    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                  EXAMINING NEW EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION: ARE
                      NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICIES PUTTING
                      AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN DANGER?

    =======================================================================

                                     HEARING

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 10, 2014

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-159

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

             Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

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                  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio                  Ranking Minority Member
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee       CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina   ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    JIM JORDAN, Ohio                         Columbia
    JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah                 JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    TIM WALBERG, Michigan                WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan               JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona               GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         JACKIE SPEIER, California
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
    TREY GOWDY, South Carolina               Pennsylvania
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    DOC HASTINGS, Washington             ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming           DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    ROB WOODALL, Georgia                 TONY CARDENAS, California
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         Vacancy
    KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida

                       Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
                    John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
                        Stephen Castor, General Counsel
                           Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 10, 2014....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Ms. Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings
      Operation, U.S. Department of State
        Oral Statement...............................................    10
        Written Statement............................................    12
    Ms. Casey Jones
        Oral Statement...............................................    18
        Written Statement............................................    20
    The Hon. Grant S. Green, Jr.
        Oral Statement...............................................    27

                                    APPENDIX

    Opening Statement, Rep. Elijah E. Cumming........................    74
    GAO report to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
      Committee and accompanying documents...........................    76
    6-23-14 letter to Hon. John F. Kerry from Mr. Issa and Mr.
      Chaffetz.......................................................    80
    Reponding to Committee Document Requests.........................    86
    10-9-2007 letter to Condoleezza Rice, submitted by Mr. Cummings..    93
    Questions for the record by Mr. Chaffetz to Ms. Muniz............   103
    Questions for the record by Mr. Walberg to Ms. Muniz.............   106
    ``Guide to Design Excellence,'' submitted by Mr. Chaffetz........   110
    Questions for the record submitte by Mr. Mica to Ms. Muniz.......   148

      EXAMINING NEW EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION: ARE NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICIES
                     PUTTING AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN DANGER?

                                  ----------

                            Thursday, July 10, 2014

                      House of Representatives,
          Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Turner, Jordan,
    Chaffetz, Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Fartenthold, Woodall,
    Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Maloney, Norton,
    Tierney, Lynch, Connolly, Duckworth, Kelly, Welch, Horsford and
    Grisham.
        Staff present: Alexa Armstrong, Legislative Assistant;
    Brien Beattie, Professional Staff Member; Melissa Beaumont,
    Assistant Clerk; Richard Beutel, Senior Counsel; Molly Boyl,
    Deputy General Counsel and Parliamentarian; Sharon Casey,
    Senior Assistant Clerk; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director;
    Adam Fromm, Director of Member Services and Committee
    Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm, Senior
    Professional Staff Member; Frederick Hill, Deputy Staff
    Director for Communications and Strategy; Caroline Ingram,
    Counsel; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark Marin, Deputy
    Staff Director for Oversight; Laura Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk;
    Andrew Shult, Deputy Digital Director; Rebecca Watkins,
    Communications Director; Sang Yi, Professional Staff Member;
    Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Communications Director; Chris
    Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator; Julia Krieger, Minority
    New Media Press Secretary; Juan McCullum, Minority Clerk; Dave
    Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; and Valerie Shen, Minority
    Counsel.
        Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order.
        Today's hearing, Examining New Embassy Construction,
    questioning, Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans
    Overseas in Danger?
        The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform exists to
    secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans have a
    right to know that the money Washington takes from them is well
    spent, and second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective
    Government that works for them.
        Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
    is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to
    hold Government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers
    have a right to know what they get from their Government. It's
    our job to work tirelessly in partnership with citizen
    watchdogs to protect these rights and to deliver the facts to
    the American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal
    bureaucracy. This is our mission Statement.
        Today we are examining the results of a Department of State
    2011 decision to transition from a successful program of
    standard embassy design, which stressed security,
    functionality, to a new undefined, loosely defined design
    excellence program, which has led to untimely delays in
    construction as well as increased cost. These delays put
    American diplomats and their staff in an unnecessary risk.
    Keeping them safe should be our primary priority.
        In response to the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the
    State Department implemented sweeping reforms in the way it
    constructed new embassies and consulates overseas. Among these
    reforms are the development of a standard embassy design that
    could easily adapt for size and location, the use of design
    built contract delivery method, the implementation of
    performance management and strategic planning principles. These
    reforms produced an impressive record of successful overseas
    facilities construction, leading to embassies and consulates
    being well built on time and on budget and offering superior
    security.
        In 2001, the Government was only building an average of one
    new embassy per year. One new embassy means 200 years to
    replace all our embassies and consulates. By comparison, in
    2006, following the implementation of the new reforms, the
    State Department Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, known
    as OBO, opened an unprecedented 14 new facilities. That same
    year, the independent Government Accountability Office, known
    as GAO, found that the construction time for embassy projects
    had been reduced from 69 months, basically 6 years nearly, to
    36 months, 3 years. In addition to reducing the amount of time
    required to build new embassies, GAO also found that the
    majority of standard embassy design projects it reviewed ended
    up costing significantly less than State Department cost
    estimates.
        The embassy construction program with standard embassy
    design at its core, went on to move a total of 32,000 overseas
    employees into secure facilities by 2013. Starting in 2011,
    however, the State Department decided that a working and
    efficient program wasn't good enough, and although they will
    report that they maintained these tools in their toolbox, they
    have gone to a program known internally as Design Excellence.
    State maintains that the new initiative will incorporate the
    successes of standard embassy design while also allowing for
    more flexibility to adapt its buildings to unique environments.
        In reality, however, the committee has learned that under
    the current management, OBO has decided to transition away from
    standard embassy design programs in favor of a unique,
    architecturally sophisticated and more expensive embassies.
    Embassies look better and cost more.
        Through this move, this may be visually attractive. The new
    design process does not prioritize security, it prioritizes
    appearance. The new standards view security and safety as
    something that must be designed around and disguised rather
    than the first priority.
        I am now going to play a short video featuring architects
    that was produced by the State Department about the Design
    Excellence Program.
        Please play the clip.
        [Video shown.]
        Chairman Issa. I am sorry to have to say this, but were our
    diplomats in Benghazi murdered because their building felt
    hostile in its context and didn't welcome the population there?
    They were vulnerable because they were in a non-standard, non-
    secure building, a building in which the refuge point was not
    designed safely, and Chris Stevens died likely of asphyxiation
    as a result of buying, renting an off-the-shelf facility by
    exception to the requirements for a consulate safety
    facilities.
        Did Americans die in the African embassy bombings because
    the buildings didn't do enough, to have enough openness and
    balance of security? Are disguising security measures really a
    good strategy to deter terrorist attacks? In the post-September
    11th world, is it disconcerting to hear State Department
    pushing these arguments? And the answer is yes.
        In May 2013, an internal State Department panel on
    Diplomatic Security organization and management, which arose
    out of Benghazi's Accountability Review Board's
    recommendations, issued a final report. In the report, the
    panel, which was chaired by former Under Secretary for
    Management, here today, Grant Green, raised concerns about
    Design Excellence Program. The panel found no evidence for a
    business case or cost-benefit analysis supporting Design
    Excellence Program. The panel also expressed concern that under
    Design Excellence, fewer facilities can be built over the same
    timeframe, which could leave U.S. Government personnel exposed
    to inadequate facilities for longer periods of time.
        Losing momentum in construction of new or more secured
    facilities on time and at a reasonable cost would leave U.S.
    Government employees in harm's way and expose taxpayers to
    unnecessary fiscal risk.
        OBO received $2.65 billion in Fiscal Year 2014 for embassy
    security and construction and maintenance, a significant
    increase over prior years, but how many embassies you build is
    how many you--large a figure you divide into that amount.
        When the department requested and Congress granted a budget
    increase, it was based on Stated need to construct new secure
    facilities, not to produce more architecturally pleasing ones.
        Today, we are conducting oversight of the State
    Department's Design Excellence Program. Though we have made
    meaningful and very specific document requests to the State
    Department, to date the department has delivered a--has not
    delivered a single document, and this is unprecedented.
        Today, we are today here to examine whether OBO has proper
    management and program in place to preserve the tremendous
    gains made under the standard embassy design Program in
    securing U.S. Diplomats and their families overseas at a
    reasonable cost.
        In closing, you are not the people responsible, but people
    who are listening today and watching today at the State
    Department understand they have stonewalled our request, they
    have even used mail to disguise--ordinary mail to disguise and
    delay responses, and this is contemptible. This is serious
    oversight of the Congress, over the very lives and safety of
    State Department employees. This committee is reaching the end
    of its rope with State Department stalling.
        You stalled on Benghazi, and 2 years after the tragic
    death, we only learned that, in fact, State Department was
    complicit with the White House in attempting to disguise a
    false narrative as to how and why the consulate was attacked.
        You are not the messengers that will be shot, but
    understand, you may very well be back again and again as the
    documents that were requested finally come in. For that, I am
    truly sorry that you may come back here again and again, but if
    we do not receive documents that were requested in plenty of
    time, then much of your testimony today will be a first round
    and not, in fact, the definitive oversight that we expected do
    have.
        With that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening
    Statement.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for holding this very important hearing. And I
    thank you, all of our witnesses, for being with us today.
        The horrific bombings of our embassies in Kenya and
    Tanzania in 1998 were a watershed moment for our Nation.
    Following those attacks, the State Department reported that 80
    percent of its overseas facilities did not, I repeat, did not
    meet security standards. Congress authorized billions of
    dollars to expedite embassy construction around the world. As
    part of this effort, the State Department's Bureau of Overseas
    Building Operations launched the standard embassy design
    Initiative to promote the use of standardized designs of small,
    medium and large embassies. This program has been very
    successful in achieving its goals. Since the year 2000, the
    State Department has constructed 111 new buildings and more
    than 30,000 U.S. personnel--and moved more than 30,000 U.S.
    personnel into safer facilities.
        The program also has its limitations. The program, for
    example, typically requires large parcels of land, which
    sometimes result in buildings being constructed further from
    urban centers. Critics contend that this impairs U.S.
    diplomatic efforts overseas, it makes it harder for officials
    to conduct their work. As one commentator noted, the standard
    embassy design Initiative was, ``an expedient solution to an
    urgent problem, but one that narrowly defined an embassy as a
    protected workplace and overlooked its larger representational
    role.''
        So we commend the tremendous progress made under the
    standard embassy design Initiative, but we must always ask
    whether we can do more. We must ask the question whether we can
    do better. On this committee in particular, we must ask how to
    make this program run even more efficiently and even more
    effectively. To me, there are three basic factors we must
    consider: one, security; two, cost; and three, function.
        In 2011, the Department launched a new embassy construction
    effort called Design Excellence. As I understand it, this
    effort aims to provide the same or better security at the same
    or lower cost while improving the ability of American officials
    overseas to do their jobs. This new program seeks to achieve
    these goals by being more flexible than the current program.
    For example, by incorporating more customized designs rather
    than standard designs, the Department may be able to build on
    smaller or irregular lots. This may allow more embassies to be
    located in urban centers to improve the effectiveness and
    efficiency of our missions.
        These more flexible designs also may reduce costs, lower
    initial construction costs and lower long-term maintenance and
    operating costs. For example, the new U.S. embassy in London,
    although not constructed entirely under this new Design
    Excellence concept, shares many of its principles. According to
    the State Department, this new facility will be more secure
    than the existing embassy, it will be more functional and
    effective for our diplomatic missions, it will be completed on
    time, and it will be built at no cost to the United States
    taxpayer. This entire project is being funded through the
    proceeds of sales from existing U.S. properties there.
        The challenge with this program, however, is the lack of
    data. No embassies have been constructed to date based entirely
    on this new concept. The new embassy in Mexico City will be the
    first facility constructed from start to finish under this
    initiative, but it will not be completed until 2019 and
    according to Mr. Green, who's testifying here today, the
    Department has not put together a comprehensive business case
    that analyzes the potential costs and benefits of this new
    program in detail.
        We all know what can happen with the lack of adequate
    planning. Under the previous administration, the new embassy
    constructed in Iraq went wildly over budget, came in well after
    the deadline, and was plagued with corrupt contractors. It
    ended up costing the American taxpayers hundreds of millions of
    dollars more than it should have, and that money could have
    been used to secure other U.S. facilities and American
    personnel throughout the world.
        So as we evaluate the merits and drawbacks of this new
    effort, we must keep one goal at the top of our list: the
    security of our diplomatic officials serving overseas.
        Mr. Chaffetz, who serves as the chairman of our National
    Security subcommittee has asked whether this new initiative to
    customize diplomatic facilities could delay their completion;
    in other words, if customizing is slower than using standard
    designs? Does that keep our people in harms way longer as they
    wait for new secure buildings? I believe that this is a
    legitimate question and a legitimate concern, and I want to
    know from the Department what their answer is.
        Our diplomatic officials deserve the safest embassies in
    the world and they also deserve facilities that help them
    conduct U.S. foreign policy in the most effective and efficient
    manner possible. I truly believe that every member of this
    panel feels the same way.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I anxiously look forward to
    the testimony of our witnesses, and I yield back.
        Mr. Mica [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
        I am pleased to recognize the chair of the National----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Mica. Yes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Prior to that, can I ask unanimous consent to
    introduce into the record a number of items?
        Mr. Mica. Without objection, at this point, do you want to
    go ahead and State your----
        Mr. Chaffetz. I would. I would like to introduce into the
    record, the GAO report on embassy construction dated January
    2001, another GAO report from November 2004, regarding embassy
    construction, an additional GAO report from June 2006 about
    embassy construction, the July 2010 GAO report, new embassy
    compounds.
        I would also like to enter into the record a letter that
    Chairman Issa and myself sent on June 23d, 2014, to Secretary
    Kerry requesting a series of documents that we have not yet
    received. I would also like to enter into the record the
    response from the State Department dated July 3d, which we
    actually received on July 8th of this year.
        And then the final document is the U.S. Department of State
    Bureau of Overseas Building Operations fact sheet: CBS News,
    Are Modern U.S. Embassies Becoming Too Costly to Build? They
    had issued a response to a couple news programs. I would like
    to enter that fact sheet back into the record as well. I would
    ask unanimous consent to do so.
        Mr. Mica. Without objection, the request is agreed to.
        Mr. Mica. And now I would like to recognize the gentleman
    from Utah for an opening Statement.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to be clear. This is the beginning of a series of
    hearings that I think are essential to figure out and get to
    the bottom of the truth of a situation that is--that thousands
    of Americans are facing with their mission and their service
    overseas.
        The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' core mission
    is to place American officials located overseas into safe,
    secure facilities as fast as possible. I would note for the
    record that the State Department budget, overall State
    Department budget since Fiscal Year 2008 has increased more
    than 58 percent, going from $17 billion to over $27 billion,
    and that security funding from Fiscal Year 2008 to Fiscal Year
    2014 has increased more than 100 percent.
        Prior to 2011 and Design Excellence, the Bureau seemed to
    be fulfilling its core mission, constructing secure overseas
    facilities both quickly and effectively; not only that, they
    were doing it on time and on budget, yet in 2011, OBO decided
    to take this rare government success story and replace it. The
    new program focuses instead on constructing fancy buildings to
    enhance the U.S. reputation around the world, all the while,
    many Americans are still waiting for their new secure
    facilities.
        Hailed as Design Excellence, the Bureau has subscribed to a
    view that fancy buildings equal successful diplomacy, that
    officials serving overseas and those whom they serve care first
    and foremost about aesthetics and that aesthetics alone can
    further U.S. diplomatic relations.
        Since the Bureau initiated the major overhaul of its
    overseas construction program 3 years ago, embassy construction
    has slowed significantly while construction costs have sky
    rocketed to millions over initial price tags. Long awaited
    facilities in less secure cities have been delayed for years,
    while American officials overseas, who devote their lives to
    furthering U.S. interests abroad must remain in unsecured,
    dated structures awaiting State to construct safer facilities.
        Earlier this year I traveled to Port Moresby, Papua New
    Guinea, where I saw firsthand the ill effects of the Bureau's
    new Design Initiative. There I saw an embassy construction
    project that was originally slated to cost $50 million, yet
    this has ballooned to a price tag of more than $200 million,
    all in the name of aesthetics.
        During my short visit, there was an attempted carjacking of
    an embassy staffer. This event, along with my conversations
    with foreign service officials stationed at Port Moresby,
    allowed me to see firsthand that having a fancy building is not
    high on their list of concerns. No one told me, ``what we
    really need is a building that represents innovation, humanity
    and openness,'' as Design Excellence purports. They wanted a
    facility that offered safety and security for themselves, their
    families and many visitors.
        Why the Department is allowing foreign service officials to
    remain in unsecured, dilapidated facilities at the price of
    aesthetics is beyond me. We had a chief of mission there who
    has tried to secure his people. They are in an old bank
    building. It is not secure. Those poor people, they work in an
    office, they have to have an armed guard take them from their
    living facilities to the embassy itself, that facility that by
    any standard is not properly secure.
        In a May 2013 internal State Department panel on Diplomatic
    Security organization and management, which was chaired by
    former Under Secretary for Management, Grant Green, issued its
    final report. The panel found no evidence of a business case or
    cost-benefit analysis supporting Design Excellence. In short,
    the program has yet to produce results, but introduces
    significant risks to constructing facilities on time, on budget
    while moving officials overseas into secure facilities.
        Despite requesting--and to my ranking member and my
    colleagues on the other side of the aisle, we cannot do the
    work on either side of this aisle unless we get the documents
    and operate from the same set of facts. We issued a letter the
    third week of July--I am sorry, third week of June asking for a
    series of things in preparation for this meeting. I have been
    working with the State Department for months. They have known
    that I've been curious about this. I have traveled overseas. I
    have visited a number of facilities. Yet despite that, we have
    not received a single document. I got one page that said, we
    will get this to you as soon as possible. And if you look at
    the document request, to have nothing coming into this hearing
    is inexcusable.
        How can you provide us nothing? We don't have documents
    that Mr. Lynch or Mr. Welch or myself or Mr. Walberg can look
    at. How can you do that to the Congress? It is a waste of time
    and money and effort. And we will bring you back, we will do it
    again, but you cannot come to the U.S. Congress when we ask you
    for these basic documents and provide us nothing. Our staff
    worked with you and said, if you have problems with, you know,
    one or two or three of the documents, whatever, just give us on
    a rolling basis what you have, and we got nothing.
        And I think on both sides of the aisle, this is a fair
    criticism. I hope my colleagues will, on the other side of the
    aisle, also, please, help us with that.
        Mr. Cummings. Will the gentleman yield for just 1 second?
        Mr. Chaffetz. Sure.
        Mr. Cummings. I agree that, and I am hoping, Mr. Chaffetz,
    that the witnesses will provide us with reasons as to why we
    have not gotten what we need. You are absolutely right, in
    order to do oversight, we have to have documents.
        And so I yield back.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And I thank the gentleman.
        Let me give you an example. One of the documents we asked
    is this report on Diplomatic Security organization and
    management. It is on the Al Jazeera website, and yet our own
    State Department won't give it to us, so I printed it out on
    the Al Jazeera website. Why do I have to go to Al Jazeera to
    get the information that you have and that you are withholding
    from Congress?
        I will yield back.
        Mr. Mica. Thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Mica. Let me recognize the gentleman from
    Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. I am sorry. Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes. We all look alike.
        Mr. Mica. Mr. Tierney is the ranking member, he is not
    here, of the subcommittee, but Mr. Lynch is here. And you are
    given 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lynch. I'm sure Mr. Tierney would take offense.
        Mr. Mica. I'm sure he would not. You're much better
    looking.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the gentleman's
    courtesy.
        Let me just say to begin with, we really do need to have
    prompt, accurate response as an oversight committee regarding
    these matters. It helps no one to have the allegation of
    obstructionism cast back and forth here.
        So, I think that some of the gentleman's from Utah's
    complaints are well founded about the responsiveness of the
    State Department to our requests. So we need to do better. OK?
    And that's from everybody up here. There's just--this committee
    is coming up on too many instances where there has been a long
    delay in providing information. Things blow up and then it
    looks like you're being less than honest and less than
    forthcoming, at least with respect to the conduct of this
    committee.
        I will say that like the gentleman from Utah and many
    members on this committee, I've spent a lot of time at
    embassies in some of the tougher spots around the world, and
    we've had an ongoing debate about how to secure the personnel
    at our embassies.
        And it's a difficult problem, and I don't think there's any
    cookie cutter approach to this and I know that there's an
    earlier--before the more creative design initiative was
    adopted, we also had during the 110th Congress, this was during
    the Bush Administration, we conducted an extensive
    investigation into the reports of the rampant waste, fraud and
    abuse around the construction of the new embassy compound in
    Baghdad, Iraq, and I've spent many nights there at the old
    embassy, the new embassy.
        That was a huge expense. It's going to be very difficult to
    staff. It's got more staffing requirements than the White
    House, to be honest with you; I think 3,400 people as opposed
    to, you know, 1,700 at the White House. It's just, you know,
    it's just unreasonable to expect that that is suitable to our
    requirements in Baghdad.
        You know, we've had situations in Yemen. I'm happy to hear
    that--and when I was there, we had, you know, reconstruction
    efforts and strengthening efforts there in Yemen, with good
    cause. We had fruitful discussions, up to a point, with the
    Syrian Bashar al-Assad about relocating our embassy there in
    Damascus. We don't have it there anymore. I know it's not
    staffed, but we're going to have to get around to relocating
    that. It's far too vulnerable to car bombs. We're right on a
    main street. We've got to look at that again.
        And I do support having a more remote, not necessarily
    remote, but a little bit of a setback for our embassies in and
    around the world, so, and that goes for not only Damascus when
    we eventually get back in there, but also Beirut, but there has
    been a profound lack of oversight in the construction process.
        One of the things I used to do, you know, I was a
    construction manager and that's what my undergraduate degree is
    in, so I've had an opportunity to see how we're going about
    this. And there is, to put it bluntly, there is great room for
    improvement here in terms of how we're going about spending
    this money and as I said before, the sort of cookie cutter way
    that we've tried to approach this in the past.
        I'll be very interested in your answers to a number of
    questions regarding some of these arrangements. I know that in
    the case of the Baghdad embassy, we had $130 million plus in
    questionable charges by the first Kuwaiti corporation, that was
    allegedly engaged in a $200,000 bribery and kickback scheme in
    order to obtain subcontracts.
        We've had flagrant oversight lapses on the part of the
    State Department, and that had been previously warned by the
    Defense Department audit agency, and it's just been a series of
    missteps on our part.
        And underlying all of this is just a new world out there in
    terms of the risk to our people in these embassies. Benghazi is
    one example, although that was not an embassy, still, it. You
    know, it shows us what can go wrong and we have a real
    obligation here to reassess the defense protocols that we have
    at our embassies, and that obviously includes how we're
    building them and what kind of apron of security that we
    provide for these facilities.
        So. We've got to get smart about this in a big hurry. We've
    got to be more effective with our architectural design, and
    we've got to be much more wise with the expenditure of taxpayer
    money in support of these efforts. We can't afford to--we can't
    afford to fail.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.
        Chairman Issa [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. I thank
    him for his important comments.
        And, Mr. Lynch, I thank you for your being a willing
    traveler to tough places. Over the years, you and I have had
    the privilege of going to some of those places.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. We now welcome our witnesses. Ms. Lydia
    Muniz is the Director of the Bureau of Overseas Building
    Operations at the United States Department of State, and again,
    OBO, as it's known. Mr. Casey Jones is a Deputy Director of the
    Bureau of Overseas Buildings and Operations at the United
    States State Department. And the Honorable Grant S. Green, Jr.,
    is the former Under Secretary for Management at the Department
    of State.
        Lady and gentlemen, pursuant to the committee rules, would
    you please rise to take a sworn oath, and raise your right
    hands, please.
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
    about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
    but the truth? Please be seated.
        Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the
    affirmative.
        In order to allow sufficient time for questions and answers
    on both sides, I would ask that--I'd let you know that your
    written Statements are already part of the record, and so
    please use your 5 minutes either to read a portion of that or
    to other comments as you please.
        Ms. Muniz.

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                        STATEMENT OF LYDIA MUNIZ

        Ms. Muniz. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa, Ranking Member----
        Chairman Issa. Oh, and I must tell you, these mics, really
    want them closer to you, not further away in order to be heard,
    so if you will pull it significantly closer, it will make it
    easier.
        Ms. Muniz. Like this.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Ms. Muniz. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and
    committee members, I appreciate the opportunity today to
    discuss the State Department's program to build safe and secure
    facilities for our U.S. Government staff serving abroad.
        I am Lydia Muniz, Director of the Bureau of Overseas
    Buildings Operations. I've been with OBO since 2009, and came
    to the Department with nearly 20 years of Government and real
    eState development experience.
        The State Department is deeply committed to the safety and
    security of our personnel overseas. Every new construction
    project that OBO undertakes must and will meet the security and
    life safety standards required by law, by our colleagues in the
    Bureau of Diplomatic Security and by OBO. Security is the
    cornerstone of our building program, and because we have an
    obligation to the American taxpayer to be efficient in
    constructing our facilities, we are committed to ensuring that
    we neither compromise the speed at which we can deliver safe
    facilities nor incur unjustified and unnecessary costs.
        OBO facilities serve as the overseas platform for U.S.
    diplomacy. They provide access to consular services, promote
    American commercial interests, ensure food and product safety
    with trading partners, and implement programs critical to our
    national security interests. Since Congress enacted the Secure
    Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act, or SECA, in
    1999, OBO, has with the continued support of Congress,
    completed 76 new embassies and consulates, with 16 more under
    design and in construction. We have moved over 31,000 employees
    to more secure facilities, with plans to move another 14,000
    within the next 5 years.
        After 10 years of a successful building program, we
    examined our work and instituted an initiative that deployed
    the lessons learned over the years; this includes how best to
    construct facilities that meet the requirements of our missions
    abroad, most critically safety and security, but also
    durability, efficiency, flexibility, proximity for personnel
    and visitors, and a platform that serves the needs and mission
    of America abroad. We know that security, safety and excellence
    are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.
        The standard embassy design, or SED, standardized facility
    requirements and the way in which they were met, and created a
    discipline within OBO to deliver those facilities. Using the
    standard embassy design, OBO came to better understand the
    common requirements of missions, like consular sections and
    specialized office space, but we also learned that while
    embassies and consulates have a number of things in common,
    they also vary widely. Their missions in dense urban
    environments and in rural areas, posts with as few as three
    staffs to as many as 2,500, some have consular sections with
    one window, others have more than 100.
        So while the SED's provided consistency, we learned that a
    standard design did not always permit OBO to meet the very
    needs of the mission or to deploy taxpayers' dollars in the
    most cost-effective manner. We learned that we should take into
    account local conditions and materials in order to have
    buildings perform better in the long-term, and to consider not
    only first costs, but long-term operating costs.
        And we recognized that our facilities not only meet the
    functional requirements of our missions, they represent the
    United States to the rest of the world. Our embassies are the
    most America that many who live around the globe will ever see.
    At a time when it is increasingly important that we provide for
    the security of our citizens at home through diplomacy and
    engagement with people around the globe, embassies that convey
    U.S. values, culture, strength and know-how can be instrumental
    in that effort.
        All of this can and must be done in meeting all of the
    department's security standards and without compromising on
    schedule or cost. We must protect our staff abroad, and using
    the lessons learned over the decades, we can design and build
    embassies and consulates that serve our mission and colleagues,
    are a better value to the U.S. taxpayer, and make better use of
    scarce resources in the short and in the long-term.
        I would like to thank Congress for their consistent support
    of OBO's building program, including in Fiscal Year 2013
    providing increased funding, to help our program keep apace of
    inflation.
        In these uncertain times, we know that our facilities must
    keep our staff safe and secure. The Excellence Initiative will
    ensure that, will meet the needs of our missions and will
    provide the best value to the American taxpayer.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        [The prepared Statement of Ms. Muniz follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Issa. Mr. Jones.

                        STATEMENT OF CASEY JONES

        Mr. Jones. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
    Cummings and members of the committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today.
        I am a Deputy Director in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
    Operations at the U.S. Department of State and have served in
    this position since October 2013.
        The safety and security of the individuals who work for the
    U.S. Government agencies overseas and creating and maintaining
    safe and secure facilities in all parts of the world is
    critical to the Department. I know firsthand the reality of
    living in a high threat environment as part of a foreign
    mission. As a child, I lived in Pakistan through periods of
    marshal law and civil unrest. In Islamabad, we lived on the
    grounds of the embassy, returning to the United States just
    months before it was stormed in November 1979. This experience
    had a profound impact on me.
        Security has been OBO's top priority since the 1998
    bombings of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and
    Nairobi. For 10 years, OBO executed a successful building
    program utilizing a standard embassy design. This work is now
    being enhanced by our Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities
    Initiative, which will build the next generation of safe and
    secure facilities.
        I want to assure you that the Excellence Initiative does
    not diminish the safety and security of new embassies. Every
    office within OBO, real eState, design, engineering,
    construction, facilities cost, and security was involved in
    developing the initiative, as well as collaboration with other
    bureaus, including Diplomatic Security. Briefings on the
    proposed improvements were provided to the department, Congress
    and the industry at large.
        The Excellence Initiative is about constructing cost-
    effective buildings, buildings that meet all of the
    requirements for our missions, safety and security chief among
    them, but including function, durability, flexibility and
    efficiency. DS and OBO worked together throughout planning,
    design, construction and day-to-day operations of diplomatic
    facilities.
        I also want to assure you that the Excellence Initiative
    does not lengthen the delivery time of new embassies and
    consulates. OBO uses two common delivery methods for its
    projects. Both methods have time, cost, design control and risk
    implications. That must be evaluated. The choice of which to
    use depends on the unique conditions of the building project.
    Under Excellence, OBO will utilize whichever method is most
    cost-effective, most expedient and reduces the most risk.
        Finally, I want to assure you that Excellence does not
    increase project budgets of new embassies and consulates. OBO
    establishes project budgets whether for an Excellence project
    or a standard embassy design that are based on scope, local
    conditions and prior year cost information.
        OBO has a depth and breadth of data that allows us to be
    very accurate in setting project budgets for new, safe and
    secure buildings, but OBO cannot anticipate every potential
    impact. Real world events, unforeseen cost increases in
    materials, civil unrest, currency fluctuations, and natural
    disasters can affect our projects.
        We are also not immune to policy changes. If the U.S.
    Government decides it is in the Nation's best interests to
    significantly increase or decrease the size of a mission or
    change the functions located at a post, the cost of our
    projects are impacted, sometimes significantly.
        An example of this is the new embassy compound in Port
    Moresby. In 2011, OBO awarded a contract to build a standard
    lock-and-leave embassy. In spring 2013, with construction well
    underway, the U.S. Government made two policy decisions that
    significantly changed the project.
        First, a Marine guard detachment was added, and second,
    staff population was increased by almost 75 percent. The cost-
    benefit analysis conducted by OBO concluded that the additional
    requirements could not be accommodated in the existing contract
    without incurring an additional $24 million over the de-scoping
    scenario. As a result, OBO stopped the remaining work, and will
    re-compete a modified project with the additional requirements.
    This option utilizes what has already been built onsite,
    provides the best value, and yields the best end product.
    Continuing with the contract as is would not have provided
    safer, more secure facilities any faster.
        As Deputy Director at OBO, I want to emphasize that I take
    the responsibility to provide safe and secure facilities very
    seriously and that there has not been, nor will there be, a
    move away from that critical mission.
        Diplomatic facilities are an essential function of our
    national interests. The individuals who represent the U.S.
    deserve safe and secure workplaces and as good stewards of
    taxpayer dollars, it is our goal to see that those resources
    are invested wisely.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        [The prepared Statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Issa. Mr. Green.

                STATEMENT OF THE HON. GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

        Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
    pleased to be here this morning to respond to your questions
    related to embassy security.
        My background, part of which has been mentioned, I served
    as Under Secretary of State for Management for 4 years under
    Colin Powell, I subsequently served as a commissioner on the
    Commission for Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
    most recently chaired the panel that has been talked about
    here, which looked at the management and the organization of
    Diplomatic Security. This panel grew out of the Accountability
    Review Board following Benghazi that was chaired by Admiral
    Mullen and Ambassador Pickering.
        As we on the panel progressed with our deliberations, we
    looked at one thing, and we looked at many things, but one
    thing we looked at was the relationship of Diplomatic Security
    to other bureaus and organizations both within the State
    Department and across the Government where appropriate.
    Obviously OBO, a close partner of Diplomatic Security, was
    included in that.
        As we talked to many DS employees and others who are
    familiar and certainly concerned with security issues, it
    became evident that they had security concerns with certain
    aspects of Design Excellence.
        You know, we can talk about the importance of security, the
    President includes it in his letter to all chiefs of mission,
    Secretary Kerry has Stated publicly that that is his most
    important mission, is to protect the people working for this
    country overseas.
        But when we hear from people who are close to DS, OBO
    operations and they have voiced concern, then we were
    concerned, and as a result, we came up with a number of
    observations and a recommendation. It wasn't to throw the baby
    out with the bathwater, it wasn't to say do away with this
    crazy scheme and go back to standard embassy design.
        All we said was, State Department, you need to take an in
    depth look at the security implications of this program.
        So with that, Mr. Chairman, I conclude my opening remarks
    and would be happy to answer any questions.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Ms. Muniz, I just want to go through briefly
    one embassy, not including the ones that were primarily here.
    On a bipartisan basis, with staff from both sides, I went to
    London and I looked at the facility there, and we understand
    that is an iconic facility.
        The justification for a glass curtain wall building, and a
    stunning appearance and an even a moat has a great deal to do
    with our relationship with our most close--one of our most and
    perhaps our most close ally. Is that correct?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes. I think that's accurate.
        Chairman Issa. And it's not part of either standard design
    or Design Excellence? It has its own purpose.
        Ms. Muniz. That's accurate.
        Chairman Issa. Let me ask--yes. Would you turn your mic on
    when you answer, please?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, that's accurate.
        Chairman Issa. But I have one question, which is, do you
    believe that it is a good policy for Congress to ever say you
    can spend all that you get from the sale of other buildings,
    not a penny more, and no encouragement to spend a penny less?
    And that's really a yes or no. Do you believe that is a good
    policy, because that's what they're doing there?
        Ms. Muniz. I think that, as you noted, London is unique,
    it's----
        Chairman Issa. I know, but I really want the yes or no,
    because I want to get on with the rest of the time.
        The Congress made a decision and State Department is
    spending every penny, adjusting up or down based on how much
    money they have, they're spending every penny that they got
    from all the revenues that they had on there. They're not
    spending any more, because they are prohibited by Congress, but
    they're not spending any less; and we watched as they're adding
    and subtracting to reach that.
        Do you believe that that is an appropriate way to design
    any building? Yes or no, please.
        Ms. Muniz. I can't answer yes are or no. These are unique
    circumstances. London----
        Chairman Issa. Ma'am.
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Allowed us----
        Chairman Issa. The issue--no, no. And my time's limited. Do
    you believe that that is appropriate doing it that way?
        First of all, do you disagree that that's what they're
    doing, is they're spending exactly what they got from the
    sales? Yes or no?
        Ms. Muniz. They're spending marginally less. The budget has
    been fixed, and there should be additional income coming from
    the sales of proceeds back to the U.S. Government.
        Chairman Issa. I wish that was so. That's not the report we
    got on a bipartisan basis less than 2 weeks ago.
        OK. I'll consider that you're not going to answer the other
    question yes or no, but I'll answer it for you. No, it is not
    appropriate to say spend all the money you can get. They could
    have spent $200 million less and we could have built two other
    embassies. If they needed $200 million more to do it right, we
    should have considered that and it should have been made in a
    request. That is not how the private sector builds corporate
    headquarters or anything else. I don't want to get into the
    details of that building, because it's not a part of it here.
        Mr. Green, basic, basic question that you found in your
    study. Standard embassy designs have a certain look, which
    could be modified quite a bit, but is it fair to say that what
    they look like to a great extent is like industrial, commercial
    office buildings all over America, what is commonly called
    Class B or concrete tilt-up buildings that are made to look
    nice, but they're ultimately fairly industrial?
        Mr. Green. I don't think so. I think when we adapt the
    facade of a building, the goal there was to fit it in with the
    culture, the country, to make it as unattractive as we possibly
    could, and in my time at the Department, I visited more than
    100 of our posts overseas.
        Chairman Issa. Well, how about Burkina Faso?
        Mr. Green. About which?
        Chairman Issa. Burkina Faso. If we could put one of those
    up. I think it's important, because quite frankly, Design
    Excellence seems to be about pretty look. You see those two
    buildings?
        Mr. Green. Uh-huh.
        Chairman Issa. Now, the State Department has not given us
    any of the information for us to evaluate the cost per desk or
    anything else, but, which makes it very hard to do some of the
    assessment, but your study shows us that they're not cost
    justifying. The building on the top is made with non-local
    materials that are only made in three places in the world, this
    concrete facade. It clearly is an architectural design
    rendering to a great extent, not necessarily all functional.
    It's not a standard build. It cost a lot of money and it's in
    an area in which there are more security guards than there are
    embassy personnel at desk. It's a high risk area.
        Is that justified versus a standard built, in your opinion?
    If I need 550 people to provide security for 400 embassy
    personnel, do I in fact have a place in which the priorities
    should be on looking pretty for the population so that they can
    be happy with us?
        Mr. Green. Not in my opinion.
        Chairman Issa. Security, if it takes 550 people to protect
    400 people, is that a place in which there's any question about
    what the priorities should be?
        Mr. Green. No. The priority has got to be security. In the
    department, there's always this argument, whether it be with
    embassy construction, or anything else, we used to--or housing,
    for example. We used to have those who would say, we need to be
    out in the community, we need to live out in the community.
    There were others who say, I don't want to live out there,
    because of the hazard. I want to be on a compound.
        If you pin people down, security is the most important to
    them. So----
        Chairman Issa. Well, let me just ask one closing question,
    because I have picture after picture, cost after cost, and we
    are going to have some of these folks back here once the State
    Department delivers the actual arithmetic so that we can
    evaluate it.
        But, Mr. Green, I know that you were above the folks here,
    and so you oversaw people doing the jobs of Muniz and Jones,
    but from a construction standpoint, from what you were trying
    to achieve, during your tenure, weren't we essentially making a
    decision to cut out architectural fees and changes that made
    embassies dissimilar versus similar?
        Mr. Green. I don't know that we were trying to make
    embassies similar, but we were trying to stay within a fixed
    amount of money so we could build as many embassies as we could
    to get as many people out of harms way as we could. If they
    weren't as beautiful as somebody might like, that wasn't the
    main factor. The main factor was get embassies built.
        As you mentioned, there were--after the Inman report after
    the Beirut bombing, we had 120 some odd embassies that were
    rated unsatisfactory, and what we wanted to do was get as many
    of those fixed as we could.
        And, you know, as I said, I've been to 100 of our posts.
    Are all of them beautiful? No, they're not beautiful, but I
    think--in fact, I opened Dar es Salaam in Nairobi after the
    bombing when we opened new embassies there, and they're fine.
        Chairman Issa. Well, I want to give you a chance to answer,
    Ms. Muniz, but I want to get two things into the record.
        First of all, the pretty building on the top is in the 19th
    most dangerous highest priority area, so this is an embassy
    that needs to be built sooner rather than later and which
    security is clearly one of our greatest concerns.
        Second, I want to mention that my trip to Britain was
    interesting in that as the Ambassador and key staff went
    through and explained to me how awful the embassy was and how
    desperately we need to replace it, he also, of course, reminded
    me that this rather ugly, dysfunctional building was designed
    by the man that designed Dulles Airport.
        That it was built during a time in which Design Excellence,
    gorgeous buildings, were in the modernist, eye of the beholder,
    and we were building them all over the world, and that, in
    fact, Design Excellence is in fact inherently like a designer
    suit, it ages more quickly than if you will, the industrial
    look.
        But if you have any other answers, I wanted to make sure I
    gave you that opportunity.
        Ms. Muniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        What I would like to add--what I'd like to go back to,
    really, when talking about this project is that as my
    colleague, Casey, noted, we base our budgets on standard
    embassy design budgets, on the number of desks, on the local
    context, which has us taking into account distance to get
    materials, we fix that budget and we work within that budget.
        So the building that you see that might be more attractive,
    might be more tailored to the missions in question----
        Chairman Issa. OK. Well, when we've----
        Ms. Muniz. Would cost no more----
        Chairman Issa [continuing]. When we have the numbers----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Than the standard----
        Chairman Issa. Well, when we have the numbers, we can have
    that discussion. I would love to hear your answers today, but
    since the State Department has refused to comply with a lawful
    request for any data, even one shred of it, we only have, if
    you will, sort of the whistleblower side of it, we don't have
    your side, but I will say that to fly in concrete from Europe
    for the top building, to me is a questionable item that I'm
    going to want to see why those materials were chosen over
    materials that could be provided more locally.
        Mr. Cummings.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I am sitting here, I want us to take a deep breath and
    focus on what you said, Mr. Green: security. When all is said
    and done, a lot of these buildings will be in existence when
    we're dead and gone.
        And this is our watch, we have a moment in time right now
    to get this right, not just for our present diplomatic corps,
    but for generations yet unborn.
        And I want us to stay focused, because I think we can kind
    of drift off and not zero in and that's why I think one of Mr.
    Chaffetz's comments about the data that we've asked for is so
    important, so that we can try to figure this thing out using
    the best information that we have in the time that we have.
        And so with that backdrop, I want to go to you, Mr. Green
    and let me start by--you know, Congressman Chaffetz, who serves
    as the chairman of our national security subcommittee, has
    raised a legitimate question about whether this new Design
    Excellence Initiative to customize diplomatic facilities could
    delay their completion.
        Mr. Green, you raised a similar concern in your report,
    which said this, ``despite schedule, cost assurances from OBO,
    there is concern that fewer facilities'' and you just said this
    a minute ago, too, ``embassies, consulates can be built on the
    same timeframe, leaving more personnel exposed in inadequate
    facilities for longer periods of time.''
        Mr. Green, can you elaborate briefly, and what are some of
    the challenges with customizing versus using standard designs?
    And you said a moment ago that you didn't say throw the baby
    out with the bathwater, you said we need to make, you said,
    certain recommendations and I assume that you were saying,
    look, we just want to be practical----
        Mr. Green. Yes.
        Mr. Cummings [continuing]. To get back to that security
    theme, cost and function so that we can be effective and
    efficient in what we're doing. So could you comment, please,
    sir?
        Mr. Green. Sure. Yes, sir.
        The observations that we made, and this is in the report,
    are certainly not all inclusive. This wasn't six smart guys in
    the mess hall that dreamed these things up. These were based on
    comments we got from security experts who work with OBO on a
    daily basis. I would tell you for one, if you could build a
    beautiful embassy under Design Excellence and you can do it as
    fast and it doesn't cost anymore, I'm all for it. I don't care.
    I don't care what we build.
        But what I am concerned with, it's just not logical to the
    people we talk to and frankly to me that you can build under
    Design Excellence, as quickly and as cost effectively as we did
    under Standard Embassy Design. You know, to pull a design off
    the shelf and build it and adopt the facade in a way that is
    fitting with the local--the country as opposed to going through
    a design bid/build with architects and builders, it just
    doesn't make sense. Now, if you can show me with facts and
    figures that it does, I'll salute and agree with you.
        Mr. Cummings. There's one thing that you did not mention,
    and I assume you meant to, function, too. You talk about
    security, No. 1----
        Mr. Green. Sure.
        Mr. Cummings [continuing]. Cost and function. So you want
    to make sure they function properly, too.
        Mr. Green. Yes, absolutely. And I think that, you know,
    Standard Embassy Design was a living, breathing thing. I mean,
    there were reviews done constantly and, sure, was everything
    perfect? No. The ceiling is too high. We can't put the light
    bulbs in, or we don't have enough parking or the medical
    facility is not large enough and those challenges were
    addressed periodically and Standard Embassy Design was modified
    accordingly.
        Function is certainly important, and I think that the
    director mentioned 100 consular windows versus one. That
    should--and maybe that happened. But that should be worked out
    as you're planning the design in a certain country that says,
    you know, five consular windows aren't enough for us. And
    hopefully within the budget we can adopt that.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, Ms. Muniz, what's your response and,
    will the Design Excellence program delay embassy construction?
        Ms. Muniz. My response is no, but I need to go into detail,
    which can sometimes lose folks, but if you would bear with me.
        First of all, we use two different methods to deliver
    projects at OBO. We use design/build and we use design bid/
    build. Sometimes we don't have a lot of advance notice.
    Sometimes we need to turn around and we need to go into Tripoli
    immediately, set up an embassy and move quickly. But because
    our appropriation is regular, it allows us to do advance year
    planning very easily.
        So what we're able to do is, we know in any given Fiscal
    Year that we're going to do these five embassies, we design
    before. But because we are going to get under the excellence
    initiative to 100-percent designs, when we award the contract,
    the duration from award to cutting the ribbon and letting
    people into that safe, secure facility is actually shorter.
    Because we will only be doing construction; we will not be
    doing design and construction after the award of the project.
        If we don't have a lot of advance notice, I think that we
    really do need to go back to design/build and re-examine the
    type of building that we would put in place. But, I think
    what's great about this initiative and this new approach is
    that it will allow us not only to meet the same schedules but
    in cases to improve on them.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, what do you have to say to that, Mr.
    Green?
        Mr. Green. Well, I mean, I'm not----
        Chairman Issa. Your microphone, please.
        Mr. Green. I'm not an architect, nor am I an engineer. And
    if OBO contends that they can build things as quickly, you
    know, I may or may not question it. All I'm saying is the folks
    that work with OBO on a regular basis questioned it.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, Ms. Muniz, the new United States embassy
    in Iraq was built during the previous administration. Is that
    right?
        Mr. Green. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Cummings. Before the department started the Design
    Excellence program.
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, that is----
        Mr. Cummings. That project was fraught with delays, cost
    overruns, contractor corruption. In fact, this committee found
    7 years ago back in 2007 that the project was delayed 16 months
    and the cost to the United States taxpayer was $144 million
    more than originally projected. So the issue of delays and
    increased cost can occur regardless of whether the department
    uses Standard Embassy Design, concept or Design Excellence
    concept. Would you all agree on that? Do you agree?
        Mr. Green. I would agree. Baghdad was kind of a unique
    situation. Once it had been planned initially, then the Defense
    Department wanted to put more people in there so we had to
    modify the size of it. And I'm sure there were many, many other
    things that, you know, I want to be there, I want 15 desks
    instead of three. It was a moving train, believe me.
        Mr. Cummings. Ms. Muniz?
        Ms. Muniz. I think that's accurate. In fairness, as my
    colleague, Mr. Jones, pointed out, we build in different
    environments. There are all kinds of things that our projects
    are subject to which can complicate delivery. The Department,
    the country can decide to change the staffing pattern
    significantly and require us to modify. War, shortages, natural
    disasters can impact those schedules.
        So while I haven't looked at the Iraq project in detail,
    I've looked forward since coming to OBO, I do think that in
    difficult environments, as folks who know construction
    firsthand, those can have a real impact.
        But I do think that having a dialog with Congress, with our
    appropriators, our authorizers, and this committee, on such
    changes so that people understand those changes I think can be
    helpful.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, as I close, I ask unanimous
    consent to enter into the record a letter sent to the State
    Department on October 9, 2007, by the committee's previous
    Chairman Henry Waxman describing in detail the many flaws with
    the construction of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq in 2007.
        Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
        Chairman Issa. And if the gentleman will yield.
        Mr. Cummings. Of course.
        Chairman Issa. I want to join with you. I was on the
    committee at that time, Chairman Waxman did a great job of
    exposing that our wartime construction of an embassy as
    Fortress USA, as a base for when we departed and with vague
    ideas of what they wanted at the beginning, and ever changing
    was the best example of a bad example of how to build an
    embassy. I think the ranking member has made a good point that
    that is exactly what we don't want to be doing.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. If I could have the indulgence
    for 30 seconds to followup on the ranking member.
        Mr. Green, I just want to have the public sort of
    understand something about the Standard Design. If we were
    looking, let's say, a 737 aircraft, something most people have
    flown in that are listening, they started making them in the
    late 1960's, early 1970's, and they are very different than
    they are today. But it's a continuous design that at any given
    time the 737 is a standard built.
        Would that be somewhat similar to how the evolution of
    standard built goes, is that what you build 20 years from now
    would be, the standard would change over time, but the idea is
    to effectively have a continuously improving product like a 737
    Boeing aircraft that everyone kind of recognizes it but it
    keeps getting better over time?
        Mr. Green. I think that's a fair analogy.
        Chairman Issa. OK. Well, and Ms. Muniz, same idea. We all
    understand it's not a fixed design but an evolution of a
    standard build. Thank you.
        Mr. Chaffetz.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the chairman, and I thank you for
    holding this hearing. It is pivotal.
        Ms. Muniz, in response to a CBS morning news program and a
    CBS evening news program, State Department was able to put out
    its fact sheet. They did produce those documents, but, again,
    no documents produced to the U.S. Congress. In this you say all
    facilities will be delivered on the same, if not shorter
    schedules. There's no evidence to the contrary.
        Do you have any examples of a Design Excellence building,
    that is coming in on time or as a shorter schedule than
    Standard Embassy Design, and do you have any examples of any
    building that has been built for less-than money or less than
    the money that we would have spent under Standard Embassy
    Design?
        Ms. Muniz. Thank you for that question. What I would like
    to go over is that, as the committee knows, the process to----
        Mr. Chaffetz. No, no, no. I'm sorry. I have 5 minutes, and
    I've got like 100 questions. Do you have a single example of
    success as you have Stated it?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Which one?
        Ms. Muniz. There are Early Excellence Initiative projects.
    There was one in 2011, one in 2012. There are three in 2014.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I need the names of these facilities.
        Ms. Muniz. We could submit that for the record, and I will
    take a bit more time to go over those. All of those are on
    budget and on schedule.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Hold on. I'm sorry, but you have already
    taken up a minute and-a-half. You're going to give us the names
    of these buildings, and when will you give them to us?
        Ms. Muniz. 2011 is----
        Mr. Chaffetz. No, no, no. You said you want to submit them
    for the record. When are you going to give them the Congress?
    What are the names of these buildings?
        Ms. Muniz. I could give them to you now or we could leave
    it----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Go ahead.
        Ms. Muniz. 2011 is Vientiane; 2012 is Emabon; 2013,
    N'Djamena, Nouakchott, Paramaribo. Those are Early Excellence
    Initiatives. The first projects that will be awarded under the
    full initiative and the new standards are in Fiscal Year 2014.
    Those are typically awarded at the end of the fiscal year, and
    they are all on budget and on schedule and we will provide
    additional data about those projects as soon as those projects
    are awarded.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Let's go to Port Moresby for a second,
    because I had a chance to go visit there in February. When was
    that originally slated to be completed?
        Ms. Muniz. In 2014.
        Mr. Chaffetz. May 2014, correct?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And now when is it slated to be completed?
        Ms. Muniz. In early 2018.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So they're having to stay in the same
    facility. It is exceptionally dangerous, correct?
        Ms. Muniz. The reason Port Moresby is on the vulnerability
    list and getting a new embassy is because it's dangerous.
        Mr. Chaffetz. When did you get the final determination that
    the Marines were going to be located at Port Moresby?
        Ms. Muniz. The embassy that is being built in Port Moresby
    was based on numbers that were provided in 2008. As the
    committee members know, the numbers and the program for
    embassies is not set by OBO. It's set by the policy side of the
    Department.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I'm asking you, when did you get notification
    that Marines would be located at Port Moresby?
        Ms. Muniz. We were awarded the contract in 2011. Two years
    into the construction of that project we were notified that
    Marines would be going to Port Moresby and that a staff of 41
    had increased by 31. Including the Marines, that's a doubling
    of the size of the embassy.
        There was no way to continue with the project in a way that
    allowed us to deploy our resources intelligently that would
    have allowed diplomatic security to certify the building and to
    co-locate all of the staff. We made the modifications that were
    necessary based on real changes that reflected American
    priorities in Port Moresby.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So I am going to try again. When did you get
    the official notification that you were getting Marines?
        Ms. Muniz. 2013.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Can you provide that to this body?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And when will I get that?
        Ms. Muniz. The Department is part of that answer, so we
    will provide that as quickly as possible.
        Mr. Chaffetz. This is the challenge, chairman.
        If it's so dangerous and they need Marines, why aren't they
    there now?
        Ms. Muniz. The deployment of Marines is not something which
    is within OBO's purview, so I would refer that question back to
    DS. We could get back to you on that.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Again, you have got to get back to us on it.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Tell me, what happened, so that cost was
    going to be what? Originally under Standard Embassy Design it
    was going to be an expense of roughly $50 million was the
    projection, correct?
        Ms. Muniz. No, that's inaccurate. The $50 million is the
    construction contract only. The information that we provided to
    the committee and to the CBS reporter who reported on this is
    that the budget was $79 million. Let's call it $80 million.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And what's the budget now?
        Ms. Muniz. The budget is not yet reconfirmed. I think we're
    going to be close to $200 million.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Wait a second. Wait a second. It's not
    reconfirmed? What about this document here that I have that has
    initials on it? It says will remain $211 million for this
    option.
        Ms. Muniz. We believe that the cost will be under that. We
    are at 35 percent design.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Why? So, but that is what was signed off on.
        Ms. Muniz. That is not what was signed off on. That is not
    a final budget.
        Mr. Chaffetz. We will go through that in further detail. I
    pass my time, and I've got a host of other questions, chairman.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        We now go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, the other
    Mr. Tierney, Congressman Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And again, I appreciate this and I know we're beating up on
    the State Department a little bit. So I do want to say to be
    fair that the State Department did turn around an immediate
    request from the chairman last weekend to support a delegation
    to inspect the embassy in London. That request came in on a
    Friday. The CODEL left on a Sunday and the meetings and
    briefings were lined up for Monday. Usually, CODELs,
    congressional delegations, are planned for weeks ahead, so the
    department should be thanked, I think, for the effort in
    helping the committee do that inspection.
        But I would caution you, and to your colleagues that have
    the authority to approve oversight committee CODELs for
    inspecting these various embassies, that we do need
    cooperation. We need cooperation right now in Iraq, and I know
    you have limited resources, but we have a responsibility here
    as the civilian part of this Government to get in and make sure
    that our folks are safe so we need cooperation there. We need
    cooperation in Yemen, we need cooperation in Afghanistan.
        And so we understand very well the trepidation that you
    have. But, this is a necessary part of our job, and we need
    full cooperation from the State Department on doing oversight.
    It's not just your job; it's also our job. So we just want to
    amplify our need to get in and out of these countries as
    expeditiously as possible, and we apologize for any diversion
    of resources to make that happen, but if we're going to sign
    off on a budget, we need to know what the situation is on the
    ground. We owe that to the taxpayers and also to the personnel
    that are in these facilities. So enough of that.
        I do want to talk a little bit, Ms. Muniz, about the
    drawback. I understand, you know, Mr. Chaffetz has an affinity
    for the Standard Design, but looking at it, it requires a
    pretty good parcel of land in order to set it down. This is the
    problem we had with Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. We're sort of
    downtown there. We're on street, very exposed. We were trying
    at that point to try to get the set design configuration for
    the new embassy there, new location.
        So, there was nothing downtown, so we end up further out.
    That exposes us even though we would have sort of Mr.
    Chaffetz's idea about set design with an apron of security
    there. We would have to be further out, out of town with a long
    commute for our people once they fly in. They will be very much
    exposed in getting to the embassy.
        This is the same problem we have had in Afghanistan. The
    most dangerous drive, you know, in recent years is when
    delegations fly in to Afghanistan and then you've got to drive
    up that road through Massoud Circle out to the embassy. They
    tried to tip my car over there in that rotary there a while
    back. A bunch of people very upset about somebody flushing a
    Quran down the toilet or something like that and, you know, the
    crowds just went wild. But, so putting our people out in a
    remote location is not the safest result for our embassy
    either.
        Tell me the answer, how to configure this. Now, you haven't
    abandoned that whole set design, right? Is that still on the
    table when the land is available?
        Ms. Muniz. Thank you for the question. Let me try to reply
    to it quickly. You make a great point. Part of the difficulty
    of the Standard Embassy Design is that it was a largely
    horizontal solution, so that where land is abundant, where we
    could still be on that much property in close proximity to our
    colleagues so that we're not required to travel back and forth,
    which has not only security but extensive cost implications, it
    made sense.
        But in a lot of the cities that we're required to build in
    now, not only is it not possible to find those 10 acres; if we
    were able to find it, it is extra ordinarily expensive. The
    example of London. We are building on less than 5 acres, 4.9
    acres. Property in London is very expensive. It makes a huge
    difference to be able to be on a smaller plot of land while
    still meeting all the security requirements including the legal
    requirement for 100-foot setback.
        But, so both cost and security, I think, play, but it also
    gives us a lot of flexibility in building in all of the
    locations that we need to build in where 10 acres may simply
    not be available.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes. So what you're saying is, does the Design
    Excellence model gives you that flexibility?
        Ms. Muniz. It absolutely gives us that flexibility.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes. All right. You know, when I try to think
    about the different locations and the different demands, the
    different environments that our embassies have to operate in,
    you know, it does give me pause to, you know, try to come up
    with a one-size-fits-all solution to that, which I think the
    set design more or less requires and I do support your ability
    to have modifications on that more toward the Design Excellence
    piece.
        But, you know, sometimes we do have what someone, a casual
    observer might observe as being, you know, far beyond what is
    necessary. So you have to caution people on the cost aspect of
    that, as well.
        I have exhausted my time and I'll yield back.
        Mr. Chaffetz [presiding]. Will the gentleman yield for a
    moment?
        Mr. Lynch. Sure I would. Sure I would.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I believe there are multiple examples of
    Standard Embassy Design on less than 10 acres.
        And one of the concerns I have is we have multiple GAO
    reports, we have an Inspector General report all confirming
    that these buildings in general, there's some exceptions, but
    we are coming in under budget and faster. And----
        Mr. Lynch. Well, you know, just to reclaim my time just for
    a minute, you know, the Baghdad embassy, though, dear Lord,
    that was $750 million. That was three quarters of a billion
    dollars.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And Baghdad is not a Standard Embassy Design.
        Mr. Lynch. It's modified. That's what it started out as. I
    mean, we have more than 10 acres there. We have got, you know,
    we've got the ideal situation. So all I'm saying is it's not
    just a question of one method versus the other. I think that,
    you know, whatever allows us some flexibility to consider the
    situation on the ground would probably provide the best--and I
    don't disagree with the points you're raising. I don't. I
    don't.
        I just think that it is so varied, the landscape under
    which the, you know, OBO and the State Department have to
    operate, they need that flexibility. That's all I'm saying.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Gentleman yield backs.
        We will now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
    Walberg for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you the
    panel for being here.
        I just opened my Statement having had the privilege to
    travel to a number of embassies and consulates in regions of a
    great insecurity. My impression of our public servants that are
    in those positions was enhanced, increased almost to disbelief
    that some would take those positioning's. So we do want to make
    sure that they are cared for appropriately. We want to make
    sure the taxpayers are cared for appropriately, as well.
        And I would add my comments to those already requesting
    that you please convey to people who can get us documents that
    we have been requesting. It's so important when I've been
    listening to questioning already and find disagreements on
    numbers, on size figures and things like that, simply because
    we don't have the information. And we can't do the work. I
    don't expect any hard drive to break down, I hope not, before
    we get that information, but we really need that.
        In your testimony, Ms. Muniz and Mr. Jones, you talk about
    the development of Design Excellence. You talk how working with
    them was a very participatory process within the State
    Department. Can you describe how the Bureau of Diplomatic
    Security participated in development of this divine excellence?
    Divine excellence, we know that works, but Design Excellence.
        Ms. Muniz. The foundation of our excellence----
        Mr. Walberg. Your microphone, please.
        Ms. Muniz. I'm sorry.
        Mr. Chaffetz. You can move that microphone up closer. Thank
    you.
        Ms. Muniz. I'm sorry.
        The foundation of the excellence initiative, sort of our
    base going-in Statement was we are not changing the security
    standards, period. I have been in discussions with my
    colleagues in diplomatic security at the highest levels and at
    the working level and have made that assurance. I think that
    that is what is most important to them, and they have every
    reason to insist that that still be the case.
        Mr. Walberg. Did they clear----
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, they did.
        Mr. Walberg [continuing]. On Design Excellence?
        Ms. Muniz. They cleared our process yes, and they support
    the process, yes.
        Mr. Walberg. Who cleared?
        Ms. Muniz. I would have to get back to you on the
    clearances, but, again, how we put those buildings together is
    in the responsibilities of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
    Operations. To the degree that we continue to build facilities
    that meet all of diplomatic security's concerns, that's what
    they need to sign off, in addition to understanding that we not
    add cost or add time to schedules in a way that would also
    jeopardize security, and we have committed to not doing that.
        Mr. Walberg. But they haven't signed off yet or they have
    signed off?
        Ms. Muniz. We have the support at the highest levels of
    diplomatic security in moving forward with this. A formal
    signoff within the department was not in the process, but they
    have signed off on our documents describing the process and how
    we're going to go about it.
        Mr. Walberg. Could you get those documents to us? Could I
    give you that assignment----
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Walberg [continuing]. To get those documents to us.
        Ms. Muniz. I would also like, if I could, a number of
    members have mentioned the document request. I would like to
    convey, both personally and professionally, that I take
    seriously the role of this committee and of other congressional
    committees. It was a vast request. We are working as quickly as
    we can to collect that information together and will get
    information to the committee.
        Mr. Walberg. But, again, even the information that was in
    Al Jazeera didn't come to us.
        Ms. Muniz. I understand.
        Mr. Walberg. And, you know, that--I appreciate your emotion
    on that. I appreciate your promise, your intentions, but we
    really need the documents.
        Mr. Green, the panel on diplomatic security organization
    and management, a group which you chaired, says in its final
    report that, ``that it understands the desire to have embassies
    and consulates be more welcoming and to reflect the openness of
    American Society;'' and that, ``OBO is convinced that Design
    Excellence has widespread support within the department.''
    However, the report also mentions that from a diplomatic
    security standpoint, there are questions raised by the changes
    under way in the embassy construction program.
        The question is, can you explain what those concerns are
    from a security perspective?
        Mr. Green. Sure. And we outline them in the report and I'd
    leave that to the committee to read at your leisure. But,
    there's another one that came up later and it goes to an
    earlier discussion here about the flexibility that Design
    Excellence provides in real eState and smaller places. That is
    one of the areas that DS really objected to in our discussions
    with them, both urban sites and smaller areas.
        Are we going to just have more waivers for the 100-foot
    setback? I know the difficulty in transiting if you're out in
    the boondocks somewhere. But there's got to be some
    accommodation. If security, in fact, is our most important
    issue, then, and let me quote from an OBO document here, it
    says, ``Whenever possible, sites will be selected in urban
    areas, allowing U.S. Embassies and consulates to contribute to
    the civic and urban fabric of those host cities. Special
    attention will be paid to the general ensemble of surrounding
    buildings, streets and public spaces, which the embassies and
    consulates will form a part.''
        What DS doesn't want is something on the street that a car
    bomb can drive up to and blow a hole in the wall. So I agree
    with the flexibility. There are cost issues as the director has
    mentioned. But some way, as we recommend it in our report, the
    Department has got to do an in-depth analysis of the security
    implications before you just start building downtown.
        Mr. Walberg. I appreciate that. My time has expired.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Yes, I was going to say the gentleman's time
    has expired. I thank the gentleman.
        Now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Kelly for
    5 minutes.
        Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board made
    several recommendations to enhance embassy security, including
    the creation of a panel to evaluate the organization and
    management of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Mr. Green, you
    led this panel, which issued a report last year raising
    concerns with the Design Excellence program.
        This report Stated, ``While the panel agrees that special
    consideration for posts in places like London and Paris are
    warranted, security concerns for many other posts deserve
    serious consideration.'' The report also found, ``no evidence
    of a business case or cost benefit analysis supporting this
    initiative.'' Mr. Green, is that correct?
        Mr. Green. When we did the report, there was no evidence of
    any business case or cost benefit analysis. That's correct.
        Ms. Kelly. And why is such a study worthwhile?
        Mr. Green. Why is such the study that we did worthwhile?
        Ms. Kelly. Or why----
        Mr. Green. This was only one recommendation of 35. There
    were 34 other recommendations that dealt with DS management and
    operations and organization and training. So this was only one
    which came to light as we begin to talk to DS people that
    express concern about security.
        Ms. Kelly. OK. And has the Department responded to this
    finding and----
        Mr. Green. No, the Department has not responded to any of
    these recommendations. I've heard informally that they've
    accepted in part or in whole 30 of the 35, but I frankly was
    not expecting them to respond. This was a report that was asked
    for by the Undersecretary for management based on the ARB
    recommendation. We did the report. We turned it in and went
    home.
        Ms. Kelly. So you're saying there's no cost benefit study
    on the new initiative?
        Mr. Green. Not that I know of.
        Ms. Kelly. Director, I gather the department has not
    dismissed Mr. Green's panel in its finding as irrelevant. So
    what has the Department done in response to the report?
        Ms. Muniz. Typically, a cost benefit analysis is done
    before we go into a scenario where there's additional cost to
    make sure that that additional cost is warranted. As I've
    explained and assured the committee, there's no additional cost
    under the excellence initiative. We're setting budgets based on
    Standard Embassy Design budgets. If anything, we are hoping
    that costs will go down as we're able to look at longer-term
    operating cost and to make decisions that allow us to effect
    that.
        The recommendation was also that we ensure--that we look at
    what the impact was on security. Again, as I've explained to
    the committee and to the members, there's no impact on
    security. We will meet all of the security standards. Two of
    those standards, as you know, are in law, that's setback and
    colocation.
        So as Mr. Green describes the concern about being on urban
    plots, we will always meet that set back that is required in
    law regardless of being in a smaller plot. It is simply that
    the ability to have a building go up rather than be horizontal,
    to not have a warehouse in a place where we're able to get
    materials in realtime and to build one would be wasteful. We're
    able to take those into consideration and build on smaller
    pieces of property.
        Mr. Connolly. Would my friend yield just for a second?
        Ms. Kelly. Yes.
        Mr. Connolly. Would you please remind us what the setback
    requirement is?
        Ms. Muniz. The setback requirement is 100 feet.
        Ms. Kelly. Mr. Green, any other comment about the
    director's response?
        Mr. Green. No.
        Ms. Kelly. OK. Well, I'd like to thank you and your
    committee for the work on the panel.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Would the gentlewoman yield for a moment?
        Ms. Kelly. Yes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. On the one hand, Ms. Muniz, you say you're
    confident that it is going to come under budget. At that same
    time, we don't have a cost benefit analysis. That hasn't been
    done, correct?
        Ms. Muniz. I've not said under budget; I've said on budget.
        Mr. Chaffetz. You were hoping that it would come under
    budget, but----
        Ms. Muniz. No. The Department sets budgets, OBO sets
    budgets based on number of desks and based on the program for a
    facility. We use historical data, historical data accumulated
    from the construction of the Standard Embassy Design to set our
    budgets. We know that people work----
        Mr. Chaffetz. But you have no completed Design Excellence
    building. In fact, you used as an example N'Djamena, which is
    in Chad, as a success story, correct? That was one of your
    examples. If we went to Chad right now and looked at N'Djamena
    what would we see?
        Ms. Muniz. It's one of the early projects that I described.
        Mr. Chaffetz. What would we see if we went to Chad? You
    used it as an example of success. What would we see if we went
    to N'Djamena?
        Ms. Muniz. I am not certain what we would see. I'm
    obviously not----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Do we even have a hole in the ground yet?
        Ms. Muniz. I don't have the status of the N'Djamena project
    right in front of me.
        Mr. Chaffetz. You came up with the example, and I'm telling
    you that it's not even scheduled to be completed until October
    2016. We're not even sure if there's a hole in the ground yet
    and you're using that as a success story; am I wrong?
        Ms. Muniz. I described the projects that were awarded using
    the excellence principles. To say that those projects are
    awarded is not the same thing as to say that those projects are
    completed.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Do you have any completed studies or any
    completed projects under the standard, or under the Design
    Excellence program?
        Ms. Muniz. As I explained, we do not. The first project
    that we awarded as a variation on the excellence initiative was
    in 2011. The first real projects that we were awarded--we will
    award, as I Stated, are in 2014. That is this fiscal year.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So the success that you have is just the
    awards. It's not actually achieving.
        Time is expired. I appreciate the gentlewoman from Illinois
    yielding me time.
        We will now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
    Bentivolio for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here today to testify. The chairman
    earlier alluded to the beauty is in the eye of the beholder,
    and I can tell you from experience, the sandbag bunker looks
    really good to a soldier under a mortor attack, but I am sure
    that we don't want to build the embassies looking like a
    sandbag bunker. But I know we do have a need for curb appeal.
    But after going through these reports and talking to some other
    people outside of this hearing, I just have a real few simple
    questions.
        I want to know, do we have a final number for the Baghdad
    embassy cost?
        Ms. Muniz. I believe we do, but I don't have it at the top
    of my head.
        Mr. Bentivolio. I heard that the contractor made over $500
    million profit. Did you hear the same thing? $500 million in
    profit?
        Ms. Muniz. Again, this was a project that was awarded
    years----
        Mr. Bentivolio. One of the most expensive embassies ever
    built.
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Years ahead of my time, under the
    Bush Administration.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Well, you have access to those numbers?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, and we can certainly provide those to the
    committee.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Great.
        Mr. Bentivolio. And what did we say the London embassy is
    going to cost?
        Ms. Muniz. The total project cost for London is near a
    billion dollars. If you exclude----
        Mr. Bentivolio. A billion dollars. How many people are
    going to work in there?
        Ms. Muniz. If you exclude the property price, it is under
    $800 million. The cost to do a major rehabilitation and
    security upgrades of the existing chancery, which would have
    never met security standards including two in law, we have
    spent $730 million.
        Mr. Bentivolio. I understand the need. For $1 billion, I
    would probably--well, we can't say that. We do need an embassy
    in London. But $1 billion seems like we should be looking at
    some alternatives. I know in places like Iraq we use Hesco
    barriers, concrete, prefabricated concrete barriers that are
    placed relatively quickly in times of danger.
        I have some questions in regards to costs, let's see, rap
    heavy reenforcement, standoff distance of 100 feet, I
    understand, steel structures with curtain walls, all kinds of
    things that, well, deal with security but you're putting more
    emphasis, it seems, on curb appeal.
        And I just, a few more questions. Can you give me a few
    reinforced concrete examples of how moving to this new design
    strategy enhances security?
        Ms. Muniz. So I think London is a great example, and I
    would like to speak in that context.
        Mr. Bentivolio. A billion dollars worth. Yes, you have my--
        Ms. Muniz. We sold the properties that were existing in
    London, this is a project that did not have to be done, for net
    zero for the taxpayer. We are able to 100 percent replace those
    facilities for $50 million more than it would have cost to do
    massive upgrades to the existing facilities that would have
    still left it vulnerable due to setback. No colocation and not
    meeting other security examples. We are able to build the brand
    new embassy.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Would it hurt to be outside of London, just
    outside of London where the cost is less expensive? One billion
    dollars.
        Ms. Muniz. I would argue, in London it would hurt to be
    outside of London.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Did you have a uniform layout for all
    embassy facilities which could aid security personnel in
    training during emergencies? I mean, you have to go from one
    embassy to the next. Everything is different. The design plan
    is different. Everything seems to be tailored at expensive
    costs.
        Ms. Muniz. Our diplomatic security staff are incredibly
    skilled, and right now they deal with a wide variety of context
    and of buildings.
        I would also like to say that if we stayed with the
    Standard Embassy Design which basically had two separate bars
    of construction, it is less efficient, it is harder to get from
    one bar to the other than a cube, London is a good example of
    that, and to build more efficiently also saves dramatically in
    terms of cost.
        Mr. Bentivolio. A billion dollars for an embassy, and that
    is efficient. I just have a real problem with that because
    having experienced in Iraq and Vietnam, I know we build the
    same bunkers, pretty much the same standard design, a few
    improvements here and there by they suffice. I know we can do
    the same thing with a more modern building uses standard format
    design either going up or out.
        You could probably have three standard designs that would
    fit just about anywhere. Why do I know that? Because I have
    experience in that business. You know, we build our military
    vehicles pretty much the same way. They're compartmentalized.
    We can drive an Abrams tank and change the engine out in a
    matter of hours.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a real problem with $1 billion designs
    and costs when contractors are making $500 million profit on
    some of our most expensive embassies.
        Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
        Now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you. You've got a pretty hard job. It really is. But
    two things: One, Mr. Lynch indicated a gratitude for your
    cooperation in turning around a CODEL; second, I know the
    chairman of the subcommittee sent some requests for
    information. It is helpful to the committee. It is a burden on
    you, but it really makes for a better life all around if there
    can be as much cooperation as possible in a timely way, but I
    do want to acknowledge the hard work that you have to do.
        One question I have is, how much--I mean, the costs are
    high. How much of the complications that you face day-to-day in
    making decisions about an embassy wherever it may be, have to
    do with the enormous security requirements that now seem to be
    part of everything? And I'll ask you, Ms. Muniz.
        Ms. Muniz. I think the security requirements clearly
    significantly add to the expense, but I don't know that anybody
    in the State Department on this committee would call into
    question the need for those security measures, both
    operationally during building and the measures physically that
    are put in place. But it does, when you look at the average
    cost of an embassy as compared to an office building on the
    market, those costs are very different but they are really
    driven by what are some of the safest facilities in the world.
        Mr. Welch. Well, Mr. Green, you know, one of the things
    that I find a little bit troubling is when I visit embassies,
    they're remote in many cases and difficult working
    circumstances, it seems, for some of the embassy personnel as a
    result of the security requirements and is there some
    indication that there are some cases where too much security
    actually interferes with the ability of the embassy personnel
    to do their job effectively?
        Mr. Green. I would say generally no, but if you talk about
    access, for example, for employees, particularly non-U.S.
    employees who are held up going through various security check
    points, possibly there is. But I think generally DS is not
    going to spend money to over-secure a place. If anything, we
    probably have some that are under secured.
        Mr. Welch. OK. Well, that's helpful.
        And Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield the balance of my
    time.
        Mr. Connolly. Would my colleague yield his time, Mr. Welch?
        Mr. Welch. Yes. I want to yield my time to Mr. Chaffetz.
        Mr. Connolly. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Go ahead. If you wanted to, go ahead.
        Mr. Welch. All right. I yield my time to Mr. Connolly.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. I'm sorry for the
    misunderstanding.
        You know, this is not a theoretical discussion. Mr. Green,
    when you were in the Reagan Administration I was in the Senate,
    and I went to Beirut for the embassy bombing, no setback, right
    on the main thoroughfare, and I had a friend killed, Bill
    McIntyre in that bombing embassy, and of course, our embassy
    was bombed again in Beirut, to say nothing of the Marine
    barracks at the Beirut airport.
        Kenya, Tanzania, some of the loudest critics of, you know,
    the cost of security and securing our embassies, of course, are
    the first to talk about the lack of security in Benghazi and it
    is a balance. But security, we have learned all too painfully,
    is a very important component in making decisions about
    fortifying setbacks and the like. Is that not true, Mr. Green?
        Mr. Green. It is the most important decision.
        Mr. Connolly. Now, let me ask, how do we balance, though,
    the need for accessibility, the need for visibility, the need
    for convenience in another country? I mean, we cannot forget,
    it isn't just about us and our security and convenience. It's
    also about the population, our embassy consulate is serving.
    Lots of people want to get visas and do business and so forth.
    Help us understand a little bit from your point of view with
    your commission, how do we strike the right balance?
        Mr. Green. That's probably the toughest question that
    anyone here has asked today. I don't know that there's a magic
    bullet to do that, but you've got to manage risk and people
    have different opinions of how you do that, whether security
    takes precedence or access takes precedence.
        I remember when I was still at the State Department there
    was a big battle between those who, in the old USIA who wanted
    more access for the local populous to go to the libraries and
    then on the flip side of that were the security people that
    said we can't afford to have a library hanging out there in
    some commercial building. So we haven't solved it. I think
    it's, you know, you have to manage risk based on the situation,
    based on the threat and if you need more security or less
    security then that's what you do. I mean, we can adjust.
        Mr. Connolly. And I'll finally just add, based on what you
    just said, you can't just have a cookie-cutter approach because
    the situation is going to be different everywhere.
        Mr. Green. That's right.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank you.
        And Mr. Welch, thank you so much for your courtesy, and
    thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Gentleman's time is expired.
        We will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chaffetz. And I think this is a
    very important hearing. Sometimes it doesn't get the attention
    others do, but it is an important meat-and-potatoes hearing
    that talks about our embassy security. A lot of that was
    highlighted by the events at Benghazi, and also our
    vulnerability with our various posts around the world.
        Now, it's kind of interesting, my brother was a Member of
    Congress who chaired the subcommittee, I think it was
    international operations, that did the Inman buildings when
    they were looking at secure facilities.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Mica, if I may, that was your Democratic
    brother.
        Mr. Mica. That was, yes.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes. Thank you.
        Mr. Mica. And if he got it right, we wouldn't be there
    today with this hearing. But touche, Mr. Connolly.
        In any event, you can do just about everything Mr. Green
    said. It's almost impossible to protect every compound, our
    employees are at risk around the world. They can't all be
    confined in the compound. But some things can be done. And we
    have two lists, I understand. One is prepared by OBO and
    another one is by the security folks, diplomatic security
    folks.
        On the risk level, I just saw a copy of one of those which
    you all have not provided to us, but we've gotten a copy of it,
    and for obvious reasons, we don't publicize that. We don't want
    our enemies to know where our emphasis is. But there are just
    some commonsense things that need to be done and some posts are
    more at risk than others, right, Ms. Muniz?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, that's absolutely right.
        Mr. Mica. OK. Mr. Jones, you'd agree, and Mr. Green.
        One of the problems we have is there's a security list I
    have seen and it differs from the OBO list. Can you tell me
    about the differences, Ms. Muniz?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, I can, and I appreciate the opportunity. DS
    assesses every facility worldwide on an annual basis for its
    risk. That is called the vulnerability list.
        Mr. Mica. Right.
        Ms. Muniz. That list is very, very extensive, because it
    includes every building in a compound which may have, say, a
    half dozen facilities spread around the town. We take that
    information----
        Mr. Mica. But it does rank them?
        Ms. Muniz. It does rank them. It absolutely ranks them.
        Mr. Mica. And your list is different from their list. Is
    that correct?
        Ms. Muniz. We basically translate their list into the
    highest risk post. We pull up, in other words, if they're
    assessing 12 facilities, we pull up the highest at risk and put
    it on our vulnerability list or our capital security cost-
    sharing program.
        Mr. Mica. But they don't match, I'm told.
        Ms. Muniz. They can't match exactly because for their ten
    entries, we would have one.
        Mr. Mica. Well, again, this started out as looking at
    Design Excellence and choosing design as opposed to security.
    You have diplomatic security that is directed to make certain
    that our folks are protected and then you have your
    organization, overseas building, and you're making your
    determinations. But they don't mesh and that may leave some of
    our facilities at risk.
        For example, Benghazi, I was told, was high on a list but
    actually didn't get the attention either from reenforcement
    after a number of requests of security personnel and other
    safeguards and that some of the attention that should have been
    focused there and that would be the Secretary of State's
    ultimate responsibility. Is that correct? Would the Secretary
    of State make a determination there, or is this----
        Ms. Muniz. We, the department, OBO and DS basically decide
    on that capital security construction schedule. So the list
    that you see----
        Mr. Mica. Does the Secretary review the list?
        Ms. Muniz. Not to my knowledge.
        Mr. Mica. Not to your knowledge. Now that's something we
    might need to change in the law. But, again, I would think that
    the Secretary of State charged with a safety and security of
    our embassies would at least look at the list, and you don't
    think like the former Secretary when Benghazi occurred even
    looked at a list or was given the list?
        Ms. Muniz. I can't speak to that, but I can assure you that
    working with diplomatic security which we do every year on that
    list, that diplomatic security signs off on the order of that
    list and that it is based on the ranking----
        Mr. Mica. Well, someone failed in Benghazi, and I'm told
    that it was high on the list, that the proper attention was not
    paid to making certain it had the protections. Because, I mean,
    even a high schooler could look at the list on Libya, Benghazi
    and pick that as a top priority. Wouldn't you say that would be
    a top priority if you were looking at a list a year ago or
    whenever?
        Ms. Muniz. The Capital Security Construction Program
    provides us funding to build embassies and consulates. Benghazi
    was neither an embassy nor a consulate and was not on the list.
        Mr. Mica. But it had American personnel and it also posed a
    risk. Diplomatic security was also responsible for the security
    of the personnel there, and they contracted also for services;
    is that correct?
        Ms. Muniz. I could make a general Statement about Benghazi
    and about OBO's role, but I think beyond that, I didn't come
    today prepared nor was OBO's role in Benghazi extensive.
        Mr. Mica. Well, I just want to know the general procedure.
    Mr. Issa and I visited, post-Benghazi, some of the diplomatic
    posts. We saw some simple comments and things that needed to be
    done, improvements in video capability, improvements in a whole
    host of areas. Are you aware that those improvements that have
    been identified by the different groups and Congress have been
    made so that our personnel are not at risk? Final question.
        Ms. Muniz. You're talking about improvements in Benghazi.
    We no longer----
        Mr. Mica. Security improvements in our diplomatic posts.
    There have been a host of groups investigating, reporting and
    they've said that certain things need to be done. I cited one
    as video capability. There are many others, but maybe we don't
    want to discuss them in open form. But can you tell the
    committee, from your position, have those improvements been
    made and addressed?
        Ms. Muniz. So let me respond on two fronts. As the
    committee knows----
        Mr. Connolly. Excuse me, can you please speak into your
    microphone. Put it up to you. Thank you.
        Ms. Muniz. Sorry. As the committee knows, the Secretary in
    the wake of Benghazi appointed an accountability review board.
    That review board made 29 recommendations. The Department
    accepted all of those recommendations and has been aggressively
    implementing those recommendations. They've also reported to
    Congress on the implementation. OBO is involved in----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Can I interrupt you right there? Because part
    of that accountability review process was the development of
    this report by Mr. Green and you had Under Secretary Kennedy go
    on CBS news and say they don't accept it. So how do you
    represent that the State Department has accepted all those
    recommendations when the work of Mr. Green was not accepted?
        Mr. Mica. And also, Mr. Chairman, if they could for the
    record, and I think all the members would want this, can you
    also give us for the record what has been implemented. If some
    of those recommendations have to remain not public, that's
    fine, but give them to the committee. So can you answer the two
    questions?
        Ms. Muniz. I can certainly take that back to the Department
    and we could reply to that request.
        Mr. Mica. You didn't answer Mr. Chaffetz.
        Ms. Muniz. If he could repeat the question.
        Mr. Chaffetz. We're going to recognize Mr. Connolly now and
    then we'll come back to this.
        Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
        Don't repeat the question, Ms. Muniz. The assertion is
    being made that Patrick Kennedy contradicted the Secretary of
    State, and I don't believe that's true. I believe that's
    inaccurate. And for the record, I would ask you to go back and
    have Mr. Kennedy clarify, but I'm quite confident knowing Mr.
    Kennedy, he was not contradicting the secretary of State who
    said she had accepted all recommendations, as you just said.
    And if there's any daylight between those two points of view,
    by all means, come back and clarify. But I didn't hear Mr.
    Kennedy say any such thing.
        Ms. Muniz. I think that assumption is right.
        Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry. Thank you.
        I also find it interesting that in hindsight we have
    perfect understanding of the security needs in Benghazi and you
    should have understood that Benghazi of all of the posts in the
    world was No. 1. Shame on you for not understanding that. How
    many posts do we have in the State Department around the world,
    Ms. Muniz?
        Ms. Muniz. We have roughly 270.
        Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry?
        Ms. Muniz. We have roughly 270.
        Mr. Connolly. You really don't like that microphone, do
    you? You need to put--thank you.
        Ms. Muniz. We have roughly 270.
        Mr. Connolly. Perfect. 270, is that right?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Connolly. So we have lots of security challenges and
    Benghazi, as you point out, was neither a consulate nor an
    embassy. That doesn't mean it's unimportant. We want to protect
    all American personnel. We don't want anyone at risk, but
    unfortunately, we live in a dangerous, imperfect world. And
    here is the same crowd complaining about you spending too much
    money which, well, you know, in any security situation you've
    got to do some triage in terms of where you put your money and
    how you prioritize it. Is that not correct?
        Ms. Muniz. I think that's absolutely right.
        Mr. Connolly. Right. And obviously, you wish all 270 posts,
    including Benghazi, were perfectly secure with the perfect
    setbacks and in the right location that met all of the demands,
    the functionality of the State Department, the needs of the
    host country, accessibility for everybody, but security that is
    impregnable. Is that not correct?
        Ms. Muniz. I think that's accurate.
        Mr. Connolly. And that would be called a perfect world.
    Would that be fair, Ms. Muniz?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, that would be.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes. So I'm not quite sure how much that
    perfect world would cost, but absent a perfect world, the
    question is, can we do better? Can we make better decisions,
    better informed decisions? As Mr. Green and I were talking
    about earlier, that clearly understand that in the world we
    live in right now security in some ways it is going to dominate
    some decisions or at least take preponderance of the weight as
    we consider all the factors.
        But it can never be the only consideration because what's
    the point of having a State Department facility, an embassy, a
    consulate if it can't function, you know? And that's the
    dilemma, and that's what Mr. Green and I were talking about a
    little bit earlier, that balance. And I assume that's something
    that bedevils you, too, Ms. Muniz, and your colleague, Mr.
    Jones.
        Ms. Muniz. I would say that I'm naturally optimistic, and I
    really do believe that with great architects, great engineers,
    great builders that we can crack that nut, that we can build
    buildings that are secure, we can make them as efficient as
    possible.
        But I really do think that we could do everything that's
    humanly possible and have those buildings do the maximum that
    they should do. I think the standard embassy design taught us a
    lot. I think we were able to take a lot of those lessons and
    help inform what we do, and I think that we're going to
    continue to learn and make these facilities better and better,
    and faster, and economical and efficient, but I really believe
    that we're going to get there, and I'm dedicated to getting us
    there.
        Mr. Connolly. I want to pick up on Mr. Bentivolio's point,
    however. While I do--I am bothered by sort of a double standard
    some seem to have about this whole issue of security; you
    should have known, but don't spend so much money, and a cookie-
    cutter approach will do fine. As Mr. Green said, it really
    won't do fine. We have to take cognizance of the variations
    among the 270 posts overseas, and the different cultures, and
    threat assessments and so forth.
        But a billion dollars is a lot of money. Now, first of all,
    did--it was not clear. It was hard to follow your math. Were
    you telling us that all but $50 million of that $1 billion has
    been recovered by the sale of other property we own in London
    and vicinity?
        Ms. Muniz. So let me go over it very briefly.
        Mr. Connolly. There's that microphone again, Ms. Muniz.
        Ms. Muniz. I'm sorry.
        Mr. Connolly. That's all right.
        Ms. Muniz. Let me go over it very briefly.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes. Very briefly. I've got 19 seconds.
        Ms. Muniz. OK. We sold all of our current properties in
    London. The proceeds of the sale from those properties are
    paying for the projects.
        Mr. Connolly. OK.
        Ms. Muniz. There will likely be a small amount of money
    left in reserve at the end of the London projects.
        The comparison I was making is that the Bureau, before my
    time there and I believe at the time that Mr. Green was at the
    Department, assessed whether it would be better to fix the
    current chancery, which would have cost $730 million, or to
    build a new one. And when you compare the cost, excluding the
    site in London, it's under $800 million. So for a difference of
    about $50 million, we're able to build a facility that meets
    setback, that collocates staff, that meets all of our security
    requirements, and that doesn't require any new appropriated
    funds.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you for that clarification.
        And, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
        We'll now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina Mr.
    Meadows for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank each of you for your testimony.
        One, before Mr. Connolly leaves, because he may need to
    comment, the gentleman from Virginia, because he sits on the
    Foreign Affairs Committee with me. And I guess I'm troubled
    that this is the first time that we're really hearing about
    Design Excellence in terms of the re-auth and the way that it's
    gone. And I'm passionate about foreign affairs, and I attend
    the majority of those hearings, and so I think the gentleman
    from Virginia would say that this is the first time he's heard
    it, but I'd yield for a couple of seconds to----
        Mr. Connolly. Can I just say to my friend from North
    Carolina, I'm sympathetic to the challenge that we face, and
    it's real, and as I said, I think, maybe before you arrived,
    for me this is not some political ball----
        Mr. Meadows. Right.
        Mr. Connolly. I had a friend killed in one of our embassies
    in a terrorist attack because there was no setback and because
    we weren't diligent, frankly, about the threat assessment.
        Mr. Meadows. Is this the first time you've heard about
    Design Excellence?
        Mr. Connolly. It is. And I want to tell you, this whole
    issue of building security, when I worked in the Senate 30
    years ago, we were talking about this. And it seems to bedevil
    the State Department in part because it's not their expertise.
        Mr. Meadows. Well, and that's where I want to followup.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes.
        Mr. Meadows. And I thank the gentleman from Virginia.
        It is very troubling to me that when I sit on an
    authorizing committee and now on an oversight committee, and
    probably even more difficult for me because I've built million-
    dollar buildings, I've worked with architects, I know design
    bid/build very well, that how do we have a set of standards--
    for example, let's talk about security, because all of us in a
    bipartisan manner here agree on security. What diplomatic
    security standards do we have for this Design Excellence
    component? Who's weighed in on that, or are you just counting
    on architects and engineers?
        Ms. Muniz. So all of the standards are established by
    Diplomatic Security and in law, setback and collocation and
    law.
        Mr. Meadows. I'm not talking about setbacks; I'm talking
    about the actual design part of it. The setbacks is pretty
    easy. We talked about that today. So you have a set of
    standards by Diplomatic Security that are published that I can
    find today?
        Ms. Muniz. I know----
        Mr. Meadows. Because I couldn't find them.
        Ms. Muniz. I know that some of those standards are
    classified, so----
        Mr. Meadows. I've got--I've got security clearance. I'd be
    glad to go look at it. So you're saying----
        Ms. Muniz. We can provide----
        Mr. Meadows [continuing]. That if I go in a classified
    setting, I can find that today, because I--make sure. You're
    under oath. You know, you've got some staff behind you. Are you
    sure about that?
        Ms. Muniz. We--let me put it this way: We meet all of the
    security standards established by Diplomatic Security for every
    new consulate and embassy that we build.
        Mr. Meadows. How do you do that when----
        Ms. Muniz. As you might also know, Diplomatic Security
    certifies that those buildings meet not only their requirements
    and their standards established by the OSPB, but also those
    standards set in law. All of the standards that are established
    by DS and by OBO to the degree that we're responsible for life
    safety standards, fire, all of those are met. Nothing will be
    changed with respect to those security standards going from the
    standard embassy design to----
        Mr. Meadows. So what does change?
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. The Excellence Initiative.
        Mr. Meadows. So what does change?
        Ms. Muniz. I think the way I would explain it is that we
    took what was a fixed module, a fixed solution to building, we
    deconstructed it in a way that it became more a kit of parts
    that could be----
        Mr. Meadows. Why?
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Assembled in different ways.
        Mr. Meadows. To make it look better?
        Ms. Muniz. No. To make it more efficient, to make it cost
    less, to build less in environments where we don't need a
    warehouse, where we don't need 10 acres----
        Mr. Meadows. OK. But----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. And to make sure that----
        Mr. Meadows. Let me just say that we don't----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. That these buildings are crafted to
    maintain low operating costs.
        Mr. Meadows. I understand that that was the goal. Where do
    we have any example where that's actually really happened to
    date?
        Ms. Muniz. I----
        Mr. Meadows. To date.
        Ms. Muniz. I think----
        Mr. Meadows. Today.
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. That's a fair question, but it's a
    relatively recent initiative. So while there are early
    examples----
        Mr. Meadows. So is the answer yes or no? Do we have any
    example? One. One example.
        Ms. Muniz. The examples that we consider early examples are
    in the pipeline and----
        Mr. Meadows. So do we have one completed example? Yes or
    no.
        Ms. Muniz. No. No, we don't.
        Mr. Meadows. So how can you say definitively that it's
    costing the taxpayers less, that it's secure, that it meets the
    standards, that it does all of that? How can you say that? I
    mean----
        Ms. Muniz. We know----
        Mr. Meadows [continuing]. Are you projecting it?
        Ms. Muniz. No. We know that the designs are certified by
    Diplomatic Security. We know what the costs are because we set
    the budget. And we know what the schedules are, because that--
    those are the schedules that we self-set to build those
    facilities overseas.
        Mr. Meadows. So why--why wouldn't we have heard about this
    in Foreign Affairs?
        Ms. Muniz. So I'd like to go back and answer that question.
    We have briefed this program and there have been numerous
    settings on the Hill where this program has been discussed
    since 2011.
        Mr. Meadows. Yes. So when was the major initiative briefed
    to----
        Ms. Muniz. The first time it was briefed to the Hill was in
    March 2011.
        Mr. Meadows. No, to Foreign Affairs. I sit on that
    committee, too. So--and I'm not aware that you ever briefed us.
    When did you brief us, the major initiative? Ever?
        Ms. Muniz. We offered briefings. I'd have to go back to my
    staff to see----
        Mr. Meadows. Well, they're behind you----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Which committee and which staff.
        Mr. Meadows [continuing]. So just turn around and ask them.
    When did you brief us? I've got my calendar. I'll be glad to
    check. And I'm talking about the major initiative here. I'm not
    talking about some little, teeny component. When was that----
        Ms. Muniz. No. I understand. It's my understanding that we
    offered briefings. When we went up and briefed in March 2011,
    we offered all committees the opportunity to be briefed in this
    program.
        Mr. Meadows. And so the House Foreign----
        Ms. Muniz. Our authorizers----
        Mr. Meadows [continuing]. Affairs turned you down?
        Ms. Muniz. My understanding is that, yes, it is. Yes, they
    did.
        I'd like to go back and put together the schedule, but we
    offered briefings to our authorizers----
        Mr. Meadows. OK. Well----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Our operators and the----
        Mr. Meadows [continuing]. Let me just tell you that I----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. In the Senate.
        Mr. Meadows [continuing]. I sit on that committee.
        Ms. Muniz. And in----
        Mr. Meadows. It hasn't been authorized. You've had new
    budget requirements. I would suggest as part of the normal
    order that you would go before that committee as well; don't
    you think?
        Ms. Muniz. I would be more than happy to brief any
    committee that's interested in the program and to answer any of
    the questions. I know that we have invited staff to----
        Mr. Meadows. I----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Have provided materials, but I
    would be more than happy to go to any committee and have a
    conversation about this program.
        Mr. Meadows. Before you put out any more bids and award any
    more contracts. Would you be willing to commit to that?
        Ms. Muniz. No.
        Mr. Meadows. All right. I yield back.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois
    Ms. Duckworth for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So I understand the tension between making sure our
    embassies are accessible to the host-nation citizens who want
    to do business with the United States, as well as to allow our
    embassy personnel to do the jobs that they need to do, but also
    the need for security. And we could focus on the past all we
    want and who voted for what, who voted for funding, who didn't
    vote for funding, who--you know, folks who are now saying,
    well, there's not enough security, but these are the same folks
    who voted to cut funding to the State Department.
        I wasn't here then. I'm here now, and my focus is moving
    forward. And in looking at the Design Excellence program, as I
    have so far, I do applaud its modularity concept, that you have
    these components that help with security, and that you can put
    them together in different ways as appropriate to the Nation,
    the security risk, the available land, all of those things, as
    opposed to a single monolithic embassy design that is the
    single embassy design, because there's a security issue with
    that as well. We don't want one single embassy design where
    every single embassy we've ever built is exactly the same,
    because if I were a terrorist, I'd just have to figure out one,
    and then I know the weaknesses for all of our embassies.
        So I do understand that, but I do have a concern with the
    Design Excellence program, and that is the involvement of
    security experts in development of the Design Excellence
    program. I know there were some who were on the commission to
    develop it, but, Ms. Muniz and then Mr. Green, if you could
    each address this issue of the actual input of security experts
    into the program, into setting the standards that are in the
    program, and whether that is--there's an ongoing effort to keep
    the security experts involved beyond what the State Department
    comes up with on its own, because one of the criticisms that
    has happened has been that the State Department has
    underestimated the security needs and the security threats. And
    I want to make sure as we move forward and we build these
    embassies that security considerations are part of that ongoing
    process of assessment.
        So, Ms. Muniz, if you could sort of address that, starting
    from who is on the initial commission and whether that
    involvement in security continues. And, Mr. Green, if you could
    give us your assessment as well, as a security expert yourself.
        Mr. Green. I'm not really a security expert.
        Ms. Duckworth. Well, you led the committee that was asked
    by the ARB, and I think that you have some very valid comments
    that I would like to hear about in terms of security in the
    Design Excellence program. But I'd like Ms. Muniz to start, if
    you don't mind.
        Ms. Muniz. As I mentioned earlier, the founding commitment
    with this program, as with any other programs that would evolve
    over time relating to embassy and consulate construction, is
    that we meet all of the security standards established by DS.
    They increase some; they change them over time. Whatever they
    throw at us, we are going to implement, because that's our
    responsibility. So I want to make that point very clear.
        Our goal with this process is also to improve our
    coordination with Diplomatic Security, so to have them more
    involved with us and to have them more involved earlier to make
    sure that they see everything that we're doing throughout the
    development of the project. So I would argue that their
    involvement is going to increase, and that the key commitment
    that I know is important to them is that we continue to meet
    all of the security standards. And I have assured--I have
    assured the Department, I assure this committee that we will
    continue do that.
        Ms. Duckworth. OK. Mr. Green.
        Mr. Green. I don't know what the interaction today is
    between DS and OBO as they develop new plans for embassies and
    consulates. What I do know is--and recognize, this report what
    was done now more than a year ago. Maybe they're all joining
    hands and singing Kumbaya now. But when we interviewed people
    who were concerned with security, not just DS, but people from
    other parts of the government also, they were not happy. The
    people we talked to were not happy in their role--with their
    role in the selection process and felt very strongly that the
    pendulum had shifted from security to design.
        I mentioned--and there are several examples of our
    observations, as I said before, didn't come from the six of us.
    These were based on the interviews that we did with more than
    100 people. Not all of them, obviously, opined on OBO and
    security, but many did. And so their--those observations are in
    there. It's not my opinion. It's what we got from people who
    work on a daily basis, or hopefully work on a daily basis, with
    OBO.
        Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chaffetz. If the gentlewoman will yield so she can
    reclaim some time and respond to this.
        Ms. Duckworth. Yes, I'll yield.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Green spearheads this effort, puts
    together this report, which was an offshoot and started because
    of the Accountability Review Board. Ms. Muniz, has the State
    Department accepted this? Has this been approved? Is there
    anything under your mind that has been--or did they disagree
    with it?
        Ms. Muniz. As Mr. Green pointed out, the DS Management
    Review Board really looked at DS' organization. So I don't know
    the status of the response or the implementation of those
    recommendations. I could take that back to my colleagues----
        Mr. Chaffetz. And that's one of the concerns.
        Ms. Muniz. With respect to--let me finish. With respect to
    the questions relating to OBO, there was one recommendation
    that we look at the cost implications--or the security
    implications of this program, and we have affirmed time and
    again that there will be no security implications to this
    program. We are dedicated to meeting all of the security
    requirements that DS establishes, that are established in law,
    and in working with DS to innovate better and better products
    every year that better meet those security standards.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So if it takes longer to build something, do
    you consider that a security implication?
        Ms. Muniz. As I explained to the committee, from the time
    of award, which is how OBO receives its funding annually, the
    time to build the facility, because we will be doing
    construction only, will be the same or shorter, which means
    that we will have people in safer facilities faster than using
    the design/build methodology, in particular when we have
    advance time to plan.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And I hope--and to my ranking member and my
    colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this report was done.
    We've asked for a copy. The State Department has thus far
    refused to give us a copy. Al Jazeera has it. They print it out
    on their Website. We don't have one here in the U.S. Congress,
    even though I'm holding one that I got off of Al Jazeera. You
    have Patrick Kennedy in a very significant post go on CBS News
    and say that he disagrees with this report. I think it's part
    of our business to understand what does he disagree with, what
    does he agree with. And if the very person who's implementing
    this office isn't totally familiar with it, isn't necessarily
    implementing it, there's a problem. There's a problem.
        Ms. Muniz. Again, I----
        Mr. Cummings. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Chaffetz. Sure.
        Ms. Muniz. I would like to restate, it was a DS management
    report. It hit and touched on DS. Diplomatic Security would be
    better positioned to answer that question.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I think they'd be in a great position to
    answer. And I think next time we have this panel, we should
    include Diplomatic Security. If I had to do it over, I'd
    include Diplomatic Security here as well.
        Mr. Cummings. Would the gentlelady continue to yield to me?
        Ms. Duckworth. Yes.
        Mr. Cummings. Thanks.
        Just one question, Mr. Green, again, trying to get to the
    bottom line, security. When you did your survey, exactly what
    were you--you said you talked to 100 people, you surveyed 100
    people. Can you tell us a little bit about that process so we
    can----
        Mr. Green. Well----
        Mr. Cummings [continuing]. Fully--fully understand and
    appreciate what it was that you did, and what you were telling
    these people, and why you were asking, because that's
    significant? You went to people whose interests--whose
    interests would be to make sure that they were secure; am I
    right?
        Mr. Green. Well, we--we--yes. We interviewed more than 100
    people. We had them come in, and they spread across all the
    bureaus in the State Department and some from outside State. We
    interviewed some of the people that were on the Accountability
    Review Board. We asked different questions of different people.
    Some were organizational questions: Does the Assistant
    Secretary for Diplomatic Security have enough of a role within
    running the organization? There was a lot of emphasis on high-
    threat posts post-Benghazi, to establish a special cell for
    high-threat posts.
        Not all of the people that we talked to did we ask about
    the relationship with OBO and others, but many of them we did
    ask that question to, and out of those questions came these
    observations that we laid out in our report.
        And the final recommendation, as I said before, we didn't
    make a determination that Design Excellence should be tossed
    out the window. All we said was before you go a lot further
    with this, we recommend that the State Department do an in-
    depth analysis to look at the security implications of this
    program.
        Mr. Cummings. It just seems to me that, you know, a lot of
    times we have departments and individuals disputing issues in
    government, and the people suffer during the dispute. You know,
    at some point we've got to figure this out so that our people
    are protected. I think Members of Congress and certainly the
    public, when they hear the debates, they--you know, they're not
    necessarily interested in watching the sausage being made; they
    want to make sure that people are secure, that the costs are
    reasonable, and that the facility is functional----
        Mr. Green. Yes.
        Mr. Cummings [continuing]. And that we're doing whatever we
    do effectively and efficiently.
        Mr. Green. Right.
        Mr. Cummings. I just think sometimes, you know, it seems as
    if we feel like we've got to argue this and argue that, but at
    the same time, the people who need what we're supposed to be
    yielding, they're not getting it, or if they're getting it,
    they're not getting it in a timely fashion.
        Mr. Green. Well, what our--our report obviously focused on
    security.
        Mr. Cummings. I understand.
        Mr. Green. And as I said early on, if someone can show me
    that we can do it just as inexpensively, just as securely, just
    as fast using Design Excellence, I will sign up tomorrow.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
        Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank the gentlewoman.
        I'll now recognize myself. But I want to ask unanimous
    consent to enter into the record the--it's called the Guide to
    Design Excellence; includes a message from you, Ms. Muniz. A
    question for--without hearing any objections, so ordered. We'll
    enter it into the record.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Who at State Department has approved this?
        Ms. Muniz. The Director of OBO approved that document.
    Before I was Director, it was Adam Namm. But I also want to
    make clear that this is a document that was widely briefed
    within the Department with our colleagues in Diplomatic
    Security, was briefed on the Hill, was briefed publicly, and
    was provided widely. So while it's within OBO's authority to
    innovate and to develop programs that help us build the best
    buildings that we can that are cost-effective----
        Mr. Chaffetz. OK. OK.
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. And are efficient----
        Mr. Chaffetz. I got it.
        Ms. Muniz. That--that is the concept----
        Mr. Chaffetz. I know. And the question that we have long
    term is Diplomatic Security's feeling about that. We'll come
    back to that.
        In response to CBS News, the State Department put out this
    Statement: There has been no evidence that Excellence projects
    take longer to build. In fact, under the Excellence Initiative,
    from the Fiscal Year award to occupancy, facilities will be
    delivered on the same, if not shorter, schedule.
        In a separate part, again in response to CBS News, it says,
    all facilities will be delivered on the same, if not shorter,
    schedules. There is no evidence to the contrary.
        Help me understand, then, why this unclassified document--
    help me understand what's going on in Maputo. In Maputo, it
    started as a standard embassy design with an estimated
    development of 39 months, and yet now it says that on March
    28th of 2014, they were changing to Design Excellence, and that
    it was going to take 46 months.
        Ms. Muniz. I don't have the document that you have. I'd
    like to be able to respond to that, but I need to be able to go
    back and look at detailed budgets and schedules.
        Mr. Chaffetz. But this is something--this is the
    frustration. We request this type of document formally, you
    play hide and seek, you don't provide it to us. You make all
    these representations that everything's ahead of schedule; in
    fact, it's probably going to be shorter is what you say. You
    tell that to the world. You put out--you put that out to the
    world. You gave that to CBS News. You let everybody know that,
    oh, no, no, no, no, nothing's behind schedule, and yet I go
    find this document. Why is that?
        Ms. Muniz. As I said, I'd like to look at the case and look
    at the document you're holding to be able to speak
    knowledgeably about that particular project.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Do you dispute what I'm saying?
        Ms. Muniz. I'm not sure what you're saying.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I'm saying that in Maputo, you went from a
    39-month project to a 46-month project. And if you're in Africa
    and don't have the proper security, you're going to feel the
    effects of that.
        Ms. Muniz. Again, I'll have to go back and look at the
    details of that project----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Tell me about----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Before I talk about----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Tell me about Oslo. Is Oslo ahead of schedule
    or behind schedule?
        Ms. Muniz. Oslo has a new contractor working on that
    project.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Is it behind schedule or ahead of schedule?
        Ms. Muniz. It is at this time behind schedule.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And it's a Design Excellence project.
        Ms. Muniz. No, it's not.
        Mr. Chaffetz. What is it?
        Ms. Muniz. Oslo was a project that was developed and could
    not be done as a standard embassy design, because many cities,
    in particular in Europe, have zoning requirements that require
    us to develop buildings differently. That is the case in Oslo.
        Mr. Chaffetz. It seems very convenient that you toggle
    between is it Design Excellence, is it standard embassy design,
    is it or is it not? We don't have that clear definition. There
    are a lot of people and, I believe, some documents out there
    that say it is Design Excellence.
        So help me with what's going on in the Hague. Is the Hague
    ahead of schedule or behind schedule?
        Ms. Muniz. I'd have to look up details about the Hague.
    Again, the Hague is like an Oslo project. The Hague was a
    project that was developed based on--it had to be an adjusted
    design based on city requirements.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Based on Design Excellence?
        Ms. Muniz. No, not based on Design Excellence.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Is it design/bid/build?
        Ms. Muniz. I believe that the Hague is design/bid/build,
    because the requirements in those cities force a very extensive
    development of the project in a way that indicates that design/
    bid/build is the better option. That is a condition that we
    find in very many cities, in Europe in particular. We have that
    issue----
        Mr. Chaffetz. And is----
        Ms. Muniz. We had that issue in London, we had it in Oslo,
    we have it in the Hague. But those are projects that were
    started before the Excellence Initiative. Why the--while the
    way in which they were developed, I think, may very well be
    responsive to the environment in a way in which the Excellence
    Initiative would have----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Well, let's go to Kiev in the Ukraine. What
    happened there? We needed some more seats, we needed more
    personnel? What did you do there?
        Ms. Muniz. USAID added an annex in Kiev.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So we added how many seats?
        Ms. Muniz. I don't have that at the tip of my finger.
        Mr. Chaffetz. More than 100, right? More than 100 seats.
        Ms. Muniz. I don't have that at my fingertips.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I do.
        Ms. Muniz. If you do----
        Mr. Chaffetz. It was standard embassy design, and we added
    more than 100 additional seats.
        Ms. Muniz. We added an annex.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Yes. Well, still seats.
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Let me go to Mr. Jones. You've been sitting
    very patiently for a long time. I don't think we've asked you
    any questions.
        So let me go to you about Port Moresby, because you were
    the one in your testimony here--let me ask you, if it takes
    longer to build an embassy, we have people in harm's way, and
    it takes longer to build it, do you think that that puts people
    in harm's way or not?
        Mr. Jones. In the case of Port Moresby?
        Mr. Chaffetz. Yes.
        Mr. Jones. Is that the question?
        Mr. Chaffetz. Yes.
        Mr. Jones. The situation in Port Moresby is that we had a
    significant increase in the number of people who would be
    located onsite and the addition of U.S. marines.
        Mr. Chaffetz. OK. So just for those of you that aren't as
    familiar with Port Moresby, we had 41 personnel, and that
    number was going to go up to 71 personnel, correct?
        Mr. Jones. Right. But under law, we are required to
    collocate the mission and would not have been able to do so had
    we only built a building for 41 people.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So there is a way, though, to build under
    standard embassy design an increase in the number of personnel.
    Let's go back as to why--why was the number of personnel
    increased?
        Mr. Jones. At Port Moresby we started with what was
    essentially a standard embassy design. It was a mini standard
    design.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Right.
        Mr. Jones. When we got the increase to add the marines, we
    were unable to----
        Mr. Chaffetz. When did that decision that marines were
    going into Port Moresby become----
        Mr. Jones. I believe that the decision----
        Mr. Chaffetz. When did you get that?
        Mr. Jones [continuing]. To add the marines was in March
    2013.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And do you have documentation for this? Could
    you provide that to the committee?
        Mr. Jones. Yes. When we provide the other documents that
    you've requested, we will include that among it.
        Mr. Chaffetz. OK. So there are no marines there now. And I
    think the public in general has a misconception as to what the
    marines actually do and don't do. They don't go outside--they
    don't go outside the wall. They're there to protect classified
    information.
        In Port Moresby there is an Exxon Mobil project,
    multibillion-dollar project that is being developed to support
    the Chinese. The Chinese have a 20-year contract. And so I
    still don't fully understand or appreciate--and you're not
    necessarily the right person to answer this question, I don't
    want to put you on the spot--as to why we suddenly had to have
    this surge in the number of personnel, but nevertheless, the
    occupancy date for Port Moresby was going to be May 2014,
    correct?
        Mr. Jones. That is correct.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And the cost of that embassy was estimated to
    be what?
        Mr. Jones. I believe the cost of the--all-in cost of the
    original facility was to be somewhere around $79 million.
        Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding it was going to be less than
    $50 million.
        Mr. Jones. OK. The cost to construct the facility itself
    was $49-.
        Mr. Chaffetz. OK.
        Mr. Jones. That includes site--the number I gave you
    includes site costs and things like that.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Right. So we have the site, whether it's
    standard embassy design or Design Excellence. I happened to go
    there in February. The chief of mission has no clue that any of
    this is going on, none of the discussions, no--had no idea. He
    was still anticipating--he understood there was a delay, but
    still thought that during his tenure they were going to be able
    to move into that.
        What is the new date for Port Moresby that they are going
    to move in?
        Mr. Jones. I believe that the new date will be in 2018.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So--and what is the estimated cost?
        Mr. Jones. We don't have a final cost yet, because we don't
    have a completed design.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Because it's not a standard embassy design,
    correct?
        Mr. Jones. No. That's not the issue. The issue----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Are you telling me that this is not Design
    Excellence, that this is under standard embassy design, Port
    Moresby?
        Mr. Jones. No. What I'm saying is that the compound in Port
    Moresby began as a standard facility. It then experienced a
    significant increase in staffing, which prevented us from being
    able to use a standard design. The facility was not capable of
    being modified because it was so small, so it required an
    annex. And it is the addition of the people, the annex and the
    marines that are now making the delivery date in 2018. That is
    based on a cost-benefit analysis that the Department has done.
    That is the fastest time that we are able to get the folks from
    that mission collocated on the compound with the marines.
        Mr. Chaffetz. This is so amazingly frustrating. The
    estimate that--the paperwork that I have, not from you, but the
    paperwork that I have says that this facility now costs in
    excess of $200 million. We're going to spend $3 million per
    seat, per seat, in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Average per
    capita income is, like, $2,500.
        Ms. Muniz. I'd like to take some of these questions. So one
    thing I'd like to point----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Well, I'm not asking you. I'm asking Mr.
    Jones. So I'm going to--I'll come to you. I'll give you plenty
    of time.
        So we're going to spend $3 million per seat in there, and
    they're not going to be there for a good 4 years. You don't
    have a final design. What are they supposed to do for security
    there for the next 4 years while they wait?
        Mr. Jones. We are attempting to get safe and secure
    facilities in Port Moresby on the fastest time schedule that we
    can. We are doing everything in our power to ensure that we're
    delivering safe, secure and functional facilities to the
    mission as expediently and as efficiently as possible.
        Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding, let me share this with the
    ranking member, is we added more than 105 desks in the Ukraine.
    Here we're talking about 30. It cost us about $24 million, and
    now we're looking at a project that was less than $50 million
    to build estimated to go north of $200 million in Papua New
    Guinea. And the consequence to this is they're going to be in
    harm's way for a longer period of time. We're going to have
    less budget and less money to build other facilities in other
    parts of the world. It is behind schedule. And these poor
    people are working in some of the most difficult situations
    I've seen in a very--when I was there, there was an attempted
    carjacking of U.S. diplomatic personnel, while I was there. We
    also had two people who showed up at the door trying to
    represent themselves as somebody that wanted to come see me and
    come see the--this is on a Saturday, dressed in garb that
    represented that they were there to meet people in the embassy,
    because you can walk right up to it. Right across the street,
    multiple times a year, I mean, very close at the pharmacy
    there, armed--armed bandits come in and try to rob that place.
        And there was no communication with that facility there in
    Port Moresby. The chief of mission should not have been getting
    that message from me, that's for sure.
        Ms. Muniz, I think you wanted to say something.
        Ms. Muniz. I wanted to point out that, as we explained
    earlier, the forces causing the change to the design are
    outside of the Bureau. We talked about Iraq earlier. When
    you're in any environment where things are changing rapidly,
    you have to adjust to those changes. There are costs related to
    those changes.
        A decision was made 2 years into a construction contract to
    add marines to a facility, to add significantly to the staff,
    to add classified capacity. That adds an extraordinary amount
    of expense in an existing contract.
        I think that when we have detailed information, and you
    have received the detailed information that you've asked, we
    can go over those costs in detail, but I think given the
    location of Papua New Guinea, given the fact that we learned
    that all materials and labor need to be shipped into Papua New
    Guinea, given the environment, the discovery of natural
    resources there have led to greater competition in a small
    market, those cost increases can be explained when a mission
    doubles in size.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I have gone way over time. I have more on
    this issue, but I'll now recognize the ranking member Mr.
    Cummings.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Green, where do we go from here? I mean,
    really. I mean----
        Mr. Green. I--you know, I think unfortunately where we go
    is we need to see the dollars and the time that it's going to
    take to do Design Excellence. We don't have that. We're
    comparing apples and oranges.
        You know, I'm not so concerned personally with the
    appearance of embassies. The State IG did a report in 2008, and
    the key findings were essentially that people were happy with
    the appearance, and the host countries of those 12 embassies
    that they looked at were happy with the appearance, so that's
    not what I'm worried about.
        What I am worried about, and I think what DS is worried
    about from a security standpoint is can you actually produce
    these things in the same amount of time with the same security
    at the same cost. And until we know that--and I don't know how
    you get to it before you do some of them, but I think the
    chairman raised an issue, what is--what is cost per desk? You
    know, what is cost per desk under standard embassy design? We
    have some good figures on that, I'm sure. What is cost per desk
    under Design Excellence? Until we can compare apples and
    apples, you know, I think there's going to be--continue to be a
    lot of skepticism that you can do this as fast and as cheap.
        Mr. Cummings. Ms. Muniz, I've listened carefully, and I am
    concerned, and I think we all should be concerned, when we
    don't get documents. And it becomes very frustrating. Time is
    valuable.
        And, you know, I listened to Admiral Mullen and Ambassador
    Pickering when they talked about the report, the ARB report,
    and, you know, it was some of the most--I think it was
    Ambassador Pickering that said--I asked him why was he--why did
    he agree to get on that board, and he talked about the fact
    that--the review board--that he felt that he owed it to his
    country and to those who died and their families to make things
    better so it didn't happen to anybody else.
        And in some kind of way--I mean, when I listen to you, Mr.
    Green, it makes sense that if I've got something that's already
    designed and--I mean, it's--I've got it, I've got something
    that I'm working with, and I guess you've had years to make any
    adjustments that you would see, right? I mean, is that right?
        Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. In other words, you've got--it's like you've
    got this house, you use the same--pretty much the same
    material, same structure over and over again, and then--but in
    the meantime, if there were problems, you can make those
    adjustments or--and just correct me if I'm wrong. I'm trying to
    put this in simple language for the American people. Or if you
    want to--if you're in a country where there's some unique
    situations, where you need a different kind of door, you know,
    you may have some height requirement or whatever, but still
    using the basic same model; is that right?
        Mr. Green. Yes. Correct.
        Mr. Cummings. So logic tells me that if I'm using the same
    model, then it's--I mean, it's just logic that it would be
    quicker if I then go to another country and use that model.
    That's basically what you're saying, right?
        Mr. Green. That's the logic that makes sense.
        Mr. Cummings. And so I think for the State Department, Ms.
    Muniz, it becomes a difficult argument to sell not only to us,
    but to the American people, because the American people, they
    don't know everything that you know. So you've got--it's easy
    for us to--I mean, and I can understand, because it's your
    expertise and what you all do, but sometimes you have to break
    this stuff down so the people get what you're talking about,
    because to them it makes no sense. And I'm not saying--I'm
    saying with the--with limited knowledge, it makes no sense.
    With all of your information, it probably makes a lot of sense.
        And so we find ourselves in a situation where you've got
    what Mr. Green's saying, we've got what you're saying, and--but
    the bottom line is, going back to what Mr. Green has said, if
    you had the data to show that we could get the same security,
    costs----
        Mr. Green. Time.
        Mr. Cummings [continuing]. Same time, all those factors
    pretty much the same, that he would sign on the dotted line. Am
    I right?
        Mr. Green. That's correct.
        Mr. Cummings. So why can't we get the information? There
    seems to be some reluctance, and I don't know why that is. Can
    you help us with that?
        Because, see, one of the things that happens here, and I've
    lived long enough and seen enough and been up here long enough,
    we can get distracted from the mission by getting caught up in
    a lot of--and I'm not saying we don't have to deal with those
    issues, but it doesn't allow us to do what we're supposed to be
    doing, and that is providing security. So we've got, oh, why
    didn't I get this report or what? I mean, they're legitimate
    questions, they really are, but at the same time, that's the
    time that we could be taking our energy and focusing on making
    sure that our folks are safe, because that's what the American
    people want.
        So go ahead.
        Ms. Muniz. I think that's absolutely right, and I'd be
    happy to explain in more detail why it is that if we award 100
    percent design on the date of award, the period of performance
    is shorter, and we could have people into safer facilities
    faster.
        What it means is that if we know that our appropriation is
    fixed, we know which buildings we're doing, it might take us
    longer to do the design. We're going to be looking closely at
    the requirements, what are the materials that--that are going
    to work in that environment, how do we put that building
    together in that environment. But from the date of award, when
    we award that project, it's not going to include any design
    time; it will be no longer than it would be with the design/
    build standard embassy design, and it will likely be shorter. I
    could go into more detail, we could provide the----
        Mr. Cummings. There's one little thing----
        Ms. Muniz [continuing]. Analysis----
        Mr. Cummings [continuing]. That--whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.
    Rewind. There's one little thing that bothers me, and that is
    why? In other words, if I've got my model, it is working, I
    know what it's going to cost, I know how much time it's going
    to take, am I missing something that I then--then I have to go
    to something else? So, OK, oh, let me run and do something
    else, when I've already got this--I've got it finally. You
    follow me?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes. I think it's a fair question. And what I've
    tried to lay out is that the standard embassy design was a
    fixed solution based on an average hypothetical size embassy or
    consulate. We build embassies and consulates in every
    environment, whether that's because it's very hot, whether it's
    because it's very cold, whether because some systems are going
    to work there on the seafront and other systems are not going
    to work in a completely different environment. We're looking at
    the real requirements of missions and thinking about how do we
    build the best buildings for those missions.
        The standard embassy design was a good fixed solution, but
    it also required us to build free-standing warehouses
    regardless of the location. There are some places we don't need
    a warehouse. Why build a warehouse if we could get----
        Mr. Cummings. Then you take it off. Am I right? Right? I
    mean, you take it off. If I don't need a garage, if I got a
    house with a garage, and I suddenly don't need a garage, I take
    the garage off.
        And, by the way, it's not just one design, right? There are
    a lot--several designs, right?
        Ms. Muniz. There's one.
        Mr. Cummings. There's one? OK.
        Ms. Muniz. There's one standard embassy design.
        Mr. Cummings. So you just take the garage off.
        Ms. Muniz. All of those things taken together--and if I
    could try to sort of put or describe the Excellence Initiative
    in a nutshell, it's really to say that we are taking those
    lessons learned from the standard embassy design, we're taking
    those modular pieces of it, but we're providing a lot more
    flexibility in how those could be put together in a way that's
    meaningful. Again, you build a very large embassy, having these
    two bars is not efficient. You're cladding two buildings as
    opposed to one. You're securing two separate buildings almost
    as opposed to one.
        So I think that using architects, engineers, folks within
    the Department, our security professionals, we look at each
    case and come up with the best and the most efficient solution.
    In many ways what the Excellence Initiative is doing is exactly
    what you're suggesting, right? It's taking sort of the baseline
    and modifying that baseline in the way that is sensible for the
    mission.
        Right now the standard embassy design or the standard
    embassy design that we're moving forward from was a very fixed
    solution, again, very horizontal: 10 acres, warehouse. That's
    not always the best solution in all of the environments.
        And I--and I'd like to also State that the cost per desk,
    we use that cost per desk to develop our budget, so we have a
    cost-estimating office in our Bureau. When we build a budget,
    whether it's a standard embassy design budget or an Excellence
    Initiative project, they tell us, you know what you've spent
    historically for this many desks and this many people in this
    environment? This much. That's what your budget is. We're going
    to work to that same budget under the Excellence Initiative or
    under the standard embassy design.
        Mr. Cummings. Ms. Muniz, let me tell you something. You
    just--you helped me, what you just explained. Now I'm finally
    getting--so in other words--you know, what I thought you were
    going to say is that circumstances change, that we have new
    technology. I thought that's what I was going to hear you say,
    that new technology, better use of certain--in other words,
    better materials, all those kind of things might go into--and
    I'm not--I don't know anything about building, so--but all
    those things might go into changing the box. And what you're
    saying is is that you may--help me if I'm wrong. You may look
    at the box, but you're forever changing the box. It's not that
    you don't look at it, you don't take it into consideration, but
    it may be changed substantially. Is that--all you're talking
    about is a brand-new box, period?
        Ms. Muniz. I would say that it depends. So, again, if we're
    looking at a very large mission, to have these--the standard
    embassy design and to put that in place would simply not be
    efficient.
        London is a good example in the case that not only are we
    building a cube, which is much more efficient than sort of two
    separate boxes that go up, which would require twice as much
    cladding, but we're also using materials that make the building
    significantly lighter; that reduce the size, the weight and the
    expense of the foundation that needs to be put down. The
    curtain wall reduces the weight, which also influences the
    foundation, and it's all able to go up faster than a
    traditional concrete building would have been able to go up in
    that place. So I think it's both materials and base building in
    certain cases.
        Mr. Cummings. Last question. Is it your--do you anticipate
    being able to take, say, that--a box--London is, I know, very
    unique, but other--that perhaps the creation of another box or
    something that you can use in more than one place, do you
    follow what I'm saying, as you're developing? And how does that
    play into that? Do you follow me?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes. I think I do.
        Mr. Cummings. In other words, if you have a--if you build
    an embassy, you do all the things you just said. You say, OK,
    now we've got great design, we've got security. This is the
    best buck--we get the best bang for our buck. Time, everything
    is straight. Do you anticipate being able to use, say, for
    example, that model, a model like that, somewhere else? Do you
    follow me?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes. Let me use an example, which may be too
    common, but I think it sort of demonstrates the point. There
    was a time when most people who drove had a Model T. It was a
    great car. It was a simple car. As we evolved, cars got better
    and better. They evolved, and they also sort of separated it
    out into the different types of cars. So today, rather than
    going with the Model T, you could go with a version that is
    much more secure, much more safe, but you could also choose to
    have an Austin Mini in one case, and you could go with an SUV,
    but those things depend on where you are. One, you want to be
    in a small urban environment, you're a small mission, you could
    go with a smaller size and still meet all your requirements and
    be more efficient to run, but there are those other times when
    you're going to need the larger solution, you're going to
    need--you're going to need the SUV.
        And I think that being able to put the appropriate solution
    with the mission, and to consider those things, and to make
    sure that we're appropriately spending the money that the
    taxpayer gives us, and considering not just first costs, but
    long-term costs, I think that's what we're talking about doing.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        Thank you all for being here.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Recognize the chairman of the committee Mr.
    Issa.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. And for the--Chairman Chaffetz
    and Ranking Member Cummings, I appreciate your questioning.
        And fortunately I came back in just in time to have you
    talk about automobiles. And I agree that sometimes--I actually
    don't think the Fiat 500 or the Morris Mini is ever appropriate
    from a safety standpoint for our men and women in the State
    Department.
        But having said that, I certainly understand the difference
    of size and scale and some of the urban versus rural
    considerations, but, Mr. Green, those considerations really
    aren't what we're asking about today. What we're asking about
    is do you, to the greatest extent possible, use a mass-
    production concept, which is what standard build is? It's about
    do you build a one-of-a-kind formula race car that's beautiful
    and fast and has unique characteristics, and each one is
    different--as a matter of fact, the secrets aren't even shared
    between formula racers--or do you build a Toyota Camry in order
    to get a--or a Ford Focus or a Ford 500? Do you build a mass-
    produced, consistent, reliable, understood, bugs worked out,
    repeatable product so that you get a highly reliable product
    that can be maintained throughout the system, standard windows,
    standard other characteristics if possible, in order to get a
    good product at a better price?
        And I switched to Ford quickly when I realized it is about
    Henry Ford's model of greater value for less cost, isn't it,
    Mr. Green?
        Mr. Green. Yes, it is. And I think it's like standard
    embassy design might be the Chevrolet Suburban, but, when
    necessary, it becomes the Escalade.
        Chairman Issa. And there are options to further uparmor----
        Mr. Green. Yes.
        Chairman Issa [continuing]. And so on.
        Mr. Green. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. Ms. Muniz, one of the other questions, Inman
    is all about security, right, the so-called Inman designs?
        Ms. Muniz. I'm not as familiar with the Inman designs as
    that program was over long before I came in.
        Chairman Issa. Well, let me tell you what I was told 14
    years ago when I came in and started going to embassies as a
    member of Foreign Affairs. We didn't used to think of embassies
    in the same security sense we do now. And what we discovered,
    the Beirut barracks, and the Marine barracks, and the Beirut
    embassy bombing and others taught us was there is no substitute
    for setback. Do you understand that as the person making these
    decisions?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes. Absolutely.
        Chairman Issa. So when you talk about urban versus rural
    and location--and I was just in Britain where setback is highly
    compromised, and they were compliant, but they made a 5-acre
    decision and went vertical and did the best they could,
    including the famous moat, part of--and, in fact, some crash
    considerations. Those safety considerations, any time you give
    up setback, you have to tradeoff higher cost for that setback,
    don't you?
        Ms. Muniz. You do, but we are not suggesting under this
    program to ever trade setback.
        Chairman Issa. OK. So when you talk about large footprint,
    which you did, and small footprint, the truth is that standard
    build--and I'll go back to Mr. Green for part of this--is about
    starting off with a footprint sufficient for current and future
    embassy considerations, including possible add-ons, in a
    country so that we can make a 50-year decision on sovereign
    U.S. soil, isn't it?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. Mr. Green?
        Mr. Green. Correct.
        Chairman Issa. I was on this codel--and I apologize, I was
    able to take a Democratic staffer, but none of my counterparts
    were able to attend because it was short notice--but I was
    struck by something that I want to make sure is in the record
    today, and what was talked about earlier in Papua New Guinea:
    changing characteristics.
        When they were talking about--and they flew in people from
    your offices to be there where we were in London. They started
    talking about, well, you know, it's individual, and we have to
    work it out. And I suddenly realized what you're doing is
    you're custom building more and more. You're going into a rut,
    which is instead of saying, State Department will plan,
    including excess space if appropriate--we will plan for the
    anticipated 50-year necessary facility, and we want to make
    sure that it's very much understood, instead what they were
    talking about was one group might need a little more here, and
    somebody may--which suddenly hit me what you're talking about
    is you're talking to the current--according to what I was told,
    you're talking to the current people in an embassy, the current
    Ambassador, the current staff, in order to find out what they
    want as part of this design characteristic.
        And that is one of the things that I came back profoundly
    concerned about from the trip to London. It wasn't the London
    facility, because at half a million square feet, there's a lot
    of room, but when you're looking at embassies and starting to
    ask, well, should it be plussed or minused based on unique
    character--or current characteristics, aren't you inherently
    creating that downstream problem that you're designing based on
    what an ambassador and their staff want, not based on a plan
    that looks 50 years in the future? And I'd like each of you to
    answer that to the extent you can.
        Ms. Muniz. I think it's a great question, because it really
    addresses one of the enduring challenges of the Department.
    We're trying to build buildings for 50, 100 years, and things
    change over that time period.
        I think that where we can financially, and based on the
    urban environment or the environment where we're building, we
    do try to buy larger sites, and we actually make a deliberate
    effort, and this was not always done with the standard embassy
    design. We site the building in such a way that we know where a
    later annex will go. For years, maybe forever, it'll be a lawn,
    but we know in advance how we might use that space so that it
    gives us that flexibility.
        The other thing that we've done under the Excellence
    Initiative, and I think this is something that is meaningful
    and reduces costs in the long term, so we're looking at things
    like using raised floors, using demountable partitions, making
    sure that infrastructure is sized in a way that, within a given
    envelope, you could have a significant increase in staff with
    very little cost. That wasn't true with the older model.
        Again, I think the standard embassy design taught us a lot,
    but I think we can improve on it. We can improve on it in
    meaningful ways that give us more flexibility for the long
    term. And I think----
        Chairman Issa. Right.
        And Mr. Green, as you respond to that question, I just want
    you to include from your research from your committee's
    activities, in fact, isn't that what standard build is supposed
    to do is to include that? So isn't it ``mend it don't end it''
    rather than staying standard build didn't include future
    annexes and expansion in their consideration?
        Mr. Green. No. It's a continuously moving standard that is
    done.
        Let me just respond to your earlier question, though. And,
    you know, what do we need 50 years out? You know, the
    Ambassador wants a bigger latrine in his office or we want 50
    consular windows instead of five. That changes all the time. I
    mean, we saw it here today. It changed with Papua New Guinea.
    You had a plan to do something and all of a sudden the
    Department says, nope, we need more for whatever reason.
        There's rightsizing that goes on constantly within the
    Department. There's the much publicized, but I'm not sure how
    much it's occurring, the pivot to Asia. What does that mean for
    the those embassies in Asia? More people. Well, you know, 5
    years from now it might be a pivot somewhere else. I don't know
    that we're ever going to reach the perfect solution to say that
    we could build something that's good today, and it will be good
    even 10 years from now.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        And Mr. Chairman, I think the point that your research and
    what we're hearing today is all about is, that as you
    standardize and drive down the cost per square foot, the
    ability to build that few extra square feet and the flexibility
    is inherent in it. As you drive up the square foot cost, you
    inherently are building smaller and tighter.
        And tight-sizing is not what we need for flexibility; it's
    rightsizing with a plan to expand or to add in and hopefully as
    you continue your research and we get the numbers, we'll begin
    seeing how standard build can be made to do just that.
        And I thank you for your indulgence and yield back.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank the chairman. We'll now recognize a
    very patient member from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio, for 2
    minutes. No, I'm just teasing. 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bentivolio. 5 minutes, good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        During our last conversation, I forgot to ask you a very,
    very important question when it came time, when we were
    discussing London, and you clarified it's going to cost about
    $800 million, and you don't look at how many employees it's
    going to house, you call them desks; is that correct?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Bentivolio. OK. So how many desks in the London
    embassy?
        Ms. Muniz. I'm sorry, I believe 644.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Six hundred and forty four. So what does
    that work out to? Let's see, $800 million divided by, how many
    did you say?
        Ms. Muniz. Six hundred and forty four desks.
        Mr. Bentivolio. That works out to be, what, $1 million a
    desk?
        Ms. Muniz. Some of our costs can be very high including for
    secure space.
        Mr. Bentivolio. A million dollars a desk? OK. But, I
    understand the risk in London and the cost per square, or is it
    meters, per meters. What's that cost? Do you know the
    breakdown, how much it costs per meter or per square foot? I
    know here in America we look at the square foot cost.
        Ms. Muniz. Right. Right. For London, I don't have the
    square foot cost at the top of my head. I would like to add for
    London, though, for those members who may not be aware----
        Mr. Bentivolio. I think you said that you're selling
    property to cover the cost of the $800 million embassy,
    correct?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Bentivolio. You did say that, OK. So you're in these
    old buildings now, am I correct?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes, these are old existing buildings at the
    embassy.
        Mr. Bentivolio. And if it runs over, the London building
    takes longer than expected, what's it going to cost to house
    our employees in the older buildings per month?
        Ms. Muniz. We're not expecting that to happen.
        Mr. Bentivolio. You're not expecting. Have you--seriously,
    for the life of me, and I'm sure there probably has been one or
    two Government contracts that didn't go over budget and didn't
    go over or came in on schedule, but OK.
        So let's just ask you this: How many work orders or change
    orders are pending or in process in the London embassy new
    construction? Change orders do delay a project, don't they? Or
    do you add that to the, you know, it's another--it's a change
    that's going to take longer so we'll just move the schedule,
    completion date out.
        Ms. Muniz. As you might imagine, with over 200 projects in
    construction, I don't have the number of change orders in
    London. But what I would like to make clear is that while
    delays pose, like on any project, a certain amount of risk, the
    Department made the decision in 2006, many years before I was
    there under a different administration that this was the best
    value for the taxpayer.
        And I think it was a great decision. We, for $50 million
    more, are getting a brand new embassy that meets all of the
    security standards in exchange for property that we had been in
    for years.
        Mr. Bentivolio. So you're going to meet all the security
    standards in London?
        Ms. Muniz. Yes.
        Mr. Bentivolio. Versus not in Phnom Penh or some of these
    other countries that, well, seem to be, look to me maybe in the
    future a greater threat.
        And let's talk about that threat. We had, a while back, we
    had some Secretary of State people tell us they don't do a risk
    analysis when it comes to risks in the country that they're
    housed, thus Benghazi, they didn't really read what was
    happening and a lot of our Americans were killed.
        So do you do a risk analysis every day in, you know, what
    the dangers are outside of the embassy no matter what country
    you're in? But wait a minute. I'm sorry. I just answered my own
    question. You don't do that, do you? What you do, apparently,
    is in places like London, you take every risk imaginable and
    come up with a building that's worth $800 million at a cost of
    $1 million per desk.
        You know, I can't really, I'm just thinking about the
    soldiers in Iraq. You know, we looked at the risk out there and
    if we thought the risk was greater, and by the way, they shot
    rockets at us once a week, we put these concrete barriers in
    front of us, sandbags and we'd adjust and I'm sure, because of
    curb appeal, we can do those things a little nicer, a little
    fancier, and take every single building including a modular or
    cookie-cutter design and add to that building outside to
    address any risk that, well, if you actually looked at the risk
    outside of your embassies and addressed them, you could take
    proper precautions.
        But I will say, and I know my time is running out, Mr.
    Chairman, but you have always had at every embassy in the world
    the best security system you could possibly buy. It's called
    the United States Marine.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
        I'm now going to recognize myself in consultation with Mr.
    Cummings here. Just a couple quick things and then we will, I
    promise we will end.
        I do have a question about London. London is unique.
    Beijing was unique. There are some iconic properties. There are
    some amazing relationships, security needs. That's understood.
    There's been a suggestion that you're still on time in London
    and on budget in London. What is your current assessment of
    where we're at in London in terms of budget and time?
        Ms. Muniz. That's exactly my assessment, that we're on
    budget and on schedule.
        Mr. Chaffetz. What about the VAT issue? Where are we at
    with the VAT issue?
        Ms. Muniz. I'd like to keep that conversation limited
    because our conversations with our counterparts in Britain are
    sensitive, but I would like to say that we're making good
    progress, and we are comfortable that we're within the budgets
    on that.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And I appreciate that. I see that as a
    potential threat. They have a, I believe it's a 20 percent VAT
    which could obviously be a huge and major issue and something
    we would appreciate if you'd keep us apprised of.
        I had an opportunity to visit Dubai, which was one of the
    last standard embassy designs. What do you find wrong with the
    facility in Dubai?
        Ms. Muniz. I don't know that particular facility. So I
    wouldn't be able to address it, but I would like to say that
    there are many standard embassy designs that I think work well
    for their missions. I think there's some that could work
    better, and I think this initiative is about improving on
    something that was good and that did a lot of good. So I could
    look at Dubai more closely and get back to you with comments,
    but I don't have any in particular, not knowing it in great
    detail.
        Mr. Chaffetz. The general concern here is it just doesn't
    make commonsense to me, it's just not commonsense to suggest
    that we're going to spend more time on design and ultimately
    that's going to take a shorter period of time. I just--I still,
    and we'll followup, and we've been talking for hours here, but
    as a followup, this is just conceptionally, I just don't
    understand it. There have been some suggestions that standard
    embassy design was just one-size-fits-all. That's not true.
    That's never been true. We build nearly 90 different buildings.
        And one of the things that drives me personally, and I
    shared this with Mr. Cummings and others, one of the things
    that drives me on this is that you have multiple GAO reports
    and an Inspector General report that says, my goodness,
    standard embassy designs, they're going faster and they're
    generally coming in under budget. We never get reports like
    that.
        And yet, I look at the State Department and they say, but
    we're going to totally scrap that. We're going a different
    design, different way and we're going to focus on architecture
    because architecture is diplomacy.
        You can shake your head no, but that's the video that the
    State Department put out. That is the video they put out.
    You're shaking your head.
        Ms. Muniz. Because as I explained, we are committed to
    being on those same budgets. We're committed to that schedule.
    We're committed to meeting all the security requirements. I
    just know that we can build even better buildings, right. What
    we're doing is what we should be doing, what bureaucrats should
    be doing, we are trying to improve on a good product. And you
    rightly pointed out, the standard embassy design did require
    modifications for different--we're taking that a step further
    and making sure that it is not a fixed envelope, that it takes
    all of the lessons learned from that and allows us to modify
    our buildings in a way that's smart for the mission, smart for
    the taxpayer and smart for the long term.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And I really challenge those assumptions. It
    will play itself out. I don't believe they'll be faster. I
    think we have strong evidence that it's taking longer. I think
    the consequence is it will cost more, and I think the other
    consequence is we're going to have more people in harm's way.
        If you brought the people from Papua New Guinea here and
    lined them up and had them raise their hand and say, which
    design would you like? They just want to be safe. They just
    want to be safe and secure and it's going to be the most
    opulent and extravagant building in that country under the
    standard embassy design and those modifications could have been
    there.
        I appreciate the dialog. This is the general concern. You
    said it in response to Mr. Cummings, the design portion will
    take longer. So again, the consequence, I think, will be more
    people in harm's way, will take longer, it will be more
    expensive and we'll have ongoing security concerns.
        I really do appreciate your participation here. I have no
    doubt about the sincerity of wanting to come in under budget
    and on time. I just don't think you can get from here to there
    and I find very few people that agree that you can get there.
    That's why we need the documents, that's why we're going to
    continue to push the Inspector General and the GAO to continue
    to look at this. It's why we're going to continue to have some
    hearings on this.
        So I do appreciate all your participation here. I know you
    care deeply about your country and the work that you do and
    you're passionate about that. We want people that are
    passionate about that. But we also have an obligation to have
    this back and forth. It's what the oversight committee is all
    about. It's what the Congress is all about. It's part of the
    process that makes this country unique and better and the
    greatest country on the face of the planet.
        So I thank you again for your participation. We look
    forward to getting the documents from the State Department
    sooner rather than later and this committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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