[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE OSCE
MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 16, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SENATE
HOUSE
BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland, CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
Chairman Co-Chairman
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
TOM UDALL, New Mexico ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas New York
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE OSCE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS
----------
JULY 16, 2014
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Alcee Hastings, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 3
Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 4
WITNESSES
William Roebuck, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Egypt and Maghreb
Affairs, Department of State................................... 4
William Taylor, Vice President for Middle East and Africa, United
States Institute for Peace (USIP).............................. 13
Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development,
University of Maryland......................................... 15
Zeinab Abdelkarim, Regional Director for Middle East and North
Africa, International Foundation for Electoral Systems......... 19
APPENDICES
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin Cardin....................... 31
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alcee Hastings........................ 33
Prepared Statement of William Roebuck............................ 34
Prepared Statement of William Taylor............................. 38
Prepared Statement of Shibley Telhami............................ 40
Prepared Statement of Zeinab Abdelkarim.......................... 42
POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE OSCE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS
----------
JULY 16, 2014
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 10:00 a.m. to 11:47 a.m. in
Capitol Visitor Center Room SVC 203/202, Washington, D.C.,
Senator Benjamin Cardin, Chairman of the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Steve
Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe; and Hon. Alcee Hastings, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: William Roebuck, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Egypt and Maghreb Affairs, Department of State;
William Taylor, Vice President for Middle East and Africa,
United States Institute for Peace (USIP); Shibley Telhami,
Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of
Maryland; Zeinab Abdelkarim, Regional Director for Middle East
and North Africa, International Foundation for Electoral
Systems.
HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Well, welcome to the Helsinki Commission
hearing. I want to welcome everyone here. It's a pleasure to
have this hearing on the OSCE, ``Political Pluralism in the
OSCE Mediterranean Partners,'' and I'm particularly pleased
that Congressman Hastings is with us because--Alcee, the
ranking Democrat on the Helsinki Commission in the House, has
been the leader on the Mediterranean partnership issues, and he
has invested a great deal of time by his personal visits to the
region. And the last hearing that we had on the Mediterranean
partnership was in 2009, I've been told, and that was coupled
with the international seminar of parliamentarians from the
region that Congressman Hastings organized, and one of the
most, I think, productive discussions that we had that led to
some very concrete proposals, so it's good now that we have
another opportunity to evaluate where we are.
And let me just make a couple brief opening comments, and
then I'm going to turn it to my colleague for his comments. The
OSCE, as I think everyone here knows, consists of 57
participating states. But that's not the borders of the OSCE
influence, as is clear from the Partners for Co-operation that
we do have. And we do have, in the Mediterranean, Algeria,
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia that are Partners
for Co-operation. And they recognize the value of the OSCE
document. They understood that this is a consensus
organization, so you're not giving up any of your sovereignty
by being--participating in the OSCE. They recognize the value
of the OSCE in dialogue, to sit down and talk with your
neighbors and resolve issues. And they recognize the core
principles of the OSCE that deal with issues of respect of
territorial integrity, that deal with peaceful resolutions of
conflicts, and the core values that recognize that security is
not just your military might, but also your commitment to
economic justice and your commitment to good governance and
human rights. And that's why the Helsinki OSCE principles have
been so widely desired and has had a major impact within the
Mediterranean partnership itself.
Coming out of the seminar that I referred to in 2009 that
Congressman Hastings was instrumental in convening, that
seminar recommended functional partnership initiatives with our
Mediterranean partners, including projects for youth exchange
and broader accessibility of the OSCE initiatives for
participants from the region. Our efforts also identified
priorities for more leadership of the Mediterranean partnership
from the region, which has become particularly relevant with
the emerging empowerment of long-disenfranchised voices of
political opposition.
The OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly have been able to
generate unique opportunities for assistance in this new area
of regional cooperation. For example, the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly was able to deploy an observation and assistance
mission for the October 2011 elections to the Tunisian
Constituent National Assembly. So they're using our mechanisms
as a result of the initiatives that the Helsinki Commission has
moved forward with on the Mediterranean partners.
The OSCE has been able facilitate exchanges with young
diplomats from the region to serve in the OSCE Secretariat. And
additionally, key materials from the thematic units of the OSCE
and ODIHR have been translated into Arabic. So we think we've
made a lot of progress in this region. Civil society and
experts from the region have become increasingly active in the
OSCE events and dialogue opportunities, coupled with expert
visits from the OSCE institutions to advise governments as they
review their structural reforms.
All of these activities have been possible through the OSCE
Partnership Fund of extraordinary budget contributions from
participating states and partners. These activities truly
demonstrate the depth of the relationship stemming back to
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and leading us into the future.
I might just point out that in Baku, the 23rd annual
Parliamentary Assembly meeting that took place just a few days
ago, the partners were very much present, and we had very good
discussions, and they were totally engaged in the work. They
don't have a vote, but they were totally engaged in the work.
They treat their partnership with OSCE as a real opportunity
for progress in their countries.
And I might just add: The experience of the Mediterranean
partners has generated a lot of interest in other regions of
the world to use the OSCE framework. As we all know, President
Park of the Republic of Korea, when she addressed a joint
session of Congress, mentioned that she would like to have a
dialogue opportunity with the countries in the Northeast Asia
region. As a result of that suggestion, I have followed up with
the countries in Northeast Asia. I chair the Asian--Northeast
Asia--the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. I have followed up, and we are
engaged to see whether they want to work within the OSCE itself
or set up a similar mechanism for dialogue and cooperation.
So we're very proud of the progress that we have made and
this hearing gives us an opportunity to hear firsthand from
some--from experts as to how we can build on the success that
we've made, planning into the future.
And with that, let me turn it over to Congressman Hastings
for his comments.
HON. ALCEE HASTINGS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Senator. I think you've
summed up real adequately a number of our activities. I'd like
to thank you for holding this hearing, in addition to thank our
presenters who are here as well as our distinguished guests
that are present.
I spent a number of years traveling among all of our
Mediterranean partners on behalf of several different OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly presidents. And even before the Arab
awakening, I sought, along with others, to empower the voices
of the disenchanted in the region and to press those who were
in power to let pluralism flourish. From Rabat to Cairo to
Algiers to Oman, I observed a common thirst for meaningful
civic engagement.
The popular uprisings since the end of 2010 have shown the
need for capacity development among the youthful population of
the region, and I think all of us are mindful that each of our
Mediterranean partners are full up with young people. And it
was difficult sometimes to see so many, particularly young men,
in Morocco and in Tunisia and Algiers and Egypt and throughout
unemployed.
The senator has talked about the conference that we
convened here in Washington, and we're fortunate to have had an
extraordinary staff working with us in that regard, and Alex
Johnson helped, along with Robert Hand and countless others,
Marlene Kaufman, and we've done a lot of follow-up work, Mr.
Roebuck. For example, I took an interest in refugee issues, and
I might add it is only heightened by ongoing events in that
area of the world today. And I perceive some serious
difficulties if we do not address, in a meaningful way, not
just humanitarian issues, but other concerns of countries
having to absorb these numbers of refugees.
I smile at events--today, we are talking 50,000 or 60,000
people on our border. Would that someone would be on the
Jordanian border and see how many people have a quest to get in
from Syria and Iraq and from elsewhere.
Mediterranean partner states are beginning to come to the
table and invest in the OSCE Partnership Fund. Morocco and
Tunisia have even requested legal reviews for their structural
reforms from the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights, ODIHR. As I have recommended for years,
investments are underway for youth exchanges and greater
contributions from civil society in the region, and I applaud
these efforts and especially look to our panel to remark on how
we can do better, acknowledging the demographic trends and
political realities.
I'd be remiss to not mention the violent conflicts in Iraq
and Syria, which have displaced millions and vastly changed the
political landscape of the region. We are on a dark trajectory
if we don't strategically invest in positive civic engagement
and much-needed educational resources for those vulnerable
populations. As I've said over and over, if we don't engage
those populations, we will see them again in another form, and
their demands will not be met through peaceful political
channels.
I look forward to our panelists on the role of the United
States and the international community in affirming the
aspirations of those who took to the streets demanding
responsive government and basic civil liberties. I have had
substantial meetings with Tunisians recently, and I suspect
that of all of the countries in the region as far as pluralism
is concerned, Tunisia at this moment is a little more advanced
in addressing the subject, as well as Morocco is as well.
But anyway, I'm so glad you're here. I see Ambassador
Taylor just walked in, so we'll hear from him a little bit. We
met along the way. Anyway, thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Congressman Hastings.
I should point out, of course Congressman Hastings was the
president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and now represents
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as the special representative
for the Mediterranean Partners.
Congressman Cohen.
HON. STEVE COHEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cohen. I just want to thank the chairman for putting
together this panel. This is a very important part of the world
and I'm here to learn. And I'm happy to see Mr. Roebuck here.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you. Well, our first panel consists of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
for Egypt and the Maghreb Bill Roebuck, a distinguished career
Foreign Service officer with experience throughout the region,
including service at a pivotal time as charge d'affaires in
Tripoli, as well as the head of the Political Section acting
deputy chief of mission in Damascus. Thank you for being here.
And as is the tradition of this committee, your written
statements and all the written statements from the witnesses,
without objections, will be included in the record. And you may
proceed as you wish.
WILLIAM ROEBUCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EGYPT, AND
MAGHREB AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Roebuck. Great. Thank you, Chairman Cardin. Congressman
Hastings, Congressman Cohen, thank you very much. I will make a
brief oral statement and then I welcome answering any questions
you might have. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you
today on North Africa. It's a particular honor for me to do so
before the U.S. Helsinki Commission.
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt of course all
participate in the OSCE Mediterranean Partners Forum, which
provides an avenue for engagement with the OSCE, its
institutions and the 57 participating states in promoting a
vision of comprehensive security that includes political,
military, economic, and environmental and human dimensions. We
welcome initiatives such as this one that make important
contributions to promoting democratic transitions and
bolstering regional stability.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, North Africa is a region of
tremendous potential, the birthplace of the Arab Awakening, or
Arab Spring. It's currently undergoing a difficult but critical
transition, the likes of which it has not experienced since the
beginning of decolonization. And each country in our region is
at a different stage along the path of democratic transition.
Let me speak just briefly about each country in North Africa
that we'll deal with.
Tunisia, as Congressman Hastings mentioned, has achieved
much success already and continues to realize the democratic
promise of its 2011 revolution. It's made positive strides with
the ratification of a new constitution and the swearing in of
an independent government that will lead it to elections later
in 2014. However, it still faces a challenge from violent
extremists, particularly Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, that seek
to counter its democratic transition; thwart the government's
authority; insert an extreme form of Islam through harassment,
incitement of violence and terrorist acts. We commend the
government's efforts so far to counter this threat and we're
optimistic about Tunisia's democratic transition.
Libya, on the other hand, faces many difficulties and I
think we must take the long view in assessing Libya's progress
towards democracy. After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya
suffers from instability and poor governance. And these are
challenges that Libya must confront, not alone but alongside
those of the international community, particularly the
partners, who have been heavily involved like ourselves, and
Libyans themselves. We will work together to bring stability
and security to Libya's fledgling democratic transition.
Libya is making progress, evidenced by its recent free and
fair elections for a new Council of Representatives. This is
the third successful set of elections that Libya has held since
2012. These elections represent an important milestone in
Libya's path towards achieving the aspirations of its February
17 Revolution. Equally important for Libya is the work
currently being undertaken by the Constitutional Drafting
Assembly, which was also elected back in February.
On the bilateral relationship with Morocco, we have a very
strong bilateral relationship. It's focused on promoting
regional stability, supporting democratic reform efforts,
countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade and
cultural ties. Indeed, Morocco is one of our closest
counterterrorism partners in the region. It's an active member
of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and it's been a non-
major--a major non-NATO ally since 2004. From an assistance
perspective, our relationship with Morocco is robust and
supports a range of activities to increase political
participation, strengthen women's rights and counter violent
extremism.
Algeria and the United States also build on a strong
bilateral relationship, characterized by our shared interest in
combating terrorism and facilitating greater stability in the
region. Our cooperation with Algeria on a range of issues
further strengthens our relationship and provides greater
security in the region. We appreciate, for example, the work
that Algeria has done with Tunisia to combat smuggling and
terrorism, and we continue to encourage Algeria to use their
expertise and their capabilities to ensure greater stability in
the Maghreb and the Sahel, where Algeria can be a big player.
Lastly, Egypt faces tremendous political, economic and
security challenges. We believe a stable, prosperous and
democratic Egypt will make the strongest and most effective
partner as we pursue our shared interests. We do view Egypt as
a strategic, long-standing partner with us, and we are working
on that relationship. We share several crucial interests with
Egypt, including countering transnational threats of terrorism,
weapons trafficking, and maintaining regional stability on
several fronts. The foremost among them is peace with Israel.
At the same time, it's also critical that we encourage a
trajectory in Egypt that advances economic reform, democracy
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. And
these two policy imperatives are reflected in our assistance.
Through our economic assistance, we're seeking to demonstrate
our commitment to achieving prosperity and improving the lives
of the Egyptian people. And through our military assistance,
we're helping Egypt protect its borders and counter violent
extremism that threatens Egypt and the broader region. We also
continue to engage diplomatically with Egypt and the broader
region, but particularly with the Egyptian government, to
underscore the need for democratic and economic reform, and we
continue to work closely with Congress to ensure that our
assistance supports broad strategic interests in Egypt and in
the region.
These are historic times in North Africa and the U.S.
government is working with our partners to assist and to
provide support during this transition. Chairman Cardin,
Congressmen, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. Certainly we are aware that our budgets are
facing increasing pressure, but this region remains vital to
protecting our national interests. With careful, targeted
assistance and smart diplomatic engagement, we're successfully
advancing our strategic interests in this region. Thank you
again for your time and your attention, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you for your testimony and thank
you for your service. Let me at least get your view as to how
helpful OSCE can be in Northern Africa particularly. We know
that they have governance issues and election issues. ODIHR
provides incredible help to member states of OSCE in regards to
those issues. We know they have free media issues. We have a
special representative for the media. We know that they have
tolerance problems. We had the special representatives that
deal with the different tolerance areas.
Has the OSCE been effective in Northern Africa, and can it
be more effective in trying to accomplish the goals that you
elaborated, which is basically good governance and stability
and stronger allies for the United States?
Mr. Roebuck. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, for the--for
the question. The answer is yes. I think the OSCE and the
partners have been--it has been an effective organization. It
has--it has already done, I think, several things that have
been successful in strengthening governance, helping with civil
society. I'll just lay out a couple of examples of what they've
been able to do.
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has
been engaged with these partner countries, as you mentioned.
This office gathered government and civil society
representatives in Warsaw, for example. And these were
representatives from Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt for
basically workshops on human rights and the democracy dimension
that can help in these regions.
The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has
also trained election observers in several of these countries,
and these observers have played a critical role in ensuring
that these elections in Tunisia, for example, in Morocco and
Egypt, were technically acceptable and, generally speaking,
free and fair. They have also worked with women's participation
in political processes, which is a very important area, and
gender equality.
I do think there are areas where we can do further
cooperation. You mentioned, for example, work with media. I
think that's a very important area where there could be
cooperation. A lot of these countries struggle with trying to
develop free media. And the work that we're doing in these
countries, and they're struggling with, continues on good
governance, organizing elections, and strengthening civil
society. In all these areas I think there's tremendous area for
further cooperation.
Mr. Cardin. You mentioned Libya in your review. Is it worth
exploring a partnership of Libya and OSCE? There have been
other countries that have shown an interest of affiliating with
OSCE. I'm not aware of Libya's interest. Is that something we
should be encouraging?
Mr. Roebuck. Yes, sir, I believe it is. Libya is interested
in joining the partnership. In fact, they have--I believe they
have put forward an application to do so. It requires, I
believe, a consensus decision, so it's still being deliberated
but we're strongly supportive of including Libya.
As I noted in my opening remarks, Libya is a country that
faces tremendous challenges going forward in terms of
governance, in terms of establishing basic security, protecting
its borders, getting control of violent extremists who are
using ungoverned space in Libya. And we believe that a
partnership--that this is one example--participating in the
Mediterranean Partnership with OSCE is one example of trying to
bring Libya into--further into the international community,
integrating it more closely with its neighbors.
It's going to have to rely very closely with its neighbors
and with help from partners in Europe as it moves forward to
try to grapple with security challenges like controlling its
borders and also with governance--building good governance
institutions inside Libya. So we're strongly supportive of
Libya becoming further engaged with the OSCE.
Mr. Cardin. The conflict in Syria, and now with the
problems in Iraq, are having major impact on partner countries.
Jordan is directly affected by this. Egypt is directly affected
by this. And obviously the underlying problems spill out to all
of the partner countries. Can you just give us your assessment
as to what these conflicts meant in regards to advancing OSCE
principles in the partner countries?
Mr. Roebuck. I'll say a few words about these conflicts in
Syria and Iraq. It's a little outside my area of expertise but
I'll comment on the way they affect the countries in North
Africa and the Maghreb, and I'll be happy to provide any
further information you would like.
A couple of points. First, the situations in Syria and Iraq
have, I think, more than anything else, created a counter-
narrative to the Arab Spring democratic transitions. And this
has been--this is--this has helped undercut, in some ways, the
progress that these countries in North Africa made in 2011 to
2012 and into 2013. In some ways Iraq was a legacy situation
that had already--the war had already taken place. Syria in
some ways was an Arab Spring-type development in the beginning.
But both these--both these countries have developed in
different ways. The conflicts there have developed in ways that
have created a counter-narrative to the Arab Spring democratic
transition, and this has been problematic.
In addition to that, of course, these conflicts have
spawned the increase in violent extremism. It was already a
problem in the region. I think it's gotten a new footing in the
region because of these conflicts. And finally, it's created
humanitarian and refugee issues that have actually had
spillover effect into North Africa. Libya, Egypt and Morocco,
for example, are all dealing with refugee issues that have--
Syrian refugees that have come to escape that conflict.
They're also dealing with jihadi elements in their own
countries that want to go and fight in these conflicts. Iraq
was a source for this, a magnet for this earlier, but Syria is
a--is a strong, strong magnet for it now. They go and fight for
a year or two in Syria then come back to these countries and
pose major security challenges in a country like Morocco, for
example. The countries are struggling to deal with this through
operational counterterrorism means, through soft-side
countering violent extremist ideology, and through regional
counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you.
Congressman Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you very much, Secretary Roebuck.
I want to take advantage of the fact that you and
Ambassador Taylor are here and have had rather extraordinary
experiences in your respective capacities and roles in not just
an area of vital interest that we have pointed to about
pluralism with our Mediterranean partners, but I can't let
events in the last three days--and it seems a lot of times when
we schedule matters, events kind of overtake matters, but in
this instance the two of you have had experiences in Gaza and
in the West Bank. And in previous years when difficulties
occurred, or in the Mubarak era with Egypt, Egypt played a
rather pivotal role in helping to quiet the ongoing events in
the respective years that those events exploded.
Now we see an even worse situation, quite frankly. And the
question I guess I have is there a role that Egypt can play,
and what, if anything, from the perspective of the United
States, can we do to assist in trying to bring some peaceful
resolution and political resolution to ongoing problems that
exist between Israel and Hamas?
One of the concerns I have, of course, is that a different
role seems to be taking place in Egypt, and specifically as it
pertains to Hamas, they've cut off, rightly, I think, a lot of
the channels that had been open, the tunnels and--in the Sinai,
a couple of things along those lines. But just give me your
take, and I'll stick to Egypt because I don't think that they
are the only ones that ought to weigh in. I certainly think
Qatar and Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which aren't a part
of this particular matter today, have significant roles to
play. But how can we activate it? How can we, with LCC, get he
and others involved, in light of the fact that they have
ongoing conflicts in their own countries?
Mr. Roebuck. Thank you, Congressman Hastings. First I would
say that we do believe that Egypt can play a role in helping to
de-escalate the situation in Gaza and with regard to Hamas and
its conflict with Israel that's ongoing. We have talked with
the Egyptians about this. Secretary Kerry has raised this
issue. We believe that the Egyptian government wants to be
helpful and that they have the capability of doing so.
As you note, historically they have had the ability to work
with Hamas as a mediating-type influence that can de-escalate.
It's true that in the last few years, because of Arab Spring
developments, they have been more absorbed internally, with
internal developments, and that this to some degree may have
affected their--at least their focus. But we still believe that
they have the capability to play this role, and they've
indicated a willingness to do so, and we've asked them to help
out, and they are doing so and counseling both sides, but
particularly Hamas, to de-escalate.
With regard to the broader aspect of your question about
their efforts in the Sinai and on counterterrorism there, the
current government has been very active in the Sinai, a very
up-tempo set of operations. They have closed a lot of these
tunnels that have been used for smuggling into Gaza. They have
mounted counterterrorism operations against some of these
extremist groups like Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, and they've had
some success against these groups. And we want to be supportive
of these efforts.
So overall, focus has been a bit internal, but we believe
they can help, and we have asked them to do so and believe they
will do so.
Mr. Hastings. I appreciate that. Just one--there are
several questions I wanted to ask about Egypt and the Islamist
issue and where you thought they were going to go with that,
but I'll pass on that because I really do believe that in
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, we have, in my judgment, an
opportunity to undertake to do some things perhaps in a more
unique fashion. For example, I would ask of you what role, if
any--and it may be early in their developing pluralism, but
what role, if any, do you see trade playing? And I see
opportunities with reference particularly to Tunisia, and I
would make one added comment. You and Senator Cardin mentioned
Libya, and you also mentioned border control. While it is a
major concern for us in our own country controlling our own
borders, the simple fact of the matter is, for example, in
Tunisia, Libyan matters, not just the terrorist matters, but
refugees as well, spill over. The same thing comes to Tunisia
from Mali and that area. Those problems spill over.
And I think if anything, we could begin thinking about
trade, at least talk about it, and two, that we could do what
we can with these respective countries to assist them in border
security, recognizing the limitations that we have. And there's
a lot in this. I'll--we've gone in one of our funds for support
from $4 million to $500,000. That's just a real small amount of
money, and I don't know how you and others coordinate it, but
it would seem to me that we--if there was ever a time when the
agencies who are directly involved need to be coordinating
their activities, it would be now.
Mr. Roebuck. Thank you, sir. On the--let me start with the
border issue, and then I'll go back to the trade issue.
I agree with you completely about the imperative of trying
to help these countries with their border challenges. You're
absolutely correct that part of the internal security problems
that Tunisia faces are caused by spillover from Libya.
Terrorists in Tunisia are fleeing into Libya and finding
ungoverned space they can use for training camps and for safe
haven and then going back across that border to, when they can,
mount operations against the Tunisian government.
We're working with the Tunisian government. We're working
with the Libyan government also on trying to shore up border
security efforts. We have a significant border security effort
with Libya that we're getting off the ground. It's a--Global
Security counterterrorism--Contingency Fund, GSCF, which will
cooperate with an EU effort on the borders in Libya. It's going
to be a big challenge, and it's going to take years to get it
under--they're--basically, their border control mechanisms have
collapsed. So it's going to be a big challenge. In Tunisia, we
are also doing border security efforts with the Ministry of
Defense and the Ministry of Interior through some of our 1200
series programs, 1207, 1206, that type of thing.
So it's a huge challenge, and then the other way that we
try to tackle the borders is through regional efforts, which
can also be effective through the--like, the trans-Sahara
counterterrorism partnership is one avenue that we use for
this. But we do need to redouble our efforts. It's a huge
challenge.
On the trade side, I agree with you, trade and promoting
economic development, private sector development, job
creation--these types of efforts are critical. Youth
unemployment in many of these countries is over 50, 60 percent,
and the populations of these countries is about 50 percent
youth. So huge numbers of these young people, particularly
young males who might be tempted by more extremist ideology,
are not gainfully employed, so that's one subset of the whole
trade and economic revitalization effort that's needed.
We have a free trade agreement with Morocco. It has boosted
trade on both sides significantly. We have trade and investment
framework agreements with Algeria and with Tunisia. The
Tunisians are interested in a free trade agreement. We have not
moved forward on that at this time, but we're working with them
to invigorate--reinvigorate the TIFA, the trade and investment
framework agreement. We also have an enterprise fund, Tunisia-
American Enterprise Fund, that's capitalized at, I think, a
hundred million dollars, and a similar fund in Egypt
capitalized at two or three times that size because of the
bigger size of the country.
So these are huge issues. Trade can be used to help
stabilize the situations in these countries and help with
governance and capacity-building of the youth, which is
critical.
Mr. Hastings. All right, thank you.
Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Cardin. Congressmen Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My main concern is ISIS. And I'm not that aware of their
tentacles. Do they have allies, cohorts, sympathizers
throughout the Maghreb?
Mr. Roebuck. They--it's not clear yet. There have been some
preliminary indications that the group I mentioned in the
Sinai, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, for example, which is a violent
Islamist extremist organization with some possible ties to--or
al-Qaida--there are indications recently that they have pledged
allegiance to ISIS. I would say that those reports so far are
very preliminary and might not end up being confirmed, but they
are out there.
If the situation in Iraq and Syria continues, that type of
influence could spread. I would say for right now, it's
relatively limited in the region. I would say the broader
trends that I mentioned, the flow of foreign fighters, the more
general rise of violent extremism are the two trends that are
more worrisome. I don't think they're specifically focused on
ISIS at this point, but that could develop.
Mr. Cohen. ISIS's goal, I guess, is they want to have a
state in Syria and Iraq, Islamic state. But I would think their
goal is to have a larger caliphate that encompasses the entire
region. Is that not something you would surmise as well?
Mr. Roebuck. That is what their ideology sort of ascribes
to, Congressman. I mean, there are different inflections of
that depending on which group it is you're talking about, but
that is a traditional ambition of these types of groups. My
sense is that for now what they've been able to achieve in
Syria and Iraq is a significant partial meeting of that
ambition. I wouldn't say they're satisfied with it, but I would
say that they have made significant gains towards that broader
Islamic caliphate-type ambition, and that's why it's so
important, the efforts that we are undertaking with others to
counter that effort.
Mr. Cohen. And what type of influence do they have in
Jordan, if any?
Mr. Roebuck. Congressman, on that one, I may have to get
back to you. I don't have the information at my fingertips. I
would--I mean, just in general terms, I would say because
Jordan is right on the border of both of these countries and
historically has been very influenced by developments in Syria
and Iraq, it's inevitable that--they're right on the front line
of what's going on. Border controls on the Iraq side, for
example, have fallen to these elements, and that inevitably
implicates Jordan immediately border control and how to deal
with these elements. I suspect there are also ideological
influences that are beginning to penetrate into Jordan. But
beyond that, I might have to defer to my experts on Jordan and
get back to you.
Mr. Cohen. The Arab Spring didn't hit Jordan and Morocco
particularly. Morocco was kind of a soft spring, but with kind
of reform, limited constitutional extensions. How secure do you
believe the monarchies are in those two countries from the same
aspirations that we saw exhibited in Tunisia and Libya and
Egypt?
Mr. Roebuck. Thank you, Congressman Cohen. I think the--in
some ways, the traditional monarchies have helped those
regimes, whether some of the instability and unrest that swept
through other parts of the Arab--North Africa and shaped the
Arab Spring. In Morocco, for example, I think the--that
monarchy is hundreds of years old, and I think it provided some
legitimacy to the government, and there's significant respect
for the monarchy there. And in--I think it sort of softened the
unrest that went through there. I also think that the king put
forward some reforms that helped take the--some of the force
out of the unrest that was developing in Morocco. He put
forward a series of reforms. They voted on a constitution that
had a lot of those reforms in them in 2011, and that has
helped.
Mr. Cohen. But they're minimal reforms, are they not? I
mean, they really haven't gone very far, it's--and the king
still has a great deal of power. And I've been reading lately
that it seems like the Moroccan people are not particularly
satisfied. Have you--is that something that you've observed or
been made aware of?
Mr. Roebuck. I would say yes and no on the question. They--
the reforms are relatively limited, you're correct. I mean,
they did try to put some minimal limits on the king's power,
particularly his power to appoint certain types of individuals.
They--the reforms sought to strengthen the role of the
legislature. These types of reforms are--I would call them
works in progress. But you are absolutely correct, the king and
the palace retain significant, extensive power and influence in
Morocco, and the strengthening of those democratic
institutions--there remains a lot to be done.
On the dissatisfaction that Moroccan citizens feel and
their desire for further reform, I think the evidence for that
is mixed. I would surmise that you're probably correct that--
because I think people generally speaking, everywhere have a
desire for more freedom, and they want to develop democratic
institutions. But there has not been significant unrest in
Morocco since the Arab--
Mr. Cohen. So you're not concerned about the monarchies in
Jordan and Morocco being able to sustain themselves, to
survive?
Mr. Roebuck. No, not at this point, no, sir.
Mr. Cohen. OK. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Roebuck. Thank you.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you very much for your testimony. We
appreciate it very much.
Mr. Roebuck. Thank you. Thank you very much for having me.
Mr. Cardin. We'll now turn to our second panel. And we're
pleased to invite up Ambassador Bill Taylor, vice president of
the Middle East and Africa of the United States Institute for
Peace. Ambassador Taylor is very well-known. His most recent
public service was State Department special coordinator for
Middle East transition, coordinating support to Egypt, Tunisia,
Libya and Syria. We know Ambassador Taylor for his work in the
Mideast Quartet as well as the former ambassador to Ukraine. We
will not question him today on Ukraine, but we could certainly
do that.
Dr. Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat professor for peace
and development at the University of Maryland--that is--I'm
very familiar with that position.
And Brookings Institution fellow--Dr. Telhami has made
pivotal contributions to the Arab-Israeli peace process
negotiations, is an expert on public opinion trends in our
countries of interest today. So thank you very much for being
here. We appreciate it very much.
Then we have Zeinab Abdelkarim, the regional director for
the Middle East and North Africa at the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems. Her expertise in electoral
systems will help us characterize the state of reforms in the
political processes throughout our countries of interest.
So we welcome all three of you to this hearing. As I
explained earlier, your prepared written statements will be
made part of the record without objection. You may proceed as
you wish. And we'll start with Ambassador Taylor.
WILLIAM TAYLOR, VICE PRESIDENT FOR MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA,
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE
Mr. Taylor. Senator Cardin, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Cohen, thank
you very much for the opportunity to be here. Glad to join my
distinguished colleagues on this panel.
Political pluralism in several of the Arab countries is a
very timely topic, as you've already referred to this morning.
I'm very pleased to follow Bill Roebuck, a good friend from
earlier times, and pleased that he had made many of the points
that I will try to reinforce.
The views I express today are solely my own and do not
represent those of the United States Institute of Peace, which
doesn't take policy positions, as you well know. I'll
concentrate this morning on two of the OSCE Mediterranean
partners for cooperation, Tunisia and Egypt.
Tunisia has demonstrated remarkable maturity and commitment
to the idea of political inclusiveness, and I'm sad to say, the
Egyptians have not. At the beginning of 2013, Tunisia was
struggling politically and economically and, was facing violent
unrest. The elections in 2012, we recall, had given the
moderate Islamist party Ennahda a plurality. It formed a
coalition with two secular parties, it was called the troika.
This troika was attempting to govern and create a new
constitution at the same time.
After broad consultations around the country on various
aspects of this new constitution, parliamentary work, which was
required to finish the work, had stalled by early 2013. The
attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis by extremists Islamist
forces in September 2012 had demonstrated the weakness of the
government and of its security forces. The instability was then
exacerbated in 2013, early 2013, February, with the
assassination of prominent opposition party member, Chokri
Belaid.
While the extent of violence in Tunisia was small compared
to the numbers killed in other countries of this region, these
incidents shocked Tunisians and led to two events: first, the
resignation of the Ennahda prime minister, and second, an
effort by civil society leaders to pull the country back from
the crisis. Several political parties supported the effort.
Ennahda did not.
At the same time--this is the beginning of 2013--the
Islamist government that had formed in Egypt under Mohammed
Morsi was also struggling to govern and to write a
constitution. Unlike in Tunisia, however, the main Islamist
party in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, had won a majority in
the parliamentary elections, and Mr. Morsi had won a tight race
for president.
Also unlike Tunisia, the Islamist majority in the Egyptian
parliament and the Islamist president forced through a
constitution without attempting to achieve consensus. Further,
security forces and the Muslim Brotherhood supporters attacked
peaceful demonstrators. Women's rights were violated,
journalists were suppressed, and police abuse continued.
President Morsi issued a decree that exempted his decisions
from judicial review. Demonstrations grew in opposition to the
government's handling of the constitutional process as well as
the social legislation in the parliament and economic
mismanagement, leading to a large army-sponsored demonstration
on June 30th, 2013, and a military coup on July 3rd that
installed a military-backed civilian government.
At this point, events in Tunisia and events in Egypt
intersect. Before the coup in Egypt, the Tunisian Islamist
party, Ennahda, had resisted efforts by civil society to bridge
political differences in Tunisian society. After the coup and
another political assassination in Tunis, Ennahda decided to
join what was then being called the Tunisian national dialogue.
The Quartet-led discussions--there were four members of civil
society in Tunisia--decided to bring in political parties.
These discussions then lasted through the fall and into the
winter.
In January 2014, this civil society-led but with
participation of the main political parties reached agreement
on three important points. They agreed on a text of the
constitution, which had not been able to be accomplished,
achieved in previous times when it was just in the parliament.
Second, they agreed that new elections, long-stalled, would
happen by the end of this year, by the end of 2014. And even
more remarkably, the Ennahda-led coalition government agreed to
step down and hand over power to a nonpolitical interim
government that would take governmental influence out of the
preparations for the elections later on this year.
In Egypt, meanwhile, the military-installed government had
begun a harsh crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, killing more
than a thousand Egyptians, jailing and prosecuting thousands
more. Hundreds at a time have been convicted, sentenced to
death, often on little evidence. The repression, which the new
military-backed government defended as a fight against
terrorists, soon extended to journalists, activists, and
liberal groups accused of supporting terrorists.
This year Field Marshal and Defense Minister al-Sisi
declared his candidacy for president under a newly ratified
constitution and in May won an overwhelming victory, even
though turnout in the election was disappointingly low. U.S.
assistance to the government of Egypt, cut off after the coup,
as called for by U.S. law, was partially restored.
Political pluralism, the topic of these discussions, in the
region I believe is at its broadest in Tunisia, which is why I
wanted to focus attention on this aspect of the Arab Awakening,
the Arab Spring. The constitution was approved as a result of
wide consultation across the country, full debate in the
parliament, political compromise struck by civil society
leaders and adherence to agreed rules as the parliament
ratified the constitution overwhelmingly, with the
parliamentarians standing to sing the Tunisian national anthem
after the historic vote.
The leading role of civil society pulling the country back
from violence, division and gridlock is the model of dialogue
over confrontation and conflict. The Tunisian national
dialogue, led by non-governmental quartet, as I said, was able
to find consensus, bring in the quarreling political parties
into the discussion, forge compromises that have set Tunisia on
a positive if still fragile course toward a successful
transition.
Egypt's political pluralism, on the other hand, is at best
reminiscent of previous military dictatorships. The new
military-backed government under President al-Sisi has not
limited security measures to violent extremists, and it has
instead used police and the courts to eliminate political
opposition.
My recommendations: first, the United States and the
international community should increase support for the
Tunisian government and people as they continue to demonstrate
that political pluralism is compatible with Islamic societies
and is the formula for a successful transition to democracy.
This assistance should include financial support from Western
governments, international financial institutions, and the
international private sector. Second. The United States should
negotiate and sign a free trade agreement with Tunisia. And
third. The United States and Europe should increase
opportunities for Tunisian students to study abroad.
In Egypt, the United States and the international community
should continue to condemn the repression, publicly and
privately, as counterproductive and short-sighted. U.S.
assistance to Egypt should concentrate on programs that enable
Egyptians to take advantage of educational opportunities, both
in Egypt and abroad. A large program of scholarships for
Egyptian young people, with an emphasis on women and
underdeveloped parts of the country, could pay great dividends
for Egypt and for U.S.-Egyptian relations.
Mr. Chairman, I'm glad to answer questions.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you. Appreciate that. Dr. Telhami.
SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT CHAIR FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
Mr. Telhami. Thanks very much. Mr. Chairman, allow me as a
citizen of--resident of Maryland and professor at the
University of Maryland to thank you for your service to our
state and to the country.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you.
Mr. Telhami : I'd like to focus my comments on really the
macro level of what's driving all this change in the Middle
East. Let me start by acknowledging that this is not a good
time for pluralism, freedom and democracy in the region. It's
obvious to all of us. The question is, why is that the case?
It's not that the region has been exactly known for democracy,
for freedom and pluralism, it is that we really had high
expectations, particularly with the advent of the Arab
uprisings in 2010. The Tahrir Square pictures really generated
a lot of excitement and hope across the globe as well as in the
region. So what has happened? Why isn't it going the way we
expected? That's what I'd like to talk about.
Let me start by talking about what is profoundly new in
what's happening in the Middle East over the past few years.
What is this Arab uprising? What's profoundly important and
likely enduring in these Arab uprisings?
Let me start with one thing that is the most profoundly
important, and that is that we're witnessing the empowerment of
the individual on a scale we had never witnessed before, and it
is enabled by an expanding information revolution. It's not
going to go away. It's going to stay with us. And if you want
to understand the scale of it, you have to compare it at some
level with the Industrial Revolution: the empowerment of the
individual, for very different reasons, in the West through
industrialization and economic independence of the individual.
We are seeing something akin to that because of the information
revolution, and therefore people want their voices heard. That
aspect of the Arab uprisings is here to stay. It's not going to
go away. There'll be some reversal here and there, but it's
expanding.
And in the long term, it's only good news because frankly,
that's what's needed to happen in the long term. But in the
short to medium term, it brings exactly the opposite. And here
is why; I'll give you a focus on five issues why that is the
case in most of the region.
Now, as we have seen, the region is not unified and there
are some bright spots and some places that are worse than
others or are better than others. But by and large,
aggregately, it doesn't look very good. And there are five
reasons for why this isn't going like some people expected, I
think unreasonably.
First, when we say the public is empowered or the
individual is empowered, it doesn't mean the public is unified.
When you get empowerment of the people, you get empowerment of
the religious and the secular, the Shia and the Sunni and the
Muslim and the Christian and the rich and the poor, and now
everybody wants the same thing; they all are vying for a piece
of the pie in a changing polity where central authority is
weakened and the rules of the games have changed. So the fact
is it's a prescription for more competition and more conflict,
even without sectarianism.
We focus on sectarianism. Obviously, that's an easy one to
focus on in places like Syria or Iraq, but Egypt doesn't have
that kind of sectarianism. And yes, it has 10 percent
Christians, and minorities tend to suffer more than others in
these kinds of competitions, but the 90 percent of Egyptians
who are Muslim are overwhelmingly Sunni, and yet look at the
black-and-white divisions that have emerged. It was the zero-
sum game that if you're not our friend, you're our enemy. And
they're all, by the way, religious. Over 90 percent of
Egyptians say they're religious. So it's not even about
religiosity, it's about the role of religion in politics and a
power struggle, and those divides happen in society no matter
what you have. And so the empowerment of the individual in the
short term doesn't add up into stability, it adds up to exactly
the opposite.
Second, even when we say that the publics are empowered,
publics are rarely the main factor in shaping politics. Even in
democracies, we see that in our country, yes, publics matter in
our electoral system, but we know the source of money and the
source of corporations, and all the distribution of power is
uneven in society. And so they're vying in a new system--to
write new rules of the game against existing institutions. The
bureaucracies haven't disappeared. The multinational
corporations haven't disappeared. People with deep pockets
haven't disappeared. The military institutions, above all,
haven't disappeared, and they're all going to fight against
this public empowerment to make sure that they have a piece of
the pie in the new rules of the game that are being written.
And if you look at that, you see for example in Egypt that
particularly the military institution is very important.
Frankly, in every single episode of the Arab uprisings, the
military institution has been perhaps the most determined
aspect of the game because when Ben Ali was ordered to leave,
essentially it was a military decision in Tunisia. When Mubarak
left, it was with the encouragement of the military. And when
Assad didn't leave, it was because the military backed him. And
when the king of Bahrain didn't acquiesce, it was because of
the military--in every single case, the initial outcome of the
uprisings and what transpired afterwards is a function of a
military decision. We saw what happened in Egypt with the
military asserting itself again in the process that is
unfolding. In Tunisia, they haven't made that decision. Don't
rule it out completely depending on what happens. It's
militaries that will remain. It's critical to the outcome of
every single uprising.
The third point I want to make is that we all understand
that when we look at the history of politics anywhere, not just
in the Middle East, we understand that transitions are
destabilizing and unpredictable. And it means that by and
large, you have often emerging insecurity and economic
deprivation that trump pluralism and democracy and work in
favor of those who want to rule with an iron fist because you
have people who are very terrified of anarchy, and people who
are certainly very terrified of not having food for their
children on the table. And that trumps everything else,
including their toleration.
By the way, I happened to meet with President Sisi in Egypt
just before the election. And he said to me, I understand what
my priorities are. I understand what the Egyptian people want
me to do now. Number one, security. Number two, the economy.
And he's frankly right. And that's how he sees it in setting up
his priorities. Now, whether we agree with the way he's doing
it or not is a separate question, but it's very clear that's
the case.
And by the way, this dynamic of the public being terrified
of anarchy and economic deprivation in a way that trumps
pluralism, democracy and human rights is one thing that other
rulers in the region are using to terrify their publics against
the expansion of the uprisings. One reason why the uprisings
have stalled is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would tell its
people, do you want Damascus or do you want Riyadh? The King of
Jordan can tell his people, do you want Aleppo or do you want
Amman? And for now, no one wants Aleppo or Damascus or Tripoli,
for that matter. And that's one of the things that is
happening.
Fourth, while each country in the region has specific
conditions that have to be evaluated separately, it is fair to
say that there are commonalities in the Arab world. Sometimes
we don't understand the regional dynamics. Yes, we have to look
at every country separately for sure. They are different.
Tunisia and Egypt are different. But there is a regional
dynamic that cannot be separated from the domestic dynamic. And
let me give you just a couple of examples.
In all of the polling, we see that there are common Arab
aspirations as well as unique aspirations domestically. When we
looked at the emergence of the uprisings starting in Tunisia
and then expanded to the Arab world, they expanded across the
Arab world but not into other countries and not even into other
neighboring Muslim non-Arab countries because there is an Arab
dynamic of aspiration. But more importantly, look at how the
uprisings have been unfolding. In every single case, with the
possible exception of Tunisia, in every single case you cannot
understand what's happening without understanding the role of
outside regional powers or, for that matter, global powers.
Look at Syria: Saudi Arabia and Iran are in competition, all of
the neighboring states, without the Saudi intervention in
Bahrain. Even Egypt that we think of as autonomous with no
military intervention, look at the tens of billions of dollars
that are coming from the Gulf that are a very essential part of
what might be likely to happen. So you can't divorce these two.
One final point I want to make, Mr. Chairman, has to do
with the one non-Arab state in the group, Israel. And I say
that now, obviously, we're all facing what seems to be a
horrific set of killings that we witnessed; ugly killings that
make all of us sick and obviously generate hostilities that
might erupt into a larger-scale conflict. But the aspect I want
to talk about is more about pluralism and democracy and the
threat to pluralism and democracy that has emerged with that
conflict.
Let me just very quickly focus on this issue. Israel within
its 1967 borders has been a successful democracy. It has done a
good job--not perfect, but a good job--as a democracy. Its
relationship with the Palestinians in the occupied territories,
in the West Bank and Gaza, has of course been rationalized by
all of us as a temporary situation of occupation--which it is,
theoretically, under legal law. And we all correctly focus our
attention on getting a political settlement along the lines of
a two-state solution to solve this problem.
If people conclude that the two-state solution is no longer
an option and we look at occupation as a semi-permanent
situation, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians
will start looking differently and be evaluated in the context
of one country, and that is going to be incredibly troubling
for those who want equality and human rights--that's number
one.
Number two, the spillover effect of that into Israel's own
Arab population, the 20 percent who are citizens of Israel who
can vote and get elected, who have participated
democratically--they're legally equal citizens in practice;
obviously, they are second-class citizens, but by and large,
Israel has a done a reasonably good job over the years to
expand that. We are beginning to find now that if there is no
two-state solution we're beginning to feel it now because a
large majority of Israelis and large majority of Palestinians
say there will never be a two-state solution in my own polling
that I do there--with that, you find then that the Israelis who
want a Jewish majority state start being fearful of the
demographics. And when you're fearful of demographics, you
start thinking Jew and Arab. And when you're thinking Jew and
Arab, you're no longer thinking about Israel and Palestine;
you're thinking domestically.
And we see how that has played into the hands of extremists
on both sides within Israel itself in a way that undermines its
democracy and pluralism. So we really have to be watchful of
these trends that are going to potentially have consequences
far beyond just the conflict but also into the nature of
democracy and pluralism in the region.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you for that very thorough analysis.
Ms. Abdelkarim.
ZEINAB ABDELKARIM, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Ms. Adbelkarim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
commission, for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate
the chance to share with you IFES' considerable experience and
expertise in assessing the overall political, socioeconomic,
security and other issues surrounding the region's democratic
transition. I will begin with a brief symposium of IFES' work
in order to contextualize my testimony. Then I will provide
background information and context to key considerations I
would like to share with you today for you to take in
consideration when addressing issues of pluralism in the
region. They mirror to greater extent what Dr. Telhami has
already covered. And then I will conclude with a few remarks.
Broadly speaking, IFES supports citizens' rights to
participation in free and fair elections by strengthening
electoral systems and by building local capacity to deliver
sustainable solution for countries that seek to enhance their
governance structure. We have been active in the Middle East
and North Africa region for over two decades, advocating for
societies where citizens have the opportunity to play an active
role in making decisions that affect their lives and in holding
their government accountable. Our approach empowers both the
recognized local authorities as well as civil society by
providing information and access to resources and training on
democratic norms and international standards for election and
political processes.
Indeed, the overall situation throughout the Middle East
and North America remains fragile and very pluralized. Newly
formed governments and elected institutions continue to face
firm resistance from their opponents and have not been
successful thus far in ushering major reforms or managing the
mistrust or the economic uncertainty and internal security
issues.
In deeply divided societies where ethnic, social, tribal
and political affiliations are key considerations, it is
imperative that the countries' transitions are managed in a
manner that is inclusive and consultative and transparent. It
is particularly important for citizens to perceive government
affairs, legal reform processes and the country economic plans
as open and transparent. The biggest danger is the growing
tendency to reduce democratic practices to voting,
constitutional drafting and electoral events.
A new constitution or the presence of electoral processes
does not necessarily mean that a democratic transition of
transparency and accountability have taken root. This kind of
development across the region cannot be considered evidence of
a new social contract between the transitioning states and
their citizens. At best, these developments could be described
as constitutional engineering led by small but dominant elites.
Understandably, undeveloped and disorganized political and
civil forces, as well as nascent civil movement in places like
Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, are unable to wield much influence on
near-term outcomes of the transition in these countries.
However, it is important to note that modern democratic
practices evolve over centuries. It makes no sense to look for
similarities in a remarkably different context, particularly so
early in the game. Rather, it is best to let these political
developments run their natural course. They are changes that
are best measured in decades, not years. Each and every state
will evolve in its own distinctive way and adapt to national,
regional and global changes over time.
We all can agree that analysis in the midst of the current
event is never easy and the future itself remains clouded with
uncertainty. However, as these events and their causes unfold,
eight key issues and concern that cover a range of political,
economic and social factors must be taken into consideration
when addressing pluralism in the regions.
And these are, first, a declining political legitimacy in
authorities charged with overseeing the transition in a number
of countries in the MENA region. The biggest challenge to
democracies is their inability to provide services and
effectively govern. Low public credibility can in some cases
engender voter apathy, violence, ineffective governance and
long-term political instability.
Second, a breakdown in security, rising instability and an
increase in both human and weapon trafficking across borders
will continue to cause human suffering and burden local
governments.
Third, the lack of serious efforts to address continued
economic meltdown and extreme poverty in some countries in the
region does not bode well with stabilization or democratic
development and could lead to more protests, insecurity if not
addressed in the near term.
Fourth, increased tension between Islamist, socialist,
liberal and other political entities. The struggle over the
constitutional drafting process in these countries is a prime
example of growing divide between Islamist and liberal as they
debate the inclusion of Sharia as the source of all
legislation, the role of men and women, the rights of ethnic
and religious minority, the criminalization of attacks against
religion and sacred values. These debates have been the center
of the political discussion across the region for decades and
it's going to stay for some time.
Fifth, the struggle for dominance in the Persian Gulf and
the Levant remain unsolved. For decades there have been fierce
competitions between the Salafist school of thought and Shiite
Islamic Republic of Iran. Both sides have provided military and
political backing to their allies across the region and it
makes them an ineffective player in influencing the regional
political transformation.
Six, as Dr. Shibley has indicated, the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict remains a destabilizing factor for the Arab world. And
can I leave it at that? He covered it very extensively.
Seven, the U.S. presence in the region faces a crisis in
legitimacy where mistrust and suspicions are dominant features
of the region--perceptions towards the U.S. involvement.
Eighth, shrinking space for democracy-building program,
which in part is due to the resistance to U.S. involvement. A
growing number of governments across the region are starting to
crack down on democracy-building programs and publicly denounce
democracy assistance, describing it as illegitimate political
meddling in internal affairs and clear attempt to subvert
political order.
Transition to democratic governance is neither fast nor
easy, and the path to introducing and implementing democratic
political reforms varies across countries. It is difficult to
predict how long the transformation of the region will take and
how far it will go. However, the regional upheaval is far from
over and the highly motivated young generation who was on the
forefront of the call for transformation will continue to
challenge the present circumstances and guard the flame of
change. And that's my conviction.
To remain effective, the international community and groups
that promote democracy must come to grips with these new trends
and a complicated history of democracy promotion globally and
genuinely rethink their strategies of engagement. The emphasis
on democratic election, participation by civil society,
empowerment of the marginalized and ethnic groups, and
competition between political parties will not guarantee that
the state will respond to its citizens' needs for social and
political accountability.
Undoubtedly there is a need to re-evaluate the way in which
democracy is supported and sustained. The human security
challenges facing the region today requires the promotion of a
broader concept that includes tolerance, consensus and peace-
building processes, accountability, human rights protection,
capacity building for social and economic development,
promotion of public involvement and consultation, and
improvement on the political and political processes.
Disengaging or limiting democratic governance aid to the
region at this juncture is a huge mistake. However, the
international community should continue to leverage existing
international frameworks, diplomacy and bilateral agreements to
find ways to encourage democratic practices and a space for
democracy-building programs. Efforts to plan future assistance
have to take into consideration that democracy-building is
highly political and not only a technical exercise.
Better understanding of the local context and norms, local
ownership and respect for viewpoints and experiences of the
targeted populations are key principles that must guide the
international community efforts. Any intervention can easily
lose credibility if perceived by local populations as
ineffective or tainted by intervening countries' political
self-interest.
With that, I conclude my remarks and I'm happy to answer
any question you may have.
Mr. Cardin. Well, let me thank all three of you. I thought
your presentations were extremely helpful and put it in
context. You're right, this is about political pluralism. And
we're patient and we understand that it will not happen
overnight. But it's very interesting: In 1975, when the
Helsinki Accords were attained, it was not U.S. values. These
were universal values. The Soviet Union fully participated in
this process. So when you mentioned the fact of U.S.
involvement in these areas of interest to our--to try to
promote--or suspicion of promoting our values, it really is--
what we're after is universal values.
Ms. Abdelkarim. True.
Mr. Cardin. And the core principles of OSCE--and I have
them in front of me because it's part of the Ukraine
resolution--Russia resolution we adopted in Baku--talks about
sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force,
the territorial integrity, peaceful settlements of disputes,
noninterference in internal affairs, respect for human rights,
et cetera.
I mention that because when Ukraine--when Russia invaded
Ukraine, it was OSCE that was on the ground. And it was a
mechanism that allowed for, I think, an international,
objective account of what was happening. And it provided the
technical help that I think has been extremely helpful to
Ukraine coming back and recognizing what it needs to do moving
forward. In Northern Africa there is no comparable organization
that I know of. Yes, we talk about the Partners for
Cooperation, but that is--it doesn't have the same resources
and the same visibility that a partner state has when it is
jeopardized.
Ambassador Taylor, I was very much interested in your
analysis of the civil societies--Tunisia. I guess my question
to the panelists is, what mechanisms are available to provide
that type of universal view of what's going on in the country,
not Western view but universal view that what a country needs
to do for stability--I thought your analysis about the
challenges to pluralism--that just because you empowered
individuals does not mean you're going to have pluralism. In
fact it, in the short term, looks like it works against
pluralism because they want stability and they go for more
effective leadership, which many times denies pluralism.
So what type of institutions exist? What type of regional
institutions or what type of societies exist in Northern Africa
that we could work with, the OSCE partners, to try to promote
understandable progress towards pluralism, knowing that it will
not happen next year and that it will take time? Should it be
civil societies? Is it different in each country? What is your
thoughts on that?
Mr. Taylor. When I look at the advantages/disadvantages of
the Helsinki process in the Middle East, in comparison to
Eastern Europe, we don't have the same kind of challenges. The
information revolution wasn't there. And this created a whole
opening for a whole set of people who might be linked to the
outside world. We don't really have that in the Arab world. If
anything, the Arabs now have probably more information than
they can handle and, despite all of the attempts to close it. I
mean, they've got tens of channels that are coming their way,
and the Internet and everything else, and they just can't have
information.
So the question is, who are they going to look up to as a
measure? And here is the positive thing about the Helsinki
process: it isn't set up as an American process or a U.S.
process, because obviously with all--for us as Americans we
have a role to play for sure. I don't think that we should
detach ourselves, but we should understand the limits of our
ability because people have this sense that we're trying to
dominate. And even when we intervene for really good
humanitarian reasons, the next morning they'll say we did it
for imperialist reasons, and if--somebody might try to use that
against us and against those who are accepting aid from the
U.S.
The good thing about the Helsinki process is that it is set
up as a universal values kind of process, and that should be
the focal point of the approach. How you do that, whether it
links up directly to groups, I think it could be, or whether it
could use international institutions to create more visibility
in terms of holding up societies to particular standards, not
the secretary of state is saying you're not living up to our
standards, but somebody else is saying you're not living up to
the international standards, I think that's the approach.
But here is the problem with civil society groups--and
we've seen that in Egypt, we see it up to a point in Tunisia,
but we see it elsewhere--they can easily be delegitimized
because of linkages to the outside world. And that's usually
the kind of the fine line that you have to figure out: How do
you help them without de-legitimizing them? And I'm not sure I
have a good answer for that.
Mr. Cardin. Well, is the Tunisia--is the Tunisia model the
right model? Does that work in other countries or is that
unique to Tunisia?
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I think Ms. Abdelkarim made a
very good point. That is, local context is really, really
important in each of these areas. I think the answer to your
question about Tunisia is that there--Tunisia's civil society
has pulled together into an organization and to an institution
of some informal sort. And it was the lead union, the largest
union in the country. It was a similar association of
employers. It was the bar, so the lawyers that got together and
then the legal human rights defenders. And that group----
Mr. Cardin. But did those groups have contacts outside of
Tunisia?
Mr. Taylor. To a small degree I think so, but that was not
what was going on. They were really internally generated. The
Tunisians did this, Tunisian civil society. Those four
organizations, they had legitimacy and this large public
service--this large union that was across the country
mobilizing more than any political party. Its members went
across the country and were able to really provide the
political muscle. But it drew in these others and drew in the
employers. It drew in the lawyers and the human rights
defenders. So that gave it a real breadth and strength to do
this. But, Mr. Chairman, I think it really was Tunisian. And we
can help them with caveats that she just mentioned about
delegitimizing. They didn't ask for any outside support and
they didn't need it. They did it themselves on this thing.
Just while--I'll mention, your point about institutions
that can help countries in Northern Africa, in the Middle East,
is a very important one. The Helsinki Commission is a great
example of how Eastern Europeans--and you mentioned the
excellent work it's been doing in Ukraine--East European and
Central European countries had OSCE, Helsinki. They could hold
the Russians to those standards that the Russians had signed up
to, but they also had the EU, with its own set of standards,
both economic and political, human rights, that they wanted to
join, that they wanted to measure up to, and in order to join
they had to meet those standards.
Many of them wanted to join NATO and did, because they
still had security concerns. It turns out they had legitimate
security concerns, and that others would like to join NATO at
this point. We're seeing that. But in the Middle East and in
North Africa we don't have those same kinds of attractive
institutions that they can kind of lean toward.
Mr. Cardin. Good point.
Ms. Abdelkarim. I would like to add, I agree with
Ambassador Taylor that Tunis didn't have the same restriction
on civil society when it comes to, receiving foreign funding.
Looking at other places in the region, such as, Egypt and
Jordan, the restrictions that are put on the implementations of
these programs and their finances and even the attendance of
events by local actors is huge and is actually going to impact,
in the long run, the effectiveness of these programs. Civil
society enjoys completely different status in Tunis than other
places in the region.
And I also agree that we don't have a regional institution.
The Arab League is very weak. Yes, it has the charters on human
rights and economic and free trade and so forth, but it's not a
strong institution to bring the region together. So definitely
looking for the international community is where most of the
assistance is actually--could be coming from.
Mr. Cardin. I would make this--as I said, we're patient. We
recognize it's going to take time, and they do not have the
same institutional support that Europe has. There's no question
about that.
I think the two points--or three points that you raised
concerning constitutional reform and electoral reform are
critically important that we see progress made. I would add a
third, which would be fighting corruption, which sort of--this
goes through all of this. I mean, we saw in Ukraine that it was
more about a corrupt government than it was a pro-Russian
government or a pro-Europe government that the people brought
down.
And I think the people have strong desires for a government
that is not corrupt, and that can bring down even the most--and
also, you got to make economic progress, and without ridding
your country of corruption, it's hard to make the economic
progress which is necessary for pluralism and democracy to
flourish.
So as I look at this, how do we judge whether sufficient
progress has been made in these countries so that we reward
that, whether it's trade agreements or whether it is a
strategic partnership for security? We've had a mixed relation
with Egypt in recent times. How do we judge whether these
countries have made real progress on constitutional reform,
anti-corruption, electoral reform?
Ms. Abdelkarim. They made some reform and progress, but not
enough. It's just the first step. And it's going to evolve over
time. And as I mentioned, we're waiting for the legislative
bodies to be elected, the long-lasting ones, to see whether or
not the elected representatives will continue to push for the
necessary reforms.
Just from looking at my 10 years of working in the region,
electoral process and the support that we've been providing to
multiple countries, including Jordan, Yemen and Egypt, things
have evolved tremendously over the years. Reforms have been
made, and gaps in laws and legal frameworks have been
addressed. But they're just the first step, and a lot more need
to be done. So----
Mr. Telhami. Yeah. Well, with constitutions, obviously
there are some things that are clear pertaining to rights and
defining the state. But frankly, it's all about how you
implement it and interpret it. We know that for sure--and we
see it in Egypt because right now----
Mr. Cardin. China has constitutional reform, but it doesn't
work very well.
Mr. Telhami. Yeah, and when you also--I mean, look at what
are our issues of good intention with Egypt, particularly when
we talk about human rights and pluralism--it's not just the
action that we're taking vis-a-vis the Muslim Brotherhood, but
you can see these court rulings. And then when you ask the
Egyptians and say, as I did ask Sisi, how do you explain how
this takes place, he says, well, there's a separation of
powers. Well, of course that's true in some ways
constitutionally, you want a separation of powers, but you want
those powers to be responsible, behaving responsibly. How do
you reform the judiciary? How do you reform the Interior
Ministry, separate from what the rules of the games are,
because these institutions have legacies? These are what people
call the deep state.
And it's a very hard thing to do because as you're trying
to govern and you are focused on specific issues like security
and the economy, and you take on these power centers that are
entrenched at a time when people don't want you to be an
authority leader that actually intrudes other powers--not an
easy issue to do. But we need to watch for that. We need to
push for that.
As Ambassador Taylor said, no matter what our capacity is,
we need to speak with clarity. And I think we speak with
clarity even more when we are appealing to universal values,
not to what we like as American foreign policy. We have that
moral authority. Handcuffing the U.S. particularly as a player
is not simply the fact that people have this mixed view of us--
on the one hand, they don't trust what we do, on the other
hand, they want us to intervene--but more than that is that
let's be frank, human rights and democracy, we all want it. Our
presidents want it. Our Congress wants it. The American people
want it. But we want security and strategic interests even
more.
And so our relationship with the Egyptian government, for
example, is above all about the military-to-military
relationship, the strategic cooperation now vis-a-vis Gaza or
vis-a-vis something else, and those issues don't always go hand
in hand. So we have limitations that therefore again speak to
going outside that process, to finding some other mechanism
too.
One final point on Tunisia, because I think we've focused
on Tunisia as a success case, and I think it is. Tunisians
should be applauded, I think, commended for moving in a right
direction, and I'm hopeful that they will get here, although
it's unclear still. It's an unsettled situation--if you look at
it, you have to understand that we're still in the beginning of
the process, not the end of the process.
But I happen to think that we underestimated two factors in
why they've moved in this direction, beyond their unique
domestic situation or civil society or groups. One factor is
actually, they were frightened by what happened in Egypt. And
so the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown scared
them and made the Islamists far more conciliatory in the final
process as they moved in the constitutional process. So they
learned from what happened.
But the second thing is I think historical accident, and
it's not having to do with an institution. Rashid al-Ghannushi,
who happens to be an exceptionally astute leader of the
Islamists, and not only because of the particular values of his
philosophy, but because he understood one thing that I think
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt didn't understand. He said that
when you have a mature democracy like the United States, it's
enough for a president to win half plus one, 50 percent plus
one; that's enough. When you're in a transitional period or the
like that we are in, it's not enough; you need a consensus to
be able to sustain minimum stability. And I think that is a
unique understanding.
That's why I think we also have to pick our allies pretty
carefully. We see what we've done in various places where we
were choosing allies based on expediency, not necessarily ones
that are going to take us on the right path.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I'd add is to your
question about how to measure our response in these areas, in--
it's--Tunisia is one case, and Egypt's another. Tunisia is a
pretty straightforward answer. It's apparently doing the right
thing, at least as we're looking at it now. It's fragile, as
Shibley says, but it is clearly going in the right direction on
these areas that we've talked about. So we should respond, in
ways that we can, whether it's trade or whether it's
international financial support, direct support to the [?]--we
should respond in that way.
Egypt is more complicated because they're not going in the
right direction on political pluralism, and the repression is
pushing them backwards and is probably destabilizing them, but
they are important to us in some security ways. I'm less
convinced about the importance of overflight rights and access
to the canal and that kind of business, but the concern about
ISIS or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, is a real concern.
I don't know how big yet because it's not clear to me how much
traction ISIS is going to have with its declaration of a
caliphate, even among extremist Muslim organizations, much less
the broad body of Muslim people. But that's important to us,
and they will be able to play a role.
They did play a role in Gaza, but it was under President
Morsi that they played this positive role. And it's not clear
yet if they're going to be able to play that positive role.
Mr. Cardin. That's very helpful.
Congressman Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am grateful to all three of you and your presentations.
They are illuminating. Regrettably, not enough of our
colleagues in the Senate or the House are privy to the same
kind of information with regularity.
Mine is more of an observation, I think, at this point than
any questioning of either of you. Obviously, you all know your
subjects, and you've studied them very carefully.
I think the takeaway for me is summed up in the senator's
question about how do we measure and Ms. Abdelkarim's sentence
in her closing remarks. Any intervention can easily lose
credibility if perceived by the local population as ineffective
or tainted by the intervening country's political self-
interests. And then Mr. Telhami speaks to all of that at some
point in his presentation.
And what I find interesting is I don't see how our country
can help without having a self-interest, period. And then there
are those that do not get accused as the United States does and
manage successfully in many of these areas of conflict. I've
always had a complete fascination with how the Dutch go in and
out of Africa and get the diamonds, and they don't care who's
fighting, but they've managed, somehow or another, to do that.
And what I'm finding fascinating in the last 20 years is
China's hands-off approach to many of the issues that other
countries are, Russia and the United States especially,
involved in proxy activities in other areas. And China swoops
in after all of the conflict, and let me use Iraq as an
example. I don't know how long it will last with the current
developments, but if we were talking two years ago, then China
had the lead number of contracts in oil in Iraq and did not
lose a soul. The persons who are doing most of the mining in
Afghanistan today are the Chinese, and there is no plan, it
doesn't seem, for the United States to benefit after having
lost life and treasure.
So as one who has a continuing interest in this area--and I
do serve as the co-chair of the Tunisia caucus, and I've been
involved in all of these other countries with regularity and
intend to stay so. Let me just sum up by saying this: There is
an inseparable triumvirate of inadequate jobs, inadequate
housing and inadequate educational opportunity. Looked at in
the long range, the best thing that we could do as a country,
for ourselves and for the world, is to encourage intercultural
and educational exchanges--and I think, Ambassador Taylor, you
spoke to some of that in your remarks--and to make special
emphasis of education on small children, small meaning pre-K,
and helping in that regard.
I believe that's where the greatest emphasis is needed. I
don't see any real immediate solutions to any of these ongoing
conflicts. I think America has been very naive in thinking that
democracy can be implanted in a lot of places, and I've
expressed that often. I feel very strongly that one of the
things that happens--and I've seen it here in my own country,
and I've been a part of it. As an African-American here in this
country, one thing I can say is government does things to
people. I'm talking the United States government, not outside
the government. I'm talking in Altamonte Springs, Florida, and
the places where I've lived--does things to people rather than
with people. And therein lays a part of the problem. And then
when you are going abroad and start doing it, you have to know
who the people are you're doing it with. And that has been a
continuing sort of travail.
I've asked in this institution, and I continue to ask, that
at the very least, we should have experts come in. I asked
Gingrich and Gephardt. I asked Pelosi and Hastert. I haven't
done so recently, but as early as 1992, and way before the
ongoing circumstances, I said if we are going to be in these
conflicts, then we at least ought to know the difference
between a Sunni and a Shiite. We ought to at least know what a
Pashtun is, what some cultural aspects are. And we don't. You
couldn't get--we could go out here right now and find--I can
find you 300 congresspeople that don't know that there are
Christians in Iraq, or just as--for example, they may know a
little bit about a few Christians in Egypt, but they don't have
any idea about what's going on, and yet we make these
interventions, and we make these policies without having a
clear understanding.
That's my story, and I'm sticking to it.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you, Congressman Hastings.
And let me thank all three of our panelists. I agree with
Congressman Hastings. This has been extremely helpful to us to
get a better understanding. We're Americans, and we're
impatient by definition, so we also--I think it just does
underpin the merits of the OSCE process from the beginning. It
was nonthreatening to a participating state because it's
consensus, that you can't force anything upon--there's no
enforcement within the OSCE framework. And look at the impact
it's had in developing universal values.
And the reality that if you're going to have a stable
country, people have to have an economy that allows them
opportunity--you can talk about--all about the--all the
military presence, but if you don't have an economy that
produces, you're not going to have a stable regime. And we've
seen that over and over again in the Middle East because of
that issue. And yes, people do want their individual rights
heard. They do want the electoral process. But that's part--
that in and of itself doesn't produce democracy. And I think--
and pluralism.
So I think this has been extremely helpful for us, as
Congressman Hastings said, to get a better understanding and
reality of what the challenges are, and we certainly will be
following up on this.
So again, thank you all very much for your testimony.
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation In Europe
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished witnesses and guests, I wish to
welcome you to this Helsinki Commission hearing on ``Political
Pluralism in the OSCE Mediterranean Partners?'' The Helsinki Commission
has long prioritized engagement with our Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Partners for Cooperation in both the
Mediterranean and Asia. I have seen the potential for the Helsinki
Process as a model for both partner regions and I have led Commission
efforts over the years on this concept. Our Commissioners, including
Representative Alcee Hastings as OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)
Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs, have led efforts in
the OSCE PA to promote the interests of our Mediterranean Partners and
forge a meaningful exchange for mutual learning; not just one-sided
engagement in the region by external actors.
We could say that the political transitions resulting from popular
uprisings at the end of 2010 have changed the face of OSCE engagement
with the region. These years since have brought successes with some
structural reforms and challenges in the development of viable
political parties and electoral systems. Our Partners, Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, have had very different
experiences based on their different political systems. I see this
hearing as a timely opportunity to explore common elements of
transition among these countries and revisit how best to foster
cooperation through OSCE mechanisms. As exemplified by the deployment
of OSCE resources and expertise to manage the crisis in Ukraine, the
OSCE remains a functional tool for fostering human security and a
potential model for advancing common human security in the
Mediterranean.
The Helsinki Commission last convened a hearing taking stock of
political developments and overall engagement with all of our OSCE
Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in 2009. That year, I worked
with Representative Hastings to convene a hearing on ``The Future of
the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation'' coupled with an
international seminar of parliamentarians from throughout the region
exploring Mediterranean Partner engagement. This event recommended
functional partnership initiatives with our Mediterranean Partners
including projects for youth exchange and broader accessibility of OSCE
initiatives for participants from the region. Our efforts also
identified priorities for more leadership of the Mediterranean
Partnership from the region, which has become particularly relevant
with the emerging empowerment of long disenfranchised voices of
political opposition. Those voices have been both productive and
disconcerting. Yet, the establishment of impartial electoral systems
will lead the region to responsive governments that address the
motivations of those who took to the streets.
The OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly have been able to generate
unique opportunities for assistance in this new era of regional
cooperation. For example, the OSCE PA was able to deploy an observation
and assistance mission for the October 2011 elections to the Tunisian
Constituent National Assembly. The OSCE has been able to facilitate
exchanges with young diplomats from the region to serve in the OSCE
secretariat. Additionally, key materials from thematic units of the
OSCE and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have
been translated into Arabic. Civil society and experts from the region
have become increasingly active in OSCE events and dialogue
opportunities coupled with expert visits from OSCE institutions to
advise governments as they review their structural reforms. All of
these activities have been possible through the OSCE Partnership Fund
of extra-budgetary contributions from participating States and
Partners. These activities truly demonstrate the depth of a
relationship stemming back to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and
leading into the future.
Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs for Egypt and the Maghreb Bill Roebuck. A
distinguished career Foreign Service officer with experience throughout
the region, including service at pivotal times as Charged' Affaires to
Tripoli, as well as Head of the Political Section/Acting Deputy Chief
of Mission in Damascus. We look forward to hearing your perspectives on
strategic investments through the OSCE, international partnerships and
other initiatives like the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI) to address political reforms in the region.
Our second panel will feature a broad cross-section of expertise on
the region starting with Ambassador Bill Taylor, Vice President for
Middle East and Africa of the United States Institute of Peace.
Ambassador Taylor most recently served as State Department Special
Coordinator for Middle East Transitions coordinating support to Egypt,
Tunisia, Libya and Syria following a distinguished career at State and
work in the region. He will be followed by Dr. Shibley Telhami, Anwar
Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland
and Brookings Institution Fellow. Dr. Telhami has made pivotal
contributions to Arab-Israeli Peace Process negotiations and is an
expert on public opinion trends in our countries of interest today. Our
expert panel will be concluded by Ms. Zeinab Abdelkarim, Regional
Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems. Her expertise in electoral assistance
will help us characterize the state of reforms in the political
processes throughout our countries of interest.
I see this hearing as an opportunity to examine not only the OSCE's
development of institutional cooperation, but also the role of
international actors and civil society in fostering political systems
that respond to the needs of the region. As noted in the Helsinki Final
Act, the security of Europe is closely linked with security in the
Mediterranean as a whole. We look to our panels now for their thoughts
on the development of political pluralism in the Mediterranean in
recognition of our common security interests. Thank you for taking the
time to join us.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alcee Hastings, Comissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
Distinguished guests, I also wish to welcome you and I thank my
friend Chairman Cardin for convening this U.S. Helsinki Commission
hearing on ``Political Pluralism in the OSCE Mediterranean Partners?''
During my service as OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) Special
Representative on Mediterranean Affairs, I spent a number of years
traveling among all of our Mediterranean Partners on behalf of several
different OSCE PA presidents. Even before the Arab Awakening, I sought
to empower the voices of the disenchanted in the region and press those
who were in power to let pluralism flourish. From Rabat to Cairo,
Algiers to Amman, I observed a common thirst for meaningful civic
engagement. The popular uprisings since the end of 2010 have shown the
need for capacity development among the youthful population of the
region and made engagement with the OSCE more functional than it has
ever been.
I worked in 2009 to convene parliamentarians and experts from
throughout the Partners in Washington for a seminar to reinvigorate
what had been a diminishing partnership. This seminar yielded key
recommendations that prompted efforts to add value to the partnership.
This event also encouraged greater ownership of affiliated projects and
initiatives by our friends from Partner States, so that our collective
efforts would be meaningful to them. That same year was the last time
that the OSCE convened its annual Mediterranean Conference in a Partner
State. Political turmoil, instability and a lack of support for
Israel's contribution to the partnership has kept some Partners from
taking a leadership role in bringing the conference back to the
Southern shore of the Mediterranean. We must change that. We must show
that meaningful exchange will only come from dialogue of equally
invested partners.
Mediterranean Partner States are beginning to come to the table and
invest in the OSCE Partnership Fund. Morocco and Tunisia have even
requested legal reviews for their structural reforms from the OSCE
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). As I had
recommended for years, investments are underway for youth exchanges and
greater contributions from civil society in the region to OSCE events.
I applaud these efforts and especially look to our expert panel to
remark on how we can do better; acknowledging the demographic trends
and political realities.
I would be remiss not to mention the violent conflicts in Iraq and
Syria, which have displaced millions and vastly changed the political
landscape of the region. We are on a dark trajectory if we do not
strategically invest in positive civic engagement and much needed
educational resources for those vulnerable populations. As I have said,
time and time again, if we do not engage those populations, we will see
them again in another form. And their demands will not be met through
peaceful political channels.
I look forward to thoughts from our panelists on the role of the
United States and the international community in affirming the
aspirations of those who took to the streets demanding responsive
government and basic civil liberties. Thank you for sharing your
expertise with us.
Prepared Statement of William Roebuck, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Egypt and Maghreb Affairs, Department of State
Thank you, Chairman Cardin and Co-Chairman Smith, for inviting me
to testify before you today on North Africa. It is a particular honor
for me to do so before the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Egypt, of course, all participate in the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mediterranean Partners for
Cooperation forum, which provides an avenue for engagement with the
OSCE, its institutions, and its 57 participating States in promoting a
vision of comprehensive security that includes political/military,
economic and environmental, and human dimensions. We welcome
initiatives, such as this one, that make important contributions to
promoting democratic transitions and bolstering regional stability.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, North Africa--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, and Egypt--is a region of tremendous potential. The birthplace
of the Arab Awakening, it is currently undergoing a difficult but
critical transformation, the likes of which it has not experienced
since the beginning of decolonization. Tunisia has achieved much
success already and continues to realize the democratic promise of its
2011 revolution, even as it faces significant security and economic
challenges. Libya faces many difficulties and we must take the long
view in assessing its progress toward democracy. However, Libyans are
committed to making progress. For the second time since its revolution,
Libyans across the country went to the polls in June and voted in free
and fair parliamentary elections, selecting members for a new Council
of Representatives. Morocco and Algeria are also undergoing reform
processes that will benefit their economies and societies at home and
increase stability in the region as a whole. Finally, our longstanding
relationship with Egypt and its centrality to the region as a whole,
require our commitment to democratic development in that country. These
are historic times in North Africa and the U.S. government is working
with our partners to assist and support during this transition.
Tunisia
Tunisia remains one of the Middle East and North Africa's best
hopes for a successful transition to democracy and has made positive
strides in the past few months--with the ratification of a new
constitution and swearing in of an independent government to lead the
country to elections in 2014. On January 26 of this year, the National
Constituent Assembly (NCA) ratified the constitution by a landslide
vote of 200 for, 12 against, and four abstentions. The new constitution
enshrines democratic principles such as rule of law, pluralism, gender
equality, and freedom of belief.
As with all transitions, of course, there are also challenges.
Tunisia's economy has struggled since the 2011 revolution in the face
of political uncertainty and security incidents. The Tunisian
government has an ongoing commitment to reform its economy, aided by an
IMF Stand-By Arrangement. Through this reform program, Tunisia is
taking steps to address the vulnerabilities in its banking sector,
reorient its budget toward a more pro-growth composition, and implement
a comprehensive structural reform agenda to promote private sector
development. As announced by President Obama in April, the United
States and Tunisia signed a loan guarantee agreement in June allowing
Tunisia to borrow up to $500 million at concessionary rates to support
this reform agenda.
Security remains vital to the success of the transition. However,
violent extremists pose an ongoing threat as they seek to counter the
democratic transition, thwart the government's authority, and impose
their extremist understanding of Islam through harassment, incitement
of violence, and attacks. Yet over the past year the Tunisian
government has shown an increasingly strong resolve to manage the
extremist threat. The Tunisian military and security forces require
additional training and equipment to counter the newly-evolving
terrorist threat. To do so, we have bolstered our assistance to help
Tunisia reform its criminal justice sector to improve its ability to
protect Tunisians and foreigners alike, as well as confront domestic
and regional security challenges. We are also working with Tunisia to
explore ways to provide at-risk groups with alternatives and prevent
further marginalization or disconnection of these groups.
We continue to provide assistance through a number of mechanisms to
support Tunisia's transition to a prosperous democratic country, to
spur job creation, to provide entrepreneurship training, and to enhance
access to finance for small and medium enterprises, and support the
democratic transition. We are also working with Tunisian civil society
to ensure a transparent electoral process by supporting domestic
election monitoring, and we will be supporting international election
observation of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.
Libya
Since the 2011 revolution, Libya has faced significant political
and security challenges. Yet it remains in our national security
interest to ensure Libya becomes a stable and democratic partner
capable of addressing regional security challenges and advancing our
shared interests. Despite the challenges, the Libyan people are
committed to making progress. On June 25, Libya successfully held
nationwide elections for the Council of Representatives (COR), a 200-
member legislative body that will replace the General National
Congress. Although turnout was lower than in 2012, COR elections
represent for many Libyans a new beginning and important milestone for
the country as it transitions to democracy. We expect the official
results of these elections by July 20 and are ready to assist the new
parliamentarians as they assume their duties, as requested.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), a 60-member
body tasked with drafting a permanent constitution, has begun its work
in Bayda in eastern Libya after being elected in February.
Yet while the government is making progress toward democracy and
legitimacy, it lacks the ability to project its authority across the
country or fulfill many core government functions. Further complicating
efforts to achieve national consensus is retired General Khalifa
Hifter's recent campaign to eradicate Islamist-leaning militants from
Benghazi. Although many Libyans support his goals, they are wary of his
methods and future intentions. We continue to affirm that a political
agreement--and not violence--is necessary to advance the transition and
enable the constitution drafting process to unfold. Accomplishing this
will require buy-in from a wide range of Libyans. At the request of the
Secretary, Ambassador David Satterfield is working in his personal
capacity to build consensus among key Libyan influencers around a set
of 10 principles that will guide the way forward. His efforts, along
with those of the international community, are essential to helping
Libya move past its current challenges.
After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya suffers from instability and
poor governance due to weak institutions, porous borders, huge
stockpiles of loose conventional weapons, and the presence of militias.
Some of these militias have extremist ties and continue to wield local
and regional power, including blocking for over a year production and
exports at many of Libya's onshore oil and gas facilities. However, we
are beginning to see progress on this front and on July 1, Prime
Minister Al Thinnai announced that militias controlling two ports in
eastern Libya (Ras Lanuf and Es-Sidr) agreed to cease these
disruptions, which has the potential to increase Libya's oil export
potential by 560,000 barrels per day.
Libyans have grown weary of the pervasive lack of security in their
country and have become impatient with their leaders' inability to
restore stability. Elected officials, including the Prime Minister,
have stated security is their top priority and we are working with the
government to improve its ability to establish stability throughout the
country. At the UK-hosted G-8 Summit in June 2013, we pledged to train
a 5,000-8,000 member General Purpose Forces (GPF), prompting the UK and
Italy to pledge to train 2,000 members each. The GPF assistance will be
paid for by the Libyan government, and we are continuing to plan for
this effort, which will take place later this year.
Border security is also a critical concern to the U.S. and our
international partners in Libya. Libya's porous borders permit the flow
not only of destabilizing Qadhafi-era conventional weapons, but also
violent extremists throughout North Africa, the Middle East, and the
Sahel. We are in the process of re-scoping a border security program in
coordination with the European Union Integrated Border Assistance
Mission (EUBAM) to provide technical expertise, training, and limited
equipment to build Libya's inter-ministerial border security capacity
to address security along its western land border. We will also
continue to work with international partners and allies to support a
broad range of activities to help the Government of Libya in securing
excess, at-risk, or easily proliferated conventional weapons.
Although Libya has great national resources, it has weak
institutions, and requires targeted support now to develop the
structures necessary to fund its own development. Alongside the
international community, we are working with the Libyan government to
build institutional public financial management capacity.
Morocco
We continue to enjoy a very strong bilateral relationship with
Morocco, focused on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic
reform efforts, countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade
and cultural ties. Morocco--a major non-NATO ally since 2004--is one of
our closest counterterrorism partners in the region, and an active
member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. We also enjoy a strong
economic relationship; a bilateral free trade agreement entered into
force in 2006 that has helped triple bilateral trade, and in November
2013 we signed a Trade Facilitation Agreement.
President Obama hosted King Mohammed VI of Morocco in Washington on
November 22, 2013, underscoring the long-term cooperation and
friendship between our two countries. On this occasion we reaffirmed
our close strategic partnership with Morocco and discussed the best
means of promoting security and prosperity in the region.
Under King Mohammed VI, the Moroccan political system has gradually
liberalized; the King founded the Arab world's first truth and
reconciliation commission--to investigate abuses that occurred during
his father's reign--and expanded women's rights. A new constitution was
adopted in 2011, and Morocco's first Islamist-led government won
nationwide democratic elections, but much progress remains to be made
on implementing the guarantees and reforming institutions.
We will continue to support Morocco as it undertakes these
important reform efforts. Our bilateral assistance focuses on promoting
economic, political, democratic and social reforms; deepening our
security partnership; promoting export control and countering violent
extremism efforts; developing a professional criminal justice system;
and encouraging broad-based economic growth. Our flagship assistance
program has been Morocco's $698 million Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) compact, which closed in September 2013 and focused
on agriculture, fisheries, and small business development. Morocco was
selected as eligible to develop a second compact by MCC's Board of
Directors in 2012 and is in the project definition phase of program
development. With regards to the Western Sahara, we support the United
Nations-led process designed to bring about a peaceful, sustainable,
and mutually-acceptable solution to the Western Sahara question. We
also support the work of the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for
the Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross, and urge the parties
to work toward a resolution.
Algeria
Algeria and the United States have built a strong bilateral
relationship, characterized by our shared interests to combat terrorism
and facilitate greater stability in the region.
Algeria has made progress on human rights and political
transparency over the past 20 years. We are encouraging the government
to create space for a more vibrant civil society and inclusive
democratic process through supporting small civil society initiatives,
such as funding training for local election monitors. We also aim to
increase educational exchanges with young Algerians, including
promoting English language learning.
The wealth from Algeria's significant hydrocarbon reserves has
empowered the state at the expense of overall economic development. We
continue to encourage Algeria to make market oriented changes that
expand job opportunities and increase its attractiveness to foreign
direct investment. With that in mind, we are working to strengthen our
trade relationship with Algeria, and are seeking to reactivate the 2001
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. In 2013, General Electric
signed deals worth $3 billion to provide gas turbines to Algeria, an
example of the benefits of our efforts to promote U.S. business in
Algeria. This will help create or sustain 4,000 American jobs.
We have encouraged Algeria to continue to expand its regional
leadership role to help stabilize neighboring states. Algeria's
experience fighting an Islamist insurgency during the 1990s resulted in
a well-equipped and battle-hardened military that constitutes the
strongest counterterrorism force in the region. We appreciate the work
that Algeria has done with Tunisia to combat smuggling and terrorism,
and we will continue to encourage Algeria to use their expertise to
train and partner with less experienced militaries and law enforcement
units in the region to help ensure greater stability in the Sahel and
Maghreb.
Egypt
Egypt has undergone dizzying changes in the last three years. While
its path forward is still being charted, its current trajectory has
raised legitimate concerns about the future of democracy and human
rights in Egypt. Egypt is also facing dramatic economic challenges as
it moves to address unemployment, diversify and strengthen its economy,
rebuild its tourist sector, and attract investment. We want Egypt to
become a stable, prosperous, democratic country. While changes in Egypt
have been shaped by internal dynamics, we recognize that these changes
have broader implications for the region. Egypt is the most populous
Arab nation--representing a quarter of the Arab world--and remains a
bellwether for political and social trends across the Middle East and
North Africa.
Egypt also remains a critical partner of the United States as we
pursue our national security interests in the region and globally. We
share several crucial interests, including countering the transnational
threats of terrorism and weapons trafficking and maintaining regional
stability on several fronts, foremost among them peace with Israel.
Egypt is supportive of these interests and we believe a stable,
prosperous, and democratic Egypt will make the strongest and most
effective partner.
We remain deeply concerned about the state of human rights and
political freedoms in Egypt, particularly the imprisonment of
journalists and democracy activists, the lack of individualized justice
and mass death sentences, and the enforcement of a harsh demonstrations
law that is being used to close off space for dissent. These tactics
are troubling: they reflect a profound lack of due process and
complicate the achievement of political reform. Such tactics are at
odds with the demands of the Egyptian people for justice; they further
polarize Egyptian society and radicalize those whom they exclude from
the political environment.
Secretary Kerry made these views clear during his visit last month
when he emphasized our strong support for upholding the universal
rights and freedoms of all Egyptians, including freedoms of expression,
peaceful assembly, and association. We will continue to call on
President Al-Sisi and the new government to take steps to support a
democratic transition in Egypt, one built on a foundation of the rule
of law, civil liberties, and open political discourse. So, in Egypt, we
are pursuing dual, though by no means contradictory, policy
imperatives: protecting our shared strategic interests and encouraging
political and economic reform in Egypt. Through our economic
assistance, we are seeking to demonstrate our commitment to achieving
prosperity and improving the lives of the Egyptian people. We are
striving to sharpen that commitment, by focusing on key issues such as
higher education, private sector growth, and longer term establishment
of democratic institutions. Through our military assistance, we are
helping Egypt protect its borders and counter violent extremism that
threatens Egypt, the broader region, and U.S. interests. We know that
respect for human rights and a more democratic political environment
are also critical to achieving those goals.
We will continue to engage diplomatically with the Egyptian
government to underscore the need for political and economic reform,
and work closely with Congress to ensure our assistance--military and
economic--supports our broad strategic interests in Egypt and in the
region.
Chairman Cardin and Co-chairman Smith, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. Certainly, we are aware that
our budgets are facing increasing pressure, but this region remains
vital to protecting our national interests, as we look to maintain
relationships with key allies and to nudge nascent democracies through
difficult transitions, with the hope of promoting stability and
countering extremist threats in the Middle East and Africa. With
careful, targeted assistance, and smart diplomatic engagement, we are
successfully advancing our key strategic interests.
Thank you again for your time and attention. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Prepared Statement of William Taylor, Vice President for Middle East
and Africa, United States Institute for Peace
Chairman Cardin, Co-chairman Smith, Members of the Commission,
thank you for the opportunity to present my views on political
pluralism in several of the Arab Spring countries. The views I express
today are solely my own and do not represent those of the United States
Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions. I commend you
for this timely and important hearing.
In addition to my current position as vice president for the Middle
East and Africa at USIP, I had the opportunity in 2011-2013 to
coordinate assistance to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria at the State
Department.
I will concentrate this morning on two of the OSCE Mediterranean
Partners for Cooperation--Tunisia and Egypt. I believe they demonstrate
the range of experience and practice that we can see in this region.
Tunisia has demonstrated remarkable maturity and commitment to the
ideal of political inclusiveness; Egypt has not.
I will review briefly several of the events of the past two years
in these two countries; I will then evaluate briefly the actions taken
by leaders in Tunisia and Egypt.
At the beginning of 2013, Tunisia was struggling politically and
economically and facing violent unrest. The elections in 2012 had given
the moderate Islamist party Ennahda a plurality. It formed a coalition
with two secular parties, called the Troika, and was attempting to both
govern and write a new constitution. After broad consultations around
the country on various aspects of a new constitution, parliamentary
work on the constitution had stalled by early 2013.
The Tunisian economy, like others in the region, was suffering from
low investment, low tourism and high unemployment.
The attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis by extremist Islamist
forces in September 2012 had demonstrated the weakness of the
government and its security forces. The instability was then
exacerbated in early 2013 with the assassination of a prominent
opposition party member, Chokri Belaid. While the extent of violence in
Tunisia was small compared to the numbers killed in other countries of
the region, these incidents shocked Tunisians and led to two events:
first, the resignation of the Ennahda prime minister, and second, an
effort by civil society leaders to pull the country back from the
crisis. Several political parties supported the effort; Ennahda did
not.
At the same time--the beginning of 2013--the Islamist government
that had formed in Egypt under Mohammed Morsi was also struggling to
govern and write a constitution. Unlike in Tunisia, however, the main
Islamist party in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, had won a majority in
the parliamentary elections, and Mr. Morsi had won a tight race for
president. Also unlike Tunisia, the Islamist majority in the Egyptian
parliament and the Islamist president forced through a constitution
without attempting to achieve consensus. Further, security forces and
Muslim Brotherhood supporters attacked peaceful demonstrators, women's
rights were violated, journalists were suppressed, and police abuse
continued. President Morsi issued a decree that exempted his decisions
from judicial review. Demonstrations grew in opposition to the
government's handling of the constitutional process as well as to
social legislation in the parliament and economic mismanagement,
leading to a large, army-sponsored demonstration on June 30, 2013, and
a military coup on July 3 that installed a military-backed civilian
government.
At this point, events in Tunisia and events in Egypt intersect.
Before the coup in Egypt, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda had
resisted efforts by civil society to bridge political differences
within Tunisian society. Ennahda had rejected invitations to join a
dialogue sponsored by four parts of Tunisian civil society known as the
Quartet and made up of the largest labor union, the association of
employers, the Tunisian bar association and the league of human rights
advocates. After the coup in Egypt--and another political assassination
in Tunis--Ennahda decided to join what was then being called the
Tunisian National Dialogue. The Quartet-led discussions lasted through
the fall and into the winter, until, in January 2014, they reached
agreement on three important points:
They agreed on the text of a new constitution, which was
then referred to the parliament and won overwhelming approval from its
members.
They agreed that new elections, presidential and
parliamentary, would take place by the end of the year, that is, before
December 2014.
Even more remarkably, the Ennahda-led coalition
government agreed to step down and to hand over power to a non-
political, interim government that would take governmental influence
out of preparations for the elections. In Egypt, meanwhile, the
military-installed government had begun a harsh crackdown on the Muslim
Brotherhood, killing more than 1,000 Egyptians and jailing and
prosecuting thousands more. Hundreds at a time have been convicted and
sentenced to death, often on little evidence. The repression, which the
new military-backed government defended as a fight against terrorists,
soon extended to journalists, activists and liberal groups accused of
supporting terrorists. This year, Field Marshal and Defense Minister
al-Sisi, who once professed no interest in the military taking over the
country, declared his candidacy for president under a newly ratified
constitution and, in May, won an overwhelming victory, even though
turnout in the election was disappointing. U.S. assistance to the
government of Egypt, cut off after the coup as called for by U.S. law,
was partially restored.
Political pluralism in the region is at its broadest in Tunisia
today. The formation of a coalition government including both the
Islamist Ennahda and two secular parties demonstrated that Islamist and
secular political parties are able to work together. Islamist leaders
soon learned that extremist violence, rather than reinforcing their
position, undermined it, and that strong security measures were
required to quell such attacks and maintain stability.
The Tunisian constitution, drafted after extensive consultation
across the country, is considered a model in the region, acknowledging
the Muslim foundation of Tunisian society and guaranteeing rights to
religions, sexes and political streams of thought. The constitution was
approved as a result of wide consultation across the country, thorough
debate in the parliament, political compromise struck by civil society
leaders, and adherence to agreed rules as the parliament ratified the
constitution overwhelmingly, with the parliamentarians standing to sing
the Tunisian national anthem after the historic vote.
The leading role of civil society--pulling the country back from
violence, division and gridlock--is a model of dialogue over
confrontation and conflict. The Tunisian National Dialogue, led by the
non-governmental Quartet, was able to find consensus, bring the
quarreling political parties into the discussion, and forge compromises
that have set Tunisia on a positive--if still fragile--course toward a
successful transition.
In Egypt, on the other hand, political pluralism is, at best,
reminiscent of previous military dictatorships. Freedom of the press
and for civil society organizations may be more constrained now than
under previous governments.
Islamist leaders drew the wrong lessons from their elections,
ignoring voices of minorities in parliament and society. Ramming
through a constitution that was not broadly supported contributed to
the rise of the opposition.
The new military-backed government under President al-Sisi has not
limited its security measures to violent extremists and has instead
used police and the courts to eliminate political opposition.
The cases of Tunisia and Egypt point the way toward potentially
effective U.S. and international strategies for the region. First, the
United States and the international community should increase support
for the Tunisian government and people as they continue to demonstrate
that political pluralism is compatible with Islamic societies and is
the formula for a successful transition to democracy. This assistance
should include financial support--in the form of loan guarantees,
project financing, and incentives for private investment--from Western
governments, international financial institutions and the international
private sector. The United States should negotiate and sign a free-
trade agreement with Tunisia. Western governments should provide
training and equipment to Tunisia's security forces. The United States
and Europe should increase opportunities for Tunisian students to study
abroad.
Second, on Egypt, the United States and the international community
should continue to condemn the repression, publicly and privately, as
counterproductive and short-sighted. We have learned a lot in the past
few years about governance in the Middle East; one clear lesson is that
political oppression is not an effective tactic to increase stability.
U.S. assistance to Egypt should concentrate on programs that enable
Egyptians to take advantage of educational opportunities, both in Egypt
and abroad. A large program of scholarships for Egyptian young people,
with an emphasis on women and underdeveloped parts of the country,
could pay great dividends for Egypt and U.S.-Egyptian relations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to answer questions.
Prepared Statement of Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and
Development, University of Maryland
This is not a good time for pluralism and human rights in the
Middle East and North Africa, although there are important degrees and
variations. In my short comments today, I will limit myself to
describing some broad dynamics affecting pluralism, human rights, and
democracy in the region so that we can have a context for a
constructive discussion of the trends and possibilities. My focus will
be on the challenges faced and not on the possibilities or the bright
spots.
Let me start with the impact of the Arab uprisings and three issues
that need to be understood.
The most profound, and probably enduring, change that has occurred
in the region with the advent of the Arab uprisings is the empowerment
of the individual in a region where the individual has counted less
politically and culturally. This empowerment is driven principally by
an expanding information revolution, especially satellite TV, the
Internet, and social media, that is not going away. Governments have
lost control of information, people's expectations are rising because
of what they see outside their own countries, and the interactive
nature of the Internet and social media is empowering. This public
empowerment is in the long term an important and constructive force
that is likely to push for more freedom, pluralism, and human rights.
But in the short term, there are dynamics that lead to exactly the
opposite, as we have witnessed in a number of states swept by public
uprisings. It should be noted, however, that even countries that have
felt only a limited impact of the uprisings, such as Jordan, Morocco,
and Algeria, are not immune to the public pressure that comes with the
empowerment generated by an expanding information revolution.
First, the fact that the public is empowered doesn't mean it is
unified. In fact there Arab societies--and Israel's--are highly
diverse, and that diversity had been muted by authoritarianism, in the
case of the Arab states, and intense external conflict in the case of
the Israelis. This diversity is not limited to the kind of sectarianism
that we see in states like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. There are
ideological, economic, and geographic divisions that surface to the top
as we have seen in Egypt, aside from the roughly 10% of the population
who are Christians, the Muslim majority is overwhelmingly Sunni. The
divide between secularists and Islamists, among others, has pitted
people against each other in a zero-sum confrontation that is at least
as divisive as sectarianism. Public empowerment means that every group
wants its voices heard and wants a share of power in a changing
political empowerment. This is especially so as central authority
weakens, and new rules of the game are being set up.
Second, in the struggle for a new system, and everyone vying for
influence and a share of the pie, not everyone is equal. In these
environments, minorities are most vulnerable as the state weakens, and
we see this already in a number of states, where groups like Christian
Arabs have become particularly vulnerable. In addition, the public is
still fighting against existing sources of power that want to assert
themselves in a new polity. This includes state bureaucracies,
corporations, individuals and groups with deep pockets, and, above all,
military institutions. In fact, in all the states with significant
uprisings, the initial outcome, and the resulting conditions, could not
be understood without understanding the roles of the military
institutions: In Egypt and Tunisia, the initial toppling of rulers came
with support or at least the acquiescence of the military, and the
different results so far are partly a function of the decisions each
institution has taken. The outcome will continue to depend on the
decisions of each institution. In Syria, Bahrain, and Libya, the army
supported the rulers and the outcome was ultimately dependent on that
decision.
Third, transitions are destabilizing, and that usually is not a
good thing for democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Deep insecurity
and economic deprivation, often short-term results of a weakened
central authority, provide fertile ground for those who want to rule
with an iron fist--as fear trumps pluralism and human rights. We see
this in many of the states facing the uprisings to varying degrees, and
we see this also playing into the hands of those governments that have
not had to deal with their own major uprisings. In fact, one reason why
the Arab uprisings have not expanded beyond the early cases is that the
anarchy, such as in Syria and Libya, and economic deprivation and
limited insecurity, as in Egypt, have given rulers a way of frightening
their own public: Do you want to be in Aleppo and Tripoli, or Amman and
Riyadh?
Fourth, while each country in the region has its own specific
conditions that have to be evaluated separately, it is fair to say that
there are commonalities in the Arab world. And regional politics are
interwoven with domestic politics; the international is sometimes hard
to separate from the national. Polls indicate common aspirations and,
more centrally, note the early spillover from Tunisia across the Arab
world, but not into other regions, including non-Arab Muslim countries.
In addition, it is also obvious that the way the uprisings have
unfolded in every country--with the possible exception of Tunisia--
cannot be explained without reference to major external intervention.
Syria is of course experiencing upheavals that are at the core
internal, but the intensity, nature, and ultimately outcome of the
struggle cannot be understood without the role of Iran and Saudi
Arabia, and Syria's neighboring states, not to mention the United
States and Russia. Even in Egypt, where there is no military
intervention from the outside, the infusion of billions of dollars from
the Arab Gulf states is an important factor of what happens in Egypt as
President Sisi tries to stabilize the economy.
Fifth, the case of the non-Arab Middle Eastern state in the group,
Israel, is of course unique, but there are potential troubles ahead for
pluralism and democracy, whose prospects remain partly tied to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel is a successful democracy with the
pre-1967 war boundaries. But two things suggest troubling trends: the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have not had full independence,
and the international toleration of this situation has been predicated
on the assumption that occupation is temporary and that the focus
should be on achieving a political settlement that leads to two states.
If the hope for two states is lost, and a sense emerges that the status
quo is semi-permanent, the Israeli-Palestinian inequality will be
evaluated differently. Second, as the Israeli aspiration for a Jewish
majority state becomes threatened within existing boundaries, we will
see more ultra-Jewish nationalism reflected not only in the
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza, but also in the internal dynamics between Israel's Jewish
minority and the 20% of its population who are Arab citizens--as we
have begun to see already. In turn, the absence of independence for
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will generate empathy among
Israel's Arab citizens in a manner that plays into the hand of
extremists on both sides--thus jeopardizing the coexistence of Jews and
Arabs even within Israel's pre-1967 borders . . .
Prepared Statement of Zeinab Abdelkarim, Regional Director for Middle
East and North Africa, International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, for the
opportunity to testify today on the topic of Political Pluralism in the
OSCE Mediterranean Partners. I appreciate the opportunity to share with
you IFES' considerable expertise and experience assessing the overall
political, socio-economic, security, humanitarian and other issues
likely surrounding the region's democratic transition.
I will begin with a brief synopsis of IFES' work in order to
contextualize my testimony. Broadly speaking, IFES supports citizens'
right to participate in free and fair elections by strengthening
electoral systems, and by building local capacity to deliver
sustainable solutions to problems facing countries that seek to enhance
their governance structures.
IFES has been active in the Middle East region for over two decades
advocating for participatory societies where citizens have the regular
opportunity to play an active role in making decisions that affect
their lives and in holding their government accountable. IFES utilizes
an integrated and innovative approach that empowers both the recognized
local authorities, local actors and civil society activists by
providing information on democratic norms, elections and political
processes, international standards and best practices; carrying out
trainings for key stakeholders on democratic and transitional issues;
and providing resources and tools for civil society activists to
implement civic education activities and prepare the country for a
democratic transition.
The Arab uprisings reaffirmed the importance of democratic
representation and the need for opportunity, access and freedom. Today,
IFES programming continues to respond to challenges across the region
in countries such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. Our work across
the region was made possible by direct funding assistance from the U.S.
Government and other international donors, including the British,
Swiss, Canadian and Dutch governments.
The overall situation throughout the Middle East and North Africa
remains fragile and very polarized. As Syria's civil war rages on and
Iraq's security and stability deteriorate, threats from Al Qaeda,
foreign mercenaries and other radical groups stretching from the Levant
and the Arabian Peninsula to Africa continue to undermine regional
stability.
The trends that played a major role in the Arab uprisings just a
few years ago--such as demographic challenges, struggling economies,
poor internal security, insufficient access to justice, ineffective
governance and stagnant social transformation--continue to affect both
the region and individual States. These trends will remain sources of
instability, and in some cases violence, in the near future.
Newly-elected governments and institutions continue to face firm
resistance from their opponents and have not been successful thus far
in managing political distrust, economic uncertainty and internal
security. In deeply divided societies where ethnic, social, tribal and
political affiliations are key considerations, it is imperative that
countries' transitions are managed in a manner that is inclusive and
consultative and engenders trust across these divisions. While any
future elections in the transitioning countries will represent an
opportunity for a population to express its degree of satisfaction with
the country's state of affairs, the simmering political and societal
conflicts that have plagued the countries of this region for decades,
and the slow pace of political reform, will pose challenges for
democratization moving forward. The biggest danger is the tendency to
reduce democratic practices to voting, constitutional drafting and
electoral events. A new constitution or the presence of electoral
processes does not necessarily mean that a democratic tradition of
transparency and accountability have taken root. It is particularly
important for citizens to perceive government affairs, legal reform
processes and the country's economic plans as open and transparent. The
current developments across the region cannot be considered to evidence
a new social contract between regional States and their citizens, in
any regard. At best, it can be described as constitutional engineering
led by a small elite faction of the dominant force or ethnic/religious
group.
Understandably, undeveloped and disorganized political and civil
forces as well as nascent civil movements in places like Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt and Jordan are unable to wield much influence on near-term
outcomes of the transition in these countries. However, it is important
to note that modern democratic practices evolved over centuries; it
makes no sense to look for similarities in a remarkably different
context, particularly so early in the game. Rather, it is best to let
the political development run its natural course. These are changes
that are best measured in decades, not years. It is not realistic to
expect a fast and seamless transition to democracy. The history of
colonial and imperial rule across the region, as well as the State's
domination of the economy and society, shaped a culture of
authoritarian political traditions that needs time and comprehensive
locally-driven efforts to overcome. Each and every State will evolve
into its own distinctive way as it adapts to national, regional and
global changes over time.
Additionally and most importantly, the lack of political and
societal consensus around major issues--such as the role of Islam and
Shariah in the affairs of the State and society, the rights of ethnic
and religious minorities, and the rights and role of women in their
respective societies--is a fundamental internal struggle that cannot be
ignored. Any external intervention on these issues has little influence
over what is considered an internal struggle that can only be addressed
when the peoples of the region genuinely seek to invoke civil
liberties, justice and the rule of law regardless of the governing
system they choose to implement.
Analysis in the midst of current political and regional events is
never easy, especially as events unfold and their causes and the future
itself remain clouded with uncertainty. In retrospect and based on
close monitoring of recent and current events, this testimony seeks to
reexamine these regional developments and offer a short outlook on key
issues and concerns that will affect the development of political
pluralism across the region. The following issues and concerns cover a
range of political, economic and social factors that must be discussed
when addressing pluralism in the region:
1. A decline in political legitimacy in some countries: Political
forces overseeing transitions have suffered a serious decline in
political legitimacy and public confidence in a number of the
countries. The lack of commitment to change, or even attempts to
introduce serious changes to the political and socio-economic status
quo, have resulted in serious questions about those new governments'
true commitment to pluralism and democratic principles. Their refusal
to exercise inclusive and transparent governance; the ongoing human
rights abuses (including the excessive use of force); torture and other
ill-treatment by security forces; unfair trials; and discrimination
against women and other religious and ethnic minorities will continue
to lead to widespread protests and eventually contribute to further
destabilization in what has proven to be an exceptionally fluid
environment.
2. A breakdown in security, rising instability and an increase in
both human and weapons trafficking: Security has been declared the top
priority for most governments across the region. There has been a
serious lack of stability since the inception of the 2011 uprisings as
the security situation has steadily deteriorated and been further
compounded by trans-border security threats. Bomb attacks,
assassinations and weapons proliferations continue to be a daily
problem for most governments, and arms have flowed out across borders
and found their way to radical groups operating in the Levant, Arabian
Peninsula, Sinai and North Africa. Impunity for political
assassinations and other politically and religiously motivated violence
is also on the rise across the region. The assassination of the
Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan that took place in Beirut in October
2012 was a dangerous twist that mirrored other successful attempts in
Libya, Tunisia, Iraq and Yemen. The recent assassination of Salwa
Bugaighis, a Libyan human rights attorney, has also sent a chill
through democracy activists across the region.
Furthermore, the ongoing conflict between the different rebel
factions in Syria, coupled with the inability of the Iraqi government
to establish a viable non-sectarian political system or find a workable
relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the
autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, is bound to fuel the
sectarian wars across the border for many years to come. As a result,
parts of Syria and Iraq may well be threatened by secession or
disintegration and a more dangerous security situation will emerge for
the citizens of these territories.
3. Economic meltdown and extreme poverty in some countries in the
region: The unstable security climate is one of the main impediments to
economic development, and it remains to be seen whether the current
governments can continue the pace of political, economic, and social
reform over the long-term that many analysts see as crucial to
addressing some countries' endemic economic problems. The lack of
effort to seriously address these problems does not augur well for
stabilization or democratic development and could lead to more
protests/insecurity if not addressed in the near-term.
4. Increased tension between Islamists, socialists, liberals and
the other political entities: Islam was largely absent from the mantras
that gave birth to the uprisings; nor has it been at the forefront of
any of the nonviolent mass movements in the region since. Recent
analysis indicates that the primary cause of discontent and
mobilization that lead to regime change in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and
Yemen was an outcry for justice, rights, economic and political
reforms. In fact, most of the Islamist movements in these countries did
not join the demonstrations in their relevant countries until sometime
after they started. However, in most of the transitioning countries or
in the other Arab countries that have seen some legal and political
reform, Islamists are a force in the new political order as they sought
to portray themselves as the vanguard of opposition to the status quo.
Examples of this tension can clearly be seen in Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya. The struggle over the constitutional drafting process in these
countries is a prime example of the growing divide between Islamists
and liberals as they debated the inclusion of Shariah as the source of
all legislation, the role of men and women, and criminalization of
attacks against religion and sacred values. These debates have plagued
the region for many years and will continue to be at the forefront of
the region's political sphere for years to come.
5. A decline in the status of women, ethnic and religious
minorities: The possibility for all citizens to participate in the
management of public affairs is at the very heart of democracy. In the
majority of MENA countries, however, the political arena remains
largely dominated by men, and is exclusively monopolized by men in some
countries. Many fear the new political order of the region will impact
universal human rights negatively, especially the already-sparse legal
rights and protections in place for women and ethnic minorities. As the
current governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya struggled to put
together their new constitutions and representative bodies, the issue
of the role of women and minorities was embodied in the debates on
constitutional articles and quotas.
6. Power shifts and the geopolitics of the region: The struggle for
dominance in the Persian Gulf and the Levant remains unresolved,
volatile and highly dangerous. For decades, there has been fierce
competition between the Salafi Saudi-Wahhabi school of thought and the
Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran. Both sides have provided military and
political backing to their allies across the region for years. Iran on
one hand has been one of Iraq and Syria's strongest allies in the
Middle East and has stepped up its military and political backing to
these two governments in recent years. Similarly, Iran has also
provided support, financially and militarily, to Lebanon's Shiite
Hezbollah for decades, and is suspected of providing financial support
and arms to the Houthi Shiite opposition in its struggle against the
Yemeni government. Conversely, the Bahraini government and six other
Gulf countries have accused Iran of meddling in its sovereignty and
inciting the Shiite uprising. On the other hand, given its vast
resources, Saudi Arabia could play a pivotal and decisive role in
determining the trajectory of development in Syria, Egypt and Yemen.
Its efforts have been aimed at stabilizing neighboring countries,
particularly Yemen, Jordan and Bahrain, containing Iran's agenda in the
region, and ensuring that the new political order in the countries
undergoing transition does not bring the Muslim Brotherhood or an
Islamic-democratic model, along the lines of Turkey's AK Party, into
power; the Kingdom has serious ideological differences with these two
groups.
External regional players, in particular the U.S., Europe, Russia
and China and their delayed and sometimes unwelcomed engagement make
them ineffective players in influencing the region's political
transformation.
7. Changing regional priorities regarding the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict: The peace process between Israel and Palestine is no longer
the main regional pre-occupation, with the Arab region spiraling
dangerously into further conflict and sectarianism. Yet the conflict
remains a destabilizing factor that is also spiraling out of control,
with no end in sight to the cycle of violence, revenge, killings,
kidnappings, bombings and rocket attacks. The role of Hamas in the Gaza
strip, as well as the Jewish settlements in lands that are meant to be
part of the future Palestinian state, have been the main deal breakers
each time the peace negotiations seemed to be about to produce change.
Without a political solution that includes an end to the occupation,
there is no telling when the current violent cycle will end.
8. Continued resistance to U.S. involvement in the region: The U.S.
presence in the region, both ideologically and physically, faces a
crisis in legitimacy, where mistrust and suspicion are the dominant
features of the regions' perception towards the U.S. The post-Saddam
period in Iraq has proved to be filled with human tragedies and grave
tactical errors; including terror, violence, political instability and
a brewing, potentially catastrophic civil war. Additionally, U.S.
selectivity in forcing democratization or applying sanctions and
embargoes on Middle Eastern countries has been met with much criticism
in the region, and it faces sustained disapproval in relation to its
reaction or lack thereof to the mass revolts that spread across the
region. Most importantly, the self-inflicted disappointments against
America's democratic principles and international standards through the
torture of prisoners and detainees at U.S.-run facilities in Iraq and
Afghanistan; the holding of hundreds of persons in legal limbo at
Guantanamo Bay; the turning over of foreign detainees to foreign
countries known to practice torture; and the astonishing scale of the
U.S. drone and surveillance programs abroad continue to be at the
forefront of the regional debate over the U.S. sincerity to uphold
justice.
9. Shrinking space for democracy-building programs: A growing
number of governments across the region are starting to crack down on
democracy-building programs and publicly denouncing democracy
assistance, describing it as illegitimate political meddling in
internal affairs and a clear attempt to subvert political order. It is
important to note this backlash against and skepticism of democracy aid
is global and not limited to the Middle East and is best understood as
likely to persist for the foreseeable future. In recent years, some
governments have expelled implementers of democracy assistance programs
from their soil, prohibited local groups from taking foreign funds, and
prosecuted local persons who have participated in trainings conducted
by international implementers. They have further formalized this
backlash by passing controversial new laws which impose heightened
controls on local and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
operating in the country. There can be little doubt that the proponents
of this resistance are clearly learning from and feeding off one
another, and we should anticipate the space for democracy promotion to
continue shrinking in the immediate future. Also, within the space that
some of these countries will leave slightly open for this type of
programming, we will see a spike in the level of scrutiny that will be
imposed by governments on the finances, implementation and
participation by local actors on these programs, which can have huge
implications on their effectiveness.
Transition to democratic governance is not easy or fast, and the
path to introducing and implementing democratic and political reforms
varies across countries. It is difficult to predict how long the
transformation of the region will take and how far it will go. However,
the regional upheaval is far from over and the highly motivated young
generation who is on the forefront of the call for transformation will
continue to challenge the present circumstances and guard the flame of
change. To remain effective, the international community and groups
that promote democracy must come to grips with these new trends and the
complicated history of democracy promotion and genuinely rethink their
strategies of engagement. There are clear signs of a decline in the
legitimacy of democratic systems in many parts of the region, including
a crisis in representation, poor voter turnout at elections and
referenda, a loss of trust due to poor performance by political
parties, corruption, severe dissatisfaction among young people and an
increase in human loss due to ongoing armed conflicts. It is critical
that democracy promotion move beyond electoral politics and
mobilization of the streets to enabling human rights, physical well-
being and human development. Unfortunately, the emphasis on democratic
elections, participation by civil societies, empowerment of
marginalized and ethnic groups and competition between political
parties will not guarantee State responses to its citizens' needs or
the social and political accountability of the ruling regime in
transitioning societies. To the contrary, and as evident by the quick
call for elections immediately after the fall of the former regimes in
the transitioning countries, open competitive politics often accentuate
social differences and lead to violent conflicts. Undoubtedly, there is
a need to re-evaluate the ways in which democratization is supported
and sustained. The human security challenges facing the region today
require the promotion of a broader concept that includes consensus and
peace-building processes, accountability, human rights protection,
capacity building for social and economic development, promotion of
public involvement and consultation and improvement of political and
electoral processes. Disengaging or limiting democratic governance aid
to the region at this juncture is a huge mistake; however given the
restrictions referenced above, the international community should
continue to leverage existing international frameworks, diplomacy and
bilateral agreements to find ways to encourage democratic governance
and the space for these programs. Efforts to plan future assistance
have to take into consideration that democracy building is highly
political and not only a technical exercise. Better understanding of
the local context and norms, local ownership, and respect for the
viewpoints and experiences of the targeted population are key
principles that must guide the international community's efforts. Any
intervention can easily lose credibility if perceived by the local
population as ineffective or tainted by the intervening country's
political self-interest.
[all]
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