[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
RELATIONS DIMENSIONS OF U.S.-AZERBAIJAN
RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 11, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.csce.gov
____________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
95-592 WASHINGTON : 2015
________________________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SENATE
HOUSE
BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland, CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
Chairman Co-Chairman
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
TOM UDALL, New Mexico ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas New York
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF U.S.-AZERBAIJAN
RELATIONS
----------
JUNE 11, 2014
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 00
Hon. Roger Wicker, Comissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 00
Hon. Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 00
WITNESSES
Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State. 00
Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 00
Miriam Lanskoy, Director for Russia and Eurasia, National
Endowment for Democracy........................................ 00
Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher, Center for Eurasian,
Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University...... 00
APPENDICES
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 00
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith..................... 00
Prepared Statement of Eric Rubin................................. 00
Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Melia............................ 00
Prepared Statement of Miriam Lanskoy............................. 00
Prepared Statement of Brenda Shaffer............................. 00
THE TRAJECTORY OF DEMOCRACY--WHY HUNGARY MATTERS
----------
JUNE 11, 2014
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 10:11 a.m. to 11:46 a.m. EST in
Room 432 Russell Senate Office Building, Senate Room 210-212,
Washington, D.C., Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hon.
Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and Hon. Roger Wicker, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
U.S. Department of State; Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Miriam Lanskoy, Director
for Russia and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy; and
Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher, Center for Eurasian,
Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University.
HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Let me welcome you all to the hearing of the
Helsinki Commission. I thank our witnesses for being here. I
particularly want to thank Senator Cantwell for allowing us to
use this committee room, the Small Business Committee that I
have the opportunity of serving on. This hearing is scheduled,
primarily because of the venue--of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly annual meeting, which will take place in Azerbaijan
the end of this month. I intend to be there, along with several
of my colleagues in the United States Senate and in the House
of Representatives. I think we'll have a pretty strong
delegation that will meet in Azerbaijan to consider the
important business of the Parliamentary Assembly. So in
preparation for that meeting, this hearing is an opportunity
for us to update the status of the relationship between the
United States and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan's fulfillment of
its commitments under the OSCE.
Let me also point out that yesterday I had an opportunity
to meet with Azerbaijan's ambassador to the United States. I
thought we had a very good meeting. He apologizes for not being
here. He had meetings on the security front with the--with
representatives of the United States at the same time, so he
sends his apologies.
The purpose of this hearing, as advertised, is to look at
the security, economic and human rights dimension of the U.S.-
Azerbaijan relations. And when we look at each of the baskets--
each of the three baskets--there's robust matters that we can
discuss today, and I'm pleased that we have our panelists to do
that.
On the security front, clearly Azerbaijan has been helpful
to the United States and our allies in regards to Afghanistan.
Their troops are in Afghanistan and the Northern Distribution
Network relies very heavily on Azerbaijan, so they're an
important strategic partner of the United States. They have
supported our position in the United Nations Security Council,
particularly as it relates to Ukraine and the territorial
integrity of Ukraine. And for that, we have a strategic partner
that's important to our country.
Ukraine's territorial integrity is an issue of great
concern to the frozen conflict in N-K, is a matter that we need
to focus on, and I know during our visit it will be a matter
that we will be talking with the Azerbaijani officials, as well
as other delegations that will be in Azerbaijan. Their support
on counterterrorism is an important strategic partnership with
the United States, and one that we certainly want to build
upon.
In regards to the economic dimension, Azerbaijan's a very
important country on oil and gas. We have cooperated with them,
and they were, I point out, the first signator to the EITI--a
matter of great interest to the Helsinki Commission, and we
have been strong proponents of transparency within the
extractive industries. And I think one of the points that I
will want to inquire about is how much they're committed to
transparency within the extractive industries.
In regards to the third basket, dealing with the human-
rights dimension, there is concern. And I mentioned that with
the ambassador yesterday. Their presidential elections that
took place fell short of international standards--a matter that
I would like to make sure that our record is complete on. It's
an authoritarian-rule country--that raises certain concerns on
their commitments to the OSCE principles--the concern of
freedom of the media, and there are several individuals who
have been harassed and detained because of their desire to
report what's happening in Azerbaijan. That falls far short of
the OSCE commitments and is something that we will be
mentioning by name during our visit to Azerbaijan. The right of
association, political opposition, all are matters of grave
concern as to whether Azerbaijan is meeting their commitments
under the Helsinki principles.
So we have a robust area to deal with today. And at this
point let me turn to our witnesses that we have here today and,
again, thank them for being here.
Tom Melia, the deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State, a
frequent participant in the Helsinki Commission. It's always a
pleasure to have Secretary Melia with us. And Eric Rubin, the
deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Europe and Eurasia
Affairs, Department of State. So we have the two experts from
the administration on these issues and we look forward to your
testimony. As is the custom of our commission, your written
statements will be made part of our record. You may proceed as
you wish.
Secretary Rubin.
ERIC RUBIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you
for inviting us to speak with you today about our bilateral
relationship with Azerbaijan. Our partnership with Azerbaijan
remains a critically important aspect of our engagement in the
Caucasus and the wider region. For over 20 years, since
Azerbaijan's independence, the United States has been working
with Azerbaijan to promote a secure, prosperous and democratic
society. And we've been--in that time we've provided
approximately 1.1 billion (dollars) in assistance to pursue
these goals.
My testimony today will focus on the core areas of our
bilateral relationship. First, I will talk about our security
cooperation. Second, I will look at our evolving economic
relationship, including energy diversification and our efforts
to promote economic reform. Finally, I will briefly examine the
country's democratic development, a subject that Deputy
Assistant Secretary Melia will cover in greater detail.
First, Azerbaijan has been a key partner for the United
States and NATO from Kabul to Kosovo. Azerbaijan currently has
94 troops serving in Afghanistan and has committed to remain in
the country beyond 2014. Azerbaijan is a key node in the
Northern Distribution Network and air route, sending nonlethal
goods in and out of Afghanistan. As such, strengthening Caspian
security, countering terrorism, stemming the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and enhancing maritime domain
awareness continue to be top priorities for U.S. assistance to
Azerbaijan.
Over the past 12 years, we have provided 44.4 million
(dollars) in foreign military financing and 9.9 million in
international military education and training and export
control and border security programs that focus on military
professionalization, building interoperability and enhancing
border security. And we are providing approximately $4 million
in this current fiscal year.
We provide security assistance to Azerbaijan while
carefully ensuring it is used to comply with U.S. law. As a co-
chair country of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with France and
Russia, the United States is doing everything we can to
facilitate a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. We hope the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan will
agree to meet in the near future to continue the constructive
dialogue begun at their summit last November. It is also
important that both governments support Track II efforts to
build people-to-people contacts between Azerbaijanis and
Armenians. These kind of confidence-building measures can help
to prepare citizens of both countries for peace.
The United States enjoys growing economic cooperation with
Azerbaijan, particularly in the area of energy. As Europe looks
more resolutely to diversify its sources of energy away from
its dependence on Russia as part of its energy-security
strategy, Azerbaijan is emerging as a crucial supplier for our
European allies. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which
began operating in June 2006, was an early success for our
Southern Corridor diplomacy, and now we are focused on
developing a gas link between Azerbaijan and Europe. Completing
the Southern Gas Corridor will bring 10 billion cubic meters of
Caspian natural gas, perhaps more, to Western Europe, starting
in 2019.
While energy remains an important part of our bilateral
economic relationship, it is not the only focus. Azerbaijan and
its neighbors could become a premier trade and transportation
corridor between Europe and Asia, but to do so they must first
reduce costs associated with high customs and tariffs and
address delays caused by a lack of regional coordination. Time
is of the essence, and the United States strongly supports
reforms that will create sustainable sources of non-oil revenue
in Azerbaijan and new opportunities for U.S. exports and
investment, including in areas like aviation, communications
technology and heavy equipment. The United States also supports
Azerbaijan's accession into the WTO and the rules-based system
in which its members participate.
In this context, it is important to note the role that
corruption plays in the entire OSCE space, including
Azerbaijan. Working with the government of Azerbaijan and local
partners, we are committed to enhancing efforts to address this
problem.
Finally, our strongest relationships throughout the world
are with democracies that respect the full range of human
rights of their citizens. We have concerns about the
environment for democratic development and the protection of
human rights in Azerbaijan, which have been deteriorating. My
colleague Tom Melia will touch on that in more detail in a
moment.
Going forward, our relationship will continue to be based
on all of these core areas: security cooperation, economic and
energy cooperation and democratic development. Our mission
remains to address each of these areas with equal rigor and
resolve in advancing our national interest, and we are
committed to working with Congress in a bipartisan manner in
our efforts to realize each of these goals and the full
potential of the U.S.-Azerbaijani relationship. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Cardin. Secretary Melia.
THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Melia. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to speak
today about democracy and human rights dimension of our
bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan. I greatly appreciate
the dedication you have demonstrated over the years to the OSCE
and especially to the enduring principles enshrined in the
Helsinki Final Act and the body of commitments that comprise
the OSCE's human dimension.
I would start with reference to a key tenet of the OSCE
canon as set forth in the 1991 Moscow Document and reaffirmed
most recently in the 2010 Astana Summit Declaration in which
all of the OSCE participating states agreed, and I'm quoting
now, categorically and irrevocably that the commitments
undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the OSCE are
matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating
states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of
the state concerned. This concept, linking respect for human
rights within states to prosperity and lasting security among
states, is reflected in our multilateral and bilateral
interactions with all OSCE-participating states, including with
Azerbaijan.
In Azerbaijan, this constitutes one of three equally
important core goals about with Deputy Assistant Secretary
Rubin has just spoken, and U.S. officials regularly meet with a
variety of Azerbaijanis, ranging from senior government
officials to civil society activists and opposition political
party representatives.
While serving as deputy assistant secretary, I have visited
Azerbaijan three times, holding valuable meetings with leading
government officials, including President Aliyev, as well as
with opposition leaders, civil society and journalists. And
I've been joined on these missions by senior colleagues from
the Department of State's Europe and Eurasia bureau, from USAID
and the Department of Justice. And I would like to visit
Azerbaijan again soon to continue these conversations with
people inside and outside of government.
The United States also provides material assistance to
support Azerbaijan's democratic development. The largest part
of this assistance is provided by our colleagues at USAID, and
we in the State Department work very closely with them, as we
also collaborate with the legal experts provided by the
Department of Justice. And this interagency collaboration works
well.
Five years ago, at the outset of this administration, it
was already difficult for advocates of democratic reform, and
especially opposition political parties, to participate in the
political life of the country, but it was still possible for
NGOs and independent activists to operate. Sadly, the
environment has worsened significantly since then, beginning
with the 2009 incarceration of young democracy activists Emin
Milli and Adnan Hajizade.
The suppression of peaceful dissent increased in 2011 with
the arrests of young Azerbaijani activists who sought to
organize peaceful pro-democracy rallies in Baku. Azerbaijan's
parliament later passed legislation significantly increasing
fines on participants and organizers of unauthorized protests
in November of 2012, which resulted in the detention of
numerous peaceful activists for baseless administrative
violations.
Since early 2013, the space for peaceful dissent has
narrowed more dramatically, and the exercise of fundamental
freedoms has become still more tenuous. A number of leading
peaceful democracy advocates, civil society activists and
journalists have been incarcerated, including the chairman of
the reform-oriented REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov; the
journalist and Musavat Party deputy chairman, Tofig Yagublu;
members of democratic youth movements; the blogger Abdul
Abilov; religious scholar and activist Taleh Bagirzade; Khural
editor Avaz Zeynalli; and the chairman of the local election
monitoring partner of the National Democratic Institute, Anar
Mammadli, chairman of the Election Monitoring and Democracy
Studies Center, which had provided a critical report on the
presidential elections to which you referred, Mr. Chairman.
Two rounds of legislative amendments since March of 2013
have further restricted NGO funding and activity. Officials
have pressured Azerbaijani and international NGOs, including
some of the U.S. government's closest partners there. Such
actions add up to an increasingly hostile operating environment
for civil society, especially for those activists and groups
advocating respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and
government accountability, thereby depriving citizens the open
channels through which they can legitimately voice their
concerns. Pressure on independent defense lawyers, moreover,
has resulted in a decreasing number of lawyers ready to defend
individuals in politically sensitive cases.
Restrictions on the ability of Azerbaijani activists to
travel outside the country are also a problem. For example,
since 2006, the government has prevented the foreign travel of
opposition Popular Front party chairman Ali Karimli by refusing
to renew his passport. One of Azerbaijan's leading human rights
defenders, Ms. Leyla Yunus, was unable to attend an OSCE
discussion taking place today in Bern, Switzerland on the
important role of human rights defenders, because Azerbaijan's
authorities confiscated her passport.
This confiscation occurred in the context of the April 19
arrest of well-known journalist Rauf Mirqedirov--the subsequent
questioning of Leyla Yunus and her husband about Mirqedirov,
and their poor treatment by police in custody. All three have
been strong proponents of people-to-people diplomacy of the
kind Secretary Rubin referred to, which helps build ties
between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, and is crucial to the
eventual peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
These are not the kind of actions the United States or the
broader international community wants to see from a partner, an
OSCE-participating state, and currently, the chair of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. We recognize
that Azerbaijan lives in a very difficult neighborhood. The
United States strongly supports Azerbaijan's long-term
stability, security and prosperity. The best way to guarantee
such a future, we believe, is to advance democratic processes
and institutions, to buttress respect for the rule of law and
fundamental freedoms. Doing so will foster long-term, internal
stability, create the most inviting environment for economic
investment and growth and make Azerbaijan the very best it can
be by giving every citizen the freedom and space to achieve his
or her potential.
We consider this to be in the short-term and long-term
interests of the Azerbaijani people and the government. And as
President Obama explained in his May 28th speech at West Point,
America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond
idealism. It is a matter of national security. Democracies are
our best friends and are far less likely to go to war.
And yet, he noted, in capitals around the globe, including,
unfortunately, some of America's partners, there has been a
crackdown on civil society. The United States believes that
Azerbaijan will have greater stability and prosperity and will
more quickly achieve its potential by allowing for a more open
society. We will continue to urge Azerbaijan to live up to its
OSCE and other international human rights commitments.
As President Obama indicated in his recent message marking
Azerbaijan's National Day, and to return to where I began, we
encourage Azerbaijan to reclaim the leadership role on human
rights and fundamental freedom its people and government
demonstrated 96 years ago. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for
this opportunity to discuss democracy and human rights in
Azerbaijan.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you both for your testimony. Let me
start with what is on, I think, the minds of people in
Azerbaijan more than anything else, and that is the concern
about territorial integrity. With Russia's actions in Georgia,
and now, Russia's actions in Ukraine, that is clearly the most
talked-about issues in that region of the world. Russia is very
active in Azerbaijan in regards to being physically present.
They have had many of their leaders in Azerbaijan talking to
the officials of Azerbaijan. Can you just update us as to how
you see the events in Ukraine impacting Azerbaijan's foreign
policy and concerns about Russia's actions?
Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a subject
of very intensive discussion and dialogue with the government
of Azerbaijan, as it has been with every country in the region,
because the principle that we're defending in defense of
Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty applies to all
the countries of the region, and, indeed, to every country
that's a member of the United Nations and the Organization for
the Security and Cooperation in Europe.
With Azerbaijan, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Melia said I
think exactly right, Azerbaijan lives in a very dangerous
neighborhood. It's got Russia to the north; it's got Iran to
the south. These are very real concerns, and we are committed
to working with the government of Azerbaijan to help them
strengthen their ability to defend their territory, defend
their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to be sure that
it's not just words, but actually, the ability to be truly an
independent country.
This is the subject, as I mentioned, of ongoing dialogue;
it's something that we've been very clear in supporting when we
speak to the leadership in Baku. Our Ambassador, Dick
Morningstar, has been following up ever since the crisis
started in Ukraine, and it's something we expect to be working
very closely with the government of Baku to support them
publicly and privately.
Mr. Cardin. I would just point out that OSCE is in a
particularly strong position here, since both Russia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Armenia all are full members of the OSCE. It has
had some success within Ukraine on its mission on providing, at
least, objective eyes of what's happening in the eastern part
of Ukraine. Do you see the OSCE mechanism working towards
trying to provide some confidence in that region on some
semblance of territorial integrity?
Mr. Rubin. Mr. Chairman, I think OSCE has a very strong
track record in this region, and as a matter of fact, has
played the central role in the peace process between Azerbaijan
and Armenia since the conflict began more than 20 years ago,
and to this day, OSCE is the premiere international
organization on the ground in Azerbaijan and Armenia, through
the Minsk Group, through the mission on the ground that
monitors the situation along the line of contact, through the
mission that helps promote efforts to broaden dialogue.
So I think OSCE is already, in many ways, in the lead, but
then, going beyond that, dealing with the situation that we
have post the crisis in Ukraine, I think, yes, there is a real
possibility for the organization to play a greater role.
Mr. Cardin. Well, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of
the longest frozen conflicts in Europe. The United States is
part of the Minsk Group. The Madrid Proposal is now many years
old. It still looks like the principal framework to try to make
progress in regards to the conflict. What is the current
status? Are there any breakthrough likely to occur that could
move this conflict to a resolution?
Mr. Rubin. As one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk
Group, we've been working very closely with Russia and France
to try to come up with ideas to try to move this forward this
year. We would, I think, be very reluctant to predict
breakthroughs, but I think progress is very possible, that the
three co-chairs have worked hard to come up with an approach
that both countries can accept for a series of meetings,
including a summit meeting of the two presidents. We've been, I
think, very strong in supporting the Minsk Group through
appointing a senior American diplomat and experienced
negotiator, Ambassador Jim Warlick, to work this issue full-
time, which he's been doing since last year.
Cooperation with the other two co-chair countries--France
and Russia--is very good, and I think all three countries,
together with the larger OSCE community, are determined to try
to make possible some opportunities this year. One of the
things we have done is spoken through the three co-chairs about
the vision of a settlement. It is the vision that has been
reflected in past rounds, including in Madrid.
And the goal is to try to get both countries together with
the co-chairs to agree on a path forward. The goal now is to
see if we can get a meeting of the two leaders scheduled in
coming months, and we're hopeful and optimistic that that will
happen, and we believe that both leaders do want to see
progress. We think it's important to support them in that.
But also, to push--as you said, Mr. Chairman, it's been
more than two decades. This is a real conflict. It is a live
conflict. People die every year. It's literally a shooting
war--thankfully usually on a small scale, but nonetheless
unacceptable in the 21st century to have this going on. And
getting this settled in the interest of all of the people
involved in both countries--both populations is a very, very
high priority for us.
Mr. Cardin. Is the Madrid proposal still very much the
framework that we believe is the appropriate framework to make
progress, or is there expectations that there will be a new
proposal or modifications of that proposal that will move
forward?
Mr. Rubin. Mr. Chairman, the three co-chairs laid out a
vision for moving forward this year that drew very heavily on
the principles reflected in Madrid, and indeed, on every
iteration of this process, because the basic concept is pretty
much the same, and has been since the negotiation began, but
literally, using the Madrid proposal, I think, is not going to
happen, because neither country wants to use Madrid alone, but
I think anything that they come up with--and this was reflected
in the statement by the co-chairs--will look a lot like Madrid,
because there is no other real approach to solving this other
than based on the principles of OSCE and the United Nations
charter, and that is what Madrid was, and that is what the
current approach is.
Mr. Cardin. I've been active in the OSCE for many years and
this has been on our agenda every year. It's very frustrating.
And I know it's not easy, but it seems to me that it's within
the leadership of the United States and Russia and France, as
the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, to make this a more urgent
priority, particularly with the anxiety that currently exists
in Europe. It seems to me that a breakthrough in regards to
this conflict would have a major positive impact on confidence
and stability in that region. So I would urge you to make that
a very high priority to try to make progress.
Let me turn to your comments in regards to the economy and
the obvious: that so much of their economy is based upon oil
and gas. And I agree with you that it's in our interest to see
whether they can't diversify their economy, and I'm going to
get to that in one moment, their accession to the WTO. But in
regards to the energy sector, we've seen the vulnerability of
Ukraine to Russia, and having a supply of alternative energy is
very much in the U.S. interest; very much, I think, in the
regional interest. So the pipeline is of great interest.
I mentioned originally that Azerbaijan was the first
country to embrace the EITI. That doesn't mean they're
complying with it. Can you just bring us--this commission up to
date as to what is the current status of their energy
commitments to transparency? I will get to corruption in one
moment, but do we have hope that they are following the best
practices of the EITI in regards to their arrangements with the
mineral extractive industry companies so that the people of
Azerbaijan have a hope of knowing whether those resources are
going to the advancement of their country?
Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a subject of
very active discussion, not just between the United States and
Azerbaijan but, as you mentioned, as part of the WTO accession
process with their other partners. Azerbaijan has been the
critical country, I would say, in advancing energy
diversification for Europe, and it's not just a question of the
past projects such as BTC but the very real project now to
bring the Shah Deniz to resources, to Europe through the Trans-
Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines, which the United States
strongly supports.
So this is about big, important projects, and we strongly
agree with you that it's very important that there be
transparency. Our ambassador in Baku, Dick Morningstar, is, I
think, more familiar with these issues than anyone else, having
worked BTC personally and having been involved in every stage
of this since the 1990s. This is part of his regular dialogue.
This will be part of our dialogue with Azerbaijan when we have
our regular economic talks with Azerbaijan.
We believe the Azerbaijani government is serious about the
commitments it's making as part of the WTO accession process
and the commitments it's made to the partners in the
international energy projects, and we will continue focusing on
this in our dialogue with them.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you.
Now, Secretary Melia, let me just make an observation and
ask you in regards to the corruption and human rights issues in
Azerbaijan. You correctly identified our strong interest in
stability of partners and to have a stable partner, that that
country needs to have a commitment towards economic opportunity
for all of its citizens, sharing the wealth of the country and
adhering to international norms on human rights--not our norms
but international norms on human rights.
No country is perfect, and this commission has been
critical of all countries including our own in regards to
meeting the Helsinki commitments. I was recently in Ukraine and
my observations there was that the protesters were more
concerned about a government that was honest than it was about
trying to pick sides on loyalty. They wanted an independent
Ukraine where the resources of their country went to the
benefit of their people, free from corruption.
In Vietnam--it was very clear in all of our discussions
that Vietnam has a serious problem of corruption and they need
to deal with it. We now have an opportunity in the TPP to have
reasons for progress to be made in Vietnam on good governance.
In Singapore, at the Shangra-La security conference, we brought
up frequently the good governance issues as it relates to
security in that region.
So my question to you is, as we look at Azerbaijan's
membership in the WTO, what specific reforms should be the
highest priority? What efforts can we reasonably expect to deal
with corruption or to deal with the freedom of the media or, as
you point out, the freedom to travel, which is a basic
commitment within the Helsinki Accords? In Vietnam we have a
checklist--literally a checklist of progress that we believe is
reasonable to be made. And we've gone over that with the
Vietnamese government officials, and we had a very, I think,
positive exchange when they were here on the human rights
basket with their delegation and my visit to Vietnam. What
expectation do you believe are reasonable for us to anticipate
in Azerbaijan?
Mr. Melia. Well, Mr. Chairman, you've very eloquently
described a major challenge that we have in many parts of the
world in trying to deal with partner governments to bring them
into the modern economy in a way that enables the prosperity to
be shared more widely in each of these countries. You're
exactly right in describing the situation in Ukraine as one
that was animated by this very question of lack of transparency
and accountability by authoritarian governments that don't feel
like they have to tell their people what they do with their
money. That is the heart of the issue and it's--I don't know
that there is a single magic silver bullet that can solve these
problems. It's part of the tapestry of democratic governance
and respect for rights that we're working to try to help
Azerbaijanis achieve.
We know that, like many other countries, there is anti-
corruption legislation in place in Azerbaijan. There's a
national action plan; there's all kinds of formalities. And
there have been some small steps taken at the local level in
some places, particularly around Baku, to eliminate petty
corruption, the kind of small-bore, fee-for-service kind of
corruption that police and local administration officials--
they've set up these ASAN centers, which is the Azerbaijani
word for ``easy.'' It's like the easy-button place where you go
to get all your licenses and permits and so on, and those seem
to be having some positive impact in their realm of where the
ordinary public engages with local administration.
But the larger question about where the massive resources
go and where the endemic corruption at a macro level, that
requires a country in which journalists are allowed to report
on what their government does; where a parliament, reflecting
the diversity of opinion in the country, can have open and
public hearings about exactly these kinds of issues; where NGOs
can be watchdogs and publish reports without fear of
retribution. Those are all the things that Azerbaijan needs and
could benefit from. They could be a more stable country, a
country where prosperity is more widely shared if they were
respecting the rights of people to ask questions and research
and talk about these issues.
So there's a whole welter of fundamental freedoms that are
constrained in Azerbaijan right now, as we've just gone
through. And the people who are trying to bring these issues to
public discussion end up unjustly imprisoned for their work. So
there's a--the fundamental freedoms do hobble a--lack of
respect for fundamental freedoms is a major impediment to any
country trying to do the responsible thing in terms of fighting
corruption and establishing a responsible government.
Mr. Cardin. Before we leave at the end of this month, we
will review with you some of the specifics, particularly
individuals who have been arrested and imprisoned, because we
do believe putting a face on the issue is one of the best ways
you can get the attention necessary to make the fundamental
changes. Yes, we want to see these individuals released or not
harassed, but we also want to see fundamental changes, not just
in their laws but the way their laws are enforced.
So it's not as simple as just the constitutional provisions
or legal changes, because there are many countries that are
very oppressive that have laws that would seem to provide basic
rights to their citizens but the way that they're enforced deny
them the opportunity to enjoy universal basic rights. So we
will be looking to Azerbaijan to make these changes, not
because we're asking them to. It's their commitments under OSCE
and it's their commitment to their own people that we think
will allow the country to become a more prosperous and more
stable ally in that region for peace. So we'll continue to work
with you to develop that type of list.
One additional question before I turn it over to Senator
Wicker, and that is that Azerbaijan has a very constructive
relationship with Israel--of course our close ally in that
region. Can you just bring us up to date as to how that
relationship has played out in regards to regional stability?
Mr. Rubin. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the Azerbaijani-Israeli relationship is a model. It
is definitely a source of not just security and economic
benefit to both countries but also a source of stability in the
region. Azerbaijan has been very supportive not just
bilaterally and privately but also publicly of Israel's
security, of the need for a peace process that will succeed in
the Middle East in bringing a just and lasting settlement and
also security to all the countries including Israel. We see
this as something that's very positive. Also, that relationship
has been very important in terms of counterterrorism
cooperation, which is something that we value greatly and see
as a benefit to us and the entire international community, as
well as to Azerbaijan and Israel themselves.
Mr. Cardin. Senator Wicker has led an OSCE delegation,
Helsinki delegation, to Baku, so he's our expert on Azerbaijan.
(Laughter.) And he will be joining us in our visit later this
month.
Senator Wicker.
HON. ROGER WICKER, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Wicker. Well, thank you. And thank you, Senator Cardin,
for your leadership in this issue, for your leadership in OSCE.
When we go to these meetings, the leadership around Europe
knows they can look to Ben Cardin for a great degree of
knowledge and understanding and wisdom about these issues.
For a country the geographic size of Maine and a relatively
small population, I think we rightly give a lot of attention to
Azerbaijan because of the importance not only locally there but
in the region, and what it says about the rest of that area.
The administration has sent one of our best people there in
Ambassador Morningstar. For a location so small, I think the
administration recognizes the strategic importance of having a
Dick Morningstar there. And we greatly benefited as a
delegation last year--I guess it was 4th of July when our
delegation was there.
How important is it, do you think, gentlemen, that OSCE is
the locale of this summer's Parliamentary Assembly and that the
eyes of Europe--not only the United States and the
international press, but the entire European community will be
on this little location--they just had the presidential
election where we had OSCE observers--and that's so
strategically located? Is there any particular benefit or
significance to the fact that we're having the PA meeting there
in late June?
Mr. Rubin. Senator, thank you, and thank you for your
commitment to this relationship and for your travel there last
year. I absolutely would agree that Azerbaijan is significantly
more important than its size would otherwise suggest, for many
reasons. Location is one of them. Commitment to supporting the
international community in places like Afghanistan is another.
Energy diversification is a third.
So it's absolutely true that supporting Azerbaijan's
independence, territorial integrity should be a high priority--
is a high priority for us. As you mentioned, the president's
choice of Dick Morningstar, a former ambassador to the European
Union, as ambassador to Azerbaijan testified to that
importance.
Mr. Wicker. It's a statement.
Mr. Rubin. It's a statement. And it was meant as a
statement, a very positive statement. So I think in that regard
it's absolutely true.
We think it's very positive that the Parliamentary Assembly
will be going to Baku. It's an opportunity for dialogue and
familiarization in both directions, with ideas, concerns, and I
think it should be a very good dialogue. I think members of the
PA will see a lot of progress in Azerbaijan. Those who have not
been there in a long time but are coming back will certainly
see that evident progress. There are obviously other issues
such as the ones that Deputy Assistant Secretary Melia has
suggested that are also important to have as part of that
discussion, so we hope it's a very broad discussion and we
think the spotlight on Azerbaijan and its importance is
justified and valuable.
Mr. Melia. These are important opportunities to demonstrate
not only a partnership with government officials and
parliamentary counterparts, but we're hoping that you would
also have time to meet with some of the people that we've
talked about who have sought to be responsible watchdogs and
advocates for reform, anticorruption, for fair elections, et
cetera, and who find themselves harassed often by the
government and by various levels of government. So we hope that
you'll--you and other colleagues from other legislatures will
use the opportunity to demonstrate a broader--a broad interest
in Azerbaijan as a society and the various aspects of its
society and make a point of meeting with a number of people
beyond official corridors.
Mr. Wicker. I think it's important for us to hear all
different points of view.
Mr. Rubin, you mentioned Afghanistan. And our hat is off to
the Azerbaijanis for their great help with our effort in
Afghanistan, is that not correct?
Mr. Rubin. Senator, absolutely. I think the role that
Azerbaijan has played throughout the NATO, ISAF and U.S.
bilateral engagement in Afghanistan has been very important,
deeply appreciated--and not just the role in facilitating the
Northern Distribution Network and transit to and from
Afghanistan but also Azerbaijan's readiness to put boots on the
ground and to stay there, as they still are, under--currently
under Turkish command. And ISAF is very, very important.
Our discussions with Azerbaijan about the security of the
region are quite broad and quite important. Azerbaijan's
location, as I mentioned earlier, is central not just in the
strategic sense but also economically in terms of trade and
transit in the future, we hope, global trade through that
region. So, very much so, and we do very much appreciate the
role that Azerbaijan has played in the effort in Afghanistan.
Mr. Wicker. So when we talk about the location--I suppose
this might have been mentioned during your testimony or during
Senator Cardin's questioning, but they're so very, very close
to Iran and so very, very close to Russia, and yet they--in
spite of that--they've chosen to seek the friendship of the
United States. And I think that speaks volumes, does it not?
Mr. Rubin. Senator, I would absolutely agree. And I think
the one thing that's been clear since Azerbaijan's independence
is the determination of not just its leadership in the various
governments over the years but also of Azerbaijanis as a whole
to defend their independence. It was hard-won. It was defeated
after the first attempt almost a century ago. And I think
that's something that unites all Azerbaijanis. It's something
that we strongly support.
Obviously Azerbaijan needs to have a relationship--good
relationship with Russia and Iran, its two big neighbors. They
have to balance that. We recognize that. But the commitment to
the relationship with us, with NATO in the Eastern Partnership
with the European Union is obviously something they've chosen
and is very important.
Mr. Wicker. I think it's a profound statement on the part
of the leadership of that country as to how they view the
United States as a friend in a neighborhood where there are
very powerful forces to the north and south. And yes, you're
correct, Mr. Rubin; they need to be friendly with their
neighbors and have good relations.
This hearing, Mr. Chairman, has a broad scope--security,
economic and human rights. It touches on almost everything.
There is a Eurasian Economic Union now consisting of Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Armenia is about to join that. Isn't
that right, Mr. Rubin? Now, what effect is that going to have
on our friends in Azerbaijan?
Mr. Rubin. Well, Senator, Azerbaijan has chosen to pursue
its own policy on economic ties with its neighbors, and we
think that's the most important aspect of this broader
question. It's the point that we've been emphasizing.
Mr. Wicker. That it's their decision?
Mr. Rubin. That it's their decision, as it is Ukraine and
Moldova and Georgia's decision to proceed with association with
the European Union. We've said in regard to Kazakhstan and
Armenia that their choice to join the Eurasian Economic Union
is also their choice as long as it's freely made and not under
coercion.
Azerbaijan has said that they want good ties with all the
blocs and countries but don't intend to pursue direct
association with either. They are pursing WTO membership.
They're pursing expanding trade through those means, and we
think that should be their choice, as it is for every country.
Mr. Wicker. Ben, did you get into the election observers?
Mr. Cardin. No.
Mr. Wicker. Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Chairman, I
believe we had OSCE election observers there last year, and was
this Parliamentary Assembly and----
Mr. Cardin. ODIHR.
Mr. Wicker [continuing]. The ODIHR. OK, so actually two
entities within OSCE sent election observers.
Mr. Melia, would you comment as to how beneficial that was,
how effective they were, how much access they had and how much
information the OSCE and Helsinki community got as a result of
these two organizations going in and helping with observation?
Mr. Melia. Well, we were reminded just a couple of weeks
ago in Ukraine how important and valuable it is to have eyes on
the ground and in large numbers as the OSCE, ODIHR and the
Parliamentary Assembly typically do. Having people from across
Europe, east and west, to be on the ground in Ukraine was very
important for all of us to know what was happening, to be able
to make a sound judgment about that process and to be able to
validate the expressed will of Ukrainian people.
Similarly, in Azerbaijan last year there were multiple
delegations, international, including the OSCE delegations and
local networks of observers. The EMDS is the Azerbaijani group
that's been trained over these two decades by international
professionals from the National Democratic Institute and
others, and they also provided eyes on the ground and
dovetailed with what the OSCE teams were doing.
And in this case, you know, the reports were much less
favorable than they were in Ukraine last month, and there were
shortcomings in the election process last year that ODIHR, in
its very dry and literal kind of way pointed out. That's a
basis for reform efforts going forward to improve the
administration of elections, and more importantly perhaps the
political environment surrounding the elections so that there's
more chance for freedom of expression and mobilizing different
political views.
So the OSCE statements on the presidential election last
year were critical, and they were echoed by our own statement
at the time, which was also pointing out that we wished it had
been a better process. And we do that in--our purpose in doing
that is not just to point fingers but it's to lay a basis for
future reform efforts to improve the quality of the process. So
the role of OSCE observers has been very valuable in that. We
hope it will continue.
And we also hope that domestic citizens of Azerbaijan will
continue to be able to monitor their own government's process
and performance as well. Unfortunately, since that election,
the EMDS network has had a number of allegations raised about
its tax management and tax payments, its financial management,
the international grants that support them. And the leader of
that organization has been prosecuted, and so for--you know,
basically for issuing a critical report. It goes back to the
point raised by Senator Cardin a few moments ago about
corruption. You can't deal with problems in governance unless
you can talk about them, and right now people are getting
punished for raising questions and trying to talk about how to
improve their society. So that's going to be a--you know, a
constraint on the improvement of the political process in
Azerbaijan.
Mr. Wicker. In the view of the department, did the election
reflect the judgment of the electorate as a whole in
Azerbaijan?
Mr. Rubin. I think, given the nature of the political
environment in Azerbaijan, the fact that one of the leading
opposition politicians who wanted to be in that election as a
presidential candidate was instead in jail throughout last year
and is still in jail today; given that the leader of one of the
main opposition parties cannot travel because the government
won't given them a passport, I mean, these are the kinds of
things that add up to, you know, an environment where it's hard
to tell what the people's choices are. The people don't have a
chance to cast a ballot, you know, in the way that we would
hope they could. So that's why our statement said that the
process fell short of our expectations and hopes.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cardin. Let me just observe, I was in Kiev for the
Ukrainian elections. And just to let Senator Wicker know, I was
with Senator Portman a little before the time that one of the
precincts was scheduled to open, and we saw a long line of
people anxious to cast their votes. We saw a little bit of
chaos as they were trying to open up the precinct as early as
they possibly could. And, quite frankly, it reminded me of my
home precinct in Baltimore at the same time.
So it was, I think, very educational for me to observe an
election in Europe. And it was very clear that--except in
eastern Ukraine, where there was violence preventing people
from voting, the elections met international standards. And
that was the conclusion by the observers, that it did meet the
international standards for a free and fair election and the
will of the people was clearly shown with Mr. Poroshenko
receiving an overwhelming majority.
In Azerbaijan the vote was overwhelming. And popular
sentiment, I think, would probably reflect that, but because of
reasons we've already stated--the opposition not having
adequate opportunity to present their case, not having the
freedom of the media, and the integrity of the election process
itself; that is, ensuring that the votes that were cast were
actually counted appropriately, which there was not that type
of integrity in the system there--led to the conclusion that it
was not a free and fair election under international standards.
So that's an area where Azerbaijan needs to improve. It may not
have changed the outcome of the election, but it can't get the
stamp of international recognition that the OSCE monitors are
there to provide. So for all those reasons we were unable to
certify the election.
We're joined now by my co-chair, Congressman Smith. I'll
let him catch his breath, if he likes. (Laughter.) He will lead
our delegation in Baku. We alternate between the House and
Senate on the annual head of our delegation. So Congressman
Smith will lead the delegation and he has traveled extensively
throughout that region, so we really do plan to be a very
active participant.
I made the observation in the beginning of this hearing
that this country is very important to U.S. interests. We have
a lot of strategic partnership issues in security and energy
and fighting extremists, and it is for that reasons that we pay
particular attention, but other countries are also paying
attention. Senator Wicker mentioned the fact that Azerbaijan
borders Russia. What we want is an independent Azerbaijan. We
want a country that will exercise what's right for its own
people, but we want a country that's stable, that respects
human rights, that has economic opportunities for all of its
citizens as well as a strategic partner on national security
issues with the United States.
With that, let me recognize and turn it over to Chairman
Smith.
HON. CHISTOPHER SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Wicker. And I want to welcome our very distinguished
panelists and thank them for their service to our country and
for raising these extraordinarily important issues,
particularly as it relates to human rights.
It will be, I think, really important that we head back to
Baku. Senator Wicker led us there last year for some very
important meetings with high-level officials. And at the time
we did raise the human rights issues very robustly, and I know
we'll be back there doing it again within the parameters of the
Parliamentary Assembly but also with some bilaterals that I
know that we will engage in.
I do have a full statement, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Cardin. Sure.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. That I'd like to make a part of the
record. But again, I just want to thank you for calling this
very timely hearing so that we're further empowered, informed;
so that we understand, you know, from the department
especially, what your insights and recommendations will be. And
this, I think, will be a good trip. And I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for convening this hearing.
Mr. Cardin. Great. We're going to turn to the second panel.
Let me thank both of our witnesses for their testimony and we
look forward to working with you as we travel to Azerbaijan.
Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Melia. Thank you.
Mr. Cardin. Let me turn to the second panel: Miriam
Lanskoy, who is the director for Russia and Eurasia, the
National Endowment for Democracy; and Brenda Shaffer, the
visiting researcher, Center for Eurasia, Russia and East
European Studies, Georgetown University. It's a pleasure to
have both of you with us today. You've been, I know, a valuable
resource to our commission and we appreciate that. As I
explained in the introductory remarks, this hearing is for
preparation for our visit to Azerbaijan and the attendance of
our delegation at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly later this
month. With that, we'll start with Ms. Lanskoy.
MIRIAM LANSKOY, DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA AND EURASIA, NATIONAL
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Mr. Lanskoy. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'm grateful to the
Helsinki Commission for holding this hearing and for giving me
an opportunity to speak. The National Endowment for Democracy
is a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth of
democratic institutions around the world. NED has been working
in Azerbaijan for many years and maintains a large portfolio in
Azerbaijan.
Over the last 10 years, freedom in Azerbaijan has declined
gradually, but over the last year, there has been an
unprecedented crackdown. Through membership in the Council of
Europe and the OSCE, Azerbaijan has committed itself to the
protection of human rights. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan obtains
the prestige associated with these organizations without
fulfilling their basic conditions.
Azerbaijan is the chairman of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe, a body charged with ensuring compliance
with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
However, Azerbaijan itself has not complied with numerous
decisions of the European Court, and though Azerbaijan violates
OSCE norms of human rights, it is about to host the
Parliamentary Assembly.
Recent events in Ukraine have complex implications for
Azerbaijan. The protests that toppled the corrupt government
there rattled nerves in Baku. But numerous prior revolutions in
the region have had little effect on Azerbaijan. More
significant for Baku is the annexation of Crimea, because that
means that Russia is an arbiter of borders on the territory in
the former Soviet Union and can decide these questions
unilaterally. The crisis in Ukraine highlights the need to
diversify energy sources, and this creates opportunities for
Baku to seek out partners and extend its influence while at
home it is taking advantage of the crisis to silence critics of
the government.
The number of political prisoners continues to grow.
Amnesty International has recognized 19 prisoners of
conscience. The U.S. Commission for International Religious
Freedom, in its annual report which was just released, provides
a list of 51 religious prisoners in Azerbaijan. Human Rights
Watch has published a comprehensive report that contains cases
against activists, human rights defenders and journalists.
I want to touch on a couple of these cases. Two prominent
opposition figures, Tofig Yagublu and Ilgar Mammadov, were
sentenced to five and seven years. In its ruling on this case,
the European Court found that Azerbaijan is in violation of
several articles of the convention, including Article 18, and
it has awarded damages to Ilgar Mammadov. The European Court
found that the actual purpose was to silence or punish the
applicant for criticizing the government. The Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, which Azerbaijan now
chairs, is supposed to oversee the implementation of a court's
decisions.
Human Rights Watch has profiled the use of narcotics
charges against youth activists who apparently had drugs
planted on them by police. Youth activists criticized the
government on social media, they were arrested for narcotics
charges, they were questioned about their politics, and they
received long jail sentences. And Human Rights Watch has
several cases of this happening.
Finally, I want to draw your attention to the case of Leyla
Yunus, who's the director of the Institute of Peace and
Democracy. She's done--she's worked on human rights for 20
years--many types of issues, including compiling lists of
political prisoners. The government has retaliated against her
in the past, most clearly in 2011, when her office was
demolished. She was questioned in connection with a case
against Rauf Mirkadirov, who's an Azeri journalist who is now
being held for participating in Track 2 meetings with
Armenians. During the questioning, over a month ago, Leyla and
her husband, Arif, had their passports taken away, but no
charges have been filed. Their passports should be returned and
they should be permitted to travel.
Pressure against NGOs is continuing to mount. New
amendments to the NGO law made it illegal for unregistered
groups to receive grants or donations. Penalties for NGOs that
don't register a grant were expanded. Onerous reporting
requirements have been extended to international organizations.
Grantees report months of efforts to register grants and
withdraw funds from banks. So you can have a registered
organization, a registered grant--and it's a big struggle to
register--and then still not be able to access your funds from
a bank account. And this seems to so far be inconclusive;
there's different scenarios unfolding there.
There is considerable apprehension that the new regulations
will be selectively enforced against organizations that are
critical of the government. Even prior to these amendments,
Azerbaijan was violating freedom of association by
overregulating NGOs. The Venice Commission found that the
process of registering NGOs in Azerbaijan was too cumbersome,
lengthy and unpredictable. And in five separate decisions, the
European Court has found that Azerbaijan violates freedom of
association by denying registration to NGOs.
Baku should be bringing its NGO legislation in compliance
with the European Court and with the Venice Commission opinions
rather than imposing even more burdens on NGOs.
The case of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies
Center illustrates why these laws are used to silence critics
in the government. EMDS, as a vote-monitoring organization, has
made numerous attempts to register and has repeatedly been
denied. EMDS entered into a contract with a registered
organization to carry out its activities. This arrangement
became grounds to sentence Anar Mammadli to 5\1/2\ years and
Bashir Suleymanli to 3\1/2\ years.
In closing, I'm grateful to the Helsinki Commission for
convening this hearing. I hope that the commission will remain
engaged by calling on the government of Azerbaijan to release
political prisoners and repeal new regulations against NGOs.
Further, I would urge that the Parliamentary Assembly which
will convene in Baku--for it to include voices from Azeri civil
society. I would also urge members of Congress who travel to
Azerbaijan to visit political prisoners in prison and meet with
their families.
Mr. Chairman, Azerbaijan has a longstanding democratic
tradition. In 1918, it became the first democracy in the Muslim
world. The civil society of Azerbaijan works to fulfill that
legacy and remind the government of its OSCE commitments. These
brave and talented people should be permitted to do their
important work without harassment and intimidation. Thank you.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you for your testimony. Ms. Shaffer?
BRENDA SHAFFER, VISITING RESEARCHER, CENTER FOR EURASIAN,
RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Shaffer. As a teenager growing up in the San Francisco
Bay area, on the bed--on the wall next to my bed, instead of
posters of rock stars or Hollywood actors, I had a picture of
the Helsinki Declaration Final Act. (Laughter.) My mom's
listening to this. She can probably confirm it.
These principles inspired most of the activism of my youth,
and even as a high school student at Burlingame High School, a
district represented by Congressman Tom Lantos, I went to the
Soviet Union, visited Soviet Refuseniks, visit other, non-
Jewish, human rights activists in the USSR and I'm--therefore
I'm--my voice is shaking, because I'm honored and moved to
testify at the Senate Commission of the--for the Security and
Cooperation in Europe, because these principles have been so
much a part of my youth and my own activism.
As part of that visit in 1982, I actually visited Soviet
Azerbaijan and started my interest in the South Caucasus. The
Soviet--Azerbaijan is a Shiite Muslim-majority country with a
strong Western orientation and a desire, as was pointed out by
the earlier testimonies, for a strong alliance with the United
States. Azerbaijan is not only a place where there's freedom of
religion, but freedom from religion--something that's too often
absent in the world. Secular people have the right to live free
of religious coercion, and government protects the right of
people, again, to freedom from religion as well.
Azerbaijan is a land where Jews have never experienced
anti-Semitism. They don't talk about feeling unwelcome in
Azerbaijan, because they feel part of Azerbaijan, and no
Azerbaijanis would consider them guests in any sense in
Azerbaijan.
Women were granted the right to vote in Azerbaijan two
years before suffrage was granted in the United States and
decades before many states in Europe.
Azerbaijan is important, as mentioned here, to the U.S. in
a wider number of issues, including its policy towards Russia,
relations with Iran, nuclear nonproliferation, Middle Eastern
regional security and European energy security. Its location as
the only state in between the Arctic Ocean and the Persian
Gulf--except between Russia and Iran and Azerbaijan, only three
states on that lateral--its location is both a blessing--that's
why we're here today, we're discussing this country--but also a
curse, because if you sit in between Russia and Iran, your
stability, your independence is quite constrained.
This almost treacherous balancing act that the regime finds
itself in Azerbaijan between balancing strong orientation
towards the United States, integration in Euro-Atlantic
structures but also peaceful relationships with Russia and Iran
is extremely challenging because not only does it have this
foreign policy aspect but also domestic policy and military
conflicts are intertwined. Russia and Iran use military
conflict, use taking of territory, use even the domestic
political arena in order to promote their views. Maybe if we
held this hearing before the invasion of Crimea, we might--it
would be maybe difficult to make the case. I think now today
it's apparent to all how Russia operates in its--in its close
environment. Russia has used military force to promote its
goals in Ukraine and Georgia, neighboring countries. It uses
the electoral process and civil society organizations. Russian
citizens have ran in elections in Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Latvia. Could you imagine a parallel in another country where
foreign citizens run to the leaderships of different countries
to try to get its way? And it's promoted separatists in a
number of neighboring countries also to promote its interests--
Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
The U.S. and even the OSCE Minsk group has done--has taken
a number of steps to try to promote resolution of these same
ethnic conflicts that afflict the region. Unfortunately, lack
of recognition of the role that Russia plays in these conflicts
really hurts and hinders the work of the OSCE Minsk Group and
of the United States. For two decades the U.S. and the OSCE
Minsk Group has chided the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
for not preparing their people for peace, for not doing enough.
I think now it's very clear that the leaders of Armenia and
Azerbaijan really do not have an independent decision on this
issue. And in fact, three times they have come to--initialed
very, very serious peace agreements between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and each time this agreement was derailed by its
northern neighbor.
Azerbaijan is also very important to Washington in terms of
Washington's Iran policy, but for the same reason, Iran works
very hard to destabilize Azerbaijan. Iran, we call it Persia,
Persian music, Persian people, is a multiethnic country where
half of the population is ethnic minorities, and all in all, a
third of the population of Iran is ethnic Azerbaijanis. So with
Iran keeping this in mind does everything possible to keep
Azerbaijan away from prosperity, involved in wars, involved in
conflicts because it fears if Azerbaijan is a fully stable,
open society, it could be a source of emulation for its own
Azerbaijani minority. Even, by the way, Khamenei, the spiritual
leader or the leader of Iran, is native Azerbaijani, and
Mousavi, head of the green movement, native Azerbaijani. It's a
very serious question for Iran's stability as well.
European energy security. Azerbaijan is the only country
that is bringing in additional supplies of gas, not rerouting
existing supplies of gas into Eastern Europe. The southern
corridor, while volumes are small at the beginning, they target
specifically vulnerable countries which have almost a hundred
percent dependent on Russia. And this is basically a
superhighway that once it's built, other regions such as the
Balkans can easily link into it. Other supply sources, such as
from Iraqi Kurdistan or from Israel, could eventually use this
infrastructure. So it's very important for European energy
security--again, quite noted by Russia, and we'll probably
genuinely, as we see, see attempts to undermine this project.
I think that the people in Azerbaijan take very serious
your commission, your work, the U.S. government's statements on
the state of regime and the state of human rights and the state
of democracy. The only thing where I think where it's very
problematic, some of the statements that have come, are related
to religious freedom. And this is where sometimes I think
people in the government feel no matter what we do, we really
can do no right with the United States. Of all--of all places,
the field where--you look at the reports from the national
commission on religious freedom, I think this is where--the
place where the United States government has not done the
best--most professional work.
There is a place--for instance, some of the criticism as
related to Azerbaijan has blocked anti-Semitic literature from
Iran to enter into Azerbaijan. I applaud that they blocked
that. I think this is an independent decision. Germany has a
law against anti-Semitic literature. We don't go into Germany
and say why do you block anti-Semitic literature. On the
question of terror financing, the United States, if you had
Hamas sending money into religious organizations in the United
States, you would find those violations and you would find
people put on trial. I don't think that the United States has
to intervene when funds or literature are coming that their
whole attempt is to destabilize a country and to destabilize
the very positive ethnic and religious makeup of the country.
And the last, even on the issue of religious coercion, if a
country decides that it wants to give children, young girls,
the choice to not be veiled and be coerced by their parents to
be veiled, this balance between right of the parents to
religious freedom and right of the child the choice is really a
place where I think the U.S. government shouldn't intervene and
to allow states to make their independent decisions.
This is the last point that as the U.S. improves
relationship with Iran, it disengages from another arenas--a
number of a arenas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, we're going to
need our allies on the ground more than ever. If we're
physically not in these places, we're going to need our allies.
And I think it's very important in your mission that you go
there as a friend. Things that have to be improved, we improve
as allies, and we improve as friends, and I thank you for your
work in this direction.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you both for your testimony.
Ms. Shaffer, thank you for taking on the responsibility of
more people knowing about the Helsinki Commission. I can't
imagine what you woke up to every morning--(inaudible). But we
appreciate that. I think that prior to Russia's incursion in
the Ukraine, most Americans had never heard of OSCE or the
Helsinki Commission. And it clearly is an extremely important
organization for U.S. interests. So we thank you for your
passion on the work of our commission.
Let me assure both of you that Azerbaijan has made
commitments for access for NGOs at our annual meeting so that
we will have opportunities to meet with the NGOs, there will be
free access for all points of view so that we can have an open
discussion at our parliamentary assembly.
I want to ask both of you basically what you think the
opportunities are now for strengthening not just the U.S. ties
with Azerbaijan but also adherence to the OSCE principles
within Azerbaijan. As has been pointed out, what has happened
with Russia and the incursion into Ukraine and, previous to
that, Georgia, is certainly on the minds of the Azerbaijanis.
There's no question about that. And with Armenia developing
closer ties with Russia, as they have with the economic
partnership and their vote in the United Nations on Ukraine, it
seems to me that the Azerbaijanis recognize that there could be
serious issues in Russia's taking sides on territorial issues
in that region.
I'm sure there are other reasons why there is a desire to
strengthen their ties with the United States. We have strong
strategic partnerships. And yet it's important to us that
Azerbaijan adhere to all the principles of Helsinki, not just
the security basket and the economic basket but also the human
rights basket.
So where do you believe that the most progress can be made
in strengthening the relationship between the United States and
Azerbaijan as particularly it relates to the Helsinki
commitments? Whoever wants to go first.
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, I agree with you, Senator Cardin, that
Ukraine, Crimea, this is an earthquake for the region, I think
not only because of the violation of territorial integrity,
because if you're Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, you've already
had a chunk of your territory pulled out with Russian support--
I mean, the Soviet Union, there were hundreds of disjunctures
between the ethnic and national borders. The only places, with
the exception of Chechnya, where violent conflict broke out
were places where there was Russian support. I mean, these wars
are not about ethnic conflict, but they're about one power
using different groups in order to leverage over other groups.
But what's I think particularly--why there is an interlap
between the domestic and the foreign policy here and where your
work is important is that--think about for countries in the
region. Crimea happens. It's not just a military invasion.
Everything was in place. There were people there to run the
government. There were parliamentarians ready to make the vote.
It was very smooth. And I think this is what--why it's really
been a very scary incidence for the people in the region.
Again, they know about taking territory, but to see how porous
many of their countries are, finding the proper balance between
protecting yourself from that infiltration and proper
maintenance of human rights and OSCE principles I don't know
what the magic formula it is, and hopefully you have some
answers for that.
I think that when there is a strong and engaged U.S., it's
better for prosperity and human rights than when the U.S. just
sits on the sidelines and complains and says this isn't good. I
don't want to live in a world where the strongest power isn't
the United States and it's any of the alternative powers. And
so we need to keep our allies.
In terms of specific issues where I think you could find a
lot of cooperation with the government and can be improved on
that--human rights and rule of law issues, one is property
rights in Azerbaijan, strengthening the process of property
rights--when people have control of their property, it's an
important part of the citizenship--and continuing development
of the democratic culture in universities, which I think has
been a very positive development in Azerbaijan.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you.
Ms. Lanskoy?
Mr. Lanskoy. Thank you. I'm going to start with the
geopolitics and come back to the OSCE principles.
Azerbaijan has a very skillful foreign policy. It's true
that they're in a tough neighborhood, but they've become very
good at creating different types of relationships with their
neighbors. President Aliyev recently visited Tehran. He's also
visited Baghdad. He has good relations. There are new border
crossings being opened with Iran. There is robust trade with
Iran. The Azeri defense minister was recently in Moscow meeting
with Russian and Iranian counterparts, and he came out of those
meetings saying that he was very satisfied with defense
cooperation in many spheres with both Russia and Iran.
President Putin visited Baku last summer and endorsed President
Aliyev during a critical moment in the presidential elections.
Russia's Rosneft and SOCAR have just signed a joint venture.
Azerbaijan is able to have a relatively--a very, actually, I
would say, independent foreign policy. Does not have Russian
military bases. It does not have a Russian ethnic minority. It
is economically independent of Russia. Russia is not as big as
trading partner.
So Azerbaijan is able to use these situations to its
advantage. And it is using the current crisis and the attention
paid to Ukraine and to energy issues to carry out a domestic
crackdown. There is no reason to suppose that the crackdown is
somehow inspired by either Russia or Iran. Azerbaijan changes
the subject. And what it can do and what it has seen it can do
over the last 10 years of participating in Council of Europe
and more than 10 years, 20 years of participating in the OSCE
is that it can change the subject away from its human rights
and domestic--the democracy obligations to subjects of energy
and security and never have to address the human dimension.
They have seen that indeed, they can go from just joining the
Council of Europe to taking up important positions within it,
that they can go from just being a participant in the OSCE to
actually hosting the parliamentary assembly and not improve.
ODIHR has monitored eight elections, national elections in
Azerbaijan since 1995. Their recommendations have never been--
they--each time they issue recommendations, there is no follow-
through on that from Azerbaijan.
You raised in the last panel coming up with some specific
benchmarks. You could take recommendations from ODIHR. You
could take political prisoners, release of political prisoners,
treatment of NGOs. You could also draw their attentions to some
strong anti-American statements that come from high levels of
Azeri government, like the head of the presidential
administration, who blames American NGOs for the revolution in
Ukraine, for instance. You could note the treatment of Senate
staff when they met with Azerbaijan's opposition journalists.
They were denounced in the press. They were denounced by
parliamentary members of Azerbaijan. And that's treatment of
Senate--of Corker's staff that--Azerbaijan wants to have part
of a relationship but not others, and they simply can't--simply
can't have.
Mr. Cardin. Give you your top three in priority order that
you would like to see progress made, that you believe, knowing
the politics of the region, could be achieved?
Mr. Lanskoy. They could easily repeal the NGO--the new NGO
legislation. That would just return it, in terms of a
benchmark, return it to a few years back, say. And you could
come up with specifics. We could work with ICNL (ph) to come up
with some, you know, very technical specifics. They could
release political prisoners. They could start with the 19
identified by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience.
And they could undertake working seriously with ODIHR to follow
up on specific--on specific ODIHR recommendations.
Mr. Cardin. That's very helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just let me
ask a couple of questions.
On Monday I returned from four days on the ground in Abuja
in Nigeria--second trip is about 10 months. I was in Jos last
September where a number of Christian churches had been
firebombed by Boko Haram. This time I met with a number of
survivors again, including one of the Chibok girls, who--and a
father whose two daughters were among the Chibok abductees, and
he's Muslim--a moderate Muslim but Muslim nevertheless,
although Christians are targeted.
We know just from reading yesterday's newspapers that a
major gain has been made by the radical Islamists in Iraq.
Afghanistan is a cauldron, and getting worse. Syria remains a
place where both sides are slaughtering people, especially
Christians. I've held several hearings on the fact that the
rebels, particularly the disparate elements who are radical
Islamists, have been slaughtering Christians by design, not as
collateral--they're in the way but simply targeting Christians.
And two weeks ago I chaired a hearing with Robert George of
the Commission on International Religious Freedom. He was very
concerned--and I know it was just mentioned in testimony that
there is a concern that on religious freedom we have not stood
up as robustly as we could. There have been no CPC designations
since 2011. Those that are in force have lapsed. Another list
of countries that ought to be CPC have not been put on the
list. There has been no ambassador-at-large for half of the
president's tenure. We hope someone with the credentials of
Rabbi Saperstein may soon emerge as the person to be
ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, but
delay is denial.
And Robert George, again, the chairman of the religious
freedom commission, said that Azerbaijan is a Tier 2 country
right on the bubble, if you will, in terms of religious
persecution. So there is this surge going on everywhere. I see
it all over Africa. My committee is Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and so I'm frequently there. And the
chairman knows because he follows Africa like the back of his
hand as well, these organizations in the Middle East and
everywhere else are--this is not ebb tide; this is surge. And
I'm wondering if you could speak to how this is impacting
Azerbaijan. Where are they in terms of the intolerance? Are
they batting any worse? You mentioned 19 political prisoners,
and I think your recommendation to visit, or try to, is an
excellent one.
Last year when we were in Baku, led so ably, our
delegation, by Senator Wicker, we had a very, very frank
discussion with the president, with Aliyev, and we raised human
rights issues point by point by point. And I think he was a bit
miffed that it was such a blunt conversation, but all members
joined in. It was a very good discussion. So of course we'll do
that again. And I know Senator Cardin never holds back, nor do
I, especially when it comes to human rights. So this religious
freedom issue, which seems to be festering as never before, and
your thoughts with regards to Azerbaijan.
Secondly, one of the issues I raised with the president
last year--since 1982 I have been raising the issue--I've been
in Congress 34 years now--particularly as it relates to the
People's Republic of China with the aggressively anti-female
policy of sex-selection abortion. China is now missing 100
million girls. Worldwide, especially in India and in China, the
three most dangerous words are: It's a girl. And after five
months, when an ultrasound is done, very often if discovered
that it's a girl she is killed. She's decimated, exterminated.
Now, we raised that in Baku because in Azerbaijan there is a
serious, serious problem of sex ratios of more boys than girls,
and I'm wondering if you've seen those reports, your thoughts
on that, because a girl child is being targeted. And of course
this then becomes a magnet for human trafficking.
The reason why China is on Tier 3 lists--and I wrote the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Last year Secretary
Kerry wisely put China on Tier 3, liable to sanctions, simply
because of the magnet that the missing girls has created when
systematically they have been exterminated since 1979 through
sex-selection abortion, maybe as many as 100 million missing
daughters. Azerbaijan, nowhere near the same aggregate numbers
but they have a serious problem, and I'm very worried that
there will be a nexus with trafficking into Azerbaijan because
of the missing girls. Do you see any of that?
Finally, the political prisoners that you would recommend
that we meet with, perhaps privately or now, you know, if you
had an order of who it is that you think we should go all out
as a commission to meet with, please tender that list.
Mr. Lanskoy. So thank you. That was very comprehensive.
In terms of who to meet with, I realized just now that
neither me nor the previous speakers mentioned NIDA youth
group, they're eight youth activists who just received long
prison terms as well. We could come up with a list. I think
taking Amnesty's 19 and maybe choosing some from different
categories--there are some journalists that are in prison--
maybe also looking at people who have been in jail longer. The
list that Leyla Yunus put together has 130 people. That's an
Azeri NGO and they've been tracking it since the `90s. Some of
their political--some of the political prisoners they identify
have been there much longer, since the `90s, for instance.
So we can come up with different types of activists. If
you're interested in meeting religious activists, there are
some that are imams that had drugs planted on them, for
instance, that you may choose to try to see.
In terms of freedom of religion, in Azerbaijan the main
issue is not--Dr. Shaffer has pointed out that Jews have always
been welcomed and are seen as--and generally in the Caucasus
that's the case. Jews are seen as a native--have been there for
2,000 years and are seen as a native. So it's not so much Jews
or even Christians. I think it's a much smaller Christian
community, but different strands within Islam, and whether
mosques are registered or unregistered and whether they belong
to a spiritual board.
There's a license board that has a near monopoly on
religious observance, and those laws have also been tightened
in 2000. There was amendments to the law, or a new law, in
2009, and those have been used to make illegal Muslim practice
outside of a very narrow range. That, I believe, is the main
issue that has led to more and more prisoners, and also that
the religious can be government critics.
It is not necessarily about maintaining a kind of monopoly
on religious practice, but it's also that certain imams emerge
as critics of the government and they are the ones who are
being--who are being put in jail. So I think that that's
definitely an important issue in Azerbaijan as well. As you
probably mentioned also, there are different--among Christian
groups--Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, so forth--groups that
are newer to Azerbaijan that also can be subjects of
harassment.
Mr. Shaffer. You know, Azerbaijan is far from perfect on
human rights and democracy, and it's good that there is the
dialogue with the U.S. government, with the U.S. Congress on
these issues. Religious freedom is not the issue. All the
different--the important examples you gave of extremism, of
discrimination against women, against--the country isn't
perfect but this is the one area where they should be getting
the star on their report card and not--and not--and not the
criticism.
There are fine lines. When you look at, for instance, the
idea of freedom for NGO financing and prevention of terror
financing, even in U.S. legislation finding that proper balance
where you allow an organization to be free and to associate
with who it wants and to promote what it wants, on the other
hand to prevent moving of funds--I mean, the U.S. government is
the leader around the world at preventing of terror financing.
Then when one of its allies implements this legislation,
prevents money transfers from Iran from extreme religious
organizations, it's criticized by the U.S. government.
The idea of proselytization that have been related to--in
U.S. reports this comes out as prosecution against Christian
minorities. These are not native minorities. These are not
people that were born in Azerbaijan. These are people that come
to proselytize in Azerbaijan. I know I've spent a big chunk of
my life in Israel. It also has a law against proselytization.
I'm very--and I'm very happy it does so that people can
actually be free from coercion and be free from constant
inundation of religious propaganda.
Mr. Smith. You're not suggesting that when somebody
proselytizes there's an element of coercion in it, are you?
Mr. Shaffer. It depends. If you are--if you're a----
Mr. Smith. In Israel?
Mr. Shaffer. In Israel there's a law that prevents it,
actually, so there isn't--there isn't--and again, there's been
questions in the U.S. national commission on religious
freedom----
Mr. Smith. I mean, free speech is involved here as well.
Mr. Shaffer. Sorry?
Mr. Smith. Free speech is involved here as well.
Mr. Shaffer. I think--you know, from research even that
I've read of the commission on religious freedom, that the
issue of--right to proselytization and freedom from harassment
is a very fine line where the commission--again, maybe in the
next hearing a commission member can speak on this, but it's a
fine line where I don't think there's any consensus where
freedom of--where freedom of religion starts and where freedom
from harassment starts. So it's very--I don't think that's--the
right to proselyte, is that something that the U.S. wants to
promote around the world even if an independent government
wants to see it in a different way?
Even the question of who's a--who's a political prisoner. A
number of the defined political prisoners by the EU in Europe--
in Azerbaijan, excuse me, are actually people that were tried
for receiving funds from Iran and being members of terrorist
organizations that worked to--had plots to blow up the U.S.
embassy, kill the U.S. ambassador, blow up the Israeli embassy,
kill leaders of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan. So again,
member in a terrorist organization or political prisoner? It's
a very--defined quite differently by different organizations.
The question of human trafficking, I don't--I don't think
there's any prominent citizen of Azerbaijan, researcher, who
would not say their government has worked strongly to prevent
trafficking, that this is something that's very--part of the
government policy. It's not just part of the nongovernment
policy. And the government has also worked against early
marriage--of course, marriage of young girls in Azerbaijan--
again, at times criticized by human rights organizations. Why
are there--why are there laws, you know, preventing the child
to do what the parent wants when their goal is to--is to
preserve the freedom of the child?
Mr. Smith. And the missing girls?
Mr. Shaffer. I'm not aware on the--of this issue of the----
Mr. Smith. OK. Just with all due respect on the
proselytization issue, if there was coercion involved where
people are being told they must, that's one thing. And it's a
difficult line of demarcation between harassment--I mean, the
free speech ought to be as unfettered as possible, and that
goes for religious freedom as well.
So I would hope that, you know, if somebody wants to take
either the Gospel or any other faith-based creed and bring that
to a country--of course, we hope they would do it with
sensitivity to the local culture, but I think we have to be
very careful to ever construe that to be coercion. Coercion is
physical or some other kind of compulsion with real
consequences, often beatings or economic penalties. I don't see
preachers doing any of that. So I would hope that, you know, we
would be very careful about how we define coercion. Thank you.
Thanks, Ben.
Mr. Cardin. Well, let me thank both of you for your
testimony. It's been extremely helpful to us, and particularly
in trying to set up priorities for our visit as to where we can
make the most impact, and we will certainly take that
information into consideration. We work very closely with our
State Department, who also will supply us with comparable
information of where we think it's important to try to
strengthen the ties between our two countries and to see the
type of progress made that helps promote that type of
improvement of our bilateral relationship.
With that, the hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you all
very much.
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
Good morning and welcome to today's hearing on the security,
economic and human rights dimensions of the U.S.-Azerbaijan
relationship. I am looking forward to leading a congressional
delegation to Azerbaijan at the end of this month where we will attend
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session, and have bilateral
meetings as well.
Azerbaijan has consistently been at the forefront of Commission
attention since its independence, and for good reason: the United
States considers Azerbaijan an important friend and partner in the
region and that means we care deeply about its development.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a serious obstacle to regional
stability, security and prosperity, and certainly is an issue where we
want to see progress because the status quo is not sustainable. I look
forward to discussing today how we might further the OSCE Minsk Group
discussions toward a solution to this conflict.
The US and Azerbaijan have a history of strategic cooperation.
Azerbaijan has played an important role in the Northern Distribution
Network. It has troops serving on the ground in Afghanistan. It made a
strong statement in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity by
voting with the United States in the UN Security Council. So while we
have significant concerns, we also have much to celebrate with
Azerbaijan.
The domestic political situation in Azerbaijan is troubling because
Azerbaijan is moving in the wrong direction. While we have consistently
seen problems with freedom of the media and freedom of association, the
last two years have seen a high number of arrests and convictions of
activists that all bear the hallmark signs of politically-motivated
prosecutions. In addition we have seen journalists such as Khadija
Ismayil and Rauf Mirkadirov, and human rights defenders such as Leyla
Yunus harassed or detained. The election of President Ilham Aliyev last
year was criticized by the OSCE and by the Council of Europe. Our
concern is that rather than working to live up to its commitments in
the OSCE and the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan is instead heading
toward greater authoritarianism. We want to work with Azerbaijan to
change that trend.
Often in the world of international affairs we see things in only
black or white. Something is either good or bad and there is little
room for nuance. But I believe that our relationship--our friendship--
with Azerbaijan requires us to be honest and sincere. Sincere in our
appreciation for the things where we agree, and honest in the areas
where we see problems. The United States needs a stable and prosperous
Azerbaijan. But absent real democratic progress, we will not see true
stability or development.
Prepared Statement of Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
This is a very timely hearing as the Commission prepares to visit
Baku for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's annual session. As we
prepare to visit Baku, I believe it's imperative for this Commission to
discuss the grave deterioration of human rights in Azerbaijan over the
past few years.
I have in front of me here a timeline prepared by Commission staff
of all of the politically-motivated harassment of journalists,
prosecution of the opposition, and jailing of activists. It's amazing
how in just the last two years the government of Azerbaijan has changed
for the worse.
In March 2012 a reporter for RFE/RL, Ms. Khadija Ismail, was
humiliated and blackmailed when an intimate video of her filmed
covertly in her apartment was released to the public. She has continued
to be harassed and called in for questioning and I have no doubt that
this harassment is due to her tenacity in researching and reporting
corruption at the highest levels of government.
In February 2013 Azerbaijan changed its law on non-governmental
organizations to follow the harsh model set by Russia.
In February 2013--two opposition politicians, Mr. Tofig Yagublu of
the opposition Musavat Party and Mr. Ilgar Mammadov, chairperson of the
opposition group REAL, are arrested on charges of orchestrating anti-
government protests. They have now been sentenced to lengthy jail
terms.
In July 2013, despite pledges to do otherwise, Azerbaijan enacted
its law on criminalization of online defamation. Azerbaijanis face jail
time of up to three years for content they post online.
In December 2013, Mr. Anar Mammadli, head of the Election
Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre (EMDS) in Azerbaijan, is placed
in pre-trial confinement pending his trial on charges of illegal
enterprise, tax evasion and abuse of authority. Mammadli was previously
questioned on numerous occasions after EMDS issued a report documenting
widespread electoral violations during the October 2013 election. He
has now been sentenced to a lengthy jail term.
Unfortunately, these are only a few of the many cases over the past
two years. While we all recognize the important role Azerbaijan plays
in the energy sector, and we also recognize that Azerbaijan has carved
out for itself a forward-leaning international relations policy that
seeks to balance the pressures from Russian and Iran with friendly
relations with the U.S. and Israel, the special role of this commission
is to urge and insist that OSCE governments meet their human rights
commitments. As a participating State in the OSCE and as the chair of
the council of ministers of the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan has
indicated that it wants to be a part of the world community. It wants
to be seen as a leader. If that is the case, then we need to see more
leadership, and less authoritarianism.
I look forward to hearing the testimony today. Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Eric Rubin
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me
to speak to you today about our bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan.
I would also like to thank you for the Commission's strong efforts to
promote the principles of the Helsinki Final Act at this critical
moment in the region's history. Your participation in the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly election monitoring mission in Ukraine two weeks
ago sent a powerful signal that the United States will support free and
fair elections in the OSCE region and throughout the world. Your
upcoming participation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual
Session in Baku will serve as an important means of examining how OSCE
member states are living up to the pledge to provide ``human security''
for all their citizens.
Our partnership with Azerbaijan remains an important aspect of our
engagement in the Caucasus. For over twenty years, the United States
has been working with Azerbaijan to promote a secure, prosperous, and
democratic society. Since 1992, we have provided approximately $1.1
billion in assistance to pursue these goals.
My testimony today will focus on three core areas of this bilateral
relationship. First, I will talk about our security cooperation.
Second, I will look at our evolving economic relationship, including
energy diversification and our efforts to promote economic reform.
Finally, I will briefly examine the country's democratic development--
DAS Melia will cover this in greater detail.
First, Azerbaijan has been a key partner for the United States and
NATO from Kabul to Kosovo. Azerbaijan currently has 94 troops serving
in Afghanistan and has committed to remain involved in the country
beyond 2014. It has completed missions to Iraq and Kosovo. Azerbaijan
is a key node in the Northern Distribution Network and air route
sending non-lethal goods in and out of Afghanistan. Thousands of
containers go through customs and thousands of state and commercial
flights transit Azerbaijan each year.
As such, strengthening Caspian security, countering terrorism,
stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
enhancing maritime domain awareness continue to be top priorities for
U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan. Since we began providing security
assistance in 2002, the United States has been working to strengthen
Azerbaijan's capacity to monitor the Caspian and protect critical
energy infrastructure. Over the past 12 years, we have provided $44.4
million in Foreign Military Financing and $9.9 million in International
Military Education and Training and Export Control and Border Security
programs that focus on military professionalization, building
operability, and enhancing border security. And we are providing
approximately $4 million in fiscal year 2014.
Where we do provide security assistance to Azerbaijan, we are
careful to ensure it is used in full compliance with the law--including
Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act and the waiver authorities
for U.S. efforts to counter terrorism, support the operational
readiness of U.S. Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter
terrorism, ensure Azerbaijan's border security as long as it is
determined that such assistance will not undermine or hamper ongoing
efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive
purposes against Armenia.
And the United States is working diligently to facilitate a
peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a co-chair
country of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with France and Russia, the
United States has worked in recent months to articulate the substantial
benefits that peace would bring to people across the region. In doing
so, we are focusing on pragmatic steps to bring the sides into
negotiations on a peace agreement based on the core principles of the
UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. We hope the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan will agree to meet in the near future to
continue the constructive dialogue begun at their summit last November.
It also is important that both governments support Track II efforts to
build people to people contacts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.
These kinds of confidence building measures can help to prepare
citizens of both countries for peace. We are troubled by the recent
arrest of well-known journalist Rauf Mirkadirov, the subsequent
investigation of Leyla Yunus and her husband Arif Yunusov, their poor
treatment by the authorities, and confiscation of their passports. All
three have been strong proponents of the Track II process and the
Azerbaijani government's actions will have a chilling effect on any
contact between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. DAS Melia will elaborate
further on this point in his testimony. Helping both sides resolve this
conflict is a key element of our relationships with both Azerbaijan and
Armenia, and we fully support the Minsk Group co-chairs in their
efforts to facilitate a more constructive phase of negotiations.
Second, the United States enjoys growing economic cooperation with
Azerbaijan, particularly in the area of energy. As Europe looks more
resolutely to diversify its sources of energy away from its dependence
on Russia as part of its energy security strategy, Azerbaijan is
emerging as a potentially crucial supplier of diversified natural gas
supplies for our European allies, and the United States has been a
longstanding supporter of Azerbaijan's efforts to provide its energy
resources to European markets. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,
which began operating in June 2006, represents the first direct
transportation link between the Caspian and the Mediterranean seas. At
full capacity, it can deliver more than one million barrels of oil per
day to market. The BTC pipeline was an early success for our Southern
Corridor diplomacy, and now we are focused on developing a gas link
between Azerbaijan and Europe. The construction of the Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline across Turkey and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline to southern
Italy will complete the Southern Gas Corridor, bringing Caspian gas to
western Europe for the first time. Last December, after more than a
decade of U.S.-led energy diplomacy in support of the Southern Gas
Corridor, a final investment decision was made on this project, which
will bring 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas--and potentially
more--through this network of pipelines from Azerbaijan across six
countries to western Europe starting in 2019.
While energy remains an important part of our bilateral economic
relationship, it is not the only focus. Given our close cooperation on
the Northern Distribution Network and our ongoing transition in
Afghanistan, we are actively encouraging Azerbaijan and its neighbors
to take advantage of this important window of opportunity to transform
the NDN into a commercial network for trade and investment when many
freight forwarders are still in the region.
Azerbaijan and its neighbors could become a premier trade and
transportation corridor between Europe and Asia, but to do so, they
must first reduce costs associated with high customs and tariffs and
address delays caused by a lack of regional coordination. Time is of
the essence, and the United States supports reforms that will create
sustainable sources of non-oil revenue in Azerbaijan and new
opportunities for U.S. exports and investment. For instance, Azerbaijan
likely will obtain the necessary certifications to operate direct
passenger and cargo flights to the United States this year.
The United States also promotes the export of U.S. goods and
services to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has already purchased hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of airplanes and a communications satellite
from the United States, and it will undoubtedly purchase more in the
future. U.S. agricultural firms are interested in selling heavy
equipment and technology, and American oil companies want to explore
and develop new oil and gas fields in the Caspian to supply the
Southern Corridor. The United States also supports Azerbaijan's
accession into the WTO and the rules-based system in which its members
participate. Opportunities for U.S. exports could increase
significantly.
In this context, it is important to note the role that corruption
plays in the entire OSCE space, and Azerbaijan is no exception. It is a
blight that tears at the economic, political, and social fabric of
society, weighing on the country's economic potential, driving up
inefficiencies, and scaring away foreign direct investment. Working
with the Government of Azerbaijan and local partners, the United States
is committed to enhancing our efforts to address this. Ultimately,
countries with strong checks and balances including a strong and
independent judiciary and apolitical civil service--are most likely to
be effective in combating corruption.
Finally, our strongest relationships world-wide are with
democracies that respect the full range of human rights of their
citizens. We seek strong cooperation on democratization with
Azerbaijan, just as we collaborate closely on security and economic
issues. Azerbaijan's respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and progress on democratic reform is key not only to strengthening our
bilateral relationship, but also to Azerbaijan's own long-term
stability. We have some serious concerns about the environment for
democratic development and the protection of human rights in
Azerbaijan, which has been deteriorating. My colleague Tom Melia will
touch more on that in a moment.
I want to emphasize that the United States remains committed to a
constructive dialogue with Azerbaijan based on friendship between our
people and mutual respect between our governments. But a constructive
dialogue means that we can and must have frank and honest discussions
in areas where we disagree. Discussing matters of agreement and
disagreement in a candid way is part of the nature of a serious
dialogue.
Going forward, our relationship will continue to be based on these
three core areas--security cooperation, economic and energy
cooperation, and democratic development. Our mission remains to address
each of these three areas with equal rigor and resolve. And we are
committed to working with Congress in a bipartisan manner in our
efforts to realize each of these and the full potential of this
relationship.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Melia
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me
to speak to you today about the democracy and human rights dimension of
U.S.-Azerbaijan relations in advance of your visit to Baku later this
month for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session. My colleagues
at the State Department and I greatly appreciate the dedication of you
and your fellow Commissioners and your staff to the OSCE and its
institutions--especially to the enduring principles enshrined in the
Helsinki Final Act and the body of commitments that comprise the OSCE's
``human dimension.'' We also greatly value our regular consultations
with you and your staff.
I would like to start by referring to a key principle of the OSCE,
as set forth in the 1991 ``Moscow Document'' and notably reaffirmed in
the 2010 Astana Summit Declaration, in which OSCE participating States
agreed unanimously that:
issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms,
democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as
respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the
foundations of the international order. They categorically and
irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the
field of the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct
and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State
concerned.
This concept linking respect for human rights within states to
lasting security among states is reflected in our multilateral
interactions and in our bilateral relationships with all OSCE
participating States, including Azerbaijan. It forms the basis on which
the United States continues to support efforts to advance democracy
worldwide. In Azerbaijan, this constitutes one of three equally
important core goals, which Deputy Assistant Secretary Rubin has just
spoken to. U.S. officials at all levels in Baku and Washington
regularly highlight the importance of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, rule of law, and other basic building blocks of
democracy, publicly and privately. U.S. officials regularly meet with a
variety of Azerbaijanis, ranging from government officials to civil
society activists and opposition political party representatives.
While serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, I have
visited Azerbaijan three times, holding valuable meetings with leading
government officials, including President Ilham Aliyev, as well as with
opposition political leaders, civil society actors, and journalists. I
have been joined on these missions to Azerbaijan, as well as to other
countries, by senior colleagues from the Department of State's European
and Eurasian Affairs Bureau, USAID, and the Department of Justice. I
believe these are important opportunities to listen to Azerbaijanis
inside and outside of government, to share with them our thoughts, and
to demonstrate that we do care about all three dimensions of the
relationship. Indeed, I would like to visit Azerbaijan again soon to
continue these conversations.
The United States also provides assistance to support Azerbaijan's
democratic development efforts, with an emphasis on support for civil
society, independent media, and rule of law. The largest part of this
assistance is provided by our colleagues at USAID, and we in the State
Department work very closely with them to ensure that these programs
are neatly lined up with our overall policy priorities. Similarly, we
work closely in Washington and Baku with the legal experts provided by
the Department of Justice in the Overseas Prosecutorial Development
Assistance and Training program. Our inter-agency partnership is
working very well.
Just two weeks ago, on May 28, Azerbaijan celebrated the 96th
anniversary of the day in 1918 on which it became the first majority
Muslim, democratic republic in the world. The Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic lasted only 23 months, until it was invaded by the Soviet Red
Army and forcibly incorporated into the nascent Soviet Union, where it
remained captive for more than seven decades. Since Azerbaijan regained
its independence in 1991, it has begun to modernize, and its people
have become more integrated into the wider world.
With regard to building democratic institutions and developing
democratic norms, Azerbaijan has taken some positive steps. For
example, it established six administrative government service centers
in Baku and the regions (known as ``ASAN,'' which means ``easy'' in
Azeri) intended to eliminate corruption by public officials at the
local level. More broadly, however, we have been seeing increasing
constraints on fundamental freedoms that increase the risk of domestic
instability, undermine confidence the rule of law will be respected,
and prevent Azerbaijanis from reaching their full potential.
Five years ago, it was already difficult for advocates of
democratic reform--especially opposition political parties--to
participate in the political life of the country, but it was still
possible for NGOs and independent activists to operate. The environment
has worsened significantly since then, beginning with the 2009
incarceration of young democracy activists Emin Milli and Adnan
Hajizade. Although they were released in 2010, the suppression of
peaceful dissent increased in 2011, with the arrests of young
Azerbaijani activists who sought to organize peaceful pro-democracy
rallies in Baku. The Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijan's parliament) passed
legislation significantly increasing fines on participants and
organizers of unauthorized protests in November 2012, which resulted in
the detention of numerous peaceful pro-democracy activists for baseless
administrative violations. Since early 2013, the space for peaceful
dissent has narrowed more dramatically, and the exercise of fundamental
freedoms has become still more tenuous. A number of leading peaceful
democracy advocates, civil society activists, and journalists have been
incarcerated, including presidential candidate and chairman of the
democratic reform-oriented REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov; opposition
journalist and Musavat Party Deputy Chairman Tofig Yagublu; members of
democratic youth movements; blogger Abdul Abilov; religious scholar and
activist Taleh Bagirzade; Khural Editor Avaz Zeynalli; and the chairman
of NDI's local election monitoring partner, the Election Monitoring and
Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), Anar Mammadli.
Additionally, two rounds of legislative amendments since March 2013
have restricted NGO funding and activity. Officials have pressured
Azerbaijani and international NGOs, including some USAID implementing
partners, which in some cases have been subject to investigations by
the tax and justice ministries. Authorities also launched a criminal
investigation of EMDS--which has been a recipient of USAID and European
assistance--and another election monitoring NGO, the International
Cooperation of Volunteers (ICV) Public Union, soon after the flawed
October 2013 presidential election. Such actions have resulted in an
increasingly hostile operating environment for civil society,
especially for those activists and groups advocating respect for human
rights, fundamental freedoms, and government accountability; thereby
depriving citizens the open channels through which they can voice their
concerns. Pressure on independent defense lawyers has resulted in a
decreasing number of such lawyers ready to defend individuals in
sensitive cases.
Restrictions on the ability of selected Azerbaijani activists to
travel outside of the country are also a problem, calling into question
the extent of the government's commitment to freedom of movement, a
founding tenet of the OSCE. For example, since 2006, the government has
prevented the foreign travel of opposition Popular Front Party Chairman
Ali Karimli by refusing to renew his passport. Today in Bern, the
OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is
discussing the important role of human rights defenders in OSCE
participating States. Sadly, one of Azerbaijan's leading human rights
defenders, Leyla Yunus, was unable to attend the event, because
Azerbaijan's authorities confiscated her passport--as well as her
husband's--in April. This confiscation occurred in the context of the
April 19 arrest of well-known journalist Rauf Mirkadirov, the
subsequent questioning of Leyla Yunus and her husband about Mirkadirov,
and their poor treatment by police authorities. All three have been
strong proponents of people-to-people diplomacy, which helps build ties
between Azerbaijanis and Armenians and is crucial to the peaceful
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The peaceful resolution of
this conflict will open borders, increase security, and create new
opportunities to trade, travel, and engage across the region.
Authorities also have prevented some in the international human rights
community from visiting or returning to Azerbaijan.
These are not the kinds of actions the United States or the broader
international community wants to see from a partner, an OSCE
participating State, and currently the chair of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe.
When President Obama spoke last month at the West Point
commencement, he explained that:
America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond
idealism--it is a matter of national security. Democracies are
our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war.
Economies based on free and open markets perform better and
become markets for our goods. Respect for human rights is an
antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence
and terror.
And he noted that,
In capitals around the globe--including, unfortunately, some of
America's partners--there has been a crackdown on civil
society.
We recognize that Azerbaijan lives in a very difficult neighborhood
and that its government seeks stability. The United States strongly
supports Azerbaijan's long-term stability, security, and prosperity.
The best way to guarantee such a future is to strengthen democratic
processes and institutions to buttress respect for the rule of law and
fundamental freedoms. Doing so will foster long-term internal
stability, create the most inviting environment for economic investment
and growth, and make Azerbaijan the very best that it can be, by giving
every citizen the freedom and space to achieve his or her full
potential, thereby maximizing the contributions of all of its people.
We consider this to be in both the short-term and the long-term
interests of both the people and the government of Azerbaijan. The U.S.
Embassy in Baku and we in Washington have been active on these issues
and have made these points. For example, Ambassador Morningstar has
been doing an outstanding job in advocating publicly as well as
privately for an environment conducive to a vibrant civil society and
in raising specific impediments to such an environment.
The United States believes that Azerbaijan will have greater
stability and prosperity, and will more quickly reach its full
potential, by allowing a more open society. We therefore will continue
to support Azerbaijani efforts to advance the country's democratic
potential, including respect for rule of law, human rights, and
fundamental freedoms. We will continue to urge Azerbaijan to live up to
its OSCE commitments and other international human rights obligations.
We will also encourage Azerbaijan to take advantage of its chairmanship
of the Council of Europe to take concrete steps on important democracy
and human rights issues. The positive changes we advocate would benefit
both the people and the government of Azerbaijan. Such changes would
also make it easier for us to expand and deepen our bilateral
relationship, since our strongest relationships are with democratic
states that respect the full range of human rights of all of their
citizens.
As President Obama indicated in his recent message marking
Azerbaijan's National Day, and to return to where I began, we encourage
Azerbaijan to reclaim the leadership role on human rights and
fundamental freedoms that its people and government demonstrated 96
years ago.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss
democracy and human rights trends in Azerbaijan and our overall
bilateral relationship.
Prepared Statement of Miriam Lanskoy
I am grateful to the Helsinki Commission for holding this very
important hearing at a crucial historical junction and for giving me
the opportunity to speak about the state of democracy and human rights
in Azerbaijan.
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit
foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic
institutions around the world. NED has been working in Azerbaijan since
the mid-1990s and maintains a large portfolio of projects. Defending
human rights, a traditional focus of the NED, remains a high priority
in Azerbaijan. Programs include monitoring, reporting on, and providing
legal assistance to victims of human rights abuses. NED's programs also
focus on expanding the capabilities of independent news providers.
Through membership in international organizations, including the
UN, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, Azerbaijan has committed
itself to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
However, despite long term engagement of Azerbaijan with these
organizations, rights enforcement is highly selective and superficial.
Azerbaijan manages to obtain the prestige associated with participation
in international organizations without fulfilling the basic conditions
of membership. When it joined the Council of Europe (CE) in 2001 it was
understood that Azerbaijan was not meeting the requirements, but it was
expected that participation in the CE would stimulate greater
democratic development. Nevertheless, twelve years later Azerbaijan
still has not met those basic criteria.
As of May 2014, Azerbaijan is the Chairman of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, a body charged with ensuring
compliance with the judgments of the European Court for Human Rights.
However, Azerbaijan has not itself complied with numerous ECHR
judgments, particularly those related to freedom of association and the
release of political prisoners. And though Azerbaijan is not in
compliance with basic norms of human rights, freedom of speech and
association that are a fundamental part of its OSCE obligations, it is
about to host the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE at the end of this
month.
Despite participation these international forums, over the last
decade freedom in Azerbaijan has declined substantially. Overall, the
country has gone from semi-free to a state of consolidated
authoritarianism. In the Nations in Transit index published annually by
Freedom House Azerbaijan shows a steep decline in every category of
governance over the period from 2003 to 2013, with the overall score
declining from 5.6 to 6.6. As a result, Azerbaijan is much closer to
Uzbekistan's 6.9 rating than Georgia's 4.7.
In an overall context of declining freedom, the last year has seen
a particularly rapid backsliding especially with respect to political
prisoners, freedom of speech, and pressure against NGOs. In 2013 there
had been a marked increase in grass roots protests sparked by instances
of official abuse of power and social injustice. In January and March
2013 peaceful protests in Baku were violently dispersed, including the
use of water cannons and rubber bullets. There were dozens of arrests
and new prohibitions on freedom of assembly, on NGOs, and the media.
This was the year of the presidential election and the crackdown was
expected to diminish after those elections were held in October.
However, it has continued unabated with long prison sentences handed
down to civil society leaders.
Recent events in Ukraine have major implications for Azerbaijan,
and are seen as part of the reason that the crackdown on government
critics has continued. Some have conjectured that the Maidan protests,
which toppled the corrupt government of President Viktor Yanukovich in
Ukraine may have rattled nerves in Baku. However, since Ilham Aliev
came to power in 2003, there have been revolutions in Ukraine, one in
neighboring Georgia, two in Kyrgyzstan, and several in the Middle East
that have had no appreciable effect on Azerbaijan.
There are two other dimensions of the crisis in Ukraine that have
even greater significance for Azerbaijan. Russia's annexation of Crimea
sets a worrisome precedent for the region and may have implications for
Nagorno-Karabakh and other frozen conflicts. The annexation of Crimea
means that Russia is the arbiter of borders on the territory of the
former Soviet Union and can decide these questions unilaterally and
arbitrarily.
The crisis in Ukraine has also made the diversification of energy
supplies a higher priority for Europe and a major opportunity for
Azerbaijan to become a more significant regional transportation hub for
gas. There has been a flurry of diplomatic activity by Baku to seek out
more partners for various potential pipeline schemes. Baku is seizing
the opportunities to extend its influence internally, while at home it
is taking advantage of the crisis to silence government critics. The
crisis in Ukraine has multifaceted implications for Baku, and for that
reason Azerbaijan votes in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity
at the UN, while domestically, the head of the presidential
administration Ramiz Mekhtiev tells the media that the revolution in
Ukraine was instigated by international NGOs whose work in Azerbaijan
is suspect and should be drastically curtailed.
In the interest of time I am limiting my remarks to particularly
egregious cases of political imprisonment and new onerous requirements
against NGOs. It should be mentioned that there are numerous other
problems related to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and
elections. They are documented in numerous reports, including the ODIHR
monitoring report of the October 2013 presidential election and the DOS
Annual Human Rights Report, as well as numerous reports by Azerbaijani
and international NGOs.
political prisoner:
The number of political prisoners continues to grow. The Institute
of Peace and Democracy in Baku documents 130 political prisoners
including persons who have been in jail since the 1990s. Amnesty
International has recognized 19 prisoners of conscience from among the
activists arrested since January 2013. In September 2013 Human Rights
Watch published a comprehensive report, Tightening the Screws:
Azerbaijan's Crackdown of Civil Society and Dissent, which details
spurious cases against activists, human rights defenders, and
journalists. I'd like to draw your attention to just a few of these
cases.
In March 2014, two prominent opposition figures, journalist Tofiq
Yaqublu of the Musavat party, and Ilgar Mammadov of REAL, were
sentenced to five and seven year sentences on false charges of inciting
rioting in the town Izmaily, where they in fact arrived a day after the
riot had occurred. Both men are considered Amnesty International
prisoners of conscience. In its May 2014 ruling in Mammadov's case, the
European Court of Human Rights, found that Azerbaijan is in violation
of articles of the convention, including Articles 5 and 18, and awarded
damages to Ilgar Mammadov. The ECHR found that ``the actual purpose of
the impugned measures was to silence or punish the applicant for
criticising the Government and attempting to disseminate what he
believed was the true information that the Government were trying to
hide.'' The Committee of Ministers of the CE, which Azerbaijan now
chairs, is supposed to oversee the implementation of the ECHR
decisions.
In May 2014, eight members of the youth movement NIDA, also
considered AI prisoners of conscience, received sentences ranging from
6-8 years. The members of the NIDA youth group organized protests
against the deaths of Azeri Army conscripts in January and March 2013.
The activists were disseminating criticisms of the government online,
including Facebook and Twitter. NIDA activists were beaten and
humiliated in detention and initially denied access to an attorney of
their choice.
Human Rights Watch has profiled the use of narcotics charges
against opposition youth activists who apparently had drugs planted on
them by police. In each instance a youth activist who posted materials
critical of the government on social media was arrested for narcotics
charges but was questioned about political views and activities. In
separate incidents government critics were prosecuted on highly dubious
charges of drug possession, tested negative for presence of drugs in
their bodies, and were initially denied legal representation, and
subjected to abuse in detention. Rashad Ramazanov, a well-known blogger
got a nine year jail term; Taleh Bagirov an imam who criticized the
government in his sermon was sentenced to two years, and Dashig
Malikov, a activist with the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party, was
sentenced to two and half years.
The last case I will mention is of an outspoken critic of the
government, Leyla Yunus, the Director of the Institute of Peace and
Democracy, a major human rights monitoring organization and democracy
think tank in Azerbaijan. Leyla Yunus has been active for two decades
in many facets of human rights work, including assistance for political
prisoners, working to reduce torture in detention, protecting women and
religious and ethnic minorities. Leyla's husband Arif Yunus is a
historian and political scientist and author of numerous books about
Azerbaijan. Leyla Yunus's human rights works has repeatedly put her at
odds with the government, which was most clearly on display in 2011
when their house was demolished with all her possessions inside after
she campaigned actively for the property rights of people arbitrarily
evicted from their homes. In April 2014 Leyla Yunus was detained and
questioned at length in connection with a case against Rauf Mirkadirov,
an Azeri journalist detained under dubious treason charges for his
participation in ``Track II'' meetings with Armenian colleagues. Both
Leyla and Arif Yunus have participated in numerous such meetings which
are seen by the OSCE mediators as an important avenue for seeking a
peaceful resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. During the
questioning, over a month ago, Leyla and Arif Yunus had their passports
taken away. Since no charges have been filed against them and there are
no formal barriers to travel, their passports should be returned and
they should be permitted to attend conferences such as the OSCE meeting
in Berne this week that they are unfortunately missing.
media
Freedom of information has also deteriorated. The government has
control over broadcast media and most newspapers, and it is now trying
to establish greater control over the internet. June 2013 amendments to
the criminal code made defamation over the Internet a criminal offense
carrying penalties of up to three years in jail. The amendments
represent a major blow to freedom of expression making it possible to
launch criminal cases against online activists. During the pre-election
period Azerbaijan was jamming satellite signals of news programs in the
Azeri language, including that of RFE/RL. Several journalists are
serving politically motivated jail sentences including Avaz Zeynalli,
the editor the opposition newspaper Khural, and Hilal Mammadov the
editor of the Tolishi Sado newspaper.
freedom of religion
Freedom of religion is another area where a decline has been
documented. US Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
has downgraded Azerbaijan to a Tier 2 country for the first time in
2013. The Commission focuses its criticism on the 2009 Law on Religion
which curtailed a range of religious activity, made unregistered
religious activity illegal, and imposed extensive government censorship
of religious literature. The law has been repeatedly amended to
increase penalties and has led to numerous raids, detentions and
arrests. In its 2014 report the USCIRF includes a list of 51 religious
prisoners in Azerbaijan.
pressure against ngos
The climate has also become much more difficult for NGOs.
Amendments to the NGO law in February 2013 increased existing sanctions
against unregistered NGO activity. It became illegal for unregistered
groups to receive grants or donations. In conjunction with arbitrary
refusal of registration, this places civic activists in an impossible
position. The amendments also dramatically increase penalties for any
NGO that does not register its grants. Another set of amendments that
extends onerous requirements to international organizations was passed
in February 2014. Grantees report months of effort with arbitrary
bureaucracy to register their grants that are so far inconclusive.
There is considerable apprehension that the regulations will be
selectively enforced against organizations that are critical of the
government.
However even prior to these amendments, Azerbaijan was seen as
violating freedom of association due to overregulation of NGOs. In a
2011 opinion the Venice Commission found that the process for
registering NGOs in Azerbaijan was too ``cumbersome, lengthy, and
unpredictable.'' In five separate decisions the ECHR has found that
Azerbaijan violates freedom of association by arbitrarily denying
registration to NGOs. Azerbaijan should be bringing its legislation in
compliance with ECHR and Venice Commission opinions rather than
imposing even greater burdens on NGOs.
The case of Anar Mammadli and Bashir Suleymanli of the Election
Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS) illustrates the way
these laws are used to silence critics of the government. EMDS is the
most authoritative domestic vote monitoring organization in Azerbaijan
and it has been attempting to register for over 5 years and has been
denied each time. The organization attempted to sue the government to
obtain registration but the courts refused to consider its case. Last
year the EMDS entered into a contract with a registered NGO to carry
out its activities. This arrangement became grounds for a criminal case
against Anar Mammadli, the Chairman of EMDS, who was sentenced to 5.5
years in jail and Bashir Suleymanli, the Executive Director, who was
sentenced to 3.5 years. Mammadli and Suleymanli were profiled in detail
in a recent Amnesty International report that also considers them
prisoners of conscience.
conclusion
In closing, I am grateful to the Helsinki Commission for convening
this hearing, which focuses attention on Azerbaijan at a very important
moment. I hope that the Commission will remain equally engaged in the
future by calling on the government of Azerbaijan to release political
prisoners and repeal onerous new regulations against NGOs. Further, I
would urge that the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE which will convene
in Baku this year to include voices from Azerbaijan's embattled civil
society in its deliberations. I would also urge Members of Congress who
travel to Azerbaijan as part of the OSCE delegation or other
congressional delegations to visit political prisoners in jail and meet
with their families and attorneys. In the case of Leyla and Arif Yunus,
who are being held in limbo, their passports should be returned and
they should be permitted to travel internationally.
Mr. Chairman, Azerbaijan has a longstanding democratic tradition,
and in 1918 became the first democracy in the Muslim world. The civil
society of Azerbaijan works to fulfill that legacy and remind the
government of its OSCE commitments. These brave and talented people
should be permitted to do their important work without harassment and
intimidation.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Brenda Shaffer
Dear members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission,
The Republic of Azerbaijan is a strategically important country
that borders Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Azerbaijan is important to a
number of wider U.S. foreign policy issues, including policy toward
Russia, relations with Iran, nuclear non-proliferation, Middle Eastern
regional security, and European energy security. In its two decades of
independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan has stood together with the
U.S. as an ally on almost every major policy issue, including by
sending troops to serve together with U.S. forces in Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has also served as the main transit point of
U.S. troops and equipment into Afghanistan. Most recently, Azerbaijan
was one of the few states bordering Russia that joined the U.S.-led
effort at the United Nations to condemn Moscow's annexation of Crimea.
Over a third of the population of Iran is ethnically Azerbaijani;
thus, developments in Azerbaijan affect developments in its neighbor to
the south, including Iran's domestic stability. Azerbaijan is a Muslim-
majority country that has not established any special status for Islam,
observes complete separation of religion and state, and protects equal
rights for citizens regardless of religious or ethnic origin. The
Republic of Azerbaijan not only allows religious freedom, but observes
freedom from religious coercion. During its short period of
independence prior to being conquered by the USSR, Azerbaijan in 1918
was the first Muslim-majority state to grant women suffrage, two years
before the United States and long before most of Europe.
Despite close cooperation between Azerbaijan and the United States
on almost every strategic issue, relations between Washington and Baku
are very complicated and occasionally tenuous. In this testimony, I
will discuss Azerbaijan's strategic foreign policy approach, its
relations with a number of its neighbors (Russia, Iran, and Armenia),
trends in the South Caucasus region, and suggestions for how the U.S.
can best support its national interests in the South Caucasus region.
azerbaijan's foreign policy
Developments in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus are strongly
influenced by regional and global powers: the region is located at the
crossroads of two continents and borders three important geopolitical
actors: Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Due to its strategic location, the
region is a focus of geopolitical competition.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Azerbaijan possesses a strong strategic orientation toward the
United States and Europe, but is also mindful of the constraints of its
neighborhood. Consequently, Baku attempts to maintain a potentially
treacherous balancing act in its policies one that allows close
cooperation with the U.S. without encouraging the wrath of its
potentially dangerous neighbors, Iran and Russia. As a Muslim-majority
country, Azerbaijan maintains close cultural ties with many Muslim-
majority states, but religious and cultural factors play no role in
determining the state's alliances or main strategies of cooperation. In
fact, one of Azerbaijan's closest alliances is with Israel. Azerbaijan
is Israel's largest supplier of oil, and the two states share strategic
cooperation on a number of issues.
Azerbaijan is rich in oil and natural gas reserves, and its
exporting of these petroleum resources westward has been a major
feature of its foreign policy since independence. Azerbaijan is among
the top twenty oil producers in the world, producing close to a million
barrels a day (850,000 barrels of which are exported). Azerbaijan also
exports natural gas to most of its neighbors and will soon play an
important role in enhancing Europe's energy security. At the end of
2013, Azerbaijan and a number of international investors announced
their final investment decision on the Southern Gas Corridor, which is
designed to bring Azerbaijan's natural gas volumes into Europe. This
ambitious project will provide the first new volumes of natural gas
into Europe in decades and allow a number of states along the route to
improve the security of their energy supply and lower their dependence
on Russia. This $45 billion project that crosses seven countries and
six regulatory jurisdictions is being built in such a way that it can
easily be expanded, and can thus transit additional volumes of gas from
new sources in the future. At the same time, adjoining pipelines can be
built to reach additional markets that need to improve their security
of supply, such as the Balkans. The Southern Corridor will be the
catalyst for natural gas interconnectors in Southern Europe. For a
number of years, the European Union has spoken about the importance of
interconnectors, and this project has encouraged the development of
these connecting pipelines between different European countries.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Azerbaijan could have sold its natural gas at a higher profit to
neighboring Iran and Russia, but embarked on this ambitious project in
order to link itself with Europe and lower its dependence on these
neighboring states. This strategic choice entails closer cooperation
with Europe, Turkey and the U.S., but also elicits potentially negative
responses from Russia and Iran.
Since Azerbaijan's independence with the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been the
major focus of its national security and foreign policies. This
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan started on the eve of the
Soviet breakup, as ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan's province of
Nagorno-Karabakh rallied to join Armenia. Moscow played the newly
independent Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other, turning a local
dispute over the status of a territory inhabited by 90,000 people into
a regional war from 1992 to 1994. Eventually, Armenia was victorious,
and it took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other Azerbaijani
districts. As a result of the war, Armenia now occupies 20 percent of
the territory of Azerbaijan (as legally recognized by the U.S.
government), and close to one million Azerbaijani refugees and
internally displaced persons were left homeless.
relations with russia and iran
Azerbaijan borders--and has challenging relations with both Russia
and Iran. Moscow seeks to limit Azerbaijan's cooperation with the
United States and Europe, an approach it takes with most of the former
Soviet states. Moscow has tried to block Azerbaijan's energy export
projects westward, and has attempted to coerce Baku to route its energy
resources to Russia.
At the same time, Azerbaijan's neighbor to the south, Iran, also
works to undermine Azerbaijan's stability. Iran is a multi-ethnic
state, and its domestic security could be affected by developments in
the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan.1 Half of Iran's population is
comprised of non-Persian ethnic minorities, with the Azerbaijanis the
largest group at close to one-third of the country's population. The
majority of residents in the northwestern provinces of Iran, contiguous
to the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan, are Azerbaijanis. One
reason that Iran supports Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan is
that it prefers Azerbaijan to be embroiled in a conflict and
consequently unable to serve as a source of support or emulation for
the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran.
As part of its policy of undermining Azerbaijan's security, Tehran
has supported Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan and engaged in
broad security, military, and economic cooperation with Yerevan since
1992. During the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran supplied
Armenia with fuel and food and allowed the flow of arms and goods
through its territory to Armenia.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Tehran has also sponsored a number of terrorist cells and attempted
terrorist attacks inside Azerbaijan, with targets that have included
the U.S. embassy, the U.S. ambassador, the Israeli ambassador and local
Jewish institutions in Baku. Due to its long and heavily crossed border
with Azerbaijan, Tehran frequently attempts to use Azerbaijani
territory to carry out attacks on Western, Israeli, and Jewish targets.
the caucasus: conflict, domestic politics, and foreign powers
In the South Caucasus region--as in most of the areas of the former
Soviet Union that border Russia--domestic politics, foreign policy, and
military conflicts are intertwined. Most of the powers involved in the
South Caucasus, especially Russia and Iran, use threats to the
stability of the region's governments and violent conflicts as tools to
promote their influence and interests.
To promote its dominance over bordering states, Russia has proved
ready to use military force (as it has in Ukraine and Georgia); to work
through electoral processes and civil society organizations (Russian
citizens ran in recent elections to lead Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Latvia) to get its way; and to promote separatists as a lever of
influence (as it has done in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan). If the United States is going to succeed in promoting
conflict resolution and democratization in the region, as well as its
own security interests, it must recognize this dynamic of regional
politics.
External support was a key factor in the emergence of the conflicts
that appeared in the Caucasus during the post-Soviet period. In the
former Soviet Union, there were hundreds of disjunctures where ethnic
and political borders did not line up, but ethnic conflicts only broke
out (with the exception of Chechnya), where Russia supported the
secessionist forces. These conflicts cannot be resolved only through
agreement between the secessionist forces and the country they have
broken away from, but their strategic backer has to be on board. These
conflicts are not ethnic conflicts, but proxy wars between Russia and
in most cases forces that want stronger integration with the West. The
conflicts in the Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh, continue to
provide outside powers with significant leverage in the region.
In the last two decades, the United States has actively supported
efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia, within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is
composed of representatives of Russia, the United States, and France.
These efforts have failed primarily because the United States has
treated Armenia and Azerbaijan as the primary protagonists in the
dispute while ignoring Russia's role in prolonging the conflict. For
example, successive U.S. secretaries of state and special negotiators
have criticized the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan for ``not
preparing their people for peace,'' as the leaders of the Minsk Group
chided last year, and for failing to reach an agreement. The U.S. has
granted millions of dollars to aid to programs aimed at ``building ties
between the two societies,'' but has never formed a strategy for
dealing with Moscow because, until the Crimea invasion, Washington
never acknowledged the extent to which Moscow uses ethnic conflicts
around the region as a lever of influence.
On May 7, the U.S. representative to the OSCE Minsk Group,
Ambassador James Warlick, made an important statement articulating the
long-standing U.S. policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.2 This
statement and continued U.S. interest in resolving the conflict are
important for the prosperity of the South Caucasus and for removing a
lever of Russian and other foreign influence in the region. Moscow will
undermine any peace agreement that it does not view in its interest,
regardless of the stances of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
current status quo of no war, no peace serves Russian interests. The
U.S. should stop blaming the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan for the
dispute and start thinking about how to mitigate Russian opposition to
settlement by identifying Russian interests that could be served
through resolution of the conflict. Successive U.S. administrations,
whether Republican or Democrat, have been loath to bargain with Russia
on strategic issues. They have preferred instead to operate on the
level of principles (such as ``state sovereignty'' and ``the
inapplicability of use of force.''). However, trade-offs are necessary
in order to achieve security and allow prosperity in the post-Soviet
region.
In addition, to further support conflict resolution, the US should
support Ankara's policy of linking the opening of the border between
Armenia and Turkey to significant advancement in the Nagorno--Karabakh
peace process. While increased trade between Armenia and Turkey will be
a good development and in the long run could help reduce Yerevan's
dependence on Moscow, this trade should be used as a force for peace.
Peace cannot be accomplished without some significant Armenian
withdrawal of the occupied territories. The only incentive that Yerevan
has to compromise, with the exception of threat of war, is the desire
to open the border with Turkey. Thus, the link of the border issue to
some compromise on the Nagorno--Karabakh conflict can be used to
facilitate trade and at the same time avert war.
In the states that border Russia, there is an overlap between
domestic politics and foreign intervention. While the U.S. and the
Soviet Union battled it out during the 1970s through intra-state wars
in the developing world, today elections and the funding of NGOs and
political movements have replaced the proxy wars. During a presentation
this year in Washington, D.C., a senior Georgian official pointed out
that Russia has recently begun funding NGOs in Georgia to campaign for
Georgian membership in Moscow's Eurasian Economic Union instead of the
EU Partnership Program. Leaders of NGOs and opposition political
movements in the South Caucasus have proudly stated that they take
money from Iran, Russia, and foreign religious organizations--from
whomever will help them get into power. These groups have accepted
outside assistance even when the agendas of these foreign states and
organizations contradict their own state's national sovereignty and the
long-term democratic development of the South Caucasus states. The
long-standing U.S. policy that rests on the premise that a ``vibrant
civil society creates stability'' ignores the fact that in many parts
of the world, elements of civil society are connected to foreign
countries, which have no interest in democracy or stability.
relations with the united states: challenges and moving forward
While U.S. officials frequently acknowledge the important role that
Azerbaijan plays in security issues that are of concern to the United
States, understanding security needs should be a two-way street.
Washington should also address Baku's security needs and its complex
strategic environment, where both the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
Azerbaijan's domestic political arena serve as theaters for Russia and
other neighboring powers to promote their interests.
Washington's actions also often contradict its own long-standing
and clearly articulated policies on the region. For instance, the U.S.
government officially recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent
seven regions as under Armenian occupation. Yet, at the urging of
leading Armenian-American political organizations, Congress imposed
sanctions on Azerbaijan in 1992 that have not been removed in over
twenty years. Congress also annually earmarks funds for the
secessionist local government in Nagorno-Karabakh. These allocations
are in violation of U.S. law, since they support settlement activity in
occupied territories. Congressional allocations to Nagorno-Karabakh are
equivalent to the idea of earmarking funds for Israeli settlements in
the occupied West Bank or for the Russian-sponsored local government in
Crimea, clearly actions that Congress would not consider taking.
However, annually Congress approves the earmark to the occupied
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In the past two decades, the U.S. has asked for Azerbaijan to join
it in security initiatives that were important to Washington. Baku has
always answered these U.S. requests, despite the fact that they often
prompted serious responses and consequences from Russia and Iran. Now,
as the Obama Administration hopes to improve relations with Tehran and
disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq, it should uphold good relations
with its allies in the region and not let these states be destabilized
as payback for their cooperation with the U.S. For the United States to
succeed in maintaining security and promoting its interests in the
region with a smaller actual presence on the ground, it will need its
allies more than ever. Washington should prioritize its good relations
with states like Azerbaijan, so that Baku will be able to help its
allies in the future.
multi-ethnic iran's azerbaijani minority
Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and over 50 percent of its
population is non-Persian. Azerbaijanis are the largest ethnic minority
in Iran, comprising over a third of the country's population.
Iran's ethnic minorities are concentrated in its border
provinces, and these groups share cross-border ties with co-ethnics in
the neighboring states of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and
Turkmenistan.
Many prominent figures in Iran are ethnic Azerbaijanis,
including Iran's spiritual leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei, and the head of
Iran's opposition Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Even though Azerbaijanis share the Shiite faith and a long
history of common statehood with Iran's Persian majority, Tehran does
not allow Azerbaijanis in Iran to operate schools or universities in
their native language or use the Azerbaijani language in government
institutions.
In addition to shared ethnic and cultural ties, many
Azerbaijanis from both sides of the border share family ties and engage
in trade with each other.
Among the approximately 25 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in
Iran, there is a broad diversity of attitudes toward the Iranian state.
Some Azerbaijanis comprise a core part of Iran's ruling elite, while
others strive for language and cultural rights. But a segment of
Azerbaijanis in Iran, especially young people openly identify as
Azerbaijanis, oppose Persian-centered rule and struggle against the
ruling regime.
[all]
This is an official publication of the
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
< < <
This publication is intended to document
developments and trends in participating
States of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
< < <
All Commission publications may be freely
reproduced, in any form, with appropriate
credit. The Commission encourages
the widest possible dissemination
of its publications.
< < <
http://www.csce.gov @HelsinkiComm
The Commission's Web site provides
access to the latest press releases
and reports, as well as hearings and
briefings. Using the Commission's electronic
subscription service, readers are able
to receive press releases, articles,
and other materials by topic or countries
of particular interest.
Please subscribe today.