    [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
                      RELATIONS DIMENSIONS OF U.S.-AZERBAIJAN
                      RELATIONS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                           COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

                             COOPERATION IN EUROPE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 11, 2014

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

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               COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

                        LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                   SENATE

                                                        HOUSE

    BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland,	        CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
    Chairman                                Co-Chairman
    SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island	JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
    TOM UDALL, New Mexico			ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
    ROGER WICKER, Mississippi		ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia		LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
    JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas			New York
                                            MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
                                            STEVE COHEN, Tennessee

    THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF U.S.-AZERBAIJAN
                                   RELATIONS

                                  ----------

                                 JUNE 11, 2014
                                 COMMISSIONERS

                                                                       Page
    Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................    00
    Hon. Roger Wicker, Comissioner, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................    00
    Hon. Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................    00

                                   WITNESSES

    Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State.    00
    Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of
      State..........................................................    00
    Miriam Lanskoy, Director for Russia and Eurasia, National
      Endowment for Democracy........................................    00
    Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher, Center for Eurasian,
      Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University......    00

                                   APPENDICES

    Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin....................    00
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith.....................    00
    Prepared Statement of Eric Rubin.................................    00
    Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Melia............................    00
    Prepared Statement of Miriam Lanskoy.............................    00
    Prepared Statement of Brenda Shaffer.............................    00

                THE TRAJECTORY OF DEMOCRACY--WHY HUNGARY MATTERS

                                  ----------

                                 JUNE 11, 2014

              Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The hearing was held from 10:11 a.m. to 11:46 a.m. EST in
    Room 432 Russell Senate Office Building, Senate Room 210-212,
    Washington, D.C., Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman of the
    Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
        Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman,
    Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hon.
    Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe, and Hon. Roger Wicker, Commissioner,
    Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
        Witnesses present: Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
    U.S. Department of State; Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Miriam Lanskoy, Director
    for Russia and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy; and
    Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher, Center for Eurasian,
    Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University.

      HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
                         COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Cardin. Let me welcome you all to the hearing of the
    Helsinki Commission. I thank our witnesses for being here. I
    particularly want to thank Senator Cantwell for allowing us to
    use this committee room, the Small Business Committee that I
    have the opportunity of serving on. This hearing is scheduled,
    primarily because of the venue--of the OSCE Parliamentary
    Assembly annual meeting, which will take place in Azerbaijan
    the end of this month. I intend to be there, along with several
    of my colleagues in the United States Senate and in the House
    of Representatives. I think we'll have a pretty strong
    delegation that will meet in Azerbaijan to consider the
    important business of the Parliamentary Assembly. So in
    preparation for that meeting, this hearing is an opportunity
    for us to update the status of the relationship between the
    United States and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan's fulfillment of
    its commitments under the OSCE.
        Let me also point out that yesterday I had an opportunity
    to meet with Azerbaijan's ambassador to the United States. I
    thought we had a very good meeting. He apologizes for not being
    here. He had meetings on the security front with the--with
    representatives of the United States at the same time, so he
    sends his apologies.
        The purpose of this hearing, as advertised, is to look at
    the security, economic and human rights dimension of the U.S.-
    Azerbaijan relations. And when we look at each of the baskets--
    each of the three baskets--there's robust matters that we can
    discuss today, and I'm pleased that we have our panelists to do
    that.
        On the security front, clearly Azerbaijan has been helpful
    to the United States and our allies in regards to Afghanistan.
    Their troops are in Afghanistan and the Northern Distribution
    Network relies very heavily on Azerbaijan, so they're an
    important strategic partner of the United States. They have
    supported our position in the United Nations Security Council,
    particularly as it relates to Ukraine and the territorial
    integrity of Ukraine. And for that, we have a strategic partner
    that's important to our country.
        Ukraine's territorial integrity is an issue of great
    concern to the frozen conflict in N-K, is a matter that we need
    to focus on, and I know during our visit it will be a matter
    that we will be talking with the Azerbaijani officials, as well
    as other delegations that will be in Azerbaijan. Their support
    on counterterrorism is an important strategic partnership with
    the United States, and one that we certainly want to build
    upon.
        In regards to the economic dimension, Azerbaijan's a very
    important country on oil and gas. We have cooperated with them,
    and they were, I point out, the first signator to the EITI--a
    matter of great interest to the Helsinki Commission, and we
    have been strong proponents of transparency within the
    extractive industries. And I think one of the points that I
    will want to inquire about is how much they're committed to
    transparency within the extractive industries.
        In regards to the third basket, dealing with the human-
    rights dimension, there is concern. And I mentioned that with
    the ambassador yesterday. Their presidential elections that
    took place fell short of international standards--a matter that
    I would like to make sure that our record is complete on. It's
    an authoritarian-rule country--that raises certain concerns on
    their commitments to the OSCE principles--the concern of
    freedom of the media, and there are several individuals who
    have been harassed and detained because of their desire to
    report what's happening in Azerbaijan. That falls far short of
    the OSCE commitments and is something that we will be
    mentioning by name during our visit to Azerbaijan. The right of
    association, political opposition, all are matters of grave
    concern as to whether Azerbaijan is meeting their commitments
    under the Helsinki principles.
        So we have a robust area to deal with today. And at this
    point let me turn to our witnesses that we have here today and,
    again, thank them for being here.
        Tom Melia, the deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of
    Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State, a
    frequent participant in the Helsinki Commission. It's always a
    pleasure to have Secretary Melia with us. And Eric Rubin, the
    deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Europe and Eurasia
    Affairs, Department of State. So we have the two experts from
    the administration on these issues and we look forward to your
    testimony. As is the custom of our commission, your written
    statements will be made part of our record. You may proceed as
    you wish.
        Secretary Rubin.

      ERIC RUBIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you
    for inviting us to speak with you today about our bilateral
    relationship with Azerbaijan. Our partnership with Azerbaijan
    remains a critically important aspect of our engagement in the
    Caucasus and the wider region. For over 20 years, since
    Azerbaijan's independence, the United States has been working
    with Azerbaijan to promote a secure, prosperous and democratic
    society. And we've been--in that time we've provided
    approximately 1.1 billion (dollars) in assistance to pursue
    these goals.
        My testimony today will focus on the core areas of our
    bilateral relationship. First, I will talk about our security
    cooperation. Second, I will look at our evolving economic
    relationship, including energy diversification and our efforts
    to promote economic reform. Finally, I will briefly examine the
    country's democratic development, a subject that Deputy
    Assistant Secretary Melia will cover in greater detail.
        First, Azerbaijan has been a key partner for the United
    States and NATO from Kabul to Kosovo. Azerbaijan currently has
    94 troops serving in Afghanistan and has committed to remain in
    the country beyond 2014. Azerbaijan is a key node in the
    Northern Distribution Network and air route, sending nonlethal
    goods in and out of Afghanistan. As such, strengthening Caspian
    security, countering terrorism, stemming the proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction and enhancing maritime domain
    awareness continue to be top priorities for U.S. assistance to
    Azerbaijan.
        Over the past 12 years, we have provided 44.4 million
    (dollars) in foreign military financing and 9.9 million in
    international military education and training and export
    control and border security programs that focus on military
    professionalization, building interoperability and enhancing
    border security. And we are providing approximately $4 million
    in this current fiscal year.
        We provide security assistance to Azerbaijan while
    carefully ensuring it is used to comply with U.S. law. As a co-
    chair country of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with France and
    Russia, the United States is doing everything we can to
    facilitate a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict. We hope the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan will
    agree to meet in the near future to continue the constructive
    dialogue begun at their summit last November. It is also
    important that both governments support Track II efforts to
    build people-to-people contacts between Azerbaijanis and
    Armenians. These kind of confidence-building measures can help
    to prepare citizens of both countries for peace.
        The United States enjoys growing economic cooperation with
    Azerbaijan, particularly in the area of energy. As Europe looks
    more resolutely to diversify its sources of energy away from
    its dependence on Russia as part of its energy-security
    strategy, Azerbaijan is emerging as a crucial supplier for our
    European allies. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which
    began operating in June 2006, was an early success for our
    Southern Corridor diplomacy, and now we are focused on
    developing a gas link between Azerbaijan and Europe. Completing
    the Southern Gas Corridor will bring 10 billion cubic meters of
    Caspian natural gas, perhaps more, to Western Europe, starting
    in 2019.
        While energy remains an important part of our bilateral
    economic relationship, it is not the only focus. Azerbaijan and
    its neighbors could become a premier trade and transportation
    corridor between Europe and Asia, but to do so they must first
    reduce costs associated with high customs and tariffs and
    address delays caused by a lack of regional coordination. Time
    is of the essence, and the United States strongly supports
    reforms that will create sustainable sources of non-oil revenue
    in Azerbaijan and new opportunities for U.S. exports and
    investment, including in areas like aviation, communications
    technology and heavy equipment. The United States also supports
    Azerbaijan's accession into the WTO and the rules-based system
    in which its members participate.
        In this context, it is important to note the role that
    corruption plays in the entire OSCE space, including
    Azerbaijan. Working with the government of Azerbaijan and local
    partners, we are committed to enhancing efforts to address this
    problem.
        Finally, our strongest relationships throughout the world
    are with democracies that respect the full range of human
    rights of their citizens. We have concerns about the
    environment for democratic development and the protection of
    human rights in Azerbaijan, which have been deteriorating. My
    colleague Tom Melia will touch on that in more detail in a
    moment.
        Going forward, our relationship will continue to be based
    on all of these core areas: security cooperation, economic and
    energy cooperation and democratic development. Our mission
    remains to address each of these areas with equal rigor and
    resolve in advancing our national interest, and we are
    committed to working with Congress in a bipartisan manner in
    our efforts to realize each of these goals and the full
    potential of the U.S.-Azerbaijani relationship. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Cardin. Secretary Melia.

    THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Mr. Melia. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to speak
    today about democracy and human rights dimension of our
    bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan. I greatly appreciate
    the dedication you have demonstrated over the years to the OSCE
    and especially to the enduring principles enshrined in the
    Helsinki Final Act and the body of commitments that comprise
    the OSCE's human dimension.
        I would start with reference to a key tenet of the OSCE
    canon as set forth in the 1991 Moscow Document and reaffirmed
    most recently in the 2010 Astana Summit Declaration in which
    all of the OSCE participating states agreed, and I'm quoting
    now, categorically and irrevocably that the commitments
    undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the OSCE are
    matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating
    states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of
    the state concerned. This concept, linking respect for human
    rights within states to prosperity and lasting security among
    states, is reflected in our multilateral and bilateral
    interactions with all OSCE-participating states, including with
    Azerbaijan.
        In Azerbaijan, this constitutes one of three equally
    important core goals about with Deputy Assistant Secretary
    Rubin has just spoken, and U.S. officials regularly meet with a
    variety of Azerbaijanis, ranging from senior government
    officials to civil society activists and opposition political
    party representatives.
        While serving as deputy assistant secretary, I have visited
    Azerbaijan three times, holding valuable meetings with leading
    government officials, including President Aliyev, as well as
    with opposition leaders, civil society and journalists. And
    I've been joined on these missions by senior colleagues from
    the Department of State's Europe and Eurasia bureau, from USAID
    and the Department of Justice. And I would like to visit
    Azerbaijan again soon to continue these conversations with
    people inside and outside of government.
        The United States also provides material assistance to
    support Azerbaijan's democratic development. The largest part
    of this assistance is provided by our colleagues at USAID, and
    we in the State Department work very closely with them, as we
    also collaborate with the legal experts provided by the
    Department of Justice. And this interagency collaboration works
    well.
        Five years ago, at the outset of this administration, it
    was already difficult for advocates of democratic reform, and
    especially opposition political parties, to participate in the
    political life of the country, but it was still possible for
    NGOs and independent activists to operate. Sadly, the
    environment has worsened significantly since then, beginning
    with the 2009 incarceration of young democracy activists Emin
    Milli and Adnan Hajizade.
        The suppression of peaceful dissent increased in 2011 with
    the arrests of young Azerbaijani activists who sought to
    organize peaceful pro-democracy rallies in Baku. Azerbaijan's
    parliament later passed legislation significantly increasing
    fines on participants and organizers of unauthorized protests
    in November of 2012, which resulted in the detention of
    numerous peaceful activists for baseless administrative
    violations.
        Since early 2013, the space for peaceful dissent has
    narrowed more dramatically, and the exercise of fundamental
    freedoms has become still more tenuous. A number of leading
    peaceful democracy advocates, civil society activists and
    journalists have been incarcerated, including the chairman of
    the reform-oriented REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov; the
    journalist and Musavat Party deputy chairman, Tofig Yagublu;
    members of democratic youth movements; the blogger Abdul
    Abilov; religious scholar and activist Taleh Bagirzade; Khural
    editor Avaz Zeynalli; and the chairman of the local election
    monitoring partner of the National Democratic Institute, Anar
    Mammadli, chairman of the Election Monitoring and Democracy
    Studies Center, which had provided a critical report on the
    presidential elections to which you referred, Mr. Chairman.
        Two rounds of legislative amendments since March of 2013
    have further restricted NGO funding and activity. Officials
    have pressured Azerbaijani and international NGOs, including
    some of the U.S. government's closest partners there. Such
    actions add up to an increasingly hostile operating environment
    for civil society, especially for those activists and groups
    advocating respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and
    government accountability, thereby depriving citizens the open
    channels through which they can legitimately voice their
    concerns. Pressure on independent defense lawyers, moreover,
    has resulted in a decreasing number of lawyers ready to defend
    individuals in politically sensitive cases.
        Restrictions on the ability of Azerbaijani activists to
    travel outside the country are also a problem. For example,
    since 2006, the government has prevented the foreign travel of
    opposition Popular Front party chairman Ali Karimli by refusing
    to renew his passport. One of Azerbaijan's leading human rights
    defenders, Ms. Leyla Yunus, was unable to attend an OSCE
    discussion taking place today in Bern, Switzerland on the
    important role of human rights defenders, because Azerbaijan's
    authorities confiscated her passport.
        This confiscation occurred in the context of the April 19
    arrest of well-known journalist Rauf Mirqedirov--the subsequent
    questioning of Leyla Yunus and her husband about Mirqedirov,
    and their poor treatment by police in custody. All three have
    been strong proponents of people-to-people diplomacy of the
    kind Secretary Rubin referred to, which helps build ties
    between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, and is crucial to the
    eventual peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
        These are not the kind of actions the United States or the
    broader international community wants to see from a partner, an
    OSCE-participating state, and currently, the chair of the
    Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. We recognize
    that Azerbaijan lives in a very difficult neighborhood. The
    United States strongly supports Azerbaijan's long-term
    stability, security and prosperity. The best way to guarantee
    such a future, we believe, is to advance democratic processes
    and institutions, to buttress respect for the rule of law and
    fundamental freedoms. Doing so will foster long-term, internal
    stability, create the most inviting environment for economic
    investment and growth and make Azerbaijan the very best it can
    be by giving every citizen the freedom and space to achieve his
    or her potential.
        We consider this to be in the short-term and long-term
    interests of the Azerbaijani people and the government. And as
    President Obama explained in his May 28th speech at West Point,
    America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond
    idealism. It is a matter of national security. Democracies are
    our best friends and are far less likely to go to war.
        And yet, he noted, in capitals around the globe, including,
    unfortunately, some of America's partners, there has been a
    crackdown on civil society. The United States believes that
    Azerbaijan will have greater stability and prosperity and will
    more quickly achieve its potential by allowing for a more open
    society. We will continue to urge Azerbaijan to live up to its
    OSCE and other international human rights commitments.
        As President Obama indicated in his recent message marking
    Azerbaijan's National Day, and to return to where I began, we
    encourage Azerbaijan to reclaim the leadership role on human
    rights and fundamental freedom its people and government
    demonstrated 96 years ago. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for
    this opportunity to discuss democracy and human rights in
    Azerbaijan.
        Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you both for your testimony. Let me
    start with what is on, I think, the minds of people in
    Azerbaijan more than anything else, and that is the concern
    about territorial integrity. With Russia's actions in Georgia,
    and now, Russia's actions in Ukraine, that is clearly the most
    talked-about issues in that region of the world. Russia is very
    active in Azerbaijan in regards to being physically present.
    They have had many of their leaders in Azerbaijan talking to
    the officials of Azerbaijan. Can you just update us as to how
    you see the events in Ukraine impacting Azerbaijan's foreign
    policy and concerns about Russia's actions?
        Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a subject
    of very intensive discussion and dialogue with the government
    of Azerbaijan, as it has been with every country in the region,
    because the principle that we're defending in defense of
    Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty applies to all
    the countries of the region, and, indeed, to every country
    that's a member of the United Nations and the Organization for
    the Security and Cooperation in Europe.
        With Azerbaijan, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Melia said I
    think exactly right, Azerbaijan lives in a very dangerous
    neighborhood. It's got Russia to the north; it's got Iran to
    the south. These are very real concerns, and we are committed
    to working with the government of Azerbaijan to help them
    strengthen their ability to defend their territory, defend
    their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to be sure that
    it's not just words, but actually, the ability to be truly an
    independent country.
        This is the subject, as I mentioned, of ongoing dialogue;
    it's something that we've been very clear in supporting when we
    speak to the leadership in Baku. Our Ambassador, Dick
    Morningstar, has been following up ever since the crisis
    started in Ukraine, and it's something we expect to be working
    very closely with the government of Baku to support them
    publicly and privately.
        Mr. Cardin. I would just point out that OSCE is in a
    particularly strong position here, since both Russia, Ukraine,
    Azerbaijan, Armenia all are full members of the OSCE. It has
    had some success within Ukraine on its mission on providing, at
    least, objective eyes of what's happening in the eastern part
    of Ukraine. Do you see the OSCE mechanism working towards
    trying to provide some confidence in that region on some
    semblance of territorial integrity?
        Mr. Rubin. Mr. Chairman, I think OSCE has a very strong
    track record in this region, and as a matter of fact, has
    played the central role in the peace process between Azerbaijan
    and Armenia since the conflict began more than 20 years ago,
    and to this day, OSCE is the premiere international
    organization on the ground in Azerbaijan and Armenia, through
    the Minsk Group, through the mission on the ground that
    monitors the situation along the line of contact, through the
    mission that helps promote efforts to broaden dialogue.
        So I think OSCE is already, in many ways, in the lead, but
    then, going beyond that, dealing with the situation that we
    have post the crisis in Ukraine, I think, yes, there is a real
    possibility for the organization to play a greater role.
        Mr. Cardin. Well, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of
    the longest frozen conflicts in Europe. The United States is
    part of the Minsk Group. The Madrid Proposal is now many years
    old. It still looks like the principal framework to try to make
    progress in regards to the conflict. What is the current
    status? Are there any breakthrough likely to occur that could
    move this conflict to a resolution?
        Mr. Rubin. As one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk
    Group, we've been working very closely with Russia and France
    to try to come up with ideas to try to move this forward this
    year. We would, I think, be very reluctant to predict
    breakthroughs, but I think progress is very possible, that the
    three co-chairs have worked hard to come up with an approach
    that both countries can accept for a series of meetings,
    including a summit meeting of the two presidents. We've been, I
    think, very strong in supporting the Minsk Group through
    appointing a senior American diplomat and experienced
    negotiator, Ambassador Jim Warlick, to work this issue full-
    time, which he's been doing since last year.
        Cooperation with the other two co-chair countries--France
    and Russia--is very good, and I think all three countries,
    together with the larger OSCE community, are determined to try
    to make possible some opportunities this year. One of the
    things we have done is spoken through the three co-chairs about
    the vision of a settlement. It is the vision that has been
    reflected in past rounds, including in Madrid.
        And the goal is to try to get both countries together with
    the co-chairs to agree on a path forward. The goal now is to
    see if we can get a meeting of the two leaders scheduled in
    coming months, and we're hopeful and optimistic that that will
    happen, and we believe that both leaders do want to see
    progress. We think it's important to support them in that.
        But also, to push--as you said, Mr. Chairman, it's been
    more than two decades. This is a real conflict. It is a live
    conflict. People die every year. It's literally a shooting
    war--thankfully usually on a small scale, but nonetheless
    unacceptable in the 21st century to have this going on. And
    getting this settled in the interest of all of the people
    involved in both countries--both populations is a very, very
    high priority for us.
        Mr. Cardin. Is the Madrid proposal still very much the
    framework that we believe is the appropriate framework to make
    progress, or is there expectations that there will be a new
    proposal or modifications of that proposal that will move
    forward?
        Mr. Rubin. Mr. Chairman, the three co-chairs laid out a
    vision for moving forward this year that drew very heavily on
    the principles reflected in Madrid, and indeed, on every
    iteration of this process, because the basic concept is pretty
    much the same, and has been since the negotiation began, but
    literally, using the Madrid proposal, I think, is not going to
    happen, because neither country wants to use Madrid alone, but
    I think anything that they come up with--and this was reflected
    in the statement by the co-chairs--will look a lot like Madrid,
    because there is no other real approach to solving this other
    than based on the principles of OSCE and the United Nations
    charter, and that is what Madrid was, and that is what the
    current approach is.
        Mr. Cardin. I've been active in the OSCE for many years and
    this has been on our agenda every year. It's very frustrating.
    And I know it's not easy, but it seems to me that it's within
    the leadership of the United States and Russia and France, as
    the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, to make this a more urgent
    priority, particularly with the anxiety that currently exists
    in Europe. It seems to me that a breakthrough in regards to
    this conflict would have a major positive impact on confidence
    and stability in that region. So I would urge you to make that
    a very high priority to try to make progress.
        Let me turn to your comments in regards to the economy and
    the obvious: that so much of their economy is based upon oil
    and gas. And I agree with you that it's in our interest to see
    whether they can't diversify their economy, and I'm going to
    get to that in one moment, their accession to the WTO. But in
    regards to the energy sector, we've seen the vulnerability of
    Ukraine to Russia, and having a supply of alternative energy is
    very much in the U.S. interest; very much, I think, in the
    regional interest. So the pipeline is of great interest.
        I mentioned originally that Azerbaijan was the first
    country to embrace the EITI. That doesn't mean they're
    complying with it. Can you just bring us--this commission up to
    date as to what is the current status of their energy
    commitments to transparency? I will get to corruption in one
    moment, but do we have hope that they are following the best
    practices of the EITI in regards to their arrangements with the
    mineral extractive industry companies so that the people of
    Azerbaijan have a hope of knowing whether those resources are
    going to the advancement of their country?
        Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a subject of
    very active discussion, not just between the United States and
    Azerbaijan but, as you mentioned, as part of the WTO accession
    process with their other partners. Azerbaijan has been the
    critical country, I would say, in advancing energy
    diversification for Europe, and it's not just a question of the
    past projects such as BTC but the very real project now to
    bring the Shah Deniz to resources, to Europe through the Trans-
    Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines, which the United States
    strongly supports.
        So this is about big, important projects, and we strongly
    agree with you that it's very important that there be
    transparency. Our ambassador in Baku, Dick Morningstar, is, I
    think, more familiar with these issues than anyone else, having
    worked BTC personally and having been involved in every stage
    of this since the 1990s. This is part of his regular dialogue.
    This will be part of our dialogue with Azerbaijan when we have
    our regular economic talks with Azerbaijan.
        We believe the Azerbaijani government is serious about the
    commitments it's making as part of the WTO accession process
    and the commitments it's made to the partners in the
    international energy projects, and we will continue focusing on
    this in our dialogue with them.
        Mr. Cardin. Thank you.
        Now, Secretary Melia, let me just make an observation and
    ask you in regards to the corruption and human rights issues in
    Azerbaijan. You correctly identified our strong interest in
    stability of partners and to have a stable partner, that that
    country needs to have a commitment towards economic opportunity
    for all of its citizens, sharing the wealth of the country and
    adhering to international norms on human rights--not our norms
    but international norms on human rights.
        No country is perfect, and this commission has been
    critical of all countries including our own in regards to
    meeting the Helsinki commitments. I was recently in Ukraine and
    my observations there was that the protesters were more
    concerned about a government that was honest than it was about
    trying to pick sides on loyalty. They wanted an independent
    Ukraine where the resources of their country went to the
    benefit of their people, free from corruption.
        In Vietnam--it was very clear in all of our discussions
    that Vietnam has a serious problem of corruption and they need
    to deal with it. We now have an opportunity in the TPP to have
    reasons for progress to be made in Vietnam on good governance.
    In Singapore, at the Shangra-La security conference, we brought
    up frequently the good governance issues as it relates to
    security in that region.
        So my question to you is, as we look at Azerbaijan's
    membership in the WTO, what specific reforms should be the
    highest priority? What efforts can we reasonably expect to deal
    with corruption or to deal with the freedom of the media or, as
    you point out, the freedom to travel, which is a basic
    commitment within the Helsinki Accords? In Vietnam we have a
    checklist--literally a checklist of progress that we believe is
    reasonable to be made. And we've gone over that with the
    Vietnamese government officials, and we had a very, I think,
    positive exchange when they were here on the human rights
    basket with their delegation and my visit to Vietnam. What
    expectation do you believe are reasonable for us to anticipate
    in Azerbaijan?
        Mr. Melia. Well, Mr. Chairman, you've very eloquently
    described a major challenge that we have in many parts of the
    world in trying to deal with partner governments to bring them
    into the modern economy in a way that enables the prosperity to
    be shared more widely in each of these countries. You're
    exactly right in describing the situation in Ukraine as one
    that was animated by this very question of lack of transparency
    and accountability by authoritarian governments that don't feel
    like they have to tell their people what they do with their
    money. That is the heart of the issue and it's--I don't know
    that there is a single magic silver bullet that can solve these
    problems. It's part of the tapestry of democratic governance
    and respect for rights that we're working to try to help
    Azerbaijanis achieve.
        We know that, like many other countries, there is anti-
    corruption legislation in place in Azerbaijan. There's a
    national action plan; there's all kinds of formalities. And
    there have been some small steps taken at the local level in
    some places, particularly around Baku, to eliminate petty
    corruption, the kind of small-bore, fee-for-service kind of
    corruption that police and local administration officials--
    they've set up these ASAN centers, which is the Azerbaijani
    word for ``easy.'' It's like the easy-button place where you go
    to get all your licenses and permits and so on, and those seem
    to be having some positive impact in their realm of where the
    ordinary public engages with local administration.
        But the larger question about where the massive resources
    go and where the endemic corruption at a macro level, that
    requires a country in which journalists are allowed to report
    on what their government does; where a parliament, reflecting
    the diversity of opinion in the country, can have open and
    public hearings about exactly these kinds of issues; where NGOs
    can be watchdogs and publish reports without fear of
    retribution. Those are all the things that Azerbaijan needs and
    could benefit from. They could be a more stable country, a
    country where prosperity is more widely shared if they were
    respecting the rights of people to ask questions and research
    and talk about these issues.
        So there's a whole welter of fundamental freedoms that are
    constrained in Azerbaijan right now, as we've just gone
    through. And the people who are trying to bring these issues to
    public discussion end up unjustly imprisoned for their work. So
    there's a--the fundamental freedoms do hobble a--lack of
    respect for fundamental freedoms is a major impediment to any
    country trying to do the responsible thing in terms of fighting
    corruption and establishing a responsible government.
        Mr. Cardin. Before we leave at the end of this month, we
    will review with you some of the specifics, particularly
    individuals who have been arrested and imprisoned, because we
    do believe putting a face on the issue is one of the best ways
    you can get the attention necessary to make the fundamental
    changes. Yes, we want to see these individuals released or not
    harassed, but we also want to see fundamental changes, not just
    in their laws but the way their laws are enforced.
        So it's not as simple as just the constitutional provisions
    or legal changes, because there are many countries that are
    very oppressive that have laws that would seem to provide basic
    rights to their citizens but the way that they're enforced deny
    them the opportunity to enjoy universal basic rights. So we
    will be looking to Azerbaijan to make these changes, not
    because we're asking them to. It's their commitments under OSCE
    and it's their commitment to their own people that we think
    will allow the country to become a more prosperous and more
    stable ally in that region for peace. So we'll continue to work
    with you to develop that type of list.
        One additional question before I turn it over to Senator
    Wicker, and that is that Azerbaijan has a very constructive
    relationship with Israel--of course our close ally in that
    region. Can you just bring us up to date as to how that
    relationship has played out in regards to regional stability?
        Mr. Rubin. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think the Azerbaijani-Israeli relationship is a model. It
    is definitely a source of not just security and economic
    benefit to both countries but also a source of stability in the
    region. Azerbaijan has been very supportive not just
    bilaterally and privately but also publicly of Israel's
    security, of the need for a peace process that will succeed in
    the Middle East in bringing a just and lasting settlement and
    also security to all the countries including Israel. We see
    this as something that's very positive. Also, that relationship
    has been very important in terms of counterterrorism
    cooperation, which is something that we value greatly and see
    as a benefit to us and the entire international community, as
    well as to Azerbaijan and Israel themselves.
        Mr. Cardin. Senator Wicker has led an OSCE delegation,
    Helsinki delegation, to Baku, so he's our expert on Azerbaijan.
    (Laughter.) And he will be joining us in our visit later this
    month.
        Senator Wicker.

      HON. ROGER WICKER, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
                         COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Wicker. Well, thank you. And thank you, Senator Cardin,
    for your leadership in this issue, for your leadership in OSCE.
    When we go to these meetings, the leadership around Europe
    knows they can look to Ben Cardin for a great degree of
    knowledge and understanding and wisdom about these issues.
        For a country the geographic size of Maine and a relatively
    small population, I think we rightly give a lot of attention to
    Azerbaijan because of the importance not only locally there but
    in the region, and what it says about the rest of that area.
    The administration has sent one of our best people there in
    Ambassador Morningstar. For a location so small, I think the
    administration recognizes the strategic importance of having a
    Dick Morningstar there. And we greatly benefited as a
    delegation last year--I guess it was 4th of July when our
    delegation was there.
        How important is it, do you think, gentlemen, that OSCE is
    the locale of this summer's Parliamentary Assembly and that the
    eyes of Europe--not only the United States and the
    international press, but the entire European community will be
    on this little location--they just had the presidential
    election where we had OSCE observers--and that's so
    strategically located? Is there any particular benefit or
    significance to the fact that we're having the PA meeting there
    in late June?
        Mr. Rubin. Senator, thank you, and thank you for your
    commitment to this relationship and for your travel there last
    year. I absolutely would agree that Azerbaijan is significantly
    more important than its size would otherwise suggest, for many
    reasons. Location is one of them. Commitment to supporting the
    international community in places like Afghanistan is another.
    Energy diversification is a third.
        So it's absolutely true that supporting Azerbaijan's
    independence, territorial integrity should be a high priority--
    is a high priority for us. As you mentioned, the president's
    choice of Dick Morningstar, a former ambassador to the European
    Union, as ambassador to Azerbaijan testified to that
    importance.
        Mr. Wicker. It's a statement.
        Mr. Rubin. It's a statement. And it was meant as a
    statement, a very positive statement. So I think in that regard
    it's absolutely true.
        We think it's very positive that the Parliamentary Assembly
    will be going to Baku. It's an opportunity for dialogue and
    familiarization in both directions, with ideas, concerns, and I
    think it should be a very good dialogue. I think members of the
    PA will see a lot of progress in Azerbaijan. Those who have not
    been there in a long time but are coming back will certainly
    see that evident progress. There are obviously other issues
    such as the ones that Deputy Assistant Secretary Melia has
    suggested that are also important to have as part of that
    discussion, so we hope it's a very broad discussion and we
    think the spotlight on Azerbaijan and its importance is
    justified and valuable.
        Mr. Melia. These are important opportunities to demonstrate
    not only a partnership with government officials and
    parliamentary counterparts, but we're hoping that you would
    also have time to meet with some of the people that we've
    talked about who have sought to be responsible watchdogs and
    advocates for reform, anticorruption, for fair elections, et
    cetera, and who find themselves harassed often by the
    government and by various levels of government. So we hope that
    you'll--you and other colleagues from other legislatures will
    use the opportunity to demonstrate a broader--a broad interest
    in Azerbaijan as a society and the various aspects of its
    society and make a point of meeting with a number of people
    beyond official corridors.
        Mr. Wicker. I think it's important for us to hear all
    different points of view.
        Mr. Rubin, you mentioned Afghanistan. And our hat is off to
    the Azerbaijanis for their great help with our effort in
    Afghanistan, is that not correct?
        Mr. Rubin. Senator, absolutely. I think the role that
    Azerbaijan has played throughout the NATO, ISAF and U.S.
    bilateral engagement in Afghanistan has been very important,
    deeply appreciated--and not just the role in facilitating the
    Northern Distribution Network and transit to and from
    Afghanistan but also Azerbaijan's readiness to put boots on the
    ground and to stay there, as they still are, under--currently
    under Turkish command. And ISAF is very, very important.
        Our discussions with Azerbaijan about the security of the
    region are quite broad and quite important. Azerbaijan's
    location, as I mentioned earlier, is central not just in the
    strategic sense but also economically in terms of trade and
    transit in the future, we hope, global trade through that
    region. So, very much so, and we do very much appreciate the
    role that Azerbaijan has played in the effort in Afghanistan.
        Mr. Wicker. So when we talk about the location--I suppose
    this might have been mentioned during your testimony or during
    Senator Cardin's questioning, but they're so very, very close
    to Iran and so very, very close to Russia, and yet they--in
    spite of that--they've chosen to seek the friendship of the
    United States. And I think that speaks volumes, does it not?
        Mr. Rubin. Senator, I would absolutely agree. And I think
    the one thing that's been clear since Azerbaijan's independence
    is the determination of not just its leadership in the various
    governments over the years but also of Azerbaijanis as a whole
    to defend their independence. It was hard-won. It was defeated
    after the first attempt almost a century ago. And I think
    that's something that unites all Azerbaijanis. It's something
    that we strongly support.
        Obviously Azerbaijan needs to have a relationship--good
    relationship with Russia and Iran, its two big neighbors. They
    have to balance that. We recognize that. But the commitment to
    the relationship with us, with NATO in the Eastern Partnership
    with the European Union is obviously something they've chosen
    and is very important.
        Mr. Wicker. I think it's a profound statement on the part
    of the leadership of that country as to how they view the
    United States as a friend in a neighborhood where there are
    very powerful forces to the north and south. And yes, you're
    correct, Mr. Rubin; they need to be friendly with their
    neighbors and have good relations.
        This hearing, Mr. Chairman, has a broad scope--security,
    economic and human rights. It touches on almost everything.
    There is a Eurasian Economic Union now consisting of Russia,
    Belarus and Kazakhstan. Armenia is about to join that. Isn't
    that right, Mr. Rubin? Now, what effect is that going to have
    on our friends in Azerbaijan?
        Mr. Rubin. Well, Senator, Azerbaijan has chosen to pursue
    its own policy on economic ties with its neighbors, and we
    think that's the most important aspect of this broader
    question. It's the point that we've been emphasizing.
        Mr. Wicker. That it's their decision?
        Mr. Rubin. That it's their decision, as it is Ukraine and
    Moldova and Georgia's decision to proceed with association with
    the European Union. We've said in regard to Kazakhstan and
    Armenia that their choice to join the Eurasian Economic Union
    is also their choice as long as it's freely made and not under
    coercion.
        Azerbaijan has said that they want good ties with all the
    blocs and countries but don't intend to pursue direct
    association with either. They are pursing WTO membership.
    They're pursing expanding trade through those means, and we
    think that should be their choice, as it is for every country.
        Mr. Wicker. Ben, did you get into the election observers?
        Mr. Cardin. No.
        Mr. Wicker. Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Chairman, I
    believe we had OSCE election observers there last year, and was
    this Parliamentary Assembly and----
        Mr. Cardin. ODIHR.
        Mr. Wicker [continuing]. The ODIHR. OK, so actually two
    entities within OSCE sent election observers.
        Mr. Melia, would you comment as to how beneficial that was,
    how effective they were, how much access they had and how much
    information the OSCE and Helsinki community got as a result of
    these two organizations going in and helping with observation?
        Mr. Melia. Well, we were reminded just a couple of weeks
    ago in Ukraine how important and valuable it is to have eyes on
    the ground and in large numbers as the OSCE, ODIHR and the
    Parliamentary Assembly typically do. Having people from across
    Europe, east and west, to be on the ground in Ukraine was very
    important for all of us to know what was happening, to be able
    to make a sound judgment about that process and to be able to
    validate the expressed will of Ukrainian people.
        Similarly, in Azerbaijan last year there were multiple
    delegations, international, including the OSCE delegations and
    local networks of observers. The EMDS is the Azerbaijani group
    that's been trained over these two decades by international
    professionals from the National Democratic Institute and
    others, and they also provided eyes on the ground and
    dovetailed with what the OSCE teams were doing.
        And in this case, you know, the reports were much less
    favorable than they were in Ukraine last month, and there were
    shortcomings in the election process last year that ODIHR, in
    its very dry and literal kind of way pointed out. That's a
    basis for reform efforts going forward to improve the
    administration of elections, and more importantly perhaps the
    political environment surrounding the elections so that there's
    more chance for freedom of expression and mobilizing different
    political views.
        So the OSCE statements on the presidential election last
    year were critical, and they were echoed by our own statement
    at the time, which was also pointing out that we wished it had
    been a better process. And we do that in--our purpose in doing
    that is not just to point fingers but it's to lay a basis for
    future reform efforts to improve the quality of the process. So
    the role of OSCE observers has been very valuable in that. We
    hope it will continue.
        And we also hope that domestic citizens of Azerbaijan will
    continue to be able to monitor their own government's process
    and performance as well. Unfortunately, since that election,
    the EMDS network has had a number of allegations raised about
    its tax management and tax payments, its financial management,
    the international grants that support them. And the leader of
    that organization has been prosecuted, and so for--you know,
    basically for issuing a critical report. It goes back to the
    point raised by Senator Cardin a few moments ago about
    corruption. You can't deal with problems in governance unless
    you can talk about them, and right now people are getting
    punished for raising questions and trying to talk about how to
    improve their society. So that's going to be a--you know, a
    constraint on the improvement of the political process in
    Azerbaijan.
        Mr. Wicker. In the view of the department, did the election
    reflect the judgment of the electorate as a whole in
    Azerbaijan?
        Mr. Rubin. I think, given the nature of the political
    environment in Azerbaijan, the fact that one of the leading
    opposition politicians who wanted to be in that election as a
    presidential candidate was instead in jail throughout last year
    and is still in jail today; given that the leader of one of the
    main opposition parties cannot travel because the government
    won't given them a passport, I mean, these are the kinds of
    things that add up to, you know, an environment where it's hard
    to tell what the people's choices are. The people don't have a
    chance to cast a ballot, you know, in the way that we would
    hope they could. So that's why our statement said that the
    process fell short of our expectations and hopes.
        Mr. Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cardin. Let me just observe, I was in Kiev for the
    Ukrainian elections. And just to let Senator Wicker know, I was
    with Senator Portman a little before the time that one of the
    precincts was scheduled to open, and we saw a long line of
    people anxious to cast their votes. We saw a little bit of
    chaos as they were trying to open up the precinct as early as
    they possibly could. And, quite frankly, it reminded me of my
    home precinct in Baltimore at the same time.
        So it was, I think, very educational for me to observe an
    election in Europe. And it was very clear that--except in
    eastern Ukraine, where there was violence preventing people
    from voting, the elections met international standards. And
    that was the conclusion by the observers, that it did meet the
    international standards for a free and fair election and the
    will of the people was clearly shown with Mr. Poroshenko
    receiving an overwhelming majority.
        In Azerbaijan the vote was overwhelming. And popular
    sentiment, I think, would probably reflect that, but because of
    reasons we've already stated--the opposition not having
    adequate opportunity to present their case, not having the
    freedom of the media, and the integrity of the election process
    itself; that is, ensuring that the votes that were cast were
    actually counted appropriately, which there was not that type
    of integrity in the system there--led to the conclusion that it
    was not a free and fair election under international standards.
    So that's an area where Azerbaijan needs to improve. It may not
    have changed the outcome of the election, but it can't get the
    stamp of international recognition that the OSCE monitors are
    there to provide. So for all those reasons we were unable to
    certify the election.
        We're joined now by my co-chair, Congressman Smith. I'll
    let him catch his breath, if he likes. (Laughter.) He will lead
    our delegation in Baku. We alternate between the House and
    Senate on the annual head of our delegation. So Congressman
    Smith will lead the delegation and he has traveled extensively
    throughout that region, so we really do plan to be a very
    active participant.
        I made the observation in the beginning of this hearing
    that this country is very important to U.S. interests. We have
    a lot of strategic partnership issues in security and energy
    and fighting extremists, and it is for that reasons that we pay
    particular attention, but other countries are also paying
    attention. Senator Wicker mentioned the fact that Azerbaijan
    borders Russia. What we want is an independent Azerbaijan. We
    want a country that will exercise what's right for its own
    people, but we want a country that's stable, that respects
    human rights, that has economic opportunities for all of its
    citizens as well as a strategic partner on national security
    issues with the United States.
        With that, let me recognize and turn it over to Chairman
    Smith.

    HON. CHISTOPHER SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
                         COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
    Member Wicker. And I want to welcome our very distinguished
    panelists and thank them for their service to our country and
    for raising these extraordinarily important issues,
    particularly as it relates to human rights.
        It will be, I think, really important that we head back to
    Baku. Senator Wicker led us there last year for some very
    important meetings with high-level officials. And at the time
    we did raise the human rights issues very robustly, and I know
    we'll be back there doing it again within the parameters of the
    Parliamentary Assembly but also with some bilaterals that I
    know that we will engage in.
        I do have a full statement, Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. Cardin. Sure.
        Mr. Smith [continuing]. That I'd like to make a part of the
    record. But again, I just want to thank you for calling this
    very timely hearing so that we're further empowered, informed;
    so that we understand, you know, from the department
    especially, what your insights and recommendations will be. And
    this, I think, will be a good trip. And I thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, for convening this hearing.
        Mr. Cardin. Great. We're going to turn to the second panel.
    Let me thank both of our witnesses for their testimony and we
    look forward to working with you as we travel to Azerbaijan.
        Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Melia. Thank you.
        Mr. Cardin. Let me turn to the second panel: Miriam
    Lanskoy, who is the director for Russia and Eurasia, the
    National Endowment for Democracy; and Brenda Shaffer, the
    visiting researcher, Center for Eurasia, Russia and East
    European Studies, Georgetown University. It's a pleasure to
    have both of you with us today. You've been, I know, a valuable
    resource to our commission and we appreciate that. As I
    explained in the introductory remarks, this hearing is for
    preparation for our visit to Azerbaijan and the attendance of
    our delegation at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly later this
    month. With that, we'll start with Ms. Lanskoy.

       MIRIAM LANSKOY, DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA AND EURASIA, NATIONAL
                        ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

        Mr. Lanskoy. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'm grateful to the
    Helsinki Commission for holding this hearing and for giving me
    an opportunity to speak. The National Endowment for Democracy
    is a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth of
    democratic institutions around the world. NED has been working
    in Azerbaijan for many years and maintains a large portfolio in
    Azerbaijan.
        Over the last 10 years, freedom in Azerbaijan has declined
    gradually, but over the last year, there has been an
    unprecedented crackdown. Through membership in the Council of
    Europe and the OSCE, Azerbaijan has committed itself to the
    protection of human rights. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan obtains
    the prestige associated with these organizations without
    fulfilling their basic conditions.
        Azerbaijan is the chairman of the Committee of Ministers of
    the Council of Europe, a body charged with ensuring compliance
    with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
    However, Azerbaijan itself has not complied with numerous
    decisions of the European Court, and though Azerbaijan violates
    OSCE norms of human rights, it is about to host the
    Parliamentary Assembly.
        Recent events in Ukraine have complex implications for
    Azerbaijan. The protests that toppled the corrupt government
    there rattled nerves in Baku. But numerous prior revolutions in
    the region have had little effect on Azerbaijan. More
    significant for Baku is the annexation of Crimea, because that
    means that Russia is an arbiter of borders on the territory in
    the former Soviet Union and can decide these questions
    unilaterally. The crisis in Ukraine highlights the need to
    diversify energy sources, and this creates opportunities for
    Baku to seek out partners and extend its influence while at
    home it is taking advantage of the crisis to silence critics of
    the government.
        The number of political prisoners continues to grow.
    Amnesty International has recognized 19 prisoners of
    conscience. The U.S. Commission for International Religious
    Freedom, in its annual report which was just released, provides
    a list of 51 religious prisoners in Azerbaijan. Human Rights
    Watch has published a comprehensive report that contains cases
    against activists, human rights defenders and journalists.
        I want to touch on a couple of these cases. Two prominent
    opposition figures, Tofig Yagublu and Ilgar Mammadov, were
    sentenced to five and seven years. In its ruling on this case,
    the European Court found that Azerbaijan is in violation of
    several articles of the convention, including Article 18, and
    it has awarded damages to Ilgar Mammadov. The European Court
    found that the actual purpose was to silence or punish the
    applicant for criticizing the government. The Committee of
    Ministers of the Council of Europe, which Azerbaijan now
    chairs, is supposed to oversee the implementation of a court's
    decisions.
        Human Rights Watch has profiled the use of narcotics
    charges against youth activists who apparently had drugs
    planted on them by police. Youth activists criticized the
    government on social media, they were arrested for narcotics
    charges, they were questioned about their politics, and they
    received long jail sentences. And Human Rights Watch has
    several cases of this happening.
        Finally, I want to draw your attention to the case of Leyla
    Yunus, who's the director of the Institute of Peace and
    Democracy. She's done--she's worked on human rights for 20
    years--many types of issues, including compiling lists of
    political prisoners. The government has retaliated against her
    in the past, most clearly in 2011, when her office was
    demolished. She was questioned in connection with a case
    against Rauf Mirkadirov, who's an Azeri journalist who is now
    being held for participating in Track 2 meetings with
    Armenians. During the questioning, over a month ago, Leyla and
    her husband, Arif, had their passports taken away, but no
    charges have been filed. Their passports should be returned and
    they should be permitted to travel.
        Pressure against NGOs is continuing to mount. New
    amendments to the NGO law made it illegal for unregistered
    groups to receive grants or donations. Penalties for NGOs that
    don't register a grant were expanded. Onerous reporting
    requirements have been extended to international organizations.
    Grantees report months of efforts to register grants and
    withdraw funds from banks. So you can have a registered
    organization, a registered grant--and it's a big struggle to
    register--and then still not be able to access your funds from
    a bank account. And this seems to so far be inconclusive;
    there's different scenarios unfolding there.
        There is considerable apprehension that the new regulations
    will be selectively enforced against organizations that are
    critical of the government. Even prior to these amendments,
    Azerbaijan was violating freedom of association by
    overregulating NGOs. The Venice Commission found that the
    process of registering NGOs in Azerbaijan was too cumbersome,
    lengthy and unpredictable. And in five separate decisions, the
    European Court has found that Azerbaijan violates freedom of
    association by denying registration to NGOs.
        Baku should be bringing its NGO legislation in compliance
    with the European Court and with the Venice Commission opinions
    rather than imposing even more burdens on NGOs.
        The case of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies
    Center illustrates why these laws are used to silence critics
    in the government. EMDS, as a vote-monitoring organization, has
    made numerous attempts to register and has repeatedly been
    denied. EMDS entered into a contract with a registered
    organization to carry out its activities. This arrangement
    became grounds to sentence Anar Mammadli to 5\1/2\ years and
    Bashir Suleymanli to 3\1/2\ years.
        In closing, I'm grateful to the Helsinki Commission for
    convening this hearing. I hope that the commission will remain
    engaged by calling on the government of Azerbaijan to release
    political prisoners and repeal new regulations against NGOs.
    Further, I would urge that the Parliamentary Assembly which
    will convene in Baku--for it to include voices from Azeri civil
    society. I would also urge members of Congress who travel to
    Azerbaijan to visit political prisoners in prison and meet with
    their families.
        Mr. Chairman, Azerbaijan has a longstanding democratic
    tradition. In 1918, it became the first democracy in the Muslim
    world. The civil society of Azerbaijan works to fulfill that
    legacy and remind the government of its OSCE commitments. These
    brave and talented people should be permitted to do their
    important work without harassment and intimidation. Thank you.
        Mr. Cardin. Thank you for your testimony. Ms. Shaffer?

       BRENDA SHAFFER, VISITING RESEARCHER, CENTER FOR EURASIAN,
        RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Shaffer. As a teenager growing up in the San Francisco
    Bay area, on the bed--on the wall next to my bed, instead of
    posters of rock stars or Hollywood actors, I had a picture of
    the Helsinki Declaration Final Act. (Laughter.) My mom's
    listening to this. She can probably confirm it.
        These principles inspired most of the activism of my youth,
    and even as a high school student at Burlingame High School, a
    district represented by Congressman Tom Lantos, I went to the
    Soviet Union, visited Soviet Refuseniks, visit other, non-
    Jewish, human rights activists in the USSR and I'm--therefore
    I'm--my voice is shaking, because I'm honored and moved to
    testify at the Senate Commission of the--for the Security and
    Cooperation in Europe, because these principles have been so
    much a part of my youth and my own activism.
        As part of that visit in 1982, I actually visited Soviet
    Azerbaijan and started my interest in the South Caucasus. The
    Soviet--Azerbaijan is a Shiite Muslim-majority country with a
    strong Western orientation and a desire, as was pointed out by
    the earlier testimonies, for a strong alliance with the United
    States. Azerbaijan is not only a place where there's freedom of
    religion, but freedom from religion--something that's too often
    absent in the world. Secular people have the right to live free
    of religious coercion, and government protects the right of
    people, again, to freedom from religion as well.
        Azerbaijan is a land where Jews have never experienced
    anti-Semitism. They don't talk about feeling unwelcome in
    Azerbaijan, because they feel part of Azerbaijan, and no
    Azerbaijanis would consider them guests in any sense in
    Azerbaijan.
        Women were granted the right to vote in Azerbaijan two
    years before suffrage was granted in the United States and
    decades before many states in Europe.
        Azerbaijan is important, as mentioned here, to the U.S. in
    a wider number of issues, including its policy towards Russia,
    relations with Iran, nuclear nonproliferation, Middle Eastern
    regional security and European energy security. Its location as
    the only state in between the Arctic Ocean and the Persian
    Gulf--except between Russia and Iran and Azerbaijan, only three
    states on that lateral--its location is both a blessing--that's
    why we're here today, we're discussing this country--but also a
    curse, because if you sit in between Russia and Iran, your
    stability, your independence is quite constrained.
        This almost treacherous balancing act that the regime finds
    itself in Azerbaijan between balancing strong orientation
    towards the United States, integration in Euro-Atlantic
    structures but also peaceful relationships with Russia and Iran
    is extremely challenging because not only does it have this
    foreign policy aspect but also domestic policy and military
    conflicts are intertwined. Russia and Iran use military
    conflict, use taking of territory, use even the domestic
    political arena in order to promote their views. Maybe if we
    held this hearing before the invasion of Crimea, we might--it
    would be maybe difficult to make the case. I think now today
    it's apparent to all how Russia operates in its--in its close
    environment. Russia has used military force to promote its
    goals in Ukraine and Georgia, neighboring countries. It uses
    the electoral process and civil society organizations. Russian
    citizens have ran in elections in Azerbaijan, Georgia and
    Latvia. Could you imagine a parallel in another country where
    foreign citizens run to the leaderships of different countries
    to try to get its way? And it's promoted separatists in a
    number of neighboring countries also to promote its interests--
    Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
        The U.S. and even the OSCE Minsk group has done--has taken
    a number of steps to try to promote resolution of these same
    ethnic conflicts that afflict the region. Unfortunately, lack
    of recognition of the role that Russia plays in these conflicts
    really hurts and hinders the work of the OSCE Minsk Group and
    of the United States. For two decades the U.S. and the OSCE
    Minsk Group has chided the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
    for not preparing their people for peace, for not doing enough.
    I think now it's very clear that the leaders of Armenia and
    Azerbaijan really do not have an independent decision on this
    issue. And in fact, three times they have come to--initialed
    very, very serious peace agreements between Armenia and
    Azerbaijan, and each time this agreement was derailed by its
    northern neighbor.
        Azerbaijan is also very important to Washington in terms of
    Washington's Iran policy, but for the same reason, Iran works
    very hard to destabilize Azerbaijan. Iran, we call it Persia,
    Persian music, Persian people, is a multiethnic country where
    half of the population is ethnic minorities, and all in all, a
    third of the population of Iran is ethnic Azerbaijanis. So with
    Iran keeping this in mind does everything possible to keep
    Azerbaijan away from prosperity, involved in wars, involved in
    conflicts because it fears if Azerbaijan is a fully stable,
    open society, it could be a source of emulation for its own
    Azerbaijani minority. Even, by the way, Khamenei, the spiritual
    leader or the leader of Iran, is native Azerbaijani, and
    Mousavi, head of the green movement, native Azerbaijani. It's a
    very serious question for Iran's stability as well.
        European energy security. Azerbaijan is the only country
    that is bringing in additional supplies of gas, not rerouting
    existing supplies of gas into Eastern Europe. The southern
    corridor, while volumes are small at the beginning, they target
    specifically vulnerable countries which have almost a hundred
    percent dependent on Russia. And this is basically a
    superhighway that once it's built, other regions such as the
    Balkans can easily link into it. Other supply sources, such as
    from Iraqi Kurdistan or from Israel, could eventually use this
    infrastructure. So it's very important for European energy
    security--again, quite noted by Russia, and we'll probably
    genuinely, as we see, see attempts to undermine this project.
        I think that the people in Azerbaijan take very serious
    your commission, your work, the U.S. government's statements on
    the state of regime and the state of human rights and the state
    of democracy. The only thing where I think where it's very
    problematic, some of the statements that have come, are related
    to religious freedom. And this is where sometimes I think
    people in the government feel no matter what we do, we really
    can do no right with the United States. Of all--of all places,
    the field where--you look at the reports from the national
    commission on religious freedom, I think this is where--the
    place where the United States government has not done the
    best--most professional work.
        There is a place--for instance, some of the criticism as
    related to Azerbaijan has blocked anti-Semitic literature from
    Iran to enter into Azerbaijan. I applaud that they blocked
    that. I think this is an independent decision. Germany has a
    law against anti-Semitic literature. We don't go into Germany
    and say why do you block anti-Semitic literature. On the
    question of terror financing, the United States, if you had
    Hamas sending money into religious organizations in the United
    States, you would find those violations and you would find
    people put on trial. I don't think that the United States has
    to intervene when funds or literature are coming that their
    whole attempt is to destabilize a country and to destabilize
    the very positive ethnic and religious makeup of the country.
        And the last, even on the issue of religious coercion, if a
    country decides that it wants to give children, young girls,
    the choice to not be veiled and be coerced by their parents to
    be veiled, this balance between right of the parents to
    religious freedom and right of the child the choice is really a
    place where I think the U.S. government shouldn't intervene and
    to allow states to make their independent decisions.
        This is the last point that as the U.S. improves
    relationship with Iran, it disengages from another arenas--a
    number of a arenas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, we're going to
    need our allies on the ground more than ever. If we're
    physically not in these places, we're going to need our allies.
    And I think it's very important in your mission that you go
    there as a friend. Things that have to be improved, we improve
    as allies, and we improve as friends, and I thank you for your
    work in this direction.
        Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you both for your testimony.
        Ms. Shaffer, thank you for taking on the responsibility of
    more people knowing about the Helsinki Commission. I can't
    imagine what you woke up to every morning--(inaudible). But we
    appreciate that. I think that prior to Russia's incursion in
    the Ukraine, most Americans had never heard of OSCE or the
    Helsinki Commission. And it clearly is an extremely important
    organization for U.S. interests. So we thank you for your
    passion on the work of our commission.
        Let me assure both of you that Azerbaijan has made
    commitments for access for NGOs at our annual meeting so that
    we will have opportunities to meet with the NGOs, there will be
    free access for all points of view so that we can have an open
    discussion at our parliamentary assembly.
        I want to ask both of you basically what you think the
    opportunities are now for strengthening not just the U.S. ties
    with Azerbaijan but also adherence to the OSCE principles
    within Azerbaijan. As has been pointed out, what has happened
    with Russia and the incursion into Ukraine and, previous to
    that, Georgia, is certainly on the minds of the Azerbaijanis.
    There's no question about that. And with Armenia developing
    closer ties with Russia, as they have with the economic
    partnership and their vote in the United Nations on Ukraine, it
    seems to me that the Azerbaijanis recognize that there could be
    serious issues in Russia's taking sides on territorial issues
    in that region.
        I'm sure there are other reasons why there is a desire to
    strengthen their ties with the United States. We have strong
    strategic partnerships. And yet it's important to us that
    Azerbaijan adhere to all the principles of Helsinki, not just
    the security basket and the economic basket but also the human
    rights basket.
        So where do you believe that the most progress can be made
    in strengthening the relationship between the United States and
    Azerbaijan as particularly it relates to the Helsinki
    commitments? Whoever wants to go first.
        Mr. Shaffer. Yes, I agree with you, Senator Cardin, that
    Ukraine, Crimea, this is an earthquake for the region, I think
    not only because of the violation of territorial integrity,
    because if you're Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, you've already
    had a chunk of your territory pulled out with Russian support--
    I mean, the Soviet Union, there were hundreds of disjunctures
    between the ethnic and national borders. The only places, with
    the exception of Chechnya, where violent conflict broke out
    were places where there was Russian support. I mean, these wars
    are not about ethnic conflict, but they're about one power
    using different groups in order to leverage over other groups.
        But what's I think particularly--why there is an interlap
    between the domestic and the foreign policy here and where your
    work is important is that--think about for countries in the
    region. Crimea happens. It's not just a military invasion.
    Everything was in place. There were people there to run the
    government. There were parliamentarians ready to make the vote.
    It was very smooth. And I think this is what--why it's really
    been a very scary incidence for the people in the region.
    Again, they know about taking territory, but to see how porous
    many of their countries are, finding the proper balance between
    protecting yourself from that infiltration and proper
    maintenance of human rights and OSCE principles I don't know
    what the magic formula it is, and hopefully you have some
    answers for that.
        I think that when there is a strong and engaged U.S., it's
    better for prosperity and human rights than when the U.S. just
    sits on the sidelines and complains and says this isn't good. I
    don't want to live in a world where the strongest power isn't
    the United States and it's any of the alternative powers. And
    so we need to keep our allies.
        In terms of specific issues where I think you could find a
    lot of cooperation with the government and can be improved on
    that--human rights and rule of law issues, one is property
    rights in Azerbaijan, strengthening the process of property
    rights--when people have control of their property, it's an
    important part of the citizenship--and continuing development
    of the democratic culture in universities, which I think has
    been a very positive development in Azerbaijan.
        Mr. Cardin. Thank you.
        Ms. Lanskoy?
        Mr. Lanskoy. Thank you. I'm going to start with the
    geopolitics and come back to the OSCE principles.
        Azerbaijan has a very skillful foreign policy. It's true
    that they're in a tough neighborhood, but they've become very
    good at creating different types of relationships with their
    neighbors. President Aliyev recently visited Tehran. He's also
    visited Baghdad. He has good relations. There are new border
    crossings being opened with Iran. There is robust trade with
    Iran. The Azeri defense minister was recently in Moscow meeting
    with Russian and Iranian counterparts, and he came out of those
    meetings saying that he was very satisfied with defense
    cooperation in many spheres with both Russia and Iran.
    President Putin visited Baku last summer and endorsed President
    Aliyev during a critical moment in the presidential elections.
    Russia's Rosneft and SOCAR have just signed a joint venture.
    Azerbaijan is able to have a relatively--a very, actually, I
    would say, independent foreign policy. Does not have Russian
    military bases. It does not have a Russian ethnic minority. It
    is economically independent of Russia. Russia is not as big as
    trading partner.
        So Azerbaijan is able to use these situations to its
    advantage. And it is using the current crisis and the attention
    paid to Ukraine and to energy issues to carry out a domestic
    crackdown. There is no reason to suppose that the crackdown is
    somehow inspired by either Russia or Iran. Azerbaijan changes
    the subject. And what it can do and what it has seen it can do
    over the last 10 years of participating in Council of Europe
    and more than 10 years, 20 years of participating in the OSCE
    is that it can change the subject away from its human rights
    and domestic--the democracy obligations to subjects of energy
    and security and never have to address the human dimension.
    They have seen that indeed, they can go from just joining the
    Council of Europe to taking up important positions within it,
    that they can go from just being a participant in the OSCE to
    actually hosting the parliamentary assembly and not improve.
    ODIHR has monitored eight elections, national elections in
    Azerbaijan since 1995. Their recommendations have never been--
    they--each time they issue recommendations, there is no follow-
    through on that from Azerbaijan.
        You raised in the last panel coming up with some specific
    benchmarks. You could take recommendations from ODIHR. You
    could take political prisoners, release of political prisoners,
    treatment of NGOs. You could also draw their attentions to some
    strong anti-American statements that come from high levels of
    Azeri government, like the head of the presidential
    administration, who blames American NGOs for the revolution in
    Ukraine, for instance. You could note the treatment of Senate
    staff when they met with Azerbaijan's opposition journalists.
    They were denounced in the press. They were denounced by
    parliamentary members of Azerbaijan. And that's treatment of
    Senate--of Corker's staff that--Azerbaijan wants to have part
    of a relationship but not others, and they simply can't--simply
    can't have.
        Mr. Cardin. Give you your top three in priority order that
    you would like to see progress made, that you believe, knowing
    the politics of the region, could be achieved?
        Mr. Lanskoy. They could easily repeal the NGO--the new NGO
    legislation. That would just return it, in terms of a
    benchmark, return it to a few years back, say. And you could
    come up with specifics. We could work with ICNL (ph) to come up
    with some, you know, very technical specifics. They could
    release political prisoners. They could start with the 19
    identified by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience.
    And they could undertake working seriously with ODIHR to follow
    up on specific--on specific ODIHR recommendations.
        Mr. Cardin. That's very helpful. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just let me
    ask a couple of questions.
        On Monday I returned from four days on the ground in Abuja
    in Nigeria--second trip is about 10 months. I was in Jos last
    September where a number of Christian churches had been
    firebombed by Boko Haram. This time I met with a number of
    survivors again, including one of the Chibok girls, who--and a
    father whose two daughters were among the Chibok abductees, and
    he's Muslim--a moderate Muslim but Muslim nevertheless,
    although Christians are targeted.
        We know just from reading yesterday's newspapers that a
    major gain has been made by the radical Islamists in Iraq.
    Afghanistan is a cauldron, and getting worse. Syria remains a
    place where both sides are slaughtering people, especially
    Christians. I've held several hearings on the fact that the
    rebels, particularly the disparate elements who are radical
    Islamists, have been slaughtering Christians by design, not as
    collateral--they're in the way but simply targeting Christians.
        And two weeks ago I chaired a hearing with Robert George of
    the Commission on International Religious Freedom. He was very
    concerned--and I know it was just mentioned in testimony that
    there is a concern that on religious freedom we have not stood
    up as robustly as we could. There have been no CPC designations
    since 2011. Those that are in force have lapsed. Another list
    of countries that ought to be CPC have not been put on the
    list. There has been no ambassador-at-large for half of the
    president's tenure. We hope someone with the credentials of
    Rabbi Saperstein may soon emerge as the person to be
    ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, but
    delay is denial.
        And Robert George, again, the chairman of the religious
    freedom commission, said that Azerbaijan is a Tier 2 country
    right on the bubble, if you will, in terms of religious
    persecution. So there is this surge going on everywhere. I see
    it all over Africa. My committee is Africa, Global Health,
    Global Human Rights, and so I'm frequently there. And the
    chairman knows because he follows Africa like the back of his
    hand as well, these organizations in the Middle East and
    everywhere else are--this is not ebb tide; this is surge. And
    I'm wondering if you could speak to how this is impacting
    Azerbaijan. Where are they in terms of the intolerance? Are
    they batting any worse? You mentioned 19 political prisoners,
    and I think your recommendation to visit, or try to, is an
    excellent one.
        Last year when we were in Baku, led so ably, our
    delegation, by Senator Wicker, we had a very, very frank
    discussion with the president, with Aliyev, and we raised human
    rights issues point by point by point. And I think he was a bit
    miffed that it was such a blunt conversation, but all members
    joined in. It was a very good discussion. So of course we'll do
    that again. And I know Senator Cardin never holds back, nor do
    I, especially when it comes to human rights. So this religious
    freedom issue, which seems to be festering as never before, and
    your thoughts with regards to Azerbaijan.
        Secondly, one of the issues I raised with the president
    last year--since 1982 I have been raising the issue--I've been
    in Congress 34 years now--particularly as it relates to the
    People's Republic of China with the aggressively anti-female
    policy of sex-selection abortion. China is now missing 100
    million girls. Worldwide, especially in India and in China, the
    three most dangerous words are: It's a girl. And after five
    months, when an ultrasound is done, very often if discovered
    that it's a girl she is killed. She's decimated, exterminated.
    Now, we raised that in Baku because in Azerbaijan there is a
    serious, serious problem of sex ratios of more boys than girls,
    and I'm wondering if you've seen those reports, your thoughts
    on that, because a girl child is being targeted. And of course
    this then becomes a magnet for human trafficking.
        The reason why China is on Tier 3 lists--and I wrote the
    Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Last year Secretary
    Kerry wisely put China on Tier 3, liable to sanctions, simply
    because of the magnet that the missing girls has created when
    systematically they have been exterminated since 1979 through
    sex-selection abortion, maybe as many as 100 million missing
    daughters. Azerbaijan, nowhere near the same aggregate numbers
    but they have a serious problem, and I'm very worried that
    there will be a nexus with trafficking into Azerbaijan because
    of the missing girls. Do you see any of that?
        Finally, the political prisoners that you would recommend
    that we meet with, perhaps privately or now, you know, if you
    had an order of who it is that you think we should go all out
    as a commission to meet with, please tender that list.
        Mr. Lanskoy. So thank you. That was very comprehensive.
        In terms of who to meet with, I realized just now that
    neither me nor the previous speakers mentioned NIDA youth
    group, they're eight youth activists who just received long
    prison terms as well. We could come up with a list. I think
    taking Amnesty's 19 and maybe choosing some from different
    categories--there are some journalists that are in prison--
    maybe also looking at people who have been in jail longer. The
    list that Leyla Yunus put together has 130 people. That's an
    Azeri NGO and they've been tracking it since the `90s. Some of
    their political--some of the political prisoners they identify
    have been there much longer, since the `90s, for instance.
        So we can come up with different types of activists. If
    you're interested in meeting religious activists, there are
    some that are imams that had drugs planted on them, for
    instance, that you may choose to try to see.
        In terms of freedom of religion, in Azerbaijan the main
    issue is not--Dr. Shaffer has pointed out that Jews have always
    been welcomed and are seen as--and generally in the Caucasus
    that's the case. Jews are seen as a native--have been there for
    2,000 years and are seen as a native. So it's not so much Jews
    or even Christians. I think it's a much smaller Christian
    community, but different strands within Islam, and whether
    mosques are registered or unregistered and whether they belong
    to a spiritual board.
        There's a license board that has a near monopoly on
    religious observance, and those laws have also been tightened
    in 2000. There was amendments to the law, or a new law, in
    2009, and those have been used to make illegal Muslim practice
    outside of a very narrow range. That, I believe, is the main
    issue that has led to more and more prisoners, and also that
    the religious can be government critics.
        It is not necessarily about maintaining a kind of monopoly
    on religious practice, but it's also that certain imams emerge
    as critics of the government and they are the ones who are
    being--who are being put in jail. So I think that that's
    definitely an important issue in Azerbaijan as well. As you
    probably mentioned also, there are different--among Christian
    groups--Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, so forth--groups that
    are newer to Azerbaijan that also can be subjects of
    harassment.
        Mr. Shaffer. You know, Azerbaijan is far from perfect on
    human rights and democracy, and it's good that there is the
    dialogue with the U.S. government, with the U.S. Congress on
    these issues. Religious freedom is not the issue. All the
    different--the important examples you gave of extremism, of
    discrimination against women, against--the country isn't
    perfect but this is the one area where they should be getting
    the star on their report card and not--and not--and not the
    criticism.
        There are fine lines. When you look at, for instance, the
    idea of freedom for NGO financing and prevention of terror
    financing, even in U.S. legislation finding that proper balance
    where you allow an organization to be free and to associate
    with who it wants and to promote what it wants, on the other
    hand to prevent moving of funds--I mean, the U.S. government is
    the leader around the world at preventing of terror financing.
    Then when one of its allies implements this legislation,
    prevents money transfers from Iran from extreme religious
    organizations, it's criticized by the U.S. government.
        The idea of proselytization that have been related to--in
    U.S. reports this comes out as prosecution against Christian
    minorities. These are not native minorities. These are not
    people that were born in Azerbaijan. These are people that come
    to proselytize in Azerbaijan. I know I've spent a big chunk of
    my life in Israel. It also has a law against proselytization.
    I'm very--and I'm very happy it does so that people can
    actually be free from coercion and be free from constant
    inundation of religious propaganda.
        Mr. Smith. You're not suggesting that when somebody
    proselytizes there's an element of coercion in it, are you?
        Mr. Shaffer. It depends. If you are--if you're a----
        Mr. Smith. In Israel?
        Mr. Shaffer. In Israel there's a law that prevents it,
    actually, so there isn't--there isn't--and again, there's been
    questions in the U.S. national commission on religious
    freedom----
        Mr. Smith. I mean, free speech is involved here as well.
        Mr. Shaffer. Sorry?
        Mr. Smith. Free speech is involved here as well.
        Mr. Shaffer. I think--you know, from research even that
    I've read of the commission on religious freedom, that the
    issue of--right to proselytization and freedom from harassment
    is a very fine line where the commission--again, maybe in the
    next hearing a commission member can speak on this, but it's a
    fine line where I don't think there's any consensus where
    freedom of--where freedom of religion starts and where freedom
    from harassment starts. So it's very--I don't think that's--the
    right to proselyte, is that something that the U.S. wants to
    promote around the world even if an independent government
    wants to see it in a different way?
        Even the question of who's a--who's a political prisoner. A
    number of the defined political prisoners by the EU in Europe--
    in Azerbaijan, excuse me, are actually people that were tried
    for receiving funds from Iran and being members of terrorist
    organizations that worked to--had plots to blow up the U.S.
    embassy, kill the U.S. ambassador, blow up the Israeli embassy,
    kill leaders of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan. So again,
    member in a terrorist organization or political prisoner? It's
    a very--defined quite differently by different organizations.
        The question of human trafficking, I don't--I don't think
    there's any prominent citizen of Azerbaijan, researcher, who
    would not say their government has worked strongly to prevent
    trafficking, that this is something that's very--part of the
    government policy. It's not just part of the nongovernment
    policy. And the government has also worked against early
    marriage--of course, marriage of young girls in Azerbaijan--
    again, at times criticized by human rights organizations. Why
    are there--why are there laws, you know, preventing the child
    to do what the parent wants when their goal is to--is to
    preserve the freedom of the child?
        Mr. Smith. And the missing girls?
        Mr. Shaffer. I'm not aware on the--of this issue of the----
        Mr. Smith. OK. Just with all due respect on the
    proselytization issue, if there was coercion involved where
    people are being told they must, that's one thing. And it's a
    difficult line of demarcation between harassment--I mean, the
    free speech ought to be as unfettered as possible, and that
    goes for religious freedom as well.
        So I would hope that, you know, if somebody wants to take
    either the Gospel or any other faith-based creed and bring that
    to a country--of course, we hope they would do it with
    sensitivity to the local culture, but I think we have to be
    very careful to ever construe that to be coercion. Coercion is
    physical or some other kind of compulsion with real
    consequences, often beatings or economic penalties. I don't see
    preachers doing any of that. So I would hope that, you know, we
    would be very careful about how we define coercion. Thank you.
        Thanks, Ben.
        Mr. Cardin. Well, let me thank both of you for your
    testimony. It's been extremely helpful to us, and particularly
    in trying to set up priorities for our visit as to where we can
    make the most impact, and we will certainly take that
    information into consideration. We work very closely with our
    State Department, who also will supply us with comparable
    information of where we think it's important to try to
    strengthen the ties between our two countries and to see the
    type of progress made that helps promote that type of
    improvement of our bilateral relationship.
        With that, the hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you all
    very much.
                                A P P E N D I X

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                              Prepared Statements

                                  ----------

    Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on
                       Security and Cooperation in Europe

        Good morning and welcome to today's hearing on the security,
    economic and human rights dimensions of the U.S.-Azerbaijan
    relationship. I am looking forward to leading a congressional
    delegation to Azerbaijan at the end of this month where we will attend
    the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session, and have bilateral
    meetings as well.
        Azerbaijan has consistently been at the forefront of Commission
    attention since its independence, and for good reason: the United
    States considers Azerbaijan an important friend and partner in the
    region and that means we care deeply about its development.
        The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a serious obstacle to regional
    stability, security and prosperity, and certainly is an issue where we
    want to see progress because the status quo is not sustainable. I look
    forward to discussing today how we might further the OSCE Minsk Group
    discussions toward a solution to this conflict.
        The US and Azerbaijan have a history of strategic cooperation.
    Azerbaijan has played an important role in the Northern Distribution
    Network. It has troops serving on the ground in Afghanistan. It made a
    strong statement in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity by
    voting with the United States in the UN Security Council. So while we
    have significant concerns, we also have much to celebrate with
    Azerbaijan.
        The domestic political situation in Azerbaijan is troubling because
    Azerbaijan is moving in the wrong direction. While we have consistently
    seen problems with freedom of the media and freedom of association, the
    last two years have seen a high number of arrests and convictions of
    activists that all bear the hallmark signs of politically-motivated
    prosecutions. In addition we have seen journalists such as Khadija
    Ismayil and Rauf Mirkadirov, and human rights defenders such as Leyla
    Yunus harassed or detained. The election of President Ilham Aliyev last
    year was criticized by the OSCE and by the Council of Europe. Our
    concern is that rather than working to live up to its commitments in
    the OSCE and the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan is instead heading
    toward greater authoritarianism. We want to work with Azerbaijan to
    change that trend.
        Often in the world of international affairs we see things in only
    black or white. Something is either good or bad and there is little
    room for nuance. But I believe that our relationship--our friendship--
    with Azerbaijan requires us to be honest and sincere. Sincere in our
    appreciation for the things where we agree, and honest in the areas
    where we see problems. The United States needs a stable and prosperous
    Azerbaijan. But absent real democratic progress, we will not see true
    stability or development.
      Prepared Statement of Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on
                       Security and Cooperation in Europe

        This is a very timely hearing as the Commission prepares to visit
    Baku for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's annual session. As we
    prepare to visit Baku, I believe it's imperative for this Commission to
    discuss the grave deterioration of human rights in Azerbaijan over the
    past few years.
        I have in front of me here a timeline prepared by Commission staff
    of all of the politically-motivated harassment of journalists,
    prosecution of the opposition, and jailing of activists. It's amazing
    how in just the last two years the government of Azerbaijan has changed
    for the worse.
        In March 2012 a reporter for RFE/RL, Ms. Khadija Ismail, was
    humiliated and blackmailed when an intimate video of her filmed
    covertly in her apartment was released to the public. She has continued
    to be harassed and called in for questioning and I have no doubt that
    this harassment is due to her tenacity in researching and reporting
    corruption at the highest levels of government.
        In February 2013 Azerbaijan changed its law on non-governmental
    organizations to follow the harsh model set by Russia.
        In February 2013--two opposition politicians, Mr. Tofig Yagublu of
    the opposition Musavat Party and Mr. Ilgar Mammadov, chairperson of the
    opposition group REAL, are arrested on charges of orchestrating anti-
    government protests. They have now been sentenced to lengthy jail
    terms.
        In July 2013, despite pledges to do otherwise, Azerbaijan enacted
    its law on criminalization of online defamation. Azerbaijanis face jail
    time of up to three years for content they post online.
        In December 2013, Mr. Anar Mammadli, head of the Election
    Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre (EMDS) in Azerbaijan, is placed
    in pre-trial confinement pending his trial on charges of illegal
    enterprise, tax evasion and abuse of authority. Mammadli was previously
    questioned on numerous occasions after EMDS issued a report documenting
    widespread electoral violations during the October 2013 election. He
    has now been sentenced to a lengthy jail term.
        Unfortunately, these are only a few of the many cases over the past
    two years. While we all recognize the important role Azerbaijan plays
    in the energy sector, and we also recognize that Azerbaijan has carved
    out for itself a forward-leaning international relations policy that
    seeks to balance the pressures from Russian and Iran with friendly
    relations with the U.S. and Israel, the special role of this commission
    is to urge and insist that OSCE governments meet their human rights
    commitments. As a participating State in the OSCE and as the chair of
    the council of ministers of the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan has
    indicated that it wants to be a part of the world community. It wants
    to be seen as a leader. If that is the case, then we need to see more
    leadership, and less authoritarianism.
        I look forward to hearing the testimony today. Thank you.
                        Prepared Statement of Eric Rubin

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me
    to speak to you today about our bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan.
    I would also like to thank you for the Commission's strong efforts to
    promote the principles of the Helsinki Final Act at this critical
    moment in the region's history. Your participation in the OSCE
    Parliamentary Assembly election monitoring mission in Ukraine two weeks
    ago sent a powerful signal that the United States will support free and
    fair elections in the OSCE region and throughout the world. Your
    upcoming participation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual
    Session in Baku will serve as an important means of examining how OSCE
    member states are living up to the pledge to provide ``human security''
    for all their citizens.
        Our partnership with Azerbaijan remains an important aspect of our
    engagement in the Caucasus. For over twenty years, the United States
    has been working with Azerbaijan to promote a secure, prosperous, and
    democratic society. Since 1992, we have provided approximately $1.1
    billion in assistance to pursue these goals.
        My testimony today will focus on three core areas of this bilateral
    relationship. First, I will talk about our security cooperation.
    Second, I will look at our evolving economic relationship, including
    energy diversification and our efforts to promote economic reform.
    Finally, I will briefly examine the country's democratic development--
    DAS Melia will cover this in greater detail.
        First, Azerbaijan has been a key partner for the United States and
    NATO from Kabul to Kosovo. Azerbaijan currently has 94 troops serving
    in Afghanistan and has committed to remain involved in the country
    beyond 2014. It has completed missions to Iraq and Kosovo. Azerbaijan
    is a key node in the Northern Distribution Network and air route
    sending non-lethal goods in and out of Afghanistan. Thousands of
    containers go through customs and thousands of state and commercial
    flights transit Azerbaijan each year.
        As such, strengthening Caspian security, countering terrorism,
    stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
    enhancing maritime domain awareness continue to be top priorities for
    U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan. Since we began providing security
    assistance in 2002, the United States has been working to strengthen
    Azerbaijan's capacity to monitor the Caspian and protect critical
    energy infrastructure. Over the past 12 years, we have provided $44.4
    million in Foreign Military Financing and $9.9 million in International
    Military Education and Training and Export Control and Border Security
    programs that focus on military professionalization, building
    operability, and enhancing border security. And we are providing
    approximately $4 million in fiscal year 2014.
        Where we do provide security assistance to Azerbaijan, we are
    careful to ensure it is used in full compliance with the law--including
    Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act and the waiver authorities
    for U.S. efforts to counter terrorism, support the operational
    readiness of U.S. Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter
    terrorism, ensure Azerbaijan's border security as long as it is
    determined that such assistance will not undermine or hamper ongoing
    efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive
    purposes against Armenia.
        And the United States is working diligently to facilitate a
    peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a co-chair
    country of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with France and Russia, the
    United States has worked in recent months to articulate the substantial
    benefits that peace would bring to people across the region. In doing
    so, we are focusing on pragmatic steps to bring the sides into
    negotiations on a peace agreement based on the core principles of the
    UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. We hope the presidents of
    Armenia and Azerbaijan will agree to meet in the near future to
    continue the constructive dialogue begun at their summit last November.
    It also is important that both governments support Track II efforts to
    build people to people contacts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.
    These kinds of confidence building measures can help to prepare
    citizens of both countries for peace. We are troubled by the recent
    arrest of well-known journalist Rauf Mirkadirov, the subsequent
    investigation of Leyla Yunus and her husband Arif Yunusov, their poor
    treatment by the authorities, and confiscation of their passports. All
    three have been strong proponents of the Track II process and the
    Azerbaijani government's actions will have a chilling effect on any
    contact between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. DAS Melia will elaborate
    further on this point in his testimony. Helping both sides resolve this
    conflict is a key element of our relationships with both Azerbaijan and
    Armenia, and we fully support the Minsk Group co-chairs in their
    efforts to facilitate a more constructive phase of negotiations.
        Second, the United States enjoys growing economic cooperation with
    Azerbaijan, particularly in the area of energy. As Europe looks more
    resolutely to diversify its sources of energy away from its dependence
    on Russia as part of its energy security strategy, Azerbaijan is
    emerging as a potentially crucial supplier of diversified natural gas
    supplies for our European allies, and the United States has been a
    longstanding supporter of Azerbaijan's efforts to provide its energy
    resources to European markets. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,
    which began operating in June 2006, represents the first direct
    transportation link between the Caspian and the Mediterranean seas. At
    full capacity, it can deliver more than one million barrels of oil per
    day to market. The BTC pipeline was an early success for our Southern
    Corridor diplomacy, and now we are focused on developing a gas link
    between Azerbaijan and Europe. The construction of the Trans-Anatolian
    Pipeline across Turkey and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline to southern
    Italy will complete the Southern Gas Corridor, bringing Caspian gas to
    western Europe for the first time. Last December, after more than a
    decade of U.S.-led energy diplomacy in support of the Southern Gas
    Corridor, a final investment decision was made on this project, which
    will bring 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas--and potentially
    more--through this network of pipelines from Azerbaijan across six
    countries to western Europe starting in 2019.
        While energy remains an important part of our bilateral economic
    relationship, it is not the only focus. Given our close cooperation on
    the Northern Distribution Network and our ongoing transition in
    Afghanistan, we are actively encouraging Azerbaijan and its neighbors
    to take advantage of this important window of opportunity to transform
    the NDN into a commercial network for trade and investment when many
    freight forwarders are still in the region.
        Azerbaijan and its neighbors could become a premier trade and
    transportation corridor between Europe and Asia, but to do so, they
    must first reduce costs associated with high customs and tariffs and
    address delays caused by a lack of regional coordination. Time is of
    the essence, and the United States supports reforms that will create
    sustainable sources of non-oil revenue in Azerbaijan and new
    opportunities for U.S. exports and investment. For instance, Azerbaijan
    likely will obtain the necessary certifications to operate direct
    passenger and cargo flights to the United States this year.
        The United States also promotes the export of U.S. goods and
    services to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has already purchased hundreds of
    millions of dollars worth of airplanes and a communications satellite
    from the United States, and it will undoubtedly purchase more in the
    future. U.S. agricultural firms are interested in selling heavy
    equipment and technology, and American oil companies want to explore
    and develop new oil and gas fields in the Caspian to supply the
    Southern Corridor. The United States also supports Azerbaijan's
    accession into the WTO and the rules-based system in which its members
    participate. Opportunities for U.S. exports could increase
    significantly.
        In this context, it is important to note the role that corruption
    plays in the entire OSCE space, and Azerbaijan is no exception. It is a
    blight that tears at the economic, political, and social fabric of
    society, weighing on the country's economic potential, driving up
    inefficiencies, and scaring away foreign direct investment. Working
    with the Government of Azerbaijan and local partners, the United States
    is committed to enhancing our efforts to address this. Ultimately,
    countries with strong checks and balances including a strong and
    independent judiciary and apolitical civil service--are most likely to
    be effective in combating corruption.
        Finally, our strongest relationships world-wide are with
    democracies that respect the full range of human rights of their
    citizens. We seek strong cooperation on democratization with
    Azerbaijan, just as we collaborate closely on security and economic
    issues. Azerbaijan's respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
    and progress on democratic reform is key not only to strengthening our
    bilateral relationship, but also to Azerbaijan's own long-term
    stability. We have some serious concerns about the environment for
    democratic development and the protection of human rights in
    Azerbaijan, which has been deteriorating. My colleague Tom Melia will
    touch more on that in a moment.
        I want to emphasize that the United States remains committed to a
    constructive dialogue with Azerbaijan based on friendship between our
    people and mutual respect between our governments. But a constructive
    dialogue means that we can and must have frank and honest discussions
    in areas where we disagree. Discussing matters of agreement and
    disagreement in a candid way is part of the nature of a serious
    dialogue.
        Going forward, our relationship will continue to be based on these
    three core areas--security cooperation, economic and energy
    cooperation, and democratic development. Our mission remains to address
    each of these three areas with equal rigor and resolve. And we are
    committed to working with Congress in a bipartisan manner in our
    efforts to realize each of these and the full potential of this
    relationship.
        Thank you.
                     Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Melia

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me
    to speak to you today about the democracy and human rights dimension of
    U.S.-Azerbaijan relations in advance of your visit to Baku later this
    month for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session. My colleagues
    at the State Department and I greatly appreciate the dedication of you
    and your fellow Commissioners and your staff to the OSCE and its
    institutions--especially to the enduring principles enshrined in the
    Helsinki Final Act and the body of commitments that comprise the OSCE's
    ``human dimension.'' We also greatly value our regular consultations
    with you and your staff.
        I would like to start by referring to a key principle of the OSCE,
    as set forth in the 1991 ``Moscow Document'' and notably reaffirmed in
    the 2010 Astana Summit Declaration, in which OSCE participating States
    agreed unanimously that:

            issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms,
            democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as
            respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the
            foundations of the international order. They categorically and
            irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the
            field of the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct
            and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not
            belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State
            concerned.

        This concept linking respect for human rights within states to
    lasting security among states is reflected in our multilateral
    interactions and in our bilateral relationships with all OSCE
    participating States, including Azerbaijan. It forms the basis on which
    the United States continues to support efforts to advance democracy
    worldwide. In Azerbaijan, this constitutes one of three equally
    important core goals, which Deputy Assistant Secretary Rubin has just
    spoken to. U.S. officials at all levels in Baku and Washington
    regularly highlight the importance of respect for human rights and
    fundamental freedoms, rule of law, and other basic building blocks of
    democracy, publicly and privately. U.S. officials regularly meet with a
    variety of Azerbaijanis, ranging from government officials to civil
    society activists and opposition political party representatives.
        While serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, I have
    visited Azerbaijan three times, holding valuable meetings with leading
    government officials, including President Ilham Aliyev, as well as with
    opposition political leaders, civil society actors, and journalists. I
    have been joined on these missions to Azerbaijan, as well as to other
    countries, by senior colleagues from the Department of State's European
    and Eurasian Affairs Bureau, USAID, and the Department of Justice. I
    believe these are important opportunities to listen to Azerbaijanis
    inside and outside of government, to share with them our thoughts, and
    to demonstrate that we do care about all three dimensions of the
    relationship. Indeed, I would like to visit Azerbaijan again soon to
    continue these conversations.
        The United States also provides assistance to support Azerbaijan's
    democratic development efforts, with an emphasis on support for civil
    society, independent media, and rule of law. The largest part of this
    assistance is provided by our colleagues at USAID, and we in the State
    Department work very closely with them to ensure that these programs
    are neatly lined up with our overall policy priorities. Similarly, we
    work closely in Washington and Baku with the legal experts provided by
    the Department of Justice in the Overseas Prosecutorial Development
    Assistance and Training program. Our inter-agency partnership is
    working very well.
        Just two weeks ago, on May 28, Azerbaijan celebrated the 96th
    anniversary of the day in 1918 on which it became the first majority
    Muslim, democratic republic in the world. The Azerbaijan Democratic
    Republic lasted only 23 months, until it was invaded by the Soviet Red
    Army and forcibly incorporated into the nascent Soviet Union, where it
    remained captive for more than seven decades. Since Azerbaijan regained
    its independence in 1991, it has begun to modernize, and its people
    have become more integrated into the wider world.
        With regard to building democratic institutions and developing
    democratic norms, Azerbaijan has taken some positive steps. For
    example, it established six administrative government service centers
    in Baku and the regions (known as ``ASAN,'' which means ``easy'' in
    Azeri) intended to eliminate corruption by public officials at the
    local level. More broadly, however, we have been seeing increasing
    constraints on fundamental freedoms that increase the risk of domestic
    instability, undermine confidence the rule of law will be respected,
    and prevent Azerbaijanis from reaching their full potential.
        Five years ago, it was already difficult for advocates of
    democratic reform--especially opposition political parties--to
    participate in the political life of the country, but it was still
    possible for NGOs and independent activists to operate. The environment
    has worsened significantly since then, beginning with the 2009
    incarceration of young democracy activists Emin Milli and Adnan
    Hajizade. Although they were released in 2010, the suppression of
    peaceful dissent increased in 2011, with the arrests of young
    Azerbaijani activists who sought to organize peaceful pro-democracy
    rallies in Baku. The Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijan's parliament) passed
    legislation significantly increasing fines on participants and
    organizers of unauthorized protests in November 2012, which resulted in
    the detention of numerous peaceful pro-democracy activists for baseless
    administrative violations. Since early 2013, the space for peaceful
    dissent has narrowed more dramatically, and the exercise of fundamental
    freedoms has become still more tenuous. A number of leading peaceful
    democracy advocates, civil society activists, and journalists have been
    incarcerated, including presidential candidate and chairman of the
    democratic reform-oriented REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov; opposition
    journalist and Musavat Party Deputy Chairman Tofig Yagublu; members of
    democratic youth movements; blogger Abdul Abilov; religious scholar and
    activist Taleh Bagirzade; Khural Editor Avaz Zeynalli; and the chairman
    of NDI's local election monitoring partner, the Election Monitoring and
    Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), Anar Mammadli.
        Additionally, two rounds of legislative amendments since March 2013
    have restricted NGO funding and activity. Officials have pressured
    Azerbaijani and international NGOs, including some USAID implementing
    partners, which in some cases have been subject to investigations by
    the tax and justice ministries. Authorities also launched a criminal
    investigation of EMDS--which has been a recipient of USAID and European
    assistance--and another election monitoring NGO, the International
    Cooperation of Volunteers (ICV) Public Union, soon after the flawed
    October 2013 presidential election. Such actions have resulted in an
    increasingly hostile operating environment for civil society,
    especially for those activists and groups advocating respect for human
    rights, fundamental freedoms, and government accountability; thereby
    depriving citizens the open channels through which they can voice their
    concerns. Pressure on independent defense lawyers has resulted in a
    decreasing number of such lawyers ready to defend individuals in
    sensitive cases.
        Restrictions on the ability of selected Azerbaijani activists to
    travel outside of the country are also a problem, calling into question
    the extent of the government's commitment to freedom of movement, a
    founding tenet of the OSCE. For example, since 2006, the government has
    prevented the foreign travel of opposition Popular Front Party Chairman
    Ali Karimli by refusing to renew his passport. Today in Bern, the
    OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is
    discussing the important role of human rights defenders in OSCE
    participating States. Sadly, one of Azerbaijan's leading human rights
    defenders, Leyla Yunus, was unable to attend the event, because
    Azerbaijan's authorities confiscated her passport--as well as her
    husband's--in April. This confiscation occurred in the context of the
    April 19 arrest of well-known journalist Rauf Mirkadirov, the
    subsequent questioning of Leyla Yunus and her husband about Mirkadirov,
    and their poor treatment by police authorities. All three have been
    strong proponents of people-to-people diplomacy, which helps build ties
    between Azerbaijanis and Armenians and is crucial to the peaceful
    resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The peaceful resolution of
    this conflict will open borders, increase security, and create new
    opportunities to trade, travel, and engage across the region.
    Authorities also have prevented some in the international human rights
    community from visiting or returning to Azerbaijan.
        These are not the kinds of actions the United States or the broader
    international community wants to see from a partner, an OSCE
    participating State, and currently the chair of the Committee of
    Ministers of the Council of Europe.
        When President Obama spoke last month at the West Point
    commencement, he explained that:

            America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond
            idealism--it is a matter of national security. Democracies are
            our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war.
            Economies based on free and open markets perform better and
            become markets for our goods. Respect for human rights is an
            antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence
            and terror.

        And he noted that,

            In capitals around the globe--including, unfortunately, some of
            America's partners--there has been a crackdown on civil
            society.

        We recognize that Azerbaijan lives in a very difficult neighborhood
    and that its government seeks stability. The United States strongly
    supports Azerbaijan's long-term stability, security, and prosperity.
    The best way to guarantee such a future is to strengthen democratic
    processes and institutions to buttress respect for the rule of law and
    fundamental freedoms. Doing so will foster long-term internal
    stability, create the most inviting environment for economic investment
    and growth, and make Azerbaijan the very best that it can be, by giving
    every citizen the freedom and space to achieve his or her full
    potential, thereby maximizing the contributions of all of its people.
    We consider this to be in both the short-term and the long-term
    interests of both the people and the government of Azerbaijan. The U.S.
    Embassy in Baku and we in Washington have been active on these issues
    and have made these points. For example, Ambassador Morningstar has
    been doing an outstanding job in advocating publicly as well as
    privately for an environment conducive to a vibrant civil society and
    in raising specific impediments to such an environment.
        The United States believes that Azerbaijan will have greater
    stability and prosperity, and will more quickly reach its full
    potential, by allowing a more open society. We therefore will continue
    to support Azerbaijani efforts to advance the country's democratic
    potential, including respect for rule of law, human rights, and
    fundamental freedoms. We will continue to urge Azerbaijan to live up to
    its OSCE commitments and other international human rights obligations.
    We will also encourage Azerbaijan to take advantage of its chairmanship
    of the Council of Europe to take concrete steps on important democracy
    and human rights issues. The positive changes we advocate would benefit
    both the people and the government of Azerbaijan. Such changes would
    also make it easier for us to expand and deepen our bilateral
    relationship, since our strongest relationships are with democratic
    states that respect the full range of human rights of all of their
    citizens.
        As President Obama indicated in his recent message marking
    Azerbaijan's National Day, and to return to where I began, we encourage
    Azerbaijan to reclaim the leadership role on human rights and
    fundamental freedoms that its people and government demonstrated 96
    years ago.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss
    democracy and human rights trends in Azerbaijan and our overall
    bilateral relationship.
                      Prepared Statement of Miriam Lanskoy

        I am grateful to the Helsinki Commission for holding this very
    important hearing at a crucial historical junction and for giving me
    the opportunity to speak about the state of democracy and human rights
    in Azerbaijan.
        The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit
    foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic
    institutions around the world. NED has been working in Azerbaijan since
    the mid-1990s and maintains a large portfolio of projects. Defending
    human rights, a traditional focus of the NED, remains a high priority
    in Azerbaijan. Programs include monitoring, reporting on, and providing
    legal assistance to victims of human rights abuses. NED's programs also
    focus on expanding the capabilities of independent news providers.
        Through membership in international organizations, including the
    UN, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, Azerbaijan has committed
    itself to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
    However, despite long term engagement of Azerbaijan with these
    organizations, rights enforcement is highly selective and superficial.
    Azerbaijan manages to obtain the prestige associated with participation
    in international organizations without fulfilling the basic conditions
    of membership. When it joined the Council of Europe (CE) in 2001 it was
    understood that Azerbaijan was not meeting the requirements, but it was
    expected that participation in the CE would stimulate greater
    democratic development. Nevertheless, twelve years later Azerbaijan
    still has not met those basic criteria.
        As of May 2014, Azerbaijan is the Chairman of the Committee of
    Ministers of the Council of Europe, a body charged with ensuring
    compliance with the judgments of the European Court for Human Rights.
    However, Azerbaijan has not itself complied with numerous ECHR
    judgments, particularly those related to freedom of association and the
    release of political prisoners. And though Azerbaijan is not in
    compliance with basic norms of human rights, freedom of speech and
    association that are a fundamental part of its OSCE obligations, it is
    about to host the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE at the end of this
    month.
        Despite participation these international forums, over the last
    decade freedom in Azerbaijan has declined substantially. Overall, the
    country has gone from semi-free to a state of consolidated
    authoritarianism. In the Nations in Transit index published annually by
    Freedom House Azerbaijan shows a steep decline in every category of
    governance over the period from 2003 to 2013, with the overall score
    declining from 5.6 to 6.6. As a result, Azerbaijan is much closer to
    Uzbekistan's 6.9 rating than Georgia's 4.7.
        In an overall context of declining freedom, the last year has seen
    a particularly rapid backsliding especially with respect to political
    prisoners, freedom of speech, and pressure against NGOs. In 2013 there
    had been a marked increase in grass roots protests sparked by instances
    of official abuse of power and social injustice. In January and March
    2013 peaceful protests in Baku were violently dispersed, including the
    use of water cannons and rubber bullets. There were dozens of arrests
    and new prohibitions on freedom of assembly, on NGOs, and the media.
    This was the year of the presidential election and the crackdown was
    expected to diminish after those elections were held in October.
    However, it has continued unabated with long prison sentences handed
    down to civil society leaders.
        Recent events in Ukraine have major implications for Azerbaijan,
    and are seen as part of the reason that the crackdown on government
    critics has continued. Some have conjectured that the Maidan protests,
    which toppled the corrupt government of President Viktor Yanukovich in
    Ukraine may have rattled nerves in Baku. However, since Ilham Aliev
    came to power in 2003, there have been revolutions in Ukraine, one in
    neighboring Georgia, two in Kyrgyzstan, and several in the Middle East
    that have had no appreciable effect on Azerbaijan.
        There are two other dimensions of the crisis in Ukraine that have
    even greater significance for Azerbaijan. Russia's annexation of Crimea
    sets a worrisome precedent for the region and may have implications for
    Nagorno-Karabakh and other frozen conflicts. The annexation of Crimea
    means that Russia is the arbiter of borders on the territory of the
    former Soviet Union and can decide these questions unilaterally and
    arbitrarily.
        The crisis in Ukraine has also made the diversification of energy
    supplies a higher priority for Europe and a major opportunity for
    Azerbaijan to become a more significant regional transportation hub for
    gas. There has been a flurry of diplomatic activity by Baku to seek out
    more partners for various potential pipeline schemes. Baku is seizing
    the opportunities to extend its influence internally, while at home it
    is taking advantage of the crisis to silence government critics. The
    crisis in Ukraine has multifaceted implications for Baku, and for that
    reason Azerbaijan votes in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity
    at the UN, while domestically, the head of the presidential
    administration Ramiz Mekhtiev tells the media that the revolution in
    Ukraine was instigated by international NGOs whose work in Azerbaijan
    is suspect and should be drastically curtailed.
        In the interest of time I am limiting my remarks to particularly
    egregious cases of political imprisonment and new onerous requirements
    against NGOs. It should be mentioned that there are numerous other
    problems related to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and
    elections. They are documented in numerous reports, including the ODIHR
    monitoring report of the October 2013 presidential election and the DOS
    Annual Human Rights Report, as well as numerous reports by Azerbaijani
    and international NGOs.
                              political prisoner:
        The number of political prisoners continues to grow. The Institute
    of Peace and Democracy in Baku documents 130 political prisoners
    including persons who have been in jail since the 1990s. Amnesty
    International has recognized 19 prisoners of conscience from among the
    activists arrested since January 2013. In September 2013 Human Rights
    Watch published a comprehensive report, Tightening the Screws:
    Azerbaijan's Crackdown of Civil Society and Dissent, which details
    spurious cases against activists, human rights defenders, and
    journalists. I'd like to draw your attention to just a few of these
    cases.
        In March 2014, two prominent opposition figures, journalist Tofiq
    Yaqublu of the Musavat party, and Ilgar Mammadov of REAL, were
    sentenced to five and seven year sentences on false charges of inciting
    rioting in the town Izmaily, where they in fact arrived a day after the
    riot had occurred. Both men are considered Amnesty International
    prisoners of conscience. In its May 2014 ruling in Mammadov's case, the
    European Court of Human Rights, found that Azerbaijan is in violation
    of articles of the convention, including Articles 5 and 18, and awarded
    damages to Ilgar Mammadov. The ECHR found that ``the actual purpose of
    the impugned measures was to silence or punish the applicant for
    criticising the Government and attempting to disseminate what he
    believed was the true information that the Government were trying to
    hide.'' The Committee of Ministers of the CE, which Azerbaijan now
    chairs, is supposed to oversee the implementation of the ECHR
    decisions.
        In May 2014, eight members of the youth movement NIDA, also
    considered AI prisoners of conscience, received sentences ranging from
    6-8 years. The members of the NIDA youth group organized protests
    against the deaths of Azeri Army conscripts in January and March 2013.
    The activists were disseminating criticisms of the government online,
    including Facebook and Twitter. NIDA activists were beaten and
    humiliated in detention and initially denied access to an attorney of
    their choice.
        Human Rights Watch has profiled the use of narcotics charges
    against opposition youth activists who apparently had drugs planted on
    them by police. In each instance a youth activist who posted materials
    critical of the government on social media was arrested for narcotics
    charges but was questioned about political views and activities. In
    separate incidents government critics were prosecuted on highly dubious
    charges of drug possession, tested negative for presence of drugs in
    their bodies, and were initially denied legal representation, and
    subjected to abuse in detention. Rashad Ramazanov, a well-known blogger
    got a nine year jail term; Taleh Bagirov an imam who criticized the
    government in his sermon was sentenced to two years, and Dashig
    Malikov, a activist with the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party, was
    sentenced to two and half years.
        The last case I will mention is of an outspoken critic of the
    government, Leyla Yunus, the Director of the Institute of Peace and
    Democracy, a major human rights monitoring organization and democracy
    think tank in Azerbaijan. Leyla Yunus has been active for two decades
    in many facets of human rights work, including assistance for political
    prisoners, working to reduce torture in detention, protecting women and
    religious and ethnic minorities. Leyla's husband Arif Yunus is a
    historian and political scientist and author of numerous books about
    Azerbaijan. Leyla Yunus's human rights works has repeatedly put her at
    odds with the government, which was most clearly on display in 2011
    when their house was demolished with all her possessions inside after
    she campaigned actively for the property rights of people arbitrarily
    evicted from their homes. In April 2014 Leyla Yunus was detained and
    questioned at length in connection with a case against Rauf Mirkadirov,
    an Azeri journalist detained under dubious treason charges for his
    participation in ``Track II'' meetings with Armenian colleagues. Both
    Leyla and Arif Yunus have participated in numerous such meetings which
    are seen by the OSCE mediators as an important avenue for seeking a
    peaceful resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. During the
    questioning, over a month ago, Leyla and Arif Yunus had their passports
    taken away. Since no charges have been filed against them and there are
    no formal barriers to travel, their passports should be returned and
    they should be permitted to attend conferences such as the OSCE meeting
    in Berne this week that they are unfortunately missing.
                                     media
        Freedom of information has also deteriorated. The government has
    control over broadcast media and most newspapers, and it is now trying
    to establish greater control over the internet. June 2013 amendments to
    the criminal code made defamation over the Internet a criminal offense
    carrying penalties of up to three years in jail. The amendments
    represent a major blow to freedom of expression making it possible to
    launch criminal cases against online activists. During the pre-election
    period Azerbaijan was jamming satellite signals of news programs in the
    Azeri language, including that of RFE/RL. Several journalists are
    serving politically motivated jail sentences including Avaz Zeynalli,
    the editor the opposition newspaper Khural, and Hilal Mammadov the
    editor of the Tolishi Sado newspaper.
                              freedom of religion
        Freedom of religion is another area where a decline has been
    documented. US Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
    has downgraded Azerbaijan to a Tier 2 country for the first time in
    2013. The Commission focuses its criticism on the 2009 Law on Religion
    which curtailed a range of religious activity, made unregistered
    religious activity illegal, and imposed extensive government censorship
    of religious literature. The law has been repeatedly amended to
    increase penalties and has led to numerous raids, detentions and
    arrests. In its 2014 report the USCIRF includes a list of 51 religious
    prisoners in Azerbaijan.
                             pressure against ngos
        The climate has also become much more difficult for NGOs.
    Amendments to the NGO law in February 2013 increased existing sanctions
    against unregistered NGO activity. It became illegal for unregistered
    groups to receive grants or donations. In conjunction with arbitrary
    refusal of registration, this places civic activists in an impossible
    position. The amendments also dramatically increase penalties for any
    NGO that does not register its grants. Another set of amendments that
    extends onerous requirements to international organizations was passed
    in February 2014. Grantees report months of effort with arbitrary
    bureaucracy to register their grants that are so far inconclusive.
    There is considerable apprehension that the regulations will be
    selectively enforced against organizations that are critical of the
    government.
        However even prior to these amendments, Azerbaijan was seen as
    violating freedom of association due to overregulation of NGOs. In a
    2011 opinion the Venice Commission found that the process for
    registering NGOs in Azerbaijan was too ``cumbersome, lengthy, and
    unpredictable.'' In five separate decisions the ECHR has found that
    Azerbaijan violates freedom of association by arbitrarily denying
    registration to NGOs. Azerbaijan should be bringing its legislation in
    compliance with ECHR and Venice Commission opinions rather than
    imposing even greater burdens on NGOs.
        The case of Anar Mammadli and Bashir Suleymanli of the Election
    Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS) illustrates the way
    these laws are used to silence critics of the government. EMDS is the
    most authoritative domestic vote monitoring organization in Azerbaijan
    and it has been attempting to register for over 5 years and has been
    denied each time. The organization attempted to sue the government to
    obtain registration but the courts refused to consider its case. Last
    year the EMDS entered into a contract with a registered NGO to carry
    out its activities. This arrangement became grounds for a criminal case
    against Anar Mammadli, the Chairman of EMDS, who was sentenced to 5.5
    years in jail and Bashir Suleymanli, the Executive Director, who was
    sentenced to 3.5 years. Mammadli and Suleymanli were profiled in detail
    in a recent Amnesty International report that also considers them
    prisoners of conscience.
                                   conclusion
        In closing, I am grateful to the Helsinki Commission for convening
    this hearing, which focuses attention on Azerbaijan at a very important
    moment. I hope that the Commission will remain equally engaged in the
    future by calling on the government of Azerbaijan to release political
    prisoners and repeal onerous new regulations against NGOs. Further, I
    would urge that the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE which will convene
    in Baku this year to include voices from Azerbaijan's embattled civil
    society in its deliberations. I would also urge Members of Congress who
    travel to Azerbaijan as part of the OSCE delegation or other
    congressional delegations to visit political prisoners in jail and meet
    with their families and attorneys. In the case of Leyla and Arif Yunus,
    who are being held in limbo, their passports should be returned and
    they should be permitted to travel internationally.
        Mr. Chairman, Azerbaijan has a longstanding democratic tradition,
    and in 1918 became the first democracy in the Muslim world. The civil
    society of Azerbaijan works to fulfill that legacy and remind the
    government of its OSCE commitments. These brave and talented people
    should be permitted to do their important work without harassment and
    intimidation.
        Thank you.
                      Prepared Statement of Brenda Shaffer

        Dear members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission,
        The Republic of Azerbaijan is a strategically important country
    that borders Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Azerbaijan is important to a
    number of wider U.S. foreign policy issues, including policy toward
    Russia, relations with Iran, nuclear non-proliferation, Middle Eastern
    regional security, and European energy security. In its two decades of
    independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan has stood together with the
    U.S. as an ally on almost every major policy issue, including by
    sending troops to serve together with U.S. forces in Kosovo, Iraq, and
    Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has also served as the main transit point of
    U.S. troops and equipment into Afghanistan. Most recently, Azerbaijan
    was one of the few states bordering Russia that joined the U.S.-led
    effort at the United Nations to condemn Moscow's annexation of Crimea.
        Over a third of the population of Iran is ethnically Azerbaijani;
    thus, developments in Azerbaijan affect developments in its neighbor to
    the south, including Iran's domestic stability. Azerbaijan is a Muslim-
    majority country that has not established any special status for Islam,
    observes complete separation of religion and state, and protects equal
    rights for citizens regardless of religious or ethnic origin. The
    Republic of Azerbaijan not only allows religious freedom, but observes
    freedom from religious coercion. During its short period of
    independence prior to being conquered by the USSR, Azerbaijan in 1918
    was the first Muslim-majority state to grant women suffrage, two years
    before the United States and long before most of Europe.
        Despite close cooperation between Azerbaijan and the United States
    on almost every strategic issue, relations between Washington and Baku
    are very complicated and occasionally tenuous. In this testimony, I
    will discuss Azerbaijan's strategic foreign policy approach, its
    relations with a number of its neighbors (Russia, Iran, and Armenia),
    trends in the South Caucasus region, and suggestions for how the U.S.
    can best support its national interests in the South Caucasus region.
                          azerbaijan's foreign policy
        Developments in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus are strongly
    influenced by regional and global powers: the region is located at the
    crossroads of two continents and borders three important geopolitical
    actors: Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Due to its strategic location, the
    region is a focus of geopolitical competition.
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Azerbaijan possesses a strong strategic orientation toward the
    United States and Europe, but is also mindful of the constraints of its
    neighborhood. Consequently, Baku attempts to maintain a potentially
    treacherous balancing act in its policies one that allows close
    cooperation with the U.S. without encouraging the wrath of its
    potentially dangerous neighbors, Iran and Russia. As a Muslim-majority
    country, Azerbaijan maintains close cultural ties with many Muslim-
    majority states, but religious and cultural factors play no role in
    determining the state's alliances or main strategies of cooperation. In
    fact, one of Azerbaijan's closest alliances is with Israel. Azerbaijan
    is Israel's largest supplier of oil, and the two states share strategic
    cooperation on a number of issues.
        Azerbaijan is rich in oil and natural gas reserves, and its
    exporting of these petroleum resources westward has been a major
    feature of its foreign policy since independence. Azerbaijan is among
    the top twenty oil producers in the world, producing close to a million
    barrels a day (850,000 barrels of which are exported). Azerbaijan also
    exports natural gas to most of its neighbors and will soon play an
    important role in enhancing Europe's energy security. At the end of
    2013, Azerbaijan and a number of international investors announced
    their final investment decision on the Southern Gas Corridor, which is
    designed to bring Azerbaijan's natural gas volumes into Europe. This
    ambitious project will provide the first new volumes of natural gas
    into Europe in decades and allow a number of states along the route to
    improve the security of their energy supply and lower their dependence
    on Russia. This $45 billion project that crosses seven countries and
    six regulatory jurisdictions is being built in such a way that it can
    easily be expanded, and can thus transit additional volumes of gas from
    new sources in the future. At the same time, adjoining pipelines can be
    built to reach additional markets that need to improve their security
    of supply, such as the Balkans. The Southern Corridor will be the
    catalyst for natural gas interconnectors in Southern Europe. For a
    number of years, the European Union has spoken about the importance of
    interconnectors, and this project has encouraged the development of
    these connecting pipelines between different European countries.
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Azerbaijan could have sold its natural gas at a higher profit to
    neighboring Iran and Russia, but embarked on this ambitious project in
    order to link itself with Europe and lower its dependence on these
    neighboring states. This strategic choice entails closer cooperation
    with Europe, Turkey and the U.S., but also elicits potentially negative
    responses from Russia and Iran.
        Since Azerbaijan's independence with the breakup of the Soviet
    Union, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been the
    major focus of its national security and foreign policies. This
    conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan started on the eve of the
    Soviet breakup, as ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan's province of
    Nagorno-Karabakh rallied to join Armenia. Moscow played the newly
    independent Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other, turning a local
    dispute over the status of a territory inhabited by 90,000 people into
    a regional war from 1992 to 1994. Eventually, Armenia was victorious,
    and it took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other Azerbaijani
    districts. As a result of the war, Armenia now occupies 20 percent of
    the territory of Azerbaijan (as legally recognized by the U.S.
    government), and close to one million Azerbaijani refugees and
    internally displaced persons were left homeless.
                         relations with russia and iran
        Azerbaijan borders--and has challenging relations with both Russia
    and Iran. Moscow seeks to limit Azerbaijan's cooperation with the
    United States and Europe, an approach it takes with most of the former
    Soviet states. Moscow has tried to block Azerbaijan's energy export
    projects westward, and has attempted to coerce Baku to route its energy
    resources to Russia.
        At the same time, Azerbaijan's neighbor to the south, Iran, also
    works to undermine Azerbaijan's stability. Iran is a multi-ethnic
    state, and its domestic security could be affected by developments in
    the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan.1 Half of Iran's population is
    comprised of non-Persian ethnic minorities, with the Azerbaijanis the
    largest group at close to one-third of the country's population. The
    majority of residents in the northwestern provinces of Iran, contiguous
    to the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan, are Azerbaijanis. One
    reason that Iran supports Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan is
    that it prefers Azerbaijan to be embroiled in a conflict and
    consequently unable to serve as a source of support or emulation for
    the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran.
        As part of its policy of undermining Azerbaijan's security, Tehran
    has supported Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan and engaged in
    broad security, military, and economic cooperation with Yerevan since
    1992. During the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran supplied
    Armenia with fuel and food and allowed the flow of arms and goods
    through its territory to Armenia.
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Tehran has also sponsored a number of terrorist cells and attempted
    terrorist attacks inside Azerbaijan, with targets that have included
    the U.S. embassy, the U.S. ambassador, the Israeli ambassador and local
    Jewish institutions in Baku. Due to its long and heavily crossed border
    with Azerbaijan, Tehran frequently attempts to use Azerbaijani
    territory to carry out attacks on Western, Israeli, and Jewish targets.
         the caucasus: conflict, domestic politics, and foreign powers
        In the South Caucasus region--as in most of the areas of the former
    Soviet Union that border Russia--domestic politics, foreign policy, and
    military conflicts are intertwined. Most of the powers involved in the
    South Caucasus, especially Russia and Iran, use threats to the
    stability of the region's governments and violent conflicts as tools to
    promote their influence and interests.
        To promote its dominance over bordering states, Russia has proved
    ready to use military force (as it has in Ukraine and Georgia); to work
    through electoral processes and civil society organizations (Russian
    citizens ran in recent elections to lead Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
    Latvia) to get its way; and to promote separatists as a lever of
    influence (as it has done in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and
    Azerbaijan). If the United States is going to succeed in promoting
    conflict resolution and democratization in the region, as well as its
    own security interests, it must recognize this dynamic of regional
    politics.
        External support was a key factor in the emergence of the conflicts
    that appeared in the Caucasus during the post-Soviet period. In the
    former Soviet Union, there were hundreds of disjunctures where ethnic
    and political borders did not line up, but ethnic conflicts only broke
    out (with the exception of Chechnya), where Russia supported the
    secessionist forces. These conflicts cannot be resolved only through
    agreement between the secessionist forces and the country they have
    broken away from, but their strategic backer has to be on board. These
    conflicts are not ethnic conflicts, but proxy wars between Russia and
    in most cases forces that want stronger integration with the West. The
    conflicts in the Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh, continue to
    provide outside powers with significant leverage in the region.
        In the last two decades, the United States has actively supported
    efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and
    Armenia, within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is
    composed of representatives of Russia, the United States, and France.
    These efforts have failed primarily because the United States has
    treated Armenia and Azerbaijan as the primary protagonists in the
    dispute while ignoring Russia's role in prolonging the conflict. For
    example, successive U.S. secretaries of state and special negotiators
    have criticized the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan for ``not
    preparing their people for peace,'' as the leaders of the Minsk Group
    chided last year, and for failing to reach an agreement. The U.S. has
    granted millions of dollars to aid to programs aimed at ``building ties
    between the two societies,'' but has never formed a strategy for
    dealing with Moscow because, until the Crimea invasion, Washington
    never acknowledged the extent to which Moscow uses ethnic conflicts
    around the region as a lever of influence.
        On May 7, the U.S. representative to the OSCE Minsk Group,
    Ambassador James Warlick, made an important statement articulating the
    long-standing U.S. policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.2 This
    statement and continued U.S. interest in resolving the conflict are
    important for the prosperity of the South Caucasus and for removing a
    lever of Russian and other foreign influence in the region. Moscow will
    undermine any peace agreement that it does not view in its interest,
    regardless of the stances of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
    current status quo of no war, no peace serves Russian interests. The
    U.S. should stop blaming the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan for the
    dispute and start thinking about how to mitigate Russian opposition to
    settlement by identifying Russian interests that could be served
    through resolution of the conflict. Successive U.S. administrations,
    whether Republican or Democrat, have been loath to bargain with Russia
    on strategic issues. They have preferred instead to operate on the
    level of principles (such as ``state sovereignty'' and ``the
    inapplicability of use of force.''). However, trade-offs are necessary
    in order to achieve security and allow prosperity in the post-Soviet
    region.
        In addition, to further support conflict resolution, the US should
    support Ankara's policy of linking the opening of the border between
    Armenia and Turkey to significant advancement in the Nagorno--Karabakh
    peace process. While increased trade between Armenia and Turkey will be
    a good development and in the long run could help reduce Yerevan's
    dependence on Moscow, this trade should be used as a force for peace.
    Peace cannot be accomplished without some significant Armenian
    withdrawal of the occupied territories. The only incentive that Yerevan
    has to compromise, with the exception of threat of war, is the desire
    to open the border with Turkey. Thus, the link of the border issue to
    some compromise on the Nagorno--Karabakh conflict can be used to
    facilitate trade and at the same time avert war.
        In the states that border Russia, there is an overlap between
    domestic politics and foreign intervention. While the U.S. and the
    Soviet Union battled it out during the 1970s through intra-state wars
    in the developing world, today elections and the funding of NGOs and
    political movements have replaced the proxy wars. During a presentation
    this year in Washington, D.C., a senior Georgian official pointed out
    that Russia has recently begun funding NGOs in Georgia to campaign for
    Georgian membership in Moscow's Eurasian Economic Union instead of the
    EU Partnership Program. Leaders of NGOs and opposition political
    movements in the South Caucasus have proudly stated that they take
    money from Iran, Russia, and foreign religious organizations--from
    whomever will help them get into power. These groups have accepted
    outside assistance even when the agendas of these foreign states and
    organizations contradict their own state's national sovereignty and the
    long-term democratic development of the South Caucasus states. The
    long-standing U.S. policy that rests on the premise that a ``vibrant
    civil society creates stability'' ignores the fact that in many parts
    of the world, elements of civil society are connected to foreign
    countries, which have no interest in democracy or stability.
        relations with the united states: challenges and moving forward
        While U.S. officials frequently acknowledge the important role that
    Azerbaijan plays in security issues that are of concern to the United
    States, understanding security needs should be a two-way street.
    Washington should also address Baku's security needs and its complex
    strategic environment, where both the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
    Azerbaijan's domestic political arena serve as theaters for Russia and
    other neighboring powers to promote their interests.
        Washington's actions also often contradict its own long-standing
    and clearly articulated policies on the region. For instance, the U.S.
    government officially recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent
    seven regions as under Armenian occupation. Yet, at the urging of
    leading Armenian-American political organizations, Congress imposed
    sanctions on Azerbaijan in 1992 that have not been removed in over
    twenty years. Congress also annually earmarks funds for the
    secessionist local government in Nagorno-Karabakh. These allocations
    are in violation of U.S. law, since they support settlement activity in
    occupied territories. Congressional allocations to Nagorno-Karabakh are
    equivalent to the idea of earmarking funds for Israeli settlements in
    the occupied West Bank or for the Russian-sponsored local government in
    Crimea, clearly actions that Congress would not consider taking.
    However, annually Congress approves the earmark to the occupied
    territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
        In the past two decades, the U.S. has asked for Azerbaijan to join
    it in security initiatives that were important to Washington. Baku has
    always answered these U.S. requests, despite the fact that they often
    prompted serious responses and consequences from Russia and Iran. Now,
    as the Obama Administration hopes to improve relations with Tehran and
    disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq, it should uphold good relations
    with its allies in the region and not let these states be destabilized
    as payback for their cooperation with the U.S. For the United States to
    succeed in maintaining security and promoting its interests in the
    region with a smaller actual presence on the ground, it will need its
    allies more than ever. Washington should prioritize its good relations
    with states like Azerbaijan, so that Baku will be able to help its
    allies in the future.
                    multi-ethnic iran's azerbaijani minority
         Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and over 50 percent of its
    population is non-Persian. Azerbaijanis are the largest ethnic minority
    in Iran, comprising over a third of the country's population.
         Iran's ethnic minorities are concentrated in its border
    provinces, and these groups share cross-border ties with co-ethnics in
    the neighboring states of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and
    Turkmenistan.
         Many prominent figures in Iran are ethnic Azerbaijanis,
    including Iran's spiritual leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei, and the head of
    Iran's opposition Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi.
         Even though Azerbaijanis share the Shiite faith and a long
    history of common statehood with Iran's Persian majority, Tehran does
    not allow Azerbaijanis in Iran to operate schools or universities in
    their native language or use the Azerbaijani language in government
    institutions.
         In addition to shared ethnic and cultural ties, many
    Azerbaijanis from both sides of the border share family ties and engage
    in trade with each other.
         Among the approximately 25 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in
    Iran, there is a broad diversity of attitudes toward the Iranian state.
    Some Azerbaijanis comprise a core part of Iran's ruling elite, while
    others strive for language and cultural rights. But a segment of
    Azerbaijanis in Iran, especially young people openly identify as
    Azerbaijanis, oppose Persian-centered rule and struggle against the
    ruling regime.

                                      [all]

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