[Senate Hearing 113-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. Durbin (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Durbin, Cochran, Shelby, Collins, and
Murkowski.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING, DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES NAVY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN
Senator Durbin. The subcommittee meets this morning to
receive testimony on fiscal year 2014 budget request for the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA). And I'm pleased to welcome the
Director, Vice Admiral James Syring, from Indiana. Thank you
for appearing before the committee.
For fiscal year 2014, the President's budget asks for $7.7
billion for this agency. It's roughly equivalent to the amount
provided in fiscal year 2013 after sequestration but assumes
sequestration in 2014 will not happen. I hope to hear more from
the admiral today on the impact of sequestration on this fiscal
year and what cuts in the future might mean.
While the United States is facing a number of threats
around the world in the area of missile proliferation,
including programs in Iran and North Korea, these policy
problems require use of a number of political, economic, and
military tools. The Missile Defense Agency brings capabilities
to the table to face those challenges.
It's our responsibility to ensure that those capabilities
perform as advertised, remain focused on realistic threats, and
be honest about the testing and results. We know the threat is
real; the question is whether our defense is real.
President Obama summed up the approach in 2009 in these
words: ``The best way to responsibly advance our security and
the security of our allies is to deploy a missile defense
system that best responds to the threats that we face and
utilizes technology both proven and cost effective.'' The
President is taking bold steps to counter threats in North
Korea and Iran, including most recently ordering the first-ever
deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
battery to Guam. This deployment was accelerated by 2 years in
light of North Korean provocations. I would like for the
admiral to update us on that.
In addition, in March, Secretary Hagel announced four major
steps MDA will take to bolster our defense from the threat of
long-range ballistic missiles. One key aspect is the planned
expansion, the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system.
Before it can be expanded, we need to know these missiles
perform as advertised through rigorous intercept tests. These
tests aren't easy, and they aren't cheap. But they're critical
if we're going to adhere to the President's guidance that our
technology must be ``proven and cost effective.''
We are painfully aware of the recent test failure just a
few days ago, on July 5. This committee will appreciate the
admiral's explanation of what happened. Prior to this month,
the same system had two high-profile test failures, in the year
2010, as well. Furthermore, given the difficult fiscal
environment we face, we need to understand the costs of any
proposed expansion of the program.
I have several questions on the ground-based mid-course
defense plan to ensure the system is reliable and affordable.
Secretary Hagel also emphasized the U.S. continued commitment
to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and her allies,
the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Last month, the Aegis
program had another successful intercept when the USS Lake Erie
intercepted a target over the Pacific Ocean, using a Block 1-B
standard missile.
Of course, none of these issues we discuss today can happen
without the dedicated military and civilian employees who work
so hard to keep us safe. Civilian employees are an integral
part of the Missile Defense Agency team. So, we would like to
know the impact of the 11-day furlough that began in July due
to sequestration.
I commend to all of those at this hearing an article
written this morning by a civilian employee of the Air Force
that is printed in the Washington Post, talking about the
disappointment that he feels, having dedicated his life first
to the uniformed military and now to the civilian military, and
facing the furlough on sequester. Based on the fact that he's
given so much of his life to defending this country, he can't
understand this approach. Neither can I.
I look forward to working with you to address these
important issues, as well as to ensure our fiscal year 2014
appropriation bill enables the Missile Defense Agency to defend
and support our Nation and interests around the world, at the
same time being fiscally responsible.
I thank the admiral for his testimony this morning. His
full statement will be included in the record.
Senator Durbin. Before I turn to him, I'm going to ask the
ranking vice chair on the full committee, Senator Shelby, if he
has any opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I'll
try to be brief here, but I think this is a very important
hearing you've called here. Mr. Chairman, I join you today here
in welcoming Vice Admiral Syring as Director of the Missile
Defense Agency.
Admiral Syring is tasked with defending the United States
deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missile
attacks. And as you mentioned in your testimony, Admiral, the
threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries are
acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing
their range, and making them more complex, survivable,
reliable, and accurate. I concur with this assessment and
believe that it's vital to ensure a robust level of funding in
the missile defense program to combat these complex emerging
threats.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I look forward to working with you, as I have. And I also
look forward to your testimony here today to ensure that our
country is appropriately prepared now and in the future against
ballistic missile attacks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby. I will
be including in the record a statement from Senator Cochran.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you in welcoming the Director of
the Missile Defense Agency, Vice Admiral James Syring.
Admiral, it appears that your success with Aegis and the
development, testing and acquisition of other complex weapon systems
has landed you in one of the toughest, most complex jobs in the
Department of Defense. Hitting a bullet with a bullet thousands of
miles away is no simple task.
We thank you for your willingness to serve in this important
position, and we are pleased to have you provide testimony today on
what is needed and planned for this coming fiscal year for missile
defense. I have been a strong advocate for a national missile defense
system, and I am encouraged by the progress since legislation was first
introduced in 1998.
An effective missile defense is needed today more than ever. North
Korea continues to test nuclear capabilities and long range launch
vehicles, and Iran has successfully launched satellites into space,
showing they have the capability to develop a long range ballistic
missile. Even with the recent missed intercept test, the ground-based
element of this architecture has had more successful intercept tests
than failures, and so we know this concept can work, but there is a
great deal more to be done to ensure this system's reliability.
Considering the recent events with North Korea, I am encouraged by
the President's decision to increase the number of operational Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBIs) from 30 to 44 to enhance our national missile
defense posture. But I question whether we are doing all that is
technically feasible, today, to address complex threats and large raid
sizes. I have been informed that the performance of our missile defense
system can be increased in the near term by enhancing discrimination. I
hope this is something we will be able to discuss in some detail during
today's hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Admiral Syring, please proceed.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING
Admiral Syring. Good morning, Chairman Durbin, Senator
Shelby. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you
today for the first time as the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency.
On July 5, we conducted an intercept test of the upgraded
Capability Enhancement-1 exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV).
Although we successfully launched the ground-based interceptor
(GBI) in FTG-07, it failed to intercept the LV-2 target.
We have started an extensive review to determine the cause
of the failure. We did demonstrate all possible secondary
objectives to include demonstrations of the ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system sensors, the first use of Aegis BMD as a
ground-based mid-course defense launch-on sensor, C2BMC, and
war-fighter tactic techniques and procedures.
However, the overall test was a failure because the primary
objective of intercepting the target was not met. I am
committed to conducting a full evaluation of the path ahead for
the GMD program, to include more regular testing, an
acceleration of the CE-II upgrades after intercept testing, or
redesign and upgrade of the current EKV.
Regardless of the path we embark on, we will aggressively
attack any substantiated quality control problems coming out of
the failure review board that need to be corrected through the
program. We will continue to keep Congress apprised of our
decisions.
Mindful of this failure to intercept and pending the
outcome of our investigation, we will work with the war-fighter
and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
communities to determine the path forward and timing for our
next GMD flight test, which could involve a repeat of the July
2013 intercept flight test attempt, using the CE-I
configuration or an intercept flight test using the currently
planned CE-II configuration. What's important is continued
testing.
We are taking other steps over the next few years to
implement Secretary Hagel's March 15 guidance to strengthen our
homeland defenses. We are increasing the operational fleet of
GBIs from 30 to 44 by 2017. This will involve the reallocation
of GBIs and the refurbishment and reactivation of Missile Field
1 in Alaska.
The decision to increase the number of deployed GBIs, of
course, assumes a successful return to intercept of the next-
generation EKV, the CE-II, and that the results of the FTG-07
failure investigation do not point to any problematic common
components within the currently planned production GBI.
We have begun our evaluation of locations in the
continental United States to determine a site suitable for
possible future deployment of homeland defense interceptors.
Also, in order to provide more robust sensor coverage for
homeland defense, this year we are working with our Japanese
partners to deploy a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan.
We will continue to strengthen regional defenses with
funding to operate and sustain command control battle
management and communications, and the AN/TPY-2 radars at the
fielded sites. We will also deliver more interceptors for the
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense program and Aegis ballistic
missile defense.
PREPARED STATEMENT
MDA will continue to fund upgrades to phase one of the
European phased adaptive approach and proceed on our schedule
to complete the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania by 2015 and in
Poland by 2018.
Sir, I ask that my written statement be accepted into the
record, and I look forward to answering the committee's
questions. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring
Good morning, Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Cochran,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify before you for the first time as the Director of
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Our current budget request of $7.684
billion for fiscal year 2014 will continue the development of defenses
for our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international partners
against increasingly capable ballistic missiles. Since the previous
Director testified before you last year, we have made good progress in
the development and deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) and we continue to build capabilities to defeat more complex
threats. My priorities in fiscal year 2014 are to continue our strong
support of the warfighter, support what we have deployed, and deliver
more capability to the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs).
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries are
acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their
range and making them more complex, survivable, reliable, and accurate.
The missile defense mission is becoming more challenging as potential
adversaries incorporate BMD countermeasures. Space-launch activities in
Iran and North Korea involve multistage systems that serve to further
the development of ballistic missile technology for longer-range
systems including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
technologies and systems. As the Director for National Intelligence
recently stated, ``Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small
satellites, and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical
steps . . . provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop
larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an
ICBM.'' In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 SLV/ICBM, North Korea is
developing a road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) capable of reaching Guam, the Aleutian Islands, and
potentially Hawaii. Iran also has steadily increased its ballistic
missile force, deploying next generation short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new
submunition payloads. Iran has publicly demonstrated the ability to
launch simultaneous salvos of multiple rockets and missiles and openly
discussed tests of an anti-ship ballistic missile.
SUPPORT FOR THE WARFIGHTER
Our overriding goal is to provide support to the warfighter. To
this end we will increase system reliability, focusing especially on
improving the performance of the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) and
the Aegis Weapons System, including the Standard Missile (SM)
interceptors and continuing our support for operational systems like
the AN/TPY-2 radar and the Command, Control, Battle Management and
Communications (C2BMC) at fielded sites. We will also deliver more
interceptors for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and, pending a successful return to
intercept, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) as we look for ways to
make it more operationally effective and cost-effective.
We remain committed to conducting developmental and operationally
realistic tests and use a ``fly before you buy'' approach. MDA
continues to work closely with the Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) and collaboratively with independent testers and the
Services. We follow an Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), a
comprehensive, integrated, and cost-effective flight and ground test
program that blends developmental testing with tests that employ
operationally realistic conditions to demonstrate BMD capabilities
against current and projected threats. I have reviewed the DOT&E 2012
Assessment of the BMDS, which identified areas that need improvement,
specifically in the areas of BMDS system-level testing and the
accreditation of BMDS element models. The report's findings
acknowledged our integration accomplishments. We must still work to
improve battle management for a fully integrated BMDS. We also agree
that we need improved GMD performance models to fully characterize
system performance. Similarly, although the report did note our
progress in testing against targets with certain SRBM and MRBM
characteristics, the acquisition of additional accredited target models
will help evaluate the performance of all phases of regional defense,
specifically for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
In order to provide the warfighters confidence in the execution of
their integrated air and missile defense plans and the opportunity to
refine operational doctrine and tactics, this year we plan to
demonstrate the ability of the integrated BMDS to defeat up to three
near-simultaneous air and ballistic threats. In the integrated BMDS
flight test (FTI-01) this past October, the largest, most complex
ballistic missile defense test ever attempted, we demonstrated the
capability of the BMDS to engage upon a raid of five near-simultaneous
representative threats, air-breathing and ballistic missiles, hitting
four out of five targets. In this year's operational BMDS flight test
we will use an operationally relevant scenario to demonstrate the
integration of regional defense systems. In FTO-01 we will engage two
medium-range ballistic missile targets launched within minutes of one
another with Aegis BMD and THAAD using Forward Based Mode (FBM) AN/TPY-
2 radar and the C2BMC system operated by Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen.
In fiscal year 2014 President's Budget Submission (April 2013) we have
added 12 more flight tests to the IMTP, going from 37 tests in IMTP
version 12.2 to 49 tests in IMTP version 13.1. As the BMDS matures we
need to increase complexity in our flight tests by doing the following:
adding system-level operational tests; increasing the number of BMDS
assets in those tests; increasing the numbers, types (ballistic and
air-breathing) and ranges of the threat representative targets we use
and conducting more simultaneous launches; and adding the entire
warfighting chain of command to evaluate concepts of operation and
tactics, techniques and procedures. We have also increased the number
of ground-tests in those planning periods from 88 to 106.
HOMELAND DEFENSE
MDA's highest near-term priority remains the successful GMD
intercept flight test of the newest GBI Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV)--the Capability Enhancement (CE)-II EKV. The successful non-
intercept controlled flight test of the CE-II GBI earlier this year
(CTV-01) gives us confidence and cautious optimism we have addressed
the causes of the FTG-06a endgame failure in December 2010 and are on
the right track for a successful return to intercept using the
redesigned EKV. Based on our analysis of the data from CTV-01, we
currently plan to conduct FTG-06b in early fiscal year 2014 to
demonstrate the ability of the CE II EKV to discriminate and intercept
a lethal object from a representative ICBM target scene. We plan to
conduct another intercept test using a two or three-stage GBI and the
CE II EKV by the end of fiscal year 2014 (FTG-09).
We plan to conduct the next intercept test of the CE-I EKV (FTG-07)
this summer in order to increase warfighter confidence and maintain a
testing cadence. We slipped this test from May/June this year to
replace corrupted non-tactical telemetry equipment critical to the
flight termination system on the interceptor, which is required for
range safety. We have made numerous improvements to the CE-I fleet
through refurbishments since the last successful CE-I flight test in
2008, and this test will demonstrate the reliability of those
refurbished GBIs. I am committed to flight testing the GMD system, at a
minimum, once per year; however, I can assure the committee that I will
not approve the execution of a flight test unless I believe we are
ready. We will work closely with DOT&E to develop scenarios and targets
for all of our tests.
We share the Government Accountability Office concern about
concurrency in the GMD program and have restructured our GMD return to
intercept (RTI) plan and schedule to design and qualify EKV fixes that
address root cause of the FTG-06a failure, and confirm the fixes
through rigorous ground and flight testing. The original RTI plan
accepted significant and excessive concurrency (parallel development,
testing and production activities) and the result has been continued
slips in the RTI plan. The current baseline RTI plan reduces this
concurrency using systems engineering ``gated'' events that confirm
critical components are ready to proceed to testing and production
while leaving options open to integrate lower risk components.
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
limited ICBM attack from current regional threats, such as North Korea
and Iran. Over the past year we have achieved higher operational
availability rates with the GMD system, mainly through high levels of
redundancy in the GMD Fire Control and communications systems. The
currently operational hardened Fort Greely, Alaska (FGA) power plant
distributes commercial power and provides generator power during
outages. We continued to maintain and improve the GMD guidance system
and engagement performance through software upgrades of the CE-I and
CE-II EKVs. Last year we completed construction of the 14-silo Missile
Field-2 at FGA and emplaced the first GBI in that field in March 2012.
We also relocated the last interceptors from Missile Field-1. This year
we will continue with our Enhanced Reliability and Stockpile
Reliability Programs to track performance, aging, and reliability
metrics, software updates, and technology enhancements for all GMD
ground systems.
MDA requests $1,033.9 million in fiscal year 2014 in Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for GMD to sustain the
current system and take steps to address the continued development of
ICBMs by countries such as North Korea. In addition to our flight
testing activities, we will continue our GMD reliability activities and
fleet upgrade program. We are also increasing the number of GBIs we
plan to produce and deploy. As announced on March 15 by Secretary
Hagel, consistent with the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR), and assuming a successful return to intercept, we plan
to increase our operational GBI fleet from 30 to 44 in 2017 by re-
allocating GBIs from the spares and stockpile reliability program. We
will reset this program with the procurement of 14 additional GBIs, two
per year, starting in fiscal year 2016. We also request $135 million in
fiscal year 2014 to rebuild a hardened Missile Field 1 critical to
achieving the 44-operational-GBI capability.
In fiscal year 2014 we will continue work on the GBI In-Flight
Interceptor Communication System (IFCS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort
Drum, New York, which we will deliver in early fiscal year 2015 and is
planned to be operational in 2015. The East Coast IDT will enable
communication with GBIs launched from Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California over longer distances and
improve defenses for the eastern United States by increasing system
performance in specific engagement scenarios.
Pursuant to the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Act, this year we will begin a siting study for a potential Missile
Field in the Continental United States (CONUS). MDA has initiated a
CONUS Interceptor Site (CIS) study to evaluate several sites for the
potential future deployment of additional GBIs capable of protecting
the homeland against threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran.
MDA will conduct a siting study this year to inform the President's
budget submission for fiscal year 2015. The Environmental Impact
Statement will be completed by the first quarter of fiscal year 2016.
These efforts would shorten the time to deploy additional GBIs if a
future decision to do so were taken.
We are also improving our homeland defense options with the
continued development of the two-stage GBI. The two-stage GBI has less
burn time than the three-stage version, which allows it to operate
within shorter engagement timelines, and will preserve future
deployment options.
To maintain readiness in our network of strategic radars, last year
MDA worked with the Air Force to begin upgrading the Early Warning
Radar (EWR) at Clear, Alaska to give it a missile defense capability,
providing improved ballistic missile defense sensor coverage over the
continental United States and reducing sustainment and operating costs.
For fiscal year 2014 we are requesting $51 million to continue this
work. Along with the Clear EWR contract award, we also exercised a
contract option in fiscal year 2013 to upgrade the Cape Cod EWR. The
upgraded Clear EWR will be added to the BMDS operational baseline in
fiscal year 2017, with the upgraded Cape Cod EWR added in fiscal year
2018. MDA plans to transfer the Beale (California), Fylingdales (United
Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland) Upgraded Early Warning Radars to the
Air Force in the later part of fiscal year 2013 once all three radars
are operating with the same software configuration.
This year we are also working with our Japanese partners to deploy
a second AN/TPY-2 radar to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of
Responsibility to enhance regional defenses and provide more robust
sensor coverage for homeland defense.
We are requesting $44.5 million in fiscal year 2014 for continued
Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar operations. For affordability reasons, MDA
transferred the SBX to Limited Test Support Status, where the radar
continues to support the BMDS test program and remains available for
contingency deployment under the operational command of PACOM. We
completed the transfer of the SBX vessel to the U.S. Navy Military
Sealift Command in fiscal year 2012. New SBX operational software with
improved discrimination and debris mitigation was delivered and
completed in January 2013. The new SBX configuration will complete
integration fielding and testing with GMD in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2014.
REGIONAL DEFENSES
Deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces,
allies and international partners remains one of our top priorities.
Our fiscal year 2014 budget request funds the continued development and
deployment of defenses against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support of
Combatant Commanders' near-term and future priorities.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.--MDA delivered the 50th THAAD
interceptor last year, completing the initial interceptor load for the
two fielded batteries. With the conclusion of unit collective training,
MDA also completed fielding of the second THAAD battery. The U.S.
Army's granting of Conditional Materiel Release for the THAAD weapon
system made THAAD available for worldwide operational employment. In
recent tests we demonstrated THAAD's ability to intercept an MRBM as
part of an integrated operational test with PAC-3 and Aegis BMD (FTI-
01) and its ability to detect, track, and engage multiple simultaneous
targets (FTT-12).
In fiscal year 2013 we are delivering the third THAAD battery to
the U.S. Army and initiating soldier new equipment training, which will
be completed in fiscal year 2014. MDA will continue to deliver THAAD
interceptors to inventory, achieving 82 interceptors by the end of this
fiscal year and 98 interceptors by the end of fiscal year 2014. For
fiscal year 2014, MDA is requesting $581 million for THAAD procurement,
which includes the purchase of 36 THAAD interceptors and six launchers,
and two THAAD Tactical Station Groups for the sixth THAAD Battery. In
fiscal year 2014 we expect to deliver the fourth THAAD Battery. Our
current plans are to deliver six batteries and, based on Combatant
Commanders' desires, we are working with the Army to analyze a
requirement for a seventh THAAD Battery within the Future Years Defense
Program. We also are requesting $269 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal
year 2014 and $92 million for THAAD operations and maintenance. We will
continue to enhance THAAD's ability to operate through post-intercept
debris, enable launch of THAAD's interceptors using sensor data
provided by other BMDS sensors, and maintain capability against current
and evolving threats.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense.--Last year we installed the Aegis
BMD 3.6 weapon system on three Aegis ships, for a total of 24 Aegis BMD
3.6 ships, and completed two Aegis BMD 4.0 installations. We also
commenced two more Aegis BMD 4.0 installs and initiated BMD 5.0 install
on the Aegis BMD test ship, the USS John Paul Jones, which will replace
USS Lake Erie in that role. This approach supports Navy and MDA testing
of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense combat system. We now have a
total of 27 certified Aegis BMD ships. This past year we delivered 11
SM-3 Block IAs and two SM-3 Block IBs, both of which were expended in
tests. By the end of 2014, up to 39 SM-3 Block IBs will be delivered.
With the Japan Ministry of Defense, we continued SM-3 Block IIA system
and component Preliminary Design Reviews and awarded a contract to
complete SM-3 IIA development.
In May 2012, we conducted a lethal engagement resulting in the
successful intercept of a unitary separating target with the second-
generation Aegis BMD 4.0 combat weapon system onboard the USS Lake Erie
and an SM-3 IB guided missile (FTM-16 Event 2a). This test also
validated the resolution of the previous flight test issue. In June
2012, we demonstrated again the ability of the SM-3 IB and the Aegis
BMD 4.0 combat system to intercept of a separating ballistic missile
target (FTM-18). Just last month we successfully conducted FTM-19
destroying a separating short-range target using the SM-3 Block IB
interceptor and the Aegis BMD 4.0.2 weapon system. This was an
important operational and developmental test for Aegis BMD that
supports the All Up Round production decision for the SM-3 IB. All
three intercept tests represented significant accomplishments for the
next generation Aegis Weapon System and SM-3 for regional defense and
specifically in support of EPAA Phase II. In the integrated FTI-01 BMDS
flight test this past October, the USS Fitzgerald successfully engaged
a low flying cruise missile over water. The Aegis combat system also
tracked an SRBM and launched an SM-3 IA against that threat space.
Despite indication of a nominal flight of the SM-3 IA, we did not
achieve an intercept. We have a Failure Review Board currently
investigating why this occurred. We have combed through ground test
data from all fleet rounds and have not found any rounds with the same
ground test results as the SM-3 IA used in FTI-01, which gives us
confidence in all deployed SM-3 IAs. This past February, in FTM-20, we
successfully intercepted a unitary MRBM target using the SM-3 IA and
the Aegis BMD 4.0 weapon system in a remote engagement using data from
the Space Tracking and Surveillance System demonstration (STSS-D)
satellites. We passed very high quality fire control quality data
provided from STSS-D satellites through C2BMC. This was a highly
complex test, and it proved the value of an integrated C2 and sensor
network and the use of space-based sensors.
The remainder of this year and next will be busy years for Aegis
BMD flight testing as we continue to demonstrate capability of the
Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapons System with the Standard Missile Block IB in a
series of intercept flight tests. Later this fall, in FTM-21, an Aegis
BMD ship will demonstrate a salvo fire capability. FTM-22 will
demonstrate the IOT&E of the SM-3 IB against a complex MRBM target.
These two tests will support a full-rate production decision. Tests of
the SM-3 IB against various targets from both ships and our first
flight testing from Aegis Ashore continue in fiscal year 2014.
In response to the Combatant Commanders' demand signal for more BMD
ships with the latest tested capability, Navy and MDA are jointly
executing efforts to upgrade Aegis Destroyers with BMD capability,
incorporating Aegis BMD into the Navy's Aegis DDG Modernization Program
and new construction of Aegis BMD DDGs. In 2014, two previously
installed Aegis BMD ships will be upgraded with the 4.0 weapons system
configuration. In addition to the ship upgrades, one non-BMD capable
ship is programmed to start the Aegis Modernization Program.
Construction of DDG 113, the first Aegis Destroyer built from the keel
up with the BMD capability, is well underway. Ships identified for
homeport transfer to Rota, Spain will have been upgraded or programmed
to receive the BMD installation.
We also continue development of a Sea Based Terminal capability to
provide protection of maritime forces against advanced anti-ship
ballistic missiles and increased layered defense for forces ashore.
Using an incremental development approach, we are incorporating BMD
capability into the Navy's SM-6 guided missile and the BMD 5.0 weapon
system. We expect to test and certify the first increment of Sea Based
Terminal capability in 2015 and 2016.
We are requesting $937 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2014
to continue the development, testing and, installation of Aegis BMD
capabilities to defeat longer range and more sophisticated ballistic
missiles launched in larger raid sizes. We also request $581 million in
fiscal year 2014 for the procurement of 52 SM-3 IB guided missiles and
$18 million for operations and maintenance of SM-3 IAs. By the end of
fiscal year 2014, we plan to deliver a total of 180 SM-3s, including IA
and IB variants.
European Phased Adaptive Approach.--We will continue to support the
EPAA to provide coverage of European NATO territory from Iranian
ballistic missile threats. In 2011 MDA completed Phase 1 of the EPAA to
provide coverage of NATO territory in Europe with the deployment of
Aegis BMD 3.6 ships with SM-3 IAs and a SPY-1 radar in the
Mediterranean, the AN/TPY-2 radar (FBM) to U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) in Turkey, and the C2BMC Spiral 6.4 system at Ramstein AFB in
Germany. We will continue to invest resources for EPAA development,
testing and deployment.
Our goal in EPAA Phase 2 is to provide a robust capability against
SRBMs and MRBMs by ensuring the system provides multiple opportunities
to engage each threat missile in flight. The architecture includes the
deployment of the Aegis BMD 4.0 and 5.0 weapon systems with SM-3 IBs at
sea and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. In fiscal year 2012 MDA
conducted Romania Aegis Ashore planning and environmental studies and
began component production necessary for early integration and testing
of the Aegis Ashore system by 2015. Aegis Ashore began construction
activities in 2012 in Moorestown, New Jersey and construction of a test
site in Kauai, Hawaii. We signed an overarching Memorandum of Agreement
with the U.S. Navy regarding Operations and Sustainment of the European
Aegis Ashore sites. The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex at
the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) will support flight testing
of Aegis Ashore capabilities in an operational configuration. The
complex will be available to conduct the first Aegis Ashore test firing
in fiscal year 2014. MDA will initiate construction of the Aegis Ashore
site in Deveselu, Romania with the delivery of the deckhouse in fiscal
year 2014. The site will be operational by December 2015. MDA requests
$85 million in fiscal year 2014 to continue construction of the Aegis
Ashore site in Romania.
In support of EPAA Phase 3, the SM-3 Block IIA, which we are co-
developing with the Japanese government and an upgraded version of the
Aegis Weapons System are on schedule to be available for deployment in
2018 at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland and at sea. Deployment
of Phase 3 will enhance and expand protection for European NATO
countries and U.S. forces through the region from MRBMs and IRBMs from
the Middle East. The upgraded Aegis Weapons System combined with the
faster, longer reaching SM-3 IIA will provide capability to counter
more sophisticated threats when compared to the SM-3 IA and IB and will
extend coverage to NATO allies in Europe threatened by longer range
ballistic missiles. With the completion of Phase 3, EPAA will provide
upper-tier coverage of NATO Europe. As we work closely with Navy in
modernization, we will also install the 5.1 Aegis Weapons System on
ships for deployment worldwide in support of the Combatant Commanders.
We will also install and deploy the 5.1 system in the two Aegis Ashore
batteries. This past year we continued development of the Aegis BMD 5.1
fire control system and awarded the SM-3 IIA contract to complete
missile development. In fiscal year 2014 we will conduct the first fly-
out test of the SM-3 IIA propulsion stack to measure its performance.
MDA requests $308.5 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2014 to
continue the bilateral, cooperative effort.
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and
Sensors.--We successfully demonstrated this past year our ability to
interoperate between NATO's Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (ALTBMD) system and C2BMC. The NATO BMD Operations Center
(BMDOC) at Ramstein Air Base is NATO's 24/7 command and control center
for missile defense. Today, the NATO BMDOC participates in joint
exercises with the EUCOM missile and air defense architecture and is
responsible for command and control of the multi-national Patriot units
currently deployed in Turkey.
In 2012 we continued to support warfighter operations of the EUCOM
BMDS capability for regional defense and executed key warfighter events
to demonstrate readiness for defense of Israel by linking the AN/TPY-2
and C2BMC ballistic missile threat tracks to Aegis BMD, THAAD, and
Patriot shooters in a distributed environment using operational
communications and crews. In partnership with the Combatant Commands,
we maintain the capability to engage multiple simultaneous threat
attacks in the region. Last year we completed the AN/TPY-2 radar
deployment to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), where we deployed a C2BMC
suite ahead of schedule as well as the Global Engagement Manager (GEM)
for control of the AN/TPY-2 radar to enhance regional missile defense.
We request $300 million in fiscal year 2014 to develop and deploy
BMDS sensors, and $145.8 million to operate and sustain the nine AN/
TPY-2 radars and support the UEWRs and Cobra Dane EWR.
We request $418.4 million in fiscal year 2014 to operate and
sustain C2BMC at fielded sites and continue C2BMC program spiral
development of software and engineering to incorporate enhanced C2BMC
capability into the battle management architecture and promote further
interoperability among the BMDS elements, incorporate boost phase
tracking, and improve system-level correlation and tracking. We will
also continue communications support for the AN/TPY-2 radars and C2BMC
upgrades.
We request $44.9 million for continued operation of the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System in fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year
2012, MDA operated STSS demonstration satellites (STSS-D) around the
clock with availability exceeding 95 percent as well as the Near Field
Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite to collect Earth limb
phenomenology. We continue to operate the two STSS-D satellites to
conduct cooperative tests with other BMDS elements and demonstrate the
capability of the satellites against targets of opportunity to provide
high precision, real-time tracking of missiles and midcourse objects
that enable closing the fire control loops with BMDS interceptors. We
conducted a successful intercept of a threat MRBM last February by
Aegis BMD system using only STSS-D data to provide launch data for the
SM-3 IA guided missile (FTM-20).
The Department of Defense has terminated the Precision Tracking
Space System (PTSS). Concurrency in the development schedule and
uncertainty in the cost estimates put in doubt long-term fiscal
sustainability. Moreover, the PTSS acquisition strategy was high risk.
We believe we need to be in space for infrared (IR) discrimination
capability, but for now we can address the threat with other land-based
sensors in key locations, which will allow us to provide support to the
warfighter in the near term and assume less acquisition risk. A study
has been initiated to determine how best to support future sensor
requirements and we are exploring technologies to improve the
capabilities of ground, air, and space sensors.
DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES
We are developing fiscally sustainable advanced BMD technologies
that can be integrated into the BMDS to adapt as threats change. Our
investments are focused on technology that brings upgradeable
capability to the warfighter. For sensors, in the near-term we will
integrate and demonstrate electro-optical and infrared sensors using
available airborne UAV platforms to create a precision track our
shooters can use . . . For interceptors, our overall strategy includes
making near-term investments in interceptor technology that accelerate
our ability to use a kill vehicle singularly or in combination in a way
that balances our overall approach to solving the very difficult
problems of lethal object discrimination, limited inventory and cost
per kill. We will also explore other ways to improve the exchange ratio
in the missile defense battle.
Last year, we restructured our high power directed energy program
and began building the foundation for the next-generation laser system
by competing two promising lightweight, highly efficient solid state
lasers, one at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the other at
MIT Lincoln Laboratory. At MIT Lincoln Laboratory, we built a small-
scale prototype of a laser device that exploits a novel technique for
combining the output of individual fiber lasers. This year, for the
fiber laser, we will team with the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency to determine the most efficient method of combining laser beams.
We will improve the performance of the competing Diode Pumped Alkali
Laser System at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory through a series
of laser system upgrades. MDA is requesting $43.5 million in fiscal
year 2014 to demonstrate the efficiency, producibility, and scaling
potential of the two candidate lasers.
MDA requests $77.3 million in fiscal year 2014 to evaluate and
research component and sensor technology requirements. Incorporating
promising hardware and software from prior programs into our advanced
sensor test bed, we will prove the value of emerging discrimination
concepts.
Despite the commonality of their mission and functions, components
on the current midcourse phase interceptors, the GBI and SM-3 kill
vehicles, were developed independently at a substantial cost over the
past decade. We are looking at the benefits of developing common kill
vehicle technology for the GBI and SM-3 variants, focusing in
particular on the ability to address future technology advancements
through the development of a similar set of components, subsystems, and
software. This common kill vehicle technology effort initially will
perform risk reduction and examine other technologies that may improve
future interceptor capabilities. This effort is in keeping with the
plan for the next generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, as directed
by section 225 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Act.
Given changes in the assessment of the threat from North Korea to
the U.S. homeland, as well as delays in the potential deployment of any
SM-3 IIB interceptor resulting from delayed technology development due
to budget reductions, the Department is evaluating alternatives to
hedge against future threat technology advancements. The Department is
no longer planning for the SM-3 IIB program and does not request
funding for the program in fiscal year 2014. In addition to the cuts
imposed in the fiscal year 2012 Appropriation and fiscal year 2013
funding, analyses show a larger missile would be required to achieve
the necessary burn out velocity, and a larger missile design would have
taken additional time and resources, pushing the initial operational
capability out past 2022. Our near-to-mid-term focus for homeland
defense will be to increase GMD capability, to include increasing
deployed GBIs from 30 to 44, investing in Common Kill Vehicle
technology, and conducting siting and EIS studies for a new U.S. GBI
missile field.
MDA requests $19.2 million in fiscal year 2014 to continue
partnerships with industry and universities to seek innovative concepts
in sensors, weapons, and advanced algorithms. We will leverage
University-to-University International Research opportunities with
allied nations to enhance Advanced Technology initiatives and build
stronger relationships with our international partners and NATO allies.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
MDA is engaged either bilaterally or multilaterally with nearly two
dozen countries and international organizations, such as NATO and the
Gulf Cooperation Council.
In Asia-Pacific, the United States and Japan are working together
to support the deployment of the second U.S. forward-based AN/TPY-2
radar. In addition, we continue to develop collaboratively the SM-3 IIA
to enable U.S. and Japanese Aegis BMD ships to engage MRBMs and IRBMs
and, when coupled with the upgraded Aegis BMD weapon system, more
sophisticated ballistic missile threats. This year we signed a Second
Amendment to the formal joint agreement with Japan administering the
SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) effort. The amendment will
reduce risk in the SCD program by adding flight tests and sufficient
time in the schedule for additional engineering analysis between flight
tests.
This budget continues MDA's longstanding commitment in support of
Israeli defensive efforts. MDA is working with the Israel Missile
Defense Organization (IMDO) to deliver Iron Dome batteries and
interceptors. Iron Dome has had significant success protecting the
Israeli population against short-range rockets and large artillery
shells. MDA has been working closely with U.S. Department of Defense
leadership to ensure U.S. funding for Iron Dome is being used
effectively to produce additional Iron Dome batteries and interceptors.
Any further U.S. contributions on Iron Dome will be governed by a
formal international agreement. MDA is actively seeking Iron Dome co-
production opportunities for U.S. defense industry. We are negotiating
to obtain available technical data packages and data rights should
there be a future U.S. defense requirement for this weapon system.
We are also developing missile defense systems with Israel to
address regional ballistic missile threats. The David's Sling Weapon
System is designed to defeat SRBM threats. IMDO and MDA completed the
first phase of the development of David's Sling last November with a
successful intercept test. MDA and Israel also are co-developing the
Arrow-3 Upper Tier interceptor. The advanced design of this interceptor
was successfully tested this past February in a non-intercept test; a
second fly-out test is scheduled for fiscal year 2014. MDA also
participated in Austere Challenge 2012 exercises, which successfully
demonstrated the concept of operations for the U.S.-Israel BMD
architecture and future interoperability.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, U.S. BMD capabilities continue to
expand in defense of forward-deployed U.S. armed forces, allies, and
partners. Major MDA activities in the Middle East involve relationships
with regional partners expressing interest in procuring U.S. systems.
Last year, MDA was officially designated as a Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) Implementing Agency for THAAD and the AN/TPY-2 radar. In addition
to our current $3.5 billion FMS case with the United Arab Emirates, we
are engaged with several other potential FMS customers for these very
capable systems.
In Europe, aside from EPAA planning and fielding, MDA maintains
active bilateral relationships with our close allies in that region.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, when I arrived at the Missile Defense Agency last
November I was impressed with the organization and the dedication and
professionalism of the government and contractor workforce. The Agency
is settling into the post-BRAC configuration, which we completed in
fiscal year 2011. This has been a challenging period for our personnel,
but we have stayed focused on our core mission. I am proud to lead the
people behind today's missile defense program. They are highly
motivated and the very best in the world at what they do.
The impact of the sequestration on the program and workforce is
significant. We will see limitations in our ability to deliver future
homeland defense capabilities. To mitigate some of the effects of
sequestration cuts, I will be working with the Department to submit an
Above Threshold Reprogramming request as part of the Department's
larger request this year.
Whatever happens, I am dedicated to executing successful GMD
intercept flight tests over the coming year and will continue to strive
to ensure reliability in our operational homeland defenses. We have
made good progress in our work with our international partners, and I
want to continue those important efforts. We will continue our work
with the warfighter to develop, test, and field a networked, global BMD
system that is flexible, survivable, and affordable. We will work on
ways to cut sustainment costs, reduce high-risk acquisition
concurrency, improve system reliability, and deliver capabilities as
promised. And, mindful that today's security environment is unlikely to
mirror that of tomorrow, we will continue to invest in promising and
potentially game-changing technology programs to ensure the BMDS will
be capable of defeating the complex threats we expect to face in the
future.
I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thanks very much, Admiral.
Philip Coyle, who once ran the Pentagon's weapons-testing
program, is currently with the Center for Arms Control. He said
in a statement after the last failed test, that the system ``is
something the United States military and the American people
cannot depend upon.''
Mr. Coyle said there has been no successful test of the
Ground-Based Mid-course Missile Defense system like the one
launched in July in 5 years. Pentagon officials acknowledge the
interceptors had a mixed record, hitting dummy targets just 50
percent of the time.
Aside from the cost of each test, which was estimated to
be, at this point, about $214 million, let me ask you some
questions. Is it not true that these failed tests have taken
place in a very controlled and scripted environment? The system
operators were privy to significant information about the
attack in advance, and even with that knowledge, 7 of the 15
intercept tests have failed and the system's track record has
not improved over time.
FLIGHT TESTING
Admiral Syring. Sir, we do test in a controlled, scripted
environment, based on the amount of time and money each one of
these tests costs. That said, we've gone through an extensive
review. And I think if Dr. Gilmore were here, he would testify
to the threat-realism aspect of our targets that we have flown.
And we stand by the results that we've obtained. We have
obtained three now out of four intercepts with the version that
we just flew in July. So this was the first failure of what we
call the CE-I EKV. And our goal is to find out what happened
and to get back to flight testing as soon as possible.
I would differ in terms of our confidence level with the
system. And certainly, the war fighters will chime in and
testify to that in the upcoming months.
We handle and will handle in the future reliability
failures, such as the one we saw, through shot doctrine. And
the current shot doctrine that the Combatant Command's (COCOM)
employ would have handled this failure. And that said, we
cannot stop testing. We must continue to test. We cannot wait
another 4\1/2\ to 5 years to test again.
And, as submitted, my budget request in 2014 is requesting
two GMD flight tests in fiscal year 2014.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you just a few specific
questions. Is it true or not that the GMD system has not been
tested against an intercontinental range missile, and no plans
for such tests have been scheduled until 2015, at the earliest?
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTING
Admiral Syring. Sir, it has not been tested against an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It's been tested
against long-range intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBM), which is the next class down. We're in the process of
manufacturing a target for ICBM testing to begin in 2015. And
between now and 2020, there's eight scheduled ICBM intercept
tests.
Senator Durbin. Has the system ever been tested against a
tumbling warhead?
Admiral Syring. Sir, in a classified environment, I'd be
happy to answer that.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you this: Of the 30 deployed GMD
interceptors, it has been reported that half include obsolete
parts, although an additional 10 have been taken off
operational status because of a known design flaw.
GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR OBSOLESCENCE TO UPGRADES
Admiral Syring. We've gone through an extensive upgrade
period of the oldest interceptors that were fielded in the
early 2000s. The test that we just flew was a CE-I upgrade,
which was the upgraded EKV that had not been flight tested. So
it was important for us to flight test that.
I won't stipulate the number due to classification, but
there are a number of GBIs that are available to the war
fighter but in a lesser readiness condition but still usable by
the war fighter.
Senator Durbin. So, Admiral, it comes down to this: Since
President Reagan announced this concept 30 years ago, and we
started making rather substantial investments, there are still
serious questions as to whether or not we have a missile
defense system that can protect America against threats that we
believe could be coming our way from Iran, North Korea, or
other enemies of our country.
This committee and Congress are being asked by some to
expand the amount of money we spend on the systems at a time
when testing has not proven that these systems are effective.
What is your belief? Is this the time to invest more money in
the deployment of these systems?
GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR TESTING
Admiral Syring. The time, sir, is to continue the test and
to continue to finish the developments that are underway. And
we're budgeted properly to do that. I won't say that additional
money won't be required. The budget, as it's currently
structured, has adequate funding to complete the development of
the CE-II, to test the CE-II, to complete the upgrades to the
CE-I fleet. And I remain confident that America is defended
today with the readiness of our system.
Senator Durbin. How can you say that you're confident that
America can be defended if we've never tested our system
against an intercontinental ballistic missile?
GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR CAPABILITY AGAINST INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC
MISSILE
Admiral Syring. Sir, we have extensive modeling and
simulation capability that projects the results of our
conducted intercept testing into the longer range environment.
Speed and distance are important, and as we have a target that
is available for intercept testing starting in 2015, we will
actually demonstrate that. But our models and simulation and
ground testing that we have done indicate that we would be
successful.
Senator Durbin. I'm told by my staff that you are unique in
that you may be the first from the Navy to be in charge of this
particular ground-based missile defense. We discussed briefly
before this hearing the Aegis missile and our reliance on it
and its proven capability.
Could you compare the Aegis missile defense system that we
currently deploy to the ground missile defense system in terms
of its reliability?
AEGIS VERSUS GROUND-BASED MID-COURSE DEFENSE RELIABILITY
Admiral Syring. Sir, the Aegis system was designed in a
much different environment than the current system that we have
for GMD. The Aegis system--the GMD--as you're aware, sir, was,
and the GBIs currently fielded were fielded very quickly to
meet a growing threat. And that served a very, very good
purpose.
The Aegis system was designed early on, once we decided to
go down that path, in a very systematic systems-engineered
approach. And I think we see the results of that. It was always
our intent, or the program's intent, from what I understand,
historically, was to incrementally improve the GBI system over
time. And that's what we're doing.
The Aegis system, sir, has been extremely successful. The
hit-to-kill technology and the hit-to-kill theory, I think, has
been proven over and over again, and as it has in GMD, as well.
I would just say that the two programs were stood up in a much
different rate in a much different timeframe.
Senator Durbin. That's the point I'd like to get to. You've
dedicated a major part of your military career to acquisitions.
What you've described to us is an Aegis system, which was
developed in a certain way, in comparison to a ground missile
defense system developed in another way. The net outcome is the
Aegis system is reliable, and we count on it to protect our
Nation. The ground missile defense system has not reached and
not produced that level of confidence.
What mistakes were made with the ground missile defense
system development that you believe led to this contrast?
PROBLEM WITH SCHEDULE DRIVEN ACQUISITIONS
Admiral Syring. Sir, I would just--I would characterize it
more as the schedule-driven pressure to get interceptors in the
ground to counter the threat. And the decision to field what
were prototypes was made, and made for good reason, with the
theory and the program structured after that to go and prove
these interceptors, which is what we've been doing. That was
what borne the CE-II program, and that was what will borne the
common kill vehicle program, which we've requested in the 2014
budget.
Senator Durbin. So it seems to me, if I can restate that as
I heard it, that the deployment schedule was so demanding that
there was deployment before development, deployment before
proven test when it came to ground missile defense. And that
was not the case when it came to Aegis.
Admiral Syring. I would agree with that, sir.
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
Senator Durbin. We run into this repeatedly, whether we're
talking about the F-35 or others. Keep producing, even while
you're testing. We've reached a point now where we're making
some critical budget decisions and may not be able to afford
that luxury.
What troubles me is this is a system that still hasn't been
proven to be able to protect America and the notion of spending
additional billions of dollars at this moment in time. I can
understand our goal. It's a worthy one, to protect our Nation.
But spending more on weapons that are not proven I don't
believe meets the President's test of weapons both proven and
cost effective.
Thank you, Admiral.
Let me turn it over to Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, let's go back to the recent test
and the failure. Do you believe that the architecture of the
whole system is sound in itself?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. And we proved that in the last
test.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely. If you can get into it some
here. And if I ask a question and you can't, you'll tell us.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. We might need a classified hearing on this.
Was there a mishap dealing with the missile itself?
Admiral Syring. I'm sorry, sir. What was the word?
Senator Shelby. The missile. In other words, what was the
failure? Where did the failure come from at this juncture? I
know you're still analyzing everything.
Admiral Syring. What we can say publicly is that the EKV,
the kill vehicle, did not separate from the third-stage
booster.
Senator Shelby. Okay. So it was not the power train? You
know, it wasn't the missile?
Admiral Syring. It wasn't the booster, sir.
Senator Shelby. Booster.
Admiral Syring. And it wasn't the guidance system. The EKV
did not separate.
Senator Shelby. Do you think you can correct that?
Admiral Syring. Absolutely. Yes, sir. We've seen separation
issues in previous flight tests before the CE-I, early on in
the prototype testing. And those have been corrected. And we'll
find out what happened here, and we'll correct this as well.
Senator Shelby. The chairman talked about the cost, and
this is the appropriations subcommittee on defense. We're
interested in costs. We're also interested in defending this
country. Don't you need more tests, rather than fewer tests?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. The more tests, the more you learn, the
more technology evolves in anything, whether it's a truck, or a
tank, or a submarine, or a missile, or a missile to defend
against a missile attack. Don't you need more tests, basically?
ADDITIONAL TESTING
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We do need more tests. And I've
requested in the 2014 budget two intercept tests and at least
one intercept test in subsequent years.
Senator Shelby. I realize that the missile defense has been
an evolving concept to reality and so forth, and it will
continue to do that. What are your biggest challenges in the
future as we look around the world? I'm speaking generically.
Is it better technology, ways to evade defense, or what is it?
Are there many? Or that should be in another form?
THREAT
Admiral Syring. If I may, it's a combination of many
factors. The threat is continuing to proliferate. The threat is
becoming more sophisticated in both numbers and capability.
It's important that we stay ahead of the threat, as we are
today. And the way we do that, and let me break it down into
two separate areas: Regional defense and homeland defense.
Homeland defense, I would say our biggest challenge near
term and then continued testing and proving the technology over
the next 10 years is reliability of the GBI, reliability of the
overall system. Flying before we buy any more, which we're
committed to, and continuing that commitment.
That said, we need to start to change the cost calculus and
the cost curve. We can't just keep building bigger interceptors
and more interceptors. And that is what we'll get into, some of
the advanced technology work that we're pursuing, some of which
I can't talk about here today and would be happy to in a
classified environment.
Continued partnership with our allies in the regional areas
over in Europe, over in the Pacific, and over in the gulf
region. And we've had extensive agreements that we have in all
three areas that are panning out. And we must continue to
pursue partnerships in terms of defense of not just the
homeland, but defense of our regional allies and our forces
ashore.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, the Department has proposed to
terminate what we call the Precision Tracking Space System
(PTSS) due to concerns over concurrency and the development
schedule, uncertainty, and of course, in the cost estimates.
How will MDA backfill lost capability for tracking and
discrimination if the termination goes through?
PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SYSTEM TERMINATION
Admiral Syring. We did have serious concerns with the
concurrent acquisition strategy of PTSS and the costs to get
there. We said when we terminated, when the announcement was
made to terminate that program, that we would be pursuing more
terrestrial-based sensors, meaning ground sensors. And you've
heard me talk about the need for more radars and more
discriminating radars.
Senator Shelby. Okay. On March 15, Secretary Hagel
announced that the U.S. will deploy 14 of these additional
ground-based interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska. That's about
a 50-percent increase. Would you clarify how the timeline for
the emplacement of these additional interceptors would be and
how this current strategy will impact the per-cost unit of each
interceptor in the near term?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. And is that important?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. The strategy to get to 44 by
2017, by 2017, is a reallocation of missiles that are currently
in the production flow under the old contract and the new
contract. Completing those missiles, once we have a successful
CE-II intercept test in March, is the ``Fly Before You Buy.''
We must complete that intercept test to release these missiles
for final integration.
And what you'll see is, as those are finished, we will
populate the remaining silos that exist. And we'll undertake
starting, or actually starting this summer, the Missile Field 1
refurbishment.
So it's a combination of a reallocation, completing what's
on contract, successfully flying, and demonstrating in our
intercept tests before we do any of it.
We have requested, and as part of the strategy that was
announced on March 15, that we would begin to buy interceptors
in 2016. And I think you'll see us come back in future budgets
on more economical and better ways to buy those.
Senator Shelby. Does the President's 2014 budget request
provide adequate funding to ensure the additional 14 ground-
based interceptors we'll produce and field by 2017, per the
Secretary of Defense guidance?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Okay. My last question, Mr. Chairman, would
be in dealing with the Iron Dome, which we all know. And while
I understand that MDA may not have an immediate requirement for
the Iron Dome system, I'd be interested in future
opportunities, if there are some, in co-production of this
system in the United States should the need for an Iron Dome
materialize.
Could you provide us an update, update to the subcommittee,
on where negotiations currently stand with Israel to obtain the
technical data packages for this system?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we have had extensive discussions with
the Israelis, Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) in
particular, four meetings recently. We are making progress.
We're not there yet, frankly. And we are actively negotiating
and striving for a significant percentage of work share in the
United States for that system.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Admiral, we appreciate your cooperation
with our committee and your appearance here today. But
especially, we appreciate your leadership in helping make sure
we're doing what we need to do to protect ourselves against
missile attack and to take advantage of emerging technologies
so that we utilize those and deploy those as soon as reasonably
possible, given the constraints of budget and practicality.
These are sometimes vague and immeasurable and imprecise
decisions that have to be made. And we appreciate your
leadership and your team and the devotion and commitment that
you are making to making the right decisions and helping to
recommend the right decisions by our Government.
The recent announcement to deploy some operational ground-
based interceptors is, I assume, due to advancing and more
sophisticated threats that we face. Are the funds that are
being requested for appropriation by the Congress now in this
budget request going to be sufficient to help us move as
quickly and as completely sound in terms of operational
capability as the money will allow us?
Admiral Syring. I'm confident of that, sir. We appreciate
your committee's support on the above threshold reprogramming
request. It helped us through the sequestration cut in 2013.
And as the budget is currently structured in 2014 and
requested, I'm confident that we can meet that need.
Senator Cochran. Would you comment on the Cobra Judy
platform, if that's something that you can discuss in open
session with us? Specifically, about the enhanced capability
that this may provide to the missile defense agency? Is this
something that you are looking at acquiring and will need to
have funds appropriated to support?
COBRA JUDY
Admiral Syring. The Cobra Judy shipping capability, the
radars that are on that ship are fantastic radars, as you know.
And I'm looking, sir, at all options in terms of where we can
either reuse radars in a better way for discrimination
capability or potentially build a new radar in the future. It
will be one of the platforms that we look at. Yes, sir.
SEA-BASED OPTION FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
Senator Cochran. Thank you. You've indicated that you have
under review some sites for a third land-based missile defense
system. And I wonder whether or not a sea-based option is
included in that review. I wonder about your assessment of that
and whether evaluating this is an approach to enhancing
specifically East Coast defense capability as a part of that
equation.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. As Chairman Dempsey has
testified, that will be one of the capabilities that will be
evaluated. The Aegis system, as you know, is a fantastic
system. We would have to get into a classified discussion in
terms of what coverage and what capability that could provide
in defense of the homeland, which I'd rather not go into here
in an unclassified setting. But, yes, sir, it will be a
capability that we examine in conjunction with examining the
third site.
TERMINAL HIGH-ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE BATTERIES
Senator Cochran. Every time I see the acronym THAAD, it
makes me wonder: What am I doing in this question here?
But I notice that there's an extra A in the missile
acronym.
Senator Durbin. You're moonlighting.
Senator Cochran. ``Moonlighting,'' he says.
But I'm just curious. There's been a decision, I suppose,
made about the number of THAAD batteries. And that's been
reduced, as I understand it, from nine to six in fiscal year
2013. To your knowledge, is the Department reevaluating that
need for increasing the number of batteries? And what is your
assessment about how effective that system is?
Admiral Syring. I'll take the second part of the question
first. The system is very effective, extremely effective since
the system was redesigned back in the mid-2000s. The track
record is 10 for 10 in terms of hit-to-kill intercept testing.
The requirement is nine. For budget reasons, we cut that to
six during the last budget submission. I am working hard as the
new director with the Army to find a way to the seventh and
possibly eighth battery. The system is needed, and the system
is needed more in number, in my assessment, in discussion with
the combatant commanders.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your testimony and
for your leadership. Again, we appreciate your service.
Admiral Syring. Thank you, sir.
Senator Durbin. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, Admiral,
welcome, and thank you for the conversations that we have had
recently to discuss missile defense and, more specifically in
Alaska, what's happening up in Greely.
I would like to just state at the outset that I'm confident
in our systems. I appreciate your leadership there at MDA.
Recognize that we have had successful tests, CE-I tests, in the
past. I think you and I would agree that it helps to have
additional testing. It helps, too, to keep on testing. Is that
correct?
ADDITIONAL GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTORS TESTING
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am, I 100 percent agree.
Senator Murkowski. As you know, I was in Greely at the
beginning of May, had an opportunity to go through the field
there. And this is obviously not my first time. I have been
through on many, many occasions. But I have been pleased to see
the build-out, the proposal that we have with Missile Field 1
there. It was absolutely my view that it was shortsighted by
the Administration with the previous decommissioning of Missile
Field 1 there at Greely.
I look at this, and particularly in view of what we see
with increasing threats coming out of North Korea, Iran, my
concern is that we not leave Greely at less than full capacity
and capability. What more can we do at Fort Greely to provide
the best missile defense to protect our Nation?
NORTH KOREA THREAT
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. The first step is for us to
complete on schedule the Missile Field 1 refurbishment and to
get those silos ready for the additional GBIs that we're going
to buy.
There would be growth possibilities beyond that if we
decided to go beyond 44. Forty-four, though, gives us a roughly
50 percent increase in terms of defense of our homeland against
a ballistic missile attack. So completing the testing,
completing the missile field, modifications, being ready for
the reload of that field up to 44 is of paramount importance to
our strategy.
Senator Murkowski. And you are comfortable with the
schedule that we're on to fill that out?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. And there will be contracts
released this summer to begin that work.
Senator Murkowski. There are future cost savings, I think,
if we were to improve Missile Field 1 to 11 or 20 silos now
instead of 6. Would you agree that by increasing the funds by a
relatively low amount now that we would increase efficiencies
and allow for greater benefits in the long run?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. There would be benefit to that
if the threat situation dictated.
Senator Murkowski. Where would you say that you would
invest your next dollars in order to achieve that persistence
coverage for the United States we are all looking for? Where do
you spend your money next?
Admiral Syring. I would spend our next dollar on
discriminating sensors, meaning radars, big radars west and
east, to give us the capability where I see the threat going in
the next 5 to 10 years.
Senator Murkowski. And as you say, okay, those are your
first dollars. How does this then track with the plans and the
scheduled build-out at Fort Greely?
Admiral Syring. The premise, the fundamental tenet of the
strategy to go to 44 was the escalation of the threat from
North Korea as the most near-term issue the United States
faces. And going to 44 by 2017 keeps us ahead of that threat in
terms of numbers and capacity.
We need to take the additional step of discriminating
sensors as the threat moves beyond just numbers, but also
sophistication to help counter that escalation. And my view is
that the 44 is important. The 44 addresses what we see with
North Korea today. Discriminating sensors are going to be
equally important. And then what you'll see is the Department
evaluate the need and the requirement to go beyond 44 as we
start to evaluate the threat from Iran and other nations like
that.
Senator Murkowski. So you view these as on parallel tracks?
So we're working to build out on the radar side, as well, at
the same time, concurrently then, as we are addressing all of
our issues at Greely?
DISCRIMINATING SENSORS
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. You'll see us down the 44 path
in a serious nature, in a serious way. You'll see us study, and
we've done some studies already with the combatant commander,
on discriminating sensors and where those might be and what
they might look like. And then the pre-work that's going on
with the CONUS interceptor site study that I'm doing this year
and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that will follow
to keep these three things in parallel.
Senator Murkowski. Okay. And you may have addressed this
already. But can you speak to the timeline of the flight
testing and return to flight for our newer missiles?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. The newest missile will be
flight tested in March 2014, intercept tested. And as you know,
we've had two failures of that missile. We understand what the
problem is. Through ground testing, we're confident that it's
been completed and adequately addressed, and we look forward to
the intercept test.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Admiral Syring. And that remains on schedule.
Senator Murkowski. Are we testing now as we would in a war
fight?
Admiral Syring. We are testing in a way that is
representative of a trajectory or a threat missile that would
come from a country such as North Korea. The last test that we
did was very similar to that in terms of speed and altitude.
And it was actually the longest-range intercept test that we
have tried.
So we're continuing to progress up that curve. But the
question that I received from the chairman earlier is, it is
necessary, based on the cost of these tests, to have our best
engineers there to script the test, understand what those
timelines are so that we get the maximum engineering value from
the test. I'm confident that the war fighters, if asked, could
employ the system seamlessly.
Senator Murkowski. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I know that you've already answered a number of
questions on the unsuccessful test, which came as a surprise to
us. I know a review board has been established, which will help
us better understand it. From what I've read, it doesn't seem
to be an indictment of the ground-based interceptor system as a
whole, but rather a more narrow issue. Would you generally
agree with that, based on what you know so far?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. Every part of the system worked
as designed up to the failure of the EKV to separate.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Admiral, a 2012 report by the
National Research Council concluded that there are gaps in our
Nation's ballistic missile defense system, particularly when it
comes to protecting the East Coast. Alaska is going to be fine.
But Maine, there is a real gap.
The report highlighted a location in Maine as one of two
possible sites for an additional missile interceptor field. In
your written testimony, you stated that MDA has begun to
evaluate several candidate sites in anticipation of conducting
an EIS for an additional ground-based interceptor site within
the United States. And we've discussed this in my office as
well.
Could you provide the subcommittee this morning with an
update on where you are in this review process? And are you
still looking at the two sites identified in the National
Research Council report, as well as other sites?
CONUS SITE
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, thank you for the question. I'll
answer the second part first. Yes, we are looking at the two
sites in Maine, in conjunction with other sites as well.
We are in the process of--screening is a good word for it--
screening all of the sites that we have looked at in detail,
down to a number that will then result in us going to ask,
first any Government entities in the area, for additional
information, and then eventually for us to go onsite to several
of these places before the end of the year to do site surveys.
My plan is within the next 2 to 3 weeks, once we've gotten
the approval through the building of the sites that have been
screened for the criteria of wanting further information,
needing further information in terms of viable contenders,
there's many factors that go into that, as you know, Senator,
with safety, location, system effectiveness, the geographic
location, base infrastructure, land infrastructure. There's a
whole series of criteria that I've used.
But what we'll do is, we will notify the Congress before we
go public with any of those selections. And once we do that and
brief the staff members, we will go ask the sites for more
information. We will then take that information and study it
for another few weeks and then send people to the sites that
have the most promise.
It's a very serious effort that is backed up with thousands
of pages of documentation and analysis. It is not haphazard.
Senator Collins. I know that you will do a thorough review.
And in addition to the criteria that you mentioned, I also
would encourage you to look at local support and acceptance for
the site. I know in my State of Maine, it is a very welcoming
place for military installations of this sort. In fact, I've
sent several letters from local groups that endorse the site
being located in northern Maine at the site of the former
Loring Air Force Base.
But I think that's a very important part of this review
process. Locating the site in an area where it is not welcomed
by the population I don't think would be wise. So in addition
to all of those extremely important technical issues, I hope
that you will consider that factor as well.
PUBLIC SUPPORT FACTOR
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, we do consider that factor, and that
will be a factor in the decision.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Separate from the discussion regarding an additional
interceptor site, would an additional radar site on the East
Coast increase our early-warning capabilities regarding threats
emanating from the Middle East?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. An additional radar would help
us with the discrimination problem and threat that we see in
the future.
Senator Collins. And that is what you seem to be saying in
response to Senator Murkowski's question, as well.
Now, I understand that your plan is for the environmental
impact study for the potential third interceptor site to be
accomplished in fiscal year 2014. Do you have funding included
in the budget request to conduct that study? I know EISs are
expensive, as well as the fact that they take a long time.
Admiral Syring. No, ma'am. There's not money in the budget
request currently. We'll be working with the Congress on
methods to address that shortfall.
Senator Collins. Admiral, both President Bush and President
Obama have recognized the advantages of an additional missile
defense site for more effective defense against long-range
ballistic missile threats.
You have looked very carefully at this issue. Could you
give us your evaluation since 2002 and 2009, when the two
different presidents made policy decisions in this area? Has
the ballistic missile threat from our potential adversaries
grown, stayed the same, decreased? What's your assessment of
the threat?
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, I'll answer it in the context of
being a consumer of intelligence. And I'll let the intelligence
experts talk about that in more detail in a classified setting.
But I will say that, as the strategy that was announced by the
Secretary is the key point of the threat has advanced. And
North Korea has made strides. The Taepo Dong-2 launch in
December meant something. And we must be able to address that.
And the 44 GBIs in Fort Greely will enable us to stay ahead
of that threat as we see it develop. And we'll be constantly
evaluating where we need to be in terms of sensors and
discrimination and potentially more GBIs beyond the 44.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Let me just end, Admiral, by
thanking you for your leadership of this very important agency.
You took over a troubled agency that had some personnel and
morale issues, and from everything I've seen, you've really
turned the agency around. And I commend you for your
leadership.
Admiral Syring. Thank you, ma'am. As I sign off every
update to the Agency, it's an honor to serve with each one of
them. And I've been in the Navy 28 years, and it's by far the
most professional and dedicated workforce I've ever had the
chance to work with.
Senator Collins. That is great to hear, because the mission
is a really important one.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
I asked the staff: How much have we spent on missile
defense since President Reagan said this was a national goal?
Their estimate is $150 billion. It's been 5 years since we've
had a successful intercept test--5 years. And all the
conversation from the administration, and at this table today,
has been about how we should continue to spend more for silos
in Alaska, for the placement of ground missile defense on the
East Coast, and so forth.
I'm trying to reconcile the appetite of Congress to keep
spending more money with the actual results of testing. I want
this country to be safe, and I believe if we had a ground
missile defense system that worked, we would be a safer Nation,
period.
Can you reconcile two things that you have said here?
First, ``Fly Before You Buy.'' I think I understand that to
basically say, ``We're not going to buy something until it's
proven that it works.'' And secondly, the notion that we're
committing ourselves to 14 more interceptors in a year or two,
when we haven't really flown. We're buying before we fly. We
haven't really proven that these interceptors can work. How do
you reconcile that?
FLY BEFORE YOU BUY
Admiral Syring. Sir, I'll answer it in two ways. The
interceptor that we're going to buy after we fly is the newest
interceptor that addresses many of the legacy and rapid
fielding issues that were in the design of the prototypes that
were fielded in the 2000s.
The CE-II was the program and the upgrade that we intended
to pursue and did pursue after we fielded the GBIs very, very
quickly.
The CE-II intercept failure, sir, that we've seen, the new
ones, have been in the very late end game of the intercepts,
meaning that everything up to that point worked. The booster
worked; the updates worked; the ballistic missile defense
system gave it the track. Everything worked.
What we're talking about is a very delicate system in the
end game that, frankly, we did not see until the flight test.
The first failure was a quality issue. It wasn't a technology
issue. It was a lock wire. The second issue is only observed
through the first actual flight test after that failure when we
saw it in the end game. We understand what happened. We've been
able to replicate it in the ground test.
So I'm talking about a very small component of the overall
interceptor, the inertial measurement unit (IMU). And through
ground testing, we're confident that in the flight test it will
work. Again, both of those intercepts, all the way up to the
point of failure, did everything they needed to do. It's case
in point, if you just consider the first failure, though, sir,
of the importance of producibility, of quality control, of
everything that is endemic in the manufacture of an
interceptor. And those processes have been improved greatly
over the last 4 or 5 years.
So, that said, and I said this before, Mr. Chairman, the
hit-to-kill technology I'm confident of. We've proven it not
just in this program, but other programs. It's a matter of
getting to a producible, repeatable, quality-controlled design
and manufacture of an interceptor.
Senator Durbin. So is it fair, I want these tests to be
successful. We've invested a lot of money. If this works, we're
a safer Nation. So, I'm not starting hoping for the worst; I'm
hoping for the best. And I like your confident feel that, you
know, the day is coming soon when we have a successful test.
But is it fair for us in this role, in the Appropriations
Committee, to say we're going to stand by ``Fly Before You
Buy'' before we make a commitment to 14 more interceptors or an
expansion of the ground missile defense system, we're going to
wait for that successful test to prove that this is money well
spent?
Admiral Syring. You should demand that, sir.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Let me ask you this question: If
the threats are Iran and North Korea, and we are currently
testing long-range missiles, are either of those countries
capable of launching long-range missiles, not ICBMs, that would
be a threat to the territory of the United States?
Admiral Syring. I'm just hesitating a little because of the
classification.
Senator Durbin. If you can't answer it in open session, I
understand.
Admiral Syring. The important point, and it's in the open
intelligence, is that they've never yet flight-tested that
long-range capability. But the Taepo Dong-2 launch, again as I
stated, means something in terms of the ability of getting a
payload into space successfully. So, although the threat
missiles haven't been tested at that range, the technology, I
think, took a step with the demonstration of that flight.
We must continue to monitor that, sir, and not count that
it won't be successful. We must plan that it will be
successful. And we must be able to maintain our defense of the
country.
Senator Durbin. Do you know the cost of the 14 interceptors
the administration is asking for?
Admiral Syring. The budget in terms of the out-year budget
projection is $75 million per interceptor.
Senator Durbin. Per interceptor. Thank you.
Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your cooperation
with our committee. And I think the questions and the answers
have helped us understand better what the testing program is
doing and producing and contributing to our future security.
Thanks for your service.
Admiral Syring. Thank you, sir.
Senator Durbin. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I think a classified hearing
would be in order here because we'll probably learn a lot more
in the hearing. I wish you would consider getting this into a
closed session. Would you do that?
Senator Durbin. Sure.
Senator Shelby. I think it's very important. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. I would just repeat the request of my
colleague here. I, too, would appreciate the opportunity to
learn more in a closed setting.
Senator Durbin. We can certainly do that, if it's okay with
the ranking Republican.
Senator Shelby. It is.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Durbin. So we'll follow through with that. And
thank you for your cooperation. If there are no further
questions from the panel, I want to thank Admiral Syring for
his testimony today. We may send you some written questions,
and I hope you'll get a chance to respond to them in a timely
way.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
SOLID DIVERT AND ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM INDUSTRIAL BASE
Question. With the cancellation of the SM-3 IIB Program, the
Missile Defense Agency intends to continue development of next
generation kill vehicle technologies including key components such as
solid Divert and Attitude Control Systems (DACS) to enable long-
duration missions. The industrial base for this critical component is
comprised of only two providers. Each provider offers a unique
technological approach to expand the capabilities of next generation
kill vehicles.
What is MDA's plan to invest in technology development by both
solid DACS providers? How will this investment plan promote the health
of the industrial base and mature burgeoning solid DACS technologies
for competitive development and procurement of next generation systems?
Answer. The Agency is funding both Alliant Techsystems and Aerojet
in fiscal year 2013. Alliant Techsystems is investigating and maturing
light weight, long mission duration SDACS technology. Aerojet is
developing more capable SDACS for the SM-3 IB and SM-3 IIA development
programs.
The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request provides the
necessary funding to sustain the solid DACS industrial base for another
year. We are working with the Department and other agencies to promote
a strong industrial base for defense related technologies.
ISRAEL
Question. What is the status of the technical data rights sharing
between the U.S. and Israel for the Iron Dome system. What is the
status of beginning co-production with U.S. defense firms?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Israel Missile
Defense Organization (IMDO) are negotiating an international agreement
related to production of Iron Dome for Israeli protection, including
co-production by U.S. firms; we expect to conclude/sign the agreement
this fall.
Regarding technical data rights and technical data packages (TDPs),
the above agreement will also require the IMDO to give MDA the TDPs
they have. In addition, the IMDO and MDA will jointly study cost,
schedule and intellectual property impacts to acquire the necessary
TDPs/data rights to build the system in the United States in its
entirety. The DOD currently lacks a Iron Dome requirement for U.S.
defense needs. The study could inform a future decision.
INCREASED GROUND-BASED MID-COURSE DEFENSE IN ALASKA
Question. Adm. Syring, how will the recent test failure of the CE-I
``kill vehicle'' (KV) affect the decision to deploy 14 additional CE-II
KVs by 2017? Has the test failure affected the timeline for the CE-II
test?
Answer. The recent test failure of the CE-I ``kill vehicle'' does
not affect the decision to deploy 14 additional CE-II KVs by fiscal
year 2017. MDA will achieve complete confidence in the Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) designs before fielding the additional 14 GBIs. On
July 5, 2013, MDA conducted Flight Test GBI (FTG)-07 using a legacy
Capability Enhancement (CE)-I Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The
GBI successfully launched, but the target was not intercepted. MDA
initiated a Failure Review Board (FRB) to determine the root cause of
the failure. In parallel with the FTG-07 FRB, MDA will verify there is
separation (the absence of potential common flaw) to ensure the cause
of the FTG-07 failure is not present in the CE-II GBIs.
MDA is continuing its Return to Intercept (RTI) program by
conducting extensive ground testing of the CE-II EKV to ensure the root
causes of the FTG-06a flight test failure have been corrected and to
qualify its design. If CE-I/CE-II separation is established, MDA (with
COCOM and Pentagon consideration) will plan to execute FTG-06b as
currently scheduled for March-May 2014. If MDA cannot establish
separation, the FTG-06b flight test date will depend on the progress
and results of the FTG-07 FRB. Successful completion of the flight
test, coupled with extensive ground test results, will allow resumption
of planned CE-II GBI deliveries for operational use.
Additionally, MDA is currently developing a CE-II Block I design
that will incorporate enhancements to improve performance and
reliability. MDA will conduct extensive modeling and simulation and
ground testing to fully qualify the CE-II Block I design. MDA will then
demonstrate the CE-II Block I EKV in an intercept flight test scheduled
for fiscal year 2016. The successful completion of ground and flight
testing of the legacy CE-II and CE-II Block I designs will provide
complete confidence in the fielded CE-II fleet and for the deployment
of additional interceptors required to achieve 44 operational GBIs by
the end of fiscal year 2017.
If MDA cannot establish design separation, or if the FTG-07 (CE-I)
failure review board indicates the root cause could be present in the
CE-II design, the CE-II flight test timeline could be affected.
[This document contains information that may be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.]
Question. Please tell me how many and what types of tests will be
required before the Pentagon makes a decision to deploy the 14
additional interceptors in Alaska. Is one successful intercept test
enough? Is there a requirement that the system be tested against
realistic countermeasures and decoys before deployment?
Answer. MDA will achieve complete confidence in the Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) designs before fielding the additional 14 GBIs. On
July 5, 2013, MDA conducted Flight Test GBI (FTG)-07 using a legacy
Capability Enhancement (CE)-I Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The
GBI successfully launched, but the target was not intercepted. MDA
initiated a Failure Review Board (FRB) to determine the root cause of
the failure. In parallel with the FTG-07 FRB, MDA will verify there is
design separation (the absence of potential common flaw) to ensure the
cause of the FTG-07 failure is not present in the CE-II GBIs.
Yes, a successful intercept flight test, coupled with extensive
ground test results, of the CE-II GBI is required before deployment of
the 14 additional interceptors in Alaska. MDA is continuing its Return
to Intercept (RTI) program by conducting extensive ground testing of
the CE-II EKV to ensure the root causes of the FTG-06a flight test
failure have been corrected and to qualify its design. If CE-I/CE-II
design separation (the absence of a common flaw) is established, MDA
(with COCOM and Pentagon consideration) will plan to execute FTG-06b as
currently scheduled for March-May 2014. If MDA cannot establish design
separation, the FTG-06b flight test date will depend on the progress
and results of the FTG-07 FRB.
Yes, GMD Ground and Flight Test scenarios, that support GMD
deployment decisions, are designed to include realistic countermeasures
and decoys as required by the Ballistic Missile Defense System
Specification and the Adversary Data Package threat suite. The
successful completion of ground and flight testing of the legacy CE-II
and new CE-II Block I designs will provide confidence in the fielded
CE-II fleet and for the deployment of additional interceptors required
to achieve 44 operational GBIs by the end of fiscal year 2017.
[This document contains information that may be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.]
Question. What is the current cost of a CE-II kill vehicle? How
much will it cost to modify the CE-II kill vehicles already deployed on
interceptors?
Answer. The current cost of a Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Block
I kill vehicle in the Development and Sustainment Contract is $32.6
million.
The current cost estimate to modify each CE-II Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle is approximately $18 million. The $18 million estimate is based
on a fix consisting of replacing the current hard-mount Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) containing version 0 firmware with a cradled IMU
containing version 10 firmware. It also includes installation of the
new EKV second locking feature, EKV sunshade knife edge adapter, Stage
1 and 2 nozzle closures, Stage 2 and 3 Thrust Vector Control
Electronics Control Units, and as necessary, Divert Attitude Control
System tanks, and frangible rails and rings. This effort includes de-
emplacement, reverse flow and testing, forward flow and testing,
emplacement and checkout.
Question. Please provide a breakdown of the costs for the planned
deployment of the 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors.
Answer. [FOUO] The total cost estimate to refurbish Missile Field-1
(MF-1) and purchase 14 GBIs is $1,356 million then year (TY) dollars.
The cost breakdown follows:
--[FOUO] The President's budget 2014 (PB 2014) provides $224 million
TY to upgrade MF-1 and construct a new mechanical electrical
building. In fiscal year 2014, the funding is divided: $82
million Military Construction and $53 million Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). In fiscal year 2015
and fiscal year 2016, RDT&E.
--[FOUO] PB 2014 provides $459 million TY for procurement and
emplacement of six additional GBIs. Extrapolating PB14 funding
through fiscal year 2022, 14 GBIs would cost $1,132 million.
[This document contains information that may be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.]
GROUND-BASED MID-COURSE DEFENSE (GENERAL)
Question. The Missile Defense Agency has stated that the Ground-
Based Midcourse system is sufficient to address current North Korean
and Iranian ballistic missile threats. The 1999 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) stated that Iran and North Korea could develop
countermeasures by the time they flight test their ballistic missiles.
Does the MDA include countermeasures using technologies like those the
NIE discussed when making this assessment?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. The 2012 National Research Council (NRC) report comparing
boost-phase ballistic missile defense to other approaches identified
six fundamental precepts of a cost-effective ballistic missile defense.
It found, ``. . . the current GMD system deficient with respect to all
of these principles.'' Because of these problems, the NRC recommended
an entirely new ground-based missile defense, or GMD, system, with new
interceptors, radars, and concept of operations. This criticism was not
restricted to the failure of the CE-II kill vehicle, yet you have
testified that a successful intercept test of the CE-II is all that is
required before moving ahead with buying 14 more interceptors. Why is
the administration recommending the purchase of 14 more ground-based
interceptors, or GBIs, when the NRC found the current system so
lacking?
Answer. The National Research Council put forth many ideas, some of
which are currently being pursued as part of the GMD Program of Record.
Others, while sound in concept, require more refinement or research to
be practical. For all of these ideas, deploying any of them is many
years away. We continue to have confidence in the basic design of the
GMD weapon system. Our flight testing consistently demonstrates the
multiple elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) do
work together reliably as intended. The GMD failures experienced
recently with the CE-II version of the Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV) (FTG-06/FTG-06a) did not show fundamental problems with the
concept. These tests revealed issues under stressing conditions that
required flight testing to identify. The learning that comes from these
failures is the purpose of developmental flight testing and ultimately
leads to a more robust and reliable system. On the strength of the
confidence in the overall BMDS, the Secretary of Defense determined the
best near-term strategy to address imminent adversary developments is
acquiring 14 more current configuration GBIs in the near term. As the
NRC noted in their Major Finding 6, the GMD can be effective as
designed against the current limited threats, but requires continued
evolution to meet the emerging adversary threats. MDA has mid- to long-
term plans to evolve the EKV to meet these threats through the Phase 3
Common Kill Vehicle Technology design now under study, as well as
implementing other improvements in other elements of the BMDS. We will
continue to evaluate improvements to the GMD system as recommended in
the NRC report.
TESTING
Question. What is the range of parameters included in GBI and Aegis
BMD tests to make the tests realistic? For each system, have they
included:
--a tumbling warhead or missile;
--countermeasures such as chaff, booster fragmentation, or mylar
balloons coupled with anti-simulation of the warhead;
--use of a cooled shroud around the warhead;
--use of radar absorbing material on the warhead;
--multiple warheads or missiles;
--inclement weather conditions;
--tests against ICBM-range targets;
--tests without knowing in advance the exact time of the target
missile launch;
--tests without knowing in advance the exact size and shape of the
target;
--a range of lighting conditions.
For each of the scenarios above, if a test has not been performed,
when is such a test planned? Will the upcoming test of the CE-II kill
vehicle include any of these parameters?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. The MDA claims that launch on remote capability was
demonstrated in two missile defense tests, FTM-15 using the AN/TPY-2
radar and FTM-20 using the STSS satellite as remote sensors. The Flight
Test fact sheets state that each interceptor launch was based on the
association of the remote sensor data with the launch of either an
intermediate or medium range missile. Only with the ability of the
system to ``launch on remote'' is the European Phased Adaptive Approach
system able to cover a large area. Without this capability, defended
areas shrink to small regions around the interceptor sites, as
explained by the Defense Science Board report on Early Intercept. In
either test list above did any part of the defense system have advance
knowledge of the nature or trajectory of its target? Did the Aegis BMD
launch the SM-3 interceptor based solely on AN/TPY-2 data acquired
during the FTM-15 test? Was the Aegis BMD able to launch the SM-3
interceptor based only on STSS-D satellite data acquired during the
FTM-20 test?
Answer. FTM-15 was an operational test of the EPAA Phase I
architecture; participants did not have advanced knowledge of the
nature or trajectory of the target. Warfighters operating the Ballistic
Missile Defense System used the system's tactical mission planning
capabilities to define sensor coverages and doctrine settings. The
operators were provided intelligence and warning orders about the
threat only defined as potential launch areas and defended areas.
Readiness posture of the system was determined by threat warnings
provided by Pacific Command and Navy's 3rd Fleet. Target launch time
was not known by the operators.
FTM-20 was an experiment vice an operational test; participants did
have advanced knowledge of the target as the test used developmental
test architecture. FTM-20 demonstrated technical capability of space
sensors, specifically the Space Tracking Surveillance System (STSS), to
acquire and track a ballistic missile target and provide fire control
quality track data to launch the SM-3 guided missile. Target trajectory
was provided to operators of STSS and to Sailors onboard the ship.
Target launch time was known to all participants.
In FTM-15, the Aegis BMD 3.6 Weapon System calculated a fire
control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IA guided missile based
solely on AN/TPY-2 sensor data. The ship's SPY radar acquired the
target in flight after the SM-3 launch. Combining initial data provided
by the off-board sensor and the ship's SPY radar data, the Aegis BMD
Weapons System completed closure of the fire control calculation during
the SM-3's flight to consummate the intercept.
The Aegis BMD was able to launch the SM-3 guided missile based only
on STSS-D satellite data acquired during the FTM-20 test. In FTM-20 the
Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System calculated a fire control solution and
launched the SM-3 Block IA guided missile based solely on STSS sensor
data. The ship's SPY radar acquired the target in flight after the SM-3
launch. Combining initial data provided by the off-board sensor and the
ship's SPY radar data, the Aegis BMD Weapons System completed closure
of the fire control calculation during the SM-3's flight to consummate
the intercept.
Question. In a written response to a question from a 2012 hearing,
J. Michael Gilmore, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
stated that: ``This was the case in Flight Test Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI)-02 (FTG-02). Although the flight test objectives
excluded actually killing the incoming RV, the EKV achieved a
``glancing blow'' on the RV. Subsequent analysis indicated the
``glancing blow'' would not have resulted in a kill. I score the FTG-02
flight test as a hit, but not a kill.'' Does the MDA classify FTG-02 as
a successful intercept? How is such an assessment consistent with Dr.
Gilmore's assessment? When exactly was the determination made that only
a ``glancing blow'' had been achieved?
Answer. [FOUO] The MDA analysis agrees with Dr. Gilmore's
assessment and classifies FTG-02 as a hit and not a kill. At the same
time MDA classifies FTG-02 as a successful intercept. Intercept success
is not determined solely by hit or kill status; it is determined by
resulting viability of the RV. In this case, even though the GBI
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) did not kill the target, the EKV
damaged it enough for aero thermal demise (e.g., the RV burned up in
the atmosphere). The determination occurred during FTG-02 post flight
analysis, which took place between September 2006 and May 2007.
SENSORS
Question. In testimony before Congress last year, then-MDA director
Lt. General Patrick O'Reilly stated that: ``The greatest future
enhancement for both homeland and regional defense in the next 10 years
is the development of the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS)
satellites.'' The administration recently cancelled the PTSS. What
particular capabilities would PTSS have provided that the current
system lacks? What systems or plans does the MDA have to compensate for
the lack of PTSS-sourced data?
Answer. The DOD terminated the PTSS program in April 2013.\1\ A GAO
report on PTSS \2\ indicated that the DOD had considered canceling the
program in November 2012 based upon a study of PTSS by OSD Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) initiated in 2011. Conclusions
drawn in this study were outlined in a May 2013 report delivered to
congressional defense committees and it is from this report that the
rationale for program cancellation was outlined.\3\ The CAPE found
risks in the proposed material solution and the execution plans
summarized in three general areas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dr. Ashton Carter, ``Resource Management Decisions for the FY
2014 Budget Request,'' 10 April 2013, pg. 41.
\2\ Christina Chaplain, ``Missile Defense: Precision Tracking Space
System Evaluation of Alternatives,'' report GAO-13-747R, 25 July 2013.
\3\ Richard Burke, ``Independent Cost Estimate for Missile Defense
Agency Precision Tracking Space Syste,'' 8 April 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Technical risk
-- The orbit of the PTSS constellation through the Van Allen
radiation belts posed a hazard to the satellite components,
potentially degrading the sensor assuming worst case
scenarios.
-- Industry did not currently manufacture focal plane arrays in
the desired wavebands in the size required by PTSS
satellites.
2. Acquisition risk
-- To support timely deployment, the decision to commit to
industry contracts occurred before all technical risks on
the development program were retired.
-- The primary member of the Lab development team, JHU/APL, had
limited experience developing operational DOD space
systems.
-- The transition from a Lab development program to a commercial
production program added programmatic risk and potential
developmental redundancy.
3. Cost risk
-- MDA estimates of program life cycle costs were deemed
optimistic for this early stage of the design.
The warfighter, in a shift of focus from regional conflict to the
defense of North America, also noted the PTSS constellation--fine tuned
for regional conflicts--lacked performance for homeland defense.
PTSS was designed to be an agile, infrared space sensor that
continuously tracked ballistic missile objects after boost, increased
raid capacity, characterized objects in the threat cloud and was
capable against mobile and emerging threats. Operating from space, PTSS
could track missiles flying over 80 percent of the Earth's surface,
could peer into large countries outside of harm's reach of offensive
weapons, and required no transit into theater. PTSS track data would be
available to any missile defense weapon system connected to the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) fire control network.
PTSS would have provided improved capabilities to the BMDS. It was
designed to:
--Provide persistent and simultaneous access to adversary launch
sites distributed across the Earth's surface.
--Deliver fire control quality tracks early in the trajectories of
homeland and regional threats, enabling over the horizon
launch-on-remote (LoR) and engage-on-remote (EoR) targeting
and--timelines permitting--shoot-assess-shoot tactics.
--Receive tracking to provide high frame rate, multi-spectral optical
data in support of BMDS discrimination and kill assessment
functions.
PTSS operated from space in order to provide persistent sensor
coverage of known and emerging threats to:
--Relieve global competition for scarce terrestrial sensor resources.
--Handle cooperative adversaries separated by global distances
launching simultaneously, or to track launching out of surprise
locations.
--Provide sensor support during crises and developing regional
conflicts when forces are not yet established.
--Compensate for terrestrial outages due to maintenance down time or
adversary attacks to suppress defenses.
There are other ways of implementing PTSS functions and features in
the near term because (1) adversaries are few and geographically
localized, (2) attack corridors are known, (3) indications and warning
are reliably available, and (4) the terrestrial sensor force structure
could be enhanced. For example:
--Existing and programmed overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) sensor
capabilities could be extended in some situations to achieve
LoR track quality and to support the BMDS kill assessment
function.
--High powered long range discriminating radars, properly positioned,
can effectively perform the midcourse discrimination task,
although the combination of optical and radar adds significant
robustness.
--Interceptor kill vehicle sensing capability could be improved to
better discriminate threat objects and more effectively conduct
the engagement.
--High altitude airborne IR platforms might be deployed in hot spots
to develop early fire control quality tracks and to provide
BMDS discrimination inputs with high resolution, multispectral
data.
All investment options are currently under review by MDA as
potential means to compensate for the lack of PTSS-sourced data.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel Coats
Question. How can MDA take advantage of unique university
experimental facilities in propulsion, prognostics, hypersonics, cyber
security and advanced system-of-systems, battle-management modeling and
simulation to enhance missile system reliability and to develop the MDA
human talent for future system success?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an active university
outreach effort that includes:
--Campus visits from the MDA Director and top level MDA management.
--Development of a university consortium focused on ``Innovative
Propulsion Technology Support''.
--``Campus Champion'' program that teams MDA Leaders with specific
universities to develop strategic long term relationships with
academic institutions.
--Development of a ``University Programs Playbook'' handout used to
help university researchers understand the needs of MDA and the
process to submit research proposals.
--University colloquiums to address the depth and breadth of research
capabilities at U.S. universities.
The MDA university engagement policy encompasses a holistic
approach involving research; educational opportunities; career
development; and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
activities.
--Benefits to our university partners include:
--Awareness of challenging research topics for missile defense.
--Access to a source of funding for continuing research.
--Shaping curricula to better prepare students for careers in
missile defense.
--Real world experience through sponsored sabbaticals and summer
intern programs.
--Benefits to MDA from these partnerships include:
--Access to cutting-edge research and facilities and a pool of
nationally recognized scholars.
--Exposing the Nation's brightest students to the intellectual
challenges a missile defense career offers.
--Influencing the engineering curricula to better prepare the
future missile defense workforce.
--Bringing a new perspective to solving some of the most difficult
missile defense-related problems.
The MDA recently sponsored a colloquium with one of our university
partners, Purdue University with presentations at Redstone Arsenal.
Topics included:
--Propulsion/combustion stability.
--Agent-based command, control, battle management and communications
architecture.
--Cyber security.
--Reliability and producibility.
In regards to the specific technology areas referenced in Senator
Coat's question, the MDA has the following active university research
efforts:
Propulsion:
--Purdue University: ``Propulsion Improvements for MDA
Applications''.--The research provides greater understanding of
the phenomenology involved with hypergolic thrusters and
combustion instability in to improve future Divert Attitude
Control System (DACS) divert thrusters. The goal is to provide
capability to withstand or prevent injector failures in an exo-
atmospheric simulated environment without modifications to duty
cycles or thrusters.
--Texas A&M: ``Solid Propellant Additives for DACS Applications''.--
The research will demonstrate and develop the use of additives
for a tailored burning rate and extinguishable propellant.
--Texas A&M: ``Ignition of Composite Propellants with Advanced
Additives''.--The research will characterize and modify as
needed the ignition behavior of the propellant formulation to
demonstrate the required attributes for a DACS mission.
--University of Alabama Huntsville: ``Green Oxidizer Development''.--
The research will explore a series of oxidizer content organic
chemicals tailored to meet decomposition demands either through
a heterogeneous or homogeneous catalytic approach.
Battle Management Modeling and Simulation/Cyber Security:
--Auburn University: ``Radar Signal Processing for Multi-Sensor
Tracking of Multiple Targets''.--The research will focus on the
development of a multi-sensor tracker to provide tracks (state
estimates) of the multiple targets in the surveillance region.
--Purdue University: ``An Agent-based Concept for an Enhanced (C2BMC)
Architecture''.--The research will develop and test a two-
tiered, agent based Command and Control, Battle Management and
Communications (C2BMC) architecture concept that links the best
mix of sensors and weapons in optimal communication and command
topologies.
--Purdue University.--The MDA is a member of The Center for Education
and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS)
located at Purdue University.
--University of Connecticut: ``Innovative Radar Signal Processing &
Algorithms, Decision Systems, Sensor Fusion, System Tracks, &
Correlation Ambiguity''.--The research will focus on forming
tracks from disparate sensors, as well as similar; extracting
boost phase information for subsequent system utility. This
approach addresses new requirements for the system to enable
persistent tracking and optimize efficiency.
--University of Illinois: ``Intelligent and Robust Control for
Optimal Engagement Planning''.--This research focuses on the
problem of engaging a ballistic missile or its warhead and is
formulated as an optimal control problem. The trajectory from
launch to terminal phase is considered. Terminal guidance is
assumed to be provided conventionally, with a feedback
controller.
Reliability:
--University of Connecticut: ``Development of Innovative Solutions of
Hardware Security and Detection and Prevention of Counterfeit
Electronic Components''.--The research will address the
security and reliability of integrated circuits. Focusing on
the development of methodologies and tools for counterfeit
integrated circuits (IC) detection and prevention, supply chain
risk management (SCRM), detection and prevention of hardware
Trojans, and reliable IC design.
The MDA has no current university research efforts in the areas of
Hypersonics and Prognostics.
The MDA pursues research opportunities with the Nation's
universities through Broad Agency Announcements posted on the FedBizOps
website twice a year. Research topics are derived from the mission and
needs of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
[This document contains information that may be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.]
Question. How can MDA work together with the industrial and
university sectors to create a defense technology/product development
pipeline to accelerate technology and products to market to meet MDA
system future needs?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an active university
outreach effort that includes:
--Campus visits from the MDA Director and top level MDA management.
--Development of a university consortium focused on ``Innovative
Propulsion Technology Support''.
--``Campus Champion'' program that teams MDA Leaders with specific
universities to develop strategic long term relationships with
academic institutions.
--Development of a ``University Programs Playbook'' handout used to
help university researchers understand the needs of MDA and the
process to submit research proposals.
--University colloquiums to address the depth and breadth of research
capabilities at U.S. universities.
The MDA university engagement policy encompasses a holistic
approach involving research; educational opportunities; career
development; and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
activities.
--Benefits to our university partners include:
--Awareness of challenging research topics for missile defense.
--Access to a source of funding for continuing research.
--Shaping curricula to better prepare students for careers in
missile defense.
--Real world experience through sponsored sabbaticals and summer
intern programs.
--Benefits to MDA from these partnerships include:
--Access to cutting-edge research and facilities and a pool of
nationally recognized scholars.
--Exposing the Nation's brightest students to the intellectual
challenges a missile defense career offers.
--Influencing the engineering curricula to better prepare the
future missile defense workforce.
--Bringing a new perspective to solving some of the most difficult
missile defense-related problems.
The MDA recently sponsored a colloquium with one of our university
partners, Purdue University with presentations at Redstone Arsenal.
Topics included:
--Propulsion/combustion stability.
--Agent-based command, control, battle management and communications
architecture.
--Cyber security.
--Reliability and producibility.
In regards to the specific technology areas referenced in Senator
Coat's question, the MDA has the following active university research
efforts:
Propulsion:
--Purdue University: ``Propulsion Improvements for MDA
Applications''.--The research provides greater understanding of
the phenomenology involved with hypergolic thrusters and
combustion instability in to improve future Divert Attitude
Control System (DACS) divert thrusters. The goal is to provide
capability to withstand or prevent injector failures in an exo-
atmospheric simulated environment without modifications to duty
cycles or thrusters.
--Texas A&M: ``Solid Propellant Additives for DACS Applications''.--
The research will demonstrate and develop the use of additives
for a tailored burning rate and extinguishable propellant.
--Texas A&M: ``Ignition of Composite Propellants with Advanced
Additives''.--The research will characterize and modify as
needed the ignition behavior of the propellant formulation to
demonstrate the required attributes for a DACS mission.
--University of Alabama Huntsville: ``Green Oxidizer Development''.--
The research will explore a series of oxidizer content organic
chemicals tailored to meet decomposition demands either through
a heterogeneous or homogeneous catalytic approach.
Battle Management Modeling and Simulation/Cyber Security:
--Auburn University: ``Radar Signal Processing for Multi-Sensor
Tracking of Multiple Targets''.--The research will focus on the
development of a multi-sensor tracker to provide tracks (state
estimates) of the multiple targets in the surveillance region.
--Purdue University: ``An Agent-based Concept for an Enhanced (C2BMC)
Architecture''.--The research will develop and test a two-
tiered, agent based Command and Control, Battle Management and
Communications (C2BMC) architecture concept that links the best
mix of sensors and weapons in optimal communication and command
topologies.
--Purdue University.--The MDA is a member of The Center for Education
and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS)
located at Purdue University.
--University of Connecticut: ``Innovative Radar Signal Processing &
Algorithms, Decision Systems, Sensor Fusion, System Tracks, &
Correlation Ambiguity''.--The research will focus on forming
tracks from disparate sensors, as well as similar; extracting
boost phase information for subsequent system utility. This
approach addresses new requirements for the system to enable
persistent tracking and optimize efficiency.
--University of Illinois: ``Intelligent and Robust Control for
Optimal Engagement Planning''.--This research focuses on the
problem of engaging a ballistic missile or its warhead and is
formulated as an optimal control problem. The trajectory from
launch to terminal phase is considered. Terminal guidance is
assumed to be provided conventionally, with a feedback
controller.
Reliability:
--University of Connecticut: ``Development of Innovative Solutions of
Hardware Security and Detection and Prevention of Counterfeit
Electronic Components''.--The research will address the
security and reliability of integrated circuits. Focusing on
the development of methodologies and tools for counterfeit
integrated circuits (IC) detection and prevention, supply chain
risk management (SCRM), detection and prevention of hardware
Trojans, and reliable IC design.
The MDA has no current university research efforts in the areas of
Hypersonics and Prognostics.
The MDA pursues research opportunities with the Nation's
universities through Broad Agency Announcements posted on the FedBizOps
website twice a year. Research topics are derived from the mission and
needs of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
[This document contains information that may be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.]
Question. What new programs will be required to further develop and
attract the essential MDA human talent base so that MDA may administer
and develop the leading edge solutions to missile reliability?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) does not require new
programs. MDA already has in place several programs that develop and
attract essential MDA human talent.
In fiscal year 2013, MDA partnered with the Naval Postgraduate
School to further develop our engineering workforce in Systems
Engineering and Reliability. MDA sponsored a 1-year graduate level
certification program in systems engineering to approximately 30
employees. Four courses were offered focusing on systems engineering
and reliability, and participants attended each class as a cohort. In
fiscal year 2014, MDA will partner with the Naval Postgraduate School
for a certificate program and a Systems Engineering Masters Degree
program. The certificate program consists of four courses in 1 year in
systems engineering. The Masters Degree program leverages the fiscal
year 2013 class by adding 12 courses conducted 1 per quarter over a 3-
year period. The intent is to continue this partnership subject to
funding and needs of the agency.
In addition to the above, the MDA leverages existing Federal human
resource flexibilities and benefits. Below are examples of Government
Flexibilities utilized at MDA:
--Department of Defense Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel
Demonstration Project (AcqDemo).
--Provides flexibilities to hire, set pay, reassign, and rate
employees based on their contributions.
--Expedited Hiring Authority for Acquisition Positions in accordance
with subsection 1705(h) of Title 10, U.S.C., as amended by
section 833 of the NDAA fiscal year 2009.
--Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives (as appropriate).
--Student Loan Repayment (as appropriate).
--Creditable Service for Annual Leave Accrual for Non-Federal Work
Experience and Experience in the Uniformed Service (as
appropriate).
--Telework.
--Wellness Programs.
--Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB).
--Supplemental Dental and Vision Insurance (FEDVIP).
--Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI).
--Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).
--All Flexible Spending Accounts (FSA).
--Long Term Care Insurance (LTC).
--Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).
--Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS).
--Alternate Work Schedule (AWS) Program:
--Flexible Work Schedule (FWS).
-- a fixed work schedule with daily start and end times different
from the MDA regular work schedule.
--Compressed Work Schedule (CWS).
-- a fixed schedule enabling a full-time employee to work 80
hours per biweekly pay period on fewer than 10 workdays.
[This document contains information that may be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.]
Question. With NATO members formally endorsing territorial missile
defense and welcoming the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) at
the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, what are the next steps to continue
``NATO-izing'' the EPAA, and what do you see as the key milestones and
challenges ahead? What impact or role does the EPAA play in NATO?
Answer. NATO is developing the Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program with NATO common funding. ALTBMD is
the command and control backbone for NATO missile defense capability.
Interim capability is deployed and operational.
NATO is progressing on developing the next increment of ALTBMD/NATO
BMD capability. The Missile Defense Agency has worked closely with NATO
in the past to ensure interoperability of U.S. and NATO command and
control systems. We will continue to work with NATO as they continue to
develop ALTBMD capability.
Phases 1 through 3 of EPAA are the U.S. contribution to NATO's
missile defense capability. Several allies have announced potential
missile defense national asset contributions to this capability, while
others are considering missile defense upgrades or acquisitions.
Question. Please describe any specific initiatives planned for the
upcoming year regarding international missile defense cooperation,
particularly in the Middle East and East Asia.
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is engaged either
bilaterally or multilaterally with over 20 countries and international
organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.
In Asia-Pacific, the United States and Japan are working together
to support the deployment of the second U.S. forward-based AN/TPY-2
radar. In addition, we continue to collaborate on developing Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA to enable U.S. and Japanese Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) ships to engage medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missile threats and, when coupled with the upgraded Aegis BMD
weapon system, more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. Last year,
we signed a second amendment to the formal joint agreement with Japan
administering the SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) effort.
The amendment will reduce risk in the SCD program by adding flight
tests and sufficient time in the schedule for additional engineering
analysis between tests.
The fiscal year (FY) 2014 budget continues MDA's longstanding
commitment to support Israeli defensive efforts. We are working with
the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) to deliver Iron Dome
batteries and interceptors. Iron Dome has had significant success
protecting Israel against short-range rockets and large artillery
shells. We have been working closely with Department of Defense
leadership to ensure U.S. funding for Iron Dome is being used
effectively to produce additional batteries and interceptors. For
fiscal year 2013 and beyond, the U.S. contributions to Iron Dome will
be governed by a formal international agreement. We are actively
seeking Iron Dome co-production opportunities for U.S. defense
industry.
We are also developing missile defense systems with Israel to
address regional ballistic missile threats. The David's Sling Weapon
System is designed to defeat short range ballistic missile threats.
IMDO and MDA completed the first phase of the development of David's
Sling last November with a successful intercept test. The MDA and
Israel are also co-developing the Arrow-3 Upper Tier interceptor. The
advanced design of this interceptor was successfully tested this past
February in a non-intercept test, and a second fly-out test is
scheduled for fiscal year 2014. We also participated in AUSTERE
CHALLENGE 2012 exercises, which successfully demonstrated the concept
of operations for the U.S.-Israel BMD architecture and future
interoperability.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, U.S. BMD capabilities continue to
expand in defense of forward-deployed U.S. armed forces, allies, and
partners. Major MDA activities in the Middle East involve relationships
with regional partners expressing interest in procuring U.S. systems.
Last year, MDA was officially designated as a foreign military sales
(FMS) implementing agency for THAAD and the AN/TPY-2 radar. In addition
to our current $4.9 billion FMS case with the United Arab Emirates for
THAAD batteries and interceptors, we are engaged with several other
potential FMS customers for these very capable systems.
Question. Is the United States planning any missile defense
cooperation with India? If not, why not?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency is not currently engaged in
missile defense discussions with India. I defer specific questions on
U.S.-India discussions to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Question. What plans do you have on utilizing expertise inherent
with the Naval Warfare Centers like NSWC Crane to help reduce program
risk?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) uses Naval Air and Surface
Warfare Centers as partners in the development and support of Aegis
BMD, and plans to continue these partnerships in the future. The Naval
Air and Surface Warfare Center enterprise contributes broadly across a
wide range of functional areas, as delineated in the attachment,
including program risk reduction.
In fiscal year 2013, approximately $186 million was authorized for
Naval Air and Surface Warfare Centers to directly support MDA programs.
program support from naval air and surface warfare centers to aegis bmd
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane
--System Integrity Engineering Support
--Review and assessment of quality and feasibility of employment of
system integrity initiatives
--Identification of potential technology improvement of system
integrity
--Parts, Materials and Processes Mission Assurance Plan
--Risk identification, Assessment and Analysis
--Contractor Compliance
--Plan Implementation
--SM-3 Missile Technical Support
--Battery Engineering
--System Safety
--Failure Investigations
--Storage
--Technical Support, In-Service and Acquisition Engineering
--Sensors, Electronics, Electronic Warfare and Special Warfare
Systems
NSWC Carderrock
--Fleet Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) Engineering
--Verifies configuration of power (failure/interruption) transfer
systems
--Provides logistics and sustainment for the HM&E mods
--Vertical Launch System (VLS) heating and cooling systems
--Fleet ship survivability and damage control engineering
--Materials Engineering for Standard Missile (SM)-3 specialty
propulsion system components
Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) China Lake
--Propulsion Engineering and Test Support
--SM-3 Propulsion Analysis
--Risk Assessment
--Missile Component Engineering Support
--System Safety
NSWC Corona
--Independent Analysis and Assessment
--Conducts Measurement Efforts
--Scientific Research and Development Analysis
--Develops and Verifies Metrology and Calibration Procedures
--Threat Engineering
--Mission Assurance Impact Assessment
NSWC Dahlgren--Aegis Weapon System Computer Program Lifetime Support
Engineering
--Computer program maintenance
--Independent testing in parallel with system development
--Functional Area Assessments to identify computer program defects
--Independent Navy Performance Verification testing after program
delivery
--Vertical Launch System Engineering
--Ship Integration Support
--Aegis BMD Combat System
--Configuration Management
NSWC Indian Head--Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation of
Munitions Support
--Manufacturing Technology
--Weapons Containers
--Ordnance Handling Equipment
--SM-3 Domestic Transportation
--Energetics Testing and Certification Support
--SM-3 Pyrotechnic Energetic Device Certification Process
--Insensitive Munitions Support
--Research and Development of Explosives and Propellants
--SM-3 Insensitive Ballistic Barrier System
NSWC Port Hueneme--Aegis Weapon System In-Service Engineering
--In-service support and maintenance of equipment
--Joint Assessment of Maintenance conducted during system
development and test
--At-sea testing shipboard assessment of equipment operation and
maintenance
--Logistics Support
--Systems/Elements Under Test Support
PROGRAM SUPPORT FROM NAVAL AIR AND SURFACE WARFARE CENTERS TO TARGETS
AND COUNTERMEASURES
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane
--Trident (C-4) Motors Static Fire
--Trident (C-4) Motors Aging and Surveillance
--Performed an independent assessment of Lithium-Ion batteries to
determine safety on eMRBM target system and the aircraft
transporting the missile
Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) China Lake
--Refurbish, maintain and modify existing or new Ground Handling
Equipment (GHE) or flight hardware used to transport, store or
test assets of the Targets and Countermeasure Program
NSWC Dahlgren
--Provides Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO)
susceptibility analysis/assessment for air certification for
air launch and ground transportation
--Assist with Spectrum Supportability--Requests for Frequency
Allocations through the spectrum approval process
NSWC Port Hueneme, White Sands Attachment
--Procure target hardware/software
--Integrate and test Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicles (ARAV) and
similar targets
--Provide launch services and range operations for the targets
--Conduct and consolidate pre & post-flight analysis
--Conduct failure review boards for any target flight anomalies
NSWC Point Mugu
--Participates in individual working group functions including items
that are PMRF local-range issues
--Represents and speak for NAWC in review boards for test problems,
test failure resolution, and other items for which range
approval is needed led by the contractor on an as-needed basis
--Attend test design planning, mission planning, and milestone
meetings on an as-needed basis
PROGRAM SUPPORT FROM NAVAL AIR AND SURFACE WARFARE CENTERS TO QUALITY
ASSURANCE
NSWC Crane
Electronic parts reliability
--Develops requirements and policy to support Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) level performance, reliability, part
screening and qualification requirements, part packaging
analyses, part obsolescence forecasting
--Expertise in radiation hardening technology, Trusted and Secure
Electronics, and Stockpile reliability
--Developed and maintains BMDS As-Designed Parts and Materials
List, which includes attributes for safety and mission
critical parts and materials
--Management of MDA Mission Assurance Advisory Program (gathers
data on Lessons Learned, and conducts research and analysis
on issues related to electronic part reliability)
--Member of Parts, Material and Processes Boards that approve
standardization, selection, qualification and acceptance of
electronic parts
--Assesses electronic part failures and concurrence with root
causes and corrective actions
--Conducts battery research, analyses, testing and qualification
--Assesses safety and risk of battery technologies proposed by MDA
contractors
Anti-Tamper (AT)
--Expertise in technology assessments of memory components, Field
Programmable Gate Arrays and sensors
--Supports Small Business Innovative Research efforts (Topic Team
Lead, Topic Author, Technical Monitor for 48 contracts,
outreach to MDA Prime Contractors)
Counterfeit Part Detection
--Serves as agency Lead for Counterfeit Parts risk reduction
program
--Provides technical expertise in defining agency policy and
requirements for counterfeit parts, detection and avoidance
--Performs on-site assessments of Unauthorized Distributors
--Provides counterfeit part detection training to MDA and its
contractors
--Performs counterfeit part detection testing at the Failure
Analysis Lab
Additional NSWC Crane Support
--Supports agency level contractor compliance audits
--Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) assemblies
--Printed Circuit Board Technology
--Power systems analyses
Question. What expertise has NSWC Crane provided to the Missile
Defense Agency in the areas of electronic parts reliability, anti-
tamper, and counterfeit parts detection? What are your unfunded
priorities in the areas of electronic parts reliability, anti-tamper,
and counterfeit parts detection?
Answer. NSWC Crane contributes broadly across a wide range of
functional areas including Parts, Materials, and Processes (PMP)
engineering support to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Parts and
Materials Engineering Division of the Quality, Safety and Mission
Assurance Directorate and anti-tamper support to the MDA Engineering
Directorate.
NSWC Crane has provided electronic parts reliability expertise in
the following areas:
--PMP requirements and policy development to support the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) level performance and reliability
--Electronic electrical and electromechanical part screening and
qualification requirements
--Electronic part packaging analyses
--Electronic part obsolescence forecasting
--Radiation hardening technology
--Development and maintenance of the BMDS As-Designed Parts and
Materials List, which includes attributes for the majority of
safety and mission critical parts and materials.
--Management of the MDA Mission Assurance Advisory Program, which
captures critical data on lessons learned, and research and
analysis on emerging issues related to electronic part
reliability.
--Trusted and secure electronics
--Parts Engineering support of agency and individual MDA programs'
PMP Boards that approve standardization, selection,
qualification and acceptance of electronic parts
--Parts Engineering assessments of electronic part failures and
concurrence with root cause and corrective actions
NSWC Crane has provided anti-tamper expertise in the following
areas:
--Anti-tamper coordinator and anti-tamper technology development
roles for MDA
--Anti-tamper technology assessments of memory components, focal
plane gate arrays, and sensors
--Subject matter expert support of anti-tamper plan development for
MDA programs
--MDA anti-tamper Small Business Research support: topic team lead,
topic author, technical monitor for 48 contracts, outreach to
MDA prime contractors.
NSWC Crane has provided counterfeit part detection in the following
areas:
--Serve as Agency lead for the Counterfeit Parts Risk Reduction
Program
--Provide technical expertise in defining agency policy and
requirements for counterfeit parts detection and avoidance
--Perform on-site assessments of unauthorized distributors
--Provide counterfeit part detection training to MDA and its
contractors
--Perform counterfeit part detection testing at the NSWC Crane
Failure Analysis Laboratory
Additional NSWC Crane Support includes:
--Supports Agency-level contractor compliance audits
--Commercial-Off-The-Shelf assemblies
--Printed circuit board technology
--Power systems analyses
--Battery research, analyses, testing and qualification
--Safety and risk assessments of battery technologies proposed for
use by MDA contractors
--Stockpile reliability
Total annual MDA funds provided to NSWC Crane across all above
areas is $5.9 million. The President's budget request for fiscal year
2014 as well as previous years has fully funded MDA's requirements in
the areas identified above and currently additional funding is not
required to meet these requirements. All of MDA's highest priorities
have been fully funded.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Durbin. We'll set a classified briefing at your
convenience and the convenience of the members.
And the meeting of the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 9:55 a.m., Wednesday, July 17, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]