[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE KEEPING OUR SKIES SAFE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 18, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-86
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
93-366 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Curtis Clawson, Florida
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan O'Hara, Acting Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Richard Hudson, North Carolina, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana Eric Swalwell, California
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Amanda Parikh, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Brian Turbyfill, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
Witnesses
Mr. Stephen Sadler, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Christopher M. Piehota, Director, Terrorist Screening Center,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Ms. Jennifer A. Grover, Acting Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Appendix
Question From Honorable Michael D. Rogers for Stephen Sadler..... 35
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE KEEPING OUR SKIES SAFE
----------
Thursday, September 18, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, Rogers, Brooks, Sanford,
Richmond, Jackson Lee, and Swalwell.
Mr. Hudson. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Transportation Security will come to order. The subcommittee
is meeting today to examine the process and procedures
surrounding the U.S. Government's No-Fly and Selectee lists. I
recognize myself for an opening statement.
I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing here
before the subcommittee. This hearing is an opportunity to
discuss how the Federal Government is working to balance civil
liberties protections for U.S. citizens with the security of
our aviation system.
Last week our Nation observed the 13th anniversary of 9/11.
Together we remembered both the cowardly acts that took the
lives of over 3,000 innocent American people and the bravery of
our first responders on that tragic day. September 11 is the
very reason our committee was created, and we must do
everything we can to protect the homeland and prevent other
attacks.
The fact remains that our enemies still view the U.S.
aviation sector as a highly-attractive target, as evidenced by
several thwarted plots and attempted attacks. In addition to
the threats posted by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the
thousands of foreign fighters, including U.S. citizens
affiliated with terrorist groups like ISIS, are a growing and
serious threat to the security of U.S. aviation and the
homeland. It is crucial that we accurately identify individuals
who pose this threat and prevent them from boarding flights in
the United States.
TSA relies on a multi-layered approach to aviation
security, with everything from Federal air marshals to canines
to the latest explosive detection technology. One of the these
layers is a behind-the-scenes program known as Secure Flight.
This program, which is the subject of today's hearing, takes
passenger data it receives from airlines and matches it against
the U.S. Government's consolidated terrorist watch lists,
including the No-Fly and Selectee lists. This program is
crucial, not only for domestic flights, but also for protecting
the international flights bound for the United States.
Since 2009, TSA's Secure Flight program has evolved from
one that looks solely at the No-Fly List and Selectee List
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center to one that
assigns passengers a risk category and uses additional criteria
to identify high-risk passengers who might not be on the watch
list. While these lists serve as an important counterterrorism
tool, we must ensure that travelers who are incorrectly matched
to a list are able to resolve those issues in a timely,
effective manner.
In two comprehensive reports issued today GAO found that
TSA could improve Secure Flight by measuring and tracking
errors that occur within the system and at the security
screening checkpoint. The Government Accounting Office also
found that TSA generally does a good job of protecting
passenger data but could strengthen privacy awareness training
among Secure Flight employees.
I thank the GAO for its thorough approach to examining this
program, and I look forward to hearing from TSA how the agency
plans to implement these Government Accounting Office
recommendations.
In addition, we are pleased to have the director of the
Terrorist Screening Center here today to discuss its role in
managing this consolidated terrorist watch list, including the
No-Fly List.
Yesterday the director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, testifying before the full committee, highlighted the
value of the consolidated watch list and the TSC in making sure
that front-line agencies like TSA are able to identify known or
suspected terrorists and stop them from entering the country,
boarding an airplane, or obtaining a visa. I look forward to
discussing those efforts in greater detail here today.
The bottom line is that our aviation security is only as
strong as its weakest link. We must identify individuals who
pose a threat, such as extremists with Western passports who
have joined the fight in Iraq and Syria, and take the necessary
steps to protect the homeland.
[The statement of Chairman Hudson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Richard Hudson
September 18, 2014
I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee today. This hearing is an opportunity to discuss how the
Federal Government is working to balance civil liberties protections
for U.S. citizens with the security of our aviation system.
Last week, our Nation observed the 13th anniversary of 9/11.
Together, we remembered both the cowardly acts that took the lives of
over 3,000 innocent people and the bravery of our first responders on
that tragic day. September 11 is the very reason our committee was
created, and we must do everything we can to protect the homeland and
prevent other attacks.
The fact remains that our enemies still view the U.S. aviation
sector as a highly-attractive target, as evidenced by several thwarted
plots and attempted attacks. In addition to the threats posed by al-
Qaeda and its affiliates, the thousands of foreign fighters, including
U.S. citizens, affiliated with terrorist groups like ISIS are a growing
and serious threat to the security of U.S. aviation and the homeland.
It is critical that we accurately identify individuals who pose this
threat and prevent them from boarding flights to the United States.
TSA relies on a multi-layered approach to aviation security with
everything from Federal Air Marshals, to canines, to the latest
explosives detection technology. One of these layers is a behind-the-
scenes program known as Secure Flight. This program, which is the
subject of today's hearing, takes passenger data it receives from
airlines and matches it against the U.S. Government's consolidated
Terrorist Watch List, including the No-Fly and Selectee Lists. This
program is crucial not only for domestic flights, but also for
protecting international flights bound for the United States.
Since 2009, TSA's Secure Flight Program has evolved from one that
looks solely at the No-Fly List and Selectee List maintained by the
Terrorist Screening Center, to one that assigns passengers a risk
category and uses additional criteria to identify high-risk passengers
who might not be on the watch list. While these lists serve as an
important counterterrorism tool, we must ensure that travelers who are
incorrectly matched to a list are able to resolve those issues in a
timely, effective manner.
In two comprehensive reports issued today, GAO found that TSA could
improve Secure Flight by measuring and tracking errors that occur
within the system and at the security-screening checkpoint. GAO also
found that TSA generally does a good job of protecting passenger data
but could strengthen privacy awareness training among Secure Flight
employees. I thank GAO for its thorough approach to examining this
program and I look forward to hearing from TSA how the agency plans to
implement GAO's recommendations.
In addition, we are pleased to have the director of the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) here today to discuss its role in managing the
consolidated Terrorist Watch List, including the No-Fly List. Yesterday
the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testifying before
the full committee, highlighted the value of the consolidated Watch
List and the TSC in making sure that front-line agencies like TSA are
able to identify known or suspected terrorists and stop them from
entering the country, boarding an airplane or obtaining a visa. I look
forward to discussing those efforts in greater detail here today.
The bottom line is that our aviation security is only as strong as
its weakest link. We must identify individuals who pose a threat, such
as extremists with Western passports who have joined the fight in Iraq
or Syria, and take the necessary steps to protect the homeland.
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman would like to point out that other
Members have the opportunity to submit opening statements for
the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 18, 2014
During times of heightened security concerns, like those we
currently face in light of the potential threat ISIL poses, there is a
tendency to cast aside privacy concerns in favor of security at any
cost. To safeguard the American public against such an overreach, it is
incumbent upon this committee to review the privacy protections that
the Department of Homeland Security, and its components such as the
Transportation Security Administration, has in place.
Thanks to reports released today by the Government Accountability
Office, we have a greater understanding of both the privacy protections
and performance of TSA's Secure Flight program. This critical program
helps ensure passengers designated as high-risk by the intelligence
community are screened appropriately or, for those on the No-Fly list,
not permitted to board a plane at all.
I look forward to hearing from our witness from the Government
Accountability Office, Ms. Grover, regarding the findings and
recommendations contained in the reports released today. I am also
eager to hear from Mr. Sadler of TSA regarding how the agency intends
to implement GAO's recommendations.
I will also be interested in hearing from TSA regarding the
agency's plans to upgrade the technology used by Transportation
Security Officers to better enable them to identify and ensure the
proper screening of individuals designated as selectees.
The Secure Flight program is only as good as the end-user. It does
no good for taxpayers to spend over $100 million a year on a program
dedicated to ensuring the proper screening of individuals if Travel
Document Checkers do not recognize the passengers' designation.
As it relates to current threats to aviation, I will be interested
in hearing from the director of the Terrorist Screening Center about
how information is obtained and used to designate individuals as
selectees or to place them on the No-Fly list.
With reports of Americans having joined ISIL and other groups
fighting in Syria and Iraq, our Members want assurances that
individuals engaging in terrorist activities are placed on the
appropriate lists in as close to real-time as possible. While Secretary
Johnson was clear with the committee yesterday that there is no
credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the homeland at
this time, we must remain vigilant.
That means using all of the tools we have available to us to ensure
that individuals who intend to commit acts of terrorism are properly
identified. While doing so, we must also protect against violating the
privacy and civil liberties of the American public.
In part, that means having a Constitutional appeal process for
individuals wrongly designated and placed on the No-Fly List.
I look forward to hearing from both TSA and the TSC witnesses
regarding how the appeal process is being revamped to address the
recent decision from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that the previous
appeals process is unconstitutional.
Mr. Hudson. I will now introduce our distinguished panel.
Mr. Stephen Sadler currently serves as the assistant
administrator for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at
the Transportation Security Administration. In this capacity,
Mr. Sadler aligns intelligence functions with vetting
operations and manages the technical modernization and Secure
Flight mission support resources critical to the TSA mission.
Mr. Sadler joined TSA in 2003 and has worked on implementing
some of TSA's largest vetting and credential programs.
Mr. Chris Piehota--did I say that correctly--thank you--Mr.
Piehota is the director of the Terrorist Screening Center
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Before becoming
director, Mr. Piehota served as the special agent in charge of
the FBI's Buffalo field office, overseeing FBI operations in
western New York from 2011 to 2013. In 2010 he joined the
Terrorist Screening Center as its deputy director for
operations, intelligence, and administration, and directly
managed the FBI's role in the U.S. Government's 24-hour
consolidated terrorist watchlisting, screening, and world-wide
terrorist encounter operation enterprises.
Finally, Ms. Jennifer Grover is the acting director of the
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice team, leading a portfolio
of work on transportation security issues. Prior to this
position, Ms. Grover was an assistant director on GAO's health
care team, where she led reviews on a diverse range of health
care-related issues. Ms. Grover joined the GAO in 1991.
So at this point I would like to recognize the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for any
opening statement that he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman
Hudson, for convening this meeting today.
As the Members of this subcommittee are well aware,
terrorists continue to target our commercial aviation sector
for attack. Earlier this year, TSA took steps to mitigate these
threats emerging from last-point-of-departure airports in
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. This past weekend, the
Associated Press published an article outlining threats to
commercial aviation emerging from terrorists currently residing
in Syria.
Yesterday the full committee heard from the director of the
National Counterterrorism Center regarding AQAP's continued
pursuit of high-profile attacks against Western aviation. Today
the subcommittee will examine TSA's Secure Flight program,
which serves as a critical tool for identifying high-risk
passengers who may pose a threat to our aviation system.
Thanks to the two Government Accountability Office reports
released today, we have a clear picture of how TSA can
strengthen the Secure Flight program. According to GAO, there
is room for improvement in the program as it relates to both
operations and privacy training for employees.
I was pleased to see that TSA referenced GAO's audits in
its prepared testimony and considered the Comptroller General's
feedback and recommendations invaluable. I look forward to
hearing from both GAO and TSA regarding the improvements that
can be made to the Secure Flight program and the time line for
implementing recommended reforms.
I am also interested in hearing from the director of the
Terrorist Screening Center regarding the process for placing
known or suspected terrorists on the Selectee and No-Fly lists.
The Secure Flight program can only be effective if the Selectee
and No-Flight lists are up-to-date, accurate, and complete. For
that to be a reality requires continuous collaboration between
TSA, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the intelligence and
law enforcement entities that nominate individuals to the watch
list. Given the number of individuals known to have recently
traveled to Syria and Iraq to join with terrorist groups, it is
imperative that the Selectee and No-Fly lists are current and
comprehensive.
In the wake of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest
Flight 253 on Christmas day in 2009, we learned valuable
lessons about how TSA and CBP can better coordinate to identify
potentially dangerous passengers in air transit. It is my hope
that we no longer need close calls to prompt TSA to identify
better ways to recognize those who pose a threat to commercial
aviation.
Before yielding back, I would like to thank each of the
witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. We
appreciate what you do on a day-to-day basis to keep our Nation
secure.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Cedric L. Richmond
September 18, 2014
As the Members of this subcommittee are well aware, terrorists
continue to target our commercial aviation sector for attack. Earlier
this year, TSA took steps to mitigate threats emerging from last point
of departure airports in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
This past weekend, the Associated Press published an article
outlining threats to commercial aviation emerging from terrorists
currently residing in Syria.
Yesterday, the full committee heard from the director of the
National Counterterrorism Center regarding AQAP's continued pursuit of
high-profile attacks against Western aviation.
Today, the subcommittee will examine TSA's Secure Flight program,
which serves as a critical tool for identifying high-risk passengers
who may pose a threat to our aviation system.
Thanks to the two Government Accountability Office reports released
today, we have a clear picture of how TSA can strengthen the Secure
Flight program. According to GAO, there is room for improvement in the
program as it relates to both operations and privacy training for
employees.
I was pleased to see that TSA referenced GAO's audits in its
prepared testimony and considered the comptroller general's feedback
and recommendations invaluable. I look forward to hearing from both GAO
and TSA regarding the improvements that can be made to the Secure
Flight program and the time line for implementing recommended reforms.
I am also interested in hearing from the director of the Terrorist
Screening Center regarding the process for placing known or suspected
terrorist on the Selectee and No-Fly lists.
The Secure Flight program can only be effective if the Selectee and
No-Fly lists are up-to-date, accurate, and complete.
For that to be a reality, it requires continuous collaboration
between TSA, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the intelligence and
law enforcement entities that nominate individuals to the watch list.
Given the number of individuals known to have recently traveled to
Syria and Iraq to join with terrorist groups, it is imperative that the
Selectee and No-Fly lists are current and comprehensive.
In the wake of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight
253 on Christmas day in 2009, we learned valuable lessons about how TSA
and CBP can better coordinate to identify potentially dangerous
passengers in air transit.
It is my hope that we no longer need close calls to prompt TSA to
identify better ways to recognize those who pose a threat to commercial
aviation.
Before yielding back, I would like to thank each of the witnesses
for appearing before the subcommittee today. We appreciate what you do
on a day-to-day basis to keep our Nation secure.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
The full written statements from all witnesses will appear
in the record.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Sadler for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SADLER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Sadler. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman
Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to talk about TSA's
Secure Flight program.
The Secure Flight system was developed and implemented as a
result of key recommendations in the 9/11 Commission report.
Specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the Federal
Government assume responsibility for all watch list matching
from commercial air carriers. Congress agreed, and DHS was
directed to do so under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
In 2005, Congress identified 10 conditions for this new
system. Among those conditions was the establishment of a
redress process for passengers who are delayed or prohibited
from boarding flights. The Secretary of Homeland Security
certified that all 10 conditions had been met in September
2008, and in January 2009 Secure Flight went operational.
The Secure Flight program vets more than 2.2 million
passengers daily and more than 800 million travelers annually,
both international and domestic, to ensure that individuals on
the No-Fly List are denied boarding and that selectees are
identified for appropriate screening. Secure Flight is capable
of randomly selecting a percentage of passengers for additional
screening to build unpredictability into the matching process.
The Secure Flight system is also critical for vetting
individuals as part of TSA's risk-based security initiatives,
such as the TSA PreCheck program. Intelligence-driven, risk-
based security increases TSA's effectiveness by expediting the
passenger screening process for known travelers while allowing
us to focus our resources to those areas where we may have
greater risk. We are able to more effectively mitigate risk to
aviation based on the information passengers share with us
ahead of time.
Additionally, the Secure Flight program has enhanced
aviation security significantly by delivering earlier
indication of potential matches, allowing for expedited
notification of law enforcement, providing a fair and equitable
and consistent matching process across all airlines,
implementing critical data security protections within the
Secure Flight system, and creating consistent application of an
integrative redress process for misidentified individuals
through the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program, also known as DHS TRIP.
To balance passenger privacy and security TSA has built key
privacy safeguards into the Secure Flight system through
administrative, operational, and technical controls to mitigate
unauthorized use, disclosure, and access to information.
Two recent GAO reports on Secure Flight offer six
recommendations, and TSA concurs with them all. GAO's
recommendations offer us an opportunity to further ensure TSA
is meeting our critical security goals. TSA strives every day
to provide the most effective security in the most efficient
way.
So thank you again for the opportunity to talk about this
critical program. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Sadler
September 18, 2014
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure Flight program.
TSA is a high-performing counterterrorism agency charged with
facilitating and securing the travel of the nearly 1.8 million air
passengers each day. Our Secure Flight program is an integral layer of
security, crucial to our ability to deter and prevent terrorist attacks
in aviation. As you know, this system performs secure, efficient, and
consistent watch list matching of passenger names for all covered
domestic and international flights into, out of, and within the United
States. TSA also performs these services for domestic air carrier
flights between international destinations. TSA vets approximately 2.2
million passengers per day on 250 domestic and foreign carriers.
secure flight history
As you know, the Secure Flight program had its genesis in the 9/11
Commission Report, which recommended that TSA take over watch list
matching from aircraft operators. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRPTA) of 2004 codified this recommendation into law,
requiring DHS to conduct pre-flight comparisons of passenger
information to the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) watch list.
Prior to the implementation of Secure Flight, airlines were responsible
for matching passenger information against the TSDB.
Since November 2010, Secure Flight has conducted watch list
matching of passenger information against the TSDB for all covered U.S.
and foreign flights into, out of, and within the United States,
including point-to-point international flights operated by U.S.
airlines. Secure Flight also performs watch list matching for flights
that overfly, but do not land in, the continental United States.
By transferring these matching responsibilities from the airlines
to TSA, Secure Flight allows for expedited notification of law
enforcement, airlines, and our partners in the intelligence community
to prevent individuals on the No-Fly List from boarding an aircraft, as
well as ensuring that individuals on the TSDB with the ``selectee''
designation receive appropriate enhanced screening prior to flying.
Secure Flight allows TSA and our partners in the intelligence community
to adapt quickly to new threats by accommodating last-minute changes to
the risk categories assigned to individual passengers. Passengers
making an airline reservation are required to provide their full name,
date of birth, and gender, as well as a Known Traveler Number and
Redress Number, if applicable. TSA matches this information against the
TSDB, then transmits the results back to airlines so they may issue or
deny passenger boarding passes.
The Secure Flight program continues to evolve as TSA's approach to
transportation security has shifted from a ``one-size-fits-all''
approach to a risk-based security approach. Improvements in technology
and intelligence collection and sharing have allowed TSA to strengthen
the TSA PreCheckTM program and focus our resources on
individuals who may pose a higher risk to transportation security.
Secure Flight is an essential component of efforts to provide
population who have volunteered information about themselves such as
pilots, flight attendants, members of the military, clearance holders,
and individuals enrolled in Trusted Traveler programs with expedited
screening. Travelers within these populations use their Known Traveler
Number when making flight reservations, which allows TSA to vet them
against the TSDB, confirm their eligibility for expedited screening,
and provide the appropriate designation on the traveler's boarding
pass.
program accomplishments
The Secure Flight program is vital to the success of TSA's mission.
Since its inception, Secure Flight has demonstrated reliability and
superior effectiveness and performance compared to the aircraft
operators' watch list matching abilities. Secure Flight vets more than
800 million travelers annually to ensure that individuals on the No-Fly
List are denied boarding and that selectees are identified for
appropriate screening.
In October 2011, TSA introduced TSA PreCheckTM, a
program which expedites the screening of certain known populations at
the airport passenger security checkpoint, thereby enabling TSA to
focus its efforts and resources on those unknown passengers. Secure
Flight is critical to the operation of TSA PreCheckTM. Watch
list vetting and confirmation of eligibility for expedited screening
are conducted by Secure Flight, which enables TSA airport staff to
appropriately route and screen passengers. In December 2013, TSA
expanded this program, allowing U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents to participate via the TSA PreCheckTM Application
program. Applicants undergo fingerprinting and a background
investigation prior to being granted expedited screening benefits. As
of August 2014, more than 500,000 individuals have applied and been
successfully enrolled in the program, further allowing TSA to focus its
watch list matching efforts on high-risk individuals.
Secure Flight is capable of identifying passengers flying
internationally for enhanced screening measures based on risk-based,
intelligence-driven information, as well as randomly selecting a
percentage of passengers for additional screening to build
unpredictability into the matching process. In 2013, TSA initiated TSA
PreCheckTM Risk Assessments, which allows Secure Flight to
enhance prescreening by utilizing intelligence-driven rule sets to
identify high- and low-risk passengers, for either enhanced, standard,
or expedited screening.
privacy and redress
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) integrated a robust
privacy and redress system as part of the Secure Flight program. TSA
has dedicated privacy staff to ensure Secure Flight systems and
analyses are in compliance with applicable laws, procedures, and best
practices. The system also has built-in safeguards to manage privacy
risks.
TSA serves as the executive agent for the DHS Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), an interagency program made up of
components of the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and State.
It is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or
are looking to resolve security screening issues they have experienced
during international or domestic travel, including enhanced screening,
delays, or denials of boarding. These individuals can use the DHS TRIP
to request redress and request that DHS, the Terrorist Screening Center
which houses the TSDB, and any other involved agency review their
personal information and correct their record to resolve their travel-
related issues or to prevent misidentification as appropriate.
DHS TRIP has received and processed more than 185,000 redress
requests and inquiries since its establishment in 2007. Once the TRIP
review process is complete, and all traveler records have been updated
as appropriate, DHS issues a letter to the traveler signaling the
completion of the review and closure of the case. Historically,
approximately 98% of the applicants to DHS TRIP are determined to be
false positives. To avoid such instances, DHS TRIP assigns applicants a
unique Redress Control Number, which they can use when booking travel.
Since TSA has taken over watch list matching from airlines through
Secure Flight and since the implementation of DHS TRIP, DHS has seen a
significant decrease in the number of redress requests.
government accountability office recommendations
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently conducted
two audits of the Secure Flight program and provided TSA with
invaluable feedback through their recommendations to strengthen our
systems and procedures. In their audit on Secure Flight operations, GAO
recommended TSA take the following steps: Develop a process for
regularly evaluating causes of screening errors, implement corrective
measures based on this analysis, tie performance more effectively to
program goals, and document cases to improve program performance.
TSA has already made great strides in addressing GAO's
recommendations by developing data collection mechanisms to evaluate
the root causes of screening errors. TSA's Office of Security
Operations has taken the lead through the Security Incident Reporting
Tool to collect feedback at airports including cause, corrective
solution, and lessons learned from each incident. TSA expects to have
this reporting system completed and implemented at all airports by the
end of the month. These lessons learned will also be incorporated back
into relevant program offices at TSA headquarters to ensure consistency
and accountability throughout the agency.
TSA has also implemented a number of critical data security
protections within the Secure Flight system, including restricting
access to authorized users and requiring audit logs as well as
increasing privacy training, and strengthening the approval process to
allow access to data. TSA also instituted a Management Directive to
manage all requests for Secure Flight data and will implement
additional systems to track all data access requests.
Finally, GAO recommended that TSA develop a system to document
Secure Flight system matching errors so TSA can better analyze data
errors and address any matching issues in the future. Our Office of
Intelligence and Analysis is developing a detailed tracking capacity
for instances of system matching errors, which we expect to have
completed by the end of the calendar year.
With regard to GAO's review of Secure Flight's privacy protections,
TSA has already begun to incorporate their recommendations to provide
privacy refresher training and to track decisions pertaining to
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Secure Flight employees will
receive job-specific privacy refresher training by the end of the
calendar year. As stated earlier, we have dedicated privacy personnel
on our staff to help with these efforts. As far as tracking decisions
pertaining to PII, efforts are already underway to establish a tracking
process and we expect a completion date early next year.
TSA greatly appreciates the work GAO put into these audits and
looks forward to enhancing the program through addressing their
recommendations.
conclusion
TSA's Secure Flight program is a robust system that allows TSA to
make Risk-Based Security decisions that are crucial to the security of
our transportation systems. Today, Secure Flight not only identifies
high-risk passengers by matching them against the TSDB, but it also
uses the information to assign all passengers a risk category: High-
risk, low-risk, or unknown-risk. At the same time, TSA has also
enhanced Secure Flight's privacy oversight mechanisms to protect
personally identifiable information.
Secure Flight continues to be the Nation's front-line defense
against terrorism targeting the Nation's civil aviation system. It is
an incredibly effective tool in identifying individuals of concern for
denial of boarding, enhanced screening, or expedited screening. TSA
will continue to expand on these successes even further as we work
toward our goals of enhancing the passenger experience while at the
same time keeping bad actors from doing us harm.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Sadler.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Piehota to testify.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. PIEHOTA, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST
SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Piehota. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking
Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the Terrorist Screening Center and
its National security mission.
Since the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center 11
years ago, the center has played a vital role in the fight
against terrorism. The Terrorist Screening Center integrates
terrorist identity information from the law enforcement,
homeland security, and intelligence communities into a single
identities database known as the Terrorist Screening Database,
or TSDB.
The TSDB populates the various terrorist screening systems
used by the Government. Since its inception, the Terrorist
Screening Center has remained committed to protecting the
American public from terrorist threats, while simultaneously
protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties.
The TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watch List,
contains both known or suspected international and domestic
terrorist identity information. The procedure for submitting
information on individuals for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch
List is referred to as the nomination process.
Nominations originate from credible information developed
by the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence
communities. Federal departments and agencies submit
nominations from known or suspected international terrorists to
the National Counterterrorism Center, or the NCTC, for
inclusion in their Terrorist Identity Datamart Environment, or
TIDE database. NCTC reviews the TIDE entries and submits them
to the TSC if these entries include sufficient biographic or
biometric identifiers and are supported with derogatory
information that generally meets the reasonable suspicion
standard. In a similar fashion, the FBI collects, stores, and
forwards information relating purely to domestic terrorists to
the Terrorist Screening Center.
The facts and circumstances pertaining to a nomination
should indicate that an individual is known or suspected to be
or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation
for, in aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist
activities. The reasonable suspicion standard is based upon the
totality of circumstances to account for the sometimes
fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Mere guesses or
hunches are not sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.
In addition, nominations cannot be solely based on race,
ethnicity, National origin, religious affiliation, or First
Amendment-protected activity. Moreover, if the information is
to the No-Fly or Selectee lists, the nomination must meet
additional screening criteria.
The utility of the watchlisting process is highest when the
information is efficiently disseminated to those law
enforcement agencies that need it to perform their law
enforcement, homeland security, or intelligence missions. As
such, the Terrorist Screening Center places a premium on the
timely dissemination of terrorist identity data to our
screening partners, and the TSC supports the TSA and other
partners by providing the No-Fly and Selectee lists for
aviation security screening through real-time transactional
information transfer.
Throughout the entire watchlisting and screening process,
the TSC continues to play a significant role in ensuring that
civil liberties are safeguarded and privacy is protected. The
goal of the redress process is to provide a timely and fair
review of redress inquiries referred to DHS and, when
applicable, the Terrorist Screening Center. Individuals who
believe they were inconvenienced as a result of screening can
submit a redress inquiry through DHS, the Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program. We support DHS TRIP by resolving inquiries
that appear to be related to terrorist data included in the
TSDB.
Upon receipt of a DHS TRIP referral, the Terrorist
Screening Center redress program reviews the available
information, including information provided by the inquiring
party, and determines whether the inquiring party is an exact
match to an identity in the TSDB and, if so, whether the
identity should continue to be watchlisted in the TSDB or
whether the inquiring party's status should be adjusted. As
part of the review process, the TSC's redress program
coordinates with the agency who had nominated the individual to
the Terrorist Watch List and, if warranted, updates the
applicable data.
In conclusion, the TSC has firmly established itself as a
primary element in the U.S. Government's counterterrorism
detection, early warning, and prevention network. As a premier
counterterrorism function, the TSC supports its interagency
partners in preserving the safety, security, and prosperity of
our communities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the TSC and
its National security mission. I look forward to any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Piehota follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher M. Piehota
September 18, 2014
Good afternoon Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond and Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and its role in the interagency
watchlisting and screening process.
Over the past 11 years, the TSC has played a vital role in the
fight against terrorism by integrating terrorist identity information
from the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence
communities into a single identities database known as the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB), which populates the various terrorist
screening systems used by the U.S. Government. Throughout this process,
the TSC has remained committed to protecting the American public from
terrorist threats while simultaneously protecting privacy and
safeguarding civil liberties. As our efforts continue to evolve in
response to new threats and intelligence, your support provides us with
the tools necessary to continue our mission.
terrorist nomination process
The TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watch List,
contains both international and domestic terrorist identity
information. The procedure for submitting information on individuals
for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch List is referred to as the
nomination process. The nomination process is the most fundamental and
singularly important step in the watchlisting process. It is through
this process that individuals are added to the Terrorist Watch List.
Nominations originate from credible information developed by our
intelligence and law enforcement partners. These intelligence and law
enforcement agencies are referred to as Originators in the watchlisting
community because it is through their work that nominations are
developed. Federal departments and agencies submit nominations of known
or suspected international terrorists to the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) for inclusion in NCTC's Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) database. NCTC reviews TIDE entries and transmits
entries to TSC that include sufficient identifiers and are supported
with information that meet the reasonable suspicion watchlisting
standard described below. Similarly, the FBI collects, stores, and
forwards information to the TSC relating to domestic terrorists that
may have connections to international terrorism.
Before placing any information into the TSDB, the TSC utilizes a
multi-level review process to ensure that the nomination meets the
criteria for inclusion. Generally, nominations to the TSDB must satisfy
two requirements. First, the facts and circumstances pertaining to the
nomination must meet the reasonable suspicion standard of review.
Second, the biographic information associated with a nomination must
contain sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened can
be matched to or disassociated from another watchlisted individual.
Reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the determination
that an individual ``is known or suspected to be or has been engaged in
conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to
terrorism and terrorist activities.'' The reasonable suspicion standard
is based on the totality of the circumstances in order to account for
the sometimes fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Due weight
must be given to the reasonable inferences that a person can draw from
the available facts. Mere guesses or inarticulate ``hunches'' are not
enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. In addition, nominations
must not be solely based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religious
affiliation, or First Amendment-protected activity, such as free
speech, the exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of
peaceful assembly, and petitioning the Government for redress of
grievances. There are limited exceptions to the reasonable suspicion
requirement, which exist to support immigration and border screening by
the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security.
Upon receiving the nomination, TSC personnel review the supporting
information to assess sufficiency, including accuracy and timeliness.
In particular, TSC personnel must make two determinations. First, they
evaluate whether the nomination meets the reasonable suspicion standard
for inclusion in the TSDB. This includes determining whether the
derogatory information provided with the nomination meets the
additional requirements for placing an individual on the No-Fly or
Selectee list. If a nomination involves a request that an individual be
placed on the No-Fly or Selectee list, the nomination must meet
additional substantive criteria, above and beyond the ``reasonable
suspicion'' requirement for TSDB nominations. Second, they consider
whether the biographic information associated with a nomination
contains sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened
can be matched to or distinguished from a watchlisted individual on the
TSDB.
Upon conclusion of the TSC's review, TSC will either accept or
reject the TSDB nomination. If a nomination is accepted, the TSC will
create a TSDB record which includes only the ``terrorist identifiers''
(e.g., name, date of birth, etc.).
Because it is a Sensitive but Unclassified system, the TSDB does
not include substantive derogatory information or Classified National
security information. This facilitates the sharing of TSDB identifying
information with Government screening and law enforcement officers,
such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers at ports of entry
and State and local law enforcement officers throughout the United
States. In addition, TSC personnel are trained on what information is
proper to disclose when responding to an inquiry by a Government
screening or law enforcement officer, based on the circumstances of the
inquiry.
To uphold the directive in Homeland Security Presidential Directive
6 to maintain ``thorough, accurate, and current'' information, and to
protect civil rights and civil liberties, within the TSDB, several
quality control measures are continuously applied by nominating
agencies, the NCTC, and TSC. These measures include periodic reviews of
nominations and TSDB records, including by attorneys, as well as audits
of supporting systems to promote the integrity of the information
relied upon for maintenance of TSDB records. Nominating agencies have
an on-going responsibility to notify NCTC and TSC of any changes that
could affect the validity or reliability of TSDB information. In those
cases where modification or deletion of a record relating to
international terrorism is required, the nominating agency must notify
NCTC, which will process the request and transmit it to the TSC for
action. For nominations relating to domestic terrorism, the FBI must
follow applicable FBI procedures to request that a FBI-nominated TSDB
record be modified or deleted.
export to supported systems
Once a known or suspected terrorist is identified and included in
the TSDB, TSC ensures the timely dissemination of the terrorist
identity data to our screening partners using encrypted electronic
exports. The utility of the watchlisting process is highest when the
information is efficiently disseminated to those who need it. The TSC
uses subject-matter experts, who are experienced analysts and
designated agency representatives, to support the U.S. Government
watchlisting and screening mission and the screening systems supported
by the TSDB. The six major U.S. Government systems supported by the
TSDB are: Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS) for passport and visa screening; Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) TECS system for border and port of entry screening;
DHS Secure Flight system for air passenger screening (such as against
the No-Fly and Selectee lists) by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA); DHS Transportation Vetting System for
credentialing transportation and critical infrastructure workers; the
Department of Defense for base access and screening; and, the FBI's
National Crime and Information Center's Known or Suspected Terrorist
File (formerly known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File
(VGTOF)) for domestic law enforcement screening. The TSDB data exported
to each of these systems is specifically tailored to the mission, legal
authorities, and information technology requirements of the department
or agency that maintains the system. Accordingly, each system receives
a different subset of data from TSDB. In addition, TSC inserts
provisions into its information-sharing agreements requiring its
information-sharing partners to properly protect TSDB-derived
information, grant access to or release that information only pursuant
to the agreement, and to provide appropriate training to individuals
granted access to this information.
redress
Throughout the entire watchlisting and screening process the TSC
plays a significant role in ensuring that civil liberties are
safeguarded and privacy is protected. The TSC led the interagency
initiative to develop an effective interagency redress process and
maintains a separate unit dedicated to resolving redress matters
regarding individuals who believe they have been incorrectly
watchlisted. The goal of the redress process is to provide a timely and
fair review of redress inquiries referred to the TSC. Working closely
with our interagency partners, TSC developed an interagency Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) on Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures that
was signed in September 2007. The MOU standardizes interagency watch
list redress procedures and provides complainants with an opportunity
to receive a timely, fair, and accurate review of their redress
concerns.
For example, travelers who are denied or delayed boarding or entry
into the United States can submit a redress inquiry through the DHS
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, commonly referred to as DHS TRIP. DHS
TRIP provides the public with a single point of contact for individuals
who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they
experienced during travel screening at transportation hubs (such as
airports and train stations) or during their inspection at a U.S. port
of entry. The TSC supports DHS TRIP by helping to resolve complaints
that appear to be related to data in the TSDB.
When a traveler's inquiry appears to concern data in the TSDB, DHS
TRIP refers the case to the TSC Redress Unit for research into the
matter. Upon receipt of a DHS TRIP inquiry, TSC Redress Unit reviews
the available information, including the information and documentation
provided by the traveler, and determines: (1) Whether the traveler is
an exact match to an identity in the TSDB; and, if an exact match
exists, (2) whether the identity should continue to be in the TSDB or
whether the status should be changed (for example, downgrade a No-Fly
record).
If the redress inquiry is a match to an identity in the TSDB, the
TSC Redress Unit researches the record and underlying derogatory
information, coordinates with the agency that nominated the complainant
to the Terrorist Watch List to ensure the information is current and
reliable, and, if warranted, updates incorrect or outdated Terrorist
Watch List data that may cause the individual difficulty during a
screening process. Upon the conclusion of TSC's review, the TSC Redress
Unit advises DHS TRIP representatives of the outcome so they can
directly respond to the complainant. In some cases, the TSC determines
that the individual should remain watchlisted, but may also modify the
individual's watch list status accordingly.
In addition, when the TSC is advised through press or Congressional
inquiries about individuals who have encountered travel difficulties
due to their perceived watch list status, the TSC Redress Unit reviews
the pertinent watch list encounter records. If the person is found to
be misidentified, the TSC examines our records to determine if there is
any additional information that could be used to reduce future
misidentifications. At the conclusion of the process, the inquiring
entity is notified that all reasonable measures to reduce any future
misidentifications have been taken.
Finally, as you may know, there are currently a number of pending
court cases involving challenges to administration of the No-Fly List
by plaintiffs who allege they have been wrongly denied boarding on an
aircraft. We are currently working with our interagency partners on
potential changes to the [existing No-Fly List] redress process to
ensure that our procedures continue to safeguard civil liberties and
privacy. These changes will be made in coordination with other agencies
involved in aviation security screening, informed by legal and policy
concerns that affect the U.S. Government's administration of the No-Fly
List and the overarching redress process. In so doing, the U.S.
Government will endeavor to increase transparency for certain
individuals denied boarding who believe they are on the No-Fly List and
have submitted DHS TRIP inquiries, consistent with the protection of
National security and National security information, as well as
transportation security.
conclusion
The TSC has a standing commitment to protect the United States and
its international partners from terrorist threats while protecting
privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. Terrorist watchlisting has
been a vital early warning and interdiction tool in the
counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and will
continue to serve in this capacity in the future.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Piehota.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Grover to testify.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER A. GROVER, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Grover. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Richmond, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss TSA's implementation and oversight of the
Secure Flight program.
In my remarks, I would like to highlight four points from
the reports GAO issued today on Secure Flight. First, what TSA
knows about Secure Flight system-matching errors. Second, what
TSA knows about screening errors at the checkpoint. Third,
initiatives to reduce processing time of passenger requests for
redress. Fourth, opportunities to strengthen Secure Flight
privacy protections.
First, Secure Flight system-matching errors, which are
instances when the Secure Flight system fails to identify a
passenger with a reservation on an upcoming flight as being
included on a watch list and who therefore should receive
additional screening or not be permitted to fly. We found that
TSA is lacking key information about how well Secure Flight is
achieving its goals, including the extent to which the system
misses passengers on the watch lists. We therefore recommend
that TSA develop additional performance measures to monitor
this and other aspects of the Secure Flight program.
Even without performance measures related to system-
matching errors, sometimes TSA becomes aware of such errors
through other means. In these cases, the TSA Match Review Board
studies the incident to determine what actions are necessary to
prevent similar errors. However, TSA has not maintained readily
available, accurate information on the number or causes of
system-matching errors which would provide a more robust basis
for program oversight. Therefore, we also recommend that TSA
develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and
causes of Secure Flight system-matching errors.
Second, screening errors at the checkpoint, which are
instances in which screening personnel have made errors in
implementing Secure Flight determinations. We reviewed TSA data
from May 2012 through February 2014 and found that such errors
have occurred. At some airports TSA officials conduct after-
action reviews to identify and address the root causes of these
errors. Conducting such reviews across all airports would allow
TSA to identify trends and target Nation-wide efforts to
address them. We recommend that TSA develop a process to
evaluate the root causes of screening errors at all airport
checkpoints and implement corrective measures as necessary.
Third, passenger requests for redress, which gives
passengers who believe they have been erroneously matched to a
watch list an opportunity to address this and prevent it from
happening in the future. DHS TRIP, the office that administers
the redress process, and the Terrorist Screening Center, which
maintains watch lists derived from the Terrorist Screening
Database, are taking steps to reduce the processing time for
redress applications. In fact, TRIP reduced the redress
processing time from an average of 100 to 42 days during fiscal
year 2014.
In contrast, the average processing time for redress
appeals is significantly longer: 276 days, or about 9 months.
This time period is inconsistent with the letter that appeals
applicants receive stating that DHS will provide a final agency
decision within 60 days. TRIP and TSC have taken steps to
reduce the appeals review time, but it will be important for
TRIP to monitor progress in this area and consider changes to
the 60-day time frame referenced in the appeals letter if
necessary.
Fourth, Secure Flight privacy protections to safeguard
passengers' personally identifiable information. Let me
acknowledge that TSA already has privacy mechanisms in place,
including
24/7 audit logs of the Secure Flight system and user events,
privacy training for all new Secure Flight staff, and
mechanisms to document some privacy-related issues, such as the
destruction of passenger data. However, TSA's protections could
be further strengthened with the development of annual job-
specific privacy training for all Secure Flight employees and
through comprehensive documentation of key privacy issues and
decisions.
As Mr. Sadler noted, DHS has concurred with all of our
recommendations regarding improvements to Secure Flight and is
planning for implementation.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, thank you for the
opportunity to testify this afternoon.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer A. Grover
September 18, 2014
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the findings
from our two September 2014 reports, being released today, in which we
assessed the performance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight program
and related privacy issues.\1\ Secure Flight screens approximately 2
million passengers each day, matching passenger information against
Federal Government watch lists and other information to assign each
passenger a risk category. By identifying those passengers who may pose
security risks, Secure Flight helps protect against potential acts of
terrorism that might target the Nation's civil aviation system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to
Determine Program Effectiveness, GAO-14-531 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9,
2014), and Secure Flight: TSA Could Take Additional Steps to Strengthen
Privacy Oversight Mechanisms, GAO-14-647 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9,
2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to requirements of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and a recommendation of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission), TSA developed and implemented Secure Flight in order to
assume from air carriers the function of matching passengers against
watch lists maintained by the Federal Government.\2\ At the time, TSA
matched passengers against two watch lists, which were intended to
identify high-risk individuals: (1) The No-Fly List, composed of
individuals who should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and (2)
the Selectee List, composed of individuals who should receive enhanced
screening at the airport security checkpoint. The No-Fly and Selectee
Lists are subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)--the U.S.
Government's consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency
organization administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Pub. L. No. 108-458, 4012(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-18
(2004) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(C)). The 9/11 Commission,
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 2004. TSA efforts to
develop a computer-assisted passenger prescreening system predated the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and the report of the
9/11 Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After initiating development of Secure Flight in August 2004, TSA
began implementing it in 2009, and completed transitioning foreign and
domestic air carriers to the program in November 2010.\3\ Secure Flight
now screens passengers and certain nontraveling individuals on all
domestic and international commercial flights to, from, and within the
United States; certain flights overflying the continental United
States; and international point-to-point flights operated by U.S.
aircraft operators.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ TSA began implementing Secure Flight pursuant to the Secure
Flight Program Final Rule, issued in October 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg.
64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008).
\4\ Secure Flight screens certain nontraveling individuals, such as
escorts for minor, elderly, and disabled passengers, who are authorized
to access the airport's sterile area--the portion of an airport defined
in the airport security program that provides passengers access to
boarding aircraft and to which access is generally controlled through
the screening of persons and property. See 49 C.F.R. 1540.5. For
purposes of this report, the term ``commercial flight'' encompasses all
U.S. and foreign air carrier operations covered by and subject to the
Secure Flight Final Rule. See 49 C.F.R. 1560.3 (defining ``covered
flight'' for purposes of the Secure Flight Program).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secure Flight can have inadvertent and potentially inappropriate
impacts on the traveling public, such as when passengers are identified
as high-risk because they share a similar name and date of birth with
an individual listed on a watch list, and thus experience delays and
inconveniences during their travels. DHS's Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program (DHS TRIP) provides passengers who have been denied boarding,
or identified for additional screening, with an opportunity to be
cleared if they are determined not to be a match to TSDB-based watch
list records (i.e., misidentified) or if they have been wrongly
identified as the subject of a TSDB watch list record (i.e.,
mislisted).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ DHS established DHS TRIP in February 2007 as the central
processing point within DHS for travel-related redress inquiries. See
49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(G)(i) (requiring the establishment of a timely
and fair process for individuals identified as a threat as a result of
TSA's passenger prescreening system to appeal the determination and
correct any erroneous information).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My testimony today highlights the key findings of our two reports
on Secure Flight.\6\ My statement will address the extent to which: (1)
TSA's performance measures appropriately assess progress toward
achieving the Secure Flight program goals, (2) TSA ensures that Secure
Flight screening determinations for passengers are fully implemented at
airport security checkpoints, (3) DHS's redress process addresses the
delays and inconveniences that result from Secure Flight screening, and
(4) TSA has implemented privacy oversight mechanisms to address Secure
Flight privacy requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO-14-531 addressed the operations of the Secure Flight
program, including TSA's implementation of screening determinations at
the checkpoint and performance measures for the Secure Flight program.
GAO-14-647 addressed Secure Flight's privacy oversight mechanisms and
DHS's redress process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the September 2014 reports, we analyzed documentation of TSA's
program goals and performance measures for fiscal years 2011 through
2013 and assessed these measures against provisions of the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA).\7\ We also analyzed a list that TSA
compiled at our request of missed passengers on two high-risk lists
(including the reasons for these matching errors) that occurred from
November 2010 through July 2013. We analyzed certain TSA data on
screener performance at airport security checkpoints from May 2012,
when TSA began tracking these data, through February 2014, when we
conducted the analysis. We also reviewed relevant DHS TRIP redress and
appeals data for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. In addition, to
evaluate TSA's documentation of Secure Flight privacy issues and
decisions and TSA's privacy training for Secure Flight staff, we
reviewed relevant documents prepared by TSA privacy officials and
contract staff, including privacy compliance validation reports for the
period from April 2012 through April 2013, monthly status reports
prepared by TSA's privacy contractor for the period from March 2013
through April 2014, and privacy training documents. We interviewed TSA
and other DHS officials who are responsible for aspects of Secure
Flight and DHS TRIP, as well as TSA officials at nine airports, which
we selected based on a variety of factors, such as volume of passengers
screened and geographic dispersion. Our September 2014 reports provide
further details on our scope and methodology.\8\ The work upon which
this statement is based was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). GPRA was updated by the GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011).
\8\ GAO-14-531 and GAO-14-647.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
Since its implementation in 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a
program that identifies passengers as high-risk solely by matching them
against the No-Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a
risk category: High-risk, low-risk, or unknown-risk. In 2010, following
the December 2009 attempted attack on a U.S.-bound flight, which
exposed gaps in how agencies used watch lists to screen individuals,
TSA began using risk-based criteria to identify additional high-risk
passengers who may not be in the TSDB, but who should be subject to
enhanced screening procedures. Further, in 2011, TSA began screening
passengers against additional identities in the TSDB that are not
already included on the No-Fly or Selectee Lists. In addition, as part
of TSA PreCheckTM, a 2011 program through which TSA
designates passengers as low-risk for expedited screening, TSA began
screening against several new lists of preapproved low-risk travelers.
TSA also began conducting TSA PreCheckTM risk assessments,
an activity distinct from matching against lists that uses the Secure
Flight system to assign passengers scores based upon their travel-
related data, for the purpose of identifying them as low-risk for a
specific flight. See appendix I for a list of Secure Flight screening
activities.
To conduct Secure Flight screening, TSA uses passenger information,
known collectively as Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), which is
collected by aircraft operators.\9\ Once this screening is conducted,
Secure Flight then sends the air carrier a determination of how the
passenger will be screened at the checkpoint if provided a boarding
pass. These determinations include a ``TSA PreCheckTM-
eligible'' message for passengers who may receive expedited screening;
a ``cleared'' message for passengers found not to match any high- or
low-risk list and who, therefore, will generally receive standard
screening; and a ``selectee'' message for passengers who should undergo
enhanced screening.\10\ For passengers matching the No-Fly List, the
air carrier is precluded from issuing a boarding pass.
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\9\ See 49 C.F.R. 1560.3. SFPD includes personally identifiable
information, such as full name, gender, date of birth, passport
information (if available), and certain nonpersonally identifiable
information, such as itinerary information and the unique number
associated with a travel record (record number locator).
\10\ Standard screening typically includes passing through a walk-
through metal detector or Advanced Imaging Technology screening, which
identifies objects or anomalies on the outside of the body, and X-ray
screening for the passenger's accessible property. Enhanced screening
includes, in addition to the procedures applied during a typical
standard screening experience, a pat-down and an explosive trace
detection search or physical search of the interior of the passenger's
accessible property, electronics, and footwear. Expedited screening
typically includes walk-through metal detector screening and X-ray
screening of the passenger's accessible property, but unlike in
standard screening, travelers do not have to, among other things,
remove their belts, shoes, or light outerwear. The Secure Flight system
may also return an error response to air carriers regarding passengers
for whom Secure Flight has received incomplete data.
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Passengers who believe they have been unfairly denied boarding or
identified for additional screening may apply to DHS TRIP using an on-
line application, by e-mail, or by mail. If DHS TRIP determines that an
individual is still a potential match to a TSDB watch list record, it
refers the matter to TSC for further review. TSC then conducts its own
review of whether the individual has been misidentified to a watch list
and whether, based on the most current available information and
criteria for inclusion on the list, the individual is either correctly
assigned to the list or is wrongly assigned and should be removed from
the list. If DHS TRIP and TSC determine that no change in the
passenger's status is warranted, the passenger is notified of this
decision, and depending on the determination, some passengers are
permitted the opportunity to appeal the decision. When passengers
appeal, DHS TRIP forwards all completed appeals paperwork to TSC. TSC
analysts are to review all derogatory information maintained on the
appellant to make a written recommendation to TSA on the appeal. TSA
then reviews TSC's recommendation through its own internal process,
which can include going back to TSC for additional information, before
the TSA administrator makes the final determination to uphold the
appellant's status, recommend that TSC downgrade the appellant to
another TSDB-based list, or recommend that TSC remove the appellant
from the list.\11\
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\11\ TSC, in the course of its review, may also find the appellant
was misidentified to a TSDB-based list.
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tsa lacks key information to determine whether the secure flight
program is achieving its goals
In September 2014, we reported that Secure Flight has established
program goals that reflect new program functions since 2009 to identify
additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however,
current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to
fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. For
example, to measure performance toward its goals that address the
system's ability to accurately identify passengers on various watch
lists, Secure Flight collects various types of data, including the
number of passengers TSA identifies as matches to high- and low-risk
lists. However, we found that Secure Flight does not have measures to
assess the extent of system-matching errors--for example, the extent to
which Secure Flight is missing passengers who are actual matches to
these lists. In addition, we found that Secure Flight's measures do not
provide information on progress toward the program's goal to
incorporate additional risk-based security capabilities to streamline
processes and accommodate additional aviation populations, in part
because the goal itself did not specify how performance toward the goal
should be measured.
We concluded that additional measures that address key performance
aspects related to program goals, and that clearly identify the
activities necessary to achieve goals, in accordance with the
Government Performance and Results Act, would allow TSA to more fully
assess progress toward its goals. For example, a measure that reflects
misidentifications to all high-risk lists could help TSA appropriately
gauge its performance with respect to its goal of limiting such
misidentifications. Likewise, establishing measures that clearly
represent the performance necessary to achieve the program's goal that
addresses risk-based security capabilities will allow Secure Flight to
determine the extent to which it is meeting its goal of adapting the
Secure Flight system for different risk-based screening activities.
Without measures that provide a more complete understanding of Secure
Flight's performance, TSA cannot compare actual with desired results to
understand how well the system is achieving these goals. Therefore, we
recommended in September 2014 that TSA develop additional measures to
address key performance aspects related to each program goal, and
ensure these measures clearly identify the activities necessary to
achieve progress toward the goal. DHS concurred with our recommendation
and stated that TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) will
evaluate its current Secure Flight performance goals and measures and
develop new performance measures as necessary.
We also found in September 2014 that TSA lacks timely and reliable
information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors.
TSA officials told us at the time of our review that when TSA receives
information related to matching errors of the Secure Flight system, the
Secure Flight Match Review Board reviews this information to determine
if any actions could be taken to prevent similar errors from happening
again.\12\ We identified instances in which the Match Review Board
discussed system-matching errors, investigated possible actions to
address these errors, and implemented changes to strengthen system
performance. However, we also found that TSA does not have readily-
available or complete information on the extent and causes of system-
matching errors. We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to
systematically document the number and causes of the Secure Flight
system's matching errors, in accordance with Federal internal control
standards. Such a mechanism would provide Secure Flight more timely and
reliable information on the extent to which the system is performing as
intended. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that TSA's
OIA will develop a more robust process to track all known cases in
which the Secure Flight system has made a matching error, and that the
Secure Flight Match Review Board will conduct reviews to identify
potential system improvement measures on a quarterly basis.
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\12\ Secure Flight's Match Review Board--a multi-departmental
entity--and associated Match Review Working Group review performance
measurement results and recommend changes to improve system
performance, among other things.
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tsa has processes in place to implement secure flight screening
determinations at checkpoints, but could take further action to address
screening errors
In September 2014, we reported that TSA has processes in place to
implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport
checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. Screening
personnel at airport checkpoints are primarily responsible for ensuring
that passengers receive a level of screening that corresponds to the
level of risk determined by Secure Flight by verifying passengers'
identities and identifying passengers' screening designations. TSA
information from May 2012 through February 2014 that we assessed
indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing
Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. TSA officials we spoke
with at five of the nine airports where we conducted interviews conduct
after-action reviews of screening errors at the checkpoint and have
used these reviews to take action to address the root causes of those
errors. However, we found that TSA does not have a systematic process
for evaluating the root causes of these screening errors at the
checkpoint across airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends
across airports and target Nation-wide efforts to address these issues.
Officials with TSA's Office of Security Operations (OSO) told us in
the course of our September 2014 review that evaluating the root causes
of screening errors would be helpful and stated they were in the early
stages of forming a group to discuss these errors. However, TSA was not
able to provide documentation of the group's membership, purpose,
goals, time frames, or methodology. Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government states that managers should compare actual
performance with expected results and analyze significant
differences.\13\ Therefore, we recommended in September 2014 that TSA
develop a process for evaluating the root causes of screening errors at
the checkpoint and then implement corrective measures to address those
causes. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that TSA's OSO
will collect and evaluate data on screening errors to identify root
causes and work to implement corrective measures. Uncovering and
addressing the root causes of screening errors could allow TSA to
strengthen security screening at airports by reducing the number of
these errors at the checkpoint.
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\13\ GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. (Washington, DC: Nov. 1, 1999).
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dhs trip addresses inconveniences and delays related to tsdb-based
lists, and is taking actions to reduce case-processing time
In September 2014, we reported that DHS TRIP affords passengers
adversely affected by TSA screening processes an opportunity to address
inconveniences and delays associated with being potentially
misidentified to a TSDB-based list.\14\ Passengers who are determined
to have been incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based
on the TSDB are added to a list of passengers known as the TSA Cleared
List, which allows them to be cleared (not identified as high-risk)
nearly 100 percent of the time.\15\ The DHS TRIP process also allows
passengers determined to have been improperly included on a TSDB-based
list (mislisted) to be removed, minimizing the likelihood they will be
identified as matches during future travels.\16\ Although DHS TRIP is
not able to provide redress for passengers who may have been
misidentified to high-risk, rules-based lists (TSA's lists of high-risk
passengers who, based on risk-based criteria, should be subject to
enhanced screening procedures though they may not be in the TSDB),
according to TSA officials, TSA procedures for using such lists
mitigate impacts on these passengers. These procedures may result in
TSA removing passengers from the lists, which ensures that passengers
who are misidentified to those individuals will no longer be identified
as a match, and thus delayed or inconvenienced as a result.
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\14\ The specific impacts experienced by a passenger who has been
matched to a watch list vary depending upon the list to which the
passenger is matched. For example, an individual with a name similar to
that of someone who is on the No-Fly list likely will be unable to
utilize the convenience of internet, curbside, and airport kiosk check-
in options.
\15\ Upon receipt of a complete application, DHS TRIP sends a
notification of receipt with a redress control number to the passenger.
DHS TRIP adds the name, date of birth, and redress control number of
applicants determined not to match a TSDB-based list to the TSA Cleared
List. Passengers included on the TSA Cleared List must then submit
their redress control number when making a reservation to allow the
Secure Flight system to recognize and clear them. Because of the
application of other TSA security measures, such as random selection,
an individual's presence on the Cleared List may diminish, but will not
preclude, the possibility of being selected for enhanced screening.
\16\ During the pendency of this review, various courts have issued
decisions relating to the No-Fly List and DHS TRIP. For example, in
January 2014, a judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California issued a findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order for relief in the case of Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland
Security, No. C 06-00545 WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan 14, 2014) (redacted).
Specifically, the court found that in this matter, which involved facts
dating back to 2004, the plaintiff had been placed on the No-Fly List
as a result of a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent's human error
and that, among other things, the redress response letter provided to
the plaintiff by the redress program in place prior to the
establishment of DHS TRIP was inadequate at the time because the
response was vague and ``fell short of providing any assurance to [the
Plaintiff] . . . that the mistake had been traced down in all its forms
and venues and corrected.'' In June 2014, a judge of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon issued an opinion and order
concluding, among other things, that because DHS TRIP procedures do not
afford individuals the requirements of due process in so much as they
do not provide them with notice regarding their status on the No-Fly
List and the reasons for placement on the list, ``the absence of any
meaningful procedures to afford Plaintiffs the opportunity to contest
their placement on the No-Fly List violates Plaintiffs' rights to
procedural due process.'' See Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D.
Or. June 24, 2014). According to a Joint Supplemental Status Report
filed with the district court on September 3, 2014, the Government is
in the process of developing revised procedures and is committed to
complete this and other steps and issue final orders prior to February
2, 2015. Our review focused on the procedures and data relating to
implementation of the DHS TRIP redress and appeals processes and did
not evaluate DHS TRIP on sufficiency of procedural due process grounds.
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We also found that DHS has reduced its average processing time for
redress cases and is taking actions to further reduce processing times.
Specifically, we found that DHS TRIP officials took several steps in
fiscal year 2013 to reduce the overall processing time and a backlog of
redress cases including, for example, automating its response to DHS
TRIP applicants and hiring additional staff. According to DHS TRIP
officials, at the beginning of fiscal year 2014, DHS TRIP's average
case-processing time for redress cases was approximately 100 days, and
as of June 2014, the average case-processing time was about 42 days. In
January 2014, DHS TRIP also reduced its target for one of its key
performance indicators--average number of days for DHS TRIP redress
cases to be closed--from 93 to 78 days.
In addition, we reported in September 2014 that DHS TRIP is taking
actions to reduce processing times for appeals cases. Appeals
applicants receive a letter stating that DHS will provide a final
agency decision on the appeal within 60 days of receipt of the appeal.
However, we found that the average total processing time for the
appeals process for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 was 276 days. In
fiscal year 2013, DHS TRIP began taking several actions to make the
appeals process more structured and reduce the overall review time,
including, among other things, developing and distributing documents
that provide information on the status and outcome of each appeal case
and implementing a more formalized process for reviewing appeals. In
January 2014, DHS TRIP also established intermediate and long-term
performance goals for the appeals process for the first time.
Specifically, the intermediate performance goal calls for an average
total processing time of 92 days, while the long-term performance goal
calls for an average processing time of 60 days, consistent with the
time frame DHS TRIP commits to achieving in the letter informing
applicants of their right to appeal. According to DHS TRIP officials,
the agency plans to periodically assess its progress toward achieving
its intermediate and long-term goals for reducing appeals-processing
times. Officials stated that if DHS TRIP finds it is not making
adequate progress by February 2015--about 1 year after the program
began taking specific actions to reduce the overall review time--it
would first evaluate whether further changes and improvements could be
made to shorten the appeals process before considering, in
collaboration with TSC and the DHS Screening Coordination Office, a
change to the 60-day time frame stated in the appeals letter.
tsa has implemented oversight mechanisms to address passenger privacy
requirements, but additional actions could better ensure full
compliance
TSA has taken steps to implement privacy oversight mechanisms, but,
as we reported in September 2014, additional actions could allow TSA to
sustain and strengthen its efforts. Overall, TSA has implemented
mechanisms to identify privacy implications associated with program
operations and address them as necessary. For example, TSA has
regularly-updated privacy documents to address changes in the Secure
Flight program and maintains and reviews audit logs of Secure Flight
system and user events, such as requests to access the system that
generates reports on Secure Flight activities. TSA has also implemented
privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees
receive annual privacy training. However, we found that existing Secure
Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training
consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements.\17\
For example, TSA updated its privacy training for new Secure Flight
staff in December 2013 to reflect new privacy risks unique to Secure
Flight's expanded screening activities. However, because the DHS
privacy refresher training for existing staff is not job-specific,
staff who joined Secure Flight prior to December 2013 may not have
received privacy training specific to these new screening activities.
We recommended that TSA provide at least annual job-specific privacy
refresher training in order to further strengthen Secure Flight's
protection of personally identifiable information. DHS concurred with
our recommendation and stated that TSA's OIA will develop and deliver
job-specific privacy refresher training for all Secure Flight staff.
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\17\ See Office of Management and Budget, Safeguarding Against and
Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, OMB
Memorandum M-07-16 (Washington, DC: 2007).
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We also reported in September 2014 that TSA documents some aspects
of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled
destructions of passenger data and reviews of planned changes to the
Secure Flight system. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to
comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and
decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight--
a mechanism TSA planned to develop when Secure Flight implementation
began in 2009. In the course of our September 2014 review, TSA's Secure
Flight privacy officer told us that, in the absence of such a system,
Secure Flight relies on its privacy contract staff to oversee and
monitor privacy protections, in consultation with the designated Secure
Flight program privacy officer and the TSA Privacy Officer. However, it
is unknown whether this ad hoc communication would be sustained after a
personnel change in Secure Flight's privacy team or contractor
personnel, and whether privacy-related decisions previously made would
continue to be implemented without documentation to inform new staff.
Therefore, to help TSA ensure that these decisions are carried into the
future in the event of a change in personnel, we recommended that TSA
comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and
decisions, in accordance with Federal internal control standards. DHS
concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will develop a
mechanism to document such issues and decisions.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
Appendix I.--Secure Flight Screening Activities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Screening Activity Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No-Fly List (high-risk).......... The No-Fly List is a subset of the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB),
the U.S. Government's consolidated
watch list of known or suspected
terrorists maintained by the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a
multi-agency organization
administered by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. The No-Fly List
contains records of individuals who
are suspected of posing or known to
pose a threat to aviation or
National security and are prohibited
from boarding an aircraft or
entering the sterile area of an
airport. Secure Flight has matched
passengers against the No-Fly List
since 2009.
Selectee List (high-risk)........ The Selectee List is a subset of the
TSDB containing records of
individuals who must undergo
enhanced security screening before
being permitted to enter the sterile
area or board an aircraft. Secure
Flight has matched against the
Selectee List since 2009.
Expanded Selectee List (high- The Expanded Selectee List includes
risk). terrorist records in the TSDB with a
complete name and date of birth that
meet the reasonable suspicion
standard to be considered a known or
suspected terrorist, but that do not
meet the criteria to be placed on
the No-Fly or Selectee Lists \1\
Secure Flight began matching against
the Expanded Selectee List in April
2011.
Transportation Security The high-risk rules-based lists
Administration (TSA) rules-based include two lists of passengers who
lists (high-risk). may not be known or suspected
terrorists, but who, according to
intelligence-driven, scenario-based
rules developed by TSA in
consultation with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), may pose an
increased risk to transportation or
National security.
Centers for Disease Control and The CDC Do Not Board List is managed
Prevention (CDC) Do Not Board by CDC. It includes individuals who
List (high-risk). pose a significant health risk to
other travelers and are not allowed
to fly.
TSA PreCheckTM lists (low-risk).. TSA PreCheckTM lists include lists of
pre-approved, low-risk travelers,
such as certain members of CBP's
Trusted Traveler programs, members
of the U.S. armed forces,
Congressional Medal of Honor Society
members, and Members of Congress--
groups of individuals TSA has
determined pose a low risk to
transportation or National security--
as well as a PreCheckTM list created
by TSA and composed of individuals
who apply and are pre-approved as
low-risk travelers through the
PreCheckTM Application Program.\2\
Secure Flight began matching against
its first set of low-risk lists, CBP
Trusted Traveler Lists, in October
2011 and instituted the PreCheckTM
Application Program in December
2013.
TSA PreCheckTM Disqualification The PreCheckTM Disqualification List
List (ineligible for low-risk). is a list of individuals who, based
upon their involvement in violations
of security regulations of
sufficient severity or frequency
(e.g., bringing a loaded firearm to
the checkpoint), are disqualified
from receiving expedited screening
for some period of time or
permanently.
TSA PreCheckTM risk assessments Secure Flight assesses certain travel-
(low-risk). related information submitted by
passengers and assigns them scores
that correspond to a likelihood of
being eligible for expedited
screening for a specific flight.
Secure Flight began performing these
assessments for selected frequent
flier members in October 2011 and,
in October 2013, began using them to
evaluate all passengers not
determined to be a match to a high-
risk or low-risk list.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--GAO analysis of TSA and TSC information. GAO-14-796T
\1\ All TSDB-based watch lists utilized by the Secure Flight program
contain records determined to have met TSC's reasonable suspicion
standard. In general, to meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the
agency nominating an individual for inclusion in the TSDB must
consider the totality of information available that, taken together
with rational inferences from that information, reasonably warrants a
determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or have
been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in
aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. To be
included on the No-Fly and Selectee Lists, individuals must meet
criteria specific to these lists. The TSDB, which is the U.S.
Government's consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists,
also contains records on additional populations of individuals that do
not meet the reasonable suspicion standard articulated above but that
other Federal agencies utilize to support their border and immigration
screening missions. In addition, according to TSA officials, Secure
Flight does not utilize all terrorist records in the TSDB because
records with partial data (i.e., without first name, surname, and date
of birth) could result in a significant increase in the number of
passengers misidentified.
\2\ Individuals on all low-risk lists receive a Known Traveler Number
that they must submit when making travel reservations to be identified
as low-risk. See 49 C.F.R. 1560.3 (defining ``Known Traveler
Number''). TSA also refers to these lists as Known Traveler lists.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Ms. Grover.
We appreciate all of the witnesses for being here, and
thank you for your service to our country.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions.
We will start, Mr. Piehota, we know that an increasing
number of Westerners, including Americans, have joined the
fight in Iraq and Syria. How confident are you in our ability
to track these foreign fighters and ensure that they are being
added to the terrorist screening database, including the No-Fly
List?
Mr. Piehota. The U.S. Government has a very capable
watchlisting and screening enterprise, and I have a high amount
of confidence in the abilities of my partners to identify and
report known or suspected terrorist identities to the Terrorist
Screening Center, and I have a high bit of confidence in the
Terrorist Screening Center's ability to export that information
to be used by our partners in countering the terrorist threat.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that.
Mr. Sadler, do you want to comment on that at all?
Mr. Sadler. Well, I would say that we have a very close
working relationship with the Terrorist Screening Center, as we
do with all our Federal partners. It is important to understand
that when that intelligence comes in, that when it goes into
the organizations that will nominate to the Terrorist Screening
Center and when the Terrorist Screening Center nominates those
individuals to the watch list, we come in and do our job and we
operationalize that data.
So I just want to make the point, we have got a great
working relationship with all of our partners, and I think we
are doing a good job with this.
Mr. Hudson. Great. Well, it is important that we do.
Mr. Piehota, has the number of individuals on the No-Fly
List grown significantly due to the situation in Syria and
Iraq?
Mr. Piehota. We can't correlate any significant increase in
the TSDB populations due to the overseas activities right now.
Mr. Hudson. How has the Terrorist Screening Center
streamlined the watch list process and improved information
sharing within the intelligence community? I mean, you both
said that there is a good working relationship there, but could
you maybe give us some specifics of how you have made those
improvements?
Mr. Piehota. Well, first the Terrorist Screening Center has
improved its policy, its protocol, and its technical
infrastructure over the past few years to remove manual
processes, lower potential for human error, and as well as to
send information to our watchlisting and screening partners in
a real-time fashion.
As information is processed at the Terrorist Screening
Center, seconds later it shows up with our partners so they can
do near-real-time screening as well, a significant technical
increase in information management.
We have also participated with our partners in various
committees, interagency functions, and collaborative projects
that have brought our organizations close together, that we
have common operating perspectives, and, as Mr. Sadler said, we
work exceptionally well together, and I would daresay that our
relationship with TSA has never been closer or more effective
than it is right now.
Mr. Hudson. Great.
Mr. Sadler, recently we learned that a former employee at
the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport was killed while fighting for
ISIS in Syria. While employed at the airport, this individual
held credentials that allowed him to work as a fuel technician
and a cleaner with access to sterile areas of the airport as
well as the tarmac and the aircraft itself.
Can you explain how TSA works to mitigate the insider
threat at airports across the country, especially in light of
this latest situation?
Mr. Sadler. Well, every individual that is issued an
airport credential is sent into my office, and we vet those
individuals on a daily basis against the Terrorist Screening
Database. We also do some other checks on them as well. So we
are very cognizant of the population that works at the airport.
That is just my piece of it. You also have to understand
that we have personnel at the airport. We have great
relationships with the FBI, with State and local authorities at
those individual airports as well. But my part of it is to take
that information and vet it on a daily basis. So if a change
comes through from the Terrorist Screening Center we will know
very quickly what that change is and what it means to our
vetted population.
Mr. Hudson. Great. I appreciate that.
Ms. Grover, I have become a fan of your work over the
years. Appreciate you being here with us again. You talked
about some of the difficulties of the checkpoint, and you
mentioned in your written statement about fraudulent IDs,
people being able to avoid sort of the No-Fly List or the
advanced screening.
How is TSA addressing this vulnerability posed by
fraudulent IDs and boarding passes?
Ms. Grover. TSA is making better progress with boarding
pass issues than the issue of potential fraudulent IDs, I would
say. They have boarding pass scanners in place at many, but not
all of the airport checkpoints, and the scanners are designed
to provide support to the travel document checker who works
there to confirm that the boarding pass is genuine, and then it
alerts the travel document checker to the specific level of
screening that that individual is supposed to receive.
As far as confirming that the identification that
individuals are using is genuine, that is still the
responsibility of the travel document checker at this point.
TSA has awarded a contract for the development of credential
authentication technology, but it was just awarded in April,
and I believe it is still in the proof-of-concept stage, so
that technology support is still quite a ways out.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
My time has expired and so I will recognize the Ranking
Member, Mr. Richmond, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Piehota, according to publicly-available data from TSC,
as of September 2011 there were approximately 16,000
individuals on the No-Fly List and approximately 16,000
individuals on the Selectee List. What are the current
statistics for those numbers of people who are on the No-Fly
and Selectee lists?
Mr. Piehota. The Terrorist Screening Center currently
stands at about 800,000 identities. For those identities, for
the No-Fly List, we are looking at about 8 percent of the
overall population of the TSDB are watchlisted at the No-Fly
level; about 3 percent of the overall population of the TSDB is
watchlisted at the Selectee level.
Mr. Richmond. As I play around with that, how many of those
individuals on the No-Fly List are U.S. persons?
Mr. Piehota. Approximately 0.8 percent of the overall TSDB
population.
Mr. Richmond. A lot of times what we deal with, and we
develop policies in theory, and in theory they make a lot of
sense, and in reality we either didn't go far enough or it just
doesn't make sense. As I look at all the people on the No-Fly
List, it just does not make common sense to me that you can be
on the No-Fly List, where we don't want you flying on our
planes, but you can go and enroll in flight school and learn
how to fly a plane.
Can you all just give me your assessment of why we would
have a policy where you can't fly, but you can go learn how to
fly a plane? Am I missing a distinction?
Mr. Sadler. I will take that one, sir. So any foreign
applicant who wants to learn how to fly an aircraft gets vetted
prior to them receiving training. So whether they are training
here, if it is an FAA-certified school, whether they are
training here, whether they are training overseas, we vet them.
Any U.S. person gets vetted through the FAA process. So
anyone who has an FAA certificate, a student pilot, whatever
that happens to be, that comes into my office, we vet those
individuals on a daily basis against the TSDB. So they are all
vetted.
Mr. Richmond. Right. But if we don't want them even flying
on a plane, why would we want them to learn how to fly a plane?
Mr. Sadler. If they are on the watch list, No-Fly, they do
not learn how to fly a plane. So the foreign applicants get
vetted against the No-Fly List and the full TSDB, and they are
denied their training application if we determine that they are
on that watch list.
Mr. Richmond. So everyone on the No-Fly List and the
Selectee List, they are barred from flight school?
Mr. Sadler. There are other operational considerations
whenever you vet an individual, and I would be happy to talk
about that in a closed setting, but they are all vetted through
the watch list.
Mr. Richmond. Okay. I just want to make sure we are saying
the same thing. If they are on the watch list, they can't go to
flight school?
Mr. Sadler. It depends on the situation, sir, and that is
why I said I would like to talk to you about this in a closed
session.
Mr. Richmond. Well, thank you.
Did anybody else want to respond to that?
Ms. Grover, GAO noted in its Secure Flight effectiveness
report that TSA has asserted that it is difficult to measure
the extent to which the Secure Flight system may miss
passengers on a high-risk list in real time, but used proxy
methods to accomplish this when the system was under
development. Should TSA reinstate the use of proxy methods to
better assess the rates at which a watchlisted passenger may be
missed by the Secure Flight program?
Ms. Grover. Yes, sir, that is exactly the sort of strategy
that would allow TSA to have some additional information about
the extent to which the Secure Flight system is accurately
identifying all of the individuals that it needs to identify.
When they were first developing the Secure Flight program
they used simulated passenger lists and watch lists to be able
to approximate the accuracy of the system, and that would be
something that they could use on a regular basis to get
information about how well the system is working and the
likelihood of misses occurring.
They also have a similar system that they use right now
when they are considering changes to the way the match process
is working that allows them to use historical data, just from
the past 7 days, to say, if we make this change, does it
improve the matching rate or does it introduce more errors. So
any of those approaches would be better than the current
situation, which is really no information about the number of
misses that are occurring on a regular basis.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
I see my time has expired, so I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Indiana,
Mrs. Brooks, for any questions she may have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing on this most important topic.
Mr. Sadler, how does the TSA know that individuals who are
on the watch list are not experiencing the expedited screening
through TSA's PreCheck, like managed inclusion, which I am
seeing more and more? I fly in and out of the Indianapolis
Airport, that is a managed inclusion site. How do we know that
they are not being chosen and put into managed inclusion?
Mr. Sadler. Well, the first thing, I just want to go back,
if you don't mind, ma'am. We do have information on the
efficiency and effectiveness of our system. We are looking at
new test data, and that new test data is going to be developed
based on our experience of vetting 3.7 billion records since we
implemented Secure Flight. So we have a pretty good idea of
what we are doing. We can improve. We appreciate GAO's
recommendations, and we concur with those and we are going to
implement those.
So everyone who goes through that airport is going to be
prescreened by TSA. So they should have a marking on the
boarding pass. That marking should be identified. That should
preclude them from going into managed inclusion.
The other thing I would say is, even with the
recommendations, everyone who goes through that checkpoint is
screened. So when you go through a managed inclusion checkpoint
we are screening you with a number of layers of security at
that checkpoint and within the airport itself. So I think that
is a very important point. Everyone is being screened going
through that checkpoint.
Mrs. Brooks. What happens if the travel documents checker
that we have heard referred to misses the selectee marking?
Mr. Sadler. If they miss the selectee marking, that
individual is going to be screened. That is the point that I
want to make. You don't go through the checkpoint, to my
knowledge, without being screened. Whether it is a behavior
detection officer, whether it is a canine, whatever, whether it
is an ETD, explosion trace detection, those individuals are
being screened.
Mrs. Brooks. I would like to just ask Mr. Piehota, on
average, your watch lists, they aren't randomly created.
Obviously you get referrals from law enforcement and from
others, from FBI, Secret Service, others. How long does it take
once an intelligence or a law enforcement agency nominates an
individual to make it into the Terrorist Watch List before that
person is added to the list?
Mr. Piehota. The time varies due to the complexity of
certain issues and the priority assigned to certain
watchlisting transactions. Some are routine modifications to
records. They are, of course, lower priority rather than people
who are added to the list, who receive higher priority. I would
not give a specific time period, because it varies from record
to record, because there are many different aspects to each
record of nomination.
Mrs. Brooks. Well, and I am certain, having worked with
Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the past, when they refer you
names, what are some of the criteria that you use to determine
how quickly, if the JTTF sends you a name, how quickly does it
make it into that list, because, as we know, timing can be
critically important in today's environment.
Mr. Piehota. All add nominations are processed immediately.
They are usually done, it could be minutes to hours.
Modifications, again, the type of modification it is, it could
take anywhere from hours to a day or so. If it is a delete
action, they generally happen pretty quickly as well, within
the next day or so.
Mrs. Brooks. Mr. Sadler, does TSA have the ability to
prevent an individual from boarding an airplane even before
that individual is added to a No-Fly List?
Mr. Sadler. Yes. The administrator has the authority to
determine who can board an aircraft and who can't.
Mrs. Brooks. How would that work if TSA believes--maybe it
has not yet gone through the practice, they are not on the No-
Fly List--how would that process work if TSA receives
information that this person should not be boarding a plane?
Mr. Sadler. So based on our earlier comments, the
communication between our organizations is as good as I have
seen it since I have been in this job. So we would receive that
information. If we felt that there was a threat to the aircraft
or the risk was too high, then we would notify our vetting
operations, who would inhibit the record of that individual, if
we had that record, or it would be inhibited when the
individual made a reservation, and then we would stop that
individual at that point.
Mrs. Brooks. How often does TSA review the names that are
actually on the expedited list?
Mr. Sadler. From the TSC, you mean?
Mrs. Brooks. Yes. Not from TSC. You have expedited lists.
How often does TSA take a look at that list?
Mr. Sadler. We normally do that on a monthly basis, and
then I personally review it on a quarterly basis.
Mrs. Brooks. Okay.
Mr. Sadler. We have a very strict oversight process for
that with our chief counsel and with our privacy officer as
well when we make those decisions.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you. My time is up. I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from California,
Mr. Swalwell, for any questions you may have.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Chairman.
Last week I had the opportunity, on September 10, to go
over to the TSA, Administrator Sadler, you were there, and I
met with Administrator Pistole and sat in on your morning
threat assessment brief. I appreciate you extending that
opportunity to me. It was a very, I think, timely visit, in
that September 11 was the next day. I left that meeting
impressed with the men and women and the effort behind keeping
us safe in the skies every day. So I have great confidence that
within our country and across the globe TSA is working hard to
make sure we address the evolving threats across the country.
I also believe that the threats that we face right now from
ISIL and the way that TSA and DHS are responding is exactly
what was envisioned out of the September 11 Commission report.
We are certainly being tested today.
Before I ask any further questions, oftentimes it is too
easy, I think, for us to beat up on TSA, but I do want to
congratulate you on the success so far on PreCheck. I hear
about it from my constituents all the time. If anyone hasn't
signed up for PreCheck, I really encourage you to sign up for
PreCheck. It has been a success. TSA and its partners in
implementing it have done a terrific job.
A few questions. First, Director Piehota, your testimony
details an extensive system of making sure only the correct
individuals are put into the Terrorist Screening Database, but
according to Administrator Sadler, 98 percent of the people who
ask DHS to remove their names as being incorrectly listed are
successful in doing so.
I understand the importance of being over-inclusive. But
what assurances can you give us that the TSA as well as DHS are
being just as vigorous to put people on that list as they are
to take those folks who don't belong on the list off of it?
Because it is important to me that that list is accurate. I
understand why it has to be a little more broad. But if someone
has evidence that they don't belong on the list, I think we
need to work overtime to take them off and not inconvenience
them. So if you could just briefly explain how the GAO report
will bring us to that moment.
Mr. Piehota. Well, in collaboration with our DHS partners,
we have cooperatively managed the Redress Inquiry Program. When
DHS provides us with an inquiry from their Redress Program, we
take it, we make sure that the individual is actually an
identical match to an identity in the TSDB. If they have been
misidentified, we work with our partners at DHS to
expeditiously remove them.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you.
I also have a question for Administrator Sadler. In light
of the emerging threat from ISIL, the Americans who we know are
over there fighting shoulder to shoulder with ISIL, and the
thousand-plus Westerners who are in the visa waiver countries,
what are we doing right now to ensure that those countries,
those visa waiver countries, who do not have 100 percent check
against the lost and stolen travel database, the lost and
stolen document database, what are we doing with those
countries to bring them up to 100 percent compliance?
Mr. Sadler. Yeah. Sir, I can't speak to that. I am not
prepared to speak to that today. What I can say, though, is
that we work very closely with CBP, Customs and Border
Protection, and along with CBP we vet passports against the
Stolen and Lost Travel Document database from Interpol. So we
are taking actions on our side to try and mitigate that risk
and buy the risk down in that area.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. As we continue to address this threat,
is there anything that you believe Congress can do to assist
the TSA as we try and learn more about what Americans are over
in the Middle East and North Africa? Is there anything that you
believe you need additional authority from Congress for or
funding to better protect us here at home?
Mr. Sadler. Sir, I mean, we can always use more help, but I
think the process that we went through with GAO and the
oversight process makes us stronger, because we have somebody
who comes in and says, these are the things that we see where
you can improve. That is what we are about. We are about buying
down risk, we are about getting better every single day so we
can do our job the best that we can for the American public.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you, Mr. Sadler.
Ms. Grover, thank you for you and your office's helpful
report in this matter.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Sanford, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Sanford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess a couple different questions. The first, and I
don't mean to be obstinate, but I want to go back to the
question that my colleague from New Orleans was asking. It
seemed to me like a fairly plain vanilla question, which is,
help me understand, if somebody is on the No-Fly List then that
means that they can't go and learn how to fly a plane, right?
Mr. Sadler. Yes.
Mr. Sanford. There were, like, three different bites at the
apple, and ultimately still no answer. It was sort-of, if I
take you into a dark tunnel, then I can answer the question.
I think from a civil liberties standpoint, that is what
drives a lot of people crazy about these different lists that
are kept by the Government. If we are a Nation of laws and not
men, there is a belief that it ought to be fairly transparent
at times where we are coming from. Are you on, are you off? If
it takes three cracks at the apple in a public hearing, and
then no answer and then the promise of in some closed-door
environment we can talk about it, it makes a civil libertarian
crazy. So what about that?
Mr. Sadler. Well, sir, I think there are some things that
are operationally sensitive that should be discussed within a
closed setting. So we try and be as transparent----
Mr. Sanford. I know. But just going back to common sense,
to his point, if you say, let me get this right, you can't go
sit in aisle 37D of the airplane, but you can sit in the
cockpit, and you can't get an answer on that.
Mr. Sadler. No, sir. I didn't say that.
Mr. Sanford. No, but you----
Mr. Sadler. I didn't say an individual on a No-Fly List
could sit in the cockpit of an aircraft. I didn't say that.
What I said was----
Mr. Sanford. Well, if you learn how to fly an airplane,
that is where you are sitting.
Mr. Sadler. What I said was that an individual on the No-
Fly List, to my knowledge, has not received training since I
have been in this position. All right? What I also said was
that there were operationally-sensitive matters that I would
like to discuss in a closed session, but I did not say that
somebody on the No-Fly List was going to sit in the cockpit. So
I want to be very----
Mr. Sanford. But you also did----
Mr. Sadler. I want to be very clear about that, sir.
Mr. Sanford. You also equally clearly said that they
definitively would--there was no definitive yes or no.
Mr. Sadler. I am telling you, sir, that I do not know of
any No-Flys that are sitting in the cockpit of an aircraft.
That is as definitive as I can get.
Mr. Sanford. Okay. Well, that is much more definitive than
we got.
Mr. Sadler. When it gets to an operational issue, then I
would like to talk to you in a closed session.
Mr. Sanford. Understood. Okay. All right. We got to a
little bit of closure on that one.
Here is another question. I want to follow up on my
colleague from California's question with regard to delisting,
which again I think is something that would drive somebody from
a civil liberties standpoint a bit crazy, which is, you end up
on the wrong list, it turns out you shouldn't be on that list.
As I understand it now, it is taking people about a year to be
cleared from that list, in terms of rough averages, about a
year, and that the goal now is to take it down to 3 months. Why
does it still take that long?
Mr. Sadler. Well, I want to clarify something. The 98
percent of the individuals that we work with are not on the No-
Fly List. They have no nexus to the No-Fly List.
Mr. Sanford. Understood.
Mr. Sadler. Those are individuals that have been matched
potentially to a person who was on the No-Fly List, and then
after going through the process you find that they have no
nexus to that individual on the watch list. So I just wanted to
clarify that.
Ninety-eight percent of the individuals who come through
the Redress Program were not on the watch list and taken off;
they were individuals that may have been matched to a person on
the watch list, and then through our redress process, we
determined that they don't have a nexus to the watch list.
Mr. Sanford. But it is still taking them a year to get off
the list.
Mr. Sadler. No. Those cases through the initial redress
process, if it is internal to TSA, we can do it within about 2
weeks; if it is external to TSA, so if it is a CBP issue or a
Department of State issue, the initial redress takes about 60
days. That is where the majority of those individuals fall,
that 98 percent.
Once you get past that point, the other 2 percent, who have
some nexus to the watch list, a portion of those may appeal.
That is when we start getting into the longer time frame.
Mr. Sanford. Okay. I guess one question would be, though,
even if you are taken off the list, so as I understand it, you
are still then on a cleared list.
Mr. Sadler. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Sanford. Why be on any list at all?
Mr. Sadler. Because we want to give you a redress number
that would allow you to enter that into your reservation, so
when you come back with another reservation we can run that
through our system and we can keep you from being
inconvenienced again. It is our way of ensuring that you can go
through the checkpoint without being inconvenienced.
Mr. Sanford. But, I mean, I thought you were cleared. So if
you got one citizen who goes through the line, turns out he has
never had any mishap, never been on any wrong list, he is not
on a cleared list. Why should somebody that went through, turns
out they were bungled with somebody else's name, why should
they be on again a cleared list, which raises some level of
suspicion with regard to, I am on yet another Government list?
Mr. Sadler. Because we are trying to ensure that they can
go through the checkpoint without being inconvenienced. So if
your name is that close and your date of birth is that close to
that individual, the way we clear that name is by assigning
this redress control number to the individual that they can put
in their reservation and then they should be cleared.
Mr. Sanford. One last question. Well, I am going over. I
guess I can't. Can I ask one more question? Five seconds? No.
Okay. Come back to it. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hudson. I am happy to do a second round if the
committee would like to do that.
Mr. Sanford. Thank you. Yes, sir.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield to him so he can ask his question.
Mr. Hudson. Well, if the gentlelady is willing to hold off
for a second before her start----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will.
Mr. Hudson [continuing]. Then sure, we will allow the
gentleman to ask one more question.
Mr. Sanford. Well, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas.
Thank you very much.
I guess my one question would be with all these lists, as I
understand it, whether it is a Member of Congress or whether it
is anybody in this room, even we are on different levels of
risk in terms of gradation. Is that correct?
Mr. Sadler. Well, I wouldn't go gradation. Well, that is a
correct answer, but our lists are based on what we know about
you.
Mr. Sanford. Well, my only point being, again from a civil
liberties standpoint, whether it is a Member of Congress who
has Secret clearance and a whole host of other things, or a
member of the military or somebody out here, again, why do they
have to be on any gradation with regard to lists? Why couldn't
we just clear those folks off this?
Mr. Sadler. Well, we have to know, sir, that when you are
coming through the airport that it is you, and we can move you
off. That is the whole intent of PreCheck. We want to move
those people off that we know so we can focus our resources
where they need to be focused.
Mr. Sanford. But as I am saying, you could be on TSA, have
PreCheck, but still have a risk factor assigned to you, and I
don't understand that risk factor.
But I have taken too much time from the gentlewoman from
Texas and I need to yield back to her. I really appreciate it.
Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for any questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and Mr.
Richmond for this hearing, very timely hearing, and following
up on the hearings that we have had this week, the briefings
that we have had. I just had an opportunity to sit on the
Foreign Affairs Committee for the testimony of Secretary Kerry;
as he testified in the Senate yesterday, he was in the House
today. We had a full committee hearing in the Homeland Security
Committee with Mr. Thompson, Mr. McCaul this week. Previously
the Border Security and Maritime Security addressed the
question of the visa waivers and other ways and means that
individuals who may be foreign fighters or who may attempt to
come into the United States might use, and so that we must be
vigilant to do so.
Certainly the witnesses before us represent the component
of vigilance that is important. Secretary Johnson was here, of
course, and represented well the position of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Let me make one or two points before. We are in a posture
of making sure that we coordinate and are aware of the actions
that are taken outside the borders of this Nation to protect
the homeland and to collaborate with what is done on the soil
of the Nation to protect the homeland and the American people.
So it is important for the knowledge of the actions that are
going to be taken, the train and equip, that Congress is
briefed on that. It is well-known by the American people that
there have been air strikes, and there are deliberations on the
utilization of air strikes in places where ISIL can be stopped.
There is collaboration with other nations in a variety of ways.
I think it all makes to the security of this Nation.
So I make the point, and I hope that I will make this on
the record and that we can get it clarified, on the McKeon
amendment establishing the appropriate committees that should
be briefed as the actions have taken place on the train and
equip, the Homeland Security Committee in both the House and
the Senate, I believe, should be added. It is outrageous that
the drafters of the amendment left out the Homeland Security
Committee. It would be good to keep it quiet and not let anyone
know that they have been left out, but I believe that it is an
egregious error by the drafters and whoever is responsible and
that there is no way that you can ensure the safety of the
homeland unless we are collaborating. So I hope someone hears
it and I hope someone makes a correction on that point.
The second point I want to do is to encourage my colleagues
to join me on the legislation that I have introduced, the No-
Fly Foreign Fighters legislation, which does not compromise a
recent court case dealing with the watch lists and the No-Fly
structure that I understand was just rendered. This is a simple
cleaning-up. The language I think that is relevant in this
legislation that has been introduced is that the terrorist
watch lists utilized by the Transportation Security
Administration, to determine basically if this is a complete
list. So we are asking for the appropriate agencies to
determine whether or not this list that is being utilized is an
accurate list, is a complete list. It has no impact on one's
removal. That process is being reviewed. I agree with the
American Civil Liberties Union that there should be a proper
process for removal. But I hope my colleagues will join in
this, simple, that says no fly for foreign fighters. I will
read some of the language in a moment.
I see my time is out. So let me just, if I could, ask this
question, and maybe you will answer it, to--is it Mr. Piehota?
Is that the correct pronunciation?
Mr. Piehota. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. As I indicated, we held a recent hearing
on the Visa Waiver Program, and during that hearing concerns
were expressed that someone with a passport from a Western
country that has joined in the fighting in Syria or in any
other place in the region where there are efforts at jihad,
joined with a terrorist organization, could be only one flight
away from our shores.
On Tuesday I introduced the No-Fly for Foreign Fighters
Act. Are individuals known to have joined terrorist
organizations in Syria and Iraq, is there seemingly a current
list or current knowledge of those individuals, and are they
being placed in a position not to possibly do harm in to the
United States and to the American people? Are we continually
updating and making sure that we have a complete list to
address?
Then my other subset of that, to explain to the
subcommittee how Secure Flight is being used to identify
passengers flying internationally for enhanced screening based
on risk-based, intelligence-driven information.
Mr. Piehota. The Terrorist Screening Database is updated on
a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis through collaboration with the
law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence
communities. We do this in partnership, we do this in a joint
National security mission fashion.
The Terrorist Screening Database at the current time has
approximately 9,000 identities that have been associated with
foreign terrorist fighter activities. Of those 9,000
identities, 95 percent of these people have already been
watchlisted at the No-Fly level.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On the Secure----
Mr. Piehota. That information is then transmitted in a
transactional real-time fashion to our TSA partners, who then
use it in their Secure Flight program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by
saying, and the idea of my legislation is for Congress to be
advised on the completeness of the Terrorist Screening
Database, which I think has not been done, particularly to our
relevant committees, and to ensure that it is continuously
updated, and particularly with those who have gone for the
fight.
So I hope my colleagues will consider the legislation, but
I thank the gentleman. I reinforce the point that I am making
with this legislation, but as well with the questions that I
asked, in order to secure the homeland, the committees of
jurisdiction that are relevant to the actions outside of the
boundaries of this Nation must collaborate with those who have
the ultimate responsibility for the securing of this Nation. As
I understand it, that is the jurisdiction of the Homeland
Security Committee and in this instance on the aviation and
other matters with the Transportation Security Committee. I
hope we can fix this as quickly as possible.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Well, I thank the gentlelady.
Thank the witnesses for your testimony and all of the
Members for your questions today.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses we will ask that you respond to in
writing.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 3:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Honorable Michael D. Rogers for Stephen Sadler
Question. The Secure Flight Program's success depends in
large part upon supporting contracts and contractors. Please
provide an overview and status update on each of the TSA's
supporting Secure Flight and Operational Computing Environment
contracts and acquisitions, including the length and cost of
each contract.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's Secure
Flight contract information requested is provided in the tables
below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Period of
Description of Performance Total
Active Contract No. Contract Type Contractor Supply/Service (Start & End Value $
Date) Million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................ Cost Plus Fixed Flatter & Independent Sep 18, 2009 7.049
Fee (CPFF). Associates. validation & thru Mar 17,
verification 2015.
services.
2............................ CPFF............ Infozen......... System Feb 1, 2008 thru 64.779
operations & Nov 27, 2014.
maintenance,
production
environment.
3............................ Firm Fixed Price InfoGlide....... Bladeworks Jan 4, 2011 thru 9.391
(FFP). software Nov 3, 2015.
maintenance.
4............................ Time and IBM............. System Dec 14, 2013 16.837
Material (T&M). application thru Oct 20,
development and 2014.
Tier 3 Support.
5............................ FFP............. Comp Sci Corp... WebEOC support. Nov 1, 2013 thru 0.251
Aug 3, 2015.
6............................ FFP............. Dell............ Hardware........ Dec 17, 2013 0.292
thru Dec 16,
2014.
7............................ FFP............. Infozen......... Hardware/ Apr 1, 2013 thru 6.974
Software (H/W) Nov 27, 2014.
maintenance
renewal, H/S
license, spare
parts.
8............................ FFP............. Omniplex........ Physical Nov 10, 2013 1.813
PSecurity. thru Nov 9,
2018.
9............................ FFP............. TSA Office of Annapolis Oct 22, 2013 13.616
Facilities. PJunction thru Jan 31,
Pfacility lease 2018.
and utilities.
10........................... FFP............. TSA Office of Colorado Springs Oct 22, 2013 9.286
Facilities. Pfacility lease thru Dec 21,
and utilities. 2018.
11........................... FFP............. Customs and Connectivity Aug 11, 2009 15.254
Border with Customs thru Aug 10,
PProtection. and Border 2015.
Protection.
12........................... Labor Hour (LH). RCM PSolutions.. Program Apr 9, 2010 thru 4.862
Pmanagement Jan 12, 2015.
support.
13........................... LH.............. SRA............. Privacy program Sep 21, 2009 4.206
development and thru Mar 20,
support. 2015.
14........................... CPFF............ Deloitte Implementation Aug 11, 2012 18.722
PConsulting. and business thru Jan 31,
operations. 2015.
15........................... FFP............. GSA............. Lines July 1, 2014 0.589
connectivity. thru June 30,
2015.
16........................... FFP............. Zibiz Corp...... Hardware........ Mar 23, 2012 1.900
thru Mar 21,
2015.
17........................... FFP............. Immix- Software license Apr 1, 2013 thru 0.011
Ptechnology. Mar 31, 2015.
18........................... FFP............. ECS Gov, PInc... Software........ Dec 20, 2011 2.959
thru Mar 31,
2016.
19........................... FFP............. Snap, Inc....... Virtual Storage, Sep 22, 2014 1.028
Smart Cloud. thru Sep 21,
2015.
20........................... FFP............. Govplace........ Net App SAN Sep 19, 2014 0.229
(storage). thru Sep 18,
2015.
21........................... FFP............. ESC Gov (IBM)... Enterprise April 15, 2013 61.100
Plicense thru Mar 31,
Pagreement. 2018.
22........................... FFP............. Dell............ Software license Apr 1, 2013 thru 0.089
Mar 31, 2014.
23........................... CPFF............ QinetiQ North System July 15, 2013 9.481
America. Poperations and thru Oct 31,
Pmaintenance -- 2014.
under Pprotest.
24........................... FFP............. Govplace........ Software........ April 1, 2014 0.041
thru March 31,
2015.
25........................... T&M............. Sev1tech, PInc.. Implementation Nov 17, 2014 14.912
and business thru June 20,
operations. 2018.
26........................... T&M............. IBM............. System Aug 20, 2014 34.458
Pdevelopment thru Feb 19,
and Tier 3 2016.
System PSupport.
27........................... FFP............. Wildflower...... DBI Data Base Sep 10, 2014 0.121
software. thru Sep 9,
2015.
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[all]