[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ONE FLIGHT AWAY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE THREAT POSED BY ISIS TERRORISTS
WITH WESTERN PASSPORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-84
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
92-901 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Curtis Clawson, Florida
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan O'Hara, Acting Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Vacancy
Curtis Clawson, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, II, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Joe Heck, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Witnesses
Mr. Troy Miller, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Intelligence and
Investigative Liaison, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Mr. John P. Wagner, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Ms. Jennifer A. Lasley, Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis,
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Ms. Hillary Batjer Johnson, Acting Deputy Coordinator, Homeland
Security and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Counterterrorism,
U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
For the Record
The Honorable Beto O'Rourke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas:
Article, El Paso Herald-Post................................... 38
Appendix
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Troy Miller............ 47
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for John P. Wagner......... 47
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Jennifer A. Lasley..... 47
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Hillary Batjer Johnson. 47
ONE FLIGHT AWAY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE THREAT POSED BY ISIS TERRORISTS
WITH WESTERN PASSPORTS
----------
Wednesday, September 10, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Barletta, Clawson,
Thompson, Jackson Lee, and O'Rourke.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security, the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threat
posed by ISIS foreign fighters who are holding Western
passports. We are very pleased today to be joined by Mr. Troy
Miller, who is the acting assistant commissioner at the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection. Mr. John Wagner, a frequent
testifier to our subcommittee here, and we appreciate him
coming back. He is the assistant commissioner at the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection.
Ms. Jennifer Lasley--we welcome you, the deputy under
secretary for analysis at DHS's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis. Ms. Hillary Johnson, the acting deputy coordinator
for homeland security and multilateral affairs at the State
Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism. I will introduce them
a bit more formally shortly.
Tomorrow marks the 13th anniversary of the most heinous and
cowardly attack in the history of our Nation, certainly a
terrorist attack that took the lives of nearly 3,000 of our
fellow Americans. It happened in part because our visa security
and border security defenses were not very effective. Among the
most important weaknesses that the attackers were able to
exploit was our porous outer ring of border security. In total,
the 19 hijackers passed through the U.S. border security 68
times back and forth without being detected.
On that day in September, we learned a very hard lesson. As
noted by the 9/11 commission, ``For terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons.'' I think that is a
very, very important statement by them. It is so true.
Many more terrorists since have exploited the visa system
in one fashion or another, and it is an on-going vulnerability,
certainly one heightened by the significant growing threat that
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria pose to our Nation. Our
best estimates are that thousands of individuals carrying
Western passports have joined in the fight in Syria and in
Iraq, including several hundred Americans.
Two innocent American journalists, James Foley and Steven
Sotloff, were brutally beheaded by an ISIS terrorist who is
likely a British citizen. These thugs have no regard for life
and have threatened to attack our homeland, and the United
States Government must be prepared to prevent such an act from
happening. Terrorists with Western passports pose an additional
risk to the homeland because many are eligible for visa-free
travel through the Visa Waiver Program. Terrorists could be
just one visa-free flight away from arriving in the United
States, bringing with them their skills and their training and
their ideology and their commitment to killing Americans, all
these things that they have learned overseas.
Let us remember that Zacharias Moussaoui, the so-called
20th hijacker, actually traveled on the Visa Waiver Program
before he enrolled in a Minneapolis flight school. Richard
Reed, the shoe bomber who tried to ignite explosives in his
shoe, also traveled on the Visa Waiver Program. Ramzi Yousef,
who was one of the main perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, again used the Visa Waiver Program to enter the
country.
These attacks occurred before the advent of increased
scrutiny on the visa waiver countries. While I think we are
confident that we can identify many threats today through the
electronic system for travel authorization, commonly called
ESTA--we will be talking about ESTA quite a bit in our hearing
today--which all these waiver applicants have to fill out, it
is clear that we may have trouble determining if some
individuals have traveled to terrorist regions.
Although CBP continuously vets all visa applicants against
our terrorism holdings, that information is imperfect if we do
not have a complete picture of an individual's travel route.
Collecting more information up front could be very, very
helpful for us to do just that.
Patriot and other pilot programs that look at the totality
of data on an ESTA and visa application are certainly good
tools to help close some of our intelligence gaps and make
connections that we would otherwise miss. However, critical
information sharing, especially with our European allies, is
critical to help combat the threat of foreign fighters bound
for the United States. Unfortunately, Europe as a whole has
been reluctant to share certain passenger name record data, or
PNR data, as we call it, with the United States, and such a gap
certainly puts our citizens in the United States at risk.
I want to commend our allies in the United Kingdom, who
have been quick to realize the severity of the threat,
especially as many Brits are among the ISIS fighters. We must
work with our foreign allies like the United Kingdom and others
to quickly identify those radicalized by ISIS and similar
groups and prevent them from traveling to the United States.
Like the United Kingdom, I also think we should be looking
at the authority that we have or we may need--and that will be
a big part of our discussion here this morning--to revoke
passports of American citizens who go to fight in ISIS. We need
to reduce their ability to travel to the United States, and I
think we need to consider what it will take to strip passports
from those who provide support to or fight with terrorists.
I certainly look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today on what further changes we have made in our visa security
system to combat the threat of foreign fighters who travel
often overland through neighboring Turkey's porous border, into
Syria and into Iraq before returning home to Europe. It might
be hard for many Americans to comprehend, but for many in
Europe, traveling to Syria is as simple as just getting in
their car and driving there.
Today's hearing is really about one simple question. Can
the United States Government adequately detect terrorists'
travel patterns, identify suspicious movement, and prevent
those who would do us harm from coming into the United States?
How can we best protect our homeland? Our enemies are intent on
attacking our country and are actively seeking to avoid our
countermeasures. We need to be one step ahead instead of
constantly reacting to their latest attack.
Defeating terrorists' ability to move internationally has
long been a focus area for this subcommittee. Terrorists who
have plotted horrific attacks against us have crossed the U.S.
border for training or fraudulently obtaining a student or a
work visa. There are certainly further opportunities that we
can take to prevent attacks and to limit terrorists' mobility,
and that is why we are holding this hearing today. Our visa
security process obviously needs to be robust, and we must deny
terrorists freedom of movement because 13 years ago, we
unfortunately saw what failure looked like.
The Chairwoman would now recognize the Ranking Minority
Member of this subcommittee, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for her opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning. Let me thank the Chairwoman
for yielding. Let me also acknowledge the Ranking Member of the
full committee, Mr. Thompson, and thank him for his leadership,
as he is joined by the Chairman of the full committee, Mr.
McCaul, and the way that they have worked diligently to provide
leadership in securing the homeland.
As I often remind our colleagues and as often as we are
questioned by our constituents, the Homeland Security Committee
is a pivotal committee that stands in the gap, making sure that
the needs of our Nation, domestic needs in protecting the
homeland, are the priority and recognized by the American
people as having a department and a committee that is clearly
assigned to protect the homeland.
September 11 continues to be a symbol for all of the
untoward terrorists across and around the world. They view that
as a challenge to them every year, as to whether or not they
can continue to intimidate the Western world, and of course,
the United States of America. Our values are contrary to their
beliefs, and therefore, 9/11 poses for all of us a time of
recognition that we still remain in the eye of the storm, and
we must be diligent.
I would offer to say that we will not fall victim to the
terrorists' intent, and that is that we will not terrorize
ourselves. We will be vigilant, which I believe is extremely
important, but we will be fair and just, and we will recognize
the civil liberties of all.
But we are in some very challenging and difficult times,
and so I want to thank the Chairwoman for allowing us and this
committee in working with me and the full committee to be the
very first committee that is addressing the question of ISIS
here in the United States Congress upon our return. That is an
important statement, for Homeland Security, Armed Services, the
Intelligence Committee are the cornerstone of defending this
Nation, and our collaboration and working together is key. That
we are doing.
This fact-finding hearing will lay the groundwork for many
other hearings that will be necessary to expeditiously address
this question. This evening, the President will address the
Nation and discuss new protocols as to how we confront ISIS,
and as he has indicated, degrade and end ISIS. So I am not
willing to cede the point that ISIS does not represent a threat
to the United States.
I did not say imminent. I did not say today. But I believe
this hearing recognizes that ISIS is a threat to the United
States and to the people of the United States. Again, not in
the instance of being intimidated, but being prepared to
protect the people of the United States of America.
Like all Americans, I was horrified, outraged, and saddened
by the beheadings of two American journalists, James Foley and
Steven Sotloff, by ISIL terrorists in Syria. ISIL has used
ruthless, brutal remedies and tactics to expand its control
over areas of northwestern Iraq, northeastern Syria,
threatening the security of both countries. They have attacked,
killed, kidnapped, and displaced thousands of religious and
ethnic minorities in the region, including Christians and
including small ethnic minority groups.
U.S. officials have warned that Syria-based terrorist
extremists may also pose a direct threat to our homeland. One
concern is that foreign fighters holding Western passports
might travel to this country to carry out a terrorist attack.
Additionally, our own U.S. citizens are known to have likewise
left the United States and gone to the battlefield to
perpetrate jihad.
The total number of armed opposition fighters engaged with
various groups in Syria, including ISIL, is estimated at
between 75,000 to 100,000 persons. Of those, the U.S.
Government estimates 12,000 are foreign fighters. Among those
foreign fighters are estimated to be more than 1,000
individuals from Europe and over 100 from the United States,
with about a dozen American fighters with ISIL specifically.
We may be reminded on 9/11, the count was approximately 19
who created the most heinous terrorist act, killing over 3,000
here in the United States of America. We mourn for them and
their families.
Many have expressed particular concern about Western
foreign fighters because they hold passports from countries
that participate in the Visa Waiver Program, which generally
allows them to travel to the United States without accepting--
without obtaining a visa. I want assurances today that these
individuals have been appropriately watch-listed, and I want to
discuss and look at whether or not we need to make the No-Fly
List more robust and would look to the idea of legislation
quickly passed that makes sure that we shore up the No-Fly
List, not to undermine civil liberties but to protect the
Nation. I am interested in a discussion of that going forward
in Classified or what is available today.
I would note, however, that while these waiver travelers
usually do not need a visa to visit this country, they are
currently vetted both prior to departure and upon arrival to
the United States. I expect that we will discuss that process
in more detail at this hearing. Similarly, some are concerned
about U.S. citizens who travel to the fight and then seek to
return to the country by air. We are aware of two individual
suicide bombers from the United States who recently died in
battle.
I expect discussion today about what DHS and its Federal
partners can do to address such situations beyond adding
individuals to the No-Fly List, if and when the need arises.
Indeed, the Departments of Homeland Security and State play a
vital role in disrupting terrorists' travel to the United
States.
This subcommittee has previously examined U.S. visa
security and passenger prescreening programs which are
essential to addressing the foreign fighter threat to the
homeland. I hope our DHS and State Department witnesses can
speak to us about how these programs operate and how they can
be used to address concerns regarding the VWP travel
specifically.
I also hope to hear from our State Department witnesses
about how we engage--and how we are engaging with our foreign
partners to help address information gaps regarding individuals
of concern and their travel patterns. Like Chairwoman Miller, I
am glad that Europe is standing up. I believe that they should
stand up and collaborate. While we maintain our values, we can
secure this Nation.
While the United States cannot resolve the larger situation
in Syria and Iraq in its totality, we can do it collaboratively
with our Mideast allies and our Western allies. We do have the
responsibility to protect the homeland from threats from ISIL
and similar terrorist organizations. Be mindful--as we mourn
and commemorate 9/11, be mindful of the fact that we have work
to do.
I therefore strongly encourage the administration and
Congressional leadership to ensure that all relevant
committees, including Intelligence, Armed Services, and
Homeland Security, are included in briefings so that there can
be a collaborative strategy in conjunction with the
administration, so we can work collaboratively together and
address these issues. I know that our Chairpersons and Ranking
Members are prepared to do so.
Finally, I look forward to the President's address to the
Nation tonight as he outlines his plan for combatting ISIL. I
remain committed to working with any of my colleagues on this
committee and will look forward to the appropriate legislation
that we would hope will be expedited and passed to ensure the
safety and security of the homeland. It is our duty and it is
our challenge.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee
September 10, 2014
I am pleased to join Chairwoman Miller in holding today's hearing
to discuss the Federal Government's efforts to identify foreign
fighters in Syria and Iraq who may seek to travel to the United States
to do our Nation harm. This hearing could not be more timely.
Like all Americans, I was horrified, outraged, and saddened by the
beheadings of two American journalists--James Foley and Steven
Sotloff--by ISIL terrorists in Syria. ISIL has used ruthless, brutal
tactics to expand its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and
northeastern Syria, threatening the security of both countries.
They have attacked, killed, kidnapped, and displaced thousands of
religious and ethnic minorities in the region, including Christians and
Yazidis. U.S. officials have warned that Syria-based terrorist
extremists may also pose a direct threat to our homeland.
One concern is that foreign fighters holding Western passports
might travel to this country to carry out a terrorist attack. The total
number of armed opposition fighters engaged with various groups in
Syria, including ISIL, is estimated at between 75,000 and 110,000
persons. Of those, the U.S. Government estimates 12,000 are foreign
fighters.
Among these foreign fighters are estimated to be more than 1,000
individuals from Europe and over 100 from the United States, with about
a dozen Americans fighting with ISIL specifically. Many have expressed
particular concern about Western foreign fighters, because they hold
passports from countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP), which generally allows them to travel to the United States
without obtaining a visa.
I want assurances today that these individuals have been
appropriately watch-listed and placed on the No-Fly List, and would
welcome the opportunity to discuss their status in more detail outside
of this open setting if necessary. I would note, however, that while
VWP travelers usually do not need a visa to visit this country, they
are currently vetted both prior to departure and upon arrival in the
United States.
I expect we will discuss that process in more detail at this
hearing. Similarly, some are concerned about U.S. citizens who travel
to the fight and then seek to return to this country by air. I expect
discussion today about what DHS and its Federal partners can do to
address such situations, beyond adding individuals to the No-Fly List,
if and when the need arises.
Indeed, the Departments of Homeland Security and State play a vital
role in disrupting terrorist travel to the United States. This
subcommittee has previously examined U.S. visa security and passenger
prescreening programs, which are essential to addressing the foreign
fighter threat to the homeland.
I hope our DHS and State Department witnesses can speak to us about
how these programs operate and how they can be used to address concerns
regarding VWP travel specifically. I also hope to hear from our State
Department witness about how we are engaging with our foreign partners
to help address information gaps regarding individuals of concern and
their travel patterns. While the United States cannot resolve the
larger situation in Syria and Iraq, we have a responsibility to protect
the homeland from threats from ISIL and similar terrorist
organizations.
I therefore strongly encourage the administration and Congressional
leadership to ensure that all relevant committees, including
Intelligence, Armed Services, and Homeland Security, are included in
briefings on this matter, so we can work cooperatively to address the
various threats posed by ISIL to the United States, both around the
world and here in the homeland.
Finally, I look forward to the President's address to the Nation
tonight as he outlines his plan for combating ISIL. I remain committed
to working with my colleagues on this committee and across Congress to
help keep America secure.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for his opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee. Thank you for holding today's hearing. I
would also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify
about the Federal Government's efforts to identify foreign
fighters in Syria and Iraq who may seek to travel to the United
States to do our Nation harm.
Since its establishment in the wake of the terrorist attack
of
9/11, this committee has been engaged in helping to address the
threats posed by terrorists' travel. For example, Members of
the committee advocated for a key provision in the 9/11 Act
requiring the implementation of an electronic system for travel
authorization to enhance the security of the Visa Waiver
Program.
This committee also examined the lessons learned from the
attempted bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas day 2009 and urged
DHS and the rest of the intelligence community to strengthen
programs aimed at identifying and interdicting travelers to
this country who might do us harm.
Today, we turn our attention to the threat posed by foreign
fighters with Islamic State of Iraq and Lebanon, ISIL,
particularly those holding Western passports, who could attempt
to travel to this country without obtaining a visa. Top U.S.
officials have made public statements warning that Syria-
trained extremists, including foreign fighters linked with
ISIL, may pose a direct threat to this country. Law enforcement
and intelligence officials know that individuals from North
America and Europe that travel to Syria could be exposed to
radical and extremist influences before returning to their home
country.
As Ranking Member Lee has already said, the U.S. Government
estimates that there are 12,000 foreign fighters who have
traveled to Syria to engage in the on-going civil war,
including more than 1,000 Europeans and over 100 U.S. citizens.
Of those 100 U.S. citizens fighting in the region, about a
dozen are believed to be fighting along ISIL.
I hope our conversation today provides insight into the
full scope of foreign fighter issues facing the U.S.
Government, as well as how we, along with our foreign partners,
can maximize our intelligence and information sharing regarding
these individuals. With that in mind, I want to hear from the
Department of Homeland Security and Department of State
witnesses about their on-going work to identify and interdict
foreign fighters coming to the United States, and whether or
not they need to increase their efforts in response to ISIL.
We know that the threat posed by ISIL foreign fighters is
very real and serious. The American people want assurances that
our Government response is and will continue to be equal to the
task at hand. Again, I thank the witnesses for joining us today
and the Members for holding this hearing.
Madam Chairwoman, with that, I also yield back the balance
of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 10, 2014
I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify
regarding the Federal Government's efforts to identify foreign fighters
in Syria and Iraq who may seek to travel to the United States to do our
Nation harm. Since its establishment in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, this committee has been engaged in helping to address
the threats posed by terrorist travel. For example, Members of the
committee advocated for a key provision in the Implementing 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53) requiring the
implementation of an Electronic System for Travel Authorization to
enhance the security of the Visa Waiver Program.
This committee also examined the lessons learned from the attempted
bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas day 2009 and urged DHS and its
Federal partners to strengthen programs aimed at identifying and
interdicting travelers to this country who might do us harm. Today, we
turn our attention to the threat posed by foreign fighters with the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and particularly those
holding Western passports who could attempt to travel to this country
without obtaining a visa. Top U.S. officials have made public
statements warning that Syria-based extremists, including foreign
fighters linked to ISIL, may pose a direct terrorist threat to this
country.
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials know that
individuals from North America and Europe have gone to Syria and will
be exposed to radical and extremist influences before possibly
returning to their home countries, possibly with intent to do harm.
Recent U.S. Government estimates indicate 12,000 foreign fighters have
travelled to Syria to engage in the on-going fighting, including more
than 1,000 Europeans and over 100 U.S. citizens. Of those 100 U.S.
citizens fighting in the region, about a dozen are believed to be with
ISIL in particular.
I hope our conversation today provides insight into the full scope
of foreign fighter issues facing the U.S. Government as well as how we,
along with our foreign partners, can redouble our intelligence,
information sharing, and response regarding these individuals. With
that in mind, I want to hear from the Department of Homeland Security
and Department of State witnesses about their on-going work to identify
and interdict foreign fighters coming to the United States, and whether
they need to increase their efforts in response to ISIL. We know that
the threat posed by ISIL foreign fighters is very real and serious. The
American people want assurances that our Government's response is and
will continue to be equal to the task at hand.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman very much for his
opening statement.
I would--before we begin, would ask unanimous consent that
a written statement offered by the gentleman from Nevada, Mr.
Heck, be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement of Hon. Heck follows:]
Statement of Honorable Joe Heck
September 10, 2014
Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Jackson Lee: Thank you for
allowing me to submit my statement to the record. Like my colleagues
that sit on this committee, one of my top priorities as a Member of the
House of Representatives is to protect and advance our country's
National security efforts.
I am very pleased that the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security is having this hearing today to examine the
growing threat from ISIL. As we have seen in the media these past few
months, the threat from ISIL is very real. They are a violent terrorist
organization that threatened our homeland and brutally murdered two of
our citizens. Reports indicate that hundreds of ISIS members
potentially hold passports from Western allied countries. This is
certainly cause for alarm and this committee is right to examine this
issue. But what must not get lost in this discussion are the benefits
of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).
As you know, VWP allows citizens from specific countries to travel
to the United States for up to 90 days without first obtaining a B1/B2
visa, also known as a tourist visa. Given the name and the way the
program facilitates travel to the United States, I understand how one
may initially question the role VWP plays in our National security
efforts. However, the VWP imposes stringent compliance requirements in
order for countries to participate.
Those requirements include:
1. A visa refusal rate below 3%; a condition that must be met
before initial designation into VWP.
2. Issuance of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)-
compliant electronic passports.
3. Reporting of all lost and stolen passports to the United States
via INTERPOL or other means as designated by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
4. Completion of information-sharing agreements with the United
States on travelers who may pose a terrorist or criminal
threat.
5. Repatriation of criminal aliens.
6. Initial and continuing reviews to determine that a country's VWP
designation does not compromise U.S. security, law enforcement,
and immigration interests.
7. Independent intelligence assessment of each VWP country in
conjunction the previously-mentioned DHS reviews.
Additionally, once a country does become a VWP member, the
continual coordination between our intelligence community and of the
Members provides constant security assessments that help protect us
against potential threats.
The Visa Waiver Program is an effective program that facilitates
legitimate travel to the United States while at the same time providing
enhanced scrutiny of travelers from participating countries. I
understand the concerns that some have, but ultimately preventing a
terrorist attack on our homeland is dependent largely upon intelligence
sharing with our allies, which the VWP facilitates.
I am eager to review the testimony and the hearing record in the
next few days, as well as potential opportunities to further strengthen
VWP. Again, thank you Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Lee for
allowing me to submit my statement. I look forward to working with you
on this very important National security program
Mrs. Miller. Other Members of the committee are reminded
that opening statements might be submitted for the record.
Again, we are pleased to have some very distinguished
witnesses with us today to discuss this very important topic.
Let me more formally introduce them, and then we will just
start.
Mr. Troy Miller serves as the acting assistant commissioner
for the Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison. Mr.
Miller and his team are responsible for implementation of
intelligence and targeting capabilities, supporting the primary
mission of securing America's border by facilitating legitimate
travel and trade. Mr. Miller began his career in 1993 as a
customs inspector in North Dakota and has since held various
positions throughout CBP.
Mr. John Wagner is the assistant commissioner for the
Office of Field Operations at the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. Mr. Wagner formerly served as executive director of
admissibility and passenger programs with responsibility for
all traveler admissibility-related policies and programs.
Ms. Jennifer Lasley is the deputy under secretary for
analysis at DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, a
position that she has held since April 2013. In this role, Ms.
Lasley leads the DHS office charged with providing all-source
intelligence analysis of threats to the homeland. Prior to this
assignment, she served as vice deputy director for analysis at
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Ms. Hillary Johnson is the acting deputy coordinator for
homeland security and multilateral affairs in the State
Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism. In this capacity, she
oversees whole-of-Government approaches to protecting the
homeland on cross-cutting issues such as transportation and
cargo security, global supply chain security and terrorism
screening and interdictions programs to include terrorism
information-sharing negotiations and agreements with foreign
partners to combat terrorist travel.
With that, the Chairwoman would recognize Mr. Miller for
his testimony.
STATEMENT OF TROY MILLER, ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE LIAISON, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Miller. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Thompson,
Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the role of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection in securing the homeland
against terrorist threats.
More than a decade after the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, terrorists continue to focus on commercial aviation
as their primary target of interest. As this committee knows,
the Department of Homeland Security, specifically CBP, has been
aware of and continues to adjust and align our resources to
address the evolving nature of the terrorist threat to the
homeland.
CBP capabilities allow us to rapidly leverage information
and respond to emerging threats as a part of our intelligence-
driven counterterrorism strategy. Of particular concern are
those threats that continue to emanate from core al-Qaeda,
their affiliates, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
ISIL, as well as other like-minded terrorist organizations from
across the globe.
CBP's Office of Intelligence has focused on the growing
threat of U.S. citizens and Europeans traveling to the Levant
to support terrorist activities and those who then return to
the United States or allied countries. This past May, a 22-
year-old American citizen blew himself up while detonating a
massive truck bomb at a restaurant in northern Syria. In
addition, in August, two U.S. citizens were killed near Aleppo,
Syria, while fighting for extremist groups.
In order to address this and other emerging threats, CBP's
Office of Intelligence provides operational and analytic
support to our front-line officers on a daily basis through
intelligence-based target rules, situational awareness
briefings and tactical intelligence, such as link analysis on
known subjects of interest.
CBP, in conjunction with our investigative partners, has
long-standing protocols for identifying, examining, and
reporting on encounters with persons on the terrorist watch
list. As a complement to its ability to identify watch-listed
individuals attempting to travel, CBP also takes steps to
identify those unknown to the law enforcement and intelligence
community for further scrutiny. These efforts occur before
departure from the United States, before departure from foreign
locations destined to the United States, or upon arrival at
U.S. ports of entry.
Through robust information sharing and collaboration, CBP
continues to work with our law enforcement and intelligence
community partners to enhance its comprehensive intelligence-
driven targeting program to detect previously-unknown
terrorists and their facilitators. For example, CBP's research
and analysis on a recent traveler identified by a partner law
enforcement agency suspected of being a Syrian foreign fighter
revealed the identity of a new suspect, a co-traveler, which
provided previously-unknown information to the investigation
and expanded our intelligence framework.
As the foreign fighter threat grows, CBP works in close
partnership with Federal law enforcement counterterrorism and
intelligence communities, State and local law enforcement, as
well as the private sector to counter the threat. In addition,
the threat posed by Syrian foreign fighters and ISIL is not
limited to the United States. There is a growing international
commitment to combatting the shared threat to our security.
Staff from the CBP's National Targeting Center and our
Intelligence Office interact with our foreign counterparts,
including those from the five ``I'' countries, the Middle East,
Europe, and North Africa on almost a daily basis to collaborate
on efforts to meet this threat.
Most importantly, CBP intelligence works aggressively to
continue to leverage assets and resources across the
intelligence community and other Federal partners to
communicate, coordinate, and collaborate with our international
partners, which enables officers and agents to take the
appropriate operational response.
In conclusion, CBP will continue to work closely with the
DHS enterprise, the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, the intelligence community, and our foreign
counterparts to detect and address emerging terrorist threats
such as those presented by ISIL and identify and address any
and all potential security vulnerabilities.
I appreciate the committee's leadership in providing this
opportunity to join my colleagues in speaking on this very
serious issue. I look forward to working with the committee on
this issue and other matters of urgency and priority. I am
happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Miller, Mr. Wagner,
and Ms. Lasley follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Troy Miller, John Wagner, and Jennifer
Lasley
September 10, 2014
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) security
measures to protect our Nation from the threat of terrorists and
terrorist weapons, including threats connected with the Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant. I appreciate the committee's leadership and
your commitment to helping ensure the security of the American people.
This year, CBP celebrates the 225th anniversary of the establishment of
the U.S. Customs Service and the important role it played in the
history of our Nation. Since its merger into CBP in 2003, Customs has
remained a part of CBP's heritage and a significant presence in the
continuation of our mission. Today, CBP serves as the front line in
defending America's borders against terrorists and instruments of
terror and protects our economic security while facilitating lawful
international travel and trade. CBP takes a comprehensive approach to
border management and control, combining National security, customs,
immigration, and agricultural protection into a coordinated whole.
cbp's intelligence-driven travel security operations
As this committee knows, we live in a world of ever-evolving
threats. From this perspective, CBP is now focused on the literally
thousands of foreign fighters, including U.S. citizens, who continue to
gravitate toward Syria to engage in that protracted civil war. Many of
these are fighting alongside violent extremist groups both in Syria and
in neighboring Iraq, learning battlefield skills and terrorist
tradecraft.
Of the numerous insurgent groups active in Iraq, Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) demonstrated focus on consolidating territory
in the Middle East region to establish their own Islamic State is of
particular concern. Since June 2014, ISIS (also known as the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)) and its allies have gained control
of Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, captured significant territory
across central Iraq, and continue to engage with Iraqi security forces
in that region. In early August, the threat to the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region increased considerably with the advance of ISIL towards Kurdish
areas.
As foreign fighters supporting ISIL's regional aggression retain
the ability to travel to their countries of origin and beyond, they
have the potential to threaten the homeland.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sources for ISIL background: Reflections on the Tenth
Anniversary of The 9/11 Commission Report, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
library/report/rising-terrorist-threat-9-11-commission; Transcript/
Remarks as Delivered by The Honorable James R. Clapper Director of
National Intelligence 9/11 Commission 10th Anniversary Tuesday, July
22, 2014 11:00 a.m.; http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-
and-interviews/202-speeches-interviews-2014/1095-remarks-as-delivered-
by-dni-clapper-on-the-9-11-commission-10th-anniversary?highlight=WyJ-
pc2lsIl0 Iraq Travel Warning, Last Updated: August 10, 2014; http://
travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/iraq-travel-
warning.html; Airstrikes in Iraq: What You Need to Know http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/08/11/airstrikes-iraq-what-you-need-know.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the potential threat posed by ISIL and other
terrorist groups seeking to gain access to the homeland, CBP, and more
broadly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is continually
refining our risk-based strategy and layered approach to security,
extending our borders outward, and focusing our resources on the
greatest risks to interdict threats before they reach the United
States. CBP processes nearly 1 million travelers each day at our
Nation's ports of entry, and about 30 percent--over 100 million a
year--of these travelers arrive via commercial aviation. Given that
terrorist organizations primarily seek to use commercial air
transportation to move operatives into the United States or as a means
to attack the homeland, our testimony will focus on international air
travel.
CBP continually evaluates and supplements layered security measures
with enhancements to strengthen DHS's ability to identify and prevent
the international travel of those individuals or groups that wish to do
us harm. The success of targeted security measures depends on the
ability to gather, analyze, share, and respond to information in a
timely manner--using both strategic intelligence to identify existing
and emerging threat streams, and tactical intelligence to perform link
analysis and targeted responses.
Our intelligence-driven strategies are integrated into every aspect
of our travel security operations. CBP develops and strategically
deploys resources to detect, assess, and, if necessary, mitigate the
risk posed by travelers at every stage along the international travel
sequence--including when an individual applies for U.S. travel
documents; reserves, books, or purchases an airline ticket; checks-in
at an airport; while en route and upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry.
Safeguards for Visas and Travel Authorization
One of the initial layers of defense in securing international air
travel is preventing dangerous persons from obtaining visas, travel
authorizations, and boarding passes. Before boarding a flight destined
for the United States, most foreign nationals must obtain a non-
immigrant visa (NIV)--issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate--or, if
they are eligible to travel under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), they
must apply for a travel authorization.
For eligible individuals traveling under the VWP, CBP operates the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).\2\ ESTA, is a web-
based system through which individuals must apply for travel
authorization prior to boarding an aircraft destined for the United
States. Through ESTA, CBP conducts enhanced vetting of VWP applicants
in advance of travel to the United States in order to assess whether
they are eligible to travel under the VWP or could pose a risk to the
United States or the public at large. Through information-sharing
agreements, CBP provides other U.S. Government agencies' ESTA
application data for the purpose of helping CBP make a determination
about an alien's eligibility to travel without a visa and for law
enforcement and administrative purposes. Additionally, CBP requires air
carriers to verify that VWP travelers have a valid authorization before
boarding an aircraft bound for the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa
exempt authority, such as Canada. Citizens of countries under visa
exempt authority entering the United States via air are subjected to
CBP's screening and inspection processes prior to departure. In the
land environment, they are subjected to CBP processing upon arrival at
a U.S. port of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travelers that require NIVs to travel to the United States must
apply to the Department of State (DOS) under specific visa categories
depending on the purpose of their travel, including those as visitors
for business, pleasure, study, and employment-based purposes. We
respectfully refer you to our colleagues in the DOS Bureau of Consular
Affairs for additional details about the visa application and
adjudication processes.
In an effort to augment and expand traveler targeting operations,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has co-located Visa Security
Program (VSP) personnel at the National Targeting Center (NTC)--a 24/7
operation where analysts and targeting officers to assess the risk of
every international traveler at each stage of the travel continuum,
leveraging intelligence materials and law enforcement data. This allows
ICE special agents and intelligence analysts to conduct thorough
analysis and in-depth investigations of high-risk visa applicants. The
focus of the VSP and NTC are complementary: The VSP is focused on
identifying terrorists and criminal suspects and preventing them from
exploiting the visa process and reaching the United States, while the
NTC provides tactical targeting and analytical research in support of
preventing terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. The co-location of VSP personnel at the NTC helps increase both
communication and information sharing.
To further enhance traveler screening efforts, ICE, CBP, and DOS
are collaborating and have begun to implement an automated visa
application screening process that expands significantly DHS' ability
to identify serious threats to National security and public safety at
the point of inception in an individual's immigration life cycle and
revolutionizes the way the U.S. Government screens foreign nationals
seeking entry to the United States. The program also results in
synchronized reviews of information across these agencies and allows
for a unified DHS response and recommendation regarding a visa
applicant's eligibility to be issued a visa. The collaborative program
leverages the three agencies' expertise, authorities, and technologies,
such as CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS), to screen pre-
adjudicated (approved) visa applications. It significantly enhances the
U.S. Government's anti-terrorism efforts, improving the existing
process by extending our borders outward and denying high-risk
applicants the ability to travel to the United States.
In March 2010, the NTC implemented a new program to conduct
continuous vetting of U.S. NIVs that have been recently issued,
revoked, and/or denied.\3\ This recurrent vetting ensures that changes
in a traveler's visa status are identified in near-real-time, allowing
CBP to immediately determine whether to provide a ``no board''
recommendation to a carrier or recommend that DOS revoke the visa, or
whether additional notification should take place for individuals
determined to be within the United States. If a potential visa
ineligibility or inadmissibility is discovered for U.S.-bound
travelvers, CBP will request that DOS revoke the visa and recommend
that the airline not board the passenger. If no imminent travel is
identified and derogatory information exists that would render a
subject inadmissible, CBP will still coordinate with DOS for a
prudential visa revocation. (Note: CBP may recommend that an airline
not board a passenger even if the passenger holds a valid visa.) If DOS
has revoked, or if CBP has requested revocation of, an individual's
visa and the individual is found to be in the United States, CBP will
notify the ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Enforcement
Unit for enforcement action. Where applicable, CBP will share any
derogatory information with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
to ensure denial of benefits. Additionally, the DOS Bureau of
Diplomatic Security has over 100 special agents embedded in consular
sections at 97 U.S. embassies and consulates. These agents have access
to derogatory information uncovered by CBP and can work with host
country law enforcement officials to conduct local investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ CBP continually vets against denied NIVs that were denied for
National security reasons, but not for all NIV denials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recurrent Vetting
Vetting of passengers and travel information occurrs repeatedly
throughout the travel sequence.
CBP gathers information and assesses risk when travel is booked and
conducts pre-departure and out-bound screening for all international
flights arriving in and departing from the United States by commercial
air. When a traveler purchases a ticket for travel to the United
States, a passenger name record (PNR) is generated in the airline's
reservation system. PNR data may contain information on itinerary, co-
travelers, changes to the reservation, and payment information. CBP
receives passenger data from commercial air carriers at operationally-
determined intervals up to 96 hours prior to departure and concluding
at the scheduled departure time.
Further, Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) regulations
require that commercial air carriers transmit all passenger and crew
manifest information before departure, prior to securing the aircraft
doors. CBP vets APIS information, which includes passenger biographic
data and travel document information, on all international flights to
and from the United States against the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB), criminal history information, records of lost or stolen
passports, public health records, and prior immigration or customs
violations and visa refusals. CBP uses APIS and PNR data to identify
known or suspected threats before they depart the foreign location.
CBP leverages all available advance passenger data including the
PNR and APIS data, previous crossing information, intelligence, and law
enforcement information, as well as open-source information in its
anti-terrorism efforts at the NTC. Starting with the earliest
indications of potential travel and continuing through the inspection
or arrivals process, the NTC continuously analyzes information using
the ATS, a decision-support tool for CBP officers. CBP matches
travelers' information against risk-based criteria developed based on
actionable intelligence derived from current intelligence community
reporting or other law enforcement information available to CBP.
CBP's pre-departure vetting efforts work in concert with
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight program,
which vets 100 percent of passengers flying to, from, over, and within
the United States, as well as international point-to-point U.S.
carriers, against the No-Fly, Selectee, and expanded Selectee portions
of the TSDB. Secure Flight provides nearly instant identification of
potential matches, allowing for expedited notification of law
enforcement, airlines, and our partners in the intelligence community
to prevent individuals on the No-Fly list from boarding an aircraft, as
well as ensuring that individuals on the TSDB with the ``selectee''
designation receive appropriate enhanced screening prior to flying.
Secure Flight allows TSA, CBP, and our partners in the intelligence
community to adapt quickly to new threats by accommodating last-minute
changes to the risk categories assigned to individual passengers.
Pre-Departure Programs
CBP's Pre-Departure Targeting Program utilizes a layered
enforcement strategy to prevent terrorists and other inadmissible
aliens from boarding commercial aircraft bound for the United States.
Three key components of the Pre-Departure Targeting Program are the
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), the Joint Security Program (JSP),
and the Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLGs). IAP and JSP support
the Pre-Departure Targeting Program with IAP/JSP Officers who are
posted at 11 foreign airports in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Japan, Germany, Spain, France, Qatar, Panama, and Mexico. These IAP/JSP
Officers work with the border security agencies of the host country and
commercial airlines in order to recommend the denial of boarding to
high-risk subjects. The RCLGs, which are located in Honolulu, Miami,
and New York, and are staffed by CBP Officers, are responsible for the
remaining non-IAP airports around the world. The RCLGs utilize
established relationships with the commercial airlines to prevent
passengers who may pose a security threat, have fraudulent documents,
or are otherwise inadmissible from boarding flights to the United
States. In fiscal year 2013, through the Pre-Departure Targeting
Program, NTC identified 5,378 passengers who would have been deemed
inadmissible to the United States, and coordinated to prevent them from
boarding aircraft at foreign locations by providing ``no-board''
recommendations to carriers.
CBP's Pre-clearance locations in Aruba, Bermuda, the Bahamas,
Canada, Ireland, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provide another
avenue of security by providing for the inspection and clearance of
commercial passengers on foreign soil. CBP Officers are in uniform, and
have the legal authorities to question travelers and inspect luggage.
All mission requirements are completed at the pre-clearance port prior
to travel, including immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections.
In the UAE, CBP Officers have the greatest authorities of any of our
other agreements. The UAE receives flights from Yemen, North and East
Africa (Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan), Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh, and India, all high-risk
pathways for terrorist travel. The underlying principle of this pre-
clearance agreement is the mitigation of threats, both known and
unknown, based on our analysis of current threats. There they are
allowed a full complement of authorities to question and search
individuals and baggage, access to the full complement of technology
systems, and are authorized to have access to firearms and other law
enforcement tools. Additionally, ICE, Homeland Security Investigations,
has an attachee office located in the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi to
follow up on any investigative leads generated from CBP pre-clearance
operations.
Arrival Processing
Upon arrival in the United States, all persons are subject to
inspection by CBP Officers. CBP Officers scan the traveler's entry
documents to perform queries of various CBP databases for exact or
possible matches to existing look-outs, including those of other law
enforcement agencies. For most foreign nationals arriving at U.S.
airports, CBP Officers collect biometrics--fingerprints and
photographs--and compare them to any previously-collected information.
Once a verified identity is established, CBP systems will identify any
watch list information and return the results to the officer for
appropriate processing. In addition to the biographic and biometric
system queries performed, a CBP Officer interviews each traveler to
determine the purpose and intent of their travel, and whether any
further inspection is necessary based on, among other things, National
security, admissibility, customs, or agriculture concerns.
Identifying and separating low-risk travelers from those who may
require additional scrutiny is a key element in CBP's efforts to
facilitate and secure international travel. CBP's trusted traveler
programs, such as Global Entry, provide expedited processing upon
arrival in the United States for pre-approved, low-risk participants
through the use of secure and exclusive lanes and automated kiosks.
Additionally, CBP has established a Counter-Terrorism Response
(CTR) protocol at ports of entry for passengers arriving with possible
links to terrorism. CTR protocol mandates immediate NTC notification,
initiating coordination with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), ICE, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) Terrorist Screening Operations Unit (TSOU) and
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).
Out-bound Operations
In addition to vetting in-bound flights for high-risk travelers,
CBP also developed protocols to enhance out-bound targeting efforts
within ATS, with the goal of identifying travelers who warrant out-
bound inspection or apprehension. Out-bound targeting programs identify
potential matches to the TSDB, including potential matches to the ``No-
Fly'' List, as well as National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
fugitives, and subjects of active currency, narcotics, and weapons
investigations. Additionally, out-bound operations are enhanced by the
implementation of targeting rules designed to identify and interdict
subjects with a possible nexus to terrorism or links to previously-
identified terrorist suspects. As with in-bound targeting rules, out-
bound targeting rules are continually adjusted to identify and
interdict subjects of interest based on current threat streams and
intelligence.
Advance out-bound manifest information is also obtained from
carriers through the APIS system. As soon as APIS information becomes
available, prior to the departure of a commercial flight, CBP and the
TSA immediately begin screening and vetting passengers on the out-bound
flight for possible inclusion in the TSDB, including potential matches
to the ``No-Fly'' and Selectee Lists, as well as other law enforcement
look-outs.
Programs and Partnerships
CBP's Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison (OIIL)
serves as the situational awareness hub for CBP and provides timely and
relevant information along with actionable intelligence to operators
and decision makers. By prioritizing and mitigating emerging threats,
risks, and vulnerabilities, OIIL improves CBP's ability to function as
an intelligence-driven operational organization and turns numerous data
points and intelligence into actionable information for analysts and
CBP Officers.
CBP works in close partnership with the Federal counterterrorism
community, including the FBI, the intelligence community, ICE, TSA,
DOS, State and local law enforcement, the private sector, and our
foreign counterparts to improve our ability to identify risks as early
as possible in the travel continuum, and to implement security
protocols for addressing potential threats.
CBP has partnered with the Department of Defense's (DoD) U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to synchronize planning,
authorities, and capabilities to enhance each organization's ability to
rapidly and persistently address threats to the homeland before they
reach our physical borders. CBP is working with SOCOM components and
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to develop greater
situational awareness of emerging threats, share intelligence, advise
on matters of border security, and coordinate enforcement actions as
appropriate. CBP and SOCOM-Central Command are working together to
leverage each other's capabilities to affect threat networks, such as
ISIL, to prevent previously-unknown operational actors and/or
facilitators from targeting the homeland.
International Partnerships
As the foreign fighter threat has grown, the international
community's response must evolve to keep pace. Nations need appropriate
laws, regulations, and enforcement tools and need to take appropriate
measures, in coordination with like-minded and transit nations, to help
prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters across borders and
mitigate terrorist recruitment or radicalization to violence. Nations
must develop the legal and institutional structures needed to provide
international cooperation in the criminal investigation and prosecution
of foreign terrorist fighters. International insitutions, such as the
United Nations and the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL), must also develop and implement appropriate measures to
address this global challenge.
As terrorists change their methods and tactics and technologies
continue to evolve, the international community must adapt as quickly
as possible. We need to better leverage and coordinate the application
of existing tools and structures, strengthen on-going efforts, and
facilitate the development of new innovative tools and approaches to
preventing and fighting terrorism, while preserving human rights such
as freedom of expression. We also need nations to more fully exercise
the tools they already have in place to prevent the movement of foreign
fighters across their borders.
conclusion
CBP will continue to work with our colleagues within DHS, DOS, FBI,
DoD, and the intelligence community to address emerging threats and
identify potential security vulnerabilities. In cooperation with other
Government agencies and commercial carriers, we will continue to
implement our multi-layered defense strategy to secure the aviation
sector against terrorists and others who threaten the safety of the
traveling public and the security of our Nation.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. We look
forward to answering your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Wagner for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WAGNER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF
FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Wagner. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Thompson, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members of
the committee. It is a privilege to appear today to discuss the
efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in securing
international travel against the threats of terrorists and
their supporters.
In response to the potential threat posed by the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, other terrorist groups and
supporters, including those who are U.S. citizens, CBP and DHS
continually refine our border security operations, focusing our
resources on the greatest risks and extending our security
measures outward to interdict threats before they reach the
United States.
Because terrorist organizations continue to primarily
target commercial air transportation as a means to move
operatives into the United States to attack the homeland, I
will focus our operational efforts to detect and respond to the
threats in the air environment. Last year, CBP processed over
100 million travelers at our Nation's airports. We have
developed and strategically deployed our resources to detect,
assess, and mitigate the risk posed by travelers at every stage
along the international travel continuum, including when an
individual applies for travel documents, reserves or purchases
an airline ticket, checks in at the airport, while en route,
and upon rival.
Before a foreign national travels to the United States,
they are first required to apply for a non-immigrant visa with
Department of State or for eligible Visa Waiver Program
travelers, a travel authorization from CBP through the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization, also known as ESTA.
Before issuing the visa, the Department of State screens
each applicant to identify potential risks or ineligibilities.
Through ESTA, CBP screens Visa Waiver Program applicants in
advance of travel in order to assess eligibility and potential
risk to the United States. In this fiscal year, CBP has denied
ESTA applications for yearly 300 travelers for security-related
reasons.
Now, once travel is booked, but before the flight departs,
CBP obtains and analyzes all airline data, including
reservation information, also known as PNR, Passenger Name
Records, and manifest information, also known as APIS, or
Advance Passenger Information, which contains the passport,
biographical data, and the flight information, to assess the
risk of all passengers, regardless of citizenship or visa
status.
CBP's National Targeting Center analyzes traveler data and
applies intelligence-driven targeting rules, as just described
my by colleague, Mr. Miller, to conduct a risk assessment. If
derogatory information or other risks are discovered, CBP is
able to take action in several ways overseas prior to actual
travel so we can address these concerns.
So in order of descending authorities and capabilities, we
have pre-clearance, we have the immigration advisory program,
and then we have our regional carrier liaison groups. Our
highest capability overseas is pre-clearance, where CBP
Officers operate on foreign soil, in uniform, with search
authorities and operational capabilities similar to what we
have in the United States.
Travelers are questioned, queried through our database, and
inspected before they board the aircraft. Pre-clearance
requires an agreement with the host country to allow us to
operate in such a manner, but after the flight is pre-cleared
at a foreign airport, the flight is generally treated as a
domestic flight once it arrives in the United States.
There are currently CBP Officers and Agriculture
Specialists stationed at 16 locations in six countries. Pre-
clearance officers this year have refused entry to 24 travelers
for security-related reasons. Our pre-clearance facility in Abu
Dhabi, which just opened this year, is of critical importance
as it is a transit hub for numerous high-risk pathways for
terrorist travel, which gives CBP a critical security operation
in a strategic location.
Next is the Immigration Advisory Program, where we have CBP
Officers in plain clothes at 11 foreign airports in nine
countries to work with air carriers and foreign authorities to
work and identify potential threats. They have no search
authority per se, but can question travelers in an advisory
capacity and can recommend additional security screening or
recommend an airline not board a traveler based on the pre-
departure vetting I described earlier occurring at our National
Targeting Center. So far in this fiscal year, IAP has
recommended that foreign airlines deny boarding to over 60
passengers for security-related reasons.
In locations without pre-clearance or IAP operations, we
utilize our regional carrier liaison groups that have
established relationships with commercial airlines to prevent
passengers who may pose a security threat, have fraudulent
documents, or are otherwise inadmissible from boarding flights
to the United States. These regional carrier liaisons basically
are in constant contact with the airlines to exchange this
information.
Now at all points in the travel continuum, CBP continues
vetting passengers and travel information, including visas and
ESTA authorizations, to ensure that any changes in a traveler's
eligibility are identified in near-real-time. This continual
vetting allows us to coordinate appropriate actions, such as
referring individuals for further inspection upon arrival. So
far this year, recurrent vetting has caused almost 400
previously-approved ESTAs to be revoked for security-related
reasons.
Upon arrival in the United States, all travelers are
subject to inspection. Our officers review entry documents,
conduct interviews, run appropriate biometric and biographic
queries against law enforcement databases. We also have
conterterrorism response protocols in place at ports of entry
for passengers encountered with possible links to terrorism,
which mandates immediate coordination with our National
Targeting Center, coordination with our partners at the FBI and
the Terrorist Screening Center or the National Counterrorism
and ICE.
CBP also conducts out-bound operations, leveraging all
available advance travel information and utilizing
intelligence-driven targeting rules specific to the out-bound
environment to identify, when appropriate, interview, or
apprehend travelers for law enforcement or security-related
reasons.
So thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and
thank you for the attention you are giving to this very
important issue. I stand ready to answer any of your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Wagner.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Lasley.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER A. LASLEY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Lasley. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Thompson, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members
of the committee. I am pleased to be here today with my
colleagues from CBP and State Department to discuss the threats
to the homeland from foreign fighters traveling to Syria to
participate in the conflict there and what we in DHS are doing
to mitigate the threats.
As you have correctly stated, the on-going conflict in
Syria has emerged as an unprecedented draw for more than 12,000
foreign fighters, including more than 1,000 Europeans and over
100 U.S. persons who have joined or seek to join the fight
there. Our concern remains that these individuals, if
radicalized, could return to their home countries or to the
United States and use their newly-acquired skills to carry out
attacks.
We have already seen an example of this in Europe, where in
May, a French national who fought alongside the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant in Syria is charged with conducting a
successful attack against a Jewish museum in Brussels, killing
4 people.
Although we currently have no credible information to
indicate that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or
ISIL, is planning to attack the homeland, we remain concerned
in the long term that their access to Westerners and to safe
havens in the Middle East and the Levant will allow them to
plan and coordinate attacks in the United States.
More broadly, veteran al-Qaeda fighters have traveled to
Syria from Pakistan to take advantage of the permissive
operating environment, as well as their easier access to
foreign fighters, particularly Europeans and U.S. persons. We
are therefore concerned that Syria could emerge as a base of
operations for al-Qaeda's international agenda, which could
include attacks against the homeland.
We also remain concerned that U.S. persons who link up with
violent extremist groups in Syria, regardless of their original
reasons for traveling to the country, could gain combat skills,
extremist connections and possibly become radicalized or be
further persuaded to conduct organized, coordinated, or lone-
wolf attacks potentially targeting U.S. and Western interests.
Because DHS border, transportation security, and
immigration personnel are at the front lines of many encounters
with potential Syrian foreign fighters, the Department is
working to ensure that they have the most up-to-date
information and can act on it in coordination with law
enforcement and ICE partners as appropriate.
I&A is working to inform DHS and State and local law
enforcement partners about observable indicators of U.S.
persons planning or attempting to travel to Syria. We have
produced tailored assessments on the motivations of U.S.
travelers, their travel patterns, the role social media is
playing in radicalization to violence, and the ways in which
U.S. persons are providing material support to Syria-based
extremist groups.
We also have partnered with the FBI to produce joint
intelligence bulletins and other products for State and local
law enforcement on trends in observable behaviors in
individuals seeking to travel to Syria to join the fighting.
I&A is also partnering with DHS operational components,
particularly CBP, TSA, and USCIS, to help identify foreign
fighters or other terrorists who may be seeking to travel to
the United States, and we are working with international--I am
sorry--interagency partners to disrupt their travel or take
appropriate law enforcement steps.
We work every day to leverage our unique DHS data to ensure
that individuals who are not fully identified in intelligence
channels can be appropriately watch-listed and denied entry
into the United States.
Finally, we work hand-in-glove with the Department to
provide intelligence assessments that support the Visa Waiver
Program, a program that DHS has managed since 2003 in
consultation with State Department, that facilitates low-risk
travelers into the United States for tourism and business.
Countries participating in this program must undergo a rigorous
review process and agree to share terrorist and criminal
information with the United States.
Our intelligence assessments, which are one factor in the
country reviews, look at a number of criteria for determining a
country's eligibility to participate in the Visa Waiver
Program, including the terrorist threat to the United States
posed by nationals of that country, the counterterrorism
capabilities of that country, the state of information sharing
between the U.S. Government and that country, and the security
of passports and other identity documents. Using similar
criteria, we participate in DHS-led reviews of all Visa Waiver
Program countries, which must occur at a minimum every 2 years
to evaluate whether a country should remain in the program.
These are just a few of the ways in which we are working to
keep the homeland safe from terrorism threats and those posed
by returning foreign fighters. Thank you very much for the
opportunity to speak with you today about these important
issues, and I look forward to your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Johnson for her
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HILLARY BATJER JOHNSON, ACTING DEPUTY COORDINATOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Thompson, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today on behalf of the State Department and with my colleagues
from the Department of Homeland Security or DHS.
We are very deeply supportive of DHS's efforts to protect
the U.S. homeland, and we make every effort to amplify its work
through diplomatic engagement with our allies and partners. We
remain gravely concerned by the activities of terrorists in
Syria and Iraq, including the Islamic State Iraq and the
Levant, or ISIL, and al-Nusra Front. We have seen in Syria a
trend of foreign fighter travel for the purposes of
participating in the conflict, largely driven by global
connectedness through the internet and social media, on an
unprecedented scale. So we at the State Department are working
closely with countries affected by the foreign fighter problem
to counter the threat these fighters pose.
The Department of State works closely with DHS to support
its mission in protecting the United States by promoting
effective border security screening with our foreign partners
through enhanced information sharing. For example, we believe
it is in our best interests to share terrorism screening
information with select foreign governments, as all of us face
a global terrorist threat that does not recognize National
boundaries. To this end, we work closely with the terrorist
screening center, which implements information-sharing
agreements with foreign partners, including Visa Waiver Program
countries. These agreements allow partners to conduct name
checks for incoming flights to their countries, which helps us
to deter terrorist travel and creates an extra layer of
security for the United States.
We also work closely with our partners at DHS to strengthen
global aviation security by engaging foreign partners to
bolster aviation screening at last points of departure airports
with direct flights to the United States. We do this to
identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from
boarding commercial flights and to prevent terrorist attacks
against global aviation.
Additionally, the Department of State is leading
interagency efforts to engage with foreign partners to prevent
and interdict foreign extremist travel to Syria, and we work
closely with the interagency, including DHS, to expedite
comprehensive approaches. This work includes facilitating
information exchanges with foreign partners, building partner
capacity, and developing shared objectives.
Ambassador Robert Bradtke, senior adviser for partner
engagement on Syria foreign fighters, leads this work for the
State Department and has met with officials from the European
Union member countries, North Africa, the Gulf, the Balkans,
and East Asian Pacific to discuss and examine our shared
concerns about this threat. Important progress has been made,
but more work remains.
Countries in the Balkans have recently adopted or are
considering more comprehensive counterterrorism laws. In the
Gulf, countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have
increased penalties related to terrorist financing. Several
have established the necessary architecture to enforce their
counterterrorism laws more effectively.
The European Council recently called for the accelerated
implementation of E.U. measures in support of member states to
combat foreign fighters. This includes finalizing an E.U.
passenger name record, or PNR, as we have mentioned here today,
proposal by the end of this year and increasing cooperation
with partner nations such as the United States to strengthen
border and aviation security in the region.
We will continue to work closely with partners in the
coming months to enhance this cooperation and build on our
efforts to date. In the week of September 24, President Obama
will chair a United Nations Security Council summit on the
rising threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. This
presents a unique opportunity to demonstrate the breadth of
international consensus and concern regarding the foreign
terrorist fighter threat and to build momentum for policy
initiatives on this topic at home and abroad.
That same week, Secretary Kerry and the Turkish foreign
minister will co-chair a Global Counterterrorism Forum, or
GCTF, ministerial meeting. At this meeting, GCTF members will
adopt the first-ever set of global good practices to address
the foreign terrorist fighter threat. GCTF members will also
launch a working group dedicated to working globally to
mobilize resources and expertise to advance implementation of
these good practices.
In conclusion, the Department of State remains deeply
supportive of DHS's efforts to protect the U.S. homeland and
make every effort to support its work through our diplomatic
engagement efforts. This is a critical component to combatting
terrorist travel.
I look forward to answering your questions and working
closely with you and our friends and allies across the globe to
make the United States safer. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hillary Batjer Johnson
September 10, 2014
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today on behalf of the State Department with my colleagues from the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We are deeply supportive of DHS'
efforts to protect the U.S. homeland and make every effort to amplify
its work through diplomatic engagement and information sharing with our
allies and partners.
We remain gravely concerned by the activities of terrorists in
Syria and Iraq, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) and al-Nusrah Front. ISIL is an extremely dangerous organization
operating in a chaotic part of the world. It has exploited the conflict
in Syria and sectarian tensions in Iraq to entrench itself in both
countries, now spanning the geographic center of the Middle East.
ISIL's attacks in Iraq and Syria have resulted in the deaths of
thousands of people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more
from their ancestral homelands. ISIL has brutally targeted all groups
who do not fit their narrow world view including some Sunnis, Shia, and
religious and ethnic minority groups. In Syria, as in Iraq, ISIL has
committed wide-spread atrocities, including torture, murder, the taking
and execution of detainees, and hostages sexual violence, and forcible
displacement.
We have seen in Syria a trend of foreign fighter travel for the
purposes of participating in the conflict--largely driven on an
unprecedented scale by global connectivity that is available through
the internet and social media. ISIL operates an extremely sophisticated
propaganda machine and disseminates timely, high-quality media content
on multiple platforms, including on social media. We have seen ISIL use
a range of media to attempt to aggrandize its military capabilities,
including showcasing the executions of captured soldiers, and evidence
of consecutive battlefield victories resulting in territorial gains.
More recently, the group's supporters have sustained this momentum on
social media by encouraging attacks in the United States and against
U.S. interests in retaliation for our air strikes. ISIL has also used
its propaganda campaign to draw foreign fighters to the group,
including many from Western countries.
It is difficult to provide a precise figure of the total number of
foreign fighters in Syria, though the best available estimates indicate
that approximately 12,000 fighters from at least 50 countries--
including over 100 U.S. persons--may have traveled to Syria to fight
for ISIL or al-Nusrah Front since the beginning of the conflict. These
fighters not only exacerbate regional instability, but create real
threats to U.S. interests and our allies. We are working closely with
countries affected by the foreign fighter problem set to counter the
threat these fighters pose. As we have built a common picture of the
threat with our allies, so, too, we continue our efforts to build
consensus around joint initiatives and complementary approaches to
sustain a broad and comprehensive approach.
securing u.s. borders
The Department of State works closely with the Department of
Homeland Security to support its mission in protecting the United
States by promoting effective aviation and border security screening
with our foreign partners through enhanced information sharing. For
example, an important effort in our counterterrorism work is Homeland
Security Presidential Directive Six (HSPD-6), a post-9/11 White House
initiative. Through HSPD-6, the State Department works with the
Terrorist Screening Center to negotiate the exchange of identities of
known or suspected terrorists with foreign partners to enhance our
mutual border screening efforts.
The Terrorist Screening Center implements these agreements with
foreign partners. These agreements allow partners to name-check
incoming flights to their countries, which helps us deter terrorist
travel, creating an extra layer of security for the United States.
HSPD-6 agreements or arrangements are a pre-requisite to
participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). To date, we have 43 such
agreements in place which includes VWP partners, and we continue to
actively seek out new partners.
The Department of State also works closely with its partners at the
Department of Homeland Security to strengthen global aviation security
by engaging foreign partners in bolstering aviation screening at last
point of departure (LPD) airports with direct flights to the United
States to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from
boarding commercial flights.
foreign terrorist fighters
Additionally, the Department of State is leading interagency
efforts to engage with foreign partners to prevent in the first place
and, where possible, to interdict foreign extremist travel to Syria. We
strongly believe that a whole-of-Government approach is the only way to
truly address the threat, and we work closely with our interagency
colleagues to facilitate comprehensive approaches. This work includes
facilitating information exchanges with foreign partners, building
partner capacity, and developing shared objectives focused on
addressing the foreign fighter threat. Ambassador Robert Bradtke,
Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters, leads
this work for the State Department and has met with officials from
European Union member countries, North Africa, the Gulf, the Balkans,
and East Asia and Pacific, to discuss and examine our shared serious
concerns about the foreign terrorist fighter threat. Ambassador Bradtke
and other Department counterparts have led sustained efforts to urge
reform and build capacity for whole-of-Government and whole-of-society
approaches to counter this threat, notably encouraging information
sharing and border security, legal reform and criminal justice, and
countering violent extremism.
Important progress has been made, but more work remains. Countries
in the Balkans recently have adopted or are considering more
comprehensive counterterrorism laws. In the Gulf, countries such as
Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have increased penalties related to
terrorist financing and several have established the necessary
architecture to enforce their counterterrorism laws more effectively,
such as Kuwait's newly-created Financial Intelligence Unit and Qatar's
establishment of a charity abuse review board.
Some of our partners have implemented legal reforms aimed more
directly at countering foreign terrorist fighters. For example,
traveling overseas to participate in combat has been newly criminalized
in the Balkans, Canada, and Jordan. The United Kingdom and Indonesia
have banned participation in groups such as ISIL, while Malaysia has
publicly opposed ISIL and its activities.
Countries have taken a variety of steps under existing laws and
regulations to inhibit foreign fighter's resources or travel. Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, and eight European countries have the authority
to revoke the passports of suspected foreign fighters.
The European Council recently called for the accelerated
implementation of E.U. measures in support of Member States to combat
foreign fighters, including finalizing an E.U. Passenger Name Record
(PNR) proposal by the end of this year, and increasing cooperation with
partner nations such as the United States to strengthen border and
aviation security in the region.
In all our efforts with our partners, we stress the importance of--
and facilitate implementation of--adhering to a rule of law framework.
We are encouraged by these and other reforms to counter the foreign
fighter threat. While we have seen progress, our efforts must be
sustained and intensified. We will continue to work closely with
partners, particularly those in the Middle East, North Africa, and
Europe in the coming months to enhance cooperation and build on efforts
to date.
multilateral initiatives and the global counterterrorism forum
We are also working the foreign terrorist fighter issue actively on
the multilateral front. The week of September 24, President Obama will
chair a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Summit on the rising
threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, no matter their religious
ideology or country of origin. This rare UNSC leader-level session is
the first U.S.-hosted Head of Government-level UNSC session since
President Obama led a UNSC Summit on non-proliferation in September
2009, and it presents a unique opportunity to demonstrate the breadth
of international consensus regarding the foreign terrorist fighter
threat and to build momentum for policy initiatives on this topic at
home and abroad. In addition to a briefing from U.N. Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon and brief remarks from leaders of all 15 UNSC members, this
summit is expected to adopt a U.S.-drafted UNSC Resolution during the
session.
That same week, Secretary Kerry and Turkish Foreign Minister
Cavusoglu will co-chair a Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
ministerial meeting, where GCTF members will adopt the first-ever set
of global good practices to address the foreign terrorist fighter
threat (FTF) and launch a working group dedicated to working with GCTF
members and non-members alike to mobilize resources and expertise to
advance their implementation. The good practices cover the four central
aspects of the phenomenon: (1) Radicalizing to violent extremism; (2)
recruitment and facilitation; (3) travel and fighting; and, (4) return
and reintegration. They are also intended to shape bilateral or
multilateral technical or other capacity-building assistance that is
provided in this area. This effort will allow our practitioners and
other experts to continue to share expertise and broaden skills in
addressing the FTF challenge.
conclusion
We remain deeply supportive of DHS's efforts to protect the U.S.
homeland and make every effort to support its work through diplomatic
engagement.
The State Department is involved in an array of activities to
counter terrorism and the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters,
such as capacity building, countering terrorist finance, and countering
violent extremism, my State Department colleagues would be happy to
brief Congress about these lines of effort at another time.
Our terrorist adversaries are nimble, and given the vitally
important imperative to protect the United States and to stay ``one
step ahead,'' we should ensure that the tools of civilian power
continue to adapt to serve National security. As I hope you will agree,
we have focused and sharpened our efforts, but there remains much to
do.
I look forward to answering your questions and working closely with
you in making the United States safer, in conjunction with our friends
and allies across the globe.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you all very much.
This subcommittee--and our full committee, but certainly on
our subcommittee--has had a number of hearings about visas,
about our visas, about the status of our visa programs. We
certainly have had a lot of discussion about the Visa Waiver
Program in a hearing that we had a year ago this month, in a
hearing in March of this year. This subcommittee has asked a
lot of questions about the Visa Waiver Program, and so we
certainly understand that the program started back in the mid-
1980s really to expedite tourism and travel, which was a very
good idea at that time.
But the world is changing. As we think about things that we
need to do to grow our economy, we also have to consider some
of these various processes and systems that we have in place
with other countries, our allies, our friends, and what kinds
of programs we have actually put in place that put America at
risk.
So to that, I guess my first question would be--we have
heard a lot of testimony here today and even in our opening
statements about estimates as many as 12,000 foreign fighters
coming from so many European countries that can travel Western
passports that are in the visa--some countries that are in the
waiver program, et cetera. One of the things, obviously, in the
Visa Waiver Program requires information sharing.
As we sit here on the day before--we are talking about 9/
11, really--one of the things that the 9/11 commission
recommendations--a recommendation that they made--an
observation that they made that always sticks in my mind is how
we had to move, really, from the need-to-know information to
the need-to-share information.
Information sharing is such a critical component to be a
country that is participating in the Visa Waiver Program here
with the United States. We certainly see, for instance, the
passenger name record, the PNR data, which we can utilize to
identify fighters or suspicious travelers or what have you, we
see our ally, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the
United Kingdom being so great on sharing information. Everybody
gives them accolades for their sharing of information with us.
But some of the other European countries may be not so
good. Even in our own hemisphere, it appears that Mexico is
pretty good. At least I have heard that. Canada--there have
been some concerns raised about information sharing there.
I guess I would say, first of all, how many countries do we
currently have? I think it is close to 30. Are there any that
have ever been eliminated from this program? Are there any that
we are thinking about? Are there things that the agencies are
able to do to really be much more aggressive about making sure
that we are getting the information that we think we need
shared with us, in order for these--the countries to
participate in the visa waiver? Are there things that we need
to be doing legislatively to assist the agencies?
I am not quite sure who I am directing this question to.
Who would like to start with that, Mr. Wagner, Ms. Lasley? Yes.
Ms. Lasley. I can certainly give you a little bit of
background in terms of how many members we have today in the
Visa Waiver Program. So currently, we have 38 members, 30 from
Europe, 7 from the Asia-Pacific region, and 1 in Latin America.
It is my understanding that we have--since the inception of
the program, as you--as you stated, in the 1980s, two countries
have been taken from the Visa Waiver Program list. That was
Argentina and Uruguay. But it was many years ago, and it was
not because of terrorism-related issues but more economic
issues.
Mrs. Miller. Is there any thought about--as I say, is there
anything that you need from us legislatively to assist you in
being more aggressive about--I mean, if there are these kinds
of concerns about information sharing from any of these
countries, should we be much more aggressive about the
information that we think we need in order to feel comfortable
to continue to have visa waiver eligibility from these various
countries?
Mr. Wagner. So we do get a lot of information from these
countries. You know, we do--they do sign the information-
sharing agreements. We do do the biennial--every-2-year review
of the countries and their procedures. They do report their
lost and stolen passports. Then all the travelers do fill out
the ESTA application, where we get about 17 data elements,
which we run through a series of background checks, and then
the recurring checks, some of the numbers I mentioned earlier.
You know, we denied this fiscal year, which is coming to
close in a couple weeks, 285 ESTA applications for security
reasons. We have revoked 393. This was after it was issued.
When we do our recurring vetting, new information had come to
light that caused us to issue that revocation. Our total
applications we have denied this year is over 35,000. So it is
a small number of the overall denials, but yes, a very
consequential and important number.
So some of the things we are looking at is reviewing all of
our procedures, our data collection efforts. Are we getting the
right data elements? Are there other elements we need? Are
there other elements we can use? You know, how does it impact,
you know, the privacy of individuals? How does it impact our
travel and tourism facilitation efforts, as well? You know,
what would we do with the data if we collected it? But these
are the things we are reviewing, along with many other--our
other procedures and things we continue to do in all of our
programs.
Mrs. Miller. Following up on that, we talk about the ESTA,
which stands for the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization, as you know, was added as a security requirement
actually by Congress after 9/11. Previous to that, we didn't
have--we didn't have the ESTA. As you mentioned, 17 different
elements that you are asking on the form, Mr. Wagner--the name,
obviously, the name, passport number, et cetera, et cetera,
information elements that you are obtaining that you can then
check against our databases, et cetera.
But the full visa application, you have to have about 110
pieces of information apparently that are required. In regards
to the ESTA--and I was taking some notes when you were saying
here about the ESTAs that have been revoked and denied, et
cetera.
I actually am drafting some legislation right now, and I
guess this is one of the things I am going to ask you here. I
am drafting legislation currently, hope to be introduced
perhaps even today, that we would clarify what the purpose of
ESTA actually is, that we need to ensure that terrorists don't
get on airplanes, and then asking the Department to tell us
what other changes to ESTA may be necessary to increase
security.
So I am again asking you, I guess, for your--what your
thought is on legislation like that. Do you think the agencies,
again, have the authority, short of any Congressional
legislation, to ask for additional--it would seem to me--I am
not in your business, but it would seem to me that asking for
additional information, particularly from a number of these
countries that are in the Visa Waiver Program, more than just
the 15 or 17 pieces of information would be something that
would be under consideration.
Again, do you think you have the authority to do that,
understanding that ESTA was initiated, again, by the Congress
after
9/11, after the commission from their recommendations, and
should we be giving you legislation to assist you there?
Mr. Wagner. Thank you. We are reviewing this, as well as a
number of other programs that we have. I--part of that review
is: Do we need additional authorities to collect additional
information? I believe in ESTA, we have--I believe we have the
authorities, but that is one of the things we are reviewing,
what other types of information would we need? Could we use it?
How would we use it? How would we collect it? Is it verifiable
information? Is it useful information? Do we have systems to
actually make use of that data that we would collect, and would
it be helpful?
So we are looking at those things. As an operational
organization, we are always looking for additional data and
additional data sources, but again, with respect to people's
privacy, and you know--is there a useful need for us to collect
that information, and can we actually put it to use?
But you know, in general, as coupled with the PNR and the
airline data, it really helps us paint a better picture of
travelers and where they are going, for how long, and what
other information we can relate that to. So having, in general
terms, a broader set of data to allow us to identify
individuals or even identify individuals who are not the person
we are looking for because we have the additional data and we
can dismiss any connections we may think are there with the
person, so--but that is one of the things, balancing the
privacy and the costs and where we would keep the information.
Mrs. Miller. Just being cognizant certainly of my time
here, but I am going to ask one other additional question, and
think about this a bit, because in addition to that piece of
legislation, I am also preparing a piece of legislation that
would seek to clarify the authorization that I think the
Department of State already has, in order to revoke passports.
We are looking at what Cameron is doing in the United Kingdom
certainly and with dual citizenship, et cetera.
Again, we are a very free and open society, but we are
living in a changing world here. Whether or not you have the
authorization to revoke these passports--how can we help you
clarify that? Because I was looking through the--trying to
become familiar with exactly what has to happen to lose your
citizenship.
For instance, it talks about if you are entering or serving
in the armed forces of a foreign state. So perhaps that is
ambiguous a bit when we are talking about terrorist
organizations because they are not really a foreign state.
These are the kinds of things that I think this committee is
looking for today from you. We want to give you the tools that
you need to help you to protect the homeland. If there is a
flaw in what we have, it is not strong enough, we need to get
that kind of feedback from all of you.
I don't know if anyone has any comment on that before I go
to the next Member.
Ms. Johnson. Just briefly, the State Department does have
the authority to revoke passports on National security grounds.
We are very concerned, as you know, about the over 100
Americans that are in the foreign fighter ranks.
We do work with--very closely with our law enforcement and
intelligence partners on information because we don't just
unilaterally revoke passports, of course. But this is a
consular affairs bureau issue set. So we are reviewing right
now in consultation with our law enforcement and intelligence
partners our current tools at our disposals and authorities
because this is a big concern, that we want to look to be able
to use that authority if we need it, but not interrupt
legitimate travel of other U.S. citizens who are constructively
engaged in the region.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that. I would just mention that
time is of the essence here, I think. I think you can see that
because of the consternation on behalf of the American people
of this. So this is not an issue we just sort of want to go off
there infinitum. I think you are going to be looking at some--
as I say, I am one Member that is going to be introducing
legislation today about these issues. I am trying to assist
you, and you know, we will see how quickly the Congress can
actually act. But we are looking for feedback from all of you.
With that, the Chairwoman recognizes the Ranking Member,
Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, let me thank the Chairman and thank
my Ranking Member, and as well, the Chairman of the full
committee. Again, this hearing is not to draw you over here to
the United States House as much as it is to make an important
statement of oversight to act.
I started my remarks by saying that in the--and on the eve
of 9/11, and although there has been much commentary of the
potential threat that ISIL poses, I am not willing to cede the
point and agree to those who have a perspective that the United
States may not be in the eye of the storm.
I think the way we respond to it is experienced and
balanced and sure as it relates to providing security for our
citizens. I thank you all for being on the front lines of doing
that. That is what the Department was created for, and that is
what the committee is created for, as well.
So I want to go to a pointed question. In the collaboration
between State and the Department of Homeland Security in
particular, intelligence, and dealing with CBP, is it your
thought that the ISIL actions in Syria and Iraq and the ISIL
profile could be a threat to the United States? Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am. With as you stated, over 100
Americans that have traveled to fight with ISIL and Nusra Front
and other extremist groups overseas, plus--and Western
Europeans, I do believe that it could be a short-term and a
long-term threat to the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner. Yes, I also agree. You know, looking at the
systems we have and how we look at, you know, the information
we get from the airlines with a person's reservation
information and looking at their itineraries and other
characteristics of their travel, you know, do they fit what we
know about, you know, what the intelligence reporting are known
factors?
Are these--are we identifying individuals that then we want
to have a further inspection with and try to--you know, to talk
to them and try to determine what their purpose and their
intent of travel is.
We have good systems to be able to do that. We have good
intelligence reporting to help us build those characteristics
we are looking for, and we get good information from Department
of State and other entities. When we do want to take actions
against known individuals, then we have the systems in place to
identify them and figure out what point in that process we need
to intercept them and have that discussion.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Lasley.
Ms. Lasley. Ma'am, we certainly assess that ISIL presents a
long-term threat to the country. We know that their leader back
in January spoke of a direct confrontation with the United
States. As I said, we don't see a near-term threat directly
from them, no evidence yet of that. But they do have a very
sophisticated and savvy media campaign, especially a social
media campaign. I think our near-term concern is that that
campaign will be quite appealing to individuals who would seek
to radicalize, whether they are over in Europe or they are here
in the homeland. They could conduct an attack on their own at
any time, based on that media campaign. So that is a very clear
near-term concern that we have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. We would echo all of those comments. I think
for both the State Department, it is not just the homeland, but
our U.S. citizens overseas. So we are also looking at that
aspect. We know ISIL's stated threats and objectives against
the United States. So we look at our protection of our U.S.
citizens overseas, as well as our missions and are always
adjusting our posture accordingly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask a specific question. Thank you.
As both Mr. Miller and Mr. Wagner knows, and as we all know,
the two acts of beheading were clearly directed toward the
sentiments, the infrastructure values of the United States, and
certainly, as Ms. Johnson has said, attack on our citizens that
were overseas.
To Mr. Miller and Mr. Wagner: Following upon the line of
questioning of Chairwoman Miller, I am concerned as to whether
or not we do have the kind of coordination that is actually
needed. I guess I don't want to use the term ``imminent.'' I
think creating hysteria is not the intent of this committee.
But I also hesitate to be able to solidly predict ISIL's
threat level, inasmuch as we are reminded of our posture on the
day before
9/11, 2001. So let me just--in the manner in which you can
answer the question, feel comfortable about the level of
coordination in this climate.
Mr. Miller, I would like to hear what level, how intense
your coordination is, how comfortable you are with the
coordination. What do you need to make it better? I would ask
Mr. Wagner that question.
Mr. Miller. Our coordination with the intelligence
community and the law enforcement community in the United
States is stronger than ever. We are working this threat daily,
whether it is with the FBI and the intelligence community.
Our foreign counterparts--we are working with them. I just
met with the Australians and the United Kingdom yesterday.
There is stronger and stronger sentiment for information
sharing from our European partners, as well. We can explain
some of our relationships, burgeoning relationships in a
Classified environment more fully.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner. We take that information and we make
operational decisions based upon it. Getting that information
is really critical to us making the right decisions on how we
operationalize that information.
One of the things, you know, we would like to see is a
stronger response from some of our partners overseas and
emulating some of the ways we do our border security
management, as was referenced earlier, you know, use of PNR and
use of the airline manifest information in trying to take
actions in advance of travel and not waiting until that person
shows up on your doorstep to figure out what to do with them.
I think we would encourage all of our allies around the
globe to consider those types of systems and those practices.
We work very closely with a lot of countries in helping build
up that capacity.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have about two questions, if I might,
just finish very quickly. Ms. Johnson, I understand that it is
somewhat difficult to track the travel of foreign terrorists. I
would like to know what the State Department is doing and how
you are improving tracking the travels of foreign terrorists
and coordinating with your fellow collaborating nation-states
about whether you are doing that.
Ms. Lasley, if I can ask you the question of our level of
intelligence in the climate of what we are in now, and
backtrack it to 9/11, where we were saying quite the contrary.
We didn't have a slight inkling of what was going to be
happening that next day. Are we in a better place, and is there
something more that you need? Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. Obviously, working with our foreign
partners is an on-going effort. Everyone has different legal
regimes and privacy concerns, but they are very concerned--our
foreign partners are very concerned about the foreign fighter
terrorist threat, and we are working with them very closely. As
I mentioned, the European is now looking at the Passenger Name
Record situation, hoping to adopt something by the end of this
year. That will help us at the United States for the CBP
Officers to be able to understand who is coming and who is
traveling. We are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think the No-Fly List can be made
more robust?
Ms. Johnson. The No-Fly List?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, make it more robust?
Ms. Johnson. I think for the No-Fly List, I think we are
working very--all the time talking about how to we can work the
No-Fly List to make sure it has got accurate information, that
is it is operational. We do share that information with foreign
partners so they know who is on the No-Fly List. We have worked
on aviation screening generally with our foreign partners,
particularly last point of departure airports. They are
enhancing their own screening efforts. That helps us prevent
people from even getting on planes, including from other parts
of the world to our European allies' airports.
As I mentioned, our information-sharing agreements,
particularly with the visa waiver partner countries, but also
additional countries under Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6. We share biographic information with foreign
partners. A lot of that information, again, is individuals on
the No-Fly List and those who need to be more screened.
We also have something I think that DHS and DOJ can talk
about, the preventing serious crime agreements, which also
collects biographic--or I am sorry, biometric information,
mostly fingerprints--to exchange that information. So there are
a lot of capabilities there to enhance our border security
screening and track terrorist travel.
Mrs. Miller. I am going to ask in the interests of time
here--we are way over the time here--that Ms. Lasley answer her
question in writing.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman--the Ranking
Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Mr.
Wagner, from time to time, Congress has in its infinite wisdom
cut the budget of the agencies who are tasked on the front line
to keep us safe. In the present budget, are you comfortable
that you can provide the security and assurance necessary that
CBP is doing all it can to keep bad people from getting into
the country?
Mr. Wagner. Yes, I believe we can. I think CBP was
fortunate enough to, you know, be one of the few organizations
that did see a very generous budget, including the addition of
2,000 CBP Officers this fiscal year. In the administration's
request for 2015, there is also a request for another 2,000-
plus officers, which we know are critically important to
securing the economy, but also then securing and facilitating--
securing and countering this threat.
Mr. Thompson. I understand the manpower. But I am concerned
about technology and some other things necessary to support the
increase in people along the border. I am looking at the
international side of it.
Mr. Wagner. Well, we use those officers to deploy them in
places like pre-clearance overseas, deploy them in our
immigration advisory program, deploy them to our National
Targeting Center, to be able to--when we collect the
information, we collect the intelligence reports and
operationalize that, it is CBP Officers and analysts and
others, too, but principally CBP Officers, based on their
experience and their knowledge in turning that into actionable
operational entities and being able to question these travelers
at different points in their travel continuum to address that.
Mr. Thompson. So it is not a matter of resources. So are
you satisfied with the coordination between the agencies in
terms of identifying these individuals coming to this country?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. I think we have seen that it has been
better than ever at this point. As these threats continue to--
you know, to appear, you know, the information sharing and the
coordination get stronger and stronger, and you know, our
systems integration to make sure our databases are talking to
each other. So when State Department takes an action against a
visa or a passport, it appears in our database so we can take
action when that traveler tries to travel or begins their
travel.
Mr. Thompson. Let's take that example. Is that a real-time
identification, or is there lag time?
Mr. Wagner. It would be a real-time identification that
that information appears in the different systems, and then we
try to access it in--far in advance of a person's travel as we
can in order to take the appropriate action or to address
whatever kind of questions we have. So yes.
Mr. Thompson. Ms. Johnson, there has been some discussion
about revoking of passports. For the committee's edification,
are the present rules for revoking passports as robust as they
need to be, given this present ISIS threat that potentially is
expanding?
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. I know our consular affairs bureau
is working with our law enforcement and intelligence community
partners to review all of our options, and I believe they are
looking at that, as well. I can take that back to have our
lawyers and the consular affairs bureau provide a more fulsome
answer, if you would like.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I would. But if you would, are you
comfortable, with the present protocols in place that if those
individuals are identified, that the passport cancellation
process would fully comply with that cancellation?
Ms. Johnson. I think that is a question that consular
affairs bureau could answer better. But I believe it is in real
time. When we revoke passports, I believe--I don't know how
many we have done--that it is pretty quick. But again, we do it
in consultation with the law enforcement and the intelligence
communities so there should be operational activities working
side-by-side on that very quickly, I imagine.
Mr. Thompson. Can anybody else address that question? Well,
can you get Consular Affairs to provide it? I think one of the
questions that we are contemplating is whether or not, when
these individuals are identified, that we are doing everything
we can to keep them from getting back here to American soil. If
there is some question as to whether or not that is, in fact,
taking place, we need to plug any potential gap that exists.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Texas, Chairman McCaul.
Chairman McCaul. I thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding
this important hearing, very timely. I thank you for your
leadership, as well.
Tomorrow, we will observe the 13th anniversary of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. While we have made a tremendous amount of
progress since that tragic day in 2001, we have to continue to
be vigilant and be one step ahead of our adversaries. Today,
ISIS is the biggest threat to the homeland. These terrorists
are brutal, driven, and intent on attacking the United States.
The job of this committee is to help ensure that this does
not happen. The largest concern is ISIS's recruitment of
foreign fighters, many of whom have Western passports that
could ease their travel into Europe and into the United States
to carry out attacks. The fact is, you don't know what you
don't know, and we only have estimates of how many Westerners,
these foreign fighters, are in ISIS ranks, and potentially
thousands that we do not know who they are.
One of the biggest worries from a counterterrorism
perspective is the unknown terrorists, those with no criminal
record or intelligence traces, who could use a valid U.S.
passport or the Visa Waiver Program to enter and exit the
homeland.
For example, in May, a 22-year-old Florida man who joined
al-Nusra in Syria, an al-Qaeda affiliate, killed 16 people and
himself in a suicide bombing attack against Syrian government
forces. U.S. officials say he was on their radar screen, but
acknowledged that he traveled back to the United States before
returning to Syria without detection.
It is also key for the administration to take the real
steps to stop the radicalization of our youth so that they do
not leave for jihad. This week, I visited the CBP's National
Targeting Center to observe the hard-working men and women who
are responsible for preventing travel by terrorists and those
with terrorists ties and others who we have on various watch
lists. The work they do targeting obscure information and
connecting the dots to keep dangerous people out of the United
States is vital to stopping ISIS.
Let me say I am hopeful--I am very hopeful that tonight--
and I have talked to the Secretary, Jeh Johnson--I am very
hopeful that tonight, we will hear from the President to take
the advice of his chairman of Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey,
that the only way you can defeat ISIS is to attack them
wherever they exist. I am hopeful tonight that the President
will come out strongly on the issue because it is a matter of
National security, and it is a matter of homeland security that
we do so, that we stop them over there before they can come
here.
That is really the whole purpose of this hearing, one
flight away, because these individuals are just one flight
away. So I would like to ask the panel--you know, we have seen
this gentleman from Florida get in and out undetected. We saw
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who was on the radar, get--leave this
country and come back and pull off a terrorist attack in
Boston.
What assurances can you give me that that will not happen
in the future, Mr. Wagner?
Mr. Wagner. Thank you. So looking at the lessons we learned
with Tsarnaev and looking at--you know, we had access to
certain pieces of information, and certain pieces of
information, you know, weren't--weren't reading or actions
being followed up in closing a lot of those gaps. We learned a
real hard lesson with the Christmas day bomber. Here was a guy
that we had in our sights, but you know, not really realizing
his intentions at the time. We were waiting for him on the
ground.
You know, taking a look at those procedures and getting--
connecting better the pieces of information we have and taking
action against a person as far in advance of them boarding that
plane as possible, whether that is revoking their visa so when
they check in with the airline, the airline is not able to
print a boarding pass because the ESTA has been revoked or the
visa has been revoked, or having our pre-clearance officers
overseas question and talk and search a person before they get
on-board that aircraft, or IAP officers that are working in
conjunction with the airlines and the foreign authorities to
question people and talk to them and try to determine a
person's intent.
You know, with all the systems that we have and all the
data we collect, we can look for patterns, we can look for
pieces of information. We can connect known pieces of
information. But determining a person's intent is a really
difficult, difficult challenge, one best brought--really
uncovered by questioning a person and using our skills to be
able to do that and our search authorities to be able to do
that.
Chairman McCaul. Now, when I talked to the Secretary, we
talked about these Visa Waiver Program countries, the ability
to get more information and more data from these countries so
that we do know more about these travelers--would you agree
with that? Could that be--legislatively, would that help you?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. As an operational organization, we are
always looking for additional sources of information to help us
paint a better picture of a traveler or if we can figure out
what their intentions are by having access to additional
information and how we would use it and what circumstances we
would use it and how we would protect it. But yes, in general,
I would agree with that.
Chairman McCaul. I would like to ask Mr. Miller and Ms.
Lasley on the intelligence side of the house--my biggest
concern is we don't have sufficient intelligence, human
intelligence, particularly in Syria, to identify the 100 to 200
Americans that are over there, that we don't have sufficient
intelligence on these tens of thousands of foreign fighters
that could board an airplane and come into the United States.
I know we are not in a Classified setting, but does that
disturb you? Is it possible that some of these foreign fighters
have actually returned to the United States, like the man from
Florida, and are currently here? Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Chairman, yes, sir, it does concern us. We
continue to look at the known terrorists, to look at travel
patterns, to look at who they are connected to, to look at some
of the data elements that we may be able to utilize to identify
future people. We identify--we continue to work with the law
enforcement and intelligence community to see if there is
additional data elements that we can utilize to help us
identify those folks. We continue to work with our foreign
partners, as well.
But as you stated, we can give more of what we are doing in
a Classified environment to put the full picture together.
Chairman McCaul. Ms. Lasley.
Ms. Lasley. Sir, I would agree with my colleague's
comments. We don't have a fulsome picture in all cases. I think
that is why our interaction with our foreign counterparts in
particular is quite important, so that where they have citizens
who are fighting there, we share those identities and that
information with each other. I know the Department and our work
with State Department, both DHS and State are working very
closely to make all of that information known and shared.
Chairman McCaul. That all sounds great, but when I ask the
question, do we have a high degree of confidence as to who
these people are over there, I am always not satisfied with the
answer. I think the honest answer is we don't. I would urge
this administration--and I am hopeful that the President
tonight will articulate a policy, strong policy, since we have
pulled out of Iraq completely without a Status of Forces
Agreement, and left the vacuum here now that has developed into
what is one of the biggest threats to the homeland and Iraq and
Syria, that we regain that reconnaissance, that intelligence,
and also that intelligence on the ground to determine who is
over there so that we can stop them from coming back to the
United States and killing Americans.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the Chairman for his very insightful
questions and comments.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
We spent a lot of time today discussing the threat of
Islamic State terrorists gaining entry into the United States,
but I am also very concerned, as the rest of the committee,
about those who may already be here. Last year, the
Government's own nonpartisan fact checker, the Government
Accountability Office, reported that the Department of Homeland
Security has lost track of roughly 1 million foreign visitors.
Mr. Miller, what steps is DHS taking to identify these
individuals and ensure the American people that they are not
affiliated with the Islamic State? Wouldn't the completion of a
biometric entry/exit system help against this threat?
Mr. Miller. We have over the last several years taken
several steps, along with HSI or Immigration and Custom
Enforcement to identify those that have overstayed and
prioritize them through our automated targeting system. With
respect to the biometric exit, I would yield to Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner. Thank you. You know, we are using the
biographical data now we receive. We receive 100 percent of--
from the airlines of everyone coming in and everyone flying out
via commercial air----
Mr. Barletta. But we are not doing land entries and exits.
Mr. Wagner. We are doing some of it at the land--like, you
know, we are doing----
Mr. Barletta. Well, my problem with that is, is that if we
are not doing it everywhere, we really don't know if somebody
has left the country.
Mr. Wagner. Absolutely. Those are the gaps we are trying to
close. As far as the biometric piece, we set up a demo lab with
our science and technology branch. It opened a few months ago.
We invite everyone to come visit it up in Landover, Maryland.
We have got some scientists there and some very, very
intelligent people there helping test out what are the right
biometrics to collect, to record that entry and then
ultimately, that exit from the United States in the different
challenging environments that we need to do it, and in real
time.
So over the course of this year and into next year, we will
be piloting different types of biometrics in this demonstration
lab. We are looking to do a few tests at airports over the
course of the next year, and then have a good pilot in place at
the beginning of 2016 at a single airport with what we think
will be the right technology that we would then expand to
additional locations.
Mr. Barletta. We know that terrorist networks have been
using our porous Southern Border and a broken immigration
system to enter the United States. Hezbollah has been actively
setting up terrorist networks in Latin America for decades now
and are working with the Mexican drug cartels to move
contraband into the United States. Al-Shabaab has reportedly
been sending individuals through Central America, take
advantage of our broken immigration system and claiming asylum
upon entry, but never showing up for their hearings.
Ms. Lasley or Mr. Miller, what measures are the Department
of Homeland Security taking to ensure that the Islamic State
does not take similar advantage of our porous borders and
broken immigration system? Is this border crisis that we are
seeing with the unaccompanied minors a concern that now HHS are
taking the minors and just dispersing them across the United
States without the Governors or States or communities even
knowing who these individuals are--if you can touch on that.
Ms. Lasley. Sir, certainly, we have had a long-standing
concern in the Department about known or suspected terrorists
and groups moving in and out of all of our border areas. So we
are continually looking at the information and the intelligence
that we receive, determine credibility of that information. To
date, we have not had credible reporting that either Hezbollah
or any other terrorist group has been taking advantage of our
borders to move individuals in and out.
It is something we are always looking for, but to date, we
have not seen credible evidence of that.
Mr. Barletta. Well, just this week, I have introduced a
bill that would stop the Federal Government from sending
unaccompanied minors around the company into our schools, into
our neighborhoods without any knowledge at all of what is
happening. You know, I think we really need to look at what
they are looking at as how to get into the United States and
kill Americans.
So thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, just an inquiry. Could
you give the gentleman an additional 30 seconds so that I can
pose a question to the gentleman?
Mrs. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman. We have worked
together on a number of issues. Do you have documentation that
unaccompanied children ages 2 years old and 4 years old and 6
years old and 10 years old are, in fact, known terrorists that
are spread throughout the Nation? Do you have present and
knowing knowledge and documentation? Maybe we will have to look
at your documentation in a SCIF, but do you have known
documentation?
Mr. Barletta. No, I am not saying that we have known
documentation that the unaccompanied minors were--85 percent of
them are the ages of 14 to 17 are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But even----
Mr. Barletta [continuing]. Are known terrorists. But
shouldn't we--shouldn't we consider that a threat, that we
don't know anything about these individuals, and they are being
sent around the United States, especially with the threat that
is going on in Iraq with ISIS, with our known intelligence that
they want to come to the United States? Don't you think that we
are vulnerable without knowing that?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me--let me thank the gentleman
for----
Mrs. Miller. All right, the time----
The Chairwoman will now recognize Mr. O'Rourke from Texas
for his comments.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Appreciate you
bringing us together for this hearing today and assembling the
panel that we have.
I want to clarify the response Ms. Lasley made to Mr.
Barletta's question or comment and seek further clarity from
any Member of the panel who would wish to offer it.
When a Member of the Congress says, we all know that
terrorist networks are using our Southern Border to enter the
United States, I think it is very important for all of us in
our sworn responsibility to know whether or not that is a true
statement.
I have been told by DHS categorically as recently as last
month that there is no evidence, nor has there ever been, of
terrorists entering the United States from--through the
Southern Border, our border with Mexico, or that terrorist
plots have been foiled or intercepted at the Southern Border or
that terrorist plots have been carried out within the United
States that have a connection to the Southern Border. That is
what I heard directly from DHS. Is there any further----
Mr. Duncan. Will the gentleman yield? Will the gentleman
yield?
Mr. O'Rourke. I will.
Mr. Duncan. An Iranian Quds Force operative tried to cross
the Southern Border, contacted a--what he believed was a
Mexican drug cartel. Turned out to be a DEA undercover
operative in Mexico. His intent was to cross the Southern
Border and bring nefarious objects with him to assassinate the
ambassador from Saudi Arabia here in this city at a restaurant
that you and I may have been attending that night.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. I will----
Mr. Duncan. That is the facts. I just want to give you an
example.
Mr. O'Rourke. I will ask the experts at the panel to answer
the question.
Ms. Lasley. Sir, I would reiterate what I stated earlier,
that we to-date don't have credible information, that we are
aware of, of known or suspected terrorists coming across the
border, particularly related to this threat stream or----
Mr. O'Rourke. Any threat stream.
Ms. Lasley [continuing]. Syrian foreign fighters.
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Miller and Mr. Wagner, would you like to
clarify what we have heard so far, either from Members of
Congress or from your co-panelists?
Mr. Wagner. Yes, thank you. Building upon that, the numbers
of known watch-listed individuals that we have encountered at
the ports, in between the ports on the Southwest Border is
minimal compared to what we see in commercial aviation. You are
talking tens versus thousands. It is minimal, from what we have
seen from watch-listed encounters.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. No, I would reiterate what Mr. Wagner said. In
addition, we do have very robust information sharing with our
counterparts in Central America, in Mexico, with the State and
local partners. In fact, we are embedded in the Texas fusion
center, our office of intelligence in Arizona. We have a robust
intel structure, so we continue to look at this. When and if
that sort of intel surfaced, we would take appropriate action.
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes. I may submit a question for the record.
I would like to share it with my colleagues the answers that I
receive from you all. I would like to know, you know, once and
for all what the facts support in terms of these repeated
accusations that the Southern Border is unsafe, that terrorists
are exploiting it to enter the United States. I want to make
sure that we address the anecdote raised by my colleague from
South Carolina. I think that is important, and I want to make
sure that I know the truth on that.
This is not new, by the way. I am going to ask for consent
to submit for the record The El Paso Herald-Post of Friday,
December 17, 1981, ``Border checked for Libyan hit squad.'' We
have been projecting our anxiety----
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted For the Record by Hon. Beto O'Rourke
border checked for libyan ``hit squad''
Inspectors report traffic moving as usual
by Patricia Lochraum and Jesse Tinsley
El Paso Herald-Post, Friday, December 17, 1981
Border inspectors reported business as usual today despite a
careful lookout for members of a Libyan ``hit squad'' thought to be in
Mexico.
Four Middle Eastern travelers have been stopped for further
investigation since the alert began Monday, said Chief U.S. Customs
Inspector Andy Towndrow today. None of the four were detained.
One border inspector has worn a bullet-proof vest for his bridge
duties, but most of the customs inspectors in El Paso and along the
Texas border simply stepped up routine inspections of passports, cars
and purchases, officials said.
``It's not exciting to us,'' said customs inspector Rocky Galarra,
20, at the Bridge of the Americas port-of-entry.
``To us it is just dangerous. We don't get any kind of glory
feeling about this, we just use extra caution.''
The search has been complicated by Christmas shoppers, who have
swelled the daily average number of cars or on foot, said regional U.S.
Customs spokesman Charles Conroy in Houston. The amount increases
significantly during the Christmas season, he added.
Some 1,270 Customs inspectors cover that traffic in Texas and New
Mexico. The INS staff for Texas includes 78 people for the three El
Paso ports.
``We can't afford to take this lightly,'' said Customs director
Manny Najera, whose runs from Fort Hancock to Columbus N.M. ``So we
decided to tighten up and check passports and anything else that caught
our attention.''
El Paso offices now have composite sketched of the subjects and
background information. But the distribution was so slow in some areas
that border officials depended on newspapers for their sketches.
``We've seen more on television than we've gotten from the
government,'' said Mitchell Britt, INS officer in charge at Laredo
bridges.
Fred Aoyen, assistant regional commissioner for U.S. Customs in
Houston, said the information flow had been as rapid as possible
``without disrupting the national security.''
Alan Giufni, INS district director in El Paso, said the major local
impact of the extra checks had been a stackup of Christmas traffic.
If border officials found someone suspicious attempting to enter
the country, they would alert local FBI agents, Najera said. The FBI
declined to comment on the situation.
U.S. Consul Keith Powell at the U.S. Consulate General in Juarez
declined comment when asked if he had received any information about
the ``hit team.''
Some Federal officials were quoted Thursday saying that Arab
communities along the border might be sounded for rumors about the
squad. However, a Lebanese restaurant owner in a sizeable Middle
Eastern community in Juarez said local feeling is that if the squad
exists and is trying to cross into the U.S., El Paso would not be the
city they choose.
``It's harder to cross from Juarez than it would be from Tijuana,
our people feel,'' said George Yanor, 42. ``We hear a lot of talk, but
absolutely nothing about anyone coming into this area.''
Mr. O'Rourke [continuing]. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman--
about threats to the United States on the U.S./Mexico border
for as long as I have been alive. It does not mean that we
should not be vigilant. It does not mean we should not take
these threats seriously. But it does mean that we should only
traffic in the facts and the data, and we should only raise
these kinds of fears and anxieties when there is--there are
facts to support them. So I just would ask for my colleagues to
do that.
There are a number of questions I have. Most of them would
probably be more appropriate in a Classified hearing. Here is a
general one, and with time permitting, would love to get
everyone's answer.
We are at war in Iraq right now. We have service members
flying missions over there. We have boots on the ground and
advisers. We are about to formalize that war, perhaps to some
greater degree, after the President's speech tonight and
potentially with Congressional action.
What does a greater state of war in Iraq and Syria mean to
you in the jobs that you do? What additional resources, as the
Ranking Member asked earlier, authorities and procedures would
you need to meet additional threats following a greater U.S.
involvement in those two countries?
I don't know if we can just have one of you answer just
briefly. I am out of time. So with the Chairwoman's permission,
would love another 30 seconds to hear from Ms. Lasley.
Ms. Lasley. Sir, I would say that we have an imperative,
and that imperative increases as the threat increases, to share
information so that we can identify and stop individuals who
want to come to this country, whether that is with our foreign
partners, whether that is within the intelligence community or
whether that is with our State and local law enforcement. So I
think we will just continue to be very vigilant in making sure
that that information is broadly shared.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. Yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Clawson.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you for the work you do. Thanks for
coming and being willing to sit in the crossfire a little bit
and for your efforts to keep us safe.
As I went through my own preparation for today's meeting,
it felt like the VWP is yesterday's tool for today's world. So
at a 20,000-foot level, the question that kept coming to my
mind as I worked it with my team--do we optimize yesterday's
tool for today's world, or do we need to go to a new program
altogether?
Maybe that means, you know, at one end of the continuum
would be visas for everyone, could be less restrictive for
that, would be more costly than what we currently do, and would
probably--we would hear some pushback from the tourism industry
and others.
I am not taking a position on that, but what I would like
is for you to take a position on whether you feel we should
optimize yesterday's tool for today's world, or do we need to
break the mold a bit here and look for something more current?
Implied in my question, of course, is bang for buck. How
much are we spending? How do we measure what we get for those
expenses? I understand 300 caught, but I know you have more
sophisticated ways of measuring what we are getting for our
resources in this effort.
So I would like to hear all four of you answer how you feel
whether we ought to continue this current road, whether we can
see around corners good enough with this information, or do we
need to go to a new level to protect the future?
Start with Mr. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Miller. Sir, I would agree with you. I think given a
threat, we need to look at the information we are currently
collecting, whether it is in the Visa Waiver Program or other
avenues, and then--and take the appropriate action and decide
if we need more information to collect.
As Mr. Wagner pointed out earlier, as operators using our
targeting system, generally, more information is better as long
as we can collect it in the right way, given civil rights,
civil liberties, privacy, and we are able to operationalize it.
Mr. Wagner. I would just say that, you know, VWP is an
important program. It does get us information-sharing
agreements and allows our close allies to share very important
information with us that we are not getting from countries we
don't have a VWP agreement with. You know, it requires them to
issue electronic passports, which helps secure the documents,
requires them to report lost and stolen passports to us.
So there are other benefits of what the overall program
does get us access to and some visibility into. Like Mr. Miller
mentioned, you know, we are taking a hard look at, are we
collecting, you know, the right data elements and what other
information could we make use of, and how would we collect it,
you know, as we are with many of our programs.
But I think the program does have value, and you know, but
a good review and a side-by-side of what VWP versus the visa
program, you know, would offer and what types of benefits is
always a good study to undertake.
Mr. Clawson. Are we doing it? Is anybody doing that?
Mr. Wagner. Sir, we are reviewing the ESTA program. We are
reviewing a lot of our different programs, you know, as we
constantly do in light of the different threats that arise. You
know, are there gaps in there? Are there gaps in the data
collection? Are there gaps in how we connect our systems? So
yes, we are looking at a lot of these things.
Ms. Lasley. Sir, and I would say that that is across the
Department. So the Department leadership is really looking at
all the tools that we have in our toolkit and how we can
optimize them to make sure that we have got the data that we
need and that we are stopping people from coming into the
country who shouldn't be here.
One of the tools that we have--if I could just highlight
one that I think we are really trying to optimize is our watch-
listing effort. So we are making a concerted effort within the
Department to share as much of our Departmental data with our
colleagues in the intelligence community to make sure that
individuals are, in fact, put on the watch list.
We at I&A are responsible for that program on behalf of the
DNI, and we do that for the entire Department, working with our
colleagues at CBP, TSA, and others. Over the last 3 years, we
have significantly increased the number of nominations that we
in the Department have given to the intelligence community from
about 4,000 2 years ago to well over 9,000 this year.
So that is one example of how we are trying to optimize a
tool that we have in order to stop travelers from coming.
Ms. Johnson. As I mentioned, we have our information-
sharing agreement with Visa Waiver Program partners. We are
increasing and strengthening those information-sharing
agreements and arrangements. In addition to beyond Visa Waiver
Program, we are expanding the number of those agreements, and
we work very closely with our interagency partners on that
watch-listing information to make sure our foreign partners
have that information, as well. I think those are very strong
tools.
Mr. Clawson. I urge you and I urge us to look at secondary
and incremental and more than incremental efforts in this--in
what we are doing here. I am a user of global entry for my
business before I came here. It makes me nervous that you all
interview me, but you don't interview people that could be
face-to-face that could be somewhere in Europe that could be
wanting to come to our country. To my knowledge, I don't think
we do that. Am I right about that, in the current ESTA program?
Mr. Wagner. They would get interviewed upon arrival in the
United States by a CBP Officer, but there is no interview to
issue that ESTA unless we have a--they come through a pre-
clearance location, where we would interview them before they
got on-board the plane, or unless some of our targeting systems
and some of our analysis of their reservation data gave us
cause for, you know, some type of reason to have our
immigration advisory program officers, if they are coming
through one of those 11 locations, talk to them before boarding
and address any types of questions we have.
So the possibility is there. We are in a lot of VWP
countries. We are in, you know, London Heathrow. We are in
Manchester. We are in Paris. We are in Amsterdam. We are in
Frankfurt, you know, major gateways, major, you know, places of
travel, especially for VWP travelers. So we have the
opportunity if our other systems do flag them for additional
review or scrutiny.
Mr. Clawson. Well, if you do a face-to-face with me, I
would really love you to do it with potential bad guys coming
from outside our country, as well.
Thank you for your answers. Yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank the panel for being here today and for your service
to our country.
In February 2014, this year, the director of national
intelligence, James Clapper, started out testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee by saying, ``looking back over
my now more than half a century in intelligence, I have not
experienced a time when we have been beset by more crises and
threats around the globe.''
Two days ago, we have a staff meeting on fly-in day, and I
shared a video with my staff of--there was an ISIS-produced
video, but it showed young Iraqi men loaded in the back of
pick-up trucks and dump trucks taken out into the desert and
murdered, hundreds of Iraqis. It hearkened to times of Pol Pot
in Cambodia and the Holocaust to watch those images that were
disturbing of men shot multiple times to make sure they were
dead as they laid in the trench!
This is a real threat. We may not think as Americans that
we may not be interested in Islamic extremism and ISIS and the
establishment of a caliphate, but I will tell you what. ISIS is
interested in America, and they are interested in you.
In June, I traveled to Europe on a codel, and I couldn't
get many Members of Congress interested in going. We were
looking at border security and foreign fighter flow--in June.
If I was to have that same Congressional delegation trip today,
I would have to turn Members away because the plane wouldn't be
big enough to travel to Europe to meet with our allies about
foreign fighter flow.
I grew up during the cold war, nation-state versus nation-
state, tracking the movements of tanks and large numbers of
troops along different borders in mainly Eastern Europe. We are
not tracking troop movement or tank movement today, we are
tracking individuals, foreign fighters who leave not only
European countries but this country to travel to fight jihad,
ofttimes being radicalized and coming back possibly to the
United States of America to create and commit heinous crimes.
Is that a far-fetched idea? Well, before I left to travel
to Brussels, a young man who had traveled to Syria through
Turkey came back through Germany. Germany tracked his movements
but failed to let the allies within Europe know about this
individual. He entered Brussels. He shot up a Jewish museum. At
least three if not four individuals were killed. Have you heard
about that on the mainstream media in this country? Probably
not. I knew about it because I was headed to Brussels and it
was on our radar screen.
But this was a jihadist fighter who radicalized, came back
to Brussels, shot up a Jewish museum, killed individuals and
tried to flee back to North Africa through France. He was
caught at a bus stop.
Free travel, shingen region in Europe, free travel among
those countries, no border crossings. Guess what? They are visa
waiver countries, as well. If they didn't know that individual
had actually traveled to Syria and become radicalized, if he
would have been--a country that was part of the Visa Waiver
Program, traveled back to his country unbeknownst to the United
States personnel, had a valid travel document, possibly could
have boarded an aircraft and flown to this country.
We need to be concerned about that. We also need to be
concerned about Americans. We now have identified a number that
have traveled over to fight with ISIS, whether it is in Syria
or Iraq or the Islamic State and whatever it looks like going
forward. We should be able to revoke the passports of United
States citizens if they do travel to fight for another
organization.
In fact, U.S. law under--I guess it is Section 8 U.S.C.
1481 says that a U.S. citizen shall lose its nationality by
volunteering and performing any of the following acts: Entering
or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state. Now, there
is a part of the law that says with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationality. Maybe we need to
strike that in future law.
But if you go on ``and committing any act of treason
against or attempting to force the overthrow or bearing arms
against the United States''--that is exactly what ISIS and ISIL
have said. If you go on to other laws, we can revoke a United
States passport if the Secretary receives certification from a
State agency that an individual owes arrears of child support
in excess of $2,500.
We can revoke their passport just because they don't pay
child support, but you can't tell me we are going to revoke the
passports of people that are going to fight with people in ISIS
that have said, we are coming to the White House, we are going
to fly that black ISIS-al-Qaeda flag over the White House, who
have made threats to the United States, who have beheaded two
American journalists? But we can revoke their passport if they
fail to pay their child support?
Secretary shall issue the passport--let's just go on to
say, the Supreme Court has interpreted Passport Act of 1926
that gives broad powers to the Secretary to revoke a passport
when necessary for security purposes.
We need to revoke the passports of these Americans that
have gone. We need to keep them from reentering the United
States when we know who they are. We need to understand,
America, the challenges of tracking individuals, foreign
fighters, and as they flow around the world through even some
allied countries, where they end up.
Madam Chairwoman, this is an apropos committee hearing. I
hope this isn't the last one. We have got a lot of threats
facing our country. I hope that the President comes out
strongly tomorrow night against this threat to the United
States of America and the very freedoms that we enjoy.
With that, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman, very much.
I think we are all very interested to hear what the
President has to say about this issue. I think it is--I would
guess, certainly in my district, and I think most Members when
they were home in their districts over the last month, we heard
about this ISIS threat over and over and over being talked
about. It certainly has--I think the Nation understands and is
looking for the President to--he is the commander-in-chief--to
outline to the country how serious of a threat it is, and what
we need to be doing as a country to address it.
Really, the purpose of this hearing----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman?
Mrs. Miller. In a moment. Really, the purpose of this
hearing was to talk about what we can do legislatively to
assist all of you. As I mentioned, I have currently two
different bills that we are looking at and introducing. I would
also encourage all of you--for instance, Mr. Wagner, you
mentioned that you are looking, you are reviewing, as you
always are, about changes in ESTA, what kinds of things would
be helpful.
Please keep us in the information loop. You don't have to
wait until we have a hearing to let us know what you are doing.
I know that maybe what you are looking at doing is better
talked about in the SCIF, but in a Classified situation, but
still, please keep us in the information loop.
Does the Ranking Member have a comment?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I do, thank you very much, very briefly.
Let me just hope to make sure that Ms. Lasley responds to my
question and to just put on the record that there is a, I
think, looming question of watch list, No-Fly List. I think
this hearing should leave the American public with the idea
that we are being vigilant and that we are knowledgeable that
ISIL wants to form an Islamic state, but we balance that with
our civil liberties and facts.
So I would ask for the--anyone who may have documentation--
I guess it is in different jurisdictions, but I want to just
put on the record--documentation on the status or the type of
unaccompanied children. I would like to get that report from
anybody who has access to that.
I would like to yield 15 seconds to--and thank the
witnesses very much, too--Mr. O'Rourke, very briefly.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you----
Mrs. Miller. You don't have to yield to him. I will
recognize the gentleman.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
My colleague and friend from South Carolina, when I asked
about a connection to known terrorist plots and the U.S./Mexico
border, mentioned the Iran terror plot to assassinate somebody
here in Washington, DC. There is, in fact, from everything that
I know about this, absolutely no connection to the border. In
fact, the plotter was interdicted at JFK airport, where he was
arrested due to our coordination with the government of Mexico.
The person with whom he thought he was dealing was actually a
DEA agent posing as a cartel member.
The border was never exploited. While I think this is a
serious issue, and again, one against which we must remain
vigilant, there is no connection to the border. So I invite
anyone, and especially those who have the subject-matter
expertise, to tell me if I am wrong. But my understanding is
that the border is as secure as it has ever been, and we do not
have any known terror plots tied to the border. Doesn't mean
that there might not be some, doesn't mean we shouldn't guard
against it, but let's again deal in the facts.
Mrs. Miller. All right, I thank the gentleman for his
comments. I think I would yield to the gentleman--or recognize
the gentleman from South Carolina, if you would like to
respond.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman. I think that the Iranian
threat was to come across the Southern Border. It was thwarted
before it ever happened. So you are right and wrong.
I will say this. We have no idea who is in our country. For
us not to recognize that we have open borders and that we have
no idea who has entered our country illegally and what their
intentions were--whether it was an intention to get a job and
provide for their family or whether it was an intention to
maybe create a terrorist cell and do something nefarious in the
future, we don't know.
I met with the security force of the King Ranch in your
State, 30, 40 miles north of Brownsville, 837,000 acres. It is
as large as the State of Rhode Island. So they have got their
own security force. This was 2 years ago. He said, Mr. Duncan,
we are catching on our property some OTMs. OTM now is a term
that is only being applied, in the press anyway, to
unaccompanied children from countries other than Mexico, such
as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala. But before
that, OTM meant anyone that wasn't of Mexican descent.
He said, Mr. Duncan, we are catching folks on our property
that are African, that are Asian, and that are Middle Eastern.
This is 50 miles north of the border. They came across the
border illegally.
I just met with a Secret Service agent on the sidewalk in
Washington that was riding a bike, former military guy, served
nine tours in Afghanistan. That ought to tell you what he did
in the military. He said part of his training was on the
Southern Border watching, and they saw thousands of people come
across the border, they called CBP and nobody showed up.
He said, part of our work was radio and communications
intercept, because they were getting ready to go do the same
thing in Afghanistan. He said, everything we heard was not
Spanish.
Wake up, America! With a porous Southern Border, we have no
idea who is in our country.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman. I thank everyone for
their passion on this issue. Obviously, there is a lot of
interest in this. I certainly want to thank all of the
witnesses for their testimony today. I know some of the
questions that were asked will be--their--you know, answers
will be submitted in writing to the committee. We appreciate
that. With that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I just want
to say thank you. I know that you are ending. I just want to
say that this is a committee of facts. No one knows and has
documented that those OTMs were terrorists. I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. We would also mention that pursuant to the
committee rule 7(c), the hearing record will be held open for
10 days. So without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Troy Miller
Question. According to Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis Jennifer
Lasley, to date, there is no credible information that indicates that
known or suspected terrorists have entered through the U.S. border,
from either Hezbollah or other terrorist groups, including ISIL or
Syrian foreign fighters. However, there are repeated accusations that
the Southern U.S. Border is unsafe. What intelligence has the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the U.S. Department of State
collected that may demonstrate whether or not a known or suspected
terrorist individual(s) or group(s) has entered through the U.S.
borders, specifically the U.S. Southern Border? Please provide this
information in a Classified and/or Unclassified manner.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for John P. Wagner
Question. According to Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis Jennifer
Lasley, to date, there is no credible information that indicates that
known or suspected terrorists have entered through the U.S. border,
from either Hezbollah or other terrorist groups, including ISIL or
Syrian foreign fighters. However, there are repeated accusations that
the Southern U.S. Border is unsafe. What intelligence has the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the U.S. Department of State
collected that may demonstrate whether or not a known or suspected
terrorist individual(s) or group(s) has entered through the U.S.
borders, specifically the U.S. Southern Border? Please provide this
information in a Classified and/or Unclassified manner.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Jennifer A. Lasley
Question. According to Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis Jennifer
Lasley, to date, there is no credible information that indicates that
known or suspected terrorists have entered through the U.S. border,
from either Hezbollah or other terrorist groups, including ISIL or
Syrian foreign fighters. However, there are repeated accusations that
the Southern U.S. Border is unsafe. What intelligence has the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the U.S. Department of State
collected that may demonstrate whether or not a known or suspected
terrorist individual(s) or group(s) has entered through the U.S.
borders, specifically the U.S. Southern Border? Please provide this
information in a Classified and/or Unclassified manner.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Hillary Batjer Johnson
Question. According to Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis Jennifer
Lasley, to date, there is no credible information that indicates that
known or suspected terrorists have entered through the U.S. border,
from either Hezbollah or other terrorist groups, including ISIL or
Syrian foreign fighters. However, there are repeated accusations that
the Southern U.S. Border is unsafe. What intelligence has the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the U.S. Department of State
collected that may demonstrate whether or not a known or suspected
terrorist individual(s) or group(s) has entered through the U.S.
borders, specifically the U.S. Southern Border? Please provide this
information in a Classified and/or Unclassified manner.
Answer. We are alert to the possibility that terrorist groups and
their supporters, including groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), Hezbollah, and HAMAS, might view the Southern
U.S. Border as a feasible means to enter the United States.
ISIL currently poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and
the broader Middle East--including American citizens, personnel, and
facilities overseas. If left unchecked, it could pose a growing threat
beyond that region, including to the United States. While we have not
yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, ISIL leaders have
threatened America and our allies. Our intelligence community believes
that thousands of foreigners, including Europeans and some Americans,
have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these
fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out
deadly attacks.
However, there is no credible information suggesting current ISIL,
Hezbollah, HAMAS, or other violent Islamist extremist individuals or
groups have entered through the U.S. Southern Border. Furthermore,
there is no credible evidence of current ties between Mexican organized
crime groups and domestic or these international terrorist groups, and
there is no indication that these terrorist organizations use Mexico as
an entry point to the United States. We continue to monitor the region
for signs of an increased threat.
The United States has strengthened our overall law enforcement
cooperation with Mexican authorities. This cooperation, combined with
the Mexican government's efforts to address its own internal law
enforcement challenges and to more effectively police its borders,
north and south, should help to make the region, including our shared
border, safer and more secure.
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