a continued modest
investment to maintain an operational force when compared to the
strategic reserve the Nation had prior to 9/11. But that investment is
more than made up for in the responsiveness, flexibility and readiness
resident in a reserve component where 84 percent of the personnel serve
in a part-time status.
accountability
We must protect the Nation's investment by insuring that the ARNG
is an effective and accountable steward of public resources. We
continue to encourage and implement innovations to improve efficiency
to sustain hard-won readiness gained over the last decade. Despite
having a lean headquarters we have followed the Secretary of Army
directive to decrease our headquarters staff by 20 percent by fiscal
year 2019. We will continue to actively advance our methods of
increased accountability as we hold ourselves to the highest standards
of ethics and integrity. We must ensure that the American people feel
confident that our actions are above reproach.
status of the force
Guard Soldiers continue to demonstrate a strong willingness to
serve this great Nation and their communities. This appetite for
service continues to draw America's youth to the Guard's ranks. To meet
our obligation to the great men and women who step forward to serve,
everyone--general officer to private--must adhere to and embody the
ethical standards articulated in our core values. By remaining focused
on ethical standards and our core values we will continue to attract
and retain Citizen Soldiers.
The Army Guard achieved 98.5 percent of its recruitment goal of
45,400 new Soldiers. Overall, our retention rate during fiscal year
2013 was 86.3 percent, as 51,145 Guard Soldiers extended their
enlistments; of note, this was a 3.8 percent increase over the previous
5 years.
For active component Soldiers who choose to leave active duty, the
National Guard continues to offer an excellent opportunity to remain in
service to our country and for the country to retain the investment in
developing the skills of these veterans. More than 4,600 Soldiers
joined the Guard last year directly from the active Army, which
surpassed the Guard's goal (105.9 percent). As future end strength cuts
loom, the Guard stands ready to retain combat-proven Soldiers in the
Army. But this talent cannot be retained if there is no place to put
it. By maintaining sufficient force structure in the Guard, the Army
can provide service opportunities for combat-proven Soldiers, as well
as saving some of the costs incurred in training new recruits.
Those Soldiers who join the Guard from the active component are
signing up with a well-trained, seasoned cohort. Nearly 50 percent of
our Soldiers today are veterans of a deployment with the Army National
Guard, many having served multiple tours. Retaining a corps of
experienced troops not only sustains the Guard's readiness, but becomes
an overwhelming benefit to the Total Army. A total of 303,282 Soldiers,
or 85 percent of our force, have joined the Army National Guard since
9/11, knowing they were likely to deploy overseas. This is a special
class of people that we want to hold on to, and improving on the
retention rate last year was important for us. The likelihood of
deploying on operational missions overseas is not nearly as great as it
was 6 years ago, and money for training and equipment will not be as
readily available. So keeping these Soldiers interested and engaged--
and thus willing to stay in our ranks--is becoming a significant
challenge not just for our retention personnel, but for leaders at
every level.
Certainly, bonuses and incentives play an important role in keeping
Soldiers in uniform, but we know that the desire for relevant training
and utilization at home and abroad play a significant role in their
decisions to stay. A key component of the operational reserve is that
it is a force that sees regular use, through a progressive readiness
model--such as Army Force Generation--that prepares Soldiers and units
for deployment. Regular employment ensures unit readiness remains high.
It provides Soldiers, their families and civilian employers the
predictability they need to plan their civilian lives and careers.
Also, it develops critical leadership skills, while exercising our
systems to ensure we can rapidly deploy when needed.
accessibility
In the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress addressed
concerns about accessing the reserve components for domestic or
overseas missions in situations short of war or a national emergency.
The authority granted in Title 10, section 12304(b) removed a
significant impediment to maintaining an operational reserve that can
be flexibly employed by combatant commanders as required. Title 10,
section 12304(a) likewise removed an impediment to employing all
Federal reserve capabilities for domestic emergencies at the request of
the governors. There remain no significant statutory barriers to
accessing the Army National Guard for either domestic or overseas
missions, though consistent budgeting for use of these authorities
remains an issue to address. The Army National Guard is accessible and
ready to meet the needs of the Nation.
an operational force that fights america's wars
The Army National Guard has demonstrated this capability in full
during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citizen Soldiers have been
mobilized in units ranging in size from two-to-three man teams, to
Brigade Combat Teams, to Division headquarters exercising command and
control over multiple Brigade Combat Teams and supporting forces. Guard
BCTs performed every mission in Iraq and Afghanistan their active
component counterparts performed except the initial invasion. Guard
BCTs successfully performed a wide variety of missions including
security force, counter-insurgency operations, and advising and
assisting host nation military and police forces in both countries.
In fiscal year 2013, more than 17,300 Army National Guard Soldiers
were mobilized in support of a multitude of ongoing missions around the
world. Approximately 10,300 served in Afghanistan, while others served
in the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, the Sinai, Honduras, the Philippines,
and mobilized for operational missions within the United States.
While this contribution is noteworthy, there is significantly more
capacity within the Army National Guard should the Nation require a
surge of forces. For example, at one point during 2005 more than
100,000 Guardsmen were mobilized and 8 of 15 Brigade Combat Teams in
Iraq were Army National Guard. Later that same year, with 80,000
Soldiers still mobilized, the Army Guard surged more than 50,000
Soldiers in the span of a week to deploy to the gulf coast in the wake
of Hurricane Katrina. In summary: In the year in which the Army
National Guard underwent its largest mobilization since the Korean War,
it also experienced the largest domestic response in its history. This
capacity and capability continues to reside in your Army National
Guard.
Response time is a critical consideration when determining the
right mix of forces to meet planned or unanticipated contingencies. The
past 13 years of war have demonstrated that even the largest Guard
formations can be trained to the Army standard, validated and deployed
well within the timelines required by combatant commanders. The
experience of deploying repeatedly over the past decade has honed this
training regimen and reduced post-mobilization training time
considerably since 2003. As the Office of the Secretary of Defense
validated in its December 2013 report to Congress, ``Unit Cost and
Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces,''
even the most complex Guard formations, the Brigade Combat Teams, take
only 50-80 days after mobilization to be ready for deployment when they
are mobilized at company-level proficiency, or 110 days when mobilized
at platoon-level proficiency. The ability of the Army National Guard to
respond to worldwide contingencies provides tremendous flexibility to
the Nation as we seek to achieve defense goals with a constrained
budget.
In fiscal year 2015, the ARNG is programmed to return to its pre-9/
11 strength of 350,200, a reduction of 4,000 in end strength from
fiscal year 2014 and 8,000 from our wartime high of 358,200 between
2008-2013. If Budget Control Act level cuts are re-imposed in 2016, the
Army will face even tougher choices and challenges in managing risk and
balancing readiness, modernization and end strength. Under these
conditions, the Secretary of Defense has announced that ARNG end
strength will have to be further reduced to 315,000 by fiscal year
2019. This will mark a significant reduction in the strategic hedge
against uncertainty that the Army Guard affords the Nation for
unforeseen contingencies. It will also undoubtedly impact domestic
response times. While the Guard will always respond to a domestic
emergency, response times may suffer as readiness centers are
shuttered, equipment maintenance is deferred, and training is reduced.
an operational force that protects the homeland
In fiscal year 2013, Citizen Soldiers responded to hurricanes,
winter storms, floods, tornadoes, search and rescue missions, and the
bombing of an iconic sporting event in one of our Nation's oldest
cities. There were 52 major disaster declarations in 24 States and
territories in 2013, but the biggest response of the year came in its
first month. Super Storm Sandy devastated communities along the east
coast in late October, and Guard members from 21 States responded, with
many remaining on duty for several weeks. At the height of the
response, more than 11,900 Guardsmen were activated. These were joined
by active component Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, as well as Army
Reservists, all of whom fell under dual status commanders in New York
and New Jersey. Both dual-status commanders were National Guard
brigadier generals, successfully integrating DOD capabilities under
State and Federal control to more effectively serve our citizens in
their time of need.
Warmer weather did not mean the National Guard would have the rest
of 2013 off. On the afternoon of May 20, an EF5 tornado packing winds
above 200 mph tore into the Oklahoma City area. The suburb of Moore was
severely impacted. Dozens of people were killed, entire neighborhoods
were flattened, and homes and businesses were destroyed. Elementary
school children were trapped in what remained of their schools, and
Army National Guard members assisted in rescuing survivors. In total,
more than 530 Army National Guard members supported the relief effort,
performing search and rescue and security support missions.
The ARNG's largest rescue operation last year was in response to
the floods that wiped out numerous roads and bridges, devastating
communities in Colorado in September 2013. Thousands of citizens were
stranded in the mountains of the Front Range. Eight people were killed,
218 were injured, and thousands of commercial and residential buildings
damaged or destroyed. More than 750 National Guard members with a total
of 21 helicopters and 200 military vehicles were joined by active
component Soldiers and aircraft from Fort Carson. More than 3,233
Civilians and 1,347 pets were rescued and evacuated. In the aftermath,
Army National Guard engineers from Colorado and several neighboring
States quickly restored miles of highway that were washed out in the
floods before winter snows would have made reconstruction impossible.
One event that has long been an annual requirement for the
Massachusetts National Guard was anything but routine last year: The
117-year old Boston Marathon. Massachusetts Guardsmen have long
supported State and Federal law enforcement at the event, providing
traffic control, area security, and a standby Civil Support Team. Their
familiarity with the marathon was extremely helpful, and indeed
lifesaving, last year. Approximately 250 Guard members were on State
Active Duty supporting the Boston Marathon on April 15 when two
improvised explosive devices detonated near the finish line. This
attack killed three spectators and injured hundreds more. National
Guardsmen on site immediately provided lifesaving aid and conducted
security cordons and traffic control operations to assist emergency
responders with their coordinated response. The 1st Civil Support Team
of the Massachusetts National Guard quickly determined that no chemical
agents had been used in the bombing. By the next morning, approximately
1,000 National Guard members were called to State Active Duty to assist
civil authorities. In addition to Massachusetts, the States of Rhode
Island, New Hampshire and New York provided Citizen Soldiers for this
response. In the days to come, armed National Guard military police
used armored Humvees to facilitate the tactical movement of law
enforcement personnel.
The Army National Guard's support to the U.S. Border Patrol along
the Southwest border continued into 2014, although at a reduced rate
than in years past. Approximately 220 Guard members from 34 States or
territories served on this ongoing mission along the 1,933-mile border
of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The current mission
focuses on criminal analysis and aerial detection and monitoring.
Still, during the 2013 calendar year, ARNG aviation personnel flew more
than 10,635 flight hours in support of this mission, assisting in the
seizure of 40,264 pounds of marijuana and 139 pounds of cocaine.
Army National Guard aviation was particularly active in the
domestic arena, flying more than 19,100 hours supporting civil
authorities in natural disasters, conducting medical evacuations, and
conducting preplanned activities such as counter drug missions. Army
Guard aircraft hauled nearly 422,000 pounds of cargo, transported more
than 18,000 passengers and worked with multiple law enforcement
agencies on a regular basis, assisting in the seizure of an estimated
$5.03 billion in drugs during the course of the year. Most importantly,
Army Guard aircraft rescued 1,604 citizens in Search and Rescue and
medical evacuation missions.
an operational force that builds partnership
One of the National Guard's greatest strengths is building
partnerships. In 2013, the Army National Guard provided 12,265 Soldiers
to support 72 military exercises in 76 countries. The Guard's
experience with the warfight, domestic disaster response, our Soldiers'
wide variety of civilian professional and educational experiences, and
close community connections to many civilian institutions such as
hospitals and universities, ideally position the National Guard for
building partnerships that are multi-dimensional.
Today, the National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program (SPP)
consists of 68 partnerships with a total of 74 partner countries. SPP
promotes security cooperation activities for military-to-military
training, disaster response, border and port security, medical, and
peacekeeping operations. Calendar year 2013 marked the 20th anniversary
of this innovative program, which continues to produce immense benefits
for both the United States and partner nations at minimal cost. In
support of the Chief of Mission and the U.S. Department of State, and
at the request of the regional combatant commanders, SPP is conducted
jointly by Army and Air Guard forces in the States, territories and the
District of Columbia under the leadership of the respective adjutants
general. As such, SPP is the perfect complement to the Army's Regional
Alignment of Forces concept and Chief of Staff of the Army's effort to
shape the security landscape, but with unique advantages. Because of
the relative stability of a Guard Soldier's career, which in most cases
remains within a single State, that Soldier has the opportunity to
forge enduring relationships with his or her counterparts in one or two
foreign nations over long periods of time. In some cases, the crucial
bonds have been cultivated and maintained for more than two decades.
These bonds have borne fruit on the battlefield. Since 2003, 16
partner nations deployed units to Iraq and Afghanistan more than 87
times alongside Guard men and women from their partner states.
Additional benefits of the State Partnership program include economic
co-development, educational exchanges, agricultural growth to build
food security, and support to other Federal agencies.
resourcing the operational force
The fiscal year 2015 budget submission represents a significant
reduction in appropriations for the Army National Guard in both
Operations and Maintenance (OMNG) and Personnel (NGPA) accounts
compared to fiscal year 2014. OMNG funding for fiscal year 2015
reflects a 12-percent reduction from fiscal year 2014. This will only
allow the ARNG to provide minimal training for units, with no
additional funding to allow for combat training center rotations in
fiscal year 2015. In addition to the decrease in OPTEMPO funding, the
ARNG assumes risk in such areas are Base Operations Support,
modernization to infrastructure, and depot maintenance of equipment and
vehicles.
NGPA funding for fiscal year 2015 is 1.2 percent below fiscal year
2014 levels. While this fully funds statutory requirements of inactive
duty training, annual training, and initial entry training, the ARNG
has assumed risk with significant reductions in funding for training
and schools as compared to last year.
These reductions will begin to degrade the readiness that the Guard
has built up over the past 13 years, limiting how rapidly ARNG units
may be operationally employed. The reductions for fiscal year 2015 will
pale in comparison, however, to the reductions that are forecast to
take place beginning in fiscal year 2016 when the Army returns to the
sequestration levels of funding imposed by the Budget Control Act.
Quite simply, the Army National Guard can be as ready as it is
resourced to be. The Guard will achieve desired levels of
responsiveness if properly resourced--and it will do so by maximizing
taxpayers' investment in programs directly contributing to Army
National Guard readiness.
maintaining the operational force: support to soldiers and families
People are the Guard's most precious resource, and the ARNG
sponsors a wide variety of programs intended to enhance coping skills
in Soldiers and their families--skills with an application to everyday
life as well as the military.
sexual harassment/assault response and prevention
The Army National Guard SHARP program reinforces the Total Army's
commitment to eliminating incidents of sexual harassment and assault
utilizing education, disciplinary action, and victim-centered response
services. In fiscal year 2012, the ARNG assigned a full-time program
manager to each State and territory and the District of Columbia;
during this past fiscal year the ARNG assigned 93 full-time victim
advocates within each State and territory and the District of Columbia.
In addition to full-time support personnel, the ARNG has trained more
than 2,400 collateral duty Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and
Victim Advocates at the brigade and battalion level. The Army National
Guard's minimum goal was to train 1,864 SHARP personnel to DOD Sexual
Assault Advocate Certification Program standard. With 2,309 certified,
we are at 127 percent of that goal.
suicide prevention
Calendar year 2013 saw a record 119 suicides of Guard Soldiers.
Combating suicides has been a persistent challenge for the Army Guard,
since leaders typically only see the majority of their Soldiers during
a single drill weekend each month. This limits a leader's ability to
intervene in a crisis. That's why the Army Guard is focusing on
training and programs to increase resilience, reduce risk, and increase
leadership awareness. In September 2013, the ARNG awarded a national
contract to provide a Suicide Prevention Program Manager (SPPM) in
every State. The SPPM manages State suicide prevention efforts,
training, and suicide surveillance. The ARNG trained 120 trainers in
the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) program in
fiscal year 2013, bringing the total to 517. These personnel trained
4,042 gatekeepers in advanced suicide intervention skills. Gatekeepers
are trained to recognize someone in crisis, intervene to keep them
safe, and provide referrals to assistance. The goal in fiscal year 2014
is to train an additional 120 ASIST trainers who will, in turn, train
approximately 11,000 gatekeepers. The Army National Guard is also
participating in Army studies of suicide trends in an attempt to
determine if prevention resources can be better focused to particular
units, States, or at-risk Soldiers. Even one suicide is one too many;
however, the trend is improving. Thus far in 2014, the number of
completed suicides is below the pace of 2013--a trend we are working
hard to sustain.
In fiscal year 2013, ARNG behavioral health counselors provided
informal behavioral health consultations to more than 30,000 Soldiers
and family members; 2,939 of these consultations identified emergent
situations leading to critical psychological care. The ARNG reported
876 command interventions in suicide attempts (including expressed
desire to commit suicide) in the 2013 calendar year. The ARNG reports
172 ideations as of mid-March 2014. We will continue to work
collaboratively to address this heart breaking challenge.
directors of psychological health
Prior to last year, one Director of Psychological Health (DPH) was
provided for each of the 50 States, three territories and the District
of Columbia. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 authorized
funding for an additional 24 DPHs, increasing the ARNG's total from 54
to 78. In accordance with NDAA 2014, the 24 new DPHs were assigned to
high-risk States. The ARNG has seen a significant increase in usage
rates addressing emergent and high-risk cases. Command consultation,
follow-up and multidisciplinary team consultations went from 13,525 to
26,766, and behavioral health case management went up from 3,556 to
10,264. We are grateful that Congress allocated $10 million for
additional Guard behavioral health counselors in the fiscal year 2014
budget.
guard resilience training
Resiliency training offers strength-based, positive psychology
tools to aid Soldiers, leaders, and Families in their ability to grow
and thrive in the face of challenges and to recover from adversity in
our communities. Soldiers complete the Global Assessment Tool annually
to measure and track a Soldier's resilience over time. Master
Resilience Trainers (MRTs) provide training to units and Families,
serving as the commander's principal advisors on resilience. In fiscal
year 2013, the ARNG obligated $10.4 million for the resilience program,
which trained more than 1,550 MRTs and 4,600 Resilience Trainer
Assistants.
In late 2011, the Army National Guard teamed with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Air National Guard to
launch a highly successful phone and Internet-based help line,
Vets4Warriors. This help-line, which is operated by Rutgers University
Behavioral Health Care, provides peer-to-peer support from a staff of
more than 30 veterans representing all branches of service and family
members. They can provide referrals as appropriate, resilience case
management and outreach services to help overcome an individual's or a
family's daily challenges. Vets4Warriors initially served only reserve
component members, but in November 2013 it was made available to all
active duty military service members and their families, wherever they
are located. Since its inception, the Vets4Warriors support line
received more than 41,000 calls and conducted nearly 1,900 live online
chats.
Family Readiness Groups are essential to creating a bond within
units that facilitates assistance and reduces unnecessary stress.
Family Readiness Support Assistants provide a great return on
investment by helping our commanders create and sustain those groups,
and by providing volunteer and resilience training at the unit level.
Family Assistance Centers serve family members of all military
components and are located in 396 communities around the Nation. We are
now facing reductions in the Family Assistance Center, Family Readiness
Support Assistance and Child & Youth Program personnel currently
provided to the States and territories. Family Readiness Support
Assistants provide logistics to 312 brigade and troop commands in
support of the Unit Readiness Program, and are the ARNG's key training
asset for volunteers, family readiness and resilience initiatives.
Funding is projected to be cut from $15.5 million in fiscal year 2014
to $10.9 million in fiscal year 2015. This, in combination with cuts to
Family Assistance Center funding, will potentially result in a
reduction of FRSAs from 312 to approximately 165.
strong bonds
Strong Bonds is a unit-based, chaplain-led program that assists
commanders in building Soldier and family member readiness and
resilience through relationship education and skills training. The Army
National Guard provides the 50 States, three territories and the
District of Columbia with information, guidance and training related to
this program. In fiscal year 2013 the ARNG held 544 Strong Bonds events
serving 22,284 Soldiers and family members throughout the Army Guard.
With a budget of just over $6 million, the ARNG's cost per person is
$269. A variety of Strong Bonds programs are available focusing on
building strong relationships for married couples, single Soldiers, and
families taught by certified chaplains.
substance abuse program
The ARNG's Substance Abuse Program (SAP) provides a continuum of
substance abuse services, including prevention, assessment, and brief
intervention services. In September 2013, the ARNG awarded a national
contract to provide Alcohol and Drug Control Officers and Prevention
Coordinators in every State and territory and the District of Columbia.
The SAP has also partnered with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration to pilot the Substance Abuse Services
Initiative, which will provide Soldiers with a voucher for substance
abuse assessments. In fiscal year 2013, more than 135,000 Soldiers
completed the Unit Risk Inventory (URI), which is an anonymous survey
measuring many of the stressors that contribute to substance abuse,
suicide, and sexual assault. Utilizing the URI results, units receive
prevention training, resources, and interventions tailored to their
unit.
employment assistance
The Army National Guard has been, and remains, deeply concerned
with the civilian employment status of its Soldiers. The ability of
Guard Soldiers to gain and maintain civilian employment is essential to
retaining these Soldiers in the ARNG. While unemployment remains most
acute immediately following redeployment, employment challenges extend
beyond those returning mobilized Soldiers. The Guard continues to work
diligently to find solutions to assist its geographically dispersed
population, working closely with the States to spread best practices
from each State across the country.
The Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) Act of 2011 mandates the
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for all Soldiers separating from a
Title 10 active duty tour of more than 180 days. The Army National
Guard is working closely with the Department of the Army and OSD to
implement the transition mandates set forth in the legislation. States
report 34,162 demobilized ARNG Soldiers since November 2012 with 26,999
(79 percent) exempt from the Department of Labor Employment Workshop
(DOLEW) due to full-time employment or student status. Of the remaining
6,998, some 5,477 (78 percent) completed the DOLEW at one of 268
workshops conducted. In fiscal year 2014 compliance has improved
through February 2014 with 2,342 Soldiers requiring the DOLEW and 2,153
(92 percent) compliant. The ARNG will continue to promote and leverage
an array of employment programs and resources to support VOW mandates
and reduce Soldier unemployment.
maintaining the operational force: medical readiness
Medical Readiness is a foundational requirement to maintaining the
Army National Guard as an operational force; fully medically ready
Soldiers are the key to ready and relevant units. Medical Readiness is
an area in which congressional resourcing and leadership focus have
made dramatic improvements. The Army Guard improved from a fully
medically ready percentage of 51 percent in July 2009, to 85 percent as
of October 2013. That is the highest percentage of medical readiness
we've ever recorded, and higher than either the active Army or the Army
Reserve at that time.
However, this is an area in which readiness will rapidly slip if
resources are reduced. For example, because a substantial number of
Soldiers were not able to conduct Periodic Health Assessments that were
scheduled for October 2013 due to the Government shutdown, medical
readiness slipped 3 percent to 82 percent in a single month. It took us
4 months just to climb back to 83 percent. It doesn't take long for our
medical readiness to slip dramatically in a short period of time, but,
turning things around is a much slower, more deliberate process. This
not only requires funding, but a tremendous amount of time--time that
we can never get back. Sustaining medical readiness is far cheaper than
rebuilding it; and most importantly, it allows the capability and
capacity for medically ready Soldiers to respond when needed for
domestic or overseas missions.
maintaining the operational force: equipping the force
The Army National Guard has received significant investments in
equipment, increasing Equipment on Hand (EOH), Critical Dual-Use
equipment (CDU--equipment that is of use for domestic response as well
as for war fighting missions), and the overall modernization levels.
Army National Guard EOH for Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment units is currently at 91 percent, an increase from 88 percent
last year and from 85 percent 2 years ago. Overall CDU EOH is 93
percent, an increase from 90 percent last year and a significant
increase from 65 percent in 2005, when the Guard responded to Hurricane
Katrina. Of the total quantity of equipment authorized, 85 percent is
on-hand and considered modernized, up from 70 percent last year. This
dramatic increase was partly due to new equipment purchases, but
principally due to the Army re-defining in the past year what models of
equipment it considers as modern. The steady improvement of equipment
on hand, particularly CDU, can in part be traced to the continued
appropriation of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account funds
(NGREA), which has allowed the Army Guard a degree of flexibility in
procurement, enabled it to meet training readiness goals, and improved
modernization levels.
maintaining the operational force: installations
The Army National Guard has facilities in more than 2,600
communities, making it the most dispersed of any military component of
any service. In many towns and cities these facilities are the only
military presence, with the Guard serving as the most visible link
between hometown America and the Nation's armed forces. These readiness
centers, maintenance shops and training centers serve as platforms for
mobilization during times of war as well as command centers and
shelters during domestic emergencies. Providing quality facilities
across 50 States, three Territories and the District of Columbia has
been an on-going challenge. The Army National Guard transformed from a
strategic reserve to an operational force over the past 13 years, but
many of our facilities have not been updated in decades. The average
age of Army Guard readiness centers is 44 years. More than 30 percent
of them are 55 years old or older, the limit to what is considered
``useful life'' for that type of facility. Many fail to meet the needs
of a 21st century operational force, cannot accommodate modern
equipment and technology, are poorly situated, and are energy
inefficient. Facilities are critical to readiness and support unit
administration, training, equipment maintenance, and storage.
This wide array of uses makes Military Construction and Facilities
Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization funding a critical matter
directly impacting unit readiness and morale, continuity of operations
and domestic preparedness.
closing remarks
With our Nation operating during an era of budgetary pressure, the
Army National Guard is structured to efficiently provide capacity and
capabilities our Nation requires in a dangerous world. With committed
Citizen Soldiers as our foundation, the Army National Guard represents
tremendous value to the Nation at large and within American communities
where we live, work and serve. A flexible force serving our citizens
for 377 years, the Guard's history shows that it has always adapted to
change in America and around the world and risen to the challenge. The
last 13 years have demonstrated these traits in full. That is why the
National Guard has been and will remain ``Always Ready, Always There''
for our Nation.
I want to thank you for your continued support for the Army
National Guard and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Secretary, reflecting on where we are today as we
contemplate our challenges at your table and here at ours, it's
clear that there's a tension. A tension that has been created
by competing interest, limited resources and, what I would say
across the board, a genuine commitment to the defense of this
Nation. I don't question the sincerity of that commitment.
There are different points-of-view on how to achieve it and I
think that's why there is this competition of ideas.
No one has experienced this more than Senator Murray, as
Chairman of the Budget Committee, because she's been tasked
with coming up with a budget with our colleagues in the House
where we both served. And she has noted, I'm sure, as all of us
have the tension between defense and non-defense and then
within the defense community, the different and competing
points-of-view.
So I'd like to ask you about two or three issues that are,
really, front and center in terms of most of the inquiries I
receive from my colleagues about this budget. And some of them
have been alluded to; some of them have been addressed
directly. But let's start with the obvious and controversial
issue of Army Aviation.
Can you tell me how much of the total Army Aviation mission
in Iraq and Afghanistan was completed by the National Guard?
Secretary McHugh. I can give you breakdown by platform. In
other words, Apache versus Blackhawk by flying hours, but I
don't have the compo breakdown. I can tell you, based on
deployments, the average Active component, Apache Brigade
Combat Team, deployed four times with a number deploying five
and six times. That's because, as all of us I think can agree,
these are, in time of conflict, very high-demand assets.
The Guard components deployed, understandably, somewhat
fewer times. They did deploy. I've read stories that say Apache
units in the Guard were not engaged, that's incorrect. But, on
average, they deployed about twice with more than half of those
units, I believe, deploying once. That's because these are
Citizen Soldiers. They go home to jobs. They have different
dwell times. But anyone who suggests that the Guard units were
not on post and station, I think, is being less than genuine.
The hard choice we had to make is that Apache platforms in
the Active component do not meet current needs. And so given
that, that is a first out-the-door kind of capability; we made
the hard choice. And the recommendation in this budget that we
moved those units into the Active component, saving billions of
dollars over the program, and at the same time recognizing the
important role of Guard aviation providing, as both the Chief
and I've noted, more than 100 Blackhawks which also fly in
combat roles, and in fact, flew the majority of combat----
Senator Durbin. If I can ask you, Mr. Secretary, you've
stated the obvious. And that is you're faced with budgetary
challenges. You're trying to meet those while maintaining our
national defense in this and so many other areas. We have a
report that the Army National Guard, AH-64, Apache fleet, on
average can be maintained for 42 percent of the cost of its
Active component counterparts.
So, if the issue here is savings, how can shifting these
helicopters from Guard assignment to Active assignment save
money if there's a 42-percent increase?
Secretary McHugh. Well, I think you have to look at how
those figures were derived. The Guard, obviously, costs less
when it's in non-Active status. Their training schedules are
different. Their service weekends are different; whereas, the
Active component is trained to be on the alert and ready to go.
The Apache unit cost in the Active component is undoubtedly
higher because it has to be out the door the first day.
And not only that, as we go forward, Apache training is one
of the most complex missions that we have. In fact, we're
integrating unmanned aerial systems into the Apache formations,
which makes that training very, very complex and is difficult
and highly expensive to maintain in the Guard component.
Senator Durbin. May I ask you, before----
General Odierno. Senator, could I just----
Senator Durbin. Of course. Go ahead, General.
General Odierno. Thank you.
It's not just Apaches. The reason this has to be done is
because we're eliminating a whole fleet, OH-58s. So we're
eliminating over 600 OH-58 aircrafts out of the Active
component. So you get all that savings. So it's not just Apache
versus Apache. It's the fact that we're taking out 600 OH-58s
out of the Active component. And we're taking the Apaches to
replace some of those OH-58s.
So it's not just the comparison of ``it's 42-percent
cheaper to have it in the Guard and the Active;'' it's the fact
that we're saving $12 billion by removing the OH-58s out of our
inventory completely.
Senator Durbin. But let me ask the next question to either
or both. In a recent report, we've seen a steady increase in
the cost of remanufactured Apache. In a recent report, the
program's cost estimates have increased 11 percent. So if the
Army projects to save $12 billion with this restructure
initiative, are these increased Apache costs included in that
proposal? How is the Army confident that this proposal is going
to be an actual savings in light of this increase?
General Odierno. We're absolutely confident in it's
savings.
Again, it's about a $12.7 billion savings. We've already
programmed in these increases. Now, the reason the cost is
increasing is because of reduced budgets. We've had to reduce
the number that we were going to purchase and slow it down over
the long-term because of our budget reductions. That's why it's
costing more. So that's going to happen no matter what you do.
But that cost will be an increase no matter what decision we
make. That increase is going to continue because we've had to
expand the programs over, now, instead of 6, 7 years, to 12, 13
years because of the sequestration budget reductions.
Senator Durbin. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me say to each of you that I'm grateful for your
service and I do understand how difficult the decisions that
you're being called upon to make must be.
Major General Lyons, you did an excellent job of outlining
the critical role that the Army National Guard plays not only
when it's deployed as it has been many, many times in Iraq and
Afghanistan but here at home whenever disaster strikes. It's
the Guard as well as our first responders who are first to
respond to the call for help.
I want to give a very specific example from my home State
of Maine of what this budget would mean for the National Guard
there because, as I understand it, these cuts would bring the
Active-Duty force to pre-war levels but the Guard would be cut
below pre-war levels even though the percentages of the cut may
suggest the opposite conclusion.
Let me give you an example of what Maine's TAG (The
Adjutant General) has told me that the cuts in the Guard would
be in Maine. He estimates that the Maine Army National Guard
would be under 2,000. That is the smallest that it has been
since Maine achieved statehood in 1820. He would have to close
remaining armories in Calais and Houlton, Maine, leaving only
one small unit in the State, north of Bangor, Maine. That's
covering almost two-thirds of the State.
And I think that is why the TAGs and the Governors have
been virtually unanimous in raising their very deep and genuine
concerns about the Army's plan. And I would ask you to give
your professional opinion. If we accept these cuts, what is the
impact going to be on the Guard's ability to respond to a
terrorist attack at home; a natural disaster such as we're
seeing in the South and in so many parts of our country; as
well as the Guard's ability to deploy to future conflicts?
Because, after all, this is a dangerous world and we just
would never have predicted, prior to September 11, 2001, the
strain that we would be putting on our Guard with repeated
deployments and extended and shortened dwell times.
General Lyons. Yes, Senator.
In reference to the impact, at 315,000 soldiers underneath
Budget Control Act, in the illustrative example you used in
Maine, there is direct impact at those levels both in terms of
not only the reduction in the number of soldiers that we have
physically present, as you outlined, but a loss of leaders,
experienced leaders, who have been honed over 12 years both in
wartime experience and in responding domestically.
So we are a community-based organization as the committee
knows; over 2,600 communities. So when we reduce down to
315,000 soldiers under BCA, that dispersed community footprint
is going to shrink. And so, Adjutant Generals will be faced
with tough decisions about closing facilities. We use those
armories, as you know, as our projection platforms when we
respond here at home. As you constrict that footprint, our
response time, depending on where that disaster strikes, is
increased. And so, that has direct impact on our ability to
respond. So it's unacceptable impact in terms of risk, at
315,000 for the Army National Guard.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just say, the Active
component in 2001 was 485,500. We were going to 420,000. So
there's a 64,000 reduction from pre-war levels in the Active
component. I just want to make sure that's very clear.
So we have taken reductions from every component based on
pre-war. The other thing I would point out, since 2001, we have
increased full-time support to the National Guard by an
additional 16,000 soldiers and that's staying. We have not
taken that out of the budget. So although their end strength is
coming down, the amount of full-time support continues to be
much higher than it was pre-war. And that is what we've
invested into the Guard, and that's remaining.
So I want to make it very clear. The percentage of the
budget that we're allocating to the Guard in this proposal,
that is at a much higher percentage than it has ever been in
our total budget. We have not reduced that. We recognize the
point you're making, that they are worth the cost. And that's
why we've taken much smaller reductions in the Guard and will
take the preponderance of the reductions in the Active crux. We
recognize exactly what you're saying.
Senator Collins. Well, I've spent a great deal of time on
the Homeland Security Committee; I've served on it for more
than a decade, I know how absolutely critical the Guard is to
emergency preparedness and response. And I don't think we can
forget that role as well; as well as the fact that it's less
expensive to have the Guard ready to deploy.
But, General, I'm also concerned for the Active-Duty. I
don't mean to imply otherwise because the 2014 QDR (Quadrennial
Defense Review) states that the U.S. military will no longer be
sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged, stability operations.
You said the Army was directed to scale down and not to size
for those kind of operations. And I couldn't help but when you
were talking about the unpredictability of the threats, to
think about Secretary Gate's comments back in 2011 when he
says, ``When it comes to predicting the nature and location of
our next military engagement since Vietnam, our record has been
perfect. We have never gotten it right.''
And that's why I'm very concerned on the Active-Duty side
as well. I know that I'm out of time. I will submit some
additional questions for the record with the Chairman's
permission.
But I would be remiss, and Mr. Secretary, you and I have
discussed this many times, if I didn't once again express my
concern about mental health services to Guard members; to
return home to rural America where we have a real absence of
mental health professionals who can help them, or soldiers who
have retired from the service. We've got to reduce the stake
level; we've got to make greater use of telemedicine; and we've
got to have active drug take-back programs that I've been
pushing the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) to allow our
military hospitals in our VA (Department of Veterans Affairs)
facilities because that's part of the suicide problem as well.
And I know you care deeply about that.
Secretary McHugh. I do, Senator. And we all deeply
appreciate yours and the other senators--Senator Murray
principally amongst them--the other committee members, who care
about this as deeply as we do.
I deeply appreciate the effort on the medicine take-back.
We think that makes common sense. We think all the services
believe that we can conduct it safely without any of the
concerns the DEA has, I think, understandably expressed. But
without some change in what is currently allowed, we're not
going to be able to go forward there.
Senator Collins. Well, I'm going to continue to push really
hard on this. I've got a bill. I'm working with OMB (Office of
Management and Budget), DEA, and it's just ridiculous that DEA
is not more cooperative in this area.
Secretary McHugh. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
having this hearing. And thank you for all of our witnesses.
And I'd be remiss if I did not start out by thanking the
National Guard on behalf of the communities in my State, in the
aftermath of the Oso mudslide, the tremendous outpouring of
support from the National Guard. We just can't thank you all
enough. I was up there many times. I've never seen a disaster
like this and the National Guard members, along with our first
responders who were digging in the worst of conditions, 75 feet
of mud, looking for victims and their affects and day-after-day
without complaining. And I just want to convey our thank you
for all of those men and women who are out there and are
still--some of them out there, working on that.
As Senator Durbin referred to the budget issues, we all
know, we're all struggling through this, obviously grateful
that we're not still dealing with sequester for the immediate,
but it is hanging out there and we all have some tough
decisions to make and appreciate all of your comments today as
we try to work forward through that.
But I want to follow-up on what Senator Collins referred to
at the end of her questioning because the 2012 DOD suicide
report was recently issued and it shows that we are still very
much struggling to combat suicide in the military. But a change
in counting suicides in the Guard and Reserves shows the
problem is actually significantly worse than was previously
reported.
I'm going to be asking for a lot of answers from the
offices responsible about those changes and why it took them so
long to get this to us. But for now, the obvious problem in the
Guard and Reserve is much worse than we were led to believe.
So for all of our witnesses--and Major General Lyons, if I
can start with you--in light of this new information that we
now have, what are you going to be doing to better address
suicide especially in the Guard and Reserve?
General Lyons. Senator, with respect to the recently
released report that you mentioned, you know, accurate figures
are--I welcome that. It helps us see ourselves better; helps us
apply our resources more effectively. And so, I view that as a
positive step.
In terms of what we're doing, leaders at all levels in the
Army National Guard from the Adjutant General in the State down
to first-line squad leaders are very concerned about this.
We're a geographically dispersed, primarily, part-time force.
And so, at the leader level, the small unit leader level, that
interaction of knowing your soldiers, knowing what's going on
in their lives, understanding and recognizing changes in their
behavior, and then having the knowledge to escort that person
that's in crisis to a caregiver is something we spend quite a
bit of time on.
We also dedicate resources to that in the terms of full-
time Directors of Psychological Health (DPH). We have 78 DPHs
across the 54 States, territories in the district. We continue
to apply additional resources that Congress has given us in
fiscal year 2014 to expand that footprint. Right now, it's
about one Director of Psychological Health to 4,500 soldiers.
We hope to close that gap down to about one to 2,300 and
continue to embed those professionals.
We continue to stress resiliency training in our
formations. In fact, we're starting to do that now, when
soldiers first join the Guard and they enter what we call the
Recruit Sustainment Program, before they even ship off to basic
combat training, introducing resiliency in risk reduction
training into that training before they even ship off.
We spend quite a bit of time with something called ASIST--
it's Applied Suicide Intervention Skills and Training. We have
35,000 of our guardsmen trained in ASIST. And again, that's all
about recognizing changes in behavior and recognizing when
someone is in crisis and knowing what to do and protecting that
person and escorting them to care.
We continue to focus on the role of our chaplains who
provide 24/7 crisis counseling to our servicemembers. And so,
these are some areas that we continue to engage on. Our
Adjutants General are partnering with local communities
stressing the importance of engagement with the Veteran's
Administration and, also, the role of TRICARE Reserve Select
for our members as an access to care.
Senator Murray. General.
General Grass. Senator, thank you.
One of the things we're doing at the National Guard Bureau,
in addition to what the Army and Air Guard are doing, really,
at the unit level is I've been working with Health and Human
Services and the Public Health Service. I have a rear admiral
from Public Health Service that serves as my liaison. And we've
been meeting with members of the Surgeon General's office to
take a look at how this problem is being dealt with for our
Nation.
I'm very concerned especially with the issues we're dealing
with today, but I'm also concerned about the future. I'm not
sure we really grasp yet the impact of 12 years or more on any
member of our society and, coming back home to small-town
America, will we have the resources there? We're working
closely with General Shinseki's staff, but Health and Human
Services and the Public Health Service is going to do some
study work for us to see, because we draw our men and women
right out of our communities and when they return, what can we
do to make local and State health resources available and the
professionals.
Senator Murray. Which is where they are when they go home.
General Grass. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Murray. Okay.
Anybody else want to comment quickly on this?
General Odierno. If I could, just a couple.
The Telehealth has increased significantly over the last
couple years. We have thousands now available that helps
National Guard and Reserve through Telehealth especially in
behavioral health.
The other thing is I want to thank everyone for the TRICARE
Reserve Select that has been put into place that is a low-cost
capability for our Reserve, specifically for our Reserve and
National Guard that helps them get care outside of the military
treatment facilities. And now that that's available, we're
starting to see the differences. So we appreciate the work
Congress has done to put that into place and those are helping
significantly.
Senator Murray. I appreciate that. And I will continue to
follow-up with all of you.
And I wanted to ask one other quick question, General
Odierno, while I'm here. I really appreciate the work the Army
has done to implement, under your leadership, the Hire Heroes
Act. Working at JBLM (Joint Base Lewis-McChord), I'm seeing
some really great programs, significant numbers of soldiers
accepting job offers prior to separation so we don't have that
gap. We're in the midst of a pilot program out there.
But I wanted to ask you, I understand there's been a long
delay in giving the unit commanders' access to the ACAP XXI
System. That's what tracks the soldier's process through ACAP.
So if the unit commander doesn't have the information, they're
not able to follow-up and make sure it's happening. When is
that capability going to be available?
General Odierno. We think we've got it about there. So we
think within the next month or so that that capability is going
to be able to provide the information for the commanders. It's
critical----
Senator Murray. Yes.
General Odierno [continuing]. As we go through this. You
are exactly right. And so, we've been working very hard to get
this in place.
Senator Murray. Okay.
I would like to follow-up with you on that as well because
we've got to get that information to the commanders.
General Odierno. Sure.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, you outlined all of this real well. And I
appreciate that and I appreciate your service.
I want to direct a couple of questions to you, if I can. I
realize, as you do, that the big problem is lack of funding.
That's cuts to everything. If we're going to have a first-class
Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, we've got to pay for it. If
we're going to have the Guard, we've got to pay for it. If
we're going to have a Reserve, which we have to have, for the
security. And I think the American people have got to realize
that. Do they want to be the top military force in the world? I
hope so. And it's manifested right here, starting in this
committee here.
General, could you just for a minute discuss the importance
of continuing to fund missile defense in spite of our cuts? And
how important is the funding of missile defense looking at
what's happening in Eastern Europe, what's happening in Korea
right now, to us and to our allies?
General Odierno. Well, Senator, obviously our missile
defense program and our ability to protect ourselves is
becoming more and more important as the Army continues to have
over 50 percent of its Ballistic Missile Defense capability
deployed around the world; and the Middle East and the Pacific,
trying to prevent and ensure that we protect our allies and
ourselves from ballistic missile attack. And we see individuals
in North Korea continue to demonstrate a capability of the
ballistic missile capability that should be concerning to all
of us. So we have to continue to build our capabilities to
ensure we can defend ourselves at both here and our entities
abroad as well.
Senator Shelby. End strength reduction, which you talked
about, I think it's very important because we get down to the
bare bones of the Army, the Guard, the Reserve, the whole
thing. Could you describe again, for the record, how this
drawdown could impact or will impact the Army's ability to
maintain a globally responsive land force?
General Odierno. Senator, as I've said before, is if we
have to go to sequestration levels, the Active component at
420, the Guard at 315, the Reserves at 185, it really puts into
question our ability to even, in my opinion, to do one
prolonged multiphased campaign.
It also impacts our ability to respond to multiple
campaigns in multiple continents which is becoming more and
more viable. And so, for me, it's concerning. And so, the risk
is significant today.
Our assumptions are that it won't be prolonged. Our
assumptions are we'll have appropriate allied support. Our
assumptions are they won't last very long. If any of those
assumptions are wrong, then our risk goes much higher than it
is today.
And so, I think we're on a dangerous path if we have to go
to full sequestration and our ability to, what I consider to
do, is to protect our national security interests.
Senator Shelby. We're headed down the road to decimating
our armed forces; aren't we?
General Odierno. I think it's going to be difficult. And I
think it puts us in a 4- or 5-year period of great
vulnerability as we draw down our end strength because our
readiness and modernization is not being properly invested in.
Senator Shelby. Secretary McHugh, I have a couple of
questions if I could direct them to you.
Could you elaborate on the Army's requirement to procure a
fourth brigade combat set of DVH (double-V-hull) Strykers? And
then, also, what is the modification timeline for this project?
Secretary McHugh. Well, did you say, ``For the record,''
Senator? Or would you like----
Senator Shelby. You can do it now if you want to.
Secretary McHugh. I know it's----
Senator Shelby. I'd appreciate it.
Secretary McHugh. No, I'm happy to do it, Senator.
Well, we always try to take lessons learned. And one of the
lessons we learned, particularly in Afghanistan, is that this
platform was highly effective in keeping our soldiers safe
while giving us appropriate mobility across the battlefield.
As you know, we had some discussion as to how do we go
forward in capturing that improvement, buying new or recapping,
retrofitting flat-bottom, single hull Strykers into the double-
V. After assessing the variances in cost, we determined that to
retrofit and refit the existing fleet with a V-hull, double-V-
hull, saved us about $1 million a platform. So we have been
adding those, first, the third brigade and now a fourth
brigade.
If funding continues as we hope, I believe we're talking
about a procurement end of about 19 but that may have to change
based on the uncertainty of funding as you know. But right now,
that's a modernization priority for us.
Senator Shelby. My next question would deal with the
Distributed Common Ground System, you called the DCGS-A.
In March of this year, a GAO (Government Accountability
Office) report noted continuing performance challenges for the
Distributed Common Ground System, DCGS-A; the Army's program of
record for intelligence data analysis, sharing, and
collaboration, which I think is very important. The Army's
budget decreases DCGS-A funding by almost 27 percent.
Is DSG--DCGS, let me say it right, still a priority for the
Army? And if so, how do you intend to continue its development
in view of everything we've got going on and why is it
important?
Secretary McHugh. Well, as you noted, the ability to gather
the most successful amount and most accurate amount of
intelligence, particularly in a theater of combat, is
absolutely essential. And the Chief has spoken on multiple
occasions about the kinds of capability and the expanse of
intelligence information through the number and added sources
that are available today, to today's commander compared to what
he had available when he was commanding in theater.
I think it's important to note, DCGS-A is not a thing onto
itself. It is a system of systems. It is software; it is
hardware. And as the GAO noted, it's a program in progress. We
think, at this point, the observations that GAO made and based
on other tests that we have done in the field and feedback
we've received, we've corrected, or certainly modified and
nullified, most of the concerns raised in that particular
report. It is our intent, in the next increment of DCGS-A,
which we hope to be underway by 2015, that we will go to full
and open competition.
Senator Shelby. General, do you want to comment on that and
what this program will, after you work out a full challenges,
what will it do?
General Odierno. Yes, Senator, the report that you gave us,
that you mentioned, is an old report.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
General Odierno. It's about a 2-year-old report. We have
corrected, already, many of the deficiencies that were
contained in that report. It's a multi-int, multi-echelon,
intelligence capability. It's a system that we have that takes
national intelligence, tactical intelligence, common SIGINT,
any int we have; it puts it into one processing where you can
put data together and then provide information to our war
fighters at all levels. It's the only system that enables us to
do that.
And so, for us it's absolutely important. We now have our
allies looking at it. The SOF (special operations forces)
community is now adopting it; the Marines. So we are very
confident with this. We obviously still have, you know, we are
going to continue to work through some of the problems----
Senator Shelby. Sure.
General Odierno [continuing]. But we think it's absolutely
the right system.
Senator Shelby. What will it do for you that you don't have
today?
General Odierno. Well, see what we don't have, what we
haven't had today, is the ability to get all the--you have to--
--
Senator Shelby. Put it all together?
General Odierno. It puts it all together. It synchronizes
everything together.
You have it coming in different places. Now, this gets it
in one place. It also processes the data and it also gives you
answers based on all the--it gives you information based on all
of the int that it gets one place. So it's a significant
improvement in what we had.
Senator Shelby. And it's got a lot of promise.
General Odierno. It's got a lot of promise.
Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's good to see all of you here. I think back, with
pleasure, the days when Secretary McHugh was Congressman
McHugh. We often flew home together to our area.
General Odierno, I still remember very well that
conversation late one night walking around.
And, General Grass, I might address this at the risk of
being a tiny bit parochial. As you know, and General Lyons
mentioned, the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team based in
Vermont is the only National Guard unit attending a CTC to
train at the brigade combat team level over this year. They've
been preparing for that for 4\1/2\ years. They're ready to go.
I think the Nation is lucky to have the Green Mountain Boys
ready to answer.
I'll just ask you: How does the National Guard Bureau use
funds to help the 86th or other units, not just in Vermont,
become ready in anticipation for operational use?
General Grass. Senator, I actually look very much forward
to being with the 86th this summer in June. I'm going to go
down and visit them. And this is the first time, in many years,
that we've actually been able to return to Fort Polk.
Senator Leahy. And I'm going to try to be there with you
when you do. Go ahead.
General Grass. Yes, sir.
You know, we have a program that we work with U.S. Forces
Command and with First Army. And once a unit is assigned,
there's a lot of additional resources that go to that unit,
additional training periods, so that when you ramp up to be
ready to deploy and go to the Joint Readiness Training Center
at the brigade level of operations, those extra resources are
given to the State. I know that General Lyons can go into great
detail what tasks they accomplish. The hard part for us right
now, though, is looking to the future with the cuts that we
have and especially under the BCA.
We will not be able to have those resources in the
earliers, the 3 to 4 years prior, much less the years to
execute those missions both at the National Training Center and
the JRTC.
Senator Leahy. Well, we should have a further conversation
about this you and General Lyons, as we work on the
appropriations bill.
And, General Odierno, as you know, Senator Lindsey Graham,
and I are considering a commission to look at the Army's
future. And I happen to know you stated opposition to a
commission as it was described in a House proposal. Now, do you
object to any independent look at the future of the Army or
only one that costs $1 billion annually in delays made of the
agreed upon changes to go forward?
General Odierno. Part of the problem, Senator--the reason
that we object to it is if it delays decisions 2 years, it
imposes, as you've mentioned, a $2 billion bill. Actually, it's
greater than that because if it goes into the second year, it's
about a $6 or $7 billion bill that we simply can't pay for if
we don't make the decisions now. So that makes it more
difficult.
We would never reject an independent look but because of
sequestration and the near-term nature of it, I'm just not sure
that we can wait that long. And so, the length of it is of
great concern to us.
We also believe that we've been open and allowed many to
have provide input to our process as we've gone through this.
We've been working on this for a very long time so we feel
comfortable that we've gotten a lot of input. But again, it's
more about the budget, it's about the immediacy of it and the
fact if we have to delay these recommendations we're making,
we're going to have to take the money from somewhere else and
it's going to be out of readiness and modernization. We already
don't have enough money in readiness and modernization. So it's
of great concern to me, sir.
Senator Leahy. Well, as the senior most member of this
committee and one who has served here longer than anybody else,
I've seen the debates over the years--from the time of Vietnam
straight through, on the budget and I am concerned about that.
But I'm also wearing another hat as the chair of judiciary, I
realize as we all do, the Constitution requires Congress to
raise and equip Armies as well as the part for the militia that
might be called into Federal service.
We, Senator Graham and I, are concerned enough because we
think a number of--small number--of the choices before the Army
are truly controversial. And I think they could fundamentally
change the nature of the Army we know. You and I may disagree
on some of those, but we will introduce legislation. And we
will, and I say this in all honestly, we will look forward to
the feedback you have when you see the legislation. But I
suspect it has a good chance of passing and I want to make sure
we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.
But I am concerned that there has not been--while I'm
concerned, on the one hand, the restrictions you have on
funding but, the other hand, that we have not looked at what
the long-term change might be not just for the Army but for the
Guard and Reserves in this. And that's one of the things we
will talk about in our commission.
General Odierno. Senator, that's fine. I mean, the
Secretary and I have a total Army policy that we are very
serious about. And my responsibility is to oversee the total
Army, which is the Guard, Reserve, and Active component. That's
my responsibility and I take it very seriously. And I believe
that, when we look at these problems, we look at it from all
perspectives.
So again I look forward to working with you, sir.
Senator Leahy. Well, General, as you know I've been
supportive of a lot of the things you've done in the past.
Maybe in some areas we may disagree, but this is one where I
want some other outsiders to also look at it.
You also made it clear, from your testimony last June to
the Congress, and you did again today here, you are committed
to rooting out cultural elements within the Army that may play
a role in the current environment that led to sexual assault
and harassment and hold those accountable; they're responsible.
I have many, many friends in the military. I have a son who
served in the military, I have neighbors and friends at home
who are retired, and throughout all of them they've raised this
question: What's the best way to handle it? The Washington
Post, last week, published a story saying a prominent commander
was suspended, relieved of command this August after an IG
report review showed he repeatedly failed to pursue allegations
of sexual misconduct against a subordinate. But then, once he
was removed, he was made Director of Program Analysis and
Evaluation on the Army staff.
What is the appropriate level of response? How do you
balance it? I realize you can't--as a prosecutor of 8 years--I
realize there's no one-size-fits-all. But how do you balance
what is an appropriate response and punishment, to use that
word, as a deterrent for future conduct?
General Odierno. Senator, it's a great question and it's
one that the Secretary and I spend a lot of time talking about.
First off, we have to make sure we have--we still have to
provide to make sure every individual has the rights that he
has. And so, during that time that you talk about, he was
suspended from command. We did a full investigation. We had to
put him in a position that he had some expertise in that would
help us to move forward. And then, once the investigation was
done, we took immediate action. And that's the action that you
saw of relief and then other actions that the Secretary will
take.
And so, we look at each one of these individually. We're
very serious about this. And we, I'm telling you, our
commanders understand this. That if somebody doesn't take
appropriate action then we will punish them. We look across the
board at what's available. If somebody does something illegal,
that's one thing. If somebody does something against
regulation, that's another thing. And we take appropriate
action based on that.
The one thing is reputation that you never get back. And
that's the one thing we never remember how big that is, is your
own reputation when something like this happens.
Secretary McHugh. And, Senator, may I just add something?
Because, from the civilian side, you've raised a point that was
something of a mystery to me when I first arrived. And that is
we had an occasion, including the specific one you mentioned,
where you have an officer where the charges have been
substantiated, whether it be a trial or whether it be through
an IG investigation, and yet, by law, they have to remain on
the payrolls because they do have due process as you as a
former prosecutor know.
And so, the question becomes for us, all right, we have to
pay him. Shouldn't we get value by the taxpayer dollars as we
go through that interim period of where that officer can file
certain matters on his own behalf and matters of appeal? Or do
we sit him in a corner somewhere? So, in the case in question,
he had certain skills and we thought it was better for the
taxpayer and the Army if we got some value out of it. After the
case and due process period was closed, we've taken some pretty
significant actions. And, as the Chief alluded to, I still have
the authority to review his status, rank and grade of
retirement, which will be part of the process going forward.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you.
I want to just begin my questions this morning with a
direct thank you, Secretary McHugh, General Odierno. You have
helped us yet again this year by allowing Major General Karen
Dyson to be available as our guest of honor and the keynote
speaker at the Fairbanks Military Appreciation event. This is
the 46th Annual Banquet that they've had up there. And I
believe that this is the first time that we have a female
general officer ever to keynote it. And I'm very proud of that.
And thank you for that. I know that the people of Fairbanks
will look forward, too, to visit with her.
General Odierno, it was a couple years ago before this
subcommittee that I asked you the question about the strategic
importance of Alaska going forward as we shift to the Pacific.
And you emphasized, I think, very clearly the importance of
Alaska's role from a geopolitical perspective, our position
there in the Pacific and, really, our overall defense
capability. That, of course, was before sequestration. Not only
are we looking at that but some very difficult decisions coming
up in 2016 if we don't find a solution to the Budget Control
Act and sequestration.
So my question to you this morning is what value does the
Army place on maintaining two brigade combat teams in Alaska if
we're not able to get around the BCA if you're forced to draw
down fore-structure to a level of 420,000; and, really, the
whole subject of pivoting to the Pacific, if those are the
numbers that we're looking at?
General Odierno. Well, we're going to have to go through a
thorough review of where we need our forces, what type of
forces we need. And we're starting that process now because, if
this in fact happens, we'd have to be at 420 by fiscal year
2019. And so, we'll start to do those reviews now. And it's a
series of capabilities based on training capabilities,
positioning, how do they respond to our national security
requirements, which the Asia-Pacific regions is up there very
high. So we'll take a look at all of those things as we
determine what capabilities we need. So we would've not begun
that process in earnest; we will soon.
As I've stated to you before, you know, we cherish our
relationship that we have with Alaska and the units we have
there, but I can say that for almost every place that we go.
So, as we evaluate that, we'll have to take all of those types
of considerations before we make any decisions. I mean, I would
just highlight that, as you probably know, you know, with the
Airborne Brigade, they just did a joint exercise in Thailand
where they did a joint airborne exercise with the Thai Army and
several other great things that we continue to do out of our
units in Alaska. So we are very proud of what they do and what
they've done there and what they continue to do to support our
missions around the world.
Secretary McHugh. Senator, can I just add a little context?
Senator Murkowski. Yes.
Secretary McHugh. Just so everyone knows the extent,
possibly, that we may have to go.
As you know, we just went through a process that took down
a BCT out of every multi-BCT post in the continental United
States. We have issued a data call to every post, camp and
station asking for what their structure would look like at a
variety of numbers. For those larger maneuver-type bases, that
number is up to 16,000 fewer troops. So we don't expect that
that would be a uniform figure across-the-board, but that is
the depth of analysis that we're going to have to do and that
is the possible implication, at least to a base or two, that
would go about if we have to go to BCA levels.
Senator Murkowski. Very sobering.
General Grass, I want to continue the conversation that
we've been having regarding management of sexual assault and
related integrity issues with the Alaska National Guard. You
may be aware that just last week, on Sunday, the Anchorage
Daily News, a columnist reported on the issue rather
extensively in terms of who knew what when. I want to focus
just on one aspect of this issue.
My staff had learned about the Chaplain's concerns of
reporting sexual assaults. I learned about it on June 12, 2013.
I signed a letter to the Defense Department, IG, requesting an
inquiry just 7 days after that. The chaplains had alleged that
they had raised their concerns through the chaplain channels to
the National Guard Bureau but it doesn't appear that anything
happened other than a staff assistance visit; which kind of
leads to the question of what did the National Guard Bureau
know and when did it know it?
But, beyond that, I'm led to believe that the National
Guard Bureau has either very little oversight, or perhaps no
oversight, over day-to-day problems that may exist in the
States even when there's a suggestion that allegations of
sexual assault are perhaps being swept under the rug unless a
Governor or the Adjutant General invites the National Guard
Bureau in.
These are clearly integrity issues and I'm really quite
surprised, perhaps shocked, that the National Guard Bureau
claims to have very little power to pursue them because they're
State forces. So this investigation, of course, is moving
forward.
General, I would hope that you know, in my judgment, I
think we need to have a process that is able to deal with
resolution of allegations that you may have Guard units that
are engaged in perhaps systemic misconduct as I think we're
finding in Alaska. And, that the process needs to be a Federal
process that does not depend on the willingness of a State to
be investigated. So your thoughts on this matter.
We're learning a lot after the fact but one of the issues
that we're reconciling now is you've got a National Guard
Bureau that may or may not have the ability to intervene and to
weigh in on issues that, I think we would all concur, are
extraordinarily troubling.
General Grass. Senator, first, let me say that as me and my
senior enlisted, we share this with every State and guardsmen
and women across the map as we go out: Sexual assault is a
crime. And we've got to go after this and take it on. We've got
to have the full suite of authorities, especially in the Guard,
because we have situations where somebody may not be on a duty
status when it occurs. We don't care. If it's a guardsman,
we're going to use whatever we can.
And, ma'am, I appreciate your question the last time we
were here. I think it was with the SACD for the Air Force. I
went back and reviewed that several years ago when it came. The
National Guard Bureau sent forward to Alaska a group of
investigators to look at the processes to see if the State had
the processes. And, at that point, the response came back that,
yes, the processes were there.
I walk a fine line, though. At some point, where trying to
work with the Adjutant General and the Governor, respecting
their authority, but at some point I do, I mean, I can enter
into the discussion. There is a colonel that works in every
State; works for me because of the Title 10 resources; the
Federal resources and the equipment. So I always have that
ability. The Inspector Generals in each State; I'm their
seniorator. They work for the Adjutant General but I'm their
seniorator. Most of them are Active Duty officers. So we have
several means there.
And I would tell you, ma'am, that the Office of Complex
Investigations that the National Guard stood up just over 2
years ago, and we have 92 trained, they're trained at Fort
Leonard Wood, special investigators, were specifically for this
situation where there may not be a local jurisdiction that will
handle the case or there may not be a uniform code of military
justice. So we actually are working right now very closely with
the Governor's office. And there's other actions underway I
think you're aware of in Alaska.
So we do feel we have the right mechanisms now to go after
this. That did not exist 2 years ago, the OCI, what we call the
Office of Complex Investigations. Also, we have a Special
Victims' Council that I've requested both from the Secretary of
the Army and Secretary of the Air Force, which we should be
hearing back shortly, that we will also be able to provide that
resource to the victims in State.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I appreciate that, General, and
perhaps if we have an opportunity to follow up in the near
future on these issues. I appreciate what you're saying about
the Federal process. And perhaps we didn't have it in place 2
years ago. I do find it somewhat disconcerting because, as we
know, these issues of sexual assault and the allegations that
are behind them have been going on for a long period of time. I
do want to know that processes that we have in place; they're
working; they're adequate; and responsive. So I'd be happy to
follow up with you later. And I appreciate you.
General Grass. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Senator Murkowski.
Mr. Secretary, if I can ask two questions here that are a
little different in scope. I've raised in previous hearings the
for-profit colleges and universities that are offering
educational opportunities to not only the men and women in
uniform but their families. And the fact that study after study
shows that these for-profit colleges and universities are twice
as expensive as their public and not-for-profit counterparts.
They have lower success rates when it comes to the students who
take the courses including lower graduation rates, worse
employment outcomes, and, in some cases, not particularly in
this case, debt levels and loan default rates dramatically
higher than in public and not-for-profit circumstances.
Can you tell me what is being done in the Army now? I'll
give you an example: I have a nephew out in Fort Drum who went
to Afghanistan and came back safely; was deployed, then, to
Korea and he wrote me an email and said, ``I got great news for
you. I just signed up at the American Military University.''
And I had to write back to him and say, ``You've made a big
mistake. This is not a good school. You've got an option to
take courses at University of Maryland, they've been doing it
for decades. And the hours are transferable to your home State
university when you get out of school.'' And he said, ``I
didn't know that.''
He was a specialist, served our country; thought he was
doing the right thing. He was misled into believing that one of
these for-profit schools was worth his time and the
Government's money. What is your thought?
Secretary McHugh. Well, we've discussed this before, and we
certainly agree that the last thing we want to see is: (a) a
soldier who is trying to do the right thing and further his
education is somehow cheated out of that genuine opportunity;
and (b) the end result is also a waste of taxpayer dollars. In
Army dollars by and large.
So, through our Tuition Assistance program, we have been
trying to establish a framework within which we can do our best
to ensure that whereever a soldier seeks to use his or her
tuition assistance that it goes only to an accredited
university. And we use the Federal Department of Education
standards and accept their accreditation. We think that's the
best way to do this.
The other thing we have established is a Memorandum of
Understanding with all schools who fall into that category, who
choose to pursue Army TA dollars, that set certain standards,
set certain requirements for them and obligations to them from
them to the soldier, in our case. And, in fact, we're finding
that the questionable schools are refusing to sign that and, as
such, we disqualify them for fund eligibility. We've had
several hundred disqualify just over the past few years.
So we want what you want. And we're trying to work in
partnership, as I saw, with the Department of Education to make
sure that we're as closely aligned to the national standards as
possible.
Senator Durbin. And we're not making your job any easier
because the U.S. Department of Education literally accredits
some of these awful schools and says to students in the outside
world, not military world, you're eligible for Pell grants and
Government loans. What's a student to think? This must be a
real school. So we're not making it easier and I'm letting
Secretary Duncan know my disappointment with what's going on at
that level.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just add?
Senator Durbin. Sure, General.
General Odierno. Just that 279 have been suspended by us;
schools. A new list is going to come out in about 30 days and
we'll suspend more that are not meeting our criteria.
The other thing we've done is we now have lists. These
lists are now available in our Soldier for Life Program at
every installation. So, when soldiers start talking about doing
education, we now show them the lists of these schools so they
understand who is on it and which ones not to sign up for. And
we're really trying to work this very hard to educate. There
are so many cases and it's so unfortunate that they waste their
benefits on institutions that, frankly, do not provide them
anything worthwhile as an education.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
General Talley. Mr. Chairman, if I could?
Senator Durbin. Sure.
General Talley. I'm kind of a recovering academic. I've
been a professor at three universities before I came back into
the Active component. So, first off, for that great specialist,
if he wants to transition to the Army Reserve, I think we can
help him.
We initiated a private partnership initiative that has
agreements in place with over 6,000 private companies to
include academia. And so, what we're doing, and I have met with
the President of Norwich University yesterday, we are taking
companies----
Senator Durbin. That's to get my attention; right, General?
General Talley. Roger that, sir. It was a great meeting. I
met with him and Gordon Sullivan.
What we've done is both companies and private not-for-
profits, so academia as well as those that give the
certification registrations in those trade and professional
industries, they're partnering with the Army Reserve on our new
initiative where they provide the resourcing and funding to our
soldiers and their family members so they can get that type of
education; both formal academic education and the certification
to get the registrations. We're having great success. And I
assure you, we only work with those universities that are
absolutely first rate.
Senator Durbin. Great.
Another unrelated topic: A year and a half ago, there was a
terrible tragedy in Bangladesh when a fire broke out at a
garment factory killing over 100 workers. And, in the course of
going through the ashes, it was discovered that this garment
factory was supplying the Marine Corps with fabrics and
garments that have been made with the Marine Corps logo. When
the Marine Corps found out about it, they said we are going to
make sure that we are never doing business with someone that's
exploiting labor in the United States or anywhere in the world.
And they sent out a new standard in terms of what they would
require.
Has the Army looked into instituting similar standards in
contracts to crack down on these kinds of abuses? And can you
work with us if you have or have not to promote this throughout
the military?
Secretary McHugh. I can assure you we will do everything we
can to both support any efforts up here on the Hill but also to
enact our own. We have very compliant measures whereby we try
to do everything we can to buy American, thereby obviating at
least the overseas challenge in where there are questions of
human rights abuses and such. As the gentlemen on your right
knows quite well, we have very strict oversight from Congress.
We're not, in theory, allowed to do that kind of business with
those kinds of organizations but it needs to be an effort of
continued vigilance.
Senator Durbin. Our appropriation bill affecting this year
requires some quarterly reports. So if you could take a closer
look. We understand there may be some question raised about
Cambodian suppliers to the United States military, in
particular the Army. So if you could take a look at that, I'd
appreciate it.
Secretary McHugh. We will do that.
Senator Durbin. My colleagues have any follow-up questions?
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Brief.
I know we've touched on a lot of things at the hearing, but
what I get out of the hearing overall, underlying everything,
is a lack of funding. A lack of funding for the Reserve, the
Guard, the regular forces, you name it. And there's an old
saying that we all know about: You get what you pay for. And
the American people, through us, are going to have to change
what we're doing.
Thank you.
Secretary McHugh. Thank you, Senator.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Leahy. No. In fact, I found every one of the
witnesses here to always be available if I had a phone call or
a question. So I have nothing further.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. John McHugh
Question Submitted by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, the subcommittee
has been concerned about the health of the combat vehicle industrial
base for several years, and the termination of the Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV) program in fiscal year 2014 has only added to this
concern. The engineering workforce that is essential to these efforts
is seemingly at risk, and once gone is difficult and expensive to
replace. With the termination of GCV, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) is seen as vital to the combat vehicle industrial base.
How did the Army evaluate the requirements for AMPV, particularly
regarding the relative capabilities of tracked vs. wheeled vehicles?
How does the Army evaluate the cost to operate a tracked vs. wheeled
vehicle?
Given the Ground Combat Vehicle termination, what is your plan for
maintaining the workforce necessary to design and produce the next
generation of fighting vehicles?
Answer. The Army conducted a detailed Analysis of Alternatives in
2011 to identify the most cost-effective solution for replacing the
M113 while reducing technical, schedule and cost risk. The Analysis of
Alternatives identified five mission roles that the M113 vehicle
performed within the Armored Brigade Combat Team: General Purpose;
Medical Treatment; Mission Command; Medical Evacuation; and Mortar
Carrier. The study then identified 115 vehicles, both foreign and
domestic, that were viable candidates to fulfill the five mission
roles. All candidates were evaluated against four screening categories:
Mission Equipment Package suitability; rough-order-of-magnitude average
procurement unit cost; initial performance analysis on mobility; and
initial performance analysis on protection attributes compared against
the base M113.
The study identified four candidates for further consideration: a
turret-less Bradley Fighting Vehicle; a Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light
with added force protection; the Caiman Multi-Terrain Vehicle; and a
Stryker Double-V Hull. Additionally, the Analysis of Alternatives
informed the requirements process and validated the capabilities needed
of the replacement system that were further validated by the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council in 2013.
An AMPV solution, whether tracked or wheeled, needs to have the
mobility required to perform to the same abilities of the primary
combat vehicles in a formation. An AMPV must be able to traverse
complex slopes in several directions (up, down, sideways). An AMPV must
be able to conduct very wide Gap Crossings of trenches in forward and
reverse. An AMPV must also be able to execute a controlled 360 degree
left or right turn within 1.5 times the vehicle length. This allows the
vehicle and unit commanders to negotiate and quickly maneuver in cross
country and urban terrain, particularly during Mounted Operations in
Urban Terrain environments where tight turning radius is particularly
necessary. The Analysis of Alternatives analyzed different types of
vehicles to see which were able to meet the aforementioned mobility
requirements.
In determining operating costs for programs in the acquisition
process, the Army considers such major cost elements as consumable
spares: reparable parts; petroleum; oil; and lubricants; ammunition;
personnel (crew); and depot maintenance. Early in the acquisition life
of a system, a cost estimate is developed by determining the closest
analogous system(s) and/or component(s). Actual historical costs are
acquired for use in these analogies. Then, these historical costs are
adjusted based on such known characteristics as weight, reliability,
and power. Per-mile metrics for repair parts and spares are valuable in
making comparisons between wheeled and tracked vehicles due to the
apparent cost deltas that exist between these vehicle types.
Historically, tracked vehicle repair parts and spares cost per mile,
and fuel costs have revealed higher operational costs than wheeled
vehicles. This is mostly due to the additional weight and complexity of
tracked vehicles.
The Army evaluates contractor's estimated operating costs of a
proposed system during Source Selection Evaluation Boards (SSEBs) prior
to contract awards. During SSEBs, the Army determines how well system
proposals meet defined Key System Attributes (KSAs) as specified in
requirement documents, e.g., Capability Development Documents. The
Sustainment Key Performance Parameter includes the Operations & Support
Cost KSA alongside Reliability, Availability (both material
availability and operational ability) and Maintainability in order to
ensure that the entire lifecycle cost is captured and considered.
The Army shares concerns regarding the Defense industry's combat
vehicle intellectual industrial base and its ability to maintain an
adequate level of engineering skills and personnel to design and
develop combat vehicles in the future. To address these concerns, the
Army has developed a strategy that will explore and refine future
combat vehicle concepts and requirements, as well as leverage its
robust Science & Technology (S&T) investment for the next generation
infantry fighting vehicle while keeping the combat vehicle engineering
industrial base engaged.
Under this strategy the Army will leverage the current Ground
Combat Vehicle program prime contractors' technology development
designs to facilitate the maturation and integration of advanced
technology into a variety of advanced combat vehicle concepts, which
will keep the intellectual industrial base engaged. Additionally, the
combat vehicle primes will support our assessment of Army S&T
technology maturation initiatives and their effects on current and
potential vehicle designs. This will enable the Army to build a
knowledge base to inform Future Fighting Vehicle requirements by
assessing design and cost tradeoffs and reduce risk. These efforts will
support a Future Fighting Vehicle program of record when resources
become available.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
Question. The Arsenal Sustainment Initiative directs you to release
the Army Organic Industrial Base Strategy Report no later than 30 days
after the enactment of the fiscal year 2014 Omnibus Appropriations
Bill. What is the status of this report?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics submitted the following report
to Congress in August 2013: ``Report to Congress on Critical
Manufacturing Capabilities and Capacities.'' This submission fulfills
the requirement in the Arsenal Sustainment Initiative to submit to
Congress a report that identifies critical capabilities for arsenals.
Question. The Arsenal Sustainment Initiative directs the Army to
assign the arsenals a sufficient workload to maintain the critical
capabilities identified in the Army Organic Industrial Base Strategy
Report. How is the Army ensuring that the arsenals are receiving a
sufficient workload for efficient operations that assists the arsenals
in maintaining a ``blue line level?''
Answer. The Army is engaged in several efforts to ensure that the
arsenals are receiving a sufficient workload to maintain critical skill
sets.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology has directed Program Executive Officers (PEO) and Program
Managers (PM) to take advantage of arsenal capabilities where feasible,
and to account for arsenal capabilities early on in the acquisition
process when possible. PEOs report annually on the workload directed to
the arsenals.
The Army Materiel Command has also developed the Materiel
Enterprise Capabilities Database (MEC-D), a standardized market
research tool with electronic access to enterprise-wide Army arsenal
and depot capabilities. This database provides the Army acquisition
community relevant Organic Industrial Base capabilities when
considering manufacturing or repair requirements. PEOs, PMs, and
Product Support Managers use MEC-D to assist with ``make-or-buy''
analyses as performed under Title 10 United States Code 4532.
Lastly, the Secretary of the Army has directed the Army Materiel
Command to work directly with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to
explore ways to make Army arsenals a DLA source of supply for Army-
related manufacturing requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Secretary McHugh, I have been informed that the Army is
requiring the National Guard to divest itself of up to four Brigade
Combat Teams. It is unfortunate that we are looking to reduce the
combat capabilities of the National Guard after they have proven
themselves to be worthy over the past 12 years of conflict. The 155th
Brigade from my home State of Mississippi has deployed twice to Iraq.
In 2005, they served alongside the Marines and conducted full spectrum
missions in Najaf, Karbala, North Babil and Eastern Al Anbar. They
performed admirably at a critical time and should be commended for
their service. Given the current budget constraints why are you not
looking to sustain the National Guard, which is less expensive when not
activated than the same force in the Active Component, and maintain
combat capability instead of divesting force structure?
Answer. We have made a fundamental decision that we will rely more
on the U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG).
This will be necessary since we are taking a much larger reduction in
the Active Component (AC) than in the Reserve Component (RC). The RC
plays an important role in peace and war, and will make up more than 50
percent of the Total Army endstrength. Reserve formations are best
suited to predictable, infrequent deployments, domestic missions, and
providing operational and strategic depth to the Joint Force in
contingency operations. Missions the RC conducts in support of civil
authorities, such as disaster relief, reinforce the RC's competency to
provide critical capabilities necessary for overseas operations. We
will continue to retain the RC as an operational reserve and employ it
as funding permits.
We have taken cost into consideration and determined that a larger
share of the cuts should come from the Active Component (AC) instead of
the Reserve Component (RC). Our plan calls for cutting a total of
213,000 Soldiers from the Total Force; 150,000 from the Active
Component, 43,000 from the ARNG, and 20,000 from the Army Reserve. A
full 70 percent of the total cuts will be from the AC. This will
ultimately result in our Total Army going from a 51 percent AC and 49
percent RC mix to a 54 percent RC and a 46 percent AC mix.
The Army has relied on the Reserve Component as an integral partner
over the last 13 years in support of world-wide contingency operations
and they have met all assigned mission requirements. However, there are
certain capabilities that are better suited for the Active Component
and others that are better suited for the Reserve Component. In
general, organizations that are large and complex, such as Armored
Brigade Combat Teams, are easier and cheaper to sustain at high levels
of readiness if in the Active Component. Units that are smaller, less
complex, and primarily composed of Soldiers with skills easily
sustained in civilian employment, such as transportation companies or
certain construction engineer units, are far more cost effective in the
Reserve Component. Readiness, capability, and agility are all critical
to the success of the both the Reserve Component and the Active
Component.
It is important to highlight an independent RAND study that
examined force mix and tour output. What we learned was that large,
complex organizations which require skills not easily sustained in the
civilian market (such as Armor Brigade Combat Teams or Combat Aviation
Brigades) are considerably cheaper to have in the AC. However, less
complex organizations which require skills easily sustained in the
civilian market (Finance and Transportation Brigades for example), are
considerably cheaper to maintain in the RC. This information
contributed greatly to our decisions on not only where to reduce end
strength, but where to maintain specific capabilities as well.
[Note: The follow question was answered by Hon. John McHugh and
General Raymond T. Odierno.]
Question. Mr. Secretary, I have been informed that the Army is
putting an additional Combined Arms Battalion in each of its Brigade
Combat Teams. While this should increase the combat capability, it
would also increase the operation and maintenance costs. Instead of
putting all that additional force structure in some of the Active force
brigades, why not use existing National Guard combat units? Have you
looked at combining the Active Army and the Army National Guard to form
multi-component or associated units? During the 1980s and 1990s the
Army had a ``Round-Out'' program where National Guard combat units were
used to round-out the brigades and divisions. How effective was that
program? With the current Guard combat training and equipment readiness
rates, do you think a program like that would benefit the Nation during
these times of decreased resources?
Answer. Lessons learned from combat operations over the last 12-
plus years of conflict resulted in the Army 2020 Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) redesign. In addition to a third maneuver battalion, the Army
2020 BCT adds an engineer battalion and precision fires capability to
the Infantry BCT. The conversion to this design coincides with the
reduction of 13 Active Component (AC) BCTs to achieve a 490K force and
allows the realignment of maneuver battalions to achieve the three
maneuver battalion design in all but the three overseas Infantry BCTs.
Our plan will also reorganize ARNG BCTs with a majority of the end
strength reductions coming from the removal of Headquarters which the
reorganizations would render as unnecessary overhead. These BCTs will
continue to be organized with only two maneuver battalions. The Army
continues to assess opportunities to integrate reserve component
Soldiers into Active Component formations either individually or by
unit. We are currently studying the possibility of integrating Reserve
Component Soldiers into AC Divisions and Corps and rounding out select
AC BCTs with Army National Guard Battalions.
We agree that leveraging the ARNG's force structure will benefit
the Total Army and the Nation during these fiscally uncertain times. As
a result, we are currently analyzing the multi-component unit (MCU)
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) option you reference. Our analysis includes--
a yet to be determined, but at least two--MCU BCTs that will
incorporate ARNG infantry maneuver battalions into Active Component
(AC) BCTs. The Army continues to assess opportunities to integrate
reserve component Soldiers into Active Component formations either
individually or by unit. We are also studying the possibility of
integrating Reserve Component Soldiers into AC Divisions and Corps.
The Army will continue to build Army National Guard and Army
Reserve forces through Army Force Generation. For example, we are
planning to send one Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to
Combat Training Centers in fiscal year 2014 and two in fiscal year
2015. These events represent a significant investment in preserving
Reserve Component readiness and ensuring an integrated and ready Total
Force. Pursuant to the Army Total Force Policy, the Army will continue
to consider using Reserve Component units for steady state rotations,
as it has in the past; however, the Army has not planned to employ Army
National Guard BCTs for rotations to Korea because the BCTs cannot
reach the desired level of training proficiency within their allotted
training days.
In general, if the Army National Guard maintains too much force
structure, its readiness funding must be reduced. Therefore, it is
essential that the Army National Guard reduce force structure as
outlined in the Army's budget submission in order to preserve its
capability as an operational force.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lamar Alexander
Question. The Army's aviation plan is premised on saving money by
divesting airframes, including the OH-58D Kiowa Warriors in my home
State, and moving all AH-64 Apache helicopters from the National Guard
to the Active Component. You have testified that there would be
approximately $12 billion in savings if your plan goes forward.
Over how many years would your plan achieve those savings? What is
the cost of retraining all of the pilots? Would it be more efficient to
retain Apaches in the National Guard as opposed to the Active Component
since they are not being deployed?
Answer. The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) will avoid an
estimated $11.9 billion in one-time costs. The Army will avoid paying
for the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP), Service Life
Extension Programs (SLEP) for the OH-58D and TH-67 training helicopter,
and a new training helicopter to replace the aging TH-67 fleet. The
Army programmed $1.457 billion for CASUP between fiscal year 2015 and
fiscal year 2019. The breakdowns of those costs are as follows: $245.01
million in fiscal year 2015; $223.12 million in fiscal year 2016;
$257.22 million in fiscal year 2017; $308.32 million in fiscal year
2018; and $423.42 million in fiscal year 2019. The Army estimated
spending an additional $1.9 billion for CASUP between fiscal year 2020
and fiscal year 2030. CASUP was a stop-gap measure to allow the Kiowa
Warrior to be more combat effective until a long-term solution for
performing the armed aerial reconnaissance mission could be identified.
The CASUP funds were reprogrammed to directly pay for training Soldiers
and aviators across all components to meet the demands of the new force
structure. The funds will also procure Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL)
for Shadow Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), AH-64E manned-unmanned
teaming capability, Gray Eagle UAS KA satellite communications upgrade,
and LUH-72 simulation transition at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
The majority of ARI cost avoidance occurs outside of the fiscal
year 2015-2019 Future Years Defense Plan. The Army estimates it would
have been required to spend $6.96 billion on OH-58D SLEP, $191 million
on TH-67 SLEP and upgrades, and $1.43 billion on a new training
aircraft to replace the TH-67 in fiscal year 2020 and beyond.
The cost to retrain both the Active and Reserve Component Aviators
and Soldiers is about $444 million between fiscal year 2015 and fiscal
year 2019. The cancellation of CASUP within the fiscal year 2015-2019
Future Years Defense Plan facilitates the reallocation of $1.457
billion to pay for training transitions, Ft. Rucker's transition to an
LUH training fleet, UAS modernization, and certain AH-64 upgrades.
The Army's Attack/Reconnaissance battalions are considered low
density and high demand assets that must be fully trained and ready on
short notice to deploy for world-wide contingencies and crisis response
in the wake of major reductions to the Total Army end-strength and
force structure. The divestment of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and the
elimination of three entire Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) from the
Active Component (AC) will take Army Aviation down from 37 to 20
shooting battalions. This necessitates transferring all Apache
helicopters to the AC in order to meet the demands of our Combatant
Commanders. The Army simply does not have the luxury of retaining
Apache helicopters in the Reserve Component (RC) as it is considerably
more expensive to maintain a sufficient, available inventory of Apaches
in the RC than it is to do so in the AC.
When considering the most effective use of limited resources,
National Guard Formations should be optimized with ``dual use''
equipment and formations that are capable of supporting States and
Governors as well as Combatant Commanders when mobilized. We must
develop complimentary and mutually supporting capabilities. The Army
supports a multi-component solution for operationalizing ARNG Aviation
Brigades in non-permissive environments. Under the Aviation Restructure
Initiative (ARI), each ARNG Aviation Brigade will have an AC AH-64
battalion aligned with them for training and deployment. These AH-64
battalions will deploy with an intermediate maintenance slice to
support AH-64 maintenance and armament. This model has proven effective
in the past, and in fact, we have a National Guard aviation brigade
deployed to Kuwait today with an active duty attack battalion attached.
The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) was necessary due to
severe budget restraints. ARI is designed to achieve a leaner, more
efficient and capable force that balances operational capability and
capacity across the Total Army. The low-density, high-demand AH-64
Apaches transferring out of the Army National Guard (ARNG) will be
repurposed to replace Active Component (AC) OH-58D Kiowa Warriors that
are being divested. The transfer will enable the teaming of Apaches
with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for armed reconnaissance, filling
a critical capability need for an Armed Aerial Scout created by the
elimination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program. In
addition, consolidation of Apache airframes in the AC will enable the
Army to better meet the operational demands of our Combatant Commanders
due to the increased operational availability as a result of the
reduced dwell times required in the AC. The ARNG will receive
additional UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to optimize the ability to
perform its mission in the homeland and deploy in support of combat
operations.
Necessary savings are generated by divesting three entire fleets of
Army aircraft--the OH-58A/C Kiowas; the TH-67 training helicopters; and
the OH-58D Kiowa Warriors--an overall reduction of 798 aircraft. The
net effect of the reduction is a 23-percent decrease in aircraft in the
AC with only an 8-percent reduction in the ARNG. In addition to
procurement and modernization cost savings, the Army would also avoid
the significant operations and sustainment costs of these aging
aircraft fleets. ARI avoids approximately $12 billion in imminent
costs. If the Army were to not execute ARI, we would be forced to
retain many of our oldest and least capable aircraft while divesting
several hundred modernized airframes. Upgrades to the Kiowa Warrior
would cost over $10 billion. Replacing the legacy TH-67 training
helicopter would cost another $1.5 billion. In addition, lower
procurement rates of modernized aircraft would cost the Army
approximately $15 billion. These costs would be unbearable for the Army
under the current budget constraints and would risk creating a hollow
force, with less overall capability and less investment in
modernization.
The Army National Guard was involved in the development and
staffing of the aviation restructure plan during the entire process.
The ARNG was directly involved as early as February, 2013 and had
planners present during the development of specific details of ARI.
Under the ARI plan, the regular Army, Army National Guard, and
United States Army Reserve all retain combat aviation units. UH-60
Black Hawks and CH-47 Chinooks, which are in all service components,
accounted for the majority of hours flown in a combat environment
during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
It is not possible to produce AH-64s at a rate sufficient to
replace the OH-58, resulting in a multi-year capability gap. In
addition to this, the purchase of sufficient AH-64's would cost over $4
billion in addition to an additional annual operations cost of more
than $340 million.
Question. The decision to divest the Army of the OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior and have the AH-64E Apache assume the scout mission is not a
permanent solution.
Does the Army plan to proceed with a new program to produce and
acquire an aircraft to perform the Army's scout missions? Does the
Army, at some point, intend to proceed with the Armed Aerial Scout
Program? Will the excess aircraft be retired or will they be
transferred back to the National Guard?
Answer. The Army maintains a valid requirement for the Armed Aerial
Scout and would like to develop an aircraft in the future; however, we
currently do not have the fiscal resources to pursue a new procurement
program.
A future materiel solution for the Armed Aerial Scout and the
Future Vertical Lift will determine the required force structure to
meet operational demands of the Combatant Commanders. Given the higher
levels of training and resources required to maintain readiness in the
Attack/Reconnaissance battalions, the Army believes the most cost
effective means to maintain this readiness is in the Active component.
Question. I have serious concerns about downsizing the Guard's
aviation capabilities and the aviation restructuring plan. Is it true
that the National Guard Bureau, the 54 Adjutants General and governors
have publicly disagreed with this plan?
I understand that the Guard has offered a counterproposal. Is the
Army actively working with the Guard and considering their
recommendations?
Has the Army considered the economic impact on the States in which
they intend to divest battalions of AH-64 Apaches and squadrons of OH-
58D Kiowa Warriors? Do you think that an estimate of $30 million per
year and 150 jobs being lost in the affected States is an accurate
estimate of the economic impact?
Answer. I am aware of publically expressed concerns regarding the
Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI); however, the National Guard
Bureau was involved throughout the development of the initiative. In
fact, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau recently testified that he
``was included in every discussion'' and provided his best military
advice. The ``$1.7B NGB Proposal'' was considered independently by
myself and the Secretary of Defense and was rejected because it does
not meet the Defense Strategic Guidance without additional investment;
it decreases fulfillment of Combatant Command contingency plans and
steady-state operational requirements; it reduces the readiness of the
Army National Guard; and it increases costs in comparison to the
Department of the Army plan.
Due to the Budget Control Act (BCA), Army Aviation's total
obligation authority for aircraft modernization and acquisition has
been reduced by $3 billion per year through fiscal year 2019, and
training and sustainment dollars are reduced by 40 percent from fiscal
year 2012 levels. These reductions make the previously approved (pre-
BCA) Aviation Force Structure and Aircraft Modernization plans
untenable, requiring a new approach.
Prior to the BCA, Army Aviation's modernization and force structure
plan was to continue to grow the Active component to 13 Combat Aviation
Brigades (CAB), continue to modernize the AH-64 Apache, UH-60
Blackhawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopter fleets, upgrade the OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior (at a cost of $10 billion) and to conduct a costly
service life extension program (SLEP) or even more costly replacement
of the aging TH-67 training fleet. The Army National Guard and Army
Reserves would have continued to receive modernized UH-60, AH-64 and
CH-47 aircraft and retain all of their structure.
To continue with the original aircraft modernization plan under BCA
constraints (upgrade OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, continue to modernize the
AH-64, UH-60 and CH-47 fleets, and SLEP TH-67) would require the
deactivation of 5 Active and Reserve aviation brigades and the
divestment of their associated aircraft (-464 aircraft). This would
have been a significant loss of structure and numbers of modernized AH-
64, UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft, just to retain the costly legacy OH-58D
and TH-67 aircraft. For that reason, I directed a fundamental
reassessment of aviation structure in the Active, National Guard and
Reserve forces. My guidance was to determine the best force structure
and modernization balance to retain the most capabilities and capacity
in highest demand by our Combatant Commanders and recurring civil and
homeland defense requirements.
The new approach, known as the Aviation Restructure Initiative
(ARI), uses the Budget Control Act level force and does not add cost to
the Army's budget. ARI calls for reducing and reconfiguring the number
of Active aviation brigades from 13 to 10, which enables the retention
of one aviation brigade per Active component division. The Reserve
component will retain 12 Aviation Brigades, but will be restructured to
a common organizational structure for 10 Brigades optimized for
assault, lift, and MEDEVAC missions--most in demand for Defense Support
of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions.
To execute ARI, the Army will divest 338 OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and
use the previously designated OH-58D cockpit upgrade dollars to
reinvest in the training base and other modernization efforts. We will
transfer all of the AH-64s from the National Guard to the Active
component and use the AH-64, teamed with unmanned systems, in armed
reconnaissance squadrons to replace the loss of the Kiowa Warrior
Squadrons in the Active component. We will transfer 159 X UH-60s from
the Active component to convert 4 of 10 Reserve component AH-64
Battalions to UH-60 (2 USAR and 2 ARNG). The National Guard will gain
111 UH-60s and the USAR will gain 48 UH-60s over current structure. We
will divest the legacy TH-67 and OH-58A/C training fleet and replace
them with UH-72A Lakota helicopters taken from the Active component and
100 newly procured Lakotas. In a compromise with the National Guard,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to procure the
100 new Lakotas to address concerns raised by the Guard during the
planning process for ARI. The National Guard will retain all of their
212 UH-72As specially equipped for the southwest border mission and
other requirements in permissive, non-combat environments. This will
give us a modernized, next generation glass cockpit, dual engine
training helicopter. These aircraft will train all new Army aviators,
regardless of component.
Eliminating three of seven entire fleets of legacy aircraft (OH58D
Kiowa Warrior, TH67, OH58A/C), remissioning AH-64 Apache helicopters to
the armed reconnaissance role in addition to their traditional attack
role, dual-purposing our UH-72A Lakota helicopters for both the
homeland defense role and initial pilot training, and growing our lift
helicopter fleets in the Army National Guard will allow us to retain
the maximum force structure and modernized aircraft across the Total
Army to meet the demand for Aviation across the Combatant Commands and
States.
Although the resulting rotary-wing force will be smaller by 798
aircraft to pre-BCA levels and with cuts falling disproportionately on
the Active component (-23 percent) versus the National Guard (-8
percent), divesting the OH-58 and TH-67 fleets and moving the AH-64s
from the RC to the AC allows us to preserve two additional Combat
Aviation Brigades and improve the quality of Aviation Training while
retaining a fully modernized aviation force across the Total Army. ARI
saves or avoids costs associated with retaining the Kiowa Warrior and
trainer, which total nearly $12 billion. Also, the Army estimates ARI
will save $1.1 billion annually in operations and sustainment at full
implementation.
In regard to the NGB proposal, it actually increases costs. While
the NGB proposal appears neutral with respect to the ARNG budget, it
does not account for the significant increase that would occur to the
$3.25 billion per year that the Department of the Army already funds
from the Regular Army budget to support the Army Guard. Specifically,
the NGB proposal does not account for increases of $300 million
annually for additional end strength and structure related costs, such
as basic combat training, specialized skill training, contractor
maintenance support, payroll processing and officer accessions. Nor
does it account for a $350 million annual increase in aviation
operations and sustainment type costs and the $4 billion one-time cost
that would result from not executing the ARI as planned.
The NGB proposal would decrease readiness by reducing Operations
and Maintenance funding, which is used to resource Soldier, unit and
facilities readiness. The proposal funds only 50-to-80 percent of
required duty military occupation specialty, functional and
professional development training, that would result in significant
numbers of Guardsmen assigned to units untrained in their military
duties and leadership responsibilities. The proposal would reduce unit
readiness, with only two Guard BCTs funded above individual-crew-squad
level of readiness. The proposal's reductions to readiness would
lengthen post-mobilization training that ARNG units require to respond
to Combatant Command operational and contingency requirements,
decreasing the Army Guard's viability as an operational reserve. The
proposal also decreases MILCON funding by $100 million per year and
decreases facilities sustainment funding, negatively impacting Army
Guard infrastructure.
The NGB proposal does not accurately capture the cost of
turbulence. The Department of the Army estimated and budgeted
turbulence costs at $310 million over 5 years, or approximately $62
million per year. The NGB estimated turbulence costs at $1 billion, but
this estimate included $275 million in costs to implement the ARI,
which are already accounted for in the Regular Army budget; $360
million in facilities upgrades for unit conversions that have not been
substantiated; and $55 million in additional recruiting costs that the
Department of the Army believes is excessive and unnecessary given the
force is reducing in size.
The NGB proposal also does not accurately depict the impact of
turbulence. OSD and Army leadership have testified to their desire to
maintain ARNG end strength at 335K as part of a 450K/335K/195K force,
which would significantly reduce turbulence if full BCA/sequester cuts
can be avoided. NGB turbulence projections of the Department of the
Army plan are overstated in that they represent a highly-unlikely
absolute-worst-case that every possible position associated with
potential structure adjustments is impacted. Even if the worst case
were realized, the average annual turbulence that would result during
the 5-year period of implementation would be less than the
approximately 15 percent annual turnover the Army Guard experiences due
to normal attrition.
Finally, the NGB proposal increases strategic and operational risk
by reducing required unit readiness and operational responsiveness in
order to preserve less-ready force structure. The proposal reduces the
Total Army's ability to meet Combatant Commander contingency plans and
steady-state operational requirements, extending the length of
operations at increased risk to mission accomplishment and likelihood
of additional casualties. Because the NGB proposal costs more and does
not meet BCA-driven funding reductions, it would require additional
reductions of $650 million per year to other accounts, further
degrading readiness and equipment modernization. The NGB proposal
decreases readiness, increases risk, costs more, and violates the
defense strategic guidance.
Under Budget Control Act spending caps, job losses under the ARI
are less than would occur without ARI. Ongoing budget cuts across all
components--Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve--will have
an economic impact to communities supporting installations and
production facilities that produce, modify, or recapitalize Army
equipment. Economic impacts will vary by State based on the final Army
National Guard stationing decisions made by the National Guard Bureau
that will determine personnel and equipment loses in each State and
Territory.
The Army's Attack/Reconnaissance battalions are considered low
density and high demand assets that must be fully trained and ready on
short notice to deploy for world-wide contingencies and crisis response
in the wake of major reductions to the Total Army end-strength and
force structure. The divestment of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and the
elimination of three entire Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) from the
Active Component (AC) will take Army Aviation down from 37 to 20
shooting battalions. This necessitates transferring all Apache
helicopters to the AC in order to meet the demands of our Combatant
Commanders. The Army simply does not have the luxury of retaining
Apache helicopters in the Reserve Component (RC) as it is considerably
more expensive to maintain a sufficient, available inventory of Apaches
in the RC than it is to do so in the AC.
When considering the most effective use of limited resources,
National Guard Formations should be optimized with ``dual use''
equipment and formations that are capable of supporting States and
Governors as well as Combatant Commanders when mobilized. We must
develop complimentary and mutually supporting capabilities. The Army
supports a multi-component solution for operationalizing ARNG Aviation
Brigades in non-permissive environments. Under the Aviation Restructure
Initiative (ARI), each ARNG Aviation Brigade will have an AC AH-64
battalion aligned with them for training and deployment. These AH-64
battalions will deploy with an intermediate maintenance slice to
support AH-64 maintenance and armament. This model has proven effective
in the past, and in fact, we have a National Guard aviation brigade
deployed to Kuwait today with an active duty attack battalion attached.
The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) was necessary due to
severe budget restraints. ARI is designed to achieve a leaner, more
efficient and capable force that balances operational capability and
capacity across the Total Army. The low-density, high-demand AH-64
Apaches transferring out of the Army National Guard (ARNG) will be
repurposed to replace Active Component (AC) OH-58D Kiowa Warriors that
are being divested. The transfer will enable the teaming of Apaches
with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for armed reconnaissance, filling
a critical capability need for an Armed Aerial Scout created by the
elimination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program. In
addition, consolidation of Apache airframes in the AC will enable the
Army to better meet the operational demands of our Combatant Commanders
due to the increased operational availability as a result of the
reduced dwell times required in the AC. The ARNG will receive
additional UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to optimize the ability to
perform its mission in the homeland and deploy in support of combat
operations.
Necessary savings are generated by divesting three entire fleets of
Army aircraft--the OH-58A/C Kiowas; the TH-67 training helicopters; and
the OH-58D Kiowa Warriors--an overall reduction of 798 aircraft. The
net effect of the reduction is a 23 percent decrease in aircraft in the
AC with only an 8-percent reduction in the ARNG. In addition to
procurement and modernization cost savings, the Army would also avoid
the significant operations and sustainment costs of these aging
aircraft fleets. ARI avoids approximately $12 billion in imminent
costs. If the Army were to not execute ARI, we would be forced to
retain many of our oldest and least capable aircraft while divesting
several hundred modernized airframes. Upgrades to the Kiowa Warrior
would cost over $10 billion. Replacing the legacy TH-67 training
helicopter would cost another $1.5 billion. In addition, lower
procurement rates of modernized aircraft would cost the Army
approximately 15 billion dollars. These costs would be unbearable for
the Army under the current budget constraints and would risk creating a
hollow force, with less overall capability and less investment in
modernization.
The Army National Guard was involved in the development and
staffing of the aviation restructure plan during the entire process.
The ARNG was directly involved as early as February, 2013 and had
planners present during the development of specific details of ARI.
Under the ARI plan, the regular Army, Army National Guard, and
United States Army Reserve all retain combat aviation units. UH-60
Black Hawks and CH-47 Chinooks, which are in all service components,
accounted for the majority of hours flown in a combat environment
during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
It is not possible to produce AH-64s at a rate sufficient to
replace the OH-58, resulting in a multi-year capability gap. In
addition to this, the purchase of sufficient AH-64s would cost over $4
billion in addition to an additional annual operations cost of more
than $340 million.
Question. Understandably, the Army is making hard decisions about
programs and budget cuts; however, I am concerned that these decisions
are often being made based on proportionality rather than long term
strategy and cost. As we look at the threats we face today, and may
face in the future, a strong and diversified force with more
capabilities and capacity to deploy quickly makes sense. Some would say
the only way to maintain that balance of capabilities that we need and
what we can afford is by having a larger Reserve Component.
Do you agree that we need to have a larger Reserve Component to
meet our future needs?
Answer. I believe the Reserve Component is appropriately-sized to
meet the Army's strategic requirements, given current budget
constraints.
The Chief of Staff and I reviewed the needs of Combatant Commanders
before deciding to disproportionally reduce our Active Component while
implementing modest reductions in Army Guard and Reserve Forces. The
Army and the Office of Secretary of Defense conducted a transparent,
open, and highly collaborative budget formulation, force structure, and
aviation restructure decision process that included representatives
from all components at every level. Additionally, experts and analysts
within the Department of Defense assessed all proposals for their
viability, ensuring the Army could meet its defense strategy
requirements.
Numerous meetings of the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commanders
examined these proposals before a final decision was made by the
Secretary of Defense. The result is a balanced approach that gives us
the best Army possible, even the Budget Control Act spending caps
continue in fiscal year 2016. The plan calls for end-strength
reductions of 213,000 Soldiers, with a disproportionate cut of 150,000
coming from the Active Army, 43,000 from the Army National Guard, and
20,000 from the Army Reserve. These reductions to the active Army
represent 70 percent of the total end-strength reductions, compared
with 20 percent from the National Guard and 10 percent from the U.S.
Army Reserve.
This will result in the Total Army going from a 51 percent Active
and 49 percent Reserve component to a 54 percent Reserve and a 46
percent Active component mix. The Army will be the only Service in
which the Reserve component outnumbers the Active component, and we
believe under these fiscal constraints it's appropriate.
The Army has relied on the Reserve Component as an integral partner
over the last 13 years in support of world-wide contingency operations
and they have met all assigned mission requirements. However, there are
certain capabilities that are better suited for the Active Component
and others, better suited for the Reserve Component. In general,
organizations that are large and complex, such as Armored Brigade
Combat Teams are easier and cheaper to sustain at high levels of
readiness in the Active Component. Units that are smaller, less
complex, and primarily composed of Soldiers with skills easily
sustained in civilian employment, such as transportation companies or
certain construction engineer units are far more cost effective in the
Reserve Component. Readiness, capability, and agility are all critical
to the success of the both the Reserve Component and the Active
Component.
Our Army is getting smaller. We must be more ready in all three
components to respond to future threats. Given reduced resources, this
plan allows us to balance end-strength, readiness, and modernization
across the Army and sustain our critical National Guard and U.S. Army
Reserve Forces as viable operational Reserve.
Question. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
(OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the recent
Reserve Forces Policy Board (RDPB) study, the National Guard is
significantly more cost effective, saving approximately \1/3\ of the
cost when not mobilized and approximately 80-95 percent of the cost
when mobilized compared to active components.
Can you discuss why you are proposing to cut the National Guard
instead of relying on them more when they offer opportunities to save
money and can sustain our defense readiness?
Did you review any options to keep tens of thousands more soldiers
in our Total Army, within the National Guard and Reserves, to help
remain inside current cost constraints?
Answer. The Army is committed to the Total Force Policy. In order
to meet the reductions imposed by the Budget Control Act and achieve
the right balance in capabilities, we directed that cuts should come
disproportionately from the Active Component (AC) before reducing the
Reserve Component (RC). We have made a fundamental decision that we
will rely more on the U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) and the Army National
Guard (ARNG). This will be necessary since we are taking a much larger
reduction in the Active Component (AC) than in the Reserve Component
(RC). The RC plays an important role in peace and war, and will make up
more than 50 percent of the Total Army endstrength. Reserve formations
are best suited to predictable, infrequent deployments, domestic
missions, and providing operational and strategic depth to the Joint
Force in contingency operations. Missions the RC conducts in support of
civil authorities, such as disaster relief, reinforce the RC's
competency to provide critical capabilities necessary for overseas
operations. We will continue to retain the RC as an operational reserve
and employ it as funding permits.
We have taken cost into consideration and determined that a larger
share of the cuts should come from the Active Component (AC) instead of
the Reserve Component (RC). Our plan calls for cutting a total of
213,000 Soldiers from the Total Force; 150,000 from the Active
Component, 43,000 from the ARNG, and 20,000 from the Army Reserve. A
full 70 percent of the total cuts will be from the AC. This will
ultimately result in our Total Army going from a 51 percent AC and 49
percent RC mix to a 54 percent RC and a 46 percent AC mix.
The Army has relied on the Reserve Component as an integral partner
over the last 13 years in support of world-wide contingency operations
and they have met all assigned mission requirements. However, there are
certain capabilities that are better suited for the Active Component
and others that are better suited for the Reserve Component. In
general, organizations that are large and complex, such as Armored
Brigade Combat Teams, are easier and cheaper to sustain at high levels
of readiness if in the Active Component. Units that are smaller, less
complex, and primarily composed of Soldiers with skills easily
sustained in civilian employment, such as transportation companies or
certain construction engineer units, are far more cost effective in the
Reserve Component. Readiness, capability, and agility are all critical
to the success of the both the Reserve Component and the Active
Component.
The Army will continue to build Army National Guard and Army
Reserve forces through Army Force Generation. For example, we are
planning to send one Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to
Combat Training Centers in fiscal year 2014 and two in fiscal year
2015. These events represent a significant investment in preserving
Reserve Component readiness and ensuring an integrated and ready Total
Force. Pursuant to the Army Total Force Policy, the Army will continue
to consider using Reserve Component units for steady state rotations,
as it has in the past; however, the Army has not planned to employ Army
National Guard BCTs for rotations to Korea because the BCTs cannot
reach the desired level of training proficiency within their allotted
training days.
In general, if the Army National Guard maintains too much force
structure, its readiness funding must be reduced. Therefore, it is
essential that the Army National Guard reduce force structure as
outlined in the Army's budget submission in order to preserve its
capability as an operational force.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
Question. Secretary McHugh, I understand the Army is considering
pulling some of its financial activities out of the Defense Finance and
Accounting Services (DFAS) office and handing them off to the Army's
own accountants. The Army is also planning to launch a pilot program
this spring that will involve significant changes in how it conducts
accounting services for its soldiers at Ft. Bragg.
Why would the Army take these services from the experts at DFAS and
give them to an unproven pilot program when the Army is working to
achieve an auditable budget by 2017?
Answer. Over the last several years, the Army and the American
people made significant investments through the deployment of
modernized web-based enterprise resource planning (ERP) business
systems. The deployment of these systems, when supported by
reengineered financial business processes, afford greater opportunity
for standardize accounting processes, and enhanced operations, which
support Audit Readiness. The Army's Financial Management Optimization
(AFMO) is designed to transform current Army financial operational
process and reorganize organizational and workforce structures that are
better aligned to the new ERP's modern capabilities. In so doing, this
will effectively and efficiently provide for the best outcomes. The
Army has taken a holistic approach to improving operational needs,
resources, and FM capabilities, with numerous recommendations to
improve and to ensure auditability.
One of the several AFMO's recommendations was to implement command-
aligned hubs, which consolidate functions and better align workers'
skills and numbers. The command-aligned hub focuses on standardizing
internal Army business process, ensuring accurate capturing of data at
the source, thereby eliminating redundancy and rework.
To test this concept, I have approved two pilots to determine if
the proposed standard processes and consolidation of Army processes and
proper alignment of tasks support our FM objectives. The Army is
currently conducting analysis, in collaboration with Defense Finance
and Accounting Services (DFAS) and other stakeholders, to plan for and
effectively conduct this test pilot, which will begin in October 2014
at Fort Bragg and at Wiesbaden, Germany. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) will review
the Army's business case analysis and recommendations based on results
of the pilot. Senior leadership from the Army and the Secretary of
Defense will review and approve any final hub implementation decisions,
in consultation with Congress.
The Army will continue to rely on DFAS to provide accounting and
payroll functions in the future; however, we must also continue to
improve and strive for the most effective and efficient services
possible.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
Question. Given the critical nature of high quality batteries used
to power military wheeled and tracked vehicles in combat environments,
I'm concerned with the safety risks caused by the use of ``flooded''
batteries originally designed in the 1960's, specifically to Soldiers'
eyes and face. ``Flooded'' batteries have a history of leaking liquid
sulfuric acid when broken or tipped onto the battery's side, causing
damaging corrosion to equipment and risk to personnel. I understand the
Army has increased its use of Absorbed Glass Mat (AGM) batteries over
the last 5 years due to the improved performance and extended life
characteristics displayed by AGM batteries in tactical environments.
Can the Army reduce these risks to Soldier safety by using newer, more
advanced AGM batteries rather than older, ``flooded'' model batteries?
Answer. The Army reduced risks to Soldier safety by replacing the
1960s style batteries with ``maintenance free'' batteries in our
vehicles, generators and other tactical systems. Military Performance
Specification governs all safety and performance requirements for three
different 6T lead acid battery types: 6TL, 6TMF, and 6T AGM (Absorbed
Glass Mat).
The Army no longer uses the 1960s era 6TL flooded lead acid battery
that required the operator to add distilled water. The 6TMF is also a
flooded lead acid type of battery that is sealed and considered
``maintenance free.'' The 6T AGM lead acid battery is also a
maintenance free battery.
6TMF and 6T AGM batteries are qualified for safety and performance
and both batteries are in field use. The Army will continue to provide
our Soldiers high quality batteries that power our tactical vehicles on
the battlefield and ensure the safety of our Soldiers.
______
Questions Submitted to General Raymond T. Odierno
Question Submitted by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, the Subcommittee
has been concerned about the health of the combat vehicle industrial
base for several years, and the termination of the Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV) program in fiscal year 2014 has only added to this
concern. The engineering workforce that is essential to these efforts
is seemingly at risk, and once gone is difficult and expensive to
replace. With the termination of GCV, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) is seen as vital to the combat vehicle industrial base.
How did the Army evaluate the requirements for AMPV, particularly
regarding the relative capabilities of tracked vs. wheeled vehicles?
How does the Army evaluate the cost to operate a tracked vs. wheeled
vehicle?
Given the Ground Combat Vehicle termination, what is your plan for
maintaining the workforce necessary to design and produce the next
generation of fighting vehicles?
Answer. The Army conducted a detailed Analysis of Alternatives in
2011 to identify the most cost-effective solution for replacing the
M113 while reducing technical, schedule and cost risk. The Analysis of
Alternatives identified five mission roles that the M113 vehicle
performed within the Armored Brigade Combat Team: General Purpose;
Medical Treatment; Mission Command; Medical Evacuation; and Mortar
Carrier. The study then identified 115 vehicles, both foreign and
domestic, that were viable candidates to fulfill the five mission
roles. All candidates were evaluated against four screening categories:
Mission Equipment Package suitability; rough-order-of-magnitude average
procurement unit cost; initial performance analysis on mobility; and
initial performance analysis on protection attributes compared against
the base M113.
The study identified four candidates for further consideration: a
turret-less Bradley Fighting Vehicle; a Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light
with added force protection; the Caiman Multi-Terrain Vehicle; and a
Stryker Double-V Hull. Additionally, the Analysis of Alternatives
informed the requirements process and validated the capabilities needed
of the replacement system that were further validated by the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council in 2013.
An AMPV solution, whether tracked or wheeled, needs to have the
mobility required to perform to the same abilities of the primary
combat vehicles in a formation. An AMPV must be able to traverse
complex slopes in several directions (up, down, sideways). An AMPV must
be able to conduct very wide Gap Crossings of trenches in forward and
reverse. An AMPV must also be able to execute a controlled 360 degree
left or right turn within 1.5 times the vehicle length. This allows the
vehicle and unit commanders to negotiate and quickly maneuver in cross
country and urban terrain, particularly during Mounted Operations in
Urban Terrain environments where tight turning radius is particularly
necessary. The Analysis of Alternatives analyzed different types of
vehicles to see which were able to meet the aforementioned mobility
requirements.
In determining operating costs for programs in the acquisition
process, the Army considers such major cost elements as consumable
spares: reparable parts; petroleum; oil; and lubricants; ammunition;
personnel (crew); and depot maintenance. Early in the acquisition life
of a system, a cost estimate is developed by determining the closest
analogous system(s) and/or component(s). Actual historical costs are
acquired for use in these analogies. Then, these historical costs are
adjusted based on such known characteristics as weight, reliability,
and power. Per-mile metrics for repair parts and spares are valuable in
making comparisons between wheeled and tracked vehicles due to the
apparent cost deltas that exist between these vehicle types.
Historically, tracked vehicle repair parts and spares cost per mile,
and fuel costs have revealed higher operational costs than wheeled
vehicles. This is mostly due to the additional weight and complexity of
tracked vehicles.
The Army evaluates contractor's estimated operating costs of a
proposed system during Source Selection Evaluation Boards (SSEBs) prior
to contract awards. During SSEBs, the Army determines how well system
proposals meet defined Key System Attributes (KSAs) as specified in
requirement documents, e.g., Capability Development Documents. The
Sustainment Key Performance Parameter includes the Operations & Support
Cost KSA alongside Reliability, Availability (both material
availability and operational ability) and Maintainability in order to
ensure that the entire lifecycle cost is captured and considered.
The Army shares concerns regarding the Defense industry's combat
vehicle intellectual industrial base and its ability to maintain an
adequate level of engineering skills and personnel to design and
develop combat vehicles in the future. To address these concerns, the
Army has developed a strategy that will explore and refine future
combat vehicle concepts and requirements, as well as leverage its
robust Science & Technology (S&T) investment for the next generation
infantry fighting vehicle while keeping the combat vehicle engineering
industrial base engaged.
Under this strategy the Army will leverage the current Ground
Combat Vehicle program prime contractors' technology development
designs to facilitate the maturation and integration of advanced
technology into a variety of advanced combat vehicle concepts, which
will keep the intellectual industrial base engaged. Additionally, the
combat vehicle primes will support our assessment of Army S&T
technology maturation initiatives and their effects on current and
potential vehicle designs. This will enable the Army to build a
knowledge base to inform Future Fighting Vehicle requirements by
assessing design and cost tradeoffs and reduce risk. These efforts will
support a Future Fighting Vehicle program of record when resources
become available.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
Question. How many active duty Brigade Combat Teams can you move
with current available airlift/sealift in the first 60-90 days of a
conflict?
Answer. This information is classified, but we would be pleased to
provide it to you in an appropriate forum.
Question. Did you factor the Reserve Forces Policy Board into the
Active Component/Reserve Component ratio decision for fiscal year 2015?
If so, explain how the Reserve Forces Policy Board supports your
position. If not, why?
Answer. No. The Army did not rely on the Reserve Forces Policy
Board (RFPB) study when making decisions on fiscal year 2015 AC/RC
force mix. The RFBP is, by law, a Federal advisory committee within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. As mandated by Congress, it serves
as an independent adviser to provide advice and recommendations
directly to the Secretary of Defense on strategies, policies, and
practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency,
and effectiveness of the reserve components.
Question. Under the 335,000 end strength scenario, it has been
proposed to reclassify and retrain Soldiers. What will it cost to
reclassify/retrain Soldiers who will be moved to a different type of
unit and how will the budget reflect that change? (ex. Field Artillery
Battalion is replaced by a Military Police Battalion Headquarters and
two Military Police Companies)
Answer. We do not have an exact number yet. As we built the fiscal
year 2015 Budget, we did not identify the specific units that would be
transitioning from one type to another. As units are identified for
transition, the Human Resources community will identify the Military
Occupation Skills for realignment. We will adjust the published Army
Program for Individual Training accordingly and apply the funds as
available to meet this mission. We anticipate reduced unit readiness
for transitioning units and will realign the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve units within the Army Force Generation Model to give
Commanders' sufficient time and resources to build personnel readiness
for these new organizations. If Budget Control Act spending caps remain
in play in fiscal year 2016 and beyond, rebuilding personnel readiness
within all units may take longer, depending on the limited availability
of funds.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. General Odierno, in the fiscal year 2015 budget request,
the Army Guard is not funded for rotations at Combat Training Centers,
which as you know are important for collective training events and unit
readiness. What is the impact on the total force?
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 President's budget request contained
transportation funding for Army Guard Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
participation in two rotations at maneuver Combat Training Centers
(CTCs); however, the request provided no increased funding for pay to
allow them to do so. In early May, a revised budget request will be
forwarded to SAC-D providing the additional Pay and Allowances and
Operation and Maintenance funds needed by two Army Guard BCTs to
participate in maneuver CTC rotations.
Question. General Odierno, in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, Overseas
Contingency Operations funds were nearly 30 percent of the total Army
budget, yet the request for 2015 for this vital budget component of
Army operations has not been provided to Congress. General, how
important is Overseas Contingency Operations funding to the Army's
ability to perform it assigned missions? What will be the impact to the
Army and our National Security, if these funds are not provided at the
beginning of the upcoming fiscal year?
Answer. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding is vital for
the Army to support Operation Enduring Freedom and other contingency
missions in defending the Nation and its interests.
If OCO funding is not provided by the beginning of the fiscal year,
the Army will be forced to cash flow war expenditures out of the base
budget. Extracting cash for war requirements out of the base budget
would cause immediate and lasting degradation to readiness across the
Army. Army readiness built through training requires steady and
predictable funding to ensure home station preparatory training and
Combat Training Center exercises are scheduled. The interruption to
planned funding that would occur in a diversion of funds to pay for the
higher priority theater operations would force the cancellation of
training. Once cancelled, lost training cannot be easily bought back;
it must be carefully planned in order to synchronize all affected units
(Brigade Combat Teams and enablers) toward training activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel Coats
Question. How can the Army afford to procure a land-based
conventional prompt global strike capability that is a lot less
survivable than the Navy's prompt global strike capabilities in this
current fiscal environment?
Answer. The Army is not planning to procure a prompt global strike
capability. To enable the development of joint capabilities, the Army
has assisted Department of Defense technology efforts with both
engineering and test facility support.
Question. The Department of Defense uses both annual contracts and
Multi-Year contracts when acquiring goods and services. Under annual
contracts, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of
procurement of a given kind of item. Under Multi-Year contracts, DOD
uses a single contract for two to 5 years' worth of procurement. The
Multi-Year contract: (1) results in supplier price breaks for larger
quantity purchases, (2) eliminates repeat labor and bureaucracy by
buying only once, and (3) provides the stability of a set number of
years' worth of production. In fiscal year 2013, when a 5-Year Multi-
Year contract was signed for the CH-47 Chinook helicopter, the savings
were $810 million--or over 19 percent--when compared to 5 single-year
contracts.
The intent of the Army is to execute a Multi-Year procurement
contract in fiscal year 2017 for the AH-64 Apache, the Army's multi-
role attack helicopter. What efficiencies and cost savings could we
expect by using a Multi-Year contract to acquire upgraded Apaches?
Answer. A Multi-Year contract will: provide more capability at a
lower cost via quantity-based price concessions; stabilize future
prices for the government and future workload for industry; and
increase efficiency by eliminating start-up and repeat labor costs both
in the production of the Apache and the government contracting process.
The Apache Program Office is currently preparing the Business Case
Analysis (BCA) to estimate the cost savings of Multi-Year Apache
procurement.
______
Questions Submitted to General Frank Grass
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
Question. Under the 335,000 end strength scenario, it has been
proposed to reclassify and retrain Soldiers. What will it cost to
reclassify/retrain Soldiers who will be moved to a different type of
unit and how will the budget reflect that change? (ex. Field Artillery
Battalion is replaced by a Military Police Battalion Headquarters and
two Military Police Companies)
Answer. Approximately $237 million. The precise actual cost of
retraining will vary somewhat from this estimate based on many factors,
some of which we do not know at this time.
Explanation: The reduction in end strength and the associated
reduction in force structure will cause the restructuring, reorganizing
and elimination of some existing units. These changes to force
structure will result in displacing 40,402 Soldiers from the position
for which they are currently trained. This equates to requiring the
reclassification training of approximately 241 company-sized elements.
In our cost estimate we used the cost to retrain an infantry company to
a military police company. The retraining cost is $985,000 per company
of Soldiers, or $237.3 million for 241 company-sized elements. The cost
includes the students' pay and allowances, as well as the cost to
operate the school house. The estimate only takes into account
retraining costs. It does not include other costs associated with
converting one type of unit to another, such as equipment purchase or
transfer expenses.
Question. While the Army National Guard prepares for its future
years defense spending plan, there will be several funding scenarios.
In the more severe funding plans wherein the Guard may propose reducing
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) how will the Army National Guard determine
which BCTs to cut?
Answer. National Guard Bureau senior leaders, in consultation with
senior leaders in the 54 States, Territories and the District of
Columbia, developed three main criteria to inform their decision to
inactivate brigade and Brigade Combat Team structure: look to reduce
structure in States with multiple brigades and BCTs; quantify readiness
rankings of brigades and BCTs; and avoid reducing more than one
brigade/BCT in a State unless replacement structure is provided.
Question. There is concern that the National Guard Bureau (NGB)
will use Unit Identification Codes that specify certain brigades
instead of data-driven analysis based on readiness, numbers and types
of brigades, etc. Please outline how the NBG makes their future year
assessments regarding potential BCT cuts in a sequestration-type
funding assumption plan.
Answer. The Army National Guard will use readiness, training, and
strength metrics over time along with State mobilization rates and
identification of States with multiple BCTs to ultimately determine
which BCTs will be considered for reduction. During the evaluation,
control measures will be used to ensure unit readiness data cannot be
correlated to a State or specific unit.
Question. If the Army National Guard begins to develop courses of
action for the reduction of Brigade Combat Teams, will the courses of
action for force structure reduction use the agreed upon Force
Management Unit Review Board?
Answer. Due to the compressed timeline the ARNG was under this
April to produce a list of units for reduction, it was impossible to
employ the Force Management Unit Review Board (FMURB) process and still
meet the Army's deadline. However, if given the time, the ARNG intends
to use the FMURB in the future to develop courses of action for force
structure reductions. Using the FMURB can be a time-consuming process,
especially given the large amount of force structure that would have to
be eliminated or rebalanced among the States in order to accommodate a
cut from 350,000 to 335,000 or 315,000 in end strength.
Question. Will the National Guard Bureau and Army National Guard
look at the Unit Assessment Tool data for fiscal year 2016 in order to
determine what force structure changes are needed based on the most
recent data?
Answer. The Army National Guard will recalculate the Unit Analysis
Tool annually in order to account for performance and readiness changes
in its units. This will ensure that senior leader decisions are fully
informed with the most recent data.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. General Grass, in your testimony, you stressed the
importance of relevant training to maintain readiness across the Guard.
More and more, the threats we face here at home are across the cyber
domain. How are you training our citizen-soldiers to protect our
critical infrastructure against this evolving threat?
Answer. The Army and Air National Guard will be an integral part of
our cyber defense. The National Guard Bureau is closely collaborating
with Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Headquarters Department of the Army,
and leadership from the 54 States and Territories and the District of
Columbia to develop ARNG cyber forces to support and are responsive to
Joint, Army, and domestic cyber requirements. ARNG cyber forces, while
they are principally defensive in nature, may conduct both defensive
and offensive cyberspace operations under the appropriate authorities,
as well as cyber security missions in support of local and national
missions.
The ARNG is building 11 Cyber Protection Teams (CPT) to provide
operational and surge capability to ARCYBER and US CYBER COMMAND while
establishing critical regional cyber capabilities for homeland defense
and civil support missions. The Secretary of the Army approved 429
Soldier authorizations for the ARNG as must-resource emerging growth in
Total Army Analysis (TAA) 16-20; 390 authorizations will be equally
split to create ten Title 32/M-day CPTs, with an additional 39
authorizations for a Title 10 ARNG CPT that will serve in a Federal
active duty status. The ARNG will follow the US CYBER COMMAND standard
for CPT structure outlined in the Cyber Force Concept of Operations and
Employment v3.3.
The ARNG cyber integration strategy rests on four guiding
principles: (1) The desired end state is to have joint training,
certification, and integration of ARNG cyber forces in the Army Cyber
mission force; (2) Emerging ARNG cyber forces will be developed in
phases beginning in fiscal year 2014 and allocated against current
Joint and Army priorities; (3) ARNG cyber forces will focus on
foundational training and certification requirements that do not
require Joint-level training facilities prior to fiscal year 2017 due
to limited training capacity. Priority of effort for resources
(facilities, training, infrastructure) shifts to ARNG upon completion
of initial Cyber Mission Force build in fiscal year 2017; and (4) ARNG
forces will train and certify to meet immediate un-resourced Army cyber
requirements.
The Air National Guard is working with USCYBERCOM and the Air Force
to build a total of 12 Cyber Operations Squadrons (CyOS) to support
Cyber Mission Force and AFCYBER missions. Within this construct, the
Air National Guard will effectively double the number of operational
cyber experts to support an enduring USCC mission beginning in fiscal
year 2016, and provide additional cyber protection assessment
capability for up to 30 or more AFCYBER missions per year. One of these
units, the 262nd Network Warfare Squadron in Washington State, also
maintains a functional area of expertise in Industrial Control Systems.
The 262nd will be available for assessments on Critical Infrastructures
as well as training the other CyOS in the ANG and U.S. Air Force.
Additionally, each of the Cyber Protection Teams will have imbedded
organic Red Team elements, nearly doubling that critical area of
expertise as well. The ANG also remains unit equipped which will allow
operations from home station, providing the maximum of cost-
effectiveness for our Nation, but they will present a sizeable surge
force capable of supporting major events in cyber.
Question. I was recently told that the 155th Brigade Combat Team
was on the divestiture list. The 155th Brigade from my home State of
Mississippi has deployed twice to Iraq. In 2005, they served alongside
the Marines and conducted full spectrum missions in Najaf, Karbala,
North Babil and Eastern Al Anbar. They performed admirably at a
critical time and should be commended for their service. I know the
history of this unit, and I also know that this brigade is the most
modernized brigade in the entire Army National Guard. The unit just
underwent new equipment training and fielded for the new M1A2 SEP
Abrams Main Battle Tank, the new M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicles and
they have some of the latest digital communications equipment in the
Army. Does it make sense to invest substantial resources into a unit
and then turn around and disassemble it?
Answer. No decision has been made to inactivate the 155th Armored
Brigade Combat Team at this time. The National Guard Bureau was
directed to plan for reductions in Army National Guard force structure
with end strengths of 335,000 by fiscal year 2017 and 315,000 by fiscal
year 2019. The preliminary plan to inactivate units across the Army
National Guard including brigade and Brigade Combat Team structure is
based on analysis of multiple readiness factors over a 5 year period.
While the 155th Armor Brigade Combat Team is one of two armor brigades
in the Army National Guard with the most modern equipment, it scored
low in the aggregate of readiness reporting over time. When any unit
inactivates, the equipment is redirected to continue modernization
throughout the Army National Guard. In the end, the decision on the
number of Brigade Combat Teams that the Army National Guard inactivates
is dependent on the scope of sequestration and guidance received from
the Chief of Staff of the Army. Under current budget restrictions the
Army National Guard will be reduced to 335,000 personnel and by two
Brigade Combat Teams by fiscal year 2017. If full sequestration limits
the Army National Guard to 315,000 personnel, then two additional
Brigade Combat Teams will have to be inactivated by fiscal year 2019.
Question. General Grass, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles play an
increasing role in our national defense; particularly during a time of
strategic transition and fiscal austerity. In January, Senator Wicker
and I sent a letter to the DOD and the FAA urging the optimization of
Special Use Airspace for National Guard testing in support of military
and civil purposes. Can you speak to the expanding role UAVs play in
support of your Title 32 requirements?
Answer. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) provide a critical and
proven war-fighting capability for our forces when deployed. These same
UAS assets have a great but largely untapped potential for emergency
support within the United States for both natural and man-made
disasters. This is true regardless of whether our UAS are used in a
Title 10, Title 32, or State Active Duty status. Within the National
Guard inventory the Army National Guard has small-size UAS's (Raven)
and medium-size UAS's (Shadow), and the Air National Guard has large-
size UAS's (Predator & Reaper).
The National Guard has the capability on-hand, but the focus now is
on how to properly and efficiently employ this capability during
domestic incidents. While the pace of progress within the Department of
Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration toward workable
procedures for rapid-response solutions has increased, work still
remains to be done. There are currently two major approvals that we
must receive in order to employ UAS assets for an incident in the
United States. The first requirement is to obtain Secretary of Defense
approval prior to any use of UAS for Defense Support to Civil
Authorities. The second approval is from the FAA to operate the UAS in
the specific portion of the National Airspace System affected by the
disaster or emergency. While both DOD and the FAA have now established
standard procedures for the submission, evaluation, and decisionmaking
on such requests, our practical experience to date is too limited to
know if we will be able to obtain approvals as expeditiously as they
may be needed in order to assist State and local officials in the
earliest stages of a response. We already have experience with this
process when we received approval from the Secretary of Defense to use
a UAS from the California Air National Guard to monitor the California
Rim Fire in August of 2013.
______
Question Submitted by Senator to Lamar Alexander
Question. From your own analysis, would the Army's aviation
restructuring plan save money?
The Army testified that there would be approximately $12 billion in
savings in cost avoidance. Can you explain that figure? Would it save
more money by retaining AH-64 Apaches in the Army National Guard? How
much will be saved by divesting the OH-58D Kiowa Warriors?
Answer. Yes, the Department of the Army Aviation Restructure
Initiative (ARI) will save money, principally through cost-avoidance as
the Army foregoes upgrades to legacy OH-58 and TH-67 aircraft.
Retaining AH-64s in the Army National Guard (ARNG) will still enable
those cost savings and allow the Army to keep significantly more
aircraft in operational units than if all Apaches are moved to the
active component.
Tangible ARI savings of about $1.1 billion in Operations and
Support (O&S) annual costs are due to the reduction of three aviation
brigades in the active component (AC) and about two brigades in the
ARNG. These savings begin as soon as the aviation units are inactivated
and are not part of the quoted $12 billion savings/cost avoidance.
As we understand it, the $12 billion savings/cost avoidance
(actually $11.94 billion) results from cancellation of the OH-58D
Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade (CASUP) [$3.36 billion], cancellation of the
OH-58D upgrades and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) [$6.96
billion], and the decision not to buy a replacement training aircraft
for flight school [$1.43 billion] and not to SLEP the TH-67 trainer as
a bridge until a new trainer was fielded [$.19 billion]. Only $1.46
billion of the CASUP funds was programmed in the fiscal year 2015-2019
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The remaining $10.48 billion was
either programmed for OH-58D CASUP and SLEP after the POM or was
recently estimated as the cost to replace the current training fleet,
but never programmed.
The $1.46 billion in CASUP savings that had been programmed during
the POM period have been reprogrammed from OH-58D CASUP to Apache and
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Shadow, and Grey Eagle), thus eliminating
those savings. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
modified the ARI plan in January to procure about 100 more UH-72 Lakota
aircraft for flight school with additional ``topline'' funding, rather
than transfer the aircraft from the ARNG. The $800 million that is
programmed for UH-72 procurement in fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year
2016 further reduces the overall ARI savings or cost avoidance by that
amount.
The ARI plan directly links the OH-58D divestiture (which saves
money) with the transfer of all ARNG AH-64s to the active component
(which costs money). ARI grows the active component from 17 Attack-
Recon Battalions (ARB) to 20 ARBs and creates a robust AH-64 spares
account--helicopters without trained pilots or crews to fly and
maintain them. Alternatively, retaining 72 AH-64s in three ARNG ARBs,
rather than transferring them to the active Army, would save $115
million in annual O&S costs. As of 27 May 2014 the annual O&S cost for
a full-time AC ARB is about $69 million, while that cost for a part-
time ARNG ARB is about $30.5 million, according to the Forces Cost
Model maintained by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost
and Economics (DASA-CE) (($69 million - $30.5 million) 3 = $115
million).
Efficient use of the total Attack-Recon force with no loss of
support to Combatant Commanders can be achieved by retaining six ARNG
ARBs, growing one more AC ARB (18 total), and reducing the AH-64 spare
aircraft account. This would provide 24 total manned, deployable ARBs
(vice 20 under ARI) at an annual cost of about $45 million more than
ARI (6 $30.5M - 2 $69 million = $45 million).
Divesting the OH-58D fleet and standing down the nine AC Air
Reconnaissance Squadrons and one ARNG Air Cavalry Squadron (less the
UH-60 Assault Troop) saves $523 million annually (9 $55.4M plus 1
$25 million = $523 million) according to the DASE-CE cost model. OH-58D
divestiture also avoids the $8.86 billion in post-POM costs for the OH-
58D CASUP and SLEP discussed earlier.
The Army's plan saves money annually due to structure reductions
and avoids future costs due to cancellation of OH-58D upgrades and
replacement of part of the training fleet with existing Army aircraft.
The National Guard Bureau alternative restructure plan with six ARNG
ARBs that was offered several months ago also saves more than $1
billion annually and includes the $12 billion in cost avoidance from
the HQDA ARI plan, while keeping more ARB capacity.
______
Questions Submitted to Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Talley
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
Question. The Army Reserve is experiencing a reduction in the
institutional training programs as a consequence of a shrinking defense
budget. How does the Army Reserve plan to adjust to the current fiscal
environment while maintaining a high level of readiness?
Answer. The Army Reserve is extremely challenged in maintaining a
high level of readiness under a constrained budgetary environment. The
increasing complexity of the operational environment requires more (not
less) training time and money. New requirements like countering cyber
attacks and Congressionally mandated classes require additional time
added to Initial Entry Training (IET), Military Occupational Skills
(MOS), Additional Skills Identifier (ASI), and Professional Military
Education (PME) training programs for all ranks.
Army Reserve mitigation strategy to minimize readiness impacts from
budget cuts include:
--Scrutinize all Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS)
documents; Course Administrative Documents (CAD) and Program of
Instructions (POI) for cost increase, redundant instruction,
and tasks added above those identified in the Critical Task
Site Selection Board (CTSSB) process.
--Prioritize individual training courses based on most to least
critical requirements.
--Work with Human Resources Command (HRC) to ensure that any Active
Component (AC) Soldier seeking transition to the Army Reserve
completes all required branch transfer MOS training prior to
leaving active duty.
--Continue to promote Electronic Based Distance Learning (EBDL)
compensation to encourage completion of course prerequisites
and subsequent use of current training quotas.
--Take full advantage of building individual proficiencies at Army
Reserve centers using Mobile Training Teams, distributed
learning, virtual, constructive, gaming capabilities, and
``blackboard'' capabilities.
--Leverage partnering with private industry for select skills
training e.g., medical equipment repair.
--Restructuring Generating Force to regionally aligned training sites
(east, west and central locations) to maximize the use of
instructors, class sizes, and training resources.
Question. Describe how cuts to NGREA funding will affect the Army
Reserve's ability to maintain an operational force. What do you
perceive to be the most substantial deficiencies in the NGREA accounts?
Answer. Reducing National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation
(NGREA) funding will adversely affect Army Reserve efforts to procure
priority items not funded in the base budget. Not procuring priority
equipment will reduce the ability of the Army Reserve to stay
operationally trained and ready on the latest equipment and add costs
to move new equipment around according to the force generation cycle.
Additionally, cutting NGREA limits the Chief of Army Reserve's
flexibility to supplement the base budget to procure items immediately
impacting readiness.
The Army Reserve appreciates the generous support of Congress
through NGREA that has improved equipment modernization and reduced
existing funding gaps. Although today's Army Reserve is better equipped
and modernized than at any point in history, the current fiscal
environment is forcing the Army to make difficult equipping
prioritization decisions. As an enabler centric force, the Army Reserve
is disproportionately affected by an Army equipping strategy that
places greater emphasis on the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). NGREA is a
key component in the Army Reserve's ability to close modernizations
gaps and sustain momentum gained in transitioning to a viable
operational force.
As future Army budgets decrease, the Army will become more reliant
on the Army Reserve as an affordable solution in providing unique
enabling capabilities in support of contingency operations, Homeland
Defense (HD), and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), while
maximizing resources in a fiscally constrained environment. With
reduced budgets, the need for NGREA will impact operational readiness,
interoperability, training, and reduce the flexibility to modernize
unique enabling systems in support of Army Force Generation
requirements. Sustaining the Army Reserve as an operational force
during a period of fiscal austerity only requires a modest investment
compared to the total force.
The most substantial deficiency in NGREA accounts is the
inconsistency in yearly guidance. The Army Reserve's NGREA acquisition
plans are developed and refined based upon Army funding guidance and
program prioritization. Internal procurement guidelines are not always
consistent from one fiscal year to another. Enacting a well-defined set
of business rules would prevent changes to procurement plans that lead
to disruptions such as losing space within existing Army procurement
contracts.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Lieutenant General Talley, the Army Reserve flight
training budget increases from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015 by
almost 70 percent in this budget request. What is the reason for this
increase?
Answer. The Army Reserve flight training budget increase from
fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015 is actually 44.6 percent. Divide
the increase from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015 (1943 - 1344 =
599) by fiscal year 2014 budget (599 / 1344 = 44.6 percent).
The reason for the budget increase is due to cost factors and new
training requirements. The following Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft cost
factors increased:
--AH-64D: $467.00 increase per hour
--CH-47D: $66.00 increase per hour
--CH-47F: $71.00 increase per hour
--HH-60M: $143.00 increase per hour
--UH-60L: $72.00 increase per hour
The rotary wing program will be going through a transition as we
turn-in the Fort Knox Battalion's AH-64D Apache aircraft for the UH-60L
and the flight crews will have to be trained on the new aircraft for
fiscal year 2015. The Texas Apache Battalion will transition in fiscal
year 2017. Additionally, beginning in 4th Quarter fiscal year 2014 the
Army Reserve will start fielding the CH-47F to replace the CH-47D.
______
Questions Submitted to Major General Judd H. Lyons
Question Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
Question. What are the specific metrics used to determine the
readiness of an Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team?
Answer. The Army National Guard uses Army metrics to determine
overall readiness of Brigade Combat Teams, including personnel,
equipment on-hand, equipment readiness, and training. Like the active
component, Army National Guard BCTs report their readiness through the
Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). The Defense Readiness
Reporting System, in turn, informs the Unit Status Report (USR). Army
Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration--
Consolidated Policies, dated 15 April 2010, is the policy that
encompasses this methodology.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Major General Lyons, in fiscal year 2015 the Army Guard
is not funded for any rotations at Combat Training Centers, which as
you know are important for collective training events and unit
readiness. What was the reason for not budgeting for these events and
what is the impact to Guard readiness?
Answer. While the Army and the Army National Guard (ARNG) view
Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations as important, decisions made by
the Army initially precluded CTC funding for ARNG BCTs in fiscal year
2015. CTC rotations, as with all programs, compete for funding.
Overall, the ARNG experienced a $93 million reduction in NGPA and a
$826 million reduction in OMNG funding between the fiscal year 2014
budget and the fiscal year 2015 President's budget submission. After
the fiscal year 2015 President's budget was submitted, the Army
confirmed scheduling of two CTC rotations for the ARNG. The Army and
the Army National Guard budget offices have included $45 million in
ARNG personnel and $23 million in ARNG operations funding that supports
these activities in the Unfinanced Priority List.
CTC rotations are the Army's premier collective training event, key
to developing the next generation of Army leaders, and facilitate the
dissemination of doctrine throughout the Army. CTCs provide commanders,
staffs, and units an operational experience focused on unit readiness
and leader development requirements. CTC rotations are the only venue
for ARNG Brigade Combat Teams to achieve company live fire/battalion
maneuver proficiency in order to meet Army Force Generation aimpoints.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Durbin. I want to thank the Secretary and Generals
for joining us today as well as those who've accompanied them.
It goes without saying, it has become a clichee, but I mean it
from the heart, thank you for your service to our country each
and every one of you.
And this meeting of the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., Wednesday, April 30, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]