[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-82
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Curtis Clawson, Florida
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan O'Hara, Acting Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Filemon Vela, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Chair (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Alex Manning, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Ms. Huban A. Gowadia, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. David C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan For Huban Gowadia......... 39
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
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Tuesday, July 29, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meehan and Clarke.
Mr. Meehan. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the Department
of Homeland Security's capabilities of protecting the homeland
from nuclear or radiological attacks.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The subcommittee meets today to examine a vitally important
issue: Protecting the homeland from nuclear and radiological
attack. I think if we just use those words alone, it identifies
the seriousness and gravity of the issue. A nuclear or
radiological attack, with its very scope, just so remarkably,
sort-of, outperforms so many other forms of concern that we
have.
So, given the alarming expansion of terrorist safe havens
across the Middle East and North Africa, along with the
increasing sophistication of these groups in organizing and
planning attacks, it is imperative the Department of Homeland
Security is properly prepared to detect and deter nuclear
threats.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which we often refer
to as DNDO, is the entity within the Department of Homeland
Security responsible for preventing a nuclear attack and is the
lead agency within the United States Government for
coordinating efforts to detect and intercept radiological and
nuclear devices that may find their way into the United States.
DNDO coordinates these efforts through an interagency system
and the collaborative framework that is known as the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO is responsible for
implementing that architecture domestically.
DNDO works with other Department of Homeland Security
components, including Customs and Border Protection, as well as
State and local law enforcement to provide these entities with
the equipment and training needed to interdict radiological or
nuclear material before it can enter the United States. DNDO
works closely with these components to install radiation portal
monitors at ports of entry and supply officers with portable
radiation monitors. Currently, 100 percent of all containerized
cargo coming in is scanned at land and sea ports of entry into
the United States.
DNDO also works with State and local law enforcement and
first responders to strengthen nuclear detection capabilities
in the interior. Through the Securing the Cities program, DNDO
helps State, local, and Tribal governments design and implement
detection and interdiction capabilities in high-density urban
areas. The efforts in the New York City region have resulted in
a robust detection architecture. Last year, DHS announced the
STC program will be expanded to Los Angeles-Long Beach area,
and they will select a third city in fiscal 2014.
While these achievements are significant, there is still
work to be done to address the gaps in the nuclear detection
architecture. The purpose of this hearing is to address those
gaps and find how we can best assist DNDO and the Department to
prevent a catastrophic nuclear event.
DNDO has had its share of struggles in the past--among
them, failed acquisition plans and less-than-optimal working
relationships with some of their other interagency components.
In its report from 2013, the GAO--and it is important to note
that this is why we have the GAO here, who has been taking a
good arm's-length look at the activities--they noted these
deficiencies and recommended approaches towards curing them. I
will be interested in hearing some of that from our witness.
Since then, DNDO has successfully worked to implement GAO
recommendations. I look forward to learning more about it, how
the office has improved as a result of those efforts.
I pleased to welcome to this hearing our distinguished
panel. Dr. Huban Gowadia is the director of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, and Dr. David Trimble is the director
of Natural Resources and Environment at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
DNDO plays a vital and specific role within the Homeland
Security, and it is our responsibility to ensure that it has
what it needs to protect and prevent a radiological or nuclear
terrorist attack. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
on, and particularly Dr. Gowadia, how she envisions the future
of DNDO.
I note also, while I talk about the catastrophic nuclear
event that is potential in a world in which proliferation,
particularly that which is going on in Iran and Iraq and other
places in which there is perhaps not weapons themselves but
certainly nuclear-grade material that can be used in other
kinds of capacities, including dirty bombs and other things, we
are talking about a broad spectrum of potential threats.
So we certainly are interested in the future and what DNDO
and Congress can do and should do to help this office achieve
its mission. So I am grateful for your presence here.
[The statement of Mr. Meehan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Patrick Meehan
July 29, 2014
The subcommittee meets today to examine a vitally important issue:
Protecting the homeland from nuclear and radiological attack. Given the
alarming expansion of terrorist safe havens across the Middle East and
Northern Africa, along with the increasing sophistication of these
groups in organizing and planning attacks, it is imperative that the
Department of Homeland Security is properly prepared to detect and
deter nuclear threats.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is the entity within
the Department of Homeland Security responsible for preventing a
nuclear attack, and is the lead agency within the U.S. Government for
coordinating efforts to detect and intercept radiological and nuclear
devices coming into the United States. DNDO coordinates these efforts
through an interagency systems and collaborative framework known as the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), and DNDO is responsible
for implementing the GNDA domestically.
DNDO works with other DHS components, including Customs and Border
Protection, as well as State and local law enforcement, to provide
these entities with the equipment and training needed to interdict
radiological or nuclear material before it can enter the United States.
DNDO works closely with these components to install radiation portal
monitors at ports of entry and supply officers with portable radiation
monitors. Currently 100% of all containerized cargo coming is scanned
at land and sea ports of entry in the United States.
DNDO also works with State and local law enforcement and first
responders to strengthen nuclear detection capabilities in the
interior. Through the ``Securing the Cities'' program, DNDO helps
State, local, and Tribal governments design and implement detection and
interdiction capabilities in high-density urban areas. These efforts in
New York City region have resulted in a robust detection architecture,
and last year, DHS announced the STC program will be expanded to the
Los Angeles-Long Beach area and will select a third city in fiscal year
2014.
While these achievements are significant, there is still work to be
done to address gaps in the nuclear detection architecture. The purpose
of this hearing is to address those gaps and find how we can best
assist DNDO and the Department to prevent a catastrophic nuclear event.
DNDO has had its share of struggles in the past. Among them, failed
acquisition plans, and less-than-optimal working relationships with
some of its inter-agency counterparts. In its report from 2013, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted these deficiencies and
recommended approaches toward curing them. Since then, DNDO has
successfully worked to implement GAO's recommendations, and I look
forward to learning more about how the Office has improved as a result
of those efforts.
I am pleased to welcome to this hearing our distinguished panel of
witnesses: Dr. Huban Gowadia, director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, Dr. David Trimble, director, Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office. DNDO plays a vital
and specific role within homeland security and it is our responsibility
to ensure that it has what it needs to prevent a radiological or
nuclear terrorist attack. I look forward to hearing from Dr. Gowadia
how she envisions the future of DNDO, and what Congress can and should
do to help the office achieve its mission.
Mr. Meehan. I now recognize the Ranking Minority Member of
the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for
any statement she may have.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing on the threats of radiological and nuclear smuggling
that our country faces.
I want to thank our witnesses today, Dr. Gowadia, director
of DNDO, and Mr. Trimble and the GAO team for agreeing to
testify today.
The issues before us today include how to measure the
balance between investment in near-term and long-term solutions
for nuclear detection gaps and how we gauge the degree and
efficiency of Federal agency coordination and especially the
mechanisms that DNDO employs for setting agency investment
priorities.
Today, we will hear about some of the achievements that the
hard-working Federal and civilian employees of DNDO have
accomplished to protect us. Other testimony today will help us
understand the challenges that we experience in such a highly
complex technological world preventing terrorists from
acquiring, transporting, and using radiological materials as a
weapon of terror.
If we are to think about reauthorizing this program, which
I understand the Chairman is inclined to do, this subcommittee
in its oversight responsibilities needs to possess ways to
evaluate and measure the outcomes of DNDO's R&D activities,
their resource requests, and their asset allocations.
I think it is safe to say that over the years this
subcommittee has seen many examples of DNDO pushing for
acquisition decisions well before some technologies had
demonstrated that they could live up to the promises made. In
my opinion, we must deal with this issue directly in any
potential legislative language.
It will be paramount that DNDO policy and strategy be
translated into operations, tactics, and implementation that
meet the requirements of Department-wide needs and that this
subcommittee be able to transparently see that process.
Furthermore, there are natural tensions among Federal
agencies created by overlapping missions in the nuclear arena,
especially in the field of nuclear detection. This fact of life
does not make matters of policy and strategy easy to implement,
nor outcomes easily measured.
Since 2009, after President Obama's administration, DNDO
has made important changes and made especially good progress in
nuclear forensics. I hope that our Congressional oversight
efforts also have had a positive effect.
In 2010, the committee, under then-Chairman Thompson, wrote
and combined S&T-DNDO authorizations, H.R. 4842, which set out
the premise that research and development and operations and
procurement are best left to separate organizations in order to
avoid obvious and glaring conflicts of interest. While not all
goals of that legislation were achieved, the message was
clearly received by the administration.
What I hope we are going to hear today is: How can DNDO's
mission be better-defined? Some claim there is still confusion
as to whether the office is an end-to-end R&D procurement
entity for all things nuclear and radiological. Is it a
development entity, or an operational entity? Some still
question whether there is an inherent conflict of interest when
an office, agency, or program is both an R&D workshop and a
procurement platform. I hope we can explore some of these
questions today.
Let me finish with this thought. On the ground and every
day, our nuclear deterrence effort as a Nation depends on
motivated and vigilant officers across the globe supplied with
the best equipment and intelligence we can give them. Officers
working out of our Nation's ports of entry have an especially
complex and difficult job. Thousands of decisions are made
every day to clear a container or a personal or commercial
vehicle for transit into the United States. Other cargo
requires further inspection or even denial of entry or an
interdiction action on a vehicle or person.
That is the hard, cold, repetitive, and everyday reality of
our mission to prevent the kind of violent nuclear attack.
However, this is part of the flow of commerce in the world's
premier, leading trading market, the United States, and we are
grateful for all of our dedicated women and men in the field
who perform these vital tasks.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony, and I
yield back.
[The statement of Ms. Clarke follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
July 29, 2014
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the threats of
radiological and nuclear smuggling our country faces. I want to thank
our witnesses today, Dr. Gowadia, director of DNDO, and the GAO team
for agreeing to testify today. The issues before us today include how
to measure the balance between investment in near-term and long-term
solutions for nuclear detection gaps, and how we gauge the degree and
efficiency of Federal agency coordination, and especially the
mechanisms that DNDO employs for setting agency investment priorities.
Today, we will hear about some of the achievements that the hard-
working Federal and civilian employees of DNDO have accomplished to
protect us. Other testimony today will help us understand the
challenges that we experience in such a highly complex technological
world--preventing terrorists from acquiring, transporting, and using
radiological materials as a weapon of terror.
If we are to think about reauthorizing this program, which I
understand the Chairman is inclined to do, this subcommittee, in its
oversight responsibilities, needs to possess ways to evaluate and
measure the outcomes of DNDO's R&D activities, their resource requests,
and their asset allocations.
I think its safe to say that over the years, this subcommittee has
seen many examples of DNDO pushing for acquisition decisions well
before some technologies had demonstrated that they could live up to
the promises made. In my opinion, we must deal with this issue directly
in any potential legislative language.
It will be paramount that DNDO policy and strategy be translated
into operations, tactics, and implementation that meet the requirements
of Department-wide needs, and that this subcommittee be able to
transparently see that process. Furthermore, there are natural tensions
among Federal agencies created by overlapping missions in the nuclear
arena, especially in the field of nuclear detection. This fact of life
does not make matters of policy and strategy easy to implement, nor
outcomes easily measured.
Since 2009, under President Obama's administration, DNDO has made
important changes, and made especially good progress in nuclear
forensics, and I hope that our Congressional oversight efforts also
have had a positive effect. In 2010, the committee, under then-Chairman
Thompson, wrote a combined S&T DNDO authorization, H.R. 4842, which set
out the premise that research and development, and operations and
procurement, are best left to separate organizations in order to avoid
obvious and glaring conflicts of interest. While not all goals of that
legislation were achieved, the message was clearly received by the
administration.
What I hope we are going to hear today is, ``How can DNDO's mission
can be better defined''? Some claim there is still confusion as to
whether the office is an end-to-end R&D procurement entity for all
things nuclear/radiological . . . is it a development entity . . . or
an operational entity?
Some still question whether there is an inherent conflict of
interest when an office, agency, or program, is both an R&D workshop
and a procurement platform. I hope we can explore some of these
questions today.
Let me finish with this thought. On the ground, and every day, our
nuclear deterrence effort as a Nation depends on motivated and vigilant
officers across the globe, supplied with the best equipment and
intelligence we can give them. Officers working at our Nation's ports
of entry have an especially complex and difficult job. Thousands of
decisions are made every day to clear a container or a personal or
commercial vehicle for transit into the United States.
Other cargo requires further inspection--or even denial of entry--
or an interdiction action on a vehicle or person. That is the hard,
cold, repetitive, and everyday reality of our mission to prevent this
kind of violent nuclear attack. However, this is part of the flow of
commerce in the world's premier and largest trading market, the United
States, and we are grateful for all of our dedicated men and women in
the field who perform these vital tasks.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony, and I yield
back.
Mr. Meehan. Let me thank the Ranking Member for her opening
statement but also for her focus on the idea that our objective
is to do, you know, effective oversight to assure that the
resources are being appropriately focused. We look forward to
the ability for the record to speak to those particular issues.
Other Members of the committee who may come in are reminded
that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 29, 2014
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, and the radiological and nuclear smuggling
threats it faces. I want to thank the director of DNDO, and the GAO
team for coming in to testify today.
We will hear testimony about some of the successes, and some of the
challenges that still exist in preventing terrorists from acquiring,
transporting, and using radiological materials as a potential weapon of
terror.
We know that our nuclear detection strategy and equipment at the
time of the 9/11 attacks was limited in its capability. Radiation
detectors could sometimes detect radiation, but could not identify
isotopes. We also found out that sensing equipment could reveal dense
objects, but it would be almost impossible to pick out a small piece of
Special Nuclear Material, or SNM. Today, as technologies have become
more capable, they can fill more gaps in the current nuclear detection
architecture.
But there's still a long way to go to fulfill the goals we set for
DNDO, and many questions to ask. For example, are we making progress on
remote detection that might offer a way to monitor chokepoints in the
United States that terrorists might pass through transporting weapons?
And, we have identified other gaps, like the need for long-range
sensors that can operate in isolated areas, and systems that can
perform efficiently in highly-congested public maritime areas. These
kinds of technologies and sensors do not come easily, or inexpensively.
But, we need to have systems under development that have the
potential to reduce false positives, speed the flow of commerce, and
reduce false negatives--all of which improve security. Over the years,
Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to deploy systems to
prevent nuclear smuggling, and to support R&D on advanced technologies.
What we hope for is that money Congress spends to achieve these
refinements can make future technologies more effective, and create an
R&D pipeline that is intended to generate a steady stream of new
technologies and systems.
However, Congress must be sure that the money it spends for this
technological pipeline is used wisely and efficiently, and that testing
and certification of these cutting-edge tools are thoroughly evaluated
and validated. Over the years, we have seen too many reports about
detection technologies being deployed without proper testing, and
without certification.
The development & procurement of sophisticated technologies is not
a simple matter, but it is also not one that should be opaque and
overly complicated for Congress to understand.
We know that DNDO has an important role across the Department, and
that it has close relationships with DHS's front-line programs, and
other Federal agencies, who depend on them for support and advice.
The challenge for this committee is how to evaluate how well DNDO
meets the operational requirements for DHS programs, how it spends its
money and prioritizes its R&D, and how it fulfills its responsibilities
in coordinating the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
We will hear testimony from GAO today about the need for a clearer,
and measurable picture of its goals, strategies, and procedures.
It is imperative that the new Secretary makes sure no more money is
wasted on devices that cannot be properly evaluated, tested, and
certified before being procured and placed into duty. Our country's
safety depends on it.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony, and I yield
back.
Mr. Meehan. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us here today on this important topic.
First, Dr. Huban Gowadia is the director of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office at the Department of Homeland
Security. Under her leadership, DNDO develops nuclear detection
capabilities, it measures detector system performance, it
ensures effective response to detection alarms, it conducts
transformational research and development, and it coordinates
the improvement of technical nuclear forensics capabilities.
Before joining DNDO, Dr. Gowadia led DHS's Science and
Technology countermeasures--the countermeasures testbeds and
also worked as a checkpoint program manager at the Office of
Security Technologies in the Transportation Security
Administration.
We are joined, as well, by Mr. David Trimble, who serves as
the director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office's
Natural Resources and Environment Group. Mr. Trimble provided
leadership and oversight on the United States and international
nuclear security and clean-up issues.
Mr. Trimble joined GAO in 2009, and, previously, he worked
at the Department of State's Political-Military Affairs Bureau
as the director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls
Compliance.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
I know there are extensive written statements, but I want
to give you the opportunity to focus on where you would like to
go in your testimony, Dr. Gowadia. So we now recognize you for
your 5 minutes to testify.
STATEMENT OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, Chairman
Meehan and Ranking Member Clarke. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO's,
progress in protecting the homeland from nuclear and
radiological threats.
I am honored to appear before you today to testify with my
distinguished colleague, David Trimble. Your support and
oversight and constructive feedback from the Government
Accountability Office are critical to our improvement and
continued success.
As you are aware, in 2005, DNDO was created within the
Department of Homeland Security as an interagency office with a
singular focus: Preventing nuclear terrorism. We do so through
two missions, nuclear detection and nuclear forensics. Let me
begin with the latter.
DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was
established to provide centralized stewardship, planning, and
integration for Federal nuclear forensics and attribution
activities. At the time, the state of nuclear forensics
capabilities were far from perfect, as emphasized in reports by
the National Academy of Sciences, the GAO, and others. Since
then, DNDO has advanced nuclear capabilities and improved
collaborative National exercises by making them remarkably
realistic. Focusing on what was then an in extremis National
capability, DNDO has supported 19 new nuclear forensic
scientists, and we are on track to add another 35 into the
nuclear forensics field by 2018. I should say, a total of 35 by
2018.
So let me switch now to the detection mission. DNDO was
established to coordinate the United States Government's
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities through the
construct of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. This is
a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear
and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory
control. In accordance with the GAO's recommendations and along
with our interagency partners, we developed the 2010 Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic Plan. Recently, we
updated it in 2014 based on feedback from the National Academy
of Sciences.
DNDO is also mandated to conduct an aggressive program of
transformational research and development. As a result of our
efforts, several breakthrough sensing materials with enhanced
detection characteristics have transitioned from the laboratory
to commercially available products.
We also have a robust test and evaluation program. To date,
DNDO has conducted more than 100 test campaigns and, with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, developed
consensus standards for radiation detection equipment. Today,
we have a total of 24 standards for homeland security
applications.
To implement the domestic component of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, we have made much progress in equipping
law enforcement officers and public safety officials with the
necessary capabilities, information, and training. For
instance, through the Securing the Cities program, we now have
robust regional nuclear detection capabilities in major urban
areas, including the New York City region and the L.A.-Long
Beach region. Through collaborative interagency efforts, we
have provided training to over 27,000 law enforcement personnel
across the Nation. Annually, we conduct approximately 15
exercises to stress operator abilities to detect illicit
nuclear and other radioactive material.
In our role as the Department lead for acquiring radiation
assistance, we bring a disciplined approach to procurement.
DNDO's efforts have ensured that all Coast Guard boarding
parties carry radiation detection equipment. All incoming
general aviation aircraft are met by Customs and Border
Protection Officers with detectors. One hundred percent of
conveyances entering our Nation at land ports of entry are
scanned for radiological and nuclear material, and almost 100
percent of maritime cargo is similarly scanned at our seaports
of entry. Finally, the Transportation Security Administration's
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams are also
equipped with radiation detectors.
To ensure that we do not repeat the same issues that led to
the cancellation of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program,
DNDO significantly improved acquisition management governance,
policy, and processes. We have implemented a disciplined
solution development process, establishing a common lexicon
with consistent practices and deliberately and continually
involving operational partners. As a result, we have increased
efficiencies, promoted programmatic and budgetary transparency,
and bolstered accountability for all our programs.
Looking forward, we will continue to build and sustain
critical partnerships across the nuclear security enterprise.
We will use an effective risk-informed approach to guide our
efforts. We will strive to leverage technical breakthroughs to
enhance our National nuclear detection and forensics
capabilities. Importantly, we will continue to improve the
discipline in procuring and deploying systems to meet the needs
of our operational partners.
Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gowadia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Huban A. Gowadia
July 29, 2014
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I appreciate your interest in the advancements the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has
made in preventing nuclear terrorism. I am honored to testify with my
distinguished colleagues from the Government Accountability Office and
the National Academy of Sciences. Your support and oversight, and their
constructive assessments and feedback, are critical to our improvement
and continued success.
Nuclear terrorism remains a serious risk because of its potential
consequences. As President Obama stated in his speech at South Korea's
Hankuk University in March 2012, ``We know that just the smallest
amount of plutonium--about the size of an apple--could kill hundreds of
thousands and spark a global crisis. The danger of nuclear terrorism
remains one of the greatest threats to global security.'' To address
this risk, DNDO was established as a unique interagency organization
with a singular focus on preventing nuclear terrorism. Reducing the
risk of nuclear terrorism is a whole-of-Government challenge, and DNDO
works with Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
international partners as well as those in the private sector,
academia, and the National laboratories to fulfill its mission.
authorities
Recognizing the threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive
materials, DNDO was created by National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD)-43 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-14 and
subsequently codified by Title V of the Security and Accountability For
Every (SAFE) Port Act (Pub. L. No. 109-347), which amended the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. Pursuant to section 1902 of the Homeland Security
Act, DNDO is required to develop, with the approval of the Secretary
and in coordination with the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and
Justice, an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture, and is
responsible for implementing the domestic portion. The architecture
serves as a framework for detecting (through technical and non-
technical means), analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other
radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. Non-technical
detection refers to an alert caused by law enforcement or intelligence
efforts and collected by GNDA partners under their statutory
authorities and consistent with National policy. DNDO is also charged
to enhance and coordinate the nuclear detection efforts of Federal,
State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a
managed, coordinated response. To accomplish this, DNDO leads programs
to develop nuclear detection and forensics capabilities, measure
detector system performance, ensure effective response to detection
alarms, and conduct transformational research and development for
advanced detection technologies.
In 2006, DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was
established by NSPD-17/HSPD-4 and later authorized by the 2010 Nuclear
Forensics and Attribution Act (Pub. L. No. 111-140). The Center was
given responsibilities to provide centralized stewardship, planning,
and integration for all Federal nuclear forensics and attribution
activities. The act also established DNDO's National Nuclear Forensics
Expertise Development program and required DNDO to lead the development
and implementation of the National Strategic Five-Year Plan for
Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the
United States.
These authorities have directed our focus in preventing nuclear
terrorism through the enhancement of nuclear detection and technical
forensics capabilities. In both instances, we rely on the critical
triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. Thus, to
maximize the Nation's ability to detect and interdict a threat, it is
imperative that we apply detection technologies in operations that are
driven by intelligence indicators, and place them in the hands of well-
trained law enforcement and public safety officials. Similarly, to
enhance attribution capabilities, the U.S. Government (USG) must ensure
that information from law enforcement, intelligence, and technical
nuclear forensics is fused to identify the origin of the material or
device and the perpetrators.
While we have made significant improvements in both detection and
forensics over the years, the threat of nuclear terrorism persists, and
requires constant vigilance.
developing the global nuclear detection architecture
As recognized by the Government Accountability Office in past
testimonies, DNDO has made progress in its strategic planning efforts.
In December 2010, DNDO issued the first-ever Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture Strategic Plan to guide the development and implementation
of USG detection programs, activities, and capabilities. In April 2012,
the Secretary issued a DHS Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
Implementation Plan, which identified priorities, necessary
capabilities, and monitoring mechanisms to assess progress. DNDO has
worked with interagency partners to update the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture Strategic Plan. The 2014 Strategic Plan presents an
updated definition and vision for the global nuclear detection
architecture, as well as a mission, goals, and objectives for
interagency efforts to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear or other
radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control.
The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-faceted,
layered, defense-in-depth framework, with the objective of making the
illicit acquisition, fabrication, and transport of a nuclear or
radiological device, material, or components prohibitively difficult.
DNDO also relies on a well-conceived arrangement of fixed and mobile
radiological and nuclear technical detection capabilities to present
terrorists with many obstacles to a successful attack, greatly
increasing costs, difficulty, and risk, and thereby deterring them.
To develop such a multi-faceted global nuclear detection
architecture, DNDO continually assesses current and planned
capabilities against the evolving radiological and nuclear threat. DNDO
uses rigorous risk assessments as one means to do so. Since 2007, and
as directed by HSPD-18 (Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction), DNDO has collaborated with the DHS Science & Technology
Directorate (S&T) to produce the Integrated Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism Risk Assessment. DNDO leads the
biennial radiological and nuclear terrorism risk assessment, which is
then combined with similar biological and chemical risk assessments. To
better address the evolving threat, DNDO has improved the threat models
in this risk assessment by adding an adaptive adversary model and is
working with Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories to
enhance improvised nuclear device models. DNDO has also supported DHS
risk assessments such as the Strategic National Risk Assessment and the
Homeland Security National Risk Characterization. These risk
assessments, coupled with requirements from our operational partners,
inform DNDO resource allocations.
While USG efforts and programs are critical, developing a global
nuclear detection architecture relies largely on the decisions of
sovereign foreign partners to develop and enhance their own National
and regional detection programs. DNDO contributes to interagency
efforts led by the Department of State by laying the groundwork to
assist partner nations in developing defense-in-depth approaches to
detecting illicitly-trafficked nuclear or other radioactive materials.
DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Second Line of
Defense program is an essential component of this defense-in-depth
approach. This program helps strengthen the global nuclear detection
architecture by installing and supporting the installation of fixed and
mobile radiation detection equipment at high-priority locations outside
the United States. DNDO has worked closely with NNSA on training
initiatives associated with building and sustaining foreign partners'
radiation detection capabilities. DNDO has assisted in the development
of guidelines and best practices through the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to outline the key characteristics of an effective architecture.
To date, IAEA has used these guidelines and best practices in regional
training courses to help more than 20 nations initiate planning of
national-level detection architectures, with over 50 national-level
planners trained in architecture development. Just two weeks ago (July
14-18, 2014), DNDO helped the IAEA expand its Nuclear Security
Detection Architecture awareness course during a train-the-trainer
session to further develop the international instructor pool. By the
end of this calendar year, the IAEA will have successfully implemented
seven regional awareness courses in English, French, and Spanish. This
strategic partnership will continue to serve as a ``force multiplier''
for USG nuclear security efforts for years to come.
conducting transformational research and developing systems
DNDO is also responsible for conducting an aggressive,
evolutionary, and transformational program of research and development
to generate and improve technologies to technically detect nuclear and
radioactive materials. DNDO's transformational research and development
efforts seek to achieve dramatic advancements in technologies to
enhance our National detection and forensics capabilities. These
developments may also reduce the cost and operational burden of using
advanced technology in the field to maintain an enhanced level of
protection. Annually, DNDO updates its research and development
strategy based on prevailing risk, advancements in technology, and the
availability of funding.
Although significant progress has been made in addressing the gaps
and needs of the global nuclear detection architecture and nuclear
forensics, several challenges remain that require sustained investment.
DNDO's technical challenges include the need for systems that:
Are cost-effective with sufficient technical performance to
ensure wide-spread deployment;
Can detect special nuclear material, even when heavily
shielded;
Facilitate enhanced wide-area searches in a variety of
scenarios, to include urban and highly cluttered environments;
Can be used to monitor traffic in challenging pathways, such
as between ports of entry along our land and sea borders; and
Support the forensics determination of origin and process
history of seized material.
DNDO has and will continue to advance fundamental knowledge in
nuclear detection and forensics through a sustained long-term
investment in our Exploratory Research program and Academic Research
Initiative. These efforts directly address the aforementioned
challenges through basic and early-applied research to feed more mature
research and development projects such as DNDO's Advanced Technology
Demonstrations.
Equally important, the Academic Research Initiative is building the
capabilities of universities to develop next generation scientists and
engineers in areas such as advanced materials, nuclear engineering,
radiochemistry, and deterrence theory. Since its inception, 57 grants
have been awarded to more than 42 academic institutions across the
country. In 2013 alone, the Academic Research Initiative directly
supported 140 students, published 108 papers, and conducted 180
conference presentations. And, we are beginning to see these projects
move up the technology pipeline. Just this year, a new room temperature
thallium-based semiconductor detector transferred from Northwestern
University to our Exploratory Research program. Nuclear resonance
cross-sections measured at Duke University are being used in our
shielded special nuclear material detection projects and background
radiation measurements performed by University of California at
Berkeley are being used in support of operational programs across the
interagency.
Several DNDO-sponsored research efforts have also led to new
commercial products that provide enhanced operational capabilities to
Federal, State, and local law enforcement and public safety personnel.
Even before a Helium-3 shortage was identified, DNDO teamed with the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency to explore options for better, more
cost-effective alternatives for neutron detection (Helium-3 is a gas
that is widely used to detect neutrons that are emitted by certain
nuclear and other radioactive materials. Helium-3 results from the
radioactive decay of tritium. As the need for tritium for nuclear
weapons decreased, so too did the availability of Helium-3.) For portal
systems, which require the largest quantities of this gas, DNDO worked
with industry and is now deploying alternative detection technologies
that do not require Helium-3. This enables the country to devote the
scarce supplies of Helium-3 to those applications where no substitutes
are possible. We are also testing alternative systems for use in
mobile, backpack, and hand-held radiation detectors, several of which
have already shown performance superior to the current-generation
systems. Importantly, due to a collaborative USG-wide effort to address
the shortfall, our USG strategic reserve of Helium-3 has increased by
70% since 2009.
Other recent DNDO technological successes that transitioned from
laboratories to commercially-available products include:
Advanced radiation-sensing materials such as Cesium Lithium
Yttrium Chloride, Strontium Iodide, and Stilbene, which have
enhanced detection characteristics and can be used to build
more capable systems featuring simplified electronics, low
power requirements, and greater reliability;
New electronics and advanced algorithms that support
networked radiation detection for improved wide-area search
capabilities;
Compact dual-energy X-ray generators with improved density
discrimination and higher shielding penetration that have been
integrated into commercially available mobile radiography
systems; and
Software to automatically detect special nuclear material
and shielding material in radiography images.
DNDO continues to develop breakthrough technologies that increase
performance and reduce the operational burdens of our front-line
operators. DNDO continues to work closely with other DHS components to
improve their mission performance.
We are collaborating with U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) Laboratories and Scientific Services to use machine learning to
greatly reduce the number of nuisance alarms in radiation portal
monitors; working with the Massachusetts Port Authority, DHS S&T, and
the United Kingdom Home Office to develop and evaluate the next
generation non-intrusive inspection imaging equipment; and continuing
to jointly evaluate parameter-setting modifications to reduce the
number of alarms from naturally-occurring radioactive material. In
fact, after a rigorous program of laboratory tests, modeling and
simulation, field trials, and successful pilots at two ports of entry,
CBP will deploy a new technique to the 26 largest seaports by the end
of 2014. It is anticipated that this effort will reduce wait times and
yield operational efficiencies.
In addition to CBP, DNDO worked closely with the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and State and
local partners to identify key operational requirements for the design
of next-generation radioisotope identification devices that can be used
by law enforcement officers and technical experts during routine
operations to identify radioactive materials. Based on the enhanced
detection material lanthanum bromide and improved algorithms, this new
hand-held technology is easy-to-use, lightweight, and more reliable
and, because it contains built-in calibration and diagnostics, has a
much lower annual maintenance cost. The new system is receiving very
positive reviews from operators in the field.
characterizing system performance
DNDO's technology efforts are coupled with a rigorous test and
evaluation program. Over the years, DNDO's test program has grown and
matured. To date, we have conducted more than 100 test and evaluation
campaigns at more than 40 laboratory and operational venues, and
evaluated systems including pagers, handhelds, portals, backpacks, and
vehicle-, boat-, aircraft,- and spreader bar-mounted detectors, as well
as next-generation radiography technologies. To ensure the equipment is
evaluated in the manner in which it will be used, these test campaigns
are always planned and executed with operational users. In addition, we
include interagency partners and use peer-reviewed processes. The
results from DNDO's test campaigns have informed Federal, State, local,
and Tribal partners on the technical and operational performance of
detection systems, allowing them to select the most suitable equipment
and implement the most effective concepts of operation.
DNDO leads the development of technical capability standards, and
in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, also supports the development, publication, and adoption of
National consensus standards for radiation detection equipment. A total
of 24 standards, including 11 U.S. standards with the American National
Standards Institute, 10 international standards with the International
Electrotechnical Commission, and 3 technical capability standards now
exist for homeland security applications. We have assessed commercially
available detection systems against National and international
standards and in various operational scenarios. Notably, we recently
completed the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment program, a
collaboration with the European Commission's Joint Research Center and
the IAEA to evaluate nearly 80 instruments against consensus standards.
The results enabled our stakeholders to compare the performance of
commercially available radiation detection equipment and provided
manufacturers with constructive feedback on their products.
implementing the domestic component of the global nuclear detection
architecture
DNDO is instrumental in implementing the domestic component of the
global nuclear detection architecture. In conjunction with Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial operational partners, DNDO
applies a disciplined approach to procure small- and large-scale
radiation detection and/or identification systems and deploy them at
ports of entry, along our land and maritime borders, and in the
interior of the United States. In addition, as part of DHS's Strategic
Sourcing efforts, DNDO is the Department's commodity manager for hand-
held radiological and nuclear detection equipment. This enables us to
take advantage of technical advancements and achieve cost savings by
leveraging the volume demand of Department-wide and other Federal
users.
DNDO's collaborative system acquisition efforts have ensured that
all USCG boarding parties carry radiation detection equipment; all in-
coming general aviation flights are met by CBP Officers with radiation
detectors; 100% of conveyances entering our Nation at land ports of
entry are scanned for nuclear and other radioactive materials; almost
100% of maritime cargo is similarly scanned at our sea ports of entry;
and the TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams are
equipped with radiation detectors. Our partnership with CBP was
leveraged during the recovery efforts from Hurricane Sandy. DNDO was
able to replace 39 radiological detector panels and nine operator
booths within 2 weeks of the storm, thereby supporting the quick
resumption of port operations at A.P. Moller, Maher, Port Newark
Container, New York Container, Global, and Red Hook terminals in New
York and New Jersey. While technology acquisition and deployments are
critical, we must also ensure that the training, exercise, and cross-
jurisdictional protocols integral to mission success are adopted and
sustained by operational partners. As such, DNDO provides program
assistance services to Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
stakeholders who are developing or enhancing radiological and nuclear
detection capabilities. This support includes assistance in developing
and integrating local or regional programs into the global nuclear
detection architecture, guiding the development of concepts of
operations and standard operating procedures, and developing training
and exercise products to ingrain those procedures into day-to-day
activities.
DNDO has made considerable progress in enhancing National radiation
detection capabilities by:
Engaging with 29 States to raise awareness and begin
developing formal radiological and nuclear detection programs.
By the end of fiscal year 2015, DNDO plans to expand its
efforts to all 50 States.
Developing an enduring partnership with State and local
jurisdictions, through the Securing the Cities program,
resulting in a robust regional nuclear detection program in the
New York City/Jersey City/Newark region. Based on lessons
learned in this implementation, DNDO expanded the Securing the
Cities program in fiscal year 2013 to the Los Angeles/Long
Beach area and will select a third region later this fiscal
year.
Supporting domestic maritime capability development by
working with regional Area Maritime Security Committees to
develop operational procedures, training, and exercises to
reinforce their Area Maritime Security Plans and address the
small vessel threat.
Deploying Mobile Detection Deployment Units to provide
radiation detection and communications equipment for Federal,
State, and local agencies to augment their capabilities during
special events or in response to elevated threat conditions. To
date, these units have been deployed over 150 times.
DNDO provides training products and support to develop, enhance,
and expand radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. In
partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, DOE, and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), DNDO develops and implements protocols and training
standards for the effective use of radiation detection equipment and
associated alarm reporting and resolution processes. DNDO has developed
42 separate courses in support of emerging detection technologies and
operational environments to support our Federal, State, and local
stakeholders. Since 2005, more than 27,000 law enforcement and public
safety personnel from 35 States have participated in DNDO-supported
radiological and nuclear detection training.
DNDO also assists State and local partners in developing,
designing, and conducting exercises that are compliant with the
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation program methodology. The
exercises provide valuable hands-on experience for personnel performing
radiological and nuclear detection operations and assist decision
makers in integrating the detection mission into their daily
operations. To date, DNDO has conducted exercises with 21 States and
annually supports up to 15-20 exercises. DNDO continues to develop and
apply standardized and customizable exercise templates and guidelines
evaluating the implementation and performance of Federal, State, and
local radiological and nuclear detection programs while fostering the
exchange of ideas and best practices amongst State and local partners.
DNDO fields a unique Red Team to objectively assess the operational
effectiveness and performance of DNDO programs and deployed
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities at the Federal, State,
and local levels. Our Red Team works across the inter-agency employing
an all-of-Government approach to collectively improving our National
capabilities. At the Federal level we partner with the Departments of
Energy, Defense, and Justice; within DHS with CBP, FEMA, TSA, USCG, and
U.S. Secret Service; and with a myriad of State and local agencies
across the United States. The Red Team evaluates deployed systems and
operations and their associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, in
as-close-to-realistic environments as possible. As covert and overt
assessments are generally the only opportunity for operators of
radiological and nuclear detection systems to gain experience detecting
uncommon nuclear sources, these operations provide valuable feedback on
the performance of tactics, techniques, and procedures. This feedback
enables operators to improve their concepts of operation and readiness.
For the past 5 years, DNDO's Red Team has averaged more than 25 overt
and covert assessments per year.
DNDO is responsible for enhancing and coordinating the nuclear
detection efforts of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments and
the private sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response. We also
coordinate across the interagency to establish protocols and procedures
to ensure that the technical detection of unauthorized nuclear
explosive devices, fissile material, or other active radioactive
material is promptly reported to the Secretaries of Homeland Security,
Defense, and Energy, the Attorney General, and others as appropriate
for action by law enforcement, military, emergency response, or other
authorities.
DNDO's Joint Analysis Center is essential in enhancing situational
awareness, as well as providing technical support and informational
products, to Federal, State, and local partners. The Joint Analysis
Center employs a secure web-based dashboard to collaborate with mission
partners and uses a geographic information system to show detection
information, detectors, situational awareness reports, and other
overlays in a geospatial viewer. Using the Joint Analysis Center
Collaborative Information System, DNDO facilitates nuclear alarm
adjudication and the consolidation and sharing of information and
databases. This system provides our State and local partners with the
ability to manage, document, and execute a radiological and nuclear
detection program. This includes the ability to electronically maintain
training, certification, and Memoranda of Understanding and Memoranda
of Agreement between jurisdictions. The system also consolidates and
maintains a database of detector equipment and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission State licensees. Through this information system, we connect
to the Triage system, maintained by DOE's NNSA, to enable a seamless
transition when National-level adjudication assistance is required. To
increase awareness of lost and stolen sources and other relevant
information, DNDO's Joint Analysis Center publishes weekly information
bulletins, summarizing relevant news articles and providing useful
facts about radioactive materials.
In addition to direct interaction with individual States and law
enforcement agencies, DNDO hosts biennial State and Local Stakeholder
Working Group meetings and annual Executive Steering Council meetings
with law enforcement and other supervisory personnel to exchange best
practices and to obtain feedback on DNDO's initiatives. The State and
Local Stakeholder Working Group provides a forum for DNDO to meet with
our stakeholders to discuss their current activities, lessons learned,
and planned detection initiatives. This forum also provides State and
local leaders an opportunity to convey their perspective on mission
needs and radiation detection requirements, so that DNDO can develop
the necessary products and services to support their efforts. The
Executive Steering Council provides policy coordination and
implementation between DNDO and senior-level State and local leaders
regarding radiation detection programs, and serves as a mechanism to
solicit input from senior leaders on their successes, evolving
requirements, and challenges, as well as for DNDO to apprise them of
on-going efforts to support their jurisdictions. Both the Stakeholder
Working Group and the Executive Steering Council have been received
favorably and continue to reinforce the relationship between DNDO and
key stakeholders.
acquisition process improvements
Initiated in 2004 and canceled in 2011, the Advanced Spectroscopic
Portal program was started with the goal of improving the performance
of the current radiation detection system that is deployed to our
seaports and land border crossings. To ensure we did not repeat the
same issues that led to the cancellation of the program, including
close end-user collaboration, DNDO and CBP completed a Lessons Learned/
Post-Implementation Review and identified 32 lessons learned, including
significant findings in acquisition management. DNDO will share these
observations with the new DHS Joint Requirements Council to ensure
maximum benefit is achieved from these past difficulties. Based in part
on these lessons learned, DNDO has significantly bolstered acquisition
management policy and strengthened its implementation via robust and
disciplined governance and program management processes. In doing so,
we ensure programs are selected based on sound business cases and are
effectively managed, resulting in an efficient and effective use of
DNDO's appropriated funds.
To enhance mission delivery and improve investment management, DNDO
designed the Solution Development Process. Aligned with DHS Acquisition
Management Directive 102-01, the Solution Development Process
institutes an integrated governance approach to program and project
oversight throughout the systems engineering life cycle. The process
brings all programs and projects under governance--establishing a
shared language, with common practices to increase efficiencies,
promote programmatic and budgetary transparency, and bolster
accountability. It aligns with DHS enterprise architecture, acquisition
management, and capital planning and investment processes. Further, the
framework guides management, through the Governance Review Board, and
Integrated Product Teams in the delivery of new solution concepts to
end-users and stakeholders, while maintaining a focus on DNDO's
mission, goals, and objectives. As a critical component of the process,
it includes active involvement of operational partners, who serve as
Lead Business Authorities, and requires rigorous technical reviews at
each programmatic stage. In adhering to the process, DNDO ensures
current and future programs are appropriately structured and have the
necessary oversight for success. DNDO will continue to incorporate
lessons learned and process improvements as the process matures,
sharing them throughout DHS to strengthen Departmental Unity of
Effort--one of the Secretary's top priorities.
Recognizing the important contributions and innovations of private
industry, National laboratories, and academia, DNDO has evolved its
acquisition focus from one that is predominantly fueled by a
Government-funded, Government-managed development process to one that
relies upon industry-led development. As such, DNDO technology
development programs now proceed with a ``commercial first'' approach;
engaging first with the private sector for solutions and only moving to
a Government-sponsored and -managed development effort if necessary.
This approach leverages industry-led innovation, takes advantage of
industry's innate flexibility and ability to rapidly improve
technologies, and reduces Government-funded development efforts. In
some cases, shifting to commercial-based acquisitions will reduce the
total time to test, acquire, and field technology.
forensics capabilities
In the event of an act of nuclear terrorism or interdiction there
will be enormous pressure for rapid, accurate attribution. The
resulting USG response will have to be supported by sound scientific
evidence supporting the determination of who was responsible, for which
the bar will be set very high by our stakeholders and allies. Nuclear
forensics--as the technical pillar of attribution--will support
leadership decisions. DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center focuses on continuously evaluating and improving the nuclear
forensic capabilities with specific responsibilities to:
Improve the readiness of the overarching USG nuclear
forensic capabilities, from pre- to post-detonation, through
centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap analysis,
exercises, improvement, and integration;
Advance the technical capabilities of the USG to perform
forensic analyses on pre-detonation nuclear and other
radioactive materials; and
Build and sustain an expertise pipeline for nuclear forensic
scientists.
Operational readiness has improved markedly in recent years. DNDO
has led the way in integrating the nuclear forensics community through
the alignment of program capabilities, coordination of research and
development and operational activities, and accelerated capability
development through synchronized interagency investments. The
interagency uses two primary DNDO-led mechanisms, the Nuclear Forensics
Executive Council and Steering Committee, to facilitate consistent
coordination across the USG. DNDO is also leading the interagency
effort to update the National Strategic Five-Year Plan for Improving
the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the United States
and to synchronize resources among partner agencies through an
established Budget Crosscut. Requirements are now regularly identified
and developed by the Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center, co-chaired
by DNDO and the FBI.
Since the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, international
partnerships in nuclear forensics have greatly expanded, resulting in
stronger National and international capabilities. DNDO provides
subject-matter expertise to numerous initiatives, including
multinational nuclear forensics table-top exercises and documentation,
to enhance understanding among policy makers, law enforcement
officials, and scientists, and to encourage and assist other nations in
developing their National capabilities.
Forensics exercises have become realistic and complex, with
intensive multi-agency planning among the FBI, DOE, Army, Air Force,
and DNDO. Many of the exercises now include State and local law
enforcement. Other exercises have involved the intelligence community,
in order to plan and synchronize the fusion of intelligence, law
enforcement and technical forensics information, leading to a more
efficient and effective attribution process.
Nuclear forensics capabilities for analysis of nuclear and other
radioactive materials have steadily advanced. DNDO's efforts are
focused on continually improving the accuracy, precision, and
timeliness of material characterization information, and linking that
information to the process and place of that material's origin. To
date, DNDO has developed seven radiological and nuclear certified
reference materials, which are forensically-relevant calibration
standards used by the National laboratories to improve confidence in
analytical conclusions. Additionally, DNDO has developed the first-ever
laboratory-scale uranium processing capability that allows us to
determine forensic signatures associated with specific variations in
uranium manufacturing processes. This capability enables us to
determine forensics signatures without having direct access to samples
from foreign fuel cycles. We are now beginning development of a similar
plutonium processing capability. Further, in cooperation with DOE and
the Department of Defense, DNDO has developed and installed a nuclear
forensics data evaluation capability at Sandia National Laboratories
that enables forensic analysts to develop and test data analysis tools
and evaluate large sets of data in order to identify distinguishing
characteristics of specific nuclear materials. Together with the
remainder of our portfolio, these projects are significantly improving
the National ability to trace nuclear materials back to their source.
DNDO's efforts to restore the expertise pipeline have also shown
substantial success to date. The Congressionally-mandated National
Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development program is a comprehensive
effort to grow and sustain the scientific expertise required to execute
the National technical nuclear forensics mission. Launched in 2008,
this effort is a key component in assuring a robust and enduring
nuclear forensics capability and its contribution to the Nation's
efforts at preventing nuclear terrorism. In close partnership with
eight National Laboratories, the program has provided support to more
than 300 students and faculty and 23 universities. In 2008, DNDO
commissioned an independent expert panel, the Nuclear Forensics Science
Panel Education Sub-Panel, to examine the deficiencies in the nuclear
forensics expertise pipeline and make recommendations to address them.
We are steadily progressing toward the initial milestone, as
established by the Science Panel's recommendation, of adding 35 new
Ph.D. scientists into the nuclear forensics field by 2018 to replace
anticipated attrition or retirements from the DOE National
Laboratories. Nineteen new nuclear forensics scientists have come
through the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development program
and been hired since the program's inception.
closing
While DNDO has made considerable progress since it was established
in 2005, much remains to be done. It will be a challenge to remain one
step ahead of the adversary--particularly one that is intelligent and
adaptable. We must ensure our efforts are robust so that the obstacles
terrorists face are many. DNDO's detection and forensics programs, in
concert with those of our partners and stakeholders, are foundational
elements in creating these impediments. Together, we can build upon
DNDO's integrated approach to architecture planning, testing, and
assessments, research and development, operational support, and nuclear
forensics to strengthen the Nation's capabilities to detect and
interdict the nuclear threat and to hold those responsible accountable
for their actions. We remain committed to this challenge and we deeply
appreciate this subcommittee's sustained interest and support in these
shared goals to secure the homeland.
Thank you again for this opportunity, I would be happy to answer
any questions from the committee.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Doctor.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from the GAO, Mr.
Trimble.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Trimble. Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and
Members of the committee--when they arrive--my testimony today
discusses GAO's past work related to DNDO and provides
preliminary observations from our on-going work for this
subcommittee on management and coordination of research and
development at DNDO.
DNDO's mission is critical to the Nation's capability to
deter a radiological or nuclear attack within the United
States. DNDO carries out this mission by coordinating the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, developing and deploying
radiation detection technology along our borders, and funding
research and development of radiation and nuclear detection
technology.
Since 2006, we have reported on progress and challenges in
DNDO's efforts to develop plans for the GNDA and deploy
radiation detection technology. We are pleased to report that
DNDO has taken actions to respond to the majority of our
recommendations in this area, including developing strategic
and implementation plans for this effort.
In 2012, we reported on how DHS coordinates research and
development across the agency, including at DNDO. We found that
DHS did not have a Department-wide policy defining R&D or
guidance directing components on how to report R&D investments,
making it difficult for DHS to track and coordinate these
efforts to prevent unnecessary duplication.
In 2013, we reviewed the extent to which DHS coordinates
its border and maritime R&D efforts and found that work
remained to be done to ensure these investments are directed
towards the highest-priority needs.
One of the significant findings from our past work on
DNDO's efforts to acquire and deploy radiation detection
equipment was inadequate communication. We specifically found
that DNDO sought to acquire an advanced system for detecting
nuclear materials without understanding that the system would
not fit in the inspection lanes operated by CBP. DNDO cancelled
the system and limited any further work to research and
development. This history highlights the importance of
effective coordination in the early research and development
phases of a system.
Our on-going work for this subcommittee examines management
and coordination issues within the research directorate at
DNDO. DNDO established this directorate, known as TAR, to
identify, explore, and develop scientific and technological
approaches that address gaps in the GNDA, improve the
performance of existing detectors, and increase the efficiency
of detection technology for the end-users who will operate it.
Regarding the TAR Directorate's efforts to manage R&D
investments, our preliminary observations are that DNDO has
taken steps to manage R&D and assess project outcomes, but the
directorate may not be able to demonstrate how agency
investments align with critical mission needs.
Critical mission needs are identified based on an analysis
of gaps in the GNDA. However, TAR Directorate officials say
they do not have systematic approach for evaluating its overall
R&D program against the gaps in the GNDA. TAR Directorate
officials told us they understand how projects are intended to
make progress on those gaps but acknowledge that the only
documentation on this linkage are large technical project
deliverables.
As a result, the TAR Directorate may not be able to
demonstrate to key stakeholders, including oversight
organizations and potential users of new technologies, that its
R&D investments are aligned with critical mission needs.
Regarding the TAR Directorate's efforts to coordinate R&D,
our preliminary analysis shows that not all of DNDO's end-users
are satisfied with the TAR Directorate's level of
communications. In essence, the TAR Directorate communicates
with end-users through a middle man. Specifically, staff in
DNDO's planning directorate, not the TAR Directorate,
communicate with end-users and then convey these user needs
back to the TAR Directorate.
Officials at CBP, a key end-user, told us they would prefer
direct communications so they can assure their operational
needs and constraints are fully understood during the critical
planning stages. Past communication breakdowns between DNDO and
CBP highlight the importance of improving this communication
channel.
We are continuing our audit work looking at R&D and the TAR
Directorate and plan to issue our final report in December.
In summary, DNDO was established to help protect the Nation
from the threat and terrible consequences of a nuclear or
radiological attack. Improving communication between DNDO and
end-users is essential to maximize the chance that its R&D
projects will improve the effectiveness of our detection
capabilities at the border. Similarly, clearly tracking and
documenting how R&D investments address critical gaps in the
GNDA will help DNDO demonstrate the benefits of these
investments.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Trimble
July 29, 2014
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-14-783T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material
to carry out an attack in the United States is a top National priority.
Within DHS, DNDO's mission is to: (1) Improve capabilities to deter,
detect, respond to, and attribute attacks, in coordination with
domestic and international partners, and (2) conduct R&D on radiation
and nuclear detection devices. GAO has reported on progress and
challenges in DNDO's efforts since 2006 and is currently reviewing
DNDO's planning and prioritization of its R&D investments.
This testimony discusses GAO's past work on DNDO's efforts to
develop the GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment and DHS's
efforts to coordinate R&D across the agency, as well as preliminary
observations from GAO's on-going review of DNDO's research
directorate's efforts to: (1) Manage its R&D investments to align with
critical mission needs and (2) coordinate its R&D efforts internally,
with other Federal research agencies, and with end-users of the
technology it develops.
To conduct its on-going review, GAO analyzed DHS documents and data
related to how DNDO plans and prioritizes its R&D program, and
interviewed officials on coordinating R&D.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. As GAO
continues to complete its on-going work, it will consider the need for
any new recommendations as appropriate. DHS provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
combating nuclear smuggling.--past work and preliminary observations on
research and development at the domestic nuclear detection office
What GAO Found
GAO has reported on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) since 2006. GAO has identified
challenges and made recommendations in the following areas:
DNDO's efforts to develop the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture (GNDA).--In 2008, GAO recommended that DHS develop
a strategic plan to guide the development of the GNDA, a
framework for 74 independent programs, projects, or activities
to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling. In 2010, DHS issued
a plan and GAO reviewed this plan and found that it generally
addressed GAO's recommendations.
DNDO's efforts to replace radiation detection equipment.--
GAO has found challenges in DNDO's efforts to develop and
deploy radiation portal monitors, which scan for nuclear or
radiological materials at ports of entry. GAO has made several
recommendations throughout the history of these efforts, and
DNDO has taken actions that have generally been responsive.
DHS's efforts to coordinate research and development (R&D)
across the agency.--In 2012 and 2013, GAO made recommendations
to help DHS oversee its R&D investments and efforts, and in
particular its border and maritime R&D efforts. GAO's
recommendations focused on strengthening coordination and
defining R&D across the agency. DHS concurred with GAO's
recommendations and described actions it plans to take in
response.
Preliminary observations from GAO's on-going review are that DNDO
has taken steps to manage R&D and assess project outcomes, but that it
may not be able to demonstrate how agency investments align with
critical mission needs. DNDO officials told GAO that they discuss how
research projects may contribute to critical mission needs but that
they do not document these discussions. Once research projects are
complete, DNDO officials told GAO they evaluate the success of
individual research projects, but DNDO does not have a systematic
approach to ensure its overall R&D investments address gaps in the
GNDA. As a result, DNDO may not be able to demonstrate to key
stakeholders--including oversight organizations and potential users of
new technologies--that its R&D investments are aligned with critical
mission needs.
GAO's on-going work indicates that DNDO officials have taken some
steps to coordinate R&D efforts internally, with other Federal
agencies, and with end-users, but preliminary analysis shows that not
all of DNDO's end-users are satisfied with DNDO's communication. DNDO
directorates work closely to identify critical mission needs, and DNDO
collaborates with other Federal research agencies to leverage
expertise. However, DNDO's end-users varied in their satisfaction with
DNDO's efforts to coordinate with them. Officials from two end-user
agencies told GAO that coordination was working well; however,
officials from the largest end-user agency stated that they were
generally dissatisfied with DNDO's coordination because DNDO's research
directorate does not provide them information directly and, in some
cases, found that project requirements would not meet the agency's
operational needs. This is consistent with GAO's 2010 finding that
inadequate communication caused DNDO to pursue scanning technology that
would not meet the operational requirements of the end-user if it were
deployed.
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work on
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) and our preliminary observations on DNDO's management and
coordination of its research and development (R&D) investments as you
consider the reauthorization of DNDO. Preventing terrorists from using
nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack in the United
States is a top National priority. Terrorists could use these materials
to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device
(also called a ``dirty bomb''). The detonation of a nuclear device in
an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and
devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as
damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause
hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part
of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain
inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort
was completed. A key element of the strategy for protecting the
homeland from the consequences of nuclear or radiological terrorism is
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), a multi-layered
framework encompassing 74 independent programs, projects, or activities
by the Federal Government and its partners to detect and interdict
nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside
the United States.\1\
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\1\ U.S. Government partners include State, Tribal, and local
governments, the private sector, and international partners.
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Within DHS, DNDO is responsible for improving the Nation's
capabilities to deter, detect, respond to, and attribute attacks, in
coordination with domestic and international partners.\2\ To accomplish
this, DNDO is organized into directorates that support elements of its
mission. Three of these directorates are relevant to my testimony
today: (1) The Architecture and Plans Directorate, which analyzes gaps
in the GNDA and develops strategies and plans for the GNDA in
coordination with its partners; (2) the Product Acquisition and
Deployment (Acquisition) Directorate, which is responsible for
developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to
support the efforts of Federal, State, and local agencies that use
radiation detection equipment to carry out their mission; and (3) the
Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) Directorate, which conducts
R&D of radiation and nuclear detection devices and furthers the
development of technologies to support the domestic component of the
GNDA. DNDO established the TAR Directorate in 2006 to identify,
explore, develop, and demonstrate scientific and technological
approaches that meet one or more of the following criteria: Address
gaps in the GNDA; improve the performance of domestic radiological and
nuclear detection systems and enabling technologies; or increase the
operational efficiency of detection technology for domestic end-users:
primarily DHS' Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but also Coast
Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and State and
local law enforcement. DNDO's TAR Directorate makes R&D investments
based on competitive awards to researchers in Government laboratories,
academia, and private industry for basic and applied R&D efforts. From
fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013, the TAR Directorate
obligated approximately $328 million for about 205 projects focused on
basic research, technology prototypes, software development, and
computer modeling for the detection of radioactive and nuclear
materials, among other things. The TAR Directorate's total budget,
including R&D, for fiscal year 2014 was $71.1 million.
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\2\ DNDO was established in 2005 by National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD)-43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-14
and codified in statute by the Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347 501, 120 Stat.
1884, 1932 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 591).
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My testimony today is based on reports we issued from March 2006 to
September 2013, as well as preliminary observations from our on-going
review for this subcommittee of the TAR Directorate's efforts to plan,
prioritize, and assess outcomes of its R&D program. Specifically, my
statement today discusses our past work on DNDO's efforts to develop
the GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment and DHS's efforts to
coordinate R&D across the agency, as well as preliminary observations
from our on-going review of the TAR Directorate's efforts to: (1)
Manage its R&D investments to align with critical mission needs, and
(2) coordinate its R&D efforts internally, with other Federal research
agencies, and with the end-users of the technology it develops.
Detailed information on our scope and methodology for our prior
work can be found in the reports cited throughout this statement. To
develop our preliminary observations on the TAR Directorate's efforts
to manage and coordinate its R&D investments, we reviewed agency
documents that identify critical mission needs for R&D and the TAR
Directorate's process for planning and prioritizing R&D investments. We
also obtained data from the TAR Directorate's project database that
contained information on all on-going and completed research projects
funded from fiscal year 2008 through 2013, which we used to determine
the total number of TAR Directorate research projects and obligations
allocated during this period. To assess the reliability of the data, we
interviewed the TAR Directorate officials responsible for maintaining
the database and determined the data were reliable for providing
background information on the TAR Directorate's projects. Our review
does not include the TAR Directorate's nuclear forensics portfolio
because projects in that portfolio are not selected using the same
planning and prioritization process as projects in the TAR
Directorate's other research areas. We interviewed the assistant
directors of the TAR Directorate, the Architecture and Plans
Directorate, and the Acquisition Directorate. We also interviewed the
TAR Directorate's research managers on the TAR Directorate's process
for identifying critical mission needs, selecting research topics and
projects, managing and evaluating research areas, coordinating R&D, and
aligning R&D investments with critical mission needs. We also
interviewed officials at Federal agencies with a R&D component and
potential end-users of technology developed under DNDO's R&D program to
understand how DNDO coordinates the planning of R&D. Specifically, we
interviewed officials at the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense
Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and end-users at DHS' CBP, the
Coast Guard, and TSA to understand their involvement in DNDO's R&D
planning, prioritization, and evaluation process. We shared the
information on our preliminary findings with officials from DNDO, CBP,
Coast Guard, TSA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA. DNDO
and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency officials provided technical
comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. We expect to issue a
final report on this work in December 2014.
The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
dndo's efforts to develop the gnda and deploy radiation detection
equipment, and dhs's efforts to coordinate r&d
We have reported on progress and challenges in DNDO's efforts to
develop the GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment since 2006
and have recently reported on DHS's efforts to coordinate R&D across
the agency.\3\
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\3\ See, for example GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-
Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 (Washington, DC: Mar. 22, 2006);
Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, DC: July 16, 2008); and
Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of Research
and Development Should Be Strengthened, GAO-12-837 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 12, 2012).
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Regarding DNDO's efforts to develop the GNDA, in July 2008,\4\ when
DNDO was in the early stages of this work, we found that DNDO, in
collaboration with other Federal agencies, had made progress by
identifying critical gaps in domestic efforts to prevent and detect
radiological and nuclear smuggling but had not clearly articulated a
long-term plan for expanding radiological and nuclear detection
capabilities to close those gaps. As a result, we recommended that DHS
develop a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA and, in
January 2009, further recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan for
the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy.\5\ DHS has
taken actions on these recommendations by issuing an interagency GNDA
strategic plan in December 2010 and an implementation plan about 1 year
later.\6\ In July 2011 and July 2012, when we reviewed these actions,
we found that they generally addressed our recommendations.\7\ However,
in July 2012, we testified that it remained difficult to identify
priorities among the components of the domestic part of the GNDA.
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\4\ GAO-08-999T.
\5\ GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,
GAO-09-257 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2009).
\6\ The GNDA strategic plan was an interagency effort jointly
developed by the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Defense,
Justice, and State; the intelligence community; and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
\7\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic
Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain,
GAO-11-869T (Washington, DC: July 26, 2011) and Combating Nuclear
Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying Equipment, GAO-12-941T
(Washington, DC: July 26, 2012).
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Regarding DNDO's efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment,
our past work has found challenges in DNDO's efforts to develop and
deploy radiation portal monitors, which scan for nuclear or
radiological materials at ports of entry, at U.S. border crossings, and
seaports.\8\ As we reported in July 2012, deployed portal monitors are
reaching the end of their expected service lives, and DNDO, with input
from CBP, will need to make decisions about whether to refurbish or
replace them.\9\ We have reported, since March 2006, on programs to
replace existing portal monitors with more advanced versions and have
made several recommendations concerning these efforts, most of which
DNDO has implemented.\10\ In September 2010, we found that inadequate
communication between DNDO and CBP contributed to DNDO pursuing the
deployment of a system to use radiography to scan cargo for nuclear
materials without fully understanding that it would not fit within
existing inspection lanes at ports of entry and would slow down the
flow of commerce through these lanes, causing significant delays.\11\
At that time, DNDO and CBP officials said they were communicating much
more routinely and that, in their view, it would be unlikely that the
communication problems we identified would reoccur. DNDO decided to
cancel the acquisition of the system and limit any further work on
demonstrating the potential capability of the technology to research
and development efforts, highlighting the importance of effective
coordination even in the R&D phases of a system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, for example, GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional
Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation
Detection Equipment, GAO-07-1247T (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2007);
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation
Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the
New Technology, GAO-09-655 (Washington, DC: May 29, 2009); and
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Recent Testing Raises Issues About the
Potential Effectiveness of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal
Monitors, GAO-10-252T (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2010).
\9\ GAO-12-941T.
\10\ GAO-06-389.
\11\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and
Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography
System to Detect Nuclear Materials. GAO-10-1041T (Washington, DC: Sept.
15, 2010).
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Regarding DHS's efforts to coordinate across its components that
conduct R&D, in September 2013 we reviewed the extent to which DHS and
its components, including DNDO, coordinated border and maritime R&D
efforts within DHS and among other Federal agencies.\12\ We found that
DNDO has mechanisms for coordinating its R&D efforts that vary
depending on the maturity of the technology. Specifically, the TAR
Directorate did not always interact directly with DHS' operational
components because it worked with less mature technologies. We also
found, among other things, that DHS had taken actions to develop
Departmental policies to better define and coordinate R&D but that work
remained to be done at the agency level to ensure border and maritime
R&D efforts are mutually reinforcing and are being directed toward the
highest-priority needs. We made recommendations to help ensure that DHS
effectively manages and coordinates its border and maritime R&D
efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions
it plans to take in response. In September 2012, we reviewed the
management and coordination of R&D at DHS among the Science and
Technology Directorate, Coast Guard, DNDO, and other components and
found that DHS did not have a Department-wide policy defining R&D or
guidance directing components how to report R&D activities and
investments.\13\ We made recommendations to help ensure that DHS
effectively oversees its R&D investments and efforts and reduces
fragmentation, overlap, and the risk of unnecessary duplication. As of
July 2014, DHS had taken some steps to address two of our
recommendations, including establishing a definition of R&D and
guidance for coordinating R&D across the agency. However, work remains
to be done to address our remaining recommendation to create a
mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated costs
across the Department.
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\12\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to
Better Evaluate and Coordinate Border and Maritime Research and
Development, GAO-13-732 (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2013).
\13\ GAO-12-837.
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the tar directorate's r&d investments may not align with critical
mission needs
Our preliminary observations from our on-going analysis are that
DNDO's R&D component, the TAR Directorate, has taken steps to manage
R&D and to assess project outcomes, but it may not be able to
demonstrate how its R&D investments align with critical mission needs.
Each year, the DNDO Architecture and Planning Directorate identifies
critical mission needs based on an analysis of gaps in the GNDA and
provides this information to the TAR Directorate. According to TAR
Directorate officials, research managers within the directorate
consider these needs to identify the topics for that year's competitive
awards for new basic and applied research. After they select which
research projects to fund, TAR Directorate officials write contracting
documents that guide the goals and milestones of the projects and
regularly review the progress of their on-going research projects.
According to TAR Directorate officials, they: (1) Consider the
potential for the research to contribute to resolving gaps in the GNDA
at each step of planning and selecting research projects, and (2)
discuss this potential with officials from the other DNDO directorates,
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA, but they do not document
these discussions. Once research projects are completed, TAR
Directorate officials told us they take steps to evaluate the outcomes
of individual research projects by, for example, requiring researchers
to complete deliverables that describe how the research performed
compared with the initial goals for the project that were outlined in
the contract.\14\
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\14\ Our review of the TAR Directorate's R&D projects from fiscal
year 2008 through fiscal year 2013 showed that examples of outcomes for
completed projects included transferring resulting technology to
private industry for commercialization, transitioning knowledge gained
to a new TAR Directorate-funded R&D project for further development, or
determining that the technology was not feasible.
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However, our preliminary observations are that the TAR Directorate
has limited information to demonstrate how its R&D investments align
with critical mission needs. TAR Directorate officials stated that they
understand how projects are intended to make progress on gaps in the
GNDA based on the information contained in the contract deliverables of
individual projects but acknowledged that it would be difficult for
non-scientists who are not fully involved in a project to understand
how projects address these gaps based on this information alone.
Further, TAR Directorate officials stated that the directorate does not
have a systematic approach for evaluating its overall R&D program or a
mechanism for: (1) Tracking the longer-term outcomes of individual
projects, and (2) measuring how those outcomes may contribute to
addressing gaps in the GNDA. TAR Directorate officials told us that the
scientific community is small enough that they are usually able to
continue to follow their funded research after a project ends. TAR
Directorate officials also told us they have made efforts to
disseminate the results of individual projects by posting articles on
DHS's website and discussing successes at conferences. With limited
information on how R&D investments are intended to make progress on
gaps in the GNDA, and without a process for assessing and reporting on
the results of its R&D program as a whole against those gaps, the TAR
Directorate may not be able to demonstrate to key stakeholders--
including oversight organizations and potential users of new
technologies--that its R&D investments are aligned with critical
mission needs. We plan to continue our audit work on this issue and
will present our findings in more detail in our final report, with any
related suggestions for improvement, which we expect to issue in
December 2014.
the tar directorate has taken steps to coordinate its r&d but may face
communication challenges with some end-users
Our preliminary observations from our on-going analysis are that
the TAR Directorate has taken steps to coordinate its R&D efforts
internally, with other Federal research agencies, and with end-users of
the technologies it develops, but the TAR Directorate may face
communication challenges with one of its key end-users. As the TAR
Directorate plans and manages its R&D investments, agency officials we
interviewed stated that TAR Directorate officials take steps to
coordinate within DNDO, across agencies with similar missions, and with
potential end-users of resulting technology as follows:
Within DNDO.--Our preliminary observation is that TAR
Directorate officials work closely with officials from DNDO's
Architecture and Plans Directorate and the Acquisition
Directorate to identify critical mission needs based on gaps in
the GNDA. For example, according to interviews with officials
from all three DNDO directorates, officials from the three
directorates participate in and provide feedback to the TAR
Directorate during individual project reviews at key milestones
and at annual research reviews. In addition, the three
directorates coordinate an annual DNDO Industry, Academia, and
Lab Engagement Day, formerly known as ``industry days'' where
officials from all three directorates discuss ways to enhance
existing radiation detection devices and develop new
technologies with members of industry, academia, DOE National
laboratories, and others. According to DNDO documents, TAR
Directorate officials also share data and results from R&D
efforts to inform the acquisition decisions made by the
Architecture and Plans Directorate and the Acquisition
Directorate. Officials from DNDO's Architecture and Plans
Directorate and Acquisition Directorate told us that their
level of involvement with TAR Directorate officials is
effective and provides them with a common understanding of how
DNDO's R&D investments are aligned with critical mission needs.
Across agencies with similar research missions.--Our
preliminary observation from our on-going review is that the
TAR Directorate coordinates regularly with the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and NNSA on both a program and individual
project level. According to officials from the TAR Directorate,
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and from NNSA, this
coordination is intended to leverage expertise and decrease the
opportunity for duplication of research efforts while each
agency invests in areas to meet its mission needs. For example,
these officials told us that representatives from these
agencies meet regularly to discuss their R&D goals, on-going
projects, and topics for soliciting new research.\15\ The
officials said that the representatives also participate in
each other's proposal review processes, as well as project
review meetings once funded projects meet key milestones.
Officials from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and from
NNSA told us that collaboration with the TAR Directorate works
well and keeps them informed about the status and results of
relevant research. We plan to continue our audit work on this
issue and will present our findings in more detail in our final
report, which we expect to issue in December 2014. We reported
in June 2014 on collaboration between the Architecture and
Plans Directorate and NNSA on an effort to research, develop,
and test a new technology for a radiological tracking device
and found that although the agencies had been meeting
quarterly, this mechanism did not always help them collaborate
and draw on each agency's expertise.\16\
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\15\ DNDO has a memorandum of understanding with DOD's Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, DOE's NNSA, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to coordinate National nuclear detection R&D
programs, which, according to officials from all three agencies, guides
these efforts.
\16\ See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Additional Actions Needed
to Increase the Security of U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources, GAO-
14-293 (Washington, DC: June 6, 2014). According to TAR Directorate
officials, the effort to research, develop, and test a radiological
tracking device was not a project within the TAR Directorate.
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With potential end-users.--Our preliminary observation is
that the TAR Directorate has an indirect mechanism for
coordinating with potential end-users of the technology that
the directorate develops during the planning phases of research
projects. TAR Directorate officials told us that, rather than
communicate directly with end-users, staff in the Architecture
and Plans Directorate discuss technology requirements and
operational needs with end-users as part of the Architecture
and Plans Directorate's work coordinating the GNDA, and these
staff relay the information back to the TAR Directorate. Once a
project starts, TAR Directorate officials told us they meet
directly with end-users by inviting end-users to project review
meetings at key milestones, such as technology demonstrations.
In the course of our on-going work, however, we found that end-
users' satisfaction with this level of coordination with the
TAR Directorate varied. For example, officials from TSA told us
that they are generally satisfied with this relationship
because they are most interested in acquiring available
radiation detection equipment and do not have the technical
expertise to engage directly with the TAR Directorate's
research efforts. In addition, officials from the Coast Guard
told us their indirect relationship with the TAR Directorate
works well because it is based on a defined strategy that
outlines the Coast Guard's short-term and long-term technology
requirements, and the Coast Guard currently has three detailees
working at DNDO who are able to communicate the unique needs of
the Coast Guard. However, officials from CBP, which is DHS's
largest end-user of radiation detection technologies, told us
they are generally dissatisfied with the level of interaction
with TAR. Specifically, CBP officials stated that they
typically do not learn about the TAR Directorate's projects
until after the project requirements are written and research
contracts are issued and, in some cases, has found that project
requirements would not meet CBP's operational needs if the
technology were deployed at ports of entry. CBP officials told
us they would prefer to work directly with TAR Directorate
officials at all stages of the research process to gain a
better understanding of the TAR Directorate's research goals
and to help ensure that its R&D projects align with CBP's
operational needs.
As noted above, in September 2010, we found that poor communication
with CBP hampered DNDO's ability to develop an advanced system for
detecting nuclear materials.\17\ In May 2013, we also found that DNDO's
analysis of lessons learned that it conducted after it canceled an
advanced portal monitor program stated that effective outreach,
communication, and buy-in from the end-user are critical to successful
acquisitions.\18\ We plan to continue our audit work on this and other
issues and will present our findings in more detail and any related
suggestions for improvements in our final report, which we expect to
issue in December 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ GAO-10-1041T.
\18\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from
Cancelled Radiation Portal Monitor Program Could Help Future
Acquisition, GAO-13-256 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2013).
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Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Meehan. I want to thank the panelists for their
testimony, and I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questions.
Before I get into some more generalized questions, Dr.
Gowadia, could you just take a minute and explain the
difference in your mind between what is forensics and what is
detection?
Ms. Gowadia. Certainly, Chairman Meehan.
Detection is, in our parlance, the ability to know that
there is nuclear material present. For technical detection, we
use this by way of detectors. If you were to use detection writ
large, you would say the intelligence community's information
would come to bear, law enforcement would come to bear, et
cetera. But for nuclear detection, when you say nuclear
detection, we literally mean detection by way of instruments to
sense the presence of radioactive material.
Forensics, on the other hand, is the ability for us to
trace back the material interdicted, or, God forbid, the
material detonated, to its origins. So, again, you will hear us
talk about the coupling with intelligence and law enforcement
to be able to attribute a material to its origin.
Does that help?
Mr. Meehan. No, it certainly does, because it could be
relevant. You might only have part of a cache of something, and
you would then be able to identify where we would be looking
for other materials that are of concern. Well, I am grateful
for that explanation.
I opened my commentary talking about events in the world.
You know, we are watching not just what had been a history of
state-sponsored activity in the nuclear era, we have grown up
in the world of assured mutual deterrence in which you have
major players who have been responsibly balancing each other's
presence in some way and we have avoided any kind of a nuclear
incident, you know, since the wars.
We are watching other countries develop capacities,
including some who currently have them who you worry about
whether they become destabilized. But, more recently, just the
potential that there are, as I have said, other kinds of both
interests on the part of Iran and others to develop nuclear
capability as well as nuclear materials, even hospital-grade,
but being available to groups that want to do--that aren't
necessarily tied directly to nation-states but are terrorist
organizations and otherwise who want to do harm or to use those
things to leverage their ends.
So we are in a dynamic and complex threat environment, and
more than we have ever faced as a Nation. The conditions
indicate there is a critical need to bolster homeland security
against a threat of terrorism that can be colluded, and we can
include this as one of our top priorities.
So, from your perspective, what actions should DNDO take to
bolster the capability to deter and protect against such an
attack? In particular, what should DNDO's role be in that
regard?
Ms. Gowadia. Chairman Meehan, you are absolutely right, we
are in a dynamic and complex threat environment. Considering
the dire consequences of this threat, as you clearly pointed
out at the start, we certainly have to be vigilant, remain
vigilant, and agile and flexible in our response. So, working
with the interagency, we need to continue to plan to be ready
for the heightened threat and, again, be ready should the
threat be elevated and we get some more credibility and
specificity to be agile and responsive.
As the lead Federal agency for coordinating the efforts for
the United States Government, our role is predominantly in
bringing the community together, setting and shaping the
strategy, and making sure that we are operationally ready to
respond. Of course, you have entrusted us with precious
resources, and we would like to apply them--we will continue to
apply them so that we can realize the maximum risk reduction.
Mr. Meehan. But how do you mean, sort-of, operationally
ready to respond? Because, in reality, we are looking at what
is always a threat. The idea of once something has been
detected and it is here, if you haven't interdicted it in a
certain way prior to its capacity to be operational, then we
are already at sort of a too-late point.
So how do we operate in such a way that, you know, the
principal objective is to assure that we don't get to the step
where we are worried about it being situated and active here in
our own homeland?
Ms. Gowadia. So there are two pieces to this. The first is
our strategy, ensuring that we have critical ties to our
intelligence community so that we can conduct intelligence-cued
searches. Ensuring that our law enforcement partners are well-
trained, well-equipped, that is the second piece. Then, of
course, there is the technology element, making sure that we
have the right technologies so that our law enforcement
operators can react when the intelligence cue comes about.
To do this, of course, we must train and exercise
constantly. A lot of us hope that in our lifetimes we will
never actually have to see this for real. So, to do that, we
practice constantly, very remarkably realistic exercises--
Federal, State, local, even international partners. We make it
so that we are not just exercising the decision-making process
but also all the way down to boots on the ground against
realistic materials with our red team, realistic materials and
interesting configurations, challenging our operators to make
that be the case. So that is one piece of it.
I would like to pull the string a little bit on your notion
of deterrence for a moment. In the classical sense, nation-
states deterrence, we look at it a little differently. Because
you would question, how does one deter an enemy who values your
death more than their life?
So, for us, there are two pieces of it. Certainly, the
forensics element adds a notion of deterrence. If you aid and
abet a terrorist, we have the means to trace back to the
origin. Then, not so classically, deterrence by denial. Here I
will steal something from Mr. Trimble's colleague, Mr. Maurer,
at the GAO, who often says, for detection technology right here
at our borders to come into play, we have to have had law
enforcement intelligence failures, treaty failures, our
partners have had to fail, everything before we get--the
security regimes for the material have had to fail,
nonproliferation regimes have had to fail, and now we are at
our borders with technology.
So it is so important that we build an architecture that is
multifaceted, multi-layered, so that the adversary has to be
right every time they encounter any one of these layers,
increasing our chances of success and, thus, deterrence by
denial.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I thank you.
I will turn to the Ranking Member for her questions, but,
obviously, we will have the opportunity to go back and forth,
and I have some other issues I will follow up with you on.
So, at this point I time, I turn it to the Ranking Member,
the gentlelady from New York.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for your testimony here this afternoon.
I would like to turn to the issue of procurement, because
that always tends to be the issue. Last month, DNDO issued a
request for proposal for its Human Portable Tripwire Program.
As I understand it, these are essentially personal radiation
detectors, PRDs, that can also identify the source of
radiation. These devices are intended for use by CBP and the
Coast Guard. The cost of these devices are going to be $24
million for 26 devices.
I have several questions about this. Let me start with this
one: Why are these costs so high? Over $900,000 a piece for
something that is worn on an officer's belt. No. 2, do you
expect costs to go down for future acquisitions?
No. 3, why are these devices needed? No. 4, in what type of
operational environments will these be used? No. 5, why can't
traditional PRDs be used in these environments instead?
That is directed to Dr. Gowadia.
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Ranking Member Clarke.
So there is some slight confusion with the announcement.
The systems will not cost nearly a million dollars apiece. The
ceiling on the contract is $24 million, and our minimum buy is
26. It is not appropriate to divide 24 by 26; that would be
incorrect.
We are expecting these devices to cost no more than
$10,000. Since it is an active procurement, it would not be
appropriate for me to share the Government cost estimate, but
we are expecting much lower than $10,000, depending on the
capabilities afforded.
Does that give you some pause?
Ms. Clarke. It does. It does.
Ms. Gowadia. So, now to your other questions as to the
environment and why we need them.
Ms. Clarke. Uh-huh.
Ms. Gowadia. These are for our Customs and Border
Protection Officers and Coast Guard Officers, as you mentioned.
Typically, what happens in DHS operations is you have your
pager, your personal radiation detection system, and all it
does is detect radiation. Now you need to follow it up with a
device that will allow you to distinguish benign from threat,
the identification device.
Think of our Border Patrol Officers who are sometimes very
far removed from the nearest identification device. So it would
be so much more efficient and convenient in their daily
operations to have both capabilities built into one. That is
what these systems were designed to--detect, identify, and
store for archival and retrieval purposes that information on
board that system.
So, yes, it would significantly improve our capabilities on
the border, improve the efficiency of our operations, and, I
think, alleviate some of the operational burden for our staff.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Are you confident that the
technologies to, sort-of, have that 3-in-1 capability already
exist?
Ms. Gowadia. So we have looked at through a lot of our
testing certain spectroscopic pagers, particularly in the
testing we did with our European Commission partners overseas
in the ITRAP+10 test series. We will use those data to make our
assessments.
Again, since this is an active and open----
Ms. Clarke. Right.
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. Procurement, I think my
procurement officer would get really upset with me if I were to
say very much more.
Ms. Clarke. Very well, Dr. Gowadia.
To radiation portal monitors--and this is for both Dr.
Gowadia and Mr. Trimble. Like many on this committee, we cannot
and should not forget some of the wasteful acquisitions and
deployments of complex security hardware that did not meet the
needs of the threat or meet requirements of the program it was
intended for. The ASP program is one of those.
Would you give us an overview today of the status of the
ASP program and later give us written details as to the cost
and the planning documents that will describe the details of
the current posture of the ASP within your planning strategies?
Ms. Gowadia. As you are aware, Ms. Clarke, the program was
started in 2004 and cancelled in 2011.
To make the best use of the technologies that we had
procured, the low-rate initial production units, 36 of those
systems are--we gave them to universities and National
laboratories to continue with the science, and some fraction of
those were also shared with the Department of Energy's Second
Line of Defense Program. They continue to be operated in the
field for overseas scanning operations.
Five of those portal monitors were given to our States--
Georgia, Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Mexico. Two
more are on their way to California.
For the mobile detectors, the ones that were built onto
trucks, essentially SUVs, we have some in New York, some in
Virginia, and some in Alabama and Florida. So seven of nine
mobile detection systems are also in use today.
These systems have served as a means for us to gather
important technical data--operational data and maintenance
data. They will certainly factor into all our technology
programs moving forward, our acquisition programs moving
forward. In fact, they will inform our analysis of alternatives
for whatever we will do next with our radiation portal
monitors.
But, most importantly, we have learned our lessons well on
the cancellation, the acquisition process. We have turned up
the discipline at DNDO so that we have a very rigorous solution
development process, which is aligned very nicely with the
Department's Acquisition 102-01. We are beginning to share our
integrated governance and program management approach across
the Department, in concert with the Secretary's unity-of-effort
priority, as well as the establishment of the Joint
Requirements Council at the Department. So we hope that the
lessons we have learned will inform not just us, as they have,
but across the DHS acquisition community.
Mr. Trimble. I don't have too much to add to that. A lot of
our work is a couple years old, at this point. I think what I
would highlight is, just sort of from the lessons learned from
that experience, the importance of communication between end-
users and the developers of the system, that that is absolutely
critical at all phases.
Not particular to DNDO, I would note that we did a wrap-up
report, I believe in 2013, looking at the lessons learned from
the ASP program. One of our recommendations from that was to
DHS to--they have a policy for doing lessons learned, but they
didn't have a process to make sure their components were
actually following it. So, as Dr. Gowadia mentions that they
are trying to implement these lessons, we had a recommendation
to make sure that that kind of thing was happening across DHS,
because there was not a real disciplined process to make sure
that was happening.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Gowadia, in the commentary both from my colleague as
well as some of the opening statements and certainly some of
the other written testimony, DNDO has been described before as
``soup-to-nuts,'' in a larger way, maybe, than some other
agencies. So you start with basic research, all the way through
to participating in the deployment and even the operations with
your stakeholder.
So explain to me your approach to research and development
and then how that is tied to your critical needs. But just as
significantly, because I think some of the testimony we had
before, how about the gaps? How is this focused on filling
those gaps so that we ultimately have this turning into, you
know, operational systems and procedures that work and that are
cost-effective?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, certainly, Chairman Meehan.
In thinking through the soup-to-nuts approach, as a result
of developing the strategy, the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture strategy, and all the work that we have done so
far over our last 9 years, the authorities you have afforded us
by way of the SAFE Port Act, I think, are a very effective
means for us to combat nuclear terrorism. You have given us a
singular focus, making it so that we stay on target every day
for a threat that has a very low probability, very high
consequences.
The holistic, integrated approach, I think, is valuable
because we are interested in moving capability to the field.
Capability is so much more than just technology. It is the
training. It is the exercises. It is, as you mentioned very
appropriately, ensuring that we analyze the risk, establish the
gaps, and allocate our resources in accordance with them. We do
this through our R&D program, through our test and evaluation
that supports the R&D, and certainly through our operations
support program.
So I want to dispel the notion that we are an operational
office. We are not. But we are very keenly supportive of our
operational partners. To Ms. Clarke's point, we bring in our
operational partners very early. We are an interagency office.
We were established that way for a purpose. We do not just have
scientists and engineers; we have intelligence officers, we
have retired intelligence officers, retired law enforcement
officers, policy analysts, acquisition professionals----
Mr. Meehan. But where do you draw the distinction between
your group and the operational entities? Who are some of those?
Are those the port entities themselves, among others?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes. Yes, sir. So we do the risk analysis and,
with them, develop the right technologies, with them, test the
right technologies.
Mr. Meehan. Which is the improvement you are looking on
incorporating----
Ms. Gowadia. Exactly.
Mr. Meehan [continuing]. In, so we avoid the mistakes that
led to the first overruns that the Ranking Member has
discussed.
Ms. Gowadia. Exactly, Mr. Meehan. In doing so, we are able
to develop and buy the right systems for them that are suited
to their CONOPS. Now, who are they? Customs and Border
Protection, Coast Guard, TSA, our State and local law
enforcement operators, our international partners. We do the
R&D for across the enterprise even though we don't buy for
across the enterprise.
Mr. Meehan. Right.
Broadening on the enterprise, we have discussed the concept
of nuclear, and that is a large part of the focus, but you work
in combination on which we are dealing with a number of weapons
of mass destruction that we are concerned about, not just
analysis but preparedness, response, again, the soup-to-nuts to
these kinds of major challenges. The Integrated Terrorism Risk
Assessment looks at things like chemical, biological,
radiological, as well as nuclear threats.
So what are your contributions to the risk assessment
piece, in the first part? How is your collaboration working,
particularly with the areas of chem and bio that are part of,
you know, what is going on with the Department of Homeland
Security?
Ms. Gowadia. Our contributions to the Presidentially-
mandated Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment is the rad/nuke
piece. We collaborate with our partners at S&T, S&T
Directorate, who do the chem and bio pieces. These come
together to form that integration.
Chairman Meehan, I would posit that this is an excellent
example of how we can bring unity of effort to bear within the
Department--again, something the Secretary has stressed upon--
S&T and DNDO's analytical capabilities brought to bear to
inform and influence and assist our operational partners as
they allocate their resources, not just at DHS but also in the
interagency.
Mr. Meehan. Well, how have you been able to see that mature
and grow?
So often, what we see has been competition or, you know,
misdirection even from groups within agencies that sit side-by-
side that see themselves having a little bit of a different
mission or a simultaneous mission, in essence, but a different
subset of it, and, you know, sometimes we break into rivalries.
How has it been that it has been able to work effectively
in this fashion, where you have been able to create a common
objective?
Ms. Gowadia. I think it has been mostly because we have
very clear lanes. We are responsible for the rad/nuke piece. We
have developed a construct that you have seen--and, Ms. Clarke,
I would love for you to see at your convenience--a construct
that looks at the risk by virtue of a layered transportation
model.
We have figured out how to work with our National
laboratories to get the right weapons information, the right
radiological threat information. We couple that with an
adversary model that uses game theory as well as probabilistic
risk assessments. Using that, we are able to lay down 394 nodes
in the architecture and score each one, allowing us to have a
framework for gaps.
Now, that construct works for the rad/nuke effort. For the
chem effort and the bio effort, you need different constructs.
At the working level, repeat constantly to make sure that
our inputs can then be coordinated. Different constructs can
still render results in a similar way to be integrated moving
forward.
Mr. Meehan. Well, you identified how you addressed the gaps
just in the nuclear side alone----
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meehan [continuing]. But the same concept, then, is
worked to assure that we are doing the same thing with the
other kinds of WMD?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes. So for the chemical piece--and I don't
want to speak too far out of my lane here--for the chem piece,
they look at things differently because they have a different
set of challenges by way of their toxins. In the biological
realm, their risks are driven differently.
So we each arrive at common factors that can be rolled up
into the integrated risk assessment, mostly based on frequency
of probable attack, dollar values of consequences, et cetera.
These things are integrated to allow, for instance, HHS to plan
countermeasures, medical countermeasures.
Mr. Meehan. Right. Right. Well, I thank you.
My time has expired for this particular round, so I am
going to turn it back to my colleague.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pick up on one of the themes you raised about
duplicating efforts. The National Nuclear Security Agency,
NNSA, has a nuclear forensic mission to collect detailed
information on nuclear material from across the world. DNDO
also has a nuclear forensics mission.
What is DNDO's forensics mission, and how is it different
from NNSA's? In what areas within the forensic mission does
DNDO take a leadership role, and what areas does NNSA take a
leadership role? Are there areas where the missions of NNSA and
DNDO overlap?
I want to hear from both you, Dr. Gowadia and Mr. Trimble.
Mr. Trimble. So, in the area of forensics, this is not an
issue, especially in regards to, sort-of, roles and
responsibilities across the agencies, that we have looked at.
We have had internal discussions that this might be an area for
us to discuss with potential Hill clients; it is worthy of an
inquiry.
But we have done, and I have in my portfolio, NNSA, and we
have done some Classified work regarding, sort-of,
accountability of some of the nuclear materials overseas as
well as some of the forensics. But we haven't done, sort-of, a
cross-agency.
The agency you didn't mention was also DOD plays in this
sandbox, as well.
Ms. Clarke. Uh-huh.
Ms. Gowadia. Well, for us, in the nuclear forensics realm,
we have much the same coordination responsibilities as we have
discussed on the detection side.
The forensics mission can be divided up into pre-detonation
or post-detonation forensics. In the pre-detonation world, we
could either capture material or a full device. DNDO is
uniquely responsible for the pre-detonation materials element,
so the technical capabilities we need to attribute the
materials to their source. DOE is responsible for the pre-
detonation weapon itself. The FBI and DOD, depending on whether
it is CONUS or OCONUS, are responsible for the post-det side.
So that is how we have nicely broken up the space, so to speak.
We could not, again, do this without our intelligence
community underpinning and the strong support of our National
laboratories system. So we work together to make sure that we
have a common strategic plan. We do. We have just set up a
requirements center, which we co-chair with the FBI, to make
sure that we have our strategic priorities lined up right.
The thing that you have given us uniquely, by virtue of
law, is to establish a nuclear forensics expertise development
pipeline program. Many years ago, this was, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, an in extremis capability. We did not
have enough graduate students in our universities across the
country studying the appropriate sciences--radiochemistry, for
example.
We have turned that around. We have established a really
good pipeline. Nineteen of these students that have come all
the way through are now already in the laboratories, and we
will have 35 by 2018. So we have gone from 4 in radiochemistry
a few years ago to suddenly looking at 35 down the line.
Ms. Clarke. Well, that is very impressive, Dr. Gowadia.
Let me just close with this question, and it is about red-
teaming covert rad/nuke testing. DNDO has a red-teaming
directorate that independently assesses the performance of
planned and deployed capabilities, including technologies and
procedures.
A recent GAO report on CBP covert testing of its rad/nuke
detection capabilities found that DNDO only works one to three
times a year with CBP on conducting these types of tests.
Why isn't the DNDO red-teaming directorate more involved
with the CBP covert testing program? Is this a risk-based
decision? Is it because of resource constraints?
Ms. Gowadia. Ma'am, when it comes to our red-teaming
efforts, we support much more than our Customs and Border
Protection partners. We certainly value their partnership, but
we also have to extend that capability to our State and local
partners, our interagency partners--DOD, FBI, et cetera, DOE.
We also work with Coast Guard and TSA in some of those efforts.
So, yes, actually, it just comes down to these things take
a very long time to develop and build and execute. That is not
where it ends. We have to come back, learn our lessons, turn it
around into documented steps for improvement. So that entire
process takes a good bit of time. We are able to sustain about,
I want to say around 20 operations a year, overt and covert.
Ms. Clarke. Did you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Trimble. I am a little limited in what I can say about
that recent report. It was issued Friday, but it is restricted.
So I would be happy to answer questions on it, but it was
largely focused on CBP, and there were issues about
prioritization raised in that. But I would be happy to, in
another forum, discuss that in more detail.
Ms. Clarke. Very well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Trimble, you just talked about CBP, which brings to
mind a report the GAO had done in 2012 looking at
opportunities, you know, across the board to reduce
duplication, achieve savings, and enhance revenue. But it also
identified that there was no single recognized agency
responsible for leading and directing Federal efforts to combat
nuclear smuggling.
Do you feel that there is any kind of fragmentation in
these efforts to combat those nuclear threats? If so, are there
possible solutions or better consolidation, or are the
responsibilities, do you think, better articulated now since
the report in 2012?
Mr. Trimble. Yeah, what I would--and I would have to take
that for a more full answer for the record. I would have to
look at the specifics on the 2012 report you are referring to.
The broader issue of overlapping duplication I know was
raised in a recent report. We looked at DHS for their R&D
program in science and technology, where we raised concerns
about DHS not having a common definition of what research and
development meant and then having a common reporting guidance
so that research and development across DHS could be managed to
avert potential duplication across all the R&D activities
within DHS.
Because within DHS you have several components that have
statutory authority to do R&D. It sort-of has the
deconfliction/coordination role, and it was having challenges
doing that because there wasn't a common shared understanding
of it and there wasn't common procedures on how the reporting
could go.
Mr. Meehan. Well, in such a narrowly-focused--and I don't
mean the importance of this is narrowly-focused, but the issue
itself is somewhat focused, narrowly-focused--how do you assure
that we are prioritizing R&D and making sure that there is
collaboration so that there isn't duplication or something
being done over here that is of no benefit to what you consider
to be a priority?
Mr. Trimble. Yeah, well, that is a great question, and that
ties very closely to the observations from our current work.
As my statement said, what we are finding is that DNDO has
mechanisms to help coordinate and manage their R&D. Where we
are--you know, again, preliminary observations, but where we
are seeing a potential for improvement is tracking the specific
projects back to the gaps. So you have gaps, you create
research priorities, then you create--they have grand
challenges, and then you create portfolios of research, and
then you actually have the project.
So they are very good at managing through that to the
projects and then assessing how you did at the projects at the
end of the year. But there is the risk--and I don't want to
make it oversimplified, but it is the forest-for-the-trees
risk, right? You get to this point, but are you forgetting
where you started?
It is just making that--so what our initial observations
are, making that linkage back from the specific project you
funded to your big need could be better documented. We think,
overall, there needs to be a process for the whole portfolio to
evaluate how your R&D effort is going.
That is sort-of where we are going with our on-going work.
Again, it is preliminary, but the folks are coordinating, there
is documentation, they say they understand the linkages, they
say it is in the contract documentation and the project
documentation. But unless you are a scientist, it is really
difficult to come in and say, yeah, we are doing great or we
are off-track.
Mr. Meehan. But that is something you are, more or less,
currently looking at?
Mr. Trimble. That reflects our, sort-of, current thinking
on the job today.
Mr. Meehan. Well, we look forward to your thinking as you
draw some of your conclusions.
Let me ask you another question, too, about the reality
that--well, we talk about nation-states and the concern that
there could be materials that would find their way, you know,
old Russian weapons or other things that get into the hand of
terrorist organizations like Hamas or otherwise. But there are
a lot of other high-risk industrial sources of radiological
materials, including mobile and stationary sources. We have an
inside threat because of their presence here.
So how does DNDO work with the other groups in charge of
this, you know, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NNSA,
and others, to secure these materials and prevent theft? Do you
think that is being adequately done?
Mr. Trimble. Yeah, well, interestingly, Dr. Gowadia and I
testified about a month ago on this very subject, on securing
industrial sources in the United States. GAO has done a couple
of reports. Previously, we did a report looking at securing
medical sources of radiological materials.
I will let Dr. Gowadia talk to you on her role in that
process, but what I would highlight from our recent work on
this is that it is really an NRC licensing issue, because NRC
is setting the rules by which users of the radiological
materials in the United States must secure these materials.
What our report had found was that the NRC guidance and
requirements could be improved with more specificity.
So, for example, the regs in the NRC vein would say, you
must use a lock to secure this radiological material in your
truck. Well, a lock can be like a simple high school gym locker
lock or it can be a secure, nice security lock. When we went
out in the field, as you might expect, everyone is doing
something different.
Mr. Meehan. Uh-huh.
Mr. Trimble. Similarly, they had regulations concerning co-
location, like, what would trigger--say you have sources of
material. If you put them in individual cubbies, locks, you
didn't hit the regulatory threshold to have security measures.
So, for well logging companies, they could have a very large
amount of radiological material but not have to implement
security measures. So we had very pointed recommendations
regarding that.
The other area, on insider threat, very notable in that
report. It was that we found an instance where someone with two
convictions for making terroristic threats had been given
unescorted access to radiological materials. The NRC--to
acknowledge that that was okay by their regulations.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I mean, for materials like this, no
matter where they are, if they are in an industrial setting
like a hospital or in, you know, a Government facility, isn't
there some level of requirement before you have access to those
kinds of things, that you pass some sort of background----
Mr. Trimble. Well, that--right. That is the NRC--NRC sets
those requirements, and NRC licenses the material. But the
licensing requirements are very general. Then the background
check provisions are essentially to say fingerprint, do a
background check, but there are no ``thou shall nots'' in the
requirements. So even if you do a background check and you find
someone has an extensive criminal record, it is still okay, it
is still the company's decision whether to grant that person
access.
The connection I would make--I mean, it is a little--the
connection I would--and I made it at the last hearing--is the
importance of that is, as Dr. Gowadia tightens the noose and
makes it more difficult to come into this country with these
materials, it makes it much even more appealing to go domestic,
shop local for your dirty-bomb material, than try to bring it
in from overseas.
So it is the other side of the equation, right? Your
instinct is right on this, is, as you make it harder to make
this stuff come in for the United States, you can't neglect how
easy it is to get it domestically.
Mr. Meehan. Dr. Gowadia, what do you think about that and
the concept--I mean, I get it, I don't want to micromanage to
that level. But, you know, we prevent people who have spent
their whole college career and they can't get a teaching degree
because they had a marijuana thing in their background. Other
policy, other place, some other time. But that is prevention.
It seems to me that if you have a criminal record and the
record relates to some kind of, you know, threats or otherwise,
to be able to have any access to materials is mind-boggling to
me.
But you can react to other points of Mr. Trimble's
commentary, as well as that particular issue, if you would.
Ms. Gowadia. Certainly, Chairman Meehan, the more secure
these materials are, the easier it becomes on us. That layered,
multifaceted architecture that begins with the material
security is reinforced. So anything any of us can do to
continue to, as Mr. Trimble mentioned, to tighten that noose,
no matter where you are in the chain, would certainly have
beneficial cascading effects to prevent a successful nuclear or
radiological attack.
Securing the materials themselves is not within DNDO's
purview. We are recipients of the information once it has left
regulatory control, and so we have a very close ties with our
partners at NRC. In fact, NRC sends us a detailee, and DOE, on
occasion, has sent us detailees, so that we can maintain some
of that on-going dialogue and awareness of an on-going event.
It is my understanding that both the NRC and DOE have
accepted Mr. Trimble's recommendations.
Mr. Trimble. I would say a qualified accept.
Ms. Gowadia. Qualified.
But we will certainly partner with them and watch the
implementation and encourage best practices to be shared. It
can only improve the security.
Mr. Meehan. Right. I thank you.
Well, let me turn to the gentlelady for a final question.
Ms. Clarke. Very well, Mr. Chairman.
Just an ask of you, Dr. Gowadia, if you have a list of
authorities or program changes that you think are needed that
the subcommittee can be of assistance with, we would ask that
you submit that to us in writing, especially considering the
likelihood that in the upcoming years we will be seeing some
declining budgets. We want to make sure that, to the extent
that we can make the case for maintenance of effort, at least,
that we have all of the information that helps us to make the
case.
Ms. Gowadia. Certainly. Certainly, Ms. Clarke. We
definitely will do that. We will send you our request in
writing.
We have reviewed our authorities. We don't see the need to
expand them. We do feel that the set, as they are, are
extremely valuable. They are manifest in every day that we do
our work.
The only request we really have is to change one of our
reporting requests from an annual to a biennial status. It
would allows us to save just at DNDO $800,000 every 2 years if
we were to go into that cadence. It would actually be more
meaningful, because the progress--it is hard to see it year on
year, but giving us a longer integration time, I think, would
be more valuable to you, as well. So that one our one request.
There are other things on the margins which we will
certainly share with all of you and your staff. Again, thank
you very much for affording us the opportunity to have this
reauthorization, and we look forward to working with you to
move forward on it.
Ms. Clarke. Very well.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentlelady.
Let me just ask one, sort-of, closing question or comment,
Dr. Gowadia, because you have been at this for a short period
of time, but you project, as well.
I think if we look at this, just in the 4 years that I have
been here, we have seen a change in the global environment. We
have seen more concern about terrorist organizations and others
who seem to be getting more active and potentially have access
to things. We have seen Iran in a state in which not only are
we worried about the proliferation of their capacity, and there
are political questions about how well-contained that will be,
but it is--I hope it is not predictable, but it is foreseeable
that if there is any on-going Iranian capacity to continue to
expand, that you might begin to see proliferation of other
countries looking, either because they want to participate or
they want to protect themselves by at least having an equal
status. We could see, down the road, not just a few but numbers
of countries, in fact even potentially scores of countries,
with access to nuclear capacity, maybe even nuclear weapons.
So, anticipating the combination of the threat of terrorism
and the loose--the struggle we have to prevent things being
controlled, I should say, not loose, but be in control of that
which exists, and the concern about proliferation and new
states, where do you see your mission evolving in, you know, 5
and 10 years compared to where you began with some of this?
What other kinds of challenges do you think you might face in
the future?
Ms. Gowadia. Chairman Meehan, our vision will remain the
same: A Nation secure from the threat of nuclear terrorism. But
we will continue with our interagency partners, our State and
local partners, our international partners to continue to build
this multilayered, multifaceted architecture, again, to make it
so that the undertaking of such an act would just be
prohibitively difficult.
Now, it goes all the way back to the security of materials,
the spreading of best practices. We will continue to work with
our international partners at the IAEA, the National Law
Enforcement Agency, even partner nations, so that they begin to
develop, based on our best practices and guidelines, what we
have learnt, readily to share their other own architectures. So
as you have National architectures built up--and by that, I
don't just mean detection systems, I mean regulatory
infrastructure, just as we have with the NRC--good practices
for securing and maintaining their materials, accountability,
et cetera, developing interior law enforcement capabilities
within the nations, not just border capabilities, this begins
to set up a harder and harder challenge, so even if we do see
the proliferation, we continue on the blue side to improve
capabilities.
Now, speaking of proliferation, you know that President
Obama has laid strong priority in reducing the amount of
special nuclear material that is available in the world today.
We have made tremendous progress based on the security summits
that he started. I don't have all the facts with me just yet
off the top of my head, but I do believe the nation-states that
had special nuclear materials significantly reduced in the last
6 years. I hope that trend continues. Best practices that DOE
shares and DOD shares with their partner nations, again, for
the security of the military programs, is so important.
Again, multiple layers, multi-faceted layers. If you choose
to do this, we can look at the money transfers, we can look at
the SIGINT, et cetera, et cetera. Anything that would give us
an advantage and an edge and make it so they have to be right
every time, giving us better opportunity, is exactly where we
are headed.
Can't do this without our partners. Our greatest focus will
be our partners. We have found a way to include them in all our
activities, all our planning from Day 1, whether it is the risk
assessment, the capabilities-based assessments. They write the
mission needs statements with us. That is a significant lesson
learned from our past missteps.
So those partnerships--law enforcement, operational
community, intelligence community, technical community--we will
base our efforts moving forward, particularly in light of the
diminishing budget. We don't have the luxury of having any
overlap. We will have to strategically partner to advance the
cause, even partnering with our international partners. We have
the British collaborating with us in R&D with S&T. So anywhere
where we can find a way to leverage, we must and will do so.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I applaud you for that leveraging with
the friendly partners in the international community. It seems
to make sense for all of us to be doing so in that capacity.
So I want to thank you again for your leadership.
I want to thank you, Mr. Trimble, for your oversight.
Collectively, these are continuing explorations of very,
very vitally important issues to not only our homeland security
but actually global security. So I thank you for your work and
your valuable testimony.
It is possible that some of our Members who will read this
transcript will be interested in having additional questions.
So if they do, you know, we ask that you respond in writing.
But I thank you again for your testimony.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan For Huban Gowadia
Question 1. What is DNDO's relationship with the DOE labs, and how
is DNDO leveraging their capabilities and expertise? Are there lessons
learned in contracting with the labs that would be beneficial to other
DHS organizations?
Answer. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has a good
working relationship with the Department of Energy (DOE) National
Laboratories and they have made significant contributions to all
aspects of the DNDO mission. According to the Homeland Security Act,
DNDO (as part of DHS) has access to the laboratories equal to that of
DOE; DHS-funded activity is not considered to be ``work for others''
that the labs can refuse if they don't think it to be within their
mission. In fiscal year 2013, DNDO obligated over $72 million at the
DOE National Laboratories and will likely obligate over $82 million in
fiscal year 2014.
National Laboratory subject-matter experts' knowledge of nuclear
weapons and associated capabilities has been a great asset to DNDO.
Their staff provides key data and analysis into system threat reviews,
including on-going analyses that are being used to determine the
feasibility of reconfiguring radiation portal monitor settings to
reduce the number of nuisance alarms while maintaining threat detection
sensitivity. We also rely on their unique knowledge and expertise to
design, manufacture, store, and transport the special nuclear materials
and weapon mock-ups (test sources) that we use in our test campaigns
and red teaming.
In fact, testing and evaluation of nuclear detection systems is a
key area where DNDO leverages DOE National Laboratory facilities and
expertise. Scientists from the National Laboratories help us to design
tests that are rigorous but efficient, with many of these test
campaigns conducted at DOE facilities. For example, our Radiological
and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex is located at
the Nevada National Security Site, a DOE facility. Its location,
adjacent to DOE's Device Assembly Facility, allows us to utilize the
unique sources stored at this facility. Nevada National Security Site
personnel maintain and secure our test facility, and also provide staff
to execute our tests.
Many of the National Laboratories support cutting-edge research to
develop new capabilities for nuclear threat detection. This research
spans such broad areas as advanced materials for gamma-radiation
detection, new approaches to neutron detection and other novel
techniques for radiation detection, gamma-ray imaging, advanced
techniques for the active detection of shielded nuclear materials, and
improved capabilities for modeling and simulation to understand
detector performance.
To fulfill its technical nuclear forensics mission, DNDO also
relies on the National Laboratories. Nearly all research and
development to improve technical nuclear forensics is conducted at DOE
National Laboratories, and we work with them on our National Technical
Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program to increase the number
of scientists capable of conducting the National technical nuclear
forensics.
Finally, DNDO was established in the Department of Homeland
Security as an interagency organization that may receive detailed
personnel from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the directors of other Federal agencies, including
elements of the intelligence community. Traditionally DNDO has also
benefited from the inclusion of National Laboratory employees through
Intergovernmental Personnel Agreements (IPAs). This year, DNDO has had
three IPAs working as a part of our staff--one from Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, one from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and one
from Los Alamos National Laboratory.
When contracting with the DOE labs, DNDO has found it beneficial to
provide the DOE site office with advanced notification of pending
interagency agreements. This allows us to identify and make any
necessary changes to the Statement of Work prior to approval by a DHS
contracting officer and submission to DOE. Advanced notification jump-
starts the DHS and DOE review and approval processes and shortens the
time to codify the interagency agreement.
Question 2a. Research projects are inherently risky--with great
uncertainty about the end results of the research. Because of this
risk, sometimes research projects fail to produce intended results. In
some respects, this is part of the cost of doing research.
Does DNDO have any kind of a benchmark for what percentage of
research projects should end in positive results--meaning that the
research leads to the development of a new or improved capability?
Question 2b. How does the Congress know if it is getting an
appropriate yield for its investment in DNDO R&D activities?
Answer. In order to tackle our technical grand challenges while
providing near-term results, DNDO takes a balanced approach to
technical risk. To that end, DNDO's R&D budget supports approximately
20% basic research, 40% applied research, and 40% technology
development. This approach also supports the establishment of a healthy
technology development pipeline. On a regular basis, all projects
report out their R&D results, either positive or negative, so that the
body of knowledge is continuously increasing.
In addition, annually DNDO reports two DHS management performance
measures that demonstrate a robust technology pipeline and a robust
human capital, or workforce, pipeline.
For the technology pipeline, in 2013 DNDO obtained 42
comprehensive evaluations or demonstrations of new and improved
technologies to protect against nuclear terrorism, surpassing
its goal of 23.
For the human capital pipeline, in 2013 DNDO granted 71
student fellowships and faculty awards in nuclear forensics and
radiation detection-related specialties, surpassing its goal of
63.
DNDO works closely with DHS Program Analysis and Evaluation and the
Office of Management and Budget to develop performance measures and set
targets. The targets reflect projected outcomes based on Department
priorities and budgetary considerations.
Over the period of multiple years, the success of an R&D program
can be demonstrated by technology that transitioned from an idea, to a
laboratory prototype, to a new operational capability. DNDO has
implemented rigorous processes to track the progress of individual
research efforts by using technology readiness levels, feasibility
evaluations, proof-of concept demonstrations, and technology
demonstration and characterizations. DNDO also employs a phase-based
approach to research management, where progress is assessed for a given
project after every phase in the project's life cycle to determine
whether the research should be carried forward or discontinued, and all
portfolios are periodically reviewed by the DNDO leadership team. These
processes allow for economy and efficiency in research execution,
mitigate technical risk, and permit focusing research to productive
end-states. We are presently working to comprehensively summarize the
transition success of our portfolio, and early indications are that it
is on par or above the success of other Federally-sponsored research
programs.
DNDO is beginning to see the results of technology transfers
resulting in the fielding of detection capabilities. As a result of
DNDO's efforts, there are new gamma-ray detection materials, new
neutron detectors that are not dependent on Helium-3 (a rare material
in very short supply that is being reserved for applications in which
it cannot be replaced), improved algorithms, and modeling tools that
are now either commercial products or are broadly available to support
the research and development community as a whole. Technologies
supporting long-range radiation detection and wide-area search
operations have also been matured to the point where programs of record
and commercial spin-offs are feasible.
Finally, new technologies for the detection of shielded special
nuclear material in cargo continue to mature, and several have or are
achieving significant maturity to support operational demonstrations.
Together, these successes contribute to improved capabilities, and
create core technologies that will support a range of future
capabilities.
Question 3. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was
established within DNDO in October 2006. As you know, the mission is to
serve as program integrator and steward for the U.S. Government to
ensure a ready, robust, and enduring nuclear forensics capability. Can
you update us on this program and has it been successful? How do you
measure that success?
Answer. DNDO has had considerable success with our nuclear
forensics mission. Since 2006, when DNDO was given this mission, the
U.S. Government has made substantial progress in developing
requirements, addressing technology gaps, improving the rigor of
exercises, and increasing the expertise pipeline from academia to the
National Laboratories. DNDO has worked to coordinate the efforts of the
U.S. Government for planning, operations, and technology development in
nuclear forensics and attribution.
Today the interagency constantly plans together, through Executive
Council and Steering Committee meetings at DNDO and many other planning
venues. We develop joint plans, such as the 2010 National Strategic
Five-Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution
Capabilities of the United States.
We established a Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center, which DNDO
co-chairs with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory. For the
first time, we've identified, developed, and documented technical and
operational requirements across the nuclear forensics spectrum.
Technical capabilities are steadily advancing. For example, DNDO
has developed the first-ever lab-scale uranium processing capability to
determine nuclear material characteristics that are uniquely associated
with specific variations of uranium manufacturing processes. This
capability allows us to better link the material to its origin and
possible pathways.
Forensics exercises have become remarkably realistic and rigorous,
with intensive multi-agency planning among the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and
DNDO. Many of the exercises now include State and local law
enforcement. State and local law enforcement have provided facilities
for exercises, as well as air transport and safety escorts for the
nuclear forensics teams to collect simulated debris samples for nuclear
forensic analysis.
Another notable success is our Expertise Development program, which
was launched in 2008. To date, we have provided support to over 300
undergraduate and graduate students, as well as faculty members at 23
universities. Nineteen new nuclear forensics Ph.D. scientists have come
through our ``pipeline program'' and been hired, primarily by the DOE
National Laboratories, since the program's inception. This brings us
more than halfway to our goal of adding 35 new Ph.D. scientists into
the nuclear forensics field by 2018.
We have a variety of methods for measuring our progress in
executing the technical nuclear forensics mission.
First, we assess our progress in an Annual Report to Congress
against the objectives laid out in the National Strategic Five-Year
Plan. Further, the annual National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Implementation Plan describes how the community will accomplish the
objectives outlined in the Strategic Plan.
Second, with respect to technical capability development, DNDO
focuses on providing our operational partners with the ability to
accurately and precisely measure and characterize nuclear and other
radioactive materials in a defensible manner that will stand up to
outside and legal scrutiny. Guiding this effort is a set of measurement
requirements authored by the interagency Bulk Special Nuclear Material
Analysis Program. DNDO develops analytical methods to meet these
requirements, and measures success in the transition of approved
methods to the DOE's operational nuclear forensics laboratories.
Third, in the exercise arena, we have a formal process for
evaluating technical competencies and areas for improvement during
exercises. These areas for improvement are discussed among the partner
agencies and documented in Corrective Action Plans, which are
implemented, tracked, and verified in subsequent exercises.
Fourth, for expertise development, we closely track the numbers of
students, colleges, and junior faculty members receiving awards, and we
monitor their progress through our pipeline in conjunction with the
quality of their research, as determined by our interagency partners,
DOE National Laboratory scientists, and our Nuclear Forensics Science
Panel. We also perform annual assessments to monitor how well the
National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program is meeting the
demands of the nuclear forensics workforce.
Question 4. What is DNDO doing to partner with foreign ports to
reach the goal of 100% scanning of in-bound cargo? How does DNDO
coordinate their efforts with DOE and DOS?
Answer. DNDO's role in the matter of 100% scanning of in-bound
cargo is predominantly focused on supporting the technology used in
detection and in mission analysis. We develop, acquire, and support the
detection systems that could be used by our operational partners for
this mandate and we assess risk reduction across the global nuclear
detection architecture.
We first conduct research and development on technologies that may
be applied to meet the 100% scanning mandate. We are in the process of
characterizing the effectiveness and maturity of three different
systems that have some ability to detect shielded and unshielded
nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo.
In addition, DNDO collaborates with DOE's Second Line of Defense
Program on requirements development, acquisition strategies,
technological advancements, capability improvement, and post-deployment
lessons learned and data analysis. DNDO has also transferred radiation
detectors to DOE for use at foreign ports.
Recently, DHS DNDO teamed with DHS Science and Technology
Directorate, Borders and Maritime Security Division to develop a
revolutionary high-energy, non-intrusive inspection (NII) system. This
system will not only image and support interdiction of shielded and
unshielded special nuclear material but will support detection of
contraband materials such as explosives, drugs, weapons, currency, and
bootleg alcohol and tobacco. Previously, this has required two
distinctly different NII systems focused on different threats. This
integrated NII system will be installed at a Boston area Massachusetts
Port Authority (MASSPORT) facility where it will be jointly tested by
DHS, MASSPORT, and the UK Home Office, which is also a partner in this
project and looking for an integrated solution.
Question 5. Do you feel that the Memorandum of Understanding
between DNDO, NNSA, DTRA, and DNI is sufficient for achieving maximum
efficiency in exchanging information between agencies on radiological
and nuclear threats?
Answer. Yes. The MOU between DNDO and the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is a very
effective means to coordinate research and development efforts related
to nuclear detection. The MOU allows full and open access among the
parties to on-going research and development, facilitates interagency
representation in program reviews and proposal evaluations, and affords
easy access to R&D findings, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing
duplication of effort. The Nuclear Defense Research and Development
Roadmap, Fiscal Years 2013-2017, developed by the interagency through
the National Science and Technology Council's Committee on Homeland and
National Security, enables further coordination and information
exchange across the interagency.
DNDO also works closely with DTRA, NNSA, and ODNI to share
information on radiological and nuclear threats. As part of our risk
analysis process, interagency experts, including those at DHS/I&A, are
surveyed on the likelihood of different threat scenarios. DNDO
collaborates closely with NNSA to estimate the theoretical capabilities
of different adversaries to develop improvised nuclear devices. This
information is then used to support, develop, and maintain the global
nuclear detection architecture and related efforts.
Question 6. The NSC has established coordination mechanisms,
including a Countering Nuclear Threats Interagency Policy Committee,
for international nuclear and radiological border security efforts. Do
you feel that this has significantly improved interagency cooperation
for nuclear smuggling? If not, how could the coordination be maximized?
Answer. Engagement with staff from the National Security Council is
beneficial and improves coordination efforts by providing a high-level
venue to gain interagency concurrence and address concerns. Indeed,
DNDO was created through the interagency process and remains committed
to working with the National Security Council to continue to strengthen
interagency coordination. For example, the 2010 and 2014 Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture Strategic Plans and the 2010 National Strategic
Five-Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution
Capabilities of the United States were vetted and approved utilizing
the same process. Coupled with other, non-White House-led mechanisms,
such as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Interagency Working
Group, the Nuclear Forensics Executive Council, and the National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Steering Committee, coordination efforts
continue to improve to ensure a holistic and efficient interagency
approach to detecting nuclear and other radioactive materials out of
regulatory control.
Question 7a. DNDO is participating in the European Union initiated
Illicit Trafficking Radiological Assessment Program, or ITRAP+10, so-
called because they are revisiting the original assessment 10 years
later. This program involved testing of numerous types of radiation
detection equipment including RPMs.
Specifically what is DNDO's involvement in that program?
Question 7b. How is DNDO using the results of this testing in
making decisions to procure new RPMs or other radiation detection
equipment?
Answer. The ITRAP+10 program was a true partnership for us with the
European Commission's Joint Research Center. Both parties contributed
funding, facilities, scientists, test personnel, and radiological and
nuclear sources to execute this program. ITRAP+10 also included sharing
of scientific subject-matter experts for peer review, joint test and
analysis plans, and sharing of specialized test equipment to ensure
consistent results. In all, ITRAP+10 tested 79 commercially-available
models in nine categories of instruments against standards accepted by
the American National Standards Institute and the International
Electrotechnical Commission.
Specifically, DNDO:
Tested 47 models of instruments to the full complement of
consensus standards, which included testing to extreme
environmental, mechanical, and electro-magnetic influences,
Developed novel instrumentation and standardized source kits
and test phantoms,
Will publish 47 individual vendor reports detailing the
performance against standards of each of instrument tested,
Will publish nine comprehensive reports with the JRC which
will survey the status of current generation detectors, and
Will archive the complete data set for future use.
Results from the ITRAP+10 efforts have directly supported two
acquisition programs for the Department and numerous requests from
other Federal, State, and local officials. For example, the Small
Vessel Stand-Off Detection program has used the data from the testing
to inform performance and operational testing, and the Human Portable
Tripwire program was able to leverage the ITRAP+10 spectroscopic
radiation personal detector tests to revise quantitative requirements
at substantial savings.
ITRAP+10 results are also being used to inform the Analysis of
Alternatives for the Radiation Portal Monitor Program.
[all]