[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
113th Congress Printed for the use of the
2d Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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GEORGIA 2008, UKRAINE 2014:
IS MOLDOVA NEXT?
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
MAY 6, 2014
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington: 2015
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
Legislative Branch Commissioners
SENATE HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
Chairman Co-Chairman
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
TOM UDALL, New Mexico ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
New York
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
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* * * * *
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European
countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1, 1995, the
Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded
to 56 partici- pating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of
the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In
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locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,
Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields
of military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human
rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is primarily focused
on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within
and among the participating States. The Organization deploys numerous
missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is:
.
* * * * *
ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the
Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate,
nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each
from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of
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when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the
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In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates
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hearings, issuing reports that
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providing details about the activities of the Helsinki process and
developments in OSCE participating States.
The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff
participation on U.S. Delega-
tions to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact
with
parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-
governmental organiza-
tions, and private individuals from participating States. The website
of the Commission
is: .
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GEORGIA 2008, UKRAINE 2014: IS MOLDOVA NEXT?
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May 6, 2014
WITNESSES
Page
Eugen Carpov, Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova, Minister for
Reintegration..........................................................
2
Paul Goble, Specialist on Ethnic and Religious questions in Eurasia,
Editor of ``Window on Eurasia''........................................
6
Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council..........
10
PARTICIPANT
David Killion, Chief of Staff, Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe..............................................................
1
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GEORGIA 2008, UKRAINE 2014: IS MOLDOVA NEXT?
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May 6, 2014
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held from 12:03 to 1:34 p.m. EDT in 268, North
Congressional Meeting Room, Capitol Visitor Center, Washington D.C.,
David Killion, presiding.
Mr. Killion. Ladies and gentlemen, if we could get started today
with this important briefing. Good afternoon. I'm Ambassador David
Killion. I'm the chief of staff of the Helsinki Commission and this is
my first event as chief of staff, so it's very special to me. I think
this is an incredibly timely event. I want to welcome our speakers as
well as our audience to this important briefing to examine Russia's
intention toward Moldova and Transnistria, its secessionist region, in
the face of growing violence and instability in southeastern Ukraine.
This briefing is occurring at an urgent time, as violence in
Odessa, which borders Moldova, continues to escalate, aided and abetted
by Russia. In fact, we heard some information indicating over the
weekend that many of the individuals arrested for violently attacking
peaceful demonstrators for Ukrainian unity in Odessa were actually
Russian nationalists and residents of Transnistria. At the same time,
Ukrainian authorities reported that arms found in the building where
over 30 of the individuals instigating violence and secession were
tragically killed last Friday also originated from Transnistria and
Russia.
Equally concerning is the continuing lawlessness and violence
across the region that's being perpetrated against state institutions
and Ukrainian citizens who do not want to see their country Balkanized,
occupied or controlled by Russia. Fighting continues in Slovyansk,
where pro-Russian secessionists launched violent attacks upon
supporters of Ukrainian unity, occupied government buildings and held
OSCE military observers hostage for over a week. Pro-Russian thugs shot
down two Ukrainian military helicopters in Slovyansk last week,
resulting in the death and injury of several military officers. Only
yesterday, other casualties were added as fighting persisted between
the military and pro-Russian insurgents.
The destabilizing events in Odessa are occurring a little over a
hundred miles from Transnistria, where Russia maintains military forces
and weapons against the wishes of the Moldovan government. Along with
political and economic coercion, Russia has used this military presence
to impede a peaceful and lawful settlement of Transnistria for over 20
years.
Today, the presence of Russian armed forces on Moldovan territory,
on Ukraine's borders and in occupied Crimea violate the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of both countries and aim to prevent their
integration into Europe and hinder their economic and democratic
development. Russia's actions violate every core principle of the OSCE
and the United Nations, as well as Russia's obligation to guarantee
Ukraine's sovereignty under the Budapest Memorandum.
We look forward to this opportunity to discuss Russia's intentions
in Moldova and Transnistria, and what the ongoing insecurity and
conflict in the region portends for countries in the southern Caucasus
and beyond. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Labor Thomas Melia was not able to join with us, so we will first hear
today from our very distinguished guest, Moldova's deputy prime
minister for reintegration, Mr. Eugen Carpov.
Mr. Carpov has held the office of deputy prime minister of the
government of Moldova since 2011. He has an extensive background in
foreign affairs and has held positions in both the public and private
sectors. From 2002 until 2005 he served as the Moldovan ambassador to
Poland, before becoming the head of the Moldovan Mission to the
European Union in 2005, a position he held until 2007. Following this,
he became the chief of the International Cooperation Department of
ASCOM Company from 2007 to 2008, and subsequently was the deputy
general manager of the Komet Group Corporation from 2009 to 2011.
We will then hear from Mr. Paul Goble, a longtime specialist on
ethnic and religious matters in Eurasia. Paul has had a distinguished
career. He has served as the director of research and publications at
the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy and as vice dean for the social
sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn. His previous
work includes tenure as a senior research associate at the Euro College
of the University of Tartu, in Estonia, during which he launched the
Window on Eurasia series. Prior to joining the faculty of Tartu
University, he served in various capacities in the U.S. State
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International
Broadcasting Bureau, as well as the Voice of America, Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. He's a prolific writer on ethnic and religious issues and has
edited five volumes on ethnicity and religion in the former Soviet
space. We're very, very pleased to have him with us today.
Finally, we'll hear from Dr. Stephen Blank, a senior fellow at the
American Foreign Policy Council in Washington and a leading
international expert on Soviet, Russian, U.S., Asian and European
military and foreign policy. From 1989 to 2013, Dr. Blank was a
professor of Russian national security studies at the Strategic Studies
Institute of the U.S. Army War College, in Pennsylvania. During 1998 to
2001 he was Douglas MacArthur professor of research at the War College.
He's testified before Congress on Russia, China and Central Asia, and
he has published or edited 15 books focusing on Russian foreign, energy
and military policies and on international security in Eurasia.
Following the statements of our panelists and questions from this
panel, the audience will have an opportunity to ask questions.
So, Mr. Carpov, the floor is yours.
Mr. Carpov. Thank you, Ambassador. Dear colleagues, thank you for
organizing this event. The Helsinki Committee continues to serve as
perfect platform for trans-Atlantic dialogue on important issues where
U.S. and Europe have mutual and shared interests. Today's event has
quite a provocative title. So at this session we will share our
thoughts on the situation in Moldova and in our region. I hope this
will be helpful to you to understand better what is going on in our
part of the world and what are the perspectives.
Since I'm dealing in the government of Moldova with the resolution
of the Transnistrian conflict, it will represent major part of my
remarks. First of all, let me set the parameters of the issue we are
discussing. Transnistrian conflict has, at its basis, mainly a
political dispute. It does not have ethnic or a religious background.
The situation in the conflict area is generally peaceful. There were no
military hostilities between sides since 1992. Certain tensions or
incidents appear from time to time, but they have no direct military
character and involve mainly law-enforcement bodies.
The dialogue on conflict settlement process is taking place through
a number of channels. The most-known is the five-plus-two negotiations
format, where the Moldovan and Transnistrian region are the sides;
OSCE, Russia and Ukraine mediators; and U.S. and EU observers. We have
also meetings of the political representatives of the sides: the chief
negotiators. In parallel, senior experts and decision-makers from
various authorities are meeting in the sectoral working groups. There
are contacts on higher political level as well. From our side, this is
the prime minister and from the Transnistrian side is the leader of the
region's administration. These meetings are taking place with different
intensity depending on the situation. The key unresolved issue of the
conflict settlement is: What status would the Transnistrian region have
within Moldova?
All international players involved in the conflict resolution have
committed to assist in resolving the Transnistrian conflict on the
basis of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Moldova and providing the Transnistrian region with a
special status.
Where the conflict settlement stands now: Current situation in the
Transnistrian conflict settlement process can be characterized as
stalemate in terms of the moving towards political settlement of the
conflict. Regretfully, the trust and confidence between sides has been
undermined by increasing negative rhetoric and unilateral actions which
run against the ongoing negotiation process.
About political aspects: The strategic goal of the Republic of
Moldova is to achieve a lasting political settlement of the conflict
based on the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Moldova. The Transnistrian region should have a special
status within the reintegrated country. Such a status would enable the
administration of Transnistrian region with sufficient level of
competences to enjoy large autonomy within Moldova. The political
solution of the conflict should ensure an effective and balanced
decision-making mechanism.
The European vector of the development of the Republic of Moldova
after reintegration should also be preserved. Currently, Tiraspol,
supported fully by the Russian Federation, refuses to talk, in the
five-plus-two negotiations, on political and security issues. In the
meantime, Tiraspol is promoting, outside of the political negotiations,
the so-called concept of civilized divorce, as well as recently has
made an address to the Russian Federation to be recognized as an
independent state.
Our position with regard to these steps is clear. The demands of
the Transnistrian region are based on illusions and have no real
perspectives. The Transnistrian region is recognized by all as part of
the Republic of Moldova, and any request for international recognition
contradicts the international law and principles of the conflict
resolution process.
On official level, all international partners which are
participating in the negotiations process are unanimously supporting a
peaceful solution based on the principles that I outlined earlier:
respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of Moldova, and special
status for Transnistrian region within the Republic of Moldova.
Basically, these principles are stipulated in the OSCE ministerial
statements of the Transnistrian conflict adopted at the meetings of the
OSCE Council of Ministers in Dublin 2012 and Kiev 2013.
At the same time, we keep reiterating that real actions of the
international partners should be in line with their official positions.
This is not always the case. While the political process is stagnating,
the efforts are concentrated on tackle some technical issues, but even
in technical issues, the room for maneuver is limited due to difference
in approaches. Chisinau is promoting proposals based on the idea of a
rapprochement between sides, while Tiraspol is insisting on further
separation. For example, when we are talking about radio frequencies or
access of the Transnistrian companies to international transportation
corridors, our view is that solutions should be based on, or at least
not contradict, the existing international commitments that Moldova has
undertaken. Also, such solutions should not lead to further separation.
So we are a bit in a vicious circles there.
In 2013, we managed to find agreement on few issues related to
ecology, pensions, dismantling of some old and dangerous infrastructure
objectives, and some aspects of freedom of movement. These are positive
developments, but to move ahead, the conflict resolution process needs
more comprehensive forward-looking decisions. There are a number of
issues that could generate tensions. I will go briefly just to list
them.
A general point that I would like to make is that since the end of
the last year, we feel increased pressure on every element of the
Moldovan presence in the Transnistrian region. This is the case of
Moldovan Latin script schools, case of access of Moldovan farmers to
their lands on Transnistria-controlled de facto territory, case of the
Moldovan police and two penitentiaries located in the Bender town. The
line that we observe in each case is that Transnistrian side tries, by
various means, to impose their rules or take under their control
institutions subordinated to Moldova or apply pressure on people
working in these institutions.
Security situation in the region remains under our constant
monitoring. In the last period of time, you observe that Transnistrian
side is taking actions aimed at consolidation of its infrastructure at
the administrative boundary line. The risk of increase of the presence
of the Transnistrian military and security structures above notified
limits also remain real. The deployment of military observers of the
peacekeeping mechanism, whose main function is to monitor the
situation, is frequently blocked because it's matter of consensus
decision by all parties to the peacekeeping mechanism. The main
supervisory body in the security zone, the Joint Control Commission, in
many cases does not have a clear assessment of the situation. So all in
all, there are a number of vulnerabilities that could turn into
security challenges if there will be such an intention.
The Russian military presence in Moldova remains factor of our
concern. Our long-standing position has not changed. We call for
finalization without any precondition of the withdrawal of ammunition
stockpiles from Kobasna and remaining Russian forces in accordance with
the relevant international commitments. We also consider that efforts
toward modernization or buildup of this military presence would not
contribute to security in the region and therefore are not welcomed.
Let me sum up the approach of the Republic of Moldova. We put main
focus on peaceful political dialogue. We will keep all channels of
dialogue with Transnistria open to prevent unilateral steps and
deterioration of the situation. We will demonstrate a calm approach and
avoid involvement in any provocation. Prime Minister Iurie Leanca is
ready to meet with Shevchuk without any preconditions. We also continue
the dialogue at the level of chief negotiators and working groups.
Our short- and medium-term goals are the following: maintain
stability in the security zone; resolve issues like Moldovan Latin
script schools or access to farmers' lands without any tensions;
discourage pressure applied on police and penitentiaries in Bender;
keep dialogue ongoing at all levels and try to achieve progress in all
areas to create positive dynamics; maintain close contacts with all
international partners involved in the settlement process and encourage
their joint actions; move forward with the 5+2 negotiations.
Situation in Ukraine and implications for the Transnistrian
settlement--let me make a couple of remarks on the implications of the
situation in Ukraine on the Transnistrian settlement process. First of
all, as a neighboring country, and as friendly nation to Ukraine, the
Republic of Moldova is very much concerned about what is going on
there. We condemned the so-called referendum in Crimea and did not
recognize the further annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.
We consider it as a major challenge to the international law, political
cooperation and security architecture in Europe.
We are also very worried about spreading violence in east and south
of Ukraine, in particular in the Odessa region. We consider that all
efforts should be focused now on finding a peaceful solution that would
preserve sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Ukraine.
Nationwide dialogue between all political players that are acting in
the legal and constitutional framework of Ukraine is needed.
We continue to believe that the way towards de-escalation should be
found jointly by Ukrainian government in cooperation with all
international actors that could influence the situation on the ground.
International engagements such as the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission
to Ukraine, transparency mechanisms of the Vienna Document on CSBM and
other tools should be applied to their full capacity.
One of the trends which has become visible in the context of the
situation in Ukraine is an intensified propaganda regarding the fact
that Transnistrian region is under blockade. Tiraspol tries to provide
it by saying that the crossing points on the border are empty and the
flow of goods and people has decreased. Another element is that Russian
citizens are almost prohibited to enter Ukraine through Transnistrian
segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The reality is that the
movement of persons has decreased due to objective reasons related to
people's safety. Despite the increased control measures by Ukrainian
authorities on this segment, available data shows that the refusal
ratio of foreign citizens entering Ukraine remains extremely low, about
1 percent of total entries.
Concerning goods, the available statistics from both Tiraspol and
Chisinau show that the foreign trade operations, in particular exports
from the Transnistrian region continue to register positive dynamics.
There was no disruption in cargo traffic. Moreover, in April this year,
the Moldovan parliament canceled a number of taxes previously applied
to the Transnistrian companies. All these facts clearly demonstrate
that the rhetoric about blockade is not proved by facts.
Let me also add a few more points about the political context in
which Moldova lives these days. First of all, we are approaching a
breakthrough in our relations with the European Union. Recently Moldova
was granted a visa-free travel regime in Schengen Area for short-time
trips. This was a result of major efforts undertaken by all national
authorities in law enforcement, human rights, and document security
areas. In June we are planning to sign the association agreement with
the European Union and DCFTA. This event will mark the irreversible
character of our European path.
At the same time, we face some counteractions to European
integration. I'll just exemplify it by recent developments in the
southern part of the country, namely the Gagauzia autonomous unit. We
feel that skeptical mood towards European integration is being worked
up in this region. The government of Moldova is committed to dialogue,
and we are already taking actions to explain better our policies and
perspectives. The parliament has also formed a special group for
dialogue with the legislative body of Gagauzia. So we are intensifying
our dialogue with the autonomous region Gagauzia.
The last point is the upcoming parliamentary elections in late
November this year. We anticipate quite a tough competition between the
governing parties and opposition. In recent years elections in Moldova
have quite a visible geopolitical dimension, and we expect it to be so
in current year.
Summing up, I would say that these days Moldova finds itself in a
crucial moment of its history, being geographically very close to the
center of major dispute and tension between the key international
players, facing a number of security challenges and experiencing
ongoing political debate about the future of the country. This is time
to support Moldova, and we thank again the Helsinki Committee for this
opportunity to present our story.
Thank you.
Mr. Killion. Thank you very much, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister.
Now I give the floor to Paul Goble. Thank you very much.
Mr. Goble. Thank you, Ambassador.
I thank the commission for calling this hearing and giving me an
opportunity to speak on Moldova. It is a country I care very much
about, and unfortunately, it is one that has not gotten the attention
it deserves.
The topicality of the focus of this hearing is obvious. I suspect
that my colleagues, like myself, felt in preparing our remarks that we
had a very real risk that developments on the ground were moving so
fast that anything we might have written even last night might be
overtaken by events given what is occurring in Ukraine and in Moldova
itself.
The importance of Moldova simply cannot be overstated at the
present time. What Moscow is up to in Moldova as an extension of its
policy Ukraine and into the Balkans could easily prove far more fateful
to Europe and the West than Russia's invasion of Georgia six years ago
did, or than its ongoing aggression in Ukraine is. The three reasons
that that may very well prove to be the case can be quickly stated.
First of all, the outcome of Vladimir Putin's actions in Ukraine, and
thus of his entire imperial project, will depend in large measure on
what Moscow is able to do and make use of Moldova's Transnistria.
Second, in his efforts to derail Moldova's efforts to join Europe,
where it quite properly belongs, Putin has put in play, as has been
mentioned, the Gagauz, a Turkish community in the country's southeast
that would likely secede in a violent fashion if Transnistria is
allowed to exit or even gain significant autonomy as a result of
Russian pressure.
Third, the demise of the Moldovan state--which would likely occur
if those two things took place--could trigger changes not only in the
borders of Moldova but throughout Southeastern Europe, force the
federalization of what could become a greater Romanian state, reverse
the post-World War I settlement there of Trianon, and contribute to a
radical destabilization of the continent. Consequently, focusing on
Moldova should be a matter of concern for everyone.
Each of these possibilities requires a great deal of additional
comment but I will simply limit my remarks to this: These dangers are
so great that we can identify them quite easily and we can, at the
present time, take steps which maximize the area we have a relative
advantage in, which is in soft power, and reduces the possibility that
in the future we will have to make use of hard power, which is
someplace where in Southeastern Europe we enjoy a comparative
disadvantage. Consequently, it is terribly important that groups like
the OSCE and the Helsinki Commission make demands on what we need to do
immediately.
For two decades Moscow has consistently supported, both in public
and covertly, the breakaway Transnistria region, a place where many
have observed that the August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in
fact succeeded. It may have failed elsewhere but it succeeded there--
and one which has the largest, or almost the largest, Soviet arms
cache, which this regime has sold off to terrorists and others to
support itself and to promote a variety of nefarious missions around
the world, giving Russia plausible deniability but in fact being done
in closest coordination with the Russian government.
The Putin regime has declared Transnistria a frozen conflict, and
all too many in the West have been willing to accept that idea and that
there must be a negotiated settlement in which Moscow will have the
whip hand. That acceptance of course has meant that no settlement is
possible or will be possible because the Russian government, at least
under Vladimir Putin, prefers the managed instability in this region to
a stable, thriving and pro-Western Moldova.
In recent weeks--and this is terribly important to take note of--
Moscow propagandists have changed their thematics on Transnistria. They
have proclaimed it, quote, ``a second Crimea,'' arguing that, like
Crimea, its population--which Moscow untruthfully claims consists of a
Russian majority; there is no ethnic Russian majority in Transnistria;
there is a Slavic plurality but that is not the same thing--that
Transnistria should and must become part of the Russian Federation, and
that if an application is made, Moscow should agree.
But far more disturbingly, in the last few weeks Moscow writers and
officials have begun talking about Transnistria as an ally of Russia's
in Putin's project of creating Novo Rossia, a new Moscow client state
stretching from Crimea on the east to Transnistria in the west and
reducing Ukraine to a landlocked country, or even eliminating it
altogether by partition. There have already been credible reports that
armed individuals and groups from Transnistria have entered
Southwestern Ukraine and were present in Odessa during the recent
troubles, in support of secessionist groups.
If Moscow does launch an overt invasion of Ukraine--something I
think it probably will not do precisely because its subversion of
Ukraine is succeeding as well as it is from Moscow's point of view--it
seems clear that Transnistria will play a major supporting role, at a
minimum forcing Kiev to divide its forces and, at a maximum, catching
Ukraine in a two-front war that it would find far more difficult to
win.
The second Russian action in Moldova, one that has attracted far
less attention but may ultimately play an equally large geopolitical
role, is a promotion of Gagauz's separatism. The Gagauz, a 200,000-
strong nation living in a dispersed rather than compact area of
settlement which is conveniently neglected by many of the Russian
commentators, have long wanted greater linguistic and political
autonomy. In the early '90s their activism forced the Moldovan
government to cede power to them and to agree that should Moldova's
external borders be changed by the exit of Transnistria, the right of
the Gagauz would exist to move toward independence.
The Gagauz have neither the numbers nor the arms supply nor the
international contacts that the regime in Transnistria does, but they
do have an important political resource in addition to the support they
are getting from Moscow. They are Christian Turks and thus enjoy the
attention and potential support of both the Moscow patriarchate and the
Republic of Turkey. In the event of a crisis, either or both could come
to their aid, something the Russian government would undoubtedly use as
a cover to promote a new wave of secessionism, just as they used that
technique in Crimea and in greater Ukraine in recent weeks.
If both Transnistria and Gagauzia, defined in border terms were to
secede, Moldova would, like Ukraine in the Putin project, be left a
rump state where a large percentage of the population would likely have
to find union with someone else. It's been suggested that a rump
Ukraine would have to be absorbed by Poland and a rump Moldova would
have to go for some kind of union with Romania.
That is the third action that Russia has a longstanding and long-
term interest in. Indeed, some in Moscow now appear to be more
interested in destabilizing the broader region and undermining Europe
than even in seizing control of particular territories, given the
social and economic costs that Moscow would have to bear. It is far
better to destabilize areas and keep other people out than it is to
take control and have to pay for the social welfare costs that are
involved.
What would happen if Moscow provoked disintegration in Moldova and
alleged a union with Romania? Almost certainly, given the differences
in historical experience deriving from Soviet control in Moldova, that
new state would be federalized, and federalization in this case would
spark demands for a Hungarian autonomy in the north. And such demands,
given the Hungarian government in place at the present time, would
likely enjoy support from the north, and that would create a very
unstable situation that could lead to the kind of controversy that the
settlements after World War I were intended to eliminate and start
destabilization that would go even further into the former Yugoslavia
and south to Greece as well, all of them affecting American interests.
Given how serious this potential threat is, we need to think what
we can do now. None of them, of course, are inevitable. Russia's
``victory,'' quote, unquote, in Crimea is not inevitable. It is not
necessarily that it will stay the course. I welcomed your remarks about
nonrecognition of the Russian occupation of Crimea, which is an illegal
act. I believe we must articulate a clear nonrecognition policy with
regard to Crimea and other Russian areas, just as we did with respect
to Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. That was a policy that was
kept in place for more than 50 years and became the birth certificate
of the recovery of independence of those three countries. We need to
understand that we are in an equally fateful situation now.
I would like to argue that we need to do five things right now.
First, we need to recognize Moldova's centrality to our security
concerns and to build up expertise inside the government and in the
American For far too long--based as a personal experience, I can tell
you--Moldova has been treated as a, quote, ``orphan'' country, as a
country that doesn't have domestic support in this country because of
the Romanian connection and that is not somehow terribly important. In
fact, Moldova's geographic position means that in an age of
geopolitics, which Mr. Putin is playing even if we are not, it is much
more important than anyone can imagine. It isn't about size. It's about
location.
Second, we need to expand Western broadcasts to Moldova and
especially Russian-language broadcasts there. The fact is that Vladimir
Putin has transformed Moscow television into an organizing tool, much
as Lenin used Iskra a hundred years ago to organize and undermine
stability in neighboring countries. We need to have an alternate voice.
It is terribly important that the people in Transnistria who do speak
Russian get their news from a Russian-language channel that is not
propaganda from the central government in Moscow.
Third, we need to promote change within Moldova, not by holding it
up to standards that will allow us to say no. Too many of the
suggestions about how we should assist countries other than Russia
start by saying, these are the standards we have to require, but that
is usually a covert way of saying, and we'll then have an excuse not
for doing something. We need to have a much bigger picture. We need to
promote exchanges, sending Americans to Moldova and bringing Moldovans
to the United States. Such exchanges were the heart and soul of
American policy in Western Europe after 1945. They should be at the
heart and soul of American policy now.
Fourth, we need to recognize, and be open about it, that our
approach to Transnistria, like our approach to Nagorno-Karabakh, and
our approach to almost all of the frozen conflicts on the territory of
what once was the Soviet empire, has been wrong. Involving Russia in
these things is a guarantee that they will not be solved, because
Russia has no interest in solving these conflicts. What we need is to
promote bilateral talks of the kind that the deputy prime minister has
discussed rather than injecting things in a way to allow Moscow to have
a veto.
Fifth, in my view anyway, we need to offer a united Moldova
immediate membership in NATO and, together with our European allies,
put it on the fast track to European Union membership. Despite the
vocabulary of many in Washington over the last two decades, one does
not, quote, ``qualify'' for a defense alliance. One includes a country
in a defense alliance either because of its position or its ability to
contribute to the goals of that alliance. Moldova, by its position, can
do that. It is worth noting that one of the earliest members of NATO
does not even have a military, something those of us who were part of
the Baltic cause frequently had occasion to note.
In considering these ideas, I would like to suggest that we need to
remember the implications of a remark that Winston Churchill made to
the American ambassador in 1944. He said at the time that, quote, ``The
Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing--after they've
tried everything else.'' That is often quoted as a suggestion that
Americans are simply bumbling incompetents. In fact, what Churchill was
calling attention to is something that we have not yet been willing to
focus on, and that is we no longer have such disproportionate economic,
political and military power that we can afford to make mistake after
mistake. We have to get things right soon. That requires expertise.
That requires attention. And it requires that we use the soft power,
which is where we will always enjoy a comparative advantage, before
it's too late. Moldova is a very good place for us to start. Thank you.
Mr. Killion. Thank you, Mr. Goble, for your very powerful testimony
and the bright lines that you drew for us. And now, Mr. Blank, it's
your turn.
Mr. Blank. Thank you, Ambassador Killion. I'd like to thank you and
the Helsinki Commission for inviting me and for holding this hearing. I
agree with what has been said here before, that Moldova is a critical
country which does not receive the attention it deserves. It plays an
important geostrategic part in Southeast Europe, for a number of
reasons.
Basically, Moldova serves as a precedent, as a template, and as a
lynchpin of Russian strategy to destabilize the entire area from the
Balkans to the Caucasus by exploiting and inciting conflicts using the
ethnic card and all the instruments of power at its disposal to prevent
the creation of consolidated states, whether it be in the former
Yugoslavia, in Moldova or in the Caucasus, or in Ukraine, and to regain
the empire. It is very clear from what we are now seeing in Ukraine,
which acts by Russia constitute an act of war, and that has to be
understood. When people say we are risking a war if we do something in
retaliation for all this, the fact is that there already is a war.
Invasion, occupation and annexation, as in Moldova, are acts of war, as
in Georgia, as in Ukraine, and they need to be recognized as such.
Moldova is a precedent. It is the first place where the Russian
government used the ethnic card and the military card 22 years ago in
order to establish a kind of neo-Soviet criminalized regime, which
looks to Moscow, and which Moscow has gradually come to recognize as
its own and therefore to resist negotiation. It is a template for what
is happening now in the Ukraine by virtue of that operation, but
furthermore because Mr. Putin has been preparing for this operation for
the 15 years that he's been president.
Already in 2000 he made clear that he did not believe that Moldova
was really a genuine state and that it had to acknowledge the special
interests of the Russians there. His federalization plan of 2003, the
so-called Kozak plan, would have destroyed any genuine sovereignty in
Moldova and is a template for what he is trying to impose now on
Ukraine. Moreover, at least since 2006, we know for a fact--this has
been published in open sources--that Mr. Putin and the Russian
government were training Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan soldiers at a
camp in Solnechnogorsk to conduct the kinds of operations we see going
on in Ukraine that have gone on since February 27th.
So there is no excuse for anyone to say that this was unforeseen.
It certainly wasn't unforeseen by Mr. Putin. He was planning this
operation for years. And he even said to George Bush at Bucharest that
he would dismember Ukraine if it moved to the West, and that it was not
a state and that its territory, meaning Crimea, was a gift from Russia.
We need to keep an eye on what's going on here and pay greater
attention to the Balkans and the Caucasus and Ukraine, because the
future of European integration and European security, which are the
vital interests of both the United States and of Europe, are at risk
here, as Paul Goble and Deputy Prime Minister Carpov have pointed out.
In the Caucasus we see Moscow inciting the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Four billion worth of arms has been sold to Azerbaijan in the
last four years, the buildup of the Russian forces in the Caucasus, the
achievement of a base at Gyumri for 25 years, plus arms sales to
Armenia indicate that Moscow has no interest in solving the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict because it is profiting from keeping it going, not
just in financial terms but in geopolitical terms, because it is able
to impose its will on Armenia and to prevent Azerbaijan from getting
closer to the West.
What's more, it is inciting conflict by running guns covertly from
Montenegro in the Balkans to Stepanakert. From 2010 through 2013, for
example, 38 Ilyushin-76 planes took off from Montenegro, loaded top to
bottom with arms, heading for Stepanakert, the capital of the, quote,
``independent'' Nagorno-Karabakh. It doesn't take much imagination to
understand whose weapons these are and whose planes these are, and what
that means in terms of Russia's ability to corrupt officials in
Montenegro, and its efforts to use the Balkans in order to incite
trouble in the Caucasus.
Moreover, historically the conquest and incorporation of Ukraine
has been the basis from which Moscow has then proceeded to launch all
of the imperial gambits it has launched in the Balkans, going back to
Catherine the Great. Today that is--there is no difference. We look at
the pattern in Ukraine. The territories that are being threatened are
precisely those that would allow Russia a direct landline to Moldova. I
don't think that's a coincidence.
Furthermore, in the Balkans Moscow's project is to prevent,
frustrate and obstruct European integration and democratization, and to
project its military power. It has asked Serbia for a base ostensibly
for humanitarian interventions at Nis. It restored a naval base on
Montenegro at Bar in the Adriatic. And it has projected its power into
Transnistria and then used that power, as we have heard, to go back in
and incite difficulties in the Ukraine.
If Moldova is allowed to be truncated in its sovereignty, abridged
in its territorial integrity, then all the kinds of consequences that
Paul Goble has just specified become real, relevant and potential
threats to European security. And they will not only take place around
Romania, Moldova and Hungary because the Russians are also busy trying
to prevent Serbia and Kosovo from achieving a lasting piece by inciting
every kind of Serbian nationalist outrage against Kosovo that it can
and to prevent the unification of Bosnia Herzegovina in the Baltics,
just as it's doing in the Caucasus. Whereas in the Caucasus, it runs
guns, or uses the military arm in order to prevent Georgia from
achieving its integrity and sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia
or to prevent conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is doing
exactly the same thing in the Balkans. It is all part of a single
strategy whose objectives are, A, restoring the Russian empire, if not
necessarily the Soviet Empire; B, solidifying Mr. Putin's domestic hold
by playing the imperial card to claim that he is a gatherer of Russian
lands. C, preventing European integration in the Balkans and the
Caucasus, and D, perpetuating what can be called a state of siege in
East-West relations; much like Lenin did in 1917 when he took power.
For all those reasons, Moldova is a state that deserves much more
consideration and interest and attention from the United States. Apart
from the recommendations that Paul Goble has made, all of which I
support, it is necessary also for us to understand that the threat we
now face in Ukraine is one that will not only be dealt with by
sanctions, although much more rigorous sanctions are needed. The ones
that have been imposed to date are clearly insufficient, and have been
reported as such.
But it is also unfortunately necessary that we have to help Ukraine
with the instruments of hard power: training, weapons, and I would
argue, also, an invitation to NATO to bring in NATO forces as
peacekeepers into the afflicted areas, because I believe that that will
deter Russia, and unfortunately, only that will deter Russia, because
what has been done up till now is not enough and will not be enough and
certainly has not altered Mr. Putin's decision-making calculus, as
President Obama has indicated.
Therefore, much more vigorous action is needed and is needed over
the long term. What is at stake today, as Secretary Kerry has observed,
is the European settlement after the Cold War's termination in 1989 to
'91 to the extent that we continue to be missing in action in the
Caucasus, in the Balkans and in Ukraine, it turns out that that
revision of the settlement is likely to occur without our participation
and against our interests, and those interests are the same as our
allies' interests.
So if we abandon our alliances because we don't understand what's
at stake, or are too selfish or apathetic to care, we will have indeed
harvested a much greater danger. Ukraine is not the end of Mr. Putin's
ambitions, it is only the beginning. Thank you.
Mr. Killion. Thank you, Mr. Blank, and thanks to all of the
witnesses for very provocative testimony, and food for thought for the
commission and for others. I'd like to start by asking a question to
our very distinguished deputy prime minister, Mr. Carpov. An issue that
was raised in Mr. Goble's testimony--recent poll results in Moldova
indicate that Russian television and other Russian media have a very
strong influence in Moldova in reflecting Moldovan and international
news, especially related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. EU
integration--Eurasian customs union, et cetera. Does your government
plan any action to put Russian TV channels on the same footing with
other foreign channels?
Mr. Carpov. Thank you for this question, Ambassador. It's really a
sensitive one. We are facing difficult times in the Republic of
Moldova, and I mentioned why. Well, informational competition is a real
thing that exists in the Republic of Moldova. We also can see that
different Russian channels in this specific period are using elements
that are not corresponding fully to different democratic standards or
levels according to the legislation of the Republic of Moldova,
according to the international standards and rules.
That's why now we started a process--when we tried to monitor
closely--very close the way that Russian channels are presenting the
information that is spreading over the media area of the Republic of
Moldova. Based on the results of this monitoring, we will definitely
decide what are the next steps in order to assure there are equal
rights and possibilities for all channels, national and foreign media
channels and full respect of the legislation that is governing the
activity of foreign media channels. Thank you.
Mr. Killion. Thank you very much. And now a question for Mr. Goble.
You stated that the leadership in Transnistria has sold arms caches
from the Soviet Union era. Could you advise as to the recipients of
such arms and what the Moldovan government and the international
community is doing to prevent the proliferation?
Mr. Goble. The problem is that during the Cold War and during the
Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, there were a number of arms caches
that were put in forward areas to be used in the event of a NATO-Soviet
conflict. One of those places with millions of tons of arms was in what
is now Transnistria. That has been an arms bazaar, and it has gone to a
variety of groups. I know that it has gone to a number of Islamist
radical groups. There are reports, which I find credible, that it has
gone to terrorist organizations that are directed against Western
countries.
I do not believe that those sales were undertaken autonomously by
Tiraspol. I believe that they reflect a way of Moscow providing arms to
anti-Western forces with the kind of plausible deniability, which I
regret to say is rarely challenged. The Moldovan government, I am
absolutely certain, would not tolerate these sales if it were in a
position to control that territory if, in fact, what the international
community said were realized, namely that the borders of Moldova
include a place called Transnistria, rather than Transnistria being run
as a Russian project outside of the control of Kishinev.
One of the many reasons for doing away with the idea that Moscow
can be our partners in solving Transnistria is that Moscow has no
interest in doing that, because this is a resource it is quite
interested in continuing to use. I believe that we have a compelling
interest in preventing terrorist groups from being armed, and I believe
that we have an immediate danger that that will continue to be the case
out of Transnistria unless and until the Russian government is not in a
position to make use of Transnistria as it has for two decades. I
suspect it's true that some of the sales that went out of the Soviet
arms cache were done to make money for the people in the Tiraspol
government, and to even pay some of the Tiraspol government's bills.
But I believe that on the whole, those sales have been coordinated
carefully with Moscow rather than being an autonomous action, even of
Tiraspol.
Mr. Killion. One additional question, Mr. Goble. You talked about
the establishment of a clear nonrecognition policy regarding Crimea.
Could you elaborate a little bit about what elements would be included
in such a clear nonrecognition and how that would be different from the
status quo?
Mr. Goble. There's an enormous difference, and I'm delighted to
have that question and have a chance to speak to it. Since 1930, the
United States has taken a position that was articulated by then
Secretary of State Stimson that it did not recognize any territorial
change achieved by force alone. That is to say that if force is used,
and then there's a post-force settlement, as there was in 1918, 1919,
that that might be the case. Indeed, when, in 1940 American
nonrecognition policy with respect to Estonian, Latvia, Lithuania was
articulated, it was on the assumption, at least I believe so from what
I've read--that there would be a peace conference after World War II
was concluded.
Nonrecognition policy for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is a useful
model. It is important to say what it specified and what it did not
specify and why it's so important to have such a policy in place with
respect to Crimea or any other place that the Russian government tries
to seize.
First, nonrecognition policy said that the United States did not
recognize this seizure, period. That we've already done. But that's not
enough. Second, this specified that no senior American official--that
was defined as someone confirmed by the Senate--would ever visit that
territory while it was under occupation. Third, in the case of Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, we recognized the diplomats of the pre-war
governments. We did not recognize governments in exile. Fourth, the
United States specified that any map produced by the U.S. government--
we produce an awful lot of them, would carry on it the statement that
the borders as claimed by the USSR were not recognized by the United
States and that we did not recognize the forcible inclusion of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR, and that policy stayed in place. We
have already seen the problem of not having a clearly articulated
policy like that, which was crafted in 1940 by Loy Henderson. In that,
there have been several American government websites that have put out
maps showing Crimea already part of the Russian Federation. That's
intolerable and would not be the case if there were a clear policy
statement. Simply saying we will never recognize it isn't enough. You
have to say what that means.
Now, two other points that I think are important. The U.S. non-
recognition policy of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania never carried with
it a suggestion that the United States was committed to doing anything
military to the liberation of these places not even in the darkest days
of the Cold War. That was important because it is not that we would
engage in a response to aggression by using military force, but rather
we will use moral suasion, and this is why we will have maps that
should show as long as Moscow claims that Crimea belongs to it and is
part of the borders--inside the borders of the Russian Federation, that
the United States government, as a matter of settled policy, does not
recognize that, but not that the United States is committed to using
force from the Black Sea or anywhere else to drive the Russians out.
That's important because the distinction, which gives us some moral
high ground, and does not create expectations, which I regret to say we
would never realize anyway.
The second thing is that by articulating a new nonrecognition
policy in Crimea, we can revive a policy which was one of the most
morally important during the Cold War. We did not do that, tragically,
after the Russian invasion of Georgia in August of 2008. We did not
articulate a nonrecognition policy of that kind. Crimea is a second
occasion when we should do that. And it would serve notice to Moscow
and to a variety of other governments around the world that the United
States, as a matter of settled policy, is going to not recognize the
results of aggression as legitimate, period. That is something that
flows from our own national tradition. It's a policy that was the right
thing to do from 1940 to 1991 for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is
the right thing to do with respect to Georgia and now with respect to
Ukraine, and I would like to see it ready and we can fill in any place
else that the Russians or anyone else tries to use military force. But
just saying that you'll never recognize it isn't enough, because it
does not create the doctrinal basis within the bureaucracy to prevent
errors, which will be used by the other side to chip away at this
attack on international legitimacy. As Steve Blank has quite accurately
said, what Mr. Putin is doing is a regression not only against the
settlement of 1991 but against the settlements of 1945 and 1919. And
nonrecognition policy is a way of making it very clear the United
States is opposed to the revision of those three settlements and that
we have a policy in place that will prevent any American official, be
he an embassy officer in Kiev, someone at a U.S. international
broadcaster or anywhere else from crossing a line that the Russians
will make and other people may make use of to legitimate a criminal
act.
Mr. Killion. Thanks for that clarification.
I want to ask you, Mr. Blank, you talked about a hard power
dimension of policy response to the current situation in Ukraine, and
you spoke about NATO and training and so forth, and I just would like
you to elaborate a little bit and talk about how the timing of your
proposed policy response would work with the speed at which events seem
to be unfolding on the ground in eastern Ukraine and other parts of the
country.
Mr. Blank. Well, thank you. It's necessary really to begin right
away. What is necessary here is, I would say, that if the Ukrainian
government were to invite NATO peacekeeping forces--which is its
sovereign right--then the response should be yes and we should start
moving forces into Ukraine right away. They would have restricted rules
of engagement. They would not be able to conduct offensive operations,
but they would be given the capabilities to protect themselves against
either regular or what we might call irregular forces that are
currently involved, and that means also air and air defense
capabilities if necessary.
Beyond that, it is urgent to help the Ukrainian government
stabilize its Ministry of Defense and command establishment, and to
start providing training for Ukrainian soldiers, because there is a
great danger that Ukrainians who are opposed to this Russian invasion
will start organizing themselves and that the Ukrainian government will
lose control of that instrument of power, plunging the country into
something let's say similar to Bosnia or Northern Ireland or Syria. So
it's important for us to help the Ukrainian state get a handle on its
own military and to devise a strategic coordinated approach to
prevailing over and repulsing the Russian invasion, because it's very
clear that the Russians have now decided to up the ante and use
violence. Shooting down helicopters clearly indicates the presence not
only of Russian weapons but of Russia officers, because you just don't
give people air defense weapons and say go ahead and use this. There's
training involved here, as we know from our own experience in--for
example, in Afghanistan. So there is that. Second, we also know that
what is going on already in these occupied territories is repression.
We've had numerous cases of reports already of anti-Semitic outrages,
attacks on Crimean Tatars, and coercion. It was just revealed last
night, for example, that the Russia government's own information
sources indicated that only 30 percent of Crimea voted in the quote
``referendum,'' and only 15 percent of those voting supported it.
That's hardly a sign of the democratic will of the people. What that
means, therefore, is an occupation by force. So that has to be
countered.
Now, the rules of engagement for that force are to be clearly
marked out as being purely defensive, but I think that sanctions alone
are not going to do the job, because, first of all, European energy and
other companies are busy making private deals with Mr. Putin, as we
have seen. Secondly, a lot of European governments really don't want to
impose sanctions. Wall Street and Bulgaria are looking for ways to
bring about the South Stream pipeline, which is the key to Russian
domination of the entire area through energy. The European Commission
has not yet said that it will under no circumstances allow South
Stream, which is what it should do, because that would make it clear to
Russia what's going on. There are other sanctions that we have the
capability of doing on our own or together with our allies, and nothing
is happening in that regard. So as a number of analysts--for example,
George Friedman of Stratfor point out--sanctions provide the illusion
that we're doing something when we are really not doing enough or doing
serious activity to roll back and prevent further incursions. It is my
firm conviction, therefore, that if we allow this to go forward, then
we will face further questions in Europe, and not only in Europe, and
not only from Russia, and that therefore the blend of hard and soft
power instruments, with a coherent strategy in mind, is the only way
forward.
Mr. Killion. Thank you very much.
Very shortly we're going to turn questions over to the audience, so
please be prepared for that. Before we do that, I'd like to turn the
floor over to my colleague Winsome Packer, who is the Helsinki
Commission's expert on the security dimension of the Helsinki Final Act
and also this region, including Moldova.
Mr. Packer. Thank you, Ambassador.
I'd like to ask a question about the conflict resolution mechanisms
in Transnistria, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. They have, by a limited
estimation proven entirely ineffective over the 20 years that they have
been in place. And I'd like to ask the panel's recommendations as to
what you think might be done to modify them and achieve some progress
in any one of these areas.
Mr. Blank. If I may go first, there has to be a recognition in the
United States that--A, that these programs have failed, as you have
said; and that, B, that it is in our important, if not vital, interest
that we regenerate the conflict resolution process in order to bring
both sides, in at least one or more of these conflicts, to the table
and to an ultimate solution. And unfortunately, that means that we
would have to take the lead and sponsor, if you like, a Camp David type
situation with regard to any or all of those conflicts.
It is patently clear that Moscow has not only no interest in
resolving these conflicts, but that it has a positive interest and is
undertaking actions toward those ends to incite them further, and not
only these, Kosovo and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.
I would recommend--and I have written this before about Nagorno-
Karabakh, but it applies to the others--that the president invite the
leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the United States and essentially
conduct that kind of negotiation that President Carter did with regard
to Camp David, because that's the only way it's going to come about.
Armenia, for example, been virtually deprived of its ability to conduct
a sovereign foreign policy, thanks to Russia. We saw that last
September when Russia said, if you sign the association agreement with
the European Union, we will cut off aid, we will make sure you can
never get Nagorno-Karabakh back, and we may destroy your economy and so
forth and so on. And Armenia caved in to that.
So it's necessary for the president to undertake the action.
There's no guarantee of success. The same thing is true with regard to
Moldova. Moscow will no doubt tell Armenia and Transnistria not to
attend these conferences, and it will certainly prevent the South
Ossetians and the Abkhazians from doing so. But in that case, we can
then turn around and say, in that case, we will not participate in any
of those processes, and there will be no conflict resolution, and
what's more, we will support our allies, and make the cost of doing so
much greater to Russia, because there is no way at present in order to
bring about conflict resolution given what is going on.
If you understand that Moscow not only wants to block this, but
wants to incite conflict, then it is our responsibility to understand
that the only way forward is to prevent Moscow from gaining its
objectives. And their objectives are to prevent both European
integration and the spread of democracy in Europe. And the spread of
democracy in Europe cannot take place in conflict zones.
Mr. Goble. I would just add to that--I agree with everything Steve
has said. I would just point out, as someone who's old enough to have
been completed the Minsk Process about Karabakh, wrote at the time that
it was a recipe for making sure there was never a settlement, because
it insisted that one of the players that would have a veto was over it
was the Russian Federation. I remember visiting Baku in 1996, and
Heydar Aliyev, who was then the president, asked me, how long do we
have to be independent before we will stop being treated as newly
independent states and appendages of Russia?
It is worth remembering that the closest that Armenia and
Azerbaijan ever got to a settlement was not because of the Minsk
Process, but the Key West meeting where it was a bilateral
conversation. The United States has an important interest in promoting
resolutions of these conflicts, but we have to understand that you
don't invite someone who is a longtime arsonist to the table to talk
about how to put out fires. And that is what the Russian government is
doing.
The tragedy is that if these conflicts go on, at some point someone
will use force--Azerbaijan in Karabakh is a possibility--and that works
to Russia's advantage as well. So it's very much in our interest to
promote bilateral talks. It's very much in our interest to stop
assuming that the Russians should have a seat at the table.
This country failed utterly for the first decade in treating the
countries that emerged when the Soviet Union disintegrated as separate
and independent. The only time that an empire has fallen apart and
where for a whole decade the United States kept all of those countries
in the same bureaucracy they'd been part of at our key institutions of
foreign policy was with respect to what had been, in effect, the Soviet
Russian empire. That drove an awful lot of things where the assumption
was that Russia should have a seat at the table. It is the only time in
the history of American diplomacy that a man who's been an ambassador
at one of the countries that gained its independence in this process is
subsequently, quote-unquote, promoted to become deputy chief of mission
in the imperial capital. That sends a very profound message. If you do
that, if you keep acting as if Russia has regard in this area, the
Russians will pocket that and continue.
We've got to promote bilateral talks. The Key West model, I don't
believe at present, is practical, but I think that's what we should be
moving toward. We should recognize that Armenia is in a much weaker
position vis-a-vis Moscow than it was when Key West happened and that
the Azerbaijanis are less susceptible to Western influence. But that's
an indictment of what we've done for two decades, not something that
was unknowable at the time. It's going to be bilateral talks.
I was delighted to hear the deputy prime minister talk about the
importance of bilateral talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol. If we
insist on thinking that everything has to be multilateral, which is a
way of getting us off the hook, in a way, what we will do is we will
guarantee that you will not get a settlement and that the situations
will deteriorate because one player that we will insist at being at the
table will do this.
One last thought on this. I think it was a horrific mistake to have
the meeting between the foreign minister of the Russian Federation, the
international affairs representative of the European Union and the
United States and the foreign minister of Ukraine in Geneva because in
effect, what we asked the Ukrainians to do was to agree to their own
submersion. With respect, even the people who are most criticized for
the way they responded to Nazi aggression in the '30s did not ask the
Czechoslovaks to be present at their own submersion. You don't do it
that way.
When a country has engaged in open aggression--and this is open
aggression, it is time not to talk about pro-Russian forces. This is an
action of the Russian state. And it is something much worse for those
who are concerned about the OSCE project. As Steve has said, and as I
tried to indicate, what we have seen is a man who is reversing the
settlement of 1945, the basis of the United Nations and the basis of
the international order. Vladimir Putin is insistent that ethnicity is
more important than citizenship. That is what got us into World War II.
That is what is the basis of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Moldova and
in the Balkans, not to speak of Central Asia and the Caucasus. This is
what people should really be worried about--if that principle goes
unchallenged in the Russian case, there are a number of other rising
powers that will invoke the same thing, and we will have problems in
Asia as well. And that is something we can't afford to counter then, so
we had best counter it now.
Sorry to be so emotional about this, but it's outrageous to
constantly assume that we are talking with people who want to find a
settlement when what they want is American cover for aggression that
they have committed. And that's what we have with respect to the
Russian government of Vladimir Putin.
Mr. Killion. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister.
Mr. Carpov. To add some words based on our experience with the
Transnistrian conflict settlement, well, from the very beginning, I
mentioned that in Moldova, there were no ethnic or religious roots for
the conflict. It's a, purely political conflict, and political elements
that generated the violence in Moldova. If we agree with this, then we
have to clarify from where these political interests are coming and who
are the international actors interested in such processes.
In our case, and now having Ukraine in the situation that it is,
it's clear that it's a geopolitical competition between East and West.
Unfortunately with Moldova and Ukraine--we are a part and we are
suffering part from this competition.
Conflict resolution--it's obvious that if there are powerful
international actors interested in a specific development in a country,
we have to see who can be a real co-partner for such a dialogue. In the
case of the Transnistrian conflict, you remember that until 2005, the
negotiation format was composed by five participants: Chisinau,
Tiraspol, and only Ukraine, Moldova and OSCE. That is why we considered
that the format was unbalanced. It was Moldovan efforts to bring to the
table of negotiations some other participants, and now we have United
States of America and the European Union unfortunately, as observers.
We are pleading further for the increasing of the role of United States
of America and EU at the level of the mediators to have an equal
dialogue between all really important international actors that can
bring positive evolutions in the settlement.
Well, as I mentioned before, we see a vital necessity to maintain
contacts at the level of Chisinau and Tiraspol, because this is also an
additional way to understand better the mentality of the opponents and
to bring arguments in case there are elements that are not
corresponding to the realities. Now, this is an additional element to
the 5+2.
Then looking at the procedures, it's obvious that consensus in
adopting decisions is a democratic principle, consensus. But in many
cases, this element becomes an obstacle when if there is one
participant who is not agreeing because of some internal, arguments,
not agreeing with the decision shared by all other participants, it
becomes a problem. It becomes a problem, and then probably there is a
need to have additional instruments of explaining, convincing such
actors in the truth of some arguments and coming to this common idea.
Thank you.
Mr. Killion. I would like to now jump quickly to the audience. We
need to move to your questions because we will lose the deputy prime
minister very soon. As you can imagine, he's very much in demand at
this moment in history and his visit to the United States.
Questioner. Thank you.
Mr. Killion. Our former ambassador to Moldova. Please introduce
yourself.
Questioner. I'm Pamela Hyde Smith. I was ambassador to Moldova some
years ago and, like many Americans who spend time there, fell in love
with the place and have stayed that way. So thank you for your
excellent testimony.
I would like to follow up on a question I've had about Moldovan
public opinion, Right-Bank Moldovan public opinion. I heard some months
ago that there was limited enthusiasm for European integration among a
majority, a plurality of Moldovans, and also not much interest in the
Transnistria issue. Is that still true? And if so, what should we be
doing to help it not be so? Thank you.
Mr. Carpov. Well, thank you, Ambassador, for being here with us and
for your question. That's true, there are different polls showing
different figures of support of the Moldovan society for the European
integration process and Euro-Asian aspects of possible integration.
Well, I personally think that it is also a part of a beginning of a
campaign, electoral campaign that Moldova will face in November this
year. That's true in Moldova, we have pro-European forces and parties,
political parties, and there is opposition, with mainly Communist Party
being clearly pro-Customs Union now, promoting this message in favor of
pro-Eastern Europe integration, Euro-Asian integration.
But I'm convinced that we have a clear majority in the Republic of
Moldova pleading for the European integration. And the results of the
voting in November will show this. At least I'm convinced that this is
the only possible way for Moldova to continue democratic reforms and
transformations is to have the democratic government and majority in
parliament for the next four years, and not only for four years.
Transnistria--that's true probably; 22 years of negotiations is a
long period of time, and maybe some sensibilities of this issue have
been lost and the society somehow is now acting with the sentiment that
Transnistria is a problem, and the end of the story is not even very
visible. That's why the interest is not so high. But this is probably
also a part of our homework for the next immediate time, to have an
informational campaign to really try to explain to our society,
especially to the Transnistrian region, to Gagauz autonomy, other
Russian-speaking areas, what are the real content of the European
integration process, what are the benefits, what it means--European
perspectives and reintegration of the country. This is what we have to
intensify.
Mr. Killion. If you could identify yourself.
Questioner. Thank you. Margarita Assenova, of the Jamestown
Foundation. I have a question for Deputy Prime Minister Carpov. What
kind of assistance would you like to receive from the United States to
deal with the illegal smuggling of weapons from Transnistria to other
regions, and radioactive materials? I realize it's about a depot that
stays there with so many years and how it can be dismantled and
destroyed, so it's a wider question, but it's time to be solved. Thank
you.
Mr. Killion. Simon, one more question right here. We'll collect the
last two questions and then let the panelists deal with the collective.
Questioner. Thank you very much. I am Batu Kutelia, The McCain
Institute. I'm from Georgia. I am former Georgian ambassador to the
U.S. In the '90s, we were facing a very serious problem of the building
up a cornerstone of European security. In the process of the adaptation
of Conventional Forces in Europe, there was quite a significant
achievement based on the regional cooperation when Moldova, Ukraine,
Georgia and Azerbaijan formed a group called GUAM, and in particular
the CFE dimension, this group achieved a lot while having a
consolidated approach against Russia's interest to maintain its
military presence in so-called near abroad.
So what would be your assessment of need or necessity of that type
of regional cooperation by countries concerning the Russian aggressive
behavior?
Mr. Killion. Who would like to go first in dealing with those
questions?
Mr. Goble. I'll just say three sentences. First, I think the United
States has to get involved in international broadcasting into Moldova,
both television and radio, and in both Moldovan and in Russian
language. Second, I think that GUAM is a wonderful organization; I'd
like to see it get its second U back. I'd like to see it get some
others added. That is a very hopeful thing. It would be very important
as a counterweight and as a forum for discussions that would clearly
indicate that a rejection of the CIS and its latest Russian imperial
incarnation, the Eurasian Union, which I think is going to fall under
its own weight, but Putin has moved much too fast, and I think
Lukashenko can see that. I'll stop with that.
Mr. Carpov. Thank you. On the assistance, I have to admit that we
have a very good level of cooperation with partners from the United
States of America on different concrete projects. And if it is about
border control or radioactive materials--and I understand--you based
your question on the last information from Ukrainian sources that they
stopped a car with 1.5 kilograms of radio and nuclear materials coming
from Transnistria region for not very clear purpose, and now we are in
contact with our Ukrainian colleagues to clarify the situation.
But about assistance for the Ministry of Interior--the institution
dealing with the border guards and combating international crimes, they
have a very good program of assistance from the United States of
America in this respect, but now we are discussing possibility to
increase the support that we are receiving from our American friends in
order to be prepared to react promptly at the new elements of risks
that can occur.
On the GUAM, that's obvious that Moldova supports different forms
of regional cooperation, and we were among the countries that initiated
the GUAM cooperation. We maintain our interest for this group. We think
there are a lot of positive possibilities to develop cooperation
between us in the different areas, and we think that while it doesn't
necessarily to have evolutions like we have in Ukraine in order to
strengthen regional cooperation; it should be natural--coming from
participating countries as part of getting better life for our
societies. Thank you.
Mr. Blank. I would add to that that for an organization like GUAM
to succeed--and is one of many attempts to create regional security
organizations on the peripheries of the Russian Empire, which have
historically all failed, it is necessary for the parties to work out a
genuine strategic consensus that they keep to, because if they allow
themselves to move apart, then the whole organization will fall apart.
Furthermore, with regard to the CFE treaty--this is another case
which--that U.S. policy, I think, has failed to assess the situation.
When Russia suspended its participation, which is a nonexistent legal
category with regard to an international treaty in the CFE seven years
ago, we didn't do anything about it. I would argue that it's really no
longer possible to sustain that treaty and that given the fact that the
Russian military is almost always going to be stronger than any of its
neighbors, just given the preponderance of resources at its disposal,
which we need to come up with a new modality.
I'm not altogether certain that regional organizations are going to
prevail when they appear to be much more attracted to the European
Union and NATO. Given that, although I would support something like
GUAM, and provided that there is a genuine working consensus that leads
to it, I think it's necessary for us and for Brussels--and that's both
organizations in Brussels--NATO and the EU--to make it clear that we
are prepared to take action to expand both organizations and invest the
necessary resources not only in European self-defense but also in
European energy and freedom from Moscow, and therefore, to invest in
these countries and to help them strengthen their capabilities to be
independent and resist Russian subversion and threats and make it clear
to Russia that, just as is the case in Ukraine, any attempt to
undermine them carries severe costs.
The fact of the matter is, Russia has declared itself to be an
outlaw state, and second and this is even more critical, based on what
Paul has said, that it has told the world that it believes Russia can
only be secure if it's an empire, that the system of governance in
Russia can only continue if Russia is an empire, which means the
diminished sovereignty, if not territorial integrity, of all of its
neighbors, not just the former Soviet neighbors, because it doesn't
really recognize the sovereignty and integrity of Poland, Romania, et
cetera. Therefore, if they are going to act in such a way as to
preserve the state of siege in Europe, then Europe must return to a
policy of deterrence, which means building up strong states on the
peripheries.
Mr. Killion. Thank you very much, and thank you to all three
participants. It's been a very useful briefing for us, and we'll take
back what we learned to our commissioners. Thank you very much.
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