[Senate Hearing 113-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2014
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THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard C. Shelby presiding.
Present: Senators Mikulski, Shelby, and Cochran.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATOR
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. The subcommittee will come to order.
Senator Mikulski, our chairperson, is running a little
late. You never know when traffic and other things happen,
General Bolden, so she asked me to go ahead and get started.
And with your permission, I will.
General Bolden, I'm going to give an opening statement, and
then we'll see where we go from there.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
one of the most publicly-recognized agencies in the Federal
Government and an inspiration to young people around the world,
motivating them to become scientists, engineers, and explorers.
I look forward to hearing from Administrator Bolden about this
budget and NASA's plans for the future.
The fiscal year 2014 budget aspires to do many new,
innovative, and exciting things, yet it proposes, General
Bolden, no additional funding. In essence, NASA is proposing to
do more with less.
I strongly believe that this country must continue to push
the science and engineering envelope while maintaining focus on
current investments in order to realize tangible benefits.
I'm concerned, General Bolden, that the budget before us is
an example of chasing the next great idea while sacrificing
current investments. This country has finite resources to
invest, and while we're committed to NASA's mission, subjecting
mission-critical activities to shoestring budgets because a
more exciting idea has come along I don't think is wise.
Based on the proposed budget, as well as previous budgets,
I have serious doubts about NASA's dedication to truly
developing a heavy launch capability. I hope you will dispel
that.
While your testimony, Administrator Bolden, points out that
NASA is building the world's most powerful rocket, the Space
Launch System (SLS), the budget doesn't reflect NASA's
commitment to that goal. Instead, it shows cuts to SLS vehicle
development as far as we can see.
This budget focuses, I believe, too heavily on maintaining
the fiction of privately funded commercial launch vehicles
which diverts, I think, critical resources from NASA's goal of
developing human space flight capabilities with the SLS.
I've long been a supporter of public-private partnerships
that use Federal dollars to leverage private resources in
everything. In this case, however, NASA has provided $1.5
billion to for-profit companies for the development of launch
capabilities, but it's my understanding it has no idea how much
money these companies are investing themselves. And according
to NASA's budget office, it has no authority to ask. That's
troubling.
In addition, NASA has no ability to keep the projects on
budget or on schedule because of the nature of the contract
that was executed.
It's also troubling that NASA paid these companies in spite
of delayed milestones, shifting completion dates, and an
altered final delivery schedule, and then had to provide
additional payments in excess of $200 million so these projects
could be successful. This sounds like a great arrangement for
the companies, but I don't believe it's a great arrangement for
the taxpayer.
PREPARED STATEMENT
There are many unanswered questions about NASA's vision for
the future and how it plans to achieve that vision. With this
budget proposal, we have a significant challenge ahead of us,
but I believe that with some direction and some accountability,
NASA's endeavors can be successful and inspire future
generations.
I look forward to working with Chairman Mikulski and with
you, Mr. Administrator, in the coming months. And I ask that my
full statement be made part of the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby
Thank you, Madam Chair.
NASA is one of the most publicly-recognized agencies in the Federal
Government and an inspiration to young people around the world
motivating them to become scientists, engineers, and explorers. I look
forward to hearing from Administrator Bolden about this budget and
NASA's plans for the future.
The fiscal year 2014 budget aspires to do many new, innovative, and
exciting things, yet it proposes no additional funding. In essence,
NASA is proposing to do more with less. I strongly believe that this
country must continue to push the science and engineering envelope
while maintaining focus on current investments in order to reap
tangible benefits.
I am concerned that the budget before us however, is an example of
chasing the next great idea while sacrificing current investments. This
country has finite resources to invest and while we are committed to
NASA's mission, subjecting mission critical activities to shoestring
budgets because a more exciting idea has come along is not wise.
Based on the proposed budget, as well as previous budgets, I have
serious doubts about NASA's dedication to truly developing a heavy
launch capability. While your testimony Administrator Bolden, points
out that NASA is building the world's most powerful rocket, the Space
Launch System, the budget does not reflect NASA's commitment to that
goal. Instead, it shows cuts to SLS vehicle development as far as the
eye can see.
This budget focuses too heavily on maintaining the fiction of
privately funded commercial cargo and crew vehicles which diverts
critical resources from NASA's goal of developing human space flight
capabilities with the SLS. Administrator Bolden, I have long been a
supporter of public-private partnerships that use Federal dollars to
leverage private resources. In this case however, NASA has provided
$1.5 billion dollars through Space Act Agreements to for-profit
companies to develop low Earth orbit launch capabilities but has no
idea how much money these companies are investing themselves, and
according to NASA's budget office, has no authority to ask. In
addition, NASA has no ability to keep the projects on budget or on
schedule because of the nature of the contract that was executed.
It is troubling that NASA paid the companies developing cargo
capability in spite of delayed milestones, shifting completion dates,
and an altered final delivery schedule and then had to provide
additional payments in excess of $200 million so these projects could
be successful. This sounds like a great arrangement for the companies
but I don't believe it is a great arrangement for the taxpayer.
There are many unanswered questions about NASA's vision for the
future and how it plans to achieve that vision. With this budget
proposal, we have a significant challenge ahead of us but I believe
that with some direction and greater accountability, NASA's endeavors
can be successful and inspire future generations.
I look forward to working with the Chair and you, Mr. Administrator
in the coming months.
Senator Shelby. And I need to mention that the subcommittee
has taken Inspector General Paul Martin's testimony for the
record already.
Senator Cochran, do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to join you in
welcoming our distinguished witness to the subcommittee today
to review the budget requests for NASA for fiscal year 2014.
I ask unanimous consent that my full statement be printed
in the record.
Senator Shelby. Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Madam Chairwoman, I join you in welcoming Administrator Bolden to
our hearing today on the fiscal year 2014 NASA budget request. I look
forward to our work to help ensure appropriate levels of funding for
the NASA activities during this budget year.
I am pleased that NASA appears to be moving forward with the
development of the Space Launch System. As you know, Stennis Space
Center in Mississippi is very important to the people of my State and I
am hopeful that we can continue to work together to ensure that we have
adequate rocket testing infrastructure at Stennis to support the Space
Launch System and our Nation's space exploration goals.
Senator Shelby. General Bolden, I talked with you a few
minutes ago, but we officially welcome you to the subcommittee,
and look forward to your testimony and the question-and-answer
period, and I'm sure the chairwoman will join us soon.
Mr. Bolden. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby. Proceed as you wish.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR.
Mr. Bolden. Thank you, Sir. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, first of all, I know Chairman Mikulski is not
here yet, and I've congratulated both of you in private on your
ascension to the chairmanship and ranking membership of the
full committee, and I want to congratulate you again and tell
you how much I look forward to working with you in all aspects.
I want to thank this subcommittee for the opportunity to
appear today to discuss NASA's fiscal year 2014 budget request.
Let me start, again, by thanking this subcommittee for its
continued bipartisan support of NASA and the world's second-to-
none civil space program. That support is also reflected among
the American people and in the White House, as evidenced by the
President's $17.7 billion funding request for NASA.
The budget reflects today's fiscal realities and aligns
NASA's full spectrum of activities to meet the President's
challenge to send humans to an asteroid in 2025 and to Mars in
the 2030s. As part of the agency's overall asteroid strategy,
NASA is planning a first-ever mission to identify, capture, and
redirect an asteroid into orbit around the Moon. This mission
represents an unprecedented technological challenge, raising
the bar for human exploration and discovery, while helping
protect our home planet and bringing us closer to a human
mission to Mars in the 2030s.
This budget also supports NASA's partnerships with American
industry partners who are developing new ways to reach space.
These partnerships are creating jobs and enabling NASA to focus
on new technologies that benefit all of our missions. Industry
partner SpaceX has begun resupplying the International Space
Station (ISS) with cargo launched from the United States. This
past Sunday's successful test launch by Orbital Science of its
Antares launch vehicle marks another significant milestone in
NASA's plan to rely on American companies to launch supplies
and astronauts to the International Space Station. Orbital is
now poised for its first demonstration launch and mission to
the ISS later this year.
The administration is committed to launching American
astronauts from U.S. soil within the next 4 years. This budget
provides the necessary resources to achieve that goal. This
budget fully funds the ISS that remains the springboard to our
next great leap in exploration. It also continues investments
that are developing the SLS rocket and Orion crew vehicle that
will take astronauts to deep space. And it supports driving the
development of space technologies, such as solar electric
propulsion, that will power tomorrow's missions and help
improve life on Earth.
This budget continues to build on our Nation's record of
breathtaking scientific discoveries and achievements in space
with science missions that will reach farther into our solar
system and provide critical knowledge about our home planet.
Among other science goals, the budget will sustain NASA's
vital role in helping us understand Earth's systems and
climate, and the dynamics between our planet and our sun. These
efforts will provide critical knowledge about our home planet
and potential threats. We will continue steady progress toward
our next great observatory as we develop the James Webb Space
Telescope (JWST), scheduled to launch in 2018.
NASA's programs of innovative aeronautics research are
pursuing an ambitious research agenda for substantially
reducing aircraft fuel consumption, emissions, and noise. With
the fiscal year 2014 request, NASA begins a new $25 million-a-
year advanced composites project that will focus on innovative
composite materials and structures.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, we've had to make some tough choices with
this budget, as I'm certain we'll discuss today. But I'm
committed to making sure that NASA is using its resources
strategically for a cohesive exploration program that bolsters
our economy, improves life here on Earth, and raises the bar of
what humans can achieve.
I look forward to your questions.
[The statements follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
have this opportunity to discuss NASA's fiscal year 2014 budget
request. The requested budget of $17.715 billion will support
continuing progress toward implementing the bipartisan program for NASA
agreed to by the President and Congress, which will ensure the United
States continues to lead the world in space exploration, technology,
innovation, and scientific discovery. A summary of the fiscal year 2014
budget request is appended to this statement.
American astronauts are living and working in space on board the
International Space Station (ISS), conducting an expanding research
program with an array of partners. By partnering with American
companies, we are cost-effectively resupplying the space station from
U.S. soil, and we are on track to end our sole reliance on Russia for
astronaut transport to and from the Space Station by 2017. NASA is
developing spaceflight capabilities to send humans to an asteroid by
2025 and on to Mars in the 2030s. To accomplish these goals, we are
building the world's most powerful rocket, the Space Launch System
(SLS), and a deep space exploration crew vehicle, the Orion Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). In critical support of the Agency's
broader mission, we are developing and testing space technologies that
will enable us to move and operate faster and more efficiently in
space, land more mass accurately on another planet, and enable new
destinations to be visited. These technologies include solar electric
propulsion, learning to store and transfer fuel in orbit, radiation
protection, laser communications, high-reliability life support
systems, and human and robotic interfaces. Our aeronautics research is
making air travel cleaner, safer, and more efficient. With many
missions actively observing Earth, the planets, the Sun, and the
Universe, we remain the world's premier space science organization and
the critical source of information for an understanding of Earth's
climate that can only be gained from the global perspective of space.
We are extending these cutting-edge capabilities with major new
developments, including the James Webb Space Telescope and a new Mars
rover. Despite an uncertain budget climate, NASA is delivering the
world's preeminent space program, supporting an innovation economy, and
broadening our understanding of the universe around us.
As is briefly described below, NASA's resources are directed to
accomplish the goals set for the Agency by the Congress and the
President. Our improved processes for cost estimating and program
management play a critical role in our ability to manage our resources,
and we remain on track in our major developments. NASA is confident
that we can continue to execute the program described below within the
budget levels anticipated in the President's fiscal year 2014 request
for NASA. We will attempt to maintain and implement long-term
development plans within future budgets as they are appropriated. The
Agency stands committed to executing our programs as efficiently as
possible.
an integrated exploration mission
The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request continues to
implement the bipartisan strategy for space exploration approved by
Congress in 2010, a plan that advances U.S. preeminence in science and
technology, improves life on Earth, and protects our home planet, all
while helping create jobs and strengthening the American economy. This
budget reflects current fiscal realities by aligning and leveraging
relevant portions of NASA's science, space technology, and human
exploration capabilities to achieve the President's challenge of
sending astronauts to an asteroid by 2025.
As part of the agency's overall asteroid strategy, NASA is planning
a first-ever mission to identify, capture, and redirect an asteroid
into orbit around the Moon. The overall mission is composed of three
separate and independently compelling elements: the detection and
characterization of candidate near-Earth asteroids; the robotic
rendezvous, capture, and redirection of a target asteroid to the Earth-
Moon system; and the crewed mission to explore and sample the captured
asteroid using the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion crew
capsule. This mission represents an unprecedented technological
challenge--raising the bar for human exploration and discovery, while
helping protect our home planet and bringing us closer to a human
mission to Mars in the 2030s.
Each mission element would heavily leverage ongoing activities
across the Human Exploration and Operations, Space Technology, and
Science Mission Directorates. We are currently working to align ongoing
activities across these directorates to affordably achieve the
objectives while we plan this mission. Progress will continue
conditional on feasibility and affordability. Funding provided within
the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request will augment our
existing activities in Space Technology, Science, and Human Exploration
and Operations to: enhance our near-Earth asteroid detection and
characterization assets; accelerate advanced solar electric propulsion
development; and design and test capabilities to capture a small, yet
slowly tumbling asteroid in space.
science
With 60 missions observing Earth, the Sun, the planets, and the
Universe, NASA remains the world's premier space science organization
and the critical source of information on the home planet. NASA's
budget request for the Science Mission Directorate includes $5,017.8
million with $1,846.1 million for Earth Science, $1,217.5 million for
Planetary Science, $642.3 million for Astrophysics, $658.2 million for
the James Webb Telescope, and $653.7 million for Heliophysics.
Earth Science
Seventeen NASA Earth Science research missions currently in orbit
study the home planet as an integrated system, including the recently
launched Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), which is undergoing
on-orbit checkout. NASA is also beginning work on land imaging
capabilities beyond LDCM as well as climate sensors that were
previously part of the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). NASA
missions continue to give us a global perspective on how Earth works as
a system and how our climate is changing over time. Few products of
NASA's research can be as valuable, in a material sense, as an accurate
understanding of the future of our planet's environment--on land, in
the oceans, and throughout the atmosphere. The fiscal year 2014 request
supports the launch of two new Earth science missions in fiscal year
2014, and final preparations for launch of two more before the end of
the calendar year. The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission,
a cooperative mission with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
(JAXA), will provide unprecedented global precipitation observations
and the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) will provide accurate
global measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. In the fall
of 2014, NASA will launch the Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP)
mission to study the Earth's hydrologic cycle. At the end of the
calendar year, in a collaboration among NASA's Science Mission
Directorate, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, and
the European Space Agency, NASA will launch and install the
Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment III (SAGE III) on the ISS to
continue critical long-term measurements of the vertical structure of
aerosols, ozone, water vapor, and other important trace gases in the
upper atmosphere.
Astrophysics and James Webb Space Telescope
NASA is on track and making excellent progress on the James Webb
Space Telescope, the most powerful space telescope in history. The Webb
telescope is the next in a series of astrophysics missions, including
the venerable, yet still unrivaled Hubble Space Telescope and the
incredibly productive Kepler exoplanet mission, which are
revolutionizing our understanding of the universe. After launching in
2018, the Webb telescope will travel 1 million miles from Earth, unfold
its sunshield to the size of a tennis court, and keep its instruments
cooled to a temperature of 370-387 degrees below zero Fahrenheit (40-50
kelvins). The Webb telescope will allow us to observe objects even
fainter than the Hubble Space Telescope can see, which will allow us to
study every phase in the history of our universe, ranging from the
first luminous glows after the Big Bang, to the formation of solar
systems capable of supporting life on planets like Earth, to the
evolution of our own solar system. The fiscal year 2014 request will
support work to finish the Webb science instruments, begin their
testing as an integrated science payload, and commence construction on
the spacecraft that will carry the science instruments and the
telescope. NASA's Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy
(SOFIA) airborne observatory is making its second year of science
observations. Operating at altitudes of between 39,000 to 45,000 feet
(12-14 kilometers) and above 99 percent of the water vapor in the
atmosphere, SOFIA makes observations that are unobtainable from
telescopes on the ground. In the coming year, SOFIA will begin its next
set of science observations. Flying out of Palmdale, California, and
Christchurch, New Zealand, SOFIA will observe star-forming regions in
our galaxy from its vantage point at the top of the Earth's atmosphere.
Planetary Science
Building on the brilliant success of NASA's new Curiosity rover on
Mars, the 2014 request supports plans for a robust multiyear Mars
program, including a new robotic science rover based on the Curiosity
design set to launch in 2020. The current portfolio includes the
Curiosity and Opportunity rovers, the Mars Recognizance Orbiter, the
Mars Odyssey orbiter, and our collaboration with the European Space
Agency Mars Express orbiter. Future missions include the 2013 Mars
Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) orbiter to study the Martian
upper atmosphere; the 2016 Interior Exploration using Seismic
Investigations, Geodesy and Heat Transport (InSight) mission (which
will take the first look into the deep interior of Mars); participation
in the European Space Agency's 2016 and 2018 ExoMars missions; and the
new Mars rover planned for launch in 2020.
Last summer, NASA's Dawn mission completed more than a year in
orbit around the asteroid Vesta, and departed for its 2015 rendezvous
with Ceres, the largest known asteroid. NASA is developing a robotic
asteroid rendezvous and sample return mission, dubbed OSIRIS-REx (for
Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-Security-
Regolith Explorer), which is planned to launch in 2016. After traveling
3 years, OSIRIS-REx will approach the Near Earth Asteroid 1999 RQ36,
map the asteroid, and collect a sample of up to 2.2 pounds for return
to Earth. This mission will provide valuable data and experience in
support of NASA's planned human exploration of a Near Earth Asteroid.
In addition, the fiscal year 2014 budget request includes enhanced
funding for NASA's Near Earth Object survey and characterization
activities in support of human exploration and to protect our planet.
Heliophysics
Perhaps even more dynamic than the Earth's climate are the
processes taking place within the Earth's nearby star, the Sun. NASA's
Heliophysics Program operates nearly 20 spacecraft to expand our
understanding of the Sun, its complex interaction with Earth, other
planetary systems, the vast space within the solar system, and the
interface with interstellar space. Last year saw the successful launch
of the Van Allen Probes, which, in a few short months, have already
redefined our understanding of the Earth's radiation belts. The fiscal
year 2014 request will support final development and launch of the
Interface Region Imaging Spectrograph (IRIS), as well as continued
development of the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) mission, which is
planned for launch in 2015 to investigate how the Sun's and Earth's
magnetic fields connect and disconnect. NASA continues to formulate the
Solar Probe Plus (SPP) mission and develop its contribution to the
European Space Agency's Solar Orbiter mission.
aeronautics research
NASA's fiscal year 2014 request includes $565.7 million for NASA's
program of innovative aeronautics research. This research supports the
Nation's aviation industry's efforts to maintain competitiveness in the
global market, and helps to provide the flying public with an improved
flying experience and fewer delays, while also maintaining an
outstanding safety level. NASA's breakthrough research into more
efficient air traffic management and environmentally friendly aircraft
helps U.S. air carriers to operate their fleets more efficiently while
reducing operating costs. Today, we are pursuing an ambitious research
agenda for substantially reducing fuel consumption, emissions and noise
to make the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) a
reality. NASA begins a new $25 million a year Advanced Composites
Project in fiscal year 2014 that will focus on reducing the timeline
for development and certification of innovative composite materials and
structures. Looking ahead, NASA is paving the way for further industry
innovation through demonstration in flight of new aircraft wing
technology designed to save fuel by reducing weight and drag, and
continued flight research of low-boom technology designed to reduce
sonic booms enough to eliminate the barrier to overland civil
supersonic flight. By advancing the state of the art in vehicle and air
traffic management technology, NASA is directly contributing to the
Nation's bottom line.
space technology
NASA's fiscal year 2014 request includes $742.6 million for Space
Technology. Space Technology enables our future in space by drawing on
talent from the NASA workforce, academia, small businesses, and the
broader national space enterprise to deliver innovative solutions that
dramatically lower costs and improve technological capabilities for
NASA and the Nation. In 2012, we successfully fabricated a 2.4 meter
composite cryogenic propellant tank. We will scale this design up and
test a 5.5-meter diameter tank to enable lower-mass rocket propellant
tanks that will meet future SLS needs. The Small Businesses Innovation
Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR and STTR)
programs saw six previously funded technologies make their way to Mars
last August with the landing of Curiosity and provide the critical
detector in the infrared instrument on the LDCM spacecraft. In 2013, we
will fly a cluster of eight small satellites that will make coordinated
space science observations. We will conduct high-altitude tests of the
largest planetary parachute ever developed and drag devices designed to
enable precise landing of higher-mass payloads to the surface of
planets, with particular focus on infusing advanced capabilities into
the Mars 2020 mission. In addition, NASA will launch the Sunjammer
Solar Sail, which will demonstrate solar sail propulsion as an enabler
for advanced space weather warning systems. Space Technology is also
systematically addressing technology barriers in preparation for a
future solar electric propulsion demonstration to an asteroid. By the
end of fiscal year 2014, NASA will test and deliver two candidates for
large deployable solar array systems, power processing units, and
advanced thrusters to support this flight demonstration. The Game
Changing Program is delivering advanced life-support, robotics, and
battery technologies for the system demonstrations planned by the
Advanced Exploration Systems Division of NASA's Human Exploration and
Operations Mission Directorate.
To meet the challenges that we face in implementing our exploration
plans, we are engaging the Nation's brightest and best. Over the past 2
years, Space Technology has engaged over 100 U.S. universities and
academic institutions with approximately 350 activities, including
fellowships, direct competitive awards, incentive prizes, and through
partnerships with NASA Centers, small businesses, and commercial
contractors. The fiscal year 2014 request will support our plans to
continue releasing a steady stream of new solicitations, tapping into
the Nation's talent to ensure the availability of advanced technologies
for NASA's missions and ultimately, through technology transfer, for
American businesses. Following the National Research Council's review
of NASA's Space Technology Roadmaps, the Agency released and is
implementing the Strategic Space Technology Investment Plan, which
guides technology priorities across the agency's space-technology
portfolio across its mission directorates. NASA's community of
innovators is applying, testing, and reworking cutting-edge research
into potentially ``game-changing'' solutions that can accelerate a
timeline, slash projected costs, or multiply science return. NASA makes
progress in essential space technologies daily, enabling more capable
and far-reaching space systems for our Nation's future, and we are
doing so through lean, agile programs and innovative approaches.
exploration and space operations
NASA is building the capabilities and knowledge to send humans
farther from the home planet than we have ever been before. The fiscal
year 2014 budget request for Exploration is $3,915.5 million with
$2,730 million for Exploration Systems Development, $821.4 million for
Commercial Space Flight, and $364.2 million for Exploration Research
and Development. Space Operations, including the International Space
Station and Space Flight Support form a critical component or the
agency's exploration plans by enabling us to develop the knowledge,
experience, and technology necessary for safely living and working in
space. The fiscal year 2014 request for Space Operations is $3,882.9
million.
Exploration Systems
The fiscal year 2014 request will enable NASA to continue to meet
its milestones in the development of the Space Launch System (SLS), a
rocket system ultimately capable of bringing an unprecedented 130
metric tons of payload to Earth orbit. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew
Vehicle (MPCV) program continues on schedule for an uncrewed test
flight in 2014. This test flight, Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1),
will see Orion conduct two orbits of Earth and reenter the atmosphere
at a high-speed characteristic of a returning deep space exploration
mission. The test will provide valuable data about the spacecraft's
systems, most importantly, its heat shield. The flight test article for
this mission is already in place at the Kennedy Space Center and being
readied for this test. The fiscal year 2014 request supports progress
toward a first uncrewed test of the Orion and the SLS together, known
as Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) in 2017, with the first crewed mission
of the two vehicles slated for 2021. These two missions will test and
demonstrate these systems. Together, the SLS and Orion MPCV represent a
critical step on the path to human deep space exploration. Because our
commercial space partners continue to make rapid and cost-effective
progress toward meeting the Agency's requirements for access to the ISS
and to low Earth orbit, NASA is able to focus its human exploration
resources to develop the deep space capabilities represented by the SLS
and Orion MPCV.
International Space Station
The fiscal year 2014 request supports the International Space
Station (ISS) with its international crew of 6 orbiting Earth every 90
minutes. The Station is making deep space exploration possible,
building on the knowledge and experience we are gaining from the
astronauts living, working, and conducting research on the ISS. Our
plans for the coming year include preparing for an extended duration,
year-long human-crewed mission to explore human adaptation to space;
continuing to utilize the ISS to improve our ability to live and work
in space, including technology demonstrations enabling future
exploration; and the addition of three Earth Science instruments that
will exploit ISS' capabilities to study winds over the oceans and the
movement of dust, smoke, and pollution through the atmosphere. The
Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) is now managing
the National Laboratory research being conducted in the U.S. segment of
the ISS by an array of organizations, including commercial researchers
interested in taking advantage of this unique, microgravity facility.
Commercial Crew and Cargo
A top priority for NASA and the Nation is to affordably and safely
launch American astronauts and their supplies from U.S. soil, ending
our reliance on foreign providers and bringing that work back home.
Under NASA's Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contracts, Space
Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) was awarded 12 cargo flights to the
space station, and Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) was awarded
8. SpaceX executed its first cargo mission to the ISS in October 2012,
successfully delivering its cargo and returning scientific samples to
Earth. SpaceX successfully completed its second CRS mission and its
Dragon spacecraft safely returned to Earth on March 26. Orbital
successfully completed the maiden flight of its Antares rocket on April
21 and will conduct a demonstration flight of the Antares with the
Cygnus spacecraft this spring under the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) effort. Orbital's first contracted cargo
resupply mission under CRS is slated for later this year. NASA
continues to work with its commercial partners to develop a U.S.
commercial capability for human spaceflight. NASA intends to procure
commercial crew services to ISS by 2017, and full funding of the fiscal
year 2014 request is essential to restore a human spaceflight
capability to the United States in this timeframe. Through the
successful execution of this partnership, we will return to the United
States the vital capability to launch astronauts to the ISS and return
them to Earth.
education
NASA supports the President's goal to utilize existing resources to
achieve improvements in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics, or STEM, education and instruction. The administration is
proposing a comprehensive reorganization of STEM education investments.
The 2014 budget will enhance the impact of the Federal investment by
reorganizing STEM education programs across agencies and redirecting
funding in support of a cohesive national STEM strategy focused on four
priority areas: K-12 instruction; undergraduate education; graduate
fellowships; and informal education activities. Within NASA, STEM
education investments previously distributed across the Agency will be
consolidated and focused within the Office of Education, the National
Science Foundation, and the Smithsonian Institution. During fiscal year
2013 and fiscal year 2014, NASA's education teams will develop
transition plans that minimize impacts to students and organizations
currently served by NASA. The Agency will also conduct studies to
determine which NASA education assets should and can be made available
to the new STEM consolidation partners.
The fiscal year 2014 request of $94.2 million includes education
activities in the Office of Education and NASA's mission directorates.
The funding request for the Education account includes funding for the
National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program, the Experimental
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR), and the Minority
University Research and Education Program (MUREP). These education
investments link to NASA's research, engineering, and technology
missions. Each of these investments provides unique NASA experiences
and resources to students and faculty. Starting in fiscal year 2014,
mission-based K-12 education, and engagement activities, traditionally
funded within programmatic accounts, will be incorporated into the
administration's new STEM education paradigm.
cross agency support
NASA's Cross Agency Support (CAS) account funds all of the
operations and maintenance of NASA's nine Centers, component
facilities, and Headquarters, including, the Agency's safety offices,
independent technical authority, NASA's engineering safety center,
procurement, and others that oversee activities to reduce the risk and
loss of life and/or mission in all of NASA's human, satellite,
aeronautic, and robotic programs. NASA's fiscal year 2014 request of
$2.85 billion supports critical efforts to modernize NASA's information
technology security processes and expanding security operations efforts
to provide early warning of cyber vulnerabilities. The request will
support the Agency's continuing efforts to reduce its facilities costs
by consolidating capabilities and disposing of unneeded assets.
conclusion
NASA thrives on the synergy created by a critical mass of brilliant
scientific and engineering talent, supported by a broad range of expert
professionals. We work, as an Agency, to send humans to an asteroid and
on to orbit Mars. We work, as an Agency, to understand the universe
from the beginning of time to the future of Earth's climate. The people
working to put the next rover on Mars are refining the systems
necessary to put humans there in the future. The people testing
advanced ring-sail parachutes for landing payloads on planetary
surfaces are also learning how flight through an atmosphere at super-
high speeds works. The astronauts running physical science experiments
on the ISS are themselves life science experiment subjects, and at the
same time, they are demonstrating the science and technology for living
and working in space. The Agency is on track and making steady progress
executing the space and aeronautical program defined for us by Congress
and the President in the 2010 authorization act, and we are confident
we can accomplish these programs under that direction. NASA's
confidence that we can execute the program described here is based
primarily on the demonstrated expertise, flexibility, and dedication of
our people. The reason why NASA ranks as the best place to work in the
Federal Government may simply be this: we all are contributors to a
mission greater than ourselves, extending beyond the current
generation. We tackle national and global challenges. We are explorers.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General
Chairwoman Mikulski, Ranking Member Shelby, and members of the
subcommittee: The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is committed to
providing independent, aggressive, and objective oversight of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and we welcome
this opportunity to discuss the major challenges facing the Agency in
fiscal year 2014 and beyond.
The successful landing of the Curiosity rover on the surface of
Mars in August 2012 energized the public about NASA's activities in a
way not seen since the final Space Shuttle flight. Similarly, two
successful commercial resupply missions to the International Space
Station (ISS) by Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX)
and a successful rocket test flight Sunday by Orbital Sciences
Corporation are milestones toward NASA's goal of fostering development
of a commercial space transportation capability to low Earth orbit.
The past year was not without its challenges, however, including
the need to reprogram funds from several Agency initiatives to
accommodate cost overruns in the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) and
other projects. This shift contributed to developmental delays in
several ongoing projects and cancellation of others, including a joint
project with the European Space Agency for planned missions to Mars in
2016 and 2018.
Moreover, because NASA's commercial crew program received less than
one-half its requested budget, the Agency's efforts to obtain
commercial transportation for its astronauts to the ISS have been
bumped to 2017 at the earliest--uncomfortably close to the Station's
currently scheduled 2020 retirement. At the same time, NASA is moving
forward with development of a new rocket, capsule, and related launch
infrastructure to enable crewed missions to an asteroid and beyond,
expensive and technically complex undertakings in an increasingly
austere budget environment.
In sum, static budgets and other fiscal uncertainties present the
most significant external challenges to NASA's ability to successfully
move forward on its many projects and programs. For example, the
Agency's fiscal year 2012 appropriation of $17.8 billion recently was
reduced by $894 million in fiscal year 2013 to reflect its share of the
Federal Government-wide sequestration.
Against this rather bleak budgetary backdrop, Agency managers
continue to face significant challenges managing NASA's diverse
portfolio of science, exploration, and aeronautics projects.
Specifically, our most recent report on the top management and
performance challenges facing NASA identified five primary issues:
--The Future of U.S. Human Space Flight;
--Project Management;
--Infrastructure and Facilities Management;
--Acquisition and Contract Management; and
--Information Technology Security and Governance.
A detailed description of these challenges and the audit and
investigative work conducted by our office in each of these areas is
described in the Top Challenges document appended to this statement.
In my testimony this morning, I will highlight three issues: (1)
project management, (2) information technology (IT) security, and (3)
NASA s aging infrastructure.
project management
Over its 50-year history NASA has been at the forefront of science
and space exploration that has led to numerous scientific and
technological discoveries and innovations. However, in addition to
their significant achievements, many NASA projects share another less
positive trait--they cost significantly more to complete and take much
longer to launch than originally planned.
Last September, the OIG issued a report that examined NASA's
project management practices and the primary challenges to achieving
the Agency's cost, schedule, and performance goals. Cost and schedule
increases on large projects like the JWST can have a cascading effect
on NASA s entire portfolio. For example, in fiscal year 2012, NASA
moved $156 million from other Science Mission Directorate projects and
its Cross Agency Support account to cover cost increases in the JWST
project. In addition, the Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope and
several other missions have been postponed to make funding available
for JWST. Moreover, as previously noted, NASA has pulled out of an
agreement with the European Space Agency on two future Mars missions
and is re-evaluating its Mars exploration strategy to accommodate a
more restricted funding profile.
Our project management review identified four factors that present
the greatest challenges to successful project outcomes at NASA: (1) the
Agency's culture of optimism, (2) underestimating technical complexity,
(3) funding instability, and (4) limited opportunities for project
managers' development. The September audit report and the 2012
Management Challenges document discuss each of these factors in detail.
One of NASA's largest ongoing projects is its new ``heavy-lift''
rocket known as the Space Launch System (SLS). The NASA Authorization
Act of 2010 set a goal for the Agency to achieve operational capability
for the SLS and the accompanying Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) by
December 31, 2016. NASA's current plan is to launch an uncrewed test
flight of the SLS and MPCV in 2017, followed by the first crewed flight
in 2021.
Establishing realistic long-term budgets for the SLS, MPCV, and
associated ground support programs is difficult, as illustrated by an
August 2011 independent cost assessment for the program, which
concluded that NASA s estimates are reasonable for near-term budget
planning but do not support establishment of long-term budgets or
detailed baselines. Constrained budgets also impact the pace of NASA's
development efforts. For example, because the MPCV program is
anticipating a ``flat'' budget profile for at least the next 10 years,
NASA has adopted an incremental developmental approach that
concentrates on systems needed to meet specific mission objectives for
each test flight rather than an approach under which work on all MPCV
systems progresses concurrently. The OIG is currently examining NASA's
efforts to develop the MPCV and will continue to focus resources on
NASA's launch and crew transportation development efforts in the years
to come.
information technology security
At a February 2012 House hearing, I testified about the state of IT
security at NASA and highlighted the fact that at the time only 1
percent of NASA's laptop computers were fully encrypted compared to a
Government-wide rate of 54 percent. Eight months later, a NASA laptop
containing the Social Security numbers and other personally
identifiable information (PII) for more than 40,000 individuals was
stolen from the vehicle of a headquarters employee. Although the laptop
was password protected, neither the laptop itself nor the individual
files were encrypted. As a result of this theft, NASA contracted with a
company to provide credit monitoring to the affected individuals and
the Agency estimates that these services could cost up to $900,000.
Following this incident, the NASA Administrator accelerated the
timetable to encrypt the hard drives of the Agency's laptop computers.
As of mid-April, NASA reported that it had encrypted 100 percent of
Agency laptops identified as requiring encryption, had exempted 4,247
laptops from the requirement, and was determining whether another 346
laptops required encryption or also would be exempted.
NASA's portfolio of information technology assets includes more
than 550 information systems that control spacecraft, collect and
process scientific data, and enable NASA personnel to collaborate with
colleagues around the world. Hundreds of thousands of NASA personnel,
contractors, academics, and members of the public use these IT systems
daily and NASA depends on them to carry out its essential operations.
Overall, NASA spends more than $1.5 billion annually on its IT-related
activities, $58 million of that for IT security.
Nonetheless, NASA remains a target of cyber intruders both because
of the large size of its networks and because of the technical and
scientific information it maintains. Over the years, NASA has
increasingly become a target of a sophisticated form of cyber attack
known as advanced persistent threats (APTs). The individuals or nations
behind these APTs are typically well organized and well-funded.
For example, our investigation of a series of APT attacks at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) involving Chinese-based Internet
protocol addresses between November 2011 and February 2012 confirmed
that cyber attackers were successful in achieving control over much of
JPL's network for several weeks and used this access to steal or
attempt to steal NASA-funded data. While data theft appears to be the
primary motive, the level of access gained by the intruders positioned
them to have caused significant operational disruption had that been
their goal.
Through our audits and investigations, we have identified systemic
and recurring weaknesses in NASA's IT security program that adversely
affect the Agency's ability to protect the information and information
systems vital to its mission. In particular, the Chief Information
Officer's (CIO) inability to ensure that NASA's mission computer
networks implement key IT security controls continues to put these
critical IT assets at risk of compromise. To illustrate, the Agency has
not yet implemented two recommendations from a May 2010 OIG audit
report to monitor its mission networks for the presence of critical
software patches and technical vulnerabilities.
Achieving the Agency's IT security goals will require sustained
improvements in NASA's overarching IT management practices. Effective
IT governance is the key to accommodating the myriad interests of
internal and external stakeholders and making decisions that balance
compliance, cost, risk, and mission success. Effective IT governance
also helps ensure that public funds are efficiently spent by
coordinating across NASA when purchasing IT products and services.
We are completing a review examining NASA's IT governance structure
and anticipate making several recommendations for improvement. This
audit is particularly timely given that the NASA CIO position is
currently vacant.
nasa's aging infrastructure
NASA is the ninth largest Federal Government property holder,
controlling approximately 4,900 buildings and structures with an
estimated replacement value of more than $30 billion. In addition, more
than 80 percent of the Agency's facilities are 40 or more years old and
beyond their design life. Under its current policy, NASA is required to
maintain these facilities either in an operational status or, if they
are not being used, in sufficient condition that they do not pose a
safety hazard. However, NASA has not been able to fully fund required
maintenance costs for its facilities and in 2012 estimated its deferred
maintenance costs at $2.3 billion.
One way NASA could reduce its facilities maintenance costs is to
reduce the amount of unneeded infrastructure in its inventory. To be
successful in this effort, NASA must move beyond its historic ``keep it
in case we need it'' approach of managing its facilities. In an audit
issued last month, the OIG identified 33 wind tunnels, test stands,
thermal vacuum chambers, airfields, and launch-related facilities that
NASA was not fully utilizing or for which Agency managers could not
identify a future mission use. These facilities cost the Agency more
than $43 million to maintain in fiscal year 2011 alone.
We found that NASA's efforts to reduce its underutilized facilities
have been hindered by several longstanding and interrelated challenges:
(1) fluctuating and uncertain strategic requirements, (2) Agency
culture and business practices, (3) political pressure, and (4)
inadequate funding. To its credit, NASA is undertaking a series of
initiatives aimed at ``rightsizing'' the Agency's real property
footprint. However, we noted that many of these efforts are in the
early stages and may ultimately be insufficient to overcome the
cultural and political obstacles that have impeded past efforts to
reduce unneeded infrastructure. Accordingly, an independent outside
process similar to the Department of Defense's Base Realignment and
Closure Commission may be necessary.
Leasing offers NASA another means to help address maintenance costs
associated with its aging and underutilized facilities. However,
Federal law and policy prohibit NASA from leasing facilities for which
it has no current or future mission-related use. The Agency should
consider other options for these facilities such as demolition or
reporting the property to the General Services Administration for sale
or transfer to another entity. The challenge for NASA is to use leasing
when appropriate to generate revenue to offset facilities operations
and maintenance costs while not using it as a way to hold on to
facilities it does not need.
conclusion
The National Research Council (NRC) concluded in its December 2012
report that there is a ``significant mismatch between the programs to
which NASA is committed and the budgets that have been provided or
anticipated.'' In other words, too many programs are chasing too few
dollars. I am hopeful that the NRC's report, together with the ongoing
work of the OIG and Government Accountability Office, will contribute
to a dialogue between the administration and the Congress about NASA's
future priorities and lead to enactment of a realistic budget that will
enable the Agency to accomplish its multifaceted missions.
We look forward to continuing our cooperative working relationship
with NASA, this subcommittee, and other congressional committees as we
conduct audits and investigations that focus on the Agency's top
management and performance challenges.
______
NASA's Top Management and Performance Challenges--November 2012
Introduction
Fiscal year 2012 ended on a high note for NASA with the successful
landing of the rover Curiosity on the surface of Mars in August. Over
the next several years, Curiosity will explore the Red Planet in an
effort to determine if it has ever been able to support life. Earlier
in the year, NASA achieved a major milestone toward its goal of
fostering the development of a commercial space transportation
capability to low Earth orbit with the successful test flight of the
Space Exploration Technologies Corporation's (SpaceX) Dragon spacecraft
to the International Space Station (ISS), followed in October by the
first actual commercial resupply mission.
The year was not without challenges, however. For example, due to
cost overruns in the James Webb Space Telescope and other projects,
NASA had to reprogram funds away from several Agency initiatives. This
resulted in developmental delays in some ongoing projects and
cancellation of other planned projects, including the ExoMars/Trace Gas
Orbiter missions to Mars.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This joint project between the European Space Agency and NASA
consisted of missions scheduled for launch in 2016 and 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the congressional decision to provide NASA's Commercial
Crew Program (CCP) with less than half the funding requested by the
President in fiscal year 2012 extended to 2017 the earliest date that
NASA expects to obtain commercial crew transportation services to the
ISS, which is significant if NASA is unable to maintain and utilize the
Station beyond its currently scheduled retirement date of 2020. In
addition, as a result of the lower-than-expected funding level, the
Agency delayed its planned transition from using Space Act Agreements
to using Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based contracts for
developing these systems. This decision heightened concern in some
quarters about the ultimate ability of the commercial companies to meet
NASA safety requirements.
Finally, declining budgets and fiscal uncertainties remained at the
forefront of the Agency's decisionmaking processes this past year. Like
the rest of the Federal Government, NASA began fiscal year 2013 under a
6-month continuing resolution that funds the Agency at fiscal year 2012
levels. Overshadowing the effects of the continuing resolution,
however, is the possibility of an early January 2013 sequestration that
would reduce NASA's anticipated budget by approximately $1.5 billion.
Even if this looming cut is averted, NASA is likely to face constrained
budgets for the foreseeable future.
Against this rather bleak budgetary backdrop, we have identified
five overarching issues we believe pose the top management and
performance challenges to NASA leadership: Future of U.S. Human Space
Flight, Project Management, Infrastructure and Facilities Management,
Acquisition and Contract Management, and Information Technology
Security and Governance.
In deciding whether to identify an issue as a top challenge, we
considered the significance of the issue in relation to the Agency's
mission; its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse; whether the
underlying causes are systemic in nature; and the Agency s progress in
addressing the challenge. Several of these challenges--specifically
project management, infrastructure and facilities management, and
acquisition and contract management--are long-standing concerns likely
to remain top challenges for the foreseeable future. However, with
focused and sustained efforts we believe that NASA can make significant
strides in addressing all of the challenges we have identified.
Future of U.S. Human Space Flight
NASA's Space Shuttle era which began with the maiden voyage of
Columbia on April 12, 1981, ended after 135 missions when Atlantis
landed at Kennedy Space Center on July 21, 2011. In the ensuing year,
NASA delivered the four retired orbiters to their permanent homes for
public display. NASA's current spaceflight activities are focused on
maximizing the productivity of the ISS, encouraging development of
commercial companies seeking to provide cargo and crew transportation
to the ISS, and developing new systems and technologies for exploration
beyond low Earth orbit. Moving each of these programs forward in a
``flat'' or diminishing budget environment will be a significant
challenge for the Agency.
International Space Station.--The ISS is currently scheduled to be
retired in 2020, although NASA is conducting studies to see if the $60
billion facility can safely be inhabited and productively utilized
until 2028. Whatever its remaining life span, a major focus for the
Agency is ensuring the most effective use of the ISS.
One of the most significant factors affecting utilization of the
ISS is the amount of time the crew can commit to research. Although
NASA has increased average crew research time from 23.9 hours per week
in 2010 to 35 hours per week in 2012, the Agency is unlikely to be able
to raise that figure given current constraints on crew size.\2\ The ISS
was designed to support a seven-member crew. However, because at
present the only means of transportation to and from the ISS is the
Russian Soyuz, which has a three-person capacity, only six crew members
can safely be aboard at one time to allow for evacuation in case of an
emergency. This limitation on crew size will exist until at least 2017,
the earliest date at which NASA's commercial partners are expected to
be ready to fly manned, higher-capacity missions to the ISS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NASA, ``Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan (COUP)
2010, Covering the period 2010-2015'' (April 26, 2011). Dan Hartman,
Manager, Operations Integration, ISS Program Office, ``International
Space Station Program Status,'' July 23, 2012, NASA Advisory Committee,
Human Exploration and Operations Subcommittee, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
672214main_1-Hartman_July12_NAC_Final_508.pdf (accessed October 8,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other limitation to full utilization is the ability to
transport materials and supplies to and from the ISS. SpaceX's Dragon
flew a successful demonstration mission to the ISS in May 2012 and
began actual resupply missions in October 2012. NASA's other commercial
cargo partner, Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital), is slated to
perform the first demonstration flight of its Antares rocket in
December 2012, with a demonstration flight to the ISS with the Cygnus
capsule in spring 2013. Although both systems are capable of delivering
cargo to the ISS, only Dragon is capable of returning cargo and
research experiments to Earth. In fact, other than the very limited
capability of Soyuz, Dragon is the only system since the retirement of
the Space Shuttles with any ``downmass'' capability.
In August 2011, NASA entered into a cooperative agreement with the
Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) initially worth
$15 million per year to manage the non-NASA science activities on the
national laboratory portion of the ISS. CASIS, a nonprofit
organization, is responsible for ensuring that the laboratory is
available to the broadest possible cross section of U.S. scientific,
technological, and industrial communities. Part of its job is to select
the experiments that will be conducted on the national laboratory.
CASIS issued its first public solicitation in June 2012 with the
goal of enabling research in the areas of protein crystallization and
the life sciences. However, during its first year of operation CASIS
encountered a variety of start-up challenges, including the resignation
of its executive director, and as of October 2012, did not have a
permanent Board of Directors. In the months and years ahead, NASA must
ensure that CASIS forms an effective management team; develops a varied
research and development portfolio based on national needs for basic
and applied research; establishes a marketplace to help match research
with funding; and stimulates interest in using the national laboratory
for research and technology demonstrations and as a platform for
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education.
NASA also needs to continue encouraging use of the ISS by other
U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and the commercial sector
while seeking partnerships and cost-sharing arrangements to supplement
Agency funding of ISS research and operations. The Office of Inspector
General (OIG) expects to issue a report examining NASA's efforts to
ensure full utilization of the ISS early next year.
Commercial Launch Providers.--Beginning in 2006, NASA entered into
a series of Space Act Agreements designed to stimulate development by
U.S. industry of transportation systems capable of providing safe and
reliable cargo and crew services to the ISS and low Earth orbit. NASA
initiated two activities to manage its investments in this area: the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program and the
Commercial Crew Program (CCP). Both programs use Space Act Agreements
to support the development of commercial transportation capabilities
and FAR-based contracts to certify the capabilities and to procure crew
and cargo services to and from the ISS. The availability of domestic
crew and cargo capability will enable the United States to transport
its own astronauts to the ISS rather than relying on Russian vehicles
and provide needed redundancy in cargo and crew transportation systems
to the ISS.
NASA has invested $750 million over the past 7 years in its effort
to encourage development of cargo transportation by private companies.
Two companies, SpaceX and Orbital, are under contract to resupply the
ISS through 2016. As noted above, SpaceX flew its first successful
demonstration flight in May 2012, during which its Dragon spacecraft
berthed with the ISS, and its first resupply mission occurred in
October 2012. The first demonstration flight of Orbital's Antares
rocket and Cygnus space freighter to the ISS is currently scheduled for
late spring 2013, with the company's first resupply mission coming as
early as 3 months later.
With respect to the development of commercial crew transportation
services, in June 2011 we reported on a series of challenges NASA faces
in certifying and acquiring those services from commercial entities:
(1) modifying the Agency's existing safety and human-rating
requirements for commercially developed systems; (2) managing its
acquisition strategy for commercial crew transportation services; (3)
implementing the appropriate insight/oversight model for commercial
partner vehicle development; (4) relying on an emerging industry and
uncertain market conditions to achieve cost savings; and (5) managing
the relationship between commercial partners, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and NASA.\3\
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\3\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Challenges Certifying and Acquiring
Commercial Crew Transportation Services'' (IG-11-22, June 20, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although challenges remain, NASA has made progress in addressing
several of these issues over the past year. For example, in November
2011 NASA updated and published detailed berthing and docking
requirements for cargo and crew delivery systems, and in December 2011
the Agency finalized more than 280 specific safety and human-rating
requirements for its CCP. With these requirements in hand, the Agency's
commercial partners will have greater insight into what will be
required of their systems to attain NASA certification. The documents
also provide the Agency's methodology for insight and oversight into
whether contractors are meeting the program's requirements.
Specifically, NASA embedded teams of NASA employees known as ``Partner
Integration Teams'' with the commercial partners to acquire insight
into their development efforts while a separate review board will
provide more formal guidance, feedback, and an assessment of the
partners' activities.
In August 2012, NASA awarded a third round of Space Act Agreements
totaling $1.11 billion to three companies to further the development of
their commercial crew systems.\4\ These Commercial Crew Integrated
Capability (CCiCap) awards were made to Boeing Corporation ($460
million); SpaceX ($440 million); and Sierra Nevada Corporation ($212.5
million).\5\ These awards deviated from the acquisition strategy the
Agency announced in September 2011, whereby NASA planned to enter into
firm-fixed-price contracts with one or more companies that would result
in a complete end-to-end design compliant with NASA Crew Transportation
System requirements. The award was to be followed by a separate
solicitation for competitively awarded contracts to develop, test,
evaluate, and certify a company's vehicles. However, when Congress
appropriated substantially less than the Agency requested for its CCP
in fiscal year 2012 ($406 million versus $850 million), NASA changed
course and decided to award a third round of Space Act Agreements
rather than move to a FAR-based fixed-price contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The first two rounds of Agreements consisted of $50 million in
Commercial Crew Development 1 (CCDev 1) awards to five commercial
partners and $300 million in CCDev 2 awards to four partners.
\5\ Nasa.gov, ``NASA's Commercial Crew Program Progressing for
Future of U.S. Human Spaceflight,'' Commercial Space Transportation,
August 8, 2012, http://www.nasa.gov/
exploration/commercial/crew/ccicap-announcement.html (accessed October
8, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both the Congress and NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
have voiced concerns about the Agency's continued reliance on Space Act
Agreements in connection with its commercial crew efforts.\6\ At a
September 2012 congressional hearing, the ASAP Chairman noted that
unlike with traditional FAR-based contracts, when using Space Act
Agreements NASA cannot dictate specific requirements to the commercial
companies, thereby heightening the risk that the companies will
ultimately not be able to deliver vehicles that satisfy NASA safety and
performance requirements. NASA, however, believes it can ensure that
commercial passenger vehicles will meet its requirements by utilizing a
two-phase process. In Phase 1, currently scheduled for February 2013,
NASA plans to award two to four fixed-price contracts worth up to $10
million for design acceptance and certification plans for the
contractors' crew transportation systems. In Phase II, scheduled for
May 2014, NASA plans to award one or two fixed-price contracts for the
development, test, evaluation, and certification of the contractors'
crew transportation system. This strategy anticipates at least one
operational crew transportation system would be certified by NASA for
crew transportation missions to the ISS by 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ September 14, 2012, hearing before the Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, U.S. House
of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further complicating NASA's commercial crew effort is the
uncertainty surrounding the Federal budget in light of the 6-month
continuing resolution that essentially holds the Agency to a $406
million funding level for its CCP At the September 2012 House hearing,
NASA's Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations
told the Congress that if the CCP is not funded at approximately $830
million per year for fiscal years 2014-2017, the Program will face
significant schedule delays that will push the first commercial crew
launch beyond 2017.
At the same time NASA is fostering the development of commercial
cargo and crew capabilities, it has been directed to develop its own
launch system and crew vehicle to carry astronauts beyond Earth's
orbit. Developing all of these capabilities simultaneously continues to
present significant management challenges for NASA leaders.
NASA Launch System and Crew Vehicle.--The new heavy-lift rocket
under development--the Space Launch System (SLS)--will have an initial
capacity of 70 metric tons and eventually be capable of lifting 130
metric tons. As such, the rocket will be capable of more than double
the lift capacity of any operational launch vehicle that exists today
and America's most powerful since the Saturn V rockets that carried
Apollo astronauts to the Moon.
The Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), which is being developed
using an existing contract and is based on design requirements for the
canceled Constellation Program's Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, will
be mounted atop the SLS. The MPCV will serve as the crew vehicle for
missions beyond low Earth orbit.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 set a goal for NASA to achieve
operational capability for the SLS and MPCV by December 31, 2016. In
November 2011, NASA reported that the Reference Design Vehicles for the
SLS and MPCV would be unable to meet all requirements and schedule
goals contained in the authorization act. Instead, NASA expects to
launch an uncrewed test flight of SLS and MPCV in 2017 and the first
crewed flight in 2021. NASA also reported that it plans to conduct a
crewed launch once every 2 years thereafter.\7\ In the decades that
follow, NASA plans to undertake crewed and robotic missions to
destinations beyond low Earth orbit, such as a near-Earth asteroid, the
Moon, or Mars. However, no final decisions have been made concerning
specific missions and destinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ NASA, ``Final Report Regarding NASA's Space Launch System and
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Pursuant to Section 309 of the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-267)'' (November 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA's management challenge in this area will be to concurrently
develop a launch system and crew vehicle and modify the necessary
supporting ground systems while meeting the NASA Administrator's
mandate that exploration systems be affordable, sustainable, and
realistic. In particular, establishing realistic long-term budgets for
the SLS, MPCV, and associated ground support programs will be
difficult, as evidenced by an August 2011 independent cost assessment
that concluded NASA's estimates are reasonable for near-term budget
planning but do not support establishment of long-term budgets or
detailed baselines.\8\
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\8\ Booz Allen Hamilton, ``Independent Cost Assessment of the Space
Launch System, Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and 21st Century Ground
Systems Programs, Final Report,'' August 19, 2011, http://wwwnasa.gov/
pdf/581582main_BAH_Executive_Summary.pdf (accessed November 5, 2012).
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Part of the challenge NASA faces in developing long-term budgets is
the relative immaturity of the SLS Program. For example, in September
2012 we reported that although the Agency's planned modification to
adapt the Ares I Mobile Launcher for use on the SLS was technically
feasible and the most cost-effective option for the initial versions of
the new rocket, NASA will need to continually assess the modifications
as the program evolves and the SLS vehicles become larger and more
powerful.\9\ We found NASA's ability to identify the technical risks
and accurately estimate future operating costs of modifying the Mobile
Launcher throughout the SLS Program life cycle is significantly
affected by both the relative immaturity of the SLS Program and the
evolvable nature of the SLS vehicles.
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\9\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Plans to Modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher
in Support of the Space Launch System'' (IG-12-022, September 25,
2012).
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NASA's development efforts have also been impacted by the
expectation of continued constrained budgets for the foreseeable
future. For example, the MPCV Program is anticipating a ``flat'' budget
profile for at least the next 10 years with no increases for inflation.
As a result, NASA has adopted an incremental approach in developing the
MPCV under which Program officials will concentrate initially on
systems needed to meet the specific mission objectives for each test
flight rather than working on all MPCV systems concurrently. The OIG is
currently examining NASA's efforts to develop the MPCV and will
continue to examine NASA's launch and crew transportation development
efforts in the years to come.
Project Management
Over its 50 year history, NASA has been at the forefront of science
and space exploration and responsible for numerous scientific and
technological discoveries and innovations. However, in addition to
their significant scientific and technological achievements, many NASA
projects share another less positive trait--they cost significantly
more to complete and take much longer to launch than originally
planned. In this era of constrained Federal budgets, NASA's ability to
deliver projects on time and within budget is more important than ever
if the Agency is to maintain a robust portfolio of science and space
projects.
Over the past year, the OIG conducted an extensive review examining
NASA's project management practices in an effort to identify the
primary challenges to the Agency achieving its cost, schedule, and
performance goals.\10\ The core of our fact-finding consisted of
interviews of 85 individuals from both inside and outside of the
Agency, including the current and former Administrators, Associate
Administrators, Center Directors, and project managers and staff.
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\10\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Challenges to Meeting Cost, Schedule, and
Performance Goals'' (IG-12-021, September 27, 2012).
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Key Challenges to Meeting Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals.--
Cost increases and schedule delays on its projects are a long-standing
issue for NASA. A 2004 Congressional Budget Office study that compared
the initial and revised budgets of 72 Agency projects between 1977 and
2000 reported a 61 percent increase between the projects' initial and
revised budgets.\11\ Similarly, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has consistently reported on cost growth and schedule delays in
NASA's major projects. For example, in its 2012 assessment of 21 large-
scale projects, GAO reported an average development cost growth of 47
percent or $315 million, much of which was attributable to the James
Webb Space Telescope (JWST). The current ``poster child'' for NASA's
persistent difficulties in controlling cost and schedule growth, JWST
has gone from an original life-cycle cost baseline estimate of $5
billion and a launch date of June 2014 to a projected cost of $8.8
billion and a launch date of October 2018.\12\
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\11\ A Congressional Budget Office Study, ``A Budgetary Analysis of
NASA's New Vision for Space Exploration,'' September 2004.
\12\ GAO ``NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects''
(GAO-12-207SP, March 1, 2012).
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As GAO noted, cost and schedule increases on large projects like
JWST can have a cascading effect on NASA's entire portfolio. To
illustrate, in fiscal year 2012 NASA moved $156 million from other
Science Mission Directorate projects and the Cross Agency Support
account to cover cost increases in the JWST Project.\13\ In addition,
several other missions including the Wide-Field Infrared Survey
Telescope have been postponed to make funding available for JWST.\14\
Moreover, NASA announced in February 2012 that it was pulling out of an
agreement with the European Space Agency on two future Mars missions
and planned to reevaluate its Mars exploration strategy to accommodate
a more restricted funding profile.
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\13\ NASA's Cross-Agency Support account funds support activities
necessary to ensure the operation and administration of the Agency such
as human capital management, security, and maintenance of real property
assets that cannot be directly aligned to a specific program or project
requirement.
\14\ The Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope is a NASA observatory
designed to settle essential questions in both exoplanet and dark
energy research.
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In our September 2012 report, we identified four factors that
appear to present the greatest challenges to successful project
outcomes at NASA:
NASA's Culture of Optimism.--Permeating all levels of NASA from
senior management to frontline engineers, a culture of optimism is
essential to overcoming the extraordinary technical challenges inherent
in the development of unique, first-of-their-kind space systems.
However, this same optimism can sometimes prevent managers and leaders
from making critical assessments of requirements, budgets, and
schedules to determine what a project can realistically accomplish
within a set budget and timetable.
Underestimating Technical Complexity.--Project managers we
interviewed cited the technical complexity inherent in NASA projects as
a major challenge to achieving cost and schedule goals. In our
judgment, five factors explain the inherently uncertain nature of
estimating costs for the type of space technologies NASA develops: (1)
unique, first-of-their-kind technologies; (2) interdependent
technologies and complex integration issues; (3) increased testing
needs; (4) limited quantities; and (5) shrinking industrial base and
reduced quality of parts.
Funding Instability.--Funding instability includes situations in
which a project receives less money than planned or where funds are
disbursed on a schedule different than planned. Such instability may
result from presidential, congressional, or Agency-directed actions and
can cause work to be delayed and development risks to be identified
late in the project life cycle, which in turn can lead to cost
increases and schedule delays.
Limited Opportunities for Project Managers' Development.--
Interviewees stated that the limited number of small and mid-size
projects in NASA's current portfolio allows too few opportunities for
Agency personnel to gain experience managing a project's cost,
schedule, and technical performance efforts. In addition, they
expressed concern that an increased reliance on contractors to design
and build projects has led to a decline in Agency personnel with
development experience. Finally, they stated that NASA engineers are
primarily operating as overseers of work performed by contractors
rather than gaining experience with in-house builds of instruments and
spacecraft.
Given the anticipated funding challenges for all Federal agencies
in the years ahead, changes to the way NASA develops and manages its
projects are imperative. At the same time, the Agency is undergoing
considerable changes in mission focus, with the end of the Space
Shuttle Program and the first steps on a new path toward human space
exploration. Collectively, these factors both necessitate and provide
an opportunity for the Agency to reset itself and take steps toward
meaningful change in the way its projects are developed and managed.
Project Management Principles and Tools.--To execute projects
within established cost and schedule estimates, NASA needs to maximize
the use of sound project management principles and tools in projects
both large and small. To its credit, NASA has taken several steps in
the last few years aimed at curbing cost growth and schedule delays.
For example, in response to a 2007 GAO report highlighting NASA's lack
of emphasis on cost controls and program outcomes, the Agency issued a
Corrective Action Plan that established a definition of success that
includes completing all development projects within 110 percent of cost
and schedule baselines and meeting Level 1 requirements for 90 percent
of the major development projects in its portfolio.\15\ NASA hopes to
achieve the Corrective Action Plan's criteria for success by fiscal
year 2013, implementing the policies and processes on new projects
while tracking and reporting the measures for existing projects.\16\
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\15\ ``NASA Plan for Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of
Contract Management,'' dated October 31, 2007, and updated through
January 31, 2008. A Level 1 requirement is a project's fundamental and
basic set of requirements levied by the Program or Headquarters.
\16\ NASA's current set of major development projects were all
underway prior to implementation of the Corrective Action Plan. These
projects will gradually be completed (NASA's typical timeline for
development is 4 years) and replaced with projects that will be fully
subject to the Plan.
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The Agency also has implemented a cost and schedule analysis
methodology that produces what is known as the Joint Cost and Schedule
Confidence Level to assist managers with cost and schedule estimating
while enabling the Agency to evaluate more accurately whether projects
have an executable plan as they proceed into implementation. NASA
believes that this analysis has helped projects such as the Gravity
Recovery and Interior Laboratory, Juno, and the Mars Atmosphere and
Volatile Evolution meet cost and schedule goals.\17\
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\17\ The Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory mission launched
on September 10, 2011, to study the Moon's interior. Juno launched on
August 5, 2011, to investigate the origin and evolution of Jupiter and
is scheduled to arrive at the planet in July 2016. The Mars Atmosphere
and Volatile Evolution mission is scheduled to launch in late 2013 to
investigate the Martian atmosphere.
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Moreover, NASA's new program and project management policy requires
that project plans document decisions to either build or procure items
based on NASA's in-house capabilities, maintenance of core
competencies, cost, and best overall value to NASA. Project plans must
also include baseline and threshold values for the performance metrics
to be achieved at each Key Decision Point and mission success criteria
associated with the program-level requirements that, if not met,
trigger consideration of a Termination Review.\18\ Furthermore, project
plans are required to document how the project will periodically report
cost and schedule performance and provide a mitigation and corrective
action plan in the event the project exceeds development cost
estimates. More recently, NASA appears to be holding project managers
more accountable for meeting cost cap agreements as evidenced by its
decision in May 2012 to terminate the Gravity and Extreme Magnetism
Small Explorer mission because development costs were likely to exceed
the agreed-upon budget.
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\18\ NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E, ``NASA Space
Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,'' August 14, 2012.
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Apart from those positive actions, NASA was not fully utilizing at
least one important tool in its arsenal--its Lessons Learned
Information System (LLIS). Since 1994, LLIS has been NASA's principal
mechanism for collecting and sharing lessons learned from Agency
programs and projects.\19\ The information in LLIS is drawn from
individuals, directorates, programs, projects, and supporting
organizations and personnel across NASA and is one component of NASA's
larger knowledge management and sharing system. Sharing lessons learned
can reduce risk, improve efficiency, promote validated processes, and
improve performance in ongoing and future NASA projects. In a March
2012 OIG report, we documented that NASA's project managers did not
routinely use LLIS to search for lessons identified by other projects
or routinely contribute new information to LLIS. Specifically, we found
inconsistent policy direction and implementation for the Agency's
overall lessons learned program; disparate levels of funding for LLIS
activities across NASA Centers; deficient monitoring of critical
Center-based LLIS activities; and lack of definition in NASA's overall
strategy for knowledge management, lessons learned, and LLIS.
Consequently, LLIS had been underutilized by project managers and
marginalized in favor of other NASA knowledge sharing system
components.
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\19\ LLIS is an online, automated database. The public can access
LLIS at http://llis.nasa.gov/llis/search/home.jsp (accessed October 8,
2012).
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Infrastructure and Facilities Management
NASA is the ninth largest Federal Government property holder,
controlling a network of approximately 4,900 buildings and structures
that support Agency research, development, and flight activities. In
total, the assets occupy 46 million square feet and their current
replacement value is estimated at more than $30.8 billion. The 2010
authorization act requires NASA to develop a strategy for the most
efficient retention, sizing, and distribution of facilities and other
infrastructure consistent with the Agency's mission. In a time of
constrained Federal budgets and transition from the Space Shuttle era,
successfully implementing this directive is among the most pressing
challenges facing Agency management.
Maintenance, Repair, and Use of Aging Facilities.--NASA officials
report that more than 80 percent of the Agency's facilities are 40 or
more years old and beyond their design life. Under its current policy,
NASA is required to maintain these facilities either in an operational
status or, if they are not being used, in sufficient condition that
they do not pose a safety hazard. However, NASA has not been able to
fully fund required maintenance costs for these facilities and in 2011
estimated its deferred maintenance costs at $2.47 billion.\20\
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\20\ NASA, ``Deferred Maintenance Assessment Report: FY11 NASA-Wide
Standardized Deferred Maintenance Parametric Estimate (Full
Assessment),'' October 1, 2011.
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NASA has struggled for years with managing its backlog of deferred
maintenance projects. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel cited the
condition of NASA's facilities and infrastructure as an area of concern
in its 2011 annual report, and in 2010 the National Research Council
cited a ``steady and significant decrease in NASA's laboratory
capabilities, including equipment, maintenance, and facility upgrades''
that require more maintenance than funding permits.
The challenge for NASA leadership in this area is to address the
backlog of essential maintenance projects so that facilities will be
available when needed to support future missions. Continuing to delay
essential maintenance projects poses a threat to the safety of
personnel and equipment and likely will result in higher repair costs
in the future.
Reducing Unneeded and Duplicative Infrastructure.--One way NASA
could reduce its facilities maintenance costs is to reduce the amount
of underutilized and duplicative infrastructure in its inventory. In
the 1990s, GAO issued several reports on NASA's infrastructure
challenges and noted that the Agency was building new facilities faster
than it was consolidating or closing older ones, resulting in
duplication of capabilities. More recently, GAO reported that over 10
percent of NASA's real property assets were either underutilized or not
being used at all.\21\ In 2008, NASA's own Program Analysis and
Evaluation Office identified 203 facilities that had no future mission
requirement yet were still listed in the NASA inventory.
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\21\ GAO, ``Federal Real Property: Progress Made Toward Addressing
Problems, but Underlying Obstacles Continue to Hamper Reform'' (GAO-07-
349, April 13, 2007).
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Finally, an August 2011 OIG audit found numerous NASA facilities
that had not been utilized, some for as long as 10 years.\22\
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\22\ NASA OIG, ``NASA Infrastructure and Facilities: Assessment of
Data Used to Manage Real Property Assets'' (IG-11-024, August 4, 2011).
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The challenge for NASA leadership in this area is to reduce
unneeded and duplicative property in light of the key missions,
technologies, and programs the Agency intends to pursue over the next
20 to 30 years and the facilities it will need for those pursuits. In
this effort, NASA must move beyond its traditionally conservative
approach of ``keep it in case we need it'' in managing its facilities.
Fundamental to the success of any such effort will be improving the
quality of the Agency's data regarding its real property assets. To
this point, our August 2011 OIG report found that the data in NASA's
primary system for compiling and analyzing its real property assets
were unreliable metrics for evaluating utilization, mission dependency,
and condition of the Agency's real property assets largely because NASA
Centers used inadequate processes to gather and update this
information.
To its credit, NASA has begun to take positive steps toward
addressing its infrastructure challenges. For example, in 2011 NASA
developed its first integrated, Agency-wide real property master plan,
which it intends to use to coordinate resources across the Agency by
linking real property needs with projected funding. However, in
December 2011 we reported that the Center master plans the Agency was
using to develop this integrated plan contained deficiencies that may
limit the plan's usefulness in making strategic real property
decisions.\23\ Developing an integrated Agency master plan in an
uncertain budget environment is a significant challenge for NASA.
Nonetheless, as noted in our report, better Center master plans will
help NASA develop a more comprehensive Agency master plan, which in
turn will enable the Agency to make better strategic decisions
regarding its real property assets.
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\23\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Infrastructure and Facilities: An
Assessment of the Agency's Real Property Master Planning'' (IG-12-008,
December 19, 2011).
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In addition to its Agency-wide master planning effort, NASA is
taking further action to better identify and assess the Agency's
strategic capabilities and the real property assets that will be needed
to support those capabilities.\24\ For example, the Agency has
strengthened central authority over infrastructure decisions and
initiated efforts to improve data management and better assess
technical capability needs across the Agency to assist in the Agency's
efforts to reduce its real property, the OIG is conducting an audit
examining NASA's efforts to identify and reduce unneeded and
duplicative test stands, wind tunnels, vacuum chambers, airfields, and
Space Shuttle-related infrastructure.
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\24\ NASA defines a capability as the necessary infrastructure,
equipment, workforce and other direct costs required to accomplish a
given mission requirement.
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Leased Space at NASA Centers.--Leasing offers the Agency another
means to help address the maintenance costs of its aging and
underutilized facilities. However, Federal law and policy prohibits
NASA (and other Government agencies) from leasing facilities for which
it has no current or future mission-related use. For these facilities,
NASA should consider other options, such as demolition or transferring
the property to the General Services Administration for sale or
transfer to another entity. The challenge for NASA is to use leasing
when appropriate to generate revenue to offset facilities operations
and maintenance costs while not using it as a way to hold on to
facilities the Agency does not need. Leasing property under the latter
scenario frustrates the Agency's efforts to reduce its real property
footprint and can divert effort and resources from its core missions.
An August 2012 OIG review found that NASA lacks clear guidance to
ensure that property identified for leasing was not excess to the
Agency's needs.\25\ We also determined that NASA lacked a complete
inventory of space available for lease as well as an effective
marketing program to attract potential tenants. In addition, we found
internal control weaknesses that limit NASA's ability to ensure that
leases provide the best value to the Agency and are fair to its
partners and potential partners. Absent better controls and improved
guidance, NASA will be hard-pressed to maximize the potential of its
leasing program to help reduce the cost of maintaining underutilized
facilities while meeting its obligation to ensure that leasing does not
become a substitute for disposing of excess property.
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\25\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Infrastructure and Facilities: An
Assessment of the Agency's Real Property Leasing Practices'' (IG-12-
020, August 9, 2012).
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One tool available to NASA is Enhanced-Use Leasing (EUL), which
allows the Agency to retain the proceeds it derives from leasing
underutilized real property rather than turning them over to the U.S.
Treasury. In fiscal year 2003, Congress granted EUL authority to Ames
Research Center and Kennedy Space Center. Using this authority, Kennedy
entered into an EUL with a Florida utility for a 60-acre site that
supports a solar farm that generates 1 percent of the Center's power
needs. Under subsequent legislation, all Centers may enter into EULs in
which they receive either cash payments or in-kind consideration
related to the development of renewable energy production facilities.
Acquisition and Contract Management
Approximately 81 percent of NASA's $18.5 billion fiscal year 2011
budget was spent on contracts to procure goods and services and provide
funding to grant and award recipients. As the President and Congress
work to reduce Federal spending and the country's budget deficit, NASA
is likely to face constrained funding levels for the foreseeable
future. Accordingly, it is critical that NASA work to ensure that the
billions of dollars of taxpayer funds entrusted to it are spent wisely.
However, systemic weaknesses in NASA's internal controls related to
acquisition and contracting continue to create challenges for the
Agency. The OIG will continue to focus resources on this issue to
identify fraud, waste, and abuse by contractors and awardees as well as
weaknesses in the Agency's system of internal controls.
Contract Management.--Given the large amount of taxpayer funds NASA
spends on contract awards, managers are constantly challenged to ensure
that the Agency pays contractors in accordance with contract terms and
receives fair value for its money. During the past year, the OIG
continued to uncover fraud and overcharging by NASA contractors.
Specifically, as a result of our investigative work in the past year:
--A Government contractor and its parent company agreed to pay $3.3
million to settle allegations that they included unallowable
costs in calculating overhead rates for NASA and national
defense-related contracts.
--Another Government contractor agreed to pay $617,789 to settle
allegations that it submitted inflated invoices for engineering
and technical services it provided to Dryden Flight Research
Center.
--A Texas business owner pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 3 years'
probation for making a false statement concerning space vehicle
parts his business supplied to NASA for use on the ISS. The
investigation found that the business owner had certified that
ratchets his company produced met contract specifications when
he knew they did not
The OIG's audit work during the past year also identified
weaknesses in NASA contract management. For example, we examined
whether research funded by NASA Research Announcements (NRAs) advanced
the Agency's aeronautics research goals and whether award costs were
allowable and properly supported.\26\ Although we found that these NRA
awards advanced the Agency's aeronautics research goals, we also found
that 18 of the 43 awards we reviewed (42 percent) contained
approximately $2.4 million in questioned costs: $22,114 in unallowable
fees, and $2,405,635 in unsupported costs.\27\ Based on our sample
results, we estimated that the NRA awards made by the Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate from May 2006 through January 2011
contained $25.2 million in unallowable or unsupported costs.
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\26\ NRAs are solicitations that announce research opportunities
and provide a formal mechanism for corporations, universities, and
research institutions to submit project ideas. From 2006 to 2010, NASA
spent approximately $1.3 billion on NRA awards, of which approximately
$435 million was spent by the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate.
\27\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Use of Research Announcement Awards for
Aeronautics Research'' (IG-12-011, April 30, 2012).
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In another audit, we reviewed NASA's compliance with the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 and found contract
files lacking documentation related to acquisition plans and rationales
supporting the type of contracts selected.\28\ We also identified
several instances where the contracting officer's technical
representative was not timely assigned and cases where NASA had not
validated the adequacy of the contractor's accounting system--both
critical to management and oversight of contractor performance.
Recently, we initiated an audit of NASA's Strategic Sourcing Program to
determine whether the Program has been effectively implemented and
whether it has resulted in cost savings for NASA.
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\28\ The act requires OIGs to report on their agencies use of cost-
reimbursement contracts and level of compliance with applicable FAR
rules related to the appropriate documentation for the award, use, and
management of those contracts. See NASA OIG, ``Final Memorandum on
NASA's Compliance with Provisions of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act of 2009--Management of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts''
(IG-12-014, March 14, 2012).
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One area in which NASA continues to be particularly challenged with
regard to safeguarding against fraud is its Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program. NASA awarded approximately $190 million to
small businesses under this program during fiscal year 2011 to
stimulate technological innovation, increase participation by small
businesses in federally funded research and development, and increase
private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federally
funded research and development efforts. In multiple investigations and
audits over the years, the OIG has identified significant fraud, waste,
and abuse in NASA's SBIR program. For example, this past year an OIG
investigation resulted in the suspension of a technology firm and two
of its principals from participation in Federal procurements for
failing to disclose that the principals were primarily employed by a
university when they submitted proposals to participate in the NASA and
Navy SBIR programs.
Moving forward, the OIG will continue to closely monitor the
Agency's SBIR activities and work collaboratively with the Agency to
improve performance in this area.
Grant Management.--NASA faces the ongoing challenge of ensuring
that the approximately $500 million in grants it awards annually are
administered appropriately and that recipients are accomplishing stated
goals. The Agency makes these awards to facilitate research and
development projects; to fund scholarships, fellowships, or stipends to
students and teachers; and to fund educational research performed by
educational institutions or other nonprofit organizations.
Over the past 5 years, the OIG conducted 40 grant fraud
investigations resulting in three prosecutions and $12.5 million in
restitution and recoveries. As a result of one recent investigation,
the Department of Justice filed a civil complaint under the False
Claims Act alleging that a NASA grant recipient improperly spent more
than $3.75 million in grant funds intended for research purposes on
construction of a building.
In September 2011, the OIG reported that NASA did not have an
adequate system of controls in place to ensure proper administration
and management of its grant program and that as a result some grant
funds were not being used for their intended purposes.\29\ Following
this report, we conducted three audits examining whether specific NASA
grants are being used for their intended purpose and whether associated
costs are allowable, reasonable, and in accordance with applicable
laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms of the grants.\30\ Although we
did not find any evidence of fraud or abuse in these audits, we did
identify a number of internal control deficiencies and improvements
needed in NASA's grant oversight and management. For example, we
determined that the Philadelphia College Opportunity Resources for
Education, a not-for-profit organization that provides college
scholarships to high school seniors, had charged $60,511 in unallocable
or unallowable expenditures and failed to maintain appropriate time and
attendance documentation to support personnel charges totaling
$156,409.
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\29\ NASA OIG, ``NASA's Grant Administration and Management'' (IG-
11-026, September 12, 2011).
\30\ NASA OIG, ``Audit of NASA Grants Awarded to the Alabama Space
Science Exhibit Commission's U.S. Space and Rocket Center'' (IG-12-016,
June 22, 2012); NASA OIG, ``Audit of NASA Grants Awarded to the
Philadelphia College Opportunity Resources for Education'' (IG-12-018,
July 26, 2012); and NASA OIG, ``Audit of NASA Grant Awarded to
HudsonAlpha Institute for Biotechnology'' (IG-12-019, August 3, 2012).
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NASA is faced with the challenge of conducting active oversight of
grant recipients within resource and staffing limitations.
Consequently, we will continue to focus resources in this area as the
Agency works to enhance its grant management processes.
Information Technology Security and Governance
NASA's portfolio of information technology (IT) assets includes
more than 550 information systems that control spacecraft, collect and
process scientific data, and enable NASA personnel to collaborate with
colleagues around the world. Hundreds of thousands of NASA personnel,
contractors, academics, and members of the public use these IT systems
daily and NASA depends on them to carry out its essential operations.
Overall, NASA spends more than $1.5 billion annually on its IT-related
activities, $58 million of that for IT security. Although many NASA IT
systems contain data that may be widely shared, some systems house
sensitive information which, if lost or stolen, could result in
significant financial loss, adversely affect national security, or
significantly impair our Nation's competitive technological advantage.
Over the past 5 years, we have issued 21 audit reports containing
69 IT-related recommendations. In addition, OIG investigators have
conducted more than 16 separate investigations of breaches of NASA
networks, several of which have resulted in the arrests or convictions
of foreign nationals in China, Great Britain, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal,
Romania, Turkey, and Estonia.
IT Security Weaknesses.--Through our audits and investigations, we
have identified systemic and recurring weaknesses in NASA's IT security
program that adversely affect the Agency's ability to protect the
information and information systems vital to its mission. For example,
NASA has been slow to implement full-disk encryption on notebook
computers and other mobile computing devices it provides to its
employees, potentially exposing sensitive information to unauthorized
disclosure when such devices are lost or stolen. Between April 2009 and
April 2011, NASA reported the loss or theft of 48 Agency mobile
computing devices, which resulted in the unauthorized release of
sensitive information including Social Security numbers, export-
controlled data on NASA's Constellation and Orion programs, and third-
party intellectual property. Although NASA has selected an enterprise
solution for encrypting data on its mobile computing devices and hopes
to complete implementation by March 31, 2013, until this process is
complete, sensitive data on the Agency's mobile computing and portable
data storage devices will remain at high risk for loss or theft.
We also found that NASA continues to experience challenges as it
moves from a compliance-focused ``snapshot'' approach for measuring the
security of its IT systems to using tools and techniques to perform
real-time security control monitoring. Although NASA has made progress
implementing such a continuous monitoring program, the Agency needs to:
(1) create and maintain a complete, up-to-date record of IT components
connected to Agency networks; (2) define the security configuration
baselines that are required for its system components and develop an
effective means of assessing compliance with those baselines; and (3)
use best practices for vulnerability management on all its IT systems.
Only by making improvements in each of these areas can NASA ensure that
its continuous monitoring program will adequately protect Agency IT
assets.
The CIOs inability to ensure that NASA's mission computer networks
implement key IT security controls continues to put these critical IT
assets at risk of compromise. Through our work we have found that
Agency mission networks do not consistently implement key IT security
controls. For example, the Agency has not yet implemented two
recommendations from a May 2010 OIG audit report to monitor its mission
networks for the presence of critical software patches and technical
vulnerabilities.\31\ Moreover, our detailed control tests of mission
networks in 2010 and 2011 identified several high-risk technical
vulnerabilities on systems that provide mission support to spacecraft.
Until NASA implements measures to better protect its mission networks,
they will remain at risk of compromise, which could have a severe
adverse effect on NASA operations, assets, or personnel.
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\31\ NASA OIG, ``Review of the Information Technology Security of
[a NASA Computer Network]'' (IG-10-013, May 13, 2010).
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Attacks on Information Technology Infrastructure.--In 2010 and
2011, NASA reported 5,408 computer security incidents resulting in the
installation of malicious software on or unauthorized access to its
computers. Such incidents disrupt Agency operations and can result in
the loss or theft of sensitive data from NASA systems. NASA remains a
target both because of the large size of its networks and because its
information is highly sought after by criminals attempting to steal
technical data or further other criminal activities. Moreover, NASA has
increasingly become a target of a sophisticated form of cyber attack
known as advanced persistent threats (APTs). The individuals or nations
behind these APTs are typically well organized and well funded and
often target high-profile organizations like NASA. Our investigation of
a recent APT attack at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) involving
Chinese-based Internet protocol addresses has confirmed that the
intruders gained full system access to numerous JPL systems and
sensitive user accounts. With full system access the intruders could:
(1) modify, copy, or delete sensitive files; (2) add, modify, or delete
user accounts for mission-critical JPL systems; (3) upload hacking
tools to steal user credentials and compromise other NASA systems; and
(4) modify system logs to conceal their actions.
In an effort to improve the Agency's capability to detect and
respond to these evolving threats, in November 2008 NASA consolidated
its Center-based computer security incident detection and response
programs into a single, Agency-wide computer security incident handling
capability called the Security Operations Center (SOC). In an August
2012 audit, we found that establishment of the SOC had improved NASA's
computer security incident handling capability by providing continuous
incident detection coverage for all NASA Centers.\32\ Moreover, the
SOC's communication processes, including weekly conference calls and
security bulletins, were effective for sharing security incident and
threat information with responders across the Agency. Finally, we found
that NASA implemented an effective information system that enables
Agency-wide management and reporting of IT security incidents.
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\32\ NASA OIG, ``Review of NASA's Computer Security Incident
Detection and Handling Capability'' (IG-12-017, August 7, 2012).
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However, we also found that NASA's computer systems and networks
remain at high risk for loss of sensitive data because the Agency's
network firewalls and the SOC's intrusion detection capability are
ineffective for either detecting or preventing APTs from bypassing the
Agency's firewalls and perimeter defenses. Moreover, even after NASA
fixes the vulnerability that permitted the attack to succeed, the
attacker may covertly maintain a foothold inside NASA's system for
future exploits. The increasing frequency of APTs heightens the risk
that key Agency networks may be breached and sensitive data stolen. We
made three recommendations in our report for enhancing the Agency's
capability to detect and prevent these types of sophisticated cyber
attacks and to improve overall SOC availability. The Agency is in the
process of implementing these recommendations.
NASA Information Technology Governance.--Achieving the Agency's IT
security goals will require sustained improvements in NASA's
overarching IT management practices and governance. Effective IT
governance is the key to accommodating the myriad interests of internal
and external stakeholders and making decisions that balance compliance,
cost, risks, and mission success. Effective IT governance also helps
ensure that public funds are efficiently spent by coordinating spending
across NASA when purchasing IT products and services.
Federal law and NASA policy designate the Agency Chief Information
Officer (CIO) as the official responsible for developing IT security
policies and procedures and implementing an Agency-wide IT security
program. However, we have found that the CIO has limited ability to
direct NASA's Mission Directorates to fully implement CIO-recommended
or mandated IT security programs.
NASA's IT assets generally fall into two categories: (1) the
``institutional'' systems and networks the Agency uses to support such
administrative functions as budgeting and human resources; and (2) the
``mission'' systems and networks that support the Agency's aeronautics,
science, and space programs such as the Mission Operations Directorate
at Johnson Space Center, the Huntsville Operations Center at Marshall
Space Flight Center, and the Deep Space Network at JPL. While the CIO
has a complete inventory of and the authority to implement the Agency's
IT security program for NASA's institutional IT assets, the CIO cannot
fully account for or ensure that NASA's mission IT assets comply with
applicable IT security policies and procedures.
IT assets on NASA's mission computer networks are funded by the
related Mission Directorate, which is responsible for IT security,
including the authority for risk determination and risk acceptance.
Moreover, IT staff responsible for implementing security controls on
mission IT assets report to officials in the Mission Directorate, not
the NASA CIO. Thus, the CIO does not have the authority to ensure that
NASA's IT security policies are consistently followed across the
Agency.
We are currently conducting a review examining NASA's IT governance
structure and anticipate making recommendations for improvement.
NASA PRIORITIES
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Administrator Bolden. It's hard
not to call you General Bolden, because we go back a while.
Administrator Bolden, over the past 2 years, in testimony
before this and other committees, you stated that NASA's top
priorities are SLS, Orion, JWST, and the ISS. In your testimony
today, you do not take, I believe, a similar position. In fact,
you're specifically talking about commercial crew being NASA's
top priority.
This statement is reflective of this budget with respect to
commercial crew. But I'm interested to learn why NASA no longer
counts these other programs as top priorities and how our
longstanding investments in these other programs will be
impacted by NASA's changing priorities.
Could you explain that to the subcommittee?
Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, I hope this will not be
considered a disagreement with the chairman, because that's not
healthy, but NASA's priorities are the Nation's priorities, and
they remain SLS, multi-purpose crew vehicle (MPCV), JWST, and
the ISS, shored up by a vigorous technology development program
and commercial crew and cargo.
The reason I emphasized commercial crew in my opening
statement is because this is a year of decision. We promised
that we would have a commercial crew capability for the Nation
by 2015, if funded at the President's requested level back in
2011, and that funding did not come. We now find ourselves
targeting 2017 for the first availability of a U.S. capability
to launch American astronauts to space.
If we do not get $822 million in the fiscal year 2014
budget as requested by the President, it will be my unfortunate
duty to advise the Congress and the President that we probably
will not make 2017 for the availability of an American
capability to get our astronauts to space. I will have to tell
you that I'm going to have to come back and ask for
authorization to once again pay the Russians to take our crews
to space.
We just renewed a contract for another year, because we
weren't able to have our own capability in 2015. It is not my
desire to come back to this subcommittee and to the Congress
and the President and ask for more money to pay the Russians.
Senator Shelby. We're joined by the chairwoman, and I'll
yield back the gavel.
Mr. Bolden. Welcome, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Mikulski [presiding]. Good morning, Mr. Bolden.
First of all, let me apologize. It took 2 hours to get here
from Baltimore this morning. I needed one of your rocket ships
or something.
Mr. Bolden. I needed one coming from Mount Vernon. I, too,
was late.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Well, you're coming from the other
side of the Potomac, but I'm beginning to think this--anyway,
so I really apologize for being late. But it shows the
bipartisan nature of this subcommittee and this Committee, with
my vice chairman, Senator Shelby. I had absolute confidence
that he could take this over, because we're going in the same
direction with the Committee, and we're going in the same
direction with the space program.
We do want to welcome you. And today is a very compressed
day. The hearing must end no later than 10:30 a.m.
Just know that, first of all, as we review the President's
budget, and the fact that we're facing sequester, and then the
usual challenges of NASA, where we ask you to do more than
less, there are many things that we would like to discuss with
you.
But I believe that our overall thrust is that we are
looking on a bipartisan basis to be an advocate for a balanced
space program. And a balanced space program to us means all of
the groundwork for continued human space exploration; reliable
space transportation mechanisms, both to carry our astronauts
and then also to be able to service the ISS; to continue
America's exceptionalism in space science; and to continue our
work in aeronautics.
We believe that NASA is an economic engine, and we want to
continue out-innovating the rest of the world. But at the same
time, we have to be stewards of the taxpayer's dollar with
oversight and accountability.
So having looked at that, Senator Shelby, did you ask any
questions yet?
Senator Shelby. Just one.
Chairwoman Mikulski. What was--may I ask----
Senator Shelby. We were just getting into the priorities of
NASA.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman, while I
go over mine, why don't you continue your line of questioning?
But I just wanted to welcome Administrator Bolden and apologize
for the delay. Why don't you do that?
SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM BUDGET ESTIMATES
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I have a couple more areas, General Bolden, I'd like to get
into.
In August 2011, an independent cost assessment determined
that NASA's budget estimates for SLS were reasonable through
2015. These budget numbers assume that costs for SLS rocket
development in the year 2014 would be $1.61 billion. But NASA's
budget request, I understand, is $1.38 billion. That's $227
million less than was expected to be needed. That's a large
swing in the cost model that raises questions, I think, whether
the difference is attributed to cost savings or is it a lack of
commitment to the mission?
Could you explain what that is, General, and why?
Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the independent
cost assessment was requested, as we have done for JWST, for
SLS, for MPCV, and most recently for the commercial crew
program. It is not surprising that every time we get an
independent cost assessment, one of their first determinations
is that we don't have enough money.
So while we accept the assessment of the independent cost
assessment that they would like to see more--they consider it
reserve. We acknowledge the fact that we did not have the
amount of reserve that we would like to have, but that we were
confident that we could carry out this program with a budget
that we requested.
As Mr. Gerstenmaier has testified before this and other
committees in the past, we are running all of our programs to
include commercial cargo and crew at the lowest level that we
feel confident we can deliver them on time.
So that's the difference between what the independent cost
assessment said they thought we should have to provide adequate
reserves and what we think we can do the program with.
Senator Shelby. Well, some of us are concerned about the
funding necessary for the SLS rocket development and, of
course, the other components. But, you know, we're talking
about SLS rocket.
And if there's truly cost savings being realized, could you
detail these actions to us, to the subcommittee, and an
understanding of how similar measures are being applied across
NASA's programs to achieve similar savings?
Mr. Bolden. I can say that----
Senator Shelby. In other words, we're concerned, and I hope
there's not a lot of ground for it, about SLS, the rocket
itself, not the component.
Mr. Bolden. I could stand corrected by somebody in my
organization, but we don't advertise that we have realized cost
savings on the SLS program. What we have done is we've
exercised efficient management of the program.
Senator Shelby. We like that.
Mr. Bolden. And when we talk about the SLS program, I do
want to be careful that I include everything that's involved in
that program. So we have completed significant upgrades to
Launch Complex 39B that is being prepared for SLS. The B-2 Test
Stand at Stennis is being prepared for main propulsion test,
which is a critical part of the preparation of SLS for its 2017
launch.
The J-2X engine has undergone numerous, very successful
tests at Stennis. We've run it 500-plus seconds more than one
time, and that puts us ahead of the game. I will say, we don't
need to be ahead of the game with the J-2X, but because we've
committed that we would do that, we did.
We recently completed the very first test of a major engine
component at Marshall in firing the gas generator for a rebuilt
F-1 engine with Dynetics. Those are all examples of the
progress that we continue to make with the SLS program.
Senator Shelby. But, General, my emphasis is on the rocket
itself, specifically, not all the ancillary things, the
components.
Mr. Bolden. Yes.
Senator Shelby. Because you've got to have that.
Mr. Bolden. Yes. I had a conversation with J.R. Thompson,
who I know you know very well. He cautioned me this Sunday or
last week, when we were waiting for Orbital to launch, not to
become overly aggressive with the rocket and forget that the
rocket is built to support an entire program. I could very
easily find myself just like we were with Constellation. We
need a 70-metric-ton vehicle, and we are on schedule, on
target, on cost to provide that 70-metric-ton vehicle. I will
need a 105-metric-ton vehicle probably in 2023. I think we're
on target, on cost, on schedule in the development of that.
It's an evolving system, and we'll get there.
Senator Shelby. But you agree that you've got to have the
engine--that's the rocket--to move and go anywhere? And just
like you've got to have an engine in a car, you can have the
finest components in the world and a beautiful seat and a good
radio and good tires, but no engine, you're going nowhere.
Mr. Bolden. Senator Shelby, you and I agree completely. I
think it's said that all roads to space lead through
Huntsville, Alabama.
Senator Shelby. I want to work with you on that.
Mr. Bolden. And Stennis. And that's very true.
And we are on schedule for having a 70-metric-ton vehicle
at the level of spending that we----
Senator Shelby. Will you furnish some details on all this
to the subcommittee?
Mr. Bolden. We will do that, sir. I'll take that.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
[The information follows:]
NASA is committed to developing the SLS for missions of deep space
exploration. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request, balancing
the Nation's goals for space exploration with the current fiscal
climate, provides the necessary funding profile required to keep SLS,
Orion, and EGS moving forward to achieve EFT-1 in 2014, EM-1 in 2017,
and EM-2 in 2021. The Agency plans to evolve SLS to achieve the 105
metric ton (mT) capability, and NASA believes the out-year resources
envisioned in the fiscal year 2014 budget request will be sufficient to
meet that goal in the 2023 timeframe. The 130 mT upgrade of SLS is
planned for Mars-class missions in the 2030s.
COMMERCIAL SPACE ACT AGREEMENTS
Madam Chairman, I have one last area to get into, if I
could, and that's commercial space.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Please, go right ahead, because your
questions are actually identical, Sir, to what I was going to
ask.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
I alluded to Commercial Space Act Agreements in my opening
statement. NASA has used Space Act Agreements rather than
traditional Federal Government contracts to execute the
commercial cargo and crew programs. These agreements lack
transparency and incorporate significant schedule leniency.
Traditional Government contracts provide full insight and
control over the contractor and the product throughout the
process to protect the Government's investment, and ultimately
the taxpayer.
With respect to the Space Act Agreements, it's my
understanding that NASA has no authority to review the work of
the contractors, audit their programs, or investigate in the
event of an accident. Is that true?
Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, that is a misconception of the
capability of Space Act Agreements. We have had satisfactory
insight and oversight on both commercial crew and cargo. We
have embedded teams in the factories of our commercial crew
partners, and we're still working fully on Space Act
Agreements. They are an integral part, so we have sufficient
insight for me.
Senator Shelby. Do you have to ask the contractor to give
you access to the Space Act Agreements that would give you some
absolute authority over the contractor? And why does NASA
prefer that approach, as opposed to the other government
contracts?
Mr. Bolden. The reason we'd prefer----
Senator Shelby. This is a deviation from the Government
contracts.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, the reason we'd prefer Space Act
Agreements at this stage of the game for commercial crew is the
same reason we did it for commercial cargo. We wanted to give
American industry as much leeway as possible to produce a
vehicle that fulfilled the requirements that we set. It has
worked very well for us, as demonstrated by the success of both
Orbital and SpaceX, when we got to the point where we entered
into a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based contract.
Senator Shelby. Well, if you're the one that's paying the
bill and they're doing it, it looks to me like you should be in
control of the destiny of that to a point, through the contract
system.
Mr. Bolden. Sir, again, it's a misconception that we don't
know what they're paying into it.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Bolden. We are a partner. When we did the independent
cost assessment, then Booz Allen was able to go into the
company, and granted, it's proprietary information.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Bolden. Without revealing what they had put into it,
because that's competitive sensitive for them, we know about
what each company has put into it.
Senator Shelby. Okay. We don't want you to be in the dark
anywhere, because it's taxpayers' money.
Mr. Bolden. I don't feel that we're in the dark with any of
the contractors either in commercial crew or cargo. We feel
very confident that we know about what level they're paying. We
don't know the precise amount, because we don't get fiscal
accounting the way that would be required if we were working
under a FAR-based contract, but they are now working under FAR-
based contracts in the Commercial Crew integrated Capability
(CCiCap) program, which is--not the CCiCap, but the
requirements definition program. That's a FAR-based contract.
We have total insight into everything that they're doing. So
when we get ready to roll out the request for proposals here
this summer, we'll be confident that we know what they're
doing.
Senator Shelby. We just know that this is a deviation from
the regular government contracts. We want to make sure----
Mr. Bolden. Most agencies don't have the----
Senator Shelby [continuing]. That NASA spends our money
wisely. That's all.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, Sir. NASA uses Space Act Agreements
judiciously, but we use them widely, because it enables us to
do much more than any other agency and the government can do
for the budget that we have. We use it as a budget tool.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
BALANCED SPACE PROGRAM
Chairwoman Mikulski. I really truly appreciate Senator
Shelby's line of questioning, because this goes to the balanced
space program, and actually, his questions were very much along
the line that I was going to ask.
I was troubled by the fact that there were decreases in the
SLS rocket and Orion capsule program by $184 million.
As the chair of the subcommittee, working with Senator
Shelby, I'm worried. So let me tell you what I'm worried about.
I believe that NASA has been constrained over several years
now with staying roughly in this $17 to $18 billion range. We
ask you to make estimates, and there's been a pattern not only
in NASA, but across all agencies, to low-ball estimates. Then
those low-balling of estimates tend to be inaccurate, and then
along comes something like sequester, which has a tremendous
impact on employees, both our civilian Federal employees, our
contractors, because NASA is truly a work-with-contractor
agency and has a fairly good track record on that.
We're going to get to the end of the day with a fiscal
quagmire unresolved, the space agency and other agencies--
Department of Defense (DOD) is the same way and others--
underestimating what it's going to take.
And then we end up with programs that falter or sputter.
And in NASA's mission, faltering or sputtering really can blow
the whole program.
So you see where I am.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
Chairwoman Mikulski. One set of dynamics, our fiscal
quagmire, was shutdown, slam-down politics that are not
characteristic of this subcommittee--in fact, just the
opposite--that we have to resolve.
And so my question to you, as we look at this, is that
facing sequester and facing the estimates in the President's
budget, do you think you can keep these NASA missions on track
and online?
Or are we really asking for an almost impossible task of
you, Director Bolden?
And I mean it very sincerely. You are a very dedicated
person. You were heading in a whole different life before
President Obama asked you to take this job.
Mr. Bolden. I was.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Yes, I know. You were going to start a
foundation oriented to sickle-cell anemia. I mean, you were
going to devote your life to inspirational motivation of young
people and cracking a biomedical problem facing Americans. Now
you're staying on for yet another tour of duty.
So, please, let's get realistic estimates, so we know what
we're really facing and what we should really be doing to
maintain a balanced space program.
Mr. Bolden. Madam Chairman, I agree with you. Let me say,
my assumption in recommending this budget to the President and
the President's assumption in sending it to the Congress was
that, between him and all of you, the 100 Senators and 400-plus
Members of Congress, we are going to solve the sequester
problem in this budget coming out.
If that is not done, then I will tell you right now, what
I'm telling you about today, I can't do. So you're going to see
us come in and tell you that it will impact the priorities that
NASA and the Congress agreed to. It will potentially impact
JWST. It will definitely impact SLS, MPCV. It will devastate
commercial crew and cargo. We have contracts now for commercial
cargo. I'll have to renegotiate those contracts. We won't fly
the number of missions that we have. Right now, we're flying 20
commercial cargo missions to the ISS over the next 5 years for
$3-point-some-odd billion dollars, an incredible value to the
Nation. I can't carry that out under sequester.
I will, in all probability, have to furlough civil
servants, and we have avoided that.
So the sequester is not good. And I'm not telling anybody I
can work a miracle. If we cannot get out from under the
sequester, all bets are off. And you are absolutely right, I'm
going to come to you and tell you things that we're dropping
off the plate.
Chairwoman Mikulski. But this is the time to tell us. In
other words, this is not in the future. The sequester is here
now.
So this is not, again, meant to be in any way pugnacious.
So let's look at the sequester issue. And if we do not
cancel or find a way to cancel the sequester, what would be the
consequences? Would it be simply delays to these projects?
Let's take three things. Let's take the JWST. Let's take
the SLS Orion. And let's take other important scientific
programs.
Mr. Bolden. Let me just say one quick thing. We are under
the sequester now, and so we're operating under fiscal year
2013 budget sequestered.
We have made adjustments such that it has not impacted our
programs, nor our people just yet. But we cannot do that in
fiscal year 2014. So you're absolutely right.
Chairwoman Mikulski. When will it actually affect you? In
other words, everybody says the sequester is a made-up crisis
and----
Mr. Bolden. No, it's not a made-up crisis.
Chairwoman Mikulski. In other words, if you have to
furlough people, when will you start doing it?
Mr. Bolden. If we do not come out from under the sequester
for the fiscal year 2014 budget, we'll start furloughing people
when the fiscal year 2014 budget becomes effective.
Chairwoman Mikulski. That would be October 1.
Mr. Bolden. That would be October 1. We'll have to start
looking at----
Chairwoman Mikulski. So we have some elasticity of time,
but not an open-ended situation.
Mr. Bolden. Time is not my ally, but time is my friend
right now when it comes to the workforce.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Well, we are your friend, but anyway,
let me go then to the next question.
Many of our colleagues have said, oh, give the agencies
flexibility. If you have flexibility, which I wanted to do, and
many on the other side of the aisle wanted. There were higher
powers that didn't. I wanted to give agencies a 1 percent
transfer, reprogramming authority so we could keep our
constitutional prerogatives and that of this subcommittee
across programs, not across agencies. Like you couldn't go to
the FBI, and they couldn't come to you, but across programs.
Would transfer authority solve your problem? Or is it truly
the whole NASA that you would be still too constrained?
Mr. Bolden. Transfer authority, as you describe it, would
always be helpful, and that's what we've requested or we have
said----
Chairwoman Mikulski. But would it solve your problem?
Mr. Bolden. Under the sequester, transfer authority, even
as you describe it, would not solve the problem.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Why not?
Mr. Bolden. We still will have to drop something from our
portfolio. We would become a $16.2 billion agency, and, you
know, we're down almost $1 billion this year. We're managing to
do that. The sequester would take us down another huge notch,
and then----
Chairwoman Mikulski. What is the number attached to a huge
notch?
Mr. Bolden. I think right now, we're operating at $16.8
billion, and we would go down to $16.1 billion in fiscal year
2014, I think is the right number, but I'll get back to you.
[The information follows:]
In fiscal year 2014, under current law and assuming a continuing
resolution, NASA expects to be subject to a sequester of approximately
7.8 percent from the $17.492 billion enacted level in the fiscal year
2013 CJS appropriation. This equates to a total of $16.159 billion and
approximates the $16.1 billion level I referred to in my testimony. As
we have discovered in the past few months, the application of the
sequester is not entirely straightforward and we have not received any
guidance on the process for fiscal year 2014, so please view this as an
estimate.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Mr. Administrator, my time is moving
along, and I want to be sure that Senator Cochran has an
opportunity.
What I would appreciate, and I think members of the
subcommittee, is what would be--you've sent me a letter, I
believe, on the consequences of that.
Mr. Bolden. We did. Yes, ma'am.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Does that outline it pretty well?
Mr. Bolden. That outlines pretty well what the effect would
be. At that time, we gave you what we knew, and things have
probably gotten more dire since then.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Well, then if you have an update or an
annex, we would like to see it.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am. We will do that.
[The information follows:]
NASA has subsequently submitted the fiscal year 2013 operating
plan, which serves as an update to the original letter to the Senator
regarding effects of sequestration.
JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE STATUS
Chairwoman Mikulski. Now let me go right to one of our
biggest scientific endeavors, the JWST. And if we don't keep
that on track, where we've already had overruns I'm very
concerned about, but if we don't keep the JWST within making
sure we maintained all standards and practices of
accountability, I'm afraid that the JWST overruns could begin
to eat NASA alive.
And you know I'm a big supporter of the JWST. I believe it
will keep America's exceptionalism in astronomy going beyond
the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), with not only the power of
the HST, but would keep us as premier space astronomers for the
next 50 years.
So here is my question about that. Looking at the JWST and
the fact that there are now additional Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reports that say there continue to
be flashing yellow lights, could you give us the status of the
JWST? Is it online? How are we doing on maintaining the fiscal
accountability that both you and Northrop Grumman promised me,
and yet address the issues around the GAO?
And then I'd like to turn to Senator Cochran.
Mr. Bolden. Yes. Madam Chairman, as I mentioned to you the
first time I called, nobody was as devastated as I was to find
out the situation that James Webb was in. But as I promised
you, when we restructured the program, we changed the
management both in Northrop Grumman and NASA. We developed a
new cost and schedule timeline. We are on schedule for a launch
in 2018. We have a 14-month pad in the critical path for the
telescope.
The reference that you make to the GAO report refers to two
instruments, Near Infrared Spectrograph (NIRSpec) and Near
Infrared Camera (NIRCam), we saw that the vendors were not
going to be able to deliver on time, so we modified the
schedule such that they could fit in, because it's critical
that they be integrated into the telescope by the time it goes
into the large test cell at the Johnson Space Center in the
next few months. They are now on schedule to be delivered and
will be there.
So we are on budget. We are on schedule. I look at JWST,
post-your conversation with me, as I do Mars Atmosphere and
Volatile Evolution (MAVEN) and Landsat Data Continuity Mission
(LDCM) and some other missions, that by doing things
differently than we always did them, we now are bringing in
missions on cost, on schedule. We have done that for most of
the missions that we have launched in the last couple of years.
I'm very proud of that. We have a tremendous team that's really
focused on the things that you asked us to focus on.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Well, thank you very much.
Senator Cochran, thank you for your patience, Sir.
B-2 TEST STAND
Senator Cochran. Madam Chairman, thank you for allowing me
to join your subcommittee for this hearing. It's a pleasure to
serve as a member of the subcommittee with such distinguished
Senators as you and Senator Shelby.
Mr. Administrator, one of the facilities that NASA
administers is the Stennis Space Center down the Mississippi
gulf coast, as you well know.
Funding is needed from time to time to maintain its
capabilities, and I'm here to see if the funding levels that
are in the budget are sufficient to maintain the integrity of
the test stand, where you will test the engines before you
actually commit them to a launch.
And if there are deficiencies, I hope you will advise us
what they are and your suggestions for dealing with them.
Mr. Bolden. Sir, it is my opinion that we have sufficient
funds to continue the work that we're doing with Stennis. We're
progressing well on the upgrades to the B-2 Test Stand, which,
as I mentioned before, will be critical for main propulsion
tests for SLS. Their record of performance in meeting test
schedules not only for the J-2X, but for even our commercial
partners' rockets, is phenomenal. We have days that we run two
or three engine tests, and that's unprecedented.
So I think we're doing very well. It will be a challenge of
them, and I'll go back to what Senator Mikulski said. Sequester
is serious, and the sequester is real. All the progress that we
made at Stennis will come to a screeching slow, if not a halt,
if we have to live under sequester.
By the way, Sir, I want to thank you for all you did when
you were ranking member of the Committee and your hospitality
when I come to Mississippi.
Senator Cochran. Well, thank you very much.
Well, you know, the President proposes and the Congress
disposes.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, Sir.
Senator Cochran. And that's something that reflects the
responsibilities of our body in participating in the decisions
regarding funding and the expenditure of taxpayer dollars on
Federal programs. So your advice and your observations about
the needs for funding are considered very important, because we
know that you're familiar with the test stand and how it is
producing some additional resources for NASA. And we want to be
sure that we do our part here to maintain the integrity of that
facility.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, Sir.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Chairwoman Mikulski. Mr. Administrator, there are many
questions we'd like to continue to pursue. But there's been a
special briefing called for Senators on both North Korea and
Syria, and as the vice chairman of the Defense Committee and we
who are the appropriators, we need to attend that briefing.
We want to thank you for your ongoing service, sir. And it
is really noted and appreciated.
You have a big job. We have a big job.
And Senator Shelby and I were just talking about the fact
that we want to return to a regular order of this committee,
where we would take bills one at a time. But in order to do
that, we have to meet our--I have to give allocations between
May 15 and May 20.
There's a discrepancy. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012 tells us to mark up our bills at a 302(a) level of $1.058
trillion. Mr. Ryan has passed a budget at $966 billion and
taken all of the cuts out of discretionary spending.
So we've got that fiscal quagmire that I've talked about.
But we're going to work together on a bipartisan basis, and we
hope that the President, through his outreach to others, and
the House would cooperate, and Mr. Ryan would appoint
conferees, that there could be a reconciliation.
I think people don't quite yet grasp the significance of
the sequester, because this is what the discrepancy is. We're
set to go. And I've instructed my clerks and subcommittee
chairmen--and I know Senator Shelby--we're not only spenders on
this Committee, we also have a sense of frugality and wise
spending. We're concerned that if we have sequester, we could
end up by being pennywise and pound foolish, by ending up with
boondoggles because of delay in schedules, et cetera.
So we've got a big job ahead, but so do you.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
Chairwoman Mikulski. So please keep in touch with us. And
we want to thank you for your cooperation at this abbreviated
hearing.
As we go forward with the markup on our bill, both Senator
Shelby and I and other members, along with our key staff, will
be in touch with you.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
Chairwoman Mikulski. So for you, it's not keep the eye on
the ball. Keep your eye on those rockets and telescopes, and
let's keep America flying.
Mr. Bolden. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Chairwoman Mikulski. If there are no further questions this
morning, Senators may submit official questions for the
subcommittee's hearing record.
We ask NASA to respond within 30 days.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
mars exploration
Question. The Curiosity Rover landing and the astonishing images
coming back from Mars have generated enormous public support for Mars
exploration. The scientific community broadly supports the next Mars
mission as well, as demonstrated by its top ranking in the National
Research Council's Decadal Survey. Moreover, Congress gave clear
direction to prioritize this program in fiscal year 2013, reversing the
severe cuts proposed in the President's budget. Despite congressional,
scientific, and public support, the budget proposal for Planetary
Science and Mars this year looks remarkably similar to last year. Why
has the administration chosen to scale back this critical funding so
significantly?
Answer. The Mars 2020 rover mission continues the pursuit of the
Mars Exploration Program's science theme of ``Seeking the Signs of
Life.'' The mission objectives are to explore an astrobiologically
relevant ancient environment on Mars and to search for potential
biosignatures within that geological environment. This mission will
enable concrete progress toward eventual return to Earth of carefully
selected materials, thereby satisfying NRC Planetary Decadal Survey
science recommendations, and it will provide opportunities for
accommodation of contributed Human Exploration & Operations Mission
Directorate (HEOMD) payload element(s), technology infusion, and
international participation.
Currently, a Science Definition Team is working to outline the
science measurements required to meet the above objectives for Mars
2020, and the project team is assessing the engineering requirements
and defining the overall mission concept, including the use of residual
flight hardware and expertise from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
mission. As the mission concept is further developed, we will proceed
to a Mission Concept Review in the fall of 2013, which will be followed
by an openly competed payload Announcement of Opportunity.
At the time of the fiscal year 2014 budget formulation, NASA was in
the early stages of defining the 2020 mission, and significant
uncertainties remain as to the phasing of the mission's overall budget
pending the results of the Science Definition Team and the upcoming
Mission Concept Review later this year. The fiscal year 2015 budget
formulation process will provide the opportunity to assess the budget
profile for the Mars 2020 mission based on this better understanding of
mission requirements.
Question. The Mars Program funding profile in the budget recommends
funding increases in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. But the increases
would only occur after severe lean years in fiscal years 2014, 2015 and
2016. How will NASA maintain its experienced and successful ``entry,
descent and landing'' team in the coming years with this budget?
Answer. NASA's Science Mission Directorate recognizes that making
steady progress towards the Mars 2020 mission launch will be critical
to retaining the core capabilities in MSL-based Sky-Crane entry,
descent and landing and Curiosity-class rover engineering systems.
Currently, members of the Curiosity Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL)
team are engaged in reconstruction and analysis of data taken during
Curiosity's landing to provide critical information for future Mars
landers and rovers. Some members of the team are also supporting other
Agency efforts in the immediate term. The ongoing concept definition
for Mars 2020 will provide input to the fiscal year 2015 budget
process, including the workforce requirements.
Question. In an effort to save money, the re-scoped Mars mission
for 2020 called for a rover that has a virtually identical design as
Curiosity, but carries different scientific instruments. This was done
to streamline costs and maintain an early launch date within a limited
budget. But, it is my understanding that the budget will not allow the
suppliers and staff who worked on Curiosity to begin work on the new
vehicle for several years. Why have you chosen to delay rover
construction even though the staff and suppliers are available to do
the work today?
Answer. At the time of the fiscal year 2014 budget formulation,
NASA was in the early stages of defining the 2020 mission, and
significant uncertainties remain as to the phasing of the mission's
overall budget pending the results of the Science Definition Team and
the upcoming Mission Concept Review this year. Currently, the team is
preparing for acquisition of key long-lead parts. The fiscal year 2015
budget formulation process will provide the opportunity to assess the
budget profile for the Mars 2020 mission based on this better
understanding of mission requirements.
commercial crew
Question. The President's budget proposes a significant increase
for the Commercial Crew Program--a 36 percent increase over the level
provided in the fiscal year 2013 Omnibus. Can you explain why the
budget proposal includes this increase? Will it allow for a meaningful
competition to occur among private entities seeking to enter the space
launch business?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request would
restore the Commercial Crew Program funding to the level requested in
previous budgets to bring an American commercial system to operational
use as quickly as possible (NASA is estimating by 2017, though the
companies have indicated that they could do it sooner). Through the
Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) effort, NASA is funding
three companies in an attempt to promote meaningful competition in the
development of their crew transportation systems, and reduce the
eventual per-seat price of commercial crew transportation and rescue
services.
space launch procurement
Question. Both NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) require
affordable access to space, but the agencies have taken different
approaches on how to achieve that goal. NASA has effectively used
competition and fixed price contracts to drive down costs, while the
DOD is primarily relying on buying in bulk, what they call a ``block-
buy'' strategy. From your experience, how has competition and fixed-
price contracting benefited the Agency in its space launch procurement,
both in terms of cost savings and mission success?
Answer. When appropriate, NASA has successfully utilized
competition and fixed price contracting to drive down costs without
compromising mission success. Specific examples include NASA Launch
Service (NLS) and the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)
contracts.
NASA pursues a ``mixed fleet'' approach to assure its access to
space by using a competitive strategy across a variety of commercial
launch services to support the small, medium and intermediate range.
Historically, NASA has benefited significantly from competition and
fixed-price contracting in the intermediate class launch services.
However, one must be flexible and adjust the strategy to fit market
conditions. In the past, we have also benefitted from a large block buy
in the medium class when no competition existed or was forecasted. More
recently, NASA was able to achieve good pricing for its medium class
missions by utilizing competition. With the recent success of emerging
launch service providers, NASA can regain the benefit from competition
in the intermediate class and maintain competition in the medium class.
The small class has only witnessed minimal competitive scenarios so
far; however the fixed-price contracting has helped keep costs in
check. As to mission success, a technical evaluation of capabilities
and past performance of the commercial providers is evaluated as part
of any competition, along with cost and other variables in order to
determine a ``best value'' selection to meet NASA's needs and the
mission's risk posture. Since NASA's Launch Services Program creation
in 1998, mission success in the medium and intermediate class launch
services has thus far been 100 percent successful. Up until the two
Taurus XL launch failures in 2009 and 2011, mission success in the
small class had also been 100 percent successful. Launch is still a
very challenging engineering endeavor, and no system will be able to
maintain a 100 percent success record. Maintaining competition and
using the NASA Launch Service Firm Fixed Priced contract structure and
terms is critical to ensuring that NASA receives the best value for its
launch services.
In addition to these programs, NASA believes that maintaining
competition for the Commercial Crew Program is critical to ensuring
that NASA and the Nation receive the best value for future U.S.-based
crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS).
Competition also incentivizes the companies to invest their own funds
and share in the development costs of their Crew Transportation System.
Having industry share in the cost of development and selling seats to
other customers in addition to NASA will likely decrease NASA's costs
for crew transportation services in both the short- and long-term. The
competitive environment provides strong incentive for the companies to
align with NASA's certification requirements in order to remain
competitive in the future certification and services phases. Having
multiple companies competing against each other will help ensure the
safest and most cost effective system possible for the Government.
space technology
Question. The budget proposes creating a new Space Technology
Directorate, and funding it at $742 million in fiscal year 2014. Can
you explain how the program and the new structure will improve our
ability to protect astronauts on long-term deep-space missions? How
will the work being done interact with the ongoing work within the
Science Mission Directorate?
Answer. The Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) was
formally established in February 2013 to bring about innovative
solutions that dramatically improve technological capabilities for NASA
and the Nation. This new mission directorate has management and budget
authority of the Space Technology programs, which are performed by all
10 NASA Centers. It focuses on project execution and technology
infusion into the Agency's exploration and science mission needs,
taking a customer driven approach to prove capabilities needed for
future NASA missions and the national aerospace community.
Using a broad investment strategy, NASA's Space Technology
investments address the identified range of technology areas found in
NASA's Space Technology Roadmaps as prioritized by the National
Research Council. The Space Technology portfolio supports a combination
of early stage conceptual studies, discovering entirely new
technologies; determining technology feasibility through rapid
competitive development and ground-based testing; and flight
demonstrations in relevant environments, completing the final step to
mission infusion.
To achieve our human spaceflight goals, there are many
technological barriers that must be overcome to allow humans to travel
further from Earth. HEOMD conducts architecture studies (e.g. Human
Exploration Framework Team (HEFT), Human Spaceflight Architecture Team
(HAT)), which identifies needed technologies, as well as their timeline
to perform future deep space human exploration missions. Exploration
Technology Development (ETD) within the Space Technology budget is
targeted specifically at human exploration technology needs. This
includes the development and demonstration of high power solar electric
propulsion (SEP) capabilities, scalable to handle power and thrust
levels needed for deep space human exploration missions. High power SEP
is considered essential to affordably performing human exploration
missions to distant destinations such as Mars. In addition, NASA is
investing in technologies that will allow for the in-space storage and
transfer of cryogenic fuels to meet the needs for future propulsion
stages to move crew from low Earth orbit to a variety of destinations.
Providing such long duration storage and transfer of propellants is
considered essential for any human exploration missions beyond the
earth-moon system. Finally, Space Technology within the ETD program
area is maturing a suite of critical technologies identified by the
HEFT. HAT and other human exploration studies. Technologies within the
portfolio include: life support components for next generation space
suits and habitats, in-situ resource utilization components to detect
water and produce oxygen from carbon dioxide (considered essential to
produce ascent vehicle propellants for a human Mars mission), advanced
batteries to support long spacewalks, high efficiency fuel cells that
require no consumables and can be recharged for reuse during long
duration missions, radiation modeling methods to improve the lead time
for solar events, autonomous systems that will permit astronauts to
efficiently operate independent of ground controllers, and robotic
systems that can work in close proximity to humans, off-loading
maintenance and operational tasks from astronaut duty cycles.
For science, this includes developing technologies that can
increase communications bandwidth so NASA is able to receive more data
from spacecraft studying the far corners of our solar system. In
addition, we are developing technologies to improve accuracy of
navigation systems and improve the longevity and efficiency of
spacecraft power systems. Space technology is developing and will
demonstrate a solar sail seven times larger than any solar sail tested
in space to date, which has tremendous potential for future
heliophysics missions. STMD also continues to support future planetary
science missions through investments in advanced entry descent and
landing (EDL) technologies, such as a new 33 meter ring sail parachute
and supersonic inflatable aerodynamic decelerators to improve upon the
landed mass and landing accuracy demonstrated by Curiosity. These new
chutes and other supersonic decelerator technologies such as STMD
investments in supersonic retro propulsion are necessary for human
missions to the Mars surface. EDL technology investments also include
inflatable and mechanical deployable heat shields applicable for
robotic missions to multiple planets, as well as human missions to
Mars. STMD is also investing in a new class of woven-carbon thermal
protection materials permitting new missions to Venus as well as the
other planets. The STMD is working with SMD to coordinate technology
investments in nuclear systems and chronographs/starshades needed for
next generation astrophysics observatories, with a goal of a space
asset capable of detecting the atmospheric content and potential
presence of life of Earth-like planets orbiting distant stars. In
addition, STMD conducts annual small spacecraft demonstrations which
tests subsystems that enable small spacecraft as well providing for an
affordable test platform for future larger systems.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
space act agreements/federal acquisition regulation (far) contracts
Question. Please provide a detailed list of NASA authorities
granted by the Space Act Agreements for the Commercial Crew Program. In
particular, what unilateral authority to investigate participants,
their activities and their books (specifically related to commercial
crew activities) does the agreement grant NASA and what must NASA have
permission from the contractor to access?
Answer. Under the Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap)
Space Act Agreements (SAAs), NASA has the authority to request any data
first produced by the partner under the agreement for the purpose of
evaluating the partner's performance of its milestones. NASA has the
authority to review the partner's records to determine if any
inventions were made under the agreement and whether the partner has
complied with the requirements of the agreement relative to reporting
of inventions. The partner is also required to report any mishap, and
NASA has the authority to request any reports and data resulting from
the partner's mishap investigation.
Question. Does NASA have the authority to investigate the
Commercial Resupply Service flights, which to date, have had multiple
incidents on ascent and at least once at landing, and if not, what is
required for NASA to gain insight into these and any future mission
irregularities?
Answer. The Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contractor has the
lead for anomaly resolution for phases of the mission during which they
have responsibility (as was the case for the recent Dragon thruster
anomaly which was successfully resolved). However, under the terms of
the CRS contract, NASA officials are kept well apprised of the nature
and progress of these activities, and NASA technical personnel may
participate in the contractor's investigation and resolution of
anomalies. SpaceX provided all relevant data necessary, including
anomaly resolution information, to perform the rendezvous and berthing
of the Dragon to the International Space Station (ISS).
Question. Can NASA provide the timing for conversion to FAR-based
contracts for the certification of commercial capabilities and
procurement of crew transportation services? Does NASA intend to sign
further Space Act Agreements, or modifications to current agreements
that are currently signed, for commercial crew prior to implementing
FAR-based contracts?
Answer. NASA's contracting effort for the certification of
commercial crew transportation services began with the first contract
phase, the Certification Products Contracts (CPC). CPC was awarded to
three companies on December 19, 2012. Under these FAR-based contracts,
the selected contractors are developing products that will lead to the
certification of their integrated commercial crew transportation
systems. Advances made by these American companies during CPC are
advancing the process of ensuring integrated crew transportation
systems that will meet Agency safety requirements and standards to
launch American astronauts to the International Space Station from the
United States, ending the Agency's reliance on Russia for these
transportation services.
The CPC contractors are:
--The Boeing Company, Houston, Texas;
--Sierra Nevada Corporation Space System, Louisville, Colorado; and
--Space Exploration Technologies Corp., Hawthorne, California.
The procurement planning for the second phase of the FAR-based
certification contracts, known as the Commercial Crew Transportation
Capability (CCtCap) procurement, has begun and will result in a
separate competition. CCtCap award(s) are planned for the summer of
2014.
NASA does not currently intend to conduct additional competitions
for Space Act Agreements to support commercial crew development. As
companies mature their designs, NASA will determine whether exercising
optional milestones is in the best interest of the Government.
cots program
Question. During the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) program, the Space Act Agreements frontloaded the funding
milestones so that nearly 90 percent of the funds were provided to
companies before a single launch occurred in order to ensure the
capability was developed and available when needed.
Given that significant Federal investment has already been made in
a commercial capability which is a ``launching point'' for much of the
commercial crew capability, has NASA considered backloaded payments for
commercial crew in an effort to push for a greater private investment
in the capability and greater accountability with respect to achieving
milestones, imbedding safety tests and meeting schedule requirements?
Answer. NASA performs a full and comprehensive analysis of the
milestones, deliverables, and payment options for all procurements and/
or agreements. All types of payment options are considered and the
specific type is chosen to best meet the objectives of the activity.
With respect to the COTS and Commercial Crew funded Space Act
Agreements, the milestones and the amount of the milestones were
proposed by industry and NASA reviewed them for appropriateness and the
extent to which they met the objectives of the Announcement for
Proposals.
competition
Question. The Commercial Crew Program has been characterized as a
competition. However, NASA has provided $1.5 billion in incentivized
grants to three companies for the development of crew launch vehicles.
This does not sound like a traditional competition where multiple
companies compete and one wins. This sounds like a grant program that
makes everyone a winner--except perhaps the taxpayer who is paying
multiple times for the same product.
Could you explain why NASA is calling the Commercial Crew Program a
competition and how this approach will save taxpayer dollars if NASA is
paying to develop multiple launch vehicles?
Answer. NASA characterizes the Commercial Crew Program as
competitive because industry competes for awards under the program.
Multiple companies competed for funded Commercial Crew Development
(CCDev) and Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) awards and
did not receive them, so the characterization of everyone being a
winner is incorrect. NASA has leveraged the benefits of competition
among companies for awards through the conduct of multiple competitions
thereby requiring the companies to provide best value during each phase
of the activity.
Maintaining a competitive environment for the Commercial Crew
Program is critical to ensuring that NASA and the nation receive the
best value for future U.S.-based crew transportation to ISS. In
addition, continued competition among providers incentivizes the
companies to expand their commercial market base by selling services to
any other customers to maintain reasonable prices. Continued
competition among providers also incentivizes the companies to invest
their own funds and share in the development costs of their systems.
Competition is also the fundamental basis for establishing fair and
reasonable pricing for all requirements. Having industry share in the
cost of development and selling seats to other customers in addition to
NASA will likely decrease NASA's costs for crew transportation services
in both the short- and long-term.
The establishment of this competitive environment provides strong
incentive for the companies to align with NASA's certification
requirements in order to remain competitive in the future certification
and services phases. Having multiple companies competing against each
other will help ensure the safest and most cost effective system
possible for the Government.
NASA is not paying multiple times for the same product. Each
commercial crew industry participant is proposing a unique crew
transportation system (even when using the same launch vehicle) and
NASA's investments are helping to develop those unique systems. The
benefits of this approach can be seen in the Commercial Cargo Program
which should soon have demonstrated two different U.S. cargo systems
for ISS logistics. NASA refers to this as ``dissimilar redundancy'' and
it allows NASA to be able to absorb a failure of any one system without
a major impact to on-orbit operations. Additionally, the technology
development that has been achieved by all the commercial crew companies
will benefit other space based activities and expand the U.S. space
industrial base.
Question. Please elaborate how the timing of NASA investment in
commercial crew, and the spreading of that investment across multiple
companies results in efficient use of Federal funding and optimizes
private investment. Also provide any studies either done independently
or by NASA that support the implementation of commercial crew.
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request will enable
the re-establishment of U.S. human access to space by 2017. Through the
Commercial Crew Program, NASA is funding multiple industry concepts in
an attempt to promote meaningful competition among providers in the
development of their crew transportation systems, and reduce the
eventual per-seat price of commercial crew transportation and rescue
services. Please see response to question above.
The most prominent study supporting the implementation of
commercial crew is the ``Final Report of the Review of U.S. Human
Spaceflight Plans Committee'' published in 2009 and available online at
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalReport.pdf.
Question. If none of the current contractors for commercial crew
vehicle development are able to meet NASA's requirements for safely
delivering crew to the international space station, will NASA choose to
continue the program, as they did with COTS, at whatever the cost or
delays in schedule may be?
Answer. It is NASA's intention to use U.S. commercial industry to
provide crew transportation and rescue services to the International
Space Station (ISS). The Agency has made its crew safety requirements
available, and is confident that one or more potential vendors will be
able to develop safe crew transportation services by 2017, contingent
upon the availability of appropriated funds and technical progress.
Question. Have any of the commercial crew participants shown to
NASA that their business will go forward, regardless of receiving NASA
funding or guaranteed flights to the international space station?
Answer. NASA has not requested a guarantee from our industry
partners for their businesses to go forward without NASA funding.
However, each company has a unique view of the market for human space
transportation and unique business cases for completing the development
of their systems.
As part of the Commercial Crew Program Industry Touchpoint held in
April 2013 in Colorado Springs, NASA did request industry input
regarding post-certification missions to the ISS. This information is
being used by the NASA in the preparation of the Request for Proposals
for the Phase 2 Certification contract.
commercial crew versus international partners
Question. Will NASA continue payments to the Russians as a back-up
to commercial crew services and for how many months, or years after
commercial crew services become regularly available?
Answer. NASA recently signed a modification to its contract with
the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) for full crew
transportation services to the ISS in 2016 with return and rescue
services extending through June 2017. NASA is facilitating development
of a U.S. commercial crew space transportation capability with the goal
of achieving safe, reliable and cost-effective access to and from the
space station and low Earth orbit beginning in 2017. NASA is committed
to launching U.S. astronauts aboard domestic spacecraft as soon as
possible.
Question. NASA's Commercial Crew Program projects that a vehicle
will be ready to launch in 2017. However, given the schedule delays in
the Commercial Cargo Program, it is likely that the Crew Program will
experience delays as well. If that is the case, I question the value of
moving forward with an extremely costly Commercial Crew Program when
the Space Station is currently slated for decommissioning in 2020.
Has NASA done a cost-benefit analysis comparing the cost of
developing a commercial crew capability with the cost of using our
international partners to provide those same flights given that there
will likely be a limited number of flights to the Space Station?
Answer. NASA has not performed a cost-benefit analysis comparing
the cost of developing a commercial crew capability with the cost of
using foreign systems. NASA's commercial crew partners have not
formally established final pricing for ISS services missions. In
keeping with the 2010 NASA Authorization Act, NASA believes U.S. human
access to space is a critical capability for the nation and that
commercial crew capabilities are a key means to achieve this goal. The
lifetime extension data that NASA and the ISS partnership have reviewed
to date indicates that the ISS could operate until at least 2028.
Question. Is this the best way for NASA to spend scarce taxpayer
dollars when the capability already exists and there are so many other
endeavors in which to invest?
Answer. Yes. The capability does not already exist within the
United States and NASA is committed to launching U.S. astronauts aboard
domestic spacecraft as soon as possible. Like the COTS program, the
Commercial Crew Program appears to date to be a cost-effective means of
developing U.S. space capabilities. Full funding of the
Administration's fiscal year 2014 budget request is critical to making
these domestic capabilities possible by 2017. The commercial crew
industry partners have indicated that they believe they could be ready
prior to that date. But, NASA has included some schedule margin because
human spaceflight development efforts have historically been
challenging. Thus, NASA believes 2017 is a reasonable estimate for the
availability of U.S. commercial crew services, pending adequate funding
and technical progress.
Question. At what point in the development of U.S.-based crew
vehicles will NASA stop negotiating future flights with the Russians
and is there a planned overlap in case the commercial vehicles are not
ready in time?
Answer. NASA will monitor the development of commercial crew
vehicles closely. It is important to note that the Russians require
approximately 3 years of lead time to manufacture a new Soyuz
spacecraft, so the Agency has to enter negotiations with that timeframe
in mind.
commercial cargo/resupply
Question. What are NASA's plans with regard to future commercial
cargo deliveries to the ISS, after 2015? Will the current contracts be
extended or will there be a new competition?
Answer. NASA can continue to award some additional flights under
the current CRS contracts. Beyond that, future competitions for cargo
servicing will be awarded using competitive FAR-based contracts. See
the answer to question #13.
Question. For the Commercial Resupply Services Program, will both
of the cargo providers meet their obligations to supply the ISS by the
dates originally agreed to by NASA? If not, why not, and will NASA have
to renegotiate existing contracts in order to accomplish the programs
purpose?
Answer. The CRS contract is a firm-fixed price, Indefinite Delivery
Indefinite Quantity procurement with a period of performance from
January 1, 2009, through December 30, 2016. The CRS contractors are not
anticipated to complete on their original contract schedule, due in
large part to the technical challenges of bringing new spacecraft and
launch vehicles to operational status. However, NASA may elect to
modify the current contracts to enable the completion of the flights.
It is important to recall that the Agency only pays the contractors for
milestones achieved.
asteroid
Question. The asteroid retrieval strategy outlined in the budget
request proposes to augment existing activities in order to facilitate
a potential mission in the future. Provide the changes in budget
profile and timing if this augmentation is not provided.
Answer. NASA is pursuing ways to align key activities in Science,
Space Technology, and Human Exploration and Operations Mission
Directorates to improve detection and characterization of near-Earth
asteroids (NEAs); including asteroids that could be potentially
hazardous to the Earth; demonstrate advanced solar electric propulsion;
and capture and redirect a small NEA to a stable orbit in the lunar
vicinity. We would then use the Orion and Space Launch System assets to
launch astronauts to the asteroid, perform rendezvous operations and
return samples from it.
Changes in the budget have been requested for fiscal year 2014 to
accelerate the development of key technologies and capabilities for
NASA, as well as enable the asteroid redirect mission. These
capabilities are important in their own right independent of the
proposed asteroid strategy. For example, the Space Technology Mission
Directorate (STMD) had planned to perform a high-powered Solar Electric
Propulsion demonstration to support the needs of future human
exploration as well as the commercial satellite sector. The fiscal year
2014 budget request will allow NASA to accelerate the development and
demonstration of these capabilities and define a mission concept to
leverage existing efforts. The asteroid mission strategy, including the
crewed segment using the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion, would
provide a compelling near term mission and destination for exploration
system capabilities. The asteroid mission fits well with the current
development timelines for SLS and Orion and it would not require
substantial added deep space architecture components implying an
affordable near term destination. If the augmentation is not provided,
a significant delay will occur in the advancement and demonstration of
these critical technologies and capabilities. Further development of
this compelling mission concept will be impaired or halted, depending
on the magnitude of the cut to the request. In addition, momentum
gained in human spaceflight for enhancing the objectives of initial
missions of Orion and SLS toward this integrated opportunity will be at
risk.
Question. Please explain the timing and chain of events that
changed NASA's planning from sending astronauts to visit an asteroid to
the currently proposed capture of an asteroid and bringing it back for
examination?
Answer. As NASA planners worked different scenarios for the
Agency's next human missions of exploration beyond low Earth orbit,
they found that the potential mission to capture and redirect an
asteroid into a stable lunar orbit for in situ study by astronauts had
a number of advantages. First, it is a comparatively near-term goal
(NASA is considering flying such a mission by the 2025 timeframe),
which would enable the Agency to test out its initial deep-space
architecture elements--the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV)--without the need for the immediate
development of other components needed for other destinations. Second,
this proposal draws on work already underway in the Agency, including
asteroid detection and tracking efforts, advanced solar-electric
propulsion (SEP) development, and the development and initial flights
of the SLS and Orion vehicles.
NASA has also spent significant time examining the potential for
sending astronauts directly to a near earth asteroid. Such a mission
includes several additional challenges. First, identifying a target NEA
that is worthy of a visit in terms of science and exploration value,
while keeping trip times and propellant requirements reasonable is
challenging. Most identified NEA targets of significant value will
require greater than 6-month round trip times. Such a mission will also
require the development of additional exploration assets/capabilities
such as a deep space habitat, space exploration vehicle (something with
an airlock, manipulator arms as well as power and propulsion), long
duration cryogenic storage, more reliable life support systems and a
strategy for radiation protection. These capability requirements imply
that the cost and schedule for a direct asteroid exploration mission is
more challenging than the asteroid redirect mission. The Asteroid
Redirect Mission would affordably support and leverage multiple efforts
across the Agency as it paves the way for journeys to other
destinations by helping NASA prove out its new heavy-lift launch
vehicle and exploration spacecraft in a near-term mission.
Question. What is the technology readiness level of the propulsion
and capture mechanisms intended to be used for a future asteroid
retrieval mission and does NASA anticipate some technology
demonstrations prior to the mission to reduce risk?
Answer. The Asteroid Redirect Mission will serve as a technology
demonstration mission to validate the utility of high-powered solar
electric propulsion and robotic capture mechanisms. Since this is a
technology demonstration effort, the goal of this mission will be to
mature these technologies for infusion into future NASA science and
exploration missions.
The technology development to support a high-powered solar electric
propulsion demonstration has been underway for the last 2 years through
Space Technology's Game Changing Development Program. The main
technology components under development include:
--Solar Array Systems: These deployable high-power arrays feature
twice the power for the same mass and three times the packaging
efficiency relative to current array technologies. STMD
selected two solar array system contractors (ATK and Deployable
Space Systems) to develop advanced deployable arrays systems
that can support the 30 kW to 50 kW required for the Asteroid
Redirect Mission and that can scale to over 300 kW for future
human exploration missions. This technology will reach TRL 5 by
the middle of fiscal year 2014. Space Technology will then be
prepared to down-select one of the two vendors for inclusion
into the SEP system for the flight demonstration.
--Electric Propulsion Thrusters: These magnetically shielded, high
thrust Hall thrusters feature higher thrust levels (10 to 15 kW
vs. 5 kW), higher specific impulse (3000 sec vs. 2000 sec) and
magnetic shielding to significantly increase long duration
operations. These thrusters will reach TRL 5 by mid fiscal year
2014, with the potential for the procurement of engineering
development units to support the asteroid redirect mission
before the end of fiscal year 2014. Alternate electric
propulsion thruster solutions (besides magnetically shield Hall
thrusters) are possible for the Asteroid Redirect Mission but
will need to prove competitive in terms of mass, efficiency,
specific impulse and technical maturity.
--Power processing units (PPUs) and power management and distribution
(PMAD) systems: Multiple options for PPUs and the PMAD approach
have been under development that can support the Asteroid
Redirect Mission. These technologies will reach TRL 6 by the
end of fiscal year 2014.
Currently, with all technology components expected to complete
development and testing during fiscal year 2014, the Solar Electric
Propulsion (SEP) system will be ready for the procurement of hardware
supporting the flight demonstration by fiscal year 2015. Currently,
STMD is considering whether any precursor demonstration, to test the
highest risk items, is warranted prior to the asteroid mission. In
addition to the current baseline Hall-thruster SEP concept, STMD will
study and consider other high-powered SEP concepts such as gridded ion
and magneto-plasma systems to power the robotic spacecraft.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Chairwoman Mikulski. This subcommittee stands in recess
until Thursday, May 9, when we're going to take the testimony
of the FBI Director, Mr. Mueller.
[Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., Thursday, April 25, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]