[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESOLVING CRISES IN EAST ASIA THROUGH A NEW SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY: THE HELSINKI PROCESS AS A MODEL
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HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE:
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 11, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SENATE
HOUSE
BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland, CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey,
Chairman Co-Chairman
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
TOM UDALL, New Mexico ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida,
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia Co-Chairman
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
New York
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
(II)
RESOLVING CRISES IN EAST ASIA THROUGH A NEW SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY: THE HELSINKI PROCESS AS A MODEL
----------
December 11, 2013
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
WITNESSES
Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy....... 3
Karin Lee, Executive Director, National Committee on North Korea. 6
Frank Jannuzi, Deputy Executive Director, Amnesty International.. 9
APPENDICES
Prepared statement of Carl Gershman.............................. 24
Prepared statement of Frank Jannuzi.............................. 27
Prepared statement of Karin Lee.................................. 31
(III)
RESOLVING CRISES IN EAST ASIA THROUGH A NEW SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY: THE HELSINKI PROCESS AS A MODEL
----------
DECEMBER 11, 2013
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 1:26 to 2:23 p.m. EST, SD-106
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator
Benjamin Cardin, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Carl Gershman, President, National
Endowment for Democracy; Karin Lee, Executive Director,
National Committee on North Korea; and Frank Jannuzi, Deputy
Executive Director, Amnesty International.
HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, COMMISSIONER,
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Let me welcome you all to the Helsinki
Commission hearing. I want to apologize for the change in time.
The hearing was originally scheduled to start at 2:00. We're
starting at 1:00 because there will be a briefing today on the
Iranian sanction agreement and there is tremendous interest
that all senators be there. And Secretary Kerry will be making
a presentation that I feel obligated to be personally present
for. So I want to thank you all for adjusting your calendar so
that you could be here at 1:00. I'm going to put my full
statement in the record but just let me make a few observations
to start.
When the Helsinki process started in 1975, there were many
naysayers in the United States. They were saying: How can such
a large regional organization be effective which only has
consensus as a way of making decisions; there are no sanctions
for failure to comply with the Helsinki commitments; that the
Soviet Union would use this as propaganda rather than dealing
with the real problems that their country faces in complying
with the commitments that were made in 1975. There are others
who said: When you combine human rights with economics and hard
security issues, human rights will get lost in the equation,
and that this organization will just be another example of how
we deal with hard security issues or perhaps some of the trade
or economic issues but that human rights would not be front and
center.
I think history has proven both of those concerns to be
without merit. Now the OSCE, Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, has become a dominant factor, bringing
people together to talk about problems and to advance causes in
all of the member states, particularly on the basket of human
rights and good governance. It's known for that globally. And
there are so many organizations that tie into the OSCE because
they know they have a friend on advancing human rights.
The U.S. Helsinki Commission has taken leadership on so
many different issues, from trafficking to anticorruption to
the protection of minority communities, and we have effectively
brought about changes in not just the OSCE member regions but
throughout the globe. We have expanded within the OSCE. We
have, of course, partners in the OSCE outside of the OSCE
region. I'm particularly pleased about the advancement of the
OSCE footprint in the Mediterranean. We have partners from
Afghanistan to Israel to Jordan to North African countries, and
we have strengthened the Mediterranean dimension that has
brought about significant progress.
When I was in Israel many years ago, promoting at the time
the OSCME, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in the
Middle East, I remember meeting with then-president Peres and
asked whether Israel would be interested in joining such a
regional group, recognizing that there would be many Arab
states and just one Jewish state. His answer to me: We want any
type of regional organization that allows us to communicate,
because we think talking with our neighbors is the best way to
work out problems, and that the OSCE has been so successful
among countries with very different views that that model would
work well in the Middle East.
So when President Park of South Korea was here in
Washington and addressed a joint session of Congress and
mentioned her support for a regional organization for East
Asia, it got my attention. I then traveled to the region and
had a chance to talk to the leadership of China, Japan and
Korea. All three underscored what they thought made good sense
for their own interests if there was a regional organization
similar to the OSCE for East Asia.
The main concern is clearly North Korea today. Now, that
may change a decade from now. We hope it does. And North Korea
is interesting because it's not just the security issues of
their nuclear ambitions--and there is unanimity among Japan,
China and South Korea that they want a nuclear-free Korea
Peninsula. They all agree on that. But it's also the human
rights and economic issues within Korea that--North Korea which
is problematic. The people there are some of the most oppressed
in the world. And their economic prosperity is near the bottom
of the global world also, with people literally being starved
to death.
So having a regional organization modeled after the OSCE or
within the OSCE that can help dialogue between the countries of
East Asia seems to me to be a very positive step in trying to
resolve some of the long term conflicts. And of course I could
mention China's most recent activities concerning their air
security zone, which raises tension. It seems to me that if
there was an OSCE for East Asia, that that mechanism could also
have been helpful to deal with maritime security issues.
So it goes on and on and on, the type of matters that we
believe this type of process could be very helpful in dealing
with these concerns. So it was for that reason that I was very
pleased that today's hearing could take place so we can start
to establish a record as it relates to whether and how we can
move forward on this type of proposal for East Asia. I must
tell you my interest is a little bit higher today because, in
addition to chairing the U.S. Helsinki Commission, I also chair
the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
I very much welcome the panel of experts that we have here
today, all of whom have incredible credentials in this area:
Carl Gershman, the president of the National Endowment for
Democracy, and one of the longstanding supporters and advocates
for human rights across the globe, and has been a longstanding
advocate of using our Helsinki process experience in East Asia.
Karin Lee, who is the executive director of the National
Committee on North Korea. In that capacity she oversees the
committee's work to facilitate engagement between citizens of
the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. So she has a good deal of experience here. And Frank
Jannuzi, who is the deputy executive director of Amnesty
International and is a former advisor to then-Senator Kerry,
and also has experience at the State Department on--working on
multilateral affairs.
So it's wonderful to have all three of you here. And we
welcome your testimony, but more importantly we welcome your
involvement as we try to find ways to use the success of the
Helsinki process to bring better understanding and cooperation
in other parts of the world. And with that, we'll start with
Mr. Gershman.
CARL GERSHMAN, PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Mr. Gershman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you to the Helsinki Commission for organizing this hearing at a
critical moment in U.S. relations with Northeast Asia.
It was almost eight years ago to the day that I and several
others, active on human rights in North Korea, joined with
policy in Korea affairs specialists to form a working group to
consider how a comprehensive framework involving international
security, economic cooperation, human rights and humanitarian
aid could be developed for the Korean Peninsula and more
broadly for Northeast Asia. I'm very happy that Roberta Cohen,
who is a member of that working group and who co-chairs the
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea is with us today.
Our decision to form this group followed the agreement
reached in the six-party talks to explore ways of promoting a
common political, economic and security agenda linking the two
Koreas with China, Russia, Japan and the United States. This
opened the door to creating a permanent multilateral
organization for advancing security and cooperation in
Northeast Asia, one of the few regions of the world without
such a mechanism.
Ambassador Jim Goodby of our working group, who had played
a key role in developing the ``basket three'' human rights
provisions that became part of the Helsinki Final Act, drafted
the first of several papers that spelled out how the
negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and
achieve a final settlement of the Korean War could evolve into
a Helsinki-type process for Northeast Asia, leading to the
eventual creation of a multilateral and multidimensional
organization for collective security.
The effort to encourage such a process had the strong
backing of Ban Ki-moon at the time. He was South Korea's
foreign minister, of course now the secretary general of the
United Nations, who told a major gathering in Helsinki in
2006--a gathering of Asian and European leaders--that--and I
quote, ``The challenge for Northeast Asia is how to draw upon
the European experience to build a mechanism for multilateral
security cooperation.''
Building such a mechanism was the focus of one of the five
working groups of the six-party talks, but efforts to implement
the idea were aborted when the talks broke down at the end of
2008. Since then, international relations in Northeast Asia
have become much more confrontational. The region suffers from
what South Korea's President Park has called Asia's paradox,
which is an acute discrepancy between the region's dynamic
economic growth and interdependence on the one hand and the
rise of nationalism, conflict and distrust on the other.
Clashes over disputed maritime space in the East China Sea,
North Korea's nuclear threat and provocative brinksmanship,
intensified military competition and historically rooted
tensions even between such ostensible allies as Japan and South
Korea have heightened anxiety over prospects for violent
conflict in the region. The situation has just become, of
course, even more dangerous with China's unilateral
establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone overlapping
with Japan's own air defense zone, and encompassing South
Korea's Leodo reef as well. In the words of The Economist,
``China has set up a causus belli with its neighbors and
America for generations to come.''
Ironically, whereas North Korea's nuclear program was the
catalyst for the six-party talks and the possible creation of a
system of collective security for Northeast Asia, it is now the
grave deterioration of the security environment in the region
itself that could act as such a catalyst. The crisis certainly
dramatizes the critical need for such a system, though that is
a long-term goal while the immediate need is for measures to
reduce risk, enhance communication through military hotlines
and other instruments that might prevent miscalculations, and
to begin to develop military confidence-building measures
similar to those negotiated in the CFCE framework.
Nonetheless, it's not too early to begin thinking about a
more comprehensive architecture that would provide a forum for
regional powers to discuss security. The Economist suggested
that such a forum, had it existed in Europe in the early part
of the last century, might have prevented the outbreak of World
War I, and that there are disturbing parallels to the situation
in Northeast Asia today with the Senkaku Islands playing the
role of Sarajevo.
For such a forum to be sustainable and effective, a
security dialogue would need to be buttressed by a broader
program of exchanges and economic cooperation. It has been said
that adding a ``basket three'' human dimension would not work
for Northeast Asia because the region's autocracies are well
aware of the liberalizing consequences of the Helsinki process
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but it's hard to
imagine a system of collective security working out without
more interaction at the societal level and having a broader
context for negotiations that would make possible tradeoffs
that might facilitate reaching an agreement.
Northeast Asia may be different from the region encompassed
by the Helsinki process, but the ``Sakharov doctrine''
regarding the indivisibility of human rights and international
security has universal relevance and should not be abandoned
even if it has to be adapted to the circumstances of the
region.
In addition to the incentive provided by the current crisis
to explore a new system of collective security for Northeast
Asia, I want to note two other factors that can be helpful. The
first is the vigorous support given to the idea by President
Park when she addressed the joint session of Congress last May,
as you have noted, Mr. Chairman. Her statement has of course
now been overshadowed by the momentum toward confrontation in
South Korea's declaration of an expanded air defense zone
partially overlapping China's and including Leodo only adds to
this momentum.
Still, South Korea's understandable response to China's
over-reaching may help to establish the strategic balance
needed to negotiate an end to the current crisis. And President
Park's commitment to a system of collective security shows that
she may want to use this crisis to make the case for a broader
architecture. Her capacity to provide leadership at this
critical time should not be underestimated.
She demonstrated both toughness and a readiness to
negotiate when, after a period of heightened tension following
North Korea's nuclear test explosion last April, South Korea
reached an agreement with the North to reopen the Kaesong
Industrial Zone. This experiment in economic cooperation shows
the potential for President Park's ``trustpolitik'' through
North Korea's cancellation--though North Korea's cancelation of
family reunions that were part of the Kaesong agreement also
shows how--how difficult it will be to sustain any kind of
engagement with Pyongyang.
Still, her steadiness of purpose is encouraging, as is her
desire, as she told the Congress last May, to use the trust-
building process that she has started ``beyond the Korean
Peninsula to all of Northeast Asia, where,'' she said, ``we
must build a mechanism of peace and security.'' That goal would
be significantly advanced, I think, if she would apply her
``trustpolitik'' to Japan, as well.
The other helpful factor is the potential role of Mongolia.
In a recent paper contrasting the challenge of building a
collective security system in Europe and Asia, the Japanese
diplomat Takako Ueta wrote that Northeast Asia--and this is a
quote--``lacks a neutral country with diplomatic skills and
efficient conference support comparable to Austria, Finland,
Sweden or Switzerland.'' But that is not true, because Mongolia
is such a country.
Last April, when Mongolia chaired the 7th Ministerial
Conference of the Community of Democracies, its president,
Elbegdorj, announced the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast
Asian Security, an initiative to broaden--I quote--``from our
Mongolian friends, a dialogue mechanism on security in
Northeast Asia that will give''--again, quote--``equal
consideration of the interest of all states and set a long-term
goal of building peace and stability in the region.''
Mongolia has an unusual geopolitical situation. Sandwiched
between China and Russia, it has maintained what President
Elbegdorj called neighborly good relations with these two big
powers, as well as with the other nations in the region, which
he--which he calls our third neighbor. It even maintains good
relations with North Korea, which were not spoiled when
President Elbegdorj concluded a state visit to the DPRK on
October 30th with a speech at Kim Il-Sung University in which
he said, and I quote, ``no tyranny lasts forever, it is the
desire of the people to live free that is the eternal power.''
He also told his North Korean audience that 20 years earlier,
Mongolia had declared herself a nuclear-free zone, and that it
prefers ensuring her security by political, diplomatic and
economic means.
Mongolia's international position is rising. In addition to
chairing the Community of Democracies, it recently joined the
OSCE--I know it had your support in doing so--and may soon
become a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Organization. Last September, at the opening of the General
Assembly in New York, President Elbegdorj was the only head of
state invited to join President Obama in presiding over a forum
of the administration's Civil Society Initiative, that seeks to
defend civil society around the world against growing
government restrictions.
Henry Kissinger, writing about Austria's chancellor, Bruno
Kreisky, observed that--and I quote--``one of the asymmetries
of history is the lack of correspondence between the abilities
of some leaders and the power of their countries.'' President
Elbegdorj is such an outsized leader of a small country, and
the fact that he is now positioning Ulaanbaatar to play the
kind of role in Northeast Asia that Helsinki once played in
Europe could be an important factor leading to a system of
collective security in Northeast Asia.
The region certainly has its own distinctive
characteristics, and Helsinki does not offer a readily
transferrable cookie-cutter model for East Asia or any other
region, but as Ambassador Goodby said in one of the papers he
wrote for our working group, so long as nation-states are the
basic building blocks of the international system, the behavior
of these units within that system is not likely to be radically
dissimilar. History suggests that autonomous behavior by
powerful nations, behavior that ignores the interests of
others, sooner or later, leads to disaster. The corollary of
this lesson is that some mechanism has to be found, be it
implicit or explicit, to allow for policy accommodations and
for self-imposed restraint within a system of nations. To fail
to do so is to make a collision almost inevitable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Ms. Lee.
KARIN LEE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON NORTH KOREA
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much, Chairman Cardin. It's an
honor to appear before you today to discuss the Helsinki
process as a model for resolving the crisis in Northeast Asia.
I have submitted a longer written statement and will now take
this opportunity to highlight the main points of my written
remarks.
I have been the executive director of the National
Committee on North Korea since February 2006, and my first
visit to the DPRK was in 1998, and my most recent visit was
this past October. I just wanted to comment that these remarks
reflect my own views and are not necessarily the views of my
organization.
First, I will reflect on the differences and similarities
in the United States and Europe in the 1970s and Northeast Asia
today, then I will discuss private sector or civil society
activities in the DPRK. I will make three key points: First,
the history of the two regions in the historical moments are
very different. To implement a Helsinki-like process in
Northeast Asia would take considerable U.S. investment.
Second, despite limited government support, productive work
is taking place inside the DPRK and with North Koreans
elsewhere in humanitarian, education and medical fields. The
United States can contribute to these efforts by delinking
security policy from what the Helsinki Process called Basket 3
activities and streamlining its visa process. Finally,
exchanges on topics of genuine regional interest may contribute
to a foundation for regional problem-solving.
The final act asserts that states will respect each other's
sovereign equality and individuality, as well as all the rights
inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty. Nevertheless,
the Helsinki Process is sometimes credited with contributing to
the changes that later swept through Eastern Europe. The OSCE
is best known today for its current work on human rights and
democratization. Therefore, the DPRK would likely look at a
Helsinki Process for Northeast Asia as a Trojan horse,
synonymous with a covert strategy for regime change.
Yet, the Helsinki Final Act as it was originally conceived,
a process aiming to increase regional stability by addressing
the most salient interests of the opposing forces, may have
merit for Northeast Asia. However, attention must be paid to
creating an environment where such a process would be possible.
In my written testimony, I highlighted seven points of
comparison between 1970s Europe and Northeast Asia today. Now,
I will address just one issue, willingness to compromise. As
the--as the commissioners know, the Helsinki Process began with
a proposal from the USSR to finalize post-World War II
boundaries and guarantee territorial integrity. Neither the
U.S. nor its allies were eager to set boundaries; however, the
West was willing to negotiate, because the dialogue included
topics that were in its own interest.
In order to apply a Helsinki-like process to East Asia, the
mechanism will need to bring everybody's concerns to the table.
The U.S. and its partners in the region need to re-examine the
incentives that have been offered to the DPRK in exchange for
denuclearization.
I will now turn to people-to-people exchanges. Whereas the
U.S. had a glowing array of private contacts and exchanges with
the Soviet Union throughout most of the Cold War, such
connections with the DPRK have been slow to develop. After
North Korea issued its first appeal for international
assistance to respond to the 1990s famine, humanitarian aid
expanded rapidly. After the famine, a handful of U.S. and other
NGOs remained active in the DPRK, developing agricultural,
medical and capacity-building programs. There is now an
impressive number of Western actors in the DPRK, as shown by
the engaged DPRK mapping initiative. This web-based tool
demonstrates the range of private sector activities that have
taken place in North Korea over the last 18 years.
While not comprehensive, the online map lists over 1,000
discrete projects carried out by 480 organizations coming from
29 different countries. Here are just a few examples: World
Visions' Community Development Project in Dochi-Ri, a community
of 12,000, is building water systems and providing solar energy
for schools, clinics and local residents' homes.
The Pyongyang University of Science and Technology is the
first private university in the DPRK. It currently has 400
graduates and 110 graduate students and plans to expand
enrollment in 2000 (sic). All of its teachers are foreign. The
majority of the teachers are from the United States.
The University of British Columbia Knowledge Partnership
Program brings North Korean university professors to UBC for a
six-month study program on topics such as modern economic
theory, finance, trade and business practices. Such projects
help build relationships between the DPRK and the West. The
nongovernmental sector also engages with North Koreans on
security matters in Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogue. This
dialogue at times makes important contributions to official
diplomacy.
The most fundamental way the U.S. could support people-to-
people diplomacy is the issuance of visas for North Koreans to
visit the United States. The Helsinki Final Act declared that
progress in one area was delinked from progress in other areas.
However, for most of the last two decades U.S. policy has been
to approve visas as an incentive or reward to the DPRK while
denying them to signal U.S. displeasure.
Cultural exchanges provide a good example of the sharp
contrast between U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and toward
the DPRK. The visit of the New York Philharmonic to Pyongyang
in 2008 was very successful and widely broadcast throughout the
DPRK. Musicians and organizations in both countries hope to
arrange a reciprocal visit by a North Korean orchestra to the
United States, but U.S. visas for such a visit have never been
issued.
Another area for growth may be science diplomacy and
regional programming on a range of humanitarian environmental
issues such as disaster and preparedness for public health--or
public health. The Mt. Paektu Changbai Shan volcano, which
straddles the Chinese-North Korean border, provides a useful
example. Mt. Paektu is considered to be the most dangerous
volcano in China. Recent monitoring has shown signs of worrying
activity. Planning future eruption scenarios requires gathering
and sharing data across political borders. Comprehensive
information sharing is necessary to plan a robust response to
any volcanic activity.
In 2011, the American Association for the Advancement of
Science began a scientific collaboration project with the DPRK
on Mt Paektu seismic activity. But this is a rare example. The
DPRK is not a member of regional networks. Institutionalizing
North Korean participation in regional and bilateral research
would improve disaster preparedness while also strengthening
regional collaboration.
Another particularly beneficial area for scientific
exchange could be medical consortiums. Medical cooperation in
Northeast Asia is weak and the DPRK is not included in relevant
existing medical networks, yet regional collaboration on
infections disease benefits citizens of all countries.
Tuberculosis may be of interest to Northeast Asia. Only Sub-
Saharan Africa has higher reported TB rates than the DPRK.
Integration into regional health networks would build upon this
strong in-country work of the WHO, the Global Fund and U.S.
organizations such as the Eugene Bell Foundation, Christian
Friends of Korea and Stanford University.
NGO activities in the DPRK are addressing unmet
humanitarian needs that contribute to the exchange of values
and ideas. Cultural and educational exchanges add to the
effectiveness of these ongoing efforts. Such activities,
including regional networks, should be encouraged for the
immediate practical benefits they can bring. This could begin
to establish a pattern of cooperative regional behavior for the
future.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Jannuzi.
FRANK JANNUZI, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Jannuzi. Thank you, Senator Cardin. It's my pleasure to
be here today. Two previous witnesses have covered some of what
I had intended to cover, so I will, with your permission,
summarize my remarks and really get right to the point.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you. And all of your full statements will
be made part of the record.
Mr. Jannuzi. Thank you, Senator.
Senator, discussing North Korea and how to effect changes
there really requires us to think about the theory of change
that we're operating under. And there are those who believe
that denuclearization of North Korea is the key which unlocks
the box which holds all of the other changes on human rights,
economic policies, regional integration, and peace and security
on the peninsula. I believe that that belief is misguided and
false. It is unrealistic to expect North Korea to denuclearize
first and integrate and make peace with its neighbors.
Second, this doesn't mean that the international community,
in its efforts to engage North Korea, must somehow reward bad
behavior, appease North Korea or lift sanctions on North Korea
that have been in place by the international community and the
United States because of North Korea's misconduct, but it does
mean that the hope of denuclearization, to me, rests as part of
a process that changes fundamentally the strategic environment
within which North Korea makes decisions about its future, and
changing that environment is what the Helsinki process for
North Korea could offer.
Now, the recent leadership change in North Korea has put it
back on the front pages, but to me this only underscores the
realization that North Korea's challenge to us is, in fact,
multidimensional. We would not be having the same concerns
about North Korea's nuclear program if its human rights record
were not what it is. And that human rights record, let me say
on behalf of Amnesty International, is of course appalling.
Recent satellite imagery analysis done by Amnesty
International has confirmed the continuing investments in North
Korea's architecture of repression: the gulags which house
perhaps 100,000 North Korea citizens, including men, women and
children, without hope of parole or a life after prison. The
gulags are not fading and disappearing. In fact, our recent
analysis shows that they continue to be enlarged in some cases
and modernized. It is against this backdrop of unbelievable
human suffering in gulags, as well as severe restrictions
across every other human right--freedom of speech, freedom of
association, freedom of movement--that the North Korean issue
must be addressed.
There is no longer any doubt about the severity of the
human rights challenges in North Korea. And in fact, the U.N.
has established a commission of inquiry examining it, which
will report to the U.N. next spring. But neither is there any
doubt about the nuclear dimension of the problem. We all know
what it is. North Korea is producing fissile material. They
have tested at least three nuclear devices. They continue to
work on long-range missiles.
Over the course of six visits to North Korea, I've had the
privilege at one point of visiting the Yongbyong nuclear
complex and seeing some of the plutonium product that they had
produced as a result of reprocessing spent fuel from the
Yongbyong nuclear reactor. This problem, like North Korea's
human rights problem, is only getting worse as time goes by.
Now, for the better part of 30 years the United States has
attempted to address this challenge by persuading North Korea
to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, with very
disappointing results. Most of the attempts to change North
Korea's trajectory have been focused on that narrow goal of
denuclearization. And even those like the agreed framework--
which, as my colleagues have pointed out, included an explicit
basket designed to get at the other regional dimensions of the
problem--still frontloaded the nuclear issue and left
everything else to be sort of the kinds of things that would be
addressed when time was available later, once the North had
demonstrated the sincerity of their commitment to
denuclearization.
But I think the critics of engagement of North Korea have
at least one thing right: North Korea is not sincere about
denuclearization yet, and to expect them to make the so-called
strategic choice to denuclearization in the current environment
of a Korea divided and at war, and a nation under sanction, a
nation isolated without hope of a better future for its people
through economic engagement, through educational exchanges and
scientific exchanges and other forms of integration is
unrealistic.
So we need to shape the playing field. How to do it? It's
time for the United States to lead decisively. The United
States must create the conditions that existed at the time the
Helsinki process was launched. It's important you, Senator,
understand, the members of the commission understand, that the
Helsinki process did not precede detente. In fact, the original
openings for arms control and engagement with the Soviet Union
had already been made by the time the Helsinki process was
launched. But the Helsinki process was the critical expansion
of the pathways of engagement that enabled what began as an
arms control initiative really to take on strategic
significance.
In the case of North Korea, the United States needs to
reach out, at a senior level, whether it's privately or
publicly--it's a matter of tactics--but to communicate the fact
that a new day is dawning with respect to how the United States
intends to work with its partners in the region, and indeed to
engage North Korea, to bring about a change in the strategic
environment.
The Helsinki approach would begin with a modest agenda, not
the complete, irreversible denuclearization--although, to be
clear, that has to be part of the end goal. You know, for the
United States to abandon that would be folly of the highest
order. It's a question of how we get there from here. You know,
engagement would have to be given time to work. A change
doesn't happen overnight, but there are signs of change in
North Korea, change that we ought to be encouraging rather than
ignoring.
The alternatives to a Helsinki-style process don't offer us
a quicker solution to the problem. I mean, this is one of the
fundamental things that I've come to realize over a career of
25 years dealing with this problem. You know, the folks who
say, well, first we've got to solve the nuclear problem and we
don't have time to wait for engagement to yield the fruits of
engagement in terms of a change of North Korea attitudes. If we
had just started this process 25 years ago we would be in a
different place now. And there's no reason to believe that the
North is going to change without outside and internal stimuli.
So let's be candid: The United States has to lead. The
strategic patience approach of the United States is not one
that is likely to bring about change in the coming years. The
good news is that there are many willing partners of the United
States. As you mentioned, Senator, every other country in the
region is crying out for U.S. multilateral engagement with
North Korea. And our core strategic ally in the region, South
Korea, President Park--with respect to the situation in North
Korea, the core ally--has put forward a Seoul process,
``trustpolitik'' initiative, which to me should be the root of
this Helsinki-style form of engagement.
Is any of this politically feasible in the United States?
Where is the constituency for such an initiative? Well, look,
I've been advising members of the Senate for 15 years in my
prior life. There is--there are very few people in this town
clamoring for President Obama to jumpstart diplomacy with North
Korea, but the fact is that the American people may be more
receptive to such an initiative than the members of congress
generally believe.
The recent polling data on Iran is a case in point. Despite
all of the mistrust which characterizes U.S.-Iran relations and
the nuclear outreach that the administration has launched, by a
2-to-1 margin the American people support striking a deal with
Iran even if that deal might eventually require sanctions
relief and even if the results of that deal might not yield the
complete elimination of Iran's nuclear program as a near-term
result.
Now, I know from first-hand experience that there exists a
constituency for reform inside North Korea. I have met with
them at the Academy of Science, at the universities, in the
agriculture field, in the trade field. But they have been
marginalized, undercut by years of failed nuclear diplomacy and
heightened military tension.
So I think, Senator, it's time to be bold. It's time for
the United States to set the stage for a Helsinki style
multilateral, multidimensional engagement process, one that
would absolutely need to include the voices of countries like
Mongolia and Singapore and Australia and New Zealand, countries
that participated in the last attempt at anything like a
strategic engagement, which was the agreed framework of 1994.
Those countries were all a part of it to one degree or another.
They should be brought back into the process.
This process won't offer a quick fix, but one of the things
that Amnesty International believes and that I believe is that
the principal beneficiaries of such a process in the near term
will be the North Korean people. They will be among the first
to see meaningful benefits. And a policy that therefore puts
the people of North Korea before the plutonium of North Korea
can yield results for both.
Thank you, Senator. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you for your testimony. And I agree
with your conclusion that we have to be bold.
The six-party talks as it relates to North Korea was viewed
as a one-issue effort to deal with nuclear ambitions of North
Korea and aimed at one country: North Korea. The establishment
of a regional organization is a much broader aspect: not one
country, not one issue.
Ms. Lee, you mentioned that it would--could be perceived by
North Korea as a ``Trojan Horse'' for regime change. I think
that looking at this from a broader perspective, there's an
argument that can be successfully made to counter those
concerns.
Mr. Gershman, you talk about it being viewed as
liberalization of policies in autocratic countries. Once again,
I think looking at it from a broader perspective, that argument
can be successfully overcome in the countries that may have
those concerns.
The success of Helsinki was first trust. There is a lack of
trust among the various players here. They believed each
other's countries' intentions were not honorable. I've
witnessed that firsthand in my visit to China and their view of
U.S. intentions. And the Helsinki process helps establish trust
by consensus. You can't get anything accomplished other than
through consensus. We thought that would be a weakness and it
ended up being the strength of the Helsinki process.
Secondly, the principles are universal principles. They're
not Western principles. And I think that's a key ingredient of
the success of the Helsinki process.
And then, third, diverse membership. When you look at
Northeast Asia or look at East Asia, and you look at the
countries that would be asked to participate in a regional
organization, you look at Russia and the United States and
China and North Korea, I don't think there would be anyone
accusing us of stacking the deck in a consensus organization.
And lastly, by way of example, we've had our problems in
the United Nations. No question about it. The United Nations
has a unique structure with the Permanent Council and the five
members, but it has brought greater consensus when decisions
are made.
So I just would like to get your assessment as to how
realistic it is to get the major players to invest in a
regional organization for Asia that--concentrating on Northeast
Asia we may go a little bit beyond that--whether this is a
doable task or whether the concerns of ``Trojan Horses'' and
liberalizations are too difficult to overcome.
Mr. Gershman. I think if you have the local parties
negotiating this, they will shape something that is acceptable
to the local countries. And even today, you know, with the
Kaesong agreement there's a process underway there and it
involves the beginning of, you know, its economic activity, but
there's also human contact that is taking place there.
So the human contact that was encouraged in part of the
Helsinki process is already part of this, and it has to be.
There's no way in the world that--in the interconnected world
that we live in today that you can dispense with this
dimension. I think it's terribly unfortunate that North Korea
cancelled the family visits. But, you know, I believe that
President Park is determined and these visits will eventually,
I hope, continue.
The one thing I think we have to remember which is
different about this process than Helsinki was that back in the
time of Helsinki the Soviet Union wanted an agreement to
formalize the borders from World War II. That was, in my view,
their main incentive in wanting the Helsinki agreement. And as
I understand it--and I welcome your own views; they may be
different--that what we wanted as part of that was a ``basket
three.'' And I don't see that kind of tradeoff in the process
today.
What I do see as the major incentive in the process today
is this--the new security situation, which is extremely
dangerous. I would not get obsessed about North Korea as we
think about how to carry this process forward, because I think
that the much more immediate and dangerous problem is what
China has done in expanding its Air Defense Identification
Zone, which is extremely dangerous. I mean, it could lead to
the shooting down of civilian airliners. And a way has to be
found to avoid miscalculations, to avoid these kind of horrible
events to take place. And I think it makes the case as
graphically as anything could that you need a system for
anticipating problems and resolving disputes.
Now, that doesn't address the kind of issues that Frank was
talking about with North Korea, but I do think that in a way
that is now on a separate track with the process that has been
started with the Kaesong agreement, which I think is quite
significant, even though it's run into some real difficulties
with North Korea. And I think these processes have to move
simultaneously. And in both processes, I think ultimately
you're going to need to have a way to connect the societies in
addition to having the militaries talk to each other and the
governments talk to each other. And I think that's possible
because it in my view, serves the interest of everyone in a
globalized world.
Mr. Cardin. Ms. Lee, I'm going to give you a chance to
respond. First let me acknowledge that we have here today
Ambassador Robert King, the State Department special envoy for
human rights in North Korea. He's also a former staff director
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee under the leadership of
my dear friend Tom Lantos, who we miss these days. It's a
pleasure to have Ambassador King in the room.
Ms. Lee, I want you to respond to the question, but I want
to just focus on one part of your testimony where you talk
about people-to-people and the importance of people-to-people.
And you give many examples where the United States has been
difficult in facilitating the people-to-people exchange. And it
seems to me, from North Korea's point of view, participation in
a regional organization that includes the United States with
its defined principles that encourage people-to-people would
make those types of arrangements a lot easier to accommodate
and could be a major point for North Korea's interest in such a
regional organization.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
I would say, on the issue of visas, I do think it would be
of great benefit to rationalize that process. In general, it's
possible to get visas--for North Koreans to get visas to visit
the United States on humanitarian issues, and some--on some
educational issues. But anything that strays beyond very
limited range of topics can be very problematic at times of
tension. And so when Frank mentioned earlier that the big
package of the agreed framework was never realized, one of the
things that was never realized was normalization of relations,
or the kind of exchanges that we really would have wanted to
see, with North Koreans being able to come over on a regular
basis.
And I wanted to comment a little bit on your question of,
is there any hope? One of the big benefits of the four-party
process and the six-party process was constant communication
among the parties. And when we talk about the escalation of
threats and danger in the region today, I believe it's because
that kind of regional dialogue isn't taking place. I don't
believe in the dismissive phrase ``talking for talking's
sake.'' I actually believe that those conversations kept
relations moving on a much more even keel.
And in that regard I would say that the actual topic in
some ways is less important than the actual process. And in
that regard, I'm really intrigued by the statement you made in
your opening comments that North Korea might be the focus now
but it might not be the focus 10 years from now. That kind of
perspective to me really opens the door for much more creative
thinking on how to move a regional process forward.
Mr. Cardin. Oh, absolutely. Depending of course on member
countries, we would expect that there would be a variety of
reasons beyond one country for creating this type of regional
organization.
Mr. Jannuzi, you mentioned being bold. Ms. Lee said it
would take considerable U.S. investment to get this going. Is
this possible, and how much effort will it take?
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, the United States is a great power.
It's capable of doing many things simultaneously. We have
talented diplomatic personnel like Ambassador King, who I
believe, frankly, we're not making the most use of at the
moment. And it's not because they're uninterested or haven't
shown initiative. It's because it really requires, at the end
of the day, a decision from the top to take some political
risks in order to see whether there will be a reward.
That risk calculation is a political decision far above my
pay grade, always has been, but I think the key thing is to
appreciate that the strategic patience approach also entails
risks. The escalating risk of violence in the region is
manifest. North Korea's conduct is not improving. Other
regional problems that could be successfully mitigated through
a Helsinki-style engagement process are in fact growing more
acute. So we shouldn't assess the level of investment required
against a zero sum. You know, we need to appreciate that what
we're doing right now entails a cost.
And finally, I would just say that the beauty of a
Helsinki-style engagement is that the foundation on which it's
based is one of sovereignty and equality among sovereign
states. Now, that may be something that sticks in the craw of a
lot of us when we think about the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, but I think that those who have engaged successfully
in diplomacy with North Korea have done so on the basis of a
certain level of respect.
I briefed President Carter prior to his 1994 mission to
Pyongyang, and I'll never forget that at the end of that
briefing he turned to those of us at the State Department at
the time--and we had spent all day briefing him and Rosalynn
Carter about the realities of North Korea since he had left the
presidency. And he turned to us and he says--he says, now, none
of you have told me what I need to know. And I hung my head
along with everyone else in the room--Robert Gallucci and
others. He says, I need to know, what does Kim Il-sung want?
And again I kind of looked under the table and tried to look
for the answer that might be buried there. And finally
President Carter said to all of us, he says, I'll tell you what
Kim Il-sung wants. He wants my respect, and I'm going to give
it to him.
Now, at the core, solving this problem requires a certain
suspension of disbelief and an engagement with North Korea as a
sovereign nation, which means that it's not just their human
rights record which will be on the table. They'll be allowed to
raise human rights concerns that they have about the misconduct
of the Japan during the colonial era. The United States may be
able to raise concerns that we have with China about the
treatment of North Korea refugees on Chinese soil.
You know, this dialogue is not a one-way street where all
of the concessions and all of the change has to happen in one
direction. But that also holds the key to why it may be
attractive to even a state, you know, such as in the
circumstances of North Korea, because it gives them a sovereign
opportunity to raise the concerns they have.
Mr. Cardin. All right, let me give you three options and
get your view as to which option you think would be the most
fruitful to pursue.
One option could be to build on the partner status that we
have for countries that are not in the OSCE but under the
umbrella of the OSCE to try to assist and help understand what
is happening within the OSCE in their own bilateral and
regional contacts. There are a lot of organizations in which
that could be used that currently exist, but not creating any
new organization but simply using the current available
opportunities to get more partners in the region.
The second option could be to build within the OSCE a
regional organization for Asia, East Asia or Northeast Asia,
that could build on the principles of OSCE with modifications
as the region believes are necessary but not reinventing the
principles of Helsinki.
And the third is to create a separate regional organization
patterned after Helsinki, which would require, of course, the
member states to agree on the principles that they would abide
by and the structure of the organization, which may be similar
to OSCE but there's no assurance until after negotiations take
place.
Do you have a preference as to which of those three options
the United States should invest its energy in?
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, if I might, for North Korea their
assessment of the end goals of such a regional process will be
affected by how it come into being and their own assessment of
what the goals and purposes and outcomes were of the Helsinki
process.
And so I guess the one caveat I would have about--or the
one concern I would have about building a special regional
organization under the auspices of the OSCE directly is that we
all know today that the Soviet Union no longer exists. Now,
that wasn't the objective of the Helsinki process but it may
very well be viewed as sort of the necessary outcome of such a
process by some in North Korea.
I think having a tutoring, mentoring, skills-sharing
process--the first option that you outlined--as the beginning
is the place to start, because there's great questioning going
on right now in Pyongyang about how they attempt to improve
their--their international situation, which is pretty dire, and
educating and sharing what the process might look like would be
the first step in getting them to buy in. And then I think you
could decide later about whether, ultimately, it's a structure
that is an outgrowth of the OSCE or a new standalone sui
generis novel idea.
I'm an incrementalist at heart, and I kind of am frightened
by the notion of having to stand up something brand new. We
have three years of negotiations about that process rather than
replicating what's already working someplace else. So I think
that there's a lot of reasons to favor your sort of a hybrid of
that first option that you suggested, and then possibly, you
know, see what becomes possible afterwards.
Mr. Cardin. Good diplomatic answer. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. I very much appreciate what Frank has said and
would endorse it. And I would just add something that Gershman
said in his opening testimony, which is that the Northeast Asia
peace and security working group, established as part of the
six-party talks, they created a set of guiding principles for a
regional structure, and that was based, in large part, on the
Helsinki process.
So the DPRK--all six parties agreed to that process. So
that idea is already out there. You mentioned it yourself in
your testimony. Unfortunately, when that negotiation process
broke down, that idea, that concept, those conversations went
into hibernation, but I think they could be brought back.
Mr. Gershman. I think there's an awful lot of advice--
sharing of experience that can be transferred from the Helsinki
process to what's going on today in Northeast Asia, especially
in the area of military confidence building measures, to look
at exactly what was done in the Helsinki process and--as a
basis for what might be done in Northeast Asia today. And so
there can be a lot of those kinds of contacts, but everything
I've--you know, all the discussions that I've had with people
in the region and what I've read is that there's a strong
feeling that Northeast Asia is different. And I think we should
start with that basis.
And I really think we should see what our Mongolian friends
have started there as an opportunity. And maybe if the U.S. got
behind it--Mongolia is a small country; it was not part of the
six-party talks, but it's strategically placed. It's very
appropriate in the region to start a process. That's what they
want to do. And it needs, I think, a little bit of buy-in from
higher levels. And I think if the U.S., maybe in cooperation
with its allies in the region, Japan and Korea, maybe starting
a discussion with China which is, you know, neighbor of
Mongolia to try to begin to encourage this idea because you now
have the potential for a regular forum. It doesn't have to be
the only one, but I think that, to me, is a more creative way
to go, because it sort of recognizes the distinctiveness of the
region and leaves them in charge of where this is going and not
making it part of a structure which is largely seen as a trans-
Atlantic structure, even though it reaches to other regions.
Mr. Cardin. I think your reference to Mongolia several
times is very interesting. Of course, Mongolia, a member of the
OSCE--full membership moving towards democracy has a working
relationship with North Korea. All that's a positive to try to
pattern their involvement in what has worked. I would also
observe in regards to the concerns on liberalization that I
think China has recognized the need for reform. I mean, they
understand that. They understand their future is very much
dependent upon becoming more respectful with regard to
internationally-recognized basic rights. And they're moving in
that direction; they've made tremendous progress, and they
still have so far to go.
So I think that there are some steps that have been taken
in that regard. Now, Mr. Jannuzi, you mentioned the fact that
they'll look at the demise of the Soviet Union into 10 separate
countries as a concern--or seven, depending on how we define
the Baltics, but no one is suggesting that North Korea will
become smaller states. It's a little bit different
circumstance.
Mr. Jannuzi. It is indeed.
Mr. Cardin. And so I'm not sure that that analogy is
exactly of concern, but you do raise a question for me, and
that is, what do we do about working with Russia? In all my
conversations with the players from the region, they
acknowledged that Russia needs to be part of a regional
organization for it to be successful in that region, and that
Russia, of course, does have the direct experience of its
involvement within OSCE.
I think I disagree with your assessment about Russia's
initial involvement. I was not around at the time, but it was
brought out to us that Russia wanted to get international
recognition for their democratic reforms at the time, that they
were open, and they thought that they were--that they complied
with the Helsinki commitments and wanted the legitimacy of
international recognition.
But I understand that there may be different motives today.
So I would welcome your thoughts as to the politics for Russia
being willing to join this type of a framework within Northeast
Asia, recognizing, of course, the six-party talks and the
working group.
Mr. Gershman. Well, it was part of the six-party talks, and
I think to exclude it now would almost be seen as excluding----
Mr. Cardin. And I'm not suggest that.
Mr. Gershman. No, I know--but still, I think Russia--with
all the problems we have with Russia, they want to be
recognized as part of a process. I think it's Russia--and this
is my own personal view, Mr. Chairman. I think it's a very
vulnerable power today for demographic reasons and for many
other reasons. And what's happening with Ukraine today is a
serious crisis for Russia, where clearly the people of Ukraine
want Europe. They don't want to be part of the customs union.
But still, I think Russia therefore, probably because it has a
lot of vulnerabilities, a lot of problems, would welcome being
part of this. And when they were part of the six-party talks,
they actually chaired the Northeast Asia peace and security
mechanism working group.
And everything I could tell--I was not part of those
negotiations, but the views that Americans had of the way they
were behaving within the six-party process was very positive.
They played a constructive role. Maybe it's because of the way
their interests weren't engaged here as they were, maybe, on
their Western side or in the Middle East. But I think they
should be a part of the process, but, you know, it's going to
be a large process. It's going to be a large process, and
obviously, the main drivers of this process today are going to
be, you know, China, North Korea and Japan along with the
United States, and--but I see no problem with having Russia
part of this process.
Ms. Lee. If I could just add something, I would say that
the DPRK has no concern about being broken into constituent
parts, but it does have some concern about being absorbed by
the south, and that's why the recognition of sovereignty is so
important.
Mr. Cardin. But on that point, aren't they better being a
full member of a regional organization that requires consensus
than sitting out there sort of isolated?
Ms. Lee. Absolutely--absolutely--but it's the question of,
what's the ultimate goal? And the unfortunate thing is that
conversations about human rights have been coupled with
conversations about regime change in the past, and that has two
problems. One, they can improve human rights without changing
their government, and two, it gives them an excuse not to talk
about human rights. So, I absolutely agree with you; being part
of a regional structure that recognizes their sovereignty
actually diminishes the fear that this process is being used to
make them disappear.
Mr. Jannuzi. And Senator, to your point--and I agree with
both of my panelists here--I think Russia can and will want to
participate in such a process. And I think one of the great
advantages for the United States is that we've got human rights
concerns about Russia. Amnesty International--I was proud to
testify before your other committee--the Foreign Relations
Committee a couple of months ago about the concerns that
Amnesty International has expressed about the crackdown on
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and especially LGBT
rights in Russia right now.
Wouldn't it be great to have another forum at which the
international community could raise some of these issues in a
spirit of regional cooperation and integration--not in one
which is designed to be punitive or overthrow governments, but
would really affect the opportunity for the United States and
other players to express some of those concerns. Russia's human
rights record right now leaves, you know, to say the least,
much to be desired.
Mr. Cardin. You're not going to get any argument from me on
that one. Mr. Gershman?
Mr. Gershman. Chairman, I just also want to add another
element to this discussion. You know, we're focused very, very
much on inter-government relations. And the assumption here is
that somehow, recognizing North Korea as an independent and
sovereign state would somehow reinforce the system. Well, you
know, East Germany was recognized as an independent and
sovereign state, and what good did it do when revolutions took
place?
And North Korea--this is just the objective facts. It's in
a very vulnerable position, being next door to a very, very
successful Korean society. Andrei Lankov has talked about this
over and over again. And, you know, just simply the process of
breaking down isolation--simply the process of breaking down
isolation in the economic sphere, in the information sphere in
all these different ways is going to open the North Korean
people up to what's happening in the outside world and what's
happening in South Korea. I think, frankly, this is a major
factor here that accounts for what's happened in Burma when
they realized how far behind they were lagging.
So I have no problem with, you know, recognizing them as a
sovereign part of these talks and so forth. I think the
underlying processes are ultimately going to change North
Korea, because it's in a--it's in a hopeless position, being a
neighbor to a successful Korean society and being a failed
society itself.
Mr. Cardin. Well, I agree with you completely. With or
without a Helsinki process, with or without Helsinki, the
realities are that if a country cannot adjust to the economic
reality of its region, its political realities and security
realities, its future is not going to be very bright. That has
been true in Europe; it'll be true in Asia with or without a
Helsinki process. The globe is getting smaller. People see
what's happening with their neighbors, and they demand a future
for their families, and that's going to happen on the Korean
peninsula. It's going to happen in China, and changes are going
to happen with or without Helsinki. The advantage of Helsinki
is that you have an orderly process where your sovereignty is
recognized and you have an equal status at the table and you
have a chance to not only improve, but to express your concerns
about what's happening among your neighbors. Yes?
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, I just wanted to jump in because what
you've just said is so important and worth underscoring.
Mr. Cardin. Well then, jump in. (Laughter.)
Mr. Jannuzi. North Korea, in its present configuration,
with its present policies, with its present international
circumstances, is not on a good trajectory, and I'm convinced
that the leadership of North Korea, and more and more, the
people of North Korea, know that. And really, the question is
not whether there will be change. And by change--by--you know,
I'm not talking about regime collapse or--necessarily, and
there are many different scenarios under which change can
happen. But the point is that every day that goes by without a
Helsinki-style engagement process is a lost day to the
international community in trying to promote and bring about
those changes.
It will happen much quicker, in a much more stable way,
with greater transparency and with greater--with lesser risk of
miscalculation and violence, with more cohesion and with less
risk of great power misunderstandings, about the future
trajectory of the Korean peninsula if it handles within the
context of this process.
I sat down with Senator Kerry in March of 2012 in New York
along with Henry Kissinger and Jim Steinberg and Ri Yong-ho
from North Korea and Volker Ruhe, the former German defense
minister during the time of re-unification of Germany. We had a
multilateral Track II conference in New York a year and a half
ago, and the one thing I can assure you is, the North Koreans
are not lacking in confidence. They understand that a process
such as this would open them up to certain kinds of risks. But
they're not imaging they're going to come out of the end of it
as the loser, necessarily. They've got their own ideas about
the superiority of their own system vis-a-vis the south
ultimately.
I mean, it may seem strange for us, sitting here--you know,
those of us who have been to both places to imagine that that
could be true. But I can assure you that the reason why this
process, to me, is not a nonstarter in Pyongyang is because
they can imagine a future in which they realize what they call
``Juche,'' which is being masters of their own fate. And they
don't believe that this process, necessarily, is contrary to
that. I think--I agree completely with what's been said, which
is that we should be maximizing--the international community
should be maximizing--the international community should be
maximizing its opportunities to help shape the direction.
Mr. Cardin. We've spent a lot of time today talking about
North Korea and a regional organization. We've talked a little
bit about security issues with the maritime security challenges
and that potential blowing up--the comparison to World War I is
certainly frightening but real. Absolutely, there could be an
incident that could mushroom out of control, and it's something
that is of great concern to the United States and to all of the
countries.
We could be talking about environmental challenges, which
are tremendous in that region; real security issues
particularly with the coastal areas but also with the air
quality, and particularly in China but in other countries as
well. But we could be talking about two of our closest allies,
the Republic and Korea and Japan, and their frosty
relationships and the need to have a dialogue organization so
that they can, hopefully once and for all, resolve their past
differences and be able to move forward as close allies.
I mean, there are so many underlining issues here that go
well beyond just North Korea, which is certainly getting the
headlines today, or the maritime issue, which is certainly
getting headlines today. So, yeah, I think we do somewhat of a
disservice if we don't make this a much broader initiative. And
that's why I used the comparison originally to the six-party
talks. And I understand the dialogue came out of that and North
Korea has been the focal point of it, but it seems to me from
the U.S. perspective and from the regional perspective there's
a much broader agenda here.
Final comments.
Mr. Gershman. Well, I'd like to use what you just said as a
way of making one additional point.
In October I was in Korea for the launch of something
called the Asia Democracy Network, which brings together the
democracy actors from the entire Asia region, and then there
will be subregional networks part of it. And it brings together
cross-regional networks dealing with the very issues you're
talking about: the environment, transparency, conflict
resolution and so forth. And there will be a Northeast Asia
democracy forum established out of this.
So I think as we speak about the Helsinki process and the
intergovernmental system, we should not overlook the
nongovernmental dimension of this, which I think is much, much
stronger today than it was in 1975. There are just many more
hundreds, thousands of NGOs. They have a lot of influence. They
are able to encourage and influence the policies of
governments. And it's even beginning to develop in China. So I
think we should keep this dimension of the scene in Asia very
much on our minds. Thank you.
Ms. Lee. First, I want to thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today, and to say I was really impressed
by Frank's optimistic testimony when he said, yes, we can do
it, and we can put all the energy into it and we can make all
this happen, because I'm a real incrementalist and I was
thinking more in terms of promoting some of these regional
civil society networks and ensuring that the kind of exchanges
on issues of regional importance that people--countries
participate out of their own self-interest and not because
they're trying to contribute to some greater cause.
These really can build a foundation, and that it's an
excellent thing when the OSCE member countries can be engaged
in those kinds of efforts and just bring in the experience of
regional relationship building. And I mentioned only two
topics, but there's a number of topics out there, and just to
build support and the idea for this, it falls short of the
vision of the process that you've raised today, but it can
start immediately. And so support for those kinds of efforts to
me is something we can work on this afternoon.
Mr. Cardin. Good.
Mr. Jannuzi. And, Senator, I also want to thank you for
this opportunity to appear. And it's true what Karin says. I've
never been accused of being a pessimist. My brother is a
physicist out in the University of Arizona, and when I talk
with him about optimism and pessimism he always points out to
me, he says: Frank, you know, you see the glass is half full. I
know that the glass is always full completely, half of water
and half of air. And we have to view Northeast Asia today as a
place not of just peril but of incredible opportunity and
possibility.
In terms of what can be accomplished, when you're starting
from a low point where two of your treaty allies can barely
talk to one another, where one of them--Japan--has territorial
disputes with three of its major neighbors--Russia, China and
South Korea--where human rights inside one of the member states
of the region--North Korea--are at a nadir and at a point that
is arguably one of the most horrific human rights conditions on
the planet, you've got nowhere to go but up.
And this process offers us opportunities to yield early
harvest, especially if the advice that Ms. Lee has offered is
followed and we begin where we can, and then by showing the
possibility of such engagement we draw more and more political
support to this process, which I think ultimately is an
inevitable one and a necessary one to bring peace and security
to Northeast Asia.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you. And I appreciate you mentioning
NGOs. They're a critical partner of the Helsinki process. And
we would clearly want any initiative for a regional
organization to partner and build with the NGO community.
And I might just say, our annual meeting this year of the
Parliamentary Assembly is in Azerbaijan and our participation
is very much contingent upon NGOs having complete access,
including from Armenia. And we're going to make sure that that
is done if--with U.S. participation. So it's a very important
point and I appreciate you mentioning that.
I think this discussion has been very, very helpful. I
fully understand the challenges of getting any type of regional
agreements in Northeast Asia. I also understand the stakes are
very high. And I think your comment about the start of World
War I is a reminder that these somewhat regional issues can
mushroom into very difficult international circumstances. The
shipping lanes are critically important. They air lanes are
critically important to international commerce. So there is a
direct interest of the globe in what's happening in Northeast
Asia today.
And of course the threat of nuclear proliferation is an
issue of global interest, and the environmental issues go well
beyond just the region. So these are issues that affect all of
us. And of course the United States, being a Pacific country
and being a country that has always been interested in Asia,
now with the rebalance that President Obama has talked about
it's a good opportunity for us to exercise greater leadership
to develop more permanent ways that we can resolve issues among
the countries of the region to strengthen each country and to
make the region a stronger region for security, for economics
and for human rights and good governance.
And that's our objective and that's why we are looking at
this. And we very much appreciate the regional leaders who have
come forward with suggestions, including in the six-party
talks. And we intend to follow this up in the Helsinki
Commission and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And we
very much appreciate your participation here today. Thank you
all.
With that, the committee will stand adjourned. (Sounds
gavel.)
[Whereupon, at 2:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for
Democracy
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Helsinki Commission, for
organizing this hearing at a critical moment in US relations with
Northeast Asia.
It was almost eight years ago to the day that I and several others
active on the issue of human rights in North Korea joined with policy
and Korean-affairs specialists to form a working group to consider how
a comprehensive framework involving international security, economic
cooperation, human rights and humanitarian aid could be developed for
the Korean Peninsula and, more broadly, for Northeast Asia.
Our decision to form this group followed the agreement reached in
the Six-party Talks to explore ways of promoting a common political,
economic and security agenda linking the two Koreas with China, Russia,
Japan and the United States. This opened the door to creating a
permanent multilateral organization for advancing security and
cooperation in Northeast Asia, one of the few regions of the world
without such a mechanism.
Ambassador James Goodby of the working group, who had played a key
role in developing the ``basket three'' human- rights provisions that
became part of the Helsinki Final Act, drafted the first of several
papers that spelled out how negotiations to resolve the North Korea
nuclear issue and achieve a final settlement of the Korean War could
evolve into a Helsinki-type process for Northeast Asia leading to the
eventual creation of a multilateral--and multidimensional--organization
for collective security.
The effort to encourage such a process had the strong backing of
Ban Ki-moon, at the time South Korea's Foreign Minister and now the
U.N. Secretary General, who told a major gathering in Helsinki of Asian
and European leaders that ``The challenge for Northeast Asia is how to
draw upon the European experience to build a mechanism for multilateral
security cooperation.''
Building such a mechanism was the focus of one of the five working
groups of the Six-party Talks, but efforts to implement the idea were
aborted when the talks broke down at the end of 2008. Since then,
international relations in Northeast Asia have become much more
confrontational. The region suffers from what South Korea's President
Park Geun-hye has called ``Asia's paradox,'' which is an acute
discrepancy between the region's dynamic economic growth and
interdependence on the one hand, and the rise of nationalism, conflict
and distrust on the other. Clashes over disputed maritime space in the
East China Sea, North Korea's nuclear threat and provocative
brinkmanship, intensified military competition, and historically rooted
tensions, even between such ostensible allies as Japan and South Korea,
have heightened anxiety over prospects for violent regional conflict.
The situation has just become even more dangerous with China's
unilateral establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone
overlapping with Japan's own air-defense zone and encompassing South
Korea's Ieodo reef as well. In the words of The Economist, ``China has
set up a casus belli with its neighbors and America for generations to
come.''
Ironically, whereas North Korea's nuclear program was the catalyst
for the Six-party Talks and the possible creation of a system of
collective security for Northeast Asia, it is now the grave
deterioration of the security environment in the region that could act
as such a catalyst. The crisis certainly dramatizes the critical need
for such a system, though that is a long-term goal while the immediate
need is for measures to reduce risk, enhance communication through
military hotlines and other instruments that might prevent
miscalculations, and to begin to develop military confidence-building
measures similar to those negotiated in the CSCE framework.
Nonetheless, it is not too early to begin thinking about a more
comprehensive architecture that would provide a forum for regional
powers to discuss security. The Economist suggested that such a forum,
had it existed in Europe in the early part of the last century, might
have prevented the outbreak of World War I, and that there are
disturbing parallels to the situation in Northeast Asia today, with the
Senkakus playing the role of Sarajevo.
For such a forum to be sustainable and effective, a security
dialogue would need to be buttressed by a broader program of exchanges
and economic cooperation. It has been said that adding a ``basket-
three'' human dimension would not work for Northeast Asia because the
region's autocracies are well aware of the liberalizing consequences of
the Helsinki process in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But it is
hard to imagine a system of collective security working without more
interaction at the societal level, and having a broader context for
negotiations would make possible trade-offs that might facilitate
reaching an agreement. Northeast Asia may be different from the region
encompassed by the Helsinki process, but the ``Sakharov doctrine''
regarding ``the indivisibility of human rights and international
security'' has universal relevance and should not be abandoned, even if
it has to be adapted to the circumstances of the region.
In addition to the incentive provided by the current crisis to
explore a new system of collective security for Northeast Asia, I want
to note two other factors that can be helpful. The first is the
vigorous support given to the idea by President Park when she addressed
a joint session of the Congress last May. Her statement has of course
now been overshadowed by the momentum toward confrontation, and South
Korea's declaration of an expanded air defense zone partially
overlapping China's and including Ieodo only adds to this momentum.
Still, South Korea's understandable response to China's over-
reaching may help to establish the strategic balance needed to
negotiate an end to the current crisis, and President Park's commitment
to a system of collective security shows that she may want to use this
crisis to make the case for a broader architecture.
Her capacity to provide leadership at this critical time should not
be underestimated. She demonstrated both toughness and a readiness to
negotiate when, after a period of heightened tension following North
Korea's nuclear test explosion last April, South Korea reached an
agreement with the North to re-open the Kaesong Industrial Zone. This
experiment in economic cooperation shows the potential of President
Park's ``trustpolitik,'' though North Korea's cancellation of family
reunions that were part of the Kaesong agreement also shows how
difficult it will be to sustain any kind of engagement with Pyongyang.
Still, her steadiness of purpose is encouraging, as is her desire, as
she told the Congress last May, to extend the ``Trust-building
Process'' she has started ``beyond the Korean Peninsula to all of
Northeast Asia where we must build a mechanism of peace and security.''
That goal would be significantly advanced if she would also apply her
``trustpolitik'' to Japan.
The other helpful factor is the potential role of Mongolia. In a
recent paper contrasting the challenge of building a collective
security system in Europe and Asia, the Japanese diplomat Takako Ueta
wrote that Northeast Asia lacks ``a neutral country with diplomatic
skills and efficient conference support comparable to Austria, Finland,
Sweden or Switzerland.'' But that is not true because Mongolia is such
a country.
Last April, when Mongolia chaired the Seventh Ministerial
Conference of the Community of Democracies, its President Tsakhiagiin
Elbegdorj announced the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian
Security, an initiative to provide ``a dialogue mechanism on security
in Northeast Asia'' that will give ``equal consideration of the
interests of all states'' and set ``a long-term goal of building peace
and stability in the region.''
Mongolia has an unusual geopolitical situation. Sandwiched between
China and Russia, it has maintained what President Elbegdorj called
``neighborly good relations'' with these two big powers as well as with
the other nations in the region, which he calls ``our third neighbor.''
It even maintains good relations with North Korea, which were not
spoiled when he concluded a State Visit to the DPRK on October 30 with
a speech at Kim Il Sung University in which he said ``No tyranny lasts
forever. It is the desire of the people to live free that is the
eternal power.'' He also told his North Korean audience that twenty
years earlier Mongolia had declared herself ``a nuclear-free zone,''
and that it ``prefers ensuring her security by political, diplomatic
and economic means.''
Mongolia's international position is rising. In addition to
chairing the Community of Democracies, it has joined the OSCE and may
soon become a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
organization (APEC). Last September, at the opening of the U.N. General
Assembly in New York, President Elbegdorj was the only head of state
invited to join President Obama in presiding over a forum of the
Administration's Civil Society Initiative that seeks to defend civil
society around the world against growing government restrictions.
Henry Kissinger, writing about Austria's Chancellor Bruno Kreisky,
observed that ``One of the asymmetries of history is the lack of
correspondence between the abilities of some leaders and the power of
their countries.'' President Elbegdorg is such an outsized leader of a
small country, and the fact that he is now positioning Ulaanbaatar to
play the kind of role in Northeast Asia that Helsinki once played in
Europe could be an important factor leading to a system of collective
security in Northeast Asia.
This region certainly has its own distinctive characteristics, and
Helsinki does not offer a readily transferable ``cookie-cutter'' model
for East Asia or any other region. But as Ambassador Goodby said in one
of the papers he wrote for our working group, ``so long as nation-
states are the basic building blocks of the international system, the
behavior of these units within that system is not like to be radically
dissimilar. History suggests that autonomous behavior by powerful
nations--behavior that ignores the interests of others--sooner or later
leads to disaster. The corollary of this lesson is that some mechanism
has to be found, be it implicit or explicit, to allow for policy
accommodations and for self-imposed restraint within a system of
nations. To fail to do so is to make a collision almost inevitable.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Statement of Frank Jannuzi, Deputy Executive Director, Amnesty
International
__________
Putting People Before Plutonium
The recent leadership shake-up in Pyongyang has thrust the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) back onto the front pages.
And while it is too soon to fully assess what impact the removal of
Jang Song Thaek will have on the course of the country, his purge
should remind all that North Korea is not a one-dimensional problem. It
requires a multi-dimensional solution and an approach by the United
States that is more ``can-do.''
Until recently, one of the less appreciated facets of the conundrum
posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was its human
rights record. Yet there should no longer be any doubt about the scale
of the unfolding human catastrophe there or that it merits urgent
attention.
Amnesty International has chronicled the DPRK's endemic human
rights abuses. Millions suffer extreme forms of repression and
violations across nearly the entire spectrum of human rights. The
government severely restricts freedom of movement, expression,
information and association. Food insecurity is widespread, and there
are persistent reports of starvation in more remote regions. As
confirmed by recent Amnesty International satellite analyses and eye-
witness reports, roughly 100,000 people--including children--are
arbitrarily held in political prison camps and other detention
facilities where they are subjected to forced labor, denial of food as
punishment, torture, and public executions.
In January 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi
Pillay, said that North Korea had ``one of the worst--but least
understood and reported--human rights situations in the world.'' And
last March, the UN Human Rights Council launched a Commission of
Inquiry to examine allegations of ``systemic, widespread and grave''
human rights violations inside the DPRK, including crimes against
humanity. The Commission will report its findings next spring.
But, of course, the real question is not whether there are human
rights abuses taking place in the North. The question is what can be
done about them.
Much the same can be said about the North's nuclear conundrum.
There is no longer uncertainty about the nature of the problem. In
defiance of the United Nations Security Council, the DPRK has produced
fissile material, tested three nuclear devices, developed long-range
missiles and constructed a modern facility capable of enriching
uranium. Comprehensive economic sanctions have neither crippled the
DPRK's ability to develop its nuclear arsenal nor persuaded its leaders
to change course. In fact, the coercive tactics often favored by the
international community--sanctions, diplomatic isolation, travel
restrictions, limits on cultural and educational exchanges, suspension
of humanitarian assistance and more--have arguably bolstered the
legitimacy of those in Pyongyang who fear openness more than isolation.
``Military First'' Approach a Failure (and Not Just for Pyongyang)
For the better part of 30 years, the United States and its allies
have been trying to convince the DPRK to abandon its pursuit of nuclear
weapons, with disappointing results. Most efforts, including the 1994
Agreed Framework, at least acknowledged up front that the nuclear issue
was enmeshed in larger questions about the past, present, and future of
the Korean peninsula. Those issues include ending the Korean War,
establishing a permanent peace mechanism on the peninsula and
integrating the DPRK into Northeast Asia's economic and political
community.
Some initiatives, especially the Republic of Korea's ``Sunshine
Policy,'' were also designed to lay the groundwork for the eventual
peaceful unification of North and South Korea. More recently, President
Park Geun-hye launched her ``Trustpolitik,'' recognizing that the
North's nuclear weapons program is as much a symptom of underlying
security concerns as it is the driver of them. President Park pitched
her approach as one designed to separate humanitarian from security
issues in the interest of building confidence and creating an
atmosphere more conducive to forging peace and denuclearization.
But even while acknowledging the complexity of the challenge, these
various attempts to change North Korea's trajectory have mostly been
focused on the narrow goal of denuclearization. Framework agreements
have been struck. Cooling towers have been destroyed and international
monitoring schemes devised. Leap Day deals have been crafted. All to
convince the DPRK that living without nuclear weapons offered a pathway
to genuine security preferable to the security offered by hugging a few
kilograms of fissile material nestled inside a nuclear weapon.
But few nations, least of all the DPRK, are inclined to disarm
first and negotiate peace second. And the few times in recent memory
when this approach has been tried cannot offer Pyongyang any
encouragement. As Jeffrey Sachs wrote last spring:
In 2003, Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi agreed with the US
and Europe to end his pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons
in order to normalize relations with the West. Eight years
later, NATO abetted his overthrow and murder. Now we are asking
North Korea to end its nuclear program as we once asked of
Qaddafi. North Korea's leaders must be wondering what would
await them if they agree.
If the United States and North Korea's neighbors hope to convince
the DPRK to change course, they will need to keep a few basic facts in
mind. First, the international community must not approach talks with
the DPRK as if they were surrender negotiations. The leadership of the
DPRK must see something of value in the negotiations for them. As
President Carter told me before heading to Pyongyang in 1994 to sit
down with Kim Il-Sung, ``Kim Il-Sung wants my respect, and I'm going to
give it to him.'' Second, while it would surely set back the goal of
denuclearization if the international community formally recognized the
DPRK as a nuclear weapons power, former Secretary of Defense William
Perry's admonition to deal with the DPRK ``as it is, not as we would
wish it to be'' still has merit. The DPRK's nuclear and missile tests
have altered the negotiating environment, and to pretend otherwise is
folly. Finally, the North may be sui generis, but that does not mean
that its leaders come from Mars or that their behavior is impossible to
understand. In fact, many DPRK-watchers have good track records
predicting how the North is likely to respond to various diplomatic
threats or inducements.
These stubborn facts do not bode well for Washington's most recent
efforts to convince the DPRK to make a strategic choice to abandon its
nuclear capabilities. The Obama Administration is demanding that the
DPRK demonstrate its sincere commitment to denuclearization by taking
concrete steps in advance of the resumption of Six Party Talks. The
DPRK counters that it remains committed to the goals, including
denuclearization, enumerated in the 2005 Joint Statement issued by
participants in those talks. It seeks resumption of dialogue ``without
preconditions.'' If the United States sticks with its current approach,
the DPRK is likely to seize the initiative in ways that will only
exacerbate existing tensions, perhaps by testing another long-range
missile or accelerating efforts to enhance its nuclear capacity as we
are seeing with the restart of its 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon.
So, as Secretary of State John Kerry and Ambassador Glynn Davies,
the US Special Envoy for North Korea, ponder how best to kick start the
moribund Six Party process, they should heed the advice of British
Parliamentarian Lord David Alton, chairman of the British-DPRK All-
Party Parliamentarian Group, who recently recommended a nuanced,
carefully calibrated peace process, rather than a ``military first''
policy, to achieve the goal of denuclearization. Drawing lessons from
the Helsinki Process of the 1980s, Alton wrote, ``What is needed now is
a painstaking and patient bridge-building strategy, one which cajoles
and coaxes, but does not appease.''
Altering the Playing Field--to Pyongyang via Helsinki
It's time for the United States to launch a multilateral initiative
designed to attack the DPRK's nuclear ambitions enfilade rather than by
frontal assault. The objective would be to shift the focus of diplomacy
from the North's plutonium to its people through a multilateral,
multifaceted engagement strategy based on the Helsinki process launched
by the United States and its allies during the Cold War.
A Helsinki-style engagement strategy would have to be
comprehensive, building multiple bridges of engagement. It could be
designed to augment, rather than replace the Six Party Talks, assuming
they can be resuscitated. Eventually, the parties must grapple with the
North's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but the
Helsinki-style approach would begin with a more modest agenda focused
on confidence and security building measures to reduce tensions and the
risk of conflict emerging from miscommunication or miscalculation.
Other dialogue topics would include energy security, economic
modernization, agriculture reform, international trade and finance,
social welfare, health policy, education, legal and judicial systems,
women's rights, refugees, freedom of religion and belief and the rights
of the disabled.
Engagement of this sort would have to be given time to succeed. It
does not offer a quick fix to end the North's nuclear ambitions or
eliminate its human rights violations, but neither do the alternatives
of coercive diplomacy or military strikes. The goal would be to so
fundamentally alter the situation that a treaty ending the Korean War
and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula would be within reach rather
than a bridge too far.
This approach has a number of advantages. First, it has the
potential to unify South Korean progressives, who first embraced the
notion under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, and conservatives, who see
potential for it based on the model of German unification. Second,
Helsinki-style engagement has proven its value already, helping to
promote economic reform and greater respect for human rights inside the
nations of the Soviet bloc. Third, it offers a step-by-step approach
suited to a political environment devoid of trust. Initial small-scale
confidence building measures--reciprocal actions that signal peaceful
intentions--could create an environment more conducive to taking larger
risks for peace. Finally, an inclusive, regional approach allays
concerns that any one country would dominate the structure. It would
also allow middle powers to play a constructive role--note the helpful
advice on freedom of expression Mongolian President Elbegdorj offered
Kim Jong-Un in a speech to students at Kim Il Sung University during
his recent visit to Pyongyang. [Obama Administration: please also note
the deft way Elbegdorj combined soccer diplomacy with his official
state visit.]
So why hasn't the Helsinki concept gained more traction in the
corridors of the Old Executive Office Building or the State Department?
Perhaps because the necessary preconditions for a Helsinki process have
not been met. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act did not begin the process of
detente; it followed it. The wind-down of proxy wars in Southeast Asia,
the agreement that ``Mutually Assured Destruction'' was not a preferred
strategic nuclear doctrine, and the success of the first fledgling
steps at superpower arms control all preceded the Helsinki Accords.
Jump-starting detente in Northeast Asia will require a bold
diplomatic opening--think Kissinger to China bold. President Obama
would have to channel the ``yes we can'' spirit of 2008 rather than the
``oh, no we shouldn't'' spirit of 2013. And the President will need to
coordinate his approach with North Korea's neighbors and other
potential partners, almost all of whom seem likely to embrace any move
that breathes fresh life into the diplomatic process.
Is this politically feasible? Diplomatic overtures to Pyongyang are
rarely popular, but if recent polling data on US efforts to engage Iran
are any guide, there may be more support for engagement than the
President's advisers realize. Americans by a two-to-one margin support
striking a deal with Iran, even if that deal requires sanctions relief
and results only in restrictions on, and not elimination of, Iran's
nuclear program. The United States should follow President Park's lead
and move forward with a process of rapprochement. It should not set
preconditions, such as requiring concrete steps by the DPRK to
demonstrate its sincerity about denuclearization. The DPRK is NOT
sincere about denuclearization . . . yet. And it won't be until more
fundamental changes in Northeast Asia are affected through a Helsinki-
style multilateral process of engagement.
It's hard to say exactly how the DPRK would respond to such an
opening. Even with the purge of Jang, who was widely rumored to be a
supporter of economic engagement with China, there exists a
constituency for reform and opening up inside the DPRK. Officials
managing energy policy, agriculture, light industry, science, and
education have much to gain from reducing North Korea's political and
economic isolation and cultivating foreign investment, trade, and
exchanges. But their clout has been undercut by years of failed nuclear
diplomacy and heightened military tension. Kim Jong Un and his cohorts
cannot navigate the path toward peace and denuclearization in the dark.
The world must illuminate that path for them.
So as already mentioned, the United States and other members of the
international community would be well advised initially to press for
small, but real, confidence and security building measures. Carefully
calibrated economic initiatives could follow, designed to bolster
civilian, market-oriented agricultural and light industrial ventures.
With time and effort, it is possible that the leaders of the DPRK could
be persuaded--by both internal and external stimuli--to stop their
provocations and begin to unleash the creative potential of the North
Korean people. As this process gains momentum--bolstered by cultural
and educational exchanges and humanitarian assistance--North Korea's
leaders would gain the confidence they need to shelve and then abandon
their nuclear weapons; decoupling their own futures from the North's
limited nuclear arsenal. If engagement with the DPRK followed a
trajectory similar to that of engagement with China, the people of
North Korea would be among the earliest beneficiaries, seeing an
improvement in all aspects of their lives, from nutrition and health to
respect for their fundamental human rights.
Time To Be Bold
The Administration's approach toward the DPRK has come to be known
as strategic patience. ``Wise and masterly inactivity'' can sometimes
be an effective tactic for defusing tension. But in this case,
inactivity not only invites DPRK provocations, but also does nothing to
encourage reforms or alleviate the suffering of the North Korean
people.
While there are no signs that the Obama administration is poised to
launch any new initiatives in Northeast Asia, if talks with Iran are
successful, that might change. The smart choice is to be bold. Engage
Pyongyang without delay, not as a reward for bad behavior, but because
it offers the best chance to gradually influence North Korea's conduct,
encouraging it to respect international norms, protect the human rights
of its people, and abandon its nuclear weapons.
The 1975 Helsinki Accords set the stage for the end of the Cold War
in Europe and led to the creation of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Helsinki process worked in part
because it built people-to-people contacts that translated later into
political pressure for reform and opening up. It worked because it
offered things of value to both sides in the Cold War, including
enhanced security, tension-reduction, and economic opportunities. It is
not hard to imagine the potential of a similar mechanism to improve the
lives of all people living on or neighboring the Korean peninsula.
The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily
reflect the positions of Amnesty International, USA.
Prepared Statement of Karin J. Lee, Executive Director, The National
Committee on North Korea
__________
The Helsinki Process and Civil Society Activities with the DPRK
Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman Smith, and distinguished members of
the U.S. Helsinki Commission, it is an honor for me to appear today to
discuss Resolving Crises in East Asia through a New System of
Collective Security: the Helsinki Process as a Model. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify, and applaud the Commission for exploring this
approach to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the
Northeast Asian region.
I have been the executive director of the National Committee on
North Korea (NCNK) since February 2006. The NCNK creates opportunities
for informed dialogue about North Korea among experts from a wide range
of backgrounds and experiences in an effort to foster greater
understanding in the United States about the DPRK. We address all
aspects of U.S. policy toward the DPRK, including security and human
security issues.
I appreciate the opportunity to reflect today on the conditions in
the United States and Europe that generated the Helsinki Final Act, and
the differences and similarities with conditions in Northeast Asia
today, which will inform the first part of my testimony. In the second
part of my testimony, I will discuss U.S. and international private
sector, nongovernment or civil society activities in the DPRK. My first
opportunity to visit the DPRK was in 1998, and my most recent visit was
this past October. During this period, I have been able to witness the
creative programming non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other
civil society organizations have been able to implement in the DPRK.
I will be making three key points. First, the history of the two
regions and the historical moments are very different, and to implement
a Helsinki-like process in Northeast Asia would take considerable U.S.
and regional government investment and a policy consistency that is
currently lacking today. Second, despite limited government support,
admirable and productive work inside the DPRK and with North Koreans is
taking place in humanitarian, education, and medical fields, and the
United States can contribute to these efforts by delinking security
policy from what the Helsinki process called Basket III, or
humanitarian exchanges. Finally, exchanges on topics of genuine
regional interest may contribute to a foundation for regional problem-
solving and should be encouraged both for the immediate practical
benefits they can bring and in order to begin laying a pattern of
cooperative regional behavior for the future.
1970s Europe and Northeast Asia Today: Similarities and Differences
As the Commissioners know, the Helsinki Process did not represent a
single moment in history and the outcomes of the Final Act were not
fully anticipated in 1975. The Helsinki Process was not designed to
undermine the Soviet bloc. To the contrary, the Act underscores that
signatory states ``will respect each other's sovereign equality and
individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by
its sovereignty'' and ``respect each other's right freely to choose and
develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as
its right to determine its laws and regulations.'' \1\ Nevertheless,
the Helsinki Process is sometimes credited with contributing to the
changes that swept through the region a decade and a half later, and
the OSCE is perhaps best known today for its ongoing work on human
rights and democratization. For these reasons, the DPRK would likely
look at a Helsinki Process designed for the Northeast Asian region as a
Trojan Horse, synonymous with a covert strategy for regime change.
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\1\ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act
Helsinki 1 August 1975. http://www.hri.org/docs/
Helsinki75.html#Introduction.
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Yet the Helsinki Final Act as it was originally conceived--a
regional process with the primary goal of increasing regional stability
by addressing the most salient interests of the opposing forces--may
have merit. Therefore, in exploring whether or not it is possible to
apply its lessons to the problems Northeast Asia currently faces, we
should consider the Final Act's initial goals and the basis on which
they were reached, not the impact it has come to represent. From this
perspective, it is useful to examine the similarities and differences
between Europe in the mid-1970s and Northeast Asia today.
Territorial Disputes and Arms Races as Possible Triggers of War
Cold War Europe, like East Asia today, contained several
territorial hotspots that threatened to trigger a broad conflagration.
The U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race and the posture of conventional
forces on the Continent added to this tension. At several points in the
early years of the Cold War, the contested status of Berlin nearly led
to conflict between the two blocs. However, by the time the Helsinki
process got underway, the security situation in Europe had become more
stable, with detente leading both sides to a greater acceptance of the
status quo and arms control agreements stabilizing the dynamics of
mutually assured destruction.
In contemporary East Asia, in contrast, longstanding points of
regional tension have only gotten more heated in recent years, raising
the fear that small incidents could spiral out of control and lead to
military confrontations. Disputes over history and conflicting
territorial claims to small outlying islands have raised nationalist
fervors in the region. While tension between Japan and China over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been very high over the past year, it is the
inter-Korean maritime dispute over the Northern Limit Line in the West
Sea that has actually led to military clashes on several occasions.
North Korea's continuing progress in developing nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles deeply threatens the security of the region, while
South Korea's recent vow to retaliate against a new North Korean
provocation by striking ``not only the origin of provocation and its
supporting forces but also its command leadership'' \2\ further
increases instability and the risk of war by misadventure.
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\2\ Maj. Gen. Kim Yong-hyun, quoted in Choe Sang-hun, ``South Korea
Pushes Back on North's Threats,'' New York Times, March 6, 2013.
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Prioritization of Foreign Policy Issues
Throughout the Cold War, the top foreign policy priority of the
United States was unambiguous: mitigating the geopolitical threat of
the Soviet Union. In this bipolar power system, the Helsinki Process
was just one of the tools by which the U.S. used diplomatic engagement
to manage and reduce the risks posed by the USSR. For example, in
addition to the Helsinki Process, the U.S. pursued rapprochement with
China, engaged in arms control negotiations, and authorized commercial
activities such as grain exports to the USSR.
Today, the U.S. does not have such an overriding policy priority,
and Northeast Asia is just one of several regions of strategic
importance to the United States. While U.S. troops have withdrawn from
Iraq and will soon withdraw from Afghanistan, events in the Middle East
continue to receive the most high-level attention from policymakers.
The U.S. rebalance to Asia is focused more on Southeast Asia than on
Japan or Korea, and as instability has increased on the Korean
Peninsula, the State Department has eliminated a high-level staff
position working on North Korea.
Yet Northeast Asia now faces three major points of tension--on the
Korean peninsula, in Sino-Japanese relations, and to a lesser extent in
South Korean-Japanese relations--that could potentially interact with
each other in ways that could cause spikes in tensions and make it
harder to ensure that crisis situations do not spin out of control.
Furthermore, as the center of the global economy shifts toward Asia,
the geo-economic considerations of regional instability are profound. A
Helsinki-like process could shift the emphasis from regional bilateral
relationships to regional multilateral solutions, but getting to this
point will require the sustained attention and effort of the United
States.
Multiple Agreements Prior to the Helsinki Final Act Created Momentum
During the Cold War, several gradual steps between the two Germanys
(German rapprochement was an essential component of greater regional
initiatives) and between the two blocs created the conditions that
allowed for the CSCE dialogue to begin in 1973 and conclude with the
Final Act in 1975. These steps included early cultural and educational
exchanges, and gained pace in 1963 with the Limited Test Ban Treaty and
the Christmas border pass agreement in Berlin. Beginning in the early
1970s, the two sides reached a series of diplomatic breakthroughs,
including the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine blocking third
countries from establishing diplomatic relations with both East and
West Germany,\3\ the Four Party Agreement on Berlin in 1971, the 1972
Salt I agreements, and the Basic Treaty between the two Germanys,
ratified in 1973. By defusing specific points of tension and quieting
the arms race, these agreements set the stage for broader engagement on
security, trade, and humanitarian issues between East and West.
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\3\ The U.S. and the GDR established diplomatic relations in 1974.
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Northeast Asia does not have a strong historical tradition of
multilateralism, although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the
Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEAN Plus Three, the Shangri-La Dialogue and the
East Asia Summit could serve as a foundation for future regional
organizations with broader capacities. In addition, the annual China--
Japan--South Korea trilateral summit holds hope for improving
trilateral coordination among the three countries and increasing
cooperation and peace in the region.\4\
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\4\ In 2011 a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was established in
Seoul, making it the regional forum with the most well-established
support structure.
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However, many of the security agreements underpinning diplomatic
relations in Northeast Asia face significant challenges. The treaty
establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965
did not address the issue of comfort women during World War II, or the
status of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets--two disputes that haunt ROK-Japan
relations today. Similarly, Japan's treaty establishing relations with
the PRC ignored the Senkakus/Diaoyu dispute.
Security arrangements on the Korean Peninsula are particularly
problematic. The Korean War never officially ended: each half of the
Korean Peninsula claims sovereignty over its entirety, and the U.S. has
not established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Earlier this year,
North Korea declared the Armistice Agreement that ended fighting in the
Korean War ``completely nullified.'' \5\
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\5\ ``US, S. Korea to be Held Accountable for Catastrophic
Consequences: CPRK,'' Korea Central News Agency, March 11, 2013.
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Several of the major agreements on the Korean Peninsula, such as
the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement on Denuclearization or the joint
statements from the two inter-Korean summits, demonstrated initial
successes. For example, the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Working
Group established as part of the Six Party Talks created a set of
guiding principles, agreed to by all six parties, that included
parameters for developing peace-building and confidence-building
mechanisms which were based to a large extent on the Helsinki Final
Act, the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\6\
However, none of the major agreements on the Korean Peninsula have been
fully implemented and they have therefore lost momentum; in many cases
both sides have failed to live up to their obligations. The critical
question is why and how these agreements have lost momentum, and how to
change that calculus moving forward.
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\6\ Frances Mautner-Markhoff, personal communication, December 8,
2013.
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Foreign Policy Consistency
The development of a consistent, nonpartisan West German policy
toward East Germany was a necessary element of rapprochement between
them. Ostpolitik, a policy to improve West Germany's relations with
East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union, was developed under the
leadership of Social Democrats, including Chancellor Willy Brandt. It
initially faced many challenges from opposition parties, particularly
the Christian Democratic Union. However, Brandt was re-elected in 1972
and the Berlin Treaty was ratified in 1973. Helmut Schmidt, also a
Social Democrat, became Chancellor in 1974 and signed the Final Act the
following year. After the West German opposition regained power in
1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl pursued a similar policy line toward the
GDR, maintaining continuity in inter-German relations. U.S. policy in
support of German rapprochement also remained consistent in spite of
increasing tension with the Soviet Union over security and human rights
issues.
In contrast, South Korea's North Korea policy has been partisan and
inconsistent. South Korean policy changed drastically between the
conciliatory ``Sunshine Policy'' of President Kim Dae-Jung and the
succeeding ``Peace and Prosperity Policy'' of Roh Moo-Hyun (1998-2008)
and the more confrontational approach of President Lee Myung-Bak (2008-
2013). President Park Geun-Hye has vowed to seek a balanced
approach,\7\ and some hope that she will ultimately be able to forge a
policy that garners greater support throughout the Korean Peninsula and
that can be sustained through future administrations.
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\7\ President Park's strategy towards the DPRK is known as
trustpolitik. For further reading see, Park Geun-Hye, ``A New Kind of
Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,'' Foreign Affairs
(September 2011).
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U.S. policy toward North Korea has also seen dramatic shifts,
particularly when new administrations have taken office. Skeptical of
the Clinton administration's diplomacy with North Korea, the Bush
administration announced a North Korea policy review early in its
tenure, and took an anti-engagement approach for several years before
adjusting its policy during Bush's second term. And as the Obama
administration's former NSC staffer Jeff Bader recounts in his book, he
rejected in early 2009 a proposed message from Secretary Clinton to
North Korea that ``focused mainly on the policy pursued by the Bush
administration in its final weeks, so as to provide the North Koreans
with a sense of continuity in policy.'' Bader argued that ``the new
president and the new national security team . . . deserved a chance to
consider the direction we were going in before the bureaucracy
attempted to tie us to existing processes and policies.'' \8\ No
regional process has a hope of succeeding until U.S. and South Korean
policy have a chance to last beyond a presidential administration.
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\8\ Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account
of America's Asia Strategy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), Google
Play edition, 70. Bader sought a policy toward the DPRK that was more
consultative with the other four parties in the Six Party talks.
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Regional Commitment to Economic Integration
The momentum created in Europe by the Helsinki Process persisted
and had a profound impact on how the region viewed itself, even after
Cold War tensions began to flare up again in the early 1980s. The
process of gradual economic integration between Western Europe and the
Eastern Bloc created a set of overlapping interests that rusted holes
into the iron curtain. Western European governments, for example, stood
firm in their support for an energy pipeline linking Europe and the
Soviet Union despite criticism of the project, calculating correctly
that the USSR's economic motivations would outweigh the possibility
that it would begin using the pipeline for political leverage.
Growing economic ties between the countries of Northeast Asia,
however, have not dampened political tensions in the region--a problem
that President Park Geun-Hye has called the ``Asia Paradox.'' \9\ North
Korea is the outlier in the region's economic success story, although
China's economic ties to the DPRK are deepening and inter-Korean trade
is also rebounding after the restoration of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex (though not yet to pre-suspensions levels). Given the U.S.
emphasis on sanctions, there has been some friction between the U.S.
and its partners in the region over economic engagement with the DPRK,
and if the Park government succeeds in its goal of expanding inter-
Korean economic relations, more of this tension can be anticipated in
the future. Nonetheless, a multilateral process that pursues regional
economic cooperation could be a stabilizing force. Rail or pipeline
infrastructure connecting the two Koreas to their neighbors would be in
the economic interest of all parties in the region; although current
levels of mistrust on the Peninsula run too deep for this sort of
large-scale project to be feasible today, it stands as an example of
what could be accomplished if some security concerns were alleviated.
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\9\ President Park Geun-Hye, ``Speech to Joint Session of
Congress,'' May 8, 2013. Accessed on December 6, 2013 at http://
www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/
President_Park_speech_at_US_Congress.pdf/.
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Willingness to Compromise
The Helsinki Process began with a proposal from the USSR to
finalize post-WWII boundaries and guarantee territorial integrity, a
proposal which was initially viewed with suspicion by the West. Neither
the U.S. nor its allies were eager to set boundaries, but because the
dialogue included topics that were primarily in their interest, such as
human rights and economic engagement, the West was willing to
negotiate. All participants in the Helsinki Process were there not to
engage in dialogue for its own sake, not to appease the other side, but
to further their own goals.
In order to apply a Helsinki-like process to East Asia, the
mechanism will need to bring everybody's concerns to the table. Doing
this will require compromises, and will not always be easy politically.
First, the U.S. and China will need to find more common ground in their
stances toward North Korea--currently, there is an overlap in many
fundamental interests, but not in priorities or tactics. Second, the
U.S. and its partners in the region need to re-examine the incentives
that have been offered to the DPRK in exchange for denuclearization,
and be willing to find creative ways to break out of the current
stalemate on the issue.
Political Will
Although the Helsinki Process is today seen as a successful
initiative, it is worth recalling that the Final Act was controversial
in its time, and the Cold War tensions that re-emerged in the years
afterwards cast doubt on its relevance. In signing the Helsinki
Accords, President Ford withstood criticism from Congress and the
public on human rights and border issues, and this gambit paid off in
the long run. Similarly, the development of a multilateral security
framework in Northeast Asia will be a long-term process, and there will
undoubtedly be bumps along the road. It will entail taking political
risks to get a meaningful agreement and implementation of that
agreement, but merely continuing to go along with the status quo in
Northeast Asia would ultimately be the far greater risk.
It is also important to recall that U.S. allies in Western Europe
played a more central role in moving the Helsinki Process forward than
did the United States. This didn't make the U.S. security commitment to
Europe any less credible or its political influence less relevant, but
rather reflected a strong partnership and trust among allies as well as
the European experience prior to World War II. As Northeast Asia is
less integrated as a cohesive region than Europe, the U.S. may play a
larger role in shaping a multilateral security dialogue. However, the
impetus for such a process needs to come from within the region as
well. President Park's call for a ``Northeast Asian Peace and
Cooperation Initiative'' that would initially focus on regional
confidence-building measures is a good start, and the U.S. should
strongly signal its support for such a mechanism.
Asia Today
The Helsinki Process spurred an uptick in private society
initiatives and exchanges, and this may be the most important lesson we
can look at today: what civil society initiatives are already taking
place in the DPRK, and how can we support their expansion. The U.S.
should support private sector and civil society initiatives by
regularizing its visa process, remaining open to perspectives gained
through Track II dialogue, lending support to humanitarian initiatives
and person-to-person exchanges, and supporting regional initiatives.
Private Sector Activities: People-To-People Exchanges
President Ford's comments before leaving for Europe to attend the
OSCE Conference where he would sign the Final Act in 1975 reflected a
confidence in the positive impact and power of people-to-people
exchanges:
The fact that these very different governments can agree,
even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and
exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification
for families and international marriages, a freer flow of
information and publications, and increased tourism and travel,
seems to me a development worthy of positive and public
encouragement by the United States.\10\
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\10\ Gerald R. Ford, ``Text of Remarks at a Meeting with
Representatives of European Background Concerning the Conference and
Security and Cooperation in Europe,'' July 25, 1975, in Gerald R. Ford,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1975), Book Two, 1033. http://
quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/ 4732052.1975.002/
103?page=root;size=100;view=image;q1=Gerald+Ford.
By that time the U.S. and the Soviet Union had been participating
in academic and cultural exchanges for two decades, while science and
technology exchanges began in the 1972-74 period. The Final Act aimed
to facilitate an expansion of such activities.
Less than two years after the Final Act was signed, the U.S.
Helsinki Commission convened a hearing to assess its implementation.
Joseph Duffey, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and
Cultural Affairs, noted that other Final Act provisions broke new
ground, but that since educational and cultural exchanges were already
taking place the most significant impact was to expand exchanges at the
nongovernmental level:
The Final Act has confirmed, on a high political level, the
legitimacy of these programs which we have been conducting for
the past 20 years. Since the signing of the Final Act, we have
sought to expand these activities for the most part under
bilateral arrangements with these countries . . . We have
assisted private American institutions in establishing
exchanges, working closely with them, providing advice when it
has been sought, and in some cases, partial funding through
grants-in-aid . . . The most promising development is direct
contacts between universities in the United States, the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.\11\
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\11\ Joseph Duffey, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational
and Cultural Affairs, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Volume III, Information Flow,
and Cultural and Educational Exchanges, May 19, 24 and 25 1977, 95th
Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977),
16-18.
While the U.S. had a gradually growing array of private contacts
and exchanges with the Soviet Union throughout most of the Cold War,
there was only a minor presence of NGOs or UN agencies in North Korea
until 1995 and 1996, after North Korea issued its first appeal for
international assistance.\12\ Humanitarian aid efforts expanded rapidly
in the 1990s in response to the North Korean famine, and in following
years a handful of U.S. and other NGOs remained in the DPRK developing
agricultural, medical and capacity-building programs.
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\12\ For more information on humanitarian assistance to North Korea
see, Karin J. Lee, ``The United States Humanitarian Experience in the
DPRK, 1996 to 2009--U.S. NGOs, the U.S. Administration and Congress,''
November 2007. http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Humanitarian-
Conf-2009_Karin-Lee_US_Humanitarian_Experience.pdf.
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Ongoing Civil Society Initiatives in North Korea
The Engage DPRK mapping initiative is a tool that demonstrates the
range of private sector activities that have taken place in North
Korea. It was recently developed by Jiehae Blackman to ``help those who
want work inside the country by illustrating the different foreign
engagement activities that have taken place inside the DPRK.''
According to the www.EngageDPRK.org website, ``By identifying the
various foreign activities throughout the country, ranging from noodle
factories and retail stores to goat farms and vaccination programs, we
endeavor to gain deeper insight into the living conditions of local
communities, the kinds of projects that are possible, and the types of
working relationships between foreigners and the DPRK government and
citizens that make for successful, sustainable projects.''
The initiative draws mainly from publically available information
and therefore cannot be considered comprehensive; there are a number of
activities that take place with little or no public profile. Even so,
the results may be surprising to most Americans: for the 18 years
covered by this project (1995-2012) the initiative was able to identify
44,000 activities implemented as part of approximately 1,100 discreet
projects carried out by 480 organizations coming from 29 different
countries as well as the UN and other international agencies. These
projects include humanitarian relief (assistance meeting immediate
needs in health, nutrition, and emergency relief/rehabilitation),
development assistance (meeting long-term needs), educational
assistance (addressing educational needs for the general public),
professional training (standalone introductions to new thoughts and
principles, separate from capacity building), and business activities.
Sports and cultural exchanges were not included in this project.
The initiative provides a public interactive map on its website
identifying the locations where these projects are being implemented
throughout the country. Each project has been broken down into
``activities,'' which are what users are able to see on the interactive
map. Information was only uploaded when complete data was available; if
data was missing (for example, the starting and ending dates),
information about the activity was not included on the map. Because of
this, information is less readily available in the early years covered
by the initiative. Furthermore, only a fraction of Chinese businesses
were included because information on their activities was incomplete.
As can be seen in the screen shots in the appendix of all non-
business activities shown on the map, there has been a high
concentration of activities in areas such as Pyongyang, South Pyongan,
North Pyongan, North Hwanghae, South Hamgyong, and Kangwon Provinces.
Such areas typically have high concentrations of population, are
particularly vulnerable to flooding, or experience greater food
insecurity because of lack of access to farms or markets. Many of the
concentrations of activities also represent sites where an NGO, INGO or
UN agency has worked long term with a particular community, farm,
orphanage, hospital or clinic on projects to enhance food security
(such as through an agricultural project or a food production facility)
or on a medical project.
As noted, this map captures some of the private sector activities
from 29 countries, including the United States. Here are a few
examples.
World Vision: Access to Clean Water
World Vision's community development project in Dochi-Ri, a
community of 12,000, increases access to clean water through building
water systems and providing solar energy to provide electricity for the
school and clinic as well local residents. World Vision also works to
reduce malnutrition by providing school children with daily lunches.
World Vision began its work in the DPRK in 1995 in response to a DPRK
request for aid. Since then, they have provided noodle factories with
equipment and supplies to produce meals for thousands of people, helped
agriculture and health systems recover following the 1998 floods, and
built greenhouses to improve vegetable production.\13\
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\13\ World Vision Website, http://www.worldvision.org/our-impact/
country-profiles/north-korea; Victor Hsu, ``A DPRK-Shangri-la,''
January 2009. http://www.ncnk.org/resources/newsletter-content-items/
ncnk-newsletter-vol-2-no-1-a-dprk-shangrila.
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American Friends Service Committee: Improving Farming Techniques
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) works with the
Academy of Agricultural Science and four farms on programs tailored to
the specific conditions of each farm, with an emphasis on experimenting
with different farming methods to increase food production and to
protect soil fertility. Most recently, AFSC has been training farmers
in a new cultivation method that requires 25% of the seed and
fertilizer normally used for seed-bed preparation and that also
decreased the labor input needed for transplanting. The new method
increases yields by 0.5 to 1 ton per hectare. Like other U.S. NGOs,
AFSC has built unheated greenhouses, which can grow crops even in
winter, bringing variety to the diet; the extra vegetable harvests also
generate income for the farm, which is used to purchase necessary
inputs such as tires and fuel. AFSC also brings farmers to China for
study tours to introduce new farming methods. A farm manager notes that
the cooperative farms with which AFSC works are the ``model farms'' in
their counties: ``The government does field trips to our farms, we have
visits by other farmers--so our country has ways of disseminating new
ideas and ways of sharing knowledge.'' \14\
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\14\ AFSC Website: https://afsc.org/story/strawberries-winter-
afscs-program-north-korea; https://afsc.org/video/improving-rice-
production-north-korea-dprk; https://afsc.org/story/bringing-
sustainable-farming-farmers-together-china.
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Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
Founded by Korean-American Chin-Kyung ``James'' Kim, the Pyongyang
University of Science and Technology (PUST) is the first private
university in the DPRK. Originally conceived in 2001, its construction
took nearly a decade. According to its Facebook page, President Kim
started the school ``with a group of evangelical Christians who have a
heart and prayer to make an eternal impact in North Korea by educating
its future leaders''; \15\ it is funded by churches and received a one-
time donation from the South Korean government of one million U.S.
dollars.
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\15\ PUST Facebook Page; https://www.facebook.com/pustkp.
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The 230-acre campus, with 17 buildings, held its first classes in
October 2010. PUST currently has three schools: Information and
Communication Technology (ICT), Industry and Management (IM), and
Agriculture, Food and Life Sciences (AFL).\16\ Plans for a new School
of Public Healthcare were discussed at the second international
conference at PUST this past October, which featured researchers from
the UK, Australia and the United States, as well as PUST graduate
students presenting ``their interdisciplinary research integrating
medical science, public health, and their own discipline in science and
technology.'' All academic offerings have been designed to apply to
purely civilian applications.
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\16\ Michael Alison Chandler, ``Private University in North Korea
Offers Lessons in Science and World Peace,'' Washington Post, October
7, 2011.
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PUST currently has about 400 undergraduates and 110 graduate
students and plans to eventually expand enrollment to 2,000 students. A
handful of PUST graduates have studied abroad or are currently studying
at Sweden's Uppsala University and Britain's University of Westminster
and Cambridge University.
University of British Columbia Knowledge Partnership Program
The University of British Columbia (UBC) established the Canada-
DPRK Knowledge Partnership Program (KPP) in 2010, the first and only
academic exchange program with North Korea in North America of its
type. Each year the KPP brings North Korean university professors to
UBC for a six-month study program at UBC on topics such as modern
economic theory, finance, trade, and business practices. The North
Korean professors also study English and attend culture classes. The
North Korean scholars have come from Kim Il Sung University, Wonsan
Economic University, the University of National Economy and the
Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies. UBC Professor Kyung-Ae Park,
who founded the KPP program, noted in an interview with the Korea Times
that ``It is too early to measure the overall impact of the KPP as it
is only in its third year. The KPP provides a non-political forum for
open dialogue with North Koreans on a variety of issues to build North
Korea's confidence in engagement with educational institutions and
allow the formation of meaningful personal and institutional
relationships.'' \17\
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\17\ Chung Ah-young, ``NK crucial for expanding Korean studies.''
The Korea Times, October 27, 2013.
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Track II Dialogue
Because official dialogue with the DPRK is sometimes strained or
impossible, the nongovernment sector also engages with North Koreans on
security matters in Track II or Track 1.5 dialogue.\18\ A handful of
these dialogues have been taking place for over a decade, with several
organizations hosting them at regular intervals. Some programs are
primarily bilateral or focused on the DPRK, such as several dialogues
held this fall which sought to test the possibility of the resumption
of negotiations over the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs. Others
are multilateral, such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
(NEACD), which brings together academics and officials from each of the
Six Party Talks countries to informally discuss regional issues and
cooperation, including issues related to the DPRK. The Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), another multilateral
forum that includes the DPRK, similarly addresses regional security,
but involves participants from a wider range of countries and covers a
broader scope of issues.
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\18\ ``Track I'' refers to official meetings between or among
official representatives from two or more governments. ``Track II'' is
used to describe talks and meetings regarding policy issues at which
there is no official government presence; Track 1.5 refers to
unofficial dialogue with government officials participating in a non-
official capacity. This section draws from Karin J. Lee, ``NCNK
Newsletter Vol. 1 No. 6: The DPRK and Track II Exchanges,'' November 6,
2008.
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Some Track II dialogues have turned out to be valuable adjuncts to
official diplomacy: for example both DPRK and US diplomats credited the
June 30-July 1, 2005 National Committee on American Foreign Policy
meeting with helping to restart Six Party Talks. U.S. Special Envoy
Joseph DeTrani thanked organizers for playing a critical role in
``getting this process back in motion,'' and North Korea's Ambassador
Han Song Ryol said the meetings ``provided [the] decisive breakthrough
for the resumption of the nuclear six-party talks.'' \18\ some
occasions, Track II activities have also been used for sending
important messages, such as North Korea's revelation in 2010 of its
surprisingly advanced uranium enrichment program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``The U.S. and North Korea: A Track II Meeting Brings
Results'' The Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2005. http://
carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-reporter/single/view/article/item/
145/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While most Track II dialogues do not lead to such major
developments, regular meetings with DPRK officials can allow for much
more direct insight into North Korean thinking on foreign policy than
one can get by reading statements published by the DPRK's state-run
news media. For example, a Track II event held in the summer of 2012
accurately indicated North Korea's stance over the following year. Much
of the benefit of Track II also comes from two sides establishing
relationships and familiarity with one another over time. Short term
results in any Track II format (not only those involving North Korea)
are rare, according to Dr. Ronald Fisher from American University; he
says that ``Most of the successful interventions in this field involve
a continuing series of interactions or workshops over time--sometimes
ten years or more.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ M.J. Zuckerman. ``Track II Diplomacy: Can Unofficial Talks
Avert Disaster?'' The Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2005.
http://carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-reporter/single/view/article/
item/136/.
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Government Support
One interesting point of comparison between the Eastern Bloc and
Northeast Asia is the amount of U.S. government involvement in Basket
III (humanitarian) activities. As noted above, government-sponsored
programming with the Soviet bloc actually preceded the private-sector
engagement proposed in the Final Act. Once the Final Act was signed,
U.S. government and private sector officials could turn to the U.S.
Helsinki Commission both for help overcoming obstacles and funding.\21\
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\21\ Allan H. Kassoff, director of International Research and
Exchanges Board (IREX), commented that since IREX was founded in 1968
it had become a ``major channel for advanced research between the US
and the Soviet countries'' but that obstacles still remained--primarily
in regard to access to information for western scholars. Kassoff hoped
that the Commission could help to resolve these issues. Hearings before
the CSCE, op cit., p. 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Northeast Asia, many governments, including the United States,
have forged and continue to participate in exchanges--after all, the
U.S.-China Ping Pong Diplomacy preceded the Helsinki Final Act by half
a decade. The programs throughout the region are too numerous to
review.
However, government-initiated exchanges with North Korea are much
less robust, although EU countries have supported some development and
training activities.\22\ Not all of these programs have endured. After
providing humanitarian relief in 1995 in response to the famine, the
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation opened an office in
Pyongyang in 1997, and began to implement a range of development
projects, including running the Pyongyang Business School. But
beginning in 2012, the SDC ended its development work and now
implements ``a purely humanitarian programme'' in the DPRK, which aims
to ``to improve food and income security, water supplies, waste water
management and protection of the environment.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ For example, Handicapped International's work in the DPRK is
supported by the Dutch Embassy, the Belgian Direction Generale de la
Cooperation au Developpement, the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and other sources. http://
www.handicapinternational.be/en/dpr-korea; North Koreans have also
attended SIDA's short-term training programs, etc . . .
\23\ SDC website, http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/northkorea/
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The U.S. government was the major donor of humanitarian assistance
to the DPRK during the famine years, and also provided some funding for
exchange programs in the years immediately following the Agreed
Framework. However, beyond that, U.S. support for Basket III-type
exchanges has been inconsistent.
The most fundamental area where the U.S. government could support
private exchanges is the issuance of visas for North Koreans to visit
the United States. Whereas one of the key tenets of the Helsinki Final
Act was that progress in one area would be delinked from progress in
other areas, for most of the last two decades the U.S. policy has been
to approve visas as an incentive or reward to the DPRK, while denying
them to signal U.S. displeasure or to mete out symbolic ``punishment.''
This practice of using visa approvals as part of the carrot-and-
stick approach has been employed by both Republican and Democratic
administrations, and has not been across the board; during some
periods, for example, visas have generally been routinely approved for
humanitarian and academic programs. However, visas are considerably
less routinely approved for political and cultural events, and approval
of visits to Washington, DC has been rare.
Cultural exchanges provide a good example of the sharp contrast
between U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the '60s and '70s and
current U.S. policy toward the DPRK. The visit of the New York
Philharmonic to Pyongyang in 2008 was the most-widely reported visit of
a U.S. music group to the DPRK, although it was just one of many U.S.
musical groups non-governmental organizations have brought to perform
in the DPRK.\24\ At the time of the New York Philharmonic's
performance, musicians and organizers in both countries hoped to
arrange a reciprocal visit by a North Korean orchestra to the United
States. However, although DPRK orchestras have performed in several
European countries,\25\ they have not performed in the United States
because U.S. visas have not been granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Other U.S. musicians who have performed in Pyongyang include
chamber music, blue grass, Christian rock (the twice-platinum Grammy-
award band Casting Crowns won an award for their performance of Amazing
Grace in Pyongyang), and a 150-man male chorus comprised primarily of
ministers of music serving in Georgia Baptist Convention Churches, The
Sons of Jubal. See Karin J. Lee, ``The New York Philharmonic in North
Korea. A New Page in US-DPRK Relations?'' Japan Focus, March 11, 2008.
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Karin_J_-Lee/2694#sthash.Hw4gpNdn.dpuf, also
https://castingcrowns.com/node/626 and http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vOh6Hd9c3Qk&noredirect=1.
\25\ See for example David Ng, ``Orchestras from North Korea,
France perform concert in Paris.'' Los Angeles Times, March 15, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. government officials have explained that issuing visas is
``one of the few points of leverage'' the U.S. government has over the
DPRK.\26\ Yet the practice has had no effect on core DPRK policies. It
has, however, undermined serious efforts to bring the fullest possible
number of North Koreans to this country and introduce them to the
realities of American society and culture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Personal communication, multiple officials on different
occasions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The uncertainty of obtaining visas for North Koreans means that
many civil society organizations will not invite North Korean groups to
the U.S. unless they feel some confidence that visas will be issued;
this dynamic has closed doors for exchanges in which North Koreans
could have visited the United States and gained exposure to the breadth
and diversity of the American experience.
Without a doubt, U.S. safety and security interests must be of
primary concern. No North Korean should be allowed to enter the U.S.
without thorough vetting. And there are specific, limited instances--
such as requests to visit by DPRK officials at a particularly delicate
time--when denial of visas may have symbolic and tactical utility.
However, depoliticizing this issue would quietly remove a serious
obstacle to broader and more regular exchanges at the interpersonal,
cultural, educational, and professional levels.
Next Steps: Regional Networks
As the private sector considers next steps, one area for growth may
be regional programming on a range of humanitarian and environmental
issues. As noted above, one of the sharpest contrasts between Europe in
the 1970s and Northeast Asia today is the negative trajectory of
regional disputes. While governments in Northeast Asia obviously have
the key responsibility for overcoming these divisions and resolving or
at the least diminishing the intensity of territorial disputes,
regional bodies working on apolitical topics of mutual interest may
prove a way to build a foundation for regional collaboration at a
higher level.
In this regard, some practitioners believe that scientific
exchanges and ``science diplomacy'' may be of particular value in
building bridges.\27\ One key reason is that the value to every country
is indisputable; participation takes place out of pure self-interest.
Positive outcomes in improving cooperation and communication beyond the
topic of the exchange or cooperation program would be a welcome
ancillary benefit but is not necessary for the program to succeed.
Thus, although activities such as these may start out as civil society
efforts, they could evolve into initiatives involving support and
participation from the U.S. government in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ For useful discussions of science cooperation with the DPRK,
see Stuart J. Thorson, Frederick F. Carriere, Jongwoo Han, and Thomas
D. Harblin, ``Notes on the SU-KCUT Research Collaboration and Exchange
Program,'' and Linda Staheli, ``U.S. Science Engagement Consortium,''
both in Gi-Wook Shin and Karin J. Lee, eds., U.S.-DPRK Educational
Exchanges: Assessment and Future Strategy, (Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center Books, 2011). http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/
23213/US_DPRK_Educational_Exchanges.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mt. Paektu/Changbaishan: Volcano Research
Environmental issues provide a rich area for exchanges, especially
when linked to disasters that have the potential to cause cross-border
destruction like typhoons, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Mt.
Paektu, (also known has Changbaishan, Mt. Baekdu and Baitoushan), an
active volcano which straddles the Chinese/North Korean border,
provides a useful example of the kind of collaboration that is possible
when all sides have an inherent interest in an issue.
As became obvious with the April 2010 volcanic eruption in Iceland,
volcanic ash recognizes no borders. Mt. Paektu is ``considered to be
the most dangerous volcano in China due to its history of large
explosive eruptions.'' \28\ Recent Chinese research has detected
``anomalous activity,'' resulting in a call for ``further research on
monitoring this active volcano to reduce hazards and risks of future
eruptions.'' \29\ China would face the greatest threat from flood
damage or ``lahars'' (a mixture of water and volcanic ash --the lake
holds 2 billion tons of water and the outlet is on the Chinese side of
the border), and both sides are at risk from pyroclastic flows.
Furthermore, depending on the season and the weather, volcanic ash
could engulf North Korea and fall on Japan or Vladivostok.\30\ A
Chinese research paper from 2003 noted that Changbaishan, along with
two other active volcanos in China, ``pose a significant threat to
hundreds of thousands of people and [would be] likely to cause
substantial economic losses.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ John Seach, Baitoushan Volcano. Volcano Live. http://
www.volcanolive.com/baitoushan.html.
\29\ Lingyun Ji, Jiandong Xu, Qingliang Wang, and Yuan Wan,
``Episodic Deformation at Changbaishan Tianchi Volcano, Northeast China
During 2004 to 2010, Observed by Persistent Scatterer Interferometric
Synthetic Aperture Radar,'' Journal of Applied Remote Sensing, Vol. 7,
No. 1 (October 4, 2013).
\30\ Richard Stone and James Hammond, personal communications,
December 7-8, 2013. See also Jiandong Xu et al., ``Recent Unrest of
Changbaishan Volcano, Northeast China: A Precursor of a Future
Eruption?'' Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 39, No. 16 (August 28,
2012); and Haiquan Wei, Guoming Liu, James Gill, ``Review of Eruptive
Activity at Tianchi Volcano, Changbaishan, Northeast China:
Implications for Possible Future Eruptions,'' Bulletin of Volcanology,
Vol. 75, No. 4 (April 2013).
\31\ H. Wei et al., ``Three Active Volcanoes in China and Their
Hazards,''Journal of Asian Earth Sciences, Vol. 21, No. 5 (February
2003), pp. 515-526.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mt. Paektu's location straddling an international border makes it
particularly appropriate for international scientific collaboration.
Projects designed to characterize the volcano, monitoring efforts, and
planning of future eruption scenarios require gathering and sharing
data across political borders; comprehensive information sharing
increases the chances of a robust response to any volcanic activity.
According to Dr. James Hammond, NERC Research Fellow, Department of
Earth Science and Engineering, Imperial College London, ``Because of
the lack of politics involved in understanding a potentially hazardous
volcano, this topic has already generated significant international
cooperation, including North Korean participation in some bilateral and
regional meetings.'' For example, in 2011, under the Lee Myung Bak
administration, the two Koreas held two ``expert meetings'' to discuss
the volcano, although the proposed plans to hold a joint seminar and
conduct a joint field trip to Mt. Paektu were never realized. That same
year, the American Association for the Advancement of Science began a
scientific collaboration project with the DPRK on Mt. Paektu's seismic
activity. The UK's Royal Society joined the project in 2013, with
participation by the Imperial College London and University of
Cambridge.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Megan Phelan, ``New Partners Keep Watch Over North Korean
Volcano,'' American Association for the Advancement of Science website,
September 5, 2013. http://www.aaas.org/news/new-partners-keep-watch-
over-north-korean-volcano.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet North Korea is not a regular participant in regional bodies
focused on environmental disaster preparedness. For example, the Asia-
Pacific Region Global Earthquake and Volcano Eruption Risk Management
Hub, established following the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, includes strong
representation from most Asian nations, including both China and
Taiwan, as well as representative institutions from France and the
United Kingdom. However, the DPRK is not on the membership list.\33\ A
field trip of volcano experts to the Chinese side of Changbaishan/Mt.
Paektu this past July did not include North Korean participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ http://g-ever.org/en/institute/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Un Young Gun, the Vice Director of the DPRK Earthquake Bureau,
was the lead author of a paper presented at International Association
of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI), the
world's biggest and most high profile volcanology conference. The paper
had four other Korean authors along with authors from the United
Kingdom and the United States.\34\ However no North Koreans attended
the actual conference, which took place this past July in Kagoshima,
Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Un Young Gun, Ju Un Ok, Kim Myong Song, Ri Gyong Song, Ri
Kyong Nam, James OS Hammond, Clive Oppenheimer, Kathy Whaler, Steve
Park, Graham Dawes, and Kayla Iacovin, ``The Mt. Paektu Geoscientific
Experiment,'' IAVCEI 2013 Scientific Assembly, Kagoshima, Japan, July
20-24, 2013. http://www.iavcei2013.com/iavcei_hp/PDF/3W_3C-P23.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutionalizing North Korea participation in regional and
bilateral research would increase exchange of critical information and
improve disaster preparedness, providing an immediate benefit to all
countries concerned. Doing so could also provide an ancillary benefit
of strengthening regional collaboration.
Medical Consortiums
Another particularly beneficial area for scientific exchange could
be medical consortiums, as demonstrated by the Middle East Consortium
on Infectious Disease Surveillance (MECIDS). This consortium, which was
established by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in 2003, is composed
of public health experts and Ministry of Health officials from Jordan,
Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. The initiative has been quite
successful, and members have overcome political divides in order to
address the common threat of infectious disease emerging in the
region.\35\ In 2006, the MECIDS network mitigated an avian influenza
outbreak in just 10 days, and during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, Israeli,
Palestinian and Jordanian health officials held an emergency
teleconference to discuss a joint action plan two days before the World
Health Organization (WHO) call for collaborative efforts to address the
emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ NTI website, Middle East Consortium on Infectious Disease
Surveillance, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/middle-east-consortium-
infectious-disease-surveillance/. See also the MECIDS website, http://
www.mecidsnetwork.org/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medical cooperation in Northeast Asia is weak, and the DPRK is not
included in relevant existing medical networks. For example, the DPRK
is considered to be a part of the WHO Southeast Asia Region along with
India and Thailand, whereas China, Japan, Mongolia, and the Republic of
Korea are all members of the WHO Western Pacific Region.\36\ In
addition to founding MECIDS, NTI founded two other regional networks,
one in Southern Africa and one in Southeast Asia, which they have
brought together under the Connecting Organizations for Regional
Disease Surveillance (CORDS). However, no similar network has been
formed in Northeast Asia.\37\ And APEC economies participate in the
Asia Pacific Emerging Infections Network (AP-EINet) convened to foster
transparency, communication, and collaboration in emerging infections
in the Asia Pacific, but since the DPRK is not an APEC economy, it does
not participate in the network.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ http://www.searo.who.int/countries/en/; http://
www.wpro.who.int/countries/en/.
\37\ NTI Website: http://www.nti.org/about/projects/CORDS/; http://
www.nti.org/media/pdfs/CORDS-strategic-plan_confirmed-final_DL_6-
29.pdf.
\38\ AP-EINetwork website, http://blogs.uw.edu/apecein/
#.UqZAbPRDvmY. See also Ann Marie Kimball, Melinda Moore, Howard
Matthew French et. al., ``Regional Infectious Disease Surveillance
Networks and their Potential to Facilitate the Implementation of the
International Health Regulations,'' Med Clin N Am Vol. 92 (2008), 1459-
1471. http://download.thelancet.com/flatcontentassets/H1N1-flu/
surveillance/ surveillance-2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet regional collaboration on infectious disease benefits citizens
of all countries. Tuberculosis may be of considerable interest to
Northeast Asia, especially given trends in the DPRK. WHO records showed
fewer than 50 reported cases of TB per 100,000 people in the DPRK in
1994; by 2011 that number had risen to 380 cases per 100,000.\39\ Only
sub-Saharan Africa has higher reported TB rates. Up to 15% of those
patients may have multiple drug-resistant (MDR) TB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ As reported in Meagan Phelan, ``Science Reporter in North
Korea Investigates Efforts to Fight Tuberculosis.'' American
Association for the Advancement of Science website, April 25, 2013.
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2013/0425_korea_tb.shtml. The rise in
cases reflects both increased susceptibility to TB during the famine
years and improved reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The WHO and the Global Fund are already active in treatment of TB
in the DPRK, along with two U.S. NGOs (Christian Friends of Korea (CFK)
and the Eugene Bell Foundation) and Stanford University. Since it was
founded 15 years ago, the Eugene Bell Foundation has supported 80
medical institutions to allow them to diagnose and treat tuberculosis
and improve general health.\40\ In all the towns, cities and districts
where they work--they are responsible for over one-third of the
population in the DPRK--Eugene Bell has separate facilities for
treating MDR-TB. Since 2008, the Eugene Bell Foundation has sent sputum
samples from patients it suspects of having MDR-TB to Seoul for
testing, and then treats patients accordingly.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ http://www.eugenebell.org/english/main.asp?subPage=250. See
also ``MDR-TB in North Korea: A Q&A with PIH's Dr. JK Seung,'' Partners
in Health website, July 19, 2013. http://www.pih.org/blog/mdr-
tuberculosis-north-korea.
\41\ Richard Stone, ``Public Enemy Number One,'' Science, Vol. 340,
No. 6131 (April 26, 2013), pp. 422-425.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to providing general medicines and vitamins needed to
cure TB and treat other ailments associated with TB and hepatitis, CFK
provides hospital equipment, greenhouses and other agricultural inputs,
as well as food. They also participate in hospital and rest home
renovations and technical upgrades.\42\ CFK has worked with the DPRK's
Ministry of Public Health, CFK, and Stanford to establish a National
Tuberculosis Reference Laboratory (NTRL) in Pyongyang capable of
screening for MDR-TB; NTI was an early collaborator in this project.
According to Science Magazine, ``NTRL researchers can now diagnose TB
cases that are resistant to first-line drug combinations, making it
possible to spot patients who need more aggressive therapy. And the lab
will soon add capacity to screen for extensively drug-resistant TB,
known as XDR the worst strains, some of which are close to impossible
to treat.''\43\ Stanford University microbiologist Kathleen England is
continuing to train the NTRL researchers, hoping to achieve
international accreditation, as early as 2015. Regional coordination
and collaboration in this work could aid in treating TB in the DPRK and
analyzing the spread of MDR-TB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Christian Friends of Korea website: http://cfk.org/about-cfk/
our-work/.
\43\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Enhanced multilateral cooperation is sorely needed to address the
many security and humanitarian issues facing Northeast Asia,
particularly in regards to North Korea. The historical experience of
the Helsinki Process in Cold War Europe clearly demonstrates the many
benefits such an arrangement, but the governments of contemporary
Northeast Asia and the United States must first take steps to build
genuine and lasting trust, and to begin seeing each other as potential
partners rather than as rivals or enemies.
Considering the current tensions in Northeast Asia, and especially
on the Korean Peninsula, this is not an easy task. But given the risks
of the status quo--with tension rising in the region, North Korea
continuing its WMD development, and the prospect of an escalatory
conflict breaking out on the Korean Peninsula--working toward this goal
is strongly in the U.S. interest. Pursuing a regional process of
dialogue and routinized cooperation would potentially be both
stabilizing, and in the long run, even transformational.
Encouraging greater person-to-person contact and exchanges is a
low-risk, low-cost way of starting to move this process forward. NGO
activities in the DPRK are addressing unmet humanitarian needs and
contributing to the exchange of values and ideas. Cultural and
educational exchanges add to the effectiveness of these ongoing
efforts. If the Commission agrees with such an approach, then support
for such activities in OSCE member countries, including a more
regularized visa process in the United States, could be critical.
Furthermore, if the countries of the region hope to succeed in
establishing a dialogue on the many issues that divide them,
cooperation on issues of mutual concern such as disaster preparedness
or public health may be a way to build trust and initiate long-term
cooperation.
Again, I thank the distinguished members of the Helsinki Commission
for inviting me to testify today, and I look forward to your questions.
These remarks reflect my own views and are not necessarily the
views of the National Committee on North Korea.
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